Regional Jet 200 ER/LR (CRJ200)
Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue
Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Declared Emergency; General Maintenance Action
Aircraft; Company Policy; Human Factors; Procedure
Requested Type I and IV deice using STANDARD phraseology. In compliance with deice local procedures and acknowledgement from Ice Man we deiced with engines off; APU running pushed back from gate. I stressed the importance of avoiding the APU inlet area. Ice Man acknowledged. Upon completion Ice Man reported we were clear of all contaminants and they used extra Type IV due to the precipitation level. Ice Man reported Full Body Type I; tactile check complete and applied Full Body Type IV. We observed a heavy application of Type IV on the nose and radome of the aircraft. I thought wings and tail only for Type IV but in a recent Company email; statements were made that Deice is properly trained and compliance is mandatory as long as we use proper phraseology; which we used; and we accepted the Deice and departed. Shortly after takeoff we observed the odor and subsequent 'smoke' from excessive deice fluid from the vents in the cockpit. This odor quickly disappeared and we continued flight. It was my opinion that the 'Full Body' Type IV sheared off the fuselage on takeoff and entered the APU inlet and we were safe to continue. Approximately 40 minutes into flight received an EFIS COMP MON Caution message with an associated IAS flag on both airspeed indicators. Airspeed indicated a deviation of 10 to 12 KTS with the right indicating within 5 KTS of the standby. We complied with QRH; and reviewed the procedure for the loss of an ADC; message disappeared after several minutes. Message reappeared after a short period of time with a subsequent deviation of airspeed. We complied with QRH again. Left airspeed dropped to 160 KTS at an aircraft speed of 300; gear horn sounded; we transferred control of the aircraft to the First Officer and complied with an ADC 1 fail QRH. Received a 'MACH TRIM' Caution; 'OB GROUND SPOILER' Caution; 'SPOILERON' Status; 'FLIGHT SPOILER' Status messages; 'GPWS FAIL' Status as well as a Master Caution light that we were unable to extinguish. All of this occurred at TOD at FL250. We were receiving ATIS; In range; landing data while attempting to inform Dispatch and get assistance from Maintenance. We were also concerned with landing fuel; at that time landing fuel indicated 1;900 LBS. Also; at the TOD we once again sensed an odor and subsequent light smoke of Type IV in the ventilation system. During the process of receiving and prioritizing these multiple failures; reading and complying with multiple QRH procedures; attempting to accept an irritating flashing Caution light in my face; and smelling smoky deice fluid and knowing my time is running out on fuel; I misread the MACH TRIM QRH and missed the 'END' statement at the bottom of the page. There was no flow to follow if the Mach Trim did not engage; which it did not and I unknowingly followed to the fine print of the following page which started with 'Mach Trim'. I unknowingly followed the QRH for another item which led me to landing at flaps 20. I contacted Dispatch for landing performance for flaps 20 and Dispatch replied with 3;300 FT with no explanation; which made no sense to us; but we were running out of fuel. We ran the numbers for the long runway; had declared the emergency; were receiving help and vectors from Approach. I wanted to run the QRH one more time for the resulting flap 20 landing decision but fuel remaining was a huge concern to me. We felt we needed fuel for a go around and potential further contingencies. We decided it was best to land the aircraft. After discussion with Maintenance Control they informed me that MACH Trim disengages with ADC Fail QRH; but also the Mach Trim did not re-engage. They stated the QRH should state that; and he has passed that upstairs because it has trapped pilots numerous times but nothing has been done about it because 'All the pilots know about it'. This was the first time in 9 years that I touched the dusty Mach Transducers. They also informed me that Maintenance found the Pitot Static System wasfilled with deice fluid.
The Captain was pilot flying and the First Officer was pilot not flying at the start of this flight. During the boarding process; freezing rain and ice pellets began to fall and we elected to be deiced since the temperature was -2C. We followed the de-icing procedures and were pushed back off the gate to be de-iced. Per company procedures; we conducted de-icing/anti-icing by simply requesting 'Type I and Type IV'. We made sure to not add anything extra as the de-icing crew is trained to do their job correctly (per the company); but this ended up obviously not being the case as with many stations. They did not have a radio frequency for communication with the de-icing crew; but they plugged a headset directly to the aircraft to communicate intentions; and then removed the headset to begin de-icing. We made clear to them to avoid the APU inlet and they assured us it would not be an issue. A full-body Type I was being sprayed as it appeared to us; but after that was completed; it appeared that they were spraying again; starting with the radome and then moving up above the cockpit and towards the rear of the aircraft with Type IV. We wanted to inquire; but unfortunately; they were no longer plugged into the aircraft; so there was nothing we could do about it. After they finished; they plugged into the aircraft to inform us that a Full-Body Type I was completed and a tactile check of both wings; then a Full-Body Type IV was sprayed and gave us our times. We taxied out and after four minutes; turned the packs on. We noticed a smell and subsequent haziness from Type IV being in the system; however it did disappear quickly and was 100% gone when the bleeds we transferred. Approximately 40 minutes into the flight at FL330; we received an EFIS COMP MON for IAS on both PFD's. We complied with the QRH and the caution message went away. About 10 minutes later; we received the caution message again and again; complied with the QRH. This time the message remained and; per the QRH; we assumed we had an ADC failure. The Captain's airspeed indicator showed approximately 260 KTS while the First Officer's showed 248 and the standby showed 250. The EFIS COMP MON QRH states to continue with the ADC Failure QRH if the EFIS COMP MON caution does not go away; so we continued to that QRH on the belief that ADC 1 had failed. At the same time; we were at TOD and received a descent instruction from ATC to descend to FL250 and then subsequently to continue direct ABCDE and then cross it at 8;000. As soon as we began our descent the Captain's IAS dropped like a rock and was down to 160 KTS when the First Officer and standby IAS showed 300 KTS. We were still in the middle of the QRH when we decided that we needed to transfer controls so that way we had accurate airspeed indications. We declared an emergency and the First Officer now became the pilot flying and Captain became the pilot not flying and completed the ADC 1 Fail QRH. While working that QRH; we received a MACH TRIM Caution message and subsequent Master Caution Light. The Captain finished the ADC 1 Fail QRH and then began with the MACH TRIM Caution QRH. At the time; unknown to the First Officer; the Captain could not extinguish his Master Caution Light and then received an OB GND SPOILERS Caution message; SPOILERONS Fault Status message; then a FLIGHT SPOILERS Fault Status message; and lastly a GPWS Fail Status message. With all these multiple failures all occurring nearly back-to-back of each other and trying to make sense of why they were failing and what was next; added to the Master Caution Light that was continuously flashing while at night; the Captain did not notice the end of the MACH TRIM QRH and continued onto the STAB TRIM QRH which began with MACH TRIM Caution message and MACH TRIM Inop light; and we had both. The First Officer continued flying unaware that we were on another section as the Captain had and was running the QRH. We had so many problems going on at one time that wewanted to make sure everything was constantly safe and no two heads were in the cockpit at the same time. The main problem is that the MACH TRIM QRH states that with at least 1 Stab Trim engaged; Mach Trim; Engage; then end. That's great if it actually would engage; but it didn't because unknown to us at the time; the MACH TRIM will disengage with an ADC transfer. Nowhere in the QRH was this stated. When the Mach Trim did not engage; the Captain continued with the QRH since it did not do what the QRH believed should happen. While the QRH has multiple colors on the iPads; the QRH in the aircraft is all black and white. Added to that; the '-----end-----' is in extremely small font and at night; very difficult to have noticed. As we continued with the QRH; it stated to land with flaps 20 and increase QRH Landing factor to 1.22. When we informed Dispatch that we had multiple failures; including MACH Trim specifically; and were landing with flaps 20; we were told no change; 3;300 FT for landing distance; which made no sense to us; which we informed him again; then just went with the ACARS landing data with the QRH Factor applied; stating just below 4;500 needed. To add more to the mix; we were coming towards 1;900 LBS of fuel while still far out on the descent and lost our fuel at landing data on MFD 1; so now we didn't know how much fuel we were set to land with. We delayed flap extension and gear extension until just the moment we needed them as well as kept the APU off to minimize and excess fuel usage. Winds were reported 360 at 16; so we wanted to have a much fuel as possible in case if a go-around was necessary from an unstabilized approach or if an ARFF truck got onto the runway and make at least 1 additional approach. We made an uneventful landing with 1;800 LBS of fuel with flaps 20. We taxied to the gate normally and deplaned with the passengers appearing positive and content. After they all left; we called in 6 write-ups for the multiple failures that all occurred at the same time. We spoke with Maintenance Control and Dispatch. Maintenance Control informed us that the MACH TRIM was associated with the EIFS COMP MON IAS QRH and when switching the MACH Transducers; it will kick off. He has discussed this with the company multiple times that it needs to be included with the QRH as pilots are not aware of it and they replied to him that; 'No; all pilots know that it is associated.' Needless to say; both the Captain and First Officer were unaware and numerous other pilots asked about what happens when you open the Mach Transducers were unaware about anything. After the fact though; it was not the Mach Transducers that failed the MACH TRIM; it was the transferring of the ADC that caused it to fail; as confirmed on the ground. Even Maintenance Control on the ground with no life-threatening issues wasn't 100% on what causes what; and we are supposed to just know that its associated with multiple failures. This is information that MUST be included in the QRH. While running the QRH for the failures is understood; knowing what is causing a failure is significantly better than thinking that the plane is having catastrophic failures with below minimum fuel to worry about. Furthermore; we inquired as to why we did not hear any reasoning from Dispatch other than; 'No; landing distance is 3;300 FT.' We specifically stated that we were landing with flaps 20 because of Mach Trim failing and if it were known to them; why we were not informed. Dispatch states that they hold half responsibility for the safe outcome of a flight; but during this flight; it strongly appeared like we were on our own. There always needs to be a 'What & Why'. We stated we were landing flaps 20 because of a MACH TRIM failure and if Dispatch disagreed; they need to tell us why. CRM broke down completely between the air and the ground. We were in the air trying to make sure we can Aviate first and safely get this plane on the ground before running out of fuel. Had fuel not been as big of an issue; maybe we could have gone significantly slower and taken more delay vectors; but when the risk of fuel exhaustion on a fully loaded aircraft is in the mix; time is of the essence and we were running out of it. It is believed by upper management that lowering fuel reserves is no big deal; and it isn't for many flights; but as indicated on this flight; it was a huge factor that could have been worse had engine failures been an issue from fuel exhaustion. It was only a matter of time before something like this happens; I just wasn't expecting it to be on my flight. We spoke with Maintenance Control again as we were getting ready for our next flight and he informed us that the mechanics were at the aircraft and found P1 to be completely blocked with deice fluid. After that I realized how it all made sense that with both the pitot tube intake and drain blocked; the pitot tube begins to act like an altimeter and as soon as we began our descent; that is when the airspeed began dropping rapidly on PFD 1. We didn't start getting indication problems because we maintained our altitude and airspeed for most of the cruise until TOD. There is a lot of pressure relating to the amount of fuel we are carrying on board the aircraft to reduce overall expenses. Had we had as little as an additional 500 LBS of fuel; we would have slowed down and taken more time through things. It's one thing to deal with a flight; another to deal with a flight and an emergency; and a completely different thing to deal with a flight; an emergency and critically low fuel. These situations need to be corrected. Additionally; the QRH needs to state what are associated faults when [performing directed actions]. If we had just a bit of knowledge to expect something else to now become inoperative because of the QRH; we would be a little bit calmer than wondering what's the next thing that is going to fail. Ultimately; the QRH needs to be clearer with the procedures; their outcomes; and the end of each procedure bolded and a different color. Lastly; we can not be trying to save a little bit of money by reducing fuel loads on a flight. This could have ended significantly differently if there was just a bit different and we were running checklists at 8;000 FT and needing to take delay vectors to run checklists rather than an idle descent from FL330.
CRJ200 flight crew experiences an apparent ADC #1 failure in flight and associated secondary failures. An error is made using the QRH procedure and this along with paltry information; low fuel; and poor communication with Maintenance Control cause much apprehension in the crew. Maintenance discovers that deice fluid in the pitot system caused the ADC to malfunction.