B737-700
Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Flight Crew Last 90 Days 146
Situational Awareness; Fatigue; Confusion
Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach
Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance
Human Factors
The Captain and I talked (at length) about many things coming into DAL and he pointed out that we aren't supposed to fly to 13L after (time Local).  So I had it ingrained in my mind that we were landing on Runway 13R.  After being given very unusual vectors for a right downwind; Tower asked if we wanted 13L or R.  The Captain said 13L would work better for us.  We set everything up accordingly.  This Captain and I have flown together before and he is VERY vocal and full of all kinds of 'helpful hints' and other superfluous information.  I was fairly fatigued from the late start of this trip; coupled with a restless night of sleep the night before.  I told the Captain that I had the runway in sight and I locked onto 13R.  As I positioned the aircraft to line up for a visual (still way out on final) DAL Tower called and asked us if we wanted the right since it appeared we were lining up on it.  The Captain replied 'No; we will take the left.'  I couldn't believe I had lined up on the wrong side since I had never done that before in my aviating career.  We started side-stepping and I felt like we were getting ourselves set up for an unstable approach and we elected to go-around.  After going around; Tower then cleared us for the Visual to Runway 13R.  I was beating myself up after the lining up on the wrong runway stunt and I was getting even more 'helpful hints' thrown my way.  As we were on a base; the Tower called out Company traffic on final to us and I told the Captain I had the runway and the traffic.  I was still feeling distracted and quite frankly discombobulated and darned if I didn't turn and roll out to line up for Runway 13L.  The Captain noticed (as well as Tower) and we made the turn to line up and land on Runway 13R.  I actually gave the aircraft to the Captain because I was disoriented and very aggravated at myself.  The rest of the approach and landing were uneventful and Tower didn't mention anything regarding the two approaches.  I take full responsibility for my actions.  The cockpit was very dynamic for both of the approaches; but still no excuse for either approach.
First Officer (FO) was Pilot Flying (PF) conducting a Visual Approach (right traffic) to DAL Runway 13L. He made confirmation of airport in sight; and we were cleared by Tower to land Runway 13L. I felt that the FO was 'pushing the field'. I stated that he was pretty high and prompted him to configure. He responded he had the landing runway in sight he began calling for flaps and gear. He turned in very tight; and I recommended he navigate (LNAV) to NITER. He initially did not respond to my suggestion. He was looking out the window; all visual and not crosschecking his instruments. The aircraft was in a descending right hand turn. I was unable to see the runway from my vantage point; but was very uncomfortable with the aircraft's altitude/position relative to distance from the runway. I again stated that he needed to get his nose down or we'd be too high. He responded that the runway was in sight. We were fully configured; high on the glideslope (full scale) and right of the Localizer. I was VERY emphatic to descend the aircraft now. He kept adding power; and stated 'I'm too slow'. I said 'yes; but you won't be if you get your nose down'. He rolled wings level lined up with the runway; and Tower queried if we preferred Runway 13R; we could have it. I then realized he was lined up for Runway 13R and called out; 'you're lined up with the wrong runway'. He realized it; turned the aircraft left to intercept final for 13L. I told Tower we were correcting back towards 13L and he verified we were cleared to land 13L. The FO began adding power again and leveling. I said; 'you're high; get the nose down and descend'. He did not respond. I said again; 'you're too high'. No response. I then commanded 'GO AROUND; GO AROUND'. He snapped out of it; and began the go-around sequence. He still had no idea that he was way out of stabilized approach criteria at about 700 feer. Tower was notified of the go-around; and queried us if we were too high. We stated yes. Missed approach instructions were issued. I asked the FO if he was OK; and if he understood what went wrong. He stated he 'simply screwed up' and got fixated. We leveled off at 3000 feet MSL; number three for landing. I took a moment to re-brief him. I stated that he should use LNAV to the final; and follow/ back up with the flight instruments. He seemed just fine and in the game. Approach vectored us around to final for Runway 13R; FO called field in sight. I reminded him to engage LNAV to LAURA on the final and he complied. We were switched to Tower frequency. As I contacted Tower; I heard the autopilot disengaged; and the FO hand flying the aircraft just prior to LAURA. I looked up; and noticed he had not selected VOR/LOC or APP. I selected APP on the MCP and verbalized the fact. Again; I had to make a deviation callout. He responded; 'you're distracting me'. I said; 'COURSE' 'you are left of course'. He said nothing. Then I stated; 'you are lined up with the wrong runway AGAIN; that's the left side.' He said; 'what?' At that point; we were about 1000' MSL; fully configured; well left of Localizer but on glidepath. I stated; 'I HAVE THE AIRCRAFT'. He responded; 'you have the aircraft' and I took control; maneuvered for an uneventful landing to Runway 13R.The First Officer had lost all situational awareness. But it was very subtle; and difficult to tell. I have flown with this FO before and he is extremely intelligent; highly experienced; and an outstanding Pilot. This may have led me to become overly confident in his ability; or his current awareness and complacent on my part. Additionally; this FO is a very relaxed Pilot who exudes confidence. I believe this inhibited me from initially being timely in my intervention; as well as my vantage point being restricted due to the right traffic pattern on the first approach. I realized; especially after three days of flying; he relies too heavily on visual cues. Utilizing the RRM model; I did a very thorough debriefing withhim. He was responsive; apologetic and embarrassed over the situation. I explained my biggest concern was the lack of backing up visual cues with navigational instruments as required in the AOM/FOM. I was over confident with his control of the aircraft; and that delayed the go-around call that I should have made much sooner. I believed the situation was falling apart well ahead of time; but was attempting not to micro manage him; especially since he had the better vantage point and I was operating off of instruments. In retrospect; staying 'in the Green' with the tools provided by the RRM model requires that the steps be applied in a timely manner. In the future; I will not let the situation deteriorate to such an extent.
B737 flight crew describes a night visual approach that becomes unstabilized when the First Officer lines up with the wrong runway and results in a go around. On the second approach; the First Officer again lines up on the wrong runway and the Captain takes control for landing.