Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Fatigue; Distraction; Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Workload
Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Airport; Company Policy; Weather; Procedure; Human Factors
I was reassigned off of my regular line flying to operate a charter flight. Crew scheduling sent me to the airport in a limo.  I left my domicile late afternoon for a 3 hour drive.  Enroute I advised dispatch at 30 minutes from the airport via cell phone to make sure the aircraft had been serviced (lav; potable water; cleaned) and that a start cart be retrieved as the APU was on deferral.  I arrived at the airport with an anxious charter representative greeting me and saying they had been advised to rush to the airport only to find out that flight was not crewed yet.  They waited on me for over 3 hours.  Needless to say; the passengers were not happy.Of course nothing was done; not even a release was sent to the FBO.  The aircraft was trashed.  It had not been fueled; lav's overflowing; and no potable water.  In addition to this; for the first time I was advised by crew scheduling that the First Officer (FO) was flying in from somewhere else.  Of course; this was done only when I inquired with the Flight Attendants (FA)s on the whereabouts of the First Officer.I get everything done; the First Officer arrives an hour later and we board.  Our filed destination was calling for -FZ DR; 1 sm visibility; and 500 feet overcast.  I did have an alternate and had 20;000 lbs of fuel on board and was very comfortable with the release.   I briefed the FO; he did his preflight; and we taxied out and departed.At about 20 minutes from arrival we picked up the ATIS and it is broadcasting FZ RA and 1sm visibility and ceiling 400 feet.  We begin descent and then we receive an ACARS from Dispatch informing us that the FBO will not take our aircraft and to standby for Alternate.  I have an alternate on the release and this is when we find out that the alternate cannot handle our aircraft.  (What?  Why wasn't that found out before we took off?)  That airport was never a good alternate for planning purposes.  We are now flying around in FZ RA (the most hazardous form of icing for ANY aircraft).  I began discussing with the FO on possible alternates and suggesting....dispatch agrees....we get cleared and then dispatch comes back and says we cannot go there (this happened at least 3 times).  Then; knowing we cannot hang out in those weather conditions any longer I request a nearby small airport ZZZ; since I know we service.  Dispatch agrees; we get cleared to ZZZ and then when almost there dispatch sends ACARS saying that 'Our alternate cannot rally the troops and we cannot go there.'  By now; not knowing how much ice had accumulated and assessing fuel situation; my FO and I decide we need to land in ZZZ and decide what we need to do on the ground.  I inform dispatch and they agree to our plan.We land at approximately shortly before midnight in ZZZ.  There are no services available and we have no APU.  I called Dispatch to discuss a plan.  That's when I am advised of the icing situation at our originally filed destination and that the FBO will not take our aircraft because they have over an inch of ice on the ramp and taxiways and cannot maneuver their equipment.  Dispatch's new plan is to fly back to our domicile where the Midwest was experiencing a snow storm.  Low visibility and ceilings and not even knowing if we can get in I say that is not a good plan. I suggest hotels and transportation to get these customers to a hotel.After about 2 hours; and still stuck on the plane; dispatch said they cannot help them and they do not know what to tell me.  They say that the customers need to call a broker and find their own accommodations.  Obviously; this was not a good thing to tell your customers who were stuck on the plane.  Finally; five hours after we landed they found their own accommodations and even offered to take care of me and my crew with rooms. The team's Coach said to me; 'come with we will take care of you.  Don't you feel like your company totally abandoned you tonight?'  I was tired; embarrassed and completely humiliated at this point.  Finally; over 6 hours since landing in ZZZ; our transportation arrived and took us to a hotel.We showed 10 hours later to fly them to the departure airport.  I stayed in constant contact with the Coach the next day as he was unsure of our company being able to perform at this point.  We flew them back to their destination on Sunday night.  Once the customers deplaned; the second shift lead supervisor at [the FBO] wanted to talk with me.  He asked if I was the Captain last night and I said yes.  He informed me that he contacted our Dispatch before I ever departed for our filed destination the night before informing them that the icing was significant and that a Boeing 737 had landed and reported the braking action as 'NIL' and that there was over inch of ice covering all taxiways; ramps; and runways and that they could not receive our aircraft that night.  We are not authorized to land at an airport with braking action reported as 'NIL'.  Not to mention; freezing rain is the most hazardous icing condition to aircraft and the fact that our flight operations knew this before we dispatched really disturbed me.  In addition to this; an alternate was listed on our release that was an airport that could not receive us anyway so that made it an 'unacceptable alternate'.  My position is that if I would have known about this situation; I would not have departed but this information was withheld from me.  I trust our flight operations to do their job and provide me with pertinent information in regards to the 'safety of flight' and they failed on this evening.  My passengers; my crew; my aircraft; as well as my own safety was jeopardized on this day.  The operation should have been shut down in before we left on the first charter leg.  We could have accommodated everyone and would have gotten this team home on Sunday morning instead of Sunday night and my crew would not have had to spend the night in an airplane with no heat.I followed up with a phone call to Director of Flight Operations about 7-10 days after this happened.  I told him I would be filing a report and assumed he would look into and follow up.  I have heard nothing.On this particular night; operational control was lost and I feel that anyone who had knowledge of this event should have followed up to understand how something like this could have happened.  I gave it time and to this date I have heard nothing from Flight Operations.  If it is accurate that our Dispatch had knowledge that the weather conditions in our originally filed destination had deteriorated and that braking action was reported as 'NIL' by a Boeing 737 prior to our flight's Departure; then this flight should have been canceled before we left.  In addition to this; the original alternate should not have been used for planning purposes if we could not have safely diverted to that airport.  Since we (crew) found out airborne that the filed alternate would not receive our aircraft because of inadequate equipment; it's obvious that no one from flight operations verified that destination would be a good alternate before planning as such.  We service our alternate's airport so I as Pilot In Command (PIC) thought was good alternate and the weather that I had in my hand was adequate.  Also; the weather packet I had attached to the release was adequate to dispatch for our original destination at the time of departure.  Pertinent information (such as a significant weather change from forecast) should always be relayed to flight crews as some as practical.
An ERJ-190 Captain describes the event surrounding his charter flight being illegally dispatched to an airport with NIL braking and freezing drizzle; then diverting to a third airport because the alternate was not suitable.