Commercial Fixed Wing
Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine
Flight Crew Total 1900; Flight Crew Type 496
Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury; Ground Event / Encounter Ground Equipment Issue
Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed
Human Factors; Procedure
While receiving an application of Type 1 De-Ice fluid to Aircraft X; EMB-145 aircraft prior to a scheduled revenue departure in ZZZ airport; FO (First Officer) was indirectly sprayed in the right eye with the Type 1 De-Ice fluid by the ground crew due to a concentrated high pressure stream of De-Ice fluid being applied directly to the seal of the Right side DV window of the aircraft for ~2 seconds. Since the aircraft was not pressurized at the time due to Standard aircraft De-Icing configuration; the seals of the cockpit windows were not air-tight; allowing for fluid passage into the cockpit. The FO was not just sprayed in the eye; Type 1 fluid also covered his forehead; right cheek; right jawline; headset; shoulder; pants; iPad resting on the window; and shelf. Type 1 fluid was seen to enter the front left and top DV window seals. CA (Captain) and FO made a crew decision to return to the gate to seek medical attention for FO for verification of the potential harm Type 1 Fluid could cause. FO got the Safety Data Sheet from a ramp manager on the fluid being applied to the aircraft. The fluid was Clariant Safewing MP 1 LFD 88 Type 1 De-Ice fluid; Substance Key 000000702835. Per instructions on the Safety Data Sheet; FO and the Emergency Response Paramedics flushed FO's right eye with Honeywell eyesaline sterile isotonic eyewash until burning sensation in FO's right eye went away. After application of the eyewash; paramedics recommended to FO to seek a follow up medical exam with an optometrist to determine if there was any further damage to the right eye or not before returning to work.[Suggest] Re-training of basic de-icing procedures required on behalf of the ZZZ de-ice crew.
Due to the snow and rain showers in ZZZ the aircraft had to be de-iced/anti-iced with type I and IV fluid. While in spot XX in hold bay XX in ZZZ; towards the beginning of the type I application; the de-ice crew sprayed high-pressure type I fluid directly on and around the FO's (First Officer) DV window. The high pressure fluid entered through the seal of the DV window spraying fluid around a section of the DV window on the inside of the flight deck. The FO was also sprayed on his headset; shirt; pants; his right arm; and small amount of fluid entered his right eye. I then informed the de-ice crew that they sprayed in the inside of the flight deck via the DV window. Dispatch; the Flight Attendant; and the passengers were informed we would be returning to the gate. Once back at the gate the FO's eye was assessed and treated by EMS in accordance with the safety data sheet on the type I fluid that was provided by station personnel. It was also recommended by EMS that the FO follow up with an optometrist for further evaluation. The FO was removed from flying status. I then contacted Maintenance Control and entered a discrepancy in the aircraft's maintenance log book in regards to the DV window. De-ice fluid was observed spraying into the flight deck through the First Officer's DV window during the de-ice application. AOM Volume I section 3.2.2 defines 'sensitive areas' as 'Areas where direct high pressure fluid application should be avoided during the deice/anti-ice process'. 'Windshields' is listed as one of these sensitive areas. During the deice process; the individual applying the type I high pressure fluid directly sprayed the FO DV window causing fluid to enter the flight deck around the seal at a high rate of speed.We returned to gate; the FO received medical attention for his eye; and a discrepancy was entered into the aircraft's maintenance log book for fluid entering the flight deck via the FO DV window. I suggest that the individuals applying de-ice fluids to the aircraft are properly trained on the 'sensitive areas' of the E145 and that direct high pressure fluid application is avoided in these areas.
Flight Crew reported de-icing crew failure to follow procedure resulted in First Officer injury.