A319
Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Flight Crew Total 21000
Communication Breakdown; Workload
Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach
Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control
Human Factors; Procedure
After being issued clearance for a visual approach to PHL Runway 27L in CAVU VMC conditions; I continued a descent to the runway while manually flying the aircraft while below the GS. The glide slope audio warning did sound during my actions. I did not go-around and completed the landing instead.The flight to the PHL traffic pattern was normal in all respects prior to approach. My First Officer (FO) [have] flown together many times over the years. Both of us are experienced with the Airbus. We were both in a positive mood and working well together prior to commencing the approach.Weather at PHL was perfect: CAVU; 23 degrees C; almost no wind; with the sun about 10 degrees above the horizon. There was almost no air traffic on the frequency...just us; a few other aircraft ahead of us inbound and one GA aircraft. He was issued a vector to '...remain clear of PHL inbounds.'We were handed off to PHL Approach while on the JIIMS Arrival at 9;000 feet. We were then cleared to 6;000 feet. While descending thru 7;000 feet; we were given a heading and cleared to 4;000 feet. We were near the WOJIK intersection; where we slow to 190 knots normally. So even though we were issued a heading off the Arrival; I began to slow on our own from 250 kts to 190 kts.We had slowed thru 220 kts; when the controller gave us 300 degree heading and 2;000 feet.That heading aimed us at the Runway 27L approach course to intercept about 1 mile east of JALTO; the FAF. Slam-dunk time. The controller then cleared us with a new altitude; '...2;100 feet.' We were high and fast. I continued to slow to deploy flaps and once we were slow enough; I was able to call for flaps '1' and then '2'. We were rapidly closing on the approach course but had not been issued a clearance yet. We were about 2 miles south of the localizer on the intercept heading when the controller started talking to the GA pilot about some aspect of his VFR transit. We still needed a clearance to turn inbound. We knew it was the controller's intention but we could not get a word in for him to give us the approach clearance. I stated to [the FO] that we're going to blow thru the approach course. Finally; the controller stopped talking and [my FO] said to him 'Air Carrier X; we have the airport in sight.' The controller said; '...Ooooh; yeah...cleared visual approach 27L.'By this time; we were over the approach course on a 300 degree heading; about a mile from JALTO and still high and slowing. I pressed the LOC button and then the APH button; hoping the airplane could still capture the localizer and glide path. The aircraft autopilot did begin to turn back to the approach course from the north side but I could see that were we not going to navigate over JALTO and that we're probably going to intercept inside the FAF. Then the controller said; '...maintain 180 knots until 5 miles out; contact Tower.'When the aircraft turned left to center up on the localizer from the right side; brilliant late afternoon sun glare hit us face-on. I pulled the sunshade down and assessed if the autopilot was adequate to complete the approach; as we had planned. I didn't think it could do what I wanted. I made a snap decision and felt I can 'fix' this problem by flying manually. I stated to [my FO]; ' ... autopilot off; flight directors off' while [the FO] was contacting Tower. PHL Tower cleared us to land while commenting we were 'way right.'I'm now hand flying the aircraft. I am navigating back to the localizer; thinking initially that we were still high and fast. I asked for 'gear down' and flaps '3.' I was concentrating on our lateral position with the localizer; trying not to look outside because of the sun glare. We completed the landing checklist after asking for flaps '3.' When the localizer started to come back in while still east of the Navy Yard; I realized that instead of being high on the GS; I was now below it and slowing to approach speed. I thought to myself; 'I can fix this; too.'I now concentrated on leveling off at 1;000 AGL and tracking inbound while waiting for the GS. I thought it would only be a few seconds but it was longer than that. I really couldn't see well in front of me into the sun glare without losing my instrument scan so kept my eyes mostly inside. I was able to maintain 1;000 AGL and level flight until the GS came back to normal descent path. It was then I began to hand-fly the final descent to the runway. I started a gradual descent and looked out to the runway and the sun glare. When I looked back; I was below the GS again. I reduced pitch; and called out to [my FO] '...below glideslope: correcting.' I could see that I was not getting back to the GS and pulled more nose up-input to the side sick and repeated; '...below glideslope; correcting.' The 'Glide Slope' audio and visual alarm sounded and I repeated again; '...below glide slope; correcting.' [The FO] cancelled the alarm. I looked up and was now able to see the runway clearly without sun glare. Landing was accomplished.It is hard to recount; on the day after; such a colossal deviation of my training; Federal Regulations; and Company SOPs. As P-I-C; I am completely responsible and at fault. There were; at least; 3 separate occasions; from the point when we were finally cleared for a visual approach to touchdown; that I should have called 'Go-Around.' 1. When we blew thru the localizer initially. 2. When I realized the autopilot would not be able to recapture the approach successfully and 3. During the entire time we were established on the final approach segment; when only momentarily on the GS at 1;000 feet AGL and then below it during final descent. Pure stupidity and excessive pride in my flying ability. When faced with the series of problems during what should have been an easy visual approach at my home airport in an aircraft that I have 11;000 hours in while flying with a close friend; I felt that '...I can fix this'.I can fix this. I can fix this. We've blown thru the localizer...oh ...I can fix this. The autopilot won't intercept the approach before the FAF... oh...I can fix that; too. We're high and hot on this visual approach...oh...I can fix that. The sun is blinding glare and I can't see the runway too well...oh... I can accommodate that. Oh...instead of high and hot on the final approach; I'm now low and slow...go-around...oh; I can fix it...no need for that. Now hand flying the final approach and I'm low on the GS....oh...I know it...I'm 'correcting' that problem; too.[My FO] and I are a team in the cockpit and we failed during this approach to do the right thing and go-around. We both failed. But as Pilot Flying and P-I-C; I am ultimately the responsible party for this occurrence. I personally don't feel any better about being candid about my professional failure. I read what I've written and realize the terrible thing that could have happened after this chain of mistakes.
While on approach to Philadelphia Runway 27R we continued an unstable approach that resulted in a glideslope caution at less than 500 ft.We were being vectored for a visual approach we received a late turn onto the final for the visual at 2100 ft. The Captain turned off the autopilot and commanded the flight directors off to make the turn to join the final course as we joined the final we were below the glide slope the descent rate to rejoin the path. As we joined the final course the sun glare was intense. I was wearing sunglasses and a hat and was able to manage; the Captain found himself in near IFR conditions flying a raw data approach. As non-flying pilot I did not understand his predicament until after we landed and debriefed. At 1000 feet we were stable and in a position to land; we should have went around. We continued; we were a half dot low on the glide path; at 500 feet we were back on the path but then went low again; on the PAPI we were 3 red 1 white when we got the glideslope caution which I canceled as it appeared the Captain was just moving his aim point on the runway to land in the touchdown zone. Having flown with this Captain many times; I am confident in his skill and ability. It wasn't his best approach I've seen him fly; I was confident we were still in a position to make a safe landing and he was just having an off day chasing the glide slope. It wasn't until our post flight debrief that we realized how unstable the approach was and we should have gone around.Continue to preach the go arounds. We completed the approach to a safe landing. Regardless the best and safest course of action would have been to go around and come back in with a proper turn to final using the automation to help mitigate the effects of the setting sun.
A319 flight crew reported continuing a visual approach even though they were not stabilized by 500 feet.