Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Flight Crew Last 90 Days 200; Flight Crew Total 18000; Flight Crew Type 1500
Workload; Time Pressure
Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Incursion Runway
Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Airport; Human Factors
During pushback from the gate; rechecked the ATIS and discovered that there was a runway change from 26L to 8R. Started the engines and entered the new runway data into the FMS and briefed the Captain on the new SID procedures for 8R and the proposed taxi route (Papa to Mike) and the Hotspot at the intersection of Papa and Mike. The Captain acknowledged the runway change; the new SID procedures; the new taxi plan; and the location of the 8R hotspot. Received taxi instructions from Ground to taxi to runway 8R via Papa and Mike taxiways; for runway 8R. Approaching the hold short line for Runway 8R; I noticed that the Captain was still progressing at a somewhat rapid pace and advised him of the need to hold short at the first set of hold short lines just in front of us. The Captain replied that he had flown into and out of Miami numerous times and was confident that the second set of hold short lines; further in front of us; was the appropriate hold short line for Runway 8R. As I saw no safety issue involved in proceeding to the second set of hold short lines; I deferred to the Captain's judgement; having flown into and out of Miami only a handful of times and never before having taken off on Runway 8R. While holding short of the improper hold short line; Miami tower cleared us for takeoff on 8R and subsequently added that the next time we taxi to runway 8R to make sure that we do not cross the 8R hold short line; which was behind us. I believe the primary human factors event that caused this runway incursion was task saturation. Learning of the runway change during the pushback/engine start procedure caused a number of critical steps to be accomplished in a (self-induced) short amount of time. Changing the flight plan; re-entering the performance numbers for a new runway; re-briefing the SID procedures for that runway; and then briefing the new taxi route; caused us not to brief in great enough detail the importance of the hotspot at the end of our taxi route. I believe if we had started off with the Runway 8 brief at the gate; as opposed to while taxiing out; that the outcome of this taxi would not have resulted in a runway incursion. [My company] has been very good at explaining to aircrews the history of runway incursions on this runway and the importance of extreme vigilance in taxiing to this runway. Although I had never taken off from Runway 8R; my antennae were up because I had done a lot of prior reading from numerous [company] publications on the importance of holding short at the proper set of lines. With all this prior knowledge; I felt it would be intuitive when I reached the hold short area as to which set of lines would be proper to hold short of. Even though I did tell the Captain that I felt we needed to hold short of the first set of lines; I relied on his judgement that the second set of lines was proper. In retrospect; I should have shown him the documentation in both the airport diagram and the Company pages that clearly states that the first set of lines is the proper hold short point for runway 8R.
Air Carrier First Officer reported advising the Captain to hold short at the first set of hold bars approaching Runway 8R on Taxiway M at MIA. After continuing across; the Tower informed the crew that they had crossed the hold line then cleared them for takeoff.