Widebody; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Communication Breakdown; Human-Machine Interface
Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach
Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach
Human Factors; Weather
With First Officer (FO) flying on final approach for the ILS level at 2;500 feet MSL; 180 knots assigned to the marker; gear down and flaps 20 set; both pilots realized we were too fast. The FO announced: 'We're not going to be stable' and I said: 'You need speedbrakes'. The FO did not immediately react; and; I pulled the speedbrake handle back. The aircraft slowed toward the flap 20 speed; and I quickly reset the speedbrake handle and set flaps 30 without direction from my FO. The FO was flustered by my manipulating 'levers' and literally threw his hands up in the air; in my estimation; quit flying the aircraft and said: 'I'm not flying this; you've got it'. I had not expected to assume the controls. I had simply been trying to help him get our speed under control.Now; I am Pilot Flying on the glideslope attempting to get familiar with the aircraft and get our speed under control. The FO called 'Unstable; Go Around' and I did not go around at that exact time. I was still processing all the information (I had been at the controls maybe 25 seconds) and believed we were still above 1;000 feet' AGL and that the FO had called Unstable early. Believing we would not be stable at 1;000 feet; the FO called 'Go Around' a second time. I evaluated the situation that we were at 147 KIAS; exactly 10 knots above approach speed (ref of 132) and realized that we were; in fact; below 1;000 feet AGL and felt that my FO had mentally 'checked out' on me.I executed a controlled go around at 850 feet AGL. I feel very strongly that was the exact altitude of the go around based on what I believe was my delay of execution trying to figure out exactly what was going on around me. I never saw approach lights and believe we broke out on the second approach from 700 to 800 feet AGL. My go around and second approach to an autoland was considered to be 'textbook' by my FO.
First Officer was unable to complete approach in IMC conditions. Captain assumed flying the aircraft; executed a missed approach and landed on the second attempt at the destination airport.