B757-200
Flight Crew Last 90 Days 50; Flight Crew Total 3500
Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification; Human-Machine Interface
Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Maintenance Action
Aircraft; Procedure
After the Captain completed his logbook review; he informed me of a previous discrepancy that had occurred on the aircraft. On the previous flight; the First Officer's airspeed indicator had not worked and the crew had to air abort after takeoff. The discrepancy had been cleared. It was determined that I would perform the pilot flying duties for this leg. The Captain included this previous discrepancy in his brief. He went over the fact that he would be watching my airspeed indicator during the initial takeoff roll and checking for airspeed before the 80 KTS call. We also did a more thorough review of appropriate reject actions if the indicator did not work since there would be a transfer of control. Events were normal up to the takeoff roll. The Captain gave me control of the aircraft on the runway and we followed normal procedures. I asked him to set takeoff thrust. The Captain announced thrust set. After this announcement I glanced down at my airspeed indicator and saw that it was not moving. I did not verbalize anything at this point. Almost immediately the Captain announced rejecting and took control of the aircraft. I looked at my airspeed indicator (it was frozen at 60); watched the Captain get the throttles and reverse thrust levers up and looked at the Captain's airspeed indicator which was around 75 KTS. I then informed Tower that we were rejecting; told them the runway; and informed them that we required no assistance. Tower cleared us to exit the runway and gave us taxi instructions. Once clear of the runway; the Captain and I agreed on what to do next. I switched to Ground and verified out taxi instructions. I then contacted Operations to inform them we were coming back and told them to remain clear of the brakes as the Captain had asked me to do. Maintenance was also on the frequency and asked several questions which I answered. I then got the QRH out and reviewed the RTO brake chart which showed that no cooling was required. I performed my after landing flows and then sent ACARS messages to the company. We taxied back in and performed normal shutdown and secure flows. We sent more ACARS to the company from the blocks. I feel the Captain's thorough logbook review and extra briefing about the airspeed indicator allowed us to keep a bad aircraft on the ground safely. I am glad that the Captain did more than was required during his logbook review. Checking the airspeed sooner that 80 KTS allowed us to make a great decision. I recommend that we consider changing our procedures to include an airspeed alive call on the runway. I do not feel this would be detrimental but would actually enhance safety. The pilot not flying could say airspeed alive when the pilot flying and pilot not flying indicators begin indicating. This would allow for a sound low speed decision point for malfunctions such as this. In the case of a no airspeed indication discovered in a very low speed regime it would be prudent to stop the takeoff. The 80 KTS call would still allow the crew to verify that the indicators are working correctly.
Upon arrival at aircraft; I reviewed the logbook per Aircraft Operating Manual and Flight Operating Manual procedures. I also reviewed past flights; not in accordance with company procedures; but I like to know what has been going on with the aircraft in the past. I found that the aircraft had performed an 'Air Turn Back' on its last flight due to a First Officer airspeed malfunction (no airspeed indication on First Officer side). Due to the previous history of the aircraft; I included the airspeed indicator malfunction in my RTO briefing for my First Officer. If I had followed Company procedures to the letter and not reviewed the previous logbook pages; we would have been forced to take the airplane airborne with a lot of associated malfunctions and warnings; as well as a load of abnormal checklists to perform; as we would not have had any prior knowledge of Airspeed Indicator problems and would have made normal calls: Pilot not flying- '80 KTS' pilot flying- 'Check' (Or in our case 'No Airspeed'). It is detrimental to safety to discourage pilots from learning as much as possible about the state and previous state of an airplane.
A B757 Captain rejected the takeoff because the First Officer's airspeed indicator was malfunctioning. The previous flight had the same malfunction which the Captain briefed the First Officer about prior to the flight.