B777-200
Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Workload; Time Pressure; Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Distraction; Human-Machine Interface
Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT
Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control; Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Human Factors
First Officer was PF (Pilot Flying). Captain was PM (Pilot Monitoring). The departure clearance was changed via CPDLC (Controller Pilot Data Link Communications) during taxi-out. [The first] SID was changed to [the second] SID after all briefings were complete for [the first SID]. I loaded the new route into the FMC from the CPDLC prompt. I failed to load the [second] departure into the FMC from the App/Dep Page. We briefed the [second SID] and I put a 4 NM ring around the ZZZ VOR in the FIX page to comply with the crossing altitude restrictions. Heading 296 was selected on the MCP (Mode Control Panel) and 2;000 in the altitude window. This was the completely wrong way to program this SID into FMC for the 'climb via' clearance. There would have been no deviation if I had deselected LNAV for the takeoff during the MCP setup. The FO (First Officer) hand flew the departure. At 500 feet the FO entered a right turn following the Flight Director guidance to waypoint ZZZZZ. This occurred during gear retraction and frequency change to [Departure]. I announced 'Runway heading! Runway heading!' FO turned back left to 296 degrees. FO had turned right about 30 degrees before correcting back to the left. We got a GPWS 'Bank Angle' alert during the left heading correction back to 296 degrees. I did not determine the maximum bank angle. There were no other GPWS alerts. Frequency change and climb with [Departure] were uneventful. There was no query by Departure.I don't even know where to start. There were multiple distractions during taxi out. The visibility began to decrease about 5 minutes before pushback. We were number 8 for takeoff and [Departure] held all departures for 15 minutes. I had initially started both engines before tower announced the ground hold. I shut down the right engine because I didn't know how long we would be delayed. In the end; I waited too late to start the right engine the second time. The CPDLC departure clearance change came late about the time I needed to start the engine. The new routing was confusing. I rushed through the FMC programming and failed to load the SID from the App/Dep Page. I questioned the 'climb via' clearance and the crossing restriction at the [second SID] DME. That became my focus. We had no shared mental model even though we discussed in detail the initial climb heading and altitude constraints. I built the initial climb for the [second] SID in the FIX page instead of loading from the FMC. The FO did not realize that I had not loaded the [second] SID in the FMC. I failed to cross check the FMA's before takeoff and during the checklist to ensure that the aircraft would track 296 degrees.I will slow down and make sure there is a shared understanding of the departure clearance and SID especially after a route change. I will load the FMC after a route change with the same steps as the initial setup. I will make sure the new route is understood thoroughly; programmed correctly; and briefed. I will slow down and cross check FMA's several times during a high distraction event. I have gone over and over the distractions that led up to the event. The significant end result was exceeding bank angle and causing a GPWS alert.
B777 Captain reported incorrectly programming the departure; which resulted in a wrong direction turn and a GPWS alert during initial climbout.