Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Flight Crew Last 90 Days 4; Flight Crew Total 4519; Flight Crew Type 4
Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification
Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown
General Maintenance Action; General Physical Injury / Incapacitation
Human Factors
I was pilot flying; [this] was my second flight of my First Officer Initial Operating Experience; and to be my first landing in a Boeing 737. I was hand-flying a visual approach for a flaps 40 landing. There was a crosswind from the right of about 5 knots. The approach was on glideslope and on localizer; and I was learning to fine tune my power corrections. Around 200 feet above the ground I transitioned the aircraft into a 'slightly low' indication on the Precision Approach Path Indicator. I was not looking to 'grease' the landing; but to have a landing that I could use as a basis for understanding and continue to learn from.During the landing I focused on reducing the threat of a tail strike. I entered rudder to counter the crosswind and retarded the thrust levers so as to be at idle before touchdown to prevent a bounce. I did not use enough back pressure on the yoke in the flare and landed flat at +2.5 degrees pitch attitude. (according to a printout from the aircraft computer) This led to a hard landing on. During the taxi-in the Captain instructed me to call the flight attendants to make sure everyone was okay and that the oxygen masks did not fall. They told me everyone was okay and the masks did not drop. A maintenance discrepancy for a hard landing was inserted into the aircraft logbook. Only after de-planing were we told there may have been injuries during the landing.I briefed that this was my first landing in a Boeing 737. I had the threat of a tail strike in my mind during the approach. I did not want to over flare and float during landing and I also thought we were higher off of the ground than we were which affected my flare (sight picture). I think a flaps 30 landing for the first landing in the aircraft may have been a better decision than flaps 40.
Flying pilot failed to round out/flare causing hard landing. First Officer and I were paired to begin his IOE. Nothing abnormal noted at 1;000 and 500 foot calls. Just inside 500 feet I noted low power setting of 49% on N1. I instructed First Officer to increase power. I'd previously briefed N1 target for flaps 40 stating that we will be light and may only require high 50s for N1. About 250 feet; First Office reset aim point and established a 3 red over 1 white glide path on the VASI. The power setting that First Officer increased to seemed to be holding aircraft on speed as we approached the overrun. Aircraft callouts of 50; 40; 30 began just prior to the threshold as expected. I don't remember if I verbally stated to begin round out/flare; but realized this was not occurring about 20 feet. I attempted with my left hand to arrest descent rate; but felt resistance. We then landed hard with little to no flare. Digital Flight Data Management Unit (DFDMU) pitch at touchdown was 2.5.At some point just after touchdown I took full control of the aircraft. I don't know exactly when; but I asked the First Officer why I was unable to pull yoke back. He did not know. I'm not sure if his grip on the yoke prevented me from pulling back. After clearing the runway; I asked the First Officer to call the flight attendants to make sure all was okay and no oxygen masks deployed. The flight attendants indicated all was okay to the First Officer. As we taxied to the gate; I instructed the First Officer to look up the code for a hard landing. I also said we needed to call maintenance. As the passengers were all off and the flight attendants were off; the lead flight attendant; said she needed to speak with me. At the 1R door threshold; she told me that all four flight attendants had neck injuries.
A Boeing 737 flight crew reported experiencing a hard landing due to an insufficient flare technique at touchdown. As a result; several injuries were reported.