DC-9 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human-Machine Interface; Confusion
Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance
Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Diverted
Weather; Aircraft; Human Factors
During climb out a non-associated annunciator to the event being described had illuminated and was being corrected by the pilot monitoring via the Cockpit Operating Manual. During that time erroneous indications from the Captains and First Officer's Artificial Horizons made the pilot flying lose proper heading to the next fix. Throughout the next several moments both crew members communicated the indications being viewed on both sides of the flight deck. The Captain (pilot monitoring) had a 20 degree bank to the right in his ADI and the First Officer also had the same indication. The standby horizon was indicating wings level and a nose up attitude in the climb. Crew communications with ATC were made at that time to alert the controller of possible deviations from course but we believed we could still appropriately maintain altitude at all times. After minor trouble shooting it was believed that the standby horizon was the only instrument indicating the correct information. No circuit breakers or associated flags were popped nor flags in view of any guidance instruments. The crew contacted operations and received a diversion release for new fuel burns etc. for the rest of the intended flight. The flight was diverted to a destination other than the original destination due to the low IMC conditions at destination and were given several other locations to fly to in the event that the instrumentation got worse than what it was. The crew at times were still unsure of the proper heading and attitude due to the gyros not sending good information to the instruments. Because of this the crew asked the controllers several times to verify current track and to be aware that we could only follow the wet compass for the best heading and it appeared to correspond with the ground track of the GPS. Flight was continued to the new diversion airport with the assistance of ATC guiding the aircraft to a visual approach. All normal checklists were followed and a safe and uneventful landing was conducted.
During climb out the controllers had issued the crew a new clearance. As the pilot monitoring (PM) I had begun to make the appropriate changes to our course indicators; frequencies etc. to begin on the new route.  While I was performing these functions the Pilot Flying (PF) (First Officer) selected Airfoil Anti Ice ON and Engine Anti Ice ON without my knowledge. I believe shortly after the selection was made the Master Caution had quickly illuminated and extinguished (I cannot be exactly sure in what sequence that happened as I was unaware he had selected the Ice ON; it was not discovered immediately). At the time I was unaware of what annunciator had made the Master Caution illuminate. Then I had noticed the First Officer was using full MCL power during his climb with the ENG/Airfoil Ice selected. He should have been using a reduced setting of .08 less than what the RAT MCL was calling for. Almost immediately after the communication was made to the First Officer to use the reduction in power I became aware that the Master Caution had illuminated due to the Left Ice Protect Temp HIGH annunciator illumination. I began another scan quickly to check engine indications etc. to verify that the aircraft was still operating normally prior to reviewing the Cockpit Operating Manual for further instructions to clear the annunciator. As the scan took place it became evident to me that we were in OAT of approximately PLUS 22 C. This is well above our limitation of 'never operate' the Anti-Ice system above plus 10 C. My first action at that time was to select all Anti Ice systems OFF and verify that we were truly not in icing conditions. Then I communicated the violation to procedure of the first officer selecting the Anti-Ice without my knowledge and that we just need to discuss future items prior to selecting them to insure compliance with limitations and other variables. It was determined that we were not in icing conditions and if we continued to climb we would eventually require the Anti-Ice system in the future. I contacted ATC and asked to level off our altitude and described the problem to ATC. ATC allowed and we leveled at FL190.  The COM procedure had already been accomplished by the time we leveled off. OAT at FL190 was approximately plus 8 and it still took the annunciator several minutes to extinguish. The procedure does not elude to 'began diversion to nearest suitable' nor does it say 'continue operation' with associated side to the high indication in the OFF position. After the annunciator extinguished and several moments had passed with no other abnormal indications to the system I elected to continue our climb to our filed altitude with only the Right Airfoil selected and if the Ice Protect Temp Low lights had illuminated I would attempt to allow for the Left side to assist. All associated annunciators remained extinguished for the remainder of the climb. This flight had no other abnormals involving the Anti-Ice systems. But the flight was diverted due to other instrument problems and poor destination weather.I heavily believe in 'Guard the Good' when referring to precautionary shutdown of an engine and the PF will put his/her hand over a fuel control unit to insure the wrong fuel control will not be selected. Or something like cross feeding fuel is another good example of something that really needs to be communicated prior to the selection. And in a case like the Airfoil or Engine Anti Ice I am not sure why it gets turned ON and OFF so often without any type of communication. If a PM does something as simple as selects 'tail' ice; wouldn't the PF really want to know? I believe this to be a lack of communication from one pilot in this instance and possible a lack of aircraft limitation knowledge. But as a company whole; it does happen frequently that a 'Captain' will select Anti Icing systems ON without any communication to others involved and if he is not the one flying the 'PF' maybe unaware that he/she needs to make a power change. This may possibly be fixed with 'PM' touch instrument style of selection for the Anti-Ice systems. ei. If the PM notices that the OAT is plus 6 or less and visible moisture is present then he or she would announce 'Anti Ice is required'. The PF could then ASK for the selection to be made and the PM would then select the Anti-Ice associated with that scenario. (Inflight maybe more related to PM/PF and ground ops would be more PIC/SIC)
DC-9 Captain experiences a Master Caution light during climbout due to ENG/Airfoil Ice selected by the flying First Officer with the OAT well above 10 C and thrust not reduced to accommodate the ice selection. After this problem is corrected the attitude indicator malfunctions require a diversion to a VMC airport.