A330
Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Workload; Time Pressure; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown
Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew FLC Overrode Automation
Weather; Procedure; Aircraft
On descent through FL200; Flight Attendant (FA) reported odor in cabin from FWD galley through row five. First Officer (FO); FB and I smelled it too. The FO and I thought it smelled like ozone; and we were flying through an area of thunderstorms. However; the FB thought it smelled electrical. We donned oxygen masks and I got out the Quick Action Card (QAC); but the FA reported the odor dissipated; so we suspended the procedure and removed our masks. Due to a late clearance for approach from ATC we had to go missed approach and at the same time the FA reported the odor again and stronger than before. We donned oxygen masks and I performed the QAC procedure and talked to ATC while the FO flew the aircraft. We were vectored back around cells for another approach. There was never any smoke visible; just electrical smell which again dissipated after three to four minutes; which is partly why I didn't declare an emergency; but in hindsight I should have anyway. We suspended further procedures after doing the Quick action card; but kept our masks on for the approach and landing; which was uneventful. I put the events in the logbook and debriefed maintenance at the gate. FO and FB performance was exemplary and contributed greatly to a coordinated crew response to a very busy situation.
All pilots had returned from break and we were on descent at FL200. Out of FL240 all of us smelled smoke. The Captain told us to don oxygen; which we did. Almost immediately the purser called to report smoke. I asked the Captain if I could check out the cabin and he agreed. I donned the mask and exited the cockpit. I walked the length of the aircraft talking to every Flight Attendant (FA). All had smelled it and all thought it was electrical. I couldn't see any smoke and the smell was dissipating as I returned to the cockpit. Upon my return the smell was virtually gone so we removed masks and continued. It was my sense that it was electrical in nature and definitely neither oil nor Skydrol in the Air Cycle Machine. There were thunderstorms all along the arrival route so we diverted a little south and then turned to the outer marker for XYR. It seems that we were the first airplane to have made an approach since a cell had passed over the field recently; it was very quiet and the only other traffic in the area was behind us. We were vectored for a right base to XYR intercepting outside the FAF at 2000 MSL and then given a heading with a clearance to intercept the localizer. The First Officer (FO); who was flying; was configured with gear down and flaps 3 as we approached the glideslope. As we crossed the GS intercept the FO realized hadn't received an approach clearance yet so we couldn't start down. The Captain called the Tower for clearance but we got stepped on once and ignored or stepped on another time and it took three calls to get an approach clearance. By now we were close to being two dots high but we started a descent to recapture. The FO called for full flaps and deployed the spoilers to get back on glide path. As we descended through 1000 feet we were close to being stable but the spoilers were still deployed. I said; rather loudly; 'The boards are still out. Go Around.' There was a startle effect as the two realized that we were; in fact; at 950 feet and the spoilers were still out. I said again; 'Go Around.' The Captain said; 'Go around' and the FO executed a go around. Within a few seconds we all smelled smoke again. The Captain again ordered us to don our masks which we did.The FO executed a soft go-around (and did a great job); the Captain began executing the QRC and I set up the intercoms so we could talk and then called back to the purser. He said it was worse than before. The Tower gave us directions to climb to 4000 feet and turned us over to the TRACON. Turning downwind I said we should probably declare an emergency. I got no response from the Captain. The Captain executed the QRH procedure; effectively cutting off the packs. After another minute or two I reiterated that would should declare an emergency; stating that landing an airplane with everyone in the front wearing oxygen masks was an emergency in and of itself and that we'd look pretty stupid if something went wrong and we hadn't done so. I don't remember exactly what the Captain said but he demurred. I deferred. Vectoring for final we were now in instrument conditions. We were cleared for the approach but had missed putting the FMS into Approach Mode ('activate/confirm'). The FO selected managed speed and the autopilot pitched to capture the glideslope. The aircraft begin to accelerate and came within 1 knot of an overspeed at 180 knots. He quickly realized what was wrong and put the speed in manual mode; and dialed back the bug to just above VLS. The captain was able to quickly put the aircraft back into approach mode and returned us to managed airspeed; we were stable by 1000 feet; and we landed. The FO is an excellent stick and a bright and cheerful pilot. He did a great job. The Captain was slow and methodical; followed company procedures and kept us all on track. They both did a really nice job and deserve commendation. I would happily fly with both of them again. Two things went wrong with this flight. The first is that Captain madea questionable call not to declare an emergency. He conceded this graciously on the ground and said that he was so busy that he was concerned that declaring an emergency would just make it worse. The second is our failure to get the aircraft in Approach mode on the second approach. The FO had gone to TOGA which restrung the approach and then cleaned up the aircraft; and had done a very nice job of it. I take some responsibility for missing this. It's the job of the FB to see everything and cover for the two guys up front flying. Having said that my two mitigating circumstances are that the Captain's and FO's MCDUs are hard to see from the observer seat; and everything is harder to see when you're wearing an oxygen mask. This is a design flaw of the Airbus. Generally the only way an Airbus will go into Approach mode by itself is if it's on a STAR and crosses a programmed energy reduction point. We seldom do this in the United States which is why SOP is to 'activate and confirm' at 10;000 feet. We train that we will always land the Airbus in managed airspeed mode. The going theory for this is to take advantage of GS mini. My experience over the last ten years is that this works nicely most of the time; especially in the 330 with its wing; but this causes trouble at times; and this was one of them. We are developing an over reliance on automation and the design of the Airbus is contributing to a decline in my flying skills. I work pretty hard to maintain them (in accordance with company policy as outlined in FM Part 1) but I know I make some pilots nervous because they're not used to flying with any of the automation turned off; ever. With the FAA's our Training Department's move to emphasize manual flight I'm hoping this will change. Secondly; the Captain's belief that declaring an emergency would potentially increase his workload is wrong. It's designed to do the opposite. Once we declare an emergency we become the local controller's priority; plus his supervisor; plus everyone else in the tower for that matter. Pilots never (rarely?) like to become melodramatic and declaring an emergency for what we suspect may be trivial will make us feel foolish. But if we had to go around because of the failure of the aircraft in front of us to clear the runway; and our little smoke incident turned into an uncontained fire; we would have certainly been fools. We should have a training module explaining what happens with ATC when we declare an emergency and what its advantages are.
A330 Captain and Relief First Officer reported odor in cabin causing a return to departure airport.