Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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would leave the district court judge with unfettered discretion to set interest rates on judgments, which was most likely not the intent of the legislature, and which is at variance with the common law. At common law, no interest was allowed, and it is only permissible when authorized by statute. See Paradise Homes v. Central Surety, 84 Nev. 109, 116, 437 P.2d 78, 83 (1968); see also Wilson v. Pacific Maxon, Inc., 100 Nev. 479, 483, 686 P.2d 235, 237 (1984) (“As we have explained, the statutory interest rate was seven percent (7%). The judgment entered below, therefore, must be modified to provide for prejudgment interest at the rate of seven percent (7%) instead of twelve percent (12%).”). Statutes in derogation of the common ng Fiberglass Corporation, 616 So. 2d 645, 647 (La. 1993) . We reject this argument based on a plain
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that courier and messenger costs are not taxable costs
B. holding that investigatory costs are considered costs of response under cercla
C. holding that mediation costs are not compensable
D. holding that costs are not fixed until judgment is entered and interest can only run on costs when due
E. recognizing that detariffmg would result in some increased administrative costs but anticipating those costs to be initial and fixed costs only resulting from the shift to a detariffed environment  such as the cost of developing short standard contracts
Reply with [A, B, C, D, E] only.