joe sloan njktmsusacom patrick shanahan wrote failing memory oldtimers utilityapplication nonkde systems mounting removable media usb devices nonkde systems well lets see theres always autofs works without gui may thinking ivman though joe vvrpgsporcupineorg sun feb 24 102739 2008 message 10 date fri 8 feb 2008 182915 0500 est vvrpgsporcupineorg wietse venema subject ietfdkim draftietfdkimssp02txt discardableexclusive steve atkins cc dkim list messageid 20080208232915824391f3ea8spikeporcupineorg contenttype textplain charsetusascii steve atkins original observation discardable reasonable term mail sender prefer recipient deliver small fraction legitimate email small fraction nonlegitimate email rather deliver either assertion made small fraction non legitimate email actually 100 nonlegitimate email assertion shown false ignore digression return came assertion sender would prefer recipient deliver small fraction legitimate email well small fraction illegitimate email rather delivering small fractions legitimate illegitimate email senders opinion important mail claiming delivered delivered english meaning discardable matches semantics pretty well want implementors easily understand deploy specification importantly limits thats fairly important 1 wietse vvrpgsporcupineorg sun feb 24 102739 2008 message 11 date fri 8 feb 2008 183701 0500 est vvrpgsporcupineorg wietse venema subject ietfdkim draftietfdkimssp02txt discardableexclusive gfkyhddlmipassocorg messageid 200802082337010b46f1f3ea1spikeporcupineorg contenttype textplain charsetusascii mh michael hammer 5304 domain chooses sign dkim respect field email address purports domain domain ability make assertion sort ssp regard practices potential benefit afforded receiver checking ssp assertion taking whatever unspecified action worth effort receivers likely little benefitinterest checking ssp rest discussion moot words juice worth squeeze spammers use dkim ssp therefore juice worth squeeze unless receiver actually knows domain perfect dkimssp total stranger relatively meaningless weve already visted station many times past wietse hwgszcaagcom sun feb 24 102739 2008 message 12 date fri 8 feb 2008 200112 0500 mh michael hammer 5304 subject ietfdkim draftietfdkimssp02txt discardableexclusive wietse venema messageid contenttype textplain charsetusascii original message lrbigfuhnacdbbdmipassocorg mailtolrbigfuhnacdbbdmipassocorg behalf wietse venema sent friday february 08 2008 637 pm gfkyhddlmipassocorg subject ietfdkim draftietfdkimssp02txt discardableexclusive mh michael hammer 5304 domain chooses sign dkim respect field email address purports domain domain ability make assertion sort ssp regard practices potential benefit afforded receiver checking ssp assertion taking whatever unspecified action worth effort receivers likely little benefitinterest checking ssp rest discussion moot words juice worth squeeze spammers use dkim ssp therefore juice worth squeeze unless receiver actually knows domain perfect dkimssp total stranger relatively meaningless im asking terms overall implementation world domains strangers juice definately worth squeeze chicken egg kickstarting adoption true half pick percentage choicethe domains strangers point benefits checking outweigh costs checking weve already visted station many times past wietse may absolutely correct context relatively meaningless micro level behavior starts examined matched signature macro level may receivers assign reputation newly signing domains based general experience class segments based type mail received class newly signing domains may dkimssp matched previous mail flows ip address characteristics associated sender dkimssp wild hard say play trying use dkimssp directly identify bad im sure useful plenty ways bad actors act bad hand dkimssp allows determination good reputation tied behavior signing domain even time may useful cases enables comparison two bad purporting good actor within certain parametersit may useful cases certainly interesting see happens dkimssp good reputation turns bad especially involves subversion domains security processes much talk reputation gained little loss sticky good reputation based dkimssp metrics without ssp even receivers choose take advantage dkim im talking handful domains im talking general adoption receivers potential 1st party 3rd party legitimate signers bad guys dont expectation receivers interpret act signing strong incentive begin signing im also assuming expectation positive outcome disincentive sign given spammers try useabuse dkim dkimssp cloak nature beast ties issues surrounding maildomain host compromise abuse fully realize even dkimssp afford protection certain things doesnt protect bad things thats another given understanding regard dkim authentication approaches goal stake defined areas practices identifyprotect legitimate even limited reputation built mail hopefully drive bad actors areas isnt 3ps 01 isnt asp 02 identifiedprotected ssp least three large receivers checking dkim assigning passfail signatures even may currently taking action determinations assume perceived potential benefit part checking signatures well checking signatures dkim checking sufficient without ssp might dkimssp help receivers 3 aforementioned well others leverage evaluation received email whether signed valid unsigned mike _______________________________________________ note well list operates according tue 05 aug 2008 171500 0800 opensuse non kde auto mount utility