Medium Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 2.5
Time Pressure; Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Distraction; Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness; Workload
ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance
ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Human Factors; Procedure
Working Advanced Technologies and Oceanic Procedures (ATOP) sector 11. Split from sector ten; Working 50 plus tracks; no ride complaints; DATA link appears to be working fine.Aircraft X (B789) is behind Aircraft Y (B777) - (ATOP) was never probing Aircraft X for the overtake with Aircraft Y ; Aircraft X- M.85; Aircraft Y- M.82. Typical MACH for both aircraft. Aircraft X speeds up to M.89 and does not notify ATC. Around the same time this occurs; the Automatic dependent surveillance (ADS) position report for Aircraft X is overdue and is rejected causing flags to turn off and red flashing to start. I notify the supervisor. He comes over and evaluates the situation. Based off the information we have at the time; it appears that we have a huge overtake between the two aircraft. From this point on I am no longer making decisions. My supervisor is ordering me what to do. I don't necessarily disagree with what he is ordering me to do but for the record. He tells me to turn Aircraft Z 10L to separate him from Aircraft X so we can climb Aircraft X thru Aircraft Z and achieve separation with Aircraft X; Aircraft Z and Aircraft Y. I turn Aircraft Z 15L. About this time Tokyo starts to dialogue for multiple aircraft to descend which only complicates matters because now I have to waste time answering their requests. At 21 miles separation between Aircraft X and Aircraft Z; my supervisor orders me to climb Aircraft X to FL380. I reluctantly issue the climb to Aircraft X but never get a response. After several minutes and several attempts to contact Aircraft X thru about 5 different ways and no response; my supervisor orders me to descend Aircraft X to FL350 because Tokyo has dialogued for us to descend Aircraft X. Again we get no response from Aircraft X and proceed to use the same methods as before to communicate with the pilots. Finally; after several minutes we get both an acknowledgement thru Commercial Radio HF and a company aircraft. Conclusion- 3 EVENTS (deals) occurred. 1st deal- Aircraft X climb thru Aircraft Z with 21 miles separation. 2nd deal- Aircraft X descend thru Aircraft Z. 3rd deal- Aircraft X descend thru Aircraft Y. Initial loss of separation between Aircraft X and Aircraft Y not our deal; automation issue. ATOP was never correctly probing for Aircraft X therefore not identifying the potential conflict in the first place. After leaving RADAR surveillance; position report was overdue for Aircraft X causing loss of RNAV capability. Shortly after ATOP received a report and tried to figure the speed based off of the aircrafts new position making it appear that there was a huge overtake and loss of separation. The pilot told my supervisor via sat phone that he initially sped up to M.89 for several minutes because he was concerned about causing wake turbulence for the aircraft beneath him then he slowed back down to M.86. I think this is what threw the machine off. We lost Controller Pilot Data Link Communication (CPDLC) along with ADS position reporting with Aircraft X. Aircraft X did climb to FL380 and we never knew about it because we never got an acknowledgement or report. Aircraft X also descended to FL350 without ever acknowledging the clearance. 30 plus minutes after all this took place all of Aircraft X's acknowledgement messages and other pertinent messages came flooding in. My opinion; although separation was lost; safety was never compromised and good control judgments were made. Considering the dynamics of all that was going on around the separation issue; the fact that we kept sector integrity says a lot to how we recovered from the situation. Pilots need to tell us when their airspeed changes by 5% or 10 knots whichever is greater. Be more pro-active with sector splitting. Split the sector as traffic progresses form one side to the other. This will help balance the workload.Do away with rule that says we have to comply with direct order from supervisor referencing our traffic.Make this a suggestion. Ultimately should be the controllers choice. I would have waited for 30 miles between Aircraft X and Aircraft Z before climbing Aircraft X. All aircraft should be in contact with HF regardless of CPDLC or VHF if traveling the Pacific Coast Organized Track System (PACOTS). Side note: This is a great example of why SECTOR 64 should not be implemented into ATOP until we have at least 35 Certified Professional Controllers (CPC). At the time this event occurred; we did not have the necessary staffing if we had to split the ocean 3 ways making sector 64 a sector all on its own which will be the case as soon as traffic volume picks up. Not to mention the current existing workload. In other words; the High Area does not have adequate staffing to support Sector 64 at this time under current known working conditions. I think absorbing sector 64 into ATOP can be done successfully but knowing all the potential issues with ATOP; we need to have the staffing available for when we encounter these known issues such as traffic volume; complexity; and automation issues.
ZAN Controller reported of three operational errors caused by communication inadequacies; and automation issues.