A319
Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Workload; Situational Awareness; Confusion; Communication Breakdown
Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Vehicle
Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Maintenance Action
Airport; Procedure; Weather
Pushback tug lost traction; jackknifed; and struck Number 1 Engine inlet. During my preflight inspection I noted that the ramp area around the aircraft was wet; but not slick. Pushback commenced normally from the gate and the ground crew gave the cleared to start instruction. After Number 1 Engine start and as the Number 2 Engine start began the ground crew said over the intercom 'The pushback failed.' About 2 seconds later the ground crew advised 'Set Brakes!' followed by 'Shutdown engines!' The aircraft stopped about 50 yards away from [our departure] gate. The ground crew then stated that during pushback the tug hit a patch of ice and slid into the Number 1 Engine resulting in a dent to the inlet. Operations responded as well as the Air Field Rescue and Fire Fighters. In discussion with the ARFF Captain via intercom there was some concern that perhaps the nose gear had been turned past the tow limit and that there could be damage to the nose gear as well. Rather than risk further damage to or possible failure of the nose gear it was decided to deplane the passengers through the 1R door via air stairs onto the ramp. Airport Operations sanded the ramp and passengers deplaned via the ramp to the terminal without incident.Apparently the ground crew failed in its assessment of ramp conditions and gave the start engines clearance prematurely. Also; attempting to turn the aircraft during pushback on a slick ramp may have contributed to the loss of traction.Better training for pushback crews.
There are several reasons why this event occurred: The actual condition of some of the apron (ramp) areas was worse than reported by the ATIS. The ATIS was reporting that the 'apron areas were covered with a thin layer of dry snow'. After this incident occurred; I walked around the ramp area; near the gate; and the conditions varied between wet near the gate (probably from dripping de-icing fluid) all the way to solid clear ice. The area 100 feet behind the gate is a seldom used area and most of it was covered with clear ice; the fact that it was dark and foggy (3/4 mile visibility) made it even more difficult to see. Secondly; the Tug Driver (and I) did not know that the surface conditions were not the same 100 feet behind the gate as they were at the gate. If he had known that; he would not have cleared me to start engines and I would not have started. I don't know if the thrust from the Number 1 Engine contributed to this incident or not. The First Officer had turned on the engine anti-ice (after start) would have increased the thrust on the engine. Another factor in this event was the difference in phraseology between pilots and ramp personnel. When a pilot hears the term 'pushback' he (or she) thinks of a procedure...i.e. a pushback procedure. Apparently; ramp personnel interpret the term 'pushback' to mean the piece of equipment (the tug). When the Tug Driver; in this incident; said 'pushback failure'; I still do not know what he meant. Unfortunately; I never had an opportunity to talk to the Tug Driver as he was escorted away for drug testing immediately after the incident. One additional factor that had an impact: this was my crew's first flight of that day and it started after dark. If I had taxied the aircraft into the gate; I would have realized how bad the ramp areas were and I would have waited until the parking brake was set prior to starting engines. I still do not know if the engine thrust had anything to do with the incident. I do not believe that the aircraft was ever 'pushing the tug backwards'...it was more that the tug started turning the nose of the aircraft; hit a patch of ice and slid sideways into the Number 1 Engine.My suggestions would be: First; the ramp areas and taxiways should have been treated and not just plowed. During the time that the First Officer and I sat in the cockpit after the incident (approx 1 hour) we monitored Ground frequency. In that hour we heard quite a few inbound cockpit crewmembers comment that 'the runway condition was good but the taxiways and ramps were fair to poor.' This was later verified by an E-190 crew that landed and taxied in to the ramp during our incident. I would have thought that our tug drivers (ramp personnel) would have had a better idea of what the surface conditions were based on previous pushbacks etc...Maybe; during winter operations; the ramp personnel should periodically; check the condition of the ramp where the pushback will end (not just at the gate). My final suggestion is that we standardize the terms and language used by ramp personnel and pilots and we refine procedures to be used when there is a 'pushback failure'.
An A319 nose wheel turned beyond the steering limit and the tug struck the Number 1 Engine inlet when the Tug Driver lost control on an icy patch some distance beyond the gate during pushback.