Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Confusion; Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification
Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed
Human Factors
We were in position for takeoff on 18R with thunderstorms in the vicinity when the wind rapidly shifted from southwest to West to northwest; and Tower announced wind shear advisory for 18R.  The wind (now approx. 320 deg. at 20 gusting 30) exceeded the tailwind limit for 18R so ATC turned the airport around.  While taxiing to 36L we set up the runway change and ran the performance numbers using the wind shear profile.  We briefed the departure; performed a new T-brief and reviewed the precautionary wind shear procedures including the First Officer (FO) use of Flight Path Vector (FPV) after setting TOGA power. We re-accomplished the Before Takeoff checklist.We were the first aircraft to be cleared for takeoff after the airport was turned around and by this time the sky and radar returns looked satisfactory for takeoff and an initial departure along the SID route.The initial takeoff roll was uneventful; the FO announced 'MAX POWER SET' and then stated 'NO Speed Reference System (SRS)'.  I was at first surprised by this. I glanced down to my FMAs and they looked normal including having SRS displayed.  I then looked over at the FO PFD and saw no Flight Module Annunciator (FMA) except thrust.  I became confused and concerned at this point because I didn't know if the FO's 'NO SRS' callout referred to mine as well (possibly an intermittent failure); or if there were problems with the air data system since he had not make the IAS crosscheck call out ('80 KNOTS').  Being concerned with the instrumentation status (air data system; SRS; and windshear guidance capability) and the potential for wind shear; I was not confident that it was safe to continue the takeoff and decided to reject.After clearing the runway and completing the checklists; we tried to establish the IAS at reject and agreed on a conservative estimate of 110 KT.  We knew it was above 85 KT because the autobrakes had engaged; but it didn't feel much faster than that; probably due to the split between GS and IAS due to the strong wind.We discussed what had occurred and concluded that the chain of events started with time compression due to the rapid rise in IAS owing to a combination of maximum power and the strong headwind component.  The FO's MAX POWER SET' call out was then delayed due to the characteristic engine lag in reaching the target power setting.  The FO had already selected FPV at this point and the disappearance of all his FMAs except thrust did not seem correct to him when he was looking for confirmation that SRS had engaged; so he announced 'NO SRS'.  This seeming anomaly contributed to his not making the '80 KNOTS' call out on schedule; then I announced REJECT before he could catch up and accomplish the IAS cross check which routinely follows the 'MAX POWER SET; SRS' call out.We discussed the system functionality and verified that both CAPT and FO FPVs and FMAs seemed to working properly.  We successfully tested the wind shear advisory system.  We concurred that there appeared to be no abnormality or fault with the aircraft; the RTO was due to human factors; and therefore no (Aircraft Maintenance Log) AML entry was needed regarding the cause of the RTO.We contacted Dispatch and Maintenance.  Maintenance advised that an RTO inspection should be made so we arranged to taxi back to the gate.  We would probably have needed to do this for fuel anyway because at this point we were close to the minimum [required dispatch fuel] on the Release.At the gate we entered the RTO in the AML and debriefed Maintenance.  I also telephoned the Duty Officer to notify him of the event.  The Duty Officer also discussed the FO's duty time situation with him.  We subsequently refueled and departed.The rapid rise in IAS and the FO's erroneous belief that SRS was not engaged led to the '80 knots' call out not being made in a timely fashion and the unusual announcement of 'NO SRS'; which resulted in confusion and concern on the part of the Captain (myself) that culminated in my erroneous conclusion that the aircraft may not have  safe to fly in the circumstances and my decision to perform an RTO.The FO stated that he felt that a contributing factor may have been his recent extended absence from line flying which produced a lack of recent experience with the wind shear takeoff profile in line operations.In future when performing a wind shear profile takeoff; I will brief the FO to not select FPV until after T-O power has been set and the 'MAX POWER SET; SRS' and '80 KNOTS' call outs have been made. I will; as well; brief the expected change to the FMAs when FPV is selected.
With thunderstorms in the area; A-300 Captain elects to use max power and FPV (Flight Path Vector) for the flight director mode. FPV is selected early by the flying First Officer and when SRS (Speed Reference System) disappears from the FMA's he announces this indication and the Captain elects to reject.