Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Situational Awareness
Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Weather; Human Factors
While deviating southeastward to avoid a strong line of thunderstorms; deviations continued well past our original estimate of 80 NM. As we continued along the eastern edge of the front about 200 NM looking for a safe opening; we lost situational awareness and exceeded 50 NM offshore without life rafts on board. Around the time we finally realized that we had exceeded this limitation; we received an ATC report of an aircraft in 'moderate' turbulence experiencing a loss of 800 feet in altitude. Because a course reversal would have been well over 200 NM; and deviations westward were ill advised; I elected to exercise Captains Authority and continued along the front a little further until it was safe to turn back shoreward. Even then; we experienced continuous moderate turbulence while crossing over the line. We received a message from our Dispatcher after we became aware; reminding us not to exceed 50 NM. I replied that I was exercising Captains Authority and that it was not safe to turn eastward citing the ATC reported altitude loss event. At the most extreme; we were approximately 120 NM offshore (as we verified by our dispatcher). Given previous personal experience utilizing the old CRJ 900 waiver for 147 NM off shore without a life raft; I knew that if I remained above FL250; I would be within gliding distance of several airports along the coast. I discussed this information with the Pilot Flying and suggested that we climb from FL260 back up to FL300 to increase the safety margin.Once clear of the line; we immediately requested vectors due West (abeam Ormond Beach; OMN) to once again position ourselves no more than 50NM offshore. From that position; we requested to rejoin the new arrival at a fix that would keep us within the limitation. I never told ATC that I was exercising Captains Authority as they were extremely helpful and granted every request made without any priority handling. Had that been necessary; I would not have hesitated. I only informed the First Officer and our Dispatcher.We believed; looking at the radar; that we would be able to turn back towards our filed route with only a minor 80 NM deviation. When we were unable to find a hole along the ATC suggested heading; we should have queried ATC as to where we could expect to be able to turn back Southwesterly. Had we the plotted the closest fix; it would have been immediately evident that we were going to exceed the limitation and would have opened a discussion as to a possible diversion airport. Alternately; informing our dispatcher of our 'minor' deviation in a more timely manner would have alerted him to keep an eye on our position and he might have been able to alert us proactively and helped avoid our transgression. Also; workload permitting; and in no way relieving me of any blame for losing situational awareness; ATC could have volunteered that deviations were currently exceeding 50 NM offshore. Most regional jets do not carry life rafts and I believe that the NYC area controllers have been made aware this after several shortcuts offered along the NY/NJ coast led to similar 50 NM deviations.
From now on; I will take more time to review the radar picture with the Captain and discuss possible scenarios that may arise. Second; whenever flying along the East Coast; I will plot VORs along the coast in the 'fix' pages of the FMS with a 50 mile ring. Tomorrow I will experiment and see if the secondary flight plan built with VORs along the coast will allow a 50 mile course offset which would effectively give a 50 mile limitation line.
CRJ-900 flight crew reported losing situational awareness and exceeding the 50 NM from shore FAR while deviating around thunderstorms.