B737-400
Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Situational Awareness; Troubleshooting; Human-Machine Interface
Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control
Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action
Procedure; Aircraft; Human Factors
We were cleared to 'line up and wait' onto Runway XX at ZZZ. We completed all checklists and were 'cleared for takeoff'. At approximately 110 kts. the Master Caution illuminated amber with FLT CONTROL enunciated. The FO (First Officer) called; 'Master Caution' and I read FLT Control. I first said that; 'I'm continuing'. I then observed the airspeed at 110 kts. and that I had over 8000 ft. of usable runway. I thought of the Gulfstream crash with the gust lock engaged and opted to reject the takeoff. I initiated the reject procedures and told the FO to call the Control Tower and inform them of our reject. I let the RTO (Rejected Takeoff) auto brakes apply brakes while I steered the aircraft on the center line and applied full reverse thrust. I began decreasing reverse thrust at approximately 70 kts. I also applied the toe brakes at 60 kts. to take the aircraft out of RTO auto brakes mode. This did not work and I could feel the RTO auto brakes still applying maximum braking. I immediately retracted the spoilers to take the aircraft out of RTO. The brakes were still being applied at maximum so I reached for the auto brakes switch and turned it off. I observed the auto brakes disarm amber light illuminate however the brakes were locked up and the wheels were not turning. The aircraft came to a complete stop just past Taxiway X. The FO was talking to the Control Tower and informing them of our situation. I then tried to taxi the aircraft to clear the active runway. The brakes were locked and would not allow the aircraft to move. The FO informed the Tower that we need a tug to be removed from the runway. The Tower asked if we needed anymore assistance with 'fire rescue' and we replied; 'no just a tug to remove us from the runway'. I called for the QRH and before we could read the first line I realized the YAW Damper failed and was the likely cause of the Master Caution light. The fire rescue showed up in a very short time and was asking if we needed assistance. I replied; 'Yes; inspect the brakes for over temperatures. The FO and I shutdown the engines and set the parking brake with rescue personnel walking around the aircraft. The fire rescue sprayed the brakes with water to cool them. After approximately 40 minutes the mechanics showed with a tug and hooked a toe bar onto the aircraft. They then attempted to move the aircraft to release the brakes and the toe bar was broken in the attempt. On the second attempt a mechanic yelled out that they blew a tire attempting to move and cool the brakes. At this point the FO and I were observers of the cleanup.[The cause was] my indecision and failure to recognize the threat. I over reacted and did not need to reject the takeoff. [I will] be much more vigilant before taking the runway and concentrate on the reasons to reject a takeoff.
A rejected takeoff was executed at ZZZ on Runway XX after a Master Caution -> FLT Control light illuminated at a speed greater than 80 kts. The aircraft came to a complete stop abeam Taxiway X with more than 4000 ft. of runway remaining. Unfortunately; the takeoff rejection resulted in the aircraft being disabled on Runway XX unable to move and ZZZ Runway XX being closed for an extended period of time while emergency crews cooled the hot brakes with water and subsequent maintenance efforts to tow/remove the aircraft from the runway.We were given clearance for takeoff on ZZZ Runway XX after a brief line up and wait; runway verified and heading checked; the takeoff clearance acknowledged; the Captain advanced thrust normally; the TOGA button pressed; and the thrust set verified. The plane accelerated normally and 80 kts. was called and cross-checked. Shortly after the 80 kts. but well before V1 a Master Caution -> FLT Control light illuminated. Shortly after; the Captain called for reject and executed the reject procedure. I got ready to key up the mike to announce the reject to ATC. I noted that the speed brakes had not deployed; but before I could make the speed brakes up call the Captain had deployed the speed brakes and the thrust reversers. The aircraft was rapidly decelerating (so I believe our speed was already near 60 kts. at this point) when the Captain stowed the thrust reversers and attempted to disarm the auto brakes first with manual braking; second with stowing the speed brake; and third with switching the auto brakes off. Seeing that the auto brake disarm light was illuminated; I wasn't understanding why the Captain would be manually braking at the rate of deceleration that we were slowing down at. For that reason; I suspected that the brakes had possibly seized. As I had advised Tower of the reject on the runway; they requested our status and asked if we could taxi off the runway. If I recall correctly; I responded with 'standby' while I conferred with the Captain and tried to assess the situation. I advised the Tower no assistance was needed as at this time we weren't sure that we couldn't taxi off the runway on our own power and there was no evidence of fire. After making an attempt to taxi the aircraft; my concern regarding the brakes was confirmed and subsequently; we informed ATC that we did need assistance as we were unable to clear the runway. While waiting for emergency personnel; I performed the after landing flow while the Captain contacted dispatch. If I recall correctly; at the time we realized that the aircraft was not going to be able to taxi on its own power; I asked the Captain if I should start the APU so that we could shut down the engines. The engines were shut down and the shutdown checklist completed. I do not recall the exact timing; but I know the engines were shut down prior to emergency personnel approaching the aircraft. Emergency personnel established communication and subsequently started spraying water on the hot brakes. Maintenance later arrived on the scene and attempted to tow the aircraft. We complied with both emergency personnel and maintenance instructions. We completed the secure checklist and informed maintenance of the APU status before leaving the aircraft.I believe I was fit to execute all of my duties for this flight operation and did make my best efforts to be well-rested for the activity. With that said; I am still adjusting to being a cargo pilot as hub turns are difficult on sleep patterns. The flight operation blocked out 45 minutes late. Additionally; I was aware of the weather at our destination possibly getting worse with a late arrival. While I do not recall either of us feeling rushed or rushing before departure or after the event; it is always prudent to be cognitive of hazards & risk factors associated with the operation (i.e. hazard and risk recognition) and applying appropriate mitigation techniques. I believe following best practices regarding briefings; communication; and standard operating procedures as precisely as possible to mitigate errors. Additionally; aircraft system knowledge and flight experience are critical for risk mitigation and safe operations.
Flight crew reported they performed a rejected takeoff in response to a Master Caution light. The brakes locked up; requiring that the aircraft be towed from the runway.