Regional Jet 200 ER/LR (CRJ200)
Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Flight Crew Last 90 Days 200; Flight Crew Total 20000; Flight Crew Type 1500
Other / Unknown
Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
General None Reported / Taken
Aircraft; Human Factors; Procedure
The airport had had snow most of the night and our aircraft had been type-1 deiced prior to crew arrival as well as having been re-positioned from the arrival gate the night before.The First Officer reported a satisfactory preflight inspection and also that we would require deicing as there were frozen solid remnants of the earlier deicing event adhering to the aircraft at various spots. Outside temperature was about plus ten degrees Fahrenheit and the snow was tapering off at that point.After passenger boarding and engine start and the second deicing; we began taxi. Immediately it was apparent that nose wheel authority was minimal; but there was some. Main brakes were a little better; we eventually reported poor braking conditions to the Tower. That said; purely for the nose wheel it was between poor and nil. There were no abnormal messages or indications. Aside from that fact; operation up to and prior to takeoff were normal.At liftoff; there were messages for nose door open; gear disagree. The nose gear indicated extended while the two main gear indicated retracted. There was a slight abnormal vibration which seemed to confirm the nose gear was extended as indicated.The aircraft was otherwise performing well and we continued climb out with the intent of running checklists and assessing options. We arrived on top of the overcast with clear sky above at roughly 13;000 MSL. I leveled off for cruise at 15;000 MSL. We ran the QRH checklist for gear disagree up to the point of pulling the manual gear extension handle. It was not clear just where; at that point; we would be landing. And there was little point in immediately attempting main gear landing without first deciding just where the landing would be.Originating airport surface conditions were alarming to me. We had reported poor braking and that was mostly for the effect that the brakes had; however; for the nose gear it was much more like nil. At moments taxiing out; I was concerned the aircraft might brake traction and begin sliding downslope. Returning to this airport was; for me; the last choice.In the area; I was generally aware of other possible airports. After advising Center of our condition; in due course we were provided weather for other airports none of which were suitable.Early in cruise; we checked fuel status. Current consumption; even at lowered altitude; indicated about an hour and a half remaining even continuing all the way on to our filed destination. There was about a 50 knot tailwind. We were indeed much lower than filed; but the QRH airspeed mandated flying at or less than 200 KIAS; which was an unsafe airspeed for cruising much higher than the low twenty thousand feet altitude regime at most. Depending on interpretation of SOP speed guidelines; it could have been said we were already higher than allowed for normal operation; which we were not in. That said; the overall situation was not an emergency; but rather an abnormal one in my assessment. The priority was not to land as soon as possible; but to identify a suitable airport; run the QRH to extend the main gear; and land there with sufficient fuel.I'd elected to head initially on flight plan route; towards our original destination; while prosecuting the plan to find suitable landing spot. I informed Center that we were committing to land at our filed destination.Arriving in the destination area; it was CAVU. We descended to 10;000; performed the remaining QRH which dropped the remaining gear with three down and locked at that point; with an hour and a half of fuel. We then accepted vectors to a landing. During rollout below 60 knots; there was a severe nose wheel shimmy that remained until at taxi speed.We cleared the runway with no nose wheel steering authority at all; it was inoperative. Emergency equipment was standing by even though [we did not request any]. Upon inspecting the aircraft; they indicated that the nose wheel appeared to have some apparent problem. We made calming passenger announcements and waited for a tow vehicle. Eventually; instead; passenger transfer busses were brought to the aircraft and we deplaned all passengers and they were transported to the terminal.With the main cabin door open; we were able to view the condition of the nose gear. The tires were badly worn; but not deflated. Most concerning; though; was that the torque links were not connected and were not damaged either.During the preflight; the torque links appeared in a normal state to the FO as well as the pushback and deicing crews. I can only account for any steering authority by theorizing that the links had been pushed and frozen together in a manner that was not obvious and remained so until nose strut extension at liftoff. A most unusual situation. I've recommended that our Company provide training containing photographs of this 'close; but not quite' condition in standard pilot preflight syllabi.
CRJ-900 torque links on nose gear were not secured after towing. Aircraft lost nose wheel steering upon landing.