Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown
Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown
Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew FLC Overrode Automation
Aircraft; Human Factors
Non radar guided ILS DME VOR RWY 07 (11- 2) to MZBZ. During the turn to enter the teardrop course reversal overhead the airport the Pilot Flying (PF) was completely unable to comprehend or accept that [they] had inserted the wrong approach transition; nor did [they] ever acknowledge or adhere to my continual prompting that [the Pilot flying] needed to turn and establish on the BZE 282 radial as verbally instructed by ATC. Outbound in the wrong procedure turn the PF lost whatever situational awareness that may have existed prior. When I explained [they were] flying approximately 60 degrees off course the PF responded that [they] would 'go this way instead'I resorted to hand signals showing that we that we were flying 'this way' and that we needed to be flying 'over there' hoping that would help the situational awareness. The PF then inexplicably decided to disconnect the autoflight system and roll into a steep descending right turn presumably toward the airport. I called out 'altitude altitude altitude...level off; you are 1;000 feet low and X miles off course; the course is over there and the airport is X miles over there' (using my hands again in the hope of painting an understandable visual picture)The PF leveled off momentarily but then began to descend again in the verbalized belief that [they were] somehow on an established segment of the approach. As we were now pointed; more or less; in the general direction of an airport; and neither terrain nor air traffic were a factor; I inserted direct to the final fix in the FMGC; selected nav and instructed [them] to proceed direct to the fix and not to descend any lower than [they already were]. The approach was stable by 1;000 Above Field Elevation (AFE)Visibility was limited to approximately 5 miles and radar services were not available. However terrain and traffic were not factors and the aircraft was operating flawlessly.During my one previous experience with this particular PF; I had to ignore [them] not once but twice as [they] commanded me to retract flaps to zero at 400 feet AFE on takeoff. That experience made me reluctant to overload [them] with anything as task-saturated as a go-around until it became the only possible solutionThe aircraft database contains two approach VIA transitions; BZE1 and BZE2. BZE1 does not correspond to anything published in the charts we are supplied. At 10 DME we were instructed to proceed to the BZE VOR and that we were cleared for the approach and to report established on the BZE 282 radial outbound. The BZE1 VIA was selected by the PF but not briefed or validated; the PF was not using the VOR that I had hard-tuned in the RAD/NAV nor the NAV display that during the outbound segment clearly showed the required VOR course did not overlay the track the autoflight system was following. The BZE1 VIA needs to be removed from the database.
A First Officer describes a botched ILS DME VOR approach to Runway 7 at MZBZ by the flying Captain. The ILS DME Runway 7 had apparently been selected in the FMGC and the autopilot was flying out the 257 Radial instead of the assigned 282 Radial. Altitude deviations also occurred.