Medium Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Other / Unknown; Distraction; Situational Awareness; Fatigue; Communication Breakdown
Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Human Factors
We taxied to Runway 30 in IAD. All checklist and procedures were called for and accomplished normally. We were given a takeoff clearance as we were taking the runway. I transferred controls to the First Officer and he immediately noticed the number one engine was not running. We canceled our takeoff clearance and cleared the runway. The engine start/stop selector was in the stop position. I determined that in the absence of an EICAS message; the engine had not spontaneously shut down and could be safely restarted. Having accomplished this; we were instructed to taxi to the runway and a normal flight was conducted.Complacency; after many hundreds of takeoff cycles; it sometimes becomes so routine that vigilance can suffer. Also; the day prior; I had worked a 1435 hour duty day with multiple deadheads and a short overnight; so fatigue can not be ruled out as contributory.
[Narrative 2 contains no additional information.]
An air carrier crew realized after taking the runway that only one engine had been started and so exited the runway to start the engine before completing a normal takeoff.