Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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before it may open a branch in Arkansas. Id. § 23-48-1001(a). These statutes, which contain express state certification requirements, demonstrate the General Assembly is capable of articulating a certification requirement when it desires one. Yet the SFA contains none. Arkansas courts presume the General Assembly has in mind previous statutes relating to the same subject matter when it enacts a new statute. See Cousins v. Dennis, 298 Ark. 310, 767 S.W.2d 296, 298 (1989). And when the General Assembly has demonstrated the ability to include qualifying statutory language in a statute, but chooses not to do so in a particular statute, Arkansas courts infer the omission was deliberate and evidences a different legislative intent. See Bush v. State, 338 Ark. 772, 2 S.W.3d 761, 764 (1999) ; Chatelain v. Kelley, 322 Ark. 517, 910 S.W.2d
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding as a matter of law pretrial electronic monitoring and home confinement merits sentencing credit under its statute
B. holding electronic home monitoring is not time spent in custody because there is a difference in restrictions between electronic home monitoring and jail
C. holding the legislatures approval of granting a defendant credit against his sentence in a statute governing postsentence 17electronic monitoring by the department of correction but omission of that approval in a separate statute relating to pretrial electronic monitoring is evidence that the legislature did not intend for credit to be given for electronic monitoring while a defendant is awaiting trial
D. holding that electronic home monitoring constitutes confinement under the sra
E. holding time spent on electronic monitoring while on bail release does not constitute custody within meaning of sentencing credit statute
Reply with [A, B, C, D, E] only.