A330
Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Distraction; Other / Unknown; Situational Awareness
Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance
Human Factors
Captain loaded flight plan into flight management system. Captain included Runway 31L with JFK2 departure. After clearance/PDC was received; the first officer changed the departure from JFK2 to SKORR THREE per the pre departure clearance. First officer failed to include RNGRR transition. On climb-out the captain flew the aircraft per the SKORR THREE; but shortly after turning left towards SKORR the first officer; with the captain's consent; removed the discontinuity between SKORR and GAYEL. As a result; the FMS commanded the flight directors to turn right towards GAYEL and the captain flew the aircraft accordingly. Captain asked the first officer to ask ATC for direct routing further down our flight plan and once queried by the first officer; ATC instructed an immediate left turn to a heading of 210 deg. We received radar vectors from that point to join our original flight plan.The international relief officer noticed that a deviation was occurring as soon as the first officer removed the discontinuity between SKORR and GAYEL from the flight plan. The relief officer advised the captain that he needed to fly over SKORR; but the right turn was already underway and continued for a few seconds. ATC thereafter requested a left turn to a heading of 210 deg. This instruction was immediately complied with by the flying pilot; whereupon ATC then issued a contact phone number regarding said deviation. Captain loaded FMS prior to receiving PDC. Once the PDC was received the first officer made the changes as referenced above to the SKORR THREE. The first officer was confused as to whether the SID included a transition and queried the captain and relief officer. At the time; there were numerous distractions on the flight deck including maintenance personnel; a jump seater; and lead gate agent. As a result of these distractions the transition was ultimately not loaded into the FMS. While the first officer conducted his own route legs verification; neither the captain nor the relief officer participated resulting in the omission of the RNGRR transition.This deviation was the result of a breakdown in CRM amongst the flight crew. The multiple distractions mentioned above combined with the crew's general concern regarding the captain's wellbeing and led to an environment where standard operating procedures were overlooked. This deviation began prior to push and was the result of multiple nonessential events that distracted the flight crew during important preflight operations. The deviation and CRM breakdown would not have occurred had all questions regarding the captain's wellbeing been resolved prior to his boarding of the aircraft.
Initially I loaded the flight plan & ATC PDC Clearance into the FMS SKORR 3 RNAV Departure RNGRR transition. I flew the departure & at approximately 400 feet called for the 'Auto Pilot One' to be engaged per company policy with RNAV Departures. At that very moment instead of engaging the auto pilot the First Officer (FO) went to his FMS & deleted the transition at the request of the IRO. This left the aircraft FMS headed towards 'GAYEL' intersection which would have taken us right into La Guardia's airspace. Having good situational awareness & having flown out of Kennedy airport for 22 years including being based there. I immediately realized this could cause a traffic conflict in a 'New York Minute'. The flight director was telling me to turn right; but I knew I needed to turn left to prevent the potential of a conflict with La Guardia. So I ignored the flight director & turned left to intercept the 039 degree radial to SKORR intersection. The FO & IRO were bickering amongst themselves & I was essentially single pilot with a 3 man crew. I asked the FO to request a vector to intercept 039 radial from departure control & they assigned us 210 heading. I received a number to call Center later; which I did. I fell on my sword & he reviewed the info & flight path & agreed with me that no conflict 'no issue'. They just wanted to hear our side of the story. I didn't brief the FO & IRO as thoroughly as I usually do; relative to other cockpit distractions between mainly the IRO & the flight attendants. No legs verification occurred after the departure was updated by me; as this would have brought the FO IRO into the loop with departure change. We were originally assigned the Kennedy two departure or maybe that is what was on the flight plan I can't remember for sure; but I know it was a last minute change.As I mentioned earlier a more thorough briefing would have helped. Also perhaps the IRO not confusing the first officer with a lot of talking at 400 feet. The IRO had minimum experience levels in the A330. He still does not have a basic understanding of how the FMS works. I could work on my CRM & I will. But; looking back now; I kind of feel like I was all alone out there; with a first officer that is willing to learn & does a decent job; but an IRO who really needs some work in the basic knowledge department & likes to talk a lot.
A330 Flight Crew reported a track deviation during SKORR3 RNAV departure from JFK. Distractions in the cockpit resulted in the SKORR3 being entered in the FMC without the RNGRR transition and was not detected until airborne. When the route discontinuity was cleared a turn direct to GAYEL was commenced before correcting back to SKORR.