CASE OF VON HANNOVER v. GERMANY
Violation of Art. 8;Just satisfaction reserved
Ireneu Cabral Barreto
8. The applicant, who is the eldest daughter of Prince Rainier III of Monaco, was born in 1957. Her official residence is in Monaco but she lives in the Paris area most of the time. As a member of Prince Rainier’s family, the applicant is the president of certain humanitarian or cultural foundations, such as the Princess Grace Foundation or the Prince Pierre of Monaco Foundation, and also represents the ruling family at events such as the Red Cross Ball or the opening of the International Circus Festival. She does not, however, perform any function within or on behalf of the State of Monaco or any of its institutions. 9. Since the early 1990s the applicant has been trying – often through the courts – in a number of European countries to prevent the publication of photos about her private life in the tabloid press. 10. The photos that were the subject of the proceedings described below were published by the Burda publishing company in the German magazines Bunte and Freizeit Revue, and by the Heinrich Bauer publishing company in the German magazine Neue Post. 11. These photos show her with the actor Vincent Lindon at the far end of a restaurant courtyard in Saint-Rémy-de-Provence. The first page of the magazine refers to “The most tender photos of her romance with Vincent” (“Die zärtlichsten Fotos Ihrer Romanze mit Vincent”) and the photos themselves bear the caption “These photos are evidence of the most tender romance of our time” (“Diese Fotos sind der Beweis für die zärtlichste Romanze unserer Zeit”). 12. The first photo shows her on horseback with the caption “Caroline and the blues. Her life is a novel with innumerable misfortunes, says the author Roig” (“Caroline und die Melancholie. Ihr Leben ist ein Roman mit unzähligen Unglücken, sagt Autor Roig”). The second photo shows her with her children Pierre and Andrea. The photos are part of an article entitled “I don’t think I could be a man’s ideal wife” (“Ich glaube nicht, dass ich die ideale Frau für einen Mann sein kann”). 13. The first photo shows her canoeing with her daughter Charlotte, the second shows her son Andrea with a bunch of flowers in his arms. The third photo shows her doing her shopping with a bag slung over her shoulder, the fourth with Vincent Lindon in a restaurant and the fifth alone on a bicycle. The sixth photo shows her with Vincent Lindon and her son Pierre. The seventh photo shows her doing her shopping at the market, accompanied by her bodyguard. The article is entitled “Pure happiness” (“Vom einfachen Glück”). 14. These photos show the applicant on a skiing holiday in Zürs/Arlberg. The accompanying article is entitled “Caroline... a woman returns to life” (“Caroline... eine Frau kehrt ins Leben zurück”). 15. Seven photos show her with Prince Ernst August von Hannover at a horse show in Saint-Rémy-de-Provence. The accompanying article is entitled “The kiss. Or: they are not hiding anymore” (“Der Kuss. Oder: jetzt verstecken sie sich nicht mehr”). Four other photos show her leaving her house in Paris with the caption “Out and about with Princess Caroline in Paris” (“Mit Prinzessin Caroline unterwegs in Paris”). 16. These photos show the applicant on the front page with Prince Ernst August von Hannover and on the inside pages of the magazine playing tennis with him or both putting their bicycles down. 17. The sequence of photos published in Neue Post magazine (issue no. 35/97) shows the applicant at the Monte Carlo Beach Club, dressed in a swimsuit and wrapped up in a bathing towel, tripping over an obstacle and falling down. The photos, which are quite blurred, are accompanied by an article entitled “Prince Ernst August played fisticuffs and Princess Caroline fell flat on her face” (“Prinz Ernst August haute auf den Putz und Prinzessin Caroline fiel auf die Nase”). 18. On 13 August 1993 the applicant sought an injunction in the Hamburg Regional Court (Landgericht) against any further publication by the Burda publishing company of the first series of photos on the ground that they infringed her right to protection of her personality rights (Persönlichkeitsrecht), guaranteed by Articles 2 § 1 and 1 § 1 of the Basic Law (Grundgesetz), and her right to protection of her private life and to the control of the use of her image, guaranteed by sections 22 et seq. of the Copyright (Arts Domain) Act (Kunsturhebergesetz – “the Copyright Act” – see paragraphs 40-41 below). 19. In a judgment of 4 February 1993, the Regional Court granted the application only in respect of the distribution of the magazines in France, in accordance with the rules of private international law (section 38 of the Introductory Act to the Civil Code – Einführungsgesetz in das bürgerliche Gesetzbuch) read in conjunction with Article 9 of the French Civil Code. With regard to the distribution of the magazines in Germany, however, the Regional Court reiterated that it was German law which applied. Under section 23(1) no. 1 of the Copyright Act, the applicant, as a figure of contemporary society “par excellence” (eine “absolute” Person der Zeitgeschichte), had to tolerate this kind of publication. The Regional Court held that she had failed to establish a legitimate interest (berechtigtes Interesse) justifying an injunction against further publication because, where figures of contemporary society “par excellence” were concerned, the right to protection of private life stopped at their front door. All the photos of the applicant had been taken exclusively in public places. 20. The applicant appealed against that judgment. 21. In a judgment of 8 December 1994, the Hamburg Court of Appeal (Oberlandesgericht) dismissed the applicant’s appeal and set aside the injunction against subsequent publications in France. Indeed, like the Regional Court, the Court of Appeal found that the applicant was a contemporary figure “par excellence” and therefore had to tolerate publication without her consent of the photos in question, which had all been taken in public places. Even if the constant hounding by photographers made her daily life difficult, it arose from a legitimate desire to inform the general public. 22. The applicant appealed on points of law against that judgment. 23. In a judgment of 19 December 1995, the Federal Court of Justice (Bundesgerichtshof) allowed the applicant’s appeal in part, granting her an injunction against any further publication of the photos that had appeared in Freizeit Revue magazine (issue no. 30 of 22 July 1993) showing her with Vincent Lindon in a restaurant courtyard on the ground that the photos interfered with her right to respect for her private life. The Federal Court held that even figures of contemporary society “par excellence” were entitled to respect for their private life and that this was not limited to their home but also covered the publication of photos. Outside their home, however, they could not rely on the protection of their privacy unless they had retired to a secluded place – away from the public eye (in eine örtliche Abgeschiedenheit) – where it was objectively clear to everyone that they wanted to be alone and where, confident of being away from prying eyes, they behaved in a given situation in a manner in which they would not behave in a public place. Unlawful interference with the protection of that privacy could therefore be made out if photos were published that had been taken secretly and/or by catching unawares a person who had retired to such a place. That was the position here, where the applicant and her male companion had withdrawn to the far end of a restaurant courtyard with the clear aim of being out of the public eye. However, the Federal Court dismissed the remainder of her appeal on the ground that, as a figure of contemporary society “par excellence”, the applicant had to tolerate the publication of photos in which she appeared in a public place even if they were photos of scenes from her daily life and not photos showing her exercising her official functions. The public had a legitimate interest in knowing where the applicant was staying and how she behaved in public. 24. The applicant then appealed to the Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht), submitting that there had been an infringement of her right to the protection of her personality rights (Article 2 § 1 read in conjunction with Article 1 § 1 of the Basic Law). In the applicant’s submission, the criteria established by the Federal Court of Justice regarding the protection of privacy in respect of photos taken in public places did not effectively protect the free development of the personality, be it in the context of private life or family life. Those criteria were so narrow that in practice the applicant could be photographed at any time outside her home and the photos subsequently published in the media. Given that the photos were not used genuinely to inform people, but merely to entertain them, the right to control the use of one’s image in respect of scenes from private life, which had been recognised by the case-law of the Federal Constitutional Court, prevailed over the right – also guaranteed by the Basic Law – to freedom of the press. 25. In a landmark judgment of 15 December 1999, delivered after a hearing, the Constitutional Court allowed the applicant’s appeal in part on the ground that the publication of the three photos in issues nos. 32 and 34 of Bunte magazine, dated 5 August 1993 and 19 August 1993, featuring the applicant with her children had infringed her right to the protection of her personality rights guaranteed by Articles 2 § 1 and 1 § 1 of the Basic Law, reinforced by her right to family protection under Article 6 of the Basic Law. It referred the case to the Federal Court of Justice on that point. However, the Constitutional Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal regarding the other photos. The relevant extract of the judgment reads as follows: “The appeal is well-founded in part. ... II. The decisions being appealed do not fully satisfy the requirements of Article 2 § 1 read in conjunction with Article 1 § 1 of the Basic Law. 1. The provisions of sections 22 and 23 of the KUG [Kunsturhebergesetz – Copyright Act] on which the civil courts based their decisions in the present case are, however, compatible with the Basic Law. Under Article 2 § 1 of the Basic Law, general personality rights are guaranteed only within the framework of the constitutional order. The provisions concerning the publication of photographical representations of persons listed in sections 22 and 23 of the KUG are part of that constitutional order. They derive from an incident which at the time caused a scandal (photos of Bismarck on his deathbed ...) and from the ensuing politico-legal debate sparked off by this incident ..., and aim to strike a fair balance between respect for personality rights and the community’s interest in being informed ... Under section 22, first sentence, of the KUG, pictures can only be disseminated or exposed to the public eye with the express approval of the person represented. Pictures relating to contemporary society are excluded from that rule under section 23(1) of the KUG ... Under section 23(2) of the KUG, however, that exception does not apply where the dissemination interferes with a legitimate interest of the person represented. The protection by degrees under these rules ensures that they take account of the need to protect the person being represented as well as the community’s desire to be informed and the interest of the media which satisfy that desire. That much has already been established by the Federal Constitutional Court ... ... (b) In the instant case regard must be had, in interpreting and applying sections 22 and 23 of the KUG, not only to general personality rights, but also to the freedom of the press guaranteed by Article 5 § 1, second sentence, of the Basic Law in so far as the provisions in question also affect those freedoms. ... The fact that the press fulfils the function of forming public opinion does not exclude entertainment from the functional guarantee under the Basic Law. The formation of opinions and entertainment are not opposites. Entertainment also plays a role in the formation of opinions. It can sometimes even stimulate or influence the formation of opinions more than purely factual information. Moreover, there is a growing tendency in the media to do away with the distinction between information and entertainment both as regards press coverage generally and individual contributions, and to disseminate information in the form of entertainment or mix it with entertainment (‘infotainment’). Consequently, many readers obtain information they consider to be important or interesting from entertaining coverage ... Nor can mere entertainment be denied any role in the formation of opinions. That would amount to unilaterally presuming that entertainment merely satisfies a desire for amusement, relaxation, escapism or diversion. Entertainment can also convey images of reality and propose subjects for debate that spark off a process of discussion and assimilation relating to philosophies of life, values and behaviour models. In that respect, it fulfils important social functions ... When measured against the aim of protecting press freedom, entertainment in the press is neither negligible nor entirely worthless and therefore falls within the scope of application of fundamental rights ... The same is true of information about people. Personalisation is an important journalistic means of attracting attention. Very often it is this which first arouses interest in a problem and stimulates a desire for factual information. Similarly, interest in a particular event or situation is usually stimulated by personalised accounts. Additionally, celebrities embody certain moral values and lifestyles. Many people base their choice of lifestyle on their example. They become points of crystallisation for adoption or rejection and act as examples or counter-examples. This is what explains the public interest in the various ups and downs occurring in their lives. As regards politicians, this public interest has always been deemed to be legitimate from the point of view of transparency and democratic control. Nor can it in principle be disputed that it exists in respect of other public figures. To that extent it is the function of the press to show people in situations that are not limited to specific functions or events and this also falls within the sphere of protection of press freedom. It is only when a balancing exercise has to be done between competing personality rights that an issue arises as to whether matters of essential interest for the public are involved and treated seriously and objectively or whether private matters, designed merely to satisfy the public’s curiosity, are being disseminated ... (c) The decision of the Federal Court of Justice largely stands up to an examination of its compatibility with the constitutional rules. (aa) The Federal Court of Justice cannot be criticised under constitutional law for assessing the conditions of application [Tatbestandsvoraussetzungen] of section 23(1) no. 1 of the KUG according to the criterion of the community’s interest in being informed and deciding on that basis that the photos showing the appellant outside her representative function in the Principality of Monaco were lawful. Under section 23(1) no. 1 of the KUG, the publication of pictures portraying an aspect of contemporary society are exempted from the obligation to obtain the consent of the person concerned within the meaning of section 22 of the KUG. Judging from the drafting history of the Act ... and from the meaning and purpose of the words used, the provision in question takes into consideration the community’s interest in being informed and the freedom of the press. Accordingly, the interpretation of this element [Tatbestandsmerkmal] must take account of the interests of the public. Pictures of people who are of no significance in contemporary society should not be made freely accessible to the public: they require the prior consent of the person concerned. The other element that is affected by fundamental rights, that of a ‘legitimate interest’ for the purposes of section 23(2) of the KUG, concerns only – and this must be stressed at the outset – figures of contemporary society and cannot therefore take sufficient account of the interests of the freedom of the press if these have previously been neglected when the circle of the persons concerned was defined. It is in keeping with the importance and scope of the freedom of the press, and not unreasonably restrictive of the protection of personality rights, that the concept of contemporary society referred to in section 23(1) no. 1 of the KUG should not only cover, in accordance with a definition given by the courts, events of historical or political significance, but be defined on the basis of the public interest in being informed ... The kernel of press freedom and the free formation of opinions requires the press to have, within legal limits, sufficient margin of manoeuvre to allow it to decide, in accordance with its publishing criteria, what the public interest demands, and the process of forming opinion to establish what amounts to a matter of public interest. As has been stated, entertaining coverage is no exception to these principles. Nor should the Federal Court of Justice be criticised for including in the ‘domain of contemporary society’, within the meaning of section 23(1) no. 1 of the KUG, pictures of people who have not only aroused public interest at a certain point on the occasion of a particular historical event but who, on account of their status and importance, attract the public’s attention in general and not just on the odd occasion. Account should also be taken in this regard of the fact that, compared to the situation at the time the Copyright Act was passed, increased importance is given today to illustrated information. The concept of a ‘figure of contemporary society “par excellence” ’ [‘absolute’ Person der Zeitgeschichte], often employed in this respect in the case-law and legal theory, does not conclusively derive from statute or the Constitution. If, as was done by the Court of Appeal and the Federal Court of Justice, it is interpreted as a shortened expression designating people whose image is deemed by the public to be worthy of respect out of consideration for the people concerned, it is irreproachable from the point of view of constitutional law at least as long as a balancing exercise is carried out between the public’s interest in being informed and the legitimate interests of the person concerned. General personality rights do not require publications that are not subject to prior consent to be limited to pictures of figures of contemporary society in the exercise of their function in society. Very often the public interest aroused by such figures does not relate exclusively to the exercise of their function in the strict sense. It can, on the contrary, by virtue of the particular function and its impact, extend to information about the way in which these figures behave generally – that is, also outside their function – in public. The public has a legitimate interest in being allowed to judge whether the personal behaviour of the individuals in question, who are often regarded as idols or role models, convincingly tallies with their behaviour on their official engagements. If, on the other hand, the right to publish pictures of people considered to be figures of contemporary society were to be limited to their official functions, insufficient account would be taken of the public interest properly aroused by such figures and this would, moreover, favour a selective presentation that would deprive the public of certain necessary judgmental possibilities in respect of figures of socio-political life, having regard to the function of role model of such figures and the influence they exert. The press is not, however, allowed to use every picture of figures of contemporary society. On the contrary, section 23(2) of the KUG gives the courts adequate opportunity to apply the protective provisions of Article 2 § 1 read in conjunction with Article 1 § 1 of the Basic Law ... (bb) In theory the criteria established by the Federal Court of Justice for interpreting the concept of ‘legitimate interest’ used in section 23(2) of the KUG are irreproachable from the point of view of constitutional law. According to the decision being appealed, the privacy meriting protection that must also be afforded to ‘figures of contemporary society “par excellence” ’ presupposes that they have retired to a secluded place with the objectively recognisable aim of being alone and where, confident of being alone, they behave in a manner in which they would not behave in public. The Federal Court of Justice accepted that there had been a breach of sections 22 and 23 of the KUG where this type of picture was taken secretly or by catching the person unawares. The criterion of a secluded place takes account of the aim, pursued by the general right to protection of personality rights, of allowing the individual a sphere, including outside the home, in which he does not feel himself to be the subject of permanent public attention – and relieves him of the obligation of behaving accordingly – and in which he can relax and enjoy some peace and quiet. This criterion does not excessively restrict press freedom because it does not impose a blanket ban on pictures of the daily or private life of figures of contemporary society, but allows them to be shown where they have appeared in public. In the event of an overriding public interest in being informed, the freedom of the press can even, in accordance with that case-law authority, be given priority over the protection of the private sphere ... The Federal Court of Justice properly held that it is legitimate to draw conclusions from the behaviour adopted in a given situation by an individual who is clearly in a secluded spot. However, the protection against dissemination of photos taken in that context does not only apply where the individual behaves in a manner in which he would not behave in public. On the contrary, the development of the personality cannot be properly protected unless, irrespective of his behaviour, the individual has a space in which he can relax without having to tolerate the presence of photographers or cameramen. That is not in issue here, however, since, according to the findings on which the Federal Court of Justice based its decision, the first of the conditions to which protection of private life is subject has not been met. Lastly, there is nothing unconstitutional, when balancing the public interest in being informed against the protection of private life, in attaching importance to the method used to obtain the information in question ... It is doubtful, however, that the mere fact of photographing the person secretly or catching them unawares can be deemed to infringe their privacy outside the home. Having regard to the function attributed to that privacy under constitutional law and to the fact that it is usually impossible to determine from a photo whether the person has been photographed secretly or caught unawares, the existence of unlawful interference with that privacy cannot in any case be made out merely because the photo was taken in those conditions. As, however, the Federal Court of Justice has already established in respect of the photographs in question that the appellant was not in a secluded place, the doubts expressed above have no bearing on the review of its decision. (cc) However, the constitutional requirements have not been satisfied in so far as the decisions of which the appellant complains did not take account of the fact that the right to protection of personality rights of persons in the appellant’s situation is strengthened by Article 6 of the Basic Law regarding those persons’ intimate relations with their children. (dd) The following conclusions can be drawn from the foregoing considerations with regard to the photographs in question: The decision of the Federal Court of Justice cannot be criticised under constitutional law regarding the photos of the appellant at a market, doing her shopping at a market accompanied by her bodyguard or dining with a male companion at a well-attended restaurant. The first two cases concerned an open location frequented by the general public. The third case admittedly concerned a well-circumscribed location, spatially speaking, but one in which the appellant was exposed to the other people present. It is for this reason, moreover, that the Federal Court of Justice deemed it legitimate to ban photos showing the appellant in a restaurant garden, which were the subject of the decision being appealed but are not the subject of the constitutional appeal. The presence of the appellant and her companion there presented all the features of seclusion. The fact that the photographs in question were evidently taken from a distance shows that the appellant could legitimately have assumed that she was not exposed to public view. Nor can the decision being appealed be criticised regarding the photos of the appellant alone on horseback or riding a bicycle. In the Federal Court of Justice’s view, the appellant had not been in a secluded place, but in a public one. That finding cannot attract criticism under constitutional law. The appellant herself describes the photos in question as belonging to the intimacy of her private sphere merely because they manifest her desire to be alone. In accordance with the criteria set out above, the mere desire of the person concerned is not relevant in any way. The three photos of the appellant with her children require a fresh examination, however, in the light of the constitutional rules set out above. We cannot rule out the possibility that the review that needs to be carried out in the light of the relevant criteria will lead to a different result for one or other or all the photos. The decision must therefore be set aside in that respect and remitted to the Federal Court of Justice for a fresh decision. (d) The decisions of the Regional Court and the Court of Appeal resulted in a violation of fundamental rights by limiting to the home the privacy protected by Article 2 § 1 read in conjunction with Article 1 § 1 of the Basic Law in accordance, moreover, with a rationale that was in keeping with the case-law at the time. The decisions in question do not need to be set aside, however, since the violation complained of has been remedied in part by the Federal Court of Justice and the remainder of the case remitted to that court. ...” 26. Following the remittal of the case to the Federal Court of Justice in connection with the three photos that had appeared in Bunte magazine (issue no. 32 of 5 August 1993 and no. 34 of 19 August 1993) showing the applicant with her children, the Burda publishing company undertook not to republish the photos (Unterlassungserklärung). 27. On 14 May 1997 the applicant reapplied to the Hamburg Regional Court, seeking an injunction preventing the Burda publishing company from republishing the second series of photos on the ground that they infringed her right to protection of her personality rights, guaranteed by Articles 2 § 1 and 1 § 1 of the Basic Law, and her right to protection of her private life and to the control of the use of her image, guaranteed by sections 22 et seq. of the Copyright Act. 28. In a judgment of 26 September 1997, the Hamburg Regional Court rejected the application, referring in particular to the grounds of the Federal Court of Justice’s judgment of 19 December 1995. 29. The applicant appealed against that judgment. 30. In a judgment of 10 March 1998, the Hamburg Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant’s appeal for the same reasons. 31. As the Court of Appeal did not grant leave to appeal on points of law to the Federal Court of Justice, the applicant lodged a constitutional appeal directly with the Federal Constitutional Court, relying on her earlier submissions. 32. In a decision of 4 April 2000, the Federal Constitutional Court, ruling as a panel of three judges, refused to entertain the appeal. It referred in particular to the Federal Court of Justice’s judgment of 19 December 1995 and to its own landmark judgment of 15 December 1999. 33. On 5 November 1997 the applicant reapplied to the Hamburg Regional Court, seeking an injunction preventing the Heinrich Bauer publishing company from republishing the third series of photos on the ground that they infringed her right to protection of her personality rights, guaranteed by Articles 2 § 1 and 1 § 1 of the Basic Law, and the right to protection of her private life and to the control of the use of her image, guaranteed by sections 22 et seq. of the Copyright (Arts Domain) Act. The applicant submitted, among other things, a sworn attestation by the director of the Monte Carlo Beach Club to the effect that the swimming baths in question were a private establishment, access to which was subject to a high fee and strictly controlled and from which journalists and photographers were debarred unless they had the express permission of the owner of the establishment. The fact that the photos were very blurred showed that they had been taken secretly, at a distance of several hundred metres, from the window or roof of a neighbouring house. 34. In a judgment of 24 April 1998, the Hamburg Regional Court rejected the application, referring in particular to the grounds of the Federal Court of Justice’s judgment of 19 December 1995. The court stated that the Monte Carlo Beach Club had to be considered as an open-air swimming pool that was open to the public, even if an entry fee was charged and access restricted. 35. The applicant appealed against that judgment. 36. In a judgment of 13 October 1998, the Hamburg Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant’s appeal for the same reasons. The Court of Appeal found that a swimming pool or beach was not a secluded place and that the photos showing the applicant tripping over an obstacle and falling down were not such as to denigrate or demean her in the public’s eyes. 37. As the Court of Appeal did not grant the applicant leave to appeal on points of law to the Federal Court of Justice, the applicant lodged a constitutional appeal directly with the Federal Constitutional Court, relying on her earlier submissions. 38. In a decision of 13 April 2000, the Federal Constitutional Court, ruling as a panel of three judges, refused to entertain the appeal. It referred in particular to the Federal Court of Justice’s judgment of 19 December 1995 and to its own landmark judgment of 15 December 1999. The Constitutional Court held that the ordinary courts had properly found that the Monte Carlo Beach Club was not a secluded place and that the photos of the applicant wearing a swimsuit and falling down were not capable of constituting an infringement of her right to respect for her private life. II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC AND EUROPEAN LAW 39. The relevant provisions of the Basic Law are worded as follows: “The dignity of human beings is inviolable. All public authorities have a duty to respect and protect it.” “Everyone shall have the right to the free development of their personality provided that they do not interfere with the rights of others or violate the constitutional order or moral law [Sittengesetz].” “1. Everyone shall have the right freely to express and disseminate his or her opinions in speech, writing and pictures and freely to obtain information from generally accessible sources. Freedom of the press and freedom of reporting on the radio and in films shall be guaranteed. There shall be no censorship. 2. These rights shall be subject to the limitations laid down by the provisions of the general laws and by statutory provisions aimed at protecting young people and to the obligation to respect personal honour [Recht der persönlichen Ehre].” “1. Marriage and the family enjoy the special protection of the State. 2. The care and upbringing of children is the natural right of parents and a duty primarily incumbent on them. The State community shall oversee the performance of that duty.” 40. Section 22(1) of the Copyright (Arts Domain) Act provides that images can only be disseminated with the express approval of the person concerned. 41. Section 23(1) no. 1 of that Act provides for exceptions to that rule, particularly where the images portray an aspect of contemporary society (Bildnisse aus dem Bereich der Zeitgeschichte) on condition that publication does not interfere with a legitimate interest (berechtigtes Interesse) of the person concerned (section 23(2)). 42. The full text of this resolution, adopted by the Parliamentary Assembly on 26 June 1998, is worded as follows: “1. The Assembly recalls the current affairs debate it held on the right to privacy during its September 1997 session, a few weeks after the accident which cost the Princess of Wales her life. 2. On that occasion, some people called for the protection of privacy, and in particular that of public figures, to be reinforced at the European level by means of a convention, while others believed that privacy was sufficiently protected by national legislation and the European Convention on Human Rights, and that freedom of expression should not be jeopardised. 3. In order to explore the matter further, the Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights organised a hearing in Paris on 16 December 1997 with the participation of public figures or their representatives and the media. 4. The right to privacy, guaranteed by Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights, has already been defined by the Assembly in the declaration on mass communication media and human rights, contained within Resolution 428 (1970), as ‘the right to live one’s own life with a minimum of interference’. 5. In view of the new communication technologies which make it possible to store and use personal data, the right to control one’s own data should be added to this definition. 6. The Assembly is aware that personal privacy is often invaded, even in countries with specific legislation to protect it, as people’s private lives have become a highly lucrative commodity for certain sectors of the media. The victims are essentially public figures, since details of their private lives serve as a stimulus to sales. At the same time, public figures must recognise that the special position they occupy in society - in many cases by choice - automatically entails increased pressure on their privacy. 7. Public figures are persons holding public office and/or using public resources and, more broadly speaking, all those who play a role in public life, whether in politics, the economy, the arts, the social sphere, sport or in any other domain. 8. It is often in the name of a one-sided interpretation of the right to freedom of expression, which is guaranteed in Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights, that the media invade people’s privacy, claiming that their readers are entitled to know everything about public figures. 9. Certain facts relating to the private lives of public figures, particularly politicians, may indeed be of interest to citizens, and it may therefore be legitimate for readers, who are also voters, to be informed of those facts. 10. It is therefore necessary to find a way of balancing the exercise of two fundamental rights, both of which are guaranteed by the European Convention on Human Rights: the right to respect for one’s private life and the right to freedom of expression. 11. The Assembly reaffirms the importance of every person’s right to privacy, and of the right to freedom of expression, as fundamental to a democratic society. These rights are neither absolute nor in any hierarchical order, since they are of equal value. 12. However, the Assembly points out that the right to privacy afforded by Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights should not only protect an individual against interference by public authorities, but also against interference by private persons or institutions, including the mass media. 13. The Assembly believes that, since all member states have now ratified the European Convention on Human Rights, and since many systems of national legislation comprise provisions guaranteeing this protection, there is no need to propose that a new convention guaranteeing the right to privacy should be adopted. 14. The Assembly calls upon the governments of the member states to pass legislation, if no such legislation yet exists, guaranteeing the right to privacy containing the following guidelines, or if such legislation already exists, to supplement it with these guidelines: (i) the possibility of taking an action under civil law should be guaranteed, to enable a victim to claim possible damages for invasion of privacy; (ii) editors and journalists should be rendered liable for invasions of privacy by their publications, as they are for libel; (iii) when editors have published information that proves to be false, they should be required to publish equally prominent corrections at the request of those concerned; (iv) economic penalties should be envisaged for publishing groups which systematically invade people’s privacy; (v) following or chasing persons to photograph, film or record them, in such a manner that they are prevented from enjoying the normal peace and quiet they expect in their private lives or even such that they are caused actual physical harm, should be prohibited; (vi) a civil action (private lawsuit) by the victim should be allowed against a photographer or a person directly involved, where paparazzi have trespassed or used ‘visual or auditory enhancement devices’ to capture recordings that they otherwise could not have captured without trespassing; (vii) provision should be made for anyone who knows that information or images relating to his or her private life are about to be disseminated to initiate emergency judicial proceedings, such as summary applications for an interim order or an injunction postponing the dissemination of the information, subject to an assessment by the court as to the merits of the claim of an invasion of privacy; (viii) the media should be encouraged to create their own guidelines for publication and to set up an institute with which an individual can lodge complaints of invasion of privacy and demand that a rectification be published. 15. It invites those governments which have not yet done so to ratify without delay the Council of Europe Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data. 16. The Assembly also calls upon the governments of the member states to: (i) encourage the professional bodies that represent journalists to draw up certain criteria for entry to the profession, as well as standards for self-regulation and a code of journalistic conduct; (ii) promote the inclusion in journalism training programmes of a course in law, highlighting the importance of the right to privacy vis-à-vis society as a whole; (iii) foster the development of media education on a wider scale, as part of education about human rights and responsibilities, in order to raise media users’ awareness of what the right to privacy necessarily entails; (iv) facilitate access to the courts and simplify the legal procedures relating to press offences, in order to ensure that victims’ rights are better protected.”