Cessna Citation Sovereign (C680)
Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Flight Crew Last 90 Days 30; Flight Crew Total 16000; Flight Crew Type 160
Situational Awareness
Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR
Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Exited Penetrated Airspace; General Maintenance Action
Aircraft; Human Factors
We were departing in a corporate Citation Sovereign in VMC conditions. I [was] the Captain and the Pilot Flying. We announced on the CTAF that we were taxiing to Runway XX. As we exited the ramp inbound traffic called in for Runway YY; so we made a last minute runway change to Runway YY resulting in a very short taxi. Before taxiing I had thoroughly briefed the Runway XX departure. But I had not briefed Runway YY and I was not 100% familiar with the airspace further south. I was aware that an immediate turn on course would present no problem and as a precaution and as a part the pre-takeoff final briefing I asked the co-pilot to open up her chart and to 'keep me honest on any airspace south of the airport.'When the landing gear was commanded up after takeoff the gear began its retraction and then immediately re-extended; evidently due to a faulty air/ground sense switch. We both focused on the problem and in my distraction I delayed starting my turn to the east. Shortly after I began the delayed turn the copilot said. 'We're in a MOA.' I glanced at my chart and said. 'No; I think we may be in a Restricted Area.' I elected to continue straight ahead out of any airspace as it appeared that the depicted area was narrow and that a course reversal could only prolong our time in the area. We completed the checklist and with the landing gear indicating safely down and locked; and with the weather being VMC; we elected to fly gear-down & VFR to the nearby Service Center. We landed there without incident and had the gear system repaired.I am very unhappy with myself over this. As a former Check Airman for a major airline I am more than familiar with the importance and recognition of human factors and the importance of the delegation of crew duties during the accomplishment of emergencies and abnormal procedures. And my co-pilot is an FAA Designated Examiner. We both know better than to get ourselves mutually wrapped up in a problem in a 2 crew aircraft!So what exactly contributed? Rushing. After the short taxi it would have taken but a moment to review the new departure fully. I'm newly back to corporate aviation and I admit I feel pressure to perform in this position that I never felt in 27 years of airline flying. This pressure is totally self-imposed and I'm going to get over that immediately! Failure of Cockpit Discipline: As a crew we fly together constantly. We always brief who will fly the airplane; and in the event of a problem who will run checklists. That's good enough in theory; but we failed to put that into practice! We did not 'Walk our Talk!' We are also changing that immediately.Steps we are taking to make certain this doesn't happen again: The next day my co-pilot and I had a long; frank; and honest sit-down discussion about how we work together in the cockpit. We covered the areas where we both believed we had strengths; but especially our weaknesses; and how those can affect our interactions. We discussed ways in which we can better communicate; especially in the heat of battle. And we decided we would stop feeling rushed; and always take our time to fully review every critical phase of flight. We also made it absolutely clear that it was the responsibility of BOTH crew members to ensure that someone was always flying the airplane; and furthermore that if the flying pilot tried to jump into working a problem then the non-flying pilot was required to remind them to stick to the flying! The session was productive and we are going to have periodic honest reviews of how we function as a crew and how we can improve communication and cockpit discipline.
I feel that this was a classic case of loss of situational awareness; compounded by dealing with an abnormal gear indication and planning for diversion to a maintenance facility. The situation was exacerbated by the sudden decision to proceed under VFR when we had planned and briefed for a flight under IFR; and a corresponding lack of preparation for VFR flight. On initial climb out my charts were displaying the IFR high charts for the area; which reduced my situational awareness of our position over the ground. Other compounding factors were the workload imposed by consulting the checklist and reconfiguring for the diversion all within the first 5-6 minutes after takeoff. I also believe transferring control of the aircraft during this high workload phase contributed to less than optimal communication and situational awareness.
CE680 flight crew reported an airspace incursion shortly after takeoff when they were distracted by a landing gear problem.