EMB ERJ 145 ER/LR
Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Confusion
ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict
General None Reported / Taken
Human Factors; Procedure
PCT TRACON advised IAD Tower FLM of a possible loss of separation involving a Piper PA34 and an Embraer 145; two successive departures off of IAD's Runway 30. There were two losses of separation and one systems deviation. The second loss; the one between the IAD departures; resulted in an error. A P180; was released off of JYO's Runway 17 via right turn direct WARDD maintain 3;000. This route keeps the departure away from IAD's Runway 19 finals. However; the JYO departure can conflict with departures off of IAD; so it should be coordinated with IAD Tower; which it was not. Someone at PCT should have restricted Tower departures off of Runway 30 to avoid the non-RADAR release out of JYO. After departure; Local Control 3 assigned the PA34 heading 320 and switched the aircraft to PCT Departure Controller. Departure then called Local Control 3 to ask for control for turns; which Local Control 3 approved. No reason was given for the request and Local Control 3 assumed Departure would not turn the aircraft back toward Runway 30. However; Departure did turn the PA34 back to heading 300 to avoid the P180 off of JYO. Unfortunately; at the time of the request; Local Control 3 did not advise Departure that the E145 was departing on runway heading. Nor did Local Control 3 fully understand what 'control for turns' meant. To further complicate matters; Local Control 3 assigned headings to these successive departures which would have caused Departure to cross flight paths in order to get them to their departure routes. This is in conflict with the PCT-IAD LOA. Within a short time of the E145 checking in with Departure; separation was lost between the E145 and the PA34; both on parallel headings. One more element of this event should be mentioned: the JYO departure; the P180; did not initiate a turn toward WARDD very quickly. In fact; the aircraft came within 1/3 mile of IAD Class B airspace. ATC cannot control that turn anyway; since local traffic patterns may dictate when a pilot makes the turn. This highlights the importance of PCT coordinating with Tower to block the airspace surrounding the satellite airport. Coordinating with the Tower to block airspace is a basic tenet of IFR releases off airports close to the primary airport. I learned this the first time I worked Dulles Approach Departure Data. We also coordinated with the adjacent RADAR Controller; in this case Departure; so departures would be restricted. These procedures were taught in academics and reinforced by our On-The-Job Training Instructors (OJTIs). However; I have seen this situation occurring more often since the IAD/PCT split; SHD controllers betting that IAD departures will not affect satellite releases. For some reason; lessons learned from years of close calls have been forgotten. This whole series of errors could have been avoided had PCT properly coordinated with IAD Tower to protect for the IFR non-RADAR release of the P180 off Runway 17 at JYO. It should also be noted that even though separation was lost within 4 to 5 sweeps of the E145 checking in with Departure; there is a tendency for Departure controllers to ask pilots their headings; rather than taking positive control and turning aircraft and/or assigning altitude to preserve separation. Our Letter Of Agreement (LOA) with PCT requires IAD Tower to accept point outs for IFR arrivals to HEF Runway's 16L/R (due to proximity to IAD departures). This is traffic we see on the RADAR. Yet the LOA does not require PCT to call Tower to block airspace for Runway 17 departures off of JYO. One might argue that this is basic 7110.65 rules and shouldn't be mentioned in the LOA. I disagree. The requirement to coordinate with IAD Tower for non-radar releases off of JYO Runway 17 needs to be stated in the LOA. SHD needs to put out a bulletin/training item on non-RADAR releases out of JYO; highlighting the requirement to coordinate internally and with the Tower to block airspace. These coordinations should be descriptive enough to enable complete situational awareness by all involved controllers. Departure controllers need to scan departure tracks when calling RADAR contact. If it doesn't look right; provide positive control; and then coordinate with Tower. Stop departures if necessary. PCT needs to include these requirements in their academics/Enhanced Target Generator (ETG) training. IAD needs to have a lessons learned from this event: show the video replay; discuss the LOA requirement to not cross fixes when sequencing aircraft off runways; and; refresh the meaning of RADAR terminology 'control for.' Finally; a recurrent theme; lack of Tower controllers' RADAR experience: Reflect on this statistic; of about 36 IAD Tower controllers; only 8 worked Dulles Approach Control (from before the split). We're now two generations removed from that experience level meaning our current OJTIs were trained by controllers who had no RADAR experience. As a Tower with RADAR we are seeing our corporate RADAR knowledge slip away. I believe PCT is experiencing this same brain drain. Most of the errors we have had in recent years revolve around RADAR separation; usually involving two departures. We absolutely have to get our Tower controllers the basic radar knowledge and practice that a course like Terminal Basic Radar Training (RTF) provides.
IAD Controller described a probable loss of separation incident likely involving multiple events; the reporter detailing a number of suggestion to resolve some existing confusion and noting the continued erosion of experience levels at ATC facilities.