Commercial Fixed Wing
Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Multiengine
Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness
Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach
General None Reported / Taken
Human Factors
The following narrative describes an event that took place while operating a passenger flight  - the second segment of a two-segment day. For this particular flight; the Captain (CA) was the Pilot Monitoring (PM); the other First Officer (FO) was the Pilot Flying (PF); and I was positioned in the First Observer's seat as the additional crew member; aiding in pilot monitoring duties. The flight itself was uneventful and could be described as a straightforward intra-European flight. We continuously checked the weather on our way to ETAR in order to remain cognizant of the weather conditions expected for landing. Well before the top-of-descent; we pulled the final weather report; requested aero-data performance; loaded the expected ILS approach; and once all crewmembers were present on the flight deck and ready to discuss the descent/approach/landing; the PF conducted the approach briefing. All checklists were completed on schedule and as we approached ETAR; we confirmed with approach controllers that we would expect the ILS to Runway XX. As we came within approximately 20 or so miles from the field; we were given radar vectors to final. At the time; ETAR was experiencing a large number of air traffic; both inbound to the field; outbound from the field; as well as training aircraft in the traffic pattern. On the downwind leg; the PM programed the course fix intercept and executed the change with the PF's verbal concurrence. The winds at ETAR were light; visibility was great; skies had a higher scattered layer; and overall it was a nice VFR day. Due to the heat rising from the surface; we did have some convective and mechanical turbulence as we approached the runway; but nothing too far out of the ordinary for a summer afternoon. The aircraft was configured on schedule (if not slightly early to be conservative) and was stable (on speed; on path; configured for landing) well before 1;000 feet. After the 'Stable' calls were made and we continued the approach; the PF disconnected automation (as briefed earlier) and continued the approach. The approach itself never destabilized as we approached the runway; however once in the flare; I noticed we were floating quite a bit. I had preloaded in my mind that floating beyond the touchdown zone would be a 'go-around' call. As we began approaching the end of the touchdown zone (and below 10 feet RA); the PM made a comment that the end of the touchdown zone was approaching. As soon as the final touchdown zone marker disappeared under the nose and before I could make the call myself; the PM called 'Go-around!' Almost as soon as this statement was made; the main tires touched down; the PF stated 'too late' and the reversers were pulled. By the time the aircraft had touched down; the flight deck had just momentarily passed the end of the touchdown zone. The aircraft decelerated normally and we cleared Runway XX on taxiway Bravo. During taxi to the terminal building; the PF stated that we would discuss the landing at the gate; to which the crew agreed. Once we were safely at the gate with the engines secured; all checklists accomplished; and the deplaning process was well underway; we had an open discussion about what had happen and why a go around should have been conducted; especially since the call was made. The debriefing was well received by the PF; who expressed that he understood why his decision to continue the landing was not correct given the circumstances. The PF mentioned that from his perspective during the landing; he believed he had still been in the touchdown zone; whereas from my perspective; we were 100-200 feet beyond it. The PF also mentioned that he saw a low altitude balked landing as being more hazardous than continuing the landing; however we reminded him that this is why bounced and balked landing recovery are part of the Extended Envelope Training received on a bi-yearly basis. After a thorough discussion and debrief; the PF stated that he agreed that we should have conducted a go-around and remained open to any suggestions/recommendations/critiques as we conducted the debrief as a crew. We discussed the no-fault go-around policy that exists and I mentioned that the response to a go-around call made by any crew member should not; and can not be 'too late;' as this breaks down CRM; places the crew in an uncomfortable situation; and establishes a scenario similar to disregarding a statement of 'I'm not comfortable with this' where one crew member's decision to continue becomes dictating (even with deteriorating safety margins) when other crew members had already expressed concern. We discussed that; although ETAR's Runway XX was long and we had ample room to decelerate after touchdown; the decision to disregard a go-around call on a shorter runway could have drastically different results. With every critique or debriefing item mentioned; the PF was incredibly receptive; understood the points being made; and was internalizing the information being discussed. I also recommended that we as a crew file reports to take advantage of a program designed for reporting slips; lapses; and errors; as well as allow each crew-member to reflect on the event in order to further analyze what could have been done differently. This event outlines a deviation from stabilized approach criteria; simply due to the landing touchdown beyond the touchdown zone. Although the correct go-around call was made; the PF continued the landing due to the immediate touchdown occurring almost immediately after the go around call was made by the PM. Expectation bias and continuation biases are incredibly powerful by influencing decision making well into the landing maneuver. Experience of landing on runways and stopping with thousands of feet remaining can cause a false sense of security when procedural drift occurs. With this event; it was incredibly beneficial to not only take time to debrief as a crew; but to see the value in each crew-member submitting an ASAP report to simply share individual perspectives from the landing. Due to the debrief; we were able to discuss company policies; procedures; as well as determine what could have been the best course of action in order to mitigate similar threats in the future. The value of a debrief can allow for crew-members to internalize constructive criticism; rather than brush off an event as an outlier. During an event such as this; I believe a tremendous amount of learning was accomplished simply by following up and discussing the events as a crew. I recommend that the normalization of debriefings after a flight; especially after flights with an event; should be standardized among the pilots. Not only are debriefings a form of mentoring tools but setting aside ego and discussing areas of possible procedural non-compliance; performance deficits; CRM breakdowns; or unmitigated threats could reinforce learning among crew-members. This ties in directly with professionalism as aviators. Although I do not believe there was an intentional violation of regulations or disregard for safety; addressing this event as a crew served to promote learning; enhance safety; and build up colleagues rather than put them down. Emphasizing the normalization of go-arounds due to unstable approaches has also been viewed as a beneficial adaptation within the Atlas culture. However; although we are seeing a statistical decrease in unstable approaches resulting in a landing; I believe this is still a work in progress as we evidently have not reached the milestone of 100% go-arounds from unstable approaches. Emphasis can also be placed in recognizing that stable approaches can still destabilize in the last 10 feet during landing; whether drifting from center-line; landing beyond the touchdown zone; or excessive pitch during the flare. This is of course in addition to ability for any operating crew member to call for a go around at any point during the approach. The go around procedure should be accomplished assoon as the call is made; and the discussion of 'why' should be reserved for when the aircraft is in level flight with checklists completed or once the aircraft is safely on the ground; parked at the gate; and checklists completed.
Air Carrier First Officer reported an unstable approach and non compliance with SOP's. The aircraft touched down and the 'GO Around' call happened almost simultaneously; creating a CRM discussion at the arrival gate.