B737-300
Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Flight Crew Last 90 Days 10; Flight Crew Type 16000
Situational Awareness
Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Flight Crew Diverted
Weather; Human Factors; Company Policy
While holding at BUDDI on our scheduled flight to BWI; we were advised through ACARS to accept the following diversion plan: FAF at BWI of 5.7 then go (divert) to IAD with a burn of 1.7. I rejected the flight plan because if executed as suggested; I would land with 4.0 at IAD; assuming everything went perfect. I rejected this plan and offered to hold so as to arrive at the FAF with 7.0 and then divert to IAD. Later on; will still holding at BUDDI; I talked to the Dispatcher via radio and once again he tried to get me to agree to 5.7 at the FAF. I objected and again stated my desire to use 7.0 at the FAF. We ended up leaving holding at BUDDI with 8.0; and arrived at IAD with 6.1. IAD is closer to BUDDI then BWI.I called Dispatch to discuss the suggestion that we would hold at the original destination down to basically VFR landing fuel and then divert (worst case) in the weather to a close in alternate with marginal weather and land with 4.0. I was told that it was done all the time and some of our pilots would accept it. Do you really think this is a good practice? The Dispatcher was busy; I know him; and he does a great job. I did not get to talk to him and this is not about him. The other Dispatcher I talked to at the time said they do this all the time; therefore; they assume that the holding aircraft will get into the original destination. I think this practice needs review. In this case; the front had already gone through IAD and was affecting BWI; but IAD did not clear up. IAD still had low ceilings and rain. We almost had to go-around on short final due to the tailwind and were among the last to land south at IAD. What if I had gotten there with 4.0; had to go-around; or received extended vectoring for a runway change? We would have been critically low on fuel. This practice appears to be a common among all our dispatchers. I realize every situation is different and dynamic and I; as the Pilot in Command; have the last vote. But in my humble opinion; this is a recipe for disaster. I recommend we review the our procedures as to how this practice came about and change the practice to allow our flights to land with approximately 5;000 LBS of fuel should they have to divert.
B737 Captain in a holding pattern; is requested by Dispatch to hold as long as possible and plan on arriving at the nearby alternate with 4;000 LBS of fuel. The alternate is also IMC and this plan is rejected. Holding is departed to land at the alternate with 6;000 LBS.