Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument
Flight Crew Last 90 Days 85; Flight Crew Total 23700; Flight Crew Type 743
Confusion; Distraction; Workload; Situational Awareness
Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance
Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Airspace Structure; Software and Automation; Procedure; Human Factors; Chart Or Publication
On the ORCKA 5 Departure; after passing the 160 SMO radial and DOCKR below 3;000 feet. We were given heading of 030 and climb to 12;000 feet as prescribed by the SID (expect vectors). As we were climbing and turning he gave us direct 'KLIPR at or above 10;000; climb to 15;000.' I could not find KLIPR on the legs pages. I checked several downline pages; went back to page 1/9 and then checked the route page to verify the ORCKA 5. It was loaded but still no KLIPR. I told the controller it isn't apparently on our route. He spelled it out. I was moving too slow. He gave us 030 heading and told us to let us know when we are heading there. I though we were heading in the right direction but the intersection is now behind us. As I was jamming the box; perhaps KLIPR got eaten or dropped out as we passed it. It's location is right by DOCKR.  I can't figure out why it wasn't there initially as we turned. We were going through 10;000 feet easily so he then gave us direct KEGGS and to go to next frequency. The next controller gave us direct NNAVY.  Altitudes were no issue; if anything our climb rate was quicker than my cumbersome effort towards KLIPR. What could we have done better. I had expectation bias from the old Loop departure. If I remember after DOCKR you loop back to LAX at or above 10;000 feet. With this departure giving an initial vector and our climb rate much better than my 737 experience.  I was looking for KLIPR to be farther down the road than between LAX and DOCKR. I still don't know why I didn't see it because I was looking at the' top of the flight plan' legs page. I was just too slow for the expectation of the controller so he vectored us on down the line. Although I haven't been to LAX in two years I am comfortable there and fell behind unexpectedly during this event. Errors were automation Management; FMC / CDU and similarly spelled waypoints.
The following narrative describes events that occurred over a very short period of time; perhaps only a few minutes in total. It is my sincere intention not to cast blame; but to offer an explanation for what happened from my biased point of view as the PF (Pilot Flying) on Aircraft X. Our flight began normally from LAX; with the exception that we were pushing back about 45 minutes late due our aircraft's late arrival into Gate 77. Preflight duties were performed fairly routine; but under some time pressure to complete everything thoroughly but as quickly as we could in an attempt to make up some of our delay. This time pressure was self-induced; as no other employee was pushing us for an on time arrival in ZZZ. Red flag #1. During the pre-departure cockpit preparations; we received notice that the passenger boarding was complete; followed shortly by ramp informing us that they were ready for the parking brake release and pushback. At this point I gave a cursory PF brief from the briefing card we all carry - too cursory. Red flag #2. Taxi and takeoff were normal from Runway 25R on the ORCKA5 Departure. I was manually flying; enjoying only my second flight as PF in over a month. We switched from Tower frequency over to SOCAL Departure; and shortly after checking in we received instructions to continue climb I believe to 5;000 feet and turn left to a heading of 030 degrees. Quickly after that we were given further climb to 12;000 and direct to KLIPR.  At this point things went wrong; rapidly. The Captain; as PM (Pilot Monitoring); couldn't find the KLIPR intersection on the legs page; and informed ATC that it did not appear to be on our departure. SOCAL spelled out the intersection phonetically; and then I think confirmed that we were on the ORCKA5. Things were happening fast. While hand-flying; in the turning climb; I tried to locate (unsuccessfully) KLIPR on the 10-3 page displayed on the iPad. Red flag #3.At this point; I should have turned on the autopilot to assist with the FMC and MCP inputs; as I could detect the stress and frustration in the Captain's voice in being unable to find KLIPR on the legs page; or on the departure plan view. Red flag #4. In my divided attention between flying the aircraft and searching for KLIPR on my iPad; I failed to find it as well. I was looking too far down the flight segment to see that the this waypoint is located right off the departure end of the 25s at LAX. This was the key moment; I think; and the last opportunity to correct the error. All I needed to do was put on the AP (autopilot); join the Captain and assist with the repair. But I did not; at least not immediately. The Captain inserted KLIPR on the legs page; got my confirmation; and executed the entry. When I had looked at the route modification; I thought it was correct. The waypoint showed in the correct direction (I thought) but much further down line than it should have; off the scale of my selected range on the navigation display. Red flag #5. Passing around 10;000 feet I engaged the autopilot at the Captain's urging to finally get back in the cockpit as a crew and together correct the problem. I engaged LNAV; but we were not turning fast enough for ATC and the controller gave us a new heading of 010.  I'd like to add at this point that our controller was patient; helpful and professional throughout our fiasco. The only way he could have helped us more is if he teleported into the cockpit and handed us our crew meals. Somewhere in the fray I had suggested that we reload the departure and that would bring KLIPR up; and now the legs page had a discontinuity and we had lost the LAS transition. Also we were given further climb; and now the KEGGS intersection to get us back on the departure. It was at this point I saw we had not been heading to KLIPR at all; but to 'CLIPR'! How did I miss that?! I had set up that problem by not giving proper confirmation of the legs page entry; having not used proper procedures (see Red flag #5). Further climb; and now direct to NNAVY were issued; but we first had to reload the lost LAS transition. After that was competently accomplished; our 'helmet fire' was apparently extinguished; and we were switched to the next Departure Controller. He gave us direct Las Vegas; and kindly spelled 'LAS' in the clearance for the lost crew.What followed was probably a good 2 hours of discussion and self-examination of what went wrong and why. I believe that two primary factors set us up for these errors. The first was my too-brief departure review. This was the first time the Captain had been on this departure; and only my second. Although we both verified the FMC route and legs page; and had confirmed the proper altitudes; we were not familiar with all the new (to us) waypoints; such as KLIPR. A more thorough review on the ground was paramount; and I failed to do it. The second was my desire to manually fly the aircraft during what rapidly became a complex departure. At the first sign of things getting too busy; it became mandatory for me to engage the autopilot; and thereby engage my brain in helping eliminate the threat. I failed in that regard. Adding mistakes such as 'CLIPR' vs. 'KLIPR'; was due to my attention being more in the HUD than on performing proper FMC verification procedures. That was entirely on me. I still have no explanation for why KLIPR was not on the legs page. I had displayed on my CDU the Takeoff Ref page; and did not give due diligence to the ND or the legs page on the Captain's side. What I saw was '_ _ IPR'; and a magenta line in the direction I wanted to go. Not good enough!  Additionally; in my attempt to find KLIPR on the Jepps I zoomed in and slid the page right-to-left; taking the desired waypoint right out of sight. Using the autopilot undoubtedly would have enabled me to do this search more thoroughly. We had only seconds; it seemed; to prevent this entire undesired event.
Air Carrier pilots reported they could not program the SID correctly and flew off course. The reporters referenced a fix with the same name but starts with a different letter exists in the NAS.