Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Distraction; Fatigue; Human-Machine Interface
Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Maintenance Action
Human Factors
We had four jumpseaters in addition to the three operating crew members. I left the cockpit to secure the cabin prior to push back. I started with shutting and arming door L1 and checked the RCB (Rigid Cargo Barrier). I continued by inspecting the 4 cabin seats and proceeded to the right RCB. I then found bedding up against the supernumerary floor vents when I inspected them. I removed the bedding and the Jumpseater placed the bedding alongside himself so it was properly secured. This is when I missed arming the R1 door. I went on to checking the galley compartments. When I arrived in the cockpit it occurred to me that I may have missed the R1 door so I checked the EICAS and saw 'doors auto' so I figured I had armed the door properly. When I returned to the supernumerary compartment later in the flight jumpseater next to the door called the error to my attention. I informed the Captain and then armed the door.I believe that I made the error because of the numerous distractions that four jumpseaters on a long flight present. Stowing bags and bedding as well as maneuvering around extra bodies added a layer of complication. I lost track of where I was in my flow and missed arming the door. I needed to slow down and take as much time as was needed to complete the task at hand. I also misread the EICAS. I didn't finish reading it. It must have said doors auto/manual. I now have more familiarity with what the EICAS will say. I need to make sure that I take as much time as I need to be methodical in my tasks and take time to recheck things I am not certain about regardless if I feel like the crew is waiting on me to push.
During climb; approximately 15 minutes after; takeoff; the CA (Captain) authorized RFO (Relief Pilot) to leave the flight deck and go to the cabin to change out of uniform for the enroute portion of the flight. When Relief Pilot returned; she stated that she had not armed the 1R entry door prior to departure. CA selected the DOORS synoptic page and all three of us on the flight deck saw that the door indicated Manual. Relief Pilot apologized and asked if it was OK for her to arm the door at that time. The CA told her that she could proceed to arm the door; which she did; resulting in the door indicating Auto on the synoptic display. As a crew we discussed how this error had occurred. The Relief Pilot stated that while she was in the cabin to arm the doors prior to departure; she had paused to move some items which had been placed; apparently by one of our jumpseaters; on; or adjacent to; the cabin vent cage behind the cabin seats; which is not a permissible location. She stated that she subsequently forgot to complete the process of arming the doors and that one of the jumpseaters had pointed it out to her while she was in the cabin. In discussing the scenario we concluded that a variety of activities and communications which occurred as we were preparing for pushback and while we taxied for departure caused all of us to miss seeing an indication that the door was in Manual mode.As a crew we concluded that a series of internal and external distractions caused us to make this error. Recognizing that the (closed loop) DOORS item on the [Emergency Checklist] only verifies locked; not armed; status and diligence in confirming the DOORS AUTO; EICAS memo message; during the BEFORE START checklist; will prevent this from occurring.
B777 flight crew reported Relief Pilot did not arm the escape slide door prior to block-out.