A319
Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument
Communication Breakdown; Distraction
Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown
Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Work Refused
Human Factors; Procedure; Aircraft
A vibration / rumble was noticed during the No.2 engine start.   During taxi the Captain performed his flight controls check so fast that I was unable to keep up with the call outs. It had been this way the whole trip; in fact I had insisted that it be repeated on the 1st leg so I could correctly check the control position.  Whilst holding short of Runway XXL the Captain indicated he would turn the anti-ice off on taking the runway. I pointed out that the published ATIS reported runway conditions of 3;3;3 with 50% compacted snow; 50% compacted snow; 75% compacted snow. He was still inclined to turn off the anti-ice so I tried again suggesting should anything happen any investigation would focus on this. Reluctantly the anti-ice remained on and having lined up it was obvious that the runway was still significantly impacted by snow.  On departure I chose to call for autopilot 2 at approx 100 ft in case the controller was busy. This allowed me to notice during the initial turn towards / at ZZZZZ that on the E / WD the title Engine" was flashing as well as "N1 VIB" was flashing green 9.9. An increase in noise and vibration was perceived from the right engine. Anti-ice was reapplied and after a short while the indication reduced to 8.2. The indication returned to 9.9 after the anti-ice was turned off during climb and it remained this way until the engines were at idle during the descent. During cruise I suggested the possibility of a bad sensor; the Captain's opinion was that we had a vibration. Later during the leg I commented on the vibration and now the Captain's opinion was that we may have a bad sensor. We were initially cleared to FL360. As we approached level off the Captain requested a climb to FL380 earlier than the flight plan fix of ZZZZZ1. On reaching cruise I reduced then increased managed Mach by 0.01 to investigate the potential of a harmonic vibration. Once established at the new speeds there was no difference in the indicated vibration so I returned to the managed speed with the intent to divert should the situation deteriorate. The Captain took out his QRH and referenced the High Engine Vibration procedure. It was given to read and after a discussion the Captain elected not to follow it as it would require descending from cruise altitude. For the remainder of cruise the Captain returned to reading his magazine. I monitored the indications; changed assigned radio frequencies and from time to time closed my eyes to concentrate on feeling whether the vibration had changed or the ambient sound had changed. We began flying the arrival. During the descent; Approach instructed us to increase speed to 310 kts or better. I felt that this was a bad idea and expressed this by saying ' I don't want to do that ' and 'I am uncomfortable with that'.  'So what it's only 20 kts' was the reply and seeing no intent to inform Approach of our situation; I felt that I had pushed as far as I could and increased speed. The Captain gleefully declared that the vibration had dropped to 2.2. I countered stating that the engines were now at idle as the aircraft attempted to stay on the profile at a higher speed. It was at this point that I decided to reach out  and have myself removed from the trip. ZZZ1 was landing north with reported winds of 160/6 so a landing approach calculation was performed for the tail wind landing. On short final the Captain elected to increase Vapp unilaterally leading to a long float during landing. A new landing approach calculation for the new numbers was not performed. On landing I briefly deployed reverse thrust and quickly closed down the right engine before it could spool up and exacerbate the vibration problem. I moderated the thrust from the left engine and relied mainly on wheel braking to slow the aircraft. Control was passed back to the Captain at approx 60 kts for the taxi to the gate."
First Officer reported asking to be removed from the flight after disagreement with Captain over correct actions to be taken after excessive vibrations on an engine were not followed.