Regional Jet 200 ER/LR (CRJ200)
Human-Machine Interface; Training / Qualification
Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Human Factors
I was pilot flying on a visual approach; this approach was backed up with snowflake. Speed control and everything else was fine during the approach phase; kept right on the snowflake. Just prior to the runway edge I noticed I was slightly above the VASI and promptly corrected. However during flare for landing I missed the touchdown zone and landed a bit past the touchdown zone. I kept following the snowflake all the way to the edge of the runway which kept me a little high above the VASI causing me to miss the touchdown zone. The snowflake is just a guide and the VASI should be used as the primary visual guide during descent. I had not flown in a while; almost 20 days; this was my first visual approach in that many days. I would suggest new crew should be flown on a more regular basis with a shorter downtime period between flying time. We are still learning a new aircraft and for me more flying time is key.
The First Officer I was flying with was new to the airplane and had not flown in the previous 25 days after sitting on reserve. He was struggling to fly the visual approach. I had anticipated this and we had briefed ahead of time the procedures. We were to fly a 5 mile final and configure early which we did. We talked about controlling airspeed with power and pitch for the glideslope. We also discussed the use of the snowflake on the visual approach as a tool and the primary indicator would the PAPI. There is no ILS to this runway the visual approach was briefed and loaded and used. The first officer was totally engrossed in flying airplane. He made no calls for configuration changes so I did the configuration changes for him. We were well configured prior to thousand feet AGL. The first officer was struggling with airspeed and pitch. He was either one light low or one dot high on the PAPI. Part of the reason for this is he was over reliant on the snowflake and not looking outside. I brought this to his attention. There was a fine line between helping him too much and becoming a distraction. I was aware of the fact I did not want to distract him. I am not really sure about the details from this point on. I believe we crossed the threshold one light high and within Ref+10; but I'm not sure about this. At 100 FT there was no or very slow power reduction. There was absolutely no flair. I intervened and cleared the aircraft. It was not a hard landing but unfortunately we landed outside to touchdown zone. The aircraft touchdown on both mains in a normal attitude the first officer immediately applied very heavy braking and maximum reverse thrust. The airplane slowed very quickly. I'm not sure but we must have had 1;500 FT to 3;000 FT of runway remaining when we hit taxi speed. The First Officer had about 100 hours in the airplane. He had been on reserve in [another base] and had not flown [from this base]. This is only his third leg in this system. He is not flown in the previous 25 days. I am not line check pilot. I am a current instructor and I certainly try to teach and be a mentor; but I do not have the training to do this level and type of instruction. I have always had great admiration for the line check pilots. They have the hardest job in the company. I should have intervened earlier. When he did not begin to flare I should've totally taken the controls at that point and done a GA. Even further back below thousand feet I should've taken over the controls and gone around. As we were flaring and I looked outside I noticed we were going to land beyond the touchdown zone; I was milliseconds away from saying set go around power spoilers in and initiating a go-around but by that time we had already touchdown and things were happening very fast. I should have taken over when he was freezing up on his calls and configuration. I have never been in a situation like that; so I thought he would snap out of it. I learned from that experience. Will included me taking over if necessary in the initial brief and again in the approach brief. If I take over from you don't take it personally. Nobody to blame but me; I have gone over the situation a million times in my mind and kick myself in the rear as many times too. I should've done a go around plain and straightforward. Lesson learned and it won't happen again. First Officer has a good attitude and is open to input and suggestions. With some refresh training and re-currency of an experienced with a Line Check Pilot I believe he will be a good pilot. We debriefed the incident in a constructive fashion.
CRJ200 flight crew describes a visual approach by a new First Officer who has not flown in the last three weeks. Configuration changes are not called for but supplied by the Captain and the snowflake' is used exclusively; without regard for the PAPI; resulting in a long landing.