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These terms and conditions contain the only conditions applicable to the P & T – Paper & Tea GmbH (HRB 139849B) (hereinafter: P & T) for the ordering of goods from the online store “P & T” that need not be by written agreements between the Purchaser and P & T be changed. Terms not otherwise be part of the contract without the express objection of P & T itself in the event of delivery.
2.1. The items offered in the online shop are not legal binding purchase offer but an invitation to submit tender offers by the buyer, dar.
2.2. By clicking the “Terms” at the end of the ordering process, the customer makes a binding offer to purchase pursuant to § 145 BGB. In case of acceptance of this offer P & T sent an order confirmation by e-mail to the purchaser of the e-mail address.
3.1. All prices on the website include VAT.
3.2. Shipping costs are in addition to carry to the prices of the buyer and may be accessed via a link on the website by the customer. You will also be clearly identified before making the binding order.
4.1. Delivery dates and times are only binding if they are confirmed in writing by P & T.
4.2. Delivery dates can only be met if the buyer has complied with his obligations (eg timely performance of the purchase price). In case of subsequent changes and additions wishes of the buyer, the delivery time will be extended. The delivery deadline is met if, before its expiration shipped the goods or the goods are ready to be provided to buyers.
4.3. As far as P & T provides non-delivery of the goods or non-conforming, the buyer P & T has set a grace period for effecting the performance. Otherwise, the buyer is not entitled to rescind the contract.
4.4. Even with agreed deadlines and dates can not be held due to force majeure, P & T Delivery and service delays. Force majeure war, riot, act of God, action in the context of labor disputes, strikes or lockouts, raw material or energy shortages and unavoidable operating or transport interruptions such as power failure, fire, water ingress or transport debilitating weather conditions apply. This applies even if the above conditions occur at the upstream of P & T, or P & T will not even supply the fault despite appropriate contracts that would have covered the created by the agreement with the buyer needs. In this case, P & T is entitled to postpone the delivery or performance by the duration of the hindrance plus a reasonable start-up period or to withdraw from the contract not yet fulfilled completely or partially.
4.5. P & T is entitled to make partial deliveries, unless this is unreasonable for the buyer. A withdrawal by the buyer from the contract because of partial delay or partial impossibility is only permitted if the partial performance for the buyer is demonstrably without interest.
5.1. The buyer has the option to make payment by credit card, Paypal and instant transfer.
PayPal is an online payment service PayPal (Europe) S.à rl & Cie., S.C.A. The use of advance requires that the buyer has a customer account at PayPal, in which his bank or credit card details are stored. If the buyer has selected the payment method “PayPal”, it is forwarded to PayPal after ordering. There, the buyer logs in with his email address and password given by him to his PayPal account and confirm the payment. The buyer will receive a payment confirmation from PayPal via email. PayPal debits the account with the appropriate purchase price and transfers it to the seller’s account by P & T. For more information, visit www.paypal.de.
The goods until full payment is owned by P & T. If the buyer is paying more than 10 days in arrears, P & T has the right to rescind the contract and recover the goods.
The buyer has a right of withdrawal. With regard to the requirements and legal consequences of withdrawal referred to in Annex Conditions.
8.1. Unless the goods are defective, the buyer is entitled under the statutory regulations to demand supplementary performance, withdraw from the contract or reduce the purchase price.
8.2. The limitation period of warranty for the goods provided is in legal transactions with consumers two years from receipt of the goods. Compared to shoppers who are not consumers, the limitation period for warranty claims is one year.
8.3. For transactions with merchants, the buyer must examine the shipment immediately upon arrival transport and other damage and make us of any damage or loss immediately by written notification stating the exact facts of communication. The provision of § 377 HGB shall additionally apply. In this case, the defective items delivered are in the state in which they reside at the time of discovery of the defect to keep available for inspection by us.
8.4. A return of goods has – if the buyer is a company or legal person of public law – be made free house. For checking unfair or incomplete return of faulty goods, P & T can be a processing fee of 50.00 EUR (incl. VAT.) Collect or specific bill. A processing fee is waived if the sale and delivery of the goods by P & T are not passed since six months. The compilation of the processing fee is the buyer of the rebuttal subject that is actually a lower damage.
8.5. If the delivered goods are defective or becomes defective within the agreed warranty period by manufacturing or material defects, P & T provides for buyers who are not consumers, at its option replace or repair works. Are regular buyers who are not consumers, at least two attempts reasonable.
8.6. If the repair or replacement after a reasonable period fails, the purchaser can demand either a reduction in payment or cancellation of the contract by the statutory requirements.
8.7. While performing a repair of the expiry of the limitation period is suspended.
8.8. Guarantees are only if descriptions of the goods have been expressly designated as a guarantee in writing.
9.1. P & T is fully liable for damages resulting from injury to life, body or health, based on a negligent breach of duty on his part, as well as damages based on an intentional or grossly negligent breach of duty by the P & T.
9.2. In the event of slight negligence, P & T is liable only if it has breached a contractual obligation (cardinal obligation). Breach of a contractual duty P & T is only liable for foreseeable harm. With essential contractual obligations (cardinal obligations) are such contractual obligations the fulfillment of which allows the execution of the contract and on which the buyer relies and may rely. Typical, foreseeable damages are those which fall under the protection of the purpose of each injured contractual standard.
9.3. The liability rules also apply to vicarious agents of P & T. The liability under the product liability law remains unaffected.
9.4. Data communication over the Internet can not be guaranteed error free and / or available at any time after the current level of technology. P & T is not liable, in the continuous and uninterrupted availability of our online shop.
P & T offers a free newsletter service. In this newsletter we provide our subscribers with contemporary and historical tea topics, best brewing practices, updates on latest product releases and special sales. Optional customer surveys help us improve this service, making sure our customers are the first to know about new products or services, and only receive the information relevant to them.
In order to subscribe to our newsletter, either check the box “Sign up for our newsletter” during check-out, or submit and confirm your email address in the sign-up box on the P & T website.
Subscribing to the newsletter is only possible via “double-opt-in.” This means newsletter subscriptions are only valid after confirming an opt-in e-mail that will be sent to your e-mail address.
Every newsletter e-mail contains information on how to unsubscribe.
10.1. It is only the law of the Federal Republic of Germany. The United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (UNCISG) dated 11.04.1980, the Uniform Sales Act (ECG) and the Uniform Law degree purchase (EKAG) do not apply.
10.2. Place of performance and exclusive place of jurisdiction for all disputes arising from contracts with companies and legal persons of public law to which these terms and conditions are based is, is Berlin.
(1) The funds available for the contract languages are German and English.
(2) The contract will not necessarily stored by us and may not necessarily be called upon completion of the order process. You can print immediately after sending the order data, however.
(3) The essential characteristics of the products offered by us and the validity limited offers to the individual product in our online store found.
(4) The presentation of our goods is a non binding offer dar. Only the order of goods by you is a binding offer according to § 145 BGB. In case of acceptance of this offer we will send you an order confirmation via email. Thus, the purchase agreement is concluded between you and us.
(5) Any input error when placing your order, you can identify and correct using the delete and change function before sending the order at any time at the final confirmation before checkout.
(6) If the goods you have ordered are not available, we reserve the right not to provide the service.
(7) The purchase price is payable with the order. The payment of goods is at your choice by credit card, PayPal or online bank transfer.
In case of an effective withdrawal, the mutually received benefits are to be returned and any benefits (eg interest) surrendered. Can you give us the performance received and benefits (eg benefits of use) or in part, or only restitute it in a deteriorated condition, you must pay us compensation for the value. For the deterioration and derived benefits, you must pay compensation only if the uses or the deterioration is due to a deal with the matter, beyond the consideration of the characteristics and functioning. By “testing the properties and functioning” refers to the testing and trying out the goods, as it is possible and customary in a retail store. Transportable items are to be returned at our cost and risk. Not parcel things do you pick. Obligations to reimburse payments must be fulfilled within 30 days. The period begins for you when you send your cancellation or the goods, for us with their reception.
P & T does not take liability that the information provided on www.paperandtea.com is complete, accurate and always current. This applies also to all links cited on this website, either directly or indirectly.
P & T is not responsible for the contents of websites which are pointed out, directly or indirectly. The responsibility of persecution by criminal or civil law lies with the provider.
Ab dem 25. Mai 2018 gelten europaweit die Vorgaben der EU-Datenschutz-Grundverordnung (im Folgenden: DSGVO). Bitte lies Dir unsere Datenschutzbestimmungen aufmerksam durch. Solltest Du Fragen oder Anmerkungen zu unseren Datenschutzbestimmungen haben, so kannst Du Dich jederzeit an die unten angegebene E-Mail-Adresse wenden.
Die folgenden Datenschutzhinweise informieren Dich über Art und Umfang der Verarbeitung sogenannter personenbezogener Daten durch die P & T Paper & Tea GmbH (nachfolgend „P & T, „wir“, „uns“ oder “unser” genannt). Personenbezogene Daten sind Informationen, die Deiner Person direkt oder mittelbar zuzuordnen sind bzw. zugeordnet werden können. Die Nutzung unserer Webseiten www.paperandtea.com, www.paperandtea.de und allen zugehörigen Seiten, Anwendungen und Diensten (gemeinsam als „Webseiten“ bezeichnet) unterliegen diesen Datenschutzbestimmungen. Bei Erstellung eines Kundenkontos bzw. bei Bestandskunden oder bei der Bestellung als Gast durch eine entsprechende Erklärung stimmst Du diesen Datenschutzbestimmungen zu und willigst ausdrücklich in die Verarbeitung, Verwendung und Offenlegung Deiner personenbezogenen Daten in der hier beschriebenen Art und Weise ein.
Zum Zwecke der Vertragsabwicklung bzw. zur Vorbereitung des Vertrages werden alle für die Durchführung eines Kaufvertrages mit P & T erforderlichen Daten verarbeitet. Sind auch externe Dienstleister in die Abwicklung des Vertrages eingebunden, z.B. Bezahldienstleister, Versanddienstleister, Optimierungsdienste, Hoster, etc. werden Deine Daten in dem jeweils erforderlichen Umfang an diese weitergegeben.
Mit Aufruf unserer Webseiten werden verschiedene Informationen zwischen Deinem Endgerät und unserem Server bzw. dem Server der von uns eingesetzten Dienste ausgetauscht. Hierbei kann es sich auch um personenbezogene Daten handeln. Die so erhobenen Informationen werden u.a. dazu genutzt, unsere Webseiten weiter zu optimieren.
Den Vorgaben der DSGVO entsprechend hast Du unterschiedliche Rechte, die Du uns gegenüber geltend machen kannst. Hierzu zählt u.a. das Recht, Widerspruch gegen ausgewählte Datenverarbeitungen, insbesondere Datenverarbeitungen zu Werbezwecken, einlegen zu können. Die Möglichkeit zum Widerspruch ist jeweils drucktechnisch hervorgehoben, damit dieser leichter aufzufinden ist. Weitere Informationen zu Deinen Rechten findest du weiter unten in einem extra Paragraphen und zusätzlich bei den einzelnen Beschreibungen der jeweiligen Datenverarbeitung. Wir verarbeiten personenbezogene Daten grundsätzlich nur nach Maßgabe der jeweils geltenden gesetzlichen Speicher- und Aufbewahrungspflichten oder bis zum jeweiligen Zweckfortfall.
Wir haben uns aufgrund des Jugend- und Datenschutzes dazu entschieden, dass unser Angebot nur Personen zur Verfügung stehen soll, die das sechzehnte Lebensjahr bereits vollendet haben. Solltest Du dieses Mindestalter noch nicht erreicht haben, so kannst Du unsere Angebote nur dann nutzen, sofern und soweit Deine Eltern hierin ausdrücklich eingewilligt haben und Du uns diese Einwilligung hinreichend nachgewiesen hast.
Diese Datenschutzbestimmungen gelten für die Datenverarbeitung durch die oben genannten Webseiten. Unser betrieblicher Datenschutzbeauftragte ist unter der Anschrift: P & T Paper & Tea GmbH, Abteilung Datenschutz, Bleibtreustr. 4, 10623 Berlin bzw. unter datenschutz@paperandtea.com erreichbar.
ggf. der Name Deines Internet-Anbieters.
Die Daten werden entsprechend der gesetzlichen Aufbewahrungsfristen gespeichert und danach automatisch gelöscht. Des Weiteren verwenden wir für unser Angebot sogenannte Cookies, Tracking-Tools, Targeting-Verfahren sowie Schnittstellen zu anderen Diensten, bspw. zu Social-Media-Plattformen, Zahlungsdiensten oder CRM-Systemen. Um welche Verfahren es sich dabei genau handelt und wie Deine Daten dafür verwendet werden, wird nachfolgend unter Ziffer 4. genauer erläutert.
Zur Vertragserfüllung und vor allem zum Zweck der Zahlungsabwicklung geben wir auf Grundlage von Artikel 6 Abs. 1 lit. b) DSGVO die Transaktionsdaten wie bspw.
an den von Dir gewählten Paymentdienstleister weiter (bspw. Paypal, Adyen, Kreditkarteninstitut, usw.). Die Übermittlung ist erforderlich, da wir die Bestellung sonst nicht bearbeiten können. Die Daten werden ausschließlich für die Durchführung und Realisierung der Zahlungsabwicklung verwendet und sicher über das „SSL“ Verschlüsselungsverfahren übermittelt. Die von uns angebotenen Dienstleister sind nach PCI DSS zertifiziert. Diese transferieren, verarbeiten und speichern gegebenenfalls personenbezogene Daten außerhalb der EU. Zu näheren Informationen prüfe bitte die Datenschutzbestimmungen Deines Dienstleisters.
Soweit Du ein Kundenkonto eröffnet hast, führen wir Dich als Bestandskunden. In diesem Fall verarbeiten wir Deine Kontaktdaten um Dir auf diesem Wege gelegentliche Informationen, bspw. über neue Produkte, Sonderaktionen, erweiterte oder verbesserte Funktionen, usw. zukommen zu lassen.
Damit Du nur solche Informationen erhältst, die für Dich von vermeintlichem Interesse sind, kategorisieren und ergänzen wir Dein Kundenprofil um weitere Informationen. Verwendet werden hierfür sowohl statistische Informationen als auch Informationen zu Deiner Person (z.B. Stammdaten oder Basisdaten Deines Kundenprofils). Ziel ist es, unser Angebot entsprechend Deiner tatsächlichen oder vermeintlichen persönlichen Interessen und/oder Bedürfnissen bzw. hinsichtlich deiner Tee- Vorlieben zu optimieren und Dir entsprechende Empfehlungen und Informationen zur Verfügung zu stellen und Dich über Neuigkeiten und sonstige Ereignisse zu informieren. So können wir sicherstellen, Dich nicht mit unnützen Anpreisungen zu belästigen.
Rechtsgrundlage für die vorgenannten Verarbeitungen ist jeweils Art. 6 Abs. 1 lit. f) DSGVO bzw. § 7 Abs. 3 UWG. Die so erfolgende Verarbeitung von Bestandskundendaten zu eigenen Werbezwecken ist nach Erwägungsgrund 47 zur DSGVO als ein anerkanntes berechtigtes Interesse anzusehen. Du kannst dieser Verarbeitung jederzeit mit Wirkung für die Zukunft widersprechen. Hierfür genügt das Anklicken des Abmelde-Buttons in der jeweiligen E-Mail oder ein kurzer Hinweis per E-Mail. Hierfür verwende bitte die Kontaktmöglichkeiten unseres betrieblichen Datenschutzbeauftragten.
um Deine Anfrage zu bearbeiten. Rechtsgrundlage hierfür ist Art. 6 Abs. 1 lit. b) DSGVO. Diese Verarbeitung ist erforderlich, um Deinem Anliegen nachzukommen. Die Daten können in einem CRM-System, z.B. Zendesk (s.o.), gespeichert werden. Wir löschen die Anfragen, sofern deren Speicherung nicht mehr erforderlich ist. Du kannst dieser Verarbeitung jederzeit mit Wirkung für die Zukunft widersprechen. Hierfür genügt ein kurzer Hinweis per E-Mail. Für die Ausübung des Widerspruchs verwende bitte die Kontaktmöglichkeiten unseres betrieblichen Datenschutzbeauftragten.
Gegen die Datenverarbeitung zu vorgenannten Zwecken kannst Du Dich jederzeit kostenfrei, für den jeweiligen Kommunikationskanal gesondert und mit Wirkung für die Zukunft Widerspruch einlegen. Hierfür genügt eine E-Mail oder ein postalisches Schreiben an die unter 1. genannten Kontaktdaten.
Soweit Du Widerspruch einlegst werden wir die betroffene Kontaktadresse für die weitere werbliche Datenverarbeitung sperren. Wir werden Deinen Widerspruch so schnell wie möglich bearbeiten und die entsprechenden Sperrmaßnahmen unverzüglich nach der Prüfung umsetzen. Wir weisen darauf hin, dass es in Ausnahmefällen auch noch nach Eingang Deines Widerspruchs zu einem Versand entsprechender Informationen oder Produktempfehlungen kommen kann. Dies ist dann ausschließlich technisch bedingt und bedeutet nicht, dass wir deinen Widerspruch nicht umsetzen. Vielen Dank für Dein Verständnis.
Rechtsgrundlage hierfür ist Art. 6 Abs. 1 lit. a), lit. b) DSGVO. Soweit wir Deine Kontaktdaten nicht zum Kundensupport oder zur Kundenpflege nutzen (siehe hierzu ausführlich unter 3.3.) speichern wir die für die Vertragsabwicklung erhobenen Daten bis zum Zweckfortfall bzw. bis zum Ablauf möglicher vertraglicher Widerrufs-, Gewährleistungs- und Garantierechte. Nach Ablauf dieser Frist bewahren wir die nach gesetzlicher Maßgabe erforderlichen personenbezogenen Daten für die gesetzlich bestimmten Zeiträume auf. Für diesen Zeitraum (regelmäßig sechs bis zehn Jahre ab Vertragsschluss) werden die Daten allein für den Fall einer Überprüfung durch die Finanzverwaltung erneut verarbeitet.
Wir setzen auf unserer Website auf Grundlage des Art. 6 Abs. 1 lit. f) DSGVO sogenannte Cookies ein. Unser Interesse, unsere Angebote zu optimieren, ist dabei als berechtigt im Sinne der vorgenannten Vorschrift anzusehen. Bei Cookies handelt es sich um kleine Dateien, die Dein Browser automatisch erstellt und die auf Deinem Endgerät (Laptop, Tablet, Smartphone o.ä.) gespeichert werden, wenn Du unsere Angebote nutzt. Cookies richten auf Deinem Endgerät keinen Schaden an, enthalten keine Viren, Trojaner oder sonstige Schadsoftware. In dem Cookie werden Informationen abgelegt, die sich jeweils im Zusammenhang mit dem spezifisch eingesetzten Endgerät ergeben. Dies bedeutet jedoch nicht, dass wir dadurch unmittelbar Kenntnis von Deiner Identität erhalten. Der Einsatz von Cookies dient einerseits dazu, die Nutzung unseres Angebots für Dich angenehmer zu gestalten. So setzen wir sogenannte Session-Cookies ein, um zu erkennen, dass Du einzelne Seiten unserer Website bereits besucht hast oder Du Dich bereits mit Deinem Kundenkonto angemeldet hast. Nutzt Du unser Angebot zu einem späteren Zeitpunkt erneut, so wird mittels des Cookies automatisch erkannt, dass Du bereits bei uns warst und welche Eingaben und Einstellungen Du getätigt hast, um diese nicht noch einmal eingeben zu müssen. Darüber hinaus setzen wir ebenfalls zum Zweck der Benutzerfreundlichkeit temporäre Cookies ein, die für einen bestimmten festgelegten Zeitraum auf Deinem Endgerät gespeichert werden. Diese werden nach Verlassen unseres Angebots automatisch gelöscht.
Zum anderen setzen wir Cookies ein, um die Nutzung unserer Angebote statistisch zu erfassen und zum Zwecke der Optimierung für Dich auszuwerten sowie um speziell auf Dich zugeschnittene Informationen einzublenden. Diese Cookies ermöglichen es uns, bei einem erneuten Besuch unserer Seite automatisch zu erkennen, dass Du bereits bei uns warst. Diese Cookies werden nach einer jeweils definierten Zeit automatisch gelöscht. Die meisten Browser akzeptieren Cookies automatisch. Du kannst Deinen Browser jedoch so konfigurieren, dass keine Cookies auf Deinem Computer gespeichert werden oder stets ein Hinweis erscheint, bevor ein neues Cookie angelegt wird. Außerdem kannst hierzu Du die gesammelte Opt-Out-Option der Network Advertising Initiative nutzen. Die vollständige Deaktivierung von Cookies kann jedoch dazu führen, dass Dir nicht alle Funktionen unserer Angebote zur Verfügung stehen. Die Speicherdauer der Cookies ist abhängig von ihrem Verwendungszweck und nicht für alle gleich.
Mit dem Google Tag Manager verwalten wir Website-Tags (Website-Code). Diese erleichtern uns die Verwaltung und Weiterentwicklung unseres Angebots und verkürzen Deine Ladezeit. Der Google Tag Manager implementiert lediglich Website-Code. Der Google Tag Manager setzt also selbst keine Cookies und erfasst keine personenbezogenen Daten. Das Tool integriert lediglich an anderer Stelle von uns abgelegten Website-Code, über den ggf. Daten erfasst werden. Das Tool dient damit nur der erleichterten Aussteuerung des jeweiligen Codes, greift aber selbst nicht auf die durch den Code verarbeiteten Daten zu. Über alle so integrierten Tags informieren wir Dich in dieser Datenschutzbestimmung. Weitere Informationen zum Google Tag Manager sowie die Nutzungsrichtlinien findest Du auf den Seiten von Google.
Die so erfassten Daten sind für uns anonym und bieten uns also keine Rückschlüsse auf die Identität des jeweiligen Nutzers. Die so erfolgende Verarbeitung zu verhaltens- und interessenbasierten Werbezwecken ist nach Erwägungsgrund 47 zur DSGVO als unser anerkanntes berechtigtes Interesse anzusehen. Die Daten werden entsprechend der gesetzlichen Aufbewahrungsfristen gespeichert und danach automatisch gelöscht.
Loggst Du Dich nach Platzierung des Pixels in Dein Facebookkonto ein oder besuchst Du unsere Webseite im eingeloggten Zustand, so ist es möglich, dass diese Daten von Facebook gespeichert und verarbeitet werden, worüber wir Dich hiermit unterrichten möchten. Facebook kann diese Daten mit Deinem Facebookkonto verbinden und auch für eigene Werbezwecke, entsprechend Facebooks Datenverwendungsrichtlinie, verwenden: https://www.facebook.com/about/privacy/. Weitere Informationen zum Facebook Pixel findest Du hier. Du kannst Facebook sowie dessen Partnern das Schalten von Werbeanzeigen auf und außerhalb von Facebook ermöglichen. Du kannst dieser speziellen Datenverarbeitung jederzeit widersprechen, indem Du entweder Deine Facebook-Einstellungen entsprechend änderst oder indem Du uns einfach darüber informierst, dass Du eine entsprechende Verarbeitung in Zukunft nicht mehr wünscht. Hierfür verwende bitte die Kontaktmöglichkeiten unseres betrieblichen Datenschutzbeauftragten. Bitte sei Dir bewusst, dass der erklärte Widerspruch nur für das jeweils verwendete Gerät gilt. Weitere Informationen entnimmst Du bitte Facebooks Datenschutzbestimmungen und Informationen zum Schutz Deiner Privatsphäre.
Diese Verarbeitung zu verhaltens- und interessenbasierten Werbezwecken ist nach Erwägungsgrund 47 zur DSGVO als unser anerkanntes berechtigtes Interesse anzusehen. Für den Fall, dass Du zur Facebook-Look-Alike-Audience zählst, übermitteln wir Deine E-Mail-Adresse und Deine Geräte-ID an Facebook. Du kannst dieser speziellen Datenverarbeitung jederzeit widersprechen, indem Du entweder Deine Facebook-Einstellungen änderst: https://www.facebook.com/settings/?tab=ads oder uns darüber informierst, dass Du diese Verarbeitung in Zukunft nicht mehr wünschst. Hierfür verwende bitte die Kontaktmöglichkeiten unseres betrieblichen Datenschutzbeauftragten.
werden an einen Server von Google in den USA übertragen und dort gespeichert. Diese Cookies verlieren nach 30 Tagen ihre Gültigkeit, enthalten keine personenbezogenen Daten und dienen somit nicht der persönlichen Identifizierung. Wenn Sie bestimmte Internetseiten unserer Website besuchen und das Cookie noch nicht abgelaufen ist, können Google und wir erkennen, dass Sie auf die Anzeige geklickt haben und zu dieser Seite weitergeleitet wurden. Jeder Google AdWords-Kunde erhält ein anderes Cookie. Somit besteht keine Möglichkeit, dass Cookies über die Websites von AdWords-Kunden nachverfolgt werden können. Die Informationen, die mithilfe des Cookies eingeholt werden, dienen dazu, Conversion-Statistiken für uns als AdWords-Kunden zu erstellen. Hierbei erfahren wir die Gesamtanzahl der Nutzer, die auf unsere Anzeige geklickt haben und zu einer mit einem Conversion-Tracking-Tag versehenen Seite weitergeleitet wurden. Wir erhalten jedoch keine Informationen, mit denen sich Nutzer persönlich identifizieren lassen. Diese Verarbeitung zu verhaltens- und interessenbasierten Werbezwecken ist nach Erwägungsgrund 47 zur DSGVO als unser anerkanntes berechtigtes Interesse anzusehen.
Sie können diese Verarbeitung bereits im Vorfeld verhindern, indem Sie die Installation der Cookies durch eine entsprechende Browser-Einstellung Ihres Browsers generell verhindern (Deaktivierungsmöglichkeit) oder diesen so einstellen, dass Cookies von der Domain „googleadservices.com. Der Verarbeitung können Sie außerdem widersprechen, indem Sie Schieberegler in den Google-Einstellungen auf „Aus“ schalten.
Wir verwenden auf Grundlage des Art. 6 Abs. 1 lit. f) DSGVO das Remarketing- oder „Ähnliche Zielgruppen“-Tool der Google Inc., 1600 Amphitheatre Parkway, Mountain View, CA 94043, USA (nachfolgend: „Google“). Diese Funktion dient dem Zweck der Analyse des Besucherverhaltens und der Besucherinteressen. Zur Durchführung der Analyse der Webseiten-Nutzung, welche die Grundlage für die Erstellung der interessenbezogenen Werbeanzeigen bildet, setzt Google Cookies ein. Über die Cookies werden die Besuche der Webseite sowie anonymisierte Daten über die Nutzung der Website erfasst. Es erfolgt keine Speicherung von personenbezogenen Daten der Besucher der Webseite. Besuchen Sie nachfolgend eine andere Webseite im Google Werbenetzwerk, so können Ihnen Werbeeinblendungen angezeigt werden, die mit hoher Wahrscheinlichkeit zuvor aufgerufene Produkt- und Informationsbereiche berücksichtigen und diesen unter Umständen ähneln.
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Wie oben dargestellt, können Daten auch an Empfänger mit Sitz außerhalb der Europäischen Union oder des Europäischen Wirtschaftsraumes übermittelt werden. Dies gilt insbesondere für die genannten Verarbeitungen an Analyse- bzw. Targetingtechnologien, die eine Datenübermittlung an die Server der Diensteanbieter bewirken können. Andere Empfänger können angeschlossene Dienstleister sein, die wir zur Bereitstellung unserer Dienste benötigen, z.B. Hoster, CRM-Tools, Analysedienstleister. Diese Server können sich außerhalb der EU, insbesondere in den USA befinden. Wir achten strengstens darauf, dass diese Dienstleister Datenschutzstandards gewährleisten, die denen der DSGVO gleichwertig sind und dass die geltenden Richtlinien eingehalten werden. So arbeiten wir nur mit solchen Dienstleistern zusammen, die nach dem sog. EU-US Privacy Shield zertifiziert sind. Für diese Zertifizierung hat die EU-Kommission unter dem Aktenzeichen C/2016/4176 die Angemessenheit des Datenschutzniveaus nach Maßgabe von Art. 45 DSGVO festgestellt. Der Einsatz dieser zertifizierten Dienstleister erfüllt somit die europäischen Standards für eine gesetzeskonforme Datenverarbeitung. Zusätzlich haben wir uns von allen im EU-Ausland ansässigen Dienstleistern geeignete vertragliche Garantien einräumen lassen, die die Einhaltung dieser EU-Standards und die Durchsetzung der Betroffenenrechte gewährleistet, bspw. auf Grundlage sogenannter Standardvertragsklauseln der EU-Kommission.
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Art. 6


It is well established that courts in United States will refrain from examining the validity of acts of foreign governments where those acts take effect within the territory of the foreign State. This rule, commonly known as the Act of State doctrine, has been stated and discussed by the U.S. Supreme Court in various cases. The Act of State doctrine says that a nation is sovereign within its own borders, and its domestic actions may not be questioned in the courts of another nation. The doctrine is not required by international law, but it is a principle recognized and adhered to by United States federal courts. Its aim is not to protect other nations’ sovereignty by intervention from the U.S., but rather to protect the US Executives’ prerogatives in foreign affairs from being frustrated by a decision issued by U.S. Courts.
In deciding whether or not to apply the Act of State doctrine, and thus, grant immunity from inquiry to an act, a court must first of all consider whether the act in question is an “Act of State”. The Act of State doctrine is applied to those acts carried out by a governmental official or body. There are two qualities for act of State. Firstly, the act must be that of a governmental body or of a body having governmental powers and must be carried out in the exercise of such governmental or sovereign powers. Secondly, the act in question must be a formal act or evidenced by formal action such as legislation or an executive order.
The acts of State officials will amount to an act of State where the official is acting in the exercise of his official functions. In deciding whether acts of officials are acts of State, the courts consider whether the official was acting in his public capacity. Likewise, when the official is acting for his own private benefit rather than for the benefit of the State, then such acts will not benefit from the application of the act of State doctrine.
The decision in Underhill v. Hernandez strongly indicates that the doctrine had its origins in notions of sovereign equality and was based on the view that international law imposed limits on the ability of States to exercise jurisdiction over other States.
The leading Supreme Court decision on the Act of State doctrine came in 1964 in Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino. The case arose when Cuba nationalized its sugar industry, taking control of sugar refineries and other companies in the wake of the Cuban revolution. The case involved a claim by Cuba for the purchase price of a cargo of sugar which had been expropriated by the Cuban government, and then, sold to a US commodity broker (Farr, Whitlock & Co.). In addition to the Cuban claim, Farr was faced with a claim from the receivers of the original owner (Sabbatino) who argued that the Cuban expropriation was contrary to international law. Both the District Court and the Court of Appeals found for Sabbatino, holding that the Act of State doctrine was inapplicable where the relevant foreign act was in violation of international law. However, the Supreme Court reversed this decision. Justice Harlan applied the Act of State doctrine and held that US courts could not question the validity of the Cuban expropriations even if the plaintiff alleged a violation of international law.
Although the Sabbatino decision was reached by a nearly unanimous Supreme Court, confusion arose which presently surrounds the doctrine. Congress expressed its displeasure about the decision by enacting legislation 22 U.S.C. § 2370 – the Second Hickenlooper Amendment. This legislation requires US courts not to refuse on act of State grounds “to make a determination on the merits giving effect to the principles of international law” in cases involving claims to property expropriated by foreign States after 1958.
There are three principal theories to justify the application of the Act of State doctrine. Two of these theories, the “international law” and “territorial choice of law” theories, are theories of external deference which gained approval in the early Supreme Court cases establishing the doctrine. However, the third, the “separation of powers” theory is based on the theory of internal deference.
In the early act of State cases, the courts were of the clear view that the Act of State doctrine was required by the universal comity of nations and the established rules of international law. In the opinion of the court, relief for wrongs committed abroad was to be sought either in the courts of the country where the wrong was committed or through international (i.e. diplomatic) means.
It has been argued that the early act of State cases utilised the Act of State doctrine as an aspect of the territorial choice of law principle. This is the principle that the validity of an act is to be determined by the law of the territory where the act took place. Thus, acts of the sovereign, or acts of state, done within the sovereign’s own territory, are legally valid everywhere.
When applying the balancing test to determine applicability of the Act of State doctrine, the party asserting the applicability of the doctrine bears the burden of proof. The party is required to offer some evidence that the government acted in its sovereign capacity and some indication of the depth and nature of the government’s interest. Although precedent is not very much clear about the parameters of the official acts limitation, the Supreme Court has distinguished between public and governmental acts of sovereign states on the one hand and their private and commercial acts on the other. When the facts presented are not sufficient to demonstrate that the conduct in question was the public act of those with authority to exercise sovereign powers, the court should not presume that the conduct at issue was an official act of the foreign sovereign.
Both the Act of State and the Sovereign Immunity doctrines are judicially created to effectuate general notions of comity among nations and among the respective branches of the Federal Government. Unlike a claim of sovereign immunity, which merely raises a jurisdictional defense, the Act of State doctrine provides foreign states with a substantive defense on the merits. Under the Act of State doctrine, the courts of one State will not question the validity of public acts performed by other sovereigns within their own borders, even when such courts have jurisdiction over a controversy in which one of the litigants has standing to challenge those acts. The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, in no way, affects application of the Act of State doctrine.
In certain instances, the State Department may indicate, by letter to the Court, that U.S.’ interests favor or disfavor application of the Act of State doctrine to a particular case or issue affecting a group of cases. The use and effect of such letters are sometimes referred to as the Bernstein and reverse-Bernstein exceptions; the former involving a letter indicating that the doctrine should not apply and the latter involving a statement that, in the view of the State Department, courts should presume that the doctrine does not apply to certain categories of cases unless the State Department affirmatively says so.
There is also a commercial activity exception to the Act of State doctrine. The state of the law concerning this exception varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. The Act of State doctrine does not cover private and commercial acts of sovereign states. It is necessary to balance a judiciary’s interest in hearing a case involving a commercial activity with its desire to avoid matters of foreign affairs controlled by the executive or legislative branches.
In Sabbatino, the Supreme Court held that the Act of State doctrine barred U.S. courts from holding invalid an official act of expropriation by a sovereign state within the sovereign’s own territory. In response, Congress passed the so-called “Hickenlooper Amendment,” 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(2), which generally provides that the Act of State doctrine shall not apply to claims concerning alleged expropriations in violation of international law, “including principles of compensation.” However the Hickenlooper Amendment can be overcome by executive-branch intervention.
2. Section 15 of the Arbitration Act Under this section passed in 1988, enforcement of arbitral agreements, confirmation of arbitral awards, and execution upon judgements based on order confirming such awards shall not be refused on the basis of the Act of State doctrine.
In 1996 Congress passed the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act [the Helms Burton Act] with a view to further tightening sanctions against Cuba. Under, 22 USCS § 6082 states that anyone who traffics in property confiscated by the Cuban government after January 1, 1959 is liable in US courts for damages to former owners of the property resident in the US. Trafficking is defined as including, knowingly and intentionally selling, transferring, distributing, managing, purchasing, leasing, receiving, possessing and using confiscated property. The Act further states that “No court of the United States shall decline, based upon the act of state doctrine, to make a determination on the merits in an action brought under paragraph (1).” 22 USCS § 6082(6).
According to Supreme Court’s decision in Sabbatino, application of the Act of State doctrine is dependent on whether the courts perceive the judicial action would interfere in the conduct of foreign relations. This has led courts to believe that they can pick and choose the factors to be taken into consideration in determining whether or not they should adjudicate on the validity of a foreign governmental act. As a result the courts have suggested various factors, limitations and exceptions to be taken into account in making this assessment. The history of the Act of State doctrine and many of its established features suggest the doctrine is better explained by international law considerations. The doctrine represents deference to the superior exercise of jurisdiction by the territorial State and prevents the U.S. from unlawfully extending its jurisdiction to situations and acts authoritatively determined by the territorial State. As such, the doctrine represents an acknowledgment that the US does not possess the legal competence to reverse the acts of foreign sovereigns carried out abroad. The doctrine therefore recognises the co-equal status of foreign States and prevents an unwarranted intervention into the affairs of those States.


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188 Herrick v. Malin, 22 Wend. (N. Y.) 388; Waring v. Smyth, 2 Barb. Ch, (N. Y.) 133; Johnson v. Moore, 33 Kan. 90, 5 Pac. 406.
199 Hatch v. Hatch. 9 Mass. 307.
200 Herriek v. Malin, 22 Wend. (N. Y.) 388; Holton v. Kemp, 81 Mo. 661; Van Horn v. Bell, 11 Iowa, 465.
201 Montag v. Linn, 23 111. 503.
202 School Committee v. Kesler, 67 N. C. 443; Kimball v. Eaton, 8 N. H. 391.
203 Jackson v. Hayner, 12 Johns. (N. Y.) 469; Morrison v. Morrison, 27 Grat, (Va.) 190; Lyons v. Van Riper, 26 N. J. Eq. 337.
204 Davis v. Brandon, 1 How. (Miss.) 154; Grandin y. Hernandez, 29 Hon, 309; Le Franc v. Richmond, 5 Sawy. 603, Fed. Cas. No. 8,209. But see Moss t. Anderson, 7 Mo. 337.
205 l stim. Am. St. Law, §§ 421, 1564. Such statutes are not retroactive. Wisdom v. Reeves (Ala.) 18 South. 13.
206 Warren v. Lynch, 5 Johns. (N. Y.) 239; Tasker v. Bartlett, 5 Cush. (Mass.) 359, 364; Bradford v. Randall, 5 Pick. (Mass.) 496.
207 Pierce v. Indscth, 106 U. S. 546, 1 Sup. Ct. 418; Pillow v. Roberts, 13 How. 473. But see Farmers' & Manufacturers' Bank v. Haight, 3 Hill (X. Y.) 493. The printed device "[L. S.]" has been held sufficient Williams v. Starr, 5 Wis. 534, 549.

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A built-in USB sound card allows simultaneous input/output of stereo signals from 4 ins and 5 outs, while 96 kHz/24-bit high-sampling processing ensures the audio quality. Connect the unit to your laptop or computer via USB and the settings utility tool will automatically open, allowing you to configure the mixer, sound card and audio routing to suit your preference.
Delivering breath-taking scope for creativity, the DJM-750 takes FX manipulation and software synergy to new levels. The DJM-750 combines our latest audio and FX technology in an attractively p4-channel mixer. The mixer boasts 13 Beat FX with a dedicated Level/Depth knob for tactile control of the wet/dry mix.The DJM-750 inherits the same 32-bit digital signal processor as our club-standard DJM-900NXS and a built-in 24-bit/96 kHz USB sound card, while 3 sampling rates makes it perfect for production and recording.
Club mixer with extreme versatility! The mixer for all DJ applications on Mallorca. The CORE MIX 4 has 2 built-in USB sound card that can easily be connected via USB to the laptop. In addition, includes a built-in MP3 - USB / SD player with display and thus allows independent music playback without additional external playback devices!
In addition to the four line / phono - channel strips there are two microphone channels with 3-band EQ.
The all-round talent for DJ performance on Mallorca!
The Pioneer DJM-250MK2 is a 2-channel DJ mixer with many professional features for every DJ, whether it's a beginner DJ, hobby DJ, professional DJ or scratch DJ. The DJM-250MK2 features a sound color FX filter, 3-band isolators, soft-running channel faders, two headphones, as well as a built-in sound card for connecting a computer, a Magvel crossfader for scratch enthusiasts Outputs and an independent Mic section, providing a particularly intuitive layout.
Thanks to the dithering technology, the Pioneer DJM-250MK2 delivers a warm, high-quality sound with both analog and digital sources. The integrated sound card of the 2-channel DJ mixer makes it possible to connect a PC or Mac via USB cable.
The compact Pioneer DJM-250MK2 also features balanced XLR connectors on the master output for professional signal transmission.
Ultra compact and perfect for Mallorca! The mixer for laptop DJs.
High-quality filters are available for professional and amateur DJs in high demand, but they were yet to be found usually only in large mixers. With the 2-channel mixer Pioneer DJM-250 that will change now, because this tool gives DJs the ability to combine EQ effects with two filters to demonstrate mix class. The DJM-250 is equipped with 8 inputs, so that a variety of sources can be connected. Among other features, the unit has a MIC input for MC deposits at parties. Since the layout of the mixer corresponds to the larger models, immediately comes to an absolute professional feeling.
And because of the mixer due to its balanced XLR output provides high-quality sound you would expect from Pioneer's club standard mixers, making it ideal for a DJ in Mallorca parties!
The Mixars CUT MKII is an extremely stable 2-channel Scratch DJ mixer with integrated contactless Galileo Essential Crossfader and Master Cue. The Mixars CUT MKII also has an adjustable crossfader curve and a reverse switch, a record output, two phono / line-switchable inputs, an independent microphone input with its own EQ and a 6.35mm and a 3.5mm headphone jack.In addition, the XLR output allows easy installation.
The compact all-round talent for numerous applications in Mallorca!
The Pioneer CDJ-2000 NXS2 is a DJ player, CD player, audio player, MP3 player and media player in one, the multiplayer solution for professional DJ performances. In addition to the main features, such as 7-inch full-color touch screen, Qwerty keyboard, track search with filter function, 8 color-coded hot cues, MIDI controller, HID interface and Pro DJ Link, the professional deck features 96 kHz / 24 bit audio interface for a crystal-clear, high-resolution sound. The second-generation digital HiRes player follows the highly popular CDJ-2000 and is even better and more powerful with its many new features. With the help of Pioneer's DJ software (MacOS / Win) rekordbox, DJs can manage their music or download the rekordbox app (iOS / Android) online to use the same features on their smartphone or tablet. Beat matching functions, slip mode and hot cue auto-loading are standard features of the Pioneer CDJ-2000NXS2, but there are many other ways to make DJ sets lighter and more creative.
The Pioneer CDJ-2000 NXS2 supports the HID control from Serato Audio Research's Serato DJ, Scratch Live DJ and Native Instruments' DJ software TRAKTOR PRO 2 via USB without the need for a control disc.
The Pioneer XDJ-1000 is an excellent choice for DJs who want a pure USB player that offers all the performance options as a player with CD-ROM drive. The Coronation of the XDJ-1000 is a large, colorful bright LCD touch display to which one has, thanks to the interactive surface direct access to the three divided regions (Browse, Play and Perform). The XDJ-1000 delivers familiar functions from the top of the CDJ-2000NXS, such as the 206 mm jog wheel Slip mode, Quantize or beat-sync. In addition, the XDJ-1000 provides the DJ with the help of "Quantize Beat Jump" and "Loop Move" freedom spontaneously in a loop 1,2 or 4 clocks forward or to be able to go back. In addition, the search for songs now faster and simpler than before. The purpose of the virtual keyboard on the touch screen.
• Usable media: iPhone / iPod touch, Android phone, etc.
The CDJ-350 is a high quality DJ deck to play all professional and popular formats on CD or USB. And if you connect it to a computer, it really comes to life!
Is the USB port enables the practical use of compatible DJ software, plug and play, and the midi control for any music software. In addition, the CDJ-350 can also be used as an audio interface. The specially designed Pioneer's music management software rekordbox is included in the deck. Thus be the BPM and beat position of songs in your music library analyzed. After preparation, you can transfer your songs and playlists on a USB device and select the CDJ-350 then musicÂ by album, artist or genre. In addition, DJs can create playlists directly on the player and edit - a novelty on the market for DJ decks.
The Technics SL-1210 MKII remains the best-selling professional turntables and demand as ever. No other product has revolutionized the DJ world as is and even after decades, the ne plus ultra. With the Technics Turntable SL-1210 MK2, they create a piece of club music and culture at your event in Mallorca.
The Turntable by Technics DJ since the beginning of history, a name for quality, robustness, durability and meet the highest quality standards ..
Not without reason Technics in 20 years of absolute market leader.
DB-Technologies' ES1002 is an active, professional and very elegant column PA system with a power output of 1800 watts peak power / 900 watts RMS. The Subwoofer of the ES1002 is equipped with two 12 "bass drivers in a semi-horn / bass reflex configuration and delivers a detailed and particularly powerful low-frequency reproduction. The top is equipped with a total of 8x4 "high-mid transducers whose alignment provides an asymmetric vertical coverage. In addition, each 4 "speaker has a newly developed phase plug, which extends the horizontal radiation and ensures perfect intelligibility in every listening position.
The elegant housings are made of robust multiplex wood with a professional black finish and visually appealing protective grids. The acoustically optimized application provides the applications of two ES1002 systems. For smaller applications such as voice reinforcement but also the use of a single system is possible.
The dB-Technologies ES1002 is designed as a mono system and has an XLR combo jack + stereo RCA as input as well as a balanced XLR output to continue the signal.
Due to its compact dimensions, the dB-Technologies ES1002 entertainment system is equally suitable for ambitious musicians and DJs, as well as for voice reinforcement and media applications in Mallorca.
With the Opera UNICA 12 dB-Technologies sets new standards in the field of portable loudspeakers.The active PA speaker features a CLASS D DIGIPRO G3 amplifier module capable of delivering up to 1800 watts peak power (900 watts RMS) and a modern neodymium woofer.What sets the Opera UNICA series apart is the network functionality provided by the Aurora-Net control software with built-in RDNet ports that allow for EQ, delay and sound processing, as well as real-time monitoring.
The unmistakable asymmetric acoustic design of the Opera Horn's HF horn ensures optimum coverage.In addition, the sound processing with FIR filtering provides excellent and linear reproduction with crystal clear audio performance.
These features make the new dB-Technologies Opera UNICA 12 the first choice for professional DJs and musicians.
With the new HD 10-A RCF provides a particularly compact active 2-way multifunctional speaker is aimed at discerning DJs.
Equipped with a very powerful 600-watt Class-D power amplifier is the latest generation of the RCF HD10-A, the pro audio tool for demanding DJ gigs in Mallorca.
10 "woofer and 1" compression driver offers absolute full rank suitability and pioneered by RCF a plastic housing with all its advantages at the same time very inconspicuous appearance.
As EFFICIENCY Higes top speaker in combination with active subwoofers can be achieved very impressive and very transparent sound reproduction.
ART 712-A is the answer: a multi purpose speaker that represents the best choice for situations in which a full frequency range with punchy bass and high definition is needed. The ART 712-A is a very versatile speaker that can be easily used as DJ-Speaker, Live-Performance and also for monitoring applications.
A 12 "/ 1" components can be used as the absolute industry standard referred. In the case of the RCF ART-312A MKIII this is of course with the highest quality components designed RCF, providing in the 3rd Generation driven by a 400 W / RMS digital amplifier including DSP excellent reproduction characteristics with clean highs, natural mids and a punchy bass. Thanks to the convection ART312-A is like the entire RCF Series maintenance-free for maximum reliability.
The RCF ART 312-A MKIII On the back, a boost switch to increase the bass - so the speaker and for the stand-alone operation without a subwoofer for smaller events suited!
The ART 310-A is one of the world's most successful speakers. Despite its compact size and low weight, it offers great sound and impressive bass response. It can be ideal for smaller applications used fullrange without a subwoofer, and in combination with a subwoofer (RCF SUB 705-AS). In the 3rd Generation is the ART 310-A â€‹â€‹MKIII equipped with a modern digital amplification, including DSP and thus has even more amplifier power than your ancestors. Key to clear, brilliant highs and distortion-free is still the outstanding RCF 1" tweeter with 1.4" Mylar.
The new RCF ART 310-A MKIII provides 400 watts / RMS and achieved remarkable 127 dB SPL!
User-friendliness, quality and performance characterize the Opera 12 speakers from dB Technologies. Not only its simple and elegant appearance, which can fit into every environment very well, but also the technology and its features convince to their full length. Multifunctional housing is the keyword when it comes to design and installation: the speaker is not only standard on tripods thanks to the 36mm flange, but also allows horizontal positioning on the ground.
At the same time, the sound is also affected, since the special construction provides the 1 "tweeter for a wide coverage of the audience. The 12" woofer provides for a decent bass. In combination with the built-in Class-D amplifier, controlled by the DSP, you get a whopping 600 watts (1200 watts peak), a glass-clear, punchy sound and enough pressure for all Mallorca weddings and events.
The design of the B-HYPE 12 is very simple to fit well into all situations and provides flexibility for multiple applications. A robust polypropylene housing as well as front grilles protect the interior optimally from external influences and make the B-Hype12 to the good companion on Mallorca - no matter whether fincaurlaub, Poolparty or small Livegig.
The B-HYPE 12 Speaker convinces with the built-in digital signal processor (DSP) and a resolution of 48 kHz and 24 Bit. In combination with the 12 "woofer and 1" tweeter, a transparent and musical frequency response is created. A wide beam angle ensures a good coverage of the audience.
The classic combination of a 12 "woofer and 1" compression driver allows use of the expanded frequency range and higher sound pressure the ideal use as a powerful full range system for live musicians.
The Cromo 12 is a modern 2-way active box equipped with a 300 watt bi-amplified digital amplifier with DSP processor. Especially powerful bass and clear treble, they stand out. A specially fabricated asymmetrical horn ensures that visitors are optimum sound quality.
As a powerful speaker in conjunction with active subwoofers can achieve powerful and transparent sound reproduction.
The speaker technologies dB L-160D is a powerful (160 watt), light compact speaker and offers a variety of connectivity options and ease of use for multimedia sound reinforcement applications.
The relatively high sound pressure of 116 dB is achieved by two phase-corrected 5 "Speaker, distinguished through digital sound processor (DSP) with a brilliant sound with high intelligibility.
One of the two 5 "speaker is designed as a coaxial system with a dome tweeter with horn front attachment, resulting in a very uniform and controlled reproduction of the high tone.
Onboard DSP offers 8 predefined settings to optimize the playback properties..
The RCF SUB 718-AS is an active subwoofer with high performance. Thanks to the powerful RCF 18 "woofer with 4" voice coil and 1000 W digital amplifier Digipro he is the perfect complement to play low frequencies at high sound pressure to build high-quality sound systems.
The RCF SUB 718-AS is recommended as SubLow for 12 "and 10" systems for building powerful Satelittensystemen with outstanding audio performance. A pole mount socket for receiving satellite systems is integrated.
DJ-SubLow official with 132 dB SPL!
The dB-Technologies SUB 618 is a compact and powerful subwoofer equipped with a 18 woofer with 2.5 "voice coil, powered by a 600 Watt RMS Digipro digital amplifier in a robust multiplex housing with deep and powerful tuning for powerful bass.
The dB-Technologies SUB 618 is recommended as a bass extension for 12 "systems for the construction of high-performance satellite systems with excellent performance. A high-standing sleeve for the reception of top parts is integrated.
Ideal for Mallorca - compact and with official 133 dB sound pressure!
The dB-Technologies SUB 615 is a compact and powerful subwoofer equipped with a 15 woofer with 2.5 "voice coil, powered by a 600 Watt RMS Digipro digital amplifier in a robust multiplex housing with deep and punchy tuning for striking bass.
The dB-Technologies SUB 615 is recommended as a bass boost for 10 "and 12" systems for the construction of high-performance satellite systems with excellent performance. A high-standing sleeve for the reception of top parts is integrated.
Ideal for Mallorca - compact and with official 131 dB sound pressure!
The dB-Technologies SUB 1002 encompasses 2X12” woofers in bass-reflex configuration, the amp module and the control panel, whose inclined design improves usability. I/O section allows to connect up to 2 INPUTS (XLR mono and RCA stereo with independent volume controls) and provides a balanced link out to feed a active mid/high speaker. A rotary with 8 preset EQ helps users to perfectly tune the system, adapting it to different environments and uses (playback, live music, speech etc.).
Portable battery-powered PA speaker system with a power of 200 watts RMS / 400 watts peak power.The ALTO TRANSPORT 12 has a 12 "/ 1" configuration and, in addition to the integrated USB media player, has a conventional connection for line and microphone signals in the form of a combo jack (XLR / jack) and a stereo RCA input.For use with speeches and singing a UHF wireless microphone with a long range is included.
The ALTO TRANSPORT 12 is a versatile complete package and the ideal solution for when you are on the move and wherever power is not available.The easy-to-carry system is designed to deliver great sound at weddings or presentations without any power.Of course, use via mains cable is also possible.The recharge time is about 4 hours.
Bluetooth extension for PA systems - battery operated.
The LD System's WIN 42 UHF Wireless System, with its excellent audio quality, offers a variety of uses for DJ performance and live performances in Mallorca.The UHF frequency working range is between 516 MHz to 558 MHz.
Directly on the microphone, you have the option to adjust the transmission power in 3 levels (10, 30, 50mW) and thus adapt to any environment.Delivery with either a dynamic or a capacitor capsule!
The new LD Systems WS1G8 is a LICENSE-FREE* true diversity wireless microphone system with 192 UHF channels that delivers natural sound with a wide dynamic range, high S/N ratio, and low THD in the 1785 - 1800 MHz band. The WS1G8 series permits simultaneous operation of up to 6 systems and is available in various versions. You can choose between a handheld dynamic or condenser microphone or a belt-pack transmitter with your choice of a headset, a lavaliere microphone, a clamp-on microphone for brass instruments or a guitar adapter cable. The system guarantees reliable audio transmission with a frequency response of 50 Hz to 16 kHz. Both the handheld microphone and the belt-pack have a practical LC display for the channel, the group, and the battery status. The automatic channel scan (ASC) function and the lighted multi-function display on the receiver ensure simple setup and operation. With high quality batteries (AA), it is possible to attain running times of up to 13 hours.
Fantastic DJ stand with maximum flexibility and an extremely safe stand.
You only need about 5 minutes for the complete setup.
Powder coated and made of hard steel. The tarps are 100% waterproof and made from a durable 600D polyester fabric that is UV resistant.
The construction time is only 3-5 minutes with 2 people.
Also available: side wall closed and weight.
The folding table is suitable for equipment support as well as for all other applications in Gastrobereich.Das material can safely use in indoor & outdoor living to.

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ART 712
ART 712
ART312
ART 312
ART 310
ART 310
ART 310


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Robert R. Harris, (Court-appointed), El Paso, Tex., for defendant-appellant.
Sidney Powell, Asst. U.S. Atty., San Antonio, Tex., for plaintiff-appellee.
Before RUBIN, TATE and JOLLY, Circuit Judges.
Joel Beltran-Nunez challenges his convictions for conspiracy to transport illegal aliens into the United States in violation of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 371 and 8 U.S.C. Sec. 1324(a)(4) and transporting illegal aliens within the United States in violation of 8 U.S.C. Sec. 1324(a)(2). On appeal, Beltran contends that his convictions must be set aside since the trial, except for the selection of the jury, was held in his absence and since he was denied effective assistance of counsel. Because we feel that our decision in United States v. Benavides, 596 F.2d 137 (5th Cir.1979) so requires with regard to Beltran's first contention, we vacate his convictions and remand for a new trial, and do not reach the question of effective assistance of counsel.
THE COURT: ... Now, the defendant is not here yet?
MR. REY: No, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Do you have anything further that you want to tell me about the status of the defendant?
MR. REY: I just now spoke to his wife, and she just--he was in front of my office, said he was going to go to his work to pick up some workers, and that was it. She said if she had a car right now, she would go over to where he worked to see if he's gone there. He was here, he was dressed well. I saw him this morning, dropped his family off.
THE COURT: The Court will find that the defendant was fully aware of trial, that as a matter of fact, late yesterday afternoon, it was contemplated that the defendant might, in fact, plead guilty to all five counts of the indictment, but that he informed his attorney that he would not. The Court will find that his family is present in the courtroom, and the defendant has voluntarily absented himself, and I will here and now revoke the bond heretofore allowed to Mr. Joel Beltran-Nunez. I will order that arrest--a bench warrant be issued for his arrest, and that the new bond be made in the amount of $100,000 cash or corporate surety.
The only other reference in the record to the defendant's absence was made by the court just prior to its instructions to the jury. The judge asked Beltran's attorney if he recalled the court making a finding on the record that Beltran "had voluntarily absented himself" from the trial. In response to this inquiry, the defendant's attorney assured the judge that he had made such a finding.3 The jury found the defendant guilty on all five counts and the court set a date for sentencing.
The defendant was not sentenced, however, until he surrendered to the authorities some four years later. The court imposed a sentence of five years in prison on each of the five counts, to be served concurrently, and the defendant appealed.
Fed.R.Crim.P. 43(b) provides that a district court may proceed with a trial when a defendant who is initially present "voluntarily absents himself after the trial has commenced." Fed.R.Crim.P. 43(b); see Taylor v. United States, 414 U.S. 17, 94 S.Ct. 194, 38 L.Ed.2d 174 (1973) (upholding the constitutionality of Rule 43 as it then read). In this case, the district court's finding that Beltran voluntarily absented himself from the trial was supported by the evidence.
The finding that the defendants' absence was voluntary should not have abruptly ended the court's inquiry. In Smith v. United States, 5 Cir.1966, 357 F.2d 486, 490, we noted that the court has "only a narrow discretion" in deciding whether to proceed with a trial when the defendant is voluntarily in absentia because the right to be present at one's own trial must be carefully safeguarded. Compare United States v. Davis, 7 Cir.1973, 486 F.2d 725, 727, cert. denied, 1974, 415 U.S. 979, 94 S.Ct. 1569, 39 L.Ed.2d 876.
Whether the trial will proceed will depend upon the trial judge's determination of a complex of issues. He must weigh the likelihood that the trial could soon take place with the defendant present; the difficulty of rescheduling, particularly in multiple-defendant trials; the burden on the Government in having to undertake two trials, again particularly in multiple-defendant trials where the evidence against the defendants is often overlapping and more than one trial might keep the Government's witnesses in substantial jeopardy.
Accord, United States v. Pastor, 2 Cir.1977, 557 F.2d 930, 934; United States v. Schwartz, 2 Cir.1976, 535 F.2d 160, 165, cert. denied, 1977, 430 U.S. 906, 97 S.Ct. 1175, 51 L.Ed.2d 581; United States v. Peterson, 4 Cir.1975, 524 F.2d 167, 185, cert. denied, 1976, 423 U.S. 1088, 96 S.Ct. 881, 47 L.Ed.2d 99, and 424 U.S. 925, 96 S.Ct. 1136, 47 L.Ed.2d 334.
This analysis is cogent. It fails to mention expressly inconvenience to jurors, which we would add to the considerations; but, with this addition, we agree with it.
Benavides, supra, 596 F.2d at 139-40.
The analysis required by Benavides ensures that a court will not proceed with a trial in the defendant's absence without first making an inquiry "into whether or not the trial could soon be rescheduled with the defendant in attendance." Benavides, supra, 596 F.2d at 140. A later finding that the defendant was indeed a fugitive during his absence cannot excuse the failure to make this inquiry, for "the validity of the court's exercise of its discretion does not turn on whether subsequent events prove or disprove unsupported judgments." Benavides, supra, 596 F.2d at 140. We note further that the careful analysis required by Benavides before a court proceeds with a criminal trial in absentia is in accord with the requirement in other circuits. See United States v. Lochan, 674 F.2d 960, 967-68 (1st Cir.1982); United States v. Pastor, 557 F.2d 930, 934 (2d Cir.1977); United States v. Peterson, 524 F.2d 167, 185 (4th Cir.1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1088, 96 S.Ct. 881, 47 L.Ed.2d 99 (1976)4.
Applying the Benavides analysis to the present case, we find that the decision to proceed with the trial in Beltran's absence, without further inquiry, was an abuse of the trial court's narrow discretion. At the time that the court noted the defendant's absence, it took no affirmative steps to ascertain whether the accused might be readily located, and it made no inquiry into the possibility of delaying the commencement of the trial slightly or of rescheduling the trial in order to obtain his attendance.
The teaching of Benavides and the cited jurisprudence of other circuits is that the important constitutional right of a criminally accused to be present at his trial cannot cursorily, and without inquiry, be deemed by the trial court to have been waived simply because the accused is not present when he should have been. Before exercising its narrow discretion to commence or continue the trial in the defendant's absence, the trial court must at the time make a record inquiry to attempt to ascertain the explanation for the absence of the accused and whether, balancing the likelihood that the trial could soon take place with the defendant's presence against the undue inconvenience or prejudice occasioned by a slight delay or a rescheduling of the trial, the district court could properly exercise its narrow discretion to commence or continue the trial in the absence of the accused.
Of course, had an inquiry before the trial proceeded established for the record that the defendant had deliberately absented himself and that there was no reasonable probability he could be located shortly, we would be loath to say that the district court would have abused its discretion by failing to delay or reschedule the trial. Here, however, no such inquiry was made, and--under Benavides --in the absence of such contemporaneous inquiry, the district court abused its narrow discretion by cursorily proceeding in the defendant's absence.
In the present case, although the jury had been selected, no evidence had been presented in the case when Beltran was found to be absent from the courtroom. At the time the defendant was found to be absent, nothing suggested that he would not shortly appear. (The statements made to the court by his attorney indicated that the defendant had been in court earlier in the morning and that he was possibly at his place of work.) The government did not then argue that its witnesses would be jeopardized or unavailable if the trial was delayed for a short time. In short, "[o]ther than the possibility of juror inconvenience, the record demonstrates no great difficulty in rescheduling the trial." Benavides, supra, 596 F.2d at 140.
In that we find that the district court abused its discretion by proceeding with the trial in Beltran's absence without further inquiry, we VACATE the defendant's convictions on all counts and REMAND for further proceedings. Accordingly, we do not reach the question of whether the defendant was denied effective assistance of counsel.
I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion and the result it reaches. It rewards a contumacious defendant for his criminal conduct by setting aside his conviction with the likelihood that he will never be prosecuted.1 We grant this beneficence to the defendant notwithstanding his undeniable waiver of the right in question. We reach this faulty result for the frail reason that the district judge did not adhere to the technicalities of a test-tube procedural rule.
At the outset it should be understood that the real question involved here is whether there was a waiver.
The defendant clearly had a constitutional right to be present at his trial. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 85 S.Ct. 1065, 13 L.Ed.2d 923 (1965); Lewis v. United States, 146 U.S. 370, 13 S.Ct. 136, 36 L.Ed. 1011 (1892). This right is further provided in Fed.R.Crim.P. 43. The courts have long held, however, that constitutional rights may be knowingly waived. See, e.g., Smith v. United States, 360 U.S. 1, 79 S.Ct. 991, 3 L.Ed.2d 1041 (1959) (right to prosecution by indictment); Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 50 S.Ct. 253, 74 L.Ed. 854 (1930) (right to jury trial); Puckett v. United States, 314 F.2d 298 (10th Cir.1963) (right to counsel). Fundamental rights are waived every day in federal courts with less demonstration of clear intent than we have here. The general requirement is that the defendant knows and understands that he is waiving the right in question.
Of course, had an inquiry before the trial proceeded established for the record that the defendant had deliberately absented himself and that there was no reasonable probability that he could be located shortly, we would be loath to say that the district court would have abused its discretion by failing to delay or reschedule the trial.
On this technicality a convicted criminal has his conviction set aside and is likely to go free. In my opinion this blind obeisance to the technicalities of a procedural rule is a classic example of reason in law becoming side-tracked by form and procedure.
Let us take a look at the rule before whose altar the majority bows. Starting with the last requirement and proceeding to the first: of course jurors are inconvenienced. Any delay in concluding proceedings inconveniences jurors. How much inconvenience may a wilful defendant impose on citizen jurors before the defendant's constitutional rights may be adjudged as abandoned or waived? This question hardly seems a proper standard by which to evaluate constitutional rights.
Next, the burden upon the government in stopping the trial and starting up again is primarily viewed in terms of the effect upon the witnesses. There is always the possibility that witnesses may flee or otherwise be unavailable. Here some of the witnesses were aliens who were incarcerated and now, it is to be supposed, are lost, either back in their native Mexico or in anonymity in this country. It would seem to me that the burden on the government in stopping the trial and starting up again is always significant. In this case where the witnesses were incarcerated aliens it was particularly significant, a fact which, however, seems to make little impression on the majority.
The difficulty of rescheduling, we are told, is a consideration that the district court must take into account. Rescheduling, it would seem to me, would always be a significant problem, since there is hardly an underworked district court.
We are thus brought to the final consideration, and that is the likelihood that the trial can soon take place with the defendant present. In my view, this is the only consideration which has any genuine significance. If the trial court has no reason to believe that the defendant has voluntarily absented himself, then trial should not proceed. That is, if the court has no reason to believe that the defendant has waived his sixth amendment right, the waiver cannot be assumed. However, when, as here, a defendant is represented by an attorney, has sat through the selection of a jury, knows of his trial date, appears in or around the courthouse on the date of trial, with his family, and then disappears and cannot be located by his lawyer, it is reasonable to assume that his absence is "voluntary" as per Rule 43, that he intends to be gone as long as possible and that it is unlikely that the trial can be rescheduled in the near future.
If the Benavides rule of inquiry is to be applied methodically and mechanically without regard to common sense, it seems to me that the ends of justice would at least require that the defendant show that he was prejudiced by the failure of the court to apply the procedural rules for the inquiry. Here, clearly, the defendant was not prejudiced. If the trial had been adjourned, the presence of the defendant would not have been achieved. The court had issued a bench warrant for his arrest and the defendant apparently was nowhere to be found. It was four years later that he reappeared. Thus the district court's rigid adherence to every detail of the Benavides inquiry would not have meant that the defendant's right to be present at his trial would have been secured to him; in other words, there is absolutely no prejudice which the defendant has suffered as a result of the court's failing to follow the rule which serves as the majority's basis for rewarding the defendant's reckless, irresponsible, contumacious and criminal conduct.
I recognize Benavides as the law of this circuit. The district courts should follow its rules of inquiry whenever possible and practicable. But there should be no requirement that Benavides must be applied rigidly in every case by us to the point of reversing a conviction when the known evidence reasonably shows that the defendant has voluntarily absented himself. If, however, we must apply Benavides inflexibly, we should at least require the defendant to show some prejudice to his right of presence at trial on account of the failure of the district court to apply Benavides.
Justice has been thwarted and I dissent.
THE COURT: The government is ready. Is the defendant ready?
MR. REY [Counsel for the Defendant]: Your Honor, the family was out in front a moment ago, and they were going to go get some coffee. I thought maybe he would be in the courtroom. I just checked upstairs and I just ran back to my office. We haven't seen him, but I didn't see the family, either, but my secretary said the family, they would be back before 9:30.
THE COURT: Well, that's their choice. We'll proceed with trial and if the defendant is not present at the first break, the Court will revoke his bond.
THE COURT: Very well. Is there any reason we should not proceed to trial?
MR. TANZY [Counsel for the United States]: None that I know of.
THE COURT: Mr. Tanzy inquired a few moments ago, Mr. Rey, in chambers whether or not I had, in fact, made a finding concerning the absence of the defendant, and I assured him that I had found that Joel Beltran-Nunez had voluntarily absented himself, and my recollection is that I did that fully on the record.
MR. REY: You did, Judge.
THE COURT: If that does not comport with your memory, you should tell me.

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Camilo Hernandez was fifteen years old when he was arrested for allegedly helping Cristian Argeta, an adult shoot into a group of six Afican American teenagers in Compton. Before shooting, Hernandez and Argeta yelled “Compton Vario Tortilla Flats” (CVTF), a name of a Hispanic gang in Compton with a reputation for violence against African Americans. One of the six youths died at the scene while another was shot in the chest.
Main Point: Sentence for juvenile of 100 years is cruel and unusual punishment for aiding and abetting murder.
Both Hernandez and Argeta were charged with one count of murder (Penal Code 187 (a)) and five counts of attempted, willful, deliberate and premeditated murder (Penal Code § § 664, 187(a)). It was alleged as to all counts that the offenses were committed for the benefits of a criminal street gang (Penal Code § 186.22 (b) (1)) and that there was an intentional discharge of a firearm causing great bodily injury and death (Penal Code § 12022.53 (d) and (e) (1)). Hernandez was charged as an adult.
The jury in the first trial was unable to reach a verdict and a mistrial was declared. In the second trial, the jury found defendants guilty on all counts. It found the murder to be in the first degree. Hernandez was convicted as an aider and abettor, Argeta as the principal.
The judge sentenced Argeta to 100 years to life, based on 1) 25 years to life for first degree murder; 2) 25 years to life for the firearm enhancement; 3) a life term for each attempted murder; plus 4) 25 years to life for the firearm enhanced regarding the injury to the teenager shot in the chest.
Hernandez was sentenced to the same sentence and appealed to the Second Appellate District both he and Argeta would not be eligible for parole until serving 75 years in prison.
Hernandez’s appeal listed many grounds to appeal the convictions, as well as the sentence. This article will only focus on the appeal of Hernandez’s sentence.
Hernandez claimed that because he was just fifteen when the attempted murder happened his sentence of 100 years to life constituted, effectively, life without parole, and this cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eight Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, as well as the California Constitution. Indeed, In Graham v. Florida (2010). 560 U.S. _______, 130 S.Ct. 2011, the U.S. Supreme Court held that sentencing a juvenile to life without the possibility of parole for a non-homicide offense violated the Eight Amendment. The Supreme Court noted that there were fundamental differences between juvenile and adult minds. Juvenile, the court stated, are “more capable of change then adults.” Later, in Miller v. Alabama (2012) ______ U.S. ______, 132 S.Ct. 2455, the Supreme Court held it was also an Eighth Amendment violation to impose a Mandatory life-without parole sentence upon a juvenile in a homicide case.
The Second Appellate District, in riling on Hernandez’s appeal, also looked to California cases on this issue. In People v. Caballero (2012) 55 Cal. 4th 262, the California Supreme Court found that when a juvenile is sentenced to minimum terms that exceed his or her life expectancy, the sentence is the functional equivalent of a like sentence without the possibility of parole and was unconstitutional. Turning to Hernandez’s sentence, the Second Appellate court held that his sentence must be reversed. It then ordered the case remanded to the trial court for resentencing on all counts.
Lastly, it merits mention that Argeta, age eighteen and five months at the time of the shooting, also alleged his sentence of 100 years was also cruel and unusual punishment, under the same rational as applied to Hernandez. The Second Appellate District rejected their argument, pointing out that drawing the line at age 18 is the line our society draws as the distinction between childhood and adulthood. The court refused to make an exception, as it would open the door to the next defendant who is only six months into adulthood, leading to no logical end to sentencing challenges.


Bassem Hunsi Ahmed MANSOUR, Petitioner v. Eric H. HOLDER, Jr., Attorney General of the United States, Respondent.
Before BYE, SMITH, and BENTON, Circuit Judges. Katherine L. Evans, Benjamin Casper, Minneapolis, MN, on the brief, for Petitioner. Nancy Canter, Russell J.E. Verby, Stuart F. Delery, Washington, DC, on the brief, for Respondent.
Bassem Hunsi Ahmed Mansour appeals the final order of the Board of Immigration Appeals finding him ineligible for “adjustment of status” under 8 U.S.C. § 1255(i). Having jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252, this court affirms.
Mansour, a Jordanian citizen, entered the United States on a student visa. He married a legal permanent resident. Invoking section 245 of the Immigration and Nationality Act—allowing certain aliens present in the United States to apply for adjustment of status to lawful permanent residency—Mansour's wife filed an I–130 petition, verifying their qualifying family relationship. 8 U.S.C. § 1255. Mansour concurrently filed an I–485 petition for permanent residency. The Immigration and Naturalization Service granted the 1986 petitions, adjusting his status to conditional permanent resident. The INS terminated this status in 1989, when Mansour and his wife failed to petition for removal of the residency conditions (he was living out of the country). See 8 U.S.C. § 1186a(c)(2).
In 1992, Mansour's mother, then a legal permanent resident, filed an I–130 petition on his behalf. The INS denied the petition because Mansour was married. Mansour and his wife divorced later that year.
In 1999, Mansour's mother filed another I–130 petition on his behalf. The INS approved the petition in 2000, authorizing him to return to the United States and remain until 2005. Mansour returned on a non-immigrant visa, but remained past the 2005 deadline (without renewing it or adjusting his status).
In 2007, Mansour filed an I–485 petition, again seeking to adjust his status to legal permanent resident. Because he had not maintained a non-immigrant visa since 2005, he was ineligible for adjustment under INA § 245(a)—which permits adjustment of status for aliens who enter the United States under inspection or parole and, as applicable here, maintain lawful non-immigrant status. 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a), (c). Instead, Mansour sought adjustment under § 245(i)—which permits adjustment of status for aliens ineligible under § 245(a) or disqualified under § 245(c). 8 U.S.C. § 1255(i). Although § 245(i) expired in 2001, a grandfather provision preserved the right to adjust status under § 245(i) for certain aliens: the alien must have been the beneficiary of a qualifying immigrant visa petition (e.g., I–130 petition) filed on or before April 30, 2001; and, the petition must have been “approvable when filed” (i.e., “properly filed, meritorious in fact, and non-frivolous”). 8 C.F.R. § 245.10(a)(1)-(3). Whether a petition meets these criteria is “based on the circumstances that existed at the time the qualifying petition or application was filed.” Id. § 245.10(a)(3). For petitions filed after January 14, 1998, the beneficiary must also have been present in the United States on December 21, 2000. 8 U.S.C. § 1255(i)(1)(C); 8 C.F.R. § 245.10(a)(1)(ii).
The USCIS initiated removal proceedings. During a removal hearing in February 2010, Mansour renewed his petition for adjustment of status before an immigration judge. The IJ denied his request, finding that he was “attempting to establish that he was grandfathered under a petition that he has already used to gain conditional permanent resident status, which results in the petition being ‘extinguished.’ “ In October 2010, Mansour submitted additional evidence for his petition, which was again denied. He appealed to the BIA. Upholding the IJ's decision, the BIA dismissed the appeal.
Where, as here, the BIA adopted the IJ's opinion and added reasoning and analysis, this court reviews both decisions. La v. Holder, 701 F.3d 566, 570 (8th Cir.2012). This court reviews de novo the BIA's legal determinations, but accords “substantial deference to the agency's interpretation of a federal statute,” unless “it is inconsistent with the plain language of the statute or constitutes an unreasonable interpretation of an ambiguous statute.” Afolayan v. INS, 219 F.3d 784, 787 (8th Cir.2000), citing Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–45, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984).
Mansour contends that the unpublished BIA decision in his case is not entitled to Chevron deference. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 234, 121 S.Ct. 2164, 150 L.Ed.2d 292 (2001) (classification rulings generally lack the force of law and are “beyond the Chevron pale”). Many circuits agree, holding that where an agency decision has no precedential value, Chevron deference is inappropriate. See Arobelidze v. Holder, 653 F.3d 513, 520 (7th Cir.2011); Carpio v. Holder, 592 F.3d 1091, 1097 (10th Cir.2010) (“If the interpretation is not precedential within the agency, then the interpretation does not qualify for Chevron deference.”); Quinchia v. United States Atty. Gen., 552 F.3d 1255, 1258 (11th Cir.2008); Rotimi v. Gonzales, 473 F.3d 55, 57–58 (2d Cir.2007); Garcia–Quintero v. Gonzales, 455 F.3d 1006, 1012–14 (9th Cir.2006). Even if Chevron deference is inappropriate, the BIA decision is entitled to a “lesser form of deference” under Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 65 S.Ct. 161, 89 L.Ed. 124 (1944). See Godinez–Arroyo v. Mukasey, 540 F.3d 848, 850 (8th Cir.2008), citing Mead Corp., 533 U.S. at 234.
This court need not address whether Chevron deference is required here because the BIA decision can be affirmed under Skidmore. See Godinez–Arroyo, 540 F.3d at 851. “The opinion is afforded weight ‘depend [ing] upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade.’ “ Id. at 850, quoting Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140. To the extent the BIA decision interprets its own regulations, the interpretation is controlling unless “plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.” Auer v. Robbins., 519 U.S. 452, 461, 117 S.Ct. 905, 137 L.Ed.2d 79 (1997).
Mansour does not claim eligibility for adjustment of status under § 245(i) based on his 1992 or 1999 petitions. Rather, he maintains that he is grandfathered under his 1986 petition and attacks the BIA decision as contrary to the unambiguous language of the statute.
Section 245(i) states that the Attorney General may adjust the status of certain aliens who are the beneficiaries of qualifying petitions filed on or before April 30, 2001, notwithstanding the provisions of § 245(a) and (c). The statute does not address whether a petition already used to adjust status is available for grandfathering. The statute is ambiguous, and the BIA decision is not contrary to it. See Afolayan, 219 F.3d at 787.
Mansour next argues that the BIA decision is contrary to § 245(i)'s implementing regulation. The text of 8 C.F.R. § 245.10(a)(3) provides that a visa petition that “was properly filed on or before April 30, 2001, and was approvable when filed, but was later withdrawn, denied, or revoked due to circumstances that have arisen after the time of filing, will preserve the alien beneficiary's grandfathered status.” Mansour contends he meets these requirements and that the regulation unambiguously entitles him to petition for adjustment of status under § 245(i).
The regulation addresses cases where a qualifying petition was later withdrawn, denied, or revoked. It does not address cases where a petition was previously approved. The regulation is ambiguous, and the BIA decision is not contrary to it. See Auer, 519 U.S. at 461.
Because the regulation is ambiguous, the BIA's interpretation controls unless “plainly erroneous or inconsistent.” Auer, 519 U.S. at 461. Because the statute is ambiguous, the BIA's interpretation receives Skidmore deference, depending on the thoroughness, validity, and consistency of its reasoning. Godinez–Arroyo, 540 F.3d at 850–51.
In March 2005, the Department of Homeland Security clarified the eligibility requirements to adjust status under § 245(i). See Interoffice Memorandum of William R. Yates, Associate Director for Operations, USCIS, DHS, “Clarification of Certain Eligibility Requirements Pertaining to an Application to Adjust Status under Section 245(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act” (Mar. 9, 2005). The Yates memo states: “Once an alien meets the requirements for grandfathering under 8 CFR 245.10, the alien continues to be grandfathered until the alien adjusts status.” Id . at ¶ 3(A). Reiterating 8 C.F.R. § 245.10(a)(3), the memo specifies: “If the alien has been denied adjustment of status, has withdrawn or abandoned the application for adjustment of status, or has otherwise not adjusted under section 245(i), the alien remains grandfathered.” Id. (emphasis added). The memo directs: “USCIS no longer considers an alien ‘grandfathered’ once the alien is granted adjustment of status under section 245(i) because the alien has acquired the only intended benefit of grandfathering: LPR status.” Id. at ¶ 3(E)(2). The Yates memo is entitled to respect to the extent it is persuasive. See Castro–Soto v. Holder, 596 F.3d 68, 73 (1st Cir.2010), citing Christensen v. Harris Cnty., 529 U.S. 576, 587, 120 S.Ct. 1655, 146 L.Ed.2d 621 (2000).
The BIA interpreted the Yates memo to require that a petition filed on or before April 30, 2001 be “available” (i.e., denied, withdrawn, abandoned, or otherwise not used) for an alien to be grandfathered under § 245(i). See Castro–Soto, 596 F.3d at 72 (“It is not an illogical corollary that an applicant's grandfathered status should expire once he has obtained all of the benefits available through a visa petition.”). The BIA's interpretation is consistent with the supplementary information to an interim rule implementing § 245(i): “A visa petition does not serve to grandfather the alien beneficiary if that alien has previously obtained lawful permanent resident status on the basis of that visa petition.” See Adjustment of Status to That Person Admitted for Permanent Residence; Temporary Removal of Certain Restrictions to Eligibility, 66 Fed.Reg. 16383, 16384 (Mar. 26, 2001). The BIA's interpretation is persuasive, not plainly erroneous, and consistent with the statute and regulation. Castro–Soto, 596 F.3d at 72 (“[I]t was not plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation for the BIA to find that Castro–Soto had obtained all of the benefit due to him based on [his prior petition], and that the petition was therefore extinguished and cannot now provide grandfathered status.”).
Mansour argues that the BIA ignored language in: (1) the statute—an alien may adjust under § 245(i) “Notwithstanding the provisions of subsections (a) and (c) of this section ”; and, (2) the Yates memo-an alien is eligible for grandfathering if the alien “has not adjusted status under 245(i) ” (emphasis added). According to Mansour, this language implies that § 245(i) is a “distinct and separate scheme for adjustment of status that operates apart from the rest of section 245” and the “only thing that terminates the eligibility of a grandfathered alien is the use of § 245(i) itself.” See Matter of Legaspi, 25 I & N Dec. 328, 329 n. 2 (BIA 2010) (finding that the beneficiary of a 1987 visa petition who adjusted her status under § 245(a) remains grandfathered and eligible for adjustment under § 245(i) until she adjusts under § 245(i)).
No regulations, memorandums, BIA decisions, or courts of appeal have interpreted the statute as Mansour does. Legaspi is inapposite: the petitioner there had not previously used the petition under which she was grandfathered. Rather, her status was adjusted based on a separate petition. Moreover, Mansour's interpretation contravenes the purpose of the grandfathering provision: to allow aliens who did not receive an adjustment of status from their qualifying petition to apply for an adjustment after § 245(i) expired. See Castro–Soto, 596 F.3d at 72–73, citing Echevarria v. Keisler, 505 F.3d 16, 19 (1st Cir.2007).
Mansour also argues that the BIA decision is a “petition-based” reading of § 245(i) inconsistent with the “alien-based” regulation. See 66 Fed.Reg. at 16384–85 (recognizing an alien-based reading of § 245(i)). He reasons that the BIA should “tie[ ] eligibility for § 245(i) to the alien, not the qualifying petition.” The BIA decision does not conflict with this reasoning. The decision says: “A grandfathered alien is not limited to seeking adjustment of status based solely on the qualifying visa petition or application for labor certification that initially conferred grandfathered status. Such aliens may seek adjustment of status on any other basis for which they are eligible.” By the BIA decision, if Mansour were a grandfathered alien, he would be eligible for adjustment of status on any proper basis. However, because Mansour was not grandfathered, he is ineligible for adjustment of status under § 245(i).
The BIA's conclusion that Mansour is not entitled to adjustment of status is a persuasive interpretation of § 245(i) and is not plainly erroneous or inconsistent with 8 C.F.R. § 245.10. Under the deference afforded by Skidmore and Auer, this court affirms the BIA.