BAe 125 Series 800
Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Engineer
Flight Crew Last 90 Days 150; Flight Crew Total 18500; Flight Crew Type 4000
Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown; Training / Qualification; Workload
Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Environment - Non Weather Related; Weather; Procedure; Human Factors
During initial climb; below 1;000 FT; the Pilot in Command (PIC) failed to select or call for NAV coupling to capture the BLZZR 1 RNAV departing BOS Runway 9R. I noticed the error and called out the corrective measure to the PIC. The PIC was slow in recognizing the error and allowed the heading to drift left of the published course before correcting. The BOS Departure Controller apparently recognized the deviation; asked for our heading; and assigned headings for the remainder of the departure before handing us off to the Boston Center. Perhaps some collateral considerations were the PIC's unfamiliarity with Boston's taxi procedures and became somewhat task saturated prior to departure. Additionally; the weather was creating a fair amount of turbulence; reduced visibility; contaminated runways/taxiways and presented another distraction. Prior to moving the aircraft from the FBO ramp; I thoroughly briefed the PIC on the current ATIS; BLZZR 1 ATC clearance and asked if he had any questions. The PIC acknowledged my briefing. The taxi route confusion began when the PIC tried to turn right onto 'B' instead of 'A' per the clearance. We were able to transition back to entry onto 'A' before exiting the FBO's ramp. However; the PIC failed to use his Electronic Flight Bag (EFB) iPad airport diagram and was relying upon mine across the flight deck for guidance. An amended taxi clearance was issued later adding to his overall reduced situational awareness. Unfortunately the PIC allowed ground and departure events to distract his attention during the sterile period; below 10;000 FT; and attempted to review those events with me. Having had extensive training in standardization; checklist discipline and appropriate Cockpit Resource Management/Human Factors (CRM/HF) I deflected his comments and continued my focus on phase of flight duties until reaching cruise altitude. We discussed the events; the PIC admitted his failure to engage the NAV flight guidance mode and confusion with the taxi clearances. Furthermore; the PIC stated he expected to 'get a letter' because of the events. In my opinion the following are collateral considerations. The PIC and I have only flown 6 days together so far; I'm working as a contract pilot for his firm. The checklists and procedures he uses are new to me and have resulted in some confusion. We've both acknowledged the differences and have worked hard to develop consistently safe practices. The lessons learned for me have been to continue applying my extensive training; considerable experience and insistence upon full compliance with established procedures/clearances. I've worked very hard to achieve a perfect safety; training and operational record with no history of accidents; incidents or violations in over 30 years of commercial and corporate flight operations.
A Corporate HS125 First Officer discussed his Captain's confusion and unfamiliarity while taxiing at and departing from BOS.