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Afghanistan, Landmine Monitor Report 2007
LM Report 2007
Report Key Developments Major Findings Maps Translations Print
State Party since
Treaty implementing legislation
Last Article 7 report submitted on
Article 4 (stockpile destruction)
Deadline: 1 March 2007
Completed: expected by November 2007
Article 3 (mines retained)
Initially: 1,076
At end-2006: 3,306
APMs, AVMs, IEDs, CBUs, other UXO, AXO
Estimated area of contamination
Article 5 (clearance of mined areas)
Likelihood of meeting deadline
Demining progress in 2006
Mined area clearance: 25.93 km2 (2005: 39.72 km2)
Battle area clearance: 107.7 km2 (2005: 99.5 km2)
Area cancellation/reduction: 33.5 km2 (2005: 16.3 km2)
MRE capacity
Mine/ERW casualties in 2006
Total: 796 (2005: 966)
Mines: 285 (2005: 405)
Cluster submunitions: 22 (2005: 26)
Other ERW: 424 (2005: 435 )
Other device types: 44 (2005: 45)
Unknown devices: 21 (2005: 55)
Casualty analysis
Killed: 98 (32 civilians, 58 children, 8 military)
(2005: 150)
Injured: 698 (243 civilians, 411 children, 3 deminers, 41 military) (2005: 816)
Estimated mine/ERW survivors
52,000 to 60,000
Availability of services in 2006
Emergency medical care: increased but inadequate
Other services: unchanged-inadequate
Laws and public policy: increased but inadequate
Progress towards survivor assistance aims
Moderate (VA24)
Mine action funding in 2006
International: $87,534,418/€69,676,366
(2005: $66,800,000)
(Afghanistan received 56% of UN Portfolio appeal)
National: none
Key developments since May 2006
Afghanistan was unable to meet its 1 March 2007 deadline for stockpile destruction. It expects to finish by November 2007. From 2004 to April 2007 a total of 486,226 stockpiled antipersonnel mines were destroyed, including 463,807 in 2006. Taliban and other opposition forces have reportedly used antipersonnel mines. Funding shortfalls in mid-2006 forced the lay-off of deminers, and less contaminated land was cleared. To increase productivity UNMACA introduced a new methodology. Casualties continued to decrease in 2006. The first national victim assistance workshop was held in August 2006, leading to new disability initiatives.
The Islamic Republic of Afghanistan acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty on 11 September 2002 and the treaty entered into force on 1 March 2003. Afghanistan has not adopted new national implementation legislation, including penal sanctions, for the Mine Ban Treaty.[1]
Afghanistan submitted its fifth Article 7 transparency report on 30 April 2007, covering calendar year 2006.[2]
Afghanistan served as co-chair of the Standing Committee on Victim Assistance and Socio-Economic Reintegration from December 2005 to September 2006. Afghanistan actively participated in the Seventh Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty in September 2006 in Geneva, as well as the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in May 2006 and April 2007, making statements at each on stockpile destruction, mine clearance and victim assistance.
Afghanistan has not yet made known its views on matters of interpretation and implementation related to Articles 1, 2 and 3, and in particular issues related to joint military operations with states not party to the treaty, foreign stockpiling and transit of antipersonnel mines, antivehicle mines with sensitive fuzes or antihandling devices, and the permissible number of mines retained for training.
In January 2007 following an announcement by Pakistan that it intended to mine its border with Afghanistan to stop cross-border terrorist activity, the Afghan Minister of Foreign Affairs sent an official letter to the Secretary-General of the United Nations strongly opposing the action. The letter stated that mines cannot deter terrorists, that Afghanistan cannot afford more antipersonnel mines which will likely target civilians, and called upon all states not party to the Mine Ban Treaty to join and to stop use and production of antipersonnel mines.[3]
Production, Transfer and Use
Afghanistan is not known to have produced or exported antipersonnel mines. Large numbers of mines from numerous sources were sent to various fighting forces in Afghanistan throughout many years of armed conflict. There have been no confirmed reports of outside supply of antipersonnel mines to government or opposition forces in recent years.[4]
Non-State Armed Groups
Since mid-2006 armed conflict has increased in scope and intensity, particularly in the south and east of Afghanistan. New use of antipersonnel mines by the Taliban and others has been reported.
On 26 May 2007 five children were killed by a mine the police claimed was freshly laid by the Taliban.[5] In March 2007 the Taliban commander for Helmand stated that his forces had laid landmines in anticipation of a NATO offensive.[6] In February 2007 residents of Musa Qala stated that Taliban units were "digging trenches and laying mines" in anticipation of a NATO offensive on the town.[7] In September 2006 Canadian forces operating in the Pashmul area of the Panjawyi district of Kandahar province claimed that retreating Taliban forces left booby-traps and landmines.[8] Later that month one Canadian soldier was killed and another injured after stepping on a mine while on patrol in Pashmul.[9] In August 2006 both the Provincial Government and the Taliban confirmed that the Taliban had mined all routes to Ghazni City.[10] In some of the preceding cases it is not clear if the mines were antipersonnel or antivehicle.
There have been other reports of soldiers operating with NATO killed or injured by antipersonnel mines, though the identity of the user is uncertain.[11]
In 2006 two rival opposition factions laid antipersonnel mines against each other in Faryab province in the north. The Mine Action Program for Afghanistan identified and mapped the mined areas, preparing them for clearance.[12]
There were also reports of the use of victim-activated antivehicle mines by unknown groups.[13]
The majority of reports of explosive attacks do not involve victim-activated antipersonnel mines, although they are frequently attributed to "landmines" in media reports. Instead they involve improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and antivehicle mines which are remotely-detonated in roadside attacks.[14] In March 2007 a NATO spokesperson described a method of ambush used by the Taliban in Helmand province involving a stack of antipersonnel mines triggered by remote control.[15]
Stockpiling and Destruction
Afghanistan was unable to meet its 1 March 2007 deadline for stockpile destruction. In April 2007 it told States Parties that while it had destroyed 486,226 stockpiled antipersonnel mines, two depots of antipersonnel mines still remained in Panjsheer province, about 150 kilometers north of Kabul. The provincial authorities apparently did not make the mines available for destruction in a timely fashion. Afghanistan said on 23 April that after negotiations the provincial authorities had agreed to submit the mines, and that destruction would start within a few days and be completed in two weeks.[16] The UN Mine Action Center for Afghanistan (UNMACA) stated subsequently that timing was dependent on factors such as accessibility, transport, security and weather conditions.[17]
However, Afghanistan's 30 April 2007 Article 7 report states, "All stockpiled anti-personnel mines will be located and destroyed by end-2007."[18] The ICBL was told by UNMACA on 23 May 2007 that destruction might not be finished until the Eighth Meeting of States Parties in November 2007. Work was underway, with mines being transported from the two depots; 715 more mines had been destroyed.[19] The total number of antipersonnel mines held in the two depots has not been announced, though Afghanistan said the stockpiles weighed approximately 20 tons.[20] Knowledgeable sources told the ICBL there were about 1,000 mines (prior to the destruction of 715).
In its April statement to States Parties, Afghanistan said that it "is proud of four years of hard work resulting in the destruction of almost half a million stockpiled anti-personnel mines." It noted: "Stockpiles…littered Afghanistan. Many stockpiles were hidden by rival groups across the country—much of which was remote, mountainous and dangerous…. Despite increasing insurgency and only after lengthy negotiations, 486,226 stockpiled anti-personnel mines have been destroyed…. This breaks down to an average of 330 stockpiled anti-personnel mines destroyed every day for the last four years."[21]
In May 2006 Afghanistan's Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs told States Parties that despite many difficulties, "we can say with confidence that all known stockpiles in Afghanistan are or will be destroyed by our deadline of March 2007. However, because of various factors like the ones mentioned above, there exists the possibility that more stockpiled mines will be discovered after March 2007."[22]
In its April 2007 Article 7 report Afghanistan indicated that it destroyed 463,807 antipersonnel mines in 2006. This report also provides a corrected total for 2005 of 20,721 mines destroyed. The report gives details on types, numbers, locations and dates of destruction.[23]
The Operations Manager for the Stockpile Destruction Project provided slightly different numbers, indicating that 486,640 antipersonnel mines had been destroyed as of 31 March 2007, including 460,736 in 2006 and 1,794 in 2007. He also listed the destruction of 13,012 antivehicle mines.[24]
The Ministry of Defense started a nationwide survey of explosive remnants of war including stockpiled antipersonnel mines in December 2004. As of 31 July 2005 destruction of stockpiled mines became the responsibility of the Ministry of Defense and the UN-supported New Beginnings Program.
Mines Retained for Training and Development
Afghanistan reported that at the end of 2006 it retained 3,306 antipersonnel mines for training purposes. This included 1,581 it retained at the end of 2005, plus 1,725 additional mines "retained from different site destructions in the country."[25] The 1,725 appears to include at least 494 antivehicle mines.
The number of mines retained by Afghanistan continues to increase each year, but no clear explanation has been provided for this. Afghanistan has stated that the precise number retained is based on the needs of the training program, and that the Ministry of Defense approves the number.[26] Afghanistan simply indicates that the mines are retained for training and development purposes.[27] In the past, it has noted that the mines were used for mine dog accreditation sites.[28] Afghanistan has not reported in any detail on the intended purposes or actual uses of its retained mines, as agreed by States Parties in 2004, and has not utilized the expanded form D for reporting on retained mines, as agreed by States Parties in 2005.
Recoveries and Seizures
In January 2007 the police arrested a person in Sayad district of Kapisa province carrying two landmines.[29] Also in January, police recovered landmines among other weapons in a cache in central Baghlan province.[30] In July 2006 landmines were recovered from a cache with other weapons.[31] Also in July, Afghan National Army and coalition forces seized a cache containing antipersonnel mines and other weapons.[32] Afghanistan has not explicitly reported on captured or recovered mines, and their destruction, in its Article 7 transparency reports or during meetings of States Parties.
Landmine and ERW Problem
Although Afghanistan has the oldest, largest and most richly resourced mine action program in the world, mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW) continue to pose a formidable challenge to social and economic reconstruction, which is critical to the country's political stabilization and to the return of refugees. Contamination affects towns and commercial areas as well as villages, farmland, grazing land and roads; the heaviest contamination and greatest impact is in eastern Afghanistan around Kabul, the northeast and southeast.[33]
Many years after the 1989 withdrawal of Soviet troops, ensuing civil war and the 2001 fall of the Taliban government, security forces continue to discover huge quantities of abandoned explosive ordnance (AXO) and unexploded ordnance (UXO).[34] The US-led coalition's intervention in late 2001 added considerable UXO to the problem, including large quantities of cluster submunitions, and this was followed by further mine use by non-coalition forces.[35]
The Afghanistan Landmine Impact Survey (ALIS), completed in 2005, found 2,368 communities and more than four million people affected by mines. It identified some 715 square kilometers of hazardous areas, concentrated in 12 of Afghanistan's 32 provinces.[36] Despite the release of more than 100 square kilometers of land since then, the estimate of contamination has increased, as a result of new survey and information generated by the return of refugees to previously unoccupied land. In its statement to the Standing Committee meetings in April 2007, Afghanistan reported 723 square kilometers of suspected hazardous areas, affecting 2,387 communities and 17 percent of the population.[37] Updated estimates at the end of May 2007 put total contamination even higher―778 square kilometers.[38]
Despite increasing attacks on coalition forces using IEDs, demining operators have seen no evidence of the re-mining of cleared areas. Recent fighting creates the likelihood of some additional ERW contamination but coalition forces have not yet responded to UNMACA requests for aerial strike data.[39]
Mine Action Program
National Mine Action Authority
Afghanistan has been in the process since 2004 of creating a national mine action authority. Overall policy is set by a Mine Action Consultative Working Group, chaired by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and including representatives of other government departments, UN agencies, donors and implementing partners.[40] A Mine Action Task Force first drafted mine action legislation in November 2004. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs submitted a revised draft to the Ministry of Justice in February 2006 and resubmitted the draft later in the year with modifications proposed by the Ministry of Justice.[41] The draft law would create a national mine action authority directly under the office of the President to oversee policy, supported by a mine action center to coordinate planning, tasking, implementation, quality assurance and information management, reporting to the national authority. The law also envisages increased nationalization of management posts within the current UNMACA, and the progressive reduction of international support. Such support would be continued until the mine problem was reduced to a residual risk to be managed by a government-identified internal entity.[42]
In 2006 the Department of Mine Clearance (DMC) in the Office of Disaster Preparedness also prepared a draft law, obtained approval from the ministries of defense and interior and submitted it to the Ministry of Justice.[43] The draft provided for a Demining Commission, also under the president, located in the DMC; this draft law was later withdrawn.[44] As of the end of May 2007, the government had not adopted the law or decided on the respective mine action roles of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the DMC.
Transition to full national ownership of the program formally started in June 2005, and was expected to take two years. After progress in 2005-2006, the transition process stalled; the government expressed no view on how it wanted to proceed and no transition timetable was agreed by the government and the UN as of end-May 2007.[45]
Mine Action Center
The UN Mine Action Center for Afghanistan (UNMACA), a project executed by the UN Office for Project Services (UNOPS), oversees the Mine Action Program for Afghanistan (MAPA), pending transition to full national ownership. Since 2002 this has been coordinated by the UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS).[46]
UNMACA is responsible for managing, planning and coordinating all aspects of mine action undertaken by the MAPA. UNMACA updates strategic and operational mine action plans and policies, draws up an annual workplan and coordinates the monitoring of mine risk education. It is also responsible for maintaining the mine action database, resource mobilization, support to and coordination of implementing partners, oversight of national mine action standards, and assistance in developing an antipersonnel mine stockpile destruction strategy.[47]
In 2006 UNMACA expanded its management team by adding a Chief of Staff with a view to strengthening operations, freeing the Program Manager to attend to transition issues, and facilitating a separation of UNMACA's roles as regulator and implementing agency.[48] In 2006 UNMACA nationalized several senior staff posts, including Chief of Operations, in line with the proposed transition to national ownership. The last field-based international technical advisor (in Herat) left at the end of 2006. As of May 2007 UNMACA had 22 international staff, all based in Kabul.[49] Dr. Mohammed Haider Reza, a former Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, became Director of UNMACA in July 2007, the first national to hold this post.[50]
UNMACA has seven Area Mine Action Centers (AMACs). A decentralized data entry system is operated by the seven AMACs, which check the data provided by demining operators. UNMACA is responsible for quality control, updating of information and sending updates to the area centers, so that each one has data for all of Afghanistan. [51]
In February 2006 quality assurance, previously outsourced to the Monitoring, Evaluation and Training Agency, was moved into UNMACA, which contracted Danish Demining Group to train staff in quality assurance. Under its 1386 (2007-2008) workplan, UNMACA's 21 three-person teams provide external quality assurance of UNMACA's implementing partners and accredit all demining operators, including commercial companies.[52]
In 2006 UNMACA started a substantial revision of mine action standards to reflect a new concept of operations and expected to reissue them after consultation with stakeholders in 2007.[53]
All demining organizations were required by UNMACA to accredit themselves in 2006. UNMACA started accrediting mine detection dogs "to reassure stakeholders that dogs are a reliable method for locating mines despite a number of mine incidents in areas that had been cleared by this method."[54]
Strategic Mine Action Planning
The MAPA adopted a 10-year strategic plan in 2003, which was revised in 2005 to take account of the ALIS findings, the expectation that UNMACA would transition to a national program, and the requirement for mine clearance to support rehabilitation of national infrastructure as well as humanitarian needs. The revised strategy, The Way Ahead, set out planning assumptions (notably, improved security and continued international donor funding) and influencing factors (Afghanistan's Mine Ban Treaty obligations to destroy all stockpiled antipersonnel mines by 2007 and to clear all known mined areas by 2013; and its Millennium Development Goals to destroy all other explosive contaminants by 2015 and all other abandoned or unwanted explosive stocks by 2020).[55]
UNMACA has an internal three-year plan for 2007-2009 that is updated annually based on progress made in the previous year. The MAPA must release at least 110 square kilometers each year in order to meet the Afghanistan National Development Strategy and Mine Ban Treaty benchmarks.[56] The MAPA workplan for Afghan year 1386 (1 April 2007-31 March 2008) calls for survey and clearance of 36.8 square kilometers of mined areas and 104.4 square kilometers of ERW-contaminated areas.[57]
Integration of Mine Action with Reconstruction and Development
Mine action has been fully integrated into Afghanistan's Millennium Development Goals.[58] In late 2006 mine action was included for the first time in Afghanistan's national budget with effect from the start of the Afghan year 1386 (2007-2008).[59]
Demining
Afghanistan has the world's longest established and biggest mine action program; some 8,000 Afghans were working for organizations coordinated by UNMACA in early 2006.[60] These included seven national NGOs, many international NGOs and at least three international commercial companies. Afghan Technical Consultants, one of UNMACA's biggest implementing partners, set up a commercial company, Hemayatbrothers International Demining (HID), in May 2006 to compete for reconstruction and development work.[61]
Identification, Marking and Fencing of Affected Areas
After the first survey in 1990 by Mines Advisory Group (MAG) survey activity became an integral part of MAPA, conducted principally by Mine Clearance Planning Agency (MCPA) and HALO Trust. MCPA conducted a general survey in 2003 and since then has carried out general, technical, battle area and socioeconomic impact surveys on behalf of all of MAPA's implementing partners. HALO and Danish Demining Group (DDG) have also carried out surveys in their own areas of operation.[62]
In 2006 MCPA, DDG and HALO conducted surveys on a total of more than 24 square kilometers of mined areas and over 13 square kilometers of battlefield areas. MCPA marked and mapped 21.9 square kilometers of mined areas and 11.8 square kilometers of battlefield. HALO surveyed over 68.1 square kilometers of battlefield and over 25.5 square kilometers of suspect mined areas.[63] DDG surveyed 177,000 square meters of minefields and 1.4 million square meters of battlefield areas.[64]
The Afghanistan Landmine Impact Survey, completed in January 2005 and certified by the UN on 30 September 2005, identified 2,368 mine/UXO-impacted communities in 259 districts. It confirmed the existence of 4,514 suspected hazardous areas (SHAs), of which 281 (6 percent) were high-impact, 480 (11 percent) medium-impact and 1,607 (36 percent) low-impact.[65] As a result of the survey, the total area of SHAs in the UNMACA database fell from 850 square kilometers to 715 square kilometers. The ALIS found that mine/UXO contamination is more concentrated than previously thought. All but two (Oruzgan and Daykondi) of Afghanistan's 34 provinces are mine-affected, but three-quarters of SHAs and of recent casualties are in only 12 provinces and half the SHAs are located in just six provinces, led by Kabul. Also, 45 percent of the recent casualties recorded by the survey were in three provinces (Kabul, Parvan and Takhar).[66]
UNMACA converted the ALIS survey teams into Landmine Impact Assessment Teams and deployed them to the regional AMACs to continue community visits in order to validate findings, update the database, ensure that high-impact communities are prioritized and that priorities are revised to take account of communities newly categorized as impacted owing to recent incidents or blockages.[67]
The ALIS reported that of 4,514 SHAs in Afghanistan, only 10 were fenced and only 542 had warning signs. A total of 3,962 SHAs, or 88 percent, were not marked or fenced.[68]
Landmine/ERW Clearance
In 2006 decreased mine action funding caused job layoffs which impacted on demining activity. Demining operators cleared 133 square kilometers of land in 2006, only 6 square kilometers (4.3 percent) less than the previous year. Although the decrease was small, it was achieved by changes in demining activity: the 25.9 square kilometers of mined areas cleared was down by one-third from 2005, mainly as a result of human resources cuts among Afghan NGOs. In contrast, battle area clearance, undertaken mainly by international NGOs unaffected by manpower cuts increased by 8 percent to 107.7 square kilometers. In 2006 operators destroyed 13,228 antipersonnel mines, 500 antivehicle mines and 891,683 ERW.[69]
UNMAS warned in April 2006 that funding shortfalls threatened to cause job losses and in June UNMACA cut 1,130 jobs. The problem was partly due to many NGO deminers working on reconstruction projects completed in mid-2006.[70] Improved financial flows in the second half of 2006 meant UNMACA did not have to cut another 2,800 jobs, but it does not intend to reabsorb deminers laid off in 2006 and expected to maintain the human resources of implementing partners at about 8,000 deminers.[71]
Demining in Afghanistan in 2006[72]
Mined area
clearance (km2)
AVMs
Battle area
UXO
CBMAP
DAFA
RONCO
S3AG
EODT
UXB
Agency for Rehabilitation and Energy Conservation in Afghanistan; ATC = Afghan Technical Consultants; CBMAP = Community Based Mine Action Program; DAFA = Demining Agency for Afghanistan; DDG = Danish Demining Group; MCPA: Mine Clearance Planning Agency; MDC = Mine Detection and Dog Center; OMAR = Organization for Mine Clearance and Afghan Rehabilitation; HI = Handicap international; MT = Mine Tech International; EODT = EOD Technology; DC = DynCorps; UXB: UXB International; S3AG is the name of a commercial company
Afghan Technical Consultants (ATC) is one of the largest Afghan mine clearance organizations. During 2006 it absorbed AREA's community-based assets as the Community Based Mine Action Program. ATC worked in the eastern province of Nangarhar and aims to provide local inhabitants with the capacity to clear their own land.[73] Demining Agency for Afghanistan conducts mine and ERW clearance mainly in western and southern provinces, including Kandahar, Helmand, Zabul, Oruzgan and Nimruz.[74] DDG conducted demining as well as stockpile destruction and training UNMACA quality assurance teams.[75] HALO, the biggest mine action NGO in Afghanistan, employed almost 2,800 staff in 2006. It focused on clearance of agricultural land for the return of displaced people, and also participated in Afghanistan's weapons and ammunition disposal program.[76] Mine Detection and Dog Center employed more than 1,300 staff and 200 mine detection dogs, with five field offices in Kabul, Kandahar, Herat, Jalalabad and Mazar-e-Sharif. Its productivity declined by nearly one-fifth in 2006.[77] Handicap International, mainly engaged in mine risk education, deployed two explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) teams in western Afghanistan, focusing on Herat.[78]
As in previous years, RONCO Consulting Corporation conducted demining for coalition forces at Bagram air base, as well as commercial EOD work.[79] DynCorp International conducted humanitarian demining and EOD under contract to the US Department of State.[80] ArmorGroup opened a mine action office in Kabul in November 2006 and embarked on clearance operations in early 2007.[81]
From 1990 until the end of 2006, almost all demining NGOs experienced mine/UXO accidents in which 82 deminers were killed and 633 injured. In 2006, 33 demining staff were injured and three killed.[82] Investigations by the Monitoring Evaluation and Training Agency (META) in previous years found that 75 percent of accidents occurred during prodding. All deminers are insured in Afghanistan.[83]
Demining in 2007
In November 2006 UNMACA introduced a new operational concept, overhauling the established methodologies of its implementing partners in order to increase productivity and "do more for less," prompted by growing pressure on donor funding. UNMACA reports that initial indications point to a 30 percent increase in productivity.[84]
Afghan NGOs have converted to one-person, one-lane demining drills. Since the start of April 2007 demining teams, previously consisting of 20 to 40 deminers, have been broken down into smaller sections to give greater flexibility in tackling smaller suspected hazardous areas. All manual clearance teams have been trained to adopt a "tool box" approach to clearance, drawing on manual, mechanical assets and dogs as required.
UNMACA also introduced a cluster approach to tasking, taking on multiple tasks around a particular community while assets are deployed there. Survey, previously undertaken only by MCPA, is undertaken by all implementing partners and more emphasis was placed on area reduction. MCPA was trained to conduct clearance as well as survey.[85]
Security for deminers continued to deteriorate in 2006-2007, particularly in the south and east. A Taliban attack in April 2007 on a RONCO team traveling with armed protection in western Farah killed three deminers, three guards and a civilian passer-by.[86] Security concerns prevented deminers from operating in some areas, resulting in assets being deployed to other areas.[87]
Summary of Efforts to Comply with Article 5
Under Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty, Afghanistan must destroy all antipersonnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but no later than 1 March 2013. This obligation is recognized in The Way Ahead draft strategy, which set the target of completing clearance of all known mined areas by 2013. The government continues to affirm confidence in its ability to meet the deadline.[88] UNMAS has warned that Afghanistan's ability to meet its treaty commitments, as well as its Millennium Development Goals and other targets, would be affected by cuts in MAPA's capacity resulting from shortfalls in donor funding.[89]
Demining in Afghanistan 2001-2006[90]
Area reduced or
canceled (km2)
N/R = Not reported
In 2006 mine risk education (MRE) was provided by nine organizations, coordinated by UNMACA. In total, 1.35 million people received MRE in Afghanistan during 2006, a decrease from 2005 (1.8 million people reached by 12 implementers). [91] Some 15 percent were women (less than in 2005) and 65 percent were children (more than in 2005).[92] Boys were 36 percent of those receiving MRE in 2006. Afghanistan provided a summary of MRE activities in its 2007 Article 7 report.[93]
MRE is coordinated at field level by Area Mine Action Centers; in 2006, MRE quality assurance supported by UNICEF was integrated into the quality assurance teams of each AMAC to ensure continuous monitoring of MRE activities.[94]
The Emergency Response MRE Program sends teams to communities with an acute mine/ERW risk; they spend several days in the communities to assess risks, ensure that community members are aware of the dangers and provide safety information to minimize risk-taking behavior. Emergency response MRE is the first step in MAPA's community-based MRE strategy, which also includes community liaison networks, teacher training and community monitoring. The program focuses on communities identified in the ALIS as high and medium impact. It identifies high-profile individuals in these communities to serve as the focal point for MRE provision and to collect information on mine/ERW incidents in the community. MAPA did not provide data on the number of high and medium-impact communities receiving MRE in 2006.[95]
In low-impact communities, community monitoring is used to identify areas with new casualties.[96] In 2006-2007 some communities were under-served with MRE due to the deteriorating security situation in the west and especially in the southern and southeastern parts of the country; radio broadcasts were increased where MRE teams were unable to travel safely.[97]
The Returnee Risk Education Program targets returning Afghans at UNHCR encashment and transit areas near the borders with Iran and Pakistan. It is run in cooperation with all major MRE implementers.[98]
Civilians Attending MRE Sessions in Afghanistan in 2006[99]
AAR Japan
ARCS community volunteers
Returnee Program
AAR Japan = Association for Aid and Relief Japan; ARCS = Afghan Red Crescent Society; ATC = Afghan Technical Consultants; DAFA = Demining Agency for Afghanistan; DDG = Danish Demining Group; HI = Handicap International; ICRC = International Committee of the Red Cross; OMAR = Organization for Mine Clearance and Afghan Rehabilitation.
In 2006-2007 UNMACA worked with government bodies to plan the inclusion of MRE in national public health and safety plans. In 2006 UNICEF supported the Ministry of Public Health to integrate landmine/ERW casualty data into the national injury surveillance system. UNMACA, UNICEF and the Ministry of Education developed a curriculum to include MRE and mine action information in school textbooks. In 2006-2007 UNICEF financially and technically assisted the Ministry of Education to develop Healthy School Initiative (HSI) teacher-training manuals, incorporating MRE; HSI training was due to start September 2007. Within the Ministry of Public Health and the Ministry of Information UNMACA intended to disseminate public health and safety advice through media broadcasts and civil service information in 2007.[100]
Information on casualties, the cause of incidents and other relevant data is provided on a monthly basis by UNMACA.[101]
MRE aims to reach all vulnerable groups in the population, including internally displaced persons (IDPs), returning refugees, and persons living in the vicinity of mine/ERW impacted areas. Men and boys are targeted as the most at-risk groups, making up 90 percent of casualties. Despite being the largest group receiving MRE, the number of boy casualties continued to increase in recent years, as did the number of tampering casualties. MRE has been increasingly ERW-oriented for the last two years.[102]
UNICEF continued community-based MRE targeting especially vulnerable out-of-school and working children and youth reaching 3,800 children between ages of 14-18 in nine provinces in 2006-2007. In 2007, UNICEF supported establishing 46 Safe-Play Areas in high-impacted communities in 22 provinces.[103] Additionally, the Ministry of Education planned to revise its 1-6 and 7-12 grade textbooks to include MRE and disability awareness information and lessons by July 2007.[104] An evaluation on school-based MRE due in 2005 had not been undertaken by mid-2007.
The greatest progress in 2006 was considered to be the increased access of women to MRE, and a general reduction in casualties. Although women constitute a minority casualty group (less than five percent in 2006), they play a key role in educating their children in risk-avoidance. UNMACA reported that female trainers worked with ATC and OMAR in 2006; in the southern region due to security issues female MRE staffs can only work in refugee encashment centers.[105]
In June 2007 British forces in Helmand province started a mine/ERW awareness campaign in cooperation with the Afghan National Army. British engineers trained their Afghan counterparts in Geresh, after which the Afghan National Army organized a landmine awareness day for 250 children and their families. Due to its success, the Director of Education in Laskhargah gave permission to conduct similar activities throughout schools in Helmand province.[106] Because local authorities are cautious about links between schools and the military, the army planned to give MRE training to teachers from June 2007 onwards.[107] Two hundred troops and civilians deployed by NATO will also conduct MRE from July.[108]
UNMACA developed a country-specific Landmine Safety Program for UN staff and aid workers.[109]
Landmine/ERW Casualties
In 2006 International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) recorded 796 mine/ERW casualties (98 killed and 698 injured), an 18 percent decrease from 2005 (966 casualties)―the first marked decrease in casualties since 2002. Within the total, 194 casualties were caused by antipersonnel mines, 91 by antivehicle mines, 22 by cluster submunitions and 424 by other ERW. Forty-nine of the casualties were military personnel and three were demining casualties. At least 77 casualties were female, including 60 girls under 18 years. Despite the overall decrease, there were substantial increases in casualties in the younger age groups: there were 469 casualties among children under 18 years (59 percent) which is an increase of 15 percent from 2005; 530 casualties were aged under 21 years (66.6 percent) which is an 11 percent increase; 342 casualties were aged seven to 14 years (43 percent) which is an 15 percent increase. Most common activities at the time of the incident were tampering (204 casualties, including 128 children), tending animals (165―117 children), playing or recreation (90―88 children), traveling (100), collecting wood or food (70) and farming (42). Almost all the child-tampering casualties were boys (119 of 128), as were the child casualties tending animals (111 of 117). Only three percent of the 2006 casualties reported having received MRE before the incident occurred, and five percent of casualties knowingly engaged in risk-taking behavior out of economic necessity. Ninety percent of casualties were not aware of the contamination.[110]
ICRC data also showed that in 2006 there were new mine/ERW casualties in 30 of the 34 provinces in Afghanistan, with 14 percent (down from 21 percent) in Herat, 11 percent in Kandahar (down from 14), 10 percent in Helmand (up from three), eight percent in Zabul (up from one) and six percent in Nangarhar (down from eight). Both Zabul and Helmand experienced increased conflict in 2006. The only provinces without reported casualties in 2006 were Daykondi, Ghor, Nimruz and Nuristan. Of those injured in 2006, approximately 33 percent required an upper or lower limb amputation.[111]
UNMACA reported 784 new mine/ERW casualties (120 people killed and 664 injured), a 7.5 percent decrease from 2005 (848).[112] From 2003 to 2005 casualties remained relatively constant at around 70-100 per month, while in 2006 the average was 60 casualties per month.[113] This is "a significant decrease from 1993 (600 to 720 monthly), 1997 (300 to 360 monthly) and 2000 (150 to 300 monthly)."[114] According to UNMACA, 160 casualties were caused by antipersonnel mines, 92 by antivehicle mines, 16 by cluster submunitions and 401 by other ERW.[115] Only 11 casualties were recorded as military personnel and 36 were deminers (three killed and 33 injured). UNMACA recorded at least 79 female casualties, but the vast majority of casualties were male (705, or 90 percent). However, UNMACA was unable to provide a breakdown of clearance casualties by mine action agency.
Child casualties are usually defined as being younger than 18 years, but UNMACA was unable to provide this breakdown, which impedes comparison with other mine/ERW-affected countries. It reported that "boys" under 21 years constituted over half of the casualties (56.5 percent). In total, 64 percent of casualties (502) were aged under 21 years, with the largest group being between seven and 14 years (353); only 59 of the "child" casualties were female. This is a significant increase in child casualties from 472 in 2005 and 449 in 2004, despite a focus on boys and men in MRE activities and increasingly ERW-oriented MRE. Children, particularly boys, traditionally tend animals and collect wood and water which puts them at risk from mines/ERW. Main activities at the time of incidents were tampering (167), tending animals (142), playing/recreation (92), traveling (84), collecting wood, food or water (71) and farming (46).[116]
Handicap International (HI) collects casualty data in the southern and western parts of Afghanistan via its Community Based Mine Action Program. HI recorded 89 new mine/ERW casualties (38 killed and 51 injured) in 2006, a significant decrease from 201 in 2005. This decrease is attributed to the limitations imposed on data collection by the poor security situation in some southern and western provinces during 2006.[117]
The increase in ERW casualties which started after the US-led offensive (October 2001-March 2002) continued in 2006-2007. Until 2002 antipersonnel mines caused the majority of casualties.[118]
The majority of casualties reported in the media were foreign or Afghan military personnel and police. At least 29 US soldiers were killed in mine/IED incidents (including two killed by antivehicle mines).[119] Other foreign military casualties included personnel from Canada, France, Netherlands, UK and US. Foreign civilians from India, Russia and Turkey were also injured. During 2006 and early 2007 IED incidents increased rapidly; most IEDs appeared to be remote-detonated and targeted at international forces, Afghan police, military and officials, but also international aid organizations. UNMACA and ICRC do not record information on foreign casualties, and do not collect information on IED incidents as these are considered to be a security issue.[120]
Mine casualties continued to be recorded in 2007. UNMACA recorded 141 new mine/ERW casualties to May 2007, but was only able to provide details on 36 casualties (three killed and 33 injured). At least 23 of the casualties were female and six were deminers, but no further details on the casualties or device types were provided.[121]
In January 2007 the ICRC database was merged with the UNMACA database, after which ICRC ceased to provide casualty updates.[122]
The collection of comprehensive mine/ERW casualty data in Afghanistan remains problematic, due in part to communication constraints and the time needed to centralize information. Although the ICRC completed the hand-over of its casualty database to UNMACA at the end of 2006, its community-based data gathering mechanism carried out in cooperation with the Afghan Red Crescent Society in 490 health centers continued to exist.[123] The discrepancies of previous years between ICRC and UNMACA data continued for 2006 data (as provided in April-May 2007, indicating that integration and verification of the two datasets is not complete).
The UNMACA database is continually updated as information on recent casualties and information on casualties from prior periods becomes available. Usually there is a one-month gap between data collection and the final entry in the database, as casualty data received is reportedly sent back to the Area Mine Action Centers for verification and is then crosschecked at UNMACA in Kabul. The UNMACA database does not include casualties recorded by the Italian NGO Emergency's three surgical/health units nor by the Coalition Hospital, and it appears that not all HI-recorded casualties are included. Until the end of 2006, ICRC submitted its casualty data to UNMACA for inclusion in the IMSMA database but differences between the databases persisted. The ICRC database contained more records, and more detailed records, especially on ERW casualties. For example, UNMACA was only able to provide information on 205 cluster submunitions casualties between 1993 and 2006, whereas ICRC identified 556 cluster submunitions casualties during the same period. ICRC data, however, displayed inaccuracies in terminology and incident location input.[124]
Both databases provide only an indication of the trends in reported mine/ERW casualties over time. Under-reporting was significant until 1998 and the ICRC data collection network did not reach all mine/ERW-affected provinces until 2002. Changes in ICRC methodology resulted in increased recording of ERW casualties since 1998.[125] Under-reported groups include fatal casualties, kochi (nomads) and women and girls, as they are often hidden due to social stigma and have less access to healthcare and services.[126]
Casualty data are used for MRE priority setting. However, the increase in ERW casualties and UNMACA's inability to identify the number of high and medium-impacted communities receiving MRE indicates that not enough use is made of this data. Communities with an increased casualty rate are reclassified. Casualty data is used to a far lesser extent for survivor assistance programs. UNMACA data is provided upon request but not routinely shared between stakeholders, and it does not include information on assistance services provided.
Cumulative Casualties
It is not possible to determine the exact number of landmine casualties or mine survivors in Afghanistan. There could be as many as 100,000 mine/ERW survivors. Between 2001 and 2004 the ALIS identified 2,245 "recent" mine/ERW casualties (922 killed and 1,323 injured). Of the total recent casualties: 416 (19 percent) were under 15 years; 924 (41 percent) were aged between 15 and 29 years. According to the Survey Action Center, this is an extraordinarily high number of victims for a young age group (mostly boys) compared to other countries where a similar survey has been conducted.[127]
UNMACA and ICRC recorded even higher percentages of child casualties. UNMACA data between 1999 and 2006 shows that children under 21 years constitute 59 percent of casualties, 90 percent of whom are boys. Children between seven and 14 are the largest casualty group (3,130 or 34.6 percent of total casualties–9,056). ERW caused 57.6 percent of casualties among children. However, among boy casualties, more than 90 percent were due to ERW (2,775 of 3,077). Boys injured or killed due to ERW are nearly 31 percent of total casualties. Antipersonnel mines are the main cause of casualties among adults (46.3 percent).[128]
ICRC data shows that 42 percent of casualties since 1999 are aged under 18 years; and between 2001 and 2004, 2,502 of 5,461 recorded casualties (46 percent) were boys and girls younger than 18 years.[129] The number of child ERW casualties continued to increase since 1999, which would indicate that MRE is not effective or that there are other factors such as economic necessity.
As of 1 January 2007, the ICRC database contained 16,450 casualties since 1980 and the UNMACA database contained 15,999 casualties since 1988.
The National Disability Survey in Afghanistan estimated in 2006 that there were between 747,500 and 867,100 people with disabilities; more than half were in the western and central parts of the country. Approximately 17 percent were war disabled; mine/ERW survivors made up seven percent of people with disabilities (between 52,000 and 60,000 people).[130]
Survivor Assistance
Mine/ERW survivors constitute a significant proportion of all people with disabilities in Afghanistan; moreover, they are usually among the poorest in society and suffer from limited service provision. In 2006 more than 50 percent of services for people with disabilities were provided by NGOs and international organizations.[131]
Healthcare in Afghanistan has been severely affected by decades of conflict and ranks among the worst in the world. Health infrastructure is damaged and poorly maintained, lacks trained staff, resources and supplies, and is unable to meet the basic health needs of most of the population.[132] Services are provided through the Afghan hospital network and international NGOs and agencies, but there is limited coordination. First-aid is available at the district level but emergency transport is lacking; trauma care and continuing care are limited to a few hospitals in major cities and can be of poor quality and expensive. Cultural barriers mean that women may be denied care or refused treatment by male practitioners, in a country with few female practitioners.[133]
According to the ICRC, "Access to physical rehabilitation services was hindered by many obstacles," including lack of awareness and professionalism, prejudice against disability, poverty, distances, lack of security and political divisions.[134] The rehabilitation needs of mine survivors and other people with disabilities are seldom met. Whereas physical rehabilitation facilities are needed in every city in at least 30 of the 34 provinces, there are only 14 operational centers (only one of which is run by the government). Coordination is good among disability stakeholders, but interministerial coordination and ministries' technical capacity is said to be weak.[135]
There is a lack of psychosocial and economic support activities, relevant information, and coordination; unemployment among people with disabilities is very high. According to the HI disability study, 70 percent of people with disabilities do not have access to schools. ICRC and NGOs carry out projects directed at specific needs, but not long-term programs.[136]
Social stigma prohibits most people with disabilities from fully exercising their rights and minimizes their inclusion in almost all economic and social opportunities.[137]
Afghanistan has no law protecting the rights of people with disabilities, but the 2004 constitution provides some basic protection. In 2006 the National Law for the Rights and Privileges of People with Disabilities was submitted to the Ministry of Justice for approval.[138]
A 2006-2008 national disability policy was drafted in 2006, without input from organizations for people with disabilities, but then shelved.[139] However, the Ministry of Labor, Social Affairs, Martyrs and Disabled is said to remain "committed to establishing a national policy for disability and the required legislation." Additional employment policy has been drafted within the national labor strategy.[140] Two people with disabilities have a seat in the Afghan parliament. The government has the aim of mainstreaming disability through the "implementation of integrated programs and the inclusion of people with disabilities into all sectors of Afghan society."[141]
Social security benefits of 300 Afghanis per month (about $6) are paid to some 300,000 registered recipients, including mine survivors and other people disabled by the war, and the families of those killed in the war. People with less than 50 percent disability receive 150 Afghanis ($3) per month. The benefit is reported to be insufficient to maintain a basic standard of living, and the bureaucratic procedure prevents many disabled people from receiving it.[142]
Progress in Meeting VA24 Survivor Assistance Objectives
At the First Review Conference in Nairobi in November-December 2004, Afghanistan was identified as one of 24 States Parties with significant numbers of mine survivors and "the greatest responsibility to act, but also the greatest needs and expectations for assistance" in providing adequate assistance for the care, rehabilitation and reintegration of survivors.[143] At the Sixth Meeting of States Parties in November-December 2005, Afghanistan became co-chair of the Standing Committee on Victim Assistance and Socio-Economic Reintegration and aimed to "lead by example to show other affected States what can be achieved with political will and commitment from all actors in the disability sector."[144] During its time as a co-chair Afghanistan focused on interministerial coordination.
Afghanistan prepared its 2005-2009 survivor assistance objectives for inclusion in the Zagreb Progress Report and continued to refine them as a result of the first national workshop on victim assistance in Kabul in August 2006. In December 2006 and April 2007, the revised objectives, as well as plans to achieve these objectives, were presented to States Parties by a victim assistance expert. The revised objectives appear to be less ambitious and more adjusted to the Afghan context. Some objectives were not retained, such as opening rehabilitation centers in every province, or including disability in the national census. Most of the revised objectives were placed in a timeframe, mainly with a 2009 deadline; objectives such as compiling knowledge, policy-making and awareness-raising have the earliest deadlines.
Several objectives scheduled for achievement in 2006-2007 do not seem to be on track or are unachieved tasks previously assigned to other institutions, most notably the National Program for Action on Disability (NPAD). Landmine Monitor notes that there is a mix of macro and micro objectives. Coordination and gender sensitivity remain overarching principles. Clear responsibilities have been assigned to the Ministry of Public Health and the Ministry of Labor, Social Affairs, Martyrs and Disabled. Both ministries lack capacity; it is likely that NGOs (mostly international) will implement activities.
Afghanistan has received support from the victim assistance expert of the Mine Ban Treaty's Implementation Support Unit (ISU) and was visited several times during 2006. Afghanistan submitted the voluntary Form J with its 2007 Article 7 report, stating that "Victim assistance planning in Afghanistan focused on a new strategy that included advocacy, awareness and prevention within the broader context of the disability sector." It detailed achievements made in 2006.[145]
Afghanistan's first National Workshop on Victim Assistance was held in Kabul on 6-8 August 2006, organized by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in cooperation with UNMACA and support from the ISU. It was attended by more than 90 participants from ministries, NGOs and international organizations. The workshop's primary aim was to develop an action plan for 2006-2009, which was subsequently presented at the Seventh Meeting of States Parties in September 2006. Other objectives were to raise awareness of the rights and needs of people with disabilities, and to provide ministries with benchmarks and responsibilities. The workshop's recommendations―the Kabul Report―are reflected in the revised objectives, and appear to function as the survivor assistance action plan for Afghanistan.[146]
Survivor Assistance Strategic Framework
Afghanistan's draft mine action law recognizes victim assistance to mean "all aid, relief, comfort and support provided to victims of mines, or victims of unexploded ordnance… or to the surviving dependants of persons killed or seriously injured by mines, unexploded ordnance…, for the purpose of reducing the immediate and long-term medical and psychological implications of their trauma. Victim assistance includes rehabilitation and reintegration of victims and surviving dependants."[147]
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs officially leads the interministerial coordination committee on survivor assistance but has not been active, nor has it created a budget for survivor assistance.[148] UNMACA informed Landmine Monitor in July 2007 that "funding to support the Kabul Report objectives has now been sourced which will increase achievements in this area;" no details of the sources or budget were given.[149] The Deputy Foreign Minister stated that a "victim assistance plan of action should be fully integrated into long term public health and development strategies, taking into account elements of already developed plans…[to] benefit all persons with disabilities in Afghanistan and provide the relevant ministries with a clear picture of the benchmarks, their responsibilities, and the way forward." Within this framework, the government is creating inclusive policies and programs that ensure the rights and dignity of all people with disabilities to ensure "that the issue of disability is situated within the framework of national development and human rights," rather than the unsustainable charitable approach applied thus far.[150]
However, it is acknowledged that several ministries lack the capacity to deal with disability issues; there is a need to build national capacities; a lack of resources prevents qualified individuals from focusing on disability issues within the relevant ministries.[151]
The Kabul Report identifies the Ministry of Labor, Social Affairs, Martyrs and Disabled (MoLSAMD), as the coordinating agency for the monitoring and implementation of survivor assistance activities. The other key implementing ministry is the Ministry of Public Health (MoPH); other ministries are involved when relevant. National and international NGOs and agencies continue to implement most assistance activities. However, through capacity-building, it is expected that relevant ministries will gradually take over responsibilities. In 2005-2006, a Disability Task Force (DTF) and an NGO Coordination Unit (NCU) were established. The DTF, headed by the MoPH, was formed to assist the government with the integration of disability services and to better coordinate disability services and activities. In 2006 it developed disability guidelines for inclusion into health services, a one-year orthotic/prosthetic upgrade course and a physiotherapy course. Additionally the MoPH established a disability unit and supported a mental health unit.[152] The NCU within the MoLSAMD meets monthly to discuss disability issues and coordination of NGO activities within the sector, however as of June 2007 was on the verge of collapse. A new, more structural unit, the Disability Support Unit (DSU) will be created in which a coordinator will work directly on the implementation of the Kabul report with the deputy MoLSAMD minister; it was expected to be operational in August 2007.[153] A network of disability resource centers to educate, provide social services and support disabled people's organizations under MoLSAMD is being constructed. The Ministry of Education established an inclusive education unit, and a pilot project was scheduled to start in April 2007 field-testing materials and assessing needs.[154] Some of the disability focal points under other ministries have been established, but it is unclear what their activities have been so far.
In 2006, the informal community-based rehabilitation network was established within the MoPH but not under direct supervision of the ministry. The network intends to strengthen the coordination, exchange expertise and include disability awareness in all its activities.[155]
UNMACA provides technical support to the government on victim assistance issues. The main priority of UNMACA is to engage the new ministries and create national ownership of victim assistance activities by building capacity at the ministerial level, stimulating inclusion of relevant actors in decision-making processes and raising awareness of disability.[156]
The National Programme for Action on Disability works mainly on capacity-building within ministries and awareness-raising. However in December 2006 NPAD staff levels were reduced by 80 percent and activities decreased accordingly. The program's manager left in May 2007 and an evaluation of the program is awaited to redefine goals and strategy.[157]
As of June 2007 the creation of task forces and coordination initiatives had led to increased policy and material development. NGOs and disabled people's organizations appear to be increasingly involved in all stages of policy development. But concrete improvements are not visible yet in the field. The assistance structure is increasingly complicated, coordination remains weak, activities are duplicated, and there remained a lack of long-term planning at the government level; there was limited capacity in disabled people's organizations.[158]
Governmental Service Provision
The Ministry of Health provides free services through the Basic Package of Health Services (BPHS); the objective was that the service would cover 82 percent of the population by the end of 2006 (an increase from 77 in 2005).[159] It is unknown if this objective was achieved, but many people in the poorest regions of Afghanistan are not covered. The BPHS has included disability guidelines as developed by the DTF in all its services faster than planned, but training and implementation have not started.[160] The Essential Package of Hospital Services (EPHS), the national plan for provision of secondary healthcare, was developed by the Hospital Management Task Force, adopted in 2005 and started in 2006. The first phase, human resources reform, was completed in 10 provincial hospitals by 2007. The disability guidelines will also be included in the EPHS.[161] The National Health Policy 2005-2009 prioritized disability issues in the BPHS to make it a fourth pillar, including disability awareness and prevention, physiotherapy and orthotics/prosthetics.[162]
Nongovernmental Service Provision
At least 150,944 people with disabilities in Afghanistan received services during 2006, including 18,937 mine/ERW survivors: 1,230 survivors received medical care, 16,546 physical rehabilitation, 561 socioeconomic reintegration and 600 capacity-building and awareness assistance. Within this total, the ICRC provided medical care to 1,744 war-injured (249 survivors) physical rehabilitation to 58,566 people with disabilities (16,506 survivors) and social reintegration activities to 2,130 people with disabilities; 65 orthotic/prosthetic technicians received training.[163] Emergency provided medical care to 981 mine/ERW casualties and orthoses to 45 people with disabilities.[164] The Swedish Committee for Afghanistan (SCA) and Sandy Gall's Afghanistan Appeal provided assistance to 64,393 people with disabilities, including physiotherapy for 44,572 people, mobility devices for 12,074, special education for 6,282, employment opportunities for 1,058 and skills development training for 407. In addition to this, at least 119,226 people received advocacy or health training.[165] The Community Center for the Disabled assisted 1,313 people with disabilities of whom 449 undertook sports and leisure activities, 457 received 'education for life,' 287 vocational training and 120 job placement; in addition 1,597 received disability awareness training.[166] HI referred 316 people with disabilities to physical rehabilitation services: 80 to its center in Kandahar and 236 to the ICRC in Herat and the Ghazni rehabilitation center. The Kabul Orthopedic Organization provided physical rehabilitation to 1,800 people with disabilities. The Association for Aid and Relief Japan provided medical assistance to 6,886 people and prosthetics/orthotics to 93 people with disabilities (40 survivors); it also distributed 190,000 disability awareness materials.[167] The Afghan Disabled Union provided economic reintegration, social and legal assistance to 900 people with disabilities (600 survivors) and referred 38 survivors to other operators for employment.[168]
The ICRC supports hospitals, clinics, and first-aid posts in Afghanistan, providing medicines, medical and surgical supplies, training, repair and renovation of facilities, as well as support to ambulance services in Kabul. In 2006 the ICRC supported 14 facilities. Despite increased conflict, roadside bombs, and military operations in the south and east of Afghanistan, the number of war-injured treated by the ICRC decreased compared to 2005. The ICRC worked together with the Afghan Red Crescent Society to provide comprehensive medical care in the south and east of the country. Programs were coordinated with similar ICRC programs in the border areas of Pakistan.[169] The ICRC also continued to be the principal provider of physical rehabilitation through six centers. The number of services delivered in 2006 was comparable to those in 2005. The ICRC also supplied raw materials to other physical rehabilitation providers and undertook field trips to inform people of available services. Emphasis was placed on improving accessibility to services in conflict areas by enhancing the referral network in cooperation with the Afghan Red Crescent Society.[170]
In 2006 the ICRC reported that international organizations and NGOs have submitted reports on the physical rehabilitation needs to persuade the government "to take on a greater role in caring for the mine-injured, especially in the south and east, where access to such services had thus far been lacking." The ICRC's social reintegration program continued to assist people with disabilities with vocational training, special education, job placement, and setting up or improving small businesses.[171]
Emergency provides immediate medical care, surgery, physical rehabilitation and psychological support, through its surgical and health facilities. The surgical hospital in Kabul has become the main trauma center for the country, as it has the only intensive care unit for civilians in Afghanistan. In April 2007 Emergency's program closed because the Director of the National Security Directorate identified it with the Taliban and al-Qaeda when it was asked by the Italian government to mediate in the release of an Italian journalist. This created security concerns and staff withdrew. The program was scheduled to reopen later in 2007 after the government guarantees the security of Emergency's staff.[172]
The Swedish Committee for Afghanistan implements the rights-based Rehabilitation of Afghans with Disabilities (RAD) Program in 32 districts of 10 provinces.[173] SCA also implements the BPHS for the government in six districts of Paktika province, and in Kunduz, Wardak and Nuristan; it inaugurated a new hospital in Kunduz in January 2007.[174] RAD expanded with community-based activities in Chagasray (Kunar) and Ghanikhil district (Nangarhar). In January 2007 Sandy Gall's Afghanistan Appeal's (SGAA) physical rehabilitation program in the eastern region was taken over by SCA/RAD. In 2006, the two organizations ran the program jointly with SGAA funding.[175]
In 2006 HI unified its Belgian and French operations and continued to provide physical rehabilitation and prostheses through its orthopedic center in Kandahar. Services were challenged by security concerns and management changes. Through the community-based mine action program, HI refers people with disabilities to rehabilitation services in the southern and western parts of the country; disability training is integrated in all community-based activities. HI continued to provide technical advice and financial support to the Community Center for the Disabled (CCD) in Kabul; in May 2007 the CCD was registered as a national NGO and a board of directors was created. HI aims to expand or duplicate the CCD to Herat in 2007.[176]
In 2007 HI started a three-year sports and leisure program for people with disabilities in Kabul in cooperation with five local NGOs and DPOs and is expanding this to Herat.[177]
The Advocacy Committee of Persons with Disabilities (ACP) within the Afghan Civil Society Forum was established in 2006, composed of 13 national and international stakeholders. It advocates for the rights of people with disabilities and lobbies the government. ACP also lobbies the government to sign and ratify UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and to accelerate approval of the national disability law.[178]
Other organizations working on survivor assistance in Afghanistan were described in last year's edition of Landmine Monitor.[179]
Funding and Assistance
In 2006 international funding of $87,534,418 (€69,676,366) for mine action in Afghanistan was reported by 18 countries and the European Commission (EC), a decrease of 31 percent from 2005 ($66,800,000 provided by 16 countries and the EC).[180] International donors in 2006 were:
Australia: A$2,665,664 ($2,008,578) consisting of A$150,000 to AUSTCARE for victim assistance, A$15,664 to UNICEF for MRE, and A$2,500,000 to UNMACA for MRE and victim assistance;[181]
Belgium: €950,000 ($1,193,485) consisting of €200,000 to HALO for mine clearance in Kunduz and Takhar provinces, and €750,000 in-kind for mine clearance experts in Kunduz, Feyzabad and Mazar-al-Sharif;[182]
Canada: C$7,500,000 ($6,613,500) to UNMAS consisting of C$500,000 for survey and clearance and C$7 million for the national mine action development budget;[183]
Czech Republic: CZK20,955,311 ($928,320) consisting of CZK5 million to HALO and technical consultants for mine clearance in Kabul and Feyzabad regions, and CZK15,955,311 for mine action by the Czech army at Kabul airport;[184]
Denmark: DKK20 million ($3,366,000) consisting of DKK5 million to UNMAS for mine clearance and DKK15 million to DDG for integrated mine action; both amounts were part of three-year grants;[185]
EC: €26 million ($32,663,800) consisting of €6 million to UNDP for stockpile destruction and €20 million to UNMAS for integrated mine action;[186]
Finland: €900,000 ($1,130,670) to UNMAS for mine clearance;[187]
France: €6,596 ($8,287) for victim assistance;[188]
Germany: €4,072,094 ($5,115,772) consisting of €72,674 in-kind for a demining expert, €585,370 to HALO for survey, manual and battle area clearance, €1,158,942 to OMAR for medical personnel, manual and mechanical clearance teams, and €2,255,109 to MDC for running costs in 2005;[189]
Ireland: €615,000 ($772,625) to HALO for mine clearance;[190]
Japan: ¥210,345,625 ($1,808,972) consisting of ¥25,459,580 for mine clearance in Parwan province, ¥87,205,000 for the mine detection dog program, and ¥97,681,045 for mine clearance and EOD in Bagram district;[191]
Netherlands: €3,549,180 ($4,458,835) consisting of €2,500,000 to UNMAS for mine clearance, and €1,049,180 to HALO for mine clearance;[192]
Norway: NOK12,830,550 ($2,001,566) consisting of NOK9,100,000 to HALO for mine clearance, NOK1,730,550 to HALO for the Weapons and Ammunition Disposal program, and NOK2 million ($312,000) to UNDP for mine clearance and EOD;[193]
Slovakia: SKK161,017,536 ($5,426,291) in-kind for a Slovak mine clearance unit;[194]
Spain: €475,000 ($596,743) in-kind to ISAF for weapons recognition and EOD personnel;[195]
Sweden: SEK15 million ($2,035,500) to DDG for unspecified mine action;[196]
Switzerland: CHF500,000 ($399,000) consisting of CHF250,000 to HI, and CHF250,000 unspecified;[197]
UK: £1,243,612 ($2,292,474) consisting of £43,612 to MAG for mine clearance and £1,200,000 to HALO for mine clearance;[198]
US: $14,714,000 consisting of $14,317,000 from the Department of State, and $397,000 from USAID/Leahy War Victims Fund.[199]
Several countries, including Lithuania, New Zealand and Poland, reported in-kind contributions for which the financial values is not known.[200]
The 2006 end-year review of the UN's Portfolio of Mine Action Projects reported that Afghanistan received 56 percent of funds ($42,463,490) requested through the appeal process in 2006, including donations from countries, UN agencies and unspecified sources.[201]
UNMAS reported that "disruptions in funding" severely affected operations in 2006. Disruptions were reportedly caused "partly from delays in some donor contributions and partly from reconstruction partners' new funding modalities, which restricted their funding of national NGO implementing partners." Although the decrease in funding in 2006 could be partly attributed to some donations being received prior to the calendar year, UNMAS linked the overall decrease to "the global trend in the reduction of mine action support." Funding shortfalls had resulted in the discharge of 1,500 staff, including almost 1,000 deminers, as of June 2007. UNMAS warned that MAPA could be "crippled" by future changes in funding priorities, and unable to meet Afghanistan's international and national mine action commitments.[202]
The 2007 Portfolio of Mine Action Projects includes six project appeals for Afghanistan with budgets totaling $92,940,593, none of which had been funded at the time of publication(November 2006).[203]
National Contribution to Mine Action
In late 2006 mine action was included for the first time in Afghanistan's national budget with effect from the start of the Afghan year 1386 (2007-2008); this provides a mechanism by which the government can contribute to mine action.[204]
[1] In April 2007 Afghanistan reported, "There is as of yet no national law prohibiting the use of mines. However, Afghanistan has stated that its constitution adopted in January 2005 requires the country to respect all international treaties it has signed. The Ministry of Defense instructed all military forces to respect the comprehensive ban on anti-personnel mines and the prohibition on use in any situation by militaries or individuals," Article 7 Report, Form A, 30 April 2007. This repeats information from previous Article 7 reports.
[2] Previous Article 7 reports were submitted on: 1 May 2006, 30 April 2005, 30 April 2004 and 1 September 2003.
[3] Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "FM letter to the Secretary-General of the United Nations," 11 January 2007.
[4] The UN said that since the collapse of the Taliban regime there has been no indication of importation of landmines by opposition forces. Email from unnamed external relations official, UN Mine Action Center for Afghanistan (UNMACA), 26 February 2006. UNMACA requested that its staff were referred to by position and not by name.
[5] "Taliban launches new countrywide operation in Afghanistan," ZeeNews (India), 27 May 2007, www.zeenews.com, accessed 2 July 2007.
[6] "We're ready, Taliban warns; Top leader says 4,000 fighters set to battle NATO offensive in north," Associated Press, 8 March 2007.
[7] Taliban rebels reinforce key captured town," Gulf Times, 12 February 2007, www.gulf-times.com, accessed 2 July 2007.
[8] "Amid the thud of artillery, soldiers stormed into a Taleban stronghold," The Times, 14 September 2006,
www.timesonline.co.uk, accessed 16 September 2006.
[9] "Canadian soldier killed by land mine in Afghanistan; Hillier acknowledges Taliban resurgence, promises to give troops whatever they need," The Globe and Mail, 30 September 2006.
[10] The type of mine (antipersonnel or antivehicle) was unspecified. "Andar district attacked, no casualties," Pajhwok Afghan News, 24 August 2006.
[11] "1 NATO soldier killed, 2 wounded in eastern Afghanistan blast," Associated Press Newswires, 16 December 2006; "2 Canadian soldiers injured by landmine in Afghanistan; 1 seriously hurt," The Canadian Press, 21 November 2006; "Eight militants killed in Afghanistan, suicide blasts wound many," Agence France-Presse, 17 August 2006.
[12] Response to Landmine Monitor Questionnaire by Senior External Relations Officer, UNMACA, 5 April 2007. This was confirmed by UNMACA's Chief of Operations in June 2007. Email from Mohammed Ershad, Landmine Monitor researcher, 20 June 2007.
[13] "Landmine recovered in Kabul," Pajhwok Afghan News, 30 November 2006; "Three anti-tank mines recovered in Nangarhar," Pajhwok Afghan News, 29 October 2006; "Civilians fall victim to landmine in Zabul," Pajhwok Afghan News, 7 October 2006; "Outlaw detained in Kunar," Pajhwok Afghan News, 27 September 2006; "2 U.S. troops killed in mine explosion in eastern Afghanistan," Kyodo News, 6 June 2006.
[14] These explosive devices have killed and injured international and national troops, government officials, national and international aid workers, including mine action personnel, and other civilians. Antivehicle devices are often made from shells, rockets, mines and other munitions, and are transported to the site by bicycle or donkey, placed and detonated from a distance once a target comes into sight.
[15] "Taliban, NATO both declaring early victories; Canadian troops with Operation Achilles successfully move into Maiwand area," The Globe and Mail, 12 March 2007.
[16] Khaled Zekriya, Assistant Minister, Fifth Political Division (Head of Mine Action), Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Update on Stockpile Destruction," Standing Committee on Stockpile Destruction, Geneva, 23 April 2007.
[17] Email from Chief of Operations, UNMACA, to Tamar Gabelnick, ICBL Treaty Implementation Director, 23 May 2007.
[18] Article 7 Report, Form A, 30 April 2007.
[19] Email from Chief of Operations, UNMACA, to Tamar Gabelnick, ICBL, 23 May 2007.
[20] Article 7 Report, Form B, 30 April 2007.
[21] Khaled Zekriya, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Update on Stockpile Destruction," Standing Committee on Stockpile Destruction, Geneva, 23 April 2007.
[22] Statement by Mahmoud Saikal, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Standing Committee on Stockpile Destruction, Geneva, 11 May 2006. He said that "locating and destroying the stockpiles of anti-personnel mines that have accumulated throughout the country over the past two decades is a major challenge. In some ways, the stockpiles are even more difficult to locate than the mines in the ground. We cannot rely on metal detectors or mine sniffing dogs. Instead we have to convince local commanders and villagers to voluntarily give up their stockpiled caches of weapons and or disclose their locations."
[23] Article 7 Report, Forms F and G, 30 April 2007. Some of the mines listed are antivehicle mines, some are booby-traps, some are Claymore-type mines, and others are unknown to Landmine Monitor.
[24] Email from Anton Ivanov, Operation Manager for Stockpile Destruction Project, Afghan New Beginnings Program, 21 May 2007.
[25] Article 7 Report, Form D, 30 April 2007. Last year Afghanistan reported that at the end of 2005, it retained 1,887 antipersonnel mines, not 1,581. This included the 1,076 mines it retained at the end of 2004, plus 505 additional mines retained from a stockpile destruction event in November 2005, and 306 mines handed over from the Monitoring Evaluation and Training Agency (META) after its training program ceased. It appears the META mines are no longer counted. Article 7 Report, Form D, 1 May 2006.
[26] Article 7 Report, Form D, 1 May 2006.
[27] Article 7 Report, Form D, 30 April 2007. UNMACA can disburse mines "to select MAPA implement [sic] partners for training purposes," but the mines remain under the control of UNMACA. Article 7 Report, Form D, 1 May 2006.
[29] "Police arrest man carrying landmines," BBC Monitoring South Asia, 24 January 2007.
[30] "Weapons cache recovered in Baghlan," Pajhwok Afghan News, 6 January 2007.
[31] "Weapon caches recovered in three provinces," Pajhwok Afghan News, 28 July 2006.
[32] "One Coalition Solider Killed, 11 Injured In Afghan Fighting," US Federal News, 18 July 2006.
[33] Survey Action Center (SAC), "Afghan Landmine Impact Survey," 2005, p. 10; "Mine Action Program for Afghanistan (MAPA) National Operational Work Plan 1385 (1 April 2006 to 31 March 2007)," Kabul, 1 April 2006.
[34] See Landmine Monitor Report 2006, p. 96. The biggest discovery to date was reported in March 2006: bunkers containing 80 tons of TNT and 15,000 antipersonnel and antivehicle landmines, detonators and other munitions. US Department of State, "Bouquet of Flowers Leads to largest Cache of Abandoned Munitions in Afghanistan," Press Release, 20 March 2006, www.state.gov, accessed 24 June 2007.
[35] See Landmine Monitor Report 2005, p. 88.
[36] Patrick Fruchet and Mike Kendellen, "Landmine Impact Survey Afghanistan: results and implications for planning," Journal of Mine Action, Issue 9.2, February 2006.
[37] Statement by Afghanistan, Standing Committee on Mine Clearance, Mine Risk Education and Mine Action Technologies, Geneva, 26 April 2007.
[38] Interview with Head of Mine Information Service, UNMACA, Kabul, 28 May 2007.
[39] Interview with Chief of Staff, UNMACA, Kabul, 27 May 2007.
[41] Interview with Khaled Zekriya, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Kabul, 28 May 2007.
[42] Email from Senior External Relations Officer, UNMACA, 5 April 2007.
[43] Interviews with Abdul Haq, Head of Department for Mine Clearance, Department for Disaster Preparedness, Kabul, 28 March and 30 May 2007.
[44] Email from Crispin Stephen, UNMAS, 26 July 2007.
[45] Interview with Program Manager, UNMACA, Kabul, 27 May 2007; see Landmine Monitor Report 2006, p. 96.
[48] Email from unnamed program support official, UNMAS, New York, 4 July 2006.
[49] Interview with Program Manager, UNMACA, Kabul, 27 May 2007.
[50] "Afghan appointed director of UN Mine Action Center," UNMAS, 8 July 2007, www.mineaction.org, accessed 20 July 2007.
[52] Interview with Chief of Staff, UNMACA, Kabul, 27 May 2007; MAPA, "Integrated Work Plan for 1386," Kabul, undated but February 2007, pp. 8, 13; see Landmine Monitor Report 2006, p. 97.
[53] UNMACA, "The Way Ahead," draft, April 2006; interview with Chief of Staff, UNMACA, Kabul, 27 May 2007; see Landmine Monitor Report 2006, p. 97.1
[54] UNMAS, "Annual Report 2006," p. 33.
[55] UNMACA, "The Way Ahead," draft, April 2006, pp.2-3; see Landmine Monitor Report 2004, p. 75.
[56] For details of the three-year plan, see Landmine Monitor Report 2006, pp. 98-99.
[57] MAPA, "Integrated Work Plan 1386," Kabul, undated but February 2007, p. 6.
[58] Presentation by Dr. Mohammed Haider Reza, Eighth International Meeting of National Mine Action Directors and UN Advisors, UNMAS, Geneva, 19-21 September 2005. Mine action is also included in the UN Development Assistance Framework for Afghanistan for 2006-2008 as an activity that improves the welfare of Afghans and leads to more development. Email from unnamed external relations official, UNMACA, 26 February 2006.
[59] Interview with Senior External Relations Officer, UNMACA, Kabul, 25 May 2007.
[60] UN, "Country Profile: Afghanistan," www.mineaction.org; email from unnamed program officer, UNMAS, 20 July 2006; interview with External Relations Officer, UNMACA, 15 April 2007.
[61] Interview with Kefayatullah Eblagh, Director, Afghan Technical Consultants, Kabul, 31 May 2007.
[63] Email from HALO, 24 July 2007.
[65] SAC, "Afghan Landmine Impact Survey," 2005, p. 19.
[66] SAC, "Afghan Landmine Impact Survey," 2005, pp. 8-9, 19-26; email from unnamed program officer, UNMAS, 20 July 2006. Kabul accounted for 313 affected communities (13 percent of affected communities), 155 SHAs (3 percent) and 420 recent victims (19 percent).
[67] Mike Kendellen, "Landmine Impact Survey of Afghanistan; results and implications," Journal of Mine Action, Issue 9.2, February 2006.
[68] SAC, "Afghan Landmine Impact Survey," 2005, pp. 48–49.
[69] Email from Senior External Relations Officer, UNMACA, 5 April 2007; UNMACA, "Monthly Progress Report," issued in December 2006; interview with Chief of Staff, UNMACA, Kabul, 27 May 2007.
[70] See Landmine Monitor Report 2006, p. 104.
[71] Interview with Senior External Relations Officer, UNMACA, Kabul, 25 May 2007; interview with Chief of Staff, UNMACA, Kabul, 27 May 2007.
[72] Data is for calendar year (January-December) 2006. Email from Senior External Relations Officer, UNMACA, 5 April 2007; UNMACA, "Monthly Progress Report," December 2006. For fuller description of mine action operators, see Landmine Monitor Report 2006, pp. 99-100. HALO reported clearing 3.66 square kilometers of mined areas and 93.34 square kilometers of battle area, destroying 3,189 APMs, 187 AVMs and 210,863 items of UXO. Email from HALO, 24 July 2007.
[73] Email from Kefayatullah Eblagh, ATC, 5 April 2007; interview with Senior External Relations Officer, UNMACA, 5 April 2007. AREA = Agency for Rehabilitation and Energy Conservation in Afghanistan.
[75] Interview with Stephen Robinson, Program Manager, DDG, Kabul 26 May 2007.
[76] Email from Andrew Lyons, Senior Operations Officer, HALO, 28 January 2007.
[77] Email from Shah Wali Ayubi, Operations Coordinator, MDC, 14 March 2007. UNMACA attributed the decrease partly to a drop in the number of dogs from 200 to 178 after some failed their accreditation. Also, MDC closed its office in Kandahar because of deteriorating security and later restructured and adjusted its methodology in response to UNMACA's new concept. Interview with Chief of Operations and Technical Advisor, UNMACA, Kabul 1 July 2007.
[78] Response to Landmine Monitor Questionnaire from Awlia Mayar, Project Manager, HI, 8 March 2007; email from Senior External Relations Officer, UNMACA, 5 April 2007.
[79] Email from Stacy Smith, Communication Manager, RONCO Consulting Corporation, 28 June 2006. RONCO provided humanitarian demining services under contract to the US Department of State for three years until August 2005.
[80] "DynCorp International to remove landmines," Aerospace-defense.com, 8 September 2005; email from H. Murphy McCloy Jr., Senior Demining Advisor, US Department of State, 20 July 2006.
[81] Interview with Peter Sutcliffe, Country Manager, Mine Action Afghanistan, ArmorGroup, Kabul, 27 May 2007.
[82] UNMACA "Monthly Progress Report," December 2006; email from Senior External Relations Officer, UNMACA, 5 April 2007.
[83] Ibid, p. 6; Ibid.
[86] "7 killed in Taliban attack on Afghan demining team," Agence France-Presse (Kabul), 7 April 2007, www.reliefweb.int, accessed 24 June 2007.
[89] "UN demining official warns of funding gap, if no new donors come forward," UN News Center, 24 April 2006.
[90] Email from External Relations Officer, UNMACA, 5 April 2007.
[91] Email from Senior External Relations Officer, UNMACA, 5 April 2007. Note that percentages calculated exclude 140,000 returnees as data from this program is not divided by sex and age.
[92] See Landmine Monitor Report 2006, pp. 104-105.
[93] Article 7 Report, Form I, 30 April 2007.
[94] Ibid; Landmine Monitor Report 2006, p. 105.
[95] Email from Senior External Relations Officer, UNMACA, 5 April 2007; Article 7 Report, Form I, 30 April 2007; see also Landmine Monitor Report 2006, p. 105.
[97] Email from Senior Technical Advisor, Mine Risk Education and Victim Assistance (MRE and VA), UNMACA, 30 June 2007.
[98] Article 7 Report, Form I, 30 April 2007. UNHCR = UN High Commissioner for Refugees.
[99] Based on data provided by Senior Technical Advisor (MRE and VA), UNMACA, 25 May 2006; ICRC, "Afghanistan Mine Action Program, Annual Report 2005," February 2006, p. 8. OMAR provided higher figures to Landmine Monitor, totaling 717,663 beneficiaries. The twelfth MRE provider, BBC Afghan Education Project, is not included in the table as it provides indirect MRE via mass media.
[100] Article 7 Report, Form I, 30 April 2007; email from UNMACA, 26 July 2007.
[101] Email from Senior External Relations Officer, UNMACA, 5 April 2007.
[102] Ibid; email from Senior Technical Advisor (MRE and VA), UNMACA, 30 June 2007.
[103] Interview with Senior Technical Advisor (MRE and VA), UNMACA, 25 May 2006.
[104] Ibid, 30 June 2007.
[105] Ibid.
[106] "Royal Engineers launch Afghan landmine awareness campaign," Reliefweb, 5 June 2007, www.reliefweb.int, accessed 20 June 2007.
[107] Information provided by Lt. Alex Savage, Royal Navy, Laskhargah, 24 May 2007.
[108] "NATO to deploy 200 to Kabul, Afghanistan," Stars and Stripes (Heidelberg), 2 June 2007.
[109] Article 7 Report, Form I, 30 April 2007.
[110] Landmine Monitor analysis of casualty data provided to HI by Zamanuddin Noori, Mine Action Programme Manager, ICRC, Kabul, 1 April and 3 April 2007. In Landmine Monitor Report 2006 it was reported that ICRC had recorded 898 casualties in 2005; however the database was updated in early 2007. ICRC recorded 22 fuze casualties, 22 booby-trap casualties, and 21 unknown.
[111] Landmine Monitor analysis of ICRC casualty data.
[112] Landmine Monitor analysis of data provided by Senior External Relations Officer, UNMACA, 5 April 2007; see Landmine Monitor Report 2006, p. 110.
[113] UNMAS, "Afghanistan: UN Mine Action Center makes substantial headway against the threat of mines and unexploded ordnance (UXO)," 8 January 2007.
[114] "Final Report of the Sixth Meeting of States Parties/Zagreb Progress Report," Part II, Annex V, Zagreb, 28 November-2 December 2005, p. 86.
[115] Additionally, UNMACA recorded 35 fuze casualties, 21 booby-trap casualties, one grenade and 58 unknown.
[116] Landmine Monitor analysis of UNMACA casualty data.
[117] Email from Awlia Mayar, HI, Kandahar 15 March 2007.
[118] Landmine Monitor analysis of ICRC casualty data; see also, HI, "Circle of Impact: The Fatal Footprint of Cluster Munitions on People and Communities," Brussels, May 2007, p. 95.
[119] Human Rights Watch analysis of US Department of Defense casualty reports 1 January-31 December 2006.
[120] See Landmine Monitor Report 2006, p. 113.
[121] Email from External Relations Officer, UNMACA, 14 May 2007.
[122] Email from Zamanuddin Noori, ICRC, 1 April 2007.
[124] Landmine Monitor analysis of ICRC casualty data, and UNMACA casualty data provided by Deputy Chief of Quality Management, UNMACA, Kabul, 12 April 2007.
[125] Landmine Monitor analysis ICRC and UNMACA data.
[126] Statement by Nadera Hayat Burhani, Deputy Minister, Ministry of Public Health (MoPH), Seventh Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 19 September 2006.
[127] See Landmine Monitor Report 2006, p. 114. "Recent" means a casualty reported as occurring within the two years prior to data collection.
[130] HI, "Understanding the Challenge Ahead, National Disability Survey in Afghanistan," Kabul, 2006.
[131] Statement by Nadera Hayat Burhani, MoPH, Seventh Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 20 September 2006.
[133] See Landmine Monitor Report 2006, pp. 117-119.
[134] ICRC, "Physical Rehabilitation Programme-Annual Report 2006," Geneva, April 2007, p. 24.
[136] Email from Firoz Ali Alizada, Assistant to Country Director, HI, Kabul, 26 June 2007; see Landmine Monitor Report 2006, pp. 120-121.
[137]Statement by Faizullah Kakar, Deputy Minister, MoPH, Standing Committee on Victim Assistance and Socio-Economic Reintegration, Geneva, 24 April 2007.
[138] Email from Firoz Ali Alizada, HI, 26 June 2007.
[139] Ibid; see Landmine Monitor Report 2006, pp. 124-125.
[140] Statement by Faizullah Kakar, MoPH, Standing Committee on Victim Assistance and Socio-Economic Reintegration, Geneva, 24 April 2007; email from Firoz Ali Alizada, HI, 26 June 2007 .
[141] Government of Afghanistan, "Report of first national victim assistance workshop," Kabul, 6-8 August 2006, p. 6.
[143] UN, "Final Report, First Review Conference," Nairobi, 29 November-3 December 2004, APLC/CONF/2004/5, 9 February 2005, p. 3.
[144] Government of Afghanistan, "Report of first national victim assistance workshop," Welcome and Opening Remarks – H.E. Mr. Mahmoud Saikal, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Kabul, 6-8 August 2006, p. 32.
[145] Article 7 Report, Form J, 30 April 2007.
[146] Afghanistan, "Report of first national victim assistance workshop," Kabul, 6-8 August 2006, p. 10.
[147] Government of Afghanistan, "Mine Action Law, Chapter One: General Provisions," Kabul, undated 2007, p. 3.
[149] Email from UNMACA, 26 July 2007.
[150] Government of Afghanistan, "Report of first national victim assistance workshop," Kabul, 6-8 August 2006, pp. 6, 8.
[152] Statement by Faizullah Kakar, MoPH, Standing Committee on Victim Assistance and Socio-Economic Reintegration, Geneva, 24 April 2007.
[159] ICRC, "Annual Report 2006," Geneva, May 2007, p. 188.
[160] Statement by Faizullah Kakar, MoPH, Standing Committee on Victim Assistance and Socio-Economic Reintegration, Geneva, 24 April 2007; email from Firoz Ali Alizada, HI, 26 June 2007.
[163] ICRC, "Physical Rehabilitation Programme-Annual Report 2006," Geneva, April 2007, p. 24; ICRC, "Annual Report 2006," Geneva, May 2007, p. 179; email from Alberto Cairo, Project Manager Orthopedic Center, ICRC, Kabul, 27 March 2007.
[164] Email from Alessandro Greblo, Human Resources Coordinator, Emergency, Milan, 26 June 2007.
[165]Email from Zemarai Saqeb, Program Coordinator, and Mohammad Amin Qanet, Senior Program Officer, SCA, Kabul, 5 July 2007; Response to Landmine Monitor Questionnaire from SCA, 14 February 2007.
[167] Email from Numata Yasuo, Coordinator Taloqan Office, AAR Japan, Taloqan, 29 June 2007.
[168] Email from Omara Khan Muneeb, Director, ADU, Kabul, 17 January 2007.
[169] ICRC, "Annual Report 2006," Geneva, May 2007, pp. 176-177.
[170] ICRC, "Physical Rehabilitation Programme-Annual Report 2006," Geneva, April 2007, p. 24; ICRC, "Annual Report 2006," Geneva, May 2007, p. 179. See Landmine Monitor Report 2006, p. 121.
[171] ICRC, "Annual Report 2006," Geneva, May 2007, p. 179; see Landmine Monitor Report 2006, p. 121.
[172] Emails from Alessandro Greblo, Emergency, 26 and 28 June 2007; see Landmine Monitor Report 2006, p. 121.
[174] SCA, "Swedish Committee for Afghanistan has signed a contract with Ministry of Public Health Services (MoPH) to implement BPHS in the South-Eastern province of Paktika," 4 July 2006, www.swedishcommittee.org; "Inauguration of Imam Sahib District hospital," 25 January 2007, www.swedishcommittee.org, accessed 25 June 2007.
[175]Email from Zemarai Saqeb and Mohammad Amin Qanet, SCA, 5 July 2007.
[179]See Landmine Monitor Report 2006, pp. 117-124.
[180] Average exchange rate for 2006: €1 = US$1.2563, used throughout this report. US Federal Reserve, "List of Exchange Rates (Annual)," 3 January 2007.
[181] Email from Catherine Gill, Mine Action Coordinator, AUSAID, 10 July 2007. Average exchange rate for 2006: A1$ = US$0.7535. US Federal Reserve, "List of Exchange Rates (Annual)," 3 January 2007.
[182] Belgium Article 7 Report, Form J, 30 April 2007.
[183] Email from Carly Volkes, Program Officer, Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada, 5 June 2007. Average exchange rate for 2006: C$1 = US$0.8818. US Federal Reserve, "List of Exchange Rates (Annual)," 3 January 2007.
[184] Email from Jan Kara, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 29 May 2007. Average exchange rate for 2006: CZK1 = US$0.0443. CZK-EU exchange: European Central Bank Statistical Data Warehouse, Exchange rates, Bilateral, Annual. EU-US exchange: US Federal Reserve, "List of Exchange Rates (Annual)," 3 January 2007.
[185] Email from Jacob Bang Jeppesen, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 26 February 2007. Average exchange rate for 2006: DKK1 = US$0.1683. US Federal Reserve, "List of Exchange Rates (Annual)," 3 January 2007.
[186] "EC Budget line 19 02 04, Community participation to actions relating to antipersonnel mines, Annual Work Plan 2006," Version 15/13/2006; additional data provided by Antoine Gouzée de Harven, EuropeAid Co-operation Office, EC, 23 July 2007; email from Samiullah Wardak, Operations Section, EC Delegation to Afghanistan, 19 July 2007. At least €20 million ($25,126,500) of the EC funding was announced or committed in December 2006, and would therefore impact 2007 rather than 2006 programming.
[187] Email from Sirpa Loikkanen, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 23 February 2007.
[188] Email from Anne Villeneuve, Advocacy Officer, HI, 12 July 2007.
[189] Germany Article 7 Report, Form J, 30 April 2007.
[190] Email from Michael Keaveney, Department of Foreign Affairs, 20 July 2007.
[191] Email from Conventional Arms Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 6 June 2007. Average exchange rate for 2006: ¥1 = US$0.0086. US Federal Reserve, "List of Exchange Rates (Annual)," 3 January 2007.
[192] Email from Vincent van Zeijst, Deputy Head, Arms Control and Arms Export Policy Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 11 July 2007.
[193] Email from Yngvild Berggrav, Adviser, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 8 August 2007. Average exchange rate for 2006: NOK1 = US$0.1560. US Federal Reserve, "List of Exchange Rates (Annual)," 3 January 2007.
[194] Email from Henrik Markus, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 28 May 2007. Average exchange rate for 2006: SKK1 = US$0.0337. SKK-EU exchange: European Central Bank Statistical Data Warehouse, Exchange rates, Bilateral, Annual.
[195] Spain Article 7 Report, Form J, 30 April 2007. ISAF = International Security Assistance Force
[196] Email from Sven Malmberg, Minister, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 27 August 2007. Average exchange rate for 2006: SEK1 = US$0.1357. US Federal Reserve, "List of Exchange Rates (Annual)," 3 January 2007.
[197] Email from Rémy Friedmann, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 7 June 2007. Average exchange rate for 2006: CHF1 = US$0.7980. US Federal Reserve, "List of Exchange Rates (Annual)," 3 January 2007.
[198] Email from Andy Willson, Program Officer, Department for International Development, UK, 23 February 2007. Average exchange rate for 2006: £1 = US$1.8434. US Federal Reserve, "List of Exchange Rates (Annual)," 3 January 2007.
[199] USG Historical Chart containing data for FY 2006, by email from Angela L. Jeffries, Financial Management Specialist, US Department of State, 20 July 2007. In other communications with Landmine Monitor, the Department of State reported $13,500,000 in funding for mine action and $3,911,955 for Small Arms/Light Weapons and EOD.
[200] Lithuania Article 7 Report, Form J, 19 April 2006; New Zealand Article 7 Report, Form J, 30 April 2007. Poland Article 7 Report, Form J, 6 April 2007.
[201] UN, "2006 Portfolio End-Year Review," New York, January 2007, p. 3.
[202] UNMAS, "2006 Annual Report", pp. 30, 69; UN, "2006 Portfolio End-Year Review," New York, January 2007, p. 8.
[203] UN, "2007 Portfolio of Mine Action Projects," New York, November 2006, List of Projects, pp. 406-423.
[204] Interview with Khaled Zekriya, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Kabul, 28 May 2007.
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