Regional Jet 200 ER/LR (CRJ200)
Flight Attendant Current
Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification; Confusion
Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown
Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Human Factors; Manuals; Aircraft
During the previous recurrent training session; we were introduced to the new immediate action item procedure for the bleed duct warning. We were told that the procedure must be done in less than 30 seconds and that speed was important. During the actual incident; I recalled the need for fast response and that might have caused me to not completely understand step Xa in the checklist. I also believe steps Xa and Xb are written in a completely confusing fashion. All the other checklist items are in a simple 'This button...push/this knob...turn' format that leaves little room for misunderstanding. A pilot under considerable stress is following a series of steps; then gets to two conditional statements written in long form with a 'Not' phrase in it. Then all the steps after are back to the simple 'do this' process. I did this; did that; did the other; and then stumbled on the 'not' phrases; then went back to doing this and that. This I believe is unacceptable. This is how it unfolded; at about FL250; we received the R BLEED DUCT warning message. The Captain took control of the radios while I started the checklists. We completed the immediate action item checklist and I began the QRH procedure. The ECS synoptic page noted that both bleed valves had automatically closed and we were losing cabin pressure. I referred to the 'Both L and R engine bleed valves are closed' portion of the checklist and started the procedure. We initiated a descent to 10;000 and completed steps 1-6 of the checklist. Step X of the checklist is the unpressurized flight procedure. In the stress of the situation; I misinterpreted step Xa of the checklist and continued. At about 18;000 I activated the EMER DEPRESS switch which caused a loss of cabin pressure and caused the masks to drop. Replace step Xa with ALTITUDE...BELOW 10;000 (Or lowest safe altitude) And Xb with AIRSPEED...200 KIAS OR FASTER. Simple; concise; and less open to mistakes.
CRJ-700 First Officer admits making a mistake attempting to accomplish a QRH procedure for an R BLEED DUCT warning message. Passing FL180 the EMER DEPRESS switch is activated causing a complete loss of cabin pressurization. Rewording the checklist to avoid confusion is suggested.