DC-10 30
Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness
Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Aircraft; Human Factors; Procedure
I was conducting IOE with a pilot that had previously been Captain on another widebody aircraft. Before departing we reviewed the logbook and noted that the anti-skid system had been written up twice. Once at cruise altitude the student suggested we review the write-ups and then review the appropriate checklists [in the event we were faced with a repeat of the previous anti-skid anomalies]. We accomplished this up to and including calculating the landing distance per the QRH. After reviewing the weather and determining what runway we would be using we further discussed how we would react if we got another anti-skid fail alert. The decision was made to extend the gear early and to do a flaps 35 landing.The decision to use flaps 35 was; in retrospect; a mistake. We discussed the fact that there was a crosswind and that the student felt better doing 35 flaps. The checklist says that flaps 50 should be used unless 35 is required. I took a liberal approach to 'required' to mean that the Captain (student) has some discretion in flap selection. I now believe that I was wrong in this regard and that we should have done a flaps 50 landing. As planned; we extended the gear early. Soon after extension--as we feared we might--we got a level 2 'anti-skid fail' warning. I had the checklist in hand and accomplished the QRH procedure as specified. I reminded the student that he had to 'be gentle' with his brake application and not over-brake. We continued our approach to a safe landing on the runway [we had discussed during our precautionary run through of the checklists]. The touchdown was approximately 1;000 FT-1;200 FT down the runway; on centerline; on speed; no crab and no drift. The student lowered the nose and engaged the thrust reversers while maintaining centerline and positive control of the airplane. I believe that the initial brake application was done at less than 100 KTS. The aircraft was slowing so the student relaxed the braking pressure. At 40-50 KTS we experienced a very slight yaw to the left and what felt like us hitting a small speed bump. I was sure that we had blown at least one tire. As we rolled out the Tower advised us that we had smoke coming from the left wheelwell area and that it appeared that we had blown a tire. We taxied clear of the runway and stopped the airplane but did not set the brakes. We also requested that the Tower roll emergency vehicles to assess any damage to the airplane. A crash truck showed up; took a look and the Ground Controller advised us that we had blown two tires and that the crash truck crew was suggesting that we request a tow to the ramp. We contacted ramp control and made that request. I made three mistakes during this event. First; we should have done a flaps 50 landing. While I believe this to be true I also think that doing a flaps 50 landing would not have made any difference with regard to the blown tires. We were firmly on the ground; weight on wheels and slowing normally. The approach flaps were irrelevant at that point. Second; I should have been more specific with the student regarding the use of brakes. While I did tell him to 'be gentle' we did not brief any specific target speeds for brake application. The slower; the better. Third; I should have thought to ask for the longer parallel runway which would have allowed us to let the airplane slow even further before engaging the brakes.
I was jump seating in the cockpit with the crew. During the approach briefing they covered what to do in case of an anti-skid failure. This was the first I knew about a possible problem with the anti-skid. They informed me that the [previous] crew had a problem but they did not write it up since the problem had occurred before and had already been written up. The Captain (receiving IOE) briefed a flaps 35 landing. While reviewing the checklist I suggested they consider a flaps 50 landing. The Captain (student) said he felt that a flaps 35 landing was OK and the LCA concurred. I did not offer any additional thoughts as I was a jump seater and felt I should wait to be asked before offering any additional inputs. After we had secured the aircraft the LCA asked me if I thought there was anything they could have done. I showed him the checklist section that states to use flaps 50 unless 35 is required. I also told him that I thought they should have considered using a longer runway. I do feel that the previous crew should have written it up.
Despite having been advised of recent anti-skid failures--one of which was on the proceeding flight but not written up because 'it was already in the logbook'--the flight crew of a DC-10 took the aircraft without maintenance attention and; upon landing approach were faced with yet another failure. Their problem compounded by poor decisions as to runway selection and flap settings; they suffered blown tires upon landing and required a tow to their gate.