B737-700
Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Flight Crew Last 90 Days 138; Flight Crew Type 20000
ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Landing Without Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew FLC Overrode Automation; Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control
Weather; Procedure; Human Factors
On arrival into SMF; we were held high by ATC for VFR traffic below. Once we were cleared to descend; we were very high; and had a 20 to 30 knot tailwind; as we were attempting to join the ILS to Runway 16R. The visibility was reported at six NM; but the actual visibility was more like three or four NM. The combination of these factors did not permit us to establish a stabilized approach by 1;000 AGL; and I initiated a go-around. When NorCal Approach vectored us back for another ILS Approach; they turned us to intercept the LOC to Runway 16R just outside of FAPIN; which is only two NM outside of the final approach fix. I had been very busy reconfiguring our FMC for the next approach; and the First Officer (FO); new to the 737; had chosen to hand fly the aircraft with the flight director turned off; and subsequently overshot the LOC by a small margin. As I was focused on helping him re-intercept the LOC; Approach called to ask if we were intercepting the LOC; and I confirmed that we were. They may have told us at that time to contact Capital Tower; but I was preoccupied with helping the FO to intercept the course and glideslope; and getting him to slow the aircraft to the required flap extension speeds. The tailwind was approximately 22 knots at this point; which was again complicating the situation. With his unfamiliarity with the 737; (which slows down less rapidly than his previous aircraft; a older McDonnell Douglas aircraft); he was trying to stay on the glideslope; but was not able to slow below the max speed for extending the flaps to 25 and 30. I told him to reduce his descent rate to allow the aircraft to slow to flap extension speeds; which caused us to get high on glideslope. This resulted in our attention being focused on re-establishing a stabilized approach; although we did have the runway in sight. We did finally achieve a stabilized approach; but we were below 1;000 AGL. I seriously considered executing another go-around; but decided; against my better judgment; that doing a second go-around would unnecessarily alarm the Passengers; when the situation was coming under control. After reflection; I also realized that there was the 'embarrassment factor' if we were not able to complete the second approach. After a safe landing; when we contacted Ground Control; as we turned off the runway; they asked if we had received clearance to land from Tower. It was at that point that we realized I had failed to set Tower frequency in the radio; and had been too busy to remember that we had not received landing clearance. I asked the Ground Controller for more information to ascertain that there had not been any traffic conflict that had been caused by the radio issue. They assured me that there was no conflict; and after I asked a few more questions; they gave me their phone number. When I called the Controller the first time; he again stated that there had been no traffic conflict; but that a Company aircraft waiting for takeoff had declined the clearance to 'line up and wait' because of the radio issue; preferring to wait until we had landed. The Controller also stated that after Tower had been unable to contact us; they had asked Approach to call us; but neither of us heard Approach call; so we don't know if they actually did attempt to call us. (Thinking back on the event; it's possible that I may have started to dial in the Tower frequency; then got distracted by the FO's difficulties; and may have ended up with a non-functioning frequency set in our radio.) In our second of two conversations; the Controller told me that for the last two days there had been an unusually high number of go-arounds that had been caused by the tailwinds on final approach; including at least two from earlier in the same day as our flight; and one after.I should have initiated a go-around on the second approach; and disregarded my concerns about Passenger perceptions and personal pride. Our landing was safe; but the approach was out of our normal Company parameters; and that; in itself; was enough reason to go-around again. On the second approach; I should have taken the aircraft and either corrected back to course and speed myself; rather than possibly overwhelming the FO with all the instructions and guidance I was trying to give him. I should have thought to request a longer downwind; because of the tailwinds and reduced visibility; because I realized later that the Approach Controller was probably giving us turns based on normal wind and visibility conditions. The short turn to final set us up for another rushed approach; which further complicated the already non-standard circumstance of returning for a second landing after the go-around. I should have told the FO to put the autopilot and flight director back on; and back me up with reconfiguring the aircraft systems and computers for the next approach. If both of us had been focusing on that; we could have more adequately covered all the bases and reviewed all the extenuating circumstances such as the tailwind and the decreased visibility; and cross-checked the FMC for correct reprogramming of the ILS Approach. I felt that I learned valuable lessons in Crew management from this event. I will never again allow another Pilot's lack of experience put us into a situation that could diminish the margin of safety of a flight. He and I thoroughly debriefed all the circumstances surrounding this flight; and I believe that he will be better prepared to recognize the situation he was in; much earlier in the approach; and take the necessary and appropriate actions to establish a stabilized approach much earlier than he did on this flight.
I thought everything was under control and was monitoring our distance from JARNU (the FAF) and FAPIN (two miles from JARNU) which were clearly displayed on my NAV display. NorCal turned us on base approximately two miles from FAPIN and then subsequently cleared us for the approach. I requested VOR/LOC and was monitoring the Localizer and glideslope manual data. When I glanced at my FMA; I expected to see 'VOR/LOC' there like we usually get and was slow to realize that since my flight director was off; blank was normal. It was at this point that I overshot the Localizer and got high on the glideslope. As I was making corrections back to both Localizer and glideslope; the Captain was trying to assist me with configuring.
A B737-700 flight crew found themselves high and fast due to a high and late turn to final and significant tailwinds. They executed a go-around and were vectored for another approach which again became unstabilized for the similar reasons; this time; however; they elected to continue to land and did so without; however a landing clearance.