Regional Jet 200 ER/LR (CRJ200)
Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Workload
Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach
Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach
Company Policy; Human Factors
Our flight into ORD was short and busy; but seemed to be going good. As we descended via the ILS 27L approach we were assigned 180 to the FAF; as we continued to slow to our Vref speeds; we encountered a stick shaker event. As the auto-pilot disengaged; the Captain quickly lowered the AOA (slightly); and as a precaution executed a go around. It was then the Captain noticed I had put the wrong landing weight (36;000lbs instead of 46;000lbs) for the landing. We reset as a crew and setup of for the ILS 27R; after getting sequenced in for that approach we landed without event.While setting up the FMS for descent into ORD; I entered the Fuel On Board (FOB); and then entered the fuel remaining at landing into the FMS to attain the landing weight; I then re-entered the FOB in the FMS. I forgot to enter the ZFW into the FMS; and continued setting up the 'box'; thus entering the incorrect landing weight into the ACARS.I need to remember to make sure I enter the ZFW when doing my descent planning; and then double check that my fuel remaining at landing added to my ZFW number (on my yoke) equals the speed card and landing data I have entered and calculated into ACARS. Possibly consider a verbal/visual check with the pilot flying; as a double check to ensure proper landing data is set.
On final approach; ILS 27L into ORD. We were held to 180 knots to the final approach fix. Upon reaching the FAF we began configuring and slowing down for final approach speed. Upon calling for flaps 45 and hearing the First Officer respond with our final straight in speed I noticed that it seemed very low for a 46;000 pound landing. I voiced my concern and realized I could not see the weight on the speed card. Our ATIS print out was unusually long because Chicago was reporting Runway Condition Code (RCC) values on all of its runways. The paper was so long it was physically covering much of the top of the speed card. As the First Officer checked the speed card he move the paper aside and revealed that the speed card he was using was for 36;000 pounds not 46;000 as expected. The aircraft felt like it was flying too slowly and perhaps at a slightly higher nose up attitude than normal while on glideslope. I told the First Officer to get the correct speed card up. I began adding a little power to increase speed towards what should have been set for the appropriate weight.At that point the shaker went off and the autopilot disconnected. As soon as the autopilot kicked off; the Angle Of Attack (AOA) lowered the least bit and the shaker stopped. I contemplated a low speed stall recovery; but we were no longer experiencing the shaker and the aircraft was fairly stable; still on glideslope and localizer. The First Officer was still looking for the appropriate speed card; but since we were at an incorrect speed I called a missed approach to remove ourselves from a situation which was growing riskier by the second. We executed the missed based on ATC instructions and completed our approach and landing on the second attempt without incident.There were many contributing factors occurring inside and outside the flight deck. The cause of the event all stemmed from the First Officer forgetting to put zero fuel weight into the FMS PERF INIT page before push back. This caused him to plan landing at a weight of 36;000 pounds instead of 46;000. He did not catch this error in flight due to his relative inexperience (first year First Officer); the high workload environment and short flight duration that is normal for an ORD flight ending with an actual approach landing west.I did not catch his error because I was expecting a 46;000 pound landing weight per the release and actual fuel burn. Coincidentally; 36;000 and 46;000 look and sound very similar; especially when working close to task saturation in an environment with a great deal of radio clutter. I am not sure what caused us to miss this error while running the descent check. Radio clutter could have masked the similar sounding landing weight during the reading of the descent check; leading me to believe I heard the appropriate landing weight. Perhaps I just heard what I had planned to hear.Another factor was the position of the flip cards on the pedestal along with the position of the ATIS print out. The print out was unusually long and obscured the top portion of the speed card; preventing me from seeing the weight on the card. I always fold ACARS print outs; but I do not make First Officers do this as I don't believe in that level of First Officer micromanagement unless absolutely necessary. The First Officer was the one to remove the ATIS print out and place it on the bottom of ED 2 on this particular occasion. Because of this; the first time I was aware of incorrect final speeds was when the First Officer verbally stated the final flaps 45 Vref.I have several suggestions for avoiding future incidents. First and foremost; I think the descent checklist should be changed to have the pilot flying actively confirm the landing weight. As it is now; the pilot monitoring sets and then states the set value of the landing weight during the reading of the checklist. The pilot flying only listens to the weight statement. If any distractions or radio traffic mask this weight read out then the pilot flying may very well be completely removed from the actual in flight landing performance calculation; completely negating the purpose of a two pilot crew. I believe the pilot flying should have to verify the landing weight verbally.Similarly; I believe the zero fuel weight should be verified during the engine start check. I have seen the zero fuel weight miss set or not set before. The error has been caught before events were allowed to play out as they did in this situation. Verifying it would catch errors immediately. I have seen this done at other airlines while jump seating.I think these are both examples of how the checklist is weak and could be improved.Finally I don't like the tribal habit of ACARS print out placement in the flight deck. Some aircraft have tabs between ED 1 and 2 that allow us to display print outs in view of both pilots without the chance of obscuring anything. The higher odds of receiving a longer printout is now very much real with the inclusion of RCC values in ATIS reports; especially at larger airports with multiple landing runways. It would be very advantageous to have a standard place to display ACARS print outs in all aircraft that will allow the printout to remain in view of both pilots while not obscuring anything.
CRJ-200 flight crew reported experiencing a stick shaker during approach due to an inaccurate landing weight caused by the omission of the ZFW entry into the FMC during preflight. A go-around is initiated and the landing weight is corrected.