Iran Sanctions Preservation Act
This bill restricts the authority of the President to waive U.S. sanctions on Iran.
Specifically, the bill repeals the President's authority to waive sanctions on the purchase of Iranian petroleum or petroleum products or license otherwise sanctionable conduct concerning such purchases.
Furthermore, the President may not remove any Iranian person (including a financial institution) from a list of persons, organizations, and entities that have U.S. sanctions levied against them without certifying to Congress that the person has not engaged in particular conduct, such as supporting terrorism or Iran's nuclear weapons program. In addition, the bill prohibits the removal of the Central Bank of Iran from this list unless there is a Senate-approved treaty between the United States and Iran that addresses Iran's nuclear proliferation, ballistic missile program, and support for terrorism.
The President must also maintain Iran's designation as a jurisdiction of money laundering concern until certifying to Congress that Iran is not engaged in illicit financial activities, nuclear proliferation activities, or ballistic missile development.
The provisions of this bill terminate on the date the Senate approves a treaty between the United States and Iran that addresses Iran's nuclear proliferation, ballistic missile program, and support for terrorism.
To impose strict conditions on the lifting of sanctions imposed with 
                respect to the Islamic Republic of Iran.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Iran Sanctions Preservation Act''.

SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

    Congress makes the following findings:
            (1) The Islamic Republic of Iran is the world's leading 
        state sponsor of terrorism and has been designated as a state 
        sponsor of terrorism by the United States since 1984.
            (2) Iran's support for terrorism, development of nuclear 
        weapons and ballistic missiles, and gross violations of human 
        rights are a threat to the security interests of the United 
        States and the rules-based international order.
            (3) Iran has given ballistic missiles, conventional 
        weapons, and technical support to Hamas, the Palestinian 
        Islamic Jihad, the Taliban, Ansar Allah (commonly referred to 
        as the ``Houthis'') in Yemen, Shia militias in Iraq, the Assad 
        regime in Syria, and Hezbollah in Lebanon, which those proxies 
        have used to implement terrorist attacks throughout the world 
        that have killed citizens of the United States and its allies.
            (4) Iran continues to hold United States citizens hostage, 
        including Bob Levinson, Baquer and Siamak Namazi, Morad Tahbaz, 
        and Emad Shargi, while also serving as a safe harbor for senior 
        leaders of al Qaeda such as Abd al-Rahman al-Maghribi.
            (5) The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (commonly 
        referred to as the ``JCPOA''), which was finalized by President 
        Barack Obama and the respective governments of the United 
        Kingdom, Germany, France, the People's Republic of China, and 
        the Russian Federation (commonly referred to as the ``P5+1'') 
        on July 14, 2015, permitted Iran to continue uranium enrichment 
        at 3.67 percent levels and possess more 6,000 IR-1 centrifuges, 
        thereby failing to eliminate Iran's pathway to a nuclear 
        weapon.
            (6) The JCPOA contained sunset provisions that allow Iran 
        to increase its number of IR-1 centrifuges and resume operation 
        of IR-2 centrifuges after 10 years, and exceed the 3.67 percent 
        uranium enrichment threshold after 15 years.
            (7) The verification and compliance mechanisms of the JCPOA 
        were insufficient to ensure and enforce compliance, allowing 
        the International Atomic Energy Agency only limited access to 
        select facilities and establishing a protracted process to 
        request access to sites suspected of hosting activity 
        inconsistent with Iran's obligations under the JCPOA.
            (8) Iran repeatedly violated numerous provisions of the 
        JCPOA by maintaining more advanced centrifuges than was 
        permitted, exceeding the limits on heavy water stocks, and 
        refusing to grant international inspectors access to nuclear 
        research and military facilities, among other violations.
            (9) A central strategic flaw of the JCPOA was its exclusive 
        focus on Iran's nuclear program apart from its support for 
        terrorism, which was bolstered by the more than 
        $100,000,000,000 in sanctions relief it received under the 
        deal.
            (10) The JCPOA contained no provisions addressing Iran's 
        development of ballistic and cruise missiles capable of 
        carrying nuclear weapons.
            (11) The JCPOA failed to address the human rights record of 
        the Iranian regime, including the regime's suppression of free 
        speech, a free press, peaceful assembly, and the free exercise 
        of religion.
            (12) Iran is one of the world's worst human rights 
        violators, having received a 16 out of 100 ``Global Freedom 
        Score'' and a 15 out of 100 ``Internet Freedom Score'' from 
        Freedom House, and has been designated as a country of 
        particular concern for religious freedom under section 
        402(b)(1)(A)(ii) of the International Religious Freedom Act of 
        1998 (22 U.S.C. 6442(b)(1)(A)(ii)) for its suppression of 
        religious freedom since 1999.
            (13) On May 8, 2018, President Donald Trump announced that 
        the United States would withdraw from the JCPOA and resumed the 
        application of sanctions against Iranian actors, thereby 
        depriving the regime of revenue to support terrorism.
            (14) On May 21, 2018, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo 
        announced that the Trump administration would ``apply 
        unprecedented financial pressure on the Iranian regime'' and 
        laid out 12 steps that Iran must take to receive sanctions 
        relief and reestablish normal relations with the United States, 
        including--
                    (A) providing the International Atomic Energy 
                Agency a full account of the prior military dimensions 
                of its nuclear program and permanently and verifiably 
                abandoning such work in perpetuity;
                    (B) stopping enrichment of plutonium reprocessing 
                and committing to refrain from resuming such work;
                    (C) permitting the International Atomic Energy 
                Agency to access all sites throughout the entire 
                country;
                    (D) ending its proliferation of ballistic missiles 
                and ceasing further development of such systems;
                    (E) releasing all United States citizens, as well 
                as citizens of United States partners and allies, who 
                are currently detained;
                    (F) discontinuing its support for terrorist groups 
                in the Middle East, including Hezbollah, Hamas, and the 
                Palestinian Islamic Jihad;
                    (G) respecting the sovereignty of Iraq by ending 
                its support for Shia militias;
                    (H) ending its military support for the Ansar Allah 
                in Yemen;
                    (I) withdrawing all forces under Iranian command 
                from the entirety of Syria;
                    (J) ending support for the Taliban in Afghanistan 
                and for senior al Qaeda leaders around the region;
                    (K) ending the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corp's 
                support for terrorist groups and proxies worldwide; and
                    (L) ceasing its threatening behavior against its 
                neighbors, many of which are allies of the United 
                States.
            (15) The financial sector of Iran, including the Central 
        Bank of Iran, is designated as a primary money laundering 
        concern under section 5318A of title 31, United States Code, 
        because of the threat to government and financial institutions 
        resulting from the illicit activities of the Government of 
        Iran, including its pursuit of nuclear weapons, support for 
        international terrorism, and efforts to deceive responsible 
        financial institutions and evade sanctions.
            (16) On April 22, 2019, President Trump announced that the 
        United States would no longer issue exemptions under section 
        1245(d)(4)(D) of the National Defense Authorization Act for 
        Fiscal Year 2012 (22 U.S.C. 8513a(d)(4)(D)), inhibiting the 
        ability of countries to purchase Iranian petroleum products or 
        conduct transactions with the Central Bank of Iran as a result 
        of the exposure to sanctions.
            (17) Following the decision to discontinue issuance of 
        those exemptions, Iran's average daily sales of crude oil 
        declined from an estimated 2,400,000 barrels per day in May 
        2018 to an estimated 1,300,000 in 2020.
            (18) The decline in revenue and decrease in exports have 
        reportedly forced the Iranian energy sector to cut the number 
        of newly drilled oil wells from 300 in 2018 to 11 in 2020.
            (19) Iran has reportedly stockpiled 60,000,000 barrels of 
        crude oil and is preparing to return to production levels of 
        nearly 4,000,000 barrels a day should sanctions relief be 
        provided.
            (20) On December 31, 2019, Iranian President Hassan Rouhani 
        admitted that Iran had lost $200,000,000,000 in revenue because 
        of United States sanctions.
            (21) Iran's 2019 defense budget cut defense spending by 28 
        percent, including a 17 percent cut to the Iranian Islamic 
        Revolutionary Guard Corps, a designated foreign terrorist 
        organization.
            (22) Following United States withdrawal from the JCPOA, the 
        value of Iran's currency reached historical lows, with the rial 
        losing around 70 percent of its value.
            (23) According to the International Monetary Fund, Iran's 
        accessible foreign exchange reserves decreased by more 96 
        percent to $4,000,000,000 in 2020 from $123,000,000,000 in 
        2018, depleting the revenue stream for the Islamic 
        Revolutionary Guard Corps, Hezbollah, and Iranian-backed 
        militias.
            (24) During the maximum pressure campaign, the United 
        States was able to secure the release of 2 hostages in Iran, 
        Xiyue Wang and Michael White, without lifting sanctions or 
        transferring cash to Iran.
            (25) President Joe Biden has reportedly offered to lift 
        sanctions, including sanctions on the Central Bank of Iran, if 
        the Government of Iran agrees to return to the JCPOA.

SEC. 3. SENSE OF CONGRESS.

    It is the sense of Congress that the United States should not offer 
preemptive sanctions relief that benefits Iran's oil industry, 
financial services sector, or supporters of terrorism unless and until 
the Senate provides advice and consent under section 2 of article II of 
the Constitution of the United States to a treaty addressing Iran's 
destabilizing activities.

SEC. 4. PROHIBITION ON SANCTIONS RELIEF FOR PETROLEUM PURCHASES FROM 
              IRAN.

    Section 1245(d) of the National Defense Authorization Act for 
Fiscal Year 2012 (22 U.S.C. 8513a(d)) is amended by striking paragraphs 
(4) and (5) and inserting the following:
            ``(4) No authority to waive.--On and after the date of the 
        enactment of the Iran Sanctions Preservation Act, the President 
        may not issue any waiver of sanctions with respect to or 
        license to authorize the purchase of petroleum or petroleum 
        products from Iran.''.

SEC. 5. CONDITIONS ON SANCTIONS RELIEF FOR SUPPORTERS OF IRAN'S MALIGN 
              ACTIVITIES.

    (a) In General.--An Iranian person may not be removed from the SDN 
list unless the President submits to the appropriate congressional 
committees a certification that the individual has not provided 
financial, material, or technical support or contributions to--
            (1) a terrorist organization or in support of terrorism; or
            (2) the development of nuclear weapons or their means of 
        delivery (including missiles capable of delivering such 
        weapons) by the Government of Iran.
    (b) Form of Certification.--A certification under subsection (a) 
shall be submitted in unclassified form but may include a classified 
annex.

SEC. 6. CONDITIONS ON SANCTIONS RELIEF FOR IRANIAN FINANCIAL 
              INSTITUTIONS.

    (a) Central Bank of Iran.--The Central Bank of Iran may not be 
removed from the SDN list until the termination date described in 
section 8.
    (b) Iranian Financial Institutions.--An Iranian financial 
institution may not be removed from the SDN list unless the President 
submits to the appropriate congressional committees a certification 
that the Iranian financial institution has not facilitated a 
transaction or provided material support to--
            (1) the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps;
            (2) any foreign terrorist organization; or
            (3) any Iranian person the property or interests in 
        property of which are blocked pursuant to the International 
        Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.).
    (c) Jurisdictions of Primary Money Laundering Concern.--The 
designation of Iran as a jurisdiction of primary money laundering 
concern pursuant to section 5318A of title 31, United States Code, may 
not be revoked unless the President submits to the appropriate 
congressional committees a certification that Iran is no longer engaged 
in--
            (1) any illicit financial activities, including support for 
        terrorism;
            (2) nuclear proliferation activities; or
            (3) ballistic missile acquisition or development.
    (d) Form of Certification.--A certification under subsection (b) or 
(c) shall be submitted in unclassified form but may include a 
classified annex.

SEC. 7. SUPPORT FOR THE IRANIAN PEOPLE.

    It shall be the policy of the United States--
            (1) to support the rights of the people of Iran to exercise 
        the freedom of speech, assembly, religion, and the press;
            (2) to condemn Iran's destabilizing activities, including 
        the suppression of protests and demonstrations in Iran;
            (3) to promote a free and open internet in Iran by 
        supporting internet freedom programs and investing in firewall 
        circumvention technologies;
            (4) to defend the rights of women in Iran; and
            (5) to hold leaders in Iran accountable for their 
        contributions to human rights crises throughout the world, 
        including in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Yemen, Gaza, and Venezuela.

SEC. 8. TERMINATION.

    The provisions of and amendments made by this Act shall terminate 
on the date on which the Senate provides advice and consent under 
section 2 of article II of the Constitution of the United States to a 
treaty with Iran that addresses Iran's nuclear proliferation, 
development of ballistic missiles, and support for terrorism.

SEC. 9. DEFINITIONS.

    In this Act:
            (1) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term 
        ``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
                    (A) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the 
                Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the 
                Senate; and
                    (B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the 
                Committee on Financial Services of the House of 
                Representatives.
            (2) Foreign terrorist organization.--The term ``foreign 
        terrorist organization'' means an organization designated by 
        the Secretary of State as a foreign terrorist organization 
        under section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 
        U.S.C. 1189).
            (3) Iranian financial institution.--The term ``Iranian 
        financial institution'' has the meaning given that term in 
        section 104A(d) of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, 
        Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (22 U.S.C. 
        8513b(d)).
            (4) Iranian person.--The term ``Iranian person'' has the 
        meaning given that term in section 1242 of the Iran Freedom and 
        Counter-Proliferation Act of 2012 (22 U.S.C. 8801).
            (5) SDN list.--The term ``SDN list'' means the list of 
        specially designated nationals and blocked persons maintained 
        by the Office of Foreign Assets Control of the Department of 
        the Treasury.
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Iran Sanctions Preservation Act
A bill to impose strict conditions on the lifting of sanctions imposed with respect to the Islamic Republic of Iran.
Iran Sanctions Preservation Act
Sen. Lankford, James