Medium Large Transport
Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument
Fatigue; Confusion; Human-Machine Interface; Training / Qualification; Situational Awareness
Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach
Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach
Human Factors
Early descent and low speed condition resulting in go-around. I was the Pilot Flying. Very short flight. Visual approach to RWY 15 at CHS. I was expecting the ILS approach. I missed that the GS for RWY 15 was out of service. We had briefed the OSPRI7 STAR. ATC recleared us direct to the airport and eventually direct MAMAE intersection to join the localizer for [Runway] 15 at 3;000 [feet] ft. Airport was in sight and we were cleared for a visual approach. I armed the approach and when we went into altitude capture at 3;000 [feet] I incorrectly set an altitude below 3;000 [feet] to allow the descent to continue in order to join the glide slope. I then realized we were not receiving the glide slope and were below the FAF crossing altitude at 1000ft. I disconnected the autopilot and stopped the descent. Unfortunately I did not also call for the flight directors off initially. I am relatively new to the equipment. Since we were in landing configuration of course the speed dropped rapidly. We were in landing configuration with the airport and PAPI's in sight but since the approach was unstable I decided to go around. We then flew the RWY 15 RNAV (GPS)Y to a normal landing. It was the third leg of a busy day with thunderstorm avoidance on the first two flights. It is my practice to carefully review the NOTAMs but somehow I missed the GS OTS. I haven't been into CHS as yet and the flight is very short and our ATC clearance had us high from the top of descent.Direct to a new airport on a time compressed flight for a visual at night is never in my opinion a pleasant way to conclude a long day of flying. Upon honest reflection I fully acknowledge I had a strong expectation bias for the ILS to 15. The lack of the GS and the unexpected consequences placed us in a reactionary position which is unacceptable.Our training is clear on how to capture and correct erroneous situations should they occur and we did our best to stop and correct an inadvertently entered unstable position. This was a clear example of the value and necessity of our human factors training. I know these things have happened before and I consider it my professional responsibility to not allow it to happen to me. And yet it did. Recognizing; and fully appreciating how higher than expected workload situations can present themselves is an essential aspect to our work. An increased diligence regarding the review of NOTAMs is a resounding suggestion I'm making to myself for one. Also; the need for particularly increased vigilance when in situations such as this is something I'll never forget.
Air Carrier flight crew reported a go-around due to an early descent and low speed condition on approach.