Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Confusion; Human-Machine Interface
Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Flight Crew FLC Overrode Automation; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance
Aircraft
Descending on the ZZZZZ STAR into ZZZ told to descend via and to plan [Runway] XXR and the ASEL had 6;000 feet selected. I programmed the ILS XXR off of ZZZZZ1 which had 10;000 feet. as lowest altitude. A DISCONTINUITY separated the two. ATC queried if we were descending on the STAR just shortly after a level off above or at 10;000 feet just before ZZZZZ2 and we began a discussion why it wasn't continuing a VNAV decent to be below 9;000 feet at ZZZZZ2. We also simultaneously received two large ATC assigned speed reductions right around this time. We weren't able to make ZZZZZ2 BELOW 9;000 feet with the VNAV not keeping us on the path and the two drastic ATC slowdowns. We advised Approach Control that we missed it and that the crossing at ZZZZZ3 would be tight. We lowered gear and brought flaps in and were close to the required altitude at ZZZZZ3. I delved into trying to determine why the VNAV failed to descend below 10;000 [feet] on its own. I then determined it to somehow be related to the 10;000 [foot] minimum altitude between ZZZZZ1 and ZZZZZ4. I was later made aware of how this had been discussed in a safety bulletin. I have learned the FMS will look at the altitude on the other side of a DISCONTINUITY and observe it and not descend below it. I believe it's a horrible design as we often try to provide long finals with waypoint and altitude data when being vectored around on potentially long downwinds. Seems to defy the purpose of a Discontinuity. In the future will ensure approaches do not contain waypoints with higher altitudes then those depicted on the Arrival; even when a Discontinuity is present.
Global 6000 Captain reported FMS discontinuity which prevents crews from FMS guidance between STAR and IAP. Captain reports this as a known safety issue; and a horrible design.