EMB ERJ 145 ER/LR
Fatigue; Distraction; Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness
Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Flight Crew Became Reoriented; General Maintenance Action
Human Factors
We were departing on the last leg of a 5 leg day on our last day of the pairing. Everything had gone smoothly up until that point in the trip. It was my leg to fly. The takeoff was normal and in compliance with company standards. I had called for 'gear up' after the Captain called out 'positive rate.' I was focused on flying the aircraft and anticipating the next callout when the Captain said 'accelerate height; V2 +15.' I called for 'flaps 0.' At the same time that I made my callout; we received a transmission from the Tower telling us to contact Departure. Since I was hand-flying and focused on my instrument panel; I do not know if the Captain ever reached over to raise the flaps before the interruption from Tower's transmission. Shortly after the Captain called Departure I asked for FLC to be selected on the FGCP. As I lowered the nose; the aircraft accelerated but at a slower pace than normal. The climb continued and I noticed that it was taking us a longer time than usual to reach 10;000 FT. I scanned the EICAS looking for any indication that something was abnormal; but noticed nothing. I primarily focused on the engine indication portion of the screen. When we reached 10;000 FT I lowered the nose to accelerate to 290 KIAS and again noticed a very sluggish acceleration. I was still hand-flying the aircraft at this point. Since I had looked at the EICAS and verified the engines were operating normally the only thing I could think of that could be causing the slow acceleration was the fact that we were flying a relatively heavy EP. Those models of the E145 are notoriously slow. But something just didn't seem right; especially after ATC called inquiring about our rate of climb. I continued to hand-fly the aircraft and accepted that we just weren't going to accelerate above 280 KIAS so I raised the nose to increase our VS. As I did this the airspeed continued to bleed off somewhat rapidly. I continued to be puzzled by the plane's behavior until I again looked at the EICAS and finally saw that our flaps had never been retracted and were still indication 9 degrees of extension. The airspeed was somewhere between 250-260 KIAS when I retracted them. The Captain noticed what I'd done and asked if our flaps had been extended. I said yes and we began to reconstruct the events that happened immediately after takeoff so that we would know why they were never raised. The rest of the flight continued normally and we made a safe landing using 22 degrees of flap extension. Maintenance was notified as soon as we parked at the gate. It was the end of a 3-day trip that had showtimes of XA:13; XX:16; and XW:45 respectively. We had a 19 hr layover the night before our last day; but were both still tired when we showed up to the plane early on the morning of the 20th. The Captain mentioned numerous times throughout the day that he was tired and didn't feel on top of his game physically. There were a few times throughout the day I also felt tired; but I don't feel that this was very much of a contributing factor to the incident. From my standpoint; it was our last leg and I had a 4-hr drive ahead of me when we got back to base. I was highly anticipating getting home that evening and spending the weekend with family. In addition; I hand-flew the airplane for the majority of the climb-out. This kept the bulk of my attention focused on the PFD/MFD with the occasional glance at the EICAS. I don't believe I ever looked at the center console while I was hand-flying. When our after takeoff 'flow' was interrupted by the radio call from Tower; the Captain never got back into it. Since I was hand-flying and anticipating being done with the work day I failed to notice that the Captain never called out 'flaps 0.' And I never verified it on my own. Also; when we passed through 10;000 FT; I failed to call out; or even mentally perform the 'flaps; speed; sterile' check. This too would have prevented the over speed. I think it's ok to anticipate gettinghome; but I still need to be able to focus on the work at hand in order to ensure the safe completion of a flight. I have never had this problem before; but now that I know it poses a threat to me I will be able to combat it in the future. I also failed to adhere to company SOP when climbing through 10;000 FT. All I needed to do was spend 5 seconds verifying the flaps were retracted and the incident would have been prevented. There is a reason that procedures are written and this verifies the necessity to adhere to them at all times even when it seems that there are no threats present.
EMB145 First Officer reports calling for the flaps to be retracted at the appropriate time but a radio transmission from the Tower interrupts the process and the flaps remain at 9. A flap over speed ensues.