Embraer Legacy 450/500
Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Situational Awareness
Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
General None Reported / Taken
Human Factors
During our departure brief we discussed at length the 2 NOTAMs at HXD that would prevent us from landing at night on RWY 3 (favored runway by the current wind). We ran an iPreflight book to determine effect of landing with a tailwind and the possible consequences if it should be raining at arrival time adding the 15% LPA. As a crew we agreed it to be safe to depart and to land with the tailwind on RWY 21. At around 75 miles the Pilot Monitoring (PM) obtained the ASOS for HXD; GPS RWY 3 was in use. I asked the PM to call HXD tower to see if they were indeed landing on RWY 3 since it was after sunset and those approaches were NOTAM'd NA. When queried; HXD tower said 'oh yeah; I'll switch that around by the time you get here'. In planning our approach we decided on the GPS 21 vs. LOC DME 21 as it was a simpler approach with our equipment not requiring a stepdown fix and the GPS would count down the distance to the runway for our Visual Descent Point calculations. Boufort approach asked us what type approach we would like; we asked for the GPS 21; we were then cleared direct to DORVE and cleared for the GPS 21. Upon switching to tower OVER the FAF; tower asked us 'can you shoot the GPS 21 at night?' We looked at each other; agreed that the NOTAMS we reviewed were for RWY 3 and said 'Yes' to the tower who then cleared us to land. I asked the PM if he was comfortable continuing the approach with a question like that from tower and he said yes so we continued the approach and landing without event.Upon landing we continued to discuss the events and how they unfolded and reviewed the NOTAMs yet again; this time we realized we overlooked the NOTAM for GPS 21 'PROCEDURE NA AT NIGHT'. In looking back we did everything right. We reviewed the NOTAMs; discussed the impact of a night landing with a tailwind; discussed wet runways; calculated performance using iPreflight; thoroughly briefed the approach and questioned ATC why they were flying approaches to the wrong runway 3 at night. So where did it go wrong? The error started when we BOTH overlooked the NOTAM for GPS 21 which was in a different format than the other 2 NOTAMs; the second link was losing faith in HXD tower who said 'oh yeah; I'll switch that around by the time you get here' making it seem that he was even unaware of the night NOTAM restrictions to RWY 3; the 3rd link was Boufort APPROACH clearing us for the GPS 21; the 4th link (and the critical one that should have broken the chain) was HXD tower asking us if we can shoot the GPS 21 at night. I think we would have given his question a little more credit if he wasn't surprised when we asked him why they were shooting approaches to RWY 3. We both felt confident in our pre-departure planning so we did not stop to investigate his query to us. In looking back we really should have stopped the approach and re-evaluated the situation prior to continuing.
EMB505 Captain reported a night landing at HXD using the GPS 21 approach that was not authorized for night use.