Citation V/Ultra/Encore (C560)
Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Procedure; Environment - Non Weather Related
On a flight landing in EWR; the ATIS advertised the Stadium Visual to Runway 29.  Although the environment was busy due to the airspace congestion; everything was working out smoothly and well.  Approach mentioned to us a few different aircraft along the way to use caution for due to wake turbulence and we did use caution for the several large aircraft we saw during the terminal phase of the approach.  I do not recall; however; my Pilot Monitoring later said the Tower upon clearing us to land issued another caution for wake turbulence for a 747.  I did not see any flying aircraft that would pose any wake turbulence threat.  The approach was normal and I was right on my target speeds.  I closed both throttles all the way during the flare; and both engines settled all the way to idle.  The tires were maybe an inch or two from the surface; the yoke back bumping the stop; all the flying air gone from the wings; touchdown imminent; [when] a large gust from the left shoved the aircraft aggressively to the right.  The gust raised the left wing up and also the whole aircraft up into the air several feet. When the gust reached the tail; it shoved the vertical stabilizer right moving the nose left.  The centerline of the runway went from centered on the nose gear to well outside the main gear near the left wing tip.  There were two gusts one right after the other; both the same and having the same effect on the aircraft.  I immediately shoved both throttles all the way forward and countered with the controls to maintain orientation.  I don't recall calling the go-around; but my Pilot Monitoring says I called it right away. The air was smooth after the two gusts; the plane settled some towards the ground as it gained momentum.  Once everything was straightened out and the airplane with some flying speed now climbing from the runway instead of closing toward it; I realized my right arm was still holding the throttles against the stop.  Knowing that could be very bad for the engines; I looked inside to see how badly they were over revving and simultaneously pulled them back off the stop some.  I never got the chance to see because I noticed the left engine sitting at idle while the right engine was making full power.  That's when I realized my right leg was holding about 80% right rudder travel in.  The gear was up and the flaps sitting at 15 degrees and we were making only 125 knots.  Then after several more seconds; the left engine began to slowly make its way through the 50%'s; 60s; 70s; 80s; and finally into the low 90% of N1 speed.  With everything back to normal; we cleaned up the aircraft and settled in for the next approach.  ATC again offered us the Stadium Visual to 29 but said the ILS 22R was available.  We took the ILS 22R.  ATC never asked us why we went around.  We did not make any communications to our team in the cabin until after shutdown.  The origin of the gust was immediately very clear to both of us in the cockpit.  It was jet blast from jet engines pointed at our flight path during our touchdown; departing aircraft on 22R beginning their takeoff roll were blasting the landing zone of 29 with their engines.  Perhaps the cautionary statements we received from ATC for wake turbulence were referring to jet blast from airlines beginning to roll on the ground and not from wake turbulence from aircraft in flight.  Had I been aware this was the case; I would have never accepted 29 as a landing option.  The 22R & L runways cross Runway 29; so I envisioned aircraft departing across our landing path as they took off on the 22s.  So I would see them and be aware of the timing for jet blast and wake from landing aircraft.  However; instead; airlines were making intersection departures after the 29 intersection; shortening their takeoff distance.  So instead of crossing our path; they were starting from our left and starting their takeoff roll; and moving away to our left.  I never looked left during my landing; so I don'tknow what was there blasting us; I'm guessing something big.  Of note; due to high fuel price in EWR; we were heavy; just a few hundred pounds under max landing weight.  I would first suggest not landing small jets on [Runway] 29 at EWR when 22s are departing in the way they were.  I wasn't familiar enough with EWR to know how dangerous the circumstance would be; I've landed on 22s in years past.  I would also suggest the left engine acceleration be repaired to an acceptable level.  Waiting 15 - 20 seconds for an engine to give power in fight is not acceptable.  If neither engine had given power for that amount of time; I do not believe a touchdown without major damage would've been possible.  Even still; it took everything the aircraft had in it plus everything humanly possible I could do to prevent an accident.
CE-560 Captain reported executing a go-around at touchdown on Runway 29 at EWR when jet blast from  air carrier aircraft on Runway 22 had a destabilizing effect on their aircraft.