B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness
ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
General None Reported / Taken
Procedure; Human Factors
The B737 aircraft was climbing off BNA. That aircraft was handed off of R62 above my airspace for an Automated Information Transfer (AIT). The Controller at R62 took the hand off; put FL310 in the data block; and flashed to T37. T37 took the hand off; and I climbed the aircraft to FL310. A few seconds later; R62 told me to stop the B737 at FL230 (altitude just below T37 airspace); T37 could not approve any higher. I stop the B737 at FL230; and then asked R62 the reason why. I then scrolled out my scope to see T37 had traffic descending out of FL260 for FL200. This traffic was deviating right of course for weather. I asked R62 of T37 was stopping the CRJ2 traffic at FL240. R62 explained that he didn't know and would call. I told him to have T37 put the CRJ2 on a 270 heading to avoid the B737 traffic at FL230. R62 called T37 and was told T37 was no longer talking to that traffic; although the aircraft was still in T37's airspace. T41 was called and told to put the CRJ2 on a 270 heading to avoid traffic. I then called to T41 to insure he had RADAR on the B737 who was level at FL230. That Controller said no; I can take a point out on the aircraft. I then explained T37 would not climb the B737; could he take RADAR. T41 took RADAR and once the CRJ2 was no longer traffic for the B737; I switched the B737 to T41. T37 should have never taken RADAR on the B737 climbing to FL310 if they had traffic. The T37 Controller should have called ZME and communicated a plan to keep these aircraft safe; not passed the buck to others. Next; if the Controller then realized they were traffic; and had to stop the B737 climb an FL230; the Controller should have taken action to stop the CRJ2 decent at FL240. The Controller should have never switched the CRJ2 frequency when such a situation was taken place. The Controller should have talked to T41; the Controller below his/her airspace and the Controller who was talking to the CRJ2 at the time. T41 should have been proactive also and communicated with me about this dangerous situation and what his plan of action was. ZTL should have been talking to me directly.
ZME Controller described in detail an alleged unsafe operation that involved the Automated Information Transfer (AIT) procedure.