A321
Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument
Flight Crew Total 14000
Time Pressure; Troubleshooting; Workload
Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown
Aircraft
Level in cruise at FL340 I felt a slight yaw in the aircraft; and noted a roll on the flight director. Checking the engine instruments I saw that Engine 2 EPR had fallen to zero thrust (1.0); and that the EPR discrepancy indications were in view. Shortly thereafter the ECAM announced (I believe) 'ENG 2 FF DISCREPANCY'. I announced the failure; checked the Quick Reference Card; then confirmed that the FO (First Officer) would continue to fly the aircraft while I performed the ECAM actions. I complied with the ECAM action; and began to search for follow up action when the FO announced that airspeed was decreasing. I broadcast a 'Pan Pan' and advised ATC that we needed an immediate descent. ATC cleared us lower and I continued to look for follow up actions; which I failed to find in the QRH - although I did find them on subsequent review. ATC advised ZZZ was nearby; and with the support and information provided by the FO I elected to divert to ZZZ; and informed ATC of that fact. Meanwhile ECAM messages for generator failure; then engine failure were displayed; and acted upon; I notified the flight attendants and the passengers; and sent a diversion message to Company Dispatch.While I was thus engaged; the FO copied the ATIS; reprogrammed the FMS for the new arrival and provided supplemental information about runway length; etc.We completed ECAM actions; reviewed the non-routine landing considerations; updated the cabin crew; performed the Descent and Before landing checklists as appropriate; and the FO executed a smooth; overweight landing. After clearing the runway we communicated with ARFF (Airport Rescue and Firefighting) and confirmed that there were no unusual indications exterior to the aircraft; then proceeded to parking on the hard stand and deplaned the passengers.Event occurred due to a loss of thrust from Engine 2.Throughout the early stages of this event I was presented with multiple demands on my attention from different sources in quick succession - primarily cascading ECAM warnings. I found myself frustrated by my inability to quickly locate information in the QRH. The multiple indexes and non-alphabetical organization of the 'alphabetical' index; combined with the location of the indices several pages deep in the QRH; made it difficult to quickly confirm whether further action was required; or available; and resulted in considerable back-tracking and re-assessing. Additionally; the listing of the system (i.e.: ENG 1(2)) before each individual ECAM item makes it difficult to pick out the relevant issue; since the identification of the specific issue only begins in the middle of the listing. Under the pressure of time and stress it is far too easy to miss the particular line applicable to the immediate problem.Another issue of note is that the engine failure follow up procedure in the QRH fails to refer to the 'Drift down and One Engine Cruise' procedure located elsewhere in the handbook. Further; the initial ECAM warnings (Fuel Flow and Generator issues) failed to address the primary issue; which was the loss of thrust from the #2 engine. The actions called for during the first couple of ECAM warnings were largely irrelevant to the larger issue of the engine failure; and attempting to work through those procedures served no purpose other than to delay and distract from the more important matters at hand. When the 'ENGINE 2 FAIL' message finally displayed - and it was notably delayed - we were well into the descent; and had already decided to divert to ZZZ. The fact that the initial ECAM warnings very obviously failed to address a far more serious issue only served to exacerbate the existing stress and confusion as I sought to locate guidance for an issue that the ECAM had not identified (though I had). Given a design philosophy that prioritizes the ECAM for emergency and non-normal procedures; coupled with a QRH that is not particularly user friendly; the failure of the ECAM to annunciate the engine failure until well into the diversion was a significant hindrance to timely; correct response to this significant failure.
A320 Captain reported a loss of thrust on the #2 engine which resulted in a diversion and landing.