Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument
Flight Crew Last 90 Days 185; Flight Crew Total 8950
Workload; Time Pressure; Communication Breakdown; Fatigue
Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach
Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Human Factors
We were operating to ELP. The first error in this chain of events is when I noticed we were level at 8;000 feet at an indicated airspeed of 280 knots going direct to AGUAS. I pointed out to the Captain that we needed to reduce our airspeed immediately. Shortly thereafter we began our speed reduction we were instructed to begin a descent to 6;000 feet and cleared visual 22. At this present time we were approximately 250 knots descending and roughly 16-17 miles from the field. The Captain was utilizing speed brakes during this descent and asked for slats to be extended at 240 knots. From that point forward I tried to back the Captain up with configuring as early as permissible with respect to aircraft limitations. With that being said; while I was doing my job to back him up; I was not nearly assertive enough in my other duties making him aware of our aircraft state with regard to our stabilized approach criteria. I mentioned that we were 'high' and 'fast'; however; if I said we were 'unstabilized' I don't recall it. At the very least I can say with confidence I wasn't said assertive enough if it was mentioned. I think the Captain and myself had tunnel vision with getting the aircraft configured and on speed. I think there was some expectation bias as well that played into that we are accustomed to flying so many approaches where the FAF is 2-4 miles further out than this particular approach into ELP. Coupled with the higher altitude/higher TAS also compounded the chain of events that led to this unstabilized approach. As far as what caused the event. As crews we know that no single instance can cause the outcome of something. In this case I think we were left a little high by center control (some in part due to some ATC issues) and then on our own doing of being at such a high speed at 8;000 feet and a high altitude airport. A potential second contributing factor today was that this was only our second leg together. As is with each new trip with a coworker you try and get a feel for how they fly the airplane and when they like to configure for approach to landing. I needed to be more assertive or just ask him when would you like to slow down and configure for approach; so that we are sharing the same mental model. I also had late van in but the night prior; and was only able to get about 2 hours of sleep in the sort. It's hard to also ignore the potential effects of fatigue as a potential contributing factor. Our evening was a late duty day and we were 22 minutes late arriving.
It was 15;000 scattered; and light winds. Unstable approach. I came on duty one hour prior to the flight. I had driven 2 hours to [my home airport] to jumpseat to work and had slept a few hours prior to this plus my normal 8 hours of sleep the prior morning and didn't think I was that tired at all. Felt decent. [At the next airport] I got a sleep room and also slept one hour prior to show. FO's (First Officer's) leg; we operated uneventfully and Captain departed to El Paso the same. On our descent into El Paso was started a bit late as we had some trouble with ATC communication getting the descent further into El Paso and we were vectored off course 10 degrees while descending to 10;000 feet. Getting close to that altitude we were then cleared direct to the outer marker. While turning to go direct to the marker a descent through 10;000 was caught by the FO which was caught leveling at 8;000 at 280; I thought I had set 250 in the window but was distracted I suppose; which then at that point we were about 20 miles from the marker; which normally would be crossed at 5;100 feet. By the time I slowed the plane to 250 with speed brakes; to continue the descent we were now about 17 miles out and so I needed to lose airspeed and 2;900 feet of altitude in 15 to 17 miles. We were cleared to 6;000 and the visual to Runway 22. (Looking back at this point I should have asked for a 360 and descended to altitude and started configuring early.) Instead I called for slats extend at 245 or so while descending with the spoilers fully extended. Then called for flaps 15 at around 205 while descending etc.; then flaps 20 as soon as the speed allowed; the gear had been extended and I was slowing but the 1;000 AGL height and a discontinued approach had slipped right out of my mind thinking about getting the airplane configured and landed. We; unfortunately were not ready to land until approximately 200-300 feet; meaning on speed and on path fully configured. We were configured in time I think at or above 1;000 feet AGL; the speed was the big factor of somewhere between 150-160; so 20-30 above speed.First; a 360 should have been done out when we realized to high. Second; a discontinued approach should been initiated when the criteria above and approaching a 1;000 feet was not met; and a no fault go around could and should have been accomplished after that instead of trying to save the landing. I have never done anything like this before and have operated all over this world and have always tried to be stable and follow procedures to the T. I have done at least one discontinued approach maybe two in the last year or so and had no problem doing them. Why that was not done here was that the crew was focused on landing; not exceeding limitations configurations but in that completely lost track of 1;000 feet criteria and such. This will not happen again on my watch; I have a pain in the pit of my stomach cannot believe this could happen to me. As a pilot; I always thought that; as a Captain; have always strived for that; but got caught up in the flying event of the aircraft. I must be aware of the airport elevation; high TASs and very short final approach fix. Too short to not be configured at least 3-4 miles prior to reaching it on speed. Briefing it all at altitude; which was done completely I must say; must be followed by actions. After landing I wished I could go back and do the 360; discontinued approach or go-around. It would have been better than this feeling. The short final approach of 3.4 miles from VALTR to the runway; high altitude airport; faster TAS and a long runway will play into a chain that leads to an unstable approach. Even being visual. It's better to treat this airport that AGUAS; which is 3.4 miles prior to the final approach fix to VALTR; should be treated as an end point. Meaning if not configured by AGUAS on altitude prior to or at this fix beware and be ready to discontinue this approach. Remember also; take all distances from the final approach fix and not the airport at this airport; as the FAF to the runway is at 1;250 feet or so; so you only have 250 feet to decide to discontinue this approach or not. Fly it that way. I will.
Widebody Transport flight crew reported being high and fast and not meeting stabilized approach criteria before landing.