Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Situational Awareness; Confusion; Training / Qualification
Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR
Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Human Factors; Procedure
After lengthy and unexpected taxi instructions from ground; I wrote down the instructions and expanded my airport diagram so as not to leave my Captain in the lurch. 14L data was not on the TPS so; after I made sure my partner knew his way to the runway; I requested TPS 14L. Since we were expecting 22L; I entered the new runway in the FMC. Even selected 14LX in the FMC; as X was listed for intersection U2. What neither of us caught was the TPS data was for full length 14L. The ensuing takeoff was long! We both realized our mistake; and after the climb went over the TPS very carefully. We were probably 4;000 pounds too heavy for the runway. Stop the aircraft before the runway; and make darn certain the CORRECT RUNWAY AND INTERSECTION is what's displayed on the TPS and the correct flaps/thrust setting correlates with it. I was distracted by a circuitous and unfamiliar taxi route and I should have asked my Captain to take some time; short of the runway to review the unfamiliar data. He was taxiing slowly; but I was still playing catch up.
Prior to taxiing planned Runway 22L for departure; max power; 26K; due to winds (ATIS: 090/07 knots); weight and runway length; First Officer's Leg to Fly. On taxi out assigned Runway 14L at U2 intersection. With a long taxi to 14L ( via A; A6; J; hold short 9R then further clearance G; E; U); First Officer went heads down to pull new TPS. With New TPS we updated runway; headings; flaps; power setting; etc. With a call for takeoff data and bugs I took the TPS and began reviewing the data in the FMC. My first item was to verify the runway intersection was correct and as I accessed the FMC takeoff pages the First Officer pointed out the runway information; on the FMC; to confirm he had put in X/14L; in my estimation; for the new TPS 14L at U2 intersection; which I confirmed from the TPS that U2 intersection was indeed called 14LX. Confident the TPS that was pulled was for 14L at U2; I went straight to the flap settings v-speeds etc.; and bypassed the first item listed in that row (the actual runway associated with that TPS which was 14L and not 14LX). Before Takeoff checks were completed and the flight cleared for takeoff. During takeoff roll aircraft performance indications were normal (N1; ground speed; etc.); however; remaining runway length became questionable if we had to abort. Continuing takeoff roll to V1/VR resulted in a much less than comfortable fly off point; on what I estimated; as less than one thousand feet of runway remaining. An inquiry to the Tower; for current winds; yielded winds at 100/09 knots; which was an approximate 4 knot headwind. Subsequent reviews; of possible causes lead us; almost immediately; to the TPS where we discovered it was pulled for 14L (full length 10k+ ft) and not 14LX (7310 ft). During the flight; we conducted a lengthy and complete review of the entire how; where; when and whys; on the proper procedures in retrieving; updating; managing; and verifying; TPS; runway and FMC information. I recognized the seriousness of this incident and have taken all possible steps to ensure this and any similar event is avoided in the future; to the best of my ability. I fully understand that the safety; conduct and successful completion of every flight under my command is my responsibility and I will continue to take all necessary steps to ensure the completion of my duties.
B737-800 flight crew reports departing Runway 14L from Taxiway U2 at ORD without verifying that U2 is an authorized intersection in the TPS [Takeoff Performance System] preplan. The result is a lift off point very close to the end of the runway.