Medium Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Situational Awareness
Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach
Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory
Human Factors; Procedure
[We] received a GPWS pull up advisory. On the way to (LSE) the First Officer who was the pilot flying along with the Captain briefed the page noting the occurrences with GPWS at that airport. As well as briefed the cold temperature altitude chart. The First Officer also remembers the recent emails from FOQA Committee reminding of these issues at this location. On the way to LSE we received direct to the airport from center. Minneapolis Center kept us high close to the airport. The FO asked the captain if they know we are using 31 instead of 36 as both are active and in use. The Captain waited and then called Center at this point we were within 20 miles of the airport. We got a descent to 6000 and later to 3500 feet. We asked for vectors for final due to a hard time locating the runway and field due to night conditions. The Center did a very poor job by not giving the requested vectors. We should have asked direct to a fix on the GPS approach into 31. We decide to declare runway in sight so were would able to descend and intercept the course better than what the Center was providing. We descended from 3500 to 2800 and now were intercepting the course from the east. Due to the fact we were inside the FAF of MUGDE and still at 2800 we had to descend at a large FPM down. With this large descent the GPWS went off telling us to pull up. The Captain advised and FO followed the command bars and responded to the FO as required when receiving the Pull-up advisory. The FO reestablished on the FPA but continued as a Visual Approach looking mostly outside. Intercepting east of course and descending caused the aircraft to be near towers in the area. With rolling hills and terrain and recent emails from the company about GPWS going off at this location causes this airport to be a high risk for potential concern. With possible warning fatigue at this airport it is always important to respond to the alerts of GPWS. Although most of the occurrences happen on 36 we received it on 31. The crew should have had Center set them up better and use the GPS approach instead of taking the Visual that Center was trying to push onto the crew. The crew should done a better job tracking the FPA. The crew should have established on final course way before inside FAF. Due to multiple reports of this issue reported by FOQA warning fatigue may happen to other pilots. LSE needs to be addressed better and Center should be aware of this situation so aircraft are set up better for the approach.
Regional jet First Officer reported receiving a GPWS terrain warning on approach to LSE.