Dash 8-100
Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Flight Crew Total 25000
Situational Awareness; Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Troubleshooting
Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL
General Maintenance Action; General Release Refused / Aircraft Not Accepted; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed
MEL; Company Policy; Aircraft; Human Factors
After landing in ZZZ and parked on the gate the First Officer and I noted that the flight controls appeared to be moving an abnormal amount backwards and forwards with the gust lock engaged. I then called Dispatch who put me through to Maintenance Control (MTC) to take the write up. MTC then questions the validity of the write up and then (unnecessarily) describes all the ill effects it will have on the operations and I would then likely have to ferry the aircraft to ZZZ1. A which point he asked me if I still wanted to write it up.  I told him; yes; I'm writing it up. He then took the write-up in a disgusted tone. I was then transferred to the dispatcher and it was acknowledged that the aircraft was on a maintenance hold. After a period of time three line mechanics arrived at the aircraft joking about what was probably a bogus write up. One mechanic inquired to me about what was wrong with the aircraft while the other mechanic commented 'pilot error.' I briefed them on the write-up and demonstrated to them the condition of the aircraft. I felt so discredited by the department [that] I went as far as starting to take steps to document the event by taking a video of the right elevator moving up and down while the left elevator remained stationary. The mechanics then acknowledged the obvious mechanical problem and left to gather more information. At that point; I made numerous calls to try and contact my direct supervisor to express my concerns about the unsafe practice of MTC improperly questioning a pilot's concerns. Unfortunately; no one was contactable. The mechanics later returned to tell me that this mechanical problem does not affect safety of flight and it would be MEL. The mechanic then told me that they were putting it under MEL 25-6 which covers Non-Essential Furnishing (NEF). To which he said in his opinion was a totally inappropriate application of the NEF program and he described as 'Bogus.' A mechanic then wrote in the Action Taken side: MEL 25-6; Provisional NEF 25-00-04N within 70 hours. Upon that deferral action; the mechanics left. I told the Flight Attendant (FA) not to board the aircraft till I could follow this up. I then called Dispatch back and asked to be transferred to MTC. I then expressed my concerns about what I believed was a total misapplication of the MEL and could find nothing remotely close to inoperative gust lock in the appendix. He informed me that it was within their authority to apply this condition to a provisional NEF because it did not affect airworthiness of flight. He even went so far as to tell me that they were going to reroute the aircraft back to ZZZ2 for repairs after I did a ZZZ1 round trip. At some point; it was obvious to me that this conversation was futile. So; I excused myself to be transferred back to Dispatch to make corrections to the dispatch release (Although I knew a NEF item need not be noted). I then told Dispatch that I was making a note of this improper MEL on the release. I then proceeded to try and call for a Pilot Supervisor to discuss this issue. Once again; I was unable to get into direct voice contact. I then called Dispatch back and told them that I was putting the flight on indefinite hold till I could discuss this issue with a direct supervisor. Shortly; thereafter I got a call from the Chief Pilot. I told him of the problem and my concerns and that I would be following this incident up with a full report. He then told me he was not told of the severity of the problem and would get back to me.I then waited for a long period of time before he called back. Upon calling me back and said that he had conferred with a lot of 'upper level people' and reviewed the system with Maintenance Controller Y and that the system did not affect the use of the flight controls in the air. And that he had also conveyed my concerns about the differential control circuit pressures placed on the elevator control interlocking system on the ground with one locked elevator and one free floating elevator in gusty windy conditions. He assured me that this was not a concern because it was explained to him that there are 'rubber bumpers' that would protect the controls from being damaged. I told him that I was not in a knowledgeable position to be able to disagree with his/their assertions and I did not disagree that an aircraft has to have a gust lock to be airworthy. I added that in my opinion if they wanted to continue to fly the aircraft and have the authority to do so; it would be better that they totally inoperative the system all together. He understood what I was talking about and suggested that in the current stormy gusty conditions we apply forward pressure on the yoke to protect the controls. I then told him; that this is why the misuse of provisions such as the NEF was wrong in so many ways. Where we might agree that aircraft are flyable given certain steps are taken to compensate for the problem; there is never any provisions or steps outlined as guidance for the next crew that might be taking the plane out. He then agreed and related this instance [from the past] where I was assigned to ferry a broken airplane back to ZZZ3 with no flaps. At which point; back then; I complained that MTC was issuing releases to fly broken airplanes with absolutely no guidance to potential problems and special crew concerns to operate such equipment. He [Chief Pilot] agreed. To his credit he continually stressed the point that I did not have to do anything I did not feel comfortable with. At which point; I replied; this whole industry is built on trust starting at the engineers all the way down to the flight crew. I have little choice but to trust others. The ZZZ2 round trip was canceled and I was swapped into another aircraft. As far as I know; the aircraft flew revenue to ZZZ1 under the 'bogus' MEL. This event occurred because of company performance pressures. Look at the big white elephant in the room! Read what the parent Air Carrier representatives said at the last town hall [company /employee] meeting. This is at the highest levels of management applying downward pressure to 'contract airlines' to bid as cheap as possible; to have a chance; of having a future. As long as this arm length approach to vindicate and protect the top central core management of the parent corporation; company's like our regional airline are going to eventually suffer more crashes. The FAA has to centralize oversight of all carriers and hold the parent brand carrier responsible for passengers carried under its brand and control. This problem is bigger than you and me.
Reporter stated the gust lock handle was engaged; but the right elevator continued to move up and down more than the left elevator. One lock had engaged on the Captain's side but not on the First Officer's side. The elevators on the DHC-8-100/200/300 aircraft have independent control cables that can operate as a single elevator if binding on one side occurs. The same aircraft was later flown by another crew on a revenue flight before any maintenance was performed. The right elevator spring lock was found to be malfunctioning; sticking and not extending to reduce elevator movement.
Captain reports the right elevator was moving an abnormal amount with the gust lock engaged on a DHC-8-100 aircraft. Maintenance Control placed the malfunctioning gust lock under a Non-Essential Function (NEF) MEL 26-6 deferral stating the mechanical problem was not a safety of flight issue. Pilot refuses aircraft. Maintenance later finds elevator gust lock spring lock plunger binding; sticking.