Optimal strategic trade policy under asymmetric information
Larry D. QIU
Research Outputs (1)
When cost is private information in the Brander-Spencer model, the home government is confronted by a decision of choosing between two policy options: a menu of policies and a uniform policy. The former induces separation and so reveals the cost information to the foreign competitors. The latter helps the weak firm by concealing the cost information. The main result from this study is that policy menu is preferred to uniform policy under Cournot competition while the opposite occurs under Bertrand competition.
Journal of International Economics
https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-1996(94)90007-8
I wish to thank Brian Copeland, Guofu Tan, and two anonymous referees for their helpful comments on earlier versions of the paper. In particular, I am very grateful to Barbara Spencer and a referee for their extremely valuable advice and help which have led to great improvements in the quality of the paper. The usual disclaimer applies.
Strategic trade policy
Assymmetric information
Fingerprint Dive into the research topics of 'Optimal strategic trade policy under asymmetric information'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.
Strategic Trade Policy Business & Economics
Asymmetric Information Business & Economics
Information Costs Business & Economics
Menu Business & Economics
Bertrand Competition Business & Economics
Cournot Competition Business & Economics
Policy Options Business & Economics
Private Information Business & Economics
1 Other Article
QIU, L. D., Oct 2003, Journal of International Economics, 61, 1, p. 247-248 2 p.
Research output: Other Publications › Other Article › Communication
Separating Equilibrium
Bertrand Competition
QIU, L. D. (1994). Optimal strategic trade policy under asymmetric information. Journal of International Economics, 36(3-4), 333-354. https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-1996(94)90007-8
QIU, Larry D. / Optimal strategic trade policy under asymmetric information. In: Journal of International Economics. 1994 ; Vol. 36, No. 3-4. pp. 333-354.
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title = "Optimal strategic trade policy under asymmetric information",
abstract = "When cost is private information in the Brander-Spencer model, the home government is confronted by a decision of choosing between two policy options: a menu of policies and a uniform policy. The former induces separation and so reveals the cost information to the foreign competitors. The latter helps the weak firm by concealing the cost information. The main result from this study is that policy menu is preferred to uniform policy under Cournot competition while the opposite occurs under Bertrand competition.",
keywords = "Strategic trade policy, Assymmetric information",
author = "QIU, {Larry D.}",
note = "I wish to thank Brian Copeland, Guofu Tan, and two anonymous referees for their helpful comments on earlier versions of the paper. In particular, I am very grateful to Barbara Spencer and a referee for their extremely valuable advice and help which have led to great improvements in the quality of the paper. The usual disclaimer applies.",
doi = "10.1016/0022-1996(94)90007-8",
journal = "Journal of International Economics",
QIU, LD 1994, 'Optimal strategic trade policy under asymmetric information', Journal of International Economics, vol. 36, no. 3-4, pp. 333-354. https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-1996(94)90007-8
Optimal strategic trade policy under asymmetric information. / QIU, Larry D.
In: Journal of International Economics, Vol. 36, No. 3-4, 05.1994, p. 333-354.
T1 - Optimal strategic trade policy under asymmetric information
AU - QIU, Larry D.
N1 - I wish to thank Brian Copeland, Guofu Tan, and two anonymous referees for their helpful comments on earlier versions of the paper. In particular, I am very grateful to Barbara Spencer and a referee for their extremely valuable advice and help which have led to great improvements in the quality of the paper. The usual disclaimer applies.
N2 - When cost is private information in the Brander-Spencer model, the home government is confronted by a decision of choosing between two policy options: a menu of policies and a uniform policy. The former induces separation and so reveals the cost information to the foreign competitors. The latter helps the weak firm by concealing the cost information. The main result from this study is that policy menu is preferred to uniform policy under Cournot competition while the opposite occurs under Bertrand competition.
AB - When cost is private information in the Brander-Spencer model, the home government is confronted by a decision of choosing between two policy options: a menu of policies and a uniform policy. The former induces separation and so reveals the cost information to the foreign competitors. The latter helps the weak firm by concealing the cost information. The main result from this study is that policy menu is preferred to uniform policy under Cournot competition while the opposite occurs under Bertrand competition.
KW - Strategic trade policy
KW - Assymmetric information
U2 - 10.1016/0022-1996(94)90007-8
DO - 10.1016/0022-1996(94)90007-8
JO - Journal of International Economics
JF - Journal of International Economics
QIU LD. Optimal strategic trade policy under asymmetric information. Journal of International Economics. 1994 May;36(3-4):333-354. https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-1996(94)90007-8