EMB ERJ 170/175 ER/LR
Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Time Pressure; Workload; Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Distraction; Fatigue; Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness
Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown
Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed
Airport; Airspace Structure; Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related
It was our last flight of a 3 leg/two day trip that had gone extremely smooth and efficient. After landing in ZZZ early; I went to get food and noticed there was a jump seater. I went to introduce myself and let him know we would get him on and he introduced himself as the FAA assigned to [the company]. This immediately instilled a rise in stress for the crew as we were told he would be sitting up front with us. Knowing there is nothing to worry about necessarily; him being there still causes some stress. When I arrived back at the airplane; I noted we were over-fueled by 10;000 lbs. The ramp topped us off at 20;430 lbs. After managing that and being over an hour delayed the FO (First Officer) and I were also told that if we didn't leave by a specific time; half the plane would miss connections. We tried to manage the flight as quickly but as safely as possible. We were finally off with no incident. During cruise; everyone seemed to be a bit more relaxed and the flight was uneventful. The FO and I discussed the arrival and requesting 25L if it was not assigned in hopes we could get the passengers in on time. After our brief; ATC issued us 24R. As the Pilot Flying and descending through 14;000 ft slowing from 310 kts to 250 kts per ATC instructions; I was managing the aircraft and requested the FO to re-program the FMS for 24R. He said it was complete and noted the speeds were the same. I had just hit 250 kts and decided to brief the approach for 24R. After the brief; I reset the altitude for 24R and continued down the arrival. After passing through 12;000 [ft] I looked at the fixes and our heading and felt that something was wrong. Through 11;000 ft; I checked the FMS (Flight Management System) and realized we were still set up for 25L on the GPS but everything else was set up for 24R. I immediately requested the FO to ask ATC for vectors back to the 24R course as we had just passed CRCUS on the arrival which is where the arrival splits from the north and south complex. ATC asked if we were set up for 25L and after we confirmed we were; we were re-cleared for 25L. At this point; we switched everything back to 25L and then the FO noticed the FMS was not activated. He asked if I wanted it activated and in the process of talking to him; he activated the FMS; but now for 24R. After realizing we were no longer on a course; I went to green needles; tracked the localizer; and checked my altitude; at this point we were descending through about 5000 ft. I set 3600 [ft] for HUNDA and tracked the localizer. The FO; extremely nervous at this time with our extra FAA crew member; could not seem to successfully load the approach into the FMS. I could tell he was extremely flustered; I was leveling off at 3600 [ft] which was right above the clouds; and realized that the situational awareness with everything going on was degrading and it would be a safer option to request breaking off the approach and be re-vectored. The FO requested it; we leveled off; then climbed to 4000 [ft] and took a heading. At this point the FO and I had a quick chat about just starting over; and I had him completely reset the FMS for the Runway 25L. We ran through all the checklists; flew a box pattern with ATC; was re-cleared for the approach and landed without incident. Our de-brief hit on the errors that caused the event and how we can trap them in the future. We asked the FAA what his thought was and he felt that overall; the mistake was made and was caught and corrected very quickly. When we realized the situational awareness was missing; the go-around was a good call. In the future; instead of stating that I will be briefing and just turn to my iPad; I will ensure the FO knows to check the FMS for both the arrival and approach. This would have caught the wrong runway issue. After briefing; I may also make a habit to check the last page of the FMS to ensure runway selection. While I could have flown the approach safely in green needles; I felt the situational awareness of the FO was missing and going into the clouds with him that confused was not the safer option. Even with the lack of situational awareness; the FO did a great job taking direction and helping out. As nervous as the FO was with the FAA on board; maybe a specific brief to talk about it and ensure that there is nothing to worry about may have helped also.
Emb-175 Captain reported increased stress; confusion and loss of situational awareness; partially due to having an FAA inspector onboard; which ultimately led to a go-around.