A319
Communication Breakdown; Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness; Confusion
Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach
Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew FLC Overrode Automation; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance
Human Factors; Aircraft; Procedure; Weather
I was the PF and we were on base leg vectors for the visual 24R with ILS back up. Base turn to final with the runway in sight; cleared for the visual; 2;600 FT set for FAF crossing altitude; the aircraft was above glideslope. On turn to final the conditions were hazy with sunlight limiting our visibility. During the descent the Captain set the MCP altitude to the lower alt of 1;000 FT [~TDZ elevation] to avoid alt capture above glideslope and a possible 'thrust excursion.' I turned off the autopilot and subsequently descended below 1;000 FT [AGL] on base leg with the runway still in sight. I leveled off as Tower called 'low altitude alert' and captured glideslope from below at roughly 1;000 FT AGL. Uneventful landing and rollout. Captain subsequently called Tower for back-brief.Better crew coordination between pilots could have avoided any confusion about automation settings. 'Verbalize and read back' is easy at altitude; but we must ensure it at low altitude as well.
As pilot in command I should have been much more specific in briefing safe parameters regarding visual approach procedures and I should have been more aggressive in monitoring the instruments and taking action in the event of any altitude deviation during the First Officer's visual approach. In trying to prevent some of the automation traps inherent with the Airbus in certain scenarios I failed to ensure that basic airmanship in the terminal environment is paramount and requires quick and decisive action on my part.
An A319 flight crew; cleared for a visual approach from a base leg vector to Runway 24R at DAY; descended too low and was informed by a low altitude alert from the Tower. The Captain's decision to reset the MCP altitude alert from the FAF crossing altitude to TDZE; apparently uncommunicated to the PF First Officer; may have contributed to the loss of situational awareness.