Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Communication Breakdown; Distraction; Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness; Time Pressure; Workload
Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control
Human Factors; Procedure
On flight from ZZZ1 to ZZZ we were given a steep; high-speed descent from 12;000 feet down to 3;000 feet. I asked my First Officer if he was ok with that and he said he was; he was flying; I was monitoring. Passing through approximately 7;000 feet we broke out into VMC (Visual Meteorological Conditions) with unrestricted visibility. It appeared as though we needed more drag (speed brake was already extended) so he asked for the landing gear down. We joined the localizer and were at flaps 5 and he asked for flaps 15. We were slightly high on the glidepath; but were catching it. Somewhere just below 3;000 feet we were given a frequency change to Tower. The speed brake was still out with the flaps at 15 and I noticed that the command speed bug was at Vapp (Approach Speed) (151 kts). I was in the process of saying something about it to my FO (First Officer) when I noticed the PLI's (Pitch Limit Indicator) dropping down towards the flight director. I simultaneously and immediately retracted the speedbrake and we both pushed forward (disconnecting the autopilot) on the yoke to get the speed back to where it needed to be. Just as I was doing that the stick shaker came on for a split second and then went away. I verified that my FO (First Officer) was flying the airplane; gave him flaps 20; then flaps 30 and bugged Vapp. The glideslope was joined around 2;000 feet and the approach and landing were stabilized and uneventful.  We could have and should have not accepted such a high workload arrival and approach. It was very busy and not necessary to put ourselves in such a rush. My FO is intelligent and has good flying capabilities which may have attributed me to not monitoring him as closely as I should have; regardless of the flight or situation I believe I was a little complacent and task saturated. I'm not sure when the command speed bug was moved to Vapp without flaps 30 being called for; but there always needs to be good communication between crew members. My attention was also diverted when the frequency change was given; I could have taken a quick look at the FMA's (Flight Mode Annunciator) before being distracted by the change to Tower. I also think it is a good idea to keep a hand on the speed break anytime it is deployed in flight so it is not forgotten about. An extra vector to build time or an early go-around would help avoid many errors during critical phases of flight; especially when hurrying to get a task accomplished. My continued goal as [company] crew member is to continually learn from both my own mistakes and others in order to stay as safe as possible. Human Errors were made and fortunately trapped and immediately rectified. I commend our training at [company] and the recent EET/UPRT (External Envelope Training/Upset and Recovery Training) I received. It helps [me] recognize and fosters immediate recovery from an undesirable situation. I am both ashamed and embarrassed that as a crew and as professionals that we did not recognize this unfolding situation sooner.
B767 Captain reported recovering from potential stall conditions after slowing a high speed descent.