B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Flight Crew Type 852
Troubleshooting
Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe
Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport
Aircraft
During initial takeoff; I noticed that the flaps did not retract and we had a Leading Edge Transit (amber) light and a flap asymmetry indication. This was noticed during the after takeoff checklist. This was a flight control issue and we [notified ATC] and decided to return to ZZZ. I initially asked for a fix to go hold; giving us time to slow down and run checklists however; ATC decided to give us vectors.Once I got into the checklist we noticed a discrepancy. Within the table of contents of the QRH the FLIGHT CONTROLS section states; LE Transit is [listed on one page]. In reality it starts on [the next page]. The table of contents for Flight Controls is labeled incorrectly. During an actual emergency is not the time to figure this out. This was the source of some initial confusion. My First Officer double checked on his I-Pad; as I was using the paper checklist. We eventually got on the right initial checklist and moved forward from there. However; this was a waste of time that could have been avoided especially when the stakes and stress levels are high.The checklist re-directed us to several more checklists that eventually directed us to the Flaps Trailing Edge Flaps Up Landing. This maze of checklists needs to be streamlined. The flap checklists are very cumbersome and caused a serious strain on CRM. We verbally said several times this is like the simulator and it was not meant in a good way. We tried our best to keep each other in the loop of what we were doing; and why we were doing it; while switching to another long checklist. If we were tight on gas this maze of checklists would have contributed to our stress exponentially.We eventually were satisfied with the checklists and notified ATC that we were ready to be sequenced back into the arrival traffic for ZZZ. AT this time; we ran the TEST checklist and informed the flight attendants and passengers what was going on. Upon intercepting the Localizer XX at ZZZ; we were left high by ATC and the glideslope was well below us. We informed them of this and told them we were going around. ATC sequenced us around and brought us in much lower outside of ZZZZZ intersection and we landed at approximately 178 knots. We exited the runway and told tower no additional help was needed. We arrived at gate.The Assistant Chief Pilot for ZZZ met us at the airplane. We were debriefing what we did right and wrong as he entered the cockpit. He asked us to please finish our debrief of the flight and at the conclusion he asked us a series of human factors questions. We informed him we were not going to be fit to fly for the remainder of the day. He then asked if we were ok to drive home and offered us a hotel room. We both informed him we were ok to drive home since we were both local pilots to ZZZ but flying was out of the question. He thanked us for returning the flight safely. He was very gracious; accommodating and supportive of our efforts.I consequently called the [Operations Manager] and informed him that the Assistant Chief Pilot met us at the airplane; debriefed with him and we were done flying for the day. (We were originally scheduled for a double turn and this occurred on leg one.) He ran us through some qualifying matrix of questions and scored my suitability to fly. He did the same with my FO (First Officer). Again I informed him that the decision was already made and we were not flying at all for the rest of the day. This was quite frustrating re-iterating to the [Operations Manager] after just completing an emergency in the weather. ZZZ weather was low overcast ceilings with gusty winds and rain when this occurred. He apologized and said he did not realize what I was saying when I said we already debriefed with the Assistant Chief Pilot.At the conclusion of the call with the [Operations Manager] maintenance had some information for us. They initially thought it was a gauge problem however; after inspecting the airplane further they did concur that the gauge was correct and it was indeed a flap malfunction. We felt vindicated even further for making the right; safe; and conservative decision to return to ZZZ and not press to [the destination].
B737 Captain reported a failure of the flaps system after takeoff.