EMB ERJ 170/175 ER/LR
Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Situational Awareness
Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe
Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Maintenance Action
Aircraft
On takeoff we experienced a simultaneous dual bleed 1 and bleed 2 overpressure as indicated by the aircraft EICAS. This occurred around 600 feet after the packs were re-energized due to a Take-Off 1 ECS OFF performance calculation predicated by ACARS. The First Officer and I completed the rest of the takeoff procedure; and per the company profile; I called for the first officer to reference the QRH for Bleed 1; 2; overpressure. There was no procedure that we could find that referenced both simultaneous failures. After discussion with the FO; we agreed on running the procedure for Bleed 1 and 2 separately and respectively. After running the QRH procedures for Engine 1 Bleed System; the EICAS message for the overpressure did not extinguish. After trying the procedure on both affected sides; the messages still remained. We continued the procedure to the last part of the QRH action which ultimately called to reduce the affected bleed engine to idle. Since this was only referencing the affected side; we were unable to bring both engines to idle.We took into consideration that a single bleed source overpressure was serious enough for the QRH to call to idle the respective engine. We discussed that this being the case; the best course of action was to return to the airport. After the decision was made; we discussed that doing so would result in an overweight landing. After discussion the pros and cons; I decided that we would make the overweight landing and the FO agreed and began running the necessary procedures to do so.After informing the Flight Attendants and the [appropriate procedures] were complete; we elected to accept vectors for the visual approach. Due to the high approach speed; weight; and available landing distance I elected to have the fire trucks standing by near the far end of the runway. I touched the aircraft down gently on the 1000 foot markers and began applying MAX braking. The decision was jointly made to get the aircraft stopped as soon as possible.  After getting the aircraft decelerated; we cleared the runway.The overweight weight landing coupled with the high energy stop resulted in a dual brake overtemp caution message displayed on EICAS. The QRH procedure was complied with and we remained stationary until they cooled to an acceptable level. Emergency crews were in direct contact and I advised them of the issue. They began taking thermal readings of each brake assembly and monitored the smoke emitted from the calipers.After some time had passed; we taxied to the the gate and deplaned the passengers with no further incident. From there; Operations; Maintenance Control; Dispatch; and Emergency response teams were engaged by myself to report and answer the questions they had.After contract maintenance examined the aircraft and preformed a total reset; we were instructed and elected to do an engine run up. We taxied off the gate to a remote part of the airport and performed the procedure. We were able to duplicate all the malfunctions and further confirmed the issue with both bleed systems.
EMB175 Captain reported a simultaneous bleed 1 and bleed 2 overpressure indication. QRH procedures were not helpful and the crew elected to return to the departure airport for an overweight landing.