PA-44 Seminole/Turbo Seminole
Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Commercial
Flight Crew Last 90 Days 66.6; Flight Crew Total 824; Flight Crew Type 100
Workload; Troubleshooting; Training / Qualification; Time Pressure; Situational Awareness; Distraction
Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT
Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; General Declared Emergency
Aircraft; Human Factors
It was during a local training flight for the student's commercial multiengine rating that a dual engine failure was experienced on the downwind leg of the traffic pattern. The day prior; I was briefed on the current progress of the student and volunteered myself to fly Lesson 168 with him. The student's flight progress demonstrated average progression in the CMEL course thus far. The student was prompt and pre-flighted before the start of the lesson shortly after noon. While running the Start Up Checklist; I observed some mishandling of switches; for example; the student engaged the starter when he meant to press the prime button; and forgot to turn the magnetos on prior to cranking the engine. Just minutes later during the runup; the student demonstrated satisfactory procedures while checking the systems; and briefing the takeoff and emergency procedures. Prior to contacting Ground for a taxi clearance; the student stated that it had been a couple weeks since he had flown and would be grateful if I would assist with radio calls; I agreed to take the radios. We taxied to Runway XX for the start of pattern work and were cleared for takeoff. While the student taxied onto the runway; I performed my own personal checks by visually confirming that all mags were on; and both fuel selectors were in the ON position. After takeoff; student turned a left crosswind; then downwind and started his pre-landing checks after the gear had been extended. I requested that he climb back to the pattern altitude of 2;000 FT since his altitude had decayed to an undesirable 1;800 FT at midfield. Abeam the runway; I requested a touch and go and read back the landing clearance to follow a Cirrus on base after spotting the traffic ahead of us. The student reduced the throttles to 15 inches MAP; added the first notch of flaps; and pitched for a 100 KTS descent as normal; even though we had started the final descent from 1;800 FT at abeam. It was at that point that I noticed the irregularity of the left engine noise. Since flying on a fairly humid day; I promptly turned on the carb heat on the left engine; and then the right. The left engine quit immediately following the application of the carb heat. I announced 'my controls;' took control of the aircraft and proceeded to adjust mixtures; props; throttles full forward only find that at that point the right engine had quit as well. I pitched for 88 KTS and turned my head right to left in search of a place to land while declaring an emergency on Tower frequency. At this point we were approximately 1;300-1;400 FT MSL and somewhere just north a highway merger. I checked the magneto switches to verify that they were on while communicating with the Tower; he asked if we required equipment to which I confirmed 'yes; we can't make the airport.' After ruling out any surrounding roads due to the amount of bank required to get to them; I aimed for a thicket of trees straight ahead. Upon reaching between the seats to verify that the fuel selectors were in the on position; my hand found them both resting mid point in the OFF position. I quickly pushed both fuel selectors full forward to ON and continued the glide. In the midst of preparing for a nose-high flare into the trees at approximately 1;050 FT MSL; both engines fired and started developing full power; pulling the aircraft up and away from the terrain. After reaching a safe altitude; I updated the Tower to let them know that we had regained power and would be landing Runway XX. The student sat quietly in the left seat with his arms crossed throughout the entire event until we were lined up on final approach to land. He started reaching for the fuel selectors and yoke to which I responded 'Don't touch anything. I am flying and will be taking this landing.' He responded 'OK' and seemed unfazed. I landed the airplane on XX and taxied off; shortly after receiving a taxi clearance back to the flight school. After parking and shutting down the aircraft; I questioned the student on his actions. He stated that he looked at the fuel selectors while on downwind; 'they looked wrong; so I moved them.' During debrief; the student expressed that he had recently started a new job. He said that normally; he wakes up at 2:45AM to get ready for work; but that day in particular he had only been released from work at 3 AM. Based on the student's behavior; I believe that fatigue and sleep deprivation were determining factors in his performance and judgment. The only reason that the student discussed his work schedule during debrief; was to inform me that he was available to fly again the next day at the same time. He also stated that during the entire event; he thought that somehow I myself had rendered an engine dead; and was expecting him to perform emergency drills. He didn't think what was going on in the aircraft was an actual emergency until after we had landed.
A PA-44 pilot training for his CMEL with an instructor; put the fuel selector to OFF on the downwind causing a dual engine shutdown due to fuel starvation. Just prior to impact; the instructor took control; placed the fuel selectors ON; and recovered.