Widebody Transport
Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Flight Crew Last 90 Days 85; Flight Crew Total 8500; Flight Crew Type 6400
Communication Breakdown; Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness
Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance
Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Procedure; Human Factors
I was pilot flying [and we were] cleared direct to ENL. The FMS was correctly modified and the First Officer created abeam waypoints for fuel tracking. With Kansas City Center; I put into legs page what a direct to CHERI would do for our timing and heading; but did not execute it. The request was made and while waiting for ATC response; the First Officer mistakenly thought we were cleared to CHERI because that's what the legs page reflected. However; it was not our active waypoint.He then created an abeam point off of ENL (for fuel) and executed; thus making CHERI our active waypoint. The sun was in our eyes and it was difficult to see the 'execute' light on the CDU and I was not aware of him creating a new active waypoint (ENL03) which would have put us a few miles north of ENL. I looked at the HSI and thought I saw the magenta line to ENL; but it was really ENL03. I missed the 03 after ENL (abeam waypoint).We were subsequently asked what point we were navigating to and realized the mistake. We corrected back to ENL and moments later were cleared direct to CHERI. The remainder of flight was uneventful. This was simply a communications breakdown by both pilots. I assumed he realized; and should have verbally informed him; that we were not yet cleared to CHERI and what he saw in the CDU legs page was not an active waypoint and it was not executed. It was for informational/situational awareness purposes only.On this occasion; the First Officer forgot to get me to acknowledge this route modification (like he did earlier in the flight) before executing. We discussed at length strict adherence to SOP; the importance of never executing an FMC change without a verbal confirmation from the other pilot; and good cockpit communications. We no doubt learned a valuable lesson from this honest mistake.
[Report narrative contained no additional information.]
B767 flight crew mismanaged the FMS in the process of navigating their clearance.