EMB ERJ 170/175 ER/LR
Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument
Workload; Communication Breakdown; Training / Qualification
Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach
Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Weather; Human Factors
We were being radar vectored to Runway XX by ATC to ZZZ airport due to moderate weather in the area and IMC conditions. From 6;000 feet; we were told to descend to 2;000 feet as we were on a narrow downwind leg parallel to the runway. My First Officer was flying and I was working the radios. Once 2;000 feet was confirmed on the altitude indicator by both pilots; I was speaking to ATC for various headings. I noticed after talking with ATC that we were not descending. I realized that the First Officer did not press the flight level change button. I brought it to his attention and it was pressed. This resulted in being about 1;500 feet too high. Our speed at this time was 210 kts with flaps 1. At the start of our descent; ATC advised we were not descending and I advised them that we were just starting the descent just prior to him calling. I recommended to the First Officer to deploy the speed brakes to increase the rate of descent by applying drag to minimize the speed increase. While speaking again to ATC for a heading for a narrow dog leg base to final; I noticed that our airspeed was increasing to 220 kts. I advised the First Officer to watch his airspeed and to slow down. He pulled down on the throttle which was already at idle. I then advised him to reduce his descent rate by pulling up which would result in correcting the increased speed. He appeared to have been overwhelmed and the airspeed continued to increase. I then took control of the aircraft. I pressed the autopilot override button on the yoke to pitch up to smoothly without being abrupt to decrease the airspeed while turning towards a heading to join the localizer for Runway XX as instructed by ATC. While my attempts to recover from the increased speed were made; obtaining a flap over-speed was made as our airspeed had reached 235kts for approximately 5 seconds and immediately again for another few seconds (basically back to back) during recovering from the increased speed. Prior to this we had already sequenced the final approach from the ZZZZZ fix for Runway XX while ATC was providing what I feel were late vectors for a heading to join the localizer. While turning to join the localizer for the approach; the localizer would not capture. With the combination of manually correcting the flap over-speed; manually turning to the assigned heading to join the localizer which did not capture thus resulting in being slightly right and then slightly left of the localizer; I had descended below the assigned altitude of 2;000 feet by 300 feet. I notice this when I heard 'altitude' from inside the aircraft and started to gradually pitch up more as the airspeed had stabilized. ATC then advised of a low altitude alert warning and to climb which was already being implemented. ATC inquired if everything was ok. I explained we were having difficulty with the automation and working on getting established on the localizer while correcting altitude. They then gave a heading to the left from our present position to rejoin the localizer. This was completed without incident and landed.  Once parked; I then called Maintenance to self-report that we had a flap over-speed incident. After that was completed; the First Officer and myself had a safety briefing in the cockpit to discuss why and how this happened; and what to do to prevent this from occurring. Preventive actions: Though my First Officer is still inexperienced with less than 400 hours; I desired to see his errors to be corrected by himself and to learn from them with the practical applications of his actions and with guidance from myself as I had provided. As I noticed he becoming overwhelmed with the environment and while being in IMC conditions; one event lead to another which as a crew was working together to resolve them. Reflecting back on this incident; I could have acted more promptly by taking over flight controls sooner than later or even asked ATC to give me delayed vectors on the downwind to reach an obtainable airspeed and altitude that would not have resulted in a flap over-speed incident; off localizer course and altitude. Together; I believe that the First Officer and I had learned valuable lessons to take home; reflect and to apply on future flights.
EMB-175 Captain reported First Officer became overwhelmed by workload resulting in flap over-speed.