B767-300 and 300 ER
Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Flight Crew Last 90 Days 109; Flight Crew Total 8000; Flight Crew Type 63
Training / Qualification; Situational Awareness
Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown
General Release Refused / Aircraft Not Accepted
Human Factors; Procedure; Weather
This event highlights a significant deviation from recognized and approved standardized deicing procedures by the deicing coordinator and their representatives on the ramp. Weather throughout this event was continuous light snow with varying visibilities and ceilings. We arrived at the aircraft 40 mins prior to schedule departure. The captain and I began our preflight duties. As the captain started his exterior inspection he noticed that the deice truck had started deicing the aircraft although the device crew had not informed the operating crew that they were about to begin the deice operation. This was of concern since we had not configured the aircraft for deicing and the Auxiliary Power Unit (APU) was on and the packs operating and the lower cargo door was open to accommodate loading. The captain informed the deice truck of the situation and they responded that they thought there was no crew on board even though we had been onboard for at least 20 mins with the APU operating. They ceased operations and went on to another aircraft. Following a prolonged loading event (45 mins after scheduled departure) we eventually called for deicing of our aircraft. We were informed that we had at least one other aircraft in front of us and to monitor the deice frequency for our turn. As we monitored the radio we listen to a conversation between the deice truck and a departing aircraft. The deice coordinator informed the departing aircraft that the deicing was complete and was giving them their holdover information when the aircraft in the spot next to them called the departing aircraft to inform them that their fuselage was not clean of snow. The operating aircraft captain informed deice that they were to deice the entire aircraft again. At this time the ramp deice coordinator came into our cockpit to explain the delay in the operations. My captain explained to her that it wasn't her fault but; he was concerned that we wouldn't be properly deiced given the conversations we had heard on the radio. She assured us that it would be done correctly. By now our mechanic came into the cockpit to check on our progress. He informed us that he didn't believe that the deice crews were properly deicing the aircraft. He described them having deiced then anti-iced the wings of the previously departed flight in thirds at a time. At this time we now had lost confidence that the aircraft were being properly deiced and the deice supervisor came into the cockpit. We explained to him the things we had seen and heard; yet; he was convinced that the fuselage of the aircraft wasn't required to be deiced; even though we had over 1 1/2 inches of snow on our fuselage. They continued to insist that all critical surfaces would be deiced and anti-iced but failed to recognize that snow adhering to the main fuselage and the nose of the aircraft was not legal. Only a thin layer of frost is legal to be on the fuselage. They also could not tell us the order in which the deice/ anti-ice process would occur. We insisted that the entire aircraft should be deiced before the application any anti-ice. We then proceeded to watch the deice truck attempt to deice then anti-ice just the left wing and the engine nacelle in same segmented process our mechanic had described on the previously departed aircraft. My captain then contacted the [Chief Pilot] in charge of deice who also continued to insist that only the critical surfaces of the B767 we in had to be deiced and anti-iced. We agreed that only the critical surfaces needed to be anti-iced but the whole aircraft had to be deiced. Using their logic; we would be legal to take off with any amount of frozen precipitation (snow or ice) on our fuselage as long as the critical surfaces were free and clear and anti-iced. This not a correct interpretation of the FAR's. They eventually agreed to deice the entire aircraft and anti-ice the critical surface before departure. The whole process resulted in a delay of over 3.5hrs from our schedule departure.
B767-300 First Officer reported concern with deice/anti-ice procedures used on their aircraft; as well as others.