Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 5.5
Troubleshooting; Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Distraction; Situational Awareness
Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic
Human Factors; Procedure
I was on Cab Coordinator in the tower when the supervisor of the operation in the radar room; called me and said there was an opposite direction arrival near Olene; Aircraft X with medical emergency; possible heart attack inbound and he would call me back with the gate number for me to call it in.  He asked how many departures we had and I said I had Aircraft Y that would be departing shortly and he would be the last one.  He said ok.  I told the local controller what I was advised.  When Aircraft X was 20-25 miles north of the airport; Aircraft Y was cleared for takeoff to a 310 heading climbing to 4;000 for the 45 degree reciprocal rule that had been coordinated with departure control.  The TRACON FLM called to see where the departure was and I said he would be tagged up in like 20 seconds and this would work and by the way what was the gate number.  He said he still didn't know.  At 15 mile final Aircraft X has 19R in data block and Aircraft Z and Aircraft A both had VLA for 01L in data block.  We thought someone had the wrong data block and was landing the parallel runway.  Aircraft Y checked on with tower and I called final to find out what runway he was given because we still weren't talking to him.  Final control said I don't know; I'm not talking to him.  When I un-keyed I heard Local control saying Aircraft Z go around.  I told him to go 270 and 3000 back towards final and I'll point out to D.  I obviously had looked to see if anyone was in the bridge and no one was.  And to put Aircraft A due east bound and Ill coordinate with final.  I called 'D' (west departure for the point out) and then called final to advise what both airplanes were doing since we had Aircraft X on final for 19R. I then called the supervisor to tell him Aircraft Z went around and he asked why?  I said I didn't know; (I had been talking to final about what runway Aircraft X was landing.)  and was just advising what was happening.  Final had a few airplanes already in her airspace plus the 2 guys we broke off final and she was still getting fed from other sectors.  There was massive confusion on all sectors and nobody knew what was going on.  Aircraft X is now on a 2 mile final and I realized the TRACON FLM still hadn't given me the gate number.  I called Fire Rescue and asked to send paramedics to Terminal E for Aircraft X landing with medical emergency; possible heart attack and we didn't know the gate number yet.  TRACON FLM called a minute later to see if Aircraft X had cleared the runway and I said he was about to and by the way what gate number was he going to? TRACON FLM said 'I forgot.'   Paramedics were late getting to the gate.The TRACON FLM has been reported on multiple times for lack of coordination.  There have been excuses made for him but things are not getting better.  I think he is in over his head at this level approach control and would be better at a lower level facility.  He has been here multiple years now and is a continuous problem for not communicating enough with controllers.  He never takes responsibility for his actions and blames anyone he can.  He is a nice guy but is over his head here at Tampa.  Another factor is the multiple opposite direction operation changes within the last several months.  There is confusion with 7110.65 vs. district operations vs. TPA manager  implied rules on what we can and can't due.  I thought since the 10 mile rule was not in effect any longer all we needed was 7110.65 separation.  Supposedly the ODO procedures are changing yet again in 3 weeks.  This many changes is a safety issue as well.
I entered the TRACON coming off of break with this scenario already in progress.  The FLM instructed me to relieve the B controller when I reported for duty.  When I plugged in the controller was very busy and I noticed Aircraft X with EM in the data block and 19R as the arrival runway in the scratch pad. The B controller did not have time to give me a formal briefing but I took it upon myself to act as an extra set of eyes during a complex scenario.  As I began to familiarize myself with the situation I came to understand the Aircraft X had a medical emergency on board and had requested an expeditious landing on 19R. It became clear that the B controller was not communicated with as to what the last departure off of 1L/R and what the last arrival to 1L would be. It also became clear that the CPC on final was unaware of the plan; because she had several aircraft inbound to 1L that were in direct conflict with the emergency aircraft. At this point the B controller took it upon himself to coordinate with the tower and tell them to break all inbounds to 1L off of their approaches to alleviate conflicts.  As I said I entered this scenario in the middle of this situation and I do not have to complete story; however I can say that this was the most dangerous operation I have seen in my years of doing this job and the reason seemed to be poor communication and leadership.  From my experience in the TRACON and through talking with other coworkers involved it seems that the FLM was unable to come up with a viable plan to handle the situation and communicate that effectively to the controllers in the operation.  This led to a situation that could have been handled calmly and efficiently turning into a frantic and stressful ordeal in which airplanes were being broken off approaches in close proximity to the airport to avoid conflict.It seems to me that the training program for FLMs who come from outside the building is deficient in the area of familiarization with the operation.  We have had similar issues in recent years where the person in charge of the operation does not seem to be confident enough with their knowledge of the operation to make a clear plan and communicate it effectively.  In the past years FLMs have also shed the requirement to be certified on all positions which has compounded the issue.  When a situation like this occurs with an unusual operation and high traffic volume also a factor this lack of confidence can become extremely dangerous.  If the agency is trying to make the position of FLM less operational and more managerial then the FLM should not be in charge of the operation.  A CPC who is CIC certified and required to have a thorough knowledge of all operational positions should be the person to be in charge of operational coordination.  The lack of effective leadership in this instance led to the pilots; passengers and controllers to all be put in positions of unnecessary risk and I hope that we can look at this and make some sound changes to increase the safety of our operation here at TPA and across the NAS.
TPA TRACON and Tower controllers report of confusion with an opposite direction emergency arrival into the TPA airport and the lack of communication from the TPA FLM.