B737-300
Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Situational Awareness; Confusion
ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance
Procedure; ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Human Factors
I was working both Sutro and Quake Departure Sectors combined. Traffic was light/minimal for Quake but slightly moderate for Sutro with a total of approximately eight aircraft on frequency. A B737 departed off of OAK on a Skyline departure. On initial contact I climbed the B737 to 5;000 FT to separate the aircraft from a light Cessna aircraft transitioning west of San Francisco northbound to O69 airport. When the B737 was far enough east to be separated from additional jet traffic departing SFO northwestbound; I turned him southbound and climbed him to 10;000 FT. This altitude would offer applicable separation from aircraft inbound on the Golden Gate Arrival; passing over the top of SFO at 11;000 FT. Once the B737 acknowledge the instruction; I went on to issue traffic advisories and instructions to another Air Carrier. Unbeknownst to me; a B757 departed SFO of Runway 01 assigned a 350 heading instead of the normal departure SID because he was not RNAV equipped and the SFO VOR was Out of Service. When the B757 departed; the aircraft did not check in and his data tag providing needed information did not auto acquire. Per our LOA with SFO Tower; they are required to call and notify NCT when an aircraft departs and does not auto acquire; this was done late and contributed to the loss of separation. There was a primary RADAR return and secondary RADAR target; but since there was no secondary information the target was small and hidden under (overlapped by) a helicopter operating VFR in the same vicinity as the B757 low level. The other Air Carrier responded to issued instructions and a Learjet departure called stating he departed off of Oakland. Shortly after SFO Tower called CI-1 (Coordinator Position) and advised that the B757 had departed and not auto acquired. Since the B757's RADAR return and subsequent information was hidden by the helicopter and CI-1 had trouble finding the aircraft. As CI-1 finished their conversation with SFO Tower; the B757 checked in stating he was upwind and climbing out of 5;000 FT. CI-1 pointed out the B757 and his position as the B757 was checking in. I immediately turned the B737 east heading 090 and issued a traffic alert. The B737 acknowledged and stated he was responding to a TCAS alert and was descending. I then issued a turn west to the B757 heading 270 and issued a traffic alert. The B757 acknowledged the turn and stated that he had the traffic in site. Once the aircraft were separated and the TCAS event was past I issued a climb and turn to the B737 and the B757 to get the aircraft back on course. No further complications took place in the scenario. I believe there were a few factors that led to this occurrence and they all happened at the perfect time to cause the conflict. The aircraft failing to auto acquire and NCT being notified of this failure by SFO Tower in a timely manner per the LOA. Late frequency change and or check in; if aircraft were issued frequency changes in a timely manner on a consistent basis as per 7110.65 it would have alleviated this problem. Lastly; although we do receive flight plan read-outs (strips) from SFO and OAK Tower prior to their departure and OAK routinely follows the LOA and clears their aircraft within two minutes of scanning the flight plans to us; SFO rarely complies with; inhibits us from using those strips to anticipate traffic off the primary airports. The B757's strip had been sitting in front of me for over 5 minutes and there for I could not base by actions of the aircraft airborne around whether departures would come off or not. It makes the controller be more re-active instead of proactive. As stated; there were many factors that happened simultaneously that allowed this situation to occur. NCT seems to have a continuous problem with aircraft not auto acquiring due to numerous different automation failures or problems; and while it is possible to separate and sequence aircraft without automation; it is a tool that we have been providedand expected to utilize per our instruction manuals. With automation failures it distracts the controller's attention from separating aircraft and places it on the automation. A recommendation would be to find a more user friendly stable program that can provide a beneficial service and be an aid instead of a hindrance. Per our LOA with SFO Tower; a notification should be issued if the aircraft departs and does not auto acquire. A delayed action can provide the opportunity for something like this to happen again. A quicker response from the Tower would be beneficial in alleviating this situation. Another solution would be for aircraft to be issued frequency changes in a timely manner. This action would have alerted me to the aircraft and allowed me to turn him or issued alternative instructions. Finally; the delay between when flight plan readouts are scanned and when the aircraft departs off of SFO does nothing to assist in our operations. If the strips were scanned and the aircraft departed within two minutes; we could adjust our plan accordingly to incorporate the expected aircraft on a continuous basis. With the current uncertainty; we have to delay aircraft in the hopes that an aircraft comes out as projected or be more reactive and come up with a plan as the aircraft depart versus planning based upon when the aircraft will depart. When aircraft departing SFO are not issued a SID due to outages it allows aircraft to come into conflict with other aircraft without a safety buffer. In this scenario it may not have helped but if pre-coordinated instructions were issued to pilots that would allow for a safety net as our normal operations do; it may limit the opportunity of a different occurrence.
Departed SFO Runway 1L; initial clearance (PDC) included the GAPP5 SID; Captain informed Clearance Delivery (CD) 1that SID was not acceptable due to VOR NOTAMed out and SID not available to non GPS aircraft; CD issued a verbal clearance to fly heading 350 degrees after take off; no amendments to other PDC parameters including maintain 10;000 FT or Departure Control frequency. We flew via this clearance; and I am not aware that we missed any other amendments. Takeoff was uneventful with a 20 KT crosswind from the left. We turned left and rolled out on a 350 degree heading near the departure end of the runway. Climbing through about 2;000 FT; while flaps were being retracted; a traffic call from ATC (NCT) pointed out a helicopter at 9 o'clock low. Traffic was observed about a half mile to the left and well below our altitude; not a factor; and acknowledged to ATC. About this time; there was a TCAS TA; momentarily thought to be for the helicopter. Both pilots were eyes-out looking for traffic. A glance at the TCAS display showed a threat (solid yellow circle) at 1 o'clock; though I do not recall the TCAS range. I visually acquired the 1 o'clock traffic; which I initially thought to be a business jet; tail on; that departed a few seconds ahead of us from 1R. It quickly became apparent that the traffic we saw was larger than a business jet; but it; momentarily; still looked to be tail-on. This turned out to be an illusion (dark airplane silhouetted against a very bright background) reinforced by the fact that head-on traffic would be quite unexpected in that location. At the time we were climbing through about 4;500 FT. Seemingly simultaneously; there was a TCAS RA that was unintelligible due to a combination of cockpit air conditioning noise and an ATC urgent traffic avoidance vector to another aircraft (the one we were looking at); which turned out to be a B737 heading directly towards us; still at about 12:30 to 1:00 and just above the horizon; at about 2 to 3 miles. About this time; the First Officer also saw the conflicting traffic and verbally directed me to turn left. A glance at the ADI TCAS symbology showed us in the avoidance region with a maintain vertical speed command. I continued the climb and began a left turn to avoid the threat while simultaneously receiving an ATC urgent avoidance vector for a left turn to 270 degrees. We were in a climbing left turn above the B737 at the closest point of approach; and not in a position that I could see how close we came; but I would estimate 1/2 mile to 1 mile lateral and 200 to 500 FT vertical separation at the closest point. NCT traffic avoidance vectors were clear; forceful yet not panicked; appropriate for the situation; and were not inconsistent with the TCAS RA. The mystery is how the two aircraft came to be in conflict to begin with. The only factor that would be slightly out of the norm is that we were on a test flight; at a low gross weight; and climb performance was better than would be typical of a revenue flight. Captain was hand flying throughout; not thought to be a factor except that it helped facilitate a timely traffic avoidance maneuver.
NCT Controller described a conflict event between traffic off SFO and OAK; the Controller listing the failed auto acquisition of the SFO traffic and non compliance of LOA procedures by SFO Tower as causal factors.