Regional Jet 200 ER/LR (CRJ200)
Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Confusion; Situational Awareness; Time Pressure; Workload; Distraction
Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Flight Crew Became Reoriented; General Maintenance Action
Aircraft; Human Factors; Procedure
The incident occurred during the landing phase on Runway 36R. We had our right thrust reverser on MEL and my captain mentioned on the approach briefing that he would only deploy the left side thrust reverser. As we were on final approach I mentioned to him as a last minute reminder that the right side thrust reverser was on MEL. As we touched down I could see in my peripheral vision the left thrust lever being pulled back into the shutdown position. As I looked down to confirm this; I noticed from the gauges that the left engine was in fact shutting down. I mentioned this to the flying pilot and asked what had happened. After some confusion; we taxied off the high speed taxiway onto the ramp while checking for any abnormalities of the engine gauges. A few seconds later; ramp control advised us 'we noticed some white smoke coming out of your engine on the rollout'. We acknowledged that statement; taxied to the gate; shut down the right engine and contacted company maintenance. This job develops a repetitive nature from day to day operations and anything that is abnormal to that nature can serve as a big distraction. With any abnormal op or MEL extra care and vigilance must be exercised to avoid a dangerous situation by not meeting the demands required. For example; during the landing phase the majority of our attention is placed outside the aircraft; so the pilot flying relies on muscle memory and specific habits such as deploying both thrust reversers. To change or go against those strong habit formations would cause a big distraction especially during critical phases of flight and ultimately reduce safety. A more thorough briefing in the future will help in situations like this.
Upon landing with the right thrust reverser on MEL; I inadvertently started to move the left thrust lever to shut-off very briefly before realizing the error and moving the thrust lever back to idle. As we exited the high-speed; the engine appeared to be running but I elected to shut it down not knowing if it might be in a partial state of shut-down.While on final; the preceding landing aircraft was slow to exit the runway and tower had cleared another aircraft into position on the runway for takeoff. We had briefed a go-around should it become necessary but the one aircraft cleared and the other was cleared for takeoff and rotated in time for us to make a normal landing. Close in; before touchdown; the First Officer made mention of the one reverser being inoperative as we had briefed we would do before takeoff and before landing prior to initially leaving the departure gate (this was our first leg of the first day of the trip).After getting to the gate; I called Maintenance Control to confer about the incident since I had shut the engine down without the normal 2-minute cool down and also tower had reported there was a brief puff of white smoke from the engine after landing. Maintenance Control was quite confident that no significant parameters had been exceeded and that we should be ok to proceed on our next flight.As is often the case; I believe this incident was the combination of a number of circumstances. We were combining an inoperative system/abnormal procedure with the distraction of a pending go-around situation on the first leg of the first day after an extended time off. With the last second mention of the inoperative reverser; I was focusing so much on 'only the one reverser' that it allowed me to react differently in placing my hand on the thrust lever and responding from muscle-memory as when shutting only one engine down. So much of what we do is based on habitual reactions that we do over and over that it is difficult when we try to break those engrained responses and deal with an inoperative system that requires altering those habits. This circumstance involved an additional distraction with the pending go-around situation and a refocusing at the last second to deal with the abnormality. We must simply remain vigilant and focused in these abnormal situations.
A CRJ-200 Captain shut the left engine down during the landing roll because after guarding its inoperative thrust reverser lever; 'muscle memory' combined with a pre-landing discussion about the inoperative thrust reverser allowed him to unconsciously move the thrust reverser to cutoff after guarding it.