A321
Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Workload; Time Pressure; Human-Machine Interface; Distraction; Confusion; Situational Awareness
Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed
Aircraft; Human Factors
My role was PF (Pilot Flying). After lengthy delay for weather and ramp closure; taxi to and departed Runway XXR ZZZ on ZZZZZ2 RNAV SID. After hearing wind shear alerts/warnings being issued by ATC; we pulled out of line to check performance numbers and decided to use improved performance with TOGA and APU ON for an abundance of caution given the weather and takeoff weight of the aircraft. Departed XXR without incident on heading 340 for weather avoidance with subsequent RV (Radar Vectors) to rejoin the departure. APU was shut down normally as part of after takeoff flow. Approximately climbing through FL210 to FL300; 2 ECAM (Electronic Centralized Aircraft Monitor) caution messages AIR ENG 1 BLD ABNRML PR and AIR ENG 2 BLD ABNRML PR. I retained control of the aircraft and assumed radios communication; the CA (Captain) began completing the ECAM action items; which did not correct the malfunction. The QRH was referenced for follow up action which allowed for two reset attempts since the takeoff was completed APU ON. However; the QRH procedure was not clear in the event of both EBV (Engine Bleed Valve) failing. We attempted the EBV resets with no resolution of the malfunction. Noting that there was no air being directed to the packs; the cabin altitude was beginning to rise; and started the APU to mitigate the pressurization issue as an added barrier for safety. The cabin altitude then stabilized normally. The CA then contacted [Operations Control] via the sat phone app for other maintenance solutions/guidance and discussing a likely return to ZZZ. During that call an additional ECAM caution message AIR APU BLEED FAULT indicated and noted the APU bleed valve also closed to the packs and cabin altitude began to rise rapidly. At that point; a request was made with ATC to return to ZZZ along with immediate descent with a pressurization issue and [requested priority handling]. We began a left turn to heading 180 and began immediate descent to 10000 ft with autopilot 2 engaged; while monitoring cabin altitude which peaked at 8900 ft. CA briefed cabin crew; passengers; and Dispatch with a plan to return ZZZ. The flight crew discussed and determined an immediate overweight landing was the safest course of action given the multi-system failures; current weight of approximately 175;000 lbs; and unstable weather in the area. Completed QRH Overweight Landing procedures and reviewed landing performance data for ZZZ Runway XYR. A request was made for ARFF to be available during landing and taxi in the event of a hot brake complication. Normal flaps full; low auto brakes landing was made with VS less at touchdown of less than 100 fpm. Full reverse immediately applied at touchdown and auto brakes off about halfway down runway with stopping distance assured. ARFF reported nothing abnormal with gear and followed flight to [the gate]. With brake fans on. Single engine taxi procedures used to reduce further brake load. Peak brake temp of 290 C. Flight parked [at the gate] without further incident; appropriate maintenance write ups entered in AML (Aircraft Maintenance Logbook) and maintenance techs present to meet aircraft were briefed. No injuries or reports of significant passenger discomfort with the changing cabin altitude.Review/improve reset procedure in QRH for dual engine bleed pressure failure. Additionally; though not directed by QRH or checklist since the aircraft was not depressurized; donning of oxygen masks should happen as an additional precaution. Given the workload and task saturation; that did not occur for me to do until after reflection of the event on the ground.
A321 First Officer reported multiple bleed valve failures resulting in cabin depressurization; immediate descent; and diversion.