EMB ERJ 170/175 ER/LR
Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Time Pressure
Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor
Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; General Physical Injury / Incapacitation
Aircraft
We were cleared for takeoff and everything up until this point were normal operations. Shortly after departure we got a call from the Flight Attendants using the normal call (single chime). We ignored it being below 10;000 feet and continued the climb and runway heading as per our clearance. At 500 feet I called for heading mode and the Captain selected heading; then VNAV at 1000 feet. After VNAV we received the triple chime (emergency call) from the Flight Attendants and they reported a burning smell with no visible smoke. We double checked to make sure we heard her correctly and she confirmed. We completed our memory items for 'smoke fire fumes'; donned the oxygen masks; then completed the smoke fire fumes checklist on the QRC; which lead to the QRH. We then stopped the climb and leveled off at 8;000 feet and started the return to [departure airport].I took the radios so the Captain could focus on the QRH. ATC gave a descent to 4000 feet and as the pilot flying I was more heads up than heads down while the Captain ran the checklist; until the point where the QRH told me to accomplish as he read. ATC gave us a descent and a discretionary turn to final after I requested [a specific] runway for the extra length. I accepted the turn a little early and requested to go through final and a block altitude to be able to accomplish everything in time. After we completed the checklist we asked the FAs (Flight Attendants) if the smell continued; which it did not; after we dumped the cabin per the checklist. We requested another turn towards final for the visual but had to take the ILS due to the sun being in our eyes and it [was] difficult to see through the smoke goggles. I flew it in then transferred the controls to the Captain who made the landing. After landing the airplane was stopped on the runway. I asked the Flight attendants one final time if the smell continued; which it did not. Contacted Maintenance and kept an eye on our brake heat due to an overweight/non normal configuration landing. We talked to Maintenance and taxied to the gate under our own power. On the taxi in we got a 'brk overheat' caution however that quickly went away and we continued to the gate without incident.After deplaning both FAs and myself had sore scratchy throats; I believe mine to be from the oxygen mask however I am not a medical professional. I would like to be notified of the cause of the fumes.
Immediately after takeoff; flight crew received an Interphone call from the Flight Attendants reporting strong fumes in the cabin with a smell of burning oil. Smoke/Fire/Fumes QRC/QRH procedures were accomplished and ATC [advised]. Dispatch was notified via ACARS and the flight conducted a return to ZZZ. A critical decision point in this procedure for me was the prompt  Smoke Source is Obvious and can be Removed. I had a suspicion that the source of the fumes was the pneumatic system; from reading reports of other aircraft in which engine oil vapor bypassed various seals and entered the air conditioning system. However; I was not sure of this source; and did not feel it would be appropriate to troubleshoot the problem while FAs and passengers were be subject to the fumes. With that consideration; I decided the answer was No and followed the appropriate decision tree. The next section clearly suggests the actions to take for a descent; and I noted that we were already descending through 6;000 feet MSL to 4;000 feet MSL and elected to review these items while accomplishing what I believed was relevant. Confirming FSTN BELTS Sign was on; Altitude - FLCH - Thrust Levers and Speedbrake items were reviewed and skipped. From that point the checklist was completed. We reached a point at which I was prompted to pull the RAT Manual Deploy Lever; and upon doing so my PF FO lost his autopilot; (I believe) FD; PFD and MFD displays. At which point; he was forced to look to the IESS and CA (reverted) PFD for aircraft control. This continued for some minutes while I prepared the aircraft for approach. He remarked on the drag caused by the RAT and had some difficulty maintaining altitude due to a combination of difficult to read displays; hampered visibility through O2 mask; and RAT drag. Late into the approach we elected to remove the masks and control was transferred to myself for the landing.The aircraft was configured as per the Smoke/Fire/Fumes Descend and Landing Checklist and a landing. Anti-skid; reverse thrust; nosewheel steering; and ground spoilers were inoperative on roll out and the aircraft came to a stop on the runway. Local ARFF notified the crew that the exterior of the aircraft appeared normal; and the flight attendants reported a cessation of fumes upon removal of air and electrical power to the cabin. After a short phone call with maintenance; both engine IDGs were returned to AUTO and nosewheel steering was re-engaged. The cabin confirmed no return of fumes. Under escort from ARFF; flight returned to gate. During the taxi in; a BRK OVERHEAT message was presented; and the aircraft was stopped and QRH procedures were conducted. This message disappeared in less than 1 minute and the taxi continued. The aircraft successfully parked at the gate and deplaned.Maintenance remarked that some work involving the #1 engine was performed the previous night; and was the first area of investigation.Both flight attendants and some passengers reported respiratory irritation and headaches which began after exposure to fumes. No information was obtained on the affected passengers. B flight attendant reported symptoms persisting for approximately 1 hour after initial exposure.  I called dispatch and asked to be patched to StatMD. StatMD recommended the FA be given an examination; and I gave that information to the director of Dispatch. He decided to relay that information to the manager of inflight.It is tough to provide meaningful suggestions to improve this event. On a crew debrief I realized that I forgot to discuss brace instructions on my call with the FAs; and they forgot to ask me for this information. Their estimation from my demeanor was that a brace signal was not going to be given; and I did not give one immediately before landing. Although a great deal of equipment was unavailable for stopping the aircraft; I felt it performed beautifully and remained well under control. I remember we had to taxi forward to exit atintersection C3 which suggests a little less than half of the runway remaining.Given my suspicions that the pneumatic system was the source of the fumes; I feel that perhaps I could have tried to diagnose the problem via the pneumatic panel. However; the cessation of fumes as a result of properly following the QRH leads me to believe that it was the proper choice to make. While it would have been nice to have some stopping aids available for the landing; it may not be worth the time delay to add further diagnosis to the procedure (eg.; after disabling pneumatics and before disabling electrical supply). In total; I feel the event had a very satisfactory conclusion; although there existed room for improvement.
E175 flight crew reported returning to departure airport after a Flight Attendant notified the cockpit crew of a burning smell.