There was a black grouse a few meters in front of him <| sep |> P 72 is a Kruger NOT RSI . It will likely be offered on exotics day and should be stand alone as it was when first sold <| sep |> wow so verify u 1 waterhole uerkanyilmaz 98 Dogecoinsnbsp $ 0 . 0192913 <| sep |> thanks , will try meditation <| sep |> Nice , sounds good . <| sep |> Reinhardt main here . Over 100 hours on Reinhardt ! Catch Phrase ! <| sep |> Thanks for your concern , but Trump ' s America will never be my America . <| sep |> I actually enjoy sinning movies I like , so I don ' t know how to answer this . <| sep |> pineapple and soprasetta , sweet salty and spicy . <| sep |> I used to enjoy standing , walking , etc . Now not a fan . <| sep |> 341 is typically taken to express the ' hinge commitments ' view , the epistemological view that there are some commitments of ours which are i not in the market for rational doubt , but also ii not in the market for rational support either . Basically nothing rationally counts against them , and nothing rationally counts for them . Their status in the structure of reasons is more basic than a potentially having evidence against them b potentially having evidence for them and c potentially being evidence for some other propositions . At least , this is one way of interpreting it . There are many interpretations , but all of them accept that the hinge commitments are not the sort of commitments that are foundational in the Foundationalist ' sep sense , but nor they the sort of commitments that you ' d give reasons for believing either . To set up a contrastFoundationalism is the inverted pyramidview of the structure of reasons . At the bottom are a cluster of the most certain propositions , things like ' I exist ', and ' I ' m thinking now ', and ' I ' m having such and such experiences '. These foundational propositions support the rest . Wittgenstein ' s picture of the structure of reasons in On Certainty disagrees with the foundationalist ' s picture of the structure of reasons . For Wittgenstein , there are some propositions which are certain , but they are not part of the same propositions that the foundationalist considers to be the foundational propositions , and in any case they don ' t function like the foundationalist thinks they function . For Wittgenstein , the hinge propositions are more like those propositions that , by virtue of not being doubted and not rationally doubtable and not being given grounds to be believed and not being rationally supportable , they enable there to be reasongiving relations between the rest of the propositions in our network of beliefs . Put another way the status of the hinge propositions are , as he notes himself , more like scaffolding for belief network than a foundation for them . 344 This one needs to be considered in the bigger picture . So , the idea is that , within your life , you naturally just accept some things . This ' natural acceptance ' is a kind of certainty which one might think is far more secure than any kind of rational certainty for some propositions that philosophers like Descartes were interested in e . g . , ' I exist ', ' I ' m thinking now '.