Embraer Undifferentiated or Other Model
Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Situational Awareness; Workload
ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach
ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Human Factors
Upon shooting the ILS 15 into BUF the Captain elected to leave the autopilot engaged while outside of the final approach fix (approximately 7 miles). The ATIS explicitly told us to fly the ILS 15 uncoupled. As the Pilot Monitoring; I suggested that he hand fly the ILS after reminding him of the necessity to do it uncoupled. The aircraft was not intercepting the course reliably on autopilot. He said he would disengage it at the FAF. I could see the course needle on my primary flight display giving me intermittent signals and expected that was the reason for the message on the ATIS. I expected that as we got closer to the airport; signal would improve and we could shoot the approach normally. I was switching between FMS guidance and LOC guidance in order to maintain situational awareness. My understanding of instrument procedures it is acceptable to use RNAV guidance when shooting an ILS approach provided you are not using it for guidance once you are inside the final approach fix. Roughly 5 miles from the FAF we got a red WARNING message that said 'autopilot fail' and the autopilot turned itself off. The Captain; at that point; elected to hand fly the approach. Everything appeared to be going fine until roughly 1 mile outside the FAF both pilots got a red X on the localizer needles indicating an unreliable signal. The Captain elected to go-around rather than shoot an approach with what very clearly appeared to be unreliable guidance. After we cleaned the airplane up for the go-around; the Captain made the decision to declare minimum fuel and shoot another approach into BUF. This time; for the ILS to Runway 32. At one point the Captain seemed concerned about whether or not we would make it into the airport but after a quick consideration of the weather; decided we should still be able to make it. Things went further when the Captain suggested that if he needed to he would 'dip below glide' in order to gain sight of the runway. I said something like 'we should follow procedure.' We took delay vectors on the missed approach and had just enough fuel to land above Final Divert as a result. If we had not declared minimum fuel; we would have been very close to Final Divert [fuel level]. The Approach Controller vectored us within 3 miles of the FAF for ILS 32. It was a very high workload for me in preparation for the approach. About 3 miles from the FAF I was prepared to begin putting flaps and gear out for the Captain. We were on the intercept vector and cleared for the approach when I quickly realized that the Captain had not configured his localizer needle to the appropriate course. He seemed confused as to why his course wasn't 'alive' like mine was. Given the lack of time for discussion; I reached across cockpit and turned his course and made it appropriate for ILS 32. We were cleared to land and touched down within the touchdown zone with no problem. After we landed; ATC inquired as to the reason of the go around and asked about the status of the autopilot. They asked if at any point during the approach we had the autopilot engaged. I told them yes; however it was disengaged several miles before the Final Approach Fix and that we believed the course guidance to be unreliable even taking the autopilot out of the equation entirely. They did not appear to consider my response credible and I doubt anything will be done to adjust the localizer strength for that runway. They claimed multiple aircraft have been able to shoot the approach with no problems. While this may be true; I am still concerned that the localizer equipment needs to be adjusted. Our airplane had no trouble shooting the ILS 32. I suspect that if we had analog needles; the course guidance wouldn't have seemed as problematic. However; given that we have digital Localizer Guidance built into our PFD; I would still consider it a problem. Investigate the reliability of the ILS 15 in Buffalo thoroughly and determine reliability in the Embraer. Consider more thorough education on fuel and bag management for pilots in training using scenario based examples. Reiterate the necessity to follow procedures and never attempt to 'dip below glide' to crew members. Ensure operations has better access to bag restrictions and there is a clearly defined number of bags and passengers before boarding starts. Often agents do not seem to have good knowledge of baggage restrictions and passenger counts which can cause problems for new Captains. Stop calling Captains and questioning their decisions to take a delay. Implement the features of ACARS that allows Captains to explain delays with a simple button press and no further questioning.
Embraer regional jet First Officer reported executing a missed approach after the BUF Runway 15 localizer signal appeared to be unreliable.