A320
Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant
Communication Breakdown
Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Maintenance Action; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed
Aircraft; Company Policy; Human Factors; Logbook Entry; Procedure
Aircraft X in ZZZ with pilot discrepancy 'F/CTL FLAPS FAULT. ECAM OCCURRED ON APPROACH WHEN MOVING FLAP LEVER FROM 1 TO 2. AFTER RECYCLING FLAP LEVER PER ECAM; FLAPS OPERATED NORMALLY.' Post flight report indicated flap jam in flight phase 6 cruise. 4th shift started troubleshooting per TSM and I was assigned to continue. TSM stated both flap actuators were required to be changed in the event of a jam with no faults due to known icing problem. Concurred with Maintenance Control that this was desired and safest step to continue. Gave all information to my crew chief; and supervisor and that the plane needs to be taken out of service until the parts are removed and replaced. Supervisor outlined that his boss argued that it's not the problem and proceeded to find any way to keep aircraft green. Both myself and work partner were pressured for well over the night to not ground Aircraft X and call it good. We raised the fact the TSM explicitly states with no faults both actuators must be changed. Due to ongoing peer pressure I reluctantly agreed to sign Aircraft X airworthy on the technicality that although the aircraft is reporting a flap jam; the phase of flight it occurred was in cruise and probably an indication error. However; prior to Date on Date-1 the exact fault and exact write up was entered. Corrective action from ZZZ2 base was a reset of LH #1 torque limiter. The TSM for this faults states that when resetting a flap torque limiter; the TSM refers to lubricate drive system; do a detail inspection and replace rotary actuator which have a tripped torque limiter. This was not done in ZZZ2 when an indicator was tripped; reset; and signed off. See [Logbook Entry]. I advised Maintenance Control and supervision of this oversight and advocated for replacing flap actuators.Event occurred because management doesn't take un airworthy as acceptable.Keep management where it belongs. Managing their supervisors and leave the technical aspect to the mechanics with the proper steps and actions from the manuals.
Plane arrived in ZZZ with Flight CTL flap slat fault; was written up previous day for same thing. Contract maintenance with Maintenance Control guidance troubleshot fault - no faults where found; we ran engines and cycled the flaps per Maintenance Control request; no faults occurred. Approaching ZZZ1 at 2;000 ft. at flaps 2 selected we had a ECAM FLT CTL FLAPS FAULT message. Did go around and followed vectors to 3;000 ft.; advised ATC and followed QRH; We did all steps but were both misinterpreted the checklist. Should have put lever to flaps 3; instead of flaps full and calculated the wrong approach speed as we now believe we misinterpreted the max speed chart for approach speed. 190 kts. instead of 165 kts. Report said we were 185 kts. I believe. On the approach I knew something was not right; thought about going around but was worried about the fuel time. During approach we had full slats no flaps. We requested longer runway (12;000 ft.); Landing was normal I let plane slow to 100 kts. before applying breaks. Never heated up beyond 150 [degrees] more or less. After firefighters looked over the airplane we proceeded to gate. Should have referred to SOP in performance for added info but thought we were right and worried about fuel. I have done this procedure in training; I ran the checklist and made the mistake that I was warned about. I believe frustration with a reassignment; irritated with a broken airplane (multiple problems) that was delivered to us and worried about fuel during checklist all added to my distraction and lead me to misinterpreting the checklist.Slow down slow read checklist slower; have more fuel to run all the way through.
Multiple repeat flap failures caused a no flap landing and subsequent errors during maintenance trouble shooting and repair of the affected system.