MU-2 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Multiengine
Flight Crew Last 90 Days 20; Flight Crew Total 4600; Flight Crew Type 650
Troubleshooting; Situational Awareness
Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe
Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed
Human Factors; Aircraft
Pilot primary operational experience is in MU-2B-20. Aircraft flown was MU-2B-26. Formal differences training received 2 years prior; and pilot had recent re-orientation flights in previous 24 hours. Aircraft diverted from original destination due to inadequate fuel (headwinds); arrived at secondary airport with approximately 1 hour fuel remaining. Airport in sight; canceled IFR; entered pattern. Gear down with nose-gear (only) unsafe indication. Gear re-cycled with same indication. While circling; [I] attempted to adjust/remove nose-gear indicator light without success. [I] attempted to contact FBO personnel without response; planning fly-by for visual nose gear inspection. Local traffic indicated FBO personnel unavailable. [I] proceeded to a larger nearby airport under VFR. Emergency checklist consulted and manual extension considered; circuit breakers cycled and reset but manual extension deferred as there was no other indication of mechanical problem- gear remained down. Approach Control was contacted and advised of nose gear unsafe indication. No emergency was declared. Approach offered fly-by and external gear inspection; provided vectors for the runway to follow commercial traffic. Tower advised AIR SHOW in progress on opposite side of airport and emergency vehicles would stand-by for low-approach inspection. Initial fly-by inspection indeterminate and 2nd fly-by was requested by ground personnel. Second inspection confirmed nose gear down. Landing accomplished without incident. Emergency crew briefed at FBO upon shutdown. Further manipulation of nose-gear indicator was successful in removing lamp and confirmed burned-out bulb; replaced with on-board spare. Flight to original destination resumed when air show departure window allowed. Factors affecting decision-process included distraction by relative low-fuel state and prolonged operations at low altitude VFR in high-drag; high-fuel-consumption condition. Incomplete familiarity with the aircraft model operated resulted in a focus on mechanically testing gear-indicator bulbs; when in fact a master gear-light press-to-test was available (not available on MU-2B-20). Recent reports of nose-gear collapse incidents in MU-2 aircraft probably also altered the perceived complexity of the problem. Perhaps a better course of action would have been to contact Approach; climb to altitude for better fuel specifics and IFR traffic protection; and proceed with additional trouble-shooting during a stabilized HOLD on autopilot. ATC handling of the situation was exemplary; and the supportive nature of Approach and Tower controllers was certainly appreciated.
MU2 Captain experiences an unsafe nose gear indication and diversion to a Tower controlled airport for a fly by. Gear is reported down and a normal landing ensues. The indicator bulb was found to be burned out and the reporter was not familiar with the test switch in this model MU2.