Gulfstream V / G500 / G550
Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Training / Qualification; Communication Breakdown
Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance
Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Human Factors
This was the third leg of the day. The first two legs I flew as the pilot monitoring from the right seat in the role of Second in Command (SIC). On this the third leg; I switched seats and flew as the pilot flying in the role of SIC from the left seat of Aircraft X. The aircraft was a Gulfstream GV; and I had never flown this actual GV aircraft previously. In addition; I had only flown with the Pilot in Command (PIC) on one other occasion several years earlier. It was a new plane; relatively unfamiliar crew; and a quick turn where we were behind schedule slightly. We departed from ZZZ at approximately XA38. The SID was [an] RNAV departure. The clearance was to climb via the SID with the exception of an altitude limit of 5000'. While the PIC was tending to other duties I set up the cockpit and put 5000' in the altitude selector window on the guidance panel. Prior to departure I briefed the other pilot about the clearance and we discussed the SID and how we would fly it. I briefed him of my intention to select LNAV upon taking the runway; but I failed to state that we would select VNAV after flap retraction. The takeoff went smoothly; and after passing 400 feet AGL I called for flaps up and FLCH. This was a mistake on my part; as I wanted VNAV and mistakenly called for FLCH out of habit. By selecting FLCH the aircraft was not going to level off at or below 3000' at ZZZZZ Intersection; as mandated by the SID. Instead; it would continue to 5000' as selected in the guidance panel altitude selector. Neither of us caught the error initially (and I blame this mainly on the fact that I failed to state clearly during the brief to select VNAV after flap retraction). As the aircraft rapidly climbed we both realized it was going to go right through 3000' prior to ZZZZZ Intersection; and the pilot monitoring verbalized it. The autopilot was not engaged (I was hand flying and following the flight director single cue); but the autothrottles were engaged. After a brief clarification of the altitude restriction I agreed with him the aircraft was going to bust the 3000' altitude restriction prior to reaching ZZZZZ Intersection. I pushed the nose over; but it was too late and we were already going through 3000'. We rounded out of the climb several hundred feet above the 3000' foot restriction and began a descent back to 3000'. Because FLCH had been selected the autothrottles had commanded climb power; but they did not reduce power as we descended and the aircraft rapidly accelerated above the 250 knot speed restriction. The pilot monitoring called out 'Speed'; and I disconnected the autothrottles; powered back manually; and then deployed the speed brakes to slow the aircraft back to 250 knots. Essentially; the poor briefing and subsequent poor use of the automation on my part resulted in us climbing through 3000' prior to ZZZZZ Intersection; and accelerating above the speed restriction of 250 knots as we descended back to altitude and leveled off. I am fairly certain a radar track of our flight from just before ZZZZZ Intersection to a few miles past ZZZZZ Intersection is probably pretty ugly. I was able to get back onto speed; track; and altitude soon after and the remainder of the flight was uneventful.In hindsight; after debriefing the situation with the other pilot it became clear to me that going forward I will always discuss not only the points; altitudes; speeds; and details of any departure or arrival; but also EXACTLY how I plan to use the automation to perform the task correctly. The pilot monitoring stated during our debrief that he questioned why I was selecting FLCH instead of VNAV; but it had not been addressed specifically during the departure briefing; and he thought I was simply going to hand fly at 3000' until after ZZZZZ Intersection. I think several factors were involved including fatigue; rush to get off on time; lack of familiarity with both the airplane and the other pilot; and missed details during the departure briefing.
This incident occurred during the initial CLIMB phase of the departure procedure out of ZZZ on a ferry flight. Clear skies and better than 12 miles visibility prevailed at ZZZ. We received our clearance via PDC; and were cleared as filed with the Remarks: Cleared Departure; Climb VIA SID Except Maintain 5000 Feet; Expect FL390 5 Minutes After Departure. I was the captain; but was not the pilot flying. The pilot flying conducted a takeoff briefing while still on the ramp prior to engine start; and among the items covered was a review of the departure. The Flight Management System (FMS) was checked to confirm that all the waypoints; headings; courses and associated altitudes were correct for this SID; and 5;000 feet was placed in the altitude preselect window. We were assigned Runway XY for takeoff. Being an RNAV departure Lateral Navigation (LNAV) was selected on the Flight Guidance Panel (FGP) to provide the correct lateral guidance after departure. After takeoff and gear retraction the flying pilot called for Flight Level Change (FLCH) which I selected on the FGP. The aircraft was light with only the crew on board and 12;000 lbs. of fuel; so the aircraft had exceptional climb performance. I cleaned up the flaps on cue from the pilot flying and proceeded to contact departure control. Shortly thereafter I glanced at the Primary Flight Display (PFD) and saw us climbing rapidly through about 2;800 feet prior to ZZZ Intersection which was to be crossed at or below 3;000 feet. I immediately called 3;000 feet at ZZZZZ Intersection at which point the pilot flying nosed the aircraft over to level flight; but not before reaching about 3;400 to 3;500 feet. About the time the aircraft was leveled off we passed ZZZZZ Intersection and I reminded the flying pilot that we needed to be on a 236 degree heading. As a result of being distracted by the altitude deviation and concentrating on flying the departure procedure neither one of us noticed the auto-throttles were still set at climb power due to the selection of FLCH after takeoff. When I looked at the airspeed tape we were accelerating rapidly through 300kts. I called airspeed which prompted the pilot flying to disengage the auto-throttles; reduce power to idle and deploy the speed brakes. About the time the aircraft was established on the correct flight path and airspeed ATC cleared us to a higher altitude with a left turn direct to ZZZZZ1 Intersection. The rest of the departure and flight were flown without incident. At no time during this event did we lose separation or have a conflict with any other air traffic.There are several factors that contributed to the occurrence of this event:1. Fatigue - After not sleeping that well my alarm went off [2 hours early for my] show at the airport for a 4 leg trip with a long duty day. We had a 4.8 hr. 1st leg and a 1.7 hr. 2nd leg; and were about 9.5 hrs. into our duty day before the departure from ZZZ where this deviation occurred.2. Contract pilot - The pilot I normally fly with was on vacation so I was with a contract pilot. I let the contract pilot fly the ferry leg out of ZZZ since I had flown the first 2 passenger legs and was going to fly the 4th and last leg of the trip. I can't help but think that the dynamic of having an unfamiliar crew member onboard played a part in this occurrence. Obviously he was accustomed to calling for FLCH after takeoff; whereas I normally request vertical speed so I can adjust the rate of climb with the Touch Control Steering (TCS) button and the auto-throttles will adjust to maintain the airspeed indicated in the speed window on the FGP. Regardless; the discussion of how to correctly configure the FGP for this departure was not briefed properly.3. Crew briefing - The items normally covered in the crew briefing were accomplished including a review of the departure procedure; and confirmation that the FMS waypoints; courses; altitudes and speeds were correct. The one thing that was missed in the briefing was how the FGP would be set up to fly the climb portion of the SID correctly. We did discuss using LNAV for lateral guidance since the [SID] is an RNAV1 departure; but how to set up the FGP for the vertical portion of this departure was not briefed appropriately. During our takeoff briefing we did mention crossing ZZZZZ Intersection at or below 3000 feet; however; the FGP was not set properly to make that happen. There were a couple of vertical mode options that could have been chosen to fly this departure correctly; but FLCH wasn't the correct choice with 5000 feet set in the altitude pre-select window. In that case Vertical Navigation (VNAV) would have been a better selection; because 3000 feet at ZZZZZ Intersection was programmed in the FMS which would have caused the flight director to level off at 3000 feet until passing ZZZZZ Intersection and the auto-throttles would have adjusted to maintain the correct speed. Then after passing ZZZZZ Intersection a climb to 5000 feet would have been initiated.4. Light takeoff weight of aircraft - With only the crew and 12;000 lbs. of fuel on board the performance capability of the GLF5 was enhanced; which exacerbated how quickly our altitude and airspeed excursions occurred.Looking back; I would say fatigue played a part in my decision to let the contract pilot fly the ferry leg out of ZZZ. Had I been well rested I'm sure I would have chosen to fly all 4 legs of this trip. Fatigue also a factored into failing to brief exactly how the FGP should be set up and which vertical mode to use after takeoff. The main lesson learned as a result of this incident is to ensure that for every departure procedure flown both pilots have a thorough understanding of how the SID is to be flown to include how the FGP is to be set up; what altitude to set in the pre-select window and what vertical mode to use for the climb.
Gulfstream flight crew reported that FLCH was selected during climb instead of VNAV causing the aircraft to overshoot the selected altitude.