B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Flight Crew Last 90 Days 60; Flight Crew Type 60
Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification; Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Distraction
Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Human Factors; Aircraft; Weather
I was the pilot flying into JAX for the last leg of the day. It was the first time I had been to JAX and was flying. Upon breaking out of the clouds; the Captain and I both thought we had JAX in sight. We were looking for traffic between us and the airport and didn't want to start down until clearing traffic. We apparently had the wrong airport in sight. We had the approach set with VOR/LOC armed and about to capture; even though we were visual. Looking at KFHB we discussed how high we looked and the Captain recommended to keep configuring. As we got closer it was apparent the approach wasn't going to work from where we were.As we broke off the approach; we realized that wasn't the correct airport. We then coordinated with ATC to get vectored for an ILS as JAX was overcast. We flew the ILS and taxied to the gate uneventfully. In hindsight I'm not sure if the Captain had the correct airport in sight to start; and fixated on the wrong one after; as I had never seen JAX. Not having a moving map or an ILS with DME made situational awareness harder to achieve in those conditions for me. However; it was my complete mistake not trusting the automation and navigation that I did have. I should have taken my time and verified where we were and what the instruments were showing.I should have had better Situational Awareness (SA); and verified local airports around JAX that could be confusing. I should have also trusted the automation and navigation that was briefed and set.
ATIS at JAX airport was 1;100 feet scattered; a cloud layer about 4;000 feet; 10 NM visibility. We had set up for and briefed a visual approach to Runway 26. On about an 11 mile dog leg to final from the northeast at 2;000 feet; as PM; I called the runway in sight (I'm not sure I verified the runway in sight with the PF first; probably not in hindsight). Approach called out traffic along the beach at approximately 900 feet; cleared us for the visual; and switched us to Tower. I switched radio frequencies; set in the FAF altitude of 1;600 feet; and responded to calls of flaps 5 and landing gear down from the PF; and he began a descent to 1;600 feet with LOC armed. I looked back outside as the PF was saying he felt high for the approach. I responded to continue configuring; which he did; all the way to flaps 30; and he disconnected the autopilot.The airport I picked up; and now realize was what the PF was looking at; was Fernandia Beach Muni; only a couple of miles away; which may have been the airport I was initially looking at. The PF had continued to descend to about 1;300 feet; and then he said he didn't think he could make it; maybe for me to request a 360 degree turn. I responded to just go around. He responded with thrust and leveled off; and said he wanted to turn left. I said no; turn right (to avoid the scattered; now looking broken cloud layer and where my perception of where the shoreline traffic was); and I finally checked in with Tower; let them know we were going around and turning right. They asked if we were looking at the wrong airport; and I said I didn't know.They switched us back to Approach Control who gave us a heading of 110 and a climb to 3;000 feet. We completed the go-around and complied. We then vectored around to the ILS 26; broke out visually under what was now for sure a broken to overcast layer at 1;100 feet and landed uneventfully; now realizing that due to the clouds; we had either always been looking at the wrong airport; or picked back up the wrong airport after both looking inside momentarily as we configured.Better situational awareness from both PM and PF as vectored to final. Although we had the LNAV points on the LEGS page up on one CDU; and the fix page with mileage to the runway on the other CDU; I as PM probably made the mistake of not confirming with the PF if he had the airport in sight (unfamiliar airport for a new FO); and allowed my expectation bias of seeing the airport (1;100 feet scattered; 10 miles visibility reported) and what was really a broken layer; to convince me I saw the correct airport; call it; get us cleared for a visual; which most likely all combined to get the PF's eyes focused on the near; wrong airport. Good recognition by the PF he was too high for the runway he was looking at; I got caught up a few seconds later and made the right call for going around (for the wrong airport though); and then communicated that to Tower. Tower made the right call to send us back to Approach Control who continued to help our climb out of the red; and make an uneventful approach and landing.
An air carrier crew on approach to JAX mistook Fernandina Beach Muni for JAX inside the Runway 26 FAF. With weather at 1;100 feet SCT; 4;000 feet OVC; 10 NM VIS a VFR descent was begun; but discontinued at 1;300 feet. ATC directed a climb to 3;000 with vectors to JAX.