A320
Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine
Communication Breakdown; Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness
Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed
Human Factors; Procedure
On the final phase of the Visual Approach; backed up by the ILS Runway XY to ZZZ; with the intention to capture the glide path from above; the Auto Pilot (AP) and Auto Throttles were disengaged. Prevailing conditions were Good Visibility and varying Tail Winds of up to nine (9) Knots. During the final portion of the descent to touchdown; with a visual transition to the PAPI reference already established (PAPI were showing 3 RED-1 WHITE); the Aircraft descended below the referenced visual glide path; with the tendency to fly over the Runway XY overrun area at an altitude (AGL) of less than 50 ft. The moment the Captain; having the Pilot Monitoring (PM) duties; mentioned his estimation for being low on the glide path; the aircraft was overflying a point short of the RWY by about 500 feet. He consecutively called for a Go Around; which was immediately executed by the PF (Pilot Flying). The Flight landed after a RADAR pattern on the same runway uneventfully.[The cause was] Human Factors / Pilot Flying error on visually estimating the projected Glide Slope to Runway XY; with the current Tail Wind conditions. Root cause is the initially higher angle of descent / rate of descent to capture the glide slope from above; that ended up to an over correction - reverse situation of flying finally lower than the projected/correct slope. [I suggest] earlier Aircraft configuration for the Final Approach Phase and timely request from the ATC for lower altitudes / earlier descent to the recommended altitudes that lead to a better projected sequence of flying tasks.
FO was flying pilot. Performed visual approach and FO had a hard time trying to catch the glide slope from above because he was trying to slow down and put flaps down while on OPEN DESC. FO called for 'the bird'; which caught me off guard because it is the first time anyone has asked for the flight path vector while trying to intercept the ILS and while disconnecting the AP. He not only disconnected AP but also eventually the auto thrust without previously briefing it. I told him to never disconnect the auto thrust again while trying to save a visual approach. Finally he was established on the ILS. Below 500 feet he said he was going to follow the PAPI. I glanced down at the VSI to make sure we were stable and when I looked backed up we had 4 red on the PAPIs and at the same time we received a GS GPWS warning. Became unstable. I loudly and sternly called 'unstable; go-around.' Performed go-around as RA called 50 feet. FO performed a soft go-around. I overrode his decision after he brought back TL (Thrust Lever) to CLB and I pushed TL to TOGA since we were in ZZZ (high airport elevation) with high OAT. I honestly could not tell you the altitude when the FO brought back the TL to CLB. I wanted to make sure we were safe since the go-around was performed at 50 feet from an unsafe position. At 50 feet RA; aircraft was not anywhere near the approach end of the runway. Came back for an uneventful landing.FO descended below glide slope and PAPI showed 4 red.Soft Go-around procedure should be changed or at least highlight the need to take into account airport elevation and OAT when deciding to make a soft go-around from a low altitude with an obvious performance deterioration.Soft Go-around procedure should be changed or at least highlight the need to take into account airport elevation and OAT when deciding to make a soft go-around from a low altitude with an obvious performance deterioration.
Flight crew reported that the First Officer made errors during final approach to landing and the Captain elected to call for a go around.