Medium Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Training / Qualification; Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness
ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT
Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Weather; Procedure; Human Factors
First Officer (FO) was flying and we requested RNAV to 31 due to stronger crosswinds on 36. Weather was CAVOK. Prior to our descent I briefed the chart regarding the numerous GPWS erroneous incidents that have occurred at this particular airport; I also briefed the cold temperature charts. We agreed to be especially vigilant to potential GPWS warnings and that we would act accordingly; i.e. immediately stop our descent if we encountered such message; then assess the situation. FO briefed the RNAV to 31; MSA and obstructions in the vicinity. We also talked about a recent email regarding LSE which also specifically discussed the numerous GPWS occurrences pilots have had there.Upon our descent to La Crosse airport we had to respond to a GPWS warning 'pull up' message. The warning occurred while we were descending at a steep angle of attack from about 6;000 feet to I believe 2;500 feet to catch up the RNAV Flight Path Angle (FPA). We had been cleared for the visual approach and also cleared to land by tower. Upon receiving the 'pull up' warning FO did not alter his angle of descent and I had to firmly state 'stop your descent' 'pull up'. We stopped our descent and reestablished our approach shortly after the FAF with no further warnings. We debriefed the approach at the gate. FO; who is still on probation; was descending too steeply to 'catch' the FPA because we were left a bit high by approach control. Because we had terrain in the vicinity the GPWS went off. Over correcting actions led to the warning. Also; the FO should have immediately stopped his descent upon receiving the warning message as we had briefed earlier. Crew members should request full approaches from center and not accept visual approaches even if they have the airport in sight.
An air carrier Captain reported a new First Officer established a high descent rate between 6;000 feet and about 2;500 feet on the LSE Runway 31 RNAV then was slow to arrest the descent after the EGPWS alerted PULL UP prior to the final approach fix.