Commercial Fixed Wing
Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine
Flight Crew Last 90 Days 98.7; Flight Crew Total 3849.73; Flight Crew Type 3849.73
Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Distraction; Situational Awareness
Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
General None Reported / Taken
Chart Or Publication; Airport; Company Policy; Weather; Human Factors
Our alternate was ZZZ2 exactly because ZZZ3; ZZZ4; ZZZ5; and ZZZ6 were not suitable weather-wise. The original flight plan had fuel to fly ZZZ-ZZZ1; go-around and fly to our alternate of ZZZ2 landing with a fairly standard REMF; as I recall; certainly not enough fuel to shoot a second approach in ZZZ1 and comfortably divert to ZZZ2.This was our third and final leg of the day; following a ZZZ-ZZZ7 turn. It was our second day of a three-day trip and we felt reasonably alert. If we had to divert to ZZZ2; I suspect we would have been close to timing out in our block time; from a passenger standpoint; ZZZ2 made a lot of sense with the ability to re-crew in a base. By the time we blocked in ZZZ1 we had completed 7:30 actual flight time. I know I was tired at the end of the day. Time compression in ZZZ between second and third leg.1. The flight plan for our final leg was not yet available for downloading and consideration before top of descent ZZZ7-ZZZ (leg #2). Flight planning on the ground felt very time compressed.2. We were switching aircraft in ZZZ.3. We were supposed to have been boarded crew meals for our second leg (ZZZ7-ZZZ) but for some odd reason; the FO's hot meal was boarded and I was offered a hodge-podge of a snack box; beef jerky; a cookie; three dried apricots and a packet of honey. I snacked on that offering but needed to find a real meal back in ZZZ between flights.4. Please appreciate the 64 minutes on the ground is from parking brake set on Flight number; (inbound flight); complete the parking checklist; collect our belongings;  traipse over to a different gate (thankfully; the gates were close); download and review: Flight Number's OFP; NOTAMs; and aircraft maintenance and history; review weather on WSI iPad app; pre-flight a new aircraft; load and check the FMC; brief flight attendants especially on the weather conditions; receive an ATC clearance; departure brief between pilots; accomplish both the pre-flight checklist and before push checklist; and then release the parking brake for push-back.Given the lower ceilings and reduced visibility with snow-rain mix and strong direct gusty crosswinds in the TAF I felt it prudent to add contingency fuel. I called our dispatcher at the gate in ZZZ and we agreed to add approximately 30 minutes of fuel; specifically; 3;000 pounds. I had hoped that our dispatcher was cognizant the conditions forecast in ZZZ1 warranted more consideration than a milk-run; day; VFR landing; but truthfully; I had a whisper of uneasy misgivings. Perhaps I felt this was the fuel plan SABRE popped out and there could have been more... more human QA to it... perhaps. Then again; maybe it was nothing... yet the voice in the back of my mind wasn't letting up. Something felt unsettled. Was our dispatcher a little susceptible to Automation and Anchoring Bias... was our dispatcher's Situational Awareness appropriately elevated? Was her Review/Monitor/Predict loop firing on all cylinders? I decided: 'I'll set it aside for now--relax; captain--it's probably nothing.' (spoiler alert: it turned out to be nothing but the ambiguity of whether it was or not; before and during the flight was distracting.)I do not have the ATIS but I did reconstruct the conditions from a historical AWOS archive01 XA:51Z: 330/19G26 6SM -RASN BR BKN009 OVC016 02/01 A29.60 PK WND 3303301 XB:51Z: 330/18G27 3SM -SN BR BKN008 OVC013 02/01 A29.61 PK WND 3203201 XC:06Z: 330/16G29 3SM -SN BR BKN010 OVC015 02/00 A29.61 PK WND 3202901 XC:14Z: 320/16G24 2-1/2SM -SN BR BKN008 OVC 013 02/00 A29.61 PK WND 3202901 XC:23Z: 320/14G28 1-3/4SM -SN BR OVC010 01/00 A29.61 PK WND 3202901 XC:30Z: 330/18G22 1-3/4SM -SN BR BKN008 OVC012 01/00 A 29.61 PK WND 32029The ATIS stated ILS RWY XXL and RCC (Runway Condition Code) 5/5/5 at XJ:00Z; XXR/YYL and XY/YX CLSD; and variousCLSD taxiways. The RCC time stamp of XJ:Z caught my attention as being roughly 16+ hours old.[Aircraft type] landing crosswind component 'guidelines' in the Flight Manual Limitations Chapter:RCC 5 and 6: 40 knotsRCC 4: 35 knotsRCC 3: 25 knots'NOTE: The crosswind guidelines presented...... The use of these guidelines should be based on the current weather conditions and thepilot's ability and experience level.'Even with the recent uptick in flying the overwhelming majority of us are feeling 'rusty'. Generally; with my XX+ years flying experience it seems to come back fairly quickly but I definitely don't feel the same high level of finesse as I did a year ago. I'm aware of it; very aware. I'm working diligently to trap the errors and as minor as they seem there are more of them.Actively seeking and countering threats; setting the right tone on the flight deck; and ensuring we are working well with dispatch these are some of the best tools we have. Overconfidence bias especially in challenging conditions while none of us are flying as much as we usually do is probably at the top of the list. Going the extra step of resolving seemingly small ambiguities seems especially appropriate right now. Plan continuation bias; expectancy bias; and optimism bias creep into the mix a little more insidiously than usual. The ever-present threat of complacency has absolutely not waned. I wonder is Dispatch in the same boat? I suspect so. I want to be cognizant and understanding of that likelihood--we are a team and we need to lift each other up.A little over an hour prior to touchdown we began planning our ILS runway XX approach and landing with the most current conditions at the time. We reviewed the NOTAMs; assiduously marking up the myriad of closed taxiways on our -9 pages. We pulled landing performance data and reviewed it intently. With the strong direct and gusty crosswinds we might have preferred a flaps 40 landing on Runway YX but it was closed.I felt the RCC 5/5/5 at XJ:00Z (16+ hours old) was a remnant and if we just encouraged dispatch to make a call to ZZZ1 Tower; we could get something much more useful; more akin to an hourly observation. Actively countering the ambiguity of a very stale RCC given the worsening weather conditions. Making allowance that Dispatch is planning and monitoring somewhere between several and a small slew of flights they aren't going to catch everything. The ACARS reply from 'X Dispatch' for an updated RCC:'ZZZ1 CITY OPS SAYS 5/5/5.THEY WON'T UPDATE THE NOTAM/FICON UNTIL THERE IS SOMETHING SIGNIFICANT TO UPDATE.'Ambiguity not resolved. Concern we were being led down a path... heightened.With time for more nuanced decision points running out; I replied to X Dispatch:'Name; JUST WANT US ALL TO HAVE THE SAME UNDERSTANDING ABOUT HOW CRITICAL I VIEW A CURRENT AND ACCURATE FICON* WITH THE GUSTY DIRECT CROSSWIND TEMP/DP 02/01... I WILL NOT ATTEMPT A LANDING WITHOUT IT. IS THE 5/5/5 FROM XJ:00Z OR HAVE THEY MEASURED IT MORE RECENTLY... I WILL NOT ALLOW A GREEN BAY OFF THE ENDCOMPLACENCY FROM ZZZ1 CITY OPS TO SUFFICE. PLS INFO FODM OF THIS'(*FICON; I should have used 'RCC' instead)X Dispatch reply:'OKAY.I GOT THE [Flight Operations Manager] IN ON A CALL TO ZZZ1 TOWER. FODM IS UP TO SPEED ON THE CONCERN. THEY REPORTED: RWY XXL AT XS:54Z. 5/5/5. 100 PCT WET.AGAIN; THEY DO NOT ANTICIPATE TO UPDATE UNLESS THERE IS AN ACCUMULATION ON THE RUNWAY OR ANOTHER CHANGE IN CONDITION.'Did I feel like we were pushing a rope? Yes. Yes; I did. I felt like we were being dismissed and my confidence in X Dispatch was significantly diminished. I felt like X Dispatch was not proactively leaning forward in the saddle and was content to accept whatever ZZZ1 City Ops said. Rather than feeling supported; rather than feeling like the increased risk was being adequately considered and mitigated; I felt a certain inappropriate nonchalance had insidiously permeated. I feel like Ihad to kick up a ruckus to finally get an RCC 5/5/5 at XC:00Z--as the XS:54Z RCC was still 7-ish hours old... DURING a RASN event. Finally; I feel like the fact that nothing bad happened adds to the confirmation bias that it was much ado about nothing... right up until it's not nothing. And 'Not Nothing' happens in a blazingly fast moment.What could I have done differently and more effectively?I should have called X Dispatch from ZZZ7 on leg #2; asking her to work up our leg #3 early--I could have alleviated the time compression I felt on the ground in ZZZ.In retrospect; I wish I had noted the XJ:00Z RCC from the ATIS available in either FD Pro X or just pulled the ZZZ1 ATIS on ACARS before pushing and added resolving the stale RCC to the fuel increase phone call with X Dispatch.I should have used 'X' words in the ACARS messages with dispatch to convey the level of my unease.I should have started descent planning and landing in those conditions at Top of Climb (TOC) to allow more time to get 'the ball rolling'.I should have taken the time to call after the flight; to debrief with our dispatcher... really wish I had done that.Ongoing concerns/questionsX Dispatch:1. How early can I ask for a flight to be planned?2. What fuel contingency plan is appropriate in these meteorological conditions for delayed arrival (E.G.; holding while treating the runway) or the preceding aircraft doesn't clear the runway in a timely manner or a gusty wind event causes an unstabilized approach condition? To name but a few possibilities...3. What could I have done differently from X Dispatch's perspective? I would like the feedback to make me a better Captain.ATC:1. How long before an RCC gets updated? Is there an upper number of hours? 2 hours? 36 hours?2. In these particular conditions of strong gusty crosswinds and rain snow mix; what is an appropriate update interval to give us 'end-users' a reasonable level of confidence in the data?3. How are RCCs actually determined?I am going to end this unusual report with a few words from a recently would-have-been furloughed-but-took-advantage-of-voluntary-separation-program and much-liked coworker. It's important to recognize that Name was an administrative co-worker. He's not a pilot himself but he certainly recognized how important his part in the team mattered. We could all profit from his example. 'I made it my goal to make sure every pilot left the flight planning area with a clear head. No matter what issue they had coming in the door; when they went out to fly that issue was taken care of or they knew that I would do my best to take care of it and follow up with them on itsoutcome. I did not want to be the one to cause a distraction. I was proud to be the one who cleaned up the distractions.''...cleaned up distractions' ... Indeed.
Air carrier Captain reported weather and associated planning issues at many airports and in particular one that was an alternate for the flight.