EMB ERJ 145 ER/LR
Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Time Pressure; Situational Awareness; Distraction; Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Workload
Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; General Maintenance Action
Aircraft
Normal flight; during approach; ATC originally assigned us [Runway] 35R; and then later offered us vectors to [Runway] 35L. We accepted [Runway] 35L. When we were on a dogleg to final approach; I (pilot flying) disconnected the autopilot and after about 5 seconds; I noticed something didn't feel right with the controls. I instructed the First Officer to take control of the aircraft and tell me what he felt. We agreed that the aileron control was very loose; and was abruptly jerking the plane.At this point we became concerned with the safety of the flight. We were on about a 5 mile final to [Runway] 35L; and the aileron control effectiveness decreased significantly. At this point; we were [in a] dire situation to land the plane. We did not declare an emergency because we were so close to landing/time constraint. I communicated to the First Officer that my plan was to get the plane on the ground immediately; rather than performing a go-around to further troubleshoot. We agreed this was our best option given the deteriorating situation. The wind was approximately 15 KT crosswind from the east. I carried extra speed in the approach/flare for better rudder effectiveness. We landed without incident. Touchdown was in the touchdown zone on center line; although we were in a cross controlled situation. After clearing the runway I noticed that aileron input on the yoke felt completely disconnected. We taxied to our gate; where we notified Maintenance of our problem. Control Surface Failure - fortunately; we didn't reach this point. Had we been further away from the airport; the outcome may have been bad. As the Captain; and pilot flying; I could have better communicated our dire situation to the First Officer. I was so consumed with getting the aircraft on the ground; that the First Officer didn't initially realize how critical our situation was. It wasn't until we cleared the runway; and the First Officer saw that my yoke was completely disconnected from the system that he realized what had happened. This was due to my poor communication in the moment; and our proximity to the airport/ground. Given the situation; we both agreed that we handled our threat with the best interest of safety.
The reporter was very concerned about the aircraft's controllability and that getting the aircraft on the ground was the sole focus during the final minutes of flight. After landing the yoke could be turned in excess of 75 degrees before any resistance was felt. Maintenance later stated that the aileron cable popped off a pulley below the cockpit floor in the vicinity of the Captain's seat. This event reportedly repeated three times during corrective maintenance. The aircraft had a previous problem which the reporter suspected was similar to this because of a Mechanic's comment; but this suspicion could not be personally confirmed.
After disconnecting the autopilot on a visual approach; the Captain realized that neither pilot's yoke had normal aileron input. Being close to the airport; they landed the aircraft in this configuration.