MD-80 Series (DC-9-80) Undifferentiated or Other Model
Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Communication Breakdown; Distraction; Time Pressure; Training / Qualification; Workload
Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury
Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Declared Emergency; General Maintenance Action
Aircraft
Soon after selection of NAV at 400 AGL; (approximate altitude of 500-800 FT AGL) [I] experienced pronounced and very loud metallic bang/boom/shudder with multiple cockpit cautions. Hand flown on southerly heading; [I] communicated [my] emergency aircraft status with engine failure to ATC. Right engine parameters at zero/near zero; no fire light illuminated. AC crosstie lockout with apparent loss of right side electrical bus; First Officer flight displays dark/blank/un-powered. Apparent loss of flight guidance panel functions: Autothrottle/Autopilot/Altitude Set not functional. Aircraft configured clean; shallow left climbing turn to north downwind commenced. Immediate action items for Engine Fire/Damage/Separation initiated. Souls on board and fuel onboard communicated to ATC during vectors. Unable to converse with Flight Attendants after chiming; related to electrical difficulties. [I] communicated emergency landing item specifics verbally through cockpit door to number one Flight Attendant. APU started. Checklists continued. Performed cabin PA to passengers describing emergency return in ten minutes; with reassurance. Flight Attendants informed of anticipated quick recovery to the airport with no planned evacuation. Some; or all; right side electrical bus apparently restored via APU power. On downwind; discussion over whether fire bottle should be discharged with no fire light. Handle/bottle left as is; without discharging agent. [I] realized after landing that it was per the checklist to fire bottle; even though fire light not illuminated. [I was] reluctant to fire bottle; based on past aircraft procedure/experience and not double-checking QRH due to time remaining. My error in hindsight; short VMC turn to base leg offered and accepted. Emergency checklist; Single Engine checklist and mechanical Landing Checklist work continued. [I] turned final configuring for 28 degree Single Engine visual approach to the runway with ILS backup tuned. Normal touchdown slightly overweight at approximately 131;000 LBS. Exited runway and parked aircraft on high speed taxiway. Communicated via PA for passengers to remain seated and calm; as Crash Fire Rescue (CFR) vehicles approached. Inspected by CFR and given all clear over VHF radio with respect to fire and/or potential remaining aircraft hot spots. [I] resumed taxi to open gate. Approximate airborne time estimated at 12 minutes. OUT/IN time of approximately 30 minutes. Important matters - my take away: a. Difficult to overestimate the dramatic and startling nature of the apparent hard engine seizure. b. Loss of bus with crosstie lockout problematic due to loss of flight guidance panel; and one pilot's displays. Should we practice? Is this common? c. Loss of displays and functions take you quickly out of our 'litany' and normal procedure flow suffers. d. Alternate means of communicating with our flight attendants beyond chime/interphone possibly needs to be practiced/discussed. e. Finally; the loss of an engine in the simulator; leads to one thing; single engine approach and landing; period. The sudden unexplained somewhat violent loss airborne of an engine; forces the crew to consider if collateral damage exists to structure/passengers/or to the other engine and to decide the safest course of action; balancing thoroughness with timeliness. First Officer [was] exceptional. Flight Attendants performance throughout [was] outstanding. My crew instrumental in the prompt secure recovery and safety of our passengers; I salute them.
I was the #2 Flight Attendant; sitting in the very aft of the aircraft. As we were taxiing out I remember thinking that the there was an unusual sound; almost a clicking. I didn't think of this again until I was talking with a pilot that was on the plane with us and he commented about it. There was a LOUD bang in the back and a tremendous jolt to the plane. I felt as though there was a jarring to my lower back. I called to the passenger in seat 31B to see if he could see anything out his window with the engine; aircraft left. He said no. About a minute later the Captain called; using four chimes. We were not able to hear anything that he said. I let him know; if he could hear us; that we were unable to hear him. This went on several times. We did eventually have him tell us that the right engine failed; we had ten minutes and that he didn't think we would evacuate. He told us to do the best we could. He then made a PA and let the passengers know what was happening. I had made a PA soon after the initial jolt to tell the passengers to tighten their seatbelts and to remain seated. The Captain said the same thing and he told the passengers to remain calm and seated. The #4 and I got our checklists and went to the front to the aircraft. We spoke to the #1 and it was decided that the #4 would brief the overwing exits on their procedures. We then went to our seats and the Captain attempted to call us again; phones not working in the back. I was aware that the Captain kept the plane level and under control. We probably landed within one or two minutes of belting in. The landing was smooth and uneventful from my point of view. The fire trucks were at the runway. The Captain told the passengers to remain seated; they were going to check the engine to make sure it was okay then we would taxi to the gate and deplane; and we did just that. We were met at the plane by flight service to see if all were okay. The #4 chose to be pulled from the sequence. During the deplaning process; as I was standing more I was noticing that my lower back was starting to ache and I too felt that I should probably return home. I ended up going to medical; was allowed to go home and was met by my manager; who wanted to make sure that I was fine. I had noticed in the past that the shoulder harnesses have been difficult to operate as they are not opening easily. One must struggle with their fingers to 'unroll' the strap. I was able to get out of my harness to check the cabin; but in returning to my seat for landing was the problem. I had to struggle to undo the harness so I could get back into the seat for landing. I had little time to do this and felt quite anxious about being as safe as possible for our landing. I did get into position and we landed safely and routinely from my viewpoint.
A Captain and Flight Attendant describe their  experience during an MD-80 catastrophic engine failure after takeoff with an emergency return.