Commercial Fixed Wing
Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Situational Awareness; Human-Machine Interface; Distraction
Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT
Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Aircraft; ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Airport; Software and Automation; Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related
I was flying pilot. Approach was fully briefed. AMOS 1E STAR; transitioning to an RNP approach from HADAS. Descending in VNAV Path. Cleared direct MORIA and cleared the approach. Normal stable descent; normal procedures and speed reduction. MORIA waypoint in the FMC must have had 3;000A instead of 3;600A; because we crossed MORIA between 3;600 and 3;000; when the altitude we should cross MORIA at is 3;600 or above. It is on the chart as 3;600A. We became aware when the controller questioned our altitude at MORIA and if we has visual terrain clearance and the runway in sight; which we did. We landed without incident in a stable configuration throughout the approach. Upon reflection; I do not know how that altitude at MORIA in the FMC was 3;000 instead of 3;600. Fatigue a factor after a long overnight flight. 1st time flying the trip with a 4th pilot; which disrupted expected rest pattern. We had multiple GPS outages on the descent and it was distracting as we were discussing the backup plan of an ILS should the GPS not return. Although this is a known issue of the GPS outages in that area; this particular outage lasted much longer throughout the descent than my previous experience. As a result; I had both approach plates queued and it took away from my normal progressive crosscheck of chart against glass routine on RNAV approaches. Regardless of distractions; as the flying pilot I need to do a better job of progressively checking the progress of the VNAV points on the approach. It is not enough to check the altitudes during the approach briefing and then rely on the data to all be correct. Fatigue after a long flight should have heightened my awareness of potential omissions or errors in the data. I have learned from this event and will increase my awareness and cross-check moving forward.
While descending into TLV we were flying the AMMOS 1E STAR to HADAS and then the HADAS transition to  an RNP Approach.  We were cleared for the approach.  We were proceeding when the controller asked us about our altitude.  I said we were going to cross MORIA at 3;000 feet.  He said it should be 3;600 feet. He then asked if we had the terrain in sight. We said we had the terrain and the airport in sight. We then realized that somehow the FMC altitude for MORIA had switched from 3;600A to 3;000.  We continued to the field and landed without any further problems.  First time into TLV.  Very concerned about the special procedures for the clearance to enter airspace by 180 miles and the loss of GPS signal during the descent.   Delaying vectors and multiple speed changes added to distractions from monitoring FMC altitudes and possible changes to those altitudes.  Language barrier also present with controllers. They had to repeat themselves a few times and we had to as well. Very difficult to understand how or why the wrong altitude was in the FMC.  I may have let my guard down once all the earlier problems had been overcome. Especially after a 9 hour flight.  I should have continued to monitor better and not trust the automation and VNAV.
Air Carrier flight crew flying into Tel Aviv airport reported descending below a crossing restriction on the AMOS1E STAR due to distractions from previous GPS outages during their flight and fatigue.