Small Transport
Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 8
Troubleshooting; Human-Machine Interface; Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness
ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic
Human Factors; Procedure
Aircraft X checked in from the southeast; and cleared to land Runway 2. There was training on LC; and we all noticed Aircraft Y that was on a downwind started to turn base and to final for Runway 2 sooner than expected because initially it appeared Aircraft X was Number 1 in the sequence from the south. Looking at the speeds it appeared that Aircraft Y was going to 'eat up' Aircraft X quickly. As I keyed up the 'shout line' to call HCF; LC broke Aircraft X out towards the Rock Quarry southeast of the airport at or above 2;500 feet; for an outbound helicopter; and to keep them east of the Runway 2 final for Aircraft Y. Aircraft Z was also joining final behind Aircraft Y.When HCF answered; the controller said 'I'll call you back' before I could say anything. It appeared he now recognized the dilemma we were in with the sequence. HCF called back and asked if we could turn Aircraft X heading 180 and send back to him; I told him that we already had Aircraft X breaking off to the Rock Quarry to sequence behind Aircraft Y; and if he could slow down Aircraft Z to give us some room. He insisted that we give Aircraft X back to him. Aircraft X was entering our airspace already; and I told him that we'll keep him and work it out. The HCF controller responded; 'Aircraft Z's not going to slow down; thank you.'LC brought Aircraft X Number 2 over the airport midfield to enter left downwind to Runway 5 with a short approach to land after Aircraft Y and stay ahead of Aircraft Z. I believe LC also slowed Aircraft Z to ENSURE our separation.1) The sequence was not clear and was not going to work as it was given. 2) In recovery; although the Approach Controller attempted to take back Aircraft X; he refused to slow down Aircraft Z to help us out. We could not figure out why not; there wasn't any aircraft behind Aircraft Z. With the Heading 180; we also didn't want to 'bust' the MVA reference recent events. We left the option open to keep Aircraft X on the downwind and control his turn to land after Aircraft Z if need be. [Need] better planning by HCF Approach.If Tower is helping fix HCF's sequence or lack thereof; Approach should be willing to help within their means. An unsafe sequence that was being fixed could have become an unsafe situation again with the Approach Controller's refusal to slow down Aircraft Z for no good reason. Many problems have been coming up with this particular controller; and it seems as though nothing is being done about it.
Aircraft X; VFR; descending out of 3;000 feet checked in from Kihei Town; between 7 miles and 10 miles southeast of OGG on a Visual Approach to Runway 2. Aircraft Y was high on a midfield right downwind for Runway 2; out of 5;000 feet about 5-7 miles east of OGG. Afterwards; Aircraft X checked in first and my trainee cleared Aircraft X to land Runway 2. They were already Number 2 to the airport after another [aircraft]; on left base Runway 5 from 5 miles northwest of OGG.After the first [aircraft] landed Runway 5; we both noticed Aircraft Y was turning about a 7-8 mile right base for Runway 2; leaving 3;000 feet on a Visual Approach and was showing 190 knots. Our other [aircraft] who we already took the Automatic Hand Off for Aircraft X; and we already got the communication transfer from HCF Approach for Aircraft X to OGG Tower. I prompted my trainee; what is the sequence going on here? And is this going to work with the Aircraft Y turning base behind Aircraft X both on a Visual Approach to Runway 2? My trainee also agreed; and he had no idea how to work this developing situation out. I wanted my trainee to figure things out and I wanted him to figure out where to make a recovery option for this developing situation. Like send Aircraft Y around and send them back to HCF for re-sequencing. Or vice-versa. Maybe Aircraft X put in a VFR holding point holding pattern near the airport to work back in to OGG after Aircraft Y lands; etc.; etc.My trainee kind of froze and did not know what to do or how to do it. So I prompted [trainee] just to show him how we can safely get Aircraft X out of the flight path for the Aircraft Y turning their right base. This Aircraft Y's right base to be after the slower [aircraft] showing 120 knots; while Aircraft Y was showing 190; 180; 170; was never going to work. Plus; Aircraft X still was on a 4-5 mile dog-leg; straight in 4-5 miles southeast of OGG; while Aircraft Y was starting their base turn leaving 3;000 feet and descending.I prompted my trainee to have Aircraft X turn right; to remain east of Runway 2 Final/Centerline; and to have Aircraft X fly to the Rock Quarry; which was a VFR reporting point/fix only 2 miles southeast of OGG; and we could buy time to coordinate with Approach and figure out what was going on and then we could figure out how we can recover the situation/scenario and get Aircraft X back into the landing sequencing to land at OGG; either back to their original Runway 2; or to the other intersecting Runway 05.I turned to our CC [Cab Coordinator] and asked for help/coordination; and simply asked; how do they want this [to] work? Kind of thing? Or maybe if they slow down the next jet in the lineup; who happened to be Aircraft Z on the ILS Runway 2; if they could slow Aircraft Z; maybe we could create space again and have Aircraft X report Aircraft Y in sight to possibly apply pilot applied visual separation to follow Aircraft Y. Or another possibility to work Aircraft X; to change to Runway 5; either to circle north of the Airport to enter a left downwind for Runway 5; and/or even to cross over the airport at 1;500 feet to then enter a left downwind to Runway 5 to land After Aircraft Y lands on Runway 2; and still need to slow down Aircraft Z to make something work possibly. Maybe give us a fighting chance to make this bad arrival sequence work? Maybe?Our CC got on the 'Shout Line' and coordinated with the Approach Controller working the Maui Approach Sector 9 and asked HC that Aircraft Y's right base was going to 'Eat Up' Aircraft X; who was ahead of Aircraft Y and was switched to us first prior to Aircraft Y's base turn. This is where we started to suspect that maybe the Approach Controller forgot about Aircraft X; or maybe the Approach Controller did not know or have any understanding of how to sequence a faster jet; following/behind a slower VFR Aircraft X. At this point; we just recognized the developing situation; and we just wanted to use our 'precious' time remaining left; to try to figure out a 'solution' to the developing situation and figure out a safer way to recover the sequence and to get the landing aircraft safely to land on our runways.When HCF answered our CC; our CC then looked surprised; and relayed back to us that HCF Approach will call us back. Now I began to worry that this might be too much for the pilots and this might be too much for my trainee. I told my trainee that it's okay; that this is the plan; and we are going to take Aircraft X to fly east of the Final Approach; and head towards the Rock Quarry; and I also prompted my trainee; by the time Aircraft X gets to the Rock Quarry; we can make another decision when Aircraft X reaches the Quarry; and then we can decide to either take Aircraft X midfield crossing at 1;500 feet to enter a left downwind Runway 05; or we could possibly have Aircraft X re-enter a right downwind to be last after Aircraft Y; and possibly even after the next jet inbound in trail of Aircraft Y.My trainee instructed Aircraft X to do what I prompted him to do; and then HCF started to call back to the CC desk. I started to feel a little better that maybe HCF Approach recognized the mistake and maybe they would be willing to help us out to maybe slow down the trail aircraft jet; Aircraft Z; to be after we get Aircraft X back to Runway 2 or something. Maybe? I was hoping.HCF coordinated that he wanted Aircraft X back to HCF's Maui Approach's Sector 9; Maui South; and to turn Aircraft X heading 180 back to him. This was another dilemma because Aircraft X was VFR and was already assigned to maintain 2;500 feet for another traffic situation for an opposite direction helicopter that was southeast bound that was restricted at or below 2;000 feet. This helicopter situation also created extra workload for my trainee; because the outbound helicopter was always supposed to go southeast bound earlier; however; now we had to break Aircraft X out the way to the Rock Quarry; and that solved the problem for Aircraft X turning base; but now we had Aircraft X and the outbound helicopter on converging courses; so we had to use altitude restrictions to separate the two VFR aircraft.Now; HCF wants Aircraft X back to them on a 180 HEADING. We knew; from previous scenarios; that we could not give the VFR aircraft a vector with a 'hard' altitude restriction. This was unnecessary because we already had traffic for Aircraft X; and we didn't want to turn Aircraft X back into the helicopter that was now south of Aircraft X; and we already separated the Helicopter and we didn't want to send Aircraft X back to a 180 heading back to the Helicopter traffic and have another traffic issue again; and we didn't want to vector the VFR Aircraft X below the high MVA in that area near the Haleakakala Volcano Mountain; and we figured that Aircraft X is already getting some pretty bad service and bad sequencing from Approach; and we already was working Aircraft X in our airspace; so we figured we could better service Aircraft X versus sending Aircraft X back [to the] Approach Controller that put us all in this bad situation to begin with.Our CC responded to [Approach's] coordination request; that we already had Aircraft X; we are breaking Aircraft X off to the Rock Quarry to sequence now after Aircraft Y; and while [Cab Coordinator] coordinated this back to HCF; [Cab Coordinator] requested to have HCF Approach slow down Aircraft Z to give OGG some space/some room to sequence Aircraft X to be sequenced behind Aircraft Y jet on final.HCF insisted that we give Aircraft X back to him. Aircraft X was now approaching the Rock Quarry; and we could see Aircraft X 2 miles southeast of OGG. We already had Aircraft Y cleared to land on a 2 mile final. [Cab Coordinator] told Approach that we will keep Aircraft X already and we will work Aircraft X out. HCF responded that 'Aircraft Z is not going to slow down; thank you; [Operating Initials].' Cab Coordinator relayed this information to me and [the developmental]; I could not believe this coordination from HCF after everything that they just put us all through and where this was placing towards the pilot of Aircraft X.I told my trainee that we were going to have Aircraft X cross over the airport at or above 1500 feet to enter a left downwind Runway 5; and then I prompted my trainee to have Aircraft X to now make a Short Approach to land Runway 05; as Aircraft Y was landing Runway 02. Aircraft Z was then switched to us; and I had my trainee slow down Aircraft Z to 170 knots for spacing to ensure our Runway Separation and Intersecting Runway Separation with all 3 aircraft involved.1.) The Arrival Sequence was never or was not very clear and was not going to work any way the way the aircraft flew and it was not going to work the way the aircraft was handed off to OGG. 2.) In the recovery stages; although the Approach Controller attempted to take back Aircraft X; he refused to slow down Aircraft Z to help us out and to help get Aircraft X back into the sequence that he gave us ahead of Aircraft Y and Aircraft Z. What is that about? We could not understand why there was resistance to slowing down Aircraft Z; there was no other aircraft in trail of Aircraft Z nor was there any other aircraft in Sector 9's airspace at all. So we could not understand why they 'needed' to keep Aircraft Z 'NOT' to slow down. For Who? For why? For what reasons?With the heading 180; we also didn't want to bust the MVA reference that Aircraft X was VFR; with an altitude restriction already for the helicopter traffic the heading 180 could have potentially sent Aircraft X back to where the helicopter was to the southeast of OGG. Even without the altitude restriction; the MVA in the area of Aircraft X I believe was around 3;500 feet or even 4;500 feet; and Aircraft X was 2;500 feet. So this was never the best option in our perspective. Not to mention; Aircraft X was originally Number 2; way earlier; and now Aircraft X would have been turned into being last; maybe Number 5 in the arrival sequence.By taking Aircraft X to a left downwind to Runway 05; we had options because even though we slowed Aircraft Z down to ensure separation; our other 'out' would have been to simply just extend Aircraft X's left downwind; and we would have controlled their base turn potentially to land Runway 05 after Aircraft Z lands Runway 02; maybe if we couldn't slow Aircraft Z down or something; etc.; we had other options just to be safe in place if need be.I recommend better planning and better communication/better coordination between the Approach Controller and our Cab Coordinator. I believe out OGG CC did an awesome job trying to be diplomatic working with HCF on Sector 9; and I also feel Cab Coordinator was professional and was trying his best to work with the Approach Controller to recover the situation. I also feel that the Approach Controller was not 'willing' to work with Cab Coordinator. Maybe there could be a personality conflict with Approach working Maui Approach and working across from Cab Coordinator; myself and others at OGG. If OGG Tower is helping Fix HCF's sequence or lack thereof; then Approach Control should be willing to help out within their means and also not put other aircraft in more or additional unsafe situations/scenarios.We were worried that this unsafe sequence that we were trying to fix could have become another unsafe situation with the Approach Controller's refusal to slow down Aircraft Z; and also to turn Aircraft X to a south heading below the MVAs; and also near where there was helicopter traffic now south of Aircraft X's position. Not to mention; these aircraft are all handed off with the AUTO WALK ONs; (Automatic Hand Offs); and simply with the communication switch. I recommend that maybe they remove the Automatic Walk Ons.Also; the Approach Controller should not be handing us unsafe situations and potential 'Deals' / L.O.S.
Maui Tower controllers reported an airborne conflict resulting from inadequate sequencing.