Regional Jet 200 ER/LR (CRJ200)
Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach
Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Human Factors
While on short final for runway XXL in ZZZ; the first officer was marginally slow on airspeed and I stated; 'airspeed'. His response was to state; 'correcting' and to add about 4-6% power to the thrust levers and pitch the nose down. As power was added and the nose lowered; the glide slope moved above our flight path and I stated; 'glideslope'. The first officer responded with; 'correcting' and raised the nose of the aircraft. Due to the limited amount of power added during the low speed correction; and the increase in the aircraft pitch angle; the trend vector quickly moved toward the low speed stall area and the stick shaker was activated. This occurred roughly 150-200 feet above the ground; just prior to crossing the threshold. The first officer immediately advanced the thrust levers to max thrust and lowered the nose. The aircraft speed never got lower than 5-7 knots below the speed bug. Within less than 5 seconds the trend vector was drastically increasing; the speed was within the speed bug; and the aircraft crossed the threshold of the runway. Simultaneously; the aircraft stated; '50' and began counting down to landing. The first officer leveled the nose and pulled the power to idle to land. When asked at 40 feet if I would like him to go around; I determined it would be safer to continue the landing because we were over the runway; on speed; within the touchdown zone; and had been at idle for at least 2-3 seconds. The aircraft was landed safely and did not have any issues on taxi or during the post flight inspection. The primary cause and contributing factor of this event appeared to be a power/control misunderstanding. Although power was added; it was not sufficient to compensate for the increased angle of attack. As the captain; I should have been more proactive at pushing the power up when I noticed only a marginal amount had been added. I chose to allow the first officer's scan to make a full circle and return to the speed tape (the speed was only at the bottom of the bug at the time) and make an additional correction. I was not anticipating the nose being raised without power being added simultaneously due to my understanding of the aircraft. I did not realize the FO is still working to understand the pitch and power tendencies of the CRJ200. I will be more proactive in the future to make an appropriate change if the necessary actions are not executed as fast as they should be. I believe allowing the FO more opportunity to experience and execute decent planning on visual approaches would benefit him greatly. The FO was extremely positive; receptive to feedback; and quick to correct and respond to the aircraft. This one instance in four days showed where the FO could benefit from more experience working with pitch/power control at low altitudes and airspeeds.
[Report narrative contained no additional information.]
CRJ-200 flight crew reported an unstable approach with stick shaker activation which was continued to an uneventful landing.