Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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policy on the basis of speculation that the l 66 (1999) (finding electronic monitoring does not place a defendant “in custody” within meaning of sentencing credit statute); State v. Climer, 127 Idaho 20, 896 P.2d 346, 350 (Idaho Ct.App.1995) (concluding “house arrest” through electronic monitoring is not “incarceration”); State v. Muratella, 240 Neb. 567, 483 N.W.2d 128, 129-30 (1992) (“Being confined to one’s home, subject to electronic monitoring, with the freedom to engage in employment and probation-related activities, is far less onerous than being imprisoned.”); State v. Faulkner, 102 Ohio App.3d 602, 657 N.E.2d 602, 604 (1995) (finding pretrial electronic home monitoring does not entitle defendant to sentencing credit); Commonwealth v. Kyle, 582 Pa. 624, 874 A.2d 12, 20 (2005) ; Tagorda v. State, 977 S.W.2d 632, 633-34
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding electronic home monitoring is not time spent in custody because there is a difference in restrictions between electronic home monitoring and jail
B. holding the legislatures approval of granting a defendant credit against his sentence in a statute governing postsentence 17electronic monitoring by the department of correction but omission of that approval in a separate statute relating to pretrial electronic monitoring is evidence that the legislature did not intend for credit to be given for electronic monitoring while a defendant is awaiting trial
C. holding that due process clause does not require a federal prisoner to receive credit for time spent on supervised release if release is revoked
D. holding as a matter of law pretrial electronic monitoring and home confinement merits sentencing credit under its statute
E. holding time spent on electronic monitoring while on bail release does not constitute custody within meaning of sentencing credit statute
Reply with [A, B, C, D, E] only.