Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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F.2d 306, 309 (11th Cir.1993) (rejecting the argument that the common law D’Oench doctrine is limited by a specific asset requirement). Other circuits are in agreement on this issue. See, e.g., Inn at Saratoga Assocs. v. FDIC, 60 F.3d 78, 82 (2d Cir.1995) (rejecting the argument that the D’Oench doctrine is limited by an “asset” requirement, because such a requirement “would undercut an important purpose of that doctrine — allowing the FDIC to rely on a bank’s records when insuring the bank”); Brookside Assocs. v. Rifkin, 49 F.3d 490, 496 (9th Cir.1995) (“[W]e hold that the common-law [D’Oench \ doctrine applies to bar suit even when the RTC does not acquire a specific asset whose value is affected by the alleged secret agreement.”); Jackson v. FDIC, 981 F.2d 730, 734-35 (5th Cir.1992) ; Timberland Design, Inc. v. First Serv. Bank
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that the doench doctrine protects the fdic even where the fdic does not have an interest in an asset
B. holding that no complete innocence exception to the doench doctrine exists
C. holding that claims that do not diminish or defeat the fdics interest in any specific asset are nevertheless doench barred in light of the established purpose of the doench  doctrine to protect the fdics reliance on the banks records
D. holding that defendant defrauded fdic when actions diluted value of fdics security interest thereby being likely to frustrate and impair the fdics ability to realize the benefit of the interest
E. holding that  1823e applies only when the fdics interest in a specific asset would be impaired by the alleged secret agreement
Reply with [A, B, C, D, E] only.