Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Flight Crew Last 90 Days 140; Flight Crew Total 3300; Flight Crew Type 850
Situational Awareness
Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance
Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Chart Or Publication; Human Factors
Prior to takeoff; the First Officer (flying pilot) and I reviewed the Offshore Five Departure procedure out of SFO as part of our before takeoff check.  This was the first time I had flown this particular departure.  28R would be the runway used.  The instructions stated 'intercept and proceed via SFO R-281/D6 at or above 2;500 FT.  SFO VOR was not inoperative.  The routing read 'turn left to a heading of 200 to intercept and proceed via PYE R-151 to SEGUL; then...'  We also discussed crossing restrictions that would occur during the initial climb.  Those included 16;000 or above at SEGUL and FL220 or above at CYPRS.  I programmed the FMS (Global GNS-XLS) and noticed the first fix in the box was WAMMY.  We backed up the departure with appropriate VOR frequencies and radials.  Upon take off; we proceeded via the departure.  At 2;500 FT; the First Officer turned to a heading of 200 to intercept the depicted route.  The NORCAL Controller then stated that we should have maintained runway heading.  I inquired; 'Are you sure?  We were following the OffShore 5 Departure.'  She then replied that we should have waited until 6 DME off the SFO VOR prior to making the turn.  She then gave us a heading to fly (240 degrees).  Prior to handing us over to the next Controller; she suggested that we review the departure procedures a little closer next time.  I apologized for the inconvenience.  No further action was taken.  Upon review of the procedure; I discovered that the appropriate turn (at 6 DME) was depicted in the graphical section of the SID.  We had focused more on the 'narrative' section and consequently inferred that the turn to 200 was to occur after reaching 2;500 FT.  We reached 2;500 FT at about 3.5 - 4 DME of the SFO VOR and as a result; turned too early.First off; I am thankful that we did not create any traffic conflicts.  I am also thankful the controller chose not to pursue action against us.  This situation has emphasized to me that it is important to review the graphical and narrative portions of a SID and/or STAR to ensure that (either as pilot flying or in this case Pilot Monitoring) the procedure is flown correctly.  If I could make some suggestions about this procedure; I would say the following: 1) Make note of the turn (6 DME) in the narrative; 2) Enlarge the chart to focus on that point 6 DME from the VOR.  Looking at the plate now; that point is in the upper left corner of the diagram.  I feel it can easily be overlooked. 3) Find a way to incorporate SENZY (the waypoint located at 6 DME) into future FMS loads.  I realize this is not an RNAV departure; however; if I would have noticed the fix SENZY prior to departing; I would have built it into the FMS as added situational awareness.  These suggestions listed above are not meant to be excuses for the error this afternoon.  I will certainly pay more attention to the various parts (narrative/text and graphical depictions) of the SIDs/STARs that I fly.  I write this report as if I was the pilot flying; I was the pilot monitoring in this situation.  As PIC; however; I am responsible for the safe operation of the aircraft.  Even as the pilot monitoring; it is important that I assist the First Officer during time of need and monitor his/her actions to ensure the safety of operations.  In regards to human factors; this was Leg 4 of 4 of a 12 hour duty day; however; at the time; I felt awake and alert.  The first officer and I missed the depiction of the point at which we were to make the turn.
CE560 Captain departing SFO Runway 28R reports turning left to 200 degrees at 2;500 FT on the Offshore 5 departure instead of the 6 DME point as depicted.  ATC points out the error.