A319
Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument
Workload; Situational Awareness; Time Pressure
Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach
Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Environment - Non Weather Related
I was conducting a visual approach to [Runway] XXR backed up by the RNAV Y XXR. I was the Pilot Flying and the Captain was the Pilot Monitoring. We had briefed all the threats and the approach per the AOM prior to the TOD and were planning flaps full for the landing configuration. We were being vectored onto a base leg to join the final visually. I was faster than I should have been on the base for the distance we were out (180 selected speed I think) and so I had to delay calling for the flaps. I think the last altitude we were given was 8;000 feet on the base before we reported the field in sight and were cleared for the visual. The approach had been activated and I went to managed speed. We then set a lower altitude just above the altitude for the next fix after the one just ahead of us on the approach so I could use vertical speed to start down and stay on the path since the approach was not quite captured. I had armed the approach and it annunciated FINAL APP as we were joining the final and the aircraft continued descending on the path. I was using the auto pilot for lateral and vertical NAV until established on final. We extended the gear prior to joining the final to help with slowing the aircraft to flap deployment speeds. The vector had put us in closer than I had anticipated and I had also started slowing later than I should have. The speed did not come back very quickly; possibly because of a tailwind shifting to a headwind as were turning final; so I had to disconnect the autopilot and arrest the descent to get the aircraft slowed for flap deployment and also to prevent an overspeed. Both the Captain and I noticed the RA was close to 1;000 [feet] as we deployed final flaps; and our speed was still well above approach speed; but we were VMC and our assessment was that we had been in final configuration prior to 1;000 AGL. We continued the approach and were stable at 500 [feet] so we landed out of the approach within the required criteria. We were at the gate when the ACARS printed a Self-Assessment Flight Report. We weren't surprised to see Y for speed and descent; but we were surprised to see a Y for flap change. We discussed it; and although we were unstable at 1;000 [feet]; we felt that we had been configured and thought the report generated a flap change Y at 0974 RA because the terrain rises to the north and the spot elevations are around 300-600 feet higher than the airport elevation near where we selected final configuration. Regardless; the final configuration selection was closer to 1;000 AGL than it should have been and we decided we would file an report just in case. Normally; I call for gear down and managed speed at 2;000 AGL so as to have plenty of time to reach final configuration prior to 1;000 AGL; but I missed that cue because I was in the yellow due to being tighter and faster than I had anticipated; and I didn't realize it because I was busy trying to get back in the green slowing and turning final and descending to stay on the path. This is also a case where my experience exceeded my performance due to being new to being back in the right seat and not flying much in September. I also didn't say anything about being in the yellow; and so I didn't get as much help as I could have used. I also failed to brief that we may need to be configured on base depending on where the base leg is and to say something if I don't ask for the gear down by 2;000 AGL. The other factor was conducting a visual approach to a high-altitude airport where AGL altitudes happen at much higher MSL altitudes than were are used to and neither I nor the Captain had been into ZZZ in a long time. I will more thoroughly brief visual approaches regarding the gates I want for configuration and speed changes that provide plenty of margin for a stabilized approach.
As we turned to intercept final and configure for landing with a near 0 VSI; a hill on final gave us an unexpected 1;000 ft. radio alt call. We where visual and comfortable with continuing the approach due to distance. I recall being fully configuration when the second 1;000 foot reading on final and on speed at 500 ft. We failed to slow down in time on base leg not taking into effect high alt difference and ground speed. We did not brief the ground speed difference and the delayed slow down or terrain around the base turn. Haven't been to ZZZ in years.
A319 flight crew reported radio altimeter 1000 foot indication due to irregular terrain resulted in a late configuration for landing warning.