HUČKO v. SLOVAKIA
Inadmissible
Alvina Gyulumyan;Ján Šikuta;Johannes Silvis;Josep Casadevall;Luis López Guerra
1. The applicant, Mr Stanislav Hučko, is a Slovak national, who was born in 1964 and lives in Otley, the United Kingdom. He was represented before the Court by Mr F. Chochol, a lawyer practising in Vranov nad Topľou. The Slovak Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Ms M. Pirošíková. 2. The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. 3. In 1998 a former business partner sued the applicant for a sum of money in the context of the dissolution of their partnership. On 8 January 2001 the applicant filed a counterclaim. 4. The case was dealt with by courts at two levels of jurisdiction. 5. On 27 April 2009 the Humenné District Court dismissed both parties’ claims. It found the claim lodged by the applicant to have lapsed. 6. On 12 February 2010 the Prešov Regional Court rejected an appeal by the applicant as having been lodged out of time. 7. The Regional Court’s decision was served on the applicant by the District Court several times owing to difficulties in obtaining a certificate of service. Thus, in a letter of 10 August 2010 a judge stated that the above impediment had prevented the District Court from indicating the date when the decision in issue took effect. On 3 March 2011, following the receipt of the relevant document and the return of the case file, the District Court put a stamp on the decision indicating that it had become final on 13 December 2010. 8. In the meantime, on 10 May 2010 the applicant unsuccessfully applied to the General Prosecutor’s Office for the lodging of an extraordinary appeal on points of law on his behalf. He argued that he had appealed within the statutory time-limit. 9. On 12 January 2011 the applicant posted a complaint to the Constitutional Court. He alleged a breach of his right to a fair hearing within a reasonable time in the proceedings before the ordinary courts. The applicant affirmed that the complaint had been lodged within two months of 12 November 2010, when he had been notified that his application to the General Prosecutor’s Office had been dismissed. 10. The applicant noted that the copy of the Regional Court’s judgment enclosed with his constitutional complaint had no stamp indicating the date of final effect. This was due to the fact that such indication had to be made first in the original decision, and that had been possible only after the case file had been returned to the District Court. 11. On 3 February 2011 the Constitutional Court rejected the complaint as having been lodged outside the statutory time-limit of two months. It held that the applicant should have lodged his complaint within two months of the service of the Regional Court’s decision. The Constitutional Court admitted that the exact date of service of that decision was unknown. However, it found that decision to have been served not later than on 10 May 2010, the date of the applicant’s application to the General Prosecutor’s Office. The applicant had posted his constitutional complaint more than two months thereafter, namely on 12 January 2011. His application to the General Prosecutor’s Office could not affect the position as it concerned an extraordinary remedy. 12. On 3 May 2011, in a reply to the applicant’s complaint, the vicepresident of the District Court indicated, with reference to the case file, that the decision in the applicant’s case had become final on 13 December 2010. 13. On 24 May 2011 the applicant’s representative asked the Constitutional Court to review its decision. 14. In a letter of 13 September 2011 a judge of the Constitutional Court, after examining the file, replied that the Regional Court’s decision of 12 February 2010 had actually become final on 8 April 2010. It had been served on the applicant on that date; he had been the last person on the list of those on whom it had to be served. The indication of 13 December 2010 as the date of final effect of the decision by the District Court had been an error, but it could not affect the legal position because it was of a merely declaratory nature. Finally, the letter stated that the applicant’s complaint was in any event inadmissible on account of his failure to seek redress by means of an appeal on points of law. 15. Pursuant to Article 158 § 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, a certified true copy of a judgment is to be served on the parties or their representatives in person. 16. Article 159 § 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that a judgment which has been served and which can no longer be challenged by means of an appeal is final. 17. Section 53(3) of the Constitutional Court Act 1993 provides that a complaint to the Constitutional Court may be lodged within two months of the date on which the decision in question becomes final and binding or on which a measure is notified or notice of some other interference with the complainant’s interests is given. As regards measures and other types of interference, this period commences when the complainant has had a practical opportunity to become aware of them. 18. Pursuant to section 62(1) of Regulation no. 543/2005, a court’s legal secretary is obliged, as soon as the date of final effect of a decision has been established, to indicate the same on the cover page of the original of the court’s decision. Under section 63 of that Regulation, upon request courts are to confirm, by means of a stamp on the cover page of a true and certified copy, the date when the decision acquired final effect and became enforceable. 19. As regards complaints about ordinary courts’ decisions in the context of civil proceedings, the Constitutional Court has held, in a number of cases, that the above time-limit of two months starts running on the day when the contested decisions become final (see, for example, decisions II. ÚS 99/2010 of 4 March 2010; IV. ÚS 188/2010 of 19 May 2010; III. ÚS 106/2010 of 9 March 2010; or II. ÚS 298/2010 of 24 June 2010). 20. In the context of complaints about judicial proceedings the Constitutional Court has consistently considered irrelevant, when determining compliance with the time-limit of two months under section 53(3) of the Constitutional Court Act 1993, the dismissal of plaintiffs’ request for an extra-ordinary appeal to be filed on their behalf. It held the date of final effect of the contested judicial decisions to be relevant in that context (see, for example, decision file no. IV. ÚS 42/06 of 28 February 2006, with further references).