Regional Jet 200 ER/LR (CRJ200)
Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human-Machine Interface; Troubleshooting
Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Maintenance Action
Aircraft; Human Factors; Procedure
Upon arrival at our first intermediate stop I did the post flight inspection. I noticed a hinged access panel at the 10 o'clock position (looking forward) on the forward part of the left engine tailcone was popped open. I wrote the problem up in the logbook with Maintenance Control. A Mechanic arrived in short time; closed and latched the panel and signed off the logbook for us and returned the aircraft to service.On the return flight; climbing through approximately 14;000 FT we felt and heard a big bang from the rear of the aircraft; and the aircraft gyrated a little as well. I looked up at the EICAS to see the left engine N1 indicating a momentary overspeed condition. I was unable to see to what RPM it oversped; but the needle was red. The autopilot stayed engaged and I reduced the throttles slightly as the First Officer and I talked about what just happened. I advanced both throttles back to climb thrust and recorded the engine indications of both engines. All engine indications stayed normal in the green; but with both engines at the same N1 the left engine showed a lower ITT (50 deg); lower fuel flow (200 PPH); and a lower oil temp (30 deg).We asked the Flight Attendant if she noted any abnormal indications beside the initial event; and she did not. A few passengers showed concern; however.The aircraft also seemed to be a sluggish climber at this point; but we were able to reach our cruise altitude of FL260 and our filed cruise TAS of 374 KTS. We then discussed what the bang was and whether we should divert and/or shut the left engine down in flight; because no QRH procedure recommended it and because all engine indications were still normal; we agreed to continue but with considerable concern.Upon initiating descent with the First Officer as temporary pilot flying; while I was typing a message to Dispatch communicating our event and intent to write-up the problem on the ground; the First Officer informed me that the left thrust lever would not decrease thrust below 81% N1. The lever physically limited travel from 81% to full thrust but not less. We both knew that this meant an in-flight shutdown of the left engine and agreed it needed to be done to achieve a safe outcome of the flight. I resumed pilot flying duties while the First Officer found the 'thrust lever jammed' QRH procedure and prepared to comply with it. He also informed the Flight Attendant that we were planning on a single engine approach and landing.We received a crossing restriction on the descent but advised ATC we were unable to make the speed. We then declared an emergency; asked for and were given a holding pattern to run checklists and were transferred to Approach Control. We then advised Dispatch of our emergency situation; position; and intentions via ACARS.We did one turn in the holding pattern and then; because of the speed in the hold due to one engine stuck at N1 81%; decided to go ahead and complete the Thrust Lever Jammed QRH; which involved shutting down the left engine. We also consulted the single engine procedures QRH; which is similar to the thrust lever jammed QRH; but we complied with every aspect of the jammed lever QRH.At this point the left engine was secured and I transferred the plane back to the First Officer and made a PA to the passengers; where I stated what had happened in basic terms and that we were going to land normally. I did not mention the word emergency to passengers; but I did inform them that it would be a single engine landing with the left engine shutdown. I made certain that the Flight Attendant was not preparing for an emergency evacuation upon landing and she agreed she was not and did not think the situation merited an evacuation. She did have multiple commuting pilots already sitting near the emergency exits and briefed them individually on the very slight possibility of an evacuation.We received good data and information back from Dispatch (minimum landing distance required; etc.). Approach wanted us to leave the holding pattern to make room for arrivals and we advised we were ready to receive vectors for the approach to the longest runway and they complied; no problem. We completed the in range checklist; I briefed the approach; and we completed the approach checklist. We wanted to take more time but the time we did have initially seemed to go by fast; our fuel was approaching 1;900 LBS estimated on arrival and we both felt we should land soon. I flew the landing at flaps 20 with a 149 KTS target speed in a calm wind; disconnecting the autopilot after we reached gear down flaps 20 configuration.On landing the airplane skipped a small amount and after it stuck I noticed the ground lift dump devices were not deploying and deployed the flight spoilers to max per the QRH. I moderately applied the brakes and full right thrust reverser; and we turned off the runway. Fuel on board was 1;900 LBS. The fire trucks were waiting for us as we cleared the runway. Via Ground Control we asked the Fire/Rescue to advise if the left engine appeared safe to taxi; they replied yes but there is damage to it.We taxied to the gate where we were met by Company Management; agents; police; and mechanics. I gave the policeman a brief report as the First Officer assisted passengers. No passengers reported injuries or requested medical attention.Afterwards I inspected the damage to the plane; the upper half tailcone cowling was gone and bottom half of the tailcone had shifted at a downward angle. Pictures were taken by Managers and Maintenance. I participated in a long phone call with Maintenance Control writing up the entire series of events; and in a debrief phone call with Dispatch; Operations Control; the Flight Department; and the Safety Department. I later learned that this aircraft had the upper and lower tailcone cowls removed and reinstalled during scheduled maintenance the night before. He stated that the inboard forward upper cowl latch (one of six latches per engine; three on each side) had not engaged its closing/locking mechanism properly; and stated that he had observed the damage and signs left over indicating this.All in all; I am happy with how we all performed our duties and made decisions during this event. I would like to thank Dispatch; Maintenance Control; Operations Control; and the Flight Department and Safety Department for their assistance during this event and for their concern for my and my crew's welfare afterwards.I will probably be suspect of the tailcone cowling security if I see a tailcone with an inspection/access panel popped in the future. If it is determined that a popped inspection/access panel; indicates a possible problem with the tailcone cowling; that information should be disseminated to the pilot group in training materials.
Following a thorough flight inspection; which discovered an open access panel on the left engine cowling; a CRJ-200 flight crew experienced a loud bang followed by a jammed left throttle at high thrust which required them to perform an inflight shutdown and perform a single engine landing. Following a safe landing; Maintenance found the upper half of the tailcone cowling missing and the lower half still attached; but displaced from its design location.