Citation Excel (C560XL)
Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Situational Awareness
Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Airport; Company Policy; Human Factors; Procedure; Weather
We were released on a 91K flight contrary to the requirements of the Company Dispatch Airport Analysis Policy.  The flight was planned to land on runway 30.  The only significant forecast weather at the time of arrival was gusting winds favoring runway 30.  The flight was also planned to land well after sundown.  Reviewing the airport diagram indicates the PAPI angle for runway 30 is 3.75 degrees.  FOM lists restrictions and specifically states; landings between sundown and sunrise must have visual or electronic slope indicator between 2.5-3.5 degrees.  I called dispatch to point out the problem.  The dispatcher I spoke with had not released the flight.  He agreed the flight could not be dispatched with a planned approach to runway 30 at night.  I suggested switching the planned landing to runway 12.  I did not have access to the weather information at the time and the dispatcher began to enter calculations to runway 12.  He said he would enter the calculation using a 10 knot tail wind for runway 12 which I found odd.  He released us to runway 12 with a 10 knot tail wind and we ended our call.  I then reviewed the weather and found the current winds would create a 12 knot tail wind for landing on runway 12.  However; the forecast winds were expected to diminish.  Since the flight was planned to be just over an hour long I found the METAR winds to be controlling as the latest reports or forecasts.  I called dispatch back and told them the flight would not depart until the METAR winds had reduced to less than a 10 knot tail wind for runway 12.  Also; the crew added an alternate as there was never an alternant listed on the release.  Dispatch informed the appropriate personnel.  The crew discussed the situation and made the determination that landing even when the winds diminished to a 10 knot tail wind would not be the safest course of action.  The crew came to an agreement that departing with a 10 knot tail wind would meet the regulatory requirements.  However; we would divert to the alternate if at the time of landing a maximum tail wind of greater than five knots. The passenger had been advised there were significant departure delays and did not arrive at the originally scheduled departure time.  Before the passenger arrived the wind had diminished to less than 10 knots.  We called dispatch back and told them we would be departing when the passenger arrived.  Enroute we updated the METAR several times and found the wind had diminished to less than 5 knots of tail wind; but the altimeter setting was missing.  Although it was VFR; the airport was in mountainous terrain so we planned to use an instrument approach.  There were two approaches available to runway 12.  We began planning the LOC approach and realized there was not an alternate altimeter setting minimums box for the LOC approach.  We switched the approach to the runway 12 GPS as it did provide alternate altimeter setting. We obtained the alternate altimeter and requested the full approach starting at ZOOMS.  ATC cleared us to ZOOMS and stated 'RADAR CONTACT LOST;' and then cleared us for the approach and to advisory frequency.  We saw the airport visually before ZOOMS; but followed the approach guidance. On post flight we recalled that a NOTAM stated that 'WHEN LOCAL ALTIMETER SETTING NOT RECEIVED; PROCEDURE NA.'  I do not believe there was a violation by the crew in regard to the altimeter setting since the airport was in sight prior to the IAF.  However; the flight should not have been originally released under current dispatch rules.  Dispatch has been pushed to the limits and complex operational performance issues are slipping by their review.  Time pressure may lead many crews to also miss complex requirements similar to this scenario. Operations Management has been reducing Dispatch personnel and these types of errors are increasing.
The flight should not have been originally released. Dispatch has been pushed to the limits and complex operational performance issues are slipping by their review. Time pressure may lead many crews to also miss complex requirements similar to this scenario.The flight crews are supposed to be the LAST line of defense; but it seems that dispatch errors are on the rise in the current environment of cost cutting and staff reductions and as a result the flight crews are not receiving the support we once did. The simple solution is to hire more and better trained & qualified dispatchers.
CE560 flight crew believes they may have violated company dispatch rules in a very complex dispatch situation. The first Dispatcher did not take the mountainous terrain and steep glideslope into consideration. The new Dispatcher and the crew did not catch a NOTAM requiring a local altimeter setting (which was missing) to fly the approach.