A319
Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Flight Crew Last 90 Days 200; Flight Crew Type 9647
Situational Awareness
Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT
Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Human Factors
Vectored on downwind Visual Runway 27 (backed up with RNAV Approach). At a point between VYDDA (4;000 feet) and OKAIN (3;600 feet); 2 miles; cleared Visual Approach to Runway 27. Configuration was Flaps 3/170 knots. A slight delay was made before turn to join final and continuation of descent. Descent at 500 FPM INITIATED to 3;600 feet while in Managed Descent mode. With runway in sight; level at 3;600 feet; and as aircraft turned to join final; Terrain Warning. Aircraft was level at 3;600 feet on Autopilot; and within 5 degrees of final when warning activated. As PF (pilot flying); procedure for night terrain warning initiated but as soon as power increased and nose vector raised even slightly; warning subsided. After debrief with PM (pilot monitoring); I realize that I did not actually achieve TOGA (Take-off/Go-Around) thrust before warning subsided and therefore did not complete the maneuver. I agree with this assessment but the warning subsided almost immediately after initial corrective action and the aircraft was now on or very close to final and all environmental concerns were visible. By this time the aircraft was either very close to or on runway centerline. Terrain was in sight. Approach continued without further incident. As PF; I was aware of terrain and took measures; including backing up approach with RNAV procedure; as well as exercising caution with descents to remain at or above prescribed altitudes at each fix. Needless to say; warning was not expected; particularly after having taken precautions mentioned.
We were flying the RNAV Y 27 into SAN. We were at 4;000 feet MSL abeam the point between OKAIN and VYDDA and cleared by ATC for the visual approach. We entered direct to OKAIN into the FMGC (Flight Management and Guidance Computer) and set 3;600 feet into the altitude window on the FCU (Flight Control Unit). The Captain initiated the turn to the fix and the descent down to 3;600 feet. We were leveled off at 3;600 feet and just about to intercept the extended final and we received the 'Terrain; Terrain; Pull Up' warning. The Captain immediately initiated the recovery by raising the nose and the warning ceased right after the completion of the first sequence of the verbal warning. We only climbed a couple hundred feet and the airspeed never increased much as the Captain initiated the level off and the engine thrust began to lower. We discussed what happened and we realized that the Captain never went to TOGA power during the recovery. The increase in engine thrust was due to the AT (auto throttle) system increasing power to maintain the desired speed as he raised the nose. He said that he probably should have gone to TOGA; and I said that I should have verified that he did. I think that when I heard the engines spooling up to maintain the airspeed; I assumed that we were in TOGA and at that point my attention diverted to making sure that we were climbing. Also; since the warning almost immediately ceased; perhaps it also led us into thinking that the situation was resolved before any additional actions were required.
A319 flight crew reported receiving a GPWS terrain warning on a night visual approach to SAN.