A319
Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Training / Qualification
Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; General Work Refused
Human Factors; Procedure
I was on reserve and called out to report to the hangar to perform a maintenance acceptance flight. Scheduling could not inform me as to what the issue had been with the aircraft but did provide me with the number to the [maintenance] hangar so I could get more information. I called the hangar and was told that the aircraft had been written up for fumes in the cabin. The Captain was already at the hangar when I arrived. He had not yet had an opportunity to review the logbook and advised me that maintenance [personnel] were discussing the course of action to be taken with the aircraft. [The Captain] had also placed a call to Dispatch and Maintenance Control to receive a brief on what needed to occur on the flight to satisfy the objective of the flight. In short; we were to fly the aircraft for 1 hour and climb to an altitude of 30;000 feet MSL. Meanwhile there was to be a member of maintenance and in-flight management on board with us to perform a cabin check (more on that topic below). Given the nature of why the aircraft was being flown and the potential for serious harm to all occupants if the problem for the original write up was not corrected properly the Captain and I were both in agreement that we would be wearing our oxygen masks at 100% for the duration of the flight and that no more than four souls would be allowed on the flight due to the limit of quick donning oxygen masks. I then proceeded to check the oxygen duration charts for the length of duration we could expect with 2 crew members and 2 observers all breathing at 100% oxygen. It was clearly evident that there would not be enough oxygen supply to provide for all 4 souls on board under the parameters of how we wanted to operate this flight. It was suggested by the in-flight management member who was to be on this flight that they could use the passenger therapeutic oxygen bottle if needed. This was quickly dismissed as an option as it blends ambient air from the cabin with the oxygen from the bottle. [The Captain] made a very clear and precise statement that he wanted to take off with 4 healthy people and land with 4 healthy people and in his opinion there was not enough oxygen able to be carried to ensure that outcome if in fact there was still a fume issue with the aircraft. [The Captain] placed a call to the duty chief pilot for concurrence of opinion. Meanwhile I reviewed the logbook while we were waiting for maintenance to clear the aircraft. After review; I had seen that the aircraft had been written up 4 times in the last week for fumes in the cabin. I informed [the Captain] of this information as neither of us were aware that it had been written up that many times. [The Captain] informed me that after discussion with Chief Pilot we were not going to be flying this aircraft as this qualified more as a test flight versus an acceptance flight and we are not qualified test pilots. A few issues came to mind while the events of the evening occurred. First is for the safety of all members involved in this type of flight. The inflight management member described to us that their role on the flight that evening was going to be to move about the cabin and see if they smelled any strange odor or fumes. I asked what type of training they had received in odor and fume detection. The answer was none. That seems odd to me that there would not be a more scientific means of air sampling in place. It strikes me as a throwback to the canary in the cage that was used in the coal mines to check if the air was safe to breathe. Next is what have they been trained to do if they do smell an odor or fume. Are they being asked to expose themselves to the odor or fumes until the aircraft is back on the ground? What if that was to happen at FL300 or higher; [it] takes time to get back on the ground even under ideal circumstances.  In my opinion that is a long time to be breathing unknown odors and fumes. Other than the quick donning oxygen masks in the cockpit;which now puts the pilots in an unfamiliar position of having two non-pilots on the flight deck; there is no other protection for them other than the PBE's. Is the maintenance manager on board trained in the use and location of a Protective Breathing Equipment (PBE)? Is there a possibility of having portable 100% oxygen masks available to the on board observers while they perform their checks in case they are needed?  We as pilots have been trained in the use of the quick donning masks in an emergency but not as a normal operation for an entire flight. While I know it was our decision to wear them; does it not make sense that you would want the pilots to have their masks on while the aircraft is being checked in case it is not yet fully repaired. In this example this aircraft had four write ups for fumes in one week.  When an aircraft does need to be flown to prove a repair valid and correct for odor and fumes should that be carried out by line pilots of test pilots? In closing I do want to state that all individuals from the various departments we worked with this evening were extremely professional and courteous. I would also like to state that in my opinion [The Captain] did an excellent job in managing and disseminating all the information that was being given to him. He clearly kept safety of flight for all involved first and foremost.
A319 First Officer reported he was assigned to an acceptance flight following multiple writeups for fumes in the cockpit that neither he nor the Captain were comfortable accepting; given the oxygen limitations involved.