A320
Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Flight Engineer; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument
Flight Crew Last 90 Days 90; Flight Crew Total 6500; Flight Crew Type 200
Workload; Training / Qualification; Time Pressure; Situational Awareness; Confusion; Distraction
Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach
Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Airspace Structure; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors; Procedure
Descending toward the Bay Area; we picked up the latest ATIS. As per the previous ATIS; I had selected the ILS 28R approach in the database; but the current ATIS advised to expect visual approaches to Runway 28L and 28R. I was not familiar with the San Francisco approaches and began reviewing the visual approaches available. I was just asking the Captain which approach he thought we would get when we got a descent assignment as well as an approach assignment. I put the approach into the database and began looking at the approach plate. As we descended through 18;000 FT we set our altimeters to the current altimeter setting and I mentioned the descent checklist; but didn't call for it as I knew it required an approach briefing. I read through the approach plate and began to brief it but was interrupted and distracted several times by step down altitude assignments; speed assignments; and traffic call outs for the parallel runway. My briefing for the approach came late and in a hurried manner. Aircraft configuration for the approach as well as the descent and approach checklists also were called for and completed late. There was a 777 on a parallel approach off to our left; and a B737 aircraft being cleared for takeoff on an intersecting runway. Our landing runway was in sight; but with all the distractions and contributing factors above I descended below 1;000 FT before being fully configured and below the glideslope. Descending through 2;200 FT; I was still above profile; flaps set at two or three; and had the speed brakes extended. The altitude set in the FCU was 1;800 FT; the lowest altitude at the end of the approach. As I didn't want the aircraft to level off at 1;800 FT; I selected 100 FT (field elevation) in the FCU altitude selector for the visual approach. My Captain was just questioning my altitude when we received a low altitude alert from the Controller. This was approximately 2 miles from the threshold and approximately 500 FT AGL. I immediately disconnected the autopilot and arrested the descent. I then re-intercepted the glide slope and continued down it to an uneventful landing. We considered going around but had parallel traffic on the left; departing traffic off to the right; terrain straight ahead; and our long landing runway in sight straight ahead. The best solution would have been to ask for an expected approach long before we finally received it. This would've helped provide the time I needed to review and then brief the approach. Because I am much more familiar with them; if we would've been assigned an ILS approach; probably none of this would ever have happened. I take responsibility and should have been better prepared for an unfamiliar airport and its approaches. There always are and always will be step down altitude assignments and traffic callouts that can be distracting and we must contend with. Thereafter; when I realized the descent and later the approach checklists were going to be delayed I should've asked for vectors around for another approach. Realizing this and requesting it early would have probably minimized any errors. The biggest mistake I actively made was setting the FCU altitude to field elevation instead of 1;000 FT above field elevation. If I would've done this; a 1;000 FT floor would have been set. It would have alerted us that I needed to get fully configured before continuing down; as well as precluded us from getting a low altitude alert. Earlier; more proactive; and more thorough preparation would have prevented the above situation.
[Narrative #2 contained no additional information.]
An A320 First Officer; unfamiliar with the SFO FMS Bridge Visual; was not expecting the level of work required to stay on profile and descended to 500 FT on a two mile final before a Low Altitude alert reminded the crew to return to the profile.