Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Training / Qualification; Communication Breakdown
Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown
Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Human Factors
FO (First Officer) was PF (Pilot Flying). Due to the FO struggling during the previous legs I told him to review the arrival into ZZZ; 'chair fly' it and confirm the runway in use at ZZZ while in the aircraft during the 40 minute ground time. I observed the FO struggling to understand how to find the runway in use at destination in ACARS. We briefed the arrival into XX at ZZZ on the ground; and checked legs and altitudes in the FMS. After an unrelated gate return for a Park Brake SOV Caution we departed for ZZZ. Cleared to descend via the [Arrival] the initial hard altitude of 8000 was set and we briefed the PF using the Direct Intercept Page and PM the legs page. We also again went over the speeds and altitudes and how to fly the arrival; I was coaching the next leg by leg.At 11;500 feet we were handed off to Approach; I checked in 'Descending via the [Arrival]' with our current altitude of 10;900. As Approach replied I simultaneously called 'Altitude' and Approach replied 'Cross ZZZZ above 11; above 11.' I called 'altitude.' And then 'climb.' I received no verbal response from the PF; and the descent was not arrested so called 'My Aircraft'; immediately disconnected the Autopilot and added power to arrest the descent and climbed back to 11;000. Climbing through 11;000 the PF called 'Minimums'Level at 11;000 with the situation stabilized I reengaged the Autopilot. I asked the PF if he was OK; did he understand where we were; and where we were meant to be and he replied he did. I transferred the controls back to him and continued to coach the arrival. The remainder of the flight was uneventful.PF lost situational awareness. FO has a poor grasp of vertical navigation procedures. Seems unfamiliar with the use of VNAV tools or procedures in the aircraft. Flight Standards evaluation for company procedures and Aircraft operation.
I was PF (Pilot Flying). We briefed the RNAV arrival into ZZZ on the ground; and checked legs and altitudes in the FMS. We had a 40-minute delay involving a gate return for a Park Brake SOV Caution. We departed and after climbing to final cruise altitude of 17;000 feet; received clearance to descend via the arrival. I decided to set the first hard altitude of 8000 feet (for ZZZZZ1); and begin a gradual descent for 8;000 using advisory VNAV procedures. Two 'proceed direct to' clearances were issued by ATC while on the STAR. I believe one was direct to ZZZZZ; and I don't recall the other. There is an at-or-above altitude of 11;000 at ZZZZZ on the arrival. I allowed the aircraft to descend below 11;000 prior to ZZZZZ. The CA/PM (Captain / Pilot Monitoring) called 'climb' just below 11;000. He then called 'my aircraft;' and he disconnected the autopilot and initiated a hand-flown climb back up to 11;000. ATC asked if we wanted just a descent to assigned altitude(s); but we declined. The CA/PM asked if I felt comfortable and wanted the aircraft back to resume my role as PF; and I accepted. I flew the rest of the arrival; approach; and landing uneventfully. I believe contributing factors/causes to this incident are as follows: -It was late; at the end of a long day. I did not feel fatigued when we were on the ground at [our departure airport] but I realized in flight I was a bit tired. -I had not been having a good day. I had made several minor procedural errors earlier in the day.-The STAR has a higher degree of difficulty; I believe; when coming into it at a lower altitude of 17;000.-I lost situational awareness of the altitude restrictions at ZZZZZ (bottom of 11;000 feet) while focusing on a rate of descent for ZZZZZ1 at 8;000; by attempting a more difficult advisory procedure on the descent. I felt some self-induced pressure to fly the STAR using the procedures (snowflake) taught in training; which was a mistake. My suggestions for what I would do different in order to prevent this incident.-Refocus my preparation and effort on procedures and PF/PM roles. -I would thoroughly brief the STAR and Approach on the ground at [our departure airport] since the flight is so short and the arrival is a busy one. Later airborne the [flight plan] could be updated briefly and quickly.-I would use a different procedure on the descent; namely setting each bottom altitude on the arrival and using the 'banana bar' to gauge my rate of descent; so as to not bust any altitudes.
CRJ-900 flight crew reported a missed crossing restriction on approach due to First Officer poor grasp of navigation procedures.