B767-300 and 300 ER
Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem
Aircraft
We received Cabin ALT Master Warning at FL360. Along with the First Officer (FO) and I; we had [another] Captain conducting a line check and two jump seaters. We all put on our oxygen masks. The cabin altitude was just above 10;000 feet with a very small rate of climb. We did the phase ones and went to the QRH (Cabin Altitude or Rapid Depressurization). The check list says 'If the cabin altitude is uncontrollable: without delay descend to the lowest safe altitude or 10;000 ft.......' With the controller in system 1 it was climbing so we tried system 2 but it would not stop the climb. I told the FO to [notify ATC of the situation] and ask for a descent. On the descent at around FL280 [line check] Captain suggested the manual control; I agreed. We were able to get control of the cabin altitude using manual. I leveled off at FL220. Once the cabin was below 10;000 feet we removed the mask. We never received an Auto Inop EICAS; even though both controllers failed; until we selected manual. We ran the Cabin Automatic Inoperative checklist in the QRH. After a brief discussion both the FO and Line Check Airmen (LCA) we all agreed that we could terminate the [urgency]. Now that we had time we consulted the MEL 'Auto Cabin Pressure Control Systems - Manual Operative'. This MEL allows release with both auto controls Inop but you must fly unpressurized below 10;000. Due to this piece of information and the fact we would be using the [special procedures] till landing I reinstated the [urgency to ATC] as a precaution. I asked ATC if needed could we descend to 10;000 feet along this route; he checked and said we could. We had 4 hours of fuel and a little over 1500 psi of O2. Given all this I believed we had a large safety margin to continue to [destination]; the other two crew members agreed; we sent a message to [operations] about our intention to continue and they also agreed.  The best way for this to be prevented would be to keep your eye on the pressurization system. All crew members worked very well together including LCA. The QRH said nothing about switching controls; this may seem self-evident that you should; but we teach that you are to do what is directed by the QRH. Switching to manual was our decision not really directed to by the QRH. Once in manual we used the QRH to operate in manual. Given the way this unfolded I can see another crew switching to manual and not using the QRH.Also on the descent I looked at my EFB to see what kind of terrain was under me and [which] airports. The EFB died because it had stopped charging! This was written up when we landed. I did not have my iPad configured for this flight. From now on my iPad will always have the Jepp app up and running even if I am using the EFB.
B767-300 Captain reported receiving Cabin Alt master warning at FL360. Crew complied with QRH and continued to destination.