EMB ERJ 145 ER/LR
Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Confusion; Situational Awareness
Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Speed All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Aircraft; Human Factors; Weather
We departed several hours late due to our previous flights' late inbound arrival. Upon initial climb out we enter IMC associated with multiple embedded thunderstorms and local convective activity. While climbing to cruise we encounter chop and light turbulence along with heavy precipitation. Multiple lightning strikes occur in close proximity along with some evidence of heavy static discharge. While climbing through precipitation and receiving vectors to avoid weather; we experience difficult communication issues with various departure and ARTCC controllers. Several aircraft as well as controller communication and transmitter changes were required to maintain contact with ATC. Due to heavy line and storm locations we elected to try to stay on a westerly course until an open area presented itself and we could traverse southerly and continue enroute to ZZZZ. While finding a vacant area of convective radar returns we elected to climb from FL320 to FL360 and proceed on a more southbound route. Shortly after leveling off and additional vectors; an IAS flag on the Primary Flight Display (PFD) indicating a difference in air data was presented. After short discussion about the indication; including the Captain's (pilot flying) recent simulation training; we find ourselves heading through a section of weather that appears to be closing in on us and our planned route through. While this is simultaneously happening both First Officer and Captain side airspeed indications begin to deteriorate. The rate and somewhat erratic change causes us to refer immediately to the erroneous airspeed tables listed in the QRH. These prompted the Captain to take the autopilot off along with disabling the flight director and yaw damper and hand fly the appropriate attitude and power settings being called out by myself (pilot monitoring); as prescribed in the QRH. During the next moments the air data (both my First Officer side and the Captain side) was showing all red Xs. Now with our planned route being closed off; turbulence increasing and workload increasing; the immediate action to return was initially made. ATC was advised along with notification of air data indications and problems. As we begin our turn back; we receive word from ATC that the route back is deteriorating as well. The Captain maintained aircraft control and I began work on notification of dispatch; alternate destination weather; and more QRH reference to aircraft control. The decision to divert to SAT was made. The location and weather was most favorable to us. We also knew we had several other options regarding customs and operations capabilities at SAT versus trying to get to a weather entrenched alternate. As we began a turn and descend we encountered more moderate turbulence; aircraft icing; as well as a loud pop and ozone/burning smell; most likely indicating a lightning strike. Throughout the descent the Captain side at times began to regain some data and then fail again; while my side was relatively void of information regarding air data. We coordinated with ATC to help call out our ground speed and their altitude in order to cross reference ours that was intermittent and maintain positive control. As we prepared for an approach to Runway 4 at SAT; we broke out and into intermittent IMC at about 6;000 feet. During some vectors around more weather into SAT the Captain side began to slowly regain air data. My side was a little more delayed and eventually returned closer to landing. Once on final the pilot flying was able to get a visual on Runway 4 and an overweight landing was made. We taxied under our own power to the terminal where flight termination was made.Threats included in this event are numerous and at times quite compounding. Adverse weather; ATC communication during weather; aircraft malfunction; stress of situation; and distractions based on all outside in influences. Errors included procedural errors based around QRH usage. I originally read the pitch and power settings and based it on the incorrect ERJ model. I did remedy this during descent once I found out I was reading the wrong ones a few pages before. Operational decision errors may have been related to proceeding farther into the storm system then we should have. The decision to divert or even avoid the weather at a greater distance may have kept us from going through the weather cell during descent that was quite rough.It seems especially with some of the foreign flying that we do; our weather gathering or even flight planning might be lacking. Of course our major threat related error was related to an aircraft malfunction; but the multitude of factors and chain of events that led to the subsequent diversion and landing may have been less likely had weather planning been improved or possibly even avoided if the flight was routed better.
An EMB-145 First Officer describes a flight in convective weather with several lightning strikes. At FL360 the crew begins to see airspeed flags and eventually lose both pilot airspeed indications. The crew elects to divert with the Captain flying pitch and power and the First Officer providing targets from the QRH. During approach; at 4;000 feet; the Captain's airspeed indication returns to normal.