B737-800
Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Flight Crew Last 90 Days 5; Flight Crew Total 24500
Situational Awareness; Time Pressure
ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach
General None Reported / Taken
Human Factors; Weather
To preface this entire episode; I would like to note that on the day of the event described I was returning to flying after 84 days of non-flying due to medical reasons.  This is not to say that I had been impaired at any time; as I had been on medical leave while being evaluated after a cardiac-related observation made on my last physical.  I mention this because I believe that lack of recent flying time affected my proficiency to a degree in this instance. After initial level off; I checked the ATIS for a heads up and saw that the ILS 13C was our likely approach; and we both remarked about the low altimeter setting; which I think was 29.48 at the time.  The cruise portion of the flight was uneventful; and when we copied the later ATIS; we then expected and briefed the RNAV (RNP) Y 13C; as well as the 13C transition for the PANGG 2 Arrival.  We also noted that in our fairly heavy -800 with WET-FAIR condition reports; we would be utilizing max autobrake and flaps 40 with a 160 foot stopping margin predicted.  After switching to Chicago Approach; we were indeed told to expect the RNAV Y 13C.  The altimeter continued to drop; I believe it was 29.46 at this point.  Within perhaps two minutes of our initial check on; we were now told to expect the ILS 13C.  We reprogrammed; reset mins (30 feet lower on the ILS); and rebriefed.  On the next Approach frequency; we were given 29.42 as the altimeter and told again to expect the RNAV Y 13C. Again we reprogrammed; reset mins; and did a very short rebrief.  We were now on a fairly tight right downwind for 13C; and were descended to 2500 feet MSL.  Shortly thereafter we were told to expect the ILS 13C again.  Again we reprogrammed; reset; and quickly rebriefed.  Another Company aircraft checked on shortly afterward and the disbelief was quite evident in that Pilot's voice when she was told to expect the ILS; so we were not the only ones rapidly changing our plans.  Just before turning base we were given a new altimeter setting of 29.35.  I mistakenly began to move the baro mins selector; realized my mistake; and then reset the altimeter.  We were then turned to a 050 base heading and slowed to 200 KIAS.  This appeared to be a very tight base; and we were turned shortly thereafter to a 070 heading; then a 110 heading to intercept and given a descent to 2100 feet until established; 170 KIAS until HITOB; and cleared for the ILS 13C. (I am fairly certain of the altitudes and speeds; the headings are probably correct.)  VOR/LOC capture was uneventful; but it was then that I noticed that I had not reset the baro mins selector after changing it by mistake; and I proceeded to do so.  At that time I noticed the FO holding his hand in the vicinity of the gear lever trying to prompt me to configure; as we had already captured the GS.  I immediately called for gear down and flaps 15; but did not reset the MCP speed of 170 as I should have; so our decel rate was not great.  By the time I realized this with his help; I was able to continue the configuration; but we clearly did not meet stabilized approach criteria at our target altitude; although I continued the approach nonetheless.  The landing was moderately firm and the decel rate was abrupt with autobrakes max.  We turned off at Kilo and taxied to our gate. I realize that ATC needs some flexibility to adjust their plans and that sequencing non RNAV capable aircraft with RNAV capable aircraft can be challenging; but our having been given four expect approach clearances in a matter of a few minutes seems excessive without a runway change or inop NAVAID being involved.  As for myself; I don't feel that on day one of my return I had the necessary mental toughness and resilience for such a dynamically changing situation.  The First Officer did a strong job as PM; but I would rather have had him direct a go-around when I failed to initiate one on my own.  I realize that his not having done so doesn't get me a pass; but I would say that his SA was clearly stronger than mine at that point; and I was not in the green.  My observations are all made given the benefit of hindsight; of course. Due to distractions got behind on ILS approach and late to configure/stabilize approach.
B737-800 Captain describes the circumstances leading up to an unstabilized approach after nearly three months off flight status.