B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Flight Crew Last 90 Days 149; Flight Crew Type 7500
Training / Qualification; Situational Awareness; Distraction; Confusion; Communication Breakdown
Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Chart Or Publication; Company Policy; Procedure; Weather
This report is concerning improper deicing communications and conflicting information provided on Company Forms X and Y. Agent provided us Form X which we reviewed at the gate. When we arrived at the Ramp deice pad; communications became very challenging. Also the deice truck did not follow standard deice communication procedures or terminology. Here is a summary of the conflicting and wrong information between paper Company Form X versus EFB Company Form Y:1. Deice frequency incorrect 2. Company frequency incorrect 3. Exiting the pad. Both forms have north ground (incorrect). It's Metering on [frequency] 4. Also incorrect and no mention on either form is that it is not 'Ramp 7' that controls the pad; its '[call sign X]'.We could not make contact with '[call sign Y]' and a Ground Ops Person approached the nose and plugged into the intercom. He said there was one truck and would be with us ASAP. When we made contact with the deice truck; I asked for Type I and Type IV; two-step deicing. He replied 'Roger wings and tail'. I was not confident he understood our request. I repeated it again and he replied again 'Type I and IV wings and tail'. I was not fully confident of what he was going to do. We were never given any of the information that Form X requires. No information on configuration type; fluid type; freeze point or name of applied fluid or start time. After about 20 minutes and the snow finally stopped we heard the ice truck call our nose number and 'clean aircraft'. I asked to confirm a clean aircraft check was performed and he repeated the same response. No comment that all equipment was clear. We saw a deice truck drive around from behind the left wing and go in front and over to the next aircraft to our right. As we completed our post deice check; an unexpected deice truck drove between us and the other aircraft to our right; out in front of our right wing before exiting to the other pad. We were about to move and would have most likely impacted the truck as it appeared after we checked the area clear. This was the truck working us and the first truck we saw was an unknown second unit that passed the nose.This did not leave us confident that the aircraft was truly deiced and anti-iced with Types I and IV and we really had no way to determine a valid holdover time. The only saving grace was that it had stopped snowing when they finished. We inspected the wings and they appeared to be clean from the cockpit windows and decided we could proceed safely. Had it not stopped snowing I would have asked for a complete re-application of deice fluids. Upon further review of the provided Form X; it appears that the one side Local Deice procedures handout is dated (year) and still has other carrier logo. The back-side deice communications checklist is dated (date). Trying to decipher this conflicting information (while out on the taxiway in the dark) was very confusing. The lack of standard phraseology was equally concerning and did not inspire confidence that the job had been done competently. I realize I may be a bit tardy submitting the safety form on this event. I was writing the IR out when I returned home from the trip and decided it was a significant enough event to warrant a safety report as well as the IR.The information provided needs to be accurate and consistent between forms. Ground Ops must review/ revise and update procedures and ensure all parties involved understand what is expected and how to communicate. The Company form X states at the bottom that it must be in the deicer during operations. It must also be followed; not just present in the deicer.
B737 Captain described the confusion created when a deice crew failed to utilize the standardized communications before; during; and after deicing his aircraft. The process nearly resulted in a ground collision with a deice vehicle.