Time Pressure; Other / Unknown; Human-Machine Interface
Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
General None Reported / Taken
Aircraft; Human Factors; Procedure
[I] accepted a scene flight request. Aircraft had not flown in two days and conditions were humid so I began cold-start procedure. Engine lit off quite suddenly with a detonation and T4 spiked instantly. I immediately brought fuel flow control lever back and T4 indicator dropped just as quickly. I did not bring Fuel Flow Control Lever (FFCL) all the way back to the stop - just enough to bring the temperature down and continue with the start-up. At flight position; I noticed the Vehicle and Engine Multifunction Display (VEMD) indicated 'Overlimit Detected'. I knew the spike had been less than one second; and temperature; Tq; NG; pressure; and NR all indicated optimal function. I informed the flight crew what had occurred and that in my estimation we were ok to proceed. They concurred. At hover I checked power and pressures/temperature; and all systems were as expected. We flew to the scene which was about 10 minutes away; landed and shut down. Patient was loaded onto the aircraft and I started up again. Start-up was normal; and patient was flown to [a hospital]. Lead Mechanic performed the prescribed Turbomeca check procedure and determined that no damage had occurred. Although I felt certain that no damage had occurred; and that the 'Overlimit Detected' indication was benign; I should have shut down the engine; aborted the mission; called the Mechanic immediately; and written the event up. As I look back; I realize what factors affected my decision to disregard this sensible course of action; and to proceed with the flight. I made the wrong call. I was eager to fly. I logged less then 3 hours the last month - weather; mechanical issues; staffing; and being at a generally 'slow' base got me chomping at the bit. Safety is the prime directive. My crews trust me to keep them safe and to make good decisions; and not to push capabilities or bend rules so that we can go flying. When I was an instructor I would tell my students 'It is only a mistake the second time you do it. The first time it's a learning experience.' The second time; well; I'm going to remind myself of that.
AS-350 pilot experienced a hot start; saw no adverse indications; and continued the flight. After landing; concluded that the flight should have been aborted.