A319
Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Situational Awareness
ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Human Factors; Procedure
I was working the CIC position in Area 2 when the R29 Controller informed me that Aircraft X had descended unexpectedly into GSO Approach airspace. He called the GSO Controller and made a point out after the aircraft had already descended into their airspace. He had already transferred communications to CLT Approach when the incident occurred. Aircraft X was a RDU departure on the KELLS 2 OPD arrival into CLT. The aircraft was vectored off course then turned direct MAJIC and instructed to 'descend via the KELLS 2 Arrival; South transition.' The aircraft should have crossed MAJIC at or above 13;000 FT per the KELLS 2 descent profile. When I was notifying the watch desk of the incident I noticed a strip for Aircraft Y; also off of RDU; on the area desk with 'KELLS descended to 12;600 FT' written on it from approximately 4 hours before. I called the day shift supervisor and he informed me that it was the same situation; which the aircraft had descended below the published altitude at MAJIC after being vectored off course. There is an obvious safety issue here that needs to be addressed ASAP. Suspend KELLS operations for RDU departures until the problem can be identified and resolved.
Aircraft X was inbound to CLT via the KELLS2 OPD arrival from RDU. Prior to being issued the clearance to descend via the KELLS2 arrival; Aircraft X was RADAR vectored for spacing. When that was complete; Aircraft X was cleared direct MAJIC intersection and then cleared to descend via the KELLS2 arrival; South transition and communications changed to CLT Tower. A minute or so later I observed Aircraft X descending through 12;600 FT about 8 NM NE of MAJIC. I called GSO Tower to point out the traffic. I then advised Management. I then observed Aircraft X at about 11;700 FT and watched as they climbed back to 13;000 FT. It seems obvious that this air carrier has not implemented this procedure (either pilot training or FMS automation) correctly or completely; therefore my recommendation would be to stop utilizing this OPD until flight standards can confirm that the necessary training and software adaptation have completed.
ZTL Controller described a failed altitude crossing event resulting in airspace incursions; the report including both the ATC and flight crew perspectives regarding this event.