ult on rwoah . this would cause soo many accidental ults for so many people . I ' ve left my keybinds default , except ult is on mouse 6 Rival 700 , mouse 6 is a button youcan ' t possibly press by accident , and ptt is on mouse 5 so I don ' t have to compromise my movement while using comms , I ' m having enough problems with movement anyway . Also 345 FG for h e llovoicelineemoteyesgroup up <| sep |> A few more days until FFXV is released ! Played the demos and it ' s being pretty fun . If nothing else , the game is VERY pretty . Hype ! <| sep |> The UN is a joke . <| sep |> This should be illegal . <| sep |> It ' s a bit long but here is part of the transcript of the podcast I heard about it on , Security Now # 585 . So anyway , last week ' s security and privacy puzzler asked it posed the question that actually came from a listener that I thought was great . We know that common security practice dictates that compressible data should be compressed before it ' s encrypted because after any data has been encrypted , it by definition will not be compressible because encryption essentially removes the entropy . It removes the patterns . It removes any of the hooks that compression uses in order to squeeze out space . So , for example , a perfect example is if you had in a file a 4 K bit of zeroes . Any compressor worth its salt will look at that and go , whoa , wait a minute . And instead of sending out 4 , 000 zeroes , it ' ll put out one zero and a repeat this 4 , 000 times clause . And so , as a consequence , two little tokens go out across the wire and at the other end , the decompressor understands that , interprets that little token , and then reexpands it to its original size . Well , the problem is that 4 , 000 block of zeroes , if it ' s encrypted , it becomes noise . Any good encryption will turn something like that into something that ' s indistinguishable from any other data . So that can ' t be compressed . So the question we posed was , does compressing , then encrypting , which we know is what you have to do if you ' re going to get any compression , create any threat to security or privacy ? And I guess it was sort of a rhetorical question because we know the answer is yes . Now , we have covered in the past two famous and classic attacks on compressed HTTPS sessions . And that was the CRIME and the BEAST attacks , where the researchers realized that , because the headers of queries were being compressed and encrypted , if they had a means to insert some of their own data , to add some data into the headers and then have it compressed , and if they could see the result after compression so they had to have kind of a strange position on the network . They had to be able to monitor , passively monitor the communications as it was leaving the system , but also have a means of affecting what was being compressed . So it was a theoretical attack . It took a huge amount of time , a crazy number of queries . But it wasn ' t infeasible . But more than anything it demonstrated , okay we have a problem here because this shouldn ' t be allowed to happen . And all it took was the browsers to essentially introduce their own little kludge to work around this potential problem . And that kludge served to obscure the information that this attack was keying on . So we ' ve seen it before . The reason this came back up and I found just a beautiful example of this is some researchers recently , at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill , have extended this concept by successfully attacking encrypted VoIP , that is , Voice over IP communications such as Skype , Fring , Google Talk , and any SIPstyle encrypted comms . It turns out that , in order to get realtime interactivity , in order to have minimal delay , which is what you want in an interactive conversation , the VoIP , the digitized voice , is encrypted in packets , very short packets , so that they ' re able to then immediately be stuck on the wire and get to the other side to be decompressed , or I should say decrypted , decompressed , and then heard . Well , the show notes have just a beautiful , frightening diagram from their research paper , where they demonstrate and they pulled this off . Taking nothing but the packet lengths , they are able , through a series of steps , to determine what was said . And the reason is that it turns out that different vowels and consonants and sibilance and so forth have characteristic sizes , and they compress at sort of welldefined known rates , that is , percentages . And it ' s possible just from the size of the packets to reverseengineer what was said . So , now , once again , if somebody actually wanted encrypted VoIP , there are several things you could do . You could sacrifice the responsiveness , a little bit of the realtime speed , by grouping in blocks rather than sending individual variablelength packets out for the sake of speed . The other thing you could do would be to deliberately pad the packets with a pseudorandom , where the pseudorandom key is known only to the sender , you know , just generated on the fly . You just grab a random number . That drives a pseudorandom number generator that decides how much fluff to add to the packet . The problem , of course , is that that tends to increase the overall bandwidth of the conversation . So there is a cost . But it would solve the problem of this being otherwise essentially decryptable or interpretable without decryption , just using the size . So anyway , I love this as a classic example of why there are applications where you cannot safely compress , then encrypt , just because of the nature of the data you ' re compressing and the way it ' s available . Again , if you were to record an entire conversation in VoIP and digitize it , then compress it as a block and then encrypt it , no problem because you wouldn ' t be getting the little essential time markers of when these utterances were made and how long they each were .