Regional Jet 200 ER/LR (CRJ200)
Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument
Communication Breakdown; Training / Qualification
Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
General None Reported / Taken
Human Factors; Procedure
Note: this event does not have to do with MEL mis-compliance. That was simply the most topic to sort this issue under. This event relates to a flap Airworthiness Directive for the CRJ-200 that is applied to the aircraft after a FLAP FAIL caution message is documented.We got to the plane in the morning (first flight of the day) and were handed a Flap Airworthiness Directive Compliance form. As we researched the underlying event; we discovered the crew who had brought the plane in the night before it had received a FLAPS FAIL caution message on taxi in to the gate after landing and had written the aircraft up. Maintenance had addressed the issue; and as a result there was an AD that allowed for 10 cycles to be flown on the aircraft. The AD is 2009-06-12. There was no information on this form guiding us on the procedure; it simply stated that compliance had been met and there was a maintenance signature stating such.On the release; the wording on the MEL/NEF (Non-Essential for Flight) section; as well as in the Remarks section; made it sound as if the flight crew was responsible for completing particular checks every flight. It was unclear to me what these were; and I had no guidance on what to do; so I made several calls. The calls were as follows: Maintenance Control; Dispatch; [local] Maintenance; [the maintenance director]; Maintenance Control; in that order. The purpose of these calls was to get an idea what was required of me to do my part in complying with the AD; and I am listing them to show how thoroughly I went through my available resources in complying with this AD. Dispatch and the [Maintenance Director] both told me they were unsure of what I had to do. Maintenance control said there was a circuit breaker reset procedure; but it had been complied with and that the flight was ready to be operated as a normal flight would.I felt unsure of this guidance; so I looked up the AD on the FAA website and read through it. I found that four parts must be complied with. The first was a one-time preflight check of the flaps run concurrently with the circuit breaker reset procedure; calling for flaps to be fully extended and then retracted five times. The second was a check of the thrust reversers; ground spoilers; and brake systems. Finally; performance at both the destination and alternate (if listed) must allow for a flaps 0 landing at planned landing weight with anticipated runway conditions. These were all complied with; so we operated the flight to [our destination.]I am writing this [report] because I believe the process was not smooth; and it took a lot of digging in order to comply with the AD. Something as serious as an AD should be much clearer; communication to flight crew should be much stronger; information on the release should be much more specific on where to look for compliance steps; and maintenance control should be ready to brief the procedure much more thoroughly. I felt that I had complied with this AD; and had done my part as a flight crewmember. Upon being released from duty and getting home; I logged online and saw an email from the Captain who had brought the plane in the night before. She said that while she had written it up; she had not been part of any reset procedure and was notifying me as a heads-up that I would be asked to do it in the morning. I was never asked to do any procedure; the one I did; I had to research myself and figure out. But where the issue lies is here: in the AD; it specifically says that the circuit breaker reset procedure must be completed by 'flight crew'. I was lead to believe by maintenance control that this procedure had been done already; so I assumed it had been completed by the flight crew the night before; with the help of maintenance. I believe the flaps were indeed cycled five times without issue; but to me the wording of the AD is black and white and it requires flight crew to be present. The cause of this issue is poor company communication.The issue with this AD is that flight crews have never been trained on how to comply with this AD. That is understandable; as each AD is complex and unique; but in such cases we should utilize strong and clear communication in order to ensure compliance is met and safety is guaranteed. As a pilot; it is easy to comply with an MEL because we are trained on how to do so and we are familiar with the process. This is not true about ADs. Since we are not familiar; we need better communication to guarantee AD compliance. Instead of handing a Flap AD Compliance Form to the flight crew; hand this plus a company approved checklist/synopsis of flight crew responsibilities for this AD. For example; imagine complying with an MEL. Operation requirements are always very simple and easy to understand. If this procedure is to remain an AD; it would be much safer if the company could create a way for flight crew to comply with it that has more in common with how one would comply with an MEL. We have been trained on how to read; comply; and satisfy MEL requirements; but we have not been trained on company procedures for doing the same thing with an AD. Today was the first I had seen of this AD; let alone an operationally demanding AD at all (in regards to flight crew action); and I did not feel prepared or supported in a manner that would guarantee compliance and safety.
CRJ-200 Captain reported failure to comply with an AD; in part because of poor communication on the issue from the company.