EMB ERJ 145 ER/LR
Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument
Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; General Maintenance Action; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed
Aircraft
After being cleared for a visual approach to Runway XXL in ZZZ we received an EICAS 'E2 OIL LOW PRESS' red master warning message on the EICAS display. I cancelled the red warning and advised my First Officer (FO) to reduce the thrust lever to idle on engine number two. I observed the oil pressure for engine two indicating in the red at about 34 PSI; but fluctuating around the top of the red level; and with occasional fluctuations into the bottom on the green range; and which caused the EICAS warning to extinguish; but then reappear once again triggering another master warning for the same condition about 30 seconds to a minute later. Engine number one was still operating within normal engine parameters (green indications); however. The FO was the pilot flying the aircraft; with the autopilot coupled to the [Runway] XXL ILS. As engine number two was still operating at idle thrust; and as I deemed that there was insufficient time to safely compete the required QRH checklist items during the approach prior to landing; I advised the FO to continue the approach. Therefore; rather than perform a go around so as to provide an adequate amount of time to complete the QRH inflight engine shutdown checklist; I made a call to ZZZ Approach and advised the Controller of the situation - that the aircraft had low oil pressure on engine two and that engine failure was imminent. The Controller queried me if I [needed priority handling]? I replied in the affirmative; and subsequently advised the Controller that the we did not require immediate assistance [for the time being]. The ZZZ Approach controller requested the number of souls on board and approximate fuel. I advised the controller that we had XX passengers and X crew for a total of XX souls on board and that we had XXXX lbs of fuel; and approximately 2 hours fuel (endurance - at single engine burn). ZZZ Approach gave instructions to contact ZZZ Tower; who issued a landing clearance for Runway XXL. I advised the FO to disconnect the autopilot and continue to hand fly the approach to landing with the engine number two at idle thrust. The low oil pressure master warning occurred shortly after the glideslope intercept and normal thrust reduction at an altitude of approximately 10;000 MSL; at around the ZZZZZ fix; on approach to runway XXL. The aircraft configuration at the time of the first EICAS warning was flaps 9; gear up; with a speed of 200 KIAS.  As we had already planned to make a normal flaps 22 approach and landing; I elected to continue the approach configure the aircraft for a flaps 22 landing as originally intended. I advised for the aircraft to be slowed to 190 KIAS and the approach to be continued. Landing gear down and flaps 22 was selected at ZZZZZ1 FAP and at which time the before landing items were completed. I then communicated with the flight attendant an abbreviated brief on the CABIN EMER intercom - that we had a low oil pressure indication on engine two; and that we had about 1 minute to go before landing; and to make sure to be seated. A normal landing was successfully carried out; and upon rollout I advised the FO to activate just the engine number one thrust reverser to aid slowing of the aircraft. I took control of the aircraft at the 80 knots and continued to slow the aircraft using moderate braking to a safe exit speed off the runway at the high speed taxiway exit 1. I taxied to a stop just after turning onto Taxiway M. I instructed the FO to advise the tower the we momentarily stopping on Taxiway M to perform checklist items. The tower advised us to contact ZZZ Ground. I then instructed the FO to shutdown engine two and back this up with the QRH and to then perform the after-landing checklist.  A number of ZZZ rescue fire service trucks were approaching the aircraft. Cognizant that the close proximity of emergency service vehicles would cause some concern for the passengers; I made a PA announcement to the explaining the situation and that once the personnel hadperformed a visual check for any smoke emanating from the rear of aircraft fuselage; we would continue the taxi to the gate as normal. Once personnel confirmed that there was no visible fire or smoke present we requested to continue the taxi to the gate as normal. We then taxied to the gate as normal with the exception that I elected to not set the parking braking - due to a possible risk of smoke or fire developing; as the brake temperature on the left inboard brake was indicating in the amber caution range - but requested for the ground personnel to chock the wheels instead to give time for the brake temps to cool down.  A normal shutdown check was performed and with normal passenger disembarkation. I immediately wrote up the discrepancy in the aircraft logbook and contacted the company dispatch to explain what had occurred and requested to speak with maintenance to discuss the write and the event. I advised Maintenance Control of the discrepancy details and what occurred. Maintenance Control then advised that they would need to place the call on hold while they checked if I needed to be transferred to the Maintenance Duty Manager or to receive a callback from a Maintenance Supervisor. I then performed the aircraft terminating checklist and went outside to inspect the aircraft exterior. I then received a call from a company Maintenance Supervisor to needed some additional information about the event. While on the phone call with maintenance I received a call from someone else in Maintenance (possibly the Duty Manager). As no voicemail or text was left by on my phone; I expected another callback from Maintenance Control; but which did not occur; however.In my view; appropriate decisions and actions were made by all crew members. And given the dynamics of the situation; that these decisions and actions were necessary to mitigate the safety risks; to the passengers; to the aircraft; and in the interests of other relevant aviation stakeholders; and which contributed to a safe resolution and satisfactory outcome.
We were cleared for the visual approach to [Runway] XXL; when we received a master warning and EICAS message E2 OIL LOW PRESS. The Captain identified and cancelled the warning and we verified the oil pressure in the red on EICAS as well as checking the oil quantity on the to data page; where we saw only 4 quarts in the number two engine. I was instructed to bring the number two thrust lever to idle to prevent further damage. At this point we were between the IAF and FAF on the XXL around 190 knots with flaps 9. The Captain and I agreed due to the time available before touchdown and severity of the situation to leave the number two engine at idle thrust. The Captain called ATC and advised ATC of our situation; ultimately [requesting priority handling]. The Captain advised ATC of souls on board and remaining fuel onboard; stating we did not need immediate assistance. ATC handed us off to Tower where we got our landing clearance for XXL. The Captain then called the Flight Attendant and gave her a report to prepare for normal landing; advised the situation; gave her time till touchdown; the flight attendant stated cabin was secured. As we neared the FAF I called for gear down and flaps 22 for the final configuration with a landing checklist. We had already briefed to do a flaps 22 landing due to forecasted wind. The Captain had me disconnect the autopilot and hand fly the approach to maintain best control of the aircraft. We performed a normal landing with number two engine at idle thrust; which was successful. At 80 knots; we transferred controls and captain advised me to tell Tower we would need to stop once clear of the taxiway; which I promptly did. ZZZ Tower instructed us to contact Ground and cleared us to stop on the taxiway. The Captain instructed me to shutdown the number two engine; and promptly back it up with the QRH to verify all necessary steps were taken for the E2 OIL LOW PRESS master warning. We completed the QRH items and after landing checklist at this time. Operations vehicles contacted us and the Captain asked them to verify no smoke; fumes; flames etc.; coming from the number two engine; which happened to have no indications. We then contacted ground control to taxi into the ramp area. Prior to movement we noticed the left hand inboard brake was in the yellow arc; in which the Captain elected to leave the parking brake released and have the wheels chocked at the gate. After parking; we accomplished the shutdown checklist; deplaned all passengers and cargo. I stepped outside to do the post flight walk around and found the bottom navel covered in oil; therefore verifying the oil leak. After returning to flight deck the captain was on the phone with Maintenance control; writing up the discrepancy; the Maintenance Duty Manager explaining the situation. We completed the terminating checklists to finish. I believe the decisions by the crew and actions performed; were the best course of action for the dynamics of the situation and time frame we worked with.
EMB-145 flight crew reported low engine oil pressure on final approach and continued the approach to a precautionary landing.