Widebody; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 4
Communication Breakdown; Confusion
ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance
Procedure; Human Factors
I was working a line of JFK arrivals on the PARCH1 arrival at the Clipper Sector (32). There was some other departure and VFR traffic in the sector as well. The HTO (31) Radar Controller reached over and pointed out an Aircraft Y descending to FL170 and said 'I'll go under the JFK arrivals'. I said point out approved. I continued to work my traffic. Both of us had planes on vectors; and the traffic was moderate. I had assumed the 31 Controller was aware of the JFK arrival; most notably Aircraft X that was the only one that was a factor. When the conflict alert went off I asked him if he was going to miss my traffic. The two aircraft were at roughly the same altitude and descending on converging courses. When it became apparent that neither of us had positive separation we both issued left turns to our respective aircraft. I thought the turns would be enough to maintain separation; but when it became clear separation would be lost I issued FL200 to Aircraft X in an attempt to gain vertical separation as well. Aircraft X then advised me they had an RA that was telling them to descend. I let them continue the descent and when clear of the traffic cleared them on course to ROBER. This traffic flow is a common procedure in these two sectors. The point out was ambiguous and neither the Sector 31 Controller nor I were clear about the plan for Aircraft Y. I was under the impression he was going to avoid my traffic; the JFK arrivals. I believe now that he was probably under the impression that I was going to descend my traffic reference his traffic. This is a Controller that I have worked with a lot; and was comfortable with his decision making; and that was probably a factor in why I didn't feel the need to question his plan further. We clearly had two different ideas of what was established in the point out. A clearer plan should have been established to maintain positive control. I should have referenced my traffic that was a factor and not just 'the JFK arrivals' as a whole. That way we would have had a better idea of who was going to be descending on top of who.
While descending from FL240 to 12;000 FT on the Parch 1 Arrival into JFK; and in a right turn; we received a TCAS traffic alert; followed 10 to 15 seconds later by a TCAS resolution advisory to descend; then increase vertical speed. A few seconds later; we were instructed by Boston Center to 'turn left 30 degrees' (we were in a right turn to approximately a 275 degree course); then instructed to 'turn left to heading 190'. Conflict aircraft passed ahead of us; from left to right (northbound) approximately 1.5 to 2 NM away; approximately 100-200 FT above us.As we were approaching FL190; Boston Center advised us to maintain FL200. I advised him we were already at FL190 due to a TCAS RA descent. He then advised us to continue descent; we then asked Controller to verify 'cleared to continue descent to 12;000 FT and direct ROBER'. Clearance was confirmed; we continued on for approach and landing without further incident. All three pilot crew members in cockpit felt we were in compliance with clearances we had received prior to the TCAS RA and subsequent evasive maneuvers.
Controller reports about improper use of point out; while pilot of aircraft reports he has to respond to a TCAS RA to avoid pointed out aircraft.