Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Situational Awareness; Human-Machine Interface; Communication Breakdown
Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT
Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Human Factors
We were in clear; VFR conditions. Approach Control had previously cleared us down to 3000 ft and direct to the final approach fix on the Localizer 23 into CAK. About 12 miles out; heading direct to the final fix; ATC asked if we had the field in sight. We did and were cleared for the visual approach and sent to tower frequency. We had already begun to slow down and configure while still heading to the final fix even though we had been cleared for the visual approach. As we got a little closer the altitude selector was mistakenly swapped to 1800 ft by the pilot flying. He then selected the vertical speed down and began to descend below 3000 ft; which on the approach plate is the altitude to intercept the glide slope on the ILS 23. Upon questioning by the pilot monitoring; the pilot flying arrested the descent and leveled off. We were fully configured and on speed; so the pilot flying turned the auto pilot off; called to clear his FD; and hand flew the approach and landing. We were in VFR conditions and in sight of the runway and surrounding obstacles at all times. The Tower Controller did get a low altitude alert on us as we descended below the MSA before being established on the localizer. By that time we were correcting; as well as confirmed with the tower that we still had the airport and obstacle/tower in sight. Because of our altitude; when we captured the localizer we were below the glide slope and received a 'glide slope' audible warning. Rather than climb up; we remained level until intercepting the glideslope and landed without further incident. Descending below the MSA before intercepting the localizer inbound was poor technique and against company procedure. After discussing it on the ground with the pilot flying; I believe it was a mistake brought on by over thinking by a low time First Officer who is still gaining experience on visual approaches. In his mind he wanted to be at 1800 ft AGL (which would have been 3100 ft MSL) 6 miles out on the approach. That would have put us on the standard 3 degree glide path to the runway. That was proper logic but improper execution as he mistaking put 1800 in the altitude selector. As the pilot monitoring I should have recognized this well before VS was selected and we began descending. We had been cleared for the visual approach with the runway in sight at all time. I should have also recognized that my fellow crew member was a fairly low time First Officer and given more guidance/technique on how I might fly a visual. At no time were we not in control of the airplane; but the experience was a valuable reminder to me to stay vigilant on the flight deck. Errors can happen to all of us; regardless of background or experience. There are two of us up there to check each other.
CRJ-900 flight crew reported descending below minimum sector altitude (MSA) while executing a visual approach.