Brasilia EMB-120 All Series
Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown
ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance
Weather; Procedure
OAK has two Air Traffic Control Towers. The South Tower owns Runway 29. The North Tower owns all other runways. I was working in the North Tower at Local Control 2. The Embraer 120 was on the LOC/DME approach to Runway 27R. The ILS approach is NA due to construction that interferes with the glideslope. Minimums are about 400. Advertised ceiling was 300; however; 8 NM ahead of the Embraer 120 was a King Air who landed on that same approach. Due to this fact I was not immediately cognizant of the possibility of a missed approach. At the threshold the Embraer 120 announced he was going missed. I immediately called over to Local Control 1 in the South Tower to let them know so they could stop any departures but they already had one upwind. It was the CRJ9. Since the CRJ9 was not tagged up I wasn't sure where on departure they were and was hoping they would be able to have their departure make a left turn to 290 or 280 to gain course divergence between the CRJ9 and the Embraer 120. After that call I turned the Embraer 120 to heading 310 and climbed to 3;000 as that is our standard missed approach procedure from the Runway 27's. The CRJ9 pilots are used to a different airport which has ASDE and are told to operate their transponders on the ground. The OAK ASR has line of sight with the terminal the CRJ9 exits and the ARTS acquired his data tag on taxi out. This led Departure Control 'Sutro' at NCT to suspend the data block. When the CRJ9 was airborne there were a few primary targets; some ghost; one was the CRJ9. I was unable to tell where the CRJ9 was on the RADAR as I was turning my Embraer 120. When the CRJ9 finally tagged up I saw that they were closer than I thought. I am not aware of any other legal options I had and the separation ended up being 1.16 NM lateral and 300 FT vertical with 11 degrees of divergence. The event occurred due to procedures that do not allow for diverging course separation between north and south field departures and due to the Local Control 1 Controller not applying 7110.65 5-8-4 minima. Also note that weather like this is fairly rare at OAK and today was the first time in the season that I have experienced conditions such as these. Several weeks ago; OAK was notified by NCT that due to magnetic variation the north and south field departures no longer had course divergence. Runway 29 SIDS state to fly runway heading (now 296); north field departures are told to fly heading 310. We are now required to stagger these departures to have 3 miles constant or increasing. I recommend that either the SIDs be changed to instruct Runway 29 departures to fly heading 290 and/or that TERPS evaluate the use of heading 320 for North Field IFR departures. This would have allowed us to create a much safer situation than what occurred. Air Traffic Management (ATM) called Chief Pilot to remind his pilots to not operate transponder on the ground at OAK while also having controllers at Ground Control 1 have the CRJ9 aircraft squawk standby if they notice his secondary target appear on the RADAR. I should have also started my Embraer 120  turn sooner; however I was unaware of the CRJ9 and I felt it important to tell Local Control 1 in case they were about to depart someone. Turning the Embraer 120 would have gotten a little extra mileage between the CRJ9 but it still would have been less than prescribed.
I was working Local 1; weather conditions were limited. When I cleared the CRJ9 for takeoff on Runway 29; I realized that there was traffic on final Runway 27R that appeared not to be continuing to descend on the approach; only a partial data block was displayed. This aircraft was within 1 mile of the Runway 27R approach end. The CRJ9 lifted off of Runway 29. Local Control 2 called; from the North Tower; and advised of the missed approach of an Embraer; and asked if I had anyone rolling. I advised yes; and told him to turn his aircraft. Separation was lost as they both climbed out. My recommendation is that during IFR conditions; Runway 27 aircraft be displayed to Local 1. I also recommend that when the weather conditions are below the minimums for a particular approach; that the missed approach instructions be issued to the pilot prior to the missed approach.... I.e. 'in the event of a missed approach; fly heading....' that awareness from Local 2 could have reduced the severity of this incident. Coordination could have also occurred between Local 1 and Local 2 before the 1st go-around; to coordinate that the 310 heading would be required.
OAK Tower controllers described a loss of separation event between a Runway 29 departure and a Runway 27R missed approach aircraft; the reporter noting weather conditions and magnetic variation changes as contributory factors.