Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine
Distraction; Time Pressure; Workload
Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Human Factors
Reposition flight to take an aircraft from ZZZ to CWA for storage. Weather was low IFR and reported 4 miles visibility and 300 ft. overcast. En-route we planned and briefed using the ILS to Runway 8 at CWA. Descending through 18;000 ft. MSP Center advised us to expect the ILS to Runway 35. We programmed and briefed the new approach and completed the descent checklist. (During the descent checklist; we were heavily task saturated. Reducing speed now for a mostly straight-in approach; following the snowflake to hit a crossing restriction; in icing conditions with several cautions for ICE and anti-Ice systems popping up. When on the minimums item; the Captain responded with the landing data information which I prompted again for the correct response and he corrected. Then the checklist was continued and completed). We were cleared direct to RELCO; descend and maintain 3000 ft. and cleared for the ILS into Runway 35. The Captain briefed that the final approach course would be intercepted in FMS/NAV mode then we would transfer to the ILS navigation (LOC/GS) once established. Approximately 5 miles from RELCO I noticed my altitude was indicating below our assigned and the charted altitude of 3000 ft. (~2500 ft.) and we were still descending. I looked at the Captains PFD and his altitude showed above 3000 ft. (~3400 at this point ft.). That ft.s when I notice his altimeter setting was 30.32 instead of 29.32 reported on the ATIS and by MSP center. I called out 'your altimeter setting is wrong; we need to climb'. The Captain proceeded to disconnect the autopilot to stop the descent and begin climbing. At one point I heard the Radar altimeter make the '1000' automated callout. The Captain input the correct altimeter setting on his side and climbed back to 3000 ft. while I informed CWA Tower of the error; the altitude deviation; and that we were correcting back to 3000 ft. Tower asked if we wanted to continue the approach and that they would contact MSP Center to advise them of the error as well. We decided to continued on the approach and configured the aircraft for landing. The Captain continued to fly a stable approach with the autopilot disconnected; breaking out of the clouds about 300 ft. AGL and making a normal landing.Incorrect altimeter setting on the Captain ft.s side. (30.32 instead of 29.32). Failure to properly execute descent checklist items. When listening the the ATIS is wrote down the altimeter and found it shockingly low so I listen a second time to ensure I heard 29.32 correctly. I mentioned this to the Captain and he asked me what the altimeter setting was in order to preselect it in the ISI standby altimeter as a reminder for later. We also had a brief conversation about how we had noticed the large low pressure system that was approaching the destination airport so a very low (hurricane like) altimeter setting made sense.Ensure to properly input altimeter settings; ensure to properly cross-check the entire altimeter setting including the values before and after the decimal place. (Making sure to say 29.32 not .32) Scan all altimeters more often to verify they are in agreement.
While at cruise we both listened to ATIS and discussed the extremely low altimeter at CWA of 29.32. I then got landing data for Runways 35 and 8. I briefed the ILS to Runway 8. We checked in with Minneapolis Center who told us to expect Runway 35; which we accepted. While descending for a crossing restriction of CWA- Runway 35 at 14;000 ft.; I then Runway 35. There was a slight rush due to the change; but it was completely manageable. Descending thru FL180; I dialed in the incorrect altimeter of 30.32; even though I had written down 29.32 on my yoke chart holder scratch paper and dialed 29.32 into the standby altimeter. I then called for and we ran the Descent Checklist. While running the Descent check; neither I or the FO (First Officer) PM (Pilot Monitoring) caught the altimeter error on my side. I believe I said '29.32 Crossschecked'. We were then cleared direct RELCO; cross RELCO at or above 3;000 ft. and cleared for the ILS Runway 35. I dialed in 3;000 ft. and configured to be at 3;000 ft. about 5 miles outside RELCO to allow for deceleration prior to RELCO. Approximately 5 miles outside RELCO; Just slowing to 200 kts; zero flaps and gear up at a 1;000 fpm descent; I believe the PM FO said 'You have the wrong altimeter. We need to climb back up.' I immediately saw the error; clicked off the autopilot and climbed up to 3;000 ft. I then dialed in the correct altimeter. I directed the FO to tell Tower what we were doing. I elected to continue the approach since we crossed RELCO at 3;000 ft. The rest of the approach and landing was handflown and uneventful. Upon post flight debrief; the PM FO said he momentarily saw his RA display less than 1;000 ft. AGL. The math says this is most likely correct. I did not see this on my side; as I was busy. This means; we were unstable and in an Unusual Aircraft State (UAS) and should have done a missed approach/go around. I estimate we may have descended to 800 ft. to 900 ft. agl above airport elevation. The terrain around RELCO appears to be the same as the airfield elevation. We did not receive a GPWS which I believe was due to our speed; descent rate and absence of towers and terrain in the area.The altimeter error and continuing an unstable approach were 90% my fault due to the following 4 reasons: 1. Lack of attention to detail; dialing in the wrong altimeter. 2. Obviously not fully reading the CA (Captain) side altimeter during the Descent Check. 3. Not doing the math in the descent; when the FO PM said 'out of 4000 ft. for 3000 ft.' when my instruments did not indicate the same. 4. Not initiating a missed approach/go-around. This was due to my failure to not realize we were below 1;000 ft. AGL. I became aware of this; after we were level at 3;000 ft. MSL and obviously stable and in position to conduct the approach. In my opinion the FO PM gets 10% of the blame for the following 2 reasons: 1. Not reading my altimeter during the Descent Check. In his defense; it is across the cockpit and difficult to see. 2. Not calling 'Unstable Go Around'; when he realized we were below 1;000 ft. AGL; not configured and not on the approach yet. BUT; the FO PM does get credit for catching the error before I or GPWS did. I thanked him; but I did not shake his hand.PERSONAL: I should pay more attention to every aspect of my flight duties. I have been a Captain for nearly 20 years and have never had a training issue; ATC issue or any event resembling this. I and everyone are unavoidably stressed; which is distracting. 2. COMPANY: I have no suggestions for changes to flight procedures or practices.
CRJ-200 flight crew reported an unstable approach and being unaware of flying approach well  below charted altitude.