B767 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Flight Crew Last 90 Days 200; Flight Crew Total 22000; Flight Crew Type 6000
Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification
Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter
General None Reported / Taken
Human Factors
NORTH ATLANTIC MNPS AIRSPACE OPERATIONS MANUAL8.5.3Distributing aircraft laterally and equally across the three available positions adds an additional safety margin and reduces collision risk. This is now a standard operating procedure for the entire NAT Region and pilots are required to adopt this procedure as is appropriate. In this connection; it should be noted that: 'Aircraft without automatic offset programming capability must fly the centerline.' 'Operators capable of programming automatic offsets may fly the centerline or offset one or two nautical miles right of centerline to obtain lateral spacing from nearby aircraft. (Offsets will not exceed 2 NM right of centerline and offsets left of track centerline must not be made). An aircraft overtaking another aircraft should offset within the confines of this procedure; if capable; so as to create the least amount of wake turbulence for the aircraft being overtaken.'F.O.MStrategic Lateral Offset ProceduresOvertaking aircraft must offset within the confines of this procedure so as to create the least amount of wake turbulence for the aircraft being overtaken.Twice in the last three months we have had traffic one thousand feet above us on the North Atlantic Tracks directly overtake without any concern for wake turbulence.  In both cases; we waited as long as possible before initiating further SLOP to protect ourselves.  Contact with one of the offending aircraft revealed that the flight crew was unaware of the concern and their responsibility for avoidance procedures.  Contact with the other flight crew was not possible as they were not monitoring the appropriate VHF frequencies.The disappointing common element in these cases was that the aircraft were both Company 777's.  If the possibility of an upset at altitude due to wake is real; it is incumbent upon the company to address this problem.  Whether lack of knowledge; discipline or a combination of both is to blame; it appears to be more than an isolated problem.  At minimum; a required pilot bulletin should be issued.  Crews should be reminded of their responsibilities when overtaking on the NAT tracks.  They should also be encouraged to remain situationally aware and prepared to protect themselves if the overtaking aircraft is oblivious.
B767 Captain reported he has noticed aircraft failing to observe North Atlantic Track procedures; putting other aircraft at risk of wake vortex encounters.