SA-227 AC Metro III
Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Commercial
Flight Crew Last 90 Days 200; Flight Crew Total 627; Flight Crew Type 127
Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Workload; Time Pressure
Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown; Ground Event / Encounter Ground Strike - Aircraft; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach
Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem
Aircraft; Airport; Human Factors
The following details were captured while I was the PF and my Captain was the PNF. Weather conditions during this flight were daytime and clear while cruising into MMIO. This was my first trip into MMIO. While in cruise Monterrey Center updated us with current weather for MMIO; and advised us to expect VOR DME 2 RWY 17. At this time; we planned to perform the first segment of the approach and ask for a visual traffic pattern since the winds were favoring RWY 35. I briefed the approach. At approximately 70NM from MMIO I requested to begin our descent. ATC advised we were cleared to descend to 12;000. I requested [the PNF] to perform our 'Descent and in Range' checklist. Prior to reaching 12;000; ATC cleared us to descend to 10;000 and that we were cleared for the VOR DME 2 RWY 17 approach. As soon as we had the airport in sight; the Captain requested to intercept a right downwind to make a visual traffic pattern for RWY 35 and after confirmation; I began to my turn to the East.As my position was approaching the 'abeam numbers' area; I requested 'flaps'. As I began to speak; the tower cleared us to land on RWY 35 along with current weather conditions; and the Captain was responding and confirming the tower's instructions. As soon as the radio was open for me to communicate my request for half flaps; we were nearing the 'Gear down landing checklist' position according to our SOPs. Also; I noticed we were getting closer and closer to the mountains. I requested flaps and the Captain engaged them; and I began to turn for final approach. As I was flying; I remained cautiously observant of altitude and terrain. I was advised by Captain that as I was turning from base to final; that I was overshooting my turn to final. I looked out at the airport and my flight path and began to correct my flight path. As I lined up with the runway; I called for gear down and 'landing checklist.' The Captain promptly complied and as he was calling the checklist I was focusing on the runway and listening to his call outs. As I crossed over the numbers I began to flare and prepare for touchdown. Just as I believed [we were] touching down; I heard an unknown noise. The Captain quickly said; 'I have the controls; we are going around.' I released control of the airplane immediately and said; you have the controls; I transitioned my thoughts and processes to PNF. I began scanning the instruments for anything unusual; to include the engine instruments and annunciator panel. I noticed nothing out of the ordinary. Captain called for 'max power' and I complied by ensuring max power setting. Captain then called for [??] flaps; which I set and confirmed visually by looking at flaps setting gauge. I then called 'positive rate' and the Captain called for gear up. I moved the gear handle up and confirmed the landing gear position lights extinguished. Shortly after the tower called us and asked; 'is everything OK?' We confirmed that everything was OK. Tower then gave us instructions for a right traffic pattern. I remained scanning the engine instruments and annunciator panel for abnormalities; nothing was noted. Captain began his cross turn and engaged in right traffic pattern. On the downwind leg; Captain stated to me that; 'since all engine parameters were normal and [there were] no fault indications that the noise could have been the result of air being dumped by the pressurization system. The controller was set differently than appropriate for field elevation. Again; being vigilant in scanning all the instruments and annunciator panel; we saw nothing out of the ordinary; we proceeded to make a normal landing. As we cleared the runway from roll out we were cleared to taxi to the ramp. Shortly after we completed the 'engine stop' checklist; the Captain called for a post flight inspection. I went out to spin the props; when I noticed the prop tips bent backwards. I then notified Captain of what I saw. Moving forward; I feel that this could have been prevented by having an experienced Pilot demonstrate this type of approach in new terrain to a new Pilot first. Then the new Pilot can demonstrate what he or she learned.
From what I can recall; it was a normal flight under daytime conditions and clear weather cruising into MMIO where we were in contact with Monterrey Center and about 110 NM away we asked for the current weather and approach to expect in to the airport. Clear skies with more than 10 SM of visibility and VOR DME 2 RWY 17 is what they answered back giving us the conclusion that at some point we were going to be able to transition to a visual traffic pattern from the expected instrument approach. I was the PNF and my First Officer was the PF. I reviewed the approach and set it up in my side of the airplane. After that done; my First Officer passed the controls to me; performing positive exchange of controls; so he was able to brief the approach himself and set everything in his side as well. When he was ready; I gave him the controls of the airplane back performing the same [positive exchange]. Just before 70 NM out; I proceeded with my First Officer's Request to ask for our descent into MMIO. Once it was approved by ATC he started descending to the cleared altitude (12;000) and asked for the 'Descent and in Range' checklist which I performed. Just before reaching 12;000 we were cleared to 10;000 feet and cleared for the VOR DME 2 RWY 17 approach. He followed altitudes and approach instructions accordingly into the airport and being aware of the winds favoring RWY 35; we requested to intercept a Right downwind to make a visual pattern into that RWY. Getting that last request cleared by ATC; we were descending through the final approach course where we leveled off at traffic pattern altitude and we began our turn towards the East of the airport to intercept a Right downwind for RWY 35. Approaching abeam the numbers in downwind I heard an unreadable call from the First Officer stepped on by the tower clearance to land on RWY 35 that rushed the steps of the traffic pattern within the SOP profile since I had to confirm landing clearance and it was not until my First Officer started his turn to 'right base' where he was able to call back for half flaps (since we already had quarter flaps 15NM away from the airport). I selected them. I was focusing on the flight path to maintain obstacle clearance from the high altitude terrain. It was not until I noticed he was about to overshoot final that I was able to confirm that [?] flaps were indicated and when I advised him about the high altitude terrain in the area. He immediately made a correction angle to intercept 'final' calling for landing gear down and landing checklist. I responded by confirming speed check and since we were already tight into the approach; I quickly extended the landing gear handle and rushed myself to call out the checklist finishing all the items due to my hurry of getting my hands close to the airplane controls securing my First Officer's movements to correct the flight path. My First Officer corrected and stabilized his path into short final at 600AGL. Just after the flare we heard an unknown noise and thought we felt an unusual touchdown; immediately causing me call for the airplane controls and say 'I have the controls; we are going around' due to my uncertainty of the conditions of the landing gear (because of the strange 'touchdown' feeling) and my awareness that all the warning annunciator panel indications were in good conditions thinking that the maybe the noise was due to a malfunction of the gear. I called for max power; increased the throttle and my First Officer ensured setting the power to Max setting. Immediately I called for 'quarter flaps' which he set and confirmed. As my First Officer confirmed positive rate I called for gear up. My First Officer followed by calling 'gear is up.' ...we proceeded to make a normal landing; now I as the PF and my First Officer as the PNF. As we cleared the runway from roll out; we proceeded with after landing checklist also cross checking the instruments and the instrument panel to ensure everything was normal. My conclusion is that due to the high altitude terrain of the area and a chain of events we got into a situation of rushing our landing checklist at a very late portion of the approach; where I; letting the First Officer perform the approach; should have taken action in time so the airplane had the appropriate configuration earlier and avoided getting ourselves into a situation like this.  A situation where we concluded that maybe the gear handle was not fully secured in the down position while performing the landing checklist. We did a transition from the VOR DME 2 RWY 17 to a visual traffic pattern to RWY 35; where a good solution in this scenario would have been to stick with the instrument procedure profile where we could have been appropriately configured in to the approach giving us enough time to confirm more than one time that the landing gear is set to the down position.
The flight crew of an SA227 inbound to MMIO; a high altitude airport surrounded by higher terrain; opted to request a visual approach rather that the VOR to Runway 17 for which they had previously been cleared.  The inexperienced First Officer; the PF; made a rushed approach and failed to extend the gear at an appropriate time.  The Captain took over the controls and executed a go around following a strange noise during the flare for landing.  Following a successful second approach by the Captain a subsequent post flight inspection revealed the prop tips were bent backward; apparently due to ground contact during the rejected landing.