A300
Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Flight Crew Last 90 Days 125; Flight Crew Total 5500; Flight Crew Type 873
Situational Awareness
Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Flight Crew Returned To Gate; Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; General Maintenance Action; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed
Aircraft; Human Factors; Procedure
Captain's takeoff. As soon as the Captain pushed the TOGA levers and the throttles started to move forward the Reverser Unlocked Light illuminated and the Captain immediately performed a rejected takeoff. The light was only on momentarily and the aircraft had moved a short distance forward at a taxi speed. The Captain rejected takeoff before I had called out any malfunction. Once the aircraft was stopped; I informed tower that we had rejected the takeoff and did not require assistance. I thought that I had seen the Reverser Unlocked Light on the #2 engine; but I was not 100% certain which engine. The Captain confirmed that it had been the #2 engine Reverser Unlocked Light. I asked the Captain if he had inadvertently engaged the thrust reverser lever during the attempted takeoff. The Captain didn't think so but thought it might be possible. With the possibility that the crew induced the malfunction; we agreed to attempt another takeoff from our current position. The second takeoff attempt yielded the same indications and resulted in a second taxi speed rejected takeoff. We returned to the chocks. Maintenance locked the #2 reverser closed and we returned without further incident. Upon further reflection I think that we made a few poor decisions in this sequence of events. First; it was a poor decision to attempt a second takeoff with this malfunction. It was flawed thinking to suggest the Captain could have engaged the thrust reversers while the throttles were advancing forward. And; even if the Captain had been able to inadvertently engage the thrust reverser during takeoff; we should have known that this would be a malfunction that would require maintenance action before continuing our flight. Second; our subsequent takeoff attempt was performed utilizing full length runway performance data even though we were a short distance down the runway after our first takeoff attempt. I think that we would have made better decisions if we had exited the active runway and taken a few more minutes to consider our options.
A300 First Officer reported questioning the wisdom of a second takeoff attempt and reject due to a Reverser Unlocked Light after the first takeoff was rejected for the same reason.