B737-800
Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Flight Crew Last 90 Days 554
Other / Unknown
Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Company Policy; Procedure; Human Factors
Arrived to [the] gate approximately 45 minutes prior to push. Received Dispatch release from Operations Agent and saw 12.6 on the fuel tanker line. Passenger load was approximately 120 on an -800 and planned landing weight was 10;000 below max landing weight. Weather in ZZZ1 was good. I asked the Operations Agent to stop fueling if it had begun and informed her I wanted the minimum fuel load as I did not want to tanker to ZZZ1. Unfortunately; the plane was fueled; so I said since we had plenty of time to please go ahead and call to defuel all tanker fuel.I then went down to the aircraft to relay my concerns to my FO (First Officer) and said that I am not a fan of tankering to ZZZ1 as I feel it is an added risk in one of our most operationally challenged airports due to the short runway and frequently changing weather conditions. I mentioned to her the first part of RRM (Risk Resource Management) even says [to] accept no unnecessary risks. That would come back into play on my phone call with the Dispatcher and Sector SOD (Supervisor on Duty). I was in the process of calling the Dispatcher to let him know about my change to the fuel load when the Operations Agent advised me to call Dispatch and that he did not consent to taking off the tanker fuel. I asked her the status of the defueling truck and she said she had called for it; but that Dispatch had instructed her not to defuel. I politely let her know that we would be defueling and at the risk of delaying the operation to please inform the Fueler. I called Dispatch who told me that I had plenty of stopping margin at 133;000+ on 22L. I told him that I felt that tankering into ZZZ1 increased my risk by increasing my approach speed; brakes on speed; and landing distance and that unless there was no gas available in ZZZ1; I would not be tankering. He got quite angry and said they are allowed to add tanker fuel for cost savings and do it all the time. I told him cost savings by tankering to ZZZ1; ZZZ2; or ZZZ3 is not something I put ahead of the additive risks. He then informed me the Sector SOD wanted to have a word with me. The SOD joined the call. He asked what my issue with tankering was and I quoted from FOM 2.2.3 the first principle of RRM says [to] accept no unnecessary risk. I expanded by repeating what I had said to the Dispatcher. I told him this model has been instilled in us the past number of years and he interrupted and told me that it was perfectly acceptable to tanker; that I was still 10;000 below ATOG and that there is no reason not to tanker.I told him I had two big reasons not to tanker and it involved two airplanes leaving the runway surface in ZZZ1: one by a check airman and one that killed a child. He then asked if the plane was booked full; would I leave people behind to reduce weight and I told him that my job is to get people; bags; and cargo safely from one place to the next and that I don't have an issue landing an 800 at MGLW (Max Gross Landing Weight) in ZZZ1 when that is the case. I told him I will always land in the first 1;000 feet of the runway and he will never read about the next day in the paper - but when I have the option to reduce landing weight; landing speed; landing distance; and brake energy requirements - as in the case with tankering; I will reduce my risk. I mentioned that even at 133;000 lbs; the aircraft will weigh more than a MGLW 700. He said we are talking about two different planes and went on to say he was not going to remove the tanker fuel as it saves money by tankering. I said we can agree to disagree here but I'm not taking the fuel.For the second time I requested the CPOC and said if they don't want to bring him on the phone; transfer me to Scheduling. I have never felt so pushed to put economics above safety as I did with how the SOD spoke to me. He mentioned he had 40 years at [the Company] and made a slight regarding my concerns which I can't remember the verbiage. He brought the CPOC on the lineand when it became obvious to the SOD that CPOC understood my concerns and was not going to replace me as the PIC (Pilot in Command); the SOD left the line. At that point; I realized the Dispatcher had still held up the defueling process and also instructed the Operations Agent not to board - even though I said it was ok to board. I recognized that completely defueling the center tank wouldn't be possible with passengers so I had asked the fuelers to leave the center tank at 2000 lbs; so we wouldn't have to slow the process any further. We ended up tankering about 5;000 and enroute burn was less than 7;000 total.For reference; my landing weight ended up being 127.2 and AB3 was 24 and MAX braking was 1434. Runway was 6-6-6. The Dispatcher and Operations Agent seem to run the fueling show at [the] Company. The Captain is rarely; if ever; consulted on the fuel loads. It would be great if the PIC and SIC (Second in Command) could be brought into the loop prior to adding tanker fuel - especially to short runway airports. It would also help on the other side as I have left NFG (Next Flight Guaranteed) and other cargo because we have alternates when they aren't required and then the associated alternate fuel which on long flights can reduce the ability to actually put the cargo on that generates revenue. It works both ways; but as PIC; I am almost never included in that part of the discussion.
B737 Captain reported receiving disagreement while requesting removal of tankering fuel due to a flight into a performance-limited airport.