CIA vs. Wikileaks
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Müller-Maguhn, Andy
In this talk, I aim to report and show a collection of observations, physical, visual and other evidence of the last years incidents that strongly indicate a context of the US Central Intelligence Agency and/or potentially other entities of the US Government actions against Wikileaks and surrounding persons and organisations. While the area of technical surveillance, SIGINT/COMINT and related Organizations and Methods have been more or less well understood in the hacker scene, the tactics and methods experienced and discussed in this talk are of a different type: For the moment, I would call it "initimidation surveillance" as it lacks the aspect of "covert" type of actions. On the last Chaos Communication Congress, I have analysed the technical aspects of the surveillance in and surrounding the ecuadorian embassy where Julian Assange stayed; this talk shows what happened to other people - friends of Assange, supporters of Wikileaks etc - not only in England, but also in other countries / other parts of the world. The idea is to not only show the scope of activities but also to contribute to a better understanding of these tactics, that might be applied also in completely different political environments where governments act in extralegal ways against activities they dislike, although they that are not a crime or easily criminalized.
 Okay, as we said the years before, the force merged to main. Andi is commonly known in our scene. His current talk CIA vs WikiLeaks, Intimidation, Surveillance and Other Tactics, Observed and Experienced. In his talk, Andi aims to report and shows a collection of his observations, physical, visual and other evidences of the last year incidents that strongly indicate the context of US Central Agency, Central Intelligence Agency and potentially other entities of the US government acting against WikiLeaks and surrounding persons and organizations. Please welcome with a very warm digital applause Andi. Okay, I have no idea how a digital applause works here, but thanks for it anyhow. At the beginning I want to make and I have to make a few disclaimers so that you know which perspective you're getting here. I'm working as a data journalist for quite a while around the topics of surveillance, signal intelligence, data security and running this funny bug planet. Even started that bugplanet.info before Snowden came with all his documents, but I did work a while with his documents. However, this talk is a bit different as I'm not talking about things that I learned and studied or whatever, but I experienced myself. I'm describing events here where I was targeted. And so I might not be the most neutral person in this scenario, but I'm trying to be technically as accurate as possible anyhow. So forgive me if I'm a bit grumpy about these people. That's just because of the perspective. Secondly, well, I've also, and the CCC of course has been addressing human rights issues in the digital age for a long time. We and I personally co-founded EG, the European Digital Rights Initiative, to ensure the enforcement of human rights in the digital environment. However, what happened here is slightly beyond digital rights. It goes into real life. And while I'm a German citizen, I now know roughly what kind of laws have been violated in respect to the German environment. I absolutely would welcome people who help me analyze and understand it from the perspective of the universal human rights because there is similar cases with people living in other jurisdictions and so on. Second slide of disclaimer. Sorry, I let it so much. So I'm addressing with this talk activities against people surrounding and have been ent or surrounding Julian and our WikiLeaks and or other members of WikiLeaks. Whatever I describe here is I have personally observed and experienced it. So it is for sure very incomplete. It's at best a fragment of what's gone on. But you will, in case you haven't heard about it yet, that Pompeo made some very clear statements when he was head of CIA is pretty clear where to attribute these things. And lastly, there is, of course, other prisoners mentioned, but I'm keeping them out here for all kinds of reasons. But there will be the time when we will hear more reports and other perspective of this particular situation. So here's my little overview. I want to get you an idea how to get into such a mess just in case you wanted. The context of the timeline, a bit of psychology as it's important because at some point you not only get paranoid, you have this drive to, no, this can't be true, right? You have this cognitive dissonance drive inside of you that you would like to stay sane. The new normal of IT incidents, we're all used to that, COVID versus overt. What I mean with the term intimidation of violence, physical events and their impact about the elephant in the room, the problem of the missing socks. And at the end, a little bit of questions. Some of my infectious, how to get out of this mess maybe also. So how to get into such a beautiful mess? Wait, it's not beautiful. Well, there's some ideas we share in the hacker community usually. And even it's not far from where to get into the journalist community. Information should be free. Free flow of information is a bit of a requirement for world peace. And we had this, and I personally also had this type of self-conception, self-understanding consciousness 20 years already when Wickeleek started around 2006. So this is not that I was jumping or anybody in the scene was jumping onto something that didn't exist until then. But Wickeleek's turned out to be an extremely good concept as a democracy test if governments cannot deal with full transparency. Well, that tells you a lot about them. And but of course, that is similar to jumping into the last one similar to working in journalism. When you expose things in journalism, be it corruption, be it hypocrisy of politicians, be it blunt lies or whatever, it's not always about making friends. It's yes, partly making friends and partly pissing people off. That happens. However, in this particular environment that Julian inspired to create, there's some, yeah, cultural even misunderstandings. For example, the word conspiracy for us in Europe, I think many of us in the German Hacker scene are inspired by Robert Wilson's way of saying, oh, a conspiracy is like the world is full of them and we should join the best of them. But the in the American context, the word conspiracy is a legal term, unfortunately. And when you are with American citizens in a room and talk about conspiracies, they often get very nervous and it's kind of a complete different attitude because it's like the US term to define people who belong to a group like organized criminals or organized, you know, this T word, this other type of entities. And of course, that's absolutely not what we want to get into involved to. But sometimes we mistakenly or misunderstanding the joke about conspiracies and people believe listening to this, get it completely wrong. And I fear that this is also what happened and how me and others got into such a mess. So at the end of course, I'm journalism and that's similar to dealing with data from a hacker's perspective is about supporting media with data and information and so on. So here's a bit of a timeline to give you a timeframe. I'm now after I was a bit long for about two decades in CCC spokesperson and board member blah, blah, blah. I moved to the board of the Vahalan Foundation. Vahalan Foundation collects actually money for WikiLeaks under the aspect of vows idea of supporting freedom of information. Since 2010 or so, I joined a little later. However, when WikiLeaks started to publish the Afghanistan, the Iraq warlocks, the diplomatic cables, that already triggered legal investigations. And of course, the arrest of Dan Stoll Bradley now, Josiah Manning later. So there was always it was always clear, more or less right from the beginning that there's legal trouble on the way that there's a secret grand jury and that the Americans didn't really appreciate their war crimes to be exposed and their diplomatic cables to be in the Internet, to be understood and readable for all of us and the media worldwide and so on. Of course, when people come together and gather in any project, you have human beings, you have they have characters, they have mistakes. They do things that are not always great. So I'm not trying to say here that everything was always great and was only the CIA messing it up. No humans make mistakes. And these mistakes in such an environment, of course, get exploited, get amplified and so on. In 2007, WikiLeaks started publishing some CIA documents and a whole series of it, the so-called fold seven documents. And those documents describe their technology, exploit programs from the CIA. You probably most of you will know them. If not, you can all look them up. These included tools that allowed the CIA to pretend to be someone else, including coming from another country, speaking another language, be it from Russia and Russia and be it from Iran and Farsi and so on. And Pompeo, who was at that moment still head of the CIA, got very upset. There's two references from this one is from April to 17. And another is from February to 18. In his first public speech as a CIA director in 13 of April to 17, he made a speech at a conference in Washington, and he said things like WikiLeaks walks like a hostile intelligence service and talks like an intelligent service and called WikiLeaks a non-state hostile intelligence service. So for those of you who know a little bit about information science, this idea of data is actually something you can technically measure information as data in a context. And intelligence is information processed to a level where you can make decisions based on it. So being a public intelligence service, I would say from that perspective is like a honorable term. However, the way Pompeo emphasized it, I think, was slightly not that honorable. He was more comparing it to other state actors and evil forces and so on because the US understanding of intelligence services far away from entities, sorry, I need a water, is far away from entities just collecting information. But as you know, they also mess up with other people's life and so on. However, a year later, in February to 18, he even upgraded this type of statements at the site, German newspaper reported about what he said at the Munich Security Conference Intelligence Roundtable. And he said really nasty sentence like that. He's most of his time, he's dealing with the non-state actors and that's like, I can either Islamic State WikiLeaks or is Bollack. Like what a list. So I have no idea what he has, what turned him into comparing these kind of things. I mean, his Bollack, I could say we in Berlin, we know that they provide actually Jami Halloumi and some things. But yes, they are money launders and are suspected terrorists in some areas or whatever. I have been declared terrorist. But their humus is really good, I can say. However, the point I'm trying to come to, so Pompeo got very upset. He made all this comparison and he seems to have allocated resources to deal with WikiLeaks and everybody jumping around. And it's no surprise that S.W. Holland Foundation finances selected activities of specific publications there that we also got in the focus with us collecting donations and talking with the guys and financing some projects. So, before I'm coming to very concrete events, I want to get one second into psychology. So of course, when things happen to you from the intelligence perspective, they always come with what's called plausible deniability. And there's a guy standing in front of the door watching, if you come in and out, it's not just someone watching your door or someone reading the newspaper or repairing some electrical pipes or some water pipe or whatever. I mean, there's always a good reason for him to be there that has nothing to do with what he's doing. And that's basic principle, plausible deniability, how intelligence agencies act in the so-called field, meaning in your home or on the street, they're following you or whatever. So over time, of course, if you have too much of this, you're seeing these patterns. And that's probably mainly called paranoia. So you get like, you know, suspicious of everything that happens that might be very legitimate, but you get like the feeling that something is wrong and so on. And that can be, we could also instead of paranoia, call it situational awareness at some points, because if it really happens, it has nothing to do with your mind getting crazy. It's just an accurate observation of patterns that happens around of you. But you might know that, and your two friends who experienced the same might know that, your girlfriend, your partner, the normal people you deal with, they might all not understand this and think that you're driving nuts. And this driving nuts is of course an element that you always have to be self-critical, because on the one hand side, you might indeed see too much things happening that do not really happen. On the other hand side, there's also this human drive that we don't want this CIA guys to be in our life. We want everything is to be fine. And to some extent, maybe that's even healthy to not see the monsters all the time. But if they are really there and you start denying them while they sit in front of you, that's also not so helpful. So I found myself in this kind of weird environment where all these kind of thoughts come up all the time. And I'm starting with the most harmless stuff. So internet attacks. I will, our internet incidents, I would, IT incidents, I call it here. Due to the pure volume of it, I will put this into separate presentation one day or report and in the next days or weeks or months. And you can all have fun with it. But she has just some basic patterns. So devices you use as communication terminals or communication devices, they always have issues when you start to do encrypted stuff. And it's always when you do it with specific people. So that's then mobile phones with data service. At some point, all of them have started to have issues. Very high volume of use data. Apps disappear if you use them at all. I stopped using them at all. Now high battery use it when you did nothing with your phone over hours and you were wondering what's going on. Okay, yes, we have Faraday bags. We put them somewhere else. But still it's a little weird when your battery is empty half day. On LTE, when I configured my phone to be on LTE only, it worked mainly fine next to that I couldn't make normal phone calls. But when I had it in the normal mode, it got downgraded to 3G and there my encrypted connection started to have problems. On my fixed lines, my VPNs, when I try to build up a VPN, it shows me certificate errors and problems. And then of course, you deal with journalists, which I'm doing with my colleagues all the time and they are not technical experts. They all have their Macs and so on. So they have funny issues with their PGP keys not working anymore with their PGP setups not working anymore. Yes, it's also because it's open source software, but there's also something going on. But this is kind of the world we all know and we get used to it. This is like, okay, IT doesn't work, secure connections break well happens all the time. From about mid to 17 when I still regularly like once twice a month was flying over to see Julian in the embassy, I realized that there was something changing it with my treatment at the border. That's of course, that's here. That's purely UK border police uncles and they like asked started to ask funny questions like do you live in the UK? What's your occupation? How long do you stay? What do you do in the UK? Before then, there was maybe one question but not three, four of them. And the most important was that I realized that he did not even listen to my answers. Sometimes he started the first question after I answered the third and I was feeling like in a limbo like with a machine who would randomly ask me things. But I then realized he was just waiting for the green light on his screen suit to let me go and that green light probably meant that the team outside was ready to pick me up. And that's what happened. So I get into the UK and have people follow me like the whole fucking day, not only on the way to the embassy from the embassy back and so on. I once spotted one of those persons like sitting on the street level on the other side, watching the whole time I was in an office ground level. And because I had a bit of experience with that in continental Europe, like in Germany, if you realize these guys go after you and you put your camera on your table or start even to make photos of them, they're very quickly gone because they don't want to be relocated, they don't like to be exposed and so on. But the British behaved in this time, this scenario completely different. So he was getting very aggressively body language, spotting, looking back and so on. So that was a little weird. That same day at three o'clock in the night when my friends drove me to the place where I was sleeping on the one-way street, there was still a car following us even in the one-way street. So actually he had to turn back and so on. That was no more coverage of violence. That was already the edge to intimidation. And then over the next months, I started to have new favorites, but not only in England or in other countries, that I would see homeless looking like people on the street level, sitting there begging or leaning to some buildings. And at some point, I had to realize that the cheap plastic bags they were wearing were just a cover for cameras that were actually with Zoom and digital getting into my direction. So that felt a little... And so the idea of this measurement, if you look at their manuals, which you'll find somehow in the internet, is that the difference between discovered surveillance, which is to find out where you are and the open surveillance, which I call intimidation surveillance, the idea is you create in the prison in this case, for me, a state of distress. So you're constantly having this looking around and you obviously have the idea something is going on and they let you know. They want to let you know. And that's a little weird. So in April 2018, actually in March 2018, I brought one of my cryptophones, in this case a desk phone based on a Zip phone called Snom870, back to our workshop here to repair. The display had been exposed to heat and got a little melted. It's not so super high quality LCD display. So I wanted just to display, to replace the display. So I opened the thing and I found actually a box and that box turned out to be very sophisticated thing. So there was a battery pack, there was a shielded thing. There was behind that shielded thing was a module that had been soldered into. It was based on an FPGA, some hardware crypto elements, 16 gigabytes of flesh ROM. It was completely passive, so I wouldn't have found it in any sweep because it just recorded whatever I talked on that encrypted phone and would be triggered by high frequency to send out the recorded stuff encrypted in a burst signal. You see here in the URL to find more pictures online to give you an idea. This is the thing I found. This is how it looked like at the beginning. It is the phone itself has two PCBs, one for the keyboard and one for the connector, the processing and so on. This was the modified version of the keyboard PCB with this battery pack in blue, the shielded module. And here you get an idea of what was in there. That's pretty high tech. We did of course look into what exactly do we have here, when were these chips produced, what does it do and so on. But it's pretty obviously that this is like for those who have read the smell documents intensely. It's what's called special collection service. Inside there there's a group called Targeted Access Operations Tau. And they work together with a thing called PAG, the physical access group. There's someone and that was the thing, it was not only built into this phone. That phone had been of course in a locked room and I had to ask myself, okay, what happened here? Here you see how they grabbed the audio with a glued mini PCB from the other main controller into their little technology. And here you see a comparison picture to the right. You see the original PCB keyboard which has almost nothing on it. And to the left you see the modified version. Friend of mine made a bit of a diagram and yeah, I'll just leave it for you. You can review it later. I'll upload these PDF slides of course. So here's some aspects of what was going through my head over the time. Of course the first question was how long was this there? No idea. It could be years. The components we identified were produced around or no earlier than April 2013. So if you remember Snowden came with this revelation mid of 2013 roughly. And I've been working for the Spiegel with others on the Snowden documents next to that phone and coordinating a lot of it in the year 2013. So in theory it could be even related to that. Who knows? The dimensions suggest clearly a non-metric origin. The antenna would work in the range of 800 MHz. So you find here a mentioning of a PDF that tells you something about these groups. But I did talk to some people who do professional sweeping, meaning looking for audio box and so on in devices and rooms. And they told me from the experience of the Cold War until today the operation to bring something into a room, into a device, that's quite an effort. Because you need to secure, you need to ensure you don't get caught and so on. And so what you normally do is because technology can fail is you do not install one box, you install at least two. In the Cold War people told me from the elder generation that the relationship was one to eight, so that because technology failed a lot back then. However that made me of course think, okay, what else could there be? What can I do to find the rest and so on? Does it even make sense? Can I secure all the rooms that I use to work here and there in such a way that I could be sure and of course I can't be. So this was a first hard confrontation with my own cognitive dissonance because all that you know surveillance theater where I thought, okay, Julian has some trouble and I think I have something to do with it. And when I travel to England, okay, they follow me, you know, you get used to that kind of things. But like something you can have in your hand and that's outside of IT incidents that means that all your encrypted communications have been listened to while that field shitty. So that's what I call a hard confrontation with my own cognitive dissonance. The next thing I want to talk about is very recent. It's about one and a half months old now. When here in Berlin, I went out actually very early in the morning to get some stuff from a grocery in a time of pandemic when no one is in the shop at seven something in the morning. I come back half an hour later and the key to my apartment door does not fit into the cylinder anymore. That felt a bit shitty. It was not a normal cylinder. It was a so-called stealth cylinder. You might want to look at the internet what it is. It's a Swiss company who's doing nice keys that you cannot photograph and copy because it has inner elements with a sophisticated mechanical way of opening. I did however when I bumped into my door and had to, first I called my locksmith's dude or my friend from the lockpicking industry. I could say who had advised me to buy that cylinder. I talked with my lawyer and we agreed it's a good idea to call the police to put it on the other list of things that I had collected until then. I then realized that I had been followed that morning but I didn't take any attention to it because I was just walking in half automatic mode to the grocery and there was a couple talking such a bullshit. They will probably listen to this talk and will remember that dialogue. It was just not making any sense but I was too polite to point it out. They were very closely. It was not about where I was going. It was about that I was not at home. They ensured that in the timeframe that I was there, the other guys could operate and so on. That is an ongoing investigation but I can tell you this is the next incident where like cognitive dissonance and the illusion you want to give yourself. I'm not important in this game. Yeah, these guys follow me here and there and this feels kind of different. This is no more nice. Here's a little bit of a get the idea of the cylinder. You cannot really see the object that was inserted but at the end we didn't get it out for forensic reasons. We had to drill. Police went through the apartment and so on. Yeah, another interesting day you can have. So here's some aspects that I asked myself. So was it even my cylinder that I couldn't open? Maybe they could not lockpick the original stealth cylinder I had. They had to open it in a violent way. They were in the apartment to whatever put another bug in there. But as they couldn't replace it with the original cylinder, as they had destroyed it, like they put another one in and that's why my key wasn't fitting. It's an option. The next option was it maybe a trap to make me replace the broken cylinder with a cheaper one with a more simple one that they could open then afterwards when I was gone. Next option. Or maybe was it not about the door at all? Was it maybe just to freak me out? Of course, it feels not so great if you can't open your own apartment door and so on. And the fourth question was of course, oh gosh, how much time did I spend that day with the police, was drilling open the door, with all that kind of things, it more or less cost me a day. And what maybe happened to my machines, meaning my computers, my other things, maybe where was my attention not in that time frame? Because it could be was a pure distraction thing. We freak him out a little bit and while he's freaking out, we do other things in his office or whatever. I can't rule it out. And then of course, I mean, the police sent me some funny questions of still working on that, like, yeah, should I name Pompeo as a suspect? Not sure. But maybe I should. Discussing it with my lawyer and so on. And also, is it maybe related to the date? This was the third of November. In case I would say it, the third of November is the election day or was the election day in the United States. And there was some accusation with you and had something to do with the election some years ago. So however, the next event, incident number three, has to do with something that happened in between because on Monday, the day before they messed up with my door, I had shipped some documents to Spain, I realized then. That was legal documents that required me and a friend going to the Spanish embassy. We gave a tour of power fraternity and so on because we are also accusing this company UC Global, which I talked about last year, which was the company running the surveillance or the protection surveillance at the beginning on behalf of the Ecuadorians in that embassy. And later turned out to be working for Shadal Ailsen's company or at least having a site arrangement there, which is still subject to an ongoing lawsuit. And we participate in that lawsuit because not only Julian was spied on, everybody was spied on who was visiting him and so on. So I had shipped documents on that Monday, almost six o'clock on the local post office here by DHL Express. I put that documents in a sealed bag, that's like a bag with a serial number and so on. That went together with the describing list was inside the bag into a white envelope that again I sealed with seal tape. Then I gave that to the post office, but they insisted it gets in a DHL Express bag, that's what you get for the 70 euro to be arriving within two days. So yeah, the stuff arrived on Wednesday, but all opened. And the Spanish lawyers freaked completely out. They were very sure that this was a madling. You would see that it was sliced open and so on. Yes, you see this funny duct tape here called Sol. But why would the German customs open a document shipment within Europe? That just not makes a lot of sense. It's still on the way to be checked. In theory they could do that. But also this incident has some aspects. It's a breach of attorney-client privilege. That's why the Spanish lawyers insisted us we bring this to a criminal complaint. They did on their end right when they received it and they made these photos. So was German customs even involved? I was just a duct tape used by some funny people. Why when I emailed all this to my lawyer with the pictures and the one, why did he not receive the email until he realized on Monday that it somehow ended in his trash? He also freaked out. And then I talked with DHL, of course. I made a big fuss there and they were like, no, we cannot tell you on which legal grounds the shipment was open. We cannot tell you who did it. But if you have an inquiry, why don't you send it to the customs? So without giving me even which customs entity it would be or whatever. And again, of course, this is kind of an interesting story, but I have normally other priorities in my life. So I'm asking myself, oh gosh, how many days should I waste here? I was finding out who opened the fucking shipment. But this is again the state of distress. This is again the effort. And it's again a reminder we are after you. We check your things. We don't like you're suing the CIA suspected company and so on and so on. So coming to a bit of a conclusion of this talk, as we also want to have time for questions and so on, I want to talk about three aspects. The one is the elephant in the room and the problem of the missing sock. So at some point, I don't want to say that I have been completely not in the state of distress. And also, I don't know how this affects my sanity and those people surrounding me. So your cognitive systems get kind of otherwise triggered and you start to see these things everywhere. And when then you wash some socks and it turns out there's a sock missing, the other person in my life was like, OK, CIA. However, I did suspect the bad sheets and we found one of the socks in the bad sheet. So when you know the problem is socks get in the drum sometimes hanging, you wash something different than like a bad sheet. And the bad sheet is an excellent place to hide things that have been in the drama, then get into the bad sheet and you just dry it with it and you don't even realize it and so on. So while I'm a complete, for entertainment reasons, also for, you know, you need to relax your brain in such a situation once a while, I'm totally OK to say this year is just once before everything, including the missing socks. But suspect the bad sheet first and realize that, yes, this is a joke and this is escapism and it helps you maybe to stay sane for the little moment. But in the long term, I don't know. So and that's the I don't know part is the other two slides that are coming out. So what should I do? And I should I invite some friends and declare my office here like a laboratory for surveillance. Yeah, it has been before I looked at surveillance technology, but in this case it's surveillance technology looking at me and my friends. So it's slightly different. It's maybe also important to not get into some kind of auto response mode when things happen because I was thinking also, what the fuck? Why are they doing all these things? It costs them money. It costs them effort. Is it to freak me out? Is it that they think that like, like, like I'm seriously in such an evil mode organization that, you know, they will escalate things and I will start to throw bombs at US embassy or I don't know. I have no idea what their idea is. But I would just try to stay like slow motion and think about it. The next aspect is, however, do I infect other people? And now I'm not talking about my paranoia or my situational awareness, as I would call it, which of course, at some point is ongoing and it's no more sometimes. But when I talk with normal people, with other journalists, with people I deal with for normal things and they visit me and we do whatever kind of social things like normal things like having food and afterwards they call me a day later and say, oh, finally my phone started rebooting twice yesterday and these kind of things. So that you think, OK, it's not my paranoia that is infectious. It's actually they obviously want to not only know what kind of people I'm dealing with and look into that technology, they also want to freak them out. So this is not cool. And it also means that the type of ignorance you could normally apply and say, well, ignorance is a blast. Come on, let's have a nice day and forget about all this. That's kind of limited. That's no more an option. And also, while I've been dealing with that type of stress and that type of thing for a while now, and I can say, well, that's how it is. And it doesn't mean that everybody dealing with you can do that. There's people who are seriously freaked out by such a situation and they it creates fear, it creates anger, stress and so on. So that's not cool. So my last slide that ends up with a question to you guys is how to get out of this mess. So option one, I managed to get proper authorities to make the CIA stop acting illegal. OK, I heard the laughing. I know this ridiculous. But it would be so beautiful. Justice prevails. The German authorities, the European ones, pick it up. I finally managed to escalate it to the General Bundesanwaltschaft. I do not have to talk with the German intelligence services, as I'm not sure they would be helpful in this game. And they make the CIA stop acting illegal and against me and the other person surrounding. Beautiful dream, but OK, not very realistic, maybe. Option two, Pompeo realizes Jesus lost WikiLeaks and whatever shall become true will be become true. He reads it in the Bible. Pompeo seems to be, if you look at his Twitter account, reasonable believe in Jesus Christ and all that thing. So he realizes it's all wrongdoing against Julian and WikiLeaks and all the people targeted in that context and stops it. I know, OK, shit happens. Well, come good. If that's realistic, I don't know, you tell me. And the third option, I don't know, maybe you have some ideas. But that's my question to you, the audience. And that's the end of my prepared part of the talk. And with these words, thank you, Andy, for the brilliant talk. In the meantime, I received a message. A third option would be to have a great wine yard. Sorry. I personally... Yes, it's completely right. I consider it actually maybe I should do something with goats, become a farmer, or, you know, yeah, there's these options. But I thought before I give it up and find my way on the countryside, I outsource the problem to the community and see what they think. In the meantime, I think there is plenty of time for a great white wine. But to our questions. We have indeed plenty of questions. The first question would be, how would you compare the surveillance of the CIA or other to the surveillance of the GDR? So for the Deutsche Demokratische Republik? Well, I'm born in Hamburg in West Germany. I lived in East Germany when the government was already falling into pieces. It was technically still there. I'm not the best person to compare it. But I did talk with a person I know who worked for the Foreign Intelligence Services because there was... You know, I simplified here, of course, the incidents a little bit. There was one scene when later I went into my kitchen that day when my door lock got tempered with and I found a blue plastic glove. And I don't have blue plastic gloves. And I asked my locksmith's guy. He was like, no, it's not from me and the police had black ones. So I thought, what the fuck? Maybe the guys have been inside the apartment, which I didn't thought earlier because it was second lock and the police checked and so on. And then I talked to, discussed it with this person I know who's quite friendly man was working in the Foreign Intelligence of that country. And so he was like, you have to look at it from a cost effectiveness point of view. Like that piece of plastic cost you 10 cent, nothing. And it freaks you out three months. So see how much, how cost effective it is. And I mean, that's a good aspect. That's a good point. And so I think that the East German, the guys, the East German intelligence guys, they also, they knew very well the difference and they had both instruments in their program to either do covert surveillance, really like not let you know. And the department thought we let him know and see how he reacts or we let him know because he's ongoing doing things and we want him to, you know, stop it and get intimidated and so on and get scared maybe or his wife gets scared or these kind of things. So I think it is comparable. Cool. Oh, well, not cool. Speaking of covert versus over civilians, sorry, as you now know, does it still bother you emotionally? Well, what bothers me sometimes is, you know, it's also it has a sometimes it's nice to be alone and it's sometimes nice to not think about the CIA guys being in the apartment next door or in my case in the apartment under me or in surrounding environments. But thinking about normal things like playing a puzzle or seeing some funny spy movies. Oh, wait, that's almost relaxing. No, seriously, at some point it sucks a little bit. I can't kind of deal with it. I mean, this 2020 year has of course complicated or has made it almost impossible to travel. So normally I escape my intensity of my work situation with travels, maybe I can do that this year. So I'd feel a little more intense and it annoys a little bit and I would like to get these guys out of my life and do something useful with their life or whatever. Now, the next question, he or she or the person or creature probably missed it. Do you disassemble all your devices on a regular base? No, I usually do just regular and seal them. In this case, the seal had had an issue with a with a heat as well. So I and that was lousy on checking it, I have to say. So yes, that's something. I mean, if you have one office, you can do that. I tend to work on different continents even and that turned out to be a bit of an issue. So yes, you need to have sleeves everywhere and seals and but even then, you know, Pompeo seems to have justified or have given orders to do these things no matter the costs. And my expectation to have like a private or secure encrypted channel so is very limited for a while watching that effort. The encryption of the cryptophone obviously was good. Otherwise, they wouldn't have had the effort to, you know, build something in. But at the end of the day, for me, it has the same impact. It's like, well, yeah, it's a phone. There's a piece of devices in a room. The room has windows. We've seen what they've done with the embassy windows and so on. So it's like, yeah, security. What a nice idea. But it doesn't really exist. Yeah. Do you try giving a few coins to the homeless looking people to do either some reverse intimidation or good deed if they are not CIA? Yeah, that's a I mean, I had this one particular situation where I was waiting for someone on a kind of a shopping street and I just I just thought something is wrong with a guy. But when I saw the camera and son, he also rushed away. So no, I didn't give them the money. The second scenario. No, but it's a good idea. The thing is that what I started to do is to always have a camera with me. That turns out for me to be important, to be able to document things. And also, most of them, except the British, don't like it when they are being photographed. You either they it's very interesting because normal people do realize when they are being photographed, but these guys are either pretending, no, I don't see that you photograph me. You know, they look but a little bit with too much energy away at the moment. Or they are seriously disturbed and go away. So the best solution would be to have the boldest, biggest, largest camera always by hand. Yeah. I mean, I've not been a fan of surveillance technology and for sure not of CCTV for a long part of my life. But I start to like the idea of CCTV at some places in my own environment. I'm sorry to say that. But there's compromises you can make like survival feed, you know, other parts you don't always need to face is if you need to face is there's options. And still analog photography is a great thing. But that's my personal opinion. You maybe you want to you can talk maybe you cannot talk about the use other counter measurements. You want to talk about or you can talk about. No, obviously, don't want to talk about it. But I mean, I've been I was wondering myself how why I had this rather intense things going on. I was wondering, is it the timeframe? Is it me as a person? It might have to do with actually being in this funny scene. Of course, I've learned. I mean, I know lockpicking persons have always had an eye on having good locks based on their advice and understanding how easy it would be otherwise. And using encryption was also not always about like hiding something. It was just good practice of having privacy and operational security. So for me, that was very normal for many years to do that and maybe, you know, compared to other persons that made me more interesting. I don't know. I'll find out one day. But I think it's a good idea for everybody involved to think about these three aspects, physical security, encryption, and also what kind of ways do you have to realize if something is being tampered with? Yeah. And that's not necessarily monitoring. I mean, monitoring can help. But on the other hand side, yeah, with monitoring systems, they can also deal with. Like physical checks, some kind of. Our next question. Do you ask the police at the border if everything is prepared now? You mean at the British border? Probably that's a reference to. I don't travel to the UK anymore. I decided, you know, after they dealt with Julian there, I don't like that place anymore. I never felt so well there. And actually, maybe I forgot to mention that after this kind of treatment at the border started, I also started avoiding sleeping in the UK. So I made day trips sometimes in order to get the last plane out of the country. I was flying to Zurich first because it was a late flight to Zurich and then next morning to Berlin, I felt in Zurich better at a bar or fish-hitty hotel than in London Central City with. Yeah, the special relationship as it's called between the intelligence of the UK and those of the US. I see. Speaking of sleeping or in this case concerning your apartment, the question would be, would some home surveillance system bring some relief, for example? Well, that's like a change in devil with the other dude, right? Yeah. I mean, no, I'm not really a friend of that. But yes, of course, I had to at the end of the day at least check with my door and so on what I can do to detect and record things and so on. But it's not a pleasure. It's not like, I don't know. I mean, yes, you end up doing that kind of shit, but that's not how life on planet Earth should be. Yeah. Yeah, it's a kind of a trade-off for what return. And I think that the thing is, I mean, look, I'm a German citizen. What I'm doing is constitutionally protected. I live in the governmental district of Berlin. It's fairly safe here. But I have friends in other places. Other situations in life is completely different there. And that is more what worries me that I'm in a relatively cool position, secure position. That's why I can talk about these things. But I have friends who have a more severe situation and they are not sure they should talk about it to not escalate things. And that's a very tricky choice to make, maybe. Yes, indeed. That brings us to another question. And I think this is a perfect point to mention that. Can we do, what can we do to support you in getting out of this mess? And what can we do in general for this? Well, I really appreciate the question. I don't have a good answer, but I think, yes, I would like to discuss more with people about what can be done. I mean, for the moment, I'm dealing with police, lawyers, the speaker guys I'm working with, they also find some ways maybe to address it. But it seems like at least if it comes to Julian's situation, things are badly escalated and it's all a bit interrelated. So I don't have a good answer at this moment, but I think it's a good idea to discuss it more and so maybe identifying other people who are in some kind of a risk situation because these things happen. And as I maybe hopefully was able to show it's not that difficult to get into such a mess, it happens. Yeah, and speaking of discussing, you mentioned earlier, there is a big blue button to discuss. Any further, you will find it in the 2D area in the 2D world in the whistleblower wiki. Is it right? Yes, in the tent, actually, I was told. And the tent is the URL to the big blue button or somehow it's interlinked there. So again, please go out, explore the 2D world and of course the whistleblower tent. We still have some minutes left. How do you do mentally? Did you use any methods to keep your head clean or clear and freak out? Yeah, that's a good question. I drink too much vodka, but I try to keep it with good quality. Let me say it like this, the real trouble is maybe that while in this scene here, people have a rough understanding of this type of things already. I also liked to be around with people who have nothing to do with IT, with security, with all these kind of things, so-called normal people. It's refreshing to be with them, but their ability to understand this mess is a little bit limited. So I think others judge better how I'm doing mentally. I'm trying to keep my head up and finding a good way out, but if anyone has a good idea, I'm really all for listening and see what's possible. In this case, I can come back to the win yard. It's pretty relaxing to have work in the late autumn. Even during a pandemic? Okay. You just have to find the way there. It's outside and there's a lot of distance between the people. I think this will work. So the last question, red or white wine? Red wine. Red. Yeah, definitely. And thank you for all this. Just to point out, please, we also have to work and to get in Julian out there and others who are in this mess who can't even talk about it. I really appreciate the option here to talk to you guys, but it's also about the others. And let us get Julian out here, please. With this great word, Andy, thanks for your time. Thanks for being here at the remote chaos. As mentioned, we still have the opportunity to ask you some questions in the whistleblower tent. And with this, have a nice evening. Try to relax and see you latest. Thanks. Thanks. Thanks. Thanks. Next time. All of you. You
 Okay, as we said the years before, the force merged to main.  Andi is commonly known in our scene.  His current talk CIA vs WikiLeaks, Intimidation, Surveillance and Other Tactics, Observed and Experienced.  In his talk, Andi aims to report and shows a collection of his observations, physical,  visual and other evidences of the last year incidents that strongly indicate the context  of US Central Agency, Central Intelligence Agency and potentially other entities of the  US government acting against WikiLeaks and surrounding persons and organizations.  Please welcome with a very warm digital applause Andi.  Okay, I have no idea how a digital applause works here, but thanks for it anyhow.  At the beginning I want to make and I have to make a few disclaimers so that you know  which perspective you're getting here.  I'm working as a data journalist for quite a while around the topics of surveillance,  signal intelligence, data security and running this funny bug planet.  Even started that bugplanet.info before Snowden came with all his documents, but I did work  a while with his documents.  However, this talk is a bit different as I'm not talking about things that I learned  and studied or whatever, but I experienced myself.  I'm describing events here where I was targeted.  And so I might not be the most neutral person in this scenario, but I'm trying to be technically  as accurate as possible anyhow.  So forgive me if I'm a bit grumpy about these people.  That's just because of the perspective.  Secondly, well, I've also, and the CCC of course has been addressing human rights issues  in the digital age for a long time.  We and I personally co-founded EG, the European Digital Rights Initiative, to ensure the enforcement  of human rights in the digital environment.  However, what happened here is slightly beyond digital rights.  It goes into real life.  And while I'm a German citizen, I now know roughly what kind of laws have been violated  in respect to the German environment.  I absolutely would welcome people who help me analyze and understand it from the perspective  of the universal human rights because there is similar cases with people living in other  jurisdictions and so on.  Second slide of disclaimer.  Sorry, I let it so much.  So I'm addressing with this talk activities against people surrounding and have been ent  or surrounding Julian and our WikiLeaks and or other members of WikiLeaks.  Whatever I describe here is I have personally observed and experienced it.  So it is for sure very incomplete.  It's at best a fragment of what's gone on.  But you will, in case you haven't heard about it yet, that Pompeo made some very clear statements  when he was head of CIA is pretty clear where to attribute these things.  And lastly, there is, of course, other prisoners mentioned, but I'm keeping them out here for  all kinds of reasons.  But there will be the time when we will hear more reports and other perspective of this  particular situation.  So here's my little overview.  I want to get you an idea how to get into such a mess just in case you wanted.  The context of the timeline, a bit of psychology as it's important because at some point you  not only get paranoid, you have this drive to, no, this can't be true, right?  You have this cognitive dissonance drive inside of you that you would like to stay sane.  The new normal of IT incidents, we're all used to that, COVID versus overt.  What I mean with the term intimidation of violence, physical events and their impact  about the elephant in the room, the problem of the missing socks.  And at the end, a little bit of questions.  Some of my infectious, how to get out of this mess maybe also.  So how to get into such a beautiful mess?  Wait, it's not beautiful.  Well, there's some ideas we share in the hacker community usually.  And even it's not far from where to get into the journalist community.  Information should be free.  Free flow of information is a bit of a requirement for world peace.  And we had this, and I personally also had this type of self-conception, self-understanding  consciousness 20 years already when Wickeleek started around 2006.  So this is not that I was jumping or anybody in the scene was jumping onto something that  didn't exist until then.  But Wickeleek's turned out to be an extremely good concept as a democracy test if governments  cannot deal with full transparency.  Well, that tells you a lot about them.  And but of course, that is similar to jumping into the last one similar to working in journalism.  When you expose things in journalism, be it corruption, be it hypocrisy of politicians,  be it blunt lies or whatever, it's not always about making friends.  It's yes, partly making friends and partly pissing people off.  That happens.  However, in this particular environment that Julian inspired to create, there's some,  yeah, cultural even misunderstandings.  For example, the word conspiracy for us in Europe, I think many of us in the German  Hacker scene are inspired by Robert Wilson's way of saying, oh, a conspiracy is like the  world is full of them and we should join the best of them.  But the in the American context, the word conspiracy is a legal term, unfortunately.  And when you are with American citizens in a room and talk about conspiracies, they often  get very nervous and it's kind of a complete different attitude because it's like the  US term to define people who belong to a group like organized criminals or organized, you  know, this T word, this other type of entities.  And of course, that's absolutely not what we want to get into involved to.  But sometimes we mistakenly or misunderstanding the joke about conspiracies and people believe  listening to this, get it completely wrong.  And I fear that this is also what happened and how me and others got into such a mess.  So at the end of course, I'm journalism and that's similar to dealing with data from a  hacker's perspective is about supporting media with data and information and so on.  So here's a bit of a timeline to give you a timeframe.  I'm now after I was a bit long for about two decades in CCC spokesperson and board member  blah, blah, blah.  I moved to the board of the Vahalan Foundation.  Vahalan Foundation collects actually money for WikiLeaks under the aspect of vows idea  of supporting freedom of information.  Since 2010 or so, I joined a little later.  However, when WikiLeaks started to publish the Afghanistan, the Iraq warlocks, the diplomatic  cables, that already triggered legal investigations.  And of course, the arrest of Dan Stoll Bradley now, Josiah Manning later.  So there was always it was always clear, more or less right from the beginning that there's  legal trouble on the way that there's a secret grand jury and that the Americans didn't really  appreciate their war crimes to be exposed and their diplomatic cables to be in the Internet,  to be understood and readable for all of us and the media worldwide and so on.  Of course, when people come together and gather in any project, you have human beings, you  have they have characters, they have mistakes.  They do things that are not always great.  So I'm not trying to say here that everything was always great and was only the CIA messing  it up.  No humans make mistakes.  And these mistakes in such an environment, of course, get exploited, get amplified and  so on.  In 2007, WikiLeaks started publishing some CIA documents and a whole series of it, the  so-called fold seven documents.  And those documents describe their technology, exploit programs from the CIA.  You probably most of you will know them.  If not, you can all look them up.  These included tools that allowed the CIA to pretend to be someone else, including coming  from another country, speaking another language, be it from Russia and Russia and be it from  Iran and Farsi and so on.  And Pompeo, who was at that moment still head of the CIA, got very upset.  There's two references from this one is from April to 17.  And another is from February to 18.  In his first public speech as a CIA director in 13 of April to 17, he made a speech at  a conference in Washington, and he said things like WikiLeaks walks like a hostile intelligence  service and talks like an intelligent service and called WikiLeaks a non-state hostile intelligence  service.  So for those of you who know a little bit about information science, this idea of data  is actually something you can technically measure information as data in a context.  And intelligence is information processed to a level where you can make decisions based  on it.  So being a public intelligence service, I would say from that perspective is like a  honorable term.  However, the way Pompeo emphasized it, I think, was slightly not that honorable.  He was more comparing it to other state actors and evil forces and so on because the US understanding  of intelligence services far away from entities, sorry, I need a water, is far away from entities  just collecting information.  But as you know, they also mess up with other people's life and so on.  However, a year later, in February to 18, he even upgraded this type of statements at  the site, German newspaper reported about what he said at the Munich Security Conference  Intelligence Roundtable.  And he said really nasty sentence like that.  He's most of his time, he's dealing with the non-state actors and that's like, I can either  Islamic State WikiLeaks or is Bollack.  Like what a list.  So I have no idea what he has, what turned him into comparing these kind of things.  I mean, his Bollack, I could say we in Berlin, we know that they provide actually Jami Halloumi  and some things.  But yes, they are money launders and are suspected terrorists in some areas or whatever.  I have been declared terrorist.  But their humus is really good, I can say.  However, the point I'm trying to come to, so Pompeo got very upset.  He made all this comparison and he seems to have allocated resources to deal with WikiLeaks  and everybody jumping around.  And it's no surprise that S.W.  Holland Foundation finances selected activities of specific publications there that we also  got in the focus with us collecting donations and talking with the guys and financing some  projects.  So, before I'm coming to very concrete events, I want to get one second into psychology.  So of course, when things happen to you from the intelligence perspective, they always  come with what's called plausible deniability.  And there's a guy standing in front of the door watching, if you come in and out, it's  not just someone watching your door or someone reading the newspaper or repairing some electrical  pipes or some water pipe or whatever.  I mean, there's always a good reason for him to be there that has nothing to do with  what he's doing.  And that's basic principle, plausible deniability, how intelligence agencies act in the so-called  field, meaning in your home or on the street, they're following you or whatever.  So over time, of course, if you have too much of this, you're seeing these patterns.  And that's probably mainly called paranoia.  So you get like, you know, suspicious of everything that happens that might be very  legitimate, but you get like the feeling that something is wrong and so on.  And that can be, we could also instead of paranoia, call it situational awareness at  some points, because if it really happens, it has nothing to do with your mind getting  crazy.  It's just an accurate observation of patterns that happens around of you.  But you might know that, and your two friends who experienced the same might know that,  your girlfriend, your partner, the normal people you deal with, they might all not understand  this and think that you're driving nuts.  And this driving nuts is of course an element that you always have to be self-critical,  because on the one hand side, you might indeed see too much things happening that do not  really happen.  On the other hand side, there's also this human drive that we don't want this CIA guys  to be in our life.  We want everything is to be fine.  And to some extent, maybe that's even healthy to not see the monsters all the time.  But if they are really there and you start denying them while they sit in front of you,  that's also not so helpful.  So I found myself in this kind of weird environment where all these kind of thoughts come up all  the time.  And I'm starting with the most harmless stuff.  So internet attacks.  I will, our internet incidents, I would, IT incidents, I call it here.  Due to the pure volume of it, I will put this into separate presentation one day or report  and in the next days or weeks or months.  And you can all have fun with it.  But she has just some basic patterns.  So devices you use as communication terminals or communication devices, they always have  issues when you start to do encrypted stuff.  And it's always when you do it with specific people.  So that's then mobile phones with data service.  At some point, all of them have started to have issues.  Very high volume of use data.  Apps disappear if you use them at all.  I stopped using them at all.  Now high battery use it when you did nothing with your phone over hours and you were wondering  what's going on.  Okay, yes, we have Faraday bags.  We put them somewhere else.  But still it's a little weird when your battery is empty half day.  On LTE, when I configured my phone to be on LTE only, it worked mainly fine next to that  I couldn't make normal phone calls.  But when I had it in the normal mode, it got downgraded to 3G and there my encrypted connection  started to have problems.  On my fixed lines, my VPNs, when I try to build up a VPN, it shows me certificate errors  and problems.  And then of course, you deal with journalists, which I'm doing with my colleagues all the  time and they are not technical experts.  They all have their Macs and so on.  So they have funny issues with their PGP keys not working anymore with their PGP setups  not working anymore.  Yes, it's also because it's open source software, but there's also something going on.  But this is kind of the world we all know and we get used to it.  This is like, okay, IT doesn't work, secure connections break well happens all the time.  From about mid to 17 when I still regularly like once twice a month was flying over to  see Julian in the embassy, I realized that there was something changing it with my treatment  at the border.  That's of course, that's here.  That's purely UK border police uncles and they like asked started to ask funny questions  like do you live in the UK?  What's your occupation?  How long do you stay?  What do you do in the UK?  Before then, there was maybe one question but not three, four of them.  And the most important was that I realized that he did not even listen to my answers.  Sometimes he started the first question after I answered the third and I was feeling like  in a limbo like with a machine who would randomly ask me things.  But I then realized he was just waiting for the green light on his screen suit to let  me go and that green light probably meant that the team outside was ready to pick me  up.  And that's what happened.  So I get into the UK and have people follow me like the whole fucking day, not only on  the way to the embassy from the embassy back and so on.  I once spotted one of those persons like sitting on the street level on the other side, watching  the whole time I was in an office ground level.  And because I had a bit of experience with that in continental Europe, like in Germany,  if you realize these guys go after you and you put your camera on your table or start  even to make photos of them, they're very quickly gone because they don't want to be  relocated, they don't like to be exposed and so on.  But the British behaved in this time, this scenario completely different.  So he was getting very aggressively body language, spotting, looking back and so on.  So that was a little weird.  That same day at three o'clock in the night when my friends drove me to the place where  I was sleeping on the one-way street, there was still a car following us even in the one-way  street.  So actually he had to turn back and so on.  That was no more coverage of violence.  That was already the edge to intimidation.  And then over the next months, I started to have new favorites, but not only in England  or in other countries, that I would see homeless looking like people on the street level, sitting  there begging or leaning to some buildings.  And at some point, I had to realize that the cheap plastic bags they were wearing were  just a cover for cameras that were actually with Zoom and digital getting into my direction.  So that felt a little...  And so the idea of this measurement, if you look at their manuals, which you'll find somehow  in the internet, is that the difference between discovered surveillance, which is to find out  where you are and the open surveillance, which I call intimidation surveillance, the idea  is you create in the prison in this case, for me, a state of distress.  So you're constantly having this looking around and you obviously have the idea something  is going on and they let you know.  They want to let you know.  And that's a little weird.  So in April 2018, actually in March 2018, I brought one of my cryptophones, in this  case a desk phone based on a Zip phone called Snom870, back to our workshop here to repair.  The display had been exposed to heat and got a little melted.  It's not so super high quality LCD display.  So I wanted just to display, to replace the display.  So I opened the thing and I found actually a box and that box turned out to be very sophisticated  thing.  So there was a battery pack, there was a shielded thing.  There was behind that shielded thing was a module that had been soldered into.  It was based on an FPGA, some hardware crypto elements, 16 gigabytes of flesh ROM.  It was completely passive, so I wouldn't have found it in any sweep because it just recorded  whatever I talked on that encrypted phone and would be triggered by high frequency to  send out the recorded stuff encrypted in a burst signal.  You see here in the URL to find more pictures online to give you an idea.  This is the thing I found.  This is how it looked like at the beginning.  It is the phone itself has two PCBs, one for the keyboard and one for the connector, the  processing and so on.  This was the modified version of the keyboard PCB with this battery pack in blue, the shielded  module.  And here you get an idea of what was in there.  That's pretty high tech.  We did of course look into what exactly do we have here, when were these chips produced,  what does it do and so on.  But it's pretty obviously that this is like for those who have read the smell documents  intensely.  It's what's called special collection service.  Inside there there's a group called Targeted Access Operations Tau.  And they work together with a thing called PAG, the physical access group.  There's someone and that was the thing, it was not only built into this phone.  That phone had been of course in a locked room and I had to ask myself, okay, what happened  here?  Here you see how they grabbed the audio with a glued mini PCB from the other main controller  into their little technology.  And here you see a comparison picture to the right.  You see the original PCB keyboard which has almost nothing on it.  And to the left you see the modified version.  Friend of mine made a bit of a diagram and yeah, I'll just leave it for you.  You can review it later.  I'll upload these PDF slides of course.  So here's some aspects of what was going through my head over the time.  Of course the first question was how long was this there?  No idea.  It could be years.  The components we identified were produced around or no earlier than April 2013.  So if you remember Snowden came with this revelation mid of 2013 roughly.  And I've been working for the Spiegel with others on the Snowden documents next to that  phone and coordinating a lot of it in the year 2013.  So in theory it could be even related to that.  Who knows?  The dimensions suggest clearly a non-metric origin.  The antenna would work in the range of 800 MHz.  So you find here a mentioning of a PDF that tells you something about these groups.  But I did talk to some people who do professional sweeping, meaning looking for audio box and  so on in devices and rooms.  And they told me from the experience of the Cold War until today the operation to bring  something into a room, into a device, that's quite an effort.  Because you need to secure, you need to ensure you don't get caught and so on.  And so what you normally do is because technology can fail is you do not install one box, you  install at least two.  In the Cold War people told me from the elder generation that the relationship was one to  eight, so that because technology failed a lot back then.  However that made me of course think, okay, what else could there be?  What can I do to find the rest and so on?  Does it even make sense?  Can I secure all the rooms that I use to work here and there in such a way that I could  be sure and of course I can't be.  So this was a first hard confrontation with my own cognitive dissonance because all that  you know surveillance theater where I thought, okay, Julian has some trouble and I think  I have something to do with it.  And when I travel to England, okay, they follow me, you know, you get used to that kind of  things.  But like something you can have in your hand and that's outside of IT incidents that means  that all your encrypted communications have been listened to while that field shitty.  So that's what I call a hard confrontation with my own cognitive dissonance.  The next thing I want to talk about is very recent.  It's about one and a half months old now.  When here in Berlin, I went out actually very early in the morning to get some stuff from  a grocery in a time of pandemic when no one is in the shop at seven something in the morning.  I come back half an hour later and the key to my apartment door does not fit into the  cylinder anymore.  That felt a bit shitty.  It was not a normal cylinder.  It was a so-called stealth cylinder.  You might want to look at the internet what it is.  It's a Swiss company who's doing nice keys that you cannot photograph and copy because  it has inner elements with a sophisticated mechanical way of opening.  I did however when I bumped into my door and had to, first I called my locksmith's  dude or my friend from the lockpicking industry.  I could say who had advised me to buy that cylinder.  I talked with my lawyer and we agreed it's a good idea to call the police to put it on  the other list of things that I had collected until then.  I then realized that I had been followed that morning but I didn't take any attention to  it because I was just walking in half automatic mode to the grocery and there was a couple  talking such a bullshit.  They will probably listen to this talk and will remember that dialogue.  It was just not making any sense but I was too polite to point it out.  They were very closely.  It was not about where I was going.  It was about that I was not at home.  They ensured that in the timeframe that I was there, the other guys could operate and  so on.  That is an ongoing investigation but I can tell you this is the next incident where  like cognitive dissonance and the illusion you want to give yourself.  I'm not important in this game.  Yeah, these guys follow me here and there and this feels kind of different.  This is no more nice.  Here's a little bit of a get the idea of the cylinder.  You cannot really see the object that was inserted but at the end we didn't get it  out for forensic reasons.  We had to drill.  Police went through the apartment and so on.  Yeah, another interesting day you can have.  So here's some aspects that I asked myself.  So was it even my cylinder that I couldn't open?  Maybe they could not lockpick the original stealth cylinder I had.  They had to open it in a violent way.  They were in the apartment to whatever put another bug in there.  But as they couldn't replace it with the original cylinder, as they had destroyed it, like they  put another one in and that's why my key wasn't fitting.  It's an option.  The next option was it maybe a trap to make me replace the broken cylinder with a cheaper  one with a more simple one that they could open then afterwards when I was gone.  Next option.  Or maybe was it not about the door at all?  Was it maybe just to freak me out?  Of course, it feels not so great if you can't open your own apartment door and so on.  And the fourth question was of course, oh gosh, how much time did I spend that day with  the police, was drilling open the door, with all that kind of things, it more or less cost  me a day.  And what maybe happened to my machines, meaning my computers, my other things, maybe where  was my attention not in that time frame?  Because it could be was a pure distraction thing.  We freak him out a little bit and while he's freaking out, we do other things in his office  or whatever.  I can't rule it out.  And then of course, I mean, the police sent me some funny questions of still working on  that, like, yeah, should I name Pompeo as a suspect?  Not sure.  But maybe I should.  Discussing it with my lawyer and so on.  And also, is it maybe related to the date?  This was the third of November.  In case I would say it, the third of November is the election day or was the election day  in the United States.  And there was some accusation with you and had something to do with the election some  years ago.  So however, the next event, incident number three, has to do with something that happened  in between because on Monday, the day before they messed up with my door, I had shipped  some documents to Spain, I realized then.  That was legal documents that required me and a friend going to the Spanish embassy.  We gave a tour of power fraternity and so on because we are also accusing this company  UC Global, which I talked about last year, which was the company running the surveillance  or the protection surveillance at the beginning on behalf of the Ecuadorians in that embassy.  And later turned out to be working for Shadal Ailsen's company or at least having a site  arrangement there, which is still subject to an ongoing lawsuit.  And we participate in that lawsuit because not only Julian was spied on, everybody was  spied on who was visiting him and so on.  So I had shipped documents on that Monday, almost six o'clock on the local post office  here by DHL Express.  I put that documents in a sealed bag, that's like a bag with a serial number and so on.  That went together with the describing list was inside the bag into a white envelope that  again I sealed with seal tape.  Then I gave that to the post office, but they insisted it gets in a DHL Express bag, that's  what you get for the 70 euro to be arriving within two days.  So yeah, the stuff arrived on Wednesday, but all opened.  And the Spanish lawyers freaked completely out.  They were very sure that this was a madling.  You would see that it was sliced open and so on.  Yes, you see this funny duct tape here called Sol.  But why would the German customs open a document shipment within Europe?  That just not makes a lot of sense.  It's still on the way to be checked.  In theory they could do that.  But also this incident has some aspects.  It's a breach of attorney-client privilege.  That's why the Spanish lawyers insisted us we bring this to a criminal complaint.  They did on their end right when they received it and they made these photos.  So was German customs even involved?  I was just a duct tape used by some funny people.  Why when I emailed all this to my lawyer with the pictures and the one, why did he not receive  the email until he realized on Monday that it somehow ended in his trash?  He also freaked out.  And then I talked with DHL, of course.  I made a big fuss there and they were like, no, we cannot tell you on which legal grounds  the shipment was open.  We cannot tell you who did it.  But if you have an inquiry, why don't you send it to the customs?  So without giving me even which customs entity it would be or whatever.  And again, of course, this is kind of an interesting story, but I have normally other priorities  in my life.  So I'm asking myself, oh gosh, how many days should I waste here?  I was finding out who opened the fucking shipment.  But this is again the state of distress.  This is again the effort.  And it's again a reminder we are after you.  We check your things.  We don't like you're suing the CIA suspected company and so on and so on.  So coming to a bit of a conclusion of this talk, as we also want to have time for questions  and so on, I want to talk about three aspects.  The one is the elephant in the room and the problem of the missing sock.  So at some point, I don't want to say that I have been completely not in the state of  distress.  And also, I don't know how this affects my sanity and those people surrounding me.  So your cognitive systems get kind of otherwise triggered and you start to see these things  everywhere.  And when then you wash some socks and it turns out there's a sock missing, the other person  in my life was like, OK, CIA.  However, I did suspect the bad sheets and we found one of the socks in the bad sheet.  So when you know the problem is socks get in the drum sometimes hanging, you wash something  different than like a bad sheet.  And the bad sheet is an excellent place to hide things that have been in the drama, then  get into the bad sheet and you just dry it with it and you don't even realize it and  so on.  So while I'm a complete, for entertainment reasons, also for, you know, you need to relax  your brain in such a situation once a while, I'm totally OK to say this year is just once  before everything, including the missing socks.  But suspect the bad sheet first and realize that, yes, this is a joke and this is escapism  and it helps you maybe to stay sane for the little moment.  But in the long term, I don't know.  So and that's the I don't know part is the other two slides that are coming out.  So what should I do?  And I should I invite some friends and declare my office here like a laboratory for surveillance.  Yeah, it has been before I looked at surveillance technology, but in this case it's surveillance  technology looking at me and my friends.  So it's slightly different.  It's maybe also important to not get into some kind of auto response mode when things  happen because I was thinking also, what the fuck?  Why are they doing all these things?  It costs them money.  It costs them effort.  Is it to freak me out?  Is it that they think that like, like, like I'm seriously in such an evil mode organization  that, you know, they will escalate things and I will start to throw bombs at US embassy  or I don't know.  I have no idea what their idea is.  But I would just try to stay like slow motion and think about it.  The next aspect is, however, do I infect other people?  And now I'm not talking about my paranoia or my situational awareness, as I would call  it, which of course, at some point is ongoing and it's no more sometimes.  But when I talk with normal people, with other journalists, with people I deal with for normal  things and they visit me and we do whatever kind of social things like normal things like  having food and afterwards they call me a day later and say, oh, finally my phone started  rebooting twice yesterday and these kind of things.  So that you think, OK, it's not my paranoia that is infectious.  It's actually they obviously want to not only know what kind of people I'm dealing with  and look into that technology, they also want to freak them out.  So this is not cool.  And it also means that the type of ignorance you could normally apply and say, well, ignorance  is a blast.  Come on, let's have a nice day and forget about all this.  That's kind of limited.  That's no more an option.  And also, while I've been dealing with that type of stress and that type of thing for  a while now, and I can say, well, that's how it is.  And it doesn't mean that everybody dealing with you can do that.  There's people who are seriously freaked out by such a situation and they it creates fear,  it creates anger, stress and so on.  So that's not cool.  So my last slide that ends up with a question to you guys is how to get out of this mess.  So option one, I managed to get proper authorities to make the CIA stop acting illegal.  OK, I heard the laughing.  I know this ridiculous.  But it would be so beautiful.  Justice prevails.  The German authorities, the European ones, pick it up.  I finally managed to escalate it to the General Bundesanwaltschaft.  I do not have to talk with the German intelligence services, as I'm not sure they would be helpful  in this game.  And they make the CIA stop acting illegal and against me and the other person surrounding.  Beautiful dream, but OK, not very realistic, maybe.  Option two, Pompeo realizes Jesus lost WikiLeaks and whatever shall become true will be  become true.  He reads it in the Bible.  Pompeo seems to be, if you look at his Twitter account, reasonable believe in Jesus Christ  and all that thing.  So he realizes it's all wrongdoing against Julian and WikiLeaks and all the people targeted  in that context and stops it.  I know, OK, shit happens.  Well, come good.  If that's realistic, I don't know, you tell me.  And the third option, I don't know, maybe you have some ideas.  But that's my question to you, the audience.  And that's the end of my prepared part of the talk.  And with these words, thank you, Andy, for the brilliant talk.  In the meantime, I received a message.  A third option would be to have a great wine yard.  Sorry.  I personally...  Yes, it's completely right.  I consider it actually maybe I should do something with goats, become a farmer, or, you know,  yeah, there's these options.  But I thought before I give it up and find my way on the countryside, I outsource the  problem to the community and see what they think.  In the meantime, I think there is plenty of time for a great white wine.  But to our questions.  We have indeed plenty of questions.  The first question would be, how would you compare the surveillance of the CIA or other  to the surveillance of the GDR?  So for the Deutsche Demokratische Republik?  Well, I'm born in Hamburg in West Germany.  I lived in East Germany when the government was already falling into pieces.  It was technically still there.  I'm not the best person to compare it.  But I did talk with a person I know who worked for the Foreign Intelligence Services because  there was...  You know, I simplified here, of course, the incidents a little bit.  There was one scene when later I went into my kitchen that day when my door lock got  tempered with and I found a blue plastic glove.  And I don't have blue plastic gloves.  And I asked my locksmith's guy.  He was like, no, it's not from me and the police had black ones.  So I thought, what the fuck?  Maybe the guys have been inside the apartment, which I didn't thought earlier because it  was second lock and the police checked and so on.  And then I talked to, discussed it with this person I know who's quite friendly man was  working in the Foreign Intelligence of that country.  And so he was like, you have to look at it from a cost effectiveness point of view.  Like that piece of plastic cost you 10 cent, nothing.  And it freaks you out three months.  So see how much, how cost effective it is.  And I mean, that's a good aspect.  That's a good point.  And so I think that the East German, the guys, the East German intelligence guys, they also,  they knew very well the difference and they had both instruments in their program to either  do covert surveillance, really like not let you know.  And the department thought we let him know and see how he reacts or we let him know because  he's ongoing doing things and we want him to, you know, stop it and get intimidated  and so on and get scared maybe or his wife gets scared or these kind of things.  So I think it is comparable.  Cool.  Oh, well, not cool.  Speaking of covert versus over civilians, sorry, as you now know, does it still bother  you emotionally?  Well, what bothers me sometimes is, you know, it's also it has a sometimes it's nice to  be alone and it's sometimes nice to not think about the CIA guys being in the apartment  next door or in my case in the apartment under me or in surrounding environments.  But thinking about normal things like playing a puzzle or seeing some funny spy movies.  Oh, wait, that's almost relaxing.  No, seriously, at some point it sucks a little bit.  I can't kind of deal with it.  I mean, this 2020 year has of course complicated or has made it almost impossible to travel.  So normally I escape my intensity of my work situation with travels, maybe I can do that  this year.  So I'd feel a little more intense and it annoys a little bit and I would like to get these  guys out of my life and do something useful with their life or whatever.  Now, the next question, he or she or the person or creature probably missed it.  Do you disassemble all your devices on a regular base?  No, I usually do just regular and seal them.  In this case, the seal had had an issue with a with a heat as well.  So I and that was lousy on checking it, I have to say.  So yes, that's something.  I mean, if you have one office, you can do that.  I tend to work on different continents even and that turned out to be a bit of an issue.  So yes, you need to have sleeves everywhere and seals and but even then, you know, Pompeo  seems to have justified or have given orders to do these things no matter the costs.  And my expectation to have like a private or secure encrypted channel so is very limited  for a while watching that effort.  The encryption of the cryptophone obviously was good.  Otherwise, they wouldn't have had the effort to, you know, build something in.  But at the end of the day, for me, it has the same impact.  It's like, well, yeah, it's a phone.  There's a piece of devices in a room.  The room has windows.  We've seen what they've done with the embassy windows and so on.  So it's like, yeah, security.  What a nice idea.  But it doesn't really exist.  Yeah.  Do you try giving a few coins to the homeless looking people to do either some reverse intimidation  or good deed if they are not CIA?  Yeah, that's a I mean, I had this one particular situation where I was waiting for someone  on a kind of a shopping street and I just I just thought something is wrong with a guy.  But when I saw the camera and son, he also rushed away.  So no, I didn't give them the money.  The second scenario.  No, but it's a good idea.  The thing is that what I started to do is to always have a camera with me.  That turns out for me to be important, to be able to document things.  And also, most of them, except the British, don't like it when they are being photographed.  You either they it's very interesting because normal people do realize when they are being  photographed, but these guys are either pretending, no, I don't see that you photograph me.  You know, they look but a little bit with too much energy away at the moment.  Or they are seriously disturbed and go away.  So the best solution would be to have the boldest, biggest, largest camera always by  hand.  Yeah.  I mean, I've not been a fan of surveillance technology and for sure not of CCTV for a  long part of my life.  But I start to like the idea of CCTV at some places in my own environment.  I'm sorry to say that.  But there's compromises you can make like survival feed, you know, other parts you don't always  need to face is if you need to face is there's options.  And still analog photography is a great thing.  But that's my personal opinion.  You maybe you want to you can talk maybe you cannot talk about the use other counter measurements.  You want to talk about or you can talk about.  No, obviously, don't want to talk about it.  But I mean, I've been I was wondering myself how why I had this rather intense things  going on.  I was wondering, is it the timeframe?  Is it me as a person?  It might have to do with actually being in this funny scene.  Of course, I've learned.  I mean, I know lockpicking persons have always had an eye on having good locks based on their  advice and understanding how easy it would be otherwise.  And using encryption was also not always about like hiding something.  It was just good practice of having privacy and operational security.  So for me, that was very normal for many years to do that and maybe, you know, compared to  other persons that made me more interesting.  I don't know.  I'll find out one day.  But I think it's a good idea for everybody involved to think about these three aspects,  physical security, encryption, and also what kind of ways do you have to realize if something  is being tampered with?  Yeah.  And that's not necessarily monitoring.  I mean, monitoring can help.  But on the other hand side, yeah, with monitoring systems, they can also deal with.  Like physical checks, some kind of.  Our next question.  Do you ask the police at the border if everything is prepared now?  You mean at the British border?  Probably that's a reference to.  I don't travel to the UK anymore.  I decided, you know, after they dealt with Julian there, I don't like that place anymore.  I never felt so well there.  And actually, maybe I forgot to mention that after this kind of treatment at the border  started, I also started avoiding sleeping in the UK.  So I made day trips sometimes in order to get the last plane out of the country.  I was flying to Zurich first because it was a late flight to Zurich and then next morning  to Berlin, I felt in Zurich better at a bar or fish-hitty hotel than in London Central  City with.  Yeah, the special relationship as it's called between the intelligence of the UK and those  of the US.  I see.  Speaking of sleeping or in this case concerning your apartment, the question would be, would  some home surveillance system bring some relief, for example?  Well, that's like a change in devil with the other dude, right?  Yeah.  I mean, no, I'm not really a friend of that.  But yes, of course, I had to at the end of the day at least check with my door and so  on what I can do to detect and record things and so on.  But it's not a pleasure.  It's not like, I don't know.  I mean, yes, you end up doing that kind of shit, but that's not how life on planet Earth  should be.  Yeah.  Yeah, it's a kind of a trade-off for what return.  And I think that the thing is, I mean, look, I'm a German citizen.  What I'm doing is constitutionally protected.  I live in the governmental district of Berlin.  It's fairly safe here.  But I have friends in other places.  Other situations in life is completely different there.  And that is more what worries me that I'm in a relatively cool position, secure position.  That's why I can talk about these things.  But I have friends who have a more severe situation and they are not sure they should  talk about it to not escalate things.  And that's a very tricky choice to make, maybe.  Yes, indeed.  That brings us to another question.  And I think this is a perfect point to mention that.  Can we do, what can we do to support you in getting out of this mess?  And what can we do in general for this?  Well, I really appreciate the question.  I don't have a good answer, but I think, yes, I would like to discuss more with people about  what can be done.  I mean, for the moment, I'm dealing with police, lawyers, the speaker guys I'm working with,  they also find some ways maybe to address it.  But it seems like at least if it comes to Julian's situation, things are badly escalated  and it's all a bit interrelated.  So I don't have a good answer at this moment, but I think it's a good idea to discuss it  more and so maybe identifying other people who are in some kind of a risk situation because  these things happen.  And as I maybe hopefully was able to show it's not that difficult to get into such a mess,  it happens.  Yeah, and speaking of discussing, you mentioned earlier, there is a big blue button to discuss.  Any further, you will find it in the 2D area in the 2D world in the whistleblower wiki.  Is it right?  Yes, in the tent, actually, I was told.  And the tent is the URL to the big blue button or somehow it's interlinked there.  So again, please go out, explore the 2D world and of course the whistleblower tent.  We still have some minutes left.  How do you do mentally?  Did you use any methods to keep your head clean or clear and freak out?  Yeah, that's a good question.  I drink too much vodka, but I try to keep it with good quality.  Let me say it like this, the real trouble is maybe that while in this scene here, people  have a rough understanding of this type of things already.  I also liked to be around with people who have nothing to do with IT, with security,  with all these kind of things, so-called normal people.  It's refreshing to be with them, but their ability to understand this mess is a little  bit limited.  So I think others judge better how I'm doing mentally.  I'm trying to keep my head up and finding a good way out, but if anyone has a good idea,  I'm really all for listening and see what's possible.  In this case, I can come back to the win yard.  It's pretty relaxing to have work in the late autumn.  Even during a pandemic?  Okay.  You just have to find the way there.  It's outside and there's a lot of distance between the people.  I think this will work.  So the last question, red or white wine?  Red wine.  Red.  Yeah, definitely.  And thank you for all this.  Just to point out, please, we also have to work and to get in Julian out there and others  who are in this mess who can't even talk about it.  I really appreciate the option here to talk to you guys, but it's also about the others.  And let us get Julian out here, please.  With this great word, Andy, thanks for your time.  Thanks for being here at the remote chaos.  As mentioned, we still have the opportunity to ask you some questions in the whistleblower  tent.  And with this, have a nice evening.  Try to relax and see you latest.  Thanks.  Thanks.  Thanks.  Thanks.  Next time.  All of you.  You
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