CASE OF SIDABRAS AND OTHERS v. LITHUANIA
Violation of Article 14+8 - Prohibition of discrimination (Article 14 - Discrimination) (Article 8-1 - Respect for private life;Article 8 - Right to respect for private and family life);No violation of Article 14+8 - Prohibition of discrimination (Article 14 - Discrimination) (Article 8-1 - Respect for private life;Article 8 - Right to respect for private and family life);Pecuniary damage - claim dismissed (Article 41 - Pecuniary damage;Just satisfaction);Non-pecuniary damage - award (Article 41 - Non-pecuniary damage;Just satisfaction)
András Sajó;Guido Raimondi;Helen Keller;Jon Fridrik Kjølbro;Lech Garlicki;Nebojša Vučinić;Robert Spano
6. The first applicant, Mr Juozas Sidabras, was born in 1951 and lives in Kaunas. 7. He graduated from the Lithuanian Physical Culture Institute (currently the Lithuanian Sports University), qualifying as a sports instructor. 8. From 1975 to 1986 he was employed by the Lithuanian branch of the USSR State Security Committee (the KGB). After Lithuania declared independence in 1990, he found employment as a tax inspector. 9. On 31 May 1999 the Lithuanian authorities concluded that the first applicant was subject to the restrictions of Article 2 of the KGB Act (see paragraph 64 below). As a result, on 2 June 1999 he was dismissed by the tax authorities. 10. The first applicant brought an administrative action against the security intelligence authorities, claiming that his dismissal under the KGB Act, and the ensuing inability to find employment, were unlawful. The domestic courts dismissed his claims (see Sidabras and Džiautas v. Lithuania, nos. 55480/00 and 59330/00, §§ 14-16, ECHR 2004VIII). 11. On 29 November 1999 the first applicant submitted an application to the Court, alleging that he had lost his job and that his employment prospects had been restricted as a result of the application of the KGB Act, in breach of Articles 8 and 14 of the Convention. 12. By a judgment of 27 July 2004 in the case of Sidabras and Džiautas (cited above), the Court found a violation of Article 14 of the Convention, taken in conjunction with Article 8. It concluded that the ban on the first applicant seeking employment in various branches of the private sector, in application of Article 2 of the KGB Act, constituted a disproportionate measure, despite the legitimacy of the aims pursued (see § 61 of the judgment). The Court ordered the State to pay the first applicant 7,000 euros (EUR) as compensation for pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage and costs. 13. By a letter of 2 November 2004 the Court informed the Lithuanian Government that, as no request had been made under Article 43 of the Convention for the above-mentioned cases to be referred to the Grand Chamber, the judgment of 27 July 2004 had become final on 27 October 2004, in accordance with Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. 14. In 2005 the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe discussed the question of whether the Court’s judgments in the cases of Sidabras and Džiautas v. Lithuania (cited above) and Rainys and Gasparavičius v. Lithuania (nos. 70665/01 and 74345/01, 7 April 2005) had been executed. As regards individual measures, the Government informed the Committee of Ministers that the sum awarded to the first applicant had been paid to him. As regards general measures, the Lithuanian Parliament was preparing amendments to the KGB Act, which would be adopted in the near future. Moreover, in order to prevent similar violations of the Convention, the Lithuanian courts and other institutions had been informed about the Court’s judgment and provided with a translation (see also paragraphs 61-63 below). 15. On 8 December 2006 the first applicant started domestic court proceedings against the State of Lithuania, seeking 257,154 Lithuanian litai (LTL) in pecuniary damages, which he counted as ten years of his tax inspector’s salary, and LTL 500,000 in non-pecuniary damages, which he claimed to have suffered because of the continuing violation of his right to respect for his private life under Articles 8 and 14 of the Convention. The first applicant noted that since 1999 he had been unemployed and registered at the Šiauliai Employment Office (Šiaulių darbo birža), a State institution that provides assistance for job seekers. He argued that, even though he had not been in the service of the KGB for more than twenty years, owing to the restrictions imposed by the KGB Act he had been unable to gain employment in certain branches of the private sector as of 1999. 16. The first applicant also maintained that the Republic of Lithuania had disregarded its obligations under international treaties and the Convention. Without referring to specific judgments of the Court, he considered that the common principles developed by the Court required that Lithuania execute the Court’s judgment in his case without undue delay. It was his view that the Court’s judgment in his case obliged Lithuania to amend the KGB Act. However, the Lithuanian Parliament had ignored the Court’s judgment and had been stalling any amendment of the KGB Act, which the Court had found to be incompatible with the Convention. He concluded that since 27 October 2004, when the Court’s judgment in his case had become final, the Republic of Lithuania had continued to violate his employment rights. 17. On 21 February 2007 at the request of the first applicant, the Šiauliai Employment Office issued him with a document to the effect that he had been registered as a job seeker since 14 June 1999, and that between August 2004 and April 2006 he had been turned down a number of times for jobs proposed to him, “for justified reasons”. As it transpires from other documents presented to the Court, those justified reasons included: a lack of professional qualification or work experience for the posts of business manager at a factory producing television sets and at other local companies; another candidate had been chosen for the post of supervisor at a waste management facility; and a lack of English language skills for a job as a hotel manager. Without further explanation, it was also briefly noted in the document of 21 February 2007 that the first applicant “had not been employed because of applicable restrictions (he could not take up jobs which required him to manage people, pedagogical jobs or work in the security sector) (bedarbis neįdarbintas dėl taikomų apribojimų: negali dirbti vadovaujantį, pedagoginį darbą, apsaugoje)”. 18. On 13 March 2007 the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court dismissed the first applicant’s claims as unsubstantiated. It observed that the Strasbourg Court had awarded him compensation for the pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage he had sustained before the Court had adopted its judgment on 27 July 2004. The first-instance court then turned to the first applicant’s claim about the continued discrimination against him after the Court’s judgment. On this point, it observed that the Šiauliai Employment Office’s document of 21 February 2007 stated that he “had not been employed because of applicable restrictions”. Without elaborating any further on the facts, the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court merely observed that that particular document and other materials of the case file did not prove that the first applicant’s right to choose a particular private sector job had been infringed because Article 2 of the KGB Act had not been amended after the Court’s judgment. Accordingly, his claim for damages for the period after the Court’s judgment was dismissed. 19. On 23 March 2007 the first applicant lodged an appeal with the Supreme Administrative Court. In addition to his previous arguments he further maintained that after the re-establishment of Lithuania’s independence, he had fully cooperated with the Lithuanian authorities and helped to disclose the identities of former KGB officers before they infiltrated the Lithuanian authorities. However, notwithstanding his loyalty to the independent Lithuania and the Court’s judgment in his favour, he had been banned from legal, pedagogical or other jobs because the KGB Act had remained in force. He had been unemployed since June 1999 and thus could not take care of his family. As it appears from his appeal on points of law, the first applicant did not mention any particular instance when he had been refused a job because of his status. Yet he reiterated his point of view that the principles of the Court required that States execute the Court’s judgments without undue delay and within the shortest time possible. 20. On 14 April 2008 the Supreme Administrative Court upheld the lower court’s decision. It observed that the Convention formed an integral part of the Lithuanian legal system and that individuals could directly rely on its provisions before the national courts. Moreover, in the event of a conflict between the legal norms of the Convention and national laws, the Convention was to be given priority. The Supreme Administrative Court agreed with the lower court’s reasoning that the first applicant’s request for compensation for pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage sustained before 27 July 2004 (the date of the Strasbourg Court’s judgment in his case) had to be dismissed because an award had already been made by the Court and the applicant had been paid the sum of EUR 7,000. 21. Regarding the first applicant’s claim in respect of the damage allegedly suffered since then, on the basis of the Court’s judgment in Scozzari and Giunta v. Italy ([GC] nos. 39221/98 and 41963/98, § 249, ECHR 2000VIII), the Supreme Administrative Court noted that States undertook to take general and, if appropriate, individual measures to be adopted in their domestic legal order to put an end to the violation found by the Court and to redress so far as possible its effects. The States were free to choose how to correct the breach of individual applicants’ Convention rights, provided that the means chosen were compatible with the conclusions set out in the Court’s judgment. Restitutio in integrum was an important aspect of remedying the violation. 22. That being so, even though the legislator had an obligation to ensure legal certainty and to reconcile domestic law with the norms of the Convention, legislative amendment was not the only way to implement the Court’s judgment. The fact that the KGB Act had not been amended had not in itself breached the first applicant’s rights. A person’s rights could also be secured by administrative decisions and domestic court practices. Both the KGB Act and the Strasbourg Court’s judgment were in force in Lithuania. For the Supreme Administrative Court, in the event of a conflict between them, priority was to be given to the Court’s judgment. Consequently, even though the KGB Act was still in force, a refusal to employ the first applicant in the private sector based on the restrictions contained in the KGB Act would be unlawful. Accordingly, the protection of a person’s rights through the direct application of the Court’s judgment and before any legislative amendments had been adopted was to be considered proper execution of the Court’s judgment. 23. Regarding the facts of the case, the Supreme Administrative Court noted that the first applicant had attempted to obtain employment in the private sector. It observed that on 21 February 2007 the Šiauliai Employment Office had issued him with a document certifying that he had been registered as a job seeker since 14 June 1999 and had not been employed because of the restrictions applied to him (see paragraph 17 above). The appellate court noted that in response to its request to explain the reasons for the first applicant’s unemployment in more detail, on 28 December 2007 the Šiauliai Employment Office had provided the appellate court with another document stating that on 14 June 1999 an individual plan for the first applicant’s employment had been prepared with a view to employing him as a lawyer (in-house lawyer; juriskonsultas), because he had more than ten years’ work experience in different companies and institutions in the city of Šiauliai. From 1999 to 2004, more than thirty posts for in-house lawyers had been created in Šiauliai, for which a university degree in law was required and the salary was just higher than minimal salary. The advertisements for those posts had been shown to the first applicant, but he had not been given any of those jobs because the employers considered that he lacked the relevant qualifications. The Šiauliai Employment Office could therefore no longer offer the first applicant other in-house lawyer posts. To increase his chances of finding a job, at the end of 2003 the first applicant had attended computer literacy courses and courses for professional training in the field of administrative work. In 2004 a new individual plan had been compiled together with the first applicant, so that, because he so wished, he could obtain the job of business manager (komercijos vadybininkas). The Šiauliai Employment Office then named six companies which refused the first applicant the job of business manager, administrator and sales manager because other candidates had been chosen or because he lacked knowledge of the English language. 24. The Supreme Administrative Court observed that those two documents were contradictory. The court deemed it proper to rely on the report of 28 December 2007 as it was more recent and, in the court’s opinion, more comprehensive and explanatory. It concluded that the restrictions which the KGB Act imposed on a person’s ability to find employment in certain areas of the private sector had not been applied to the first applicant. The existence of the KGB Act, as such, had not violated his rights and did not entitle him to compensation. The Supreme Administrative Court determined that there was no proof that, after the Court’s judgment of 27 July 2004, the first applicant had been prevented from obtaining a private sector job because of the restrictions related to the KGB Act. Furthermore, he had not provided any particular information as to who had refused to employ him on the basis of those restrictions and when. It followed that the first applicant had not managed to secure a job because of the local labour-market situation. Moreover, there was no information that he had attempted to find a job in another manner, that is to say not only relying on the assistance of the Šiauliai Employment Office, but had been refused a job because of the legislative restrictions. To give rise to a violation of the Convention, a breach of a person’s rights had to be real, and not hypothetical. Given that there was no proof that after the Court’s judgment of 27 July 2004 the first applicant could not obtain a job because the KGB Act remained unchanged, and having concluded that his right to work in the private sector could no longer be restricted because of the direct applicability of the Convention, the first applicant’s claim for damages had to be dismissed. 25. On 18 April 2008, four days after the Supreme Administrative Court’s final decision in his case, the Šiauliai Employment Office suggested that the first applicant contact two specific private companies for a post as a business manager. On 6 May 2008 the first applicant came back to the Šiauliai Employment Office and stated that he had not taken the business manager’s job in one of those companies because he did not like the conditions offered. He planned to take part in the interview for the business manager’s job in the other company. Later in 2008 the first applicant was refused positions of business manager, insurance consultant and other jobs a number of times because he lacked foreign language skills, qualifications, or the relevant work experience. As it transpires from the documents in the Court’s possession, he turned other jobs down simply because he deemed that the salary offered was too low or the work place too far away. On 23 December 2008 the first applicant was appointed as a carer for his mother (paskirtas motinos rūpintoju). The Šiauliai Employment Office therefore discontinued its assistance to him. 26. The second applicant, Mr Kęstutis Džiautas, was born in 1962 and lives in Vilnius. 27. On an unspecified date in the 1980s, he graduated from Vilnius University as a lawyer. From 11 February 1991 he worked as a prosecutor. 28. On 26 May 1999 the Lithuanian authorities concluded that, from 1985 to 1991, the second applicant had been an employee of the Lithuanian branch of the KGB and that he was therefore subject to the restrictions provided for by Article 2 of the KGB Act. As a result, on 31 May 1999 he was dismissed from his job as prosecutor. 29. The second applicant brought an administrative action against the authorities, claiming that his dismissal under the KGB Act, which made it impossible for him to find employment, was unlawful. The domestic courts dismissed his claims (see Sidabras and Džiautas, cited above, §§ 20-23). 30. On 5 July 2000 the second applicant lodged an application with the Court. Like the first applicant, he alleged that Articles 8 and 14 of the Convention had been violated. 31. By a judgment of 27 July 2004 in Sidabras and Džiautas v. Lithuania (cited above), the Court found a violation of Article 14 taken in conjunction with Article 8 of the Convention and awarded the second applicant EUR 7,000 in respect of pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage and costs. 32. On 5 January 2005 the second applicant wrote to the Chairman of the Human Rights Committee of the Lithuanian Parliament, the Prime Minister and the Minister of Justice to enquire whether the State intended to amend the KGB Act and, if so, when. At the same time, he acknowledged that the Lithuanian authorities had already paid him a sum of money awarded to him by the Court. 33. On 11 January 2005 the Government Agent before the Court informed the second applicant that the Ministry of Justice was working on amendments to the KGB Act. On 26 February 2005 the Chairman of the Human Rights Committee of the Seimas informed the second applicant that the Seimas had set up a working group that was also drafting legislative amendments. 34. According to the Government, as of 29 March 2006 the second applicant was registered in the list of trainee lawyers (advokato padėjėjas), which is a precondition to becoming a lawyer. The Government also noted that the second applicant had submitted his traineeship report on 14 May 2009 and was going to take the Bar exam. 35. On 20 October 2006 the second applicant sued the Republic of Lithuania for non-pecuniary damage. He claimed to have lost LTL 100,000 as a result of the State’s failure, since 27 July 2004 (the date of the Court’s judgment in his case), to amend the KGB Act. This in turn had restricted his prospects of finding employment in certain private sector areas. He argued that the common principles governing the execution of the Court’s judgments required the State to execute the judgment without undue delay. 36. On 12 February 2007 the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court dismissed the second applicant’s claim. It noted that the judgment in the Sidabras and Džiautas case did not oblige the State to amend the KGB Act within a specific time-frame and that the Seimas was in the process of discussing the relevant legislative amendments. During the court hearing the second applicant submitted that he had contacted an insurance company and a commercial bank in order to check what the reaction of potential employers would be. He maintained that those employers had replied that they would be unable to employ him because to do so would breach the KGB Act. The first-instance court, however, noted that the second applicant had not provided any evidence to prove that he had actually applied for and been refused any particular job in the private sector. Accordingly, the court had no basis on which to hold that the second applicant had in reality addressed those two employers and that they had refused to hire him. 37. The second applicant appealed. He pointed out in particular that he had not attempted to obtain employment in the private sector so as not to harm the employers, who would have faced administrative liability if they had employed him. That was the reason why he had no proof of having actually attempted to obtain a job barred to him by the KGB Act. 38. On 18 April 2008 the Supreme Administrative Court dismissed the second applicant’s appeal. Its reasoning was similar to that of its decision of 14 April 2008 in the first applicant’s case (see paragraphs 20-22 above). It observed that the second applicant had based his claims for damages on the alleged non-execution of the Court’s judgment of 27 July 2004. However, referring to the cases of Scozzari and Giunta (cited above, § 249) and Vermeire v. Belgium (29 November 1991, § 26, Series A no. 214-C), it observed that under Article 46 of the Convention, Contracting States were free to choose the appropriate individual and general measures to discharge their legal obligation to execute the Court’s decisions, albeit monitored by the Committee of Ministers. Moreover, given the abstract nature of the Convention norms, the domestic courts should follow the Strasbourg Court’s jurisprudence in order better to comprehend their content. 39. As to the facts of the second applicant’s case, the Supreme Administrative Court observed that, because the Court’s judgment in Sidabras and Džiautas prevailed over the KGB Act, the restrictions on working in certain private sector areas could no longer be imposed on the second applicant. Thus, even though the KGB Act had not been amended, a refusal to employ him on the basis of the restrictions provided for in the KGB Act would be in violation of the Convention and consequently unlawful. It was also the court’s view that protecting a person’s rights by direct application of the Court’s judgments rather than by legislative amendments was an appropriate way to execute those judgments. It followed that, because of the direct applicability of the Convention and the Court’s judgments, the State had not failed to act, the latter being a precondition for the State’s civil liability. 40. As to the second applicant, he had failed to prove that, after the Court’s judgment of 27 July 2004, he had attempted to obtain employment in the private sector and had been refused owing to the restrictions of the KGB Act. The Supreme Administrative Court stressed that “the mere existence of contradictions and ambiguities in the legal system did not in itself provide grounds for a violation of a person’s rights and did not harm that person”. Similarly, a mere hypothetical violation and a person’s idea that his rights had been breached, without any tangible facts, were not sufficient. The Supreme Administrative Court therefore dismissed the second applicant’s claim in respect of non-pecuniary damage. 41. The third applicant, Mr Raimundas Rainys, was born in 1949 and lives in Vilnius. 42. From 1975 to October 1991 he was an employee of the Lithuanian branch of the KGB. Thereafter he found employment as a lawyer in a private telecommunications company, Omnitel. 43. On 17 February 2000 the State Security Department informed Omnitel that the third applicant had been a KGB officer and was therefore subject to the restrictions provided for by Article 2 of the KGB Act. As a result, on 23 February 2000 Omnitel dismissed the third applicant from his job. 44. After unsuccessful litigation before the Lithuanian courts for reinstatement in his job and for unpaid salary (see Rainys and Gasparavičius, cited above, §§ 11-13), the third applicant lodged an application with the Court, alleging that he had lost his job and that his employment prospects had been restricted as a result of the application to him of the KGB Act, in breach of Articles 8 and 14 of the Convention. 45. In its judgment in the case of Rainys and Gasparavičius (cited above, § 36) the Court held that the third applicant’s inability to pursue his former profession as a lawyer in a private telecommunications company, and his continuing inability to find private-sector employment because of his “former permanent KGB employee” status under the KGB Act, constituted a disproportionate and thus discriminatory measure, despite the legitimacy of the aims pursued. The Court concluded that there had been a violation of Article 14 taken in conjunction with Article 8 of the Convention. 46. By a letter of 15 July 2005, the Court informed the Lithuanian Government that, as no request had been made under Article 43 of the Convention for the above-mentioned cases to be referred to the Grand Chamber, the judgment of 7 April 2005 had become final on 7 July 2005, in accordance with Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. 47. On 25 July 2005 the third applicant requested that the Supreme Administrative Court reopen the proceedings in his earlier case for unlawful actions and reinstatement in his job at Omnitel, on the basis of Article 153 § 2 (1) of the Law on Administrative Court Proceedings (see paragraph 65 below). 48. On 23 February 2006 the Supreme Administrative Court noted that the proceedings in the domestic courts related to the dismissal of the third applicant from his position as a lawyer with a telecommunications company. It observed that the Court’s judgment gave reason to doubt the lawfulness of those domestic decisions. It therefore decided to reopen the proceedings which the third applicant had previously instituted against the State Security Department and his previous employer, the private telecommunications company, Omnitel. For reasons of jurisdiction, the case was subsequently remitted to the Vilnius Regional Court, a court of general jurisdiction, for a fresh examination. 49. On 10 July 2007 the Vilnius Regional Court acknowledged that the third applicant had been dismissed from his previous job at Omnitel unlawfully. As to the question of his reinstatement, the court relied on Article 297 § 4 of the Labour Code (see paragraph 67 below) and noted that more than seven years had elapsed since the telecommunications company had dismissed the third applicant from his job. During that time the third applicant had worked in companies specialising in other fields, such as railways and television. Moreover, the activities of the telecommunications company had also evolved. In the court’s view, because he lacked appropriate qualifications and foreign language skills, after such a long time the third applicant would no longer be competent to work as a lawyer in that company. The court also noted that at that time the third applicant was working in another company, without specifying what that company was, and therefore had a source of income. The Regional Court also noted the continuing conflict between the third applicant and the company, which could be another reason not to reinstate him to his former job at Omnitel. Lastly, the court observed that the KGB Act was still in force. In the court’s view, should the third applicant be reinstated, the question of his dismissal could arise de novo, or his employer would face the risk of administrative penalties. In the light of those circumstances, the court dismissed the third applicant’s claim for reinstatement. 50. The court then turned to the issue of compensation for lost earnings for the period of 23 February 2000 to 23 March 2007, indicated by the third applicant, for which he requested the sum of LTL 136,464. However, it was to be noted that the Court had already awarded him more than LTL 120,000 for both past and future pecuniary loss. Moreover, after his dismissal from Omnitel, the third applicant had worked in different jobs and had received more than LTL 90,000 in salary. Under Lithuanian law, an employee could be awarded no more than three years’ unpaid salary. In the third applicant’s case the salary in Omnitel would amount to LTL 145,440 (LTL 4,040 a month for thirty-six months). Accordingly, the two sums he had already received (LTL 120,000 and LTL 90,000) amounted to more than the award requested. Lastly, the third applicant had acknowledged that since his dismissal from Omnitel, he had continued to receive a pension from another State for his work in the KGB, ranging from LTL 500 to 800 a month. It followed that the claim for pecuniary damage had to be dismissed. 51. Both the third applicant and Omnitel appealed. At the hearing, the third applicant asked to be paid LTL 167,534 for lost earnings as compensation for the fact that he had still not been reinstated with Omnitel. 52. On 11 February 2008 the Court of Appeal rejected both appeals. It upheld the lower court’s conclusion that the third applicant had been dismissed from his previous job unlawfully. Moreover, the circumstances mentioned in Article 297 § 4 of the Labour Code existed. Accordingly, the third applicant could not be reinstated in his former job with Omnitel. The court added that “the laws that provide for the prohibition on former [USSR] KGB employees from working in the telecommunications sector are still in force, so that if the [third] applicant were reinstated in his previous job, certain problems might arise”. Additionally, the applicant was working in another company and receiving a pension for his previous work with the KGB. He therefore had a source of income. The Court of Appeal also endorsed the lower court’s view that the third applicant had been compensated by the Strasbourg Court for the pecuniary damage he had suffered as a consequence of his unlawful dismissal. The sum he now asked for – LTL 167,534 – was lower than the awards of LTL 90,000 and 120,000 he had already received. 53. The third applicant lodged an appeal on points of law, reiterating his claim for reinstatement and for compensation for lost earnings. He argued that Article 42 § 1 of the Law on the Employment Contract was an imperative legal norm and meant that once the court found that an employee had been dismissed unlawfully, that employee was to be reinstated in his or her previous job. It followed that the argument of the Court of Appeal that “if the [third] applicant were reinstated to his previous job certain problems might arise” was arbitrary. 54. Omnitel argued that in 2000 it had dismissed the third applicant from his job merely following the letter of the KGB Act. Article 1876 of the Code of Administrative Law Violations provided that an employer could be fined LTL 3,000 to 5,000 should he not comply with the KGB Act. This was all the more likely to happen since the Constitutional Court had recognised Article 2 of the KGB Act as constitutional in its ruling of 4 March 1999, that is before the third applicant was dismissed. Even though the Court had found a violation in the third applicant’s case, the KGB Act was still in force, and therefore the third applicant’s reinstatement was barred. Furthermore, in the judgment of 17 March 2005 the Court had not ordered Lithuania to amend the KGB Act. Nor had the Court ordered the Lithuanian courts to have the third applicant reinstated in his previous job. In his written reply to this last argument, the third applicant observed that the Republic of Lithuania, by not appealing against the Court’s judgment to the Grand Chamber, had shown its agreement with the interpretation and application of the Convention in the Rainys and Gasparavičius judgment. He therefore insisted that the Court’s judgment was sufficient legal basis for him to be reinstated in his former job at the private telecommunications company, Omnitel, notwithstanding the fact that Article 2 of the KGB Act had not been amended. 55. Lastly, Omnitel maintained that the lower courts had been correct in referring to other circumstances why the third applicant could not be reinstated on the basis of Article 297 § 4 of the Law on the Employment Contract, namely, for economic, technological and organisational reasons, and the fact that it could lead to unfavourable conditions for him (see paragraph 49 above). 56. On 20 June 2008 the Supreme Court held: “The European Convention on Human Rights is an international agreement, ratified by the Seimas. It is therefore an integral part of the legal system of the Republic of Lithuania... The European Court of Human Rights was established to guarantee the observance of the rights and fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the Convention. In ratifying the Convention, the Republic of Lithuania took an undertaking to execute the Court’s final judgments in every case in which it is a party. The Convention norms must be implemented in reality (Konvencijos normos turi būti realiai įgyvendinamos). The State itself establishes the manner in which it will ensure implementation of the Convention norms. One such method is the reopening of proceedings, provided for in Article 366 § 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Namely, a case which had been terminated by a final court decision may be reopened if the Court finds that the Lithuanian courts’ decisions are in conflict (prieštarauja) with the Convention or its Protocols, to which Lithuania is a party.” 57. As to the facts of the case, the Supreme Court noted that the third applicant had worked as a lawyer at Omnitel and had been dismissed on 23 February 2000 because of the restrictions provided for in Article 2 of the KGB Act. As the Constitutional Court had held on 4 March 1999, those restrictions were compatible with the Constitution. 58. The Supreme Court nevertheless observed that on 7 April 2005 the Court had found that the third applicant had lost his job as a lawyer in the private telecommunications company on the basis of the application of the KGB Act which the Court had found to be discriminatory, in breach of Article 14 of the Convention, taken in conjunction with Article 8. The Court had also held that the third applicant’s inability to pursue his former profession and his continuing inability to find private sector employment because of his “former KGB officer” status under the Act constituted a disproportionate and thus discriminatory measure, even having regard to the legitimacy of the aims sought (paragraphs 36 and 45 of the Court’s judgment). The Supreme Court then held: “Accordingly, even though the KGB Act, which was the basis for dismissing the third applicant from his job, is in force and even acknowledged as being in conformity with the Lithuanian Constitution, the dismissal from his job on the basis of that Act in essence had been recognised as unlawful by the Court’s judgment, that is to say a violation of Article 14 of the Convention, taken in conjunction with Article 8, had been found. This circumstance is not to be questioned when resolving the dispute in the domestic court. Despite the fact that there was no fault in the actions of [the State Security Department or Omnitel], which were implementing the obligations stemming from the KGB Act, the undertaking to implement the provisions of the Convention constituted a legal ground for the courts of the first and appellate instances to conclude that the applicant’s dismissal was unlawful. It must be emphasised that the ground for such a decision is not the provisions of the Law on the Employment Contract or the Labour Code, which regulate the issue of reinstatement, but the provisions of the Convention and the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights. At the same time it must be emphasised that, while the KGB Act, the compatibility of which with the Constitution had already been verified (kurio konstitucingumas jau buvo patikrintas) is still in force, the question of reinstating the third applicant to his job may not be resolved favourably. In the circumstances of this case the recognition of the fact that he had been dismissed from his job unlawfully is sufficient satisfaction for him (atleidimo iš darbo pripažinimas neteisėtu šios bylos aplinkybių kontekste yra ieškovui pakankama satisfakcija).” 59. The Supreme Court noted that the third applicant had been awarded compensation by the Court for actual and future pecuniary damage. Given that he had been awarded EUR 35,000 [approximately LTL 120,000], the third applicant had already been fully compensated for the disproportionate and discriminatory measure – dismissal from his job at Omnitel. For the court of cassation, “there was no legal ground for repeatedly awarding compensation for the violation, which the Court had not found to be of a continuous nature (pakartotinai priteisti žalos atlygimą už pažeidimą, kurio tęstinumo Europos Žmogaus Teisių Teismas savo sprendime nekonstatavo, nėra teisinio pagrindo)”. 60. The Supreme Court thus fully upheld the lower court’s decisions. It also observed that “in the context of the [third applicant’s] case, other arguments by the parties in the appeals on points of law had no legal relevance for the lawfulness of the lower courts’ decisions”. 61. On 9 February 2005 a working group of the Seimas was set up to prepare amendments to a number of laws, including Article 2 of the KGB Act. According to the documents submitted to the Court by the Government, as of January 2005, the Lithuanian Government submitted a number of reports to the Department for the Execution of Judgments of the Council of Europe, explaining individual and general measures regarding execution of the Court’s judgments in the applicants’ cases. They noted, firstly, that the compensation awarded by the Court had been paid to the applicants. The Government also noted that the Court’s judgments and their translations into Lithuanian had been disseminated to the Lithuanian courts. 62. The Government considered that appropriate execution of the Court’s judgments required setting up legal regulation giving access to employment in the private sector for the former KGB employees, which was in compliance with the Convention requirements. In that connection they indicated that amendments to Article 2 of the KGB Act had been registered in the Seimas and had been presented to its plenary on 14 June 2005. They expected that the law would be amended at the beginning of the Seimas’ autumn session of 2005. The Government also considered that the draft law amending Article 2 of the KGB Act would guarantee the balance between the aims sought and interference with the right to respect for private life. The legislative amendments would also provide appropriate safeguards for avoiding discrimination as well as adequate judicial supervision of the employment restrictions imposed by the KGB Act. In February 2007 the Government informed the Department for the Execution of Judgments that the amendments to the KGB Act had been presented to the Seimas on 16 January 2007. However, voting in Parliament had failed because the necessary quorum had not been reached. They reiterated their previous statement about the importance of having the KGB Act amended and expected that the relevant amendments would be adopted in the spring of 2008. In October 2007 the Government wrote to the Department for the Execution of Judgments that a draft new law, amending the KGB Act in its entirety (not only its Article 2), was included in the Seimas’ working programme for the autumn session. In September 2008 the Government informed the Department for the Execution of Judgments that the KGB Act had still not been amended and, to their regret, would most likely not be amended until the Seimas’ elections in October 2008. However, a number of specific laws, for example, those regulating the professions of lawyers, bailiffs and notaries, had been amended, so that they no longer banned former KGB employees from taking up those professions. The Government also suggested that the judgments of the Court were directly applicable in the Lithuanian legal system. Therefore, the fact that the KGB Act had not been rectified had no legal consequences for former KGB employees as regards their opportunities to obtain employment in the private sector. By a letter of 22 January 2009, the Government informed the Department for the Execution of Judgments that as of 1 January of that year, even formal restrictions enshrined in the KGB Act had ceased to be valid. 63. The KGB Act was never amended and is still a valid law.