Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Situational Awareness; Distraction; Confusion; Communication Breakdown
ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Human Factors; Procedure; Weather
We briefed the route and departure; to include the [engine failure] procedures. We confirmed the route in the FMS. After being cleared for takeoff and reaching 400 AGL; We turned to heading 189 and hit moderate or greater turbulence and mountain waves; which significantly affected us. I had trouble communicating with ATC and performing cockpit duties due to turbulence. Just before reaching 1;000 AGL; Tower said switch to departure. Upon contacting departure we were told 'upon reaching 8;000; proceed direct to a fix'; but the radio quality of the transmission was poor and we couldn't clearly hear the name of the fix. I realized the mountain was on our path and for an immediate left turn to avoid terrain. The Spokane Departure Controller cleared us direct to a fix by name but not the identifier or phonetic spelling; which I couldn't understand due to significant turbulence and poor radio quality. We continued normal flap retraction callouts and takeoff profile. We were given heading a 120; to which we turned; and it took several radio calls between the Captain and ATC to get clarification on the identifier to which we were cleared. This was due to scratchy radios; the turbulence; and some possible confusion on the part of the controller who was talking with us and another company aircraft. We were mistakenly trying to navigate to ENY VOR which caused us to be confused and task saturated. Once we got the correct identifier for HIA and entered into the FMS; we proceeded on course as cleared. However this delay resulted in us temporarily deviating from the charted procedure. This caused the controller to get a low altitude alert although we did not receive any terrain avoidance warnings from our aircraft. In retrospect; the controller admitted on our phone conversation afterwards that this situation is very common. There are a lot of risks and stressors associated with this MZULA.MSO RWY12 and I feel like our outside resources did not help the flight crew. We accept full responsibility for allowing this situation to develop; but changes to this procedure will greatly increase safety in the future.First our Jeppesen charts had no verbal narrative and left us needing FAA charts to understand the procedure. It would be a great help if the procedure could be simplified or the controller's expectations that are outside the procedure could be communicated before we hit significant turbulence. The controller was clearly frustrated with us which only made our situation worse by trying to give us a phone number during a high stress and high workload phase of flight in significant turbulence. This shows the controllers are not fully aware of what human factors the flight crews have and how to help safety of flight. Having poor radio transmission quality was also a significant factor.
I was the First Officer and Pilot Flying departing MSO. I received and read back the clearance from ATC which included the MZULA5 Departure MSO transition. I programmed this into our FMS and the Captain and I thoroughly reviewed the route in the FMS and on our Jeppesen plates. We also briefed the procedure for engine failure departure. In my takeoff briefing I again described the departure we were assigned. After being cleared for takeoff and reaching 400 AGL; I turned to heading 189 as charted. Immediately we began to encounter moderate turbulence. Just before reaching 1;000 ft AGL; Tower said switch to Departure. Upon contacting Departure we were told 'upon reaching 8;000; proceed direct to ________ ' but it was very turbulent and we did not clearly hear the name of the fix. I immediately realized the flight director was not commanding a left turn in accordance with the charted procedure. The Captain asked to say again the fix; and the controller said the name but not the identifier or phonetic spelling. At 1;000 ft AGL; I called out 'flight level change'; followed by the normal flap retraction callouts and told him we needed a left turn since I knew from the charted SID that's what we were supposed to do. Meanwhile the Captain was trying to get clarification on the fix to which we were to proceed. We knew it would be a left turn so he asked for a left turn and we were given heading 120; to which we turned. During this entire time it was very turbulent and took a lot of effort and concentration to focus on safe flying. It took several radio calls between the Captain and ATC to get clarification on the identifier to which we were cleared. This was due to scratchy radios; the turbulence; and some possible confusion on the part of the controller who was talking with us and another company aircraft. Once we got the correct identifier and entered it into the FMS; we proceeded on course as cleared. However; this delay resulted in us temporarily deviating from the charted procedure. During this time; we had terrain radar displayed on our MFD and were well aware of our surroundings and the location of rising terrain; and at no time did we ever get a terrain caution or warning.Although the SID was correctly programmed into the FMS; for unknown reasons the Flight Director did not command the left turn to intercept the MSO 159 radial. The extreme turbulence and difficulty understanding ATC instructions caused a delay in turning to the assigned fix; resulting in a course deviation. First of all; given our route of flight; it would have made much more sense if; in the pre-departure clearance; we would have been given the Salmon transition. This fact was even stated by the ATC supervisor on the phone when I called him after we landed. He further stated they have had frequent problems with pilots and aircraft not following the procedure we were assigned. Second; I could have anticipated a potential issue; and tuned the MSO VOR in NAV 1 and 2; along with the radial to intercept prior to takeoff. If I return to MSO in the future; I will definitely do that as a backup in case this kind of thing should happen again. I realized we were supposed to be turning left; which is why we asked for a left turn in the interim while trying to get the identifier for the fix and get that loaded in the FMS. The significant turbulence and the communication difficulties with ATC were definitely contributing factors in this temporary deviation. Nonetheless; as a pilot it is my responsibility to safely and correctly fly the plane; so I will ensure I have a backup navigation source programmed and ready in the future. And if I go back there again and get assigned that same SID; I will ask for the Salmon transition rather than the MSO transition; as suggested by the ATC supervisor. Finally I will brief my Captain on what happened previously so we can be vigilant and prepared.
Flight crew reported receiving a low altitude alert from ATC departing MSO when they had a track deviation following communication difficulties.