Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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outlining the offenses, not the later date of indictment. Id. The appeals court disagreed, holding that denial of parole due to pending charges is not equivalent to arrest on the charges. Id. at 1043. Therefore, the defendant’s continued incarceration was for his prior conviction, rather than pretrial detention for the uncharged offense, and so the speedy trial clock began to run from the date of indictment. Id.; see also People v. Roscoe, 162 Mich.App. 710, 413 N.W.2d 483 (1987); State v. Johnson, 92 Wash.2d 598, 599 P.2d 529 (1979). Likewise, the Alaska Court of Appeals has repeatedly held that the speedy trial clock begins to run when a defendant is indicted, rather than when arrested on other offenses or for probation violations. Harmon v. State, 908 P.2d 434 (Alaska Ct.App.1995) ; Demientieff v. State, 814 P.2d 745 (Alaska
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that although plaintiff was liable for medical services rendered he was not bound by the amount of the charges listed in the admission contract as he was entitled to question the reasonableness of the charges
B. holding that the speedy trial clock for state charges did not begin to run when the defendant was taken into custody by federal authorities on federal charges but rather when he was indicted for the state charges
C. holding attorneys must be given reasonable notice of the charges they face before the referees hearing on those charges
D. holding that  1983 claims accrued when all charges were dismissed rather than a previous date on which the conviction was vacated on the theory that the charges remained pending until the dismissal
E. holding that an exception to the charges having to do with contributory negligence  charges two three and four was insufficient to preserve issue for appeal
Reply with [A, B, C, D, E] only.