Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 16
ATC Issue All Types; Conflict NMAC; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance
Aircraft; Airspace Structure; Procedure; ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings
I cleared Aircraft Y for take-off on Runway 20L. This aircraft was on a VFR flight plan with departure instructions to turn left heading 080. The Local 1 controller cleared Aircraft X for take-off on Runway 20R. Aircraft X was on a departure SID that had a left turn of 175. Aircraft that depart Runway 20L are supposed to make a left turn of 15 degrees after take-off to avoid aircraft departing Runway 20R; this is published in the AFD. Aircraft Y departed and I then issued instructions to a helicopter that was waiting for a taxiway departure that would go westbound across Runway 20R. I was carefully watching the helicopter to make sure it cleared Runway 20LR and I did not see Aircraft Y on the upwind. The radar (STARS) did not show any target or primary on the upwind however other controllers ask me what Aircraft Y was doing. I could not see Aircraft Y out the window because I was looking at the wrong place (where he should have been) while the aircraft had actually flown straight out and was in the vicinity of Aircraft X. Aircraft X asked the Local 1 controller about the Aircraft Y and took evasive action by staying at an extremely low altitude to avoid him. Aircraft Y finally acquired on the radar and approximately 2 miles south of SNA. I told Aircraft Y to turn left to 080 degrees and he complied.During this session on Local 2 I experienced several incorrect data tags in my airspace. The tags were not correctly depicting the position of the aircraft. Several times the radar indicated that an aircraft in the pattern was 1 or 2 miles north of the runway on base or final when in fact the aircraft was on short final. This is very unsafe because if you do not immediately have your aircraft in sight you may think your runway is clear and issue crossings etc.I recommend that the STARS system be adjusted to work correctly or to put a different system in place as this provides a false sense of security that aircraft are in a particular when they are not.
I departed Aircraft X off the right parallel runway. When I observed Aircraft X in the climb; I saw that Aircraft Y failed to do his required 15 degree and was drifting towards Aircraft X but at a higher altitude. I asked the Local 2 controller what their aircraft was doing. For a split second; I scanned the radar to see if I could get a better position on Aircraft Y to give a traffic call; but nothing was showing up. I turned back to the departure end and couldn't see where Aircraft Y was at any more. I didn't give a traffic call; because it would have been incomplete and not helpful at all to the pilot; plus I observed Aircraft X leveling his climb to avoid Aircraft Y. After Aircraft Y finally turned to the East; Aircraft X asked what happened; I told him and told him to not worry about the noise abatement; because of his evasive maneuver.1. Scrap the STARs radar system at John Wayne. ARTs (Automated Radar Terminal Systems) was monumentally better than this new system. This new system; at SNA doesn't ever give you a complete and accurate picture of what is actually happening out there in the sky; especially with the General Aviation aircraft. Most times; General Aviation aircraft on the left downwind are nowhere near their target on the radar. On a hazy day; it makes it dangerous to locate aircraft.2. Having double shades down only when the sun is in the windows. Any time the sun is above the windows; only have one shade down. In the window that I was trying to locate the aircraft; we had double shades down and with a malfunctioning radar system; it made the task impossible.
SNA Local Controllers and commercial flight crew reported a NMAC on departure from Runway 20R. GA aircraft departing the left runway was supposed to turn 15 degrees left on departure. The aircraft did not comply with the procedure and drifted into the path of the commercial aircraft which had departed the right runway. The Captain of the commercial aircraft from the right runway observed the GA departure and took evasive action by stopping their climb. ATC did not detect the left departure was not complying with the procedure. The left runway aircraft did not show up on the Tower radar display. The Tower Controller had limited visibility out of the window due to sunlight and both Tower shades drawn down.