Seaplane or Amphibian
Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor
Flight Crew Last 90 Days 100; Flight Crew Total 2000; Flight Crew Type 30
Situational Awareness; Workload; Confusion; Distraction
Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Inflight Event / Encounter VFR In IMC
Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Weather; Human Factors
I was finishing an approximately 30 hour ferry flight of an amphibious [aircraft] from the desert to SMO.The weather forecast showed layered clouds in the Los Angeles Basin area with thinning clouds throughout the day. As a precaution; I decided to update all avionics in the aircraft and prepare for IFR flight on arrival. This included all obstacles.Prior to departing; and while enroute; I checked weather for all airports along my route of flight; and all were showing similar forecasts of few at 700; scattered at 2;500; and overcast at approximately 4;000. What I expected; was distinctly layered cloud decks. As a precaution; I entered the approach in to SMO on standby so that I would have little to do in the event of needing to pick up an IFR flight plan and finish with an approach.Upon climbing out; I attempted to climb to 6;500 MSL in order to cruise above the clouds. However; the aircraft is extremely limited in altitude; due to drag from the amphibious floats; and I wasn't able to climb above 5;800 MSL or so.The clouds seemed very sparse below 4;000 feet or so. I opted at that time to fly VFR under the cloud deck as opposed to flying above them; as I would be spending a significant amount of time in in IMC conditions in an aircraft I was relatively unfamiliar with; had not flown approaches with yet; and knowing I would not be able to climb to the 6;000 feet MEA.Upon descent; visibility was limited; but below 2;500 feet; there were no visible clouds; so I continued. I transited all airspace via the highway south and parallel to the 10 freeway. I did so in case of the unlikely event of unpredictable loss of VMC; I would have an obstacle free corridor to stay over.Upon reaching the EMT area; the ceilings continued to descend; the cloud layers began to all meet each other; and I found myself approximately 1;000 feet AGL. I carefully followed the highway to the 605; and then the 10. However; while passing south of EMT; the clouds descended rapidly and certainly to within 500 feet of the ground. Turning back toward VMC conditions would have put me in extremely limited visibility; over obstacle-laden terrain. Although I had all obstacles painted on my MFD; I did not want to rely on this at such a low altitude. I made the decision at that time that the safer option between; continuing to descend in limited visibility; or climbing in to IMC over my preplanned 'safety corridor;' was the latter. Unable to maintain VMC; I began a Vy climb to 2;500 feet as I was under the LAX Class B airspace 2;500 foot shelf. I carefully maintained my position centered over the highway by utilizing my moving map on my MFD; and looking down (still able to see the ground intermittently). These conditions lasted for less than 1 minute before I was clear of all weather and cruising in to SMO at approximately 1;500 feet AGL at 80 knots.The reason I decided to file this report was because although I maintained FAA minimums over terrain; and did not enter any airspace without permission; I did inadvertently enter IMC at low altitude without a clearance. This is something I stress is a potentially fatal scenario to my students; and is something to be avoided at all cost. I believe I found myself in this situation because of a combination of factors.FACTORS:1. I relied on forecasts to 'thread the needle.' Although the airports were accurately reported; I did not then fly directly over each of these airports; but instead flew the highway due to my lower altitude. Although I viewed this as a safer flight path due to my lack of altitude; it also put me in territory that was not being accurately reported or forecasted; and the weather in these areas; although on the edge of the airport areas; was in fact different than what I expected.2. Upon exiting the pass; I made the decision to enter MVFR conditions. Although what I could see was safe and flyable VMC; I could not see 50 miles ahead; and was relying on local METARs. Thesafer option; in retrospect; would have been to pick up an IFR flight plan; and potentially have to wait until I could be vectored to the SMO approach at a lower altitude. I did plan extra fuel to allow for this; and I should have preemptively made the decision to do this.3. As weather began to deteriorate; I flew the downward contour of the clouds; again; relying on METARs to be accurate; even though they were looking less and less so. I should have made the decision at that point; to contact SoCal; let them know it was unlikely I was going to be able to maintain VMC; and that I would most likely be unable to maintain the 6;000 MEA; but that I needed to pick up an IFR flight plan regardless. My hesitation was born out of knowledge that that would inconvenience the controllers and make them have to scramble and potentially vector inbound aircraft to LAX; which I did not want to cause. I should not have let this dictate my decision process and instead contacted them with my request.FIXES:Training could prevent others from making the same mistake. Primarily; I think stressing from the beginning of a pilot's career; that 'scud running;' is a highly dangerous scenario. This is not because you 'can't fly low;' it's because when doing so; the conditions are rarely level and commonly can slope down; forcing you in to IMC at dangerously low altitudes which is far more dangerous than low flight; or unintentional IMC penetration alone.Further; initial training stress on human factors could prevent this circumstance. By the time I arrived in the Los Angeles area; I had less than 30 hours in the aircraft; and had not yet flown any instrument approaches in it. Being an experienced CFII with large amounts of IMC time and number of approaches; specifically the SMO approach which I was likely to have to fly; practicing approaches in the aircraft while flying VFR across the country was not something I thought necessary. I largely had a 'piece of cake' attitude about it. However; when faced with the decision; IFR versus MVFR; although capable and current; I was fatigued; and I made the decision to scud run because of my subconscious recognition of my unfamiliarity with the avionics and aircraft systems in this new aircraft. Safety wise; this was simply the wrong call. I think there could be more human factors focus in initial training on 'future issues.' I think this could help prevent some of the accident spikes at 500/3;000 hours; etc. Although this is something that is already mentioned in training; complacency is something that I still have personally seen repeatedly as a notable factor in fatal accidents.
A pilot reported that while ferrying a single engine amphibian to SMO from the deserts; unexpectedly entered IMC near EMT at 1;000 feet; but continued until encountering VMC below Class B.