Cessna 150
Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor
Flight Crew Last 90 Days 150; Flight Crew Total 4500; Flight Crew Type 200
Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification; Workload
Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Human Factors
While flying in IMC with a student; my student became spatially disoriented. She was being vectored to a left heading of 040 to set up for the ILS XX at ZZZ. I watched her turn past her heading. I told her to turn back. She continued to the left. I was starting to question if her heading was really that off or if we were experiencing a vacuum failure. She said your flight controls. I took over but was already getting disoriented when I took the controls and struggled to regain control of the aircraft. My student became afraid we could stall; although we were not slow. She pushed the controls forward. We lost about 1;500 feet in a turn before regaining control of the aircraft. I feel that my student became spatially disoriented while I fell behind what was happening due to my questioning of the instruments. We lost altitude due to the unusual attitude. She and I are both current instrument rated pilots. She passed a check ride [a few months ago]. I passed a multi-commercial check ride [a few months ago]. We have both flown approaches since then. Neither of us had been in an unusual attitude in actual conditions before. We did unusual attitudes on a simulator the next day. We will both do it in the plane as soon as weather and schedule permits.
I was working on my commercial rating; but the ceilings were too low to do maneuvers. I still needed total time and I was scheduled to fly the next day for a fly-out; and I had never flown that airplane before; so we decided to take that airplane IFR to familiarize ourselves with it. My instructor had never flown that particular airplane IFR. I was; and am; a VERY low-time pilot in actual IMC. We decided to shoot one approach. ATC cleared us to 3;000 feet; heading 090; with vectors for the ILS XX. We entered the clouds at ~1;300 AGL. Everything went well initially; but early on I asked my CFI to be in charge of tuning radios and putting things into the GPS because I knew it would task-saturate me. However; I continued to talk on the radios. I turned left to a heading of 100 at ATC's instruction; and leveled out at 3;000 feet. While finishing my briefing of the approach; ATC gave me another turn to the left; and I blew past the heading because I was fixating on the gradual descent shown on the VSI. With the airplane in a left descending turn and ATC talking on the radio directing us to turn back to the right; I began to feel disoriented and uncomfortable; and I gave the controls to my CFI. She said; 'What are you doing? Are you okay?' and I said something like; 'I feel a little disoriented; please take the controls' and she said 'I have the controls'.We proceeded to enter an unusual attitude with a steeply banked right turn; according to the attitude indicator. My CFI called ATC and told them that we were having trouble; and that we had lost our vacuum pump. I looked at the vacuum gauge and it was in the green; I told my instructor the vacuum looked like it was working and I thought we were in an unusual attitude. I began to panic and completely lost my scan. At some point; hearing the panic also in my CFI's voice; I decided to take the controls again; but said nothing. Based on engine noise and afraid of deteriorating airspeed/impending stall; I pushed the stick forward. That must have put us into a dive because a few seconds later I heard the engine getting loud so I pulled the throttle back and looked at the ASI; which showed an IAS of ~130 MPH...in the yellow arc... so I began to bring the airplane back to a level pitch. I felt we were level again in controlled flight and began looking for the ground - I announced as I soon as I could see the ground; and leveled out under the clouds. ATC began to vector us to ZZZ at our request; then vectored us back to ZZZ1 when we changed our mind. We realized we did not know the weather at ZZZ and we did not want to fly back into the clouds inadvertently.We flew back to ZZZ1 at 1;400 feet MSL without incident; staying visual; and landed.Factors involved in this loss of control / unusual attitude in IMC incident were as follows:1. Pressure to fly to build total time.2. Pressure to fly this particular aircraft since I was scheduled in it the next day and had never flown it before.3. Me being a low-time pilot; and an extremely low-time actual IMC pilot.4. Me having never flown this particular aircraft; and having done all my IFR training in a C-172; which has very different control feel compared to a C-150.5. Me relying on my CFI to be able to get me out of trouble.6. My CFI being relatively unfamiliar with the incident aircraft and not having any IFR experience in it; and having most of her recent experience in 172's as well.7. My CFI relying on me to not get myself into trouble and getting 'behind' the situation.8. Overcast at 1;300 feet AGL; hard IMC conditions at the time of loss of control.9. Possible temporary loss of the vacuum system.10. Panicking - on my part and my CFI's11. Failing to maintain an instrument scan leading up to the incident and while I was panicking.12. Failure on my part to uphold the initial 'positive transfer of control' - since I took the controls back without speaking and we were probably both trying to control the aircraft at that point / loss of trust in my CFI to recover the situation when I heard her panicking.13. Mild fatigue on my part - I had slept for maybe 5-6 hours the night before; which is not quite enough for me in general.14. Task saturation on my part - inability to think about briefing the approach; talk on the radio to ATC; and maintain my scan / control the aircraft.The only factor in our favor about this event was that we had a 1;300 feet ceiling; no adverse weather conditions; and no rising terrain or obstructions.The best way to prevent this would have been to realize that it was stupid; especially as a low-time pilot; to take an unfamiliar airplane (both in terms of model of airplane and avionics on board) into actual IMC without practicing in it first under the hood in VMC [and] learning the control pressures and the avionics in a safer environment. We should have stayed on the ground. We could have flown the simulator to build time. Better ways to respond as the situation unfolded would have been for me to turn ALL non-flying tasks over to my CFI (better Crew Resource Management) when we entered the clouds so I could concentrate 100% on flying the airplane. When I first began to feel disoriented; I could have taken a deep breath; leveled the wings; and continued a careful scan; before worrying about ATC's instructions. After my CFI took the controls; she could have done the same thing - leveled the airplane and made sure she had positive aircraft control before trying to comply with ATC's directive to turn right. In the middle of it; I do not know if I should have taken the controls back or not from my instructor; because I do not know if she had positive aircraft control or not; but I should have said something about it. It was dangerous for me to make control inputs based on engine noise alone while in a (literally) blind panic. We were lucky to survive. Other ways to prevent future such incidents; besides the above; is to pay very close attention to the IMSAFE and PAVE checklists before each flight; especially IMC flights. I plan to gain more actual IMC time in familiar airplanes with CFI's who are also very familiar with the given airplane in IFR situations. I plan to never take an unfamiliar airplane or avionics suite into actual IMC before flying a proficiency check under the hood in VMC or a proficiency check in IMC with an instructor who is high-time in that airplane. I will maintain my proficiency by flying MANY more approaches/holds/etc.; per 6 months than are prescribed to stay legal as an instrument pilot. I will maximize my crew resources as needed to ensure that I can maintain aircraft control and not task-saturate. In general; I will avoid single-pilot IFR/IMC operations until I have a few hundred hours of actual IMC time. I also need to train myself to think rationally and maintain an instrument scan even in high-stress situations - this will be harder to do.
C150 student and instructor reported becoming disoriented and entering an unusual attitude in IMC conditions during practice instrument approach.