B767-300 and 300 ER
Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Distraction; Situational Awareness
Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Ground Strike - Aircraft; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Human Factors; Aircraft; Company Policy
I was operating as the Pilot Flying and experienced a tail strike. After an approximately 24 hour layover; the flight continued. I was the Captain. We arrived at the aircraft and accomplished the preflight. The Loader brought the load plan and explained that cans had to be removed and repositioned due to an error; which I assume is what caused the delay. We blocked 16 minutes late. We had discussed that due to the heavy weight airplane and the gusty winds that we should perform a max thrust takeoff. We also received an ARTR from our Dispatcher due to an increase in payload informing us of our required taxi burn to be under our max takeoff weight. We pushed and had about a 44 minute taxi due to traffic congestion so the fuel burn was not an issue.As we approached the end of the runway; there were some reports from landing traffic of 10 knot gains on final. I considered re-running the takeoff data for wind shear but it did not seem warranted. The takeoff was normal with the exception that I inadvertently selected VNAV instead of THRUST after pushing the power up. The First Officer immediately called it out and VNAV was deselected and THRUST was selected. The takeoff and climbout proceeded normally with the exception that there was moderate turbulence through about 10;000 feet. We planned and briefed the ILS approach. The weather was clear and the winds were light. On descent I discussed the need to be below 23.5 on the fuel in order to not exceed max landing weight of 326. We reached that level on the descent; so I was not concerned.Our VREF was 147 [knots] giving us an approach speed of 152 [knots]. We were asked to maintain 165 knots to a 4 mile final; which I did and slowed to approach speed by approximately 1;500 feet. I rechecked the speeds on final and the VREF was 146 [knots] so I adjusted the approach speed to 151 [knots]. I disconnected the autopilot at approximately 800 feet and the approach continued to be stable until what appeared to be a normal flare and touchdown. I disconnected the auto brakes; which had been set to 4; at approximately 100 knots and exited the runway and taxied to parking. We informed the gateway that we did not want to go to the terminal and would be staying on the airplane for the approximately two hour layover. The mechanic came and took the logbook and after about 30 minutes; the [Relief Pilot] went to do the walk around. When he returned; he stated that the tail had been scraped. The First Officer and I then put vests on and went out to inspect the tail. The [Relief Pilot] informed the mechanic and because he had possession of the logbook; he entered the irregularity at that time. The mechanic returned after about 30 minutes and performed the deferral procedure and the aircraft was cleared. I had contacted our Dispatcher in the interim to request that the cans be weighed; remembering the irregularities that had occurred with loading in [departure airport]. I was informed after some checking that the cans had already been broken down so that they could not be weighed. I did retain both weight and balance forms from the two legs. Additionally; we did not receive an EICAS message on takeoff or after landing relating to any irregularities.
After landing; during the walk around inspection; I observed that the tailskid was scraped. I notified the mechanic and the Captain. I was the [Relief Pilot]. The Captain was flying. We operated normally; the flight was relatively unremarkable. The only thing that sticks out in my memory was that I had a minor perception that the sink rate inside of 50 feet; at the flare; might have a been a bit more than usual. I recall thinking that the Captain seemed to have caught it and 'greased it on'. I also recall having a momentary thought that we might float or bounce slightly; but that we didn't. The aircraft settled gently down onto the runway. At no point did the landing seem unsafe or scary. The 'perceptions' I mention about the sink rate; the Captain's reaction to it; and the touchdown are minor observations that did not evoke strong emotions real-time; but rather coalesced after seeing the scraped paint on the tailskid pad.Obviously in hindsight; that is what a tail strike looks and feels like from the [Relief Pilot] seat and I'll adjust my sight-picture. Of note; it was a max-weight landing; and there had been some loading issues prior to departure. It's my understanding that the Captain's report contain much of the details regarding the loading anomalies and the rest of the flight; so I will not repeat all of them here. Elaboration on 'FATIGUE' as a contributor. I only marked YES on this particular question because any time the sky goes from light to dark; the melatonin and melanopsin mechanisms are affected; and the human body is unlikely to 'willfully' overcome these biological forces of nature. We all agreed that it was a long flight; a long day; and we were feeling the impacts of a 'long day'; and having been up since 6 am. Even though it wasn't particularly long; the effect of the daylight shifting to night time has a subtle; and sometimes overt; effect on the body and brain. Therefore; FATIGUE was a factor by definition. How much of a factor? On the margin; probably small. Maybe negligible in this case; maybe not. But in my personal opinion; fatigue is rarely not a factor.
B767-300 flight crew reported a tail strike during landing.