Commercial Fixed Wing
Training / Qualification; Situational Awareness
Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
General Maintenance Action
Procedure; Human Factors; Manuals; Aircraft
There were two other AMT's and a QA Inspector on or at the aircraft. I took the task of being the monitor AMT and the other two AMT's were the task AMT's. We were assigned the task of putting the left over wing exit hatch back into a serviceable condition. This included re-arming the emergency escape system. Initially [the] steps were confusing to me. I had to re-read them several times; eventually I became frustrated with what I interpreted them to be. Having said that I now know that I made a mistake by not continuing to be the monitor of the task. At the time of the incident I felt that I had interpreted the point the paperwork was trying to convey to me. I then let my mechanical experience take over and proceeded to do what I felt should have been done to complete the task within the intent of our assigned referenced task.
Myself and two other AMT's were assigned to this aircraft to re-arm the over wing escape hatch. The slide work card had some confusion with regards to arming of the slide. When the battery was attached to cannon plug to activate battery the slide deployed.
B737 Maintenance crew reported that they installed an over-wing slide and it deployed when they connected the electrical connector.