Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer
Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 9
Situational Awareness; Workload; Communication Breakdown
ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed
Airspace Structure; Procedure; Weather; Company Policy; Manuals
Restricted Area Special Use AirspaceRestricted Area was active 30;000 feet and below.Weather event day for ZHU and ZFW.  Weather from DFW to SAT.  DFW SE corner post was closed due to weather.  Traffic Management Unit (TMU) play books in effect for DFW and DAL.  Restricted Area is located just north of GRK and has hot artillery shells fired in airspace.  At approximately XA:00 local time; controllers advised supervisors that said restricted area was a safety factor for deviating aircraft.  It is my belief that several aircraft deviated Restricted Area while live artillery was in use. Throughout the day Rocksprings and Austin area supervisors attempted multiple times to lower restricted area after controller requests.  Forth Worth Center supervisors also made attempts to lower restricted area. Each request to lower it was denied by Supervisor Traffic Management Unit (TMU). The S TMU's response was that all Traffic Management Initiatives (TMI's) had to be exhausted before the restricted area was lowered.  They stated that TMIs will keep all aircraft clear of restricted area. Pull the weather data all day for Stonewall and Kelly sectors; Bergstrom sector; Austin sector; Junction sector; Hicoe sector; and Dallas sector.  Any TMI issued to miss restricted area accomplishes absolutely nothing due to convective activity.  The NEXRAD data shows these sectors were saturated with convective activity.  Convective activity is extremely dynamic and it is impossible for controllers to predict exactly how aircraft will deviate.  NEXRAD data lags behind; therefore; not showing the exact location of precipitation.  NEXRAD does not show overhangs; turbulence; and thrown hail from thunderstorms.  Keep in mind the turbulence from convective activity is responsible for loss of aircraft control and the majority of injuries and deaths related to thunderstorms.  As an ex airline pilot that has deviated around thunderstorms; I can assure you that pilots deviate well beyond displayable precipitation to avoid turbulence.  Therefore it is impossible to tie aircraft down on exact routes with convective activity.  Simply put with the amount of convective activity in these sectors; issuing TMIs to avoid the restricted area is asinine.  This does not ensure aircraft will miss restricted area and may be forcing aircraft unnecessarily into a precarious situation.   The above pilot deviating knowledge was also discussed in recent crew briefings. A pilot did a crew briefing at ZHU regarding the dangers of build ups; turbulence and overhangs; all of which NEXRAD does not show.  He made very clear statements that aircraft deviate around airspace that may not actually show precipitation.  I do not understand how ZHU management passes these safety tools down to controllers but when controllers apply this knowledge on sector the Supervisory Traffic Management Coordinator (STMC) dismisses it.  The STMC; in reality; has no clue how aircraft will deviate around weather.  Let's now discuss other safety factors regarding the restricted area.  During recurrent training at ZHU we were taught the 'Swiss Cheese Model' for errors and accidents.  The model basically states that for aviation errors and accidents to occur; certain controller errors/distractions take place leading up to a potentially catastrophic event. Factors affecting sectors on this day are as follows:  -'red' sectors; extremely elevated map values-weather deviations-holding for Fort Worth Center-extremely time consuming re routes -frequency congestionRestricted Area: the controller shouldn't have had to deal with it.  The other issues were unavoidable; the restricted area could have been mitigated.  Given the above distractions; controllers made request for the restricted area to be lowered.  They were attempting to remove one of the holes in the 'Swiss Cheese Model' to avoid an error or accident. In conclusion; the STMU explained that all TMI's have to be exhausted to take back restricted area.  As stated above convective activity saturated sectors around the restricted area; there was no way for controllers to pin down aircraft to TMI's.  Therefore all TMI's were exhausted at this time.  The STMU's above statement is simply ignorant; unacceptable; and a threat to the integrity of the National Airspace (NAS).  The STMU's decision not to recall the restricted airspace put the NAS in grave danger.  Again; please keep in mind that during this time live artillery was fired in restricted area.  An individual with STMC responsibilities should be aware that aircraft do not stay established on TMIs when affected by convective activity.  Considering the above information it is disconcerting that this individual potentially jeopardized hundreds of lives.Requesting a Traffic Management Review for [this date occurrence]
I was working [the] Traffic Management Unit (TMU) position during a large weather event day. The convective weather was present in ZFW as well as ZHU. The CQY Area was shut down for DFW and DAL arrivals; a national playbook was in effect routing the traffic that normally flows through CQY around to the north to the BYP Area and around the south through ZHU to the JEN Area. Weather was also building to the south and west of DFW inside the JEN area throughout the shift. Arrivals were having difficulties deviating around the weather in the JEN Area. The DFW airport had been shut down for arrivals numerous times; a 1st Tier Ground Stop had been issued for DFW as well as an internal ZFW Ground Stop for DFW. The airport opened and shut down several times throughout the shift. The FLM's for both the DAL and JEN Areas requested numerous times that the Restricted Area be capped at a lower altitude than 30;000 feet; and the ZHU TMU concurred. Grey Approach Control and the [military] control the Restricted Area Airspace and refused every request to cap Restricted Area. Aircraft were holding in the JEN area for the DFW stop and the JEN area Front Line manager as well as the ZFW Operations Manager both concurred this was an unsafe situation as the holding aircraft were too close to the Restricted Area airspace. This event occurred over a 6-hour period of time and should not continue.This is the second time in less than a year that Grey Approach Control and the [military] have refused to lower the cap of Restricted Area when asked for safety reasons. An aircraft deviating into Restricted Areas in a weather event is a very distinct possibility.ZHU or ZFW TMU and Operations Managers should have more say when a weather event occurs to ensure the safe and expeditious flow of traffic around the area. The Letter Of Agreement controlling the Restricted Area needs to be amended to give the option to ZFW and ZHU to cap the Restricted Area in a reasonable (30 minutes to 1 hour) amount of time to ensure aircraft can safely avoid the area.
During a busy air traffic period a Military Restricted Area was in use. There were numerous weather deviations and Air traffic Management did not attempt to get approval from the military authorities to let air traffic transit the Restricted Areas due to weather deviations. One of the reporters believes several aircraft entered the Restricted Areas deviating for weather.