Medium Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown
ATC Issue All Types; Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Human Factors; Weather
Prior to departure; FO and I reviewed destination and alternate weather on the flight release as well as area weather radar on my phone's weather app. We viewed showers south and east of Amarillo; TX as well as isolated convective weather east of Lubbock; TX with both systems building and moving east-northeast toward DAL [our intended destination]. I then reviewed the fuel load as well as the projected fuel on board after landing at DFW if a diversion to our alternate was required and found the fuel load to be adequate. During the crew brief; I informed flight attendants I would have them in their jumpseats early in the descent for the remainder of the flight due to convective weather in the DAL area. During my welcome aboard PA; I informed the passengers of the convective weather and that it appeared our flight and the weather currently west of our destination may arrive at DAL at the same time.Once airborne; we climbed to our filed attitude of FL340. After the ride deteriorated first to moderate chop then to moderate turbulence; we requested and received clearance down to FL300 where the ride was smooth and the winds more favorable. Numerous fuel checks enroute verified our fuel burn was on schedule despite the lower cruise altitude the second half of the flight; mostly due to lower than forecasted headwinds. While onboard weather radar showed convective activity had moved north of our route of flight; additional areas of convective weather displayed west of and in close proximity to DFW. We received a report from center controller that DAL was reporting heavy to severe precipitation rapidly approaching DAL from the west and that DAL was estimating a 1-hour closure of the airport once the convective weather arrived on airport. We sent an ACARS message to dispatcher to confirm weather information and trend reported by DAL. [Dispatcher's] reply confirmed the weather and trend reported by the center controller. Approximately 75 miles from DAL when onboard weather radar displayed the convective weather at DAL; we requested an update from the center controller. Center controller stated DAL was vectoring an aircraft in for a 'short approach to beat the weather'. Descending to 10;000 feet; I advised center controller onboard weather radar indicated convective weather had arrived at DAL. I further advised center controller; based upon the information provided to me by numerous sources; it was a strong possibility we were going to proceed to our filed alternate Dallas Fort Worth to conserve fuel in lieu of holding for an hour. At that point and based upon our remaining flight time to DAL; onboard weather radar indicating convective weather at DAL; the potential for encountering convective weather during a missed approach at DAL; the anticipated 1-hour closure of DAL and the center controller inquiring what our intentions were passing thru 14;000 feet on the descent; I made the decision to divert to DFW. I informed the center controller we were diverting to our filed alternate; Dallas Fort Worth. The center controller [was] task loaded due to numerous areas of convective weather and the resulting deviations by multiple aircraft around it; immediately cleared us direct to FINGR (approximately 125 miles from present position) via the 'Hillbilly' Three arrival (we would later determine it was the HIBIL THREE arrival) and assigned a climb to FL230 (after I inquired what altitude we were to climb to). As we leveled off then initiated a climb at 13;500 feet; I directed FO to enter FINGR; DFW and the 'Hillbilly' Three arrival into the FMS. I then directed FO to contact dispatch to notify [Dispatcher] we were diverting to DFW. At that moment; we experienced an ACARS 'no comm' for approximately 10 minutes. FO stated there is no 'Hillbilly' Three arrival (i.e. HIBIL THREE arrival) in the FMS database for DFW. He advised the next center controller we did not possess the 'Hillbilly' Three arrival Jepp chart for DFW or the arrival in our navigation database. The center controller inquired if we had the FINGR FIVE arrival. After we confirmed we did; we were directed to change the arrival to the FINGR FIVE. As FO completed numerous tasks associated with our diversion to DFW; I directed him to notify the flight attendants of our diversion and then I transferred the controls to FO prior to briefing the passengers to notify them of the diversion due to the before mention convective weather in the DAL area. We then received a clearance to descend and cross 20 miles northeast of FINGR at 10;000 feet with a subsequent clearance to cross FINGR at 9;000 feet. We complied with both clearances.Approach controller assigned us a 'visual approach to runway 13L' (there is no DFW ILS 13L approach in the FMS database or in our Jepps). Runway 13L visual approach was entered into the FMS. Prior to FINGR; we were assigned a 220 heading. The MFD showed DFW runway 13L southwest of our position so it appeared ATC was vectoring us to transition to a left downwind entry for the visual approach to runway 13L at DFW. After I mistakenly turned direct to DFW (approximately a 240 heading) while focusing on the location of DFW runway 13L displayed on the MFD; the approach controller directed us to turn back left to a 215 heading. We inquired about the heading to which the approach controller replied the airport was at our 10 o'clock position. The approach controller then inquired if we were familiar with the Dallas Fort Worth area. Since FO had no prior experience operating into or out of DFW and I had yet to do so as a [Company] captain and had not done so since prior to 2008 as [another air carrier] Captain; we advised the approach controller that we were not. Based upon the approach controller turning us away from the DFW runway 13L displayed on our MFDs; our prior ATC communications and the approach controller's reply questioning our familiarity with the Dallas Fort Worth area after we questioned the heading; FO and I discussed the possibility the orientation of runway 13L at DFW displayed on the MFD may be unreliable due to a possible GPS position error when we first diverted to DFW and FO programmed the FMS for DFW and the FINGR FIVE arrival. Due to my focus on flying the aircraft and deviating around weather enroute to DFW; directing FO to complete numerous tasks required by the diversion; our collective focus on completing all the required tasks in a limited amount of time in addition to ATC; dispatch; flight attendant and passenger communications; the overall crew workload during the short flight to Dallas (that began just prior to declaring our diversion to DFW) and the limited time to process all the information (further exacerbated by the ACARS no comm) it had yet to occur to us that ATC was sending us to DAL (Dallas Love Field) in close proximity to DFW. Unsure of our position; unfamiliar with the DFW area and the location of DFW due to limited time to process conflicting information and the myriad of ground lights at night in the Dallas Metroplex coupled with ATC's apparent confidence in where our flight was and where it was going; we requested radar vectors to the runway 13L final approach course. The approach controller had no issue with providing that service so we were vectored accordingly. As I began to fly the visual approach to runway 13L; I noticed there was no PAPI on the left of the runway as I briefed per the back of the DFW Jepp 60-9 airport chart. While much too late and finally with time to process all the information absent the requirement of performing distracting multiple crew tasks and maneuvering the aircraft around weather; the realization that the runway ahead of me was not DFW runway 13L but rather DAL runway 13L (if there was indeed a runway 13L at DAL since I was unfamiliar with and had yet to operate a flight into DAL) was immediately confirmed when the DAL tower controller inquired if we were diverting to DAL or DFW. While I selected AIRPORTS on myMFD MENU prior to the descent into DAL (my normal practice); I realized airports were no longer displayed on my MFD as I displayed a 5-mile range. Regrettably; I didn't discover the absence of airports on my MFD until it was too late since I was primarily focused on the visual presentation of DFW runway 13L on the MFD at first the 10-mile then 5-mile range. After FO responded we were diverting to DFW; the DAL tower controller directed us (at approximately 750 feet) to go around. I immediately initiated the go around since at that time I suspected (but had yet to verbalize it due to the exchange between FO and the DAL tower controller) we were landing at the wrong airport once I noticed the absence of a runway 13L PAPI. A go around was executed via runway heading to 3;000 feet followed by a downwind vector to DFW. The short flight to DFW proceeded without incident where a visual approach (backed up by the ILS) and landing to runway 17C was completed. Once at gate; I briefed flight attendants; then using the flight attendant PA handset I provided the passengers a complete account of what had occurred and advised them to make themselves as comfortable as possible. I thanked them for their patience and assured them I would provide more information for the return flight to [intended destination] as soon as I spoke with the dispatcher for our flight. I then contacted dispatch. I provided her a complete briefing of what occurred then gave the same briefing to dispatch coordinator who asked to speak with me. After reviewing the incident in its entirety to write this ASAP report; I have an even greater appreciation for how quickly a crew's situational awareness can deteriorate when task loaded in a limited amount of time during a diversion. When we encountered the absence of the HIBIL THREE arrival in our DFW Jepp charts and the FMS database; our query to ATC was dismissed by the controller with the substitution of the FINGR FIVE arrival; since FINGR is a fix depicted on both arrivals. When we queried the Dallas approach controller after being issued a vector away from the location of DFW runway 13L displayed on our MFDs; we were questioned by the controller about our familiarity with the Dallas Fort Worth area which in turn led us to wrongly question ourselves about the location of DFW runway 13L depicted on our MFDs. The runway 13L assignment (common to both DFW and DAL) did little to assist us in differentiating between where ATC was vectoring us to land (DAL) and where we requested to be diverted to (DFW). Regardless of the circumstances that led to the initial DAL runway 13L visual approach and the subsequent go around; it was my responsibility as PIC to ensure the diversion to DFW was completed without incident. Therefore; I accept full responsibility for failing to better manage crew workload in order to maintain the level of situational awareness required to avoid the incident. In the future when diverting to an alternate; I will confirm the alternate airport with the center controller subsequent to the controller I declare the diversion to; since it appears the task loaded center controller who acknowledged our request to divert to DFW may have mistakenly filed us to DAL. When assigned an arrival or approach not in my possession in Jepp chart form or in the FMS database; I will request a confirmation of my destination airport from ATC. Likewise; when I question a vector issued by ATC that conflicts with the depiction of the destination airport on the MFD; I will request a confirmation of my destination airport from ATC. When operating in terminal areas with more than one air carrier airport present; I will ensure that I'm completely familiar with not only the runway layout of both (or all) airports but also their proximity to one another. I will also now select AIRPORTS on the FMS MFD MENU prior to pushback at the departure airport rather than prior to descent into the destination airport. While hindsight is always 20/20;
Air carrier Captain reported experiencing a great deal of confusion during a weather diversion to DFW which resulted in the flight almost landing at DAL. Factors cited as contributing included pilot unfamiliarity with the area; communication issues with ATC; weather; and fuel concerns.