B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Flight Crew Last 90 Days 187; Flight Crew Type 1916
Situational Awareness
Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Procedure; Company Policy; Human Factors
I have departed MROC from runway 7 on 2 different occasions and believe the Safety Alert concerning the POAS4 departure on the 10-7 and the Engine failure procedure needs to be addressed. This safety alert should apply to all departures from Runway 07 which turn back to the TIO VOR. The Take Off (T/O) data message seems to be in direct conflict with this alert. The T/O data message calls for 1100 AGL power reduction; 2 engine acceleration; and engine out acceleration. Our flight path resulted in a flight path right up to the R-113 of TIO. During both occasions the safety alert was briefed and a plan of action was developed. We briefed that we would fly V2 +20 with a minimum of 25 degrees AOB until the turn was completed; however the actual results differed momentarily from our briefs. On the first occasion; although the T/O Data said to accelerate at 4130 MSL (1100 AGL) we elected a [noise abatement] departure. This let us maintain V2 +20 until 6330 feet MSL (3000 feet AFE). VNAV commanded a speed increase to CMS [clean maneuvering speed]. Passing this altitude without our turn to the TIO VOR being completed. After a brief acceleration; LVL CHG was selected with V2+20 set for the speed. Our course path had us right on the R-113.The second occasion our plan was to use V2+20 in the L2 page with VNAV selected and maintain this speed until inbound to the TIO VOR. However; VNAV commanded FLAP 1 maneuvering speed of 190 knots instead of our V2+20 of 182 knots. Had we flown 190 speed it would have taken us south of the 113 radial. It took some CRM to get the First Officer to use at least 25 AOB while below the flaps 1 maneuvering speed. Again our track took us right to the R-113 because a minimum of 25 degrees AOB wasn't maintained through the entire turn. I believe the 10-7 alert should suggest VNAV off on the departure with LNAV selected until the turn starts and the HDG select to the TIO VOR to ensure not going south of the R-113. Also a note referencing that V2+20 will be below a flap 1 maneuvering speed and it is protected for AOB of over 25 degrees.With this all in mind; the engine failure procedure calls for an 1100 feet AGL. I believe the aircraft will accelerate before the turn is complete if Clean Maneuvering Speed is called for at the 1100 feet AGL. The T/O data calls for an 1100 feet AGL acceleration. If the 113 radial is critical; the turn needs to be completed prior to accelerating to CMS (this is not mentioned on the procedure). It needs an acceleration to V2+15 or V2+20 at a certain time since the aircraft will be at V2 if the engine failure occurs prior to rotation. Maintain minimum AOB of 25 degrees at V2+15 or V2+20 until inbound to the TIO VOR. Additionally; remarks from engine failure procedures from the FM should be referenced.
B737 Captain found that it was very difficult to avoid crossing the TIO R-113 during departures from Runway 7 at MROC and believed that company procedures should be modified to address the problem.