Boeing Company Undifferentiated or Other Model
Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness
Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach
Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Procedure; Human Factors; Aircraft
I was PM and FO was PF. Cleared visual approach while descending through about 3;500 FT. We were coming straight in with the runway in sight. The MCP Attitude was set at 3;000 FT. I asked if he wanted 800 FT in the MCP Altitude thinking he would VNAV down to minimums or at least not get ALT CAP at 3;000 FT. He started to say set 2;300 FT; the OM altitude; but said sure set 800 FT. When he did nothing else I asked if he wanted APP armed. He said sure. We were well below the GS with it coming down to us. Problem is....he was still in LVL CHG and following the FD down to 800 FT. At one dot below the GS I directed my attention to the checklist and iPad work. When I looked back we were two dots low and descending. I called it out and said to level off. While trying to correct our situation and talking to Tower; we selected final flaps below 1;000 FT about 800. Landing was uneventful. We discussed what happened later at the gate. Talked about the pitfall of following the FD in LVL CHG right into the ground. I see most guys either use VNAV to the GS or just level off till the GS comes down to them. Bottom line....I think I talked him into something he wasn't mentally prepared for. He had another plan in mind. And my PM back up needed to be a little more alert.
Air Carrier Captain as the pilot monitoring reports the First Officer descending in LVL CHG below the glide slope. At two dots low the First Officer is directed to level off and capture the glide slope. As a result final flaps are not selected until about 800 FT.