B737-700
Flight Crew Last 90 Days 200; Flight Crew Type 2000
Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification
Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Vehicle
General Work Refused
Human Factors; Procedure
There was no Ground Marshaller at the gate so the Captain stopped the aircraft prior to entering safety zone. The ground crew walked into position a minute or two later. Lit wands were used and Captain taxied down the line towards the gate. About the position that we are used to stopping; we noticed we were still being directed forward although our positioning clearly did not feel right. The Captain stopped the aircraft while direction to continue forward was still being given by Ground Marshaller. A tug and towbar were then hooked up at Captain's direction and the aircraft was pushed back into position. It is my belief that--if the Captain had continued to follow the Director's signals--a turning engine would have come in contact with the jetway. A thorough debrief was conducted with the Ground Supervisor who guided the aircraft into the gate. Though all parties were composed and professional during the debrief; I was not convinced that the severity of the situation was completely understood by the ground crew.Ground crew training on proper marshal placement of -700 aircraft versus -800 aircraft. Lines are in different places and extra attention must be given to ensuring the aircraft is stopped accordingly.
The flight crew of a B737-700 refused the Ground Marshaller's guidance into the gate when they became uncomfortable continuing further into the safe zone than they felt appropriate for their aircraft. They later determined they were being guided to the stop line for a B737-800; located some 12 feet further into the zone than that appropriate for the shorter -700.