Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
```
and definite promise that the parties would enter into a legally executable lease that would induce detrimental reliance by Andersen. See Moore, 2007 WL 2331021, at *6-7 (rejecting a landlord’s claim that a tenant’s promise that he “will start putting the package together ... [the tenant] would like to get this in the June 17th meeting for approval.... This is a busy time for everyone ..., but lets get this deal done, behind us, and open!” was a “clear and definite promise”). Andersen argues that Kranz’ internal e-mail to Gower on February 25 was a clear and definite promise that FCOA would sign the lease. However, this cannot constitute a clear and definite promise because the promisee must be aware of the promisor’s promise. See Johnson v. Pattison, 185 N.W.2d 790, 795-96 (Iowa 1971) . Even if Kranz’ e-mail constituted a clear and
```
What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that debtor as grantor and trustee of a trust that held legal title to the property held a sufficient equitable interest in the property to claim it as exempt homestead where she resided on the property prepetition with the intent to maintain it as her primary residence
B. holding that promissory estoppel existed when the grantor agreed to use the property for only residential purposes took title with knowledge of that promise and the grantee relied upon that agreement
C. holding that any promise involving real property is enforceable only if that promise meets the requirements of the statute
D. holding when a deed provides grantee would take subject to the state of facts which a personal inspection or accurate survey would disclose grantee has no claim against grantor for power line easement
E. holding that where grantee was named as trustee without identification of the beneficiaries or the nature and purposes of the trust and no trust agreement of record was identified the grantee received fee simple title
Reply with [A, B, C, D, E] only.