Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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2209-10, 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975), “speculative,” Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 42-46, 96 S.Ct. 1917, 1926-28, 48 L.Ed.2d 450 (1976), or “abstract,” O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 494, 94 S.Ct. 669, 675, 38 L.Ed.2d 674 (1974). Rather, it must be “certainly impending.” Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 158, 110 S.Ct. 1717, 1725, 109 L.Ed.2d 135 (1990) (internal quotations omitted). Ripeness, while often spoken of as a justiciability doctrine distinct from standing, in fact shares the constitutional requirement of standing that an injury in fact be certainly impending. See Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, 438 U.S. 59, 81, 98 S.Ct. 2620, 2634-35, 57 L.Ed.2d 595 (1978); DKT Mem’l Fund, Ltd. v. Agency for Int’l Dev., 887 F.2d 275, 297 (D.C.Cir.1989) . It is only the prudential aspect of ripeness—
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that speculative theory of possible injury insufficient to establish injury in fact under article ills case or controversy requirement
B. holding that allegation of procedural injury does not affect the issues of injury in fact or causation
C. holding that the constitutional requirement for ripeness is injury in fact
D. holding that in a personal injury suit the timely notice requirement does not apply 
E. holding that if a person has suffered no constitutional injury at the hands of the individual police officer the fact that the departmental regulations might have authorized a constitutional deprivation is immaterial
Reply with [A, B, C, D, E] only.