B747-C/F
Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Workload; Time Pressure; Distraction; Communication Breakdown; Fatigue
Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance
Human Factors
The taxi route from our gate towards the runway contained 3 hotspots. We delayed configuration and taxi checklist until past all hot spots.  This caused a significant disruption in our normal checklist procedure. I heard the Captain call for the flight control check.  While he certainly must have called for 'Flaps 10' just before calling for the flight control check; I didn't hear it; and therefore did not react to it by putting the flaps to 10.  It is completely my fault on this.  Even if the captain had not called for the flaps; I should have asked him about them.  I have no explanation other than my mind 'skipped ahead' and just missed it. Perhaps I subconsciously thought the flaps had already been extended. When I read the Flaps 2 times in the checklist; I saw what I expected to see; not the actual flap position.Although I tried to get quality rest/sleep the night before; that just did not happen prior to this flight.   It's hard to get a perfectly restful night's sleep in our kind of job (due to circadian rhythm changes); but perhaps I was more fatigued than what I had realized.  I could have at the least; alerted the other crew members of this.  Also; our work has very tight time constraints with respect to on-time departures.  I tend to be slower; or less efficient in general preparation for departures than most crew members.  Due to this; I constantly push myself to 'get things done' as promptly as possible.  But when you push yourself to be 'too fast'; it is possible to miss critical events; especially when one is not adequately rested. IN THE FUTURE; I AM GOING TO BE MORE DELIBERATE; AND PERHAPS A LITTLE SLOWER ON THESE CRITICAL CHECKLIST ITEMS.  I do not blame the company or anyone else for my errors in this incident.
Upon reaching the runway; I set takeoff power; and immediately saw and heard the TAKEOFF CONFIG warning; which occurred at very low speed. I rejected the takeoff; taxied free of the runway; and conducted a normal flight to our destination.First of all; our taxi route was mostly hot-spots; so I delayed configuration and the taxi checklist; which was non-normal and probably a distraction. I should have configured and run the checks prior to the complex taxi route. Next; I am a recently transitioned 747-200 Captain. On my earlier aircraft; the flap procedure was better verified. I am totally ashamed at having attempted a takeoff with zero flaps. That is a problem. In terms of helping myself as well as others; the flap setting should be a mutual call. Twice. I flew the -200 for 10 years and the error never; ever happened when the captain was involved during the taxi check. I take total responsibility for what happened; but also see some problems with both our procedures and the culture than engineered them. As it stands; the captain's verification of the flap setting takes place while positioning the aircraft for takeoff and communicating with the tower. What we did was unacceptable; but I can imagine procedures that would prevent this from happening again.
A B-747 air crew rejected a takeoff after a TAKEOFF CONFIG warning alerted them that the flaps were not set for takeoff.  They taxied clear; configured properly and conducted a normal flight to their destination.