EMB ERJ 145 ER/LR
Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness; Workload; Distraction
Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance
Aircraft; Human Factors
We were on the KLNDR1 RNAV arrival into DFW. ATC gave us a clearance to descend via the KLNDR1 arrival. I was the pilot flying so I briefed the arrival with the First Officer. Discussed the altitudes and speeds at each fix and set the bottom of the arrival as 8000. I asked the First Officer if he confirmed that and agreed with my plan. First Officer agreed with the plan with a verbal yes. I scrolled 8000 in the altitude selector and began the descent as planned. Everything was working just as planned hitting the fixes and speeds as published along with the VPI on the aircraft. We hit the WARDZ fix slightly below 13000 and 250 right on schedule as it called for 250 and 13000-11000. At that point I looked down and behind me at the FMS to verify the next fix and speed. I pressed the next button once and it cycled two pages. So I pressed previous twice to get back and it only cycled once; so I pressed it again and finally got the page I wanted. I saw DIETZ at 11000 and 220 and WHOOT at 8000 and 210. I thought to myself well we have DIETZ made no problem and started mental math to make sure we could slow and make WHOOT at 8000 and 210. I knew I had the airplane in a 1500 FT/min descent when I crossed WARDZ so I thought let me shallow that out a bit so I won't be early. When I began to scroll the VS we got a Traffic Advisory (TA) advisory. I saw an airplane 5nm away and 1000 ft below on the TCAS. The First Officer went outside to find the airplane. I kept scrolling the VS to arrest the descent. I looked outside and saw the airplane and immediately clicked off the autopilot and leveled our descent at 10500. ATC instructed us to climb and maintain 11000. I immediately realized we were at the wrong altitude and climbed our airplane up to 11000. We were a few miles short of where we should have descended out of 11000. The main error was setting 8000 ft for WHOOT at the bottom of the approach. The altitude should have been the first hard altitude at 11000. That way the aircraft would have stopped at 11000. By setting 8000 the aircraft continued below 11000 before the published point. Leading us to be below our altitude by 500ft a few miles before DIETZ. The lack of a cross check by the First Officer and the initial mistake by the Captain lead to this situation. Also the position of the FMS lead the Captain to have his head down and back during a crucial point in the arrival. With my head down and back to verify the FMS and working mental math I didn't see the aircraft encroaching 11000. That lack of a scan also contributed to the altitude deviation. As well as unfamiliar new arrivals into DFW. In the future I would set the first hard altitude on the arrival. I would also ask the FO to give me a progress report at the half way point to make sure we are on schedule and descending to the right altitude. That keeps the First Officer involved and thinking and double checks my math and altitudes. Also when on a single FMS aircraft and an RNAV arrival I will have the First Officer or pilot not flying looking back at the FMS to verify and monitor the fixes and progress. While the pilot flying will always be heads up looking at the charts and the airplane. To prevent this from happening it is my opinion that the company should work on this is in AQP simulator training. These types of RNAV approaches [are] very complicated and busy in non VNAV aircraft. It requires a lot of planning and action by the crew. Better teamwork is needed and it needs to be trained as a point of emphasis. When you have 7-8 altitude requirements and 3-4 speed changes in one arrival that is a threat. I believe some enhance procedures are necessary. Such as a half way down progress report; or verbal call outs by the pilot not flying of times and altitudes to next fix. Something that can trap a mistake like I made well ahead of time. Ultimately as the captain it is my responsibility to ensure the state of the aircraft and these mistakes will not be repeated.
An additional threat was having a single FMS; so it was difficult to have the VNAV page up and the arrival procedure. A VNAV coupled system could help avoid a lot of these scenarios.
'Descending via' the KLNDR RNAV STAR to DFW without benefit of autoflight NVAV capability the flight crew of an E145 descended through the required 11;000 FT prior to DIETZ and received a TCAS TA and an alert from ATC to return to 11;000 FT.  The lack of autoflight VNAV capability; and the non-user-friendly location of the single FMS control head were cited as contributing factors.