B767-300 and 300 ER
Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Troubleshooting
Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance
Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown
Aircraft; Human Factors
While starting the right engine; I noticed that the EGT (Exhaust Gas Temperature) was getting hot; exceeding 600. After that we had a R STARTER CUTOUT EICAS (Engine Indication And Crew Alerting System) Message. We followed the R STARTER CUTOUT QRH. The R Engine Start Selector was in AUTO. The valve light was illuminated so proceed to Step 3. RT ENG bleed air switch was selected off. Right ISLN (Isolation) valve was selected off. No Ground Air Source was in use; proceed to step 7. Wing Anti-ice remained off. Avoid Icing Conditions. Checklist complete.I contacted Dispatch at XA35Z. I informed of the EICAS message; that we had complied with the QRH and inquired about icing conditions along the route. Dispatch asked if I wanted to bring Maintenance Control on the line. Maintenance Control joined the conversation. I briefed the Maintenance on what the aircraft status was. Maintenance said continue to destination and write it up at next stop. With concurrence of Dispatch and Maintenance I continued the flightWe started the left engine and taxied out to Runway XXR for departure for an approximate 370;000 pounds takeoff with Flaps 5.Normal takeoff on the runway. I called for Heading Select after passing 413 MSL turned to 155 as cleared. I called for VNAV; Center Autopilot to Command after passing 1;013 MSL.At approximately 1;300 feet the aircraft began to vibrate severely; loud noise from the right side of the aircraft and the Autopilot disconnected. The Purser attempted contact to advise of the indications from the cabin. I elected to delay communication to fly the aircraft and assess the situation.The First Officer  [advised ATC]. ATC cleared us to land on any runway. We informed ATC of souls on board and 100;000 pounds of fuel.We continued climb to 2;000 feet and turned a downwind leg. Autopilot was engaged. I asked for Status. Report given was Right Engine Severe Damage. We completed the Severe Engine Damage Immediate Action Items and QRH followed by After Take Off Check. This was approximately XB00Z. The engine fire switch was pulled. Maximum EGT exceed captured by EICAS during the event showed 995.  I elected to return for ILS Runway XXL and land overweight at approximately 365;000 pounds.Briefed the Purser for TEST [situation and actions]. Yellow; Engine Failure; Short and no special instructions. We climbed to 3;000 during downwind as per ATC. We confirmed Emergency Equipment was standing by for landing.I asked to be prepared for ILS XXL Flaps 20 landing. I transferred aircraft control to complete set up in a timely manner as First Officer was delayed in completing the task and to brief the approach. We turned to a heading of 350 for Base leg. ATC gave us further headings to intercept. During one turn we received a Bank Angle alert. The Pilot Flying adjusted the control pressure to correct the bank angle and the autopilot remained engaged. Control was transferred back and I was Pilot Flying. I asked the First Officer to confirm landing distance for our weight on ACARS Flight Deck Performance as I failed to adjust Fuel for arrival and the second First Officer to confirm with the QRH. The deferred Descent and Approach Checklist were completed.We joined the localizer and tracked inbound.  Configured for landing; let the aircraft stabilize descending down the glideslope before disconnecting the Autopilot.Touchdown on Runway XXL was smooth with no noticeable main gear side load. The main gears touched down; the speed brakes deployed and I lowered the nose gear to the runway. Braking was initiated and full Left Engine reverse was used. Aircraft was brought to a stop. I elected to stop prior to Runway 4L intersection and set the parking brake. Emergency Crews inspected the aircraft. The right brake temp indicators were 5 and 6 due to overweight landing. The QRH was consulted and brake temps were in the Caution Zone. Two of the right brake temp indicators increased to 7; Fuse Plug Melting Zone.I elected to remain stationary for brakes to cool before taxiing off the runway to the parking spot.I made an announcement over the PA that we would remain stationary for 50 minutes to let the brakes cool. During the cool down period the Purser called to inform she would serve the guests.During the cool down period; the cabin temperature was increasing. We attempted to cool the cabin by opening the right isolation valve for the right pack not thinking of the position of the Start Valve.I contacted Dispatch and Maintenance to question the ability of the aircraft to taxi on one engine at approximately 364;000 pounds as I had never done that. Maintenance said it was okay. No arrangement for a tug was made.After the cool down period had expired and the Purser informed me the cabin was ready for movement; we received clearance to taxi. I taxied the aircraft clear of the runway and the after landing flow was completed. We taxied with emergency equipment escort until entering the ramp when the [event] was cancelled. Parked the aircraft; shutdown the engines and completed the Shutdown Checklist.Post flight inspection revealed the right engine turning due to the Right Isolation Valve On Position with reference to cooling the cabin with the right pack. The First Office kept the left Isolation Valve closed after shutdown and cabin temperature continued to increase. [Suggestions include] Training for engine failures other than V1 cuts. Think of the whole system when opening the isolation valve on the ground so not as to send air to the engine that was shutdown because start valve may not be fully closed. Don't allow flight attendants to serve while on the ground on a runway waiting for brakes to cool.
The Starter Valve stayed open after starting the right engine. I Completed the QRH and afterward the Captain ran the crew deferral flow chart. I recommended to the Captain that we bring the onboard mechanic to the cockpit. The Captain elected to call Dispatch and Maintenance Control. Maintenance Control advised the Captain 'you are good to go as long as you complied with the QRH....write it up at the next stop.' I felt uneasy about this as we were operating 8 hrs over water in ETOPs (Extended Twin Operations) but felt it was safe and legal to continue. I started the left engine normally and we continued our taxi to [Runway] XXR. Normal take-off from [Runway] XXR and completed a right turn to 155 degrees.At 1;300 feet; the Captain called for VNAV (Vertical Navigation). I complied. After selecting VNAV; the right engine exhibited severe vibrations. The Captain wrestled control of the aircraft. I noticed the Captain required complete concentration to control the aircraft and was task saturated hand flying the severely vibrating aircraft. Tower control simultaneously advised us to switch over to departure control. Anticipating that we would be returning to the field; I did not want to switch to departure. I advised Tower that we had an engine failure; were [requesting priority handling]; and wanted vectors back to the runway. Tower advised us that we could have any runway we desired. We decided to fly an extended downwind for either Runway XXR or XXL. After stabilizing the aircraft at 2;000 feet; the Captain asked me for 'Status.' I observed the engine instruments; excessive right EGT temperatures and severe vibration from the right engine and replied 'Right Engine Severe Damage.' The Captain; and other first officer concurred. The Captain next called for the right engine Severe Damage Immediate Action Items. He and I complied with these in textbook fashion. He then asked me to complete the Right Engine Severe Damage QRH. I complied with this in textbook fashion. Tower advised us to climb to 3;000 ft. The Captain climbed us to 3;000 ft. and after completing all checklists; asked me to set us up for the ILS XXL. I complied. The Captain asked us if both other pilots were fine with an overweight landing. We agreed that that would be the best choice.After setting us up for XXL; and with the help of the other First Officer for landing performance; the Captain turned us on the base for the ILS XXL. A normal approach and landing was made for [Runway] XXL. We stopped on the runway and had the fire department inspect our right engine. We advised them to stay away from the right main landing gear due to excessive heat. The brake cooling charts indicated that we should wait for 1 hr to cool the brakes. After one hour; we continued our taxi with 1 engine to the ramp. This was the completion of our flight. Suggestions for myself. After not feeling completely 'comfortable' with the decision to continue the flight after the starter valve malfunction; I should have made my feelings clear to the Captain and offered a solution before continuing. I should have firmly requested that we bring the flight mechanic to the cockpit to put an extra set of eyes on the situation. That would have made me more comfortable to continue with an extended overwater ETOPs flight. Also; I should have used the words 'Mayday; Mayday; Mayday'. Once the [event] happened; I feel we worked very well as a crew and used a high level of CRM to bring the flight to safe conclusion.
B767 flight Crew reported aircraft encountered engine failure after takeoff.