Widebody Transport
Flight Crew Last 90 Days 255; Flight Crew Total 15000; Flight Crew Type 11000
Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification
ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach
Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented
ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Procedure; Human Factors
On Briefing before departure; the Captain informed me that he had just come off of Medical Leave and had just checked out in the this aircraft last spring. He said he knew I was very experienced and asked my help in keeping him safe and giving him any helpful pointers I could provide from my experience. The pilot not flying also informed me that he had only 3 months experience in the aircraft. I responded that I would help where needed. Takeoff and cruise seemed to be normal without incident. Although; he did have his hands full with a 15 knot crosswind.    The Captain took last break and awoke 1+05 hrs before landing. He appeared to be rested and completed a thorough brief of the approach and landing; to include reviewing the current ATIS for SFO. The ATIS stated that visual approaches to 28L and 28R were in use. Nowhere in the ATIS did it mention that the ILS was OTS. We were cleared the GOLDEN GATE 6 Arrival and to expect visual 28L. Approaching the SFO VOR we were at 11;000 FT; 250 KTS; ATC slowed us to 210 KTS. We departed the VOR at the preassigned heading of 140 degrees. Approach immediately gave us a descent to 8;000 FT; the airspeed was still reducing but no configuration change had been attempted. Approaching CMS the pilot not flying asked the Captain if he wanted Flaps 1; the Captain hesitated then responded yes and flaps one was selected. Passing approximately 9;500 FT Approach cleared us to 4;000 FT. 4;000 FT was put in the ALT window but we continued at a slow rate of descent (approximately 500 FPM down) I then advocated that the Captain may need more flaps for a faster descent. There was no response and we continued our slow descent rate. I waited for approximately 1;000 FT and advocated that in my experience it was unusual to get that low of an altitude this soon in the approach and it may be prudent to select more flaps. The Captain then responded that he was above the flight path marker. I responded that the flight path marker really had no bearing that it was apparent that Approach wanted a lower altitude sooner and that it appeared that they were preparing for a closer turn in. The Captain continued without changing any configuration. At that time I felt like the Captain either didn't understand what I was describing or that he wasn't going to do anything he didn't want to do; so I sat back and continued to observe. Passing approximately 6;800 FT we were given a left hand turn to crosswind. The pilot not flying then asked the Captain if he wanted more flaps; after looking around the Captain said yes; Flaps 10 and that was selected. Immediately on rolling out; Approach asked if the airport was in sight and the Captain gave a thumbs up while looking out at the runways. The pilot not flying responded in the affirmative that we had the airport. Approach immediately gave us a heading of 310 degrees and cleared us for a visual approach to 28L. The Captain immediately armed the APCH Mode and asked the pilot not flying to set 3;100 FT altitude. I immediately stated that I would advocate 1;800 FT (Bridge altitude) or 100 FT (Runway Elevation). The pilot not flying responded that that was the altitude of final approach fix; I responded that we were on a visual and that altitude was null and void. I looked up from that exchange to see the extended centerline of 28L pass off our left with no change on our part. I immediately stated 'Captain; we're overshooting 28L we need to come left immediately.' I looked at the Captain who did not respond but began scanning the instrument panel; I then stated 'we are now overshooting 28R and we're going way off course.' The Captain did not respond and continued to scan his instruments. The Captain then began to reach for the HDG SEL knob. I immediately stated 'you need to disconnect and come Hard Left immediately.' Without changing heading the Captain put his right hand up and stated 'will you please let me fly the airplane.' I responded; 'Yes; but you have to fly the airplane you are now endangering all of us.' The pilot not flying was echoing all my statements and also added that we need to get back on course immediately. The Captain then disconnected from autopilot and flew the airplane back on course; however; he still had not looked outside and was scanning his instruments; in the meantime the pilot not flying went to Tower frequency; told them our location and intended landing runway and inquired as to the condition of the ILS. Tower responded that the ILS was OTS and it was on the ATIS. We both immediately looked at the ATIS and confirmed that ILS OTS was NOT on the ATIS. The pilot not flying notified Tower and they responded they would change it immediately. The Captain; still relying on his instruments; got low on the visual glideslope and as we saw 3 Reds and 1 white; on the PAPIs; the pilot not flying stated we were low. As the Captain began correcting we momentarily saw 4 Red lights on the PAPI however the Captain was correcting and we were above 1;000 FT. It was my feeling that passing through approximately 800 FT the Captain finally reverted to visual cues outside the cockpit and continued the approach. Touchdown was firm but safe. We taxied in and parked without incident.     After Parking checklist and all checks were complete I remained to complete a debriefing.  Captain began by saying that we needed to discuss our exchange on approach. I replied that; yes; we did need to discuss it. The Captain stated that he didn't feel I came across very well. He said that I should have given him information; let him analyze it and then decide what to do. He said that I shouldn't tell him how to fly the airplane. He said that he was trying to analyze what was wrong with the ILS. He then said; 'Yes; I asked you to help me; but I think you did too much.' He then said he realized that as an observer we see everything from the back. He then asked for my input.     I started by saying; 'Sir; you briefed me that you wanted me to 'Keep you Safe.' I tried to do that and give you the benefit of my experience.' I then said; 'I told you we were overshooting 28L; you did not respond or react.' I then said; 'I told you we were overshooting 28R; you did not respond or react; you then began to reach for the HDG SEL knob and knowing that that would take us too long to correct our overshoot; I then told you to disconnect the Autopilot and come hard left.' I then said; 'I understand analyzing a problem; however; you need to fly the airplane first and analyze second.' I told him that we were in a critical phase of flight and he endangered us by not flying the airplane. I then added; 'By the way; I was gentle with my prodding; because you're going to fly with some very experienced first officers on this senior aircraft that are going to be screaming at you and they're not going to stop just because you put your hand up. I said they're going to continue to scream at you until you get the aircraft under control and back on course.' I finished by saying; 'What you did is unacceptable.' He responded by saying ok. I then departed.     The First Officer caught up with me in the hallway and stated that he told the Captain that he agreed with my assessment and also told the Captain that I had been gentle with him.
We were southwest of SFO on vectors to final and had the latest ATIS which did not make any mention of the ILS/LOC 28L being OTS. Approach Control assigned heading 330 to intercept the final to Runway 28L; and asked if we had the airport in sight. I responded that the field was in sight and the Controller cleared us for the visual to 28L and said to contact Tower. No mention was ever made about any other traffic. The Captain armed the approach mode and I looked down to change to Tower frequency. I looked up as I heard the Relief Pilot say to the Captain that we need to come left. I realized we were passing through the 28L final still on approximately the same heading and also told the Captain we needed to come back to the left. As we continued through the 28R final course; both First Officers again stated that we needed to come to the left now. The Captain then responded that he was trying to analyze and understand why the LOC had not captured; and he turned the Heading Select knob to the left. I told him we were in the 28R airspace and needed to come hard left. The Relief Pilot told the Captain that he needed to disconnect the autopilot and pull us around to the left. The Captain once again told us he was trying to analyze why the LOC did not capture and told the Relief Pilot to let him fly the aircraft. We finally got lined up with 28L and tried to contact Tower who was in a lengthy discussion with another aircraft about canceling takeoff clearance. Inside of the bridge we were finally cleared to land on 28L. I then asked the Tower Controller if the ILS/LOC 28L was out. We were told yes and that it was on the ATIS. I responded that it was not on the ATIS. After we landed Tower announced that a new ATIS was available. The new ATIS said ILS/LOC 28L was out. We could have lost separation with any aircraft landing on 28R.
Air carrier flight crew; cleared for a visual approach to Runway 28L at SFO; flew through the extended centerlines of both 28L and 28R as the pilot flying was awaiting localizer intercept. They later learned the ILS was OTS; but the outage was not broadcast on the ATIS.