Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
```
and tenuous,” SEC v. Mayhew, 121 F.3d 44, 52 (2d Cir.1997), but if that information comes from an insider and concerns actual and serious merger discussions, “a lesser level of specificity is required [to establish materiality].” Id. As the Supreme Court has recognized, “ ‘[i]nside information as regards mergers ... can become material at an earlier stage than would be the case as regards lesser- transactions-and this even though the mortality rate of mergers at such formative stages is doubtless high.’ ” Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 238, 108 S.Ct. 978, 99 L.Ed.2d 194 (1988), quoting SEC v. Geon Indus., Inc., 531 F.2d 39, 47-48 (2d Cir.1976); see also Glazer v. Formica Corp., 964 F.2d 149, 156 (2d Cir.1992) (same); SEC v. Shapiro, 494 F.2d 1301, 1306-07 (2d Cir.1974) . In fact, even disclosures about tender offer
```
What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that even if information in an affidavit was provided in reckless disregard of the truth appropriate course of action is to sever that information from the affidavit and determine whether sufficient information remained in order for the magistrate to find probable cause
B. holding that such information is not material under securities law
C. holding that even though negotiations had not jelled to the point where a merger was probable information disclosed regarding those negotiations was material in light of the potential profits
D. holding that although the defendant was able to impeach the prosecution in certain respects the suppressed information was material under brady because there was a significant difference between the suppressed material and the information to which the defense had access
E. recognizing that information disclosed in private is not a public disclosure under the fca
Reply with [A, B, C, D, E] only.