B737-700
Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Flight Crew Last 90 Days 150; Flight Crew Type 7500
Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Time Pressure; Training / Qualification
Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown
Equipment / Tooling; Company Policy; Human Factors; Staffing
The situation evolved from the disorganization commonly seen when employees are rushed and trying to do too much with too little; and ended where a ramp worker could have been either seriously hurt or possibly killed by ingestion into a running engine. Prior to pushback our Agent was preparing our flight for departure. The First Officer was monitoring Company frequency when he heard an inbound Company aircraft attempting to contact Operations to determine the status of their gate; which was the gate we were to exit; before taxiing into the alley. Our agent was also responsible for the Company radio so we offered to relay the status to them. Ramp Control cleared us to push back deep into the alley to allow the Company aircraft onto the gate. We relayed to the Company aircraft that we would be pushing back from the gate to allow them access and they were subsequently cleared into the alley. I established communications with our pushback driver over the headset and told him that we were cleared to push deep into the alley so that Company could access the gate. The communication was strained due to a language barrier and noise because the tug driver left his MIC in the hot MIC position throughout the pushback. We started the right engine during pushback and elected to hold off on starting the left engine as we were anticipating some delay before we could taxi. As we were at the top of the gate on the ramp taxiway; the tug driver turned us sharply to align us with the taxiway. He then told us to set our brakes and began the process to disconnect us from the tug. I mentioned that we were cleared to push deep into the alley to allow Company access but the tug driver seemed confused. The Wing Walker; who was on the right side of the aircraft; approached the tug. I heard them; over the still hot MIC; discussing that I wanted to push deep and that we would need to continue the pushback. There was some apparent confusion between the ramp agents and discussion about whether to leave us there or continue the pushback. I relayed that we needed to continue as a Company aircraft was on the way in to the alley and we would not be able to taxi out of the ramp until they were in the gate. There was some difficulty moving the aircraft further as the tug was apparently jackknifed. I suggested to the tug driver that he should disconnect the tow bar; reposition the tug; and continue the pushback as the Company aircraft had now taxied into the alley blocking our egress as we blocked their access. Another ramp agent ran over to help out as they disconnected the aircraft and headset and realigned the tug and tow bar to continue our pushback. I then noticed a ramp agent signaling me that the headset was broken and to release brakes. I released the brakes and we slowly continued the pushback away from our gate into the alley. As we begun to pushback again; the First Officer heard the inbound Company aircraft alert us over the Company frequency that a baggage cart was rolling toward the aircraft. We looked to the Captain's side of the aircraft; the side opposite of the single wing walker; and noticed a provisioning air stair had begun to roll from the ramp area toward the left side of the aircraft. As we slowly pushed back; the air stair gained momentum and continued its trajectory towards the left engine. The First Officer attempted to get the attention of the Wing Walker by opening his window and waving/yelling that we were about to be hit by the air stair. I could no longer see the tug driver or the ramp agent who was acting as the signaling agent. When the wing walker noticed the First Officer hanging out of his window; he ran to the nose of the aircraft where the First Officer told him about the impending collision. The wing walker ran under the nose of the aircraft and was fortunately able to stop the air stair a few feet from hitting the left engine or fuselage. The wing walker's efforts were fairly heroic as the air stair had gained quitea bit of momentum and we had resigned that the impact was imminent. Fortunately; while no aircraft damage or injury occurred in this instance; I feel that; had the left engine been running; it is likely that the Wing Walker would have been ingested had he not noticed in time to stop. There are many aspects to this incident that commonly occur in our daily operations. We have grown accustomed to dealing with shortfalls in Ramp staffing and training; communication difficulties; procedural complacency; etc.; and it had unfortunately defined a new normal baseline for our ground operations. Pilots often believe that we can compensate for these shortfalls with heightened awareness but; as evidenced above; compounding the deviations from the ideal can quickly become insurmountable with potentially serious consequences.1. Ramp equipment should be routinely chocked.2. Wing walkers should be required on both sides of the aircraft.3. Ramp pushback training should emphasize the importance of proper communication procedures and ramp agents should not be authorized to push back aircraft if they are not able to clearly communicate with flight deck crew.4. Ramp agents should be trained that an aircraft must be pushed back per ATC/Ramp Control instructions; it is far too common that the aircraft is pushed at the tug driver's discretion and contrary to the flight crew's instructions considering clearances; even when communicated to the tug driver. 5. The importance of the ability to maintain constant communications between the aircraft and the pushback crew should be emphasized.
B737 Captain describes problems encountered during push back; including a rolling provisioning stair that is headed toward the aircraft undetected by the ground crew.