Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear
Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Flight Instructor
Flight Crew Last 90 Days 200; Flight Crew Total 19500; Flight Crew Type 500
Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Confusion
Conflict NMAC
Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Procedure; Human Factors; Airspace Structure; Airport
I taxied to RWY29 at AWO. Shortly before taking the runway; I placed a phone call to my wife as I usually do before takeoff (brakes set) and observed one aircraft land on 34; followed by one departure (Aircraft Z) off 29. As my headset was off during the call; I heard no other traffic. I put my headset back on; and approximately one minute after the previous 29 departure; I began my takeoff roll on 29 (also straight out departure); watching the preceding traffic vigilantly. As my airplane has roughly the same performance of Aircraft Z; I was not concerned with overtaking it; but was more concerned it may turn; climb abruptly; or double back; so I was watching to ensure it continued straight out ahead of me. I climbed at Vy; probably longer than I usually do; as it seemed Aircraft Z was staying low; and the steeper I climbed; the faster I would be clear of him. As the nose was high; I did not see well over the nose; and as I glanced off to the right; I saw Aircraft Y pass close by; nearly head on; entering the 45 for 34. Shortly after; I heard his voice asking if I had seen him. I didn't intend to engage in an argument on the radio; but the preceding Aircraft Z answered; perhaps thinking he was the one being addressed; or perhaps had also had a near miss. The Aircraft Y pilot then angrily chastised him (and me; I presume) for using 29 when 34 was the 'active'. The Aircraft Z pilot replied that he had announced his 29 departure; and the Aircraft Y pilot retorted 'that doesn't count'.In my perception; this was a simple failure to 'see and avoid'. I didn't see Aircraft Y; and he didn't see me; almost until it was too late. My failure to see him was related to my fixation on Aircraft Z; and my high deck angle; obscuring my forward vision. I also should have made my phone call a little sooner; so as to have a longer time listening to the radio on taxi-out; in order to formulate a better mental picture of the traffic in the area.I believe his failure to see me was his presumption that the airport had a designated 'active' runway (winds had been calm a few minutes before; but had begun to come from the west); and the expectation that there wouldn't be any traffic using any other runways. This is a common perception at non-towered airports; and particularly strong at AWO; where there seems to be a local cultural aversion to using 11/29; even when it is strongly favored by the winds.In the future; I will make a better effort to scan the entire airspace; not just follow known traffic. I will try to lower the nose earlier in order to have better forward visibility; but regardless; when I am climbing; I will adjust my body position in order to see better over the nose. I will also make my phone call much earlier in order to have more time to listen to the radio.There also needs to be better awareness in the pilot community that the concept of 'active runway' doesn't exist at non-towered airports; or more precisely; that all runways can be active. The Aircraft Y pilot seemed far more upset by my runway choice than the simple fact I didn't see him.
GA pilot reported a NMAC while departing a non-towered airport with an aircraft arriving to a different runway.