B767-300 and 300 ER
Flight Crew Last 90 Days 120; Flight Crew Total 8700; Flight Crew Type 2200
Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Declared Emergency
Aircraft; Procedure
This aircraft had recently come out of maintenance for previous problems with air/ground logic. Our departure papers stated that the aircraft was determined to be airworthy; and in addition; described the previous problems and what other crews had experienced. These problems basically included: possible partial-flaps landing; no reverse thrust; no autospoilers; and no autobrakes. On the first leg; we experienced no problems. On the second leg; approximately halfway to destination we received the [EICAS] status message 'LND GEAR MONITOR'. This was the problem discussed in our departure papers. We discussed the problem and the possible implications with each other and with Dispatch. We determined that based on our current situation (aircraft weight; weather; wind; runway conditions and length; etc.); the best action would be to continue to destination. While enroute; we discussed the possible failures we could have during approach and upon touchdown and reviewed their associated checklists. Upon check-in with Approach Control we advised them of our situation and that we may need extra time/airspace for the approach. Upon the initial selection of flaps; we received a 'LE SLAT ASYM' message. We ran the appropriate checklist which led us to a flaps 20 landing and a Vref 30+30 (approximately 161 KTS). At this time; the Captain declared a precautionary emergency with Approach Control. Upon touchdown; I immediately determined that the thrust reversers were locked out and not available. I decided not to wait and see if the autobrakes would work and manually applied steady; even braking with the intent on using the entire runway length. The Captain also immediately applied manual spoilers. Upon exiting the runway at the end; we discussed our rather long taxi route and the high possibility of a brake overheat situation. We decided to inform Tower that we would need to shut down and be towed to our ramp; which we did. While monitoring the brake temperatures while being towed in; we determined that we would have most certainly experienced a brake overheat situation.
About an hour into the flight we received an EICAS message: 'LND GEAR MONITOR' with no other indications and not as a result of any crew inputs. Due to previous similar malfunctions on this aircraft we were alerted to possible further complications via the departure papers prior to leaving. (That flight was uneventful with all systems operating normally.) First Officer and I discussed the situation and reviewed the departure papers for possible further complications. We checked the landing distances needed for a worst-case situation under the given conditions (dry runway; calm to light headwinds; VMC conditions; etc.) and determined that the destination runway was more than adequate for our landing weight of approximately 264;800 LBS. After contacting Dispatch via ACARS we decided the best course of action was to continue. We talked about slowing to approach speed on downwind and extending the flaps a bit early since that was the only way we were going to be able to see what problems we might have to handle. We coordinated with ATC declaring a precautionary emergency and advising them that we needed to slow up early on the downwind and letting them know that we might need an extended downwind or vectoring to deal with any possible malfunctions. As we reached 6;000 FT and turned to the south on the arrival we started to extend the flaps to 1. That's when the 'LE SLAT ASYM EICAS' message appeared. We turned to the QRH checklist as we had previously briefed and ran the checklist which resulted in the trailing edge flaps extending normally to 20 - their final position for landing and used Vref 30 +30 for our final approach speed of 161 KTS at 264;800 LBS. As we agreed prior to descending; First Officer would fly the approach and the final mile to the runway at slightly under the glideslope to utilize the most runway available rather touch down at the normal glideslope intercept distance. We touched down just past the numbers and facilitated a landing roll which resulted in less braking than would normally have been required. We had armed the autobrakes to 3 and the spoilers for automatic deployment but were not sure if they worked as designed since we did not want to take a chance on them NOT working resulting in a longer landing roll than needed. I think the speedbrakes were coming up (or attempting to) as we touched down and I manually ensured that they were out. The thrust reversers only extended to the idle detent and would not go into full reverse. We rolled to the end of the runway before turning off; using as little braking action as necessary to slow down. After turning off we coordinated with Ground Control to taxi clear before stopping to be towed the rest of the way onto ramp. Brake temperatures reached a maximum of 6 on the left inner two wheels. The right side only got up to a maximum of 5 briefly but stayed at 4 most of the time. The Crash Crew was right there upon landing and stayed with us to parking though no assistance was needed.
A B767-300 that had recently come out of maintenance for problems with air/ground logic had a repeat LND GEAR MONITOR EICAS message during cruise and a LE SLAT ASYM EICAS message upon arrival at their destination. The flight crew declared an emergency and after landing was towed to the gate.