EMB ERJ 170/175 ER/LR
Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Flight Crew Total 6500; Flight Crew Type 4000
Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
General Flight Cancelled / Delayed
Aircraft; Human Factors
Upon reporting to the aircraft I found that the gate agents were unable to print a flight release due to technical problems with their computer systems. I began speaking with our Dispatch personnel to find a way to print our normal paperwork. During that process I began looking over the aircraft logbook and found a discrepancy for which I eventually refused the aircraft.In reviewing the logbook I found that yesterday the aircraft's bleed pressurization system had two write-ups made by flight crews. The first write-up was 'Bleed 1 Fail in flight' - which that crew resolved with a QRH reset procedure. The maintenance entry in response was that it was found to be a transitory condition and that the aircraft was OK for service. The next page in the logbook had a write-up for 'Bleed 2 over-pressure in flight'. The crew was able to run the QRH and isolate that problem; and when the aircraft landed the Bleed 2 system was put on MEL. In speaking with maintenance and Dispatch prior to conducting this flight I expressed my concern that we were being asked to fly a plane with only one operational bleed system which had also just experienced a 'transitory' failure the day before. I was reassured that the aircraft had flown two subsequent flights without any additional failures on Bleed system.1. At that point I accepted the aircraft and was preparing to operate the flight.As I continued to prepare the flight for departure my First Officer and I became aware that those two subsequent flights without additional bleed 1 failures were very short. Those flights are almost always conducted at 10;000 feet and average a flight time of approximately 25 minutes. Because I felt that the round trip was not a reliable indication that the Bleed 1 system would be capable of handling the pressurization of our aircraft for 3 hours at FL310 I then decided to refuse the aircraft.I called Dispatch and explained that I was now refusing to fly the aircraft for the above reasons. I was told that I would need to speak with a Chief Pilot regarding the matter; and was put on hold. I was transferred to a Chief Pilot where I explained that one bleed system was MEL'd and the other had demonstrated a failure as well. I was told that I would be removed from the flight and to standby for further communication from Operations.Shortly thereafter I received an additional phone call from the Chief Pilot asking me to once again clarify my position. I once again explained the situation thoroughly and he replied that he understood my decision. He followed that by saying; 'I'm not trying to Monday morning quarterback you; but just so you know; the flight was legal to operate'. I replied that simply by adding that statement to our conversation he was implying that he would make a different decision and that he didn't need to be making those statements to a PIC who was making a safety related decision. I felt that while he understood I was not going to change my mind; he was implying that he felt my concerns were unreasonable and that I should have operated the flight. We ended our phone call with him telling me that I would need to fill out a crew report explaining my refusal of the aircraft.As we subsequently waited for our reassignment my First Officer received a phone call from crew scheduling in which he was advised that since we had both refused the aircraft that we were both removed from the next two legs that both of us would be 'removed without pay per the Chief Pilots'.Obviously flying an aircraft with one bleed system on MEL is both legal and safe; and is part of our normal daily operations at [this] Airline. That said; operating an aircraft with one bleed system on MEL and the other one exhibiting a very recent transitory failure might be legal; but in my opinion it is not safe.I personally feel that the pressure and tone that the Chief Pilot took with me on the phone regarding my refusal runs counter to this policy. I felt that hewas doing his absolute best to explain to me that he would have made a different decision while avoiding using those exact words. This was highly unprofessional; and I am concerned for our newer Captains coming online that might feel pressured into changing their decisions when pressured by the Chief Pilot. I do not take the decision to refuse an aircraft lightly. It is my professional opinion based on 8 years and 6;000+ hours of airline flying that this aircraft did not have a pressurization system which was reliable enough to fly safely for 3 hours in remote areas at FL310.If bleed system 1 had not demonstrated a failure on the following day; I would have most likely accepted the aircraft. The two subsequent flights was not a sufficient indication in my mind of the reliability of Bleed system 1 to offset my concerns of its previous failure. Finally; the additional punitive measure explained to my First Officer regarding the loss of pay over a refusal to fly an aircraft for safety concerns is absolutely deplorable in any airline safety culture. No airline should ever cause it's pilots to even think for one minute that if they have a safety concern that they may not be paid if they refuse to fly.
Upon reporting to the aircraft I found that the gate agents were unable to print a flight release due to technical problems with their computer systems. I conducted my walk around while the Captain began speaking with our Dispatch personnel to find a way to print our normal paperwork. During that process the Captain began looking over the aircraft logbook and found a discrepancy for which I eventually refused the aircraft. In reviewing the logbook it was found that the day prior on the aircraft's bleed pressurization system had two write-ups made by flight crews. The first write-up was 'Bleed 1 Fail in flight' - which that crew resolved with a QRH reset procedure. The maintenance entry in response was that it was found to be a transitory condition and that the aircraft was OK for service. The next page in the logbook had a write-up for 'Bleed 2 over- pressure in flight'. The crew was able to run the QRH and isolate that problem; and when the aircraft landed the Bleed 2 system was put on MEL. From the Captains communications with maintenance and Dispatch prior to conducting the flight when the concern was expressed that we were being asked to fly a plane with only one operational bleed system which had also just experienced a 'transitory' failure the day before. We were reassured that the aircraft had flown two subsequent flights without any additional failures on Bleed system 1. At that point I accepted the aircraft and was preparing to operate the flight. As I continued to prepare the flight for departure I opened up the flight times page and to look at what the preceding flight was and became aware that those two subsequent flights without additional bleed 1 failures were very short. Those flights are almost always conducted at 10;000 feet and average a flight time of approximately 25 minutes. Because I felt that the short round trip was not a reliable indication that the Bleed 1 system would be capable of handling the pressurization of our aircraft for 3 hours at FL310 I then decided to refuse the aircraft. At that point the Captain called Dispatch and spoke with them and a Chief Pilot informing them of us refusing to operate that aircraft. We were than notified to stand by for further instructions. We proceeded up to the LAX crew room to wait for a new airplane assignment. While in the crew room I was informed that the Captain had been removed from the flight and I was still expected to operate the flight in that aircraft. At that point I notified crew scheduling that I was refusing to operate that aircraft. I was subsequently notified that we were removed from the flight and the subsequent leg as well and would instead deadhead to the second location. I was notified it was being coded cancelled and would be pay protected. I later received an additional call that it was instead being coded removed from schedule unpaid 'per Chief Pilot'. The Captain and myself made a decision that the aircraft was legal but it was not in a safe state of operation for the intended route nor was it smart to operate the aircraft with the status of the bleed systems on the intended route. In response to our decision instead of receiving the spare that eventually operated the flight we were replaced from the trip and told we were being removed from schedule unpaid. At our airline we are told from day one that safety is of upmost importance. To remove a fight crew from flying and code it removed from schedule unpaid is a disciplinary action being imposed on crew members making a decision with safety being the guiding factor in their decision making. I hope this does not become standard practice as I fear removing pilots for making safety conscious decisions and then not paying them could eventually lead to pilots accepting a flight they do not feel comfortable flying based on financial ramifications of not being paid.
EMB-175 crew declined to fly an aircraft with a single operative pressurization system that had experienced two separate malfunctions the previous day. Crew was replaced on the flight.