Dash 8-100
Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Workload; Situational Awareness; Distraction
Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Human Factors
I was the pilot flying on this originating flight.  A minute or so after leveling off at our filed cruise altitude of 16;000'; I looked up and saw the Master Warning light flashing.  A check of the panel showed that the CAB PRESS warning light was illuminated.  I immediately checked the pressurization panel and saw that the cabin altitude was above 10;000'.  The sun was coming from over my left shoulder illuminating the glareshield and caution panel making it difficult to see the caution/warning lights; so I'm not sure how long the light had been on before I noticed it; but the cabin altitude was around 11;000' and climbing.I immediately checked the AUTO/DUMP switch; cabin altitude setting; manual outflow selector; and bleeds; all of which were normal.  Since we were up at 16;000' with a climbing cabin altitude for reasons that weren't obvious to me at the time; I told the FO that we would suit up; and we would then begin a descent down to 10;000'.  After I had my mask on and set; the FO was still finishing with his; so I [advised] ATC and began a fairly quick descent to 10;000'.  I did debate on whether [advising ATC] was necessary; but in the moment I decided to make the most conservative choice and do so; thus making sure that our descent to 10;000' wouldn't be unnecessarily delayed.  Once leveling off at 10;000'; I knew the situation would be stable and we would have plenty of time to properly troubleshoot.Level at 10;000'; the FO and I removed our O2 masks and I transferred the flight controls to him.  I then immediately called the flight attendant in the back to confirm that all was well there.  She advised me that none of the passengers realized anything was amiss; and that she had noticed we descended a little faster than usual; but didn't think anything of it.  I then got out the emergency checklist and turned to the Cabin Pressurization Failure checklist.  It was when I got to the 'Bleed Air 1 and 2......On/Max' line that I realized the flow selector had been inadvertently left in the Min position.  After confirming that cabin pressurization was returning to normal; I immediately advised ATC that we could continue on our normal route to [destination].  I made a PA to the cabin explaining our swift descent; and confirmed once again with the FA that none of the passengers seemed alarmed.  Finally; I called our dispatcher to make sure she was aware [of our situation]; that everything was under control; we were continuing; and that I'd call her on the ground with further details.As stated above; I noticed the event occurred via the Master Warning light flashing and the illumination of the CAB PRESS warning light.  A check of the pressurization panel confirmed that the cabin pressure was above 10;000'.Ultimately; this occurred because of our failure to turn the bleed flow selector to Max during the after takeoff flow.  While the F/O as pilot monitoring would have physically moved the knob; I as PIC should have backed him up and caught it as well.  I believe this occurred because of the distraction caused by ATC instructing us to switch to departure.  Tower advised us to contact Departure right about 300' AGL...just as the F/O was preparing to make the 400' call.  I believe he turned the bleeds on; then looked away to answer ATC and make the frequency change; forgetting to return and finish with the flow selector.Contributing to this situation was the fact that our hotel van driver called in sick right at the time we were supposed to be leaving for the hotel.  The front desk clerk hurriedly called for a cab to take us; but it took almost 15 minutes for it to arrive.  By the time we got to the airport; we were 20-25 minutes late.  Accordingly; we were in a rush to get our originating checks complete and depart as close to on-time as possible.  I specifically told the FO that we would take our time and make sure we didn't cut any corners; but there was no break in the action from the time we arrived at the airport until we were established in the climb out.Finally; the flow selector was not caught with the after takeoff checklist (which the F/O did complete; checklist in hand.)  The 'Bleeds...ON' line doesn't specifically address the flow selector; and since the bleed switches were actually on; it would be easy to note this fact and continue on with the checklist.  With the bleeds on and the cabin partially pressurizing; nothing would have stood out as obviously amiss at the 'Pressurization Panel...CHKD' line.  We continued on with our flight as normal.  Because ATC had already worked on a more direct route for us in consideration of our [situation]; we were cleared direct.  With each successive controller change; it was made very clear that we not longer had an [urgent situation] and that we were continuing our flight as normal.  We landed and taxied to our gate with no issue.  No emergency equipment was standing by.No maintenance writeup was necessary as there was no mechanical issue with the aircraft; and the small amount of oxygen we used left the fixed O2 pressure adequate for further dispatch.The most important factor for preventing a recurrence of this event is to continue to be aware of checklist discipline for every checklist on every flight.  This is even more critical in high workload or distracting situations; and I will be sure to be more aware in the future of situations where we were unusually busy or distracted.  Even though the checklist was completed in this situation; an item was still missed.  I will try to be more diligent at making sure each line is given the attention it requires.  Finally; I will make it a point to back up the other pilot on checklists they are to complete as soon as I'm able.I think a small revision to the normal After Takeoff checklist could also be very beneficial here.  While the emergency checklist specifically addresses the flow selector by using the verbiage 'On/Max' at the 'Bleed Air 1 and 2' line; the flow selector is never specifically addressed on the normal checklist.  If we could change the normal after takeoff checklist to read 'Bleeds....ON/MAX' (or perhaps 'ON/MAX/AUTO' to address the packs on the -300); it would serve as an additional reminder that 'Bleeds' means more than just the bleed switches themselves.Finally; I have learned the lesson that including the flow selector in troubleshooting any pressurization problem is very important.  Had I realized the flow selector was at Min as soon as I saw the CAB PRESS light; I could have potentially eliminated the need to [advise] ATC.  However; at the time this occurred; it wasn't immediately obvious to me what our problem was; so I still believe that [advising ATC of our situation] was the prudent decision.  I knew that when we were safely level at 10;000'; we would have plenty of time to evaluate the situation with clear focus.
Dash 8 Captain reported low cabin pressure resulted from failure to properly position the flow selector.