Regional Jet 700 ER/LR (CRJ700)
Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument
Human-Machine Interface
Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach
Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem
Human Factors
I was [the] pilot flying; headed into ZZZ. It was VMC; severe clear; and in the afternoon. We were being vectored toward Runway XX in ZZZ. I was in green needles; with the [Runway] XX ILS frequency active. My FO made a comment [that] we weren't picking up the right identifier; but because it was visual; and we had just called the field in sight; I was not going to reference the glideslope anyway. I could clearly see the PAPIs and was going to reference that since I had a visual. We were then cleared for the visual for [the] runway; so I kicked off the autopilot; and began a stable descent. We had noticed the glideslope and the PAPIs were not lining up; so I made a comment I was just going to fly it visually and use the PAPIs as the guide; not the glideslope. After all; it was only being used as a back up. Well; as we proceeded along; even though I was 2 white/2 red on the PAPI; the glideslope annunciator started yelling at us (later; we found out the ILS was OTS; which explained why it was not working correctly). Instead of asking the FO to switch his and my frequencies back to standby; I elected to fly higher on the PAPIs to shut the annunciator up. I ended up being 4 white about at about 300 ft. Because the winds were calm; the runway was clear and dry; and I knew a safe landing could be accomplished; I elected to continue the approach. I still landed softly and safely in the touchdown area; and stopped in the usual amount of runway required. It was an uneventful landing.When we taxied clear of the runway; I asked Tower and asked about the frequency and asked the FO to pull up the current ATIS to see if there was a NOTAM about the ILS frequency; and sure enough; it was OTS. In hindsight; I'm not sure how I missed that on the ATIS; but I should have read it more carefully and I could have avoided this situation altogether.
I was the First Officer and the Pilot Monitoring for this flight. Having received ATIS for ZZZ and setting up the approach the CA (Captain) briefed the Visual Approach Runway XX to be backed up by the ILS and I concurred and had no questions on the briefing. When going to green needles on the approach I noticed the identifier for the ILS Runway XX did not match with the identifier on the LIDO chart. I mentioned to the CA that I did not have the proper identifier and I double checked the frequency to ensure that it was correct and it was. The CA acknowledged and [said] that we had been cleared for the visual approach. During the approach the CA noticed that the GS (Glideslope) and the PAPI were not matching and informed me he was strictly using the PAPI for the visual approach. While continuing on the approach the GS annunciator was sounding a notification and the CA ended up high on the PAPI at about 100-200 ft. The CA called he was high and correcting and continued the approach into ZZZ and landed in the landing zone with no issue and was able to slow the aircraft and exit on taxiway. Once on the ground the CA asked the Tower to confirm the frequency for the ILS and the Tower responded it was released to Maintenance. At that point the CA asked me to bring the ATIS back up and that is when we both noticed the ILS was NOTAMed OTS. We discussed the approach and landing and decided to both submit reports.
CRJ-700 flight crew reported landing from an unstable approach due to missing ATIS information regarding ILS OTS.