B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Flight Crew Total 14650
Situational Awareness; Fatigue
Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach
General None Reported / Taken
Airport; Human Factors
Prior to this flight I had not been to San Diego. Briefed approach and arrival 3 times during the flight and descent. We entered descent winds and checked all altitudes and talked about terrain. Started the Checklist at FL180. While over the mountains ATC gave us a direct to OKAIN; a 12 mile final. Now that we were off the arrival and the altitudes I became concerned with terrain. ATC stepped us down to 7000 then 5000 the 4000. They also instructed us to maintain 230 Kts till CIJHI. At 8 thousand feet I looked down at the checklist and noticed the First Officer (FO) was behind and I had not made the 'prepare for landing' call which I made at this time. As we approached VYDDA we were coming down on the glide slope and everything seemed to be coming together. I lowered the flaps to 5 at VYDDA and as we slowed between VYDDA and OKAIN we decelerated and lost the glide slope. I disconnected the auto pilot and went primarily visual for the approach. I extended the speed brake and extended the landing gear. About this time; although I did not realize it; I began to loose situational awareness and we entered the 'yellow'. I knew I was high and a bit fast but I was unsure how high we were above the 3.5 degree glide slope. I extended the flaps and at the first buffet I realized I had left the speed brake extended. I began to mentally chastise myself for this error and I should have asked for a go around at this time but I felt we were coming down on the glide slope. As we got closer to the runway it seemed the glide slope was coming in. At 1;000 feet I had final flaps and gear extended we were about 10 kts fast and decelerating I was thinking go around when I noticed the PAPI went one red and three white. I latched onto this visual cue thinking I was finally coming down on the glide slope and unfortunately decided not to go around. I knew I was high visually but the surrounding high terrain and the knowledge of a non-standard 3.5 degree glide slope deluded me that I was stabilizing. I never heard a 500 foot call I don't think he made one. At this point I desperately needed a 'Go Around' call to snap me out of the tunnel but I think the FO was as far behind as I was and I don't think he made one. Coming up on the threshold I lowered the nose I knew I was going to touchdown long but as I saw the 5000 foot remaining marker and mistakenly thought I was OK with runway remaining and landed. Of course now I had gained airspeed from lowering the nose and I floated and landed just beyond the 5000 foot remaining markers. I deploy the Thrust reversers and used manual braking. I could have turned off at taxiway [intersection X] but saw the terminal to the left and let off the brakes and turned off at [Intersection Y]. I should have broken off this approach at OKAIN; the 12 mile mark. I knew I was fast; 230 assigned; and high but I thought it was correctable. What I did not take into consideration was that the 3.5 degree glide slope was already close to the limit for a 737 and that the 400 ft correction I needed to make in 12 miles was not achievable. Throughout the visual approach I was latching onto a few cues that were reinforcing my perception that I was about to come onto the glide slope and the approach was salvageable. As soon as I recognized I was losing situational awareness I should have gone around but each time I began to make the go around decision I would lock onto a visual cue that fooled me into thinking the approach was coming together and the problem was the nonstandard glideslope.I was flying with a pilot new to the company; but with flying experience at the commuter. Unfortunately; I believe he also lost situational awareness and was focused outside and he was not monitoring the instruments for go around triggers. I was fatigued going into the sequence; not from flying; but from external stresses. I have been waking up often at night and have trouble getting back to sleep. Next week I am going to contact medical to ask for a sleep aid prescription. I also mistook the sign in time for the departure time and showed up an hour early for the flight.
B737 Captain described an unstabilized approach into SAN that resulted in a landing beyond the 5;000 feet remaining marker.