Regional Jet 200 ER/LR (CRJ200)
Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Situational Awareness
Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff
Human Factors; Procedure; Weather
We were running late due to weather and ATC delays. We were given a clearance to taxi for Runway 18L; Ground Control changed our runway to 18C; so we were on our way to spot 2; when our runway changed again to 36R due to thunderstorms and other ATC factors. We shut down one engine. We were watching the weather move in and observing other aircraft taking off and maneuvering around thunderstorms. We were recalculating takeoff data and V speeds (etc) with all of the changing conditions. When we were approaching the front of the line for takeoff we restarted the engine and I was about to call for the 'flaps 8 before takeoff checklist' when we began discussing a white 6 indication on our inboard left BTMS [Brake Temperature Monitoring System]. We communicated with Tower that we were going to need some time; and they were going to taxi us down the runway and back in line. Then it cooled to green; we announced that we were no longer going to need the delay. We immediately got a 'line up and wait' clearance; followed by a 'cleared for takeoff' clearance; as we lined up we were watching the radar map and the TCAS of other aircraft to see their departure route. We transferred controls to the First Officer; and he was then the flying pilot. He added power and we immediately received a 'TO Config flaps' warning. We communicated with ATC; rolled down the runway to a clear taxiway and we notified the Flight Attendant. We contacted Dispatch for a revalidation and Maintenance for reassurance. We reconfigured the aircraft for takeoff and left when it was our turn without further incident.The conditions were changing rapidly and as we adapted; we allowed ourselves to be distracted by the BTMS indication. When it cleared we failed to get back into the regular flow of doing the checklist. I never called for the before takeoff or the takeoff checklist. Once we were in the front of the takeoff line and something wasn't 'perfect' or set up as normal; we did the right thing by asking to be re-sequenced so we could have time to work it out. We should have stuck to our plan instead of trying to jump back into normal operations as soon as the messaged improved. When my normal flow was interrupted I failed to get back to normal procedures. This was poor multi-tasking. I guess I got too focused on getting out of CLT before the thunderstorm stopped all departures and felt rushed into asking for a takeoff clearance. It would have been infinitely safer to get re-sequenced for departure and taken extra time to depart. In the future; I will be sure to take a moment to double check that we didn't overlook such huge procedures. In rushed situations; with changing runways; weather; and aircraft configurations it is even more crucial to double check and cross check that we didn't skip over something while dealing with irregular ops. Non standard operations require even more vigilance than routine ones do.
This narrative showcases the events leading up to a Config Flap Warning that was received prior to take off and resulted in an aborted takeoff. The warning was generated because the flaps were not set for takeoff while takeoff thrust power applied. Assuming a short taxi for 18L we started both engines. We were then assigned 18C and then 36R; due to wind shifts and encroaching thunderstorms. Once in line for 36R taxing traffic was at a standstill due to a thunderstorm off the departure end of 36R. We elected to shutdown the left engine to ensure enough fuel for take off. Just after we shutdown the left engine; the Tower started launching aircraft. Everyone was told to expect vector to avoid the thunderstorm to resume the departure from the vector. With four airplanes in front of us for departure we restarted the left engine and accomplished the Delayed After Start Checklist. We then discussed and set a maximum rotation speed in case windshear was encountered on departure. We next discussed the departure path and agreed that a vector heading on take off would keep us out of the thunderstorm. As we approached the number one spot for departure; I noticed a white BTMS on the left inner brake. I made this know to the Captain. Nearly at the same time we were cleared to 'Line Up and Wait 36R' The Captain said that we would need to taxi out of the way and let the brake temp cool down. I called the Tower back and told the controller that we had a high brake temp and would need to taxi down the runway and out of the way. As we were arranging taxi instructions with the Tower the left inner brake temp dropped into the green. The decision was made that we would no longer need to taxi out of the way. I told Tower that our brake temperatures were good. The Tower again told us to 'Line Up and Wait.' As we were taxing onto the runway I realized that the radar was not on and mentioned to the Captain that I was turning it on. After we had lined up; the Captain was adjusting the tilt on the radar for departure when we received our take off clearance. After I read back the take off clearance; the Captain gave me control of the aircraft. Also during this time an aircraft had been cleared to land behind us. I took control of the aircraft and stood the thrust levers up to Take Off power. This activated the Config Flap warning. As soon as I heard the warning I brought the thrust levers back to idle; the brakes were never released. The Captain reported to the Tower of our aborted take off; I then gave control of the aircraft to the Captain. We received taxi instructions from Tower and taxied off the runway with no incident. I then called the Flight Attendant; informed her of the aborted take off. I explained that everything was ok and that we would be taxing back into line for departure.I believe this event occurred because both pilots were caught up in the current weather conditions and BTMS readouts. Also contributing were the pressures to not hold up the departure line and landing traffic. Above all; as a crew member I failed notice that the before takeoff checklist had not been accomplished. Diligence to standard operating procedures set forth in the FCM. A Flaps Taxi style checklist such as other airlines utilize; were aircraft do not taxi until the flaps have been set for takeoff.
CRJ200 flight crew describe the factors leading up to an attempted takeoff with the flaps not set and the before takeoff checklist not accomplished. The Configuration warning sounds when the thrust is advanced for takeoff and the takeoff is rejected.