Internalized Norms and Intrinsic Motivations: Are Normative Motivations Psychologically Primitive?
Daniel Kelly
Emotion Researcher 1 (June):36-45 (2020)
A Framework for the Emotional Psychology of Group Membership.Taylor Davis & Daniel Kelly - 2021 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-22.details
The vast literature on negative treatment of outgroups and favoritism toward ingroups provides many local insights but is largely fragmented, lacking an overarching framework that might provide a unified overview and guide conceptual integration. As a result, it remains unclear where different local perspectives conflict, how they may reinforce one another, and where they leave gaps in our knowledge of the phenomena. Our aim is to start constructing a framework to help remedy this situation. We first identify a few key (...) ideas for creating a theoretical roadmap for this complex territory, namely the principles of etiological functionalism and the dual inheritance theory of human evolution. We show how a "molecular" approach to emotions fits into this picture, and use it to illuminate emotions that shape intergroup relations. Finally, we weave the pieces together into the beginnings of a systematic taxonomy of the emotions involved in social interactions, both hostile and friendly. While it is but a start, we have developed the argument in a way that illustrates how the foundational principles of our proposed framework can be extended to accommodate further cases. (shrink)
Ethics and Cognitive Science in Normative Ethics
Moral Emotion in Normative Ethics
A pluralistic framework for the psychology of norms.Evan Westra & Kristin Andrews - 2022 - Biology and Philosophy 37 (5):1-30.details
Social norms are commonly understood as rules that dictate which behaviors are appropriate, permissible, or obligatory in different situations for members of a given community. Many researchers have sought to explain the ubiquity of social norms in human life in terms of the psychological mechanisms underlying their acquisition, conformity, and enforcement. Existing theories of the psychology of social norms appeal to a variety of constructs, from prediction-error minimization, to reinforcement learning, to shared intentionality, to domain-specific adaptations for norm acquisition. In (...) this paper, we propose a novel methodological and conceptual framework for the cognitive science of social norms that we call normative pluralism. We begin with an analysis of the explanatory aims of the cognitive science of social norms. From this analysis, we derive a recommendation for a reformed conception of its explanandum: a minimally psychological construct that we call normative regularities. Our central empirical proposal is that the psychological underpinnings of social norms are most likely realized by a heterogeneous set of cognitive, motivational, and ecological mechanisms that vary between norms and between individuals, rather than by a single type of process or distinctive norm system. This pluralistic approach, we suggest, offers a methodologically sound point of departure for a fruitful and rigorous science of social norms. (shrink)
Cognitive Psychology in Philosophy of Cognitive Science
Moral Psychology, Misc in Normative Ethics
Normativity, Misc in Value Theory, Miscellaneous
Theory of Mind and Folk Psychology in Philosophy of Cognitive Science
A willingness to be vulnerable: norm psychology and human–robot relationships.Stephen A. Setman - 2021 - Ethics and Information Technology 23 (4):815-824.details
Should we welcome social robots into interpersonal relationships? In this paper I show that an adequate answer to this question must take three factors into consideration: the psychological vulnerability that characterizes ordinary interpersonal relationships, the normative significance that humans attach to other people's attitudes in such relationships, and the tendency of humans to anthropomorphize and "mentalize" artificial agents, often beyond their actual capacities. I argue that we should welcome social robots into interpersonal relationships only if they are endowed with a (...) social capacity that is functionally similar to our own capacity for social norms. Drawing on an interdisciplinary body of research on norm psychology, I explain why this capacity is importantly different from pre-programmed, top-down conformity to rules, in that it involves an open-ended responsiveness to social corrective feedback, such as that which humans provide to each other in expressions of praise and blame. (shrink)
Robot Ethics in Applied Ethics
Normas sociales.Hugo Viciana - forthcoming - Enciclopedia Online de la Sociedad Española de Filosofía Analítica.details