Embraer Phenom 300
Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Situational Awareness
ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance
Human Factors
There were multiple aircraft at the departure end of the runway waiting to depart as they were sequenced with arrivals. An A319 was cleared for takeoff while a Phenom 300 with a strip to [a nearby airport] was put into position. The only unusual item at this point is the Phenom 300 did not go into the rundown tab list by call sign and had to be put in by the beacon code which the Local Control advised the aircraft to change to as it appeared as the wrong beacon code on the ASDE-X. The aircraft were diverging courses as an A319 was on the [SID1] departure (westbound turning south) and the Phenom 300 on the [SID2] (northwest bound). As the A319 was lifting with more then 6;000 FT and airborne the Phenom 300 was cleared for takeoff with diverging courses. Approximately a minute later after both aircraft had already been switched the TRACON; the RADAR Controller called in the shout line at the Local Assist position to turn the Phenom 300 as he was overtaking the Airbus ahead and continuing westbound. The Local Control reached out to the aircraft and there was no response then I as the assist called back with 'no joy' to the West Controller as he came over frequency to the next sector. At this time both aircraft were on the same course and approaching the same altitude without the proper separation. The Departure Controllers then did the necessary evasive actions to separate the two aircraft. Approximately two minutes later the Flight Data Controller at the TRACON called over asking about the strips mentioning that there were two flight plans; and upon investigation from the position there were indeed two flight plans one which was still at the Ground Control position. The Ground Controller working the position failed to realize that there were two flight plans sitting clearly in front of him/her on the glass with two separate courses and destinations. One of the flight data strips was sent over via PDC; while the second strip which according to the proposed times printed out 30 minutes later was read. This continues to show the gross negligence in part of the Ground Controller working the position. This is NOT the first time an incident with this apathetic Controller has happened. In the commentary before coming onto position with the Local Control 'I don't want to work with that Ground Control.) This is exactly the reason why. The Ground Control has NO regard for safety; multiple controllers have had 'off the record' conversations with management hoping that they would at least talk to said Controller with his/her previous incidents; in which there was no action taken. Something needs to be done; as I am not the only Controller that works here that believes the only way something is going to change is when there is a flaming fireball off the end of the runway or only if the agency has blood on their hands. Myself and other controllers are tired of instead of working as a 'team' feeling like we're the 'babysitters' for a few select individuals that continue to burden us with their workload on top of ours. In addition; if there are two flight plans with the aircraft as PDC capable; it should ALWAYS come up as a revision even if the destinations are different otherwise there is a safety net failure as the person at clearance does not know if there is already a flight plan already at another position. I was under the assumption that multiple flight plans under the same call sign would come up as a REV.
Local Assist Controller described a near loss of separation event between two departures that were assigned the same route due to the Ground Controller failing to identify same.