EMB ERJ 145 ER/LR
Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Flight Crew Last 90 Days 90; Flight Crew Total 4089; Flight Crew Type 125
Training / Qualification; Workload; Distraction; Situational Awareness
Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach
Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory
Chart Or Publication; Company Policy; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors; Procedure; Weather
I was flying as a First Officer in an Embraer 145. We were executing the ILS approach and the approach was normal and stable. Reported visibility 6;000 RVR and ceilings at 300 feet. I was the pilot flying and my Captain was the pilot monitoring. Because the Captain was restricted our minimums were 300 feet. The Captain called runway in sight continue. I continued the approach to 200 feet where the pilot monitoring stated runway in sight. I quickly scanned and could not visually acquire the runway. I scanned the instruments quickly and back outside to see the runway slightly to my right. I made the correction to align the runway with our flight path and began our final landing phase. We were slightly high so I nosed the aircraft forward to increase descent rate and the aural annunciation alarmed us sink rate. I slowly retarded the thrust levers and pitched for landing; the sink rate was more than usual and we experienced a very firm landing. We did not bounce and the remainder of landing and taxi phases were normal.
The First Officer was the pilot flying while I was the pilot monitoring during the ILS approach. We had a normal and stable approach; at 500 feet the First Officer was at approach speed and descending at 600 feet per minute; on glideslope. We knew the ceiling was at 300 feet; and the RVR was just reported at 6000. At 300 feet I saw the runway approach light system and I said 'continue'; we descended below minimums. While the autopilot was disconnected we drifted a little to the left of course and decreased the rate of descent. We were visual and as soon as the First Officer looked up and had the runway in sight too he corrected back to the appropriate course and aligned with the runway. We were also high; so the First Officer corrected it by immediately pitching down; maybe a little too aggressively and we got the 'Sink Rate' aural caution. The First Officer corrected for it; but our speed was low. While he was correcting for the rate of descent and the speed; at approximately 5 feet above the runway; we had the stick shaker. We touched down harder than normal on the main gear. The landing was very firm but was not bounced. Thrust levers were put on full reverse and we stopped on the runway and exited at a taxiway. During the post flight nothing was reported out of the ordinary; but since I have a very limited experience as Captain; I decided that it was safer to contact maintenance and have them check out the airplane.I have limited experience as Captain. I met the First Officer on the previous flight during which he showed confidence and knowledge. I was pilot flying for that leg. On the way back the First Officer was the pilot flying. We discussed the destination weather on the ground; we talked about the alternates and; during the cruise phase of the flight; we talked about the approach; the higher minimum we were going to use and we reviewed the go around procedure. I also suggested to keep the autopilot on until minimums; so that in case of go-around the procedure was going to be a little easier.The First Officer showed understanding and confidence. The approach was flown well all the way down to minimums. I had no concerns and I felt confident in my First Officer's capabilities. Once we reached minimums at 300 feet I had the approach light system in sight and I said 'continue' expecting the pilot flying to disconnect the autopilot; but to follow the flight directors down to 100 feet or until I said runway in sight or go around. Maybe due to the lack of experience of the First Officer; he felt the urge to look outside when I said continue; which caused him to deviate from the flight director; causing a decrease in descent rate and in a drift to the left. Once the First Officer had the runway in sight also; he corrected for both lateral deviation and for the descent rate.I think his limited experience brought him to over-correct the descent rate which caused the SINK RATE caution. Between 300 feet and the moment we touched down I felt like everything happened very fast; the pilot flying was correcting for his mistake and was responsive; maybe his corrections were not enough or not very accurate but they were present and did not lead me to take over the controls right away once the deviation happened. I think if I had more experience I would have spotted some other signs of the First Officer weaknesses or I would have been more alert on the possibility of his uneasiness in low ceiling/visibility conditions and choose to be the pilot flying for that leg. I was expecting the First Officer to react and behave like we train in the simulator and in my experience as First Officer I never had my Captain feeling the need to 'take' my leg because of weather related issues so I did not think it was necessary.In the future I will pay much more attention to the level of experience of my First Officers on the actual airplane; and not as pilots. When I reach minimum and have the approach lights in sight; I expect to be able to keep looking outside in order to see the runway environment; while the pilot monitoring is still focused on its instruments and descends to 100 feet. As soon as I have the runway in sight and I say it; I expect the pilot monitoring to look outside and state either landing or go around. Unfortunately; this is not what happened; and now I know that I cannot assume this will happen. I misjudged the level of competence that my FO (First Officer) had. Had my attention been more cross scanning outside-inside and verifying he was still on appropriate glide path and speed; while looking for the runway; this occurrence may have been prevented.
ERJ-145 flight crew reported landing below minimums and conducting a hard landing.