Commercial Fixed Wing
Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 1
Confusion; Communication Breakdown
ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic
Airspace Structure; Human Factors; Procedure
I was working Local Control during an air show. Due to the TFR immediately north of the airport; arrivals were using Runway 29 while departures were using Runway 17L. Because the wind was between 15 and 30 KTS from the south; some aircraft required the use of Runway 17L for landing. This could only be accommodated by coordinating with the air show Air Boss to sterilize the TFR area and release control of it to SDF. During the [main aerobatics team] performance; Runway 17L was unavailable for arrivals; Aircraft X was cleared for the localizer Runway 29 approach. I cleared the aircraft to land on initial contact and issued the wind. The pilot then informed me that the quartering tailwind exceeded their limitations and requested to hold until Runway 17L was available. After coordinating with the TRACON; Aircraft X was handed back to arrival for holding. After the [main aerobatics team] were on the ground; the Supervisor in the Tower informed the Air Boss through our Air Traffic Liaison that we had two arrivals to Runway 17L. The Air Boss then released control of the TFR to SDF for the two arrivals. The first arrival was Aircraft X followed by Aircraft Z. After clearing Aircraft X to land; I observed a target east of the final moving westbound. The target was obscured from my view on the CTRD by numerous data blocks for aircraft at LOU; approximately 3.5 NM east of SDF. When I observed the target; it was maneuvering inside the Class C surface area approximately one mile east of Aircraft X at the same altitude. Traffic was not exchanged because Aircraft X was already passing the target by the time the conflict was observed. There was no conflict alert and no pilot-reported TCAS RA. The Supervisor in the Tower then contacted the Air Boss through our air traffic liaison to determine the identity of the aircraft. We were told initially that it was Aircraft Y; a helicopter; but I used the binoculars to determine that the aircraft was fixed-wing. I then issued a landing clearance to Aircraft Z; followed by several traffic advisories. Aircraft Z eventually reported traffic in sight before passing it. About this time; we were informed that the aircraft; [Aircraft Y;] was an air show participant that departed LOU. Due to the release of the TFR to SDF; the aircraft should have been sent north out of LOU to a pre-arranged holding point until control of the TFR was given back to the Air Boss. Instead; the Air Boss instructed the aircraft to enter the TFR and begin his performance. During this event; attempts to communicate effectively with the Air Boss were hindered.  By the time he was able to get the Air Boss' attention; the situation was over.The primary problem in this situation was the Air Boss' lack of regard for ATC procedures and lack of awareness of how the air show impacts the surrounding airspace. In this instance; he knew there were arrivals to Runway 17L; but he still authorized an air show participant into the TFR. Having a more highly trained and qualified Air Boss would help ensure adherence to the procedures developed for this special event. Ideally; the Air Boss should be a current SDF Air Traffic Control Specialist. A significant contributing factor was the difficulty in communicating with the Air Boss. In order to communicate; the Supervisor in the Tower had to call the Air Traffic Liaison on the radio and have the Liaison relay messages. This method is cumbersome as well as ineffective since getting the attention of the Air Boss is frequently difficult. The Liaison is often physically unable to get close enough to the Air Boss to relay messages. While having a Liaison relay messages may be necessary due to the Air Boss' workload; it is imperative that the Liaison have constant access to the Air Boss. Lack of continuous immediate communication ability poses a serious risk to the safety of both participating and non-participating aircraft.
Local Controller at SDF reports issue related to lack of communication between an air show Air Boss/Liaison and FAA facility.