Commercial Fixed Wing
Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
General Maintenance Action
Human Factors; Procedure
The Lead working [the] departure was tasked with loading a 'Quick Pack Delivery' of human blood. The package originally was not identified as HAZMAT until flight closeout at departure time. The flight was closed out and that is when the HAZMAT was identified. The package and load was adjusted as needed to make it right.The Lead was tasked with another flight for arrival at the same time. She received and parked [the] flight. The Lead then called over the radio to the Board Lead to correct and close out the flight for her. It was assumed closed out; but not completed properly. The assigned Lead then proceeded to the office to close out the flight manually on a computer terminal. This time as identified in the report; it was correct.Employee is [Load Plan] qualified to close out the flight and very experienced; however; she is not in the system to close out on the handheld scanner planeside. She must go into the office and close out on the computer all flights. The Trainer must enroll her into the system; and is on vacation.
Load Control Agent reported Ramp Lead corrected misidentified HAZMAT shipment.