A320
Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Communication Breakdown; Human-Machine Interface; Confusion; Situational Awareness
Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert
Human Factors
Approximately 20 minutes prior to top of descent; as the pilot monitoring; I received the most current ATIS information for Phoenix Sky Harbor International Airport via ACARS which indicated that runways 07 and 08 were in use for arriving aircraft and verified that the FMGC and ND displayed the correct information for the EAGUL FIVE RNAV ARRIVAL RUNWAY 08 TRANSITION; in accordance with the 'Arrival Verification and Briefing' procedure in the A320 Pilot Handbook Bulletin. When cleared by Albuquerque Center to 'Descend via the EAGUL FIVE RNAV arrival; Runway 08 transition; Phoenix Sky Harbor altimeter three zero two six;' I verified that the pilot flying had set 7;000 in the FCU after which I received an arrival briefing. I monitored the aircraft's compliance with the arrival routing; altitude constraints and airspeed restrictions while acknowledging comments from the pilot flying. I had preset each anticipated radio frequency and responded promptly to each radio call addressed to us; however; my attention was diverted from monitoring tasks within the flight deck due to traffic vigilance. Unbeknownst to me; perhaps between EAGUL and HOMRR; the FMGC had been modified from Runway 08 to Runway 26; perhaps while I was communicating with Albuquerque Center and Phoenix Approach Control during the handoff. The first indication that we were off course occurred when the approach controller asked if we were on the Runway 08 transition. I acknowledged in the affirmative; however; when I saw that Runway 26 was; in fact; displayed in the FMGC and determined that we had passed the HOMRR Intersection; I endeavored to communicate to the Controller that we were now aware of the error. The aircraft was descending through 8;800 FT in the managed mode as verified by the FMA. Immediately prior to keying the side stick 'push-to-talk' comm switch in order to convey my urgent message; the Controller instructed us to turn right to a heading of two one zero and maintain nine thousand. I acknowledged the clearance while the PF set the heading on the FCU to 210; however; when the pilot flying did not also promptly reset the FCU altitude from 7;000 to 9;000; I immediately alerted the pilot flying. When the pilot flying did not respond to my second alert; I ensured that the FCU altitude hold selector had commanded the aircraft to maintain the present altitude and advised the pilot flying that we must immediately climb to 9;000. I then advised the Controller that we could proceed directly to GEENO and resume the arrival. He immediately and very politely responded by clearing us to 'proceed direct GEENO; maintain 9;000 and resume the EAGUL FIVE arrival.' I thanked him and reminded myself to remain 'in the green.' I informed the pilot flying to reset the FCU altitude to 7;000 and; now fully aware of the adrenaline rushing through my circulatory system; easily maintained an elevated level of situational awareness.I believe the cause of the event to have been poor CRM.
An A320 flight crew descending on the EAGUL RNAV STAR to PHX discovered the wrong runway transition inside of HOMRR was programmed in their active route.