Lies . That Priest is not running purify , that is clearly a silence . <| sep |> True that . The prior probabilities have to be addressed so the conversation can keep moving . There are some limitations on what differences it is possible to overcome in prior probabilities . Aumann ' s agreement theorem presupposes common priors , yet there indeed ways to eliminate some differences in prior probabilities , but not others . Ah , but God is simple , he has no parts , he is not complex We are not talking about structural complexity . Intelligences are intrinsically complex , even moreso if they ' re ontologically fundamental aka . have no constituent parts . Just to know , where have you learned of the solomonoff induction ? I ' m guessing some kind of computingmathematical background ? I have an interest for epistemology , so I read about it on wikipedia . My older brother may have slipped it in conversation . We are both very intelligent , but he ' s much more invested in nerdy topics than I am . Of course . What kinds of implementation of skepticism would not rely on some kind of mechanism for confirming success or failure though ? Genuinely curious , I ' d like to know more . Falsification is not the same as confirmation of success or failure , there are other modes of doing the latter . Falsifiability is the condition of the statement having generalizable or otherwise testable implications , where if they ' re shown wrong , the statement is incorrect . In probabilistic frameworks , you establish prior probabilities and allow evidence to affect it in either direction , with some hypotheses allowing direct falsification , others not . For falsification to be possible , the statement must have a necessary implication that is testable . In syllogistics , falsification might be termed denying the consequent , but in a probabilistic framework , claims are a simplification and the model consists of a probability distribution . In the same vein , would you mind telling me say the top 3 atheist failed arguments you see most often ? Just out of curiosity , to see if we ' d agree . I don ' t have an MBTI personality type that is good at recalling such , but I will make an attempt to list some . Example 1 A theist makes claims about cosmic improbability or evolutionary improbability and an atheist says that it is impossible to calculate a precise probability without a statistical record of outcomes . The atheist is strawmanning the theistic position into a position about frequentist probabilities , when this is not the most charitable interpretation , and though a precise probability can indeed not be calculated , the scope can be estimated . Example 2 Burden of proof An atheist claims the theist has a burden of proof . Burdens of proof are a quirk of a particular epistemological framework and cannot necessarily be imposed in such a context . We use them as a legal standard , but as a heuristic they have their merit in being a practical application of a generalized Occam ' s Razor . In probabilistic frameworks , probability updates need to be justified , and this is the closest equivalent to the burden of proof . The claimant is making a claim out of an interest to convince , meaning they have an interest in fulfilling the burden of proof nonetheless , but imposing a burden of proof is an invalid heuristic . Of course , it is even more incorrect for a theist to ask an atheist to fulfill a burden of proof , though they are justified in questioning a different probability than 50 %, to which the appropriate response would be citing different prior probabilities , possibly justified by a principle like Solomonoff induction or similar . This post is getting rather long , but if you are intrigued I may be able to come up with additional examples .