EMB ERJ 145 ER/LR
Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Communication Breakdown; Distraction; Workload; Training / Qualification; Time Pressure; Situational Awareness
Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown; Ground Incursion Runway
Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Human Factors; Procedure; Company Policy
This flight seemed to start out very normal other than myself being the First Officer on the trip as I am a line holding Captain. I was the first crewmember to the aircraft. During power up a Short dispatch message appeared on the EICAS. I immediately notified MX and wrote up the discrepancy in the logbook. The Captain then showed up around about ten minutes later and said; 'I was at an outstation one time and the aircraft was on a GPU when it did this.' The Captain then shut down the aircraft and re started in without direction from MX. Although the message did not reappear; by him doing so he is impeding the effort for MX to clear up a problem that has been reoccurring with this aircraft.I suggested that he just leave the aircraft powered up; but during me saying that; he depowered the aircraft. I do not agree with the Captains actions. MX subsequently placed the Short dispatch message back on MEL; which I was happy with as there is now a record of the reoccurrence; but that still does not change the fact that MX lost an opportunity to further diagnose the reoccurring issue.Boarding was very smooth and timely; all operations to this point were normal. Once the doors were closed the captain asked for me to call for push; we had not yet completed the receiving checklist. I asked him about doing the checklist and we then accomplished the receiving and before start pushback checklist. During pushback the tug driver and the Captain were very chatty. They both seemed to distract one another and neither was paying attention to anything. During pushback the Captain asked me to start engine two. It seemed as though when the tug driver said 'spin two'; that I would then follow the tug driver's commands. I did nothing until the Captain called for it. The Captain then asked me to call for taxi after the tug had been disconnected; however we had not completed the after start checklist. I asked him if he would like to run the checklist before I call and he agreed. I then called for taxi after completing the checklist. We received some very normal instructions to taxi to [the] runway. At this airport this happens very fast and allows very limited time to warm up the engines; so I asked the Captain when he planned on starting engine 1. He said 'we are tight on fuel; and wanted to wait and see'. As a Captain myself; I am now wondering about this guy's ability to plan as we had plenty of fuel; the sky is about as clear as it gets (severe VFR); and in typical fashion this airport's tower was launching planes about as fast as they could takeoff.After that question the Captain seemed to engage the jumpseater in some conversation about nothing; I am now considering my options as I am questioning in my head this Captains capacity to fly this aircraft. The Captain is now taxing the aircraft with the thrust lever on #2 at an angle close to the guard; and then stabbing the brakes and being overly aggressive with the tiller. At this point I am in complete disbelief about how non-compliant this Captain is; it seems as though he is becoming further distracted by something by his charts; or his charts as he keeps looking at them while he is taxing. We are now; #3 and aircraft are leaving fast; #1 engine is still not running. I then asked the Captain if he would like to start engine 1; which he wants to start it now so I did. We are now at the runway and will not have enough time on engine #1 if Tower keeps launching planes as quickly as they are.The before takeoff checklist has not been called for; and because of that not completed. I asked the Captain if he would like to run the before takeoff checklist. I started to run my flow; notified the FA to be seated for takeoff via the PA; (still have com 1 selected to listen in on tower while doing this); and the Captain proceeds to push the thrust levers up to taxi us onto the runway without any clearance! I yelled stop! Whoa; Whoa; STOP to the Captain and the Captain has the aircraft completely past the hold short bars; and I looked for an aircraft on final; there was a caravan that was about to touch down right in front of us. As I am yelling those commands my feet are also on the brakes. While I was yelling stop to the Captain he was looking at his charts! Did not have the parking brake set; and at first was not paying attention to my stop command. The Captain is now asking the jumpseater; 'what do you think'; and all the jumpseater could say is 'good thing he caught it'; in my amazement the caravan landed; and then tower gave us a clearance to takeoff... After finishing the checklist we departed.The Captain continued with not calling for checklists; and I continued to ask him if he wanted them for the remainder of the flight. Then a miracle happened; on the ground at the gate in our destination he asked for the parking checklist. After that he apologized; 'I'm sorry for the runway incursion'. I didn't respond; and I am still in disbelief; as I don't accept his apology.By the Captain resetting the aircraft to clear the Short Dispatch message was dangerous and defeating to the MX personal who are charged with keeping our aircraft safe to operate. The biggest threat for me to accomplish the job as the first officer was having to lead the captain into accomplishing the checklist on the ground timely. I also noticed the captain does not use lights during ground operations and in the air to trigger remembering if you have a clearance to move on the ground; taxi across a runway; and the cleared for approach; and landing light. They are either all on or off with him. On the ground when stopped he does not use the parking brake. If the parking brake had been used when holding short of the runway; I believe I would have noticed sooner had I seen the brake drop.I have noticed a lot of drift specifically with some first officers at our company from not complying with simple and easy to do company policies and procedures. In fact our job becomes significantly easier to do when everyone does it per the standard operating procedures. As a Captain I make every effort to correct those issues while flying the line as they appear; I know see where the drift is coming from.
A Captain qualified EMB-145 First Officer reported the Captain's behavior as distracted; nonstandard; and lacking in CRM.