B777-200
Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Distraction; Confusion; Human-Machine Interface; Workload; Training / Qualification; Time Pressure; Situational Awareness
Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem
Chart Or Publication; Company Policy; Human Factors; Procedure
Flight planned for international flight with a fairly reasonable early morning departure. I received a reasonable amount of rest prior to the event. The problem with this flight was the addition of the new [Commercial Chart] EFB. Of the four crewmembers onboard; only one had used the [Commercial Chart] EFB prior. All of us had reviewed the required training prior to the event; however. Having arrived at the aircraft at a normal amount of time prior to pushback; we found ourselves fairly quickly 'behind' when trying to manipulate the new [Commercial Chart] EFB. Having one crewmember with experience with this EFB helped; but didn't fully overcome our lack of experience or knowledge with the new software. We spent an inordinate amount of time trying to input our flight plan and getting the system 'up and running' before launching. Our problem arose in that having spent as much time as we did trying to get versed in the new system; we fell out of our normal routine with regards to all other pre-flight duties. In the end; our error came from having an incorrect speed set in the mode control panel for departure. Specifically; we are supposed to have our V2 speed set in the window prior to takeoff. While I can't recall what our speed was supposed to be; we had a speed of 147 (a speed which was below our V1 speed) set in the window. I am guessing our V2 speed should have been set to 174; and the numbers were transposed. Unfortunately; not a single one of the four crewmembers on the flight deck noticed this discrepancy prior to takeoff roll. I noted [that] the speed was not correct at approximately 80-90 KTS on takeoff roll; but elected not to call for a reject as I believed it was a safer course of action to continue the takeoff; rather than perform a high speed heavyweight reject for a relatively minor error in the set speed. I suspect all our issues with regards to this error were due to the fact we spent so much time and energy into trying to get comfortable with the [Commercial Chart] EFB we made this error in setting the correct V2 speed.I feel this could have been prevented if we would have received a more comprehensive amount of training prior to flying an aircraft with the [Commercial Chart] EFB onboard. Perhaps some ground school coupled with some time in the simulator would have helped immensely as we would have then been much more comfortable with the system; and would have not had to dedicate as much time as we did to it during our pre-flight duties.
A B777 crew was distracted while learning a new iPad Commercial Chart EFB application as they prepared for departure which caused a V2 speed selection of 147 when it was actually 174.