Small Aircraft; High Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear
Flight Crew Private
Flight Crew Last 90 Days 4.6; Flight Crew Total 170; Flight Crew Type 160
Communication Breakdown; Workload; Confusion; Situational Awareness; Distraction
Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Procedure; Human Factors
I am a Private Pilot SEL and instrument student. My instructor and I were shooting the LOC Runway 34 at SGS located in South St. Paul; MN. Weather was clear below 10;000 FT and visibility was better than 10 miles. We were cleared by ATC to the approach with instructions to remain VFR. A known aircraft was also shooting the same approach ahead of us. At approximately the ORVEE Intersection (DME 12 mi) ATC told us that the other aircraft was 4 miles ahead of us and told us to change to CTAF at SGS. SGS AWOS reported calm winds. The calm wind runway at SGS is Runway 16 and traffic could be heard using Runway 16 as well as a helicopter hovering in close vicinity of the runway (not a primary factor in the situation; but a secondary distraction for all involved.) Just after crossing the HINZZ Intersection (DME 6 mi) another pilot called her departure from Runway 16 and announced she was staying in the pattern. At this point we had descended to 1;400 FT and was coming up on about 2.5 DME when we decided it was time me to take the FOGGLES off and get back to pattern altitude (1;720 FT) As we started to climb the 300 FT to pattern altitude; we saw the departing aircraft climbing on a collision course toward us at about 0.25 miles distant. We banked the airplane hard to the right and the climbing pilot did the same avoiding a crossing of the 2 aircraft's paths. At that point we entered the downwind for Runway 16. I had not paid close attention to my airspeed at this point and we were flying 110 KTS where a normal downwind would have been 85-90 KTS. I pulled the power to idle and started slowing the airplane. At mid field we heard the aircraft that we believed was shooting the approach in front of us squawk about us passing him in the pattern and missing him by about 100 FT. Two sets of eyes in the cockpit missed this airplane in the pattern. Both my instructor and I expected that the aircraft was on the ground or doing a MAP and would be far from the pattern at this point. I do not recall hearing him self-announce before his reporting us passing him. Given the closure rate of 30 KTS (110 KTS vs. 80 KTS in the pattern worst case) and distance of 4 miles; it would have taken us 10 minutes to overtake him which should have given the lead pilot sufficient time to make the airport ahead of us and not been a factor. The lead aircraft pilot called us and asked our intentions and we reported back that we would enter the left base for Runway 16 and land. He replied that he would turn right and go over the river and re-enter the traffic pattern. The previously departing pilot also reported in the pattern behind us. I landed the aircraft without incident and taxied to the ramp. There are several links in the chain of events that brought us to this near miss scenario. 1) Not fully briefing the approach prior to flying and discussing what-if scenarios. 2) Flying an approach into a busy; uncontrolled airport opposite the runway being used by the majority of traffic. 3) Not breaking off the approach at a greater distance from the runway and climbing to pattern altitude. 4) Adrenaline rush from the near miss then quickly trying to slow the airplane to pattern velocity may have caused both of us to miss any call from or visually acquire the near miss aircraft in the pattern.
A student instrument pilot flying a practice instrument approach to SGS Runway 16 had an airborne conflict with a departing aircraft; then a near miss with another aircraft already in the traffic pattern which they did not hear reporting positions.