CASE OF PALUDA v. SLOVAKIA
Violation of Article 6 - Right to a fair trial (Article 6 - Disciplinary proceedings;Article 6-1 - Access to court;Civil rights and obligations);Pecuniary damage - claim dismissed (Article 41 - Pecuniary damage;Just satisfaction);Non-pecuniary damage - award (Article 41 - Non-pecuniary damage;Just satisfaction)
Alena Poláčková;Branko Lubarda;Dmitry Dedov;Georgios A. Serghides;Helen Keller;Helena Jäderblom;Luis López Guerra;Pere Pastor Vilanova
6. The applicant was born in 1959 and lives in Bratislava. He is and at the relevant time was a Supreme Court judge. 7. The Judicial Council of the Slovak Republic is the supreme governing body of the judiciary in Slovakia. It has eighteen members, including its President (section 3(1) of the Judicial Council Act (Law no. 185/2002 Coll., as amended)). Under Article 141a of the Constitution (Law no. 460/1992 Coll.), as applicable at the relevant time, the President of the Supreme Court automatically held the office of the President of the Judicial Council. Of the remaining seventeen members, eight were elected by judges and three were appointed by each the National Council of Slovakia, the President of Slovakia, and the Government of Slovakia. 8. On 8 September 2009, sitting it the above mentioned composition, the Judicial Council decided under section 22(1) and (2) of the Judges and Assessor Judges Act (Law no. 385/2000 Coll., as amended – “the Act”) to suspend (dočasné pozastavenie výkonu funkcie sudcu) the applicant in the exercise of his function with immediate effect. This decision followed another decision of the Judicial Council taken on the same day under section 120(2)(c) of the Act to file disciplinary charges against the applicant. 9. The accusation was that the applicant had committed what was classified as a “serious disciplinary offence” by failing to comply with his duties, such as abstaining from behaviour which might cast doubt on the respectability of his judicial office, abiding by the principles of judicial ethics and enhancing the good reputation of the judiciary. In particular, reference was made to the fact that the applicant (i) had filed a criminal complaint accusing the President of the Supreme Court of abuse of authority, and (ii) had publicly stated that the distribution of cases at the Supreme Court had been modified with a view to allowing its President to influence the outcome of proceedings. In terms of a sanction, the Judicial Council proposed that the applicant’s post as a judge be revoked. 10. Under section 22(7) of the Act, the decision to suspend him entailed a 50% reduction in the applicant’s salary for the duration of the disciplinary proceedings. The same provision prevented him from spending time at the workplace, with the exception of time which was necessary for asserting his rights in relation to the administration of human resources. Under section 22(5) of the Act, the suspension could last at most two years. The withheld part of the applicant’s salary might or might not be restored to him, depending on the outcome of the disciplinary proceedings (section 22(8) and (9) of the Act). 11. The applicant sought protection of his rights in relation to the decision to suspend him as a judge by way of what he termed an appeal (rozklad) to the Judicial Council of 29 October 2009, an administrative-law action of the same day, and a constitutional complaint of 2 November 2009. 12. On 25 November 2009 the Constitutional Court declared the complaint inadmissible. It noted that the applicant’s applications before the Judicial Council and administrative tribunals were still pending and considered that, under the principle of subsidiarity, his constitutional complaint was accordingly premature. 13. As to the applicant’s submission to the Judicial Council, its president responded to it in a letter of 27 January 2010 informing the applicant that the law did not allow for decisions of the Council to be challenged by means of appeals to the Council and that its decisions were reviewable by administrative tribunals. 14. On 13 May 2010 the Bratislava Regional Court discontinued the proceedings on the applicant’s administrative-law action and on 23 February 2011 the Supreme Court upheld that decision following an appeal lodged by the applicant. The courts found that the decision to suspend the applicant had been of a preliminary nature, that it had not amounted to a determination of his rights with final effect, and that as such it had no bearing on his fundamental rights and freedoms. In such circumstances, the decision was excluded from judicial review under Article 248 (a) of the Code of Civil Procedure (Law no. 99/1963 Coll., as applicable at the relevant time). 15. On 17 June 2011 the applicant lodged a fresh complaint with the Constitutional Court, alleging a breach of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention on account of the ordinary courts’ decisions, as detailed above. 16. On 7 December 2011 the Constitutional Court declared the applicant’s complaint of 17 June 2011 inadmissible as being manifestly illfounded. It held that the Supreme Court had given sound reasons for its decision, and its decision was not arbitrary or otherwise contrary to the applicant’s right to a fair hearing. 17. According to a communication from the Judicial Council dated 6 August 2016, submitted and relied on by the Government, the applicant had addressed various submissions to the Council, but had never requested it to lift his temporary suspension, pursuant to section 22(5) of the Act (as applicable at the relevant time – see paragraph 24 below). 18. The disciplinary charges against the applicant fell to be determined by the Supreme Court, sitting as a disciplinary tribunal. 19. In accordance with a legislative amendment which took effect on 1 May 2011, the Minister of Justice became a party to pending disciplinary proceedings against judges which had been initiated by the Judicial Council. 20. On 9 May 2011 the Minister of Justice withdrew the application to discipline the applicant. 21. On that ground the Supreme Court discontinued the disciplinary proceedings against the applicant on 13 May 2011. The applicant challenged that decision by way of an appeal, only to withdraw it on 11 August 2011. The decision thus became final on 27 September 2011. 22. The part of the applicant’s salary that was retained from him during the time of his suspension (see paragraph 10 above) was restored to him in July 2012.