EMB ERJ 145 ER/LR
Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Situational Awareness; Time Pressure; Workload
Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue
Flight Crew Became Reoriented; General Maintenance Action
Human Factors; Procedure
I was operating flight to ZZZ. The weather was good and after detecting inadequate fuel planning and requesting additional fuel we departed on time and flew the filed flight plan. We were clear direct to ZZZZZ. Our ATIS was showing that we were expecting to land on Runway XX left.Knowing it was early in the morning we did anticipate a possible runway opening of either XX right or XY. When we were about three minutes from ZZZZZ; We were given the instructions to depart ZZZZZ on a heading to intercept the XY localizer. Although we had planned for the possibility of XY; this was a fairly abrupt and last-minute instruction from ATC. As briefed; this falls under the 'slam dunk' which was is always a threat; as I briefed for departure.We departed ZZZZZ on the assigned heading and began to set up for the intercept of the XY localizer. We were given a descent to 9000; then very quickly a decent to 6000; then a speed reduction to 170 and then briefly after that another speed reduction to 160 (until 5 out). All of this seem to happen in [a] very quick sequence. I was set up to intercept; set up to descend and began to slow down According to our instructions.We established our self on the ILS [Runway] XY without incident but when I realized that we needed to slow down; I called for flaps 22 'out of sequence.' (Typically flaps 22 is called with 'Gear Down'). I had already called for flaps nine; and just naturally called for flaps 22 knowing I needed to slow down.My First Officer (FO) followed the command and put in flaps 22. I naturally look down and scanned my instruments as I always do after a change command and I immediately realized that we were above the 200 knot threshold. I immediately took action - I pressed in the TCS (Control Steering) button; pitched up and began to slow down. As quickly and as safely as I could I brought the aircraft under the 200 knot limitation and completed the rest of the flight without incident.Upon landing I called my dispatcher; explained what happened; maintenance came out; they completed a full inspection and downloaded the information from the airplanes computer. We swapped airplanes so that the inspection could be completed and by the time we landed in ZZZ1; I had heard back from the maintenance supervisor. He told me that the inspection was completed no defects were found and the airplane was returned to service.I detected the problem. I always do a brief scan during critical phases of flight to confirm that the command and input was followed. So I did my scan after calling for Flaps 22 and immediately realized the error. I did not alert FO; as it was not necessary and I simply made the adjustments to the pitch and speed by using the TCS button. I feel there were 2 factors contributing cause to this event. The first was the additional time we had to spend on considering our planned fuel situation. This was definitely an added concern that both FO and I collaborated on before we even left the gate. Then; as Runway XY was opened and we received the 'Slam Dunk' vectors onto the ILS XY; was a second major contributor to this situation. My suggestion as to how to avoid this situation is to simply avoid the 'slam dunk' vectors. Had I asked for better vectors; I'm certain that this situation could and would have been avoided.
Captain reported a flap speed was exceeded when the Captain called for an early flap extension to slow after ATC gave them a series of rapid descents and airspeed reductions.