Research Article| October 01 2018
Electoral Strategy and Intergovernmental Transfers in Postwar Japan: Who Sees the Unseen Pork?
Taylor C. McMichael
Taylor C. Mcmichael is Senior Lecturer in the Department of Social and Behavioral Sciences, and Political Science Program Director, University of Texas of the Permian Basin, Odessa. Email: <mcmichael_t@utpb.edu>.
Taylor C. McMichael; Electoral Strategy and Intergovernmental Transfers in Postwar Japan: Who Sees the Unseen Pork?. Asian Survey 1 October 2018; 58 (5): 847–873. doi: https://doi.org/10.1525/as.2018.58.5.847
Japanese distributive politics draws scholarly attention as a partial but powerful explanation of the LDP's electoral dominance via the contention that the LDP rewarded its supporters and punished its opponents. But the empirical evidence disappears when intergovernmental transfers, which can be tracked to electoral constituencies, are examined. Using intergovernmental transfer data, this article tests four separate hypotheses.
Japanese politics, distributive politics, pork-barrel politics, Japanese economic policy
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