Citation Excel (C560XL)
Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Communication Breakdown; Confusion
ATC Issue All Types; Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Company Policy; Human Factors
The Day started in ZZZ with a passenger trip to ZZZ1. After Successful completion of that flight we were assigned to ferry the plane from ZZZ1 to ZZZ2 for a subsequent passenger trip.While at cruise from ZZZ1 to ZZZ2; we received a message that scheduling wanted us to divert to ZZZ3 to recover a passenger trip. Thankfully we were over 10;000 feet so the WiFi worked; enabling me to speak with a dispatcher. While we were over eastern PA for this call; the connection was broken; and I was not able to understand the dispatcher in full. We were able to understand enough information to receive the instructions to divert; and proceeded. I asked the dispatcher to email the release from ZZZ3 to ZZZ4 as that would avail the ZZZ3 NOTAMS. I'm glad I did as our phone connection deteriorated while the dispatcher was reviewing weather and NOTAMS with me. It turns out the ILS we ended up using had alternate missed approach instructions as the primary VOR used in the missed was inop.  It should be noted the entire east coast was engulfed in IMC this day. Receiving this email version of the next flights release was the only intelligible way I could have received the NOTAMS at ZZZ3; short of calling flight service. The flight from ZZZ3 to ZZZ4 was uneventful.After landing in ZZZ4; we were scheduled for standby duty for a couple hours. I then received a call from a Flight Manager to respond to a trip request to ferry from ZZZ4 to ZZZ5. Again; weather was IMC all over the east coast with moderate rain; low ceilings; and turbulence in both ZZZ4 and ZZZ5. It turned out ZZZ5's GS was OTS (Out of Service) so; this would be a non-precision approach in non-radar environment in IMC in ZZZ5 at 13+ hours of duty. (The risks continue to build).  After fueling; reviewing weather; and preparing the aircraft for departure; we departed ZZZ4. The flight entered IMC almost immediately with light and moderate rain with the associated turbulence. About 20-25 minutes into the flight; we were about FL310; and received a message from dispatch. Scheduling wanted us to return to ZZZ4 so the aircraft could be in position for a passenger trip in the morning. I transferred controls to my SIC; and called dispatch. I used the aircraft's iPhone connected to WiFi; and the signal was broken at best. I confirmed 3 times with dispatch that we were to return to ZZZ4. He was as incredulous as I was. After the call; I informed my SIC of the situation; and I resumed control of the airplane (it was my turn as Pilot Flying). He informed ATC of our change; and we were given a right turn from our approximately 160 course to a heading of 360 (I think) and an altitude of FL270 (I believe).  We began the turn and descent immediately. During the turn my SIC began AFIS (Aerodrome Flight Information Service) requests for ATIS at ZZZ4; and configuring his iPad for the approach into ZZZ4. While still in the turn; we near simultaneously got a TCAS 'traffic; traffic' and a call from ATC advising us of traffic; and that we needed to descend to FL240; and be out of FL280 in 10sec or less (we were about FL285). We heard the controller advise the traffic; an Airbus; that he needed to level at FL280 or FL290 (I don't remember) immediately. If memory serves; he was descending and only a few hundred feet above the controllers recently assigned altitude making the airbus's level-off abrupt at best. My SIC and I both realized how close the traffic was as we could see his lights (as we were temporarily between layers); and from the controllers description relative our position. I disconnected the autopilot; maintained 30 degrees right bank; extended the speed brake; lowered the nose to 20 degrees down; and removed my crew and aircraft from harms' way.  My SIC and I were both frustrated to have been put in that situation (by scheduling); and discussed what we saw later after landing. We saw from the TCAS that the airbus was 600-800 feet vertically about 3 miles away. When it passed directly overhead (my SIC saw it out his window) I don't know what our vertical spacing was. Albeit somewhat shaken; we focused; continued the flight; and landed after shooting the ILS to minimums in night IMC on a wet and slippery runway after 13 hours of duty. There were several factors that lead to this situation. I don't know if the controller made an error; but I'm not filing this report to fault the controller. He was given a last minute and irregular request. After discussion with my SIC; we felt we followed ATC's instructions quickly and correctly. My frustration and motivation is with the [company's] operational pace and seeming lack of direction or focus. This flight and its subsequent diversion seemed to be a knee-jerk reaction to a last-minute solution. There have been multiple decisions in operational culture that have served to reduce communication levels and subsequently the company's level of overall safety.Reliance on WiFi for phone conversations with dispatch. The inaction to replace the outdated land-based air phones with any equivalent substitution has reduced the capacity for the crews to effectively communicate with dispatch. The on-board phones are many times missing or not charged. In the past two trips I have had airplanes with inoperative air phones and are missing the onboard iPhones.  Furthermore that the WiFi does not work below 10;000 feet removes the avenue altogether; and at an altitude and position when we'd need it most. The broken phone communication on my two diverted flights this day made a difficult situation worse. We used to be able to directly reply to dispatch's email containing the flight release. I contacted the person responsible for this decision several months ago. They responded that they agreed that would be a useful function; but they're not going to implement that at this time. No rationale was given. In this day's case; it would have been one more avenue for communication. And it would cost the company little if anything.The last couple trips have been constant change and the rate of errors I'm finding has increased markedly. It just seems like every department is just understaffed. Our support and subsequent level of overall safety just isn't what it used to be. Combined with the increased rate of schedule change; it just seems like it's asking for problems. My previous 7 day trip we had 80 different briefs. That means we had 72 schedule changes. Unreal. This narrative came on day four of a trip; and to that point we had 39 schedule changes in 4 days. The lack of ability to plan means that we're just that less prepared for any given flight. I've found myself focusing on just one flight at a time more and more.I am concerned with the operations pace and level of change in the day-to-day schedule. These last minute changes are ripe for error. Something has to change.
CE560 Captain laments his company's policy of rapid schedule changes that in this case; may have led to an airborne conflict when the crew is told to return to their departure airport twenty minutes after takeoff.