MD-11
Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Maintenance Action
Aircraft; Procedure; Human Factors; Company Policy
From the moment we showed up at the airplane; things were 'Not quite right'. For starters; the airplane was spotlessly clean. Immediately thereafter; we were handed the 64 page Maintenance Release. (Both big clues [To extensive maintenance procedures being accomplished]). Captain loaded the FMS; which would not provide an accurate aircraft position due to a failed (or deactivated) IRU and Global Navigation System (GNS) system. (Thankfully; that was caught at the gate and not during taxi or after takeoff.) It was nearly impossible to explain the problem to local maintenance personnel; but after much effort we were able to resolve the issue our own. Not surprisingly; during the resolution process we received a 'UNABLE RNP' message as we literally watched the aircraft position move with respect to the airport on our map displays despite sitting motionless at the gate.Pushback and taxi were relatively uneventful. Take off was uneventful until shortly after liftoff; when the stick shaker engaged and both PFD's presented and Amber boxed 'SLAT' message. The Captain reduced the aircraft pitch to approximately 15 degrees and noted that we were both accelerating and climbing. Aircraft was still controllable. At 400 feet; we received a Level 2 'SLAT DISAG' message. I requested a straight out departure from tower (vice the turning departure) and advised that we would be leveling at 3;000 feet while running an abnormal checklist. They were most accommodating. The checklist instructed us to raise the slats and advised that the problem was likely to re-appear when slat extension is made prior to landing. The aircraft exhibited a notable rolling moment while slat retraction was in progress.We opted to re-extend the slats (resuming the checklist) while in the vicinity of [the airport] rather than waiting to potentially re-discover the problem upon arrival. During extension; the aircraft once again exhibited a roll moment and I immediately retracted them as briefed. The checklist then led us to prepare for a 28/RET landing. We made required notifications; and began to prepare for our return to [the airport].Approach was awesome; as we asked for vectors or holding while troubleshooting and they largely left us alone until we had time to communicate. Kudos to them for making our life easy. Per the checklist and performance data; we planned on a 200 KIAS approach speed and stopping roughly 10;000 feet down the runway. The Captain crossed the threshold on speed and glide path. We touched down and immediately applied maximum braking and reverse; slowing to taxi speed less than 2;000 feet from the end of a 13;000 foot runway. It was the first time in my career I have thought that perhaps a 13;000 foot long runway might be too short.Brakes were hot coming into the ramp; and we advised them well in advance. Shutdown was uneventful. Maintenance spent roughly three hours troubleshooting but could not duplicate the problem on the ground and absent an air load on the slats. They eventually replaced a slat sensor in the left wing and signed off the airplane as airworthy. A new release was issued and we were redispatched. Shortly before pushback; the HUD failed and we took a further delay during the deferral process. On liftoff; we received several momentary Amber boxed 'SLAT' indications on the PFD; which ceased once we had accelerated to V2 plus 20. No 'SLAT DISAG' message was displayed and if I hadn't been specifically looking for it; I wouldn't have seen it.At top of climb; a tail fuel pump failed and we complied with checklist procedures to pull the affected Circuit Breaker.Arrival was uneventful. We configured early in anticipation of further problems but were pleasantly surprised when the slats extended without fault.In a close review of the 64-page Maintenance Release; we saw evidence of a C check and nearly countless maintenance processes performed; but no evidence of a test flight. (It appears we; in essence;performed two 'test flights' while in revenue service.) A subsequent review of the aircraft's maintenance history (looking at entries made after our flight) reveals that the subsequent two legs flown also exhibited flight control (Flap) problems.Perform test flights with briefed/prepared crews and without the distraction of revenue operation following heavy maintenance and prior to releasing an aircraft to revenue service.
During the preflight process; we had several issues that were brought to the attention of maintenance. The IRU's aligned with significant drift; IRU 2 fell off line 2 times; Global Navigation System (GNS) was inhibited; UNABLE RNP due to the excessive drift of the Actual Navigation Performance (ANP) and an apparent map shift on the first couple of alignment attempts. The FMC manual recommended swapping data bases; which appeared to solve the Nav problems and we continued with the preflight. It was apparent that this aircraft had not flown in quite some time. During pushback; got Fuel System Controller (FSC) Fault caution. Stopped the pushback and wrote it up. Maintenance then solved the problem and we continued with pushback; start and configured for takeoff.We ran the QRH after getting an expected Slats Disagree after extension. We also had a rolling moment with the extension and immediate retraction of the Slats. We selected Slats Stow In Accordance With (IAW) the QRH and flew a 0 Ext/Flaps 28 approach. Considered dumping fuel; but decided that a 450;000 lb landing would allow sufficient stopping distance and would preserve our inflight options if anything else malfunctioned.I hate to get on a soap box; but all of this could have been prevented had a series of test flights been performed on this aircraft. Though we handled the problems successfully; line crews are not prepared or trained to handle these kinds of multiple malfunctions and different landing conditions. I flew test flights in the [military] for 2 different types of fighters; so I had that experience to fall back on; but it is not a normal line pilot function. When did we stop flight testing airplanes out of C Checks? If this is a recent decision; I think it is a terrible idea and should be reconsidered. We put the revenue freight at risk; never mind the physical well being of the aircraft as well as ourselves to save money? Seriously? We need to rethink this procedure in my humble opinion.
An MD11 Flight Crew reports receiving an aircraft out of heavy maintenance and having several maintenance issues to resolve before departure. Immediately after takeoff the stick shaker is activated and a slat disagree warning is displayed. QRH procedures are complied with and the crew returns to the departure airport with slats retracted and flaps at 28 degrees.