CASE OF MUČIBABIĆ v. SERBIA
Violation of Article 2 - Right to life (Article 2-1 - Effective investigation) (Procedural aspect);Non-pecuniary damage - award (Article 41 - Non-pecuniary damage;Just satisfaction)
Alena Poláčková;Branko Lubarda;Georgios A. Serghides;Helena Jäderblom;Johannes Silvis;Luis López Guerra;Pere Pastor Vilanova
5. The applicant was born in 1926 and lives in Novi Sad. His son, Mr Vojislav Mučibabić, was born in 1951 and died on 23 June 1995. The present case concerns the investigation into the death of the applicant’s son. 6. On 23 June 1995 a powerful explosion occurred at the facilities of Grmeč, a company with headquarters in Belgrade. 7. It transpires from the judicial decisions and the case file that the explosion was caused by the covert production of composite solid rocket fuel under the auspices of the State Intelligence Service. 8. The general information the Court has been able to procure as to the production of rocket fuel and the risk of an explosion at production sites may be summarised as follows. 9. Composite fuel, also known as composite propellant, is a broad class of solid chemical fuels that are used as propellants in rockets. The rocket-fuel sheets resemble PVC folia but are less stable and require a specialised location with a high level of preventive measures and safety precautions. They are composed of fuel and oxidiser. An example of a fuel is phenol formaldehyde and of an oxidiser, ammonium perchlorate (“AP”). AP is a powerful oxidiser, which explains why it is used mainly in solid propellant rocket boosters, including space shuttles and military missiles. 10. AP is a white, granular, crystalline solid or powder. Its explosive characteristics depend on particle size and granulometric composition. It is a class 4 oxidiser (it can cause an explosive reaction) when particles measure over 15 micrometres. It is classified as an explosive when particles measure less than 15 micrometres. It has been apparently involved in a number of accidents. AP is stable when properly stored, transported and handled at temperatures below 150 degrees Celsius (oC). The amount put in any pile must be limited and storage sites must be designed with blast walls. The risks of explosion and fire associated with AP arise mainly when there is a large proportion of AP in a premix or when it is exposed to intensive heat or an organic compound. When heated to 300oC, AP degrades organic adhesive, breaking cemented joints. Complete reactions leave no residue. 11. At a series of meetings, an Intelligence Service executive had apparently agreed to the production of rocket fuel with a private company, JPL Systems (hereinafter “JPL”). The latter’s experts were supposed to provide the formula and certain components, including oxidisers. Certain Grmeč managers had allegedly been requested to make available a mill with two counter-rotating rollers in its facilities for the production of polyvinyl chloride sheets, as well as other substances and its experts. 12. On 23 June 1995, most of the components were blended together in a batch mixer in another company, transported in aluminium bins to Grmeč in a private car by JPL experts and stored next to the mill. When the mixture was put on the mill and extraction of the sheets of rocket fuel started, an explosion occurred in the presence of more than twenty workers from the two commissioned companies. As a consequence, the applicant’s son and ten other people died, while ten others were seriously injured. 13. It appears from the Serbian Business Register and the expert reports that neither Grmeč nor JPL was licensed and adequately equipped for the production of rocket fuel at the material time. 14. At about 9 p.m. on 23 June 1995 the investigating judge on duty, M.A., arrived at Grmeč to inspect the scene of the incident. V.V., the Deputy District Public Prosecutor Office (hereinafter “the prosecutor”), Z.L., a crime inspector, and V.M., a crime-scene technician, were also present. 15. According to the investigating judge’s two-page report of his inspection of the incident scene (zapisnik o uviđaju), at about 6.30 p.m. on 23 June 1995 a massive explosion occurred during the production of a new product – polyvinyl chloride sheets. The explosion greatly damaged the production room and killed a number of people who had been involved in the production process. When the investigating judge arrived at the scene, unspecified members of the factory’s security staff and the Belgrade police prevented him and the prosecutor from entering the production room. They were requested to examine the scene two to three steps away from the entrance door for security reasons, given that the damaged roof could have collapsed. The judge noticed that it had been a powerful explosion, and that the production room had been covered in dust and pieces of the roof, which also prevented a good overview of the room. As the judge could not inspect the incident scene, in order to gather evidence he talked to the director, R.U. He had to wait thirty minutes for the director to be found and to finish his telephone call with the Belgrade mayor, N.Č. The director stated that the explosion had occurred when the factory’s experts with a team of additional experts (part of the statement is illegible) had apparently tested a new product-manufacturing process with which he was not familiar. However, he clarified that the manufacturing process required special security measures and teams, and named all of the factory’s experts involved, including the applicant’s son as a chief engineer. The technical director, S.K., stated that his team of between seventeen and twenty employees had been testing a new product and that experts from other companies and faculties “might have been involved” in the manufacturing process that afternoon. Presuming that ten people had died, he anticipated that the cause of the explosion may have been “an unwanted, unexpected and unknown chemical reaction which had ‘broken out’ during the process”. The investigating judge instructed (a) the Belgrade police’s expert team and the factory experts to continue looking for those involved who had died or survived; (b) the crime-scene technician to collect and register all traces, objects and details which might help to elucidate the account of the events and to make an appropriate file in that respect; (c) the removal of all the corpses to the Institute for Forensic Medicine for post-mortem examinations to determine the cause of death; and (d) the transfer of all the survivors to the appropriate medical centres. All those activities and the relevant documentation were to form an integral part of the incident report. 16. In his two-page report on the forensic inspection of the incident scene (izveštaj o kriminalističko-tehničkom pregledu lica mesta), the crime inspector, Z.L., noted that there had been traces of the destruction caused by a massive explosion which had occurred at about 6 p.m. on 23 June 1995 at the Vinfleks factory (production room) where bituminous materials were produced. He reported that nine corpses had been found and gave the names of several injured people who had been transported to hospital (one of them had died there) as well as a short statement by one of the workers who had been nearby. The inspector reported that the police firemen had already started extinguishing the fire, that the crime-scene technicians, M.P. and M.Š, had taken photographs, and that the criminal police (Kriminalistička služba (UZSK)) had taken on the case. The identification of the casualties and the cause of the explosion should have been determined the following day by specialised teams of criminal police. No other documents, photographs, scheme of the scene or results of any chemical or toxicological analysis, if any, have been submitted to the Court with the case file; nor apparently were they made available to the applicant. 17. On 24 June 1995 an additional forensic report was drawn up after the fingerprinting and photographing of the bodies. The bodies were transferred for post-mortem examination, together with additional body parts which had been found in the meantime, while the clothing was sent to the prosecutor’s office. 18. The post-mortem examination of victims’ bodies was carried out between 24 and 26 June 1995 by the Institute for Forensic Medicine of the Faculty of Medicine in Belgrade. The autopsy reports stated that the victims’ deaths had been violent and caused by the destruction of or damage to some vital organs and/or third and fourth-degree burns from the explosion, or complications thereafter. 19. On 24 June 1995 the Belgrade police ex officio set up a commission to examine the cause of the explosion. The commission was comprised of several officers from the Security Institute (Institut bezbednosti MUP-a Srbije), as well as two professors from the Mechanical Engineering Faculty in Belgrade, B.J. and Ð.B., who were also the co-owners of JPL (see paragraph 11 above). 20. Following site inspections between 23 and 26 June 1995 and computer simulations of the explosions, two experts from the Security Institute, B.G. and P.P., submitted their report to the DDPO on 9 August 1995. As regards the cause and origin of the accident, the experts stated (a) that the explosion appeared to have been initially caused by the heat generated by the mill’s rollers during the production of composite fuel; (b) that static electricity could not have ignited the composite fuel, premix or fuel sheet; (c) that the primary blast of the premix or the composite fuel sheet on the mill’s two counter-rotating rollers had most probably been caused by the presence of a mechanical object in the premix, which had ended up between the rollers; and (d) that the initial blast had led to two secondary explosions of the premix, which was stored in two aluminum bins next to the mill. 21. On 30 August 1995 the Labour Ministry inspectorate lodged a criminal complaint against the Director of Grmeč, R.U., for breaching health-and-safety regulations (see paragraphs 76-77 below). Previously, on 3 July 1995 the Ministry had informed the prosecutor that on 24 and 26 June 1995 they had been refused access to the factory and to documentation for inspection, and that Grmeč had not informed them to that date about the fatal incident, as required by the relevant law. 22. It would appear that the prosecutor lodged a request for a formal preliminary judicial investigation against unknown persons from Grmeč in respect of the explosion (zahtev za sprovođenje pojedinih istražnih radnji). On 13 September 1995 the applicant sought to be granted victim status. 23. On 8 March 1996 the applicant and two other victims’ relatives lodged a criminal complaint against a number of senior executives of Grmeč and JPL (R.U., D.M., S.K., D.Z., Lj.R., Z.O., B.I. and V.B.), on the grounds that there was a reasonable suspicion that they had committed grave breaches of public safety regulations (see paragraph 76 below, Article 194 § 2 in conjunction with Article 187 § 4 of the Criminal Code). 24. The experts’ report of 9 August 1995 was served on the applicant on 15 April 1996. Two weeks later, the applicant submitted numerous objections and posed questions. He questioned, inter alia, the expert commission’s authorisation to investigate the case, the fact that it had focussed on the cause of the explosion without establishing whether the appropriate safety precautions had been taken, and the experts’ conclusions, which were pure presumption. 25. On 5 June 1996 the prosecutor lodged a request with the Belgrade District Court that the police experts be heard. 26. At a hearing scheduled for 4 December 1996, however, the investigating judge did not take statements from the experts. The applicant again objected to the experts’ report. The investigating judge endorsed the experts’ request to be provided with all questions in writing and to be given another month to answer. In their reply of 15 April 1997, the experts clarified that (a) on 23 June 1995 at the scene of the incident, where they had gone ex officio, the investigating judge had instructed them orally to establish the cause of the explosion; (b) they had not made any plan or programme for the expert report; (c) they had not had sufficient information (for example, on the original premix or the final product) to examine and determine the cause of the blast, but they had found traces of AP at the accident scene and had been provided with the formulae of the premix by JPL; (d) they could not say whether the fire had started on the rollers, the fuel or the rocket-fuel sheet; (e) they had not found any documentation about the planning or technology programme of the production of rocket fuel which had led to the blast; and that (f) their task had been to establish the cause of, and not the responsibility for, the explosion. 27. On 14 May 1997 the applicant amended his criminal complaint, relying on Article 194 § 2 in conjunction with Article 187 § 4 of the Criminal Code (see paragraph 76 below). 28. Following the prosecutor’s proposal of 10 June 1997, a month later the court appointed the Military Institute to determine and submit a report on whether the cause of the explosion had been of a technical nature or a human mistake. On 18 July 1997 the Institute informed the investigating judge that it did not have the capacity to do so. 29. On 28 November 1997 the Belgrade Chemistry Faculty was appointed to determine the cause of the explosion, whether it could have been avoided and the possible liability in that respect. 30. Following two unsuccessful attempts to receive additional relevant data, on 12 May 1998 the Professor of the Belgrade Chemistry Faculty, I.J., submitted his report. He claimed that it was based on reliable data collected by the Security Institute, given that, owing to the lapse of time, it was impossible to analyse any samples found on the site. He clarified further that he had not used most of the Institute’s documentation, as it concerned computer-generated and simulated experiments of assumed events which could only indirectly hint at the possible answers. The expert stated that the collected data were incomplete and did not contain quantitative figures of the samples examined to allow any deeper analysis of the collected evidence or its compliance with the account of the events that had allegedly led to the explosion. While not excluding the possibility that the cause of the explosion might have been the one suggested by the police experts, the expert observed that the possible exposure of AP to humidity could have made it sensitive to an organic compound and the explosion could have been caused by a piece of paper, wood or engine oil, especially in the presence of unwanted metal or soot particles. 31. The expert also noted the following issues as relevant: (a) although explosive, carcinogenic and other dangerous substances were used during the production process, no technical-technological documentation and certificates for them had been found; (b) the purity of the components, especially of AP, was questionable (it was described as light pink powder, whereas it was a white, crystalline substance); (c) the samples revealed, unusually, included the presence of phosphates, which were not components of composite fuel, or equipment for the maintenance of the mill or the building itself; (d) the production process and technology did not seem to have been accurately specified and followed, as certain components had been added and mixed on the mill in the course of the production process; and (e) an unacceptably high number of individuals present had indicated that they did not know what had been produced and that other safety measures had probably not been taken. 32. Following the prosecutor’s proposal of 13 June 1998, the investigating judge heard evidence from a number of witnesses to and surviving victims of the accident (eighteen out of the nineteen were from Belgrade) on ten occasions between 10 November 1998 and 15 October 1999. They were asked who had allowed V.B. to bring the premix to Grmeč, and whether they had known what it contained and what safety measures had been taken. On 27 July 1999 and 18 February 2000 respectively the investigating judge also interviewed Mr Radosav Lukić and Mr Jovica Stanišić, Deputy Head and Head of the State Intelligence Service. 33. On 1 March 2000 the investigating judge returned the case file with the collected evidence to the prosecutor. 34. On 9 June 2000 the investigating judge, on the prosecutor’s initiative, withdrew the case file and sealed the statements of the State Intelligence Service executives, classifying them as State secret. 35. On 12 June 2000 the public prosecutor decided not to prosecute, relying on secret evidence and information. He stated that a detailed analysis of the facts had been provided in an official note of 15 March 2000, which had been classified as confidential. He summarily dismissed the applicant’s criminal complaint on the grounds that there were no elements of crimes prosecuted ex officio (da se prijavljeno delo ne goni ex officio), invoking Articles 184 to 187 of the Criminal Code. By a letter of the same date, the applicant was informed about the prosecutor’s decision and notified that he could pursue a subsidiary criminal prosecution within eight days of the date the letter had been served on him by lodging a request for an investigation (zahtev za sprovođenje istrage). 36. The applicant alleged that despite his request, he had not had access to the case file until 10 June 2000. In the meantime, he commissioned an expert report by the court’s permanent specialist on explosives and blasts, M.A.L. In her report of 11 May 2000, the specialist stated that most of the police experts’ work had been incomplete or irrelevant, and gave the reasons for her assertions. She found that neither Grmeč nor JLP had been registered and properly equipped for working with explosive materials, and that their employees had lacked the necessary skills and competences. She confirmed in principle, and further elaborated on, the findings of the Chemistry Faculty’s expert and itemised the numerous failures of the two companies to comply with the relevant provisions of the Explosive Substances, Flammable Liquids and Gases Act concerning transporting and working with explosive materials (see paragraphs 84-86 below). 37. On 20 June 2000 the applicant instituted subsidiary prosecution against R.U., S.K., R.Č., V.B., J.T. and R.L. by lodging a request with the Belgrade District Court that a criminal investigation be opened into breaches of safety regulations, referring to Articles 194 § 2 and 187 §§ 1 and 3 of the Criminal Code (see paragraph 76 below). 38. On 27 September 2000 the investigating judge of the Belgrade District Court refused to open the investigation sought by the applicant (izrazio neslaganje sa zahtevom), and referred the case to a three-judge criminal panel (see paragraph 81 below). 39. On 3 October 2000 the three-judge panel of the District Court upheld the investigating judge’s decision, having established that rocket fuel had been produced on the orders of the then Serbian President, Mr Milošević, and Mr Stanišić (see paragraphs 7 and 32 above). The applicant appealed on 21 October 2000. 40. On 28 December 2000 the Supreme Court of Serbia quashed that decision. On 25 January 2001 it referred the case back to the Belgrade District Court for additional investigation, holding that the prosecuting authorities had failed to assess the evidence properly. 41. A month after the prosecutor’s request of 19 March 2001, the investigating judge commissioned the Military Technical Academy (Vojno-tehnička akademija-Katedra za raketna goriva) to draw up a fresh expert report in respect of the explosion. The Academy refused, claiming that it did not have the power to do so. 42. On 10 May 2001 the investigating judge appointed the Security Institute to draw up the report, but that institute also refused, referring to its report of 9 August 1995 (see paragraph 28 above). 43. On 12 June 2001 the investigating judge informed the applicant that there was no other available institution to carry out a fresh expert report and that, instead, he could file an indictment directly if he so wished. 44. In June and August 2001 the applicant filed an indictment and requested further investigative measures. 45. On 25 March 2002 the criminal chamber of the District Court sent the case file back to the investigating judge, referring to the Supreme Court’s decision of 28 December 2000 (see paragraph 40 above). The chamber instructed the investigating judge to open an investigation and interview the suspects. It stated that the three-judge panel of the District Court would again decide on his refusal to open an investigation once the suspects had been heard. It explained that it would be inappropriate to proceed with a subsidiary indictment without first carrying out an investigation, even with the investigating judge’s permission to file a direct indictment, if the suspects had never been questioned. 46. On the same date, the investigating judge opened an investigation. Between 16 September and 10 October 2002 he questioned all five suspects and gave individual decisions on investigation in respect of each of them. 47. On 29 October 2002 the investigating judge again appointed the Military Technical Academy to draw up a report establishing in a clear and conclusive manner the cause of the explosion and which irregularities in the production process had led to the blast. In a short report drawn up in December 2002, the Academy stated this time that their task was apparently to examine the cause of the explosion, not the possible failure of any of the suspects to protect those involved from the risk of explosion. 48. On 8 April 2003 the investigating judge closed the investigation. The applicant was informed and instructed that he could file an indictment as a subsidiary prosecutor within fifteen days if he so wished. 49. On 22 April 2003 the applicant and two others filed an indictment, laying blame on four former senior executives of Grmeč and JPL, R.U., S.K., R.Č. and V.B., as well as on Mr R.L., former Deputy Head of the Intelligence Service, for failing to take measures that had been required of them to prevent the lives of the applicant’s son and others from being avoidably put at risk or to mitigate casualties. By 3 July 2003, the District Court rejected all of the objections raised by the defence that the indictment was defective, and upheld the indictment. 50. The beginning of the trial was scheduled for 12 December 2003 and then for 22 March 2004, but was adjourned on both occasions by the court because it had been unable to secure the proper composition of its bench and/or some of the defendants had not been properly summoned. 51. The trial before the Belgrade District Court eventually started on 14 May 2004, when the court heard two defendants and adjourned the hearing because the scheduled time had lapsed. The three scheduled hearings (14 June 2004, 16-17 September 2004 and 18 January 2005) were adjourned because of the presiding judge’s other commitments and/or because one or more of the defendants had failed to appear in court. 52. At a hearing held on 15-16 March 2005, the court heard four defendants (S.K., R.U., V.B. and R.Č.) and adjourned to decide on further objections to the indictment. Between 23 March 2005 and 7 December 2005, the competent courts dismissed the indictment in respect of R.L. and R.Č., because the applicant had failed to name them as suspects in his earlier criminal complaint for the crimes at issue (see paragraph 23 above), which were, in principle, supposed to be prosecuted firstly ex officio. The hearing scheduled for 24 October 2005 was adjourned to allow the court to decide on R.Č.’s objection, and the next hearing scheduled for eleven months later, on 13 September 2006, was cancelled as the case file had been at the Supreme Court to decide on appeals on points of law lodged by other suspects (R.U, S.K. and V.B.) against the courts’ decisions on their objections. 53. On 25 September 2006 the indictment was slightly amended with regard to the facts. 54. On 20 November 2006, the trial recommenced before a new chamber, and also owing to the lapse of time since the previous hearing. The court heard the defendants and two witnesses. 55. On 6 February 2007 the applicant requested the District Court to re-examine whether the classification of the testimonies of two Intelligence Service executives as State secret had been in accordance with the law, and to add them to the case file if appropriate. No decision in respect of his request has been submitted to the Court. 56. The trial recommenced once again before a new trial chamber on 12 February 2007, when the court heard two defendants and three witnesses. On 14 and 15 May 2007, the court heard four new witnesses, as well as R.L. and R.Č. The three hearings set for 13 February, 5 September and 12 November 2007 were adjourned or cancelled owing to a strike by court clerks (zapisničara) and/or as the witnesses had not been summoned properly or had failed to appear. The court imposed fines on four witnesses for failure to appear in court. 57. The trial recommenced before yet another trial chamber on 11 February 2008, as well as again because of the lapse of time. The court heard one witness and adjourned the hearing because it had been unable to maintain the proper composition of its bench. Two further scheduled hearings (15 April and 8 September 2008) were cancelled at the request of the defendants or their lawyers for private or professional reasons and/or because of the inadequate summoning of witnesses. 58. On 17 July 2008 the applicant lodged a new bill of indictment against R.L. and R.Č. 59. The trial started anew because of the lapse of time on 24 November 2008, when the court again heard defendants and four witnesses. On 28 November 2008 the present proceedings were joined with the criminal proceedings against R.L. and R.Č. The two hearings scheduled for 2526 February and 23 April 2009 were cancelled due to the failure of the defendants’ lawyers to appear in court and/or the difficulties of successfully tracing certain experts after so many years. 60. On 24 June 2009 the trial re-started again because of the lapse of time, but could not proceed as the competent experts failed to appear in court. The judge fined one of the experts. On 16 September 2009 the court heard one police expert (B.G.). The hearing scheduled for 15 December 2009 was adjourned because of the absence of two forensic experts (P.P. and I.J.) and the defendants’ attorneys. 61. Following judicial reforms, on 1 January 2010 the case was assigned to another judge of the newly competent Belgrade High Court and the proceedings had to begin anew. The hearing fixed for 21 May 2010 was cancelled because the court had been informed that R.L. had been found dead on 19 February 2010, as well as because one of the defendants’ lawyers had not been properly summoned. 62. On 6 July 2010, the court discontinued the proceedings against R.L. In order to speed up the trial, the applicant amended the indictment, accusing the defendants of being co-accomplices in serious breaches of safety regulations (see paragraph 77 below, Article 288.2 in conjunction with Article 278.3 of the Criminal Code). The hearing was adjourned until 19 October 2010 to allow the defendants to readjust their defence to the slightly amended indictment. The latter hearing was also not held due to a judiciary strike. 63. By September 2011, the District Court had held one hearing and adjourned another four hearings. Specifically, during a very short hearing on 11 February 2011 one defendant and a number of witnesses had been re-heard, whilst the hearings of 8 December 2010 and 24 March 2011 had been adjourned because the defendants’ lawyers had not appeared. The hearing scheduled for September 2011 was cancelled by the court itself because it had, apparently, been unable to secure the proper composition of its bench. When one of the parties to the proceedings complained about the delay, the Belgrade High Court informed him that the case had been classified as “backlog” and would be dealt with shortly. 64. On 24 April 2013 the court rendered the first-instance decision. It acquitted the defendants, finding that there was insufficient evidence to declare them guilty of the offences with which they had been charged. The judgment was served on the applicant on 8 September 2013. 65. According to the information made available by the parties, the case is still pending before the Belgrade Court of Appeal. 66. On 10 September 2010 the applicant lodged an appeal with the Constitutional Court (Ustavni sud), complaining about the length of the criminal proceedings described above. He complained, in particular, of obstacles and obstructions within the criminal proceedings, of not being involved in the investigative activities and of having had no access to the case file. 67. On 14 July 2011 the Constitutional Court held that the applicant had suffered a breach of his “right to a trial within a reasonable time” in respect of the ineffective, inadequate and lengthy criminal proceedings before the first-instance court, and ordered the latter to bring the impugned proceedings to a conclusion as soon as possible. In order to establish its jurisdiction ratione materiae, the court held that the criminal proceedings concerned the right to life, which was a civil right. The Constitutional Court also declared that the applicant was entitled to non-pecuniary damages, in accordance with Article 90 of the Constitutional Court Act. The applicant does not seem to have been served with that decision until October 2011. 68. On 31 October 2011 the applicant’s lawyer lodged a request with the Commission for Compensation. In so doing, he relied on the Constitutional Court’s decision, and sought 10,000,000 dinars (RSD) in compensation on account of the pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage suffered. 69. On 27 December 2011 the Commission for Compensation offered to pay the applicant the sum of RSD 100,000 (at the time approximately 840 euros (EUR)) for the non-pecuniary damage referred to in the Constitutional Court’s decision. According to the information contained in the case file, the applicant refused to accept that amount, deeming it insufficient. 70. Instead, on 17 July 2012 the applicant lodged a claim with the Belgrade Court of First Instance (Osnovni sud), noting that he had not received an appropriate offer from the Commission for Compensation, which was why he was entitled to bring a separate civil suit in this respect (Article 90 of the Constitutional Court Act, see paragraph 63 above). The applicant sought RSD 10,000,000 (at the time approximately EUR 85,000) for the non-pecuniary damage sustained. 71. On 12 December 2013 the Belgrade Court of First Instance accepted the applicant’s claim in part and awarded him RSD 500,000 (approximately EUR 4,330). The applicant was exempted from paying court stamp duty on account of his age and indigence. 72. On 14 May 2014 the Belgrade Court of Appeal (Apelacioni sud), decreased the award to RSD 300,000 (approximately EUR 2,580). The court stated that the payment of the original award would be contrary to the purpose of compensation and that the State could not be responsible for the omissions of third parties. According to information made available by the parties, the awarded amount has not yet been paid. 73. It would appear that on an unspecified date the applicant lodged another constitutional appeal with the Constitutional Court in respect of the compensation. The Court has not been informed by the parties about the outcome of the proceedings before the Constitutional Court. 74. Despite the Court’s request to the Government to provide it with the information indicating the ownership structure of Grmeč and JPL as of June 1995, the documents provided by the Government concerned only the legal status of Grmeč as of 1997, when it was incorporated as a limited liability company (društvo sa ograničenom odgovornošću). Nevertheless, documents in the Court’s possession show that in 1995 it was a well-established “socially-owned” holding company (društveno preduzeće/poslovni sistem) licenced for the production of homogeneous flooring and other products made of PVC masses. Its Vinfleks factory was apparently registered for the production of bituminous materials. 75. JPL was registered as a privately-owned company in 1995 for other services than the production of rocket fuel. It would appear that soon after the explosion the company was re-registered as Brunner, and that some of its co-founders, including R.Č. and B.J., further re-registered the company or established new companies called Infinity and/or EdePRO. According to media reports, a new explosion occurred on the EdePRO premises in November 2008. One person died and three were injured. 76. The Criminal Code 1977 (published in the Official Gazette of the Socialist Republic of Serbia – “OG SRS” – no. 26/77, amendments published in OG SRS nos. 28/77, 43/77, 20/79, 24/84, 39/86, 51/87, 6/89, 42/89, and Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia – “OG RS” – nos. 16/90, 21/90, 26/91, 75/91, 9/92, 49/92, 51/92, 23/93, 67/93, 47/94, 17/95, 44/98, 10/02, 11/02, 80/02, 39/03 and 67/03) was in force from 1 July 1977 until 1 January 2006. The relevant provisions read as follows: “(1) Whosoever by fire, flood, explosive, poison or poisonous gas, ionising or radioactive radiation, engine power or other generally dangerous act or generally dangerous means causes danger to life or body of people or to property of larger scale, shall be punished with imprisonment of between six months and five years. (2) The penalty specified in paragraph 1 of this Article shall also be imposed on an official or responsible person who fails to install prescribed equipment for protection against fire, explosion, flood, poison, poisonous gas, ionising or radioactive radiation, or fails to maintain these in proper order, or fails to use the equipment in time of need, or generally fails to observe regulations or technical protection standards and thereby causes danger to life or body or to property of large scale. (3) If a number of people are gathered at the location of the offences specified in paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article, the offender shall be punished with imprisonment of between one and eight years. (4) If the offence specified in paragraphs 1 and 3 of this Article is committed by negligence, the offender shall be punished with imprisonment of up to three years.” “If the offence specified in Article 187 §§ 1-3, Article 188 § 1, Article 189 §§ 1-2 and Article 190 § 1 hereof resulted in the death of one or more persons, the offender shall be punished with imprisonment of not less than three years.” 77. The Criminal Code 2005 (published in OG RS no. 85/05 of 6 October 2005, amendments published in OG RS nos. 88/05 of 14 October 2005, 107/05 of 2 December 2005, 72/09 of 3 September 2009 and 111/09 of 29 December 2009) entered into force on 1 January 2006. It contains similar provisions (Articles 278 and 288 § 2 thereof), but the prescribed penalties are now imprisonment of between one and six years (instead of imprisonment of between one and eight years) for breaching general safety regulations at a location where a number of people are gathered, and imprisonment of between two and twelve years (instead of imprisonment of not less than three years) for the breach of general safety regulations which resulted in the death of one or more persons. 78. The Code of Criminal Procedure 2001 (published in the Official Gazette of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia – “OG FRY” – no. 70/01 of 28 December 2001, amendments published in OG FRY no. 68/02 of 19 December 2002 and OG RS nos. 58/04 of 28 May 2004, 85/05 of 6 October 2005, 115/05 of 27 December 2005, 49/07 of 29 May 2007, 20/09 of 19 March 2009 and 72/09 of 3 September 2009) entered into force on 28 March 2002. The relevant domestic provisions are contained in Articles 19, 20, 46, 61, 64, 235, 242, 243, 379, 406 and 425 of the Code. 79. Most criminal offences (including those mentioned above) are subject to public prosecution, but some minor offences are only subject to private prosecution. The public prosecutor’s discretion to decide whether to press charges, however, is bound by the principle of legality, which requires that he must act whenever there is a reasonable suspicion that a crime subject to public prosecution has been committed. The public prosecutor must undertake measures necessary for the preliminary investigation of crimes subject to public prosecution and the identification of the alleged perpetrators. To that end, he is vested with the power to co-ordinate the work of various law-enforcement agencies and other governmental bodies. 80. If the public prosecutor finds, based on the evidence before him, that there is a reasonable suspicion that a certain person has committed a crime subject to public prosecution, he will request the competent court to open an official investigation or file a bill of indictment. If, however, the public prosecutor decides that there is no basis for the institution of such proceedings, he must issue a reasoned decision and also inform the victim of that decision; the victim then has the right to take over the prosecution of the case on his or her own behalf, in the capacity of “subsidiary prosecutor”, within eight days of the notification of the public prosecutor’s decision. 81. A subsidiary prosecutor may submit a request for the opening of an investigation or file an indictment. If an investigating judge refuses to open the investigation sought, the case will be referred to a three-judge criminal panel to issue a decision in that respect within forty-eight hours. A further appeal is allowed. If the prosecution has already been taken over by a subsidiary prosecutor, the public prosecutor nevertheless has the power to resume the prosecution of the matter ex officio. 82. At the relevant time the acquisition, production, trade and/or storage of armaments and explosive and flammable substances should have been carried out in compliance with numerous health-and-safety requirements and in the manner set out by the relevant laws and bylaws, as appropriate. 83. The Manufacturing of Armaments and Military Equipment Act of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia prescribed the conditions for and manner of, inter alia, the production of armaments and military equipment needed to supply the Yugoslav army and for national defence in general, as well as the legal status of enterprises empowered to do so. Only enterprises which were empowered or contracted by the national defence authorities or by an extraordinary federal law were licensed to produce armaments and military equipment. The licensed enterprises were required to observe preventive measures and safety precautions, organise special units and adopt technical and physical firefighting-related plans and programmes in that respect. Under the law, the national defence authorities were responsible for supervision of the implementation of the law, while the data on capacity, development programmes and production of weaponry were confidential. 84. The Explosive Substances Trade Act of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Explosive Substances, Flammable Liquids and Gases Act of the Republic of Serbia regulate the terms and procedures for issuing authorisation, competence and control of the authorities, and their supervision over implementation of the legislation. The legislation also provides for other matters of importance for the production and trade of explosive and/or flammable substances that are not used in the military and mining sectors. Weaponry may be produced by registered enterprises, which have been licensed by the competent interior affairs authorities (at the level of the Republic of Serbia or of the autonomous provinces) following a positive opinion provided by the competent authorities in charge of national defence. No manufacturing permits may be used until the competent authorities have verified that the enterprise has met all the necessary requirements in respect of location, technical equipment, safety and preventive measures, storage and staff training, as required by the law. 85. The licensed enterprises are required to ensure that all preventive measures are carried out and that people and neighbouring buildings are protected. They must hold records of the materials produced and technologies used (to be verified by the competent State authorities). They must also make sure employees are properly informed about the production technology and the risks, and trained to control or deal with them, and obtain authorisation for the transportation of explosive and flammable substances. Furthermore, the enterprises are required to put in place adequate checks and regularly review their implementation of the prescribed requirements and measures. 86. Lastly, the interior affairs authorities of the Republic of Serbia or its provinces are responsible for supervision of the implementation of the regulations in respect of the production of explosive substances, while the municipal interior affairs authorities have a supervisory role in respect of all other activities and measures. 87. The relevant legislation sets out the liability for disciplinary, criminal or misdemeanour offences, as appropriate, for failures to adhere to the regulations.