Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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required merger where the “evidence presented at a particular trial” showed that one offense was coextensive with another, “does not suffice to overcome the presumption.” Id. Byrd’s presumption applies here because kidnaping and child sexual abuse each “requires proof of a fact which the other does not.” 598 A.2d at 389. Kid-naping, unlike child sexual abuse, requires “asportation or confinement.” Parker, 692 A.2d at 916; see also D.C.Code § 22-2001. Child sexual abuse, on the other hand, requires proof of an actual or attempted “sexual act” (in the case of first-degree child sexual abuse, see D.C.Code §§ 22-3008, 3018) or “sexual contact” (in the case of second-degree child sexual abuse, see D.C.Code §§ 22-3009, 3018), whereas kid-naping does not. See also Bryant, 859 A.2d at 1108 . Since D.W. “has not presented any evidence,
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that all convictions under wisconsin sexual assault statute were not per se convictions for crimes of violence
B. holding that enticement and sodomy merge under  223601d
C. holding that convictions under  846 and 371 do not offend the double jeopardy clause
D. holding that under byrd kidnaping and sexualabuse convictions do not merge
E. recognizing that the district court could merge duplicative convictions after the jury verdicts are recorded
Reply with [A, B, C, D, E] only.