A320
Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Situational Awareness
Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem
Human Factors; Procedure
Approximately 10 minutes prior to departure the ramp agent gave me a notification to Captain of dangerous goods packet. Per the FOM (Flight Operations Manual); I complied with section XX.X page 2 and identified the station of departure the flight number; and tail number. Once we were airborne; I looked further at the notification packet and discovered that the compressed oxygen was in class 2.2 with a sub hazard of 5.1. It was placed in the same pit as the item labeled: life- saving appliances; self-inflating; which falls into class or division nine. When I looked at page 5 of our dangerous loading reference table there is a specific table that says anything in division 2.2 sub divided to 5.1 should not be loaded with a class nine dangerous goods. We did not discover this until we were airborne; however I believe that these two dangerous goods should not have been loaded together. To further confuse the issue also on page 5; there is a box on the left side of the page that says all dangerous goods on Airbus aircraft must be loaded in the forward compartment. The ramp agent or lead is the one responsible for knowing which dangerous goods should not be loaded together; and I believe that these two items should not have been loaded together. Our FOM policy once again removes the Captain from a critical safety checkpoint. In this case; I think it's unlikely that these two items would've reacted; however; I can see where something more critical could have happened; and the Captain would have had no knowledge of the dangerous goods in the cargo compartment. Despite not being required to check the categories of dangerous cargo; and whether they can be loaded in the same area; from here on I will always take the time to ensure that the dangerous goods can be loaded together. Further; I believe the SOM [FOM] should be changed to require the Captains check to ensure that dangerous goods can travel together.
A-320 Captain reported two Hazmat procedural violations [Segregation and Load location errors] by ground personnel loading Hazmat cargo. More importantly the Captain stated the FOM Dangerous Goods Procedure does not include the flight crew approval at the loading sequence prior to pushback. Captain recommends FOM revision to include flight crew approval.