Lexis®Library
Lexis®PSL
LexisNexis®Webinars
All Judgments
Legislation & Guidance
Online service practice areas
Looseleafs
Emergency Remedies in the Family Courts
Family Law Precedents Service
Rayden and Jackson on Relationship Breakdown, Finances and Children
Clarke Hall and Morrison on Children
Court of Protection Law Reports
The Family Court Practice (Red Book)
Court of Protection Practice
International Family Law Journal
On demand: 1hr of training for just £75
Upcoming: Recent Developments in Private Children (2019)
Family Law Awards 2019
Resolution National Conference 2019
Home / News & Comment / Guidance on Art 5 compliance when a child in local authority care is deprived of their liberty
Lexis@Library
Lexis@PSL
Our articles are written by experts in their field and include barristers, solicitors, judges, mediators, academics and professionals from a range of related disciplines. Family Law provides a platform for debate for all the important topics, from divorce and care proceedings to transparency and access to justice. If you would like to contribute please email editor@familylaw.co.uk.
Children and Same Sex Families
Children and Same Sex Families: A Legal Handbook
Mental Capacity: Law and Practice
Evidence in Family Proceedings
Edward Bennett
Guidance on Art 5 compliance when a child in local authority care is deprived of their liberty
Date:13 MAR 2018
Emma Fitzsimons
In Re A-F (Children) (Care Orders: Restrictions on Liberty) [2018] EWHC 138 (Fam) the court gave guidance on when Art 5 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) is engaged in relation to a child in the care of the local authority, and the procedures necessary to ensure the deprivation of liberty is lawful.
The test cases concerned seven children, aged between 11 and 16. A final care order was made in each case in favour of the same local authority. Each had health difficulties such as autism, severe learning disabilities or global development delay. Each was in foster care or a residential placement. Some were in locked environments, and all were heavily supervised.
Article continues below...
Provides professionals at all levels with a...
"the principal (monthly) periodical dealing with...
Provides professionals at all levels...
"the principal (monthly) periodical...
Munby P set out the legal framework in which the issue arose, including:
The three Storck v Germany (App No 61603/00) [2005] ECHR 406 components of deprivation of liberty, as summarised by Lady Hale in P v Cheshire West and Chester Council; P and Q (by the Official Solicitor) v Surrey County Council [2014] UKSC 19, [2014] COPLR 313:
(a) The objective component of confinement in a particular restricted place for a not negligible length of time;
(b) The subjective component of lack of valid consent; and
(c) The attribution of responsibility to the state.
Where a child is subject to a care order, neither the local authority nor a parent can exercise their parental responsibility in such a way as to provide a valid consent for the purpose of Storck component (b) [12]
A foster carer does not have parental responsibility enabling the carer to provide a valid consent for the purpose of Storck component (b) (Re D (A Child) [2017] EWCA Civ 1695, para 31)
Cheshire West formulates the 'acid test' of whether Storck component (a) is satisfied as being 'whether a person is under the complete supervision and control of those caring for her and is not free to leave the place where she lives'.
Munby P held that where a child was subject to a care order, the critical question would be whether there was confinement, ie Storck component (a). If there was, the state would be responsible, and neither the local authority nor a parent could exercise their parental responsibility so as to consent.
He took care at [16] to distinguish between a "deprivation of liberty" within the meaning of Art 5 and a restriction on liberty of movement governed by Art 2 of Protocol 4.
Many aspects of the normal exercise of parental responsibility that interfere with a child's freedom of movement do not involve a deprivation of liberty engaging Art 5, even if they are a restriction on liberty of movement (Re D (A child) at [95]). Whether particular accommodation is locked or lockable is not determinative of whether there is confinement as described in Storck component (a), (HL v United Kingdom (Application No 45508/99) (2004) 40 EHRR 761 at [92]).
Most eight-year-old children living with their parents at home would be living in circumstances amounting to confinement that satisfy the 'acid test', but common sense would plainly indicate that such a child is not, within the meaning of Art 5, deprived of his liberty.
For a child in care, the inquiry would focus more on supervision and control, rather than freedom to leave.
He held that where the placement of a child involves a "confinement" for the purpose of Storck component (a) but is not secure accommodation within the meaning of s 25 of the Children Act 1989, there must be judicial authorisation in order to comply with Art 5 and this can only be provided by the High Court, in the exercise of the inherent jurisdiction or in some circumstances if the child has reached the age of 16, by the Court of Protection [26].
He held (at [43]) that whether a state of affairs which satisfies the 'acid test' amounts to a confinement for the purposes of Storck component (a) has to be determined by comparing the restrictions to which the child in question is subject with those that would apply to a child of the same 'age', 'station', 'familial background' and 'relative maturity' who is 'free from disability'.
Although each case had to be determined on its facts, as a rule of thumb, a 10-year-old under constant supervision was unlikely to be being deprived of his liberty, an 11-year-old might be, but the court would more readily conclude that a 12-year-old was.
Article 5 compliant process
He dealt with the requirements of an Art 5 compliant process at [45]-[53] which includes that:
Confinement will be lawful if, as a matter of substance, it is both necessary and proportionate, ie the least restrictive regime which is compatible with the child's welfare and, as a matter of process, has been authorised by a judge in the Family Division.
An application to the court should be made where the circumstances in which the child is, or will be living constitute at least arguably, a deprivation of liberty.
There must be an oral hearing in the Family Division, though a s 9 judge could preside.
The child must be a party to the proceedings and have a guardian and should be permitted to express their wishes and feelings if of an age to do so.
He also dealt with the requirement of review by a judge at least every 12 months [55 – 57].
This case provides much-needed guidance as to when care arrangements for children in the care of the local authority including in foster care amount of a deprivation of liberty, and steps that must be taken to ensure compliance with Art 5 ECHR.
The President was at pains to state throughout that whether there is a confinement for the purposes of Art 5 will turn on the individual facts of the case, emphasising a child development-based approach.
He gave some useful guidance to the comparative approach required at [38]-[39], citing Re B [2017] EWFC B93, as providing an 'insightful' and 'compelling' analysis of a typical 11-year-old's life: comparing a child with his peers and distinguishing commonplace restrictions such as limited access to games consoles and being accompanied on journeys in the community, with much more significant restrictions like 24-hour supervision, restricted contact with parents and siblings and use of physical restraints.
This article was originally published by Garden Court Chambers
Deprivation of Liberty after Cheshire West: key questions for social workers and medical practitioners
Authors: Alex Ruck Keene
Deprivation of liberty in intensive care – the Court of Appeal decides
Worldwide: United Kingdom
Family Law Awards
New Law Journal
LexisNexis eStore
LexisNexis Webinars
Family Court Practice
Child and Family Law Quarterly
Protecting human rights: Our Modern Slavery Act Statement
Copyright © 2019 LexisNexis