CASE OF N.S. v. DENMARK
Remainder inadmissible;No violation of Art. 3 (in case of expulsion to Sri Lanka)
Isabelle Berro-Lefèvre;Karel Jungwiert;Mark Villiger;Peer Lorenzen;Rait Maruste;Renate Jaeger;Zdravka Kalaydjieva
5. The applicant was born on 21 November 1967 in Sri Lanka. He is of Tamil ethnicity. 6. Having been granted family reunification on 3 December 1997, by virtue of the former section 9, subsection 1(2), of the Aliens Act (Udlændingeloven), on 13 December 1997, with a valid passport and visa, the applicant joined his Sri Lankan wife in Denmark. It appears that she had left Sri Lanka in 1992 and stayed in India before, at some unknown time, she was granted asylum in Denmark, apparently due to her connections with the LTTE. 7. Three children were born to the couple in 2000, 2002 and 2005. 8. By a judgment of 4 July 2006 by the City Court in Tønder (Retten i Tønder), upheld on appeal on 19 September 2006 by the High Court of Western Denmark (Vestre Landsret), the applicant was convicted of the sexual abuse of a girl who was less than twelve years old. He was sentenced to three years and three months' imprisonment and expelled with a prohibition on returning. 9. The applicant did not request leave to appeal against the judgment to the Supreme Court (Højesteret). 10. The applicant finished serving his prison sentence on 20 March 2009. 11. In the meantime, on 14 June 2007 the applicant requested asylum under section 7 of the Aliens Act and maintained in support thereof, inter alia, that his three siblings, two of whom were dead, had been members of the Tamil Tigers (LTTE). He had not been a member of any organisation in Sri Lanka. 12. According to an interview report of 11 December 2007 prepared by the Immigration Service, the applicant added that until he turned 30 years of age, he had been a fisherman. Then he had married and been reunited with his family in Denmark in 1997. When the applicant went to school, persons from the LTTE had come up and asked him if he could dig holes, move things and carry out various jobs. The applicant took no part in action, exercises or military training. He assisted the LTTE on a full-time basis for three years. During this period he stayed with the LTTE all the time. Thereafter he moved back to his family without telling the LTTE. Confronted with the fact that he had previously stated that he had no involvement with the LTTE, he maintained that his statement had been translated incorrectly. He had assisted the LTTE from 1990 to 1995 but had not been a member. He did not recall whether he had been wanted by the Sri Lankan authorities but he had been arrested by them ten to fifteen times. When asked why he had not previously mentioned the arrests, he stated that most of the arrests had been of only a few hours' duration but that the last one had lasted some months. It was in 1991 when he was arrested in connection with the mass arrest. He remembered being released after six months as a result of a peace agreement but his memory was not very good. Whenever he had been arrested the authorities asked him whether he was working for the LTTE. He had denied this, although this was the period during which he had worked for the organisation. Confronted with the fact that he had previously stated that he would not risk any harm upon return to Sri Lanka as he was neither wanted nor persecuted, the applicant submitted that this must have been a misunderstanding. 13. On 21 December 2007 the applicant's application for asylum was refused by the Immigration Service (Udlændingeservice), finding that he lacked credibility and that there was no substantiated risk that he would be subjected to treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention upon return. 14. The applicant appealed to the Refugee Appeals Board (Flygtningenævnet) before which, during an oral hearing held on 20 May 2008, he explained for example that the LTTE had approached him numerous times between 1985 and 1997 to ask him to work for them, which he did, but he had not been a member of the LTTE. The last time he assisted them was in January 1997. The applicant left in December 1997. 15. By decision of 13 June 2008 the Refugee Appeals Board refused to grant the applicant asylum. It noted that the applicant had expanded his motive for requesting asylum and had submitted various divergent explanations. Moreover, even disregarding the fact that the applicant had made various unclear statements about the dates, number and duration of his detention by the authorities, it could be considered a fact that he was last detained in 1991, which was five or six years before his departure, in connection with a mass arrest; that he was released in connection with a peace agreement; that he was never charged or sentenced; and that he had been able to leave Sri Lanka in 1997 on a valid passport without any problems. The Refugee Appeals Board did not find that the applicant had substantiated being at risk of persecution by the Sri Lankan authorities or the LTTE upon return. Finally, it observed that the general situation in Sri Lanka for Tamils coming from the north and east of the country could not alone justify the granting of asylum, and that the applicant's case had been assessed on its concrete and particular circumstances. 16. On 11 December 2008, upon the applicant's request, the Court of Human Rights decided to apply Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, indicating to the Government that it was in the interests of the parties and the proper conduct of the proceedings that the applicant should not be expelled to Sri Lanka pending the Court's decision. 17. On 2 March 2009 the Refugee Appeals Board refused the applicant's request to reopen the case. 18. On 16 June 2009 the Refugee Appeals Board decided to suspend the examination of asylum cases concerning Tamils from northern Sri Lanka, including the applicant's case. 19. On 16 December 2009, on the basis of the most recent background information concerning Sri Lanka including, inter alia, a Memorandum of 26 October 2009 prepared by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Refugee Appeals Board decided to review the suspended cases, including the applicant's case. 20. On 16 March 2010 the Refugee Appeals Board refused to reopen the applicant's case as it found that the most recent general background information would not lead to a revised assessment of the case. More specifically in its letter to the applicant's representative it stated as follows: ... In its decision of 13 June 2008, the Refugee Appeals Board found ... The Refugee Appeals Board still finds that your client's fear of being forcibly recruited by the LTTE or of being subjected to outrages by the LTTE as a result of having fled from the LTTE does not warrant a residence permit under section 7 of the Aliens Act. In this connection, the Refugee Appeals Board emphasises that your client's statements about his alleged connection with the LTTE were extended during the asylum proceedings and were diverging in essential areas. In this connection, the Refugee Appeals Board also refers to the fact that the Sri Lankan military forces defeated the LTTE in May 2009. Moreover, the Refugee Appeals Board refers to the background information available to the Board from which it appears that it is hardly likely that former low-ranking members of the LTTE or persons who have previously supported the LTTE will risk reprisals from the LTTE, see United Kingdom: Home Office, Operational Guidance Note, Sri Lanka, August 2009. Regardless of whether your client's information about his previous activities for the LTTE is considered a fact, the Refugee Appeals Board stills find that your client would not risk persecution or being subjected to outrages as covered by section 7 of the Aliens Act by the Sri Lankan authorities if returned to Sri Lanka, including in connection with his arrival at Colombo airport. The Refugee Appeals Board emphasizes that from his detention in 1991, where his photo was taken, and until his departure in 1997 your client has not been detained or had his picture or fingerprint taken or in any other way been the object of interest from the Sri Lankan authorities. The authorities have thus not carried out any acts aimed at your client that indicated that he was suspected of being a member of the LTTE. In this connection, the Board also refers to the fact that your client departed lawfully from Sri Lanka with his own Sri Lankan national passport for the purpose of family reunification with his spouse. Similarly, the Refugee Appeals Board refers to the background material available to the Board, according to which persons who have previously supported the LTTE on a lower level are generally not of interest to the authorities, see United Kingdom: Home Office, Operational Guidance Note, Sri Lanka, August 2009, and see United Kingdom: Home Office, Report of Information Gathering Visit to Colombo, Sri Lanka 23-29 August 2009. Against that background the Refugee Appeals Board also finds that the fact that one or more of your client's siblings have been members of or active for the LTTE cannot warrant a residence permit under section 7 of the Aliens Act, according to the background information now available. The fact that as an ethnic Tamil from northern Sri Lanka your client may risk being questioned and investigated by the authorities on entry into the country cannot lead to a revised assessment of the case under asylum law. In this assessment, consideration has been given to the background information available to the Board, according to which the individuals at particular risk of being detained and investigated upon entry in Colombo are young Tamils, men in particular, from northern and eastern Sri Lanka, those without identification or residence in Colombo, and those recently returned from the West, see United Kingdom: Home Office, Report of Information Gathering Visit to Colombo, Sri Lanka 2329 August 2009. In this connection the Board refers to its finding that it has not been rendered probable that your client would be an object of particular interest to the Sri Lankan authorities. As in its decision of 13 June 2008, the Refugee Appeals Board still finds that the general situation in Sri Lanka is not of such nature as to warrant in itself the grant of a residence permit under section 7 of the Aliens Act. The Board observes in that connection that it is a condition for a residence permit under section 7 of the Aliens Act that, upon a specific, individual assessment, an alien is deemed at risk of persecution or outrages. The authority of the Refugee Appeals Board is restricted to deciding asylum-relevant issues, and it is thus outside the Board's authority to determine whether an alien who does not meet the conditions of section 7 of the Aliens Act may be issued with a residence permit for other reasons of a more humanitarian nature. Against that background and in accordance with the Board's decision of 13 June 2008, the Refugee Appeals Board still finds that it has not been rendered probable that, in case of return to Sri Lanka, your client would be at concrete and individual risk of persecution as covered by section 7(1) of the Aliens Act, or that your client would be at a real risk of outrages as covered by section 7(2) of the Aliens Act. It should be noted that your client's time-limit for departure is still suspended until further notice on the basis of the request of 11 December 2008 from the European Court of Human Rights. If the basis for your client's lawful stay in Denmark lapses, your client must leave the country immediately, see section 33 of the Aliens Act. As appears from the decision of the Refugee Appeals Board of 13 June 2008, your client may be forcibly returned to Sri Lanka if he does not leave voluntarily, see section 32a, cf. section 31, of the Aliens Act. 21. On 18 March 2010, the applicant's representative brought proceedings against the Refugee Appeals Board before the City Court (Retten i Sønderborg) claiming that the Board's decision of 16 March 2010 should be annulled. It appears that the proceedings are still pending. 22. By virtue of section 7 of the Aliens Act (Udlændingeloven), asylum is granted to aliens who satisfy the conditions of the Geneva Convention. Applications for asylum are determined in the first instance by the former Aliens Authorities (now called the Immigration Service) and in the second instance by the Refugee Appeal Board. 23. Pursuant to section 56, subsection 8, of the Aliens Act, decisions by the Refugee Board are final, which means that there is no avenue for appeal against the Board's decisions. Aliens may, however, by virtue of Article 63 of the Danish Constitution (Grundloven) bring an appeal before the ordinary courts, which have authority to adjudge on any matter concerning the limits to the competence of a public authority. 24's country of origin or first country of asylum. For this purpose, the Refugee Appeals Board has a comprehensive collection of general background material on the situation in the countries from which Denmark receives asylumseekers. The material is updated and supplemented on a continuous basis. The background material of the Refugee Appeals Board is obtained from various authorities, in particular the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Danish Immigration Service. In addition, background material is procured from various organisations, including the Danish Refugee Council, Amnesty International and other international human rights organisations and the UNHCR. Also included are the annual reports of the US State Department (Country Reports on Human Rights Practices) on the human rights situation in a large number of countries, reports from the British Home Office, reports from the documentation centre of the Canadian Refugee Appeals Board, reports from the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, reports from EURASIL (European Union Network for Asylum Practitioners), reports from the authorities of other countries and to some extent articles from identifiable (international) journals. Moreover, the Board may request the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs to issue an opinion on whether it can confirm information from a background memorandum drafted in general terms. The Refugee Appeals Board also retrieves some of its background material from the Internet. Internet access also enables the Board to obtain more specific information in relation to special problems in individual cases. 25. Usually, the Refugee Appeals Board assigns counsel to the applicant. Board hearings are oral and the applicant is allowed to make a statement and answer questions. The Board decision will normally be served on the applicant immediately after the Board hearing, and at the same time the Chairman will briefly explain the reason for the decision made. 26. Extensive information about Sri Lanka can be found in NA. v. the United Kingdom, no. 25904/07, §§ 53-83. The information set out below concerns events occurring after the delivery of the said judgment on 17 July 2008 and, in particular, after the cessation of hostilities in May 2009. 27. Fighting between the Sri Lankan army and the LTTE intensified in early 2009, with the army taking a number of rebel strongholds in the north and east of the country. On 19 May 2009, in an address to the country's parliament, the President of Sri Lanka announced the end of hostilities and the death of the leader of the LTTE, Velupillai Prabhakaran. It was also reported that most, if not all, of the LTTE's leadership had been killed. 28. The previous day, the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs had estimated that around 220,000 people had already reached internally displaced persons' camps, including 20,000 in the last two or three days. In addition, it was believed that another 40,000-60,000 people were on their way to the camps through the crossing point at Omanthai, in the northern district of Vavuniya. 29. In July 2009, the South Asia Terrorism Portal reported that the number of killings in Sri Lanka in the previous three years (including deaths of civilians, security forces and members of the LTTE) was: 4,126 in 2006; 4,377 in 2007; 11,144 in 2008 and 15,549 between 1 January 2009 and 15 June 2009. An estimated 75-80,000 people were reported to have been killed in total over the course of the 26 year conflict. “Notwithstanding the cessation of the hostilities, the current protection and humanitarian environment in Sri Lanka remains extremely challenging. In the North, nearly the entire population from the territory formerly held by the LTTE in the North (285,000 Tamils) has been confined to heavily militarized camps in the Northern region. Although the government has gradually reduced the military presence in the camps and has pledged to start the progressive return to their villages of origin of the majority of those in the camps, it is clear that this may take a considerable amount of time. The lack of freedom of movement remains the overriding concern for this population restricting its ability to reunite with family members outside the camps, access employment, attend regular schools, and ultimately choose their place of residence.” 31. A Human Rights Watch [HRW] press release, dated 28 July 2009, reported that: “The government has effectively sealed off the detention camps from outside scrutiny. Human rights organizations, journalists, and other independent observers are not allowed inside, and humanitarian organizations with access have been forced to sign a statement that they will not disclose information about the conditions in the camps without government permission. On several occasions, the government expelled foreign journalists and aid workers who had collected and publicized information about camp conditions, or did not renew their visas.” 32. A further Human Rights Watch press release dated 26 August 2009 set out concerns that more than 260,000 Tamil civilians remained in detention camps without the freedom to leave. 33. In August 2009, the first post-war local elections were held in Northern Sri Lanka. The British Broadcasting Corporation reported that voter turn-out was low due to the number of people who were still displaced. The governing party, the United People's Freedom Alliance, took the majority of seats in the biggest city in the region, Jaffna. However, the Tamil National Alliance, a party sympathetic to the defeated LTTE, took the majority of seats in Vavuniya, the other town where polling took place. 34. On 7 September 2009, James Elder, the official spokesman for the United Nations Children's Fund in Sri Lanka was ordered to leave Sri Lanka because of adverse remarks that he had made to the media about the plight of Tamils in the government-run camps. 35. On 10 September 2009 the Sri Lankan Official Government News Portal announced that the motion to extend the State of Emergency (under which the authorities have extensive anti-terrorism powers and heightened levels of security including checkpoints and road blocks) by a further month had been passed by Parliament with a majority of 87 votes. 36. In a report dated 22 October 2009, the United States of America State Department published a report entitled “Report to Congress on Incidents During the Recent Conflict in Sri Lanka”, which compiled incidents from January 2009, when the fighting intensified, until the end of May 2009. Without reaching any conclusions as to whether they had occurred or would constitute violations of international law, it set out extensive reports of enforced child soldiers, the killing of captives or combatants trying to surrender, enforced disappearances and severe humanitarian conditions during the hostilities. 37. On 21 November 2009, the Sri Lankan Government announced its decision that all internally displaced persons would be given freedom of movement and allowed to leave the detention camps from 1 December 2009. 38. In its Global Appeal 2010-2011, the UNHCR reported that: “The Government-led military operations in northern Sri Lanka which ended in May 2009 displaced some 280,000 people, most of whom fled their homes in the last few months of the fighting. The majority of these internally displaced persons (IDPs) now live in closed camps in Vavuniya district, as well as in camps in Mannar, Jaffna and Trincomalee. An additional 300,000 IDPs, some of whom have been displaced since 1990, are also in need of durable solutions. The IDPs originate mainly from the Mannar, Vavuniya, Kilinochchi, Mullaitivu and Jaffna districts in northern Sri Lanka, as well as from some areas in the east of the country. Though the end of hostilities has paved the way for the voluntary return of displaced people, some key obstacles to return remain. For instance, many of the areas of return are riddled with mines and unexploded ordnance. Not all are considered to be of high risk, particularly those away from former frontlines, but mine-risk surveys and the demarcation of no-go areas are urgently needed. Other key obstacles to return include the need to re-establish administrative structures in areas formerly held by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam; the destruction or damaged condition of public infrastructure and private homes; and the breakdown of the economy - including agriculture and fisheries. The Government of Sri Lanka is planning the return framework, and it has called on UNHCR for support with return transport, non-food items, return shelter, livelihoods support and assistance in building the capacity of local authorities. With some progress having been recently achieved, it is hoped that a substantial number of IDPs will be able to return to their places of origin in the latter half of 2009, but a large portion of new IDPs are also likely to remain in the camps and with host families until well into 2010.” 39. In a Human Rights Report 2009, dated 11 March 2010, the United States of America State Department stated that the Sri-Lankan Government accepted assistance from NGOs and international actors for the IDP camps but management of the camps and control of assistance were under the military rather than civilian authorities. Food, water, and medical care were all insufficient in the first few weeks after the end of the war, but by July the situation had stabilised and observers reported that basic needs were being met. In June the military withdrew from inside the camps but continued to provide security around the barbed wire-enclosed perimeter. The IDPs in the largest camp, Manik Farm, were not given freedom of movement until December, when a system of temporary exit passes was implemented for those who had not yet been returned to their districts of origin. Some observers said that this exit system still did not qualify as freedom of movement. 40. Human Rights Watch, in their report, World Report 2010, estimated that six months after the main fighting ended, the Government continued to hold more than 129,000 people (more than half of them women and girls) in the camps. Over 80,000 of these were children. The camps were severely overcrowded, many of them holding twice the number recommended by the UN. As a result, access to basic requirements such as food, water, shelter, toilets and bathing, had been inadequate. These conditions imposed particular hardships on the elderly, children and pregnant women. The camps were under military administration, and effective monitoring by humanitarian agencies was lacking. The authorities failed to provide camp residents with sufficient information about the reason for their continued detention, the whereabouts of relatives, or the criteria and procedure for their return home. 41. The United Kingdom Border Agency Country of Origin Information Report on Sri Lanka of 11 November 2010 (“the November 2010 COI Report”) stated as follows: 4.23 The International Crisis Group (ICG) report Sri Lanka: A Bitter Peace, 11 January 2010, also referred to “extra-legal detention centres” maintained by the military and observed: “These detained have had no access to lawyers, their families, ICRC or any other protection agency, and it is unclear what is happening inside the centres. In addition, 'the grounds on which the ex-combatants have been identified and the legal basis on which they are detained are totally unclear and arbitrary'. Given the well-established practice of torture, enforced disappearance and extra-judicial killing of LTTE suspects under the current and previous Sri Lankan governments, there are grounds for grave concerns about the fate of the detained. The government has announced that of those alleged ex-combatants currently detained, only 200 will be put on the trial; most will detained for a further period of 'rehabilitation' and then released.” ... 4.25 Referring to the “at least 11,000 people” detained “in so-called 'rehabilitation centers” because of their alleged association with the LTTE, the HRW [document Legal Limbo, The Uncertain Fate of Detained LTTE Suspects in Sri Lanka, released on 29 January 2010, observed: “The government has routinely violated the detainees' fundamental human rights, including the right to be informed of specific reasons for arrest, the right to challenge the lawfulness of the detention before an independent judicial authority, and the right of access to legal counsel and family members. The authorities' consistent failure to inform families of the basis for the detainees' arrest and their whereabouts raises serious concerns that some detainees may have been victims of torture and ill-treatment, which are more likely to take place where due process of law is lacking and which have long been serious problems in Sri Lanka. Given the lack of information about some detainees, there is also a risk that some may have been 'disappeared'.” 4.31 The UNHCR 'Eligibility Guidelines for Assessing the International Protection Needs of Asylum-Seekers from Sri Lanka', 5 July 2010 reported that “In the wake of the conflict, almost 11,000 persons suspected of LTTE links were arrested and detained in high-security camps” adding that “According to a Government survey, as of 1 March 2010, 10,781 LTTE cadres were being held at 17 centres. Among the detainees were 8,791 males and 1,990 females.” and noted that “Some of the adult detainees have...been released after completing rehabilitation programmes or because they were no longer deemed to present a risk, including some persons with physical disabilities.” 42. The November 2010 COI Report also set out: 4.09 The EIU [The Economist Intelligence Unit], Country Report, Sri Lanka, July 2010 reported: “The EU has warned that Sri Lanka faces losing trade advantages under the Generalised System of Preferences-Plus (GSP-Plus) scheme from August 15th, unless the Government commits itself in writing to improving its human rights record. The EU has put forward 15 conditions that it says the Government needs to promise to meet within the next six months. These include: ensuring that the 17th amendment to the constitution, which requires that appointments to public positions be impartial and reflect the country's ethnic and religious mix, is enforced; repealing parts of the Prevention of Terrorism Act that are incompatible with Sri Lanka's covenants on political and human rights; reforming the criminal code to allow suspects immediate access to a lawyer on arrest; and allowing journalists to carry out their professional duties without harassment. However, the Government has rebuffed the EU, stressing that the issues that it has raised are internal political matters that should not be linked to trade. “The EU is not the only international body currently putting pressure on the government. Sri Lanka has also rejected the UN's appointment of a three-member panel to examine possible human rights violations during the island's civil war. The Sri Lankan authorities have warned that they will not provide visas for panel members to enter the country.” ... 4.11 The EIU, Country Report, Sri Lanka, August 2010 noted that: “The decision by the UN secretary-general, Ban Ki-moon [on 22 June 2010], to appoint a panel to examine accountability issues stemming from the final stages of the island's civil war, which ended in May 2009, has prompted a strong reaction in Sri Lanka ... 4.12 On 17 September 2010 the UN News Service reported that “Secretary-General Ban Kimoon has held his first meeting with the panel of experts set up to advise him on accountability issues relating to alleged violations of international humanitarian and human rights law during the final stages last year of the conflict in Sri Lanka.” The source also noted that the role of the experts was to examine “the modalities, applicable international standards and comparative experience with regard to accountability processes, taking into account the nature and scope of any alleged violations in Sri Lanka.” 43. The United Kingdom Border Agency Country of Origin Information Report on Sri Lanka of 18 February 2009 (“the February 2009 COI Report”) sets out a series of letters from the British High Commission – hereafter “BHC”, Colombo, on arrival procedures at Colombo airport. In its letter of 28 August 2008, the BHC observed: “[T]he correct procedure for [Department of Immigration and Emigration [DIE]] officers is to record the arrival of these persons manually in a logbook held in the adjacent Chief Immigration Officer's office. The name, date and time of arrival and arriving flight details are written into the log. It records why the person has come to their attention and how the case was disposed of. I have had the opportunity to look at the log, and it appears that the only two ways of disposal are to be passed to the Criminal Investigations Department [CID], or allowed to proceed. The office of the State Intelligence Service [SIS] is in the immigration arrivals hall and an officer from SIS usually patrols the arrivals area during each incoming flight. Invariably, if they notice a person being apprehended they approach IED [Immigration and Emigration Department] and take details in order to ascertain in [sic] the person may be of interest to them. Their office contains three computer terminals, one belonging to the airport containing flight information and two stand-alone terminals. If an apprehended person is considered suitable to be passed to CID, they are physically walked across the terminal building to the CID offices. A CID officer should then manually record the arrival of the person in a logbook held in their office...often persons shown in the DIE logbook to have been handed to CID are never actually recorded as being received in the CID logbook. It is believed that CID has allowed these persons to proceed and no action has been taken against them.” 44. The same letter also noted that CID offices at the airport contained two computers, which were not linked to any national database. Any checks on persons detained or apprehended were conducted over the phone with colleagues in central Colombo. There were no fingerprint records at the airport. One computer contained records of suspects who had been arrested and charged with offences, and court reference numbers. It continued as follows: “Were a Sri Lankan national to arrive at Colombo Airport having been removed or deported from the United Kingdom, they would be in possession of either a valid national Sri Lankan passport, or an emergency travel document/temporary passport, issued by the Sri Lankan High Commission in London. The holder of a valid passport would have the document endorsed by the immigration officer on arrival and handed back to him/her. A national passport contains the national ID card number on the laminated details page. I have made enquiries with the DIE at Colombo Airport, and with the International Organisation for Migration who meet certain returnees at the airport, and both have confirmed that a person travelling on an emergency travel document is dealt with similarly. They too have the document endorsed by the immigration officer on arrival and returned to them. Before issuing an emergency travel document, the Sri Lankan High Commission in London will have details of an applicant confirmed against records held in Colombo and will thus satisfactorily confirm the holder's nationality and identity. If a returnee subsequently wishes to obtain a national identity card, they have to follow the normal procedures.” 45. In a letter dated 22 January 2009, the BHC reported that an official had spent several hours observing the return of failed asylum seekers from the United Kingdom, including those who were in possession of emergency travel documents, issued by the Sri Lankan High Commission in London. In the official's opinion, the fact that certain returnees had been issued with emergency travel documents by the Sri Lankan High Commission in London did not seem to make any difference to their treatment upon arrival. 46. The Report of Information Gathering Visit to Colombo on 23 to 29 August 2009, conducted jointly by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office Migration Directorate and United Kingdom Border Agency Country of Origin Information Service (“the Report of Information Gathering Visit, August 2009”), concluded that all enforced returns (of whatever ethnicity) were referred to the CID at the airport for nationality and criminal record checks, which could take more than 24 hours. All enforced returns were wet-fingerprinted. Depending on the case, the individual could also be referred to the SIS and/or the Terrorist Investigation Department for questioning. Anyone who was wanted for an offence would be arrested. 47. The report set out that those with a criminal record or LTTE connections would face additional questioning and might be detained. In general, non-government and international sources agreed that Tamils from the north and east of the country were likely to receive greater scrutiny than others, and that the presence of the factors below would increase the risk that an individual could encounter difficulties with the authorities, including possible detention: - Outstanding arrest warrant - Criminal record - Connection with the LTTE - Bail jumping/escape from custody - Illegal departure from Sri Lanka - Scarring - Involvement with media or NGOs - Lack of an ID card or other documentation 48. The United Kingdom Border Agency Country of Origin Information Report on Sri Lanka of 11 November 2010 set out the following: 33.20 The BHC letter of 30 August 2010 went on to observe that: “At the beginning of 2010, partly due to the large numbers of Sri Lankans being returned from around the world and causing logistical problems, CID procedures were relaxed in that they no longer had to detain returnees until written confirmation was received from the local police. All returnees are still interviewed, photographed and wet fingerprinted. The main objective of these interviews is to establish if the returnee has a criminal record, or if they are wanted or suspected of committing any criminal offences by the police. The photographs are stored on a standalone computer in the CID office at the airport. The fingerprints remain amongst paper records also in the CID office at the airport. Checks are initiated with local police, but returnees are released to a friend or relative, whom CID refers to as a surety. This surety must provide evidence of who they are, and must sign for the returnee. They are not required to lodge any money with CID. “The main CID offices at Colombo Airport, which are housed on the ground floor adjacent to the DIE embarkation control, are currently undergoing a complete refurbishment funded by the Australian government. The one completed office suite has three purpose built interview rooms, and facilities where returnees can relax and eat meals.” ... 33.22 A British High Commission letter of 14 September 2010 reported: “There is strong anecdotal evidence that scarring has been used in the past to identify suspects. Previous conversations with the police and in the media, the authorities have openly referred to physical examinations being used to identify whether suspects have undergone military style training. More recent claims from contacts in government ministries suggest that this practice has either ceased or is used less frequently. At the very least it appears that the security forces only conduct these when there is another reason to suspect an individual, and are not looking for particular scars as such, but anything that may indicate the suspect has been involved in fighting and/or military training. There is no recent evidence to suggest that these examinations are routinely carried out on immigration returnees.” 49. On 19 October 2009, Tamilnet reported that twenty-nine Tamil youths were taken into custody by the State Intelligence Unit of the Sri Lanka Police at the International Airport in two separate incidents whilst trying to leave Sri Lanka. It was also reported that since July 2009, special teams of the State Intelligence Unit and police had been deployed in the airport to monitor the movement of Tamils who try to go abroad. 50. The Report of Information Gathering Visit, August 2009, stated that the frequency of cordon and search operations had not reduced significantly in recent months, though there were fewer large-scale operations than in previous years. In general, young male Tamils originating from the north and east of the country were most at risk of being detained following cordon and search operations, with the presence of the risk factors set out above increasing that risk. Those without employment or legitimate purpose for being in Colombo were also likely to be seen as suspect. The same report also noted that most sources agreed that there had been few, if any, abductions or disappearances since June 2009. There was not a great deal of available information about the profile of Tamils targeted for abduction, although it appeared that people linked to the media might be more vulnerable. Police did not generally carry out effective investigations. It went on to note that most sources agreed that there had not been any significant reduction in the number of checkpoints in Colombo, whose stated purpose remained to detect and prevent terrorist activity. In general those most likely to be questioned were young Tamils from the north and east; those without ID; those not resident or employed in Colombo; and those recently returned from the West. However, most sources said that arrests at checkpoints were rare and none had been reported since June 2009. It was reportedly fairly likely that someone would be stopped at a checkpoint en route from the airport to Colombo city. Finally, it clarified that people who wished to live in Colombo but did not originate from there must register with the local police station with a national ID card or full passport, and details of planned length and purpose of stay. In theory, whilst anyone was entitled to register to stay in Colombo, some sources suggested that young Tamil men originally from the north or east of the country could encounter difficulties and face closer scrutiny. The presence of any of the risk factors set out above would also attract greater attention from the police. “The significant majority of reported cases of human rights violations in Sri Lanka involve persons of Tamil ethnicity who originate from the North and East...In Government-controlled areas, Tamils who originate from the North and the East, which are, or have been under LTTE control, are frequently suspected as being associated with the LTTE. For this reason, Tamils from the North and the East are at heightened risk of human rights violations related to the implementation of anti-terrorism and anti-insurgency measures. While this risk exists in all parts of Sri Lanka, it is greatest in areas in which the LTTE remains active, and where security measures are heaviest, in particular the North and parts of the East, and in and around Colombo.” “The country of origin information that UNHCR has considered indicates that Tamils from the North of Sri Lanka continue to face a significant risk of suffering serious human rights violations in the region (and elsewhere in the country) because of their race (ethnicity) or (imputed) political opinion. Tamils in the North are still heavily targeted in the security and anti-terrorism measures described in the Guidelines. Wide scale detention and confinement of Tamils from the North remains a serious concern. Pro-Government paramilitary elements also continue to operate with impunity against Tamils in the North.” 54. The UNHCR Eligibility Guidelines for Assessing the International Protection Needs of Asylum-Seekers from Sri Lanka of 5 July 2010, which superseded the April 2009 Guidelines contained information on the particular profiles for which international protection needs may arise in the current context. It was stated that: “given the cessation of hostilities, Sri Lankans originating from the north of the country are no longer in need of international protection under broader refugee criteria or complementary forms of protection solely on the basis of risk of indiscriminate harm. In light of the improved human rights and security situation in Sri Lanka, there is no longer a need for group-based protection mechanisms or for a presumption of eligibility for Sri Lankans of Tamil ethnicity originating from the north of the country. It is important to bear in mind that the situation is still evolving, which has made the drafting of these Guidelines particularly complex.” 55. In summary, the following were UNHCR's recommendations: All claims by asylum seekers from Sri Lanka (i) persons suspected of having links with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE); (ii) journalists and other media professionals; (iii) civil society and human rights activists; (iv) women and children with certain profiles; and (v) lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender (LGBT) individuals. It was also stated that in the light of Sri Lanka's 26 year internal armed conflict, and a record of serious human rights violations and transgressions of international humanitarian law, exclusion considerations under Article 1F of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees may arise in relation to individual asylum seeker claims by Sri Lankan asylum seekers. 56. The BBC reported in March 2010 that the Colombo Police force had opened four special units in Colombo suburbs able to take statements in Tamil, with plans for more. Previously, Tamil-speaking Sri Lankans had to rely on a friend to translate their complaints into Sinhala.