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You can also find out about how to make adonation to Project Gutenberg , and how to get involved . ** Welcome To The World of Free Plain Vanilla Electronic Texts **** eBooks Readable By Both Humans and By Computers , Since 1971 ******* These eBooks Were Prepared By Thousands of Volunteers ! ***** Title : An Enquiry Concerning Human UnderstandingAuthor : David Hume et alRelease Date : January , 2006 [ EBook # 9662 ] [ This file was first posted on October 14 , 2003 ] [ Most recently updated : October 16 , 2007 ] Edition : 10 Language : EnglishCharacter set encoding : iso - 8859 - 1 *** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK , AN ENQUIRY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING *** E - text prepared by Jonathan Ingramand Project Gutenberg Distributed Proofreaders DAVID HUMEAN ENQUIRY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING . Extracted from : ENQUIRIES CONCERNING THE HUMAN UNDERSTANDING , AND CONCERNING THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS , BY DAVID HUME . REPRINTED FROM THE POSTHUMOUS EDITION OF 1777 , AND EDITED WITH INTRODUCTION , COMPARATIVE TABLES OF CONTENTS , AND ANALYTICAL INDEX BY L . A . SELBY - BIGGE , M . A . , LATE FELLOW OF UNIVERSITY COLLEGE , OXFORD . SECOND EDITION , 1902 CONTENTSI . Of the Different Species of PhilosophyII . Of the Origin of IdeasIII . Of the Association of IdeasIV . Sceptical Doubts Concerning the Operations of the UnderstandingV . Sceptical Solution of these DoubtsVI . Of ProbabilityVII . Of the Idea of Necessary ConnexionVIII . Of Liberty and NecessityIX . Of the Reason of AnimalsX . Of MiraclesXI . Of a Particular Providence and of a Future StateXII . Of the Academical or Sceptical P h i l o s ophyFootnotesIndexSECTION 1 . OF THE DIFFERENT SPECIES OF PHILOSOPHY . 1 . Moral philosophy , or the science of human nature , may be treated after two different manners ; each of which has its peculiar merit , and may contribute to the entertainment , instruction , and reformation of mankind . The one considers man chiefly as born for action ; and as influenced in his measures by taste and sentiment ; pursuing one object , and avoiding another , according to the value which these objects seem to possess , and according to the light in which they present themselves . As virtue , of all objects , is allowed to be the most valuable , this species of philosophers paint her in the most amiable colours ; borrowing all helps from poetry and eloquence , and treating their subject in an easy and obvious manner , and such as is best fitted to please the imagination , and engage the affections . They select the most striking observations and instances from common life ; place opposite characters in a proper contrast ; and alluring us into the paths of virtue by the views of glory and happiness , direct our steps in these paths by the soundest precepts and most illustrious examples . They make us feel the difference between vice and virtue ; they excite and regulate our sentiments ; and so they can but bend our hearts to the love of probity and true honour , they think , that they have fully attained the end of all their labours . 2 . The other species of philosophers consider man in the light of a reasonable rather than an active being , and endeavour to form his understanding more than cultivate his manners . They regard human nature as a subject of speculation ; and with a narrow scrutiny examine it , in order to find those principles , which regulate our understanding , excite our sentiments , and make us approve or blame any particular object , action , or behaviour . They think it a reproach to all literature , that philosophy should not yet have fixed , beyond controversy , the foundation of morals , reasoning , and criticism ; and should for ever talk of truth and falsehood , vice and virtue , beauty and deformity , without being able to determine the source of these distinctions . While they attempt this arduous task , they are deterred by no difficulties ; but proceeding from particular instances to general principles , they still push on their enquiries to principles more general , and rest not satisfied till they arrive at those original principles , by which , in every science , all human curiosity must be bounded . Though their speculations seem abstract , and even unintelligible to common readers , they aim at the approbation of the learned and the wise ; and think themselves sufficiently compensated for the labour of their whole lives , if they can discover some hidden truths , which may contribute to the instruction of posterity . 3 . It is certain that the easy and obvious philosophy will always , with the generality of mankind , have the preference above the accurate and abstruse ; and by many will be recommended , not only as more agreeable , but more useful than the other . It enters more into common life ; moulds the heart and affections ; and , by touching those principles which actuate men , reforms their conduct , and brings them nearer to that model of perfection which it describes . on the contrary , the abstruse philosophy , being founded on a turn of mind , which cannot enter into business and action , vanishes when the philosopher leaves the shade , and comes into open day ; nor can its principles easily retain any influence over our conduct and behaviour . The feelings of our heart , the agitation of our passions , the vehemence of our affections , dissipate all its conclusions , and reduce the profound philosopher to a mere plebeian . 4 . This also must be confessed , that the most durable , as well as justest fame , has been acquired by the easy philosophy , and that abstract reasoners seem hitherto to have enjoyed only a momentary reputation , from the caprice or ignorance of their own age , but have not been able to support their renown with more equitable posterity . It is easy for a profound philosopher to commit a mistake in his subtile reasonings ; and one mistake is the necessary parent of another , while he pushes on his consequences , and is not deterred from embracing any conclusion , by its unusual appearance , or its contradiction to popular opinion . But a philosopher , who purposes only to represent the common sense of mankind in more beautiful and more engaging colours , if by accident he falls into error , goes no farther ; but renewing his appeal to common sense , and the natural sentiments of the mind , returns into the right path , and secures himself from any dangerous illusions . The fame of Cicero flourishes at present ; but that of Aristotle is utterly decayed . La Bruyere passes the seas , and still maintains his reputation : But the glory of Malebranche is confined to his own nation , and to his own age . And Addison , perhaps , will be read with pleasure , when Locke shall be entirely forgotten . The mere philosopher is a character , which is commonly but little acceptable in the world , as being supposed to contribute nothing either to the advantage or pleasure of society ; while he lives remote from communication with mankind , and is wrapped up in principles and notions equally remote from their comprehension . on the other hand , the mere ignorant is still more despised ; nor is any thing deemed a surer sign of an illiberal genius in an age and nation where the sciences flourish , than to be entirely destitute of all relish for those noble entertainments . The most perfect character is supposed to lie between those extremes ; retaining an equal ability and taste for books , company , and business ; preserving in conversation that discernment and delicacy which arise from polite letters ; and in business , that probity and accuracy which are the natural result of a just philosophy . In order to diffuse and cultivate so accomplished a character , nothing can be more useful than compositions of the easy style and manner , which draw not too much from life , require no deep application or retreat to be comprehended , and send back the student among mankind full of noble sentiments and wise precepts , applicable to every exigence of human life . By means of such compositions , virtue becomes amiable , science agreeable , company instructive , and retirement entertaining . Man is a reasonable being ; and as such , receives from science his proper food and nourishment : But so narrow are the bounds of human understanding , that little satisfaction can be hoped for in this particular , either from the extent of security or his acquisitions . Man is a sociable , no less than a reasonable being : But neither can he always enjoy company agreeable and amusing , or preserve the proper relish for them . Man is also an active being ; and from that disposition , as well as from the various necessities of human life , must submit to business and occupation : But the mind requires some relaxation , and cannot always support its bent to care and industry . It seems , then , that nature has pointed out a mixed kind of life as most suitable to the human race , and secretly admonished them to allow none of these biasses to draw too much , so as to incapacitate them for other occupations and entertainments . Indulge your passion for science , says she , but let your science be human , and such as may have a direct reference to action and society . Abstruse thought and profound researches I prohibit , and will severely punish , by the pensive melancholy which they introduce , by the endless uncertainty in which they involve you , and by the cold reception which your pretended discoveries shall meet with , when communicated . Be a philosopher ; but , amidst all your philosophy , be still a man . 5 . Were the generality of mankind contented to prefer the easy philosophy to the abstract and profound , without throwing any blame or contempt on the latter , it might not be improper , perhaps , to comply with this general opinion , and allow every man to enjoy , without opposition , his own taste and sentiment . But as the matter is often carried farther , even to the absolute rejecting of all profound reasonings , or what is commonly called metaphysics , we shall now proceed to consider what can reasonably be pleaded in their behalf . We may begin with observing , that one considerable advantage , which results from the accurate and abstract philosophy , is , its subserviency to the easy and humane ; which , without the former , can never attain a sufficient degree of exactness in its sentiments , precepts , or reasonings . All polite letters are nothing but pictures of human life in various attitudes and situations ; and inspire us with different sentiments , of praise or blame , admiration or ridicule , according to the qualities of the object , which they set before us . An artist must be better qualified to succeed in this undertaking , who , besides a delicate taste and a quick apprehension , possesses an accurate knowledge of the internal fabric , the operations of the understanding , the workings of the passions , and the various species of sentiment which discriminate vice and virtue . How painful soever this inward search or enquiry may appear , it becomes , in some measure , requisite to those , who would describe with success the obvious and outward appearances of life and manners . The anatomist presents to the eye the most hideous and disagreeable objects ; but his science is useful to the painter in delineating even a Venus or an Helen . While the latter employs all the richest colours of his art , and gives his figures the most graceful and engaging airs ; he must still carry his attention to the inward structure of the human body , the position of the muscles , the fabric of the bones , and the use and figure of every part or organ . Accuracy is , in every case , advantageous to beauty , and just reasoning to delicate sentiment . In vain would we exalt the one by depreciating the other . Besides , we may observe , in every art or profession , even those which most concern life or action , that a spirit of accuracy , however acquired , carries all of them nearer their perfection , and renders them more subservient to the interests of society . And though a philosopher may live remote from business , the genius of philosophy , if carefully cultivated by several , must gradually diffuse itself throughout the whole society , and bestow a similar correctness on every art and calling . The politician will acquire greater foresight and subtility , in the subdividing and balancing of power ; the lawyer more method and finer principles in his reasonings ; and the general more regularity in his discipline , and more caution in his plans and operations . The stability of modern governments above the ancient , and the accuracy of modern philosophy , have improved , and probably will still improve , by similar gradations . 6 . Were there no advantage to be reaped from these studies , beyond the gratification of an innocent curiosity , yet ought not even this to be despised ; as being one accession to those few safe and harmless pleasures , which are bestowed on human race . The sweetest and most inoffensive path of life leads through the avenues of science and learning ; and whoever can either remove any obstructions in this way , or open up any new prospect , ought so far to be esteemed a benefactor to mankind . And though these researches may appear painful and fatiguing , it is with some minds as with some bodies , which being endowed with vigorous and florid health , require severe exercise , and reap a pleasure from what , to the generality of mankind , may seem burdensome and laborious . Obscurity , indeed , is painful to the mind as well as to the eye ; but to bring light from obscurity , by whatever labour , must needs be delightful and rejoicing . But this obscurity in the profound and abstract philosophy , is objected to , not only as painful and fatiguing , but as the inevitable source of uncertainty and error . Here indeed lies the justest and most plausible objection against a considerable part of metaphysics , that they are not properly a science ; but arise either from the fruitless efforts of human vanity , which would penetrate into subjects utterly inaccessible to the understanding , or from the craft of popular superstitions , which , being unable to defend themselves on fair ground , raise these intangling brambles to cover and protect their weakness . Chaced from the open country , these robbers fly into the forest , and lie in wait to break in upon every unguarded avenue of the mind , and overwhelm it with religious fears and prejudices . The stoutest antagonist , if he remit his watch a moment , is oppressed . And many , through cowardice and folly , open the gates to the enemies , and willingly receive them with reverence and submission , as their legal sovereigns . 7 . But is this a sufficient reason , why philosophers should desist from such researches , and leave superstition still in possession of her retreat ? Is it not proper to draw an opposite conclusion , and perceive the necessity of carrying the war into the most secret recesses of the enemy ? In vain do we hope , that men , from frequent disappointment , will at last abandon such airy sciences , and discover the proper province of human reason . For , besides , that many persons find too sensible an interest in perpetually recalling such topics ; besides this , I say , the motive of blind despair can never reasonably have place in the sciences ; since , however unsuccessful former attempts may have proved , there is still room to hope , that the industry , good fortune , or improved sagacity of succeeding generations may reach discoveries unknown to former ages . Each adventurous genius will still leap at the arduous prize , and find himself stimulated , rather that discouraged , by the failures of his predecessors ; while he hopes that the glory of achieving so hard an adventure is reserved for him alone . The only method of freeing learning , at once , from these abstruse questions , is to enquire seriously into the nature of human understanding , and show , from an exact analysis of its powers and capacity , that it is by no means fitted for such remote and abstruse subjects . We must submit to this fatigue , in order to live at ease ever after : And must cultivate true metaphysics with some care , in order to destroy the false and adulterate . Indolence , which , to some persons , affords a safeguard against this deceitful philosophy , is , with others , overbalanced by curiosity ; and despair , which , at some moments , prevails , may give place afterwards to sanguine hopes and expectations . Accurate and just reasoning is the only catholic remedy , fitted for all persons and all dispositions ; and is alone able to subvert that abstruse philosophy and metaphysical jargon , which , being mixed up with popular superstition , renders it in a manner impenetrable to careless reasoners , and gives it the air of science and wisdom . 8 . Besides this advantage of rejecting , after deliberate enquiry , the most uncertain and disagreeable part of learning , there are many positive advantages , which result from an accurate scrutiny into the powers and faculties of human nature . It is remarkable concerning the operations of the mind , that , though most intimately present to us , yet , whenever they become the object of reflexion , they seem involved in obscurity ; nor can the eye readily find those lines and boundaries , which discriminate and distinguish them . The objects are too fine to remain long in the same aspect or situation ; and must be apprehended in an instant , by a superior penetration , derived from nature , and improved by habit and reflexion . It becomes , therefore , no inconsiderable part of science barely to know the different operations of the mind , to separate them from each other , to class them under their proper heads , and to correct all that seeming disorder , in which they lie involved , when made the object of reflexion and enquiry . This talk of ordering and distinguishing , which has no merit , when performed with regard to external bodies , the objects of our senses , rises in its value , when directed towards the operations of the mind , in proportion to the difficulty and labour , which we meet with in performing it . And if we can go no farther than this mental geography , or delineation of the distinct parts and powers of the mind , it is at least a satisfaction to go so far ; and the more obvious this science may appear ( and it is by no means obvious ) the more contemptible still must the ignorance of it be esteemed , in all pretenders to learning and philosophy . Nor can there remain any suspicion , that this science is uncertain and chimerical ; unless we should entertain such a scepticism as is entirely subversive of all speculation , and even action . It cannot be doubted , that the mind is endowed with several powers and faculties , that these powers are distinct from each other , that what is really distinct to the immediate perception may be distinguished by reflexion ; and consequently , that there is a truth and falsehood in all propositions on this subject , and a truth and falsehood , which lie not beyond the compass of human understanding . There are many obvious distinctions of this kind , such as those between the will and understanding , the imagination and passions , which fall within the comprehension of every human creature ; and the finer and more philosophical distinctions are no less real and certain , though more difficult to be comprehended . Some instances , especially late ones , of success in these enquiries , may give us a juster notion of the certainty and solidity of this branch of learning . And shall we esteem it worthy the labour of a philosopher to give us a true system of the planets , and adjust the position and order of those remote bodies ; while we affect to overlook those , who , with so much success , delineate the parts of the mind , in which we are so intimately concerned ? 9 . But may we not hope , that philosophy , if cultivated with care , and encouraged by the attention of the public , may carry its researches still farther , and discover , at least in some degree , the secret springs and principles , by which the human mind is actuated in its operations ? Astronomers had long contented themselves with proving , from the phaenomena , the true motions , order , and magnitude of the heavenly bodies : Till a philosopher , at last , arose , who seems , from the happiest reasoning , to have also determined the laws and forces , by which the revolutions of the planets are governed and directed . The like has been performed with regard to other parts of nature . And there is no reason to despair of equal success in our enquiries concerning the mental powers and economy , if prosecuted with equal capacity and caution . It is probable , that one operation and principle of the mind depends on another ; which , again , may be resolved into one more general and universal : And how far these researches may possibly be carried , it will be difficult for us , before , or even after , a careful trial , exactly to determine . This is certain , that attempts of this kind are every day made even by those who philosophize the most negligently : And nothing can be more requisite than to enter upon the enterprize with thorough care and attention ; that , if it lie within the compass of human understanding , it may at last be happily achieved ; if not , it may , however , be rejected with some confidence and security . This last conclusion , surely , is not desirable ; nor ought it to be embraced too rashly . For how much must we diminish from the beauty and value of this species of philosophy , upon such a supposition ? Moralists have hitherto been accustomed , when they considered the vast multitude and diversity of those actions that excite our approbation or dislike , to search for some common principle , on which this variety of sentiments might depend . And though they have sometimes carried the matter too far , by their passion for some one general principle ; it must , however , be confessed , that they are excusable in expecting to find some general principles , into which all the vices and virtues were justly to be resolved . The like has been the endeavour of critics , logicians , and even politicians : Nor have their attempts been wholly unsuccessful ; though perhaps longer time , greater accuracy , and more ardent application may bring these sciences still nearer their perfection . To throw up at once all pretensions of this kind may justly be deemed more rash , precipitate , and dogmatical , than even the boldest and most affirmative philosophy , that has ever attempted to impose its crude dictates and principles on mankind . 10 . What though these reasonings concerning human nature seem abstract , and of difficult comprehension ? This affords no presumption of their falsehood . on the contrary , it seems impossible , that what has hitherto escaped so many wise and profound philosophers can be very obvious and easy . And whatever pains these researches may cost us , we may think ourselves sufficiently rewarded , not only in point of profit but of pleasure , if , by that means , we can make any addition to our stock of knowledge , in subjects of such unspeakable importance . But as , after all , the abstractedness of these speculations is no recommendation , but rather a disadvantage to them , and as this difficulty may perhaps be surmounted by care and art , and the avoiding of all unnecessary detail , we have , in the following enquiry , attempted to throw some light upon subjects , from which uncertainty has hitherto deterred the wise , and obscurity the ignorant . Happy , if we can unite the boundaries of the different species of philosophy , by reconciling profound enquiry with clearness , and truth with novelty ! And still more happy , if , reasoning in this easy manner , we can undermine the foundations of an abstruse philosophy , which seems to have hitherto served only as a shelter to superstition , and a cover to absurdity and error ! SECTION IIOF THE ORIGIN OF IDEAS . 11 . Every one will readily allow , that there is a considerable difference between the perceptions of the mind , when a man feels the pain of excessive heat , or the pleasure of moderate warmth , and when he afterwards recalls to his memory this sensation , or anticipates it by his imagination . These faculties may mimic or copy the perceptions of the senses ; but they never can entirely reach the force and vivacity of the original sentiment . The utmost we say of them , even when they operate with greatest vigour , is , that they represent their object in so lively a manner , that we could almost say we feel or see it : But , except the mind be disordered by disease or madness , they never can arrive at such a pitch of vivacity , as to render these perceptions altogether undistinguishable . All the colours of poetry , however splendid , can never paint natural objects in such a manner as to make the description be taken for a real landskip . The most lively thought is still inferior to the dullest sensation . We may observe a like distinction to run through all the other perceptions of the mind . A man in a fit of anger , is actuated in a very different manner from one who only thinks of that emotion . If you tell me , that any person is in love , I easily understand your meaning , and form a just conception of his situation ; but never can mistake that conception for the real disorders and agitations of the passion . When we reflect on our past sentiments and affections , our thought is a faithful mirror , and copies its objects truly ; but the colours which it employs are faint and dull , in comparison of those in which our original perceptions were clothed . It requires no nice discernment or metaphysical head to mark the distinction between them . 12 . Here therefore we may divide all the perceptions of the mind into two classes or species , which are distinguished by their different degrees of force and vivacity . The less forcible and lively are commonly denominated Thoughts or Ideas . The other species want a name in our language , and in most others ; I suppose , because it was not requisite for any , but philosophical purposes , to rank them under a general term or appellation . Let us , therefore , use a little freedom , and call them Impressions ; employing that word in a sense somewhat different from the usual . By the term impression , then , I mean all our more lively perceptions , when we hear , or see , or feel , or love , or hate , or desire , or will . And impressions are distinguished from ideas , which are the less lively perceptions , of which we are conscious , when we reflect on any of those sensations or movements above mentioned . 13 . Nothing , at first view , may seem more unbounded than the thought of man , which not only escapes all human power and authority , but is not even restrained within the limits of nature and reality . To form monsters , and join incongruous shapes and appearances , costs the imagination no more trouble than to conceive the most natural and familiar objects . And while the body is confined to one planet , along which it creeps with pain and difficulty ; the thought can in an instant transport us into the most distant regions of the universe ; or even beyond the universe , into the unbounded chaos , where nature is supposed to lie in total confusion . What never was seen , or heard of , may yet be conceived ; nor is any thing beyond the power of thought , except what implies an absolute contradiction . But though our thought seems to possess this unbounded liberty , we shall find , upon a nearer examination , that it is really confined within very narrow limits , and that all this creative power of the mind amounts to no more than the faculty of compounding , transposing , augmenting , or diminishing the materials afforded us by the senses and experience . When we think of a golden mountain , we only join two consistent ideas , gold , and mountain , with which we were formerly acquainted . A virtuous horse we can conceive ; because , from our own feeling , we can conceive virtue ; and this we may unite to the figure and shape of a horse , which is an animal familiar to us . In short , all the materials of thinking are derived either from our outward or inward sentiment : the mixture and composition of these belongs alone to the mind and will . Or , to express myself in philosophical language , all our ideas or more feeble perceptions are copies of our impressions or more lively ones . 14 . To prove this , the two following arguments will , I hope , be sufficient . First , when we analyze our thoughts or ideas , however compounded or sublime , we always find that they resolve themselves into such simple ideas as were copied from a precedent feeling or sentiment . Even those ideas , which , at first view , seem the most wide of this origin , are found , upon a nearer scrutiny , to be derived from it . The idea of God , as meaning an infinitely intelligent , wise , and good Being , arises from reflecting on the operations of our own mind , and augmenting , without limit , those qualities of goodness and wisdom . We may prosecute this enquiry to what length we please ; where we shall always find , that every idea which we examine is copied from a similar impression . Those who would assert that this position is not universally true nor without exception , have only one , and that an easy method of refuting it ; by producing that idea , which , in their opinion , is not derived from this source . It will then be incumbent on us , if we would maintain our doctrine , to produce the impression , or lively perception , which corresponds to it . 15 . Secondly . If it happen , from a defect of the organ , that a man is not susceptible of any species of sensation , we always find that he is as little susceptible of the correspondent ideas . A blind man can form no notion of colours ; a deaf man of sounds . Restore either of them that sense in which he is deficient ; by opening this new inlet for his sensations , you also open an inlet for the ideas ; and he finds no difficulty in conceiving these objects . The case is the same , if the object , proper for exciting any sensation , has never been applied to the organ . A Laplander or Negro has no notion of the relish of wine . And though there are few or no instances of a like deficiency in the mind , where a person has never felt or is wholly incapable of a sentiment or passion that belongs to his species ; yet we find the same observation to take place in a less degree . A man of mild manners can form no idea of inveterate revenge or cruelty ; nor can a selfish heart easily conceive the heights of friendship and generosity . It is readily allowed , that other beings may possess many senses of which we can have no conception ; because the ideas of them have never been introduced to us in the only manner by which an idea can have access to the mind , to wit , by the actual feeling and sensation . 16 . There is , however , one contradictory phenomenon , which may prove that it is not absolutely impossible for ideas to arise , independent of their correspondent impressions . I believe it will readily be allowed , that the several distinct ideas of colour , which enter by the eye , or those of sound , which are conveyed by the ear , are really different from each other ; though , at the same time , resembling . Now if this be true of different colours , it must be no less so of the different shades of the same colour ; and each shade produces a distinct idea , independent of the rest . For if this should be denied , it is possible , by the continual gradation of shades , to run a colour insensibly into what is most remote from it ; and if you will not allow any of the means to be different , you cannot , without absurdity , deny the extremes to be the same . Suppose , therefore , a person to have enjoyed his sight for thirty years , and to have become perfectly acquainted with colours of all kinds except one particular shade of blue , for instance , which it never has been his fortune to meet with . Let all the different shades of that colour , except that single one , be placed before him , descending gradually from the deepest to the lightest ; it is plain that he will perceive a blank , where that shade is wanting , and will be sensible that there is a greater distance in that place between the contiguous colours than in any other . Now I ask , whether it be possible for him , from his own imagination , to supply this deficiency , and raise up to himself the idea of that particular shade , though it had never been conveyed to him by his senses ? I believe there are few but will be of opinion that he can : and this may serve as a proof that the simple ideas are not always , in every instance , derived from the correspondent impressions ; though this instance is so singular , that it is scarcely worth our observing , and does not merit that for it alone we should alter our general maxim . 17 . Here , therefore , is a proposition , which not only seems , in itself , simple and intelligible ; but , if a proper use were made of it , might render every dispute equally intelligible , and banish all that jargon , which has so long taken possession of metaphysical reasonings , and drawn disgrace upon them . All ideas , especially abstract ones , are naturally faint and obscure : the mind has but a slender hold of them : they are apt to be confounded with other resembling ideas ; and when we have often employed any term , though without a distinct meaning , we are apt to imagine it has a determinate idea annexed to it . on the contrary , all impressions , that is , all sensations , either outward or inward , are strong and vivid : the limits between them are more exactly determined : nor is it easy to fall into any error or mistake with regard to them . When we entertain , therefore , any suspicion that a philosophical term is employed without any meaning or idea ( as is but too frequent ) , we need but enquire , from what impression is that supposed idea derived ? And if it be impossible to assign any , this will serve to confirm our suspicion . By bringing ideas into so clear a light we may reasonably hope to remove all dispute , which may arise , concerning their nature and reality . 1 SECTION III . OF THE ASSOCIATION OF IDEAS . 18 . It is evident that there is a principle of connexion between the different thoughts or ideas of the mind , and that , in their appearance to the memory or imagination , they introduce each other with a certain degree of method and regularity . In our more serious thinking or discourse this is so observable that any particular thought , which breaks in upon the regular tract or chain of ideas , is immediately remarked and rejected . And even in our wildest and most wandering reveries , nay in our very dreams , we shall find , if we reflect , that the imagination ran not altogether at adventures , but that there was still a connexion upheld among the different ideas , which succeeded each other . Were the loosest and freest conversation to be transcribed , there would immediately be observed something which connected it in all its transitions . Or where this is wanting , the person who broke the thread of discourse might still inform you , that there had secretly revolved in his mind a succession of thought , which had gradually led him from the subject of conversation . Among different languages , even where we cannot suspect the least connexion or communication , it is found , that the words , expressive of ideas , the most compounded , do yet nearly correspond to each other : a certain proof that the simple ideas , comprehended in the compound ones , were bound together by some universal principle , which had an equal influence on all mankind . 19 . Though it be too obvious to escape observation , that different ideas are connected together ; I do not find that any philosopher has attempted to enumerate or class all the principles of association ; a subject , however , that seems worthy of curiosity . To me , there appear to be only three principles of connexion among ideas , namely , Resemblance , Contiguity in time or place , and Cause or Effect . That these principles serve to connect ideas will not , I believe , be much doubted . A picture naturally leads our thoughts to the original 2 : the mention of one apartment in a building naturally introduces an enquiry or discourse concerning the others 3 : and if we think of a wound , we can scarcely forbear reflecting on the pain which follows it 4 . But that this enumeration is complete , and that there are no other principles of association except these , may be difficult to prove to the satisfaction of the reader , or even to a man ' s own satisfaction . All we can do , in such cases , is to run over several instances , and examine carefully the principle which binds the different thoughts to each other , never stopping till we render the principle as general as possible 5 . The more instances we examine , and the more care we employ , the more assurance shall we acquire , that the enumeration , which we form from the whole , is complete and entire . SECTION IV . SCEPTICAL DOUBTS CONCERNING THE OPERATIONS OF THE UNDERSTANDING . PART I . 20 . All the objects of human reason or enquiry may naturally be divided into two kinds , to wit , Relations of Ideas , and Matters of Fact . Of the first kind are the sciences of Geometry , Algebra , and Arithmetic ; and in short , every affirmation which is either intuitively or demonstratively certain . That the square of the hypothenuse is equal to the square of the two sides , is a proposition which expresses a relation between these figures . That three times five is equal to the half of thirty , expresses a relation between these numbers . Propositions of this kind are discoverable by the mere operation of thought , without dependence on what is anywhere existent in the universe . Though there never were a circle or triangle in nature , the truths demonstrated by Euclid would for ever retain their certainty and evidence . 21 . Matters of fact , which are the second objects of human reason , are not ascertained in the same manner ; nor is our evidence of their truth , however great , of a like nature with the foregoing . The contrary of every matter of fact is still possible ; because it can never imply a contradiction , and is conceived by the mind with the same facility and distinctness , as if ever so conformable to reality . That the sun will not rise to - morrow is no less intelligible a proposition , and implies no more contradiction than the affirmation , that it will rise . We should in vain , therefore , attempt to demonstrate its falsehood . Were it demonstratively false , it would imply a contradiction , and could never be distinctly conceived by the mind . It may , therefore , be a subject worthy of curiosity , to enquire what is the nature of that evidence which assures us of any real existence and matter of fact , beyond the present testimony of our senses , or the records of our memory . This part of philosophy , it is observable , has been little cultivated , either by the ancients or moderns ; and therefore our doubts and errors , in the prosecution of so important an enquiry , may be the more excusable ; while we march through such difficult paths without any guide or direction . They may even prove useful , by exciting curiosity , and destroying that implicit faith and security , which is the bane of all reasoning and free enquiry . The discovery of defects in the common philosophy , if any such there be , will not , I presume , be a discouragement , but rather an incitement , as is usual , to attempt something more full and satisfactory than has yet been proposed to the public . 22 . All reasonings concerning matter of fact seem to be founded on the relation of Cause and Effect . By means of that relation alone we can go beyond the evidence of our memory and senses . If you were to ask a man , why he believes any matter of fact , which is absent ; for instance , that his friend is in the country , or in France ; he would give you a reason ; and this reason would be some other fact ; as a letter received from him , or the knowledge of his former resolutions and promises . A man finding a watch or any other machine in a desert island , would conclude that there had once been men in that island . All our reasonings concerning fact are of the same nature . And here it is constantly supposed that there is a connexion between the present fact and that which is inferred from it . Were there nothing to bind them together , the inference would be entirely precarious . The hearing of an articulate voice and rational discourse in the dark assures us of the presence of some person : Why ? because these are the effects of the human make and fabric , and closely connected with it . If we anatomize all the other reasonings of this nature , we shall find that they are founded on the relation of cause and effect , and that this relation is either near or remote , direct or collateral . Heat and light are collateral effects of fire , and the one effect may justly be inferred from the other . 23 . If we would satisfy ourselves , therefore , concerning the nature of that evidence , which assures us of matters of fact , we must enquire how we arrive at the knowledge of cause and effect . I shall venture to affirm , as a general proposition , which admits of no exception , that the knowledge of this relation is not , in any instance , attained by reasonings a priori ; but arises entirely from experience , when we find that any particular objects are constantly conjoined with each other . Let an object be presented to a man of ever so strong natural reason and abilities ; if that object be entirely new to him , he will not be able , by the most accurate examination of its sensible qualities , to discover any of its causes or effects . Adam , though his rational faculties be supposed , at the very first , entirely perfect , could not have inferred from the fluidity and transparency of water that it would suffocate him , or from the light and warmth of fire that it would consume him . No object ever discovers , by the qualities which appear to the senses , either the causes which produced it , or the effects which will arise from it ; nor can our reason , unassisted by experience , ever draw any inference concerning real existence and matter of fact . 24 . This proposition , that causes and effects are discoverable , not by reason but by experience , will readily be admitted with regard to such objects , as we remember to have once been altogether unknown to us ; since we must be conscious of the utter inability , which we then lay under , of foretelling what would arise from them . Present two smooth pieces of marble to a man who has no tincture of natural philosophy ; he will never discover that they will adhere together in such a manner as to require great force to separate them in a direct line , while they make so small a resistance to a lateral pressure . Such events , as bear little analogy to the common course of nature , are also readily confessed to be known only by experience ; nor does any man imagine that the explosion of gunpowder , or the attraction of a loadstone , could ever be discovered by arguments a priori . In like manner , when an effect is supposed to depend upon an intricate machinery or secret structure of parts , we make no difficulty in attributing all our knowledge of it to experience . Who will assert that he can give the ultimate reason , why milk or bread is proper nourishment for a man , not for a lion or a tiger ? But the same truth may not appear , at first sight , to have the same evidence with regard to events , which have become familiar to us from our first appearance in the world , which bear a close analogy to the whole course of nature , and which are supposed to depend on the simple qualities of objects , without any secret structure of parts . We are apt to imagine that we could discover these effects by the mere operation of our reason , without experience . We fancy , that were we brought on a sudden into this world , we could at first have inferred that one Billiard - ball would communicate motion to another upon impulse ; and that we needed not to have waited for the event , in order to pronounce with certainty concerning it . Such is the influence of custom , that , where it is strongest , it not only covers our natural ignorance , but even conceals itself , and seems not to take place , merely because it is found in the highest degree . 25 . But to convince us that all the laws of nature , and all the operations of bodies without exception , are known only by experience , the following reflections may , perhaps , suffice . Were any object presented to us , and were we required to pronounce concerning the effect , which will result from it , without consulting past observation ; after what manner , I beseech you , must the mind proceed in this operation ? It must invent or imagine some event , which it ascribes to the object as its effect ; and it is plain that this invention must be entirely arbitrary . The mind can never possibly find the effect in the supposed cause , by the most accurate scrutiny and examination . For the effect is totally different from the cause , and consequently can never be discovered in it . Motion in the second Billiard - ball is a quite distinct event from motion in the first ; nor is there anything in the one to suggest the smallest hint of the other . A stone or piece of metal raised into the air , and left without any support , immediately falls : but to consider the matter a priori , is there anything we discover in this situation which can beget the idea of a downward , rather than an upward , or any other motion , in the stone or metal ? And as the first imagination or invention of a particular effect , in all natural operations , is arbitrary , where we consult not experience ; so must we also esteem the supposed tie or connexion between the cause and effect , which binds them together , and renders it impossible that any other effect could result from the operation of that cause . When I see , for instance , a Billiard - ball moving in a straight line towards another ; even suppose motion in the second ball should by accident be suggested to me , as the result of their contact or impulse ; may I not conceive , that a hundred different events might as well follow from that cause ? May not both these balls remain at absolute rest ? May not the first ball return in a straight line , or leap off from the second in any line or direction ? All these suppositions are consistent and conceivable . Why then should we give the preference to one , which is no more consistent or conceivable than the rest ? All our reasonings a priori will never be able to show us any foundation for this preference . In a word , then , every effect is a distinct event from its cause . It could not , therefore , be discovered in the cause , and the first invention or conception of it , a priori , must be entirely arbitrary . And even after it is suggested , the conjunction of it with the cause must appear equally arbitrary ; since there are always many other effects , which , to reason , must seem fully as consistent and natural . In vain , therefore , should we pretend to determine any single event , or infer any cause or effect , without the assistance of observation and experience . 26 . Hence we may discover the reason why no philosopher , who is rational and modest , has ever pretended to assign the ultimate cause of any natural operation , or to show distinctly the action of that power , which produces any single effect in the universe . It is confessed , that the utmost effort of human reason is to reduce the principles , productive of natural phenomena , to a greater simplicity , and to resolve the many particular effects into a few general causes , by means of reasonings from analogy , experience , and observation . But as to the causes of these general causes , we should in vain attempt their discovery ; nor shall we ever be able to satisfy ourselves , by any particular explication of them . These ultimate springs and principles are totally shut up from human curiosity and enquiry . Elasticity , gravity , cohesion of parts , communication of motion by impulse ; these are probably the ultimate causes and principles which we shall ever discover in nature ; and we may esteem ourselves sufficiently happy , if , by accurate enquiry and reasoning , we can trace up the particular phenomena to , or near to , these general principles . The most perfect philosophy of the natural kind only staves off our ignorance a little longer : as perhaps the most perfect philosophy of the moral or metaphysical kind serves only to discover larger portions of it . Thus the observation of human blindness and weakness is the result of all philosophy , and meets us at every turn , in spite of our endeavours to elude or avoid it . 27 . Nor is geometry , when taken into the assistance of natural philosophy , ever able to remedy this defect , or lead us into the knowledge of ultimate causes , by all that accuracy of reasoning for which it is so justly celebrated . Every part of mixed mathematics proceeds upon the supposition that certain laws are established by nature in her operations ; and abstract reasonings are employed , either to assist experience in the discovery of these laws , or to determine their influence in particular instances , where it depends upon any precise degree of distance and quantity . Thus , it is a law of motion , discovered by experience , that the moment or force of any body in motion is in the compound ratio or proportion of its solid contents and its velocity ; and consequently , that a small force may remove the greatest obstacle or raise the greatest weight , if , by any contrivance or machinery , we can increase the velocity of that force , so as to make it an overmatch for its antagonist . Geometry assists us in the application of this law , by giving us the just dimensions of all the parts and figures which can enter into any species of machine ; but still the discovery of the law itself is owing merely to experience , and all the abstract reasonings in the world could never lead us one step towards the knowledge of it . When we reason a priori , and consider merely any object or cause , as it appears to the mind , independent of all observation , it never could suggest to us the notion of any distinct object , such as its effect ; much less , show us the inseparable and inviolable connexion between them . A man must be very sagacious who could discover by reasoning that crystal is the effect of heat , and ice of cold , without being previously acquainted with the operation of these qualities . PART II . 28 . But we have not yet attained any tolerable satisfaction with regard to the question first proposed . Each solution still gives rise to a new question as difficult as the foregoing , and leads us on to farther enquiries . When it is asked , What is the nature of all our reasonings concerning matter of fact ? the proper answer seems to be , that they are founded on the relation of cause and effect . When again it is asked , What is the foundation of all our reasonings and conclusions concerning that relation ? it may be replied in one word , Experience . But if we still carry on our sifting humour , and ask , What is the foundation of all conclusions from experience ? this implies a new question , which may be of more difficult solution and explication . Philosophers , that give themselves airs of superior wisdom and sufficiency , have a hard task when they encounter persons of inquisitive dispositions , who push them from every corner to which they retreat , and who are sure at last to bring them to some dangerous dilemma . The best expedient to prevent this confusion , is to be modest in our pretensions ; and even to discover the difficulty ourselves before it is objected to us . By this means , we may make a kind of merit of our very ignorance . I shall content myself , in this section , with an easy task , and shall pretend only to give a negative answer to the question here proposed . I say then , that , even after we have experience of the operations of cause and effect , our conclusions from that experience are not founded on reasoning , or any process of the understanding . This answer we must endeavour both to explain and to defend . 29 . It must certainly be allowed , that nature has kept us at a great distance from all her secrets , and has afforded us only the knowledge of a few superficial qualities of objects ; while she conceals from us those powers and principles on which the influence of those objects entirely depends . Our senses inform us of the colour , weight , and consistence of bread ; but neither sense nor reason can ever inform us of those qualities which fit it for the nourishment and support of a human body . Sight or feeling conveys an idea of the actual motion of bodies ; but as to that wonderful force or power , which would carry on a moving body for ever in a continued change of place , and which bodies never lose but by communicating it to others ; of this we cannot form the most distant conception . But notwithstanding this ignorance of natural powers 6 and principles , we always presume , when we see like sensible qualities , that they have like secret powers , and expect that effects , similar to those which we have experienced , will follow from them . If a body of like colour and consistence with that bread , which we have formerly eat , be presented to us , we make no scruple of repeating the experiment , and foresee , with certainty , like nourishment and support . Now this is a process of the mind or thought , of which I would willingly know the foundation . It is allowed on all hands that there is no known connexion between the sensible qualities and the secret powers ; and consequently , that the mind is not led to form such a conclusion concerning their constant and regular conjunction , by anything which it knows of their nature . As to past Experience , it can be allowed to give direct and certain information of those precise objects only , and that precise period of time , which fell under its cognizance : but why this experience should be extended to future times , and to other objects , which for aught we know , may be only in appearance similar ; this is the main question on which I would insist . The bread , which I formerly eat , nourished me ; that is , a body of such sensible qualities was , at that time , endued with such secret powers : but does it follow , that other bread must also nourish me at another time , and that like sensible qualities must always be attended with like secret powers ? The consequence seems nowise necessary . At least , it must be acknowledged that there is here a consequence drawn by the mind ; that there is a certain step taken ; a process of thought , and an inference , which wants to be explained . These two propositions are far from being the same , I have found that such an object has always been attended with such an effect , and I foresee , that other objects , which are , in appearance , similar , will be attended with similar effects . I shall allow , if you please , that the one proposition may justly be inferred from the other : I know , in fact , that it always is inferred . But if you insist that the inference is made by a chain of reasoning , I desire you to produce that reasoning . The connexion between these propositions is not intuitive . There is required a medium , which may enable the mind to draw such an inference , if indeed it be drawn by reasoning and argument . What that medium is , I must confess , passes my comprehension ; and it is incumbent on those to produce it , who assert that it really exists , and is the origin of all our conclusions concerning matter of fact . 30 . This negative argument must certainly , in process of time , become altogether convincing , if many penetrating and able philosophers shall turn their enquiries this way and no one be ever able to discover any connecting proposition or intermediate step , which supports the understanding in this conclusion . But as the question is yet new , every reader may not trust so far to his own penetration , as to conclude , because an argument escapes his enquiry , that therefore it does not really exist . For this reason it may be requisite to venture upon a more difficult task ; and enumerating all the branches of human knowledge , endeavour to show that none of them can afford such an argument . All reasonings may be divided into two kinds , namely , demonstrative reasoning , or that concerning relations of ideas , and moral reasoning , or that concerning matter of fact and existence . That there are no demonstrative arguments in the case seems evident ; since it implies no contradiction that the course of nature may change , and that an object , seemingly like those which we have experienced , may be attended with different or contrary effects . May I not clearly and distinctly conceive that a body , falling from the clouds , and which , in all other respects , resembles snow , has yet the taste of salt or feeling of fire ? Is there any more intelligible proposition than to affirm , that all the trees will flourish in December and January , and decay in May and June ? Now whatever is intelligible , and can be distinctly conceived , implies no contradiction , and can never be proved false by any demonstrative argument or abstract reasoning priori . If we be , therefore , engaged by arguments to put trust in past experience , and make it the standard of our future judgement , these arguments must be probable only , or such as regard matter of fact and real existence , according to the division above mentioned . But that there is no argument of this kind , must appear , if our explication of that species of reasoning be admitted as solid and satisfactory . We have said that all arguments concerning existence are founded on the relation of cause and effect ; that our knowledge of that relation is derived entirely from experience ; and that all our experimental conclusions proceed upon the supposition that the future will be conformable to the past . To endeavour , therefore , the proof of this last supposition by probable arguments , or arguments regarding existence , must be evidently going in a circle , and taking that for granted , which is the very point in question . 31 . In reality , all arguments from experience are founded on the similarity which we discover among natural objects , and by which we are induced to expect effects similar to those which we have found to follow from such objects . And though none but a fool or madman will ever pretend to dispute the authority of experience , or to reject that great guide of human life , it may surely be allowed a philosopher to have so much curiosity at least as to examine the principle of human nature , which gives this mighty authority to experience , and makes us draw advantage from that similarity which nature has placed among different objects . From causes which appear similar we expect similar effects . This is the sum of all our experimental conclusions . Now it seems evident that , if this conclusion were formed by reason , it would be as perfect at first , and upon one instance , as after ever so long a course of experience . But the case is far otherwise . Nothing so like as eggs ; yet no one , on account of this appearing similarity , expects the same taste and relish in all of them . It is only after a long course of uniform experiments in any kind , that we attain a firm reliance and security with regard to a particular event . Now where is that process of reasoning which , from one instance , draws a conclusion , so different from that which it infers from a hundred instances that are nowise different from that single one ? This question I propose as much for the sake of information , as with an intention of raising difficulties . I cannot find , I cannot imagine any such reasoning . But I keep my mind still open to instruction , if any one will vouchsafe to bestow it on me . 32 . Should it be said that , from a number of uniform experiments , we infer a connexion between the sensible qualities and the secret powers ; this , I must confess , seems the same difficulty , couched in different terms . The question still recurs , on what process of argument this inference is founded ? Where is the medium , the interposing ideas , which join propositions so very wide of each other ? It is confessed that the colour , consistence , and other sensible qualities of bread appear not , of themselves , to have any connexion with the secret powers of nourishment and support . For otherwise we could infer these secret powers from the first appearance of these sensible qualities , without the aid of experience ; contrary to the sentiment of all philosophers , and contrary to plain matter of fact . Here , then , is our natural state of ignorance with regard to the powers and influence of all objects . How is this remedied by experience ? It only shows us a number of uniform effects , resulting from certain objects , and teaches us that those particular objects , at that particular time , were endowed with such powers and forces . When a new object , endowed with similar sensible qualities , is produced , we expect similar powers and forces , and look for a like effect . From a body of like colour and consistence with bread we expect like nourishment and support . But this surely is a step or progress of the mind , which wants to be explained . When a man says , I have found , in all past instances , such sensible qualities conjoined with such secret powers : And when he says , Similar sensible qualities will always be conjoined with similar secret powers , he is not guilty of a tautology , nor are these propositions in any respect the same . You say that the one proposition is an inference from the other . But you must confess that the inference is not intuitive ; neither is it demonstrative : Of what nature is it , then ? To say it is experimental , is begging the question . For all inferences from experience suppose , as their foundation , that the future will resemble the past , and that similar powers will be conjoined with similar sensible qualities . If there be any suspicion that the course of nature may change , and that the past may be no rule for the future , all experience becomes useless , and can give rise to no inference or conclusion . It is impossible , therefore , that any arguments from experience can prove this resemblance of the past to the future ; since all these arguments are founded on the supposition of that resemblance . Let the course of things be allowed hitherto ever so regular ; that alone , without some new argument or inference , proves not that , for the future , it will continue so . In vain do you pretend to have learned the nature of bodies from your past experience . Their secret nature , and consequently all their effects and influence , may change , without any change in their sensible qualities . This happens sometimes , and with regard to some objects : Why may it not happen always , and with regard to all objects ? What logic , what process of argument secures you against this supposition ? My practice , you say , refutes my doubts . But you mistake the purport of my question . As an agent , I am quite satisfied in the point ; but as a philosopher , who has some share of curiosity , I will not say scepticism , I want to learn the foundation of this inference . No reading , no enquiry has yet been able to remove my difficulty , or give me satisfaction in a matter of such importance . Can I do better than propose the difficulty to the public , even though , perhaps , I have small hopes of obtaining a solution ? We shall at least , by this means , be sensible of our ignorance , if we do not augment our knowledge . 33 . I must confess that a man is guilty of unpardonable arrogance who concludes , because an argument has escaped his own investigation , that therefore it does not really exist . I must also confess that , though all the learned , for several ages , should have employed themselves in fruitless search upon any subject , it may still , perhaps , be rash to conclude positively that the subject must , therefore , pass all human comprehension . Even though we examine all the sources of our knowledge , and conclude them unfit for such a subject , there may still remain a suspicion , that the enumeration is not complete , or the examination not accurate . But with regard to the present subject , there are some considerations which seem to remove all this accusation of arrogance or suspicion of mistake . It is certain that the most ignorant and stupid peasants — nay infants , nay even brute beasts — improve by experience , and learn the qualities of natural objects , by observing the effects which result from them . When a child has felt the sensation of pain from touching the flame of a candle , he will be careful not to put his hand near any candle ; but will expect a similar effect from a cause which is similar in its sensible qualities and appearance . If you assert , therefore , that the understanding of the child is led into this conclusion by any process of argument or ratiocination , I may justly require you to produce that argument ; nor have you any pretence to refuse so equitable a demand . You cannot say that the argument is abstruse , and may possibly escape your enquiry ; since you confess that it is obvious to the capacity of a mere infant . If you hesitate , therefore , a moment , or if , after reflection , you produce any intricate or profound argument , you , in a manner , give up the question , and confess that it is not reasoning which engages us to suppose the past resembling the future , and to expect similar effects from causes which are , to appearance , similar . This is the proposition which I intended to enforce in the present section . If I be right , I pretend not to have made any mighty discovery . And if I be wrong , I must acknowledge myself to be indeed a very backward scholar ; since I cannot now discover an argument which , it seems , was perfectly familiar to me long before I was out of my cradle . SECTION V . SCEPTICAL SOLUTION OF THESE DOUBTS . PART I . 34 . The passion for philosophy , like that for religion , seems liable to this inconvenience , that , though it aims at the correction of our manners , and extirpation of our vices , it may only serve , by imprudent management , to foster a predominant inclination , and push the mind , with more determined resolution , towards that side which already draws too much , by the bias and propensity of the natural temper . It is certain that , while we aspire to the magnanimous firmness of the philosophic sage , and endeavour to confine our pleasures altogether within our own minds , we may , at last , render our philosophy like that of Epictetus , and other Stoics , only a more refined system of selfishness , and reason ourselves out of all virtue as well as social enjoyment . While we study with attention the vanity of human life , and turn all our thoughts towards the empty and transitory nature of riches and honours , we are , perhaps , all the while flattering our natural indolence , which , hating the bustle of the world , and drudgery of business , seeks a pretence of reason to give itself a full and uncontrolled indulgence . There is , however , one species of philosophy which seems little liable to this inconvenience , and that because it strikes in with no disorderly passion of the human mind , nor can mingle itself with any natural affection or propensity ; and that is the Academic or Sceptical philosophy . The academics always talk of doubt and suspense of judgement , of danger in hasty determinations , of confining to very narrow bounds the enquiries of the understanding , and of renouncing all speculations which lie not within the limits of common life and practice . Nothing , therefore , can be more contrary than such a philosophy to the supine indolence of the mind , its rash arrogance , its lofty pretensions , and its superstitious credulity . Every passion is mortified by it , except the love of truth ; and that passion never is , nor can be , carried to too high a degree . It is surprising , therefore , that this philosophy , which , in almost every instance , must be harmless and innocent , should be the subject of so much groundless reproach and obloquy . But , perhaps , the very circumstance which renders it so innocent is what chiefly exposes it to the public hatred and resentment . By flattering no irregular passion , it gains few partizans : By opposing so many vices and follies , it raises to itself abundance of enemies , who stigmatize it as libertine profane , and irreligious . Nor need we fear that this philosophy , while it endeavours to limit our enquiries to common life , should ever undermine the reasonings of common life , and carry its doubts so far as to destroy all action , as well as speculation . Nature will always maintain her rights , and prevail in the end over any abstract reasoning whatsoever . Though we should conclude , for instance , as in the foregoing section , that , in all reasonings from experience , there is a step taken by the mind which is not supported by any argument or process of the understanding ; there is no danger that these reasonings , on which almost all knowledge depends , will ever be affected by such a discovery . If the mind be not engaged by argument to make this step , it must be induced by some other principle of equal weight and authority ; and that principle will preserve its influence as long as human nature remains the same . What that principle is may well be worth the pains of enquiry . 35 . Suppose a person , though endowed with the strongest faculties of reason and reflection , to be brought on a sudden into this world ; he would , indeed , immediately observe a continual succession of objects , and one event following another ; but he would not be able to discover anything farther . He would not , at first , by any reasoning , be able to reach the idea of cause and effect ; since the particular powers , by which all natural operations are performed , never appear to the senses ; nor is it reasonable to conclude , merely because one event , in one instance , precedes another , that therefore the one is the cause , the other the effect . Their conjunction may be arbitrary and casual . There may be no reason to infer the existence of one from the appearance of the other . And in a word , such a person , without more experience , could never employ his conjecture or reasoning concerning any matter of fact , or be assured of anything beyond what was immediately present to his memory and senses . Suppose , again , that he has acquired more experience , and has lived so long in the world as to have observed familiar objects or events to be constantly conjoined together ; what is the consequence of this experience ? He immediately infers the existence of one object from the appearance of the other . Yet he has not , by all his experience , acquired any idea or knowledge of the secret power by which the one object produces the other ; nor is it , by any process of reasoning , he is engaged to draw this inference . But still he finds himself determined to draw it : And though he should be convinced that his understanding has no part in the operation , he would nevertheless continue in the same course of thinking . There is some other principle which determines him to form such a conclusion . 36 . This principle is Custom or Habit . For wherever the repetition of any particular act or operation produces a propensity to renew the same act or operation , without being impelled by any reasoning or process of the understanding , we always say , that this propensity is the effect of Custom . By employing that word , we pretend not to have given the ultimate reason of such a propensity . We only point out a principle of human nature , which is universally acknowledged , and which is well known by its effects . Perhaps we can push our enquiries no farther , or pretend to give the cause of this cause ; but must rest contented with it as the ultimate principle , which we can assign , of all our conclusions from experience . It is sufficient satisfaction , that we can go so far , without repining at the narrowness of our faculties because they will carry us no farther . And it is certain we here advance a very intelligible proposition at least , if not a true one , when we assert that , after the constant conjunction of two objects — heat and flame , for instance , weight and solidity — we are determined by custom alone to expect the one from the appearance of the other . This hypothesis seems even the only one which explains the difficulty , why we draw , from a thousand instances , an inference which we are not able to draw from one instance , that is , in no respect , different from them . Reason is incapable of any such variation . The conclusions which it draws from considering one circle are the same which it would form upon surveying all the circles in the universe . But no man , having seen only one body move after being impelled by another , could infer that every other body will move after a like impulse . All inferences from experience , therefore , are effects of custom , not of reasoning 7 . Custom , then , is the great guide of human life . It is that principle alone which renders our experience useful to us , and makes us expect , for the future , a similar train of events with those which have appeared in the past . Without the influence of custom , we should be entirely ignorant of every matter of fact beyond what is immediately present to the memory and senses . We should never know how to adjust means to ends , or to employ our natural powers in the production of any effect . There would be an end at once of all action , as well as of the chief part of speculation . 37 . But here it may be proper to remark , that though our conclusions from experience carry us beyond our memory and senses , and assure us of matters of fact which happened in the most distant places and most remote ages , yet some fact must always be present to the senses or memory , from which we may first proceed in drawing these conclusions . A man , who should find in a desert country the remains of pompous buildings , would conclude that the country had , in ancient times , been cultivated by civilized inhabitants ; but did nothing of this nature occur to him , he could never form such an inference . We learn the events of former ages from history ; but then we must peruse the volumes in which this instruction is contained , and thence carry up our inferences from one testimony to another , till we arrive at the eyewitnesses and spectators of these distant events . In a word , if we proceed not upon some fact , present to the memory or senses , our reasonings would be merely hypothetical ; and however the particular links might be connected with each other , the whole chain of inferences would have nothing to support it , nor could we ever , by its means , arrive at the knowledge of any real existence . If I ask why you believe any particular matter of fact , which you relate , you must tell me some reason ; and this reason will be some other fact , connected with it . But as you cannot proceed after this manner , in infinitum , you must at last terminate in some fact , which is present to your memory or senses ; or must allow that your belief is entirely without foundation . 38 . What , then , is the conclusion of the whole matter ? A simple one ; though , it must be confessed , pretty remote from the common theories of philosophy . All belief of matter of fact or real existence is derived merely from some object , present to the memory or senses , and a customary conjunction between that and some other object . Or in other words ; having found , in many instances , that any two kinds of objects — flame and heat , snow and cold — have always been conjoined together ; if flame or snow be presented anew to the senses , the mind is carried by custom to expect heat or cold , and to believe that such a quality does exist , and will discover itself upon a nearer approach . This belief is the necessary result of placing the mind in such circumstances . It is an operation of the soul , when we are so situated , as unavoidable as to feel the passion of love , when we receive benefits ; or hatred , when we meet with injuries . All these operations are a species of natural instincts , which no reasoning or process of the thought and understanding is able either to produce or to prevent . At this point , it would be very allowable for us to stop our philosophical researches . In most questions we can never make a single step farther ; and in all questions we must terminate here at last , after our most restless and curious enquiries . But still our curiosity will be pardonable , perhaps commendable , if it carry us on to still farther researches , and make us examine more accurately the nature of this belief , and of the customary conjunction , whence it is derived . By this means we may meet with some explications and analogies that will give satisfaction ; at least to such as love the abstract sciences , and can be entertained with speculations , which , however accurate , may still retain a degree of doubt and uncertainty . As to readers of a different taste ; the remaining part of this section is not calculated for them , and the following enquiries may well be understood , though it be neglected . PART II . 39 . Nothing is more free than the imagination of man ; and though it cannot exceed that original stock of ideas furnished by the internal and external senses , it has unlimited power of mixing , compounding , separating , and dividing these ideas , in all the varieties of fiction and vision . It can feign a train of events , with all the appearance of reality , ascribe to them a particular time and place , conceive them as existent , and paint them out to itself with every circumstance , that belongs to any historical fact , which it believes with the greatest certainty . Wherein , therefore , consists the difference between such a fiction and belief ? It lies not merely in any peculiar idea , which is annexed to such a conception as commands our assent , and which is wanting to every known fiction . For as the mind has authority over all its ideas , it could voluntarily annex this particular idea to any fiction , and consequently be able to believe whatever it pleases ; contrary to what we find by daily experience . We can , in our conception , join the head of a man to the body of a horse ; but it is not in our power to believe that such an animal has ever really existed . It follows , therefore , that the difference between fiction and belief lies in some sentiment or feeling , which is annexed to the latter , not to the former , and which depends not on the will , nor can be commanded at pleasure . It must be excited by nature , like all other sentiments ; and must arise from the particular situation , in which the mind is placed at any particular juncture . Whenever any object is presented to the memory or senses , it immediately , by the force of custom , carries the imagination to conceive that object , which is usually conjoined to it ; and this conception is attended with a feeling or sentiment , different from the loose reveries of the fancy . In this consists the whole nature of belief . For as there is no matter of fact which we believe so firmly that we cannot conceive the contrary , there would be no difference between the conception assented to and that which is rejected , were it not for some sentiment which distinguishes the one from the other . If I see a billiard - ball moving towards another , on a smooth table , I can easily conceive it to stop upon contact . This conception implies no contradiction ; but still it feels very differently from that conception by which I represent to myself the impulse and the communication of motion from one ball to another . 40 . Were we to attempt a definition of this sentiment , we should , perhaps , find it a very difficult , if not an impossible task ; in the same manner as if we should endeavour to define the feeling of cold or passion of anger , to a creature who never had any experience of these sentiments . Belief is the true and proper name of this feeling ; and no one is ever at a loss to know the meaning of that term ; because every man is every moment conscious of the sentiment represented by it . It may not , however , be improper to attempt a description of this sentiment ; in hopes we may , by that means , arrive at some analogies , which may afford a more perfect explication of it . I say , then , that belief is nothing but a more vivid , lively , forcible , firm , steady conception of an object , than what the imagination alone is ever able to attain . This variety of terms , which may seem so unphilosophical , is intended only to express that act of the mind , which renders realities , or what is taken for such , more present to us than fictions , causes them to weigh more in the thought , and gives them a superior influence on the passions and imagination . Provided we agree about the thing , it is needless to dispute about the terms . The imagination has the command over all its ideas , and can join and mix and vary them , in all the ways possible . It may conceive fictitious objects with all the circumstances of place and time . It may set them , in a manner , before our eyes , in their true colours , just as they might have existed . But as it is impossible that this faculty of imagination can ever , of itself , reach belief , it is evident that belief consists not in the peculiar nature or order of ideas , but in the manner of their conception , and in their feeling to the mind . I confess , that it is impossible perfectly to explain this feeling or manner of conception . We may make use of words which express something near it . But its true and proper name , as we observed before , is belief ; which is a term that every one sufficiently understands in common life . And in philosophy , we can go no farther than assert , that belief is something felt by the mind , which distinguishes the ideas of the judgement from the fictions of the imagination . It gives them more weight and influence ; makes them appear of greater importance ; enforces them in the mind ; and renders them the governing principle of our actions . I hear at present , for instance , a person ' s voice , with whom I am acquainted ; and the sound comes as from the next room . This impression of my senses immediately conveys my thought to the person , together with all the surrounding objects . I paint them out to myself as existing at present , with the same qualities and relations , of which I formerly knew them possessed . These ideas take faster hold of my mind than ideas of an enchanted castle . They are very different to the feeling , and have a much greater influence of every kind , either to give pleasure or pain , joy or sorrow . Let us , then , take in the whole compass of this doctrine , and allow , that the sentiment of belief is nothing but a conception more intense and steady than what attends the mere fictions of the imagination , and that this manner of conception arises from a customary conjunction of the object with something present to the memory or senses : I believe that it will not be difficult , upon these suppositions , to find other operations of the mind analogous to it , and to trace up these phenomena to principles still more general . 41 . We have already observed that nature has established connexions among particular ideas , and that no sooner one idea occurs to our thoughts than it introduces its correlative , and carries our attention towards it , by a gentle and insensible movement . These principles of connexion or association we have reduced to three , namely , Resemblance , Contiguity and Causation ; which are the only bonds that unite our thoughts together , and beget that regular train of reflection or discourse , which , in a greater or less degree , takes place among all mankind . Now here arises a question , on which the solution of the present difficulty will depend . Does it happen , in all these relations , that , when one of the objects is presented to the senses or memory , the mind is not only carried to the conception of the correlative , but reaches a steadier and stronger conception of it than what otherwise it would have been able to attain ? This seems to be the case with that belief which arises from the relation of cause and effect . And if the case be the same with the other relations or principles of associations , this may be established as a general law , which takes place in all the operations of the mind . We may , therefore , observe , as the first experiment to our present purpose , that , upon the appearance of the picture of an absent friend , our idea of him is evidently enlivened by the resemblance , and that every passion , which that idea occasions , whether of joy or sorrow , acquires new force and vigour . In producing this effect , there concur both a relation and a present impression . Where the picture bears him no resemblance , at least was not intended for him , it never so much as conveys our thought to him : And where it is absent , as well as the person , though the mind may pass from the thought of the one to that of the other , it feels its idea to be rather weakened than enlivened by that transition . We take a pleasure in viewing the picture of a friend , when it is set before us ; but when it is removed , rather choose to consider him directly than by reflection in an image , which is equally distant and obscure . The ceremonies of the Roman Catholic religion may be considered as instances of the same nature . The devotees of that superstition usually plead in excuse for the mummeries , with which they are upbraided , that they feel the good effect of those external motions , and postures , and actions , in enlivening their devotion and quickening their fervour , which otherwise would decay , if directed entirely to distant and immaterial objects . We shadow out the objects of our faith , say they , in sensible types and images , and render them more present to us by the immediate presence of these types , than it is possible for us to do merely by an intellectual view and contemplation . Sensible objects have always a greater influence on the fancy than any other ; and this influence they readily convey to those ideas to which they are related , and which they resemble . I shall only infer from these practices , and this reasoning , that the effect of resemblance in enlivening the ideas is very common ; and as in every case a resemblance and a present impression must concur , we are abundantly supplied with experiments to prove the reality of the foregoing principle . 42 . We may add force to these experiments by others of a different kind , in considering the effects of contiguity as well as of resemblance . It is certain that distance diminishes the force of every idea , and that , upon our approach to any object ; though it does not discover itself to our senses ; it operates upon the mind with an influence , which imitates an immediate impression . The thinking on any object readily transports the mind to what is contiguous ; but it is only the actual presence of an object , that transports it with a superior vivacity . When I am a few miles from home , whatever relates to it touches me more nearly than when I am two hundred leagues distant ; though even at that distance the reflecting on any thing in the neighbourhood of my friends or family naturally produces an idea of them . But as in this latter case , both the objects of the mind are ideas ; notwithstanding there is an easy transition between them ; that transition alone is not able to give a superior vivacity to any of the ideas , for want of some immediate impression 8 . 43 . No one can doubt but causation has the same influence as the other two relations of resemblance and contiguity . Superstitious people are fond of the reliques of saints and holy men , for the same reason , that they seek after types or images , in order to enliven their devotion , and give them a more intimate and strong conception of those exemplary lives , which they desire to imitate . Now it is evident , that one of the best reliques , which a devotee could procure , would be the handywork of a saint ; and if his cloaths and furniture are ever to be considered in this light , it is because they were once at his disposal , and were moved and affected by him ; in which respect they are to be considered as imperfect effects , and as connected with him by a shorter chain of consequences than any of those , by which we learn the reality of his existence . Suppose , that the son of a friend , who had been long dead or absent , were presented to us ; it is evident , that this object would instantly revive its correlative idea , and recal to our thoughts all past intimacies and familiarities , in more lively colours than they would otherwise have appeared to us . This is another phaenomenon , which seems to prove the principle above mentioned . 44 . We may observe , that , in these phaenomena , the belief of the correlative object is always presupposed ; without which the relation could have no effect . The influence of the picture supposes , that we believe our friend to have once existed . Contiguity to home can never excite our ideas of home , unless we believe that it really exists . Now I assert , that this belief , where it reaches beyond the memory or senses , is of a similar nature , and arises from similar causes , with the transition of thought and vivacity of conception here explained . When I throw a piece of dry wood into a fire , my mind is immediately carried to conceive , that it augments , not extinguishes the flame . This transition of thought from the cause to the effect proceeds not from reason . It derives its origin altogether from custom and experience . And as it first begins from an object , present to the senses , it renders the idea or conception of flame more strong and lively than any loose , floating reverie of the imagination . That idea arises immediately . The thought moves instantly towards it , and conveys to it all that force of conception , which is derived from the impression present to the senses . When a sword is levelled at my breast , does not the idea of wound and pain strike me more strongly , than when a glass of wine is presented to me , even though by accident this idea should occur after the appearance of the latter object ? But what is there in this whole matter to cause such a strong conception , except only a present object and a customary transition to the idea of another object , which we have been accustomed to conjoin with the former ? This is the whole operation of the mind , in all our conclusions concerning matter of fact and existence ; and it is a satisfaction to find some analogies , by which it may be explained . The transition from a present object does in all cases give strength and solidity to the related idea . Here , then , is a kind of pre - established harmony between the course of nature and the succession of our ideas ; and though the powers and forces , by which the former is governed , be wholly unknown to us ; yet our thoughts and conceptions have still , we find , gone on in the same train with the other works of nature . Custom is that principle , by which this correspondence has been effected ; so necessary to the subsistence of our species , and the regulation of our conduct , in every circumstance and occurrence of human life . Had not the presence of an object , instantly excited the idea of those objects , commonly conjoined with it , all our knowledge must have been limited to the narrow sphere of our memory and senses ; and we should never have been able to adjust means to ends , or employ our natural powers , either to the producing of good , or avoiding of evil . Those , who delight in the discovery and contemplation of final causes , have here ample subject to employ their wonder and admiration . 45 . I shall add , for a further confirmation of the foregoing theory , that , as this operation of the mind , by which we infer like effects from like causes , and vice versa , is so essential to the subsistence of all human creatures , it is not probable , that it could be trusted to the fallacious deductions of our reason , which is slow in its operations ; appears not , in any degree , during the first years of infancy ; and at best is , in every age and period of human life , extremely liable to error and mistake . It is more conformable to the ordinary wisdom of nature to secure so necessary an act of the mind , by some instinct or mechanical tendency , which may be infallible in its operations , may discover itself at the first appearance of life and thought , and may be independent of all the laboured deductions of the understanding . As nature has taught us the use of our limbs , without giving us the knowledge of the muscles and nerves , by which they are actuated ; so has she implanted in us an instinct , which carries forward the thought in a correspondent course to that which she has established among external objects ; though we are ignorant of those powers and forces , on which this regular course and succession of objects totally depends . SECTION VIOF PROBABILITY 9 . 46 . Though there be no such thing as Chance in the world ; our ignorance of the real cause of any event has the same influence on the understanding , and begets a like species of belief or opinion . There is certainly a probability , which arises from a superiority of chances on any side ; and according as this superiority encreases , and surpasses the opposite chances , the probability receives a proportionable encrease , and begets still a higher degree of belief or assent to that side , in which we discover the superiority . If a dye were marked with one figure or number of spots on four sides , and with another figure or number of spots on the two remaining sides , it would be more probable , that the former would turn up than the latter ; though , if it had a thousand sides marked in the same manner , and only one side different , the probability would be much higher , and our belief or expectation of the event more steady and secure . This process of the thought or reasoning may seem trivial and obvious ; but to those who consider it more narrowly , it may , perhaps , afford matter for curious speculation . It seems evident , that , when the mind looks forward to discover the event , which may result from the throw of such a dye , it considers the turning up of each particular side as alike probable ; and this is the very nature of chance , to render all the particular events , comprehended in it , entirely equal . But finding a greater number of sides concur in the one event than in the other , the mind is carried more frequently to that event , and meets it oftener , in revolving the various possibilities or chances , on which the ultimate result depends . This concurrence of several views in one particular event begets immediately , by an inexplicable contrivance of nature , the sentiment of belief , and gives that event the advantage over its antagonist , which is supported by a smaller number of views , and recurs less frequently to the mind . If we allow , that belief is nothing but a firmer and stronger conception of an object than what attends the mere fictions of the imagination , this operation may , perhaps , in some measure , be accounted for . The concurrence of these several views or glimpses imprints the idea more strongly on the imagination ; gives it superior force and vigour ; renders its influence on the passions and affections more sensible ; and in a word , begets that reliance or security , which constitutes the nature of belief and opinion . 47 . The case is the same with the probability of causes , as with that of chance . There are some causes , which are entirely uniform and constant in producing a particular effect ; and no instance has ever yet been found of any failure or irregularity in their operation . Fire has always burned , and water suffocated every human creature : The production of motion by impulse and gravity is an universal law , which has hitherto admitted of no exception . But there are other causes , which have been found more irregular and uncertain ; nor has rhubarb always proved a purge , or opium a soporific to every one , who has taken these medicines . It is true , when any cause fails of producing its usual effect , philosophers ascribe not this to any irregularity in nature ; but suppose , that some secret causes , in the particular structure of parts , have prevented the operation . Our reasonings , however , and conclusions concerning the event are the same as if this principle had no place . Being determined by custom to transfer the past to the future , in all our inferences ; where the past has been entirely regular and uniform , we expect the event with the greatest assurance , and leave no room for any contrary supposition . But where different effects have been found to follow from causes , which are to appearance exactly similar , all these various effects must occur to the mind in transferring the past to the future , and enter into our consideration , when we determine the probability of the event . Though we give the preference to that which has been found most usual , and believe that this effect will exist , we must not overlook the other effects , but must assign to each of them a particular weight and authority , in proportion as we have found it to be more or less frequent . It is more probable , in almost every country of Europe , that there will be frost sometime in January , than that the weather will continue open throughout that whole month ; though this probability varies according to the different climates , and approaches to a certainty in the more northern kingdoms . Here then it seems evident , that , when we transfer the past to the future , in order to determine the effect , which will result from any cause , we transfer all the different events , in the same proportion as they have appeared in the past , and conceive one to have existed a hundred times , for instance , another ten times , and another once . As a great number of views do here concur in one event , they fortify and confirm it to the imagination , beget that sentiment which we call belief , and give its object the preference above the contrary event , which is not supported by an equal number of experiments , and recurs not so frequently to the thought in transferring the past to the future . Let any one try to account for this operation of the mind upon any of the received systems of philosophy , and he will be sensible of the difficulty . For my part , I shall think it sufficient , if the present hints excite the curiosity of philosophers , and make them sensible how defective all common theories are in treating of such curious and such sublime subjects . SECTION VII . OF THE IDEA OF NECESSARY CONNEXION . PART I . 48 . The great advantage of the mathematical sciences above the moral consists in this , that the ideas of the former , being sensible , are always clear and determinate , the smallest distinction between them is immediately perceptible , and the same terms are still expressive of the same ideas , without ambiguity or variation . An oval is never mistaken for a circle , nor an hyperbola for an ellipsis . The isosceles and scalenum are distinguished by boundaries more exact than vice and virtue , right and wrong . If any term be defined in geometry , the mind readily , of itself , substitutes , on all occasions , the definition for the term defined : Or even when no definition is employed , the object itself may be presented to the senses , and by that means be steadily and clearly apprehended . But the finer sentiments of the mind , the operations of the understanding , the various agitations of the passions , though really in themselves distinct , easily escape us , when surveyed by reflection ; nor is it in our power to recal the original object , as often as we have occasion to contemplate it . Ambiguity , by this means , is gradually introduced into our reasonings : Similar objects are readily taken to be the same : And the conclusion becomes at last very wide of the premises . One may safely , however , affirm , that , if we consider these sciences in a proper light , their advantages and disadvantages nearly compensate each other , and reduce both of them to a state of equality . If the mind , with greater facility , retains the ideas of geometry clear and determinate , it must carry on a much longer and more intricate chain of reasoning , and compare ideas much wider of each other , in order to reach the abstruser truths of that science . And if moral ideas are apt , without extreme care , to fall into obscurity and confusion , the inferences are always much shorter in these disquisitions , and the intermediate steps , which lead to the conclusion , much fewer than in the sciences which treat of quantity and number . In reality , there is scarcely a proposition in Euclid so simple , as not to consist of more parts , than are to be found in any moral reasoning which runs not into chimera and conceit . Where we trace the principles of the human mind through a few steps , we may be very well satisfied with our progress ; considering how soon nature throws a bar to all our enquiries concerning causes , and reduces us to an acknowledgment of our ignorance . The chief obstacle , therefore , to our improvement in the moral or metaphysical sciences is the obscurity of the ideas , and ambiguity of the terms . The principal difficulty in the mathematics is the length of inferences and compass of thought , requisite to the forming of any conclusion . And , perhaps , our progress in natural philosophy is chiefly retarded by the want of proper experiments and phaenomena , which are often discovered by chance , and cannot always be found , when requisite , even by the most diligent and prudent enquiry . As moral philosophy seems hitherto to have received less improvement than either geometry or physics , we may conclude , that , if there be any difference in this respect among these sciences , the difficulties , which obstruct the progress of the former , require superior care and capacity to be surmounted . 49 . There are no ideas , which occur in metaphysics , more obscure and uncertain , than those of power , force , energy or necessary connexion , of which it is every moment necessary for us to treat in all our disquisitions . We shall , therefore , endeavour , in this section , to fix , if possible , the precise meaning of these terms , and thereby remove some part of that obscurity , which is so much complained of in this species of philosophy . It seems a proposition , which will not admit of much dispute , that all our ideas are nothing but copies of our impressions , or , in other words , that it is impossible for us to think of any thing , which we have not antecedently felt , either by our external or internal senses . I have endeavoured 10 to explain and prove this proposition , and have expressed my hopes , that , by a proper application of it , men may reach a greater clearness and precision in philosophical reasonings , than what they have hitherto been able to attain . Complex ideas may , perhaps , be well known by definition , which is nothing but an enumeration of those parts or simple ideas , that compose them . But when we have pushed up definitions to the most simple ideas , and find still some ambiguity and obscurity ; what resource are we then possessed of ? By what invention can we throw light upon these ideas , and render them altogether precise and determinate to our intellectual view ? Produce the impressions or original sentiments , from which the ideas are copied . These impressions are all strong and sensible . They admit not of ambiguity . They are not only placed in a full light themselves , but may throw light on their correspondent ideas , which lie in obscurity . And by this means , we may , perhaps , attain a new microscope or species of optics , by which , in the moral sciences , the most minute , and most simple ideas may be so enlarged as to fall readily under our apprehension , and be equally known with the grossest and most sensible ideas , that can be the object of our enquiry . 50 . To be fully acquainted , therefore , with the idea of power or necessary connexion , let us examine its impression ; and in order to find the impression with greater certainty , let us search for it in all the sources , from which it may possibly be derived . When we look about us towards external objects , and consider the operation of causes , we are never able , in a single instance , to discover any power or necessary connexion ; any quality , which binds the effect to the cause , and renders the one an infallible consequence of the other . We only find , that the one does actually , in fact , follow the other . The impulse of one billiard - ball is attended with motion in the second . This is the whole that appears to the outward senses . The mind feels no sentiment or inward impression from this succession of objects : Consequently , there is not , in any single , particular instance of cause and effect , any thing which can suggest the idea of power or necessary connexion . From the first appearance of an object , we never can conjecture what effect will result from it . But were the power or energy of any cause discoverable by the mind , we could foresee the effect , even without experience ; and might , at first , pronounce with certainty concerning it , by mere dint of thought and reasoning . In reality , there is no part of matter , that does ever , by its sensible qualities , discover any power or energy , or give us ground to imagine , that it could produce any thing , or be followed by any other object , which we could denominate its effect . Solidity , extension , motion ; these qualities are all complete in themselves , and never point out any other event which may result from them . The scenes of the universe are continually shifting , and one object follows another in an uninterrupted succession ; but the power of force , which actuates the whole machine , is entirely concealed from us , and never discovers itself in any of the sensible qualities of body . We know , that , in fact , heat is a constant attendant of flame ; but what is the connexion between them , we have no room so much as to conjecture or imagine . It is impossible , therefore , that the idea of power can be derived from the contemplation of bodies , in single instances of their operation ; because no bodies ever discover any power , which can be the original of this idea . 1151 . Since , therefore , external objects as they appear to the senses , give us no idea of power or necessary connexion , by their operation in particular instances , let us see , whether this idea be derived from reflection on the operations of our own minds , and be copied from any internal impression . It may be said , that we are every moment conscious of internal power ; while we feel , that , by the simple command of our will , we can move the organs of our body , or direct the faculties of our mind . An act of volition produces motion in our limbs , or raises a new idea in our imagination . This influence of the will we know by consciousness . Hence we acquire the idea of power or energy ; and are certain , that we ourselves and all other intelligent beings are possessed of power . This idea , then , is an idea of reflection , since it arises from reflecting on the operations of our own mind , and on the command which is exercised by will , both over the organs of the body and faculties of the soul . 52 . We shall proceed to examine this pretension ; and first with regard to the influence of volition over the organs of the body . This influence , we may observe , is a fact , which , like all other natural events , can be known only by experience , and can never be foreseen from any apparent energy or power in the cause , which connects it with the effect , and renders the one an infallible consequence of the other . The motion of our body follows upon the command of our will . Of this we are every moment conscious . But the means , by which this is effected ; the energy , by which the will performs so extraordinary an operation ; of this we are so far from being immediately conscious , that it must for ever escape our most diligent enquiry . For first ; is there any principle in all nature more mysterious than the union of soul with body ; by which a supposed spiritual substance acquires such an influence over a material one , that the most refined thought is able to actuate the grossest matter ? Were we empowered , by a secret wish , to remove mountains , or control the planets in their orbit ; this extensive authority would not be more extraordinary , nor more beyond our comprehension . But if by consciousness we perceived any power or energy in the will , we must know this power ; we must know its connexion with the effect ; we must know the secret union of soul and body , and the nature of both these substances ; by which the one is able to operate , in so many instances , upon the other . Secondly , We are not able to move all the organs of the body with a like authority ; though we cannot assign any reason besides experience , for so remarkable a difference between one and the other . Why has the will an influence over the tongue and fingers , not over the heart or liver ? This question would never embarrass us , were we conscious of a power in the former case , not in the latter . We should then perceive , independent of experience , why the authority of will over the organs of the body is circumscribed within such particular limits . Being in that case fully acquainted with the power or force , by which it operates , we should also know , why its influence reaches precisely to such boundaries , and no farther . A man , suddenly struck with palsy in the leg or arm , or who had newly lost those members , frequently endeavours , at first to move them , and employ them in their usual offices . Here he is as much conscious of power to command such limbs , as a man in perfect health is conscious of power to actuate any member which remains in its natural state and condition . But consciousness never deceives . Consequently , neither in the one case nor in the other , are we ever conscious of any power . We learn the influence of our will from experience alone . And experience only teaches us , how one event constantly follows another ; without instructing us in the secret connexion , which binds them together , and renders them inseparable . Thirdly , We learn from anatomy , that the immediate object of power in voluntary motion , is not the member itself which is moved , but certain muscles , and nerves , and animal spirits , and , perhaps , something still more minute and more unknown , through which the motion is successively propagated , ere it reach the member itself whose motion is the immediate object of volition . Can there be a more certain proof , that the power , by which this whole operation is performed , so far from being directly and fully known by an inward sentiment or consciousness , is , to the last degree mysterious and unintelligible ? Here the mind wills a certain event : Immediately another event , unknown to ourselves , and totally different from the one intended , is produced : This event produces another , equally unknown : Till at last , through a long succession , the desired event is produced . But if the original power were felt , it must be known : Were it known , its effect also must be known ; since all power is relative to its effect . And vice versa , if the effect be not known , the power cannot be known nor felt . How indeed can we be conscious of a power to move our limbs , when we have no such power ; but only that to move certain animal spirits , which , though they produce at last the motion of our limbs , yet operate in such a manner as is wholly beyond our comprehension ? We may , therefore , conclude from the whole , I hope , without any temerity , though with assurance ; that our idea of power is not copied from any sentiment or consciousness of power within ourselves , when we give rise to animal motion , or apply our limbs to their proper use and office . That their motion follows the command of the will is a matter of common experience , like other natural events : But the power or energy by which this is effected , like that in other natural events , is unknown and inconceivable . 1253 . Shall we then assert , that we are conscious of a power or energy in our own minds , when , by an act or command of our will , we raise up a new idea , fix the mind to the contemplation of it , turn it on all sides , and at last dismiss it for some other idea , when we think that we have surveyed it with sufficient accuracy ? I believe the same arguments will prove , that even this command of the will gives us no real idea of force or energy . First , It must be allowed , that , when we know a power , we know that very circumstance in the cause , by which it is enabled to produce the effect : For these are supposed to be synonimous . We must , therefore , know both the cause and effect , and the relation between them . But do we pretend to be acquainted with the nature of the human soul and the nature of an idea , or the aptitude of the one to produce the other ? This is a real creation ; a production of something out of nothing : Which implies a power so great , that it may seem , at first sight , beyond the reach of any being , less than infinite . At least it must be owned , that such a power is not felt , nor known , nor even conceivable by the mind . We only feel the event , namely , the existence of an idea , consequent to a command of the will : But the manner , in which this operation is performed , the power by which it is produced , is entirely beyond our comprehension . Secondly , The command of the mind over itself is limited , as well as its command over the body ; and these limits are not known by reason , or any acquaintance with the nature of cause and effect , but only by experience and observation , as in all other natural events and in the operation of external objects . Our authority over our sentiments and passions is much weaker than that over our ideas ; and even the latter authority is circumscribed within very narrow boundaries . Will any one pretend to assign the ultimate reason of these boundaries , or show why the power is deficient in one case , not in another . Thirdly , This self - command is very different at different times . A man in health possesses more of it than one languishing with sickness . We are more master of our thoughts in the morning than in the evening : Fasting , than after a full meal . Can we give any reason for these variations , except experience ? Where then is the power , of which we pretend to be conscious ? Is there not here , either in a spiritual or material substance , or both , some secret mechanism or structure of parts , upon which the effect depends , and which , being entirely unknown to us , renders the power or energy of the will equally unknown and incomprehensible ? Volition is surely an act of the mind , with which we are sufficiently acquainted . Reflect upon it . Consider it on all sides . Do you find anything in it like this creative power , by which it raises from nothing a new idea , and with a kind of Fiat , imitates the omnipotence of its Maker , if I may be allowed so to speak , who called forth into existence all the various scenes of nature ? So far from being conscious of this energy in the will , it requires as certain experience as that of which we are possessed , to convince us that such extraordinary effects do ever result from a simple act of volition . 54 . The generality of mankind never find any difficulty in accounting for the more common and familiar operations of nature — such as the descent of heavy bodies , the growth of plants , the generation of animals , or the nourishment of bodies by food : But suppose that , in all these cases , they perceive the very force or energy of the cause , by which it is connected with its effect , and is for ever infallible in its operation . They acquire , by long habit , such a turn of mind , that , upon the appearance of the cause , they immediately expect with assurance its usual attendant , and hardly conceive it possible that any other event could result from it . It is only on the discovery of extraordinary phaenomena , such as earthquakes , pestilence , and prodigies of any kind , that they find themselves at a loss to assign a proper cause , and to explain the manner in which the effect is produced by it . It is usual for men , in such difficulties , to have recourse to some invisible intelligent principle 13 as the immediate cause of that event which surprises them , and which , they think , cannot be accounted for from the common powers of nature . But philosophers , who carry their scrutiny a little farther , immediately perceive that , even in the most familiar events , the energy of the cause is as unintelligible as in the most unusual , and that we only learn by experience the frequent Conjunction of objects , without being ever able to comprehend anything like Connexion between them . 55 . Here , then , many philosophers think themselves obliged by reason to have recourse , on all occasions , to the same principle , which the vulgar never appeal to but in cases that appear miraculous and supernatural . They acknowledge mind and intelligence to be , not only the ultimate and original cause of all things , but the immediate and sole cause of every event which appears in nature . They pretend that those objects which are commonly denominated causes , are in reality nothing but occasions ; and that the true and direct principle of every effect is not any power or force in nature , but a volition of the Supreme Being , who wills that such particular objects should for ever be conjoined with each other . Instead of saying that one billiard - ball moves another by a force which it has derived from the author of nature , it is the Deity himself , they say , who , by a particular volition , moves the second ball , being determined to this operation by the impulse of the first ball , in consequence of those general laws which he has laid down to himself in the government of the universe . But philosophers advancing still in their inquiries , discover that , as we are totally ignorant of the power on which depends the mutual operation of bodies , we are no less ignorant of that power on which depends the operation of mind on body , or of body on mind ; nor are we able , either from our senses or consciousness , to assign the ultimate principle in one case more than in the other . The same ignorance , therefore , reduces them to the same conclusion . They assert that the Deity is the immediate cause of the union between soul and body ; and that they are not the organs of sense , which , being agitated by external objects , produce sensations in the mind ; but that it is a particular volition of our omnipotent Maker , which excites such a sensation , in consequence of such a motion in the organ . In like manner , it is not any energy in the will that produces local motion in our members : It is God himself , who is pleased to second our will , in itself impotent , and to command that motion which we erroneously attribute to our own power and efficacy . Nor do philosophers stop at this conclusion . They sometimes extend the same inference to the mind itself , in its internal operations . Our mental vision or conception of ideas is nothing but a revelation made to us by our Maker . When we voluntarily turn our thoughts to any object , and raise up its image in the fancy , it is not the will which creates that idea : It is the universal Creator , who discovers it to the mind , and renders it present to us . 56 . Thus , according to these philosophers , every thing is full of God . Not content with the principle , that nothing exists but by his will , that nothing possesses any power but by his concession : They rob nature , and all created beings , of every power , in order to render their dependence on the Deity still more sensible and immediate . They consider not that , by this theory , they diminish , instead of magnifying , the grandeur of those attributes , which they affect so much to celebrate . It argues surely more power in the Deity to delegate a certain degree of power to inferior creatures than to produce every thing by his own immediate volition . It argues more wisdom to contrive at first the fabric of the world with such perfect foresight that , of itself , and by its proper operation , it may serve all the purposes of providence , than if the great Creator were obliged every moment to adjust its parts , and animate by his breath all the wheels of that stupendous machine . But if we would have a more philosophical confutation of this theory , perhaps the two following reflections may suffice . 57 . First , it seems to me that this theory of the universal energy and operation of the Supreme Being is too bold ever to carry conviction with it to a man , sufficiently apprized of the weakness of human reason , and the narrow limits to which it is confined in all its operations . Though the chain of arguments which conduct to it were ever so logical , there must arise a strong suspicion , if not an absolute assurance , that it has carried us quite beyond the reach of our faculties , when it leads to conclusions so extraordinary , and so remote from common life and experience . We are got into fairy land , long ere we have reached the last steps of our theory ; and there we have no reason to trust our common methods of argument , or to think that our usual analogies and probabilities have any authority . Our line is too short to fathom such immense abysses . And however we may flatter ourselves that we are guided , in every step which we take , by a kind of verisimilitude and experience , we may be assured that this fancied experience has no authority when we thus apply it to subjects that lie entirely out of the sphere of experience . But on this we shall have occasion to touch afterwards . 14 Secondly , I cannot perceive any force in the arguments on which this theory is founded . We are ignorant , it is true , of the manner in which bodies operate on each other : Their force or energy is entirely incomprehensible : But are we not equally ignorant of the manner or force by which a mind , even the supreme mind , operates either on itself or on body ? Whence , I beseech you , do we acquire any idea of it ? We have no sentiment or consciousness of this power in ourselves . We have no idea of the Supreme Being but what we learn from reflection on our own faculties . Were our ignorance , therefore , a good reason for rejecting any thing , we should be led into that principle of denying all energy in the Supreme Being as much as in the grossest matter . We surely comprehend as little the operations of one as of the other . Is it more difficult to conceive that motion may arise from impulse than that it may arise from volition ? All we know is our profound ignorance in both cases 15 . PART II . 58 . But to hasten to a conclusion of this argument , which is already drawn out to too great a length : We have sought in vain for an idea of power or necessary connexion in all the sources from which we could suppose it to be derived . It appears that , in single instances of the operation of bodies , we never can , by our utmost scrutiny , discover any thing but one event following another , without being able to comprehend any force or power by which the cause operates , or any connexion between it and its supposed effect . The same difficulty occurs in contemplating the operations of mind on body — where we observe the motion of the latter to follow upon the volition of the former , but are not able to observe or conceive the tie which binds together the motion and volition , or the energy by which the mind produces this effect . The authority of the will over its own faculties and ideas is not a whit more comprehensible : So that , upon the whole , there appears not , throughout all nature , any one instance of connexion which is conceivable by us . All events seem entirely loose and separate . one event follows another ; but we never can observe any tie between them . They seem conjoined , but never connected . And as we can have no idea of any thing which never appeared to our outward sense or inward sentiment , the necessary conclusion seems to be that we have no idea of connexion or power at all , and that these words are absolutely without any meaning , when employed either in philosophical reasonings or common life . 59 . But there still remains one method of avoiding this conclusion , and one source which we have not yet examined . When any natural object or event is presented , it is impossible for us , by any sagacity or penetration , to discover , or even conjecture , without experience , what event will result from it , or to carry our foresight beyond that object which is immediately present to the memory and senses . Even after one instance or experiment where we have observed a particular event to follow upon another , we are not entitled to form a general rule , or foretell what will happen in like cases ; it being justly esteemed an unpardonable temerity to judge of the whole course of nature from one single experiment , however accurate or certain . But when one particular species of event has always , in all instances , been conjoined with another , we make no longer any scruple of foretelling one upon the appearance of the other , and of employing that reasoning , which can alone assure us of any matter of fact or existence . We then call the one object , Cause ; the other , Effect . We suppose that there is some connexion between them ; some power in the one , by which it infallibly produces the other , and operates with the greatest certainty and strongest necessity . It appears , then , that this idea of a necessary connexion among events arises from a number of similar instances which occur of the constant conjunction of these events ; nor can that idea ever be suggested by any one of these instances , surveyed in all possible lights and positions . But there is nothing in a number of instances , different from every single instance , which is supposed to be exactly similar ; except only , that after a repetition of similar instances , the mind is carried by habit , upon the appearance of one event , to expect its usual attendant , and to believe that it will exist . This connexion , therefore , which we feel in the mind , this customary transition of the imagination from one object to its usual attendant , is the sentiment or impression from which we form the idea of power or necessary connexion . Nothing farther is in the case . Contemplate the subject on all sides ; you will never find any other origin of that idea . This is the sole difference between one instance , from which we can never receive the idea of connexion , and a number of similar instances , by which it is suggested . The first time a man saw the communication of motion by impulse , as by the shock of two billiard balls , he could not pronounce that the one event was connected : but only that it was conjoined with the other . After he has observed several instances of this nature , he then pronounces them to be connected . What alteration has happened to give rise to this new idea of connexion ? Nothing but that he now feels these events to be connected in his imagination , and can readily foretell the existence of one from the appearance of the other . When we say , therefore , that one object is connected with another , we mean only that they have acquired a connexion in our thought , and give rise to this inference , by which they become proofs of each other ' s existence : A conclusion which is somewhat extraordinary , but which seems founded on sufficient evidence . Nor will its evidence be weakened by any general diffidence of the understanding , or sceptical suspicion concerning every conclusion which is new and extraordinary . No conclusions can be more agreeable to scepticism than such as make discoveries concerning the weakness and narrow limits of human reason and capacity . 60 . And what stronger instance can be produced of the surprising ignorance and weakness of the understanding than the present ? For surely , if there be any relation among objects which it imports to us to know perfectly , it is that of cause and effect . on this are founded all our reasonings concerning matter of fact or existence . By means of it alone we attain any assurance concerning objects which are removed from the present testimony of our memory and senses . The only immediate utility of all sciences , is to teach us , how to control and regulate future events by their causes . Our thoughts and enquiries are , therefore , every moment , employed about this relation : Yet so imperfect are the ideas which we form concerning it , that it is impossible to give any just definition of cause , except what is drawn from something extraneous and foreign to it . Similar objects are always conjoined with similar . Of this we have experience . Suitably to this experience , therefore , we may define a cause to be an object , followed by another , and where all the objects similar to the first are followed by objects similar to the second . Or in other words where , if the first object had not been , the second never had existed . The appearance of a cause always conveys the mind , by a customary transition , to the idea of the effect . Of this also we have experience . We may , therefore , suitably to this experience , form another definition of cause , and call it , an object followed by another , and whose appearance always conveys the thought to that other . But though both these definitions be drawn from circumstances foreign to the cause , we cannot remedy this inconvenience , or attain any more perfect definition , which may point out that circumstance in the cause , which gives it a connexion with its effect . We have no idea of this connexion , nor even any distinct notion what it is we desire to know , when we endeavour at a conception of it . We say , for instance , that the vibration of this string is the cause of this particular sound . But what do we mean by that affirmation ? We either mean that this vibration is followed by this sound , and that all similar vibrations have been followed by similar sounds : Or , that this vibration is followed by this sound , and that upon the appearance of one the mind anticipates the senses , and forms immediately an idea of the other . We may consider the relation of cause and effect in either of these two lights ; but beyond these , we have no idea of it . 1661 . To recapitulate , therefore , the reasonings of this section : Every idea is copied from some preceding impression or sentiment ; and where we cannot find any impression , we may be certain that there is no idea . In all single instances of the operation of bodies or minds , there is nothing that produces any impression , nor consequently can suggest any idea of power or necessary connexion . But when many uniform instances appear , and the same object is always followed by the same event ; we then begin to entertain the notion of cause and connexion . We then feel a new sentiment or impression , to wit , a customary connexion in the thought or imagination between one object and its usual attendant ; and this sentiment is the original of that idea which we seek for . For as this idea arises from a number of similar instances , and not from any single instance , it must arise from that circumstance , in which the number of instances differ from every individual instance . But this customary connexion or transition of the imagination is the only circumstance in which they differ . In every other particular they are alike . The first instance which we saw of motion communicated by the shock of two billiard balls ( to return to this obvious illustration ) is exactly similar to any instance that may , at present , occur to us ; except only , that we could not , at first , infer one event from the other ; which we are enabled to do at present , after so long a course of uniform experience . I know not whether the reader will readily apprehend this reasoning . I am afraid that , should I multiply words about it , or throw it into a greater variety of lights , it would only become more obscure and intricate . In all abstract reasonings there is one point of view which , if we can happily hit , we shall go farther towards illustrating the subject than by all the eloquence and copious ｅxpression in the world . This point of view we should endeavour to reach , and reserve the flowers of rhetoric for subjects which are more adapted to them . SECTION VIII . OF LIBERTY AND NECESSITY . PART I . 62 . It might reasonably be expected in questions which have been canvassed and disputed with great eagerness , since the first origin of science and philosophy , that the meaning of all the terms , at least , should have been agreed upon among the disputants ; and our enquiries , in the course of two thousand years , been able to pass from words to the true and real subject of the controversy . For how easy may it seem to give exact definitions of the terms employed in reasoning , and make these definitions , not the mere sound of words , the object of future scrutiny and examination ? But if we consider the matter more narrowly , we shall be apt to draw a quite opposite conclusion . From this circumstance alone , that a controversy has been long kept on foot , and remains still undecided , we may presume that there is some ambiguity in the ｅxpression , and that the disputants affix different ideas to the terms employed in the controversy . For as the faculties of the mind are supposed to be naturally alike in every individual ; otherwise nothing could be more fruitless than to reason or dispute together ; it were impossible , if men affix the same ideas to their terms , that they could so long form different opinions of the same subject ; especially when they communicate their views , and each party turn themselves on all sides , in search of arguments which may give them the victory over their antagonists . It is true , if men attempt the discussion of questions which lie entirely beyond the reach of human capacity , such as those concerning the origin of worlds , or the economy of the intellectual system or region of spirits , they may long beat the air in their fruitless contests , and never arrive at any determinate conclusion . But if the question regard any subject of common life and experience , nothing , one would think , could preserve the dispute so long undecided but some ambiguous ｅxpressions , which keep the antagonists still at a distance , and hinder them from grappling with each other . 63 . This has been the case in the long disputed question concerning liberty and necessity ; and to so remarkable a degree that , if I be not much mistaken , we shall find , that all mankind , both learned and ignorant , have always been of the same opinion with regard to this subject , and that a few intelligible definitions would immediately have put an end to the whole controversy . I own that this dispute has been so much canvassed on all hands , and has led philosophers into such a labyrinth of obscure sophistry , that it is no wonder , if a sensible reader indulge his ease so far as to turn a deaf ear to the proposal of such a question , from which he can expect neither instruction or entertainment . But the state of the argument here proposed may , perhaps , serve to renew his attention ; as it has more novelty , promises at least some decision of the controversy , and will not much disturb his ease by any intricate or obscure reasoning . I hope , therefore , to make it appear that all men have ever agreed in the doctrine both of necessity and of liberty , according to any reasonable sense , which can be put on these terms ; and that the whole controversy has hitherto turned merely upon words . We shall begin with examining the doctrine of necessity . 64 . It is universally allowed that matter , in all its operations , is actuated by a necessary force , and that every natural effect is so precisely determined by the energy of its cause that no other effect , in such particular circumstances , could possibly have resulted from it . The degree and direction of every motion is , by the laws of nature , prescribed with such exactness that a living creature may as soon arise from the shock of two bodies as motion in any other degree or direction than what is actually produced by it . Would we , therefore , form a just and precise idea of necessity , we must consider whence that idea arises when we apply it to the operation of bodies . It seems evident that , if all the scenes of nature were continually shifted in such a manner that no two events bore any resemblance to each other , but every object was entirely new , without any similitude to whatever had been seen before , we should never , in that case , have attained the least idea of necessity , or of a connexion among these objects . We might say , upon such a supposition , that one object or event has followed another ; not that one was produced by the other . The relation of cause and effect must be utterly unknown to mankind . Inference and reasoning concerning the operations of nature would , from that moment , be at an end ; and the memory and senses remain the only canals , by which the knowledge of any real existence could possibly have access to the mind . Our idea , therefore , of necessity and causation arises entirely from the uniformity observable in the operations of nature , where similar objects are constantly conjoined together , and the mind is determined by custom to infer the one from the appearance of the other . These two circumstances form the whole of that necessity , which we ascribe to matter . Beyond the constant conjunction of similar objects , and the consequent inference from one to the other , we have no notion of any necessity or connexion . If it appear , therefore , that all mankind have ever allowed , without any doubt or hesitation , that these two circumstances take place in the voluntary actions of men , and in the operations of mind ; it must follow , that all mankind have ever agreed in the doctrine of necessity , and that they have hitherto disputed , merely for not understanding each other . 65 . As to the first circumstance , the constant and regular conjunction of similar events , we may possibly satisfy ourselves by the following considerations . It is universally acknowledged that there is a great uniformity among the actions of men , in all nations and ages , and that human nature remains still the same , in its principles and operations . The same motives always produce the same actions . The same events follow from the same causes . Ambition , avarice , self - love , vanity , friendship , generosity , public spirit : these passions , mixed in various degrees , and distributed through society , have been , from the beginning of the world , and still are , the source of all the actions and enterprises , which have ever been observed among mankind . Would you know the sentiments , inclinations , and course of life of the Greeks and Romans ? Study well the temper and actions of the French and English : You cannot be much mistaken in transferring to the former most of the observations which you have made with regard to the latter . Mankind are so much the same , in all times and places , that history informs us of nothing new or strange in this particular . Its chief use is only to discover the constant and universal principles of human nature , by showing men in all varieties of circumstances and situations , and furnishing us with materials from which we may form our observations and become acquainted with the regular springs of human action and behaviour . These records of wars , intrigues , factions , and revolutions , are so many collections of experiments , by which the politician or moral philosopher fixes the principles of his science , in the same manner as the physician or natural philosopher becomes acquainted with the nature of plants , minerals , and other external objects , by the experiments which he forms concerning them . Nor are the earth , water , and other elements , examined by Aristotle , and Hippocrates , more like to those which at present lie under our observation than the men described by Polybius and Tacitus are to those who now govern the world . Should a traveller , returning from a far country , bring us an account of men , wholly different from any with whom we were ever acquainted ; men , who were entirely divested of avarice , ambition , or revenge ; who knew no pleasure but friendship , generosity , and public spirit ; we should immediately , from these circumstances , detect the falsehood , and prove him a liar , with the same certainty as if he had stuffed his narration with stories of centaurs and dragons , miracles and prodigies . And if we would explode any forgery in history , we cannot make use of a more convincing argument , than to prove , that the actions ascribed to any person are directly contrary to the course of nature , and that no human motives , in such circumstances , could ever induce him to such a conduct . The veracity of Quintus Curtius is as much to be suspected , when he describes the supernatural courage of Alexander , by which he was hurried on singly to attack multitudes , as when he describes his supernatural force and activity , by which he was able to resist them . So readily and universally do we acknowledge a uniformity in human motives and actions as well as in the operations of body . Hence likewise the benefit of that experience , acquired by long life and a variety of business and company , in order to instruct us in the principles of human nature , and regulate our future conduct , as well as speculation . By means of this guide , we mount up to the knowledge of men ' s inclinations and motives , from their actions , ｅxpressions , and even gestures ; and again descend to the interpretation of their actions from our knowledge of their motives and inclinations . The general observations treasured up by a course of experience , give us the clue of human nature , and teach us to unravel all its intricacies . Pretexts and appearances no longer deceive us . Public declarations pass for the specious colouring of a cause . And though virtue and honour be allowed their proper weight and authority , that perfect disinterestedness , so often pretended to , is never expected in multitudes and parties ; seldom in their leaders ; and scarcely even in individuals of any rank or station . But were there no uniformity in human actions , and were every experiment which we could form of this kind irregular and anomalous , it were impossible to collect any general observations concerning mankind ; and no experience , however accurately digested by reflection , would ever serve to any purpose . Why is the aged husbandman more skilful in his calling than the young beginner but because there is a certain uniformity in the operation of the sun , rain , and earth towards the production of vegetables ; and experience teaches the old practitioner the rules by which this operation is governed and directed . 66 . We must not , however , expect that this uniformity of human actions should be carried to such a length as that all men , in the same circumstances , will always act precisely in the same manner , without making any allowance for the diversity of characters , prejudices , and opinions . Such a uniformity in every particular , is found in no part of nature . on the contrary , from observing the variety of conduct in different men , we are enabled to form a greater variety of maxims , which still suppose a degree of uniformity and regularity . Are the manners of men different in different ages and countries ? We learn thence the great force of custom and education , which mould the human mind from its infancy and form it into a fixed and established character . Is the behaviour and conduct of the one sex very unlike that of the other ? Is it thence we become acquainted with the different characters which nature has impressed upon the sexes , and which she preserves with constancy and regularity ? Are the actions of the same person much diversified in the different periods of his life , from infancy to old age ? This affords room for many general observations concerning the gradual change of our sentiments and inclinations , and the different maxims which prevail in the different ages of human creatures . Even the characters , which are peculiar to each individual , have a uniformity in their influence ; otherwise our acquaintance with the persons and our observation of their conduct could never teach us their dispositions , or serve to direct our behaviour with regard to them . 67 . I grant it possible to find some actions , which seem to have no regular connexion with any known motives , and are exceptions to all the measures of conduct which have ever been established for the government of men . But if we would willingly know what judgement should be formed of such irregular and extraordinary actions , we may consider the sentiments commonly entertained with regard to those irregular events which appear in the course of nature , and the operations of external objects . All causes are not conjoined to their usual effects with like uniformity . An artificer , who handles only dead matter , may be disappointed of his aim , as well as the politician , who directs the conduct of sensible and intelligent agents . The vulgar , who take things according to their first appearance , attribute the uncertainty of events to such an uncertainty in the causes as makes the latter often fail of their usual influence ; though they meet with no impediment in their operation . But philosophers , observing that , almost in every part of nature , there is contained a vast variety of springs and principles , which are hid , by reason of their minuteness or remoteness , find , that it is at least possible the contrariety of events may not proceed from any contingency in the cause , but from the secret operation of contrary causes . This possibility is converted into certainty by farther observation , when they remark that , upon an exact scrutiny , a contrariety of effects always betrays a contrariety of causes , and proceeds from their mutual opposition . A peasant can give no better reason for the stopping of any clock or watch than to say that it does not commonly go right : But an artist easily perceives that the same force in the spring or pendulum has always the same influence on the wheels ; but fails of its usual effect , perhaps by reason of a grain of dust , which puts a stop to the whole movement . From the observation of several parallel instances , philosophers form a maxim that the connexion between all causes and effects is equally necessary , and that its seeming uncertainty in some instances proceeds from the secret opposition of contrary causes . Thus , for instance , in the human body , when the usual symptoms of health or sickness disappoint our expectation ; when medicines operate not with their wonted powers ; when irregular events follow from any particular cause ; the philosopher and physician are not surprised at the matter , nor are ever tempted to deny , in general , the necessity and uniformity of those principles by which the animal economy is conducted . They know that a human body is a mighty complicated machine : That many secret powers lurk in it , which are altogether beyond our comprehension : That to us it must often appear very uncertain in its operations : And that therefore the irregular events , which outwardly discover themselves , can be no proof that the laws of nature are not observed with the greatest regularity in its internal operations and government . 68 . The philosopher , if he be consistent , must apply the same reasoning to the actions and volitions of intelligent agents . The most irregular and unexpected resolutions of men may frequently be accounted for by those who know every particular circumstance of their character and situation . A person of an obliging disposition gives a peevish answer : But he has the toothache , or has not dined . A stupid fellow discovers an uncommon alacrity in his carriage : But he has met with a sudden piece of good fortune . Or even when an action , as sometimes happens , cannot be particularly accounted for , either by the person himself or by others ; we know , in general , that the characters of men are , to a certain degree , inconstant and irregular . This is , in a manner , the constant character of human nature ; though it be applicable , in a more particular manner , to some persons who have no fixed rule for their conduct , but proceed in a continued course of caprice and inconstancy . The internal principles and motives may operate in a uniform manner , notwithstanding these seeming irregularities ; in the same manner as the winds , rain , clouds , and other variations of the weather are supposed to be governed by steady principles ; though not easily discoverable by human sagacity and enquiry . 69 . Thus it appears , not only that the conjunction between motives and voluntary actions is as regular and uniform as that between the cause and effect in any part of nature ; but also that this regular conjunction has been universally acknowledged among mankind , and has never been the subject of dispute , either in philosophy or common life . Now , as it is from past experience that we draw all inferences concerning the future , and as we conclude that objects will always be conjoined together which we find to have always been conjoined ; it may seem superfluous to prove that this experienced uniformity in human actions is a source whence we draw inferences concerning them . But in order to throw the argument into a greater variety of lights we shall also insist , though briefly , on this latter topic . The mutual dependence of men is so great in all societies that scarce any human action is entirely complete in itself , or is performed without some reference to the actions of others , which are requisite to make it answer fully the intention of the agent . The poorest artificer , who labours alone , expects at least the protection of the magistrate , to ensure him the enjoyment of the fruits of his labour . He also expects that , when he carries his goods to market , and offers them at a reasonable price , he shall find purchasers , and shall be able , by the money he acquires , to engage others to supply him with those commodities which are requisite for his subsistence . In proportion as men extend their dealings , and render their intercourse with others more complicated , they always comprehend , in their schemes of life , a greater variety of voluntary actions , which they expect , from the proper motives , to co - operate with their own . In all these conclusions they take their measures from past experience , in the same manner as in their reasonings concerning external objects ; and firmly believe that men , as well as all the elements , are to continue , in their operations , the same that they have ever found them . A manufacturer reckons upon the labour of his servants for the execution of any work as much as upon the tools which he employs , and would be equally surprised were his expectations disappointed . In short , this experimental inference and reasoning concerning the actions of others enters so much into human life that no man , while awake , is ever a moment without employing it . Have we not reason , therefore , to affirm that all mankind have always agreed in the doctrine of necessity according to the foregoing definition and explication of it ? 70 . Nor have philosophers ever entertained a different opinion from the people in this particular . For , not to mention that almost every action of their life supposes that opinion , there are even few of the speculative parts of learning to which it is not essential . What would become of history , had we not a dependence on the veracity of the historian according to the experience which we have had of mankind ? How could politics be a science , if laws and forms of goverment had not a uniform influence upon society ? Where would be the foundation of morals , if particular characters had no certain or determinate power to produce particular sentiments , and if these sentiments had no constant operation on actions ? And with what pretence could we employ our criticism upon any poet or polite author , if we could not pronounce the conduct and sentiments of his actors either natural or unnatural to such characters , and in such circumstances ? It seems almost impossible , therefore , to engage either in science or action of any kind without acknowledging the doctrine of necessity , and this inference from motive to voluntary actions , from characters to conduct . And indeed , when we consider how aptly natural and moral evidence link together , and form only one chain of argument , we shall make no scruple to allow that they are of the same nature , and derived from the same principles . A prisoner who has neither money nor interest , discovers the impossibility of his escape , as well when he considers the obstinacy of the gaoler , as the walls and bars with which he is surrounded ; and , in all attempts for his freedom , chooses rather to work upon the stone and iron of the one , than upon the inflexible nature of the other . The same prisoner , when conducted to the scaffold , foresees his death as certainly from the constancy and fidelity of his guards , as from the operation of the axe or wheel . His mind runs along a certain train of ideas : The refusal of the soldiers to consent to his escape ; the action of the executioner ; the separation of the head and body ; bleeding , convulsive motions , and death . Here is a connected chain of natural causes and voluntary actions ; but the mind feels no difference between them in passing from one link to another : Nor is less certain of the future event than if it were connected with the objects present to the memory or senses , by a train of causes , cemented together by what we are pleased to call a physical necessity . The same experienced union has the same effect on the mind , whether the united objects be motives , volition , and actions ; or figure and motion . We may change the name of things ; but their nature and their operation on the understanding never change . Were a man , whom I know to be honest and opulent , and with whom I live in intimate friendship , to come into my house , where I am surrounded with my servants , I rest assured that he is not to stab me before he leaves it in order to rob me of my silver standish ; and I no more suspect this event than the falling of the house itself , which is new , and solidly built and founded . — But he may have been seized with a sudden and unknown frenzy . — So may a sudden earthquake arise , and shake and tumble my house about my ears . I shall therefore change the suppositions . I shall say that I know with certainty that he is not to put his hand into the fire and hold it there till it be consumed : And this event , I think I can foretell with the same assurance , as that , if he throw himself out at the window , and meet with no obstruction , he will not remain a moment suspended in the air . No suspicion of an unknown frenzy can give the least possibility to the former event , which is so contrary to all the known principles of human nature . A man who at noon leaves his purse full of gold on the pavement at Charing - Cross , may as well expect that it will fly away like a feather , as that he will find it untouched an hour after . Above one half of human reasonings contain inferences of a similar nature , attended with more or less degrees of certainty proportioned to our experience of the usual conduct of mankind in such particular situations . 71 . I have frequently considered , what could possibly be the reason why all mankind , though they have ever , without hesitation , acknowledged the doctrine of necessity in their whole practice and reasoning , have yet discovered such a reluctance to acknowledge it in words , and have rather shown a propensity , in all ages , to profess the contrary opinion . The matter , I think , may be accounted for after the following manner . If we examine the operations of body , and the production of effects from their causes , we shall find that all our faculties can never carry us farther in our knowledge of this relation than barely to observe that particular objects are constantly conjoined together , and that the mind is carried , by a customary transition , from the appearance of one to the belief of the other . But though this conclusion concerning human ignorance be the result of the strictest scrutiny of this subject , men still entertain a strong propensity to believe that they penetrate farther into the powers of nature , and perceive something like a necessary connexion between the cause and the effect . When again they turn their reflections towards the operations of their own minds , and feel no such connexion of the motive and the action ; they are thence apt to suppose , that there is a difference between the effects which result from material force , and those which arise from thought and intelligence . But being once convinced that we know nothing farther of causation of any kind than merely the constant conjunction of objects , and the consequent inference of the mind from one to another , and finding that these two circumstances are universally allowed to have place in voluntary actions ; we may be more easily led to own the same necessity common to all causes . And though this reasoning may contradict the systems of many philosophers , in ascribing necessity to the determinations of the will , we shall find , upon reflection , that they dissent from it in words only , not in their real sentiment . Necessity , according to the sense in which it is here taken , has never yet been rejected , nor can ever , I think , be rejected by any philosopher . It may only , perhaps , be pretended that the mind can perceive , in the operations of matter , some farther connexion between the cause and effect ; and connexion that has not place in voluntary actions of intelligent beings . Now whether it be so or not , can only appear upon examination ; and it is incumbent on these philosophers to make good their assertion , by defining or describing that necessity , and pointing it out to us in the operations of material causes . 72 . It would seem , indeed , that men begin at the wrong end of this question concerning liberty and necessity , when they enter upon it by examining the faculties of the soul , the influence of the understanding , and the operations of the will . Let them first discuss a more simple question , namely , the operations of body and of brute unintelligent matter ; and try whether they can there form any idea of causation and necessity , except that of a constant conjunction of objects , and subsequent inference of the mind from one to another . If these circumstances form , in reality , the whole of that necessity , which we conceive in matter , and if these circumstances be also universally acknowledged to take place in the operations of the mind , the dispute is at an end ; at least , must be owned to be thenceforth merely verbal . But as long as we will rashly suppose , that we have some farther idea of necessity and causation in the operations of external objects ; at the same time , that we can find nothing farther in the voluntary actions of the mind ; there is no possibility of bringing the question to any determinate issue , while we proceed upon so erroneous a supposition . The only method of undeceiving us is to mount up higher ; to examine the narrow extent of science when applied to material causes ; and to convince ourselves that all we know of them is the constant conjunction and inference above mentioned . We may , perhaps , find that it is with difficulty we are induced to fix such narrow limits to human understanding : But we can afterwards find no difficulty when we come to apply this doctrine to the actions of the will . For as it is evident that these have a regular conjunction with motives and circumstances and characters , and as we always draw inferences from one to the other , we must be obliged to acknowledge in words that necessity , which we have already avowed , in every deliberation of our lives , and in every step of our conduct and behaviour . 1773 . But to proceed in this reconciling project with regard to the question of liberty and necessity ; the most contentious question of metaphysics , the most contentious science ; it will not require many words to prove , that all mankind have ever agreed in the doctrine of liberty as well as in that of necessity , and that the whole dispute , in this respect also , has been hitherto merely verbal . For what is meant by liberty , when applied to voluntary actions ? We cannot surely mean that actions have so little connexion with motives , inclinations , and circumstances , that one does not follow with a certain degree of uniformity from the other , and that one affords no inference by which we can conclude the existence of the other . For these are plain and acknowledged matters of fact . By liberty , then , we can only mean a power of acting or not acting , according to the determinations of the will ; that is , if we choose to remain at rest , we may ; if we choose to move , we also may . Now this hypothetical liberty is universally allowed to belong to every one who is not a prisoner and in chains . Here , then , is no subject of dispute . 74 . Whatever definition we may give of liberty , we should be careful to observe two requisite circumstances ; first , that it be consistent with plain matter of fact ; secondly , that it be consistent with itself . If we observe these circumstances , and render our definition intelligible , I am persuaded that all mankind will be found of one opinion with regard to it . It is universally allowed that nothing exists without a cause of its existence , and that chance , when strictly examined , is a mere negative word , and means not any real power which has anywhere a being in nature . But it is pretended that some causes are necessary , some not necessary . Here then is the advantage of definitions . Let any one define a cause , without comprehending , as a part of the definition , a necessary connexion with its effect ; and let him show distinctly the origin of the idea , expressed by the definition ; and I shall readily give up the whole controversy . But if the foregoing explication of the matter be received , this must be absolutely impracticable . Had not objects a regular conjunction with each other , we should never have entertained any notion of cause and effect ; and this regular conjunction produces that inference of the understanding , which is the only connexion , that we can have any comprehension of . Whoever attempts a definition of cause , exclusive of these circumstances , will be obliged either to employ unintelligible terms or such as are synonymous to the term which he endeavours to define . 18 And if the definition above mentioned be admitted ; liberty , when opposed to necessity , not to constraint , is the same thing with chance ; which is universally allowed to have no existence . PART II . 75 . There is no method of reasoning more common , and yet none more blameable , than , in philosophical disputes , to endeavour the refutation of any hypothesis , by a pretence of its dangerous consequences to religion and morality . When any opinion leads to absurdities , it is certainly false ; but it is not certain that an opinion is false , because it is of dangerous consequence . Such topics , therefore , ought entirely to be forborne ; as serving nothing to the discovery of truth , but only to make the person of an antagonist odious . This I observe in general , without pretending to draw any advantage from it . I frankly submit to an examination of this kind , and shall venture to affirm that the doctrines , both of necessity and of liberty , as above explained , are not only consistent with morality , but are absolutely essential to its support . Necessity may be defined two ways , conformably to the two definitions of cause , of which it makes an essential part . It consists either in the constant conjunction of like objects , or in the inference of the understanding from one object to another . Now necessity , in both these senses , ( which , indeed , are at bottom the same ) has universally , though tacitly , in the schools , in the pulpit , and in common life , been allowed to belong to the will of man ; and no one has ever pretended to deny that we can draw inferences concerning human actions , and that those inferences are founded on the experienced union of like actions , with like motives , inclinations , and circumstances . The only particular in which any one can differ , is , that either , perhaps , he will refuse to give the name of necessity to this property of human actions : But as long as the meaning is understood , I hope the word can do no harm : Or that he will maintain it possible to discover something farther in the operations of matter . But this , it must be acknowledged , can be of no consequence to morality or religion , whatever it may be to natural philosophy or metaphysics . We may here be mistaken in asserting that there is no idea of any other necessity or connexion in the actions of body : But surely we ascribe nothing to the actions of the mind , but what everyone does , and must readily allow of . We change no circumstance in the received orthodox system with regard to the will , but only in that with regard to material objects and causes . Nothing , therefore , can be more innocent , at least , than this doctrine . 76 . All laws being founded on rewards and punishments , it is supposed as a fundamental principle , that these motives have a regular and uniform influence on the mind , and both produce the good and prevent the evil actions . We may give to this influence what name we please ; but , as it is usually conjoined with the action , it must be esteemed a cause , and be looked upon as an instance of that necessity , which we would here establish . The only proper object of hatred or vengeance is a person or creature , endowed with thought and consciousness ; and when any criminal or injurious actions excite that passion , it is only by their relation to the person , or connexion with him . Actions are , by their very nature , temporary and perishing ; and where they proceed not from some cause in the character and disposition of the person who performed them , they can neither redound to his honour , if good ; nor infamy , if evil . The actions themselves may be blameable ; they may be contrary to all the rules of morality and religion : But the person is not answerable for them ; and as they proceeded from nothing in him that is durable and constant , and leave nothing of that nature behind them , it is impossible he can , upon their account , become the object of punishment or vengeance . According to the principle , therefore , which denies necessity , and consequently causes , a man is as pure and untainted , after having committed the most horrid crime , as at the first moment of his birth , nor is his character anywise concerned in his actions , since they are not derived from it , and the wickedness of the one can never be used as a proof of the depravity of the other . Men are not blamed for such actions as they perform ignorantly and casually , whatever may be the consequences . Why ? but because the principles of these actions are only momentary , and terminate in them alone . Men are less blamed for such actions as they perform hastily and unpremeditately than for such as proceed from deliberation . For what reason ? but because a hasty temper , though a constant cause or principle in the mind , operates only by intervals , and infects not the whole character . Again , repentance wipes off every crime , if attended with a reformation of life and manners . How is this to be accounted for ? but by asserting that actions render a person criminal merely as they are proofs of criminal principles in the mind ; and when , by an alteration of these principles , they cease to be just proofs , they likewise cease to be criminal . But , except upon the doctrine of necessity , they never were just proofs , and consequently never were criminal . 77 . It will be equally easy to prove , and from the same arguments , that liberty , according to that definition above mentioned , in which all men agree , is also essential to morality , and that no human actions , where it is wanting , are susceptible of any moral qualities , or can be the objects either of approbation or dislike . For as actions are objects of our moral sentiment , so far only as they are indications of the internal character , passions , and affections ; it is impossible that they can give rise either to praise or blame , where they proceed not from these principles , but are derived altogether from external violence . 78 . I pretend not to have obviated or removed all objections to this theory , with regard to necessity and liberty . I can foresee other objections , derived from topics which have not here been treated of . It may be said , for instance , that , if voluntary actions be subjected to the same laws of necessity with the operations of matter , there is a continued chain of necessary causes , pre - ordained and pre - determined , reaching from the original cause of all to every single volition of every human creature . No contingency anywhere in the universe ; no indifference ; no liberty . While we act , we are , at the same time , acted upon . The ultimate Author of all our volitions is the Creator of the world , who first bestowed motion on this immense machine , and placed all beings in that particular position , whence every subsequent event , by an inevitable necessity , must result . Human actions , therefore , either can have no moral turpitude at all , as proceeding from so good a cause ; or if they have any turpitude , they must involve our Creator in the same guilt , while he is acknowledged to be their ultimate cause and author . For as a man , who fired a mine , is answerable for all the consequences whether the train he employed be long or short ; so wherever a continued chain of necessary causes is fixed , that Being , either finite or infinite , who produces the first , is likewise the author of all the rest , and must both bear the blame and acquire the praise which belong to them . Our clear and unalterable ideas of morality establish this rule , upon unquestionable reasons , when we examine the consequences of any human action ; and these reasons must still have greater force when applied to the volitions and intentions of a Being infinitely wise and powerful . Ignorance or impotence may be pleaded for so limited a creature as man ; but those imperfections have no place in our Creator . He foresaw , he ordained , he intended all those actions of men , which we so rashly pronounce criminal . And we must therefore conclude , either that they are not criminal , or that the Deity , not man , is accountable for them . But as either of these positions is absurd and impious , it follows , that the doctrine from which they are deduced cannot possibly be true , as being liable to all the same objections . An absurd consequence , if necessary , proves the original doctrine to be absurd ; in the same manner as criminal actions render criminal the original cause , if the connexion between them be necessary and evitable . This objection consists of two parts , which we shall examine separately ; First , that , if human actions can be traced up , by a necessary chain , to the Deity , they can never be criminal ; on account of the infinite perfection of that Being from whom they are derived , and who can intend nothing but what is altogether good and laudable . Or , Secondly , if they be criminal , we must retract the attribute of perfection , which we ascribe to the Deity , and must acknowledge him to be the ultimate author of guilt and moral turpitude in all his creatures . 79 . The answer to the first objection seems obvious and convincing . There are many philosophers who , after an exact scrutiny of all the phenomena of nature , conclude , that the WHOLE , considered as one system , is , in every period of its existence , ordered with perfect benevolence ; and that the utmost possible happiness will , in the end , result to all created beings , without any mixture of positive or absolute ill or misery . Every physical ill , say they , makes an essential part of this benevolent system , and could not possibly be removed , even by the Deity himself , considered as a wise agent , without giving entrance to greater ill , or excluding greater good , which will result from it . From this theory , some philosophers , and the ancient Stoics among the rest , derived a topic of consolation under all afflictions , while they taught their pupils that those ills under which they laboured were , in reality , goods to the universe ; and that to an enlarged view , which could comprehend the whole system of nature , every event became an object of joy and exultation . But though this topic be specious and sublime , it was soon found in practice weak and ineffectual . You would surely more irritate than appease a man lying under the racking pains of the gout by preaching up to him the rectitude of those general laws , which produced the malignant humours in his body , and led them through the proper canals , to the sinews and nerves , where they now excite such acute torments . These enlarged views may , for a moment , please the imagination of a speculative man , who is placed in ease and security ; but neither can they dwell with constancy on his mind , even though undisturbed by the emotions of pain or passion ; much less can they maintain their ground when attacked by such powerful antagonists . The affections take a narrower and more natural survey of their object ; and by an economy , more suitable to the infirmity of human minds , regard alone the beings around us , and are actuated by such events as appear good or ill to the private system . 80 . The case is the same with moral as with physical ill . It cannot reasonably be supposed , that those remote considerations , which are found of so little efficacy with regard to one , will have a more powerful influence with regard to the other . The mind of man is so formed by nature that , upon the appearance of certain characters , dispositions , and actions , it immediately feels the sentiment of approbation or blame ; nor are there any emotions more essential to its frame and constitution . The characters which engage our approbation are chiefly such as contribute to the peace and security of human society ; as the characters which excite blame are chiefly such as tend to public detriment and disturbance : Whence it may reasonably be presumed , that the moral sentiments arise , either mediately or immediately , from a reflection of these opposite interests . What though philosophical meditations establish a different opinion or conjecture ; that everything is right with regard to the WHOLE , and that the qualities , which disturb society , are , in the main , as beneficial , and are as suitable to the primary intention of nature as those which more directly promote its happiness and welfare ? Are such remote and uncertain speculations able to counterbalance the sentiments which arise from the natural and immediate view of the objects ? A man who is robbed of a considerable sum ; does he find his vexation for the loss anywise diminished by these sublime reflections ? Why then should his moral resentment against the crime be supposed incompatible with them ? Or why should not the acknowledgment of a real distinction between vice and virtue be reconcileable to all speculative systems of philosophy , as well as that of a real distinction between personal beauty and deformity ? Both these distinctions are founded in the natural sentiments of the human mind : And these sentiments are not to be controuled or altered by any philosophical theory or speculation whatsoever . 81 . The second objection admits not of so easy and satisfactory an answer ; nor is it possible to explain distinctly , how the Deity can be the mediate cause of all the actions of men , without being the author of sin and moral turpitude . These are mysteries , which mere natural and unassisted reason is very unfit to handle ; and whatever system she embraces , she must find herself involved in inextricable difficulties , and even contradictions , at every step which she takes with regard to such subjects . To reconcile the indifference and contingency of human actions with prescience ; or to defend absolute decrees , and yet free the Deity from being the author of sin , has been found hitherto to exceed all the power of philosophy . Happy , if she be thence sensible of her temerity , when she pries into these sublime mysteries ; and leaving a scene so full of obscurities and perplexities , return , with suitable modesty , to her true and proper province , the examination of common life ; where she will find difficulties enough to employ her enquiries , without launching into so boundless an ocean of doubt , uncertainty , and contradiction ! SECTION IX . OF THE REASON OF ANIMALS . 82 . All our reasonings concerning matter of fact are founded on a species of Analogy , which leads us to expect from any cause the same events , which we have observed to result from similar causes . Where the causes are entirely similar , the analogy is perfect , and the inference , drawn from it , is regarded as certain and conclusive : nor does any man ever entertain a doubt , where he sees a piece of iron , that it will have weight and cohesion of parts ; as in all other instances , which have ever fallen under his observation . But where the objects have not so exact a similarity , the analogy is less perfect , and the inference is less conclusive ; though still it has some force , in proportion to the degree of similarity and resemblance . The anatomical observations , formed upon one animal , are , by this species of reasoning , extended to all animals ; and it is certain , that when the circulation of the blood , for instance , is clearly proved to have place in one creature , as a frog , or fish , it forms a strong presumption , that the same principle has place in all . These analogical observations may be carried farther , even to this science , of which we are now treating ; and any theory , by which we explain the operations of the understanding , or the origin and connexion of the passions in man , will acquire additional authority , if we find , that the same theory is requisite to explain the same phenomena in all other animals . We shall make trial of this , with regard to the hypothesis , by which we have , in the foregoing discourse , endeavoured to account for all experimental reasonings ; and it is hoped , that this new point of view will serve to confirm all our former observations . 83 . First , It seems evident , that animals as well as men learn many things from experience , and infer , that the same events will always follow from the same causes . By this principle they become acquainted with the more obvious properties of external objects , and gradually , from their birth , treasure up a knowledge of the nature of fire , water , earth , stones , heights , depths , & c . , and of the effects which result from their operation . The ignorance and inexperience of the young are here plainly distinguishable from the cunning and sagacity of the old , who have learned , by long observation , to avoid what hurt them , and to pursue what gave ease or pleasure . A horse , that has been accustomed to the field , becomes acquainted with the proper height which he can leap , and will never attempt what exceeds his force and ability . An old greyhound will trust the more fatiguing part of the chace to the younger , and will place himself so as to meet the hare in her doubles ; nor are the conjectures , which he forms on this occasion , founded in any thing but his observation and experience . This is still more evident from the effects of discipline and education on animals , who , by the proper application of rewards and punishments , may be taught any course of action , and most contrary to their natural instincts and propensities . Is it not experience , which renders a dog apprehensive of pain , when you menace him , or lift up the whip to beat him ? Is it not even experience , which makes him answer to his name , and infer , from such an arbitrary sound , that you mean him rather than any of his fellows , and intend to call him , when you pronounce it in a certain manner , and with a certain tone and accent ? In all these cases , we may observe , that the animal infers some fact beyond what immediately strikes his senses ; and that this inference is altogether founded on past experience , while the creature expects from the present object the same consequences , which it has always found in its observation to result from similar objects . 84 . Secondly , It is impossible , that this inference of the animal can be founded on any process of argument or reasoning , by which he concludes , that like events must follow like objects , and that the course of nature will always be regular in its operations . For if there be in reality any arguments of this nature , they surely lie too abstruse for the observation of such imperfect understandings ; since it may well employ the utmost care and attention of a philosophic genius to discover and observe them . Animals , therefore , are not guided in these inferences by reasoning : Neither are children : Neither are the generality of mankind , in their ordinary actions and conclusions : Neither are philosophers themselves , who , in all the active parts of life , are , in the main , the same with the vulgar , and are governed by the same maxims . Nature must have provided some other principle , of more ready , and more general use and application ; nor can an operation of such immense consequence in life , as that of inferring effects from causes , be trusted to the uncertain process of reasoning and argumentation . Were this doubtful with regard to men , it seems to admit of no question with regard to the brute creation ; and the conclusion being once firmly established in the one , we have a strong presumption , from all the rules of analogy , that it ought to be universally admitted , without any exception or reserve . It is custom alone , which engages animals , from every object , that strikes their senses , to infer its usual attendant , and carries their imagination , from the appearance of the one , to conceive the other , in that particular manner , which we denominate belief . No other explication can be given of this operation , in all the higher , as well as lower classes of sensitive beings , which fall under our notice and observation 19 . 85 . But though animals learn many parts of their knowledge from observation , there are also many parts of it , which they derive from the original hand of nature ; which much exceed the share of capacity they possess on ordinary occasions ; and in which they improve , little or nothing , by the longest practice and experience . These we denominate Instincts , and are so apt to admire as something very extraordinary , and inexplicable by all the disquisitions of human understanding . But our wonder will , perhaps , cease or diminish , when we consider , that the experimental reasoning itself , which we possess in common with beasts , and on which the whole conduct of life depends , is nothing but a species of instinct or mechanical power , that acts in us unknown to ourselves ; and in its chief operations , is not directed by any such relations or comparisons of ideas , as are the proper objects of our intellectual faculties . Though the instinct be different , yet still it is an instinct , which teaches a man to avoid the fire ; as much as that , which teaches a bird , with such exactness , the art of incubation , and the whole economy and order of its nursery . SECTION XOF MIRACLES . PART I . 86 . There is , in Dr . Tillotson ' s writings , an argument against the real presence , which is as concise , and elegant , and strong as any argument can possibly be supposed against a doctrine , so little worthy of a serious refutation . It is acknowledged on all hands , says that learned prelate , that the authority , either of the scripture or of tradition , is founded merely in the testimony of the apostles , who were eye - witnesses to those miracles of our Saviour , by which he proved his divine mission . Our evidence , then , for the truth of the Christian religion is less than the evidence for the truth of our senses ; because , even in the first authors of our religion , it was no greater ; and it is evident it must diminish in passing from them to their disciples ; nor can any one rest such confidence in their testimony , as in the immediate object of his senses . But a weaker evidence can never destroy a stronger ; and therefore , were the doctrine of the real presence ever so clearly revealed in scripture , it were directly contrary to the rules of just reasoning to give our assent to it . It contradicts sense , though both the scripture and tradition , on which it is supposed to be built , carry not such evidence with them as sense ; when they are considered merely as external evidences , and are not brought home to every one ' s breast , by the immediate operation of the Holy Spirit . Nothing is so convenient as a decisive argument of this kind , which must at least silence the most arrogant bigotry and superstition , and free us from their impertinent solicitations . I flatter myself , that I have discovered an argument of a like nature , which , if just , will , with the wise and learned , be an everlasting check to all kinds of superstitious delusion , and consequently , will be useful as long as the world endures . For so long , I presume , will the accounts of miracles and prodigies be found in all history , sacred and profane . 87 . Though experience be our only guide in reasoning concerning matters of fact ; it must be acknowledged , that this guide is not altogether infallible , but in some cases is apt to lead us into errors . one , who in our climate , should expect better weather in any week of June than in one of December , would reason justly , and conformably to experience ; but it is certain , that he may happen , in the event , to find himself mistaken . However , we may observe , that , in such a case , he would have no cause to complain of experience ; because it commonly informs us beforehand of the uncertainty , by that contrariety of events , which we may learn from a diligent observation . All effects follow not with like certainty from their supposed causes . Some events are found , in all countries and all ages , to have been constantly conjoined together : Others are found to have been more variable , and sometimes to disappoint our expectations ; so that , in our reasonings concerning matter of fact , there are all imaginable degrees of assurance , from the highest certainty to the lowest species of moral evidence . A wise man , therefore , proportions his belief to the evidence . In such conclusions as are founded on an infallible experience , he expects the event with the last degree of assurance , and regards his past experience as a full proof of the future existence of that event . In other cases , he proceeds with more caution : He weighs the opposite experiments : He considers which side is supported by the greater number of experiments : to that side he inclines , with doubt and hesitation ; and when at last he fixes his judgement , the evidence exceeds not what we properly call probability . All probability , then , supposes an opposition of experiments and observations , where the one side is found to overbalance the other , and to produce a degree of evidence , proportioned to the superiority . A hundred instances or experiments on one side , and fifty on another , afford a doubtful expectation of any event ; though a hundred uniform experiments , with only one that is contradictory , reasonably beget a pretty strong degree of assurance . In all cases , we must balance the opposite experiments , where they are opposite , and deduct the smaller number from the greater , in order to know the exact force of the superior evidence . 88 . To apply these principles to a particular instance ; we may observe , that there is no species of reasoning more common , more useful , and even necessary to human life , than that which is derived from the testimony of men , and the reports of eye - witnesses and spectators . This species of reasoning , perhaps , one may deny to be founded on the relation of cause and effect . I shall not dispute about a word . It will be sufficient to observe that our assurance in any argument of this kind is derived from no other principle than our observation of the veracity of human testimony , and of the usual conformity of facts to the reports of witnesses . It being a general maxim , that no objects have any discoverable connexion together , and that all the inferences , which we can draw from one to another , are founded merely on our experience of their constant and regular conjunction ; it is evident , that we ought not to make an exception to this maxim in favour of human testimony , whose connexion with any event seems , in itself , as little necessary as any other . Were not the memory tenacious to a certain degree , had not men commonly an inclination to truth and a principle of probity ; were they not sensible to shame , when detected in a falsehood : Were not these , I say , discovered by experience to be qualities , inherent in human nature , we should never repose the least confidence in human testimony . A man delirious , or noted for falsehood and villany , has no manner of authority with us . And as the evidence , derived from witnesses and human testimony , is founded on past experience , so it varies with the experience , and is regarded either as a proof or a probability , according as the conjunction between any particular kind of report and any kind of object has been found to be constant or variable . There are a number of circumstances to be taken into consideration in all judgements of this kind ; and the ultimate standard , by which we determine all disputes , that may arise concerning them , is always derived from experience and observation . Where this experience is not entirely uniform on any side , it is attended with an unavoidable contrariety in our judgements , and with the same opposition and mutual destruction of argument as in every other kind of evidence . We frequently hesitate concerning the reports of others . We balance the opposite circumstances , which cause any doubt or uncertainty ; and when we discover a superiority on any side , we incline to it ; but still with a diminution of assurance , in proportion to the force of its antagonist . 89 . This contrariety of evidence , in the present case , may be derived from several different causes ; from the opposition of contrary testimony ; from the character or number of the witnesses ; from the manner of their delivering their testimony ; or from the union of all these circumstances . We entertain a suspicion concerning any matter of fact , when the witnesses contradict each other ; when they are but few , or of a doubtful character ; when they have an interest in what they affirm ; when they deliver their testimony with hesitation , or on the contrary , with too violent asseverations . There are many other particulars of the same kind , which may diminish or destroy the force of any argument , derived from human testimony . Suppose , for instance , that the fact , which the testimony endeavours to establish , partakes of the extraordinary and the marvellous ; in that case , the evidence , resulting from the testimony , admits of a diminution , greater or less , in proportion as the fact is more or less unusual . The reason why we place any credit in witnesses and historians , is not derived from any connexion , which we perceive a priori , between testimony and reality , but because we are accustomed to find a conformity between them . But when the fact attested is such a one as has seldom fallen under our observation , here is a contest of two opposite experiences ; of which the one destroys the other , as far as its force goes , and the superior can only operate on the mind by the force , which remains . The very same principle of experience , which gives us a certain degree of assurance in the testimony of witnesses , gives us also , in this case , another degree of assurance against the fact , which they endeavour to establish ; from which contradition there necessarily arises a counterpoize , and mutual destruction of belief and authority . I should not believe such a story were it told me by Cato , was a proverbial saying in Rome , even during the lifetime of that philosophical patriot . 20 The incredibility of a fact , it was allowed , might invalidate so great an authority . The Indian prince , who refused to believe the first relations concerning the effects of frost , reasoned justly ; and it naturally required very strong testimony to engage his assent to facts , that arose from a state of nature , with which he was unacquainted , and which bore so little analogy to those events , of which he had had constant and uniform experience . Though they were not contrary to his experience , they were not conformable to it . 2190 . But in order to encrease the probability against the testimony of witnesses , let us suppose , that the fact , which they affirm , instead of being only marvellous , is really miraculous ; and suppose also , that the testimony considered apart and in itself , amounts to an entire proof ; in that case , there is proof against proof , of which the strongest must prevail , but still with a diminution of its force , in proportion to that of its antagonist . A miracle is a violation of the laws of nature ; and as a firm and unalterable experience has established these laws , the proof against a miracle , from the very nature of the fact , is as entire as any argument from experience can possibly be imagined . Why is it more than probable , that all men must die ; that lead cannot , of itself , remain suspended in the air ; that fire consumes wood , and is extinguished by water ; unless it be , that these events are found agreeable to the laws of nature , and there is required a violation of these laws , or in other words , a miracle to prevent them ? Nothing is esteemed a miracle , if it ever happen in the common course of nature . It is no miracle that a man , seemingly in good health , should die on a sudden : because such a kind of death , though more unusual than any other , has yet been frequently observed to happen . But it is a miracle , that a dead man should come to life ; because that has never been observed in any age or country . There must , therefore , be a uniform experience against every miraculous event , otherwise the event would not merit that appellation . And as a uniform experience amounts to a proof , there is here a direct and full proof , from the nature of the fact , against the existence of any miracle ; nor can such a proof be destroyed , or the miracle rendered credible , but by an opposite proof , which is superior . 2291 . The plain consequence is ( and it is a general maxim worthy of our attention ) , ' That no testimony is sufficient to establish a miracle , unless the testimony be of such a kind , that its falsehood would be more miraculous , than the fact , which it endeavours to establish ; and even in that case there is a mutual destruction of arguments , and the superior only gives us an assurance suitable to that degree of force , which remains , after deducting the inferior . ' When anyone tells me , that he saw a dead man restored to life , I immediately consider with myself , whether it be more probable , that this person should either deceive or be deceived , or that the fact , which he relates , should really have happened . I weigh the one miracle against the other ; and according to the superiority , which I discover , I pronounce my decision , and always reject the greater miracle . If the falsehood of his testimony would be more miraculous , than the event which he relates ; then , and not till then , can he pretend to command my belief or opinion . PART II . 92 . In the foregoing reasoning we have supposed , that the testimony , upon which a miracle is founded , may possibly amount to an entire proof , and that the falsehood of that testimony would be a real prodigy : But it is easy to shew , that we have been a great deal too liberal in our concession , and that there never was a miraculous event established on so full an evidence . For first , there is not to be found , in all history , any miracle attested by a sufficient number of men , of such unquestioned good - sense , education , and learning , as to secure us against all delusion in themselves ; of such undoubted integrity , as to place them beyond all suspicion of any design to deceive others ; of such credit and reputation in the eyes of mankind , as to have a great deal to lose in case of their being detected in any falsehood ; and at the same time , attesting facts performed in such a public manner and in so celebrated a part of the world , as to render the detection unavoidable : All which circumstances are requisite to give us a full assurance in the testimony of men . 93 . Secondly . We may observe in human nature a principle which , if strictly examined , will be found to diminish extremely the assurance , which we might , from human testimony , have , in any kind of prodigy . The maxim , by which we commonly conduct ourselves in our reasonings , is , that the objects , of which we have no experience , resembles those , of which we have ; that what we have found to be most usual is always most probable ; and that where there is an opposition of arguments , we ought to give the preference to such as are founded on the greatest number of past observations . But though , in proceeding by this rule , we readily reject any fact which is unusual and incredible in an ordinary degree ; yet in advancing farther , the mind observes not always the same rule ; but when anything is affirmed utterly absurd and miraculous , it rather the more readily admits of such a fact , upon account of that very circumstance , which ought to destroy all its authority . The passion of surprise and wonder , arising from miracles , being an agreeable emotion , gives a sensible tendency towards the belief of those events , from which it is derived . And this goes so far , that even those who cannot enjoy this pleasure immediately , nor can believe those miraculous events , of which they are informed , yet love to partake of the satisfaction at second - hand or by rebound , and place a pride and delight in exciting the admiration of others . With what greediness are the miraculous accounts of travellers received , their descriptions of sea and land monsters , their relations of wonderful adventures , strange men , and uncouth manners ? But if the spirit of religion join itself to the love of wonder , there is an end of common sense ; and human testimony , in these circumstances , loses all pretensions to authority . A religionist may be an enthusiast , and imagine he sees what has no reality : he may know his narrative to be false , and yet persevere in it , with the best intentions in the world , for the sake of promoting so holy a cause : or even where this delusion has not place , vanity , excited by so strong a temptation , operates on him more powerfully than on the rest of mankind in any other circumstances ; and self - interest with equal force . His auditors may not have , and commonly have not , sufficient judgement to canvass his evidence : what judgement they have , they renounce by principle , in these sublime and mysterious subjects : or if they were ever so willing to employ it , passion and a heated imagination disturb the regularity of its operations . Their credulity increases his impudence : and his impudence overpowers their credulity . Eloquence , when at its highest pitch , leaves little room for reason or reflection ; but addressing itself entirely to the fancy or the affections , captivates the willing hearers , and subdues their understanding . Happily , this pitch it seldom attains . But what a Tully or a Demosthenes could scarcely effect over a Roman or Athenian audience , every Capuchin , every itinerant or stationary teacher can perform over the generality of mankind , and in a higher degree , by touching such gross and vulgar passions . The many instances of forged miracles , and prophecies , and supernatural events , which , in all ages , have either been detected by contrary evidence , or which detect themselves by their absurdity , prove sufficiently the strong propensity of mankind to the extraordinary and the marvellous , and ought reasonably to beget a suspicion against all relations of this kind . This is our natural way of thinking , even with regard to the most common and most credible events . For instance : There is no kind of report which rises so easily , and spreads so quickly , especially in country places and provincial towns , as those concerning marriages ; insomuch that two young persons of equal condition never see each other twice , but the whole neighbourhood immediately join them together . The pleasure of telling a piece of news so interesting , of propagating it , and of being the first reporters of it , spreads the intelligence . And this is so well known , that no man of sense gives attention to these reports , till he find them confirmed by some greater evidence . Do not the same passions , and others still stronger , incline the generality of mankind to believe and report , with the greatest vehemence and assurance , all religious miracles ? 94 . Thirdly . It forms a strong presumption against all supernatural and miraculous relations , that they are observed chiefly to abound among ignorant and barbarous nations ; or if a civilized people has ever given admission to any of them , that people will be found to have received them from ignorant and barbarous ancestors , who transmitted them with that inviolable sanction and authority , which always attend received opinions . When we peruse the first histories of all nations , we are apt to imagine ourselves transported into some new world ; where the whole frame of nature is disjointed , and every element performs its operations in a different manner , from what it does at present . Battles , revolutions , pestilence , famine and death , are never the effect of those natural causes , which we experience . Prodigies , omens , oracles , judgements , quite obscure the few natural events , that are intermingled with them . But as the former grow thinner every page , in proportion as we advance nearer the enlightened ages , we soon learn , that there is nothing mysterious or supernatural in the case , but that all proceeds from the usual propensity of mankind towards the marvellous , and that , though this inclination may at intervals receive a check from sense and learning , it can never be thoroughly extirpated from human nature . It is strange , a judicious reader is apt to say , upon the perusal of these wonderful historians , that such prodigious events never happen in our days . But it is nothing strange , I hope , that men should lie in all ages . You must surely have seen instances enough of that frailty . You have yourself heard many such marvellous relations started , which , being treated with scorn by all the wise and judicious , have at last been abandoned even by the vulgar . Be assured , that those renowned lies , which have spread and flourished to such a monstrous height , arose from like beginnings ; but being sown in a more proper soil , shot up at last into prodigies almost equal to those which they relate . It was a wise policy in that false prophet , Alexander , who though now forgotten , was once so famous , to lay the first scene of his impostures in Paphlagonia , where , as Lucian tells us , the people were extremely ignorant and stupid , and ready to swallow even the grossest delusion . People at a distance , who are weak enough to think the matter at all worth enquiry , have no opportunity of receiving better information . The stories come magnified to them by a hundred circumstances . Fools are industrious in propagating the imposture ; while the wise and learned are contented , in general , to deride its absurdity , without informing themselves of the particular facts , by which it may be distinctly refuted . And thus the impostor above mentioned was enabled to proceed , from his ignorant Paphlagonians , to the enlisting of votaries , even among the Grecian philosophers , and men of the most eminent rank and distinction in Rome : nay , could engage the attention of that sage emperor Marcus Aurelius ; so far as to make him trust the success of a military expedition to his delusive prophecies . The advantages are so great , of starting an imposture among an ignorant people , that , even though the delusion should be too gross to impose on the generality of them ( which , though seldom , is sometimes the case ) it has a much better chance for succeeding in remote countries , than if the first scene had been laid in a city renowned for arts and knowledge . The most ignorant and barbarous of these barbarians carry the report abroad . None of their countrymen have a large correspondence , or sufficient credit and authority to contradict and beat down the delusion . Men ' s inclination to the marvellous has full opportunity to display itself . And thus a story , which is universally exploded in the place where it was first started , shall pass for certain at a thousand miles distance . But had Alexander fixed his residence at Athens , the philosophers of that renowned mart of learning had immediately spread , throughout the whole Roman empire , their sense of the matter ; which , being supported by so great authority , and displayed by all the force of reason and eloquence , had entirely opened the eyes of mankind . It is true ; Lucian , passing by chance through Paphlagonia , had an opportunity of performing this good office . But , though much to be wished , it does not always happen , that every Alexander meets with a Lucian , ready to expose and detect his impostures . 95 . I may add as a fourth reason , which diminishes the authority of prodigies , that there is no testimony for any , even those which have not been expressly detected , that is not opposed by an infinite number of witnesses ; so that not only the miracle destroys the credit of testimony , but the testimony destroys itself . To make this the better understood , let us consider , that , in matters of religion , whatever is different is contrary ; and that it is impossible the religions of ancient Rome , of Turkey , of Siam , and of China should , all of them , be established on any solid foundation . Every miracle , therefore , pretended to have been wrought in any of these religions ( and all of them abound in miracles ) , as its direct scope is to establish the particular system to which it is attributed ; so has it the same force , though more indirectly , to overthrow every other system . In destroying a rival system , it likewise destroys the credit of those miracles , on which that system was established ; so that all the prodigies of different religions are to be regarded as contrary facts , and the evidences of these prodigies , whether weak or strong , as opposite to each other . According to this method of reasoning , when we believe any miracle of Mahomet or his successors , we have for our warrant the testimony of a few barbarous Arabians : And on the other hand , we are to regard the authority of Titus Livius , Plutarch , Tacitus , and , in short , of all the authors and witnesses , Grecian , Chinese , and Roman Catholic , who have related any miracle in their particular religion ; I say , we are to regard their testimony in the same light as if they had mentioned that Mahometan miracle , and had in express terms contradicted it , with the same certainty as they have for the miracle they relate . This argument may appear over subtile and refined ; but is not in reality different from the reasoning of a judge , who supposes , that the credit of two witnesses , maintaining a crime against any one , is destroyed by the testimony of two others , who affirm him to have been two hundred leagues distant , at the same instant when the crime is said to have been committed . 96 . one of the best attested miracles in all profane history , is that which Tacitus reports of Vespasian , who cured a blind man in Alexandria , by means of his spittle , and a lame man by the mere touch of his foot ; in obedience to a vision of the god Serapis , who had enjoined them to have recourse to the Emperor , for these miraculous cures . The story may be seen in that fine historian 23 ; where every circumstance seems to add weight to the testimony , and might be displayed at large with all the force of argument and eloquence , if any one were now concerned to enforce the evidence of that exploded and idolatrous superstition . The gravity , solidity , age , and probity of so great an emperor , who , through the whole course of his life , conversed in a familiar manner with his friends and courtiers , and never affected those extraordinary airs of divinity assumed by Alexander and Demetrius . The historian , a cotemporary writer , noted for candour and veracity , and withal , the greatest and most penetrating genius , perhaps , of all antiquity ; and so free from any tendency to credulity , that he even lies under the contrary imputation , of atheism and profaneness : The persons , from whose authority he related the miracle , of established character for judgement and veracity , as we may well presume ; eye - witnesses of the fact , and confirming their testimony , after the Flavian family was despoiled of the empire , and could no longer give any reward , as the price of a lie . Utrumque , qui interfuere , nunc quoque memorant , postquam nullum mendacio pretium . To which if we add the public nature of the facts , as related , it will appear , that no evidence can well be supposed stronger for so gross and so palpable a falsehood . There is also a memorable story related by Cardinal de Retz , which may well deserve our consideration . When that intriguing politician fled into Spain , to avoid the persecution of his enemies , he passed through Saragossa , the capital of Arragon , where he was shewn , in the cathedral , a man , who had served seven years as a door - keeper , and was well known to every body in town , that had ever paid his devotions at that church . He had been seen , for so long a time , wanting a leg ; but recovered that limb by the rubbing of holy oil upon the stump ; and the cardinal assures us that he saw him with two legs . This miracle was vouched by all the canons of the church ; and the whole company in town were appealed to for a confirmation of the fact ; whom the cardinal found , by their zealous devotion , to be thorough believers of the miracle . Here the relater was also cotemporary to the supposed prodigy , of an incredulous and libertine character , as well as of great genius ; the miracle of so singular a nature as could scarcely admit of a counterfeit , and the witnesses very numerous , and all of them , in a manner , spectators of the fact , to which they gave their testimony . And what adds mightily to the force of the evidence , and may double our surprise on this occasion , is , that the cardinal himself , who relates the story , seems not to give any credit to it , and consequently cannot be suspected of any concurrence in the holy fraud . He considered justly , that it was not requisite , in order to reject a fact of this nature , to be able accurately to disprove the testimony , and to trace its falsehood , through all the circumstances of knavery and credulity which produced it . He knew , that , as this was commonly altogether impossible at any small distance of time and place ; so was it extremely difficult , even where one was immediately present , by reason of the bigotry , ignorance , cunning , and roguery of a great part of mankind . He therefore concluded , like a just reasoner , that such an evidence carried falsehood upon the very face of it , and that a miracle , supported by any human testimony , was more properly a subject of derision than of argument . There surely never was a greater number of miracles ascribed to one person , than those , which were lately said to have been wrought in France upon the tomb of Abb ( c ) Paris , the famous Jansenist , with whose sanctity the people were so long deluded . The curing of the sick , giving hearing to the deaf , and sight to the blind , were every where talked of as the usual effects of that holy sepulchre . But what is more extraordinary ; many of the miracles were immediately proved upon the spot , before judges of unquestioned integrity , attested by witnesses of credit and distinction , in a learned age , and on the most eminent theatre that is now in the world . Nor is this all : a relation of them was published and dispersed every where ; nor were the Jesuits , though a learned body , supported by the civil magistrate , and determined enemies to those opinions , in whose favour the miracles were said to have been wrought , ever able distinctly to refute or detect them 24 . Where shall we find such a number of circumstances , agreeing to the corroboration of one fact ? And what have we to oppose to such a cloud of witnesses , but the absolute impossibility or miraculous nature of the events , which they relate ? And this surely , in the eyes of all reasonable people , will alone be regarded as a sufficient refutation . 97 . Is the consequence just , because some human testimony has the utmost force and authority in some cases , when it relates the battle of Philippi or Pharsalia for instance ; that therefore all kinds of testimony must , in all cases , have equal force and authority ? Suppose that the Caesarean and Pompeian factions had , each of them , claimed the victory in these battles , and that the historians of each party had uniformly ascribed the advantage to their own side ; how could mankind , at this distance , have been able to determine between them ? The contrariety is equally strong between the miracles related by Herodotus or Plutarch , and those delivered by Mariana , Bede , or any monkish historian . The wise lend a very academic faith to every report which favours the passion of the reporter ; whether it magnifies his country , his family , or himself , or in any other way strikes in with his natural inclinations and propensities . But what greater temptation than to appear a missionary , a prophet , an ambassador from heaven ? Who would not encounter many dangers and difficulties , in order to attain so sublime a character ? Or if , by the help of vanity and a heated imagination , a man has first made a convert of himself , and entered seriously into the delusion ; who ever scruples to make use of pious frauds , in support of so holy and meritorious a cause ? The smallest spark may here kindle into the greatest flame ; because the materials are always prepared for it . The avidum genus auricularum 25 , the gazing populace , receive greedily , without examination , whatever sooths superstition , and promotes wonder . How many stories of this nature have , in all ages , been detected and exploded in their infancy ? How many more have been celebrated for a time , and have afterwards sunk into neglect and oblivion ? Where such reports , therefore , fly about , the solution of the phenomenon is obvious ; and we judge in conformity to regular experience and observation , when we account for it by the known and natural principles of credulity and delusion . And shall we , rather than have a recourse to so natural a solution , allow of a miraculous violation of the most established laws of nature ? I need not mention the difficulty of detecting a falsehood in any private or even public history , at the place , where it is said to happen ; much more when the scene is removed to ever so small a distance . Even a court of judicature , with all the authority , accuracy , and judgement , which they can employ , find themselves often at a loss to distinguish between truth and falsehood in the most recent actions . But the matter never comes to any issue , if trusted to the common method of altercations and debate and flying rumours ; especially when men ' s passions have taken part on either side . In the infancy of new religions , the wise and learned commonly esteem the matter too inconsiderable to deserve their attention or regard . And when afterwards they would willingly detect the cheat , in order to undeceive the deluded multitude , the season is now past , and the records and witnesses , which might clear up the matter , have perished beyond recovery . No means of detection remain , but those which must be drawn from the very testimony itself of the reporters : and these , though always sufficient with the judicious and knowing , are commonly too fine to fall under the comprehension of the vulgar . 98 . Upon the whole , then , it appears , that no testimony for any kind of miracle has ever amounted to a probability , much less to a proof ; and that , even supposing it amounted to a proof , it would be opposed by another proof ; derived from the very nature of the fact , which it would endeavour to establish . It is experience only , which gives authority to human testimony ; and it is the same experience , which assures us of the laws of nature . When , therefore , these two kinds of experience are contrary , we have nothing to do but substract the one from the other , and embrace an opinion , either on one side or the other , with that assurance which arises from the remainder . But according to the principle here explained , this substraction , with regard to all popular religions , amounts to an entire annihilation ; and therefore we may establish it as a maxim , that no human testimony can have such force as to prove a miracle , and make it a just foundation for any such system of religion . 99 . I beg the limitations here made may be remarked , when I say , that a miracle can never be proved , so as to be the foundation of a system of religion . For I own , that otherwise , there may possibly be miracles , or violations of the usual course of nature , of such a kind as to admit of proof from human testimony ; though , perhaps , it will be impossible to find any such in all the records of history . Thus , suppose , all authors , in all languages , agree , that , from the first of January 1600 , there was a total darkness over the whole earth for eight days : suppose that the tradition of this extraordinary event is still strong and lively among the people : that all travellers , who return from foreign countries , bring us accounts of the same tradition , without the least variation or contradiction : it is evident , that our present philosophers , instead of doubting the fact , ought to receive it as certain , and ought to search for the causes whence it might be derived . The decay , corruption , and dissolution of nature , is an event rendered probable by so many analogies , that any phenomenon , which seems to have a tendency towards that catastrophe , comes within the reach of human testimony , if that testimony be very extensive and uniform . But suppose , that all the historians who treat of England , should agree , that , on the first of January 1600 , Queen Elizabeth died ; that both before and after her death she was seen by her physicians and the whole court , as is usual with persons of her rank ; that her successor was acknowledged and proclaimed by the parliament ; and that , after being interred a month , she again appeared , resumed the throne , and governed England for three years : I must confess that I should be surprised at the concurrence of so many odd circumstances , but should not have the least inclination to believe so miraculous an event . I should not doubt of her pretended death , and of those other public circumstances that followed it : I should only assert it to have been pretended , and that it neither was , nor possibly could be real . You would in vain object to me the difficulty , and almost impossibility of deceiving the world in an affair of such consequence ; the wisdom and solid judgement of that renowned queen ; with the little or no advantage which she could reap from so poor an artifice : All this might astonish me ; but I would still reply , that the knavery and folly of men are such common phenomena , that I should rather believe the most extraordinary events to arise from their concurrence , than admit of so signal a violation of the laws of nature . But should this miracle be ascribed to any new system of religion ; men , in all ages , have been so much imposed on by ridiculous stories of that kind , that this very circumstance would be a full proof of a cheat , and sufficient , with all men of sense , not only to make them reject the fact , but even reject it without farther examination . Though the Being to whom the miracle is ascribed , be , in this case , Almighty , it does not , upon that account , become a whit more probable ; since it is impossible for us to know the attributes or actions of such a Being , otherwise than from the experience which we have of his productions , in the usual course of nature . This still reduces us to past observation , and obliges us to compare the instances of the violation of truth in the testimony of men , with those of the violation of the laws of nature by miracles , in order to judge which of them is most likely and probable . As the violations of truth are more common in the testimony concerning religious miracles , than in that concerning any other matter of fact ; this must diminish very much the authority of the former testimony , and make us form a general resolution , never to lend any attention to it , with whatever specious pretence it may be covered . Lord Bacon seems to have embraced the same principles of reasoning . ' We ought , ' says he , ' to make a collection or particular history of all monsters and prodigious births or productions , and in a word of every thing new , rare , and extraordinary in nature . But this must be done with the most severe scrutiny , lest we depart from truth . Above all , every relation must be considered as suspicious , which depends in any degree upon religion , as the prodigies of Livy : And no less so , every thing that is to be found in the writers of natural magic or alchimy , or such authors , who seem , all of them , to have an unconquerable appetite for falsehood and fable 26 . ' 100 . I am the better pleased with the method of reasoning here delivered , as I think it may serve to confound those dangerous friends or disguised enemies to the Christian Religion , who have undertaken to defend it by the principles of human reason . Our most holy religion is founded on Faith , not on reason ; and it is a sure method of exposing it to put it to such a trial as it is , by no means , fitted to endure . To make this more evident , let us examine those miracles , related in scripture ; and not to lose ourselves in too wide a field , let us confine ourselves to such as we find in the Pentateuch , which we shall examine , according to the principles of these pretended Christians , not as the word or testimony of God himself , but as the production of a mere human writer and historian . Here then we are first to consider a book , presented to us by a barbarous and ignorant people , written in an age when they were still more barbarous , and in all probability long after the facts which it relates , corroborated by no concurring testimony , and resembling those fabulous accounts , which every nation gives of its origin . Upon reading this book , we find it full of prodigies and miracles . It gives an account of a state of the world and of human nature entirely different from the present : Of our fall from that state : Of the age of man , extended to near a thousand years : Of the destruction of the world by a deluge : Of the arbitrary choice of one people , as the favourites of heaven ; and that people the countrymen of the author : Of their deliverance from bondage by prodigies the most astonishing imaginable : I desire any one to lay his hand upon his heart , and after a serious consideration declare , whether he thinks that the falsehood of such a book , supported by such a testimony , would be more extraordinary and miraculous than all the miracles it relates ; which is , however , necessary to make it be received , according to the measures of probability above established . 101 . What we have said of miracles may be applied , without any variation , to prophecies ; and indeed , all prophecies are real miracles , and as such only , can be admitted as proofs of any revelation . If it did not exceed the capacity of human nature to foretell future events , it would be absurd to employ any prophecy as an argument for a divine mission or authority from heaven . So that , upon the whole , we may conclude , that the Christian Religion not only was at first attended with miracles , but even at this day cannot be believed by any reasonable person without one . Mere reason is insufficient to convince us of its veracity : And whoever is moved by Faith to assent to it , is conscious of a continued miracle in his own person , which subverts all the principles of his understanding , and gives him a determination to believe what is most contrary to custom and experience . SECTION XI . OF A PARTICULAR PROVIDENCE AND OF A FUTURE STATE . 102 . I was lately engaged in conversation with a friend who loves sceptical paradoxes ; where , though he advanced many principles , of which I can by no means approve , yet as they seem to be curious , and to bear some relation to the chain of reasoning carried on throughout this enquiry , I shall here copy them from my memory as accurately as I can , in order to submit them to the judgement of the reader . Our conversation began with my admiring the singular good fortune of philosophy , which , as it requires entire liberty above all other privileges , and chiefly flourishes from the free opposition of sentiments and argumentation , received its first birth in an age and country of freedom and toleration , and was never cramped , even in its most extravagant principles , by any creeds , concessions , or penal statutes . For , except the banishment of Protagoras , and the death of Socrates , which last event proceeded partly from other motives , there are scarcely any instances to be met with , in ancient history , of this bigotted jealousy , with which the present age is so much infested . Epicurus lived at Athens to an advanced age , in peace and tranquillity : Epicureans 27 were even admitted to receive the sacerdotal character , and to officiate at the altar , in the most sacred rites of the established religion : And the public encouragement 28 of pensions and salaries was afforded equally , by the wisest of all the Roman emperors 29 , to the professors of every sect of philosophy . How requisite such kind of treatment was to philosophy , in her early youth , will easily be conceived , if we reflect , that , even at present , when she may be supposed more hardy and robust , she bears with much difficulty the inclemency of the seasons , and those harsh winds of calumny and persecution , which blow upon her . You admire , says my friend , as the singular good fortune of philosophy , what seems to result from the natural course of things , and to be unavoidable in every age and nation . This pertinacious bigotry , of which you complain , as so fatal to philosophy , is really her offspring , who , after allying with superstition , separates himself entirely from the interest of his parent , and becomes her most inveterate enemy and persecutor . Speculative dogmas of religion , the present occasions of such furious dispute , could not possibly be conceived or admitted in the early ages of the world ; when mankind , being wholly illiterate , formed an idea of religion more suitable to their weak apprehension , and composed their sacred tenets of such tales chiefly as were the objects of traditional belief , more than of argument or disputation . After the first alarm , therefore , was over , which arose from the new paradoxes and principles of the philosophers ; these teachers seem ever after , during the ages of antiquity , to have lived in great harmony with the established superstition , and to have made a fair partition of mankind between them ; the former claiming all the learned and wise , the latter possessing all the vulgar and illiterate . 103 . It seems then , say I , that you leave politics entirely out of the question , and never suppose , that a wise magistrate can justly be jealous of certain tenets of philosophy , such as those of Epicurus , which , denying a divine existence , and consequently a providence and a future state , seem to loosen , in a great measure , the ties of morality , and may be supposed , for that reason , pernicious to the peace of civil society . I know , replied he , that in fact these persecutions never , in any age , proceeded from calm reason , or from experience of the pernicious consequences of philosophy ; but arose entirely from passion and prejudice . But what if I should advance farther , and assert , that if Epicurus had been accused before the people , by any of the sycophants or informers of those days , he could easily have defended his cause , and proved his principles of philosophy to be as salutary as those of his adversaries , who endeavoured , with such zeal , to expose him to the public hatred and jealousy ? I wish , said I , you would try your eloquence upon so extraordinary a topic , and make a speech for Epicurus , which might satisfy , not the mob of Athens , if you will allow that ancient and polite city to have contained any mob , but the more philosophical part of his audience , such as might be supposed capable of comprehending his arguments . The matter would not be difficult , upon such conditions , replied he : And if you please , I shall suppose myself Epicurus for a moment , and make you stand for the Athenian people , and shall deliver you such an harangue as will fill all the urn with white beans , and leave not a black one to gratify the malice of my adversaries . Very well : Pray proceed upon these suppositions . 104 . I come hither , O ye Athenians , to justify in your assembly what I maintained in my school , and I find myself impeached by furious antagonists , instead of reasoning with calm and dispassionate enquirers . Your deliberations , which of right should be directed to questions of public good , and the interest of the commonwealth , are diverted to the disquisitions of speculative philosophy ; and these magnificent , but perhaps fruitless enquiries , take place of your more familiar but more useful occupations . But so far as in me lies , I will prevent this abuse . We shall not here dispute concerning the origin and government of worlds . We shall only enquire how far such questions concern the public interest . And if I can persuade you , that they are entirely indifferent to the peace of society and security of government , I hope that you will presently send us back to our schools , there to examine , at leisure , the question the most sublime , but at the same time , the most speculative of all philosophy . The religious philosophers , not satisfied with the tradition of your forefathers , and doctrine of your priests ( in which I willingly acquiesce ) , indulge a rash curiosity , in trying how far they can establish religion upon the principles of reason ; and they thereby excite , instead of satisfying , the doubts , which naturally arise from a diligent and scrutinous enquiry . They paint , in the most magnificent colours , the order , beauty , and wise arrangement of the universe ; and then ask , if such a glorious display of intelligence could proceed from the fortuitous concourse of atoms , or if chance could produce what the greatest genius can never sufficiently admire . I shall not examine the justness of this argument . I shall allow it to be as solid as my antagonists and accusers can desire . It is sufficient , if I can prove , from this very reasoning , that the question is entirely speculative , and that , when , in my philosophical disquisitions , I deny a providence and a future state , I undermine not the foundations of society , but advance principles , which they themselves , upon their own topics , if they argue consistently , must allow to be solid and satisfactory . 105 . You then , who are my accusers , have acknowledged , that the chief or sole argument for a divine existence ( which I never questioned ) is derived from the order of nature ; where there appear such marks of intelligence and design , that you think it extravagant to assign for its cause , either chance , or the blind and unguided force of matter . You allow , that this is an argument drawn from effects to causes . From the order of the work , you infer , that there must have been project and forethought in the workman . If you cannot make out this point , you allow , that your conclusion fails ; and you pretend not to establish the conclusion in a greater latitude than the phenomena of nature will justify . These are your concessions . I desire you to mark the consequences . When we infer any particular cause from an effect , we must proportion the one to the other , and can never be allowed to ascribe to the cause any qualities , but what are exactly sufficient to produce the effect . A body of ten ounces raised in any scale may serve as a proof , that the counterbalancing weight exceeds ten ounces ; but can never afford a reason that it exceeds a hundred . If the cause , assigned for any effect , be not sufficient to produce it , we must either reject that cause , or add to it such qualities as will give it a just proportion to the effect . But if we ascribe to it farther qualities , or affirm it capable of producing other effects , we can only indulge the licence of conjecture , and arbitrarily suppose the existence of qualities and energies , without reason or authority . The same rule holds , whether the cause assigned be brute unconscious matter , or a rational intelligent being . If the cause be known only by the effect , we never ought to ascribe to it any qualities , beyond what are precisely requisite to produce the effect : Nor can we , by any rules of just reasoning , return back from the cause , and infer other effects from it , beyond those by which alone it is known to us . No one , merely from the sight of one of Zeuxis ' s pictures , could know , that he was also a statuary or architect , and was an artist no less skilful in stone and marble than in colours . The talents and taste , displayed in the particular work before us ; these we may safely conclude the workman to be possessed of . The cause must be proportioned to the effect ; and if we exactly and precisely proportion it , we shall never find in it any qualities , that point farther , or afford an inference concerning any other design or performance . Such qualities must be somewhat beyond what is merely requisite for producing the effect , which we examine . 106 . Allowing , therefore , the gods to be the authors of the existence or order of the universe ; it follows , that they possess that precise degree of power , intelligence , and benevolence , which appears in their workmanship ; but nothing farther can ever be proved , except we call in the assistance of exaggeration and flattery to supply the defects of argument and reasoning . So far as the traces of any attributes , at present , appear , so far may we conclude these attributes to exist . The supposition of farther attributes is mere hypothesis ; much more the supposition , that , in distant regions of space or periods of time , there has been , or will be , a more magnificent display of these attributes , and a scheme of administration more suitable to such imaginary virtues . We can never be allowed to mount up from the universe , the effect , to Jupiter , the cause ; and then descend downwards , to infer any new effect from that cause ; as if the present effects alone were not entirely worthy of the glorious attributes , which we ascribe to that deity . The knowledge of the cause being derived solely from the effect , they must be exactly adjusted to each other ; and the one can never refer to anything farther , or be the foundation of any new inference and conclusion . You find certain phenomena in nature . You seek a cause or author . You imagine that you have found him . You afterwards become so enamoured of this offspring of your brain , that you imagine it impossible , but he must produce something greater and more perfect than the present scene of things , which is so full of ill and disorder . You forget , that this superlative intelligence and benevolence are entirely imaginary , or , at least , without any foundation in reason ; and that you have no ground to ascribe to him any qualities , but what you see he has actually exerted and displayed in his productions . Let your gods , therefore , O philosophers , be suited to the present appearances of nature : and presume not to alter these appearances by arbitrary suppositions , in order to suit them to the attributes , which you so fondly ascribe to your deities . 107 . When priests and poets , supported by your authority , O Athenians , talk of a golden or silver age , which preceded the present state of vice and misery , I hear them with attention and with reverence . But when philosophers , who pretend to neglect authority , and to cultivate reason , hold the same discourse , I pay them not , I own , the same obsequious submission and pious deference . I ask ; who carried them into the celestial regions , who admitted them into the councils of the gods , who opened to them the book of fate , that they thus rashly affirm , that their deities have executed , or will execute , any purpose beyond what has actually appeared ? If they tell me , that they have mounted on the steps or by the gradual ascent of reason , and by drawing inferences from effects to causes , I still insist , that they have aided the ascent of reason by the wings of imagination ; otherwise they could not thus change their manner of inference , and argue from causes to effects ; presuming , that a more perfect production than the present world would be more suitable to such perfect beings as the gods , and forgetting that they have no reason to ascribe to these celestial beings any perfection or any attribute , but what can be found in the present world . Hence all the fruitless industry to account for the ill appearances of nature , and save the honour of the gods ; while we must acknowledge the reality of that evil and disorder , with which the world so much abounds . The obstinate and intractable qualities of matter , we are told , or the observance of general laws , or some such reason , is the sole cause , which controlled the power and benevolence of Jupiter , and obliged him to create mankind and every sensible creature so imperfect and so unhappy . These attributes then , are , it seems , beforehand , taken for granted , in their greatest latitude . And upon that supposition , I own that such conjectures may , perhaps , be admitted as plausible solutions of the ill phenomena . But still I ask ; Why take these attributes for granted , or why ascribe to the cause any qualities but what actually appear in the effect ? Why torture your brain to justify the course of nature upon suppositions , which , for aught you know , may be entirely imaginary , and of which there are to be found no traces in the course of nature ? The religious hypothesis , therefore , must be considered only as a particular method of accounting for the visible phenomena of the universe : but no just reasoner will ever presume to infer from it any single fact , and alter or add to the phenomena , in any single particular . If you think , that the appearances of things prove such causes , it is allowable for you to draw an inference concerning the existence of these causes . In such complicated and sublime subjects , every one should be indulged in the liberty of conjecture and argument . But here you ought to rest . If you come backward , and arguing from your inferred causes , conclude , that any other fact has existed , or will exist , in the course of nature , which may serve as a fuller display of particular attributes ; I must admonish you , that you have departed from the method of reasoning , attached to the present subject , and have certainly added something to the attributes of the cause , beyond what appears in the effect ; otherwise you could never , with tolerable sense or propriety , add anything to the effect , in order to render it more worthy of the cause . 108 . Where , then , is the odiousness of that doctrine , which I teach in my school , or rather , which I examine in my gardens ? Or what do you find in this whole question , wherein the security of good morals , or the peace and order of society , is in the least concerned ? I deny a providence , you say , and supreme governor of the world , who guides the course of events , and punishes the vicious with infamy and disappointment , and rewards the virtuous with honour and success , in all their undertakings . But surely , I deny not the course itself of events , which lies open to every one ' s inquiry and examination . I acknowledge , that , in the present order of things , virtue is attended with more peace of mind than vice , and meets with a more favourable reception from the world . I am sensible , that , according to the past experience of mankind , friendship is the chief joy of human life , and moderation the only source of tranquillity and happiness . I never balance between the virtuous and the vicious course of life ; but am sensible , that , to a well - disposed mind , every advantage is on the side of the former . And what can you say more , allowing all your suppositions and reasonings ? You tell me , indeed , that this disposition of things proceeds from intelligence and design . But whatever it proceeds from , the disposition itself , on which depends our happiness or misery , and consequently our conduct and deportment in life is still the same . It is still open for me , as well as you , to regulate my behaviour , by my experience of past events . And if you affirm , that , while a divine providence is allowed , and a supreme distributive justice in the universe , I ought to expect some more particular reward of the good , and punishment of the bad , beyond the ordinary course of events ; I here find the same fallacy , which I have before endeavoured to detect . You persist in imagining , that , if we grant that divine existence , for which you so earnestly contend , you may safely infer consequences from it , and add something to the experienced order of nature , by arguing from the attributes which you ascribe to your gods . You seem not to remember , that all your reasonings on this subject can only be drawn from effects to causes ; and that every argument , deducted from causes to effects , must of necessity be a gross sophism ; since it is impossible for you to know anything of the cause , but what you have antecedently , not inferred , but discovered to the full , in the effect . 109 . But what must a philosopher think of those vain reasoners , who , instead of regarding the present scene of things as the sole object of their contemplation , so far reverse the whole course of nature , as to render this life merely a passage to something farther ; a porch , which leads to a greater , and vastly different building ; a prologue , which serves only to introduce the piece , and give it more grace and propriety ? Whence , do you think , can such philosophers derive their idea of the gods ? From their own conceit and imagination surely . For if they derived it from the present phenomena , it would never point to anything farther , but must be exactly adjusted to them . That the divinity may possibly be endowed with attributes , which we have never seen exerted ; may be governed by principles of action , which we cannot discover to be satisfied : all this will freely be allowed . But still this is mere possibility and hypothesis . We never can have reason to infer any attributes , or any principles of action in him , but so far as we know them to have been exerted and satisfied . Are there any marks of a distributive justice in the world ? If you answer in the affirmative , I conclude , that , since justice here exerts itself , it is satisfied . If you reply in the negative , I conclude , that you have then no reason to ascribe justice , in our sense of it , to the gods . If you hold a medium between affirmation and negation , by saying , that the justice of the gods , at present , exerts itself in part , but not in its full extent ; I answer , that you have no reason to give it any particular extent , but only so far as you see it , at present , exert itself . 110 . Thus I bring the dispute , O Athenians , to a short issue with my antagonists . The course of nature lies open to my contemplation as well as to theirs . The experienced train of events is the great standard , by which we all regulate our conduct . Nothing else can be appealed to in the field , or in the senate . Nothing else ought ever to be heard of in the school , or in the closet . In vain would our limited understanding break through those boundaries , which are too narrow for our fond imagination . While we argue from the course of nature , and infer a particular intelligent cause , which first bestowed , and still preserves order in the universe , we embrace a principle , which is both uncertain and useless . It is uncertain ; because the subject lies entirely beyond the reach of human experience . It is useless ; because our knowledge of this cause being derived entirely from the course of nature , we can never , according to the rules of just reasoning , return back from the cause with any new inference , or making additions to the common and experienced course of nature , establish any new principles of conduct and behaviour . 111 . I observe ( said I , finding he had finished his harangue ) that you neglect not the artifice of the demagogues of old ; and as you were pleased to make me stand for the people , you insinuate yourself into my favour by embracing those principles , to which , you know , I have always expressed a particular attachment . But allowing you to make experience ( as indeed I think you ought ) the only standard of our judgement concerning this , and all other questions of fact ; I doubt not but , from the very same experience , to which you appeal , it may be possible to refute this reasoning , which you have put into the mouth of Epicurus . If you saw , for instance , a half - finished building , surrounded with heaps of brick and stone and mortar , and all the instruments of masonry ; could you not infer from the effect , that it was a work of design and contrivance ? And could you not return again , from this inferred cause , to infer new additions to the effect , and conclude , that the building would soon be finished , and receive all the further improvements , which art could bestow upon it ? If you saw upon the sea - shore the print of one human foot , you would conclude , that a man had passed that way , and that he had also left the traces of the other foot , though effaced by the rolling of the sands or inundation of the waters . Why then do you refuse to admit the same method of reasoning with regard to the order of nature ? Consider the world and the present life only as an imperfect building , from which you can infer a superior intelligence ; and arguing from that superior intelligence , which can leave nothing imperfect ; why may you not infer a more finished scheme or plan , which will receive its completion in some distant point of space or time ? Are not these methods of reasoning exactly similar ? And under what pretence can you embrace the one , while you reject the other ? 112 . The infinite difference of the subjects , replied he , is a sufficient foundation for this difference in my conclusions . In works of human art and contrivance , it is allowable to advance from the effect to the cause , and returning back from the cause , to form new inferences concerning the effect , and examine the alterations , which it has probably undergone , or may still undergo . But what is the foundation of this method of reasoning ? Plainly this ; that man is a being , whom we know by experience , whose motives and designs we are acquainted with , and whose projects and inclinations have a certain connexion and coherence , according to the laws which nature has established for the government of such a creature . When , therefore , we find , that any work has proceeded from the skill and industry of man ; as we are otherwise acquainted with the nature of the animal , we can draw a hundred inferences concerning what may be expected from him ; and these inferences will all be founded in experience and observation . But did we know man only from the single work or production which we examine , it were impossible for us to argue in this manner ; because our knowledge of all the qualities , which we ascribe to him , being in that case derived from the production , it is impossible they could point to anything farther , or be the foundation of any new inference . The print of a foot in the sand can only prove , when considered alone , that there was some figure adapted to it , by which it was produced : but the print of a human foot proves likewise , from our other experience , that there was probably another foot , which also left its impression , though effaced by time or other accidents . Here we mount from the effect to the cause ; and descending again from the cause , infer alterations in the effect ; but this is not a continuation of the same simple chain of reasoning . We comprehend in this case a hundred other experiences and observations , concerning the usual figure and members of that species of animal , without which this method of argument must be considered as fallacious and sophistical . 113 . The case is not the same with our reasonings from the works of nature . The Deity is known to us only by his productions , and is a single being in the universe , not comprehended under any species or genus , from whose experienced attributes or qualities , we can , by analogy , infer any attribute or quality in him . As the universe shews wisdom and goodness , we infer wisdom and goodness . As it shews a particular degree of these perfections , we infer a particular degree of them , precisely adapted to the effect which we examine . But farther attributes or farther degrees of the same attributes , we can never be authorised to infer or suppose , by any rules of just reasoning . Now , without some such licence of supposition , it is impossible for us to argue from the cause , or infer any alteration in the effect , beyond what has immediately fallen under our observation . Greater good produced by this Being must still prove a greater degree of goodness : a more impartial distribution of rewards and punishments must proceed from a greater regard to justice and equity . Every supposed addition to the works of nature makes an addition to the attributes of the Author of nature ; and consequently , being entirely unsupported by any reason or argument , can never be admitted but as mere conjecture and hypothesis 30 . The great source of our mistake in this subject , and of the unbounded licence of conjecture , which we indulge , is , that we tacitly consider ourselves , as in the place of the Supreme Being , and conclude , that he will , on every occasion , observe the same conduct , which we ourselves , in his situation , would have embraced as reasonable and eligible . But , besides that the ordinary course of nature may convince us , that almost everything is regulated by principles and maxims very different from ours ; besides this , I say , it must evidently appear contrary to all rules of analogy to reason , from the intentions and projects of men , to those of a Being so different , and so much superior . In human nature , there is a certain experienced coherence of designs and inclinations ; so that when , from any fact , we have discovered one intention of any man , it may often be reasonable , from experience , to infer another , and draw a long chain of conclusions concerning his past or future conduct . But this method of reasoning can never have place with regard to a Being , so remote and incomprehensible , who bears much less analogy to any other being in the universe than the sun to a waxen taper , and who discovers himself only by some faint traces or outlines , beyond which we have no authority to ascribe to him any attribute or perfection . What we imagine to be a superior perfection , may really be a defect . Or were it ever so much a perfection , the ascribing of it to the Supreme Being , where it appears not to have been really exerted , to the full , in his works , savours more of flattery and panegyric , than of just reasoning and sound philosophy . All the philosophy , therefore , in the world , and all the religion , which is nothing but a species of philosophy , will never be able to carry us beyond the usual course of experience , or give us measures of conduct and behaviour different from those which are furnished by reflections on common life . No new fact can ever be inferred from the religious hypothesis ; no event foreseen or foretold ; no reward or punishment expected or dreaded , beyond what is already known by practice and observation . So that my apology for Epicurus will still appear solid and satisfactory ; nor have the political interests of society any connexion with the philosophical disputes concerning metaphysics and religion . 114 . There is still one circumstance , replied I , which you seem to have overlooked . Though I should allow your premises , I must deny your conclusion . You conclude , that religious doctrines and reasonings can have no influence on life , because they ought to have no influence ; never considering , that men reason not in the same manner you do , but draw many consequences from the belief of a divine Existence , and suppose that the Deity will inflict punishments on vice , and bestow rewards on virtue , beyond what appear in the ordinary course of nature . Whether this reasoning of theirs be just or not , is no matter . Its influence on their life and conduct must still be the same . And , those , who attempt to disabuse them of such prejudices , may , for aught I know , be good reasoners , but I cannot allow them to be good citizens and politicians ; since they free men from one restraint upon their passions , and make the infringement of the laws of society , in one respect , more easy and secure . After all , I may , perhaps , agree to your general conclusion in favour of liberty , though upon different premises from those , on which you endeavour to found it . I think , that the state ought to tolerate every principle of philosophy ; nor is there an instance , that any government has suffered in its political interests by such indulgence . There is no enthusiasm among philosophers ; their doctrines are not very alluring to the people ; and no restraint can be put upon their reasonings , but what must be of dangerous consequence to the sciences , and even to the state , by paving the way for persecution and oppression in points , where the generality of mankind are more deeply interested and concerned . 115 . But there occurs to me ( continued I ) with regard to your main topic , a difficulty , which I shall just propose to you without insisting on it ; lest it lead into reasonings of too nice and delicate a nature . In a word , I much doubt whether it be possible for a cause to be known only by its effect ( as you have all along supposed ) or to be of so singular and particular a nature as to have no parallel and no similarity with any other cause or object , that has ever fallen under our observation . It is only when two species of objects are found to be constantly conjoined , that we can infer the one from the other ; and were an effect presented , which was entirely singular , and could not be comprehended under any known species , I do not see , that we could form any conjecture or inference at all concerning its cause . If experience and observation and analogy be , indeed , the only guides which we can reasonably follow in inferences of this nature ; both the effect and cause must bear a similarity and resemblance to other effects and causes , which we know , and which we have found , in many instances , to be conjoined with each other . I leave it to your own reflection to pursue the consequences of this principle . I shall just observe , that , as the antagonists of Epicurus always suppose the universe , an effect quite singular and unparalleled , to be the proof of a Deity , a cause no less singular and unparalleled ; your reasonings , upon that supposition , seem , at least , to merit our attention . There is , I own , some difficulty , how we can ever return from the cause to the effect , and , reasoning from our ideas of the former , infer any alteration on the latter , or any addition to it . SECTION XII . OF THE ACADEMICAL OR SCEPTICAL PHILOSOPHY . PART I . 116 . There is not a greater number of philosophical reasonings , displayed upon any subject , than those , which prove the existence of a Deity , and refute the fallacies of Atheists ; and yet the most religious philosophers still dispute whether any man can be so blinded as to be a speculative atheist . How shall we reconcile these contradictions ? The knights - errant , who wandered about to clear the world of dragons and giants , never entertained the least doubt with regard to the existence of these monsters . The Sceptic is another enemy of religion , who naturally provokes the indignation of all divines and graver philosophers ; though it is certain , that no man ever met with any such absurd creature , or conversed with a man , who had no opinion or principle concerning any subject , either of action or speculation . This begets a very natural question ; What is meant by a sceptic ? And how far it is possible to push these philosophical principles of doubt and uncertainty ? There is a species of scepticism , antecedent to all study and philosophy , which is much inculcated by Des Cartes and others , as a sovereign preservative against error and precipitate judgement . It recommends an universal doubt , not only of all our former opinions and principles , but also of our very faculties ; of whose veracity , say they , we must assure ourselves , by a chain of reasoning , deduced from some original principle , which cannot possibly be fallacious or deceitful . But neither is there any such original principle , which has a prerogative above others , that are self - evident and convincing : or if there were , could we advance a step beyond it , but by the use of those very faculties , of which we are supposed to be already diffident . The Cartesian doubt , therefore , were it ever possible to be attained by any human creature ( as it plainly is not ) would be entirely incurable ; and no reasoning could ever bring us to a state of assurance and conviction upon any subject . It must , however , be confessed , that this species of scepticism , when more moderate , may be understood in a very reasonable sense , and is a necessary preparative to the study of philosophy , by preserving a proper impartiality in our judgements , and weaning our mind from all those prejudices , which we may have imbibed from education or rash opinion . To begin with clear and self - evident principles , to advance by timorous and sure steps , to review frequently our conclusions , and examine accurately all their consequences ; though by these means we shall make both a slow and a short progress in our systems ; are the only methods , by which we can ever hope to reach truth , and attain a proper stability and certainty in our determinations . 117 . There is another species of scepticism , consequent to science and enquiry , when men are supposed to have discovered , either the absolute fallaciousness of their mental faculties , or their unfitness to reach any fixed determination in all those curious subjects of speculation , about which they are commonly employed . Even our very senses are brought into dispute , by a certain species of philosophers ; and the maxims of common life are subjected to the same doubt as the most profound principles or conclusions of metaphysics and theology . As these paradoxical tenets ( if they may be called tenets ) are to be met with in some philosophers , and the refutation of them in several , they naturally excite our curiosity , and make us enquire into the arguments , on which they may be founded . I need not insist upon the more trite topics , employed by the sceptics in all ages , against the evidence of sense ; such as those which are derived from the imperfection and fallaciousness of our organs , on numberless occasions ; the crooked appearance of an oar in water ; the various aspects of objects , according to their different distances ; the double images which arise from the pressing one eye ; with many other appearances of a like nature . These sceptical topics , indeed , are only sufficient to prove , that the senses alone are not implicitly to be depended on ; but that we must correct their evidence by reason , and by considerations , derived from the nature of the medium , the distance of the object , and the disposition of the organ , in order to render them , within their sphere , the proper criteria of truth and falsehood . There are other more profound arguments against the senses , which admit not of so easy a solution . 118 . It seems evident , that men are carried , by a natural instinct or prepossession , to repose faith in their senses ; and that , without any reasoning , or even almost before the use of reason , we always suppose an external universe , which depends not on our perception , but would exist , though we and every sensible creature were absent or annihilated . Even the animal creation are governed by a like opinion , and preserve this belief of external objects , in all their thoughts , designs , and actions . It seems also evident , that , when men follow this blind and powerful instinct of nature , they always suppose the very images , presented by the senses , to be the external objects , and never entertain any suspicion , that the one are nothing but representations of the other . This very table , which we see white , and which we feel hard , is believed to exist , independent of our perception , and to be something external to our mind , which perceives it . Our presence bestows not being on it : our absence does not annihilate it . It preserves its existence uniform and entire , independent of the situation of intelligent beings , who perceive or contemplate it . But this universal and primary opinion of all men is soon destroyed by the slightest philosophy , which teaches us , that nothing can ever be present to the mind but an image or perception , and that the senses are only the inlets , through which these images are conveyed , without being able to produce any immediate intercourse between the mind and the object . The table , which we see , seems to diminish , as we remove farther from it : but the real table , which exists independent of us , suffers no alteration : it was , therefore , nothing but its image , which was present to the mind . These are the obvious dictates of reason ; and no man , who reflects , ever doubted , that the existences , which we consider , when we say , this house and that tree , are nothing but perceptions in the mind , and fleeting copies or representations of other existences , which remain uniform and independent . 119 . So far , then , are we necessitated by reasoning to contradict or depart from the primary instincts of nature , and to embrace a new system with regard to the evidence of our senses . But here philosophy finds herself extremely embarrassed , when she would justify this new system , and obviate the cavils and objections of the sceptics . She can no longer plead the infallible and irresistible instinct of nature : for that led us to a quite different system , which is acknowledged fallible and even erroneous . And to justify this pretended philosophical system , by a chain of clear and convincing argument , or even any appearance of argument , exceeds the power of all human capacity . By what argument can it be proved , that the perceptions of the mind must be caused by external objects , entirely different from them , though resembling them ( if that be possible ) and could not arise either from the energy of the mind itself , or from the suggestion of some invisible and unknown spirit , or from some other cause still more unknown to us ? It is acknowledged , that , in fact , many of these perceptions arise not from anything external , as in dreams , madness , and other diseases . And nothing can be more inexplicable than the manner , in which body should so operate upon mind as ever to convey an image of itself to a substance , supposed of so different , and even contrary a nature . It is a question of fact , whether the perceptions of the senses be produced by external objects , resembling them : how shall this question be determined ? By experience surely ; as all other questions of a like nature . But here experience is , and must be entirely silent . The mind has never anything present to it but the perceptions , and cannot possibly reach any experience of their connexion with objects . The supposition of such a connexion is , therefore , without any foundation in reasoning . 120 . To have recourse to the veracity of the supreme Being , in order to prove the veracity of our senses , is surely making a very unexpected circuit . If his veracity were at all concerned in this matter , our senses would be entirely infallible ; because it is not possible that he can ever deceive . Not to mention , that , if the external world be once called in question , we shall be at a loss to find arguments , by which we may prove the existence of that Being or any of his attributes . 121 . This is a topic , therefore , in which the profounder and more philosophical sceptics will always triumph , when they endeavour to introduce an universal doubt into all subjects of human knowledge and enquiry . Do you follow the instincts and propensities of nature , may they say , in assenting to the veracity of sense ? But these lead you to believe that the very perception or sensible image is the external object . Do you disclaim this principle , in order to embrace a more rational opinion , that the perceptions are only representations of something external ? You here depart from your natural propensities and more obvious sentiments ; and yet are not able to satisfy your reason , which can never find any convincing argument from experience to prove , that the perceptions are connected with any external objects . 122 . There is another sceptical topic of a like nature , derived from the most profound philosophy ; which might merit our attention , were it requisite to dive so deep , in order to discover arguments and reasonings , which can so little serve to any serious purpose . It is universally allowed by modern enquirers , that all the sensible qualities of objects , such as hard , soft , hot , cold , white , black , & c . are merely secondary , and exist not in the objects themselves , but are perceptions of the mind , without any external archetype or model , which they represent . If this be allowed , with regard to secondary qualities , it must also follow , with regard to the supposed primary qualities of extension and solidity ; nor can the latter be any more entitled to that denomination than the former . The idea of extension is entirely acquired from the senses of sight and feeling ; and if all the qualities , perceived by the senses , be in the mind , not in the object , the same conclusion must reach the idea of extension , which is wholly dependent on the sensible ideas or the ideas of secondary qualities . Nothing can save us from this conclusion , but the asserting , that the ideas of those primary qualities are attained by Abstraction , an opinion , which , if we examine it accurately , we shall find to be unintelligible , and even absurd . An extension , that is neither tangible nor visible , cannot possibly be conceived : and a tangible or visible extension , which is neither hard nor soft , black nor white , is equally beyond the reach of human conception . Let any man try to conceive a triangle in general , which is neither Isosceles nor Scalenum , nor has any particular length or proportion of sides ; and he will soon perceive the absurdity of all the scholastic notions with regard to abstraction and general ideas . 31123 . Thus the first philosophical objection to the evidence of sense or to the opinion of external existence consists in this , that such an opinion , if rested on natural instinct , is contrary to reason , and if referred to reason , is contrary to natural instinct , and at the same time carries no rational evidence with it , to convince an impartial enquirer . The second objection goes farther , and represents this opinion as contrary to reason : at least , if it be a principle of reason , that all sensible qualities are in the mind , not in the object . Bereave matter of all its intelligible qualities , both primary and secondary , you in a manner annihilate it , and leave only a certain unknown , inexplicable something , as the cause of our perceptions ; a notion so imperfect , that no sceptic will think it worth while to contend against it . PART II . 124 . It may seem a very extravagant attempt of the sceptics to destroy reason by argument and ratiocination ; yet is this the grand scope of all their enquiries and disputes . They endeavour to find objections , both to our abstract reasonings , and to those which regard matter of fact and existence . The chief objection against all abstract reasonings is derived from the ideas of space and time ; ideas , which , in common life and to a careless view , are very clear and intelligible , but when they pass through the scrutiny of the profound sciences ( and they are the chief object of these sciences ) afford principles , which seem full of absurdity and contradiction . No priestly dogmas , invented on purpose to tame and subdue the rebellious reason of mankind , ever shocked common sense more than the doctrine of the infinitive divisibility of extension , with its consequences ; as they are pompously displayed by all geometricians and metaphysicians , with a kind of triumph and exultation . A real quantity , infinitely less than any finite quantity , containing quantities infinitely less than itself , and so on in infinitum ; this is an edifice so bold and prodigious , that it is too weighty for any pretended demonstration to support , because it shocks the clearest and most natural principles of human reason . 32 But what renders the matter more extraordinary , is , that these seemingly absurd opinions are supported by a chain of reasoning , the clearest and most natural ; nor is it possible for us to allow the premises without admitting the consequences . Nothing can be more convincing and satisfactory than all the conclusions concerning the properties of circles and triangles ; and yet , when these are once received , how can we deny , that the angle of contact between a circle and its tangent is infinitely less than any rectilineal angle , that as you may increase the diameter of the circle in infinitum , this angle of contact becomes still less , even in infinitum , and that the angle of contact between other curves and their tangents may be infinitely less than those between any circle and its tangent , and so on , in infinitum ? The demonstration of these principles seems as unexceptionable as that which proves the three angles of a triangle to be equal to two right ones , though the latter opinion be natural and easy , and the former big with contradiction and absurdity . Reason here seems to be thrown into a kind of amazement and suspence , which , without the suggestions of any sceptic , gives her a diffidence of herself , and of the ground on which she treads . She sees a full light , which illuminates certain places ; but that light borders upon the most profound darkness . And between these she is so dazzled and confounded , that she scarcely can pronounce with certainty and assurance concerning any one object . 125 . The absurdity of these bold determinations of the abstract sciences seems to become , if possible , still more palpable with regard to time than extension . An infinite number of real parts of time , passing in succession , and exhausted one after another , appears so evident a contradiction , that no man , one should think , whose judgement is not corrupted , instead of being improved , by the sciences , would ever be able to admit of it . Yet still reason must remain restless , and unquiet , even with regard to that scepticism , to which she is driven by these seeming absurdities and contradictions . How any clear , distinct idea can contain circumstances , contradictory to itself , or to any other clear , distinct idea , is absolutely incomprehensible ; and is , perhaps , as absurd as any proposition , which can be formed . So that nothing can be more sceptical , or more full of doubt and hesitation , than this scepticism itself , which arises from some of the paradoxical conclusions of geometry or the science of quantity . 33126 . The sceptical objections to moral evidence , or to the reasonings concerning matter of fact , are either popular or philosophical . The popular objections are derived from the natural weakness of human understanding ; the contradictory opinions , which have been entertained in different ages and nations ; the variations of our judgement in sickness and health , youth and old age , prosperity and adversity ; the perpetual contradiction of each particular man ' s opinions and sentiments ; with many other topics of that kind . It is needless to insist farther on this head . These objections are but weak . For as , in common life , we reason every moment concerning fact and existence , and cannot possibly subsist , without continually employing this species of argument , any popular objections , derived from thence , must be insufficient to destroy that evidence . The great subverter of Pyrrhonism or the excessive principles of scepticism is action , and employment , and the occupations of common life . These principles may flourish and triumph in the schools ; where it is , indeed , difficult , if not impossible , to refute them . But as soon as they leave the shade , and by the presence of the real objects , which actuate our passions and sentiments , are put in opposition to the more powerful principles of our nature , they vanish like smoke , and leave the most determined sceptic in the same condition as other mortals . 127 . The sceptic , therefore , had better keep within his proper sphere , and display those philosophical objections , which arise from more profound researches . Here he seems to have ample matter of triumph ; while he justly insists , that all our evidence for any matter of fact , which lies beyond the testimony of sense or memory , is derived entirely from the relation of cause and effect ; that we have no other idea of this relation than that of two objects , which have been frequently conjoined together ; that we have no argument to convince us , that objects , which have , in our experience , been frequently conjoined , will likewise , in other instances , be conjoined in the same manner ; and that nothing leads us to this inference but custom or a certain instinct of our nature ; which it is indeed difficult to resist , but which , like other instincts , may be fallacious and deceitful . While the sceptic insists upon these topics , he shows his force , or rather , indeed , his own and our weakness ; and seems , for the time at least , to destroy all assurance and conviction . These arguments might be displayed at greater length , if any durable good or benefit to society could ever be expected to result from them . 128 . For here is the chief and most confounding objection to excessive scepticism , that no durable good can ever result from it ; while it remains in its full force and vigour . We need only ask such a sceptic , What his meaning is ? And what he proposes by all these curious researches ? He is immediately at a loss , and knows not what to answer . A Copernican or Ptolemaic , who supports each his different system of astronomy , may hope to produce a conviction , which will remain constant and durable , with his audience . A Stoic or Epicurean displays principles , which may not be durable , but which have an effect on conduct and behaviour . But a Pyrrhonian cannot expect , that his philosophy will have any constant influence on the mind : or if it had , that its influence would be beneficial to society . on the contrary , he must acknowledge , if he will acknowledge anything , that all human life must perish , were his principles universally and steadily to prevail . All discourse , all action would immediately cease ; and men remain in a total lethargy , till the necessities of nature , unsatisfied , put an end to their miserable existence . It is true ; so fatal an event is very little to be dreaded . Nature is always too strong for principle . And though a Pyrrhonian may throw himself or others into a momentary amazement and confusion by his profound reasonings ; the first and most trivial event in life will put to flight all his doubts and scruples , and leave him the same , in every point of action and speculation , with the philosophers of every other sect , or with those who never concerned themselves in any philosophical researches . When he awakes from his dream , he will be the first to join in the laugh against himself , and to confess , that all his objections are mere amusement , and can have no other tendency than to show the whimsical condition of mankind , who must act and reason and believe ; though they are not able , by their most diligent enquiry , to satisfy themselves concerning the foundation of these operations , or to remove the objections , which may be raised against them . PART III . 129 . There is , indeed , a more mitigated scepticism or academical philosophy , which may be both durable and useful , and which may , in part , be the result of this Pyrrhonism , or excessive scepticism , when its undistinguished doubts are , in some measure , corrected by common sense and reflection . The greater part of mankind are naturally apt to be affirmative and dogmatical in their opinions ; and while they see objects only on one side , and have no idea of any counterpoising argument , they throw themselves precipitately into the principles , to which they are inclined ; nor have they any indulgence for those who entertain opposite sentiments . To hesitate or balance perplexes their understanding , checks their passion , and suspends their action . They are , therefore , impatient till they escape from a state , which to them is so uneasy : and they think , that they could never remove themselves far enough from it , by the violence of their affirmations and obstinacy of their belief . But could such dogmatical reasoners become sensible of the strange infirmities of human understanding , even in its most perfect state , and when most accurate and cautious in its determinations ; such a reflection would naturally inspire them with more modesty and reserve , and diminish their fond opinion of themselves , and their prejudice against antagonists . The illiterate may reflect on the disposition of the learned , who , amidst all the advantages of study and reflection , are commonly still diffident in their determinations : and if any of the learned be inclined , from their natural temper , to haughtiness and obstinacy , a small tincture of Pyrrhonism might abate their pride , by showing them , that the few advantages , which they may have attained over their fellows , are but inconsiderable , if compared with the universal perplexity and confusion , which is inherent in human nature . In general , there is a degree of doubt , and caution , and modesty , which , in all kinds of scrutiny and decision , ought for ever to accompany a just reasoner . 130 . Another species of mitigated scepticism which may be of advantage to mankind , and which may be the natural result of the Pyrrhonian doubts and scruples , is the limitation of our enquiries to such subjects as are best adapted to the narrow capacity of human understanding . The imagination of man is naturally sublime , delighted with whatever is remote and extraordinary , and running , without control , into the most distant parts of space and time in order to avoid the objects , which custom has rendered too familiar to it . A correct Judgement observes a contrary method , and avoiding all distant and high enquiries , confines itself to common life , and to such subjects as fall under daily practice and experience ; leaving the more sublime topics to the embellishment of poets and orators , or to the arts of priests and politicians . To bring us to so salutary a determination , nothing can be more serviceable , than to be once thoroughly convinced of the force of the Pyrrhonian doubt , and of the impossibility , that anything , but the strong power of natural instinct , could free us from it . Those who have a propensity to philosophy , will still continue their researches ; because they reflect , that , besides the immediate pleasure , attending such an occupation , philosophical decisions are nothing but the reflections of common life , methodized and corrected . But they will never be tempted to go beyond common life , so long as they consider the imperfection of those faculties which they employ , their narrow reach , and their inaccurate operations . While we cannot give a satisfactory reason , why we believe , after a thousand experiments , that a stone will fall , or fire burn ; can we ever satisfy ourselves concerning any determination , which we may form , with regard to the origin of worlds , and the situation of nature , from , and to eternity ? This narrow limitation , indeed , of our enquiries , is , in every respect , so reasonable , that it suffices to make the slightest examination into the natural powers of the human mind and to compare them with their objects , in order to recommend it to us . We shall then find what are the proper subjects of science and enquiry . 131 . It seems to me , that the only objects of the abstract science or of demonstration are quantity and number , and that all attempts to extend this more perfect species of knowledge beyond these bounds are mere sophistry and illusion . As the component parts of quantity and number are entirely similar , their relations become intricate and involved ; and nothing can be more curious , as well as useful , than to trace , by a variety of mediums , their equality or inequality , through their different appearances . But as all other ideas are clearly distinct and different from each other , we can never advance farther , by our utmost scrutiny , than to observe this diversity , and , by an obvious reflection , pronounce one thing not to be another . Or if there be any difficulty in these decisions , it proceeds entirely from the undeterminate meaning of words , which is corrected by juster definitions . That the square of the hypothenuse is equal to the squares of the other two sides , cannot be known , let the terms be ever so exactly defined , without a train of reasoning and enquiry . But to convince us of this proposition , that where there is no property , there can be no injustice , it is only necessary to define the terms , and explain injustice to be a violation of property . This proposition is , indeed , nothing but a more imperfect definition . It is the same case with all those pretended syllogistical reasonings , which may be found in every other branch of learning , except the sciences of quantity and number ; and these may safely , I think , be pronounced the only proper objects of knowledge and demonstration . 132 . All other enquiries of men regard only matter of fact and existence ; and these are evidently incapable of demonstration . Whatever is may not be . No negation of a fact can involve a contradiction . The non - existence of any being , without exception , is as clear and distinct an idea as its existence . The proposition , which affirms it not to be , however false , is no less conceivable and intelligible , than that which affirms it to be . The case is different with the sciences , properly so called . Every proposition , which is not true , is there confused and unintelligible . That the cube root of 64 is equal to the half of 10 , is a false proposition , and can never be distinctly conceived . But that Caesar , or the angel Gabriel , or any being never existed , may be a false proposition , but still is perfectly conceivable , and implies no contradiction . The existence , therefore , of any being can only be proved by arguments from its cause or its effect ; and these arguments are founded entirely on experience . If we reason a priori , anything may appear able to produce anything . The falling of a pebble may , for aught we know , extinguish the sun ; or the wish of a man control the planets in their orbits . It is only experience , which teaches us the nature and bounds of cause and effect , and enables us to infer the existence of one object from that of another 34 . Such is the foundation of moral reasoning , which forms the greater part of human knowledge , and is the source of all human action and behaviour . Moral reasonings are either concerning particular or general facts . All deliberations in life regard the former ; as also all disquisitions in history , chronology , geography , and astronomy . The sciences , which treat of general facts , are politics , natural philosophy , physic , chemistry , & c . where the qualities , causes and effects of a whole species of objects are enquired into . Divinity or Theology , as it proves the existence of a Deity , and the immortality of souls , is composed partly of reasonings concerning particular , partly concerning general facts . It has a foundation in reason , so far as it is supported by experience . But its best and most solid foundation is faith and divine revelation . Morals and criticism are not so properly objects of the understanding as of taste and sentiment . Beauty , whether moral or natural , is felt , more properly than perceived . Or if we reason concerning it , and endeavour to fix its standard , we regard a new fact , to wit , the general tastes of mankind , or some such fact , which may be the object of reasoning and enquiry . When we run over libraries , persuaded of these principles , what havoc must we make ? If we take in our hand any volume ; of divinity or school metaphysics , for instance ; let us ask , Does it contain any abstract reasoning concerning quantity or number ? No . Does it contain any experimental reasoning concerning matter of fact and existence ? No . Commit it then to the flames : for it can contain nothing but sophistry and illusion . FOOTNOTES . Footnote 1 : ( return ) It is probable that no more was meant by those , who denied innate ideas , than that all ideas were copies of our impressions ; though it must be confessed , that the terms , which they employed , were not chosen with such caution , nor so exactly defined , as to prevent all mistakes about their doctrine . For what is meant by innate ? If innate be equivalent to natural , then all the perceptions and ideas of the mind must be allowed to be innate or natural , in whatever sense we take the latter word , whether in opposition to what is uncommon , artificial , or miraculous . If by innate be meant , contemporary to our birth , the dispute seems to be frivolous ; nor is it worth while to enquire at what time thinking begins , whether before , at , or after our birth . Again , the word idea , seems to be commonly taken in a very loose sense , by LOCKE and others ; as standing for any of our perceptions , our sensations and passions , as well as thoughts . Now in this sense , I should desire to know , what can be meant by asserting , that self - love , or resentment of injuries , or the passion between the sexes is not innate ? But admitting these terms , impressions and ideas , in the sense above explained , and understanding by innate , what is original or copied from no precedent perception , then may we assert that all our impressions are innate , and our ideas not innate . To be ingenuous , I must own it to be my opinion , that LOCKE was betrayed into this question by the schoolmen , who , making use of undefined terms , draw out their disputes to a tedious length , without ever touching the point in question . A like ambiguity and circumlocution seem to run through that philosopher ' s reasonings on this as well as most other subjects . Footnote 2 : ( return ) Resemblance . Footnote 3 : ( return ) Contiguity . Footnote 4 : ( return ) Cause and effect . Footnote 5 : ( return ) For instance , Contrast or Contrariety is also a connexion among Ideas : but it may , perhaps , be considered as a mixture of Causation and Resemblance . Where two objects are contrary , the one destroys the other ; that is , the cause of its annihilation , and the idea of the annihilation of an object , implies the idea of its former existence . Footnote 6 : ( return ) The word , Power , is here used in a loose and popular sense . The more accurate explication of it would give additional evidence to this argument . See Sect . 7 . Footnote 7 : ( return ) Nothing is more useful than for writers , even , on moral , political , or physical subjects , to distinguish between reason and experience , and to suppose , that these species of argumentation are entirely different from each other . The former are taken for the mere result of our intellectual faculties , which , by considering priori the nature of things , and examining the effects , that must follow from their operation , establish particular principles of science and philosophy . The latter are supposed to be derived entirely from sense and observation , by which we learn what has actually resulted from the operation of particular objects , and are thence able to infer , what will , for the future , result from them . Thus , for instance , the limitations and restraints of civil government , and a legal constitution , may be defended , either from reason , which reflecting on the great frailty and corruption of human nature , teaches , that no man can safely be trusted with unlimited authority ; or from experience and history , which inform us of the enormous abuses , that ambition , in every age and country , has been found to make of so imprudent a confidence . The same distinction between reason and experience is maintained in all our deliberations concerning the conduct of life ; while the experienced statesman , general , physician , or merchant is trusted and followed ; and the unpractised novice , with whatever natural talents endowed , neglected and despised . Though it be allowed , that reason may form very plausible conjectures with regard to the consequences of such a particular conduct in such particular circumstances ; it is still supposed imperfect , without the assistance of experience , which is alone able to give stability and certainty to the maxims , derived from study and reflection . But notwithstanding that this distinction be thus universally received , both in the active speculative scenes of life , I shall not scruple to pronounce , that it is , at bottom , erroneous , at least , superficial . If we examine those arguments , which , in any of the sciences above mentioned , are supposed to be the mere effects of reasoning and reflection , they will be found to terminate , at last , in some general principle or conclusion , for which we can assign no reason but observation and experience . The only difference between them and those maxims , which are vulgarly esteemed the result of pure experience , is , that the former cannot be established without some process of thought , and some reflection on what we have observed , in order to distinguish its circumstances , and trace its consequences : Whereas in the latter , the experienced event is exactly and fully familiar to that which we infer as the result of any particular situation . The history of a TIBERIUS or a NERO makes us dread a like tyranny , were our monarchs freed from the restraints of laws and senates : But the observation of any fraud or cruelty in private life is sufficient , with the aid of a little thought , to give us the same apprehension ; while it serves as an instance of the general corruption of human nature , and shows us the danger which we must incur by reposing an entire confidence in mankind . In both cases , it is experience which is ultimately the foundation of our inference and conclusion . There is no man so young and unexperienced , as not to have formed , from observation , many general and just maxims concerning human affairs and the conduct of life ; but it must be confessed , that , when a man comes to put these in practice , he will be extremely liable to error , till time and farther experience both enlarge these maxims , and teach him their proper use and application . In every situation or incident , there are many particular and seemingly minute circumstances , which the man of greatest talent is , at first , apt to overlook , though on them the justness of his conclusions , and consequently the prudence of his conduct , entirely depend . Not to mention , that , to a young beginner , the general observations and maxims occur not always on the proper occasions , nor can be immediately applied with due calmness and distinction . The truth is , an unexperienced reasoner could be no reasoner at all , were he absolutely unexperienced ; and when we assign that character to any one , we mean it only in a comparative sense , and suppose him possessed of experience , in a smaller and more imperfect degree . Footnote 8 : ( return ) ' Naturane nobis , inquit , datum dicam , an errore quodam , ut , cum ea loca videamus , in quibus memoria dignos viros acceperimus multum esse versatos , magis moveamur , quam siquando eorum ipsorum aut facta audiamus aut scriptum aliquod legamus ? Velut ego nunc moveor . Venit enim mihi Plato in mentem , quera accepimus primum hic disputare solitum : cuius etiam illi hortuli propinqui non memoriam solum mihi afferunt , sed ipsum videntur in conspectu meo hic ponere . Hic Speusippus , hic Xenocrates , hic eius auditor Polemo ; cuius ipsa illa sessio fuit , quam videmus . Equidem etiam curiam nostram , Hostiliam dico , non hanc novam , quae mihi minor esse videtur postquam est maior , solebam intuens , Scipionem , Catonem , Laelium , nostrum vero in primis avum cogitare . Tanta vis admonitionis est in locis ; ut non sine causa ex his memoriae deducta sit disciplina . ' Cicero de Finibus . Lib . v . Footnote 9 : ( return ) Mr . Locke divides all arguments into demonstrative and probable . In this view , we must say , that it is only probable all men must die , or that the sun will rise to - morrow . But to conform our language more to common use , we ought to divide arguments into demonstrations , proofs , and probabilities . By proofs meaning such arguments from experience as leave no room for doubt or opposition . Footnote 10 : ( return ) Section II . Footnote 11 : ( return ) Mr . Locke , in his chapter of power , says that , finding from experience , that there are several new productions in nature , and concluding that there must somewhere be a power capable of producing them , we arrive at last by this reasoning at the idea of power . But no reasoning can ever give us a new , original , simple idea ; as this philosopher himself confesses . This , therefore , can never be the origin of that idea . Footnote 12 : ( return ) It may be pretended , that the resistance which we meet with in bodies , obliging us frequently to exert our force , and call up all our power , this gives us the idea of force and power . It is this nisus , or strong endeavour , of which we are conscious , that is the original impression from which this idea is copied . But , first , we attribute power to a vast number of objects , where we never can suppose this resistance or exertion of force to take place ; to the Supreme Being , who never meets with any resistance ; to the mind in its command over its ideas and limbs , in common thinking and motion , where the effect follows immediately upon the will , without any exertion or summoning up of force ; to inanimate matter , which is not capable of this sentiment . Secondly , This sentiment of an endeavour to overcome resistance has no known connexion with any event : What follows it , we know by experience ; but could not know it priori . It must , however , be confessed , that the animal nisus , which we experience , though it can afford no accurate precise idea of power , enters very much into that vulgar , inaccurate idea , which is formed of it . Footnote 13 : ( return ) [ Greek : theos apo maechanaes . ] Footnote 14 : ( return ) Section XII . Footnote 15 : ( return ) I need not examine at length the vis inertiae which is so much talked of in the new philosophy , and which is ascribed to matter . We find by experience , that a body at rest or in motion continues for ever in its present state , till put from it by some new cause ; and that a body impelled takes as much motion from the impelling body as it acquires itself . These are facts . When we call this a vis inertiae , we only mark these facts , without pretending to have any idea of the inert power ; in the same manner as , when we talk of gravity , we mean certain effects , without comprehending that active power . It was never the meaning of Sir ISAAC NEWTON to rob second causes of all force or energy ; though some of his followers have endeavoured to establish that theory upon his authority . on the contrary , that great philosopher had recourse to an etherial active fluid to explain his universal attraction ; though he was so cautious and modest as to allow , that it was a mere hypothesis , not to be insisted on , without more experiments . I must confess , that there is something in the fate of opinions a little extraordinary . DES CARTES insinuated that doctrine of the universal and sole efficacy of the Deity , without insisting on it . MALEBRANCHE and other CARTESIANS made it the foundation of all their philosophy . It had , however , no authority in England . LOCKE , CLARKE , and CUDWORTH , never so much as take notice of it , but suppose all along , that matter has a real , though subordinate and derived power . By what means has it become so prevalent among our modern metaphysicians ? Footnote 16 : ( return ) According to these explications and definitions , the idea of power is relative as much as that of cause ; and both have a reference to an effect , or some other event constantly conjoined with the former . When we consider the unknown circumstance of an object , by which the degree or quantity of its effect is fixed and determined , we call that its power : And accordingly , it is allowed by all philosophers , that the effect is the measure of the power . But if they had any idea of power , as it is in itself , why could not they Measure it in itself ? The dispute whether the force of a body in motion be as its velocity , or the square of its velocity ; this dispute , I say , need not be decided by comparing its effects in equal or unequal times ; but by a direct mensuration and comparison . As to the frequent use of the words , Force , Power , Energy , & c . , which every where occur in common conversation , as well as in philosophy ; that is no proof , that we are acquainted , in any instance , with the connecting principle between cause and effect , or can account ultimately for the production of one thing to another . These words , as commonly used , have very loose meanings annexed to them ; and their ideas are very uncertain and confused . No animal can put external bodies in motion without the sentiment of a nisus or endeavour ; and every animal has a sentiment or feeling from the stroke or blow of an external object , that is in motion . These sensations , which are merely animal , and from which we can priori draw no inference , we are apt to transfer to inanimate objects , and to suppose , that they have some such feelings , whenever they transfer or receive motion . With regard to energies , which are exerted , without our annexing to them any idea of communicated motion , we consider only the constant experienced conjunction of the events ; and as we feel a customary connexion between the ideas , we transfer that feeling to the objects ; as nothing is more usual than to apply to external bodies every internal sensation , which they occasion . Footnote 17 : ( return ) The prevalence of the doctrine of liberty may be accounted for , from another cause , viz . a false sensation or seeming experience which we have , or may have , of liberty or indifference , in many of our actions . The necessity of any action , whether of matter or of mind , is not , properly speaking , a quality in the agent , but in any thinking or intelligent being , who may consider the action ; and it consists chiefly in the determination of his thoughts to infer the existence of that action from some preceding objects ; as liberty , when opposed to necessity , is nothing but the want of that determination , and a certain looseness or indifference , which we feel , in passing , or not passing , from the idea of one object to that of any succeeding one . Now we may observe , that , though , in reflecting on human actions , we seldom feel such a looseness , or indifference , but are commonly able to infer them with considerable certainty from their motives , and from the dispositions of the agent ; yet it frequently happens , that , in performing the actions themselves , we are sensible of something like it : And as all resembling objects are readily taken for each other , this has been employed as a demonstrative and even intuitive proof of human liberty . We feel , that our actions are subject to our will , on most occasions ; and imagine we feel , that the will itself is subject to nothing , because , when by a denial of it we are provoked to try , we feel , that it moves easily every way , and produces an image of itself ( or a VelleÃ ¯ ty , as it is called in the schools ) even on that side , on which it did not settle . This image , or faint motion , we persuade ourselves , could , at that time , have been compleated into the thing itself ; because , should that be denied , we find , upon a second trial , that , at present , it can . We consider not , that the fantastical desire of shewing liberty , is here the motive of our actions . And it seems certain , that , however we may imagine we feel a liberty within ourselves , a spectator can commonly infer our actions from our motives and character ; and even where he cannot , he concludes in general , that he might , were he perfectly acquainted with every circumstance of our situation and temper , and the most secret springs of our complexion and disposition . Now this is the very essence of necessity , according to the foregoing doctrine . Footnote 18 : ( return ) Thus , if a cause be defined , that which produces any thing ; it is easy to observe , that producing is synonymous to causing . In like manner , if a cause be defined , that by which any thing exists ; this is liable to the same objection . For what is meant by these words , by which ? Had it been said , that a cause is that after which any thing constantly exists ; we should have understood the terms . For this is , indeed , all we know of the matter . And this constancy forms the very essence of necessity , nor have we any other idea of it . Footnote 19 : ( return ) Since all reasonings concerning facts or causes is derived merely from custom , it may be asked how it happens , that men so much surpass animals in reasoning , and one man so much surpasses another ? Has not the same custom the same influence on all ? We shall here endeavour briefly to explain the great difference in human understandings : After which the reason of the difference between men and animals will easily be comprehended . 1 . When we have lived any time , and have been accustomed to the uniformity of nature , we acquire a general habit , by which we always transfer the known to the unknown , and conceive the latter to resemble the former . By means of this general habitual principle , we regard even one experiment as the foundation of reasoning , and expect a similar event with some degree of certainty , where the experiment has been made accurately , and free from all foreign circumstances . It is therefore considered as a matter of great importance to observe the consequences of things ; and as one man may very much surpass another in attention and memory and observation , this will make a very great difference in their reasoning . 2 . Where there is a complication of causes to produce any effect , one mind may be much larger than another , and better able to comprehend the whole system of objects , and to infer justly their consequences . 3 . one man is able to carry on a chain of consequences to a greater length than another . 4 . Few men can think long without running into a confusion of ideas , and mistaking one for another ; and there are various degrees of this infirmity . 5 . The circumstance , on which the effect depends , is frequently involved in other circumstances , which are foreign and extrinsic . The separation of it often requires great attention , accuracy , and subtilty . 6 . The forming of general maxims from particular observation is a very nice operation ; and nothing is more usual , from haste or a narrowness of mind , which sees not on all sides , than to commit mistakes in this particular . 7 . When we reason from analogies , the man , who has the greater experience or the greater promptitude of suggesting analogies , will be the better reasoner . 8 . Byasses from prejudice , education , passion , party , & c . hang more upon one mind than another . 9 . After we have acquired a confidence in human testimony , books and conversation enlarge much more the sphere of one man ' s experience and thought than those of another . It would be easy to discover many other circumstances that make a difference in the understandings of men . Footnote 20 : ( return ) Plutarch , in vita Catonis . Footnote 21 : ( return ) No Indian , it is evident , could have experience that water did not freeze in cold climates . This is placing nature in a situation quite unknown to him ; and it is impossible for him to tell a priori what will result from it . It is making a new experiment , the consequence of which is always uncertain . one may sometimes conjecture from analogy what will follow ; but still this is but conjecture . And it must be confessed , that , in the present case of freezing , the event follows contrary to the rules of analogy , and is such as a rational Indian would not look for . The operations of cold upon water are not gradual , according to the degrees of cold ; but whenever it comes to the freezing point , the water passes in a moment , from the utmost liquidity to perfect hardness . Such an event , therefore , may be denominated extraordinary , and requires a pretty strong testimony , to render it credible to people in a warm climate : But still it is not miraculous , nor contrary to uniform experience of the course of nature in cases where all the circumstances are the same . The inhabitants of Sumatra have always seen water fluid in their own climate , and the freezing of their rivers ought to be deemed a prodigy : But they never saw water in Muscovy during the winter ; and therefore they cannot reasonably be positive what would there be the consequence . Footnote 22 : ( return ) Sometimes an event may not , in itself , seem to be contrary to the laws of nature , and yet , if it were real , it might , by reason of some circumstances , be denominated a miracle ; because , in fact , it is contrary to these laws . Thus if a person , claiming a divine authority , should command a sick person to be well , a healthful man to fall down dead , the clouds to pour rain , the winds to blow , in short , should order many natural events , which immediately follow upon his command ; these might justly be esteemed miracles , because they are really , in this case , contrary to the laws of nature . For if any suspicion remain , that the event and command concurred by accident , there is no miracle and no transgression of the laws of nature . If this suspicion be removed , there is evidently a miracle , and a transgression of these laws ; because nothing can be more contrary to nature than that the voice or command of a man should have such an influence . A miracle may be accurately defined , a transgression of a law of nature by a particular volition of the Deity , or by the interposition of some invisible agent . A miracle may either be discoverable by men or not . This alters not its nature and essence . The raising of a house or ship into the air is a visible miracle . The raising of a feather , when the wind wants ever so little of a force requisite for that purpose , is as real a miracle , though not so sensible with regard to us . Footnote 23 : ( return ) Hist . lib . iv . cap . 81 . Suetonius gives nearly the same account in vita Vesp . Footnote 24 : ( return ) This book was writ by Mons . Montgeron , counsellor or judge of the parliament of Paris , a man of figure and character , who was also a martyr to the cause , and is now said to be somewhere in a dungeon on account of his book . There is another book in three volumes ( called Recueil des Miracles de l ' Abb ( c ) Paris ) giving an account of many of these miracles , and accompanied with prefatory discourses , which are very well written . There runs , however , through the whole of these a ridiculous comparison between the miracles of our Saviour and those of the Abbh ( c ) ; wherein it is asserted , that the evidence for the latter is equal to that for the former : As if the testimony of men could ever be put in the balance with that of God himself , who conducted the pen of the inspired writers . If these writers , indeed , were to be considered merely as human testimony , the French author is very moderate in his comparison ; since he might , with some appearance of reason , pretend , that the Jansenist miracles much surpass the other in evidence and authority . The following circumstances are drawn from authentic papers , inserted in the above - mentioned book . Many of the miracles of Abb ( c ) Paris were proved immediately by witnesses before the officiality or bishop ' s court at Paris , under the eye of cardinal Noailles , whose character for integrity and capacity was never contested even by his enemies . His successor in the archbishopric was an enemy to the Jansenists , and for that reason promoted to the see by the court . Yet 22 rectors or curu ( c ) s of Paris , with infinite earnestness , press him to examine those miracles , which they assert to be known to the whole world , and undisputably certain : But he wisely forbore . The Molinist party had tried to discredit these miracles in one instance , that of Mademoiselle le Franc . But , besides that their proceedings were in many respects the most irregular in the world , particularly in citing only a few of the Jansenist witnesses , whom they tampered with : Besides this , I say , they soon found themselves overwhelmed by a cloud of new witnesses , one hundred and twenty in number , most of them persons of credit and substance in Paris , who gave oath for the miracle . This was accompanied with a solemn and earnest appeal to the parliament . But the parliament were forbidden by authority to meddle in the affair . It was at last observed , that where men are heated by zeal and enthusiasm , there is no degree of human testimony so strong as may not be procured for the greatest absurdity : And those who will be so silly as to examine the affair by that medium , and seek particular flaws in the testimony , are almost sure to be confounded . It must be a miserable imposture , indeed , that does not prevail in that contest . All who have been in France about that time have heard of the reputation of Mons . Heraut , the lieutenant de Police , whose vigilance , penetration , activity , and extensive intelligence have been much talked of . This magistrate , who by the nature of his office is almost absolute , was vested with full powers , on purpose to suppress or discredit these miracles ; and he frequently seized immediately , and examined the witnesses and subjects of them : But never could reach any thing satisfactory against them . In the case of Mademoiselle Thibaut he sent the famous De Sylva to examine her ; whose evidence is very curious . The physician declares , that it was impossible she could have been so ill as was proved by witnesses ; because it was impossible she could , in so short a time , have recovered so perfectly as he found her . He reasoned , like a man of sense , from natural causes ; but the opposite party told him , that the whole was a miracle , and that his evidence was the very best proof of it . The Molinists were in a sad dilemma . They durst not assert the absolute insufficiency of human evidence , to prove a miracle . They were obliged to say , that these miracles were wrought by witchcraft and the devil . But they were told , that this was the resource of the Jews of old . No Jansenist was ever embarrassed to account for the cessation of the miracles , when the church - yard was shut up by the king ' s edict . It was the touch of the tomb , which produced these extraordinary effects ; and when no one could approach the tomb , no effects could be expected . God , indeed , could have thrown down the walls in a moment ; but he is master of his own graces and works , and it belongs not to us to account for them . He did not throw down the walls of every city like those of Jericho , on the sounding of the rams horns , nor break up the prison of every apostle , like that of St . Paul . No less a man , than the Due de Chatillon , a duke and peer of France , of the highest rank and family , gives evidence of a miraculous cure , performed upon a servant of his , who had lived several years in his house with a visible and palpable infirmity . I shall conclude with observing , that no clergy are more celebrated for strictness of life and manners than the secular clergy of France , particularly the rectors or cur ( c ) s of Paris , who bear testimony to these impostures . The learning , genius , and probity of the gentlemen , and the austerity of the nuns of Port - Royal , have been much celebrated all over Europe . Yet they all give evidence for a miracle , wrought on the niece of the famous Pascal , whose sanctity of life , as well as extraordinary capacity , is well known . The famous Racine gives an account of this miracle in his famous history of Port - Royal , and fortifies it with all the proofs , which a multitude of nuns , priests , physicians , and men of the world , all of them of undoubted credit , could bestow upon it . Several men of letters , particularly the bishop of Tournay , thought this miracle so certain , as to employ it in the refutation of atheists and free - thinkers . The queen - regent of France , who was extremely prejudiced against the Port - Royal , sent her own physician to examine the miracle , who returned an absolute convert . In short , the supernatural cure was so uncontestable , that it saved , for a time , that famous monastery from the ruin with which it was threatened by the Jesuits . Had it been a cheat , it had certainly been detected by such sagacious and powerful antagonists , and must have hastened the ruin of the contrivers . Our divines , who can build up a formidable castle from such despicable materials ; what a prodigious fabric could they have reared from these and many other circumstances , which I have not mentioned ! How often would the great names of Pascal , Racine , Amaud , Nicole , have resounded in our ears ? But if they be wise , they had better adopt the miracle , as being more worth , a thousand times , than all the rest of the collection . Besides , it may serve very much to their purpose . For that miracle was really performed by the touch of an authentic holy prickle of the holy thorn , which composed the holy crown , which , & c . Footnote 25 : ( return ) Lucret . Footnote 26 : ( return ) Nov . Org . lib . ii . aph . 29 . Footnote 27 : ( return ) Luciani [ Greek : symp . ae Lapithai ] . Footnote 28 : ( return ) Luciani [ Greek : eunouchos ] . Footnote 29 : ( return ) Luciani and Dio . Footnote 30 : ( return ) In general , it may , I think , be established as a maxim , that where any cause is known only by its particular effects , it must be impossible to infer any new effects from that cause ; since the qualities , which are requisite to produce these new effects along with the former , must either be different , or superior , or of more extensive operation , than those which simply produced the effect , whence alone the cause is supposed to be known to us . We can never , therefore , have any reason to suppose the existence of these qualities . To say , that the new effects proceed only from a continuation of the same energy , which is already known from the first effects , will not remove the difficulty . For even granting this to be the case ( which can seldom be supposed ) , the very continuation and exertion of a like energy ( for it is impossible it can be absolutely the same ) , I say , this exertion of a like energy , in a different period of space and time , is a very arbitrary supposition , and what there cannot possibly be any traces of in the effects , from which all our knowledge of the cause is originally derived . Let the inferred cause be exactly proportioned ( as it should be ) to the known effect ; and it is impossible that it can possess any qualities , from which new or different effects can be inferred . Footnote 31 : ( return ) This argument is drawn from Dr . Berkeley ; and indeed most of the writings of that very ingenious author form the best lessons of scepticism , which are to be found either among the ancient or modern philosopher , Bayle not excepted . He professes , however , in his title - page ( and undoubtedly with great truth ) to have composed his book against the sceptics as well as against the atheists and free - thinkers . But that all his arguments , though otherwise intended , are , in reality , merely sceptical , appears from this , that they admit of no answer and produce no conviction . Their only effect is to cause that momentary amazement and irresolution and confusion , which is the result of scepticism . Footnote 32 : ( return ) Whatever disputes there may be about mathematical points , we must allow that there are physical points ; that is , parts of extension , which cannot be divided or lessened , either by the eye or imagination . These images , then , which are present to the fancy or senses , are absolutely indivisible , and consequently must be allowed by mathematicians to be infinitely less than any real part of extension ; and yet nothing appears more certain to reason , than that an infinite number of them composes an infinite extension . How much more an infinite number of those infinitely small parts of extension , which are still supposed infinitely divisible . Footnote 33 : ( return ) It seems to me not impossible to avoid these absurdities and contradictions , if it be admitted , that there is no such thing as abstract or general ideas , properly speaking ; but that all general ideas are , in reality , particular ones , attached to a general term , which recalls , upon occasion , other particular ones , that resemble , in certain circumstances , the idea , present to the mind . Thus when the term Horse is pronounced , we immediately figure to ourselves the idea of a black or a white animal , of a particular size or figure : But as that term is also usually applied to animals of other colours , figures and sizes , these ideas , though not actually present to the imagination , are easily recalled ; and our reasoning and conclusion proceed in the same way , as if they were actually present . If this be admitted ( as seems reasonable ) it follows that all the ideas of quantity , upon which mathematicians reason , are nothing but particular , and such as are suggested by the senses and imagination , and consequently , cannot be infinitely divisible . It is sufficient to have dropped this hint at present , without prosecuting it any farther . It certainly concerns all lovers of science not to expose themselves to the ridicule and contempt of the ignorant by their conclusions ; and this seems the readiest solution of these difficulties . Footnote 34 : ( return ) That impious maxim of the ancient philosophy , Ex nihilo , nihil fit , by which the creation of matter was excluded , ceases to be a maxim , according to this philosophy . Not only the will of the supreme Being may create matter ; but , for aught we know a priori , the will of any other being might create it , or any other cause , that the most whimsical imagination can assign . INDEX . Abstractionnot source of ideas of primary qualities , 122 . Academicphilosophy , 34 . Actionand philosophy , 1 , 4 , 34 , 128 ; Addition 4 . Analogya species of , the foundation of all reasoning about matter of fact , 82 ; Animalsthe reason of , 83 - 85 ; learn from experience and draw inferences , 83 ; which can only be founded on custom , 84 ; cause of difference between men and animals , 84 n . Antiquity 62 . Appearancesto senses must be corrected by reason , 117 . A priori 25 , 36 n , 89 n , 132 , 132 n . Aristotle 4 . Associationof ideas , three principles of , 18 - 19 , 41 - 44 ( v . Cause C ) . Atheism 116 . Bacon 99 . Belief ( v . Cause C , 39 - 45 ) ; and chance , 46 . Berkeleyreally a sceptic , 122 n . Bigotry 102 . Bodyand soul , mystery of union of , 52 ; volition and movements of , 52 . Real existence of ( v . Scepticism , B , 118 - 123 ) . Causefirst ( v . God , Necessity , 78 - 81 ; Providence , 102 - 115 , 132 n ) . a principle of association of ideas , 19 , 43 ; sole foundation of reasonings about matter of fact or real existence , 22 . A . Knowledge of Causes arises from experience not from Reason , 23 - 33 . Reasonings a priori give no knowledge of cause and effect , 23 f . ; impossible to see the effect in the cause since they are totally different , 25 ; natural philosophy never pretends to assign ultimate causes , but only to reduce causes to a few general causes , e . g . gravity , 26 ; geometry applies laws obtained by experience , 27 . Conclusions from experience not based on any process of the understanding , 28 ; yet we infer in the future a similar connexion between known qualities of things and their secret powers , to that which we assumed in the past . on what is this inference based ? 29 ; demonstrative reasoning has no place here , and all experimental reasoning assumes the resemblance of the future to the past , and so cannot prove it without being circular , 30 , 32 ; if reasoning were the basis of this belief , there would be no need for the multiplication of instances or of long experience , 31 ; yet conclusions about matter of fact are affected by experience even in beasts and children , so that they cannot be founded on abstruse reasoning , 33 ; to explain our inferences from experience a principle is required of equal weight and authority with reason , 34 . B . Custom enables us to infer existence of one object from the appearance of another , 35 - 38 . Experience enables us to ascribe a more than arbitrary connexion to objects , 35 ; we are determined to this by custom or habit which is the great guide of human life , 36 ; but our inference must be based on some fact present to the senses or memory , 37 ; the customary conjunction between such an object and some other object produces an operation of the soul which is as unavoidable as love , 38 ; animals also infer one event from another by custom , 82 - 84 ; and in man as in animals experimental reasoning depends on a species of instinct or mechanical power that acts in us unknown to ourselves , 85 . C . Belief , 39 - 45 . Belief differs from fiction or the loose reveries of the fancy by some feeling annexed to it , 39 ; belief cannot be defined , but may be described as a more lively , forcible , firm , steady conception of an object than can be attained by the imagination alone , 40 ; it is produced by the principles of association , viz . resemblance , 41 ; contiguity , 42 ; causation , 43 ; by a kind of pre - established harmony between the course of nature and our ideas , 44 ; this operation of our minds necessary to our subsistence and so entrusted by nature to instinct rather than to reasoning , 45 . Probability , 46 - 7 . Belief produced by a majority of chances by an inexplicable contrivance of Nature , 46 ( cf . 87 - 8 ) ; probability of causes : the failure of a cause ascribed to a secret counteracting cause , 47 ( cf . 67 ) ; it is universally allowed that chance when strictly examined is a mere negative word , 74 . D . Power , 49 - 57 . Power , force , energy , necessary connexion must either be defined by analysis or explained by production of the impression from which they are copied , 49 ; from the first appearance of an object we cannot foretell its effect : we cannot see the power of a single body : we only see sequence , 50 . Is the idea of power derived from an internal impression and is it an idea of reflection ? 51 ; it is not derived , as Locke said , from reasoning about power of production in nature , 50 n ; nor from consciousness of influence of will over bodily organs , 52 ; nor from effort to overcome resistance , 52 n ( cf . 60 n ) ; nor from influence of will over mind , 53 ; many philosophers appeal to an invisible intelligent principle , to a volition of the supreme being , and regard causes as only occasions and our mental conceptions as revelations , 54 - 5 ; thus diminishing the grandeur of God , 56 ; this theory too bold and beyond verification by our faculties , and is no explanation , 57 ; vis inertiae , 57 n . In single instances we only see sequence of loose events which are conjoined and never connected , 58 ; the idea of necessary connexion only arises from a number of similar instances , and the only difference between such a number and a single instance is that the former produces a habit of expecting the usual attendant , 59 , 61 . This customary transition is the impression from which we form the idea of necessary connexion . E . Reasoning from effect to cause and conversely , 105 - 115 ( v . Providence ) . In arguing from effect to cause we must not infer more qualities in the cause than are required to produce the effect , nor reason backwards from an inferred cause to new effects , 105 - 8 ; we can reason back from cause to new effects in the case of human acts by analogy which rests on previous knowledge , 111 - 2 ; when the effect is entirely singular and does not belong to any species we cannot infer its cause at all , 115 . F . Definitions of Cause , 60 ( cf . 74 n ) . Ceremonies 41 . Chanceignorance of causes , 46 ; has no existence , 74 ( v . Cause B ) . Cicero 4 . Circlein reasoning , 30 . Clarke 37 n . Colourpeculiarity of ideas of , 16 . Contiguity 19 , 42 . Contradictionthe test of demonstration , 132 . Contrariety 19 n . Contraryof matter of fact always possible , 21 , 132 . Creation 132 n . Criticism 132 . Cudworth 57 n , 158 n . Customwhen strongest conceals itself , 24 ; an ultimate principle of all conclusions from experience , 36 , 127 ; and belief , 39 - 45 ; gives rise to inferences of animals , 84 . Definitiononly applicable to complex ideas , 49 ; need of , 131 ; of cause , 60 . Demonstrativeopp . intuitive , 20 ; reasoning , 30 ; confined to quantity and number , 131 ; impossible to demonstrate a fact since no negation of a fact can involve a contradiction , 132 . Descartes 57 n . ; his universal doubt antecedent to study if strictly taken is incurable , since even from an indubitable first principle no advance can be made except by the faculties which we doubt , 116 ; his appeal to the veracity of God is useless , 120 ( v . Scepticism , 116 - 132 ) . Designargument from , 105 f . ( v . Providence ) . Divisibilityof mathematical and physical points , 124 . DoubtCartesian , 116 , 120 ( v . Scepticism A ) . Epictetus 34 . Epicureanphilosophy , defence of , 102 - 15 ; denial of providence and future state is harmless , 104 ( v . Providence ) . Euclidtruths in , do not depend on existence of circles or triangles , 20 . Evidencemoral and natural , 70 ; value of human , 82 - 9 ( v . Miracles ) . Evildoctrine of necessity either makes God the cause of evil or denies existence of evil as regards the whole , 78 - 81 . Existenceexternal and perception , 118 - 9 ( v . Scepticism , B , 116 - 32 ) . Ex nihilo nihil 132 n . Experience ( v . Cause A , 23 - 33 ) ; opposition of reason and experience usual , but really erroneous and superficial , 36 n . Infallible , may be regarded as proof , 87 ( v . Miracles ) ; all the philosophy and religion in the world cannot carry us beyond the usual course of experience , 113 . Extension 50 ; a supposed primary quality , 122 . Faith 101 , 132 . Fictionand fact ( v . Cause C ) , 39 f . Futureinference to , from past , 29 ( v . Cause A ) . Generalideas , do not really exist , but only particular ideas attached to a general term , 125 n . Geographymental , 8 . Geometrypropositions of certain , as depending only on relations of ideas not on existence of objects , 20 ; gives no knowledge of ultimate causes : only applies laws discovered by experience , 27 . Godidea of , 14 ; no idea of except what we learn from reflection on our own faculties , 57 ; theory that God is cause of all motion and thought , causes being only occasions of his volition , 54 - 57 ; by doctrine of necessity either there are no bad actions or God is the cause of evil , 78 - 81 . Veracity of , appealed to , 120 . And creation of matter , 132 n . v . Providence , 102 - 115 ; Scepticism , 116 - 132 . Goldenage , 107 . Gravity 26 . Habit ( v . Custom , Cause B ) . Historyuse of , 65 . Humannature , inconstancy a constant character of , 68 . IdeasA . Origin of , 11 - 17 . Perceptions divided into impressions and ideas , 11 - 12 ; the mind can only compound the materials derived from outward or inward sentiment , 13 ( cf . 53 ) ; all ideas resolvable into simple ideas copied from precedent feelings , 14 ; deficiency in an organ of sensation produces deficiency in corresponding idea , 15 - 16 ; suspected ideas to be tested by asking for the impression from which it is derived , 17 ( cf . 49 ) ; idea of reflection , 51 ; general ideas , 135 n ; innate ideas , 19 n ; power of will over ideas , 53 . B . Association of , 18 - 19 . Ideas introduce each other with a certain degree of method and regularity , 18 ; only three principles of association , viz . Resemblance , Contiguity , and Cause or Effect , 19 ; contrariety , 19 n ; production of belief by these principles , 41 - 43 . C . Correspondence of ideas and course of nature , 44 ; relations of ideas one of two possible objects of enquiry , 20 ; such relations discoverable by the mere operation of thought , 20 , 131 ; no demonstration possible except in case of ideas of quantity or number , 131 . Imagination 11 , 39 ; and belief , 40 . Impressionsall our more lively perceptions , 12 ; the test of ideas , 17 , 49 . Incestpeculiar turpitude of explained , 12 . Inconceivabilityof the negative , 132 ( cf . 20 ) . Inertia 57 n . Inferenceand similarity , 30 , 115 ( v . Cause ) . Infinitedivisibility , 124 f . Instancesmultiplication of not required by reason , 31 . Instinctmore trustworthy than reasoning , 45 ; the basis of all experimental reasoning , 85 ; the basis of realism , 118 , 121 . Intuitiveopp . mediate reasoning , 2 . La Bruyere 4 . Liberty ( v . Necessity , 62 - 97 ) . Definition of hypothetical liberty , 73 . Necessary to morality , 77 . Locke 4 , 40 n , 50 n , 57 n . His loose use of ' ideas , ' 19 n ; betrayed into frivolous disputes about innate ideas by the School - men , 19 n ; distinction of primary and secondary qualities , 122 . Malebranche 4 , 57 n . . Mana reasonable and active being , 4 . Marriagerules of , based on and vary with utility , 118 . Mathematicsideas of , clear and determinate , hence their superiority to moral and metaphysical sciences , 48 ; their difficulty , 48 . Mathematical and physical points , 124 n . Matternecessity of , 64 ; creation of , 132 n ( v . Scepticism A ) . Matter - of - factcontrary of , always possible , 21 ; arguments to new , based only on cause and effect , 22 . Metaphysicsnot a science , 5 - 6 ; how inferior and superior to mathematics , 48 . Mindmental geography , 8 ; secret springs and principles of , 9 ; can only mix and compound materials given by inward and outward sentiment , 13 ; power of will over , 53 . Miracles . 86 - 101 . Belief in human evidence diminishes according as the event witnessed is unusual or extraordinary , 89 ; difference between extraordinary and miraculous , 89 n ; if the evidence for a miracle amounted to proof we should have one proof opposed by another proof , for the proof against a miracle is as complete as possible ; an event is not miraculous unless there is a uniform experience , that is a proof , against it , 90 ; definition of miracle , 90 n ; hence no testimony is sufficient to establish a miracle unless its falsehood would be more miraculous than the event it establishes , 91 ; as a fact the evidence for a miracle has never amounted to proof , 92 ; the passion for the wonderful in human nature , 93 ; prevalence of miracles in savage and early periods and their diminution with civilization , 94 ; the evidence for miracles in matters of religion opposed by the almost infinite number of witnesses for rival religions , 95 ; value of human testimony diminished by temptation to pose as a prophet or apostle , 97 ; no testimony for a miracle has ever amounted to a probability , much less to a proof , and if it did amount to a proof it would be opposed by another perfect proof , 98 ; so a miracle can never be proved so as to be the foundation of a system of religion , 99 ; a conclusion which confounds those who base the Christian religion on reason , not on faith , 100 ; the Christian religion cannot be believed without a miracle which will subvert the principle of a man ' s understanding and give him a determination to believe what is most contrary to custom and experience , 101 . Moralevil ( q . v . ) 80 . Moral science 30 ; inferior to mathematics , 48 ; sceptical objections to , 126 - 7 . Moral evidence easily combined with natural , 70 . Motion 50 . Naturedesign in , 105 f . ( v . Providence ) , and the course of our ideas , 44 . State of , a philosophical fiction , 151 , 151 n . Necessaryconnexion ( v . Cause ) . Necessitytwo definitions of , 75 . A . and Liberty , 62 - 81 ; the controversy is based on ambiguity , and all mankind have always been of the same opinion on this subject , 63 ; our idea of the necessity of matter arises solely from observed uniformity and consequent inference , circumstances which are allowed by all men to exist in respect of human action , 64 ; history and knowledge of human nature assume such uniformity , 65 , which does not exclude variety due to education and progress , 66 ; irregular actions to be explained by secret operation of contrary causes , 67 ; the inconstancy of human action , its constant character , as of winds and weather , 68 ; we all acknowledge and draw inferences from the regular conjunction of motives and actions , 69 ; history , politics , and morals show this , and the possibility of combining moral and natural evidence shows that they have a common origin , 70 ; the reluctance to acknowledge the necessity of actions due to a lingering belief that we can see real connexion behind mere conjunction , 71 ; we should begin with the examination not of the soul and will but of brute matter , 72 ; the prevalence of the liberty doctrine due to a false sensation of liberty and a false experiment , 72 n ; though this question is the most contentious of all , mankind has always agreed in the doctrine of liberty , if we mean by it that hypothetical liberty which consists in a power of acting or not acting according to the determinations of our will , and which can be ascribed to every one who is not a prisoner , 73 ; liberty when opposed to necessity , and not merely to constraint , is the same as chance , 74 . B . Both necessity and liberty are necessary to morality , this doctrine of necessity only alters our view of matter and so is at least innocent , 75 ; rewards and punishments imply the uniform influence of motives , and connexion of character and action : if necessity be denied , a man may commit any crime and be no worse for it , 76 ; liberty also essential to morality , 77 . Objection that doctrine of necessity and of a regular chain of causes either makes God the cause of evil , or abolishes evil in actions , 78 ; Stoic answer , that the whole system is good , is specious but ineffectual in practice , 79 ; no speculative argument can counteract the impulse of our natural sentiments to blame certain actions , 80 ; how God can be the cause of all actions without being the author of moral evil is a mystery with which philosophy cannot deal , 81 . Negativeinconceivability of , 132 . Newton 57 n . Nisus 52 n , 60 n . Numberthe object of demonstration , 131 . Occasional causestheory of , 55 . Parallelismbetween thought and course of nature , 44 - 5 . Perceptionand external objects , 119 f . ( v . Scepticism , Impression , Idea ) . Philosophymoral , two branches of , abstruse and practical , 1 - 5 ; gratifies innocent curiosity , 6 ; metaphysics tries to deal with matters inaccessible to human understanding , 6 . True , must lay down limits of understanding , 7 ( cf . 113 ) ; a large part of , consists in mental geography , 8 ; may hope to resolve principles of mind into still more general principles , 9 . Natural , only staves off our ignorance a little longer , as moral or metaphysical philosophy serves only to discover larger portions of it , 26 ; academical , or sceptical , flatters no bias or passion except love of truth , and so has few partisans , 34 ; though it destroy speculation , cannot destroy action , for nature steps in and asserts her rights , 34 ; moral , inferior to mathematics in clearness of ideas , superior in shortness of arguments , 48 . Controversies in , due to ambiguity of terms , 62 . Disputes in , not be settled by appeal to dangerous consequences of a doctrine , 75 . Speculative , entirely indifferent to the peace of society and security of government , 104 ( cf . 114 ) . All the philosophy in the world , and all the religion in the world , which is nothing but a species of philosophy , can never carry us beyond the usual course of experience , 113 . Happiness of , to have originated in an age and country of freedom and toleration , 102 . Pointsphysical , indivisible , 124 n . Power 50 f , 60 n . ( v . Cause D ) . Probability 46 f . ( v . Cause , B ) . Probablearguments , 38 , 46 n . Production 50 n . Promisesnot the foundation of justice , 257 . Proof 46 n , 86 - 101 ( v . Miracles , Demonstrative ) . Providence 102 - 115 ( v . God ) . The sole argument for a divine existence is from the marks of design in nature ; must not infer greater power in the cause than is necessary to produce the observed effects , nor argue from such an inferred cause to any new effects which have not been observed , 105 ; so must not infer in God more power , wisdom , and benevolence than appears in nature , 106 ; so it is unnecessary to try and save the honour of the Gods by assuming the intractability of matter or the observance of general laws , 107 ; to argue from effects to unknown causes , and then from these causes to unknown effects , is a gross sophism , 108 . From imperfect exercise of justice in this world we cannot infer its perfect exercise in a future world , 109 ; we must regulate our conduct solely by the experienced train of events , 110 ; in case of human works of art we can infer the perfect from the imperfect , but that is because we know man by experience and also know other instances of his art , 111 - 112 ; but in the case of God we only know him by his productions , and do not know any class of beings to which he belongs , 113 ; and the universe , his production , is entirely singular and does not belong to a known species of things , 115 . Punishmentrequires doctrines of necessity and liberty , 76 ( v . Necessity ) . Pyrrhonism 126 . Qualitiesprimary and secondary , 122 . Quantityand number , the only objects of demonstration , the parts of them being entirely similar , 131 . Realpresence , 86 . Realityand thought , 44 . Realismof the vulgar , 118 . Reason ( a ) opp . intuition , 29 ; opp . experience , 28 , 36 n . ( b ) Corrects sympathy and senses , 117 . No match for nature , 34 . Fallacious , compared with instinct , 45 . Of men and animals , 84 n . ( c ) attempts to destroy , by reasoning , 124 ; objections to abstract reasoning , 124 f . ( v . Scepticism ) . ( d ) Reasoning . Two kinds of , demonstrative and moral , 30 , 46 n , 132 ; moral , divided into general and particular , 132 ; produces demonstrations , proofs , and probabilities , 46 n . Probable ( v . Cause , 28 - 32 ) . Relationsof ideas , discoverable by the mere operation of thought , independently of the existence of any object , 20 . Religiona kind of philosophy , 113 ( v . Miracles , Providence ) . Resemblance 19 , 41 ( v . Similarity ) . Resistanceand idea of power , 53 n . ScepticismA . antecedent to study and philosophy , such as Descartes ' universal doubt of our faculties , would be incurable : in a more moderate sense it is useful , 116 ( cf . 129 - 30 ) ; extravagant attempts of , to destroy reason by reasoning , 124 . No such absurd creature as a man who has no opinion about anything at all , 116 ; admits of no answer and produces no conviction , 122 n . ( cf . 34 , 126 , 128 ) . B . As to the Senses , 117 - 123 . The ordinary criticisms of our senses only show that they have to be corrected by Reason , 117 ; more profound arguments show that the vulgar belief in external objects is baseless , and that the objects we see are nothing but perceptions which are fleeting copies of other existences , 118 ; even this philosophy is hard to justify ; it appeals neither to natural instinct , nor to experience , for experience tells nothing of objects which perceptions resemble , 119 ; the appeal to the veracity of God is useless , 120 ; and scepticism is here triumphant , 121 . The distinction between primary and secondary qualities is useless , for the supposed primary qualities are only perceptions , 122 ; and Berkeley ' s theory that ideas of primary qualities are obtained by abstraction is impossible , 122 , 122 n ; if matter is deprived of both primary and secondary qualities there is nothing left except a mere something which is not worth arguing about , 123 . C . As to Reason , 124 - 130 . Attempt to destroy Reason by reasoning extravagant , 124 ; objection to abstract reasoning because it asserts infinite divisibility of extension which is shocking to common sense , 124 , and infinite divisibility of time , 125 ; yet the ideas attacked are so clear and distinct that scepticism becomes sceptical about itself , 125 . Popular objections to moral reasoning about matter of fact , based on weakness of understanding , variation of judgement , and disagreement among men , confuted by action , 126 ; philosophical objections , that we only experience conjunction and that inference is based on custom , 127 ; excessive scepticism refuted by its uselessness and put to flight by the most trivial event in life , 128 . Mitigated scepticism or academical philosophy useful as a corrective and as producing caution and modesty , 129 ; and as limiting understanding to proper objects , 130 ; all reasoning which is not either abstract , about quantity and number , or experimental , about matters of fact , is sophistry and illusion , 132 . D , In Religion ( v . Miracles , Providence ) . Sciences 132 ( v . Reason , ( d ) ; Scepticism , C ) . Secretpowers , 39 ; counteracting causes , 47 , 67 . Sensesoutward and inward sensation supplies all the materials of thinking -- must be corrected by reason , 117 . Scepticism concerning , 117 ( v . Scepticism , B ) . Similaritybasis of all arguments from experience , 31 ( cf . 115 ) . Solidity 50 ; a supposed primary quality , 122 . Souland body , 52 . Spaceand time , 124 f . Speciesan effect which belongs to no species does not admit of inference to its cause , 115 ( cf . 113 ) . Stoics 34 , 79 . Superstition 6 ( v . Providence ) . Theologyscience of , 132 ( v . God , Providence ) . Tillotsonargument against real presence , 86 . Timeand space , 124 f . Truth 8 , 17 ( v . Scepticism ) . Understandinglimits of human , 7 ; operations of , to be classified , 8 ; opp . experience , 28 ; weakness of , 126 ( v . Reason , Scepticism ) . Voluntarinessas ground of distinction between virtues and talents , 130 . Wholetheory that everything is good as regards ' the whole , ' 79 80 . Willcompounds materials given by senses , 13 ; influence of over organs of body can never give us the idea of power ; for we are not conscious of any power in our will , only of sequence of motions on will , 52 ; so with power of will over our minds in raising up new ideas , 53 . Of God , cannot be used to explain motion , 57 . Freedom of ( v . 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