MD-11
Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument
Time Pressure; Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Troubleshooting
Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR
Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Maintenance Action
Aircraft; Human Factors; Procedure
Descending through approx 12-13;000 feet for landing at ZZZZ; my FMS timed out as they occasionally do.  Gave it a few moments to catch up and then selected the FMC1 prompt in the upper left hand corner of the FMC.  Not only did it not reset; there was no standby option listed and I then noticed my First Officer's FMC had also lost all data.  On a descent into ZZZZ at about 10;000 feet I decided it would be best if I assumed control of the airplane and we did a positive transfer of control.  At about the same time I glanced over at the approach chart for ILS XXR went to the NAV page and manually entered the frequency and inbound course for ILS runway XXR.  We had a Level 1 alert to set field altitude manually and I tasked that duty to my First Officer.  I also said I had the radios at the time.  I called ATC and informed them we had lost most of our normal navigation equipment; that we would be unable to proceed directly to any fix and that I would need vectors to join the runway XXR localizer.  Passing 10;000 feet I would estimate we were approx 20-25 miles from the field.  Several times the flight director was commanding directives that did not comply with our ATC directives so I was forced to turn it off as it was a distraction.  The autothrottles also were not responding in an appropriate manner either and rather than trying to fight them I disconnected them as well.  Conditions at the field were day VMC.  On a vector and once cleared for the approach approach mode armed although I doubt it did any good I looked for the localizer to come alive and when it did I attempted to track it manually.  There were a couple S turns as I was in real time having to adjust my scan away from looking for a flight director and towards just a localizer needle and a heading and trying to bracket it.  Things became more stable as we continued down the localizer until we had the runway in sight still at many thousands of feet above the ground I transitioned to line up visually and then cross checking my localizer it showed right of course and I realized the piece of pavement many miles in front of me was the taxiway not the runway and shifted back to the left onto localizer at I would estimate 2;500-3;000 ft AGL.  We probably should have asked for a visual approach at that time but we were too busy to even think of it.  Now hand flying the airplane fully manually with no automation nor flight director assistance at around 2;000-2;500 feet I would estimate I leveled the airplane as the glide slope was approx 1 dot below us to join it.  I did not even look at the approach plate to see were intercept altitude was as we were in visual conditions and I was too focused on maintaining manual aircraft control to be distracted looking away from the panel.  ATC did ask us several times during the approach are you stabilized.  We had the situation under control so I told me First Officer tell her yes.  We were fully configured on glide slope and localizer with landing checklist complete by 1;000 feet AGL (actual more like 1;500-2;000 ft).  There was a high speed foot on the airspeed indicator but no low speed foot.  Based upon our landing weight and my prior experience in the airplane I flew the approach at 165 knots flaps 35.  The approach and landing from 1000 feet AGL to touchdown was uneventful.  This airplane had recent prior multiple flight control computer malfunctions that caused a prior crew to have a sudden pitch down moment according to the prior Captain.  My goal was to get it on the ground as soon as it was safely possible and try to separate the automation from control of the aircraft to a reasonable extent.When we lost all our navigation data from both FMS so close to the airfield and with day VMC conditions at the field and my First Officer focusing on another checklist and given the recent history of this airplane; I decided the safest course was to revert back to old school flying and not waste time trying to manage the problem through running an extended Dual FMS Loss checklist and focus our efforts on getting the airplane on the ground.The prior day I witnessed two aircraft mechanics on this same jet in conflict over whether the airplane should be returned to service or not.  One mechanic thought there was only 1 flight control computer having issues the other thought both computers were malfunctioning.  One mechanic said the airplane was AOG to me 2 times.  After that I went into the cockpit to observe their trouble shooting.  One mechanic was simply trying to clear the fault in the CFDS (Centralized Fault Display System) the other wanted to know why and wanted more time to diagnose it.  When one mechanic said to me the airplane is AOG a 3rd time I took the extraordinary step of calling the Duty Officer and telling him I was not crewing this airplane until the mechanics were given some time to troubleshoot and requested we be placed into rest.  After minimum rest we came back to the jet and I spoke with the mechanic that was objecting to the return to service the previous night and he now seemed comfortable releasing the jet to fly.I personally witnessed one mechanic trying to pressure another to push the jet back on the line and I commend the mechanic who resisted.  I don't know what happened after we left the airplane to then make him comfortable having it signed off; but I was told there would be 2 replacement flight control computers sent to this jet after I left it.  Not sure if that actually occurred.  I know we have a business to run but one of the mechanics told me at least one of the flight control computer issues was a repeat write up.  Maybe we need to give more time and attention to issues that are repeatedly written up with a common problem source.
MD-11 Captain reported flight control computer issues during approach resulted in loss of all autoflight capability. Pilot also reported the aircraft had been previously refused due to flight control computer malfunctions.