A321
Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT
Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action
Aircraft; Human Factors
This report covers two events generated from the same aircraft condition.  At FL370; I; as pilot flying received an Engine 1 EPR (emgine pressure ratio) Mode fault.  The FO (First Officer) ran the ECAM procedure and we selected N1 modes on and ran the autothrust manually.  We almost had to ask for a descent because the speed was bleeding off.  I managed to correct the speed; and noticed the thrust levers were quite split.  I needed to transfer aircraft control to the FO so that I could call Dispatch and Maintenance.  I explained the split throttle situation to the FO and gave him the aircraft and radios.  Shortly afterwards; he said we needed to descend.  I saw the speed deteriorating and immediately said to start down; we were going below green dot and into the hook.  I took back the radio; and we descended. Our fuel situation was such that at the lower altitude we couldn't continue on to ZZZ1; so we coordinated to divert to ZZZ2.  Everything was non eventful until we started the approach.  I had the FO flying because he was handling the split thrust levers well and I thought it would be best for him to continue.  He asked for a longer final then they were vectoring us for and ATC gave us a long final.  When cleared for the Visual; the FO decided to descend from 8000 feet to 7000 feet. I should have told him to maintain 8000 feet. I wanted him comfortable on the approach and let him descend early.  ATC called us with a low altitude alert; stating the MDA was 7500 and we climbed back to that altitude and intercepted the glide slope and landed without incident.The cause of the low altitude alert was that I had already told the FO how to make the descent with the throttle situation and didn't want him to feel like I was flying while I was Pilot Monitoring; and we were visual so I knew we were safe as far as terrain and obstacles; but we were definitely dragged in.  Normally when FO's ask to descend early on visuals I mention class B airspace or terrain; but this time I wanted him to be comfortable just working the split thrust levers. I've thought about this for about a day now; and what I've come up with is try to keep things as normal as possible even in an abnormal situation.  The extended final was fine.  It actually made it easier to accomplish what he was trying to accomplish and made the descent totally unnecessary.  I also want to mention that the mechanic who greeted us asked why we hadn't applied the MEL; which would have helped us with our power settings.  We don't reference the MEL in flight; but either the QRH should address the thrust situation or it should mention to refer to the MEL because it would have been helpful.
During cruise at FL360; in the vicinity of the ZZZ VORTAC; flight experienced a Master Caution and a following ECAM warning message of ENG 1 EPR MODE FAULT. The CA (Captain) who was the Pilot Flying (PF) stated 'My Aircraft' and I; the FO who was the Pilot Monitoring (PM) immediately began the procedures to address the ENG 1 EPR MODE FAULT caution. After referencing the Quick Reaction Card (QRC) we determined this was not a Quick Action or ECAM exception; and after concurrence between the PF and the PM began the ECAM Actions for ENG 1 EPR MODE FAULT. After completion of the ECAM actions; and the aircraft was stabilized we both noted the trust levers were split in their position to maintain corresponding N1 and N2 engine settings. The CA (PF) then transferred the aircraft and ATC communications to me and I became the PF. The CA began an aircraft wifi internet phone call to company Dispatch and Maintenance and began to discuss follow-on options. I then informed ATC Center that the flight would be diverting due to 'engine issues' but the divert destination was not yet determined and we did not require any priority handling at that time. The decision to divert was made and ZZZ1 was determined the best place to divert. Once the CA completed coordination with Dispatch and Maintenance; he assumed the ATC Communications and assumed the PM duties and I remained the PF. During this time we noticed the power setting; as to not exceed any N1 engine limitations; were not sufficient to maintain the desired airspeed at FL360; and I notified the CA (PM) we needed an immediate descent out of FL360. The CA (PM) attempted to communicate with Center for the immediate decent; but was not able to establish communication due to frequency saturation from other radio calls. I (PF); in order to maintain airspeed; immediately disconnected the autopilot and began a shallow descent out of FL360. The CA (PM) made a call and notified Center of our descent out of FL360 and we were requiring a lower altitude. Center immediately responded to call and then cleared us to FL340; I estimate our altitude to be 35;850 feet when Center responded to call. The flight continued; uneventfully; to land at XXR a ZZZ with a visual approach.
A321 flight crew reported a successful mechanical diversion which included a low altitude alert during a visual approach.