B777 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 2.8
Situational Awareness; Human-Machine Interface
ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance
Human Factors; Procedure; ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Airspace Structure
I received a briefing which included no out of the ordinary situations within the sector. The controller finished his briefing and I had taken full control. I set the sector up and was just browsing through the aircraft when I received a Position message from Aircraft X in my sector queue. Immediately I realized this report was for the boundary fix and was three minutes in the past for an aircraft entering my airspace. I immediately opened up the aircraft messages window and determined that this flight did exist but was not in the system or protected. I recovered his flight plan and manually reentered him with the information from the progress report; this took two minutes to fully investigate and correct. Immediately upon entering this information; a conflict window appeared with Aircraft Y showing 11 minutes and 47 seconds when I require 15 minutes between these two crossing aircraft; which began in three minutes. I immediately sent out a clearance for Aircraft X to climb 1000 feet to 35000 feet to resolve the conflict; which the aircraft responded that he was unable higher. I immediately rejected his read back and resent a descent clearance to 33000 feet; which he read back and reported level. After insuring he was separated I cleared Aircraft X to his destination to ensure profile and route accuracy.After the incident was over; I began looking through the messages for Aircraft X trying to figure out what had happened. When I reviewed his coordination; I noticed the previous controller had incorrectly input the time for Aircraft X at ZZZZZ. The controller had entered the wrong time transposing numbers. When he accepted this time into the system; ATOP (Advanced Technologies and Oceanic Procedures) moved his data block across the scope into Europe; and removed his entire flight plan. There were no warnings or anything received since Aircraft X made no reports prior to hitting ZZZZZ. When he reported ZZZZZ it sent a Position message to my queue.The ATOP system has two logic checks built into it when it regards aircraft and the coordination window. The system automatically looks at the aircraft type and knows the 'normal' operating ranges for the aircraft. If a controller attempts to coordinate or clear an aircraft to something outside of these ranges; the system generates a pop up window warning the controller that this is 'not normal'. The controller must override/accept that this information is correct and click a confirmation to process the clearance/coordination. To go with that; the TIME window within the coordination window has NO logic checks or safeguards in place. The ATOP system uses multiple sources of information to process and update flight plans before getting into ATOP airspace. The system should be programmed to have logic checks which would determine time accuracy based upon the information it has.Paired RADAR data block in ATOP- it should warn the controller if the time is off by more than 5 minutes. ADS-C connected at the time of coordination- It should warn the controller if the time is off by more than 5 minutes. HF/Non-ADS/Non-Radar/Preactive Status- the system should warn the controller for any ACTIVE flight that is more than 15 minutes from the time the system is expecting the flight based on the information it has. Non-Active flights- There should be a warning that always appears that tells the controller; 'This flight is inactive; Confirm boundary estimate and routing'.By doing this this will help alleviate the erroneous computer entry which occurs periodically and help to avoid these issues when coordination occurs. This seems to happen a lot and we need to place a safeguard to help avoid this problem.
A controller reported discovering an unprotected flight due to the entry of an incorrect fix estimate time for a flight plan through non-radar airspace causing the flight plan to be removed from the system.