Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Workload
Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury
Flight Crew Diverted; General Declared Emergency
Human Factors
Approximately 2:00+ hours into the flight; the captain started to complain about stomach pain.  He asked how I was feeling since we both ate at the same restaurant the night before.  The captain had a hamburger and I had a turkey burger at the hotel restaurant.  I was feeling fine; no stomach pain at all.  We both thought that maybe he had a 'bad' hamburger and he had some sort of food poisoning. Or was just passing some bad food through his system.  Shortly thereafter; the captain started to vomit and to continue to comment on stomach discomfort.  He was in obvious pain; but was completely coherent.   He stated he was going to recline in his seat to try to ease the discomfort and maybe ease the pressure off his stomach.  After several more vomits; the captain commented that he was thinking about diverting to the nearest city (ZZZ).  No more than five minutes later; the captain said; I can't take this anymore; we need to divert to ZZZ.  During this timeframe; we did not ask for a patch to Medlink; nor did we ask if there were any trained medical professionals on board the aircraft.  Leading up the request to divert to ZZZ; our thought was bad food.  It will pass.  When it got to the point where the pain was unbearable to the captain and we requested to divert; there was no time to seek Medical advice; as we were busy getting the aircraft quickly and safely to ZZZ.  The captain notified the A flight attendant that we were diverting to ZZZ due to his illness.  The captain notified Center of our intentions to divert due to a medical emergency with a flight crew member.  We started to discuss a plan and the captain's pain had become apparent at this time.  He told me that I would have to handle a majority of the workload by myself.  I suggested we let company know what was going on.  But our data link ACARS was not working.  It was intermittent throughout a portion of the flight.  Dispatch later commented that there is a possible dead spot in that area.   The captain told center to call company and let them know of our situation and our intentions.  They agreed to comply.  After this point in time; I worked all radios with ATC.  I briefly was off Com. 1 to make a quick passenger announcement of our situation.  Pointing out that we had a very sick crew member and that were diverting to ZZZ.  I made sure that the captain knew I was off Com. 1 briefly.  I requested radar vectors and altitudes from Center and Approach Control.   I did not want the additional task of being routed on an Arrival and trying to make altitude and/or speed restrictions.  They complied with this request throughout the whole descent and approach.  This was very; very helpful.  Since we had no ACARS; we requested latest ZZZ weather from Center and copied it down.  Basically good weather.  VFR; cold and a bit gusty.  No significant crosswind.  We were told to expect XXL.  After reviewing the airport diagram I noticed that XXR was about 1000 feet longer than XXL.  We were going to land approximately 10;000 pounds over the recommended maximum landing weight.  I mentioned this to the captain and suggested we request XXR; mentioning the overweight issue and the potential for hot brakes.  He replied that it was a good idea.  I made the request with ATC and made the runway change in the FMC.  I requested emergency trucks be alerted; and reiterated to ATC that we would be significantly over our max landing weight and that hot brakes might be an issue.  This part I'm not 100% sure:  I am pretty sure I requested Aero Data landing numbers.  I sent the request but before the numbers came back; I had to leave the request page of the FMC to complete something else on the box.  It may have been the runway change; or to enter something in the PERF page.  Don't remember exactly; but I don't think I ever received the numbers.  Not sure.  But I knew that with 10;000 plus feet of runway on a A319; and making sure I used all available runway; that we would have more than sufficientrunway to make the landing.  Especially given the weather conditions.  VFR plus strong headwind component.  It was a judgment decision that I was very confident in making.  During the approach and configuration changes; I made every attempt to follow and comply with company procedures; call outs and FMA calls.  e.g. 'speed checks; flaps one; LOC; star; 9000; etc.  I had to complete flap and gear configurations changes; work the radios; read and comply with check lists and flows by myself.   I completed most of the FMC changes and updates as well. It was clear that the captain was unable to contribute as a 'normal' crew member.   However; he was coherent and contributing when he could.  In fact; there were a few times when his contribution was vital.  For instance:  When Center first cleared us on a heading toward zzz; I fumbled a bit with the 'Enter New Destination' step of the FMC.  The captain jumped right in and completed that task and entered a runway.  When I was contemplating requesting XXR due to the overweight situation and length of the runway; I wasn't sure on the criticality of this request because I didn't want to add to an already high-task environment.  And XXL wasn't exactly a short runway anyway.  I queried the captain; 'What do you think about requesting XXR; longer runway; overweight; hot brakes?'   His response was simple; 'I think that's a good idea.'  So; I guess there was a factor of confidence in my actions.  Assurance I was doing the right thing.  We were entering a left base leg for XXR.  I felt a bit high.  I did not want to come in high and/or fast and risk a Go Around.  So I asked ATC for a turn out towards the right to loose a little altitude.  Because of this; I did not have a good view of the airport because it was now on the captain's side.  After a short while on a modified downwind; I asked the captain how we looked.  His response was; 'Looks good.  I'd turn in.'  So again; it was nice to have some assurance is this particular situation.  When I dropped the gear and pressed managed speed; I noticed that the airspeed bug turned magenta but it did not decrease as it typically does.  I pressed several more times and said out loud; '[What] is up with the airspeed?  Why isn't it going down?'  The captain's response was; 'Ground speed (GS) mini.  Strong head winds.'   It immediately made sense.  Because of our high weight and strong head winds; the GS mini at that time was around 170 knots.  It gradually decreased as we descended and I was able to configure on schedule.  I think the Captain should be commended for his contribution in this situation; given that he was in extreme pain (which later required surgery; some sort of gall stone or gall bladder issue; total stay in hospital was approximately two-and-one-half days).  I thank him for his contributions.  The landing was uneventful.  I used Auto Brakes Low and used max Thrust Reverse immediately.  I applied manual brakes fairly early in the landing roll.  We were slowed to an appropriate turn-off speed by [mid runway].  But our taxi instructions were to exit [taxiway further down the runway].  We exited the runway and continued per our taxi instructions to the gate.  I performed the after landing flow.  I checked the ECAM Wheels page and the highest I noticed the brake temps were around 180 degrees on the right truck.  I contacted the fire trucks on their dedicated frequency (given to us by tower) and told them that our brake temperatures looked good; but requested they still follow us to the gate.  I taxied the aircraft to the gate.  I believe I did not run the after landing check list.  Approaching the gate; I asked the captain if we should turn on the APU so we could shut down the engines immediately.  He reached up and initiated the APU start.  Approaching the gate; I requested that the captain help me by calling my turn.  He complied.  We stopped at the gate.  The captain set the Parking Brake.  He checked that the APU was ready to acceptpower.  He shut down both engines.  I turned off the Fuel Pumps and completed the First Officer Parking flow.  I do not believe I ran the Parking Checklist. The captain wrote up in the Log Book that we performed an over weight landing.  He told me to make sure Maintenance came out and signed off on the Log Book.  He thanked me and he immediately left the cockpit and was met by medical personnel.  I think the fact that I had a some experience taxiing a transport category aircraft at a previous airline was very beneficial in this situation.  If I had not had that experience in the past; it only would have added to an already very complex situation.
A319 First Officer described the challenge and workload of diverting to a nearby airport when the Captain became incapacitated due to illness.