A319
Confusion; Workload
ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance
Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance
Procedure; Human Factors
MIA landing west. From Curso 2 RNAV ARR; on initial contact; Miami Approach control assigned vectors to LOC DME RWY 26R. We were vectored north of the field on a right downwind. Right base turn was outside HINKU; then we were cleared to intercept 26R localizer at 3000 FT. We intercepted the LOC; but when inbound noticed spacing with preceding aircraft was approximately 3 nm (on TCAS). Approach then assigned a left turn heading 240 while advising us we would be brought back on downwind for the approach; which we presumed was for separation. After being established on a 240 heading (south towards active RWYs 27 and 30) we received an unexpected/conflicting clearance to turn back right to intercept the 26R LOC. By this time we were inside HINKU; still at 3000 feet; without approach clearance; and judging whether or not to continue the approach or request additional vectors. We were then cleared to 2000 feet; at which time we acquired a visual with RWY 26R; below the cloud layer; and called the runway in sight. Approach control then cleared us for a visual approach to RWY 26R; contact MIA Tower. On initial contact with tower; inside JODAX; at approximately 1300 ft.; were cleared to change runways; and cleared to land on RWY 26L. Pilot flying (PF)/Pilot Monitoring (PM) agreed and we accepted the clearance; reverted to the lowest level of automation; confirmed landing checklist complete; and landed visually and uneventfully; on RWY 26L. Three days in a row; [operating Air Carrier X flight] ZZZZ-MIA; we initially received ILS RWY 30; then a change of RWY to LOC DME 26R. Two out of three days; we were issued a last minute change to RWY 26L below 1500 FT. On the occasion of this ASAP report; the approach controller communication was less than professional. The controller appeared task saturated and situationally disconnected with spacing of arrivals. Indeed; both PF and PM; when assigned the 240 heading off the 26 R LOC; began internal cockpit questioning whether the controller actually knew which flight he was communicating that clearance to. Speed assignments; sequencing; and spacing should be better managed by Approach Control so as to mitigate the risk of miscommunication; confusion; and last minute runway changes which increase potential for errors.
A319 pilot reported receiving multiple late runway changes from MIA ATC on several different days that led to confusion and increased workload.