Dash 8-400
Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Communication Breakdown; Troubleshooting; Confusion; Distraction; Human-Machine Interface
Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
General Maintenance Action
Manuals; Environment - Non Weather Related; Aircraft; Company Policy
At our station; my co-Captain (Captain flying as First Officer) and I identified the need to write-up the back light on the engine start panel as it appeared to be inoperative. After speaking with Maintenance Control and Dispatch; two Maintenance Personnel showed up to the aircraft. They indicated to me that they would not be able to fix the part as they do not have the entire panel in inventory and that was the only way to correct the issue. I asked if that meant that we would have to cancel the flight. They indicated to me that they could defer the back lighting on the panel. In the conversation; they asked if we 'could see the panel.' Both my co-Captain and I indicated that we really could not see the panel without additional lighting (e.g. handheld flashlight). However; the Maintenance Personnel continued to defer the panel. After they left; I began to review the MEL (33-10-1).  The MEL specifically states that 1 is installed and 1 is required; with the caveat that it could continue at night if appropriate ambient light allowed the panel to be viewed and the crew was comfortable with the lighting scenario.  I immediately started discussing this with my co-Captain as I was confused and shocked by the MEL verbiage. In fact; my first question was surrounding our ability to depart with the MEL. As it was; with normal ambient light; the panel and switches were not visible. Only with the flight deck overhead lighting on or a handheld flashlight could we view the panel. Our discussion initially surrounded the validity of the MEL and our interpretation of the MEL language. We were not confident that the correct MEL was applied so we decided to contact Maintenance Control. In speaking with the Maintenance Controller; he determined that it was the correct MEL for the item and that it would be up to the crew if we were comfortable accepting the aircraft. We thanked him and indicated that we would discuss it further and make a determination. Clearly at this point we were concerned about the decision to not go with this particular MEL. We were not necessarily comfortable accepting the aircraft for a number of reasons. Most of our concerns related to our ability to access and utilize the panel in an emergency. Generally; the type of emergency that would require using that particular panel are those where a number of systems may be failing and we may not be able to count on overhead lighting. Additionally; those scenarios typically require the use of all of our hands to address the situation from reading the checklists; flying the plane and making the necessary actions per the checklist. They are not conducive to having to also hold a flashlight to shine on the affected panel while the other situations are underway.   We decided to contact the Manager-On-Duty Line offered to the flight crews by the Airlines Flight Operations Management. This line is directed to a rotating group of individuals in the Flight Operations Management team. It is meant to be a direct line to the management team in the event a crew member has an immediate concern or question and is interested in receiving feedback and/or advice from the management team. This line is staffed 24/ 7/365. We dialed the number; placed it on speaker phone so both my co-Captain and I could speak to the MOD and hear their perspective. This particular day the Q400 Program Manager answered our call. We described the situation to him including our concerns for the safe operation of the flight. His response to us was shocking at minimum. He first indicated to us that we should consider this MEL in the context of normal operations only. He indicated to us that we would hypothesize situations; all kinds of situations that would preclude us from having the lights available to us but that these should not weigh into our decision process. It was his opinion that flying was dangerous and if it was too dangerous for us that we should reconsider our decision to be pilots. Again; we were absolutely shocked at the bluntness of his response and the complete disregard for our question. We then asked if we determined that it was not safe to continue; if he would support our decision. He emphatically indicated that he would not support our decision. Period.  We were completely taken aback and shocked. At that point we ended the call. We discussed amongst ourselves his perspective and our continued concern. Clearly; at that point; we felt backed into a corner. It was clear that the Company; and representatives of the Company; would not support our decision in this safety related situation. We weighed our overall concern with the probability of retaliation by the Company and its representatives. We felt that there was a high likelihood of retaliation if we chose to not accept the aircraft; with a lower likelihood of in-flight issues if we accepted the aircraft.  We chose to accept the aircraft. However; this lack of support by the Flight Operations Management Team and the Company in this safety related situation caused us great consternation throughout the flight and remainder of the evening. Both my co-Captain and I were stressed over this situation; to the point that my co-Captain was unable to sleep most of the evening (reference the fact that we landed after midnight with a show time eight and a half hours later).  It is my professional opinion that the advice provided by the Company Flight Operations Management Team; specifically the Q400 Program Manager; was faulty and unacceptable. I am hopeful that this is not the position of the Company; and was only the short-sighted opinion of the Q400 Program Manager. When we look at the factors that affect flights; specifically under the threat management program components; we can clearly identify a number of Threats and Errors in this situation. The Threats involved include the following: - Maintenance Deferral - Time of Day - Length of Period Awake - Company Pressure - Goading into flying by a Company Representative (reference the statement regarding the dangers of flying and decision for us to remain pilots) The Error this night was accepting the aircraft.  I am wholly shocked and saddened that the reaction to a reasonable question by TWO Captains; relatively new to the aircraft and position; was to belittle our question; perspective; flying skills and decision making capabilities. My expectation of the management team; when I ask a question; is to rationally review the situation and provide feedback. I would hope that I would also receive the support of the management team on the decisions we make as captains when safety is concerned. In this particular situation; we received none of this support by the Company Representative. In fact; we were essentially told that our safety concerns were not relevant and if we did not take the aircraft; that our decision would not be supported by the Company. This has clearly implications on our future and tenure at our Company.  The response by the Company Representative (Q400 Program Manager) makes me question his ability to rationally and responsibly make decisions and provide direction to the group. I do not believe that the response by the Q400 Program Manager was appropriate or warranted. I believe that it is contributing to a culture where the crews are concerned about their ability to make safety related decisions without retaliation by the Company.  If we were wrong in asking the questions then please let us know. I do not think that we were.
A Q400 Engine Start Panel back lighting was discovered inoperative prior to a night flight but because the crew could use a flashlight to see the controls; Maintenance and Management refused to repair it and under a Management threat they felt forced to accept the aircraft.