Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Flight Crew Last 90 Days 202; Flight Crew Type 9300
Workload; Training / Qualification; Time Pressure; Confusion; Distraction
Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach
Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Human Factors; Procedure
We were assigned the EWR STADIUM Visual Approach to Runway 29. As it was both mine and the First Officer's (Pilot Monitoring) first time landing on Runway 29 and it was night VMC; we requested the RNAV RNP Y but were denied by ATC; citing the need for same ground track due to heavy traffic.I put TET (3000 ft) and GIMEE (500 ft) in the box; with a fix off of GIMEE 190/4.9 to represent SLIMR. CHUMR; the last fix on the chart; was not available in the database; nor was it possible to create a significantly accurate fix. Bearing in mind the weather; the Company policy that we should not build approaches to the runway; and positive that we would have the runway in sight I did not put anything in the FMC that would provide a possible runway position.I had the preceding aircraft and the runway environment in sight. The approach notes call for the aircraft to be fully configured and at 500 ft crossing the railway bridge on the extended centerline and I feel that I complied with that instruction. I had actually begun to level the aircraft. At 500 ft the PAPIs became apparent to me; indicating four reds. The PM (Pilot Monitoring) was talking about the runway; making sure I was aware of the four reds and making helpful observations as I corrected the glideslope. During a very busy time on the approach; with plenty of ATC chatter on the frequency; I heard a single undetermined audio alert. With the runway in sight; very slightly right of centerline and almost immediately correcting to the glidepath it happened so quickly that I had no idea what I had heard. I continued with the approach and landed uneventfully. It was only after we landed that I asked the PM if he had heard the alert. He replied that he had but again; considering how busy we were; was unable to determine or recall the exact nature of the alert.The STADIUM Visual to Runway 29 procedure should not be flown at night by Crews who have never landed on 29 before. The runway lights are inadequate for early visual acquisition. There needs to be an RNAV visual like in LAS; DCA and LGA.  In an attempt to comply with ATC instructions; the workload was very high and; with an unknown single audio event in the cockpit; I can easily see how this can lead to an unstable approach.
It was the Captain's and my first leg together. I was to be the Pilot Monitoring for this leg. We were 70 minutes late leaving to go to Newark. En route to Newark; we saw that were going to be doing the STADIUM Visual to Runway 29 that neither one of us had done before. The RNP YANKEE approach to Runway 29 was not going to be available due to traffic. That particular visual approach is not in the FMS database so the Captain and I programmed Teterboro at 3000 ft; GIMEE at 2500ft; and the 190 radial at 4.9 DME to represent SLIMR. Neither SLIMR or CHUMR are in the FMS database. According to the procedure; the aircraft is to be at 500 ft crossing the railway bridge. We were complying with the procedure; listening to the Air Traffic Control chatter and also trying to follow the aircraft in front of us and find the runway which was very difficult to see with all the lights coming from that direction. In the mix of the talking about the runway's location and Air Traffic Control noise; there was an unknown alert that only happened one time. The Captain and I looked at each other neither one of us recognizing what it was. At that point; we were in position for normal landing so we continued and landed uneventfully.First; the FMS database needs to include those fixes or there needs to be a published visual approach to the runway in the FMS database. Next; after landing we realized that the actual runway itself was not put into the flight plan and then maybe was the cause of whatever alert it was. Not having the runway in the flight plan and not being able to extend from the end of it for situational awareness was our biggest mistake.
Air carrier crew was on a night time EWR Stadium Visual Approach to Runway 29 with an improperly programmed FMS. It was the first time conducting this approach for both pilots. At 500 feet; PAPI indicated four reds followed by an unidentified alert; correction was made immediately. This procedure should not be flown at night by crews who have never landed on runway 29 before.