Medium Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Confusion; Distraction; Workload; Communication Breakdown
Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue
Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Procedure; Weather; Company Policy
Issued release at IAD was 1 1/4 mi FZ RA and few at 500. Forecast to be VFR at time of arrival (improving trend). No alternate assigned. Dispatch approved extra FOB due to possible delays in IAD area. We received IAD ATIS information that IAD was 1 mile and 500 OVC. Immediately checked surrounding fields for current weather. ORF was 80 miles away and VFR. I began preparations to divert. We had 3;400 LBS on board. ZDC had just [issued us] our descent into IAD. I tried to ACARS Dispatch and received an ACARS no com MSG (first time this flight). I then tried to reach Dispatch via SELCAL and was unable to make contact with NY. (Too low I assume) I then contacted Operations in IAD for a phone patch to Dispatch. Finally able to get phone relay and advised we needed numbers for divert to ORF. After a seemingly very long time; Dispatch came back (relayed) that we needed 613 LBS for divert to ORF from IAD. He did not say we were cleared to divert due to many communication issues and the extremely high workload at this point; I opted to continue flight to IAD as planned; thinking there was an excellent chance we would get in; they had multiple runways; etc. I figured worst case; we could divert to DCA or ORF if unable to land and still land with 1;000 LBS. Landing uneventful in IAD and landed with 2;700 LBS. As PIC; I should have taken particular notice of the poor conditions in IAD at the time of release and ACARS'ed Dispatch earlier in the flight to confirm weather was improving. This has been my practice in the past and I should have done it. By the same token and perhaps to a greater degree; Dispatch should have been monitoring weather in IAD. Dispatch had six (six!) flights inbound to IAD at the same time. I was told by Dispatcher that none of these flights diverted. I asked how many had an alternate and he was evasive. (I am betting on none) This is very troubling. The Dispatcher said no one else; but me contacted him about the weather. Do we really have captains flying our aircraft that are landing in hard IMC with no alternate? How could the Dispatcher have so many aircraft inbound to IAD and NOT check the weather? Who was supervising the Dispatcher? For my part; I wanted to divert to ORF as soon as we got the current weather. It was 80 miles away and we would have landed with 3;000 LBS. I did not do that because I was concerned that I was unable to notify company and feared Dispatch would receive notice of 'loss of operational control' By the time I finally had contact (although very poor) with Dispatch via phone relay; it made more sense in my mind to continue the arrival (at this point we were nearly abeam the airport). Should I have just diverted anyway and told center to advise our company? Or should I have declared an emergency first? I would like your input.  I would also like to know what will be done to make sure this type of error (on both sides) doesn't happen again.
An Air Carrier pilot was dispatched to IAD without an alternate or fuel; as were other company flights; when the actual arrival weather was 500 FT overcast 1 mile. The flight landed safely but during descend the Captain had a very high workload contacting Dispatch and making contingency plans.