KRŽEVSKI v. "THE FORMER YUGOSLAV REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA"
Inadmissible
Aleš Pejchal;Armen Harutyunyan;Kristina Pardalos;Ledi Bianku;Mirjana Lazarova Trajkovska;Päivi Hirvelä;Robert Spano
1. The applicant, Mr Pero Krževski, is a Macedonian national who was born in 1936 and lives in Skopje. 2. The Macedonian Government (“the Government”) are represented by their Agent, Mr K. Bogdanov. 3. The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. 4. In 2000 the applicant lodged a civil action against his employer, claiming payment of salary supplements. With decisions delivered on 3 March and 22 October 2003 respectively, the Skopje Court of First Instance and the Appeal Court both rejected the applicant’s claim, considering it as having been withdrawn. 5. On 11 February 2005 the applicant applied to the first-instance court for the proceedings to be resumed. The first-instance court ordered the applicant to make his claim more specific. In a reply dated 15 December 2005, the applicant specified that the claim concerned the payment of a 20% increase of his salary, as well as another employment-related allowance. In this connection he referred to his written submissions of April 2001 in which he specified his claim. 6. On 19 December 2005 the first-instance court held that the applicant had not specified the value of his claim to an extend allowing the court to rule on it. Furthermore, the court pointed out that it could not take into consideration his submissions of 2001 since they had been made in proceedings which had terminated with a final decision in 2003. As the applicant could not seek that those final proceedings be resumed, the court rejected the applicant’s request. This decision was confirmed on appeal by the Skopje Court of Appeal on 15 June 2006. 7. On 11 August 2008 the applicant contested these decisions by means of an appeal on points of law. On 30 January 2008 the Supreme Court allowed the applicant’s appeal, quashed the lower courts’ decisions and remitted the case for fresh examination. The relevant parts of the decision read as follows: “... In the present case, the first-instance court correctly ordered [the applicant] to make the claim more specific. According to [this] court, [the applicant] complied with this order and with submissions of 15 December 2005, he specified the claim ... According to the Supreme Court, the claim is (sufficiently) specified and the proceedings can continue. The lower courts’ decisions to reject the claim as incomplete (неуредна) are wrong. In view of the foregoing, (the court) decided in accordance with ... the Civil Proceedings Act of 1998, which was in force when the first-instance court delivered its decision ...” 8. By decisions of 7 November 2008 and 21 May 2009 respectively, the first-instance court and the Appeal Court both dismissed the applicant’s claim on the merits. 9. On 21 July 2009 the applicant challenged these decisions by means of an appeal on points of law. 10. By a decision of 17 February 2011, the Supreme Court rejected the applicant’s appeal as inadmissible ratione valoris, finding that the value of the claim was below the statutory threshold specified in section 372 § 2 of the 2005 Civil Proceedings Act (see paragraph 14 below). The court established that the subject matter of the dispute was the payment of salary supplements. Since it did not concern “termination of employment”, which was specified, under section 372(3) of the 2005 Civil Proceedings Act, as a dispute in which an appeal on points of law was always allowed irrespective of the value of the claim, the court declared the applicant’s appeal inadmissible. It further stated that: “The [applicant] did not specify the value of the claim in his action. In such circumstances, the value of the claim is to be determined on the basis of the amount of court fees paid. The [applicant] paid court fees in the amount of 600 denars (Macedonian denars, MKD), which corresponds to the claim value of MKD 40,000, which is below the (statutory threshold) of MKD 500,000. The appeal on points of law is accordingly inadmissible given the (low) value of the claim.” 11. This decision was notified to the applicant on 30 March 2011. 12. Section 368 §§ 1 and 2 of the 1998 Act provided that parties concerned could lodge an appeal on points of law against a second-instance final decision within thirty days of the service of that decision. An appeal would be inadmissible in a property-related dispute which, inter alia, concerned a pecuniary claim, if the value of the claim in the dispute as specified by the plaintiff did not exceed MKD 1,000,000. 13. Under paragraph 4 of that section an appeal was always allowed in disputes which concerned (i) maintenance; (ii) compensation claims for loss of maintenance due to death of the care provider; (iii) copyright disputes; (iv) industrial-property-related disputes; and disputes concerning unfair competition and anti-competitive behaviour. 14. Under section 372 §§ 2 and 3, parties can lodge an appeal on points of law if the value of the claim in the dispute exceeds MKD 500,000. An appeal is always allowed irrespective of the value of the claim in disputes concerning (i) maintenance; (ii) compensation claims for loss of maintenance due to the death of the care provider; (iii) labour disputes concerning termination of employment; (iv) copyright disputes; (v) industrial-property-related disputes and disputes concerning unfair competition and anti-competitive behaviour. 15. Under section 474, if a first-instance decision was delivered before the 2005 Act became operable, the proceedings are conducted under the rules that were applicable at that time. If the first-instance decision was set aside after this Act became operable, the proceedings continue under this Act. 16. Under section 477, the 2005 Act entered into force on 29 September 2005 and it became operable on 29 December 2005.