Heavy Transport; Low Wing; 4 Turbojet Eng
Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Communication Breakdown; Other / Unknown
ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Human Factors; Procedure; Staffing
Prior to the event; I came up from break and took a LC (Local Control) position that controls a satellite Class D airport with a gravel strip and water lanes. This position was combined with both CIC and Clearance Delivery/FD. This was never trained as a standard; but some work crews have made this a normal practice when staffing is short. Quickly after taking position; and before the event occurred; I did call up someone to split off the position but I should not have allowed it to remain de-combined in the interim. LC and GC (Ground Control) were de-combined; and while working I heard GC bring a potential conflict to LCs attention (good tower teamwork from GC). As I examined the situation I saw the same conflict- a heavy aircraft had taxied into departure position (Runway 33) with a large aircraft arriving behind on a non-intersecting runway (Runway 7L). With the spacing of the aircraft it did not appear that there was enough space to ensure compliance with our facility order. Our facility order details spacing required with aircraft arriving Runways 7R/L and departing Runway 33. I advised the LC that I did not believe adequate spacing would exist and suggested; but did not instruct; alternate courses of action to avoid a situation where the arriving aircraft might encounter jet blast. The LC insisted it would work and did not take any action. With the proximity of the aircraft; I don't believe a safety issue existed; however lack of compliance with facility guidelines with no standard for separation is an unacceptable risk to the users of the system.This event highlights many issues.As CIC during the event; I take responsibility for my own personal performance. I should not have taken CIC combined with an LC position. I should have had more engagement in the operation - if this situation had been detected earlier there may have been more time to correct it. I also should have given the LC instruction instead of suggestion when I saw action was not going to be taken.1. Lack of staffing. Perpetual lack of staffing leads this facility down the path of using what should be contingency practices into day to day practices. Positions are too often combined and because this has become the norm; controllers do not understand that they are providing a reduced level of service.2. Lack of safety culture. LC had two controllers address concern over this action and did not appear to consider an alternate course of action. This is not a behavior to this specific Controller but throughout this facility.3. Lack of training. The training culture and training at this facility has fallen short on ensuring that the staff of the facility have a thorough understanding of the rules we are expected to apply.4. Lack of supervision. Much like our Controller workforce; our supervisory staff is frequently understaffed and asked to do an excessive amount of duties that take them away from the operation. There was not a supervisor present at the time of the incident.5. Bad procedures. The facility; and region as a whole have done a poor job at creating procedures that are not easily followed by pilots or controllers. Many of these procedures don't have reasonable 'outs'; which put pilots and controllers in dangerous situations in a recovery situation.Consider revising ANC jet blast procedures.Provide clear expectations to CPCs on services we are expected to provide pilots.Provide adequate staffing to accomplish existing goals.
ANC Tower Controller reported Local Controller failed to follow facility policy nor take action to comply. Reporter states facility policies are unclear and difficult to follow.