B767-300 and 300 ER
Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument
Situational Awareness; Workload
Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem
Human Factors; Aircraft
Entire event Day VMC. FO (First Officer) [was] PF (Pilot Flying) at start of event. We set 310K in VNAV page and executed. Just after this; the RT AC Bus failed with many associated failures. [Aircraft] started a gentle climb. PM (Pilot Monitoring) announced 'you're climbing;' PF acknowledged and disconnected [autopilot]. Both pilots at this moment know a system has failed; but have yet to determine what failed. The bottom EICAS was failed; and compressed onto top screen. The top caution item presented on the EICAS was Autothrottle Disconnected. Just as the PM was beginning to assess the EICAS screen; the PF announced he had multiple failures and needed to pass the controls (PF had no FD; EHSI; CDU; and numerous other flags on his ADI).The CA (Captain) accepted the controls; while asking Center for vectors and altitudes to ZZZ due to a system failure (logic being we needed relief from the numerous above and below altitudes associated with the STAR). Center provided headings and altitudes. We were set up to fly the approach to XXL. Center asked if we could accept XXR (which is 2;000 feet longer). We agreed we could (day VMC) and knew we would have to change our set up. I don't recall all the headings and altitudes; however; approach requested we slow as much as practical to prepare for our arrival on XXR. Thusly; we started to configure with flaps and later gear to slow down and get down. At some point we did get below bugged airspeed simply due to being behind the power curve on autothrottles inoperative.The PM was a bit overtasked due to running the QRH; internal and external comms; runway change set-up; etc. However; at no time did either of us have any doubt about continuing the arrival to ZZZ because we essentially had the airport in sight. Later; Approach asked us to change back to Runway XXL; again not a problem due to day VMC. What it did was slow down the PM ability to fully complete the QRH checklist. What he was essentially able to accomplish was cycling the generator; and starting the APU; and announcing we had to land at the nearest suitable airfield which is what we were doing. We landed safely and wrote up the RT AC Bus Failure. Had we been IMC or night VMC (due terrain); we would have had to ask for vectors/holding etc; buy more time to complete all QRH checklists and accomplish the same safe landing.This event happened in the last 15 minutes of a 4.5 hour flight. The nature of an AC Bus failure causes so many items to fail; it takes some time to figure out what the root cause of the failure was. In our case; R AC BUS OFF was not the item at the top of the compressed EICAS screen; it was beneath AUTOTHROT DISC. Thusly; it took awhile for the FO to arrive at the correct QRH checklist (in fact; at one point he actually asked me if we had 'lost an engine'; I said no and pointed to both good motors on the upper EICAS); and then; we didn't get past the 2nd page of the 9 page checklist. Why? In this case; we were Aviating; Navigating and Communicating a perfectly flyable aircraft to an airfield we could 'essentially' see from the outset.As the CA; and PM at the beginning of the event; I would have preferred to let the FO continue flying while I took care of troubleshooting and communicating. That wasn't an option in this case; as the FO rightfully passed the controls to me due to the multiple PFD malfunctions on his side. Once I took the aircraft; it was a handful to fly for the first minute or so (trim; autopilot off; etc.) and then again a little later when it came time to get throttles/airspeed in sync. I think that realizing immediately that we needed relief from the 'VIA' portion of our arrival was good; however a couple items Approach threw at us made our task more difficult. They asked if we could accept XXR (my initial thought was just stay with our set-up on XXL; but the FO accurately pointed out it was 2000 ft. longer....so I agreed); but then they ask us to slow as much as possible to prepare for our arrival on XXR. Thusly; we started configuring far earlier than SOP to accommodate the ATC request. And it cost us time in the cockpit (changing). The kicker ends up being they ask us to change back to XXL. I would like to have that time back. As you read this; you need to know that the FO had to reach across the throttle quadrant to make any FMC changes; as his FMC was dead; and my hand was on the throttles. At one point I reached around him to select the next required flap setting (yes; I realize non-standard...but in the moment it was necessary; expedient; and kept from interrupting the FO's task on my FMC). If given this system failure again at the same start point; could we handle it more cleanly...yes. But; we did an after action review of our thought process throughout and are satisfied with each decision we made as a crew during this event. Suggestion; it seems we may have taken the cheap route on reproducing QRH checklists on the aircraft. The color version provided in my opinion provides subtle cognitive clues that were placed there for a reason and present worthwhile information. Suggest applying the resources for proper color QRHs.Suggestion; my FO and I haven't exactly arrived at how the QRH could be cleaner on this failure; but this is one of those procedures where (at least in the heat of the moment) isn't that easy to understand. Maybe a tasker for safety in conjunction with training department to see if the solution we have is the best practice going forward. I honestly don't know.
Day VMC. I'm the PF (Pilot Flying; Captain is the PM (Pilot Monitoring). Leveling at FL210; Approach requests we maintain 300kts or greater for spacing. Captain puts 310 in the FMC VNAV page and executes after confirming with me. At the moment I heard a loud clicking noise coming from the overhead panel; I look to see a number of amber lights on the panel. My scan turns to the EICAS; which has now last compressed to a single CRT; and see a list of yellow cautions. My scan goes to my flight instruments and I recognize that the aircraft has started to climb and started a small left hand turn. The Captain states 'you're climbing' and I immediately disconnect the autopilot. I level the wings and stop the aircraft from climbing and recognize that I have lost some instruments; my CDU is blank; my EHSI is blank; my flight directors are gone; there are a number of yellow flags on my ADI and it appears that my ADI is frozen. I immediately glance at the Captains flight instruments and recognize that his instruments have not been effected and I pass the controls to the Captain. As Captain takes the controls he immediately calls Center and states that we need vectors and altitudes. [Center] provides a vector and altitude and asks if we are [Advising]. Captain and I look at each other and agree that we would continue the approach and determine if we needed to [advise ATC]. I told [Center] that we were accessing the situation; to which [Center] replied; 'can you accept Runway XXR.' We were set up for XXL and the Captain originally stated that he would rather stay with the original plan. I stated that XXR is 2000 ft. longer and the Captain said we can accept XXR. I told [Center] that [we] would accept XXR; to which they asked us to slow as much as practical as they prepared for our arrival (XXR was closed; per ATIS). The Captain started to slow the aircraft as we continued to trouble shoot and determine what exactly happened. The first caution on the EICAS was Auto Thr Off. In my haste to trouble shoot I read that first line to be Auto Pilot Off; as surmised that it was a result of me disconnecting the autopilot. It isn't until later that I become aware of this fact. The next caution was Rt A/C Bus Off; which the Captain and I agreed was the System failure we were dealing with. [Center] provided additional vectors and altitudes; and I set up the approach to XXR using the Captain's CDU. I finally get out the non-normal checklist and go to the appropriate checklist. As I started reading the checklist message to verify we were in the correct checklist for the problem we were dealing with; the Captain had to advance the throttles quite a bit to add power and airspeed as the aircraft decelerated below a bugged speed. It was at this [point] the Captain stated that we didn't have autothrottles and he asked me to back him up on air speeds. Back to the checklist; the first step was to cycle the Rt generator switch; which I did with negative results. The next step called for the starting of the APU. As I waited for the APU to start I tried to regain some of my own instruments; however I was unsuccessful.[Center] then stated that they couldn't get XXR open in time for our arrival and we needed to switch back to XXL. Again; I set us up for XXL using the Captains CDU because mine was still not working. We were VFR the entire time and could see the runway from the start of this event; and now we are turning final for XXL. We configured the aircraft for landing; flaps 25; and slow to approach speed. Again the Captain asks me to monitor airspeed and calls for the landing checklist. At this point I don't feel like I can finish the non-normal checklist so I quickly scan the rest of the checklist and state to the Captain that I can't finish the checklist and that it calls for us to land at the nearest suitable airport; to which the Captain states; 'well; that's ZZZ and that's what we're doing'. The landing and taxi in was uneventful.The checklist; Lt/Rt A/C Bus Off is a long and complicated checklist; 9 pages. What complicated things for me and slowed me down; was the fact that the checklist includes a dual or BOTH A/C Bus Off procedure that runs concurrent with the Lt/Rt A/C Bus Off procedure. I feel that the aircrew would be better served if the checklists were broken into two checklists: a single failure checklist and a dual failure checklist.
B767-300ER flight crew reported experiencing confusion and workload issues while dealing with the loss of an AC bus on approach.