B757-200
Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Distraction; Workload; Communication Breakdown
Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem
Aircraft; Human Factors
Upon climbing out; we observed an L BLEED EICAS message; followed by an R BLEED message. We noticed the aircraft was not pressurizing so we told ATC we needed to level off at 11000.  The cabin pressure continued to climb so we initiated a descent to 8000. We then received a CABIN ALT warning message as we were descending. When I started the QRH procedure; I noticed that the packs were off and the APU was running with the isolation valve open. In short; I had neglected to perform the after start checklist; even though the captain had called for it. There were several distracting factors during and after the engine start but the failure to complete the checklist was my responsibility. We corrected the settings for the pressurization system and once the aircraft cabin was stable continued to destination. During both our descent down to 8000 and our subsequent climb the aircraft exceeded 250 knots below 10;000 feet. The event was caused by my failure to complete the after start checklist. I had just completed [training] the day before this trip but I was also off work for three weeks prior to my training. I was also distracted by events during and after starting the engines. The wind was gusting up to 40 knots before our departure.  We delayed the engine start until the aircraft was facing into the wind to prevent a hot start; thus changing the normal pace of operations. Also; we had a difficult time finding the tug driver after he disconnected for our wave-off. The wind was blowing excessively hard and I had my mind on the departure rather than my immediate tasks. It was however my responsibility to perform the checklist.  During engine start and immediately afterwards; the FO is extremely busy. He is ensuring that the engines are starting correctly as well as ensuring that the ground personnel are clear of the aircraft. The after start checklist usually occurs right at the same time we are beginning to taxi and my attention is divided between avoiding a wing strike or the location of our ramp personnel and performing the checklists. I need to slow down and be more deliberate while still ensuring that we are not going to damage the aircraft or harm our ramp staff.
On takeoff roll we received an R Bleed Off alert but elected to continue the takeoff due to aircraft speed. On initial climb the Right Bleed Off annunciation extinguished and we continued to climb as normal; noting that the aircraft was pressurizing. Passing 11;000 we received a Left Bleed Off alert and began to level the aircraft and let ATC know we were stopping our climb; during the level off we received a Right Bleed Off alert and noted the aircraft was not pressurizing. We notified ATC and received clearance to descend to 5000. During the descent passing 10;500 we received a Cabin Altitude alert. We were below 10;000 so elected to not don O2 mask. The first officer began the QRH checklist and realized we had neglected to complete the After Start Checklist and had left the APU running and the Packs Off. He corrected the error; completed the checklist and the aircraft began pressurizing. We leveled off at 8000; the Altitude Alert extinguished and everything was operating normally. We contacted ATC and advised them we had corrected the problem and was then cleared to climb to FL350. During the descent to 8000 the aircraft accelerated above 250 kts but was corrected. Also once the issue had been corrected we accelerated above 250 kts during the climb before we passed 10;000.There are several factors that contributed to us overlooking and missing the After Start Checklist. One was the fact that due to winds exceeding 40 kts we delayed the engine start to prevent starting with a tail wind. This changed our habit patterns and created an unusual environment. Also the ground crew were clearing on the First Officers side of the aircraft at the same time I called for the after start checklist. He was distracted by an abnormal pattern of events and then the ground crew. I believe I also asked a question about an annunciator at that same time which added to the increased workload of the situation.I knew we were changing our normal pattern by delaying the engine start and should have made more effort to ensure we were not rushed or hurried during the engine start. We discussed among ourselves how distracting it was when the ground crew waves us off just as we are completing a checklist. I should have delayed the after start checklist until we were free of external distractions.
B757 flight crew experiences an L and R Bleed EICAS message during climb. Examining the overhead panel reveals that the packs are off and the bleeds are off and the APU is running; indicating the after start checklist was never accomplished. The switches are set right and the flight continues to destination.