Airbus Industrie Undifferentiated or Other Model
Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant
Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
General Maintenance Action
Human Factors; Equipment / Tooling; Company Policy; Procedure
I was assigned to replace the right wingtip assembly with two other mechanics assisting. I was working Non-Routine write-ups # XXXX-27; XXXX-03 AND XXX-31. Non-Routines-27 and -31 involved Navigation (Nav)/Strobe lights and Circuit Breakers (C/Bs) were identified and pulled in accordance with the Maintenance Operation's Department Manual 4-50-200. We were told to stop work before we were finished so the aircraft could be pushed out for engine runs. They explained that a sheet metal job involving Static port damage needed to get underway and that the aircraft could not be moved once the job was underway. My Lead Mechanic was fully aware that non-routines were still open and even came to us asking what was left on our job. I replied nav and strobe lights still needed to be installed along with the front shear bolt for the wing tip and nav lens cover. The aircraft was pushed outside; engines run and then came back into the same place it was originally parked. We went back to work; not knowing that the Lead had someone remove all the C/B lockout devices; both red and yellow and pushed in all the circuit breakers. This was totally in violation of the Maintenance Operation's Department Manual 4-50-200 procedures. Lockout devices are only supposed to be removed when the post dock or engine runs are to be accomplished and all other work had been verified closed. Nav light wiring was still not installed on the right wing (Non-Routine XXXX-27 and the lights were not mounted.) This could have either [electrically] shocked us [while] working the wingtip job or caused shorts to ground. This was plain and simple pressure from management and the Lead bowing to managements' wishes to get the engine runs done so other work could be started. The static port damage will most certainly take more than a week to do and they know it. Having the 'B' Check closed within a certain time period is of the utmost importance here. How many hours does it take to do the 'B' Check? What can we do to make reduce the 'B' Check span time? This is what concerns our management. Not doing things safely and by the numerous published manuals we are asked to follow. During our beginning shift meetings; they only discuss what's left on an aircraft or who will be on an aircraft just starting a check. They never discuss past problems they have run into; or what could have been done to prevent a problem they encountered in maintenance to prevent it from happening in the future.I don't think [situations] can be prevented as long as there exists the policy of awareness is better than punitive punishment. We have had the Lockout-Tagout (LOTO) Procedure in the Department Manual for more than several years and still there are problems with it not being followed by many people; management included. Management views it (in my opinion) as an inconvenience and just something that is cutting into their 'B' Check span times.
An Aircraft Maintenance Technician (AMT) describes a recent maintenance incident that is reflective of a larger issue with their Maintenance division's conflict with maintaining a safe work environment while shortening time for Aircraft Checks. Lock-out/Tag-out (LOTO) tags and devices had been removed from Circuit Breakers on an Airbus and not re-installed during a wing tip nav/strobe light and wiring installation.