B767 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Flight Crew Last 90 Days 35; Flight Crew Total 12000; Flight Crew Type 35
Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue
Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport
Aircraft; Company Policy; Human Factors; Procedure
After a VFR departure while climbing through approximately 10;000-13;000 I turned on the Weather Radar. The map display indicated amber 'WXR Fail.' No EICAS messages were present. We completed the QRH procedures for WXR Fail and consulted the MEL as reference. I decided to wait till through FL180 before using the SAT Phone to contact Maintenance Control. This also allowed us to complete most of the necessary 'ETOPS CoastOut Checklist.'  Maintenance Control had us try various circuit breakers; to no avail. At the completion of the discussion; we asked to speak to our Dispatcher [but] decided it best to call her direct. [After some difficulty we were connected with the Dispatcher.] This was at approximately :45 after departure. The following is a recollection of the events that transpired over the next hour and a half compiled approximately 24 hours after the incident. I cannot include direct quotations or exact times unless they are from printed messages; however; this is compiled from the best of my and the First Officer's recollections. At the time of the first contact with Dispatch I relinquished the flight controls to the First Officer; along with the radio communications so as to be able to best manage the situation. I explained the situation and asked for options. The Dispatcher indicated that Maintenance Control had briefed her and [she] would need time to go to inquire about the weather in SFO; forecasts for our planned alternates; and the location of parts to fix the airplane. She wanted 15 minutes to do the research. During the discussion she said that if we could go to LAX she would have to research the track activity; talk to the ATC desk; and indicated that we would likely have to turn south (we were on the A routes then random) to join the F route into LAX. I'm not sure why she asked us to call her back as I thought Dispatch could SAT Phone the airplane; however; we agreed to do so; and discontinued the call. [Later] we received an ACARS message advising 'SFO will not be an option at your arrival time with no radar.'  We cannot recall if the message came before our initial call to Dispatch and after our discussion with Maintenance Control or immediately after our first discussion with Dispatch. I then informed the lead Flight Attendant of the situation and that I would give him an update after the call back to Dispatch. Earlier in the flight ATC had given us a block altitude of 350-370 as we were initially too heavy for our planned crossing at 370. At XA35 we received a CPDLC message that our block altitude was cancelled and we were to remain at FL350. Knowing that we were now not going to SFO; possibly back to HNL or LAX; we requested to modify our speed slowing to Mach .77 which was approved. We assumed Dispatch was generating some sort of plan and that was why the block altitude was cancelled. Fuel preservation now seemed prudent. Approximately 15 minutes after our first conversation; I called Dispatch again. She said she spoke to weather and they indicated that thunderstorms were off the coast of SFO and that icing was present. Her weather briefing continued for quite some time. I wasn't sure why as she had already sent us a message that SFO was not an option; and everything she was telling me made me concur. I eventually interrupted her to say that we had it in writing from her that SFO wasn't an option as it appeared that we would not be able to remain VFR so we needed to look at the next option. Throughout this entire time there appeared to be absolutely no urgency to find a solution on her part as we were flying away from the last suitable runway between Hilo and SFO. She continued that perhaps LAX might have the parts and again indicated that we would have to transit the tracks to the F Route and check on the airspace but that she had not gotten that far as she had been interrupted. I believe that it was at this time that she asked us to call back in another :10 minutes; however; it may have been at this time that she put us on hold. No matter; during that dead time we were approximately 160 miles west of the fix N29W149. We input on Route two direct to that fix (assuming that we would have word by the time we got there) then direct to the next fix on the F route (Fixel) then R578 to Ficky; then direct to LAX and the ILS to 25L. That gave us fuel on landing at LAX of 19.9. That assumed that we maintained FL350 (not descending to cross the tracks and climb back up) and that we maintained Mach .77 to LAX. When we next spoke to Dispatch she advised the parts were available in LAX but she still did not know if they were available in HNL. I told her that we had done some WAG numbers and showed that at the time; if we proceeded as we input; the FOD at LAX would be 19.9. That was; of course; without winds; etc. but if she ran it and it was close we would be okay to proceed to LAX. However; we needed a Critical Point and ETOPS fuel analysis to ensure legality and safety; ASAP. She said she would work on it and coordinate with ATC. We hung up awaiting further information. We assumed that she would immediately run a flight plan and get us real numbers checking most importantly the fuel as we had no real way to determine an Equal Time Point. We also assumed that if it was legal and safe; a new clearance would be forthcoming. After a few minutes and no numbers we called her back and got the Chief Dispatcher. He said she was busy but he could get her. I said no; just tell her that returning to HNL is the only option if the numbers do not work and that we needed to know ASAP as we were getting further away by the minute.At this point their lack of urgency was becoming increasingly frustrating. No one really seemed to realize that we were screaming away from Hilo at Mach .77. I personally assumed; from seven years of ETOPS flying and two years as Captain that someone was keenly aware of our deteriorating situation and was working on a fix; let alone cared at all. We next received a CPDLC message from ATC asking us to 'State our intentions.'  We still had not heard back from Dispatch whom we thought was coordinating the decision of LAX or HNL based on what was the best safe and legal option. Knowing we were not going to SFO; I requested a clearance as discussed to LAX to at least get us going in a direction other than to SFO. ATC inquired as to the nature of the diversion; and I indicated that we had lost the radar and could not proceed to SFO. I stated that for fuel; we needed to stay at FL350 (not descending to cross the tracks and then climb back up); and that we needed to maintain .77 to conserve fuel. I guess I could have just asked for direct to LAX; but Dispatch had indicated that the only clearance we would be able to get was via the F Routes; therefore; that is what we requested. Several minutes later we were cleared as requested. We began the required diversion checklists and sent Dispatch a message that ATC had cleared us as requested and that we needed the new flight plan; numbers; critical point; and suitables.During this entire time; we were closely monitoring fuel and checking fuel burn should we need to immediately return to HTO. We were constantly planning for the worst case scenario. As we were cutting diagonally across the tracks; we monitored the nearest fix on each track. We decided that in an emergency; we would turn immediately toward the nearest track fix; establish a 15 mile offset and parallel that track; descending or climbing as required. This was a lot of work and time was flying by as the stress level heightened.At some point we received an ACARS message with a new release to LAX which I still accepted; for now knowing we needed the Critical Point and fuel analysis; but assuming two very wrong assuptions: 1) that the computer would not generate a flight plan without the legal and safe required fuel and 2) someone in Operations was checking for that very issue. Some minutes later we received the top portion of a new flight plan. The first thing we noticed was that it now included the BUFIE STAR arrival. We added this to our route and saw our landing fuel drop to 14.8. We started to look hard at what information we had; and began to question the information. This flight plan appeared to be based on the WAG landing fuel we had given the Dispatcher. I'm not sure how she arrived at the landing fuel as we never received the rest of the plan or ETOPS information. Our WAG did not include an arrival and our FMC landing fuel was -4.8 [from our estimate]. In addition; we still did not have accurate wind information for the new plan. We were now concerned that Dispatch was 'whipping' numbers to satisfy the plan for mission completion; without regard to legality. That is speculation; but when the hair on your neck starts to stand up; one needs to discuss all concerns.  Shortly; we received an ACARS release to change the destination alternate to ONT; with a burn of 3.2K.  We had no idea what that meant. Changing the destination alternate to ONT at this point was of no concern. We revisited the Revised Clearance Checklist stopping at the bullet point for ETOPS Critical Point.We started looking hard at the worst case scenario not having a Critical Point or wind info as we cut across the tracks. Concern was growing. We tried to WAG a new Critical Point to no avail. The best we could guess would be about Fizel and the estimated fuel over Fizel was much lower than the original flight plan Critical Point. I called Dispatch back. She indicated that she had sent it all and would send it again; but that she was interrupted; etc. I said no. Just please read it to me. As she read it we entered the Critical Point on the legs page and plotted it on the chart; it was just past FIZEL. FMC fuel over the Critical Point was now 37.2. She read me all the fuel estimations. Worst case we needed 44.8. It became immediately apparent that if we continued and arrived over the Critical Point with the predicted 37.2 and had an emergency; we would not make it back; even removing the holding fuel. We believed that the Dispatcher was completely unaware/unsure what I was saying. For about the next 30 seconds we heard a myriad of excuses about how she kept getting interrupted over the past hour; etc. At that moment I was completely dumbfounded as to her reaction and the lack of concern by Operations throughout the previous hour plus. Shouldn't they be as concerned at this minute as me? The First Officer and I actually later discussed that at that moment we felt that getting the airplane to LAX was more important [to them] than our safety and that of the 213 other souls on board. I interrupted her and told her that we were immediately going back to hnl. My desire to be safe far outweighed any further discussions.We sent a message to Control via CPDLC and received an immediate clearance back to HNL via the D Route. After loading that into the FMC and turning back; we noted that landing fuel was good so we climbed and returned to ECON. We landed in HNL without incident. In the aftermath of this above situation I have several question and few thoughts:1)	 Does operational Control have a Revised ETOPS Clearance or ETOPS Diversion checklist for dispatchers similar to what we have in the cockpit; and if so why wasn't it used? If not; why not?A)	Upon initial contact we needed a plan. That should have been easy. B)	Clear your desk or pass us to the Chief Dispatcher. C)	Check weather for legality at all options due to our maintenance status.D)	Check routing and fuel status including Critical Point; ETOPS Alternates; etc.E)	The last concern should be finding maintenance parts when we are screaming away from the last available runway at 600 MPH.2)	 There was absolutely no sense of urgency on the part of anyone in Dispatch. We received only constant excuses about getting distracted. The distraction
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When a failed radar made continued ETOPS operations problematic due to designation weather the flight crew of a B767 was unable to obtain satisfactory and timely assistance from their Dispatcher to conduct a diversion to an airport near their destination and opted; instead; to return to their departure airport.