Bonanza 36
Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Situational Awareness; Confusion; Distraction
ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
General None Reported / Taken
Human Factors; Procedure
I was working the Departure RADAR One (DR-1) position and the Peninsula Sector (PSR) was combined to this position and Arrival RADAR One (AR-1). Traffic was light; southwest operation. I received a request for release from the Tower for the BE36; Runway 32. I initially approved a right turn-out into AR-1's airspace; but then amended it a short time later to runway heading due to arrival traffic on the final for Runway 23. I advised the AR-1 Controller of the departure with expected climb northeast bound and he acknowledged. After departure; I turned the BE36 to a heading of 050 and climbed him to 7;000. Arrival traffic was no factor. The BE36 then asked for a final altitude of 7;000 FT and I told him to expect that. I then initiated a hand off to East Feeder (EFR). At the time; I had 2-3 other releases off various airports. A C130 departed NGU and would not acquire. I became preoccupied with this issue. I had to go back and restrict CNV's climb due to other approaching traffic; and was calling Flight Data to put CNV back into the system. I heard the East Feeder Controller say 'turn that guy'. I then looked at the BE36 who was now in conflict with the B737 inbound on a Visual Approach to Runway 23. the BE36 was just out of 4;000 FT at this time. I immediately issued a turn heading 360 for traffic. The BE36 hesitated and stated he had a request. I told the BE36 to turn 'NOW' and hold his request. The pilot acknowledged and turned. I saw the B737 increase his rate of descent. When clear of the BE36; I had him restate his request. I had observed the B737 a minute before on a southeast heading toward the Runway 23 ILS initial approach fix. His position and speed at the time indicated that the track of the BE36 would be no factor. The B737 was well outside my sector boundary when first observed. The BE36 then advised he had an 'open door' indication and asked to level off at 5;000 FT to investigate. I approved his request and told the pilot to advise me of his intentions. Other events then began for the BE36; but by now I had advised EFR of the pilot's intent; and the issue with the B737 had passed. Immediately following the 'event'; the BE36 stated he was having a problem with a possible open door. This would explain his slow climb rate which I failed to notice while distracted with other duties. When EFR took a hand off on the BE36; the aircraft's Data Block on the AR-1 scope became limited. I should have used automation to point out the BE36 to the AR-1 Controller which would have maintained a full Data Block as well as turn the Data Block yellow on his RADAR scope. The BE36 should have been issued a more northerly heading for his climb thereby keeping him further away from the final approach course. The departure off NGU that failed to acquire should have been put on a heading and at an altitude away from all other traffic until the automation issue was fixed. This would have alleviated most of my distraction from the rest of my sector. Sector complexity was self-induced.
TRACON Controller described a loss of separation event complicated by a number of other contributing factors; the reporter acknowledging the sector complexity was 'self induced.'