Falcon 900
Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor
Flight Crew Last 90 Days 10; Flight Crew Total 8860; Flight Crew Type 50
Training / Qualification; Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness
Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR
General None Reported / Taken
Human Factors
I am a contract pilot and an on-call simulator instructor on the various Falcon EASy airplanes. The PIC is an experienced large airplane pilot. His current experiences are on numerous types of Boeings; etc. He became the manager/pilot of the subject -900EASy and has roughly 6 flights with this aircraft; most with me. His type training was about 3 months ago and he did not fly the airplane until roughly 1.5-2.0 months after his check ride (guesstimate). I have been providing SIC support (until the other full-time pilot can accomplish his type training) as well as IOE on the airplane and especially on the EASy avionics. The pilot's 'airliner avionics' background has generated system misunderstandings that I have corrected. This includes incorrect use of Flight Guidance selection choices. While arriving on the STAR into ZZZ we were advised to 'descend via the STAR'. The Captain highly prefers to use VNAV for virtually all climbs and descents and as he was selecting such I was reprogramming our waypoints for altitude crossings. The Captain then questioned me as to 'how best to set up the VNAV function'. I explained various ways to do so; i.e. VNAV versus minimum altitude to select; using the vertical profile 'laser pointer' to start the descent or to use for constant descent without stair-stepping through crossing altitudes; how to change the descent angle utilized on the FMS avionics page; etc. However; after some time I noticed that the VNAV was not capturing and that the 'laser pointer' was moving away from the target setting; i.e. waypoint selected for crossing. This happened a few times. I even showed him how to do a 'Direct Vertical Descend To' but it also did not work. The Captain was complaining about the EASy system compared to the Boeings he flies and couldn't understand why it was not capturing. During this time I was acquiring the ATIS and setting up for the approach to be utilized. However; when I once again noted that we were still not descending correctly I stopped doing my functions and spent more time analyzing the situation. That is when I noticed that the airplane was west of the intended course (I would guess about 4-5 miles). I then informed him that somehow he had lost LNAV guidance. As such; the VNAV would not be correct. Although he asked me to now give him direct to the waypoint I told him he instead needed to rejoin the arrival and advised him to use HDG (heading) or TRCK (track) to perform a turn back to rejoin. He said he understood but I noticed his confusion and delay in doing so. I again advised him that he needed to get back on course and almost simultaneously ATC noticed our discrepancy. Because of our course deviation we did not descend accordingly. As such; ATC gave us a direct to ZZZZZ and cross at 10;000. I performed the 'direct to' and advised the Captain to start an immediate descent which he slowly did; however; the eventual angle was high and as such the airspeed increased. He complained about the increasing speed and I told him that he needs full airbrakes to check the speed increase (twice). He looked confused and delayed the extension of the airbrakes until the speed had already climbed; i.e. he now had to reduce the speed he had allowed to increase during the initial descend maneuver. Therefore; we exceeded the 250 knots below 10;000 feet for roughly 600-700 feet (I think we were back at 250 before 9;300 ft.) The remainder of the flight was uneventful. I should note that during a post debrief the Captain was noting how only one person should be touching the guidance panel. He was; in my opinion; somewhat deflecting responsibility for the loss of the LNAV function (after I asked him if he knew how we lost LNAV guidance). However; I did not manipulate the panel. I pointed to what and where he needed to go for his choice of modes. This is especially true during the initial mistake. Although I cannot guarantee my thought I think that the Captain inadvertently disconnected LNAV after passingZZZZZ1 while we were setting up for the descent. He has previously chosen the wrong button before; e.g. he once switched guidance to the non-flying pilot during his attempt at setting-up another choice. At that time I saw his action and corrected him immediately (that time I did change the setting myself). It was in a very high workload moment and I did not have the time then to explain to him what he had done. In that situation I needed to get the guidance back to the pilot flying which necessitated a minimum of three button selections. After a little time; and after I had completed what I was doing as the SIC; I attempted to explain what he had done but prior to such he said he understood his mistake so I did not delve deeper into it. Since aircraft traffic in the ZZZ area was light there was no deviations and ATC did not 'appear upset'. However; I felt it important to write this ASRS Report. This Captain is very confident of his methods (he is very experienced) and strives to be as efficient as possible. He chooses to carry the minimum fuel required for a trip; always flies at Long Range Cruise power setting; requests as many short cuts as possible; and wishes to start the airplane moving as quickly as possible after engine starts. As such; he has often questioned me in relation to after start tests that need to be performed for each flight versus those that only need to be performed once a day; or maybe even once a week. He does not like sitting with engines running. Therefore; we are sometimes somewhat in a hurry. Being the SIC and as a contract pilot I have acquiesced to his overall style as it is not illegal or unsafe; although it is not the method I prefer. For a pilot new to an airplane I would recommend that the pilot 'go slow' and diligently learn the process of the new airplane but a pilot's prior experiences can alter that process. This is especially true when the pilot has a vast (many years) experience flying numerous large airplanes worldwide. I have suggested that this Captain fly as the SIC for a bit to truly learn the airplane but he noted that during his training he only got experience in the left seat. His comment was that he wants to become familiar with the left seat before trying the right seat. As the SIC can be busy it is hard for an experienced pilot (in a particular airplane) in that role to provide guidance to an inexperienced pilot (in a particular airplane) while doing both instruction; IOE overview; and normal duties simultaneously. My recommendation is that regardless of experience that a pilot 'to a new airplane' be limited to the SIC duties for a minimum of 5 flights (segments; not hours) before transitioning to the left seat. What is required is the 'muscle and mental memory' performing the numerous tasks associated with the various sections of a flight.
Pilot Instructor on Falcon 900 aircraft reported on heading and speed deviations during flight.