§ 151-1 Emergency contact information.
§ 151-2 Prevention of false alarms.
§ 151-3 Accuracy of records.
§ 151-4 Costs and maintenance.
§ 151-5 Limitation of responsibility of Township.
§ 151-6 Applicability; exceptions to provisions.
§ 151-7 Violations and penalties.
Fire prevention — See Ch. 283.
Noise from alarms — See Ch. 362, § 362-5B(5).
It shall be the responsibility of all businesses, establishments, corporations, partnerships, entities, firms, concerns, or other groups that maintain alarm systems within the Township of Cinnaminson, to provide current information to the Cinnaminson Township Police Department, which information shall consist of the names and telephone numbers of responsible persons who may be contacted to respond in case of emergency or who are authorized to provide service to the alarm system. Such persons are to be available for calls on a twenty-four-hour basis. This information is to be filed with the Police Department when the alarm system is initially placed into service for new systems installed after the passage of this article, or within 30 days of the effective date of this article, for systems existing prior to the effective date of this article, and is to be revised immediately whenever changes to such information is necessary.
It shall be the responsibility of all businesses, persons, or entities who have alarm systems in businesses, multifamily dwellings, and other nonresidential units within the Township of Cinnaminson to prevent the transmission of false alarms.
A false alarm is hereby determined to be a violation of the provisions of this article and shall subject the property owner to fines and penalties as hereinafter provided.
Eight false alarms in any one-year period.
In the event that the number of false alarms from a single location shall exceed the maximum permissible number of false alarms the owner of the alarm system shall be subject to fines and penalties as hereinafter provided.
Any business, establishment, partnership, entity, firm, concern corporation or other group which installs or maintains any alarm equipment or system within the Township of Cinnaminson, shall provide, on a monthly basis, a report of all subscribers and the number of actual and false alarms received by that monitoring equipment. Such reports will be forwarded to the Police Department of the Township of Cinnaminson for the purpose of assisting in the determination of excessive false alarms.
The Chief of Police of the Township of Cinnaminson is required to maintain reasonable records of number of false alarms within the aforementioned period(s). For first occurrence violations, the Chief shall provide notification of payment due. A subscriber will have 30 days in which to make a full payment.
The original cost and cost of maintenance of the system shall be on the business, establishment, corporation, partnership, entity, firm, concern, or other group owning the burglar or fire alarm systems.
Each present user and any future applicant for such service shall execute and deliver to the Township of Cinnaminson an agreement releasing and saving harmless the Township from any responsibility if any such alarm fails to operate, or if a call is not answered promptly by the Police Department due to insufficiency of personnel on duty at the time such alarm is received.
The provisions contained herein shall apply equally to those alarm systems that were placed in service prior to or subsequent to the effective date of this article.
The provisions of this article shall not apply to the general alerting alarms that may be used by fire companies, ambulance squads or civil defense agencies to summon response of their members. The provisions of this article shall not apply to alarm systems that are affixed to motor vehicles.
Any person violating any provisions of this article shall, upon conviction, be punishable as provided for herein.
No more than maximum. Any person or entity whose alarm system(s) generates no more than the maximum permissible false alarms shall not be subject to fine or penalty.
First offense. Any person or entity whose alarm system(s) generates more than the maximum permissible false alarms may, upon the receipt of a violation notice, plead guilty by affidavit and pay a fine of $100 per false alarm, which, upon such guilty plea, may be paid through the Violations Bureau of the Municipal Court.
Subsequent offenses. Any person or entity whose alarm system(s) generates more than the maximum permissible false alarms and who has been previously cited and pleas or is found guilty under this article shall be scheduled for court. Any business, establishment, partnership, entity, firm, corporation, concern or other group that is found guilty of violating any of the provisions of this section shall be subject to a fine of no less than $250 per violation or not more than $1,000 for the total offenses presented.


Jean K. Gilles Phillips, The Paul E. Wilson Defender Project, University of Kansas School of Law, Lawrence, Kansas, for Petitioner - Appellant.
Jared S. Maag, Assistant Attorney General, Office of the Kansas Attorney General, Topeka, Kansas, for Respondents - Appellees.
This court granted rehearing en banc primarily to consider whether the panel correctly applied deference under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) to the cumulation of Strickland(1) prejudice and Brady(2) materiality where the state courts had not adjudicated the Strickland-Brady cumulation issue on the merits. See Gonzales v. McKune, 247 F.4d 1066, 1077-79 (10th Cir. 2001). At en banc oral argument, the State asserted for the first time that Gonzales had failed to exhaust the Strickland-Brady cumulation issue in state court. Because we agree that Gonzales failed to raise this issue in state court and thus procedurally defaulted it, we vacate our order granting rehearing en banc as improvidently granted. Further, we vacate Part V of the panel opinion, which addressed Strickland-Brady cumulation.
We begin by noting that the State did not waive the defense of exhaustion as to the Strickland-Brady cumulation claim by failing to assert it prior to en banc oral argument.(3) See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(3) ("A State shall not be deemed to have waived the exhaustion requirement or be estopped from reliance upon the requirement unless the State, through counsel, expressly waives the requirement."). Cf. Hale v. Gibson, 227 F.3d 1298, 1327 n.12 (10th Cir. 2000) (holding that state did not waive exhaustion on appeal by failing to assert the issue before district court).
In his petition for discretionary review filed with the Kansas Supreme Court during post-conviction proceedings, Gonzales did not assert a Strickland-Brady cumulation argument.(4) Brief of Appellant, Petition for Review at 1-4, State v. Gonzales, (Kan. 1995) (No. 94-71217-A).(5) Claims not included in a petition for discretionary review to the state's highest court are not exhausted and are procedurally defaulted when, as here, they are now time-barred. O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 845 (1999).
In his supplemental brief on the exhaustion issue, Gonzales makes no effort to argue that he asserted the Strickland-Brady cumulation issue in state court. Nor does he argue that any procedural default of this issue is excused by adequate cause and actual prejudice or a fundamental miscarriage of justice. See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750 (1991). Instead, he offers two arguments for overcoming the exhaustion and procedural default requirements. The second of these arguments plainly is without merit. Gonzales argues that any failure to exhaust the Strickland-Brady cumulation claim is excused because exhaustion of this claim would have been futile. Such futility, he argues, is established by the fact that "[t]here can be no conceivable purpose in requiring state litigation to include an argument of cumulation of various errors when the state courts refused to find any error existed in the first place." (Aplt Supp. B. 5.) This argument fails for two reasons. It is wrong as a factual matter, because only the court of appeals "refused to find any [Brady] error existed in the first place." The Kansas Supreme Court never stated its reason for denying review; thus only through pure speculation could we conclude that its denial was based on a conclusion that the undisclosed material was not exculpatory. Further, it fails as a legal matter, because Gonzales fails to present any authority  and we have found none  in support of the position that an argument is futile merely because in retrospect it appears that the claim would have been denied.
We find this argument unpersuasive. Here, the substance of the claim is that the state courts should have cumulated Strickland prejudice and Brady materiality in determining whether its confidence in the outcome was undermined. The Kansas Supreme Court might have found this argument persuasive, but it never had an opportunity to consider it. To grant Gonzales relief now, on the basis of an argument that he failed (without explanation) to present to the relevant state court, would be contrary to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1).
Accordingly, we hold that Gonzales failed to exhaust the issue of Strickland-Brady cumulation and that the issue now is procedurally defaulted without cause and prejudice or a fundamental miscarriage of justice. Because consideration of that issue was the central reason why the en banc court granted rehearing, we now vacate our order granting rehearing en banc as improvidently granted.
In any event, we perceive no reason to take the unusual step of sua sponte raising exhaustion as to the other issues discussed in the panel opinion. Hardiman v. Reynolds, 971 F.2d 500, 502 (10th Cir. 1992) ("Generally, where the parties have not raised a defense [of exhaustion or procedural default], the court should not address the defense sua sponte."). We note that, unlike the Strickland-Brady cumulation issue, the other issues addressed in the panel opinion were issues that were analyzed by the state court of appeals and discussed in detail by the district court. See id. at 503 n.5 ("[S]ua sponte consideration of a state procedural default might be inefficient where substantial resources have already been spent litigating the merits of a petition or where the defaulted issue is recurring."). Accordingly, we vacate only Part V of the panel opinion.
For the foregoing reasons, Part V of the panel opinion in this case is VACATED, and the order granting rehearing en banc is VACATED.
1. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984).
2. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).
3. We emphasize that this is not a case where a state chose to remain silent on the exhaustion issue until after an opinion had been issued and then asserted the non-exhaustion defense as to those portions of the opinion with which it was not satisfied. As explained more fully in the last paragraph of this section, the State acted properly in this case by addressing the exhaustion issue in its answer to the habeas petition before the district court. The present confusion regarding exhaustion of the Strickland-Brady cumulation issue arose largely because Gonzales failed to raise that issue until after the State already had addressed exhaustion.
4. Gonzales' petition for discretionary review to the Kansas Supreme Court was not included in the record by either party until, after en banc oral argument, this court specifically instructed the parties to submit it as a supplement to the record.
5. Indeed, in his petition before the Kansas Supreme Court, Gonzales did not assert any of the arguments later raised in his present habeas petition: the sole "issue" raised in the state supreme court petition for review was a "request" that the court "review his motion on a de facto [sic] basis" because "[w]ithout a de facto review Mr. Gonzales is without a form [sic] to address his issues." Brief of Appellant, Petition for Review at 3, State v. Gonzales, (Kan. 1995) (No. 94-71217-A). The State nevertheless conceded that Gonzales exhausted the arguments raised in his habeas petition and memorandum in support thereof. Answer & Return at 2, Gonzales v. McKune (D. Kan. 1999) (97-3168-DES).
6. Because the panel only found deficient performance as to one of Gonzales' ineffective assistance of counsel claims, and Gonzales only asserted one Brady violation, the panel properly did not address cumulative error as to Strickland or Brady claims alone.
7. See supra note 5.
8. The State, correctly addressing the exhaustion issue in its answer to the habeas petition, "admit[ted] that petitioner has properly exhausted the issues now presented to this Court." Answer & Return at 2, Gonzales v. McKune (D. Kan. 1999) (97-3168-DES). This admission does not apply to the Strickland-Brady cumulation issue for the simple reason that at the time the admission was made, Gonzales had not yet asserted the Strickland-Brady cumulation issue.


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S Suryanarayanan and R Narasimha, Instability and Turbulence: Shear Layers, Bulletin of the American Physical Society (2010).
Sivaperumal R, Subramanian P, Yadav P and VK Sharma, Analysis of light pulse induced phase shift in locomotor activity rhythm of vg and Cryb mutants of Drosophila melanogaster, Journal of Pharmaceutical Science and Research 2,	433 - 444 (2010).
Lone SR, Ilangovan V, Murugan M and VK Sharma, Circadian resonance in the development of two sympatric species of Camponotus ants, Journal of Insect Physiology 56,	1611 - 1616 (2010).
K. Raidongia, A. Gomati and C.N.R. Rao, “Synthesis and characterization of nanoparticles, nanotubes, nanopans and graphene-like structure of BN, Israel J. Chem. (Special Nano Number) 50,	399 (2010).
C.N.R. Rao, S.R.C. Vivekchand and A. Govindaraj, Inorganic nanotubes and nanowires in “Low dimensional solids”, Eds. D.W. Bruce, D.Oâ€™Hare and R.I. Walton), John Wiley, PP77- 162 (2010).
S. Kumar, N. Kamaraju, K.S. Vasu, A. Nag, A.K. Sood and C.N.R. Rao, Graphene analogue BCN: Femtosecond nonlinear optical susceptibility and hot carrier dynamics, Chem. Phys. Lett. 499,	152 (2010).
S.V. Bhat, S.B. Krupanidhi and C.N.R. Rao, A comparative study of metallic Au and ReO3 nanoparticles on the performance of silicon solar cells, Appl. Phys. Express 3,	115001 (2010).
Roddam Narasimha, Sourabh S. Diwan, Duvvuri Subrahmanyam, K.R.Sreenivas and G.S.Bhat, Laboratory simulations of cumulus cloud flows explain the entrainment anomaly, American Physical Society - Division of Fluid Dynamics: 63rd Annual Meeting, Long Beach, CA (2010).
R Narasimha and Subarna Bhattacharyya, A wavelet cross-spectral analysis of Solar-ENSO-rainfall connections in the Indian Monsoons, Applied and Computational Harmonic Analysis doi:10.1016/j.acha.2010.02.005 28,	285 - 295 (2010).
Das H, Spaldin NA, Waghmare UV, T Saha-Dasgupta, Chemical control of polar behavior in bicomponent short-period superlattices, Phys. Rev. B 81,	235112 - 235119 (2010).
Tripathi S, Kumar A, Waghmare UV, D Pandey, Effect of NaNbO3 substitution on the quantum paraelectric behavior of CaTiO3, Phys. Rev. B 81,	212101 - 212108 (2010).
Anil Kumar and U V Waghmare, First-principles free energies and Ginzburg-Landau theory of domains and ferroelectric phase transitions in BaTiO3, Phys. Rev. B 82,	05411 - 05419 (2010).
Dutta G, Saha SK, Waghmare UV, Effects of Zr and Ti doping on the dielectric response of CeO2: A comparative first-principles study, Sol. State. Comm. 150,	2020 - 2022 (2010).
Choudhury D, Hazarika A, Venimadhav A, Kakarla C, Delaney KT, Devi S, Mondal P, Nirmala R, Gopalakrishnan J, Spaldin NA, Waghmare UV, Sarma DD, Electric and magnetic polarizabilities of hexagonal Ln(2)CuTiO(6)(Ln = Y, Dy, Ho, Er, and Yb), Phys. Rev. B 82,	134203 - 134210 (2010).
Pradhan GK, Kumar A, Deb SK, UV Waghmare and C Narayana, Elastic and structural instability of cubic Sn3N4 and C3N4 under pressure, Phys. Rev. B 82,	144112 - 144118 (2010).
Smith KC, Fisher TS, Waghmare UV, N de Leew, R Grau-crespo, Dopant-vacancy binding effects in Li-doped magnesium hydride, Phys. Rev. B 82,	134109 - 134117 (2010).
Nishimatsu T, Iwamoto M, Kawazoe Y, UV Waghmare, First-principles accurate total energy surfaces for polar structural distortions of BaTiO3, PbTiO3, and SrTiO3: Consequences for structural transition temperatures, Phys Rev B 82,	134106 - 134112 (2010).
A Gupta, UV Waghmare and MS Hegde, Correlation of Oxygen Storage Capacity and Structural Distortion in Transition-Metal-, Noble-Metal-, and Rare-Earth-Ion-Substituted CeO2 from First Principles Calculation, Chemistry of Materials 22,	5184 - 5198 (2010).
Sandeep Kumar, KPSS Hembram, U V Waghmare, Intrinsic buckling strength of graphene: First-principles density functional theory calculations, Phys. Rev. B 82,	11541 (2010).
Kumar A, Kumar P, Waghmare UV, ... AK Sood, First-principles analysis of electron correlation, spin ordering and phonons in the normal state of FeSe1-x, Journal of Physics Cond Mat 22,	385701 - 385708 (2010).
N Dzade, ...., U V Waghmare, Silicene and transition metal based materials: prediction of a two-dimensional piezomagnet, Journal of Physics Cond Mat 22,	375502 - 375510 (2010).
Saikat Mandal, Marappan Sathish, Govindachetty Saravanan, K. K. R. Datta, Qingmin Ji, Jonathan P. Hill, Hideki Abe, Itaru Honma and Katsuhiko Ariga, Open-Mouthed Metallic Microcapsules: Exploring Performance Improvements at Agglomeration-Free Interiors, J. Am. Chem. Soc. 132,	14415 - 14417 (2010).
K. K. R. Datta, B. V. Subba Reddy, Katsuhiko Ariga and Ajayan Vinu, Gold Nanoparticles Embedded in a Mesoporous Carbon Nitride Stabilizer for Highly Efficient Three-Component Coupling Reaction, Angew. Chem. Int. Ed. 49,	5961 - 5965 (2010).
K. Jayaramulu, P. Kanoo, S. J. George and T. K. Maji, Tunable emission from a porous metal-organic framework by employing an excited-state intramolecular proton transfer responsive ligand, Chem. Commun. 46,	7906 - 7908 (2010).
J. van Herrikhuyzen, R. Willems, S. J. George, C. Flipse, J. C. Gielen, P. C. M. Christianen, A. P. H. J. Schenning and S. C. J. Meskers, Atomic Force Microscopy Nanomanipulation of Shape Persistent, Spherical, Self-Assembled Aggregates of Gold Nanoparticles, ACS Nano (2010). In Press.
A. Gomati, K. Gopalakrishnan and C.N.R. Rao, Covalent functionalization of metal oxide and carbon nanostructures with polyoctasilasesquioxane (POSS) and their incorporation in polymer composites, Mater. Res. Bull. (2010).
L.S. Panchakarla, A. Govindaraj and C.N.R. Rao, Boron- and nitrogen-doped carbon nanotubes and graphene , Inorg. Chim. Acta (Achim Muller issue), (2010).
N.J.M. Sanghamitra, N. Varghese and C.N.R. Rao, Effect of curcumin and Cu2+/Zn2+ ions on the fibrillar aggregates formed by the amyloid peptide and other peptides at the organic-aqueous interface, Chem. Phys. Lett. 496,	104 (2010).
C.M. Nagaraja, J.N. Behera, T.K. Maji, S.K. Pati and C.N.R. Rao, Organically templated kagome compounds containing two transition metal ions, Dalton. Trans (Commun.) 39,	6947 (2010).
C.M. Nagaraja, T.K. Maji and C.N.R. Rao, Synthesis and structures of CoII, NiII and CuII coordination frameworks formed by flexible 1, 3- phenylenediacetic acid, J. Mol. Struc. (A. Barnes issue) 976,	168 (2010).
P. Mandal, A. Iyo, Y. Tanaka, A. Sundaresan and C.N.R. Rao, Structure, magnetism and giant dielectric constant of BiCr0.5Mn0.5O3 synthesized at high pressure, J. Mater. Chem. 20,	1646 (2010).
P. Mandal, A. Sundaresan, C.N.R. Rao, A. Iyo, P.M. Shirage, Y. Tanaka, Ch. Simon, V. Pralong, O.I. Lebedev, V. Caignaert and B. Raveau, An interesting case of magnetization reversal in BiFe0.5Mn0.5O3 synthesized at high pressure, Phys. Rev. B (2010).
D. Swain, V.S. Bhadram, G.K. Pradhan, S.V. Bhat, C. Narayana and C.N.R. Rao, Superionic phase transition in KHSO4: A Raman investigation, J. Phys. Chem. (2010).
B. Chitara, D.J. Late, S.B. Krupanidhi and C.N.R. Rao, Room-temperature gas sensors based on GaN nanoparticles, Solid State Commun. (2010).
C.N.R. Rao, K.S. Subrahmanyam, H.S.S.R. Matte, P. Kumar, B. Das, B. Hakeem, D.J. Late and A. Govindaraj, A study of the synthesis of and properties of graphenes, Sci. Tech. Adv. Mater. (2010).
C.N.R. Rao and R. Voggu, Molecular charge-transfer involving graphene and carbon nanotubes, Materials Today (2010).
K.S. Subrahmanyam, A.K. Manna, S.K. Pati and C.N.R. Rao, A study of graphene decorated with metal nanoparticles, Chem. Phys. Lett. 497,	70 (2010).
D. Choudhury, B. Das, D.D. Sarma and C.N.R. Rao, XPS evidence for molecular charge-transfer doping of graphene, Chem. Phys. Lett. 497,	66 (2010).
K.S. Subrahmanyam, P. Kumar, A. Nag and C.N.R. Rao, Blue-light emitting graphene-based materials and their use in generating white light, Solid State Commun. 150,	1774 (2010).
U.K. Gautam, M. Imura, C.S. Rout, Y. Bando, X. Fang, B. Dierre, L. Sukharov, A. Govindaraj, J. Sekiguchi, D. Goldberg and C.N.R. Rao, Unipolar assembly of ZnO rods manifesting polarity-driven collective luminescence, PNAS 107,	13588 (2010).
P. Kumar, L.S. Panchakarla, S.V. Bhat, U. Maitra, K.S. Subrahmanyam and C.N.R. Rao, Photoluminescence, white-light emitting properties and related aspects of ZnO nanoparticles admixed with graphene and GaN, Nanotechnology 21,	385701 (2010).
P. Kumar, S. Saha, C.R. Serrao, A.K. Sood and C.N.R. Rao, Temperature –dependent infrared reflectivity studies of multiferroic TbMnO3: Evidence for spin-phonon coupling, Pramana 74,	281 (2010).
P. Kumar, S. Saha, D.V.S. Muthu, J.R. Sahu, A.K. Sood and C.N.R. Rao, Raman evidence for orbiton-mediated multiphonon scattering in multiferroic TbMnO3, J. Phys. Condens. Matter 22,	115403 (2010).
K. Raidongia, A. Nag, A. Sundaresan and C.N.R. Rao, Multiferroic and magnetoelectric properties of core-shell CoFe2O4@BaTiO3 nanocomposites, Appl. Phys. Lett. 97,	062904 (2010).
U.A. Palnitkar, R.V. Kashid, M.A. Mose, D.S. Joag, L.S. Panchakarla and C.N.R. Rao, Remarkably low turn-on field emission in undoped, nitrogen-doped and boron-doped graphene, Appl. Phys. Lett. 97,	063102 (2010).
K. Biswas, C.S. Rout and C.N.R. Rao, Metal oxide nanostructures: Synthesis, properties and applications in Metal Oxide Nanostructures, Amer. Sci. Publishers 4,	423 (2010).
R. Voggu, S. Ghosh, A. Govindaraj and C.N.R. Rao, New strategies for the enrichment of metallic single-walled carbon nanotubes, J. Nanosci. Nanotech. 10,	4102 (2010).
R. Voggu, A. Shireen and C.N.R. Rao, One-step synthesis of high-purity flourous-capped inorganic nanoparticles, Dalton Trans. (Commun.) 39,	6021 (2010).
K. Raidongia, K.P.S.S. Hembaram, U.V. Waghmare and C.N.R. Rao, Synthesis structure and properties of mesoporous B/C/N microspheres, Zeit. Anorg. Allgem. Chem. 636,	30 (2010).
M.K. Bera, M.K. Sanyal, L. Yang, K. Biswas, A. Gibaud and C.N.R. Rao, Small-angle x-ray scattering study of the aggregation of gold nanoparticles during formation at the toluene-water interface, Phys. Rev. B 81,	115415 (2010).
S. Manjunatha, L.S. Panchakarla, K. Biswas and C.N.R. Rao, Nanorods and nanofilms of ZnO generated at the liquid-liquid interface, Inorg. Chim. Acta. (A. Chakravorty issue) 363,	2125 (2010).
C.N.R. Rao and A. Nag, Inorganic analogues of graphenes, Euro J. Inorg. Chem. (2010).
D. Late, A. Ghosh, K. Subrahmanyam, L.S. Panchakarla, S.B. Krupanidhi and C.N.R. Rao, Characteristics of FETs based on undoped and B- and N-doped few-layer graphenes, Solid State Commun. 150,	734 (2010).
L.S. Panchakarla, Y. Sundarayya, S. Manjunatha, A. Sundaresan and C.N.R. Rao, On the defect origin of room-temperature magnetism-exhibited by metal oxide nanoparticles, Chem. Phys. Chem. 11,	1673 (2010).
U. Maitra, S. Ghosh, K. Biswas and C.N.R. Rao, Scaling behavior of Plasmon coupling in Au and ReO3 nanoparticles incorporated in polymer matrices, PSS Rapid Res. Lett. 4,	169 (2010).
S.K. Samantha, A.Pal, S. Bhattacharya and C.N.R. Rao, Carbon nanotube-reinforced supramolecular gels, J. Mater. Chem. 20,	6881 (2010).
S. Bhattacharya, S.K. Samantha, A. Gomati and C.N.R. Rao, Novel nanocomposites made of BN nanotubes and a physical gel, Langmuir 26,	12230 (2010).
K. Raidongia, A. Nag, K.P.S.S. Hembaram, U.V. Waghmare, R. Datta and C.N.R. Rao, BCN: A graphene analogue with remarkable adsorptive properties, Chem. Eur. J. 16,	149 (2010).
A. Nag, K. Raidongia, R. Datta, K.P.S.S. Hembaram, U.V. Waghmare and C.N.R. Rao, Graphene analogues of BN: Novel synthesis and properties, ACS Nano 4,	1539 (2010).
H.S.S.R. Matte, A. Gomathi, A.K. Manna, D.J. Late, R. Datta, S.K. Pati and C.N.R. Rao, Graphene analogues of MoS2 and WS2, Angew. Chem. Int. Ed. 49,	4059 (2010).
A. Ghosh, K.V. Rao, S.J. George and C.N.R. Rao, Non-covalent functionalization, exfoliation and solubilization of graphene in water employing a fluorescent coronene carboxylate, Chem. Eur. J. (Commun.) 16,	2700 (2010).
R. Voggu, K.V. Rao, S.J. George and C.N.R. Rao, A simple method of separating metallic and semi-conducting SWNTs based on molecular charge transfer, J. Am. Chem. Soc. (Commun.) 132,	5560 (2010).
C.N.R. Rao, A.K. Sood, R. Voggu and K.S. Subrahmanyam, Some novel attributes of graphene, J. Phys. Chem. Lett. (Perspective) 1,	572 (2010).
K. V. Rao, K. Jayaramulu, T. K. Maji and S. J. George, Supramolecular Hydrogels and High-Aspect-Ratio Nanofibers through Charge-Transfer-Induced Alternate Coassembly, Angew. Chem. Int. Ed. 49,	4218 - 4222 (2010).
K. V. Rao and S. J. George, Synthesis and Controllable Self-Assembly of a Novel Coronene Bisimide Amphiphile, Org. Lett. 12,	2656 - 2659 (2010).
A. Ghosh, K.V. Rao, R. Voggu and S. J. George, Non-Covalent Functionalization, Solubilization of Graphene and Single-Walled Carbon Nanotubes with Aromatic Donor and Acceptor Molecules, Chem. Phys. Lett 488,	198 - 201 (2010).
R. Voggu, K.V.Rao, S.J. George and C.N.R.Rao, A Simple Method of Separating Metallic and Semiconducting Single-Walled Carbon Nanotubes Based on Molecular Charge Transfer, J. Am. Chem. Soc 132,	5560 - 5561 (2010).
A. Ghosh, K. V. Rao, S.J. George and C.N.R. Rao, Noncovalent Functionalization, Exfoliation, and Solubilization of Graphene in Water by Employing a Fluorescent Coronene Carboxylate, Chem. Eur. J. 16,	2700 - 2704 (2010).
Asha Gupta, Anil Kumar, M.S. Hegde, and Umesh Waghmare, Structure of Ce1-xSnxO2 and its relations to oxygen storage property from first-principles analysis, J. Chem. Phys. (2010). In Press.
Raidongia K, Nag A, Hembram KPSS, Waghmare UV, Datta R, Rao CNR, BCN: A Graphene Analogue with Remarkable Adsorptive Properties, Chemistry European Journal A 16,	149 - 157 (2010).
Pradeep Kumar, Surajit Saha, Anil Kumar, D. V. S. Muthu, J. Prakash, S. Patnaik, Umesh V. Waghmare, A. K. Ganguli, and A. K. Sood, Anomalous Raman Scattering from Phonons and Electrons of Superconducting FeSe0.82, Sol. State. Comm. Fast Track (2010). In Press.
Somnath Bhowmick and Umesh V Waghmare, Anisotropy of the Stone-Wales Defect and Warping of Graphene Nano-ribbons: A First-principles Analysis, Phys Rev B (2010). In Press.
Deepak J., T. Pradeep and U. V. Waghmare, Gold chains through interaction with carbon nanotube bundles: A first-principles study, Journal of Physics Cond Mat. (2010). In Press.
Angshuman Nag, Kalyan Raidongia, Kailash P. S. S. Hembram, Ranjan Datta, Umesh V. Waghmare, and C. N. R. Rao, Graphene Analogues of BN: Novel Synthesis and Properties, ACS Nano (2010). In Press.
Debraj Choudhury, Adyam Venimadhav, Chandrasekhar Kakarla, Kris T. Delaney, P. Sujatha Devi, P. Mondal, R.Nirmala, J. Gopalakrishnan, Nicola A. Spaldin, Umesh V. Waghmare, D. D. Sarma, Unusual dielectric response in B-site disordered hexagonal transition metal oxides, Appl. Phys. Lett. (2010). In Press.
Venu P, Chakraborty S. and Inamdar M., Analysis of long- term culture properties and pluripotent character of two sibling human embryonic stem cell lines derived from discarded embryos, In vitro Cellular & Developmental Biology - Animal 46,	200 - 205 (2010).
Kalyan Raidongia, K. P. S. S. Hembram, Umesh V. Waghmare, M. Eswaramoorthy, C. N. R. Rao, Synthesis, Structure, and Properties of Mesoporous B/C/N Microspheres, ZAAC 636,	30 - 35 (2010).
Bivas Saha, J Acharya, T Sands and U V Waghmare, Electronic structure, phonons, and thermal properties of ScN, ZrN, and HfN: A first-principles study, J. of Appl. Phys. 107,	033715 (2010).
Madhvendra Nath Tripathi, Umesh Vasudeo Waghmare, Thimmasandra Narayan Ramesh, and P. Vishnu Kamath, Polytypism and Stacking Disorders in Nickel Hydroxide: A First-Principles Study , Journ. Electrochemical Soc 157A,	280 - 286 (2010).
Joydeep Bhattacharjee and Umesh Waghmare, Wannier orbital overlap population (WOOP), Wannier orbital position population (WOPP) and the origin of anomalous dynamical charges, Physics Chem. Chem. Phys (2010). In Press.

matches: V. V. V. V. V. V. V. V. V. V. V. V.


FindACase | Stewart v. Armtech Insurance Service, Inc.
Stewart v. Armtech Insurance Service, Inc.
A farmer who participated in the federal crop insurance program appeals the trial court's confirmation of an arbitration award given when he was retroactively determined to be ineligible to participate in the program for failure to pay the premium and, as a consequence, was required to repay the payment he had received for a loss sustained under another policy. The arbitrator held that the contract upon which the claim was paid was void and that the insurance company was entitled to recover the amount paid on the claim. The trial court affirmed the arbitrator's award, and the policyholder appeals. Finding no basis upon which to conclude that the arbitrator exceeded its authority, we affirm the judgment.
Brian O. Bowhan, Smyrna, Tennessee, for the appellant, Derwood Stewart.
Jeffrey S. Dilley, Clarksdale, Mississippi, for the appellee, Armtech Insurance Service, Inc.
Richard H. Dinkins, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which Frank G. Clement, Jr., P.J., M.S., and Andy D. Bennett, J., joined.
This case involves crop insurance provided to farmers and ranchers pursuant to the Federal Crop Insurance Act, 7 U.S.C. §1501 et. seq. Section 1503 of the Act created the Federal Crop Insurance Corporation ("FCIC"), which administers the crop insurance program and regulates the private sector insurance companies that sell and service the multiple peril crop insurance ("MCPI") policies. The FCIC is supervised by the United States Department of Agriculture's Office of Risk Management, 7 U.S.C. § 6933, which is authorized to administer the program on behalf of FCIC. 7 C.F.R. § 400.701. The FCIC pays a portion of the yearly policy premium, leaving the remainder for the farmer to pay. Per the FCIC's regulations in effect at the time period relevant in this case, failing to pay the premiums caused all policies in which the farmer is the sole insured to be void until the delinquency was paid. See 7 C.F.R. §400.681 (2010).
Derwood Stewart is a farmer who does business as Stewart Nursery and Farms in Warren County. According to the allegations of the complaint, he had purchased crop insurance through an insurance agency not a party to this suit in 2009, but did not pay the full premium for the policy. He subsequently purchased crop insurance from Armtech Insurance Services, Inc. ("Armtech") for 2010 and 2011; at issue in this case is the policy he purchased for crop year 2010. The premium for that policy was $44, 251, of which the federal government's portion was $26, 998, and Mr. Stewart's was $17, 568.80. When he suffered a loss that year, Armtech paid Mr. Stewart $42, 708 for his loss, which represented the crop loss of $58, 159.00, less the balance of his premium due of $12, 699.68.
In 2012, Mr. Stewart was denied eligibility to purchase crop insurance for that year due to his failure to pay the premiums for his 2009 crop insurance; upon learning that he was not eligible, he paid the balance of the 2009 premium. Mr. Stewart was also informed that he would be ineligible to participate in the federal crop insurance program until he repaid the payment he had received for his loss in 2010. Armtech initiated efforts to recover the entire amount it paid to Mr. Stewart in 2010.
Mr. Stewart filed a declaratory judgment action in Warren County Chancery Court on February 28, 2014, seeking a declaration that Armtech was not due a refund because the insurance contract entered into for the 2010 crop year was valid, that he had been compensated for his loss in accordance with the contract, and that the parties' becoming aware that he was ineligible to participate in the crop insurance program after the payment was made was irrelevant. In the alternative, he asked that if the court held that the contract was void, that the premiums paid be used to set off any refund due, which would result in no money being due to Armtech.
On May 1, 2014, the court granted the parties' motion to stay the action while they participated in arbitration, as required by the crop insurance policies. The case was submitted to the arbitrator to decide "whether [the 2010] policy is void, and, if so, whether Armtech is entitled to a return of net benefits paid to Stewart in the amount of $42, 708, plus interest." The arbitrator issued a decision determining that the 2010 contract was void and that Armtech was entitled to recover the sum of $42, 708 plus interest, for a total of $52, 146.78. Of particular importance to Mr. Stewart's argument on appeal, the arbitrator held that "[t]he parties have agreed, by the express terms of their contract, to be bound by the Federal Crop Insurance Act (7 USC 1501 et seq.) and the regulations promulgated thereunder" and that the contract was "to be interpreted and enforced in accordance with the Federal Crop Insurance Act [ ] and regulations promulgated thereunder."


text: locative of রোগ: রোগ [ rōga ] n a disease, an ailment; morbidity; (fig.) an incorrigible bad practice or addiction, a vice (মিথ্যা বলা তার রোগ). রোগ সারা v. to recover from a disease, to be cured of a disease; to come round; (fig.) to be freed from a vice. রোগ হওয়া, রোগে পড়া, রোগে ধরা v. to fall ill, to be attacked with a disease; (fig.) to become a victim to a vice. রোগে ভোগা v. to suffer from an illness. ~ক্লিষ্ট a. disease-stricken, sick. ~গ্রস্থ a. diseased, ailing, sick. ~জনক a. causing disease; unwholesome; (bot.) pathogenic. ~জীবাণু n. a virus, a bacterium (pl. bacteria), a bacillus (pl. bacilli). ~জীর্ণ a. worn-out or run down by disease. ~নিদান n. the cause of a disease. ~নিদানতত্ত্ব n. pathology. ~মুক্ত a. cured of or recovered from a disease; free from disease (রোগমুক্ত থাকা). রোগমুক্ত করা v. to cure of a disease; to bring round. রোগমুক্ত হওয়া v. to recover from a dis ease; to come round. ~মুক্তি n. recovery from a disease. ~যন্ত্রণা n. the agonies of a disease. ~লক্ষণ n. a symptom of a disease. ~শয্যা n. a sick-bed. ~শান্তি same as ~মুক্তি । ~শোক n. pl. disease and bereavement. রোগা a. diseased, ill, sick; sickly; lean, delicate; debilitated, emaciated. রোগা হওয়া v. to grow thin or thinner, to become emaciated; to lose flesh. রোগাক্রান্ত a. attacked with a dis ease, diseased, ill. রোগাটে a. somewhat lean; gaunt; slim. রোগাতঙ্ক n. pathophobia. রোগা-পটকা a. lean and feeble. রোগার্ত a. afflicted with disease or ailment. রোগী a. suffering from a disease; ailing, sick, ill. ☐ n. a sick man, a patient. fem. রোগিণী । রোগের চিকিৎসা treatment of a disease. রোগের যন্ত্রণা same as ~যন্ত্রণা । রোগোপশম n. healing or cure of a disease; abatement of a disease.

matches: v. v. v. v. v. v.


Section 385 is the last section within Subchapter C of the Code. It is a grant of authority to the IRS to write regulations to treat an interest in a corporation as stock or as debt “for purposes of this title.” “This title,” of course, is Title 26, the entire Internal Revenue Code. Thus, if an interest in a corporation is treated as stock under §385, it will be treated as stock for all purposes of the Code.
Treatment as stock under §1504, with possible deconsolidation effects.
As far as the other collateral consequences of the FAFTP rule were concerned, the preamble to the final §385 regulations insisted that an instrument characterized as stock under the regulations should be treated as stock FAFTP. The FAFTP rule has myriad collateral consequences, many of which are likely yet to be discovered. One example of the approach that the regulations take to the FAFTP rule — that involving interests in U.S. real property holding corporations (“USRPHCs”) — is illustrative of the general problem presented by the FAFTP rule.
The preamble to the regulations correctly explains the various permutations of the USRPHC issue. At its simplest, §897 treats a foreign person's gain from the disposition of stock of a USRPHC as taxable, but does not tax gain from the disposition of an “interest solely as a creditor” in a USRPHC. The policy behind the distinction between debt and equity interests in USRPHCs is to tax foreign persons on U.S. real property interests held indirectly through certain USRPHCs. It was thought that a foreign person who owns only straight debt of a USRPHC should not be treated as indirectly owning the USRPHC's real property. Thus, if a foreign person holds straight, non-participating debt of a USRPHC, any gain on the disposition of such debt is not subject to U.S. tax. But if the §385 regulations treat that debt as stock, because for example it is issued as a dividend, any gain on its disposition would be taxable under §897.
The policy underlying the distinction in §897 between stock and debt of a USRPHC rule is unrelated to any policy underlying the §385 regulations. If a foreign person holds an interest in a USRPHC that would under normal rules be respected as debt, he or she does not participate even indirectly in the growth of the value of any U.S. real property owned by the USRPHC. Nevertheless, the preamble to the §385 regulations states that the IRS is prepared to do nothing to solve the collateral damage problem. The reason for refusing to deal with the problem is not that the result makes sense; it quite clearly does not make sense given the policy of the USRPHC rule. Instead, the IRS justified the application of the FAFTP rule by asserting that the same result would arise in any case in which debt of a USRPHC is characterized for federal tax purposes as stock .
This justification is completely illogical. Outside of §385, debt will be treated as equity only when it in fact resembles equity economically and in substance. In fact the regulations under §897 go to some length to prescribe the circumstances in which debt is treated as an interest other than solely as a creditor, for example, where the debt incorporates an equity kicker feature. Debt that is straight debt can be recharacterized as stock under the §385 regulations even where the debt bears all the hallmarks of indebtedness and none of the hallmarks of stock. It is also illogical for the §385 regulations to create an exception from the FAFTP rule for §1504 based on the policy of §1504, without making other exceptions based on the policies of other rules.
Because the §385 regulations can have the effect of treating as stock an instrument that is debt in substance, the rules turn upside down many provisions of the Code — the USRPHC rules of §897 being just one. The rules of the Code that turn on the distinction between debt and equity are predicated on the assumption that the distinction is one going to the substance of the relationship created by the terms of the instrument itself, and not by the circumstances in which the instrument is issued.
The steps down the path at which the §385 regulations arrived at this through-the-looking-glass world are not difficult to reconstruct. Step One was the IRS's desire to curb interest-stripping of the U.S. tax base by foreign persons, particularly in and following inversions. Step Two was the IRS's realization that it lacked plausible authority to take any action in this respect, given the statutory rules in §163(j), tax treaties and elsewhere. As stated in the preamble to the regulations, “although section 385 authorizes the Secretary to prescribe rules to determine whether an interest in a corporation is treated as stock or indebtedness, neither section 385 nor section 163 authorizes a broad rule that disallows an interest deduction under section 163 with respect to an instrument that is otherwise treated as indebtedness.” Step Three was the IRS's discovery of its long-dormant and unused authority under §385 to treat debt as equity — but only FAFTP.
Step Four was the IRS's realization that many inverted companies managed to push debt down into the U.S. target via a debt dividend, particularly where the U.S. target has little or no earnings and profits. This technique became the target of the §385 proposed regulations. All of the verbiage in Reg. §1.385-3 and §1.385-3T is designed to backstop the general rule that a debt dividend gives rise, per se, to an equity instrument.
Having settled on §385 as the solution, at Step Five the IRS was required to live with the statutory injunction that an instrument treated as stock under §385 must be so treated FAFTP. This explains why the rules could not be limited to interest stripping or to inversions. But because the distinction between debt and equity is assumed to be one of substance throughout the Code, the decision to treat as equity what is in economic substance debt cannot but have very far-reaching collateral consequences. Most of the consequences will not make sense, because the underlying substantive rules were predicated upon the assumption that we can distinguish debt from equity based on the terms of the instrument.
The IRS clearly recognized the conundrum it created by treating debt as stock FAFTP. Accordingly, Step Six was the adoption, particularly in the final regulations, of an extensive patchwork of exceptions, carve-outs and limitations from the general rule. None of these exceptions is grounded in any substantive distinction between debt and equity; all of them are designed expressly to ameliorate the undue reach of the FAFTP rule.
The final §385 regulations are now narrowly targeted rules. Their obvious aim is to combat interest stripping by foreign parents from their U.S. subsidiaries. In light of this, for the IRS to insist on the FAFTP principle is beyond disingenuous. The IRS insists on applying this principle only because, if it did not, then §385 cannot logically be the authority for these regulations.
This state of affairs cannot possibly be what Congress had in mind in enacting §385. The reason that §385 was made to apply FAFTP is that Congress envisioned rules that would distinguish debt from equity based on generally applicable indicia, taking into account the terms of the instrument in question. Section 385 itself lists five criteria that Congress envisioned might apply, including proportionality and subordination. With the exception of proportionality (incorporated using an 80% relationship test), not a single one of these criteria is reflected in the final §385 regulations. If Congress had intended §385 to apply to instruments depending on the circumstances in which they were issued, as opposed to the actual terms of the instrument in question, it would not have made §385 apply FAFTP. It follows that the final §385 regulations cannot be authorized by that section of the Code.


I am asked occasionally whether a separation agreement, which was perhaps incorporated in the subsequent judgment of divorce, entered into years ago can be vacated because of subsequent changes in the parties’ circumstances. My usual response is no, since in order to have the agreement vacated, the party must show grounds sufficient to vitiate a contract. The burden of proof in those situations is very high and may also be subject to time limitations. Similarly, with respect to modification of a child support obligation included in a stipulation or a separation agreement, the party must show an unreasonable and unanticipated change in circumstances since the time of the stipulation to justify a modification, and that the alleged changes in that party’s financial position was not of his/her own making. A recent decision by a trial court, Debreau v. Debreau, 2009 N.Y. Slip. Op. 51750 (Sup. Ct. Nassau Co.), demonstrated a good illustration of the above principles, holding that if the parties make a deal as a part of their divorce settlement, provided that the settlement was arrived at fairly, the settlement will stand despite the fact that the circumstances have changed.
When the parties divorced in 2007, they agreed by stipulation to allow the husband’s share of the marital home serve as a prepayment of the child support he would owe for the couple’s four children over the next 15 years. Mr. Deabreu’s child-support obligation was set at $2,972 per month, or a total of about $535,000. The parties agreed that the husband’s share of the $1.85 million Melville house, after paying off its $400,000 mortgage and other expenses, was comparable to that obligation. They therefore stipulated that his obligation would be met by transferring over title. In June 2008, the house sold for only $1.2 million, netting the wife $734,000 rather than the $1.45 million she had anticipated. Ms. Deabreu subsequently filed a motion seeking child support arrears of $484,492, the amount she contends her husband owes to her from 2006 through 2021.
In my opinion, it is not likely that Ms. Debreau would be able to establish an unanticipated and unreasonable change in circumstances in the above situation. I am also left wondering why the house was not sold earlier. I also would like to know if Ms. Debreau entered into this stipulation after discussing the risk of decline in real estate values with her divorce lawyer. Personally, I don’t think that I would recommend this type of an arrangement to a client. The risk of decline in the value of any asset subject to market forces is too great. As a divorce attorney, I would also be concerned about giving advice to the client to retain a fixed asset as a prepayment of future child support or maintenance obligation.
In these uncertain economic times, someone obligated to pay maintenance may lose a job, experience significant investment losses, or suffer other adverse financial events. Can something be done about maintenance under those circumstances? The answer, as I have often written, depends on the specific facts.
A party seeking the reduction of a maintenance obligation bears the burden of establishing a substantial change of circumstances. Klapper v. Klapper, 204 A.D.2d 518 (2d Dept. 1994). In Klapper, the Second Department held that, in determining whether there was a substantial change in circumstances sufficient to warrant downward modification, the change is to be measured by a comparison between the payor’s financial circumstances at the time of the motion for downward modification and at the time of divorce or, as the case may be, the time that the order of which modification is sought was made.” Id. at 519. The Appellate Division, Fourth Department utilized the same standard of review in Able v. Able, 245 A.D.2d 1026 (4th Dept. 1997).
In Simmons v. Simmons, 26 A.D.3d 883 (4th Dept. 2006), defendant lost his job and subsequently moved for a downward modification of his maintenance obligation. The Appellate Division held that since despite defendant’ diligent job search, he had little prospect of finding employment at a salary comparable to his salary at the time of the divorce, the downward modification was warranted.
The party seeking to modify the maintenance provisions of a judgment of divorce in which the terms of a stipulation of settlement have been incorporated but not merged, must demonstrate that the continued enforcement of the party’s maintenance obligations would create an “extreme hardship”. Beard v. Beard, 300 A.D.2d 268 (2d Dept. 2002) (the proper amount of support payable is determined not by a parent’s current economic situation, but by a parent’s assets and earning powers). See also, Domestic Relations Law § 236(B)(9)(b).
A reduction in the payor’s income will not result in decreased maintenance where it is the result of a voluntary action, such as self-imposed retirement. Fendsack v. Fendsack, 290 A.D.2d 682 (3d Dept. 2002); DiNovo v. Robinson, 250 A.D.2D 898 (3d Dept. 1998). In Dallin v. Dallin, 250 A.D.2d 847 (2d Dept. 1998), the Second Department held that Family Court properly rejected the father’s claims that his financial situation, prolonged unemployment, and illnesses warranted a drastic reduction of his maintenance and child support obligations. The father had failed to produce any competent evidence to support his claim that he used his best efforts to obtain employment commensurate with his qualifications and experience or that his medical conditions rendered him unemployable.
In Lenigan v. Lenigan, 146 Misc.2d 627 (Sup.Ct., Albany County 1990), the defendant sought to reduce his maintenance and child support obligations. The defendant claimed that, in the prior three months, his compensation as a stock broker had been reduced. It is well settled that the party seeking to obtain a reduction of support bears the burden of establishing a substantial change of circumstances. Id. A drastic change in income can constitute a substantial change of circumstances. Id. In Lenigan, the defendant was a stockbroker, and by the very nature of his business, his income would fluctuate throughout the year. The Supreme Court held that, adopting the defendant’s theory of allowing a modification based upon temporary fluctuations in income would lead to a ludicrous result. Although the defendant asserted a three-month lull in business, there was nothing to establish that sales would not pick up in the following months.
In conclusion, an experienced divorce lawyer faced with a significant change in client’s economic situation, must carefully construct an argument for the court that the change was not created by his/her client, that the change is significant, that it is likely to last for a some time, and that the client has exhausted all other alternatives.
In Watrous v. Watrous, 292 A.D.2d 691 (3d Dept. 2002), at age 55, the plaintiff voluntarily retired from State employment and, shortly thereafter, moved to terminate or, in the alternative, reduce his maintenance obligation. The plaintiff asserted as a substantial change in circumstances that he took early retirement due to his poor health and would be experiencing a significant reduction in income. A hearing was held and, at the close of plaintiff’s proof, Supreme Court granted defendant’s motion to dismiss, finding that plaintiff had failed to establish a sufficient change in circumstances. The Third Department affirmed on appeal, stating that a maintenance obligation established by a judgment of divorce will not be modified absent clear and convincing proof of a substantial change in circumstances. The record revealed that, at the time of the divorce, Supreme Court was aware of both the medical restrictions on plaintiff’s employment and the possibility that his poor health might cause him to retire early. Accordingly the circumstances existing at the time of the plaintiff’s application for downward modification were foreseeable, and anticipated at the time of the parties’ divorce. Furthermore, the record was devoid of evidence that the reduction in the plaintiff’s income would substantially diminish his standard of living or his ability to satisfy his maintenance obligation. The Third Department therefore concluded that the plaintiff failed to establish a substantial change in circumstances.


text:
“And I saw in the right hand of him that sat on the throne a book written within and on the backside, sealed with seven seals. And I saw a strong angel proclaiming with a loud voice, Who is worthy to open the book, and to loose the seals thereof? And no man in heaven, nor in earth, neither under the earth, was able to open the book, neither to look thereon. And I wept much, because no man was found worthy to open and to read the book, neither to look thereon. And one of the elders saith unto me, Weep not: behold, the Lion of the tribe of Judah, the Root of David, hath prevailed to open the book, and to loose the seven seals thereof. And I beheld, and, lo, in the midst of the throne and of the four beasts, and in the midst of the elders, stood a Lamb as it had been slain, having seven horns and seven eyes, which are the seven Spirits of God sent forth into all the earth. And he came and took the book out of the right hand of him that sat upon the throne” (Revelation 5:1-7).
V. 1. The vision John now sees of God holding the Scroll is very important. It leads us into the rest of Revelation, and the judgment.
The right hand of God is the symbol of His power and authority. He is the almighty and none other than He could have written the Scroll. This Scroll is special in that it has seven pages. Most Scrolls, or what we call books, were written on one side of one sheet of parchment. Once scrolls were finished, they were sealed with wax, and if it came from a king, it was pressed with his signet ring. The seal demonstrates the scrolls authenticity, for only one can signify it with that particular ring. Jesus makes acceptable to God when we accept Him as Savior and He seals us with His signature. There is only One who can write on our hearts, that is King Jesus our High Priest.
A scroll in Greek is biblios. This is where we get the word Bible. The original parchments were biblios, hence a compilation of biblios is contained in our Bible today.
The way these books are set up is amazing. After the seal on one book is broken, and the book opened, the seal for the next biblios appears and can then be broken to open. That this Scroll is seven pages, written on both sides indicates the completion of God’s Word and work. Nothing can be added or removed from this Scroll. It is full and true.
Please know this. Many people will tell you that the Scripture that warns against taking away or adding to the Word of God is just for the Book of Revelation. I promise you, the entire Bible is God’s Revelation to mankind, therefore not one word, jot or tittle should be changed in any way. Jesus said, “For verily I say unto you, Till heaven and earth pass away, one jot or one tittle shall in no wise pass from the law, till all be fulfilled” (Matthew 5:18), and “Heaven and earth shall pass away, but my words shall not pass away” (Matthew 24:35).
“And when I looked, behold, an hand was sent unto me; and, lo, a roll of a book was therein; And he spread it before me; and it was written within and without: and there was written therein lamentations, and mourning, and woe” (Ezekiel 2:9, 10).
The scroll the Lord gave Ezekiel was also written on both side, and from it came lamentation and woes. Those same lamentations and woes will come from this Book of Revelation as well. People’s hearts are hardened and they will not heed the warnings written in either Book. They will continue to curse and mock God. They will pay an eternal price for it.
V. 2. From this second verse up to Revelation 21:3, the phrase “loud voice” is repeated 20 times. A strong angel to me indicates an archangel. This could be Gabriel whose name means the strong and mighty One of God. But since he is not named, that is speculation.
The shout of the loud voice this strong angel used asked a question that rattles beyond all time lines, and to heaven, earth, and below the earth. “Who is worthy?” Meaning who is clean and pure, without spot or wrinkle? Who is worthy to break the seal on the scroll? Knowing that no man could ever be righteous in God’s eyes.
And we see the answer to this question in Revelation 4: 11. “Thou art worthy, O Lord, to receive glory and honour and power: for thou hast created all things, and for thy pleasure they are and were created.” As he wept, John was comforted with, “And one of the elders saith unto me, Weep not: behold, the Lion of the tribe of Judah, the Root of David, hath prevailed to open the book, and to loose the seven seals thereof” (verse 5).
One of the twenty-four elders comforted John by telling him there was one, and who He was who could open the scroll. As the Lion of Judah (Genesis 49:9), Jesus is the King. As the Root of David, He is the King who was prophesied to come (Isaiah 11:1). As the one who prevailed (Revelation 3:21), or overcame all things, Jesus is the only One worthy and able to open this book and deliver it‘s prophecies to the people, and fulfill the prophecies written in this biblios, (Bible). What makes Jesus worthy? His birth, life, sufferings, death, and resurrection, purity of heart, and His shed blood. He had already triumphed over the enemy who tempted Him, and was the ultimate Victor. Finally, God gave judgment into the hand of Jesus (John 5:22). God has been calling mankind to repent by the ministry of His Holy Spirit, but they ignored Him then and are now, and will still during the Tribulation. God has appointed a day for judgment (Acts 17:30, 31) and it will take place.
V. 6. Did John see this powerful, able, sufficient One these names would indicate Jesus was when he looked at Him through his tears? No, He saw the Lamb who had been slain. The term Lamb used here represents the qualities if Jesus, His meekness, His gentleness, His willingness to be killed as the once-for-all Sacrifice that saves. The love and compassion of Jesus for His children showed through His eyes.
The Lion and the Lamb refers to the two ministries of Jesus. The Lamb came first, and was slain. The Lion comes later as the sovereign Judge. Jesus is only called a Lion once in Revelation, but a Lamb 27 times.
Now standing at the right hand of God in the middle of the elders and cherubim, was this Jesus. But now He was in His power as the resurrected Savior. The seven horns are expressions of His power, authority, dominion, and government. In Daniel 8:20, horns represented the kings of Media and Persia.
V. 7. Once the vision had convinced John of the worthiness and qualifications of Jesus to open the Scroll, Jesus moved to the throne of God, reached forth, and took the scroll from the Father’s right hand, His hand of righteousness (Isaiah 41:10). Praise the Lamb who is the powerful Lion worthy to unseal the scrolls!
“And when he had taken the book, the four beasts and four and twenty elders fell down before the Lamb, having every one of them harps, and golden vials full of odours, which are the prayers of saints. And they sung a new song, saying, Thou art worthy to take the book, and to open the seals thereof: for thou wast slain, and hast redeemed us to God by thy blood out of every kindred, and tongue, and people, and nation; And hast made us unto our God kings and priests: and we shall reign on the earth. And I beheld, and I heard the voice of many angels round about the throne and the beasts and the elders: and the number of them was ten thousand times ten thousand, and thousands of thousands; Saying with a loud voice, Worthy is the Lamb that was slain to receive power, and riches, and wisdom, and strength, and honour, and glory, and blessing. And every creature which is in heaven, and on the earth, and under the earth, and such as are in the sea, and all that are in them, heard I saying, Blessing, and honour, and glory, and power, be unto him that sitteth upon the throne, and unto the Lamb for ever and ever. And the four beasts said, Amen. And the four and twenty elders fell down and worshipped him that liveth for ever and ever”(Revelation 5:8-14).
V. 8. Now Jesus had taken, or “took” the scroll. Took here is a verb that denotes completion. When He took the scroll, that part of Christian history was finished. The elders had found the Lamb who was worthy to unseal and open the scroll. Once He had taken the book from the right hand of the Father, the search was over. This is another “it is finished” moment in the ministry of Jesus the Christ.
Look at the behavior of the four living creatures and the twenty-four elders. They immediately go into worship, not of God the Father seated on the throne, but of Jesus who was standing before them holding the scroll. This signifies that the Lamb who was slain is not only a resurrected man whom God had sent as Mediator between Himself and man, but that Jesus is fully God and worthy of this worship. Praise the Almighty Lord!!!
The harps the elders are holding, but not playing, are symbols of worship (I Chronicles 25:3; Psalm 33:2; 150:3). Don’t ever let anyone tell you there should be no music in the church. Praising God with raised, hands, musical instruments and a LOUD voice are throughout the Bible. The saints of the church used the harp along with other instruments in praise and worship. The elders are holding these harps as a display of their praise and worship to Jesus for giving up so much to redeem sinners. But I’m with J. Vernon McGee when he says, “I am so glad I found out that I am not going to be an angel playing on a harp in heaven  that just doesn’t appeal to me! You may want a harp, and if you want one, I guess in heaven they will get you one, but I am thankful I don’t have to have one.” Personally, I will be too busy to want to be encumbered by a large musical instrument. I want to sing praises to the Lord with my new voice while on my face at His feet for the first 10.000 years. Then I want to sing praises while running around checking out heaven and meeting all the saints. We will not sing the old song of creation, but the new song of redemption.
Along with the harps, the elders also had golden bowls full of incense. The incense represents the purified prayers of the saints of God. So here the elders are acting as priests offering up the fragrant aroma of the prayers that Jesus prayed while He was on earth, and those of all the saints who ever uttered a prayer (Psalm 141:2; Luke 1:10). The prayers Jesus said were already pure, but ours are not, for we know not how to pray (Romans 8:26 AMP).
V. 9. See here! The new song is coming from their tongues now, and we know it’s the redemption song, because it says so. Jesus is worthy to unseal the scroll because He was chosen as the personality of God who had been slain to redeem us to God by His blood (John 1:29; Hebrews 9:12; I Peter 1:18, 19).
What people did He save?
Any who would acknowledge Him as the Savior and Lord of their lives.
From what people group did He save them?
All of them! Jesus called people from every nation, tongue, and tribe. God is no respecter of persons (Acts 10:34; Romans 2:11; Ephesians 6:9; I Peter 1:17). Could God have made this any clearer? We are all equal in His site. There is ONLY saved and unsaved, redeemed and needing redemption. Remember what the song says? “Red, yellow, black, or white, we are precious in His sight.” No lie! He loves everyone equally.
V. 10. Let’s understand one thing before we go on. Whatever was promised to Israel is now ours too, because we are in Jesus, and He in us. We are all God’s chosen who accept Jesus as Savior and are received by Him. We are kings in the kingdom, and we will reign with Christ forever. As kings we will have rule and authority over sin and satan. As priests (Exodus 19:6), we will have authority to reign with Jesus on the earth, and to offer up the sacrifices of prayer and praise. We will reign with Jesus for 1000 years in these capacities.
V. 11, 12. I will not get into the distracting business of trying to figure out how many angels are being talked about here. Know that there are millions of angels of varying degrees of responsibility. Here what could be referred to as a multitude is worshipping Jesus. We can believe that as the many angels are around God’s throne, so are Michael, Gabriel, Uriel, and Raphael.
What are these angels doing? They are not singing here, they are saying, (declaring or pronouncing) in a loud voice that Jesus is the worthy One.
Because it is a public announcement they are making to affirm and signify that Jesus is the ONLY one worthy for He’s the pure, sinless, holy Son of God.
What do they call this worthy Son?
A Lamb! A lamb is meek, mild, and friendly. He was telling us the nature and sacrifice of Jesus. Jesus is our Shepherd whose voice we hear and follow (John 10:4). Jesus is our Bridegroom (Mark 2:19, 20). Jesus is the Judge (II Timothy 4:1). To the church, the redeemed, His bride, Jesus is gentle. To his enemies and the enemies of God, Jesus will come in power and in might and judge this old world.
V. 13, 14. Every created being, human, angelic, animal, fish, or whatever will one day cry out that Jesus is the Lamb worthy of all praise, honor, glory etc... Jesus said that if the people did not worship Him, the rocks would cry out in praise.
“And he answered and said unto them, I tell you that, if these should hold their peace, the stones would immediately cry out” (Luke 19:40).
Many teach that this is not for the church today as we will be taken out before all this happens. I resist this attempt of satan to blind our eyes. This is a warning to all of us. Revelation is a forth telling of what’s to come. We need to be giving God the Father, Son, and Spirit honor and glory now. Let’s not be like the five foolish oil-less, light-less virgins who were unprepared for their Bridegroom. Let’s not stumble in the darkness of this earth and its sin. Let’s light out lamps, walk in grace and mercy and in the freedom of our redemption so that we can assist many others out of the world of darkness.

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The principles that govern this ground of appeal are not in doubt.
 First, the trial judge’s credibility findings are owed significant deference on appeal. They should not be interfered with unlessthey “cannot be supported on any reasonable view of the evidence”: R. v. P.(R.), 2012 SCC 22 (CanLII),  1 S.C.R. 746; and R. v. Burke, 1996 CanLII 229 (SCC),  1 S.C.R. 474, at para. 7.
 Second, significant testimonial inconsistencies should be addressed because, as the Supreme Court noted in R. v. Gagnon,2006 SCC 17 (CanLII),  1 S.C.R. 621, at para. 21, the accused is entitled to know “why the trial judge is left with no reasonable doubt”. However, a trial judge is not required to refer to or resolve every inconsistency raised by the defence in the course of his or her reasons: R. v. R.(C.), 2010 ONCA 176 (CanLII), 260 O.A.C. 52, at para. 48.
 Third, an appellate court should not interfere with a trial judge’s findings of credibility if the core of the complainant’s allegations against an appellant remain largely intact on a review of the entirety of the evidence: R. v. Roy, 2017 ONCA 30 (CanLII), at para. 14; R. v. Barua, 2014 ONCA 34 (CanLII), 315 O.A.C. 83, at paras. 7-8; and R. v. Marleau (2005), 2005 CanLII 8667 (ON CA), 197 O.A.C. 29 (C.A.), at para. 7.
 Applying these principles, I would reject this ground of appeal.

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Ver. 1. Baltassar. He is believed to be the same as Nabonides, the last of the Chaldean kings, grandson to Nabuchodonosor. He is called his son v. 2, 11, &c. according to the style of the Scriptures, because he was a descendant from him. Ch. S. Jer. in Is. xiii. Usher, &c. --- Some think that he was brother of Evilmerodac. v. 11. Bar. i. 11. But he seems rather to have been his son. Jer. xxvii. 7. Profane authors place Neriglissor and Laborosoarchod between them. They were not of the royal family, and might be looked upon as usurpers, or reigned in some other place; or they did not meddle with the Jews. C. --- It is wonderful that Josephus should prefer these authors; (T.) yet he abandons the dates given by them. Ant. x. 12. & c. Ap. 1. They represent Nabonides as a simple Babylonian raised to the throne, defeated by Cyrus, and suffered to retire into Carmania; whereas, Baltassar was slain. v. 29. C. --- The others were of a different lineage, and are mentioned by Eus. &c. Evilmerodac certainly preceded him on the throne, and honoured Joachim in the 37th years of his captivity. W. --- Thousand; or, "for his officers over a thousand men." Theodot. --- Every. Chal. "and drank wine before the thousand," more than any, for this was deemed a great perfection; or he drank in their presence, but apart. C. --- The Persian monarchs used to sit in a separate apartment, with a veil before the door, so that they could see the guests without being seen. A great chandelier was before them; (Athen. iv. 10.) probably on the outside, otherwise it would have defeated their purpose. Light sufficient would appear for Baltassar to see the hand-writing on his chamber wall. v. 5. H. --- According to the order of time, this chapter should be placed after the vii. and viii. C. --- But those contain visions. H.
Ver. 6. Loosed, so that he quaked for fear. Ezec. xxix. 7. C. --- He was not so drunk as to be deprived of sense. H. --- This happened in the 17th and last year of his reign, when Daniel was about a hundred years old, (W.) though we have no certain account of his age. H. --- He might be eighty-two when he died. C.
Ver. 7. Purple. This and the chain were reserved for the highest nobility. --- Third, or one of the three great officers. C. vi. 1. and 2 K. xxiii. 8. 19.
Ver. 8. Read. It was written in Samaritan characters; or, for want of vowels, could not be read or understood. C.
Ver. 10. The queen. Not his wife, but the mother of the king; (Ch.) Amyit, widow of Nabuchodonosor, and sister of Darius, the Mede; or (C.) Nitocris, the mother of Labynithus, (Herod. i.) whom many confound with Baltassar. C.
Ver. 11. Father. So a grandfather might be styled. Jer. xxvii. 7. W. ---Daniel was not perhaps at the head of the wise men. C. --- They were too jealous to mention him; and the intoxicated king and courtiers remembered not his merit, till an aged matron suggested that he should be consulted. He was probably (H.) in some office, at Susa, yet happened to be then in Babylon, (C.) which was besieged; and thither he might have retired at the approached of Cyrus.
Ver. 16. Difficult. Lit. "things which are tied," or perplexing. H. --- The Persians still used the like expressions, to imply an intelligent governor. Chardin.
Ver. 17. Another. He does not refuse the offers, but civilly replies that he will give satisfaction without regard to any recompense.
Ver. 19. Slew. He was an absolute monarch, and considered his subjects as so many slaves. C. --- Xerxes having called together his nobles, that he might not seem to have resolved on the war with Greece alone, said: "Nevertheless, remember that you have to obey rather than to advise." V. Max. 9. 5. 2.
Ver. 21. Beasts. His disordered imagination made him dwell with them. W. --- It is strange that such an example should have been so soon forgotten, that Daniel is forced to repeat it so explicitly. C. iv. 13.
Ver. 23. Vessels. Only part had been returned to Sedecias: (C. i. 2.) but they were taken again, and kept in the palace, or in the temple of Bel. H. --- Breath, or soul. Gen. ii. 7. C.
Ver. 25. Phares. These words consist of three letters, mona, thokol, pros, as we add o merely for pronunciation. Being unconnected and almost destitute of vowels, (H.) it is not easy even for the learned to read these words, or to ascertain their meaning. Thus d b r being placed in a similar situation, it would be impossible to determine the sense; as it may have ten different meanings, according as it is pronounced. v. 8. C. --- Mane is twice repeated, to shew the certainty and exactitude of the numbering. M. --- Yet in the sequel each word occurs once and unconnected, as it is here in the Vulg.; not Mene, Mene, Tekel, Upharsin, (Prot. H.) "He hath numbered, weighed, and the dividers or the Persians" are upon thee, (T.) as Dalila said to Samson. Only three words (H.) were written. S. Jer. --- The rest contain the prophet's explanation. The Chaldean empire had now attained its utmost height. Its king brought ruin upon himself by his wicked life. H. --- He would soon be divided with the sword, and his kingdom shared between the Medes and Persians. S. Jer.
Ver. 28. Persians. Those who confound Baltassar with Nabonides, say that Cyrus made himself master of all the empire. How then was it divided? Darius rather took possession of the greatest part while Cyrus had Persia, (C.) till his uncle's death. H.
Ver. 29. Third, or over a third part. S. Jer. v. 7. H. The honours wee conferred without delay, and they would have been made public in the morning. But death prevented the king; and Daniel did not enjoy them till they were ratified by Darius, to whom he adhered. C. --- The Medes then besieged the city, which they took that night, when most part were drunk. W. --- It was a solemn festival. Is. xxi. S. Jer. --- Cyrus rushed in by the channel of the Euphrates, and two of the king's guards slew him to revenge themselves. Xenoph. 7. Beros.
Ver. 31. Darius. He is called Cyaxares by the historians, and was the son of Astyages, and uncle to Cyrus (Ch.) as well as to Baltassar, by the mother's side. He is styled Astyages, (C. xiii. 65.) or Artaxerxes. Sept. C. vi. 1. He takes the title of king both of the Medes and Persians. C. vi. 8. &c. C.

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After respondent Shannon Carter, a student in petitioner public school district, was classified as learning disabled, school officials met with her parents to formulate an individualized education program (IEP), as required under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. 1400 et seq. Shannon's parents requested a hearing to challenge the proposed IEP's appropriateness. In the meantime, Shannon's parents enrolled her in Trident Academy, a private school specializing in educating children with disabilities. After the state and local educational authorities concluded that the IEP was adequate, Shannon's parents filed this suit, claiming that the school district had breached its duty under IDEA to provide Shannon with a "free appropriate public education," 1401(a)(18), and seeking reimbursement for tuition and other costs incurred at Trident. The District Court ruled in the parents' favor, holding that the proposed IEP violated IDEA, and that the education Shannon received at Trident was "appropriate" and in substantial compliance with IDEA's substantive requirements, even though the school did not comply with all of the Act's procedures. In affirming, the Court of Appeals rejected the school district's argument that reimbursement is never proper when the parents choose a private school that is not approved by the State or that does not comply with all of the requirements of 1401(a)(18).
A court may order reimbursement for parents who unilaterally withdraw their child from a public school that provides an inappropriate education under IDEA and put the child in a private Page II school that provides an education that is otherwise proper under IDEA, but does not meet all of 1401(a)(18)'s requirements. Pp. 4-8.
(a) In School Comm. of Burlington v. Department of Ed. of Mass., 471 U.S. 359, 369 -370, the Court recognized the right of parents who disagree with a proposed IEP to unilaterally withdraw their child from public school and place the child in private school, and held that IDEA's grant of equitable authority empowers a court to order school authorities retroactively to reimburse the parents if the court ultimately determines that the private placement, rather than the proposed IEP, is proper under the Act. P. 4.
(b) Trident's failure to meet 1401(a)(18)'s definition of a "free appropriate public education" does not bar Shannon's parents from reimbursement, because the section's requirements cannot be read as applying to parental placements. The 1401(a)(18) requirements that the education be "provided . . . under public supervision and direction," and that the IEP be designed by "a representative of the local educational agency" and "establish[ed]," "revise[d]," and "review[ed]" by the agency, will never be met in the context of a parental placement. Therefore, to read them as applying to parental placements would effectively eliminate the right of unilateral withdrawal recognized in Burlington, and would defeat IDEA's purpose of ensuring that children with disabilities receive an education that is both appropriate and free. Similarly, the 1401(a)(18)(B) requirement that the school meet the standards of the state educational agency does not apply to private parental placements. It would be inconsistent with the Act's goals to forbid parents from educating their child at a school that provides an appropriate education simply because that school lacks the stamp of approval of the same public school system that failed to meet the child's needs in the first place. Parents' failure to select a state-approved program in favor of an unapproved option does not itself bar reimbursement. Pp. 4-7.
(c) The school district's argument that allowing reimbursement for parents such as Shannon's puts an unreasonable burden on financially strapped local educational authorities is rejected. Reimbursement claims need not worry school officials who conform to IDEA's mandate to either give the child a free appropriate public education in a public setting or place the child in an appropriate private setting of the State's choice. Moreover, parents who unilaterally change their child's placement during the pendency of IDEA review proceedings are entitled to reimbursement only if a federal court concludes both that the Page III public placement violated IDEA and that the private placement was proper under the Act. Finally, total reimbursement will not be appropriate if a court fashioning discretionary equitable relief under IDEA determines that the cost of the private education was unreasonable. P. 7-8.
950 F.2d 156 (C.A. 9 1991), affirmed.
The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 84 Stat. 175, as amended, 20 U.S.C. 1400 et seq. (1988 ed. and Supp. IV), requires States to provide disabled children with a "free appropriate public education," 1401(a)(18). This case presents the question whether a court may order reimbursement for parents who unilaterally withdraw their child from a public school that provides an inappropriate education under IDEA and put the child in a private school that provides an education that is otherwise proper under IDEA, but does not meet all the requirements of 1401(a)(18). We hold that the court may order such reimbursement, and therefore affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
Respondent Shannon Carter was classified as learning disabled in 1985, while a ninth grade student in a school operated by petitioner Florence County School District Four. School officials met with Shannon's parents to formulate an individualized education program (IEP) for Shannon, as required under IDEA. 20 U.S.C. 1401(a)(18) and (20), 1414(a)(5) (1988 ed. [ FLORENCE COUNTY SCH. DIST. FOUR v. CARTER, ___ U.S. ___ (1993) , 2] and Supp. IV). The IEP provided that Shannon would stay in regular classes except for three periods of individualized instruction per week, and established specific goals in reading and mathematics of four months' progress for the entire school year. Shannon's parents were dissatisfied, and requested a hearing to challenge the appropriateness of the IEP. See 1415(b)(2). Both the local educational officer and the state educational agency hearing officer rejected Shannon's parents' claim and concluded that the IEP was adequate. In the meantime, Shannon's parents had placed her in Trident Academy, a private school specializing in educating children with disabilities. Shannon began at Trident in September, 1985, and graduated in the spring of 1988.
Shannon's parents filed this suit in July, 1986, claiming that the school district had breached its duty under IDEA to provide Shannon with a "free appropriate public education," 1401(a)(18), and seeking reimbursement for tuition and other costs incurred at Trident. After a bench trial, the District Court ruled in the parents' favor. The court held that the school district's proposed educational program and the achievement goals of the IEP "were wholly inadequate" and failed to satisfy the requirements of the Act. App. to Pet. for Cert. 27a. The court further held that, "[a]lthough [Trident Academy] did not comply with all of the procedures outlined in [IDEA]," the school "provided Shannon an excellent education in substantial compliance with all the substantive requirements" of the statute. Id., at 37a. The court found that Trident evaluated Shannon quarterly, not yearly as mandated in [IDEA], it "provided Shannon with low teacher-student ratios, and it developed a plan which allowed Shannon to receive passing marks and progress from grade to grade." Ibid. The court also credited the findings of its own expert, who determined that Shannon had made "significant progress" at Trident, [ FLORENCE COUNTY SCH. DIST. FOUR v. CARTER, ___ U.S. ___ (1993) , 3] and that her reading comprehension had risen three grade levels in her three years at the school. Id, at 29a. The District Court concluded that Shannon's education was "appropriate" under IDEA, and that Shannon's parents were entitled to reimbursement of tuition and other costs. Id., at 37a.
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed. 950 F.2d 156 (1991). The court agreed that the IEP proposed by the school district was inappropriate under IDEA. It also rejected the school district's argument that reimbursement is never proper when the parents choose a private school that is not approved by the State or that does not comply with all the terms of IDEA. According to the Court of Appeals, neither the text of the Act nor its legislative history imposes a "requirement that the private school be approved by the state in parent placement reimbursement cases." Id, at 162. To the contrary, the Court of Appeals concluded, IDEA's state-approval requirement applies only when a child is placed in a private school by public school officials. Accordingly, "when a public school system has defaulted on its obligations under the Act, a private school placement is `proper under the Act' if the education provided by the private school is `reasonably calculated to enable the child to receive educational benefits.'" Id., at 163, quoting Board of Ed of Hendrick Hudson Central School Dist. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 207 (1982).
In School Comm. of Burlington v. Department of Ed. of Mass., 471 U.S. 359, 369 (1985), we held that IDEA's grant of equitable authority empowers a court "to order school authorities to reimburse parents for their expenditures on private special education for a child if the court ultimately determines that such placement, rather than a proposed IEP, is proper under the Act." Congress intended that IDEA's promise of a "free appropriate public education" for disabled children would normally be met by an IEP's provision for education in the regular public schools or in private schools chosen jointly by school officials and parents. In cases where cooperation fails, however, "parents who disagree with the proposed IEP are faced with a choice: go along with the IEP to the detriment of their child if it turns out to be inappropriate or pay for what they consider to be the appropriate placement." Id., at 370. For parents willing and able to make the latter choice, "it would be an empty victory to have a court tell them several years later that they were right, but that these expenditures could not, in a proper case, be reimbursed by the school officials." Ibid. Because such a result would be contrary to IDEA's guarantee of a "free appropriate public education," we held that "Congress meant to include retroactive reimbursement to parents as an available remedy in a proper case." Ibid.
As this case comes to us, two issues are settled: 1) the school district's proposed IEP was inappropriate under IDEA, and 2) although Trident did not meet the 1401(a)(18) requirements, it provided an education otherwise proper under IDEA. This case presents the narrow question whether Shannon's parents are barred from reimbursement because the private school in which Shannon enrolled did not meet the 1401(a)(18) definition [ FLORENCE COUNTY SCH. DIST. FOUR v. CARTER, ___ U.S. ___ (1993) , 5] of a "free appropriate public education." * We hold that they are not, because 1401(a)(18)'s requirements cannot be read as applying to parental placements.
Section 1401(a)(18)(A) requires that the education be "provided at public expense, under public supervision and direction." Similarly, 1401(a)(18)(D) requires schools to provide an IEP, which must be designed by "a representative of the local educational agency," 20 U.S.C. 1401(a)(20) (1988 ed., Supp. IV), and must be "establish[ed]," "revise[d]," and "review[ed]" by the agency, 1414(a)(5). These requirements do not make sense in the context of a parental placement. In this case, as in all Burlington reimbursement cases, the parents' rejection of the school district's proposed IEP is the very reason for the parents' decision to put their child in a private school. In such cases, where the private placement has necessarily been made over the school district's objection, the private school education will not be under "public supervision and direction." Accordingly, to read the 1401(a)(18) requirements as applying to parental placements would effectively eliminate the right of unilateral withdrawal recognized in Burlington. Moreover, IDEA was intended to ensure that children with disabilities receive an education that is both appropriate and free. Burlington, supra, at 373. To read the provisions of 1401(a)(18) to bar reimbursement in the circumstances of this case would defeat this [ FLORENCE COUNTY SCH. DIST. FOUR v. CARTER, ___ U.S. ___ (1993) , 6] statutory purpose.
Nor do we believe that reimbursement is necessarily barred by a private school's failure to meet state education standards. Trident's deficiencies, according to the school district, were that it employed at least two faculty members who were not state-certified, and that it did not develop IEPs. As we have noted, however, the 1401(a)(18) requirements - including the requirement that the school meet the standards of the state educational agency, 1401(a)(18)(B) - do not apply to private parental placements. Indeed, the school district's emphasis on state standards is somewhat ironic. As the Court of Appeals noted, "it hardly seems consistent with the Act's goals to forbid parents from educating their child at a school that provides an appropriate education simply because that school lacks the stamp of approval of the same public school system that failed to meet the child's needs in the first place." 950 F.2d, at 164. Accordingly, we disagree with the Second Circuit's theory that "a parent may not obtain reimbursement for a unilateral placement if that placement was in a school that was not on [the State's] approved list of private" schools. Tucker, 873 F.2d, at 568 (internal quotation marks omitted). Parents' failure to select a program known to be approved by the State in favor of an unapproved option is not itself a bar to reimbursement.
Furthermore, although the absence of an approved list of private schools is not essential to our holding, we note that parents in the position of Shannon's have no way of knowing at the time they select a private school whether the school meets state standards. South Carolina keeps no publicly available list of approved private schools, but instead approves private school placements on a case-by-case basis. In fact, although public school officials had previously placed three children with disabilities at Trident, see App. to Pet. for Cert. 28a, [ FLORENCE COUNTY SCH. DIST. FOUR v. CARTER, ___ U.S. ___ (1993) , 7] Trident had not received blanket approval from the State. South Carolina's case-by-case approval system meant that Shannon's parents needed the cooperation of state officials before they could know whether Trident was state-approved. As we recognized in Burlington, such cooperation is unlikely in cases where the school officials disagree with the need for the private placement. 471 U.S., at 372 .
There is no doubt that Congress has imposed a significant financial burden on States and school districts that participate in IDEA. Yet public educational authorities who want to avoid reimbursing parents for the private education of a disabled child can do one of two things: give the child a free appropriate public education in a public setting, or place the child in an appropriate private setting of the State's choice. This is IDEA's mandate, and school officials who conform to it need not worry about reimbursement claims.
Moreover, parents who, like Shannon's, "unilaterally change their child's placement during the pendency of review proceedings, without the consent of the state or local school officials, do so at their own financial risk." Burlington, supra, at 373-374. They are entitled to reimbursement only if a federal court concludes both that the public placement violated IDEA, and that the [ FLORENCE COUNTY SCH. DIST. FOUR v. CARTER, ___ U.S. ___ (1993) , 8] private school placement was proper under the Act.
Finally, we note that, once a court holds that the public placement violated IDEA, it is authorized to "grant such relief as the court determines is appropriate." 20 U.S.C. 1415(e)(2). Under this provision, "equitable considerations are relevant in fashioning relief," Burlington, 471 U.S., at 374 , and the court enjoys "broad discretion" in so doing, id., at 369. Courts fashioning discretionary equitable relief under IDEA must consider all relevant factors, including the appropriate and reasonable level of reimbursement that should be required. Total reimbursement will not be appropriate if the court determines that the cost of the private education was unreasonable.

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