Philosophy of Cognitive Science > Science of Consciousness > Consciousness and Psychology > The Stream of Consciousness
The Stream of Consciousness
Cognitive Models of Consciousness (209)
Attention and Consciousness in Psychology (595)
Metacognition and Consciousness (130)
Control and Consciousness (132)
Action and Consciousness in Psychology (269)
Emotion and Consciousness in Psychology (4,238)
Time and Consciousness in Psychology (163)
Self-Consciousness in Psychology (465)
Development of Consciousness (300)
Consciousness and Psychology, Foundational Issues (66)
Consciousness and Psychology, Misc (118)
Conscious Thought (129)
Temporal Experience (713 | 253)
Mental Actions (296)
States of Consciousness, Misc (58)
Consciousness and Language (68)
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Women's Ancient Stories: Archetype and Meaning.Maxson J. McDowell - manuscriptdetails
The author interprets three stories from recently Neolithic cultures (Melanesian, African Bushman, and Inuit) and a fourth story from an oral tradition of Haitian women. All four are about women and perhaps, judging by their content, composed by women. The author trained with Edward Whitmont and developed his interpretation technique in decades of practice with dreams as a Jungian analyst. He adds a new tool, the use of repetition, in which the same point is made by a series of different (...) details. Repetition provides an internal test for the accuracy of an interpretation. The author updates Jung's concept of archetypes to incorporate an understanding of Darwinian evolution (which Jung lacked), new knowledge of the function of genes, and new knowledge of the emergence of complexity in dynamic and adaptive systems. He compares his interpretations of the four stories with other scholars' interpretations, in particular the extraordinary work of Michael Wessels on African Bushman legends. Though Wessels criticized Jung for imposing his 'colonial' theory of universal archetypes, both Jung and Wessels insisted that interpretation requires a dialogue between two agents in which both are subjects, neither being dominated or objectified. In the four stories, the author shows, symbolic consciousness began with women. The anthropologist Chris Knight proposed something similar in 1991 in his controversial book Blood Relations: Menstruation and the Origins of Culture. (shrink)
Evolution of Consciousness in Philosophy of Cognitive Science
The Stream of Consciousness in Philosophy of Cognitive Science
Why does the mind wander?Joshua Shepherd - forthcoming - Neuroscience of Consciousness.details
I seek an explanation for the etiology and the function of mind wandering episodes. My proposal – which I call the cognitive control proposal – is that mind wandering is a form of non-conscious guidance due to cognitive control. When the agent's current goal is deemed insufficiently rewarding, the cognitive control system initiates a search for a new, more rewarding goal. This search is the process of unintentional mind wandering. After developing the proposal, and relating it to literature on mind (...) wandering and on cognitive control, I discuss explanations the proposal affords, testable predictions the proposal makes, and philosophical implications the proposal has. (shrink)
Attention and Action in Philosophy of Mind
Conscious Thought in Philosophy of Mind
Control and Consciousness in Philosophy of Cognitive Science
Philosophy of Psychology, Misc in Philosophy of Cognitive Science
William James's stream of consciousness and the river of the unconscious Joyce and Proust.Gian Balsamo - 2017 - In David Howell Evans (ed.), Understanding James, Understanding Modernism. Bloomsbury Academic.details
William James in 19th Century Philosophy
Temporal Experience: Models, Methodology and Empirical Evidence.Maria Kon & Kristie Miller - 2015 - Topoi 34 (1):201-216.details
This paper has two aims. First, to bring together the models of temporal phenomenology on offer and to present these using a consistent set of distinctions and terminologies. Second, to examine the methodologies currently practiced in the development of these models. To that end we present an abstract characterisation in which we catalogue all extant models. We then argue that neither of the two extreme methodologies currently discussed is suitable to the task of developing a model of temporal phenomenology. An (...) entirely top-down methodology is largely insensitive to empirical findings, while one that is entirely bottom-up is insensitive to both introspective evidence and more general philosophical considerations. We recommend a methodology that falls between these two extremes. (shrink)
Cognitive Models of Consciousness in Philosophy of Cognitive Science
Experience of Temporal Passage in Philosophy of Mind
Temporal Experience, Misc in Philosophy of Mind
The Specious Present in Philosophy of Mind
External control of the stream of consciousness: Stimulus-based effects on involuntary thought sequences.Christina Merrick, Melika Farnia, Tiffany K. Jantz, Adam Gazzaley & Ezequiel Morsella - 2015 - Consciousness and Cognition 33:217-225.details
The Continuity of Consciousness.Oliver Rashbrook - 2013 - European Journal of Philosophy 21 (4):611-640.details
: In this paper I discuss two puzzles that concern the sense in which consciousness can be described as 'continuous'. The first puzzle arises out of recent work by Dainton and Tye, both of whom appear to oscillate between ascribing the property of 'continuity' to the stream of experience, and ascribing it to the objects of experience. The second puzzle concerns the notion that the stream of consciousness could be in some sense unreal or illusory—a puzzle stemming from the thought (...) that some of the brain processes underlying consciousness do not exhibit continuity. I argue that these problems can be solved by distinguishing between three possible bearers of the property of 'continuity'—(1) the State of Consciousness, (2) the Stream of Experience, and (3) what is represented by experience—and two different senses of 'continuity'—'strict' and 'extreme' continuity. I conclude by providing a positive account of the continuity of consciousness, according to which the State of Consciousness exhibits 'strict' continuity, and the Stream of Experience exhibits 'extreme' continuity. (shrink)
The Unity of Consciousness in Philosophy of Mind
An Appearance of Succession Requires a Succession of Appearances.Oliver Rashbrook - 2013 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 87 (3):584-610.details
A familiar slogan in the literature on temporal experience is that 'a succession of appearances, in and of itself, does not amount to an experience of succession'. I show that we can distinguish between a strong and a weak sense of this slogan. I diagnose the strong interpretation of the slogan as requiring the support of an assumption I call the 'Seems→Seemed' claim. I then show that commitment to this assumption comes at a price: if we accept it, we either (...) have to reject the extremely plausible idea that experience is as it seems, or we are forced to provide an account of temporal experience that isn't compatible with the phenomenology. I conclude by noting that the only plausible interpretation of the slogan is the weak interpretation, and outline a positive account of temporal experience, according to which an appearance of succession requires a succession of appearances. (shrink)
Intentionalist Theories of Perception in Philosophy of Mind
Broad's Accounts of Temporal Experience.Oliver William Rashbrook - 2012 - Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy 1 (5).details
Two extremely detailed accounts of temporal experience can be found in the work of C. D. Broad. These accounts have been subject to considerable criticism. I argue that, when we look more carefully at Broad's work, we find that much of this criticism fails to find its target. I show that the objection that ultimately proves troubling for Broad stems from his commitment to two principles: i) the Thin-PSA, and ii) the 'Overlap' claim. I use this result to demonstrate that (...) we can learn two extremely important lessons from Broad's work on temporal experience. -/- The first lesson is that there is a structural problem facing any account that commits to these two principles. This is significant given that a number of recent accounts of temporal experience are so committed. The second lesson is that the problem facing these accounts stems only from commitment to the Thin-PSA and 'Overlap', rather than to commitment to a particular conception of how experiences are to be individuated. This, I argue, gives us reason to reject Tye's recent claim that the problems facing accounts of temporal experience can be dissolved simply by making stipulations about how experiences are to be individuated. (shrink)
C. D. Broad in 20th Century Philosophy
Representationalism in Philosophy of Mind
Un braconnage impossible : le courant de conscience de William James et la durée réelle de Bergson.Mathias Girel - 2011 - In Stéphane Madelrieux (ed.), Bergson et James, cent ans après. Puf. pp. 27-56.details
James a maintes fois célébré les rencontres philosophiques et l'on sait les efforts de James et de Bergson pour se voir, lors des passages de James en Europe. Proximité physique ne signifie évidemment pas convergence ni capillarité philosophiques, comme l'apprend à ses dépens Agathon dans le Banquet de Platon. Or, le rapprochement, mais aussi les confusions, entre la philosophie de Bergson et celle de James, voire entre « bergsonisme » et « pragmatisme », restent un passage obligé de l'étude des (...) deux hommes. Si cette confusion — peut-être ces familles de confusions — sont caractéristiques du début du XXe siècle , il serait sans doute illusoire de croire que nous en sommes sortis aujourd'hui. C'est en France une expérience encore très répandue chez le jamesien que devoir se justifier par rapport au « bergsonisme », et c'en est une autre pour le « bergsonien » que de devoir dire qu'il n'est pas forcément « pragmatiste ». Ces glissements ont déjà été maintes fois analysés et je tiendrai ici pour acquis que Horace Kallen , Floris Delattre , Ralph Barton Perry et Millic Capek , qui ont procédé à la revue de détail, nous ont donné suffisamment d'éléments pour qu'il ne soit pas nécessaire de reprendre le dossier dans son ensemble. Le propos sera plutôt de décomposer un travers de lecture que l'on inflige généralement aux deux auteurs à partir d'un terrain plus limité : le thème du « courant », ou flux (stream), de conscience, thème prétendument commun aux deux hommes. Je vais pour cela tenter d'identifier, dans la première section, deux grandes manières d'aborder le rapport entre les deux hommes qui ont conduit à méconnaître leur apport propre. L'une interdit tout simplement de les lire comme philosophes, même si elle est couramment pratiquée, ce que j'illustrerai à la lumière de deux exemples. L'autre type de lecture engage, lui, un contresens sur la thèse même de James, et c'est ici que la face critique de ce chapitre se retourne en argument positif. Le cœur de ce contresens est de croire que James aurait introduit le thème du courant de pensée ou de conscience, et que ce serait là son originalité. Or, comme il est normal chez un auteur pragmatiste après tout, l'originalité réside dans l'usage qui est fait de ce thème. En examinant dans la deuxième section les rouages de ce contresens, dont il n'est pas certain que tous les lecteurs de Bergson l'aient totalement évité alors même qu'ils pensaient le déposer, on tentera donc de préciser tout d'abord en quoi le thème lui-même n'est pas spécifiquement jamesien, ensuite en quoi le propos de James n'est pas tant de décrire ce flux pour lui-même que de nous expliquer ce qui nous guette si nous le négligeons systématiquement, enfin quelles sont les fonctions remplies par les passages sur le courant de conscience dans l'argument de James. (shrink)
Henri Bergson in 20th Century Philosophy
Phenomenal Continuity and the Bridge Problem.Johan E. Gustafsson - 2011 - Philosophia 39 (2):289-296.details
Any theory that analyses personal identity in terms of phenomenal continuity needs to deal with the ordinary interruptions of our consciousness that it is commonly thought that a person can survive. This is the bridge problem. The present paper offers a novel solution to the bridge problem based on the proposal that dreamless sleep need not interrupt phenomenal continuity. On this solution one can both hold that phenomenal continuity is necessary for personal identity and that persons can survive dreamless sleep.
Consciousness, Sleep, and Dreaming in Philosophy of Cognitive Science
Personal Identity, Misc in Metaphysics
Attention as Structuring of the Stream of Consciousness.Sebastian Watzl - 2011 - In Christopher Mole, Declan Smithies & Wayne Wu (eds.), Attention: Philosophical and Psychological Essays. Oxford University Press. pp. 145.details
This paper defends and develops the structuring account of conscious attention: attention is the conscious mental process of structuring one's stream of consciousness so that some parts of it are more central than others. In the first part of the paper, I motivate the structuring account. Drawing on a variety of resources I argue that the phenomenology of attention cannot be fully captured in terms of how the world appears to the subject, as well as against an atomistic conception of (...) attention. In the second part of the paper, I show how the structuring account can be made precise: attention causes and causally sustains phenomenal relations to hold between the parts of the stream of consciousness; most importantly the relation of one part being peripheral to another. I end by pointing out consequences for both the scientific study of attention as well as for several areas of central philosophical interest. (shrink)
Attention and Consciousness in Philosophy of Mind
Attention and Consciousness in Psychology in Philosophy of Cognitive Science
The Nature of Attention in Philosophy of Mind
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Riverrun' Running Through 'The Stream of Life'.Alexandra Teresa Yancey - 2008 - Semiotics:917-924.details
Artificial Consciousness.Antonio Chella & Riccardo Manzotti - 2007 - Imprint Academic.details
And why is there a subjective component to experience?). It is easy to see that the separation between Weak and Strong Artificial Consciousness mirrors the separation between the easy problems and the hard problems of consciousness.
Embodiment and Situated Cognition in Philosophy of Cognitive Science
Machine Consciousness in Philosophy of Cognitive Science
Machine Mentality, Misc in Philosophy of Cognitive Science
Quantum Mechanisms of Consciousness in Philosophy of Cognitive Science
Robotics in Philosophy of Cognitive Science
I-SELF: A connectionist model of the self or just a general learing model? Comment on "connectionism and self: James, Mead, and the stream of enculturated consciousness" by Kashima et al.Bettina Hannover & Ulrich Kühnen - 2007 - Psychological Inquiry 18 (2):102-107.details
George Herbert Mead in 19th Century Philosophy
Self-Consciousness in Psychology in Philosophy of Cognitive Science
Connectionism and self: James, Mead, and the stream of enculturated consciousness.Yoshihisa Kashima, Aparna Kanakatte Gurumurthy, Lucette Ouschan, Trevor Chong & Jason Mattingley - 2007 - Psychological Inquiry 18 (2):73-96.details
Wandering minds.D. Kleinfeld - 2007 - Science 315 (393).details
material on Science Online. 25. E. Salinas, T. J. Sejnowski, J. Neurosci. 20, 6193 (2000). 14. L. J. Borg-Graham, C. Monier, Y. Fregnac, Nature 393, 26. B. Haider, A. Duque, A. R. Hasenstaub, D. A. McCormick, 11 September 2006; accepted 23 November 2006.
Stream of Consciousness.Joel Krueger - 2007 - In John Lachs & Robert Talisse (eds.), Encyclopedia of American Philosophy. Routledge.details
Sense as a 'translation' of mental contents.Andrea Lavazza - 2007 - In Antonio Chella & Riccardo Manzotti (eds.), Artificial Consciousness. Imprint Academic. pp. 82-96.details
Content and the stream of consciousness.Matthew Soteriou - 2007 - Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):543–568.details
Toward a continuity of consciousness.Michael Spivey & Sarah Cargill - 2007 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (1):216-233.details
Real-time cognition is continuous in time and contiguous in mental state space. This temporal continuity implies that the majority of mental life is spent in states that are partially consistent with multiple representations. The state-space contiguity implies that different cognitive processes interact in ways that make them quite non-modular. As the evidence for such information-permeability expands to include not just neural subsystems but also the entire brain and even the entire organism, this radical interactionism leads one to hypothesize that mental (...) activity, and perhaps consciousness itself, is something that emerges amid the interface between one's body and one's environment. We portray mental activity as a continuous trajectory through a brain-body-environment state space, where close visitations with labelled attractors may constitute reportable self- consciousness and traversals through unlabeled regions may constitute unutterable immediate conscious awareness. (shrink)
Paddling in the stream of consciousness: Describing the movement of Jamesian inquiry.J. Kaag - 2006 - Journal of Speculative Philosophy 20 (2):132-145.details
Husserl: Philosophy of Mind in Continental Philosophy
The stream of consciousness: XXIX. Does consciousness exist? (Second part).Thomas Natsoulas - 2006 - Imagination, Cognition and Personality 25 (1):69-84.details
Do We Dream in Color? Cultural Variations and Skepticism.Eric Schwitzgebel - 2006 - Dreaming 16:36-.details
Predicting the stream of consciousness from activity in human visual cortex.John-Dylan Haynes & Geraint Rees - 2005 - Current Biology 15 (14):1301-7.details
Binocular Rivalry in Philosophy of Cognitive Science
Onflow: Dynamics of Consciousness and Experience.Ralph Jason Pred - 2005 - Cambridge MA: Bradford Book/MIT Press.details
Honorable Mention, 2007 Book Prize competition sponsored by the Canadian Philosophical Association.In Onflow, Ralph Pred supplies an account of the nature of ...
Could the stream of consciousness flow through the brain?Thomas Bittner - 2004 - Philosophia 31 (3-4):449-473.details
Precis: Stream of Consciousness.Barry Dainton - 2004 - PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 10.details
That our ordinary everyday experience exhibits both unity and continuity is uncontroversial, and on the face of it utterly unmysterious. At any moment we have some conscious awareness of both the world about us, as revealed through our perceptual experiences, and our own inner states – our bodily sensations, thoughts, mental images and so on. Since once wakened we tend to stay awake for several hours, tracing out continuous routes through whatever environment we happen to find ourselves in, it is (...) hardly surprising that our experience itself is continuous rather than discontinuous. (shrink)
Neurocognitive mechanisms underlying the experience of flow.Arne Dietrich - 2004 - Consciousness and Cognition 13 (4):746-761.details
Recent theoretical and empirical work in cognitive science and neuroscience is brought into contact with the concept of the flow experience. After a brief exposition of brain function, the explicit–implicit distinction is applied to the effortless information processing that is so characteristic of the flow state. The explicit system is associated with the higher cognitive functions of the frontal lobe and medial temporal lobe structures and has evolved to increase cognitive flexibility. In contrast, the implicit system is associated with the (...) skill-based knowledge supported primarily by the basal ganglia and has the advantage of being more efficient. From the analysis of this flexibility/efficiency trade-off emerges a thesis that identifies the flow state as a period during which a highly practiced skill that is represented in the implicit system's knowledge base is implemented without interference from the explicit system. It is proposed that a necessary prerequisite to the experience of flow is a state of transient hypofrontality that enables the temporary suppression of the analytical and meta-conscious capacities of the explicit system. Examining sensory-motor integration skills that seem to typify flow such as athletic performance, writing, and free-jazz improvisation, the new framework clarifies how this concept relates to creativity and opens new avenues of research. (shrink)
Philosophy of Neuroscience, Misc in Philosophy of Cognitive Science
Skills in Philosophy of Action
Aesthetic experience: Marcel Proust and the neo-Jamesian structure of awareness.David Galin - 2004 - Consciousness and Cognition 13 (2):241-253.details
Aesthetic Experience in Aesthetics
Perception, affect and epiphenomenalism: Commentary on Mangan's.William S. Robinson - 2004 - PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 10.details
This commentary begins by explaining how Mangan's important work leads to a question about the relation between non-sensory experiences and perception. Reflection on affect then suggests an addition to Mangan's view that may be helpful on this and perhaps some other questions. Finally, it is argued that acceptance of non-sensory experiences is fully compatible with epiphenomenalism.
Epiphenomenalism in Philosophy of Mind
Machine Consciousness.Owen Holland (ed.) - 2003 - Imprint Academic.details
In this collection of essays we hear from an international array of computer and brain scientists who are actively working from both the machine and human ends...
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The stream of consciousness: XXVIII. Does consciousness exist? (First part).Thomas Natsoulas - 2003 - Imagination, Cognition and Personality 23 (2):121-141.details
Language re-entrance and the 'inner voice'.Luc Steels - 2003 - Journal of Consciousness Studies (4-5):174-185.details
As soon as we stop talking aloud, we seem to experience a kind of 'inner voice', a steady stream of verbal fragments expressing ongoing thoughts. What kind of information processing structures are required to explain such a phenomenon? Why would an 'inner voice' be useful? How could it have arisen? This paper explores these questions and reports briefly some computational experiments to help elucidate them.
There is no stream of consciousness.Susan J. Blackmore - 2002 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 9 (5-6):17-28.details
Throughout history there have been people who say it is all illusion. I think they may be right. But if they are right what could this mean? If you just say "It's all an illusion" this gets you nowhere - except that a whole lot of other questions appear. Why should we all be victims of an illusion, instead of seeing things the way they really are? What sort of illusion is it anyway? Why is it like that and not (...) some other way? Is it possible to see through the illusion? And if so what happens next. (shrink)
Aspects of Consciousness in Philosophy of Mind
Streams of consciousness.Alumit Ishai - 2002 - Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience 14 (6):832-833.details
Science of Visual Consciousness in Philosophy of Cognitive Science
Subcategories of "fringe consciousness" and their related nonconscious contexts.Elisabeth Norman - 2002 - PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 8.details
Conscious and Unconscious Memory in Philosophy of Cognitive Science
Emotion and Consciousness in Psychology in Philosophy of Cognitive Science
On focus and fringe in explicit mental processing.Maxim I. Stamenov - 2002 - In Kunio Yasue, Marj Jibu & Tarcisio Della Senta (eds.), No Matter, Never Mind. John Benjamins. pp. 33--145.details
No Matter, Never Mind: Proceedings of Toward a Science of Consciousness : Fundamental Approaches (Tokyo '99).Kunio Yasue, Mari Jibu & Tarcisio Della Senta (eds.) - 2002 - John Benjamins.details
This international selection of 34 papers from the Tokyo '99 conference held at the United Nations University gives a valuable state of the art overview of consciousness research. Not only the recognized European and American approaches but also the distinguishing approaches from many Japanese researchers are presented. It will provide a world-wide audience with a comprehensive outlook for the remarkable potential contribution in the future scene of consciousness research.The Tokyo '99 declaration to promote scientists' ethical warning against the thoughtless aiming (...) of consciousness research at warfare is also included.(Series B). (shrink)
Category Theory in Philosophy of Mathematics
Consciousness and Neuroscience, Foundational Issues in Philosophy of Cognitive Science
Consciousness and Neuroscience, Misc in Philosophy of Cognitive Science
Consciousness and Physics, Misc in Philosophy of Cognitive Science
Godelian Arguments Against AI in Philosophy of Cognitive Science
Neural Correlates of Consciousness in Philosophy of Cognitive Science
Pleasure and Pain in Philosophy of Mind
Quantum Mechanics, Misc in Philosophy of Physical Science
Susanne Langer and William James: Art and the dynamics of the stream of consciousness.Donald Dryden - 2001 - Journal of Speculative Philosophy 15 (4):272-285.details
Sensation's ghost: The nonsensory fringe of consciousness.Bruce Mangan - 2001 - PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 7.details
Non-sensory experiences represent almost all context information in consciousness. They condition most aspects of conscious cognition including voluntary retrieval, perception, monitoring, problem solving, emotion, evaluation, meaning recognition. Many peculiar aspects of non-sensory qualia (e.g., they resist being 'grasped' by an act of attention) are explained as adaptations shaped by the cognitive functions they serve. The most important nonsensory experience is coherence or "rightness." Rightness represents degrees of context fit among contents in consciousness, and between conscious and non-conscious processes. Rightness (not (...) familiarity) is the feeling-of-knowing in implicit cognition. The experience of rightness suggests that neural mechanisms "compute" signals indicating the global dynamics of network integration. (shrink)
The concrete state continued.Thomas Natsoulas - 2001 - Journal of Mind and Behavior 22 (4):451-474.details
I continue here to consider concretely the states of consciousness that are held to be the fundamental durational components of James's famous stream — my ideal purpose being to arrive eventually at a general description applicable to every one of them. I closely attend therefore to James's account of the sense of personal identity, not for its own sake but for what it further reveals regarding the specific states of consciousness that James called individually "the present, judging Thought." These states, (...) which are the inner awarenesses, remembrances, and appropriations of other states of consciousness in the same stream, are supposed to provide us with a sense of our own diachronic continuity. According to James, they are the only "I" there is. I bring out among other things that, notwithstanding James's rejection of an entitative Ego responsible for apprehending and appropriating the states of consciousness and other components of our empirical "me," James in effect assigned this job to the total brain process. Embodying all the information required, it is this physical process that is proposed to produce each Thought full-blown. (shrink)
The stream of consciousness: XXV. Awareness as commentary (part I).Thomas Natsoulas - 2001 - Imagination, Cognition and Personality 21 (4):347-366.details
The case for intrinsic theory: Incompatibilities within the stream of consciousness.Thomas Natsoulas - 2001 - Journal of Mind and Behavior 22 (2):119-145.details
In The Varieties of Religious Experience, James explores in some depth, among much else, a kind of dividedness that can exist within the stream of consciousness — "the divided self." This condition of the stream consists in crucial part of a phenomenological heterogeneity, inconsistency, discordance, or division of which disapproving notice is taken subjectively. The pertinent discordance exists among states of consciousness that comprise the same stream, is evident directly to inner awareness, and is not necessarily a matter of positing (...) or inferring the existence of a second stream of consciousness or an unconscious mental life. Typically, intrinsic theorists of inner awareness — or the immediate awareness we all have of at least some of our own mental-occurrence instances — disagree with appendage theorists concerning, inter alia, what the firsthand evidence reveals about inner awareness. I proffer in the present article an hypothesis that should help to explain why the first-person reports of appendage theorists contradict intrinsic theory with regard to inner awareness. My hypothesis derives from James's discussion in Varieties of the not uncommon divided-self phenomenon. (shrink)
The concrete state: The basic components of James's stream of consciousness.Thomas Natsoulas - 2001 - Journal of Mind and Behavior 22 (4):427-449.details
The basic components of James's stream of consciousness are considered concretely and in a way that tends to be relatively neutral from a theoretical perspective. My ultimate goal is a general description of the states of consciousness, but I try here to be more "observational" than "theoretical" about them. Giving attention to James's reports of his personal firsthand evidence, I proceed as though I were conversing with this most phenomenological and radically empirical of psychological authors. I disagree with James on (...) some points but, also, I find many of his claims acceptable and base my own view on a thesis fundamental to his perspective: A stream of consciousness consists of a succession, one at a time, of unitary states and all of the other mental occurrences that are conscious are features of such states. This is an effort to see more clearly together with James, not an exercise of correcting errors in how he treated of our topic. (shrink)
The effect of motivation on the stream of consciousness: Generalizing from a neurocomputational model of cingulo-frontal circuits controlling saccadic eye movements.Marica Bernstein, Samantha Stiehl & John Bickle - 2000 - In Ralph D. Ellis & Natika Newton (eds.), The Caldron of Consciousness: Motivation, Affect and Self-Organization. John Benjamins. pp. 133-160.details
Consciousness and Neuroscience in Philosophy of Cognitive Science
A linguist's perspective on William James and "the stream of thought.".Wallace Chafe - 2000 - Consciousness and Cognition 9 (4):618-628.details
Stream of Consciousness: Unity and Continuity in Conscious Experience.Barry Dainton - 2000 - Routledge.details
_Stream of Consciousness_ is about the phenomenology of conscious experience. Barry Dainton shows us that stream of consciousness is not a mosaic of discrete fragments of experience, but rather an interconnected flowing whole. Through a deep probing into the nature of awareness, introspection, phenomenal space and time consciousness, Dainton offers a truly original understanding of the nature of consciousness.
Philosophy of Consciousness in Philosophy of Mind
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The Caldron of Consciousness: Motivation, Affect and Self-Organization.Ralph D. Ellis (ed.) - 2000 - John Benjamins.details
Artificial Intelligence Methodology in Philosophy of Cognitive Science
Development of Consciousness in Philosophy of Cognitive Science
Substantive thoughts about substantive thought: A reply to Galin.Russell Epstein - 2000 - Consciousness and Cognition 9 (4):584-590.details
In his commentary, David Galin raises several important issues that deserve to be addressed. In this response, I do three things. First, I briefly discuss the relation between the present work and the metaphoric theories of thought developed by cognitive lin- guists such as Lakoff and Johnson (1998). Second, I address some of the confusions that seem to have arisen about my use of the terms ''substantive thought'' and ''nucleus.'' Third, I briefly discuss some of the directions that Galin suggests (...) for further research. (shrink)
Bertrand Russell in 20th Century Philosophy
The neural-cognitive basis of the Jamesian stream of thought.Russell Epstein - 2000 - Consciousness and Cognition 9 (4):550-575.details
William James described the stream of thought as having two components: (1) a nucleus of highly conscious, often perceptual material; and (2) a fringe of dimly felt contextual information that controls the entry of information into the nucleus and guides the progression of internally directed thought. Here I examine the neural and cognitive correlates of this phenomenology. A survey of the cognitive neuroscience literature suggests that the nucleus corresponds to a dynamic global buffer formed by interactions between different regions of (...) the brain, while the fringe corresponds to a set of mechanisms in the frontal and medial temporal lobes that control the contents of this global buffer. A consequence of this account is that there might be conscious imagistic representations that are not part of the nucleus. I argue that phenomenology can be linked to psychology and neuroscience and a meaningful way that illuminates both. (shrink)