PA-34-200 Seneca I
Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor
Flight Crew Last 90 Days 250; Flight Crew Total 1600; Flight Crew Type 170
Confusion; Distraction; Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification
Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Gear Up Landing
Aircraft Aircraft Damaged
Human Factors; Procedure
I was conducting a training flight with a student that is approaching the end of the Multi Engine Commercial syllabus.  The student pilot has her Private Pilot's Certificate with Instrument rating and has about 200 total flight hours and approximately 13 hours in type.  I have approximately 1;600 total hours; 1;100 dual given and 170 in type.   The student pilot was in the left seat and I was in the right.  The lesson calls for a night cross country flight with ten landings to a full stop at a towered airport.  My plan was to fly to a local towered airport that is only 15 miles from home base; conduct the ten full stop landings and then fly to an airport that is beyond 50 NM away before returning to home base.  After entering the towered airport's airspace; we were directed to enter a right downwind pattern for Runway XXR; which is the larger of the two parallel runways.  While we were on downwind we were switched to Runway XXL.  We began our training; and remained in left hand traffic for Runway XXL.  After about five or six landings; the wind shifted and Tower changed the active runways to Runway XYL and XYR.  We were giving instructions to depart Runway XXL and then conduct a teardrop maneuver to return to land on Runway XYR.  I used this as a training opportunity and conducted the maneuver and landing while describing what I was doing to the student.  Once I landed; I returned control to her for the subsequent takeoff from Runway XYR.  The takeoff was normal and she began to fly a right hand traffic pattern.  Unfortunately; she had chosen a poor ground reference for her downwind and was diverging from the airport at about a thirty degree angle.  I informed her of this and instructed her to resume a rectangular course.  By this time she had climbed approximately 200 FT above pattern altitude and I asked her to correct this deviation as well.  I attributed her poor pattern to her not being able to see the airport from her side of the cockpit; so I asked Tower if we could land on the left runway so our subsequent patterns would be to the left; thereby keeping her in the inside of the pattern.  Permission to switch runways was granted and I reminded her that she will need to adjust her pattern accordingly because of the greater distance of her base leg and the fact that the runway thresholds are offset from each other.  By this time we were turning base and I began to instruct her on the pitch/power/glide path/aim point relationship.  As we turned final; she originally lined up on the wrong runway so I reminded her to sidestep to the left runway.  The first indication that something was wrong was when the right propeller blade hit the runway; followed immediately by the left; then the fuselage.  We had forgotten to put the gear down.  As I have learned in the past; I believe this was not caused by one dominant factor; but many small ones that lined up to defeat the countermeasures that we have in place.  Here is what I believe led up to the gear up landing.  The change in runways required a new set of ground references to fly a rectangular pattern.  I corrected the student when she rolled out on the wrong heading; just when she normally begins her before landing checklist.  I interrupted her again to warn her of her altitude deviation.  I then turned my attention to the radios; in an effort to fix what I perceived as the problem.  (Student's inability to see the runway across the cockpit).  The last minute change to the landing runway added to the workload.  I did not properly recognize the warning sign of my student's growing fatigue.  After a previous landing attempt; I asked the her to remove her knee board from her outer leg because I thought it was interfering with her ability to correctly apply sufficient aileron input to correct for the crosswind.  She normally keeps her copy of her checklist on her knee board.  Even though it would have been too dark to see; this tactile reminder might have prompted her to review the before landing checklist; even after my interruptions.  The seatback on my chair was broken so I had to sit in a more reclined position than I normally do; which affected my landing sight picture.  The gear up warning horn was inoperative.  There is no gear-in-transit light.  On this type of aircraft; the gears down indicators dim when the nav lights are on.  I believe I may have mistakenly misidentified the unlit indications for being merely too dim during my GUMPS check.  I immediately assumed a mechanical failure; and not what the indicators were telling me.  Note that I did advance the propeller levers fully and asked the student to verify that the landing lights were on.  I attributed the fact that I could not see the landing lights to the glare from the TDZN lights on the runway.  I have come to realize that they were on but I could not see them because they were inside the closed nose gear wheel well at the time.  I did not comprehend what the dim indicators and lack of landing lights were telling me in time to prevent the gear up landing.  I grew complacent because the student was performing so well.  I ignored the basic tenant of flight instruction and I did not recognize that I allowed the student to put me in a position that I could not recover from.  Aviate; navigate; then communicate.  Fly the plane; always.
A commercial student pilot flying a PA-34 with an inoperative gear warning; landed gear up on a night training flight after the instructor failed to notice the student's fatigue and while both pilot's were distracted by a runway change and an altitude deviation.