Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument
Flight Crew Last 90 Days 30; Flight Crew Total 5600; Flight Crew Type 5000
Fatigue; Situational Awareness
Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Human Factors
I have many hours and many approaches to minimums as a single pilot operator over 30 years of flying; mostly Part 91. Very few missed approaches in that time span. Based upon current weather at time of approach; I expected to breakout well above the 250 FT DA. [Decision Altitude] The aircraft did not have an autopilot and my hand-flown approach was rock solid right down to DA. I looked up fully expecting to see the runway in sight for continuation and landing. I was flying the ILS as it had lower minimum than the RNAV/GPS approach. Looking up; I saw nothing of the runway environment as I tried to discern the nature and meaning of glowing globes through the fog (which I later concluded were lights on the ground diffused by the fog at dusk). I had made no mental accommodation to do a missed approach as I just KNEW that my skills would allow me to land as they had several times in past years. The only conscious control input that I can recall is leveling at the MDA while continuing to focus outside the cockpit for the runway environment. It just had to be there! I do not consciously remember looking at nor interpreting the flight instruments as I began what in retrospect was an uncontrolled; unconscious 90 degree turn to the left - still looking for the runway environment. Through a break in the clouds and fog - (don't know how low I was) I saw a clear picture of the runway lights (which I had clicked on 5 times at approach top of descent) showing the intersection of the two runways. I just happened to be on a (very) low right base to the cross runway and reacted by chopping power; setting full flaps (which probably saved me) and executed a steep right-hand turn at low altitude to uneventfully land and consider it a blessing to be writing this to you. I was tired when I began my flight; having circumvented convective activity with Center help on a previous flight earlier that day. I did file an alternate based on the weather (TAF) but really just wanted to get home; and really never seriously considered that I would have to make a missed approach. I was flabbergasted when I looked up and could not see the runway; and my behavior was all downhill from there. My perceptions; judgments and decisions from that point were automatic; faulty and flawed. The discipline to call a missed approached had totally evaded me as I wandered in the fog trying to see the runway. I will never again launch on an approach to low minimums without respectfully considering the real necessity of having to call a go-around and be much more than casually aware of the implications of making that decision. The TAF forecast visibility and ceiling was for better conditions than I encountered. At time of approach the ASOS was reporting visibility and ceilings better than I experienced. I'm also working up a personal minimum for low approaches to the effect that even though I do and always have enjoyed making approaches to low minimums; I will bring a different mindset to the game in the future. I'm still refining my personal minimum rule but something along the line of: If the approach DA is 250 FT (as in the case of this ILS) then double this figure to 500 FT. If the TAF is lower than that number; then there must be a total expectation and commitment to either not take the flight if one is tired (as I was) or be totally and irrevocably committed to a missed approach and alternate airport landing. I was not; but lived to relate this story to you. I would also treat the TAF visibility in a similar fashion but haven't as yet reflected on that component as a personal minimum.
A commercial and instrument rated pilot flying a single engine aircraft describes his near fatal loss of situational awarness when intentionally descending below minimums on an instrument approach.