Regional Jet 200 ER/LR (CRJ200)
Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Workload
Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Maintenance Action
Aircraft
I was called out on a reserve callout to deadhead to ZZZ to pickup an airplane that needed to be repositioned to ZZZ1. I noticed in the Maintenance log that Maintenance had been working on the standby Airspeed Indicator/Altimeter. I assume that this is why the airplane was stranded in ZZZ. First Officer and I completed our preflight checks and briefings to include the Non Routine Flight Operations task cards per normal; with nothing unusual occurring. We taxied out to ZZZ Runway XX; and departed normally via the ODP. The winds on takeoff were a strong gusty crosswind to about 30 knots from the right. The takeoff roll was normal with no abnormalities. We called positive rate; and then I called for 'Gear Up'. Shortly after selecting the landing gear up; all of my air data instruments went blank; and displayed Red IAS; ALT; & V/S flags. The autopilot was not engaged; and my flight director did not indicate with the loss of air data indications. I told my First Officer that I lost my airspeed and air data; and left the power set for takeoff and pitched for 10 degrees nose up. My First Officer read out the speeds on his speed tape and the standby gauges. While I had a hunch that his indications were correct; due to the Maintenance write-ups and recent work; and the unusual and immediate failure; we elected to initially diagnose this as an unreliable airspeed emergency; at least until we could verify that both the First Officer's ADC and the standby gauges were correctly indicating. I suspected an ADC 1 failure of some sorts. After reaching a safe altitude and completing the After Takeoff Checklist; I transferred the flight controls over to my First Officer; and told him to climb on course initially while we could work to verify that the airspeed indicators on his side were correctly indicating. ATC was notified of the instrument failure and of our request to climb on course for the time being. We were in VMC conditions and felt it was safe and prudent to continue to climb away from the terrain around ZZZ. As the airplane was empty; it's climb performance was exceptional. After verifying our speed; power settings; and pitch attitudes using the charts from the Unreliable Airspeed procedure we were able to affirmatively establish that both the First Officer's indications along with our standby instruments were indicating correctly. We at this point elected to abandon the unreliable airspeed procedure; as we still had two functioning airspeed indicators and instead address this as an ADC 1 abnormal procedure and failure. I felt that the unreliable airspeed procedure; while providing us with good situational information to verify that our other two indicators were functioning correctly; was irrelevant because we didn't have varying unreliable airspeed indications; but rather a complete loss of air data information. Although I suspected it was simply an ADC failure initially; due to our low altitude and critical phase of flight; we elected to initially treat the failure as an unreliable airspeed situation to assure that we were flying a safe pitch and power setting regardless of airspeed to reach a safe altitude clear of the terrain. ATC was updated that we suspected an ADC 1 failure. An emergency was never declared with ATC. We spoke to Dispatch and agreed that with the ADC 1 failure a diversion to the nearest suitable airport was not necessarily required; which is an important difference from the unreliable airspeed procedure; although we did discuss as a crew and with Dispatch the possibility of a diversion to ZZZ2 or another nearby airport along our route. We agreed that with the situation stable and well diagnosed; we felt it was pertinent; legal; and safest to continue on to ZZZ1. We landed in ZZZ1 where the ADC failure was written up in the Maintenance log as a discrepancy; and Maintenance was briefed on the phone. I called the Flight Dispatcher and debriefed with him as well; and he assured me that he was in agreement with our decision making and the [Dispatcher] was aware of the situation; and no further calls or reports were required. Maintenance later removed; and replaced ADC 1; prior to dispatching the aircraft on it's next flight. The cause of this event was a failure of ADC 1. I am curios as to whether or not the Maintenance work done on the standby airspeed/altimeter could have contributed to the failure of ADC 1. In terms of recurrence; and preventing this; from a flight ops standpoint I'm not sure what to recommend. However; I will say that this is the 2nd time in a month I have dealt with an unreliable airspeed issue; pitot/static issue; or ADC issue on the CRJ. Maybe I'm snakebit; but I have taken notice to the increase in frequency with these events. We train for this; and just a week ago I went through [training].  In our training we ran through the unreliable airspeed procedure. Because of this; I was familiar that if an initial climb is required; or just after takeoff; in the CRJ200 the checklist tells you to pitch to 10 degrees nose up at takeoff power. Fortunately; the recent familiarity with that procedure 100% helped; and was highly effective through the initial diagnosis and trouble shooting of our abnormality. There isn't a great checklist for 'loss of airspeed' in the QRH; you have to pick between unreliable airspeed; and an ADC failure. We used the Immediate Action Items from the unreliable airspeed checklist; along with the pitch/thrust reference tables; to help assure that we were climbing in a safe flight path state; and that our remaining operational airspeed indicators were properly functioning; however; then rediagnosed the issue as a full ADC 1 failure; and felt it was more prudent to treat this as an ADC failure as opposed to an unreliable airspeed emergency. I realize today though that in real life...It could be difficult to truly distinguish between the two. As a crew; we elected to start with the ultra safe option; and then once we gathered more information about the problem; were able to move into a different; and more accurate checklist; that more appropriately addressed the problem. If I could make a recommendation; I think that we need to add both memory items; and a QRC checklist for a suspected Unreliable airspeed or loss of airspeed immediate response. The immediate action items in the QRH; should absolutely be committed to memory; and probably be backed up by a QRC. While I was fortunately familiar with these; should we have a new Captain/ First Officer pairing on the aircraft in the future; that maybe isn't familiar with the aircrafts normal performance; this could potentially be an unforgivable consequence. Just a recommendation after taking some time to look back at the events of today.
CRJ-200 flight Captain reported an uneventful landing at destination after experiencing ADC1 failure during flight and successfully overcame failure.