Helicopter
Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 1.5
Time Pressure; Workload; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown; Confusion
ATC Issue All Types; Conflict NMAC
Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Airport; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors; Procedure
Helicopter X checked on my frequency inbound and was instructed to enter right downwind runway 30; pilot read back instruction. I made a few other calls to other airmen in my traffic pattern to sequence; and clear while simultaneously receiving a call from Helicopter Y on the ground at the FBO. I did not have a departure strip for helicopter Y and coordinated with ground to give helicopter Y taxi instructions to my runway for intersection departure. I observed Helicopter X on right downwind; as instructed passing the midpoint of the runway. During all of this I was also receiving a coordination request verbally from the other local controller beside me regarding inbound instructions to other arrivals outside of the airspace. Later Helicopter X reported on right base runway 30 and was promptly instructed to turn back to the downwind and extend. The pilot read back the instruction and I observed Helicopter X on a base heading in a left turn back to the downwind. I continued sequencing and clearing other aircraft in the pattern and as I was making one transmission to another airmen I lost sight of Helicopter X; on the extended right downwind; behind two controllers in the tower cab conducting a position relief briefing at the Operational Supervisor in Charge desk. I stood up to regain sight of Helicopter X flying directly through the final approach course for runway 30; approximately 1 mile final. There was already a C172; approaching 1 mile final cleared for runway 30. Helicopter X appeared disoriented and was flying very fast for the phase of flight they were in (VFR traffic pattern). I sent Cessna around and asked Helicopter X if they had the airport environment in sight. The pilot responded in the affirmative and I instructed them to turn around and intercept final for runway 30. At that time the pilot reported a NMAC with the fixed wing (Cessna). Helicopter X continued on a south heading through final and now approaching the opposite downwind. I issued a suggested heading to fly to Helicopter X to reorient the pilot on the opposite downwind and the pilot read it back. I then issued a sequence number 2 and pointed out traffic on base to final; another Cessna; to follow. I observed Helicopter X now on an easterly heading approaching final for runway 30; opposite direction again. I asked the pilot his heading; he read back an easterly heading that was 35 degrees off from what I had suggested. At that point I made the decision to make Helicopter X #1 to the runway and climb the two Cessna's I had originally planned for Helicopter X to follow on final above pattern altitude to overfly the runway. I coordinated with ground for the taxi route of Helicopter X to legend and issued instructions to Helicopter X to taxi to the FBO after landing. I asked Helicopter X if he was familiar and the pilot responded in the affirmative.Runway 30/12 operations at this airport are already faced with many obstructions to views causing difficulties for controllers. Although the runway is visible; aircraft holding short of the runway are blocked by a building. There is a CCTV (Closed-circuit Television) camera that faces this blind spot but it has been a black screen in the tower cab (OTS) for almost a full year. Radar coverage is very poor SW of the airport and that is typically where the fixed wing traffic pattern/inbounds are on runway 30/12 ops. On this particular day; the radar was a black screen due to a widespread outage. There are antennas that protrude through the visual scan of the runway from the perspective of the tower cab. The tower cab position configuration puts the CIC; FD; CD; and GC all in-between the LC1 controller and runway 12/30 creating obstructions to view when controllers stand (position relief; making the ATIS; people walking up the stairs into the tower cab; not enough chairs; etc.)I would recommend that all controllers be aware of the distraction that simply entering the operations area (especially a small VFR tower) and relieving another controller may create; and to act accordingly to minimize the negative impact to the controllers on position.
I was working Local Assist at the time of the incident. There was a CIC/Operational Supervisor in Charge position relief briefing happening. I do not know if there were an obstruction of view for the LC1 position. When on RWY 30 the local controller views out the window towards the CIC position in the tower. We were working an inner/outer configuration with our two local controllers. At about XA30L that day we lost all radar; landlines; phone lines; and internet capability. Approach also was limited to only one frequency in their whole facility. I recall when Helicopter X checked in with LC1 he was instructed to proceed direct to the tower and enter a right downwind for RWY 30. The pilot acknowledged. His next call was turning base. Cessna was on 1.5-2 mile final for RWY 30 at this time; LC1 told Helicopter X to extend downwind and turn left. A few seconds later I observed Helicopter X not making the turn and still heading towards final at Cessna. I told the LC1 he was heading at the Cessna on final. Helicopter X then gave him an instruction to turn right 180 to re-intercept final. The helicopter reported a NMAC and LC1 sent Cessna around. Cessna reported the helicopter intercepted final. LC1 then issued a suggested heading of 120 to put the helicopter on the left downwind. There was another Cessna on final that was issued to climb to 065 to get out of the way of the helicopter attempting to rejoin final.Everything that day was a mess due to the loss of all the equipment and radar. We were unable to use the radar as an aid to assist in finding aircraft entering the class Delta airspace. Helicopter X took base early and after told to remain on downwind still headed towards the final corridor. Had he taken the left turn and remained on downwind the NMAC would have never happened.
Two Tower controllers and a Helicopter pilot describe a near miss at a busy airport where communications and radar were hampered by outages.