Medium Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 1.5
Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Distraction; Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness; Time Pressure
ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach
Human Factors
Aircraft X was cleared for takeoff with Aircraft Y on approximately 3.5 mile for Runway 4L with a low ceiling. Aircraft Z was following Aircraft Y less than the required 5 miles behind. As I wondered what N90 was going to do with Aircraft Z; I observed Aircraft Y speeding up. After I cleared Aircraft X for takeoff I reached out for Aircraft Y because he was not on my frequency. Aircraft Y ended up going around and speeding up talking to no one. I turned and stopped the climb of Aircraft X to try and get out of the way of Aircraft Y. They ended up 700 feet apart vertically and less than 1.5 miles laterally.The transfer of control point needs to be followed. The practice of 'frequency separation' needs to be addressed. N90 routinely will hold on to communication of aircraft that do not have wake turbulence separation until the preceding heavy jet is no longer on the radar. The reasoning is because the heavy jet has landed and if the ATPA (Automated Traffic Proximity Alert) is no longer displayed then the separation error no longer exists and the Tower can't send the aircraft around. It is used to circumnavigate the ATPA and wake turbulence separation along with avoiding re-sequencing and/or a missed approach due to wake turbulence.Runway 4L needs a Standard Instrument Departure procedure. Every 4L departure at JFK receives an amended departure procedure that changes the SID completely. The only thing that remains unchanged on the JFK5 departure procedure is the departure frequency. Every departure is instructed to maintain runway heading until JFK 1.5 DME then turn right heading 100. This procedure is to protect for the possible 4R missed approach. The amendment is confusing to pilots and vague at best. It also does not ensure where the departure will be when they turn; i.e. rate of turn; altitude of turn; climb rate; etc.Runway 4L published missed approach needs to be amended. Aircraft Y flew the beginning of the published missed approach; which will conflict with the possible 4R missed approach. Being that the SID and the published missed approach and the possible missed approach off Runway 4R all converge; it is only a matter of time before they do.
I was working LC1 Runway 4R on an IFR day with arrivals only on 119.1. LC2 was working Runway 4R with arriving and departing traffic 123.9. Aircraft Y was on about a 5 mile final with traffic on 4L about to begin departure roll; and also traffic in trail behind Aircraft Y. The traffic following Aircraft Y; Aircraft Z; had lost separation; less than 5 miles and only 500 feet vertical. LC2; who was departing traffic from 4L; was trying to get in touch with Approach Control to switch Aircraft Y since he had traffic departing from their (Aircraft Y) runway. Approach routinely holds on to traffic that has lost separation because it seems they just don't care. Approach ignored LC2 request for Aircraft Y to contact Tower 123.9. Approach Control regularly disregards requests from the Tower; and quite often; communication with controllers at N90 is tense; unprofessional; and downright harassing. I will neglect to call Approach Control because I don't want to hear bad attitudes and be subject to their unprofessional; abusive demeanor.We all noticed that Aircraft Y began to increase airspeed and start to climb. This is indicative of a missed approach; so LC2 turned his departure to a sharp right turn heading 090 to get them out of Aircraft Y's way. A few moments later; Aircraft Y checked in on my frequency; 119.1 and stated he was going around. At this same time; Aircraft Y entered 'the main bang' and I could not verify his heading. Instead; the radar displayed an estimated track for Aircraft Y which; based on his last heading; was estimated to be 040. I told Aircraft Y to fly present heading; wrongly assuming he was still tracking runway heading. He replied he was flying the published missed approach procedure; and at about this same time he exited 'the main bang' and my radar display corrected to his correct position; directly over the 4L departure. The data block for Aircraft Y was obscured by this 4L departure. I began to issue a turn to Aircraft Y and mid instruction stopped myself because I was unsure where I should have turned him to avoid this 4L departure. LC2 told me he stopped the departures climb at 1500; and I should climb Aircraft Y. I instructed Aircraft Y to begin an immediate climb to 3000. After this; the 4L departure continued on a 090 heading and Aircraft Y was well above him and conflict had been solved and separation re-established.After this; while this isn't really part of this scenario but related; Approach refused to have traffic on approach Runway 4R contact my frequency 119.1 for landing clearance. Twice in a row; I asked Approach to have traffic contact my frequency short final. And then after this; Approach started to have traffic on final contact me outside the transfer of control point. At one point; a flight contacted me so far away he was outside my displayed range on my radar display. This confused me so I called Approach to ask if I should have this traffic; to which they only responded 'YES!' This is just another example of N90's disregard for safety and professionalism on landlines and transfer of control.This whole scary scenario is a direct result of N90's unprofessional landline communication and their willingness to continue traffic behind heavy jet traffic after separation has been lost. If Aircraft Y had been instructed to contact Tower at the appropriate time; Aircraft Y would have been on the correct frequency; and traffic information would have been exchanged sooner; and possibly LC2 may have elected to not depart Runway 4L if he had ever known Aircraft Y was not properly established. A quick conversation with the pilot can clarify this. If N90 was able to communicate with a safety orientated goal instead of their never ending pissing match; they could have communicated better with LC2 as to the traffic scenario that was quickly developing and more proactive action could have taken place. Instead; Aircraft Y was never issued a frequency change and elected to fly the published missed absent control instructions; putting them in direct conflict with the 4L departure LC2 had already tried to get out of the way. Aircraft Y contacting my 119.1 frequency because it is just the default Tower frequency; it appears he was never issued a frequency change.A total review of N90's inter-facility communication procedures should take place; with emphasis being put on professionalism and respect for their fellow controllers and union members. The importance of timely transfer of control should also be stressed so Tower personnel can safely separate unusual traffic situations like this from routine departing traffic; or to try and re-establish separation between flights who have lost/are losing separation on approach.
JFK Local Controllers and air carrier flight crew reported an airborne conflict which was attributed to the Approach Control being behind and not doing what was expected.