Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
```
in denying supersedeas under Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure 24.2(a)(3) and (a)(5), even though those provisions were in effect at the time of the ruling.” Cascos, 319 S.W.3d at 217. This analysis is clearly wrong, however, because, as noted above, the supreme court’s opinion in Long expressly referenced the trial court’s discretion under what is now TRAP rule 24.2(a)(3): Sweitzer [the judgment creditor] had possible mechanisms for seeking enforcement of the injunction.... Sweitzer could have sought denial of suspension of the injunction. See former Texas R.App. P. 47(f) (allowing trial court to decline to permit other judgments to be suspended) (currently Tex.R.App. P. 24.2(a)(3)); City of Robstown v. Westergren, 774 S.W.2d 739, 740-41 (Tex.App.Corpus Christi, 1989, no writ) . In re Long, 984 S.W.2d at 626. Thus, not only
```
What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that district court has discretion under appropriate circumstances to rule on summary judgment motion before addressing pending class certification motion
B. holding that district court has discretionary authority under former rule 47f to deny a city suspension of an injunction pending appeal
C. recognizing that the district court has discretion to admit or deny motive evidence
D. holding that a district court of appeal opinion which cites as controlling authority a decision that is either pending review in or has been reversed by the court constitutes prima facie express conflict and allows the court to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction
E. holding that when a state commission has the right under section 6001 of the texas civil practice and remedies code to supersede an order the trial court cannot deny suspension of a temporary injunction under former rule 43a currently texrapp p 291b pending an interlocutory appeal
Reply with [A, B, C, D, E] only.