B737 Next Generation Undifferentiated
Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Situational Awareness; Other / Unknown; Distraction; Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Training / Qualification
ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; General Work Refused
Airspace Structure; Chart Or Publication; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors; Procedure
I have been flying to MGGT for many years and I love it. The country; the people; the food. However; the flying environment is very demanding and the controllers add to that stress.1. On approach the night before; we were just 13 miles from the final approach fix when he asked us to speed up to 250 kts. We respectfully declined and he was good with it.2. Every time we call for departure clearance; he always gives us a different SID than we filed. So; we asked for the filed SID he gave it to us. It is the same every trip.Ok; these two points are minor; but I wanted to mention them. However; the next three points are very important and need to be addressed.3. Holding short for runway 02; he said; 'Aircraft X; you are cleared immediate takeoff. Fly runway heading and maintain 8;000 feet until 10 DME.' And that is all he said. I looked at my FO and his mouth dropped open and he shook his head. He looked at me as I was also now shaking my head and then I keyed the mike and said 'we are not going to fly runway heading and maintain 8;000 feet.' He backed off and said; 'OK; OK hold short.' 4. We did a bleeds off takeoff at 159;000 pounds. My first officer did the takeoff. I asked him to run the power up to max and make it shake before releasing the brakes. Everything seemed OK but with slow acceleration because of the altitude and weight. During the roll it became evident that we were far down the runway when the V1 call came and I made the 'rotate' call right after that. The FO rotated and I said 'look how far down we are' and it appeared to be about only about 2;000 feet left. The aircraft did not jump off the runway and it slowly lifted off and climbed after what seemed like a little hesitation. After we cleaned up the aircraft; we discussed it and the FO said that 'the controls seemed sluggish at rotation.' We both discussed that if we had lost an engine; it would have been very; very bad. We double checked what we did with flaps; N1; TPS; etc; but we think it was all correct. Then I thought about it and we had asked about the wind right at taxi about 20 minutes earlier. He had said calm. I did not ask for an updated wind on takeoff and he did not offer a wind readout. I suspect that we had a 5 to 7 knot tailwind on takeoff and he did not tell us. 5. Something is wrong with the design/geometry of RNAV (RNP) Y Rwy 20. The first time I flew it a couple of months ago at night in the weather I broke out at minimums and it seemed that I was screaming low right over the runway end identifier lights with 4 red PAPIs. Two days later I flew the same approach during the day down to minimums again. When we broke out I looked around and noticed that we seemed low with of course 4 red PAPIs again and really close to the buildings and antennas. I said to my FO 'Does it seem like we are a little low?' He right away loudly said 'We ARE LOW!' I said it's strange because everything looks perfect on the HUD. Later we went to Duty Free and talked with a guy from another airline who landed just before us. He said that his stepfather is a Captain and briefed him that everybody knows when you get to DA on this approach; hesitate for a couple of seconds and then continue visually. Well; the PAPI is 3.5 degrees and the approach is 3.2; so you never get up to the PAPI. However; it appears to many of us pilots that the approach takes you to land on the displaced threshold instead of the runway.
Reporter stated that he recognized that his points 1 and 2 are a function of the local; foreign flying environment. Of his point 3; he stated that he believed that the revised; dangerous takeoff clearance into mountainous terrain was not issued maliciously; but that it happens routinely and needs to be recognized by those who fly in that environment. On his point 4; he stated that he believes that the Tower Controller intentionally did not provide wind information with the takeoff clearance because it would have likely caused the reporter to use the opposite runway. The reporter stated that he was so upset by the revised; dangerous takeoff clearance issue (point #3); that he forgot to ask the wind when he was given clearance to takeoff. On his point 5; he stated that the MGGT RNAV (RNP) Y Rwy 20 approach was flown on the HUD and was 'centered.' He stated that his 'centered' approach definitely put him low on the PAPIs at the decision altitude where he broke out. Other pilots complain of the same flaw in the approach. He explained that the approach; if flown as published; appears to set you up to land on the runway past the beginning of the pavement; but short of the displaced threshold which he stated was what he was trying to say in the last statement of his report. He stated that it was definitely a hazard and reiterated that it has to be addressed.
B737 Captain reported difficulty and stress in working with Guatemalan controllers. He was given a revised; unacceptable takeoff clearance by MGGT Tower and did not receive the winds for takeoff. Captain also stated the RNAV (RNP) Runway 20 Approach is allegedly flawed in its design. It consistently positions the aircraft low when on the glidepath at the decision altitude.