Widebody; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Distraction; Situational Awareness
Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Company Policy; Human Factors; Procedure
We were departing from BIF. We received ATIS from El Paso as listed as the primary weather source for BIF. The station was calling for light winds out of the south; El Paso International Airport nearby was using Runway 22. BIF had Runway 21-03. We requested Runway 03 for departure out of BIF since we were parked on the south ramp closer to Runway 03. We were told by Ground to expect a Runway 03 departure.  There was a NOTAM in the paperwork for Runway 21 displaced threshold of 4000 ft.  However; this NOTAM was not on the El Paso ATIS and since BIF doesn't have an ATIS we didn't hear about it there; nor did BIF Clearance; Ground; or Tower mention anything about the displaced threshold for Runway 21 when we requested a Runway change to 03.  When BIF Ground notified us of the approval for a Runway 03 change; we ran the OPS for Runway 03. Admittedly; we forgot to include the NOTAM for the closed portion of the Runway 21 mentioned only in the paperwork. We input the numbers for Runway 03 into OPS (Operating System); started engines and taxied to the hold-short line for Runway 03. Upon cleared for takeoff; controls were handed over to the right seat PF (Pilot Flying); power was raised to 1.05 EPR (Engine Pressure Ratio) and brakes released. At the beginning of the takeoff we could not see any equipment at the end of Runway 03 (the reason for the displaced threshold or Runway 21). At around V1 the equipment started coming into view.  Feeling we still had plenty of room to takeoff; we rotated as scheduled at VR and departed the runway easily before the 9500 ft. of usable runway; and before the closed portion of the runway. Due to the proximity of the end of the runway at liftoff; we began talking about how there must have been a mistake. Reviewing the inputs of OPS data and available NOTAM; we realized our absence of the shortened runway and failed to compute the performance data required. The cause was our oversight of an applicable NOTAM and forgot to enter the NOTAM in the OPS software. Recommend adding NOTAMs to Takeoff Briefing and review all NOTAMs as a crew. Ensure ATC verbalizes and clarifies any issues effecting runway length.
[Report narrative contained no additional information.]
Flight crew reported missing a NOTAM concerning a closed portion of the takeoff runway.