SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``United Nations Rapid Deployment Act 
of 2001''.

SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

    The Congress finds the following:
            (1) The December 1999 United Nations ``Report on the 
        Independent Inquiry into the Actions of the United Nations 
        During the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda'' indicates that in April 
        1994, the United Nations Security Council failed to deploy 
        5,500 United Nations peacekeepers to Rwanda within two weeks of 
        the initial violence, thereby allowing the conflict to 
        escalate. The six-month estimated cost of the deployment would 
        have been $115,000,000. Instead, the genocide consumed 800,000 
        lives along with $2,000,000,000 in humanitarian aid.
            (2) The April 2000 report of the United Nations Secretary 
        General, ``We the Peoples, The Role of the United Nations in 
        the 21st Century'', states that only member nations of the 
        United Nations can fix the structural weakness of United 
        Nations peace operations. The report compares the current 
        system for launching peacekeeping operations to a volunteer 
        fire department that has to find fire engines and the funds to 
        run them before starting to douse any flames. The present 
        United Nations system relies almost entirely on last minute, ad 
        hoc arrangements that guarantee delay, with respect to the 
        provision of civilian personnel even more so than military 
        personnel. Availability and readiness of forces is very 
        unpredictable and constraints on resources preclude rapid 
        deployment.
            (3) In August 2000, the specially-appointed panel on United 
        Nations Peace Operations issued its findings. Known as the 
        ``Brahimi Report'' (A/55/305; S/2000/809), the report concludes 
        that ``few of the basic building blocks are in place for the 
        United Nations to rapidly acquire and deploy the human and 
        material resources required to mount any complex peace 
        operation in the future''. These building blocks include a 
        standing police corps, a reserve corps of mission leadership, a 
        sufficient stockpile of equipment, and arrangements for 
        recruitment of civilian personnel. Furthermore, the report 
        encourages member nations to enter partnerships with one 
        another in the context of the United Nations Stand-by 
        Arrangements System (UNSAS). These partnerships would form the 
        basis for Rapid Deployment Brigades (RDBs), which would develop 
        the operational capabilities to fully deploy ``traditional'' 
        peacekeeping operations within 30 days of the adoption of an 
        authorizing Security Council resolution and to fully deploy 
        ``complex'' peacekeeping operations within 90 days of the 
        adoption of an authorizing Security Council resolution.
            (4) Former United States Ambassador Richard C. Holbrooke, 
        speaking before the United Nations Security Council on November 
        15, 2000, stated that ``[u]nless we move decisively on 
        meaningful peacekeeping reform, those that threaten 
        peacekeepers across the globe may draw the conclusion that the 
        UN lacks the will, the cohesion and even the capability to 
        perform its essential peacekeeping function''.
            (5) Both the nations of Europe and the United States have 
        recognized the value and need for rapidly deployable combat 
        units in response to a full spectrum of contingencies, 
        including peacekeeping and humanitarian operations, low-
        intensity conflicts, and full-scale warfare. The European Union 
        has proposed forming a standing police force and rapid 
        deployment brigades as part of the European Defense Force, and 
        in the United States, the Department of Defense is establishing 
        interim brigade combat teams as part of the overall Army 
        transformation strategy.
            (6) The United States' veto power in the United Nations 
        Security Council gives it the capacity to halt the deployment 
        of United Nations forces if the deployment is not in the 
        national interests of the United States.

SEC. 3. ESTABLISHMENT OF A UNITED NATIONS RAPID DEPLOYMENT POLICE AND 
              SECURITY FORCE.

    (a) Establishment.--The President shall direct the United States 
representative to the United Nations to use the voice, vote, and 
influence of the United States to urge the United Nations--
            (1) to establish a United Nations Rapid Deployment Police 
        and Security Force (UNRDPSF) that--
                    (A) is rapidly deployable under the authority of 
                the United Nations Security Council;
                    (B) should be able to deploy within 15 days of a 
                United Nations Security Council resolution to establish 
                international peace operations;
                    (C) is limited to a maximum deployment of six 
                months for any given mission;
                    (D) should be deployed only when the United Nations 
                Security Council determines that violations of human 
                rights, breaches of the peace, or the failure to 
                restore the rule of law, requires rapid response to 
                ensure adherence to negotiated agreements to prevent or 
end hostilities;
                    (E) should be composed of at least 6,000 volunteers 
                who train together and are appropriately equipped 
                expressly for international peace operations, including 
                civilian policing; and
                    (F) should be given the authority to protect 
                itself, execute negotiated peace accords, disarm 
                combatants, protect civilians, detain war criminals, 
                restore the rule of law, and to carry out other 
                purposes as detailed in United Nations Security Council 
                resolutions;
            (2) to recruit personnel to serve in the Force; and
            (3) to provide equitable and reliable funding for the 
        Force.
    (b) Definition.--In this section, the term ``international peace 
operations'' means any operation carried out under a United Nations 
Security Council resolution.

SEC. 4. ESTABLISHMENT OF RAPID DEPLOYMENT BRIGADES.

    In order to promote the development of human and material resources 
for United Nations peacekeeping operations as recommended by the August 
2000 Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (A/55/305; 
S/2000/809), commonly known as the ``Brahimi Report'', the President--
            (1) shall direct the Secretary of State and the United 
        States representative to the United Nations to encourage the 
        member nations of the United Nations to enter into partnerships 
        with one another, in the context of the United Nations Stand-by 
        Arrangements System (UNSAS), to form the basis for Rapid 
        Deployment Brigades, which would develop the operational 
        capabilities to fully deploy ``traditional'' peacekeeping 
        operations within 30 days of the adoption of a Security Council 
        resolution and ``complex'' peacekeeping operations within 90 
        days of the adoption of a Security Council resolution; and
            (2) shall direct the Secretary of Defense to undertake a 
        study, not later than six months after the date of the 
        enactment of this Act, to determine the advisability of and the 
        feasibility of using interim combat brigade teams as part of 
        Rapid Deployment Brigades as described in paragraph (1).

SEC. 5. REPORT ON UNITED NATIONS RAPID DEPLOYMENT.

    Not later than one year after the date of enactment of this Act, 
the President shall prepare and transmit to the Congress a report on--
            (1) the status of negotiations to establish a United 
        Nations Rapid Deployment Police and Security Force (UNRDPSF) in 
        accordance with section 3;
            (2) the status of United States activities to encourage 
        member nations of the United Nations to establish Rapid 
        Deployment Brigades in accordance with section 4(1); and
            (3) the results of the study conducted under section 4(2).
United Nations Rapid Deployment Act of 2001 - Requires the President to direct the U.S. representative to the United Nations (UN) to use the voice, vote, and influence of the United States to urge the UN to: (1) establish a United Nations Rapid Deployment Police and Security Force (UNRDPSF) that is rapidly deployable under the authority of the UN Security Council, and that meets other specified requirements; (2) recruit UNRDPSF personnel; and (3) provide equitable and reliable funding.Requires the President, in order to promote the development of human and material resources for UN peacekeeping operations as recommended by the August 2000 Report of the Panel on UN Peace Operations (Brahimi Report), to: (1) direct the Secretary of State and the U.S. representative to the UN to encourage UN member nations to enter into partnerships with one another to form Rapid Deployment Brigades which could develop operational capabilities to fully deploy peacekeeping operations within a specified time; and (2) direct the Secretary of Defense to study the advisability of and feasibility of using interim combat brigade teams as part of the Rapid Deployment Brigades.
{"src": "billsum_test", "title": "To enhance the capability of the United Nations to rapidly respond to emerging crises."}