EMB ERJ 145 ER/LR
Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine
Distraction; Situational Awareness
Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
General Maintenance Action
Aircraft; Human Factors
We picked up a new plane in ZZZ on the XX hardstand for our seconded flight of the day. The plane had also flown and arrived from ZZZ1 that morning. It was hot; and clear around noon when I (FO) began the 'Walkaround Inspection' in place of the more detailed 'Exterior Inspection' as the plane had flown previously and had not undergone any known maintenance. While a more detailed inspection was made of the RVSM (Reduced Vertical Separation Minimum) Critical Area on the right side of the aircraft; the left side static ports were presumably covered with silver speed tape enclosed in the silver area around the ports. This went undetected on the walkaround and the flight operated to ZZZ2. Upon arrival in ZZZ2 the FO (First Officer) again inspected the plane in the post flight check; but did not detect the covered static ports. In ZZZ2; a new outbound crew took over the aircraft; and noticed the covered static ports on their inspection. As a result of the covered static ports not being discovered; the aircraft operated the flight as planned to ZZZ2 with covered static ports on the left side of the aircraft. No excessive cross altitude comparison deviations were observed between the three instrument systems. For certain; I the FO should have noticed the covered ports even on the walk around. Complacency of inspections should be held in check; and an increased thoroughness in preflights should be exercised. Additionally; I should recognize how ramp distractions (extended air tube; proximity to mobile boarding adapters at head height; and GPU (Ground Power Unit) cord trip/arc hazards; possible jetways blocking view of ports) may contribute to inadequate attention given to the actual preflight particularly around the door area. Perhaps a change in the order in which I inspect items in the preflight would have allowed me to see the ports at a more optimal angle to note abnormalities. While I (the FO) need to improve my preflight technique; there were a few other factors in this event I feel are worth mentioning. These factors are not intended to rationalize my short comings; but rather present additional information that may help other crews avoid this trap. I think a couple of us these ports on walkaround; perhaps these factors contributed: 1) The silver speed tape blends quite well with the dinner plate sized silver area surrounding the static ports; making it more difficult to detect. Perhaps an effort to utilize more visible tape or extend the silver tape out into the paint of the aircraft would make this procedure of blocking ports more visible. 2) As alluded to earlier; ramp safety has been a pretty big talking point in the company. As I prefer a clockwise inspection path; I would have arrived at these static ports in a pretty complex and busy ramp area. Before I would have seen these ports; I would have negotiated the ground air hose (trip hazard); had to duck under the MBA [Mobile Boarding Adapter] and around the door (head banging hazards); while making sure I didn't get caught up in the GPU cord (trip and shock hazard). All I'm saying there's a lot going on right there; apparently I let these issues distract me and didn't even realize it. I've probably been doing this for years and didn't even realize it. 3) These ports can be in a hard spot to see; possibly even covered by the bumper on the jet bridge. I suspect pilots overlook these ports more then they realize.
EMB-145LR First Officer reported failure to notice static ports covered with tape on walk around inspection.