Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Engineer
Flight Crew Last 90 Days 30; Flight Crew Total 19000; Flight Crew Type 30
Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness
ATC Issue All Types; Conflict NMAC
Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Procedure; Human Factors
On Freeway 2 Arrival into JRF at the H-1/H-2 Interchange; HNL Approach advised us of traffic at 1130 and less than 1/2 mile and cleared us to turn left and enter a right downwind for Runway 04L at JRF; cleared us for the visual approach and immediately handed us off to JRF Tower. Tower asked if we were at the quarry (a prominent landmark but well off to our right on our course) and advised us of a B767 inbound to HNL Runway 08L. This traffic conflicted with our visual approach so I executed an immediate tight right turn to separate from the traffic. I estimate the closest point of proximity to be less than 1/2 mile at co-altitudes. JRF Tower acknowledged the evasive maneuver and then re-cleared us over midfield to re-enter the right downwind for 04L. They stated that HNL Approach had not coordinated with them regarding the [aircraft] on approach. I feel HNL Approach erred in directing us onto the visual without advising us of the conflict or coordinating with JRF Tower.
B767-300 was on approach from the West to RWY 8L at HNL. [Small Transport] was on approach to JRF Runway 4R from the North Northeast. The flight paths were projected to cross. I took over the position after both aircraft were cleared for approach. I wrongly assumed that the [Small Transport] would descend to JRF pattern altitude prior to entering JRF Class Delta airspace. I did recognize that [Small Transport] did not descend as anticipated and called traffic to B763. B763 got [Small Transport] in sight and visual separation was applied with more than 3 miles lateral separation. JRF TWR was told that visual separation was being applied. The pilot of [Small Transport] held altitude and closed the distance to B763 to 16% of 3 mile lateral separation. I have been informed by HCF Management that I misapplied visual separation because I switched B763 to HNL Tower frequency before some other form of separation existed.I realize that I did not ensure the separation that would have prevented this occurrence. I could have spun the [Small Transport] to ensure the flight paths would not cross. I could have restricted the [Small Transport] to enter class delta at pattern altitude. I could have broken B763 out when I saw [Small Transport] not descend. I truly felt that with B763 having the [Small Transport] in sight that the hazard was minimized. I also felt that I applied visual separation correctly. I will study what the 7110.65 rules on visual separation are and make sure that I know precisely what is required.Airspace/Procedure changes that would have prevented this and other situations involving [Small Transport] and Jets from conflicting in the future is to not force the controllers to pry these two types of traffic apart every day. HCF has set up SOPs that lets [Small Transport] intimately mix with large and heavy jets in Class Bravo airspace on a daily basis. There are other routes that would keep these slow moving aircraft away from the larger faster traffic. HCF refuses to recognize this as an inherently tenuous situation. Class Bravo (prior name TCA) were created to avoid just that. One would think with all the incidents involving light aircraft and Large/Heavy aircraft at HNL that maybe doing business as usual is not what is best for a safe; orderly and expeditious flow of traffic.
A flight crew terminated a visual approach after detecting another aircraft at the same altitude at approximately 1/2 mile distance on approach to the same airport.