EMB ERJ 170/175 ER/LR
Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Flight Crew Total 4200; Flight Crew Type 1800
Workload
Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Inflight Event / Encounter Bird / Animal
Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; General Declared Emergency; General Maintenance Action
Aircraft; Environment - Non Weather Related
Just after rotation on takeoff; as I was watching for a positive rate of climb; the aircraft seemed to sink slightly (perhaps 10 feet) and require more aileron and rudder input to stay on runway heading. I thought this must have been due to mechanical turbulence associated with the gusty winds (approximately 150 degrees) coming over the terminal. Achieving positive rate of climb; I made the 'positive rate; gear up' call out; and the Captain raised the gear. We immediately began to hear a thumping-type noise; followed by a noise that sounded to me like a spinning tire rubbing against the aircraft fuselage; on the right side of the airplane. The aircraft began to demand unusual control inputs to maintain our clearance to climb on runway heading. The noise continued; and a strong vibration was felt. I looked at the EICAS and observed the Engine #2 N1 value was drastically reduced; and the ITT had well exceeded limits with the dial filled in red. I said to the Captain that we had an 'engine failure; right side'. The aircraft was climbing well; at approximately V2. He declared an emergency with ATC; as they were trying to hand us off to Departure Control. I reached up to the flight guidance panel and selected HDG and BANK mode myself; while the Captain was busy on the radio. As there were thunderstorms at our 12 o'clock; we requested and were given a heading of 180 degrees. I called for 'Heading; Bank' even though I'd already selected it; to get us on the proper sequence of events in line with SOPA/SMAC for an engine failure. Thus; when the Captain pressed the HDG and BNK buttons; the flight director switched to ROLL mode; and took the bank protections off. I immediately re-armed HDG/BNK modes myself. Just past acceleration altitude I called for FLCH and we began to accelerate to VFS; and retracted the flaps on schedule. We requested and were cleared to maintain 3;000 FT. Upon reaching; I selected the speed to 210 KTS and called for 'CON; BANK'. The Captain selected max continuous thrust and we both confirmed that the Engine #1 had appropriately changed N1. I selected the autopilot on; and told the Captain I had the radios; and to reference the 'Engine failure QRC/QRH'. The flight attendants called over the intercom; and reported to the Captain that sparks had been seen flying out of the right engine. ATC queried us as to our intentions; and I told them we'd be returning to [departure airport]. We were given vectors to the west; and then circled south of the approach end to [runway]. The engine failure QRC/QRH was completed. Prior to fully shutting down engine 2; I observed the respective ITT reach approximately 1300 degrees; both igniters A and B ON; and the engine wind-milling icon displayed. The Captain thoroughly completed the QRH procedures; including the Single Engine Landing checklist. We discussed that we would be landing a few hundred pounds over Max Landing Weight (the FMS estimated approximately 75;600 LBS); and agreed based off the overweight landing procedure referenced in the QRH that this was acceptable and necessary. He also briefed the flight attendants with the TEST items. We did not expect an evacuation after landing; but would have the crash/fire/rescue trucks standing by. I reprogrammed the FMS for our return; and loaded the approach for the ILS. Once we were fully ready; we advised ATC. They gave us a heading to intercept the final and cleared us for a visual. The Captain completed the Descent and the Approach checklists. Approximately five to seven miles outside the final approach fix I began slowing the aircraft and calling for flaps. Upon intercepting the glideslope and beginning to descend I called for the gear down; the flaps 5; and the landing check. At approximately 1;000 FT I turned the autopilot off. The gusty winds made airspeed control difficult (150 degrees gusting to +25 KTS). I called for an extra 10 KTS on VAPP. The landing was made normally; with minimum reverse (to avoid control issues with asymmetric reverse thrust) and maximum braking. Stopping on the runway; the Captain set the parking brake and advised ATC of our intentions to stop there and assess the situation with coordination with the Fire Department. He began the Emergency Evacuation checklist in line with SOP. We were given another frequency to speak directly with the Fire Department. They informed us that there were no signs of fire; and no signs of damage to the aircraft; with exception to the failed engine. I made a quick PA to calm the passengers and assure them there was no immediate danger; inform them to remain in their seats with seat belts fastened; and that we would be taxiing clear of the runway and to a gate; where they would be given more information. We then taxied clear of the runway and to the gate; with the emergency personnel following close behind. With the Parking Check completed at the gate; the passengers were safely deplaned using the jetbridge. The crew then went out to observe the damage and meet with ground personnel; whereupon we were informed by Maintenance personnel that the failed engine had ingested a large bird. As the root cause of this incident was an act of nature outside pilots' direct control; proffering my suggestions as to bird strike mitigation would be outside the purview of this report. One thing to help pilots in the future handle this type of emergency would be engine failure scenarios in the simulator that occurred at more random times; as opposed to the traditional 'V1 cut'. Though I do think that practicing multiple V1 cuts in simulator sessions in my past training greatly helped me handle this incident; the fact that this engine failure occurred as the landing gear was being retracted was disorienting at first. Recognizing the engine failure; and being able to make the cognitive switch to the appropriate procedure to handle it; can take time when each second is critical. So perhaps in future recurrent training in the simulator; pilots could be given an engine failure/fire/etc. soon after takeoff; but not precisely at V1.The opportunity to practice flying the actual aircraft; not a simulator; single-engine (like the Air Force trains) would give pilots a huge step up in proficiency in how to handle the real aircraft in such an emergency. Though I expect this suggestion will be viewed as cost-prohibitive; I would be remiss if I did not address it. The natural stress and fear of handling the aircraft while down to one engine cannot be replicated in the simulator; where a pilot's confidence in his abilities; owing in part to past successes; easily overcomes the psychological stress of a 'jeopardy' training event. In the real emergency; I found my brain tending toward a tunnel vision fixated strictly on flying the airplane; much more so than when I've been drilled on similar scenarios in the simulator; and it was thanks in part to real world experiences that helped me fight this 'brain lock'.
About 3 seconds after I put the landing gear lever in the up position; I heard a loud 'rolling' noise followed by a red indication on our ENG 2 ITT Indicator on the EICAS. The ITT temperature seemed to increase and decrease rapidly for about a minute. I monitored the aircraft's attitude; airspeed; and altitude while determining that the First Officer had a good control of the aircraft. I must have missed a call or two from the Tower about switching to Departure because all I remember is that the Controller seemed irritated that we weren't answering his call about the Departure frequency. It seemed logical at the time to let the Tower know of our emergency and that we needed to return to the airport. There were a few exchanges with the Tower; and I wasn't keeping up with the call-outs from the pilot flying. Once I was able to pay full attention to the First Officer flying the airplane again; we raised the flaps at or above the correct speeds; climbed to 3;000 FT; leveled off; and gained sufficient airspeed. I then proceeded with the ENG 2 QRC and QRH.ATC gave us quite a few heading changes while I was executing the checklists to avoid the thunderstorms and other traffic which was very distracting and made the checklists take a long time. In the middle of the QRH; we received a call from the Lead Flight Attendant. I made the decision to hold on the QRH to talk with him because of how long the checklist seemed to be taking and they probably needed some communication from me. Before taking the call; I made it clear that the First Officer had control of the airplane and the radios so that I could talk with the flight attendants and passengers. The Lead Flight Attendant told me that the engine was on fire. I told him that we did not have any indication of the fire in the flight deck and that I needed him to verify whether or not the engine was on fire. He told me that he would walk down the aisle to take a look at it. After looking at the engine; he told me that the fire was out. I then told him that we have an engine failure; evacuation was not likely; but to prepare the cabin for an evacuation just in case. I didn't think of any special instructions for them. I told him that they had 5 minutes to prepare for landing. I then made an announcement to the passengers about the situation and made it clear that they needed to devote their full attention to their flight attendants. I then returned to the checklist and allowed the First Officer to keep the radios so that I have my full attention on the QRH. We finished the QRH items; completed the climb check; briefed the approach while having a conversation about whether or not we thought of everything with the approach including whether or not we should stop on the runway. Since the Flight Attendant told me that the engine had been on fire; I determined that we should stop on the runway and I would set the parking brake while the Fire Department checked our engine. I programmed the speeds; runway; destination; course preview; and localizer frequency. We then completed the descent check; and approach check. I took the radios again and asked for alternate missed approach instructions of straight ahead up to 3;000 FT. I devoted my full attention to airspeed; glideslope; attitude; and altitude while making callouts for deviations. The airplane seemed to take awhile to respond to power inputs because of the single engine; turbulence; and gusty conditions which is why we got slow a couple times. After getting slow; we determined that we should increase the speed by 10 KTS to avoid getting too slow. Once we landed and were stopped on the runway; I set the parking brake and proceeded with the evacuation checklist. I determined that I didn't need to scare the passengers with the 'Stand-by' call 3 times and didn't see a reason to evacuate with the given indications and information available at the time. I asked for a frequency to communicate with the Fire Department. The Tower Controller gave me the wrong frequency so I went back and asked for a different one. I got the right one and was able to get into contact with the Fire Chief. This distraction took some time; so I wasn't able to talk to the passengers. The First Officer made an announcement to them. The Fire Chief determined that we did not have a fire; so we taxied off the runway. We didn't think that we should change the flap configuration on the after landing check because there may be pieces of jet engine in places that we didn't know about. We contacted Operations and were given a gate. The fire trucks escorted us to our gate. We shut down the aircraft; completed the parking check; and deplaned the passengers. A maintenance person informed us that we had suffered a bird strike on Engine 2.The two largest obstacles with this emergency was dealing with distractions and prioritizing. I believe that I should have communicated more clearly with ATC initially to avoid further distractions. I should have let them know that we needed radio silence and they were distracting by asking for unnecessary information. Another possible solution could have been to turn the radio off altogether. If I had buried the distraction of ATC early on; I believe that I could have communicated and listened much better with my First Officer and flight attendants. I could have devoted the initial climb out phase to helping the First Officer fly the aircraft rather than diverting attention to unnecessary ATC things. Obviously; I'm thankful for a very capable First Officer; and flight attendants that were able to transform their fear into useful actions after working a full day; night; thunderstorm; gusty; and turbulent conditions. Although we made some mistakes; I believe we did everything we could with the given circumstances in a real-life; worst-case situation.
ERJ-170 flight crew ingested a bird and suffered engine failure shortly after liftoff. They ran the QRH; secured the engine; and returned to departure airport.