Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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merely because it leads to a result that seems contrary to the court’s expectations.” Id. at 427. Similarly, it may be counterintuitive to allow credit against prison time for the period Anderson spent living at home wearing an electronic ankle bracelet, but this result is not so absurd as to permit us to disregard the plain language of the statute requiring that credit. See Holland, 253 Iowa at 1011, 115 N.W.2d at 164; Iowa R.App. P. 6.904(3)(to ). State courts in construing their respective state statutes have reached different conclusions as to whether sentencing credit is awarded for electronic monitoring and home supervision. Several states allow sentencing credit for electronic monitoring at home. See, e.g., State v. Guillen, 130 N.M. 803, 32 P.3d 812, 813 (N.M.Ct.App.2001) ; Harris v. Charles, 171 Wash.2d 455, 256 P.3d
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding the legislatures approval of granting a defendant credit against his sentence in a statute governing postsentence 17electronic monitoring by the department of correction but omission of that approval in a separate statute relating to pretrial electronic monitoring is evidence that the legislature did not intend for credit to be given for electronic monitoring while a defendant is awaiting trial
B. holding as a matter of law pretrial electronic monitoring and home confinement merits sentencing credit under its statute
C. holding electronic home monitoring is not time spent in custody because there is a difference in restrictions between electronic home monitoring and jail
D. holding that electronic home monitoring constitutes confinement under the sra
E. holding time spent on electronic monitoring while on bail release does not constitute custody within meaning of sentencing credit statute
Reply with [A, B, C, D, E] only.