Fighting Falcon F16
Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Other / Unknown; Situational Awareness
ATC Issue All Types
Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance
Human Factors; Procedure
I had a proposed reservation for the Howard MOA for Aircraft X; flight of 2; and Aircraft Y; flight of 4. I observed the track of Aircraft X in Chicago Center's airspace and displayed the data block. Chicago Center called and advised that Aircraft X was deviating for weather and would be direct to the Howard MOA when able. Aircraft X checked in on frequency at FL230; still deviating for weather. He asked for a turn toward the area; which I approved. I cleared the flight 'when established in the confines of the Howard MOA; you are cleared to maintain 090B230 in the East and 100B230 in the West.' When the flight was approximately 10 miles from the airspace; I noticed that the aircraft was descending below FL230. Upon another altitude update showing continued descent; I advised the pilot that he was not cleared from FL230 until he was established in the airspace and that he still was approximately 10 miles north. He reported climbing back to FL230. He entered the airspace and began his maneuvers. About 10 minutes later; I observed the Aircraft Y flight enroute. Chicago Center called and advised that the flight was descending to 13;000 FT due to an equipment problem on the lead flight; Aircraft Y. The flight checked on frequency at 13;000 FT and was cleared into the MOA with Aircraft X. I looked in the proposal list for departure flight plans for the two military flights back to MSN. There were none on the screen and I did a search for them using URET; there were no flight plans in the computer for their return flights to MSN; as would be the usual situation. I figured I would route key the flights back to MSN when they were done in the MOA. Later Aircraft Y1 came up on frequency stating that he was finished in the MOA and wanted to return to MSN as a single ship. I assigned Aircraft Y1 a discrete beacon code; RADAR indentified the aircraft. I called Chicago Center upon initiating the hand-off to advise that Aircraft Y1 was coming out of the MOA enroute to MSN at FL230; requesting FL260. I route keyed the flight QU KMSN and the route line was displayed on the screen. The aircraft handed off to G55; which was correct. Chicago Center; BRL sector; said he would take a point out on the aircraft. I bought the hand off back and attempted to hand it off to G52; the high altitude sector. The hand off failed. I tried again but it failed. I route keyed the aircraft again but it again failed. Another Controller was offering me a break and was standing behind me and I turned and asked for assistance with the flight plan entry. At this time; Aircraft Y1 was approximately 15 miles north of the airspace at FL230. At about this time; Aircraft Y2 called on frequency; also requesting to return to MSN. I assigned a discrete beacon code. Aircraft Y1 advised he wanted to wait for Aircraft Y2 to fly together to MSN. I asked [if] wanting to turn around and he said; no; he would just slow down. I approved his request. When the data block for Aircraft Y2 tagged up on his discrete code; he was approximately 12 miles outside of the airspace. This aircraft had NOT received a clearance out of the MOA; rather; he flew out on his own. I then noticed a discrete code flying north out of the airspace. Chicago Center called and asked who that aircraft was and I told them I wasn't sure; but that it was probably another F16 coming out on his own without a clearance. Also during this time; one of the 3 who had departed the airspace climbed to FL240 without clearance into the Chicago Bradford Sector. About this time; my assistant and I noticed the Aircraft X flight headed north as if to leave the airspace as well. I advised Aircraft Y; who was the only [Aircraft] flight left in the MOA that no aircraft were to leave the MOA without a clearance. He must have advised Aircraft X not to leave the airspace as we observed the flight turning back into the MOA. Chicago Center called to advise that the Aircraft X flight had checked in on their frequency and that Chicago Centerwould clear them from the MOA. Aircraft Y advised that he was also ready to leave the area but would need to stay at 090 due to [an] equipment problem. I told him to expect a clearance in a few minutes due to the workload we were under with coordination and routes on the previous aircraft fro the MOA. While he was waiting for a clearance; he flew into the West area of the MOA at 090; whose altitude limits are 100B230; deviating another airspace. I finally was able to clear Aircraft Y out of the MOA. I advised Aircraft Y that he was to call ZKC Operations Manager when he arrived in MSN to discuss the deviations. All of these aircraft should have had a flight plan on file for their departure from the MOA back to MSN. We were unable to enter any flight plans for these aircraft; using route key; 6-7-10 amendment; VP flight plan; etc. None of the flight information passed to Chicago Center. We probably could have put flight plans in on each one flight if the aircraft had not departed the MOA without clearance and been in an adjacent center's airspace. We received multiple error messages; fail messages; manual coordination/point out; interfacility handoff error; etc. The military units requesting the Howard MOA must file a return flight plan from a point within the airspace before departing their base for the MOA. If there is not a flight plan on file; the MOA should not be released; or the aircraft needs to advise 10 minutes prior to departing the MOA so that flight plans can be entered manually if necessary.
[Narrative 2 contains no additional information.]
Enroute Controller described an airspace spill out by military aircraft complicated by an absence of filed flight plans leaving the restricted airspace.