SF 340A
Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Training / Qualification; Human-Machine Interface; Communication Breakdown; Confusion
Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Event / Encounter Vehicle
Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; General Maintenance Action
Human Factors; Company Policy; Procedure; Aircraft
The aircraft had issues with the cockpit auto and manual modes of the environmental system and I contacted the next Captain by phone during the taxi in to make him aware of the situation and asked if he would accept the aircraft; or preferred it be written up. He suggested writing it up since he knew there was a spare aircraft available and scheduled flight operations would not be compromised. I informed Maintenance immediately after parking the aircraft and before going through Customs. After completing Customs the crew was prepared to travel to the hotel; but was asked by the on site Maintenance personnel to 'do them a favor' and reposition the aircraft to a remote parking stand approximately 300 yards away. We agreed to help them out and boarded the aircraft; closed the door and waited until after ground personnel had deplaned passengers from an arriving aircraft. After passengers were clear only the right engine was started for the taxi. A verbal checklist was not utilized; but normal flows were performed by both pilots. We then taxied forward to the requested parking stand which was; at the time; occupied by the incoming aircraft that was waiting for the parking spot we had just occupied at the Customs Ramp. We taxied past that aircraft; turned 90 degrees and came to a complete stop. After the aircraft left the parking spot we proceeded forward about 50 feet and I cleared the right side from the only visible obstacle before completely stopping again. There was a brief discussion about where exactly to park; as the parking markings were difficult to see; giving where we were located and the gradient of the ramp; but I had observed exactly where the spot was and provided progressive taxi instructions to the Captain. Getting there required two more left turns to align with the painted line that designated the parking position. Everything was fine until I told him to stop on the crossbar and realized he was about to overrun it. It was then I had the first indication something was wrong when he exclaimed he had no brakes. I instantly tried to apply the brakes from the right side as he called out to kill the engine. I heard his command but thought it was better to go full reverse (I stated my intentions verbally); so I applied reverse and went heads down to make sure I didn't over temp/over torque. After seeing that wasn't going to be an issue; I went heads up only to realize the engine noise had decreased significantly; and the start of a subtle right turn had suddenly digressed into a pronounced left turn. I then realized that the fire handle was pulled (I saw his arm coming down in my peripheral and confirmed visually). From that point on I did not touch or manipulate any levers; switches; etc. as there was nothing I could do. I recall looking at the hydraulic manual override switch and thought the guard was up; thus assuming an attempt was made to manually activate the hyd system (I did not look or see the gauges at that moment); but I have to second guess my initial observation since I definitely know (and saw) that the Captain activated the override switch (post impact) and I heard the pump run.  I cannot honestly provide information to the position of her guard.This all took place within the first 12-15 seconds; following which the aircraft more or less stabilized on a westerly heading at a very low speed and no amount of crew inputs could change the course or result. From my vantage point; I could see the air stair vehicle as we approached and asked if we were clear. The answer was no and the left wing impacted the stairs causing the aircraft to pirouette around it until it came to rest 180 degrees from point of impact. Total time elapsed post impact was 8-10 seconds. Total time elapsed for the entire event was between 20-25 seconds.I believe there can be improvements made in the 'immediate action' responses (to this type of event); that should NOT necessitate using a standard checklist;QRC;QRM; as this event proves there may be little or no time to identify and perform them.  In addition; I think it might be a good idea to have a dedicated checklist/procedure that only addresses ground only/repo operations with no intent of flight.
An SF-340 flight crew; asked to reposition their aircraft after their last flight of the day; lost their brakes as they approached their parking spot and; ultimately struck a boarding ladder vehicle; finally bringing the aircraft to a stop.  The lack of a dedicated ground operations only checklist was cited as a contributing factor as the crew failed to utilize normal checklists as they are intended for use for flight operations.