Widebody Transport
Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Distraction; Workload; Training / Qualification
Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach
Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Airport; Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure
ARRIVAL: Upon checking in with Quito approach descending to flight level in the low 20s; Quito approach control advised 'this will be radar vectors for Runway 18.' We were anticipating Runway 36 per en route weather requests and current ATIS. After loading new approach into the FMC; Quito approach changed instructions and said; 'Quito landing Runway 36; proceed direct to QIT VOR and cleared for the ILS Z RWY 36 approach; report QIT inbound.' We complied with the instructions and selected our previously anticipated Runway 36; in the FMC. We did not conduct another briefing because this was our Runway and approach of intended landing; but we did pay close attention to the ATIS (non-digital) for wind changes. The winds were reported as a quarterly tailwind on the ATIS for Runway 36.CONDITIONS:Weather: DAY VMC; high level scattered and broken layer. Runway surface dry. Performance: LANDING Weight = 215.4 tons; FLAPS = 25; AUTOBRAKES 2 = roughly 11900ft performance with no T/R credit. Runway is almost 13;500 long at roughly 8000ft MSL. Crew elected AUTOBRAKES 2 due to taxi closure and anticipated full length roll-out to the end of the Runway.APPROACH: After completion of the approach over the QIT VOR and interception of the Runway 36 localizer; tower cleared us to land Runway 36. Tower reported winds out of the west; direct crosswind of 9 kts or so. From 10;500ft MSL (Localizer/GS intercept altitudes) it was clear the winds were a quarterly tailwind (about 150 degrees) at 14kts. After glide slope intercept and descending into the valley; light to occasional moderate turbulence was experienced with gusty winds. Gusty winds were not reported on the ATIS or by the tower. The CA/PF elected to add a slight speed additive to approach speed above Vref. 1000ft AGL to Threshold: The CA/PF had a difficult time getting the aircraft to slow to target approach speed. Due to the light weight of the aircraft and the gusty wind conditions; along with a high altitude airport; the TAS warranted a steeper V/S of 1000-1100fpm to maintain glide slope. I stated to the captain 'Speed' to indicate our current airspeed was above Vref. At one point during the approach; IAS was in excess of 25-30kts of bug. I also stated to the Captain that we still have a tailwind component 'roughly 9 kts; I will call the wind shift for you.' We were still anticipating a direct left crosswind over the threshold as reported by tower. It is not uncommon to have low level wind shifts flying into Quito. My best guess for our tailwind component over the threshold was 9-11kts. Winds were roughly 140 degrees at 12-14kts according to the wind vector displayed on the ND. Approaching the runway threshold; I started to question the successful outcome of this landing and was extra vigilant on flight instruments/indications and primed to call go-around. Our GS on the ND was 195kts over the threshold and we were roughly 20-25kts above Vref at this point.Threshold to Touchdown: The higher IAS above Vref; coupled with the unanticipated tailwind component; the aircraft expeditiously flew through the touchdown zone. Leaving the end of the touchdown zone I called 'Let's go-around' due to roughly 10-15kts above Vref and beyond the touchdown zone at 10ft RA. There was no response from the CA as he was wrestling with the controls to get the aircraft on the runway. A quick 4 seconds pass as I try to see if the captain is struggling with the GO-AROUND procedures; but he is still trying to land the aircraft. I call a more direct 'GO AROUND' and the captain responded; 'No; I got it.' Another 2-4 seconds we touched down and the captain went into full reverse thrust but kept the AUTOBRAKES set at 2. Manually braking occurred at roughly 100kts; and as the 1000ft remaining markers on the runway were approaching I called '1000ft remaining' and saw a GS of 80kts. The aircraft performed well due to the light aircraft weight and dry runway. After touchdown with the spoilers deployed and reverse thrust selected; I DID NOT doubt that we had enough runway remaining.The reason for the 'Go-Around' call-out is clear in our FOM; 'A missed approach is required upon reaching the decision height DA(H); the missed approach point (MAP); or at anytime thereafter if: ... The pilot determines that a landing cannot safely be made in the touchdown zone. OR The airplane is not in a position form which a descent to a landing within the touchdown zone can be made at a normal rate of descent; using normal maneuvers.' Runway 36 at Quito does not have runway distance remaining markers. Our only indication is the touchdown zone. Leaving the touchdown zone; if we assume our GS is roughly 150kts; that means every second we are traveling 250ft down the runway. My first 'Let's Go-Around' call-out was at 3000ft down the runway (end of the touchdown zone). I believe at roughly 4 seconds later was my second 'Go-Around' call-out which means we were at 4000ft down the runway. It was still another 4 seconds for the airplane to touchdown; meaning my best guess is that we touched down at 5000ft down the runway.After taxi-in and completion of the shutdown checklist; I carefully thought how I wanted to approach this subject. I first wanted to have an open conversation with the CA; one-on-one before including the other crew members. I wanted to discuss CRM; TEM; personal minimums; company policies regarding go-arounds and our safety culture. The Captain actually approached me first to apologize about the approach and said that in hindsight he probably should have gone around; but he knew we were light weight and the runway was very long. I understand his point; but my follow-up question was; 'when did you touchdown?' He didn't know; so I asked him again; 'so how did you know you had a long runway in front of you if you didn't know when you touched down?' I gave him my rundown of indications and performance speeds I observed during the approach and that my best guess was that we touched down at 4500-5000ft down the runway. We went over the AERODATA numbers and even worked another performance scenario through AERODATA to reflect the 10kt tailwind component. At; AUTOBRAKES 2; the new data showed 12451ft of landing distance. This assumes a 1500ft touchdown (CAT1) meaning we have roughly 11000ft of ground rollout. We touched down at 4500-5000 feet down the runway; more than 3000 beyond the AERODATA assumed touchdown point. Meaning we had 8500 of runway remaining (13500-5000) and a ground roll-out performance of 11;000ft. After this long conversation the CA understood the issue and once again apologized and lesson learned.GO-AROUND Culture: My biggest concern with the event is the disregard for a crew member calling 'Go-around' ... twice! I conveyed this to the CA and asked; what if I was calling go-around for a different reason than what you thought? Aircraft entering runway etc; how do you know what I am calling go-around for? Our company policy is to allow for any crew member to call go-around; but we have a cultural issue accepting this policy and an overall lack of a contemporary approach to safety. This is a classic 'drift into failure' scenario. The CA admitted that just previously this month; he observed another captain come in who landed long but knew he had enough runway. It worked last time out of tolerances; so it will work this time right? To make matters worse; the CA/PF went back to discuss the event with the other CA in the observers seat; and the other captain agreed with the decision to continue the landing. How far will we drift away from standard procedures before an incident/accident occurs? The qualifications of these two captains; and their extensive experience in South America is very impressive; but the lack of a proper approach to safety and accepting an undesired aircraft state with a desire to disregard a 'crew concept' flight deck will cause an undesired outcome. Luckily; this scenario turned out successful. This CA;and myself learned a lot from this event and I truly feel the CA understands the risks that were taken; and how we could have mitigated the direct threats to our aircraft. Unfortunately; this is one captain and one crew; and with the response from the other CA that he tOo would have continued the landing and disregarded two go-around calls when landing out of the touchdown zone means we have a cultural and systemic problem; not an individual problem. I discussed with the CA and crew how we could have approached this arrival to landing differently. I accepted part of the blame that during the briefing; I did not ask about go-around policies and our personal minimums for this flight at a high altitude airport with gusty winds. A lesson learned for all.We need a no fault Go-Around policy in place at this airline immediately. We need a strict procedure that if ANY crew member calls 'go-around' a go-around is mandatory.
A Widebody Transport freight aircraft was ferried empty into SEQU but with the wind conditions and light weight the Captain could not slow the aircraft. He refused to go-around and landed with about 4;000 feet remaining but was able to stop.