A320
Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine
Flight Crew Last 90 Days 172; Flight Crew Total 16938; Flight Crew Type 15354
Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance
Flight Crew Returned To Gate; Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; General Maintenance Action; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed
Aircraft; Procedure
The aircraft had preexisting maintenance issues when we received it for dispatch. There was a Class II Flight/Control maintenance message that was defferred. The number 3 IRU was differed from an inbound write up that stated the 'Capt Mach/Airspeed Inop and Nav/Alt discrepancy repeat writeup went to Air Data Capt3 position.' The MEL required that IRU 3 be maintained in the off position. Finally; the First Officer noted a skid mark on the number 1 tire that was subsequently found to be within limits by maintenance. Our Flight was cleared for take off with the Captain flying and Tower indicating that there was a 5 knot tailwind. The 100 knots call out had not yet been made and the thrust levers had been set to FLX/MCT when we received a Level II ECAM. The Captain glanced at the ECAM and noted an Auto Flight Auto Thrust Off ECAM. The Captain elected to continue the take off and to set TOGO thrust. The Captain's thinking at this point was that an Auto Thrust Failure would not affect the ability of the aircraft to fly and that setting TOGO would help with the tailwind. The First Officer then stated that there was another ECAM which indicated an Auto Flight Rudder Travel Limit System Failure. At this point; the V1 call out had not yet been made so the Captain elected to abort the take off. The Captain's thinking at this point was that there was a question now as to the ability of the aircraft to fly since the additional ECAM was potentially a flight control issue and the fact that both ECAMs were received after thrust power had been set. The Captain performed a rejected take off procedure. The aircraft appeared to be under normal control with no other apparent issues so just prior to bringing the airplane to a stop; the Captain instructed the First Officer to make a PA announcement for the passengers to remain seated. The Captain wanted to clear the runway at Taxiway X which is approximately halfway down the 10;187 foot runway but noted to the First Officer that it appeared that the aircraft was not moving forward easily after coming to a stop. At this point the First Officer and Captain discussed the possibility of a tire failure as a potential reason for the difficulty in moving the aircraft but it had not felt like a tire failed. We decided to tell the tower we were going to maintain our position on the runway until we could figure out what the issue was. At this point; we received a call from the flight attendants concerning a faint rubbery/acrid odor that was perceptible in the cabin. The Captain noted that the brake temperatures were still between approximately 450 and 550 degrees Celsius; although increasing; with no other abnormal system indications. The Captain and First Officer discussed that the smell was most likely from the aircraft tires as a result of the rejected takeoff and informed the flight attendants and passengers. The Captain was subsequently able to move the aircraft forward surmising that the aircraft may have been in a low spot on the runway that may have caused the difficulty in moving forward. As the Captain moved the aircraft slowly forward he noted that the aircraft was now moving freely and that there did not appear to be any issues with the tires. The First Officer requested from tower to clear the runway at Taxiway D; we completed our checklists; briefed our passengers and coordinated clearance to hardstand parking Spot 20 so that maintenance could look at the aircraft's condition. Upon arriving at parking Spot 20; the Captain talked with maintenance over the intercom and asked them to inspect the tires and the rest of the aircraft as a result of the rejected take off. Maintenance indicated that there were no visible issues except for the fact that the original skid mark on the number one tire was now larger. After maintenance inspected the aircraft exterior they brought the air-stairs up to door 1L and boarded the aircraft to run maintenance system checks. The wheelswere chocked and the parking brake was released to help cool the brakes. The Captain and Station Manager discussed deplaning the passengers and returning them to the terminal to await the results of the maintenance procedures. The Station Manager did an outstanding job of taking care of our passengers during the deplaning process and also provided our passengers with a complementary meal voucher. The Captain subsequently communicated with Maintenance Control; dispatch and the Duty Manager concerning the rejected take off. The Flight and Cabin crew also debriefed each other concerning the rejected take off. The Captain and First Officer discussed with Maintenance Control what the maintenance plan would be for the aircraft since we were still scheduled to take the aircraft to ZZZ1 and there appeared to be multiple maintenance issues. Maintenance Control indicated that they would perform various checklists and resets. The First Officer advocated that if time permitted that we should attempt to bring in a 320 Systems specialist if possible to answer some of our concerns including why we received the ECAMS after what we thought should have been an inhibited time period after take-off power was set. ALPA Safety reached out to the Captain during this time period so the Captain asked if ALPA Safety could connect the flight crew with an A320 systems specialist to talk about these issues which they did. Maintenance Control subsequently cleared all the maintenance issues with the exceptions of deferring the Auto Thrust system and Class II maintenance messages for Flight/Control and Air Bleed. Maintenance also changed out the number 1 tire due to the skid mark being worse after the rejected take off. We were subsequently dispatched again from ZZZ to ZZZ1 on the same aircraft. Just after take-off roll and beginning the climb out; with the Captain flying; the Captain lost his airspeed and mach indications. The Captain transferred control of the aircraft to the First Officer and the First Officer continued the climb out. The Flight then received a Nav/Alt Discrepancy ECAM. We performed the checklist. In order for us to restore the Captain's Airspeed/Mach indication we had to select Air Data Capt3 for the Captain just like the previous write up. We also had to select the First Officers Auto Pilot 2 since the Captains Auto pilot 1 would level off 500 feet off altitude. We Contacted Dispatch to get a phone patch to Maintenance Control and told Maintenance Control we were still having Air Speed; Mach and altimeter issues for the Captains side and wrote up the issues. We then proceeded to ZZZ1 with no further issues.
Rejected takeoff due to multiple ECAMs which were triggered and addressed as we transitioned from low speed to high speed regime.  The reject actions were as per SOP and the flight attendants thanked us for a prompt Remain Seated; Remain Seated notification.  Taxi back to ramp and a multi-hour maintenance delay ensued.
Flight Crew reported recurring ECAM messages after a rejected takeoff and subsequent maintenance action on the next flight.