MD-83
Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Troubleshooting; Training / Qualification; Human-Machine Interface; Confusion; Workload
Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; General Declared Emergency
Aircraft; Human Factors; Weather
During a turn to intercept the localizer in IMC conditions; the Captain's PFD and ND failed; the auto throttle and auto pilot disconnected; and all windows of the mode control panel went blank. The Captain transferred aircraft control to me. During the control transfer my flight director failed and I immediately monitored raw data and attempted to get the aircraft stabilized to no avail. The Captain directed a go-around when suddenly my PFD and ND failed. I utilized the standby attitude indicator to initiate the go around when simultaneously the aircraft WAGS [Windshear Alert Guidance System] computer began annunciating a wind shear warning accompanied by a significant loss of aircraft performance. I performed an escape maneuver with the aid of the standby flight instruments. The Captain declared an emergency and we successfully climbed out of the shear and diverted to an airport where; from previous discussion en route; we had determined the weather was VMC. While enroute I transferred aircraft control to the Captain and commenced normal PNF duties; requested single frequency handling and ARFF to monitor our arrival. Mindful of our deteriorating fuel state the Captain requested ATC to advise the tower to expect us to land opposite direction on Runway 28 [vice their active runway 10]. Shortly thereafter; the Tower activated the Runway 28 ILS and the Captain flew an idle LD/Max visual approach to an uneventful; normal landing. I believe this event occurred due to a random mechanical failure in conjunction with unpredictable atmospheric phenomena. Recurrence of such an event is unlikely; but I would strongly recommend pilots have a review of pitch and power settings for their respective aircraft while attending recurrent training.
I was the pilot flying. We were holding for an ILS in ZZZ. Our alternates were ZZZ2 and ZZZ3. I called Dispatch and informed him of our fuel. We discussed changing to a closer alternate to give us some extra time in the holding pattern. We agreed that ZZZ4 would be sufficient; requiring approximately 3600 lbs. At approximately 10000 lbs of fuel I declared minimum fuel with Approach Control. Shortly thereafter they gave of vectors out of holding. Instead of giving us vectors to final we started vectors in lieu of holding. Again we informed approach of our fuel and inquired about our sequence for the approach. At approximately 9000 lbs of fuel remaining I declared emergency fuel with approach. They turned us toward final and said we were #3 for the approach and asked our intentions. I elected to continue the approach. The visibility was two miles in heavy rain. Approach cleared us to 2;000 feet; cleared for the approach. I started the descent and when I selected the new heading while in heading select the aircraft banked left and immediately my PFD and ND went blank; the autopilot and autothrottles disconnected. The FO's PFD and ND were normal so I transferred aircraft control to him. We overshot the localizer and he corrected back to course. He started down the glideslope late and slightly above. Then his flight director failed. He continued the approach on raw data. After we had passed 1;000 feet I noticed our vertical speed was approximately -1500 fpm and we were well above glideslope. I then commanded a go-around. He started the go-around and as we started to clean up the aircraft the FO's PFD and ND as well as the flight guidance panel had failed. He continued to fly the missed approach on the standby instruments. Then we received a windshear alert. The FO conducted the escape maneuver on the standby instruments. With full power the airplane felt like it stopped flying. The airplane slowly started to recover I called for a climb and he flew us away from the ground. I declared an emergency for the loss of primary flight instruments and emergency fuel. I knew from checking the weather at my alternates that ZZZ2 was the only alternate with weather allowing a VFR approach. I immediately requested a climb for FL250 and a vector for ZZZ2. I informed ATC of SOBs and approximately one hour of fuel and asked him to contact Dispatch for the hazardous cargo onboard. I called Dispatch and briefed him of our situation. During the climb the FO's PFD and ND returned to normal operation. I selected EFIS both on two and my PFD and ND operated normally. I then briefed the flight attendants and made a PA to the passengers. During the climb I noticed our fuel was now 6000 lbs. I assumed control of the aircraft and flew to FL250. At approximately 70 miles from ZZZ2 I started an idle descent at L/D max clean/minimum maneuver. We were southeast of the airport and they were landing RWY 10. The wind was 020/7. I informed ATC that I would be landing opposite direction on runway 28 and requested ARFF. I did not want to use additional fuel maneuvering to the west of the field for a landing on RWY 10. We broke out of the weather at 2;000 feet and I immediately saw the field. I flew a visual approach to Runway 28. The landing was uneventful. I canceled the emergency and taxied to the gate. While waiting for the van for the hotel several passengers asked me about the event and one of the passengers informed me that he saw the ground during our go around/ windshear event and estimated our height to be approximately 100 feet.No more vectors in lieu of holding. Hold until divert becomes necessary. The vectors only provide a false sense of security and no real situational awareness. The vectors had nothing to do with the instrument failure but were a contributing factor to our emergency fuel situation.
Just as they were about to intercept the localizer in IMC the flight crew of an MD-83 suffered the loss of first the Captain's PFD; ND; autothrottles and MCP panel and; after passing control to the First Officer; his PFD and ND failed as well. A go-around was initiated on standby instruments during which they encountered a windshear alert warning accompanied by associated significant performance degradation. An ATC assisted diversion to another airport for a fuel mandated downwind emergency landing was nearly an anticlimactic conclusion.