MD-11
Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Other / Unknown; Fatigue
Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Landing Without Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach
General None Reported / Taken
Human Factors
Captain was pilot flying and was late configuring the aircraft in the approach; as well as high on the approach. The aircraft was stable precisely at 500 feet; not before. The Captain understood at approximately 5;000 feet he was high and put the gear out as the first drag/flight control device. At the outer marker (1;800); he had gear down and flaps 15; as well as fast. I prompted twice if he wanted flaps 28; he looked directly at me and said; 'No not yet;' speed was well within flaps 28 range. It was around 1;000 feet we went to flaps 28; and under 1;000 we went to final flaps 35. However; we were still high on glideslope. At 500 feet I believe we had all parameters stable...glideslope 1/2 dot high. We remained a 1/2 dot high until 50 feet; then went one dot high; landed long just prior to the 3;000 foot marker. It was so busy in the final segment; I am not sure if I asked for or received a landing clearance. I did not realize this until I was driving home; some 5-6 hours later. This was the first night of hotel standby. We went on duty for standby at midnight local time and received a call for flight at approximately XA:00 am local time. I went to bed at approximately XR:30 local time the night before; felt fairly well rested. I am unsure of when Captain went to bed. However; the Captain said he was tired. The flight departure time was XC:23 local. The event was caused by late getting down from top of descent; and the approach. As well as late configuring the aircraft for landing; causing distraction in the cockpit. The final landing checklist was late in the approach; which may or may not have caused me to miss not calling the Tower. I could have been more proactive earlier in the arrival to let the pilot flying know I was concerned he was not getting down. I tried to make the pilot flying aware he was high and fast; not configured; but he seemed overloaded and not listening. In the debrief his only comment was I was 'badgering' him. We discussed in the debrief that we had poor crew communication and coordination and would try harder next time. We discussed the value of being stable earlier and that the company was looking to move the stable corridor back to 1;000 feet for VMC. Lesson learned is be conservative and get down earlier; configured; and stable much earlier than the minimum requirements.
MD-11 First Officer describes an unstabilized approach; due to a late start down and late configuration by the flying Captain; that may have met stabilized criteria at 500 feet.