Regional Jet 200 ER/LR (CRJ200)
Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine
Human-Machine Interface; Distraction; Workload
Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action
Human Factors
On the arrival into the ZZZ area; ATC kept us high due to departing IFR traffic. We heard the departing traffic calling ATC on the radio after departure; but got no response. Because we were getting very close to the airport; we elected to reduce speed in order to make the impending descent easier to manage. We were monitoring both the ATC Center frequency and the CTAF frequency at ZZZ. There was a significant amount of General Aviation traffic operating in the vicinity of the ZZZ airport. As the speed was reduced below 200 knots; the First Officer; who was the PF; asked for Flaps 8 and 20. I verified that the speed was below 200 knots and selected Flaps 8 and 20. As soon as I selected Flaps 20 I realized we were still at 16;000 ft.; and said; 'We can't do that yet;' and immediately retracted the Flaps back to 0.  At this point we were only six or seven miles from the airport; still at 16;000 ft. We had identified the traffic threats on TCAS. In order to initiate our descent to the airport; we canceled IFR. After descending through 15;000 feet the First Officer again asked for Flaps 8 and 20. Because we had extended the flaps earlier above 16;000 feet; I was focused on the altitude. Due to the fact that we had slowed to below 200 knots the first time we extended the flaps; I failed to look at the airspeed indicator; thinking we were still below 200 knots. We were discussing the maneuver we would need to make to circle around and descend to the airport at the time. ATC and CTAF radio traffic was also heavy at the time. As soon as the flaps were selected the overspeed clacker started up. I looked at the airspeed indicator; saw that we were above 200 knots; and reached for the flap lever with the intent of retracting the flaps. At this point I'm unclear what EXACTLY happened next.  There was some turbulence; we were beginning our turn; and there was a lot of radio traffic.  We were also focused on the traffic displayed on the TCAS. All of this created a great deal of distraction. My hand was on the flap lever at the time; with the intent of retracting the flaps. Whether it was because of turbulence causing me to inadvertently move the lever; or me simply moving it the wrong way because of the distractions; I did; in fact; move the flap lever to 45. The overspeed clacker; interestingly enough; added to the momentary confusion. In fact; at one point I believe the First Officer said; 'What the hell is going on?' I was mortified to see the indication that the flaps were at 45; because there was no intent; plan; or call for further flap extensions. It was simply a mistake. I immediately retracted the flaps to zero. We did not receive any message associated with a flap problem; i.e. 'Flaps Fail'; etc. After everything calmed down and things were back in order; we continued the approach; which ended up resulting in a go-around because a general aviation aircraft cut us off on short final. After landing and proceeding to the gate; I wrote up the flap limitation exceedance. Maintenance arrived later; inspected the flaps; performed functional checks; found no irregularities; and returned the aircraft to service.In my opinion there were several factors contributing to the event. Distraction was probably the primary cause. We were distracted by all the radio traffic on the CTAF frequency. Sometimes it was difficult to differentiate between the CTAF traffic and the Center traffic. Also; being left so high so late on the arrival created a self-imposed sense of immediacy...'We need to get down'. Interesting to note that this urgency was never 'real'; but rather something we imposed on ourselves. Assumption was another contributing factor. Because we had originally slowed to below 200 knots; I assumed we were still at that airspeed when flaps were requested the second time. This assumption caused me to neglect the airspeed indicator before selecting the flaps because I was more concerned about the altitude.This is primarily an exercise in self-discipline and patience. The training and procedures are all in place to help prevent these types of events from occurring. It simply becomes incumbent on each pilot to be disciplined enough to not allow external factors to get in the way of simple; straight-forward procedures that can and will keep the aircraft; passengers; and crew safe.
CRJ-200 Captain reported an uneventful go-around due to an unstable approach which was caused by multiple distractions.