B737-700
Flight Crew Last 90 Days 139
Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness
Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown
General Release Refused / Aircraft Not Accepted
Aircraft; Company Policy; Human Factors
The Captain and I were re-routed to fly an airplane that a crew had refused to fly due to a known and documented manufacturing situation regarding a fairing upstream of the vertical stabilizer. Both the Captain and I conferred with Maintenance and Dispatch and were satisfied the aircraft was airworthy; in fact; we had flown the aircraft in and had swapped out of it. Short story is that in all the busy work that ensued; the Captain missed the fact that the previous Captain's name was on the load sheet. The aircraft; tail number; and release amendment were correct. I usually double check that the 'lower right corner' of the load sheet is correct but was working pretty hard to get the folks on their way and missed my back-up flow. Both of us first day off of vacation; both of us first day iPad users; previous leg required Med-Link; I did the pre-flight including a visual inspection of the area in question via air-stairs; set up the cockpit; did my normal duties; briefed anxious and concerned folks after a lengthy delay and a crew change; queried the gate agents as to our further delay (passenger reconciliation); coordinated with Dispatch via ACARS. Needless to say; a one armed paper hanger. I do have procedures I follow to back up mistakes on the load sheet but I was 'in the yellow' for quite some time at the gate. I caught the mistake once airborne. I am at a loss as to why or how one name can appear on the release; and another on the load sheet. Do these systems not talk to each other? (Rhetorical question; but a valid one) This should not be physically possible. It is a crew 'get in trouble' preventable problem. Let's fix this. Captain should have caught it; my back-up should have caught it; but frankly; this should not be even possible with millions of dollars worth of computing power behind us. Is it possible to print one with the wrong tail number? The wrong aircraft type?? I hope not. Again; if so; let's fix that too.
After reporting to the aircraft late due to minimum rest requirements; my First Officer found a significant gap where the forward vertical stabilizer attaches to the dorsal fin on the preflight inspection. I went outside to inspect it myself. I too saw a significant gap in said location; and could see daylight through the area that looked like an attachment point. I went to look at another Company -700 at the next gate; no gap. I have never come across this gap before (15 Year pilot at Company); nor had my First Officer. Our Ramp Personnel were present. I apologized for the delay I felt this would cause; they responded that they never seen this gap before either and it needs to be checked out.I went upstairs and contacted Maintenance Control through Dispatch. The Maintenance Controller said this was normal and read me a 2007 Service Bulletin (or Engineering Report) from the Manufacturer. This report; (I felt) referred to the aft vertical stab were the rudder attaches on aircraft with an HF Antenna. I have seen gaps in this location before. The report also said that after the aircraft was on the ground for some time the gap would get smaller or close due to the warmer atmosphere. We were now on the ground for at least an hour and there was no change to the gap. I did not feel that we were talking about the same location referred to in the S.B. Maintenance Control was READING to me over the phone.I then asked for the Chief Pilot on Call. The CP also read the same SB Maintenance Control did; I tried explaining that I did not feel that SB applied to the location I was concerned about. After some back and forth; the CP suggested that if I was not comfortable with the aircraft I could refuse to fly it (which I did; and First Officer also).The Captain who brought the aircraft in; was called back to fly this aircraft. I waited for him; and told him my concerns; and took him outside to view said gap. By this time; Ramp had pulled up airstairs; so we had a new and improved vantage point. He agreed with my concerns and contacted Maintenance Control himself. I only heard his side of the conversation but he was saying the same things I was; i.e. SB is referring to a different location. This conversation was almost as long as mine was with Maintenance Control. In the end I heard him say; 'Well I guess I trust you;' and accepted the aircraft for the flight to XXX.I should have put the discrepancy in the logbook! This would have caused Contract Maintenance to come out and confirm or deny that the SB or Engineering Report Maintenance Control was reading applied to the area I was concerned about. I feel that if Maintenance Control is correct and this gap in said location is normal; the pilots (who are responsible for walkarounds); should be made fully aware. This can be done by an Ops Bulletin or even a Maintenance note in the logbook on affected aircraft. Doing this would prevent unnecessary delays and stress. This also affected the flight attendants; they did not want to fly on the aircraft either.
A B737-700 flight crew report discovering a significant gap where the forward vertical stabilizer attaches to the dorsal fin during the preflight inspection. The aircraft is refused; but another crew is assigned to fly it and eventually agrees to do so. A report from the First Officer of the crew that accepted the aircraft is also included.