MD-83
Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Training / Qualification
Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Flight Crew FLC Overrode Automation; General Maintenance Action
Company Policy; Human Factors
On a descent from FL290; I engaged the VNAV function for descent. This was the first time I'd tried using this outside of the simulator. Immediately upon selecting this mode; the aircraft pitched up and began climbing. I abandoned the VNAV function and selected indicated Mach for descent. I began a discussion with the Captain about various descent modes and did not press the mach changeover button to get the aircraft to descend in IAS instead of mach. Soon; we noticed the speed was increasing towards Vmo. I disconnected the autopilot and readjusted pitch to slow the aircraft. For my part; more vigilance in monitoring the aircraft's performance while under automation was called for. There were several traps that I could have been more aware of. Beginning a descent at IAS/Mach changeover altitude should probably have been initiated in IAS instead of in Mach. Also; more training in VNAV in the initial [training center] would also have helped. VNAV descents and climbs were not trained to any degree of proficiency and were left for us to learn on the line if we desired.
FO was pilot flying; and he had only been 2 weeks out of training. Captain was pilot monitoring. This was our second leg together; and his first actually flying the aircraft. FO appeared to have little or no concept of how to fly the aircraft. I had to intervene by taking control of the aircraft twice during climb to prevent altitude deviations. On descent; the FO became completely confused about how to control the aircraft speed. I saw the speed reach 340 KIAS with associated clacker for some time as I was attempting to first verbally; and later physically intervene to slow the aircraft below Vmo. I was not aware we had exceeded the Vmo by 19 KIAS until I was told by the Company. Had I known we actually passed Vmo by that much I would have written up the plane.I have flown with several new-hires in recent months. The FO's performance in this situation is pretty typical of what I have seen. This leads me to believe the problem is inadequate training from the [training center]; as there is no way that a dozen pilots are all deficient without some core cause out of their control. Other training problems I have seen include: suction feeding the engines on the ground with no boost pumps. When I asked what they were doing they reply that they were told to do that to shed electrical load on the generators. FMS programming is non-existent. Most FOs ask me to load everything. I later lean that they ask because they received insufficient training on the 'box.' No altitude planning. Inadequate autopilot knowledge.I tried my best on this flight; but I have not been trained to teach new hires; and my workload on the line is already sufficiently high to keep me busy. The [training center] needs to send them to the line with at least basic aircraft systems and autopilot knowledge. On this flight the First Officer's attitude was great; and he is a very sociable individual. I do not blame him; as I got the impression he was absolutely trying his best and attempting to listen to instruction. Do not send new-hires to the line until they are truly proficient.
MD83 flight crew is informed after the flight that Vmo was exceeded by 19 KIAS during descent. The event is described by the Captain as a new hire First Officer attempting to learn the auto flight system on the line; since the company will not do this training in the simulator.