B767 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness
Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution
Weather; Aircraft; Procedure
I was the Relief Pilot. I had come off of my rest break; received a briefing from the Captain and then the Captain went on break. We were East of 50W; established on NAT track U when we got a master caution EICAS message: R STRUT DUCT LEAK with R ENGINE BLEED and R PACK OFF sub messages. I ran the checklist from the QRH. We called the Captain back to the flight deck and briefed him on the situation. A satcom call was established to dispatch and we eventually had dispatch; Maintenance Control and a Duty Manager on the line. The satcom call worked well initially but then dropped several times making communications very lengthy and cumbersome. Discussions ensued regarding ETOPS legality; suitable diversion airports and; ultimately; our plan of action. We were not in ETOPS airspace at the time the strut leak occurred. However; by the time we ran the checklist; discussed the situation with dispatch; maintenance; and amongst ourselves; we were well into ETOPS airspace. The checklist states; 'Avoid Icing Conditions.' This was of particular concern because we were in the dead of winter over the North Atlantic and the entire East coast of North America was experiencing a winter storm. Gander (CYQX) was the only suitable alternate behind us. My main concern was a situation where we would to need to descend while on the NAT due to pressurization or engine issues. In this scenario we might well find ourselves in icing conditions for an extended period of time. Ultimately; the decision was made to continue to destination with a suitable enroute alternate (without icing) at LPLA (Lajes). Later in the flight we received an ACARS message from dispatch suggesting a diversion to ZZZZ (clear wx) as our destination was now experiencing and expecting icing conditions for our time of arrival. We were told that there would be an airplane available in ZZZZ to take our passengers on (not true). We then coordinated the diversion with Shannon Control and eventually landed there. I felt as though dispatch; Maintenance Control and a Duty Manager were pushing us to continue. In retrospect; I don't feel like any of the aforementioned parties had the whole picture/situation. I found the FM and QRH to be deficient in helping us determine 'what happens' when a Strut Duct Leak is detected. i.e. what valves close etc. I eventually found information that confirmed my thoughts that we would not have engine A/I available in this situation (Maintenance Control insisted we would). The QRH should state; 'Flight into icing conditions PROHIBITED'; rather than; 'Avoid Icing Conditions.' The latter does not convey the gravity of the condition. I also found the FOM to be deficient in referencing a 'short list' of items needed for ETOPS entry (not dispatch/flight planning but actual real world entry).
This report is to highlight how SATCOM and iPad manuals failed my team miserably. Just after being established on the NAT tracks (Passing 50W with CPDLC; HF established but before Extended-range Twin Operational Standards (ETOPS) entry point @ 50N44W) we received a 'RT STRUT DUCT LEAK' EICAS with the Right Bleed and Right Pack now disabled and the inability to heat the right wing A/I and a requirement to stay at FL350 or less. With the east coast experiencing a winter storm; our closest and only east coast choice for a diversion at this point was to perform a U-Turn on the tracks and go into Gander. This was strongly encouraged by one member of the crew focusing on whether we were legal to continue into ETOPs with no way of ascertaining a second pack failure and flying at 10;000 feet to an alternate and be able to avoid icing conditions with the resources we had at this time. SATCOM was established with dispatch; Maintenance Control; and the Duty Manager. These questions were raised along with getting confirmation from Maintenance Control that the engine AI should still work on the RT engine (turned out this was not true for us). (Now entering ETOPs) A quick reply was that we were legal to continue but while discussing other concerns surrounding the soundness of this decision; SATCOM failed. For a good 20 min of NO COMM we continued discussion in the cockpit with 1 dissenting on continuing. My thoughts centered around staying above the weather on the same course to Europe with the high possibility we divert into our alternate as our destination was expecting icing conditions. But other west coast European cities should be available as well and if we should end up descending en route with any more of a deteriorating condition; diverting to LPLA as opposed to BIKF would be an option to stay in warmer weather and we still had Gander night VFR behind us.The discussion now turns to 'Did we have all legal requirements to enter ETOPs?' We have 3;758 pages of manuals (FOM; FM; WOM) to sort through in a matter of seconds as we need to make this decision on our own because 5 other attempts on SATCOM failed. With ''ETOPs' entered in the searches of each manual; we are led to 684 pages to reference (not a speed reader!!). When entering 'ETOPs requirements'; we are led to 3 pages each saying 'Check ETOPs Requirements'!!!! Later in flight; a message comes from dispatch saying that after a round table discussion at Ops; it is suggested that we divert to ZZZZ as the weather at the destination will require anti-ice and there is an aircraft available there for us to continue; if Captain is agreeable. We reply YES and the coordination begins at coast in with Shanwick. Three hours pass before we fly over VFR conditions and begin our descent into ZZZZ. As we pass into conditions requiring engine anti-ice; it fails to come on. Our mechanics descended on our aircraft to determine whether it can be fixed with no option of ascertaining that aircraft we were promised. A three hour grounding occurred with all passengers on board. Our only hope for a fix was to replace the computer card monitoring the pneumatic system as a real leak would have ended here. SATCOM and ACARS messages for permission to perform an engine run-up for mechanics went unanswered. As the crew was focused on not failing the mission to continue; we performed the engine run-up without the permission of the company which is now FOM policy; but what were we to do? No immigration to deplane and no aircraft as promised was delivered and at this point we are just another ACARS nuisance to an overloaded dispatcher.
B767 flight crew experiences an 'R STRUT DUCT LEAK' EICAS message entering the North Atlantic Track (NAT) eastbound. The QRH advises to remain clear of icing and a major snowstorm is impacting the Northeastern U.S. and by the time consultation with the company is complete the best choice is to press on with a new alternate. Destination weather deteriorates and a diversion to an ice free alternate is executed.