Commercial Fixed Wing
Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument
ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT
General None Reported / Taken
Airport; Airspace Structure; Procedure
Getting radar vectors to intercept the final approach course to Runway 34L RNO;  ATC instructed us to fly direct to SPOON at 11;000 ft and intercept the localizer. The direct routing to SPOON took us on a westerly heading approximately 90 degrees to the final approach course. SPOON is defined as a radar fix on the approach chart and is D24.6 from the field. As such; we were reluctant to use the localizer to guide our turn to final and instead used GPS to navigate to SPOON and turn onto final. Upon overflying SPOON; the GPS commanded an aggressive; yet smooth; right turn to final. Once on final; we intercepted the localizer and descended on the glide path while observing the altitude restrictions at APIME; WAGGE; and EPOSE. The FO (First Officer) and I were fully 'dialed in' for this approach as we had briefed the procedure; identified the surrounding terrain; and associated threats. Landed uneventfully. Three days later I was advised ATC identified our airplane as one that lost acceptable separation with terrain during our approach. The FO was making his first trip to RNO and I had only been to RNO a few times in at least a few years. We were initially planning to fly an approach to the south until ATC told us to expect one to Runway 34L. The routing to SPOON put us at (approx.) 90 degrees to the final approach course with (from memory) an unreliable localizer signal at D24.6. That large angle and our reluctance to use the localizer so far from the field forced us into using the GPS which caused an overfly situation; and thus; and overshoot of the final approach course. I think getting a heading to intercept the final approach course inside SPOON and at a lesser angle would alleviate the overshoot possibility and the resulting loss of separation.
We were cleared to and were proceeding direct to SPOON at 11;000 ft on a track of approximately 070 when we were cleared to intercept the localizer for the ILS 34L.  The Pilot Flying (Captain) and I discussed intercepting the localizer so far from the field (SPOON is 24.6D from the field) and the PF elected to stay in Nav [mode] until we had turned on to the final.  We saw the line the nav was going to take and that it was going to fly over SPOON and then turn us onto final with a slight overshoot and the PF verbalized this.  We had done an extremely thorough review of the RNO brief and of all of the pages in FD Pro and based on the clear weather and our awareness of the terrain hazards we concluded that this would be an appropriate course of action.  We overflew SPOON; 'nav'd' to the final approach course and then selected the approach mode and flew the rest of the approach and landing uneventfully. The extremely steep intercept angle and relatively close proximity to SPOON when we were cleared to intercept the localizer along with the far distance from the field.  Emphasize to both ATC and aircrew the ramifications of a steep intercept angle to final.
Flight Crew reported overflying a fix which led to a loss of separation from terrain reported by ATC.