B737-700
Flight Crew Last 90 Days 222; Flight Crew Type 1145
Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Person / Animal / Bird; Inflight Event / Encounter Bird / Animal
Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; General Declared Emergency
Airport; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors
I was the pilot flying when our B737-700; ingested a goose that was on the runway with a flock of geese; into the left (Number 1) Engine at/approaching V1. We continued the takeoff roll and rotation with nearly immediate compressor stalls/surges coming from the engine. Tower reported smoke and flames coming from the left engine within the first several hundred feet of flight. I swapped controls with the Captain when safely airborne at approximately 1;000 AGL; cleaned up the aircraft; and executed the Engine Fire/Severe Damage/Separation/Seizure Checklist immediate action items. At no time did we have any associated warning/caution lights or warning horn and the engine kept running with nearly symmetrical power until we shut the engine down in accordance with the checklist. After accomplishing the engine shutdown; I declared an emergency with Tower; was given a block altitude; and we leveled off at approximately 5;000 MSL and 210 KTS and stayed up Tower frequency receiving radar vectors to remain within Tower airspace while accomplishing the rest of the checklist. Once completed; we swapped controls while the Captain explained the situation to the flight attendants as well as made a PA to the passengers. We then re-swapped controls and executed the One-Engine Inoperative Landing Checklist; calculated Flaps 15 single-engine landing data; reviewed the approach and go-around procedure; and set-up and executed a fairly uneventful single-engine approach and landing. Fire and rescue personnel met us on the runway and told us the engine looked safe to taxi to the gate. We then reviewed brake cooling data; with no special procedures required; and taxied uneventfully to the gate to offload the passengers and secure the aircraft. I discussed the incident with the Airfield Operations representative after we returned to the gate and he said they are constantly battling to keep the migrating Snow Geese clear of the runway environment on the airfield. Potentially this event will lead to increased awareness and funding for the BASH Program and they will have sufficient manning and equipment to increase bird detection capability and reduce the likelihood of bird strikes in the future.
The First Officer was the pilot flying. It was daylight; hazy; with good visibility. I used the HUD for takeoff. V1 was 120; VR was 132; and V2 was 136. Almost simultaneously with the V1 call during the takeoff; I saw large birds about halfway down the runway just as the First Officer verbalized that he saw birds. I saw between six and ten birds; later identified as Canadian geese; sitting near the runway centerline; mostly on the Captain's (left) side. The geese were not visible from the departure end due to a crowned runway. We saw the geese approximately 150 yards prior to impact. I was very concerned about ingesting multiple birds in at least one engine; and I continued to watch them until we hit them. The geese remained sitting on the runway until we were almost on top of them; when two or three flew up and towards the Captain's side of the runway. This distraction caused me to not make the rotate call. At very close to rotate speed; I felt multiple impacts with the plane's left side; followed immediately by loud; continuous compressor stalls; and accompanied by erratic engine indications on the number one engine. The First Officer continued the takeoff and began a climb. I assumed control of the aircraft at approximately 100 FT AGL; by saying 'I have the aircraft.' A few seconds later the Tower Controller advised us that we had smoke and flames coming from the left engine. There were no fire or overheat indications in the cockpit. At approximately 400 FT above the ground; reverting back to 20 years of PT's and PC's; I attempted to call for the exact right checklist name; but stumbled on the exact verbiage when calling for the memory items associated with the 'Engine Fire; Severe Damage; Separation.' I eventually said something like 'Engine Fire Memory Items;' and the First Officer responded appropriately. We completed the appropriate memory items and checklist; and the number one engine was successfully shutdown. We used the Challenge; Response; Response procedure for this portion of the checklist. While guarding the number two throttle for the shutdown procedure; I realized that we had accomplished a reduced thrust takeoff; and had more power available. I pushed the throttle almost all the way up and noticed a slight increase in our climb rate; but we were still climbing at only about 300 FT per minute; which is less than a normal simulator profile. I then noticed the gear was still down; so I called for Landing Gear Up right after we completed the memory items a few seconds later. I am fairly certain that we did not raise the landing gear due to the distraction caused by the quick transfer of aircraft control just after takeoff. After retracting the flaps; we declared an emergency with the Tower Controller and requested assistance from the Fire Department upon landing. We asked the Tower Controller to vector us away from terrain and close to the airport as we would be returning after accomplishing the appropriate checklists. We were cleared to 4;000 FT MSL. I connected the A autopilot shortly after retracting the flaps; and it did a good job of holding heading and making turns to heading. I had selected 210 as a climb speed; and I believe we were in Level-Change; but I am not certain. I then averted more of my attention to the checklist being accomplished. Sometime later; I noticed that we were passing 4;500 FT MSL; and the Controller subsequently cleared us to 5;000 FT. Even though I felt like I was doing a good job of monitoring power and airspeed; I failed to notice that the autopilot did not capture the altitude set in the MCP; nor do I know why it did not capture. After leveling at 5;000 FT; I switched from the A autopilot to B autopilot. I needed to do a better of job of accomplishing a complete instrument cross check whole dividing my attention between Challenge; Response; Response; and flying the airplane. After completing the checklist up to the Descent portion; with the plane in level flight with the autopilot connected; I transferred control to the First Officer. After contacting the flight attendants via interphone; they confirmed there was no longer smoke or fire coming from the number one engine. I briefed the flight attendants about what happened and what our plan was. I then briefed the customers with similar information; and asked them to follow the flight attendants' instructions explicitly. After accomplishing the Descent Checklist; we were cleared for a visual approach from a position nine miles northeast of the airport at 5;000 FT. We configured with landing gear and Flaps 15. We were slightly high intercepting final; so we elected to fly through final and turn back to the left to re-intercept final. At 1;000 FT AGL we were on glideslope with a sink rate of 800 FPM; 11 KTS above target speed. At 800 FT AGL; we were on glide slope and within a few KTS of target speed; with approach power set. We made an uneventful landing using thrust reversers and autobrakes too. We stopped on the runway and the First Officer communicated with the Fire Department personnel via radio. The Fire Department spokesman confirmed no evidence of smoke or fire; or significant structural damage. We taxied to the gate on one engine and deplaned the Customers using normal procedures. After arrival at the gate; I completed a form for the Airport Fire Department; and communicated via telephone with Company Dispatch; Maintenance Control; and Air Traffic Control. Notes:1. The First Officer performed excellently during the most critical phase of this emergency. He recognized the birds as a hazard; verbalized it; continued the takeoff without a rotate call almost simultaneous to impact; and did an outstanding job accomplishing the memory items for the engine fire and failure.2. Given the number and location of the geese; we were lucky to not have birds fail both engines. If I could think more quickly; we would have maneuvered the aircraft towards the right side of the runway for two reasons -we would have increased our distance from the birds; and we would have placed the fuselage between the birds and the number two engine.3. The compressor stalls were much louder than in the simulator; and they were very distracting. I forced myself to ignore the sound. 4. I wasted a few precious seconds stumbling over the exact right checklist name. Why can't we just call it the Emergency Engine Shutdown Checklist? We can still apply the checklist in the event of an 'engine fire; severe damage; separation; or seizure;' but it is not necessary to repeat all the reasons to accomplish a checklist in the checklist name. After experiencing this particular emergency; recalling and reciting this overly verbose checklist name is a waste of time and mental energy; and compromises safety at a critical time.5. I believe our simulator training adequately prepared me to handle this emergency. 6. In the simulator; I cannot ever remember a reject decision scenario where there was a hazard (birds; vehicle) far down the runway that required us to make a difficult decision about continuing. In the simulator; we almost always know a failure is coming; and that it will happen soon after V-1. I suggest that scenarios similar to what I have described in this report be incorporated into our simulator training.7. In my opinion; the flight attendants; despite performing superbly; were fairly shook up after the customers had deplaned. Immediately after the flight; Scheduling wanted to deadhead all six crew members back to base; which would have involved two legs on full airplanes; a plane change; and eight hours of traveling. That's a lot to ask of people who might experience a delayed emotional reaction to their emergency event. The Company should provide a variety of options for crew members after a serious emergency; and leave it to each individual crew member to decide which option to choose.8. The ATC Tower Controller did an excellent job with communications and vectoring.
B737 flight crew reports ingesting a goose at V1 during takeoff with the First Officer flying. Loud compressor stalls are heard from the left engine and the Captain assumes control at approximately 100 FT AGL but the positive rate call is not made and the gear is not retracted. After the engine is shut down the gear is noticed and retracted. Flight returns for a single engine landing.