Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear
Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Commercial
Flight Crew Last 90 Days 50; Flight Crew Total 700; Flight Crew Type 600
Distraction; Situational Awareness; Workload
Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Airspace Structure; Equipment / Tooling
I departed as a flight of two on a formation flight leaving Class Delta airspace as the wingman headed east. The pre-flight briefing was thorough and covered a range of topics to include emergency procedures. However; given both pilots familiarity with the airspace did not review altitudes. As wingman my primary responsibility was flying off the wing of another aircraft while the lead works radio; airspace; aircraft; obstacles; etc.We departed in nearly CAVU conditions however some very small (few to nill) clouds existed around 3;900 FT to our east about 5-10 miles. As we were proceeding east as a flight of two I received a traffic alert as the wingman which I relayed to lead. Lead established a visual with the traffic and began to climb us from around 3;500 FT for traffic separation. I glanced at my altitude to which it indicated 3;950 FT MSL and we were under the Class B shelf of 4;000 FT. I relayed to lead to watch Bravo which he confirmed. Lead wanted to climb ASAP because some small clouds were ahead and we could not maintain cloud separation criteria unless we began to climb soon. Lead relayed he was clear of the Bravo and beginning a climb to 4;500 FT eastbound. I glanced at my map to realize I was still within 1-2 mile of the Class B. I relayed this information to lead and advised we remain here for a moment which we did. Upon reaching the edge of the Class B a climb was initiated and we worked well east of the Bravo. The rest of the flight was uneventful. The deviation that was created was the lack of altitude between the floor of the Class B airspace and the Class E underneath it was below my personal minimums.A few issues come up in this event: A. Due to being stuck below a shelf; traffic; and clouds; we found ourselves in a difficult situation to maneuver. B. There was apparently a difference in GPS position between lead and wingman. We do not understand which GPS map was accurate and why we had this deviation between equipment. C. The concentration and focus of flying formation does not allow for the level of situational awareness one would normally have.Ideas to resolve this in the future: A. Ask for flight following to clear under the Bravo so that an urgent situation that comes up could result in immediate Class B entry if needed. B. Better pre-flight plan the altitudes used for departing areas where airspace issues may exist.
The reporter stated that his aircraft is equipped with a G1000 WAAS capable GPS while the lead aircraft's GPS was a 430; probably not WAAS capable. They have not determined the cause of the position error during this event. The flight departed MKC; but was not in the area of a known intermittent GPS outage about one mile from Runway 3 which affects aircraft on the Runway 3 GPS approach. MKC Tower and the FSDO have been notified about the intermittent outage area.
A pilot in a two aircraft formation under MCI Class B reported a 1-2 mile difference between his WAAS G1000 GPS and the lead aircraft's GNS430 so that the flight approached Class B while climbing to avoid weather in Class E. The flight was not near the MKC Runway 3 intermittent GPS signal loss area.