Commercial Fixed Wing
Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Distraction
Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach
General None Reported / Taken
Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related
FO was PF on first leg of 3-day sequence (I assigned him the first leg since he was senior on the aircraft; I was just off OE as CA; and had not flown in 5 weeks). Cleared direct to ZZZZZ fix for visual approach to Runway XX.  Noticed FO was a bit high and fast; but given his experience flying the airplane; [I] felt he could adjust accordingly.  When checked in with Tower; they cleared us to land.  FO continued going direct to ZZZZZ fix; and was in a high energy state.  Although my attention was diverted momentarily; I thought I saw him pull HDG to establish himself on a downwind leg outside of ZZZZZ; a false assumption.  I mentioned that we were high and pretty fast; but he said he thought he could get it within stable approach parameters by 1;000 feet.  I monitored sink rate and airspeed.  At 1;000 feet; I recall that he was within parameters; but I overlooked that fact that flaps were not at final setting.  At the time I completed the final flap setting and checklist; I believe we were within stable approach parameters; but I overlooked the requirement for final flap configuration no later than 1;000 feet AGL.  Normal landing made within landing zone with no adverse consequences.  Once at the gate; FO was very apologetic and angry at himself for not going around.  I told him it was a crew failure; not just his; I should have commanded a go-around.Cause -1.  Lack of currency. This was my first post-OE flight.  My last OE flight was early June.  I had been practicing flows and callouts during this down time; but recall feeling very clumsy and 'behind the curve' on this flight.  2.  I should have been more assertive in calling a go-around early on in an approach that didn't look like it was going to end well.  I vow to be much more assertive in the future to avoid another similar occurrence.  3. FO wore his COVID cloth face mask the entire flight; his communications were very difficult to decipher at times due to the muffling effect on his voice.  4.  I made a false assumption that because the FO was senior and experienced; he was less fallible to getting too far behind the aircraftSuggestions - 1.  I should have called a 'go-around' farther out on the approach when I saw that he wasn't 'catching up' to a comfortable point in his aircraft stabilization.  2. After the lengthy gap since my OE; I wish I had requested a check airman in order to get my skills back up to speed.  3. Better FMA monitoring and situational awareness.  4. Don't hesitate: if it doesn't look right; go-around!
As a returning First Officer from a two month leave and a new Captain; our first approach into ZZZ we turned final a bit early and were caught high on approach. Then as we recovered on the approach with setting the aircraft for landing configuration I noticed around 1;200 feet that our flaps were not in the full position yet; so I called for flaps but at that point I believe we were passing through the 1;000 feet mark. We were able to stabilize at the 500 feet gate and make a safe landing but in hindsight we should have performed a go-around and completed another approach. Some factors involved were crew communications and proficiency in the aircraft. I could have briefed my Captain better as to how I was going to transition to the approach from radar vectors that we had received. With him more aware of the exact plan we probably would have circumvented the situation. A recent leave of absence could have also been a contributing factor; though we both were experienced on the aircraft we seemed to be playing catch up on the approach.Suggestion: Better planning and communication for the approach or simply perform a go-around and reestablish a stable approach.
Air carrier flight crew reported experiencing an unstabilized approach and flaps not at final setting before 1;000 feet AGL. Captain stated he should have commanded the First Officer to go-around and cited lack of recent flying as a contributing factor.