Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor
Flight Crew Last 90 Days 10; Flight Crew Total 13600; Flight Crew Type 750
Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness
Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff
Human Factors
I coordinated my annual recurrent training with the instructor to take place yesterday. The instructor was Director of Training for Company for many decades; and even still provides insurance-required recurrent examinations; etc.; and I have been flying with him since I purchased Aircraft X in 2006. The instructor is also a recipient of the Wright Brothers Award from the FAA for 50 years of safe flying. With the weather situation; we decided to fly out of ZZZ. I met the instructor about noon after flying in from ZZZ1; and by the time we got Aircraft X started and taxied to Runway X for departure; we heard Aircraft Y announce 'downwind'. It took a few minutes to get to the approach end of Runway X; and we came to a full stop so we could carefully check for traffic before taking the active. In fact; the instructor and I examined just about every place we could look; including downwind and approach trying to locate any traffic; especially given the previous call. No traffic was depicted on the ADS-B (Automated Dependent Surveillance Broadcast) either. I specifically asked the instructor; 'do you see any reason we cannot take the active'; to which he replied he saw no reason not to. At the time; I even commented seeing what appeared to be either a large bird or an aircraft; but whatever it was it seemed to be moving out of the area and was therefore not a factor. Accordingly; I announced taking the active and departing Runway X for local air work with a northwest departure. After establishing Aircraft X on the runway and starting to advance the power; we suddenly heard Aircraft Y report 'short final'; after which Aircraft Y passed over Aircraft X and landed on the same runway in front of us. I aborted the departure and we watched Aircraft Y land far down the runway (it appeared to be well over halfway down from where we were sitting) at what seemed to be a very high speed; and then; after touchdown; generating all sorts of smoke in the aircraft's wake; either from the engine or from the brakes/tires. It appeared as though there wasn't much runway left and it eventually cleared the runway at the end; apparently using almost all of the 6;704 ft. runway. The instructor observed the smoke to be more 'whitish' in color; meaning it may have been coming from the tires (notably; the instructor provides recurrent training events in the TBM and Jet-prop aircraft as well).Following our recurrent event; the instructor and I thoroughly debriefed what had transpired. We could not understand why we had not visually observed Aircraft Y; given the careful examination of the area surrounding the airport we did prior to taking the active. We were in no hurry whatsoever; and would not have taken the active runway unless we were completely certain there was no conflicting traffic approaching; and we observed none. We examined the FlightAware record as well; but it did not become more obvious as to what may have transpired until today when the instructor and I were discussing the event. For example; Aircraft Y climbed to a cruising altitude of 30;000 ft. enroute from Columbus; Ohio to ZZZ. We believe the pilot may only possess a private pilot certificate; which brings into question whether he could legally be operating at that altitude under IFR (Instrument Flight Rules) conditions or on an IFR flight plan. The mysterious track Aircraft Y flew descending into ZZZ commenced with Aircraft Y descending to 12;500 ft.; presumably VFR (Visual Flight Rules); while still a significant distance from the destination airport. For whatever reason; Aircraft Y pilot apparently elected not to execute one of the three IFR approaches available for that airport at the time; including an ILS (Instrument Landing System) and two GPS (Global Positioning System) approaches. According to the FlightAware data; Aircraft Y first circled the area at 12;500 ft.; completing a 'racetrack' pattern in the immediate vicinity of the airport; while at the same time descending.After flying the racetrack pattern; Aircraft Y continued to descend in an even tighter circular pattern around the airport. It then commenced a base leg turn as it descended out of 5;300 ft.; and then; as it was approaching the airport; it completed an even tighter 360 degree turn at approximately 3;700 ft. As it descended out of that exceedingly tight turn onto final; it was closing on the airport very quickly at an altitude of 2;100 ft. Given our familiarity with the weather at the time; some of the cloud bases of a scattered to broken layer were approximately at 2000 ft. MSL (Mean Sea Level) or even slightly lower; with multiple layers above. In other words; it appears as though the pilot was descending in the vicinity of the airport in what was essentially a 'cloud break' procedure; instead of flying one of the three available instrument approaches. He apparently only relocated the airport visually when he was on a very high approach path already; which would explain the extended touchdown point and the use of most of the runway. It would also explain why we did not see him; as at 2;100 ft. Aircraft Y was likely obscured by the clouds at that point; when Aircraft Y would be located approximately a mile south of the approach end of Runway X.First; the airman made no callouts on Unicom other than flying 'downwind'; not mentioning he was at or above 6;000 ft. while on the downwind leg. Nor did the pilot tell anyone on Unicom he was orbiting the airport and descending trying to locate the runway visually. He made no callouts whatsoever between the original 'downwind' call we heard while taxiing Aircraft X initially; and then just the 'short final' call before Aircraft Y overflew Aircraft X; landing far down the runway in front of us.As the conditions were very similar when I arrived approximately 30 minutes previously; there was no problem maintaining VFR conditions in order to make a visual approach to runway X; and those conditions continued 45 minutes later when we concluded our flight. Visibility was at all times in excess of 10 miles. There appears to be a significant amount of desperation exhibited by the pilot in landing over Aircraft X after we had initiated the departure; as it seems he might have been in somewhat of a panic to get Aircraft Y on the ground; when the only prudent course of action at that point; given that neither of us visually located Aircraft Y; despite an extremely diligent search; and after announcing that we were taking the active runway for departure purposes; was to immediately go around and reenter the pattern.Quite a few of the preceding flights for Aircraft Y available on FlightAware appear to be training type missions; and it is unclear what put so much pressure on the pilot to complete the approach and landing; imperiling all involved; instead of merely executing a prudent go around and reentering the pattern; which the weather would certainly permit at the time. Quite frankly don't know what else we could have done to prevent this situation from occurring; as we used all due diligence before we took the active runway. Aircraft Y was likely above the clouds when we searched for traffic before departing. The two pilots on our flight deck at the time had over 100 years of [combined] flight experience; without incident or accident.
Pilot reported a near miss; during takeoff roll; with an aircraft flying overhead on short final.