Regional Jet 200 ER/LR (CRJ200)
Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Situational Awareness
Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach
Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Human Factors
While conducting ILS 13 approach; given late turn to join localizer. When cleared for approach I did not arm approach mode due to business I believe with the new checklist procedures. Did not get a glideslope alive call [and] did not descend at glideslope intercept. I armed approach mode selected 100 FT higher in alt preselect and began a descent in vertical speed mode of 1;600 FT per minute. I didn't realize I continued the descent below 1;000 FT AGL. We intercepted the glideslope well above localizer-only mins which I had mentioned during the descent. Captured the glideslope [and] continued the approach at a normal rate of descent [and] landed with no further threats. During the debrief I realized I had descended lower than I realized at that rate of descent.We had a late turn on combined with new procedures; focusing on perfecting new procedures distracted from situational awareness. Continuing to descend at a higher rate than normal procedures.We talked before next flight [and] agreed if that happens in the future we will go around at from our initial approach altitude [and] ask for another approach.
During approach to PIA; in Night IMC; the Captain was pilot flying (PF); with the autopilot engaged. After being vectored onto the approach; the captain did not engage approach mode on the FCP. Apparently Nav was selected during intercept but not APPR mode; possibly due to distraction with the new checklist procedures. As PF; I was busy reading the new landing checklist and failed to notice the approach mode not engaged. I finished the checklist and noticed that we were off scale glideslope (GS) deflection high; due to not capturing the GS; and brought it to the Captains attention. He immediately started a descent to capture the GS from above. As we started descending I commented that this is likely going to be a go around due to the possibility of being unstable thru 1;000 FT AGL. We discussed the go around option briefly; but as we descended thru 1;000 FT we were still 2 dots high and 1;600 fpm descent. I said ok; that is a go around due to our descent rate and GS deviation. We discussed the go around requirement briefly and as I prepared to initiate a go around could see that we were decreasing descent rate and capturing the GS and by 750 AGL we were stabilized; spooled up; on speed and that a go around seemed to be unnecessary at this time. A safe landing was made in the touchdown zone; on speed. At no time was airspeed below ref + factor.The only unusual threat was the new checklist which was a distraction during the approach. The Captains errors were failure to ensure that APPR was actually engaged and the glide slope was followed. My errors were not noticing the APPR mode had not been selected and GS descent was started until I finished the checklist.The undesired aircraft state was excessive descent rate thru 1;000 FT AGL and no go around.A better vigilance of pilot monitoring (PM) duties especially when distractions are present. This would have prevented the entire situation. However the real error here was an unwillingness to go around at 1;000 FT due to sink rate and the failure to go around even when it was requested by myself. The real issue was my; the PM's; failure to initiate a go around at 1;000 FT which should have been automatic not a polite request; followed by a discussion of stabilized approach parameters; another request and then conceding that at 750 AGL there was no longer an excessive sink rate or GS deviation and therefore no current need for a go around.
CRJ-200 flight crew reported deviating from charted approach procedure altitudes on a night IMC approach to PIA; resulting in an unstabilized approach and a CFTT event.