A319
Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Situational Awareness
Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Human Factors
While descending for the approach the Pilot Flying (PF) called for flaps 1; flaps; 2; and then flaps 3. All calls and selections were made within flap speed limit restrictions.Realizing we were too high; we requested a 360 turn so that we would have spacing for a descent to the runway. As we turned the indicated speed increased; causing a warning bell to sound on the flight deck. The PF pulled the nose of the aircraft up; the speed returned to normal; and we landed without further incident.We contacted contract maintenance when we landed he called [maintenance]. [Maintenance] told him to perform a check; which he did; and he determined that the airplane was fit to fly. We completed our [next] leg without further incident.Looking at the situation; I am actually surprised that our company doesn't have more Airbus cases of ASAPs due to reliance on automation. Our Airbus training encourages a heavy reliance on automation and focuses less on actually flying this plane. Being an aircraft that is relatively new in its design and handling features; it would benefit us all to focus more on flying the aircraft. I have flown with many other pilots who are hesitant to actually fly the plane instead of using the Auto Pilot (AP) in all phases of flight. It is a detriment to our profession to have training which encourages AP 'on' at 11;000 feet and 'off' at DA; MDA; etc.
A319 First Officer reported a flap overspeed on arrival; citing overreliance on automation as a contributing factor.