No they weren ' t and you should do research dumbass . <| sep |> Shot of the Book of Mazarbul and the Red Book , crap quality but oh well . Can ' t think of any other books from lotr , if i was more familiar with the Hobbit films I ' d grab any from those for ya <| sep |> I know those feels . I was on business in Carolina when Oil were on losing streak . Watching them play poorly starting at 900 on a shitty internet stream is the holy trinity of unenjoy . <| sep |> HighlightsSummary To continue employing amphibious operations in support of American interests , U . S . naval forces require new operating concepts and capabilities that circumvent or defeat increasingly effective coastal defenses . These concepts and capabilities should enable the types of amphibious operations needed in the long term . These two imperatives are interrelated . Amphibious units will need to disperse , become less detectable , and reduce their time in contested areas to dilute enemy salvos and lower the number of weapons arriving at a target to be within the capacity of its defenses . At the same time , precisionguided weapons PGW and new sensor and countermeasure technologies will allow smaller , lighter , and more distributed amphibious forces to achieve similar effects in shorter periods of time than those that fought in previous conflicts . Strategic Problem A U . S . campaign to roll back the results of an act of aggression by one of these potential adversaries might eventually be successful . However , the effort could take weeks or months . An adversary might calculate that rapidly attaining a set of limited objectives could achieve a fait accompli before U . S . forces are able to complete their rollback campaign . Faced with the prospect of lengthy and demanding preparatory operations to regain theater access , the United States might simply conclude that military intervention is not worth the cost . New Operational Concepts for Amphibious Forces Establish and sustain Expeditionary Advanced Bases EABs . EABs in contested areas can support offensive air operations , crossdomain fires , raids , and logistics support at closer ranges and with potentially greater survivability than naval forces at sea or in the air . Execute raids to assure access . Potential adversaries are using coastal sensors and weapons to contest the surface and airspace around their territory . These systems can be difficult to degrade or destroy with air strikes and may need to be rooted out by Marine raids launched from EABs or outside the contested area . Employ crossdomain fires . Groundbased air defenses and surfacetosurface weapons can transform islands and archipelagos into barriers against adversary power projection and increase the number and complexity of fires poised at enemy forces . Conduct surface warfare . Amphibious forces at sea can attack enemy surface combatants with missiles and helicopters to add offensive firepower to U . S . surface forces as well as improve the defense of amphibious ships by challenging enemy surface combatants directly . Impose blockades . The adoption of a concept of denial and punishment for deterrence increases the importance of blockade . Preventing the flow of goods and commodities to the enemy can impose significant costs as an element of punishment .