Medium Large Transport
Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Flight Crew Last 90 Days 170
Situational Awareness
Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach
Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Airport; Human Factors
On visual approach to Runway 4 at AMA; heading to outer marker; runway off First Officer (FO) side. He said he had runway in sight. I went to enlarge my approach pictorial on iPad to verify altitudes and it disappeared. It took me repeated tapping to get page up so I was distracted. While my attention was diverted; the FO apparently made a right turn to go between marker and runway. He then announced he was high and started a descent. I was confused as it seemed too soon and questioned where runway was; as I still could not see it due to angle of approach. As he turned I saw a short runway he was headed for and announced 'that is not AMA; do not descend'. He became confused. We both called go-around. We began a go-around and saw the AMA runway ahead of us. We were a little high but headed for it. We configured for landing. He was high and one sink rate warning below 1000 feet. I called sink rate. He brought power up and I thought he was going around but he continued descent and we landed. It all happened very fast. I thought we were high but it was very difficult to tell as the runway has very little lighting and markings. We landed a little long and exited the usual taxiway. We debriefed. I explained it was always better to go to marker and that if he was confused we should have gone around as I could not see runway until the 90 degree turn and was relying on him to see it at that point. I did not know he had not been to this airport before.Better crew coordination. If you are unsure say so. Slow down. Go around. If you are tired/fatigued let the other pilot know. Don't work 6 days in a row. I don't understand why AMA does not get better runway lights and markings. It is a black hole that can suck you in.
On the last flight of a four-leg day on day five of six I was given a clearance to fly direct to the PANDE FAF for a visual to Runway 4 at AMA. The approximate heading was 290 degrees to PANDE. The Captain asked if I had the field in sight; which I responded yes I did. We were then cleared for visual. The Captain was not able to see the field because it was approximately 110 degrees to our right. After lining up on what I thought was Runway 4 at AMA we realized it was not the right runway. It was Runway 5 at Tradewind airport approximately two miles NW of PANDE. It did not correspond to the Localizer and looked too short. I then called for a go-around. About the same time; the Crew saw the correct Runway 4 slightly to the right a few miles ahead. I then maneuvered the aircraft for Runway 4 at AMA and verified with Localizer and glideslope. On landing we received a GPWS warning. I elected to continue and arrested the descent rate and landed since it was a 13500 runway.Considering this was the first time I had flown into AMA and it was nighttime; I should have slowed earlier and relied on LNAV to fly over the final approach fix on speed and altitude. Also; the safest course of action is to go around when the sink rate is high enough to trigger a GPWS warning on landing.
Air carrier Flight Crew described a night visual approach to Runway 4 at AMA with the First Officer flying that resulted in the misidentification of TDW as AMA. The Captain detected the error and a go around was initiated then AMA was sighted and the go around was abandoned. An unstable approach was flown to landing at AMA. Fatigue was cited as a factor by the First Officer.