Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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should not benefit from its own tardiness; it should not be allowed “to enlarge” the period for filing its objections. Further, Appellees state that the statutory framework does not permit the State “[to] manipulate the time period within which its own objections could be filed by delaying in filing the award with the court, despite the mandatory obligation of Section 21.048 of the Texas Property Code.” As stated, “The plain language of a statute is the surest guide to the Legislature’s intent.” Chatha, 381 S.W.3d at 507. Here, the plain language of the statutory provisions reveals that only one provision governs when objections to the commissioners’ award must be filed. That provision is section 21.018(a). See State v. Garland, 963 S.W.2d 95, 97 (Tex.App.-Austin 1998, pet. denied) . Undeniably, section 21.048’s language,
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that to offset a jurys damage award a separate thirdparty insurance award must cover the same loss which served as the basis for the jury award
B. holding that an award of attorneys fees under supreme court rule 38 precursor to rule 222 did not preempt an award of attorneys fees to which one is otherwise entitled and thus appellant could seek an award of attorneys fees pursuant to section 1577300 which permits an award of fees for a party prevailing in an action against a state agency
C. holding that an attorneys fees award is not appealable until the amount of the award is set
D. holding that the state circuit court did not have the authority to award prejudgment interest for matters occurring prior to arbitration award
E. holding that under plain statutory language starting point for computing deadline to file objections to commissioners award is actual filing date of the award irrespective of whether the state which filed award for commissioners had failed to timely file award pursuant to section 21048
Reply with [A, B, C, D, E] only.