Widebody Transport
Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Confusion; Workload; Fatigue; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown; Training / Qualification; Distraction
Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Flight Crew FLC Overrode Automation; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Human Factors; Procedure
I (PF) briefed the LENDY6 Arrival and VOR/DME RWY 22L approach. Captain (PM) asked 'what if ATC asks for VOR 13L?' I told him unable; or he is welcome to take the approach. I considered the VOR 13L a 'contact with the ground' approach mostly used for pilots familiar with JFK and the surroundings. I wasn't comfortable doing this visual maneuver at the end of my long day over congested population into a busy airport. He agreed and let me continue with the approach planning VOR/DME 22L.NY center cleared us direct to LENDY and the arrival. After passing LENDY at FL190 and 250K; switched to Kennedy Approach (radios were busy; but not overly congested) who said 'cleared direct to LGA for VOR 13L approach'. PM replied 'unable' (we meant 'unable for the VOR13L approach' and assumed VOR/DME 22L as it was the only other approach reported on the ATIS; ATC understood 'unable direct LGA'); ATC gave us a heading of about 120. We continued and crossed close to the field continuing SE about 12;000 FT. We then discussed if we were going to get vectors back to the north for RWY 22L. Further descent to 6000 FT still heading away from the airport. I then slowed to 210K (about 15 knots above the lower foot) using FCP level change (speed on pitch). About 20 miles away from JFK over the ocean; another descent to 3000 FT; at this time we didn't know which Runway we were getting vectored for. PM asked ATC which Runway to expect; ATC replied VOR 13L. We replied we were unable and stated that at check-in.ATC got a little frantic and directed us to a left turn heading northeast; followed quickly by directions to another aircraft (presumably close-by) to stop descent at 5000 FT (our altitude). ATC then told us 'good rate of turn; traffic descending to 5000 FT.' Being under control of the situation and with good S/A about the airspace (and maybe over-confidence in my airmanship); I disconnected the AP and made a 30-40 degree bank turn while still descending. The problem was the FMA was still in a 'speed on pitch' profile with the throttles clamped at idle! Half way thru the turn; I noticed the airspeed had decayed to 15 knots BELOW the foot! I quickly dialed up the Vertical Speed to get the FMA out of 'speed on pitch' and back to 'speed on thrust' (previously selected at 210K) then immediately pushed the throttles up a lot! About the same time; the PM said 'airspeed' and followed the base of the throttles up behind my input. I shallowed out of the turn (didn't want to get into stick-shaker or stall) as the engines spooled up. The PM directed me to continue my descent to 3000 FT. After settling the plane on our northeast heading at 3000 FT and over 220K; I ensured the FCP was programmed to what I wanted and engaged the AP. Once separation was established; ATC was back to normal speed of instructions; it didn't appear this would be an incident on their part.The tone on the flight deck changed; and to get CRM back I stated 'I'm sorry about that; I'm recaged again' and something to the effect of 'do you want me to continue or do you want to take it from here?' PM told me to continue flying. Vectors to VOR/DME 22L and landing were without incident. Thorough debrief afterwards. I was very upset with myself!1) Disconnect with our call 'unable' meaning unable VOR 13L and ATC's understanding of our call; he thought 'Unable direct LGA' but still vectoring us to VOR 13L.2) We should have ensured which approach to expect as we started heading in the opposite direction from VOR/DME 22L approach. Radios were busy but we still could've asked the controller.3) Once ATC knew our intentions; he could've let us drone a bit more vs. telling us to turn left heading NE immediately; and then discovered we might be a conflict with other traffic.4) ATC's frustration and 'good rate of turn' shouldn't have prompted me to disconnect the AP and make an aggressive maneuver. There was the plane was performing normally.5) I should have been more aware of the 'speed on pitch' FMA and had the airspeed in my cross-check. Flying with auto-throttles always engaged gave me a false confidence that the airspeed was being monitored.
After reviewing the ATIS for JFK the FO realized there was a good possibility we would be asked to do the VOR 13L since that and the VOR 22L were advertised. He informed me that he was uncomfortable doing the VOR 13L in the aircraft because of bad results he had witnessed performing it in the simulator. In order to avoid a potentially unsafe situation; I decided to inform approach that we were unable that approach if we were assigned it. Shortly after briefing this; we were instructed to proceed direct LaGuardia VOR and to expect the VOR 13L. I informed approach control that we were 'unable' and he began to give us vectors for what I thought would be runway 22L. What I discovered several minutes later was that approach thought we were unable to go direct LaGuardia VOR; but still planned on us doing the VOR 13L. When this became apparent; I queried approach and he told us that we were being vectored for 13L. I asked if he copied that we were unable and he explained the misunderstanding that we had. At that point; the approach controller's tone became very hectic as he had us descend to 3000 feet and stopped aircraft behind us from descending below 5000 feet. He then asked us to turn 180 degrees to the left as quickly as we could. The FO commanded the aircraft to turn immediately; but the autopilot limited the bank to 25 degrees. Because of the controller's sense of urgency; he then disconnected the autopilot to increase the bank to 30 degrees. As he took manual control of the airplane; he decreased the pitch down and momentarily stagnated the descent. The aircraft was still in a 'speed on pitch' and the auto throttles were still at idle in order to descend at the expected rate. This caused the speed to slow 15 KTS below the commanded speed and approach the yellow band on the airspeed indicator. I reached over to push up the throttles at the same time the FO was pushing them forward. I had to then command the FO to continue the descent since I realized that ATC was trying to get us vertical clearance from the aircraft we were turning back toward. The rest of the flight continued uneventfully.The first factor toward this was the unexpected situation we were presenting to Approach Control since they probably assume most pilots can fly any approach they have available to them. Since this is probably not normal; that made it easy for them to misinterpret the situation when I did not fully communicate what part of the clearance we could not complete. The other major factor was that the FO felt he needed to disconnect the autopilot in a descending turn just to get an additional 5 degrees of bank just because the controller sounded hectic. It was a situation that he was clearly not fully prepared to handle with complete safety.Next time I fly with an FO that feels incapable of flying an approach that most other aircraft are assigned to fly; I will inquire whether he feels capable of making the radio calls while I fly the approach. In an attempt to foster a positive environment in the cockpit; I feel that I let the FO's weakness jeopardize our safety further. In the future; I feel that it would enhance safety to show less concern for the climate in the cockpit in this type of situation and acknowledge that it could create a greater hazard by disrupting the flow in one of the busiest approach environments in the world.
First Officer disconnected the autopilot and allowed the speed to decay significantly while being vectored for an approach to JFK VOR/DME Runway 22L after refusing the VOR Runway 13L. The autothrottles were engaged but were at idle in 'speed on pitch' mode rather than 'speed on thrust.'