A321
Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL
General Maintenance Action
Incorrect / Not Installed / Unavailable Part; Staffing; Procedure; Human Factors; MEL
Aircraft was written up upon landing for third time: F/Ctl Slat Sys 2 fault/Sfcc2. Maintenance in ZZZ was to swap out SFCC (Slat Flap Control Computer) with new SFCC inventory. After looking; no part found. Maintenance Control authorized ADD (Acceptable Deferred Defect): MEL (Minimum Equipment List) 27-XXa Slat/Flap Ctl System and Mel/73-XXb Min Gnd Idle. Maintenance Technicians under pressure to complete application before ZZZ curfew.This Safety of Flight Event occurred due to Maintenance in ZZZ not finding the required part computer in inventory. Secondly; Maintenance Technicians were in a rush to complete MEL task card to make the curfew for takeoff. 3 Maintenance Technicians in cockpit were task loaded and mis-applied. Maintenance procedure for securing the SFCC2. FCtl/Slat Sys 2 Fault (Ecam) (Electronic Centralized Aircraft Monitoring).Specifically; CB's (Circuit Breakers) P19 and P20 were to be pulled. P19 was pulled; P20 WAS NOT PULLED. ALSO; CB R-21 was pulled and collared not in accordance with MEL 27-XXa requirements. This as relayed to me enroute by phone with Maintenance Supervisor. Maintenance Supervisor confirmed that CB's P19 and P20 were supposed to be pulled and that CB R-21 should NOT have been pulled. Also requested that I make logbook entry regarding mis application of procedure and need for MEL verification upon landing ZZZ1.There were too many errors not caught by too many technicians trying to EXPEDITE APPLICATION of this MEL. The MEL was required for continued service; but time pressure limited the MEL Application and verification procedures.AS PIC (Pilot in Command); the Operations procedures DO NOT specify checking to verify the specific CB's that should be pulled. I assumed that Maintenance had complied with THEIR procedures and the MEL was complete. Perhaps the Operations procedure should have a cross check to VERIFY the correct CB's are in fact pulled and collared.
A321 Captain reported that aircraft arrived with incorrect MEL procedures accomplished by Maintenance.