EMB ERJ 145 ER/LR
Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Communication Breakdown; Distraction; Troubleshooting
Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed
Aircraft; Human Factors
We were pushing off of gate in IAD. As we pushed the ramp crew advised we were clear on engine 2; and I commanded the First Officer start the engine. As he did this I continued to monitor the pushback; looking outside. At the same time we were finishing the push and disconnecting from the tug; the First Officer said: 'somethings not right.' I was acknowledging the ramp crew had removed the strap; and looked up to overhead panel. I saw that the APU bleed was not illuminated and noted this to the First Officer. I assumed the start attempt would be stopped and looked back outside to finish the disconnect procedure with the ramp crew. As I did this the First Officer reached up and pressed the APU bleed button. At this point we did not know but the APU bleed was open; and the bulb had burned out. As the First Officer selected the bleed I remarked;'no; don't.' He then pressed the switch again reacting to my remark. What we had not figured out yet was that; since the bulb was burned out; the engine was receiving bleed air to the starter already; and we had just interrupted that process by quickly removing the air. Though his hand remained on the start/stop selector the First Officer did not stop the start sequence; and; as we were both confused; I did not command him to. The engine experienced a 'hot start.' Since the air was re-introduced; however; it continued to start normally and stabilized. At this point the First Officer selected 'stop;' and the engine shut down normally. We then began the process of contacting Maintenance; Dispatch; Operations; and ramp to arrange a return to gate in order to allow Maintenance to inspect the aircraft.It's important to put in context that from the First Officer's remark of 'something's not right' to selecting stop on the engine was approximately 10 seconds. As we were sitting back at the gate waiting on Maintenance I spoke to the First Officer about this. Our conversation put an emphasis on monitoring the EICAS during engine start; following the memory items for a start abort; and; most importantly; during an abnormal situation not resorting to just 'pressing buttons.' The First Officer understood this; and I think this was a good lesson for both of us on applying these principles and on the importance of CRM in a complicated situation that the crew doesn't fully understand until it's over. If I had commanded the memory item for start abort at the very beginning; this entire situation could have been avoided.
EMB-XRJ Captain reported the pilot crew caused an engine hot start by not flowing proper procedures.