Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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Id., § 164, at 579. This parallel between the Privacy Act and the common-law torts of libel per quod and slander suggests the possibility that Congress intended the term “actual damages” in the Act to mean special damages. The basic idea is that Privacy Act victims, like victims of libel per quod or slander, are barred from any recovery unless they can first show actual— that is, pecuniary or material — harm. Upon showing some pecuniary harm, no matter how slight, they can recover the statutory minimum of $1,000, presumably for any unproven harm. That Congress would choose to use the term “actual damages” instead of “special damages” was not without precedent. The terms had occasionally been used interchangeably. See, e. g., Wetzel v. Gulf Oil Corp., 455 P. 2d 857, 862 (CA9 1972) ; Electric Furnace Corp. v. Deering Milliken
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding defendant a foreign manufacturer was not subject to the personal jurisdiction of a wyoming court because the plaintiff failed to introduce sufficient evidence to establish an agency relationship between the defendant and its us distributor
B. holding that state did not submit sufficient evidence to establish amount of restitution to victim for medical bills incurred when it did not introduce any medical bills
C. holding that the plaintiff had failed to produce sufficient evidence to establish constructive notice because the plaintiff did not present any evidence to establish that the oil was on the floor for any length of time
D. holding that termite damage does not fall within the meaning of property damage in the policy because the alleged misrepresentations did not cause the damage the termites did
E. holding that plaintiff could not establish libel per quod because he did not introduce any valid and sufficient evidence of actual damage
Reply with [A, B, C, D, E] only.