Flight Crew Last 90 Days 291
Distraction; Situational Awareness
ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach
Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Procedure; Weather; Human Factors
I was the pilot flying with autopilot/auto throttles engaged slowing to flaps 5 speeds 15 miles out on approach to ATL ILS PRM 28 Approach at 3;000 feet. Upon switching to Atlanta Tower; landing winds were called at 130/6G17. We suspected these winds were out of limits and re-entered them into the performance computer. The data showed our landing tailwind out of limits. We briefly discussed we would not be able to land. The Captain (PM) began to converse with Tower about the winds and that we would be unable to land with these winds. The conversation went back and forth; while I delayed calling for further configurations since I was preparing in my head for a go-around instead. Passing through a 1;000 feet; the winds reported for the runway were determined to be within limits and the Captain reaches up and drops the gear; however; we were still at flaps 5 approximately 160 knots. At this point; my overall situational awareness was low and I failed to call for the go-around. With the complexity of Atlanta operations and airspace; thunderstorms off the departure end; and the split-second decision; we elected to immediately configure and continue. We quickly configured and met stabilized approach criteria by approximately 500 feet. We landed safely on speed; in the first 1;000 feet with an uneventful touchdown.Upon reflection; even with the safe culmination of the flight; in accordance with our procedures for stabilized approach; the split-second decision after the winds were determined in limits should have been to go-around regardless of the complex airport operations and weather. We were just too low and far into the approach. With a completely clear head; it is clear a go-around was our only option in compliance with our procedures. Manage distractions better; stay focused on the primary task of flying and recognize when I'm no longer in the green so that I consciously regain my situational awareness to the point where I have the assertiveness to break the cycle; strictly follow the procedures; and go around. Also; I think Atlanta Tower giving landing winds that are out of limits or for a runway we aren't landing on needs to be addressed. This led to being forced to resolve a problem during a time where task loading was already high.
We initially briefed the arrival and the visual 27L backed up with the ILS 27L. ATIS had visual conditions with 27L and 28. Landing distance was not [a factor] with a small tailwind. On contact with Approach; they told us to plan 28 approach. We briefed the visual 28 backed up with ILS. We reprogrammed the Runway 28 ILS in the FMC. I got ATL information G and the only thing changed was ILS PRM's. Had multiple descent altitudes; speed; and heading vectors. I had difficulties locating the ILS PRM monitoring frequency. We got that in COM2 and were nicely established on final in VMC conditions when switched to Tower frequency for Runway 28. We had the runway in sight and the FMC and ILS paths for 28 were tracking normally. Tower cleared us to land with Runway 28 winds 130 6G17. That seemed too much tailwind and I ran the numbers real quick. It said a 14 tailwind. I queried the controller and she repeated the same winds. I said they were out of limits. She replied the Runway 28 winds were an average of the winds at the airport. I asked what the real winds were. The controller answered the Runway 27L winds were 120 at 8. Those winds were in limits for landing. I asked why 27L instead of 28. She responded Runway 28 had no wind read out and that the Runway 27L wind read out was the most accurate winds for Runway 28. I accepted that we were within landing limits. I looked out and saw were close to the field and motioned to lower the gear to the F/O then commanded gear down and landing flaps. By the time we got configured; I realized that we had probably configured below 1;000 feet. At about 500 feet we were in the slot and could achieve a normal approach and landing from that position and I decided landing from that position was a much safer course of action that doing a go-around in Atlanta at a busy time with weather off the departure end on the airport.In dealing with the controller and solving the problem of the out of limits tailwind reporting; I had allowed myself to lose situational awareness. I should have been cross checking the pilot flying's approach more. A humbling experience on how one can get too task focused and lose situational awareness. I didn't catch that the plane was descending and the 1;000 foot call. On the ATC side; Tower needs to report the best winds available for the particular runway in this case Runway 27L and if those winds are significantly out of limits change runways. The Tower needs to be giving pilots information they can use. In this case; the initial Tower wind report was unusable and counterproductive. Being on final approach is no place to be trying to straighten this mess out. On the crew side; I should have better articulated the plan of keep flying and configuring for the approach until I call for the go-around. As pilot monitoring; I should have been much more diligent about monitoring the approach and backing up the pilot flying. Ultimately; I allowed the out of limits tailwind problem affect my situational awareness which I did not fully get until about 500 feet AGL. I should not have allowed that to happen. The optimum solution during the quick two minutes of problem solving would have been to either been configured by 1;000 feet AGL or go-around.
B737-700 flight crew describes the circumstances leading up to an unstabilized approach and landing at ATL.