CASE OF HILAL v. THE UNITED KINGDOM
Violation of Art. 3;No violation of Art. 13;No separate issues under Art. 6 and 8;Non-pecuniary damage - finding of violation sufficient;Costs and expenses award
Nicolas Bratza;Simon Brown
8. The applicant was born in Pemba, one of the Zanzibar islands, in 1968. Zanzibar is part of the United Republic of Tanzania. It has its own President, parliament and government and enjoys considerable autonomy. 9. According to the applicant, in 1992 he joined the Civic United Front (“the CUF”), an opposition party in Zanzibar. He was an active member, attending meetings and contributing money to the party funds. In August 1994 the applicant was arrested by Chama Cha Mapinduzi (“the CCM”, the ruling party) officers because of his involvement with the CUF. He was detained at Madema police station in Zanzibar for three months, where he was tortured. He was repeatedly locked in a cell full of water for days at a time so he was unable to lie down. He was hung upside down with his feet tied together until he bled through the nose, and he was also subjected to electric shocks. 10. In November 1994 the applicant stated that he was released from detention following pressure from CUF leaders on the Tanzanian government. He was admitted to hospital, where a medical officer recorded that the applicant was haemorrhaging severely through the nose as a result of his treatment and had been subjected to harm endangering life. 11. The applicant stated that his brother had been taken into detention shortly before he was. He had been ill-treated and died in January 1995 in hospital where he had been taken from prison. 12. Following his release, the applicant stated that he only contributed funds to the CUF. In January 1995 the police came looking for him while he was out. The police detained his wife overnight and questioned his friends. He decided to leave his home and Tanzania, fearing for his safety. 13. On 9 February 1995 the applicant arrived in the United Kingdom and claimed asylum. That day a pro forma interview was held with an immigration officer, where the applicant was assisted by an interpreter. According to the form, the purpose of the interview was to enable the immigration officer to take down the initial details of the asylum application. When asked what the basis of his asylum claim was, the applicant was noted as having said: “Because of the problems in the country and my safety. I have been threatened a lot by the ruling party so I decided to leave the country.” The applicant stated that he had been a member of the CUF since 1992. 14. At the full asylum interview held on 15 March 1995, the applicant was recorded as stating that he had had no problem in obtaining a passport as he was a businessman, and that he had organised his passage to the United Kingdom himself. When asked what the basis for his asylum claim was, he stated that he had been taken away and detained for three months, from August to November 1994, at Madema police station, where he had been tortured. He had been locked in a room with a very low ceiling, where he could not stand up, and then placed for one and a half days in a room filled with water up to the chest, where he could not lie down. He was taken out and returned there twice a week. A few days before he was released he was hung upside down and given electric shocks. He had been arrested because he gave money to the CUF. He was told that he had been released because the CUF leaders had approached the authorities in Dar es Salaam. After his release, he was treated in a private clinic. He produced his CUF card. He had been an ordinary member, doing nothing more than give money. He had not taken part in the demonstration which had been allowed. He mentioned that his brother had been arrested in January 1995 and died after being in police custody. His brother had been badly beaten and was vomiting blood, so they had released him to hospital on 20 January 1995 as they knew he was going to die. His uncle had helped him to leave, obtaining an income-tax clearance and an airline ticket. His uncle checked in with the ticket for him and he was able to board the plane. 15. On 29 June 1995 the Secretary of State refused asylum, finding the applicant’s account implausible and noting inconsistencies in his answers. The applicant’s appeal to a special adjudicator was dismissed on 8 November 1996. During the proceedings the applicant had claimed that the Tanzanian authorities intercepted the letters he was sending home, knew that he had claimed asylum, and had summoned his parents to explain “about [their] son who [was] in a foreign country to abuse the government which [was] in power ...” He provided correspondence from the Royal Mail concerning his enquiries about money which had gone missing from a registered letter dated 27 November 1995 which he had sent to his parents in Tanzania. 16. In his decision the special adjudicator noted inconsistencies between the evidence given by the applicant before him and the answers given in his asylum interviews. He placed considerable weight on the fact that the applicant had not mentioned his arrest and torture at his first asylum interview and did not accept the applicant’s explanation that the interviewing officer told him that it was not necessary to give details at this stage or that he was having difficulties with the interpreter. He also noted that the evidence concerning his brother’s arrest was contradictory and that no documentary evidence such as a death certificate had been produced. He therefore did not accept that the applicant’s brother was arrested, tortured or killed. He also observed that the applicant had not provided documentary evidence that the Zanzibar authorities were accusing him of tarnishing Tanzania’s good name, and therefore did not accept that it existed. Looking at the evidence as a whole, he concluded that there was no well-founded fear of persecution for a Convention reason established to the required standard. 17. Leave to appeal to the Immigration Appeal Tribunal was refused on 10 January 1997. 18. The applicant obtained a copy of his brother’s death certificate and a medical report which recorded that his brother died on 20 January 1995, after being brought to hospital from prison with a history of severe chest pain and general body weakness associated with a fever. He also obtained the summons from the Pemba police headquarters to his parents dated 25 November 1995 requesting their attendance to explain the applicant’s unlawful conduct in embarrassing the government and country. He made representations to the Secretary of State dated 30 January 1997, providing copies and requesting that his letter be considered as a fresh asylum application. 19. By letter dated 4 February 1997 the Secretary of State expressed the view that the police summons was self-serving and not significant, while the death certificate did not disclose proof that his brother, who died of a fever, had been murdered by the authorities. He had, accordingly, decided not to treat the representations as a fresh application for asylum, but to reconsider the original asylum application on all the evidence available to him. He refused on that basis to reverse his decision. 20. By letter dated 4 February 1997 the applicant’s representatives requested, alternatively, that the new material be referred to the special adjudicator under section 21 of the Immigration Act 1971. By letter dated 5 February 1997 the Secretary of State informed them that he had decided not to refer the material in question. 21. By letter dated 29 April 1997 the applicant’s representatives submitted to the Secretary of State a medical report about the applicant’s treatment following detention in Zanzibar, and requested that the new materials be submitted to the special adjudicator under section 21. They submitted further representations on 26 March 1998. The hospital medical report, dated 8 November 1994, from a medical officer recorded that the applicant had suffered a severe nasal haemorrhage, that this was of a “dangerous harm” degree and that the injury had been inflicted by hanging upside down. 22. By letter dated 23 April 1998 the Secretary of State informed the applicant that he had considered the new material, but that this evidence did not cause him to reverse his decision to refuse asylum. He noted that the documents would have been available to the applicant at the time of his appeal hearing but were not produced, which cast doubt on their authenticity. Even if the medical certificate and police summons were authentic, however, he saw no reason why the applicant could not return to live safely and without harassment in mainland Tanzania. He refused to make a reference under section 21. 23. The applicant applied for leave to apply for judicial review of the Secretary of State’s refusal to refer the new material to the special adjudicator. He submitted an expert opinion confirming that the documents were genuine. The Secretary of State submitted that the documents were irrelevant because the applicant could live safely in mainland Tanzania. He relied on a letter from the British High Commission in Tanzania dated 8 April 1998 which stated that in general there was no evidence of politically motivated detentions on the mainland, although there were “more general human rights problems such as arbitrary detentions and poor penal conditions” on the mainland. 24. On 1 July 1998 the application for leave was rejected by the High Court. Mr Justice Jowitt stated: “The Secretary of State’s decision [is] that things have changed and that as matters now stand, whatever was or was not the case in November 1996 and whatever ought or ought not to have been the outcome of the appeal heard then, the applicant can safely return to his home country, provided he goes to the mainland. Having looked at the letter [from the British High Commission], I can see no arguable grounds for saying that the Secretary of State has acted with Wednesbury unreasonableness in concluding that in the light of this new material he has no need to refer the matter to the Special Adjudicator and this application must be refused.” 25. The applicant appealed to the Court of Appeal arguing that the Secretary of State’s refusal was wrong in law and “Wednesbury unreasonable” and that, in claiming that the applicant could live safely on the mainland, he was not complying with international obligations by failing to take into account the applicant’s specific case or documentation. 26. On 1 December 1998 the Court of Appeal refused leave to apply for judicial review. In its judgment it noted that the hospital records showed that his brother had died of fever and did not support the applicant’s evidence that his brother had been tortured. Even assuming that the medical report on the applicant and the summons by the police to his parents were genuine, there was no evidence to suggest that the conclusion reached by the Secretary of State that the applicant could live without harassment on the mainland was wrong. 27. On 23 December 1998 the applicant was notified that he would be removed to Zanzibar on 11 January 1999. 28. On 22 February 1999 the applicant’s wife arrived in the United Kingdom and claimed asylum shortly afterwards. It was recorded that she stated in her interview that the police had harassed her due to her husband’s involvement with the CUF. She had been detained for one day in April 1995 and questioned about her husband’s whereabouts. The police came to her house on 12 February 1999, wanting to know if her husband was back in Zanzibar as there was a rumour that the United Kingdom had sent back most of the asylum-seekers from Zanzibar. They were angry because he had claimed asylum and tarnished the name of the President. They threatened to arrest her instead. 29. Asylum applications are determined by the Secretary of State, pursuant to paragraph 328 of the Immigration Rules and section 3 of the Immigration Act 1971 (“the 1971 Act”). Where leave to enter is refused by the Secretary of State pursuant to section 4 of the 1971 Act, the person may appeal against the refusal to a special adjudicator on the grounds that the removal would be contrary to the United Kingdom’s obligations under the Geneva Convention (section 8 of the 1971 Act). 30. An appeal lies from the special adjudicator to the Immigration Appeal Tribunal (section 20 of the 1971 Act). 31. Section 21 of the 1971 Act provides: “(1) Where in any case: (a) an adjudicator has dismissed an appeal, and there has been no further appeal to the Appeal Tribunal, or the tribunal has dismissed an appeal made to them ...; or (b) the Appeal Tribunal has affirmed the determination of an adjudicator dismissing an appeal ... the Secretary of State may at any time refer for consideration under this section any matter relating to the case which was not before the adjudicator or Tribunal ...” 32. Rule 346 of the Immigration Rules provides that the Secretary of State will treat representations as a fresh application if the claim advanced is sufficiently different from the earlier claim. He disregards, in considering whether to treat the representations as a fresh claim, material which is not significant, or is not credible, or was available to the applicant at the time when the previous application was refused or when any appeal was determined. 33. There have been a number of domestic cases where special adjudicators have rejected “internal flight” possibilities for CUF members from Zanzibar. In Masoud Mussa v. the Secretary of State (30 July 1998), the Government pointed out that the Secretary of State’s counsel had not been present to argue the point. In Omar Machano Omar v. the Secretary of State (24 June 1998), the asylum claimant was an escaped prisoner from Zanzibar and a target for internal extradition proceedings. In Salim Saleh Salim v. the Secretary of State (15 January 1998), the adjudicator found that there was no evidence before him to show that the claimant would be any safer on the mainland than in Zanzibar. 34. In the case of Adam Houiji Foum v. the Secretary of State (10 January 2000), the Immigration Appeal Tribunal allowed the appeal of a Tanzanian asylum-seeker who had been involved in CUF activities, on the basis that, as he had suffered torture in Zanzibar and a summons had been issued against him in Tanzania generally, there was a very reasonable prospect that he would be picked up by the police and undergo ill-treatment similar to that previously received in Zanzibar, either at the hands of the Zanzibar authorities or of the police in mainland Tanzania who also exercised brutality on prisoners in their custody. It therefore rejected the “internal flight” option. 35. Decisions of the Home Secretary to refuse asylum, to make a deportation order or to detain pending deportation are liable to challenge by way of judicial review and may be quashed by reference to the ordinary principles of English public law. 36. These principles do not permit the courts to make findings of fact on matters within the jurisdiction of the Secretary of State or to substitute their discretion for the minister’s. The courts may quash his decision only if he has failed to interpret or apply English law correctly, if he has failed to take account of issues which he was required by law to address, or if his decision was so irrational or perverse that no reasonable Secretary of State could have made it (Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v. Wednesbury Corporation [1948] 1 King’s Bench Reports 223). 37. In the recent case of R. v. Home Secretary, ex parte Turgut (28 January 2000), concerning the Secretary of State’s refusal of asylum to a young male Turkish Kurd draft evader, Lord Justice Simon Brown, in the Court of Appeal’s judgment, stated as follows: “I therefore conclude that the domestic court’s obligation on an irrationality challenge in an Article 3 case is to subject the Secretary of State’s decision to rigorous examination and this it does by considering the underlying factual material for itself to see whether it compels a different conclusion to that arrived at by the Secretary of State. Only if it does will the challenge succeed. All that said, however, this is not an area in which the Court will pay any especial deference to the Secretary of State’s conclusion on the facts. In the first place, the human right involved here – the right not to be exposed to a real risk of Article 3 treatment – is both absolute and fundamental: it is not a qualified right requiring a balance to be struck with some competing social need. Secondly, the Court here is hardly less well placed than the Secretary of State himself to evaluate the risk once the relevant material is before it. Thirdly, whilst I would reject the applicant’s contention that the Secretary of State has knowingly misrepresented the evidence or shut his eyes to the true position, we must, I think, recognise at least the possibility that he has (even if unconsciously) tended to depreciate the evidence of risk and, throughout the protracted decision-making process, may have tended also to rationalise the further material adduced so as to maintain his pre-existing stance rather than reassess the position with an open mind. In circumstances such as these, what has been called the ‘discretionary area of judgment’ – the area of judgment within which the Court should defer to the Secretary of State as the person primarily entrusted with the decision on the applicant’s removal ... – is decidedly a narrow one.” 38. In January 1997 the US Department of State released the Tanzania Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 1996. It stated: “The Government’s human rights record did not improve and problems persisted. Although the 1995 multiparty elections represented an important development, citizens’ right to change their government in Zanzibar is severely circumscribed. Although new opposition parties were competitive in many 1995 races and won in some constituencies, police often harassed and intimidated members and supporters of the opposition. Other human rights problems included police beatings and mistreatment of suspects, which sometimes resulted in death. Soldiers attacked civilians, and police in Zanzibar used torture, including beatings and floggings. Prison conditions remained harsh and life threatening. Arbitrary arrest and prolonged detention continued and the inefficient and corrupt judicial system often did not provide expeditious and fair trials ... Since the 1995 election, police in Zanzibar, particularly on Pemba, have regularly detained, arrested and harassed CUF members, and suspected supporters. Despite orders from the Union Government’s Inspector General of Police, officers in Zanzibar continue these activities ... The Wairoba Commission found that pervasive corruption affected the judiciary from clerks to magistrates. Clerks took bribes to decide whether or not to open cases and to hide or misdirect the files of those accused of crimes. Magistrates often accept bribes to determine guilt or innocence, pass sentence, withdraw charges or decide appeals ... There are reports of prisoners waiting several years for trial because they could not pay bribes to police and court officials. Authorities acknowledge that some cases have been pending since 1988. The Government initiated efforts as early as 1991 to highlight judicial corruption and increased its oversight ... In the 2 years since the election, government security forces and CCM gangs harassed and intimidated CUF members on both of the two main Zanzibar islands, Pemba and Ugunja. Because CUF won all 20 seats on Pemba, Pembans living on Ugunja were regarded as CUF supporters and as a result were harassed. CUF members accused police of detaining dozens of its members ... Safety is not ensured in Pemba, where security forces dispersed gatherings, intimidated and roughed up individuals ...” 39. In the Amnesty International Annual Report 1997, it was stated: “Prisoners of conscience were among scores of government opponents arrested and briefly detained on the islands of Zanzibar and Pemba. Many were held without charge or trial; others faced criminal charges and were denied bail. Scores of political prisoners were tortured and ill-treated on the islands ... Criminal charges such as sedition, vagrancy and involvement in acts of violence, often accompanied by the denial of bail for periods of two weeks or more, were also used as a method of intimidating government critics or opponents.” 40. In their 1998 report, Amnesty International stated: “In December [1997], 14 possible prisoners of conscience on Zanzibar were charged with treason and refused bail. The men, supporters of the CUF, were arrested and initially charged with sedition in November and December, during the week the CUF won a by-election to the Zanzibar House of Representatives.” 41. On 8 July 1998 Amnesty International issued a press release expressing concern that the vice-chairperson of the CUF might be arrested on a fabricated treason charge. In Tanzania it noted treason carried a mandatory death penalty. On 24 July 1998 Amnesty called for the immediate release of eighteen leading CUF members or supporters, most of them imprisoned since November 1997 on fabricated treason charges. It expressed concern about their deteriorating health and a denial of adequate medical treatment. 42. The 1998 US State Department report on Tanzania noted that serious problems remained in that government’s human rights record. “... the police regularly threaten, mistreat or beat suspected criminals during and after their apprehension and interrogation. Police also use the same means to obtain information about suspects from family members not in custody ... Police in Zanzibar use torture ... Repeated reports from credible sources indicate that the police use torture, including beatings and floggings in Zanzibar, notably on Pemba Island. Both the Zanzibar and Union Governments have denied these charges. Police have not yet explained the deaths of six detainees in the town of Morogoro who were electrocuted at the end of 1997 ... Prison conditions remained harsh and life-threatening. Government officials acknowledge that prisons are overcrowded and living conditions are poor. Prisons are authorised to hold 21,000 persons but the actual prison population is estimated at 47,000 ... The daily amount of food allotted to prisoners is insufficient to meet their nutritional needs and even this amount is not always provided ... Earlier the Commissioner of Prisons stated that his department received inadequate funds for medicine and medical supplies. Prison dispensaries only offer limited treatment, and friends and family members of prisoners generally must provide medication or the funds with which to purchase it. Serious diseases, such as dysentery, malaria and cholera are common and result in numerous deaths. Guards continued to beat and abuse prisoners. ... There were no reports of political prisoners on the mainland. At the year’s end, there were 18 political prisoners in Zanzibar.” 43. The report noted that in January 1998 the police had searched the offices of the CUF party in Tanzania and removed files. In the three years since the election in 1995, government security forces and CCM gangs harassed and intimidated CUF members on both the main Zanzibar islands of Pemba and Ugunja. 44. The Amnesty International 1999 Report for Tanzania stated that: “Eighteen prisoners of conscience, including three arrested during the year, were facing trial for treason on the island of Zanzibar, an offence that carries the death penalty. Scores of other opposition supporters in Zanzibar were imprisoned for short periods; some were possible prisoners of conscience. More than 300 demonstrators arrested on the mainland in the capital Dar es Salaam were held for several weeks and reportedly tortured. Conditions in some prisons were harsh ...” The eighteen prisoners, CUF members, included fifteen arrested in 1997 and three arrested in Zanzibar in May 1998, and many had reportedly fallen ill due to a denial of access to medical treatment. According to the report, the conditions in some mainland prisons amounted to cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment, which in the case of Mbeya Prison led to forty-seven deaths in the first half of the year. 45. In its press release of 27 January 2000 Amnesty International, reporting on the imminent trial of the eighteen CUF members, referred to them “as prisoners of conscience who are imprisoned solely on account of their non-violent opinions and peaceful political activities”. It described how between the 1995 and the 1998 elections, numerous CUF supporters had been arrested on trumped-up criminal charges, tortured in custody and imprisoned. On more recent events, it commented: “Following lengthy attempts by the Secretary General of the Commonwealth and the United Nations Secretary General to settle the political crisis in Zanzibar, an agreement was finally reached between the CCM and CUF in April 1999. Far-reaching reforms for democratisation, human rights and fair elections were set out in the Commonwealth Agreement, but few have yet been implemented. Although the CUF is allowed to operate more freely, the Zanzibar government continues to press ahead with the trial, intent on convictions and death sentences.” 46. In the 1999 US State Department report on Tanzania, issued on 25 February 2000, it was reported, inter alia, that the authorities had been responsible for a number of extrajudicial killings and that several prisoners had died as a result of harsh prison conditions, including inadequate nutrition, medical care and sanitation: “... the police regularly threaten, mistreat or occasionally beat suspected criminals during and after their apprehension and interrogation ... Repeated reports indicate that the police use torture, including beatings and floggings, in Zanzibar, notably on Pemba island.” The situation in Zanzibar was less favourable in a number of respects. It was stated that, except in Zanzibar, Tanzanian citizens generally enjoyed the right to discuss political alternatives freely and opposition party members openly criticised the government, although the government had used the provision prohibiting “abusive language” against the leadership to detain some opposition figures. Opposition parties had generally been more able to hold rallies, although CUF meetings in Zanzibar had been far more restricted than those of other parties. Police continued to break up meetings attended by persons thought to be opposed to the Zanzibar government. In Pemba the security forces broke up gatherings and intimidated opposition party officials and the government continued to arrest opposition politicians for holding meetings. “In the four years since the election, government security forces and CCM gangs harassed and intimidated CUF members on both main Zanzibar islands, Pemba and Ugunja ... The CUF accused police of detaining dozens of its members including several local leaders ... citizen’s safety is not assured in Pemba, where security forces dispersed gatherings and intimidated persons ... Almost all international donors have suspended direct assistance to Zanzibar in response to the authorities’ human rights abuses. Under pressure from the international community, the ruling CCM party and the main opposition party, the CUF, signed a political agreement in June to make the political process in Zanzibar fairer; however the provisions of the agreement were not fully implemented by the year’s end and observers believe that the Government did not act in good faith in the period following the signing of the agreement.” 47. In a letter dated 8 April 1998 the British High Commission in Dar es Salaam commented that there were concerns about the situation in Zanzibar but that on the mainland there had been no evidence of political killings, disappearances or politically motivated arrests. There were more general human rights problems, such as arbitrary detentions and poor penal conditions, which were systemic and not related to political activity. 48. In a letter dated 25 May 1998 Michael Hodd of the University of Westminster commented that there was evidence of human rights violations in Zanzibar, including a list of sixty-six missing persons. Although there was a good human rights record in mainland Tanzania, it was possible for the Zanzibar government to demand extradition, which had been successful in the case of Abdallah Kassim Hanga, whom a well-informed source reported as having been beheaded. 49. According to a report dated 16 March 1999 obtained by the applicant, Professor Parkin, professor of social anthropology at All Souls College, Oxford, an expert on Uganda, Kenya and Tanzania, stated that while there was less likelihood of persecution in mainland Tanzania than on Zanzibar, he observed a deteriorating situation also affecting the mainland. He referred to particular members of the Zanzibari CCM visiting the mainland and harassing and persecuting CUF dissidents who had taken refuge there. The Zanzibari CUF leader was living in Dar es Salaam but only ever moved out of his flat surrounded by CUF party aides able to protect him.