Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
General Maintenance Action; General Release Refused / Aircraft Not Accepted
Aircraft; Procedure
During the previous flight the radar was not working correctly. The Engineer entered it into the log. We arrived at the airplane the next morning to find all of our discrepancies were signed off as fixed; but 2 of them were not (INS DME #1 on Captain's instruments and a mystery warning light signed off as W/S Caution and moved to CI.) I was mainly concerned with the radar; as the other 2 were lights. I said to the Maintenance person that since the lights were not fixed; how can I believe that the radar was fixed. The radar was signed off as 'per 34-43-00' and 'normal.' He pulled the Maintenance Manual and we did the tests together. During the cockpit test; we followed; step by step; to test the radar tilt; gain; and test functions. The test function showed the correct pattern; but the radar would not provide accurate ground returns or changes in gain. This showed that the cockpit tests failed. The next step was to open the radome and visually check correct operation. The radome was opened. Then; with coordination through the intercom; the 2 Maintenance personnel visually watched as the radar would sweep. The radar would not tilt to the down position. The Maintenance personnel informed me that the radar antenna motors were inoperative and that the antenna would need to be replaced. Our route of flight consisted of embedded TS to FL550.If my crew had not flown the airplane in and entered this into the log; another crew would have accepted the aircraft. This could be a deadly mistake. Again; our route consisted of embedded TS to FL550. This event occurred because of Maintenance personnel being unfamiliar with certain systems and not completing the required troubleshooting tasks. Also Maintenance did not have the proper test harnesses to troubleshoot INS stabilization. These are all required to sign off 'per 34-43-00.' Our Maintenance is pushing aircraft out of 'their' stations to move problems to another person; or 'we can't fix that here.' Also; on time departures and avoiding maintenance delays are a primary goal. I believe that the aircraft are becoming extremely unsafe because of this culture. Once identified; the crew refused the aircraft. In order to correct these problems; the Maintenance personnel and crews need to trust each other. Maintenance needs to fix or troubleshoot airplanes correctly. This mistake could have been deadly. If not for due diligence among our flight crews; their superior flight skills; and unprecedented experience; a crash will happen. The flight crews will miss something; eventually. This is not a matter of 'if we miss something;' but more of a 'when we miss something;' that the ultimate costs of the culture here will be realized. The accident chain needs to be broken; and the final link is the crews. With increasing responsibility like ordering catering; missing charts; organizing the airport transportation; … incomplete or inaccurate paperwork; unapproved chart manuals; nonstandard aircraft; and duty days more than 18 hours with 'legal rest;' the crews are exhausted before reaching top of climb.
B747-200 Captain notes a radar discrepancy during descent and enters the fault in the logbook. The next day the radar is signed off but functional testing with the help of Maintenance indicates that the radar tilt is inoperative and the aircraft is refused.