B767 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Declared Emergency
Aircraft
On departure at V1; we had a compressor stall on the left engine.  Takeoff was continued; emergency declared; emergency procedures followed; fuel was dumped and returned for emergency landing.  Landing normal; aircraft inspected by AARF and no evacuation required.  No injuries.
On downwind; Captain commanded fuel dumping to begin.  Landing performance was evaluated as fair; go-around performance as marginal in the event of a go-around.  Fuel dumping lasted until final approach; terminated about 7-8 NM final.  Once on final; in the landing configuration; aircraft performance was sluggish and I was appreciative of the Captain's choice to reduce the landing weight.  Landed overweight; stopped on the runway and inspection by CFR.  No ground evacuation was required.  Taxied normally to a ramp spot; followed by CFR.  Once parked; passenger's deplaned via ramp stand in a normal manner with out any injuries. EO procedure was difficult to track.  The VOR used for this operation was tested at the gate and no ID could be heard.  NOTAMs did not show it as INOP.  Once airborne; switchology for 'raw data' of a ground based NAVAID confused me.  There are many different cockpit configurations to achieve this display and this time I did not get it correct.  Eventually used an alternate published EO track based upon an NDB.  I think this needs to be addressed under a safety issue by the fleet.  I do not think the FMC data for this kind of operation is sufficient for reliable operation alone; I.E. Route two programing of EO procedure.  Bird strike into the engine was a thought; but no visual evidence found during the pilot's post-flight inspection.  Un-manned hot air balloons were a thought.  I have hit these in the past.  Again no evidence was found on the pilot's post flight inspection.  Lowering visibility was a concern due to the smoke and haze increasing after dark.  This is from burning trash heaps near the airport.  Once stopped; it was difficult to know if the smoke and smell was from burning airplane parts or was from the local conditions.  No direct communication with the CFR inspector was a hindrance to this evaluation. Standard verbiage to indicate 'Continue TO' vice 'Abort TO.' should be developed and drilled by crews .I.E. 'NO;NO;NO' can sound like 'GO;GO;GO.' Something like 'Fly;Fly;Fly' and 'Abort;Abort; Abort' should be included in our training. This was not a classic V1 cut like we drill in the simulator. I do not think our training goes far enough to challenge and prepare us with the abnormal occurrences found in line flying...in a foreign country...at night...on the backside of your body clock. More and different scenarios need to be developed and drilled in our simulators. Just so that it is said; these would be non-career threatening skills and judgement development sessions. Expect one thing; and get another then cope. Not rote skills demonstration. Dumping fuel in an ICAO country [procedure] indicates that 'Fuel Jettisoning' 'should' occur above 6;000 FT; over water; etc. This is in contrast to [company procedure] 5;000 FT. I think [company procedure] should be brought into line with ICAO; at least for Int. ops. and list it in Chap. 17. There was nothing in my training that prepared me for the situation that developed when the authorities wanted to interview the crew PRIOR to leaving the country. This is a problem that will only get more invasive with time. [Company] will need to prepare an action plan for evacuation or legal support for detained crews and brief operations managers and international crews as to what can be expected.
B767 international departure experiences compressor stall near V1.  Flight continued takeoff; emergency declared; fuel dumped; and the flight returned to departure airport.