Regional Jet 700 ER/LR (CRJ700)
Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Communication Breakdown
Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance
General None Reported / Taken
Human Factors
We were assigned a test flight after the aircraft had the right aileron replaced. The initial flight planning called for 800 lbs of ballast in the forward compartment for weight and balance purposes. Upon arrival at the aircraft; we noted that the ballast was laying on the bag loader; which was parked near the (open) forward aircraft bin. The aft bin was also open. The First Officer performed the walk around; and both pilots were in the cockpit preparing for departure while the ballast was loaded. Upon running the numbers through the ACARS; it was determined that an additional 100 lbs of ballast would be required in the forward bin to keep the aircraft within the operating envelope. We contacted operations who forwarded the request for additional ballast to the ramp. After the aircraft door was closed; while running our checklist; we observed the additional ballast being driven up to the aircraft and saw it loaded in the forward bin. We imputed the new ballast weight into the ACARS; and confirmed that we were within our W/B limits. We pushed; and departed for the test flight without incident. During the approach phase; after selecting flaps 20; the stabilizer warning clacker indicated an extended period of stabilizer movement. The First officer also noted that the stabilizer trim seemed excessive given the current flight configuration on final approach. The flight landed without incident and taxied to the hangar. Upon arrival; the Captain performed a post-flight walk-around. During his walk-around; he decided to check the forward compartment to see if the bags had shifted or leaked during the test flight. Upon opening the forward compartment; it was discovered that only two bags of ballast were loaded in the forward bin (100 lbs.) Upon inspection of the aft bin; it was discovered that the 800 lbs that had originally been planned had in fact been loaded incorrectly in the aft cargo bin. This improper loading placed the aircraft outside the weight and balance envelope; and was the reason for the abnormal stabilizer trim during the approach phase.   As with most incidents the entire scenario could have been avoided by double checking what the ramp personnel had done in the first place before departure. We believe there were several factors contributing to this mistake. As we approached the aircraft we noticed the conveyor belt was already loaded and parked next to the forward cargo bin; leading us to incorrectly believe that ground personnel knew the ballast was to be loaded in the forward bin and were already in the process of doing so. As the rampers began loading the bin we were already busy running first flight of the day checks and preparing the aircraft for the test flight. This preparation also included a discussion about the low IFR weather conditions and several calls to Operations to verify whether we needed written authorization for the test flight similar to that of a ferry flight permit. When performing a test flight or a part 91 repo flight; the priority for aircraft servicing is very low since the revenue flights are considered more important and time critical. Often; it comes down to the pilots to organize; coordinate and arrange aircraft loading and servicing. Non routine operations present a different set of challenges compared to standard revenue flights. After we did the test flight we were scheduled to ferry the aircraft so we could operate the return revenue scheduled flight back. Since this plane had been in the maintenance hangar for several days we also knew it would need a security sweep; lavatory service; catering; fueling; potable water and we would need to coordinate with crew tracking meeting our flight attendants at the maintenance hangar after the test flight since they were scheduled to ride with us. We also sensed the added time constraints of the day since we knew it was up to us to complete the test flight and repo flight in time for the scheduled flight back. We weren't necessarily rushed through the process but we knew we couldn't waste much time during the day considering the unpredictable nature of coordinating non scheduled flight operations. In the future we both recognize the fact that it's acceptable to slow down the frantic pace and make sure all our bases are covered. Missing a simple step; or assuming a simple step has been completed; can easily be overlooked during the final preparation stages of a flight; especially one that's non routine; and non standard in nature. As explained in the narrative above; when we realized an extra 100 lbs of ballast was needed we actually saw the ramper load the ballast in the correct bin; cementing the fact in our minds that he had placed the previous 800 lbs in the correct location. As with double checking gear pins; we will always double check the quantity and placement of ballast before closing the aircraft door when it's required; rather than assume ground personnel has done it correctly as instructed.
CRJ700 Captain reports ballast being loaded in the wrong bin for a maintenance test flight. During approach; when flaps 20 are selected; stabilizer trim is noted to run for an abnormally long time and result in an excessive nose up trim setting. A normal landing ensues and the error is detected on post flight inspection.