Widebody Transport
Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Fatigue; Situational Awareness
Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Human Factors
Bottom line short version was took off on correct runway (XXR) but had XXL in FMC. Now the long version. This leg falls in the middle of an 11 day trip and was suspected to be the hardest night since 2 legs at night after acclimating to [a far off timezone]. We come off [several days] in [a different timezone; Country A] and we both discussed the plan to try and mitigate fatigue during this segment. The plan was to get up early the morning of and then rest the afternoon prior to show. I got up [early morning] local time and got to bed [in the late afternoon] planning on a [light night] alert. Got right to sleep but wind conditions outside started creating a banging noise that awoke me. I was up for at least an hour but then finally fell hard asleep and awoke to the alert call. We briefed with a discussion about fatigue being a threat along with [Country B] ops and language challenges being top of the list. The first leg went uneventful to ZZZZ with arrival slightly early. One issue that started to become evident was that the A/C conditioning system was louder than normal although a very new plane. During the turn we ate our catering; had more coffee and prepared for the [next] leg. After my setup I started feeling a bit tired so I leaned my chair back and closed my eyes for a few minutes. I heard the ACARS bing with the weight and balance and sat back upright to finish briefing. This is where we failed to capture the error on the FMC having been loaded with XXL. We had briefed the departure for XXR and all the points were identical to the left except for 1 degree heading difference. During the performance brief when the runway challenge was made I failed to notice the error. We started to have some other errors that happened such as wrong a call sign (ZZZZ tower was working various frequencies making it hard to talk to him) during pushback request; failure to send off the final [Weight and Balance] report. We started both engines in an attempt to mitigate errors since we were noticing small errors increasing. During this phase of our taxi I became more aware of the air conditioning noise which I think was starting to affect communication. We made several runway crossings and arrived at the holding point for XXR and held short. I checked my EFB enroute page and realized it was incomplete so that became a distraction prior to entering the runway and another uncaptured error although it was on my I-pad and was corrected later in the EFB. We were cleared to line up and wait then shortly after to takeoff. We verbalized runway signage upon entering the runway and on the runway but missed the FMC verification and after completion of the before takeoff checklist started the takeoff roll. After standing up power I pressed TO/GA (Take-Off Go-Around) then got the EICAS regarding FMC runway disagree and by the time I processed this we were past 80 knots so I elected to continue the takeoff rather than do a high speed reject. Trey re-verified the initial departure points and the flight continued without further incident. After top of climb and after landing we discussed this at length and both feel fatigue was a major contributor to this chain of events. Side note: all the times referenced in the form and in the narrative are local times. I was unable to get the form to take UTC (it may be due to fatigue)I believe fatigue caused the chain of events that allowed our accidental incomplete procedures to prevent this particular error.I know this particular error won't happen to me again but I will be more aware of the onset of fatigue.
Bottom line - we received a 'FMC runway disagree' caution on takeoff on our second leg of the night from ZZZZ. We ran performance for and briefed runway XXR (the correct runway); but incorrectly inputted runway XXL into the FMC. Captain was the Pilot Flying and inputted the departure. I was the pilot monitoring and failed to error capture the mistake.Detailed account - Incident occurred on the second of two night legs. The first leg was [to ZZZZ] and was debriefed as safe and standard. Second leg was from ZZZZ; departing [early morning] local. The Captain briefed the primary threat to the flight as fatigue. After a three day layover in [Country A]; both the Captain and my circadian rhythms were adjusted to local time. The night before we had dinner together and were back at the hotel and in bed at [early night]; resting from [normal night hours]. The Captain and I briefly went into [the] city during the day and spent time walking and sightseeing. We were back at the hotel at [mid-afternoon] local and headed to our rooms to rest for the event. I attempted to nap [in the evening] and got some broken sleep. There were loud banging noises outside of my hotel window that would intermittently wake me. During this time; I got out of bed a few times and studied for the flight and read a book; all while intermittently trying to get back to sleep and rest. Our alert came at [night] local. Arriving for the flight; I felt alert but briefed the Captain that fatigue might be an issue due to the broken sleep and the timing of the flight being through the middle of the night. During the turn in ZZZZ; the Captain and I ate our crew meals and made preparations for the second leg. With the short turn; there was very little time for rest. I ran performance for and briefed runway XXR; the active departure runway and our cleared runway at ZZZZ. During the briefing I remember looking at the FMC to verify the settings; but clearly did not error capture XXL in the FMC. I did correctly read runway XXR during the performance briefing and ran performance for XXR. Upon blocking out; we realized we had not yet accepted the final [Weight and Balance] and corrected this. Additionally; I used my call sign from the previous leg; call sign with ground (quickly error captured and corrected). Both items alerted us to the fact that we were fatigued and we again mentioned fatigue as a threat. We were cleared to taxi to runway XXR with no incident other than standard difficulty understanding [foreign] controllers. On taking the runway; the captain briefly mentioned that the route in the EFB did not go all the way to our destination; causing me to check the EFB route and respond that it included the full departure and was enough to get us airborne and along our way. This was a minor but important distraction during final runway verification. We lined up about 10 degrees short of the runway heading; prompting me to alert the Captain that we were 10 degrees short of heading. He corrected for this. I had now verified both the signage entering and on the runway; as well as our heading and was confident we were on the correct runway; but I failed to error capture XXL in the FMC. Upon selecting the TO/GA (Take-Off Go-Around) button for takeoff; the 'FMC runway disagree' came on. I announced 'FMC runway disagree;' and the Captain elected to continue the takeoff. Upon climbing away; I immediately verified that the departure for XXR was identical to that for XXL and we continued on the departure. Remainder of the leg was executed without incident. Extensive debriefing was conducted both airborne and post flight.1) Human error - failed to detect discrepancy between FMC loaded runway and cleared runway. During the performance briefing; I ran performance for and read aloud performance data for runway XXR. We verified the runway during the performance briefing (XXL selected in the FMC). At no point during or following the performance briefing did I error capture the mistake. Additionally; as part of my duties during the final runway verification; I failed to correctly error capture the selection of runway XXL in the FMC. 2) Fatigue - This was the second of two legs beginning with a [very early morning] local takeoff time; a [short] turn in ZZZZ and then [another early morning] local takeoff time from ZZZZ. The Captain and I correctly identified fatigue as a threat and even made additional notes of small errors prior to the takeoff indicating fatigue. These included failing to send a final W&B prior to blocking out (error captured and corrected) and a single instance of incorrect call sign usage (I used my call sign from the previous leg once with ground). At no point did I feel rushed; but I did note the previous errors and both the Captain and I emphasized the need to stay alert. On taking the runway; I carefully verified that we were taking the runway we were cleared for by viewing and verbalizing the runway signage. Additionally; I alerted the Captain to being 10 degrees shy of runway heading; for which he corrected our lineup on the runway. However; I did not properly identify that runway XXL was selected in the FMC; which I believe was the result of expectation bias brought on by fatigue (I believed we had properly set the FMC during the performance brief). 3) Accidental non-compliance with a policy or procedure. FOM takeoff considerations clearly states that 'crews must...verify the correct runway and the correct first departure fix are selected in the FMS.' Although we did correctly verify the first departure fix during the departure brief; we both failed to verify that the correct runway was in the FMS; resulting in the caution on takeoff.Suggestions:Some rest during the turn could have contributed to a better scan on my part. Next time I will eat my crew meal during the inbound flight; and I'll try to get some sleep in the crew rest compartment during the turn. Additionally; this incident will forever improve my three part habit pattern upon taking the runway - 1) FMC runway and first departure point; 2) runway heading and 3) runway signage. This should have already been my scan; but this incident will etch the importance of it into my head. Additionally; for the broader organization; it might be beneficial to look at the effects of more time during the turn for the crew to rest (even if it is in the crew rest compartment).
Flight Crew flying cargo aircraft reported improperly programmed Flight Management Computer.