PA-46 Malibu/Malibu Mirage/Malibu Matrix
Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Private
Flight Crew Last 90 Days 9; Flight Crew Total 1936; Flight Crew Type 1481
Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Event / Encounter Ground Strike - Aircraft; Ground Excursion Runway
Aircraft Aircraft Damaged
Aircraft; Manuals
We had a normal and uneventful flight; where we were landing for fuel en route to ZZZ. I was PIC; in the left seat; and my [passenger] was assisting with radios from the right seat. We requested and received the GPS approach. Weather was reported as good; with winds from 270 at 8 knots. A call to the tower confirmed that the runway was dry and clear. My approach was perfectly normal and stable; I was on the glide slope and localizer; did a final check from my checklist; used the red autopilot disconnect button on the yoke to disconnect the autopilot; corrected slightly to the right to line up with the centerline; and came over the numbers; centered; at 90 knots. I brought the power to flight idle; held the nose off and landed on the main landing gear. When I lowered the nose and the nose wheel touched down; the plane swerved wildly from one side of the runway to the other; with widening oscillations. I could not control it; and it exited the runway to the right and came to a stop in snow-covered dirt. The nosewheel was collapsed and the prop had struck the ground.I met with [an official] the following day and also spoke with them by phone to answer some further questions a day or so later. They had examined the checklist in the plane and noted that a final check of the autopilot and yaw damper were not included on the checklist. I had never thought about that because the checklist includes disengaging the yaw damper and bringing the rudder trim to 0 degree during the descent.As I replayed this incident over and over during the last week or so; I can't come to a definitive conclusion about what I might have done to prevent and/or correct it. I don't know my actual speed when I lowered the nose; but I do know that my prelanding speed was what it should have been; and the correct touchdown speed of the plane is just 5 knots lower than that. I've never before experienced loss of control like this; and I don't think my initial use of rudders or brakes was different from the way I've been trained and the practices I've used over the years. I do take seriously the comments about the checklist I use and will include a final autopilot and yaw damper check in my prelanding checklist; in the same way that the POH includes it.I'd be happy to answer any further questions that are not adequately addressed in this statement of the incident as I experienced it.
Reporter further offered that an inspection of nose gear; after runway excursion; showed sheared lug nuts. The aircraft was three weeks out of annual inspection. Three different checklists were in the aircraft. The one used did not include a final prelanding check of autopilot disconnect and yaw damper off. With autopilot disconnect; the yaw damper does disconnect also. Pending further investigation; reporter believes this to be a mechanical failure leading to nose wheel steering failure.
Pilot of PA46 reported loss of controllability resulting in a runway excursion after nose gear collapse and prop strike.