Viewing posts from: ICC
LNA Military Prosecutor Office turns down the ICC appeal
On 17 November, the Libyan National Army (LNA) Military Prosecutor, Gen. Faraj al-Sousa, refused the International Criminal Court's (ICC) appeal to apprehend the al-Saiqa Special Forces unit commander, Maj Mahmoud al-Warfalli, to stand trial for alleged war crimes. Al-Sousa said they have already cooperated with the ICC concerning a number of alleged war crimes and human rights violations in Libya, and that al-Warfalli was already under domestic investigation in Libya.
On 6 November, the ICC prosecutor, Fatou Bensouda, renewed her call upon relevant authorities in Libya to apprehend Saif al-Islam Qadhafi, Maj Mahmoud Al-Warfalli and Al-Tuhami Mohammed Khalid (Qadhafi Libya head of the Internal Security Directorate) Maj Mahmoud Al-Warfalli. Bensouda stated the current cycle of violence and impunity provided a breeding ground for atrocities in Libya. Referencing "reliable information" Bensouda made known the ICC's view on the whereabouts of all three suspects: Saif is in Zintan, Al-Tuhami is in Cairo, while al-Waraflli is in Benghazi where he still in command of a Saiqa unit. Bensouda deplored the promotion of al-Warfalli twice since the ICC issued a first arrest warrant against him in August 2017, a second arrest warrant in July 2018.
The LNA Military Prosecutor issued an investigation order of Al-Warfalli in August 2017 following the ICC arrest warrant. However, the court proceedings were never publicized nor ever reached a final verdict. Later in July 2018, Hafter was pressured by the ICC into ordering an immediate arrest of al-Warfalli. However, al-Warfalli resisted the arrest order, leading his fellow soldiers to stage a protest across Benghazi. Despite this, he was apprehended. The LNA is likely to continue in declining the ICC calls of surrendering al-Warfalli. Al-Warfalli remains popular in Benghazi and the LNA's extradition would likely cause schisms within the local population, as well as outrage on behalf of Madkhalist Salafists within the LNA's rank and file.
Double Benghazi bombing leads to LNA execution of suspects and international backlash against Werfalli
On 23 January, a dual bombing in Benghazi led to at least 40 deaths, with many of those critically injured in the initial attack subsequently dying from their wounds. The first bomb went off outside the Bayaat al-Radwan mosque in the central al-Salmani district, as worshippers were leaving evening prayers. Around 10 to 15 minutes later, after security and health officials had arrived on the scene, a second more powerful blast was reportedly detonated from a Mercedes parked on the opposite side of the street. The victims include both Libyan National Army (LNA) fighters (who control the city) and civilians. No one has claimed responsibility for the attack.
This shocking attack triggered another atrocity reportedly perpetrated by Mahmoud al-Werfalli, the field commander of the LNA's Special Forces division. On 24 January, Werfalli publicly executed twelve people imprisoned by the LNA, who were accused of being jihadists. The video of the executions shows a man who resembles Werfalli shooting the prisoners at the site of the bombings. On 26 January, five more bodies were discovered in a dump in the Lithi area of Benghazi, with notices attached to their bodies accusing them of being jihadists. On 28 January, LNA fighters also arrested a 'terror' cell in Jalou near Ajkherra after walls were vandalised in support of the bombing attack in Benghazi.
These developments sparked widespread local and international condemnation, with UNSMIL and a number of Western countries calling for the implementation of the International Criminal Court (ICC) arrest warrant for al-Werfalli. The ICC issued an arrest warrant for Werfalli in August 2017 due to video evidence of his orchestration and participation in the execution of prisoners in Benghazi, which amounts to war crimes. After the ICC issued the warrant, the LNA announced it was investigating him and had detained him, though his whereabouts were unclear. However, it is now clear that the LNA has so far been unable to arrest Werfalli due to public support for his actions in Benghazi.
If LNA leader Khalifa Haftar were to arrest Werfalli or hand him over to the ICC, then he would likely lose a great deal of support in the city and he cannot afford to lose any of his current power base. Despite Werfalli's brutal tactics, he is supported by many for taking a hard line against the anti-LNA forces that have been carrying out attacks in eastern Libya for many years. While there may be some international pressure on Haftar to arrest and try Werfalli for his crimes, the ICC has no power to extradite Werfalli and the international community feels it has more to gain from persuading Haftar to participate in the UN political process than from ostracising him over his human rights record. Werfalli is theoretically under Haftar's command, therefore the reoccurrence of public summary executions either has Haftar's blessing, or means Haftar has little control over the actions of those under his command.
Defusing the Ticking 'Jihadist' Timebomb: Can Transitional Justice Help Counter the Trend of Radicalisation in Tunisia?
In a new working paper published by Hate Speech International, Houda Mzioudet and Rhiannon Smith discuss radicalization in Tunisia and whether the country's Transitional Justice process can help diffusing a 'jihadist' timebomb in the country. The 29-page report offers insight into radicalisation and violent extremism in Tunisia, looks at its root causes and gives an overview of the Transitional Justice process and its role in the struggle against radicalization in the country. Its key findings are:
Transitional Justice Allows Grievances To Be Aired, But Justice Must Also Be Seen To Be Done: If the perpetrators of human rights violations made public through the TDC hearings are not prosecuted or held accountable in some form, there is a risk that the process of publically airing human rights abuses and grievances will actually reinvigorate public anger and frustration, potentially radicalising a new cohort of disenfranchised Tunisians.
Transitional Justice Can Help Redress Past Abuses Against Islamists But Not At The Cost Of Justice For Other Victims: By introducing reforms and establishing justice mechanism which appear to favour one section of society over another, the legitimacy and effectiveness of transitional justice mechanisms is likely to be undermined and could create a backlash which reignites tensions. There is a danger that a zero-sum approach to justice will lead to a cycle of repression and retribution which is likely to facilitate further radicalisation rather than preventing it.
Transitional Justice Mechanisms Can Help Seek Justice For Terrorism But Should Not Be Used As An Excuse For An Arbitrary Crackdown On Islamists: Excessive use of violence by the state legitimises the use of violence by those opposed to it, facilitating radicalisation. Transitional justice mechanisms should aim to create wide reaching institutional and systemic reforms which can tackle the root causes of the systemic grievances that led to the 2011 revolution and have also contributed to elevated levels of radicalisation among Tunisian youth.
Transitional Justice Mechanisms Can Help Bridge The Gap Between The Citizen And The State But Face Challenges in Implementation: Many of the grievances that sparked both the Tunisian revolution and the apparent acceleration of young Tunisians joining jihadist groups have their roots in the corruption and inequality that is endemic at an institutional level in Tunisia. Institutional change is by its very nature both excruciatingly slow and difficult to achieve. Transitional justice mechanisms have the potential to begin the process of reforming institutions and bridging the gap between the citizen and the state thereby treating, or at the very least recognising, the underlying cause of some of the country's current problems. However, this is dependent on the state not obstructing or undermining the transitional justice process.
UK asks Libya to extradite Hasham Abedi
Rhiannon Smith spoke to ITV News yesterday to discuss the request on 1 November by the UK government to extradite Hasham Abedi, the brother of Salman Abedi who carried out the attack on a concert in Manchester in May, from Libya. She explains that Abedi is currently held by the Rada Special Deterrent Forces in Libya and that even if the Government of National Accord (GNA) were to agree to the extradition, the GNA lacks the power, both politically and militarily, to compel Rada to hand him over. Given the political sensitivity in Libya around handing Libyans over to external powers and Libya's track record on failing to hand over internationally wanted figures(Saif al-Islam Qadhafi being the most notable example), Rada are unlikely to relinquish him, even if they say they will consider the request.
Click here to watch the video.
Smoking Gun Videos of Haftar Ordering War Crimes
In an article for the Just Security blog last week, Ryan Goodman, Professor of Law at New York University School of Law, and Alex Whiting, who spent eight years as an international criminal prosecutor at the International Criminal Tribunal, discuss the emergence of new video evidence that could implicate Khalifa Haftar in war crimes.
The International Criminal Court very recently issued an arrest warrant for a militia leader in Libya which should catch the attention of U.S. policymakers, diplomats and prosecutors because of the possibility that his most senior commander—an American citizen by the name of Khalifa Haftar—ordered soldiers to commit war crimes. So has General Haftar been telling his subordinates to carry out the very acts that are part of the International Court's arrest warrant, such as summary executions? Alex Whiting raised that prospect in a recent article at Just Security. Now startling video evidence of General Haftar's potentially doing just that has emerged, we can report. The videos of Haftar reinforce concerns about the American's criminal exposure and his suitability as an interlocutor in any diplomatic negotiations over the future of Libya. What's more, if these videos help prove Haftar is personally committing war crimes, individuals who support Haftar's military operations in the future, U.S. officials included, could also be exposed to criminal liability under international and domestic law.
LNA Says Werfalli Being Investigated Following ICC Warrant
On 18 August, the Libyan National Army (LNA) issued a positive response to an arrest warrant issued by the International Criminal Court against Mahmoud al-Werfalli, saying that the notorious commanderWerfalli has been suspended pending an investigation. The LNA's statement said, "The defendant in your judicial case, Mahmoud al-Werfalli, is under investigation for the cases against him by the general military prosecutor and is now under arrest". It also announced the LNA's "readiness to cooperate with you in informing you of the result and course of the judicial case," although it did not say that the LNA would be prepared to hand him over to the ICC. This prompted the US, UK and France to issue a joint statement on 19 August welcoming the LNA's announcement. Protests were held both in Benghazi and Bani Walid against the LNA's suspension of Werfalli.
Click here to read more about this.
ICC Issues Arrest Warrant for Mahmoud Werfalli
On 14 August, Pre-Trial Chamber I of the International Criminal Court (ICC) issued a warrant of arrest for Mahmoud Mustafa Busayf al-Werfalli over his allegedly responsible for murder as a war crime in Libya. The warrant states that Werfalli is alleged to have directly committed and to have ordered murder as a war crime in the context of seven incidents, involving 33 persons, which took place from on or before 3 June 2016 until on or about 17 July 2017 in Benghazi or surrounding areas, in Libya. Werfalli is a commander in the Libyan National Army (LNA) who has gained notoriety in recent months for filming executions of LNA prisoners in Benghazi. He resigned under local pressure earlier in the year but was reinstated by Khalifa Haftar shortly afterwards. This is the first ICC arrest warrant issued in the Libya situation for events that have taken place after the 2011 uprising and follows the Chief Prosecutor's statement that her office was considering expanding its investigations in Libya.allegedly responsible for murder as a war crime in the context of the non-international armed conflict in Libya.
Click here to see more details.
Zintani Militia Say They Have Released Saif al-Islam Qadhafi
On 9 June, the Zintani Abu Bakr al-Siddiq Battalion issued a statement saying it had released Saif al-Islam Qadhafi, the son and heir apparent of Muammar Qadhafi. The Zintani militia, which had been holding Saif since 2011, said it was acting on a request from the justice ministry of the House of Representative's (HoR) Bayda-based government. However, both the Zintan Military Council – which had previously been involved in his detention – and Zintan's Municipal Council have condemned his release.The HoR's defense and security committee also criticized the move, showing that opinion among officials in the east is also split.
Saif was sentenced to death in absentia by a Tripoli court in 2015 for war crimes. According to Reuters, a statement posted by the attorney general's office in Tripoli on 11 June said Saif was still wanted under that conviction and that an investigation had been launched into his reported release.He is also wanted by the International Criminal Court for crimes against humanity, committed during the 2011 uprisings against the Qadhafi regime.
There has not yet been any independent confirmation of his release. Some reports indicate Saif has fled to Tobruk, in eastern Libya. If Saif's release is confirmed, it is likely to provoke greater tension and hostilities between those who support Saif's release — and there were celebrations in many towns at the news of his release, including Sebha — and those who condemn it as a miscarriage of justice, further complicating Libya's chaotic political environment. The Zintanis have used Saif as one of their main bargaining chips since 2011 therefore it is unclear what deal could have been struck with elements within the HoR and the eastern faction to persuade them to release him.
The ICC, The African Court, and Libya: the case of Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi
Dr Mishana Hosseinioun, Aidan Ellis, Haydee Dijkstal and Sir Geoffrey Nice QC gave a fascinating talk for the Oxford Transitional Justice Research seminar series on 9 November 2016 about the case of Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi and how it is intertwined with the political predicament that Libya is experiencing today.
Click here to hear the full podcast of the talk.
Libya Rebuked in African Court Judgment on Saif Gaddafi Detention
"In a default Judgment issued 3 June 2016, The African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights has decided that Libya's incommunicado detention of Saif Gaddafi at an unknown location has violated and continues to violate Saif al-Islam Gaddafi's rights to liberty and to a fair trial." This judgement was advocated for by my old Oxford colleague, Mishana Hosseinioun. To read her press release on this development click here.
On 26 May 2016, the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC) reminded the UN Security Council of its responsibility to ensure that Libya surrenders Mr Gaddafi to that Court. The UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention has declared his detention unlawful. Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch and other NGOs have expressed deep concern at his treatment.
To read the full press release from the MH group click here.
Behind the Scenes in Skhirat and a Historical Parallel
That the UN has proven itself unable to root out corruption, unable to adjust its policies to changes in the political climate, and essentially a cumbersome bureaucracy that plods forward on autopilot, should come as no surprise to anyone who follows the organization closely.
Looking back, it is now clear the Skhirat deal was final made possible on Dec 17 after last minute efforts by the UN-envoy, Martin Kobler to assuage the HoR, Haftar and the Tubroq faction. He did this by obtaining the nomination of Ali Al-Gutrani (HoR Rep), for the position of Deputy PM in the GNA presidential council. Gutrani's role will be to safeguard the interests of the Haftar.
In a joint press conference with Kobler from his base in Eastern Libya, just one day before the signing, Haftar gave his implicit blessing for the GNA, saying that it was indeed urgently needed to combat terrorism and that it is 'in our favour, not against us' but noted his disapproval of the agreement in its current form. This statement showed that Kobler is merely continuing the biased pro-Tobruq policies of his predecessor Bernardino Leon.
It is key to recognize this now as the GNA is not actually a government of national accord in the normal sense as it is not the product of real negotiations between the two main competing blocs. It is more akin to the post-1951 government imposed by the UN with British support upon Libya, which was a continuation of previous big power politics and alliances in Libya and not a genuine turning of the page. Yes most of the Libyan population rightly preferred that to Bevin-Sforza but it was not a compromise solution between Bashar al-Saadawi and the Tripolitanian Arab Nationalists and and the more conservative forces in Cyrenaica. That is to say that the Sanussi Monarchy and the structures in Cyrenaica post-51 were essentially the same as those under the British Military Administration of Cyrenaica from 1942-49 and the connection to Britain was the same even though the labels were changed.
From this we can conclude that even if the GNA is to take root it will have the same weaknesses and biases of its component parts, i.e. pro-Haftar and pro-Misratan elements each of which draw support from their separate support bases without anything genuinely new actually having been created. In fact, the GNA is likely to represent the same failings of the HoR with the same alliances with international powers, except possibly worse as the GNA appears to be signalling a phase of greater international intervention in Libyan affairs rather than a movement to an organic solution over which Libyan ownership can be exerted.
Libya Back in the Limelight, Will Actors on The Ground Capitalize from it?
As written yesterday and in the previous days, the ongoing crisis in Libya is deepening with no side capable of achieving a significant breakthrough, whether in battle or in negotiations. This violent stalemate has progressively engulfed civilian areas and state infrastructures into the battle, spurring several Libyans to temporarily abandon the country via land routes to "wait out" the fighting.
In an article for the New York Times, Kareem Fahim reflects on the symbolic and moral importance that the devastation occurred in Tripoli's airport has had in spurring people to leave:
The battle for the airport has left it a gutted symbol of a disintegrating state. Lost in the rubble of the airport was the sense of collective purpose that seemed to unite Libyans not so long ago, during the revolt.
"If you're willing to destroy your airport — that idea of national sovereignty, that we're all in this together, then the issue of national identity is simply not as important as everyone thought it would be," said Dirk Vandewalle, an associate professor at Dartmouth College and an expert on Libya who has visited regularly since the revolution.
Realising that the latest Libyan crisis was not going to defuse itself from within, as it often happened in the recent past, international actors have increased their focus on events. The renewed sense of urgency about Libya is well reflect by a recent tweet of Italy's PM Matteo Renzi, who indicated events in the north African country as his only serious concern in this moment. However, it remains unclear what this renewed interest will concretely translate into and if any actor on the ground will be able to capitalise from it.
The Libya Herald quoted Libya's UN representative Ibrahim al-Dabashi threatening militias with a statement hinting at a possible hands-on approach from Western countries to the ongoing violence, as seen in 2011, and to future prosecution from the ICC. However, a conference call between US and EU leaders has so far led to a mere renewal of statements of support for the House of Representatives and for a bigger role to be played by the UN. Messages coming from the ground are likely to further embolden militias in their battle, as diplomatic missions are being progressively shut down and foreign expats evacuated from the country, the Libyan government struggle to gather international support for extinguishing the fire in Tripoli fuel tankers. Furthermore, public opinion in Western countries seems to be headed in a different direction than in 2011. This s well reflected by the wealth of op-eds and articles that are being published in these hours portraying and analysing events in Libya only through the prism of the NATO-led intervention; focusing on settling old scores of internal politics and over-exaggerating the importance that Western countries have had in the brewing of the ongoing crisis.
Melinda Taylor Finally Freed
A Libyan government spokesman says that Libya respects the ICC's immunity by freeing Melinda Taylor and her colleagues. Will Libya's armed brigades show that same respect? More on this story from Australia's ABC – Taylor Leaves Angered Libya Behind.
TONY EASTLEY: Three officials from the International Criminal Court who were also detained in Libya almost a month ago have also been released.
The ICC has expressed its regret over the incident as part of a deal to get the legal team freed.
The Libyan government's official spokesman has told AM that Melinda Taylor's disrespected the law and another official says it will not be safe for her to ever return.
ICC Captive Is Pawn in Struggle between Militias and the NTC
My latest on Al-Jazeera English Opinion ICC Captive Is Pawn in Struggle between Militias and the NTC: Four ICC officials detained by Libyan militia are prisoners of the political chaos gripping the North African state.
The fault lines dividing the interim Libyan central government from both the militias and the international community are starkly illustrated by the ongoing saga surrounding the detention of four International Criminal Court (ICC) officials in Libya since June 7.
In today's Libya, the NTC does not have a monopoly on force. Far from it. It is the plethora of regional militias that effectively control the country. This ongoing tug of war between the NTC and the militias does not bode well for Taylor and her colleagues. The most probable explanation for all the diplomatic manoeuvring is that the NTC simply lacks the power to compel the Zintani militia to release her, but simultaneously wishes to use the Taylor issue to stake out a populist position. Moreover, since Taylor's incarceration on June 7, the Libyans have a powerful bargaining chip to trade for the ICC's "determination" that Libya now possesses the judicial capacity to try Saif.
The NTC is clearly caught up in a zero-sum struggle for power with the militias, setting a bad precedent for the forging of a working relationship between the militias and the soon-to-be-elected new government. Caught in the whirlwind is Melinda Taylor, whose bosses at the ICC do not seem to appreciate how power is currently being contested in the new Libya. The ICC appears willing to appease the NTC, but what are they offering the Zintani militiamen who actually hold her captive? As far as I can tell, nothing.
ICC Expresses "Regret" over Staff Held in Libya
Reuters details the latest twist in the complex diplomacy regarding Melinda Taylor in their article — ICC expresses "regret" over staff held in Libya. In my reading, it appears that the ICC did the minimum necessary in terms of 'apologizing' to push the ball into the court of the Libyans and see what the NTC or the Zintanis will do next. But the NTC appears to be passing the buck as well — most likely because they can't cause Taylor's release because they have no power over the Zintanis and they are covering up for that by saying she compromised Libyan National security. Alternatively, they are able to effectuate her release but either think she is guilty or are making this into a populist issue where they can 'stand up' to the West. Any of these alternatives is very unfortunate and it doesn't look like Taylor will be leaving Zintan anytime soon.
"The ICC deeply regrets any events that may have given rise to concerns on the part of the Libyan authorities," the court said in a statement issued after a meeting at the court's headquarters in The Hague between Abdelaziz Al-Hassadi, the Libyan attorney general, and Sang-Hyun Song, the court's president.
Libya has said it will try Saif al-Islam, and has refused to extradite him.
But many question how strongly the writ of the capital Tripoli runs in the western mountain town of Zintan, where Saif al-Islam is being held and where the ICC staff were detained.
Libya Dashes Hopes of Early Release for Melinda Taylor
From Chris Stephens of the Guardian– Libya dashes hopes of early release for Australian ICC official: Melinda Taylor is being interrogated over claims documents were passed to Saif al-Islam Gaddafi, says government spokesman
The arrest of Taylor is spiralling into the most serious crisis in the ICC's 10-year history. Never before has one of its officials been arrested and held in detention.
The decision comes after the Australian foreign minister, Robert Carr, met Libya's prime minister, Abdulrahim el-Keib, earlier this week, announcing a hope that Taylor would be released if the ICC issued an "apology".
Carr said earlier this week that Tripoli would be likely to release Taylor if the ICC agreed that Saif could be tried in Libya, rather than The Hague.
But ICC judges can make such a decision only if they are satisfied that Libya, struggling to rebuild a shattered country after last year's civil war, can guarantee Saif al-Islam Gaddafi a fair trial with a fully functioning legal system.
Libya Wants ICC Hamstrung Via Aussie's Capture
An article I co-authored for the Australian — Libya wants ICC hamstrung via Aussie's capture
THE detention of International Criminal Court officials in Libya – including Australian Melinda Taylor – highlights the key fault lines in post-Gaddafi Libya among the central government, the militias and various international actors.
Taylor, a lawyer assigned to represent deposed dauphin Saif al-Islam Gaddafi, was incarcerated earlier this month for allegedly passing her client coded messages from Mohammad Ismael, a former Gaddafi-regime official wanted for war crimes.
Cognizant of its challenges, yet reluctant to relinquish its most prized prisoner, the NTC understood that another acrimonious meeting with ICC defense counsel would be detrimental to its case to try the younger Qadhafi. As Jihani told one of the authors in December, 'if we don't start to investigate and prosecute Saif, the demand to turn him over to the ICC will come.'
In arresting Taylor and her colleagues, the NTC has sought to hamstring the ICC's investigation while sending the court a message that Libya will not tolerate an infringement of its sovereignty.