Medium Transport; High Wing; 2 Turboprop Eng
Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Communication Breakdown; Human-Machine Interface; Time Pressure
Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance
Aircraft; Procedure; Human Factors
After overnighting in MSO my FO (First Officer) and I showed at the airport to work flight to ZZZ. The CA's (Captain) FMS (mine) was MEL'd out of service. After completing the Preflight and Originating procedures as well reviewing the MEL I chose to fly the leg back to ZZZ (allowed by the MEL). I was speaking with the cabin crew at the time the FO was getting the clearance and I did not fully hear the communication between the FO and ATC. The FO obtained the clearance and wrote it down on the data card in handwriting that was illegible to me. Our filed flight plan included the DIDLY5 SID but our clearance was the MZULA5 SID. Also; each of these SIDs include a MLP pass transition. I conducted a standard brief in accordance with the FOM/FSM. When I attempted to read the clearance from the data card I was unable to determine what was written. I asked the FO what she had written and she state 'we are cleared via the MZULA5.' I briefed the MZULA5 SID off the iPad; briefed the Complex Turn Procedure for Runway 12; and set up the ARCDU and VOR RMI pointer in case we had to fly the turn procedure. The FO had loaded the DIDLY5 into the FMS; not the MZULA5 which we had been cleared for. During the point in the brief where I read aloud the flight plan clearance page off the FMS to the FO I looked at the clearance card and the only portion of the clearance I saw that was legible (to me) was the '5'. Because our FILED route was the DIDLY5 MLP transition (which was printed clearly on the release that was clipped to my yoke); and also because I was looking over across the flight deck at the FO's FMS (since my FMS was Organized Track System); my brain registered the DIDLY5 MLP transition that I saw displayed on the FO's FMS as being correct. We took off; pushed NAV at 400 ft.; and started following the flight guidance. Since the MZULA5 which I had briefed does initially turn us to the right to intercept the MSO 159 radial outbound I continued to follow the flight guidance. The MFD in front of me was not displaying any NAV data (because the FMS was Organized Track System) I was looking over at the FO's MFD to cross check our flight path. I did not see what I expected to see on the FO's FMS and I knew something was not right. I switched my iPad from the Complex Special 12 over to the MZULA5 SID chart to figure out what wasn't right. At about the time I switched my charts ATC queried us about our flight path saying that we had flown through the desired MSO 159 radial. I knew right then that what had happened was the wrong SID had been loaded into the FMS. Also; prior to ATC's query I had been displaying the Complex Special 12 which IS a continuous right turn to the northwest and was the approximate flight path we were flying. The FO PM (Pilot Monitoring) obtained a VFR climb up to a certain altitude and direct a fix which got us back on track with ATC. The weather conditions were clear skies and unlimited visibility. ATC did not notify us of a deviation/lack of traffic/terrain separation and did not give us a phone number. I had noticed the FO's illegible handwriting the day prior to this flight. However; on the three legs we had flown the day prior I had heard via the overhead speakers the FO obtain the clearance from ATC and the read-backs she gave. When it came time to brief the flight plans I knew what the card and her handwriting were trying to convey. I had thought about saying something the day prior but I chose not to. Lesson learned: speak up whenever matters of communication are involved even when it's a matter of handwriting. Also; when the Complex turn procedure is significantly different from the SID it will now be a part of my briefing to identify such during the brief. In wanting to always be prepared for an engine failure I unwittingly relied on the FMS to take us where we were supposed to go. Lesson learned: Always have the SID displayed in accordance with the FOM and have the first several steps of the Complex Special written down on my scratchpad in case I need to switch to flying the turn procedure. Changing the numbers of the DIDLY5 and the MZULA5 to something like the DIDLY5 and MZULA6 would be wise. I think I latched onto the '5' and did not critically evaluate the text preceding the '5' during our brief and while looking across the console to the FO's FMS.
Captain reported the First Officer loaded the incorrect SID into FMS.