A300
Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Communication Breakdown
Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff
Weather; Human Factors
After receiving Line-Up & Wait instructions from ATCT on Runway 18R; airport experienced a radical wind shift with convective activity near the field. We were instructed to taxi to Runway 36L and were told that a wind shear alert had been issued.  As we taxied toward 36L the Captain requested a re-computation of the takeoff data using the wind shear profile.  We discussed the steps in using the wind shear profile and the appropriate changes were made to the cockpit setup to reflect the new runway and wind shear profile. Specifically we discussed the Pilot Monitoring (PM) switching to Flight Path Vector (FPV) after Takeoff Go-Around (TOGA) was selected.  Once cleared for takeoff (winds ~320/21G31) the Captain advanced the throttles; stabilized the power; selected TOGA and stated 'set max power'.  Shortly after TOGA was selected; while the throttles were being driven to the takeoff setting I selected FPV on my Primary Flight Display (PFD).  The engines reached takeoff thrust and I looked at my display in anticipation of stating 'Max power set; Speed Reference System (SRS); 80 kts....etc'.  Instead I said 'Max power set; no SRS' because of the blank Flight Mode Annunciator (FMA)s with the exception of the THRUST display.  Due to the wind and the slower acceleration of the PW4100 series engines; the aircraft was already well beyond 80 knots.  The captain announced 'reject'; brought the throttles to idle and maximum braking was initiated by the autobrake system.  I announced 'spoilers' and the aircraft was brought to a rapid stop.  I estimate that the reject occurred at approximately 105-110 knots.  We informed the tower of the rejected takeoff; cleared the runway; and ran the Rejected Takeoff (RTO) checklist and the after landing checklist.  We coordinated with ATCT to find a suitable parking position and contacted [company] for appropriate guidance regarding the high speed RTO.  We were instructed to return to the gate for a maintenance inspection and for refueling as we were approaching our RQR fuel. Brake fans were placed on In Accordance With (IAW) ECAM and the hottest brake approached 380C.  We proceeded back to parking without incident.  The duty officer was contacted after block in and the Ground Turn Back closed with flight coordination.  Maintenance found no issue with the brakes; tires; or fuse plugs and the brakes cooled normally.My improper callout of 'Max power set; no SRS'.  This call caused the captain to reject the takeoff; specifically with regard to the wind shear alerts and his belief that the SRS system was not working.Given the announcement by ATCT of winds shear alerts we utilized the wind shear procedure for takeoff.  That procedure drove our decision to have the PM utilize FPV after TOGA was selected.  The fact that the FPV selection eliminates most displayed information on the FMA of the selected side was unanticipated.  Instead of announcing 'Max Power set; no SRS' I should have crosschecked the captain's display and not fixated on the engine performance gauges while waiting for Max power to be set.  I may have realized that it was in fact a normal indication and not an anomaly.  A better understanding of the FPV setting; its resultant effect on the FMA's; and perhaps the selection of FPV after the 'SRS' call would have prevented this incident.  I have re-read the PHB procedures on Wind shear to ensure this type of circumstance does not result in a future incident.  Admittedly; I was very surprised by the Captain's decision to reject the takeoff; although I believe his decision rested with the possibility of taking an aircraft into the air with known wind shear alerts that potentially did not have a working SRS bar/Wind shear detection system.
An A300 First Officer (FO) reported the Captain initiated a rejected takeoff when the FO announced 'No SRS' at about 105 kts on the takeoff roll.