Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer
Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument
Flight Crew Last 90 Days 100; Flight Crew Total 20000; Flight Crew Type 12000
Situational Awareness; Workload; Human-Machine Interface; Confusion
Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Ground Equipment Issue
General None Reported / Taken
ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Airport; Procedure
[Personnel were brought to] PTKK to finally fix the PAPI lights that have been inoperative for months. The Runway 4 PAPI was no longer NOTAM'd out. However; upon arrival [to] PTKK; we tried multiple times to turn them on to no avail. We asked TKK Radio to try and he was unable to turn them on either. Then arriving PTSA; the PAPI was inop for Runway 5 with no NOTAM. Then arriving [to] PKWA the Runway 6 PAPI is also NOTAM inop with shortened runway construction. So now we have the three shortest runways PTKK 6;000 ft.; PTSA 5;700 ft.; and PKWA (now down to 6;000 ft. with construction) having inoperative PAPI lights for the prevailing wind runway. Add this to PGSN not having PAPI/VASI installed even though the Jeppesen Approach chart indicates there are VASI; and we have 4 airports in the Guam region with no visual guidance. Poor trend; especially for night time operations and new crews coming on board. Unsatisfactory trend. [We're] lucky we have light and empty airplanes with very few passengers allowing for short landing rolls.
I write this not relating to a specific flight but relating to a safety issue at PTKK airport. For the past 2 years; the PAPI at PTKK Runway 4 has been out of service. Sometimes this is noted on the NOTAMs and sometimes it is not. The safety issue is that PTKK is the proverbial 'black hole' airport which gives very limited visual reference. This makes flying a visual approach very challenging. In fact; an article 'Black Hole Approach' concludes with the statement 'The best way to combat these often subtle and insidious factors (relating to the Black hole effect) is to avoid straight-in; visual approaches at night without glide slope guidance; especially when overflying the infamous black hole.' Engineers conducted an extensive study of the problem. The results were published in a report entitled; 'Flight Deck Work Load and Night Visual Approach Performance' They concluded that the problem is exacerbated by many factors but the factors that stood out to me are those that are present on nearly all PTKK approaches. They are:1. A runway length/width combination that is unfamiliar to a pilot. PTKK is 6;000 ft. long with absolutely no overrun on either end. It is shorter than most runways and that effect is amplified by the fact that there is no paved safety area on either end. SNA is famed for being short but it is 5;700 ft. long PLUS over 1;000 ft. of paved safety area on the approach end to Runway 2L. It actually has almost 7;000 ft. of pavement. PTKK only has 6;000.2. Substandard runway and airport lighting. PTKK has had broken PAPI for at least 2 years. The only other airport lighting is the runway edge lights and some taxi lights. There are no MALSR lights. There is no big city lights to help with visual reference. 3. Peering through a rain-soaked windshield can convince a pilot (because of refraction) that the aircraft is too high and can result in an error of as much as 200 ft. of altitude per nautical mile from the runway. It is very common to have an island induced rain shower right off the approach end of Runway 04 at PTKK. Now we are flying this approach late at night; windshield covered in rain; poor lighting; and absolutely no backup source of glide path information as I will explain later due to the way the RNAV approach is built. 4. An airport that is situated at a slightly lower elevation and on a different slope than the surrounding terrain. This is PTKK. The runway is on the northwest side of the island at sea level. The island rises quickly to the southeast to an elevation of 2;700 ft. in less than 1 mile. 5. An approach over water or unlit terrain means that the visual reference points are at a distance where altitude and sink rate are more difficult to judge. This is PTKK. Absolutely no ground reference from the IF of FIGBY until the runway nearly 10 miles away. The problem is further exacerbated by the fact that the only approach we have to Runway 4 (most commonly used because of the prevailing trade winds from the NE) is the RNAV (GPS) Runway 4 approach. Everything works fine with VNAV and LNAV until we reach the missed approach point of HAMAX. Notice that HAMAX is 2.2 miles from the end of the runway. So here you are; flying the approach as usual in VNAV and LNAV and you have the usual rain shower between FASPO and the runway. You are tired because it is now after midnight and you are over the dark ocean with no ground lights in sight and the PAPI's are not working as usual. You approach the waypoint HAMAX and the flight director bars (your only vertical guidance at this point) suddenly command a pitch up and a turn to the left. Why?? Because you have hit the missed approach point and the guidance tells you to go around. This isn't common for most approaches. It throws off even seasoned pilots. You can see the runway lights through the rain soaked windshield but again with no PAPI; you have now lost all vertical guidance. You are now at 660 ft. above the ocean and continue based on a fuzzy view outof the windshield. Are you stable for that 500 foot callout? I guess so; hard to tell if we're on the vertical path...Is this safe? I would submit that in my opinion that this is the most dangerous flight we operate. Why do we do it in the middle of the night? I am not talking about the hopper. That is daytime and is doable. We don't currently have an aircraft availability problem like we did when we were busy. Why not do this flight in the daylight? Why not get those PAPI's fixed? They've been broken for 2 years! Why not get the RNP approach finished. That would solve the whole problem if we actually had vertical guidance to the runway instead of losing it right at 660 ft. where we really need it.
Reports of PAPI lights to PTKK inoperative but not NOTAM'd out of service. Reporter states PAPI and VASI do not operate at PGSN but Jeppesen charts state VASI is available.