Commercial Fixed Wing
Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 5
Workload; Confusion; Distraction; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown
ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic
Human Factors; Procedure; Staffing; Airspace Structure
On our status information board on this day shift; it showed that military airspace was scheduled to go hot at XB:00-XD:00 for most of the day.  I do not remember when it appeared; but I do remember that it showed for several hours that VOK East; South; AND West MOA's and ATCAA's were going hot.  Everyone in the area took note of this; and when the time came closer; within 30 minutes or so; we all took note and commented audibly in the area so everyone was aware.  At around XA:45; I noticed the controller at Lone Rock sector (64) becoming quite busy; as one of his land lines was ringing very loudly for roughly 30 seconds.  In the area; we all know this as the sound of flight service calling to request a clearance for a pilot off an uncontrolled airport.  I also heard calls from other approach controls and centers over their shout lines.  At the time; DBQ and LNR was combined; so the controller was already under an increased workload with no D-side.  I yelled across the room that he probably needed a D-side at this time.  The controller seemed extremely busy as I would later learn to find that adjacent sectors from other centers were routing aircraft directly into the military airspace that we thought was going active at XB:00.  Long story short; the military airspace never went active.  The controller at Lone Rock vectored and expedited numerous aircraft and became extremely busy for roughly 20 minutes because the military airspace was actually scheduled for Day 1; and not Day 0; we learned to find.  The radar controller didn't get a D-side until probably XA:55Z; so he was pretty much buried in landline coordination with flight service; approach controls; Minneapolis center; as well as issuing command instructions to numerous aircraft at the time.  There are numerous factors that I think led to this event to occur.  The first factor is that the agency is negligent when it comes to staffing the North area at Chicago center; we are understaffed every single day of the week.  6 Certified Professional Controllers (CPCs) for 5 radar sectors is the norm here. This leads to continually combining sectors that have numerous frequencies at a high workload with high complexity and running without a D-side in the area.  At the time; the controller at Lone Rock had to monitor 5 frequencies with no D-side.  The second factor at play here is that the agency does not staff supervisors that have any knowledge whatsoever as it pertains to the workings of the North area.  They are totally clueless when it comes to our procedures; military airspace; routes; etc.  On Day 0; there was a total revolving door of supervisors and CIC's on the day shift.  We were continually using supervisors from other areas; and then they'd go on break for 30 minutes and assign a CIC; then come back; then be replaced by another clueless supervisor; etc.  No one knew who had actually put the military airspace as scheduled to be active on the day shift.  The third issue is that until the last 6 months or so; the military airspace would be printed out on strips and posted at every sector in the area that would be effected by the airspace.  This has changed recently; what the agency does now is typically print up all of the military airspace in a very confusing manner on a standard 8x11 piece of paper.  This leads to the piece of paper just lying on the console inevitably being crumpled up; having liquids spilled upon; etc.  Not only that; but we were not briefed of the change of the posting of scheduled military airspace.  During this event; there was no dissemination of the military airspace in this manner; but we all still assumed it would go active; as it was posted on our information board for hours.  With these factors in mind; I would recommend these changes:1.  Staff the area adequately.  9 CPCs should be scheduled on nearly every day/swing shift; period.2.  For the vast majority of the time; we should have supervisors that are knowledgeable and experienced with the inner workings of our area.  To throw a random supervisor into our area who has no knowledge of military airspace; SOPs/LOAs; routing; the flow of the area; etc. is negligent.  The North area; traffic wise; is one of the slower in Chicago center; however it is one of the most complex due to military airspace and airport control. The agency is setting up their supervisors to fail; and they fail us time and time again. 3.  Military airspace posting should go back to the old method of printing up strips at the start of each day and posting them on strip bays at each position that is effected.  When a change comes to the military airspace; supervisors should make corrections on the actual strips and the status information board.  With all of these factors at play; an objective outside observer would immediately say that this work situation is a dangerous; sloppy environment.  I want to be part of an organization that works efficiently and safely.  Now; we are operating like a sloppy bunch of idiots due to the policies of the agency and their short-sighted cost saving measures.  I wonder what the pilots who were denied clearances from flight service due to the radar controller thinking that military airspace would go active directly on top of their airports would think if they actually saw what was going on in our area at the time.  When I went to the Monroney Academy in OKC; the FAA's statement was 'safe; orderly; and expeditious' service to the public.  Nothing about this safety event fits that goal.
A Chicago Center (ZAU) Controller describes a situation where Special Use Airspace (SUA) is scheduled to go hot. Another controller is observed missing phone calls and becoming very busy. The reporter asks for a D-Side to help this person; but no one is able at the time. The reporter found out later that the other controller is vectoring traffic away from the SUA because it is going to be hot. Help arrives later for the overworked controller and it is later discovered that the information posted about the SUA is for the next day and was not going hot.