A319
Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Time Pressure; Workload; Communication Breakdown; Distraction; Human-Machine Interface
Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown
Flight Crew FLC Overrode Automation
Aircraft; Human Factors
During taxi to runway 8R for takeoff in Miami; tower switched our takeoff runway to runway 12.  I had briefed the First Officer on this possibility and asked if she was comfortable switching the takeoff data to a different runway that late in the ground phase.  She said 'yes; no problem; I have 3;000 hours in the Airbus at [her previous employer]; it is impossible to rush me.'  I told her if she didn't feel comfortable switching runways; or if she felt rushed; I would not accept the runway change.  She once again told me; 'no problem.'  We did all taxi checklist items without incident including checking the takeoff data for the planned runway for departure (8R).  When approaching the hold short for runway 8R we were instructed to go to the left side of the pad and plan for runway 12.  The First Officer then went heads down to load the runway 12 data into the FMGC.  Because it was dark and with multiple aircraft approaching the known hotspot at the converging hold short thresholds for both runways 8R and 12 I was focused on taxiing the aircraft into the proper hold short position for runway 12 while also avoiding and remaining clear of other aircraft as well as the runway 8R threshold.  In short; I was very concerned with not causing a runway incursion while maneuvering the aircraft to the hold short for runway 12.  As I was doing this [the First Officer] stated that she had successfully changed the takeoff data for runway 8R to our new runway; 12.  We were cleared for takeoff from 12 with an assigned heading of 110 and an altitude of 5000 feet.  I called for 'below the line' and we finished the taxi checklist and verified that the new runway; 12 was indeed on the ND as well as the FMCG.  I forgot to check that the V speeds were in the PFD and that the flex temp was on the EWD.  I positioned the aircraft for takeoff and set Flex as per the SOP.  I began our takeoff roll and within about 5 seconds I observed a master caution and the ECAM message 'ENG-thrust not set'  I quickly scanned the thrust lever position and determined that the thrust levers were in the correct position (flex) and as trained; and per the ECAM blue instructions; positioned the thrust levers to TOGA and continued the takeoff.  [The First Officer] incorrectly told me that the auto thrust was off; suggesting that was the cause of the message. She then read me the Vspeeds from the FMCG.  The takeoff was uneventful and I informed [the First Officer] that her assessment was incorrect; that the auto thrust as well as all systems were operating normally but that we didn't have a FLEX temp set so I had to select TOGA per the ECAM.  The rest of the flight was uneventful and proceeded normally.I think that a procedure should exist to recheck the takeoff data; FMCG; PFD; ND; and EWD that the correct runway takeoff data is indeed confirmed by both; pilot flying; as well as pilot monitoring entered into the PERF page when a runway change is made after initially checking the data previous on the taxi checklist.  As a side note; from a Human Factors standpoint; I feel I should have confirmed the new runway data to include the new FLEX temp on the EWD prior to taking the runway.  I also realize I missed the auto thrust arm annunciation on the FMA column 1.  If I had noticed that the auto thrust didn't arm when I selected FLEX I would have avoided the confusion of the ENG caution message.  I might attribute this mistake to the runway change and being in a 'rush to comply' with ATC high frequency demands.  I also believe that I put more trust into [the First Officer's] ability to perform the runway change in the FMCG due to her high level of experience in the Airbus and her reassuring me that she was more than capable to perform her duties without question.  I also believe that; being new to [our airline] and not as confident in [our] procedures as she apparently is with [those of her previous employers] caused her to fall back into what she most comfortable and confident in.  This caused her to mistakenly believe she had indeed entered the takeoff data in the FMGC.
A late change in the A319's takeoff runway and the flight crew's failure to program the associated flex thrust temperature prior to start of the roll; resulted in a EWD warning and the use of TOGA thrust for takeoff. Workload; time pressure and the resultant breakdown in CRM were cited as contributing factors.