A320
Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Troubleshooting; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown
Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach
Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control; Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Airport; Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related
On arrival ZZZ were cleared for a visual Runway XX; FO's (First Officer's) leg. Initially at 4;000 ft. on a high wide right downwind he set and descended to 3;000 ft. for traffic pattern altitude. We did not receive a response to our in-range until moments before so with things well in hand I now selected the taxi page on my Jeps (Jeppesen) to briefly review the anticipated taxi as there were several NOTAMed closures. Then thinking of the numerous towers in the area I decided I was premature and reselected the ILS XX plate which I fumbled some with. In the mean time I did not see my FO select 2;000 feet (which was only 500 feet AGL) and begin a premature descent. I noticed as we were 1;000 feet; RA (Radar Altimeter) [a few] miles from the turn to final and told him to climb back to 2;500 feet.In retrospect; I should have immediate taken control of the aircraft; but he initially was responding although not as quickly as I would have liked. I thought he had inadvertently selected the altitude and that a correction at a position on a wide base and well before the turn to final was appropriate but did not know that he had lost sight of the airport and become disoriented. I did not call go-around as we were in a position that put us well outside of stabilized approach criteria and did not feel it was required under the circumstances and I felt a climb to 2;500 feet for an intercept of final at about 3 [and] 1/2 miles was more appropriate. About that time we got a 'too low gear' I again told him to climb which he did although slowly. I selected gear down to silence the warning in an attempt to unload my FO and get him to again listen to me; as my FO had by this point 'checked out' (his words from our debrief of the situation). He was now intermittently holding the side stick priority button and I did not want to initiate a struggle for control of the aircraft and essentially a single pilot go around so using captain's emergency authority I guided him through the approach and landing.I do want to state that on the previous trip this month and on the other occasions I have flown with this First Officer he has always displayed fine airmanship and professionalism and this situation is completely out of character for him.In retrospect my reluctance to call for a go-around or take control at a point where I felt it was still possible aggravated the situation. I made assumptions about why the FO had done what he had done; i.e.; an error; which turned out to not be correct. He had become disoriented; overwhelmed. I would have not considered before this incident telling someone to 'go around' while on downwind.  In our position miles from joining final on a wide base I felt the same. In our debriefing I stated that one of my mistakes in the situation was to not have taken control early on. He indicated that he felt a 'go around' call may have brought him back into the situation. I actually tend to agree. I would not have hesitated in IMC to call 'go around 'if we were similarly out of sorts; why the hesitation in VMC.I want to focus on my misgiving and failings in this report; but do believe it is worth note that in our debrief of this incident we did discuss the use of the ND (Navigation Display) in helping to improve situational awareness. The ILS was briefed as a backup to the visual with the glide path intercept altitude being of note. Communicating his lack of situational awareness and disorientation. And following SOP regarding changes to altitude settings. These things in addition to those already mentioned that I feel I specifically could/should have done better.
Starting with the transition from the en-route phase with Center to the approach phase with Approach Control. An estimated 20 nautical miles southwest of the airport with continued ATC descent and course changes. An attempt is made to visually acquire the airport. The Captain states the location and direction of the airport. Crosschecking the navigational display; I state 'I do not have the airport'. We are handed off to Tower at 4;000 feet on a right downwind to Runway XX slowing to 210 kts and call for flaps 1. It is the first time I visually acquire the airport.Tower Controller: 'Do you have the airport?'. I respond 'yes'; the Captain states he has the airport and informs the Tower. We are cleared for a visual approach to Runway XX abeam the numbers. I descend to 3;000 feet and slow to 190 kts and call for flaps 2. Using the ILS to Runway XX as a back up reference. My intention is to turn base about 1 mile inside of ZZZZZ (FAF) and descend to 2;500 feet; complete the landing configuration and turn a 4 mile final stabilized at 2;500 feet. I begin the right turn and start the FCU selection from 3;000 feet to 2;000 feet while cross checking my visual reference. I have again lost the airport; owing to the sunlight reflection angle combined with the flatness of terrain. While focusing outside I stopped my FCU selection and did not complete the setting to 2;500 feet. Turning my attention back inside the cockpit to crosscheck my reference. I am alerted to both warning sounds and lights of 'too low gear'. While attempting to ascertain what was happening I observe the Captain's hand selecting gear down; instructing me to climb and configure the aircraft for landing without my input. Disconnected the autopilot and using the course line on the navigational display and started a turn toward final. With a landing clearance; an uneventful landing and flight completion.First consideration: 20 miles from an unfamiliar airport; difficulty locating I should have requested vectors to final. Second consideration: loss of visual on base should have gone around. Third consideration: should have overridden the Captain on landing and gone around rather than continue to land. Fourth consideration: Task focused; not speaking in declarative CRM statements. Fifth consideration: 'Pride' allowing my years and hours of experience rather than the humility to admit needing some assistance. Personal observation: We as a crew tore this incident apart in 4 day debriefing for the remainder of our trip. Conclusion; I have learned and discovered and will go forward in a different manner.
A320 flight crew reported First Officer lost sight of the airport and descended prematurely while on visual approach.