Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
```
discrimination can be proved from the face of the tax statute); cf. Fulton Corp. v. Faulkner, 516 U.S. 325, 331, 116 S.Ct. 848, 133 L.Ed.2d 796 (1996) (quoting Oregon Waste Systems, Inc. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality of Oregon, 511 U.S. 93, 99, 114 S.Ct. 1345, 128 L.Ed.2d 13 (1994)) (“State laws discriminating against interstate commerce on their face are ‘virtually per se invalid.’ ”); Trinova Corp. v. Michigan Dep’t of Treasury, 498 U.S. 358, 374, 111 S.Ct. 818, 112 L.Ed.2d 884 (1991) (quoting Jenkins, State Taxation of Interstate Commerce, 27 Tenn. L.Rev. 239, 242 (1960)) (a tax imposed “on sleeping measured by the number of pairs of shoes you have in your closet is a tax on shoes”); PPG Industries, Inc. v. Commonwealth, Bd. of Finance & Revenue, 567 Pa. 580, 790 A.2d 261, 264 (2001) . In reaching its conclusion here, the majority
```
What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that commerce clause authorizes congress to punish any particular criminal action even without proof of a relation to interstate commerce when the activity is part of a class of activities determined by congress to affect interstate commerce
B. holding that ordinance requiring all municipal solid waste generated within county to be delivered to a particular facility discriminated against interstate commerce
C. holding that stock exchanges asserting their rights to engage in interstate commerce free of discriminatory taxes are within the zone of interests protected by the commerce clause
D. holding that three municipal flow control ordinances similar to the one here at issue discriminated against interstate commerce
E. holding manufacturing exception to pennsylvanias capital stock and franchise taxes unconstitutional because it facially discriminated against interstate commerce
Reply with [A, B, C, D, E] only.