Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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that they had no duty to defend against Starks’s suit. Id. at 1127. But Starks was never “acquitted,” and it is not entirely clear whether he was “exonerated” when his convictions were vacated and a retrial ordered or only when the prosecutor dismissed the charges. Northfield Insurance appears to address this question, saying that “[i]f the prosecution was abandoned for reasons of Starks’s innocence, then May 15, 2012 [when the aggravated sexual assault charges were dismissed nolle prosequi ], is the trigger date for his malicious prosecution claim.” 701 F.3d at 1131-32. By “malicious prosecution claim,” the Seventh Circuit meant Starks’s malicious prosecution, wrongful prosecution, and due process claims, which it was discussing collectively. Id. at 1130; see Brooks, 578 F.3d at 579  (quoting Snodderly v. R.U.F.F. Drug
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that a  1983 due process claim that essentially contests the fairness of the plaintiffs prosecution  is  similar to his malicious prosecution claim and claims resembling malicious prosecution do not accrue until the prosecution has terminated in the plaintiffs favor 
B. holding the same for malicious prosecution
C. holding that malicious prosecution claim accrues when underlying prosecution is terminated
D. holding that section 1983 claims alleging due process violations stemming from malicious prosecution are unavailable when a state malicious prosecution action exists
E. holding that the statute applies also to malicious prosecution actions
Reply with [A, B, C, D, E] only.