text:
                      højesterets kendelse
                         afsagt fredag den 24. februar 2017
sag 267/2016
(1. afdeling)
anklagemyndigheden
mod
t
(advokat henrik stagetorn, beskikket)
i tidligere instanser er afsagt kendelse af retten i næstved den 28. april 2016 og af østre
landsrets 8. afdeling den 9. juni og den 30. juni 2016.
i påkendelsen har deltaget fem dommere: lene pagter kristensen, jytte scharling, jon
stokholm, poul dahl jensen og lars apostoli.
påstande
t har nedlagt påstand om, at justitsministeriets afgørelse af 5. april 2016 om udlevering af
ham til straffuldbyrdelse i rumænien tilsidesættes, og at udlevering nægtes.
anklagemyndigheden har nedlagt påstand om stadfæstelse af landsrettens kendelser.
supplerende sagsfremstilling
den 17. februar 2016 traf en engelsk domstol (westminster magistrates’ court) beslutning
om, at den europæiske arrestordre om udlevering af t til straffuldbyrdelse i rumænien ikke
var gyldig, fordi den ikke var udfyldt i overensstemmelse med artikel 8 i rådets
rammeafgørelse af 13. juni 2002 om den europæiske arrestordre (2002/584/ria) om
angivelse af gerningsstedet for forbrydelsen. af afgørelsen fremgår bl.a.:
                                                - 2 -
       ”27. mr. stansfield, on behalf of mr. t, submits that the warrant must contain
       particulars of the location in which the offence is said to have been committed for
       it to satisfy section 2 of the ea 2003. he submits that this warrant does not
       contain any particulars of the location of where these two offences took place. he
       submits that the warrant is therefore not a valid part 1 warrant.
       28. ms. pottle, on behalf of the judicial authority, concedes that the warrant does
       not contain particulars of the location of these offences. she suggests that the
       court would be in difficulties being satisfied to the criminal standard that the war-
       rant is a valid warrant. she observes that common sense suggests that the conduct
       “probably” occurred in romania. she was also concerned that mr. t’s role was
       described as “he gathered their addresses especially by means of their
       advertisements from the internet” which might suggest he could have acted
       anywhere in the world.
       29. i made observations that a number of the injured victim companies had
       “bucharest” in their names, from which it could be inferred that they were located
       (at least in part) in romania. i also noted that, whether or not mr. t carried out
       activities outside romania might not matter as the first offence alleged was
       participation in a criminal organization which would include activities of others
       not just mr. t. ms. pottle did not attempt to seize on these observations in support
       of the judicial authority’s position. she was in no doubt right not to do so.
       30. i agree with mr. stanfield’s submission on this matter. the warrant fails to
       specify the place of participation in the offence by the requested person. as such,
       it clearly does not comply with article 8(1)(e) of the framework decision. as has
       been made clear in brussels v cando armas, i must interpret section 2 so that is it
       not inconsistent with article 8. as it is made clear in king v france, there must be
       sufficient circumstances in the description of the offence(s) to enable both sides to
       be able to consider barriers to extradition. the divisional court makes it clear that
       “particulars of conviction” include a requirement as to place of participation.
       though i might make some common sense inferences as to the place in which the
       relevant conduct occurred, guesswork by the court is not what is required. section
       2 requires particulars. sufficient particulars have not been provided. this is not, in
       my judgment, a valid part 1 warrant.”
anbringender
t har anført navnlig, at den rumænske arrestordre ikke lever op til de gældende krav til
indholdet, herunder beskrivelse af tid og sted for den strafbare handling, som ligger til grund
for arrestordren. det blev fastslået ved den engelske dom af 17. februar 2016, og denne
afgørelse er bindende for danske domstole. det er derfor ikke muligt at foretage udlevering af
ham til straffuldbyrdelse i rumænien på grundlag af den samme arrestordre.
                                                - 3 -
udlevering af ham til straffuldbyrdelse i rumænien vil endvidere være i strid med udleve-
ringslovens § 10 h, stk. 2, og den europæiske menneskerettighedskonventions artikel 3, da
der ikke foreligger reelle og tilstrækkelige garantier for, at han ikke vil blive udsat for umen-
neskelig og nedværdigende behandling.
anklagemyndigheden har anført navnlig, at den omstændighed, at en domstol i et andet eu-
land tidligere har truffet beslutning om, at en europæisk arrestordre ikke indeholder tilstræk-
kelige oplysninger, hverken er bindende for de danske myndigheder eller udgør et tilstræk-
keligt grundlag for et afslag. de danske myndigheder og domstole har med rette foretaget en
selvstændig vurdering og fundet, at oplysningerne i arrestordren er fyldestgørende.
betingelserne for afslag i medfør af udleveringslovens § 10 h, stk. 2, er heller ikke opfyldt. de
rumænske myndigheder har taget kritikken, der tidligere er fremført af fængselsforholdene i
landet, til sig, og man har forøget kapaciteten og forbedret forholdene. der må lægges afgø-
rende vægt på de oplysninger og garantier, der fremgår af udtalelsen af 21. juni 2016 fra de
rumænske myndigheder, således som landsretten også har gjort ved sin kendelse af 30. juni
2016. det er herefter med rette, at landsretten har lagt til grund, at der ikke er reel fare for, at
t vil blive udsat for umenneskelig eller nedværdigende behandling, hvis udlevering finder
sted, og danmark er derfor forpligtet til at udlevere ham i henhold til rammeafgørelsen om
den europæiske arrestordre.
retsgrundlaget
bestemmelserne i udleveringslovens § 10 h, stk. 2, og § 18 a, stk. 1 og 3, har følgende ordlyd:
      ”§ 10 h. …
      stk. 2. udlevering må endvidere ikke finde sted, hvis der er fare for, at den pågældende
      efter udleveringen vil blive udsat for tortur eller anden umenneskelig eller nedværdi-
      gende behandling eller straf.
      § 18 a. en europæisk arrestordre skal for at kunne danne grundlag for anholdelse og
      udlevering til en medlemsstat i den europæiske union indeholde oplysning om den
      eftersøgtes identitet og nationalitet, tid og sted for den strafbare handling, dennes be-
      skaffenhed og de anvendelige straffebestemmelser samt oplysning om, hvorvidt der er
      truffet beslutning om anholdelse eller fængsling, eller om der er afsagt dom.
      …
                                              - 4 -
      stk. 3. en europæisk arrestordre, der er udstedt med henblik på udlevering til straf-
      fuldbyrdelse, skal tillige indeholde oplysning om den idømte straf eller anden
      retsfølge.”
bestemmelserne blev indsat ved lov nr. 433 af 10. juni 2003 i forbindelse med de ændringer
af udleveringsloven, der var nødvendige for danmarks opfyldelse af rådet for den europæ-
iske unions rammeafgørelse om den europæiske arrestordre mv. en europæisk arrestordre
indeholder dels en anmodning om anholdelse og varetægtsfængsling med henblik på ud-
levering, dels en anmodning om udlevering. i bemærkningerne til lovforslaget hedder det bl.a.
(folketingstidende 2002-03, tillæg a, lovforslag nr. l 168, s. 4284 og s. 4297):
      ”almindelige bemærkninger
      1. indledning
      …
      1.3. den gældende udleveringslov indeholder ikke en udtrykkelig bestemmelse om, at
      udlevering ikke må ske i strid med danmarks internationale menneskeretlige forplig-
      telser, herunder f.eks. den europæiske menneskerettighedskonvention. disse forpligtel-
      ser gælder imidlertid fuldt ud – også uden en sådan udtrykkelig bestemmelse. udleve-
      ring kan således f.eks. ikke ske, hvis udleveringen ville være i strid med artikel 6 i den
      europæiske menneskerettighedskonvention om retten til en retfærdig rettergang. ram-
      meafgørelsen indebærer ingen ændringer af danmarks forpligtelser til at overholde de
      grundlæggende rettigheder og principper, der bl.a. følger af den europæiske menneske-
      rettighedskonvention.
      i lyset af den udtrykkelige bestemmelse i præamblen til rammeafgørelsen om forbud
      mod udlevering til tortur har justitsministeriet fundet det naturligt at indsætte en be-
      stemmelse, der præciserer, at udlevering ikke må finde sted, hvis der er fare for, at den
      pågældende vil blive udsat for tortur eller anden umenneskelig eller nedværdigende
      behandling eller straf.
      …
      4. justitsministeriets overvejelser
      …
      4.1.1. forholdet til den europæiske menneskerettighedskonvention
      det fremgår af rammeafgørelsens præambelbetragtning nr. 12 og artikel 1, stk. 3, at
      reglerne i rammeafgørelsen er fastsat under iagttagelse af de grundlæggende rettigheder
      og grundlæggende retsprincipper, som fremgår af artikel 6 i traktaten om den euro-
      pæiske union (teu).
      efter artikel 6 i teu bygger unionen på principperne om frihed, demokrati og respekt
      for menneskerettighederne og de grundlæggende frihedsrettigheder samt retsstatsprin-
      cippet, der alle er principper, som medlemsstaterne har til fælles. det følger endvidere
      af bestemmelsen, at unionen respekterer de grundlæggende rettigheder, således som de
                                                - 5 -
      garanteres ved den europæiske menneskerettighedskonvention, og således som de føl-
      ger af medlemsstaternes fælles forfatningsmæssige traditioner, som generelle principper
      for fællesskabsretten.
      lovforslag indebærer således ingen ændringer af danmarks forpligtelse til at overholde
      de grundlæggende rettigheder og principper, der bl.a. følger af den europæiske menne-
      skerettighedskonvention.
      i præambelbetragtning nr. 13 i rammeafgørelsen om den europæiske arrestordre mv. er
      anført, at personer ikke må udleveres til en stat, hvor der er alvorlig risiko for, at de vil
      blive udsat for dødsstraf, tortur eller anden umenneskelig eller nedværdigende behand-
      ling eller straf.
      …
      i lyset af denne udtrykkelige bestemmelse i præamblen til rammeafgørelsen samt de
      indkomne høringssvar har justitsministeriet fundet det naturligt at indsætte en bestem-
      melse, der præciserer, at udlevering ikke må finde sted, hvis der er fare for, at den på-
      gældende vil blive udsat for tortur eller anden umenneskelig eller nedværdigende be-
      handling eller straf. der henvises herved til de foreslåede bestemmelser i § 6, stk. 2 (om
      udlevering til stater uden for eu) og § 10 h, stk. 2 (om udlevering til eu-medlems-
      stater).”
den europæiske menneskerettighedskonventions artikel 3 har følgende ordlyd:
      ”artikel 3.
      ingen må underkastes tortur og ej heller umenneskelig eller nedværdigende behandling
      eller straf.”
artikel 4 i den europæiske unions charter om grundlæggende rettigheder har følgende
ordlyd:
      ”artikel 4
      ingen må underkastes tortur, ej heller umenneskelig eller nedværdigende behandling
      eller straf.”
 af rådets rammeafgørelse af 13. juni 2002 om den europæiske arrestordre og om proce-
 durerne for overgivelse mellem medlemsstaterne (2002/584/ria) fremgår bl.a. følgende:
      ”rådet for den europæiske union har –
      …
      ud fra følgende betragtninger:
      …
                                          - 6 -
6) den europæiske arrestordre, som denne rammeafgørelse omhandler, er den første
udmøntning på det strafferetlige område af princippet om gensidig anerkendelse, som
det europæiske råd har udråbt til en ”hjørnesten” i det retlige samarbejde.
…
10) ordningen med den europæiske arrestordre er baseret på en høj grad af tillid mellem
medlemsstaterne. anvendelsen af den kan kun suspenderes i tilfælde af, at en
medlemsstat groft og vedvarende overtræder de principper, der er fastlagt i artikel 6, stk.
1, i traktaten om den europæiske union, hvilket skal fastslås af rådet i henhold til
samme traktats artikel 7, stk. 1, med de følger, der er fastsat i stk. 2 i samme artikel.
…
12) denne rammeafgørelse respekterer de grundlæggende rettigheder og principper,
som er anerkendt i artikel 6 i traktaten om den europæiske union, og som afspejles i
den europæiske unions charter om grundlæggende rettigheder, navnlig kapitel vi.
…
13) personer må ikke overføres, udsendes eller udleveres til en stat, hvor der er alvorlig
risiko for, at de vil blive udsat for dødsstraf, tortur eller anden umenneskelig eller
nedværdigende behandling eller straf.
…
vedtaget følgende rammeafgørelse:
kapitel 1
almindelige principper
artikel 1
definition af og pligten til at fuldbyrde en europæisk arrestordre
1. den europæiske arrestordre er en retsafgørelse truffet af en medlemsstat med det
formål, at en anden medlemsstat anholder og overgiver en eftersøgt person med henblik
på strafforfølgning eller fuldbyrdelse af en frihedsstraf eller en anden frihedsberøvende
foranstaltning.
2. medlemsstaterne fuldbyrder enhver europæisk arrestordre på grundlag af princippet
om gensidig anerkendelse og i overensstemmelse med bestemmelserne i denne ramme-
afgørelse.
3. denne rammeafgørelse indebærer ikke nogen ændring af pligten til at respektere de
grundlæggende rettigheder og grundlæggende retsprincipper, således som de er define-
ret i artikel 6 i traktaten om den europæiske union.
…
artikel 8
den europæiske arrestordres indhold og form
1. den europæiske arrestordre skal indeholde følgende oplysninger i overensstemmelse
med formularen i bilaget:
…
e)        en beskrivelse af, under hvilke omstændigheder lovovertrædelsen er begået,
          herunder tidspunkt, sted og omfang af den eftersøgtes deltagelse heri,
…
                                                  - 7 -
       kapitel 2
       overgivelsesprocedure
       …
       artikel 15
       afgørelse om overgivelse
       1. den fuldbyrdende judicielle myndighed træffer afgørelse om overgivelse af den
       pågældende inden for de frister og på de betingelser, der er fastsat i denne ramme-
       afgørelse.
       2. hvis den fuldbyrdende judicielle myndighed finder, at de oplysninger, den ud-
       stedende medlemsstat har fremsendt, ikke er tilstrækkelige til, at den kan træffe af-
       gørelse om overgivelsen, anmoder den om straks at få de nødvendige supplerende
       oplysninger, navnlig i forbindelse med artikel 3-5 og 8, og kan fastsætte en tidsfrist for
       fremsendelsen af disse oplysninger under hensyn til nødvendigheden af at overholde
       fristerne i artikel 17.
       3. den udstedende judicielle myndighed kan til enhver tid fremsende supplerende
       nyttige oplysninger til den fuldbyrdende judicielle myndighed.”
eu-domstolens dom af 5. april 2016 i de forenede sager c-404/15 (pál aranyosi) og c-
659/15 ppu (robert căldăraru) angår fuldbyrdelse af europæiske arrestordrer om henholdsvis
strafforfølgning i ungarn af en ungarsk statsborger og staffuldbyrdelse i rumænien af en
rumænsk statsborger. dommen er afsagt efter præjudiciel forelæggelse af spørgsmål fra en
tysk domstol, der skulle tage stilling til fuldbyrdelsen af de to arrestordrer. i dommen hedder
det bl.a.:
76.    rammeafgørelsen har således med indførelsen af en ny forenklet og mere effektiv
       ordning for overgivelse af personer, der er dømt eller mistænkt for at have overtrådt
       strafferetten, til formål at lette og fremskynde det retlige samarbejde med henblik på at
       bidrage til at gennemføre unionens erklærede mål om at blive et område med frihed,
       sikkerhed og retfærdighed på grundlag af den høje grad af tillid, der skal være mellem
       medlemsstaterne (jf. domme melloni, c-399/11, eu:c:2013:107, præmis 37, f., c-
       168/13 ppu, eu:c:2013:358, præmis 35, og lanigan, c-237/15 ppu, eu:c:2015:474,
       præmis 28).
77.    princippet om gensidig anerkendelse, som er grundlaget for ordningen for den euro-
       pæiske arrestordre, er i sig selv baseret på, at der mellem medlemsstaterne hersker en
       gensidig tillid til, at deres respektive nationale retsordener er i stand til at yde den
       samme effektive beskyttelse af de grundlæggende rettigheder, som er anerkendt på eu-
       plan, og navnlig i chartret (jf. i denne retning dom f., c-168/13 ppu, eu:c:2013:358,
                                               - 8 -
    præmis 50, og analogt for så vidt angår civilretligt samarbejde dom aguirre zarraga, c-
    491/10 ppu, eu:c:2010:828, præmis 70).
78. både princippet om gensidig tillid mellem medlemsstaterne og princippet om gensidig
    anerkendelse er af grundlæggende betydning i eu-retten, idet de muliggør oprettelsen
    og bevarelsen af et område uden indre grænser. mere specifikt pålægger princippet om
    gensidig tillid, bl.a. for så vidt angår et område med frihed, sikkerhed og retfærdighed,
    hver af medlemsstaterne at lægge til grund, medmindre der er tale om helt særlige
    omstændigheder, at samtlige andre medlemsstater overholder eu-retten og navnlig de i
    denne ret anerkendte grundlæggende rettigheder (jf. i denne retning udtalelse 2/13,
    eu:c:2014:2454, præmis 191).
79. på det af rammeafgørelsen regulerede område er princippet om gensidig anerkendelse,
    der udgør »hjørnestenen« i det retlige samarbejde, således som det bl.a. fremgår af sjette
    betragtning til rammeafgørelsen, udmøntet i rammeafgørelsens artikel 1, stk. 2, i hen-
    hold til hvilken medlemsstaterne i princippet har pligt til at fuldbyrde en europæisk
    arrestordre (jf. i denne retning dom lanigan, c-237/15 ppu, eu:c:2015:474, præmis
    36 og den deri nævnte retspraksis).
80. det følger heraf, at den fuldbyrdende judicielle myndighed kun kan nægte at fuldbyrde
    en sådan arrestordre af de – udtømmende opregnede – obligatoriske grunde til at afslå
    fuldbyrdelse, som er fastsat i rammeafgørelsens artikel 3, eller fakultative grunde til at
    afslå fuldbyrdelse, som er fastsat i rammeafgørelsens artikel 4 og 4a. desuden kan den
    europæiske arrestordres fuldbyrdelse kun underlægges de betingelser, der er udtøm-
    mende fastsat i rammeafgørelsens artikel 5 (jf. i denne retning dom lanigan, c-237/15
    ppu, eu:c:2015:474, præmis 36 og den deri nævnte retspraksis).
81. i denne sammenhæng bemærkes, at det i tiende betragtning til rammeafgørelsen hedder,
    at anvendelsen af ordningen for den europæiske arrestordre kun kan suspenderes i til-
    fælde af, at en medlemsstat groft og vedvarende overtræder de værdier, der omhandlet i
    artikel 2 teu, og i overensstemmelse med proceduren i artikel 7 teu.
82. ikke desto mindre forholder det sig for det første således, at domstolen har anerkendt, at
    der kan gøres indskrænkninger i princippet om gensidig anerkendelse og princippet om
    gensidig tillid mellem medlemsstaterne »under helt særlige omstændigheder« (jf. i den-
    ne retning udtalelse 2/13, eu:c:2014:2454, præmis 191).
83. for det andet kan rammeafgørelsen, som det fremgår af dens artikel 1, stk. 3, ikke
    indebære nogen ændring af pligten til at respektere de grundlæggende rettigheder, så-
    ledes som de er defineret bl.a. i chartret.
…
                                              - 9 -
88. det følger heraf, at når den judicielle myndighed i den fuldbyrdende medlemsstat råder
    over oplysninger, der dokumenterer en reel risiko for umenneskelig eller nedværdigende
    behandling af frihedsberøvede personer i den udstedende medlemsstat målt efter nor-
    men for beskyttelse af de grundlæggende rettigheder, der er sikret ved eu-retten og
    navnlig ved chartrets artikel 4 (jf. i denne retning dom melloni, c-399/11,
    eu:c:2013:107, præmis 59 og 63, samt udtalelse 2/13, eu:c:2014:2454, præmis 192),
    skal myndigheden vurdere, om denne risiko foreligger, når den træffer afgørelse om
    overgivelse af en person omfattet af en europæisk arrestordre til myndighederne i den
    udstedende medlemsstat. fuldbyrdelsen af en sådan arrestordre må således ikke føre til
    en umenneskelig eller nedværdigende behandling af den pågældende.
89. ved denne vurdering skal den fuldbyrdende judicielle myndighed først og fremmest
    basere sig på objektive, pålidelige, præcise og behørigt ajourførte oplysninger om de
    forhold for frihedsberøvede, der hersker i den udstedende medlemsstat, og som påviser
    reelle mangler, der er systemiske eller generelle, eller som berører visse persongrupper
    eller visse centre for frihedsberøvede. disse oplysninger kan bl.a. fremgå af interna-
    tionale retsafgørelser, såsom den europæiske menneskerettighedsdomstols domme, den
    udstedende medlemsstats retsafgørelser samt afgørelser, rapporter og andre dokumenter,
    der udarbejdes af organerne i europarådet eller af fn-organer.
90. i denne forbindelse fremgår det af den europæiske menneskerettighedsdomstols prak-
    sis, at emrk’s artikel 3 pålægger myndighederne i den stat, på hvis område en fri-
    hedsberøvelse finder sted, en positiv forpligtelse til at sikre sig, at enhver fange fri-
    hedsberøves under forhold, der garanterer respekten for den menneskelige værdighed, at
    den måde, hvorpå foranstaltningen fuldbyrdes, ikke påfører den berørte person så stor
    nød eller så store prøvelser, at den grad af lidelse, som uundgåeligt er forbundet med
    enhver frihedsberøvelse, overskrides, og at fangens helbred og velfærd sikres på en
    passende måde under hensyn til praktiske fængselsmæssige krav (jf. den europæiske
    menneskerettighedsdomstols dom i sagen torreggiani m.fl. mod italien, sag nr.
    43517/09, 46882/09, 55400/09, 57875/09, 61535/09, 35315/10, og 37818/10, af
    8.1.2013, § 65).
91. imidlertid kan en konstatering af, at der foreligger en reel risiko for umenneskelig eller
    nedværdigende behandling på grund af de generelle forhold under frihedsberøvelse i
    den udstedende medlemsstat, ikke som sådan føre til et afslag på at fuldbyrde en euro-
    pæisk arrestordre.
92. når en sådan risiko er konstateret, skal den fuldbyrdende judicielle myndighed dernæst
    også foretage en konkret og præcis vurdering af, om der er vægtige grunde til at antage,
    at vedkommende løber denne risiko på grund af de forhold under dennes frihedsberø-
    velse, som kan påregnes i den udstedende medlemsstat.
                                             - 10 -
93.  den omstændighed, at der foreligger oplysninger, som vidner om mangler, der er sy-
     stemiske eller generelle, eller som berører visse persongrupper eller visse centre for
     frihedsberøvede, ved forholdene under frihedsberøvelse i den udstedende medlemsstat,
     indebærer således ikke nødvendigvis i sig selv, at den berørte person i en konkret sag vil
     blive udsat for en umenneskelig eller nedværdigende behandling, såfremt vedkommen-
     de overgives til denne medlemsstats myndigheder.
94.  med henblik på at sikre overholdelsen af chartrets artikel 4 i en konkret sag, hvor en
     person er omfattet af en europæisk arrestordre, skal den fuldbyrdende judicielle myn-
     dighed, som stilles over for objektive, pålidelige, præcise og behørigt ajourførte op-
     lysninger, som vidner om, at der foreligger sådanne mangler, derfor prøve, om der efter
     omstændighederne i den foreliggende sag er vægtige grunde til at antage, at vedkom-
     mende efter sin overgivelse til den udstedende medlemsstat løber en reel risiko for i
     denne medlemsstat at blive udsat for en umenneskelig eller nedværdigende behandling i
     denne artikels forstand.
95.  med henblik herpå skal nævnte myndighed i medfør af rammeafgørelsens artikel 15,
     stk. 2, anmode den judicielle myndighed i den udstedende medlemsstat om straks at få
     de nødvendige supplerende oplysninger vedrørende de forhold, hvorunder det påregnes
     at frihedsberøve den berørte person i denne medlemsstat.
…
98.  kan den fuldbyrdende judicielle myndighed, henset til de oplysninger, der er afgivet i
     medfør af rammeafgørelsens artikel 15, stk. 2, samt alle øvrige oplysninger, som denne
     myndighed har til rådighed, konstatere, at der foreligger en reel risiko for, at den person,
     som er omfattet af den europæiske arrestordre, bliver udsat for en umenneskelig eller
     nedværdigende behandling som omhandlet i denne doms præmis 94, skal fuldbyrdelsen
     af denne arrestordre udsættes, men kan ikke opgives (jf. analogt dom lanigan, c-237/15
     ppu, eu:c:2015:474, præmis 38).
…
103. såfremt det på baggrund af de oplysninger, som den fuldbyrdende judicielle myndighed
     har modtaget fra den udstedende judicielle myndighed, kan afvises, at der foreligger en
     reel risiko for, at den berørte person gøres til genstand for en umenneskelig eller ned-
     værdigende behandling i den udstedende medlemsstat, skal den fuldbyrdende judicielle
     myndighed inden for de i rammeafgørelsen fastsatte frister træffe sin afgørelse ved-
     rørende den europæiske arrestordres fuldbyrdelse, uden at dette berører den pågældende
     persons mulighed for, når vedkommende er blevet overgivet, at udnytte de retsmidler i
     den udstedende medlemsstats retsorden, som giver denne mulighed for i givet fald at
     anfægte lovligheden af forholdene under sin frihedsberøvelse i et fængsel i denne
     medlemsstat (jf. i denne retning dom f., c-168/13 ppu, eu:c:2013:358, præmis 50).
                                                - 11 -
104. det følger af samtlige ovenstående betragtninger, at de forelagte spørgsmål skal
       besvares med, at rammeafgørelsens artikel 1, stk. 3, artikel 5 og artikel 6, stk. 1, skal
       fortolkes således, at den fuldbyrdende judicielle myndighed, som stilles over for ob-
       jektive, pålidelige, præcise og behørigt ajourførte oplysninger, som vidner om, at der
       ved forholdene under frihedsberøvelse i den udstedende medlemsstat foreligger
       mangler, der er systemiske eller generelle, eller som berører visse persongrupper eller
       visse centre for frihedsberøvede, skal foretage en konkret og præcis prøvelse af, om der
       er alvorlige grunde til at antage, at en person, som er omfattet af en europæisk arrest-
       ordre udstedt med henblik på retsforfølgning eller fuldbyrdelse af en frihedsstraf, på
       grund af forholdene under sin frihedsberøvelse i denne medlemsstat løber en reel risiko
       for at blive udsat for umenneskelig eller nedværdigende behandling som omhandlet i
       chartrets artikel 4 i tilfælde af overgivelse til nævnte medlemsstat. med henblik herpå
       skal den anmode om supplerende oplysninger fra den udstedende judicielle myndighed,
       der skal meddele disse oplysninger inden for den i anmodningen fastsatte frist, efter om
       fornødent at have anmodet om bistand fra den eller en af de centrale myndighed(er) i
       den udstedende medlemsstat som omhandlet i rammeafgørelsens artikel 7. den fuld-
       byrdende judicielle myndighed skal udsætte sin afgørelse vedrørende den berørte per-
       sons overgivelse, indtil den får supplerende oplysninger, som giver denne mulighed for
       at afvise, at der foreligger en sådan risiko. såfremt det ikke inden for en rimelig frist kan
       afvises, at der foreligger en sådan risiko, skal myndigheden beslutte, om overgivelses-
       proceduren bør bringes til ophør.”
det fremgår af den europæiske menneskerettighedsdomstols praksis, at udlevering kan inde-
bære en overtrædelse af den europæiske menneskerettighedskonventions artikel 3, hvis den
pågældende i givet fald vil blive udsat for en behandling, som er i strid med artikel 3 i det
land, som vedkommende udleveres til, jf. således f.eks. menneskerettighedsdomstolens dom
af 7. juli 1989 (soering mod england, nr. 14038/88). i dommen hedder det bl.a.:
       ”89. what amounts to "inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment" depends on all
       the circumstances of the case... furthermore, inherent in the whole of the convention is
       a search for a fair balance between the demands of the general interest of the com-
       munity and the requirements of the protection of the individual’s fundamental rights. as
       movement about the world becomes easier and crime takes on a larger international
       dimension, it is increasingly in the interest of all nations that suspected offenders who
       flee abroad should be brought to justice. conversely, the establishment of safe havens
       for fugitives would not only result in danger for the state obliged to harbour the pro-
       tected person but also tend to undermine the foundations of extradition. these consi-
       derations must also be included among the factors to be taken into account in the inter-
       pretation and application of the notions of inhuman and degrading treatment or punish-
       ment in extradition cases.
                                             - 12 -
     90. it is not normally for the convention institutions to pronounce on the existence or
     otherwise of potential violations of the convention. however, where an applicant
     claims that a decision to extradite him would, if implemented, be contrary to article 3
     (art. 3) by reason of its foreseeable consequences in the requesting country, a departure
     from this principle is necessary, in view of the serious and irreparable nature of the
     alleged suffering risked, in order to ensure the effectiveness of the safeguard provided
     by that article (art. 3)…
     91. in sum, the decision by a contracting state to extradite a fugitive may give rise to
     an issue under article 3 (art. 3), and hence engage the responsibility of that state under
     the convention, where substantial grounds have been shown for believing that the per-
     son concerned, if extradited, faces a real risk of being subjected to torture or to inhuman
     or degrading treatment or punishment in the requesting country. the establishment of
     such responsibility inevitably involves an assessment of conditions in the requesting
     country against the standards of article 3 (art. 3) of the convention. nonetheless, there
     is no question of adjudicating on or establishing the responsibility of the receiving
     country, whether under general international law, under the convention or otherwise. in
     so far as any liability under the convention is or may be incurred, it is liability incurred
     by the extraditing contracting state by reason of its having taken action which has as a
     direct consequence the exposure of an individual to proscribed ill-treatment.”
den europæiske menneskerettighedsdomstol har den 20. oktober 2016 afsagt dom i sagen
muršić mod kroatien (nr. 7334/13). i dommen, der er en storkammerafgørelse og angår
spørgsmål om krænkelse af den europæiske menneskerettighedskonventions artikel 3 som
følge af de fængselsforhold, den pågældende havde været undergivet i kroatien, hedder det
bl.a.:
     ”c. the court’s assessment
     1. introductory remarks
     91. the court is frequently called upon to rule on complaints alleging a violation of
     article 3 of the convention on account of insufficient personal space allocated to
     prisoners. in the present case, the court finds it appropriate to clarify the principles and
     standards for the assessment of the minimum personal space per detainee in multi-
     occupancy accommodation in prisons under article 3 of the convention.
     92. the court would further note that different questions might arise in the context of
     single-occupancy accommodation, isolation or other similar detention regimes, or
     waiting rooms or similar spaces used for very short periods of time (such as police
     stations, psychiatric establishments, immigration detention facilities), which are
     however not in issue in the present case (see paragraph 50 above; and georgia v. russia
     (i) [gc], no. 13255/07, §§ 192-205, echr 2014 (extracts)).
     93. the matter of prison overcrowding in multi-occupancy accommodation was one of
     the issues considered by the grand chamber in the idalov v. russia case ([gc], no.
                                        - 13 -
5826/03, §§ 96-102, 22 may 2012). it has also been addressed in several pilot and
leading judgments in which the court has already indicated specific aspects related to
the assessment of the problem of prison overcrowding, and the duty of the states to
address the deficiencies identified by the court in these judgments.
94. in particular, the court has so far adopted pilot judgments addressing the question of
prison overcrowding in respect of the following states: bulgaria (see neshkov and
others v. bulgaria, nos. 36925/10, 21487/12, 72893/12, 73196/12, 77718/12 and
9717/13, 27 january 2015); hungary (see varga and others, cited above); italy (see
torreggiani and others, cited above); poland (see orchowski v. poland, no. 17885/04,
22 october 2009; and norbert sikorski v. poland, no. 17599/05, 22 october 2009); and
russia (see ananyev and others, cited above),
95. the court has also addressed the question of prison overcrowding by indicating the
necessity of improving conditions of detention under article 46 of the convention in
leading judgments with regard to the following states: belgium (see vasilescu v.
belgium, no. 64682/12, 25 november 2014); greece (see samaras and others v.
greece, no. 11463/09, 28 february 2012; tzamalis and others v. greece, no. 15894/09,
4 december 2012; and al. k. v. greece, no. 63542/11, 11 december 2014); romania
(see iacov stanciu v. romania, no. 35972/05, 24 july 2012); slovenia (see mandić and
jović v. slovenia, nos. 5774/10 and 5985/10, 20 october 2011; and štrucl and others v.
slovenia, nos. 5903/10, 6003/10 and 6544/10, 20 october 2011); and the republic of
moldova (see shishanov v. the republic of moldova, no. 11353/06, 15 september
2015).
2. recapitulation of the relevant principles
(a) general principles
96. article 3 of the convention enshrines one of the most fundamental values of de-
mocratic society. it prohibits in absolute terms torture or inhuman or degrading treat-
ment or punishment, irrespective of the circumstances and the victim’s behaviour (see,
for example, labita v. italy [gc], no. 26772/95, § 119, echr 2000-iv; and svinarenko
and slyadnev v. russia [gc], nos. 32541/08 and 43441/08, § 113, echr 2014
(extracts)).
97. ill-treatment must attain a minimum level of severity if it is to fall within the scope
of article 3. the assessment of this minimum is relative; it depends on all the circum-
stances of the case, such as the duration of the treatment, its physical and mental effects
and, in some cases, the sex, age and state of health of the victim (see, among other
authorities, ireland v. the united kingdom, 18 january 1978, § 162, series a no. 25;
jalloh v. germany [gc], no. 54810/00, § 67, echr 2006‑ix; idalov, cited above, § 91;
and also, kalashnikov v. russia, no. 47095/99, § 95, echr 2002‑vi).
98. ill-treatment that attains such a minimum level of severity usually involves actual
bodily injury or intense physical or mental suffering. however, even in the absence of
these, where treatment humiliates or debases an individual, showing a lack of respect
for or diminishing his or her human dignity, or arouses feelings of fear, anguish or
inferiority capable of breaking an individual’s moral and physical resistance, it may be
characterised as degrading and also fall within the prohibition of article 3 (see, among
                                        - 14 -
other authorities, idalov, cited above, § 92; and also, pretty v. the united kingdom, no.
2346/02, § 52, echr 2002‑iii; ananyev and others, cited above, § 140; varga and
others, cited above, § 70). indeed, the prohibition of torture and inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment is a value of civilisation closely bound up with respect for
human dignity (see bouyid v. belgium [gc], no. 23380/09, § 81, echr 2015).
99. in the context of deprivation of liberty the court has consistently stressed that, to
fall under article 3, the suffering and humiliation involved must in any event go beyond
that inevitable element of suffering and humiliation connected with detention. the state
must ensure that a person is detained in conditions which are compatible with respect
for human dignity, that the manner and method of the execution of the measure do not
subject him or her to distress or hardship of an intensity exceeding the unavoidable level
of suffering inherent in detention and that, given the practical demands of imprison-
ment, his or her health and well-being are adequately secured (see kudła v. poland
[gc], no. 30210/96, §§ 92-94, echr 2000‑xi; idalov, cited above, § 93; svinarenko
and slyadnev, cited above, § 116; mozer v. the republic of moldova and russia [gc],
no. 11138/10, § 178, echr 2016; and also, valašinas v. lithuania, no. 44558/98, §
102, echr 2001‑viii; and ananyev and others, cited above, § 141).
100. even the absence of an intention to humiliate or debase a detainee by placing him
or her in poor conditions, while being a factor to be taken into account, does not con-
clusively rule out a finding of a violation of article 3 of the convention (see, inter alia,
peers v. greece, no. 28524/95, § 74, echr 2001‑iii; mandić and jović, cited above, §
80; iacov stanciu, cited above, § 179; and generally under article 3, svinarenko and
slyadnev, cited above, § 114, and bouyid, cited above, § 86). indeed, it is incumbent on
the respondent government to organise its penitentiary system in such a way as to en-
sure respect for the dignity of detainees, regardless of financial or logistical difficulties
(see, amongst many others, mamedova v. russia, no. 7064/05, § 63, 1 june 2006;
orchowski, cited above, § 153; neshkov and others, cited above, § 229; and varga and
others, cited above, § 103).
101. when assessing conditions of detention, account has to be taken of the cumulative
effects of these conditions, as well as of specific allegations made by the applicant. the
length of the period during which a person is detained in the particular conditions has
also to be considered (see, amongst many others, idalov, cited above, § 94; and also
orchowski, cited above, § 121; torreggiani and others, cited above, § 66; and ananyev
and others, cited above, § 142).
(b) principles concerning prison overcrowding
102. the court notes that the relevant principles and standards for the assessment of
prison overcrowding flowing from its case-law in particular concern the following
issues: (1) the question of minimum personal space in detention under article 3 of the
convention; (2) whether the allocation of personal space below the minimum require-
ment creates a presumption or leads in itself to a violation of article 3 of the con-
vention; and (3) what factors, if any, could compensate for the scarce allocation of
personal space.
(i) the question of minimum personal space under article 3
                                        - 15 -
(α) the relevant case-law
103. the court has stressed on many occasions that under article 3 it cannot determine,
once and for all, a specific number of square metres that should be allocated to a de-
tainee in order to comply with the convention. indeed, the court has considered that a
number of other relevant factors, such as the duration of detention, the possibilities for
outdoor exercise and the physical and mental condition of the detainee, play an impor-
tant part in deciding whether the detention conditions satisfied the guarantees of article
3 (see samaras and others, cited above, § 57; tzamalis and others, cited above, § 38;
and varga and others, cited above § 76; see further, for instance, trepashkin v. russia,
no. 36898/03, § 92, 19 july 2007; semikhvostov v. russia, no. 2689/12, § 79, 6
february 2014; logothetis and others v. greece, no. 740/13, § 40, 25 september 2014;
and suldin v. russia, no. 20077/04, § 43, 16 october 2014).
104. nevertheless, extreme lack of space in prison cells weighs heavily as an aspect to
be taken into account for the purpose of establishing whether the impugned detention
conditions were “degrading” within the meaning of article 3.
105. in a substantial number of cases when the allocation of space to a detainee in
multi-occupancy accommodation fell below 3 sq. m, the court found the overcrowding
so severe as to justify the finding of a violation of article 3 (see the cases cited in
orchowski, cited above, § 122; ananyev and others, cited above, § 145; and varga and
others, cited above, § 75).
106. when inmates appeared to have at their disposal personal space measuring be-
tween 3 and 4 sq. m the court examined the (in)adequacy of other aspects of physical
conditions of detention when making an assessment under article 3. in such instances a
violation of article 3 was found only if the space factor was coupled with other aspects
of inappropriate physical conditions of detention related to, in a particular context,
access to outdoor exercise, natural light or air, availability of ventilation, adequacy of
heating arrangements, the possibility of using the toilet in private, and compliance with
basic sanitary and hygienic requirements (see orchowski, cited above, § 122; ananyev
and others, cited above, § 149; torreggiani and others, cited above, § 69; vasilescu,
cited above, § 88; and varga and others, cited above, § 78; see also, for example, jirsák
v. the czech republic, no. 8968/08, §§ 64-73, 5 april 2012; culev v. moldova, no.
60179/09, §§ 35-39, 17 april 2012; longin, cited above, §§ 59-61; and barilo v.
ukraine, no. 9607/06, §§ 80-83, 16 may 2013).
107. in the above-mentioned pilot and leading judgments the court has fixed for its
assessment the relevant minimum standard of personal space allocated to a detainee in
multi-occupancy accommodation at 3 sq. m of floor surface (see orchowski, cited
above, § 123; ananyev and others, cited above, § 148; torreggiani and others, cited
above, § 68; vasilescu, cited above, § 88; neshkov and others, cited above, § 232;
samaras and others, cited above, § 58; tzamalis and others, cited above, § 39; varga
and others, cited above, § 74; iacov stanciu, cited above, § 168; and mandić and jović,
cited above, § 75). moreover, in the grand chamber idalov case (cited above, § 101),
when finding a violation of article 3 on account of inadequate conditions of the
applicant’s detention, the grand chamber noted, among other things, that “the
                                         - 16 -
applicant’s detention [had not met] the minimum requirement, as laid down in the
court’s case-law, of 3 square metres per person”.
108. however, in a minority of cases the court has considered that personal space of
less than 4 sq. m is already a factor sufficient to justify a finding of a violation of article
3 (see, inter alia, cotleţ v. romania (no. 2), no. 49549/11, §§ 34 and 36, 1 october
2013; and apostu v. romania, no. 22765/12, § 79, 3 february 2015). this standard
corresponds to the minimum standard of living space per detainee in multi-occupancy
accommodation as developed in the practice of the cpt and recently elaborated in its
policy document (see paragraph 51 above).
(β) the approach to be taken
109. the court reiterates that, while it is not formally bound to follow its previous
judgments, it is in the interests of legal certainty, foreseeability and equality before the
law that it should not depart, without good reason, from precedents laid down in pre-
vious cases (see, for example, christine goodwin v. the united kingdom [gc], no.
28957/95, § 74, echr 2002‑vi; scoppola v. italy (no. 2) [gc], no. 10249/03, § 104, 17
september 2009; and sabri güneş v. turkey [gc], no. 27396/06, § 50, 29 june 2012).
110. the court sees no grounds for departing from the approach taken in the pilot
judgments and leading cases cited above and in the grand chamber idalov case (see
paragraph 107 above). it therefore confirms that the requirement of 3 sq. m of floor
surface per detainee in multi-occupancy accommodation should be maintained as the
relevant minimum standard for its assessment under article 3 of the convention (see
paragraphs 124-128 below).
111. with regard to the standards developed by other international institutions such as
the cpt, the court would note that it has declined to treat them as constituting a deci-
sive argument for its assessment under article 3 (see, for instance, orchowski, cited
above, § 131; ananyev and others, cited above, §§ 144-145; torreggiani and others,
cited above, §§ 68 and 76; see also sulejmanovic, cited above, § 43; tellissi v. italy
(dec.), no. 15434/11, § 53, 5 march 2013; and g.c. v. italy, no. 73869/10, § 81, 22
april 2014). the same applies with regard to the relevant national standards, which,
although capable of informing the court’s decision in a particular case (see orchowski,
cited above, § 123), cannot be considered decisive for its finding under article 3 (see,
for instance, pozaić, cited above, § 59; and neshkov and others, cited above, § 229).
112. the central reason for the court’s reluctance to take the cpt’s available space
standards as a decisive argument for its finding under article 3 relates to its duty to take
into account all relevant circumstances of a particular case before it when making an
assessment under article 3, whereas other international institutions such as the cpt
develop general standards in this area aiming at future prevention (see paragraph 47
above; see also, trepashkin, cited above, § 92; and jirsák, cited above, § 63). likewise,
the relevant national standards vary widely and operate as general requirements of
adequate accommodation in a particular penitentiary system (see paragraphs 57 and 61
above).
113. moreover, as the cpt has recognised, the court performs a conceptually different
role to the one assigned to the cpt, whose responsibility does not entail pronouncing on
                                         - 17 -
whether a certain situation amounts to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment
within the meaning of article 3 (see paragraph 52 above). the thrust of cpt activity is
pre-emptive action aimed at prevention, which, by its very nature, aims at a degree of
protection that is greater than that upheld by the court when deciding cases concerning
conditions of detention (see paragraph 47 above, the first general report, § 51). in
contrast to the cpt’s preventive function, the court is responsible for the judicial
application in individual cases of an absolute prohibition against torture and inhuman or
degrading treatment under article 3 (see paragraph 46 above). nevertheless, the court
would emphasise that it remains attentive to the standards developed by the cpt and,
notwithstanding their different positions, it gives careful scrutiny to cases where the
particular conditions of detention fall below the cpt’s standard of 4 sq. m (see para-
graph 106 above).
114. lastly, the court finds it important to clarify the methodology for the calculation
of the minimum personal space allocated to a detainee in multi-occupancy accom-
modation for its assessment under article 3. the court considers, drawing from the
cpt’s methodology on the matter, that the in-cell sanitary facility should not be
counted in the overall surface area of the cell (see paragraph 51 above). on the other
hand, calculation of the available surface area in the cell should include space occupied
by furniture. what is important in this assessment is whether detainees had a possibility
to move around within the cell normally (see, for instance, ananyev and others, cited
above, §§ 147-148; and vladimir belyayev, cited above, § 34).
115. the court would also observe that no distinction can be discerned in its case-law
with regard to the application of the minimum standard of 3 sq. m of floor surface to a
detainee in multi-occupancy accommodation in the context of serving and remand pri-
soners. indeed, in the orchowski pilot judgment the court applied the same standards
for the assessment of minimum personal space under article 3 with regard to prisons
and remand centres (see orchowski, cited above, § 124), and the same standard was
applicable in other pilot judgments relevant for the conditions of detention of remand
prisoners (see ananyev and others, §§ 143-148) and serving prisoners (see torreggiani
and others, cited above, §§ 65-69). other leading judgments on the matter followed the
same approach (see iacov stanciu, cited above, §§ 171-179; mandić and jović, cited
above, §§ 72-76; and štrucl and others, cited above, § 80). moreover, the same stan-
dard was applied in more recent case-law with regard to russian correctional colonies
(see butko v. russia, no. 32036/10, § 52, 12 november 2015; for the previous case-law
see, for example, sergey babushkin v. russia, no. 5993/08, § 56, 28 november 2013
and cases cited therein).
(ii) whether the allocation of personal space below the minimum requirement creates a
presumption or in itself leads to a violation of article 3
(α) the relevant case-law
116. in assessing whether there has been a violation of article 3 on account of an
extreme lack of personal space in detention the court has not always been consistent
with regard to the question whether the allocation of personal space falling below 3 sq.
m leads in itself to a violation of article 3 or whether it creates a presumption of a
violation, which could be rebutted by other relevant considerations. different ap-
proaches can be distinguished in this respect.
                                        - 18 -
117. first, in a number of cases the finding that a detainee had disposed of less than 3
sq. m of personal space in itself led to the conclusion that there had been a violation of
article 3 (see, for example, sulejmanovic, cited above, § 43; trepashkin v. russia (no.
2), no. 14248/05, § 113, 16 december 2010; mandić and jović, cited above, § 80; lin v.
greece, no. 58158/10, §§ 53-54, 6 november 2012; blejuşcă v. romania, no. 7910/10,
§§ 43-45, 19 march 2013; ivakhnenko v. russia, no. 12622/04, § 35, 4 april 2013; a.f.
v. greece, no. 53709/11, §§ 77-78, 13 june 2013; kanakis v. greece (no. 2), no.
40146/11, §§ 106-107, 12 december 2013; gorbulya v. russia, no. 31535/09, §§ 64-65,
6 march 2014; and t. and a. v. turkey, no. 47146/11, §§ 96-98, 21 october 2014).
118. there are also cases where the court has held that personal space allocated to a
detainee below 3 sq. m was a violation of article 3, and then examined other conditions
of detention only as further aggravating circumstances (see, for example, torreggiani
and others, cited above, § 77; and vasilescu, cited above, §§ 100-104).
119. another approach is based on the “strong presumption” test set out in the ananyev
and others pilot judgment (cited above). on the basis of a thorough analysis of its
previous case-law on the matter, in the ananyev and others judgment, the court set out
the following test for overcrowding: (1) each detainee must have an individual sleeping
place in the cell; (2) each must dispose of at least 3 sq. m of floor space; and (3) the
overall surface area of the cell must be such as to allow detainees to move freely be-
tween items of furniture. it stressed that the absence of any of the above elements
created in itself a strong presumption that the conditions of detention amounted to
degrading treatment and were in breach of article 3 (see ananyev and others, cited
above, § 148).
120. similarly to the “strong presumption” test, in the orchowski pilot judgment (cited
above, § 123) the court emphasised that all situations in which a detainee was deprived
of the minimum of 3 sq. m of living space inside his or her cell would be regarded as
giving rise to a strong indication that article 3 had been violated (see further olszewski
v. poland, no. 21880/03, § 98, 2 april 2013). moreover, the “strong presumption” test
has been reiterated in several of the above-mentioned pilot judgments on the question of
prison overcrowding (see neshkov and others, cited above, § 232; and varga and
others, cited above, §§ 74 and 77).
121. in line with that approach, the finding of a violation of article 3 was based on the
assessment whether or not, in the circumstances, “a strong presumption” of a violation
was rebutted by other cumulative effects of the conditions of detention (see orchowski,
cited above, § 135; ananyev and others, cited above, § 166; lind v. russia, no.
25664/05, §§ 59-61, 6 december 2007; kokoshkina v. russia, no. 2052/08, §§ 62-63,
28 may 2009). accordingly, in a number of post-ananyev cases concerning various
factual circumstances, the court consistently examined the cumulative effects of the
conditions of detention before reaching a final conclusion as to the alleged violation of
article 3 on account of prison overcrowding (see, for example, idalov, cited above, §
101; iacov stanciu, cited above, §§ 176-178; asyanov v. russia, no. 25462/09, § 43, 9
october 2012; nieciecki v. greece, no. 11677/11, §§ 49-51, 4 december 2012;
yefimenko v. russia, no. 152/04, §§ 80-84, 12 february 2013; manulin v. russia, no.
26676/06, §§ 47-48, 11 april 2013; shishkov v. russia, no. 26746/05, §§ 90-94, 20
                                          - 19 -
february 2014; bulatović v. montenegro, no. 67320/10, §§ 123-127, 22 july 2014;
tomoiagă v. romania (dec.), no. 47775/10, §§ 22-23, 20 january 2015; neshkov and
others, cited above, §§ 246-256; varga and others, cited above, § 88; and mironovas
and others v. lithuania, nos. 40828/12, 29292/12, 69598/12, 40163/13, 66281/13,
70048/13 and 70065/13, §§ 118-123, 8 december 2015).
(β) the approach to be taken
122. in harmonising the above divergences, the court will be guided by the general
principles of its well-established case-law under article 3 of the convention. in this
connection it would reiterate that according to this case-law the assessment of the
minimum level of severity for any ill-treatment to fall within the scope of article 3 is, in
the nature of things, relative (see paragraphs 97-98 above). the assessment of this
minimum, as emphasised ever since the ireland v. the united kingdom case (cited
above, § 162), will depend on all the circumstances of the case, such as the duration of
the treatment, its physical and mental effects and, in some cases, the sex, age and state
of health of the victim (see paragraph 97 above).
123. accordingly, the court’s assessment whether there has been a violation of article
3 cannot be reduced to a numerical calculation of square metres allocated to a detainee.
such an approach would, moreover, disregard the fact that, in practical terms, only a
comprehensive approach to the particular conditions of detention can provide an accu-
rate picture of the reality for detainees (see paragraphs 62-63 above).
124. nevertheless, having analysed its case-law and in view of the importance attaching
to the space factor in the overall assessment of prison conditions, the court considers
that a strong presumption of a violation of article 3 arises when the personal space
available to a detainee falls below 3 sq. m in multi-occupancy accommodation.
125. the “strong presumption” test should operate as a weighty but not irrebuttable
presumption of a violation of article 3. this in particular means that, in the circum-
stances, the cumulative effects of detention may rebut that presumption. it will, of
course, be difficult to rebut it in the context of flagrant or prolonged lack of personal
space below 3 sq. m. the circumstances in which the presumption may be rebutted will
be set out below (see paragraphs 130-135).
126. it follows that, when it has been conclusively established that a detainee disposed
of less than 3 sq. m of floor surface in multi-occupancy accommodation, the starting
point for the court’s assessment is a strong presumption of a violation of article 3. it
then remains for the respondent government to demonstrate convincingly that there
were factors capable of adequately compensating for the scarce allocation of personal
space. the cumulative effect of those conditions should inform the court’s decision
whether, in the circumstances, the presumption of a violation is rebutted or not.
127. with regard to the methodology for that assessment, the court refers to its well-
established standard of proof in conditions-of-detention cases (see, for example,
ananyev and others, cited above, §§ 121-125). in this context the court is particularly
mindful of the objective difficulties experienced by applicants in collecting evidence to
substantiate their claims about conditions of their detention. still, in such cases appli-
                                        - 20 -
cants must provide a detailed and consistent account of the facts complained of (ibid. §
122). in certain cases applicants are able to provide at least some evidence in support of
their complaints. the court has considered as evidence, for example, written statements
by fellow inmates or if possible photographs provided by applicants in support of their
allegations (see, for example, golubenko v. ukraine (dec.), no. 36327/06, § 52, 5
november 2013, and cases cited therein; see further tehrani and others v. turkey, nos.
32940/08, 41626/08 and 43616/08, § 88, 13 april 2010).
128. once a credible and reasonably detailed description of the allegedly degrading
conditions of detention, constituting a prima facie case of ill-treatment, has been made,
the burden of proof is shifted to the respondent government who alone have access to
information capable of corroborating or refuting these allegations. they are required, in
particular, to collect and produce relevant documents and provide a detailed account of
an applicant’s conditions of detention. relevant information from other international
bodies, such as the cpt, on the conditions of detention, as well as the competent
national authorities and institutions, should also inform the court’s decision on the
matter (see further ananyev and others, cited above, §§ 122-125; and neshkov and
others, cited above, §§ 71-91).
(iii) factors which may compensate for the scarce allocation of personal space
129. in view of its findings above (see paragraphs 124-125 above), the court has to
determine which factors may compensate for the scarce allocation of personal space to a
detainee, and thus rebut the strong presumption of a violation of article 3 arising where
the detainee disposes of less than 3 sq. m of personal space in multi-occupancy acco-
mmodation in prisons.
130. the court firstly notes, in the light of its post-ananyev case-law, that normally
only short, occasional and minor reductions in the required personal space will be such
as to rebut the strong presumption of a violation of article 3. this was, for example, the
case in fetisov and others (cited above, §§ 134-138) where a prisoner disposed of
approximately 2 sq. m of floor surface for nineteen days (see further dmitriy rozhin,
cited above, §§ 52-53), or vladimir belyayev (cited above, §§ 33-36) where a prisoner
disposed of 2.95 sq. m of personal space for a period of ten days, and then non-
consecutively 2.65 sq. m for a period of two days and 2.97 sq. m for a period of twenty-
six days. moreover, referring to its case-law in fetisov and others and dmitriy rozhin,
the court found no violation of article 3 in the kurkowski case (cited above, §§ 66-67)
where the applicant disposed of approximately 2.1 sq. m of floor space for four days,
and then subsequently 2.6 sq. m of floor space for another four days.
131. nevertheless, the court has already held that, while the length of a detention period
may be a relevant factor in assessing the gravity of suffering or humiliation caused to a
detainee by the inadequate conditions of his or her detention, the relative brevity of such
a period alone will not automatically remove the treatment complained of from the
scope of article 3 if other elements are sufficient to bring it within the scope of that
provision (see, for example, vasilescu, cited above, § 105; neshkov and others, cited
above, § 249; and shishanov, cited above, § 95).
132. the court would further note that in other cases concerning the inadequate
allocation of personal space to detainees it examined whether the reductions in the
                                         - 21 -
required personal space were accompanied by sufficient freedom of movement and
adequate out-of-cell activities, as well as confinement in, viewed generally, an
appropriate detention facility (see, for example, samaras and others, cited above, §§ 63-
65; and tzamalis and others, cited above, §§ 44-45). the examples of cases in which
the scarce allocation of personal space did not give rise to a violation of article 3
include: andrei georgiev v. bulgaria, no. 61507/00, §§ 57-62, 26 july 2007; alexov v.
bulgaria, no. 54578/00, §§ 107-108, 22 may 2008; and dolenec, cited above, §§ 133-
136. in the court’s view, the strong presumption of a violation of article 3 arising from
the allocation of less than 3 sq. m in multi-occupancy accommodation will normally be
capable of being rebutted only where the requirements are cumulatively met, namely
where short, occasional and minor reductions of personal space are accompanied by
sufficient freedom of movement outside the cell and adequate out-of-cell activities and
confinement in what is, when viewed generally, an appropriate detention facility (see,
mutatis mutandis, varga and others, cited above, § 77; and mironovas and others, cited
above, § 122).
133. with regard to the question of sufficient freedom of movement, in particular, in the
ananyev and others case (cited above, §§ 150-152) the court has referred to the rele-
vant cpt standards according to which all prisoners, without exception, must be al-
lowed at least one hour of exercise in the open air every day and preferably as part of a
broader programme of out-of-cell activities, bearing in mind that outdoor exercise
facilities should be reasonably spacious and whenever possible offer shelter from
inclement weather (see further neshkov and others, cited above, § 234). indeed,
according to the relevant international standards prisoners should be able to spend a
reasonable part of the day outside their cells, engaged in purposeful activity of a varied
nature (work, recreation, education). regimes in establishments for sentenced prisoners
should be even more favourable (see further paragraphs 48, 53, 55 and 59 above).
134. lastly, with regard to the overall appropriateness of the detention facility, the
court refers to general aspects of detention identified in its case-law (see further
ananyev and others, cited above, §§ 153-159; and neshkov and others, §§ 237-244;
see further iacov stanciu, cited above, §§ 173-179; and varga and others, cited above,
§§ 80-92) and the relevant international standards (see paragraphs 48, 53, 55, 59 and 63-
64 above). accordingly, in addition to sufficient freedom of movement and adequate
out-of-cell activities, no violation of article 3 would be found where no other aggrava-
ting circumstance arises with regard to general conditions of an applicant’s detention
(see, for instance, the approach in alver v. estonia, no. 64812/01, § 53, 8 november
2005; andrei georgiev, cited above, § 61; and dolenec, cited above, § 134).
135. it follows from the above that, when considering whether measures of compen-
sation for the scarce allocation of personal space below 3 sq. m of floor surface in multi-
occupancy accommodation are capable of rebutting the strong presumption of a viola-
tion of article 3, the court will have regard to factors such as: the time and extent of
restriction; freedom of movement and adequacy of out-of-cell activities; and general
appropriateness of the detention facility.
(c) summary of relevant principles and standards for the assessment of prison
overcrowding
                                          - 22 -
136. in the light of the considerations set out above, the court confirms the standard
predominant in its case-law of 3 sq. m of floor surface per detainee in multi-occupancy
accommodation as the relevant minimum standard under article 3 of the convention.
137. when the personal space available to a detainee falls below 3 sq. m of floor surface
in multi-occupancy accommodation in prisons, the lack of personal space is considered
so severe that a strong presumption of a violation of article 3 arises. the burden of
proof is on the respondent government which could, however, rebut that presumption
by demonstrating that there were factors capable of adequately compensating for the
scarce allocation of personal space (see paragraphs 126-128 above).
138. the strong presumption of a violation of article 3 will normally be capable of
being rebutted only if the following factors are cumulatively met:
(1) the reductions in the required minimum personal space of 3 sq. m are short, occa-
sional and minor (see paragraph 130 above):
(2) such reductions are accompanied by sufficient freedom of movement outside the cell
and adequate out-of-cell activities (see paragraph 133 above);
(3) the applicant is confined in what is, when viewed generally, an appropriate detention
facility, and there are no other aggravating aspects of the conditions of his or her deten-
tion (see paragraph 134 above).
139. in cases where a prison cell – measuring in the range of 3 to 4 sq. m of personal
space per inmate – is at issue the space factor remains a weighty factor in the court’s
assessment of the adequacy of conditions of detention. in such instances a violation of
article 3 will be found if the space factor is coupled with other aspects of inappropriate
physical conditions of detention related to, in particular, access to outdoor exercise,
natural light or air, availability of ventilation, adequacy of room temperature, the possi-
bility of using the toilet in private, and compliance with basic sanitary and hygienic
requirements (see paragraph 106 above).
140. the court also stresses that in cases where a detainee disposed of more than 4 sq.
m of personal space in multi-occupancy accommodation in prison and where therefore
no issue with regard to the question of personal space arises, other aspects of physical
conditions of detention referred to above (see paragraphs 48, 53, 55, 59 and 63-64
above) remain relevant for the court’s assessment of adequacy of an applicant’s
conditions of detention under article 3 of the convention (see, for example, story and
others v. malta, nos. 56854/13, 57005/13 and 57043/13, §§ 112-113, 29 october 2015).
141. lastly, the court would emphasise the importance of the cpt’s preventive role in
monitoring conditions of detention and of the standards which it develops in that
connection. the court reiterates that when deciding cases concerning conditions of
detention it remains attentive to those standards and to the contracting states’
observance of them (see paragraph 113 above).
3. application of the above principles in the present case
                                        - 23 -
142. the court observes at the outset that, although the problem of prison overcrowding
has been examined in several cases against croatia in which a violation of article 3 was
found (see cenbauer v. croatia, no. 73786/01, echr 2006-iii; testa v. croatia, no.
20877/04, 12 july 2007; štitić v. croatia, no. 29660/03, 8 november 2007; dolenec,
cited above; longin, cited above; and lonić v. croatia, no. 8067/12, 4 december 2014),
it has not so far considered that conditions of detention in croatia disclosed a structural
problem from the standpoint of article 3 of the convention (see, by contrast, paragraphs
94-95 above). moreover, none of the cited cases concerned the conditions of detention
in bjelovar prison which give rise to the applicant’s complaints in the present case.
with regard to the conditions of detention in bjelovar prison the court has so far
examined one case, in which it found no violation of article 3 (see pozaić, cited above).
143. the present case does not raise a structural issue concerning the conditions of
detention in croatia. the court’s task is to address the applicant’s particular complaint
of overcrowding in bjelovar prison, where he was serving a prison sentence in the
period between 16 october 2009 and 16 march 2011 (see polufakin and chernyshev v.
russia, no. 30997/02, §§ 155-156, 25 september 2008).
144. the applicant in particular complained that for several non-consecutive periods,
amounting in total to fifty days, including a period of twenty-seven consecutive days, he
disposed of less than 3 sq. m of personal space, and that there were also several non-
consecutive periods in which he was allocated between 3 and 4 sq. m of personal space
in the cells (see paragraph 15 above).
145. in view of the relevant test enunciated above (see paragraphs 136-139 above), the
court will address the applicant’s complaints separately with regard to the period in
which he disposed of less than 3 sq. m of personal space, and the period in which he
was allocated between 3 and 4 sq. m of personal space in bjelovar prison.
(a) period in which the applicant disposed of less than 3 sq. m of personal space
(i) whether the strong presumption of a violation of article 3 arises in the present case
146. the court notes that the particular details of the personal space allocated to the
applicant are based on the documentation provided by the respondent government
which the applicant did not contest (see paragraph 17 above). specifically, during his
stay in bjelovar prison, which lasted for one year and five months (see paragraphs 13-
14 above), the applicant was detained in four cells in which he had between 3 and 6.76
sq. m of personal space. only during the following non-consecutive periods did he have
personal space which fell below 3 sq. m, by 0.45 and 0.38 sq. m: on 21 april 2010 (one
day – 2.62 sq. m), and between 3 and 5 july 2010 (three days – 2.62 sq. m); 18 july and
13 august 2010 (twenty-seven days – 2.62 sq. m); 31 august and 2 september 2010
(three days – 2.55 sq. m); 19 and 26 november 2010 (eight days – 2.55 sq. m); 10 and
12 december 2010 (three days – 2.62 sq. m); 22 and 24 december 2010 (three days –
2.62 sq. m); and 24 and 25 february 2011 (two days – 2.62 sq. m).
147. there were also certain periods in which there were reductions in the minimum
required personal space of 3 sq. m by 0.08, 0.04 and 0.01 sq. m (see paragraph 17
above). although such reductions are not of the same degree and extent as those noted
above, particularly given that some of them can hardly be demonstrated and distin-
                                        - 24 -
guished in terms of space, and are therefore not decisive for the determination of the
case at issue, the court considers that they cannot be ignored in the overall assessment
of conditions of the applicant’s confinement in bjelovar prison.
148. in view of these findings, and the relevant principles enunciated in its case-law (see
paragraph 137 above), the court finds that a strong presumption of a violation of article
3 arises in the case at issue. accordingly, the question to be answered is whether there
were factors capable of rebutting that presumption.
(ii) whether there were factors capable of rebutting the strong presumption of a
violation of article 3
149. the court notes that the relevant reductions in the applicant’s personal space
below 3 sq. m were of relatively short duration. this is in particular true as to single
non-consecutive periods of one (2.62 sq. m), two (2.62 sq. m) and eight days (2.55 sq.
m), three non-consecutive periods of three days during which the applicant had 2.62 sq.
m of personal space, and one period of three days during which the applicant had 2.55
sq. m of personal space. the court notes, however, that there was also a period of
twenty-seven days (between 18 july and 13 august 2010) in which the applicant
disposed of 2.62 sq. m of personal space (see paragraph 146 above).
150. in these circumstances, sharing the chamber’s concerns with regard to the period
of twenty-seven days, the court will first consider whether that period could be
regarded as a short and minor reduction in the required personal space.
(α) the period of twenty-seven days
151. in this connection the court observes that in a comparably similar case of vladimir
belyayev (cited above), concerning several non-consecutive periods of reductions in the
applicant’s personal space below 3 sq. m, the longest period lasted twenty-six days
during which the applicant disposed of 2.97 sq. m of personal space (see paragraph 130
above). however, in the case at issue the applicant disposed of 2.62 sq. m of personal
space for a period of twenty-seven days (see paragraph 146 above).
152. these circumstances are sufficient for the court to conclude that the period of
twenty-seven days when the applicant had only 2.62 sq. m at his disposal cannot call
into question the strong presumption of a violation of article 3.
153. accordingly, the court finds that in the period of twenty-seven days in which he
disposed of less than 3 sq. m of personal space in bjelovar prison, the conditions of the
applicant’s detention subjected him to hardship going beyond the unavoidable level of
suffering inherent in detention and thus amounting to degrading treatment prohibited by
article 3 of the convention.
(β) the remaining periods
154. as regards the remaining periods which were of short duration and in respect of
which the strong presumption of a violation of article 3 of the convention can accor-
dingly be rebutted on other grounds, the court must have regard to other relevant
                                         - 25 -
factors, namely the possibility of sufficient freedom of movement and out-of-cell
activities and the general conditions of the applicant’s detention (see paragraphs 137-
138 above). the burden of proving that there were such factors is on the government.
155. with regard to the question of freedom of movement and out-of-cell activities, the
court notes the government’s submissions concerning the amenities available for
inmates in bjelovar prison. the government explained that the inmates were allowed to
move freely outside their cells in the morning and afternoon, and to use the indoor and
outdoor facilities of bjelovar prison. this in particular included two hours of outdoor
exercise and in addition free out-of-cell movement inside the prison between 4 and 7
p.m. the government also explained in detail the prisoners’ daily regime and described
the facilities available in bjelovar prison (see paragraphs 19-20 above).
156. in support of their claims the government provided photographs, floor plans and
other relevant documentation related to the available facilities in bjelovar prison (see
paragraph 21 above). this in particular concerns the photographs, taken in 2007, 2010
and 2011 in the context of the renovation of the prison and visits of various officials to
the prison, showing the interior of bjelovar prison, the recreation yard, the cells and
their sanitary facilities. these photographs correspond to the government’s description
of the relevant facilities available to prisoners. the government also provided docu-
mentation concerning the availability of entertainment for prisoners in bjelovar prison,
which further supports the claims made in their submissions (see, by contrast,
orchowski, cited above, §§ 125 and 129).
157. for his part, the applicant sought to challenge the government’s submission only
in very general terms insisting on the fact that he had not been engaged in any work. at
the same time he did not provide a detailed description disputing the government’s
claims concerning the opportunities for outdoor exercise and other details of the
relevant prison regime in bjelovar prison (compare golubenko, cited above, § 61). he
conceded the fact that he had had a possibility of three hours per day of movement
outside his cell but argued that the outdoor facilities were inadequate and insufficient,
particularly given that there was only an open recreation yard (see paragraph 16 above).
158. the court observes at the outset that the government’s submissions are very
detailed and consistent with their position in the pozaić case concerning the relevant
facilities available to detainees in the same prison at the relevant time (see pozaić, cited
above, §§ 15 and 60; and, by contrast, idalov, cited above, § 99). moreover, there is no
indication that the relevant materials submitted by the government were prepared after
they had been given notice of the applicant’s complaint. there is therefore no reason for
the court to doubt the authenticity, objectivity and relevancy of such materials (see
sergey chebotarev v. russia, no. 61510/09, §§ 40-41, 7 may 2014).
159. on the other hand, in the absence of any detailed information from the applicant
about his daily routines at bjelovar prison, and regard being had to the materials sub-
mitted by the government on the issue, the court is unable to accept the applicant’s
submissions as sufficiently established or credible (see ildani v. georgia, no. 65391/09,
§ 27, 23 april 2013). it also attaches particular importance to the fact that the applicant
never complained at the domestic level about certain aspects of his confinement, such
as, in particular, the lack of outdoor exercise or insufficient time for free movement.
                                         - 26 -
160. in view of the above, the court’s task in the present case is to determine whether it
can be ascertained, from the material submitted before it, that the applicant was given
sufficient freedom of movement and adequate out-of-cell activities, which were capable
of alleviating the situation created by the scarce allocation of personal space.
161. in this connection the court notes that in the ordinary daily regime in bjelovar
prison the applicant was allowed the possibility of two hours of outdoor exercise, which
is a standard set out in the relevant domestic law (see paragraph 43 above, section 14
(1.9) of the enforcement of prison sentences act above) and above the minimum stan-
dards set out by the cpt (see paragraph 53 above). the photographs available to the
court show the recreation yard, which according to the government’s undisputed
submission, has a surface area of 305 sq. m and includes a lawn and asphalted parts as
well as protection from inclement weather and is equipped with various recreational
facilities, such as a gym, basketball court and ping-pong table.
162. furthermore, it is undisputed by the applicant that he was allowed three hours per
day of free movement outside his cell within the prison facility. taking also into ac-
count the period of two hours of outdoor exercise, as well as the periods necessary for
serving breakfast, lunch and dinner, it cannot be said that the applicant was left to
languish in his cell for a significant proportion of his day without any purposeful ac-
tivity. this is particularly true given the entertainment facilities available in bjelovar
prison, such as the possibility of watching tv or borrowing books from the local
library, as follows from the material available before the court (compare valašinas,
cited above, § 111).
163. against the above background, the court finds that, even taking into account that
the applicant was unable to obtain work, which related not only to the objective im-
possibility (see paragraph 20 above) but also arguably to the applicant’s previous
behaviour (see paragraph 13 above), the possibility of free out-of-cell movement and
the facilities available to the applicant in bjelovar prison could be seen as significantly
alleviating factors in relation to the scarce allocation of personal space.
164. it remains to be determined whether the applicant was detained in generally
appropriate conditions in bjelovar prison (see paragraphs 134 and 138 above). the
court is of the view that the above considerations concerning the material available
before it hold true for the general conditions of the applicant’s detention. in particular,
the government’s detailed submission is corroborated by relevant evidence (see
paragraph 21 above) and the findings of the competent domestic authorities in the
applicant’s case, notably the competent judicial authorities, the ministry of justice
prison administration and the ombudsperson (see paragraphs 25, 28, 30 and 38 above).
in this context the court would note that there is no reason for it to call into question
these findings of the competent domestic authorities. it also attaches particular im-
portance to the fact that the applicant did not raise, let alone substantiate, allegations
concerning poor hygiene conditions in the cells and poor nutrition, or notably in-
adequate recreational and educational activities, in his constitutional complaint before
the constitutional court.
                                        - 27 -
165. moreover, the applicant’s statements concerning the general conditions of his
detention are inconsistent and contrary to the available evidence. specifically, at one
instance the applicant argued that the cells where he had been accommodated were
insufficiently equipped with the relevant furniture for every inmate (see paragraph 16
above), whereas elsewhere, when he intended to show that he had not had sufficient
freedom of movement inside the cell, he argued that he had been unable to pace
normally due to the furniture available to every inmate (see paragraph 80 above), which
contradicts his own above-cited statement. moreover, the applicant argued that the
sanitary facilities were in the same room as the living area from which they were not
fully separated (see paragraph 16 above), while the photographs and floor plans of the
prison dating back to 1993, the authenticity and relevancy of which are not in dispute,
show that the prison cells in bjelovar prison were equipped with a fully partitioned
sanitary facility.
166. likewise, the court observes that it appears from the material available to it that
the food served to the prisoners was regularly inspected by the prison doctor and the
competent state authorities, and that prisoners were served three meals per day which,
on the basis of the menu presented by the government, do not appear substandard or
inadequate (compare alexov, cited above, § 106; and, by contrast, kadiķis v. latvia
(no. 2), no. 62393/00, § 55, 4 may 2006, where prisoners had only one meal per day).
moreover, prisoners had free access to the sanitary facilities and there is no issue with
regard to the access to natural light and fresh air in the cell.
167. there was also, as it appears from the available materials, a possibility to shower
three times per week (see paragraph 26 above; see further paragraph 55 above, rule
19.4 of the european prison rules; and by contrast shilbergs v. russia, no. 20075/03, §
97, 17 december 2009, where the applicant had a possibility to shower no more than
once every ten days). the facilities of bjelovar prison were constantly renovated and
maintained, including in the period before and during the applicant’s stay in that prison
(see paragraphs 18 and 38 above). in this connection the court notes the photographs,
the authenticity of which is not in dispute, showing the interior of bjelovar prison, the
recreation yard, the cells and their sanitary facilities, which appear to be in an adequate
state of repair and cleanliness (see, by contrast for example, zuyev v. russia, no.
16262/05, § 59, 19 february 2013), and which accordingly correspond to the
government’s description of the relevant facilities available to prisoners.
168. in view of the above, the court considers that the applicant was detained in
generally appropriate conditions in bjelovar prison.
169. against the above background, as regards the other periods during which the
applicant disposed of less than 3 sq. m of personal space, the court finds that the
government have rebutted the strong presumption of a violation of article 3. those
non-consecutive periods can be regarded as short and minor reductions in personal
space, during which sufficient freedom of movement and out-of-cell activities were
available to the applicant. moreover, he was detained in, viewed generally, an
appropriate detention facility.
170. the court therefore considers that it cannot be established that the conditions of
the applicant’s detention, although not completely adequate as regards personal space,
                                              - 28 -
      reached the threshold of severity required to characterise the treatment as inhuman or
      degrading within the meaning of article 3 of the convention. this conclusion is not
      altered by the fact that the relevant domestic law provided for a standard of 4 sq. m of
      personal space per detainee, which, as already indicated above, may inform the court’s
      decision but cannot be considered a decisive argument for its assessment under article 3
      (see paragraph 111 above). this is particularly true in the context of the croatian dome-
      stic system given that the constitutional court, in its assessment of the minimum per-
      sonal space allocated to a detainee, referred to the court’s minimum standard of 3 sq. m
      of personal space set out in its ananyev and others judgment (see paragraph 45 above).
      171. in the light of the above, the court considers that the conditions of the applicant’s
      detention during the remaining periods in which he disposed of less than 3 sq. m of
      personal space did not amount to degrading treatment prohibited by article 3 of the
      convention.
      (γ) conclusion
      172. the court finds that there has been a violation of article 3 of the convention with
      regard to the period of twenty-seven days (between 18 july and 13 august 2010) in
      which the applicant disposed of less than 3 sq. m of personal space (see paragraph 153
      above).
      173. conversely, with regard to the remainder of the periods in which the applicant
      disposed of less than 3 sq. m (see paragraph 171 above), the court finds that there has
      been no violation of article 3 of the convention.”
højesterets begrundelse og resultat
sagens temaer
sagen angår udlevering til straffuldbyrdelse i rumænien af t i henhold til en europæisk
arrestordre. spørgsmålet er for det første, om udlevering skal nægtes med den begrundelse, at
arrestordrens indhold ikke lever op til kravene til beskrivelse af tid og sted mv. for den
strafbare handling, og at en engelsk domstol den 17. februar 2016 traf beslutning om ikke at
fuldbyrde den samme arrestordre med den begrundelse, at disse krav ikke fandtes opfyldt.
hvis udlevering ikke skal nægtes med den anførte begrundelse, skal der tages stilling til, om
udlevering skal nægtes i medfør af udleveringslovens § 10 h, stk. 2, sammenholdt med den
europæiske menneskerettighedskonventions artikel 3 og den europæiske unions charter om
grundlæggende rettigheder artikel 4.
arrestordrens indhold og betydningen af den engelske afgørelse om at afslå fuldbyrdelse af
arrestordren
                                               - 29 -
højesteret finder, at den engelske afgørelse om at afslå fuldbyrdelse af arrestordren ikke er
bindende for danske myndigheder. efter rådets rammeafgørelse af 13. juni 2002 om den
europæiske arrestordre er de danske myndigheder derfor forpligtet til at foretage en selv-
stændig vurdering af, om betingelserne for udlevering er opfyldt.
herefter, og da højesteret af de i landsrettens kendelse af 9. juni 2016 anførte grunde finder,
at kravene til indholdet af arrestordren er opfyldt, tiltræder højesteret, at der ikke er grundlag
for at nægte udlevering af de formelle grunde, som t har gjort gældende.
udleveringslovens § 10 h, stk. 2, spørgsmålet om krænkelse af eu-chartrets artikel 4 og den
europæiske menneskerettighedskonventions artikel 3
efter udleveringslovens § 10 h, stk. 2, må udlevering ikke finde sted, hvis der er fare for, at
den pågældende efter udleveringen vil blive udsat for tortur eller anden umenneskelig eller
nedværdigende behandling eller straf. bestemmelsen skal fortolkes i overensstemmelse med
eu-chartrets artikel 4 og menneskerettighedskonventionens artikel 3.
eu-domstolen har i sin dom af 5. april 2016 i de forenede sager c-404/15 (pál aranyosi) og
c-659/15 ppu (robert căldăraru) fastslået, at princippet om gensidig anerkendelse, som er
grundlaget for ordningen for den europæiske arrestordre, er baseret på, at der mellem med-
lemsstaterne hersker en gensidig tillid til, at deres respektive nationale retsordener er i stand
til at yde den samme effektive beskyttelse af de grundlæggende rettigheder, som er anerkendt
på eu-plan. af dommen fremgår endvidere, at princippet om gensidig anerkendelse og
gensidig tillid mellem medlemsstaterne er af grundlæggende betydning i eu-retten, idet disse
principper muliggør oprettelsen og bevarelsen af et område uden indre grænser. princippet om
gensidig anerkendelse betegnes som en ”hjørnesten” i det retlige samarbejde. som udgangs-
punkt kan risiko for umenneskelig eller nedværdigende behandling på grund af de generelle
forhold under frihedsberøvelse i den eu-medlemsstat, som har fremsat anmodning om udle-
vering, derfor ikke føre til afslag på at fuldbyrde en europæisk arrestordre, men alene til
anmodning om supplerende oplysninger fra den pågældende stat med henblik på at sikre sig
imod en sådan risiko.
                                               - 30 -
i overensstemmelse med eu-domstolens dom har østre landsret foranlediget supplerende
oplysninger om de forventede fængselsforhold for t tilvejebragt fra det rumænske
justitsministerium.
af det rumænske justitsministeriums udtalelse, der er citeret i landsrettens kendelse af 30. juni
2016, fremgår bl.a., at t efter udlevering til straffuldbyrdelse vil blive indsat i fængslet
bukarest rahova med henblik på at gennemføre en karantæneperiode på 21 dage. han vil her
få minimum 2-3 m2 personligt rum til rådighed. efter karantæneperiodens afslutning er det
mest sandsynligt, at han i begyndelsen skal afsone i fængslet i tulcea. i udtalelsen er der
redegjort for afsoningsforholdene i fængslet, herunder med hensyn til belysning, ventilation,
sanitære forhold, gårdture, uddannelses-, arbejds- og fritidsaktiviteter mv. for så vidt angår
pladsforholdene har den rumænske kriminalforsorg i udtalelsen garanteret, at t vil komme til
at afsone straffen i fængslet i tulcea eller i en anden detention, som vil sikre ham personligt
rum på mellem 2 m2 og 3 m2, inklusiv seng og møblement.
den europæiske menneskerettighedsdomstol har i dom af 20. oktober 2016 i sagen muršić
mod kroatien (nr. 7334/13, storkammerafgørelse) præciseret sin praksis vedrørende plads-
forhold i fængsler. i dommen udtales bl.a., at der er en stærk formodning for, at den euro-
pæiske menneskerettighedskonventions artikel 3 er krænket, hvis en indsat har mindre end 3
m2 personligt rum til rådighed, og at denne stærke formodning normalt kun kan afkræftes,
hvis en række kumulative betingelser er opfyldt, herunder at begrænsningen i forhold til et
krævet minimumsareal på 3 m2 er ”short, occasional and minor”, jf. præmis 138. i dommens
præmisser 151-153 fastslog domstolen, at det forhold, at en indsat i en periode på 27 dage
kun havde haft 2,62 m2 personligt rum til rådighed, i sig selv var tilstrækkeligt til at konklu-
dere, at den pågældende havde været udsat for nedværdigende behandling i strid med kon-
ventionens artikel 3.
udtalelsen fra det rumænske justitsministerium er afgivet den 21. juni 2016 og dermed forud
for, at den europæiske menneskerettighedsdomstol afsagde dommen i sagen muršić mod
kroatien.
på den baggrund finder højesteret, at der inden endelig stillingtagen til, om en udlevering vil
være i strid med udleveringslovens § 10 h, stk. 2, bør indhentes en fornyet udtalelse fra de
                                              - 31 -
rumænske myndigheder om de forhold, som t efter en eventuel udlevering vil blive anbragt
under, jf. artikel 15, stk. 2, i rammeafgørelsen om den europæiske arrestordre.
sagen udsættes herefter på, at anklagemyndigheden i lyset af den europæiske menneske-
rettighedsdomstols dom af 20. oktober 2016 indhenter en fornyet udtalelse fra de rumænske
myndigheder om de forhold, der kan påregnes under frihedsberøvelse af t, såfremt han
udleveres til rumænien.
spørgsmålet om fortsat varetægtsfængsling afgøres særskilt.
                                        thi bestemmes:
sagen udsættes med frist til den 24. marts 2017 på, at anklagemyndigheden indhenter en
fornyet udtalelse fra de rumænske myndigheder om de forhold, der kan påregnes under
frihedsberøvelse af t, såfremt han udleveres til rumænien.

source: retspraksis

LICENSE:
Creative Commons Legal Code

CC0 1.0 Universal

type: caselaw

jurisdiction: Denkmark