Saab 340 Undifferentiated
Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument
Flight Crew Last 90 Days 75; Flight Crew Total 1800; Flight Crew Type 85
Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification
Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
General None Reported / Taken
Procedure; Staffing; Weather; Aircraft; Company Policy; Human Factors
I had spent a full six weeks not flying at all after passing IOE. This was the situation with many pilots; especially if you were assigned a temporary base in one of the many bases that [the airline] has been opening up over the last few months. If you were a new hire; you were sent to small town bases...to essentially baby-sit a hotel room. There was little flying to be done; if any at all; by reserve pilots. [The airline] has sent me to get the FAR mandated 100 hours of flying time within 120 days of passing my check-ride. Management had realized that they were facing an impending problem with myself and several other pilots possibly not meeting these criteria.... The atrophy of my flying skills was obvious. Over the month of November I'd rebuilt my recurrency and restored what little confidence I had with the Saab and my first Part 121 gig. On the day in concern I was scheduled to fly with a Captain I'd never heard of before.... She sounded apprehensive and concerned since not only had she not flown the Saab for 30 days; but she too was a green pilot on the equipment. 'Green on Green.' Finally; it would appear as if; with my 10 hours of flying in the North East; I would be the veteran pilot on this airplane; if you could even call me that. She had never flown in the North East and never landed or took off from [our destination]. It has come to my attention that [the airline] keeps getting Green on Green waivers. How is this happening? I ask that because of the following: We took off and immediately encountered moderate icing conditions. I advised her of the icing level we were in. With that; she looked up at the ice panel and appeared a little lost. With hesitation she made the selection to activate the wing boots and engine intake heating. Continuing our climb through the icing conditions; a minute later; I looked up at the ice panel and saw that a warning light had illuminated. The panel was right above her head and she had failed to see the disposition change. The 'Timer' light had come on. This means that there is a fault in the system that moves the inflation of the boots from the tail; to the inboard and then to the outboard sections of the main wing every 30 seconds. She looked at it with concern and looked at me a little puzzled. I had to advise her what it meant. I further told her that we needed to manually activate each boot section now by depressing the buttons for each section; respectively; which we took turns doing.... The problem is that [the airline] is forcing a dangerous situation upon its pilots and passengers with not only the down-time new or transitioning pilots have to endure; but also sending pilot teams into regions and flying conditions they have absolutely NO experience with....the entire time we were in icing conditions I couldn't help but think; 'My God! Is the NTSB going to be listening to the CVR of this flight and hearing the voices of two more under-experienced pilots flying a perfectly good airplane into the ground at the cost of passenger's lives?' These Green on Green exemptions; on any level; must end.
[No report]
SF340 First Officer cites the Captain's lack of familiarity with aircraft de-icing equipment and procedures as evidence of the danger inherent in the company policy of allowing both an inexperienced First Officer and Captain to operate on the same crew.