MD-88
Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant
Maintenance Lead Technician 11; Maintenance Technician 16
Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown
Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue
Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; Flight Crew Diverted; General Maintenance Action; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed
Aircraft; Human Factors; Procedure
While working with contract maintenance in ZZZ on a MEL deferral of the right engine fuel heat valve. All MEL procedures were complied with except for wiring the position indicator into place to secure the valve. On climb out; crew had high fuel and oil temperature. Crew was unable to control oil temperature and shut the right engine down. Aircraft off landed in ZZZ1. Landing was uneventful.
October 2014. I was called by Air Carrier X for contract maintenance on field at ZZZ. Discrepancy was listed as Right-Hand (R/H) fuel heat valve light stays illuminated. I spoke with Air Carrier X Maintenance Control Operations and was instructed to open the front lower cowling. Upon opening I could hear the fuel heat valve motor running continuously. I pulled the breakers for the motor and indicator. The motor stopped running and the indicator light went out. I positioned the valve to the closed position; all under specific instruction by the Maintenance Controller for Air Carrier X. I specifically asked if there were any further 'M' procedures for mel compliance and was told there were not. Apparently both the controller and myself missed the step of safety wiring or manually fixing the valve to the closed position. I closed the cowling; collared the effected Circuit Breakers (C/Bs) and filled out the log book and mel placard; again under direct instruction of Air Carrier X Maintenance Controller. The aircraft was dispatched and developed oil overheat problems as the fuel/oil heat valve vibrated to the open position. The aircraft diverted to ZZZ1 and landed safely. There was no damage to the aircraft or engine. There were no injuries.
Two Aircraft Maintenance Technicians (AMTs) were informed that an MD-88 aircraft they had just performed an 'M' procedure for an MEL deferral of the Right Engine Fuel/Oil Heat Valve; had developed uncontrollable high fuel and oil temperatures on climbout; requiring an inflight engine shutdown. Valve had been physically positioned to the 'closed' position; but not safety wired and vibrated to the 'open' position after engine start-up.