Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Situational Awareness; Distraction
Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Human Factors
Our aircraft departed with a serious weight and balance discrepancy that could have resulted in a serious aircraft accident if at another airport or with a shorter runway. During final weight and balance inputs; I failed to properly confirm my First Officer's inputs which resulted in a large error of passenger inputs. Our load manifest matched up with the final weight and balance copy; and as usual I performed the fuel reliability check and started making my welcome aboard PA. At this point; my First Officer incorrectly entered 000/67 in Cabin A; when in fact it should have been 67 in Cabin A; and 89 in Cabin B. The total passengers should have been 156. Instead; we only inputted 67 half weights. This resulted in a weight difference of 26;800 pounds under planned! Unfortunately; I completely failed in my duties to confirm his inputs as it gave me a Weight and Balance (WB) solution with Flaps 1; which we were anticipating. The incorrect solution was auto-uplinked; and we proceeded as normal. This was a grave error; and I fully realize the devastating consequences that could have happened had we not had a 10;000 runway in good weather. On departure; we got a MCDU scratchpad message saying 'Check Weight.' I then looked at our printed out copy of the first page of our WB solution and discovered the serious error. I then corrected our Zero Fuel Weight (ZFW) to the planned ZFW to achieve proper speeds for cruise and landing.This event could have easily been prevented by verifying the final inputs on the Weight and Balance. I failed in my duties to verify my First Officer's inputs. Unfortunately; we rushed through the process even though we were 5 minutes early. Complacency was definitely a factor as I have never seen this issue and have been flying the aircraft for a very long time. My previous four day was flown with my First Officer and I found him to be exceptionally bright and competent as he has been here a little under 2 years with an impressive aviation carrier and experience. I was lulled into complacency by getting a weight and balance solution with a Flaps 1 Takeoff (TO)/Flex (which was anticipated). I became distracted with other duties (Fuel reliability; Welcome aboard PA; verifying passenger counts on final WB with passenger load sheet; and confirming the passenger count with the A flight attendant); and failed to confirm the final WB inputs. Unfortunately; I trusted without verifying.This is why there are two of us; and I failed in my duties. This also happened in day VMC at our home base airport. Complacency was once again a factor. I'm much more cognizant of weight and balance at [other] airports. Needless to say; this is an error that will not be repeated on either of our ends.This could have been prevented in two ways. Verify the final weight and balance inputs. This procedure is already in place. Do not allow a weight and balance solution with a margin of error so high. We got a solution; albeit a grossly egregious one. We uplinked the solution and got an [anticipated] Flaps 1/Flex TO numbers.
We had a prelim of 147 passengers. When loaded we had an exceedance of 3.3 percent of Center of Gravity (CG). I then re-entered the Weight and Balance (WB) on ACARS and I thought I entered with a split cabin to resolve the problem. I had not actually loaded split cabin; but half weights. I had entered 000/67 and /87 passenger. This resulted with a 26;800 lbs difference in the actual weight. The system gave us a solution and I did not catch the error. It allowed me upload the solution and I did not check the additional pages showing the issue. I had checked the engine out procedure and notes when I entered the preliminary WB and didn't need to see that info again. On take we noticed an unusual take off roll and got an error message on the scratch pad to check WB. We then realized my error and made adjustments so that the WB would be correct on landing. We just got complacent. I have flown with the captain before and he is extremely professional and attentive. We created a self-induced time crunch and I had not caught my error. We were lucky it happened at an airport with a 10K [foot] runway and good weather. One issue is that stations are filling out WB paperwork incorrectly resulting in incorrect prelims. AS a crew; we usually have to split cabins and move weights around so that they are properly set. I have never actually been taught the WB on the ACARS computer but have had a quick once-through during IOE as a new hire. Actually having use of an ACARS for automated WB during sim training would alleviate most errors. Also not making PAs after we get final paperwork would throw attention to checking final numbers prior to pushback. I do not intend to make this mistake again.
An A320 flight crew reported departing with a large (26;800 lbs) self-induced error in weight and balance calculations.