Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor
Flight Crew Last 90 Days 150; Flight Crew Total 5000; Flight Crew Type 40
Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness
Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Flight Crew Became Reoriented; General Maintenance Action
Aircraft; Human Factors
After doing a crew swap into an airplane with an MEL'd right Thrust Reverser; we were notified of the MEL and saw the sign off on the sheet. Everything seemed to be fine and the captain taxied out to the runway where we were cleared for takeoff. On the takeoff roll we got a right reverser unlock light and the corresponding red CAS message. The takeoff was aborted and as soon as we taxied off the runway we contacted maintenance who advised us that a circuit breaker for the MEL'd reverser had been neglected to be pulled. They advised us to pull the circuit breaker and try again. On the second take off attempt the reverser unlock light illuminated again along with the corresponding red CAS message. We aborted the takeoff and taxied back to parking; where we contacted maintenance again and they said they were sending out the local maintenance guys who had worked on it that morning. We went to the hotel and a few hours later were contacted by maintenance to go out to the airplane and do a test run up. I went to the airport and conducted the run up and all checkouts that maintenance asked me to run; all successful. When I pulled the MEL to do the MEL to our write up I noticed that the previous MEL was not signed off correctly. It was signed off by a pilot; but had an (M) procedure requirement. The mechanics there advised me that they had not performed the maintenance functions required by the MEL prior to our attempted departure; and that is why there was no sign off by them. There was obviously a breakdown of communication between maintenance and the previous crew; combined with our failure to reference the MEL to compare what was signed off to the requirement of said MEL entry. In the future I will very closely inspect any MEL's and make sure that all maintenance actions required of them have been performed.
GIV First Officer reported they attempted several takeoffs that were rejected when a reverser light illuminated. Confusion over applicability of MEL was contributory.