B767-300 and 300 ER
Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness
Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
General None Reported / Taken
Human Factors
Captain and Line Check Airman landed in what I perceived on the radar as severe weather against my numerous; [and] at the end; strenuous objections; ignoring me and exercising extremely poor CRM. Upon arrival in the terminal area; the weather extended from 20 NM south of the airport extending over the airport and the approach path to 20 NM north of the airport.  This was confirmed with approach control. We first deviated around the weather to the north; received vectors for the ILS to [a west] runway; broke off the approach; then flew back around the weather again to the north and shot an approach and landing to [the south]. In addition to the strong radar returns; the wind was gusting and approach control had earlier called a wind shear warning of a 15 knot loss. I also saw flashes of lightning directly over or very close to the airport (it was on my side). It was my leg and I did not feel it wise or at least the best course of action to complete either approach in such severe conditions.I suggested we go hold until the line of weather passed; perhaps 15-20 minutes maximum.  We had the fuel and our alternate was clear.  [The Captain] completely ignored my suggestions and inputs in the end. It soon became apparent to me [the Captain] was determined to land despite my now fervent suggestions to do otherwise; so prior to glide slope intercept on [the south runway]; I initiated a safe transfer of aircraft control to [the Captain] and assumed support duties. He completed the approach and landing with some difficulty.  On short final he had us at full scale defection high on the Glide Path: both electronic and the PAPI (4 white). I called 'glide slope deviation' yet he elected to continue the landing. To further exacerbate the situation; [the Check Airman] sat in the jumpseat and said nothing; not a single word. Giving no input of any kind which may have supported a wiser course of action.  While we were in a phase of flight which requires a sterile cockpit; that did not or should not have prevented him from joining in a fight related; potentially safety related conversation.I felt it to be a blatant disregard for CRM in ignoring my suggestions when a simple and safer course of action which I was proposing existed. I have 9000+ hours in the 767; most of it flying to Florida with its many thunderstorms; I have been a Captain here at [this airline] and several years ago; I received several months worth of radar interpretation training in USAF Navigator Training. I have NEVER seen anyone even attempt to land with such intense radar returns. If Captains and Check Airmen do not heed the concerns and suggestions of experienced first officers; what is the purpose CRM training?In conflict with the FOM; I took a photo of the severe radar returns covering the approach; because I feared the Captain's insistence to continue the approach and landing had the potential at the very least to damage the aircraft and I felt I need something to support my position that it was unsafe to continue.  The autopilot was engaged and I certainly deem it safer to take a few seconds to take the photo in case a far greater incident occurred.  It is not something I would consider unsafe or even unwise at that juncture when I was being 'squashed' and the airplane and I were being directed in the wrong way by the Captain.
B767 First Officer reported the Captain ignored his concerns about landing at the destination with severe weather in the area.