Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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final when the mandate issued from the supreme court affirming the judgment on May 24, 1999, and that the two-year time limitation of rule 3.850(b) began to run at that time, thus rendering his January 4, 2002, motion untimely. Snipes argues that the time limitation of the rule did not commence until this court’s affirmance of his sentence on remand became final on January 16, 2001. The unequivocal language of rule 3.850(b) supports Snipes’ contention: A motion to vacate a sentence that exceeds the limits provided by law may be filed at any time. No other motion shall be filed or considered pursuant to this rule if filed more than 2 years after the judgment and sentence become final in a noncapital case.... (Emphasis added.) See also Oliver v. State, 734 So.2d 1083 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999) . We also note the well-established principle
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. recognizing an exception to the twoyear time bar imposed on rule 3850 claims when the claim asserted is based on facts that were unknown to the movant and could not have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence
B. holding that defendants 3850 motion for postconviction relief was procedurally barred as successive where the defendants current rule 3850 motion is one that could have or should have been raised in his first rule 3850 motion
C. holding that the twoyear time limitation of rule 3850 does not commence until the sentence becomes final
D. holding that a court may not change the term of sentence by subsequent amendment after the sentence becomes final
E. holding that rule 3850 motion was not time barred where the order did not place any time limitation on when the defendant would refile his rule 3850 motion
Reply with [A, B, C, D, E] only.