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Third, ask the lawyer how many cases like your case has the lawyer handled?
Fourth and most importantly, trust your instincts. If the lawyer does not make you feel comfortable, then don’t go any further.
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The answer to this is very simple. When you talk with us, you will hear and feel the difference. We will actually take the time to listen to you and not pressure you to hire us. If we don’t think we are the right Rich criminal counsel for you, we will tell you.
On October 1, 2000, Hudgins pushed an eleven-year-old boy (the victim) from his bicycle and took the bicycle from him.
On February 28, 2001, the grand jury returned an indictment charging that, “On or about Sunday, October 1, 2000,” Hudgins “did rob the victim of U.S. Currency or other personal property, in violation of counsel Code § 18.2-58.” The value of the property taken was not alleged in the indictment. In a bench trial on March 16, 2001, Hudgins was tried on the robbery indictment and acquitted of robbery. The record of the present trial reflects that before acquitting Hudgins of robbery, the trial court had indicated its belief that the evidence was sufficient to support a conviction for larceny from the person, but that it could not convict Hudgins of that offense because larceny from the person was not a lesser-included offense of robbery. See Graves, 21 Va. App. at 166, 462 S.E. 2d at 904 (holding that grand larceny from the person was not a lesser offense included within the robbery specification of the indictment).
The record does not reflect whether the Commonwealth asked the trial court to find Hudgins guilty of larceny of the bicycle or whether, in reliance on our holding in Graves, the trial court concluded the Commonwealth could seek a subsequent indictment for grand larceny from the person. Whatever the Commonwealth’s intention, it does not impact our decision of whether the acquittal of robbery at the first trial necessarily acted as an acquittal of the larceny of the bicycle.
Hudgins moved to dismiss the indictment on grounds of former jeopardy because of his prior acquittal of robbery based on the same facts. In a memorandum in support of that motion, he conceded that this Court held in Graves, under an indictment charging robbery, that it was impermissible to instruct the jury that it could convict the accused of the offense of grand larceny from the person. Hudgins argued that in obtaining the second indictment, the Commonwealth impermissibly relied on the same theft from the same person as the basis for the subsequent indictment that had been the basis of the first indictment on which he was acquitted. The Commonwealth conceded in the trial court that, “the ‘same conduct’ by Hudgins resulted in the two indictments, one for Robbery of which he was acquitted, and one for Grand Larceny from the Person,” of which he was convicted.
After hearing evidence, the trial court convicted Hudgins of grand larceny from the person, and he noted this appeal.
On appeal, Hudgins contends the trial court erroneously ruled that his prosecution and conviction for grand larceny from the person, after his previous acquittal for robbery arising out of the same theft, did not violate double jeopardy principles. He argues that the offense of larceny from the person, the offense for which he was convicted, is a lesser-included offense of robbery, the offense for which he was acquitted, and that the subsequent prosecution for larceny from the person violated his protections against double jeopardy.
The double jeopardy protections of the counsel and United States Constitutions provide that no person shall “be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.” Commonwealth v. Washington, 263 Va. 298, 304, 559 S.E. 2d 636, 638 (2002); see U.S. Const. amend V; Va. Const. art. I § 8. These protections prevent prosecution under successive indictments “when (1) the two offenses involved are identical, (2) the former offense is lesser-included in the subsequent offense; and (3) the subsequent offense is lesser-included in the former offense.” Martin v. Commonwealth, 221 Va. 720, 722, 273 S.E. 2d 778, 780 (1981) (citing Roderick Cecil Jones v. Commonwealth, 218 Va. 757, 759, 240 S.E. 2d 658, 660 (1978)); see Coleman v. Commonwealth, 261 Va. 196, 199, 539 S.E. 2d 732, 733-34 (2001). Likewise, the double jeopardy protections prevent multiple punishments for the same offense in a single trial. Jordan v. Commonwealth, 2 Va. App. 590, 347 S.E. 2d 152, 3 Va. Law Rep. 132 (1986).
“It is well established that the Double Jeopardy Clause forbids the retrial of a defendant who has been acquitted of the crime charged.” Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U.S. 430, 437, 68 L. Ed. 2d 270, 101 S. Ct. 1852 (1981).
An acquittal is accorded special weight. The constitutional protection against double jeopardy unequivocally prohibits a second trial following an acquittal, for the public interest in the finality of judgments is so strong that an acquitted defendant may not be retried even though the acquittal was based upon an egregiously erroneous foundation. If the innocence of the accused has been confirmed by a final judgment, the Constitution conclusively presumes that a second trial would be unfair. The law attaches particular significance to an acquittal. United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 129, 66 L. Ed. 2d 328, 101 S. Ct. 426 (1980) (citations omitted). Put simply, “the Fifth Amendment guarantee against double jeopardy …surely protects a man who has been acquitted from having to ‘run the gantlet’ a second time.” Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 445-46, 25 L. Ed. 2d 469, 90 S. Ct. 1189 (1970) (citation omitted).
In Graves, which did not involve a double jeopardy challenge, this Court held that grand larceny from the person was not a lesser-included offense of robbery, at least under the specific language of the robbery indictment in that case. Graves, 21 Va. App. at 167, 462 S.E. 2d at 905. This Court determined that because robbery and grand larceny from the person each had elements of proof that the other did not, grand larceny from the person could not be a lesser-included offense of robbery. Id. at 164, 462 S.E. 2d at 903. The Court concluded, however, that petit larceny is a lesser-included offense of robbery. Id. at 167, 462 S.E. 2d at 905.
When Hudgins was acquitted of the robbery in which the bicycle was taken, he was necessarily acquitted of petit larceny of the same bicycle. Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 168, 53 L. Ed. 2d 187, 97 S. Ct. 2221 (1977); Myers v. Commonwealth, 148 Va. 725, 729-30, 138 S.E. 483, 484 (1927). The Commonwealth could not later, consistent with double jeopardy protections, prosecute him for larceny, whether grand or petit, of the same bicycle after he was acquitted of the petit larceny of the bicycle in the first trial. To hold otherwise would suggest that Hudgins could not be convicted of petit larceny, but could be convicted of the greater offense of grand larceny of the same bicycle.
The Commonwealth urges that our holding in Graves compels us to conclude that robbery and grand larceny from the person are separate offenses under the “same elements” test and that the acquittal of Hudgins of robbery is not a bar to his subsequent prosecution of grand larceny from the person.
counsel’s jurisprudence is deeply rooted in the ancient precedents, procedures, and practices of the English system of justice. A substantial portion of “the common law of England” and the “writs, remedial and judicial, given by any statute or act of Parliament, made in aid of the common law” has been legislatively incorporated in the law of this Commonwealth. Code §§ 1-10 and -11. Oehl v. Oehl, 221 Va. 618, 623, 272 S.E. 2d 441, 444 (1980). As in its codification of robbery, the General Assembly did not alter the common law definition of larceny. Darnell v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 948, 957, 408 S.E. 2d 540, 545, 8 Va. Law Rep. 318 (1991) (citing Smith v. Cox, 435 F.2d 453 (4th Cir. 1970) (“Larceny is a common law crime, although it is regulated by statute.”)). While the General Assembly has not altered the common law elements of robbery and larceny, it has specified in statutory form the punishments for those crimes. The statutory provisions enacted by the General Assembly “will not be held to change the common law unless the legislative intent to do so is plainly manifested.” Herndon v. St. Mary’s Hosp., Inc., 266 Va. 472, 476, 587 S.E. 2d 567, 569 (2003); see Linhart v. Lawson, 261 Va. 30, 35, 540 S.E. 2d 875, 877 (2001); Boyd v. Commonwealth, 236 Va. 346, 349, 374 S.E. 2d 301, 302, 5 Va. Law Rep. 956 (1988); Acey v. Commonwealth, 29 Va. App. 240, 248, 511 S.E. 2d 429, 432 (1999). A statutory change to the common law will be recognized only as is expressly stated in the words of the statute or as is necessarily implied by its language. Herndon, 266 Va. at 476, 587 S.E. 2d at 569 (citing Mitchem v. Counts, 259 Va. 179, 186, 523 S.E. 2d 246, 250 (2000); Boyd, 236 Va. at 349, 374 S.E. 2d at 302).
As in robbery, larceny from the person involves the taking of personal property from the possession or presence of another. In addition, Code §§ 18.2-95(i) and 18.2-96(1) do not separately define larceny from the person, but provide only that larceny from the person of $ 5 or more shall be punishable as grand larceny and that larceny from the person of less than $ 5 shall be punishable as petit larceny. It is the theft of the property that is the core of the crime, with the degree of the potential punishment being established by proof of the value of the property taken. The difference between robbery and larceny from the person is that robbery must involve a taking accompanied by, or accomplished through, the use of force, violence, or intimidation.
Any person who (1) Commits larceny from the person of another of money or other thing of value of less than $ 5, or (2) Commits simple larceny not from the person of another of goods and chattels of the value of less than $ 200, except as provided in subdivision (iii) of § 18.2-95, shall be deemed guilty of petit larceny, which shall be punishable as a Class 1 misdemeanor.
Accordingly, larceny from the person, whether punishable as grand larceny under Code § 18.2-95(i) or petit larceny under Code § 18.2-96(1), includes all of the elements of robbery, except the taking by force or violence, under the common law definition.
Following the common law tradition, counsel courts have considered larceny from the person to be a lesser-included offense of robbery regardless of the value of the property stolen. Saunders v. Commonwealth, 18 Va. App. 825, 827, 447 S.E. 2d 526, 528, 11 Va. Law Rep. 138 (1994) (affirming larceny from the person conviction where at trial “the robbery charge was reduced to the lesser included offense of larceny from the person of property valued in excess of five dollars, Code § 18.2-95”); Broady v. Commonwealth, 16 Va. App. 281, 291, 429 S.E. 2d 468, 474, 9 Va. Law Rep. 1294 (1993) (holding that, because reasonable minds could not disagree that the crime was one of robbery, trial court did not err in refusing to instruct on a lesser-included offense of larceny from the person).
Here, the Commonwealth argues that grand larceny from the person is not a lesser-included offense of robbery, thus permitting the second indictment. See Graves, 21 Va. App. at 163, 462 S.E. 2d at 903. In Graves, the trial judge “struck the evidence as to the robbery …indictment, and ruled that grand larceny from the person is a lesser offense included within a charge of robbery and permitted the case to go forward on a charge of grand larceny from the person.” Id. A panel of this Court reversed the conviction for grand larceny from the person and held that grand larceny from the person was not a lesser offense included within the robbery specification of the indictment, “because the robbery indictment against Graves did not set forth allegations of value or of theft from the person, it did not charge grand larceny from the person.” Id. at 166, 462 S.E. 2d at 904.
While the holding in Graves relied on the “guidance in Jones v. Commonwealth” to support its decision that grand larceny from the person is not a lesser-included offense of robbery, both Jones and other counsel authority support the contrary conclusion – that grand larceny from the person is a lesser-included offense of robbery. See Martin, 221 Va. at 723, 273 S.E. 2d at 780-81; Jones, 218 Va. at 759, 240 S.E. 2d at 660; Clayton Motors v. Commonwealth, 14 Va. App. 470, 472-73, 417 S.E. 2d 314, 315-16, 8 Va. Law Rep. 2975 (1992).
The issue addressed in Graves was not whether a subsequent indictment for grand larceny from the person would violate the protections of the Double Jeopardy Clause after an acquittal of robbery. It did not address whether the accused could be convicted in a single trial of both larceny from the person and robbery based on the same transaction. Graves was limited to whether the trial court correctly gave a jury instruction on grand larceny from the person as a lesser-included offense for robbery under the indictment then before it.
The Supreme Court has “pointed out that one offense is not lesser-included within another unless all its elements are included in the other.” Martin, 221 Va. at 723, 273 S.E. 2d at 780-81.
Id. at 760, 240 S.E. 2d at 660; see also Martin, 221 Va. at 723, 273 S.E. 2d at 780-81.
The larceny, however, must be based on the same theft as that which underlies the robbery. If not, the larceny and the robbery are based on “distinct and separate acts” and conviction of one does not bar conviction of the other. Martin, 221 Va. at 726, 273 S.E. 2d at 782. Whether the robbery and the larceny are based on the same theft may be determined by comparing the two indictments. Jones, 218 Va. at 759-60, 240 S.E. 2d at 660-61.
However, this fact may not always be determined from the indictments, and it may be necessary to examine the evidence.
Martin, 221 Va. at 725-26, 273 S.E. 2d at 782. Clayton Motors, 14 Va. App. at 472-73, 417 S.E. 2d at 315-16.
In Clayton Motors, which the Graves decision did not discuss, the defendant entered a convenience store and asked the clerk for two $ 300 money orders. Clayton Motors, 14 Va. App. at 471, 417 S.E. 2d at 315. When the clerk asked for payment, the defendant showed her a pistol in his waistband and ordered her to give him the money orders. Id. The defendant was charged and convicted of both robbery and of larceny of the money orders. Id. at 472, 417 S.E. 2d at 315. We noted that “where a defendant is charged with robbery and larceny based upon ‘distinct and separate acts’ which do ‘not involve the same theft’ of the same object a defendant is not twice put in jeopardy for the same offense.” Id. (quoting Martin, 221 Va. at 726, 273 S.E. 2d at 782); see also Jones, 218 Va. at 761, 240 S.E. 2d at 661. Where the robbery and the larceny are based upon the theft of the same item, “proof of the larceny is necessarily included in proving the robbery.” Clayton Motors, 14 Va. App. at 472, 417 S.E. 2d at 315 (citing Martin, 221 Va. at 723, 273 S.E. 2d at 780-81). Accordingly, this Court held that because the defendant was convicted of both the robbery and the theft of the same money orders, punishing for both offenses violated double jeopardy. Id. at 473, 417 S.E. 2d at 316. Likewise, convicting a person of robbery of a bicycle and the theft of the same bicycle as part of the same transaction would violate double jeopardy. See Graves, 21 Va. App. at 167, 462 S.E. 2d at 905 (concluding simple larceny is a lesser-included offense under the robbery indictment in that case).
Martin and Jones differ from the present case in that each of those defendants was convicted of two distinct and separate thefts. In Martin, the defendant robbed a service station attendant at gunpoint of the money in his pockets and also of the money kept inside the service station. Martin, 221 Va. at 722, 273 S.E. 2d at 779. He was indicted for both robbery and grand larceny and convicted of robbery and the lesser-included offense of petit larceny. Id. at 722, 273 S.E. 2d at 780. He was convicted of petit larceny rather than grand larceny because the Commonwealth failed to prove the value of the money stolen from the service station. Id. at 722, 273 S.E. 2d at 779-80.
Definitionally, theft is an essential component of robbery and charged as such in every robbery indictment. Manifestly, a robbery indictment includes all elements of whatever larceny offense it charges, whether grand or petit, and the larceny offense charged is, therefore, lesser-included in robbery. Jones, 218 Va. at 759-60, 240 S.E. 2d at 660. “Thus, the considerations involved in determining whether offenses are the same or lesser-included ‘as charged in an indictment’ for double jeopardy purposes are quite different from those involved in determining whether the elements of offenses are the same for purposes of convicting an accused of a lesser-included offense.” Graves, 21 Va. App. at 169, 462 S.E. 2d at 905-06 (Coleman, J., dissenting).
Here, Hudgins was charged initially with robbery for stealing a bicycle from an eleven-year-old victim. In acquitting Hudgins of that robbery, the trial court noted its belief that the evidence was sufficient to convict him of larceny from the person, indicating that it found that the larceny of the bicycle occurred. It did not, however, convict Hudgins of any larceny offense, thereby acquitting him of any larceny offense that was a part of the robbery charge. With Hudgins having been acquitted by the trial court of the larceny of the bicycle, the Commonwealth was thereafter barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause from requiring him to stand trial anew for stealing the same bicycle from the same person in the same criminal act that was the basis of the robbery trial. Clayton Motors, 14 Va. App. at 472, 417 S.E. 2d at 315.
In Graves, the majority relied on common law definitions of robbery and larceny from the person to determine whether grand larceny from the person was a lesser-included offense of robbery charged in the indictment. It focused its analysis not on whether all larceny is a lesser-included offense of robbery, but on whether the particular charging document sufficiently alleged a value that would support a conviction of grand larceny or grand larceny from the person. It concluded that the indictment before it charging robbery did not charge grand larceny from the person.
Relying on our holding in Garland, the majority in Graves concluded that the “from the person” element of larceny was different than the “in his presence” taking element of robbery. Thus, we hold that larceny from the person embraces not only theft of property from physical contact with the victim, but also theft of property that is in the victim’s possession and within his immediate custody and control.
At common law property was stolen “from the person” of another even if it was only “in the presence” of the person at the time it was stolen ….”Property is stolen ‘from the person’ if it was under the protection of the person …although not actually ‘attached’ to him ….As said by Coke in the 1600’s: ‘for that which is taken in his presence, is in law taken from his person. ‘” Id. at 709, 446 S.E. 2d at 630 quoted with approval in Graves, 21 Va. App. at 171, 462 S.E. 2d at 907 (Coleman, J., dissenting). We hold that larceny from the person, whether grand or petit, is a lesser-included offense of robbery, and to the extent that Graves is inconsistent with this holding, we overrule Graves.
When Hudgins was first tried and acquitted on March 16, 2001 of robbery involving the bicycle, the trial court indicated that the evidence was sufficient to support a conviction of larceny. When it failed to convict, however, the trial court’s general verdict of acquittal necessarily acquitted Hudgins of the lesser-included offense of larceny of the bicycle. The trial court’s indication in the first proceeding that it believed the evidence was insufficient to prove robbery but sufficient to prove larceny from the person does not support a different result. Jeopardy having attached, and there being an acquittal of larceny of that bicycle, Hudgins could not thereafter be forced to stand trial for that same offense.
A verdict of acquittal on the issue of guilt or innocence is, of course, absolutely final ….
For these reasons, we reverse Hudgins’s conviction for grand larceny from the person. To the extent that our holding in Graves that larceny from the person is not a lesser-included offense of robbery is inconsistent with this opinion, it is overruled. The trial court erred in denying Hudgins’s motion to dismiss the indictment as violative of the Double Jeopardy Clause of the counsel and United States Constitutions. We reverse and dismiss his conviction. Reversed and dismissed.


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(b) An Advanced Semester is any semester in which a student is enrolled for at least six credit hours after completion of the First Academic Semester. A Summer session is not considered an Advanced Semester.
(c) For purposes of GPA calculations for the probation and dismissal rules that follow, the calculation of the cumulative GPA of first-year students in the full-time Day Division at the conclusion of the Spring semester will include all grades received to that point, with the exception that grades received for Legislation or for an elective course taken in place of Legislation will not be included. For purposes of GPA calculations for probation and dismissal, the grades for Legislation or elective will be included in the cumulative GPA in semesters following the first year, starting with the cumulative GPA calculation made at the conclusion of the Fall semester of the student's second year.
A student must attain a cumulative GPA of at least 2.300 for the First Academic Semester and at the end of each Advanced Semester to remain in good academic standing. In computing a student's cumulative GPA, a grade received to replace an Incomplete grade is counted in the cumulative GPA in the semester in which the Incomplete was given. See §8.1 for calculation of the cumulative GPA for probation and dismissal purposes for first-year students after the conclusion of the Spring semester.
A student whose cumulative GPA falls below 1.700 at the end of the First Academic Semester will be dismissed from the Law School for academic reasons. Students who fail the same required course twice shall not be permitted to reregister for that course and shall be dismissed from the Law School. See § 8.1 for calculation of the cumulative GPA for probation and dismissal purposes for first-year students after the conclusion of the Spring semester.
(a) A student will be placed on academic probation if his/her GPA is at least 1.700 but below 2.300 at the end of the First Academic Semester. If the cumulative GPA of a student falls below 2.300 at the end of any Advanced Semester, the student will be placed on academic probation. A student on academic probation will be entitled to one or more semesters of academic probation as provided in the following subsections.
See §8.1 for calculation of the cumulative GPA for purposes of probation and dismissal for first-year students after the conclusion of the Spring semester.
(b) Except as provided in §8.5(e), a student is permitted only one probationary semester within which to attain a cumulative GPA of at least 2.300. If the student attains that cumulative GPA, the student regains good academic standing at the end of the probationary semester. If a student regains good academic standing and his/her cumulative GPA later falls below 2.300, the student will be permanently dismissed from the Law School without further probation.
(c) The probationary semester is the first academic semester after the effective date the student is placed on probation, which is the last day of the semester in which the GPA fell below the minimum GPA, regardless of the date of receipt of such grades. A Summer session may not serve as the probationary semester.
(d) A student may withdraw from the law school prior to the probationary semester. A student may withdraw during the probationary semester only with the approval of the Assistant Dean for Academic Administration and Student Affairs. In the event of withdrawal prior to or during the probationary semester, the student must re-enroll in the law school for the probationary semester the next academic semester, unless the student receives permission of the Assistant Dean for Academic Administration and Student Affairs to further postpone the probationary semester. Failure to enroll in either the first or second academic semester after the effective date the student is placed on academic probation, without permission of the Assistant Dean of Academic Administration and Student Affairs, will result in dismissal from the law school.
(e) A student who fails to achieve a cumulative GPA of at least 2.300 at the end of the probationary semester will be dismissed permanently from the Law School unless the student earned a GPA of 2.600 or higher in the probationary semester. A student who earns a GPA of at least 2.600 in the probationary semester is entitled to a second probationary semester within which to achieve a cumulative GPA of at least 2.300. A student who fails to achieve a cumulative GPA of at least 2.300 at the end of the second probationary semester will be dismissed permanently from the Law School regardless of the GPA earned in the second probationary semester.
See §8.1 for calculation of the cumulative GPA for probation and dismissal purposes for first-year students after the conclusion of the Spring semester.
All students who have not been notified that they have been dismissed may enroll in the Summer session. The Summer session will not be considered a student's probationary semester.
If a student is notified that her or she has been dismissed as of the previous Spring semester, the student must immediately withdraw from the Summer session; the tuition for the Summer session will be refunded. This provision applies regardless of when the student is notified of the dismissal, even if the such notification is received after the Summer session has concluded. If the student has been dismissed as of the prior Spring semester, grades received during the Summer session are void and will not count for any purpose.
If a student will be on academic probation in the Fall semester, the student may enroll in the Summer session. The Summer session will not be considered the student's probationary semester. The grades earned during the Summer session will be averaged together with the grades earned during the fall probationary semester to determine if the student has met the 2.300 requirement of §8.5(b), but will not be averaged to determine if the student has met the 2.600 requirement of §8.5(e).
Students dismissed for failing to satisfy the minimum GPA requirements may apply for readmission to the law school as a new student after three years from the date of dismissal. Students admitted under this procedure will not receive credit for any course work previously completed and will have to complete all courses required for new students at the time of readmission. In considering applications for readmission, the applicant's prior dismissal will be considered as a negative factor. In order to be admitted under this procedure, the applicant must provide evidence to the Admissions Committee that he/she possesses the requisite ability and that the applicant's prior dismissal does not indicate a lack of capacity to complete the course of study.
A student who receives the grade of E or WE in a required course must retake the course at the earliest opportunity. A student who receives the grade of E or WE in an elective course may, but is not required to, register for the course in a subsequent semester and receive credit by successfully passing the course on repeat. If a student repeats a course in which an E or WE was received, full tuition must be paid for the course the second time and the student's cumulative GPA will include both the E or WE grade and the grade received on repeat. A student may not repeat a course in which the grade of D- or higher was received.
In addition to the standards of the Law School relating to academic probation, students who fail the same required course twice shall not be permitted to reregister for that course and shall be dismissed from the Law School.

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Successful in jury and bench trials involving insurance indemnification, forcible detainer (gas lease), breach of contract, lien foreclosure, personal injury (insurance defense), property damage, vehicular homicide, and inverse condemnation.
Obtained counterclaim judgment for $419,000 for exclusive American distributor of CZ firearms, against terminated CEO based on breach of fiduciary duty and the Kansas Faithless Servant Doctrine.
Oil Pipeline Leak: Recovered $400,000 in remediation costs for Dallas-based land developer in relation to a 100,000 gallon oil pipeline leak that delayed construction of apartments and created complex causation issues.
Obtained restraining order and rescission of fraudulent corporate stock sale that violated blue sky laws, resulting in complete restitution of $250,000 plus attorney's fees.
Prevailed for damages and attorney fees against ex-employee dentist who misappropriated over 100 clients and 2 employees in breach of non-solicitation covenant.
Obtained appointment of receiver to manage daily operations of pet supply company and accomplished subsequent buy-out of 50 percent shareholders.
Successfully defended limousine company against action for injunctive relief alleging tradename infringement, Lanham Act violations, and unfair competition.
Co-chaired defense and ultimate dismissal of two class action suits relating to the Coffeyville flood and oil release of 2007, which involved over $55 Million in damage to 300 homes and businesses.
Appeal for large volume electricity consumers that resulted in reversal of rate case for a return of over $12 Million to the Kansas Industrial Consumers.
Representative of petroleum refieries and suppliers before F.E.R.C. and in federal court, regarding antitrust attittudes, pipeline and terminal access, and pipeline allocaion.
Morrison V. GEICO Gen. Ins.Co.
Collier, et al. v. Flowserve Corp., et al.
Grice, et al. v. CVR Energy, Inc., et al.
Rigdon, et al. v. flowserve Corp., et al.
Nacy, et al. v. D.F.C. Enterprises, Inc., et al.
Coffeyville Resources Refining & Marketing LLC v. Liberty Surplus Insurance Corporation, et al.
CZ-USA, Inc., v. Timber Valley Assoc., Inc.

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