Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine
Communication Breakdown; Troubleshooting; Situational Awareness
Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Company Policy; Procedure; Human Factors; Aircraft
The main reason for filing this report is the [priority handling request] due to multiple repeat aircraft malfunctions. Also pertinent from a safety standpoint are events involved in the preparation and execution of this flight. I will address these administrative factors at the end of my narrative.Approaching ZZZ1 airspace at 39;000 ft. we experienced the ALT DISAGREE alert; accomplished the QRH (Quick Reference Handbook) checklist and determined the FO (First Officer) and IFSD (Integrated Standby Flight Display) altimeters were correct. The FO was flying and continued to fly as I ran the checklist. We next noticed the IAS DISAGREE alert and accomplished the QRH checklist for Airspeed Unreliable. The FO continued to fly as I ran the checklist and we determined that the FO and ISFD airspeed indications were correct. At this point the FO reengaged the autopilot and manually controlled the throttles. I advised ATC (Air Traffic Control) that we were negative RVSM (Reduced Vertical Separation Minimum) and we continued at 39;000 ft. I remembered from my AML review during preflight that the previous crew had also written up that both engines had gone into EEC (Electronic Engine Control) alternate mode. When I checked the overhead panel both ALTN lights were illuminated and we were in soft alternate mode. With all the PFD (Primary Flight Display) alerts; the FO and I didn't notice if the ENG light illuminated on the six pack previous to this. With the FO continuing to fly I ran the EEC ALTERNATE MODE checklist and placed the EECs in hard alternate mode. Because we were approaching ZZZ Center airspace I elected to continue to ZZZ and subsequently [requested priority handling] with ZZZ Center. I conferred with the FO and we agreed that diverting into a foreign airport at night would have only unnecessarily complicated our situation. I kept the FAs (Flight Attendants) informed of our situation throughout.Upon checking in with ZZZ Center with a [priority handling request] call I heard a response of 'standby'. Since we were in no need of immediate assistance; I waited a few minutes to check in again. When I checked in the second time I queried the controller if he had heard my [priority] call. He hadn't and after a brief exchange we determined that the standby call was for another aircraft; he was controlling on multiple frequencies and hadn't heard my initial check in call. None of this was detrimental to the handling of our flight; but he was understandably concerned that he missed my first check in with the [priority] call. Meanwhile the CA's (Captain) altitude and then airspeed slowly returned to normal and both disagree alerts disappeared prior to our descent from 39;000 ft. IAW (In Accordance With) with the Airspeed Unreliable checklist we did not reengage the autothrottle for the remainder of the flight; because I did not want to complicate our situation in case the problems reoccurred. The autopilot continued to operate normally.We were given direct to ZZZZZ and subsequently cleared the ILS Runway XX at ZZZ. After an uneventful approach and landing we taxied to the gate. Now I would like to highlight some issues leading up to the flight and initial execution which need to be addressed.When I was assigned the trip by scheduling I was not informed that it was anything other than a normal revenue flight. The first I knew it was anything different was upon landing in ZZZ2 when I talked to the agent meeting our DHD (Dead Head) flight and determined we had to go through customs and then back through security and our flight would depart from a hardstand with no passengers although we had four flight attendants. We were scheduled to depart 55 minutes after our scheduled arrival which was woefully inadequate given how events unfolded.After we exited customs we had a local [company] (I think) employee for escort which was helpful but the hoops we had to jump through were unknown by him or us. At security we were toldto scan the QR code on our phones to fill out a health questionnaire concerning COVID-19; but even though we answered no to all the questions we still had to wait for a 'medic' to check us out and ask us the very same questions; and from what the local agent could determine; it was because we were leaving ZZZ2; regardless of how we answered the health questions. We could have skipped the time it took to fill out the questionnaire and then we had to wait another 10-15 minutes for the medic. He asked us all the same health questions and took our temperature and used a pulse oximeter before clearing us to go through security.When we reached the area where we would take a van to the aircraft; two of our FAs were missing and they had arrived three hours earlier. We were approaching the scheduled departure time. After our remaining FAs showed up; the agent had to get permission for us to go to the airplane which included taking pictures of our (CA and FO) licenses and medicals. This delayed us another 5-10 minutes. Station personnel apologized for all the delays; but they were caused by the airport policies/procedures and not within local [company] control.After arrival at the airplane I was briefed by local MX (Maintenance) that they had changed out the CA's TAT (Total Air Temperature) probe and everything checked out. The next issue is the flight release. There was confusion when we called for our clearance as 'Aircraft X'. Clearance Delivery called us 'Aircraft Y'. After much back and forth confusion we finally figured out we should be 'Aircraft Z'. My mistake for not noticing it in the lines of the release where it is different. At the top of the flight plan it says Aircraft X and the nose number matched the airplane and AML which I am very conscientious about checking. It also shows Aircraft X on the TPS; FIL; NS; etc. To fill out this form it is even listed as Aircraft X. I guess this flight falls under the category of Non-Schedule Flights; but maybe it doesn't because it wasn't assigned a flight number beginning with [number]. Even after reviewing the FOM I'm still not sure what this flight would be classified as but it seems to be the closest to a positioning flight.The final issue I think bears mentioning is that I was assigned this trip while on a XA:00 RAP (Reserve Availability Period). As originally scheduled; it would have finished close to the end of my 14 hour RAP. As it played out it went into that twilight zone between 14 and 16 hours; which although it is legal; it may not be a smart way to do business. From my own personal experience deadheading feels more tiring than actually operating the flight and yet it is not considered in the number of legs for legality purposes. Fortunately; through good CRM (Crew Resource Management); checklist discipline and adherence to SOPs (Standard Operating Procedures) the outcome was a safe conclusion to a long day. Although fatigue wasn't a factor for me on this occasion; on another day given the same set of circumstances it very well could have.Incomplete information from scheduling when assigned the trip contributed to increased stress and confusion starting with arriving at ZZZ2 through departure. Multiple [critical issues] presented an increased challenge; especially at night; overwater; in foreign airspace after a long day.Scheduling needs to make sure it is clear to the crew when any part of their schedule is other than a normal revenue flight. Dispatch should also include a statement in the remarks section of the release if the call sign is other than what appears on the HI3; NS; TPS; etc.
We were flying from ZZZ2 to ZZZ. During our preflight preparations and AML review; the CA (Captain) advised me that the previous crew had written up both engine EEC's (Electronic Engine Control) for going into alternate mode. I was the PF (Pilot Flying) and the CA (Captain) was the PM (Pilot Monitoring). Approaching ZZZ1 airspace at 39;000ft.; night time; we experienced an ALT DISAGREE alert. The CA accomplished the QRH (Quick Reference Handbook) checklist and determined the FO and IFSD (Integrated Flight Standby Display) altimeters were correct. We next noticed the IAS DISAGREE alert and the CA accomplished the QRH checklist for Airspeed Unreliable. The first (Indicated Airspeed) two steps for this checklist are turn both the autopilot and autothrottle off which I did. The aircraft continued to handle safely and correctly when this was done. Subsequently; per the QRH procedures; I reengaged the autopilot and manually controlled the throttles. The CA advised ATC (Air Traffic Control) that we were negative RVSM (Reduced Vertical Separation Minimum) and we continued at 39;000 ft. to ZZZ. The CA then scanned the overhead panel and saw that the EEC ALTN lights were illuminated and in soft alternate mode. The CA then ran the EEC ALTERATE MODE checklist and placed the EECs in hard alternate mode. At this point; the CA and I discussed possible courses of action. We decided that continuing to ZZZ was the safest course of action because the aircraft was handling safely and correctly; the QRH procedures for these alerts did not require us to either land ASAP or at the nearest suitable airport; diverting into a foreign airport at night would have complicated our situation; and we were approaching ZZZ Center airspace so working with their ATC controllers would be easier to deal with. We had four FA's on board with us (no passengers); and the CA kept the FAs informed of our situation throughout the flight.Upon checking in with ZZZ Center the CA declared a [priority handling] call as a precaution in case any or all of the system alerts we had dealt with earlier reappeared. The controller told us to stand by; he obviously did not hear our [priority] call on our initial check in. Since we were not in need of immediate assistance; we decided to check in several minutes later - this time we established positive communication with the controller with our [priority] call. Meanwhile the CA's altitude; and then airspeed; slowly returned to normal and both disagree alerts disappeared prior to our descent from 39;000 ft. IAW with the Airspeed Unreliable checklist we did not reengage the autothrottle for the remainder of the flight because we did not want to complicate our situation in case the problems reoccurred.We were given direct to ZZZZZ and subsequently cleared the Runway XX at ZZZ. After an uneventful approach and landing we taxied to the gate.[I believe the cause was] maintenance procedures that did not correct the writeups from previous flight. Or an aircraft system that failed.[I suggest] review maintenance procedures for the alerts we had to deal with on this flight. Ensure any corrections or modifications to these maintenance procedures are disseminated to both domestic and foreign maintenance department; both in house and contract maintenance.
737-800 Flight Crew reported several human and indicator errors involving electronic engine control; altitude and airspeed.