Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Situational Awareness; Human-Machine Interface
Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance
General Maintenance Action
Procedure; Manuals; MEL; Human Factors
When I arrived at aircraft to prepare for the flight to ZZZ; maintenance was on the flight deck dealing with a write up made by the in-bound crew. I went to brief the cabin crew and returned to the flight deck where I observed maintenance doing what I assumed was a byte check (through the MCDU). I understood the problem to be with Elevator Aileron Computer 1 (ELAC1) though I did not read the write-up at that point. Maintenance then left the flight deck with the logbook and the MEL saying that they were going to have to defer ELAC1 per MEL procedures. I continued with normal cockpit prep minus the logbook check as it was with maintenance.After about 20 minutes maintenance returned with the logbook at which point I reviewed the logbook and the write up and the MEL/placarding etc. Maintenance returned the red 'out of service card' to its storage place. I read the write up and MEL as 'ELAC 1 fault' if I remember correctly and the deferral to read ELAC 1 deferred per MEL [number]. This MEL had both [maintenance and Operation] procedures. The [maintenance] procedures referenced a task card and the [Operation] procedures; items to be completed during cockpit prep to satisfy the remarks section of the MEL regarding spoiler and elevator control. Maintenance informed me that the ELAC 1 CB's in the [electronics] compartment had been pulled as per the [maintenance] procedures which I had no reason to question (they are not spelled out in the MEL reference document in my EFB). The appropriate Operations procedures completed by myself and my First Officer prior to closing the main cabin and cockpit doors. After the jetway was pulled back; the tug driver called to say maintenance was coming back on the aircraft and the jetway was repositioned; cabin doors dis-armed and the main cabin door re-opened. A different maintenance tech came in to the flight deck to inform me that the MEL had been applied incorrectly and that it was an ELAC 'PITCH FAULT' associated with a servo motor; not the ELAC itself. I was told therefore that the CBs in the [electronics compartment] compartment were being reset and that the ELAC itself did not need de-activating. I re-read the MEL and found that the same MEL applied to either ELAC 1 or any ELAC 1 function so no further [action] was required. The placarding requirements were slightly different and changed accordingly; and the [Operation] procedures were slightly different as well for the ELAC 1 pitch fault so my First Officer and I re-did the whole thing from the top per the MEL. We re-secured the cockpit and main cabin doors and departed normally. The flight was uneventful and no ECAM's were evident enroute.During the cockpit prep in ZZZ in preparation for the flight to ZZZ1; we once again did the [operation] procedures specified in the MEL for ELAC 1 pitch fault. Afterward; I re-read the [operation] procedure for the third time now. I noticed that these [operation] procedures were not necessary if there was no F/CTL ELAC 1 PITCH FAULT alert present on the [warning display] (which there wasn't). My thought process was that the ELAC 1 PITCH FAULT was MELd and I had achieved an equivalent or higher level of safety by having already done the check; even though none was required so we departed normally. Upon arrival in ZZZ1; I briefed the First Officer of the crew receiving the aircraft that there was an ELAC 1 PITCH FAULT MEL deferral in the logbook and an associated preflight procedure but no Follow-Up required which I thought odd for such a relatively involved [operation] procedure. I did not point out the note about the fault needing to be present to necessitate doing the associated [operation] procedure as I did not want to bias that crews interpretation of the MEL nor was I confident that the F/CTL ELAC 1 PITCH FAULT had not appeared since leaving the aircraft.  In re-reading this MEL the following day; the main thing I would change relative to this particular MEL is to separate theELAC FAULT and the ELAC PITCH FAULT (and other possible ELAC malfunctions) in to separate MELs and thus separate their associated [operation] procedures as they are relatively involved and can be easily mixed up; particularly in a time compressed situation like a quick turn.
The MEL procedures for the flight crew when the Elevator Aileron Computer1 (ELAC1) is deferred is different than when the 'ELAC1 Pitch Fault' is deferred.