Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Communication Breakdown; Fatigue; Human-Machine Interface; Training / Qualification
Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach
Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem
Aircraft; Human Factors
We had deadheaded outbound; [and] then we were to fly the leg back; switching positions with the crew that flew us out. Our deadhead departed at 2015 local and the return departed at 0100 local time. The Captain was the pilot flying and preferred to fly manually; engaging the autopilot only during the cruise portion. Normal SOP calls for the use of VNAV during the takeoff and departure phase; but the Captain preferred FLCH. Standard callouts were somewhat confusing due to the variance from SOP and the fact that it was late at night. The same procedures were used--with the Captain preferring to use FLCH without the autopilot--during the approach. Even though we had only flown one leg; our fatigue level was higher than normal due to the time. The approach was done manually to the final configuration with flaps 25 instead of 30. The problem occurred in the final flap selection. We both called flaps 25 and closed that portion of the checklist but; in fact; flaps 25 had not been selected; only flaps 20. The GPWS [configuration warning] went off alerting us to the fact that flaps 25 had not been selected. My first instinct was to select flaps 25 and that is what I did. The GPWS alert went away. However; the Captain elected to do a go-around. A decision I supported. We went around and successfully landed the aircraft.I believe; given the time of the landing; this is an example were more automation should have been used. It is not a case of overreliance on automation. The autopilot should have been used until a point was the glideslope had been intercepted. It was close to work overload to have the non flying pilot running checklists; selecting different flight director modes; setting altitudes and choosing all airspeeds to comply with flap settings and configuration changes. Reaching across the cockpit to set airspeeds on final approach may not have been the best course of action; given the time of day this flight occurred.
At about 400 FT AGL on final to Runway 30 in perfect VMC weather and choppy air; [we received] a sound warning and EICAS message--paraphrasing--'FLAPS NOT IN LANDING CONFIGURATION.' An uneventful go-around was immediately executed and another approach; uneventful; again with flaps 25; was completed to a full stop. The flap handle appeared to not have been in the FLAPS 25 detent as planned; and briefed and executed by about 1;300 FT AGL. The approach was easy; not rushed; no traffic in front or behind and perfectly stabilized. The choppy air; for whatever reason may have resulted in the First Officer not fully deploying the flaps to the 25 detent; and upon completing the Before Landing Checklist; again; chop; darkness; parallax may have resulted in myself not realizing that the flaps were not fully on the 25 degree mark.Our procedures are excellent; just need to check; check and really check!
At the end of an all night turnaround the flight crew of a B757-200 executed a go-around when they received a flap configuration warning at approximately 400 AGL on final. The reporters disagreed as to whether the conduct of the approach was optimum from a CRM/SOP perspective.