Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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fully accept this principle but find it inapplicable here. Where the indictment includes, as here, specific, narrowing language “descriptive of the offense charged,” we cannot treat it as immaterial “surplusage.” Commonwealth v. Nuckles, 266 Va. 519, 523, 587 S.E.2d 695, 697 (2003); see also Etheridge, 210 Va. at 330, 171 S.E.2d at 192. In short, we hold a fatal variance existed between the indictments against Purvy and the proof offered by the prosecution at trial. For this reason, his convictions cannot stand. II. Sufficiency of the Evidence Purvy also contends the evidence was insufficient to prove the unindicted variant offenses for which he was convicted—specifically, violating Code § 18.2-472.1(B) by “knowingly providing] materially false information” i at 435-36 (15th ed.1993) , with Farr, 536 F.3d at 1186-87 (recognizing
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that where the date of the offense is not an element of the charge  a variance between the indictment date and the proof at trial is not fatal so long as the acts charged were committed within the statute of limitations period and prior to the return date of the indictment
B. recognizing double jeopardy bar is inapplicable where a variance between indictment and proof necessitated prosecution under a new indictment
C. recognizing that evidence may be legally insufficient where there is variance between indictment allegations and proof
D. holding that trial on second indictment alleging repeat offender count separate from indictment on primary offense for which defendant was convicted did not offend principles of double jeopardy
E. holding that the dismissal of an indictment before trial and institution of a superseding indictment does not trigger double jeopardy
Reply with [A, B, C, D, E] only.