B757 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument
Communication Breakdown
Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown
Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Maintenance Action
Human Factors; Procedure; Aircraft
Upon arrival at [the] gate almost two hours late; brakes set; APU on; I directed the F/O (First Officer) to shut down the engines. Left engine shutdown was normal. I was watching the marshaller outside as he was giving me the 'Chocks In Place' signal. F/O stated that the right engine wasn't shutting down. He apparently; without my direction; thought toggling the fuel cutoff switch from OFF to ON several times was appropriate; but it had no effect. I don't recall seeing any EICAS messages or the valve lights ON by the switch as I was kind of stunned by his action. I told him to put the switch in OFF and then pull the Fire Shutoff Handle per the B757 FM Normals. Having been on this jet for half my career here; a few things stick over time; that being one of them. The F/O fumbled with how to pull the switch. I told him he had to push the release button; then pull the handle up. As he was pulling the switch up; I noticed his hand starting to bias toward a handle rotation. Just as the words 'DONT ROTATE IT' started to come out of my mouth; I think I at least got 'DONT RO....' out; he inadvertently rotated the handle towards him and the #2 bottle discharged into the engine. We watched the engine very slowly shutdown; much more slowly than normal. If I had to estimate how long this took from initial shutdown to pulling the handle I would guess a little over a minute. Time seems to move differently in stressful situations. Engine finally stopped rotating; Operations was called; Maintenance met aircraft; ELB (Electronic Logbook) entry was made. F/O speaks fluent Spanish; so he started speaking with the mechanic right away as soon as he came to the cockpit. I have no idea exactly what was said; so I have no idea if the correct info was passed to him. I had to borrow the CSR phone to call [Maintenance Control] to ensure they had receipt of the write up. Played phone tag with the [Chief Pilot] while in van to hotel; but I kept losing signal on my cell phone; so had to wait until I got to hotel to contact him. While speaking with [Chief Pilot]; he and I both agreed that muscle memory and a bias toward rotation from events involving fire probably contributed to this event.
Upon reaching [the] gate; with parking brake set and verified; Captain called for both engine shut down. Engine #1 shut down normal. However engine #2 after Right Fuel Control Switch placed on Cutoff; I noticed that FF (fuel flow) was steady at 500 well into over 1 minute; and N1 and EGT although lower than normal were not decreasing to engine off indications. After verifying with both the Captain and [relief pilot]; we determined that the Right Engine was not secure and off. We determined that the Right Shutoff Handle should be pulled.I pulled the Right Shutoff Handle and inadvertently (what I believe to be a muscle memory reaction as every time I have pulled the handle in simulator training there was a twist involved) and momentarily slide handle to discharge fire bottle agents. Maintenance was called immediately and EFB (Electronic Flight Bag) log was created. After handle was pulled there was still well over another 1 minute before FF; N1 and EGT took a while to zero and engine secure and off indications.
B757 Flight Crew reported one engine did not shut down at the gate with the fuel master switch.