Commercial Fixed Wing
Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Flight Crew Last 90 Days 164; Flight Crew Total 19930; Flight Crew Type 7400
Confusion; Distraction; Communication Breakdown; Workload; Training / Qualification
Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance
General None Reported / Taken
Airspace Structure; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors
I was the pilot monitoring and my First Officer was the pilot flying on Aircraft X from ZZZ1 to ZZZ.  We were rather high and fast at 6;000 feet with 250 knots when ATC cleared us for a visual approach for [Runway] XXL (backed up by RNAV XXL).  Approach clearance included the altitude restriction to cross ZZZ2 VOR at or above 2;500 feet which is normal when landing south at ZZZ.  However; in our effort to lose excess altitude and airspeed quickly we got busy; and that created a distraction in the cockpit.  The result was our crossing the VOR at around 2;200 feet (RNAV FAF altitude).During our post flight de-brief; the First Officer told me that he was not aware of the safety alert memo on the chart page; which cautions pilots on being high and fast when landing south.  He also told me that he was not sure of the location of ZZZ2 VOR on his navigational display.  None of that was communicated while in flight.  My being very familiar with operating in and out of ZZZ; and the past experience of working well with this particular First Officer; led me to assume that he was well aware of the uniqueness of the local procedures.  I should know better than to make assumptions about my crew's awareness.  What I should have done was bring that alert memo to his attention when he did not include that in his briefing.  I should have realized that the First Officer's recent flight experience might have been lacking due to COVID pandemic induced schedule reductions.  Again; a thorough briefing without my assuming First Officer's knowledge and awareness could have prevented the altitude deviation.  I will be careful going forward.
We were vectored off of the ZZZZZ arrival (landing south) for the visual [Runway] XXL. At this point; we were still holding 250 KIAS at 4;000 feet. We were given a heading to intercept and a clearance for the visual approach with the restriction to 'cross the VOR above 2;500 feet.' Although we had the aircraft stabilized by 1;500 feet AGL; we may have missed the crossing restriction by approximately 300 feet. During my approach briefing; I failed to notice the safety alert box located on the chart page. When we received the crossing restriction in the clearance; I struggled to find the VOR on the approach plate (RNAV XXL). First; I did not know which 'VOR' the clearance was referencing. Second; the ZZZ VOR is not charted on the RNAV XXL approach plate. This caused a brief moment of confusion allowing me to get 'behind' the aircraft. Instead of arming NAV mode; I engaged APPR mode. The Captain objected and NAV mode engaged. Realizing that we were fast; high and becoming task saturated with automation; I elected to disconnect the aircraft and fly the approach manually. We used gear and flaps to reduce airspeed before I lowered the nose to put the aircraft onto a glide path. We intercepted the glide path from above and managed to establish a stabilized approach by approximately 2;200 feet AGL.  However; in my assumption that we were high on the approach anyway; I did not verify that we crossed the VOR at 2;500ft. The Captain made mention of this after the flight ended in the debrief. He believes that we may have actually crossed the VOR at 2;200 feet (300 feet low).I realize that my failure to thoroughly review and brief all necessary approach plates resulted in missing critical information that would have helped us avoid the threat of this unusual crossing restriction.
Air carrier flight crew reported not making a crossing restriction on a visual approach.