B767 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Confusion
Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe
General None Reported / Taken
Aircraft; Human Factors; Company Policy
This report is not timely and does not have to do with an actual incident. I recently completed my yearly proficiency training and was again reminded of the issue I wish to discuss here. The QRH is a good tool; but it could be much better and it would be simple to make it so. Such an improvement could move us toward an integrated B767 fleet; realizing large economies of scale within the pilot force resulting in significant cost savings for the company as well as significant increases in overall safety. While I understand the need to control costs; the construction of the QRH in its current form is a false economy. Trying to fit all the sub fleets we fly into one all encompassing document (B757 or B767) dedicated to the safe outcome of rarely practiced stressful emergency and irregular operations is dangerous and will/does result in undesired aircraft states when its purpose is to do exactly the opposite. Any procedure that necessarily states a specific aircraft subtype is an undesired aircraft state looking for a place to happen. Put another way; no QRH in any of our individual aircraft should contain a procedure in it that does not pertain to that particular aircraft. An added benefit would be significant reduction in bulk of the publication making it much easier to handle in an irregular or emergency. The cost of editing and maintaining appropriate QRH's is no doubt small compared to the cost of a wrongly executed procedure done on an aircraft that the procedure does not even pertain to or worse yet; the creation of confusion in an already stressed and perhaps fatigued crew because things don't add up; potentially leading to a tragedy.
B757/767 Captain laments the complexity of the QRH due to the variety of aircraft covered after the merger and the opportunity for error in an emergency situation.