Commercial Fixed Wing
Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Workload; Situational Awareness; Fatigue
Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT
Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance
Human Factors
We had just went missed into ASE and we were in the process of asking for another approach. We were on the published missed and ATC had told us to expect the approach over LIFTT. I was trying to get the FMS set back up for the approach. The FO had been really behind on the first approach and the missed. I decided to take control over the FMS. In the process the FO had already started to execute some changes and the aircraft had started a turn. I told the FO to get a vector. Knowing that ASE airspace is rather tight with EGE I knew we needed to be quick. I reloaded the FMS and then tried to clean up the box as ATC told us to turn direct LIFTT and cleared for the approach. No altitude or heading was given. Things would not cleaned up correctly and I just went to green needles to intercept the LOC.At that point the FO noticed the FMS was on page 2 and went ahead and cleaned up the FMS. The LOC captured and were at 14;200. At this point I looked up to make sure we were headed in the correct direction and the entire valley was now covered in fog. I was a little disoriented as only 5 mins earlier we could see airport with a few low level clouds. I noticed a few key terrain features and knew we were headed in the correct direction. The FO was still a little task saturated and I set a lower altitude to start down and I begin to call for flaps and get the aircraft configured for landing. In the process I confused where we were on the approach and set 12;300 instead of 13;600 to cross LIFTT. About 3 miles from LIFTT ATC gave a low alt alert and told us cross LIFTT at 13;000. I immediately turned off the autopilot and climbed the aircraft back to 13;000. At that point we were at 12;600. Going missed in ASE is a complex procedure and trying to get the FMS reprogrammed for another approach is not easy. ASE has very limited airspace and this really brings down the time you have to properly set things up. The FO is rather [junior] and the first approach he was rather behind and that led me to have to worry about more things and become task saturated. When we left the ramp; I noticed a strange MX issue with the flaps/slats indicator and we had to pull back into the ramp and have MX reset a few things. After the MX issue was taken care of we left only to be told that we had a ground stop into ASE. Was waited 45 mins to depart. I had also not flown in almost 3 weeks due to not being used on reserve and days off. I had also not slept well the night before and felt a little tired. I should have slowed things down to help bring the FO back into the game and given us more time to set up and brief the approach again. I know ASE pretty well and I feel proficient flying in there. I was rushed with the airspace and I should have asked for more vectors for more time. I should have transferred the controls to the FO while I took care of the FMS and briefed the approach.
We had already experienced a number of issues on this flight. The slats were MELed for half speed. During taxi; we had an issue relating to proper slat position indication which required a maintenance troubleshoot. After the problem was resolved; we departed for Aspen. Conditions in Aspen were marginal with many aircraft going missed; requiring multiple approach attempts and in some cases diversions. Aspen was calling above minimums with good visibility however they were experiencing intermittent low clouds/fog. Prior to departure we briefed the approach/missed approach/balked landing procedures and discussed what we would do in the event of a missed. We had enough fuel for at least two approach attempts if we deemed it safe. We shot the LOC DME 15 approach; we had the runway in sight at approximately LIFTT but we could see a cloud on the approach end of the runway. Unfortunately; the cloud was exactly over CEYAG at the MDA which required a missed approach. While tracking outbound on the IPKN to LINDZ we told Aspen approach that we would like to try again. We were told to expect the LOC DME 15 from AJAXX. This required a modification of our previous approach in order to not have to completely reload the approach and all the intermediate fixes/altitudes. We asked and were given a vector so that we could accomplish the task and the captain began to manipulate the FMS. As he was working on the changes; approach gave us a base turn and asked to keep it tight. This caused the captain to become task saturated. I asked if I could manipulate the FMS and free him to focus on flying the aircraft to which he agreed. While I was reloading the approach the controller cleared us direct LIFTT and for the LOC DME 15. I read back the clearance however in my distraction I did not notice if he gave us a crossing altitude at LIFTT nor did I read one back. I was able to execute the direct to LIFTT and returned to monitoring our progress. We were VMC in a descent and almost at LIFTT when the controller instructed us to maintain 13000 until crossing LIFTT. At that time; I looked and saw that we were at 12;600. We began to correct the altitude when the controller gave as a low altitude alert. We were VMC with adequate terrain separation; we corrected and continued the approach. Unfortunately the fog bank had completely recovered the airport and surrounding area. We went missed again and diverted.It was a challenging day at a very challenging airport. We allowed ourselves to be rushed us into a second attempt at an approach without enough time to adequately prepare. In the rush; PF attempted to manipulate the FMS during a critical phase of flight and lost situational awareness. When the PM took over FMS load responsibilities; he was rushed and also lost situational awareness. While the PM was loading the FMS; the PF mistakenly started a descent for 12;300; the published altitude after LIFTT; without making proper challenge/response of altitude selection. As a result; the PM was unaware of the selected altitude change. To avoid recurrence; the flight crew need to follow SOP guidance; requiring PM to make all FMS changes during critical phases of flight; and requiring the PF to confirm all altitude changes in Alt Pre select with the PM. Above all; the crew must be more assertive in communicating with ATC their need to set up between approaches with such tight geographic and airspace constraints.
Air carrier flight crew reported they received a low altitude alert from ATC on approach into ASE citing workload; weather; and situational awareness as contributing.