Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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highway and road design standards generally accepted at the time the road or highway was designed and constructed.” 4 . From the record, it is apparent that the trial court rested it ruling on MHTC’s argument that the PSC had exclusive jurisdiction over the placement of both the railroad crossing and the bridges. 5 . All statutory references are to RSMo 1994 unless otherwise noted. 6 . By the adoption of § 622.015, RSMo 1986, the legislature transferred all powers, duties, and functions relating to transportation activity within the State from the PSC to the Division of Transportation of the Department of Economic Development. Coon v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe, 826 S.W.2d 66, 69 (Mo.App. W.D.1992). 7 . See also Walker v. St. Louis-Southwestern Ry., 835 S.W.2d 469 (Mo.App. E.D.1992) . 8 . See § 386.550, RSMo 1986 ("In all
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that where evidence shows that federal funds were expended for installation for warning devices or signs at railroad crossing state law claims based on adequacy of those warning devices are preempted by the federal railroad safety act
B. holding that in a personal injury action against a railroad a report containing the conclusions of a hearing examiner of the public utilities commission regarding an alleged hazardous railroad crossing was obvious hearsay
C. holding the state law claims were not preempted
D. holding claims that a railroad crossing was extrahazardous that warning devices were inadequate and that the train was not operating at a speed commensurate with the hazardous nature of the crossing were all preempted by federal law
E. holding that the old common law duty to moderate train speed  at an extra or ultrahazardous crossing is preempted
Reply with [A, B, C, D, E] only.