Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Flight Crew Last 90 Days 103; Flight Crew Total 5400; Flight Crew Type 1700
Situational Awareness; Workload
Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Human Factors; Weather
I would like to preface the event with what I believe to be a chain of events and distractions that led to the improper input and subsequent flying of the incorrect SID for the departure from Charleston; SC. (KCHS). The flying pilot is new to the airplane and needed to get left seat time so the first two of three legs were to be flown by him. Our plan was to arrive one hour before our departure from KCHS with eight passengers. No fueling would be required. We left earlier to arrive at KCHS thirty minutes earlier than planned.  Weather at destination was IMC as forecasted but still good enough for an approach. While enroute; weather became low IFR which was not in the forecast. During the approach briefing; we discussed the weather at our alternate; ZZZ; which was quickly deteriorating as it was VFR during our enroute phase of flight. Our briefing included the approach; missed approach procedures per the approach plate and the review the aircraft missed approach procedures as a review to the new pilot. ZZZ weather became IFR as we were being vectored for our ILS 33 approach into KCHS. We attempted an ILS approach to runway 33 followed by a missed approach. We then proceeded via radar vectors to our alternate; ZZZ; to fly the ILS approach to runway 09. I called our scheduler via SAT Phone and advised to contact the passengers for them to prepare to drive to ZZZ for pick up. I said I would call back if anything changed. Flight time from KCHS to ZZZ was roughly 8 minutes. We attempted the ILS approach but the weather quickly diminished and we were not able to 'break out' at minimums. A missed approach was carried out followed by our request to hold via radar vectors in order to wait for the weather to improve and discuss alternatives. We had originally planned for no fuel uplift at KCHS so we were fueled to continue to our next destination plus alternate airport contingencies. During our holding; we had four hours fuel remaining. We were told by ATC that they were just informed by Weather Service that the weather would not improve for at least another hour. I called our scheduler back to advise the passengers to stay in KCHS until further notice. During our holding; we overheard a King Air attempt an ILS approach into runway 33 followed by a missed approach. He was notified the RVR improved for runway 15 and he requested vectors for ILS 15. The King Air landed and reported 'breaking out' at minimums. Upon hearing of the King Air's success; we loaded and briefed the ILS 15 approach and then requested vectors for ILS 15. The approach was successful as we also saw the runway at minimums followed by a successful landing. The taxi to parking was low visibility. Upon parking; the time was now our original planned departure time. I notified our scheduler we had arrived. All eight passengers were waiting in the lobby and we now had an unscheduled fuel uplift for our next leg. I asked the flying pilot; since it was his next leg as well; if he was ok the prepare the cockpit and oversee fueling while I went inside to attend to passengers; bags and pay for services. He agreed. After my business in the FBO was complete and the fuel truck safely away; I brought the passengers to the plane and loaded their bags with some assistance of the flying pilot. I will note that during cockpit preparations for the next leg; the flying pilot informed me he left the flight deck during that preparation to assist the fueler. Before engine start; I noticed the V-speed were not posted on the PFDs. I verified on the FMS 1 Perf Page that the correct information was entered and it was. I reentered runway 15 and corresponding data for a runway 15 departure but the V-speeds still did not post. I then checked the MFD drop down menu and saw the Takeoff Speed setup was in MANUAL instead of AUTO. Once switched to AUTO; the V-speeds posted. I will also note that in my runway selection in the FMS; I did see the Allendale (ALD) transition so it was my understandingthe PLFMD1 SID was loaded. I was not briefed by the flying pilot but it was stated we were cleared 'as filed.' After engine start and taxi request; we were assigned runway 22 instead of 15 as per the ATIS. I then had to re-enter Perf Data for the new runway. During my entries; no SID entries were made or changed; only runway. Visibility had improved considerably for our short taxi from the FBO to runway 22 [21]. Taxi time was around three to five minutes. We accomplished the required checklists and briefings and the SID was discussed briefly regarding fix and altitude requirements and I verified that 4;000 was set in the Alt Sel Window for the Flight Director. I did not reference the FMS as I was looking at the SID plate and then referencing the checklist. We were cleared for takeoff after maybe two minutes of hold short. Tower said 'clear for takeoff; fly the PLFMD departure.' I acknowledged with a read back and we departed. It should also be noted that both RNAV SIDS begin with 'PL' which can add confusion. (These SIDS are pronounced 'PLUS MUD' and 'PLUS TO.') At the pre-determined altitude; the aircraft began its turn but went left instead of right. We were then handed off to departure control and I checked on.  The flying pilot may have entered the wrong departure frequency in the standby radio which we use as reminder/reference. I received no answer. Something did not look right to me at this second. I looked at the SID plate and noticed the frequency was different. I immediately realized the wrong SID was loaded in the FMS. As I stated before; I saw the ALD transition loaded in the FMS back on the ramp. I did not question it as it was our exit point from the SID. I quickly called ATC on the correct frequency. They soon realized as well and advised us that we were on the Northbound SID instead of the Westbound SID. I acknowledged and advised I was ready to copy a re-route. We received a couple of vectors and a frequency change then cleared direct ALD. There were no traffic conflicts. Both ATC and crew were very professional and orderly in their actions in quickly correcting course flown. The day in question; the tower said 'cleared for takeoff. Fly the Plus Mud Departure.' When we departed again from KCHS [on a later flight] with the same clearance; we were simply 'cleared for takeoff.' There does not seem to be a standard. It is my belief from the lengthy description above; that the high workload from the morning's flight environment with three approach attempts; pressures of departing on time for executives whom have never flown with our company before; the unscheduled fuel uplift; the distractions that affected the flying pilot in the initial cockpit setup during fueling procedures; PFD/MFD functionality issues concerning V-speed postings; the last second runway change followed by a short taxi; contributed to the incorrect departure SID entry and failure to correctly identify the incorrect entry. Even when all SOPS and checklists are followed; it is still entirely possible to make a mistake especially during a high workload environment. This event has been discussed by myself and the flying pilot over and over to try and understand the sequence of events that may have led to this omission. It has also been discussed with our Chief Pilot as well. We all agree that due to the high workload and pressures that morning that the proper thing to do is to slow procedures down and take your time. Re-check the details and look things over one more time. I do believe this type of event is common and flight departments; no matter the size and type of aircraft flown; need to discuss and review events like these to prevent the same pitfalls from happening to their crews as pressures mount during unplanned flight operations. This event has been discussed with the crew and Chief Pilot. Corrective action was administered in the form of event review and suggested future recommendations should such high workload flight occur again.
A CE560 Captain describes the events leading up to the wrong RNAV departure being loaded into the FMC by the flying First Officer prior to departure from CHS. The PLMTO ONE was loaded instead of the PLFMD ONE.