MD-11
Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Confusion; Distraction; Situational Awareness; Troubleshooting; Workload
Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Aircraft
After takeoff and on initial climb at approximately 400-500 feet AGL; we got a LVL 1 Alert 'REV 2 Pressure Fault'.  We also had a Red 'U/L' indication in the #2 Engine N1 Gauge.  We kept climbing and maintained speed at 230 KIAS.  We checked all thrust reverser levers secure and down.  We referenced and accomplished both checklists in the QRH; then referenced the MEL & Aircraft Systems Manual.  There were no vibrations or yawing or trim anomalies associated with the alerts and the aircraft was climbing/flying normally (hand flying at time and subsequently placed autopilot ON to free up the Captain; who was PM; and to allow me to be involved in the process as PF).  There were numerous frequency changes and fairly busy traffic in the area.  Although the QRH allowed for continuing to our filed destination; after considerable crew discussion and Captain's coordination with Maintenance at the departure Ramp we felt it safer to return to the departure airport to investigate further.  Part of our discussion rested on the MEL stating that if Maintenance was to defer a thrust reverser that once they secured and 'locked out' the Reverser; if the Amber 'U/L' (UNLOCKED) remained displayed the deferral could not be used and therefore the aircraft could not be dispatched until the Amber 'U/L' was repaired.  Although the MEL no longer applied at this point (airborne) and we were operational and referencing for information and knowledge; we felt it was the safest course of action to return.  We coordinated with ATC; descended to 11;000; and once we leveled at 11;000 feet all alerts and indications disappeared.  We discussed it further and since we had a significant amount of fuel; [we] decided as a crew we could continue to our filed destination safely and notified Ramp; Dispatch and ATC.  The remaining flight and landing in our filed destination were uneventful.The QRH is clear and we only had indications of a #2 'U/L'; although we had 2 alerts associated with the same engine thrust reverser and neither referenced the other; continuing with a Red 'U/L' with weather enroute; moderate turbulence reported on ATIS and soon to be accelerating to 355 KIAS and M.82 simply didn't appear to be the safest course of action.  I am certain there are multiple backup systems to secure the thrust reverser inflight but once again felt it was the safest course of action and best decision.
A MD-11 LVL 1 'REV 2 PRESSURE FAULT' and a Red 'U/L' in the #2 N2 gauge alerted after takeoff and as the QRH was completed the crew prepared to return but the alerts extinguished so the crew continued to the filed destination.