B747-400
Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Flight Crew Last 90 Days 150; Flight Crew Total 15000; Flight Crew Type 500
Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Distraction; Situational Awareness; Time Pressure
Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown
Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Human Factors; Procedure
We were level at 16;000 feet and given traffic ahead at FL180; 11 o'clock position.  Traffic was reported in sight and we were given clearance to climb to FL230 and maintain visual separation from the traffic.  The Captain begins the climb; and because of the proximity to the traffic; I stated 'you'll need to level off a thousand feet below the traffic'. The Captain did not respond; but was looking at the traffic and appeared to be aware of the situation.  Approaching 1;400 feet below the traffic and the climb increasing; I stated 'level off' emphatically twice.  The Captain reached up to the Flight Guidance Panel and instead began a turn away from the traffic.  I yelled loudly twice to 'stop the climb'.  The Captain stated that he was cleared to climb to FL230. I reiterated the climb was in reference to traffic and that we were going to get an RA.  We got a TA followed immediately by an RA.  I never felt in danger of a collision; but separation was going to be less than acceptable.  After the incident; ATC queried the P-3 as to whether they had visual contact with us.  They responded affirmatively.Once clear; the Captain stated that 'that did not work out as well as planned'.  I had a more colorful description of the event.  We approached the slower traffic from below and behind on a converging course of about 20 degrees.  The Captain obviously badly misjudged the closing rate in terms of speed and climb.  His turn away from the traffic was too little; too late.  A level off was the only way to avoid conflict; but by the time he reacted; the turn was certainly prudent as the rate of climb would have been difficult to arrest.  I am sure the P-3 crew was quite surprised by both the RA and the sight of a large aircraft climbing rapidly through their altitude; 1;500 feet off the right wingtip.  I am thankful they had us in sight and maintained their course and altitude; so as not to aggravate the situation.This was my first trip with this Captain.  He is experienced and capable; but we don't often get visual climbs in positive airspace.  We converged much more rapidly than he anticipated.  I was concerned when he did not respond to my initial suggestion of leveling off below the traffic and very upset that he did not respond aggressively to my strong commands to level off. The situation developed rapidly; and because he did take evasive action; I did not feel it was prudent to take control away from him.  I am also a Captain on the B747; and in fact senior to the operating Captain.  I was assigned to this flight because of a scheduling conflict; and allowed this Captain to operate as PIC because it was his original trip.  I know that I would have handled this situation much differently had I been the PIC with a regular First Officer (FO) handling the controls.  It is very true that a cockpit with multiple Captains is dangerous.  I did not affirmatively get clarity on his plan of action in regard to the traffic; a situation that he clearly did not fully appreciate. Nor did I expect to be so ignored when I made suggestions and later affirmative commands.  It has given me much to think about.
A B747 First Officer reported climbing VMC to FL230 while closing on a P-3 at FL180. The flying Captain misjudged the closure and did not take evasive action until a TCAS RA alert about 1;500 feet horizontally.