EMB ERJ 145 ER/LR
Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Workload; Communication Breakdown; Distraction; Situational Awareness; Time Pressure
Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue
Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; General Maintenance Action
MEL; Aircraft; Company Policy; Human Factors; Weather
Upon taking the aircraft; the number 3 MFD was inoperative which; per the MEL; required the Captain to complete all flying duties. While at ZZZ the Captain noticed that the GPWS Inop; Windshear Inop; Terrain Inop; and Terrain fail message were indicated in the EICAS. The Captain called maintenance who immediately deferred the issue and the Captain completed the logbook entries. Prior to push I entered the appropriate information into ACARS which did not match the PERF INIT which the Captain entered. We verified the numbers multiple times and determined that the ACARS had to be inaccurate. We also verified our numbers with the updated AOM. After calling Dispatch it appeared that their was a fleet wide issue with ACARS. It appeared to me that some information that is generally manually input may have already been calculated in the zero fuel weight of ACARS (85lbs for crew bags). Prior to the ACARS issue we notified Ground Control to receive an off time into ZZZ1 which we were given a departure time. At that point the Captain decided to complete the paper form X. We notified the ground crew of the delay who informed us they had to leave for another aircraft and would not be back for about 30-40 minutes. The Captain decided to have them push us from the gate in the event our issue was solved prior to their return. We completed the appropriate checklists and pushed but did not start any engines. Then notified ATC of the delay to void Off Time. The Captain then called the company for approval to open the cabin window to hand the form paper copy to the ground crew. Once the form was completed we called ops; handed the W&B out the window; and re completed the before start checklist all the way through. We also discussed not utilizing ACARS W&B throughout the flight (added workload). We then notified Ground that we were ready to verify off time prior to starting engines (fuel management). They gave us an immediate wheels up time so we started the engines and taxied to [Runway] XX. I used my IPAD to verify weather at ZZZ1 prior to push which was reporting calm winds ; few 050 TCU and 10 miles vis and again I checked prior to taxi which they were reporting calm winds; 046 CB; 10 miles. On departure from [Runway] XX we were given a turn to the west and eventually a heading to the north with a climb to 8;000 [feet]. When given direct to ZZZZZ for the ZZZZZ4 Arrival we had to vector around a few storms. We also had to vector around storm clouds on the arrival and were given vectors off the arrival by approach due to flow into ZZZ1. Within this period we both discussed the weather; verified the TAF; and discussed needing an alternate and potential fuel issues. After updating the D-ATIS we verified that the field visibility had dropped below 3 miles so we messaged Dispatch asking for/if we needed an alternate due to visibility. Dispatch responded that the TAF was good and we didn't need an alternate. The Captain started to become concerned because he was showing extreme areas of precipitation along the arrival and approach. Other aircraft ahead reported heavy rain. There were multiple discussion with ATC about getting in to ZZZ1 but I don't remember if they advised aircraft were going missed. We received normal vectors into the approach to Runway XYL and my first awareness of wind shear is when the aircraft in front of us called wind shear and missed. With our Windshear capabilities inoperative we were both paying very close attention to the aircraft's instruments. After intercepting the localizer and passing the Runway XYL FAF the precipitation was worsening. Somewhere between 1;700 and 1;200 feet the aircraft instruments were showing increased gains and losses and began to vibrate significantly. The Captain called wind shear and we completed the wind shear procedure up to the missed approach altitude of 3;000ft. Tower gave us runway heading and eventually turned us to the west with a hand off to approach. Prior to the handoff we began discussing fuel and alternates. The Captain suggested ZZZ2 which we messaged to Dispatch. Dispatch recommended ZZZ3. I recommend that we not go to ZZZ3 because of all the weather that was building between ZZZ1 and ZZZ3 and it also appeared weather was building at ZZZ3 per my IPAD. We asked ATC about ZZZ3 and they indicated that ZZZ3 had similar weather to ZZZ1 so we determined based on fuel and ATCs information that ZZZ3 was not an option. It seemed to me that Dispatch was adamant about diverting to ZZZ3. We also discussed other airport near ZZZ1 (off field) that could be potential alternates. After the check in with Approach they asked us our intentions which we replied stand by and began rough fuel calculations to ZZZ2. The Captain quickly determined that fuel to ZZZ2 was inadequate due to a 15-20 minute flight and approximately 2200lbs of fuel on board. (Increased fuel burn at lower altitude; storms in the area; and potential unknown issues on arrival at ZZZ2). We then asked ATC about aircraft success in to ZZZ1 which they replied that some aircraft were making it in and some were not. We then requested Runway XYR because it was the closer runway and informed ATC of our minimum fuel situation. The Captain notified the Flight Attendant; we ran the appropriate checklist (ATIS; build it; bug; brief it) and continued vectors to Runway XYR. There were two aircraft in front of us which one was able to land and another missed (aircraft in front of us) due to wind shear. After recalculating fuel requirements the Captain determined that a missed would put us in an emergency fuel situation therefore we [advised ATC]. I believe that upon intercepting the localizer we were somewhere around 1700-1800lbs. During the approach the gains and losses of altitude did not seem significant but it appeared to be difficult to maintain the localizer although I did not see anything greater than one dot. There was also added pressure to continue the approach due to the fuel situation. During the approach tower asked the aircraft that made it in where they broke out and they replied 'right at mins'. At around 800 feet I called out that I could see the ground which was not visible as we got to 500 ft. At 300 feet I called approach lights in sight 12 o'clock and continued to call out the approach lights. The aircraft began to drift right and I called the runway environment insight at 11 o'clock. Throughout this period it was apparent that the Captain was having difficulty seeing the runway. When he finally looked up and determined that he did not have adequate references; and the aircraft was not in a safe position to land; he called the missed. Immediately on the missed it was apparent the at least 90 percent of the airfield was VFR. We could see all of Runway XZ/XA; including approach paths; so we made a decision request XZ and due a VFR pattern into XZ. Tower provided we could use whatever runway we needed so we continued with XZ; entered the left crosswind; base; and landed. During the miss we did not climb to the missed approach altitude; left the gear down; and kept the flaps at nine because of the immediate landing after the missed to Runway XYR. We updated the FMS with Runway XZ and extended a line for reference because there are no approaches in our pubs for XZ. We did not rerun the performance information again because the field length was 10;500 [feet] which was longer than Runway XYR and it was an immediate landing. We also received fuel EICAS alerts during the missed and a fuel critical prior to landing XZ. All approaches were conducted with flaps 22. Emergency vehicles were on scene which we did not require. Upon taxiing into the gate the field went in to a ground stop due to lightning. In all the entire flight segment from door closed to door open was 3.4 hours. I would say that this flight provided the crew with several threats. To name a few; my PFD was inop so only the CPT could fly; windshear; GPWS; and TCAS were inop; pop-up weather wasoccurring throughout the flight route; fuel considerations; ACARS not accurate due to new AOM changes; delays prior to departure; delays in route; other aircraft encountering wind shear; and potentially an inexperienced dispatcher. There was also a significant pressure to land the second approach. I felt that we handled the situation very well as a crew and discussed and analyzed any and all potential alternatives but were cornered due to the fuel situation. I do wish I had analyzed the winds better throughout the duration and been more aware of the weather at the field during the Runway XYL wind shear event. With most of the airfield being VFR it was absolutely possible to successfully complete approaches to the XB runways and XZ/XA [runways]. The only area impacted by the weather was the XY runways approach segments. Therefore; if winds were within landing limits we could have immediately requested an alternate runway from ATC.
While conducting the setup check in ZZZ; the GPWS Inop; Windshear Inop; Terr Inop; and Terr Fail messages appeared on the EICAS. Maintenance was called and the affected system was deferred per MEL. The aircraft also had an MEL for the First Officer MFD; and an NEF item in the cockpit. ACARS would not produce accurate weight and performance numbers; and Dispatch informed us that this was a known issue. We elected to perform a manual weight and balance with the Form X. The TAF for ZZZ1 was forecasting VFR and radar looked fairly benign. The First Officer obtained the D-ATIS for ZZZ1 which showed Winds Calm; visibility 10SM; Few at 5000; Scattered at 8000; with no other weather (information M). Due to this; extra fuel for weather was not considered by us or Dispatch. While in our initial descent the First Officer and myself noticed the weather in ZZZ1 was deteriorating and sent an ACARS to Dispatch asking if we should get an alternate. Dispatch replied that no alternate was needed; and we assumed that they had more up to date information than available to us in the air. Our radar was depicting areas of extreme return (red and purple) blanketing the approach and airport with other aircraft saying it was a smooth ride; but heavy precipitation. While outside of the final approach fix on the ILS Runway XYL; other aircraft were heard going missed due to windshear. ATC informed us that some aircraft were landing and some were going around. We elected to continue the approach as we were not experiencing any abnormal flight conditions. Inside of the final approach fix; I was unable to maintain positive aircraft control on the approach path due to airspeed; altitude; and course fluctuations. I made the determination to execute a windshear escape/go around. The Flight Attendant was notified of our situation. We contacted Dispatch to request a diversion and suggested ZZZ2. Dispatch replied that ZZZ3 was a better option; but ATC informed us that ZZZ3 was having similar weather to ZZZ1. I used the FMS to determine a rough fuel burn to ZZZ2 as 1400 lbs not including any deviations or approaches. We were also low on fuel; approximately 2;200 lbs after the missed approach. We discussed and agreed that we did not want to end up in ZZZ3 with such low fuel and similar weather issues. We decided to attempt a second approach at ZZZ1 after ATC stated that some aircraft were landing successfully. It was apparent that we would be below divert and possibly final divert on the second approach so we declared Minimum Fuel. We requested ILS Runway XYR due to perceived improved conditions and the closer approach for that runway. During the approach; the Flight Attendant called and said that a passenger was in the bathroom and asked if we could delay the landing. I advised her that due to our fuel situation; it would not be possible. She was able to get the passenger back to his seat before final approach. While on the approach; we overheard the aircraft in front of us go around for windshear. Our fuel level was low and a go around would put us in a fuel critical situation. We [advised ATC] and continued the approach. We experienced difficulty in maintaining the approach course and I used my PIC authority to continue the approach since a missed approach would leave us with inadequate fuel for much option. The First Officer called approach lights in sight; and we continued to 100 feet above the field. The First Officer called Runway in sight; and when I looked up; I did not see a runway and was disoriented due to the extreme precipitation and reduced visibility and immediately executed a go around. We were now showing a very low fuel level; and it was unlikely we would have enough fuel to get to another airport or reattempt an approach. I used PIC emergency authority to request a circle to land Runway XZ. We were able to maintain visual contact with Runway XZ during the maneuver. We had no time to get any type of performance numbers; and reasoned that since itwas longer than Runway XYR we could land. The landing was conducted without incident. As we engaged E/TO Reserve on the windshear escape; I entered this in the logbook and contacted maintenance. See attachments for reference if needed.Many threats existed in this incident including: pop up weather; weight restrictions; the need for paper performance calculations; an inoperative MFD; an inoperative Windshear system; and lack of an alternate. The weather and TAF looked ok during the planning portion of the flight; it was not until enroute; that everything deteriorated. I believe we acted in the best manner possible given the stressful situation and lack of backup options (fuel and/or alternate). It was a unique scenario that required a unique response. I believe we made safe decisions based on the current parameters. In hindsight; I would have been more assertive about requesting an alternate enroute. I do not believe we could have forecasted such bad weather; which is why we did not ask to remove passengers to add fuel in ZZZ. As we could not find a suitable alternate; we had little choice once we were low on fuel than to attempt to land on any runway. A third go around would have likely had us considering an off field landing.
Air carrier flight crew reported numerous overlapping problems caused them to depart for destination airport with reduced IMC capability and minimum fuel; resulting in minimum fuel before landing.