Commercial Fixed Wing
Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Situational Awareness; Workload
ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach
Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Human Factors; Procedure
On descent to MGGT we briefed ILS Z 02. We were proceeding direct to the AUR VOR and expecting the full ILS Z 02 approach. Approximately 15 nm to the east of the AUR VOR we were given a turn to the north for traffic and told to maintain 10;000 ft. (I believe). Several minutes and approximately 5nm to the north east of the AUR VOR; we were cleared directly to AUR VOR cleared to 9000 ft and cleared ILS Z 02. We were at flaps 5 and flaps 5 maneuvering speed. The aircraft was too close to the VOR to go direct and the FMS had the aircraft intercept the 165 radial south of the VOR. This forced a delay in the decent to 7200 ft (as allowed during this segment of the approach) as the course wasn't alive. As the course came alive we began the decent to 7200 ft in LNAV/VNAV. We lowered the gear and extended flaps to 20 and slowed to approximately 150 knots. Still high on descent profile; the captain and pilot flying elected to extend the speed brakes. He allowed himself to become task saturated and got away from the fact the speed brake was extended. The aircraft reached the AUR165/5.0 DME point and began the right turn in bound for localizer intercept. As the plane rolled into a bank the stick shaker/stall warning came on due to the increased angle of bank; and low airspeed. The Captain disconnected the auto pilot rolled wings level added power lowered the nose and retracted the speed brakes. The stall warning quickly stopped. No altitude or air speeds were violated. We continued right turn to intercept the localizer and continued the decent. We re-automated the aircraft and landed normally. I believe that the combination of a very strong language barrier between us and the ATC controller lead to a heavier than normal task load. Along with a very involved full instrument approach procedure allowed the crew to become very task saturated. I became very involved with the radio communication; and looking outside for traffic and the runway environment. While this was happening I was unable to continually monitor the airspeed and aircraft configuration while the Captain was flying. When the stall warning did go off I immediately informed the Captain the speed brake was extended; and he proceeded to increase power and retract the speed brake lever. This was my first time into MGGT airport; and now I know how busy it can be in the approach phase. This will now allow me to know what to expect; and pay extra attention to all elements involved with the flight.
[Report narrative contained no additional information.]
Flight crew experienced a stick shaker during approach to MGGT due to the speed brake being extended and forgotten during the turn inbound to the airport.