Commercial Fixed Wing
Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Distraction; Time Pressure; Troubleshooting; Workload
Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport
Aircraft; Manuals
Flew trip as scheduled. commuted in from ZZZ1 before the flight. Had adequate rest in ZZZ1 (6-8 hours) in the evening before commuting to ZZZ2. Leg 1: jumpseat; ZZZ2-ZZZ. I slept 2.5 hours on the way to ZZZ. Leg 2: operated; I was the pilot monitoring. During taxi to runway; received level 1 alert messages: 'Autopilot Single' and 'No Autoland.' Referenced QRH procedures. Both messages; the procedures were the same. Code = 'MAINT.' Consequences = 'NONE.' Taxi and takeoff continued. I was the pilot monitoring for the flight. During climb out phase; autopilot was off. Captain felt higher than normal elevator nose down control forces. After flap/slat retraction; the plane continued to exhibit cyclical fore/aft 'porpoise-like' movement involving nose down pushing forces; which were countered by the Captain; the pilot flying. We used the autopilot disconnect switches on the yokes to verify the autopilot was disconnected. 'AP OFF' was displayed on PFD. Captain told me to [request priority handling] and vectors for a long straight-in approach to runway 10 at ZZZ (other runway was closed) while he continued to fly the aircraft and maintain aircraft control. With Center; I [requested priority handling]; stated 'mayday' and requested vectors to runway 10; and told ATC we were experiencing flight control malfunctions.We did not receive any level 3; 2; 1/0 alerts; nor did any of the 'non-alert' messages in the QRH pertain to this situation. We did not dump fuel (not needed). We used the long approach and the time over the water to configure the aircraft and determine if there were any controllability issues at the slower approach speed. Airplane was still controllable; although the constant nose-down pushing forces remained present throughout the entire flight. ACARS divert was sent; as well as the landing performance request. FMC was configured for straight in ILS approach to 10. During landing phase; I helped guard the controls due to the large nose down forces. Landed safely and taxied clear. Cancelled [priority handling]; although Aircraft Rescue and Firefighting followed us to the ramp due to possible hot brakes.Additional notes and observations: First and most importantly; there needs to be a company checklist in place whenever a crew [receives priority handling] for what happens afterwards! I feel like I have been twisted and turned upside down after this event and have no idea where to go. I was rescheduled more than 5 times after this event to include line check with a check airman. The crew should be put into immediate rest; allowed to decompress and process; and then dead-headed home; without worry of a flight or a check ride.1) Trying to find anything specific in our manuals is one of the most difficult and time consuming activities I have ever done. If you do not type the phrase into the search engine perfectly; you will not find what you need. Also; bookmarks disappear as well as notes and highlights with all the incessant and non-stop changes to our manuals. For instance; it took me almost 30 minutes to find the specific phrase the captain needed for the write up. It had been moved; and moved again in the FOM.2) Indications from the CFDS (Centralized Fault Display System) show the previous crew began to have malfunctions at approximately 1;900 feet on their arrival into ZZZ. We were not aware of this. There was also a previous write-up in the logbook with similar malfunctions.3) Company training is phenomenal with regards to the simulator and learning muscle memory. However; our manuals and the constant changing of company procedures and moving of information around in the manuals contributes to the confusion.4) A suggestion is to only allow changes to the manuals 2 times per year. This would allow us to gain a familiarity with where everything is located; and hopefully; end the ever present confusion of 'where was the written again? Or where can I find that?' It is so frustrating trying to use our manuals now.5) I will have to develop my own way of searching through the manuals; to include probably printing the specific pages to have available instantaneously.
First Officer and I deadheaded ZZZ2-ZZZ. We both slept on the way there. Normal preflight. No deferrals. Loading was delayed and we pushed 29 minutes late. Cost index was 200 so not much ability to make up time. During taxi; approaching runway; First Officer noticed Level 1 alerts Autopilot Single and No Autoland. QRH was referenced. It had a 'MAINT' code with consequences 'NONE'. These are not uncommon alerts and can be spurious and come and go. Decision was made to continue. All applicable checklists run and required briefings accomplished. During takeoff; on initial rotation; I noticed a greater 'pull' than normal was required. As we climbed away; I was feeling more downward pressure on the control column than normal. I trimmed away the pressures and continued to climb. Pressures returned and seemed unpredictable. I was feeling an oscillation in the control column. It felt as though the autopilot was engaged; but it was not. There were no alerts or messages. I tried to disengage the autopilot multiple times. When I had the pressures at a minimum; I used light finger pressure and showed the First Officer and the jump seater that the control column was moving forward and aft in an unpredictable nature with no pilot inputs. The aircraft mechanic was also called up to the cockpit to see the movements and to solicit ideas. A level off was requested. Downward pressure would come and go and I needed to continually trim even though the airspeed was not changing. I asked the First Officer to [request priority handling] and vectors back to ZZZ. The jump seater First Officer became a vital part of the crew.He provided valuable inputs and helped with ACARS. We considered a controllability check; but decided against it because the unpredictable nature of the flight control forces. Additionally; I elected to not engage the autopilot as I did not know if it might make matters worse. In my opinion the safest course of action was to land as soon as possible. Landing calculations were run and we asked if the longer runway would be available to us. ATC said it would take some time for the other runway and we elected to accept Runway 10 and use auto brakes Max. Control column forces were heavy during the approach. First Officer told me he would be on the controls as we approached approximately 200 feet. I told him that it was a good idea. Landing was uneventful. We stopped on the runway and taxied clear. [Priority handling] was cancelled; but we requested the firetrucks to remain as we got towed into parking as the brakes were warm and we did not know if we would experience hot brakes. We debriefed maintenance personnel and called the company. As we were decompressing and preparing the logbook write-up; First Officer noticed a similar incident had been written up [previously]. In retrieving data maintenance personnel noticed that the aircraft was experiencing related faults from 1;900 feet on the last flight into ZZZ. First Officer was exceptional on this flight. His CRM skills were noteworthy and he allowed me to aviate while he handled the communications and backed me up. Upon reflection I am not sure what could have been done to prevent this event from recurring. It seems that this aircraft may have had a history of flight control anomalies during the approach phase. Corrective actions were taken. Problems worsened and were evident during all phases of flight. If the fleet is experiencing widespread flight control issues an in-depth inspection of associated systems may be prudent. One other unrelated aspect of the flight that I could have handled differently was to cancel our takeoff clearance and contact dispatch to see if a deferral may have been required for the Level 1 Alert. We were already 30 minutes late and one of the alerts had already extinguished. I may have been too mission oriented and in rereading the exact wording in [the manual]; it warranted at least a call to dispatch.
Air carrier flight crew reported a flight control problem resulted in a return to the departure airport.