A321
Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Time Pressure; Situational Awareness; Workload; Troubleshooting
Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action
Human Factors; Aircraft; Procedure
Aircraft X was scheduled for a XZ41 departure ZZZ-ZZZ1.  We were delayed due to being short one flight attendant.  During the preflight and logbook review; the Captain (CA) brought to my attention a previous write up from Date that the number 2 engine was shut down in flight due to an EGT over temp and that a subsequent overweight landing was made.  Both discrepancies were signed off.  The CA and I discussed this during our 'threats' briefing since we were heavy; it was hot; and we would be performing a TOGA take off with the APU ON.  It was my leg to fly.  The start; taxi; and initial take off were routine.  Prior to thrust reduction; we heard the ECAM chime and saw the Master Caution.  I stated 'my aircraft' and called for autopilot 2.  The CA advised ATC of troubleshooting a potential return to ZZZ.  We were instructed to maintain 4;000 feet and fly heading 090.  We cleaned up the aircraft on schedule; leveled off; and began the non-Normal methodology once we were stable.  The ECAM still present was ENG2 EGT OVER LIMIT.  This ECAM directed THR LVR 2 IDLE then ENG 2 MASTER OFF.  I was assigned PF/Radios and we ran the ECAM via non-normal methodology.  Once the engine was shut down; as expected; the ENG2 SHUTDOWN ECAM appeared.  We started the non-normal methodology again.  All checklists; normal and non-normal; overweight landing considerations; and briefings were complete.  ATC vectored us around and was extremely helpful while we were troubleshooting and running checklists.  Once we were ready to return to ZZZ we delivered the PAN-PAN REPORT and requested the full ILS to XXC in ZZZ.  I maintained PF duties and the CA took the PM duties.  We completed an uneventful single engine overweight landing and stopped on the runway.  Once the [airport] response crews said the airplane looked good; we [advised ATC] and taxied to park.  The fire trucks followed us to the gate.Aircraft malfunction; repeat gripe from 2 days prior.  Bore scope and engine run appeared to be the sign off.  I'm not sure that puts the aircraft in the same state that a heavy; hot take off does.Take aways/suggestions:  ATC was outstanding during our event. Next; the QRH has a section for EGT 1/2 OVERLIMIT for IAE ONLY.  We had CFMs.  I believe there may be some benefit in looking at this specific malfunction and how our current procedures address it.  If you follow the non-normal methodology; after FLYING THE AIRCRAFT; we identify the non-normal.  We check if it is a quick action or ECAM exception.  It's not. Once the duties are split; we go through the ECAM.  This particular one directs you to shut the effected engine down.  (We had the ECAM present until we accomplished the steps.) Once the engine is shut down; and you have cleaned up we do the follow up items and supplementals.  When you get to the supplementals on this non normal (attached) it discusses referencing max pointer indications prior to either reducing the thrust lever or shutting the engine down.  The problem is once you get to the supplemental; you have already shut the engine down if you followed the current procedure and strategy.  Is there logic that keeps this ECAM on with CFMs if that temp of 970 degrees C is exceeded; or does the ECAM stay on even if only 915 degrees-950 degrees is reached?  I believe this procedure as an ECAM EXCEPTION that allowed you to reference the max pointer prior to ECAM ACTION may make sense?  It may also give the crew more discretion prior to shutting an engine down.
First Officer reported an engine in flight shut down and air turn back caused by a repeat discrepancy of engine EGT exceedance on climb out.