EMB ERJ 170/175 ER/LR
Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification
Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Human Factors
Stick shaker activated at approximately 2000 feet MSL after departure from IAH. Aircraft was in a climbing right turn with the Landing gear UP and the Flaps at Zero (0) degrees. Captain was the PF. Takeoff procedure was normal through the V1 and 'rotate' call-outs. As the nosewheel lifted off; we got a single-chime; Master Caution; and 'Dual Bleed Overpress' EICAS annunciation. The aircraft was flown to acceleration altitude where the Climb Sequence procedures were performed. We were assigned by Tower a right turn to Heading 350 degrees. Upon confirmation by myself that the gear and flaps were up; I confirmed with [Captain] that he had the controls and told him that I would reference the QRH for the problem. He said 'OK'.As I was head down looking for the checklist; I heard the stick shaker fire off. I looked up at my PFD and saw the airplane in an approximate 18 degree nose up attitude; with approximately 25 degrees of right bank. The autopilot was on. I said to [the Captain]; 'What are you doing?? roll wings level and pitch forward.' He did not respond. I repeated; 'roll wings level and pitch down.' At that point he disconnected the autopilot and began to roll wings level as I pushed on my yoke a slight amount to get some airspeed. Shortly thereafter; a safe airspeed was attained and the remainder of the climb out was normal. I reset the bleed switches and the EICAS messages extinguished. As we climbed out of 10000 ft MSL; the After TakeOff Checklist was completed. [Captain] then stated to me; 'From now on; we don't do any checklists at a low altitude. We will wait to get higher; then run the checklist.' This statement to me was a thinly veiled accusation that he flew the airplane into a stall because I was running a checklist and not monitoring his flying.This was the third flight of the duty day for this crew. Earlier in the day; Captain had been PF. On this particular flight; I noticed that he was climbing in FPA (Flight Path Angle) Mode. This is NOT an authorized climb mode in this airplane. At acceleration height; the PNF selects FLCH which is safe because it holds an airspeed. It is akin to SPD mode in the CRJ. FPA is dangerous to climb in because it will hold a climb angle and disregard airspeed - all the way down to stall speed if the pilot lets it.I can't say for certain; but is my guess that the Captain selected FPA mode again on the incident flight and got slow because too large a climb angle was selected in conjunction with a bank angle. This selection was not apparent to me because I had my head down buried in a checklist.A strict adherence to the proper mode selection procedures in imperative for safe operations. This must be stressed during all training and checking events. Also; more attention must be paid to stall recovery techniques during training. Captain's response to stick shaker activation was completely inadequate.
EMB-175 First Officer reported the Captain flew the airplane into a stall warning while they were troubleshooting a mechanical issue.