Small Aircraft
Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 4.0
Confusion; Situational Awareness
ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance
Manuals; Procedure; Airspace Structure
I was working clearance delivery/flight data and controller in charge combined. Local was working local/ground combined. HCF approach had two aircraft inbound to OGG from the south of the airport. [Aircraft X] was VFR; approaching the Pu'unene drag strip (65z; geographical reporting point) about 4-5 miles south of OGG; on a right base for runway 05; 1;000 feet on approach; showing 100 knots. [Aircraft Y] was crossing TEBBS fix; straight in runway 02 2;000 feet showing 200 knots. TEBBS fix; is about OGG 204raidial 9 DME; while [Aircraft X]; was about OGG 185radial 004 DME; entering a right base for the intersecting runway 05; while [Aircraft Y] was compressing on [Aircraft X]. From TEBBS fix to Pu'unene drag strip fix (65z) 4.5 miles apart with each aircraft's flight paths intersecting to the intersecting runway 02 and runway 05. HCF approach calls cab coordinator and informs them that [Aircraft X] is on a right base runway 05; and [Aircraft Y] was straight in runway 02. The coordination was confusing because [Aircraft X] was showing 100knots over Pu'unene drag strip. And [Aircraft Y] showing 200 knots; they were on converging courses; and [Aircraft X] right base flight path would have intersected with [Aircraft Y] straight in route to runway 02 with the compression on final approach for both aircraft. Also; tower would have to accomplish intersecting runway separation afterwards; however the [Aircraft X] aircrafts performance and their intersecting flight paths would not have worked given the large aircraft's performance and the compression. As soon as HCF handed off [Aircraft X] and [Aircraft Y] to tower; local control changed the sequence and broke [Aircraft X] off the right base to runway 05 and had [Aircraft X] fly northeast bound to the rock quarry east of the runway 02 final centerline reference [Aircraft Y] to be #1 to the airport and [Aircraft X] sequenced after the [Aircraft Y]. Approach control handed us the two arrival aircraft to both intersecting runways with the potential conflict with intersecting flight paths during the approach arrival sequence to the airport during the communications transfer and the transfer of control to OGG. I recommend letter of agreement change between OGG and HCF. I also recommend skill enhancement training and/or training team briefings to have refresher training and a better understanding about control transfer from one facility to another facility during the hand off. Especially since OGG and HCF have automatic hand off walk ons (automatic transfer of control; no handoff required). Also reference the potential conflicts during the radio communications transfer and control transfer and on 7110.65 5-4-5 (transferring controller handoff) ; 5-4-6 (receiving controller handoff); and 2-1-15 (control transfer) b. Transfer control of an aircraft only after eliminating any potential conflict with other aircraft for which you have separation responsibility. C. Assume control of an aircraft only after it is in your area of jurisdiction unless specifically coordinated or as specified by letter of agreement or a facility directive.
I was training a developmental on Cab Coordinator (CC). [Aircraft Y]; IFR; visual approach left base runway 05; descending out of 2;500 feet. showing 240 knots. Then [Aircraft Y]; VFR; about 13 miles northwest of OGG; on a visual approach; left base runway 05; 1;500 feet; showing 120 knots. Then [Aircraft X]; VFR; pops up; just east of the [Aircraft Z] aircraft; now in between nakalele point (62z) and kahakuloa rock point (63z; geographical reporting point) 800 feet; showing 90 knots. At this point; [Aircraft Y]; is now showing 220 knots; however; [Aircraft X] is still showing 90 knots closer to kahakuloa rock; and the [Aircraft Z] in trail of the [Aircraft X] is showing 130 knots now. We have the [Aircraft Z] compressing on the [Aircraft X]; and the [Aircraft Y] who is IFR compressing on both the [Aircraft X] and [Aircraft z]; all on a visual approaches to the same runway 05.HCF approach calls us for coordination. Trainee answers the line; and the approach controller informs us the sequence; that [Aircraft Z]; is going to pass the [Aircraft X]; on a left base runway 05; and keep his speed up; reference the compression between the [Aircraft Z] and the [Aircraft Y] and also informs us that the [Aircraft X] will be entering a left downwind to the intersecting runway; runway 02 to be last in the sequence. At this point the [Aircraft X] is still 7-8 miles northwest of OGG along the shoreline; the [Aircraft Z] is 8-9 miles northwest of OGG along the shoreline; and the [Aircraft Y] is slightly off shore; however; still following the shoreline on a left base for runway 05; now approaching 10-12 miles northwest. My trainee relays the information/coordination plan with local control (LC); and informs LC that the [Aircraft X] is last in the sequence; left downwind to runway 02; however the [Aircraft X] is still the lead aircraft; while the other aircraft are compressing on each other on their approaches from the northwest to OGG.HCF switches to Ogg the [Aircraft Z] first. [Aircraft Z]; who is still in trail of the [Aircraft X]. And targets were now passing each other. Then we are not talking to the [Aircraft X] yet; and the [Aircraft X] is entering our delegated tower airspace; 7 miles northwest. We prompt local control about the compression between all 3 aircraft; and local control makes mho52 to make a short approach runway 05.Local control reaches for [Aircraft X] who is now in our airspace; and we have still have not received the radio switch yet; I make an on the spot correction with my trainee; and instruct my trainee to call HCF approach; and to have them switch the [Aircraft X]; because we are still not talking to the [Aircraft X] in our airspace. HCF tells my trainee; that they are switching [Aircraft X] now.When [Aircraft X] checks in; he was supposed to be on a left downwind runway 02; he reports that he is with us; on a left base runway 02. Local control instructs the [Aircraft X] to fly towards the sugar mill for spacing and sequencing reference [Aircraft Y].When [Aircraft Y] checks in with OGG tower; [Aircraft Y]; reports 6.5 miles west of the airport along the shoreline for runway 05; which is still a potential conflict for the [Aircraft X] who is also along the shoreline about 3-4 miles west; 90 knots and the compression with [Aircraft Y] showing 180 knots and [Aircraft Y] making short approach to the same runway showing 140 knots; we still need same runway separation between the large [Aircraft Y] aircraft and the small [Aircraft Z]; plus [Aircraft X] is showing 90 knots a heading to [Aircraft Y] right about 2 miles.The [Aircraft X]; then requested to get sequenced back to runway 05 due to the wind condition; winds were about 070 16G26Local control takes over the sequence and issue a control instruction to [Aircraft X] to proceed to fly over the Kahului Harbor to make the sequence work with a holding pattern over the harbor. Local control and cc are still working to solvethe 3 ties that approach has handed to the tower. Local control makes [Aircraft Y] a short approach runway 05; reference spacing was good with [Aircraft Z]; now 1 mile final; and the [Aircraft X] reports [Aircraft Y] in sight; and local issues [Aircraft X] to maintain visual separation from the [Aircraft Y]; issues a caution wake turbulence advisory and to follow the large; cleared to land runway 5HCF approach set up an initial approach sequence; but there were still multiple conflicts still unresolved; and local had to make adjustments to each aircraft to ensure VFR/IFR separation; class C separation and service; and sequencing to the same runway. Not to mention; a left downwind to runway 02 would intersect with the left base to the intersecting runway 05. Also; another consideration was each aircraft's performance was completely different from each other. The [Aircraft Y] was compressing on both Cessna's; and the [Aircraft X] was along the shoreline was still potential conflict for both the [Aircraft Z] and the [Aircraft Y]. I feel HCF did not apply control transfer 2-1-15 b. and late radio communications transfer after the coordination 2-1-17. I also feel that HCF did not resolve the potential conflicts with the aircraft involved prior to the control transfer and radio communications transfer. I feel that HCF approach could have done a better job with setting up a better sequence prior to the hand off; communications transfer; also; I feel; HCF should have resolved all potential conflicts prior to control transfer and radio communications while the [Aircraft X] was entering our airspace; and we still did not receive a point out; was a late hand off; or late switch. I recommend to remove the auto hand off walk on feature. I recommend a revision and/or change of the current OGG and HCF LOAI also recommend refresher training; team briefings and s.e.t; to have better knowledge and application of control transfer 7110.65 2-1-15 b. Transfer control of aircraft only after eliminating any potential conflict with other aircraft for which you have separation responsibility. Also including refresher training; team briefings and s.e.t on transferring controller hand off 7110.65 5-4-5 and receiving controller hand off 5-4-6'; radio communications 2-1-17; and control transfer 2-1-15 a.b.c. Also 2-1-14 coordinating use of airspace.
OGG Tower Controller In Charge observed the Approach Controller transfer two aircraft to the Tower on converging courses to different intersecting runways. The Tower Local Controller resolved the conflict.