EMB ERJ 145 ER/LR
Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine
Training / Qualification; Distraction; Human-Machine Interface
Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Flight Crew Became Reoriented; General Maintenance Action
Human Factors
The First Officer was the Pilot Flying for this leg; I (Captain) was Pilot Monitoring. The flight had been normal and we had briefed and been cleared for a visual approach to Runway XX at ZZZ. The First Officer had called for flaps 9 at around 230 knots on downwind; and I set them to 9 at that time. Established on final; and approaching the glide slope; the First Officer called for 'gear down; flaps 22' at approximately 194 knots. The Approach Controller had called out three military helicopters as traffic to look out for and to contact Tower. As I selected gear down and flaps 22; I inadvertently selected flaps 45 and did not realize the error. The First Officer did not mention anything amiss; and was unaware of my error at that time. At glide slope intercept at around 143 knots; the First Officer called 'flaps 45; landing check'. It was at that time I realized that I had already selected flaps 45. I verbally made the First Officer aware of the error; and he acknowledged. The aircraft was stable; fully configured; and cleared to land. With no abnormal flying qualities; we continued the approach for a normal landing. At the gate; we debriefed the event and I made [Maintenance Control] aware of the issue; and also made an [Logbook Discrepancy] entry. The error made by me was a result of a couple different issues. I am relatively new to the EMB-145; with only a month on line. I did not visually verify my flap selection as I should have to mitigate this potential error. I was a little distracted with the helicopter traffic and contacting tower around the same time. Clearly; an aircraft limitation was exceeded during this event. It did not affect the approach itself; but could have resulted in damage to the aircraft; so [Maintenance Control] was notified upon block-in. In the future; I will be visually verifying and verbalizing every; and all; flap selection I make. I subconsciously went based on 'feel' this time ; and must have gone past the flaps 18 slot (which I realized is mechanically blocked on other aircraft); going into the flaps 22 slot and finally; 45. I feel this was an unfortunate error that due to a few factors I did not trap. Although I think training was adequate and effective; this particular difference between CRJ and ERJ could be a threat to transitioning crews as the design is substantially unalike.
EMB145 Captain reported exceeding flap speed on approach; citing his unfamiliarity with aircraft as contributing.