B737-800
Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Situational Awareness
Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Flight Crew FLC Overrode Automation
Procedure; Human Factors; Company Policy; Weather
I was the Pilot Flying on the leg. The windy conditions had been a subject of discussion and mentioned during the briefing of the arrival and approach. During the descent we had some light chop and the surface reports were easing up as we made the descent on the RNAV Approach. We were fully configured; on speed; Vref +15; [with] the runway in sight [and] the autopilot off. At about 1;500 ft. AGL on final; we received a 'wind shear ahead' warning. Since it was a lot smoother ride than anticipated and I didn't have any other cues about wind shear with either the airspeed or vertical speed; it took me a couple of seconds to interpret the warning in which time it went away. Since we remained on speed and profile after the warning went away; I continued the approach and landed.In debriefing the approach; we both agreed that a go around should have been initiated; but that a lack of other cues was a factor in a few moments of hesitation about whether initiating a go around was necessary. I felt like we otherwise had good monitoring; cross checking; and communication about the aircraft state throughout the arrival and approach. So often; wind shear training in the simulator is accompanied by the cues that help us identify the onset of wind shear; wind shift; airspeed vertical speed etc. I need to brief or at least tell myself to be ready to go around when directed by the predictive computer.
[Report narrative contained no additional information.]
B737 flight crew reported landing instead of initiating a go-around despite receiving a brief wind shear warning on final.