A319
Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Flight Crew Total 7521; Flight Crew Type 1145
Confusion
Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor
Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Human Factors
After landing and clearing runway we were instructed by ground to taxi via 'C' to hold short of taxiway 'R' while waiting for the alley around the gate to clear of traffic. Once holding short; with the parking brake set; I proceeded to start the APU. At the same time the Captain instructed me to shutdown engine number 2 when we had the appropriate cool down time (3 minutes). After the appropriate cool down time; I proceeded to shut down what I thought was engine number 2 but was in fact engine number 1. Since the number 2 generator was already OFF the first indication of my error was the loss of power. The APU generator kicked on shortly after. While this was happening the alley near our gate had cleared and ground cleared us to continue to the gate. We advised ground that we were working a problem and that we needed a few minutes. After a quick systems discussion; we both decided that the best course of action was to restart engine number 1 before continuing to the gate to establish a normal configuration for taxi in. We both confirmed that the engine was shut down by verifying the N2 was at zero. The N1 also indicated the amber 'XX' with amber band. I noted the EGT was about 250 and decreasing when I attempted the start. We then received an ECAM because I forgot to configure the APU BLEED appropriately so I shut off the number 1 engine master and turned the APU BLEED ON. I then re-attempted the start. The engine motored longer than usual as expected due to the higher EGT. Just after 1 minute of motoring; ground control advised us of excessive smoke coming out of the number 1 engine. We shutoff the engine master at approximately 1m 19s after initiating the start (start valve opening). At the same time the Captain asked the controller to send out the fire trucks as a precaution; however; there was never an ECAM; or fire warning. Since there was no fire warning we decided to hold off any further checklists until the approaching crash/fire/rescue (CFR) vehicles could give the number 1 engine a visual inspection. CFR still noted smoke but no fire. CFR offered to spray water only into the inlet to see if smoke would dissipate. We both agreed and the Captain instructed CFR to proceed with the water shot. The water did dissipate the smoke. We both decided that shutting down engine 2 and being towed the rest of the way to the gate was the safest course of action at that point. We coordinated with ops and accomplished the tow-in checklist. The tow in was uneventful. Once towed in to the gate we accomplished the parking checklist.
[Report narrative contained no additional information.]
A319 flight crew reported shutting down the wrong engine on the taxiway. During the attempted engine restart; smoke was reported from the tailpipe.