A319
Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Communication Breakdown; Confusion
Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Other / Unknown
Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Maintenance Action
Human Factors; Procedure; Environment - Non Weather Related; Company Policy; Aircraft
Aircraft was dispatched with an improper deferral that was reckless and unsafe. The improper deferral was detected and corrected at the last minute by the flight crew. However; aircraft had flown several flights the day before with the improper deferral. The initial write-up was about the Air Data Reference-1 (ADR-1) inoperative. The Corrective Action confirmed ADR-1 was bad when it was swapped with ADR-2 and ADR-2 was [made] inoperative. The deferral was incorrectly defined for Inertial Reference-2 (IR-2) NAV INOPERATIVE (INOP). No apparent reason to defer IR-2 NAV when ADR-2 was Inoperative. Just sloppy and quick deferral procedures without any apparent oversight. IR-2 NAV INOP only changes the Autoland Limit to CAT-3 Single. However; the INOP ADR-2 also prohibits flight into RVSM airspace and takeoff with Flaps 1+F (Flaps Position-1 with Slats extended); both of which were planned for our flight. (We have early A-319 model). Once the deferral was corrected; the flight was properly dispatched using the new performance numbers (NOT Flap 1+F) and not in RVSM airspace. Working with Dispatch and Maintenance Control to identify and correct the issue was a team effort. Both men did an outstanding job to coordinate the changes and fix the deferral issues. This problem of the incorrect deferral is systemic of our procedures. No one seems to look at the deferrals and everything is left to the flight crews. Documentation errors. It's all about the 'On Time'!
Reporter stated that since the merger; their seems to be a greater number of items being incorrectly deferred and wonders if there is less Quality Assurance (Q/A) oversight; or less back checking of deferrals applied by Maintenance controllers. Prior to the merger; there seemed to be more layers of review of items deferred by Maintenance and Maintenance Control before pilots saw a deferral. His concerns also extends to the lack of awareness by the previous flight crews who flew the same A319 into RVSM airspace with an inoperative ADR-2; that was incorrectly deferred as Inertial Reference IR-2 NAV. Dispatch was unaware of the Performance Limitation requirements for the A319 with an inoperative ADR-2; because they were working from the information Maintenance Control had deferred; which was incorrect. Better preflight review of previous write-ups in the logbook would have shown the discrepancy between the original Corrective Action sign-off and the item that actually ended up being deferred. Flight crews are told not to question deferrals by Maintenance Control; just fly the airplane. He suspects many pilots are following that practice; but are missing deferrals that are incorrect and improper.
A Captain reports that incorrect deferrals by Maintenance Control have become a systemic problem at their Air Carrier; especially noticeable since the merger of the two airlines. Pilot noted that an Air Data Reference-2 (ADR-2) was inoperative on an A319; but deferred as Inertial Reference-2 NAV. Takeoff Performance Limitations for Flap settings and RVSM restrictions under inoperative ADR-2 were never applied; due to the incorrect deferral.