B787 Dreamliner Undifferentiated or Other Model
Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument
Flight Crew Last 90 Days 63; Flight Crew Total 18115; Flight Crew Type 35
Time Pressure; Training / Qualification; Workload; Communication Breakdown; Distraction; Situational Awareness
Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation - Altitude Undershoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT
Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Human Factors; Weather
We got a low altitude alert on arrival to Runway XX in ZZZ. We had to hold due to thunderstorms in the area. That caused a runway change close to airport. We also were put behind an emergency aircraft. I got high and a little fast on extended approach. As we got closer glide slope was below our path. Being new to the airplane I was getting busy. And when I felt we were high I turned off autopilot to descend to the glide slope. We captured glide slope but I descended one dot thru it before correcting. That's when we received the low altitude alert.
This was the last leg of a six day pattern. Fatigue was not the primary cause; but certainly a contributing factor. This was an OE flight with the FO (First Officer) being the PF (Pilot Flying) and trainee. The PM (Pilot Monitoring) was a Captain LCA (Line Check Airman) and two other FO's were onboard. The flight was being vectored around weather for a visual approach to Runway XX. The autopilot was engaged; we were above the glideslope; and approximately 5 miles from ZZZZZ our altitude was above 8;000 feet. I mentioned that we seemed high; and soon after the gear and speedbrakes were extended. I also spoke of the pitfalls of getting ALT before G/S capture and that using vertical speed instead of FLCH was the correct way to solve that problem. We did get ALT and the FO disconnected the autopilot which significantly increased the work load. I switched to Tower; and shortly after we went from above glideslope to approximately 1 dot below. Speedbrakes were extended; flaps were going to 25 and then 30. Tower issued a low altitude alert; and the FO responded back to glidepath. We never heard a GPWS glideslope warning. After securing the airplane at the gate; all four of us thoroughly debriefed the event. We emphasized automation management and specifically the result of turning off the autopilot which significantly increased everyone's workload. Another emphasis was situational awareness and how the 787 does not slow and descend as quickly as the 777 the FO had previously flown. We also talked about monitor crosscheck and the need to speak up earlier to address an approach that is becoming high and fast. Finally; I talked about leadership effectiveness and my lack of being more assertive instead of allowing the student to continue into that situation. Additionally; during the debrief for my own knowledge and clarity; I asked the other pilots if the speedbrakes had been retracted by 1;000 feet; the autothrottles had remained engaged; the glideslope was captured and if we had met the stabilized approach criteria. The others agreed that was the case. Finally; perhaps the training center could include a training scenario where the glideslope needs to be captured after the FAF with ALT engaged.
Air Carrier Crew reported an Low Altitude Alert issued by ATC as the crew was maneuvering around weather for a visual approach. The First Officer (PF); was new to the aircraft and corrected the flight path after the alert.