B737-800
Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Flight Crew Total 17000
Situational Awareness
Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury
General Release Refused / Aircraft Not Accepted
Human Factors; Procedure
On arrival our crew had a last minute aircraft swap. While flight planning I was approached by another Captain who informed me that he had just refused the aircraft due to an inbound passenger traveling with an open but bandaged wound that had active bleeding and pus. The Captain also informed me that he was told a person traveling with the wound victim informed the inbound crew that the wound had a possible MRSA infection.I went down the jet bridge to review aircraft log book and at the mechanic stand near the aircraft door I met an aircraft mechanic who was searching his tablet for MRSA decontamination procedures. The mechanic said he was informed the aircraft had been cleaned by cabin service and was good to go. On his own initiative and before signing off the inbound Captain's write-up he had called environmental protection [resources] as he was unfamiliar with MRSA decontamination procedures. I then consulted the [union] Safety Department who recommended that I should also refuse the aircraft which I quickly did. I wrote in the AML that I had refused the aircraft on the basis of public safety due to possible MRSA infection. I never entered the aircraft and returned to the gate area.Once back at the gate I was asked to speak to Ramp Operations who asked me if I was refusing the aircraft. I informed them I was refusing it due to the inbound open wound and possible associated MRSA infection. They thanked me for the information and the call ended there. I called my Dispatcher who hadn't heard about me refusing the aircraft. The Dispatcher agreed with my decision; thanked me for the heads up; and began the process of finding us a different aircraft. I then received a phone call from one of the Chief Pilots. The Chief asked me what was going on regarding my refusal of the aircraft; I gave him a brief synopsis of what I was told; and he thanked me for the information and said it was probably a good call that I had refused the aircraft. After speaking to the Chief Pilot I received a follow-up call from the same member of [union] Safety Department who told me he had spoken to the inbound Captain. That Captain told him he had no idea of the presence of the passenger with the open wound until the aircraft had reached cruise altitude. The inbound Captain also said the wound had bled and pus had seeped onto the aircraft carpet; seats; seat belts; and the general area around the passenger's seat during passenger entry; the entire flight; and during deplaning. I then went back down the jet bridge and added the active bleeding and seeping pus to my original write-up. At that time a different mechanic showed up who told me he was there to take the aircraft to the hangar. I told him what I had been told; then put him on the phone with [union] Safety Department to ensure he was fully informed of the seriousness of the situation before he boarded the aircraft. We were given a substitute aircraft and completed our flight without further incident. I would like to express my sincere appreciation and gratitude to the members of the [union] Safety Department for their assistance and guidance during this very unusual situation. Once aware of the serious nature of the situation Ramp Operations; Flight Office; and Dispatch personnel were also helpful in swapping our aircraft and helping us complete our flight. I believe this event happened due to a failure to prevent a passenger with an open and possibly infectious wound from boarding an aircraft. I also believe that once the situation had become known the disinfection protocols in place were inadequate to deal with a wound and infection of this type and the aircraft could have easily continued in service possibly risking infecting many other passengers and crew members. Agents should be trained to be on the alert for passengers traveling with open wounds and to prevent them from boarding aircraft in that condition. This situation should never have gotten as far as the flightcrew before this aircraft was taken out of service. Once possible infections are made known to the company IMMEDIATE aircraft isolation and clean up protocols should be in place to determine the extent of the contamination and to ensure the aircraft is completely and properly disinfected before it is returned to passenger service.
B737-800 Captain reported refusing an aircraft after learning an inbound passenger had contaminated the aircraft from a bleeding wound; with the possibility of a MRSA infection being mentioned.