Airbus Industrie Undifferentiated or Other Model
Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Flight Crew Last 90 Days 210; Flight Crew Type 1113
ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach
Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach
Human Factors
We were high and fast intercepting glide path between 2000 and 1000 (feet) AGL. PF (Pilot Flying) made best efforts to capture glide path and slow the aircraft before required stabilization altitude. Using speed brake and configuration we were able to get on speed but were still above glidepath. At ~ 800 ft I called for a go around and the PF executed the missed approach.
We were flying to RIC after arriving 1.5 hours prior from a [previous] flight. We spent some extra time flight planning because we felt we needed to add fuel due to weather on the east coast; mostly thunderstorms and turbulence west of RIC. We had an uneventful enroute portion with the exception of me feeling slightly fatigued because I only slept 5 hours that night (at my own home on a layover). I almost 'nodded off' 1.5 hours from landing and I conveyed this to my FO (First Officer); and that I woke up too early because I'd been conditioned for east coast early report times over the last two pairings. I then ate a protein bar; which was my only lunch because of a maintenance issue at the gate prevented me from getting a full lunch. I wasn't that hungry and knew my protein bar would help; and they usually are adequate. I then did some stretching; deep breathing and actually started to feel better; and didn't think my fatigue was an issue at all. I guess I was wrong.We were flying an ILS approach to runway 34 in RIC with the weather reported at 1000 ft ceiling and 6 sm in light rain. I briefed the approach in detail covering all details and procedures; landing configuration; full flaps; wet runway; go around; published missed approach decision altitude; etc. I believe nothing was missed in the brief and the FO concurred; and had no questions.We had an unusual vector from the approach controller; who stated he would cross us through the final course short of the FAF and have us do a right downwind back to course. What really happened was he vectored us in pretty close to the FAF with a close turn onto course which actually overshot us as we turned directly to course (left turn) not a right downwind to course. It was a little short but we got on course prior to the FAF on altitude at approximately 170 KIAS. The problem started when I selected 'approach mode' for the ILS and apparently did an 'Airbus push' and didn't get it engaged. I didn't notice right away that it didn't enter the approach mode; and I noticed this when I saw we were flying above the glide slope and the FMA's didn't match. So; I tried to descend quickly to intercept the glideslope from above and I believe I pulled open descent and told the FO I was going open descent to catch the GS. I thought we were barely above the glideslope and that it would be reasonable to catch it and maintain a stable approach; but in retrospect; due to my fatigue; I guess; we were much higher than we thought because my scan must have been slow. The open descent didn't work because we were at 2000 ft which was set in the altitude window. I saw that the autopilot was reacting to my open descent pull (like it is designed) so I disconnected the autopilot and the autothrust to hand fly the approach; which I do on almost all my approaches; even in IMC when it is legal to do so. Well; one of the times I don't hand fly the approaches is when I'm fatigued; and I didn't realize how fatigued I must have been because my scan and situational awareness; and spatial orientation went out the window.I tried to hold 1000 FPM on the descent and at the 1000 ft call I estimated we were almost to capture the GS (expectation bias probably?); the FO called '1000' and I answered 'cleared to land.' At 897 ft MSL I saw the glideslope coming up at a nice reasonable rate and I added power and attitude to catch the glideslope expecting we would be completely stable by 500 ft AGL. Something strange happened next with the glideslope indicator; and it confused me greatly. I was holding 900 FPM descent when I saw the glideslope diamond coming to center and then it literally jumped up to 2 dots low after I had added power and attitude and we got a 'glideslope' call; we believe; but not sure; then the ILS diamond dropped back down to near centered; and then high again. I knew something wasn't right and assumed we were unstable and or had bad GS info and I initiated the go around at the same time the FO said 'Go around.' I added TOGA (Takeoff / Go-Around) power; rotated to about 15 degrees and as I was saying 'flaps 3'; the ATC controller asked if we were going around. The FO answered him and then the ATC asked if we didn't break out. So; our missed approach procedure was interrupted by the two calls by ATC; which; as professionals; we should have ignored him and kept the go around procedurally correct like we practice and brief all the time. So; with the interrupted calls for flaps and gear; I had to ask for the flaps to 3 again; maybe twice (I really can't remember) because I got stepped on by the ATC controller; and then gear up and then a frequency change call which we didn't get the frequency-- because so much was happening so fast and with 4 ATC calls on a real go around; gear up call again; I was really losing SA (Situational Awareness). The FO did a great job except that maybe he responded to ATC when we should have ignored him and kept the go around correct. We debriefed this and agreed that we let ATC distract us.As we acquired 'Speed; Alt' I noticed that we also had the 'TOGA Lock' FMA which totally confused me --where did that come from? Did we get an Alpha floor event I'm thinking; no way. If we did it must have been in the rotation to GA attitude because neither of us had any idea where an alpha floor event happened. I'm thinking to myself as all this messed up go around is happening; 'I must be really screwed up and fatigued if I just caused an alpha floor event and I didn't even notice it.' So; at this point I'm completely distracted with ATC calls; a missed frequency; the go around not progressing like it does in the simulator; a confusing missed approach instruction; which was opposite the direction of the published missed approach and then a question about whether the heading was 340 degrees or 230 degrees; watching out for an over speed with TOGA lock; and then resetting the auto thrust to normal climb mode. Then to top it off; whether it was my fault in mismanaging the autopilot; or the autopilot not doing what we expected; after I cleared the TOGA lock; clean airplane; we noticed the airplane descending and going into a turn to the left off of heading; even though we had the missed approach altitude; 2000 ft. At this point I was very confused; way behind the airplane; and trying to communicate with the FO; (and listen to ATC)--the FO did a great job handling the intrusive ATC calls and the mess of the go around. I finally got the ACP set up to do what we wanted and it all settled down; and we clarified with ATC which heading they wanted.On downwind we then briefly debriefed what happened and agreed we were both at a point where our SA was compromised; we were both spatially disoriented; and the airplane did not do what we wanted; whether it was my fault or some strange mode of the autopilot; which I have seen before and had described to me. We then briefed the next approach in detail; accomplished a successful approach and landing without incident.I have to say this was a very disturbing event and both of us were so overwhelmed we're not sure what all happened during the go around. I admitted that we should have just asked for a '360' to try again after we missed glideslope intercept; except that we both believed we were not that high and we believed recovering and maintaining a stable approach was reasonable. I don't know what happened at the point when the GS diamond jumped; because I don't believe 900 FPM rate of descent wouldn't cause that at approximately 2 miles from the runway; especially after I just added power and attitude. As to what happened with the TOGA lock; we discussed it and couldn't figure it out; unless our SA and scans were so bad that let it happen and didn't even notice.We debriefed this event in detail and know that it all started with my autopilot mode error; which for some reason I didn't check; or see that the FMA's did not go to GS and LOC. I can only defend myself that I must have been much more fatigued that I thought and my scan was inadequate. I believe we were stable until my attempt at catching the GS near 900 ft MSL; and then realized something was wrong and we made the right decision to go around. The rest of the go around; as I said; was a complete mess. With my SA; scan; and spatial orientation failing; and my confusion starting with the missed FMA error; and then the GS diamond anomaly--I can only believe it was an anomaly; because if we were that unstable at that point; we didn't see it; and that would mean I was really behind the airplane and fatigued. In our debrief we both agreed that with the intrusive ATC calls; the interruption in the go around procedures; the missed frequency change; the TOGA lock mystery; the uncommanded (or unintended) descent and turn; the extra ATC calls and frequency change and confusing instructions on go around clearance resulted in us both being overwhelmed and stressed and apparently getting the airplane in an undesired state; all starting with a missed glide slope intercept. We discussed in detail all the events that happened and realize that we most likely missed some things and couldn't even recall most of it. It was a very stressful event and very disturbing to both of us because of all the things that happened that we didn't expect; didn't understand and couldn't even explain afterward. I learned a great lesson about fatigue as a result of this event; and it also reinforced how important our stabilized approach criteria are. I also realize that I have to be 100 % attentive to the FMA's; even more so if one of us is fatigued; and if the glide slope is missed it's not worth continuing the approach. We both agreed that our crew coordination was key to keeping the aircraft safe and restoring the aircraft to the correct state.
Airbus flight crew reported an unstabilized approach resulted in a go around.