B737-800
Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Other / Unknown; Situational Awareness; Confusion
Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach
Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related
So; it's a clear night; calm winds. I've been to [this airport] many times; but never at night. I planned a flaps 40 visual to Runway 2L; backed up by the ILS. In retrospect; I should have planned the ILS backed up by the visual. Cleared at pilot's discretion to 8;000 FT; 150 miles east of the airport; normal descent; cleared to 6;000 FT then 4;000 FT; direct to [the Initial Approach Fix]. Once I was 'sure' I had the runway; I had [the First Officer] ask for the visual. Cleared to descend to 2;000 FT; cleared visual. Now at this point I; evidently smarter than everyone else; decide to go Heading Select and cut just inside the IAF. I'm already a little low because; like an idiot; I am thinking [the airport] is sea level; not 400-plus FT. So we are out of 2;000 FT; throw the gear down; run the landing check; and I am making a slow turn to the runway; or so I thought. Well; I was turning; but looking at Runway 2R. The VASI is red/red which isn't jiving with the ILS for 2L at this point. I realize I am looking at the wrong runway with some help from [the First Officer]; who is a great pilot; and make a correction to the left (it wasn't radical as we were still a couple of miles out). Finally it dawns on me that I am low so I add power and essentially level off. Now mind you; I've only been flying big jets for about 35 years now; you'd think I'd realized that if I level off with flaps 40 it will take a lot of power. So to keep it interesting; I add what I think is enough power; of course still concentrating on getting over to centerline and glide slope. I was about a dot-and-a-half low. Ref speed was 132 KTS. [The First Officer] reminded me of that at 130 KTS and I pushed the power up. He re-reminded me of that at 127 KTS and I pushed the power up a lot as I finally realized that I was essentially level going back to the glide slope. Speed came back up to 140 then 145 KTS (of course). Now I'm maybe 500 FT AGL; back on glide slope and in the slot; pulling the power back a bit because we actually get to descend now...uneventful touchdown and rollout. Moral of the story: 1) keep hiring people like [the First Officer]. 2) At night;… always fly the ILS if there is one and I swear it doesn't matter if you have been there one time or one thousand times; night is different. Your eagle eyes are not near as much help to you as that panel in front of you. Two minutes extra is worth it for the aging process. Flying the ILS eliminates the need for estimating the turn to final; debating which runway you are going to; etc. If there is no ILS then there is some electronic guide you can use. Pick a safe altitude to start it and follow it to the runway. I learned this same lesson like 25 years ago at DCA; but evidently I left that lesson in some other part of my brain last night. Pass this on: being low and slow and not on the localizer or glide path at night is very disconcerting. You are completely out of your element and your brain is racing to fix it; but you don't look at the right stuff. An excellent First Officer picks up on that and feeds the info that; for whatever reason; you aren't getting.Everyone can learn from this. Restating the obvious is essential; but some people like me don't seem to get it every time. Events in my career have not occurred with malfunctions or weather; usually. They happen on nights like last night; where everything is even better than normal so you think you'll be Sky King and do the perfect visual and landing. I; for one; just got another wake up call.
B737-800 Captain recounts the difficulties encountered in performing a night visual approach with ILS backup and advises that the reverse; an ILS approach backed up by the visual; is a far better practice.