B737 Next Generation Undifferentiated
Workload; Time Pressure; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Distraction
ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Taxiway
Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Airport; Chart Or Publication; Human Factors; Procedure
[It was my] first sequence after returning from three week illness with the flu. Sequence assigned by Crew Scheduling rather than requested. [It was my] first time flying with the Captain who had approximately 34 hours in the aircraft after IOE. Not a new Captain but new to the 737. Sign in first day before dawn. 6:45 minutes of flying first day. Layover LGA fire alarm sounds very early in the morning for 20 minutes; [I] never fell back to sleep. Sign in second day again before dawn. Captain is the flying pilot for flight. Depart the gate ahead of schedule. They are pushing us to get out. We are still reviewing new SID and tell them to wait. We leave 4 minutes prior to scheduled departure time. We push to the assigned spot. Start both engines at the spot. Ramp clears us to top of alley. We contact Ground with ATIS. Radio congestion; they don't answer and then call another aircraft with our taxi instructions. Ground corrects themselves. We read back taxi on G hold short Runway 22. Ground is clarifying departure instructions with everyone else but us. Ground clears us to cross Runway 22 at G follow A B757 on DD for Runway 13 monitor Tower. We ask to confirm our departure. They don't answer then respond later. Captain calls for the checklist. I respond let us cross the runway since this is a hot spot circled on the Commercial Chart's 10-9 page. I also point out to the Captain the B757 who I can see taxiing on DD. I think we will have time at the end of the departure end to run the checklist. It appears to be many airplanes taxiing out. We are both heads up watching out the window and cross checking the 10-9 page. The Captain stops the aircraft on G just short of DD -CC - G Intersection. We are staring at the B757 who is nose to nose with us. The Captain states that he is too close for the B757 to make left turn to the runway. It is dark out with intermittent rain. We inform the Tower that we are too close for the B757 to turn. The B757 is continuing toward us. Tower clears the B757 for takeoff. We state that we are too close for his turn. Tower then states we will have go first and cleared us to line up and wait Runway 13. I state we need a minute. Tower asks us if we are ready. I state 'no we need a minute.' The before Takeoff Checklist hadn't been run. Tower changes their mind and starts to give us taxi instructions. The Captain begins to taxi toward the runway. I tell the Captain to stop; stop; stop. Tower gives us right on P; right on BB; and hold short G. We are stopped and able to make a hard right on P. We stop short of BB because an airplane is blocking BB. Once airplane is clear of BB on G; Tower again tells us to taxi on BB and hold short of E. Then we are given further instructions of right on E; right on DD; and hold short of the wind sock. As we approached DD there was an Air Carrier on DD facing us and blocking us from turning. We stopped and Tower said to turn on CC if we were unable to turn on DD and hold short of G. We did this. There were no airplanes approaching the runway at this time. Tower then proceed to hold us and continued to let airplanes takeoff for approximately ten minutes. We finally asked our sequence and then Tower let us takeoff. I have some suggestions. First- Radio congestion and fast instructions both by Ground and Tower- ATC needs to slow down. ATC may need their brains to work that fast but they don't need to speak so fast. They often cut off; interrupt; and use incorrect call signs or instructions when they speak faster. It creates more confusion which adds to more radio chatter. Second- The Commercial Chart could be better depicted. We were heads up the whole time. I was looking at the 10-9 page which didn't match the reality of what we saw. The small section of earth located between Taxiway G and P is very small compared to the 10-9 page. I think both the Captain I thought we were further back on G because we were expecting much more space at the G/DD/CC/PP Intersection as depicted on the 10-9 page. The airport signs are further confusing. Studying the diagram for an hour wouldn't have made a difference nor would asking Ground because we expected the 10-9 page to be accurate. The issue was we were taxiing into an unfamiliar area and our only reference is a diagram that doesn't adequately depict the reality. If we knew the 10-9 page was bad; we would have asked for a better instruction such as hold short of BB on G. It doesn't look it but that is about the correct amount of room the B757 needed. Third- Tower could be more professional in their communications. Tower was degrading and belittling without merit. We stated our safety concern with the B757. We stated we stopped too far for the B757 to turn. This is what we are supposed to do and yet we are met with a confrontational tone and rudeness. We correctly stated we needed more time. Taking a runway because it meets ATC schedule but we are not in compliance with our checklist is not correct thing to do. We subsequently were held for an excessive time as if we were being punished. This behavior only encourages crews to not speak up and for bad relations between pilots and ATC. Fourth- the Captain and I could have better communication. Once we knew the B757 wasn't going to make the turn; we each were thinking different things. I don't think the Captain heard the change with Tower not to line up wait but taxi out of the way. There was a moment when all three of us (me; Captain; and the Tower) were not on the same page with a moving aircraft close to the runway. Not ideal! I think if we stated to Tower a more directive statement like we need to come right on P or taxi down the runway it would have put us all on the same page faster. Fifth - If the guest at the overnight hotel had decided not to smoke in the hallway and set off the fire alarm; we might have been a bit sharper in our response times.
The Reporter stated that she does not operate at LGA frequently and her visual expectation of the area bounded by Taxiways P; G and BB where the wind sock is located was much different from what she had conceived while studying the Commercial Airport Chart. She had expected a much larger area but when taxiing by that area it appeared very small and the crew simply misjudged how far back to stop thus allowing another aircraft to taxi from Taxiways PP or CC onto Runway 13. Following the crew's error; ATC's language and clearances became vindicate and lacked the understanding that the crew made an error and rightfully admitted the error not expecting to be punished for it.
A B737 pilot stopped near the wind sock on Taxiway G but blocked an aircraft on DD so it could not get to Runway 13. ATC then became vindictive after further taxi instructions delayed their takeoff inordinately long.