B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Distraction; Situational Awareness
Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance
Human Factors
The weather was clear and smooth and after dark and you could not see the terrain. I; the first officer; was the flying pilot. I called for VNAV flaps 1 set FL190. This is because of the pre-set altitude at 7 for the first restriction. After we checked in with departure at 250 knots just prior to ROPPR on the SHEAD 1 RNAV departure; we were instructed by Departure Control to delete the speed restrictions at ROPPR and MDDOG; but comply with the restriction at TARRK. The Captain and I looked at each other because it was a unique clearance first off; but one that wasn't an issue. While I was still hand flying the aircraft the Captain reached up and selected Altitude Intervention button twice which deleted the first two restrictions and left the TARRK restriction in the box. I looked at the box and acknowledged to the Captain and he agreed that was correct and we kept on climbing at 250 knots. While passing through ten thousand feet the flight director pitched down to about 2.5 degrees nose up. I very slowly dropped the nose of the aircraft down to about 3.5 degrees nose up to accelerate to the new set speed of 320 knots. The Captain was turning the center fuel tank lights off at this point in the climb. Then we both independently looked up at the pressurization panel to check pressurization. At this point I was climbing still; but not level at this point because I wanted to keep the climb coming since I knew we were in the area of terrain. After I was about 300 knots and accelerating still and around 11;500 feet the LAS Departure Controller called us and said 'I needed you to comply with the restriction at TARRK' (TARRK at 11;000 feet). We acknowledged the Controller and said ok and the Controller said traffic to our right; level at 13000 feet; maintain visual separation; climb and maintain FL190. Which is what the SID has us climb to. We complied with the instructions. We had no TCAS alerts at this time or on the climb out. While the Controller was giving these last instructions to us; I the flying pilot looked down and realized we are not at 11;000 feet but 11;700. At this point we were not at TARRK yet; about 5-6 miles prior I think (unsure of this distance). I lowered the nose even further down to about level and started a slow decent back down to 11;000 feet. While I was around 11;300 we were given the traffic call and then cleared to FL190. I started a climb in Level Change to FL190 and contact LA Center. After the Captain contacted LA Center in the climb through 13;500 (roughly); I the Flying Pilot; turned the autopilot on and verified it said CMD. Once established around 14000 feet or so and at 320 knots; I engaged VNAV again and announced it to the Captain. Once we got to cruise and we were at a point we could discuss the situation we spoke about what happened. The captain I both were a little baffled because we could not figure out what happened to make us be 700 feet high on our altitude. The aircraft flight director never budged the entire time we passed through the altitude (11000). First off; it was my mistake because regardless of the flight director position; I lost situational awareness momentarily because I should have caught it and just level the aircraft at 11000 instead of relying on the flight director to be requesting a level off. After talking through what happened in cruise I have come to the conclusion of what happened and where I the flying pilot made the mistake. At 10000 feet the aircraft flight director pitched down to about 2.5 to3 degrees to accelerate to the new VNAV speed of 320. While we were accelerating I only pitched down to about 3- 3.5 degrees. This is where my mistake was. I figured I didn't want to pitch down all the way to 2.5 degrees since the aircraft speed was accelerating fine with a climb still progressing. I was thinking that this 3-3.5 degree pitch slightly above the flight director pitch was good and we would still be ok. However; because it was only 1000 feet to the restriction (10000-11;000) altitude; the flight director pitched down to 2.5 initially was for the acceleration; but it turned into a pitch for the crossing restriction and it happened to be the same pitch attitude. That pitch attitude was close to or at what we needed to level off for the restriction. We did have a climb going during this process; but it was very small about 500-700 per minute (roughly). We did not see the VNAV speed switch over to PATH at that restriction either. Due to my lost situational awareness at the acceleration altitude of 10;000 feet I forgot about the 11;000 altitude restriction farther down the SID. The Captain happened to miss the altitude too because we also had fuel pump lights blinking at us that the Captain was turning off and both of us independently checking pressurization at 10;000 feet also distracted us. That is how we ended up 700 feet high at TARRK.Though hand flying is good and keeps us sharp; another recommendation would be to turn the autopilot on when flying SIDs with lots of altitude restrictions. That way I can take on a more of an active monitoring role. The autopilot is there to help reduce workload and it can help alleviate pilot errors if it is utilized appropriately. Also; by getting the autopilot on sooner on a more complex departure (lots of restrictions) taking care of the pressurization and fuel pumps at 10;000 feet also would not have distracted us from making the restriction. It seemed to have a lot of events happen right at 10;000 feet. Trapping errors is the name of the game and we could have done a more thorough job with the autopilot on in situations like this.
B737 First Officer reported that a SID crossing restriction was missed while hand-flying the aircraft due to distractions and not following the flight director.