ATR 42
Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Troubleshooting
Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; General Maintenance Action
Procedure; Aircraft
This report concerns the unscheduled separation of the #4 - outboard right main wheel - from the aircraft on takeoff from Runway XX in ZZZ. We began the trip receiving the aircraft from the previous crew at the gate in ZZZ1 one leg prior. There were no abnormalities on the pre-flight; no abnormalities that had not been cleared; and no major abnormalities of any kind recorded in the logbook or in the previous logbook that was in the can for the aircraft. The previous crew verbally told us that it was performing well when we received it from them. The first leg; ZZZ1 to ZZZ; operated smoothly with nothing out of the ordinary occurring. The post flight after that leg revealed no discrepancies of any kind. We pushed back from ZZZ; and our taxi route towards Runway XX included left- and right-hand turns as well as brake applications; and the aircraft continued to operate normally with no signs of any abnormality on the wheels.When we performed the takeoff; shortly after we selected the landing gear up; Tower called us and told us it looked like we lost a tire on the runway. The takeoff was so smooth that we weren't sure if we had in fact lost a tire as we had no indication in the cockpit of any system abnormalities; and the aircraft felt like it was operating normally. We knew there was construction around the runway in about the position we would have lifted off the ground at; so I thought that perhaps it was misidentified construction debris - although we hadn't seen any debris on the runway prior to takeoff. We asked them to perform a runway inspection to determine if it was our tire while we contacted Dispatch to obtain some identifying information about it; as well as to make a plan of action in case it was our tire. We contacted ZZZ Operations after some attempts; and asked them to remain at the airport to assist in identifying the tire and in case we needed to return to ZZZ.We decided not to relay to Dispatch through Operations because we initially had trouble reaching them and we believed that their Operations radio was a handheld and would not have good signal at altitude and location we would need to hold at. We decided to continue climb so that we could contact Dispatch through AIRINC. We discussed the possibility of flying by ZZZ Tower to have them identify if we were missing the tire and which one it was; but at that time we were still not sure that it was our tire and we were unsure if we would have enough fuel to do that and still proceed to ZZZ1 if that was what Dispatch wanted us to do. We made the judgement call that Dispatch would most likely have us continue to ZZZ1 due to the long runways; good emergency services; and having the finest Operations and Maintenance staff there to assist. We continued to climb along our filed route while ATC attempted to identify the tire. Shortly after that; we advised the Flight Attendant (FA) of the potential situation and that we were most likely continuing to ZZZ1; and we would wait to advise the passengers until we were sure and close to ZZZ1 to avoid panic. She said that she would take the time to review some information in her manuals. We chose to continue at a speed of long-range cruise or slower - 180 IAS being the safe speed used when structural damage is suspected - because we were unsure if there was debris on the wheel assembly that could become dislodged and damage something else; or if losing the tire had already damaged something.It took about 30 minutes to 45 minutes for us to make contact with Dispatch after that. We attempted AIRINC; Station Operations on 4 or 5 different local frequencies; relaying through company aircraft; or through another frequency. We attempted using different transmitters in case there was debris from the tire that had damaged an antenna. We were unsuccessful; so ATC attempted to call Dispatch. This took time because ATC was attempting to call using an old company number with an old area code. It was further delayed because we werebeing handed off to new controllers periodically and we had to apprise them each of the situation and have them attempt to make contact. ATC did make contact and Dispatch instructed us to continue towards ZZZ1. After that; we were advised that it was in fact our tire. We requested priority handling and continued to ZZZ1. After this determination; it took roughly 15 - 30 minutes longer for us to contact Dispatch on AIRINC.We had time with a low workload in cruise because we couldn't contact Dispatch through AIRINC yet; so we used the time to review our manuals and the QRH for the related procedures. In the QRH we decided that the Landing with Abnormal Landing Gear Procedure was the most applicable. We began to brief and discuss this procedure while trying to make contact with Dispatch through AIRINC. When we did make contact with Dispatch; [they] advised us that they thought it was the #1 wheel - the left main outboard. We told him that the procedure called to induce a fuel imbalance and to burn off as much fuel as possible before landing. We asked his opinion of going into holding on the way in to ZZZ1 to do so; and he agreed.After this determination was made; we said we would call back again and terminated the call because our radio transmitters made it very difficult to talk to ATC and Dispatch at the same time - there appeared to be interference or override between VHF 1 and 2. We began cross-feeding fuel to make the left side as light as possible and briefed the FA assuming that the #1 wheel was the one we had lost. We told the FA that there was a good chance that it would be a normal precautionary landing and that we would most likely come to a stop on the runway; or exit the runway if able; but most likely would not taxi to the gate. We decided to request for fire trucks; busses; a tug; and a GPU to be standing by. After we were done briefing the FA; we continued to discuss the procedure for approach and landing. The first step of the checklist was to notify the passengers; so we used some time to create an agreed-upon script to brief the passengers without inducing panic - which I would later administer when we were holding near ZZZ1. We noticed that this procedure appeared to be designed to cover both structural landing gear issues as well as tire and wheel problems. We were not sure if we had structural problems or not resulting from the loss of the wheel; so we briefed the procedure including several decision times - such as what we would do if the gear extended normally vs. if the gear did not extend normally vs. if we lost the hydraulic system when the gear was extended; etc. The result which did occur which we briefed was that the gear extended normally and the remaining tire; brakes; and steering operated normally for the landing.The decisions which we briefed involved in this were as follows. We left the GPWS switch in the on position because that switch's function is to silence alerts when the gear is not sensed down and locked. No fuel imbalance was established; and with our and Dispatch's agreement due to the relatively light weight of the aircraft; small practical difference the imbalance would make; and for ease of procedure application in the interest of safety. We did not pull the emergency gear extension lever due to the gear extending normally and indicating locked down by both indicating systems. Our understanding is that the emergency gear extension handle simply opens the uplock boxes; which had already been opened successfully; and that pulling the emergency gear extension handle could potentially impede us during egress if an evacuation was needed. We discussed at what time the bleeds should be selected off for approach. I had never selected the bleeds off in this aircraft in flight before; so the Captain and I had different opinions about when it should be done. We ended up selecting them off at 500 ft.; which I now agree with in hindsight. The remaining items of the checklist would be completed after we were already on the ground. We briefed that we would complete these steps if there was some kind of fire; severe damage; or loss of control evident at touchdown; but we would otherwise move slowly and discuss these steps due to the potential hazards of aircraft control involved with performing them.While we were discussing this; Dispatch called on AIRINC again and corrected that we had actually lost the #4 - outboard right main wheel - rather than the #1 as said earlier. I asked him if he was sure and made sure that Maintenance had checked the serial numbers on the wheel to be positive. After Dispatch told us this we re-briefed the Flight Attendant for the #4 wheel.After we were all thoroughly briefed; we began our delay vectors around ZZZ1 to burn down to roughly 2000 lb. as instructed by Dispatch; I gave the PA to the passengers. When we had burned enough fuel; we began the ILS to Runway XYR - the longest and most familiar runway for us in ZZZ1. The gear extended normally and we saw no abnormal flight characteristics or any system abnormalities. On touchdown; as briefed; I began using the tiller to steer the aircraft early; and we felt it pulling slightly toward the right. However; not nearly enough to warrant the emergency engine shutdown. We were able to control the aircraft throughout the rollout to maintain centerline. We chose not to try to turn off the runway as it would be a left turn-off; which would put the most weight on the right side; and we were unsure of the quality of braking that we had. We used reverse only until we were at a slow walking speed and only then used brake application to bring the aircraft to a stop on the runway centerline abeam the XX taxiway exit where the firetrucks and Operations were waiting.Tower gave us the discrete frequency to use. The firetrucks came onto the runway and asked us to shut down the #2 engine so they could inspect. We complied and they said the remaining tire seemed to be in good condition and asked us if we wanted to exit. We said no; we would like to deplane the passengers and then be tugged. While Operations was setting up to deplane the passengers; we briefed how we would manage shutting down the #1 engine in order to deplane; and requested the GPU to be connected so we could deplane with lights on without killing the batteries. When the GPU was ready; we connected; Operations pinned all 3 gears; we shut down #1; checked the after-landing and -parking checklists; called the Flight Attendant; and then began deplaning to the busses. While the passengers were deplaning; Operations connected the tug. When the passengers were clear we prepared to sit in the cockpit while Operations tugged us to Gate XX. We monitored the tug process; arrived at the gate; and began conducting the postflight inspection and filling out the logbook. I completed the logbook while the Captain called the Chief Pilot to begin debriefing.I suggest that Station Operations be provided with better radio systems; or that the ACARS system be utilized in our aircraft. It was difficult for us to establish a reliable communication with Dispatch due to a combination of poor-quality radios and not many base stations being occupied due to the time of day. A communication with Dispatch was very necessary in order for Maintenance to verify which tire was missing so that we could adjust our procedures.
ATR 42 First Officer reported that ATC advised flight crew after takeoff that the aircraft may potentially be missing a tire as a main tire and wheel assembly had been found on the runway; resulting in a immediate precautionary landing at the destination airport.