Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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very approach our court adopted in Pro-Snax, concluding that it departed from the statute by imposing a “heightened standard” and requiring evaluation “by hindsight.” In re Top Grade Sausage, Inc., 227 F.3d 123, 132 (3d Cir.2000) abrogated on other grounds by Lamie, 540 U.S. 526, 124 S.Ct. 1023. Finally, the Ninth Circuit held that § 330(a)(4)(A) superseded its past precedent, which had “requir[ed] that the services actually provide an ‘identifiable, tangible and material benefit to the [debt- or’s] estate.” ’ In re Smith, 317 F.3d 918, 926 (9th Cir.2002) (quoting In re Xebec, 147 B.R. 518, 523 (B.A.P. 9th Cir.1992)). In addition, the Seventh Circuit has applied a similar rule, without specifically relying on the post-1994 guidelines. See In re Taxman Clothing Co., 49 F.3d at 314-16 . While Pro-Snax purported to consider the
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding in part that the trial court abused its discretion in granting a temporary injunction in the absence of a showing that the plaintiff did not have an adequate remedy at law
B. recognizing discretion of district court in determining a fee award
C. holding that the bankruptcy court abused its discretion in granting a fee award to an attorney whose preference action did not have a reasonable likelihood of benefiting the estate
D. holding that when an attorney fee award is made under a statute that does not define reasonable the award should be determined in light of all cetreumstances emphasis added
E. recognizing court discretion in determining reasonable fee under rule 11
Reply with [A, B, C, D, E] only.