Falcon 900
Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor
Flight Crew Last 90 Days 80; Flight Crew Total 4000; Flight Crew Type 100
Communication Breakdown; Workload
Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
General None Reported / Taken
Human Factors
I was scheduled to fly a six leg day in the Falcon. On the preceding day; I spent several hours doing the necessary preflight preparations to assess the weather; runway lengths; and fuel options for the lengthy day. The scheduled trips involved extra attention to runway lengths; performance numbers; terrain; and passenger loads in addition to coping with less than ideal weather. With the flight plans filed and a plan of where to purchase fuel; sufficient for the performance required; I felt prepared for the upcoming day.[The night before the flight; I] did a final check of the weather. It looked like it was going to be an interesting day ahead with the remnants of a hurricane lurking on the east coast. I went to sleep feeling ready to accomplish the flights safely.[The morning of the flight] I did the entire preflight and loaded the catering before the Captain arrived. When he arrived and picked up our manifest; we discussed the weather and the difficulties of the day. At this point in time; the Captain seemed stressed and concerned as he announced that our risk assessment was in the yellow or approaching the yellow for the entire day; which I concurred with. Winds; weather; and runway length were the greatest contributors.Due to performance issues and terrain; the Captain elected to fly the [first two] legs. These legs occurred smoothly; even when weather deteriorated and we had to shoot the LDA down to minimums. I did the best I could to encourage the Captain to use the new checklist and FMS cues that are now in our manual. The Captain did not use the new procedures and preferred to use TCS instead of calling for a climb mode. Instead of requesting the Pilot Monitoring to move the knobs which is our Standard Operating Procedures; the Captain would turn the heading and yaw damp buttons for himself even after I had solicited their selection. This resistance to newly establish procedures set the tone for the rest of the legs to follow.After landing in VFR conditions and a quick turn; the Captain asked me to fly the [next] leg. At the time of departure; the winds in [destination] were less than 20kts and the ceilings were around 2000 ft; however the weather was deteriorating faster than forecasted. The flight was a short hop and my approach briefing was interrupted with a runway change that would leave us high and fast for a closer runway. Soon we were getting radar vectors for the ILS 13L approach and I was required to re-brief the approach. As the Pilot Monitoring prepared the FMS and I finished briefing the procedure; we were given a speed restriction of 180kts. During our vectors; I announced that we were too high to be capturing the glide slope based on our present position. I advised the Pilot Monitoring that we were above glideslope intercept. The weather conditions were quickly deteriorating and we were experiencing moderate turbulence and wind shear.ATC removed our speed restriction and issued a turn about 3 miles from the final approach fix. This because this was a close turn onto final; I called for the Pilot Monitoring to lower Flap/Slats 1. The Pilot Monitoring did not lower the Flaps/Slats and shook his head while saying; 'ummmmmm not yet'. As the designated Pilot Flying; I announced again; that I wanted to slow down to go down. I asked the Pilot Monitoring to verify that our speed restriction was canceled and he did not respond. I wondered why the Pilot Monitoring did not configure the aircraft right before the final approach fix. Standard Operating Procedures require the pilots to configure the aircraft before the final approach segment to ensure that the speed is stable and that the aircraft is in a safe condition for the approach and landing.At that time; ATC issued our turn onto final saying; 'maintain 2100 until established; cleared for the approach and contact tower'. For the third time; I called for Flaps/Slats 1 and requested for the gear to be extended. Instead of moving the flightcontrols; the Pilot Monitoring called the tower and set the altitude select to 2100 feet. During this entire time; the aircraft was at an acceptable speed to configure. After he was done with his radio call I asked him for the fourth time; for Flaps/Slats 1 as I began spinning the Vertical Speed knob down to catch the glideslope below us. As I was descending to capture the glideslope; the Pilot Monitoring shouted; 'you're going to be too fast.' The speed was 180 with an increasing trend; and I responded by deploying Air Brakes 1. [Our] speed stayed 180 or less while we were experiencing windshear of +/- 10-15 knots consistently. The Pilot Monitoring notes we will be too fast for the approach without configuring; and decides to respond to my four previous requests to configure the aircraft. At the same time; as the Pilot Monitoring yells; 'We're too fast;' I disengage the auto throttles and retard the power because the automation was not keeping up with the gusty conditions. I knew that managing the power manually would be safer for the approach.  I turned the auto throttles off with one click; which did not promptly silence the warning; just as I heard the Pilot Monitoring announce the GS intercept. As we caught up with the glideslope and the plane began to raise the nose to the three degree path; the Pilot Monitoring was still prompting me to slow down. The auto throttle cue was still chiming and the Pilot Monitoring was distracted enough by it to vocalize; 'turn it OFF already; or I'm going to do it' and began to reach over to shut it off. I responded with 'I've got it' and silenced it with my thumb. Despite my efforts to slow down and become configured on the approach in a standard manner; I allowed the plane to get too slow for the turbulent and windy conditions; because I chose to listen to the Pilot Monitoring rather than fly the aircraft according to my experience and training. In the bumpy conditions; as the airspeed decayed; the low speed cue protection system announced; 'increase speed'. I responded by pushing the power levers forward half way and noting the aircraft speed to be 137 and increasing. The Pilot Monitoring's response was to yell; 'POWER' and 'what the hell' as [he] chose to retract the air brakes. Windshear of +/- 10-15 knots continued and the 'increase speed warning' was heard again. This time; as I was pushing the power levers all the way forward; the Pilot Monitoring came from behind and pushed my hands all the way forward while yelling; 'POWER' to make sure the power levers were at maximum. After a couple seconds; and again verifying the speed was safe; I reduced the power levers to an appropriate setting for the approach. This recovery was followed by a series of berating shouts; 'come on....You can't do this to me; I thought you were better than this... Do you have this or not?' To which I responded; 'I got it'.  Once I called that the aircraft was stable; I was using the thrust vector guidance and the the flight director to keep the aircraft on track with the approach. Due to the turbulence; our speed continued to be +/- 10kts and occasionally +/- 15. I called for Flaps/Slats 2 and Pilot Monitoring extended them. I selected to fly 145 with manual speeds based on our calculated approach speed. Instead; the Pilot Monitoring then reached across and selected manual speed of 150 with no explanation. Standard Operating Procedure is for the Pilot Flying to call for the approach speed to be set; and for the Pilot Monitoring to set the requested speed. I decided to maintain the higher approach speed to ride out the bumps. I called for FS3 (Flaps/Slats 3) and then we broke out of the clouds and continued visually the rest of the way to the runway. There was a crosswind at about 45 degrees to the wet runway; gusting over 29kts as I touched down.     As we taxied across the Bravo Bridge to the FBO; the Pilot Monitoring was still upset and continued to verbalize that I shouldn't have allowed the airplane to get that slow. I apologized and continued to pay attention to the taxi route.After giving a lot of thought to the details leading up to the LSC (low speed condition) event; I can accept full responsibility for allowing the aircraft to get too slow on approach. If I had exercised more focus and superior airmanship; I would have put my full attention on flying the aircraft and I would have caught it before I ever got that slow. I fully understand that I should never have become distracted enough with the failure in communication to allow my instrument scan to slow down. Based on my experience as a 4000 hour pilot; I knew we were already high above the glideslope when I noticed how tightly we were being vectored. Because of this; I called for Flaps/Slats 1 and gear down. When the Pilot Monitoring did not act or respond to my requests as the Pilot Flying; I should either deployed the air brakes to slow for the approach or called to go-around. Looking back; with 100 hours of experience [in this] aircraft; I let my focus shift because of the Pilot Monitoring's lack of action to configure.  This inhibited my ability to stay ahead of the aircraft. Likewise; turning off the auto throttles without turning [off] the autopilot provided a false sense of security. In the future I will maintain a speed that is more conservatively above approach speed and below the FS (Flaps/Slats) and gear limitations. I will use the air brakes as required to be at the appropriate speed when the Pilot Monitoring cannot or will not configure the aircraft. Also; if the air brakes are out; I will keep my hand on the lever to remind myself to stow them when the speed is acceptable. If I deem that the auto throttles are not keeping up with the required speed; I will disengage both the autopilot and auto throttles to obtain a more real feeling of flying and controlling the aircraft. Finally; when CRM is failing in the cockpit; I will do my best to aviate; navigate; then communicate. If I had been aviating and not fixated on our poor communication and the fact that Pilot Monitoring was delaying our configuration of the aircraft until the last possible second; I would have caught the speed decreasing as the autopilot raised the nose to join the normal glideslope. Other safe and appropriate options in our situation would be to request a go around or vectors back to final.  The next time that I feel the crew does not have the aircraft configured at the final approach fix and is not ready for the approach; I will resist the temptation to fall into the hazardous attitude of 'Get-there-itis'.
Falcon 900 First Officer reported weather and crew resource management issues complicated the approach into JFK.