Medium Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 9.5
Confusion; Distraction; Situational Awareness
ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance
General None Reported / Taken
Airport; Airspace Structure; Human Factors; Procedure
I have been told that it's 'our job to provide visual separation.' Yeah; up until the time we have an unplanned missed approach; the landing aircraft climbs right up into the departure; and subsequently files a NMAC report because of the uncomfortably close proximity of the aircraft involved. Situation: west Flow at ORD; VFR; landing all three arrival runways; 27R/L and 28C. I was in the north tower; arrivals are approximately 2.5 miles apart; plenty of room. Aircraft X departed 28R; turning right to a heading of 040. Aircraft Y was on short final 27R; and another aircraft was roughly 2.5 miles behind; landing 27R. Aircraft X flew right over the departure end of 27R climbing through 2300-2400 (not even 2000 AGL) as Aircraft Y was touching down.This situation occurs on a regular basis during west flow and VFR conditions. It is not illegal per the 7110.65; or CRO (Converging Runway Operations) rules. Under the current flawed CRO rules though; it should be. Either we need to ensure that departures are flying west of the RWY 33/27R extended centerline virtual intersection; or the CRO rules need to be re-evaluated. CRO doesn't allow us to depart 33 and land 27R independently; even in clear and unrestricted visibility conditions. It is my understanding that the extended centerlines intersect about 200 feet within the 1 mile distance required by the rule. Someone please explain to me what is safer: runway 33 departure on runway heading (climbing away from the 27R arrivals by a mile) or a runway 28R departure climbing right over 27R at low altitude (just barely at the MVA I might add) which would be in direct conflict with an unexpected missed approach from 27R; and may be a violation of paragraph 3-9-9 of the 7110.65 as it pertains to flight paths of intersecting runways since the 28R departure is instructed to turn right in a manner that causes it to overfly 27R. Let's not forget that in the case of 27R and 33; when a 27R missed approach starts; they would be 2 miles from the 33 centerline. That's 7500 feet minus 2000-2500 feet of runway used EVEN IF THE AIRCRAFT MADE A TOUCH AND GO ON 27R DUE TO UNSTABLE CONDITIONS! Yes; I've seen unplanned touch and goes many times in my career. A controlled go-around is always going to be prior to the threshold; which gives AT LEAST 2.5 miles of distance to the runway 33/27R 'virtual' intersection! That gives each local controller more than enough time and space to turn traffic away from each other and issue traffic/safety advisories. What's more; runway 33 departures could even be given a 310 heading or less when cleared; which would provide a track that is west of the virtual intersection in all situations. I must encourage you to view the radar track of the situation I am reporting. Departing 33 while landing 27R is much safer than departing 28R; turning; and overflying 27R with traffic about to land.BOTTOM LINE RECOMMENDATION: The current flawed rule of CRO needs to be re-evaluated as it pertains to ORD runway 27R arrivals and 33 departures; and a waiver be granted to ORD tower to allow simultaneous runway 33 departures and 27R arrivals during specified weather minimums. Computers have their place in ATC safety; but the human mind will never be matched in its cognitive ability to make quick decisions in the visual environment of an airport. Some will say I am too old school. Yes; I retire [soon]. I also welcome computer automation as an aid to ATC. But it's unfortunate that the 'new' class of controllers or trainees never be able to safely achieve the combined level of safety; expertise; and efficiency that our system once had. Complex and difficult situations that a computer can't solve; that occur on a daily basis; are either rarely; or never; addressed here at ORD due to deficiencies in our training program; inconsistent management practices; and differences in instructor ability and experience. I hope this narrative can help make at least a move in the right direction.
ORD Tower Controller reported concern with aircraft departing on the Runway 28s and possible go-arounds on the Runway 27s.