B737-800
Communication Breakdown; Distraction; Workload; Time Pressure; Situational Awareness; Human-Machine Interface; Confusion
ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach
Flight Crew Returned To Clearance
Human Factors; Procedure
Captain flying pilot and I was the First Officer pilot not flying; cleared Modesto 5 arrival into SFO. Checking into NorCal [cleared to] expect to intercept the 095 SFO radial to intercept the [Runway] 28R localizer. Set and briefed this. Discussing how we were going to intercept and running descent checklist. Approximately 2 miles from CEDES given a turn to 190; slow to 200; descent to 8;000 expect FMS Bridge Visual 28R; expect direct ARCHI. Captain started descent and turn. Captain [was] looking for the approach. He tried several approaches. I told him to fly and I would do the box. [I] stopped the checklists [and] tried to find the approach. We decided to enter in points manually; typing them in [while] ensuring correct vertical and lateral tracks. Configuring. Looking for parallel traffic; bridge and airport; I ensured both sides set up with 28R ILS. [I] noticed somewhere between 1;000-800 FT approach speed not in box [so I] entered it into box. Looked back Captain was low on the glideslope. Called out low. Glideslope warning went off shortly after. Captain correcting glideslope; [I] told him to add power as we were on speed and know the autothrottles slow. Last looked at 583 [MSL and] we were stabilized. Landing and rollout [were] uneventful.With had no idea the new ATIS would allow the FMS Bridge Visual 28R to be conducted. We were behind. If it was on ATIS; we would have better prepared and discussed possibility of getting this. Instead with multiple 28R approaches it was easier said than done to select correct one on short notice. Checklist was stopped to ensure we were navigating points correctly both laterally and vertically. My normal habits were stopped. Compounding this was we were trying to locate traffic; bridge; and airport. I didn't not know Captain missing information in the HUD until after landing. He only verbalized later. This may have clued me into missing ref speed earlier. Not sure why Captain got low. He was on path. I looked away and he was low. I was looking outside and at the raw data which is what I normally utilize on a visual. He later stated he was looking outside as well. When on glidepath to 28R it can look visually high coming in over the water. Not sure if this visual illusion caused him to sink below. We corrected. Speed was always maintained at Vref to the best of my knowledge throughout despite missing ref speed.
[We] received 3 different approach clearances to Runway 28R all within the last 10 minutes prior to ARCHI. 1st - intercept SFO 095R to ILS 28R; 2nd vectors to ILS 28R; and finally clearance was FMS Bridge Visual 28R less than a minute from ARCHI? Both Captain (pilot flying) and First Officer (pilot not flying) were struggling to gain visual contact with aircraft on approach to Runway 28L. Took about 30 seconds to gain visual contact with this aircraft; by then we were nearly over ARCHI without having loaded the RNV 28R approach in the FMS. Never did have time to load this approach from DEP/ARR data base; but entered fixes from approach plate manually. Speed was 200 KTS assigned over ARCHI and we felt rushed and a bit uncomfortable but certainly not unsafe as we were VMC and could see the airport from about 15 miles out. Rushing to just stay ahead of manual FMS FIX entries we neglected to enter an APP REF speed until around 600 FT. Received a below glideslope alert about this time but was flying visually using PAPI; 1 white and 3 red is the lowest I recall seeing. Landing was uneventful in TDZ.[We should have] Request[ed] a delay vector to properly and fully prepare and brief any Unexpected last second approach clearance.
A B737-800 flight crew; flummoxed by the need to process and program three unique approach clearances to Runway 28R at SFO got low and may have been slow on the approach while both pilots were engaged in attempting to manually program the last of the three clearances.