MD-83
Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Flight Crew Total 7000
Human-Machine Interface; Workload; Fatigue
ATC Issue All Types; Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; General Release Refused / Aircraft Not Accepted
Human Factors; Aircraft; Chart Or Publication; Company Policy; Procedure
Short description of incident: Total FMS failure on RNAV arrival. Location: Top of descent on the FRDMM One RNAV Arrival into DCA. Relevant Background: Flight crew: This was the last day of a two-day sequence; second leg of three-leg day for both cockpit crew members. I; the Captain; was on fifth day of continuous duty after previously completing a three-day sequence; with minimum rest time between the two sequences (first departure of second sequence delayed slightly to accommodate domicile rest). I had a total flight time in the five days previous to this event of approximately 26 hours; not including approximately 2 hours of on-gate hold in ZZZ on day three. Aircraft: There were two previous write-ups in recent logbook history for FMS failures during either cruise or descent. Weather: Scattered to broken layers of cumulous-type clouds with light chop/turbulence throughout arrival area. Our arrival airport was VFR with the Mt. Vernon Visual Runway 1 as the active approach.The First Officer was pilot flying; and I was pilot not flying. The flight up to point of the event was normal. We did note that the estimated arrival time for the destination was not displaying on the FMS progress page; so we checked for discontinuities or other incorrect data inputs. Finding none we did not perceive there was a serious issue. We had completed first part of Descent Checklist and reviewed the FRDMM One RNAV Arrival. After some discussion; we decided to fly the arrival with autopilot engaged in VNAV mode. Lastly; due to weather and forecast turbulence in the arrival area; the Captain directed the cabin crew to prepare for landing early and take their seats. We were cleared by ATC to descend via the FRDMM arrival. Just after beginning descent at approximately FL310; both NAV displays (map mode) went blank with 'FMS Fail' warning annunciated. After a few seconds; the map display returned briefly; and then failed again. I directed the First Officer to switch to Arc or Rose mode on Navigation Display and to continue flying without further reference to any FMS data. I informed ATC the primary navigation system had failed; the aircraft was unable to continue the FRDMM arrival and requested alternate descent instructions. We were initially cleared to descend to FL240 and proceed direct to ESL to join the NUMMY One Arrival. After getting out the NUMMY Arrival page and tuning in ESL; neither VOR receiver received a navigable signal. We subsequently confirmed with ATC that ESL was off the air. ATC then cleared us to a fix further down on the arrival (I can't remember which one). I replied that we were unable to navigate direct to a fix and could only accept clearance to VORs; radials defined off VORs; or radar vectors. ATC then directed us to intercept the 297 radial inbound to AML and fly the published procedure. After a quick review of the NUMMY One Arrival I determined that it was too complex to safely navigate without a thorough prior review and briefing by the crew. I then requested radar vectors and altitudes to destination. Later in descent; we were asked if we could proceed direct to AML and then direct to DCA with 'expect vectors' to downwind. We accepted that clearance and eventually were vectored to the Mt Vernon arrival followed by an uneventful landing. During the entire event; we dealt with three different ATC controllers. While they were generally helpful; it was my perception that the necessity of having to deal with a navigationally impaired aircraft was creating high workload issues on their end. Details of the FMS failure were entered into the logbook. After reviewing the information; the Maintenance technicians reported that they did not have the appropriate parts to repair the problem and that no spare aircraft were available. The Maintenance Technician proceeded to placard the FMS per the MEL. After some discussion with my First Officer; I chose to refuse the aircraft. The flight was subsequently canceled. Factors weighing on my decision to refuse the aircraft were 1) the demanding nature of operating in the DCA area with its high-density traffic and numerous restricted areas; 2) the less than optimum weather conditions in the departure corridor; 3) the high workload that would be required in operating the aircraft without the use of FMS; 4) the length of crew duty day up to this point; 5) and the cumulative fatigue on my part from total duty performed in the previous five days. As further background; I have operated the MD80 with an inoperative FMS; and I have found that it substantially increases the workload for the crew. On another day; at another airport; with different weather; and with a fresher crew; I might have accepted this aircraft; but not on the day in question. While making the refusal entry in the logbook; I received a phone call from our Chief Pilot regarding my refusal; and seeking additional information. I explained my rationale as stated above. While I sensed he wished I would have made a different decision; he never questioned my authority as the Captain to make it. I then deadheaded home. Maintenance needs to make sure the problem is fixed the FIRST--and no later than the second--time it malfunctions. But three times?!! I sometimes get the feeling that Maintenance is slapping Band-Aids and MEL's on maintenance issues just to keep the airplanes moving and not making the proper effort to fix the problem in the first place.
[Narrative #2 contained no additional information.]
While 'descending via' the FRDMM RNAV STAR to DCA the flight crew of an MD80 lost both FMSs and their associated Map displays thus rendering them unable to comply with the RNAV procedure. ATC ultimately provided vector and altitude clearances to a successful visual approach. The logbook showed two recent FMC failures. When asked to fly another leg with both FMS systems deferred the Captain refused the aircraft and the flight was canceled.