PA-28R Cherokee Arrow All Series
Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Commercial
Flight Crew Last 90 Days 189; Flight Crew Total 1100; Flight Crew Type 25
Communication Breakdown; Distraction; Situational Awareness
Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Gear Up Landing; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Aircraft Aircraft Damaged
Human Factors; Procedure; Weather
I was flight instructing for my employer. The day seemed to be routine. The winds were 240@10 knots when we departed. I was flying with a pilot whom I had flown with before in the past. He was not my student; but we had been known to fly together when his instructor was not available. Today was our very first flight together in the Piper Arrow. The student had only flown with me before in our school's Diamond 20 aircraft. Prior to flying with me; the student had flown the Piper Arrow with his normal instructor a handful of times. The student is a helicopter commercial pilot and was working on his airplane commercial add-on.We departed with the intention of working on commercial takeoffs and landings. Once we got to the airport we made 3 full stop take offs and landings. The Piper Arrow is a retractable gear and we purposely do not touch any handles until exiting the runway. This is to avoid inadvertently putting the gear handle in the up position while on the ground. There are several factors that I believe resulted in this aircraft incident.On our final takeoff; we were executing a soft field takeoff. I explained to the student that the next maneuver would be an accuracy landing. I did not want it to be a surprise. Once were on the downwind at midfield for the runway; I called for the landing checklist. The student ran through the prompts and executed the checklist. He pulls the power back and the gear warning horn goes off. The student then pinned the gear in the upwards position. This was done to keep the gear from popping out until the student had secured the landing (meaning; he could successfully make it to the runway). This was also an emergency procedure listed in the Piper Arrow's Pilot Operating Handbook (POH). Abeam our intended point of the 1;000 ft. markers; the student pulled the power back. I noticed that he didn't pull the power back all the way to idle; so I told him such and I reduced the power (to idle).The student used his judgment about when he felt he should turn the aircraft. The conditions at the time of the incident were winds from the southwest at 10 knots gusting to 15 knots. It was quite turbulent; we were within the tolerances of the airplane. I saw the student reach in the direction of the gear handle during a moment of turbulence. I became distracted from the aircraft becoming slow. I instantly told the student to lower the nose to allow the momentum to carry the aircraft and increase our airspeed. I assumed that when the student reached for the gear selector; he had put it in the down position. The student realized that the aircraft was kind of high and began to add flaps. The flaps were to the full position by the time we made it to the runway numbers. The airplane did get slow again as the student flared pretty high. I told him to lower the nose so that we could use ground effect to our benefit. We made it to ground effect and then the aircraft smoothly landed on the belly. That's when the propeller began hitting the tarmac and I realized my mistake. We shut the aircraft down and exited to assess our damage.   There are a number of variables that I have compiled that are factors for the incident that took place. For starters; I've been on the track to fly about 100 hours this month. In the previous 3 weeks; I've logged 77 hours and 35 hours of ground. While I remained legal within my duty time I was tired at the time of the incident. I had a hard time sleeping the night before. I also feel that I ran my energy level down by instructing so much. I don't feel that I was at 100% fit for flight at the time of the incident. The conditions in which we were flying were VFR 10 miles of visibility and the winds were from the southwest at 10 knots gusting to 15 knots. This was a crosswind condition at the airport. There was also turbulence present while we were executing our landings. I believe that this served as a distraction during the maneuver. The landing gear being in the pinned position was a definite contributor. Per the checklist and our (Standard Operating Procedure) SOP we are supposed to pin the gear up; but there were no safeguards to ensure this system still did its job. Doing this removes the barriers to prevent a gear up landing. Had his hand been on the airspeed gear override system instead of pinning it we both would have recognized that the gear wasn't down. If he took his hand off the gear override; the gear would have extended due to low airspeed and there would have been no incident. Once the gear warning horn was pinned up; my student and I did not have a gear warning horn. I believe this led to complacency and us forgetting to unpin the gear. The landing gear is supposed to have a warning light that illuminates to say it's unsafe. Based on the design and the sunlight; I failed to see it illuminate. The ultimate factor that led to the incident was the circumvention of my trigger to put the gear down. My student extended full flaps and the gear should have been down prior to that time. When I did all of my flight training in complex aircrafts; my trigger to put the gear down occurred prior to selecting any normal landing flap position. At that time my call out would be gear down flaps approach; landing checklist. That trigger was to put gear down before selecting a landing flaps position. When landing with no flaps; I brief a no flap landing and when I would extend the gear. I base the gear extension speed 30 knots above my approach speed. It was done that way so that I would never forget to put the gear down. By being distracted by the turbulence; slow speed and thinking I saw my student touch the gear handle led to my student getting past my trigger and landing gear up.
[Report narrative contained no additional information.]
PA28 pilot neglected to lower the landing gear during training while conducting an emergency procedure.