B767-200
Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition
Aircraft; Human Factors; MEL; Procedure
I was the Captain; and Pilot Monitoring on flight to CVG. Upon arrival to the aircraft and subsequent walk around performed by myself; I noted that the inboard forward brake on the right main gear truck appeared to be disconnected. This was after receiving a tire change due to prior events. Upon discussion with our Mechanic I was informed that they had disconnected the brake and we would be operating according to MEL 32-XX-XXX 'Wheel Brakes Brake Line Capped'. The FO (First Officer) and I reviewed the DDG (Dispatch Deviations Guide) together to ensure compliance in operation. Among other things this DDG states that; one brake may be inoperative provided the anti-skid system operates normally on the remaining wheels. At this time we still had not received any paperwork from station personnel; and I subsequently notified Dispatch of this so they could get the proper revision out to us as soon as possible. We received our paperwork finally at around XA:00. After further review of the paperwork and final flight deck preparation we were able to close and push back at XA:35. We taxied to [the] runway for departure and subsequently departed at XA:59. Per the procedures on the DDG 32-XX-XXX; we started the clock for a 2 minute count after calling positive climb in order to allow the wheel with disconnected brake to spin down before retraction. We retracted the gear and continued normal flight. Shortly after departure and on climb out we were taken off the SID by ATC for vectoring around some moderate to extreme weather echoes and became very busy below 10;000 ft. At this time I noted that the EICAS screen started displaying the caution message 'ANTISKID'. I called it out to the First Officer and Pilot Flying; and stated that since we were busy on climb out going around weather we would address the issue once we get out of 10;000 ft. and the terminal area since it was not time critical. We subsequently exited the area of weather; received further climb.At this time I noted to the first officer that the ANTISKID EICAS message had gone away but that I was going to get out the QRH to address the message anyway noting that ANTISKID had been a prior requirement of the MEL. Throughout the entirety of the flight the ANTISKID EICAS caution message would return and go away some 6 times. After discussion with my First Officer it was my decision that based upon the past day's events; and the fact that we were operating on MEL 32-XX-XXX; that even though the ANTISKID EICAS message did not persist at the time; the safest and best course of action would be to assume the system was unreliable and to operate the aircraft according to the QRH. We ran the QRH; and it called for a landing with autobrakes off and led us to the performance inflight section of the QRH for non-normal landing distance for ANTISKID/ANTISKID OFF. At this time I decided to use all resources available to me and have AIRINC connect me to Dispatch and Maintenance Control to get everybody in the loop on our situation and my decision making process and have everyone on board with the situation. I had Dispatch back me up on the non-normal landing distance for ANTISKID/ANTISKID OFF and chose the flaps 30 option. They ran a live calculation for me for landing on Runways 18C and 18L in CVG. All were in agreement on the plan of action for landing in CVG. At this time the First Officer had received the weather for Cincinnati and we coordinated with Center to have them let CVG know we would be requiring landing on 18L. The QRH also states to use light and consistent braking on rollout to avoid possible tire blowouts. The First Officer and I decided at this time that I would become Pilot Flying and perform the landing to prevent the possibility of brakes grabbing at a changeover of control and to ensure consistent braking throughout the rollout. Proper procedures were followed for setting up the approach; the approach was briefed with special considerations from the QRH discussed; and the deferred items descent and approach checklists completed. Upon checking on with Approach Control I asked the First Officer to let them know that we would not be declaring an emergency but that we would like to use the entirety of the runway and have CFR (Crash; Fire; Rescue) at the end as a precaution in case we ended up with a hot brake or anything of the sort. ATC then stated that they would roll the trucks and at their discretion they were going [give us priority]. We acknowledged this declaration and continued with an approach to a landing. On landing we used max reverse and minimal braking to exit the runway at the end of 18L. Upon rollout to the end I had the FO bring up the status page and noted that the brake temps were all zeros. We told CFR we would not be requiring any further assistance and they left informing the Tower. We were instructed by Tower to taxi to the ramp at our discretion and we blocked in at XC:16.
Flight Crew reported that review of MEL procedures enabled them to correctly handle a situation in flight caused by Autobrake system becoming unreliable.