Large Transport
Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Flight Crew Last 90 Days 180; Flight Crew Total 13000; Flight Crew Type 750
Workload; Time Pressure; Situational Awareness; Human-Machine Interface; Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Distraction
ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach
Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Human Factors; Aircraft; Procedure; Airspace Structure; Airport; Company Policy
The STARs; transitions; approaches; and typical ATC handling into Mexico City (MMMX) are likely to contribute to a safety incident sometime in the very near future. Over the past year; I have flown into MMMX as a [large transport] Captain approximately 6 times. Some of my observations:STARs and TRANSITIONS - Coming from the northwest quadrant on all of my MMMX arrivals; I have always flown the KOBEK4A or 4B arrivals. On my last entry into MMMX; these arrivals had been renamed as TIKEB1A or 1B arrivals.1. These arrival profiles keep arriving aircraft much too high; too close in to the airport on arrival. In fact; one must use full speed brakes once passing SL303 in order to remain on profile.2. On the STAR procedure for the TIKEB1A (p. 10-2); the fix (IAF) after SLM is annotated as MATEO (SMO). However; the transition to the RNAV (GPS) ILS 05R on page 11-0 is over a fix called MAVEK; NOT SMO.3. It turns out that these two fixes are geographically co-located. Nowhere; on any of our JeppFD-Pro charts; is it annotated as such. The only way that pilots might discover this is when they program the FMC and they notice that both fixes are on top of one another.ATC HANDLING1. On the TIKEB1A; passing SL303; ATC routinely clears you direct to MAVEK at 12;000 feet to fly the MAVEK transition to RNAV (GPS) ILS 05R and to maintain 250 KTS. You are already barely maintaining altitude profile with full speed brakes deployed and now ATC asks you to cut the corner; decreasing the distance to fly and thus the time available to descend. The only way to handle this is to wait until you are below the max flaps extend altitude (20;000 feet); and then cheat on the airspeed by slowing to 240 KTS; extend flaps to 5 (with speed brakes STILL fully extended) and continue the descent. 2. Eventually; the pilot must slow further; extend flaps to 10 (still with speed brakes fully deployed) in order to cross MAVEK at 12;000 feet and 160 KTS in accordance with the MAVEK Transition (p. 11-0).3. On several of my arrivals into MMMX; I have been harassed by ATC about my airspeed approaching MAVEK. Apparently; they feel that 160 KTS is too slow over MAVEK. They are probably correct. We could probably increase the speed a bit over MAVEK and still easily be stabilized by the time we turn final. However; our [company] MAVEK Transition chart (11-0) instructs us to cross MAVEK at 12;000 feet/160 KTS and that is what we do. I realize that the notes say that it is a 'suggested profile' but we all know what would happen if something goes wrong and the pilot is not flying the [company] 'suggested profile'.4. On one of my arrivals into MMMX; ATC told me to keep the speed up approaching MAVEK (I believe that he wanted 250 KTS!!!) We told him that we were unable. Shortly thereafter; he called traffic for us at our 6 o'clock and 2 miles. Shortly after THAT; he made US execute a missed approach. This was right about the point where we were turning onto final; inside of MEX05. I have NEVER seen a preceding aircraft waved off for spacing with the aircraft behind him; unless the trailing aircraft was experiencing an in-flight emergency. The preceding aircraft on approach is; by definition; at a lower altitude than the trailing aircraft and thus it is much more hazardous to wave off the preceding aircraft than the trailing aircraft. We also routinely practice and expect to execute a Missed Approach when we are on final; aligned with the runway. Having us execute a missed approach while we were initiating the turn to final was pretty challenging but I am happy to say that it was flown safely despite the unexpected nature of the whole event.APPROACHES - As challenging as it is to get there on profile; once you are able to meet the 12;000 feet/160 KT gate over MAVEK on the transition; you are well set up for a stable approach to 05R. HOWEVER:1. When you roll out onto final; it turns out that the RNAV course and glideslope are NOT ALIGNED withthe localizer and glideslope for ILS 05R. The ILS localizer is to the right of the RNAV course and the ILS glideslope is BELOW the RNAV.2. Despite what the MAVEK Transition Procedure (11-0) says; remaining in LNAV and VNAV will NOT maneuver the aircraft on course to capture the ILS localizer and glideslope. Instead; BELOW approximately 1500 feet Above Field Elevation; it is required to disconnect the autopilot and steer to the right to intercept the localizer while simultaneously increasing the rate of descent to approximately 1;000 FPM to descend onto glideslope.3. Fortunately; all of my landings in MMMX on runway 05R have been in decent weather and we have been able to land safely. I do not look forward to returning to MMMX in low visibility conditions.TIKEB1B and Runway 23L APPROACH - 1. I haven't flown the arrival or approach into runway 23L in approximately 6 months; however my memory is that the TIKEB1B has the same altitude/airspeed issues as the 1A. However; the turn to final happens at a greater distance from the runway; so this arrival is not as challenging as the arrival into 05R.2. Additionally; I also seem to remember that the ILS localizer for runway 23L is not aligned with the runway centerline as we are accustomed to seeing in the USA; but it was offset a bit; making for a bit of a strange sight picture on final as well.3. That being said; the runway 23L arrival into MMMX is much safer than the arrival to 05R.RECOMMENDATIONS1. In the short term - [company] and [union] should have a significant number of check airmen; from all [company] fleets that fly into MMMX; fly into MMMX and experience for themselves the current shortcomings found there. After a period of data gathering; check airmen should meet to discuss my critiques and any additional issues that they might uncover. Following the check airmen meeting; modifications to existing procedures (11-0 page); should be made to increase [company's] safety margin when operating into MMMX.2. In the longer term - [company] and [union] should take the check airmen's concerns to the FAA and must work with the FAA to bring pressure to bear upon Mexican aviation authorities to change STARs; Transitions; Approaches; and ATC handling to meet the safety standards that are enjoyed in the rest of North America and most of the free world.3. IMMEDIATELY - Designate MMMX as a Special Qualification Airport at a MINIMUM. I believe; however; that all of the challenges that I've delineated above warrant that MMMX be designated as a Supervised Operations Airport; as long as its Arrival procedures remain substandard.Most; if not all; of the issues that I have raised here are apparently widely known. The MMMX 10-7 page's SAFETY ALERT box discusses issues that are the DIRECT RESULT of the substandard arrival/approach/ATC procedures being used in MMMX.1. Flap extensions above 20;000 feet are a direct result of terrible STAR altitude profiles coupled with ATC giving short-cut vectors to MAVEK.2. High Rates of descent at low altitude 'especially Runways 05L/R' are a direct result of the RNAV glide path being above the ILS glideslope and the necessity for the pilot to correct to it at low altitude due to the close-in turn to final.It is unfortunate that; up to this point; all that [company] has apparently done to combat the safety issues at MMMX is to write a SAFETY ALERT on the 10-7 page. [Company] should make an immediate and significant effort to make changes to the STARs; Transitions; Approaches and ATC handling at MMMX so that [company] can ensure that every flight operating into MMMX is conducted in accordance with the most widely accepted standards of safety; standards which are most definitely not being met in MMMX at the current time.
Captain inbound to MMMX reported that he was sent around because of conflict with traffic at 6 o'clock and 2 miles after being instructed to The Captain further stated that MMMX controllers routinely require aircraft to fly high and fast into MMMX and complained about 'substandard arrival/approach/ATC procedures being used in MMMX.'