Medium Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument
Communication Breakdown; Workload; Confusion; Situational Awareness
Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
General None Reported / Taken
Company Policy; Human Factors
During visual approach into New York's LaGuardia airport; we were shooting a visual approach to runway 22. Just outside of the outer marker; with the approach mode armed; we received two 'false' captures of the localizer. At that point; I disconnected the autopilot and resumed hand flying the approach for runway 22. The winds at that time were a quartering tail wind of over 45 mph at 2000 feet and on the surface they were 300 at 8 gusting to 20+. During the descent the winds and turbulence made it necessary to focus extremely hard on keeping a stabilized approach. With the tunnel vision that ensued; I failed to notice that flaps 45 were not chosen and the before landing check was not complete at 1000 feet or before. At 1000 feet the first officer said cleared to land and I repeated it. At 500 feet the first officer said 'stable continue'. At this point is where the confusion began. Almost immediately I heard the first officer say something of 'flaps 45; gears down'. I did not process; nor realize; nor understand that he was saying the flaps were not at 45. I really thought he was re-running the landing checklist for some unknown reason. I was still extremely focused and had extreme tunnel vision on keeping the aircraft stabilized with the changing winds and gusty conditions. I only came to full understanding during taxi in and at the gate; when we started discussing what had happened. The first officer said that he had chosen flaps 45 when he realized at 500 feet that that we had not completed the before landing check and re-ran to ensure everything else was done. With me just realizing the full picture of what had just gone on; we then debriefed extensively about why no go-around was called for nor executed by me. I came to the conclusion that my tunnel vision prevented me from totally knowing what he was trying to communicate. Our failure in communications with him not calling for a go around and me allowing myself to fixate on 'just flying' resulted in an un-stabilized approach criteria being met. Without a doubt we should have gone around immediately when it was recognized that full stabilized approach criteria was not met at 1000 feet.
Captain reported landing at LGA while confused about the status of the flap setting.