B737-700
Flight Crew Last 90 Days 346
Other / Unknown
ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
General None Reported / Taken
ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Airport; Human Factors; Procedure
Cleared for a visual approach 19R. Captain as pilot flying concerned after landing that separation with traffic on 19L was inadequate. I felt Approach Controller did not properly call our traffic on parallel runway; and incorrectly assumed we had Runway 19L landing traffic in sight. Landing was uneventful. I could not find an approach chart for 19R in the aircraft set. I did find a 19R RNAV approach in FMC database. NorCal Approach never said another carrier Airbus traffic on parallel approach had us in sight.
They say a mishap is generally the result of a chain of circumstances. If so; these are the nineteen linked events that led to our near mid-air collision. None of these are errors; they are circumstances that colluded against us.1. FAR 117. The first day of our AM trip was scheduled for over eight hours of block. We overflew; were delayed; and had a longer day generally than under the old regs. We were tired. The overnight rest was good; but you don't recover with the same reserves in one night.2. The second day was five legs and about seven hours of scheduled block. When we originated the number two engine started; but number one failed to light. Followed the QRH and then worked the problem with [company]. Issue (cold soaked) eventually resolved; but now we were late. Time pressure. Flew to ZZZ. While enroute; discussed next leg to ZZZ due to 2 1/2 miles in rain there. Runway change coming into ZZZ. Late.3. Flew to ZZZ. Weather. Rain. Demanding arrival. Next leg to SFO delayed two hours. Most crews will tell you the most tiring thing of all is airport time. This wait was no exception. Three legs to go. Really late.4. Flew to SFO. New arrival and landing ILS 19L in rain. Neither pilot had flown this arrival or landed on these runways. Fairly uneventful. We watched traffic crossing underneath us on final and landing south in OAK.5. Flew to ZZZ. Bumpy. Late; late; late. No gate. Gate on arrival.6. Fifth and last leg. FAA Inspector is going to ride the jumpseat back to SFO. There is no greater distraction than a Fed on the jumpseat.7. SFO used a different arrival. ATC assigned us a visual to 19R. We tried to figure out why they weren't using 19L; but have no answer.8. No approaches to 19R. There is RNAV in the box; but no plates. We decided not to use it. We will have the ILS 19L up as backup.9. We could build a backup approach with the HUD. We're in an aircraft with no HUD.10. SFO swapped our arrival. Reprogramming in earnest. Still 19R. Fed still on jumpseat.11. Abeam 19R at 7;000 FT. Visibility okay; but gray; overcast; and scattered clouds below around the bay.12. We are asked to look for another carrier's Airbus turning final for 19R. We will follow him. In sight.13. At about ten miles; ATC turned us right base from 7;000 FT and gives us a descent. Whoa. Flaps five gear down. 14. In a high; tight; descending configured right turn for 19R. ATC asked us if we had the Airbus in sight. We replied we had the Airbus in sight. Cleared for the visual to 19R.14. Selected APP to keep from blowing through final; if necessary.15. Scanning outside and TCAS for any traffic. Traffic under us on TCAS; and we could see it on final to OAK; just like last time.16. Difficult to reprogram autopilot and MCP to keep up with the rapidly changing situation.17. Disconnected autopilot; pulled the nose around to angle over to 19R and not blow through final; got flaps to 30; kept nose down; and all the rest.18. Level wings and there is a different carrier's Airbus RIGHT THERE on the ILS 19R [19L?]. 200 FT next to me; slightly below. Expletive here.19. If we had left the autopilot on; and not pulled the nose around; our main mounts could be in his row. Rest needs to be rigged to duty day and flight hours. Anyone but a pilot on the jumpseat is a distraction. You know what pilots know; they know what you know; and they are a non-issue. Anyone else is a distraction. The FAA will always want to be on jumpseats. The distraction would be reduced if they did not have enforcement authority from jumpseat observation. They don't know what we're doing. If brief that we could read the checklist backwards and they wouldn't know. Just don't talk below ten. If ATC visual traffic calls and procedures are not standardized; they need to be. Is identifying air carrier information required? Standardize those calls. If it is standardized; practice it. Simulator instructors tend to harangue uswhen we turn off the autopilot. Sometimes it's the best way to keep up.
B737 flight crew laments ATC handling of an approach to Runway 19R at SFO and a NMAC with an Airbus on the Runway 19L approach.