SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Nuclear and Terrorism Threat 
Reduction Act of 2002''.

SEC. 2. ENHANCING THREAT REDUCTION.

    (a) Statement of Policy.--
            (1) It is the policy of the United States to work 
        cooperatively with the Russian Federation in order to prevent 
        the diversion of weapons of mass destruction and materials 
        relating thereto, including nuclear, biological, and chemical 
        weapons, as well as the scientific and technical expertise 
        necessary to design and build weapons of mass destruction.
            (2) With respect to enhancing threat reduction, there 
        should be three primary objectives, as stated in the 
        President's review of 30 different United States-Russia 
        cooperative programs, as follows:
                    (A) To ensure that existing United States 
                cooperative non-proliferation programs with the Russian 
                Federation are focused on priority threat reduction and 
                non-proliferation goals, and are conducted as 
                efficiently and effectively as possible.
                    (B) To examine what new initiatives might be 
                undertaken to further United States threat reduction 
                and non-proliferation goals.
                    (C) To consider organizational and procedural 
                changes designed to ensure a consistent and coordinated 
                United States Government approach to cooperative 
                programs with the Russian Federation on the reduction 
                of weapons of mass destruction and prevention of their 
                proliferation.
            (3) The goal of United States programs to assist the 
        Russian Federation should be to have them work well, be focused 
        on priority tasks, and be well managed.
            (4) In order to further cooperative efforts, the following 
        key programs should be expanded:
                    (A) The Department of Energy Material Protection, 
                Control and Accounting (MPC&A) program to assist the 
                Russian Federation secure and consolidate weapons-grade 
                nuclear material.
                    (B) The Department of Energy Warhead and Fissile 
                Material Transparency Program.
                    (C) The International Science and Technology Center 
                (ISTC).
                    (D) The Redirection of Biotechnical Scientists 
                program.
                    (E) The Department of Defense Cooperative Threat 
                Reduction project to construct a chemical weapons 
                destruction facility at Shchuch'ye, Russia, to enable 
                its earliest completion at no increased expense.
            (5) Other programs should be adjusted, refocused, or 
        reexamined, including--
                    (A) approaches to the current plutonium disposition 
                program in the Russian Federation, in order to make the 
                program less costly and more effective;
                    (B) the project to end production by the Russian 
                Federation of weapons-grade plutonium, in order to 
                transfer the project from the Department of Defense to 
                the Department of Energy;
                    (C) consolidation of the Department of Energy's 
                Nuclear Cities Initiative (NCI) with the Initiative for 
                Proliferation Prevention (IPP), with a focus on 
                projects to assist the Russian Federation in reduction 
                of its nuclear warheads complex; and
                    (D) acceleration of the Department of Energy's 
                Second Line of Defense program to assist the Russian 
                Federation install nuclear detection equipment at 
                border posts.
    (b) Increased Funding of Certain Key Programs.--In order to 
guarantee that the United States-Russia non-proliferation and threat 
reduction efforts operate as efficiently as possible, certain key 
programs should receive additional funding above current levels, 
including--
            (1) the United States-Russia Highly Enriched Uranium 
        Purchase Agreement;
            (2) the Second Line of Defense program;
            (3) the Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention;
            (4) the Fissile Materials Disposition program;
            (5) the Redirection of Biotechnical Scientists program;
            (6) the Department of Energy Material Protection, Control, 
        and Accounting (MPC&A) program;
            (7) the International Science and Technology Center; and
            (8) the Warhead and Fissile Material Transparency program.
    (c) Report.--Not later than six months after the date of enactment 
of this Act, the President shall submit to Congress a report containing 
recommendations on how to enhance the implementation of United States-
Russia non-proliferation and threat reduction programs, which shall 
include--
            (1) recommendations on how to improve and streamline the 
        contracting and procurement practices of those programs; and
            (2) a listing of impediments to the efficient and effective 
        implementation of those programs.

SEC. 3. COMPREHENSIVE INVENTORIES AND DATA EXCHANGES BETWEEN THE UNITED 
              STATES AND THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION ON WEAPONS-GRADE 
              MATERIAL AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

    (a) Findings.--Congress finds that inventories of weapons-grade 
material and warheads should be tracked in order, among other things--
            (1) to make it more likely that the Russian Federation can 
        fully account for its entire inventory of weapons-grade 
        material and assembled weapons; and
            (2) to make it more likely that the sources of any material 
        or weapons possessed or used by any foreign state or terrorist 
        organization can be identified.
    (b) Statement of Policy.--It is the policy of the United States to 
establish jointly with the Russian Federation comprehensive inventories 
and data exchanges of Russian and United States weapons-grade material 
and assembled warheads, with particular attention to tactical, or 
``nonstrategic'' warheads, one of the most likely weapons a terrorist 
organization or terrorist state would attempt to acquire, and with 
particular attention focused on weapons that have been removed from 
deployment.
    (c) Assistance in Developing Comprehensive Inventories.--
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the United States 
Government shall work with the Russian Federation to develop 
comprehensive inventories of Russian weapons-grade plutonium and highly 
enriched uranium programs and assembled warheads, with special 
attention to be focused on tactical warheads and warheads that have 
been removed from deployment.
    (d) Data Exchanges.--As part of this process, to the maximum extent 
practicable, without jeopardizing United States national security 
interests, the United States is authorized to enter into ongoing data 
exchanges with the Russian Federation on categories of material and 
weapons described in subsection (c).
    (e) Report.--Not later than six months after the date of enactment 
of this Act, and annually thereafter until a comprehensive inventory is 
created and the information collected from the inventory exchanged 
between the governments of the United States and the Russian 
Federation, the President shall submit to Congress a report, in both an 
unclassified and classified form as necessary, describing the progress 
that has been made toward that objective.

SEC. 4. COMMISSION TO ASSESS THE TRANSITION FROM MUTUALLY ASSURED 
              DESTRUCTION (MAD) TO MUTUALLY ASSURED SECURITY (MAS).

    (a) Statement of Policy.--With the end of the Cold War more than a 
decade ago, with the United States and the Russian Federation fighting 
together against global terrorism, and with the Presidents of the 
United States and the Russian Federation agreeing to establish ``a new 
strategic framework to ensure the mutual security of the United States 
and Russia, and the world community'', the United States and the 
Russian Federation should increase significantly their efforts to put 
dangerous and unnecessary elements of the Cold War to rest.
    (b) Establishment.--In order to assist with the policy expressed in 
subsection (a), the President is authorized to conclude an agreement 
with the Russian Federation for the establishment of a Joint United 
States-Russia Commission to Assess the Transition from Mutual Assured 
Destruction (MAD) to Mutual Assured Security (MAS) (in this section 
referred to as the ``Commission'').
    (c) Composition.--The United States delegation of the Commission 
shall consist of 13 members appointed by the President, as follows:
            (1) Three members, after consultation with the Speaker of 
        the House of Representatives.
            (2) Three members, after consultation with the Majority 
        Leader of the Senate.
            (3) Two members, after consultation with the Minority 
        Leader of the House of Representatives.
            (4) Two members, after consultation with the Minority 
        Leader of the Senate.
            (5) Two members as the President may determine.
    (d) Qualifications.--The United States members of the Commission 
shall be appointed from among private United States citizens with 
knowledge and expertise in United States-Russia strategic stability 
issues.
    (e) Chair.--The chair of the Commission should be chosen by 
consensus from among the members of the Commission.
    (f) Russian Commission.--The President should make every effort to 
encourage the Government of the Russian Federation to appoint a Russian 
Federation delegation of the Commission that would jointly meet and 
discuss the issues described in subsection (g).
    (g) Duties of the Commission.--The duties of the Commission should 
include consideration of how--
            (1) to ensure that the reduction of strategic nuclear 
        weapons announced by the United States and the Russian 
        Federation in November 2001 take effect in a rapid, safe, 
        verifiable and irreversible manner;
            (2) to preserve and enhance START I monitoring and 
        verification mechanisms;
            (3) to develop additional monitoring and verification 
        mechanisms;
            (4) to preserve the benefits of the unratified START II 
        agreement, especially those measures that affect strategic 
        stability;
            (5) to ensure the safety of warheads removed from 
        deployment;
            (6) to safely and verifiably dismantle warheads in excess 
        of the ceiling established by the President Bush at the 
        November 2001 United States-Russia summit;
            (7) to begin a new high-level dialogue to discuss United 
        States and Russian Federation proposals for a global and 
        theater level missile defense systems;
            (8) to extend presidential decision-making time as it 
        relates to nuclear weapons operations;
            (9) to improve Russian-American cooperative efforts to 
        enhance strategic early warning, including but not limited to 
        the Joint Data Exchange Center and the Russian-American 
        Observation Satellite; and
            (10) to increase cooperation between the United States and 
        the Russian Federation on the programs and activities described 
        in sections 2 and 3.
    (e) Cooperation.--In carrying out its duties, the Commission should 
receive the full and timely cooperation of United States Government 
officials, including providing the Commission with analyses, briefings, 
and other information necessary for the fulfillment of its 
responsibilities.
    (f) Report.--The Commission shall, not later than six months after 
the date of its first meeting, submit to Congress an interim report on 
its findings and, not later than six months after submission of the 
interim report, submit to Congress a final report containing its 
conclusions.
Nuclear and Terrorism Threat Reduction Act of 2002 - States the policy of the United States to work cooperatively with the Russian Federation in order to prevent the diversion of weapons of mass destruction and related materials, including nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons, as well as scientific and technical expertise necessary to design and build weapons of mass destruction.Requires the U.S. Government to work with the Russian Federation to develop comprehensive inventories of Russian weapons-grade material and warheads.Authorizes the President to conclude an agreement with the Russian Federation for the establishment of a joint United States-Russia Commission to Assess the Transition from Mutual Assured Destruction to Mutual Assured Security.
{"src": "billsum_test", "title": "A bill to promote enhanced non-proliferation cooperation between the United States and the Russian Federation."}