EMB ERJ 145 ER/LR
Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Situational Awareness
ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical
Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance
Human Factors; Procedure
We were utilizing an unusual runway configuration due to line painting on Runway 10/28; which was closed. The advertised departure runways were 24L and 24R; with GC selecting the best runway based on arrival demand to 24L; the only available landing runway. I was the CIC; and was preparing to begin a position relief briefing as the event unfolded. I became aware of the developing situation when the Local Controller called out to me; at which point I observed an E145 on departure roll on 24L; with another E145 flaring for landing on short final. At first glance it immediately became apparent to me that if allowed to land; the second E145 would be less than 6;000 FT from the departing aircraft. The Local Controller seemed to be soliciting my opinion on whether to allow the arrival aircraft to land; which while resulting in a loss of separation; might theoretically be safer than issuing a go-around. My snap decision was that the safest decision was to send the arrival around; which I vocalized immediately to the Local Controller. The instruction was delayed due to another aircraft checking in; but as soon as he was able; the Local Controller issued the go-around. The Local Controller stated; 'E145; go around; right side.' The phraseology was unfamiliar to me; and I presumed it would be unfamiliar to the pilot as well. I told the Local Controller to assign a heading to the go-around aircraft; which was now climbing with the departure aircraft just ahead of him. I am not entirely sure where the resulting confusion came from; whether it was a mixed up call sign or simply the wrong aircraft taking the turn; but the departure aircraft began a turn to the right; which is what the Local Controller intended for the trailing aircraft to do. The Local Controller stopped the first aircraft's turn; and then turned the trailing aircraft right to a northwesterly heading; established divergence and switched both aircraft to departure. During this sequence; the AMASS had triggered an alarm. I was aware of the situation before the AMASS alert sounded; and was quite intently focused on the events outside the Tower window; to the point that I did not consciously note the AMASS alert and had to be told later that it had in fact; sounded an alert. I believed the go around was issued before the second aircraft crossed the threshold; thus preventing a loss of separation; but after 'reconstructing' the event some time later; I am no longer certain that separation was not lost. In any case it was not a desirable operation. Having only been made aware of the situation after it was well underway; I can only speculate on the causes; but a few causes seem obvious. 1. The Local Controller's decision to attempt to launch a departure between two arrival aircraft which were ultimately too close together to allow a same-runway departure between them. 2. The Local Controller's hesitation to issue mitigating instructions (a request for S turns or more timely go-around instructions) 3. The Ground Controller's decision to taxi the departure aircraft to the lone arrival runway at a time when arrival demand was starting to increase. Also contributing were the Local Controller's relatively low currency in the Tower; and the fact that I did not recognize the developing situation due to being 'heads down' at the CRU-Art station; looking at the staffing situation and being relatively unaware of the traffic situation. Recommendation; at the time of the incident; I was the most senior and experienced Controller in the Tower. If I could do it over again; I would have paid closer attention to what the front line was doing; and had I been watching more closely; I'm certain I would have noted the fact that a departure was taxiing for the arrival runway as arrivals were coming in; and I would have seen that all the arrivals were closely spaced with no natural gap for a departure. Having said that; it is virtually impossible; as CIC; to fulfill all duties while maintaining constant vigilance over the operation. Inevitably there will be times when the CIC's attention will be focused on other tasks; as mine was when the event occurred. In my humble opinion; the best thing to prevent a re-occurrence of this event would be the mere fact that the event occurred to begin with; drawing the collective attention of the facility's controllers to the factors that led up to the event. To many controllers with more experience than myself; today's event is not surprising at all. To many with less experience; there is much to be learned. Lack of proficiency is epidemic at a facility; we have too many developmentals; not enough trainers and even fewer airplanes. Any given day; you could be called upon to work a position that you haven't seen any complexity or volume on in weeks if not months; and any given day; something unusual or unlikely can happen that will expose the controller's lack of proficiency. Some days; that exposure leads to a loss of separation or a bad/unsafe operation. I see no obvious solution to the issue. We all just try to get by.
Tower CIC described a go-around event resulting from the Local Controller's questionable spacing judgment between an arrival and departing aircraft.