EMB ERJ 145 ER/LR
Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Situational Awareness; Confusion
Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory
Aircraft; Human Factors
In cruise at FL360; I was the pilot monitoring and the First Officer (FO) was pilot flying. I suddenly felt my ears pop significantly; and looked at the EICAS for any pressurization indications. I observed the cabin pressure rising rapidly through approximately 10;000 feet and we then received the Cabin aural warning. We immediately donned O2 masks and I attempted to establish crew communications; but my mask mic was not working as it had at the gate when I tested it. My FO had his mask on and was trying to hear/understand me; when I opted to take the flight controls by instinct. We had a positive transfer of controls via hand signals; and I proceeded with the emergency descent memory items. Though only a few seconds had past; I observed the cabin altitude rising rapidly through 13;000 feet. I completed the memory items except for the cabin notification due to my mic not working; and the noise from the landing gear now made communications even more difficult. As we descended; the Flight Attendant called up and my FO handled communication with her and ATC; informing them we were performing an emergency descent. They cleared us to 11;000 feet. I then noticed the cabin altitude was pegged at 14;000 feet and steady. Through approximately 20;000; we got an EICAS Caution 'PRESN AUTO FAIL'. The controller then cleared us to 10;000 feet. The cabin altitude began to come back down at that point. We came off masks at approximately 11;000 feet as the cabin alt was below 10;000 feet. Once we were able to communicate more effectively; we ran the QRH for emergency descent to back up our memory items and the QRH for Pressurization Auto System Fail. Upon contact with Dispatch; they advised us to continue to destination.Having a rapid depressurization is a threat; but added to that our inability to establish communications elevated that threat exponentially. We were severely limited in our ability to coordinate actions and set expectations and manage work load with masks on; no intercom; and an incredible amount of noise from the gear being out; all during an instantaneous spike in workload. Thankfully; I believe that our training helped us to know what to do; and even to anticipate what the other pilot WOULD be doing despite our inability to talk. We proceeded deliberately and methodically as two individual pilots rather than a coordinated crew.I instinctually took the controls; and may not have communicated effectively that I was indeed flying the aircraft. It was a momentary loss of Situational Awareness due to the disorientation caused by the sudden [loss of] cabin pressure. We quickly reestablished some communication between us through use of hand signals. A brief confusion took place when I took the controls without being able to verbally express that to my FO.
In cruise at FL360; I felt an increase in air pressure and my ears popped. I looked at the EICAS and saw the cabin altitude start climbing and go amber. The Captain (CA) and I both donned oxygen masks. The CA had trouble with his mask mic and we couldn't establish communications. After the initial confusion the CA initiated an emergency descent even though I was pilot flying. I immediately contacted ATC and told them we had pressurization failure and was starting an emergency descent. The FA called and I told her to be seated and what was happening. The cabin altitude went into the red and we got 'PRESN AUTO FAIL' on the EICAS. After the initiation of the emergency descent and things calmed down I resumed as flying pilot and the CA and I went thru the memory items. The CA ran the appropriate QRH and we finally got in touch with dispatch. We agreed to continue to destination because we were close enough already. The cabin altitude came back in the green and we continued at 10;000 feet. Threats-inability to communicate with the CA; pressurization failure. Both CA and I were working independently due to inability to establish communications; confusion on starting emergency descent; not clear on who had which role; taking too long to assess what was happening.
EMB145 flight crew reported a rapid decompression at FL360 and donning oxygen masks; but communications could not be established through the Captain's mask mic.