B737-300
Flight Crew Last 90 Days 164; Flight Crew Type 3000
Troubleshooting; Workload; Time Pressure; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown
Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; General Maintenance Action
Human Factors; Procedure; Aircraft
While descending to [the airport] TRACON left us slightly high; Captain (pilot flying) called for flaps 5 and landing gear down. I set position 5 and landing gear down; but upon verification of the flaps I noticed they were indicating position 1 and advised the Captain. Captain called for the checklist and I opened the QRH to Flaps; Trailing Edge: Symmetrical Non-Normal/No Flaps. Captain asked for a delaying turn from TRACON indicating that we should only need one turn. Before running QRH; we checked circuit breakers and finding none open; I began the QRH. Checklist Warning advised to calculate landing data for worst case scenario (flaps staying at position 1). I ran the performance calculation for landing Runway 26 with Flaps Position 1 and got Vref of 160 KIAS and V Target of 165 KIAS with no 'B' (for brake cooling) and all positive stopping distances. I asked Captain to verify my data and advised him that performance calculation showed a reminder to calculate possible brake cooling on landing. He verified data noting that it looked good to him. I then resumed running the QRH. As I was completing the first step and corresponding caution in the procedure; we completed the turn to final and TRACON passed us off to Tower ATC who immediately cleared us to land. At that time we were three to four miles out and I believed it would be difficult to complete the checklist before landing. I asked the Captain if he wanted to continue running the QRH which I thought was more of a rhetorical prompting (I assumed his answer would be yes) and then I would advise him we would need more time. I was surprised his answer was; 'No. We're safe with flaps 1. Let's just get it on the ground.' The thought occurred to me that there was possibly a safety issue of which he was aware that I was not as the answer also displayed a sense of urgency. That combined with the fact that we were now closer to landing with positive stopping distance caused me to not question his decision. Closer in; after running the Before Landing Checklist I became more uneasy that we had not completed the QRH and prompted him by asking if he was sure he did not want to try the Alternate Flaps Master switch; again thinking my question more of a rhetorical prompt and that we would then go around and take more time to finish the QRH. Again; I was surprised that his response was; 'No. Let's just go ahead and land.' We landed without issue and turned off at Intersection J. Upon completing my after landing flow; I advised the Captain that we might have brake cooling issues and asked if he wanted to check the brake cooling chart. He indicated that he felt we were OK and as we were now getting close to the ramp where there were construction obstacles. I decided to focus my attention to helping prevent conflicts. Upon completing the Shutdown Checklist; I consulted the brake cooling chart and indicated to the Captain that we did have brake cooling issues and he then ensured Ground personnel were advised. We should have taken our time to ensure that the entire QRH had been completed without rushing to land. Personally; I should have been more assertive and insisted that we complete the QRH even if that meant going around to do so.
I wasn't sure what the brake on speed was; so as a caution; I then went to the ramp and directed all personnel and equipment be kept away from the airplane until the indicated time had expired. I called Dispatch and coordinated with Maintenance and Ground Operations about the malfunction. Then I called my Assistant Chief Pilot and debriefed him on the event including my errors.I should not have started toward the landing runway until the checklist was confirmed completed and the First Officer was in agreement. There was no reason to rush. The First Officer made several timely suggestions that would have prevented my errors. I need to pay proper attention to the First Officer's input.
A B737-300's flaps failed to extend beyond 1 before landing; so delay vectors were taken but the QRH procedure was not completed before landing because the Captain wanted to get on the ground.