S-76/S-76 Mark II
Maintenance Inspection Authority
Maintenance Inspector 20
Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness
Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
General Maintenance Action
Aircraft; Procedure; Manuals; Logbook Entry; Incorrect / Not Installed / Unavailable Part; Human Factors; Company Policy; Environment - Non Weather Related
During aircraft maintenance on the flight line; the installed 'LifePort' cabinet was found improperly installed. The LifePort cabinet is used to support patient litters [stretchers] and infant 'Isolettes' during airborne patient transfer. This system was originally installed by Supplemental Type Certificate (STC) in the Sikorsky S-76B [helicopter] approximately several years ago. There are two additional Patient Air and Suction fittings installed on the aft aircraft cabin wall as back-up systems. These are powered by the LifePort cabinet and connected by color coded hoses. The two control valves on the aft wall had blue masking tape across them with the words 'Inop' [Inoperative] written in black marker. The supply hoses for these valves were found loose and not connected to the supply fittings on the LifePort. The supply ports were open to the atmosphere and not capped off. In operation of the LifePort; these uncapped fittings would have allowed the cabinet 'Air' and 'Suction' to be vented to the atmosphere; thereby disabling the system on the LifePort. The potential for having a patient aboard and these systems not functioning properly could result in a more severe medical emergency. The LifePort cabinet was removed and replaced with a second cabinet and the 'Air' and 'Suction' lines were properly connected. Failure to properly install the [LifePort] cabinet in accordance with the STC instructions; no testing of the systems after installation and a 'Return to Service' of a medical unit not functioning properly was not done to the Repair Station standards and Part 135 [Operations] Manual requirements. This situation was brought to the Director of Operation's (DOP) attention; who also was the pilot on the aircraft. His response was 'those systems were not needed over the week-end'. It was not documented when; or who; installed the LifePort [cabinet]; as there was no Work Order (W/O) or logbook entry generated.
A LifePort medical cabinet was improperly installed and without correct documentation in a Sikorskey S-76B helicopter.