PA-46 Malibu/Malibu Mirage/Malibu Matrix
Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument
Flight Crew Last 90 Days 150; Flight Crew Total 4000; Flight Crew Type 1000
Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Situational Awareness
ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance
Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance
Chart Or Publication; Human Factors; Procedure; Aircraft
With RNAV capabilities much more often available in TAA aircraft now; and many more flights being flown direct and on RNAV routes; I believe that publishing the MVA's so pilots have ready access to them for situational awareness and preflight planning is essential to flight safety so that confusion about MIA's and appropriate altitude to fly during lost comm situations is reduced. I was cleared SNS KARNN V111 SUNOL with an initial altitude of 6;000 FT. I didn't question the fact that V111 does not go to SUNOL because it was clear enough to know what the Controller meant for me to do. I also did not question the fact that the MEA for V301 is 6;500 and I was cleared at 6;000. In the future; I probably will pay more attention to those details when accepting a clearance. Honestly; in the back of my mind; I was curious about how this would play out and since it was VMC along that route; I thought I might learn something from this unfolding scenario. I have long believed that it is confusing that controllers can clear an aircraft at an altitude that is lower than any MIA a pilot has access to. There are many instances in the mountainous terrain in California where the MVA is lower than published minimum IFR altitudes. I had accepted this fact but always wondered a little about the details of the impact of this on safety. So this scenario seemed like a nice opportunity to learn more about what controllers expect pilots to do to ensure safety. While enroute from SNS to KARNN; the Controller said 'maintain 7;000'; then revised that clearance to 'maintain 6;000'. I wondered to myself if the Controller was also unsure if 6;000 was an appropriate altitude (perhaps it was a trainee; I thought). After turning onto V301 toward SUNOL where the MEA is 6;500; I was getting a little itchy see if I was going to be cleared to a higher altitude. About the time I was going to ask the Controller to tell me the MVA in that area; I was told to change to freq. 123.7. I am pretty familiar with the frequencies in the area; and was pretty sure that was not the right frequency; but attempted to contact that frequency. When no one answered; I decided that this had become a lost comm situation and I was below MEA; so I started a climb as I switched back to the original frequency. When I returned to the prior frequency; I informed the Controller that I was climbing to the MEA. The Controller immediately asked me to return to 6;000; so I did. My logs from the aicraft GPS show that I never got above 6;200 FT. Upon landing at OAK; the Ground Controller asked me to call NorCal. The Supervisor said that I should not have declared 'lost comm' quite so quickly and changing altitudes might have caused a loss of separation; so to avoid getting a violation; I should be more careful about changing altitudes without requesting permission first. I expressed to him that I have no way to verify that the Controller had cleared me at an appropriate altitude and that I felt this causes an unsafe situation. The Controller expressed frustration that he didn't think I was 'getting it'. So I stopped trying to make any additional arguments in favor of better information for pilots and thanked him for his time. In the days since that incident; I asked another in SoCal about when MVA's can be relied upon. I had misunderstood that direct routes also qualify for MVA use. I had thought MVA's only applied when on a vector as the name implies. I also reviewed the AIM and Intrument Procedures Handbook for guidance in this area. Both explain fairly clearly that random routes must only be flown only in RADAR contact so that controllers can ensure terrain separation. I had always thought that when flying on my own navigation; that I was responsible for terrain separation. I imagine that there is likely significant confusion about this among pilots and their instrument instructors. Neither the AIM or the Instrument Procedures Handbook specifically address precisely when pilots are responsible for terrain separation and when controllers are.  Ideally; we should have a system where both can be responsible so there is redundancy; thereby improving safety. If pilots can verify the controller is doing the right thing; they will be less likely to question a clearance at precisely the wrong time that could cause a mid air collision. I believe this is an excellent example of why MVA's should be published so pilots can make use of them. Had I known that there is an MVA of 6000 FT on V301; I would not have been as hasty to climb to an altitude I was not assigned in order to maintain terrain clearance. I could have independently verified that the Controller was not in error when I was unable to ask. I do not believe it is wise to make pilots depend on complete faith in controllers to keep them clear of the rocks in conflict with published altitudes available to the pilot. Until MVA's are published; I would recommend that pilots not accept clearances below the altitudes that are published and available for their use. That reduces the available airspace so it is not ideal; but it is much safer in my opinion to have both pilot and controller able to back each other up; rather than the controller being depended upon soley to keep the flight separated from terrain; especially when we have so many new controllers in the system right now.
IFR inbound to OAK elected to climb above the ATC assigned altitude to the published MEA when experiencing communications problems; the reporter noting MVA's should be available to pilots for safety clarity.