CASE OF HARRISON McKEE v. HUNGARY
Remainder inadmissible;No violation of Article 6 - Right to a fair trial (Article 6 - Civil proceedings;Article 6-1 - Access to court)
András Sajó;Egidijus Kūris;Guido Raimondi;Helen Keller;Jon Fridrik Kjølbro;Nebojša Vučinić
5. The applicant was born in 1948 and lives in Surfers Paradise, Australia. 6. In 2003 the applicant, who was represented by a Hungarian lawyer throughout the proceedings, initiated civil proceedings against a public prosecutor assigned to the Hungarian Budapest Regional Public Prosecutor’s Office, the Budapest Regional Public Prosecutor’s Office itself, and the Office of the Attorney General, alleging a violation of his personality rights. Given the subject matter of the dispute, the applicant was exempt from having to advance the court fees, by virtue of section 64 of Act no. XCIII of 1990 on Stamp Duties, as in force at the relevant time. 7. In particular, the applicant complained that a letter sent in the course of criminal proceedings conducted against him by the public prosecutor to the Pest Central District Court, the trial court in his case, had contained false information about him and thus infringed his right to honour, dignity and reputation. 8. The applicant subsequently modified his claim, seeking non-pecuniary damages in respect of a violation of his personality rights in the amount of 390,000,000 Hungarian forints (HUF) (approximately 1,314,000 euros (EUR)). It appears that the amount claimed was an expression of the applicant’s personal estimation of the value of his reputation, rather than a sum deduced from relevant domestic jurisprudence; however, in the ensuing procedure the applicant maintained this claim. 9. The Budapest Regional Court delivered a judgment on 22 September 2005. It discontinued the proceedings against the Budapest Regional Public Prosecutor’s Office, since it had no procedural standing. As to the remainder of the claims, it held that the applicant’s right to reputation had been violated by the public prosecutor’s statements and ordered the public prosecutor to present her apologies to the applicant. However, it dismissed the applicant’s claim for compensation, stating that it was excessive and in any event he could not prove that he had suffered any actual damage. The court further applied section 39 of Act no. XCIII of 1990 on Stamp Duties and ordered the applicant to pay HUF 879,000 (approximately EUR 2,900) in court fees. Under this rule, at the material time, the amount of stamp duty in civil cases was 6% of the claim but should attain a minimum of HUF 15,000 (approximately EUR 50) and should not exceed a maximum of HUF 900,000 (approximately EUR 3,000). In a subsequent supplementary decision on court costs, the court explained that the law required the payment of court fees proportionately to the dismissed part of the claim, and observed that the applicant’s claim was far beyond the amounts normally awarded in similar cases. 10. Both the applicant and the respondents appealed to the Budapest Court of Appeal, which dismissed the appeal on 3 October 2006. As regards the costs, the court upheld the position taken by the Budapest Regional Court, that is, that the applicant should pay court fees calculated as a percentage of the dismissed part of his claims. It further ordered the applicant to pay HUF 900,000 (approximately EUR 3,000) in appellate fees. 11. The respondents sought the review of the final decision before the Supreme Court, arguing that the statements of a prosecutor expressed in the course of criminal proceedings could not violate the accused’s personality rights, even if they were detrimental to him. By a decision of 4 July 2007 the Supreme Court quashed the final decision and dismissed the applicant’s action in its entirety. It found that the opinion of the public prosecutor had been expressed in the context of the criminal proceedings conducted against the applicant and thus constituted a legitimate exercise of her powers as a prosecutor. The Supreme Court further ordered the applicant to pay the court fees related to the first- and second-instance and the review proceedings in the amount of altogether HUF 1,836,000 (approximately EUR 6,000), instead of the aggregate amount of HUF 4,300,000 (approximately EUR 14,200) in principle applicable under sections 42, 46 and 50 of the Act on Stamp Duties (see paragraph 13 below).