Citationjet (C525/C526) - CJ I / II / III / IV
Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Flight Crew Last 90 Days 50; Flight Crew Total 17100; Flight Crew Type 1800
Communication Breakdown; Human-Machine Interface
Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; Flight Crew Returned To Gate; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; General Maintenance Action
Aircraft; Human Factors
During the start sequence for the second engine (the right engine was started first); all displays went blank; and when they came back; I checked that we had not exceeded ITT (Interstage Turbine Temperature) limits. Prior to taxi; I confirmed that there were no Amber Alerts or Red Warnings; and that there were no CAS messages; and called 'clear panel'. After receiving clearance from Ground Control; we taxied to the runway; and were cleared for takeoff.I brought the power up slowly; and as we started moving; long before reaching takeoff power; I noticed the need to use right rudder to avoid drifting left of centerline. At the same time; my FO (First Officer) called 'zero power on the left engine'. We aborted the takeoff; and in response to Tower's question; responded that we aborted for lack of power on the left engine.Things I will do differently in the future:1. When a checklist is interrupted by an unusual event; I will call for the checklist starting at the beginning.2. Prior to taxi; my FO and I will verify and agree that the plane is configured and completely ready to taxi.3. Prior to takeoff; both my FO and I will verify and agree that the plane is ready to fly before taking the runway.
I am undergoing SIC training at my carrier; which is authorized for single-pilot operations in the CE-525B. I was briefing passengers in the back of the aircraft as the PIC was starting the engines. I returned to the cockpit when I finished; and the PIC informed me that the avionics had reset when he attempted to start Engine No. 1. Once the radios came back online I started working to get the new ATIS; taxi clearance; and pull up the taxi diagram; while also verifying that our flight plan and aircraft initialization had not been deleted from the system during the avionics reset. The PIC began taxiing the aircraft once I obtained our taxi clearance. After briefing passengers; I did not look at the engine gauges upon my return to the cockpit until I ran the Cleared for Takeoff checklist. We had a short taxi to Runway XX. As we approached the runway I obtained our takeoff clearance; visually cleared the runway; and ran our 'Cleared for Takeoff' checklist items. As the PIC aligned the plane on the runway for takeoff and began feeding in power I looked over at the engine instruments; that's the last item on the 'Cleared for Takeoff' checklist. I noticed and told the PIC that the left engine was out. We aborted before takeoff power was set; and I called the tower to tell them we were aborting as we expedited our way off the runway. Once off of the runway the PIC attempted several restarts; which were not successful. We returned to the FBO.In hindsight; upon learning of the electrical malfunction that occurred while I was in the back; I should have indicated that we were simply not ready to taxi until we stepped back into the Before Start checklist and ran all checklist items all over again; in order to ensure normal systems. It seems apparent that this would have forced reexamination of the situation; and if Engine No. 1 was not indicating properly; we would have noticed as much prior to taxi. I assumed that the PIC handled all engine starting tasks; including the checklist; during my absence from the cockpit. Going forward; the takeaway for me is to never assume that items are completed and to visually confirm all checklist items for myself; especially when flows are interrupted by abnormal events; like our avionics reset. Inherent suspicion as to the state of the aircraft is a good and healthy thing. This is likely the most significant lesson I've learned in all of my aviation training; and it will not be forgotten.
C-525B flight crew reported rejected takeoff due to left engine failure.