Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer
Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 21.5
Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness
ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Procedure
Breakdown in communication from Operations Manager In Charge (OMIC) to affected areas/sectors concerning radar outage:We use 3 NM separation in most of sectors 34 and 47. Sector 34 uses the COV radar site (Providence Approach's radar). I was working the sectors combined. Using descend via procedures to RY22L at BOS. Had Aircraft X off of Cape Cod at 16000 feet going to HPN routed PROVI..PUT..NELIE..(Preferential route) HPN. Gave them a 280 heading to go south of PROVI with the plan being to give them direct NELIE when they were 3 miles west of PROVI. Advised BOS descend via arrivals to cross PROVI AOA 17000 feet; then descend via 22L transition. As I was about to issue the HPN aircraft direct NELIE his 3 NM HALO changed to a 5 NM HALO and I received an ERAM alert that COV was Out of service. I waited until Aircraft X was 5NM west of PROVI and issued direct NELIE. There were 3 BOS arrivals that went over the top of the Aircraft X aircraft at 17000 feet. I advised the Front Line Manager of the outage and asked if he knew about it. He said no. He then called the Operations Desk and informed them of the outage. At XA:11z we received a written message at the sector stating 'COV radar will be released from XA:00z Until Further Advised.' The phrasing of this message implies that it was a planned outage. When radar sites fail the message will normally state 'COV RADAR FAILED.' If the timing were just slightly different Aircraft X would have been 3 miles west of the BOS arrival as the 3 mile J-Ring went to 5 miles and there would have been an operational error.I'm not sure what the current procedure is for forwarding equipment outages to the areas. But; whatever it is; it needs to be stressed that such outages that impact separation standards MUST be relayed immediately and verbally coordinated between the supervisors and controllers.
Sector was notified of a radar outage affecting separation standards 11 minutes late. The Controller worked four aircraft during this period none of which had separation which was less than required.