Monet ary I nt egrat i on Chal l enges i n t heAsi a- Paci f i c Regi on
著者Ml odkowski  Pawel
j ournal  orpubl i cat i on t i t l e
Comparat i ve cul t ure,  t he j ournal  of  Mi yazakiI nt ernat i onal  Col l ege
vol ume22
page range47- 65
year2017
URLht t p: //i d. ni i . ac. j p/1106/00000704/
Monetary Integration Challenges in the Asia-Pacific Region
Paweł Młodkowski 
Abstract 
Monetary integration in Asia has been a hot topic for years. Proponents justify 
regional cooperation by proving a range of benefits. The importance of their arguments stems 
from the fact that exchange rate instability plagues Asian countries. The competitiveness of 
Asian economies, being export-oriented, relies on exchange rates. In the past, 
macroeconomic stability was achieved through use of hard pegs. However, the costs of fixed 
rates called for alternative solutions. Instead, for national regimes in the Asia-Pacific region it 
may be feasible to introduce a common basket peg, or even a common currency, to cope with 
exchange rate-related problems. Successful management of regional policy may lead to an 
Asian Monetary Union and would not be easy. Not only must economies converge, but a 
great deal of political will and solidarity would be required. This paper discusses alternative 
solutions and offers a correlation analysis of business cycles showing the current situation in 
Asia. 
Keywords: ASEAN, exchange rate, monetary integration, monetary policy 
coordination, trade. 
Introduction 
Asia has emerged as a global power during the last 25 years. Over this period, the 
region has been characterized by high levels of foreign direct investment that fueled 
incredible economic expansion. Factors contributing to growth have been numerous, but low 
labor costs and fewer regulations (including a lack of environmental protection laws) have 
been recognized as beneficial and therefore attractive for relocating global production to 
Asian countries. Socio-economic success materialized through the improvement of living 
standards over a relatively short period of time. This, in turn, provided grounds for discussion 
on possible regional solutions with regard to economic and monetary integration. After 
successful implementation of the ASEAN initiative, economists and governments in the 
region have analyzed scenarios of monetary integration. The success of the Economic and 
Monetary Union (EMU) in Europe has motivated popularity of the monetary integration in 
Asia up until recent years. Literature concerned with various designs of the monetary system 
in Asia is vast.  
Problem 
Monetary integration, regardless of the region of the world it covers, has been a hot 
topic and has been gaining in popularity. This is in spite of the fact of fast expansion of 
currencies issued online, which has been beyond national government control.  
The literature most often lists Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Indonesia, 
Malaysia, Singapore, China, Thailand and the Philippines as members for Asian monetary 
integration (Yuen, 2002; Williamson, 2005; Eichengreen & Bayoumi, 1996). A list of 
potential member states of the currency union in Asia tends to differ from study to study. For 
instance, Eichengreen & Bayoumi (1996) also include Australia and New Zealand in their 
analysis of correlations. Different sets of countries are considered for the purpose of 
answering questions on the optimal composition of a new monetary union. Optimality is 
defined here with utility function maximizing potential benefits monetary union members. 
The above list is concise and represents the focus group for this research.  
Demand for monetary integration within this group stems from a desperate need to 
achieve exchange rate stability. Such an attitude results from the fact that all of these 
countries belong to highly open small economies. As a consequence, economic performance 
depends heavily on the external value of their respective national currencies. The Asian 
currency crisis of 1997 was a problem resulting mostly from rigidity of exchange rate 
regimes (Hefeker & Nabor, 2002). This rigidity is also a result of the disproportionate share 
(in currency baskets) assigned to the dollar (Rajan, 2002). The currency crisis of 1997 raised 
the question of finding a valid solution to the myriad of exchange rate problems suffered by 
Asian countries. The goal of this paper is to present various arguments for monetary 
integration in the region and possible solutions to the problem of effective monetary 
cooperation.  
There have been already many studies that have discussed various methods of 
achieving exchange rate stability. They have included exchange rate regimes based on fixed 
and flexible rates, currency basket-based regimes, and the idea of a common currency for 
selected countries in Asia.  
 Current Asian exchange rate regimes range from hard peg to free float systems. The 
former approach is still in use, despite the Asian currency crisis having resulted from rigidity 
of fixed exchange rates (Hefeker & Nabor, 2002). This is justified by the fact that the main 
benefit of hard peg is that of “reducing uncertainty in trade and investment” (Hefeker & 
Habor, 2002, p. 3). Stability in the external value of domestic currency reduces the risk in 
international business. Variability of exchange rates greatly affects the competitiveness of 
products exported. Instable international capital flows and current account reversals put the 
financial stability of a nation in question. Prevalent during the currency crisis in 1997 were 
many competitive devaluations (Hefeker & Nabor, 2002, p. 4). As argued by Mc Kinnon 
(1998), Rose (1998), and Hefeker & Nabor (2002), such countermeasures added to 
macroeconomic instability in Asia. One may claim that hard peg regime effectively solves 
most of the above-mentioned problems. Popularity of fixed exchange rates in Asia is 
attributed to a long history of successful economic performance under such regimes. Limiting 
exchange rate fluctuations created instability. Governments in the region, however, and 
global institutions are still on a quest to achieve macroeconomic stability for the sake of each 
society’s wellbeing. 
Objective 
The objective of this paper is to provide a review of opinions on monetary integration 
in Asia and evaluation of possible forms of international cooperation in the area of exchange 
rate regime in the region. In terms of specific contribution to a discussion of available 
scenarios an objective is to offer a simple argument based on correlation of business cycles 
among potential members of an Asian Monetary Union. 
Methodology 
The idea of monetary integration belongs to international economic policy issues. Any 
study in this area must draw heavily from literature and contemporary political discussion. 
However, in addition to a systematic and diligent literature review, this paper offers a very 
simple empirical investigation on business cycle correlation among potential members of an 
Asian Monetary Union. Real GDP growth rates (annual observations) are the basis for 
calculating correlation coefficients between pairs of countries. For the purpose of presenting 
significant changes to the underlying situation and eligibility of Asian countries to create an 
optimum currency area (according to classical OCA theory), correlation coefficients are 
presented separately for three distinctive sub-periods over the last 113 years. Time series 
employed in the empirical exercise come from GAPMINDER database.  
Result and Discussion 
The external value of domestic currency does not need to be fixed, though. There is 
an option to employ the most self-sustaining solution in the form of a free float. However, to 
have a flexible exchange rate, a set of conditions must be met. One should note, however, that 
free float is not a solution for small economies. The most successful countries with freely 
floating exchange rates are those with the largest share in the global economy. Only in a 
stable and well-developed economic system do free market forces grant stability to the 
external value of a domestic currency. Deep foreign exchange markets with millions of 
transactions and high turnover seem resistant to speculative capital flows and any other forms 
of market mechanism deficiencies.  
According to Cowen et al. (2006, p. 46) exchange rate management marked by 
flexibility is likely to foster regional integration. Therefore, Asian countries would still be 
able to pursue national agendas without losing autonomy in exchange rate policy. Debate on 
monetary integration in Asia centers on an analysis of hard peg versus flexible exchange rate 
regimes. Fixed rates with the same peg (probably pegged to the US dollar) can be a phase in 
the transition to a common currency. On the other hand, remaining in a system that fuels 
exchange rate volatility is likely to negatively influence international transactions (trade and 
investment) due to inherent uncertainty (Cowen et al., 2006, p. 45).  
The fundamental problem in designing and introducing monetary integration in Asia 
is the scale of collective action required. Since the emergence of a “common currency” as an 
idea for ASEAN countries, there have been many alterations in expressed willingness to 
proceed with monetary cooperation. There was initially high solidarity followed by strong 
resistance, as there were local economic problems and a global financial crisis that called for 
drastic countermeasures at the national level.  
These days it may be difficult to find many Asian countries that are still willing to 
engage in close forms of monetary cooperation. Currently, each country pursues and retains 
its own monetary and exchange rate policies, thus maintaining full autonomy in this regard. 
However, there are still researchers that analyze monetary cooperation and integration 
scenarios for Asian countries. There is one point found in the literature, as early as 2002 with 
Hefeker & Nabor ( p.1), that has received substantial attention. It is about a system based on a 
basket peg. Williamson (2005) offers the idea of either each country having its own basket 
peg, or the creation of a single basket for pegging all Asian currencies. A different approach 
is advocated by Rajan (2002). He proposes implementation of the Japanese government’s 
plan to introduce a tri-currency basket peg for East Asia. It would be composed of most 
important international currencies for trade and investment, which are the dollar, the euro, 
and the Japanese yen. It should be noted that currency pegs, in general, lead to more 
positively correlated business cycles (Frankel & Rose, 1998). This may be perceived as a 
substantial benefit to all countries involved in such forms of exchange rate cooperation. At 
the same time, achieving high symmetry in business cycles would facilitate further attempts 
to reach full monetary integration.  
Fixed exchange rates are characterized in the literature as having few disadvantages in 
special circumstances. Listing just the most prominent ones here, one should point out a loss 
of autonomy for national governments in respect to external value of the local currency and 
the requirement for setting an anchor currency, both of which may prove challenging. 
Another problem, should some adjustments become necessary, results from further changes 
to the exchange rate. Changes or a withdrawal from the fixed exchange rate regime could 
generate a currency crisis and result in loss of credibility by the national government or its 
specialized agency responsible for managing exchange rate policy (Hefeker & Nabor, 2002, 
p. 5).
 In spite of the introduction of a common basket peg for Asian countries being the 
most realistic, there are many objections. These doubts stem from different compositions of 
export and import-related flows along with diverse foreign direct and portfolio investment 
transfers in all potential members of such exchange rate arrangement. Within such a common 
basket, shares in the Japanese yen, the dollar, and the euro are difficult to calibrate in such a 
way that suits all Asian countries involved.  In particular, the Japanese yen is commonly 
used for invoicing intra-regional trade. Also, denomination of sovereign debt issued by Asian 
countries has shifted from the dollar to the yen. However, the US dollar still retains 
significant influence when it comes to exchange rates in the region (Eichengreen & Bayoumi, 
1996, p. 5). A collective basket may be a feasible solution in the mid-term, however. Hong 
Kong and Singapore, as very small and highly open economies with strong trade links with 
their neighbors, may find it more appealing to peg the external value of their respective 
national currencies to other East Asian currencies (Eichengreen & Bayoumi, 1996, p. 10). 
Eichengren & Bayoumi (1996, p. 11) noted that the country pairs consisting of Singapore and 
Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand, Singapore and Hong Kong, Singapore and Taiwan, and 
Hong Kong and Taiwan, would most benefit from a common external peg. Another group 
that includes Indonesia, South Korea, and the Philippines exhibits a weaker case for benefits 
stemming from a common hard peg. While the concept of a collective hard peg for Asian 
countries has been studied for many years, there is still no credible plan for achieving such a 
form of regional cooperation.  
 A common basket peg for all the Asian countries within this analysis has convincing 
rationale. It seems that after many years of fascination with economic integration, the world 
economy has entered a period of opposite tendencies in many regions. Not only Brexit, but 
also the main themes of the US presidential campaign in 2016, prove that societies are willing 
to support separatist initiatives. Voters support leaders that promise to protect national 
economies by imposing barriers to trade, controls over investment, and restrictions to the 
flow of people.  
According to empirical investigations available in the literature, should each Asian 
country peg its currency to one of the G-3 currencies, greater exchange rate stability would be 
achieved (Cowen et al., 2006, p. 46). As a side effect, such regimes would guarantee that any 
changes in “the third country exchange rates would [not] disturb the trading relationships 
among the East Asian countries themselves” (Williamson, 2005, p. 1).  
 An alternative solution based on a basket of currencies to which external value of 
national currency is pegged, is tailoring individual baskets for each Asian country. Such a 
country-specific basket would be composed of international currencies as well as the 
currencies of neighboring countries in the immediate region. It can be argued that tailoring 
currency baskets on the basis of currency composition of international trade and investment 
would be better adapted to the features of each specific country. This would probably reduce 
intraregional exchange rate variability, in turn promoting trade and investment (Cowen et al., 
2006, p. 46). When it comes to technical issues related to a country-tailored currency basket, 
one should bear in mind that for each country involved, even a small one, the country would 
need to operate its own forward market for foreign exchange. This has always been 
problematic for smaller countries (Williamson, 2005, p. 2). Williamson (2005) claims that 
this problem would be effectively solved through the introduction of a formerly presented 
exchange rate regime based on the common basket for all Asian countries. Still, developing 
the most appropriate weights to compose such basket would be somewhat challenging 
(Cowen et al., 2006, p. 48).  
The two forms of fixed exchange rate regimes using a currency basket (the common 
basket and the tailored one) represent two similar solutions aimed at limiting exchange rate 
variability at the cost of national economic policy independence. This issue may be even 
more problematic as international capital mobility might also be affected, as derived from the 
“impossible trinity” rule (Cowen et al., 2006, p. 45). The exchange rate regime options for 
Asian countries discussed above would reduce independence in monetary policies as long as 
capital flows remain unrestricted. In this case, they are subject to government control. 
“...regional integration may in the end be held back if countries are forced to trade off 
domestic stability for deeper trade linkages” (Cowen et al., 2006, p. 48).  
Adapting an exchange rate regime that employs a collective currency basket and a 
hard peg requires a great deal of solidarity and political will. There is a need for a very good 
understanding of all benefits and trade-offs that are involved in such new arrangement. 
Prospective forms of exchange rate and monetary cooperation in Asia still require a 
systematic analysis at the national level and at the regional level. Proper and competent 
information campaigns are required to gain common acceptance for new forms of 
international cooperation.  
A reason for achieving good public understanding of this new regime is to avoid 
populists gaining the attention of the public. Even the most developed countries, like the UK, 
have witnessed populists, propelled by misunderstandings and ignorance, playing against 
coordinated international initiatives. Therefore, all countries that wish to embark on a quest 
for stability and prosperity by means of monetary and exchange rate cooperation must 
approach the marketing of these ideas to the general public with due diligence and care.  
Shaping appropriate mentality in societies and generating readiness for sacrifice, 
especially at the beginning of monetary integration, are necessary for successful 
implementation of any initiatives of this magnitude. It can be argued that East Asian 
countries still lack the political solidarity in 2017. However, the same problem was 
recognized as early as 1996 (Eichengreen & Bayoumi, 1996, p. 21). This is simply an 
impediment that needs to be addressed by conscious and responsible public marketing.  
How far are we from an Asian Monetary Union? 
The various factors and conditions mentioned above lead to the fundamental question 
of the feasibility of a monetary union among Asian countries. There has been a consensus 
that an Asian Monetary Union (AMU) could be potentially beneficial. However, it is an 
initiative that requires lengthy and gradual reforms national levels. This kind of economic 
integration of diverse national economic systems calls for a great deal of political will and 
requires a longer time line for its successful completion (Hekefer & Nabor, 2002; Yuen, 
2000; Cowen et al., 2006).  
Economic policy implications resulting from monetary integration in Asian countries 
would differ due to variety of factors. Smaller currency areas to be formed in Asia are also 
advised (Yuen, 2000, p. 16) as a viable option. It may be easier to have several groups of 
fewer countries that coordinate their monetary policies first, and then these small ‘currency 
unions’ could more easily achieve external harmonization with other currency areas in the 
region. Yuen (2000, p.3) claims that factors facilitating such a scenario are “the symmetry of 
underlying [economic] shocks, geographic proximity and socio-cultural compatibility”. By 
using such criteria, it has become possible to recognize three potential groupings of Asian 
countries for the presented alternative two-stage monetary integration scenario. These 
separate clusters would be comprised of: Singapore and Malaysia, Japan and Korea, and 
Taiwan and Hong Kong (Yuen, 2000, p. 12).  
 There are still many impediments to the Asian Monetary Union becoming a reality. 
As argued by Takeuchi (2006, p. 1) there are still significant disparities among Asian 
economies. Differences in industrial structure and the efficiency of factor markets (labor and 
capital markets) drive the costs of adopting a common currency in the region. Associated 
reasoning and arguments of the role of such differences stem directly from the original 
Optimal Currency Areas (OCA) theory. These differences are responsible for a higher 
probability of asymmetric shocks and resulting mismatch between economic situations in 
each member state and the common monetary policy. However, these arguments against 
monetary integration in Asia may simply be an overreaction to the advice formulated by the 
OCA theory. As already observed before the introduction of the euro by Eichengreen & 
Bayoumi (1996, p. 15-16) the labor markets of East Asia are more flexible than those of 
Western Europe. Monetary integration in Europe generated benefits for member countries. 
The member countries have had conditions far from optimal for those advised by the OCA 
theory. It is more reasonable and justified to implement monetary integration in Asian 
countries that are closer to satisfying the OCA criteria. Asian countries are much more 
economically homogeneous than those of Europe. Probability of asymmetric shocks is 
therefore much lower. The low probability of Asian countries exhibiting unique asymmetric 
shocks creates a situation conducive to national governments in the region. There would be 
no other choice but to pursue similar (if not identical) policies across the region. In such a 
case, there is no reason for conflict of interest among potential member states. Joint and 
coordinated fiscal adjustments, along with a common monetary policy, seem highly feasible. 
Such a situation would allow Asian countries to form a successful monetary union (Yuen, 
2000).   
The main impediment for monetary integration in Asia is still a lack of political will, 
political solidarity, and consensus regarding regional institutional infrastructure (Rajan, 
2002). Other impediments result from China’s asymmetric shocks, due to many factors, but 
mainly because of different production structures and a unique economic model pursued by 
the Chinese government. This is why there had been a low correlation between the Chinese 
business cycle and the cycle of other Asian economies (Yuen, 2000, p. 12). Impediments to 
monetary integration in Asia are also of a political nature.  European monetary integration 
was marked with increased political integration along with the creation of a supranational 
body (Eichengreen & Bayoumi, 1996, p. 18). The European Central Bank was able to 
override national governments who reached consensus on relinquishing independence of 
monetary policy. In 2017, after 21 years since Eichengreen & Bayoumi (1996, p. 19) 
formulated their comments on Asian monetary integration, countries in the region still lack 
understanding and the initiatives necessary to bring about greater solidarity and political 
cooperation. There must be much more trust and cooperation for an Asian Monetary Union to 
emerge.  
Another empirical test for the viability of monetary integration in Asia? 
The classical OCA theory advanced several optimality conditions for a group of 
countries to engage in monetary integration. Generalizing OCA criteria leads to the 
conclusion that high positive correlation of business cycles is a pre-condition for a shock-less 
substitution of domestic monetary policies with a common one. Therefore, in order to get a 
better image of the suitability of Asian countries engaging in such integration, one could take 
a closer look at correlations of their business cycles over the last few years. A simple 
empirical investigation on the feasibility of an Asian Monetary Union delivers correlation 
coefficients of real GDP growth rates for China, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, and Malaysia. 
Using long time series for real GDP from the GAPMINDER database, correlation 
coefficients were calculated for three different periods: 1900-1989, 1999-2004, and 
1990-2013.  
Table 1 Correlation of real GDP growth rates among Asian countries over the period from 
1900 to 1990 
China Indonesia Japan Korea, Rep. Malaysia 
China 1.00 
 Indonesia 0.6 1.00 
 Japan -0.160.08 1.00 
 Korea, Rep. 0.26 0.42 -0.131.00 
 Malaysia 0.01 0.09 -0.100.07 1.00 
Source: Author, based on GAPMINDER database (www.gapminder.org) 
Table 1 presents correlation coefficients for the longest period considered 
(1900-1989). It indicates that over the period of 90 years in Asia, business cycles in all 
countries included in the empirical exercise were neither positively nor negatively correlated. 
Coefficients that are not significantly different from zero suggest total independence in the 
way these economies grew over time. However, as empirical investigation advanced with the 
periods covered, a very new situation was revealed for all considered Asian countries.   
When correlation analysis is restricted to a shorter period - from 1999 to 2004, results 
(Table 2) seem to indicate a much more pronounced similarity in business cycles, with China 
and Japan still walking their growth paths independently. 
Table 2 Correlation of real GDP growth rates among Asian countries over the period from 
1999 to 2004  
China Indonesia Japan Korea, Rep. Malaysia 
China 1.00 
 Indonesia 0.43 1.00 
 Japan -0.040.57 1.00 
 Korea, Rep. 0.17 0.84 0.44 1.00 
 Malaysia 0.49 0.90 0.57 0.86 1.00 
Source: Author, based on GAPMINDER database (www.gapminder.org) 
Then, including the most recent period of economic growth up until 2013 (Table 3), 
shows a new situation. All of the considered national economies achieved a much stronger 
positive correlation of their respective business cycles over the last 27 years. What may be 
responsible for such a significant change is a common and similar response to the most recent 
global financial crisis. However, as surprising as it is to see Japan and China with positive 
correlations in their business cycles, such a result is a strong supporting argument for 
potential monetary integration in Asia. Previous negative correlations were a strong argument 
for opponents of an Asian Monetary Union. These negative correlations provided 
ammunition to dismiss any ideas of a common monetary policy for the two prominent 
economies.   
Table 3 Correlation of real GDP growth rates among Asian countries over the period from 
1990 to 2013  
China Indonesia Japan Korea, Rep. Malaysia 
China 1.00 
 Indonesia 0.55 1.00 
 Japan 0.22 0.49 1.00 
 Korea, Rep. 0.44 0.55 0.58 1.00 
 Malaysia 0.40 0.79 0.75 0.77 1.00 
Source: Author, based on GAPMINDER database (www.gapminder.org) 
Indonesia and Malaysia are highly positively correlated, as well as Korea and 
Malaysia, and Korea and Indonesia. All correlation coefficients seem to drift in the same 
direction. All of them are statistically significant. Common monetary policy, as is conducted 
in a monetary union, can be effective and beneficial for all member states as long as it suits 
them all at the same time. Therefore, it is important to achieve high synchronization of 
business cycles prior to commencing with monetary integration. Otherwise, monetary policy 
will generate asymmetric shocks and will be responsible for increased macroeconomic 
instability. Presented pairs of countries show high and growing similarity in terms of their 
business cycles. One could even think about the feasibility of small cluster unions, as 
proposed by Yuen (2000).  
Conclusions and Recommendations 
There have been cycles in the popularity of monetary integration in Asia for many 
years. Every time there has been turmoil due to regional crisis or global recession, national 
governments have abandoned previously worked-out plans for closer regional cooperation. 
As has been discussed above, any economic integration initiatives, not only in the area of 
money and monetary policy, require a large dose of political will, international solidarity, and 
well-devised public marketing campaigns to proceed. These observations flow directly from 
the European experience and role model created by the EMU in Europe.  
An Asian Monetary Union (AMU) is a long-term commitment requiring cooperation 
among countries that share difficult and painful histories. However, in this regard, potential 
members of an AMU are not very different from those of European countries. The difficult 
history of European nations was addressed through appropriate education and diligent 
arguments supporting integration initiatives. In this way, it became possible to overcome 
historically developed animosities.  
Another conclusion is that designing and implementing a monetary union in Asia 
would require fulltime engagement of all stakeholders. Formation of a monetary union in 
Asia may not be feasible today due reasons presented earlier. However, empirical tests 
suggest that after a century (1900-2000) of independent economic growth, Asian countries 
witness real convergence of business cycles. This, in turn, creates a very different situation 
for a discussion on the feasibility of regional monetary integration. Impediments that 
previously existed seem to diminish, or even transform into supporting factors.  
Economic stability of Asian countries would increase greatly due to monetary 
integration and an exchange rate regime based on a common basket with a hard peg and later 
on the creation of a new common currency. Policy formation in small steps and the testing of 
alternative seem to be a most probable scenario. Careful and well-informed political 
decisions have a potential to save Asian countries from potential threats to their stability on 
their path toward a full monetary union.  
Due to the very nature of Asian economies, exchange rate stability remains the central 
issue for the whole region. Current exchange rate regimes allow national governments to 
retain some autonomy in their respective monetary policies, but in a highly globalized world, 
this would become less and less possible. A monetary union is an alternative for achieving 
external stability, but would cost national governments the loss of ability to shape monetary 
policy. However, potential benefits may outweigh such costs. The example of the EMU 
should be used as a reference. European governments seem to do well in a situation where 
union-wide authority (the European Central Bank) manages the common currency and 
conducts monetary policy that in fact suits all of member states. In addition to expanding 
knowledge and understanding the gist of monetary integration among citizens and politicians, 
governments should invest some of their resources in developing long-term economic 
integration plans. These schedules should, in turn, include design of institutional and political 
infrastructures to facilitate further economic and monetary integration for the sake of Asian 
nations. 
Bibliography 
Cowen, D., Salgado, R., Shah, H., Teo, L., Zanello A. (2006). Financial Integration in Asia: 
Recent Developments and Next Steps [online]. IMF. Retrieved from: 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2006/wp06196.pdf [Accessed 10, June 
2017] 
Eichengreen, B., Bayoumi, T. (1996). Is Asia an Optimum Currency Area? Can It Become 
One? Regional, Global and Historical Perspectives on Asian Monetary Relations 
[online]. Berkeley, Center for International and Developmental Economics 
Research. Retrieved from: 
http://repositories.cdlib.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1033 
&context=iber/cider [Accessed 10, June 2017] 
Hefeker, C., Nabor, A. (2002). Yen or Yuan? China’s role in the Future of Asian Monetary 
Integration [online]. Hamburg, Hamburg Institute of International Economics. 
Retrieved from: 
http://www.hwwa.de/Publikationen/Discussion_Paper/2002/206.pdf 
[Accessed 10, June 2017] 
Rajan, R. (2002). Counterbalance: The Euro in Asia [online], Harvard Pacific Asia Review, 
Retrieved from: 
http://www.hcs.harvard.edu/~hapr/winter00_millenium/Euro.html [Accessed 10, 
June 2017] 
Takeuchi, F. (2006), Measuring the Costs of an Asian Currency Unit [online]. Tokyo, Japan 
Center for Economic Research. Retrieved from: 
http://www.jcer.or.jp/eng/pdf/kenho1e.pdf [Accessed 10, June 2017] 
Williamson, J. (2005). A currency basket for East Asia: Not just China [online], Institute for 
International Economics, Retrieved from: http://eldis.org/static/DOC19890.htm 
[Accessed 10, June 2017] 
Yuen, H. (2000). Is Asia an Optimum Currency Area? “Shocking Aspects of output 
fluctuations in East Asia [online].  Singapore, National University of Singapore. 
Retrieved from: http://nt2.fas.nus.edu.sg/ecs/pub/wp/previous/Hazel.pdf 
[Accessed 10, June 2017] 