B767 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Flight Crew Flight Engineer; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Flight Crew Last 90 Days 170; Flight Crew Total 12490; Flight Crew Type 2700
Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Human Factors
Mistakenly departed off of runway with 1600RVR requirements with only 800RVR.I reported to work in the middle of the night. The day looks easy on paper; consisting of only two legs; but in reality is very tiring. It was the first night of my trip; and I hadn't been to work in over 3 weeks. I was tired to begin the trip; but I did get a good 3 hour nap in before it. On the way to the airport fog had set in; and I estimated visibility at 1/4 to 1/2 miles. When I arrived at work things were rushed as always. The First Officer hadn't flown in a month either; and was tired and moving slow. We arrived at the airplane and started performing our duties. ATIS was reporting 1200RVR and I agreed with it. I coordinated with company and received a take-off alternate. Just as I accomplished this; ground personnel completed loading our airplane and were wanting us to block out 20 minutes early. I then started moving quicker and this is where I made my mistake. When I looked at my take-off minimums page for the airport I mistakenly read the wrong runway. I read the information for the opposite runway. I fill this was due to a combination of fatigue and hurriedness. On a well-rested daytime flight; I don't believe I would have made this mistake. The First Officer did not catch this mistake either. I believe he was in the same condition as I was in. The runway I read indicated 500RVR was required. We had 1200RVR; so I thought we were good to go. I blocked out early and proceeded to taxi. During the taxi I crossed a runway intersection and quickly counted the number of runway edge lights I saw. I counted 6. 1200' visibility; ATIS was right on. I continued to the runway and departed. Runway centerline lights and markings where clearly visible and the take-off was normal. After departure the First Officer informed me that the ATIS had changed before we started to taxi and the reported visibility was 800 RVR. Would I have caught my mistake had he told me this? Probably not; but it might have triggered an auto look up response in me. All in all this was another classic example of the accident chain forming. It started with what I feel is the biggest threat to me in my job; fatigue. Add in being rushed and a First Officer in the same condition as I was feeling; and you get mistakes. Usually these mistakes are caught by one of us; but that night it wasn't. A lesson in risk management was learned; luckily the flight ended normally.
B767 Captain reported a takeoff from a runway with a runway visual range that was below minimums.