Commercial Fixed Wing
Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Situational Awareness
ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
General None Reported / Taken
Airspace Structure; Human Factors; ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Procedure
I was working Sector 90/80/47 combined. Part of the White Sands Missile Range (WSMR) was active FL300 and below; the only part being hot above that was R5103C; showing 000B999 (unlimited). That changed part way through the shift (not sure exactly when) to FL300 and below (scheduled via EDST by the MOS in TMU and then the orange depictions in ERAM on the scope); so we started clearing aircraft through the areas. Later I had a B737 going direct LLO and noticed that it showed orange in EDST. I clicked out; saw R5103C was active 999 and below again; and re cleared the aircraft RUTER...LLO to miss the airspace (R5103 is about 100 miles east of my airspace). I thought that I had missed the original alert in EDST; assuming the airspace had changed in EDST via an MOS inputted schedule and I just hadn't noticed it. I yelled over at Sector 91 to let him know that the chunk of airspace was not hot. A few minutes later; the FLM on duty came down to the area and told me that R5103C was actually hot and had never gone cold. The Supervisor told me that WSMR had called to ask why there were airplanes in the airspace because they were shooting off missiles. I don't know how many aircraft went through the airspace. I believe we showed it FL300 and below for at least a couple of hours. I'm not entirely sure what the recommendation for this would be. The TMU and TMO are in the middle of trying to work out a redesign of the MOS position because it is inherently flawed. About a year and a half ago; we had several deviations of WSMR because of a problem with the schedule (on ZAB's end) which; in investigating the incidents; it was discovered that the design was bad. About 18 months later; we have had no movement on the design of the MOS. It is still flawed; there are still not any procedures governing the MOS; there is no training and the problems with SAM/MADE are creating extreme potential for error. Frankly; I think we need some help getting this accomplished. We are in the process of creating a collaborative workgroup for military airspace because of the problems we've been having. Unfortunately; the scope of the workgroup will be limited to internal solutions; even though some of problems lie outside of the building.
ZAB Controller indicated the possibility that several aircraft were directed through restricted airspace;listing airspace design; facility coordination and equipment updates as causal factors.