B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Training / Qualification; Troubleshooting; Workload
Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Security
Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; General Work Refused
Chart Or Publication; Company Policy; Procedure
While completing the preflight duties; we received three Dangerous Goods Forms. Two dangerous goods (DG) were for two 27 lbs boxes of explosive release devices; the remaining DG was for 20 lbs of dry ice.  During review of the DG forms multiple concerns transpired. The DG forms were found incomplete. In an attempt to understand the missing fields combined with the unusual occurrence of the type of Dangerous Goods on board; we contacted Station Operations for help.Multiple attempts to reach the Station Operations personnel as per the Flight Operations Manual (FOM) regarding the DG questions failed. The personnel were not available. During this time the departure time had passed. I then contacted the Chief Pilot for direction. With the help of the Chief Pilot; additional attempts to contact DG personnel at the Operations Center regarding the questions surrounding the DG of 54 lbs of explosive release devices failed. While working with the Chief Pilot; the ramp personnel whom loaded the DG came onto the jetway to discuss the parcels. The agent informed me that the packaging was correct; but that I should physically come with him to view the DG. By reviewing the loaded DG; I was unable to ascertain the information needed for the paperwork entries in question. While reviewing the labels of the DG; I found the contents listed as missile incendiary explosives; origin country; and shipping company. The combination of the inconsistencies with the Planned Dangerous Goods paperwork and our FOM; the inability to contact the DG Operations personnel; and the sensitivity surrounding the contents lead me to removal it from the aircraft.  Additionally; my Firs Officer and I we were concerned for the passenger's opinions as they had a clear ability to watch the explosive DG being loaded on their flight. During the above attempts to find information and receive answers regarding the DG; the First Officer shared his concern as to why we carry this type of DG. Additionally; the First Officer felt that the safety of our flight could be affected with the unknowns surrounding the DG and its presence in our cargo pit.The  FOM and Planned Dangerous Goods paperwork issues were:1) FOM X.YZ.A lists information regarding the classification criteria for multiple hazard classes [which] was blank.2) FOM X.YZ.A classifies the DG in one of three groups. The DG listed 'NA.' There is no defined guidance regarding answers of 'NA.' With the heightened concern due to the type of DG loaded; this entry was an additional cause for safety concerns (not applicable; not allowed; not available; not authorized?).3) The 24 hour phone number listed on the Planned Dangerous Goods paperwork contained 12 numbers. Not a legal 10 numbers. A new updated final Dangerous Goods Form was attained with removal of the two 27 lbs of DG. We closed and pushed for a safe albeit late flight.
A B737 Captain reported 27 pounds of dangerous goods were loaded on his aircraft with incomplete dangerous goods paperwork. The cargo was ultimately removed because it contained explosives from a foreign country and dangerous goods personnel were unavailable to clarify the ambiguity around the contents.