Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Air Traffic Control Developmental
Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification; Confusion; Communication Breakdown
ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance
Human Factors; Procedure
I was working D54 when I observed three aircraft; 'Aircraft Y' at FL360 heading SW and one aircraft 'Aircraft X' heading NW at FL360. I told my R-side to be watchful of these aircraft. My R-side tells the R-55 radar controller to put Aircraft X on a 20R vector; R55 controller took a while because he was busy but then complied. I told my R-side once Aircraft X came over to ask if he can accept FL380 but my R-side did not comment back. He then told me his plan was to fit Aircraft X between Aircraft Y and another aircraft which was in front of Aircraft Y (also at FL360; can't remember the call sign). I told him again 'see if Aircraft X can take FL380' but no response was given nor was the question asked to the pilot.At this point he vectors Aircraft X to what I believe was a 315 heading watching the situation get closer. I thought to myself well lets go ahead and descend Aircraft X to FL340 so I PVD (Suppress/Request Data Block) the aircraft to Salt Lake Sector 46 and as I'm about to call for the point out the R-side reassures me he's going to make it work. He turns Aircraft Y to what I believe was 20 degrees left to vector behind Aircraft X; conflict alert starts to go off he acknowledges it. I told him 'that's really close' he again reassured me not to worry. At this point the two aircraft start flashing a second time and the R55 controller takes wind of the situation and tells the R-54 controller he should probably descend Aircraft Y. My R-side decides this is a good idea and issues an expedited descent clearance to FL340 for traffic to Aircraft Y; immediately after telling Aircraft Y to 'report leaving FL350.'At this point I tell the R-side controller that this is going to be a deal and to climb Aircraft X but he said once again 'don't worry we will have it.' I and the R-side controller both observe the two aircraft penetrate the 5 mile radius O-ring halo that was placed on Aircraft Y's primary. Aircraft Y soon after reports leaving FL350. R-side tells R55 he had the separation and he reported out of it and assures me we had it the whole time. Considering Aircraft Y reported leaving after I observed the loss of separation I deemed it to be a controller error and thus decided to file this report.After the situation Aircraft X was put back on course and the 4th line of Aircraft Y's data block was removed. The R-side thought he had issued Aircraft Y to proceed back on course but a few minutes later I observed his track was off from his route line and prompted the radar controller about it. He then asked Aircraft Y if he was still on a heading. Aircraft Y confirmed he indeed was; radar controller apologized and cleared the pilot to the next fix on his flight plan.The OAPM (Optimization of Airspace and Procedures) airspace we have established between the 54 and 55 positions continues to worry controllers on a daily basis; they literally talk about it every day for the duration of the day with nothing but complaints on how much it impacts safety and adds complexity to day to day basis to one of the busiest airspace's in the entire center. I've only been in the area for almost a year and I consider myself to be a junior personnel and just 'roll through the punches' so to speak but I'm becoming alarmed at the fact that months after the implementation there are so many seasoned controllers having issues with the airspace and the congestion the new boundaries are causing. Although this may not have had a direct impact on the safety event described in this submission; I strongly believe had the R-side controller had control of Aircraft X from the beginning he may have had more time to resolve the conflict. The majority of controllers in the area would agree this airspace design is without a doubt something that should be addressed on a continual basis.
ZLA Developmental Controller reported a loss of separation due to the Radar Controller not taking the advice of the Developmental.