Helicopter
Flight Crew Commercial
Flight Crew Last 90 Days 86; Flight Crew Total 1200; Flight Crew Type 990
Situational Awareness; Time Pressure
Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance
Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Airport; Human Factors; Procedure
I was the PIC for a routine training mission around Oahu. My copilot was at the controls at the beginning of the flight and I contacted HCF approach and requested a patrol of Pearl Harbor. We were cleared into Class B airspace and instructed to hold at Ford Island after the patrol was complete. At the conclusion of the harbor patrol I contacted HCF and informed them we were ready to proceed south out the channel and then westbound along the shoreline. We were told to hold at Ford Island and switched to the HNL tower. HNL tower instructed us to head southbound towards the mouth of the harbor and stay north of 8L. We started southbound in the channel and noted a 747 on final approach to 8L. We informed tower that we had the landing traffic. After reporting that I had the traffic in sight I took the controls. I did not hear back from tower and asked my copilot to report the traffic again and let tower know we were ready to proceed south. I slowed down to about 50 knots at 150 feet and continued down the channel expecting a clearance call down the channel after the 747 landed. Tower reported a 717 at the two o'clock position. I immediately looked south at the one o'clock position for a 717 making the channel approach to 8L and my copilot reported traffic at the three o'clock that looked like it was next in line on final for 8L. I stated that I did not think that traffic was a 717; but could not see it. I based this on my perception that most 717 that come into HNL make the channel approach from offshore. I think that created confusion in the cockpit. As we were trying to clear that up we were cleared to proceed south out of the channel and pass behind the 717. As soon as I heard we were cleared south I started to accelerate and proceed down the channel. Once I heard the rest of the transmission to pass behind the 717 I realized that tower was talking about the traffic reported by my copilot. I believed that I could safely pass in front of the 717 and at this point I was very close to the approach corridor to runway 8L and did not feel safe making any turns in the immediate vicinity as I perceived that would put me too close to the landing traffic. I accelerated to 100 knots and descended to 100 feet AGL to clear the channel as expeditiously as possible. I heard the pilot of the 717 say they had us in sight and they were going to alter course slightly for us. Tower told me to pay better attention to the directions given. I apologized and continued on my flight. A couple of things that I can contribute to this event was my perception that I was going to be cleared between the aircraft landing and the aircraft on long final to 8L as I had in the past. Because I expected this I continued down the channel to put myself in the position to do so with as little impact on ATC as possible. The controller obviously did not have the same plan. There was a delay from the tower and I responded to this delay by slowing down. Expecting a clearance at any time; I continued down the channel. As soon as I heard cleared I acted on my expectation and started moving faster. When the direction was different than what was expected I had already committed myself. Strength of an idea also played into this one. I stated that I did not think that the aircraft reported by my copilot was a 717. I was wrong and this lead to my copilot believing that the traffic we were told to go behind was the earlier 747 that was about to touchdown on 8L.
Military helicopter pilot describes a conflict that develops with a air carrier on approach to HNL; when the reporter anticipates a clearance from the Tower that is not delivered as expected.