Lancair 360
Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Flight Engineer; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine
Flight Crew Last 90 Days 78; Flight Crew Total 23000; Flight Crew Type 300
Situational Awareness; Distraction
Conflict NMAC
Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Human Factors
Both aircraft [involved in the NMAC] were training. One was in the VFR traffic pattern and the other was flying a straight in ILS approach from TFD VOR. Both were making radio position calls in the blind. Even though calls were being made; some were not being heard because of the instruction being conducted. The point where the VFR traffic pattern base leg meets final and merges with the ILS final is a hot spot and potentially dangerous situation. In this case neither aircraft noticed the other until a [near] mid-air collision. The shadow of the ILS aircraft was noticed by the traffic pattern aircraft and upon looking up; the ILS aircraft was approximately 50 ft directly above the traffic pattern aircraft which turned to the right to gain separation. Both aircraft were on frequency and reporting positions. We were very fortunate there was not a mid-air. This brought to my attention that I should limit instruction and be more vigilant in this situation. This airport is uncontrolled and has heavy instrument training and VFR traffic so there is an unusually high potential for a mid-air.
We entered left hand traffic pattern for RW 05 over the top of the airport. We called our position 3 miles south of the airport; and again on top at a pattern altitude of 3000 MSL. We entered left downwind for RW 05 and called our position again. There were approximately 2-3 aircraft in the stack at Stanfield VOR and we heard this traffic on frequency. There were several aircraft whose radio calls were unintelligible or difficult to understand due to foreign language speaking pilots in the stack at Stanfield. I was also receiving instruction while in the pattern and was distracted and don't recall making my base and final turn calls. When we were approximately on 1/4 mile final at approximately 500 feet AGL; we saw a shadow in the cockpit and looked up to see a Diamond DA20 approximately 40 feet above us that immediately started climbing away from us and staying on RW heading. We continued descending and landed normally on RW 05 and taxied back for takeoff. The pilot (or instructor) in the Diamond called on the radio and stated that it was the closest near miss that he had ever encountered and asked about radio calls. I stated on the radio that we had made several calls entering the pattern and we hadn't heard his approach and final call either. As we were departing the airport; we again heard the pilot ask others in the pattern if they had heard 'the experimental's calls in the pattern' and one other pilot responded that he did hear the 'on top' and the 'downwind' calls clearly.Contributing Factors - Distraction of training and conversation that was underway in the cockpit while on downwind/base/final. Difficulty in hearing location reports from other pilots in pattern and not confirming where these aircraft were before continuing the approach.Corrective Actions - More concerted efforts in establishing location and number of aircraft in airport pattern before beginning approach. Don't let language barrier be an impediment to full understanding of where targets are. Be more diligent about consistent and quality reports of our location in the pattern.
Lancair 360 instructor and student pilot reported a NMAC on final approach to CGZ airport.