B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Flight Crew Last 90 Days 100; Flight Crew Total 16330; Flight Crew Type 4920
Confusion; Training / Qualification
Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Other / Unknown
General None Reported / Taken
Company Policy; Procedure; Chart Or Publication
The PREFLIGHT checklist for the 737 is poor and I believe it essentially dupes many Captains into lying when responding to three of the items that require a Captain response.We are being trained to be careful not to become victims of 'Normalization of Deviance' and it is actually a training topic for the current training cycle yet the 737 checklist is instilling 'Normalization of Deviance' upon the flight crews that fly it.The 737 PREFLIGHT checklist has several items; the following three items on the PREFLIGHT checklist require a response by the Captain not the First Officer:Hydraulic system.....Checked; ON [C]Mode control panel................Set [C]Ground proximity...........Checked [C]The problem is due to the fact that two of these checks are completed by the First Officer (typically when the Captain is not on the flight deck) and one of the items requires a response when the item is in fact not set.The First Officer is responsible for checking the hydraulic system and ground proximity during his/her preflight check.  As I said earlier; it has been my experience that this check is done when I am absent from the flight deck. So; as a result of the Captain responding to a checklist item that he/she in fact does not complete; one of four things must occur:  1. The Captain must always ask the First Officer if they in fact checked the hydraulic system and ground proximity system; or 2. the Captain must physically conduct the check on their own; or 3.  It must be a requirement for the Captain to be present during the First Officer's check of these two items;  or 4. The Captain will essentially be lying when they respond 'Checked' to each of these items if they were not actually present during the checks.  I strongly believe that most pilots do item number 4 resulting in 'Normalization of Deviance'.During my career; I have never been required to respond to a checklist item that I am not personally responsible for checking or required to witness the checking.  The response for these two items should be from the First Officer not the Captain.  When I addressed my concern to a 737 Captain evaluator in the training center I was rebuffed and told it was no big deal -  'Normalization of Deviance'.The other item on the PREFLIGHT checklist of concern is 'Mode control panel...........Set [C]'.  The Mode control panel is not completely set when the requirement for this checklist to be completed arrives - 'Normalization of Deviance'.  A very important item - The V2 speed - in the IAS/MACH window for the Mode Control Panel.  As a result; I believe we are lying when we respond 'Set' to this checklist item.  To add to potential errors; when I arrive to the flight deck of a new airplane the inbound crew rarely zeroes out the IAS/MACH window.  The result is that often times the Mode control panel may actually appear to be set due to the target approach speed being potentially close to the departing V2 speed.
A B737 Captain reported the recent preflight checklist response changes contained some system setting and selection responses which were not completed or were inaccurate. This situation lead him to feel the policy was promoting a normalization of deviance.