B737-800
Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Security
General None Reported / Taken
MEL; Aircraft; Procedure
MEL 52-XX was in effect. After reviewing the MEL my First Officer and I noted that due to the cockpit door electronic lock being deferred that we had to use the deadbolt in the key inoperable position. The problem with this MEL is that the flight deck door cannot in an emergency be opened from the cabin. This left me with concerns that though are remote; the possibility exists that in an accident if both pilots are incapacitated they could be trapped for a period of time in the flightdeck. FAs would not be able to access the flightdeck in any way to help incapacitated pilots; nor would fire rescue with the deadbolt engaged. The only way would be through the flightdeck windows by fire rescue. The flightdeck door is a good design; however; with the electronic keypad being INOP; and with the flightdeck keyhole being purposely blocked by a metal plate on all B737 aircraft; the deadbolt in the key operable position is no longer a possibility. If the deadbolt in the key operable position were possible then FAs would be able to use a flightdeck key to override the deadbolt and open the flightdeck door in the event of pilot incapacitation. This MEL 52-XX with the deadbolt engaged does not allow for a timely response from FAs nor fire rescue to the flightdeck in an emergency.MEL 52-XX should be a non-deferrable MEL with the deadbolt in the key inoperable position. Or the key operable solution must be restored.
Captain reported disagreement with MEL52-XX being accurate.