Post - Gadhafi Libya brims with promise , but also with pitfalls . Blessed with low - sulfur oil , proximity to Europe , and recent strong economic growth , the country should be poised to move forward . But that ’ s only if the risks of tribal conflicts and the challenges of a very young population and regional divisions can be managed . As Tito held Yugoslavia together , and the Soviet dictatorship kept dozens of nations under one boot , Libya has been unified under one autocrat for 42 years . That reality allowed outsiders who interacted with Libya to pay less attention to its domestic politics , formal and informal . The price of inattention , coming due now , is that policymakers in the West are scrambling to acquire the necessary map of interests and personalities , the history of conflicts and alliances that might inform the way forward . Our experience shows that old governance patterns are very durable , notwithstanding aspirations and promises of new governance values . What other recent post - conflict evolutions also tell us is that outsiders can be enormously helpful , but that enthusiasm for initial leaders and their promises shouldn ’ t get in the way of making the new state ’ s legitimacy a high priority along with support for its capacity and effectiveness . Donor funds can rebuild infrastructure and improve service delivery . But it ’ s more difficult by far to invest in institutions that assure the ongoing legitimacy of the new state . Will all Libyans trust their government to treat them fairly ? Here ’ s what we think our experience in other countries has to teach those advising the National Transitional Council : 1 . Security is number one . Security for government installations , banks and other critical sites is paramount , but so is security for individuals against crime and retribution , and a rebel army is not a suitable force for policing civilians . The remnants of Gadhafi ’ s army and security forces , excluding only officers who ordered their troops to kill Libyans , should be offered places in a new Libyan military and police if they first agree to take at least six months of training in democratic policing . Given the urgency of establishing a police force , the U . N . should offer its training services and temporary staffing support to help the transitional government maintain order and security . 2 . Embrace federalism . The Berbers of the south and west , who helped defeat Gadhafi ’ s forces , want their language and culture recognized as primary in their region . The Eastern region does not want Tripoli to dominate either , and tribes there expect some degree of self - government . So building a new centralized regime in Tripoli should not be a goal . Western donors , oil consumers , and geo - politicians will push to build and support a unified state that can deliver key services and command and allocate resources . Better now would be a federal system based on the regional self - determination needed to ensure broad cooperation and participation in a new Libyan regime . While Egypt benefits from a widely shared sense of “ Egyptness , ” this is not Libya ’ s luck . 3 . Elections should not be rushed . Important stabilizing forces , elections must be legitimate , and their results must be accepted by all major parties . However , achieving the agreements and the capacity to hold such voting takes time . Libya ’ s interim government should wait 12 to 15 months before holding national elections . 4 . Jobs , jobs , jobs . Like the rest of North Africa , Libya has a large number of young men without sufficient employment . Putting people to work and restoring the war - torn economy will be vital to retaining support for the interim government and the transition to democracy . Infrastructure spending , government positions , and incentives for foreign investment all need to be cranked up to keep young men gainfully employed . Outsiders have diverse interests requiring coordination , and decisions need to be , and will be , made by Libyans . But that ’ s no excuse for reducing assistance to only those activities that can find agreement among the new Libyan leadership . A post - conflict development strategy that takes account of existing institutions , that targets all aspects of state capacity ― not just immediate humanitarian and technocratic needs ― can meet the long - term objectives of Libyans and most outside parties . Adding muscle to institutions that constrain opportunism by new state actors can help Libya avoid some pitfalls of other post - conflict regimes . If these steps are taken , Libya should make great strides toward democracy . It will not be a perfect democracy ― no country is . But if Libya can do as well as Malaysia or Georgia , it will be doing all right economically , and its people will enjoy their hard - won freedom . By Jack Goldstone and Charles Cadwell Jack Goldstone is the Virginia E . and John T . Hazel Jr . professor and director of the Center for Global Policy at George Mason University . Charles Cadwell is the director of the Center on International Development & Governance at The Urban Institute . ― Ed . ( The Urban Institute / MCT Information Services )