Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer
Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Situational Awareness
ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
General None Reported / Taken
Human Factors; Procedure; Weather
[I was] assigned Local East on a north operation using Runway 36R. Winds are out of the northeast around 5 to 7 KTS. TRACON called and wanted to change to a south 23 converging operation. [We were] departing 18L landing 23 a crossing runway. Landing 18R and departing 18C. I was under the impression the Supervisor did not want to change because of the wind; but appeared to be overridden. The next push began and the wind increased as expected per the Supervisor (FLM). Wind direction was between 340 to 050 and at a rate of up to 12 KTS. A weather area was located south of the airport and west moving east. Jackal transition aircraft which normally depart Runway 18C were moved to Runway 18L. Arrivals were landing Runway 18R and 23; they do not intersect. Aircraft landing Runway 23 were on visual approaches; I do not know about 18R. Terminal Doppler Weather Radar (TDWR) indicated wind shear activity at some point in the push; and I stopped my departures. The FLM had already left the Tower to talk with the Operations Manager and had put a CIC in charge. The strength of the wind shear began at 15 KTS and peaked at 30 KTS. The precipitation to the west of the airport was heavy; possible extreme; with lightning. This cell was very close to 18R. The precipitation to the south was not as strong but intensity was heavy at some point. Departures were turning to a heading of 120 before the wind shear started and then I stopped rolling. My concern is that safety was compromised because of landing with a tailwind of 12 KTS [and] landing with wind shear between 15 KTS to 30 KTS. Converging approaches with thunderstorms west and south of the field. Go arounds would have very little room to maneuver. I am not sure what my plan B would have been if aircraft had starting go around due to the conditions. It appears to be contrary to the safety culture we learned about during recurrent training. The day before I was told that Tech Ops requested the TDWR for an upgrade during the time a heavy precipitation area was close to the field. I was told when they returned the equipment to the Air Traffic; wind shear events were already taking place on the field. The conditions were such that I believe the FAA would have had a hard time defending itself; if an event would have occurred. Recurrent training seems to indicate a desire to avoid such scenarios but it appears to have made little difference. A survey of controllers; TMC; and management might reveal why we continue to do things that seem contrary to the stated desires of the FAA.
CLT Controller described an unsafe situation with regard to supervisory runway configuration decisions and the resulting tailwind landing events.