Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Confusion; Workload; Situational Awareness; Human-Machine Interface; Distraction; Communication Breakdown
Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown
Flight Crew Returned To Clearance
Human Factors
We were cleared for a VOR/GPS 13L approach. The visibility was unrestricted and the winds were 180/17 G23. I conferred with the First Officer (FO) and we agreed on the RNAV 13L approach in the FMS. There was an RNAV 13L and a VOR 13L in the FMS. We even discussed the reluctance of ATC to clear us for the visual since we need to have traffic and airport in sight. I briefed a flaps 15; autobrakes 2 landing at an approximate landing weight of 127;000 LBS  following a visual hand flown approach; backed up by LNAV/VNAV. We had a 27 KT tailwind; I hand flew the approach from ASALT with traffic ahead and airport in sight. I remainded at 3;000 FT until ZADUD; Approach gave me 3 rapid speed reductions because of the tailwind and traffic ahead from 200; 170; to 150 KTS prior to ZADUD. I was gear down; flaps 15; prior to descent. While configuring; slowing and asking the FO for the flap inhibit switch; and receiving a clearance to contact Tower. The FO correctly realized that on the 45 degree track; we were left of CRI VOR and had the wrong approach in the FMS. I was concentrating on ground track vs LNAV; remaining to the right of the Long Island Expressway and following the lead in lights to runway 13L. And keep the traffic ahead insight. The FO was trying to convince me that we were off track and he was trying to change the FMS approach to the VOR/GPS 13L. I said;'We still need the flap inhibit switch; need to contact Tower; and finish the checklist. I'm proceeding visually and it's too late to change the FMC; I need you heads up outside.' We were cleared to land on 13L and turned off at Taxiway Echo. Upon debriefing the FO; I realized he felt out of the loop; and was focused on the fact that we chose the wrong approach and needed to rectify it. We were in a high workload environment and I was focused on a continuous descending visual with a tailwind turning into a gusty crosswind landing.
Upon arrival into New York airspace; we were issued an approach clearance for GPS 13L. I was the Pilot Monitoring (PM). Flight crew became confused on which approach we were using. Pilot Flying (PF) and PM were not 'on the same page' as PF was flying a visual approach. Our confusion led to a small lateral deviation from CRI VORTAC (flyover waypoint). PF continued visually over the approach light system and landed uneventfully.Better preparation and a thorough briefing will allow the PM to better perform his duties.
The Captain and First Officer of a B737-800 suffered a breakdown in communication before beginning and approach to Runway 13L at JFK.  Confusion and a modest track deviation were the result.