Embraer Jet Undifferentiated or Other Model
Dispatch Dispatcher
Confusion; Communication Breakdown
Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance
Flight Crew Returned To Gate
Company Policy; Human Factors
Flight departing sent an ACARS saying they needed their weight and balance.  I contacted Loads and the reply was the now have their closeout. 20 or so minutes later the CA (Captain) called to say that tower told them not to leave; without any explanation. I said; 'Everything looks good on the closeout so if you're happy I'm happy.' [The Captain] called back and then said that  Ops had called and told ATC to not let them depart. I tried contacting Ramp; Turn Coordinator; and finally the Gate Planner answered. He said that Ramp had physically loaded ballast in the wrong compartment and the flight would need to come back so that it could be moved to the correct position. I asked him why he did not advise CA (via radio) or myself (via phone call). I told him that contacting ATC for the purpose of delaying a flight is not operations concern or responsibility. Ramp loaded physical ballast in the wrong compartment; but said they put it in the right compartment when closing out; and then; with most likely best of intentions infringed on operational control by contacting ATC. Operations in any facet outside the scope of pilot/Dispatcher must contact either or and not act outside their responsibilities. Simply telling the pilot they need to come back without information why; and not telling the Dispatcher takes us outside confines of the regulations. If Ops needs training on what Operational Control is defined by 14CFR Part 121 then the company needs to provide it.
On [date]; operated Aircraft X with less than 30 passengers. Called Ramp to push off Gate at XA:03. During pushback; tug driver stated we needed to return to gate to add ballast. Tug pulled us back into the alley and the ramp crew added the ballast. Tug pulled us back to release spot and disconnected as normal. We received our load closeout at XA:27. We were in line for takeoff off when Tower told us company needed us to call. I took Number 1 radio and my FO (First Officer) took Number 2 to call operations. No answer. He then called a different number and they were checking if we got our ballast. Again; Tower said company needed us to call. At XA:34; I called our dispatcher to say we had gotten our ballast and if anything else was needed. He asked if we got our load closeout; if so; we were good to go. We were now Number 3 for takeoff. Tower again stated we needed to call company; refused to let us takeoff and taxied us across the runway to holds and sort everything out. Again; my FO tried to call company with no answer. Then called company and said as far as they knew everything was fine but was trying to call ramp on the phone but they were not answering. I again called Dispatch on the phone at XA:44. This time he patched through to ramp control because he could not get our ramp on the phone. After 6 minutes on the phone; it was determined that the 800 pounds of ballast had been placed in the Forward Cargo; but it should have been in the Aft Cargo. We returned to Gate at XB:23. The same push crew met us at the gate. They quickly moved the ballast from the forward cargo to the aft cargo. The tug driver stated he saw the original paperwork that stated the ballast was to be placed in the forward cargo. We departed the gate again at XB:39 and were airborne at XB:57. Note: All times are EST. Because of the light passenger load; our CG was out of limits. Somewhere between Load Planning; company; and ramp; the message of where the ballast was to be placed was severely wrong. Then the inability to reach company ramp tower by anyone (us the flight crew; other ramp controllers or dispatch) created an environment for this error to not be caught and corrected. I do not know how to avoid this; but I know I never want to be in this position again. I shudder to think what could have been if our forward CG would have been exacerbated by 800 pounds of ballast being put in the forward cargo area versus the aft.
EMB-190 Captain and Dispatcher reported communication breakdown between them and Company ramp and operations personnel concerning the placement of cargo compartment ballast.