Skylane 182/RG Turbo Skylane/RG
Air Traffic Control Developmental
ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance
Human Factors
I was D-Side for Sector XX and XY which were combined. I had just returned from a break. Weather in the sector was MVFR; with visual approaches to ZZZ in the South and IFR and ILS/GPS approaches at ZZZ1 in the North.  Traffic was moderate to heavy and complex with several arrivals of various types to ZZZ and ZZZ1; flight following; practice approaches; sky diving activity; and arrival and departure traffic from the area. There was sequencing into ZZZ1. Number 1 was a SW2; number two was a C182; and number 3 was a GLF4. ZZZ1 Tower requested an SYD release with C182 for a CL30 opposite direction to the arrivals.  The GLF4 was 20 plus miles in trail and not yet cleared for the approach. Due to its position and the fact it was just flying from ZZZ to ZZZ1; I assumed it was a slow aircraft. I approved SYD and issued the departure a 180 heading to provide lateral spacing from the GLF4; because I thought the GLF4 was slow and they would pass 10 plus miles south of the field. I don't specifically recall what I told the R-Side; I think I said 'SYD ZZZ1.' I DM'ed the aircraft; started a track; entered H180 in the 4th line; and entered a temporary altitude of 080. The R-Side thought I went SYD with the GLF4. Both the R-Side and I were saturated with other tasks and did not recognize the situation until the GLF4 was already cleared for the approach; established inbound; and descending. Once the R-Side recognized the situation; he asked who I went SYD with. When I told him it was the C182 he broke the GLF4 off the approach as I called the Tower to see if the CL30 was rolling yet or not. The CL30 was rolling. The R-Side issued the GLF4 a left 360 because terrain was lower to the west. I coordinated with ZZZ1 Tower; they said they had the GLF4 in sight and were providing visual. They then asked if he was turning; I said yes; and they shipped the Cl30. As soon as the CL30 checked on; the R-Side issued a further right turn. The Tower then called; said they still had both aircraft in sight; and asked us to turn the GLF4 to the right; inbound; and transfer communication. It was too late by the time I could relay that to the R-Side; the GLF4 was already in the left turn and separation with the CL30 was already lost. Once the problem was recognized; both the R-Side and I tried to increase separation; and/or coordinate with the Tower to provide visual separation. The R-Side continued working to increase separation after it was apparent that separation would be lost. In hind sight there were multiple different actions that could have been taken by both me and the R-Side to have avoided the loss of separation. I have definitely learned from the experience. I did not recognize the GLF4 was a jet; I did not clearly communicate to the R-Side who I went SYD with; and I did not notice the situation in enough time to avoid losing separation. Additionally; the work load at the sector was high; the frequency was somewhat congested; and because of that it was difficult to quickly and clearly relay information to the R-Side regarding the Tower maintaining visual separation. Recommendation; to prevent this from occurring again; whenever I use SYD; especially with multiple aircraft being vectors for approaches; I will do a better job communicating with my R-Side and making sure our plans are the same. I will also evaluate the types of aircraft more diligently and consider aircraft performance. I will pay special attention in my scan to the airports and airport traffic to ensure that I catch errors sooner so that corrective action can be taken in a timelier manner. Once the situation is recognized; I could have taken more assertive and aggressive action to ensure separation will be maintained. Additionally; if the sectors were split; the work load would have been substantially lower and the error could have more easily been avoided.
I was the R-Side working Sectors XX and XY combined. I had a C182 cleared for the ILS approach at ZZZ1 and talking to ZZZ1 Tower.  A GLF4 was also cleared for the ILS approach at ZZZ1 with adequate spacing between the C182 and still on my frequency. The D-Side informed me that he had done an SYD release of a CL30 out of ZZZ1 who would be on a 180 heading vector SID. I assumed this SYD release was between the CL30 and the GLF4 so I kept the GLF4 inbound on the approach; just waiting for the arrival notice from the Tower prior to switching communications with the GLF4 to the Tower. I began a position relief briefing. During the traffic portion of the briefing; I was telling the incoming R-Side that the CL30 was SYD with the GLF4 at which time the D-Side informed me that I was incorrect. He corrected me and informed me that the CL30 departure was SYD with the C182. I realized immediately we had a problem and told him to call the Tower to cancel the release. The Tower informed the D-Side that the CL30 was already rolling. I then contacted the GLF4; terminating his approach and giving them a left 360 and climb clearance to the MVA of 3;300 feet. I turned them left because that was the direction of lower terrain; thinking that I would prefer to turn them that way even though it took him towards the direction the departure would be turning. I thought the Tower would switch the CL30 departure right on takeoff and I could vector them to the southeast; but the Tower realized something was wrong; tried to keep the CL30 on frequency longer than usual to provide visual separation with the GLF4. However; once the Tower realized we had turned the GLF4 they knew they could no longer provide visual separation so they switched the aircraft to my frequency. Upon check on I initially tried to turn the CL30 southeast; but they had already turned right; so I issued a 250 heading to the west still hoping to maintain lateral separation. Separation was lost; the closest proximity appeared to be 2.02 miles lateral with 900 feet and 2.16 miles with 500 feet. Recommendation; following the event; the D-Side and I discussed how if we had only communicated better with each other I could have easily built a hole for the departure CL30 in front of the GLF4 or revised the plan and cancel the SYD with the C182 and approve SYD with the GLF4.
Enroute Controller described a loss of separation event when coordination regarding an opposite direction operation was confused between the RADAR and Data controllers.