Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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Brooks, 141 S.W.3d at 162. Although Rule 39 provides for joinder in mandatory terms, “there is no arbitrary standard or precise formula for determining whether a particular person falls within its provision.” Cooper v. Tex. Gulf Indus., Inc., 513 S.W.2d 200, 204 (Tex.1974); see Kodiak Res., Inc., 361 S.W.3d at 248-49; Longoria, 255 S.W.3d at 180. In this regard, we note that the trial court has “broad” discretion in deciding matters regarding joinder. Royal Petroleum Corp. v. Dennis, 160 Tex. 392, 332 S.W.2d 313, 317 (Tex.1960); Longoria, 255 S.W.3d at 180. Similarly, the standard of review on severance is abuse of discretion. In re Allstate Tex. Lloyds, 202 S.W.3d 895, 899 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 2006, no pet.). Appellees assert that joinder of the McAdams and Chilcoat 477 (1942) ; Kodiak Res., Inc., 361 S.W.3d at 248-49
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. recognizing that other courts have applied rule 8b to cases involving multiple defendants but stating that it seems to us that contrary to the jurisprudence in other circuits when a joinder of offenses charged against the same defendant is challenged the literal meaning of the rule 8 requires application of rule 8a irrespective of whether multiple defendants are involved in the case
B. holding under prior rule regarding joinder that royalty owners under the other lease contracts in a unitized block are necessary parties to suit under prior version of rule 39
C. holding that a case may be dismissed sua sponte under rule 12b6 prior to service without motion by defendants or briefing by the parties
D. recognizing rule
E. holding that a necessary party under rule 19a would be entitled a priori to intervene as of right under rule 24a
Reply with [A, B, C, D, E] only.