MD-11
Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument
Flight Crew Last 90 Days 300; Flight Crew Total 17700; Flight Crew Type 3100
Time Pressure; Fatigue; Communication Breakdown; Confusion
Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown
Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Aircraft; Human Factors; Procedure
The previous week of flying was the most demanding experienced in over XX years of flying. In hindsight; these challenging events diminished and taxed my mental and physical abilities on subsequent flights leading to inadvertent decisions possibly contributing to my rejected takeoff.  On 3 out of last 4 flights encountered nearly identical events with the Environmental System Controller (ESC) Level 1 Alerts of Pack Flo/ Pack Disagree/ Bleed Off anomalies on two different aircraft during Max Thrust Takeoff with Anti-ice On flights. In the first flight event the anomalies presented on upwind; climb-out were corrected automatically by the ESC and Auto Anti Ice mode. Bleed Air Off; Pack Disagree; Pack Off; Level alerts all extinguished automatically. There was no input from the crew and the Level 1+2 checklists were reviewed for reference by crew. In the second flight event; relying on system knowledge; the previous flight; and anticipating the ESC would respond accordingly in same fashion it was discussed with crew that the ESC in Auto Mode would automatically resolve a pack flow disagree issue level 1 alert noticed late in taxi with a higher demand airflow presented in the system; when we were to run-up the engines for deice concerns for :30 seconds; in position prior to takeoff. Numerous distractions such as short taxi; checklist completion; deice fluid on windscreens making taxi turns difficult due to limited visibility on side windows; and significant deice delays made our departure later than normal allowing more body and mental fatigue to set in. The air synoptic was illuminated due to manual selection of Anti Ice because this air frame did not have an auto anti feature on it. This is important to note because it was normal looking to see AIR for our takeoff setup conditions. After engine run-up and brake release received a level 2 alert Pack not off alert; Pack Flow Disagree resulting in a decision to abort takeoff with a low speed <50 knots reject. Contacted MX resulted in a Block turn back and MX deferral for a malfunctioning Pack.Third flight event; subsequently occurred two days later with Bleed Air off/ Pack Disagree/ Pack Off level 1 alerts occurring on climb out on same aircraft first instance happened on. Close observation revealed in fact the ESC in combo with the Auto Anti Ice again fully resolved any anomalies without any input from the crew. It became more obvious to me the Auto Anti Ice feature once detecting no need for Anti Ice usage is securing Anti Ice allowing the ESC to revert to normal ops eliminating any level 1 or 2 alerts. Thus the ESC must be prioritizing the airflow; protecting the system if a potential leak is detected; turning off packs and bleeds in its process when Anti Ice was ON. On the rejected Takeoff the Anti-Ice was Manually turned ON; the ESC attempted to secure the Pack Flow /Disagree but was unsuccessful in doing so. The decision to conduct a low speed reject was correct but may have possibly been avoided by first contacting MX before takeoff. Checklist were reviewed by the crew but it was fully anticipated the ESC to resolve the Pack issue on run-up before brake release. In the future; it will be my priority with any confusing level alerts to involve MX early to form the best team based consensus and strengthen decision making.
After deicing and during taxi out we received a level 1 alert for 'Pack 3 FLOW DISAG'. Level 1 checklist references: 'Consequences NONE'. It was our understanding that this was a cycling pack flow issue that the system controller would resolve with higher demand flow on run up once takeoff power was applied. This was our second leg for the night and we were already dealing with a lengthy delay; de-icing; icing conditions; snow; wake turbulence avoidance of a departing heavy jet and having to do an engine run up while holding in position in order to clear the engines of icing before releasing the brakes for take off. At the point of brake release to initiate the takeoff roll; neither of us noticed if the level 1 alert was still displayed. Once takeoff power was applied and we reached approximately 40kts ground speed we received a level 2 PACK 3 NOT CLOSED alert. The captain elected to reject the takeoff as is in accordance with company SOP. We cleared the runway with no further indecent and returned to the blocks where maintenance deferred pack 3. We ultimately departed without further incident and completed the flight as originally planned.  In hind sight we should have delayed the take off and mitigated the level 1 PACK FLOW DISAG alert before taking the runway.
MD-11 flight crew reported fatigue and confusion resulted in a Rejected Take Off due to misdiagnosing a Bleed Air/ Pack/ Anti Ice Issue.