Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Flight Crew Last 90 Days 244; Flight Crew Type 13000
Training / Qualification; Situational Awareness; Confusion; Distraction
Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT
Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related
[We were] approaching ABQ from the east running late; winds 300/9. We discussed the following: First; legality of Runway 26 at night; (reviewed NOTAMS and 10-7); and saw nothing that precluded using 26. Second; [we] used performance data to look at Runway 30; and if used; it required MAX braking. [We] created a visual point five miles east of the field at 180 KTS/7;300 FT AGL. [We] fully configured with flaps 30 positioned east southeast of field approximate radial 120. Intentionally offset to the south east because of terrain. At approximately 8;500 FT MSL (VSI approximately 800); we received a single (i.e. one) 'Terrain' aural warning; and the First Officer said he saw the Pull Up light for one second. I immediately initiated the go-around (adding power and starting a climb). Immediately thereafter (within three seconds); all warnings both aural and visual stopped. I leveled the altitude and announced 'leveling' and 'I'm going to continue the approach.' We proceeded to fly the remainder of the approach; and although saw white over white when approximately 1;500 FT AGL; was stabilized and within all parameters by the 1;000 FT call. Landed; and rolled out to Taxiway C for the right turn. I asked Tower if they had received any altitude warnings for us; and they said no. The First Officer and I immediately realized the situation; and called for a complete terrain avoidance maneuver; instead of a brief go-around. After a lengthy discussion and agreement; we both felt that mistakes had been made; and that an ASAP was called for. I am clearly aware of proper terrain avoidance maneuvers; and made the mistake of thinking that known circumstances and flight parameters allowed for an abbreviated response to the procedure. This was clearly wrong! Regardless of the duration of warnings; the performance of the complete maneuver was called for and should have been completed. If again faced with any GPWS Warnings of this type; I will not hesitate to perform the complete maneuver. Also; although we adequately prepared for; and briefed the hazards associated with a night visual to Runway 26; I will not again choose this night approach option into ABQ.
[Narrative #2 contained no additional information]
An Air Carrier crew approached ABQ for a night visual to Runway 26 and momentarily leveled after an GPWS warning; but continued the approach and after landing decided a Runway 26 night approach was ill advised.