B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Flight Crew Last 90 Days 206
Time Pressure; Workload
Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Maintenance Action
Aircraft; Human Factors
All procedures and indications; to include number one start EGT (peak in the 500s); were normal prior to this event. I may have violated the sterile cockpit rule during taxi. Takeoff power had just been set for a takeoff. Accelerating through approximately 60 knots there was a loud bang and the aircraft pulled to the left. I stated 'reject' and aborted the takeoff. We stopped on the runway and I instructed the Flight Attendants (F/As) and Passengers to remain seated while the First Officer (F/O) informed Tower of our reject. The F/O stated that he scanned the engine instruments just prior to the bang and saw the number one EGT Overheat light illuminated. I asked the F/As if there was any smoke or fumes in the back of the aircraft and they stated everything seemed normal. I taxied clear of the runway on Taxiway 'G' while discussing the number one engine indications with the F/O and Cockpit Observer. The number one engine EGT was in the 500s and N1 and N2 indicated zero percent. We ran the Engine Severe Damage Checklist from the QRC while our Cockpit Observer used the performance computer to calculate brake energy after the reject. We requested Fire Department assistance to verify there was no fire or damage that we were unable to determine from inside the aircraft. While waiting on the fire trucks we completed the Engine Severe Damage Checklist from the QRH; coordinated with Operations; and let the Passengers know that fire trucks would be coming alongside as a precaution and to inspect the exterior of the aircraft. Fire Department personnel said the aircraft appeared normal and there were no issues with brake cooling; so we taxied back to the gate. During our taxi we were informed that a Cessna waiting for takeoff behind us witnessed a fireball that came from the number one engine prior to our reject. The report of a fireball was confirmed later by a deadheading F/O who witnessed it. We were met by Operations and Contract Maintenance. I asked the passengers to stay seated for a few more minutes until we had the whole picture; then spoke with Operations; Dispatch; Maintenance and a Chief Pilot on Call. The passengers were deplaned. We entered the Maintenance discrepancy in the logbook then turned the aircraft over [to maintenance] personnel who towed it away from the gate.I felt a little rushed as we completed the Before Takeoff Checklist. I could have slowed things down a little bit during taxi. There were numerous tasks that needed to be done after taxiing clear of the runway; and I believe we got them all done. I felt rushed at this point also. Here again; slowing things down may have resulted in a more thoughtful approach to completing all the required tasks.
B737 Captain reported rejecting the takeoff when they experienced an engine problem at approximately 60 kts.