B787 Dreamliner Undifferentiated or Other Model
Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument
Flight Crew Last 90 Days 250; Flight Crew Total 30000; Flight Crew Type 2800
Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification
Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Human Factors
I was seated directly behind the center pedestal on the ZZZ-ZZZZ leg and prior to pushback noticed several items on the 787 Class II NAV/ETOPS (Navigation/Extended Twin Operations) Guide were not checked off. I inquired about this and was dismissed and said that they were. Later in the flight during the initial departure climb out of ZZZ; (5000 feet) I observed the FO (First Officer) started the HOWGOZIT below 10;000 feet. I stated that he not do it. He did stop and did it after we were above 10;000 feet.During our first crew change; 5 hrs into the flight; observed that neither pilot donned the O2 mask when the other pilot left their station. During the relief pilot change briefing; I stated the cockpit light were very bright and how it is stated in manual to keep the cockpit light low; which helps to ID thunderstorms. After the crew change was complete; I accomplished my checks and noticed the Route II procedures were not accomplished.During the second crew change; I purposely had the FO (Relief Pilot) leave his station first so I could demonstrate using the O2 mask. When I was ready to leave my station and gave control of the Aircraft to the FO; I still had to ask the FO to put on his O2 mask. While on our final break; the flight encountered a violent downdraft; causing myself to become airborne and several flight attendants to hit their heads on the ceiling.When we returned from our break; I asked about the turbulence we encountered; the captain responded that the cell suddenly showed up. I want to add the it was a Full Moon that night and visibility was very good that night and the cockpit light were again Full Bright. When the FO (Relief Pilot) returned to the flight deck; the FO stated he wanted to use the Lav. He instantly left his station without waiting or asking the Captain to put on the O2 mask. He defiantly looked me in the eye letting me know that this was intentional.After we arrived at the gate in ZZZZ; during the debrief; the Captain stated that my actions were disruptive when I started asking about the Flight Deck Preparations on the Class II Nav/ETOPS were complete. I stated that I noticed several were not checked off and that I was just making sure that they were done. I informed him about the Route 2 not being completed when I took the left seat after the first crew change. He also stated that when I told the FO to 'Not do that' when he was requesting the HOWGOZIT below 10;000 feet distractive; I apologized and agreed that I should have waited to discuss it in the debrief. I then stated that I observed that neither of them putting on the O2 mask when they did the crew change. That it's still required even thought this may change in the future. I was direct with them but at all times; I was professional and respectful. The FO insinuated that had a dislike for him that started when I mentioned that he was not in uniform compliance. When we were at the aircraft; I stated 'that there were only 3 jackets hanging in the closet'. I noticed during the walk to aircraft that the FO was not wearing a Coat or Hat. I was attempting to bring it to his attention in a humorous way; but when he responded that 'It was going to be 90 degrees in ZZZZ'; that this was intentional on his part and he was letting me know this. We discussed the flight and our perceptions and the FO and I continued our discussion on the crew bus to the hotel.On the departure from ZZZZ; the FO flew the departure with the Flight Director turned off. It was discussed during the departure brief that there was a speed restriction of 230/4;000 feet. on the SID (Standard Instrument Departure). The Captain was going to request a HIGHSPEED request after airborne. The Frequency was busy and they were not able to get the HIGHSPEED request authorized in a timely manner. The aircraft accelerated to 245 kts. before they were granted the request. If the FMC was programmed 230/4000 on the VNAV (Vertical Navigation) climb page; and the FO was flying the FDs; this airspeed bust may not have occurred. Additionally; when we completed the first crew change; I discovered that the Route 2 procedures were not accomplished again. I did mention this in the crew debrief at the gate in ZZZ.
Relief Captain on B787 flight notes numerous CFR and Company policy violations by flight crew.