B747-400
Communication Breakdown
Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach
Human Factors; Weather
Operating Flight XXXX we executed the XXXXX arrival planning for Runway XXC that was being advertised on the arrival D-ATIS. The winds were appropriately 210/200 @19 G31. We discussed the possibility of landing on Runway XXC with auto-brakes 4 and max thrust reversers. The Captain stated that he didn't think that was a good idea because of the strong crosswind and rather to just rely on the brakes vs TR due to the crosswind component and cited the ZZZ runway incident. I agreed and we planned on using idle TR and Auto-brakes 4. However the Captain computed the performance with wet runway and flaps 30; although on the D-ATIS there was no FICON (Field Condition report) or mention of wet-runway conditions; but justified his using those performance that with the NOTAMS for wet runway that were 6 hours old. I mentioned to him that due to the gusty winds I thought it would be a good idea to use flaps 25 due to the possibility of FLAP RELIEF and was told 'it wouldn't be a problem.' Once we got closer to the terminal area; the new ATIS stated Runway XYR was now in use and I asked for performance and again stated I would like flaps 25 because of the wind gust component and our weight so close to flaps 30 speed. The Captain again programmed the performance with wet runway although there was no FICON or mention of wet runway on the ATIS; and used flaps 30. I explained to him that 'if we hit flap relief below 1;000; we would be unstable and would have to go around and I thought that would be an issue due to the gusty winds.' I was again ignored and the Captain computed the performance for flaps 30 with MAX AUTO brakes.At appropriately 800 ft. on the first ILS to XYR we got the Flaps Relief EICAS message and I called 'unstable go-around.' We executed a go around that was uneventful and was given a heading and told to climb to 5;000 ft. The go around went fine and I again expressed concern for the flaps 30 speeds vs 25; as well as the wet runway performance that I thought was unnecessary; and I was told 'FLAPS 30; even if we get the flaps relief below 1;000 we will continue' I told the Captain 'I was not comfortable with that and if necessary we could use Runway XXC if we had to go around again.' This time the Captain elected to use the BRAKING ACTION GOOD on performance; although there was no FICON; and told me that flaps 25 was not an option and to stop 'over-controlling the throttles' even though our REF speed plus gust additive was 165 kts. and flaps 30 speed was 180. On the 2nd ILS to XYR we again got the Flaps Relief at appropriately 600 ft. and I again called 'unstable go around' and hit the TOGA switch. The Captain said 'I have the controls; and that I (me) was absolutely right for going around but we were going to land anyways' I replied with 'your controls' and noted the fuel was appropriately 13.4T. The Captain started to explain his reasoning for landing and I told him ''we could talk about on the ground.' He then dove for the runway unstable and landed on Runway XYR after the autopilot had already started initiating a go around and increasing TOGA thrust. After landing the taxi in was uneventful; and after shutdown he replied that 'he hoped I wasn't upset' in which I replied that I was; and that I was going to file a report. The Captain then said he was going to have to file a lot of paperwork and said he was sorry for taking the controls.I think the culture of Captains not valuing their First Officers' experience and ideas has become toxic at [company name]; and there needs to be a change. This particular Captain had taken the time to explain a lot of valuable information before and during the flight; clarifying the FCOM; the new 'Briefing the Glass' procedure; De-ice procedure etc. Which I was very appreciative of; however I think he took on the role that he was the teacher and that I had nothing to offer him as a pilot no matter my experience level or knowledge base.
FO (First Officer) was PF (Pilot Flying). During the arrival briefing; his briefing did not include 'Fuel Plan' and a few other required items. As I was going over the briefing items he had missed; we discussed the fuel burn to our alternate would be about 5 tons so we wouldn't have a lot of extra fuel or time if something happened at our destination before we would have to divert. The FMC reserve was 11.1. Due to strong and gusty winds the approach speed included a 20 kt. additive and was 171. Initially ZZZ was landing to the west and he was confused about proper wind additives and also mentioned that we would have to land at flaps 25 because of Flap Relief. At the beginning of the flight he informed me that he did a lot of flying outside of [company name] so if I saw or heard something the wasn't correct; to let him know. We reviewed the wind additives for the headwind component and agreed that only a small additive would be needed for the planned landing Runway XXC since the wind was 70 degrees off runway heading. He also briefed that he would use Max reverse thrust. We discussed the disadvantages of using max reverse in a strong crosswind situation and I asked that he change his plan to instead use the FCOM standard of idle reverse. Late in the descent; the airport changed to landing on XYR.The NOTAMs for the airport listed XXL/XYR as wet with FICON 5/5/5. The FDP required Max Manual braking for that condition. We queried Tower and received info that the only report they currently had was braking action good. With that information we could use Max Auto braking at flaps 30. I told him then that we could go back to his initial plan of using max reverse since we no longer had a strong crosswind. We received vectors and flew the ILS XYR. On the first approach we accomplished a go-around due to the FO (PF) using poor thrust technique by adding and subtracting too much thrust for the momentary atmospheric airspeed deviations. The airspeed would jump 5 knots or so above the bug and the FO would slam the thrust to idle. Then as the airspeed started to fall below the bug he would rapidly bring in too much thrust causing the airspeed to increase to 180 and cause the Flap Relief advisory on the EICAS. I told him that with smaller thrust corrections on the second approach we shouldn't get the Flap Relief issue again. I thought he was using thrust technique that worked for the other aircraft he said he was flying. On the second approach with the same conditions; I coached him to use smaller thrust corrections which he initially did with good results. Just after the 1;000 ft. stable call; he again made too large of a thrust correction and caused the Flap Relief message and he; the FO; (FP) called go-around. I glanced at the fuel remaining and thought it said 11. In my opinion at that time; I thought it was safer to continue the approach because of the fuel state; the transient atmospheric airspeed deviations; the proper alignment with the runway and being in VMC on proper glidepath. I announced that; ' I have the aircraft' and made an uneventful landing. On the ground I told the FO that he was 100% correct in his callouts and actions. I said that in my opinion; at that time; I thought it was safer to continue than to execute another go-around and possibly get into a critical fuel state. After we blocked in and accomplished all checklists; I tried to explain my decision and to reinforce that what he did was correct from his perspective. The FO was upset and disagreed with my assessment. I would have much preferred to accomplish another go-around. I did not take lightly the decision to exercise my emergency authority and do what I thought was the safer course of action. I know this is a 'no-win' situation. If I had it to do over again; I would have flown the second approach myself instead of letting him fly it again.
B747 flight crew reported a disagreement between the Captain and First Officer on the landing flap configuration resulting in two go-arounds.