Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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if any of them believed that the Creditor Group was legally barred from ... bringing the Claims, (Answering Br. at 21.) We agree. To hold otherwise would allow a “claw back” of the sale itself because the value of the claims, without the ability to prosecute them, would be completely eliminated and a central feature of the transaction would thus be frustrated, through no apparent fault of the Creditor Group. See, e.g., Pieper, Inc. v. Land O’Lakes Farmland Feed, LLC, 390 F.3d 1062, 1066 (8th Cir. 2004) (concluding that defendant’s expressed principal purpose for entering an agreement was substantially frustrated by the failure of basic assumption of the agreement, defeating the commercial reason for contract); Unihealth v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 14 F.Supp.2d 623, 635 (D.N.J. 1998) ; 30 Williston on Contracts § 77:95 (4th ed.
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. recognizing frustration of purpose where an unexpected regulatory change substantially frustrated the principal purpose of the agreement to the unfair advantage of one party
B. holding that a defendant is in custody and miranda applies even when the purpose of defendants detention is unrelated to the purpose of the interrogation
C. recognizing purpose of ccpa as protection of consumers from unfair illegal or deceptive acts
D. holding that conspiracy requires an agreement to accomplish either an unlawful purpose or a lawful purpose by unlawful means
E. holding that rule 408 exclusion does not apply to evidence of a settlement agreement if it is offered for another purpose ie for a purpose other than to prove or disprove the validity of the claims that the agreement was meant to settle
Reply with [A, B, C, D, E] only.