A320
Flight Crew Last 90 Days 198; Flight Crew Total 15000; Flight Crew Type 10200
Workload; Distraction; Time Pressure
Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor
Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Declared Emergency; General Maintenance Action
Aircraft
On the short leg climbing with the autopilot engaged; as Pilot Flying; I had just completed briefing the arrival and ILS XX approach and my Captain; Pilot Monitoring; began the Approach Descent Checklist.  Coincidently; the aircraft began leveling at FL290 and the autothrottles began retarding from climb to cruise thrust.  Two loud pops were heard with momentary ECAM displays of ENG1 stall and ignition-on.  The Pilot Monitoring announced ECAM and split cockpit duties as the warnings extinguished.  He checked engine parameters and found that they indicated normal.  The Lead Flight Attendant called via interphone to ask about the source of the noise.  The Pilot Monitoring explained the situation to the Lead and followed up with a PA to explain the source of the noise to concerned passengers.  Following the PA the Lead called again and announced that the left engine was on fire.  The Pilot Monitoring asked the Lead to confirm the fire visually as there were no indications in the cockpit and the condition had evidently been reported by passengers.  The Pilot Monitoring completed the Approach Descent Checklist and pushed the ECAM recall button which returned a NORMAL.  The Lead called back reporting that there was no fire; just flashes of fire associated with the loud pops.  The Pilot Monitoring directed the Lead to station a crew member in position to monitor engine 1 visually and provide reliable information.  As; Pilot Flying; I continued with radio duties as the Pilot Monitoring looked up and sent the appropriate Maintenance code.  Duties were then returned to normal and shortly after Center directed a descent to FL200.  I pushed the altitude knob to begin a managed descent and as the autothrottles reduced thrust another loud pop was heard with ENG1 Compressor Stall ECAM.  The Pilot Monitoring split the duties in the cockpit and proceeded with the ECAM checklist.  Per the Pilot Monitoring's direction; as Pilot Flying; I matched throttle position to EPR indication; disengaged the autothrottles and retarded no. 1 throttle to flight idle.  The ECAM disappeared and the engine returned to normal indications.  Satisfied the condition of the no.  1 engine was stable; the Pilot Monitoring; declared an emergency reporting; souls on board; endurance and asked for CFR support at our destination.  The Pilot Monitoring made a PA followed by another call from the Lead reporting an engine fire.  When asked to verify the report the Lead indicated that the stationed crewmember confirmed no current visible evidence of fire.  The Captain; Pilot Monitoring; briefed the Lead to expect a normal landing using a TEST briefing.  As Pilot Flying; I communicated our desire for an ILS guided visual approach and complied with vectors and descent guidance as the Pilot Monitoring communicated our situation via ACARS to Dispatch.  Passing approximately 16;000 feet; the Pilot Monitoring returned cockpit duties to normal; was told by Approach to expect ILS 25R and immediately began reprogramming the MCDU for the new runway.  As Pilot Flying; I continued to fly the airplane and the Pilot Monitoring briefed the new approach.  Approach; landing and rollout were uneventful.  CFR followed us to the gate to assure no further support was necessary.  The Captain called the Maintenance Engine Controller to report the incident and indications.  Cursory post-flight inspection of visible engine components revealed no damage.  After leaving the aircraft; the Captain also received a phone call from the FODM to recap the evening's events.
I gave the aircraft and radios to the Pilot Flying and was preparing to do the ECAM procedures when the engine stabilized; the ECAM went away; autoignition went off and all engine parameters were normal. We kept the cockpit split and I took the first call from the Purser and he told me the engine was 'on fire' and I asked him; 'Still?' because we had no indications of fire in the cockpit. I asked him to go back and make sure. During this time I asked for the Maintenance Code book and started to write up the malfunction and what we had observed when the Purser called back to tell me that the passengers on the left side of the plane and behind the wing had seen flames shoot out of the engine at the time of the loud bangs but there was no fire at this time. The Pilot Flying suggested having a flight attendant keep watch for the duration of the flight instead of relying on a passenger and I made this request which was acknowledged. I completed entering the maintenance write up but noted on the ACARS response that the code I used indicated that we had shut the engine down which was not the case. I finished the Approach Descent Checklist and was about to correct the mistake when we received a clearance to descend to FL200. At that time I felt we should focus on flying and we went back to Pilot Flying; Pilot Monitoring SOP and put the cockpit back to 'normal' figuring I'd correct the Maintenance reporting gaff in descent. I set FL200 in the altitude window; we verified and the Pilot Flying pushed the altitude select button to begin a managed descent. When the autothrottle pulled the thrust back we immediately got another single loud bang; large EPR swings on engine 1; autoignition and the ECAM. Again; we went into standard ECAM procedures and split the cockpit duties and just as I was having a look at the ECAM procedure it all went away at the stabilized reduced trust for the managed descent. One of the things I had noticed on the procedure was to turn off the autothrust and reduce thrust. The Pilot Flying turned off the autothrust in an air manlike manner and gently pulled the engine 1 thrust lever to idle with no further compressor stalls. While he was doing that I fielded another volley of calls with the Purser exactly like the first series only this time I gave him TEST and told him we were declaring an emergency; proceeding to our destination and to expect a normal landing with equipment rolling next to us. We discussed the decision to continue as the best course of action and to leave channel nine on with a PA com to the passengers. I declared an emergency with Center; souls and 1:20 fuel (6200+ lbs) with a request for equipment as precautionary and that we expected a normal landing; rollout and to exit the runway on our own. We were cleared direct the airport and I made a PA to the passengers that covered all of the above and when we would be landing. At this time; we stayed split cockpit and I notified Dispatch via ACARS of all of the above and corrected the MRM mistake by telling him that we had a DEGRADED engine and that it WAS NOT shut down which was acknowledged by 'COPY ALL.' We also made sure our QRH's were handy and contemplated the possibility of an evacuation. We put the cockpit back together and continued our descent with engine 1 at idle and all parameters normal. When we transitioned through FL180 we were switched to Approach and were given the ILS and we asked to be vectored onto the approach as opposed to taking a visual for terrain considerations. We were downwind and south of the field. We split the cockpit one more time and I installed the approach and briefed the Pilot Flying from my plate and handed it to him for review and briefly took the airplane. When we were both satisfied with our situational awareness we went back to Pilot Flying; Pilot Monitoring SOP. The remaining approach and landing with engine 1 at idle thrust were completely normal and we asked for a fire truck to follow us to the gate which he did. We post flighted the number 1 engine and saw no outward signs of damage and I called the Engine Controller to give him our perspective. The Maintenance Manager called to close the loop and we proceeded to the layover hotel.
An A320 left engine experienced two compressor stalls at cruise: first when thrust was reduced to set cruise power and when reduced again to begin the descent. The QRH was completed; an emergency declared and the flight continued to its filed destination with both engines operating.