Small Aircraft
Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Multiengine
Flight Crew Last 90 Days 100; Flight Crew Total 7000; Flight Crew Type 1500
Other / Unknown; Physiological - Other; Situational Awareness; Time Pressure
Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter VFR In IMC; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
General None Reported / Taken
Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors; Weather
I arrived at the airport before dawn with my copilot; an equally qualified ATP; for a planned departure around sunrise from an uncontrolled field overlaid by Class G airspace. The flight involved carrying a group of passengers on a transcontinental itinerary; with two short stops. Knowing the morning surface temps were likely to be at or near freezing; with potential for frost; we had arranged for the aircraft to be hangared for the night and to be pulled out around the time we intended to arrive. We had anticipated clear skies; based on the available forecasts. On arrival at the airport we discovered the upper surfaces of the wings were covered in frozen droplets. The line crew explained that a rain shower had blown through before they put the aircraft in the hangar the previous evening; and that the wings were still wet when they towed it out in the am. Unfortunately; they had pulled it out a little earlier than arranged; which had given the water time to freeze. The temp reported by the AWOS at that time was -XC. Another unanticipated factor was a low broken cloud layer instead of clear skies. I asked the line crew to put the plane back in the hangar and called the passengers and informed them there would be a delay.Once the drops had melted we dried the surfaces with towels; then called the passengers to come to the airport. With passengers onboard I started the engine; began the taxi; and had the copilot call the clearance. Clearance informed us there would be several minutes delay due to traffic departing a nearby field. The delay turned into 20 minutes and as we sat at the hold line a fog settled in; restricting surface visibility to around 1/4 mile. The OAT read minus 1. Given the restricted visibility and potential surface icing conditions we decided it was unwise to depart; even though we suspected the fog layer was only a few hundred feet thick. I went aft and explained the situation to the passengers; then taxied back to the ramp. By this time we were already almost two hours' delayed. The fog persisted another 90 minutes or so; during which time the passengers grew increasingly anxious about the prospect of having to postpone the trip to the following day. We had learned that morning of an impending inter-state COVID quarantine rule change with potentially very negative consequences for us in the event of further delay. All this put us under considerable pressure to depart.The fog eventually lifted into low clouds; and we noticed an area of blue sky appear off the departure end of the runway. Surrounding fields were reporting clear skies. The AWOS at our departure field was reporting 400 feet overcast and 6 miles visibility. Under normal circumstances I would have elected to depart IFR. However; faced with the already considerable delay and irritated passengers I made a quick decision to depart VFR; anticipating that we could maintain class G cloud clearance requirements in the initial climb and would be beyond the area of low clouds over the field by the time we were entered Class E airspace. I was highly familiar with the terrain in the area; having landed at the field several times in the preceding week and noted no local traffic on TCAS or the CTAF.In the initial climb; however; I discovered I had misjudged the cloud coverage off the departure end; and was felt the safest route was to climb into IMC instead of stay below the deck. We ended up IMC as we entered Class E airspace; only clearing the tops around 1;000 AGL; in violation of FAR 91.155.After departure I asked my copilot to pick up our IFR clearance with the Local Controller. He then informed me that he had actually activated a hold for release clearance with clearance before departure while I had been outside the airplane informing the passengers that we were ready to board. While a hold for release clearance does not prohibit a VFR departure; the AIM does state that the hold for release should be canceled before a VFR departure.In hindsight it is clear to me I should have handled the situation differently. I should have resisted the pressure to get wheels up quickly; and remained on the ground until either an IFR departure clearance could be obtained from clearance; or the weather had lifted to the point I could be absolutely certain a VMC departure and climbout could be made. My rushed decision making and hasty conduct of the takeoff resulted in poor judgment and a lapse in good CRM.
Corporate Captain reported poor judgment resulted in flying VFR into IMC. Captain reported outside pressures to depart contributed to the event.