B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown; Confusion
Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown
Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Human Factors; Airport
On the morning of (date); a nice day as far as the weather was concerned; we were cleared to taxi into [gate]. I was recently warned by ramp control to avoid blasting the firehouse with jet blast when taxing into that gate. We've been warned before as a pilot group regarding the dangers of jet blast particularly in the gate area of LAX. As we taxied past [spot] I noticed a crew of marshallers gathered at the bottom of [gate] on the ramp. I anticipated them taking positions to guide us into the gate as we got closer. As [gate] faces the firehouse; I wanted to keep the engines at idle as we made our right turn to the gate. I judged the plane had enough momentum to take us to the gate without pushing up the engines which would blast the firehouse with jet blast. The marshallers did not take their positions as rapidly as I had anticipated. I did not see any equipment inside the safety lines so I chose to idle the plane into the gate. As we got closer to the gate the central marshaller held up his wands crossed indicating for me to stop. Given that all equipment was outside safety lines I thought he would quickly uncross the wands and start to guide me in. I didn't want to stop the plane at this point for that would necessitate me pushing up the throttles to get the plane going again and thereby jet blasting the firehouse. The marshaller eventually did uncross his wands and guided me in to the gate.In retrospect; I should have stopped the plane at the marshaller signal. My concern for the firemen in the firehouse and the damage that jet blast could cause them was perhaps misplaced in this instance. As a pilot; in spite of what we see or think we see; we must depend on and work with our ground crews to keep our operation safe as possible for all concerned. Going forward I recommend that when we taxi into [gates] we wait abeam [gate] until our marshalling crew is in position. That way we can power past the firehouse with our engines' jet blast going west; away from the firehouse. We would then be able to use minimal power going into those gates.I recommend that when we taxi into [gates] we wait abeam [gate] until our marshalling crew is in position. The ground crew should be anticipating us waiting for them to get into position so they are ready and waiting to do so when they see our arrival abeam [gate]. That way we can power past the firehouse with our engines' jet blast going west; away from the firehouse. We would then be able to use minimal power going into those gates.
We were taxiing into [gate]. Ramp Control told us not to turn into the gate until our ramp crew was present so that we would not blast the fire department. After the clearance; the Captain asked me what ramp control had said. I told him. Then he asked me what that meant. I again responded and said: just stay on the taxi line until you know that you can park and have positive marshalling. Despite this; the Captain began the 90 degree right turn towards [gate]. We were now in a compromised position with the engines pointed at the firehouse. I was confused because I thought my clarification provided understanding of the instructions. As we turned the corner; I evaluated the situation. It appeared that the parking area was clear of personnel and equipment. However; there was a group of ramp personnel gathered at the end of the J line talking. They seemed unconcerned that we were there. I believe the airplane initially stopped but the Captain then moved the airplane forward toward the parking gate. The Marshaller held up crossed wands. I initially thought the Captain was just moving up slightly to create separation from the fire house since we were now in a compromised position. At the time; I didn't think that he was intending to continue into the gate as far as we did. I kept waiting for the Captain to stop in response to the Marshaller. I began to think about whether or not I would apply the brakes as I continuously evaluated the right side of the airplane. I decided that I would apply the brakes if I saw something inside the safety lines and that would be my absolute hard line to take control of the airplane. In the moment; that seemed logical. In hindsight; I should have taken control of the brakes much sooner and I let the situation develop much too far. I had an unreasonable expectation bias that either the Captain would stop the airplane; or that the Marshaller would give us instructions to continue which would resolve the situation. I missed several opportunities to stop the operation. This is uncharacteristic and I won't let it happen again.I should not have made any assumptions as to where the Captain was taxiing. Although I thought I made my concerns clear and vocal; perhaps they weren't. I will stop the operation much sooner next time (and use the brakes) if I do not get the expected results.
B737 flight crew reported that a miscommunication with the ground crew at the gate caused them to deviate from instructions.