B767-300 and 300 ER
Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification
Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown
Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Human Factors
APU inop. In my experience; normally start engine #2 in the blocks with start cart. I requested clearance to start #2 engine when proper duct pressure was displayed. Ground crew used very nonstandard and unclear language when communicating with me. Ground crew said something along the lines of 'yeah go ahead' when I requested clearance to start engine number 2. I confirmed twice to make sure we were cleared to start since poor verbiage was used. After engine was almost fully spooled up; the ground crew said something unintelligible to me on the headset. I asked her to repeat. A mechanic then came on the headset and told us to shut down the engine because the start cart was located in close proximity to the #2 engine. We shut down the engine. Luckily no damage was done to the aircraft or ground equipment and no injury resulted. We then proceeded with a normal start of the #1 engine with use of external air; not typical since hose hook up is on that side. We pushed back and set parking brake. Crossbleed start was then conducted on #2 engine. Non-standard and poor verbiage was used by ground crew throughout push back.
After receiving and completing our paperwork; we alerted the ground crew that we would need a huffer cart as our APU was deferred. They apparently had not been told this and said they would get one right away. We proceeded to close the L1 door and prepare for a huffer cart start by looking up [the procedure]. We saw the cart pull up to the aircraft from the right side; and then lost visual contact with it as visibility rearward is limited from the flight deck. The Captain asked the ground crew to let us know when it was connected and we could start. The person on the intercom responded with 'yeah; you're good.' The Captain again repeated himself and asked to let us know when it was ready; as we were ready for start. The ground personnel responded with 'it's hooked up; you're ready to start'. We noted the duct pressure then rise to approximately 35psi. The Captain then asked 'we're ready to start; confirm cleared to start #2?' To with the ground personnel responded 'yeah; go ahead.' The Captain then asked again 'confirm cleared to start #2.' Ground personnel responded with 'yeah; go ahead; you're ok to start.' We proceeded to start the #2 (right) engine. At approximately 50% N1; as the starter cut out; we heard ground personnel suddenly say 'Stop! Stop it!' Captain asked them to repeat themselves; and we were unable to understand the reply. At that time a new voice came on the intercom and said 'this is maintenance; abort the start and shut down #2! They parked the huffer right in front of the engine!' We moved fuel control to cut off and monitored the engine shutting down. We observed a normal start and shut down. After shutdown was completed; the Captain asked for clarification and we were told the ground personnel had parked the huffer immediately in front of the #2 (right) engine. Maintenance personnel stated he was unsure why they had parked it there; since we always start #2 first. We reiterated that we asked if we were cleared to start #2 twice and were told to do so. We also checked the [procedure]; and it does not say specifically say which engine should be started first. The mechanic then checked the engine and said it looked fine; and we would be ok to start it. The rest of the flight proceeded without incident. Had there been any loose items or debris on the huffer cart; this very easily could have resulted in completely destroying an engine; not to mention any injuries that could have resulted from items becoming projectiles. Contributing factors:-ground personnel using nonstandard phraseology for ground handling and engine start operations. -ground crew apparently not knowing we needed a huffer cart till right before start-inability to see huffer cart from flight deck-ground personnel possibly lacking in training; or being ill trained in [company] engine starting procedures-[Documentation] not specifying with engine should be started first Ensure ground personnel are trained in [company] procedures and phraseology.
B767-300 flight crew reported poor adherence to SOP and poor communication led to starting #2 engine with the air cart parked directly in front of that engine.