B767-300 and 300 ER
Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Situational Awareness
Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
General Declared Emergency
Aircraft; Human Factors
Flight was proceeding at FL380 when EICAS Caution 'C HYD QTY' came up.  Status page indicated Center HYD QTY was 0.49. I was PM and FB was PF. The QRH was referenced for C HYD QTY was for crew awareness. Observing the QTY; it was slowly decreasing. The FB and I discussed the situation and I elected to secure the C ELEC pumps and the ADP to attempt to save the fluid for landing. The QTY stabilized at 0.46 and the FO was recalled from his break. The 3 of us discussed the situation; a plan was developed to leave the pumps secured until established on downwind for the ILS. The pumps would then be turned on and the aircraft would be configured for landing. If at any point a problem occurred in extending the gear and flaps; I would declare an emergency and wave off the approach to complete the appropriate checklist. Dispatch was briefed on the situation and intentions. I asked Dispatch to brief Maintenance Control and solicit any input. Maintenance Control concurred with the plan. A normal descent was initiated. Checking in with Approach Control; I apprised them of the situation and the plan for the approach. Approach accommodated our request. While descending to the downwind leg; Approach requested a confirmation that there was a hydraulic leak; which I confirmed. Approach then said that ARFF were being dispatched as a precaution and to standby for possible runway contamination by hydraulic fluid. It was then I decided to declare an emergency and cognizant information was provided. Immediately after that; we turned on the Center HYD pumps; extended the gear and flaps normally for landing and commenced the approach. The FO flew the approach to a normal landing. Thrust reverses were used for primary braking. I took control of the aircraft and exited the runway to a holding position on Victor taxiway.  As the emergency vehicles were approaching the aircraft I realized that I had never given the flight attendant's the TEST briefing. A PA was made to apprise the passengers of the situation. The Fire Commander checked over the aircraft and detected a possible leak in the vicinity of the right main landing gear. I taxied the aircraft to just short of the gate for tow in. I think several factors contributed to all three of us missing the TEST briefing. Fatigue; this was the end of a two leg all night flight. Workload; I declared the emergency and immediately the process of configuring the aircraft and commencing the approach. Complacency; once the aircraft configured with no problems and we were established on the approach; job was complete. Crew coordination in the cockpit was excellent; we focused on working through the problem and getting the aircraft safely on the ground. We simply forgot to communicate with the back of the airplane. We do practice in the simulators giving the TEST brief but usually we are lead to it by a checklist. Possibly some discussion in training about using the TEST briefing even in minor abnormal situations.
I was First Officer on an augmented crew on the return leg of an all night flight. I was on the last break resting. Approximately 45 minutes prior to ETA; I was awakened from my rest break and asked to come to the cockpit. Upon arriving in the cockpit I was briefed on a low Center Hydraulic Quantity indication by the Captain and the FB. They had already started the checklist and assessment process. I took my seat as the flying pilot. As the Captain and FB were all trying to get me up to speed; run checklists and make assessments; we had started our descent for landing. After checklists were complete; we were all in agreement that the hydraulic leak was stabilized at 45% quantity. There were no other abnormalities. We planned for contingencies and briefed Approach Control that we wanted a 3;000 foot clearance early so we can be configured early for the approach. It was at this time we declared an emergency. As well; it was at this time we should have advised the flight attendants (TEST) about the situation. I believe we failed to TEST the flight attendants due to the non-deteriorating situation of the system failure; over focused on our cockpit duties; no written checklist reminders to do so and fatigue from an all night flight. (I was woken up from a difficult rest break). We were able to get fully configured with no flight control indication problems. Yet; we lost 90% of the center hydraulic fluid. We landed without incident. The Captain did a PA to the passenger cabin advising them of why there was Fire Rescue outside the aircraft. Fire Rescue looked over the aircraft after we cleared the runway. They trailed us to the gate. We shut down just prior to the gate and elected to be towed in. We parked with no other abnormalities. After we opened the cockpit door; the purser approached us (very professionally and with out angst) asking us what happened and why we didn't advise the cabin crew of the emergency. It was at this point we realized we had forgotten to TEST the cabin crew. Our cockpit crew duties were other wise near perfect. The Captain did an excellent job in decision making process; and utilized the resources of two other cockpit crew members. The FB did an excellent job supporting the required cockpit tasks and risk assessment. As far as cockpit CRM; risk assessment; and checklist procedures; I feel we did an excellent job. However; we should have gotten the cabin crew in the loop. Thankfully all ended well.
B767-300 flight crew experiences an EICAS Caution for C HYD QTY at FL380 approaching destination after an all night two leg flight. It is decided to turn of the center hydraulic pumps to conserve the fluid for landing which is successful although an emergency is eventually declared but the flight attendants are not briefed.