Widebody; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown; Confusion
ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance
Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Human Factors; Procedure
I was working LC (Local Control) during this event. RWY 20/23 were in use. Minutes prior to the event; Aircraft Z had twice attempted to land RWY 20; but had to go around due to a tailwind on final. However; our equipment indicated that the north and south field winds were consistently displaying winds that favored the current configuration. Aircraft X was holding short of RWY 20 with Aircraft Y (not on my frequency) on an 8 mile final. I cleared Aircraft X for takeoff and issued the traffic on final. My CC (Cab Coordinator) then received a call from HCF that Aircraft Y was on a visual approach and would be entering a right downwind for RWY 2. Our CC informed him that Aircraft X was passed the hold short bar and was taxiing onto the runway. While my CC was on the line with HCF; Aircraft Y checked in. Initially; I did not hear that he had been issued a right downwind for RWY 2. I thought he had requested it. I told him unable; because Aircraft X was departing. I told him to 'Say intentions.' He responded with uncertainty about landing RWY 20; because of the previous pilot report from Aircraft Z. I gave him the current north and south field winds and asked if he could continue for RWY 20. He seemed hesitant; but agreed to give it a shot. Aircraft X made a slow turn onto the runway and proceeded to inform Aircraft Z of what information he had on the winds and nearby windsock. Aircraft Y was on a 3 mile final. Aircraft X departs without incident and is well off the departure end by the time Aircraft Y lands. Aircraft Y exited the runway and no separation was lost. My concerns: RWY 20/23 operations are rare here at PHOG. There are a lot more traps on this configuration and it requires a lot more careful planning with departing aircraft. Part of the reason for this is because we have a very small range of headings we can issue due to the mountain ranges on either side of the airport. The winds were swirling at the time and aircraft were having to go around or land long due to this. HCF never coordinated an opposite direction approach for Aircraft Y until they had already switched communications to us. They did not ask if we were about to depart anyone and then coordinate an opposite direction approach for Aircraft Y. With Aircraft X; a heavy departing; wake turbulence would become an issue when trying to get Aircraft Y in for right traffic to RWY 2. Aircraft Y would have to extend their downwind at 1500 feet; while Aircraft X starts a climbing left turn above them at 2100 feet; unless taken off the SID (Sweep 2 Departure).We did not have a lot of time to act and come up with a safe plan. I was unaware that Aircraft Y was on a right downwind for RWY 2 until he was 7 miles north of the airport and checked in with me. I tried to convince him to stick with RWY 20; because the winds displayed by my equipment favored that runway; and also because Aircraft X heavy was departing.Had there been proper coordination by HCF; we could have held Aircraft X short of RWY 20 and accommodated Aircraft Y's request to land on RWY 2. Aircraft X had a slow takeoff roll because they were trying to assist Aircraft Y's approach to RWY 20 by informing them of their experience of the field conditions. This caused a possible compression issue to exist. In the event Aircraft Y had to go around; there could be a loss of wake turbulence separation with a [smaller aircraft] following a heavy aircraft with limited vectors available to separate the two aircraft.My recommendations: HCF should be familiar with the LOA (Letter of Agreement) concerning opposite direction operations. We rarely deal with such operations and things happen quickly in these instances. HCF should improve their coordination with our facility and seek the approval of doing something out of the ordinary; rather than issue the aircraft abnormal instructions; switch them to us; and then inform us what the aircraft will be doing; with little time for us to fix it. Overall; an imminent situation was created due to the lack of proper coordination; but luckily avoided due to the pilots being willing to accept RWY 20. When it comes to safety; we should be working hard for the pilots; and not the other way around.
RWY20/23 in use. Low level windshear advisories were in effect. We received multiple reports of aircraft experiencing tailwinds on final RWY20 but the surface wind showed 180/18 consistently. I was working Cab Coordinator (CC) and was having difficulty coordinating effectively with HCF Approach for about an hour prior to the event due to the attitude of the controller. LC cleared Aircraft X for takeoff RWY20. Aircraft Y was on an 8nm final RWY20 with scratchpad coordination indicating he was on the RNAV GPS approach to RWY20. HCF Approach calls me for coordination just as I was about to call him for a rolling call for Aircraft X. He says 'Aircraft Y is on a visual approach to RWY2; he is on the right downwind and will circle south of the airport and land on RWY2.' This was not a request for an opposite direction operation; he was telling me that Aircraft Y was already given the instructions. I informed him that Aircraft X was departing on the SWEEP2 departure; a SID that has the aircraft start a climbing left turn out of 2;100 and double back to the VORTAC located on the airport; which would put Aircraft X head on; opposite direction; with any aircraft on the right downwind to RWY2. The controller seemed surprised that Aircraft X was departing and asked several times about where exactly Aircraft X was. I told him multiple times that Aircraft X was on the runway and had begun the takeoff roll. I told him multiple times 'Unable Aircraft Y opposite direction operation'. He responded by saying; 'Okay; then Aircraft X; hold for release'. I responded with 'Unable; he's already rolling'. He then said 'Aircraft X is in direct conflict with Aircraft Y'. I agreed with him and again denied his request for the opposite direction operation. He ended the coordination by asking if we were talking to Aircraft Y. I responded in the negative since the last I knew; we did not have Aircraft Y on frequency. As the coordination was being terminated; I heard LC clear Aircraft Y to land RWY20. I keyed up the shout line to HCF and said 'We have Aircraft Y'. Aircraft X departed safely without incident and Aircraft Y landed RWY20 without incident. While I was on the line attempting to coordinate; Aircraft Y checked in on our frequency without me knowing. Aircraft Y informed LC that he was on a visual approach to RWY2 and was entering the right downwind. LC issued the surface wind; which heavily favored RWY20 and asked him to say intentions. Aircraft Y expressed concern about landing RWY20 due to pilot reports of tailwinds on final approach. Aircraft X was on the runway beginning his takeoff roll and offered advice to Aircraft Y based off the windsocks and suggested RWY20 as the better option. Aircraft Y decided to make a straight in to RWY20 and landed without incident. HCF cleared Aircraft Y for a visual approach to RWY2 and enter the right downwind; switched the aircraft to our frequency; and then initiated the coordination for an opposite direction operation. The main problem at hand was that an opposite direction operation was initiated by approach without prior coordination with the tower.This situation had the potential to be significant and extremely dangerous. The LOA (Letter of Agreement) between OGG TWR and HCF Approach states that an opposite direction operation arrival must be coordinated with the tower. An opposite direction arrival on RWY2 must be at least 25nm from the threshold by the time the departure off RWY20 is airborne and issued a turn to heading 185. This situation does not even fall into the scope of the LOA because the arrival was inbound from the north to land on RWY2; which put him head on with the departing Aircraft X; which would be making a climbing turn and reversing course. An opposite direction operation such as this would require clear coordination prior to any control instructions being given to a pilot; but that is not what happened. I would recommend the controller working at HCF be reminded of the importance of properly coordinating opposite direction operations; especially being that it is a top 5 issue throughout the FAA. Furthermore; I would recommend HCF be reminded about the LOA between the tower and approach. A better understanding of the LOA could have avoided the development of this situation by coordinating in a timely fashion; before the control instructions were given to Aircraft Y. Additionally; I would recommend the HCF controller try to adopt a more positive attitude when coordinating with the tower. There have been many; many instances of unprofessional behavior on both the tower and approach's part throughout the years and there is definitely animosity between the two facilities. But when it comes to the safety of the flying public; we have to set our differences aside and work as a team. This is an example of what can happen when the relationship of the tower and approach control breaks down. We narrowly avoided a disastrous situation with two air carriers flying head on. This situation was easily avoidable with proper coordination.
Maui Tower Controllers reported resolving a head-on conflict caused by untimely coordination from HCF.