Large Transport
Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Situational Awareness; Human-Machine Interface; Communication Breakdown
ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic
Procedure; Human Factors
I was working DR2 (Departure Radar); SR2 (Satellite Radar) and DR3 combined. Traffic was just beginning to slow down after being moderate to very busy. During that time I'd heard my Supervisor; call someone on the recorded phone line and say something to the effect of; 'This is ridiculous; I've got one DR Controller (me) working 15 airplanes while DR1 and SR1 are working two aircraft combined!' It appeared he was not allowed to combine SR1 to DR1 in order to get someone to help me. That morning I was told it was mandated by our Air Traffic Manager; to have the SR1 position open regardless of traffic demand. Because of this; our shift was short on controllers and everyone was running close or over two hours per session. In this configuration; I was solely responsible for half of the departure airspace including climbing and turning around the 26 final; while four controllers were working the other half. I was given Aircraft Y direct EEONS at 12;000 ft. by the DR4 controller; I coordinated FL 230 with ZDV and climbed in my airspace. At the time I was also working an IFR FTG arrival who was unfamiliar to the airport and asked for vectors to final. FTG is in very close proximity to DEN so I needed to be sure he didn't cross over his final. As a facility; new point out and scratch pad procedures have recently been implemented. As per the new procedure I made an automated point out for my FTG aircraft with the final controller at FR2 (Final Radar) without verbal coordination. I heard FR2 clear an aircraft for the RNZ approach to 35R at DEN which does not protect for an IFR to 35 at FTG. I was about to call to confirm when I saw Aircraft X headed toward Aircraft Y and issued a traffic alert. I heard the DR4 controller yell that he didn't know where Aircraft X was going and that he'd stopped him at 13;500 ft. and he was sorry. I found out later that Aircraft X had been issued a heading from DEN without coordination. DR4 had climbed Aircraft X and not noticed he was on a heading instead of the SID. In this case DR4 and I have shared airspace to 20 miles for departures; after that we have to coordinate which was not accomplished.Supervisors should be allowed to move positions accordingly for traffic demand; particularly when they call to say it's warranted. From my perspective; the new automated point out/coordination procedures has increased workload overall. Having to enter extra information in the scratch pad takes time and still leaves things open for interpretation. In my example; I discovered the FR controller issued an interim altitude to protect my aircraft to FTG but it wasn't in the scratch pad. Normally I wouldn't have questioned the point out but now I do. The procedure does help in a couple commonly used deviations from the SOP; but many controllers are entering data even when they are complying with the SOP and then that redundant information needs to be removed later for accuracy. I now have to clear multiple fields should I elect to change anything about the aircraft. This all takes a lot of time and a lot of attention in a fast paced terminal environment and I've received a lot of aircraft with erroneous information in the data block because the controller didn't have time to fix it. I'd like to see this procedure used only in the handful of commonly used applications. At the very least to remind the workforce that this is not to be used on aircraft that are complying with the SOP.
While working South Departure at D01; Aircraft X departed Denver Runway 34L as a STAKR RNAV departure. The pilot checked in climbing to 10;000 ft. After Aircraft X passed arrival traffic descending to 11;000 ft.; I climbed the aircraft to Flight Level 230. I was looking at other traffic south of the airport then noticed Aircraft X was 20 miles east of Denver climbing out of 13;200 ft. Aircraft Y; was about 5 miles south of Aircraft X climbing out of 14;200 ft. northeast bound. I told Aircraft X to level off at 13;500 ft. in order for Aircraft Y to climb above. Aircraft X reached 13;800 ft. before he began to descend. Aircraft Y was only at about 14;600 ft. when Aircraft X reached 13;800 ft. and was only 2.11 miles apart. After attaining vertical separation; I turned Aircraft X south to go on course and climbed after passing Aircraft Y.When the pilot of Aircraft X checked in with me; he stated he was climbing to 10;000 ft. He gave no indication he was on a Denver Tower assigned heading. I received no coordination from the Tower of a heading or altitude assignment; so I was expecting the aircraft to climb via the STAKR SID and to turn on the RNAV track. (Note: It is common for RNAV departures to check on frequency climbing to 10;000 ft. I almost always instruct the pilot to 'climb via SID.' This time I did not.)1) I should have shown better situational awareness in this incident. I was thinking about a couple of airplanes in the south part of my airspace and APA arrivals and was not focused on my Aircraft X departure.2) I did not receive any coordination from Denver Tower that they had put the aircraft on a heading. This is very important because it affects how I will work this aircraft.3) It was unusual for a southbound aircraft to come off RWY 34L as Aircraft X did. On his initial contact; I was concerned about the aircraft's routing; especially when the pilot checked in only climbing to 10;000 ft.; but I didn't take action to confirm the intentions of the pilot. I just let it go; assuming that the aircraft was on the RNAV departure and doing what I expected. Next time I will verify that the pilot is doing what I expect him to do.4) I had performed OJT (On the Job Training) for most of the morning with a challenging Developmental Position. By the time I worked South Departure in the mid-afternoon; I was very fatigued and discouraged from training and from a long week. This incident occurred during the last hour of my shift on the last day of my workweek. During the last few hours of my shift; I had had difficulty concentrating. I should have made the Supervisor aware of my condition and asked to work a non-safety position.
Denver TRACON Controllers reported miscommunication between controllers and flight crew resulting in a potential conflict between two aircraft.