Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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officer. See United States v. Watson, 599 F.2d 1149, 1156 (2d Cir.) ([T]he speedy trial right under the Sixth Amendment attaches not when a sealed indictment is filed but when it is unsealed), on reh’g op. replaced, 690 F.2d 15 (1979), modified, en banc, sub nom. United States v. Muse, 633 F.2d 1041 (1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 984, 101 S.Ct. 1522, 67 L.Ed.2d 820 (1981); see also United States v. Vaughn, 510 F.Supp. 206, 209 (D.N.J.1981) ("The [speedy trial] statute ... plainly and unambiguously require^] that trial commence within seventy days of the indictment being made public (i.e. unsealed) or the defendant's appearance before a judicial officer of this District, whichever date last occurs") (emphasis in original); cf. United States v. Ramey, 791 F.2d 317, 322 (4th Cir.1986) . Thus, the current speedy trial figure may be
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that the statute of limitations does not run on a debtorinpossession
B. holding that an accused may not complain if the statute of limitations is extended so long as the period of time originally provided therein had not run at the time of such extension because an accused does not acquire any vested right in a statute of limitations until it has operated to bar the prosecution of the offense with which he has been charged
C. holding that an order dismissing a claim without prejudice is a final appealable order if the statute of limitations for that claim has expired
D. holding that a sealed indictment handed down before statute of limitations has run is valid even if it is not unsealed until after the limitations period has expired
E. holding statute that extended statute of limitations for certain criminal sexual conduct could not be applied retroactively to a prosecution commenced after the limitations statute in effect at the time of the alleged offense had expired
Reply with [A, B, C, D, E] only.