Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Fatigue; Situational Awareness
Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach
General None Reported / Taken
Company Policy; Human Factors
This event occurred on leg 2 of a continuous duty overnight pairing. The departure the previous evening was delayed by 1:18 and the break time between flights was reduced from scheduled 7:43 down to 6:40. On approach; we were sequenced to about a 20 mile final. The approach from that point on in was stable and all appropriate callouts were made. However at approximately 1200 feet AFL; I realized that I was not fully configured; and called 'Gear Down; Flaps 3; Landing Checklist.' Except for that detail; everything else was stable. While the gear and flaps were in transit however; an ECAM (Electronic Centralized Aircraft monitoring) warning was triggered. Just as I was about to command 'Go Around;' the warnings ceased; everything was stable; and I judged that the safest course of action was to land.There is more than one contributing factor here. First the reduced rest contributed to a lack of concentration. While I felt fit for duty; in retrospect; the simple physiological fact that I was operating at a reduced level of alertness seems now self-evident. Also; I have been flying this trip sequence all month; and therefore the routine nature of these flights probably contributed to some degree of complacency. Next; the fact that we flew such a long stabilized final could have given me a sense of boredom to some extent.Having performed this flying duty on reduced period of sleep; I should have been reminding myself to be extra vigilant. I thought that I was; because I can remember giving myself a little pep talk silently as we took the runway for takeoff; reminding myself of the contingencies for rejected takeoff and engine failure after takeoff. But toward the end of the flight; I can't say that I remember doing the same thing for approach and landing. Though I had only about 4 hours sleep; instead of the 5 and-a-half that I was used to on this trip sequence; I felt 'fit for duty' when I electronically signed the release. One of the things that the 'fit for duty' certification does not take into account; however; is how you might feel 2 hours later. And while you might be able to guess at that; there is no way to know.
Captain (Flying Pilot) and I operated this flight. We were vectored off the [approach] for a 20 plus mile final to the ILS. Distracted by an abnormal amount of acute fatigue and also focusing on ground contact; Captain called for 'Gear Down; Flaps 3; Landing Checklist.'During configuration change and after initiation of Landing Checklist; I heard a Warning Bell (Configuration) momentarily and it went away after gear (and/or flaps) were down and locked. I completed last 3 items on checklist and the aircraft was configured for a normal landing. I have a memory of starting to call for a Go Around at this point and thought twice as I realized the Go Around should have been initiated earlier and new the current configuration of the aircraft was correct. I also do not recall hearing the '1;000' automated callout; but could have been blocked by Captain or bell.The pairing was an all-nighter and was delayed the night before. I had done the same paring the previous night and; although rested; was unable to take a nap the day before pairing in question. I didn't get adequate rest and seemed to wake every half hour for about 4 hours. Surprisingly; I felt fine getting ready; eating; transit to airport; preflight; push; taxi; climb and most of cruise. We were slowed from normal to 270; then 250; then 210; then 190; then 170 while still on the [arrival procedure] and the approach really seemed to linger. We were handed off to tower after being cleared for the approach and there was an unusual amount of time flying from 'clearance to land' to GS (Glideslope) interception.Although I did not fall asleep; I do not recall a time ever being so tired while operating an airplane. I became fixated trying to identify ground contact. Captain and I have been flying together all month and he is a strong crew member and safe pilot and I perhaps inadvertently put too much responsibility on him and didn't adequately perform my monitoring duties.I personally would have a hard time understanding how this could happen if I would have read the description written by another pilot. In my nearly 20 years of flying; I don't think I have ever gotten so behind and missed so many barriers; especially during a critical phase of flight.I am well versed and competent on all phases of flight; including Go Arounds; as I write this; I am still bothered as to why I didn't call for a Go Around. Looking back; I believe I got caught up trying to complete the task. This is a good reminder for myself to perform our company SOP regardless of what I may deem as having enough time.
A319 flight crew describes fatigue due to a short overnight in the hotel resulting in a late call for landing gear and flaps and an unstabilized approach.