Skyhawk 172/Cutlass 172
Flight Crew Private; Flight Crew Instrument
Flight Crew Last 90 Days 44; Flight Crew Total 1100; Flight Crew Type 1100
Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Flight Crew Exited Penetrated Airspace
Human Factors
I left POU; at about XA45 to go to [a nearby airport] for a XC00 safety seminar. At some point before reaching the Long Island Sound I climbed to 4;500 feet in order to cross the open body of water at a higher altitude. And failing to descend to an altitude below the shelf; did inadvertently fly through the New York Bravo airspace without proper clearance.Flying in the area all of my flying career; I normally don't have qualms about crossing the Long Island Sound and have done so many times at 3;500 feet.  Maybe because it was dusk and the sound appeared more menacing; maybe it was because I was going to a safety seminar where my good friend was going to talk about his incident out of [a nearby airport.] But for some reason I made a last minute decision to climb to a higher altitude of 4;500 feet; thinking that it was better to be higher when crossing the water. Of course I know about the super Bravo; I've been flying through it with clearances and all around it since I first learned to fly. I love the NY Bravo; it's a source of pride; part of being a New Yorker pilot to have the privilege to competently share the skies with the heavies and fast talking TRACON personnel.  And; I know that when I fly into [a nearby airport] I need to duck under the shelf.  It's true that an error or mistake is never the result of just one decision--there were four faulty decisions that lead to me busting the airspace. Four links in the error chain.The first link in the error chain involved a last minute route change. The original flight plan included a stop at BDR to pick up a friend who would also attend the seminar. But at the last moment; my friend called to say he couldn't make it and I simply did a Direct-To from POU to [a nearby airport.]  If I had of focused more on the nagging thought that occurred to me that I'd never gone direct from POU to [a nearby airport]; I might have remembered the reason I never do that route direct was that it would mean I'd have to fly below the Bravo shelf and over the water at less than 3;000 feet; at about 2;500 feet. I made a last minute route change without fully contemplating the effects on altitude and other flight aspects.The next link was the contemplation of my friend's good fortune at having survived his incident last summer and how lucky he was to have survived.  He and others have often said that his survival was due largely to his decision-making at the time.  I was thinking about how he was departing [a nearby airport] when he had to declare an emergency; he was flying to ZZZ; when disaster struck him.  I was following the same route and I; too; wanted to be safe and these thoughts led me to do an act of over caution by climbing higher without proper route consideration.  Another link was over reliance on a new function of the panel-mount GPS; the GTN-650.  I've had it for several months and until I got the software upgrade last month it didn't automatically show the floor and ceilings of controlled airspace on the map page.  Therefore; before last month; I'd use my iPad Foreflight app for quick reference for place and height of controlled airspace.  One of the recent upgrade features is that now the GTN does show airspace ceilings on the map page.  In an effort to declutter the cockpit; I turn off the iPad when it's not directly needed for something I can't quickly retrieve from the GTN; before last month's GTN upgrade I always got airspace limits from the iPad.  So unlike normal circumstances; I was relying of seeing the airspace altitude indicator on my panel mount GPS map page as my cue for knowing when I was near controlled airspace.  Lastly; I should have used flight following and had decided against it for no good reason; and that was a mistake.  With flight following I would have been cleared into the Bravo or at least they would have told me to stay clear of it--in either case; I would have been alerted. The first error chain was the last minute routingchange without proper thought. The approach to [the nearby airport] would have allowed me to overfly the Long Island Sound for the entire route without entering the Bravo.  Preoccupations with a matter outside of the scope of the current flight lead me to act differently by climbing to an altitude not normally used for that direction of flight and mission.  Still being somewhat unfamiliar with my new GPS software; I should have left the trusty iPad on for ease of reference.  And; furthermore; the whole event would have been a nonevent had I used flight following.  Actually; if; in fact; I had acted differently on any of these points I doubt I would have made inadvertent flight through NY's controlled airspace without proper clearance.Unfortunately; I unknowingly entered the Bravo at 4;500 feet before I even reached the Sound.  I didn't notice because I didn't expect to reach the Bravo until I was over Long Island land mass--which would have been true for my original approach coming from BDR.  Once on Long Island; I began a 500/fpm descent to 2;000 feet and turned on the iPad to see a taxi diagram for [the nearby airport.]  When it opened on the map page I saw my airplane georeferenced inside the Bravo at about 4;000 feet and descending. Horrified I increased the descent to 2;000fpm to get below the floor of the shelf.  I still hadn't grasped that I'd been inside the shelf since before overflying the Sound.  Being about 12 miles from [the nearby airport]; I busied myself with getting the ATIS and radioing the tower with my intent to land.  Now; it was well past sunset and the lights of Long Island made it difficult to pick out the airport and I didn't see it until I was about 3 miles away.  I made my position report on downwind runway 01 and was cleared first to land. Still getting darker and the city lights getting brighter; I lost the airport on my downwind to base turn and began hunting for it.  The ATC controller noticed and told me I was west of the airport and she would blink the runway lights.  Bingo; there it was and I straightened out my base; made final and landed uneventfully.  CHAIN OF EVENTS HUMAN - How the problem arose; last minute route change; preoccupation with other matters- How it was discovered; saw my position georeferenced on the iPad Foreflight app.- Contributing factors; new GPS software; failure to use flight following -Corrective actions; immediately flew out of airspacePERFORMANCE CONSIDERATIONS- Perceptions; judgments; decisions; fixation on matters outside the flight led to do something inconsistent with safe flight climbing to higher when I should have been lower and not concentrating on navigational issues at hand- Actions or inactions; failed to properly interpret the GPS and follow through on appropriate actions--note my position and descend accordingly- Factors affecting the quality of human performance; fixation on matters outside the flight my friend's accident from [the nearby airport] was the biggest problem.  While I was properly flying the airplane; I should have been navigating using all available instruments instead of just navigating by faulty memory.
A Cessna 172 pilot inadvertently entered the New York Class B when a change was made in the planned itinerary. Upon discovery of the aircraft's location via digital navaids the pilot expedited a descent to exit the airspace.