B737-700
Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Flight Crew Last 90 Days 296; Flight Crew Type 10000
Communication Breakdown; Time Pressure
Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown
Human Factors; Company Policy; Procedure; Weather
We were delayed 70 minutes at the gate due to thunderstorms and intermittent ramp closures. With what seemed to be a significant gap in the series of thunderstorms approaching the airport; the ramp opened; bag loading was being completed; and I informed the First Officer and our Jumpseater to return to the cockpit. When seated the First Officer retrieved the new ATIS and reloaded performance data into the OPC. We had not; at this point; accomplished the Before Start Checklist. The loadsheet then arrived and within maybe one minute; the pushback crew banged on the side of the plane to get my attention told me the ramp had just closed and they would push us; but it had to be right away. My thought was to get the plane off the gate safely; set the brake; and run all checklists once we were out on the ramp with the brake set. The First Officer called for and received push clearance. I checked door annunciator lights; ground power; hydraulic pumps; and gave the 'brakes released clear to push' hand signals. We pushed back; set brakes; cleared the push crew and they left. We ran all checklists unhurried and in sequence started engines; taxied; and flew uneventfully to our destination. The problem was our pushback was not per FOM procedures and the engines were started with no personnel outside to direct and monitor the start. Looking back; I feel that an elevated level of professionalism on my part would have eliminated our non-standard procedure. I should have kept my mind on the fact that the ramp could close again at any time and should have directed completion of cockpit tasks a little sooner than I did. I should have communicated with the Tug Driver earlier and let him know how we were progressing in the cockpit. At the time; performing the actions that seemed reasonable and I believed that there was no safety hazard or jeopardy to the aircraft. However; shortly after; I realized these are the circumstances which start a chain of events that lead to errors. I believe in the value of our ground school training; identifying situations as 'condition green; yellow and red' and I should have applied that here; identifying our environment as condition 'yellow' well in advance. I also have given thought to the fact that I would not consciously violate FOM policy; yet I chose to prematurely push off the gate; thinking I could make it right by performing all checklists and required procedures after push with the brake set. I also chose to start engines with nobody outside directing the start; thinking that if we can do it that way when experiencing delays on taxiways; we can do it here. I realize that this is the kind of thinking that can lead to serious problems. If we were not able to prepare for push as per FOM; I should not have allowed the push. If we were unable to start engines exactly as per FOM; we should not have done it. I have learned through this experience that a situation can exist where you know that you are not following exact FOM guidance; but have justified in your mind that you are not really violating the FOM. I do not think that this is acceptable; especially as it relates to preflight procedures. I also understand better that this way of thinking can be insidious and can have serious results.
We were waiting for updates in the cockpit and just about to run the Before Push Checklist in anticipation of the push when the Agent handed us the loadsheet and at the same time a Ramper told the Captain that the ramp was closed; but he would push us off the gate without headsets. The Captain did not confer with me or ask for my input; just simply told me to call Ground Control for clearance to push. I did as I was asked and got clearance to push. This happened very quickly and I did not know what the Captain's plan was beyond the pushback.We pushed from the gate without running the Before Start Checklist or the Before Push Checklist. About 20 FT or so into the push; I told the Captain this was just not safe. I saw lightning overhead and I feared for the ground crew's safety. Later; the Captain told me he felt the same; but there was no way he could communicate with the ground crew to stop the push. We continued the push until the tug driver thought we were far enough away from the gate to taxi off on our own.There was a lot of lightning in the area even before the ramp was closed. I thought some cloud to ground strikes we saw from the cockpit windows were well within two to three miles of the field; but the Agent said Operations was not even close to closing the ramp for the weather. Throughout this event; I thought there were too many people outside working before and during the ramp closure while lighting was well within two to three miles of our position. I sense that our Company Operations and employees are not giving lightning hazard enough respect during a thunderstorm. People are still outside driving; walking around and loading bags even when I thought the ramp was closed while lightning was seen overhead. A lightning strike is a very real and dangerous hazard. We should not wait till one of our employees is hit by lightning before we take this hazard more seriously and adhere strictly to the established ramp closure procedures.
A B737-700 flight crew allowed themselves to be pushed back and depart without following SOP while the airport was being struck by thunderstorms; which were causing the ramp to be closed to ground personnel for their own safety.