Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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amply justified in concluding that despite the fact that the hearing on Nelson’s motion in limine to exclude the Rule 404(b) evidence was deferred until trial, the speedy trial clock did not run during the entire pendency of this motion. See 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1)(F); United States v. Phillips, 936 F.2d 1252, 1254 (11th Cir.1991) (“Motions necessitating hearings, such as suppression hearings ... are governed by section 3161(h)(1)(F). As such, the entire time from the fifing of the motion to the conclusion of the hearing is excludable, even when the hearing is deferred until trial.”)(citing United States v. Garcia, 778 F.2d 1558, 1562 (11th Cir.1986) and United States v. Mastrangelo, 733 F.2d 793, 796 (11th Cir.1984)); see also United States v. Beard, 41 F.3d 1486, 1488 (11th Cir.1995) . Thus, no more than 30 non-excludable days
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding district courts should defer to hearing officers finding on the credibility and reliability of evidence of witnesses who testified before her
B. holding that a pretrial motion triggers an automatic exclusion under  3161h1f even though no actual delay results
C. holding trial court abused its discretion by refusing to conduct hearing and render decision on motion
D. recognizing that a district courts decision to defer hearing a motion until trial does not render the intervening time nonexcludable under  3161h1f
E. holding that where both the appellate and trial courts are reviewing the paper record  there is no reason for the appellate courts to defer to the trial courts finding
Reply with [A, B, C, D, E] only.