Commercial Fixed Wing
Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Situational Awareness; Fatigue; Confusion; Time Pressure; Workload; Training / Qualification
Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance
Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance
Human Factors; Procedure
We were departing DCA via the National 1 Departure; departing from Runway 1. We had been running late all day; due to earlier maintenance and also due to ATC complications and delays related to the 'sequestration furloughs' of ATC personnel. It had been a mentally (if not physically) tiring day already. The First Officer has recently completed his 100 hours in type; so he is no longer considered 'low time.' I had permitted him to land in DCA the previous day; and while he seemed just a little bit behind while operating on the ground; he seemed to have good situational awareness while in flight and landing at DCA. I elected to allow him to do the Runway 1 departure. He briefed the departure procedure in the exacting detail that this departure requires. However; in retrospect; I don't recall him briefing the DCA VOR frequency. And I don't recall verifying the frequency. On departure; once the flight director captured; it kept commanding a turn to the right. Being in white needles; it appeared to me that we were exactly on the centerline of the DCA R-328; but the flight director kept commanding a turn to the right. The First Officer was following the flight director. I looked over at his (green) needle; and it was pegged on the right of the instrument. I verified that he had R-328 dialed in; and he did. The Flight Director kept commanding a turn to the right. I looked underneath and could see that we appeared to be over the center of the river; which would seem to indicate that we were either on R-328 or slightly right of it. I glanced down at RTU #2 and realized that it was tuned to a different frequency from DCA. I immediately took control of the aircraft; and hand-flew it back onto the white needle on my side. We never heard anything from ATC; so I assume we didn't penetrate P-56A or P-56B. It appeared to me that we stayed over the river the entire time.We were rushed for time. Briefing the departure out of DCA is extremely complex and time-consuming; and it's easy for something to get missed. I'm not offering that as an excuse; but it does need to be reiterated that the DCA northbound departure procedure is INCREDIBLY complex and time-consuming to brief. Especially when you're with a relatively new First Officer; who has enough experience that he's allowed to do this departure; but who has never done it before. I also find the VFR single-engine Complex/Special departure procedure to be unnecessarily complex. We spent a great deal of time; mental effort; and verbiage briefing that if we lose an engine we're going to; 'climb straight ahead at V2 until we reach the DCA 0.4 DME; then we will execute a right turn to follow the river until we reach 600 FT AGL; then we will intercept the 328 radial until our cleanup altitude of 1;100 FT AGL; then we will select MCT and continue climbing out at MCT....' We actually briefed all of this in it entirety. What we forgot to do was check the frequency of the VOR.Keep first things first! In the process of making sure I got every technicality correct about when to climb; when to turn; and all the rest; I forgot the biggest piece of the puzzle....making sure I could navigate using the correct VOR. I personally don't see the advantage to this Complex/Special procedure coming out of DCA in visual conditions. Following the river until intercepting R-328 should be sufficient. It seems to me that the complexity of this procedure makes it easy to miss something obvious. Like an incorrect VOR frequency.
While departing DCA via the National 1 Departure; this flight crew failed to select the correct VOR frequency and did not exactly follow the detailed departure procedure.