B767-300 and 300 ER
Flight Crew Last 90 Days 130; Flight Crew Total 11000; Flight Crew Type 6000
Workload; Troubleshooting; Training / Qualification; Time Pressure; Distraction
Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance; Ground Event / Encounter Ground Strike - Aircraft
Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Maintenance Action
Aircraft; Company Policy; Weather
Flight was scheduled to depart SFO at midmorning on a rainy; windy; overcast morning. We pushed late; due to a last minute deferral of the bulk cargo pit; which resulted in some rearrangement of bags in the cargo pits. We finally pushed at less than 20 minutes late and taxied out to 19R for an unusual SFO takeoff to the south; due to the strong southerly winds. While waiting in line for takeoff; I repeated the engine out on takeoff procedure and the fact that we would be making a climbing left turn away from the mountains; whether we did the normal SID or the engine out procedure. Our wind check just prior to takeoff was 160/19G29. We had previously briefed a max power takeoff due to the short runway and gusty winds and we could definitely feel the gusts as we rolled down the runway. I; the First Officer; performed what felt like a normal rotation (other than the gusts). On initial climb out; I did notice that the nose was trying to pitch up; so I pitched (and trimmed) down and accelerated toward flap retraction speed while we were in the turn. I assumed this pitching up was due to the relatively light weight with max power. The Captain gave the sterile cockpit chime climbing through 10;000 FT; and shortly after; around 13;000 FT; we got a call from the Lead Flight Attendant saying that the flight attendants in the back had heard a metal scraping sound on takeoff. By the time the Captain finished talking to the Flight Attendant and we discussed the flight attendant observations; we were climbing through 21;000 FT. We had no pressurization problems and no indications in the cockpit; however we felt the descriptions given by the flight attendants were compelling enough to justify our assuming a tail strike. We agreed to split up the duties at this point. I was flying and working the radios and the Captain started running the checklist. With the Captain's concurrence; I immediately asked for a level off and then a descent back down to 11;000 FT and then 8;000 FT. The Captain got out and performed the Tail Strike Checklist; which had us manually depressurize the aircraft. Meanwhile; I requested vectors back toward SFO with a hold; so we could get set up for an approach; finish our checklists and the Captain could talk to company; the Flight Attendants and the passengers. We discussed declaring an emergency; but decided it was not necessary. We went once around in holding and were finished and ready to come back for an approach (ILS 19L) SFO. We requested landing data from Dispatch for 19L; got vectored around onto final by ATC; landed and taxied to the gate. After we finished all duties; we went down to the ramp to look at the tailskid. The mechanics were there and they said it was barely scraped and there was no compression of the tail skid whatsoever. They repainted it; did the inspections and then a few hours later we were ready to go again. The Flight Manager who met the plane and asked us some questions mentioned that there have been a lot of problems with cargo loading and trim settings since we switched over to the new computer system a week and a half ago. When we were all buttoned up and ready to go; we sat there for another 45 minutes because both the Aft and Forward Cargo doors were open. Operations advised us that the ramp personnel were waiting for a new loading sheet. When we called again 30 minutes later asking what was going on down there; they said they were unloading all of the cargo containers from the back and moving them to the front and then taking passenger bags and moving them from the front to the back. I honestly am not sure how I scraped that tailskid. Other than the gusty winds; it felt like every other takeoff and did not feel like an aggressive rotation. Whether we hit a wind gust at just the right moment at rotation; or whether the cargo loading played a part in this event; or whether I just over rotated and didn't realize it; I really don't know. We finally pushed back again and I performed anothertakeoff on 19R; but this time it was uneventful.
We split duties; First Officer flew aircraft and handled ATC; asking for lower altitude and clearance back to SFO. We were below landing weight already; as First Officer was doing that I sent ACARS message to Dispatch to call. They first sent message 'on SELCAL.' At first this confused me. (Busy thinking of other things) and couldn't immediately remember the route to hook up; sent ACARS to use 130.8. I think I was feeling some denial that what seemed a normal aircraft needed such drastic handling. Dispatch called and I briefed him we were returning to SFO; and reason. He would notify Station and Maintenance. For us and I asked for performance printout for landing which he sent to our printer. I went to manual control on cabin pressure system and started bringing the cabin up. I think we were at 11;000 FT descending to 8;000. We were operating under the assumption of the tail strike; I did not declare an emergency; we were heading for the airport area as fast as we needed; and a plane that was by all our accounts fully capable. After de-planing the passengers; while they worked; we were re-released; refueled; and re-boarded. The door was closed and then we were kept waiting and waiting; forward and aft cargo doors open; we kept checking on what they were doing. About 45 minutes went by. We were told that the Operations wanted baggage to be pulled; and weighed-or something; and some re-juggling of the load. We were wondering if our performance papers were correct the first time or not. I've heard some comments about the new system messing things up. Now; in hindsight; I would critique that 'by-the-book' I should probably have declared an emergency when we didn't immediately get 8;000 FT clearance; depressurized the aircraft manually let the masks come down and finish the QRH procedure more timely. (Again; I feel that some denial that the airplane wasn't 'fine?' which it turned out to be fine - and passenger ears; were conflicting thoughts in my head. I will be honest in saying I didn't remember anything about the procedures for tail strike checklist; - and I was surprised of the drastic steps it called for. I am not arguing them; was just not thinking in that direction. One thing that was not on the list that surprised me was no mention of crew donning masks if above; etc...? Back at the gate First Officer and I ran through the event and debriefed the threat assessment; actions; frustrations from ATC; denial issues; etc. and the fact that there was some surprise that this was as big a thing as it was. We initially just thought we would be going back to SFO because we shouldn't continue the flight to destination without getting it checked. Again; from what I observed during rotation; I had no thought or concern that the rate of rotation wasn't safe. I did look away for V2 call then out the window. Also; the flight attendants were worried about calling sooner; maybe not sure of how important it was to call and tell us sooner and sterile cockpit; etc. I do make sure they know can and should ask; inquire on anything of concern to them. Post flight I debriefed the two flight attendants in the back jumpseats and re-emphasized that they hear something that sounds like that they should call the cockpit sooner and not worry about the interruption.
A B767-300 had a minor tail strike on takeoff in gusty weather but also the aircraft may have been mis-loaded because after returning to the airport the cargo and bags were shifted followed by a normal takeoff.