Airbus Industrie Undifferentiated or Other Model
Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument
Flight Crew Last 90 Days 189; Flight Crew Total 18938; Flight Crew Type 10755
Communication Breakdown; Other / Unknown
Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown
Airport; Weather; Procedure; Human Factors
We were operating to ZZZ. As we were taxiing out; a storm system started to roll through the ZZZ airport area and the controllers switched departures to Runway XXL. We arrived at the departure end of XXL with no traffic ahead of us and we were almost immediately cleared for departure. I heard the controller call the winds [50-degrees off runway heading] 38 gust 45. I initially did not catch the wind direction but the velocity definitely caught my attention. Rather than line up and wait as directed by the controller; I elected to hold short of the runway of the runway so we could evaluate the wind conditions. As we were holding; Aircraft Y behind us told the tower they were unable to accept departure due to the winds. We were then able to tell the tower we would not accept the winds as they exceeded the crosswind limit of [our aircraft] of 38 knots. As we were waiting for the gust front to pass; I went searching through our manuals for a crosswind chart and was amazed I could not find one; so I quickly connected to the internet and download one from the FAA's handbook. As I was doing this the tower controller asked if anyone in the line of waiting aircraft could accept departure; no one accepted except Aircraft Z. They told the controller they could accept the takeoff. The controller taxied them out of the now sizable line of aircraft and had them enter the runway and back taxi into position. We sat and listened as the controller cleared them for takeoff stating the average airfield winds were [now 70-degrees off runway heading] 37 gust 45. By now I had the crosswind chart in front of me and this is a 40 knot direct crosswind on runway XXL. We watched Aircraft Z; a 737 takeoff and immediately upon rotation roll into a pronounced crab into the wind. I later spoke to a B737 Captain friend of mine and he informed me the crosswind limit for that model of 737 is 30 knots. We continued to wait for about another 10 minutes at which time the gust front had moved through and the winds became more of a headwind and at a much decreased rate; and we felt it was safe to accept the departure. Since this was my First Officer's departure; I made sure my FO (First Officer) was comfortable with our decision to accept the takeoff and they assured me they were. My FO was also very happy with our decision not to accept the takeoff when the winds were gusting to 45 knots. When we finally accepted the takeoff clearance the runway winds were for XXL were [50-degrees off runway heading] at 24 knots. This delay only took us about 16 minutes to wait for a safer condition. The takeoff and departure were bumpy but not uncomfortable. When listening to the recording; you can hear the conversations from the tower controller for the XXR approaches. Only one aircraft during this time aborted the approach after experiencing a 20 knot windshear on the approach. I have six recommendations. First; a crosswind chart should be part of the manuals. Second; the tower controller adds confusion by stating; 'the average airfield winds or airfield winds are...' He should only report the winds for the runway he is working; or if reporting winds from another runway state the runway number. Telling me the average airfield winds leaves me no choice but assume the worse condition. Third; after listening to the transmission from both the XXL and R tower controllers; it is obvious pilots were not evaluating the wind conditions for landing. We need to emphasis the crosswind limits apply at all times during takeoff and landing. Fourth; listening to the transmissions; it is obvious the controllers are not going to stop the operation for safety. It is up to the pilots to make the call and tell the controllers they are not going to accept the clearance for the conditions. I commend the crew of Aircraft Y for speaking-up and stating they would not accept the takeoff clearance; and I am deeply disappointed in the crew of Aircraft Z for accepting the takeoff clearance after everyone else said they would not. I was fully expecting to see their takeoff roll not end well. My fifth recommendation; the crew of Aircraft Z should be discreetly contacted and asked; what were they thinking? I'm sure the data for their takeoff is recorded in the FOQA data and our counterparts at Aircraft Z's company should be made aware of the situation. I am not trying to 'Rat out the crew;' but as I stated; I did not expect the takeoff sequence to end well. I am happy it didn't result in an accident but it could have. In fact; the weather conditions that day could have resulted in many incidents which leads me to one last observation and sixth recommendation; ZZZ no longer has runways that will accommodate those types of winds. Had the XYL and R still existed; this would be a non-event. I did not file [a report] for this event as I felt it was not the appropriate venue for this event.
Airbus Captain reported observing a B737 taking off where crosswind component was exceeded.