Widebody Transport
Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human-Machine Interface; Distraction; Communication Breakdown; Confusion
Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach
Aircraft; Human Factors; Manuals
The pilot monitoring's (PM) iPad was low on power and the PM plugged in his iPad to recharge the battery ten minutes after takeoff. Prior to descent; the PM retrieved the iPad for the approach. The iPad only increased its charge from 3% to 5% even though it was plugged in for over an hour. This will be a factor later in the approach. The pilot flying (PF) was also recharging his iPad during the flight. His iPad received a sufficient charge.During a CAT I approach to RWY 9R at PHL; the aircraft was vectored off the STAR for vectors to intercept the LOC. The PF realized he had inserted the Converging ILS V RWY 9R instead of the ILS Z RWY 9R. The PF informed the PM that he had the wrong approach in and was changing it. The PM misunderstood the comments thinking that the PF was only commenting on the two different ILS approaches to RWY 9R.The PM was reviewing the approach on his iPad and noticed he only had 3% power remaining. The PM did not want to change any pages on the iPad for fear of using all the power prior to the approach being completed. When the PF changed the approach; he inadvertently inserted the ILS RWY 9L. Neither the PF nor the PM noticed the incorrect approach in the FMC. When the glide slope (GS) was captured and the PF selected/confirmed the missed approach altitude; the aircraft broke off of the GS and began to drift slightly above GS. The PF intervened and adjusted the sink rate to re-intercept the GS.About that time; ATC asked if we were having any difficulty. The PM responded no because the PM believed ATC was concerned about the position of the aircraft above the GS and at the time of the ATC transmission; the aircraft was correcting back to GS capture. GS was re-established and the approach was continued. ATC made a second query about any problems just as we were breaking out visually. Simultaneously; the PF initiated a go-around; ATC commented that we were approaching RWY 9L and should go around and the PM visually picked up RWY 9R and commanded a go-around.We accomplished a go-around and were handed off to approach control for sequencing. Once established in a stable configuration and airspeed on downwind we began analyzing what was wrong. We asked ATC for an extended downwind to give us more time to analyze the situation. Fuel was not an issue. It was then we noticed that the ILS to RWY 9L was in the FMC instead of the ILS Z RWY 9R. We surmised that the PF must have inadvertently inserted the wrong approach when we realized that initially he had inserted the converging ILS to RWY 9R and needed to make a change. We were re-sequenced for the ILS Z 9R and flew the approach without incident.
[Report narrative contained no additional information]
A Widebody Transport crew inserted the approach for a runway other than the one cleared for. Simultaneously; when they broke out; they called for go-around.  They then entered the correct approach and landed. Insufficiently charged IPads were an important and distracting factor.