B747-400
Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Flight Crew Last 90 Days 180; Flight Crew Total 10000; Flight Crew Type 3000
Training / Qualification; Communication Breakdown; Confusion
Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Person / Animal / Bird
Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Human Factors
During the pushback process all was SOP until the tow tractor with attached bar drove away. We were in the process of starting engines and had received no communication from the ground crew. The First Officer continued to start the remaining engines. I requested the Relief Pilot to call the tug frequency we had been given while I continued my attempt to reach anyone that may be on the headset as it appeared the entire ground crew had left. I communicated with the rest of the crew my concerns. After engine start we waited...extended flaps 20 and waited...did the flight control check and waited all the while trying to establish contact with the tug or at the nose which we were never able to do. The Tower was unable to see anyone. After delaying departure and numerous attempts to contact the push crew or anyone else we received taxi clearance. I released the brakes at which point a man came from near the nose with headset in hand. Brakes were set and we established hand signals which basically was a thumbs up and a shrug of his shoulders and he left. The flight continued uneventfully. The previous leg was similar with the ground crew getting in the tug and backing away without a salute and release; thumbs up or any combination thereof which is what you find out the on the line as nothing appears to be standard. What happened here? Why did the tug leave one man behind? Why did he stay under the nose with no communication with engines running; flaps extending; flight controls moving?
From the charter package in the airplane we were advised the tow/push-back crew used a discrete frequency to co-ordinate the push-back. We tried the frequency several times and there was no answer. [I since have learned that this is a chronic problem and numerous crews have encountered the same thing. I'm wondering if the frequency is even in use]. Per SOP I; as the pilot not flying [co-pilot] was listening to ATC and starting engines and running checklists while the Captain handled the push-back. The Relief Pilots were monitoring the push-back frequency with the tug as well as ATC frequency. After a successful engine start of all four engines I ran checklists configured aircraft; did a flight control check double checked performance data [partial runway ops due to NOTAM]. The whole process seemed to take longer than usual; maybe 10 minutes (plus or minus). The Captain instructed me to call for taxi and I did. The Tower/Ground [same frequency] cleared us to taxi. I relayed this to the Captain and we began to move slowly. Almost immediately the Relief Pilot sitting behind the Captain said 'stop' and the Captain did so immediately. The Relief Pilot saw the ground person stumbling and running with the red flag pin in his hand. We came very close to squashing the guy. The tug had left a long time ago with the tow-bar and the ground guy took an inordinate amount of time to get the pin out. We did not know he was down there at all. I have since learned that this is not the first close call at this location due to their non-standard; non-SOP methods for pushback. I have many years of Military Aircraft Command (MAC) and Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) experience but never have I seen such a poor operation. My recommendation is to have a person on the ground with a walkie-talkie or radio that can coordinate with the flight deck like we used to. I'm not sure what has changed but the way this operation is being handled is very poor. There are numerous other issues with this charter operation I have handled via operational report.
B747-400 flight crew experiences non-standard ground handling procedures during pushback and engine start at UAFM.