Google's Civilian Surveillance Data + A U.S. Military 5G Network = Bad Idea
Cyber Systemic Risk
Self Driving Car
Wireless Spectrum
What could possibly go wrong with a nationalized, dual-use, military-civilian, secure 5G wireless network to centralize all military and civilian U.S. transportation traffic control and management with Alphabet-Google as the only commercial wireless ISP "financing/anchor tenant?" Way too much.
Per Axios reporting, National Security Council Staff apparently have a network vision for a secure 5G wireless network for the U.S. military, that is ultimately capable of C3I (command, control, communications, and intelligence) of the "total situational-awareness," necessary for the 21st century, "Internet of the Battlefield" of integrated, autonomous warfare of vehicles, drones, and robots. The unclassified NSC plan envisions four "financing/anchor tenants:" U.S. Air Force, General Services Administration (GSA), Alphabet-Google, and Wells Fargo.
Alphabet-Google-Waymo-Waze apparently has a commercial wireless ISP vision of being the no-bid, "financing/anchor tenant," spectrum access administrator, general network-software contractor, and the monopoly citizen-location/maps/traffic/data-supplier, of an open, government-owned, commercially-shared, secure, 5G wireless network, ultimately capable of nationalized transportation traffic control and machine-to-machine management (with machine-learning) of human-driven vehicles and autonomous private vehicles, drones, and robots.
The NSC staff's efforts to potentially combine these two network visions into a "Secure 5G Eisenhower National Highway System for the Information Age" is an exceptionally bad idea.
Who could compete with a new government-sanctioned, Alphabet-Google, "information transportation superhighway" monopoly?
Who's going to watch these watchers?
And what are the incorruptible proposed checks and balances to prevent the near absolute power of a "Google-GoverNet" from becoming a modern Orwellian Big Brother Inc.?
[Note: Let me be crystal clear here. 5G wireless technology is very important to deploy quickly and the China security threat is a real and severe problem that must be mitigated for national security. As a defense hawk, I support the U.S. military: 1) creating its own secure 5G wireless network for national security purposes only, if Congress agrees it is necessary; 2) ensuring national security personnel and networks do not use any Chinese communications equipment, devices, or software; and 3) ensuring that there is a viable sustainable market demand for allied and trusted equipment companies to make secure communications gear. The problem is not these ends; the problem is a wrong-headed means -- of using unchecked, hyper-concentration of centralized government and commercial monopoly power-means -- to meet those ends.]
Summary of Why a Google-GoverNet Is an Exceptionally Bad Idea.
First, consumer devices and apps are the weakest links in the overall national cybersecurity chain. Last week's military security breach via the Strava civilian fitness app and "heat-map is only the latest proof. In addition, last month's new severe "Spectre" and "Meltdown" cybersecurity vulnerabilities directly threaten the secure 5G wireless network organizing principle here, i.e. that the virtualization firewalls that would separate military and civilian data on the same physical cloud network equipment could remain inviolate.
Second, security has long been Google's Achilles heel. Alphabet-Google has an abysmal privacy record and a long consistent history of data security failures. Both problems stem from Alphabet-Google's deep-seated culture of hostility toward the inefficiencies and speed losses that cybersecurity, privacy, and property rights protection measures inherently cause.
Third, Alphabet-Google-Android has the unmatched civilian surveillance capability to non-transparently know the exact location and general activity of most Americans at any given time, and it has no accountability for how it uses that data. It is fair to ask: what would be the Google-Government quid pro quo for partnering in the wireless omni-surveillance of all Americans?
Fourth, there is a potential fox-in-the-henhouse problem here given the current apparent Google-SoftbankKeiretsu (cartel) around software control of autonomous transportation. It brings at least the perception of serious conflicts-of-interest if Google/Softbank-China connections have a significant role in U.S. autonomous vehicle traffic management and the artificial intelligence capability on which that depends.
Fifth, apparently Alphabet-Google's quid pro quo here is some de facto "grand bargain" that determines it is in the U.S. national security interest to grant Alphabet-Google some form of a de facto government-sanctioned wireless 5G "information transportation superhighway" monopoly.
In return for a de facto sanctioned-monopoly network and Google's unique expertise and innovations in temporal spectrum access management optimization, autonomous transportation C3I, and artificial intelligence, the USG purportedly would get a nationalized 5G wireless network secure from the Chinese for U.S. military use, while Americans would get super-fast, free nationalized universal broadband access.
The precedent for this grand bargain is apparently the 1913 USG-AT&T, out-of-court antitrust settlement called the "Kingsbury Commitment." In 1913, the USG dropped its antitrust case against AT&T and granted AT&T a government-sanctioned monopoly network, in return for AT&T divesting its stake in Western Union Telegraph and for committing to always interconnecting to other telephone networks.
There is a method to the apparent madness of this surprisingly ill-advised solution to a real problem that must be solved. Apparently, that method is Alphabet-Google maximally-leveraging the vestiges of its exceptional Obama Administration political influence inside the Executive Branch at the GSA-USDS, OSTP, DOD, and State; combined with the influence of Softbank Chairman Masa Son leveraging his public commitment to invest $50b in the U.S. over the next three years.
As currently drafted, this de facto Google-GoverNet proposal is an exceptionally bad deal for America.
Consumer networks are the primary security vulnerability for national security networks. Alphabet-Google has well-documented hostility to cybersecurity, privacy, and accountability to government. Comingling Google's unmatched civilian surveillance database with military C3I artificial intelligence capabilities on the same network is a recipe for abuse of power. The Alphabet-Google-Softbank autonomous transportation keiretsu/cartel apparently has China security conflicts-of-interest. And Alphabet-Google warrants antitrust scrutiny and prosecution not antitrust absolution.
Forewarned is forearmed.
[Note: For the evidentiary links, supporting analysis, and supplemental research undergirding these conclusions please see below.]
Scott Cleland served as Deputy U.S. Coordinator for International Communications & Information Policy in the George H. W. Bush Administration. He is President of Precursor LLC, an internetization consultancy for Fortune 500 companies, some of which are Google competitors, and Chairman of NetCompetition, a pro-competition e-forum supported by broadband interests. He is also author of "Search & Destroy: Why You Can't Trust Google Inc." Cleland has testified before both the Senate and House antitrust subcommittees on Google.
THE EVIDENCE & ANALYSIS WHY A GOOGLE-GOVERNET IS AN EXCEPTIONALLY BAD IDEA
Axios reported this week that National Security Council staff is effectively considering adopting Alphabet-Google's wireless vision and networking approach for 5G -- per a leaked unclassified National Security Council report entitled "Secure 5G: The Eisenhower National Highway System for the Information Age."
The proposal is a general facsimile of Google's longstanding wireless strategy/plan to move America away from the 1992-2012 bipartisan wireless policy to auction government spectrum to create a competitive wireless free market, towards Google's wireless vision of government managing the "sharing" of government spectrum with the public for free when not in use, with Google as the de facto government-sanctioned monopoly software contractor, and non-neutral "Spectrum Access Administrator."
President Reagan's adage is warranted here: "Trust but verify."
Is the best national security interest for the U.S. military to partner specifically with Alphabet-Google and their apparent keiretsu partner SoftBank? Let's do some due diligence verification of the Alphabet-Google part of this proposal.
First, civilian devices and apps are the weakest link of security. Inviting unsecure, mass civilian devices and apps onto a "secure" physical military wireless network appears to be the antithesis of national security.
A dual-use, military-civilian, 5G wireless network, primarily administered by Alphabet-Google, risks being unsecure by design, and yet another cybersecurity disaster in waiting. That's because it is common knowledge that most of the worst breaches of government networks have been exploited via the weakest link of cybersecurity – i.e. civilian technologies and uses, and Google's technologies, products, and services are the most used by far by civilians.
Just last week, this civilian Achilles heel was spotlighted again, in that the locations of secret military operations apparently have been exposed by a civilian fitness app called Strava.
The recently-discovered, most-severe, "systemic" cybersecurity vulnerabilities of Spectre and Meltdown, which are firmware/hardware based, threaten the long presumed inviolability of software virtualization security approaches.
Since the Google-GoverNet vision for a secure 5G wireless network predates the new Spectre-Meltdown vulnerability that threatens the security premise of virtualization security approaches, it appears that the national security proponents of this proposal may need to go back to the drawing board.
America's best cybersecurity minds need to re-verify that trust in a dual-use, virtualized military-civilian, 5G wireless network approach can indeed be fully secure for military-grade use -- is still warranted given the severity of the new Spectre/Meltdown, firmware/hardware cybersecurity threat.
Imagine the temptation that would be created by inviting masses of brilliant teen hackers and gamers to "share" a 5G wireless network with the U.S. military. If a teen could hack the CIA Director, could other teens resist the temptation and challenge of hack into the U.S. military's real war games -- from the inside of the network by hacking through a now potentially-porous virtual wall that would supposedly separate U.S military and civilian communications and data?
Second, security has long been Google's Achilles heel. Alphabet-Google's abysmal privacy record and has a long history of data security failures stems from a deep-seated culture of hostility to the inefficiencies cybersecurity measures inherently cause.
Then Google CEO Eric Schmidt explained Google's view of cybersecurity: "In most cases… the [Google] default is not to use the most secure form because it slows everything down. … Ultimately we are not going to do anything that disadvantages speed."
Google CEO Sundar Pichai reinforced Google's low priority for security: "We do not guarantee that Android is designed to be safe; its format was designed to give more freedom. When they talk about 90% of malicious programs for Android, they must of course take into account the fact that it is the most used operating system in the world. If I had a company dedicated to malware, I would also send my attacks to Android."
Ironically, to coincide with Alphabet-Google's interest in being the U.S. military's lead architect of a "secure" 5G wireless network, Alphabet-Google announced just two weeks ago the creation of a new Alphabet subsidiary called "Chronicle," which will sell cybersecurity data and analytics to corporations.
Understandably, nowhere in Chronicle's marketing materials does it disclose that Google's entire network was fully-compromised by Chinese hackers in 2010 and that its "Gaia" password system was stolen, and that the hackers had the run of Google for months creating broad long-term security risks. [Note: For more evidence, at the end of the post see Precursor's research series "Security is Google's Achilles Heel Series."]
Third, Alphabet-Google-Android now has the capability to non-transparently know the exact location and general activity of most all Americans at any given time, and it has no accountability for how it uses that data. It is fair to ask: what would be the Google-Government quid pro quo for partnering in the surveillance of all Americans in America?
Google now knows where most every American is, who they are with, where they have been and are going, and even what they are doing, because Google-Android devices collect a wide variety of location information automatically without permission and have made it deceptively hard to fully turn off any Google tracking -- per recently reported experiments by Quartz for Android here and Bluetooth here.
The public evidence of Alphabet-Google's monopoly civilian surveillance network capability to dominate search digital advertising is overwhelming.
For a comprehensive analysis of Google's civilian surveillance network capabilities to feed its digital advertising model see here. For a chart of Alphabet-Google's physical surveillance capabilities see here. For an analysis of all the information Google collects see here. For a one-page chart of Why Google is Big Brother Inc. see here.
And to see Google's history of illegally wiretapping civilians, see this analysis: "Widespread Wiretapping Is How Google Works" here. [Note: At the end of the post see Appendix 1: Precursor's "Google Spying" research series for more evidence.]
How can Google claim its info-opoly is benign because people can use Bing and because Google does not have government police or military power, when Google is most aggressively maneuvering to politically ingratiate itself with the DOD and the Federal national security apparatus by aggressively pushing a partnership on a dual-use, military-civilian, secure 5G wireless network?
How would FISA law and the process of the government not surveilling American citizens without judicial oversight work with an ongoing, dual-use, military-civilian, secure 5G network?
Fourth, there is a potential fox-in-the-henhouse problem here given the apparent Google-Softbank keiretsu around autonomous transportation that brings with it at least the perception of U.S.-China security conflicts of interest in autonomous vehicles and the artificial intelligence on which they depend.
If the purpose here is a public-private "information transportation superhighway" to enable both military and civilian commands, controls, and communications of their respective military and civilian autonomous vehicle/drone efforts, and if the national security impetus for building a secure 5G wireless network is to guard against Chinese control, theft, or surveillance, then national security authorities should do their due diligence, and verify the trust that there is no underappreciated or problematic compromise of U.S. software and artificial intelligence behind command, control, and communications in the autonomous transportation space.
It is fair to ask, how is there not national security risk/concern around Google just launching an artificial intelligence center in China, when artificial intelligence will be integral to operating the proposed secure 5G wireless network's spectrum access management, and Alphabet's recent cybersecurity threat detection business arm called Chronicle?
Some important background is needed to spotlight Google and Softbank's exceptionally close long Keiretsu-like alliance in the Internet space.
The big anticompetitive genesis of Google and Softbank's Keiretsu appears to be SoftBank's facilitation of Google's monopolization of the Japanese search market in 2010. In July 2010, SoftBank's Yahoo Japan subsidiary outsourced Yahoo Japan's dominant #1 search and advertising monetization platform to the #2 competitor in Japan, Google, which gave Google a 90% search advertising monopoly in Japan.
Amazingly, SoftBank was able to persuade Japanese antitrust authorities to sign off on the de facto monopolization deal. That same month in 2010, SoftBank strategically co-invested in Zynga with Google corporate, not Google Ventures. And in 2011, SoftBank was an early Japanese big corporate adopter of Google Apps for its 26,000 employees, and also launched an early adopter, Android-powered, "Yahoo-phone" in Japan.
Importantly, Softbank and Google's founders both started in the software/Internet business and then evolved and converged their tech-rooted businesses into communications businesses. And more importantly, both share an entrepreneurial-founders' kinship for thinking big, looking ahead, taking big risks, and leveraging big technological disruption against incumbents to grow.
Google and Softbank also were strongly aligned on SoftBank's investment in and then acquisition of Sprint. See here for details. Last June, after Alphabet-Google tried unsuccessfully for over a year to sell its military soldier Robotics company Boston Dynamics, Softbank became the buyer-of-last-resort for Google and bought the company.
Tellingly, the Japanese Embassy is the only U.S. embassy included in the proposed Secure 5G team; and Softbank Chairman Masa Son just happens to be the wealthiest Japanese citizen by far.
Now let's look at Softbank's China connections. Softbank is the largest shareholder owning 28% of Alibaba, China's equivalent of Amazon. In May 2016, the WSJ reported the closeness of Softbank and China's Alibaba:
"SoftBank founder and Chief Executive Masayoshi Son first invested in Alibaba in 2000 when he put in $20 million into the then tiny e-commerce company. Since then, Alibaba has evolved into China's biggest internet shopping mall, worth more than $200 billion by market value, making it Mr. Son's most successful bet. Mr. Son has been a close ally to Alibaba founder and executive Chairman Jack Ma, and the companies forged strong relationships through various joint ventures. In May, the two companies said they would form a joint venture to launch cloud-computing services in Japan. … SoftBank stressed that the companies would maintain a "strong relationship," with Mr. Son retaining his seat on Alibaba's board and Mr. Ma remaining on Softbank's board." [Bold added]
[Note: Remember here that Alphabet-Google-Waymo-Waze dominates all the core building blocks of autonomous transportation software tracking, control, and management with its dominance in: search, Maps (including Earth & StreetView), location-services, Android operating system, Waze crowd-source real-time traffic data, Google Analytics, Chrome browser, translate, etc.]
Now let's look at how Alphabet-Google's Keiretsu partner, SoftBank Chairman Masa Son, is a very big force in the transportation services and autonomous vehicles future, especially in the U.S.
A fellow technology investor familiar with Mr. Son, Softbank, and transportations services, tellingly told Forbes: "He wants to play pope in the ride-sharing app world."
SoftBank owns 28% of Alibaba and Alibaba owns a stake in Didi Chuxing -- China's Uber. In 2016, Uber was pressured to sell its China business -- its largest business by rides in the world -- to Didi Chuxing – China's Uber. Softbank invested another $5b in Didi Chuxing in May 2017. Recently, the leading investor in China's ride sharing service, SoftBank, bought 20% of Uber at a 30% discount.
SoftBank essentially replaced Google as a lead investor because Google had to pull back given it was suing Uber for allegedly stealing Google-Waymo's leading autonomous vehicle software trade secrets. Google had had a board seat before the lawsuit, and it still effectively does now that the apparent Google-Softbank Keiretsu board has a board seat from Softbank's recent lead investment in Uber.
While influential ownership in China's ride sharing business and America's leading transportation services app Uber technically may not be an antitrust problem, except for the overlocking directorates concerns, it is potentially a serious cybersecurity and national security concern.
Concerning the U.S. autonomous transportation market, now consider the incestuous Google-Amazon-Waymo-Softbank-Uber-Lyft-Softbank-Airbnb keiretsu-ing dynamic apparently at work.
Amazon's Jeff Bezos was among the first investors in Google. Both Alphabet-Google and Amazon CEO Jeff Bezos are big early investors in the two biggest online winner-take-all wannabe platforms, Uber and also Airbnb that could potentially compete with Alphabet-Google-Waymo in the autonomous vehicle market or with Amazon in the autonomous delivery space that leverages its cloud computing capability.
Tellingly, Google Capital led the big fundraising rounds for both of its potential transportation-as-a-service competitors: Uber (for $258m and getting Google's Chief Legal Officer on Uber's board in 2013 and leaving in August 2016) and Lyft (for $1b and getting Google's CapitalG partner, David Lawee, on Lyft's board in October 2017) ensuring that no other entity could know more inside information and deepest anticompetitive intelligence on Uber and Lyft than their biggest overall competitive threats, Google-Waymo and Amazon transportation services.
Now that Google has repositioned itself from partnering with Lyft versus Uber, because it is suing Uber for stealing its autonomous vehicles trade secrets, Softbank apparently is filling in behind Google at Uber and "covering its six," by making a big play to take a 20% ownership share of Uber, a transaction which may still be, and should be, under serious CFIUS national security review at the U.S. Treasury Department.
The substantial public evidence of an Alphabet-Google-Softbank Keiretsu dynamic that creates the perception of China security conflicts-of-interest, means that, at least the area of autonomous transportation tracking, management, control, communications, and information/data, warrants close scrutiny and monitoring by the CFIUS process and authorities going forward.
The precedent for this grand bargain is apparently the 1913 USG-AT&T, out-of-court antitrust settlement called the "Kingsbury Commitment." The USG dropped its antitrust case against AT&T and granted AT&T a government-sanctioned monopoly network, in return for AT&T divesting its stake in Western Union Telegraph and for committing to always interconnecting to other telephone networks.
It is important to note that Google has a well-documented history of using its commercial monopoly power and political influence to undermine U.S. fair administration of Justice.
These are two stark examples of Google evidently improperly influencing the U.S. law enforcement process.
In August 2012 after a year-long probe, the FTC Staff recommended antitrust prosecution of Google. Before the election, the FTC Chairman then signaled in the press that the FTC intended to bring an antitrust case against Google. After the 2012 Presidential election, Bloomberg reported that Google Chairman Schmidt was credited as "an under-appreciated asset" in the Obama Re-Elect Campaign.
On November 19, 2012, Renata Hesse, Google's 2011 outside antitrust defense counsel who worked on shutting down Texas' Google antitrust probe, was appointed Acting U.S. DOJ Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust.
Just 44 days later, on January 3, 2013, all five Google antitrust probes were closed. While four were closed with a vote, voluntary commitments, and explanations, the Android tying probe was silently closed without a vote.
Google also evidently improperly influenced the nation's patent enforcement process.
In 2014, Google faced a phalanx of patent infringement lawsuits from several companies: Apple, Microsoft, Nokia, Blackberry, Ericsson, Sony, and Skyhook Wireless. In January 2014, Michelle Lee became Acting Director of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office. Eighteen months prior, Ms. Lee served as Google's Deputy General Counsel for Patents from 2003-2012. By 2015, all the companies suing Google for patent infringement settled or dropped their cases against Google-Android.
The national security stakes are too high for Alphabet-Google to improperly influence America's national security apparatus and harm national security vis-à-vis China for anticompetitive gain. [Note: For more evidence, at the end of the post see Precursor's "Googlegate" research series.]
There is a method to the apparent madness of this surprisingly ill-advised solution to a real problem that must be solved. Apparently, that method is Google maximally-leveraging the vestiges of its exceptional Obama Administration political influence inside the Executive Branch at the GSA-USDS, OSTP, DOD, State, and NASA; combined with Softbank Chairman Masa Son leveraging his public commitment to invest $50b in the U.S. over the next three years.
Appendix 1: "Security is Google's Achilles Heel" Research Series
Part 1: Why security is Google's Achilles heel [7-8-09]
Part 2: Google values security much less than others do [7-16-09]
Part 3: Google: "Security is part of our DNA" (Do Not Ask) [7-28-09]
Part 4: Why Security is Google's Achilles Heel [8-12-09]
Part 5: Google Apps Security Chief is a magician/mentalist [1-5-10]
Part 6: Google-China: Implications for Cybersecurity [1-13-10]
Part 7: Did Google Over-React to China Cybersecurity Breach? [3-3-10]
Part 8: Google's Titanic Security Flaws [4-22-10]
Part 9: A Google Android Botnet Problem [11-12-10]
Part 10: Google's Deep Aversion to Permission [3-10-11]
Part 11: Top Ten Reasons Google Has Culpability in the Gmail Data Breach [6-3-11]
Part 12: Google's Culture of Unaccountability in its Own Words [8-1-12]
Part 13: Google's Privacy Rap Sheet: Fact-Checking Google's Claims on Privacy [3-13-13]
Part 14: Why Google is America's Cyber-Security Achilles Heel [5-29-13]
Part 15: Google Android Dominates by Cheating Data Protection [8-4-14]
Appendix 2: "Google's Spying" Research Series
Part 1: All the Blackmail-able Info that "J. Edgar Google" Collects on You [7-17-08]
Part 2: Google's Interventional Targeting: Get into People's Heads? [5-19-09]
Part 3: Big Brother NSA: Google-NSA Through a Foreigners Eyes [3-9-10]
Part 4: What Else Does Google Secretly Track? [6-2-10]
Part 5: Google's Total Information Awareness; Graphic of Info Google Has [6-4-10]
Part 6: Google China License: What's the Rest of the Story? [7-9-10]
Part 7: Big Brother Inc. Implications of Google Getting No-Bid Spying Contract [8-25-10]
Part 8: Google's Deep Tracking Inspection [8-31-10]
Part 9: Google's Mandatory Location Profiling/Tracking [11-1-10]
Part 10: Google's Deep Aversion to Permission [3-10-11]
Part 11: Google's No Privacy by Design Business Model [3-17-11]
Part 12: Google's Rogue WiSpy Invasive Behavior Proliferates [6-17-11]
Part 13: Why Google is Big Brother Inc. – One-Page Graphic [6-10-13]
Part 14: Google Spy [7-8-13]
Part 15: Google Spy-Glass – Google's Big Rest of World Trust Problem [9-8-13]
Part 16: Top Questions for Google at Cato's NSA Surveillance Conference [10-8-13]
Part 17: Google's Faux Outrage Over NSA Spying – Part 17 Google Spying Series [11-1-13]
Part 18: Rebutting Mr. Ammori's "Blame the NSA not Google" USA Today Op-ed [11-23-13]
Part 19: Are Google Glass' Recordings Illegal Wiretapping Too? [12-9-13]
Part 20: Google's Robots and Creeping Militarization [1-9-14]
Part 23: Google's Titan Spy-Drones Mimic Spy-Planes [4-17-14]
Part 24: Google SkyBox Spy Satellites – Big Brother Always Watching [6-11-14]
Part 25: Dropcam Key to Google's New Ubiquitous Physical Surveillance Network [6-24-14]
Part 26: Google's WorldWideWatch over the WorldWideWeb [9-14]
Appendix 3: "Googlegate" Research Series
Part 1: How America Protects National Champion Google in the EU [3-5-15]
Part 2: FTC-Googlegate Scandal Repercussions in U.S. & EU [3-20-15]
Part 3: The Appearance of Google-USG Conflicts of Interest Grows [3-25-15]
Part 4: Googlegate -- The FTC Cover-up Evidence Piles Up [4-1-15]
Part 5: Googlegate II: The Evidence DOJ Made Google Criminal Case Go Away [4-8-15]
Part 6: Googlegate Email Shows FTC an Extension of Google's Lobby/Press Operation [5-15-15]
Part 7: Google Fiber's Corporate Welfare Vigorish for running the Game [8-6-15]
Part 8: Does U.S. Antitrust Law Apply to Google? [10-27-15]
Part 9: Does U.S. Children's Privacy Law Apply to Google? [12-3-15]
Part 10: Why Google Can't Criticize EU Much for Ruling it Dominant & Anticompetitive [2-3-16]
Part 11: Questioning Google's Extraordinary Influence over U.S. Government Decisions [2-11-16]
Part 12: Must-Read: Intercept's Exposé on Google's Remarkably Close White House Ties [4-22-16]
Part 13: Google's Government Influence Nixed Competition for Winner-Take All Results [10-25-17]