B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Flight Crew Type 55
Communication Breakdown; Time Pressure
ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach
General None Reported / Taken
Human Factors
The areas of concern contained within this report are the abnormal maneuvering to landing on final approach and the lack of response from the other crew member upon the call to go-around. I am a new pilot with the airline and this trip was my third pairing after the completion of my initial operating experience. The pairing assigned to us was a 1-day trip.  In our preflight discussions I conveyed that to the captain and told him that because I was low time I was not allowed to fly the return flight to ZZZ and we agreed that I would fly the first leg of the pairing. On the arrival; approach control told us to expect runway 8; which we had been expecting; had briefed and loaded into the FMC. A few short minutes later we were switched to expect runway 7L. At this time we were outside of the SNRRA intersection. The CA acknowledged and began to change the runway and re-load the arrival; however; did not re-load the transition from Blythe (BLH) intersection because it was already behind us. The arrival displayed active waypoint of SPINK directly to HYDRR intersection; omitting the altitude restriction of SNRRA at or below FL220 when he asked me if I agreed with what he had loaded. I initially said yes; because of my expectation bias; and then immediately realized that it had deleted the restriction at SNRRA. I voiced this to the captain; we reset MCP altitude to 220; used level change and our own calculations to meet the restriction while I reloaded the appropriate transition and reselected VNAV to fly the remainder of the arrival. As a result of this error we had a steeper descent path to make the remainder of the 'at or above/at or below' crossing restrictions for the remainder of the arrival. We complied with all restrictions; but were at the higher altitudes of most of the restrictions. Past HYDRR intersection; approach control switched us back to runway 8 and I reloaded the approach. We were broken off the arrival before TEICH intersection and given vectors to the final approach course; maintain 8;000 feet. We were vectored onto the approach outside of JAMIL intersection and were left high so I began to slow to configuration speeds so that I may deploy flaps to aid in our descent once cleared to a lower altitude. We called the field in sight and were cleared for the approach. The controller realized that we were left high on the approach and we were queried if we were going to be able to make the descent from that point. I don't recall exactly what altitude/distance we were at when we were asked; but we were still outside of JAMIL intersection. The captain replied yes. I was confident in his experience for that acknowledgement. I had never experienced the capabilities of what the aircraft performance was capable of in a situation like this one. I started to configure immediately. I continued a shallow descent; one that would still allow for deceleration and for me to configure and reached gear down; flaps 15 configuration prior to WAZUP (FAF) but still very high on the glide path. The captain told me that I would have to raise the nose to arrest the descent; configure further and then the rate of descent would be such that would allow for an adequate descent to re-intercept the glide path on approach. As we got closer both the captain and I saw that we were still going to be very high on the glide path. He told me to 'kick in a little rudder and drop the wings' into a slip to further decrease lift on the aircraft. I told him I was uncomfortable doing that; and he suggested it a second time. At that point; I felt I wouldn't be able to re-intercept the glide path. I felt that possibly the captain had more skill or knowledge of the aircraft and asked him if he wanted to take the controls to which he replied yes. We had a positive exchange of controls. He raised the nose; commanded flaps 30; then flaps 40. We hadn't briefed a flaps 40 landing and we didn't have the speeds selected for that setting. When I asked him if he really wanted flaps 40; he said yes. I selected Flaps 40 and expected him to call for me to adjust his REF speed; which he did not. To the best of my knowledge at this point we were just passing WAZUP intersection. Before the flaps even began transit to Flaps 40 position he put the aircraft into a slip to the right. At first; I couldn't believe it was actually happening. I told him immediately that I was uncomfortable with the situation; which he dismissed saying 'it will be fine'. He continued further and noticed in a short instant that the winds had changed on him; so he then put the aircraft into a slip to the left. At this point every sense about me and experience being a pilot was alarmed and I called GO AROUND. He dismissed me again and continued; which I was equally shocked about. I then said; 'I am really uncomfortable with this; GO AROUND'. And he dismissed me a third time. I took a mental snap shot of where exactly we were; to the best of my memory; 2.5 mile final; still in the slip; descending at rate that was excess of a normal descent rate. He continued to the runway and made a successful landing. I was shocked that he blatantly disregarded my input and realized at that moment that these are the situations that we cannot accept or allow to continue. After we parked at the gate and I collected my thoughts; I had a conversation with him and expressed my concerns professionally and factually. He again dismissed my concerns saying that we did nothing wrong; that we met all stabilized approach criteria and that sometimes training doesn't give us the appropriate tools to operate on the line. I still couldn't believe what he was saying. As a final talking point I asked him why he didn't respond to my go around call. His reason was because I didn't call a parameter (i.e. Go around; airspeed) and that he didn't want to do a complex missed approach (We were cleared for the visual. It is a tower directed go-around) and add 20 minutes of flying time on to our flight. I am disappointed in the lack of professionalism that was displayed; the compromise to safety that was easily avoidable and very correctable and the invisible CRM that the approach terminated with.
B737 First Officer reported that while high on a visual final approach the Captain assumed aircraft control; configured to full flaps; gear down; and put the aircraft into a sideslip to lose more altitude. Being uncomfortable with the high sink rate at low altitude; the First Officer called for a go-around which the Captain ignored and landed the plane.