Flight Crew Type 150
Other / Unknown; Communication Breakdown
Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT
Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance
Human Factors
This was my first flight to Bogota. In preparation for the flight; I watched the airport familiarization video; read the Jeppesen airport pages for Bogota; and highlighted the appropriate HI-LO charts for the route to be flown. My approximate time in this aircraft is 150 hours. The Captain was the pilot flying. During the cruise portion of our flight; the Captain and I discussed in detail the descent into Bogota; the terrain surrounding the airport; the approach itself and the current weather. The engine failure/missed approach procedure was also reviewed and loaded into the secondary flight plan as per the Jeppesen pages. As we began our descent the Captain was viewing the radar on his ND and terrain was being displayed on my ND. Bogota approach issued a late descent to 12000 feet; and asked us to slow to 210 kts until 5 miles from the BOG VOR. At this time we were cleared for the ILS 13R approach. I did not notice 10000 feet being set in the altitude window. The aircraft had not reached the BOG VOR; my scan was alternating from inside the flight deck to outside because the aircraft had entered VFR conditions and I had the airport in sight. At this time Bogota approach asked us our altitude. It was 11000 feet. Approach said we needed to remain at 12000 feet until the BOG VOR. At this time we had a 'Terrain and Pull Up' aural. In response to this; the Captain added thrust and climbed the aircraft. I noticed the radar altimeter read 1700 feet; at no time did I notice any red indications displayed on my ND. We then intercepted the glide slope and landed on 13R.
First Officers first time to Bogota. Enroute; we reviewed the arrival; approaches; engine out procedures; and the terrain; including the terrain in the vicinity of the Bogota VOR that requires the 12;000 feet crossing altitude.Coming into Bogota we were deviating right of course for weather. We requested descent prior to calculated top of descent point. Stepped down in increments; getting farther and farther above the path. Finally; at approximately Mariquita (MQU) we were 'cleared direct to the Bogota (BOG) VOR; descend to 12;000 feet; cleared the ILS runway 13R.' At this point we were over 6000 feet above the path. Descending at 210 kts; (assigned; until 5 miles from BOG VOR) with speed brakes and gear down; we were making progress toward the path.For some reason; I perceived that we were crossing the BOG VOR as we passed 14;400 feet (still high). I said 'inside the Bogota VOR; 10;000 feet;' set 10;000 in the FCU; and pointed. First Officer replied 'roger; 10;000;' meaning (to him) that once we were past BOG; that would be the correct altitude to set next. He was looking outside; and did not actually notice that I had changed the altitude from 12;000 feet to 10;000 feet. As we continued the descent; Approach asked if we have the field in sight. When we responded in the affirmative; he said; 'OK; no problem. Next time; you should maintain 12;000 feet until the Bogota VOR.' I said to the First Officer; 'we did' as I double checked position on the ND. I saw that we were still prior to the VOR; and the EGPWS said 'Terrain; Terrain.' I began a climb back to 12;000 feet; when the EGPWS said 'Pull Up.' I disconnected the autopilot and continued the escape. First Officer called out 'Radio Altitude 1700; climbing; Radio Altitude gone; we're above 2500 feet.' I re-engaged the autopilot and continued the approach; on profile.Lessons learned:1. There are many layers of the cheese. Approach control and the airplane both caught my error; and brought it to our attention.2. Altitude Setting Procedure calls for PF to set the altitude in the FCU; point to it; and state that altitude; silently check FMA. I did those things. PM verbally states the altitude; points; silently checks FMA. I heard the verbal altitude; but that was not his intent. He did not realize I was actually making a change on the FCU. Going forward; I might add the word 'SET' when changing an altitude in a high workload environment; so the PM knows that there is an actual change happening; not just a prospective change. I will also look for the confirming finger pointing at the altitude in the FCU.3. The late descent had us above the path; and Managed Descent was not going to catch it; so I switched to Open Descent. If I had gone back to Managed Descent; it would have honored the programmed constraint to cross BOG at 12;000 feet.
Air Carrier flight crew describes the circumstances causing a descent below assigned altitude prior to the BOG VOR during ILS to Runway 13R at SKBO. The flying Captain had set 10;000 feet in the MCP window thinking that BOG VOR had been passed; without obtaining the First Officer's confirmation. ATC alerts at the same time a terrain warning sounds.