Commercial Fixed Wing
Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Training / Qualification; Situational Awareness; Distraction; Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Time Pressure
Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach
Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance
Procedure; Human Factors; Airport; Environment - Non Weather Related
The plan was to join ILS 14 for decent through cloud layer and continue for visual conditions straight in landing. Upon exiting cloud layer it was evident that we were too high above glideslope for straight in. I suggested to FO (First Officer) to convert to a visual to Rwy 32 and use the additional distance and time to descend to pattern altitude. He agreed to that change and I made appropriate calls and set up for the change. He maneuvered to enter a right downwind and continued without event.  We entered downwind; started to configure for landing; I noticed that we were not descending very much from pattern and while turning base was able to confirm once I could visually see RWY 32 that again we were too high. I told FO to start descending; he increased rate of decent and continued to configure flaps for landing. Airspeed also increased as he continued turn from base to final. As we rolled out on final I observed an 1800 ft/min rate of decent; airspeed approx. 10 knots over solid bug and we were still well above a normal glidepath. I commented that we needed to reduce rate of decent or were going to get an EGPWS warning. Right after I stated that we received a sink rate warning followed by a terrain pull up warning. I immediately commanded a go-around. We executed a go-around on Rwy heading and I had to lead PF (Pilot Flying) through continuing to reconfigure; warned of approaching Flap overspeed (believe we got to 175K with flaps 15). I directed FO that we would climb to 3000 ft and turn to enter a left downwind and return for visual to Rwy 32. I took a more active role in directing him for the remainder of the approach. He was late turning base this time and I needed to direct to level off as we were now too low for our distance from runway. We were able to continue the approach without incident other than an airspeed call again on short final. He was slightly above solid bug; and corrected as soon as I made call. I believe the main cause of this event was the FO lack of proficiency in flying a visual approach. He was slow to recognize and not sure if he realized how high we were after exiting clouds 15 miles out from airport.  I gave him some time to evaluate it and come up with a solution; but it seemed he wasn't sure what to do; and readily agreed to change to opposite rwy. He also seemed to have trouble judging position while in traffic pattern. I should have spoken up earlier on the approach as soon as I was able to again see the runway turning base. I was concerned already that this approach wasn't working out. I let this continue too far and could have prevented the EGPWS warning by calling for a missed approach as soon as I was sure that a landing was not possible. I'm not sure he ever knew during the approach how unstable it became. We did discuss it after parking at gate.
An air carrier Captain reported his First Officer had difficulty flying two attempted night visual approaches to MFR. High sink rate with an EGPWS alert and speed control were concerns.