Stratotanker 135
Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Flight Crew Last 90 Days 167; Flight Crew Total 2143; Flight Crew Type 2003
Situational Awareness; Distraction; Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Training / Qualification
Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Landing Without Clearance
Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Human Factors; Aircraft; Chart Or Publication; Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure
The crew complement was an Instructor Pilot (IP) who had recently returned from deployment; a Squadron Director of Operations in requalification training; an Instructor Boom Operator with 4 hours of flight time in the last 90 days; and a new Boom Operator (student) in Mission Qualification Training. The aircraft had completed the first of several planned approaches at ZZZ and requested to be cleared the same approach for a second time. In order to de-conflict with traffic; Approach Control cleared the aircraft to an IAF for the approach. While the fix was present on the approach plate; it was not present in the database approach which we loaded from the FMS. Since the aircraft was not yet cleared for the approach; the IP typed the fix in to the FMS in order to pull it from the database (in order to get us pointed the right direction). Immediately upon loading the fix in the FMS; the autopilot cycled to the next point loaded which happened to be the next point on the approach. This resulted in the aircraft momentarily navigating in a direction which it was not cleared; and a heads down situation in the cockpit as the crew attempted to load a navigation solution. At this time Approach Control cleared the aircraft for the approach; however we were not in a position to legally do so as we were still unable to load the approach in its entirety from the database. In order to get a handle on the situation; the IP requested cancellation of the clearance for the RNAV Approach and vectors for the Visual Approach. At approximately 7 miles from the threshold the IP identified that he was substantially behind the aircraft; had not started the checklist; and that this would be to a low approach. Unfortunately the IP then allowed himself to be talked in to continuing the approach to a touch and go; rather than continue with the low approach as he had stated. At no following point did any other crew member alert the crew to the following red flags. The Pilot Flying (and IP) had verbally stated that he had lost Situational Awareness and would be doing a low approach. The Copilot had stated 'we are still 7 miles out; it's fine'. The IP did not immediately enforce the missed approach; the checklist was not complete; and no 'safety checks' were verbalized. Due to the breakdown of CRM; Situational Awareness; and communication; the pilot monitoring never switched the radio to tower's frequency; and nobody on the crew identified that the aircraft had not received landing clearance. There were no noted call outs on guard or over approach frequency. The first indication of the error perceived by the crew was upon climb out after completing the touch and go. Contributing factors to this situation were complacency; poor preparation; and executing a complex instrument approach training plan at an unfamiliar field at night. Also low proficiency due to recent flight time/flight experience; automation (we should have disengaged the autopilot and requested vectors); poor judgment by the Instructors on board; and a rapid breakdown of CRM and loss of Situational Awareness.
KC-135 pilot reported being cleared for an approach not found in the FMS database; causing the crew to lose situational awareness; fly off course; and complete a touch and go without clearance.