Widebody Transport
Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Flight Crew Last 90 Days 80
Situational Awareness; Fatigue
Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach
Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; General Maintenance Action
Human Factors
This flight was an IOE trip with myself; a PIC conducting OE [Operating Experience] for an upgrade captain.  I was the PF [Pilot Flying] as the upgrade captain had numerous previous legs and requested a leg as PM [Pilot Monitoring].  The crew was augmented with an additional FO [First Officer] and IRO [International Relief Officer].  The flight progressed normally until the arrival into SDF.  A visual approach was planned to 35R backed up by an RNAV approach.  I used the RNAV approach for backup because the upgrade captain had only seen one non-precision approach during OE. We were cleared for the arrival and expected to land on 35R.  The arrival was normal until approaching DLAMP when we were cleared to 4000 ft.  DLAMP has a published altitude of +6000 and 210 kts.  I called for 4000 ft. in the altitude window and asked the PM to clear the /+6000 restriction at DLAMP.  On clearing the restriction; I observed the 210 kt profile was also cleared and FMS speed intervened (speed select 210) to comply with the speed.  I actually had to select 230 since we had not extended slats and out min clean speed was about 230.  After rolling out on downwind I called for slats and re-selected 210.  I observed oncoming traffic for the north runways and elected stay on profile to 4000.  We were subsequently cleared to 3000 ft but I stayed on profile for fuel efficiency believing that we would have an extended downwind.  After passing GETTA I expected the aircraft to descend to 3000 ft. but since GETTA is the exit fix for the arrival the FMS leveled the aircraft at 4000 ft.  I selected level change to descend to 3000 ft.  ATC turned us to base leg shortly after passing GETTA.  I accepted the turn and then realized we were going to be too high to descend on profile and called for flaps 15.  We then accepted a clearance for a visual approach to 35R and I called for direct PARCL with a 348 intercept to comply with note 4 on the published approach.  Once that intercept was in the FMS I selected NAV to get at least one magenta field in the FMS (We were still in speed select and level change in the other fields).  I asked the PM to set MDA in the ALT window but realized we were not going to reach profile prior to PARCL.  I called for gear down and flaps 28 but we were still above flaps 35 speed. I disconnected the AP in an effort to level the aircraft to slow but that effort was futile.  At 1700 AGL I announced to the PM that this wasn't going to work and he agreed.  At 1500 ft AGL I called for missed approach. Since we only had about 1000 ft to climb;  I wanted to select level change rather than hit the TOGA button which would give us go-around thrust but MDA was still set in the altitude window so I hit the TOGA button (probably should have just used VS but it didn't occur to me until too late).  We executed the missed approach but I was still hand flying and overshot the 3000 ft clearance by about 200 ft.  We notified ATC of the deviation.  I also over sped the flaps in the process of trying to maintain level flight and documented this overspeed in the aircraft logbook and event report.Once leveled off I re-established autoflight and we were vectored for a second approach.  I briefed the same approach and it progressed normally until base leg.  When cleared for the approach; I initiated a turn to intercept final.  I intended to call for direct PARCL with a 348 intercept as we had done previously but I apparently called for direct PGSUS instead.  The PM gave me what I asked for.  PGSUS was behind us so the aircraft began a left turn across final rather than a right turn to intercept.  I disconnected the autopilot to correct the aircraft flight path but could not avoid overshooting  the final approach course.  The PM notified ATC of this deviation.  I gave up on automation and hand flew a visual approach to 35R; landing uneventfully.     We did have both augmented crewmembers in the cockpit observing this approach and landing.  I would like to emphasize that all other crewmembers were instrumental in calling deviations and helping me to mitigate the errors.  I am humiliated by my performance and take full responsibility for any consequences.  I had ample opportunity for crew rest prior to the flight but found myself not mentally alert per my normal standard and after the initial error; struggling to get back ahead of the aircraft. I am submitting this report to hopefully aid in data collection and help those that follow to learn from my mistakes.
This flight had a crew of 4 due to Captain Upgrade IOE and flight leg over 8 hours. OE [Operating Experience] instructor was PF [Pilot Flying] and student in left seat was PM [Pilot Monitoring]. There was a Captain and an FO [First Officer] acting as relief officers and they were both in the cockpit observer seats for the descent; approach; missed approach and subsequent landing. PF got behind on the approach (RNAV 35R) and initiated G/A [Go-around] at approx. 1;500 feet AGL. The TOGA button was pressed; PM announced GA to tower and tower issued instruction to climb to 3;000 feet on RWY HDG. Somewhere during all of this PF turned off the autopilot and PM dialed 3;000 feet into the altitude select window. Due to the application of GA Thrust the airplane was climbing at a great rate and PF overshot the selected altitude by approx. 200 feet. The tower was notified and they indicated that there was no problem and to descend and maintain 3;000 feet.
Air Carrier flight crew describes an unstabilized approach with the Check Captain flying from the right seat that results in a go-around. On the go around the assigned altitude is exceeded and the flap speed may have been exceeded. The second approach is stabilized but has an initial overshoot into the adjacent approach path. Fatigue was cited as a possible factor.