CASE OF ULLENS DE SCHOOTEN AND REZABEK v. BELGIUM [Extracts]
Partiellement irrecevable;Non-violation de l'art. 6-1
András Sajó;David Thór Björgvinsson;Françoise Tulkens;Guido Raimondi
4. Mr Fernand Ullens de Schooten and Mr Ivan Rezabek live in Bonlez and Brussels respectively. They were directors of an accredited clinical biology laboratory called Biorim, whose services were eligible for reimbursement through the National Institute for Sickness and Invalidity Insurance (Institut national d’assurance maladie invalidité – the “INAMI”). 5. The Biorim laboratory was searched on 21 November 1989 following a complaint from the Special Tax Inspectorate. The applicants were arrested and remanded in custody. Proceedings were brought against them and eleven other individuals for offences related to the management of the laboratory, including forgery and failure to comply with Article 3 of Royal Decree no. 143 of 30 December 1982. The Article in question laid down, in respect of clinical biology services, the conditions to be met by medical laboratories so that the cost of their services could be reimbursed to users through the sickness insurance scheme. In the version of the text that was in force until 24 May 2005, it stipulated in particular that only laboratories that were run by doctors, pharmacists or persons qualified in chemical sciences were entitled to carry out clinical tests that were eligible for reimbursement. 6. On 29 June 1993 the investigating judge concluded the preparation of the case. On 3 April 1995 the Crown Prosecutor finalised his written submissions and, on 29 May 1996, the Committals Division made an order committing the applicants (and eleven other defendants) to stand trial before the Brussels Court of First Instance, sitting as a criminal court. The fraudulent intent referred to in the committal submissions for offences classified as acts of “forgery” consisted in the fact of deceiving the authorities “responsible for monitoring implementation of the legislation on the operation of medical laboratories, in particular the provisions of Royal Decree no. 143”. 7. The oral proceedings began on 20 June 1997 and were spread over forty hearings. 8. A number of mutual insurance companies applied to join the proceedings as civil parties. They sought compensation for damage stemming from two causes. They claimed that the applicants had, firstly, engaged in a practice of fee sharing and, secondly, had run a clinical biology laboratory in breach of the provisions of Article 3 of Royal Decree no. 143. Under the second head they claimed 19,908,531 euros, corresponding to the total amount paid to the Biorim laboratory between 1 January 1990 (date on which Royal Decree no. 143 entered into force) and 16 April 1992 (last day of the period in which the offences were committed). 9. On 30 October 1998 the criminal court convicted the applicants, imposing prison sentences and fines, for various offences that had been committed in connection with the management of Biorim. It found in particular that between 1 January 1990 and 10 June 1997 the laboratory had been run by the first applicant at a time when he did not fulfil the conditions of Article 3 of Royal Decree no. 143, and that he had devised various means of circumventing the legislation. The court declared the civil parties’ claims admissible, but awarded them only a token amount of one euro on the ground that the damage had not been sufficiently substantiated. 10. Before the Brussels Court of Appeal, the applicants argued in particular that Article 3 of Royal Decree no. 143 was incompatible with Article 86 of the Treaty establishing the European Community, taken together with Articles 82 (prohibition of the abuse of a dominant position) and 43 (freedom of establishment) of the Treaty and that it should be declared inapplicable on account of the direct effect and primacy of Community law. They requested in this connection that the question be referred to the Court of Justice of the European Communities for a preliminary ruling. 11. In a judgment of 7 September 2000 the Brussels Court of Appeal, after examining the above-mentioned argument on the merits, found that Article 3 of Royal Decree no. 143 was compatible with Community law. It emphasised, in particular, that “national measures capable of hindering or rendering less attractive the exercise of the fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the Treaty” had to fulfil four conditions and that the measure in question did so, being non-discriminatory, justified by compelling reasons in the general interest, appropriate to ensure the fulfilment of the aim pursued, and not going beyond what was necessary to that end. The Court of Appeal then decided “that there [was] no need to refer questions for a preliminary ruling”. 12. ... The Court of Appeal thus handed down convictions – mainly for tax fraud – sentencing the first applicant to five years’ imprisonment, with a five-year suspension for the part of the main prison sentence in excess of four years, and to a fine of 500,000 Belgian francs (about EUR 12,395), and the second applicant to three years’ imprisonment, with a five-year suspension for the part of the main prison sentence in excess of two years, and to a fine of 300,000 Belgian francs (about EUR 7,437). As to the requests of the civil parties, the Court of Appeal declared them inadmissible. 13. Ruling on appeals by the applicants and the civil parties, the Court of Cassation, in a judgment of 14 February 2001, dismissed the appeals in so far as they were directed against the criminal provisions of the judgment of 7 September 2000, finding in particular that there was no need to refer questions to the Court of Justice of the European Communities. It quashed the judgment, however, in respect of its findings on the civil actions and, within that limit, referred the case back to the Mons Court of Appeal. 14. On 7 December 1999 the first applicant had lodged a complaint against Belgium with the European Commission, arguing that Article 3 of Royal Decree no. 143 was incompatible with the Treaty establishing the European Community. In May 2001 the European Commission initiated the infringement procedure provided for in Article 226 of the Treaty establishing the European Community and requested the Belgian authorities to submit their observations on the compatibility of Article 3 of Royal Decree no. 143 with Article 43 of that Treaty, concerning freedom of establishment. 15. On 17 July 2002 the European Commission adopted a reasoned opinion finding that Article 3 of the Royal Decree was incompatible with Article 43 of the Treaty. It requested Belgium to amend that provision, which had the effect of placing non-Belgian operators wishing to run clinical biology laboratories in Belgium and establish themselves there at a disadvantage in relation to certain Belgian professionals (in particular doctors, pharmacists or persons qualified in chemical sciences). In the Commission’s opinion, the fact that only those laboratories which fulfilled the prescribed conditions could provide services eligible for reimbursement through the health insurance system discouraged beneficiaries of that insurance from going to other laboratories and thus restricted the effectiveness of the freedom of establishment, in breach of Article 43 of the Treaty establishing the European Community. 16. On 24 May 2005 Belgium enacted a law amending Article 3 of Royal Decree no. 143, abolishing the requirement to have particular qualifications to operate a laboratory carrying out clinical tests eligible for reimbursement under the sickness and invalidity insurance scheme. 17. On 22 September 2003 the parties wrote to the office of the public prosecutor at the Mons Court of Appeal seeking the organisation of a preparatory hearing. It took place between 13 February 2004 and 4 April 2005. 18. The debate concerning the reimbursement of clinical tests focussed on the question of the compatibility with Community law of Article 3 of Royal Decree no. 143. In the applicants’ submission, that provision was in breach of certain rules of the Treaty establishing the European Community, in particular those concerning freedom of establishment (Article 43 of the Treaty), the free movement of capital (Article 56), the free provision of services (Article 49) and the rules on free competition (Articles 82 and 86). Referring in particular to the European Commission’s opinion of 17 July 2002 (see above), they concluded that Article 3 of Royal Decree no. 143 could not have produced ab initio any legal effect and that, being bound by the primacy of Community law, the Court of Appeal could not take account of the convictions handed down, not even considering the offences as mere torts. In the alternative, the second applicant requested that a question be referred to the Court of Justice of the European Communities for a preliminary ruling on the conformity of Article 3 of Royal Decree no. 143 with the provisions of Articles 43, 49, 56, 82 and 86 of the Treaty establishing the European Community. 19. In a judgment of 23 November 2005 the Court of Appeal dismissed the applicants’ arguments. It emphasised that the European Commission’s reasoned opinion of 17 July 2002 was not binding and that the Brussels Court of Appeal’s judgment of 7 September 2000, of which the criminal provisions had the authority of res judicata, had found Article 3 of Royal Decree no. 143 to be compatible with Community law. Further noting that the Court of Cassation, in its decision of 14 February 2001, had decided that there was no need to refer preliminary questions to the Court of Justice of the European Communities, it reached the same conclusion, on the ground that such questions were not “indispensable for adjudication”. 20. Upholding the civil claims, the Mons Court of Appeal ordered the applicants to pay various amounts to the civil parties, including six mutual insurance companies jointly, for a total of EUR 1,859,200. 21. On 1 December 2005 the applicants appealed on points of law against the judgment of 23 November 2005. They reiterated in particular the argument that Article 3 of Royal Decree no. 143 was incompatible with the Treaty establishing the European Community, a higher source of law. They further submitted that, whilst the Court of Cassation itself had not found the provisions incompatible, it had a duty, under Article 234 of the Treaty establishing the European Community, to refer the matter to the Court of Justice of the European Communities for a preliminary ruling on the issue ofprinciple of the authority of res judicata and the primacy of Community law. In their submission, the fact that the Mons Court of Appeal had upheld the authority of res judicata in the Brussels Court of Appeal’s judgment, whereas developments following that decision had revealed it to be erroneous, constituted a breach of the right to a fair hearing under Article 6 of the Convention and more specifically the entitlement to a hearing by an impartial tribunal. 22. On 14 June 2006 the Court of Cassation dismissed the applicants’ appeals. It reiterated among other things the principle that the authority of res judicata in criminal matters precluded the court hearing any subsequent civil claims from calling into question what had been adjudicated with final effect, certainty and necessity as to the existence of a fact forming the common basis of the criminal proceedings and the civil suit. It concluded that the Mons Court of Appeal had rightly held that the finding of the Brussels Court of Appeal of 7 September 2000 concerning the conformity of Article 43 of Royal Decree no. 143 with Community law had been correct, being in line with that principle. The Court of Cassation, moreover, considered that the question whether the principle of the primacy of Community law should take precedence over that of the authority of res judicata had already been settled by the Court of Justice of the European Communities in its judgments in Eco Swiss China Time Ltd and Benetton International NV (C-126/97) of 1 June 1999 and Rosemarie Kapferer v. Schlank & Schlick GmbH (C-234/04) of 16 March 2006. It noted in this connection that the Luxembourg Court had concluded in those judgments that the second principle prevailed, finding that “Community law [did] not require a national court to disapply domestic rules of procedure conferring finality on a decision, even if to do so would enable it to remedy an infringement of Community law by the decision at issue”, and had explained in the Kapferer judgment that “the obligation of the body concerned to review a final decision, which would appear to have been adopted in breach of Community law [was] subject, in accordance with Article 10 EC, to the condition, inter alia, that that body should be empowered under national law to reopen that decision”. The Court of Cassation concluded that “there [was] no need to submit once again to the Court of Justice of the European Communities the point of law that it [had] thus resolved, regardless of the nature of the proceedings which [had given] rise to its case-law and despite the questions at issue not strictly being the same”. 23. On 18 March 1999 the Minister for Public Health issued a decision suspending the laboratory’s accreditation for a twelve-month period. Referring to the Brussels Criminal Court’s judgment of 30 October 1998 (see paragraph 9 above), the decision was based on a failure to comply with Royal Decree no. 143. The company Biorim unsuccessfully lodged an administrative appeal: the suspension was confirmed by a ministerial decision of 9 July 1999. 24. In the meantime, on 8 June 2000, a fresh ministerial decision had extended the suspension of accreditation for a twelve-month period “on account of the continuing infringements of Article 3 of Royal Decree no. 143”. In a decision of 24 July 2000 the Minister dismissed the administrative appeal lodged by Biorim and confirmed the suspension, on the ground that the company had not put an end to the situation which had justified the first suspension of accreditation, the applicant having continued to run the laboratory. 25. On 13 September 1999 and 21 September 2000 Biorim applied to the Conseil d’Etat for the annulment of the ministerial decisions of 9 July 1999 (G/A 85.522/VI-15.170; the “first set of proceedings”) and of 24 July 2000 (G/A 94.649/VI-15.635; the “second set of proceedings”). 26. The applicant was a third-party intervener in the proceedings. 27. The company Biorim and the applicant claimed in particular that Article 3 of Royal Decree no. 143, on which the impugned decisions had been based, was in breach of Articles 43 (freedom of establishment), 49 (free provision of services) and 56 (free movement of capital) of the Treaty establishing the European Community, and of Article 86 taken together with Articles 82 (prohibition of abuse of dominant position), 43, 49 or 56. They concluded that those decisions were devoid of admissible basis and should therefore be annulled. In the alternative, the applicant requested the Conseil d’Etat to refer questions to the Court of Justice of the European Communities for a preliminary ruling to determine whether the above-mentioned Articles of the Treaty establishing the European Community were to be interpreted as precluding the application of legislation imposing the various restrictions provided for in Article 3 of Royal Decree no. 143. 28. In his report of 22 September 2005, the Auditeur (legal assistant at the Conseil d’Etat) declared the argument well-founded and took the view that the impugned decisions should be annulled on the ground that Article 3 of Royal Decree no. 143 was not in conformity with Community law. The Auditeur observed first of all that the Belgian courts had to refuse to give effect to any provisions of domestic law that ran counter to provisions of international law having direct effect. This was the case for national legislation concerning the services of medical laboratories, which had to be compatible with the rules of Community law on freedom of establishment and the free provision of services, since the Court of Justice of the European Communities had held that those rules applied to such services (CJEC, 11 March 2004, C-496/01). He added that it was invalid in the present case to argue that the legislation bore no relation to trade between two EC member States – especially as, in his opinion, factors of such nature were present – as justification for finding the provisions inapplicable, referring in this connection to the case-law of the Luxembourg court to the effect that since the fundamental freedoms enshrined in Community law extended in their application to the potential effects of legislation, they could not be considered inapplicable simply because the facts of the specific case were confined to a single member State (CJEC, C-321/94 to C-324/94). He went on to observe that “national measures capable of hindering or rendering less attractive the exercise of such fundamental freedoms” were admissible only under certain conditions, in particular where they did not go beyond what was necessary to achieve the aim pursued. In the present case, firstly, Article 3 of Royal Decree no. 143 hindered and rendered less attractive the freedom of establishment, the free provision of services and the free movement of capital as regards the operation of clinical biology laboratories; secondly, the measure implemented was disproportionate to the aim pursued – to avoid over-consumption of clinical biology services – as that aim could be achieved by means that were less restrictive of freedoms. 29. In two judgments of 21 February 2007, the Conseil d’Etat dismissed the submission that there had been a violation of the above-mentioned Articles of the Treaty establishing the European Community. It first observed that, under Article 86 § 1 of the Treaty, “[i]n the case of public undertakings and undertakings to which member States grant[ed] special or exclusive rights, member States [could] neither enact nor maintain in force any measure contrary to the rules contained in that Treaty, in particular to the rules provided for in Article 12 and Articles 81 to 89”. Finding that the laboratories referred to in Article 3 of Royal Decree no. 143 did not fall within those categories, it declared Article 86 of the Treaty inapplicable in the present case. As to the other provisions of the Treaty relied upon in the submission, the Conseil d’Etat referred to the case-law of the Court of Justice of the European Communities to the effect that the Treaty’s rules in matters of free circulation of persons and services did not affect any restrictions applying to nationals of a member State on the territory of that State where the situation in which they found themselves had no link to any of the situations envisaged by Community law. According to the Conseil d’Etat, the dispute did not, in the present case, contain any extraneous elements capable of justifying the application of Community law. In that connection it explained as follows: “... [Biorim] is a company incorporated under Belgian law and operating in Belgium. As it operates within the Belgian market, it has not availed itself of the freedom of establishment or the free provision of services provided for respectively by Articles 43 and 49 of the Treaty establishing the European Community. The alleged circumstance ... that Community nationals established in other member States could make use of the services of [Biorim] does not constitute, in respect of the company, a link to Community law within the meaning of the above-cited case-law of the Court of Justice of the European Communities. [The applicant] is Belgian and in order to run the laboratory of [Biorim] he did not make use of freedom of movement within the European Community. Although it has been shown in the criminal-court decisions that he used “financing packages”, in particular through the intermediary of the Luxembourg company [T.], this factor has no bearing on the grounds for the impugned decision. The case against [Biorim] is not that it was operated by that company, or that it was financed by foreign capital, but precisely that it was run by [the applicant], whereas he did not have one of the qualifications required to do so, as shown by the criminal-court decisions. The [applicant’s] situation in this connection is confined exclusively to the national sphere ...” The Conseil d’Etat further refused to refer the applicant’s questions to the Court of Justice of the European Communities for a preliminary ruling, observing as follows: “... Article 234 of the Treaty establishing the European Community does not oblige courts or tribunals against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy under national law to refer a question concerning the interpretation of Community law raised before them if that question is not relevant, that is to say, if the answer to that question, regardless of what it may be, can in no way affect the outcome of the case. The same applies when the question raised is materially identical with a question which has already been the subject of a preliminary ruling in a similar case, where previous decisions of the Court have already dealt with the point of law in question, even though the questions at issue are not strictly identical, or where the correct application of Community law is so obvious as to leave no scope for any reasonable doubt as to the manner in which the question raised is to be resolved ... In the present case, there is no reasonable doubt as to the inapplicability of Article 86 § 1 of the Treaty establishing the European Community to the laboratories referred to in Article 3 ... of Royal Decree no. 143 .... In addition, for the reasons given, an answer by the Court as to the interpretation of Articles 43, 49 and 56 of the Treaty establishing the European Community could not affect the outcome of the present dispute ...” 30. The company Biorim additionally argued, inter alia, that there had been a breach of Articles 10 and 11 of the Constitution concerning equality before the law and the prohibition of discrimination. The Conseil d’Etat held that, in so far as Biorim was complaining of a difference in treatment between Belgian nationals established in Belgium and those established in other member States or nationals of other member States, on the ground that the latter categories enjoyed more rights and guarantees in the context of the application of Article 3 of Royal Decree no. 143, this was a new submission raised only in its rejoinder and was thus belated and inadmissible. In response to Biorim’s argument that, by reserving the intervention of the sickness insurance scheme to laboratories run by doctors, pharmacists or persons qualified in chemical sciences, Article 3 of Royal Decree no. 143 introduced, between those persons and other business operators, a prohibited difference in treatment, the Conseil d’Etat found that its decision should be reserved in order to submit a question on that subject to the Constitutional Court for a preliminary ruling. The Constitutional Court responded by a judgment of 19 December 2007 that the said provision did not breach Articles 10 and 11 of the Constitution. 31. In addition, in the context of the second set of proceedings, the Conseil d’Etat partly re-opened the case, requesting the Auditeur to pursue the investigation and produce a supplementary report on arguments other than those alleging a breach of Community law. The Auditeur found that the ministerial decision of 24 July 2000 should be annulled on grounds related to the reasoning of the impugned decision, being unconnected to the complaints submitted by the applicant to the Court. 32. The Conseil d’Etat dismissed the applications by two judgments of 10 September and 22 December 2008. 33. Article 234 of the Treaty establishing the European Community (former Article 177 and, since 1 December 2009, Article 267 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union) provides for preliminary rulings of the Court of Justice of the European Communities as follows: “The Court of Justice shall have jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings concerning: (a) the interpretation of this Treaty; (b) the validity and interpretation of acts of the institutions of the Community ...; ... Where such a question is raised before any court or tribunal of a Member State, that court or tribunal may, if it considers that a decision on the question is necessary to enable it to give judgment, request the Court of Justice to give a ruling thereon. Where any such question is raised in a case pending before a court or tribunal of a Member State against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy under national law, that court or tribunal shall bring the matter before the Court of Justice.” 34. In the case of S.r.l. CILFIT and Lanificio di Gavardo S.p.a. v. Ministry of Health (283/81, Rec. 1982, p. 3415) the Court of Justice of the European Communities had received a request from the Italian Court of Cassation for a ruling as to whether the third paragraph of Article 234 of the Treaty establishing the European Community (former Article 177) laid down an obligation to refer a matter which precluded the national court from determining whether the question raised was justified or whether it made that obligation conditional on the prior finding of a reasonable interpretative doubt. In its judgment the Court of Justice explained, firstly, as follows: “... 6. The second paragraph of that article [Article 234] provides that any court or tribunal of a Member State may, if it considers that a decision on a question of interpretation is necessary to enable it to give judgment, request the Court of Justice to give a ruling thereon. The third paragraph of that article provides that, where a question of interpretation is raised in a case pending before a court or tribunal of a Member State against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy under national law, that court or tribunal shall, bring the matter before the Court of Justice. 7. That obligation to refer a matter to the Court of Justice is based on cooperation, established with a view to ensuring the proper application and uniform interpretation of Community law in all the Member States, between national courts, in their capacity as courts responsible for the application of Community law, and the Court of Justice. More particularly, the third paragraph of Article [234] seeks to prevent the occurrence within the Community of divergences in judicial decisions on questions of Community law. The scope of that obligation must therefore be assessed, in view of those objectives, by reference to the powers of the national courts, on the one hand, and those of the Court of Justice, on the other, where such a question of interpretation is raised within the meaning of Article [234]. 8. In this connection, it is necessary to define the meaning for the purposes of Community law of the expression “where any such question is raised” in order to determine the circumstances in which a national court or tribunal against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy under national law is obliged to bring a matter before the Court of Justice. 9. In this regard, it must in the first place be pointed out that Article [234] does not constitute a means of redress available to the parties to a case pending before a national court or tribunal. Therefore the mere fact that a party contends that the dispute gives rise to a question concerning the interpretation of Community law does not mean that the court or tribunal concerned is compelled to consider that a question has been raised within the meaning of Article 177. ...” The Court of Justice went on to observe that courts or tribunals against whose decisions there was no judicial remedy had the same discretion as any other national court or tribunal to ascertain “whether a decision on a question of Community law [was] necessary to enable them to give judgment”. It concluded that they were not obliged to refer a question of interpretation of Community law raised before them in the following situations: (1) where the question was not relevant, in the sense that the answer to the question, regardless of what it might be, could in no way affect the outcome of the case; (2) where the question was materially identical with question which had already been the subject of a preliminary ruling in a similar case, or where previous decisions of the Court had already dealt with the point of law in question, irrespective of the nature of the proceedings which led to those decisions, even though the questions at issue were not strictly identical; or (3) where the correct application of Community law was so obvious as to leave no scope for any reasonable doubt as to the manner in which the question raised was to be resolved (bearing in mind that before it came to this conclusion the national court or tribunal had to be convinced that the matter was equally obvious to the courts of the other member States and to the Court of Justice, and only if those conditions were satisfied could the national court or tribunal refrain from submitting the question to the Court of Justice and take upon itself the responsibility for resolving it). The judgment then concluded as follows (point 21): “... the third paragraph of Article [234] of the EEC treaty is to be interpreted as meaning that a court or tribunal against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy under national law is required, where a question of Community law is raised before it, to comply with its obligation to bring the matter before the Court of Justice, unless it has established that the question raised is irrelevant or that the Community provision in question has already been interpreted by the Court or that the correct application of Community law is so obvious as to leave no scope for any reasonable doubt. The existence of such a possibility must be assessed in the light of the specific characteristics of Community law, the particular difficulties to which its interpretation gives rise and the risk of divergences in judicial decisions within the Community.” 35. Articles 43, 49, 56, 82 and 86 of the Treaty establishing the European Community (Title III “Free Movement of Persons, Services and Capital”) read as follows: “Within the framework of the provisions set out below [on the right of establishment], restrictions on the freedom of establishment of nationals of a Member State in the territory of another Member State shall be prohibited. Such prohibition shall also apply to restrictions on the setting-up of agencies, branches or subsidiaries by nationals of any Member State established in the territory of any Member State. Freedom of establishment shall include the right to take up and pursue activities as self-employed persons and to set up and manage undertakings, in particular companies or firms within the meaning of the second paragraph of Article 48, under the conditions laid down for its own nationals by the law of the country where such establishment is effected, subject to the provisions of the chapter relating to capital.” “Within the framework of the provisions set out below [on services], restrictions on freedom to provide services within the Community shall be prohibited in respect of nationals of Member States who are established in a State of the Community other than that of the person for whom the services are intended. The Council may, acting by a qualified majority on a proposal from the Commission, extend the provisions of the Chapter to nationals of a third country who provide services and who are established within the Community.” “1. Within the framework of the provisions set out in this chapter [on capital and payments], all restrictions on the movement of capital between Member States and between Member States and third countries shall be prohibited. 2. Within the framework of the provisions set out in this chapter, all restrictions on payments between Member States and between Member States and third countries shall be prohibited.” “Any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position within the common market or in a substantial part of it shall be prohibited as incompatible with the common market in so far as it may affect trade between Member States. ...” “1. In the case of public undertakings and undertakings to which Member States grant special or exclusive rights, Member States shall neither enact nor maintain in force any measure contrary to the rules contained in this Treaty, in particular to those rules provided for in Article 12 and Articles 81 to 89. ...” 36. Article 21ter of the Preliminary Title of the Code of Criminal Procedure reads as follows: “Should the length of criminal proceedings exceed a reasonable time, the court may convict by a mere declaration of guilt or hand down a lesser sentence than that provided for by law ...”