MD-11
Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Distraction; Troubleshooting; Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness
Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control
Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control
Aircraft; Human Factors; MEL; Procedure
During an 18-hour duty day with multiple discrepancies; write-ups; MEL's; a rejected takeoff; a turnback to the gate; and other issues; we departed Runway XXL at ZZZ for the ZZZZZ RNAV departure. We had just finished 5 hours on the ground dealing with a hydraulic 3 elevator shutoff valve and inoperative 3-2 non-reversible motor pump; and had briefed the possibility of an associated flight control problem on departure. During the initial climb; we were instructed to maintain 250 kts and acknowledged. Our speed did not require a high-speed climb. Repeatedly during this event (prior to slat retraction; and intermittently all the way to final cruise altitude); we got am amber-boxed engine 1 compressor vibration indication; averaging 4.5 units of vibration. This required retarding power on engine 1 (up to one knob-width; and up to 7-10% N1 reduction); to bring the vibration out of the amber range. When reaching 3;000 feet and just beyond ZZZZZ1 on the ZZZZZ; we began the clean-up process on schedule; and upon slat retraction; the airplane rolled left. I countered with considerable right aileron. The strong rolling moment occurred coincident with slat retraction. Shortly after; we got a master caution and two level 1 EAD messages (SEL LSAS LOB OFF; SEL LSAS RIB OFF); for which I called for the [Relief Pilot] and FO (First Officer) to address and confirm before selecting off. As that occurred; we got a caution light with a lateral fuel imbalance (LAT FUEL UNBAL); which occurred three more times (four total); along with a 2;000 kg drop in fuel quantity (repeat write-up). While focused on the control issue; I allowed airspeed to increase briefly above the 250 kts limit; estimated to be 270 kts; before decreasing speed again to maintain 250 kts to 10;000 feet ATC did not mention the overspeed; but the [Relief Pilot] did call 'airspeed.' The ZZZZZ departure includes a restriction to remain below 3;000 until ZZZZZ1; then a climb to 15;000 or above; by ZZZZZ. My priority was addressing the control issue; but adjusted pitch per the flight director to return to 250 kts. No further variations from the speed schedule occurred during the remainder of the climb; or flight. Additional distractions occurring in series (except the engine vibration indication; which occurred intermittently throughout the event); one after the other; did not cause the airspeed excursion; but certainly worked to divert attention; and increase cockpit workload.I became aware of the amber boxed vibration indication about the time we entered the 1100 ft. ceiling; departing ZZZ. I became aware of the rolling moment immediately upon slat retraction; and the airspeed excursion upon the 'airspeed' call by the [Relief Pilot]. I did note the pitch attitude below that commanded by the flight director; and noted speed increasing; but the intent was to increase airspeed through slat retract speed to 250; and I focused on the immediate concern; the rolling moment. I did not notice the speed exceed 250 until the [Relief Pilot] brought it to the crew attention with the 'airspeed' call. At that time; I observed approximately 270 on the airspeed indication; and increased pitch to the flight director pitch bar to reduce speed. The FO was occupied retracting slats; and performing the follow-up flow associated with my call; 'slats retract; after takeoff checklist.' Aside from being distracted by the rolling moment; the illumination of the amber compressor vibration indication on engine 1; subsequent LSAS failure; and fuel imbalance were contributing errors to detection; and detection was voiced by the [Relief Pilot]. I became aware of the LSAS issue; and the lateral fuel imbalance issues; with illumination of the master caution light. The LSAS issue caused loss of autopilot 2. I delayed autopilot engagement until the series of issues were addressed; given that they included flight control and subsequent autopilot engagement problems. Once those were addressed and we were outside the busier airspace; the enroute climb and remainder of the flight until descent; were largely uneventful; except for continued monitoring and adjusting of engine 1 throttle position to prevent high compressor vibration. The period of time between detection of the event and the filing of this report is accounted by the end of a long duty day; the necessity of filing another report on the previous leg rejected takeoff in ZZZ1; and then flying home.We had briefed the possibility of a flight control problem; given the return to the gate for the system 3 Hydraulic elevator shutoff valve; and associated 3-2 non-reversible motor pump. The fix on the ramp had been to add another two gallons of fluid to system three; with the explanation that 'maybe the gauge is just reading high.' I did not find that explanation satisfactory; but following an engine run in which the problem did not reoccur; maintenance was satisfied; the write-up was signed off; and we departed. About the time we entered the cloud layer; the amber-boxed engine 1 compressor vibration alert illuminated; and power was reduced on engine 1 slightly (up to one knob width) to reduce the vibration indication. This indication came and went; as we climbed; necessitating further slight reductions in power. The flight control problem which occurred after departure (strong left rolling moment; coincident with slat retraction) did not match the potential problem (possible elevator shutoff valve actuation and NRMP malfunction); but did merit attention; during which time I let the airspeed slip. I focused on leveling the wings and reduced angle of attack. I should have maintained pitch with the flight director; but divided the task of roll and pitch to prioritize directional control; while addressing the uncommanded rolling moment. Additional subsequent illumination of the master caution with the LSAS failure; and the lateral fuel imbalance level 2 warning and master caution illumination; were peripheral distractions; as was the engine vibration issue. I was hand flying at the time; and believe it was better to be hand-flying with the potential to feel a problem; than have it masked by the autopilot. Had the autopilot been flying; the speed excursion would likely not have occurred; but we may not have seen or felt the rolling moment as much; if at all. I did feel a shift in the controls when the LSAS was selected off; but couldn't say afterward exactly what I'd felt. In retrospect; the best course would have been to focus on the flight director while addressing the roll. The natural tendency when experiencing that event (rolling moment); for me; was to decrease angle of attack slightly; which I did; which resulted in the excess speed as we accelerated while cleaning up. The rolling moment was caused; I am certain; by asymmetric slat retraction; the degree of asymmetry I couldn't say; but it was significant in feel and the amount of aileron deflection needed to counter the roll. There was no buffet. It was significant enough that on arrival in the ZZZ2 area; we briefed the possibility of the same event when extending slats; and I hand flew the descent and arrival; configuring slats early. A rolling moment did occur; but not to the same degree as departing ZZZ. (We also experienced a strong rolling motion that resulted in heading change; with autopilot engaged; when deploying speed brakes; and observed speed brake asymmetry on the configuration synoptic page; and determined not to use speed brakes further on the subsequent ZZZ2 arrival). These aircraft discrepancies; while important; should not have detracted from the basic task of flying the airplane; or maintaining the assigned/required 250 kts. on departure from ZZZ. Additionally; the subsequent illumination of the master caution light several times with LSAS failure and lateral fuel imbalance issues served as peripheral distractions. The tendency for engine 1 compressor vibration to show high with amber-boxed indication; repeatedly; and to require the engine power to be retarded repeatedly; was also a distraction. Retarding power on the no. 1 engine further caused a slight yawing motion; and subsequent potential rolling moment. Flying all night and then a five hours of trouble shooting on the ramp in a hot airplane didn't help; prior to this takeoff.My reaction to the high compressor vibration indication on engine 1 was to retard the No. 1 throttle slightly; the problem was known and a recurring one which had become a repeat write-up. My reaction to the 'airspeed' call was to note the speed and increase pitch to the flight director pitch bar; after observing airspeed in excess of 250 kts. I followed the flight director command while re-acquiring and holding 250 kts; and flying the departure. My reaction to the subsequent master caution illumination was to direct the First Officer and [Relief Pilot] to work together; specifically on the LSAS issue; because with one FCC affected; I wanted confirmation on selecting the correct switches off. The lateral fuel level 2 warning was familiar; as it keeps happening and keeps being written up on this airplane. On arrival; I wrote it up again. The engine vibration was a repeat write-up that was squawked multiple times; and was subsequently written up again on arrival in ZZZ2. On arrival in ZZZ2; the [Relief Pilot] asked if I thought we should file an report; and I advised that yes; I thought it prudent. I advised the crew to file what they saw; individually. After that; I was occupied discussing multiple discrepancies and write-ups with Maintenance; and with the incoming crew as they arrived. It was a very long night and day; and a full duty day. We had a rejected takeoff; ATC directed; at ZZZ1 on the first leg; and I had to write a report for that; after arriving at the hotel. I made that report; and the next day flew home; where I slept for an extended period. This report is submitted outside the 24-hour window; when I had rested adequately to be awake to write it. I did write up the flight control issues; to be addressed by Company Maintenance Personnel.My actions were my own; and my responsibility. I was the Pilot Flying; and the Captain; and I was hand flying; and regardless of distractions; should not have allowed the airspeed excursion to occur. That said; we should not be seeing so many discrepancies and issues; especially on one flight (let alone one phase of flight simultaneously or subsequently in close succession; and especially not items which have been written up multiple times). These issues ranged from multiple flight control issues to fuel system indications and issues; engine vibration; and even a TCAS fail during the initial climb. The subsequent issues that occurred on the flight including multiple items that were repeat write ups; including a level 2 fuel lateral fuel imbalance several times during the departure. The LSAS failure is also a repeat write-up. I do not include these as excuses for failing to maintain the airspeed at 250 kts; as that was my responsibility; but these are certainly things which do not need to be happening on every flight; as a regular part of flight operations; and this can be fixed. So far as preventing this specific event from occurring again; my counsel is to point my finger at myself and what I would say to anyone else: 'fly the damn airplane.' I need look no farther than myself as the reason for failing to maintain 250 kts as cleared; and as required by the regulation; and as the captain; the buck stops with me. We can prevent it; in my cockpit; by my not allowing it to occur again. The question will arise why the autopilot was not engaged earlier in the series of events. I had briefed a hand-flown departure. The engine vibration; while a distraction; did not rise to the level of needing automated intervention; and was familiar; having occurred previously and been a repeat write-up. The rolling moment was not something I wanted masked by engaging the autopilot;
After getting handed off to approach ATC instructed us to limit our speed to 250 kts. However because of multiple issues going on and the flight deck our speed had increased to 300 kts. Once I called airspeed the Captain and then proceeded to reduce the speed to 250.Use auto pilot in airspace in which is busy and cockpit work load is heavy.Have a proper scan and use auto pilot when workload is heavy.
MD11 flight crew reported multiple systems failures that required attention and distracted them; resulting in exceeding an airspeed limitation.