Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor
Flight Crew Last 90 Days 140; Flight Crew Total 2000; Flight Crew Type 400
Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Situational Awareness
Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure; Human Factors
Both aircraft came to a stop with approximately 200 feet separation at the intersection of the (different) Runways (05 & 13) they used for landing at VNC (busy; uncontrolled airport with extensive flight training).My assumption that the transport aircraft was also using Runway 5 since the last time I listened to AWOS the wind was 060 and other traffic was also using Runway 5 (filtering out that the crew did a call-out for final Runway 13)- I was too much focused on training my student for the landing/traffic pattern. The air carrier crew did only ONE call-out for 5 Mile final (not recommended); did not call-out his aircraft type (I wouldn't have turned final if I would have known his type/speed) and didn't use recommended traffic pattern/entry.Recommend to make published operations at uncontrolled airports in AIM and AC's mandatory. I have too many examples of pilots going straight into the downwind crossing traffic on the upwind or crosswind. Or people overflying the field at 1;000 for an immediate turn into the downwind. Straight in approaches should only be allowed if sufficient call-outs from at least 10 miles out are given. Most commercial operated airplanes do a good job by even calling out 30 miles out so that other traffic can anticipate.
An instructor pilot reported he stopped his aircraft on CTAF airport VNC Runway 5 about 200 feet from an air carrier twin which landed on Runway 13. The air carrier crew apparently made only one position call out on final which failed to mentally register with the task saturated instructor.