Large Transport
Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification
Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown
Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach
Company Policy; Procedure; Human Factors
Having been assigned to four Sports Team Charters over the past couple of months; I have had serious concerns with the looseness of the operation as observed by me on several fronts. This last weekend was number four; and the series of issues I encountered have prompted this report.It starts with the way we handle weight and balance. I was made aware that there have been FAA compliance issues with regard to weight and balance computations on sports team charters; specifically; how we compute the final passenger weights. Prior to last week; we have been using AVERAGE passenger weights (albeit skewed to account for generally heaver players and coaches) in direct conflict with Flight Manual Part 1. This section states that ACTUAL weights MUST be used for the flight. My numerous contacts with Flight Department management regarding this issue resulted in responses such as 'you are misinterpreting Part 1;' or 'this is the way we have always done it'. The underlying tone was generally one of frustration; bordering on anger; with me for even bringing it up.Apparently; someone finally realized the problem and in an attempt to rectify the conflict; a letter to all Charter Coordinators was issued by the Manager of Weight and Balance Planning. The letter mandated that actual player/coach weights would be used for the upcoming weekend charters; but stated that average weights for non-player/coaches would be acceptable. This was a move in the right direction; but still contrary to our Flight Manual Part 1 which requires ACTUAL weights for the entire FLIGHT.In an effort to resolve this prior to departure; I was told that interrogated (non-player/coach) passenger weights would suffice in this situation; in accordance with Ops. Specs. XYYY. Although XYYY does not pertain to sports team charters; it does allow for the use of interrogated weights. However doing so still violates Part 1 since the Part 1 does not differentiate between players; coaches; staff; etc.; but applies to the entire flight.In addition; XYYY requires the use of ACTUAL weight for baggage; and I am assuming this refers to carry-on baggage. In the case of this flight; I do not know if anyone carried on any baggage; and in any case; we would have had no way of weighing it. We were however; carrying personal baggage in the cargo compartment; along with other equipment. The load numbers which were given to me prior to departure showed 29 personal bags at 24 pounds each. I assume that these weights were provided by the university and they appear to be average weights; again contrary to Flight Manual Part 1. The other cargo items included 1 Pelican Case at 50 pounds; and 3 laundry hampers at 300 pounds each. The 'roundness' of these numbers seem to suggest that they are 'best guesses' but we have no way of knowing; since we depend on the university to provide these weights; and we have no procedure to weigh them ourselves.Given all the information I have been presented; I am left confused. However it seems clear that we are operating contrary to our own Flight Manual Part 1; poorly written as it is.We arrived as a ferry flight and upon arrival; we were marshaled to Gate 2; which had a jet bridge. Since I was told that the day before this flight had parked at this gate; I assumed they had the equipment to handle a push off the gate. At departure time; with the jet bridge pulled away; the guide man signaled 'cleared to start'. This took me completely by surprise; as we had not established interphone communications; and I could see no tug connected. After they finally located a headset and plugging in; I learned that we were expected to taxi our large transport aircraft away from the gate just as they do with the RJ's they handle. Directly in front of us was a large deicing truck; and a pickup truck w/ cargo trailer. I consulted Volume II for some guidance; and found a caution statement to not attempt to turn away from an obstacle within 33 feet of the nose; orwithin 22 feet of the wing tip. The truck looked close; but I had no good estimate of how close. I ask the guide man to pace off the distance to give us an idea.During this transaction; for reasons unknown; our mechanic decided to slip out of the cockpit. As he opened the door; the Charter Coordinator burst into the cockpit and announced sternly that 'We have to leave!' Taken aback that a non-crewmember would just storm into the cockpit like that; I told her to leave the cockpit. I had to repeat myself three times before she finally left. This interruption caused me to miss observing how the guide man measured the distance; but he reported back that we should be good; and that besides; the same type aircraft taxied away from this gate yesterday. With wing walker in place; I pulled forward and made a hard right turnout; hoping our significant jet blast would do no damage. Upon arrival in the destination terminal area; we received weather information via ASOS; and on downwind; were cleared for a visual approach at which point radar service was terminated. It was then that I realized the tower was CLOSED.How could this have happened? On the ground prior to departure; knowing that ZZZ was a part time tower; we questioned whether the tower would be open for us. I was aware that tower hours were sometimes extended for late arrivals. So I phoned Dispatch to find out. The dispatcher put me on hold; then returned on the line to inform me that indeed it would be. This was the last thought I gave it until now.Downwind at night in uncontrolled airspace is not a good place to brief Tower Closed operations; but the weather was good and the field was in sight with the runway lights glowing brightly. We broadcasted our position in the blind as we flew the pattern; and as I made my way onto final; I suddenly realized I had lost sight of the field. We had the RNAV (GPS) 21 approach set up as a backup; so I knew where it was supposed to be; but there was nothing in front of me but black. As we overflew the field at pattern altitude; we realized that the runway lights; which had been on bright; had cycled off! Remaining at pattern altitude; we contacted Center and requested vectors for the RNAV 21. This time the FO keyed his mic the required number of times to bring the lights back up. It was a long series of vectors; finally being cleared direct ZZZZZ (IAF) and cleared for the approach. On course; using VNAV; everything appeared stable. Then; at around 1;000 AGL; every light on the field (except the PAPI) turned off. Total black. I continued the approach; urging the First Officer to please get the lights back up! He keyed his mic time after time to no effect. Finally; at about 300 AGL; just as I was about to go around for the second time; the lights came up full brightness. It was rather blinding; but I was able to make a safe landing.Obviously; this mis-communication (I suppose between Dispatch and whomever he called) created a huge problem for us. Had we known that the tower would be closed; we would have briefed it thoroughly; including the section in Part 1 which discusses Tower Closed operations and Pilot Controlled Lighting. Tower Closed operations are not something we do very often; and I can't recall using Pilot Controlled Lighting anytime in my 30 years with this company.I am also left wondering what; if any; FAR's may have been violated. I believe I am legal to continue an approach with only a PAPI visible; but I have no way of knowing if; for example; there was ARFF available on the field; or if there may have been other issues I was not aware of.After unloading; we refueled and gathered the data we needed for the return ferry flight. On taxi out; we had a radio exchange with a light twin six miles out; making an approach in the opposite direction. As I taxied away from the ramp area; I joined the parallel taxiway A. Everything seemed normal abeam taxiway C; but as I proceeded; I realized that the taxiway was narrowing; and I suddenly found myself on what; from the cockpit of this Large Transport Aircraft; seemed to be an extremely narrow taxiway. I stopped the jet; and the FO and I discussed the possibilities. I finally ended up opening my window and; with flashlight in hand; leaning out as far as I could to observe the main gear. Fortunately; the 22 foot wide gear was on the pavement; but that pavement ended about the outboard edge of the engine nacelles. I do not know what minimum taxiway width we can accept; as it's not in my manuals; but had the tower been open; I cannot imagine them sending us down this taxiway.The events I experienced on this sequence highlight the hazards of these totally non-standard operation. The fact that these operations are conducted by regular line crews who do not routinely operate in this manner is even more alarming. To make this operation even more stressful for my First Officer; this was his first trip off IOE!
Large Transport Aircraft Captain described a sports team charter that he believes highlights the company's lax attitude toward these operations in general and weight and balance calculations in particular.