B757-200
Flight Crew Last 90 Days 60; Flight Crew Total 12000; Flight Crew Type 60
Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness
Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown
General Work Refused
Aircraft; Human Factors
While reviewing the logbook; the Captain advised that the Hydraulic Quantity Indicator DMI (Daily Maintenance Inspection) had been performed two days earlier. I reminded him that the MEL required an inspection and logbook entry prior to the departure. The Captain asked the Mechanic on duty; who also had done the inspection two days earlier; whether his inspection after our previous flight sufficed inasmuch as the aircraft had not moved in two days. When he replied that it did the Captain had him call Maintenance Control; who concurred with the local maintenance personnel. The Captain accepted the DMI log with the Mechanic's ID number as sufficient sign off.I advocated that if required inspection was not going to be entered in the logbook as prior to departure inspections are required to be entered we should at least have the Mechanic inspect the system visually as required 'Prior To Departure' to ensure proper fluid quantity today; not as seen two days earlier. The Captain reiterated that the visual inspection was done but that the Mechanic was not going to make any logbook entries and [since] the Captain concurred with the Mechanic 'everyone was now happy.'On arrival in our destination I pulled up the associated maintenance chapter and reviewed the procedures required when either a pilot or a mechanic performs an inspection 'required prior to departure' as referenced in the MEL; and determined it requires it requires a logbook entry after each 'before departure inspection' is performed. Discussion with another company Mechanic confirmed that the proper entry is on a logbook page and the airworthiness carried over to yet another logpage was the correct procedure.Subsequently the Captain provided subpar CRM upon lecturing me that I should stop trying to do everyone else's job. Even after I tried to explain that my objective was correct performance and subsequent protection from FAA ramp inspections. The Captain's subpar CRM affected subsequent events in the flight including using the improper checklist for an in-flight electronic system malfunction and a post-flight lecture on how my 'inferiority complex' was a 'danger to flight' just drove the effectiveness of CRM through the floor. Twice I have flown with this Captain and twice the CRM atmosphere was disastrous. When I remarked to the Captain that perhaps less 'you' and more 'we' concerning the CRM environment in his cockpit was a more constructive approach [he made it clear the] conversation was over on his part.
A rancorous cockpit atmosphere was a poor substitute for effective CRM when a disagreement about a required maintenance preflight inspection of the Hyraulic Quantity Indicator; performed two days earlier after the aircraft's last flight; was accepted as an adequate pre-departure check by the Captain of the B757-200; but not by the Reporter/First Officer.