Cessna Stationair/Turbo Stationair 6
Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Flight Crew Last 90 Days 183; Flight Crew Total 2250; Flight Crew Type 538
Communication Breakdown; Other / Unknown
ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
General None Reported / Taken
Human Factors; Procedure
I was flying a C208 on an IFR flight plan. Along A555; we were given a handoff from Miami Center to a new frequency and instructed that we would likely not be able to reach anyone over the frequency until waypoint INDEE which was still over 100 NM ahead. Prior to reaching INDEE; while cruising at 10;000 feet; we experienced a near midair collision with an aircraft descending along the same air route and opposite direction. Upon approaching and reaching INDEE we were still unable to reach anyone on the frequency and were out of range on the previous frequency. We continued on along our cleared route; as we approached Nassau; it became clear that we were not going to reach anyone on the frequency and began looking for a local frequency to contact Approach Control. We were told to remain on frequency with Nassau for a time; but were subsequently handed back to a Florida based approach control (I believe it was Miami Center). The next few controllers gave us a phone number to contact upon landing. The gentleman I spoke with upon landing informed me that I had read back an incorrect frequency for contact at INDEE and it had not been caught by the transmitting Controller. He also mentioned the importance of monitoring guard (121.5) frequency while conducting overseas operations. Even in hindsight; it would have been difficult to sooner realize a frequency miscommunication without the Controller catching the incorrect readback. The importance of monitoring guard frequency during overseas routes especially when having a long leg out of communications with ATC should be emphasized here. The length of the leg out of communications and in VMC conditions proved quite monotonous from a human factors standpoint; though we had been actively scanning for traffic; it was the TCAS which snapped our attentions to the aircraft in question. It still took a relatively long amount of time (several minutes) to locate the target visually. We could have diverted course to the North (right of heading as we were approaching head-on) before obtaining visual contact with the TCAS target. Although reactionary without actual visual contact; this action would have put more distance between the oncoming aircraft and ourselves in this particular case.
C208 pilot reports an airborne conflict at 10;000 feet on A555 while out of radio contact with ZMA. The frequency copied and readback by the reporter was not correct but not caught by the Controller. Since contact was not expected on the new frequency for some time; the error was not quickly discovered and 121.5 was not being monitored.