Large Transport
Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Workload; Situational Awareness; Distraction; Communication Breakdown; Confusion
ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue
Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Procedure; Human Factors
I was the Captain on final approach to ILS RWY 24L ZZZ. We were cleared by tower for the visual approach and stabilized at approximately 1100 feet MSL; with autopilot off; when the tower cleared a heavy for takeoff while taxiing 90 degrees to the runway. As we continued the approach the tower controller made a comment to the heavy to expedite his takeoff. The pilot answered he was heavy. The controller asked us to S turn to the north; which I complied with; to assist the tower controller. The aircraft was stabilized at all times. The controller realized he would not have the spacing to land us behind the heavy. The ATC tower controller directed us to go around. We accomplished a go around at approximately 400 feet. We were given heading 250 and climb to 2000 feet. We completely cleaned up and complied with the controller instructions going overwater for several minutes on a heading of 270; besides the heavy flying that was flying a 240 heading on my left. The heavy was in sight the entire time until we were handed back to Approach.  Departure gave us right turn direct ZZZ1 (VOR); leaving ZZZ1 (VOR) fly heading 070; climb to 4000 feet; then 5000 feet. We complied with all the controllers' instructions and were handed off to another approach controller that was very busy. We had an original FOD (Fuel Over Destination) of 6.8 at ZZZ. After the go around; I made a quick assessment with the FO (First Officer) that we were at minimum fuel as we headed east on the 070 heading away from the airport. I made several attempts to contact the controller to declare minimum fuel. I got blocked a couple of times as the controller was extremely busy. I called again on the same heading 070 several times and he finally said Standby. I said I need to know our sequence. He said 5. I couldn't get a word back in as I tried to declare minimum fuel. Knowing the controller was making us number 5; I was being told to standby.  Our MCDU computer now indicated an FOD of around 2000; and on final 1400 with a low fuel warning. I clearly told the FO we were [advising ATC Of our fuel urgency]. The FO switched to guard and called May Day three times several times because the controller was not answering either of us using the approach frequency; with the only response from another carrier. I continued calling the controller to [advise of our fuel situation] because we had travelled so far east; without the controller acknowledging us on either frequency. I squawked 7700 on a heading of 070. When we got no response after repeated calls to ATC on both frequencies we started a slow turn to base behind an aircraft in sight on final to 24L at 2 o'clock. As soon as we started the turn; the controller called us and finally understood we were a [minimum fuel] aircraft. He vectored us to Runway 24L; vectored the preceding aircraft out of the way to our right and in sight. He descended us to 3600 feet and cleared us for the ILS to Runway 24L. I told the FO; reactivate the approach and get the approach speed back up. We landed uneventfully with 3800 pounds of fuel. We had an original FOD of 6.8 and burned 3000 pounds of fuel during the go around with my emergency intervention. We would have had an extremely dangerous fuel state if we had been vectored any further east away from the airport; as the controller had planned by making us number 5. Also; another go around would have required an emergency opposite direction landing and was briefed on the second approach. The passengers and flight attendants were advised of the reason for the go around over the PA. I was called by the tower and told to call the tower and given a phone number. I was called back while taxiing by the tower and told to call Approach instead of tower and a phone number for Approach. I complied and called Approach to answer any questions the controller's supervisor had. The controller's supervisor said they may be filing a pilot deviation because I began my slow turn to base usingCaptain's Emergency Authority after squawking 7700 and making repeated emergency calls on both Approach and Guard frequencies. He said they had to vector a couple of aircraft because I was turning back to the airport. At no time did I lose sight of the preceding aircraft on final or separation. There was no TCAS event. The controller only responded after we began a slow turn to follow the preceding aircraft. The supervisor requested my name; pilot certificate number and address. I complied and gave him all three. I asked the supervisor for the controller's name; but he would only give me his name.  [Company aircraft] was on a 15 mile final to runway 24L on our second approach to 24L; heard the entire ATC exchange and the declaration of [our fuel situation]. [Captain] and co-pilot are willing to make a witness statement.Landing clearance issued to us with a misunderstanding by the tower controller of how long the heavy would require to take off on Runway 24L. He correctly directed us to go around.Understandable that a go around was directed by tower for traffic separation with the heavy.After cleanup from a TOGA go around and vectors; we tried to notify ATC as soon as possible that a minimum fuel state; then emergency fuel state; existed; but traffic volume; frequency congestion and a very busy controller hampered effective communication. We should have been given traffic priority for a second approach; as a go around aircraft with the tower advising Approach we were a go around. I don't know ATC procedure for a go around hand off; but direct ZZZ1 (VOR); then heading 070 out of [THE VOR]; seems like a canned go around procedure by ATC. The go around aircraft fuel state could be considered by ATC when re-sequencing a go around aircraft. Normally; I add fuel for contingencies; but the weather was fine across the entire country; except the Phoenix area. We did not have an alternate with 800 pounds of dispatch add and 2377 pounds of hold fuel. Weather VMC at destination ZZZ. Total fuel release fuel load was 39;100. Fuel burn was normal for the entire flight with an FOD of 6.8. I will add fuel in the future for a go around contingency and extensive vectors; especially at high volume airports. The controller workload and frequency congestion were the major factors hampering effective communication. No ATC controller response on Guard frequency to the Mayday calls or the squawk of 7700 while on a heading of 070.
ATC responded at that point; broke off the [preceding aircraft] and cleared us for the visual approach to 24L. We were above glide slope at first; but were in the slot; fully configured by 1500 feet; stable by 1000 feet and landed uneventfully. After landing we were asked to call the tower; then that was cancelled and we were asked to call Approach about a possible pilot deviation. The person we spoke to seemed confused as to why we [advised ATC of our fuel situation] on 121.5 when we were in contact with Approach. Unfortunately we had been unsuccessful in communicating with them; with repeated attempts; due to frequency saturation and were told 'STAND BY!' so that left us with no choice but to do as we have been taught our entire pilot careers; transmit on 121.5 and proceed immediately out of the 'red' and back toward the 'green.' Then there was discussion about why we turned in without a clearance to do so. I am unaware of the FAR that tells us we need clearance at that point. Accident reports show that lack of timely response to a negative situation usually ends very badly. It was unfortunate that we could not get positive timely communication with ATC due to frequency saturation. We operated safely with our aircraft and got our passengers safely on the ground. We can all talk about more fuel; not launching a heavy when someone else is over the marker inbound; etc. Those are human factor issues that will always be recurring. They are not systemic errors; they are facts of life in the world we operate in. What could help is having an additional frequency to reduce controller work load and frequency congestion so we could have communicated effectively; all been on the same page; and no reports to write. Secondly; it should be the assumption by ATC; that on a VFR day; a go around aircraft needs priority back to the airport; that #5 is just not okay. We have no alternate; we can do one go around and fly a box pattern back to a landing. We simply don't have the gas to rejoin the conga line to the airfield where it is most convenient for ATC. We have not done 3-4 turns in holding; sipping fuel at altitude. We essentially did a fully configured approach and subsequent takeoff at maximum fuel flow during the same time period. Priority after a VFR go around is essential to safe operation.
Captain and First Officer both reported a flight where they had to go around due to a heavy aircraft taking too long to depart. The aircraft then had to make a go-around; and come back to land. Pilot tried to advise ATC of aircraft fuel issues but could not speak to Controller. Pilot turned off downwind to land aircraft. Traffic had to be vectored out of the way. Aircraft landed uneventfully.