Large Transport
Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (mon) 10
Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Time Pressure; Situational Awareness
ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Procedure; Human Factors; Airspace Structure
Aircraft X was direct to CAMRN to cross 40 miles southeast of CAMRN at FL140. W-107 had gone active and my Radar Assist secured a point out through the warning area for Aircraft X direct to CAMRN descending to FL090.When Aircraft X was approximately 10 miles from the boundary of sectors 86 and 66 the conflict alert started to flash with Aircraft X and the [a flight of three.] The [flight of three were] turned directly into the Aircraft X that I was working.When I recognized the conflict I told Aircraft X to turn left for traffic; no response was received. I called a traffic alert for Aircraft X. My RA told me that [one controller] wanted me to stop Aircraft X at FL180. I told Aircraft X to maintain FL180. Aircraft X responded that he was responding to a TCAS Resolution Advisory. I did everything that I could.As for the Aircraft Y; he was never in my airspace. The first time that I recall seeing this limited data block was when the Aircraft Y was at FL190 heading eastbound already off the Aircraft X's right side. At that point the Aircraft X was already descending down and was out of FL189. Upon watching the Falcon playback it appears that Aircraft Y turns off his transponder. At that point there was absolutely no way for me to be able to even know he was there until the Aircraft Y turns his transponder back on.After this second conflict cleared I was told by my RA; who was told by sector 66 to put Aircraft X on a heading of 010. I did this and transferred communications to sector 66 as they wanted to talk to him.[The other Controller] should protect for point outs when they accept point outs from us. If they are unable to do so then they need to advise us during coordination so that a mutually agreeable solution can be determined.
I was working the D Side of sector 86. [Another controller] called to activate warning area W107. At which time I pointed out two aircraft. One already within the lateral confines of W107; one just outside; being Aircraft X. I pointed both aircraft out direct to CAMRN descending to FL090; which is the altitude the next sector 66 which also has W107 within its boundaries descends arrivals to. Both point outs were approved by [another controller]. Shortly thereafter sector 66 called to confirm both aircraft were pointed out down to FL090 with [another controller]; which I replied affirmative. The first aircraft was handed off to 66 and communications transferred to them. The second aircraft as it approached the boundary between sector 86 and 66; began to flash conflict alert with a flight of 3.  The data blocks of these aircraft indicating they were out of FL140 climbing to FL230 whereas Aircraft X was out of approximately out of FL220 descending to 140. Upon recognizing the conflict I contacted [another controller] to question what the flight of three were doing. They stated the aircraft were making a hard left and asked me to stop Aircraft X at FL180. At this point the Aircraft X was approximately 200 FT about FL180; so I told the R side to stop Aircraft X at FL180. The R controller issued the clearance as well as a traffic alert; however at this point Aircraft X was responding to a traffic advisory. In addition a limited data block directly above the Aircraft X was at FL190. This aircraft had shut off their transponder; presumably to avoid any TCAS alerts as they joined up with the [flight of three]. We later found out this aircraft was attempting to turn away from the Aircraft X the [the flight of three] was turning directly towards Aircraft X.Either [other controllers] separates their traffic with point outs they accept through any warning area and remains in direct communication with their aircraft or they no longer accept point outs through these warning areas. The problem lies with aircraft already within the warning area when they go hot. Perhaps a delay in the time the warning area goes hot and the time aircraft under [air traffic] control arrive within it; to assure all non participating flights depart the warning area.
ZNY Center Controllers reported about a problem with a restricted area due to traffic in and out of it that caused airborne conflicts with multiple aircraft.