Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Flight Crew Last 90 Days 320
Situational Awareness; Time Pressure
Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Procedure; Weather; Human Factors
Pushed slightly late and had determined we would need to deice. ATIS reported -SN; but it looked like very light rain mixed with SN. The temperature was 1 degree C. We considered using Type 1; but due to holdover time and the extremely slow process of deciding in PHL; we decided to use Type 1 then 4. Other than taking more time than anticipated to deice; the process was uneventful. Taxi and takeoff were uneventful; but right after we took off; I checked our gas and noticed we had taken off below min fuel for takeoff. This was due to the wait time for deicing. Because we were dispatched with landing fuel well above 5;000; I wasn't worried about our arrival fuel. We landed in excess of minimums.
Our flight was delayed by about 30 minutes for flight attendant crew rest. The PHL METAR was reporting light rain and snow and three quarters of a mile visibility. Deicing was required and we knew that since we were departing Runway 27; there would be a long taxi and some deicing delay. Preflight and taxi out were normal. We taxied out on both engines with the APU off. The Captain and I discussed whether we needed Type four or just type one fluid application. There have been some changes in our winter operations policy this year as in previous years so we referenced the cards and the reference handbook and made multiple checks of the METAR and even called Tower because we felt that it was not an accurate reflection of the actual precipitation. We decided on Type IV anti-icing. There was only one aircraft ahead of us in the deice bay we were assigned. It still took over an hour from engine start to completion of the deice/anti-ice process. Very; very slow process. Incredibly wasteful. Neither of us remembered to crosscheck the required takeoff fuel on the Dispatch Release. During the departure; we received an FMC alert that we were close to reserve fuel for landing. That is when I first realized that we might have taken off below the takeoff fuel printed on the Dispatch Release. The rest of the flight was uneventful and we landed with fuel well above the required reserve. Basically; we burned through our contingency fuel; dispatch add fuel; and extra fuel; in addition to our plan taxi out; so we should have called Dispatch to revise the release before takeoff.
B737 flight crew reports departing with less than the Dispatch required fuel load due to a long taxi and deicing prior to takeoff. Although there was sufficient fuel on board for the flight the actual fuel on board was not compared with the dispatch release just prior to takeoff.