CASE OF PANOVITS v. CYPRUS
Reminder inadmissible;Violation of Art. 6-1 and 6-3-c;Violations of Art. 6-1;No violation of Art. 6-1
Christos Rozakis;Dean Spielmann;George Erotocritou;Giorgio Malinverni;Khanlar Hajiyev;Sverre Erik Jebens
6. The applicant was born on 14 August 1982 and is currently serving concurrent sentences of imprisonment at the Nicosia Central Prison. 7. In the context of a police investigation concerning a murder and robbery which took place on 19 April 2000, the police contacted the applicant’s father and invited him and the applicant to visit the Limassol police station. At the time the applicant was just over 17 years old. The applicant went to the police station accompanied by his father. The Limassol District Police Director (hereinafter “the Police Director”) informed the applicant’s father, in the presence of the applicant, about the crime that had been committed, the seriousness of the case, and the fact that there was evidence involving the applicant and that an arrest warrant had been issued against him. 8. According to the applicant, he immediately stated that he was innocent. Another police officer told him that his friend had already confessed to murdering the victim together with the applicant. The police officer added that the applicant’s friend was crying and hitting his head against a wall while he (the applicant) was merely lying to them. Then, another police officer came into the Police Director’s room holding an arrest warrant and informed the applicant that he was under arrest for murder. The applicant replied that he had nothing to add to his statement that he was innocent. The police officer then told the applicant to follow him into a different office. There there were 5 or 6 officers who started asking him questions and inducing him to confess, promising that if he did so they would assist him. They questioned him for approximately 30-40 minutes but he kept saying that he could not remember anything as he had been very drunk the night before. At some stage during the interrogation a police officer put his gun on the desk and told the applicant that he should hurry up as they had other things to do. The police officers told him that if he wanted to go he should confess. Subsequently a police officer suggested that they take a written statement from the applicant and that the police officers would remind him of anything he could not remember. The applicant then agreed to make a written statement. He denied having made any prior oral admission. 9. According to the Government, relying on the testimonies of the police officers participating in the interrogation, the applicant was shown the arrest warrant and informed of the reasons for his arrest, and had his attention drawn to the law. The applicant replied that he had nothing to say other than that he was innocent. He was then taken to a different room for questioning. Before the applicant was questioned the arresting officer explained again the reasons for his arrest, repeated that there was evidence involving the applicant in the circumstances under investigation and cautioned him that anything he said could be used against him in subsequent proceedings. There were four police officers present in the room. The applicant replied that he had not intended to kill anyone and started to give an explanation of the events. According to the arresting officer, the applicant was interrupted and his attention was drawn to the law. During the questioning the applicant confessed his guilt. 10. The parties agreed that when the applicant was taken away for questioning, his father remained in the Police Director’s office. He was shocked and after a couple of minutes told the Police Director that they should not use violence against his son. The Police Director replied that the police did not use such practices and added that the case was serious, that there was evidence linking the applicant with the crime and that it was important to seek the advice of a lawyer. He asked the applicant’s father whether he wanted to be present while his son was questioned. The father declined the offer. A few minutes afterwards, a police officer entered the room and informed the Police Director and the applicant’s father that the applicant had confessed. The Police Director invited the applicant’s father to join his son in the interview room so that he could hear what his son had admitted. The applicant’s father preferred to wait outside. 11. The applicant was charged with manslaughter and robbery under the Criminal Code (Cap. 154). On 9 May 2000 the applicant noted in an additional written statement: “I did not hit him (the victim) with the stone but only kicked him a couple of times.” 12. The applicant and his co-accused were brought for trial before the Limassol Assize Court. 13. During the trial the applicant maintained that his confession to the police had not been voluntary but the product of deception, psychological pressure, promises, threats and other tactics aimed at creating fear. He also argued that at the time he had made his statement to the police he had been drunk and, therefore, he had not been in a position to remember accurately the facts described in that statement. Furthermore, the applicant argued that he had not had legal advice immediately after his arrest and before being questioned and induced to sign the written statement. 14. On 11 and 12 January 2001 the court heard the evidence of the Police Director concerning the applicant’s arrest and questioning. The Director confirmed that he had invited the applicant and his father to his office, where he had told the father, without addressing the applicant, that an arrest warrant had been issued against the applicant in connection with a murder and that there was evidence linking the applicant to the crime. The applicant had then been cautioned, arrested and taken into a separate room for questioning. Shortly after the applicant left the room the Director had explained to the applicant’s father the seriousness of the case and suggested that they find a lawyer. 15. On 7 February 2001 the Assize Court, having considered all the evidence put before it, found that the applicant’s confession had been voluntary and that he had not been subjected to any undue or improper pressure by the police to secure it. The evidence of the prosecution gave a clear picture of the events that had taken place and the court dismissed the applicant’s allegations that, at the time of his confession, he had suffered loss of memory due to drunkenness. The confession was, therefore, admissible as evidence. 16. As regards the applicant’s claims concerning the lack of legal representation before his questioning, the court noted that the defence had not relied on any provision or authority recognising a right to have legal advice as a condition for receipt of an accused’s statement. Nor had the applicant or his father requested a lawyer and been refused one by the police. Moreover, the Director of Police had advised the applicant’s father that he and his son should seek legal representation. Overall, there had been no inappropriate action on the part of the police in this respect. 17. Subsequently, on 14 February 2001, during the main trial, the following exchange took place between the applicant’s lawyer, Mr Kyprianou, and the bench (translation of verbatim record of the proceedings): “Mr Kyprianou: I will ask the prosecution to give me all the statements of suspects who made a statement about this case so that I can continue my cross-examination of this witness. The prosecution is obliged to supply me with all the statements taken from other suspects and it is not permissible in our view for the prosecution to hide behind this. Court: First we want you to lower the tone of your voice. You do not let slip an opportunity to attack the prosecution who we believe is trying to present its case in a fair way, at least as the facts so far show. If you asked at some stage for the statements to be given to you and the prosecution refused, that is another matter. Mr Kyprianou: I believed that I would get this from the case file, now I am deprived of this right. I want the complete case file. I cannot continue my cross-examination of this witness if I do not have the complete case file. Ms Kyriakidou (prosecutor): The position of the prosecution on the basis of Article 7 of the Law on Criminal Procedure (is that) to make any complaint the Defence must apply in writing to the prosecution to ask for any statement in the file and if the Prosecution refuses, then the defence is entitled to complain. Here, the defence did not apply in writing; certain particulars, photographs, plans were asked for verbally and whatever was asked for was given and the prosecution never refused to give anything to the defence. This process did not happen and it is my position that this attitude of the defence is not justified. Court: We have considered the request of the learned counsel of accused no. 2 for the Court to interrupt the proceedings so that he can get statements of persons who gave statements during the investigation of the case from his opponents. As stated earlier today, the defence had a right, on the basis of Article 7 of the Law on Criminal Procedure, Cap.155, to request to be supplied with the said copies from the day when the accused pleaded not guilty, but failed to do so. We do not consider it expedient to break after so much delay and to create a fresh delay for this purpose. In any case, the Court in the present case is occupied with whether the prosecution will succeed in proving the guilt of the accused, who we note are presumed innocent until the prosecution, with their evidence, prove their guilt beyond all reasonable doubt. Whether the examination was unsatisfactory or not is a matter which will be decided at the end of the case. The request is therefore refused. Mr Kyprianou: I would ask for a break of five minutes in view of your ruling to gather my thoughts and see how I shall proceed because I believed that there would be disclosure of all the documents, for this reason I want five minutes to think about what I shall do in view of your ruling, that is to say how I shall proceed with the cross-examination. The cross-examination will take another sitting of the court. So the five minutes I am asking for are not unjustifiable. Court: We will approve a break of ten minutes but we will remind (the defence) that it is the second time that an interruption of the proceedings has been requested for inspecting the case file. We had a break in a previous session and gave a sufficient interval for them to see the file.” 18. Following the break, the proceedings were resumed. At one point a confrontation occurred between the applicant’s lawyer, Mr Kyprianou, and the court. Mr Kyprianou was at the time cross-examining a police officer who had taken the applicant’s written statement and was asking him about the manner in which an indication by another police-officer to insert the time of taking the statement was made. The court interrupted Mr Kyprianou and noted that they found his questions unnecessary. Mr Kyprianou then sought leave to withdraw from the case which was refused. The verbatim record of the proceedings reports the following exchange (translation): “Court: We consider that your cross-examination goes beyond the detailed cross-examination that can take place at the present stage of the main trial in issues... Mr Kyprianou: I will stop my cross-examination... Court: Mr Kyprianou... Mr Kyprianou: Since the Court considers that I am not doing my job properly in defending this man, I ask for your leave to withdraw from this case. Court: Whether an advocate is to be granted leave to withdraw or not, is a matter within the discretionary power of the court and, in the light of what we have heard, no such leave is granted. We rely on the case of Kafkaros and Others v. the Republic and do not grant leave. Mr Kyprianou: Since you are preventing me from continuing my cross-examination on significant points of the case, then my role here does not serve any purpose.” Court: We consider your persistence... Mr Kyprianou: And I am sorry that when I was cross-examining, the members of the court were talking to each other, passing ‘ravasakia’ among themselves, which is not compatible with allowing me to continue the cross-examination with the required vigour, if it is under the secret scrutiny of the court. Court: We consider that what has just been said by Mr Kyprianou, and in particular the manner in which he addresses the court, constitutes a contempt of court and Mr Kyprianou has two choices: either to maintain what he said and to give reasons why no sentence should be imposed on him, or to decide whether he should retract. We give him this opportunity exceptionally. Section 44 (1) (a) of the Courts of Justice Law applies to its full extent. Mr Kyprianou: You can try me. Court: Would you like to say anything? Mr Kyprianou: I saw with my own eyes the small pieces of paper going from one judge to another when I was cross-examining, in a way not very flattering to the defence. How can I find the stamina to defend a man who is accused of murder? Court (Mr Photiou): It so happens that the piece of paper to which Mr Kyprianou refers is still in the hands of brother Judge Mr Economou and Mr Kyprianou may inspect it. Court (Ms Michaelidou): The exchange of written views between the members of the bench as to the manner in which Mr Kyprianou is conducting the case does not give him any rights, and I consider Mr Kyprianou’s behaviour utterly unacceptable. Court (Mr Photiou): We shall have a break in order to consider the matter. The defendant (in the main trial) should in the meantime remain in custody. ... Court: We considered the matter during the adjournment and continue to believe that what Mr Kyprianou said, the content, the manner and the tone of his voice, constitute a contempt of court as provided for in section 44 (1) (a) of the Courts of Justice Law 14/60 ... that is, showing disrespect to the court by way of words and conduct. We already asked Mr Kyprianou before the break if he had anything to add before we pass sentence on him. If he has something to add, let us hear him. Otherwise, the court should proceed. Mr Kyprianou: Mr President, certainly during the break, I wondered what the offence was which I had committed. The events took place in a very tense atmosphere. I am defending a very serious case; I felt that I was interrupted in my cross-examination and said what I said. I have been a lawyer for forty years, my record is unblemished and it is the first time that I face such an accusation. That is all I have to say. Court: We shall adjourn for ten minutes and shall then proceed with sentencing.” 19. After a short break the Assize Court, by a majority, sentenced Mr Kyprianou to five days’ imprisonment. The court referred to the above exchange between Mr Kyprianou and its members and held as follows: “...It is not easy, through words, to convey the atmosphere which Mr Kyprianou created since, quite apart from the unacceptable content of his statements, the tone of his voice as well as his demeanour and gestures to the court not only gave an unacceptable impression of any civilised place, and a courtroom in particular, but were apparently aimed at creating a climate of intimidation and terror within the court. We are not exaggerating at all in saying that Mr Kyprianou was shouting and gesticulating at the court. It was pointed out to him that his statements and his behaviour amounted to contempt of court and he was given the opportunity to speak. And while there was a reasonable expectation that Mr Kyprianou would calm down and that he would apologise, Mr Kyprianou, in the same tone and with the same intensity already referred to, shouted, ‘You can try me’. Later, after a long break, Mr Kyprianou was given a second chance to address the court, in the hope that he would apologise and mitigate the damage caused by his behaviour. Unfortunately, at this stage Mr Kyprianou still showed no signs of regret or, at least, of apprehension for the unacceptable situation he had created. On the contrary, he stated that during the break he wondered what his crime had been, merely attributing his behaviour to the ‘very tense atmosphere’. However, he was solely responsible for the creation of that atmosphere and, therefore, he cannot use it as an excuse. Mr Kyprianou did not hesitate to suggest that the exchange of views between the members of the bench amounted to an exchange of ‘ravasakia’, that is, ‘love letters’ (See: ‘Dictionary of Modern Greek - Spoudi ravasaki (Slavic ravas), love letter, written love note’). And he accused the Court, which was trying to regulate the course of the proceedings, as it had the right and the duty to do, of restricting him and of doing justice in secret. We cannot conceive of another occasion of such a manifest and unacceptable contempt of court by any person, let alone an advocate. The judges as persons, whom Mr Kyprianou has deeply insulted, are the least of our concern. What really concerns us is the authority and integrity of justice. If the court’s reaction is not immediate and drastic, we feel that justice will have suffered a disastrous blow. An inadequate reaction on the part of the lawful and civilised order, as expressed by the courts, would mean accepting that the authority of the courts be demeaned. It is with great sadness that we conclude that the only adequate response, in the circumstances, is the imposition of a sentence of a deterrent nature, which can only be imprisonment. We are well aware of the repercussions of this decision since the person concerned is an advocate of long standing, but it is Mr Kyprianou himself who, through his conduct, brought matters to this end. In the light of the above we impose a sentence of imprisonment of five days”. 20. Mr Kyprianou served his prison sentence immediately. He was in fact released before completing the full term in accordance with section 9 of the Prison Law (Law no. 62(I)/1996). 21. The applicant continued to be represented by Mr Kyprianou for the rest of his trial. 22. On 21 February 2001 the defence requested the judges to withdraw from the case in view of the events that had occurred so that the case could be tried by another bench. Mr Kyprianou requested that the court be addressed by another lawyer in this respect, given the fact that he had been directly concerned by the court’s decision on contempt. The defence was concerned that the court would not be impartial. This request was granted. 23. On 2 March 2001, by an interim decision, the Assize Court dismissed the request for its withdrawal. Having examined the relevant case-law on the issue it found that no ground had been established for its withdrawal. In this connection it noted that: – as opposed to plain rumours or the manner in which the matter had been presented in the media – would justifiably form the impression that there was a real likelihood of prejudice by the court against the defendant simply because of its conclusion that his lawyer’s behaviour, at some stage of the proceedings, had been in contempt of court”. 24. Given that its decision on contempt had been a decision reached within the context of its exercise of its judicial functions and, as such, there was no issue of personal feelings of the judges or any prejudice on the part of the court, there was no reason why the court should abandon the examination of the case before the completion of the trial. 25. The proceedings therefore continued before the same bench. 26. On 10 May 2001 the Assize Court found the applicant guilty of manslaughter and robbery. The court dismissed the applicant’s allegations that his confession had been fabricated by the police and taken under suspicious circumstances. It found that there had been clear, independent and persuasive evidence demonstrating the genuine nature of his confession to the police. Furthermore, it noted that apart from the free and voluntary confession, the conclusion about the applicant’s guilt was supported by other strong and independent evidence and facts. In particular, the court relied on the applicant’s further statement of 9 May 2000 (see paragraph 11 above), placing the applicant at the time and place of the crime and confirming that he used force against the victim, a statement of a friend of the applicant to whom the applicant had stated that he had been involved in a serious fight with the victim, and various testimonies confirming that the applicant had been seen in a pub drinking and talking to the victim, leaving the pub right after the victim and heading in the same direction as the victim. Moreover, further testimonies confirmed that the applicant was seen in the early hours of the following morning drinking in another pub dressed in clothes covered in mud. The medical evidence concerning the victim’s death had confirmed that the cause of death had been multiple and violent blows, a finding which was consistent with the applicant’s two statements as well as that of his co-accused. The confession of his co-accused could not be treated as evidence against the applicant. 27. On 24 May 2001 the Assize Court sentenced the applicant to two concurrent sentences of imprisonment for fourteen and six years for manslaughter and robbery respectively. 28. On 29 May 2001 the applicant lodged an appeal with the Supreme Court against his conviction and sentence. 29. In challenging his conviction he repeated his arguments concerning the involuntary nature of his confession, the circumstances in which it had been taken and the violation of his right to the assistance of a lawyer. In particular, it was emphasised that the Director of Police had not advised the applicant himself that he should consult a lawyer and had not warned the applicant that he was under no obligation to state anything about the case. Moreover, the applicant maintained that his conviction had been the direct consequence of the hostility which had been openly expressed by the Assize Court towards his lawyer, who had also been tried, convicted by the same court for contempt and imprisoned. As a result, the applicant’s confidence in the impartiality of the court and his lawyer had been shaken. 30. The prosecution also lodged an appeal challenging the sentence imposed as “manifestly insufficient” in the circumstances. 31. On 3 July 2003 the Supreme Court dismissed both appeals. 32. As to what had occurred at the pre-trial stages of the proceedings the Supreme Court noted that the applicant had gone to the police station accompanied by his father and both had been informed about the crime, the suspicion that the applicant had been involved in it and that they could be assisted by a lawyer if they so wished. The applicant had stated that he was innocent; he had then been arrested and taken for questioning in a different room. When his son had been taken for questioning the applicant’s father had been warned about the seriousness of the case, that they could consult a lawyer and that he could be present during the questioning. However, he had preferred to wait outside. A few minutes later the applicant’s father and the Police Director had been informed that the applicant had confessed his guilt. The court observed that the fact that the applicant had confessed did not necessarily lead to the conclusion that something improper had occurred. 33. As to the applicant’s confession, the court noted that it had constituted the subject of a separate hearing within the trial and that the Assize Court had concluded that it had been the product of the free will of the applicant and found it admissible as evidence. The court observed that the Assize Court, following settled principles of Cypriot jurisprudence, had re-examined the content of the statement in the light of the entirety of the evidence in the main trial. Its judgment was elaborate and the evidential material was discussed with meticulousness together with the arguments of the parties. A simple reading of the minutes confirmed the correctness of the Assize Court’s judgment. As for the applicant’s credibility, the Supreme Court noted that: “as a general comment, ... the appellant appeared, as it is shown by the evidence, to have had a selective memory. He remembered all the details which did not incriminate him while he had complete lack of memory in respect of all the elements which linked him to the crime. This attitude is evident from his evidence both in the main trial and in the trial within a trial concerning the voluntariness of the contested statement. And in both proceedings he tried to negate the statements he had made in his earlier written confession.” 34. Moreover, there was sufficient, powerful and independent evidence putting the applicant at the time and place of the crime. Such evidence taken together with the applicant’s admission contained in a second statement, the admissibility of which was not contested as having been submitted on an involuntary basis, rendered the applicant’s guilt proven beyond any reasonable doubt. 35. The Supreme Court also dismissed the applicant’s argument concerning the Assize Court’s alleged lack of impartiality in view of his lawyer’s conviction for contempt of court. In particular it stated the following: “Following his conviction by the Assize Court (for contempt of court) Mr Kyprianou requested to withdraw from the proceedings and to stop acting as counsel for the appellant....The appellant’s argument that, in view of what had happened before the Assize Court, this ceased to be an impartial court and the trial was rendered unfair, is incorrect. A simple reading of the voluminous transcript of the proceedings demonstrates the smooth conduct of the trial, in which all the evidence was presented before the court, which had to evaluate it and decide the extent to which the prosecution had managed to prove the charges against the appellant beyond all reasonable doubt. We have indicated above that the evidence against the appellant was conclusive. His advocate had put to the Assize Court everything that could be submitted in his defence in a trial; a task which was, admittedly, rather difficult. The Assize Court’s decision not to allow the advocate to withdraw in the middle of the trial or to withdraw itself from the case, which would have led to a retrial, did not render the trial unfair, while the court itself had, in our opinion, preserved its impartiality throughout the proceedings.” 36. Finally, as regards the sentence imposed by the Assize Court, the Supreme Court found that there had been evident leniency in sentencing, making the length of the prison sentence imposed almost manifestly insufficient. Nevertheless, it decided not to interfere with the Assize Court’s decision in this respect. 37. Concerning the Mr Kyprianou’s request to stop acting as counsel for the applicant (see paragraphs 18 and 35 above), the Government clarified that it was made before the contempt proceedings. This was supported by the applicant and the relevant transcript of the proceedings. 38. Article 11 (4) of the Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus provides as follows: “Every person arrested shall be informed at the time of his arrest in a language which he understands of the reasons for his arrest and shall be allowed to have the services of a lawyer of his own choosing.” 39. Article 12 (4) and (5) of the Constitution provides, in so far as relevant, as follows: (4) “Every person charged with an offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. (5) Every person charged with an offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly and in a language which he understands and in detail of the nature and grounds of the charge preferred against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; ...” 40. Article 30 (2) and (3) provides, in so far as relevant, as follows: (2) “In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, every person is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent, impartial and competent court established by law. ... (3) Every person has the right: (a) to be informed of the reasons why he is required to appear before the court; (b) to present his case before the court and to have sufficient time necessary for its preparation....”. 41. The ICCPR provides in Article 14(4), which broadly corresponds to Article 6 of the European Convention, that: “In the case of juvenile persons, the procedure shall be such as will take account of their age, and the desirability of promoting their rehabilitation.” 42. Section 8 of the Criminal Procedure Law, Cap. 155 provides as follows: “Without prejudice to the generality of section 3 of this Law and without prejudice to the operation of section 5 of this Law the rules for the time being approved by Her Majesty’s Judges of the Queen’s Bench Division in England relating to the taking of statements by police officers (known as ‘The Judges’ Rules’) shall apply to the taking of statements in the Colony as they apply to the taking of statements in England”. 43. Section 13 of the Criminal Procedure Law, Cap. 155 provides, in so far as relevant, as follows: “...Any [arrested] person while in custody shall be given reasonable facilities for obtaining legal advice, for taking steps to obtain bail and otherwise for making arrangements for his defence or release.” 44. Rule II of the Judges’ Rules provides as follows: “As soon as a police officer has evidence which would afford reasonable grounds for suspecting that a person has committed an offence, he shall caution that person or cause him to be cautioned before putting to him any questions, or further questions, relating to that offence. The caution shall be in the following terms: ‘You are not obliged to say anything unless you wish to do so but what you say may be put into writing and given in evidence.’ ” 45. The CPT standards on police detention were set out in its 2nd General Report [CPT/Inf (92) 3] as follows: 36. The CPT attaches particular importance to three rights for persons detained by the police: the right of the person concerned to have the fact of his detention notified to a third party of his choice (family member, friend, consulate), the right of access to a lawyer, and the right to request a medical examination by a doctor of his choice (in addition to any medical examination carried out by a doctor called by the police authorities). They are, in the CPT’s opinion, three fundamental safeguards against the ill-treatment of detained persons which should apply as from the very outset of deprivation of liberty, regardless of how it may be described under the legal system concerned (apprehension, arrest, etc). 37. Persons taken into police custody should be expressly informed without delay of all their rights, including those referred to in paragraph 36. Further, any possibilities offered to the authorities to delay the exercise of one or other of the latter rights in order to protect the interests of justice should be clearly defined and their application strictly limited in time. As regards more particularly the rights of access to a lawyer and to request a medical examination by a doctor other than one called by the police, systems whereby, exceptionally, lawyers and doctors can be chosen from pre-established lists drawn up in agreement with the relevant professional organisations should remove any need to delay the exercise of these rights. 38. Access to a lawyer for persons in police custody should include the right to contact and to be visited by the lawyer (in both cases under conditions guaranteeing the confidentiality of their discussions) as well as, in principle, the right for the person concerned to have the lawyer present during interrogation. 46. The CPT standards on juveniles deprived of their liberty were set out in the CPT’s 9th General Report [CPT/Inf (99) 12] as follows: “In this context, the CPT has stressed that it is during the period immediately following deprivation of liberty that the risk of torture and ill-treatment is at its greatest. It follows that it is essential that all persons deprived of their liberty (including juveniles) enjoy, as from the moment when they are first obliged to remain with the police, the right to notify a relative or another third party of the fact of their detention, the right of access to a lawyer and the right of access to a doctor.” 47. In Vouniotis v. The Republic (1975) 2 C.L.R. 34 the Supreme Court held that the court should verify the truthfulness of a confession by independent evidence. In this case the following extracts from R v Sykes 8 Cr. App. Rev. were cited with approval: “A man may be convicted on his own confession alone; there is no law against it... the first question [to be asked] when ... examining the confession of a man, is, is there anything outside it to show it was true? Is it corroborated? Are the statements made in it of fact so far as we can test them true? ... Is it [the confession] consistent with other facts which have been ascertained and which have been, as in this case, proved before us? ...” 48. In the case of Kafkaris v. The Republic (1990) 2 CLR 203, the following was stated: “A confession of a crime – so long as it is accepted as voluntary – can on its own constitute sufficient ground for an accused’s conviction. No matter how voluntary a confession is, it is prudent, in accordance with the case-law... to have, where possible, corroborating evidence in support of the accuracy of its content. That would exclude the possibility of error and discourage the interrogating authorities to seek a confession as an easy alternative to having a crime properly investigated. The content of a confession must be judged not only on the basis of the authenticity of the allegations it contains, but also in conjunction with any other testimony that tends to support or disprove the accuracy of its content.”