A321
Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Communication Breakdown; Distraction; Time Pressure
ATC Issue All Types; Conflict NMAC; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Human Factors
While being vectored for a visual approach to Runway 19R at TPA; Tampa Approach advised us of traffic which we attempted to gain sight of at about our 10 o'clock position and below us. We couldn't see the traffic however we had the airport in sight and reported that. At that time approach cleared us for a visual approach to 19R. We began slowing as we intercepted the final approach course to the runway using the ILS for additional navigation and awareness. At this point we were flying at 3000 ft outside of FADDI intersection. We were still attempting to locate the traffic visually but had a TCAS target in the vicinity of where approach advised. I noted that the traffic on TCAS was only 300 ft below our altitude. As we began to configure for the approach and landing we; as well as our jump seat observer; were still looking for the traffic. Approximately 1-2 miles outside of FADDI we got a TCAS RA of 'MONITOR VERTICAL SPEED' at which point [the] Captain disconnected the autopilot and followed TCAS instructions. Our jump seat observer then located the traffic as it was about to pass underneath us noting that he believed it to be a Piper. Shortly after the initial RA; we received a 'CLIMB' RA; at which point [the] Captain pitched up to follow TCAS instructions. This required greater than 1900 fpm climb rate. I monitored his maneuver to ensure he was following the TCAS and back him up. For a significant amount of time; I noticed the intruder aircraft was still 300 feet below our altitude. This led me to believe that the intruder aircraft pitched up and was climbing into us directly beneath us posing a serious risk of a collision. I also notified approach that we were responding to an RA. They acknowledged and asked numerous times prior to the end of the conflict if we can still make the approach. I ignored it until clear of conflict. Because we were already beginning to configure for approach; we already had flaps out. Due to this and the distraction by ATC we encountered a brief flap overspeed by 10 knot for between 5 and 10 seconds which [the] Captain immediately reduced power to correct the situation. Once clear of conflict and in a normal state of flight I advised ATC we would not be able to make the approach and would need to be vectored back around for another approach. The intruder aircraft did not maintain any kind of visual separation and appeared to even climb up toward us while passing beneath us. I do not know if this aircraft was under ATC control or was even in communication with any ATC facility. The floor of the Class B airspace where this occurred is 3000 ft MSL. Although the intruder aircraft was initially below the Class B shelf; when he began to climb while we were responding to the TCAS RA he entered the airspace. I also do not know if the aircraft had clearance to do so or not. With regards to Tampa Approach; when we advised we were responding to the RA the controller asked more than once if we could still make the approach or need to be vectored. This led to a distraction which made the situation for us in the cockpit more difficult.I do not know what can be done about the intruder aircraft because I don't know what his clearance was or if he was even talking to anyone. However; when an aircraft advises ATC of responding to a TCAS RA; they should respond with 'Roger' and standby until the affected aircraft advises no more conflict. Anything more is a distraction. They certainly should not be asking several times if the aircraft can still make the approach.
A321 First Officer reported an NMAC with a light aircraft on approach to TPA.