A300
Training / Qualification; Situational Awareness
Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown
Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem
Human Factors; ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Airport; Company Policy; Procedure
After landing at ZZZ on the first leg of a first officer IOE; the runway lighting for [our only useable runway] was NOTAMed out. The lighting was knocked out by snow removal equipment working on the edges of the runway. After consultation with flight operations management; a thorough review of the FOM Takeoff Visual Reference requirements for a night takeoff and a discussion with the First Officer; I decided we would taxi out to the runway; line up; turn the aircraft lights off and determine if there was adequate forward visual reference to make a safe takeoff. We called Ground Control and stated our plan; and they said no problem; but they would not issue us a takeoff clearance and takeoff would be entirely at my own risk. I called the flight ops Duty Manager and let him know this and said I still wanted to taxi out and give it a shot; as long as it was safe. Since the airport is a[n approved] non-Tower ops field; it would be legal to takeoff and meet the FOM requirements. The Duty Officer called back after consulting with his Manager who wanted me to call the Tower and asked exactly what he meant by not issuing takeoff clearance. This was to determine if certificate action would be taken against me if I did takeoff. I called the Tower on my cell phone and the Controller said this was just to relieve them of any responsibility and they would not take action against me. The Duty Officer's Manager also wanted me to know that whichever decision I made; he would support me and not to feel pressure to move the jet because I am an LCA. After the aircraft was loaded we taxied out and lined up in position. After the [landing/taxi] lights were turned off we sat there a few moments and; with a dry runway and snow on each side; the runway was easy to see. There were 2 red lights at the departure end and we asked tower [who confirmed] they were stationary (not a truck that would drive off). With the reflection off the snow; the bit of moonlight and lights at the departure end that established the centerline; even with if the aircraft lights failed; I could safely make the takeoff. I asked the First Officer what he thought before I stated my opinion. He was comfortable with the visibility. We told the Tower our decision and were issued a statement that takeoff was at our own risk. I made the flaps 15/20 takeoff (to reduce our time on the runway) and we departed and completed the flight uneventfully.
After taking the runway to have a look; the Captain and I decided that visual reference was adequate and made an uneventful takeoff; with the Captain as the pilot flying.
When the runway lights for the only adequate runway for their takeoff were disabled by snow removal equipment the flight crew of an A300 creatively resolved their departure problem by; after consultation with flight management; taxiing out; stopping in position; and evaluating the adequacy of their visual reference to conduct a safe takeoff. Clear skies; a clear dry runway outlined by snow banked runway edges reflected by a waxing moon were declared adequate and an uneventful takeoff and flight ensued.  The Tower had previously advised that an unlighted takeoff would be made at their own risk and made a broadcast to that effect for the record prior to the departure.