Global Corporate Governance: Volume 19
(9 chapters)
Pages i-viii
Citation: (2017), "Prelims", John, K., Makhija, A.K. and Ferris, S.P. (Ed.) Global Corporate Governance (Advances in Financial Economics, Vol. 19), Emerald Publishing Limited, Bingley, pp. i-viii. https://doi.org/10.1108/S1569-373220160000019002
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Financial Performance and the Competitive Effects of Corporate Social Responsibility
This study examines share price reaction to the enrollment by companies in the Children's Food and Beverage Advertising Initiative. We find that, on average, in the month of enrollment, shareholders of companies that join the CFBAI experience abnormal return of −3% and so do the shareholders of the immediate competitors that do not join the initiative. However, over the subsequent five years, while the shareholders of companies enrolled in the initiative experience an average abnormal return of +16.6%, that of non-enrolled competitors experience a further abnormal return of −34%. The abnormal returns for the two groups (at the time of enrollment and over the subsequent five years) are uncorrelated and so benefitting at the expense of competitors does not appear to be the motive for enrolling in the CFBAI. The study also provides comparison of number of employees and other important financial ratios before and after enrollment in the CFBAI for the two groups.
Citation: Gondhalekar, V. and Lehnert, K. (2017), "Financial Performance and the Competitive Effects of Corporate Social Responsibility", Global Corporate Governance (Advances in Financial Economics, Vol. 19), Emerald Publishing Limited, Bingley, pp. 1-21. https://doi.org/10.1108/S1569-373220160000019001
Regulation and the Ownership Structure of European Listed Firms
In this paper, we explore an extensive panel data set covering more than 4,000 listed firms in 16 European countries to study the effects of shareholder protection on ownership structure and firm performance. We document a negative firm-level correlation between shareholder protection and ownership concentration. Differentiating between shareholder types, we find that this pattern is mainly driven by strategic investors. In contrast, we find a positive correlation between shareholder protection and block ownership of institutional investors, in particular when we restrict the analysis to independent institutional investors. Finally, we find that independent institutional investors are positively associated with firm valuation as measured by Tobin's Q. The opposite applies for strategic investors. Overall, our results are consistent with the view that (i) high shareholder protection and (ii) limited ownership by strategic investors make small investors and investors interested in security returns more confident in their investments.
Citation: Rapp, M.S. and Trinchera, O. (2017), "Regulation and the Ownership Structure of European Listed Firms", Global Corporate Governance (Advances in Financial Economics, Vol. 19), Emerald Publishing Limited, Bingley, pp. 23-76. https://doi.org/10.1108/S1569-373220160000019003
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Determinants of Corporate Leverage in Publicly Listed GCC Companies – Conventional versus Sukuk
I study the determinants of conventional leverage in a sample of publicly listed corporations based in Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, and Qatar, for a period spanning from 2005 up to end of 2014, and investigate whether those determinants can also explain the utilization of Sukuk by the same corporations in their capital structures. Evidence related to the determinants of conventional leverage is consistent with results from prior studies conducted on corporations based in developed and developing countries. Firm's size, profitability, tangibility, age, and tendency to pay dividends are significant determinants of conventional leverage. However, not all those factors significantly explain the utilization of Sukuk as a financing vehicle. The size of the firm remains to be the most significant factor, in addition to the conformance of those corporations with respect to Shari'a principles measured by their utilization of other Islamic investments and financing instruments. Overall, I conclude that models used to predict conventional leverage are not capable of fully explaining the determinants of Sukuk issuances.
Citation: El-Khatib, R. (2017), "Determinants of Corporate Leverage in Publicly Listed GCC Companies – Conventional versus Sukuk", Global Corporate Governance (Advances in Financial Economics, Vol. 19), Emerald Publishing Limited, Bingley, pp. 77-102. https://doi.org/10.1108/S1569-373220160000019004
Large Shareholders and Target Returns: International Evidence †
We examine the market valuation of targets with multiple large shareholders (MLS) and single large shareholder (SLS) structures, in an international sample of M&A announcement in 19 countries outside North America. We find that the presence and power of MLS in these firms are negatively associated with abnormal returns and first-bid-to-merger-completion returns, suggesting that MLS mitigate agency problems in the target, and hence their acquisition is perceived as "a loss of good governance." The negative association between MLS targets and returns is stronger in widely held firms suggesting that MLS indeed curb expropriation of minority shareholders. By contrast, when the second largest shareholder in the MLS structure of the target is a family, we find positive cumulative abnormal returns at the merger announcement, suggesting exacerbated agency problems in these firms that should benefit from the "acquisition of good governance." Our evidence is robust to a battery of tests and to addressing potential endogeneity.
Citation: Boubakri, N., Cosset, J.-C. and Mishra, D. (2017), "Large Shareholders and Target Returns: International Evidence", , https://doi.org/10.1108/S1569-373220160000019005
A Gender Gap in Executive Cash Compensation in Thailand: A View of the Expectancy Theory
This study investigates the relation of executive cash compensation and gender characteristics of senior executives of Thai listed companies using 1,660 firm-years observations from 2009 to 2013. The findings show that male executives earn more cash compensation than do their female counterparts and that compensation is higher for male CEOs whose educational qualifications were Master's degree or above. Companies with a higher proportion of male executives and with better firm performance (measured by ROA, ROE, and Tobin's q) pay higher cash compensation. The results conform with the Expectancy theory that male executives receive more compensation than do female executives because of their (expected) abilities to make higher returns to the firm's assets. Other significant determinants are that older and larger firms pay more cash compensation to the executives (Life cycle theory) and that companies with a higher proportion of independent directors (Agency Theory) and higher ownership concentrations (Stewardship theory) offer less compensation.
Citation: Namwong, K., Jantarakolica, T., Suwannoi, T. and Wongkantarakorn, J. (2017), "A Gender Gap in Executive Cash Compensation in Thailand: A View of the Expectancy Theory", Global Corporate Governance (Advances in Financial Economics, Vol. 19), Emerald Publishing Limited, Bingley, pp. 147-166. https://doi.org/10.1108/S1569-373220160000019006
CEO Compensation Practices around Spinoffs
We examine the use of relative performance evaluation (RPE), asymmetry in pay for skill/luck, and compensation benchmarking for a sample of firms involved in a spinoff. The spinoff affects firm characteristics that influence the use of the identified compensation practices. We test for differences in the compensation practices for the pre- and post-spinoff firms. We find that RPE is used for post-spinoff CEOs, but not pre-spinoff CEOs. Post-spinoff CEOs are also paid asymmetrically for luck where they are rewarded for good luck but not punished for bad luck. Both pre- and post-spinoff CEOs receive similar levels of compensation benchmarking. The study provides additional evidence on factors that influence compensation practices. Our spinoff sample allows us to examine how compensation practices are affected by changes in firm characteristics while keeping other determinants of compensation constant (i.e., the board and, in many cases, the CEO). Our findings contribute to the understanding of how the identified compensation practices are used.
Citation: Howe, J.S. and O'Brien, S. (2017), "CEO Compensation Practices around Spinoffs", Global Corporate Governance (Advances in Financial Economics, Vol. 19), Emerald Publishing Limited, Bingley, pp. 167-208. https://doi.org/10.1108/S1569-373220160000019007
Socio-Psychological Motives of Socially Responsible Investors
The 2008/2009 World Financial Crisis underlined the importance of social responsibility for the sustainable functioning of economic markets. Heralding an age of novel heterodox economic thinking, the call for integrating social facets into mainstream economic models has reached unprecedented momentum. Financial Social Responsibility bridges the finance world with society in socially conscientious investments. Socially Responsible Investment (SRI) integrates corporate social responsibility in investment choices. In the aftermath of the 2008/2009 World Financial Crisis, SRI is an idea whose time has come. Socially conscientious asset allocation styles add to expected yield and volatility of securities social, environmental, and institutional considerations. In screenings, shareholder advocacy, community investing, social venture capital funding and political divestiture, socially conscientious investors hone their interest to align financial profit maximization strategies with social concerns. In a long history of classic finance theory having blacked out moral and ethical considerations of investment decision making, our knowledge of socio-economic motives for SRI is limited. Apart from economic profitability calculus and strategic leadership advantages, this paper sheds light on socio-psychological motives underlying SRI. Altruism, need for innovation and entrepreneurial zest alongside utility derived from social status enhancement prospects and transparency may steer investors' social conscientiousness. Self-enhancement and social expression of future-oriented SRI options may supplement profit maximization goals. Theoretically introducing potential SRI motives serves as a first step toward an empirical validation of Financial Social Responsibility to improve the interplay of financial markets and the real economy. The pursuit of crisis-robust and sustainable financial markets through strengthened Financial Social Responsibility targets at creating lasting societal value for this generation and the following.
Citation: Puaschunder, J.M. (2017), "Socio-Psychological Motives of Socially Responsible Investors", Global Corporate Governance (Advances in Financial Economics, Vol. 19), Emerald Publishing Limited, Bingley, pp. 209-247. https://doi.org/10.1108/S1569-373220160000019008
Citation: (2017), "Index", Global Corporate Governance (Advances in Financial Economics, Vol. 19), Emerald Publishing Limited, Bingley, pp. 249-255. https://doi.org/10.1108/S1569-373220160000019009
Advances in Financial Economics
Kose John
Anil K. Makhija
Stephen P. Ferris