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1.1. These business terms and conditions (hereinafter referred to only as the “Business Terms and Conditions”) of the trading company ANV KNIVES s.r.o. with registered office at Na Perštýně 2, 110 00 Prague 1, Company ID No.: 05522790, VAT No.: CZ05522790 (hereinafter referred to only as the “Seller”), regulate the mutual rights and obligations of the Contracting Parties created in relation to or on the basis of a purchase contract (hereinafter referred to only as “Purchase Contract”) concluded by and between the Seller and another natural person or corporate entity (hereinafter referred to only as the “Buyer”) via the Seller’s e-shop, this being in compliance with the provisions of Section 1751 para. 1 Act No. 89/2012 Coll., Civil Code (hereinafter referred to only as the “Civil Code”). The e-shop is operated by the Seller on the website located at the address www.anvknives.com (hereinafter referred to only as the “Website”), this being via the Website interface (hereinafter referred to only as the “E-shop Web Interface”).
1.2. Provisions differing from the Business Terms and Conditions may be arranged in the Purchase Contract. Different arrangements in the Purchase Contract shall take precedence over the provisions of the Business Terms and Conditions.
1.3. The provisions of the Business Terms and Conditions constitute an integral part of the Purchase Contract. The Purchase Contract and the Business Terms and Conditions are drawn up in Czech and in English.
1.4. The Seller may alter or supplement the wording of the Business Terms and Conditions. These provisions shall not affect the rights and obligations which arose during the period of effectiveness of the previous version of the Business Terms and Conditions.
2.1. On the basis of registration of the Buyer on the Website, the Buyer may access its user interface. The Buyer may place orders for goods from its user interface (hereinafter referred to only as “User Account”). If the E-shop Web Interface so allows, the Buyer may also order goods without registration directly from the E-shop Web Interface.
2.2. When registering on the Website and when placing orders for goods, the Buyer shall be obliged to state all details correctly and truthfully. The Buyer shall be obliged to update the details specified in the User Account in the event of any change to them. The details specified by the Buyer in the User Account and when placing an order shall be deemed to be correct by the Seller.
2.3. Access to the User Account is protected by a user name and password. The Buyer shall be obliged to preserve the confidentiality of information needed to access its User Account.
2.4. The Buyer shall not be entitled to allow any third parties to use its User Account.
2.5. The Seller may cancel the User Account, in particular if the Buyer does not use its User Account for more than 12 monts, or if the Buyer breaches its obligation arising from the Purchase Contract (including the Business Terms and Conditions).
2.6. The Buyer acknowledges that the User Account need not be available continuously, in particular in view of the necessary maintenance of the Seller’s hardware and software equipment, or the necessary maintenance of the hardware and software equipment of third parties.
3.1. All presentation of goods on the E-shop Web Interface is informative in nature and the Seller shall not be obliged to conclude a Purchase Contract regarding these goods. The provisions of Section 1732 para. 2 Civil Code shall not be applied.
3.2. The E-shop Web Interface contains information about goods, including specification of the prices of individual goods. Prices of goods are specified inclusive of value added tax and all related fees. Prices of goods shall remain valid over the period in which they are displayed on the E-shop Web Interface. This provision shall not restrict the possibility on the part of the Seller to conclude a Purchase Contract subject to individually agreed conditions.
3.3. The E-shop Web Interface also contains information about costs relating to packaging and delivery of goods. Information about costs relating to packaging and delivery of goods specified on the E-shop Web Interface only apply in cases when goods are delivered in the Czech Republic.
3.4.3. information about costs relating to delivery of goods (hereinafter referred to jointly only as the “Order”).
3.5. Before sending the Order to the Seller, the Buyer can check and change the details which the Buyer entered into the order, this also being to allow the Buyer to ascertain and correct any mistakes which occurred while entering data into the Order. The Buyer sends the Order to the Seller by clicking on the “Place order” or “Order” button. The details specified in the Order shall be regarded as correct by the Seller.
3.6. Sending an Order shall be regarded as action by the Buyer which clearly identifies the ordered goods, the purchase price, the identity of the Buyer and the method of settlement of the purchase price, and which is a binding draft Purchase Contract for the Contracting Parties. A condition for the validity of the Order is entry of all obligatory details in the order form, familiarisation with these Business Terms and Conditions on the Website and confirmation by the Buyer that it has familiarised itself with these Business Terms and Condition.
3.7. Without delay after receiving the Order, the Seller shall provide the Buyer confirmation of this receipt by e-mail, this being to the Buyer’s e-mail address specified in the user interface or in the Order (hereinafter referred to only as the “Buyer’s E-mail Address”).
3.8. Depending on the nature of the Order (quantity of goods, anticipated costs for transportation), the Seller shall always be entitled to ask the Buyer to provide additional confirmation of the Order (for example in writing or by telephone).
3.9. The draft Purchase Contract in the form of an Order shall be valid for fifteen days.
3.10. The contractual relationship between the Seller and the Buyer shall be created on acceptance of the Order, this being sent by the Seller to the Buyer by e-mail to the Buyer’s E-mail Address.
3.11. If the Seller is unable to meet any of the requirements specified in the Order, it shall send the Buyer a modified Order to the Buyer’s E-mail Address with specification of possible alternatives for the Order and shall ask the Buyer for its opinion.
3.12. The modified Offer shall be deemed to be a new draft Purchase Contract and the Purchase Contract shall in such a case not be concluded until acceptance by the Buyer by e-mail.
3.13. The Buyer agrees to use of remote means of communication while concluding the Purchase Contract. Costs incurred by the Buyer while using remote means of communication in relation to conclusion of the Purchase Contract (costs for an internet connection, costs for telephone conversations) shall be settled by the Buyer itself, whereas these costs are no different from the basic rate.
4.2. Together with the purchase price, the Buyer shall be obliged to also pay the Seller costs relating to packaging and delivery of goods in the contractually agreed amount. Unless explicitly determined otherwise, the purchase price shall hereinafter be understood to also include costs relating to delivery of goods.
4.3. The Seller shall not request any deposit or other similar payment from the Buyer. This shall not affect the provisions of art. 4.6 of the Business Terms and Conditions with regard to the obligation to settle the purchase price of the goods in advance.
4.4. In the case of payment in cash or in the case of cash on delivery, the purchase price shall be payable on acceptance of goods. In the case of cashless payment, the purchase price shall be payable within 5 days of conclusion of the Purchase Contract.
4.5. In the case of cashless payment, the Buyer shall be obliged to pay the purchase price of the goods together with specification of the variable symbol for the payment. In the case of cashless payment, the obligation of the Buyer to pay the purchase price shall be met at the moment of crediting of the respective amount to the Seller’s account.
4.6. The Seller shall be entitled, in particular if the Buyer does not provide additional confirmation of the Order (art. 3.6), to require settlement of the whole purchase price before sending the goods to the Buyer. The provisions of Section 2119 para. 1 Civil Code shall not be applied.
4.7. Any discounts on the price of goods which may be provided by the Seller to the Buyer cannot be mutually combined.
4.8. If usual in commercial transactions or if so determined by the generally binding legislation, the Seller shall issue the Buyer a tax document – invoice regarding payments made on the basis of the Purchase Contract. The Seller is a VAT payer. The Seller shall issue the Buyer the tax document – invoice after payment of the price of the goods and send it to the Buyer’s E-mail Address in electronic format.
5.1.8. concerning delivery of digital content, unless delivered on physical media and delivered with the prior explicit consent of the Buyer before expiry of the deadline for withdrawal from the contract and the Seller notified the Buyer before conclusion of the contract that in such a case, it shall not be entitled to withdraw from the contract.
5.2. Unless this concerns a case specified in art. 5.1 or other case when it is not possible to withdraw from the Purchase Contract, the Buyer shall, in compliance with the provisions of Section 1829 para. 1 Civil Code, be entitled to withdraw from the Purchase Contract, this being within fourteen (14) days of receipt of the goods, whereas if the subject of the Purchase Contract is constituted by several types of goods or delivery of several parts, this deadline shall begin on the date of receipt of the last delivery of goods. Notice of withdrawal from the Purchase Contract must be sent to the Seller within the deadline specified in the previous sentence.
5.3. The Buyer may use the specimen form provided by the Seller for withdrawal from the Purchase Contract, this constituting an appendix to the Business Terms and Conditions. The Buyer may, among other things, send notice of withdrawal from the Purchase Contract to the address of the Seller’s business premises or registered office. The provisions of art. 11 of these Business Terms and Conditions shall apply to delivery of notice of withdrawal from the contract.
5.4. In the event of withdrawal from the Purchase Contract in accordance with art. 5.2 of the Business Terms and Conditions, the Purchase Contract shall be terminated ex tunc. Goods must be returned to the Seller within fourteen (14) days from the moment of withdrawal from the contract. If the Buyer withdraws from the Purchase Contract, the Buyer shall bear costs relating to return of goods to the Seller, even if goods cannot be returned in the regular manner by post due to their nature.
5.5. In the event of withdrawal from the contract pursuant to art. 5.2 of the Business Terms and Conditions, the Seller shall refund money received from the Buyer within fourteen (14) days of withdrawal from the Purchase Contract by the Buyer, this being in the same manner in which the Seller received such money from the Buyer. The Seller shall also be entitled to already return performance provided by the Buyer on return of the goods by the Buyer or in another manner, if the Buyer agrees to this an no further costs are incurred by the Buyer. If the Buyer withdraws from the Purchase Contract, the Seller shall not be obliged to return money received to the Buyer until the Buyer returns the goods or proves that it has sent the goods to the Seller.
5.6. The Seller shall be entitled to unilaterally set off entitlement to compensation for damage caused to goods against entitlement on the part of the Buyer to refunding of the purchase price.
5.7. Until the moment of acceptance of the goods by the Buyer, the Seller shall be entitled to withdraw from the Purchase Contract at any time. In such a case, the Seller shall refund the purchase price to the Buyer without unnecessary delay, this being in a cashless manner to the account determined by the Buyer.
5.8. If the Buyer is provided a gift together with the goods, the gift contract between the Seller and the Buyer is concluded with the condition subsequent that if the Buyer withdraws from the Purchase Contract, the gift contract relating to this gift shall lose its effectiveness and the Buyer shall be obliged to also return the gift provided together with the goods to the Seller.
6.1. If the method of delivery is contractually agreed on the basis of special request by the Buyer, the Buyer shall bear any possible risk and additional costs which may arise in relation to this method of delivery.
6.2. If the Seller is obliged, in accordance with the Purchase Contract, to deliver goods to a location determined by the Buyer in the Order, the Buyer shall be obliged to accept goods on delivery.
6.3. If for reasons lying on the side of the Buyer it is necessary to deliver goods repeatedly or in a different manner than that specified in the Order, the Buyer shall be obliged to provide reimbursement of costs relating to repeated delivery of goods, or costs relating to a different method of delivery.
6.4. On acceptance of goods from the carrier, the Buyer shall be obliged to check the integrity of the packaging of the goods and in the event of any defects whatsoever, to immediately inform the carrier of this. If interference with the packaging is found indicating unauthorised opening of the consignment, the Buyer need not accept the consignment from the carrier.
7.1. The rights and obligations of the Contracting Parties regarding rights from defective performance shall be governed by the respective generally binding legislation (in particular the provisions of Section 1914 to 1925, Section 2099 to 2117 and Section 2161 to 2174 Civil Code).
7.3. The provisions specified in art. 7.2 of the Business Terms and Conditions shall not be applied, in the case of goods sold at a lower price, to a defect which was the reason for arrangement of the lower price, to wear and tear of goods caused by their regular use and in the case of used goods, to a defect corresponding to the level of use or wear and tear which the goods exhibited at the moment of acceptance by the Buyer, or if this arises from the nature of the goods.
7.4. If a defect exhibits itself over the course of six months from acceptance, it shall be understood that the goods were already defective at the moment of acceptance.
7.5. The Buyer shall exercise rights from defective performance with the Seller at the address of its business premises in which acceptance of claims is possible in view of the range of goods sold, or at the Seller’s registered office or place of business. The moment when the Seller received the goods being claimed from the Buyer for shall be regarded as the moment the claim is exercised.
7.6. Other rights and obligations of the parties relating to liability on the part of the Seller for defects may be regulated for by the Seller’s claims procedure.
8.1. The Buyer shall acquire ownership of the goods by payment of the purchase price for the goods in full.
8.2. The Seller shall not be bound by any codes of conduct in relation to the Buyer within the meaning of the provisions of Section 1826 para. 1 e) Civil Code.
8.3. Out-of-court settlement of consumer complaints shall be ensured by the Seller via the e-mail address info@anvknives.com. The Seller shall send information about handling of the Buyer’s complaint to the Buyer’s E-mail Address.
8.4. The Seller is authorised to sell goods on the basis of a trade licence. Trade licencing inspection shall be performed by the Trade Licencing Authority within the framework of its sphere of competence. Supervision over the field of personal data protection shall be performed by the Office for the Protection of Personal Data. The Czech Trade Inspection Authority shall, among other things and within the determined scope, perform supervision of compliance with Act No. 634/1992 Coll., on Consumer protection, as amended.
8.5. The Buyer hereby assumes risk of change in circumstances within the meaning of Section 1765 para. 2 Civil Code.
9.1. Protection of the personal data of the Buyer if the Buyer is a natural person is provided by Act No. 101/2000 Coll., on Personal data protection, as amended.
9.2. The Buyer agrees to processing of the following items of its personal data: name and surname, address, identification number, VAT number, e-mail address and telephone (hereinafter referred to jointly only as “Personal Data”).
9.3. The Buyer consents to processing of Personal Data by the Seller, this being for the purpose of exercising the rights and meeting the obligations arising from the Purchase Contract and for the purpose of administration of the User Account. If the Buyer does not choose any other option, it also agrees to processing of Personal Data by the Seller for the purpose of sending information and commercial messages to the Buyer. Consent to processing of Personal Data within the whole framework of this article is not a condition which in itself would make conclusion of a Purchase Contract impossible.
9.4. The Buyer takes due note of the fact that it is obliged to state its Personal Data (during registration, in its User Account, when placing an Order from the E-shop Web Interface) correctly and truthfully and that it is obliged to inform the Seller of any change to its Personal Data without unnecessary delay.
9.5. The Seller may commission a third party to process the Buyer’s Personal Data as a processor. Apart from parties transporting goods, Personal Data shall not be handed over by the Seller to third parties without the prior consent of the Buyer.
9.7. The Buyer confirms that the Personal Data provided is precise and that it was informed of the fact that this concerns voluntary provision of Personal Data.
9.8.2. request that the Seller or processor remedy such a state of affairs which has arisen.
9.9. If the Buyer requests information about processing of its Personal Data, the Seller shall be obliged to provide such information to it. The Seller shall be entitled to request reasonable reimbursement for provision of information pursuant to the previous sentence, not exceeding the level of costs necessary for provision of information.
10.1. The Buyer agrees to sending of information relating to goods, services or the business of the Seller to the Buyer’s E-mail Address and also agrees to sending of commercial messages by the Seller to the Buyer’s E-mail Address.
10.2. The Buyer agrees to saving of so-called cookies on its computer. If a purchase on the Website can be made and the obligations of the Seller arising from the Purchase Contract met without so-called cookies being saved on the Buyer’s computer, the Buyer may retract its consent as specified in the previous sentence at any time.
11.1. Notices relating to the relations between the Seller and the Buyer, in particular relating to withdrawal from the Purchase Contract must be delivered by post in the form of a registered letter, unless determined otherwise in the Purchase Contract. Notices shall be delivered to the respective postal address of the other party and shall be deemed to have been delivered and effective at the moment of its delivery by the post office, with the exception of notice of withdrawal from the contract given by the Buyer, when withdrawal shall be effective if notice is sent by the Buyer within the deadline for withdrawal.
11.2. A notice, acceptance of which was refused by the recipient, which was not collected during the period of its storage or which was returned as undeliverable shall also be deemed to have been delivered.
11.3. The Contracting Parties may deliver regular correspondence to each other by e-mail, this being to the e-mail addresses specified in the Buyer’s User Account or specified by the Buyer in the Order, or to an address specified on the Seller’s Website.
12.1. If the relationship established by the Purchase Contract contains in international (foreign) element, the Parties agree that the relationship shall be governed by Czech law. This shall not affect the rights of the consumer arising from the binding legislation.
12.2. If any of the provisions of the Business Terms and Conditions are invalid or ineffective, or if they become so, a provision shall be used instead of the invalid provision, the meaning of which is a close as possible to the invalid provision. The invalidity or ineffectiveness of one provision shall not affect the validity of the other provisions. Changes and supplementations to the Purchase Contract or Business Terms and Conditions must be made in writing.
12.3. The Purchase Contract, including the Business Terms and Conditions, shall be archived by the Seller in electronic format and is not accessible.
12.4. A specimen form for withdrawal from the Purchase Contract constitutes an appendix to the Business Terms and Conditions.
1.1. Tyto obchodní podmínky (dále jen „obchodní podmínky“) obchodní společnosti ANV KNIVES s.r.o. se sídlem Na Perštýně 2, 110 00 Praha 1, identifikační číslo:05522790, DIČ: CZ05522790 (dále jen „prodávající“), upravují v souladu s ustanovením § 1751 odst. 1 zákona č. 89/2012 Sb., občanský zákoník (dále jen „občanský zákoník“) vzájemná práva a povinnosti smluvních stran vzniklé v souvislosti nebo na základě kupní smlouvy (dále jen „kupní smlouva“) uzavírané mezi prodávajícím a jinou fyzickou či právnickou osobou (dále jen „kupující“) prostřednictvím internetového obchodu prodávajícího. Internetový obchod je prodávajícím provozován na webové stránce umístěné na internetové adrese www.anvknives.com (dále jen „webová stránka“), a to prostřednictvím rozhraní webové stránky (dále jen „webové rozhraní obchodu“).
1.3. Ustanovení obchodních podmínek jsou nedílnou součástí kupní smlouvy. Kupní smlouva a obchodní podmínky jsou vyhotoveny v českém a anglickém jazyce.
3.5. Před zasláním objednávky prodávajícímu je kupujícímu umožněno zkontrolovat a měnit údaje, které do objednávky kupující vložil, a to i s ohledem na možnost kupujícího zjišťovat a opravovat chyby vzniklé při zadávání dat do objednávky. Objednávku odešle kupující prodávajícímu kliknutím na tlačítko „Dokončit objednávku“ nebo "Objednat". Údaje uvedené v objednávce jsou prodávajícím považovány za správné.

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§ 1751


CAPITAL SERVICE, Inc. et al.
Petitioner manufacturers and distributes bakery products in California. A union sought unsuccessfully to organize its employees. Thereupon, the union sought to enlist the aid of purchasers and consumers of petitioner's products. Agents of the union requested retail stores not to handle petitioner's products and stated that if they continued to do so, a picket line would be set up. Some stores acquiesced; others did not. The union placed pickets at the entrances of the latter stores, with the result that many deliveries were interrupted and some employees of other employers refused to cross the picket lines.
Petitioner made two counter moves. First, it filed suit for an injunction against the union in the California courts. A few days later it filed a charge of an unfair labor practice against the union with respondent. Each had as a basis the same conduct of the union.
"In view of the fact that exclusive jurisdiction over the subject matter was in the National Labor Relations Board, Garner v. Teamsters, Chauffeurs and Helpers Local Union No. 776 (A.F.L.) (346 U.S. 485), 74 S.Ct. 161, could the Federal District Court, on application of the Board, enjoin Petitioners from enforcing an injunction already obtained from the State court?" 346 U.S. 936, 74 S.Ct. 375.
I. The District Court had jurisdiction of the subject matter, because this is a 'civil action or proceeding' arising under an Act of Congress 'regulating commerce.' 28 U.S.C. § 1337, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1337. The National Labor Relations Act is a law 'regulating commerce' (National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 57 S.Ct. 615, 81 L.Ed. 893); and here, as in American Federation of Labor v. Watson, 327 U.S. 582, 591, 66 S.Ct. 761, 765, 90 L.Ed. 873, the rights asserted arise under that law.
II. In absence of a command of the Congress to the contrary, the power of the District Court to issue the injunction is clear. Federal courts seek to avoid needless conflict with state agencies and withhold relief by way of injunction where state remedies are available and adequate. See Alabama Public Service Commission v. Southern Ry. Co., 341 U.S. 341, 71 S.Ct. 762, 95 L.Ed. 1002. But where Congress, acting within its constitutional authority, has vested a federal agency with exclusive jurisdiction over a subject matter and the intrusion of a state would result in conflict of functions, the federal court may enjoin the state proceeding in order to preserve the federal right. See Public Utilities Commission of Ohio v. United Fuel Gas Co., 317 U.S. 456, 468—470, 63 S.Ct. 369, 375—376, 87 L.Ed. 396; Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U.S. 503, 510—511, 64 S.Ct. 641, 645, 88 L.Ed. 892. Cf. American Federation of Labor v. Watson, supra, 327 U.S. at pages 593—595, 66 S.Ct. at pages 766—767, 90 L.Ed. 873. Congress, however, has provided that 'A court of the United States may not grant an injunction to stay proceedings in a State court except as expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgments.' 28 U.S.C. § 2283, 28 U.S.C.A. § 2283.
We do not stop to consider the many questions which have been propounded under this newly worded provision of the Code.2 One alone suffices for this case. For we conclude that the injunction issued by the District Court was 'necessary in aid of its jurisdiction' and thus permitted under the exceptions specifically allowed by Congress.
The state court injunction restrains conduct which the District Court was asked to enjoin in the § 10(l) proceeding brought in the District Court by the Board's Regional Director against the union. In order to make the § 10(l) power effective the Board must have authority to take all steps necessary to preserve its case. If the state court decree were to stand, the Federal District Court would be limited in the action it might take. If the Federal District Court were to have unfettered power to decide for or against the union, and to write such decree as it deemed necessary in order to effectuate the policies of the Act, it must be freed of all restraints from the other tribunal. To exercise its jurisdiction freely and fully it must first remove the state decree. When it did so, it acted 'where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction'.
In view of our ruling, we find it unnecessary to consider whether apart from the specific exceptions contained in § 2283, the District Court was justified in enjoining this intrusion on an exclusive federal jurisdiction. Cf. Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U.S. 503, 510—511, 64 S.Ct. 641, 645, 88 L.Ed. 892.


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The primary and most important of the domestic relations, is that of husband and wife. It has its foundation in nature, and is the only lawful relation by which Providence has permitted the continuance of the human race. In every age it has had a propitious influence on the moral improvement and happiness of mankind. It is one of the chief foundations of social order. We may justly place to the credit of the institution of marriage, a great share of the blessings which flow from refinement of manners, the education of children, the sense of justice, and the cultivation of the liberal arts.1 In the examination of this interesting contract, I shall, in the first place, consider how a marriage may be lawfully made, and, secondly, how it may be lawfully dissolved; and, lastly, I shall take a view of the rights and duties which belong to that relation.
The age of consent by the English law, was no doubt borrowed from the Roman law, which established the same periods of twelve and fourteen, as the competent age of consent to reader the marriage contract binding. Nature has not fixed any precise period, and municipal laws must operate by fixed and reasonable rules. The same rule was adopted in France, before their revolution;11 but by the Napoleon code,12 the age of consent was raised to eighteen in males, and fifteen in females, though a dispensation from the rule may be granted for good cause.
The statute of this state is susceptible of the same construction as that given to the statute of James, and therefore, if one of the married parties shall have continually remained abroad for five years, and be living, even within the knowledge of the party here, or the parties were at the time only under a divorce a mensa et thoro, yet the second marriage, though void in law, would not be within the penalties of the act. It is still a divorce, and the act does not distinguish between the two species of divorce.16 The crime of bigamy, or of polygamy, as it ought more properly to be termed,17 has been made a capital offence in some, and punished very severely in other parts of Europe;18 but the new civil code of France,19 only renders such second marriage unlawful, without annexing any penalty for the offence.
The direct and serious prohibition of polygamy contained in our law, is founded on the precepts of Christianity, and the laws of our social nature, and it is supported by the sense and practice of the civilized nations of Europe.20 Though the Athenians, at one time, permitted polygamy, yet, generally, it was not tolerated in ancient Greece, but was regarded as the practice of barbarians.21 It was also forbidden by the Romans throughout the whole period of their history, and the prohibition is inserted in the Institutes of Justinian.22 Polygamy may be regarded as exclusively the feature of Asiatic manners, and of half-civilized life, and to be incompatible with civilization, refinement, and domestic felicity.
(5.) The consent of parents, or guardians, to the marriage of minors, is not requisite. In this state, we have no statute provision in the case, and marriages are left to the freedom of the common law, and, consequently, with as few checks in the formation of the marriage contract, as in any part of the civilized world. The matrimonial law of Scotland, and of Ireland, is similar to our own,33 and so was the English law prior to the statute of 26 Geo. II. c. 33. That statute, among other things, declared all marriages under licenses, when either of the parties were under the age of twenty-one years, if celebrated without publication of banns, or without the consent of the father, or unmarried mother, or guardian, to be absolutely null and void. The English statute pursued the policy of the civil law, and of the law of the present day in many parts of Europe, in holding clandestine marriages to be a grievous evil, so far as they might affect the happiness of families, and the control of property.34 Though the Roman law greatly favored marriages by the fatuous jus trium liberorum, allowing certain special privileges to the parent of three or more children; yet it held the consent of the father to be indispensable to the validity of the marriage of children, of whatever age, except where that consent could not be given, as in cases of captivity, or defect of understanding.35 Parental restraints upon marriage existed likewise in ancient Greece,36 and they exist to a very great extent in Germany,37 Holland,38 and France.39 The marriage of minors, under these European regulations, is absolutely void, if had without the consent of the father, or mother, if the survivor; and minority in France extends to the age of twenty-five in males, and twenty-one in females, and even after that period the parental and family check continues in a mitigated degree.
(6.) No peculiar ceremonies are requisite by the common law to the valid celebration of the marriage. The consent of the parties is all that is required; and as marriage is said to be a contract jure gentium, that consent is all that is required by natural or public law.40 The Roman lawyers strongly inculcated the doctrine, that the very foundation and essence of the contract consisted in consent freely given, by parties competent to contract. Nihil proderit signasse tabulas, si mentem matrimonii non fuisse constabit. Nuptias non concubitus, sed consensus facit. This is the language equally of the common and canon law, and of common reason.
By the Scots law, a previous publication of the intention of the parties is required, though a clandestine marriage without such public notice is still valid in law, and only subjects the parties to certain penalties.43 It has been the usual practice with nations, to prescribe certain forms and ceremonies, and generally of a religious nature, as being requisite to accompany the celebration of the marriage solemnity.44 In the Roman Catholic church, marriage was elevated to the dignity of a sacrament, and was clothed with formalities, and made a complicated institution. But in France, under the revolutionary constitution of 1791, marriage was declared to be regarded in law as a mere civil contract. The same principle was adopted in the code Napoleon; and now, says Toullier,45 the law separates the civil contract entirely from the sacrament of marriage, and does not attend to the laws of the church and the nuptial benediction, which bind only the conscience of the faithful. The statute of 26 Geo. II required all marriages in England, without special license to the contrary, to be celebrated in a parish church, or public chapel, and rendered the place indispensable to the validity of them. In most cases, the observance of the positive municipal regulations, was made necessary to the validity of the marriage; but the painful consequences of such a doctrine, have recommended a less severe discipline, in respect to the parties themselves and their issue. The statute of 3 Geo. IV relaxed the rigor of the former statute, in some particulars, as in the case of the marriage of minors by license, without parental consent, or without due publication of banns, for the severity of that statute frequently led to cases of the most alarming nature, such as the annulling of marriages after the parties had lived happily for a great many years, and reared children. In the states of Maine and Massachusetts, it is requisite, by statute, to a valid marriage, that it be made in the presence and with the assent of a magistrate, or a stated or ordained minister of the gospel; and though a marriage without publication of banns, and without the consent of the parents or guardians, will expose the officer to a penalty for breach of the statute, yet a marriage so had, would nevertheless be lawful and binding, provided there was the presence and assent of a magistrate or minister.46 The statute law of Connecticut, requires the marriage to be celebrated by a clergyman or magistrate, and requires the previous publication of the intention of marriage, and the consent of parents, and it inflicts a penalty on those who disobey the regulation; but it is the opinion of the learned author of the Treatise on the Domestic Relations,47 that the marriage, if made according to the common law, without observing any of those statute regulations, would still be a valid marriage. This I should infer, from the. ruse of Wyckoff v. Boggs,48 to be the rule in New Jersey, where the marriage contract is under similar legislative regulations. It is the doctrine judicially declared in New Hampshire and Kentucky, and the marriage is held valid as to the parties, though it be not solemnized in form, according to the requisitions of their statute law. There are probably statute provisions of a similar import in other states of the Union; and wherever they do not exist and specially apply, the contract is, everywhere in this country, (except in Louisiana,) under the government of the English common law.
(7.) It has been a point much discussed in the English courts, whether a clandestine marriage in Scotland, of English parties, who resided in England, and resorted to Scotland, with an intent to evade the operation of the English marriage act,49 could be received and considered in England, as valid. Though we may not, in this country, have at present any great concern with that question, the principle is nevertheless extremely important in the study of the general jurisprudence, applicable to the marriage contract.
1. The great philosophical poet of antiquity, who was, however, most absurd in much of his philosophical theory, but eminently beautiful, tender, and sublime in his poetry, supposes the civilization of mankind to have been the result of marriage and family establishments.
Castaque privatae veneris connubia laetaCognita sunt, prolemque ex se videre creatam:Tum genus humanum primum mollescere caepit.
Lucret. de Rer. Nat. lib. 6.
2. 2 Phillimore’s Rep. 19. 69.
3. Ash’s case, Prec. in Ch. 203. 1 Eq. Ca. Abr. 278. pl. 6. Ex parte Turing. 1 Ves. & Bea. 140. Turner v. Myers, 1 Haggard, 414.
4. Wightman v. Wightman, 4 Johns. Ch. Rep. 343.
5. Voet ad Pand. lib. 24. 2. 15. Toullier’s Droit Civil Francais, tom. 1. No. 501. 504. 506. 512. Reeve’s Domestic Relations 201. 207, Pothier’s Trait du Contrat de Marriage, No. 307, 308. 2 Haggard, 104. 246.
6. Ferlat v. Gojon, 1 Hopkins, 478.
7. Toullier, ibid. No. 515. 521.
Pothier, ibid. No. 310. 314. 1 Phillimore, 137. 2 Haggard, 243. 1 Day’s Rep. 111. Benton v. Benton.
8. Co. Litt. 33. a. 79. b.
10. Harg. Co. Litt. lib. 2. n. 45.
13. Cro. Eliz. 858. 1 Salk. 121.
14. Laws N.Y. 11th sess. ch. 24.
16. 4 Blacks. Com. 163, 164. This point was raised and discussed in Porter’s case, Cro. Car. 461, and while the court admitted the second marriage to be unlawful and void, yet they did not decide whether the statute penalty would attach upon such a case of bigamy.
17. Harg. Co. Litt. lib. 2. n. 48.
18. Barrington on the Statutes, p. 401.
20. Paley’s Moral Philosophy, b. 3. c. 6.
21. 2 Potter’s Greek Antiq. 264. Taylor’s Elem. Civil Law, 340-344.
22. Cic. de Orat. 1. 40. Suet. Jul. 52. Inst. 1. 10. b. ad fin. Taylor, ibid. 44-347. The more ancient laws of Rome, prohibiting divorces, were extremely praised by Dionysius of Halycarnassus, lib. 2.
23. 1 Potter’s Greek Antiq. 107. 2 Ibid. 267, 268, 269. Tacit. Ann. 12. sec. 4, 5, 6, 7.
24. Co. Litt. 235. a. Gibson’s Cod. 412. 1 Phillimore’s Rep. 201. 355.
25. 1Mitford’s Hist. of Greece, vol. vii. p. 374.
26. Burgess v. Burgess, 1 Haggard, 386. Such a connection was held in equal abomination by Justinian’s Code. Code 5. 8. 2.
27. Vaughan’s Rep. 206. 2 Vent. 9. S. C.
28. Doctor Taylor, in his Elements of the civil law, p. 314-389, has gone deeply into the Greek and Roman learning as to the extent of the prohibition of marriage between near relations, and he says, the fourth degree of collateral consanguinity is the proper point to stop at; that the marriage of first cousins is lawful, and the civil law properly established the fourth as the first degree that could match with decency.
29. 4 Johns. Ch. Rep. 343.
31. Gilbert’s Eq. Rep. 156.
32. Whether it be proper or lawful, in a religious or moral sense, for a man to marry his deceased wife’s sister, has been discussed by American writers. Mr. N. Webster, in his Essays, published at Boston in 1790, No. 26, held the affirmative; and it is made lawful by statute in Connecticut. Dr. Livingston, in his Dissertations, published at New Brunswick in 1816, and confined exclusively to that point, maintained the negative side of the question. It is not my object to meddle with that question; but such a marriage is clearly not incestuous or invalid by our municipal law.
33. Erskine’s Inst. vol. i. 89-91. McDouall’s Inst. vol. i. 112. 2 Addam’s Rep. 375. 1 Ibid 64.
34. The rigor of the act of Geo. II was somewhat softened by the new marriage act of 3 Geo. IV c. 75., and the provisions rendering void all marriages solemnized by license, by minors, without consent, was repealed, and marriages had by previous publication of banns were rendered valid, though there had been false names used in the publication of the banns. 1 Addam’s Rep. 28. 94. 479.
35. Inst. 1. 10. Pr. Taylor’s Elements of the Civil Law, 310-313.
36. Potter’s Greek Antiq. vol. ii. 270, 271.
37. Heinec. Elem. Jur. Gen. lib. 1. s. 138.
38. Van Leeuwen’s Cons. on the Roman Dutch Law, p. 73.
39. Pothier, Traite du Contrat de Mar. No. 321-342. Code Napoleon, No. 148–160. Toullier, Droit Civil Franc. tom, 1. 453-463.
40. Grotius, b. 2. c. 5. s. 10. Bracton, lib. 1. ch. 5. sec. 7.
41. 6 Mod. 155. 2 Salk. 137 S. C. Dalrymple v. Dalrymple, 2 Haggard, 54. La Tour v. Teesdale, 8 Taunton, 830. Fenton v. Reed, 4 Johns. Rep. 52.
42. 1 Salk. 119. 4 Burr. 2057. Doug. 171. The King v. Stockland, Burr. Sett. Cases, 509. Cunninghams v. Cunninghams, 2 Dow. 482. McAdarn v. Walker, 1 Dow. 148. Fenton v. Reed, 4 Johns. Rep. 2.
43. 1 Ersk. Inst. 91. 93. McDouall’s Inst. vol. i. 112.
44. Selden’s Uxor Ebraica, b. 2. c. l. 2 Potter’s Greek Antiq. 279. 283. Dr. Taylor’s Elem. 275. 278.
45. Droit Civil Francais, tom. 1. No. 494.
47. Reeve’s Domestic Relations, p. 196. 200. 290.
49. 2 N. Hamp. Rep. 268. 3 Marshall, 370.
50. De Conflictu Legum, sec. 8.
51. Buller’s N. P. 114. 2. Haggard, 443, 444. S.C.
52. Robinson v. Bland. 2 Burr. 1077.
55. 16 Mass. Rep. 157.
56. West Cambridge v. Lexington, 1 Pickering, 506.
57. By the French civil code, No. 63.; publication of banns is to precede marriage; and by the article No. 170, if a Frenchman marries in a foreign country, the same regulation is still to be observed; and yet, according to Toullier, Droit Civil Francais, tom. 1. No. 578. and note ib. the omission to comply with the prescribed publication does not render the marriage void, whether celebrated at home or abroad. But if the marriage by a Frenchman abroad, be within the age of consent fixed by the French code, though beyond the age of consent fixed by our law, it would seem, that, the marriage would not be regarded in France as valid, though valid by the law of the place where it was celebrated. The French code, No. 170, requires the observance by Frenchmen of the ordinances of that code, though the marriage be abroad, for personal laws follow Frenchman wherever they go. Toullier, Droit Francais, tom. 1. Nos. 118. and 576.

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9-0 Supreme Court Win – The United States Supreme Court unanimously ruled in favor of the State of Mississippi in an antitrust lawsuit against manufacturers alleged to have conspired in a massive scheme to fix prices of LCD monitors. The ruling affirms attorneys generals’ right to enforce their states’ laws on behalf of their citizens in their own state courts. Zimmerman Reed represented the State in this lawsuit.
In re Vitamins Antitrust Litigation – Zimmerman Reed represented both direct and indirect purchasers of vitamin products used for both human and animal consumption, including porcine vitamins. The lawsuit alleged a long running international conspiracy to fix, raise and maintain the inflated prices of certain bulk vitamins and vitamin products. The case settled for $225 million in 2001.
Metroprolol Succinate End-Payor Antitrust Litigation – In a suit against AstraZeneca over its heart drug Toprol-XL, Zimmerman Reed represented the National Join Power Alliance, a company that supplies goods and services to school districts, cities, counties, and other governmental agencies. It alleged that AstraZeneca’s manufacturing and marketing of Toprol-XL violated antitrust and deceptive trade practices laws, causing it to pay significantly higher prices for the drug. The case settled for $20 million in 2002.
Ovation Pharmaceuticals – The parties reached a settlement in June 2011 on behalf of hospitals, pharmacies and health care organizations who directly purchased Indocin or NeoProfen from Defendant Ovation Pharmaceuticals, Inc. and/or Lundbeck, Inc.
National Computer Systems – Zimmerman Reed filed a lawsuit against National Computer Systems who had incorrectly scored standardized tests resulting in 7,997 students being told they failed the math section of their Basic Standards Test. Just days before trial, the case settled for more than $12 million.
Pilot Flying J – A settlement was reached in a lawsuit regarding whether or not Pilot Flying J diesel truck stops were issuing proper payment to individuals and businesses participating in the company’s fuel rebate and discount program. The settlement guarantees compensation of unpaid rebates and discounts from the class period as well as an additional 6% interest per year that the Principal rebate was unpaid for all eligible class members.
Target Security Breach – A $39 million settlement on behalf of banks and financial institutions following the massive 2013 data breach compromising 110 million credit and debit cards and personal information of Target customers. Zimmerman Reed served as Co-Lead Counsel.
Tobacco Litigation – Acting as part of the Castano Group (a consortium of 65 class action law firms from across the country) Zimmerman Reed participated in filing the first class action against the Tobacco industry. This lawsuit led to the filing of Attorneys General cases and, ultimately, led to a historic national settlement in June 1997.
Levaquin – $1.8 million jury verdict for our client for Achilles tendon rupture while on Levaquin.
Baycol – Co-Lead Counsel achieving a $1.15 billion settlement for 2,500 clients who had significant injury after taking the cholesterol lowering drug, Baycol.
Guidant – Negotiated a nationwide $240 million settlement for 8,500 patients after the Guidant heart defibrillator recall.
Medtronic – $95.6 million settlement on behalf of 2,682 patients who had faulty Medtronic heart defibrillators.
Stryker Hip Replacements – As a member of Lead Counsel Committee, Zimmerman Reed was part of a $1.4 billion global settlement that will help thousands of patients with recalled Stryker hip replacements.
Zicam – $27 million settlement for clients who lost their sense of smell arising out of their use of the Zicam Cold Remedy Nasal Gel product.
Daud, et al. v. Gold’n Plump Poultry, Inc. – $1.35 million settlement for employees facing religious discrimination in the workplace.
Fluegel v. FedEx Ground Package System – Zimmerman Reed headed the legal team that successfully challenged FedEx’s independent contractor model on behalf of 141 Illinois drivers in a lawsuit brought under federal and Illinois wage and hour laws.
Frank, et al. v. Gold’n Plump Poultry, Inc – Employer change of practices and $2.65 million monetary settlement for Minnesota and Wisconsin employees who were not paid for time spent performing work before and after paid shifts.
Grabman, et al. v. Brakebush Brothers, Inc. – Employer change of practices and $675,000 settlement for employees who were not paid for time spent performing work before and after paid shifts, and who were not properly paid for work performed during meal breaks.
Milner, et al. v. Farmers Insurance Exchange – $1.5 million settlement after a jury found that insurance claims adjusters in Minnesota had been misclassified as exempt from overtime.
Phelps, et al. v. Green Bay Dressed Beef, LLC – Employer change of practices and $1.175 million settlement for employees who were not paid for time spent performing work before and after paid shifts.
Robinson, et al. v. Novellus Systems, Inc – Settlement for field service engineers in California and Oregon who had been misclassified as exempt from overtime.
Airport Noise – Zimmerman Reed represented homeowners whose property was within a certain distance of the MSP International Airport. The lawsuit, filed against the Metropolitan Airports Commission (“MAC”), alleged that MAC breached a promise to provide noise mitigation to certain homes surrounding the Minneapolis-St. Paul Intl. Airport after the decision was made to expand rather than build another location. Weeks before trial, a settlement was reached with the MAC and then with the Cities who were also seeking to enforce promises made, providing noise mitigation for more than 9,500 homes in the areas surrounding the International Airport.
Minot Train Derailment – On January 18, 2002, the largest release of anhydrous ammonia in U.S. History occurred when a Canadian Pacific Railway train derailed in Minot, North Dakota. Zimmerman Reed represented hundreds of individuals injured by the release and obtained a $1.2 million in jury verdict in Minneapolis, MN on behalf of two clients.
MTBE – Since 2003, we have worked with other environmental lawyers, on behalf of numerous municipalities across the country whose water was contaminated with MTBE. MTBE (methyl tert-butyl ether), a gasoline additive, can affect water’s taste and odor making it undrinkable. A global settlement was reached in 2009 with the oil companies on behalf of the various plaintiffs, including five municipalities represented by Zimmerman Reed.
Imprelis – A settlement was reached on behalf of a class of homeowners, golf course companies, and other property owners in a lawsuit against E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Company after their herbicide product, Imprelis, caused mature trees to die across the country following lawn application.
In re Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc. Securities, Derivative and ERISA Litigation – Current and former employees filed a case against Merrill Lynch under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) for losses suffered as a result of 401k investments in company stock. A $75 million dollar settlement was approved in August 2009.
Minnesota Corn Processors Litigation – Farmer/shareholders achieved a $5.75 million settlement shortly before trial. The farmers brought breach of fiduciary claims against MCP officers related to their improper communications with competitor Archer Daniels Midland (ADM), and an ultimate sale of the company to ADM that included lavish golden parachute compensation packages for those officers.
Morgan Keegan Securities Litigation – Investors brought a series of lawsuits against the defendants, including Regions Financial, Regions Bank, Morgan Keegan & Company, Inc., Morgan Asset Management, and PricewaterhouseCoopers, Inc., alleging violations of federal securities laws, breach of fiduciary duty and other state law causes of action that resulted in three open-end mutual funds to tank in 2007. In January 2015, Regions Financial Corp. agreed to pay $125 million to end both a putative class action and shareholder derivative lawsuits.
Wells Fargo Securities Lending – $62.5 million settlement reached, two days before trial. The City of Farmington Hills’ pension fund brought this case on behalf of itself and more than 60 other funds/investors. The Fund–and a certified class–sought to recover investment losses caused by Wells Fargo’s misrepresentations about its securities lending program and its mismanagement of the program that put investors’ money into high risk funds, in violation of program’s policies. One of the largest recoveries achieved in a securities lending case stemming from the 2008 financial crisis.
Citigroup Litigation – Zimmerman Reed and Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP represented a large corporation in an action against Citigroup Inc., alleging fraud and negligent misrepresentation in connection with the sale of mortgage-backed securities. The parties successfully resolved all of the claims relating to this action in 2014.
Deutsche Bank Litigation – Zimmerman Reed, along with Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP represented a large corporation in an action against Deutsche Bank AG, alleging fraud, aiding and abetting, and negligent misrepresentation in connection with the sale of mortgage-backed securities and collateralized debt obligations. The parties successfully resolved all of the claims relating to this action in 2014.
NFL Concussion Lawsuit – A $765 million settlement was announced on behalf of 4,500 former NFL players. This settlement would resolve concussion-related lawsuits; the settlement would fund medical exams, concussion-related compensation, and medical research.
Retired NFL Players Publicity Lawsuit – A historic settlement was approved between retired NFL players and the League to resolve the retired players’ publicity rights class action. The settlement creates a licensing agency that, for the first time, will market the group rights of retired players. The NFL has agreed to partner with the Agency to help retired players establish commercial opportunities.

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Complainant is LEGO Juris A/S of Billund, Denmark, represented by Melbourne IT Digital Brand Services AB, Sweden.
Respondent is Charlie Carmichael of Spring Valley, California, United States of America.
The disputed domain name is <legodino.net> which is registered with Wild West Domains, Inc.
The Complaint was filed with the WIPO Arbitration and Mediation Center (the “Center”) on September 8, 2010. On September 8, 2010, the Center transmitted by email to Wild West Domains, Inc. a request for registrar verification in connection with the disputed domain name. On September 9, 2010, Wild West Domains, Inc. transmitted by email to the Center its verification response confirming that Respondent is listed as the registrant and providing the contact details. The Center sent an email communication to Complainant on September 17, 2010 requesting Complainant to submit an amendment to the Complaint. Complainant filed an amendment to the Complaint on September 17, 2010.
The Center verified that the Complaint, as amended, satisfied the formal requirements of the Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the “Policy” or “UDRP”), the Rules for Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the “Rules”), and the WIPO Supplemental Rules for Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the “Supplemental Rules”).
In accordance with the Rules, paragraphs 2(a) and 4(a), the Center formally notified Respondent of the Complaint, and the proceedings commenced on September 22, 2010. In accordance with the Rules, paragraph 5(a), the due date for Response was October 12, 2010. Respondent did not submit any response. Accordingly, the Center notified Respondent’s default on October 14, 2010. The Center received an email communication from Respondent on October 14, 2010.
Due to a technical problem with the electronic transmission of the Complaint, on October 19, 2010, the Center resent the Complaint in Word and .pdf format and Respondent was granted additional three days, in order to indicate to the Center by return email whether it intended to participate in these proceedings. The due date for the submission of any Response, or the indication that Respondent intended to submit any such Response, was reset at October 22, 2010. Respondent did not reply.
The Center appointed Gerardo Saavedra as the sole panelist in this matter on November 9, 2010. This Panel finds that it was properly constituted. This Panel has submitted the Statement of Acceptance and Declaration of Impartiality and Independence, as required by the Center to ensure compliance with the Rules, paragraph 7.
Complainant is a company incorporated in Denmark.
Complainant has rights over the trademark LEGO, which is registered in numerous jurisdictions around the world, including: registration No. 39800 with The Trade Marks and Designs Registration Office of the European Union, registered in 1998, international classes 3, 9, 14, 16, 20, 24, 25, 28, 38, 41, and 42; and registration No. 1018875 with the United States Patent and Trademark Office, registered in 1975, international class 28.
Complainant is also the owner of several domain names containing the term LEGO.
The disputed domain name was created on April 28, 2010.
Complainant is the owner of LEGO and all other trademarks used in connection with the famous LEGO brands of construction toys and other LEGO branded products.
Complainant (through its predecessors) and its licensees (collectively the “LEGO Group”) commenced use of the LEGO trademark in the United States of America during 1953, to identify construction toys made and sold by them. Over the years, the business of making and selling LEGO branded toys has grown remarkably. Complainant has subsidiaries and branches throughout the world, and LEGO products are sold in more than 130 countries, including in the United States of America.
The LEGO Group have expanded their use of the LEGO trademark to computer hardware and software, books, videos and computer controlled robotic construction sets.
Complainant maintains an extensive website under the domain name <lego.com> and is also the owner of more than 1,000 domain names containing the term LEGO.
The trademark LEGO is among the best-known trademarks in the world, due in part to decades of extensive advertising, which prominently depicts the LEGO mark on all products, packaging, displays, advertising, and promotional materials. The LEGO trademark and brand have been recognized as being famous; for instance, list of the official top 500 Superbrands for 2009/10, provided by Superbrands UK, shows LEGO as number 8 of the most famous trademarks and brands in the world1.
The disputed domain name is confusingly similar to Complainant’s world famous trademark LEGO. The fame of the trademark has been confirmed in numerous previous UDRP panel decisions (LEGO Juris A/S v. Level 5 Corp., WIPO Case No. D2008-1692; LEGO Juris A/S v. Michael Longo, WIPO Case No. D2008-1715; LEGO Juris A/S v. Reginald Hastings Jr, WIPO Case No. D2009-0680).
The dominant part of the disputed domain name comprises the word “lego”, which is identical to Complainant’s LEGO trademarks and domain names registered in numerous countries all over the world.
The addition of the suffix “dino” is not relevant and will not have any impact on the overall impression of the dominant part of the disputed domain name, LEGO, instantly recognizable as a world famous trademark.
The likelihood of confusion includes an obvious association with Complainant’s trademark. There is a considerable risk that the public will perceive the disputed domain name either as a domain name owned by Complainant or that there is some kind of commercial relation with Complainant.
By using Complainant’s trademark as a dominant part of the disputed domain name, Respondent exploits the goodwill and the image of the trademark, which may result in dilution and other damage for Complainant’s trademark.
Respondent has no registered trademarks or trade names corresponding to the disputed domain name.
Complainant has not found anything that would suggest that Respondent has been using LEGO in any other way that would give Respondent any legitimate rights.
Complainant has not given to Respondent any license or authorization of any other kind to use the LEGO trademark. Respondent is not an authorized dealer of Complainant’s products and has never had a business relationship with Complainant.
It is highly unlikely that Respondent was unaware of Complainant’s legal rights at the time of the registration of the disputed domain name. It is rather obvious that it is the trademark’s fame that motivated Respondent to register the disputed domain name. This proves that Respondent’s interests could not have been legitimate.
Respondent is not using the disputed domain name in connection with a bona fide offering of goods or services. There is no disclaimer on the website associated with the disputed domain name explaining the non-existing relationship with Complainant. Instead Respondent has intentionally chosen a domain name based on a registered trademark in order to generate traffic to an online store that sells toys. No evidence has been found that Respondent uses the name as a company name or has any other legal right in the name LEGO. Respondent is trying to sponge off Complainant’s world famous trademark.
The trademark LEGO in respect of toys belonging to Complainant has the status of a well-known and reputed trademark with a substantial and widespread reputation throughout the world. The number of third party domain name registrations comprising the trademark LEGO in combination with other words has skyrocketed in the last years; the considerable value and goodwill of the mark LEGO is most likely, a large contribution to this and also what made Respondent register the disputed domain name. It is highly unlikely that Respondent was not aware of the rights Complainant has in the trademark and the value of said trademark, at the point of the registration.
Complainant first tried to contact Respondent on June 10, 2010 through a cease and desist letter sent by email, advising Respondent that the unauthorized use of the LEGO trademark within the disputed domain name violated Complainant’s rights in said trademark. No reply was received so a reminder was sent on June 23, 2010 and a final reminder was sent on July 20, 2010. Respondent did not answer to these letters.
The disputed domain name is currently connected to an online store selling toys. Consequently, Respondent is using the disputed domain name to intentionally attempt to attract, for commercial gain, Internet users to websites, by creating a likelihood of confusion with Complainant’s mark as to the source, sponsorship, affiliation or endorsement of its websites.
By using the disputed domain name, Respondent is not making a legitimate noncommercial or fair use without intent for commercial gain but is misleadingly diverting consumers for his own commercial gain.
Respondent did not reply to Complainant’s contentions, although on October 14, 2010 Respondent filed with the Center an email communication stating that “I had the site taken down. I thought that was all I had to do”.
Respondent’s email communication of October 14, 2010 can not be deemed as an official response since it does not comply with the requirements set forth in the Rules, paragraph 5(b). Thus this Panel has decided not to take into account such email communication from Respondent2. In any event, if this Panel had taken into consideration such email communication, that would not have changed the outcome of this proceeding.
The lack of a proper response from Respondent does not automatically result in a favorable decision for Complainant3. The burden for Complainant, under paragraph 4(a) of the Policy, is to show: (i) that the disputed domain name registered by Respondent is identical or confusingly similar to a trademark or service mark in which Complainant has rights; (ii) that Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in respect of the disputed domain name; and (iii) the disputed domain name has been registered and is being used in bad faith.
Complainant has demonstrated it has rights over the LEGO trademark.
The disputed domain name entirely incorporates the LEGO trademark, adding the suffix “dino”. The addition of such word is not enough to avoid similarity, nor does it add anything to avoid confusion. Prior UDRP panel decisions support this Panel’s view (Cfr. Dr. Ing. h.c. F. Porsche AG v. Del Fabbro Laurent, WIPO Case No. D2004-0481; Nokia Corporation v. Nokiagirls.com a.k.a IBCC, WIPO Case No. D2000-0102).
Therefore, this Panel finds that the disputed domain name is confusingly similar to Complainant’s LEGO trademark.
It is undisputed that Complainant’s LEGO trademark and that Complainant’s products identified with such trademark are well-known internationally.
Complainant asserts that it has no relationship with Respondent and that it has never licensed or authorized Respondent to use the LEGO trademark or to act as reseller of Complainant’s products. Likewise, Complainant asserts that Respondent has never been known by the LEGO trademark and that Respondent's website has no affiliation or connection whatsoever with Complainant.
Respondent is using the website associated with the disputed domain name to sell toys, that is, products competing with Complainant’s. Such website does not show any disclaimer as regards Complainant thus leading consumers to believe that the website reached from the disputed domain name is a site owned by, or at least somewhat associated with, Complainant. That is not a bona fide offering of products or services. It seems that Respondent has registered the disputed domain name with the purpose of diverting Internet users from Complainant’s official website in order to attract consumers.
Based on the aforesaid, this Panel considers that Complainant has established prima facie that Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in the disputed domain name4.
In the absence of any explanation from Respondent as to why he might consider he has a right or legitimate interest in using a domain name which entirely incorporates Complainant’s LEGO trademark,, this Panel concludes that Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in the disputed domain name.
Complainant has evidenced that the LEGO trademark was registered in several jurisdictions, including the United States of America, long before Respondent registered the disputed domain name. Taking into consideration the nature of Complainant’s products and the prolonged use and exposure of the LEGO trademark, it is clear for this Panel that Respondent should have been fully aware of the existence of Complainant’s trademark and the products marketed thereunder at the time he obtained the registration of the disputed domain name.
The use of the disputed domain name for a website that is used as an online store selling toys, which are the same products identified under Complainant’s LEGO trademark, constitutes an improper use of Complainant’s trademark and is evidence of Respondent’s bad faith5. Additionally, the website used in connection with the disputed domain name contains no disclaimer disassociating Complainant from such website.
Furthermore, Respondent’s failure to reply to Complainant’s cease-and-desist letters is also indicative of bad faith (see Ebay Inc. v. Ebay4sex.com and Tony Caranci, WIPO Case No. D2000-1632).
Thus this Panel finds that Respondent has registered and used the disputed domain name to intentionally attempt to attract, for commercial gain, Internet users to Respondent’s website by creating a likelihood of confusion with Complainant’s mark as to the source, sponsorship, affiliation or endorsement of Respondent’s website or location.
In light of the above, this Panel concludes that the disputed domain name was registered and is being used in bad faith.
For all the foregoing reasons, in accordance with paragraphs 4(i) of the Policy and 15 of the Rules, this Panel orders that the domain name <legodino.net> be transferred to Complainant.
1 This Panel notes that Superbrands’ list refers to brands known in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.
2 Similar situation in World Wrestling Entertainment, Inc. v. Ki Sung, WIPO Case No. DMX2009-0005, where this Panel also declined to take into account as official response an email communication. See also EAuto, Inc. v. Available-Domain-Names.com, d/b/a Intellectual-Assets.com, Inc., WIPO Case No. D2000-0120; Crédit Industriel et Commercial S.A v. Yu Ming, WIPO Case No. D2005-0458.
3 See Berlitz Investment Corp. v. Stefan Tinculescu, WIPO Case No. D2003-0465: “[…]the panel finds that as a result of the default, Respondent has failed to rebut any of the factual assertions that are made and supported by evidence submitted by Complainant. The panel does not, however, draw any inferences from the default other than those that have been established or can fairly be inferred from the facts presented by Complainant and that, as a result of the default, have not been rebutted by any contrary assertions or evidence”.
4 See Casio Keisanki Kabushiki Kaisha (Casio Computer Co., Ltd.) v. Jongchan Kim, WIPO Case No. D2003-0400: “There is no evidence that the Complainant authorized the Respondent to register the disputed domain name or to use the CASIO trademark, with or without immaterial additions or variants. These circumstances are sufficient to constitute a prima facie showing by the Complainant of absence of rights or legitimate interest in the disputed domain name on the part of the Respondent”.
5 See Bartercard Ltd & Bartercard International Pty Ltd . v Ashton-Hall Computer Services, WIPO Case No. D2000-0177: “the Domain Name has been used to host a website offering competing products to those offered by the Complainant [...] this suggests that the Respondent registered the Domain Name with the primary intention of disrupting the business of a competitor [...] It also indicates that the Respondent has used the Domain Name to attract Internet users to its website for commercial gain by virtue of confusion with the Complainant’s mark [...] Under the Policy, both of these are sufficient to show registration and use of the Domain Name in bad faith”. See also Philip Morris Incorporated v. Alex Tsypkin, WIPO Case No. D2002-0946; and Medco Health Solutions, Inc. v. Digi Real Estate Foundation; WIPO Case No. D2005-0216.

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Alexander v. E. Tank Servs., Inc.
Adam Alexander, Appellant, v. Eastern Tank Services, Inc., Appellee.
Joe D. Byars P.A. Ltd., Fort Smith, by: Joe D. Byars, Jr., for appellant. Jones, Jackson & Moll, PLC, by: Kathryn A. Stocks, Fort Smith, for appellee.
Joe D. Byars P.A. Ltd., Fort Smith, by: Joe D. Byars, Jr., for appellant.
Jones, Jackson & Moll, PLC, by: Kathryn A. Stocks, Fort Smith, for appellee.
Appellant Adam Alexander appeals from the Sebastian County Circuit Court's July 14, 2015 order granting appellee's motion for summary judgment and denying appellant's motion for extension of time to respond, and from the circuit court's August 11, 2015 order denying appellant's motion for new trial or reconsideration. On appeal, appellant contends that (1) the circuit court erred in concluding that he failed to produce sufficient evidence to show that genuine issues of fact remain to be tried with respect to whether the discharge of his employment was motivated by discrimination in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Arkansas Civil Rights Act (ACRA), and (2) the circuit court erred in denying his request for additional time to complete discovery before ruling on appellee's motion for summary judgment. We affirm in part and reverse and remand in part.
Appellant filed his complaint against appellee Eastern Tank Services, Inc. (Eastern) on May 2, 2014. He alleged that Eastern unlawfully terminated his employment in violation of the ADA, the ACRA, and 42 U.S.C. § 2000ff (GINA). Alexander began his employment with Eastern as a dispatcher in September 2011. He alleged that he began seeing Eric Johnson, LPC, LMFT, at Vista Health in Barling, Arkansas, around August 9, 2012, for biweekly outpatient-therapy sessions. He provided a copy of a note explaining the need for his therapy to his safety manager, Paul McGehee, and Barry Zielinski with Eastern. Alexander also alleged that he had revealed to his employer that his therapist mentioned the possibility that he had Asperger's Syndrome, that he was scheduled to be tested in the future, and that he felt that he could still handle his work without any problems. Alexander stated that he subsequently overheard McGehee speaking on his cell phone stating that “we are not going to have someone with that condition working in this office.” However, he did not overhear who McGehee was speaking about. Alexander's employment was subsequently terminated on August 20, 2012, and Eastern told him that he was being “laid off.” Alexander further alleged in his complaint that he was wrongfully terminated because of his disability, because he was regarded as having a disability, or because of his genetic information in violation of the ADA, the ACRA, and GINA.
In Alexander's deposition, he explained that he was officially diagnosed with Asperger's Syndrome on May 21, 2014, after he had undergone testing.
Appellee filed an answer on May 30, 2014, and a motion for summary judgment on March 11, 2015. In its motion for summary judgment, Eastern alleged that Alexander had failed to establish a prima facie case for discrimination under the ADA or the ACRA and had failed to establish any unlawful employment practice in connection with GINA. Eastern additionally alleged that Alexander was laid off because its largest customer was reducing the number of loads, and fewer dispatchers were needed. Eastern further alleged that Alexander's alleged disability and genetic information had no impact on its decision; instead, Alexander had the least seniority except for one other dispatcher who actually occupied the position of slip seat, meaning that the employee could either dispatch or drive because he held a commercial driver's license. Eastern attached several exhibits to its motion, including depositions and affidavits. In McGehee's affidavit, he revealed that the decision to lay off Alexander was made in early August before Alexander had ever mentioned Asperger's Syndrome. The termination date of the first employee that Eastern laid off was on August 8, 2012. However, McGehee explained in his affidavit that Alexander's termination was delayed until August 20, 2012, because of other dispatchers being out sick or on vacation.
On March 17, 2015, appellant filed a motion for an extension of time to file a response, which the circuit court subsequently granted and extended his time to file a response until May 1, 2015. Appellant filed a second request for an extension of time on April 27, 2015, which the circuit court granted and extended his time to file a response until May 29, 2015. On May 29, 2015, appellant filed a partial response in opposition to the motion for summary judgment and alternatively requested the court to again grant him an extension of time to respond. In his partial response, he alleged that there were genuine issues of fact that still existed and that appellee's motion for summary judgment should be denied in its entirety. Alternatively, he requested additional time to conduct further discovery to show that any decline-in-business explanation offered by Eastern was merely pretext and to incorporate any further findings in a subsequent response, “if such be necessary.” After Eastern filed a reply, the circuit court filed an order on July 14, 2015, stating, “The Court being well-informed declares that the [summary-judgment] motion should be and is hereby GRANTED. Plaintiffs request for a second extension of time is therefore DENIED.” Although appellant filed a motion for new trial or for reconsideration, the circuit court denied this motion on August 11, 2015, without any additional findings incorporated into the order. This timely appeal followed.
Alexander alleged that his response to the motion for summary judgment was originally due on April 2, 2015.
Alexander titled his alternative request as a “REQUEST FOR SECOND EXTENSION OF TIME TO RESPOND” even though he had already received two extensions.
Appellant first contends that the circuit court erred in concluding that he failed to produce sufficient evidence to show that genuine issues of fact remain to be tried with respect to whether the discharge of his employment was motivated by discrimination in violation of the ADA and the ACRA. Summary judgment may be granted only when there are no genuine issues of material fact to be litigated. Greenlee v. J.B. Hunt Transp. Servs., 2009 Ark. 506, 342 S.W.3d 274. Once the moving party has established a prima facie entitlement to summary judgment, the opposing party must meet proof with proof and demonstrate the existence of a material issue of fact. Id. On appellate review, this court determines if summary judgment was appropriate based on whether the evidentiary items presented by the moving party in support of the motion leave a material fact unanswered. Id. We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the party against whom the motion was filed, resolving all doubts and inferences against the moving party. Id. Our review focuses not only on the pleadings, but also on the affidavits and other documents filed by the parties. Id. In the context of employment-discrimination cases, our supreme court has noted that an affidavit must contain “[m]ore than mere assertions or possibilities ... to defeat a motion for summary judgment.” Mack v. Sutter, 366 Ark. 1, 6, 233 S.W.3d 140, 145 (2006).
Appellant does not contend that the circuit court erred in granting summary judgment based on the allegation in his complaint that appellee also violated GINA by unlawfully discriminating against him based on his genetic information, and any argument as to this claim is therefore abandoned.
The ADA prohibits employers from discriminating against a disabled individual qualified for a job because of the disability of such individual. 42 U.S.C.A. § 12112(a) (Westlaw through Pub.L. No. 114–115 (excluding Pub.L. Nos. 114–94 and 114–95)). To establish a prima facie case of disability discrimination, a plaintiff must show (1) that he or she was disabled; (2) that he or she was qualified to do the essential job functions with or without reasonable accommodation; and (3) that he or she suffered an adverse action due to his or her disability. See Johnson v. Windstream Commc'ns, Inc., 2012 Ark. App. 590, 2012 WL 5327799 (Johnson I ). The ACRA provides citizens of this state legal redress for civil-rights violations of state constitutional or statutory provisions, hate offenses, and discrimination offenses, and ACRA claims are analyzed under the same principles as ADA claims. Id. However, the statutes differ in that the ADA includes within its definition of the term “disability” an individual who is “regarded as” disabled by his or her employer, 42 U.S.C. § 12102, and the ACRA does not include such language in its definition. Faulkner v. Ark. Children's Hosp., 347 Ark. 941, 954–55, 69 S.W.3d 393, 402 (2002) (refusing to extend coverage of the ACRA to include individuals who are regarded as being disabled by their employers).
Our supreme court has adopted the three-stage, burden-shifting standard set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973) in analyzing these types of employment-discrimination cases. Brodie v. City of Jonesboro, 2012 Ark. 5, 2012 WL 90016. The plaintiff bears the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination. Id. Once a prima facie case is established, a rebuttable presumption shifts the burden to the employer to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for discharging the employee. Id. If the employer articulates such a reason, the presumption disappears, and the plaintiff bears the burden of proving that the employer's proffered reason is merely a pretext for discrimination. Id.
Our supreme court has additionally made it clear that, even in summary-judgment cases, the circuit court must evaluate employment-discrimination cases using the McDonnell Douglas framework and that it must explain its findings. Brodie, supra. As in Brodie and Johnson I, we cannot conclude that the circuit court properly evaluated this case under McDonnell Douglas. There is no mention in the circuit court's order about a prima facie case of discrimination, a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the discharge, or pretext for discrimination. See Brodie, supra ; Johnson I, supra ; Johnson v. Windstream Commc'ns, Inc., 2014 Ark. App. 99, 2014 WL 580151 (Johnson II ). Accordingly, we must reverse and remand this case to the circuit court to explain its ruling on each issue. Johnson I, supra. As we further explained in Johnson II, the circuit court must use the McDonnell Douglas framework in reviewing appellee's motion for summary judgment regarding appellant's ADA and ACRA claims and include its analysis in its summary-judgment order. Implicit in these directions is the possibility that the circuit court might determine after its analysis that the claims are not appropriate for summary judgment. See Johnson II, supra.
In his second point on appeal, appellant contends that the circuit court erred in denying his request for additional time to complete discovery before ruling on appellee's motion for summary judgment. We disagree. A circuit court has broad discretion in matters pertaining to discovery, and the exercise of that discretion will not be reversed by this court absent an abuse of discretion that is prejudicial to the appealing party. Bennett v. Lonoke Bancshares, Inc., 356 Ark. 371, 155 S.W.3d 15 (2004). In order for this court to reverse the circuit court's denial of a continuance, the appellant must show that the circuit court abused its discretion and that the additional discovery would have changed the outcome of the case. Vibo Corp. v. State ex rel. McDaniel, 2011 Ark. 124, 380 S.W.3d 411. Under Arkansas Rule of Civil Procedure 56(f) (2015), the party opposing the motion for summary judgment is required to present an affidavit setting forth the problems the party is having gathering facts to support its opposition to summary judgment. See id. ; Jenkins v. Int'l Paper Co., 318 Ark. 663, 887 S.W.2d 300 (1994).
While the passage of time is not determinative, our supreme court has explained that it is a factor to be considered. Jenkins, supra. Appellant filed his complaint on May 2, 2014. Almost a year later, appellee filed its motion for summary judgment. Although appellant's response was initially due on April 2, 2015, the circuit court granted two extensions, giving appellant until May 29, 2015, to file a response. Although appellant filed a response on May 29, 2015, requesting the circuit court to deny the motion for summary judgment, appellant alternatively requested additional time to complete further discovery and incorporate any findings into a subsequent response, despite the fact that appellant had already received two extensions to file his response. Furthermore, even on appeal, appellant fails to adequately explain how he was prejudiced and instead alleges only that he “may have been able to provide ... more evidence of pretext ... or [evidence] that the reasons given for his termination were not credible.” (Emphasis added.) Therefore, under these circumstances, we cannot say that the circuit court abused its discretion, and we affirm on this point on appeal.
Kinard and Glover, JJ., agree.


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Organization performance and value promote through activities enhancing critical success factors. Research literature shows the effects of factors such as size, management style, relationships between incomes and costs, capital structure, and customer attitudes on organizational performance. This research investigates effects of size, management efficiency and capital structure on customer perception of service quality and financial performance as well as the effects of customer perception of service quality on financial performance, through three main hypotheses and some sub-hypotheses. Studied organizations consist of all banks listed in Tehran Stock Exchange in 2014. Furthermore, customer perception of service quality was evaluated by questionnaire answered by some of the bank customers. Structure equation modeling based on variance approach and Smart PLS software were used for testing research conceptual framework. Findings show that capital structure, size, and management efficiency are effective on customer perception of service quality and financial performance. Furthermore, there is a significant relation between customer perception of service quality and financial performance. Positive relation between size and customer perception of service quality for providing more facilities in larger banks, positive effects of capital structure from agency theory and trade off theory perspectives and also, effect of management efficiency on customer perception of management efficiency effects on productivity promotion and customer satisfaction have been analyzed and explained.
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