Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Distraction; Situational Awareness
Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Human Factors
We started the aircraft normally; and began our taxi; with instructions to taxi via T; A; A8 to runway XX.  Noted  AH-1s just to our left (south of the SIDA area) were now running.  As we finished the turn onto A; ground informed us that we had a clearance window in about 10 minutes.  We taxied to the end of the runway.  When tower cleared us for takeoff; we did the before take-off check; taxied into position; and released the brakes while advancing the power levers.  Almost simultaneously; we received aural warnings for flaps and autofeather.  A quick scan showed the flap handle was still at 0 degrees.  We rejected the takeoff and taxied clear of the runway.  It quickly became obvious what had happened: the taxi check had not been completed.  We taxied back to the runway after doing the after landing check and then the taxi check; and completed the flight normally thereafter.The primary causes of this event were distraction; complacency; and frustration.  We were distracted by the Marine's helicopters; both as interesting aircraft and the concern as to whether or not they were pulling any pitch; which would create significant wind.  Once we were past the helicopters; I remember starting to call for the taxi check when I was interrupted by the call from ground telling us we would be further delayed.  We were already about two hours late at this point; as we had to wait out fog at one of our destinations earlier that morning.  This added to my already frustrated state.  We had a new FA being checked out on the 120; and while she was doing fine; she was much slower than an established FA.  We had to execute a go around inbound; as traffic was not going to be clear before we got to the runway.  As we were late; the fueling vendor was not expecting us; and had to be called multiple times to fuel the aircraft.  There were other minor issues; all of which compounded into a general frustration that was a distraction in itself.  Finally; the day had started with low ceilings and fog but was now VMC; which allowed a sense of complacency to also enter the picture.There are several ways similar situations can be avoided in the future: Recognize that frustration and distraction can be very similar to physical hazards like hypoxia.  You don't recognize how affected you are.  Just by being aware that these issues can creep up on me; will prompt me to be extra vigilant in ensuring that they don't cause me to lose focus on my duties. A more thoughtful approach to Threat/Error Management.  It is easy to brief that complacency or frustration is a threat; but it is much more useful to focus on how you will manage that threat.  Taking a moment to really consider both the implications and possible avenues for dealing with your state of mind can pay large dividends later on.    -Perhaps the company could in the future produce [CRM] training that more specifically addresses threats that are primarily personal responses to external stimuli; as they can be difficult to identify. Most importantly; take the time to do the job right; especially when the situation has deviated from the norm.
On take-off; the aural warning alerted us to incorrect configuration. The captain performed a rejected take-off. We taxied back to the runway; and realized that the taxi check was not performed. We completed the taxi check (flow and checklist) and pre take-off check and departed normally.The taxi check was not performed during taxi out and the omission was not noticed by either pilot. On taxi out; there were two military helicopters preparing to depart (rotors spinning) and they were of concern to us. During taxi; when I would normally hear the captain call for the taxi check; the ground controller gave us our departure window; which I then read back. After that; the taxi out was uneventful; and our attention was on the other traffic at the airport. Since we were beyond the point in a normal taxi out where the taxi check would normally be performed; it did not occur to me that it had not been performed.Other factors include:1) 5th leg of the day - a 6-leg day with no breaks2) running two hours behind due to weather on leg 23) flight attendant IOE4) heightened vigilance on airport traffic due to a go-around on arrival due to a late hand off to tower and conflicting traffic in the pattern5) uncomfortably hot cockpit due to weak cooling from the packsSuggestion:1) Add a check of the flap setting to the before takeoff checklist (above the line).
EMB-120 flight crew reports being distracted during taxi out after a long day with weather and other delays and forgets to do the taxi checklist. The flaps were not set and autofeather was not armed; resulting in a takeoff warning horn and a rejected takeoff.