CASE OF SEVERE v. AUSTRIA
Violation of Article 8 - Right to respect for private and family life (Article 8 - Positive obligations;Article 8-1 - Respect for family life);Non-pecuniary damage - award (Article 41 - Non-pecuniary damage;Just satisfaction)
André Potocki;Angelika Nußberger;Mārtiņš Mits;Nona Tsotsoria;Síofra O’Leary;Gabriele Kucsko-Stadlmayer
6. The applicant was born in 1967 and lives in Rochefort, France. 7. The applicant was in a relationship with C.B., a French and Austrian national. Their sons (twins), also of French and Austrian nationality, were born on 3 March 2006. The family had been living together in Rochefort and the applicant and C.B. had joint custody of the children under French law. 8. On 10 December 2008 the applicant and C.B. had a dispute, which resulted in C.B. leaving their home with the two children. She claimed that she would return two days later. 9. On 13 December 2008, instead of coming back home, C.B. went with the children to stay with her parents in Golfe-Juan in the south of France. She informed the police of this fact. 10. On 17 December 2008 C.B. notified the police in Fréjus that she intended to move to Vienna, where she had already taken her main residence. 11. On 18 December 2008, however, she notified the police in Rochefort that she was living with her parents and that her lawyer would inform the applicant of her whereabouts. Nonetheless, the same day C.B., her mother and the children left France and travelled to Vienna. 12. On 7 January 2009 the family judge at the Rochefort tribunal de grande instance, after an oral hearing on 31 December 2008, issued an interim injunction at the applicant’s request, ruling that he and C.B. had joint custody, but that the children’s main residence was with their father. The court also proceeded to determine C.B.’s contact rights. It noted that C.B., being absent from the oral hearing, had been duly summoned to attend. 13. On 16 March 2010 the Rochefort investigating judge issued an arrest warrant against C.B. and on 11 June 2010 the Rochefort tribunal de grande instance issued a European Arrest Warrant (EAW) against her for unlawful removal of the children from France. 14. On 5 July 2011 the Poitiers Court of Appeal upheld the interim injunction issued by the Rochefort tribunal de grande instance on 7 January 2009 on the above-mentioned points (see paragraph 12 above). 15. On 26 January 2012 the competent public prosecutor decided not to institute a preliminary investigation against the applicant, who had been accused of sexual assault by C.B. in a complaint lodged with the French authorities on 15 December 2011. 16. On 25 April 2013 the La Rochelle tribunal correctionnel convicted C.B. of child abduction and sentenced her to one year’s imprisonment. In addition, she was ordered to pay the applicant 25,000 euros (EUR) in damages. C.B. subsequently lodged an appeal against that decision, but withdrew it on 29 May 2013. 17. On 6 June 2013 the Court of Cassation dismissed an appeal on points of law by C.B. against the Poitiers Court of Appeal’s decision of 5 July 2011. 18. On 23 December 2008 the Vienna District Court (“the District Court) granted a request by C.B. for an interim injunction against the applicant, ordering him to refrain from contacting her for a period of three months. The court based its decision on statements given by C.B. according to which the applicant had threatened to kill her and had tried to abduct one of the children. 19. On the same day the mayor of Vienna granted a request by C.B. for a ban on disclosing information (Auskunftssperre) under the relevant provision of the Residence Registration Act (Meldegesetz). 20. On 27 February 2009 the applicant lodged a complaint against C.B. with the Austrian criminal authorities for suspected child abduction. 21. On 17 March 2009 the District Court dismissed a request by C.B. for an extension of the interim injunction granted against the applicant on 23 December 2008. 22. On 7 April 2009 C.B. filed a new request with the District Court for an interim injunction against the applicant, this time claiming that they were all at risk of physical harm and the children at risk of sexual abuse. The request was dismissed on 22 April 2009. 23. On 22 May 2009 the Vienna public prosecutor’s office (Staatsanwaltschaft) informed the applicant that the criminal investigation it had initiated against him for the aggravated sexual abuse of minors had been discontinued. 24. On 25 May 2011 the public prosecutor’s office informed the applicant that the criminal investigation against C.B. in Austria for child abduction had been discontinued. 25. On 25 February 2009 the applicant lodged a request with the District Court for the children’s return, pursuant to the Hague Convention of 25 October 1980 on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction (“the Hague Convention”). 26. On 6 April 2009 the District Court, after hearing the applicant and C.B. in person, ordered C.B. to return the children to the applicant. It found that C.B.’s allegations of sexual abuse of the children directed against the applicant could not be proven by her or her mother’s statements, or reports obtained from the Child Protection Centre (Kinderschutzzentrum). It argued that she had raised that suspicion rather late in the proceedings, and that the Child Protection Centre’s reports mainly relied on her and her mother’s allegations. Furthermore, the Child Protection Centre’s first report, dated 4 March 2009, did not contain any information about alleged sexual abuse, while the reasoning in the second report, dated 14 March 2009, why certain observations of the children’s behaviour would allude to sexual abuse by their father, was considered to be unsubstantiated. The District Court further held that the children’s removal had been wrongful within the meaning of Article 3 of the Hague Convention and that C.B. had failed to establish that their return would expose them to a grave risk of physical or psychological harm or otherwise place them in an intolerable situation pursuant to Article 13 (b) of the Hague Convention. 27. C.B. appealed against that decision. 28. On 25 June 2009 the Vienna Regional Court (“the Regional Court”) partly allowed C.B.’s appeal and amended the decision in so far as it ordered the children’s immediate return to France (and not to the applicant). Under point 3 of the decision, it further declared that the decision would only become effective if the French authorities demonstrated that they would take adequate measures to protect the children’s best interests in France after their return, in particular with regard to the suspicion of sexual abuse and in accordance with Article 11 (4) of the Brussels IIa Regulation. It held that neither tactical reasons for the mother’s allegations of sexual abuse nor interference with the children’s best interests after their return to their father’s place could be excluded. 29. On 13 October 2009 the Supreme Court dismissed an appeal by C.B. against the Regional Court’s decision. However, it partly allowed an appeal by the applicant and removed point 3 from the impugned decision. Since it had not been established that he actually posed a threat to the children or that there were any other obstacles to their return, there was no reason to make the return order dependent on the safeguards which could be furnished by the French authorities under Article 11 (4) of the Brussels IIa Regulation (“safe harbour orders”). 30. On 18 November 2009 the applicant filed a request with the District Court for enforcement of the return order. 31. On 21 November 2009 a court bailiff (huissier de justice) in Nice confirmed that C.B. and the children had presented themselves to her. In submissions to the District Court of 24 November 2009, C.B. claimed to have fulfilled the conditions set out in the decisions of the Regional Court and the Supreme Court by returning the children to France (and not to the applicant). 32. On 2 December 2009 the applicant informed the District Court of his suspicion that C.B. had meanwhile left France again and travelled back to Austria. 33. On 6 December 2009 the District Court ordered a bailiff (Gerichtsvollzieher) to remove the children from C.B. and hand them over to the Youth Welfare Office. 34. On 7 December 2009 the competent judge, the bailiff and a representative of the Youth Welfare Office looked for C.B. and the children at her and her mother’s addresses in Vienna. However, the enforcement attempt was unsuccessful as neither C.B. nor the children were present at the addresses known to the authorities’ representatives. However, they did see C.B.’s mother and a friend of hers, who stated that C.B. was currently hiding in France with her children but would have to come back to Vienna for work. Afterwards the applicant, who had been waiting nearby, was informed of the authorities’ unsuccessful attempt to trace C.B. and their children that day. The incidents were reported in a letter to the president of the District Court, including a statement that the court currently regarded the “issue” as “terminated”. 35. C.B. subsequently appealed against the District Court’s enforcement order of 6 December 2009, and on 24 December 2009 she filed a request for the court to refrain from enforcing the return order (Antrag auf Abstandnahme von der Fortsetzung des Rückführungsverfahrens). 36. On 22 February 2010 the applicant requested that the District Court disclose C.B.’s address, which had been kept secret from him. 37. On 2 April 2010 the District Court granted the applicant’s request, holding that the ban on disclosure was no longer justified. 38. On the same day the District Court dismissed C.B.’s request for nonenforcement of the return order. 39. On 13 April 2010 the Regional Court rejected C.B.’s appeal against the District Court’s enforcement order of 6 December 2009. It held that she was no longer adversely affected by the impugned decision as the enforcement date had already passed before she had filed the appeal. However, as an obiter dictum it pointed out that, according to recent reports from the Child Protection Centre, the children’s accounts of alleged ill treatment by their father had become more precise in the meantime, which constituted a substantial change in the circumstances on which the return order had been based. Contrary to the outcome of the main proceedings under the Brussels IIa Regulation and the Hague Convention, the Regional Court therefore considered the obligation under Article 11 (4) of the Brussels IIa Regulation to be applicable in that the District Court would have to ask the French authorities to use safeguards to ensure that the return of the children was in their best interests, such as not to return them to the applicant in person while the suspicion of abuse against him remained. 40. On 16 April 2010 the applicant filed a new request for enforcement of the return order, stating that in another set of proceedings before a court in Rochefort C.B.’s representative had informed the court that her current address was her mother’s in Vienna, where for the purposes of enforcement of the return order C.B. and the children had been searched for by the competent authorities on 7 December 2009 (see paragraph 34 above). 41. On 26 April 2010 C.B. filed a new request for the District Court to refrain from enforcing the return order, which was dismissed on 26 July 2010. She also submitted a psychiatric opinion, dated 29 March 2010 and commissioned by the Vienna Youth Welfare Office. The expert stated that the children seemed to be traumatised and suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder, possibly due to assaults by their father which could not be specified any further; thus, even assuming that C.B. had also attempted to alienate her children from the applicant, their return to their father would in any event trigger fear and panic reactions contrary to their best interests. 42. On 21 September 2010 the Regional Court dismissed appeals by C.B. against the decisions of 2 April 2010 and 26 July 2010 concerning her requests for non-enforcement of the return order. It further rejected an appeal by her against the District Court’s decision of 2 April 2010, ordering the disclosure of her address to the applicant. However, it held again that it would be the District Court’s task to obtain safeguards from the French authorities to avoid the children being exposed to a grave risk of physical or psychological harm. 43. On 20 October 2010 the Supreme Court rejected an extraordinary appeal on points of law by C.B. against the Regional Court’s decision of 13 April 2010. It upheld the Regional Court’s reasoning in so far as C.B. was no longer adversely affected by the impugned decision (see paragraph 39 above), but held that it was for the court of first instance to examine whether the circumstances had changed in the meantime in such a way that the enforcement of the return order would now entail a grave risk for the children. 44. On 23 November 2010 the Supreme Court rejected an extraordinary appeal on points of law by C.B. against the Regional Court’s decision of 21 September 2010. It noted that the District Court had already contacted the French Central Authority by letter in accordance with Article 11 (4) of the Brussels IIa Regulation, and that the enforcement of a return order under the Hague Convention could only be stopped if it was established that there were no adequate safeguards to protect the children’s best interests upon their return to France. It therefore called upon the District Court to examine the adequacy of the safeguards offered by the French authorities. 45. On 14 January 2011 the District Court held an oral hearing to examine how best to approach the question whether the children would face a grave risk of harm upon their return to France. The competent judge also requested that C.B. inform her of all the proceedings then pending in France. 46. On 26 January 2011 the judge appointed an expert psychologist, S., and ordered her to submit a report on whether the children’s return to France (either to their father or to a child protection institution) could harm their psychological development. The judge pointed out, inter alia, that due to the arrest warrants (see paragraph 13 above) C.B. was likely to be arrested as soon as she returned the children to France herself, and that the expert’s observation of the father’s and the children’s interactions with each other would be of significant importance with a view to the accusations of ill-treatment directed against him. All the parties were ordered to cooperate with the expert. 47. On 4 February 2011 C.B.’s counsel submitted to the court the requested information concerning the pending proceedings in France (custody proceedings, criminal proceedings against C.B. for child abduction, and criminal proceedings against the applicant for sexual abuse) (see paragraphs 12 – 17 above). 48. On 15 March 2011 C.B. informed the court that the children would not be able to attend the scheduled examination by the appointed expert due to illness; she also submitted a medical certificate describing the children’s illness. 49. On 21 March 2011 C.B. challenged the judge and S. for bias. The president of the District Court dismissed the challenge for bias against the judge on 25 May 2011. C.B. subsequently appealed against that decision and submitted new challenges for bias against the competent judge of the District Court again as well as the panel of judges of the Regional Court which had given the decision of 21 September 2010 (see paragraph 42 above). The District Court, the Regional Court and the Vienna Court of Appeal each subsequently ruled on these challenges for bias and on C.B.’s respective appeals. Her allegations were dismissed with final effect on 7 December 2011 by the Regional Court, which, inter alia, considered C.B.’s allegations to be unfounded and that she had lodged several challenges for bias for tactical reasons. 50. On 7 March 2012 the District Court dismissed C.B.’s challenge against the expert S. 51. On 8 March 2012 the District Court removed S. from the case and appointed another expert psychologist, R. who, unlike S., was a specialist in traumatology. It referred to the Court’s judgment in the case of Šneersone and Kampanella v. Italy (no. 14737/09, 12 July 2011), in which the Court found a violation of Article 8 because the domestic courts in that case had not adequately taken into consideration the risk of psychological trauma that would inevitably stem from a sudden and irreversible cutting of the close ties between mother and child. 52. On 5 April 2012 R. submitted her expert opinion to the District Court; two further psychological opinions were privately commissioned by C.B. and submitted by her counsel to the court at the same stage of the proceedings. 53. On 13 August 2012 the District Court dismissed the applicant’s request of 16 April 2010 for enforcement of the return order (see paragraph 40 above). Referring to the three expert opinions mentioned above (see paragraph 52 above), in particular the one obtained from R., it held that the children had been severely traumatised by all the events which had occurred in their family since 2008, that they were suffering from severe post-traumatic stress disorder, and that a separation from their mother and their return to France would very likely trigger an existential crisis and gravely harm their emotional and cognitive development. The court did not deny that the mother’s adverse influence on the children regarding their father had also contributed to their negative attitude towards him. However, it also stated that the allegations of sexual abuse against him could neither be proven nor excluded. Regarding the statement on the applicant’s mental health in the psychiatric opinion forwarded by the French Central Authority (see paragraph 72 below), the District Court considered that the report had not been drawn up in accordance with the Austrian standards for examining a person’s educational skills as it had only been based on the applicant’s interview with the expert and no psychological tests had been carried out. In contrast, the three expert opinions (see paragraph 52 above) were not only based on C.B.’s allegations, but also on psychological tests of the children and their mother. However, in her examination of the case R. did not hold a meeting between the children and the applicant as such an interaction would have very likely resulted in the children being further traumatised. 54. In its reasoning, the District Court further reiterated that a court could only refuse to return a child for the reasons set out under Article 13 (b) of the Hague Convention if it was not established that adequate measures to protect the child’s best interests after his or her return would be taken. In August 2010 it had therefore requested that the French authorities provide the appropriate safeguards. According to the French Central Authority’s answers by letters of 23 May and 8 July 2011, all conditions would be met to ensure that the children were returned without any risk; they also stated that the children would not be immediately entrusted to the applicant upon their return. The District Court concluded therefore that the children would temporarily be put into foster care, which was contrary to their best interests. It also pointed out that on 26 March 2012 it had held a hearing to discuss possible scenarios concerning the children’s return to France and to consider alternative ways of reestablishing contact between the applicant and the children. Since the applicant had failed to attend the hearing without providing any excuse, the court assumed that the purpose of the proceedings seemed to be more for him to argue out his conflict with C.B. than for the children’s return to France. It further held that a balancing of the competing interests of those involved had to be carried out in such a case, and that the children’s interests were of paramount importance. Referring to the case of Neulinger and Shuruk v. Switzerland ([GC], no. 41615/07, ECHR 2010), the court stated that the possibility of the children being further traumatised, the serious difficulties that they would be likely to encounter under new living conditions in France and the lack of adequate safeguards were reasons why the return order could not be enforced. Instead, psychologically assisted contact between the applicant and the children should be slowly re-established in Austria. 55. The applicant appealed against the decision and challenged the judge for bias. 56. On 1 October 2012 the District Court dismissed the challenge for bias. The decision was upheld by the Regional Court on 20 February 2013. 57. On 7 May 2013 the Regional Court dismissed an appeal by the applicant against the District Court’s decision of 13 August 2012 (see paragraph 53 and 54 above), upholding its reasoning and adding that, due to the arrest warrant against C.B., the children would likely be put into foster care without their mother. 58. On 28 August 2013 the Supreme Court quashed the District Court’s decision of 13 August 2012 and the Regional Court’s decision of 7 May 2013 and remitted the case. It observed that under the Hague Convention the court dealing with an application for return should act expeditiously when deciding it and, subsequently, when providing for the enforcement of an already issued return order. It would be contrary to that obligation if the court delayed or possibly impeded the return of a child by not ruling or by belatedly deciding the parties’ requests. In that context, it noted that in the present case, after the District Court had delivered its decision on 13 August 2012, eleven months had already elapsed before the case eventually came before it. The delay in the return proceedings caused by the abducting parent’s behaviour was not a fact which by itself exempted the authorities from their obligation to swiftly and adequately implement their duties under international law. 59. However, the Supreme Court conceded that, given that the children had meanwhile adapted well to living in Austria and their mental health had become stable, their well-being would be gravely put at risk if the return order was enforced without any safeguards. Nonetheless, it noted that this development was mainly due to the fact that almost four years had elapsed since the return order had become final in October 2009. Therefore, the return order was still enforceable as long as it was not established that no adequate measures would be taken to protect the children’s best interests upon their return to France. The Supreme Court therefore ordered the District Court to clarify whether the arrest warrant issued against C.B. in France could be lifted, to assess whether C.B.’s mother in place of C.B. would be willing to accompany the children to France and care for them in a child protection institution, and to obtain the French authorities’ assurance that the children could live in a child protection institution as close to the applicant as possible. It further held that it was for the applicant to apply to the competent authorities in France for temporary care for his children in a child protection institution, and that it was not for the Austrian courts to establish contact between him and the children under Article 11 (4) of the Brussels IIa Regulation since the establishment of contact for the purposes of the enforcement of a return order fell within the competence of the authorities of the State from which the children had been abducted. 60. On 15 November 2013 the District Court asked the French authorities for information as requested by the Supreme Court in its decision of 28 August 2013. 61. On 31 October 2014, after another oral hearing on 29 August 2014 and a telephone conversation with the public prosecutor at the Poitiers Court of Appeal on 3 September 2014, the District Court again dismissed the applicant’s request of 16 April 2010 for enforcement of the return order (see paragraph 40 above). It held that C.B.’s mother was unwilling to stay temporarily with the children in France after their return and that, in any event, C.B. had to start serving her prison sentence once she entered France. It further noted that the French authorities had formulated different ways of avoiding the children’s separation from their mother, but could not give any guarantees in advance; instead, they had pointed out that C.B. first had to return the children to France before any concrete measures could be taken. The District Court therefore concluded that the French authorities had failed to devise an exact plan which, in particular, would avoid the children being immediately separated from their mother. Given that the children would probably be placed in a child protection institution in a (for them) foreign country and without any familiar caregivers around, there would be a severe risk of harm for them within the meaning of Article 13 (b) of the Hague Convention if they were returned to France. 62. On 11 February 2015 the Regional Court dismissed an appeal by the applicant against the District Court’s decision of 31 October 2014. It conceded that C.B.’s behaviour concerning the removal of the children from France in itself, but also with regard to her delaying tactics in the present proceedings, was unacceptable. However, it was now for the Austrian courts only to decide whether the requirements of Article 11 (4) of the Brussels IIa Regulation were fulfilled, namely whether the children could be returned to France without being separated from their mother. In this regard, it held that the District Court had correctly concluded that the requirements of Article 11 (4) were not fulfilled, since the French authorities had not provided sufficient guarantees to ensure that the children would not suffer severe harm upon their return. It had not been established that the children could stay with C.B. while she was serving her prison sentence, and since their grandmother was unwilling to accompany them to France, they would be left without any caregivers familiar to them. 63. Regarding the applicant’s allegations that the District Court had failed to contact the relevant French authorities and to ask the right questions, the Regional Court held that the French authorities had merely referred to general alternatives without offering any precise answers to the Austrian courts’ concerns. The court considered that the District Court had already made sufficient attempts to obtain concrete guarantees from the French authorities as it was mainly their responsibility to take adequate measures. In particular, the French authorities should have given an undertaking that the decision of 7 January 2009 provisionally determining the children’s main residence with their father would be revoked and that, despite the prison sentence, C.B. would be granted safe conduct in order to be able to participate in the custody proceedings in France. The Regional Court also considered that the applicant’s conduct was not in the children’s best interests either, since the enforcement of the decision of 7 January 2009 and C.B.’s criminal conviction appeared to be more important to him than their well-being, and he did not even realise the seriousness of the burden to which he would expose his children if they were forced to return to him after not having seen him for more than six years. In sum, the Regional Court concluded that because of a lack of adequate “safe harbour orders” the children’s return to France entailed a grave risk for them; furthermore, since they had meanwhile adapted well to living in Vienna, their uprooting would very likely also lead to a severe endangerment of their well-being. 64. On 30 March 2015 the applicant filed an extraordinary appeal on points of law. 65. On 27 April 2015 the Supreme Court rejected the extraordinary appeal on points of law. It confirmed that the children’s separation from their mother in the event of their return to France could still not be excluded because of C.B.’s prison sentence, and that such separation would very likely severely traumatise and psychologically harm them within the meaning of Article 13 (b) of the Hague Convention. It reiterated that the return of the children could not be refused if it was established that the French authorities had made adequate arrangements to protect the children’s best interests upon their return. However, if there remained doubts in this respect, the return would have to be refused. Since the measures as set out by the French authorities had to be considered insufficient to secure the protection of the children upon their return, the non-enforcement of the return order was justified. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court pointed out that the decision was primarily based on what seemed best for the children’s well-being and did not necessarily lead to the conclusion that C.B.’s conduct had been lawful. Lastly, it observed that the applicant still had the possibility of applying to the Austrian courts for contact rights. 66. The decision was served on the applicant on 19 May 2015. 67. In a letter of 6 February 2017 the District Court stated that, to date, the applicant had not applied to the Austrian courts for contact rights. 68. The French Central Authority (bureau de l’entraide civile et commerciale international) at the Ministry of Justice (hereinafter “the FCA”) and its Austrian counterpart at the Federal Ministry of Justice (hereinafter “the ACA”) remained in contact throughout all of the abovementioned proceedings. In their letters, the officials in charge of the case regularly discussed how to protect the children’s best interests upon their return to the applicant. The FCA sent several requests to its counterpart for information on the progress of the case, in particular on the measures taken by the Austrian authorities to locate C.B. and the children and the reasons why the return order had not been enforced. The ACA informed its French counterpart of the respective state of the proceedings, referred to the parties’ requests and appeals as obstacles to the continuation of the enforcement of the return order and considered the actual address of C.B. and the children to be unknown. Regarding the ACA’s requests for safeguards to secure the protection of the children, the FCA pointed out at the beginning of the enforcement proceedings that there were no obstacles impeding the children’s return to their father as the competent French judge had already determined that their main residence was at his home; thus, the French Youth Welfare Office would not be notified of the children’s return to France. However, on 27 November 2009 the FCA confirmed in a letter to the ACA that if the children returned to France, a social worker would meet them at the airport in Paris and take them to their father. 69. In May and August 2010 the competent judge at the District Court twice requested that the FCA help her establish contact with the judge competent in childcare matters (juge des enfants – hereinafter “the children’s judge”) in France because she had doubts as to whether the immediate return of the children to their father would expose them to grave harm and therefore preferred temporary social care for them. 70. On 4 February 2011 the FCA informed its Austrian counterpart that it had been suggested to the public prosecutor in charge of childcare matters that the case be brought before the children’s judge in accordance with Article 11 (4) of the Brussels IIa Regulation, and that the public prosecutor had indicated a wish to do so. 71. On 7 February 2011 the children’s judge at the La Rochelle tribunal de grande instance appointed an expert psychiatrist and ordered him to deliver a report on whether the applicant was suffering from any form of mental illness; on the same day he ordered the STEMOI (Service territorial éducatif de milieu ouvert et d’insertion, a youth welfare service) in La Rochelle to examine the living conditions at the applicant’s home and his educational and emotional skills. 72. On 6 April 2011 the FCA submitted the psychiatric opinion obtained by the children’s judge, which stated that the applicant did not suffer from any form of mental illness, could meet a child’s needs and was very much devoted to his children. 73. On 23 May 2011 the FCA submitted the STEMOI’s pre-report which confirmed that the living conditions provided by the applicant were appropriate to accommodate his children; however, the STEMOI would only be able to assess the applicant’s educational and emotional skills once the children were returned to him. 74. In a letter of 8 July 2011 the FCA confirmed, in reply to the Austrian authorities’ concerns about an immediate return of the children to the applicant and their proposal of temporary social care, that the children would not be entrusted to their father right after their return, and that the children’s judge would monitor their best interests and, if need be, take measures of educational support. 75. On 12 August 2011 the FCA submitted a judgment given by the children’s judge of the La Rochelle tribunal de grande instance on 27 July 2011, which stated that no measures of educational support for the applicant had to be taken at that time. According to the evidence taken so far (see paragraphs 72 and 73 above), the applicant was able to provide appropriate living conditions for his children and did not suffer from any form of mental illness or sexually deviant behaviour. His educational and emotional skills could only be assessed upon the children’s effective return to France, and by the time of their return concrete measures could again be taken into consideration. 76. Following the Supreme Court’s decision of 28 August 2013 (see paragraph 58 above), on 23 December 2013 the FCA informed its Austrian counterpart that it had forwarded the District Court’s request of 15 November 2013 (see paragraph 60 above) to the public prosecutor at the Poitiers Court of Appeal, suggesting that the case again be brought before the children’s judge at the La Rochelle tribunal de grande instance. 77. In a letter of 14 March 2014 the FCA submitted a report which the public prosecutor at the Poitiers Court of Appeal had made on 14 February 2014, in reply to the District Court’s request of 15 November 2013 (see paragraph 60 above). According to the report, C.B., due to the arrest warrant against her, was registered in the French register of persons being searched for by the criminal authorities (fichier des personnes recherchées – “FPR”); thus, she could immediately be arrested once she entered France. However, in the event of her return to France together with her children, the public prosecutor would be prepared to withdraw her from the FPR on the grounds that the children’s return would make it possible for the applicant to see his children, so that the objective of the arrest warrant would then also be achieved. Hence, C.B. would not risk immediate arrest if she entered France. The public prosecutor however noted that in any event C.B. would have to start serving her prison sentence, and that suspending it from the outset would not be possible. She could however apply to serve the sentence under electronic surveillance immediately after being imprisoned if she proved that she had a residence in France. After serving half of the sentence she could then apply for conditional release, which could even be granted earlier if she proved that her children were living with her. As to the civillaw issues of the District Court’s request of 15 November 2013, the public prosecutor referred to the children’s judge’s decision of 27 July 2011 (see paragraph 75 above). 78. In their letter of 14 March 2014, the FCA complemented the public prosecutor’s report by explaining that the children’s judge could order that the children be placed either with their mother, another member of the family or a trusted third party, or eventually in an institution, possibly in the vicinity of the applicant’s home. Such an order would overrule the decision of the Rochefort tribunal de grande instance family judge of 7 January 2009, which had determined that the children’s main residence was with their father. As for C.B.’s prison sentence, it was recommended that she or her counsel contact the competent public prosecutor in advance and already prepare the necessary applications, since it could not be excluded that she would be questioned by the judge in charge of the review of her punishment as early as on the first day of her detention. 79. On 15 April 2014 the FCA submitted confirmation by the children’s judge dated 8 April 2014 that as soon as the effective return of the children was fixed by the Austrian authorities he would be prepared to order temporary foster care for them and educational support for the father to reestablish the ties between them. 80. On 1 July 2014 the FCA submitted another report from the public prosecutor at the Poitiers Court of Appeal which, in reply to another questionnaire of the District Court, repeated the conditions under which C.B. could apply for conditional release. It further stated that the children would not be allowed to stay at the detention centre while C.B. was serving her sentence. During that time they would be cared for by their father or by the Youth Welfare Office. Instead of temporary foster care, the children’s judge could order educational support in an “open setting” consisting of a team of social workers assisting the father with his children. If the exact return date was not communicated by the Austrian authorities in advance and an interim measure had to be adopted quickly due to C.B.’s detention, the public prosecutor would have to order temporary foster care for the children and would have eight days to bring the case before the children’s judge, who would then have to take the necessary steps.