B737-800
Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Flight Crew Last 90 Days 35; Flight Crew Type 35
Communication Breakdown; Time Pressure
Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation
Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action
Human Factors
Very near to scheduled departure time; the Flight Crew was verbally informed that there was an aircraft battery onboard and the Operations Agent was in process of completing the NOTAC. The Agent was waiting on Tech Ops for necessary information.Approximately 20 minutes later; the Agent returned and explained there was confusion due to the fact that the battery originated on the same aircraft in ZZZ and was scheduled to continue on another aircraft. A short while later I was provided a document that resembled a NOTAC; however; was a single copy and had no place for me to sign; thereby acknowledging the presence of HAZMAT. I requested the proper form; in duplicate; and the Agent graciously agreed leaving once again to gather the proper form.I attempted to find the reference to required notices (NOTAC) in the X manual while the First Officer searched for the recent bulletin that we both recalled being issued referencing the subject. Dispatch was contacted and I agreed to a pen and ink revision to the Release in order to add the note 'HAZMAT on flight - refer to NOTAC'. The Operations Agent returned with the original NOTAC; issued in ZZZ; signed by the original flight's Captain. The Agent had a duplicate copy. I accepted that document; placed it in the aircraft log and proceeded with the flight.Airborne; we continued to research the event and found bulletin XX-YY issued (date). This revised Company procedures to provide a NOTAC for each individual flight.Do not succumb to perceived time pressures until a valid reference can be located. There were many resources called upon in this event including the Flight Crew; Operations Supervisors; Tech Ops; Dispatch; and an additional Operations Supervisor in the Operations Center. Everyone seemed to be in agreement that we were legal to depart once the original NOTAC was obtained. Had we been able to readily locate and reference the policy/bulletin; we would have been able to verify the revised procedure. It was evident we were not the only aspect of this event that was unfamiliar with the revised procedure.
B737-800 Captain reported receiving incorrect Hazmat document (NOTAC) during preflight for onboard cargo. Flight crew persisted until correct revised procedure and correct Hazmat form provided to flight crew.