Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Retractable Gear
Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 10
Workload; Confusion; Distraction
ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Event / Encounter Ground Equipment Issue; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT
Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Airport; Human Factors; ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Procedure
I took a handoff on Aircraft X; east of ZZZ1 landing ZZZ at approximately XA45Z.  As he got closer to ZZZ I verified that he had the weather and NOTAMs and what approach he wanted.  He requested the RNAV Runway XX from ZZZZZ; the right base T-fix.  I gave him a pilots discretion descent to 7;000 feet and pointed him out to ZZZ2 approach; who was still open at the time.  They accepted the point out; and I issued a crossing restriction of 6;600 feet at ZZZZZ and approach clearance once the aircraft passed the ZZZ2 Runway XY departure corridor.  I switched the aircraft to CTAF once I ensured he was ZZZZZ1 inbound.  A few minutes later (XB13Z approximately) the aircraft cancelled IFR while still airborne passing 3;000 feet (approximately). I stated 'Roger; IFR cancellation received; squawk VFR; freq. change approved'.I then moved on to do a couple other things.  Approximately XB20Z I received a call that an aircraft was 'missed approach at ZZZ; I couldn't get the lights on'.  It took me a few moments to realize who was missed as I had removed strips on Aircraft X when they cancelled IFR.  I asked 'calling say again'; he repeated his prior statement at which point I grabbed the strip I had just marked to get the call sign.  I issued Aircraft X a code; and radar identified him.  It seemed to me that the pilot still thought he was IFR because he was flying the missed approach procedure; but I still had to climb him to my Minimum IFR Altitude of 6;500 feet. Again; he didn't seem to grasp this fact but eventually he did so.  During this he asked me if there was a way to get the lights on at ZZZ; I quickly reviewed NOTAMS to see if they were U/S (they weren't) and also reviewed the Chart Supplement to make sure there weren't any 'tricks' associated with getting the lights on (different frequency than CTAF; lights only on for part of night; for example).  There were none; they should have come on by clicking the mic on CTAF as expected.  I told the pilot this; and he asked me if I had any way to turn the lights on; I responded in the negative.He then stated that he would try the approach one more time and if unsuccessful go to ZZZ2; 23 miles west of ZZZ. At this point; ZZZ2 ATCT had closed for the evening at XB00Z and I had assumed control of the airspace.  ZZZ2 had a NOTAM for a runway XX/XY closure with 30 min PPR (Prior Permission Required) from XB00Z-XC30Z; and I had a strip in the bay stating as such.  Runway XZ/XA was open and available.  He then stated he had about 20 gallons of gas on board.  I issued 'maintain 6;500 until ZZZZZ; cleared RNAV-Z Runway XA approach ZZZ'.  When the aircraft was procedure turn inbound; I switched him to CTAF.  My 'spidey sense' started to kick in at this point; so I went and grabbed the emergency airport binder and the portable phone in case I needed to call ZZZ2 airport ops if Aircraft X diverted - this happens regularly on the mid shift and ZZZ2 ops personnel are very responsive to any request.Around XA35z; Aircraft X reported airborne and requested clearance to ZZZ2 as he could not get the lights on.  I radar identified him; and told him to execute the published missed approach; climb and maintain 6;500 feet.  He was at approximately 3;000 feet.  His voice seemed stressed and said he wanted to go direct ZZZ2.  I told him unable as my Minimum Vectoring Altitude is 6;500 feet; when you level off I will have direct ZZZ2 for you.  He kept tracking westbound towards ZZZ2 in a slow climb.  I told Aircraft X that direct ZZZ2 is not a good idea; you are 1;000 feet below the terrain in the area; fly the published missed; maintain 6;500.I am familiar with the area; the aircraft was tracking directly at a  mountain 4;393 feet tall.  It is not depicted on our scopes; but ZZZ direct ZZZ2 takes one dangerously close to it; especially on a dark moonless night. I told the aircraft again I couldn't give direct ZZZ2 until he got to 6;500 for terrain; and he said 'well I'm gonna [request priority handling]'and continued tracking straight at the mountain.  Again; I told him he was well below the mountaintop.  At this point since [priority handling was requested]; I called the Supervisor over from the watch desk.  Eventually Aircraft X did climb; got to 6;500 feet and over the terrain - for the moment. I asked Aircraft X for fuel; souls on board and intentions. Again; he stated he wanted vectors for an approach to ZZZ2.  I advised him Runway XX/XY was closed; but I am working on getting it open; and that any instrument approach with vectors would result in him going out to an 18 mile final due to our vectoring requirements.  Meanwhile; the Supervisor showed up; I quickly explained what was going on and asked him to call ZZZ2 ops and open up Runway XX/XY for the inbound.  While the Supervisor was doing this; I asked him if he needed any information for ZZZ2.  He told me to standby.Meanwhile; Aircraft X had started to descend again and was getting below the Minimum IFR Altitude (MIA). The area in question is on the boundary of a 6;500; 6;000; and 4;100 MIA area.  I succeeded in getting him the ZZZ2 weather; but other than that the pilot was in his own world; doing whatever he wanted to do below the MIA. I asked the pilot 'is there any information I can get you for ZZZ2 so you don't have to look it up?' I was fully prepared to give him elevation; runway; lighting; CTAF; etc data so he didn't have to be heads down looking at his [tablet] for the info.  He stated firmly 'NO'.  He then passed into a 4;100 foot MIA area and I issued a vector for a right base entry for Runway XY.  I also issued the position of the airport.At this point there wasn't much else I could do as the pilot was charting his own course; literally.  I advised the MIA was 4;100 feet and he just kept descending.  The Supervisor was successful in getting a hold of ZZZ2 ops and opening Runway XX/XY.  I advised Aircraft X that Runway XX/XY was open and again gave the position of ZZZ2.  He could not see the airport. Aircraft X in his haste to get to ZZZ2 did not realize the tower was closed and the lights were not on.  The Supervisor was still on the phone with ZZZ2 ops; they saw the aircraft circling; and activated the lighting for him.  It appeared that the aircraft circled ZZZ2 and landed Runway XX.  He cancelled IFR on the ground on my frequency. I don't know what could have been done to prevent this. The pilot painted himself into a corner; and it almost led to his demise.I did a bit of research; and the aircraft had originally departed ZZZ3 destination ZZZ4.  Somewhere he changed his destination to ZZZ.  Looking at his ICAO flight plan info; ZZZ was his alternate for his flight plan to ZZZ4.  Per the FARs he should have had enough fuel to fly ZZZ3-ZZZ4; then to ZZZ and for 45 minutes thereafter.  Being a pilot myself; this seems a bit of a stretch for [that make/model aircraft].  There were plenty of viable other airports along his route to ZZZ if fuel was going to be a factor.  I don't know why the pilot didn't/couldn't want to climb to get over the mountain. If one is concerned about engine stoppage due to fuel; altitude is your best friend. I think the pilot was task saturated in a mountainous; dark environment and was used to being provided approach control services in flatter terrain.  He just picked out a path and did whatever he wanted to do; without listening to ATC; below the MIA.  If one chooses to operate in the area ZZZ is located in it deserves more planning and caution than a typical flight.The pilot also declined my offer to provide him with ZZZ2 airport information.  Had he stopped for a minute to listen; he may have gained some useful information rather than thinking 'hey; I got this'.
I was Pilot In Command of Aircraft X in on Date and Date1 and I had to [request priority handling] due to the possibility of fuel shortage at approximately XA:00 AM; Date1. My account below describes the circumstances that triggered my decision to [request priority handling]; the steps that resulted in the safe; uneventful landing of Aircraft X; and my post-flight review of trip and fuel planning. I filed an IFR flight plan from ZZZ3 to ZZZ4. Given forecasted IFR conditions at ZZZ4; I filed ZZZ as an alternate which had excellent VFR weather forecasted; an LPV approach; and is a field with which I'm familiar and experienced.I monitored weather at ZZZ4 real-time during the flight via the onboard G1000 and ADSB on my iPad Foreflight app. I noted conditions at ZZZ4 were deteriorating and consistently coming in worse than they were forecasted. As I approached I coordinated with ATC to divert to our alternate ZZZ. I was given direct to ZZZ and the flight continued to proceed unremarkably until approaching ZZZ. Upon diverting; I noted fuel quantities onboard were well in excess of requirements for ZZZ and IFR reserves. Getting closer to ZZZ; I made my requested approach (the RNAV XX an LPV approach); picked up weather at ZZZ (excellent VFR conditions and calm winds); and noted that the G1000 predicted 40 gallons of fuel upon landing at ZZZ (in excess of 2 hours of fuel). Everything was feeling good and looking good at this point.I shot the RNAV XX and pilot-controlled lighting did not activate. More specifically; a PAPI light was on; but no runway lighting came on. Having previously flown into ZZZ at night; I had a reasonable expectation of what the lighting would look like; as well as I had an expectation of bright lights that leave the pilot no uncertainty about the runway location and comfort in landing. I retried the pilot-controlled lighting a few times as I was descending with no success; and ultimately decided the PAPI light alone was insufficient; did a go around; and flew the published miss. Given climb out of ZZZ and the published hold for RNAV XX; I had a modest amount of time to replan and coordinate with ATC; which I took advantage of. I first ruled out that pilot error as a factor in activating the pilot-controlled lights; asking ATC to confirm I was using the correct frequency; that pilot-controlled lighting wasn't down via NOTAM; etc. ATC confirmed as much. I should also mention that I had a phone call with the ZZZ Fixed Base Operator Manager earlier that day. The runways at ZZZ have been under construction and only recently opened; so as an extra precaution I wanted to confirm with them that pilot-controlled lighting was operational; which they did.I then expressed to ATC my plan was to retry the RNAV XX and to go directly to ZZZ2 in the event I could not activate the lighting at ZZZ and land successfully. ATC expressed vigorous agreement. I noted with ATC that according to the fuel gauges I had about 1 hour--while lower than I expected; it is well known that the fuel quantity gauges in this type aircraft can be unreliable (especially when fuel sloshes around in descents and climbs); were likely under-reporting fuel onboard; and in any event 1 hour of fuel was still sufficient to shoot the RNAV XX and to make an approach at ZZZ2 if needed. The second approach into ZZZ resulted again in pilot-controlled operated lighting not activating. I climbed out and began heading directly to ZZZ2 on a heading of roughly 280. I noted that fuel quantity gauges were continuing to read lower than expected (at this point I had at least one tank showing a reading 'in the red range'). For the same reasons as noted above; I had good reason to believe that the fuel gauges were reading lower than their actual levels; but given the risks involved with low fuel or fuel starvation; I decided to treat these low readings at face value and act accordingly; which I did.I reestablished contact with ATC and immediately [requested priority]. ATC asked me to fly the published miss at ZZZ; but noting [my request] and my right to deviate; I elected to continue direct to ZZZ2. I loaded the RNAV XY (vectors) and intended to use its guidance displayed visually on my G1000 to aid in getting well aligned for a straight in landing on Runway XY; an 8;000 plus foot strip that was only a slight right turn from my present heading.  A negotiation ensued with ATC about climb altitude (he wanted me higher; I knew from experience that we were clear of terrain; the minimum altitudes for waypoints on RNAV XY suggested I was already high enough; as well as I had synthetic vision and TAWS (Terrain Alert Warning System) onboard to ensure safety; direction of flight (I would have liked wider to get better established on XY; ATC wanted me on a heading tighter to the airport; presumably to account for his concerns about altitude); and selection of runway (XY was my preference; but that choice was briefly in doubt until ATC coordinated on the ground with ZZZ2). Complicating matters further; I expected that with clear VFR the Class C ZZZ2 airfield would be 'lit up like a Christmas tree' but it turned out that the tower was closed and pilot-controlled lighting was in effect. ATC was able to coordinate with ZZZ2 staff to turn on the lights; however; at the time lights were switched on I was very high about 2;500 feet AGL and right on top of the runway. I attribute being too high and too close to the factors named above--kept too high by ATC and vectors too tight to the runway from ATC--but in any event that was where we found ourselves.At that moment; I made a split-second calculation that I could throw out all available drag (gear; flaps; and speed brakes) and make a steep descent for [Runway] XY and given the length of the runway I'd have time to level off; slow down; and land successfully. This proceeded successfully until I was leveling off over Runway XY. I noted that my airspeed was too high (began leveling off at about 150-160 knots) and I had already eaten up about a quarter of the runway. For context; I like airspeeds in the 80s as I'm coming over the fence; so 150-160 knots is way too fast. I made another split-second decision that while it was probable that I would be able to land the plane in those conditions it was unlikely I could do so without running off the runway; damaging the aircraft and property if not worse. I peeked at the fuel gauges and noted I was showing enough fuel to make a quick traffic pattern for Runway XA and that the conditions for a safe landing on Runway XA were ideal (I could be assured of no other traffic in the pattern; the weather was severe VFR; the runway was now lit up like a Christmas tree; and I was perfectly established for an easy left traffic pattern). Landing on XA proceeded with great ease and uneventfully.While we were taxiing off the runway and to the Fixed Base Operator (FBO); I noticed as expected that the purportedly low fuel readings were returning to higher ranges more in line with my expectations. I noted fuel quantities in excess of 10 gallons in both the left and right tank when I shut the aircraft down; which is in excess of one hour of fuel. After getting a few hours of sleep; I returned promptly to ZZZ2 the next morning. I turned on the G1000 to get a fuel reading. It showed 11 gallons in the left tank and 9 gallons in the right tank; well in excess of an hour of fuel. I had the FBO top off the aircraft's main tanks (60 gallons capacity each for 120 gallons total; I did not have them top off the two 10 gallon extended range tanks). The top off resulted in 94.3 gallons; meaning that the aircrafts tanks held 25.7 gallons (120 gallons - 94.3 gallons) when it landed at ZZZ2. All plausible readings of actual fuel onboard; in other words; vigorously confirm that the aircraft landed with well over one hour of fuel onboard (exceeding regulatory required minimums) and point to inaccuracies in the fuel quantity measurement system as the likely root cause of the apparent fuel [situation] we experienced.Furthermore; I reviewed the flight planning and fuel expectations for the flight. We took off with approximately 140 gallons of fuel from ZZZ3. With conservative assumptions (normal cruise speeds; no extra helpful pushes from big tail winds; etc.); it takes a little under 90 gallons of fuel to get from ZZZ3 to ZZZ4. It takes another 30 gallons to fly all the way from ZZZ4 to our alternate ZZZ. That implies a full 20 gallons of fuel (in excess of an hour's worth of fuel). And; of course; under real-world conditions; outcomes are likely to be better. For instance; if the pilot begins to anticipate (s)he may need to divert (s)he can begin leaning the aircraft to economy settings. I've seen going to an economy setting take my normal cruise fuel burn down from about 22 gallons of fuel per hour to as low as 14-15 gallons per hour. Or; as I did; diverting to the alternate simply by paying attention to the conditions on the ground at ZZZ4 while I was enroute no doubt helped me bank some fuel that might otherwise have been misapplied.Altogether; I think the lessons from this challenging but ultimately happy and successful outcome include: Discussions with my aircraft mechanic. I understand that the aircraft's fuel quantity measurement system while well understood to be inaccurate have a few after-market upgrades that can improve reliability. Continued or perhaps additional rigor in flight and fuel planning. For instance; I keep a log on each flight of any meaningful distance of the fuel onboard. Every time I switch from one tank to the other (which I do every half hour); I note the new fuel levels and whether those new levels are matching my expectations. For instance; if I'm burning 20 gallons per hour; I look to see that the most recently used tank has burned about 10 gallons in the previous half hour. While this is a reasonable process; I think I can explore ways to harden it further. For one; I can assign another person onboard on the flight to duplicate this process with me to reduce the possibility of human error. I'm also interested to see if there are products on the market that provide additional telemetry on fuel readings; fuel estimation; etc. with which to triangulate against the readings I get from the current system. Finally; in the very unlikely event I find myself in a similar position where I have a robust quantity of fuel onboard but know that if the fuel readings 'act up' it could make the situation look like an emergency; I'll make sure to over-communicate with ATC and earlier in the process to get several steps ahead of any unlikely issues.
Center Controller and pilot reported that while attempting to land at a non towered airport at night the runway lights would not activate so the pilot diverted to a nearby airport. The pilot executed a missed approach to divert but did not comply with ATC instructions and flew below the Minimum IFR Altitudes.