Regional Jet 200 ER/LR (CRJ200)
Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Distraction; Situational Awareness; Time Pressure; Communication Breakdown
ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Speed All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue
Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Airport; Company Policy; Procedure
Our flight encountered stronger than forecast winds. We had been dispatched with zero contingency fuel and only 33 LBS of 'extra fuel' for a total of 5;700 LBS. At brake release for takeoff the total was 5;650 LBS. At Top of Climb; fuel was plus 35 LBS from planned with 4;100 LBS as we approached JOINN.The flight was flown 250 KIAS to 10;000 MSL and profile cost index speed of 263 KTS to FL300. Over AVERY with 70 KT headwinds; fuel was 100 LBS less than planned due to the greater headwinds. On arrival the downwind fixes were not flight planned for fuel and burn off from WORFF to ATL planned at only 300 LBS required 450. Atlanta Center cleared us to FL240; we requested discretion for fuel but they were unable. Additionally we were asked to maintain 290 KTS and later increased to 310 KTS in the descent as we were number two in the pack.Fuel on landing was forecast to be 2;000 LBS (and; predictably; lower with a 20 NM final into ATL. We asked Center for relief on the airspeed which helped but were then given DIRTY at 14;000 and 320 KTS. Approach first assigned Runway 8L then subsequently changed it to Runway 10 from a north transition. We were now forecast to land with reserve fuel or less. We declared minimum fuel and requested 8R. They did not seem to understand minimum fuel and stated; 'We'll see what we can do.' We landed with 1;940 LBS at touchdown; 300 LBS below planned arrival fuel.The company is flight planning on razor thin fuel margins; particularly into large airports. I have seen planned landing fuels as low as 1;900 LBS into major hubs. This is becoming the norm with both of our 'mother' airlines. If the company plans razor thin margins; flight planning MUST be more accurate. An increase in forecast headwinds and a change in runways should NOT cause minimum fuel situations. Captain had been on property for 14 1/2 years and First Officer for 6 1/2. Furthermore; downwind fixes were not added to the furthest fix of WOTBA. Carrying fuel costs money; but the ATC system is dynamic and with only 33 extra LBS of fuel; there is no room for any contingency; no flexibility in the system. We're flying into the biggest; busiest airports and flight planning like we're landing in Podunk. Had this not been an experienced crew; perhaps the minimum fuel call would not have been made.
The planned en route wind was -55. Actual wind in cruise was -80. If we hadn't taken off with 200 LBS above our minimum fuel our fuel would have been a source of concern much sooner. I agreed to the increased en route speed because of the 200 LBS at takeoff along with the Center's indication that we were second in line going into Atlanta.About a minute later Approach called back and assigned us Runway 10. I quickly plugged it into the FMS which then indicated that we would land below [FAA] reserves. Based on the fact that Atlanta frequently runs beyond 20 miles and the possibility of needing to go around I did not feel that continuing to Runway 10 would leave enough fuel to guarantee a safe outcome. When [the company] began operating with cost indexes; 250 LBS of contingency fuel was regularly added for exactly this reason. Now there is no such contingency addition. If this becomes the new normal; where company flight crews have to refuse speeds assignments because of fuel concerns it will cause delays for our mainline partners and/or we will be vectored out of the sequence. We NEED to have enough fuel to complete our mission in line with what is expected by ALL parties. The customer expects to arrive safely. Our mainline partner expects us to arrive on time. Air Traffic Control expects that we be able to accept assigned speeds and that we be able to accept any suitable runway at our destination. A 15 KT change in wind and/or having a speed assigned by ATC should never put an aircraft near a minimum fuel state.
A CRJ-200 flight crew used their flight--compromised on arrival by less than required remaining fuel on board--as an example to address concerns about their company's penurious standards with respect to fuel required at departure; planning only for best case scenarios and making little or no allowance for routine and/or predictable contingencies.