B777-200
Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Situational Awareness; Fatigue; Distraction; Communication Breakdown; Workload
Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach
Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Human Factors
The entire flight was uneventful until turning base for the runway. The weather was not a factor. The FO had slowed down and had flaps 5 before turning base. Approach asked if we had the airport in sight. I asked the FO and he said yes. We were then cleared for the visual approach.In descent the FO briefed the RNAV approach to the runway with the appropriate minimums set. After being cleared for the visual approach I extended a line from ZZZZZ intersection to intercept the final approach course. I asked the FO if it looked good. He agreed so I executed it.When being cleared for the visual approach the FO disconnected the autopilot and did not engage VNAV or LNAV. I put the Decision Altitude (DA) in the altitude window.At this point things changed rapidly. The FO was not configuring; so I encouraged him to do so. He called for gear and flaps 20. I told him we needed to be configured by 1;500 AGL. I believe I asked him if I could select flaps 30 and he agreed. We did get a momentary horn as the gear was not fully down at this time. The final flaps were probably selected at about 1;200 AGL; 300 feet lower then procedure calls for.At this point I believe the Relief Officer (RO) and I notice the speed low. I only noticed 10 knots slow while the RO said he noticed 20 knots slow. We both stated this fact and called for an increase in power. We then got fast and slow again. At one point I noticed 4 red on the PAPI and informed the FO.Unbelievably; we were stable at 500 and continued to a normal landing. This approach was at the end of a 9 hour flight; so there is no doubt in my mind that fatigue had something to do with the way this event happened.In the area above; I checked several communication boxes. When I brief the flight attendants and crew I stress the importance of communication. Although what the FO did was legal under these conditions; it would have been helpful for the RO and me to know his intentions.As stated about everything came undone about the time the autopilot was disconnected. It is good to hand fly; yet under conditions as this; being at the end of a 9 hours flight; I would recommend using all available resources.At the gate we discussed this for some time. One major problem is the FO was arguing with me about when we needed to be fully configured. 777 Operating Manual (OM) Volume 1; page 20.2 states that landing flaps must be selected no lower than 1;500 feet AGL. The RO was forced to get the OM out to show this to the FO.Not using automation and every available resource and not knowing very basic procedures are what caused this event to happen. While I was distracted by lack of configuration; the RO noticed the airspeed. There were many things happening and it's impossible to monitor everything at once. Due to the coordination of the RO and myself; I believe we prevented this situation from getting much worse; as the FO was not making corrections without us bringing them to his attention.
On arrival this morning FO briefed the approach. There was some discussion as to whether we would do an RNAV or the ILS to the runway.Approach began with a normal down wind and base turn. FO had begun to configure. My recollection of exactly when is vague.We lined up with the runway; and continued to descend. The minimums for the RNAV approach had been set. Configuration of the airplane slowed down in pace; and the FO did not request gear and flaps 20 until close to 1;500 feet. In other words; too late to select flaps to final landing configuration per procedure.Captain said something like 'let's get more flaps out' at 1;500 feet or so; and then went ahead and selected flaps 25. We got the configuration horn briefly; because the gear wasn't down yet. It was at this time that I started to pay a lot more attention to the situation. We descended below 1;500 feet; and my recollection is that final flaps were selected about 1;200 feet or so.The situation was a bit confusing. CA was selecting flaps without input from the FO; and I think I heard the FO say something like 'but I didn't ask for more flaps yet.'It was at that time; both the CA and I noticed that the speed was well below VREF. I think close to 20 KIAS; and well into the amber foot. CA immediately said something like 'we're slow; push it up.' The FO pushed it up a little; and I think I said 'push it up more!' FO pushed throttles way up; and as the engines spooled up; we shot through VREF by about 15 KIAS on the high side.Around 1;000 feet or so; we were fully configured; and the before landing checklist was completed. I looked at the speed; and we were again slow; this time by about 10 KIAS. I mentioned that; and the FO pushed the throttles back up. At some point prior to that; I noticed that MDA for the RNAV was still set; and asked for missed approach altitude to be set. The FO's flight director was not in view; and I began to look at other settings in the MCP. Neither VNAV nor LNAV were engaged.While we had been low up to this point; (red over red PAPI were visible); we were now high on the approach. At about 700 feet I said something like 'there is no way you're going to be stable at 500 feet.' The FO reduced power; and we were in fact in the slot at 500 feet at pretty close to REF; and the PAPIs confirmed on path. Since we were VFR; engines stable; and now finally somewhat under control; I did not call for a go-around.The three of us discussed the events on the ground after block in.My observations are the following:1. Both CA and I are quite experienced on the 777; and I'm pretty sure the FO is too. I quite frankly was extremely tired; (more on that in a minute) and did not notice that nothing had been set in the MCP when we turned final. The configuration of the flaps; getting them out by 1;500 feet; the CA selecting them with no input from the FO; (which was fine; but non-standard) focused everyone's attention; and nobody was really flying the airplane at that point. We went from what seemed like a normal situation; to about 20 KIAS slow in a very short amount of time. At least that was my impression. In retrospect; when we saw we were not going to be configured properly and on time; and the speed got slow; we should have gone around; and reset.2. During our ground debrief; I told the FO that hand flying the airplane is fine; but modes still need to be selected in the MCP; including missed approach attitudes; etc. Clearly; we did not back him up on that. I question the usefulness of turning off the flight director; as it's a useful backup to indicate that perhaps the MCP is not set properly.3. The throttles not 'awakening' and backing up the FO was an item of discussion. I think it was because VNAV wasn't set; (we may have been in flight level change). Be that as it may; you still have to fly the airplane. We got very slow; and then quite fast; the slow again.4. Fatigue for me was an issue; especially at the end ofthe sequence. It was a double all-nighter; and as is often the case; my rest in the bunk on the return was interrupted by noise in the galley; then lack of air circulation. I woke up several times sweating. I've written up these concerns many times; and I don't want to turn this report into a 777-200 rest area report; but the last I heard; [company] was 'studying' the issue of the bunk area further. That's what government and corporations say when they don't want to fix something. It's way past time that the bunks get fixed with better soundproofing and ventilation. As an aside; last week when I flew the same trip; we had a check airman; and we split the breaks evenly. My level of alertness with a four and a half hour break versus a 2 hour and 20 minute break was pretty dramatic. The double all night flights and often compromised rest on the airplane is a fairly significant degradation of safety.To sum up; crew coordination and back up on this final portion of the flight fell apart. We reacted well to fix things; but it never should have been allowed to get to that point. Hand flying a VFR approach is fine; especially VFR with little traffic; but everyone should still be clear on how it will be flown; and with what settings. After a double all night flight; and little rest on my break; I was not helpful initially. The low speed event certainly focused my attention. What was surprising is how quickly we went from what seemed like a normal approach; to a very hectic; non-standard; and alarming event.
A Boeing 777 flight crew reported that an approach became unstable after transitioning from auto to manual flight. A delay in final configuration and several speed excursions contributed to this event; however; at 500 feet the aircraft was in a stable condition and an uneventful landing was accomplished.