B737 Next Generation Undifferentiated
Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Workload; Time Pressure; Situational Awareness; Human-Machine Interface; Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Distraction
Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue
Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; General Declared Emergency
Procedure; Human Factors; Company Policy; Environment - Non Weather Related; Aircraft
When the First Officer called for flaps 10 from flaps 5 we noticed a momentary split in flap indicator. Upon calling for gear down flaps 15 the flap indicator did not move from flaps 10. We called for a go around; declared an emergency and asked for a heading towards a nearby airport with longer runways. We then ran the 'TRAILING EDGE FLAP DISAGREE' Checklist and; upon completion; landed on the longest runway at the nearby airport.Fuel on board [FOB] was approximately 4;900 LBS at the initiation of the go around.  FOB at touch down was approximately 3.0 and 2.7 at the gate. Both fuel quantity indicators were amber shortly after completion of the checklist. In hindsight we should have declared a fuel emergency and we forgot (did not have time) to contact Dispatch about the diversion. I also momentarily misinterpreted the fuel in minutes when I relayed it to ATC. The First Officer actually relayed more accurate information. The checklist seemed convoluted and took too long to run properly in a low fuel situation. For only three items to be actually done; flap inhibit switch; alternate flap switch; and extend flaps with electrical switch it should take about 45 seconds. I did miss a step in that I did not put the flap handle to 15. We burned up a considerable amount of fuel just determining which of the checklist items to run. We did not have enough fuel on board at touch down to do a go around and landing. I realized after I left the airport that I had neglected to contact Dispatch.Our fuel consideration was immediate and overshadowed the entire event. It made it hard to concentrate on the task at hand and split our attention. We also should not have allowed ourselves to be vectored so far from our divert airport. ATC was very concerned about fuel and souls on board and continually made calls to us; which was very distracting. I asked them to stop calling us while we ran the checklist. I should have informed them more accurately and sooner about our fuel situation.
After having requested flaps '10' I noticed a split between the left and right flaps of approximately 3 degrees. While beginning to look into the split flap indication the gauge suddenly corrected itself to a normal flap indication. Assuming the problem to have been just a temporary flap gauge indication problem we continued to configure for landing. Upon requesting gear down and flaps to 15 degrees ... we did not get any additional flaps with the request.I know in these hard economic times it's hard for the 'company' to justify carrying fuel above and beyond the minimum reserves. Our Emergency/diversion was as text book as it could have been for a divert of this magnitude yet we landed with 2;700 LBS of fuel which is too close to 'ZERO'!  I know we can't plan for every scenario but the minimum reserves for this aircraft have to be increased!
A B737-NG's diversion from the short runways at their planned destination to the longer ones at a nearby airport due to a failure of the flaps to extend was complicated by the minimum legal fuel reserves boarded for the flight.