Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Other / Unknown; Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness
Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
General None Reported / Taken
Weather; Human Factors
Takeoff conditions were IMC and windy. It was my leg to fly. Before takeoff we briefly briefed the possibility of wind shear after takeoff. Once we did the takeoff; we actually encountered a caution wind shear. The reason for this [report] is my insufficient wind shear SOP. I did not move the thrust lever to max nor said the callout. Because I did not move the levers to max thrust the wind shear guidance did not activate. However; because I seemed to have tunnel vision; thought it did activate and ensured positive aircraft control at all times. The Captain also missed the call outs; however I do not blame the Captain for it as she was probably focused on seeing if I would ever push the thrust lever to max and ensure I had positive aircraft control.The Captain and I had a thorough briefing once we landed about the issues and how we could have done better. We briefed that next time we should ensure we go over the procedure mentally and do some chair flying to better prepare as to avoid the heat of the moment mistakes in not the most comfortable turbulence and situation. Additionally; I learned how my body reacted and will ensure next time I do the SOP properly.At the moment of wind shear; I knew what I had to do; callout wind shear max thrust and push it to max thrust. However; in the heat of the moment I may have suffered confirmation bias when I heard the ATTCS (Automatic Takeoff Thrust Control System) move thrust automatically to max thrust and made me hesitate. So when I noticed my hesitation I just forgot about SOP and focused on maintaining aircraft control by ensuring airspeed wings level  with the rolling tendencies the turbulence was doing.
After departure from Runway XXR and into the beginning of our takeoff climb we received a 'caution windshear'. The aircraft was configured for a no flex takeoff prior to departure and the Captain briefed windshear guidance procedures in the event windshear was encountered. However; once the caution occurred the windshear escape procedure was not executed properly. The Pilot Flying (First Officer) pitched to 20 degrees and maintained heading; however did not call out or move the throttles to the max thrust position or press the toga button. PF did proceed to call out of windshear and recover. The Pilot Monitoring (Captain) recognized windshear and the aircraft maintaining an increasing Ra position. While verifying the thrust position; the PM became aware thrust lever position hadn't moved up and toga button not pressed. The PF started to turn towards the assigned heading around 1;000 feet and around when the caution cleared. The PM attempted to communicate max thrust but became distracted by the turn; ATC instructions and got tongue tied. The aircraft proceeded with the flight with no other occurrences. PM and PF discussed the occurrence; identifying what went wrong and how to prevent future errors. The PF explained how he heard the engines spool up thus creating misperception and how he focused on the departure. The PM believes the missed call out created missed triggers and lead to getting behind. We believe better communication and speaking louder is an effective solution to prevent tunnel vision and enhance situational awareness. The weather posed threats and a changing environment that requires risk management and quality CRM. We understand these events happen within seconds and that maintaining vigilance will eliminate errors and mitigate threats. Reviewing procedures and call outs as a crew and individually will help eliminate future errors and maintain safe operations.
Air carrier flight crew reported receiving a windshear warning on takeoff and failing to perform the Wind Shear Maneuver.