Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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was no appeal here — interlocutory or otherwise — relating to the district court’s declaration of mistrial. Therefore, "the action occasioning retrial” must be the declaration of mistrial itself. See United States v. Menzer, 29 F.3d 1223, 1227 (7th Cir.) (noting that, where no party appealed declaration of mistrial, "there is no dispute that following the mistrial ..., the government had seventy days in which to retry the defendant”), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1002, 115 S.Ct. 515, 130 L.Ed.2d 422 (1994). 4 . Compare United States v. Gambino, 59 F.3d 353, 358 (2d Cir.1995) (stating that "[t]he length of an exclusion for complexity must be ... limited in time”), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 116 S.Ct. 1671, 134 L.Ed.2d 776 (1996), and United States v. Jordan, 915 F.2d 563, 565 (9th Cir.1990)  with United States v. Twitty, 107 F.3d 1482,
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that speedy trial act requires that an ends of justice continuance be specifically limited in time
B. holding that where a defendant acquiesces in a continuance that time is excluded from the speedy trial calculation
C. holding that an ends of justice continuance may be appropriate where the case is unusual or complex
D. holding that a seven week suspension of the speedy trial clock was warranted under the ends of justice provision where the chief prosecutor was ill and new assistant prosecutors required time to prepare for trial
E. holding that fivemonth openended continuance based on ends of justice did not violate speedy trial act
Reply with [A, B, C, D, E] only.