Widebody Transport
Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Fatigue; Distraction; Confusion; Workload
Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR
Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Human Factors; Procedure
CA (Captain) was PM (Pilot Monitoring); FO (First Officer) was PF; third [relief pilot] in observer seat.During PM rest period; the PF loaded the GONAV2M arrival for an expected ILS 33R; PULUN Transition and briefed accordingly for a hand flown; night VMC approach. Vectored off of the published arrival; Seoul App told [call sign] to expect vectors for ILS 33R. PM extended the FAF off the DepArr page; JISUN INTC.On what appeared to be left downwind vectors; App then cleared us direct to KOTRA (IAF) to cross at or above 4000 ft and cleared us for the approach. We were approximately 10 miles from KOTRA. I was off frequency with OPs obtaining parking when I heard the ATC clearance being issued just as I was coming back on ATC Frequency. The Autopilot had been disconnected almost simultaneously (just a coincidence) with the clearance and I looked up to verify the new altitude of 4000 ft (to cross KOTRA) was set. I heard the PM and PF confirm and execute the new route but I didn't catch the closure from KOTRA to JINSU instead of TOMAL because I was verifying the new altitude.We turned at KOTRA; direct JISUN descending from 4000 ft to FAF altitude of 2600 ft. The minimum altitude from KOTRA to JISUN is depicted as 3600 ft. MSA in our quadrant was 2100 ft. Established on the heading to JISUN; Seoul App asked us where we were going. PM replied JISUN and looking down at the Jepp approach plate realized his CDU (Control Display Unit) entry error and stated 'direct JISUN not TOMAL' (IF). App asked if we could make the approach and we replied affirmative. App told us to switch Tower and we made an uneventful landing.Post flight discussion focused on ATC approach terminology. We would have been better served if App cleared us for the 'ILS 33R; KOTRA Transition.' This would have driven the PM to go to the DepArr page and select the approach and transition; loading the complete approach. Unfortunately this wasn't the case and the PM loaded the KOTRA fix in the legs page which I didn't catch as I was verifying the new assigned altitude.The Approach Controller led us to believe that we would be vectored to final and not final via an IAF. It was a busy time but it was VMC conditions and the airport and runway were already in sight. I didn't realize something was wrong until the Controller queried our progress and asked if we could make the approach. After an uneventful landing and reviewing the approach plate; the omission of the segment between KOTRA to TOMAL was evident. In review there were contributing factors that lead up to this omission that will be used as a learning tool for the future. Because the Controller told us we were being vectored for final and the PM had extended the FAF (JISUN) we were of that mindset that led to missing the segment between KOTRA and TOMAL and or TOMAL was overlooked partially because of this. Always use the DEP/ARR page for an approach to ensure that missing segments aren't missing. The PF had disconnected the AP almost simultaneously when the approach clearance was given (just a coincidence) which was a busy time for all of us because of the vectors; timing and the altitude we were at. As the [relief pilot] in the observer seat I heard the clearance right after coming back on frequency and ensured the correct altitude was set and overheard the PM and PF confirm a closure of a disco on the FAC (Flight Augmentation Computer). Glancing at the magenta line and knowing that JISUN was on the final I assumed that it was correct because of the verification from the PF and the PM and the clearance the Controller had told us to expect. I should have looked at my chart to verify the PM and PF actions were correct. I only focused on the altitude and the stability of the approach which was stable. Once again; don't assume. Because the entire approach was done in VMC conditions (a virtual visual approach) with the field in sight and Controller leading us to believe it would be vectors to finalwe missed the connection between KOTRA and TOMAL because of the extension from JISUN. We must always be vigilant and not let our guard down to unexpected changes. I didn't realize that the PM put KOTRA in the legs page so after review that was another good lesson. Enter from the DEP/ARR page and verify on the legs. The obvious might have been caught. Don't let your guard down even in severe clear VMC conditions and be lulled into making a mistake.
An air carrier was vectored off the RKSI GONAV2M arrival and told to expect the ILS 33R then given direct KOTRA cleared for the approach. The Pilot Monitoring selected KOTRA JISUN bypassing TOMAL and the descent began early. A better ATC clearance would have been ILS 33R; KOTRA transition.