B737-800
Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument
Flight Crew Last 90 Days 372
Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification; Distraction
Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach
General None Reported / Taken
Human Factors
I was flying my second Captain trip; and I was practicing my first HGS CAT III Approach. So inexperience is definitely a risk factor. We were on approach to land flying a HGS CAT III Approach. The weather was calm and clear. Somewhere around the FAF; I became distracted and forgot to call final flaps 30 and the landing checklist. I allowed myself to become completely engrossed by the procedures and callouts. Distraction was the second risk factor. Somewhere below the 500 FT callout; I heard 'Too Low Flaps'. I looked at the flap indicator and saw that the flaps were still at 15. I immediately called 'Flaps 30; Before Landing Checklist!' The First Officer complied; and by the time we had completed the checklist; the radio altimeter was making the '100; 50; 30; 10'' calls. Things happened so fast that I did not think to go around. Being rushed was the third risk factor. I landed; and realized on landing rollout that 'Too Low; Flaps' is not a caution; but a warning. I was in violation of Go Around/Missed Approach requirements.
During final approach as Pilot Monitoring (PM); I failed to recognize that we were not properly configured from flaps 15 to flaps 30 for landing. We were doing a practice CAT III Approach. During the final approach segment I became internally distracted trying to simulate as best as possible the CAT III conditions as it has been some time since I have conducted those procedures. I initially made the A III mode call at FAF and not 1000 FT. Additionally; I was trying to remember at which point my hand was to be placed behind the thrust levers. This distraction caused a lack of situational awareness and a lack of proper configuration. Somewhere below 400 FT AGL we got the 'too low; flaps' auditory warning and immediately recognized our error. The Captain called for flaps 30 and the Landing Checklist; which I complied with. We made an uneventful landing. In retrospect; I should have called for the go-around upon hearing the auditory warning for flap configuration. Personally; I need to have the internal discipline to study and remain comfortable with CAT III procedures rather than trying to think about hand placement and callouts during the final phase of the approach.
B737-800 flight crew reported failure to execute a go-around following an unstabilized approach.