Falcon 2000
Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown
ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Human Factors; Procedure
A Cirrus was coordinated as 'a practice approach that was going to go missed approach.' We give practice approaches IFR separation on the approach but do not have to allow them to execute the missed approach with IFR protection. I told him he would be VFR after terminating the approach and 'right turn out approved.' I told the aircraft when he reported at the missed approach point to maintain VFR. He read it back. I then cleared a Falcon for takeoff on a LINDZ 7 departure. I coordinated with Approach that the Cirrus would be VFR from the missed approach point. Approach then advised me that the aircraft was in fact an IFR aircraft; not just a VFR doing a practice approach. The RA event was with Falcon departing and Hawker arriving. I scrambled to afford IFR separation with the Cirrus whom I now understood was an IFR Cirrus departure in front of a Falcon departure. The Falcon didn't get as good of traffic calls as I should have given. However the Hawker; inbound was on final and the Falcon quite clear of final to the west; westbound when he got the TCAS alert. They were not a factor. He was unhappy about the situation. At the time I told approach that the Cirrus was VFR on the climb out; and she told me he was on an IFR flight plan; I was scrambling. I coordinated headings to keep the Cirrus out of the way of the Falcon right behind him. I was successful in this but did not use the landlines in the interest of time as we are a TRACAB and it was faster to point at approach's scope and coordinate simultaneously with issuing the turn to the pilot. It is not directly related to the TCAS event; but the use of the term 'practice approach' is quite misleading. I have seen this before in training on approach. I advised the developmental not to coordinate an IFR arrival as 'a practice approach.'
We departed Aspen in perfect weather on the LINDZ 7 departure. At 11;000 FT we got an RA command 'descend descend.' My partner was flying and followed the commands. A Hawker was on descent to ASE to land. We followed the RA commands down to 9;200 FT on the LINDZ 7; before we were clear of conflict. The Hawker seemed to continue its descent to ASE for landing. I informed ASE Tower we were TCAS descent; I had to repeat due to a heterodyne. Tower seemed very unconcerned. I repeated we were TCAS descent still. I was doing my best to express urgency. A voice over the frequency said 'grow up'! Our takeoff briefing was very thorough and we had the southeast emergency route ready and briefed. The briefing of a safe altitude of 10;000 FT was fresh in our minds. We climbed steeply to 10;000 FT after the RA. Most noticeable; the Hawker continued it's descent to land while we were in our TCAS descent. We did our best; the Tower was quite 'calm' about it; and the Hawker crew?
ASE Controller described a TCAS RA event between a departure and arrival aircraft caused by a misunderstanding between the Approach and Local Controllers reference the term 'practice approach' and IFR vs VFR status.