Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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of the statute, different terms may be used to show criminal intent. Morissette, 342 U.S. at 264, 72 S.Ct. 240 (“Congress ... has seen fit to prescribe that an evil state of mind, described variously in one or more such terms as ‘intentional,’ ‘wilful,’ ‘knowing,’ ‘fraudulent,’ or ‘malicious,’ will make criminal an otherwise indifferent act....”) Here, section (a)(3) requires a higher mens rea than general criminal intent; a defendant must “knowingly” falsify header information and “intentionally”. transmit it. Thus, a defendant must at the very least know he is being deceptive while sending multiple commercial emails. Under Mor-issette, and its progeny, this satisfies the “evil-meaning mind” requirement. See U.S. v. Yermian, 468 U.S. 63, 74-75, 104 S.Ct. 2936, 82 L.Ed.2d 53 (1984) . Cf. Liparota v. U.S., 471 U.S. 419, 432 n.
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that a defendant who deliberately avoids reading the form he is signing cannot avoid criminal sanctions for any false statements contained therein
B. holding that all claims submitted by defendant were false because they were acquired by kickback
C. holding statute imposing criminal sanctions for deliberately false statements submitted to federal agency even without a showing that defendant knew they were being submitted to the federal government did not constitute a trap for the unwary
D. holding that the provisions of the false claims act allowing suit imposing liability on any person who presented false claims to the federal government did not allow suits against state governments
E. holding that the defendant contractor violated 18 usc  286  a companion statute to the criminal fca  because his claims were false when submitted even though the false claims were ultimately irrelevant to the total amount paid by the government to the contractor
Reply with [A, B, C, D, E] only.