B757 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Flight Crew Last 90 Days 256; Flight Crew Total 14400; Flight Crew Type 10750
Workload; Time Pressure; Confusion
Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Incursion Runway
Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Airport; Human Factors
A series of distractions set up an error on my part departing ORD on the last leg of a 2 day trip. A delay at the gate by a minor cabin maintenance issue followed by traffic in the alley created concern about making an estimated departure clearance time (EDCT). An unfamiliar runway configuration also helped to create time compression issues. The departure ATIS called for Runway 10L; 22L or 9R for departure. We initially planned for and briefed a 22L departure. Upon check-in with Ground; with approximately 10 minutes to our EDCT; we were assigned Runway 9R via Taxiway A; E; cross 4L; H hold short of J; a fairly short; complicated taxi.   As the Captain taxied I went heads down to request the takeoff data for the departure runway. Unfortunately; at this point; years of flying out of ORD under the old runway naming conventions and very little recency with the new (maybe 3 times) combined with all the other references to 'left' runways (10L; 22L and crossing 4L) led me to request data for and load 9L. As the data came in requiring a configuration change to flaps 15; we were cleared into position. We were both distracted by a regional jet taxiing at fairly high speed on J approaching us and the entry to 9R.  The regional jet stopped abruptly but left marginal wing tip clearance as we made the turn toward the runway.  I believe this significantly impacted both of us not catching the discrepancy during the before takeoff checklist and runway verification.  I believe I said 9L during the checklist read out and remember looking at the 9 next to the runway as I said it.  I believe the L may have been obscured by TCAS info from a departing aircraft.  Also; in my mind; 9L was the correct runway.  Neither of us noticed the aircraft was not lined up on the runway display until after the 100 knot call.  When I realized the mistake I made the decision not to call for the abort because the takeoff data was for a shorter runway and the aircraft did not meet the criteria for a high speed abort.  Discussing the error later with the Captain; he came to the same conclusion.
Departure ATIS said departure runways were 9R and 22L. We expected 22L and set the FMC for 22L and had takeoff data for 22L; flaps 5 prior to pushback. Ground Control issued clearance for taxi to 9R via A E cross 4L H hold short J. The aircraft in front of us was given taxi instructions for 9R of A A7 J. I was expecting to follow him. We had an estimated departure clearance time (EDCT) and thus a different taxi route. I devoted extra diligence to the taxi route and directed the First Officer to make the FMC runway change and obtain new takeoff performance data. He made the requested FMC runway change and said it will now be flaps 15. I directed him to set flaps 15 and I verified that flaps were set to 15. I verified on the FMC takeoff page that flaps 15 was displayed. I glanced at the new takeoff performance data printout and saw flaps 15. As we approached Taxiway J I called for the Before Takeoff Checklist. Tower issued us '9R line up and wait' about the same time we were accomplishing the checklist. At about the same time I was focused on another aircraft taxiing toward 9R on J at a higher than normal speed such that I slowed our taxi because I thought he was not going to yield to us. We both stated '9R verified' prior to taxiing onto the runway. When the First Officer called '100 knots' I glanced at the engine instruments. As I made that glance I saw the Takeoff Performance data printout below the CDU and saw 'Runway 9L'. We were now in the high speed takeoff range. I elected to continue the takeoff because I considered that to be the safest course of action. My reasons for that decision were that we had the correct flap setting for the takeoff data; 9R is longer than 9L and there are no climb obstacles that were a factor (no takeoff procedure for either 9L or 9R). I am shocked and cannot believe that we made this mistake. When I verify the takeoff runway prior to entering the runway I always look at the runway sign and I always have the FMC takeoff page displayed and look at the runway and flap setting displayed there as part of my technique. I do not recall if I verified the FMC runway change made by the First Officer as I was focused more on complying with the taxi instructions. I used my captain emergency authority to continue the takeoff as that was the safest course of action (safer than a high speed abort; the flap setting was correct; and the takeoff data was conservative as we were n a longer runway).
B757 flight crew reports becoming distracted during taxi out at ORD due to an estimated departure clearance time and a departure runway change. Takeoff data for Runway 9L is inadvertently requested and used for takeoff from Runway 9R. Both crew members detect the error during the takeoff roll and elect to continue due to 9R being longer than 9L.