B747-400
Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Flight Crew Last 90 Days 75; Flight Crew Total 20500
Communication Breakdown; Training / Qualification
Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach
General None Reported / Taken
Human Factors; Procedure
Unstable Approach night time. On the leg from ZZZ to ZZZZ; the Captain was Pilot Flying. Crew was First Officer and myself as Relief Pilot. Takeoff; climb proceeded normally. Enroute FL370; night time between layers.Prior to top of descent; weather was received. Pilot Flying commenced the descent slightly before FMA T/D. Speed intervene was selected using LNAV VNAV.The descent initiation normal; but Captain quickly fell behind in the 3:1 profile - VNAV PTH never captured. VNAV SPD was selected and remained. Captain increasing MCP Speed was only action taken to correct for lag in rate of descent. Captain failed to realize that as AC fell further behind in descent he was rapidly gaining on IAF.The FD was never captured for vertical path during descent or approach. He refused to Select Speedbrake or FLCH prior to FAF to capture Vertical path guidance as suggested for a stable descent. Captain responded 'I do not use Speed brakes.' (Pilot known for not using FLCH; believes speedbrake are for weak pilots.) He did not go around to establish a more stable approach prior to 1;000 feet despite very high and extreme pitch down attitude.At STAR waypoint ZZZZZ; we were well above the 3:1 rule of thumb for descent planning. By my calculations; we would cross ZZZZZ1 approx. 6;000 - 7;000 feet. Jepps called for 3;000 [feet.] or above and 200 kts. We crossed ZZZZZ1 at slightly above 6;000 feet. Speed was slowing to 200 kts. At ZZZZZ1 I stated 'You need to go around; wave off; this is too high'. The First Officer/Pilot Monitoring said nothing at any time. ZZZZZ1 - ZZZZZ2 FAF recommends crossing ZZZZZ1 3;000 to descend to 1;800 [feet] at ZZZZZ2. At ZZZZZ2; Captain had managed to descend to approx. 3400 ft.; not 1;800 [feet] I said he should go-around. The Approach was never stable. The Captain never declared a visual to crew or ATC. Inside ZZZZZ2; the attitude was 15 [degrees] nose down. At ZZZZZ2 I said he should go around. At 1;000 feet rate of descent had stabilized; the DA was 860 feet and a landing was made.The weather was clear we saw the PAPI indicating high. Later; I asked the First Officer why he didn't advised the Captain that he was high throughout the arrival; including inside the IAF. His only remark was 'Nothing matters until 1;000 feet. He only had to be stable at 1;000 feet.' Also; First Officers have clearly been given the directive that they are to 'keep their mouths shut.' That certainly would have played a role in the First Officer in this situation in not alerting the Captain to his unstable approach.Legal operating standard is 'stable at 1;000 [feet]' for approaches. 'We only have to be stable at 1;000 feet' has clearly been misapplied by Management and some crew members believe ANY phase of unstable approach is of no concern until 1;000 feet.Illustration of 15 degrees down PFD pitch inside FAF ZZZZZ2.  PFD displayed 15 degrees nose down inside FAF all the way to 1;000 feet - unstable approach. This situation after FAF the slightest upset could have resulted in a CFIT. Understand that CFIT occurs in all phases of flight.It is always in the interest of safety to consistently fly the normal; stable flight profile every time. Use the FD; plan normal rate of descent using all the automation at hand and FLY SAFE.
B747-400 First Officer reported a communications breakdown between Captain (PF) and First Officer (PM) during unstabilized approach. First Officer further stated Captain refused to consider Pilot Monitoring recommendations.