EMB ERJ 145 ER/LR
Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance
Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition
Aircraft; Weather
After Takeoff we received Pack 2 VLV CLSD and Bleed 2 VLV CLSD EICAS messages. Neither would reset in accordance with the after takeoff checklist. Circuit breaker panel was checked and noted that Pack 2 circuit breaker had popped. We ran the QRH checklist for both Pack 2 VLV CLSD and BLD 2 VLV CLSD. BLD 2 VLV CLSD Checklist prompted to running of the BLD 2 FAIL checklist and single bleed operation in icing procedure. We advised ATC that we would like our final altitude as 25;000 ft. (instead of planned 27;000 ft.) in accordance with the QRH procedure. We also notified Dispatch and Maintenance Control. On the ZZZZZ Arrival passing through 10;000 ft. we encountered icing conditions and received STAB A/ICE FAIL and WG A/ICE FAIL caution messages. We turned the ice detection override to all and advanced the thrust levers in accordance with the QRH procedure. The messages extinguished briefly but then re-appeared with the addition of the ICE COND -A/I INOP warning message. After running the checklist we briefly discussed the possibility of diverting. At around 7;000 ft. we advised ATC and asked if it was possible to descend below the icing conditions. Another aircraft gave a pilot report that there was no icing at 3;000 ft. We descended to 3;000 ft. and executed the ILS XXR. After advising ATC we informed Dispatch and the Flight Attendant. We coordinated alternate missed approach instructions with ATC to avoid icing and had a normal landing; rollout and taxi to the gate. Failure of aircraft equipment led to [a serious] situation.It was not my first thought to look at the circuit breaker panel. I only looked after the First Officer mentioned in it. I would suggest incorporate looking when a non-normal equipment condition occurs in my own flow to increase my own situational awareness.
On climb out; PM (Pilot Monitoring) attempted to reset PACK 2 and BLEED 2 due to PACK 2 VLV CLSD and BLEED 2 VLV CLSD advisory messages on the EICAS. PACK 2 and BLEED 2 failed to reset; prompting the crew to check the overhead CB panel where it was discovered that the PACK 2 circuit breaker was popped. Crew ran the QRH procedures for PACK 2 VLV CLSD and BLEED 2 VLV CLSD and advised ATC that FL 250 would need to be final altitude due to single PACK operations. Since BLEED 2 would not open; crew executed the BLEED VLV 2 FAIL procedure. On the ZZZZZ arrival during descent into ZZZ (through 10;000 ft.); crew received the ICE CONDITION; STAB A/I FAIL and WING A/I FAIL caution messages. Crew ran the procedures in the QRH; but could not descend and maintain assigned speed and advance the thrust levers to provide adequate bleed air to the ice protection system. PF (Pilot Flying) asked for Flaps 9 in order to add some drag to the aircraft to advance the thrust levers and provide air to the Bleed system (air was in the white band on the ECS (Environmental Control System) page of the MFD). Crew received the ICE CONDITION - A/I FAIL warning message. Diverting was discussed; crew asked ATC if it was possible to descend out of icing conditions. Another aircraft on frequency responded that they exited icing conditions at 3;000 ft. CA (Captain) [advised ATC]; and asked for a descent to 3;000 ft. to exit icing conditions and land at ZZZ. CA advised Flight Attendant and Dispatch that we had advised ATC. Once cleared for the ILS XXR Approach; crew configured for landing and was able to advance the thrust levers which cleared the ICE CONDITION - A/I FAIL // STAB A/I FAIL // WING A/I FAIL warnings and advisories. Crew advised Tower that they were still a [priority] aircraft and would be unable to execute published climbout procedures and requested amended climbout instructions for no higher than 3;000 ft. to stay out of icing conditions in the event of a missed approach or go around. The crew landed the aircraft successfully and taxied to the gate without incident.Cause of the incident was the loss of the PACK 2 and BLEED 2 due to the PACK 2 circuit breaker that popped after take-off. Bleed system was unable to provide ice protection in the descent.Crew considered diverting to the south to exit icing conditions; however after receiving a PIREP that icing conditions cleared below 3;000 feet; the crew decided that the fastest way to exit icing conditions was to [request priority handling] and descend out of icing conditions. Once configured for the approach (with sufficient drag on the aircraft) the Thrust Levers could be advanced enough to provide adequate bleed air to the ice protection system.
EMB-145 flight crew reported Air Conditioning Pack and Bleed Air Failure in climb.