Commercial Fixed Wing
Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine
Flight Crew Last 90 Days 348
Fatigue; Workload; Communication Breakdown; Time Pressure
Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR
General Work Refused
Human Factors
Upon finishing my three-day paring in ZZZ1 at (time/date) I received a phone call from Scheduling; as I was leaving the aircraft. They told me they had added on to my schedule; they needed me to deadhead to ZZZ; then ferry an aircraft back to ZZZ1. I was concerned because I had already flown quite a bit that day and was afraid that I would not be legal for it. The Scheduler assured me that I was legal and that it was all okay. I asked them to look into it again because I had my doubts. I then asked if they could provide a hotel for rest at the end of the turn as I would be extremely tired. She claimed she would pass it on to the hotel desk. Upon contacting the hotel desk they said they could only provide a room if there was an unused ZZZ1 overnight room; which there was not.I proceeded onto the gate for the first leg of the ZZZ turn. Inside 30 minutes to departure there was no crew or other deadheading crewmember present at the aircraft. The flight to ZZZ was scheduled completely empty except for the Operating Crew; myself and one other deadheader. Again; I was concerned that I would time out before we could complete the turn so took it upon myself to prepare the aircraft for departure and set up the cockpit for the Operating Crew; in order to expedite our departure. We eventually departed 18 minutes later than planned. Upon reaching ZZZ; the operating First Officer left to recover a diverted aircraft back to ZZZ1 and I quickly prepared our aircraft for our return to ZZZ1. Unfortunately; once again; our aircraft experienced multiple delays due to random unexplainable maintenance locks; issues with load and balance calculation and performance. As we sat on the ramp at ZZZ I could tell that I would soon be in danger of timing out and verified my legalities. It showed a Table B Limit of XX42C without extension. At roughly XXX25CI called Crew Scheduling and notified them I was within 20 minutes of reaching the latest takeoff limit; and asked them what their plan was. The Scheduler on the line said that there was someone looking into my legalities and that they would call me back. That call never came. Shortly thereafter the aircraft issues were resolved and we were able to depart at XX37CF; just five minutes before the XX42C takeoff limit. With the aid of computer program and the printed crew legalities sheet; it appeared we had taken off within limits and were completely legal to fly the flight.Upon landing at ZZZ1 at XX04C; we were told that there were no gates available we would have to hold on the pad until one became available. Shortly after parking in the pad; we received an ACARS message referencing my employee number and requesting a flight delay extension. It showed several times; but those times did not match any times on the calculator on computer program. It was confusing and seemed to be in error. Since we were parked in the pad with the parking brake set; the Captain took the radios and I called Crew Scheduling. I explained we were on the ground waiting for a gate; I told them I had received the ACARS message and that it did not make sense - I asked for clarification and the implications of accepting or rejecting. They placed me on a brief hold but when they came back they were not able to answer any of my questions and essentially didn't seem too concerned since we were on the ground in ZZZ1. Since Crew Scheduling was not able to explain the ACARS message I neither accepted nor rejected the extension. Once again I asked for a hotel room; and they said they were not able to accommodate.A gate finally opened; we terminated the aircraft and I left the gate. As I was walking away I got a call from Crew Scheduling; a different Scheduler was on the line telling me that I had violated the limits. I explained to him that I had taken off five minutes before the limit time and that I should have been legal to fly the flight. The Scheduler explained that even though that was true I had violated the 'Last Block In' time of XX15C. I told him that I was not aware of any Last Block In Time; it is not a number that is published or provided to us in the cockpit; either by the Crew legalities sheet or the computer calculator. I also explained that I had called Crew Scheduling multiple times this evening to voice my concern over my proximity to the limits and not once during any of those calls did any member of Crew Scheduling even bother to mention a 'Last Block In' time limitation. The Scheduler tried to explain that it was all okay as long I say I was aware of it and that I was in acceptance. I countered that no; I was not aware of the limit despite my multiple requests to Crew Scheduling to evaluate my limits; and no; I was not aware I had exceeded any limit; yet when I called for an explanation of the ACARS message; it would have been the perfect time to tell me; and finally no; I did not accept the extension; nor did I reject it because nobody at Crew Scheduling could explain it to me. However; by default; a lack of acceptance should be considered a rejection. This was obviously not what the Scheduler wanted to hear; so he told me that he would forward it to a Supervisor; who would subsequently call my Chief Pilot. I said that was fine; asked that he have the Supervisor call me as well and we ended the call.This experience has taught me that Company does not have either the capability or the desire to adequately protect its pilots from exceeding FAR Part 117 Flight Duty Limitations and Rest Requirement restrictions. I understand that FAR 117 responsibilities are shared between the certificate holder (Company) and the pilot (myself). In this case; however; the pilot had expressed concern about the limits three times; asked for clarification from the certificate holder; yet was repeatedly stonewalled with evasive or non-existent guidance in order to complete the operation. Finally; after successfully and safely completing that operation the pilot was criticized for exceeding a limit the he was never provided; warned of; or explained ahead of time. Then finally the certificate holder attempted to coerce the pilot into accepting the extension after the fact.Resolution of this issue and prevention in the future should include: 1. Provide pilots with the latest block-in time on the crew legalities sheet and computer in additions to latest takeoff times for every flight. This allows pilots to clearly understand all limits of the flight. 2. Better and/or more extensive training of Crew Schedulers on FAR Part 117 duty restrictions. 3. Clearer and more proactive communication from Crew Scheduling to pilots about approaching limits. 4. Make available crew rest accommodations; on request; to a pilot that has been flown to the extent of or over the flight limits on the last day of a paring. Accident prevention should extend beyond the confines of the cockpit. After working 13 hours and 48 minutes on duty operating aircraft; nobody should be behind the wheel of a motor vehicle late at night.
This event involves a potential exceedance of the Part 117 Maximum Block In (MBI) time for the First Officer at the end of a long duty day that included a re-route (involuntary assignment). It has already been reported by the First Officer; and I agree with and support his report. Rather than repeat his whole narrative; I will highlight important points and add one or two additional observations.In ZZZ; we experienced multiple unexplained maintenance locks which prevented us from receiving takeoff data. (Unknown if this malfunction was due to the new maintenance software; or ZZZ Ops not entering our actual fuel on board - which was tankered in and approximately 3;000 pounds more than expected on the release.) After about 30 minutes; we were able to resolve the situation by correcting fuel on board on a new release (and new takeoff reference number.) Feeling pressure to simultaneously deal with First Officer's legality issue while resolving the maintenance lock issue was a distraction and threat that (unlike weather; passenger issues; or aircraft malfunctions) is created by the system. In other words; although Part 117 is intended to help improve safety; the way it's applied ends up being an unhelpful distraction and a threat to safety.The First Officer tried to raise legality questions on the original call. Later; during the re-assignment; the First Officer called Scheduling at least three times to try to discuss the situation. Although I could not hear the other end of the conversations; it sounded like each time he was told they were aware of it and 'working on it.'The First Officer had accepted an extension the previous night. This caused him / us to wonder whether he was even legal for an extension on a 2nd consecutive night? He attempted to bring this up to Scheduling but never got a good answer from them. (Like everything else in Part 117; it's not as easy to answer as it should be. It certainly isn't a yes/no answer.)Once on the ground in ZZZ1 and holding in the pad for a gate to become available; we received an automated ACARS message asking to accept or reject an extension. This was done at the very last minute; when the only realistic options were: accept the extension; or violate Part 117. That doesn't really give the pilot any option to reject the extension. As previously stated; he had already been trying to work with Scheduling prior to this. And; he also (unsuccessfully) attempted to clarify his block in time and options with Scheduling after the ACARS message. When there was still time to address the issue; Scheduling would only give him a 'we're working on it.' It seems like the only option Scheduling would consider was strong-arming him into accepting the extension 'or else.' As we approach what looks to be a very busy summer flying schedule; with the strong possibility that the pilots being brought back in July from extended time off will arrive on the line too late to fill the gaps; Scheduling and Dispatch might consider being more proactive looking for other solutions (offering more premium open time trips; not diverting aircraft into airports where we only have one scheduled flight per day; etc.) versus pushing so hard and flirting with legality issues. In the interest of fatigue management and safety; I don't think it's reasonable to assume that a pilot who has been involuntarily reassigned more flying at the end of a long trip will automatically desire to voluntarily accept an extension to his flight duty limits. The discussion needs to happen much earlier; and not through an automated message giving the false appearance the pilot has an actual choice in the matter.
Air Carrier flight crew reported crew scheduling tried to fly the First Officer beyond Far 117 limits.