PA-60 600 Aerostar
Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Communication Breakdown
ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
General None Reported / Taken
Human Factors; Procedure
I observed an Aerostar being worked by another controller on STV (50) Sector. The affected sectors were told earlier that R6302 was active; but only R6302A at 140 and below. The aircraft in question was outside the 'A' portion of R6302 but over the 'C' portion. The controller was anticipating descending the aircraft since it was nearing its destination. Before he did; someone observed that URET (User Request and Evaluation Tool) was indicating the 'C' portion of R6302 was also active 140 and below. The aircraft was directly above this portion with live fire exercises happening below. The controller did not descend the aircraft fortunately. Our Specialty posts the R6302 activation times and areas on the overhead ESIS (Enhanced Status Information System) display. This display has 'boxes' for each sub-area of R6302 (A; C; D) that affect our sectors. When I asked the supervisor about the event; they stated that the R6302C area was active but the information was inadvertently omitted from all of the ESIS posting boxes. The assumption was that a new supervisor had failed to carry the information through to all affected posting areas and only posted to the R6302A area of ESIS. Something seems to have slipped over the years in how we coordinate R6302 activation times and altitudes. In the past; we would use another posting that graphically depicts active areas of R6302 with the altitudes and times. In addition; the supervisors used to call the affected sectors on a recorded line to verbally notify them of the activations. Neither of these are being used any longer. Instead; only ESIS is used and verbal notification happens but not through a recorded line. I don't believe the verbal notification via recorded line or not is really contributing to our current series of events with R6302 notification; but it has been an issue in the past. It might be worthwhile going back to this method to preserve a record of when notification took place and what was coordinated. The other issue seems to revolve around failure to carry information through or misinterpreting information. Standardizing the information presented could help avoid misinterpreting. A number of the incidents that have taken place have to do with dates being omitted from the data presented. As far as carrying information through or being too vague; I think that can only be resolved by emphasizing the importance of what is being relayed. Standard phraseology and relaying ALL information; not just parts; would go a long way to resolving this. We have to realize that a mistake could lead to civilian aircraft flying into a live fire exercise.
ZHU Controller voiced concern regarding facility notification procedures regarding 'Restricted Airspace' limitations citing a recent example of an airspace incursion because of incomplete notifications efforts.