B737-700
Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Flight Crew Last 90 Days 288; Flight Crew Type 1318
Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition
Aircraft
It's a long read; hang in there. Lots of lessons learned. Flight from ZZZ; (139 Souls) forecasted; VMC FOs (my) leg pushed back from Gate with normal engine start on both engines. Checklists ran with flaps 5 setting and Max Thrust purposely selected in the performance computer (While at the gate the planned zero and takeoff weight with reduced thrust rendered a 514 ft stopping margin on Runway XXL and when I pointed that out to the Captain; he elected to select a Max Thrust Takeoff. I concurred with his assessment but then when the load sheet arrived I pointed out that we were approximately 4000 pounds lighter than planned (rendering a 1500 ft plus stopping margin) and perhaps we could consider a reduced thrust takeoff. The Captain decided to stay with the Max thrust Takeoff decision due to gusty takeoff wind conditions and the added Safety margin in the event of an RTO. I concurred with his reasoning and we stayed with the Max Thrust takeoff plan. With the Before Taxi Checklist completed Ground cleared us to 'taxi to XXL via Taxiway A; hold short Taxiway B;' which I read back verbatim. (Quick lesson learned not associated with the Engine Failure later: The clearance should have been 'taxi to XXL via Taxiway C; hold short Taxiway B' but neither one of us caught this until we were on C; short of B).Within approximately 30 seconds; Company traffic we were holding short for cleared out and we received instructions to 'continue taxi to XXL via Taxiway A'; read back and complied. Before Takeoff Checklist completed and as we approached the XXL hold short; Tower cleared us for takeoff with a departure heading: left turn 140. Proper transfer of controls to me and we took off uneventfully with Max Thrust takeoff (95.6 percent N1 I believe). HDG Select at 1300 ft MSL and in the turn at 1620 ft MSL I commanded 'set speed; flaps 1; climb thrust.' Within approximately five seconds there was a big boom on the right side of the aircraft and the airframe shuddered slightly as the number 2 Engine wound down and you could hear grinding noises. I assessed that the Captain was most likely in the Red; based on his comments at the moment and his breathing hard in the intercom. I assessed that I was personally in the Yellow. I observed N1 winding down rapidly through 30 percent and EGT flashed red but then also came down in temperature. I had just been through training 2 weeks prior and at that moment I was really appreciating my single engine practice I had on the simulator. I felt like I was in full control of the aircraft and our rate of climb decreased but we were still climbing slowly to 3000 MSL. Once I was satisfied that we still had one good engine I felt myself coming back into the Green. In reality; I honestly think I vacillated back and forth between Green and Yellow throughout the entire 13 minute divert as we handled threats (some; if not many; self-induced). I am pretty sure we were still on Tower and the Captain calmly [advised ATC] and said; 'We lost an engine; we are going to ZZZ1.' We had briefed on the ground that if we lost an engine that we would proceed to ZZZ1. BIG Lesson Learned: the distance from ZZZ to ZZZ1 is obviously small and in hindsight it would have been far easier if we had ZZZ1 selected as an alternate (takeoff A) in the EFB for rapid selection during the situation; more on that later. The Captain pulled the QRH and said 'I think we have an engine seizure.' Between the Captain's calm ATC transmission and his immediate grab of the QRH I assessed (lesson learned: I as the PF should have called for something but the Captain beat me to it; easily I might add; as I was 90 percent task saturated with trying to smoothly fly the single engine plane) that the Captain was out of the Red and at least at Yellow if not in the Green. I said to him there was still approximately 11 percent N1 and holding and the EGT 'looked ok' (I believe in the range of approximately 300 to 400 degrees) and that I thought we had an engine failure and not a Seizure. Neither one of us noted vibrations. Captain noted zero percent N2 (to himself - I learned this after) but I don't recall him verbalizing it. He asked me if I 'was ok to continue to fly.' I said yes and retained control of the aircraft. He asked me two to three more times during our 11-12 minute divert over to ZZZ1 and each time I replied 'I'm good.' He seemed appreciative of that during the event so he could run the show. He told me after how much it helped him during the situation to not have to worry at all about the flying part. Everything was happening fast and to the best of my recollection the following happened but the exact order of which might be faulty: 1) We were switched to Departure and given a heading of further left heading. 2) We were stabilizing at level 3000 ft; flaps up; autopilot engaged (verbalized); and speed 210 knots (verbalized). 3) The bank angle was set at 30 degrees which was excessive at the time as we were coming left so I dialed it down to 20 degrees bank (not verbalized). 4) The Captain ran the QRH for Engine Failure while I guarded the appropriate controls on the good engine (challenge-response-response). 5) I switched the Transponder. 6) I remember ATC having to call us twice at various times and I answered when the Captain was too busy. Captain as PM ended up handling more than 60 to 70 percent of the overall COMMS start to finish but there were times I stepped in and helped him. In hindsight a definitive delineation or delegation of COMMS to me as PF with Autopilot engaged would have been better. 7) When the APU Gen was placed 'ON' the Autopilot B kicked off but was immediately reengaged by the Captain. Arm chair quarterbacking this whole event reminded us yet again it would be best to verbalize clearly what is about to happen and the known consequences through knowledge of aircraft systems. 8) ATC gave us a further left heading.9) I dialed the airspeed to 230 KIAS (verbalized; I think). In hindsight this was a foolish move on my part as we were rushed anyway and faster didn't help! 10) The Captain said 'I need to make a PA.' To his credit; he visibly slowed down; took a deep breath; recollected his thoughts for a second or two and calmly made an excellent PA to the Passenger. I do not recall if he talked to the Flight Attendants first but I don't think so. Later we learned just how much many of the Passengers were calmed down and reassured by the Captain's awesome PA. The Flight Attendants told us after the fact that they felt properly communicated to and appreciated all our (their words) 'great COMMS.' 11) Flight Attendants dinged us twice and asked if they needed to 'prepare the Cabin' to which the Captain said 'no' and gave a bit more amplifying information to the FAs. 12) I suggested to the Captain that we should make a quick call on VHF-2 'Ops Frequency' to let the Company know 'had an engine failure - going to ZZZ1.' He readily agreed and tried twice; but no answer and we moved on. Lesson Learned: On the ground we had called ZZZ Maintenance for an EFB cable replacement. We never put Ops back in VHF-2. Therefore both attempted calls were on ZZZ Maintenance! Always check VHF-1 and VHF-2 Active and Standby windows set properly prior to push!13) ATC gave us a climb to 4000. I dialed 4000 and selected vertical speed (verbalized) at approximately 900 fpm. 14) Captain seemed to be wrestling with himself if Engine Failure or Engine Seizure was truly the right call; but stuck with Engine Failure and briefly considered the possibility of relight. We both quickly concluded NO and both agreed 'let's concentrate on getting this aircraft safely on the ground at ZZZ1.' 15) ATC asked again for information. Captain read off the napkin and was punching a few buttons on the FMC. I pulled up the Progress page. Lesson Learned: throughout my 20 years of flying I had always armchair flew emergencies with the intent that I would be smooth on ATC with already having done the mental math of adding Souls on board and Crew members together. DON'T! This Captain's way is a no brainer: 'SOB and number Crew members.' Done; finished; easy. Maybe this is obvious to others but not to me until now. 16) Leveled off at 4000 and got fast. We were doing 255 knots (my fault - did I mention yet that everything for 13 minutes seemed fast and furious?) I recognized it and slowed back down to 210 KIAS. Lesson Learned: 'SLOW IS SMOOTH; AND SMOOTH IS FAST' (credit for that saying goes to Company Instructor at the Training Center during my recent taining.) In accordance with - slow down; slow down; and slow down. Not just in Airspeed alone but asking for extended vectors; box pattern; etc. While your heart is racing in your throat and you are trying mightily to get back to the Green; will yourself to slow down and try to methodically think through stuff. 17) The Captain was still trying to wrap up the QRH. 18) ATC asked which runway we wanted to which the Captain replied 'the longest.'19) I dialed 3000 and V/S in the MCP (verbalized; I think) and called 'flaps 1' and I set speed 180 in the speed window (not verbalized). Captain selected flaps 1. 20) Somewhere about now the Captain pulled out the performance computer to run the landing numbers for XXR. 21) The Captain said to ATC 'what is the ILS Frequency?' ATC responded but I did not process what they said. The Captain dialed the frequency in his side and I thought I saw his hand flash over to my side. I assumed he dialed it in but I did not verify. I engaged VOR/LOC on the MCP (verbalized). Long story longer: the Captain got distracted and did NOT dial in my NAV box. Neither one of us had ZZZ1 up on our EFBs. We both fumbled hurriedly to try to get the proper pages up but with the adrenaline pumping the EFB was not responding very well to my rapid (shaky) finger touches on the screen. 22) I did not know exactly which one of the Runways was XXR at ZZZ1. I did not have ZZZ1 up on my EFB and no LOC frequency. I flew through the final approach course and ATC said 'you are a little right of course for XXR; come left' which I complied. 23) By now I realized the LOC frequency was not in my side and I asked the Captain to put it on my side. He said to ATC 'what is that ILS frequency again?' This time was put in my side but by now I was slightly left of final approach course. 24) Kicked off the Autopilot and began a visual; hand flown; approach to XXR. 25) Commanded 'landing Gear down; flaps 15' but then looked at my airspeed and we were doing 200 KIAS so I yelled 'leave the flaps for now.' The Captain lowered the gear and did not move the flaps. Slowed to 180 KIAS and called 'flaps 15.' Not sure in all this if we ever did flaps 5 or not. 26) Somewhere in here I verbalized to the Captain that Company policy for the single engine landing was the Captain PT's. He said something to the effect of 'keep control of the aircraft for now; and I will take it later.' 27) Got VOR/LOC Capture by 2000 ft and glideslope capture by 1500 ft. 28) Somewhere in here we were switched to Tower. I asked the Captain if we had landing clearance and I think he called to get it. I did not hear the landing clearance. 29) I don't recall if I asked for the Landing Checklist but I can admit I definitely did not call for the 'S/E Deferred Landing Checklist.' I made a mental note that I saw 3 down and locked but I am fairly certain we never verbally ran the deferred before Landing Checklist.  30) 1000 ft call was made at 850; something along the lines of '1000 now 800; airspeed 150 correcting; sink rate 850 fpm.' 31) I asked if we had landing clearance and the Captain said something along the lines of 'getting it now.' 32) I asked the Captain if he now wanted to take the aircraft for the landing. He said something along the lines of 'you are looking good and stable; you keep
There are two very prominent reasons this event came to a successful conclusion:1: Company Training Department2: First OfficerI cannot speak highly enough of the First Officer! His airmanship and professionalism shined throughout this event. The best thing he did for our Passengers; our Company; and me was fly the aircraft and remain calm and professional. This allowed me to manage the bigger picture of getting this damaged aircraft on the ground safely. The flight lasted 14 minutes. From the time of engine failure to touchdown at ZZZ1 was approximately 13 minutes. I do not recall many of the details of those 13 minutes as this was the fastest 13 minutes of my life. I have waited a few days to write this report and I'm glad I did. Although some of the details have dropped from my mind; it has allowed me to mentally digest the entire situation; stop beating myself up for not being perfect; and realize that although I could have done some things better; we did the 'big' things right or at least mostly right. We as Pilots want to be robots and do step 1; step 2; step 3; etc. In real life; the effect of being stunned and the rush of adrenaline causes momentary tunnel vision; fog shrouded initial thinking; and brain hyper drive. The following is what happened to the best of my recollection.This flight was a completely normal; everyday flight until about 1900 MSL. I think we had completed a left turn and were wings level. We were climbing to 3000 MSL. Then it happened. BOOM! It felt and sounded like an explosion on the right side of the aircraft. Then entire airplane shook and shuddered like we had been hit by something large. I have never experienced an engine failure outside of training and can say with certainty; nothing in training could have prepared me for the loudness; violence; immediate shock and stun of an event like this; or the effects of adrenaline on the brain.The aircraft banked to the right and First Officer did an outstanding job of recovering and keeping the aircraft in a climb. He recovered so quickly I never had the time to even consider whether I needed to get on the controls with him. I can recall several things; but I cannot recall the exact order in which they happened. The tunnel vision effect had presented itself. I recall looking at the engine gauges and seeing one of them filled with red; I believe it was the N1 gauge but am not 100% certain. I recall looking at the flight instruments and these are the basics of what I saw. We were at 2000; climbing; flaps 1; airspeed good. At some point; I think the FO and I looked at each other I said to something to effect of; 'What was that?' My mind was racing and my first thought was bird strike. I remember being stunned with tunnel vision. I looked at the hand microphone and was thinking the Passengers need to know they will be ok. I regained my senses and the gravity of the situation hit me. This is real! Focus. We are in a damaged aircraft. This is on me! Another rush of adrenaline I'm sure. All of this took place in a matter of seconds. Once I 'snapped to'; the following events occurred (though I am uncertain as to the exact order). I asked The FO if he was Ok. I think I asked if he had it under control; but not sure. He responded yes. I got on the radio; [advised ATC]; told ATC we had lost an engine and we would be flying up to ZZZ1. They asked for number of souls on board and fuel in pounds. I responded; 'Standby'.I was 'in the red' and was aware of it; still a little stunned and had not completely processed anything more than an engine had failed; we were not on fire; and the aircraft was under control. I was overwhelmed with the number of tasks that had to be accomplished to get this aircraft safely on the ground ASAP. My brain was going in many different directions. This is where Company Training Department shines! With 100% certainty; one of the best things Company Training has ever done is give us the QRH. The training kicked in. Although I was 'in the red'; I did what we do in training. I reached for the QRH. I cannot tell you how valuable this tool was at the time. It brought me back into the loop and zeroed me in on where I needed to be. With the adrenaline rush/stun factor; my brain was still in hyper drive and I still was not processing information as well as I would have liked. I recall looking at the QRH and methodically going through the items. Red items; Rapid Decompression. No. This is not a memory item event. Loss of Thrust on Both Engines. No. Engine Fire or Engine Severe Damage or Separation. Maybe. I knew; no matter what; we had to go through the process of securing the right engine and this checklist would accomplish that. I vaguely recall doing the items on the QRH as a Crew. However; when I reached item 4. Engine Fire Switch; I internally questioned whether we were on the correct checklist. I looked at Engine Fire Warning and at the engine gauges. We had no indication of an engine fire. I then looked at the engine gauges and we had N1 rotation. I remember 13.1%. At this point; there was short conversation with the FO about what we were dealing with. I do not recall the details. The only thing I remember is that the conversation gave me conflicting information with my view of the situation and I had to reassess. I stopped the checklist. I did not want to do anything unless I was 100% sure it was correct. The N1 rotation was unexpected. I was looking at the gauges trying to analyze the engine parameters. Was it severe damage or just an engine failure? Did we take a bird? We have N1. My brain was still in overdrive. I made a decision. Don't spend too much time analyzing and get this aircraft on the ground immediately. The aircraft is flying just fine. I verified again; we do not have an engine fire. We are single engine and low altitude. If we take a bird; we're done. I did not want to spend too much time flying around on one engine as we have nice long runways nearby and it's clear and a million. Back to the basics. What do I know for sure? The FO is flying; the aircraft is under control. We do NOT have an engine fire. We do have an engine failure.QRH. Engines tab. Engine Failure Shutdown. Yes.As a Crew; we accomplished the Engine Failure Shutdown Checklist. I recall announcing I was waiting for the APU to start. After it started; I placed the right side APU Gen online. It kicked the autopilot off. I knew immediately what it was and reached over and reengaged the B Autopilot as I did not want that to distract the FO from what he was doing. I told him what I was doing. As soon as I was able; I made a PA to the Passengers. The A Flight Attendant estimated it was about 5 minutes after the engine failure. I took a deep breath and made sure my voice was calm and reassuring. I can only imagine how fearful they must have been. I told them we had an engine failure (or something to that effect); everything is under control; we were flying to ZZZ1 and we would have them on the ground shortly.The Flight Attendants immediately called the flight deck and asked if they should prepare the cabin. I think I responded; 'No; we're good.' They said once I made the PA and told them 'we're good' that the calm demeanor settled their minds. As far as I can tell based on conversations after the event; they did a stellar job of maintaining their composure while the Passengers were looking to them. The most important thing they did for us was wait before calling the flight deck until I made the PA and they knew we were in a position for them to call. We didn't need another distraction before this point. I'm sure it is very tough to sit there without knowing what was going on; especially after something that drastic.Throughout this process; I was also trying to handle the radios so the FO could concentrate on flying. We teamed up though. If I was too busy or missed a radio call; he took it. We traded off when necessary and worked well together. I inherently knew he had the aircraft under control because he was calmly answering radio calls when necessary and complying with ATC instructions. I did; however; check back with him at least a few times throughout this event to make sure he was doing ok. ATC asked again how many souls on board and how much fuel in pounds. I have no idea at what point in the flight this was. I do know having that napkin from the A Flight Attendant right there avoided yet another distraction. I looked at the napkin and said; '139 passengers; 5 crewmembers; and 13;800 (?) pounds of fuel'.ATC asked which runway we would like. I responded; 'Whatever the winds favor and the longest one you have.' They said XXR. I asked for the frequency. When they responded after a short wait; I think I put the frequency on my side; but something distracted me (radio call?) and I did not get it into the FO side. I recall ATC saying we had flown through the course and they gave a heading to get back on. I recall the FO calling for flaps; and somewhere around 1000; I came back into the flying loop. I looked up and saw four runways in front of us and was not sure which one was XXR. I asked The FO and he thought we were lined up on it. I managed to pull up the ZZZ1 10-9 and told the FO I thought were lined up on Runway XXC and to move to the right one. At some point; ATC said the winds; and I recall realizing it was fairly gusty and I wanted an accurate target speed. Still being in the red and unable to compute numbers; I pulled out the performance computer; and quickly found ZZZ1 and put in the winds with all other fields to the default numbers. It think it was 140; 153; no brackets. The FO called for flaps 5 and then landing gear down. When he called for flaps 15; we received a Ground Proximity Warning and the FO calmly inhibited the flap switch. I had the page in the QRH open but we never made it to the descent checklist due to the time crunch. I do not recall if we accomplished the Before Landing Checklist. Out of habit; I do recall internally accomplishing the '5 green light' check.At approximately 700; the FO said; 'You're supposed to land.' I said; 'No; you're landing.' He responded; 'Are you sure?' I replied; 'Yes; I'm not transferring control of the airplane at this point; you're landing.'Touchdown and rollout was uneventful. We exited to the right and stopped and spoke with Ground Control. Fire/Rescue was approaching from the front of the aircraft and on frequency. I asked them to check out the exterior of the aircraft. I made a PA and informed the Passengers we were on the ground at ZZZ1 airport and to not be alarmed at seeing fire trucks. As a precautionary measure; I had asked them drive around the aircraft and check everything out. Fire/Rescue informed us everything looked ok and they would be standing by at our 6 o'clock all the way to the gate. The FO and I worked together in coordinating with Dispatch in securing a gate and keeping the Passengers and F/A's informed. We eventually (20 minutes?) proceeded to Other Carrier gate at ZZZ1. Other Airline Maintenance and Customer Service met us at the gate and did an outstanding job of taking care of our Customers.The FO coordinated Chiefs; Union; and Dispatch while I was formulating a plan with Other Airline Customer Service in how to deal with our Passengers. After that; I dealt with Maintenance to make sure the logbook was properly finished and I had permission to release the aircraft to Other Airline Maintenance to tow the aircraft to their hangar. The number of phone calls was a bit ridiculous. It seemed everybody wanted to talk to me. I was busy dealing with Other Airline Customer service trying to take care of our Customers; and coordinating between Company Maintenance and Other Airline Maintenance. I needed everybody to leave me alone and let me finish the job! We were safely on the ground. Not one of these conversations needed to be accomplished immediately. The FO did a great
B737 flight crew reported an engine failure shortly after takeoff with a successful diversion to a nearby airport.