EMB ERJ 170/175 ER/LR
Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Human Factors; Weather
This report is being filed to help other crews not make the possible grave mistakes I observed by a crew which I was assigned to line check. Upon meeting the crew in the terminal I informed them that a line check was assigned to me for this flight. During the pre-brief to the crew; I informed them I was assigned the task by our company of testing a new line check form on the iPad and I would be utilizing my iPad a lot during the flight and to not think that anything they were doing was wrong. Unfortunately; it turns out; the crew was noncompliant on so many issues I was task saturated trying to keep up with scribbled notes and using this new line check form.I will try to duplicate what happened to the best of my knowledge. While standing in the cockpit doorway I was observing the FO and Captain performing their preflight duties. The Captains flows from Originating Receiving to Before Start below the line were all mixed and it was quite evident he was unsure of the correct way to perform these tasks. As for the FO; I noticed the ATIS report on the MCDU reporting all surfaces were contaminated and braking action advisories were in effect. It was very obvious the condition outside being IMC; light rain/mist and slush/snow plowed all over. I watched as the FO programmed the weight and balance takeoff conditions page. The setup was to request 'wet;' not contaminated data; asking for flex numbers; not no flex numbers and the load portion of the weight & balance did not include myself in the jump seat. Some of these items unfortunately are a common occurrence and I tend to let the crews work through their duties so they hopefully will trap these errors before I say something. The flight pushed back with these errors still in place. The crew was cleared to start engines during the disconnect from the tug and the FO asked the Captain if he wanted engine #2 started and he said 'NO'; we will taxi out on just number one. NOTE-EDCT (Expected Departure Clearance Time) was approximately 5 minutes! I advised the crew they had a few serious items that needing fixing prior to departure or I would not allow the takeoff. I told them to proceed as they would as if I was not present with the hopes they would discover and trap the mistakes during taxi; briefings; or a checklist. The ramp area was wet with slush & snow plowed to the sides; but as we approached an area of contamination; I had to speak up and have the crew start engine #2. The crew looked at checklists; looked at every display; button; etc. in the cockpit and still were unable to trap their programming mistakes. The Captain said to me 'we have no idea what is wrong; please tell us.' Due to time constraints; being late and having an EDCT time; I guided the crew to fixing their mistakes to allow for a safe departure and still keep the airline running. At this point; their takeoff weight; their takeoff speeds; & their thrust setting were now correct. Approaching Runway XX the controller gave the crew the current winds. The controller cleared the flight for takeoff but the crew still had some engine warmup time reaming and advised the controller they needed another minute or two. The controller stated; 'you are still cleared for takeoff; just advise when you're rolling.' When the Captain taxied onto the runway and began his takeoff; he performed a normal takeoff which per the SOP and FOM; he should have performed as a maximum thrust takeoff. As we were climbing out an aircraft was being worked for Runway YY; we departed Runway XX. I thought about this and what the controller told the crew before departure about the winds. Although being completely task saturated trying to keep up with notes on all the mistakes this crew was making and using this new line check form; I noted the winds I heard on my note pad. We were in sterile cockpit as I was making sense of the airplane landing Runway XX and the controller wanting us off Runway YY; along with the wind report. Once we passed 10;000feet I asked the crew if they remembered what the wind was from the controller. They weren't exactly sure. I had the winds written on my papers as I noted above; all scribbled with other notes and I requested the FO to go into the MCDU to the performance takeoff page. I had the FO enter the exact runway heading and the reported wind. The MCDU returned a message of 'tailwind limit exceeded.' My intuition during climb was correct; this crew didn't even consider the winds on takeoff. Now; the crew realized they had exceeded a limit in our SOP of a maximum tailwind component of 10 knots. The above calculation exceeded the SOP limit by 3 knots. Now; not only did they depart exceeding the limit; they did so on a contaminated runway.During the debrief at the gate; they did say they kind of thought the way the controller reported the winds made them think something was weird. The captain said he had knowledge of the airplane being worked for Runway YY and knew something must be wrong yet decided to go anyway. I advised the crew that both pilots were being de-qualified. Neither one of them were surprised and owned up to all the mistakes. Both crew members have a very poor foundation of knowledge of our airlines policies and procedures. I also talked with the crew noting that if I had not been on the jump seat; they would have single engine taxied on a contaminated surface; they would have reduced power on a contaminated runway; they would have departed with incorrect takeoff data and because of me not figuring out until airborne about the tailwind; they still would have taken off with the wrong takeoff type and with the tailwind. I would hate to think of the possible outcome of this flight without my intervention. This crews' lack of procedural knowledge and lack of CRM are what ultimately led to this train wreck of a flight. There were many other SOP/FOM mistakes on this line check not noted here; but this is not a line check form. Better CRM and crews need to stay sharp in our manuals not just for ground school or sim check.
[Report narrative contained no additional information.]
ERJ-175 Check Airman reported numerous SOP; FOM; and FAR violations during an unsatisfactory line check.