B737-900
Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Flight Crew Last 90 Days 22; Flight Crew Total 5520; Flight Crew Type 2823
Workload; Training / Qualification; Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Time Pressure
Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Human Factors; Staffing; Weather
We were scheduled to fly ORD. There was a SIGMET for TRWs (Thunderstorm) in the Indianapolis area with tops to FL400 moving to the northeast. The Dispatcher who was on IOE (Initial Operating Experience) filed us through the area of weather. Prior to departure I called the Dispatcher to discuss the routing through the weather and the weather in the ZZZ area that was already building to the south and east. Our forecasted time of arrival into ZZZ was XA04; forecast at ETA was 080/5 P6SM Few 1500 Tempo Broken 1500. At XB Tempo 5M TRW. I questioned the timing of the TRWs in ZZZ as I believed [that] given the radar picture and direction of storm movement; ZZZ would be impacted earlier than XB. The Dispatcher said ZZZ would be fine.Regarding the weather in the Indy area; the Dispatcher said I could plan on deviating to the east. I questioned him on that as the weather was moving in that direction and stated it looked like less of a deviation to go on the west side by STL and we would most likely be able to cut back faster on course as the weather moved east; which we were able to do enroute. I asked him to file us on the back side; to the west of the weather.Enroute; about half way to ZZZ; I started ACARS messaging the Dispatcher about ZZZ and our alternate. Weather was continuing to build just south of ZZZ and ZZZ1. I told him I did not think the ZZZ1 plan was a viable alternate at this point due to the convective weather all around the area. He asked if ZZZ2 would work. As the weather was south of ZZZ; clearly ZZZ2 was not going to work. I sent a 'call me' to talk to him directly. We spoke about the diversion plan; I had to explain why; if the weather was coming up from the south; ZZZ2 was not going to work. Respectfully; this is not something I should have had to explain. He suggested we could go to ZZZ3 if ZZZ1 did not work. At that time if we could not get into ZZZ and ZZZ1; we would head directly to ZZZ3. I also told him to keep me updated on the weather moving into ZZZ and the area. As I will discuss later; we did not get a single update. I told the Dispatcher we did not have any hold fuel and would have to go right from ZZZ to ZZZ1 and then right to ZZZ3. The FO (First Officer) and I talked about the diversion plans; the fuel burns; etc. The weather was starting to now build on the east coast and around ZZZ3 area. The FO and I then discussed the possibility of not being able to get into any of the airports but we did have a clear shot to get back to ZZZ4 if absolutely needed. I did the mileage to ZZZ4 and calculated approximately 4000 lb. burn. ZZZ5 was not a viable option due to the convective weather there. The FO and I discussed our fuel situation; our bingo fuels at ZZZ and ZZZ1; and calculations [on] go around fuel and having to deviate around the weather that was building east of ZZZ1 and getting to ZZZ3.I asked the Dispatcher for a fuel burn to ZZZ4. The FO and I looked up the airport information and runway information on our iPad as we no longer had this information in our manuals and had to rely on Dispatch for this information. We wanted [to] make sure we had the runways and availability for a landing if needed as a back-up plan. We got the burn from Dispatch which showed about the same burn as I had calculated; but no other information from him about ZZZ4. Still not a single update from Dispatch about the weather just south of ZZZ; tops to FL500; weather at ZZZ1 or ZZZ3; SIGMETs; FPAs (Flight Path Angle); [and/or] ride reports - not one update.We had selected the updated TAFs for ZZZ; ZZZ1; ZZZ3; [and] ZZZ4. We had auto updates for ZZZ selected for the ATIS. We pulled the current ATIS for ZZZ1. We used the airport weather on our iPads along with WSI (Weather Services International) Radar; SIGMET; FPG (Flight Planning Guidance); RPM (Rapid Precision Mesoscale); and all available data.On arrival into ZZZ we could see the cell just off of the airport. We queried ATC about the cell. He said thecell was 1.5 miles to the south of the airport; tops to FL500. The FO and I briefed the go around again; as we could not do the published missed due to the storm locations. [We] briefed [what] we would give Tower [as] our plan for a missed approach - hard left turn for weather avoidance - and we briefed the windshear maneuver. [While] getting vectored for final; ATC reported [a] 80 kt. gain on final. We requested an immediate divert to ZZZ1. We had to do some deviating for weather. I sent an ACARS to Dispatch on the divert; and the 80 kt. gain. We reprogrammed the FMC; did an approach briefing for ZZZ1; [and performed the] descent checklist. I updated the FAs (Flight Attendants) and passengers. We received nothing from Dispatch. No weather in ZZZ1; no update on the weather; no preps - nothing. We were on our own.We explained to ATC our fuel situation. Not quite minimum fuel at that point but getting tight on fuel; and asked if they knew if ZZZ1 had storms impacting the area for landing. He said ZZZ1 had windshear warnings but they were not active at the moment. ATC did an outstanding job working with us. Please convey to ZZZ; ZZZ5; ZZZ1 controllers that we appreciate the handling of our situation as they were very busy with jets diverting and deviating around the weather. We had to do some minor deviating and saw cells in close proximity to the airport. I asked ATC if they could let us know right away if ZZZ1 got any windshear reports as we were now minimum fuel. The FO and I again briefed the windshear maneuver and if we had to go around we would go straight ZZZ4 and [request priority handling].At this point ZZZ3 had storms in the area. We had convective weather just to the east of the ZZZ1 airport which would require deviating and if we got to ZZZ3 we had no hold fuel or go around fuel with storms in the area. The safest course of action at that point was to head north out of the weather to a VFR airport. As we were being vectored to ZZZ1; ATC reported windshear. We immediately [requested priority handling and] headings to ZZZ4. I sent an ACARS to Dispatch; updated the FAs; and passengers and we reprogrammed the FMC. After heading north to ZZZ4; ATC said the storm had moved off of ZZZ1 and asked if we wanted to come back and try again. I told ATC the issue would be [that] if we returned with the storms still in the area and got windshear again; we had no options with our fuel situation. Both the FO and I had discussed this before our missed into ZZZ1 and our fuel situation and bingo fuel. We both agreed with heading to ZZZ4 if ZZZ1 got any windshear warnings given all the convective activity in the area.Heading north we still did not receive any information from Dispatch. I ACARS again and asked him to acknowledge our divert and told him we needed landing data for Runway XX. As we had no weather updates for him; we were guessing at the runway in use. We tried to get weather via radio [through] ATIS and were unable. We got ZZZ4 weather from ATC as we still had no information from Dispatch. A few minutes later we got our landing data and NOTAMs. I told him we needed landing data for Runway XY. We got that several minutes later; nothing else.We loaded the FMC; got the weather; [and] I had already looked up the landing data in the manual as we were getting close and had not yet received the information from Dispatch. We did our briefing [and] talked about our fuel situation and the need to make sure we mitigated any possibility of a go around. We made sure we had plenty of room behind Aircraft Y to give them time to get off the runway; but ATC was doing a great job of separation and knew we [requested priority handling]. We talked about when we would start our descent and planned when we would configure and our goal for being fully stabilized and configured due to the critical nature of our fuel. We did our descent checklist and looked over the diversion checklist as well. I updated the FAs and passengers. We followed Aircraft Y; also diverting to ZZZ4 due to weather in ZZZ1. We landed with the fuel gauges showing 3.1 on [our aircraft]. ATC had the emergency equipment standing by. We had not requested it and let them know we did not need them to follow us after landing. We taxied to [the FBO] as ATC directed. When we got there I called Dispatch. We told him our on-time and in-time. We then discussed fuel and getting back to ZZZ. We got the [Chief Pilot] involved in the divert at well. I told [him that] we needed to sit for a bit and [to] get our heads back into the game after our [priority handling] and then we would be able to go again. I wanted to make sure the FO was good as well as the FAs. [The Chief Pilot]; as a whole other host of issues occurred is one of the best assets [Company A] has. I cannot say enough about the amazing support [he] gave us. He was outstanding. After about 20 minutes and [a] talk with my crew; we were good and ready to go. I asked my FO about her stress levels and fatigue. I asked the FAs about any issues they might be having. We were all good. I made announcements to the passengers to update them on the weather at the airports and let them know we would be leaving as soon as we could get fuel and flight planned. I explained it was a bit of delay as Aircraft Y was getting fuel before us; but we [were] leaving as soon as possible. I talked to the Dispatcher about the route. He had us going south into the weather [and] tops on the arrival were up to 400. He said we could deviate west as there was no convective activity - no lightning strikes. I said I see tops to FL400 moving from ZZZ to the west so I am going to assume convective activity and asked if he thought going east; then around the backside into ZZZ would work. He said no; we should deviate west. I asked how far he thought we would have to go west as we would not be there for about an hour and I'm showing movement in that direction. He said possibly 100 miles. I questioned the routing again as I did not think this would be the best plan. He said it was. In the meantime we had some issues with the fueling at [the FBO]. The personnel there were good to work with. They parked both Aircraft Y and us on the south Ramp. I gave them the fuel load of 19.0. They then told me they needed a payment method. I had [him] on the phone with me and he started working on that issue. I then called Dispatch as the weather was building up more on our planned route. He said they were now coming in from the east side; as I had originally asked to be filed on. He refiled us on the new arrival. I continued to keep the FAs and passengers updated on the situation. We had some issues with the flight plan in that he had us filed on one arrival but the plan showing a different arrival. ATC had the incorrect routing as well. We [then] had all [the] issues resolved and were ready to go. We had been on the ground [for] approximately an hour.As we started the No. 2 engine before power transfer; the autothrottles tripped off. We checked to verify the temperatures and all [of the] data was correctly loaded in the FMCs; they were. We [then] reset the A/T (Autothrottles). We started the No. 1 engine and the A/T tripped off again. We tried cycling the F/Ds (Flight Directors); checked all data was still in the FMCs; but the A/T continued to trip off. We called Dispatch to patch us through to Maintenance. While waiting; we had [the Chief Pilot] on the phone trying to help us troubleshoot. Maintenance came on line and the issue was narrowed down to the probes. They were heating up too fast and tripping the A/T. Maintenance suggested we takeoff; get some airflow over the probes; then turn them on and the A/Ts. I told him I understood what he was trying to do; but we questioned what other systems could be involved with probes overheating and I could not do that as the after start checklist directed us to turn on the probes before taxi and I cannot break SOPs to fix a
Captain discussed with the Dispatcher on an alternative route west of a solid line of storms enroute; verse right through it; like previously planned; and convective weather at the destination airport and fuel load prior to departure. [The] Captain [had] ACARS Dispatch one hour into the flight after referencing WSI (Weather Services International) and noticing weather moving into ZZZ. [The] Captain requested a call with Dispatch via the CALLME prompt in ACARS after failing to get adequate plan regarding weather moving into ZZZ.[The] crew decided to continue to ZZZ with ZZZ1 as an alternate; provided Dispatch provides regular updates on the weather at both airports. [The] crew discussed other alternate options and reviewed fuel requirements to ZZZ3; ZZZ5 and ZZZ4. We were unable; after much research in the FOM/WOM/QRG; to find the airport table. Therefore; we were unable to determine if ZZZ3 and ZZZ4 were fueling/provisional/emergency airports. We; therefore; queried Dispatch. No response. [The] crew briefed [the] arrival and approach into ZZZ Runway XXR; including the need of [an] alternative go around plan due to a cell off the departure end of XXR. Large thunderstorms in the southwest and south quadrants eliminated the ability to proceed to [the VOR] as required in the published missed approach. We agreed to a sharp left turn to the east to avoid the massive cell. While being vectored on a right base for Runway XXR; Tower reported windshear with +/- 80 kts. We instantly proceeded to ZZZ1 and reported our divert to Dispatch as we prepared our arrival into ZZZ1; landing south. We advised ATC we were MIN FUEL and will need immediate advisories of any kind of windshear or convective activity at ZZZ1.We requested from Dispatch; the burn and weather to ZZZ4 and ZZZ3; to confirm our own calculations. Dispatch verified the burn to ZZZ4 was 4.0. We had 7.4 FOB in [our aircraft type]. We needed to make it into ZZZ1 or we would be at emergency fuel. No information [was provided] from Dispatch regarding the HUGE cell moving into ZZZ1 from the south. Same situation as in ZZZ; storms moved in prior to forecast and [there was] NO WARNING from Dispatch. We quickly referenced our radar and determined ZZZ3 was not a good option because of a cell over the airport eliminating any escape possibilities; as well as; the line of storms between us and ZZZ3. Still no word from Dispatch as to what class of airport ZZZ3 and ZZZ4 was or the runways available or the weather. Vital information was not provided as we requested. Then ZZZ1 Approach reported an Aircraft Y went around reporting windshear; as well as; a wind shear alert of +/- 20 knots from Tower. We had no other choice; but to proceed to ZZZ4. We then [requested priority handling]. We needed concrete... FAST. No ATIS was available for ZZZ4; so I asked Center for the weather and NOTAMs at ZZZ4 and pulled up the METAR from ACARS. Runway XY/XZ was closed; vital information. We got no information from our Dispatcher regarding weather or landing distance or NOTAMs. I initially planned on an approach to XA with a 10 kt. tailwind. Later; we learned that Runway XA ILS was OTS (Out of Service) and [restricted to] landing distance using max manual brakes only. This information was NOT TIMELY and costed us critical time. Aircraft Y ahead of us reported getting the field in sight below the ceiling at 3000 ft. MSL; so we changed our plan to Runway XB; visual with a very tight base; so as to conserve as much fuel as possible. Dispatch should have provided us with landing data for both runways without delay. Especially after seeing we had a 10 kt. tailwind and Runway XY/XZ was CLOSED. We were an airplane [that requested priority handling]; with ZERO support. Had we been advised of the weather moving into ZZZ1; we wouldn't have wasted precious time and gas trying to land there. We briefed every minute detail including when to start our descent and went to turn final as to conserve as much fuelas possible. Our Dispatcher's lack of support caused us to become an airplane [that requested priority handling]. Period. If we are not going to be given the flight following required by in compliance with FAR 121.593; 121.595; 121.533; 121.535; and FAR 121.601; then passengers should not be boarded. At that point; we were a Part 91 flight. Flight landed uneventfully; yet the situation continued to deteriorate from there while on the ground at ZZZ4. We had no ground support and incurred a 3 hour delay after landing due to a maintenance issue and barely got the engines started in time to avoid long tarmac delays. Again; no word from Dispatch. Once on the gate; we were told by [Maintenance Control] to take off with our pitot tubes off and [to] put them on in-flight; another violation of our MEL and [CFRs]. We didn't have a GSC (Ground Security Coordinator) to reboard the airplane and verify our manifest; requiring us to work with Corporate Security and [another Company's] Customer Service. [It took] 7 attempts to get a route that avoided weather and listed our autothrottles INOP on our flight plan. Complete nonsense.
B737 flight crew reported encountering a minimum fuel situation due to severe weather and lack of timely information from Dispatch.