PA-28 Cherokee/Archer/Dakota/Pillan/Warrior
Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Private
Flight Crew Last 90 Days 36; Flight Crew Total 209; Flight Crew Type 21
Situational Awareness
ATC Issue All Types; Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution
Aircraft; Human Factors
While flying on a VFR flight plan during night hours; I noticed that the lights beneath me were beginning to disappear. Having learned during my IFR training that this is an indicator of clouds; I made no hesitation to call Center; whom I was already on flight following with and requested an IFR clearance. As I was already at 11;500 feet MSL; I expected they would give me 13;000 as an altitude. I intended at that point to divert north; since continued flight in the present course would require higher than my plane was capable of; not to mention not having oxygen on board; I would not be able to stay up here longer than 30 minutes. Center came back and asked what type of equipment I had; and requested a climb to 16;000. I was shocked and said I was unable. They insisted that I had to climb for terrain shortly in front of me; although my on board equipment showed me at least a few thousand feet above any forbidding terrain. After all; I filed VFR for 11;500; not intending to climb to 13;500 until shortly before Rollins Pass (12;000 ft MSL; roughly). I indicated I would try; but likely would need 13;000 and a turn north to facilitate compliance with oxygen requirements. After I got close to 14;000; I hesitated to attempt further climbing for fear that I might compromise the flight; and the service ceiling was quickly being reached as my VSI was only indicating a bare climb. Just as I was ready to call and say I needed to turn north now and go lower; my airspeed indicator stopped indicating. Given my height and apparent spatial disorientation due to oxygen; I responded as though I was about to stall; as it felt like it to me. Having trained not to stall in IMC; I felt my action was proactive. I verified my altitude above ground with my on board equipment; quickly viewed my nearby options to land; and turned north as I quickly descended. I then called Center and advised them of my airspeed indicator failure and my intention. Needless to say; I felt like in the given condition; that I had about 3 minutes to live if I continued to descend and could not get below or out of the clouds. Surely; ice had caused my airspeed indicator to fail. I verified the pitot heat was on and arrested my descent at 13;000 feet MSL. I was given a heading of 020 and reminded that Dixon was closest to me. While I considered it a last ditch option; I noted the weather and conditions at Shively were better. Since I was in positive control of the airplane; having averted a near disaster; I indicated I was heading for Shively. Once able; I requested to descend below the clouds to get a visual of the field. I landed and checked for ice buildup. Thankfully; there was none.I believe that action sooner to prevent having to fly into the clouds would have kept me from having to request an IFR clearances during night IMC; resulting in sending me higher into the clouds. I believe that in the future; though my intended flight plan and weather briefing was going to put me in the vicinity of cloud layers right at the time the sun was coming up; avoiding high altitude with clouds in a plane not designed for high performance will keep me alive longer. I believe I relied on my tools too much to carry me; instead of only using them as a means of avoiding danger. The problem arose when I didn't find a suitable option for continuing; instead of entering the clouds at night. Contributing factors were center not recognizing the capability of my aircraft and sending me higher into the clouds instead of heading my request to stay below them. Additionally; I let myself take direction from Center; instead of asserting my pilot-in-command authority until a situation arose that I needed to act immediately. Obviously a problem was discovered when my reaction was improperly abrupt and I could feel the effects of the altitude. I; again; let myself receive direction; instead of acting as pilot in command and staying low enough for the capability of my physiology and aircraft. However;once I noticed my error; I took immediate corrective actions by putting the nose over and descending to an altitude I wanted to be at; and requested a safer direction of flight. My perception that I was entering a stall really calls to light the validity of human physiology and hypoxia training. It's very true; that in such difficult and stressing conditions; judgments are affected. However; I'm thankful my resolve to get down and be safe was not affected. I did not become macho; but instead decided I needed to take control and get on the ground as soon as able. Honestly; I am a mixed bag of emotions still; having lived when I could have easily died; and having let myself get there in the first place.
PA-28 pilot reports encountering IMC on a night VFR flight at 11;500 feet and requesting an IFR clearance. The clearance is granted with a climb to 16;000 feet due to MEA considerations; which was not expected by the reporter. At 14;000 feet the airspeed indicator stops working and a descent is initiated and a request is made to divert to a suitable airport; which is accomplished.