Medium Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown
Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Vehicle
Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Maintenance Action; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed
Human Factors
My crew and I were involved in an incident where the right engine nacelle made contact with the pushback tug and caused damage to the right engine nacelle. We were operating day 2. In spite of getting only five hours of sleep; I did not feel fatigued and felt safe to work as scheduled. The pre-flight and boarding were normal. All required crew briefings and checklists were completed as required by standard operating procedures. The final minutes of the departure were a bit rushed and was complicated with a half-weight count being necessary and last minute bag adjustments. The cabin door was closed and the brake was released one minute prior to scheduled departure. The ramp controller gave us the instruction to push tail east deep in the alley so he could move our company flight onto our gate. That airplane was blocking another flight also trying to depart from the next gate. I told the pushback crew the brakes were released and they were cleared to push east; tail deep into the alley. The ground agent received my instructions and then stated that he only had a short cord headset and we would be doing the rest of the push via hand signals. He disconnected and started the push before I had the chance to complete the recommended briefing suggested in the FOM. Due to having to communicate with the ramp tower; I also did not initially notice that the nose marshaller did not have lighted wands. The sun had also just set twenty minutes prior to our push; so there was still some daylight as we began the push. It got quite dark during the push; and as the aircraft was pushed back 180 degrees into the alley; it became quite hard to see the marshaller. The pushback tug that was being used was also a smaller version and it was barely visible from the cockpit. We received the signal to start the first engine and began that process. While that engine was being started; the ramp asked us to push deeper into the alley; so he could move the company aircraft closer to the gate. I attempted to convey this to the ground crew; but I could not get them to understand what I needed. As we began to start the second engine; my First Officer was heads down monitoring the start. The start process on the [aircraft] takes a lot of time and requires the First Officer to be monitoring the start for approximately four minutes. The airplane began to move forward. I was under the impression that the ramp crew was moving us forward a bit so they could reposition us further into the alley. I was completely unable to see the pushback tug. I got a stop signal from the marshaller at this point. I interpreted this signal to mean that they were stopping the tug and the next signal would be for us to set the brakes and then disconnect. We then heard one of the pilots from the other company aircraft broadcast over the ramp frequency; 'Stop; you have a truck in the way; stop!' Both the First Officer and I aggressively applied the brakes; but we were unable to avoid running the right engine nacelle into the tug. At no time did we receive or acknowledge the signal to set the brakes or to disconnect. My initial thought was that the ramp had gotten the tug out of position and had oversteered with the towbar still connected. I later found out the ramp had disconnected the tug and towbar without giving us a set brakes or disconnect signal. The ramp must have also disconnected the towbar without checking to see if the parking brake light was illuminated on nose gear. My First Officer says the nose gear parking brake light was working during his walkaround. Instead of being towed forward as I thought; the airplane was rolling free and rolled into the tug as it was moving away. The second engine was still in the motoring phase and had not begun to produce power when my First Officer aborted the start of that engine and he also shut down the number 1 engine which had been running at idle power. We then made the call to have the ramp tower to dispatch the airport crash; fire; rescue to team to determine whether or not we were leaking fuel or other fluids that might be a fire hazard. The firemen responded and confirmed that we were not leaking any hazardous fluids and that there were no injuries to our ground personnel. We also consulted the QRH and applied the procedure for a possible fuel leak.It took some time to establish communication with the ground crew. At this point I called the Chief Pilot duty phone and made a preliminary report to them. I received permission to have the airplane moved to a gate at this time. It took some time to coordinate with the ground crew to get the airplane moved back to the gate. They were unable to find a working headset; so I eventually had to relay my cell phone number via the ramp frequency to a ramp person to coordinate a pushback. After we made it back to the gate; we completed the parking checklist. I then entered all discrepancies into the logbook and turned control of the aircraft to the Maintenance Department. My First Officer and I then agreed to submit to a post-accident drug and alcohol test. We were forced by the company compliance officer to wait at the airport for four hours for a collector to show up. The drug collector expressed concerns about having the proper paperwork and the proper test on more than one occasion. The facilities she used were not adequate in my opinion as we ended up taking our screening in an empty women's restroom in the main terminal. We finished the drug and alcohol screen at an hour later. We went on rest and went to the hotel.This incident could be avoided by requiring all stations to maintain operative pushback headsets. Positive communication needs to be established with the pushback crew and the cockpit prior to aircraft movement via a headset. I have communicated my concerns about using hand signals for pushback in a previous report. Unfortunately; the company has chosen to run the operation as cheaply as possible and has done a poor job of demanding that ground service contractors keep and maintain working pushback headsets. Using hand signals for pushback has become the rule rather than the exception. In addition; high turnover among personnel with our ground service contractors has resulted in poor training and the company using personnel who are unaware of the importance of proper hand signals; using lighted wands; and communication. Hand signals do not provide sufficient opportunity for the crew to communicate ground and ramp controller instructions when things change. Pushback tugs also need to be flagged so the flight crew can see where it is at all times. After disconnect; pushback tugs should be driven so both pilots can see it move away. The company needs to also make an additional investment in ramp training and safety so an incident like this can be avoided in the future.As suggested in my previous narrative; the use of headsets with proper cords should be mandatory. Contracted ground stations need to be made aware of the importance of a headset; and if the ground service vendor doesn't want to maintain them; then it needs to become [this airline's] responsibility to provide them. The use of standard hand signals does not allow the crew to convey complicated instructions to the pushback crew when there is a change from the ramp.
[Report narrative contained no additional information.]
Air carrier flight crew reported a collision with the pushback tug during engine start at RDU with the ground crew not using a headset and a smaller tug.