Commercial Fixed Wing
Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument
Flight Crew Last 90 Days 74; Flight Crew Total 3050; Flight Crew Type 3050
Confusion; Situational Awareness
Deviation - Altitude Undershoot; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach
Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution
Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors
This was me and the First Officer's first flight together.  He hadn't had a landing for approximately a month and hadn't been flying a lot recently.  It was a beautiful day in ZZZ and we were cleared for the visual to XXL at about 7;000 MSL.  We were established on the localizer as a backup and had the runway in sight holding around 210 knots.  Approach control handed us off to tower and I checked in.  We were cleared to land and told that there would be fighters departing out of ZZZ1; but they would stay below us.  The First Officer started too slow and I extended flaps to 2.  I started searching for the fighters and saw 2 of them takeoff.  I keep my eyes on them to make sure we were clear.  First Officer called for the gear and I extended it.  I noticed we were still at flaps 2 and we were too fast for flaps 3.  We were inside the FAF by this point and it was going to be close for a stabilized approach.  The first officer had previously selected the approach mode and we were on course about 300 feet high on the glide path and fast so not correcting.  I noticed the power on the engine instruments was not at idle which was strange because we had the approach selected in managed speed and the speed tape showed the target speed well below our current speed.  I pointed the power setting out to the first officer and it was also confusing to him why the power was still up.  We got to flaps 3 around 1;000 AGL and were still high on the glide path.  We leveled off a little to get the flaps to full and then started to correct to glidepath.  When we got to 500 feet we were still a good 200 feet high and 15-20 knots above our target speed.  The First Officer asked me if I wanted him to go around.  There was no traffic and the runway is 2 miles long so I said to continue.  We ended up touching down at target speed well within the touchdown zone and cleared the runway.  After getting to the gate and shutting down the engines we debriefed the approach.  The First Officer said that all along he thought he was setting himself up nicely for the approach and thought it would work.  I agreed and then I took myself out of the SA loop when I started searching for the fighters and didn't pay close enough attention to our energy status.  When I finally did get back into it I wasn't forceful enough to help.  When I pointed out the engines not being at idle I assumed he would disconnect the auto thrust and put the throttles at idle.  When he didn't I should have told him too and that alone would have probably made us stable as there was still some time.  At any rate I didn't and we were clearly unstable and we both knew it.  The only correct option was to execute a go-around.  Fuel was not an issue as we ended up landing with 6;500 pounds.  I told him that I should have told him to go-around but he should have just executed a go-around without asking.  That is the procedure.  You don't need permission from the other pilot and permission not to go-around is still wrong anyway.  We agreed that the biggest factor that got us going down this path in the first place was his recency of experience and that in order to fix that he should in the immediate future at least; slow down and configure earlier then he thinks he needs to.  Going back to our departure briefing I should have taken the first leg anyway since I knew he hadn't flown in a while.  This way he could have eased back into it.
Air carrier Captain reported landing after an unstable approach when they should have gone around.