CASE OF TAGAYEVA AND OTHERS v. RUSSIA
Remainder inadmissible (Art. 35) Admissibility criteria;(Art. 35-3-a) Ratione personae;Violation of Article 2 - Right to life (Article 2 - Positive obligations;Article 2-1 - Life) (Substantive aspect);Violation of Article 2 - Right to life (Article 2-1 - Effective investigation) (Procedural aspect);Violation of Article 2 - Right to life (Article 2-1 - Life) (Substantive aspect);Violation of Article 2 - Right to life (Article 2-1 - Life) (Substantive aspect);No violation of Article 13+2 - Right to an effective remedy (Article 13 - Effective remedy) (Article 2 - Right to life;Article 2-1 - Life);Respondent State to take individual measures (Article 46-2 - Individual measures);Pecuniary damage - claim dismissed (Article 41 - Just satisfaction);Non-pecuniary damage - award (Article 41 - Non-pecuniary damage;Just satisfaction);Respondent State to take measures of a general character (Article 46-2 - General measures)
Dmitry Dedov;Erik Møse;Julia Laffranque;Khanlar Hajiyev;Linos-Alexandre Sicilianos;Mirjana Lazarova Trajkovska;Paulo Pinto De Albuquerque
5. The applicants raised various issues related to the terrorist attack, siege and storming of school no. 1 in Beslan, North Ossetia, Russia, from 1 to 3 September 2004. Some applicants were held hostage and/or injured, while others had family members among those taken hostage, killed or injured. Information in respect of each applicant is summarised in the Appendix. 6. While most events are relevant for all the applicants, their position in the domestic proceedings differed somewhat. However, given the number of applicants, the extent of the domestic procedures and the difficulties associated with establishing each applicant’s procedural role, the present judgment refers to them collectively as “the applicants”. This is based on the assumption that their position in the domestic proceedings was relatively similar, whether or not each of them participated in a given procedural step, either directly or through their representatives (see Abuyeva and Others v. Russia, no. 27065/05, § 181, 2 December 2010). 7. The anti-terrorist operation mounted from 1 to 4 September 2004 involved a number of State agencies. The documents in the case file refer to the police, internal troops of the Ministry of the Interior, army servicemen of the Ministry of the Defence and officers of the Federal Security Service (Федеральная Служба Безопасности (ФСБ) – hereinafter “the FSB”). Unless otherwise specified, the terms “security personnel” or “security forces” used in the present judgment apply to any of those State agents. Equally, the terms “anti-terrorist” or “security operation” are used to describe the operation of 1 to 4 September 2004. 8. The voluminous material in the case files lodged by the applicants and submitted by the Government include documents from four criminal investigations, three criminal trials, two sets of civil proceedings for compensation, two reports by parliamentary groups and one dissenting opinion thereon, books and articles written in the aftermath, copies of forensic and expert reports in respect of each applicant and/or their relatives, the applicants’ own statements to the Court and independent expert reports. The statement of facts below is a succinct summary of the documents mentioned above and other publicly available information. 9. The year 2004 saw a surge of terrorist acts in Russia involving numerous civilian victims. Mr Shamil Basayev, the underground leader of the Chechen separatist movement, either claimed responsibility or was held responsible for these acts. 10. On 6 February a suicide bomber killed over forty people and wounded over 250 on an underground train in Moscow. 11. In February and March several explosions in the Moscow Region damaged gas pipelines, a heating station and electricity pylons. 12. On 9 May the President of Chechnya, Mr Akhmat Kadyrov, and several senior officials were killed by a bomb in a stadium in Grozny. 13. On 21 and 22 June a large group of armed rebel fighters attacked Nazran, Ingushetia’s largest town. They primarily targeted police stations and other security offices; over ninety people were killed and an ammunition warehouse was looted. 14. On 24 August two civilian aeroplanes which had departed from Moscow Domodedovo Airport simultaneously exploded in mid-air; ninety people lost their lives. 15. On 31 August a suicide bomber blew himself up at the entrance to an underground station in Moscow, killing ten and wounding about fifty others. 16. On 18 August 2004 the North Ossetian Ministry of the Interior issued the following telex (no. 1751) to all local departments of the interior: “[The North Ossetian Ministry of the Interior] has received information indicating the movement of participants of [illegal armed groups] from the plains of [Ingushetia] and [Chechnya] to the mountainous and forested area along the border of [Ingushetia] and [North Ossetia]. A meeting of the fighters is presumably planned for mid-August of this year, following which they are intending to commit a terrorist act in [North Ossetia] similar to that in Budennovsk. According to the available information, the fighters plan to capture a civilian object with hostages in the territory of [North Ossetia], and then submit demands to the country’s leadership for the withdrawal of troops from [Chechnya]. A large sum of money in [a foreign] currency has apparently been transferred from Turkey. [This information is being] transmitted in order for preventive measures to be taken.” 17. On 27 August 2004 the North Ossetian Ministry of the Interior issued Decree no. 500 on the protection of public order and security during the Day of Knowledge in the educational facilities of North Ossetia, which was sent to all district police stations. The plan provided for heightened security awareness and an increase in the number of mobile posts and police officers near public gatherings, and contained a series of measures aimed at the prevention of terrorist acts and hostage-taking during public gatherings on the Day of Knowledge in the settlements situated along the administrative border with Ingushetia. The plan further stipulated that each head of the district departments of the Interior should inform the administrations of educational facilities accordingly, put in place working plans for every such gathering and personally inform police staff of their functions, carry out hourly updates of the situation at public gatherings, give immediate feedback to the North Ossetian Ministry of the Interior and provide contingency staff in each police department. 18. On 25, 27 and 28 August 2004 the North Ossetian Ministry of the Interior issued three other telexes to the local departments concerning security measures to be taken during the Day of Knowledge, heightened terrorist threats in the region and the prevention of possible attacks. The personnel of the Ministry of the Interior were put on high alert (усиленный режим несения службы). 19. As revealed by subsequent investigations, towards the end of August 2004 a sizeable group of terrorists (at least thirty people) were camping and training between the villages of Psedakh and Sagopshi in the Malgobek District of Ingushetia. In the early hours of 1 September 2004 the group crossed the administrative border between Ingushetia and North Ossetia, driving a GAZ-66 utility truck. 20. At 7.30 a.m. on 1 September 2004 Major S.G. from the North Ossetian Ministry of the Interior stopped the vehicle for an inspection at the administrative border with Khurikau. The terrorists disarmed him, placed him in the back seat of his own white VAZ-2107 and drove to Beslan. Major S.G. escaped and later testified about these events. 21. At 9 a.m. on 1 September 2004 school no. 1 in Beslan, North Ossetia, held a traditional Day of Knowledge ceremony to mark the opening of the academic year. Over 1,200 people gathered in the courtyard of the Eshaped two-storey building located on Kominterna Street in the centre of the town, whose population was approximately 35,000. The school was situated next door to the district police station of Pravoberezhny (Правобережный районный отдел внутренних дел (РОВД) – hereinafter “the Pravoberezhny ROVD”). The gathering included 859 schoolchildren, sixty teachers and staff of the school and members of their families. Dozens of children below the age of six were in the crowd with their parents, since several kindergartens in Beslan were closed on that day for various reasons. One unarmed police officer, Ms Fatima D., was at the ceremony. 22. According to some sources, on the morning of 1 September 2004 the Beslan traffic police were called to secure the passage of Mr Dzasokhov, the North Ossetian President, through the town. The applicants referred to the testimony of the traffic policemen and servicemen of the Pravoberezhny ROVD, saying that they had been instructed to take various positions along the route of Mr Dzasokhov’s convoy, and thus leave the school unprotected. 23. During the first few minutes of the ceremony, at about 9.05 a.m., a group of at least thirty-two people (the number of terrorists is disputed – see below) armed with various weapons, including machine guns, explosives and handguns, surrounded the people in the school courtyard and, shooting in the air, ordered them to enter the school through the main door and through smashed windows on the ground floor. A GAZ-66 vehicle entered the yard through the main gates and a group of terrorists jumped out. According to some witnesses, some other terrorists came from behind the school and another group was already in the building. 24. The terrorists in the main courtyard fired into the air and there was an exchange of fire with local residents and the police. At least two local residents were killed (Mr R. Gappoyev and Mr F. Frayev) and some were wounded during the shooting. It also appears that two terrorists were wounded. About one hundred people, mostly adults and senior students, managed to escape. Another fifteen people hid in the boiler building, from where they were rescued later in the day. 25. Despite the initial chaos, the terrorists managed to round up the majority of those in the courtyard – 1,128 people (the exact figure is disputed by some sources), including about 800 children aged between several months and eighteen years. Several groups of hostages initially tried to hide inside the school or escape through fire exits, but the terrorists were in firm control of the building and escorted everyone to the gymnasium. 26. The hostages were assembled in a gymnasium located on the ground floor in the central part of the building and measuring about 250 square metres. The terrorists informed them that it was a terrorist act and that they had to obey their orders. The hostages’ personal belongings, mobile telephones and cameras were confiscated, and they were ordered to sit on the floor. 27. The attackers then proceeded to arrange a system of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) around the gymnasium, using basketball hoops and gymnasium ladders for support. Male hostages were forced to assist them in this task, which was completed within about two hours. A single chain connected several smaller IEDs hanging above the hostages’ heads, two large IEDs attached to basketball hoops on the opposite walls of the gymnasium and several heavier ones placed on the floor. Some IEDs were filled with parts such as metal pellets, screws and bolts. They were connected by wire to pedal detonators (“dead man’s switches”), which two of the terrorists took turns to hold. Two women wearing ample black clothes with explosive belts underneath – suicide bombers – remained in the gymnasium among the hostages. 28. The attackers smashed the windows of the gymnasium, to allow air and probably avoid the use of gas as a means of attack. Several rooms around the school building were turned into firing points, with windows smashed and stocks of food, water and ammunition set out. During the course of the day the terrorists kept shooting out of the school windows in the direction of the security personnel and civilians gathered outside. 29. At 9.25 a.m. the Ministry of the Interior in Vladikavkaz received information about the seizure of the school. It was immediately transmitted to Mr Dzasokhov and the FSB. 30. The hostages were forced to sit in very cramped conditions on the floor of the gymnasium. During the first few hours of captivity some families remained separated, but they were allowed to reunite later during the day. 31. The hostages were ordered to keep quiet and not to speak in languages other than Russian. Mr Ruslan Betrozov, whose two sons were in the gymnasium, repeated the captors’ orders in Ossetian. One of the terrorists walked up to him and executed him in full view of everyone in the gymnasium by shooting him from close range; his body was not removed until several hours later. Mr Betrozov’s sons Alan (born in 1988) and Aslan (born in 1990) witnessed the execution; both boys died on 3 September 2004 during the storming. Another father of three, Mr Vadim Bolloyev, was shot in the shoulder during the first few hours of the crisis for apparently refusing to obey the terrorists’ orders. By the end of 1 September he had died in the gymnasium. His younger son Sarmat (born in 1998) survived the attack, but his two daughters Zarina (born in 1993) and Madina (born in 1995) died during the storming. 32. During the course of the day on 1 September 2004 the attackers allowed groups of children, under their escort and accompanied by adults, to access the toilets outside the sports hall to drink tap water. They also ordered senior students to bring water into the hall in buckets and distribute it among the hostages in small quantities. The terrorists also took a large television into the gymnasium and on several occasions turned on the radio so that some of the hostages could hear about the events on the news. 33. On 1 September the terrorists allowed the elderly and sick hostages and some mothers with nursing babies to stay in a smaller adjacent weights room, where they could stretch out on the floor. They were later taken into the sports hall. 34. From 2 September the terrorists refused to allow the hostages water and ordered them to use buckets to relieve themselves and to drink their own urine. They announced to the hostages that the tap water had been poisoned and that they would be undergoing a “dry hunger strike” in support of their captors’ demands. Some chewed the leaves of interior plants in order to relieve their thirst. Survivors later complained of severe thirst and heat on 2 and especially 3 September 2004. 35. From the outset the terrorists separated most of the men and forced them to perform various tasks in order to fortify the building, or put in place IEDs. They were told that their disobedience would lead to the execution of women and children in the hall. 36. On the morning of 1 September two men were ordered to lift up floorboards from the library floor. Floorboards were also lifted from the corners of the gymnasium. Others were ordered to move furniture and blackboards to the windows of various classrooms and corridors. 37. On the afternoon of 1 September several men were lined up in the corridor of the ground floor. An explosion occurred there at 4.05 p.m., as a result of which several male hostages were killed or injured. One (or two) women suicide bombers and one terrorist of Arab descent were killed by this blast. Several explanations for that explosion were put forward; the criminal investigation accepted that the terrorist in charge of the operation, Mr Khuchbarov, “Polkovnik” (Colonel), had executed the male hostages whom the terrorists had no longer needed and at the same time had activated the explosive belt of one of the suicide bombers because she had objected to the treatment of the children. Some of the surviving hostages testified that there had been an attack from the outside, as a result of which the explosive belt had detonated killing the female bomber, the Arab terrorist and several hostages. 38. Men who survived the explosion in the corridor were finished off with automatic rifles. Karen Mdinaradze survived the explosion and the ensuing execution. When the terrorists discovered that he was still alive, he was allowed to return to the gymnasium, where he fainted. He later testified about these events. At about 4.30 p.m. on 1 September the terrorists forced two men to throw bodies out of a window on the first floor. One of them, Aslan Kudzayev, jumped out the window and was wounded but survived. His wife, one of the applicants, was released on 2 September with their infant daughter; their other daughter remained in the gymnasium and received injuries during the storming. 39. According to the investigation, sixteen men were killed by the terrorists on 1 September. Another sixteen people were wounded that day as a result of shots fired by the terrorists. 40. At about 3 p.m. on 2 September the terrorists fired several rounds from automatic weapons from the windows of the school, although it appears that no one was hurt and there was no return fire. 41. At around 11 a.m. on 1 September the terrorists passed a note to the authorities via one of the hostages. Mrs Larisa Mamitova, an ambulance doctor, walked to the school gates, handed the note to a man who approached her and walked back; in the meantime her young son was being held at gunpoint inside the building. The note contained a mobile telephone number and the names of the people with whom the terrorists wanted to negotiate: the North Ossetian President Mr Dzasokhov, the Ingushetian President Mr Zyazikov and a paediatrician, Dr Roshal. The note also stated that the school building had been mined and would be blown up in the event of an attempt to storm it, and that the terrorists would shoot fifty hostages for any one of them killed. However, it appears that the mobile telephone number had either been wrongly noted or was switched off, as no telephone contact could be established at that time. 42. At 1 p.m. on 1 September the Russian State television programme “Vesti” announced that the attackers had transmitted a videotape to the authorities, containing their demands and images filmed inside the school. One hour later it was announced that the videotape was empty. Later, the very existence of this videotape remained disputed. 43. Around 4 p.m. on 1 September Mrs Mamitova took out a second note, containing a corrected mobile telephone number and the name of another possible negotiator, Mr Aslakhanov, an aide to the Russian President. She also told the person who collected the note that there were over 1,000 hostages inside the building. 44. The authorities contacted the terrorists through a professional negotiator, the FSB officer Mr Z. His attempts to discuss proposals aimed at alleviating the hostages’ conditions and the possibility of exiting or surrendering or removing bodies from the school courtyard remained futile. 45. Dr Roshal arrived in Beslan on the afternoon of 1 September 2004. When he called the hostage takers, on 1 and 2 September, they were hostile and told him that they would only enter into negotiations if all four people requested by them came to the school. They told him that if he attempted to enter alone, he would be killed. They also refused to accept food, water or medicine, and forbade him from entering the building to examine the sick and wounded. 46. On 2 September the former President of Ingushetia, Mr Ruslan Aushev, arrived in Beslan at the request of the operative headquarters (“the OH”). It appears that at about 3 p.m. he, for the first time, telephoned Mr Akhmed Zakayev, the head of the self-proclaimed Chechen separatist government who was living in London. He told Mr Zakayev about the siege and said that the number of hostages exceeded 1,000. 47. Following telephone contact with the terrorists, at 3.30 p.m. on 2 September, Mr Aushev was allowed to enter the school. He was the only person whom the terrorists agreed to let inside during the siege. Mr Aushev was led to the gymnasium and had a meeting with the leader of the terrorists, Mr Khuchbarov (“Polkovnik”). 48. Following negotiations, Mr Aushev was permitted to leave with twentysix (other sources indicate twenty-four) people – nursing mothers and their babies. All the women had older children in the school and were forced to leave them behind. 49. Mr Aushev took out a message from Mr Shamil Basayev addressed to the Russian President, Mr Vladimir Putin. It demanded that troops be pulled out of Chechnya and official recognition of Chechnya as an independent State. In return, it promised that terrorist activities in Russia would end “for the next ten or fifteen years”. It made no mention of the school siege. It appears that the terrorists also gave Mr Aushev a videotape depicting part of his visit, the gymnasium with the hostages, explosive devices and one terrorist holding his foot on a “dead man’s switch”. It also contained a statement by Mr Khuchbarov that the negotiations should involve Mr Aslan Maskhadov, the President of the self-proclaimed independent Chechen State, who had been in hiding at the time. 50. On 2 September and on the morning of 3 September the attackers tried to contact the North Ossetian authorities of North Ossetia with the assistance of the school director, Mrs Tsaliyeva. Two hostages – children of the head of the North Ossetian Parliament, Mr Mamsurov – were allowed to call their father on his mobile telephone and tell him that they were suffering without water and food. It appears that family members of other possible contacts among officials and public figures (district prosecutor, a well-known sportsman) were singled out by the terrorists but no contact was established. 51. In parallel to the negotiations carried out through Mr Z., on 2 September direct contact with the terrorists was established through Mr Gutseriyev, an influential businessman of Ingush origin. He supplied Mr Aushev with the requisite telephone numbers, participated in conversations with Mr Akhmed Zakayev and eventually tried to liaise with Mr Maskhadov. 52. As can be seen from various information sources, at around 5 p.m. on 2 September Mr Aushev, Mr Dzasokhov and Mr Zakayev had a telephone conversation during which Mr Zakayev promised to involve Mr Maskhadov in the negotiations (see paragraphs 129, 321, 331, 339 below). Some sources indicate that these talks apparently resulted in Mr Maskhadov agreeing to go to Beslan. 53. At about 10.30 a.m. on 1 September 2004 the OH started to function on the premises of the Beslan town administration. The exact composition, leadership and powers of this structure remain disputed. According to most sources, it was initially headed by Mr Dzasokhov, the North Ossetian President, and as of 2 September by General V. Andreyev, the head of the North Ossetian FSB. It was later established that the OH included the deputy head of the counter-terrorism commission of North Ossetia Mr Tsyban, the Minister of the North Ossetian Ministry of Emergency Situations (Emercom) Mr Dzgoyev, the North Ossetian Minister of Education Mrs Levitskaya, deputy head of the information programmes department of the State television company, Rossiya, Mr Vasilyev and the commander-in-chief of the 58th Army of the Ministry of Defence General Sobolev (see paragraphs 130, 158, 183, 312-333 below). 54. The detachments of the 58th Army started to arrive in Beslan during the afternoon of 1 September. On 2 September 2004 eight armoured personnel carriers (APCs) and several tanks of the 58th Army arrived. They were placed under the command of the FSB special purpose units and positioned around the school out of the terrorists’ sight. 55. In the early morning of 3 September the FSB special purpose units went to Vladikavkaz for joint training with the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of Defence to prepare for a possible storming. 56. Thousands of people in Beslan were directly affected by the crisis. 57. Despite the attempts of the authorities to clear the area, local residents and ethnic Ossetians from outside Beslan, some of whom were armed, remained around the school building throughout the siege. 58. On the afternoon of 1 September the hostages’ relatives were invited to the town’s Cultural Centre. Until the end of the siege the Cultural Centre remained a hub for communicating with relatives and providing medical and psychological assistance to them. 59. At 7 p.m. on 1 September the North Ossetian President Mr Dzasokhov, the deputy speaker of the North Ossetian Parliament Mr Kesayev and the North Ossetian Deputy Minister of the Interior Mr Sikoyev met with relatives in the Cultural Centre. During the meeting Mr Sikoyev informed them that the terrorists had not put forward any demands and had refused to accept food, water or medicine for the hostages. 60. At about 9.30 p.m. on 1 September Dr Roshal participated in the meeting at the Cultural Centre. He assured those present that the conditions in the school were “acceptable” and that the hostages could survive for several days without food or water. He also stated that the terrorists had not put forward any demands to the authorities. 61. On 2 September a psychological aid unit was set up at the Cultural Centre. 62. Late in the evening of 2 September Mr Dzasokhov held another meeting with the relatives at the Cultural Centre. 63. At 11.15 a.m. on 3 September he announced to the relatives that there would be no storming and that “new public figures” had appeared in the negotiation process. 64. Some of the applicants were among the relatives who had gathered outside the school building or stayed at the Cultural Centre, and submitted written statements describing the events. 65. From the outset the information about the hostage-taking was strictly controlled by the authorities. Mr Vasilyev, a member of the OH and a senior employee of Rossiya, was put in charge of contacting the journalists. 66. On the afternoon of 1 September the media announced, referring to official sources, that about 250 people had been taken hostage. Later that day the media reported a “corrected” number of hostages: 354 people. According to some hostages, this news outraged the terrorists and prompted them to execute men or throw their bodies out of the window. It also transpires from the hostages’ statements that after the announcements the terrorists refused to allow them to drink or go to the toilet, saying that “there should be no more than 350 of you left anyway” (see paragraph 285 below). 67. On the evening of 2 September Dr Roshal held a press conference. He announced that he had talked on the telephone to a terrorist nicknamed “Gorets” (highlander), who had put forward no demands. 68. At 1 p.m. on 3 September State television showed some of the terrorists’ relatives of Ingush origin asking them to release the hostages. One woman, the wife of a presumed hostage taker, said that she and her children were being held somewhere “against their will” and asked her husband to do everything “to avoid harming the children”. 69. The hostages in the gymnasium were extremely exhausted and suffered from thirst and hunger. They had gone two days without sleep in cramped conditions and the physical state of many had worsened: people started to lose consciousness and some children were hallucinating, having seizures and vomiting. 70. In the early morning the terrorists lifted the IEDs in the gymnasium from the floor, hanging them along the walls. 71. At 11.10 a.m. the terrorists agreed to a request by Mr Aushev and Mr Gutseriyev to allow Emercom to collect the bodies from the school courtyard. 72. At about noon Mr Dzasokhov informed the OH that he had reached some sort of agreement with Mr Zakayev (see paragraph 331 below). According to some sources, that agreement could have extended to the possibility of Mr Maskhadov arriving in Beslan. 73. At 12.55 p.m. an Emercom truck and four officers entered the school courtyard. The men had Mr Gutseriyev’s mobile telephone to communicate with the terrorists. One of the terrorists came out and supervised their work. The explosions inside the gymnasium at 1.03 p.m. came unexpectedly to the group. The ensuing exchange of gunfire resulted in two officers being killed. 74. At 1.03 p.m. a powerful explosion occurred in the upper east part of the gymnasium. Part of the roof was destroyed, the insulation caught fire and fragments of the burning ceiling and roof fell into the gymnasium, killing and injuring those seated underneath. Many of the surviving hostages described the first explosion as a “fireball” or “column of fire”, followed by silvery white powder falling from the ceiling. It appears that the explosion caused a fire in the roof space of the gymnasium (see paragraph 288 below). Twenty seconds later another explosion ripped through the lower part of the wall under the first window on the north-east side. The nature and origins of these explosions are disputed (see documents referred to below). 75. The two explosions killed both terrorists who had been holding the detonators, though most of the IEDs remained intact (see paragraph 307 below). Dozens of people were killed, others were wounded or received burns of varying degrees, and almost everyone was shell-shocked. Many applicants submitted witness statements about these events. 76. Those who could move and were able to reach the opening in the wall on the north side started to climb through it and run outside. The terrorists fired at them from the upper floor, prompting an exchange of gunfire between the terrorists and the security forces. 77. At this point General Andreyev issued an order to storm the building and proceed with the rescue operation and neutralisation of the terrorists. 78. Several terrorists were killed or wounded during the first two explosions but the majority of them survived, including “Polkovnik”. They rounded up the survivors in the gymnasium (about 300 people) and forced them to walk to other parts of the main building, mostly in the south wing: the canteen, the kitchen, a meeting room and craft classrooms. Some hostages remained in the rooms adjacent to the gymnasium, namely the weights room and changing rooms. 79. The dead, injured and shell-shocked remained in the gymnasium, where fire continued to spread in the roof space. 80. At about 1.30 p.m. a third powerful explosion occurred in the south part of the gymnasium, which appears to have been caused by one of the large IEDs catching fire. Soon afterwards flames spread around the gymnasium, taking to the floor and walls. Some hostages continued to escape through the openings in the walls. 81. Between 1.30 and 2.50 p.m. servicemen of the security services and local residents broke the west wall of the gymnasium and entered the hall. They helped to evacuate survivors. Their movements were covered by an APC which went close to the school. No terrorists were found there, but the gymnasium was under fire, probably from terrorist snipers on the first floor. 82. At about 1.40 p.m. part of the burning roof collapsed. 83. Hundreds of wounded hostages and servicemen were taken to the Beslan Hospital in private cars and ambulances. A field hospital had been set up by Emercom in the hospital courtyard in order to sort the wounded and cope with the influx of casualties. Many of the injured were taken to hospitals in Vladikavkaz. The hostages’ relatives were not allowed to enter the hospital. Over 750 civilians and over fifty servicemen received medical help on 3 September 2004 (see paragraphs 242 et seq. below). 84. Over 300 hostages who had survived the explosions and fire in the gymnasium were taken by the terrorists to the canteen and kitchen situated on the ground floor in the south wing. Other hostages were taken to the main meeting room situated above the canteen on the first floor. There they found stocks of water and food and could relieve their thirst for the first time in two and a half days. 85. The women and children in the canteen and meeting room were forced by the terrorists at gunpoint to stand in the windows as human shields and wave their clothes; some were killed or wounded by gunfire and explosions. 86. As shown by many of the witness statements, but not corroborated by the results of the criminal investigation, after 2 p.m. a tank with hull number 320 entered the schoolyard and fired several rounds at the canteen. It appears that another tank with hull number 325 or 328 also fired at the school from a distance of about 20 to 30 metres. Some of the rounds were fired with solid shots, while others were probably done with ammunition (see paragraphs 293, 294, 298, 303, 411 below). 87. Two APCs entered the schoolyard and took part in the fighting with their large-calibre machine guns. 88. The army and the FSB assault troops were positioned on the roofs of 37, 39 and 41 Shkolny Lane, five-storey apartment blocks located on the east side of the school. These servicemen fired at the school with portable grenade launchers and flame-throwers, although the exact timing of the attacks is disputed (see paragraphs 142, 293, 300, 408, 410 below). Two MI24 helicopters circled above the school. According to some sources, although not corroborated by the official investigation, at least one rocket was launched from a helicopter on the school roof (see paragraph 410 below). 89. At 3.10 p.m. the OH ordered fire brigades with water cannons to intervene, by which time the gymnasium was ablaze and other parts of the building were on fire (see paragraphs 150, 199, 304 below). At the same time the head of the OH ordered the servicemen of the FSB special forces units Alfa and Vympel to enter the building. 90. At about 3.30 p.m. the entire roof of the gymnasium collapsed. After 4.30 p.m. the fire was contained; the servicemen of the special forces and firefighters entered the gymnasium, but found no survivors. 91. It appears that the servicemen of the special forces entered the canteen at about 4 p.m. through the openings in the walls and through the windows whose metal bars had fallen off as a result of the explosions or having been pulled out with an APC. Amid fierce fighting they evacuated the surviving hostages. 92. Numerous bodies of terrorists and hostages were found in the canteen, meeting room and rooms and corridors of the south wing. 93. At about 5 p.m. a strict security perimeter was established around the school. All civilians, Emercom staff, firefighters and servicemen of the army were ordered to leave, leaving only the FSB special forces inside. At about 5.25 p.m. the servicemen of the FSB special units held a minute’s silence in the corridor of the south wing in order to honour the memory of their comrades: ten members of the elite Vympel and Alfa units, including three group commanders, had lost their lives and about thirty were wounded – the biggest losses ever sustained by the units in a single operation. 94. After 6 p.m. several shots were fired at the south wing of the building from anti-tank missiles and flame-throwers. 95. At about 9 p.m. two tanks fired at the school. Several powerful explosions followed, which completely destroyed the walls and roof of the craft classrooms in the south wing. 96. The gunfire and explosions at the school continued until past midnight. 97. One terrorist, Nurpashi Kulayev, was captured alive. The rest, it appears, were killed during the storming. Consistent rumours circulated that some terrorists had escaped or had been captured secretly. 98. On the night of 4 September President Putin arrived in Beslan and stayed for several hours. He visited the town hospital and administration. 99. The school building had remained surrounded by soldiers throughout the day. 100. At 7 a.m. Emercom staff started to collect the bodies and clear the debris. Between 112 and 116 charred bodies were found in the gymnasium, and about eighty bodies in the adjacent changing rooms and weights room. It appears that between 106 and 110 bodies were found in the south wing of the school and on other premises, although no exact information was recorded in this respect (see paragraphs 119-122 below). The bodies of eighteen men were collected from the courtyard. About 330 bodies (including those of over 180 children) were placed in the schoolyard and taken to the Vladikavkaz morgue. 101. Later during the day on 4 September bulldozers and trucks arrived at the school. The remaining debris was loaded onto trucks and taken to the town rubbish dump. The victims alleged that they and other locals had later found a number of important items of evidence among this rubbish, including the terrorists’ personal belongings such as backpacks and razor blades, human remains, hostages’ clothes and parts of IEDs. 102. At 6 p.m. on 4 September the security cordons in Beslan were lifted. After 8 p.m. the units of the 58th Army withdrew from the town. 103. On 5 September 2004 the first funerals took place. Over the days that followed collective burials of over 100 people took place. The local cemetery was too small and had to be extended. A special memorial was later erected there (see paragraph 422 below). 104. Many of the bodies were charred beyond recognition. On 17 September seventy-three bodies were taken to a forensic laboratory in RostovonDon for identification through DNA testing. The identification and burials continued throughout December 2004 (see paragraphs 340, 341 below). 105. After declaring 5 and 6 September 2004 days of national mourning, on 6 September 2004 President Putin delivered a televised address to the nation, announcing future measures to improve agency cooperation in counter-terrorism measures. He called the attack a “direct intervention of international terrorism against Russia”. 106. On 5 September 2004 the website Chechenpress.org published a message signed by “the President of Ichkeria” Mr Aslan Maskhadov, condemning the hostage-taking and terrorist attacks against civilians, but blaming the Russian authorities for the radicalisation of Chechens. 107. On 17 September 2004 the website Kavkazcenter.com circulated an email, allegedly from Mr Shamil Basayev, a leader of the radical wing of the Chechen separatist movement who used the titles “Amir of Riyadus Saliheen Brigade of Martyrs” and “the chief of the high military madjlisul shura of the united Caucasus mujahidin”. Mr Basayev, who at the time lived secretly in the Russian North Caucasus, claimed that his “battalion of martyrs” had carried out the attack in Beslan, as well as the explosions in Moscow and the aeroplane crashes in August 2004. 108. The email alleged that the special forces had started the storming and that the IEDs set up by the attackers in the gymnasium had not exploded. Mr Basayev also claimed that the following demands had been put to the authorities: that military action in Chechnya be stopped, that troops be pulled out and that President Putin step down from his post. The note stated that all the hostages, including children, had declared a “dry hunger strike” until these demands were granted. The letter contained details of the number and types of IEDs used, indicated the ethnic origin of thirtythree “mujahedin” who had taken part in “Operation Nord-West” (as they had named the attack at the school) and alleged that the group had gathered and trained for the last ten days under Mr Basayev’s personal leadership near the village of Batako-Yurt [near Psedakh in Ingushetia]. The letter also mentioned the message to President Putin, which had been transmitted through Mr Aushev, and contained its full text. Mr Basayev alleged that the only surviving terrorist, Mr Nurpashi Kulayev, had been taken into the group the night preceding the operation. The document further stated that the leader of the operation, “Polkovnik”, had called him after the storming had started to say that they had counterattacked, and that the last call from him had been received at 2 a.m. [on 4 September]. Lastly, the letter cited the alleged costs of the terrorist attacks of August and September 2004: 8,000 euros (EUR) for “Operation Nord-West”, 7,000 US dollars (USD) for the explosions in Moscow and USD 4,000 for the aeroplanes. 109. In August 2005 the same website published another message signed by Mr Shamil Basayev containing passages suggesting that a member of the group which had seized the school, Mr Vladimir Khodov, had been a double agent of the FSB and Mr Basayev and had ensured the group’s “cover” during the preparation for the attack and their unhindered passage to North Ossetia. 110. On 10 July 2006 Mr Basayev was killed by an explosion in Ingushetia. It was announced that his death had been a result of a special operation by the Russian security services. It was also reported that the blast had resulted from the mishandling of explosives. 111. On 1 September 2004 the North Ossetian Prosecutor opened criminal investigation no. 20/849 concerning a terrorist attack at the school by an armed group and the murder of twelve male hostages. 112. On 2 September 2004 Mr Fridinskiy, Deputy Prosecutor General, ordered the transfer of the investigation concerning the hostage-taking of over 600 people to the Prosecutor General’s Office in the North Caucasus. On the same day Mr Fridinskiy appointed a group of over sixty investigators from the prosecutors’ offices of the Southern Federal Circuit to take over the investigation, under the command of a special investigator of the Prosecutor General’s Office in the North Caucasus. 113. The investigation was extended on several occasions and is still pending (adjourned). 114. Many important investigative steps aimed at establishing the exact circumstances of the preparations for and carrying out of the terrorist act, as well as the explosions in the gymnasium and the ensuing storming, were taken in the course of these proceedings. The applicants claimed that in the course of the proceedings they had not been allowed full access to the documents of the file and challenged this aspect of the proceedings. At the Court’s request, the Government submitted the list of documents in the criminal case. According to this list, by 2012 the case file contained 235 volumes, each ranging on average between 200 and 350 pages. The available information may be summarised as follows. 115. The investigation found out that the group which had committed the terrorist act had been organised by Mr Aslan Maskhadov, Mr Shamil Basayev, “a mercenary of Arab descent” called Taufik-al-Jedani (AbuDzeyt), and their entourage. The aim of the group had been “to disturb the public peace and scare the population to put pressure on the State authorities in order to achieve the withdrawal of troops from Chechnya”. In July and August 2004 the men had put together a plan to take hostage a large number of pupils and parents of school no. 1 in Beslan and murder civilians, police officers and military servicemen. 116. In the second half of August 2004 the men had put together an organised criminal group (gang) comprising over thirty people. Its members had included residents of Chechnya, Ingushetia, other regions of Russia and foreign mercenaries. The organisers of the terrorist act had entrusted the command of the operation to an active member of the gang, Mr Khuchbarov from Ingushetia, who had used the nickname “Rasul” and the radio callname “Polkovnik” (colonel). Twenty-four terrorists were identified by name, while at least six remained unidentified. 117. On 31 August 2004 the gang had gathered in the vicinity of Psedakh in the Malgobek District of Ingushetia. They had had the following arms and ammunition (partly originating from the attacks in Ingushetia on 21 and 22 June 2004): at least twenty Kalashnikov assault rifles, four Kalashnikov machine guns (RPK-74 and PKM), one tank machine gun (PKT), two portable anti-tank missile launchers (RPG-7V), four hand pistols and corresponding ammunition, including cartridges of different calibres and grenades of various modifications. In addition, the group had had two identical IEDs comprised of plastic explosives and hexogen and filled with metal pellets and electro detonators (with a minimum impact radius of 200 metres), six IEDs made of OZM-72 anti-personnel circular fragmentation mines and so-called “suicide bomber belts” – IEDs containing plastic explosives and projectiles made of cut metal wires and metal sheets. The gang had also used mobile telephones and portable radio transmitters. The members had been supplied with camouflage clothes, balaclavas and gas masks. They used a GAZ-66 truck. 118. On 31 August 2004 Mr Khuchbarov had informed the members of the gang about the forthcoming attack and distributed roles amongst them. In the early morning of 1 September 2004 they had travelled towards Beslan. As they had passed through the village of Khurikau they had captured a local policeman, S.G., seizing his handgun and vehicle. 119. Between 7 a.m. and 6.25 p.m. on 4 September 2004 a group of investigators and experts, in the presence of twelve attesting witnesses, compiled a report of the school building and courtyard. The examination of the site was conducted while the clearing of the debris and rescue operation were taking place. It ran to forty-three pages and was accompanied by video and photographic material (over 150 pages). 120. The report mostly concentrated on descriptions of the items found in the school, including personal belongings and documents of the hostages, the terrorists’ equipment and ammunition, damage to the structure of the building and the terrorists’ bodies. Very little information was given about the location and state of the hostages’ bodies. Most notably, page 24 of the report contained the following passage: “[in the gymnasium] from the floor up to 40 to 50 centimetres high there are hundreds of burnt bodies of women, children and men, occupying about half of the gymnasium floor space”. Only three individual descriptions of hostages’ bodies were made. On page 13 it was noted that the body of a twelve to fourteen-year-old boy had been found next to the corpse of a terrorist in a classroom located on the ground floor and on page 25 that the bodies of an elderly man and woman had been found in a storage room adjacent to the gymnasium. The report noted that the bodies had been carried out by Emercom staff into the courtyard. Among relevant items noted as “found among the rubble in the gymnasium” and taken by the sappers and Emercom staff into the courtyard were parts of explosive charges from grenade launchers, launching tubes of grenade launchers, a security cap from an RPO-A Shmel flame-thrower, parts of hand grenades, anti-personnel mines, automatic firearms, pistols, cartridges and ammunition and parts of IEDs. Other similar items were listed simply as “collected at the site”, without specifying in which part of the school they had been found. 121. The description of the canteen on page 15 failed to mention the state of its two windows facing the railway line or to give any details about the nature and extent of damage to its walls other than “signs of damage from firearms ... [resulting in] whitewash falling off”. Page 21 described the damage to the main meeting hall, including a partially destroyed external brick wall and two openings measuring 15 by 20 centimetres in the wall facing the railway line. The adjacent corridor bore signs of numerous impact traces and was scattered with parts of a destroyed wall and furniture. 122. The description of the south wing on page 23 was limited to the following: “the wing is almost destroyed and the Emercom servicemen are clearing the debris, as a result of which no examination of this wing is being carried out”. 123. Subsequent expert reports cited additional examinations of the site. Several reports cited examinations which had taken place on 2 February 2005, 14 September 2005 and 21 February 2007. The reports of these examinations contained much more detailed descriptions of the structure, findings and traces of impact. They were accompanied by a collection of samples, such as scrapes and swabs, in order for chemical examinations to be carried out. The documents indicated that most of the samples had been unable to yield any relevant results. 124. Following requests by the investigation in October and November 2004, on 23 December 2005 “comprehensive forensic expert examination no. 1” (комплексная судебная экспертиза hereinafter “expert report no. 1”) was produced. The request was to evaluate the conduct of the OH and various military and security agencies from 1 to 3 September 2004. The experts visited the site in Beslan and examined numerous items of evidence, including the testimony of servicemen and other witnesses, photographs, graphs and tapes of telephone and radio conversations. The report ran to over seventy pages. It concluded that the actions of the officials had been lawful and reasonable in the circumstances. In particular, it found that the members of the OH and servicemen of the Ministry of the Interior, the internal troops, the FSB and Emercom “had not committed any offences which could bear a causal relationship with the negative consequences resulting from the terrorist act of 1 to 3 September 2004”. 125. This document was extensively cited and relied upon in the subsequent proceedings, although it was later declared invalid (see paragraph 156 below). 126. The report focused on several questions. 127. Firstly, the report found that the actions of the OH had been focused on negotiations with the terrorists in order to obtain the release of and ensure safety for a maximum number of people. The terrorists’ demands transmitted through Mr Aushev could not serve as the subject of negotiations, since they had threatened the basis of the constitutional order and Russia’s territorial integrity. 128. The involvement of Mr Aushev and Mr Gutseriyev as negotiators, as suggested to the OH by the FSB, and the success of Mr Aushev’s mission when he had taken out twenty-six people, had served as an antidote to the escalation of the ethnic Ossetian-Ingush conflict. 129. With respect to Mr Maskhadov’s involvement in the negotiations, the report found that Mr Dzasokhov and Mr Aushev had talked to Mr Zakayev on the morning of 3 September. He had told them that his connection with Mr Maskhadov had remained on a one-way level. They had suggested to Mr Zakayev that he contact Mr Shamil Basayev, but he had refused in view of their past differences. 130. The report also covered the question of Mr Dzasokhov’s involvement in the OH. It stated that on the morning of 1 September 2004 Mr Dzasokhov had taken an active part in the work of the OH. Under his command the officials had ensured a security perimeter around the school, informed the public about the measures taken, supplied the local population with the necessary provisions in the Cultural Centre, and set up a field hospital. Information to the inhabitants had been provided hourly through Mr Dzugayev, the North Ossetian President’s press secretary. Mr Dzasokhov had taken care of the immediate needs of the first day of the siege, coordinating various agencies involved and increasing the security of other vital objects in the Republic. When the terrorists had named him as a negotiator, Mr Dzasokhov had been prepared to go ahead, but the OH had formally forbidden him from doing so. 131. Having scrutinised the taped conversations between the hostage takers and the OH and between the terrorists inside the building and their collaborators outside (namely several conversations with someone using the call-name “Magas” recorded after the start of the storming), the experts found that the terrorists had unconditionally refused to discuss any measures aimed at alleviating the hostages’ situation or any other arrangements except for political demands relating to the situation in Chechnya, and had insisted that the hostages had voluntarily joined them in declaring a “dry hunger strike”. The telephone conversations had often been ended by them in an aggressive manner and without apparent reason. Furthermore, they had anticipated and planned their own deaths, as well as numerous deaths among the hostages, as attested by the cheers and support received by them from “Magas” once the storming had started. These later conversations had contained references to “meeting in heaven”, “fulfilling the duty” and becoming martyrs (shahid), and had welcomed the killing of infidels and referred to the storming as “going normally”. 132. The report relied on numerous telexes, orders and decrees issued by the Ministry of the Interior and the FSB in July and August 2004 indicating a heightened terrorist threat in the North Caucasus and ordering various measures to be taken by the local police and security forces. As of 22 August all forces of the Ministry of the Interior in the Southern Federal Circuit had been put on alert (усиленный вариант несения службы). On 24 and 31 August the local police stations had been requested to take special measures to prevent terrorist acts from taking place during the Day of Knowledge on 1 September. 133. With respect to the Pravoberezhny ROVD of Beslan (situated next to the school building), the report concluded that the commanding officers had failed to take certain preventive steps. In particular, the personnel of the ROVD had not been told what action to take in case of an emergency, and no plan had been put in place to ensure additional security during ceremonies in the schools. The only police officer at school no. 1 had been unarmed, namely Mrs Fatima D. The two other police officers who had been scheduled to guard the school during the ceremony had been absent. Two patrol officers of the transport police had been transferred elsewhere to secure the passage of Mr Dzasokhov’s convoy along the “Kavkaz” federal highway. As a result, the terrorists had had unhindered access to the school and had been able to force a large number of hostages inside. No reaction from the local law-enforcement bodies had been forthcoming during the first fifteen minutes of the attack. 134. The servicemen of the Pravoberezhny ROVD, having received no instructions beforehand and having no preliminary plan of action in the event of a terrorist act, had received arms and ammunition at the ROVD and by 10 a.m. had set up a security cordon around the school. Information about the school siege had been immediately transmitted to the North Ossetian Ministry of the Interior. The report found that the actions of the senior staff of the Pravoberezhny ROVD had amounted to professional negligence. 135. With respect to the situation in the Malgobek District of Ingushetia, the report concluded that the local police had failed to prevent the members of the gang from assembling and training there at the end of August. Reference was made to the pending criminal case against the senior officers of the Malgobek ROVD (see paragraph 363 below). 136. The report concluded that the servicemen of the internal troops had been deployed only in the outer security perimeter around the school, the FSB special forces being deployed in the inner one. They had taken no part in the fighting, and their actions and equipment had fully complied with the relevant legal regulations and with their mission. 137. Servicemen of the FSB special forces had taken part in the operation. They had been armed with customary weapons and special equipment such as RPG-26 portable grenade launchers and RPOA Shmel portable flame-throwers. 138. Turning to the events of 3 September 2004, the report gave the following chronology. By 1 p.m. no plan had been in place to start the storming operation. Two special forces groups had been training outside Beslan, snipers and intelligence groups had kept monitoring the object from their designated positions, an emergency group of thirtytwo people had been positioned behind the housing blocks and the remaining servicemen had stayed at the assembly point. 139. The explosions which had occurred at 1.05 p.m. had been caused by two IEDs. No shots had been fired at that time, as Emercom staff had been working in the front yard of the school. In any event, the place of the explosion had been invisible from the snipers’ positions. 140. No flames could be seen in the gymnasium after the two explosions. The hostages had started to run out through the openings in the walls. The terrorists had opened fire on the escaping people using automatic rifles and machine guns. On the instruction of the head of the OH, the servicemen of the special forces had been ordered to save the hostages. The terrorists had been aimed at by the fire-support group and three APC-80s. 141. A group of servicemen had entered the weights room and evacuated from it several women with small children. This group had then entered the gymnasium and started to take out the hostages. The terrorists had opened fire at them. Two servicemen had taken position on the floor and returned fire, while the rest had continued to lead the hostages out. Between 1.40 and 1.50 p.m. the terrorists had fired several shots from portable grenade launchers (RPG18 Mukha) at the gymnasium, killing and injuring several hostages, wounding two officers of the special forces and starting a fire in the gymnasium. 142. The rescue operation had lasted until 2.40 p.m., at which time all available FSB forces had been regrouped pursuant to a previously adopted plan. At 3 p.m., upon an order from the commander, they had stormed the building. Their movements inside the building had been slowed down by low visibility from smoke and whitewash powder and the presence of hostages whom the terrorists had been using as human shields. The terrorists had used automatic weapons, hand grenades and portable grenade launchers, while the FSB forces had been constrained to fire single shots, to avoid excessive harm to the hostages. By 6 p.m. no hostages had remained in the building. Only once this had been ensured had the forces of the FSB used heavy weapons against the terrorists who had refused to surrender. Hand grenades, RPG20 portable grenade launchers and Shmel flamethrowers had been used for the first time after 6 p.m. At 9 p.m. a T-72 tank had been used to make openings in the walls and suppress enemy firing points, since further movement in the building had been impossible because of mines laid by the terrorists. The records of the site examinations and video material showed that no bodies of hostages had been found in places where the terrorists had been killed by heavy arms and indiscriminate weapons. 143. Ten servicemen of the special forces had been killed during the operation, and eleven had received injuries. The fatalities had included two lieutenant-colonels [group commanders], one of whom had died during the first few minutes of the storming as he had rushed to the school shielding the escaping hostages; the second had died in the main meeting room while trying to release the hostages detained there. 144. The report also analysed the circumstances of the deaths and injuries of each serviceman of the special forces which occurred between 1.20 p.m. and 3 p.m. on 3 September and concluded that their actions had been lawful and adequate and had demonstrated high professionalism, courage and selfsacrifice. 145. The commander of the 58th Army of the Ministry of Defence, General Sobolev, had been informed of the hostage-taking at 9.38 a.m. on 1 September. By 1.30 p.m. the third ring of the security perimeter had been set up around the school by the 58th Army servicemen. The servicemen had been armed with various automatic weapons and portable grenade and mine launchers, but they had not used any of them since their task had been limited to maintaining the security cordon. 146. As to the use of military vehicles, the report found, on the basis of various descriptions, plans, logbooks and servicemen’s testimony, that on 2 September three T-72 tanks with hull numbers 320, 325 and 328 had been transferred under the command of the FSB officers. Tanks with hull numbers 320 and 328 had manoeuvred around the school following the commands of the FSB officers but had not opened fire. A tank with hull number 325 had fired seven high-fragmentation shots (125 millimetre calibre) at the canteen situated in the right wing of the school, following the instructions of the FSB officer in charge. The shots had been fired between 9 and 9.30 p.m. on 3 September 2004. The report concluded that the tank had been used after the end of the rescue operation at 6 p.m., when no harm could have been caused to the hostages and it had been guided by the need to suppress enemy fire in the most efficient way. 147. Several other military vehicles had been used during the operation, also under the command of the FSB officers. Eight APC-80s had been stationed at various points around the school from 1 or 2 September 2004 onwards. Two of them, with hull numbers 823 and 824, had taken part in the storming operation. APC number 823 had used a heavy machine gun (calibre 7.62 millimetres) between 2 and 2.20 p.m. to suppress the terrorists’ firing positions on the school roof. At the same time an APC with hull number 824 had fired several rounds from a heavy machine gun at the windows of the first floor, covering the Alpha servicemen who had entered the building. The remaining military vehicles had taken no active part in the fighting. The experts concluded that the use of machine guns had been fully appropriate in the circumstances and could not have resulted in injuries or deaths among the hostages. 148. From 9.35 a.m. on 1 September, various services of Emercom from North Ossetia and neighbouring regions had begun to arrive at school no. 1. They had included brigades specialising in extinguishing major fires and fire engines with water tanks or cisterns. Rescue workers had arrived with special equipment and search dogs. At 5 p.m. on 1 September 2004 fourteen psychologists had started working with the relatives, and by 4 September 2004 fiftyone psychologists had been working in Beslan. The hub of psychological assistance had been in the Cultural Centre, to which ambulance doctors had been called when necessary. In total, between 1 and 4 September 2004, 254 people and seventy Emercom vehicles had been deployed in Beslan. 149. At 12.40 p.m. on 3 September four servicemen of the Emercom rescue team had been instructed to retrieve bodies from the school courtyard. They had received safety guarantees and a mobile telephone to communicate with the terrorists in the school. Following the explosions in the gymnasium, chaotic firing from the upper floor and roof by the terrorists had left two servicemen dead and two injured. 150. The report then focused on the actions of the fire brigades on 3 September. At 2.51 p.m. a fire alert had been given to the fire service. At around 3.20 to 3.25 p.m. fire brigades had arrived at the scene. The delay in their arrival had been caused by the order of General Andreyev, who had considered that the firemen and their engines could have been attacked by the terrorists, rendering the rescue operation more complex. At 3.26 p.m. two brigades had rolled out fire hoses and proceeded to extinguish the fire. Each cistern had been full and had contained about 2,000 litres of water, which had been used within three to five minutes. The fire hydrant in the school could not be used as it had been located in the military engagement area. At 3.35 p.m. two other fire units had arrived and had been stationed on the north and east sides of the gymnasium. The North Ossetian Deputy Minister of Emercom Colonel Romanov had assumed the role of incident commander. Five fire hoses had been deployed. A supply of water from a water hydrant situated within 200 metres had been ensured, and the firemen had also used water from newly arrived tanks. 151. The fire had been contained and extinguished by 9.09 p.m. The operation had been protracted since on two occasions the firemen had been removed from the school at the request of the special forces. 152. In the meantime, Emercom rescue workers had evacuated hostages from the school building. By 4 p.m. they had taken out over 300 people, including 100 children. After the fire had been extinguished, rescue teams had started to search the debris in the gymnasium. They had had to stop at 10.25 p.m. when unexploded IEDs had been discovered and sappers had been called in. 153. Immediately after midnight on 4 September a fire had started in the south wing of the school building where the canteen, craft classrooms, library and meeting room had been situated. Four fire brigades had arrived on the spot and the fire had been extinguished by 3.10 a.m. 154. At 7 a.m. on 4 September Emercom rescue workers and military servicemen had started to clear the debris and search for the bodies. In total, 323 dead bodies had been collected and sent to the forensic unit in Vladikavkaz. By 7 p.m. the search and rescue operation in the school had been completed. 155. The report concluded, with reference to the evidence contained in the case file, that the deaths of 112 people whose bodies had been found in the gymnasium had been caused by the explosions of the IEDs. The bodies found there had had been 70 to 100% carbonised; the carbonisation had occurred post mortem. The firefighters had had to act in extreme and life-threatening conditions. The organisation and equipment supplied had been sufficient to enable them to carry out their tasks. 156. On 9 November 2006 the Leninskiy District Court of Vladikavkaz, following an application by the applicants, declared expert report no. 1 invalid owing to a number of serious breaches of the procedural legislation governing the appointment of experts and the carrying out of expert evaluations. 157. The investigation established the following time frame concerning the action taken by the OH (as set out in expert report no. 1 and other documents): 158. At about 10.30 a.m. the OH was set up, in accordance with the plan of action in the event of a terrorist threat issued on 30 July 2004. Initially it was headed by the President of North Ossetia Mr Dzasokhov, the head of the North Ossetian FSB General Andreyev and the North Ossetian Minister of the Interior Mr Dzantiyev. Prior to his appointment on 2 September 2004 as head of the OH, General Andreyev had been in charge of coordinating the actions of various law-enforcement and military structures, including the FSB units arriving in Beslan. Two deputy heads of the FSB, Mr Pronichev and Mr Anisimov, who had arrived in Beslan on 2 September, acted as consultants and did not interfere with the command of the operation. 159. Between 11 a.m. and 2 p.m. the operative headquarters ensured the evacuation of residents from adjacent premises and cordoned off the school. The police and security forces searched basements and attics of the nearby buildings, cleared the adjacent streets of parked vehicles and closed them to traffic, closed the local railway line and took other necessary measures. In order to avoid harm to the hostages and other civilians, they were also ordered not to respond to the random shots fired by the terrorists. Scanning of radio frequencies in the vicinity of the school had been put in place by the Ministry of the Interior, the FSB and the army. 160. At 11.05 a.m. the terrorists sent out the first note, containing a telephone number and naming possible negotiators. However, the telephone number had been noted down incorrectly and no contact could be established. 161. Between 11.30 a.m. and 1.30 p.m. two safety perimeters were put in place around the school, composed of police and army servicemen using seventeen APCs. At noon the APCs were moved out of the terrorists’ view, in order to avoid provocation. 162. At 11.40 a.m. the OH started compiling a list of the hostages. 163. At 12.35 p.m. the OH invited the North Ossetian mufti to take part in the talks, but the terrorists opened fire on him when he tried to approach the seized building. 164. At 1.55 p.m. all reserve forces of the North Ossetian police were placed on high alert, including local policemen in towns and villages along the administrative border with Ingushetia and police academy students. 165. At 4.05 p.m. hostage Mrs Mamitova took out a second note with the correct telephone number. 166. Between 4.05 and 5 p.m. a series of gunshots and explosions were heard inside the school. The OH instructed Mr Z., a professional negotiator from the North Ossetian FSB, to contact the terrorists by telephone. The hostage taker presented himself as “Shahid” and said that he had executed ten people and blown up twenty others because the authorities had been slow in contacting them. He then insisted that the men indicated in their note (Mr Zyazikov, Mr Dzasokhov, Mr Aslakhanov and Dr Roshal) should come to the school together. Mr Z. pleaded for some time to bring the four men to Beslan. The terrorist said that the gymnasium had been mined and would be blown up in the event of a storming. 167. At 4.30 p.m. Mr Kudzayev escaped from the school by jumping out of a first floor window. He identified a photograph of one terrorist from Ingushetia; on the same day his relatives were brought from Ingushetia by the FSB. However it transpired that the identification was incorrect. This man was later killed in Ingushetia while actively resisting the authorities. 168. During the day the OH collected information about possible hostage takers and their relatives, so as to involve the latter in the negotiations. 169. At 5 p.m. the terrorists fired several random shots from automatic weapons and portable grenade launchers. About a dozen bodies were thrown out of the window. The OH took steps to prepare for the evacuation of the injured to the local health establishments, and psychological support had been called in for the hostages’ relatives. 170. At 5.45 p.m., in order to prevent the dissemination of incorrect information, it was decided that all contact with the media should be carried out by General Andreyev, Mr Dzantiyev and Mr Dzugayev. Mr Peskov from the Russian President’s administration was given the task of liaising with journalists. 171. At 6 p.m. the North Ossetian Ministry of Health designated hospitals to be on stand-by, and twenty-eight ambulance vehicles were deployed. 172. At 6.30 p.m. special forces of the FSB (подразделения центра Специального назначения (ЦСН) ФСБ России) arrived in Beslan and set up their headquarters. They started contemplating various ways of liberating the hostages and neutralising the attackers. 173. At 7.20 p.m. hundreds of bottles of water, juice and food rations were stocked by the headquarters for the hostages’ eventual needs. 174. At 9.30 p.m. Dr Roshal arrived in Beslan. The terrorists refused to accept water or food from him. They continued to insist that all four men indicated by them should come to the school. Dr Roshal was permitted to talk on the telephone with the school director, who described the situation inside. 175. At 9.36 p.m. the OH continued talks with the attackers. They tried to involve journalists of an Arab television company in the negotiation process, but this was rejected by the terrorists. At the same time, they contacted the former President of Ingushetia Mr Aushev and an influential businessman, Mr Gutseriyev. 176. At 10.20 p.m. the OH tried to arrange the release of hostages in exchange for money and unhindered passage to Chechnya or Ingushetia. Twenty buses were requested in the event that the terrorists agreed. 177. By the end of the day, six hostages who had escaped from the school had been questioned in order to obtain information about the number and location of the terrorists and hostages inside the school, as well as to draw a plan of the IEDs. 178. At 9.30 a.m. some hostages were allowed to call their relatives in order to put pressure on the authorities. 179. At 10 a.m. the OH authorised Mr Gutseriyev’s participation in the negotiations. His offers of money and guarantees of unhindered passage were rejected by the hostage takers. 180. At 1 p.m. General Andreyev spoke to the hostages’ relatives and assured them that no storming would take place. This was done in view of rumours circulating among the local population and the idea by civilians of forming a “life ring” around the school. 181. At 1.50 p.m. religious Muslim leaders of Chechnya, Ingushetia and North Ossetia delivered a televised address calling for peace and the end of further ethnic clashes. 182. At 2.40 p.m. Mr Aslakhanov spoke to the attackers on the telephone; he assured them that their demands would be passed on personally to the Russian President. The terrorists insisted that he come to Beslan with Mr Aushev. 183. At 2.45 p.m. the FSB of Russia appointed General Andreyev the head of the OH and appointed its members by coded message. Report no. 1 listed thirteen members, including two deputy heads of the OH: General Tikhonov, the commander of the FSB Special Services Centre, and Mr Dzantiyev, the North Ossetian Minister of the Interior. It also listed the following members: the North Ossetian President Mr Dzasokhov, the head of the Ingushetian FSB General Koryakov, the commander of the 58th Army General Sobolev, the deputy commander of the internal troops of the Ministry of the Interior General Vnukov, the head of the operational management group at the North Ossetian Ministry of the Interior Lieutenant-Colonel Tsyban, the North Ossetian Minister of Health Mr Soplevenko, the North Ossetian Minister of Education Mrs Levitskaya, the North Ossetian Minister of Emercom Mr Dzgoyev, the director of the AllRussia Centre of Disaster Medicine at the Ministry of Public Health (“the Zashchita Centre”) Mr Goncharov and the deputy head of the information programmes department of Rossiya. All members of the OH were informed of their positions. 184. At 3.23 p.m. Mr Aushev was permitted to enter the school. Between 4 and 4.30 p.m. he negotiated with the terrorists; as a result of his mission twenty-six people were released: babies aged under two and their mothers. Mr Aushev also took out a letter signed by Mr Shamil Basayev with a demand for troops to be withdrawn from Chechnya. 185. At 5.30 p.m. an additional debriefing of former hostages took place in order to obtain more information about the positions of the hostages and terrorists and the location of the IEDs. 186. At 5.40 p.m. the OH ordered measures aimed at identifying and neutralising possible accomplices of the terrorists outside the school. 187. At 6.05 p.m. Mr Aushev proposed to the terrorists that the bodies be collected. They agreed to consider this proposal. 188. At 7.20 p.m. the attackers told Dr Roshal, Mr Gutseriyev and Mr Z. that the hostages had refused to accept food, water or medicine. 189. At 8 p.m. the terrorists fired random shots from automatic rifles and portable grenade launchers out of the school windows. The OH ordered that the surrounding territory be cleared of parked vehicles. 190. In the morning an agreement was reached through Mr Aushev and Mr Gutseriyev to clear the bodies from the schoolyard. 191. At 12 noon Emercom officers were appointed and transport was arranged. They received instructions and means of communication. At 12.40 p.m. the officers started to collect the bodies. One terrorist went down to the courtyard to supervise their work. 192. At 1.05 p.m. two powerful explosions occurred in the gymnasium. Part of the wall collapsed and the hostages started to panic and exit through the opening. The terrorists opened fire on them from automatic rifles and RPG18 portable grenade launchers from the windows of the first floor. Twenty-nine people were killed as a result of gunshot wounds. 193. At 1.10 p.m. the head of the OH, General Andreyev, gave written orders to the units of the FSB special forces to commence the operation aimed at saving the hostages and neutralising the terrorists. 194. At 1.15 p.m. the first hostages were taken to hospitals in Beslan and Vladikavkaz. 195. At 1.20 p.m. one terrorist, Mr Kulayev, was detained and handed over to the investigators. 196. As a result of the explosions and the ensuing fire at least 250 hostages died; the rest were forced by the terrorists to move to the meeting room and other premises of the school. 197. At 2.50 p.m. a fire broke out in the gymnasium. The expert report on fire and explosions established that the source of the fire had been located in the roof of the gymnasium, above the exit. 198. Mr Andreev ordered the firemen not to intervene immediately, in view of the continuing fighting, the risk to the firemen’s lives and the danger of delaying the rescue operation, which would result in more victims. 199. The OH ordered the firefighters to intervene at 3.10 p.m. They arrived at 3.20 p.m. and proceeded to extinguish the fire. 200. At 6 p.m. the rescue operation was over. The OH ordered the deployment of heavy weaponry to neutralise the terrorists. 201. At 12.30 a.m. on 4 September the sweeping of the school building was over and a security cordon was set up. At 1 a.m. the demining started. 202. Two deputy heads of the FSB, Mr Pronichev and Mr Anisimov, were in Beslan during the crisis. 203. A number of high-ranking FSB servicemen were questioned in the course of the investigation, including General Andreyev (on 29 September 2004), General Koryakov (on 30 September 2004) and Generals Anisimov and Pronichev (October 2005). The documents of the criminal investigation submitted by the Government do not contain the record of questioning of General Tikhonov, the commander of the FSB Special Services Centre, who was in charge of the storming operation. His name is not listed among the witnesses/members of the OH in volume 124 of file no. 20/849. The list of documents examined by the experts who had produced expert report no. 1 does not mention his testimony either. 204. In July 2007 the applicants wrote to the head of the FSB and referred to the meeting they had had with the Deputy Prosecutor General in charge of the case, who had told them that the relevant video and audio material could not be found. In December 2006 State television aired a film entitled “The Final Assignment” containing video and audio material made by the special forces in Beslan from 1 to 3 September 2004. They sought to ensure that the footage would be given to the Prosecutor General’s Office. They also asked that the members of the special forces be questioned during the investigation. In September 2007 the FSB informed the applicants that any such action would be done in response to the relevant requests by the prosecutor’s service and in line with the legislation. 205. The investigation file contains a number of documents concerning the use of arms and ammunition by various State bodies; some are cited in other documents (see below). Dozens of various individual experts’ reports were ordered by the investigation on firearms (hand pistols, guns and automatic weapons), ammunition and IEDs supposedly used by the terrorists, as well as weapons and ammunition used by the security forces. Some of the cartridges were marked by experts as suitable for identification of the weapons (for example, expert report no. 263 of 4 October 2004 marked fifty spent cartridges from a Kalashnikov automatic rifle as suitable for weapon identification). These reports were submitted to the Court by the Government, and the most relevant ones are summarised below. The victims challenged certain procedural steps related to the commissioning of some of the reports, complaining that they had not been allowed to take copies of them but had been able to view them in the prosecutor’s office for a limited amount of time. 206. According to a document dated 9 September 2004 (act no. 3), one military unit of the 58th Army of the Ministry of Defence deployed in Beslan used about 6,500 cartridges for automatic weapons and machine guns (5.45 and 7.62 mm calibre), 340 tracer bullets (5.45 mm T), 450 armour-piercing incendiary cartridges for large-calibre machine guns (14.5 mm BZT and B-32) and ten hand grenades (RGD-5). 207. Dozens of witness statements were collected by the investigation between September 2004 and August 2007 from the military and police servicemen, officers of Emercom, firefighters and members of the OH. These statements, consistently and in detail, denied the use of grenade launchers, flame-throwers and a tank cannon prior to 6 p.m. on 3 September 2004. 208. The investigation ordered individual expert reports on parts of explosive charges and launch tubes of explosive, thermobaric and armour-piercing weapons found at the school and in the nearby areas. These included launch tubes of twelve RPOA Shmel flame-throwers with batch and individual serial numbers, parts of artillery shells, hand grenades, smoke grenades, spent cartridges of different calibres, tubes and charges for grenade launchers. The reports contain the following relevant descriptions of the weapons used. 209. Two reports examined launch tubes of five RPOA Shmel tubes with different batch and serial numbers (expert report SI-76 of 10 September 2005: batch 3-02, nos. 115, 171; batch 795, no. 896; batch 13, nos. 51 and 52) and seven RPOA Shmel tubes (expert report SI132 of 11 October 2005: batch 3-02, nos. 109-13 and 116; batch 103, no. 13). The reports describe the RPOA Shmel as follows: “[A] portable anti-personnel flame-thrower RPOA Shmel is designed to impact fortified firing points of the enemy ... destroy light armoured vehicles and other vehicles, sheltered and exposed manpower... Technical characteristics: - range of direct fire 200 m; - effective range 600 m; - maximum range 1,000 m; - temperature of burning of the combustible mixture 1,800˚C; - destruction caused in a closed structure 80 m²; - destruction of manpower 50 m²” The fire experts’ report of 22 December 2005 mentioned an additional expert report, SI–92 of 20 September 2004, which had examined several parts of RPO-A spent charges. 210. In addition to the above-mentioned twelve tubes of RPOA with identified batch and serial numbers, the file contained a document dated 25 September 2004 and signed by Lieutenant-Colonel Vasilyev from the 58th Army. This document stated that the FSB units had received seven RPOA flame-throwers (batch 4-96, nos. 945-48, 486-88) from military storage. After the operation two flame-throwers with the indicated numbers, plus one with a different batch and number (batch 1-0, no. 12), had been returned to storage. It does not appear that the remaining five RPOA devices from batch 4-96 were spotted and examined by experts. 211. Three expert reports concerned over forty used capsules with readable serial numbers, which the experts were first unable to identify or describe otherwise than “special purposes ammunition”, for which no descriptions or technical characteristics were available to the experts of the Ministry of the Interior (expert reports SI83 of 15 September 2004, SI85 of 16 September 2004, SI90 of 17 September 2004). In April 2007 these spent capsules were identified as charges for a light infantry flame-thrower LPO97 (expert report nos. 750/17, 757/17 of 25 April 2007). This latest report also contained detailed information about the thermobaric charge for an LPO-97. Upon an explosion, impact is created by a “sphere of fire” with temperatures ranging from about 2,300˚C in the centre to about 630˚C at 1 metre and 80˚C at 3 metres distance, and secondary effects. Due to the very short “time span of the sphere of fire” (less than four milliseconds), the explosion cannot lead to the combustion of wooden structures. People located within 1 metre of the explosion can receive thermal burns on exposed body parts and within 1.6 metres various injuries, including a perforated eardrum. 212. On 31 January 2005 Colonel B. from a unit of the 58th Army issued a note stating: “[the] use of rocket propelled infantry flame-throwers RPOA and light infantry flame-throwers LPO97 is not prohibited by international conventions. They have been widely used during combat operations in Afghanistan and Chechnya.” 213. On 4 February 2005 a military unit located in Vladikavkaz forwarded detailed technical characteristics of RPOA and LPO97 flamethrowers to the military prosecutor’s office. The functionality of an RPOA was described as: “[the] destruction of manpower in fortified firing points, buildings, vehicles, [and] the creation of islands of fire in the abovementioned objects and on the ground.” The functionality of an LPO97 (introduced into service in 2002) was described as “[the] destruction of manpower inside buildings by means of high-temperature field and a field of extensive pressure ...” 214. Expert report no. SI-75 of 10 September 2004 examined five launch tubes from RPG26 Aglen disposable anti-tank grenade launchers, bearing identifiable batch and serial numbers. 215. Expert report no. SI81 of 17 September 2004 examined the following items that were found in the gymnasium: one grenade type VOG17M for an AGS17 automatic mounted grenade launcher with an identifiable batch number; one grenade type VOG25 for an under-barrel grenade launcher GP25 with a batch number; an RGD5 hand grenade; an F1 hand grenade; an RGN hand grenade; an RDG2B smoke grenade; a shell of a GSZ-F stun grenade, and one security cap from an RPOA Shmel. 216. Expert report no. SI98 of 8 October 2004 examined one used antitank grenade type PG7L with an identifiable batch and serial number, used by reloadable portable grenade launcher type RPG7 and its modifications; four spent parts from RPG-26 disposable anti-tank rocket launchers, with identifiable batch numbers; and one spent part of an anti-tank grenade (RPG27 disposable grenade launcher), with a batch number. 217. On 10 November 2004 the military unit in Vladikavkaz responded to a question from the military prosecutor’s office and submitted a table containing the technical characteristics of four types of grenade launchers: the reloadable RPG7 and GP25, and the disposable RPG18 and RPG22. 218. On 22 December 2005 the Russian Federal forensic expert centre produced fire expert’s report (заключение пожаро-технической судебной экспертизы) no. 2576/17, 320328/1817. The voluminous report consisted of 217 pages, accompanied by about sixty pages of tables and photographs. The report started by reviewing a number of relevant pieces of evidence, including extracts from witness statements, expert reports, information about the arms and ammunition used, an examination of the building materials and a review of available photo and video material. 219. In particular, the report cited a “joint record” dated 10 September 2004 of the arms and ammunition used by the military servicemen, which included about 7,000 cartridges for automatic weapons and machine guns (5.45 mm PS, 7.62 mm LPS), 2,160 tracer bullets (5.45 mm T), ten disposable anti-tank rocket launchers (RPG26 Aglen), 18 armour-piercing charges for reloadable anti-tank grenade launchers (PG7VL), eight highfragmentation warheads for a 125 millimetre calibre tank gun (125 mm OF) and ninety smoke grenades (81 mm ZD6) (page 128 of the report). The same report contained references to expert examinations of a number of parts of used RPOA Shmel flame-throwers (report SI 92 of 20 September 2004) and a list of six empty tubes from an RPOA Shmel collected by the members of the parliamentary commission citing their serial numbers (batch 302, nos. 10913 and 116) (see paragraph 409 below). It also mentioned a document dated 25 September 2004 and signed by LieutenantColonel Vasilyev from the 58th Army about the use of five RPOA flamethrowers with batch number 496 (see paragraph 210 above). On 25 September 2004 LieutenantColonel Vasilyev from the 58th Army was questioned and stated that he had received back two flame-throwers from batch 496, plus one from another batch, which had not been issued from that storage (batch 1–03, no. 12); Major Ts. from the FSB Vympel unit explained that the others had been used (pages 12930 of the report). 220. The report further mentioned a witness statement of Colonel K., who explained that he had led a group of officers who had taken part in the storming of the school building. The group had used RPG26 grenade launchers and RPOA flame-throwers, but not at the premises where the hostages had been present (page 131 of the report). One witness, M.K., a member of a storming group, stated on 23 November 2004 that he had used RPG26 grenade launchers and RPOA flame-throwers upon “enemy firing points which had been designated in advance and identified during the storming”. The firing points identified in advance had been located in the window of the attic area and the third window on the first floor of the main building. No hostages had been there at the time. For the second time the flame-thrower had been used at night, at about midnight, upon a group of terrorists in the craft classrooms on the ground floor. At that time the rest of the building had been in the firm control of the security forces and Emercom staff had been finishing carrying the bodies out of the gymnasium (page 183 of the report). The report listed the main characteristics of an RPOA Shmel: a thermobaric charge of over 2 kilograms upon explosion creates a powerful combustion zone (a sphere of fire 5 to 7 metres in diameter) burning at temperature of about 1,800oC; accompanied by an extremely powerful shock wave caused by a complete burning of oxygen in the detonation zone. An expert described the effects of this charge upon people, which would include severe fractures caused by the shock wave and lung collapse; and upon buildings as a “blowing out” of the external walls and collapse of the structure. The report referred to the records of two experiments carried out on 13 October 2005 wherein disused buildings had been fired at with RPOA flamethrowers, as a result of which the buildings had been demolished but no fire had started (page 183 of the report). Relying on the testimonies of security personnel, the pattern of destruction of the roof in the main part of the building, parts of RPOA charge found in the attic of the “left wing” of the school and the absence of any such parts in the gymnasium, the conclusion was that there had been no explosions of a thermobaric charge from an RPOA there. The report concluded as follows on the use of flamethrowers (pages 185 and 217 of the report): “RPOA Shmel were used during the special operation aiming to free the hostages. Criminal case file no 20/849 contains no material to conclude that RPOA Shmel flame-throwers had been used on the roof and the structure of the gymnasium of school no 1. The use of an RPOA Shmel flame-thrower on the roof of the gymnasium could not have led to a fire in its wooden parts.” 221. In so far as the first explosions were concerned, the report concluded that the explosions in the gymnasium which had occurred within several seconds at about 1.05 p.m. on 3 September 2004 had resulted from the IEDs attached to a basketball hoop near the west wall (equivalent to about 1.2 to 1.3 kilograms of TNT) and located on a chair placed about 0.5 metres away from the north wall under the window (and equivalent to 5.2 kilograms of TNT). Both IEDs had been filled with numerous small metal objects. The third explosion had resulted from the IED placed under a basketball hoop at the north wall catching fire, its metal filling falling on the floor and the explosion of a small amount of explosives (equivalent to about 100 grams of TNT), as a result of exposure to heat (pages 170-73 of the report). 222. The experts considered and accepted as “probable” the hypothesis that the fire in the gymnasium had started as a result of use of armourpiercing and incendiary charges, which could have been used by the terrorists (page 185 of the report). As to the place where the fire had started, having analysed the extent and degree of damage to various constructions of the gymnasium, the experts concluded that it had most probably been located in the attic area located more or less above the basketball hoop in the north part of the room; the fire on the floor had started only after the burning parts of the ceiling and roof had fallen down. The extent of damage caused by the fire and explosions prevented any detailed analysis of the number of places where the fire had started and its exact cause and spreading in the building (pages 215-17 of the report). 223. On 30 December 2005 the FSB’s Institute of Forensic Studies (Институт Криминалистики ФСБ РФ) produced expert report no. 4/106. The report focused on the examination of the IEDs used by the terrorists in the gymnasium. It concluded that the terrorists had placed at least sixteen IEDs in the gymnasium, joined into a single chain by electric cables and detonators. On 3 September at least three IEDs had exploded in the north-west part of the gymnasium: one at the basketball hoop on the west wall (made of an OZM72 anti-personnel mine, equivalent to about 0,66 kilograms of TNT), the second on the right-hand side of the door leading into the gymnasium on the west wall (a sphereshaped IED equivalent to at least 0.5 kilograms of TNT) and the third on the windowpane of the first window on the north-west wall (an IED in a plastic bottle equivalent to at least 1 kilogram of TNT). The total force of the explosions had been equivalent to no less than two kilograms of TNT; however it was impossible to confirm their exact timing and sequence. The most likely cause of the explosions was intentional or non-intentional impact upon the detonator pedal; the reasons why the whole chain had failed to react were unclear, but it could be that the first explosions had damaged the electric cables connecting the rest of the IEDs (pages 18-29 of the report). 224. On 25 October 2006 a comprehensive forensic report on the explosions (комплексная криминалистическая экспертиза математического моделирования взрывов) was ordered from experts of the Stateowned scientific and production company Bazalt (ФГУП ГНПП “Базальт”) and the Central Research and Testing Institute, named after Karbyshev of the Ministry of Defence (Центральный Научно-исследовательский испытательный институт им. Карбышева Министерства Обороны РФ). The applicants submitted that the document in its entirety had been unavailable to them prior to the exchange of the parties’ observations in 2012. 225. In January 2007 Mrs Tagayeva applied to the prosecutor’s office to have the experts of Bazalt dismissed, as they had been administratively dependent on the Ministry of Defence. Her application was rejected on 30 January 2007 because no subjective bias of the experts could be discerned and, objectively, the Ministry of Defence had not been a party to the criminal proceedings. 226. Expert report no. 16/1 was produced on 14 September 2007 and ran to over 300 pages, accompanied by detailed charts and photographs. It appeared to dismiss the doubts expressed, notably, by a member of the State Duma investigative committee and a renowned expert in the field of explosions, Mr Savelyev, about the external origins of the first two explosions in the gymnasium (see paragraphs 406, 408, 410 below). The conclusions of report no. 16/1 are found on pages 264 to 273. They can be summarised as follows: the first explosion was the result of the detonation of a large IED, equivalent to between three and six kilograms of TNT. The origin of this explosion was not linked to the electric wires and detonator, but resulted, most probably, from mishandling of the device by the terrorists guarding it. This IED exploded in the north-east part of the gymnasium, at a spot about a metre away from the north wall and 5 metres away from the east wall. The second explosion occurred about twenty seconds later and consisted of the simultaneous detonation of several (between five and ten) smaller IEDs in the north-west part of the hall; this explosion most probably resulted from one of the terrorists intentionally or unintentionally using the detonator pedal. It could not have been caused by a cumulative charge launched from the outside. The report also concluded that out of all the recorded damage to the gymnasium walls, only two marks could have been caused by either a thermobaric charge or a cumulative charge projected from outside. These projectiles could not have been launched from the roofs of houses at 37, 39 or 41 Shkolny Lane (as alleged by some experts). The damage caused to the south wing of the school could have been caused by the use of various weapons and explosives, including a tank cannon, flame-throwers and grenade launchers; however, the extent of the destruction excluded the possibility of any detailed reconstruction of the events. The report dismissed as improbable the launching of a thermobaric charge from a helicopter, pointing out that it could lead to the destruction of the helicopter and death of the crew. Lastly, the report listed the following types of weapons used by the members of the counter-terrorist operation, reconstructed on the basis of video material and the documents contained in criminal case file no. 20/849: “- portable grenade launchers RPG-7V and their modifications with anti-tank charges PG-7VL, PG-7VM, PG-7VS, fragmentary warhead OG-7V; - disposable anti-tank rocket launchers RPG-26, RPG-27; - propelled attack grenades RShG1 with a thermobaric warhead; - flame-throwers RPOA Shmel with a thermobaric warhead; - light infantry flame-throwers LPO97 with a thermobaric charge (probably); - firearms and portable grenade launchers.” Based on the same sources, the report concluded that the terrorists had used an RPG-7V portable grenade launcher with anti-tank charges type PG7VL; RPG-26 disposable anti-tank rocket launchers, possibly a grenade launcher with a thermobaric charge; no fewer than ten “bottle” type IEDs, no fewer than two IEDs made out of MON90 anti-personnel mines and no fewer than four IEDs made out of OZM-72 anti-personnel mines; and firearms and portable grenade launchers (pages 263-73 of the report). 227. As a follow up to that report, on 14 October 2007 the North Ossetian Ministry of the Interior’s expert laboratory examined the explosion marks on the south walls of the gymnasium and confirmed the above conclusions about the possible trajectory of the charges having been fired from the first floor of the south wing of the school and that these shots could not have been fired from houses at 37, 39, 41 Shkolny Lane or the garage roof (report no. SI63, page 12). 228. Expert report no. 16/2 was ordered by the investigation in April 2007 in order to dispel Mr Savelyev’s allegations about the origins of the second explosion in the gymnasium which had resulted in the destruction of a section of the wall under the window on the north side. It was completed on 11 December 2009 (see paragraph 406 below). Like report 16/1, it was carried out by experts of Bazalt. The experts tested all the possibilities suggested by Mr Savelyev, including the use of various types of grenade launchers and flame-throwers upon a similar construction and concluded that their impact had been incompatible with the damage in the gymnasium. The report ran to over 130 pages and concluded that the “origin of the hole in the north-west wall of the gymnasium ... was the detonation of an IED with the equivalent of about six kilograms of TNT, placed at a height of about 500 millimetres from the floor, near the radiator... The power of this explosion’s impact upon the wall was exacerbated by an almost simultaneous explosion of several other IEDs located in the north-west part of the gymnasium, further away from the first explosion” (pages 99-100 of the report). 229. On 3 December 2004 the Vladikavkaz deputy military prosecutor issued an order not to prosecute unnamed military servicemen of the 58th Army of the Ministry of Defence and internal troops of the Ministry of the Interior. The document stated that the investigation had established that the personnel of the army and Ministry of the Interior had used automatic weapons, RPG25 grenade launchers, RPOA Shmel flamethrowers and T72 tanks. The document then proceeded to describe the events of the siege and storming, in line with witness statements of General Sobolev of the 58th Army. In particular, the document stated that on 1 September 2004, during the first meeting of the OH, it had been decided that Mr Dzasokhov’s involvement in the negotiations was “devoid of purpose” (нецелесообразно) since there was a threat of his being taken hostage as well. It further stated that although the decision to clear the area around the school of civilians and armed “volunteers” had been taken at about 12 noon on 1 September, it had not been implemented until 3 September. Furthermore, on 2 September the terrorists had demanded that Mr Dzasokhov, Mr Zyazikov, Mr Aslakhanov and Dr Roshal arrive for negotiations, but the OH had decided that such talks were also “devoid of purpose”. After the first explosions at 1.10 p.m. the terrorists had opened fire at the hostages running out of the gymnasium, following which the servicemen of the second security perimeter had returned fire. At 2 p.m. a group of sappers under the command of Colonel Nabiyev had started to demine the gymnasium; at the same time he had called for firemen to extinguish the fire. The first fire vehicle had arrived at 2.45 p.m. and contained 2,000 litres of water; the second vehicle had arrived at 3.45 p.m. and proceeded to extinguish the fire. By 9 p.m. the storming of the building had been over, while the search for and elimination of terrorists had continued until 12.30 a.m. on 4 September 2004. 230. The document then summarised the witness statement of Lieutenant-Colonel Tsyban, who explained that the OH had officially been created on 2 September 2004 at about 12 noon under the command of General Andreyev. The OH had decided that Mr Dzasokhov’s involvement in the negotiations could not be authorised in view of the threat of his being taken hostage. 231. The document then related the witness statements of about a dozen servicemen from the 58th Army – sappers, tank and APC commanders. They stated that the tanks had fired seven shots in the evening of 3 September 2004 and that none of them had fired at the school during the daytime. 232. The document referred to several hundred names of military servicemen who had been deployed within the security perimeter. Their statements were summarised in the following manner: “... while securing the area no instances of any loss or stealing of arms or ammunition were noted, and there were no attempts by the terrorists to break through or to get away. Since the commanders had issued an order not to open fire unless there was an open breakthrough of the terrorists, no fire was opened and the use of firearms was regulated by section 11 of the [Army Field Manual]. There were no noted instances of breaches of order or unauthorised use of firearms. No ammunition was used.” 233. The document concluded that the servicemen of the Ministry of the Interior and Ministry of Defence had used “personal, authorised, smallarms weapons, engineering hardware and chemical weapons, destined to cause harm to manpower, but this ammunition was used in line with the [applicable] regulations and on account of the inability to prevent the terrorists’ actions by any other means; the use of the above weapons resulted in the terrorists’ elimination or detention”. The document further stated that the investigation had obtained no evidence that the use of the above-listed weapons had resulted in harm to any of the hostages. Accordingly, there was no evidence of an offence having been committed. 234. The decision of 3 December 2004 was quashed on 12 September 2005 due to certain technical deficiencies. It is unclear what happened next in this respect. 235. On 29 October 2004 a commission from the North Ossetian Emercom carried out an internal investigation into the actions of the Emercom staff during the crisis. According to its findings, the firefighters were aware in advance of the locations of the fire hydrants in the vicinity of the school, but could not use them because they could have been shot at by the terrorists. Hence, they first used mobile cisterns. The staff in charge had drawn up a plan of access for the fire engines to the school, but it was not within the firefighters’ powers to ensure that these routes were accessible – that should have been coordinated by the OH on the basis of that plan. Failure to intervene during the initial stage had been based on the instructions of the OH. Lastly, the use of more powerful hydraulic cannons was deemed impractical by the commission, in view of the limited choice of locations where they could be placed, the distance to the source of the fire of about 60 metres, narrow access to the fire and the danger from the “hot vapour” to those who might still be alive in the burning building. The commission concluded that the actions of the Emercom staff had been correct and justified. 236. On 10 December 2004 an investigator from the Prosecutor General’s Office in the North Caucasus decided not to charge the North Ossetian Minister of Emercom Mr Dzgoyev and his deputy and head of the fire service, Colonel Romanov, with crimes under Article 293 of the Criminal Code (criminal negligence). The decision referred to witness statements made by Colonel Romanov, Mr Dzgoyev and a number of other firefighters and officials of the service. They confirmed that the information about the fire had first come in after the first explosions, soon after 1 p.m., but that the OH had only allowed the firefighters to intervene after 3.20 p.m. They said that seven fire engines had been ready to take part in the operation, but that the access routes to the school had remained busy with cars and people. The two closest fire hydrants had not been accessible; at first the engines had used cisterns to extinguish the fire from two water cannons; later a line to the next hydrant had been made. The decision discussed the question whether the firefighters could have used a more powerful hydraulic water cannon, but the firefighters argued that it could only have produced the desired effects if the distance to the source of fire had been less than 30 metres – that could not have been ensured in view of the ongoing fighting. The decision concluded that at the time of the firefighters’ intervention, the general management of the operation had been taken by the OH headed by the FSB, without whose permission no action could have been taken. The FSB had not allowed the firefighters to intervene for about two hours, in view of a lack of special equipment for them, and thus their members could have been injured or died. In such circumstances, the actions of the Emercom officials contained no elements which could lead to the conclusion that a crime had been committed. It is unclear when the applicants were informed of this decision and whether they had appealed against it. 237. In March 2006 the victims lodged an application to have the competent officials, including Mr Dzasokhov, General Andreyev, Mr Popov and Colonel Romanov, charged with criminal negligence and withholding information entailing danger to people’s lives and health, with serious consequences (Articles 293 § 2 and 237 § 2 of the Criminal Code). In particular, they argued that no necessary preventive measures had been taken prior to the terrorist act; that the OH had remained passive and failed to ensure meaningful negotiations with the hostage takers; that as a result of the inaction of the OH the hostages’ conditions had deteriorated from 1 to 3 September 2004, thus rendering them weak by the time of the storming; that the failure of Mr Dzasokhov, Mr Zyazikov and Mr Aslakhanov to appear for negotiations had excluded the possibility of a dialogue; that the security perimeter around the school had not been properly ensured; and that the storming operation had not been thoroughly prepared. The victims also alleged that the military and security forces had acted without a plan and used excessive and indiscriminate weapons after 1 p.m. on 3 September. In support of that assertion they referred to several dozen witness statements collected during the trial of Mr Nurpashi Kulayev attesting to the use of flame-throwers, grenade launchers, tanks and APCs. They further alleged that there had been a one-and-a-half hour delay between the start of the fire in the gymnasium and the commencement of the extinguishing operation, and that the firefighters had been unprepared since they had lacked water supplies. As a result, dozens of hostages including children in the gymnasium had been burnt alive, since they were injured, shellshocked, disoriented or too weak to leave on their own. 238. On 14 March 2006 the Deputy Prosecutor General rejected the application, finding that the decisions of the investigating officers had been lawful and that the actions sought by the victims were not necessary as the relevant facts had been established through other steps. On 26 June 2007 the Promyshlenny District Court of Vladikavkaz allowed an appeal by the victims against the decision and ordered the Deputy Prosecutor General to examine the victims’ applications in detail and provide them with reasoned answers to each of their arguments. On 15 August 2007 the North Ossetia Supreme Court quashed and remitted the District Court’s decision. On 24 August 2007 the District Court confirmed the validity of the decision of 14 March 2006. It was then approved by the North Ossetia Supreme Court on 3 October 2007. Subsequent requests by the victims for a supervisory review were unsuccessful. 239. In the meantime, and in parallel to the above-mentioned proceedings, on 20 April 2006 the head of the investigation team, an investigator of the Prosecutor General’s Office in the Southern Federal Circuit, decided not to open a criminal investigation, under the same provisions of the Criminal Code, in respect of the head and members of the OH. The investigator found that there were no constituent elements of an offence in the officials’ actions. He relied heavily on the conclusions of expert report no. 1, saying that the actions of the OH had been in conformity with the relevant rules and regulations. The victims appealed, and on 3 April 2007 a judge of the Leninskiy District Court of Vladikavkaz quashed the investigator’s decision, since expert report no. 1 had been found to be unlawful. On 2 May 2007 the North Ossetia Supreme Court quashed and remitted the District Court’s decision, finding that it was not based on all the material available. On 6 June 2007, in a new set of proceedings, the Leninskiy District Court rejected all the applications and found that even though expert report no. 1 had been invalidated, the evidence on which it had relied remained valid and supported similar conclusions. On 15 August 2007 the North Ossetia Supreme Court upheld this decision. 240. In a separate decision, also dated 20 April 2006, the same investigator decided not to open criminal proceedings against the North Ossetian Deputy Minister of Emercom and head of the fire service Colonel Romanov and the head of the fire service of the Pravoberezhny District Mr Kharkov. The decision referred to Article 293 § 2 of the Criminal Code, which concerned criminal negligence, and to witness statements confirming that the first information about the explosions and fire in the gymnasium had been received soon after 1 p.m. on 3 September, as well as to the fact that Colonel Romanov had, on several occasions between 1.20 and 3.20 p.m., ordered the firefighters to intervene and then cancelled his orders due to a lack of authorisation by the head of the OH. At 3.25 p.m. two fire engines had arrived at the school with a full load of water, which could last for about 3 to 5 minutes. Once it had been used, two other fire engines had been called in; later, water had been obtained from a fire hydrant because the closest hydrants could not be used. The decision referred to expert report no. 1 and to the fire expert’s report no. 2576/17, 320-328/18-17 (see paragraphs 218 et seq.). 241. On 30 September 2005 the Russian Ministry of Health informed the Prosecutor General’s Office of the results of its internal inquiry into the actions of its staff from 1 to 3 September. The Ministry conceded that the scale and circumstances of the events had been unprecedented even for its most experienced staff, and that the situation had been “exacerbated by a lack of verifiable information about the number of hostages, the unpredictability of the events and the difficulty in predicting the types of injuries”. The report noted that the situation at the site of the paediatric field hospital set up in Beslan on 2 September 2004 had been made difficult by the presence of a large number of local residents, who had “sometimes turned into a mob displaying signs of emotional/psychological instability”. The work of a mobile group of psychologists had helped to dispel the pressure and create the conditions necessary to administer medical aid. The overall input of the Zashchita Centre was described as vital. 242. The Government, in their submissions made in September 2013, summarised the documents contained in file 20/849 relating to the work of the medical staff as follows. 243. On 1 September 2004 the Ministry of Health set up a coordination cell, joining the forces of the local and federal ministries of health, Emercom, the Zashchita Centre and the Ossetia State forensic bureau (Бюро Судебномедицинской экспертизы (БСМЭ) – “the forensic bureau”). From the evening of 1 September, special psychological aid units were put in place for the relatives. A number of other urgent steps were taken, such as putting medical personnel in a number of local hospitals on standby, preparing supplies of necessary equipment and material, including blood for transfusion, ensuring the preparedness of the intensive care and surgery units. 244. On 2 September an emergency paediatric field hospital was set up in Beslan. The “federal and local headquarters” worked out access to the school and evacuation routes and instructed the drivers and medical and paramedical personnel involved. 245. On 3 September an additional hospital was set up in Beslan, equipped to perform urgent surgical operations and other types of emergency care. Measures were taken in order to assist a large number of the injured. A total of 1,300 places were reserved at various hospitals in the region. Both before and after the storming medical teams were brought in from other regions, including highly qualified doctors from Moscow. 246. By the time of the first explosions, over 200 doctors, 307 medical staff and seventy ambulances were in Beslan. This made ninety-four mobile medical teams, including fourteen reserve ones. 247. Between 1.15 and 6.30 p.m. on 3 September 2004, 556 injured people, including 311 children, were transferred to the local hospitals. By 7 p.m. all patients had been placed in hospitals in Beslan and Vladikavkaz and forty-seven urgent operations had been performed. 248. Over 1,000 people were provided with psychological aid. 249. From 4 September 2004 special medical teams visited families, assisting those hostages and their family members who had gone home. Between 5 and 15 September over 200 patients (including 137 children) were transferred for treatment to Moscow by special flights. 250. Between 3 September and 16 December 2004 about 800 patients received medical aid. A total of 305 died at the school, while twenty-six people died in hospital. By 16 December 2004 twenty-six patients (including seven children) continued to receive medical aid in hospitals; others had been discharged. North Ossetia received twenty-six tonnes of medical equipment and supplies in relation to the crisis. 251. In May 2007 the applicants applied to the Prosecutor General’s Office in the Southern Federal Circuit to have Mr Dzantiyev, the North Ossetian Minister of the Interior, charged with criminal negligence. On 1 June 2007 that application was dismissed. Following an appeal by the victims, on 18 February and 27 March 2008 the Promyshlenny District Court of Vladikavkaz and the North Ossetia Supreme Court upheld that decision. 252. In July 2007 the applicants requested that the prosecutor’s office “evaluate” the actions of the North Ossetian senior officials who had failed to prevent the terrorist act and inform the population of the imminent threat or ensure a proper security perimeter around the school. They also asked it to verify the lawfulness of the actions of the members of the OH who had authorised the use of indiscriminate weapons and had failed to ensure that the fire was promptly extinguished. They referred to the information contained in the Federal Assembly report (see paragraphs 398 et seq.), also seeking to have the officials concerned and the victims questioned. On 2 August 2007 this application was dismissed in part by the investigator, who found that the questions raised by the victims were the subject of the pending criminal investigation. 253. On the basis of the medical documents and forensic reports, the causes of death were established for 215 people; the exact cause of death of 116 people could not be established owing to extensive post mortem burns. As to the injured, seventy-nine people received gunshot wounds, ninety-one shrapnel wounds, 302 people suffered from the consequences of the explosions, ten people received concussion, eighty-three people suffered from fractured bones and contusions, thirty-six people received thermal injuries and 109 people suffered psychological and neurological problems. 254. The investigation concluded that the deaths and injuries of the victims were not connected with any actions or omissions on the part of State agents, including the use of firearms. 255. The applicants in their numerous complaints stressed that the forensic expert reports had been carried out without the extraction of bullets, shrapnel and other objects from the bodies. They also stressed that the forensic reports for many people had failed to establish the cause of death altogether, owing to extensive burns. 256. In the course of the domestic proceedings the victims lodged several hundred applications with the prosecutor’s office requesting various procedural steps to be taken. They appealed against the results of most of these decisions in the district courts. Copies of most of the applications and complaints, as well as the authorities’ reactions, were submitted to the Court or described by the applicants in their submissions. 257. In July 2006 the victims asked the investigator in charge of the case to find out who had decided against presenting the four men sought by the terrorists for negotiations; to hold confrontations between civilian and police witnesses on the one hand and army servicemen on the other; and to investigate the use of tanks and flame-throwers in the afternoon of 3 September 2004. On 24 July 2006 the investigator rejected the application, stating that the decision to use the appropriate weapons had been taken by the OH and that witness confrontations were not considered useful by the investigation. 258. In January 2007 the applicants asked the investigator to determine who had decided that the four men requested by the terrorists should not participate in the talks and who had authorised the use of tanks and flamethrowers during the storming. On 30 January 2007 the investigator in charge granted the application and informed the applicants that they would be kept up to date with the investigation results. 259. In August 2007 the applicants asked the investigation to find out the number of hostages that had been communicated by the OH to the FSB, the Ministry of the Interior and the Russian President on each day of the crisis and to question the relevant officials. On 14 August 2007 this application was granted. 260. In November 2007, referring to the results of the forensic reports and witness statements obtained during the trial of Nurpashi Kulayev (see paragraphs 269 et seq.), the victims argued that the bodies of 116 people had been severely burned, rendering it impossible in most cases for the cause of death to be established. However several forensic reports indicated extensive burns as the cause of death. The victims sought to find out who had ordered the delay in the firefighters’ intervention in the gymnasium and whether they had been properly equipped upon arrival. On 16 November 2007 the investigator dismissed the application to bring charges against several officials, referring to the pending investigation. 261. At the victims’ request, on 23 November 2007 the investigator appended to the file the records of the trials of the officers of the Pravoberezhny and Malgobek ROVDs. 262. In December 2007 the investigator granted the victims’ applications, based on information obtained during the trial of Mr Kulayev, to have a number of senior officials questioned about the steps taken in August 2004 with the aim of preventing the terrorist act, in order to clarify the extent of the local police’s involvement in securing Mr Dzasokhov’s passage on the morning of 1 September and to find out how the OH had come up with the figure of 354 hostages that was aired during the crisis. The investigator also granted the victims’ application to have the commander of the FSB Special Services Centre (ЦCН ФСБ России) General Tikhonov questioned, in order to ascertain the details of the use of indiscriminate weapons on the school. 263. On 10 May 2007 the Promyshlenny District Court of Vladikavkaz reviewed, at the applicants’ request, about 120 applications lodged by them with the investigator between December 2005 and March 2007, the results of which they found unsatisfactory. The complaints mostly concerned the following points: the applicants’ attempts to obtain additional evidence about the exact cause of their relatives’ deaths and injuries; information about the reasons for the first three explosions in the gymnasium; the details of the involvement of various military and security units in the storming; information about the types and results of examinations of the weapons found in the school, evidence related to the actions of the OH; information about the actions of firefighters immediately after the first explosions; the extent of the officials’ responsibility for the outcome of the crisis; and the victims’ requests to acquaint themselves with various documents in the file. The applicants’ complaint was dismissed in full, the District Court finding that the investigators had acted lawfully and within the limits of their professional discretion. The court also noted that the proceedings were still pending. The applicants appealed, but on 13 June 2007 the North Ossetia Supreme Court upheld the decision. 264. On 23 October 2007 the Promyshlenny District Court of Vladikavkaz rejected a complaint by the victims about the investigators’ decisions in response to seven applications they had lodged to ascertain the reasons for the first explosions and the origins of the firearms which had caused the hostages’ deaths and injuries, to find out more about the communications with the terrorists, to identify the person who ordered the deployment of tanks, APCs, flamethrowers and grenade launchers, and to establish the reason for the carbonisation of 116 bodies. The court also rejected the victims’ complaint of inefficiency and delays on the part of the prosecutor’s office. On 8 February 2008 the North Ossetia Supreme Court upheld this decision. 265. On 10 January 2008 the Promyshlenny District Court rejected another complaint in relation to five complaints lodged by the victims with the investigator. They concerned the victims’ access to the expert report on the explosions, ballistics reports and documents relating to the existence of a real threat of a terrorist act prior to 1 September. The court, referring to Article 161 § 3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, concluded that the restrictions on the victims’ access to the documents had been justified. The remaining actions of the investigation were also found to be lawful. This decision was upheld on appeal on 27 February 2008. 266. According to the decision of the Promyshlenny District Court of 13 March 2008, sixty-two victims and their representatives complained to the Prosecutor General’s Office and then to the court about the investigators’ decisions to reject twelve complaints lodged between December 2007 and January 2008. They included the following demands: to find out the exact reasons for the victims’ deaths where the conclusions of the post-mortem reports had been incomplete; to ascertain whether the carbonisation of the bodies had been caused prior to or after death; to seek an explanation for six victims as to why the conclusions about the reasons for their relatives’ deaths had been based on external inspection without autopsy reports; to establish the causal relationships between the use of flame-throwers, grenade launchers, tanks and APCs during the storming and the hostages’ deaths; to obtain additional questioning of the servicemen of the Malgobek ROVD and of a military unit stationed in the Malgobek District about the prevention of the terrorist act; to clarify the reasons for the appointment of General Andreyev as the head of the OH on 2 September 2004; and to obtain full access to the material of the case file and copies of the complex expert report (including mathematical computations of the explosions, ballistics and explosion examinations). The victims also alleged that they had received no timely responses to their applications and requests, that the investigation had been protracted and lacked objectivity and, in particular, that they had not had access to the most important case documents. The Promyshlenny District Court dismissed all the appeals, finding that the victims’ demands had been satisfied by the investigation wherever possible, or had not been based on the pertinent legislation. On 23 April 2008 the North Ossetia Supreme Court upheld that decision on appeal. 267. On 10 December 2008 the Promyshlenny District Court dismissed another complaint lodged by a group of victims against the decisions taken in response to their complaints to the investigators. Eleven complaints, lodged between February and September 2008, concerned the victims’ access to the ballistics reports and the records of negotiations with the terrorists, obtaining copies of certain documents in the case file and the decisions ordering expert reports. The victims also alleged that the investigation had been unnecessarily protracted, with important steps being delayed, which in turn could have led to a loss of evidence and make the judicial examination of the matters less effective. They asked for the actions of the investigators to be declared unlawful in so far as they had not conducted an effective investigation, had refused to allow victims access to the case file and had failed to establish the extent of the officials’ responsibility. The court found that some documents requested by the victims were confidential, while access to others was regulated by Article 161 § 3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. On 11 February 2009 the North Ossetia Supreme Court upheld the District Court’s decision. 268. The victims’ subsequent attempts to seek a supervisory review of these decisions were unsuccessful. In September 2015 a group of applicants sought the latest information about the developments in the investigation from the head of the investigation team. They reiterated that they had received no information about the state of proceedings since 2013, particularly in respect of the actions concerning the military and the OH. 269. The applicants submitted voluminous documents related to the criminal investigation and trial concerning Mr Nurpashi Kulayev, the only terrorist captured alive. In particular, they submitted four volumes of trial records (about 2,000 pages), copies of the trial court judgment (319 pages) and cassation court decision and their appeals to the cassation and supervising courts. The most relevant documents and the applicants’ submissions can be summarised as follows. 270. On 19 January 2005 the criminal investigation in respect of the only surviving terrorist, Mr Kulayev, was separated from criminal case no. 20/849 and assigned the number 20/870. 271. On 17 May 2005 the North Ossetia Supreme Court opened the trial of Mr Kulayev. He was charged with aggravated murder, terrorism, hostage-taking, membership of a criminal gang, illegal firearms handling and attempts on the life of law-enforcement personnel (Articles 105, 205, 206, 209, 222 and 317 of the Criminal Code). Between May 2005 and February 2006 the trial court held sixty-one hearings. 272. In court Mr Kulayev stated that he had joined the group on 31 August 2004. His brother, Mr Khanpash Kulayev, had been a clandestine fighter since the early 1990s, but had lost an arm and had lately been living in Psedakh, their home village. On 31 August 2004 a group of armed men had arrived in a VAZ-2110 and accused his brother of working for the FSB. Both brothers and two of their friends had gone with the armed men to a camp situated about 300 metres away from the road. Late in the night on 31 August 2004 the man in charge of the camp, “Polkovnik”, had told all those present to get into a GAZ-66 truck. There had been thirty-two people, including two women wearing masks. Explosives and arms in backpacks had been placed under the benches and the men had taken seats on the floor of the truck. Responding to the victims’ questions, Mr Kulayev stated that he had not seen any wooden boxes for cartridges (which had later been found in the school canteen). 273. They had spent the night in the valley and in the early hours of the morning had continued their journey. The body of the truck had been covered with canvas and they could not see out. At one point the vehicle had stopped and Mr Kulayev had heard someone asking for the driver’s documents. They had then been told that a policeman had been captured and they had travelled on. The policeman had later been released because he had been a relative of one of the fighters. The ride had lasted around two and a half hours. During the capturing of the school one fighter had been fatally injured and “Polkovnik” had ordered the killing of twenty male hostages. In the school Mr Kulayev had been assigned to the canteen. On 1 September there had been a dispute among the fighters and “Polkovnik” had detonated the explosive device carried by a female suicide bomber. This explosion had fatally wounded the other woman and another fighter of Arab origin. According to Mr Kulayev, many members of the group, including himself and his brother, had been unaware of the nature of their mission, but “Polkovnik” had referred to Basayev’s orders and executed anyone attempting to object. The terrorists had talked between themselves in Ingush and “Polkovnik” had called someone to receive instructions in Russian. 274. Referring to the conversations among the terrorists, Mr Kulayev said that “Polkovnik” had told Mr Aushev that if the four men indicated by them came to the school, they would release 150 hostages for each of them. He also understood that some hostages and fighters would have been able to move in buses to Chechnya if the Russian troops had pulled out of the mountainous districts. 275. Speaking about the first explosions in the gymnasium, Mr Kulayev testified that “Polkovnik” had said that a sniper had “killed the man [holding the switch]”and had then cried to someone over the telephone “What have you done?!” before breaking it; after that he had encouraged the terrorists to fight until the bitter end. Mr Kulayev had jumped out of the canteen window and shouted to the soldiers that they should not shoot there because there were women and children. He denied that he had used his machine gun and had walked into the gymnasium while the hostages were detained there. 276. Two people convicted earlier for terrorist activities testified that they had known Mr Khanpash Kulayev, the accused’s brother, as an active member of the underground terrorist movement and that in 2003 both brothers and several other members of the armed group, together with their families, had lived in a rented house in Ingushetia (Ganiyev R., vol. 4, page 1562 of the trial records, Muzhakhoyeva Z., vol. 4, p. 1611). 277. Some local residents stated in court that they had seen unknown men and suspicious boxes at the school prior to 1 September 2004 (Tomayev V. vol. 1, pp. 360-63; Gutnova L. vol. 1, p. 458; Levina Z. vol. 1, p. 474; Kokova R. vol. 3, p. 1243; Rubayev K. vol. 3, p. 1305). During August 2004 the school building had been partially renovated, but the teachers and director denied that anyone other than the school staff and their families had been involved (Guriyeva N., vol. 2, p. 542; Ganiyeva Ye. vol. 3, p. 1157; Digurova Z. vol. 3, p. 1238). Some teachers testified that they had inspected the school in the early morning of 1 September and there had been no one there (Tsagolov A. vol. 1, p. 265; Avdonina Ye. vol. 2, p. 871; KomayevaGadzhinova R. vol. 2, p. 874; Shcherbinina O. vol. 2, p. 931). 278. The police officer who had been captured by the terrorists on the administrative border on the morning of 1 September 2004 testified that he had stopped the GA66 vehicle between 7 a.m. and 8 a.m. The armed men had taken his service pistol, VAZ vehicle and police cap and had driven to Beslan. He had escaped as soon as the shooting started. He denied having known any of the terrorists and confirmed that the terrorists had spoken Ingush between themselves and to him (G.S., vol. 4, p. 1546). 279. As to the prevention of the terrorist act, a senior police officer of the Pravoberezhny ROVD testified in court in November 2005 that at about 8 a.m. on 1 September the school had been inspected, possibly with a service dog. He admitted that, unlike in previous years, no patrol police had been deployed at the school (Khachirov Ch. vol. 3, p. 1215). Mr M. Aydarov, the former head of the Pravoberezhny ROVD, had been aware that the school had been inspected with service dogs on the morning of 1 September, but no appropriate records had been provided (vol. 3, p. 1410). 280. The trial court noted that criminal proceedings in respect of the organisers of the terrorist act were the subject of a separate criminal investigation (no. 20/849, see above). The court cited statements and documents from investigation file no. 20/849. It identified nineteen terrorists (including Mr Kulayev) and referred to thirteen unidentified individuals (including “Abu-Radiy” and “Abu-Farukh”). 281. It transpires that between October and December 2004 numerous hostages and the victims’ relatives were questioned and granted victim status. By the opening of the trial several hundred people had been granted victim status in the proceedings. Over 230 victims were questioned during the trial; statements by others given during the investigation were read out. 282. The victims questioned in court mostly denied having seen Mr Kulayev in the gymnasium, although several hostages had seen him in the gymnasium, in the corridor between 1 and 3 September and in the canteen during the final stage of the assault. Most of the hostages had not seen Mr Kulayev’s brother Khanpash, who had lost his right arm. Several of them also referred to one particular terrorist: a shaven man with a large scar on his neck, who had been particularly cruel to the hostages and whom they had not identified after the siege was over (witness Mitdziyeva I. vol. 2, p. 520). Most hostages had seen two women suicide bombers, although some hostages said they had seen another woman of Slavic appearance on the first floor of the school on 2 September and possibly a fourth one also on 2 September (Mitdziyeva I. vol. 2, p. 518; Misikov K. vol. 2, p. 571; Scherbinina O. vol. 2, p. 935). One woman told the court that on 2 September terrorist “Abdulla” had asked her if she was Ingush and suggested that they would let her family members go free if she agreed to act as a suicide bomber, since “their two girls had been killed by an ammunition round” fired from the outside (Kudziyeva L. vol. 2, p. 525). The hostages estimated the number of terrorists at between thirty and seventy. 283. With respect to the taking of the school, many hostages testified that as soon as the fighters had surrounded the gathering in the courtyard and started to shoot in the air, another group of fighters had fired from the top of the building. Some witnesses stated that when the shooting had started some children had tried to escape through Shkolny Lane, but there had been fighters there who had forced them to return. Many had seen fighters running to the school from the railway line (Kusayeva R. v. 1 p.147; Misikov Yu. v. 1 p. 471; Daurova M. v. 2 p.574). Others said that when they had entered the school there had already been armed fighters guarding the stairs to the first floor. One boy aged nine at the time testified that on 2 September he and about ten older boys had been forced to take boxes with grenades and mines from an opening under the stage in the meeting hall (Khudalov S. v. 2 p. 866), but no one else from this group could be identified. One witness testified that when the fighters had broken the floors in the gymnasium on 1 September they had taken out a long tube which she supposed had been a grenade launcher (Tsakhilova A. v. 2 p. 896). 284. Police officer Fatima D. gave detailed submissions about the hostage-taking and subsequent events. According to her, a second police officer had failed to arrive at the school. At about 8.50 a.m. one mother told her that a strange truck had been parked nearby. When she went out to check, she heard a suspicious noise. She ran to the staffroom on the first floor to alert the police but as soon as she took the telephone, she was surrounded by several fighters wearing camouflage uniforms. They told her that “everything would be serious this time” and led her to the gymnasium. She estimated that there were about seventy fighters (vol. 1, p. 365). 285. On 1 September the teachers, on the terrorists’ orders, drew up lists of the children aged below seven, although they were never used (Levina Z. v. 1 p. 475; Shcherbinina O. vol. 2, p. 937). Numerous hostages told the court that the terrorists had been extremely annoyed by the information about the number of people being held in the school and that their attitude had become harsher after the figure of 354 people had been announced. They testified that the terrorists had refused to allow them to drink or go to the toilet since “nobody needed them anyway and there would only be 350 of them left” (Kokayeva I. vol. 1, p. 413; Kaloyeva F. vol. 1, p. 448; Pukhayeva Z. vol. 1, p. 461; Daurova Z. vol. 1, p. 481). The hostages complained of mocking, insults and ill-treatment and explained how the terrorists had hit the elderly and children, subjected them to false executions, held parents and grandparents at gunpoint in the children’s view, and had fired into the air in order to keep them quiet. 286. The hostages saw the terrorists’ attitude deteriorating further on 2 September after Mr Aushev had left the school. Several of them said that on 2 and 3 September the terrorists had attempted in vain to liaise with the authorities through those who had had relatives among officials or public figures. 287. The school director Mrs Tsaliyeva was a hostage, together with members of her family. She stated that she had inspected the school on the morning of 1 September, denying allegations that anyone except staff and their relatives had been involved in the renovation. She had been called by the fighters to negotiate and testified that they had been annoyed by the absence of contact with the authorities. On 3 September she had attempted to involve the children of Mr Taymuraz Mamsurov and a prosecutor’s mother in the negotiations, but to no avail (Tsaliyeva L., v. 1 p. 432). 288. Many hostages testified about the explosions in the gymnasium. They said that prior to the explosions the fighters had been behaving in a relaxed manner and preparing lunch. Others mentioned some agitation probably caused by electricity failure in the gymnasium. Some hostages testified that they had seen an IED fixed to a basketball hoop explode (Dzarasov K. v. 1 p. 213; Archinov B. v. 1 p.274). Others insisted that when they had been leaving the gymnasium they could still see large IEDs intact on the basketball hoops (Sidakova Z. v. 1 p. 315) or that only the third explosion had come from that IED (Bekuzariva I. v. 2 p. 962). Some described the first blast as a “fireball” (Dzestelova A. v. 2 p. 538). Many testified about the fire and heat emanating from the explosions, enflaming their clothes and hair and causing burns (Agayeva Z. v. 2 p. 600; Dzheriyeva S. v. 2 p. 614; Kochiyeva F. v. 2 p. 631; Tsgoyev A. v. 2 p. 748; Bugulova F. v. 2 p. 764; Makiyev V., v. 2 p. 826; Khanikayev Sh. v. 2 p. 831; Kokova T., v. 2 p. 884). Many testified that the fire could have killed, injured and shellshocked people who had been unable to leave the gymnasium on their own (Tomayeva L. v. 1 p. 357; Gagiyeva I. v. 1 p. 444; Kudziyeva L. v. 2 p. 526; Fidarova S., v. 2 p. 584; Skayeva T. v. 3 p. 1001; Mitdziyeva Z., v. 3 p. 1043; Alikova F. v. 4 p. 1577). Some hostages described how they had been saved by local civilians from the gymnasium and adjacent premises after the explosions (Gagiyeva I. v. 1 p. 444). Numerous witnesses also gave evidence that when the hostages had started to run from the gymnasium through the opening in the wall they had been shot at from the first floor of the school, and many had been wounded. 289. Those hostages who had been taken by the fighters to the canteen and the meeting room testified about the fierce fighting which had taken place there. They stated that the fighters had tried to force the hostages – women and children – to stand in the windows and wave their clothes, and some had been killed by shots fired from outside and by powerful explosions (Kusayeva R., v. 1 p. 152; Sidakova Z., v. 1 p. 313; Urmanov S. v. 1 p. 426; Daurova Z., v. 1 p. 483; Badoyeva N. v. 2 p. 823; Makiyev V. v. 2 p. 826; Svetlova T. v. 2 p. 956; Katuyeva V. v. 2 p. 971). 290. Many also stated that they had not been satisfied with the results of the criminal investigation and that they did not intend to seek damages from the accused, since they considered that the State officials had to bear responsibility for the deaths and injuries. 291. Mr M. Aydarov, former head of the Pravoberezhny ROVD, was questioned in court (vol. 3, pp. 1394-4014) while under investigation in criminal case no. 20/852 for criminal negligence (see paragraph 355 below). He explained that he had only been appointed in midAugust 2004. The administrative border with Ingushetia in the district was 57 kilometres long and had been mostly unguarded. Many small roads through the fields had been closed off and rendered impassable in view of the heightened terrorist threat; however, this had not suited the locals, who very often had removed the barriers. In August 2004 information had been received about a gathering of armed groups near Psedakh in Ingushetia and a number of steps had been taken on both sides of the administrative border, but at the time the measures had produced no known results. 292. He also explained that out of the fifty-three officers of the ROVD who had been present on 1 September, over forty had been women. It had been difficult to maintain the staff on alert for a long time. As soon as shooting could be heard from the school, at about 9.15 a.m. on 1 September, he had ordered his staff to maintain security around the building. Two servicemen of the ROVD had witnessed the hostage-taking and exchanged fire with the terrorists. 293. Mr T. Murtazov, deputy head of the Pravoberezhny ROVD, was also under investigation for criminal negligence at the time of questioning. He gave detailed submissions about the use of Shmel flamethrowers on the school from three snipers positioned on the roofs of a technical building on Lermontova Street, a five-storey housing block on the corner of Shkolny and Batagova Streets and the caretaker’s house (vol. 3, p. 1418). He did not know where the snipers had come from. Between 2 and 4 p.m. he had witnessed a tank shooting at the school and the use of grenade launchers by the military. The officer remarked that not a single bullet had been extracted from the bodies of the deceased hostages which could have led to the identification of the servicemen of the Ministry of the Interior (v. 3 p. 1424). 294. Mr Dryayev, another senior ROVD officer, testified that immediately after the first explosions on 3 September he had seen soldiers (of the army or internal troops) firing automatic weapons at the school in response to enemy fire. Soon after 3 p.m. he had seen a tank stationed on Kominterna Street firing about ten shots at the corner of the school from a distance of about 30 metres. These rounds, possibly non-explosive, had damaged the wall and the roof (vol. 3, p. 1428). 295. Police officers of the Pravoberezhny ROVD testified that by the evening of 1 September they had carried out a house-to-house inspection in the district and compiled a list of 900 hostages’ names, which they had submitted to the officer on duty (Khachirov Ch. v. 3 p. 1212; Friyev S. v. 3 p. 1217). 296. The policemen also explained that two men had been assaulted by the crowd on 2 September and detained at the ROVD on suspicion of aiding the terrorists. They turned out to be civilians from a nearby town; both men had been identified and testified in court about this incident. 297. The court questioned several civilians who had helped to evacuate hostages from the gymnasium. Mr Dudiyev testified that he had entered the gymnasium after the first explosions, together with the special forces units, to search for his wife and three children. He had taken out his wounded wife and the body of his daughter, while his brother had evacuated his injured son; his eldest child had also been killed (Dudiyev A. vol. 1, p. 251). Other witnesses, both civilian and police, told the court that they had entered the burning gymnasium several times, taking out injured women and children before the roof had collapsed (Adayev E., vol. 2, p. 659, Totoonti I., vol. 4, p. 1595). One policeman witnessed the fire spreading very quickly on the roof of the school, saying that the firemen had failed to intervene (Badoyev R. vol. 3, p. 1295). 298. Some witnesses saw tanks shooting at the school soon after the explosions (Khosonov Z. vol. 3, p. 1110); one man was injured by an explosion while taking a child out of the gymnasium (Gasiyev T. vol. 2, p. 676). One witness, E. Tetov, explained that he had served in the army as a tank crew member and was well acquainted with tanks and the ammunition used by them. Shortly after 1 p.m. on 3 September he had counted between nine and eleven non-explosive rounds fired from a tank gun. He was also of the opinion that the first explosions and the fire had been started from the outside, by either a flame-thrower or a tracer bullet (vol. 2 pp. 72930). One civilian witness stated that he had served in the army as a grenade launcher operator and had identified at least two shots fired from grenade launchers or flame-throwers between the second and third major explosions in the gymnasium (Totoonti I., vol. 4, p. 1603). 299. Several police officers testified that the storming of the building had started unexpectedly and that this explained the casualties. Some of them had had no time to put on protective gear and rushed to the school as soon as they had heard the shooting. Some servicemen described the situation after the first explosions as “chaotic”, when various forces had been shooting at the school building using automatic weapons and other arms (Khosonov Z., vol. 3, p. 1109). They referred to the terrorists’ high level of training and preparedness, which had allowed them to mount resistance in the face of the elite Russian units (Akulov O., vol. 1, p. 492). 300. An officer of the Pravoberezhny ROVD testified that at about 9 a.m. on 3 September, while he had been ensuring the security cordon around the school, he had seen two full carloads of portable grenade launchers (RPG) and flame-throwers (RPOA Shmel) being delivered by servicemen of the Ministry of the Interior driving a white Gazel vehicle. He estimated that at least twenty flame-throwers had been unloaded and taken to the snipers’ positions, located about 200 metres from the school. The snipers and the forces of the Ministry of the Interior had used these flame-throwers soon after the explosions at the school, responding to enemy fire from grenade launchers and machine guns (Khachirov Ch. vol. 3, p. 1212). Another policeman counted up to ten shots from flamethrowers in the direction of the gymnasium roof at around 2 p.m. (R. Bidzheov, vol. 3, p. 1222). Other policemen testified that between 3 and 5 p.m. they had seen a tank firing at the school (Friyev S. vol. 3, p. 1218; Khadikov A. vol. 3, p. 1224; Khayev A. vol. 3, p. 1227; Karayev A. vol. 3, p. 1231) and that shots had been fired from grenade launchers (Karayev A. vol. 3, p. 1231; Aydarov M. vol. 3, p. 1400). 301. The hostage-taking and subsequent events were witnessed by numerous local residents; some of them were questioned in court. Several passengers of vehicles who had found themselves on the street in front of the school on the morning of 1 September had seen a GAZ66 truck arriving in the schoolyard. Some said that they had seen three or four women jumping out of the vehicle. Mr K. Torchinov had been a teacher at school no. 1 and a former investigator of the prosecutor’s office; he lived in the house opposite the school and had watched the ceremony from his window, from a distance of about 200 metres. He gave detailed explanations about the hostage-taking. In particular, he had counted the men who jumped out of the GAZ66 vehicle and said that there had been twenty-seven. He had also seen two other fighters in the schoolyard and between seven and eight who had run from the railway lines; at the same time there had been shots fired from the roof and the first floor of the school; he thus estimated the number of fighters at at least forty or forty-five. Mr Torchinov also stated that from 1 to 3 September there had been no soldiers or police lined up along the backyard of the school and that it had been possible to walk there from his house and back (vol. 2, pp. 847-59). 302. Numerous local residents whose relatives had been held in the school stated that they had been appalled by the announcement of the number of hostages. They said that the school had had about 900 students – lists could have been obtained from the local department of education – and that numerous parents and relatives had also been captured. Officials from the local department of education testified that on the morning of 1 September the number of students (830) had been transmitted to the administration with an indication that many relatives could be present at the ceremony (Dzukayeva B. vol. 3, p. 1334; Burgalova Z. vol. 3, p. 1349). Moreover, on 1 September volunteers and police had drawn up lists of over 1,000 hostages. In view of this, they could not explain how the officials had arrived at a figure of 350 (Khosonov Z. vol. 3, p. 1107). 303. Many local residents testified that they had seen or heard a tank shooting at the school after the explosions (Duarov O. vol. 3, p. 1083; Pliyev V. vol. 3, p. 1085; Dzutsev Yu. v. 3 p. 1121; Gagiyev E. vol. 3, p. 1300; Malikiyev A. vol. 3, p. 1308; Savkuyev T. vol. 3, p. 135; Ilyin B. vol. 1, p. 1453). Mrs E. Kesayeva had remained outside the school, where four members of her family were being held hostage. She testified that a tank positioned on Kominterna Street had fired several rounds between 1 p.m. and 4 p.m. (vol. 1, p. 325). One local resident saw a tank enter a courtyard on Pervomayskaya Street and heard it shooting at the school before 3 p.m. on 3 September. The witness was about 50 metres away from the tank (Khabayeva A. vol. 3, p. 1289). All those witnesses described the tank cannon shots as being particularly strong and clearly identifiable despite the overwhelming noise of fierce fighting. 304. Several residents testified about the firemen’s actions. They alleged, in particular, that the firemen had lost time before intervening in the gymnasium and that once the fire engines had arrived, they had been of little use since the water supplies in the cisterns had been quickly exhausted. Moreover, the pressure in the water hoses had been weak and they could not reach the gymnasium from where the machines were stationed. Some witnesses deplored the lack of preparedness by the firemen, who had failed to find out beforehand where to find water locally around the school rather than bringing it in cisterns (Tetov E. vol. 2, p. 729; Katsanov M. vol. 2, p. 802). Other witnesses told the court that they had seen a fire engine stuck in the courtyard and trying to find water for the cistern (Pliyev V. vol. 3, p. 1086). 305. Colonel Bocharov, brigade commander of the internal troops deployed in Beslan on 1 to 4 September, testified in November 2005 that servicemen under his command had ensured the security cordon. Their task had been to prevent the terrorists from breaking through. Four APCs from his brigade had been transferred to the FSB forces on 2 September (v. 3 p. 1209). 306. Officers of the 58th Army testified that their task had been to ensure the “third ring” of security around the school. One officer explained that General Sobolev, the commander of the 58th Army, had instructed him to follow the orders of the FSB officers. Each army vehicle deployed in Beslan had been reinforced by an officer of the FSB who had given orders and coordinated the crews’ actions (Isakov A. vol. 3, p. 1260; Zhogin V. vol. 3, p. 1265). They denied having heard or seen grenade launchers, flamethrowers or tanks being used prior to late on the evening of 3 September. The tank unit commander stated that between 8.56 p.m. and 9.30 p.m. one tank had fired seven high-fragmentation shells at the school (although the seventh had failed to explode), following orders of the FSB officer in charge. No shots had been fired from the tank guns before or after that (Kindeyev V. vol. 3, p. 1277). 307. One officer, a sapper, testified that he had entered the gymnasium at around 2.40 p.m. on 3 September and had deactivated an IED attached to a basketball hoop. Most IEDs had not exploded and had been deactivated the following day. The officer testified that he had entered the gymnasium with a group of seven servicemen and fifteen or twenty civilians who had evacuated the hostages for about one hour. Initially there had been no fire there, but the premises had been under attack from the north wing of the school. Soon afterwards he had noticed a fire starting in the roof, above the entrance to the gymnasium from the side of the weights room (Gagloyev A. vol. 4, pp. 1715 and 1733). 308. Mr Z., a professional negotiator from the North Ossetian FSB, was called to Beslan at 9.30 a.m. on 1 September. He had a meeting with General Andreyev and then informed him of the talks and received instructions from him. He was placed in a separate room, with a psychologist, and maintained telephone contact with the terrorists every 30 to 35 minutes. His efforts to establish psychological contact with his interlocutor (who called himself “Shahid”) were unsuccessful and he failed to obtain any concessions aimed at alleviating the hostages’ situation. The conversations were conducted in a rude manner; the gangsters insulted him and Dr Roshal. The terrorists repeatedly said that they would talk to the four men named by them and did not present any other demands. They did not specify the number of hostages they were holding, saying only that they had “enough”. They spoke of about twenty people shot dead on the first day and said that they had three days to wait for the authorities to bring the four men together. When asked if Mr Dzasokhov could come alone, the terrorists refused. The first telephone conversation took place at about 4 p.m. on 1 September, the last one after 1 p.m. on 3 September immediately following the first explosion. The witness remembered saying “What have you done?!” and “Shahid” responding “We have fulfilled our duty”. Responding to the victims’ questions, Mr Z. admitted that the negotiations involving Mr Aushev and Mr Gutseriyev had been carried out without him and that he had only been informed of these developments after they had occurred (vol. 4, pp. 1819-43). 309. The head of the FSB in Beslan at the relevant time stated in court in January 2006 that he had not been aware of the information and telexes sent by the Ministry of the Interior in August 2004 about the heightened terrorist threat during the Day of Knowledge. The FSB had not been involved in the protection of the administrative border, but their services had cooperated with the Ministry of the Interior in examining the area around the border (Gaydenko O. v. 4 pp. 1847-54). He did not have any information about the possible escape of terrorists after the storming. 310. The former head of the FSB department in Ingushetia, General Koryakov, confirmed that there had been sufficiently precise information about the activities of terrorist groups in Ingushetia in the summer of 2004 as a number of successful special operations had been carried out, but there had been no information about the armed group in the Malgobek District. He testified that he had arrived in Beslan on the morning of 1 September and had remained there for three days, working in close cooperation with General Andreyev. He was not certain if he had been a member of the OH, but he had been fully aware of its work. On the morning of 1 September General Koryakov had called the Ingushetian President Mr Zyazikov and informed him of the terrorist act; at that time no demand to involve Mr Zyazikov in the negotiations had been made. He could not reach Mr Zyazikov later since his mobile telephone had been switched off. By questioning the escaped hostages, they had tried to identify terrorists from Ingushetia and involve their relatives in the negotiations. They had therefore brought in the wife and children of a presumed terrorist, but her appeal had had no effect. The witness had not been aware of the note taken out by Mr Aushev (v. 4 pp. 1841-90). 311. Most of the army and internal troops servicemen failed to testify in court, and their witness statements collected during the investigation of criminal case no. 20/849 were read out (see paragraph 207 above). 312. On 15 November 2005 the court questioned Lieutenant-Colonel Tsyban (v. 3 pp. 1192-203), who at the relevant time headed the operational management group at the North Ossetian Ministry of the Interior (начальник группы оперативного управления по РСО при МВД РФ). The group was created on 11 August 2004 by an order of the Minister of the Interior with the mission of preventing terrorist acts, planning and carrying out special operations and controlling and managing resources allocated for counterterrorism activities. When asked about the meetings, functions and actions of the commission prior to 1 September 2004, he could not recall any details. 313. Lieutenant-Colonel Tsyban learnt of the hostage-taking at 9.30 a.m. on 1 September and went to Beslan. By late morning, he had organised the security perimeter around the school. As of noon on 1 September he reported to the deputy commander of the internal troops of the Ministry of the Interior, General Vnukov. Although he was a member of the OH, he stated that his participation had been limited to ensuring the second security perimeter. He had not been aware of the number of hostages, the nature of the terrorists’ demands or the negotiation attempts. He had not taken part in any meetings or discussions of the OH. As to the rescue operation, he stated that the servicemen of the internal troops had not used weapons, approached the school or taken part in the rescue operation. He had not been at the school on 3 September. He refused to answer when asked whether any terrorists could have passed through the security perimeter. 314. General Sobolev, the commander of the 58th Army of the Ministry of Defence, was questioned in November 2005 (vol. 3, pp. 1316-30). He was the most senior officer from the Ministry of Defence in the OH. He described the OH’s principal strategy of negotiation with the hostage takers, but said that the attempts had been futile because the terrorists had only been prepared to talk if the four people named by them came. Dr Roshal had attempted to contact the terrorists, but they had refused to talk to him; Mr Dzasokhov had been prevented by the OH from going to the school, and no contact had been established with Mr Zyazikov. The danger to the lives of the four men had been too high in the absence of any goodwill shown by the terrorists. In General Sobolev’s view, no negotiations were possible in the circumstances; the storming of the school should have taken place immediately, before the IEDs had been assembled. He believed that the terrorists had been supported and funded by foreign services, including the Central Intelligence Agency (of the United States). His task had been mostly limited to ensuring the security perimeter around the school and providing the necessary equipment; he was not aware of the number of hostages, negotiation strategies or the rest of the plan drawn up by the OH. 315. He named the forces and equipment brought in by the army. Eight APCs and three tanks had been transferred under the command of the FSB to be used as cover in the event of a storming. A group of sappers had demined the gymnasium on the afternoon of 3 September; they had found four mines and ten smaller IEDs connected by a “double chain” which had allowed them to be activated all at once or one by one. Three IEDs had exploded prior to demining; in one of them only the detonator had exploded but not the main charge. 316. Turning to the storming, General Sobolev explained that it had started unexpectedly. Officers of the FSB’s Alpha unit had been training in Vladikavkaz and had to be brought in urgently; many of them had had no time to prepare. This had led to an extremely high number of casualties: a third of the elite troops who had stormed the building had been injured or killed. He had not been aware that flame-throwers or grenade launchers had been used. The tank cannon had fired seven shots after 9 p.m. He was of the opinion that the army had successfully concluded its mission. 317. Mr Dzantiyev testified in November 2005 that at the relevant time he had been the North Ossetian Minister of the Interior. He had arrived in Beslan at about 10 a.m. on 1 September and followed Mr Dzasokhov’s orders. As of 3 p.m. on 1 September General Andreyev, the head of the North Ossetian FSB, had taken over the command of the operation. Mr Dzantiyev’s tasks had been to ensure security around the school and evacuate civilians from the area. The victims referred to the decree of the Russian Prime Minister of 2 September 2004 by which Mr Dzantiyev had been appointed deputy head of the OH; however, the witness insisted that he had not been informed of this, had not assumed such responsibilities and had been excluded from the OH meetings. Mr Dzantiyev had received orders from the Russian Minister of the Interior and his deputy Mr Pankov, who had arrived in Beslan, and on two occasions the deputy head of the FSB Mr Anisimov had asked him to check the situation in two villages. Mr Dzantiyev had been aware by the evening of 1 September, from the lists drawn up by the local police, that the number of hostages had been at least 700. He did not know where the figure of 354 had come from. He had no information about the use of heavy weapons during the storming but knew that later a number of empty tubes from Shmel flamethrowers had been found on the nearby roofs (vol. 3, pp. 137194). 318. In November 2005 the court questioned Mr Dzugayev (v. 3 pp. 143045). At the relevant time Mr Dzugayev was the head of the information and analytical department of the North Ossetian President’s administration. He testified that he had arrived in Beslan on 1 September 2004 at about 10 a.m. He had been instructed by Mr Dzasokhov and General Andreyev to liaise with the press, but had not been aware of the OH’s work, composition and strategy. He was asked a number of questions about the figure of 354 hostages which he had consistently announced to the press between 1 and 3 September. He explained that he had been told the figure by General Andreyev, who had referred to the absence of any exact lists. He had always stressed the preliminary nature of this information. 319. General Andreyev, who at the relevant time was the head of the North Ossetian FSB and head of the OH, was questioned in court in December 2005 (vol. 3-4, pp. 1487-523). He gave a detailed account of his actions and the work of the OH during the crisis. According to him, no formal leadership over the operation had been assumed prior to 2 p.m. on 2 September, but informally all the people with responsibility – members of the operational management group – had carried out their tasks under his and Mr Dzasokhov’s guidance. According to General Andreyev, as of 2 September the OH included seven officials: himself as the head, Lieutenant-Colonel Tsyban as his deputy, Mr Sobolev, Mr Dzgoyev, Mr Goncharov, the North Ossetian Minister of Education Mrs Levitskaya, and Mr Vasilyev from the State television company. 320. Mr Pronichev, deputy head of the FSB, had assisted the OH in a personal capacity but had assumed no formal role. General Andreyev referred to the Suppression of Terrorism Act, which stipulated the plan of action in the event that the hostage takers put forward political demands. The same law excluded political questions from the possible subjects of negotiations. He believed that the terrorists’ primary aim had been to achieve a resumption of the Ossetian-Ingush ethnic conflict, of which there was a real threat. From the first hours of the crisis, work had been carried out in close cooperation with the head of the FSB in Ingushetia. 321. General Andreyev detailed the authorities’ unsuccessful attempts to negotiate with the terrorists: their mobile telephone had initially been switched off, and the school telephone had been disconnected. The terrorists had often interrupted the contact, saying that they would call back. The OH had involved a professional negotiator, who was a staff member of the FSB. The terrorists had behaved in an aggressive and hostile manner and refused to discuss any proposals unless the four men indicated by them came to Beslan. General Andreyev insisted that Mr Zyazikov, the Ingushetian President, could not be found, while the three other men had been in contact with the OH (Mr Aslakhanov had talked to the terrorists over the telephone and had arrived in Beslan on the afternoon of 3 September). The OH had invited two influential men of Ingush origin, Mr Aushev and Mr Gutseriyev, to take part in the negotiations. The terrorists had been inflexible and refused to consider any proposals aimed at aiding the hostages or the possibilities of a ransom and exit. No written demands had been issued and a number of political demands had been made verbally through Mr Aushev. Responding to the questions about the number of hostages, General Andreyev insisted that there had been no exact lists beyond the 354 names and the OH had not wanted to release unreliable information. Responding to the victims’ questions, he reiterated that in the course of the negotiations the terrorists had not referred to the number of hostages and that in his opinion they had not been particularly interested in the figure announced. He testified that on the evening of 2 September Mr Gutseriyev had talked to Mr Zakayev in London and the latter had promised to establish contact with Mr Maskhadov. However, no direct line of communication with Mr Maskhadov had been established. 322. The OH’s strategy had been to negotiate, and no plan consisting of resolving the situation by force had been considered. General Andreyev explained that the involvement of the special forces had only been foreseen in the event of a mass killing of the hostages. 323. Turning to the special forces of the FSB, General Andreyev specified that the FSB Special Services Centre, under the command of General Tikhonov, had their own temporary headquarters located on the third floor of the Beslan administration building, at the local department of the FSB. Questions concerning the types and use of special weapons, such as flame-throwers, lay within the competence of that Centre. General Andreyev had issued an order to start the operation aimed at liberating the hostages and at neutralising the terrorists as soon as the latter had started to shoot at escaping hostages. He conceded that at the beginning of the operation there had been shots fired by other servicemen, and the FSB forces had been in danger of friendly fire. He insisted that the tanks and flame-throwers had been used only after 9 p.m. on 3 September, when there had been no hostages still alive in the school. General Andreyev stated that two terrorists had been captured alive, but one of them had been lynched by the locals. 324. During questioning, the victims openly accused General Andreyev of incompetence, concealing the truth and being responsible for the fatalities. They were reprimanded by the presiding judge. 325. The court heard a statement by the North Ossetian Minister of Emercom Mr Dzgoyev (v. 4 pp. 1523-44). He explained that he had been informed that he was a member of the OH on the evening of 2 September; however, both before and after that time he had functioned semi-autonomously. He had estimated the number of hostages at around 800 and on 2 September Mr Aushev had informed him personally that there were over 1,000; this information had been sufficient to prepare the rescue operation. 326. Mr Dzgoyev answered numerous questions about the extinguishing of the fire in the gymnasium. He stated that the information about a fire at the school (but not in the gymnasium) had been noted by their service at 1.05 p.m. on 3 September. The message that the roof of the gymnasium was starting to collapse had been noted at 2.40 p.m. General Tikhonov, the commander of the Special Services Centre, had authorised the firemen to move in at 3.10 p.m. and at 3.20 p.m. they had arrived at the scene. Mr Dzgoyev was told that by that time there had been no hostages still alive in the gymnasium; this information had later been confirmed by the forensic reports. Five fire brigades had been involved. By 4 p.m. the fire had been contained. Later the fire brigades had been ordered by the FSB to leave the gymnasium. They had then entered again and left the building at 6 p.m. 327. The witness explained that another fire vehicle had been brought in by a relative of a hostage from a nearby factory; it had been seen by many witnesses but had not been an Emercom car. He also insisted that the vehicles and cisterns had been fully prepared, that hoses had been laid from the nearest water hydrants and that the fire equipment had been sufficient. 328. At 7 a.m. on 4 September Emercom teams had started the clearance operation. They had worked in parallel with the staff of the FSB, army sappers and the prosecutor’s office. They had collected the remains of 323 hostages, of which 112 had been found in the gymnasium and adjacent premises. The bodies of thirty-one terrorists had also been found. During the day the Emercom staff had cleared the debris with the use of cranes, bulldozers and excavators; the debris had first been shifted manually to collect human remains and other relevant items. Only after sifting had the rubble been loaded onto the trucks supplied by the local administration. Mr Dzgoyev had personally inspected the destroyed wing of the school, where two floors had collapsed onto the cellar. He had seen the terrorists’ bodies but no hostages’ remains. Emercom had finished the clearance work by 7 p.m. on 4 September, after which the building had been handed over to the local administration. 329. Mr Dzasokhov was questioned on 27 December 2005 (v. 4 pp. 1562690). Then the North Ossetian President, he stated that at about noon on 1 September General Andreyev had received a verbal instruction from the FSB, with reference to the Russian Government, to head the OH. Mr Dzasokhov had not been a member of the OH, which he considered had been a mistake. However, he had done whatever he had thought was right and within his powers. He had been prepared to go and negotiate with the terrorists, but he had been told that he would be placed under arrest if he did so. He had not talked to the terrorists over the telephone, since this had been done by a professional negotiator. He had participated in the meeting with the relatives at the Cultural Centre on 1 and 2 September. He had also had several talks with General Tikhonov, the commander of the FSB Special Services Centre, who had shared his concerns about the use of force. 330. Mr Dzasokhov believed that too much operative information of low quality had been circulated prior to the terrorist act, which had made it difficult to react. In particular, there had been insufficient clarity about the terrorists’ plans in the summer of 2004, although the heightened security threat had been evident. 331. Turning to the negotiations, Mr Dzasokhov testified that he had seen the handwritten note allegedly signed by Mr Basayev which Mr Aushev had taken out of the school. He also explained that on 2 September he had talked to Mr Zakayev in London. At 12 noon on 3 September Mr Zakayev had confirmed that the request to take part in the negotiations had been transmitted to Mr Maskhadov. Mr Dzasokhov had informed the OH accordingly. 332. Mr Ogoyev, a former member of the counter-terrorism commission of North Ossetia and secretary of its security council testified that the OH appointed on 2 September had excluded all other people from its meetings. He had had no access to the OH, and Mr Dzasokhov and Mr Mamsurov had only been invited to its meetings on two occasions (Ogoyev U. vol. 3, p. 1362). He could not recall the work of the North Ossetian counter– terrorism commission created on 23 August 2004, of which he had been a member. 333. Mrs Levitskaya was the North Ossetian Minister of Education at the relevant time. She testified that she had gone to Beslan on 1, 2 and 3 September. She had been at the town administration and had had a number of discussions with Mr Dzasokhov and several other Ossetian officials. She had not participated in any OH sessions or other meetings. She had learnt that she had been a member of the OH on 10 September 2004 during a meeting of the North Ossetian Parliament (vol. 4, p. 1696). She had been informed on 1 September by the local department of education about the number of pupils at the school; she had also been told that this information had already been transferred to the district authorities. 334. The North Ossetian Deputy Minister of the Interior admitted that their resources had been insufficient to monitor the border crossing points with Ingushetia. He had also been aware of the attempts to block small roads in the Pravoberezhny District and the problems that had been encountered in August 2004 – a lack of staff, sabotage by the locals and the absence of funds to pay for the works (Popov V., vol. 4, p. 1807). 335. The director of the Zashchita Centre Mr Goncharov (vol. 3, pp. 116678) testified that on 2 September he had been told that about 300 people were being held hostage and that medical assistance had been planned accordingly. Only after he had met with Mr Aushev on 2 September had he realised that the number of hostages had actually been much higher. That evening he had set up emergency paediatric teams, called in ambulances from the region, carried out training and prepared for the arrival of patients. They had mostly expected victims of injuries; the probability of gas poisoning had been considered low. He testified that although he had been a member of the OH as an official of the Ministry of Public Health, he had not taken part in any meetings or discussions. He had not received any information from the OH, as, in his view, the number of hostages had been the only relevant factor and that had been communicated to him personally by Mr Aushev. His own experience and available resources had been sufficient. Being highly experienced in providing emergency treatment to a large number of victims, his work had been relatively independent from the rest of the OH. Besides, his previous experience had shown that the “security structures” would not share their plans with the medics, out of a need to keep such considerations secret. 336. Turning to the organisation of medical assistance, Mr Goncharov explained that by the morning of 3 September they had had about 500 people on standby in Beslan, including 183 doctors, over seventy ambulances, one field paediatrician hospital and several intensive care units. “Carriers” with stretchers had been grouped about 700 metres from the school, with ambulances and medical vehicles placed in several spots around the building. The idea had been to take the injured to Beslan Hospital where the sorting would take place, urgent operations and life–saving measures would be carried out in the paediatric field hospital and, for adults, in Beslan Hospital and then those who could be transported to Vladikavkaz would be taken there (about 20 kilometres away). 337. Immediately after the explosions at 1 p.m. on 3 September he had received a call from the OH to bring in the medical rescue team. For four hours on 1 September the sorting centre at Beslan Hospital had treated 546 patients and carried out seventy-six urgent operations. Five people had been taken to the hospital in agony and had died within a few hours; fourteen other patients had died within twenty-four hours. In total, 199 adults had been evacuated to other hospitals after urgent medical assistance; fifty-five children had been in a lifethreatening condition and had had to be treated on the spot, seven children had had emergency surgery. On the night of 3 September six children in a critical condition had been taken to Moscow in a specially equipped aeroplane. There had been difficulties in maintaining the necessary security around the school, and later around the hospital, to avoid disruption of services by the relatives. 338. Mr Soplevenko, then North Ossetian Minister of Public Health, was questioned in court on 15 November 2005 (vol. 3, pp. 1179-91). He also testified that between 1 and 3 September he had not received any particular instructions, but rather general indications by Mr Dzasokhov that “adequate medical aid” should be provided. He had not been part of the OH or any other body during the crisis. He had learnt from the nursing mothers who had walked out with Mr Aushev on 2 September that more than 1,000 people were being held in the school. In cooperation with Mr Goncharov he had alerted the hospitals in Vladikavkaz that they would have to admit patients: beds had been freed at five hospitals, surgery and intensive care teams had been put on standby, and stocks of medical and dressing material had been set aside. 339. Dr Roshal, director of the Moscow Institute of Emergency Paediatric Surgery, was questioned in February 2006. He stated that he had been informed by journalists on 1 September about the hostage-taking and had immediately gone to Beslan. He had been taken to the town administration where the OH and other officials had been stationed. He had been taken to a room with Mr Z. where he had received brief instructions from him. On several occasions he had called the terrorists; each time they had reacted in a hostile manner and refused to discuss anything unless all four men requested by them came. His attempts to convince them to accept water, food, medicine or to allow him to examine and treat the wounded and sick had been flatly rejected; moreover, the terrorists had said that all the hostages had declared a “dry hunger strike” in support of their demands. On 2 September at about 11 a.m. the terrorists had called him and let him talk to the school director, who had pleaded with him to intervene since their situation was dire. On 2 September Dr Roshal had personally telephoned Mr Zakayev in London and let Mr Dzasokhov talk to him (v. 4 pp. 1900-25). 340. In December 2005 the court, following an application by the victims, questioned a senior expert of the forensic laboratory in RostovonDon, who on 13 September 2004 had been appointed the chief of the team in charge of identifying the remains by DNA testing. The expert explained that their laboratory was the best equipped in Russia and that the genetic testing would take between three days and five weeks, depending on the quality of the material under examination. All work in the Beslan cases had been completed within a month and a half. Mr Korniyenko stated that the results obtained through genetic pairing had been final and could not be challenged on grounds of possible misidentification. He admitted that many relatives had refused to believe that their loved ones had died and that on some occasions they had carried out second rounds of tests with other relatives’ DNA, primarily out of respect. The expert cited difficulties in identifying the remains which had been burnt “to ashes” and in identifying body fragments, a process which had lasted until summer 2005. The same expert group had worked with the terrorists’ remains: twenty-three had been identified, while eight remained unidentified (v. 3 p. 1469). 341. Hundreds of forensic reports on the victims were examined by the court. They included examinations of bodies, results of the identification of remains through DNA testing, conclusions of experts regarding damage to the health of the surviving hostages and other documents. Over 110 forensic reports concluded that the cause of death could not be established in view of many of the remains being extensively charred and burned and the absence of other injuries. Other reports named extensive burns, gunshot wounds, traumatic amputation of the extremities and injuries to the head and body as the causes of death. Injuries from gunshots and explosions, burns and psychological trauma were recorded for the surviving hostages. 342. In the course of the proceedings the victims lodged several hundred applications. Some of them were lodged with the district courts in Vladikavkaz, where the investigation was being conducted, while others were lodged directly with the North Ossetia Supreme Court. Some of them were submitted to the Court, while others were mentioned in the statement of facts or in the trial records. 343. On 29 September 2005 the victims sought the withdrawal of the head of the investigation team, Deputy Prosecutor General Mr Shepel. They argued that the investigation had been incomplete and failed to take into account all the relevant information about the crime. They indicated that copies of many expert reports had been unavailable to them, that the prosecutor’s office had ignored numerous facts and statements which had differed from the facts “selected” to form the basis of Mr Kulayev’s indictment, and that the role of various officials in the hostages’ deaths had not been clarified. This complaint was dismissed. 344. In January 2006 the victims sought the withdrawal of the prosecution and the judge presiding in the case, referring to the incomplete nature of the investigation and the repeated dismissal of their complaints by the judge. They also questioned the logic behind separating the investigation concerning the terrorist act and its consequences into several sets of criminal proceedings. These complaints were also dismissed (vol. 4, p. 1801). 345. In November and December 2005 and in January 2006 the victims applied to the trial court for permission to have a number of additional witnesses called and questioned: members of the OH, senior civilian and FSB officers who had been present in Beslan during the operation, members of the North Ossetian Parliament’s investigative commission on Beslan, and people who had negotiated with the terrorists, including Mr Gutseriyev, Dr Roshal, Mr Z. and Mr Aslakhanov. The court agreed to question several Ossetian officials who were members of the OH, but refused to call other officials, negotiators and members of the North Ossetian Parliament. It also refused to include the results of the investigation of the North Ossetian parliamentary commission in the case file (v. 3 pp. 1311-312, v. 4 pp. 1570, 1589, 1651, 1778-783, 1796, 1929). In January 2006 the court granted the victims’ application to question Mr Z., Dr Roshal and some senior FSB officials. 346. In February 2006 the victims again sought the withdrawal of the prosecutor in the trial. They argued, with reference to the European Convention on Human Rights, that the investigation had been ineffective and incomplete in ascertaining the most important elements of the crime. They sought to have independent experts appointed in order to clarify key questions concerning the preparation of the terrorist act, the composition and powers of the OH, the reasons for the first explosions, the use of flame-throwers, grenade launchers and tank guns, and the belated arrival of the firefighters. The request was dismissed (v. 4 p. 1936). 347. In July 2006 the victims sought to acquaint themselves with the entire set of documents in the criminal case and to be allowed to take copies. Similar requests were lodged in March and July 2007, but apparently to no avail. 348. In his final submissions of February 2006 the prosecutor asked the court to apply the death penalty to the accused. The victims argued that the investigation and the trial had failed to elucidate many key elements of the events and that the officials responsible should be prosecuted for their actions which had led to the tragedy. 349. On 16 May 2006 the North Ossetia Supreme Court found Mr Nurpashi Kulayev guilty of a number of crimes, including membership of a criminal gang, handling of unlawful arms and explosives, aggravated hostage-taking, murder, and attempts on the life of law–enforcement personnel. The 319-page judgment summarised witness and victim statements and referred to forensic reports, death certificates, expert reports and other evidence. The court found that 317 hostages, one Beslan civilian and two Emercom workers had been killed; 728 hostages had received injuries of varying degrees (151 received serious injuries, 530 received moderately serious injuries and 102 received minor injuries). Ten servicemen of the FSB had been killed and fifty-five servicemen of the army and law-enforcement bodies wounded. The actions of the criminal group had caused significant damage to the school and private properties in Beslan. Mr Kulayev was sentenced to life imprisonment. 350. The victims appealed against the court’s decision. In detailed complaints of 30 August and 8 September 2006 they claimed that the court had failed to undertake a thorough and effective investigation and that its conclusions had not been corroborated by the facts. They argued that the court had failed to investigate the authorities’ failure to prevent the terrorist attack, apportion responsibility for the decisions taken by the OH, establish the exact places and circumstances of the first explosions in the gymnasium and assess the lawfulness of the use of indiscriminate weapons by the security forces. They also complained that the court had not allowed them full access to the case material. Their complaints were supplemented by reference to relevant statements and documents. 351. On 26 December 2006 the Supreme Court held a cassation appeal hearing. Four victims, the defendants’ lawyer and the prosecutor made oral submissions. The Supreme Court slightly amended the characterisation of one offence imputed to Mr Kulayev, while the remaining parts of the parties’ complaints were dismissed. In particular, the Supreme Court found that the questions raised by the victims had no bearing on the characterisation of Mr Kulayev’s actions and that the victims had been allowed full access to the case documents after the completion of the investigation. 352. On the same day the Supreme Court issued a separate ruling (частное определение) in respect of Deputy Prosecutor General Mr Shepel, who had acted as the State prosecutor in the trial. The court noted that his request to the trial court to apply the death penalty to Mr Kulayev had been contrary to the applicable legislation and as such incited the court to adopt a manifestly unlawful decision. 353. The applicants in application no. 26562/07 submitted that during the trial they had heard testimony and examined other evidence. It had allowed them to draw conclusions about the actions of the OH and other officials, most of which could not be elucidated within the course of the trial. Referring to the case material and other evidence, the applicants made the following inferences: (i) from 1 to 3 September the hostages had been detained in inhuman conditions and subjected to intense physical and emotional stress including deprivation of food and water, humiliation, witnessing the suffering and death of family members, and a feeling of helplessness in the absence of any meaningful negotiation attempts from the outside world; (ii) the conclusion that the IEDs had caused the first explosions was not supported by the hostages’ statements and the state of the gymnasium; (iii) after the first explosions the servicemen of the army and FSB had used heavy indiscriminate weapons including a tank gun, APC machine guns, flame-throwers and grenade launchers; (iv) the OH had not made the saving of hostages its primary aim and had authorised the use of heavy weapons during the storming; (v) the firefighters’ intervention had been significantly delayed, resulting in additional victims in the gymnasium. 354. In parallel to the proceedings in criminal case no. 20/849 and that concerning the actions of Mr Kulayev, two additional criminal investigations were conducted against police officers on charges of professional negligence. 355. On 20 September 2004 the Deputy Prosecutor General Mr Kolesnikov ordered the opening of a separate criminal investigation for negligence on the part of the head of the Pravoberezhny ROVD, Mr Aydarov, his deputy on issues of public safety, Mr Murtazov, and the ROVD’s chief of staff, Mr Dryayev. This criminal case was assigned the number 20/852. 356. The police officers were charged with negligence entailing serious consequences and the death of two or more people under Article 293 §§ 2 and 3 of the Criminal Code. They were accused of failing to properly organise an anti-terrorist defence and to prevent terrorist attacks in August 2004, despite the heightened terrorist threat and the relevant telexes and orders of the North Ossetian Ministry of the Interior. 357. Over 180 people were granted victim status in the proceedings. Although no procedural documents were submitted, it appears from the cassation appeal by the victims that only those whose relatives had died were granted victim status in the proceedings, while other hostages were refused this status. 358. On 20 March 2006 the Pravoberezhny District Court of North Ossetia started hearing the case. The applicants submitted four volumes of trial records, comprising about 1,500 pages and covering sixty-nine court hearings. 359. On 29 May 2007 the court terminated the criminal proceedings against the three officials, applying to them the provisions of the Amnesty Act of 22 September 2006. They agreed to the application of that Act, which absolved them from criminal responsibility for the acts committed during the period covered by it (see paragraph 464 below). The prosecutor’s office supported the application of the amnesty, while the victims objected. Outraged by the verdict, the victims present in the courtroom ransacked the premises. 360terrorism operation in Beslan had started after the crime in question had been committed. They also complained that the court had refused to consider civil claims at the same time, that many other hostages and relatives of the injured had been refused victim status in the proceedings, that one volume of the criminal investigation file (no. 43) had been declared confidential by the trial court and thus the victims had been denied access to it, that a number of key witnesses had not been called, and that the trial court had refused to take into account additional evidence such as the report of the North Ossetian Parliament about the investigation into the terrorist act. 361. On 2 August 2007 the Supreme Court of North Ossetia at last instance upheld the judgment of 29 May 2007. It found the victims’ allegations about procedural deficiencies to be irrelevant to the conclusion and confirmed the applicability of the Amnesty Act. 362. The victims applied for supervisory review of the above decisions, but to no avail. 363. On 7 October 2004 a separate criminal investigation was opened in respect of the head of the Malgobek ROVD, Mr Yevloyev, and his deputy, Mr Kotiyev, for negligence entailing serious consequences (Article 293 §§ 2 and 3 of the Criminal Code). It appears that at least one hundred former hostages or their relatives were granted victim status in these proceedings. 364. The applicants submitted various documents related to this trial, including about 200 pages of trial court records, corrections by the victims of these records, copies of their complaints and other documents. As shown by these documents, the officials of the Malgobek ROVD had been charged with failing to spot the terrorists who had gathered and trained in the district and had travelled on 1 September 2004 to North Ossetia. The investigation obtained a number of documents which contained sufficiently clear and precise information about the possible terrorist threat and the actions to be taken to counter it. In particular, on 22 August 2004 the Ingushetia Ministry of the Interior had issued Order no. 611 concerning a terrorist threat to public security, putting all staff of the Ministry on heightened alert until further notice. This document instructed all heads of district departments of the interior to contact the local municipalities, hunters and forest workers, in order to keep track of the movements of any suspicious looking men, and to check all trucks and other vehicles capable of transporting illicit cargo, if necessary using service dogs. On 23 August 2004 Mr Yevloyev issued a corresponding order on measures to be taken in the Malgobek District. 365. On 25 August 2004 the Ingushetia Ministry of the Interior issued Order no. 617 on security measures in schools and educational facilities. By this order the police were called to take special measures aimed at protecting educational facilities against possible terrorist acts. On 28 August 2008 Mr Yevloyev issued a corresponding document for the Malgobek District. 366. On 31 August 2004 the Ingushetia Ministry of the Interior sent a directive to all district departments, citing operative information about a possible terrorist act in educational facilities on the opening of the academic year. Again, a number of urgent steps involving local government and school principals were recommended. 367. The trial was conducted by the Supreme Court of Ingushetia in closed sessions in Nalchik, Kabardino-Balkaria. The defendants opted for a trial by jury. On 5 October 2007 the jury found the defendants not guilty. On the same date the Supreme Court of Ingushetia fully acquitted the defendants and rejected the civil actions lodged by the victims within the same proceedings. 368. The victims appealed, and on 6 March 2008 the Supreme Court confirmed the validity of the judgment. The victims’ subsequent applications for supervisory review were unsuccessful. 369. In November 2007 a group of victims lodged a civil claim against the Ministry of the Interior, seeking compensation for the damage caused by the terrorist act. The victims referred to the judgment of the Pravoberezhny District Court of 29 May 2007 in respect of the officers of the Pravoberezhny ROVD of Beslan. They argued that the application of the Amnesty Act did not exclude the possibility of claiming damages in civil proceedings. Arguing that the Ministry of the Interior had failed to take steps to prevent the terrorist act, they sought financial compensation in respect of each family member who had died or had been a hostage. 370. On several occasions the Pravoberezhny District Court requested the applicants to supplement their claims. On 22 May 2008 the court ordered the case to be transferred to the Leninskiy District Court of Vladikavkaz attached to the North Ossetian Ministry of the Interior. On 26 September 2008 the Leninskiy District Court ordered the case to be transferred to the Zamoskvoretskiy District Court of Moscow near to the Ministry of the Interior of Russia. On 21 October 2008 the North Ossetia Supreme Court, following an appeal by the applicants, quashed a ruling made by the Zamoskvoretskiy District Court and remitted the case to the Leninskiy District Court. 371. On 10 December 2008 the Leninskiy District Court of Vladikavkaz dismissed the applicants’ civil action against the Ministry of the Interior. It explained that the Suppression of Terrorism Act, which had been relied on by the claimants, did not provide for compensation for non-pecuniary damage by a State body which had participated in a counter-terrorism operation. As to the applicants’ attempt to link the compensation claim to the decision not to prosecute the officers of the Pravoberezhny ROVD, the court dismissed it as it concerned another defendant. 372. On 24 February 2009 the North Ossetia Supreme Court rejected an appeal by the applicants against the above decision. Their subsequent attempts to obtain supervisory review of these decisions were unsuccessful. 373. In separate proceedings another group of victims attempted to sue both the Russian and North Ossetian Ministries of the Interior for nonpecuniary damage sustained by them by the terrorist act. On 9 December 2009 the Leninskiy District Court of Vladikavkaz dismissed the claim, giving similar reasoning. On 17 March 2009 the North Ossetia Supreme Court upheld this decision at last instance. 374. On 10 September 2004 the North Ossetian Parliament set up a commission to examine and analyse the events in Beslan from 1 to 3 September 2004. In its work the commission relied on the material available, including official documents, photographs, video footage and audio material, press articles, witness statements and their own information sources. The commission’s report was published on 29 November 2005. The report was forty-two pages long and contained chapters on the chronology of the terrorist act, facts and an analysis of the events preceding the hostage-taking, the actions of the OH and the various State agencies involved, an examination of the first explosions in the gymnasium, detailed information about the fighters and various statistical information relating to the act. The report ended with recommendations to the authorities. 375. The commission strongly criticised the local police and the Ingushetian and North Ossetian branches of the FSB. It expressed particular dismay at the fact that despite a “heightened security threat” the terrorist group had been able to gather and train unnoticed in the vicinity of a village and a major local road, as well as to pass unhindered to the school in the centre of a town across the administrative border, which was supposed to have been under special protection. The commission argued that the police’s attention had been diverted to the presidential elections in Chechnya which had taken place on 29 August 2004, following which no real attention had been paid to other security threats. 376. Turning to the work of the OH, the report was highly critical of its composition and functioning. It concluded that the “first, socalled ‘republican’ OH” had been created on 1 September 2004 at 10.30 a.m., in line with the Suppression of Terrorism Act and the pre-existing plan dated 30 July 2004. It had comprised eleven people under Mr Dzasokhov’s command and had included the heads of the North Ossetian FSB, Ministry of the Interior and other officials. In the presence of the OH members, Dr Roshal and a number of other public figures, Mr Dzasokhov had announced that he was prepared to go to the school; however, the deputy Minister of the Interior of Russia, Mr Pankov, had replied that in that case he would be authorised to arrest him. Mr Dzasokhov himself had confirmed that he had been informed by senior officials in Moscow that he should not take “any steps which could lead to further complications in the operation aimed at liberating the hostages”. This “republican” OH had continued to consider possible strategies aimed at liberating the hostages throughout the crisis. It had also considered the possibility of inviting Mr Maskhadov to negotiate. 377. In the meantime, on the afternoon of 1 September 2004 the President of Russia, in accordance with a secret order issued by the Russian Government (no. 1146-rs), had determined the composition of the OH under the command of General V. Andreyev, the head of the North Ossetian FSB. The OH had included seven people: the deputy head of the counter-terrorism commission of North Ossetia Lieutenant-Colonel Tsyban, the commander of the 58th Army of the Ministry of Defence GeneralLieutenant V. Sobolev, the North Ossetian Minister of Emercom Mr Dzgoyev, the North Ossetian Minister of Education Mrs Levitskaya, the director of the Zashchita Centre Mr Goncharov, and the deputy head of the information programmes department of Rossiya, Mr Vasilyev. The report criticised the composition of the OH, which had excluded not only Mr Dzasokhov – the North Ossetian President – but also a number of other senior officials from the republic. It also noted that two deputy heads of the FSB who had arrived in Beslan, Mr Anisimov and Mr Pronichev, had not been officially designated to take on any tasks in the OH. This had led to a situation of a multitude of “leaderships”. 378. The report described the situation as follows: “The striking disunity of the headquarters is further proved by their locations. The Beslan administration building saw the following distribution of bodies and officials. In the left wing of the ground floor – [the] FSB (Generals V. Andreyev and T. Kaloyev). In the office next to them – Mr Pronichev and Mr Anisimov. On the third floor in the left wing were the Republic’s President, Mr Dzasokhov, Parliament’s speaker Mr Mamsurov, Plenipotentiary Representative of the Russian President in the Southern Federal Circuit Mr V. Yakovlev, and a group of Duma deputies headed by Mr D. Rogozin. In the right wing of the third floor worked the commanders of the Alfa and Vympel special forces units under the leadership of General Tikhonov. However, the most closed and mysterious structure was situated in the south wing of the ground floor of the [administration building], keeping its work secret from all members of the above-listed headquarters. In it worked people who did not belong to any official headquarters structure: Mr Anisimov and Mr Pronichev, Mr Pankov, Mr Kaloyev and others. Another secretive structure was located on the second floor of the building, in the centre. This was a sort of ‘ideological headquarters’ where all information going public was verified and edited prior to publication. Most probably, the announcement of the figure of 354 hostages had been decided there ... In addition, the commander of the 58th Army, Mr Sobolev, had set up his headquarters outside the administration building. Mr Dzgoyev, who, according to his own statement, had been “in reserve”, was also stationed outside the building, as was the North Ossetian Minister of the Interior ... The formal nature of [General] Andreyev’s appointment as OH commander is supported by well-known facts. The head of the North Ossetian FSB had left the headquarters on dozens of occasions and thus lost control over the situation: he talked to the Beslan citizens outside the OH, met with journalists [and] accompanied Mr Aushev to the school on 2 September and the Emercom group on 3 September. How could the General, on whose decisions the lives of hundreds of people depended, behave in this way? This is either excluded or, to the contrary, quite possible, if actual decisions for [General] Andreyev had been taken by his immediate superiors – Mr Pronichev, Mr Anisimov and, probably, the head of the North Caucasus department of the FSB, Mr Kaloyev. There is reason to believe that [General] Andreyev’s orders and directives were not formally recorded, that no meetings of the OH took place, and that everything was decided verbally in the course of working discussions with various agencies ... One gets the impression that the OH under [General] Andreyev’s command oscillated between two extremes: on the one hand, without making public the terrorists’ demands it was searching (or pretending to search) for negotiators who would be able to participate in such talks; on the other hand, it constantly announced the impossibility of a forced solution, while at the same time being obliged not simply to consider this option but to take steps in order to implement it ... By the end of the second day, not a single federal official who could at least partially discuss the terrorists’ demands had contacted them with the aim of negotiating. Becoming more and more convinced that their demands were not being considered and that the topic of negotiations remained the hostages’ supply with food and water, the liberation of the infants and elderly, an ‘escape corridor’ to Chechnya and the like, the terrorists hardened the hostages’ conditions. As to the terrorists’ agreement to allow the removal of two dozen bodies from the school courtyard, it was probably caused by the fighters’ wish to scare the population and make the OH more flexible, since one could easily predict the impression on the relatives of an Emercom truck loaded with corpses. Incomplete information about the development and content of the negotiations, and the lack of clarity about the videotape transmitted to the headquarters, leave many questions unanswered ... Without questioning the principle of non-compliance with the terrorists’ demands, although the Suppression of Terrorism Act speaks about minimal concessions to the terrorists, it appears that it would have been much more reasonable if the federal authorities, to whom the terrorists’ demands had been directed, had undertaken to implement it rather than delegate this problem to the regional authorities or even a paediatrician. It is obvious that any promises by the regional authorities not supported by appropriate guarantees by the highest officials could not have inspired the fighters’ confidence, and they could not have taken the so-called ‘security corridor’ seriously.” 379. The report argued that the first two explosions could not have come from the IEDs. The first explosion, according to the hostages’ testimony, had occurred in the north part of the gymnasium roof space, destroying part of the roof and creating a mushroom-shaped smoke cloud above the explosion. The report argued that this could not have been the result of an IED explosion for a number of reasons: the terrorists had not mined the roof or the roof space of the gymnasium, so not a single electric cable had led there; a mine in the gymnasium could not have destroyed the ceiling and roof 6 metres above; there would have been several simultaneous explosions because they had been connected in a single chain; the mushroom-shaped cloud could not have risen within seconds to about 13 to 15 metres above the roof from an IED explosion inside the gymnasium; the damage to the basketball hoop and the brick wall of the gymnasium bore evidence of the passage of a device fired from outside. The second explosion, which had created a half-metre-wide opening in the brick wall under the window, had not been the result of an IED either, since the floorboards immediately near the hole had not been damaged, unlike the floorboards under the basketball hoop where the IED had later detonated. 380. The report stated that the video-recording of the events had captured not only the smoke cloud from the first explosion, but also the sounds of both explosions, leading to the conclusion that the shots had been fired from a grenade launcher or a flame-thrower. The report considered that the nature of the destruction was consistent with this version. The choice of targets inside the gymnasium had been determined by the presence there of the pedalholding fighters; since a sniper could not have reached them, a grenade had resolved this situation. 381. The report found that the third explosion had most probably resulted from an IED being affected by spreading fire, following which the fire had spread from the ceiling to the floor of the gymnasium. 382. The document concluded by saying that the exploration of the first explosions should have been carried out properly within the framework of the criminal investigation. The report deplored the hasty clearing of the site, which had been opened to the public on 5 September 2004. It referred to “hundreds of people who had found objects which should have been of interest to the investigation”. A number of items had apparently been collected from the town rubbish dump where the debris had been taken on 4 September in trucks. 383. In a separate conclusion, the report stated that the active involvement of civilian volunteers immediately after the explosions had saved many hostages’ lives. The evacuation had been carried out by people who had taken on “the functions of the police, firemen and emergency workers”. 384. The report evaluated the number of army personnel and police officers (excluding the FSB) deployed within the security perimeter around the school at about 1,750 people. Three security cordons were judged to have been of little effect and had basically fallen apart once the operation had started. Hundreds of civilians and dozens of private cars had passed unhindered through the cordons, while filtration groups formed in advance from servicemen of the police special forces (Отдел милиции особого назначения (ОМОН)) and the Pravoberezhny ROVD had not stopped for an identity check any of the volunteers who had helped to evacuate the hostages. The report remarked that a number of men had arrived from elsewhere in Ossetia and spent two days around the school; they had often been unshaven, dirtied with blood and soot, and could not be distinguished from the terrorists. 385. The report then addressed the problem of the ambulance and fire services accessing the school, commenting that it had been made difficult by vehicles parked in the adjacent streets which had not been towed away. The first fire engine, which had arrived at the school at about 2 p.m., had not been carrying a full load of water in its cistern. Other fire brigades which had arrived even later had allowed civilian volunteers to operate the water hoses. 386. The report found it established that between 2 p.m. and 2.30 p.m. on 3 September a tank with hull number 328 stationed behind the railway line had fired several non-explosive rounds at the canteen and kitchen, while at around 4.30 p.m. a tank with hull number 325 stationed on Kominterna Street had fired at the canteen from a close distance, towards the area immediately above the entrance to the cellar. The commission’s members could not agree that the use of the tank to fire at the canteen before 5 p.m. had been justified in view of the probable presence of the last group of hostages with the terrorists. The commission had entered the cellar and found it entirely intact and bearing no traces of the terrorists’ alleged stay there. No complete information could be obtained about the use of tanks, helicopters, flamethrowers or other heavy weapons. 387. The document separately noted the multitude of lines of responsibility within the various agencies involved. According to the commission’s information, the commander of the 58th Army had regularly reported to the Chief of Staff of the Ministry of Defence in Moscow and had obtained instructions from him in return. The Ministry of the Interior had commanded the largest contingent in Beslan and had initially followed the orders of its own headquarters based in the administration building; it later followed the instructions issued by the FSB. 388. Turning to the role of the FSB, the report stated the following: “The Russian FSB has remained the most closed structure in terms of the Commission’s efforts to obtain information in order to find out about its actions between 1 and 3 September 2004. Therefore, it is very difficult to accept, without further verification, the statement that, according to the operative groups of the Special Services Centre, by 6 p.m. there remained no living hostages with the terrorists (in the classrooms, cellar and roof space).” 389. The report devoted some attention to the number of fighters and their identities. It noted discrepancies in the names and number of identified and non-identified terrorists in the documents issued by the prosecutor’s office in relation to the investigation in criminal case no. 20/849. Relying on the information provided by the Prosecutor General’s Office, the report listed thirty-eight names or aliases; of them twenty-two people (including Mr N. Kulayev) were identified by their full name, date of birth, ethnic origin and place of residence, and fourteen people were identified provisionally. In the list of thirty-eight people, at least nine had previously been detained by the law-enforcement authorities; some of them had been released for unknown reasons. According to the report, Mr Iliyev had been detained in 2003 in Ingushetia on charges of illegal arms and ammunition handling, but the case had been closed two months later; Khanpash Kulayev had been sentenced to nine years in prison in 2001; Mr Shebikhanov had been charged with attacking a military convoy in August 2003 and released by jury in July 2004; Mr Tarshkhoyev had been convicted at least three times and given suspended sentences for illegal arms handling and theft, most recently in March 2001; Mr Khochubarov (“Polkovnik”) had been on trial for illegal arms handling; and Mr Khodov had been wanted for a number of serious crimes including terrorist acts and had been detained in 2002 but released. Most of the other identified terrorists were known to the lawenforcement authorities, who had retained their fingerprints, on the basis of which their bodies were identified. Many were on wanted lists for various crimes. 390. Some of those initially announced by the Prosecutor General’s Office as identified bodies in Beslan had later been killed in other places. Mr Gorchkhanov’s death had first been announced in Beslan, but in October 2005 his name had again been announced by the Deputy Prosecutor General Mr Shepel as one of the organisers of the attack at Nalchik, KabardinoBalkaria, who had been killed. Mr Kodzoyev had first been identified as one of the terrorists in Beslan and had apparently had a telephone conversation with his wife, whom the authorities had brought to the school on 2 September. His death had then been announced in an anti-terrorist operation in Ingushetia in April 2005. The report deplored the lack of clarity in such an important aspect of the investigation and asked the prosecutor’s office to issue clear and exhaustive information in this regard. 391. The report contained a table compiled on the basis of information provided by the Prosecutor General’s Office including various figures related to the total number of hostages and the number of people, killed, injured and liberated as a result of the anti-terrorist operation. The commission noted that the causes of death for 331 people had been as follows: twenty had died in hospital; fifty-one (including twenty-one men killed on 1 September) had died of gunshot wounds; 150 had died of shell wounds; ten had died of fire injuries and four had been killed by blunt force trauma injuries. In 116 cases the cause of death could not be established owing to extensive fire damage. Eighty-three bodies had been identified through DNA matching and six cases had called for exhumation and DNA testing, procedures which had lasted until April 2005. The report concluded that the real reasons for many victims’ deaths and injuries had not been established: bullets and shell fragments had not been extracted from the bodies, and no ballistics reports had been made to analyse the bullets and cartridges found at the scene. 392. The commission’s report was made public in December 2005. Mr Torshin stated that it posed more questions than it answered, and its findings and conclusions were not mentioned in the report prepared by the Federal Assembly (see below). 393. In 2007 the report was published as a separate document. By that time the authors had prepared additional statistical data. It included a complete list of the hostages, with indications as to their injuries and dates of death, and other important findings. Many of the figures arrived at by the authors of the report differed from those used by the prosecutor’s office. 394. In particular, the authors stated that 1,116 people (not 1,127 as indicated by the Prosecutor General’s Office) had been taken hostage; three people had escaped on 1 September; seventeen (not twenty-one) men had been shot dead on 1 September and twenty-four (not twenty-six) people had been led out by Mr Aushev on 2 September. By 1 p.m. on 1 September 1,072 hostages had remained alive in the school; 284 had been killed during the storming; ten had died in hospital within two months and three more had died by 2006. Ten special forces servicemen, two servicemen of Emercom and seven civilians had been killed: three civilians had been killed on 1 September by the assailants and four more had died during the storming while evacuating the hostages. Thirty-five civilians had been wounded, the majority of them while evacuating the hostages from the school. 395. The publication gave a list of the servicemen of the FSB, Ministry of the Interior and Emercom who had been killed (twelve) and injured (fifty-two) during the terrorist act. 396. Turning to the causes of death, the publication stated that the commission had examined over 300 orders for forensic expert reports issued by the prosecutor’s office on 3 and 4 September 2004 and the forensic reports issued by the forensic bureau. The document highlighted that the investigation’s orders had suggested that the experts should conduct external examinations of the bodies, and carry out a full autopsy only “where necessary”. Only a few cases had thus necessitated a full examination; one third of the expert reports had concluded that “the cause of death could not be established”. In total, the document stated that 159 bodies out of 333 had displayed burns, although for most cases the experts had noted that the carbonisation had most probably occurred post mortem. They also noted that a disproportionately high number of victims had died of gunshot wounds – forty-four civilians, including eleven women and nine children – while only seven servicemen out of eleven had died of gunshot wounds. 397. Lastly, the report noted that nine exhumations (and not six as indicated in the official documents) had been carried out for an additional verification of the remains. The report listed these cases. 398. On 20 and 22 September 2004 both chambers of the Federal Assembly (the Russian Parliament) – the State Duma and Federation Council – decided to create a joint commission in order to investigate the reasons for and circumstances of the terrorist act in Beslan. About twenty members of both chambers were appointed to the commission, which was chaired by Mr Aleksandr Torshin, deputy speaker of the Federation Council. The commission undertook a number of investigative measures, including visits to Beslan, Ingushetia, Chechnya and RostovonDon. 399. The commission questioned forty-five senior officials, including the Prime Minister, several federal ministers, Mr Aslakhanov, an aide to the Russian President; Mr Patrushev, Mr Pronichev and Mr Anisimov, the head of the FSB and his two deputies; General Tikhonov, commander of the FSB Special Services Centre; several senior officials from the Prosecutor General’s Office, including four deputies to the Prosecutor General; North Ossetian and Ingushetian officials, including Mr Dzasokhov and Mr Zyazikov; and people who had negotiated with the terrorists: Mr Aushev, Mr Gutseriyev and Dr Roshal. The commission received several hundred telephone calls to a special line and letters. 400. On 22 December 2006 the commission’s report was presented to the Federal Assembly. It ran to 240 pages and included a chronology of the terrorist act, chapters on the actions of the State authorities, a historical and political analysis of terrorism in the North Caucasus and a number of legislative recommendations. Two commission members refused to sign it. One of them, Mr Savelyev, prepared an alternative report (see below). 401. The report’s main conclusions were principally in line with the conclusions of the criminal investigations. In particular, it found that: (i) prior to the terrorist act, a number of security measures had not been taken by the local administration and police forces in North Ossetia and Ingushetia. The conduct of the police in the Malgobek District was described as professional negligence and the actions of police in Ingushetia in general as “keeping aloof” from following the orders from the Ministry of the Interior (pages 107-08 of the report). The North Ossetian police had failed to comply with certain precautionary measures and this had facilitated the terrorists’ attack at the school; (ii) the actions of the federal authorities had been adequate and correct; (iii) the OH had been correct in its actions aimed at negotiations with the terrorists, however there had been a number of weak points in its composition and the way it had conducted its work and informed the population of the developments (pages 84 and 94 of the report); (iv) the first explosions in the gymnasium had been caused by two IEDs (page 87); and (v) the use of flame-throwers and the tank gun against the school had been authorised by the commander of the FSB Special Services Centre after 6 p.m. on 3 September and they had not caused any harm to the hostages, who by that time had been evacuated (page 89). 402. Mr Yuriy Savelyev, a deputy of the State Duma elected in 2003 from the Rodina party, was a member of the commission headed by Mr Torshin. He was a rocket scientist by profession, had a doctorate in technical sciences, was the director of the St Petersburg Military Mechanics Institute and had written numerous scientific works and training manuals on rocket construction, ballistics, thermodynamics and pertinent fields. 403. In the summer of 2006 Mr Savelyev announced that he strongly disagreed with the report drafted by the commission. Later that year he published a separate report, based on the material to which he had access as a commission member. The report, entitled “Beslan: The Hostages’ Truth” (“Беслан: Правда Заложников”), was in seven parts: (i) ’The first explosions in the gymnasium’, 259 pages with fiftyeight photographs (“Part 1”); (ii) ‘The origin and development of the fire in the gymnasium’, 133 pages with forty-three photographs (“Part 2”); (iii) ’The use of portable flame-throwers and grenade launchers’, ninetyseven pages with forty-nine photographs (“Part 3”); (iv) ’The use of T-72 tanks and APC-80 military vehicles’, 140 pages with fifty-two photographs (“Part 4”); (v) ’Women in the terrorist group’, sixty-nine pages with twelve photographs (“Part 5”); (vi) ’Losses among the hostages sustained outside the gymnasium’, 145 pages with fifty-four photographs (“Part 6”); and (vii) ’The circumstances of the seizure of hostages’, 296 pages with twenty-one photographs (“Part 7”). 404. This report was submitted to the Court, and its entire content was published on the Internet site www.pravdabeslana.ru. 405. Although based on the same factual material, the report also relied on the author’s own technical expertise and the way it was presented and its conclusions differed drastically from the document signed by the majority of the parliamentary commission and thus from the conclusions reached by that time by the criminal investigation. 406. To sum up the most important distinctions, in Part 1 Mr Savelyev concluded that the first explosion had resulted from the detonation in the attics over the north-east part of the gymnasium of a thermobaric grenade launched by a portable grenade launcher from the roof of a house at 37 Shkolny Lane. The terrorist holding the “dead man’s switch” right under the detonation had been killed instantly. The explosion had created a zone of powerful smouldering combustion in the wood and attic insulation material, which had later caught fire. The second explosion had occurred twenty-two seconds later under the first window of the north side of the gymnasium, destroying the brick wall and throwing the bricks outside, while the windowpane situated immediately above the opening had remained intact. Mr Savelyev concluded that the nature and extent of destruction in this particular area ruled out the idea that it had come from an IED inside the gymnasium. He argued that the explosion had probably been caused by a portable anti-tank missile fired from the roof of a house at 41 Shkolny Lane. The projectile had entered the gymnasium from the opposite window and created the opening in the wall below the windowpane. 407. Mr Savelyev also argued in Part 2 that the fire which had been triggered by the first explosion in the attics had continued to spread unabated until 3.20 p.m. The broken windows of the gymnasium and the opening torn in the roof by the explosion had created a powerful draught, feeding the smouldering insulation with oxygen. The fire had raged in the attics with sufficient force to destroy the wooden beams holding the roof slates, which had finally collapsed by 3.20 p.m., burying the hostages unable to leave under the burning fragments. The firemen had intervened after 3.20 p.m., by which time the fire from the collapsed roof had spread to the floor and walls of the gymnasium. 408. Part 3 of the report included detailed information and an analysis of the type and number of arms and ammunition used between 1 and 4 September 2004. This information was made available to the commission, whilst the victims had no direct access to it. According to the report, volume 1 of the criminal investigation file no. 20/849 contained a “joint record of the use of arms and ammunition during the military operation” (cводный акт об израсходовании боеприпасов при выполнении соответствующей боевой задачи), no. 27 of 10 September 2004. According to this record, various military units had used over 9,000 cartridges for automatic weapons (5.45 mm PS, 7.62 mm LPS, 5.45 mm T), ten disposable anti-tank rocket launchers (RPG26), 18 propelled anti-tank grenades (PG7VL), eight high-fragmentation warheads for a 125 millimetre calibre tank gun (125 mm OF) and ninety smoke grenades (81 mm ZD6) (see paragraphs 219 and 220 above). 409. The report also noted that on 20 September 2004 members of the parliamentary commission had discovered in the attic of 39 Shkolny Lane six empty tubes from RPOA flame-throwers and three empty tubes of disposable RPG26 antitank rocket launchers, the serial numbers of which had been noted by the commission members in an appropriate record on 22 September 2004. These tubes had been transmitted to the prosecutor’s team carrying out the criminal investigation. According to the report, volume 2 of criminal case file no. 20/849 contained a document dated 25 September 2004 and signed by LieutenantColonel Vasilyev from military unit no. 77078 of the 58th Army. This document stated that the FSB units had received seven RPOA flamethrowers from military storage and listed their serial numbers. After the operation two flame-throwers with the indicated numbers, plus one with a different serial number, had been returned to storage (see paragraph 219 above). At the same time, Mr Savelyev noted that the serial numbers of flamethrowers mentioned in the commission’s record of 22 September 2004 and in the document issued by Lieutenant-Colonel Vasilyev on 25 September 2004 differed. He referred to other contradictory evidence given by military servicemen and statements by the Deputy Prosecutor General concerning the use of flamethrowers, concluding that at least nine disposable RPOA flamethrowers had been used by the special forces. Mr Savelyev also referred to the witness statements of one serviceman of the FSB given to the investigation (volume 5 p. 38 of file no. 20/849), according to whom RPG26 grenade launchers and RPOA flame-throwers had been used during the storming, in daytime (see paragraph 220 above), and the statement General Tikhonov of the FSB made to the commission on 28 October 2004 saying that the RPG grenade launchers and RPOA flamethrowers had been used at 3 p.m. 410. Mr Savelyev listed detailed characteristics of each type of the projectiles. According to his conclusions, after the first two explosions at 1.03 p.m. the school building was subjected to the following assault: between 1.30 p.m. and 2 p.m. the windows of the first floor of the south wing were fired at with portable grenade launchers, probably types RPG26 and RShG2; between 2.50 p.m. and 3.05 p.m. flame-throwers (RPO-A) were used upon the roof of the main building, RPG26 and RShG2 grenade launchers were fired at the south-facing windows of the first floor of the south wing and a RPO-A flame-thrower upon the roof of the south wing at the point where it joined the main building. He also argued that at least one thermobaric grenade had been launched from a MI24 helicopter at a target in the central area of the roof of the main building above the Ossetian language classroom, at a terrorist sniper who could not have been suppressed by any other means. 411. Part 4 concentrated on the use of tanks and APCs during the storming. Having analysed numerous witness statements and material evidence, the report drew the following conclusions: three tanks with hull numbers 320, 325 and 328 had taken positions around the school. Tanks with hull numbers 325 and 328 had been positioned near a house at 101 Kominterna Street. These two tanks had repeatedly fired at the school building at 2.25 p.m. and then between 3 p.m and 4 p.m. on 3 September. Seven additional shots had been fired from a tank with hull number 325 at the canteen windows and the wall and stairwell of the south wing. 412. Part 5 of the report was devoted to an analysis of the witness statements and other evidence about the women in the terrorist group. Mr Savelyev concluded that the group had included five women: four suicide bombers who had changed places with each other so that there had always been two of them in the gymnasium at any one time, while the fifth woman had probably been a sniper and had remained on the top floor of the school. 413. Part 6 of the report examined the situation of the hostages whom the terrorists had forced to move from the gymnasium to the south wing after the first explosions. From photographs and video footage of the events and witness accounts, Mr Savelyev concluded that between 1.05 p.m. and 2.20 p.m. the terrorists had evacuated about 300 people to the south wing. The hostages had been divided in more or less equal numbers between the canteen and kitchen on the ground floor and the main meeting room on the first floor. The south wing had become an area of fierce fighting between the terrorists and the assault troops; eight out of ten FSB elite officers had died there. The presence of hostages in that wing had not been taken into account by the assaulting troops, who had used indiscriminate weapons. Mr Savelyev noted the absence of any detailed description of the location of the hostages’ bodies, even though this could have allowed the circumstances of the hostages’ deaths in the south wing to be established. He argued that the bodies in the gymnasium had been exposed to fire, while the number of people who had been found dead adjacent to the gymnasium had been known. He thus estimated the number of hostages who had lost their lives during the fighting in the south wing at about 110. 414. Appended to Part 6 was a “study case” – a document prepared by several authors, including the head of the forensic bureau, summarising their experiences regarding the Beslan terrorist act. The document listed various problems related to the collection, transportation and storage of remains, the organisation of the identification process and the compiling of forensic reports. In view of the large number of remains, many with extensive injuries and difficult to identify, together with the presence of numerous aggrieved relatives, on 4 September the prosecutor’s office had taken the decision first to permit the relatives to identify the remains and then to carry out forensic examinations. As a result, there had been a number of incorrect identifications which later had to be corrected. Furthermore, in view of these constraints most bodies had been subjected to an external examination only. The exact cause of death had been established in 213 cases: of those, gunshot wounds in 51 cases (15.5 %), shell wounds in 148 cases (45%), burns in 10 cases (3%), and blunt force trauma injuries in 4 cases (1.2%). The cause of death had not been established in 116 cases (35.6%) due to extensive charring. The document concluded by giving a number of recommendations for the future, including the establishment of a single information centre and careful compliance with various procedural stages, with people responsible for each stage. 415. Part 7 of the report covered the first moments of the school seizure on 1 September. On the basis of witness accounts, Mr Savelyev concluded that a small group of terrorists – between five and seven – had been in the crowd by 9 a.m. Following a signal by one of them, who had started to shoot into the air, another group of ten to twelve people had entered the school building from Shkolny Lane and other sides. Some of them had run to the first floor while others had broken windows and doors on the ground floor so that the hostages could enter the building. At this point the GAZ-66 vehicle stationed on Kominterna Street near the school fence had approached the main school entrance and up to fifteen people had descended from it. This vehicle had left after the fighters had descended. Lastly, a second GAZ-66 vehicle with a different registration plate had entered from Lermontovskaya Street to Kominterna at high speed, raising a large column of dust mentioned by many witnesses. Over twenty fighters, including four women, had descended from it and run towards the school; the vehicle had then broken down the school gates and stopped in the courtyard. The overall number of terrorists in the school had been between fifty-six and seventy-eight. 416. In response to Mr Savelyev’s allegations about the origins of the first explosions and the use of indiscriminate weapons on the gymnasium, the Prosecutor’s Office ordered expert reports. In 2007 and 2008 experts from the Stateowned scientific and production company Bazalt and the Ministry of Defence Central Research and Testing Institute named after Karbyshev produced two expert reports on the explosions (see paragraphs 224 and 228 above). The results were not published, but were cited by several sources and by Mr Savelyev. The reports ruled out the idea that the first explosions had come from devices fired from outside, such as thermobaric grenades or projectiles. 417. In March 2008 Mr Savelyev published an extensive article in the Novaya Gazeta containing diagrams that indicated four different places and origins of the first explosions in the gymnasium: three from the expert reports ordered by the investigation and his own. He argued that the results of the three experts’ reports differed to such an extent that it was impossible to reconcile them. He further argued that the conclusions about the reasons and yield of the explosions contained in the most recent expert report were inconsistent with the witness statements and material evidence. Lastly, he drew attention to the fact that the remaining parts of his report concerning issues other than the first explosions had not been addressed by the investigation. 418. In accordance with Russian Government Order no. 1338-r of 11 September 2004, the victims of the terrorist act were awarded the following compensation: 100,000 Russian roubles (RUB) (approximately 2,700 euros (EUR) at that time) for each person who had been killed, RUB 50,000 for each person who had received serious and medium gravity injuries and RUB 25,000 for each person with minor injuries. People who had been among the hostages but escaped unharmed received RUB 15,000 each. In addition, the families received RUB 18,000 for each deceased person in order to cover funeral expenses. 419. On 6 and 15 September 2004 the North Ossetian President ordered (Order nos. 58-rpa and 62-rp) the payment of RUB 25,000 in funeral costs for each person who had died, RUB 100,000 for each deceased, RUB 50,000 to each person who had suffered serious and medium injuries and RUB 25,000 to each of the other hostages. 420. The terrorist act in Beslan triggered a major humanitarian response, resulting in collections of significant sums of money. 421. In accordance with North Ossetian Government Decree no. 240 of 17 November 2004, the North Ossetian Ministry of Labour and Social Development distributed the funds paid into their account devoted to humanitarian relief to the victims in the following manner: RUB 1,000,000 for each person who had died (approximately EUR 27,000 at that time); RUB 700,000 for each person who had received serious injuries; RUB 500,000 for each person with medium gravity injuries and RUB 350,000 for people who had suffered minor injuries or had been among the hostages. In addition, each child who had lost their parents received RUB 350,000 and other people who had been briefly detained but had not been among the hostages received RUB 75,000 each. Similar sums were allocated to injured servicemen of the FSB and Emercom and the families of those who had been killed. 422. In 2005 the memorial complex “City of Angels” was opened at the Beslan town cemetery. It comprised a single monument to the victims, individual graves of over 220 people and a monument to the FSB servicemen who had died on 3 September 2004. 423. In 2004 to 2008 there followed a number of other measures by the Russian and North Ossetian Governments, aimed at covering additional medical and social costs for the victims and financing other projects in Beslan. In November 2004 the Russian Government issued Decree No. 1507r providing for the construction of two new kindergartens and schools in Beslan, a multifunctional medical centre, a social support centre for children and families and a number of housing projects aimed specifically at helping the victims’ families. Most of these projects, financed from the federal budget, were completed by 2010. 424. One sports boarding school opened in Beslan was constructed with the participation of Greece and was named after Mr Ivan Kanidi (also spelled Yannis Kannidis), a sports teacher from school no. 1. Mr Kanidi, a Greek and Russian national, was 74 years old at the time and refused to leave the school when asked to do so by the terrorists. After the explosions in the gymnasium on 3 September he got into a struggle with an armed fighter while trying to rescue children and was killed. In December 2004 he was posthumously awarded a Golden Palm Order by the Greek Prime Minister. 425. In September 2004 the entire North Ossetian Government were dismissed by Mr Dzasokhov. 426. On 13 September 2004 the President signed a decree aimed at setting up a more efficient system of anti-terrorist measures in the North Caucasus region. On the same day, at a joint meeting of the Government of Russia and the heads of Russia’s regions, he announced the following measures aimed at achieving greater national unity and better representation of the population’s concerns: cancellation of direct elections of the regional heads of the executive, who would be elected by the regional parliaments upon nomination by the Russian President; the setting up of a purely proportional system of parliamentary elections; establishment of a consultative body comprised of representatives of non-governmental organisations – a Civic Chamber (Общественная Палата); reinstatement of a special federal ministry charged with inter-ethnic relations; implementation of a plan for social and economic development of the North Caucasus region, and other steps. By the end of 2004 these administrative and legal measures had largely been implemented. 427. During and after the Beslan terrorist act, numerous journalists from all over the world covered the events. 428. In January 2005 the US network CBS aired a film about the hostage-taking in their programme 48 Hours. Shown in it, for the first time, was an extract filmed by the terrorists. The network alleged that the tape had been found by locals among rubble on the site and then obtained by their journalist. The tape had been made on 2 September 2004 inside the school and showed the fighters’ leader, “Polkovnik”, and about a dozen other terrorists in full military gear. It also showed the talks with Mr Aushev and the mothers with nursing babies being led out by him. In the final moments a baby girl (the youngest hostage aged six months) was handed to Mr Aushev by her mother who could not force herself to part with her two older children (aged three and ten; only the three-year-old boy survived). The extract ended with the school door being closed and locked by the terrorists filming from inside. The extract had been tagged by the operator “Fun Time2/09/2004”. 429. Several long reports were produced by the journalists who had been in Beslan during the siege and by those who had investigated the tragedy afterwards. Notably, over the years the Moscow-based Novaya Gazeta and Moskovskiy Komsomolets ran a series of reports dedicated to the hostage-taking and the investigation. Der Spiegel published a large report in its December 2004 issue and Esquire published a story entitled “The School” in March 2007. 430. A significant number of other television programmes, documentary films and books have covered the subject. The applicants in the present cases, in particular, have referred to the relevant chapter from Mr Rogozin’s book, “Public Enemy”. An Internet site http://pravdabeslana.ru was dedicated to the tragedy and subsequent proceedings. 431. The relatives and victims of the terrorist act have joined efforts, striving primarily to obtain a comprehensive investigation into the events of 1 to 3 September 2004 and determine the level of the officials’ responsibility. 432. In February 2005 the victims set up a non-governmental organisation, Beslan Mothers (Materi Beslana). The organisation had about 200 members – former hostages and relatives of the victims. It was headed by Mrs Dudiyeva. 433. In November 2005 several hundred victims set up another organisation, The Voice of Beslan (Golos Beslana), chaired by Mrs Ella Kesayeva. In November 2005 the NGO issued a public statement labelling the criminal investigation inefficient and fraudulent. It called on anyone who could assist them with obtaining or gathering factual information about the events to do so. On 15 October 2009 the Pravoberezhny District Court of Vladikavkaz found that it had contained statements defined as “extremist” under the Suppression of Extremism Act (Federal Law no. 114-FZ of 25 July 2002) and put it on the federal list of extremist material, making it an offence to disseminate it by any means. 434. These organisations have played an important role in collecting and publishing material about the terrorist act in Beslan, advocating the rights of victims of terrorist acts in general, supporting victims in similar situations, and organising public gatherings and events. On two occasions – in September 2005 and in June 2011 – their representatives met with the Russian Presidents; they also regularly meet with local and federal officials and high-ranking international visitors. 435. Following the admissibility decision of 9 June 2015, the applicants submitted two additional documents – independent expert reports ordered by them on the counter-terrorist and forensic aspects of the case. 436. In September 2014 two UK anti-terrorist experts produced a report following a request from EHRAC, the applicants’ representatives. The experts were Mr Ralph Roche, a solicitor admitted in Northern Ireland, England and Wales, a Council of Europe and OSCE consultant on policing and human rights issues, co-author of the Council of Europe publication The European Convention on Human Rights and Policing (2013); and Mr George McCauley, former Detective Chief Superintendent and former head of the Special Operations Branch within the Police Service of Northern Ireland. The authors relied on open sources, including the communication report in the present case, and analysed the applicability of the relevant standards under Article 2 of the Convention to different aspects of the operation. Their main conclusions may be summarised as follows. 437. Looking at the previous attacks and the information available to the authorities immediately before the Beslan attack, the experts argued that “there was an extremely high level of threat of terrorist attack in the Southern Federal [Circuit] of Russia in late August to early September 2004, in particular in the border areas of [North Ossetia] and Ingushetia. This threat could be classified as real, as it had been verified by various orders, telexes and other documents issued by the Federal [Ministry of the Interior]. It could also be classified as immediate, as the information disseminated by the authorities pointed to an attack taking place on a specific day: 1 September”. The experts also pointed out that, in addition to the date, the information had referred to a specific area – near the border between North Ossetia and Ingushetia – and the potential target, as the attack had been planned to coincide with the Day of Knowledge. As Beslan was the largest town in Ossetia within 20 kilometres of the border with the Malgobek District, where terrorists had apparently been gathering, they concluded that “Beslan, and other towns in the vicinity, were clearly under a real and immediate threat of an attack on a school on 1 September”. Such a large-scale attack against a civilian target would have the potential for significant loss of life. The experts concluded that the level of detail available even from the relatively “sanitised versions” in the telexes and other communications indicated that there might have been a “covert human intelligence source” in the terrorist group, as well as technical coverage, such as the interception of communications. The event had therefore had a “high degree of foreseeability”. 438. As to the scale of the threat presented by the “well-organised, ruthless and determined terrorists who had ... actively targeted civilians”, the report reiterated the importance of the Day of Knowledge to Russian society and argued that an attack upon a school on that day was an act “bound to strike at the very heart of the nation” – something the terrorists had obviously strived to achieve. 439. The experts thus concluded that in view of the high foreseeability and magnitude of the threat, the feasible operational measures “must have been seen to take precedence over all other threats”. They divided the possible responses into three broad categories: (i) target denial, (ii) intervention and (iii) security. An example of target denial would involve postponing the opening of the school year in a defined area. Although unprecedented, this would have denied the terrorists the high-profile target sought. As to intervention, in the absence of any additional information, any comment would necessarily be speculative. It could be that the authorities did not conduct any preventive strike on the basis that to do so would have compromised the sources, or for other reasons – for example in view of the serious risk to the lives of the members of the security forces. Nevertheless, it was clear that “the risk would be likely to be greater in the event that the group succeeded in carrying out their intentions” and that the need to protect sources could not be used as a valid reason to put human life at serious risk. Lastly, as to security, the experts were of the opinion that the “essentially passive approach” adopted had been “seriously inadequate” in view of the circumstances. They noted that there had been no effective ownership or containment of the threat and that the staff of the local police had clearly been incapable of dealing with the security situation: “Given the degree of foreseeability, the recognised high threat by the [North Ossetian Ministry of the Interior] and the level of specificity in terms of the terrorists’ location, asserted target and likely area, there should have been a significant scaling up of resources in the identified areas. The purpose of this would have been to prevent or disrupt the terrorists’ plans and deny the target. Such actions would include large, highly visible deployments of forces to search and locate the terrorist group, to undertake Vehicle Check Points both along the main arterial routes and in depth at likely target towns. Similar specific deployments should have been implemented at schools to deny the target.” The experts concluded that while no security measures could serve as a guarantee against the attackers’ success, the presence of security personnel on the roads and at potential targets would have acted as a deterrent and could have impeded the attackers. They considered that the fact that a group of over thirty armed terrorists had been able to travel along the local roads to Beslan, having encountered only one police roadblock manned by a single officer “show[ed] the extent of failure of the authorities to act upon the information available to them”. 440. By means of comparison, the experts outlined the steps that would have been taken in the United Kingdom in the event of a known comparable threat. They considered that a command centre would have been established, with a clear and accountable chain of command, depending on role requirements. The centre would have comprised senior police officers coordinating with the relevant units of the British Army, specialist counter-terrorism units and the security services, as well as other public sector bodies such as fire and rescue and ambulance services. A dedicated crisis response committee would have been set up within the Government of the UK, in order to co-ordinate the actions of various bodies to ensure adequate resources and a media strategy. The potential targets would have been “hardened” by high-profile visible deployments of armed security personnel. 441. According to the report, once the terrorists had reached the school and taken a large number of hostages, the authorities faced an extremely difficult scenario – one where significant loss of life, including that of children, was inevitable. The experts noted the group members’ intention to die, which had been apparent from the beginning, and to cause large-scale loss of life in the event of a storming. In such circumstances, the role of the authorities should be to seek to minimise the loss of life to the greatest extent possible. 442. The experts started by reiterating that the presence of only one unarmed police officer at the school at the time of the hostage-taking had delayed the response to the attack and permitted the terrorists to capture a large number of children and adults at the ceremony, as well as secure the building and deploy the IEDs with very little resistance. Without predicting the exact results of a heavier security presence at the ceremony, the experts argued for the possibility that “an adequately-assured police response would have repelled the terrorists for long enough to allow a significant number” of potential hostages to escape. 443. They then reflected on the formation, structure, record-keeping and auditing of the OH. The experts stressed that the pressure under which the members of the OH had worked could not be underestimated. In their words, “[a]ny amount of training and experience could not prepare someone fully for [a] crisis such as Beslan” which represented “one of the most difficult situations that any administration could face”. Furthermore, there could be no detailed or prescribed international standard for the control and planning of an operation of this sort; it seemed inevitable that the responses would be prepared quickly and with minimal formalities, in order to reflect the dynamics and seriousness of the situation. Relying on the witness statements, official documents and other data cited in the Court’s decision on admissibility, the report noted the following shortcomings of the OH functioning: failure to keep proper records of the OH’s composition, meetings and the main decisions taken; a lack of any apparent formal structure for information-sharing and decision-making, resulting in uncoordinated decisions being taken; a clear lack of structure of command and control for both strategic and important tactical decisions, such as the types and use of special weapons; and an overall failure of command and control. They stressed, in addition to the above, that the absence of any plan to start a rescue operation as late as 1 p.m. on 3 September, in view of the hostages’ intolerable conditions and the terrorists’ unpredictability – meaning that intervention could be required at any moment – had amounted to a failure to plan properly for a rescue operation. 444. According to the experts, the situation faced by the Russian authorities, once the terrorists had reached their target, was a terrible one. The possibility of a peaceful outcome of the hostage-taking appeared minimal. The authorities were therefore required to make extraordinarily difficult and agonising decisions in a highly fluid situation and “there [was] no training or manual which [could] provide solutions to these dilemmas”. Furthermore, they acknowledged significant gaps in the information relating to the preparation of the rescue operation and many aspects in the way it was carried out, for example those relating to the origins of the first explosions. Having said that, the experts were of the opinion that since the situation had developed for over two full days before the rescue operation had started, it could not be characterised as entirely spontaneous, since the authorities had had time and resources to plan and practice it. 445. In view of the above, they highlighted a number of points that were, in their opinion, important in the evaluation of the rescue operation. Some of these points were relevant to the level of control exercised by the authorities over these developments: for example whether the operation was at all times under the control of the senior officers, or whether, in view of the hostages’ known intolerable conditions, they had prepared their response to a possible attempt by the hostages to leave the building at any moment. Other points focused more on the commanders’ tactical decisions directly relevant to the rescue operation that had taken place. 446. If the first explosions had been triggered by the detonation of an IED placed by the terrorists, and they had started to shoot at the fleeing hostages, the authorities had no option but to launch a rescue operation, which was in fact done. It ended with massive loss of life, and the accounts differ as to the use of flame-throwers and tank cannon fire. The experts stressed that these were military weapons destined to neutralise buildings with enemy combatants within. In their view, if these weapons had indeed been used at a time when hostages had still been within the building, it would have been unjustifiable. It could be justifiable if they had been used in the belief that there had been no civilians in the building and no military alternative to their use; however, in the absence of a definitive assessment of the facts such judgment had to be reserved. They noted, nevertheless, that the fact that by 5 p.m., or soon afterwards, the school building had seemed to be sufficiently under control for the security forces to hold a memorial service for the fallen officers made it unlikely that the terrorists had still been in the building at that time. 447. The report then commented that the fact that both the Alpha and Vympel special forces units had been deployed at a training exercise at the time when the rescue operation had commenced, had left the authorities without or with insufficient specialist intervention contingencies. The high number of losses sustained by the FSB special forces was a testament to the officers’ bravery, since they had probably realised that they had been likely to lose their lives by entering the school. Nevertheless, the experts were of the opinion that the same failures to plan and conduct the rescue operation had had a bearing on their fate as well as on the fate of the hostages. 448. Turning to the firefighters, the experts pointed out that in view of the known potential for fires to start from explosions, the fire brigades should have been deployed earlier. In their view, “the fact that very few fire engines were deployed and that they were without adequate supplies of water [was] a failing of foresight and planning ... The general requirement ... that rescue operations must be planned and controlled in such a manner as to minimise the risk to life, required a much greater deployment of fire brigade resources including multiple pumps and specialist fire vehicles...” Equally, the experts noted that although the medical evacuation and subsequent services had been well organised, as relatively few wounded had died in hospital, the medical staff had not been informed in any detail of the relevant information in order to plan an appropriate response. They commented that “it appear[ed] that the relative success of the medical evacuation [was] a result of the professionalism of the medical staff, and that they [had] not [been] included in the OH or even kept informed of relevant information (such as the number of hostages) so that they could deploy adequate resources”. 449. The experts also examined three aspects of the operation challenged by the applicants: (i) dissemination of incorrect information regarding the number of hostages during the crisis, (ii) coordination between various authorities about the rescue plans and (iii) the negotiation strategy. 450. As to the number of hostages, the authors of the report were of the opinion that this aspect of communication could not have had any foreseeable negative impact on the terrorists’ behaviour or any other foreseeable consequences. With regard to the authorities’ co-ordination, the authors pointed out that effective coordination was a key element of command and control of counter-terrorist operations. They noted the obvious lack of coordination with the medics and the failure to preserve the scene, despite the presence of several cordons manned by different security agencies. Nevertheless, once the explosions and outbreak of shooting had occurred, the authorities had had no other option but to order the rescue operation; at this stage the pre-planned contingencies should have been implemented. 451. Lastly, concerning the negotiations, the experts were of the opinion that the terrorists “were not interested in negotiation and came to Beslan to inflict as much terror and death on the most vulnerable element of the civilian population as possible”. Their demands had been unrealistic and inflexible and they did not seem to have had any negotiation strategy; in addition, they seemed to have been prepared to die from the very beginning. Such a mental state “was not of rational people and so unpredictable as to render negotiations particularly difficult, if not impossible”. The authorities had ascertained the terrorists’ demands, made efforts to engage with them and put them in contact with the people they had demanded. The authorities’ approach to negotiation could not be criticised. 452. In October 2015 a forensic pathologist from Glasgow produced an expert report in response to a request from EHRAC to consider matters related to the recovery of bodies, post-mortem examinations and conclusions drawn as to the causes of death. Dr John Clark had worked in England and Scotland as a forensic pathologist for about thirty years. He was also involved in international work, having been the Chief Pathologist for the International Criminal Court for Former Yugoslavia (1999-2001) and having worked in Africa for the International Criminal Court, in Palestine/Jordan for the United Nations, and in other regions of the world. He also had the relevant academic and teaching background (having previously held a post at the University of Glasgow and being an examiner for national pathology qualifications and secretary of the professional association for UK forensic pathologists). In addition to the Statement of Facts (admissibility decision) in the present case, Dr Clark was provided with the transcripts of the representatives’ oral submissions before the Court, English translations of expert report no.1 (of 23 December 2005), five autopsy reports of the victims and transcripts of the testimonies given by the pathologists in the domestic proceedings. His conclusions may be summarised as follows. 453. On the overall organisation of the forensic service, Dr Clark noted that the task faced by the authorities had been extremely difficult. The mortuary in Vladikavkaz could not have possibly coped with the influx of over 300 bodies – as, in fact, no mortuary in the world could have. Alternative solutions should therefore have been considered, such as establishing a temporary mortuary elsewhere (a storage warehouse or cool facility – he recalled the use of an ice-rink in the Lockerby events) and bringing in refrigerator trucks or distribution to other mortuaries. In view of the potentially high number of expected casualties from the siege, some sort of system should have been planned in advance, with a suitable location, equipment and personnel identified and available at short notice. He noted that “the matter of body storage and preservation would have been uppermost in the minds of the pathologists, particularly with the warm weather”. A more orderly fashion of dealing with the bodies could have not only helped to avoid wrong identifications, but also alleviated the pressure on the forensic team. It would have permitted them to carry out a more in-depth examination of the bodies, where necessary, in order to establish the causes of death and identify and extract the objects that could be helpful to the investigation, such as bullets, fragments of IEDs and so forth. A clear explanation to the relatives as regards time expectations and the need for examination would have helped both them and those dealing with the bodies. 454. As to the recovery of the bodies from the school, the expert noted that the location and position of each person should have been recorded and the body numbered and preferably photographed. The description of the scene and the record of body recovery as reflected in the available documents appeared “totally inadequate for such an important incident and provides no basis for independent analysis, as any proper forensic report should allow”. 455. That most bodies had been subjected to external examinations only, as opposed to a full autopsy, would have been understandable if the principal purpose of the examination had been identification. Such an approach was justifiable, for example, in cases of major disaster casualties, or even at mass crime scenes where the evident injuries from gunfire or gross damage from an explosive device made the cause of death obvious. However, such an approach “would not reveal other unexpected findings, nor permit retrieval of bullets or shrapnel from inside the body”, although the evidential value of much of this type of material, for example for matching with a particular rifle, would have been questionable in the case of high-velocity ammunition. A lighter option could have included the use of imaging facilities, such as portable X-ray machines usually available at hospitals. This could have assisted in deciding whether a more in-depth examination had been required. In some cases, the expert noted, the conclusions about the cause of death had been inconsistent with the number of examination carried out, and should have been “couched in far more cautious terms”. With respect to those cases where the cause of death had not been established, mostly in view of extensive burns, Dr Clark was of the opinion that this could have been established relatively easily. “Questions of where and when they died, and whether it was from gunshot, explosion, fire, other trauma, or any combination, could and should have been established...” 456. The expert also commented on the people who had been burnt to an extent that the cause of death could not be established, and whether these burns could have been received ante or post mortem. He stressed that post mortem burns often masked those received while the person had been alive; that most people died in fires from smoke inhalation rather than from burns; but that smoke inhalation could only be proved by an internal examination including a carboxyhaemoglobin blood test and dissection of the body in order to examine to what extent the air passages were lined with soot. The expert stressed that “[i]nternal examination of a body to establish smoke inhalation can be done on even very charred and partly destroyed remains (which generally are remarkably well preserved inside), certainly on the type seen in the photographs and described in the post-mortem reports above. Thus, to say that no cause of death could be established because the body was burned is nonsense and dishonest”.