B737-800
Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant
Confusion; Communication Breakdown
Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
General Maintenance Action
Chart Or Publication; Company Policy; Human Factors
December 2013; a B737-800 aircraft was in the hangar for an assigned an A-Check. I received the paperwork and proceeded to divide the [Maintenance] Paper Package into skill sets (Lube; Engine; Cabin; Aircraft; Avionics; Inspection). There was adequate manpower for the tasks at hand. Approximately two hours later; I assigned technicians to the A-Check; splitting the manpower to the different skill sets. Each group of technicians then got together and split up the individual skill sets to individual technicians; i.e. two engine technicians split up the two separate engine tasks amongst themselves; one for Number 1 Engine; and one for the Number 2 Engine etc. There were several tasks in the Paper Package that were rescheduled to [be] accomplished at a future date; and were marked as such; those job cards were separated from all others and put into the completed file.As the night progressed the technicians returned their job cards and as they piled up I collected them and audited them to make sure all Mechanic and Inspection items had a file number and initials to indicate the completion of the individual tasks. As I completed the audit; I would stamp the Accountability Sheet to indicate the return and completion of all job cards. Of all the job cards; either issued or rescheduled; one in particular was an Airworthiness Directive note to accomplish a lubrication of the aileron components. I was informed after I had returned from vacation that the Airworthiness Directive Job Card was not completed. I was pretty sure that when I separated the Paper Package into Skill sets that the Aileron Lube Task was included in the lube pile; to be dispersed among the [aircraft] lubers. I was also informed that I had signed-off completion of the task in Septre [maintenance computer system]. I would like to iterate that this would not have happened because I did not do the task and would not have assigned myself to do that task. I also did not enter into Septre certain other job cards that required a Septre entry; as it would have been indicated on the cover sheet of those cards. The only Septre entry I would have made is that which acknowledges the completion of the A-Check; a task that was completed by dayshift. I would also mention that there is no [employee] file number security protection preventing someone else from entering anybody's file number into Septre. One possible explanation as to why this job card was not completed is that it was in sequenced between two rescheduled job cards and had stuck to the staples of a job card that preceded it sequentially; and as I audited the [other] job cards for completion I assumed that those sequenced cards were part of the rescheduled job cards. As a result; the aircraft departed with this task incomplete. The aircraft was scheduled to depart in the late morning; so it was turned over to Dispatch on dayshift. The only items to be left for dayshift to complete were to remove the [landing] gear pins; sign the Airworthiness Release and complete the Scepter entry for the completion of the A-check. The completed Paper Package would then go to the on shift Supervisor to review all the completed job cards and audit the package as I had done; in case I had missed something. The Paper Package would the go to Inspection for a Final Review before being sent to Aircraft Records. Somewhere the safety nets that were to prevent this from happening failed. Operation in non-compliance. Boeing B737-800. One huge solution to this event would be to implement the electronic E-task option; which is in place at some stations. With this electronic version; the lead mechanic would assign each technician their task and each technician is responsible for the electronic signature of the job cards assigned to them; this signature is secure from anyone else signing-off for work they did or did not accomplish. Our Maintenance has been trying to implement this version of job completion; but has met with resistance fromthe I.T. Department. Other solutions have been discussed and one is not to dispatch the aircraft from the hangar until ALL audits have been completed; although a little severe; until a better solution is addressed; this may by the best solution presently.
Reporter stated he is a Lead Mechanic and one of his responsibilities is to review the A-Check Paper Package for completion of work and signatures. On any given night; the number of Job Cards (Tasks) in an A-Check can range from 105 to 125 separate job cards; some only one page; others upwards of ten pages. Review of the Paper Package he had just accomplished was supposed to be completed by his shift Supervisor who was very busy that night; but did sign for the second review. However; he never actually accomplished the review process and instead asked the dayshift Supervisor to do the review. Apparently that request was overlooked and the Final Review of the paper package by an Inspection Supervisor was also; apparently missed.Reporter stated that a week and a half later; the paper package arrived at their Maintenance Base Records Department. That's when the missed Airworthiness Directive paperwork for the lube and inspection of the aileron trim tab 'free play' was found not completed. The B737-800 aircraft was grounded that day and the special Engineering Callout for the Airworthiness Directive that should have been completed during the A-Check was finally accomplished.Reporter stated whoever entered his name in their Sceptre maintenance computer system has not been resolved. But his Air Carrier continues to allow open access to their Sceptre maintenance program where anyone can go into the system and enter another employee's file number for accomplishment of a task and not be identified as to who did the entry; no password or file number required. That's why he was supporting the individual Electronic E-Task 'sign-on' and 'sign-off' software program.
A Lead Mechanic describes the breakdown in their A-Check Paper Package review process for verifying job card completions and sign-offs of work accomplished on a B737-800 aircraft. An Airworthiness Directive for lubing and checking aileron tab 'free play' was missed; aircraft was grounded. Lead Mechanic also notes that open access to their Sceptre maintenance computer allows anyone to enter another employee's name and file number without any identification of who entered the information.