B737-300
Flight Crew Last 90 Days 213
Human-Machine Interface; Distraction; Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Workload; Time Pressure
Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance
Human Factors; Procedure
After being vectored around for sequence; we were given direct OTT [VOR]. About 10 prior to OTT; we were told to expect holding at OTT. The Captain got the FMC set up to enter the holding information as I was ready to copy the holding clearance. About two miles from OTT; we were given our holding instructions for OTT (to hold as published). The Captain double checked in holding page information and; just as the aircraft started a slight left turn toward the next fix; the Captain executed the FMC holding page. The FMC accepted the execution but continued a left vice a right turn into the holding pattern. Once we assessed that the aircraft was not going to reverse back to the right; the Captain disengaged the LNAV and with Heading Select and rolled in a right hand turn back toward OTT. The Approach Controller queried us as to our holding direction and we told him we were correcting back into the holding pattern. While manually trying to fix our direction of turn and enter the holding airspace; the Captain; after rechecking the FMC; and believing we were heading in a good direction to enter holding; re-engaged to FMC holding page; and the FMC accepted the entry. Shortly (less than one minute) after the FMC was reengaged; I switched from NAV to VOR/LOC and dialed up the OTT VOR and the holding course. During this three- to four- minute evolution; apparently we did not get back into the proper holding airspace. I was just about ready to interpret the raw data for holding airspace assessment when the Controller once again asked us what we were doing (that we were still north of the holding area; I guess) and gave us south vectors until clearing us to RAVNN. As I replayed this event in my mind; the following stand out. First; our situational awareness (SA) quickly degraded when the aircraft continued turning in the wrong direction; and second; without fully comprehending our positional error we were too quick to re-engage the FMC. Our SA quickly moved from green (thinking we had the information needed to perform the task) to yellow (trying to quickly figure why the aircraft continued to turn in the wrong direction and how to best correct this error). Additionally; we did not fully analyze our positional error prior to trying to make the FMC fly us into the correct holding airspace. In the future; should I see a similar situation developing; I will be set up and ready to downgrade to raw data (VOR tuned; radial dialed in) just in case our automation does not move the aircraft as expected; and use this raw data until SA (situational awareness) is fully regained.
Confusion and a lengthy track deviation ensued when the flight crew of a B757-200 failed to execute their holding pattern in a timely fashion and were unable to re-establish compliance with their holding clearance. ATC provided vectors for a subsequent approach.