Commercial Fixed Wing
Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 2
Communication Breakdown; Time Pressure
ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic
Company Policy; Procedure; Staffing; Weather; Airspace Structure
ZDC was inundated with moderate to severe turbulence associated with a cold front.  We received GI messages for severe turbulence in ZDC Areas 6 and 5 (XA05Z FL180-190 at MOL; XA25Z 140-FL210 at CSN; XA43Z FL210 at LDN; XA51Z 170 at MRB); which we assumed would mean that the front that was traveling northeast bound; toward us; would eventually provide Area 1 with the same conditions. The controllers at sector 17 and 12 coordinated directly with the sectors behind them to re-route PHL aircraft over SWL for the JIIMS arrival instead of BUKYY; and we then asked our supervisor to advise TMU of this coordination. As the part of the front approached BUKYY that had been getting severe reports; our supervisor asked if we could take a pathfinder through the front because Area 4 was being inundated with PHL arrivals that they were not originally projected to get.  I was training a D-side at sectors 18/19 starting around XC00Z; where we work arrivals to TEB (JAIKE); EWR (PHLBO); and LGA (KORRY). We were supposed to be complying with a 15MIT restriction to EWR and a 20MIT restriction for JAIKE. Our R-side was receiving 20MIT from the sector behind us for EWR and 25MIT for JAIKE; which is our standard feed. Due to the winds; our R-side was vectoring to attempt to give the next sectors those mileages; but was unable to do so. Our EWR arrivals were unable to comply with the 'descend via' restrictions; and also needed to be vectored not only for the MIT but in order to get the arrivals low enough into the next sector at all. My D-side trainee was doing point-outs for the vectored aircraft; and we asked our Supervisor to put in reports for moderate turbulence; which all aircraft were getting between 170-FL250. We also advised our Supervisor three times that he needed to coordinate with Area 2 to provide at least 35MIT for our area on JAIKE arrivals and 25MIT for EWR arrivals. This was only communicated on the fourth attempt; when our R-side stood up and shouted at the Area 2 supervisor that 'We NEED 35MIT for JAIKE arrivals!!!' The Area 2 supervisor reported not having heard anything about this requested restriction. Eventually in the night; I did work the R-side at sector 12; and I was personally providing 30-35MIT at FL250 and 250 kts for all EWR arrivals; and sector 18/19 was barely capable of keeping 15MIT even with an added 20MIT restriction. Around XD00Z; our D-side training was suspended and I was assigned to relieve the Controller at sectors 17/11. The Controller I relieved advised me he had shut off COLIN departures southbound and J42 departures northbound due to moderate to severe turbulence. Within 10 minutes of sitting at the sector; I had aircraft departing on both of those routes. Once the aircraft departed the airports; the only way to get them out of the turbulence was to get them above FL250; and I was not going to make PCT KRANT hold aircraft in known severe turbulence. I called KRANT to advise that we would accept no more aircraft due to continuous moderate to severe turbulence. I was relieved from that sector by XD15Z; where the relieving Controller ended up having a priority handling situation due to severe turbulence and at least three more reports northbound. Within 10 minutes of our D-side training being terminated; the Controller at sectors 18/19 requested a D-side again; as JAIKE arrivals started to report severe turbulence. The Controller had the sector behind hold JAIKE arrivals due to severe turbulence. 1. 'As the part of the front approached BUKYY that had been getting severe reports; our supervisor asked if we could take a pathfinder through the front because Area 4 was being inundated with PHL arrivals that they were not originally projected to get.' Our TMU should have put restrictions out for other traffic entering sector 54 to avoid this being an issue; or routed PHL traffic earlier to have a more cohesive flow BEFORE they h ad to be sequenced in sector 54. The answer should NOT have been attempting to put any aircraft through known areas of moderate to severe turbulence. 2. 'We received GI messages for severe turbulence in ZDC Areas 6 and 5 (XA05Z FL180-190 at MOL; XA25Z 140-FL210 at CSN; XA43Z FL210 at LDN; XA51Z 170 at MRB); which we assumed would mean that the front that was traveling northeast bound; toward us; would eventually provide Area 1 with the same conditions.' In Area 1; we did not have severe turbulence begin until the XC00Z hour. There should have been restrictions in play to route aircraft away from the turbulence as soon as the ZDC powers-that-be realized that this was going to continue as the front traveled eastbound. 3. 'The Controller I relieved advised me he had shut off COLIN departures southbound and J42 departures northbound due to moderate to severe turbulence. Within 10 minutes of sitting at the sector; I had aircraft departing on both of those routes.' I have no idea why this happened. This was communicated both through our supervisor; presumably then through TMU; and PCT KRANT sector. NO departures should have come out beyond that point. 4. 'Within 10 minutes of our D-side training being terminated; the Controller at sectors 18/19 requested a D-side again; as JAIKE arrivals started to report severe turbulence.' Either (A) we should have never been removed from the sector; or (B) a D-side should have been paged back before I was assigned to relieve the Controller at sectors 17/11. 5. 'The Controller had the sector behind hold JAIKE arrivals due to severe turbulence.' This should have happened earlier; or aircraft should have been re-routed onto a route that did not have known severe turbulence. We knew hours in advance that there was potential for this. Eventually the JAIKE arrivals were routed up J220 through ZNY; but this should have happened much earlier.
ZDC Controller reported management and TMU failure to support controllers during turbulence and severe weather; resulting in priority handling situations.