SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Nuclear Weapons Complex Conversion 
Act of 2000''.

SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

    Congress makes the following findings:
            (1) The Russian nuclear weapons complex is still at its 
        Cold War size. Little information about this complex is shared, 
        and 10 of its most sensitive cities remain closed. These cities 
        house 750,000 people and employ approximately 150,000 people in 
        nuclear military facilities. Although the Russian Federation 
        Ministry of Atomic Energy has announced the need to 
        significantly downsize its workforce, perhaps by as much as 50 
        percent, it has been very slow in accomplishing this goal. 
        Information on the extent of any progress is very closely held. 
        The major impediments to downsizing have been economic and 
        social conditions in Russia.
            (2) The United States, on the other hand, has significantly 
        downsized its nuclear weapons complex in an open and 
        transparent manner. As a result, an enormous asymmetry now 
        exists between the United States and Russia in nuclear weapon 
        production capacities and in transparency of such capacities. 
        It is in the national security interest of the United States to 
        assist the Russian Federation in accomplishing significant 
        reductions in its nuclear military complex and in helping it to 
        protect its nuclear weapons, nuclear materials, and nuclear 
        secrets during such reductions. Such assistance will accomplish 
        critical nonproliferation objectives and provide essential 
        support towards future arms reduction agreements. Without a 
        significant, transparent reduction in nuclear weapons 
        production capacity, the Russian Federation's ability to 
        quickly reconstitute its arsenal remains inconsistent with 
        current and contemplated arms control agreements.
            (3) Several current programs address portions of the 
        downsizing and nuclear security concerns. The Nuclear Cities 
        Initiative was established to assist Russia in creating job 
        opportunities for employees who are not required to support 
        realistic Russian nuclear security requirements. Its focus has 
        been on creating commercial ventures that can provide self-
        sustaining jobs in three of the closed cities. The current 
        scope and funding of the program are not commensurate with the 
        scale of the threats to the United States sought to be 
        addressed by the program.
            (4) To effectively address threats to United States 
        national security interests, progress with respect to the 
        nuclear cities must be expanded and accelerated. The Nuclear 
        Cities Initiative has laid the groundwork for an immediate 
        increase in investment and potential for immediate risk 
        reduction in the cities of Sarov, Snezhinsk, and Seversk, which 
        house four key Russian nuclear facilities. Furthermore, the 
        Nuclear Cities Initiative has made considerable progress with 
        the limited funding available. However, to gain sufficient 
        advocacy for additional support, the program must demonstrate--
                    (A) rapid progress in conversion and restructuring; 
                and
                    (B) an ability for the United States to track 
                progress against verifiable milestones that support a 
                Russian nuclear complex consistent with their future 
                national security requirements.
            (5) Reductions in the nuclear weapons-grade material stocks 
        in the United States and Russia enhance prospects for future 
        arms control agreements and reduce concerns that these 
        materials could lead to proliferation risks. Confidence in both 
        nations will be enhanced by knowledge of the extent of each 
        nation's stockpiles of weapons-grade materials. The United 
        States already makes this information public.
            (6) Many current programs contribute to the goals stated 
        herein. However, the lack of programmatic coordination within 
        and among United States Government agencies impedes the 
        capability of the United States to make rapid progress. A 
        formal single point of coordination is essential to ensure that 
        all United States programs directed at cooperative threat 
        reduction, nuclear materials reduction and protection, and the 
        downsizing, transparency, and nonproliferation of the nuclear 
        weapons complex effectively mitigate the risks inherent in the 
        Russian Federation's military complex.
            (7) Specialists in the United States and the former Soviet 
        Union trained in nonproliferation studies can significantly 
        assist in the downsizing process while minimizing the threat 
        presented by potential proliferation of weapons materials or 
        expertise.

SEC. 3. EXPANSION AND ENHANCEMENT OF NUCLEAR CITIES INITIATIVE.

    (a) In General.--The Secretary of Energy shall, in accordance with 
the provisions of this section, take appropriate actions to expand and 
enhance the activities under the Nuclear Cities Initiative in order 
to--
            (1) assist the Russian Federation in the downsizing of the 
        Russian Nuclear Complex; and
            (2) coordinate the downsizing of the Russian Nuclear 
        Complex under the Initiative with other United States 
        nonproliferation programs.
    (b) Enhanced Use of MINATOM Technology and Research and Development 
Services.--In carrying out actions under this section, the Secretary 
shall facilitate the enhanced use of the technology, and the research 
and development services, of the Russia Ministry of Atomic Energy 
(MINATOM) by--
            (1) fostering the commercialization of peaceful, non-
        threatening advanced technologies of the Ministry through the 
        development of projects to commercialize research and 
        development services for industry and industrial entities; and
            (2) authorizing the Department of Energy, and encouraging 
        other departments and agencies of the United States Government, 
        to utilize such research and development services for 
        activities appropriate to the mission of the Department, and 
        such departments and agencies, including activities relating 
        to--
                    (A) remediation of the environmental consequences 
                of United States nuclear weapons activities and Russian 
                nuclear weapons activities;
                    (B) nonproliferation (including the detection and 
                identification of weapons of mass destruction and 
                verification of treaty compliance);
                    (C) global energy and environmental matters; and
                    (D) basic scientific research.
    (c) Acceleration of Nuclear Cities Initiative.--(1) In carrying out 
actions under this section, the Secretary shall accelerate the Nuclear 
Cities Initiative by implementing, as soon as practicable after the 
date of the enactment of this Act, programs at the nuclear cities 
referred to in paragraph (2) in order to convert significant portions 
of the activities carried out at such nuclear cities from military 
activities to civilian activities.
    (2) The nuclear cities referred to in this paragraph are the 
following:
            (A) Zarechnyy (Penza-19).
            (B) Sarov (Arzamas-16 and Avangard).
            (C) Snezhinsk (Chelyabinsk-70).
            (D) Seversk (Tomsk-7).
    (3) Before implementing a program under paragraph (1), the 
Secretary shall establish appropriate, measurable milestones for the 
first year of the program.
    (d) Plan for Restructuring the Russian Nuclear Complex.--(1) The 
President, acting through the Secretary of Energy, is urged to enter 
into negotiations with the Russian Federation for purposes of the 
development by the Russian Federation of a plan to restructure the 
Russian Nuclear Complex in order to meet changes in the national 
security requirements of Russia by 2010.
    (2) The plan under paragraph (1) should include the following:
            (A) Mechanisms to achieve a nuclear weapons production 
        capacity in Russia that is consistent with the obligations of 
        Russia under current and future arms control agreements.
            (B) Mechanisms to increase transparency regarding nuclear 
        weapons production processes and nuclear materials inventories 
        in Russia to the levels of transparency for such matters in the 
        United States, including the participation of Department of 
        Energy officials with expertise in transparency of such 
        matters.
            (C) Measurable milestones that will permit the United 
        States and the Russian Federation to monitor progress under the 
        plan.
    (e) Encouragement of Careers in Nonproliferation.--(1) In carrying 
out actions under this section, the Secretary shall carry out a program 
to encourage students in the United States and in the Russian 
Federation to pursue a career in an area relating to nonproliferation.
    (2) Of the amounts available under subsection (f), $2,000,000 shall 
be available for purposes of the program required under paragraph (1).
    (f) Funding for Fiscal Year 2001.--There is hereby authorized to be 
appropriated for the Department of Energy for fiscal year 2001, 
$50,000,000 for purposes of the Nuclear Cities Initiative, including 
activities under this section.
    (g) Sense of Congress Regarding Funding for Fiscal Years After 
Fiscal Year 2001.--It is the sense of Congress that the availability of 
funds for the Nuclear Cities Initiative in fiscal years after fiscal 
year 2001 should be contingent upon--
            (1) demonstrable progress in the programs carried out under 
        subsection (c), as determined utilizing the milestones required 
        under paragraph (3) of that subsection; and
            (2) the development and implementation of the plan required 
        by subsection (d).

SEC. 4. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A NATIONAL 
              COORDINATOR FOR NONPROLIFERATION MATTERS.

    It is the sense of Congress that--
            (1) there should be a National Coordinator for 
        Nonproliferation Matters to coordinate--
                    (A) the Nuclear Cities Initiative;
                    (B) the Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention 
                program;
                    (C) the Cooperative Threat Reduction programs;
                    (D) the materials protection, control, and 
                accounting programs; and
                    (E) the International Science and Technology 
                Center; and
            (2) the position of National Coordinator for 
        Nonproliferation Matters should be similar, regarding 
        nonproliferation matters, to the position filled by designation 
        of the President under section 1441(a) of the Defense Against 
        Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of 1996 (title XIV of Public 
        Law 104-201; 110 Stat. 2727; 50 U.S.C. 2351(a)).

SEC. 5. DEFINITIONS.

    In this Act:
            (1) Nuclear city.--The term ``nuclear city'' means any of 
        the closed nuclear cities within the complex of the Russia 
        Ministry of Atomic Energy (MINATOM) as follows:
                    (A) Sarov (Arzamas-16 and Avangard).
                    (B) Zarechnyy (Penza-19).
                    (C) Novoural'sk (Sverdlovsk-44).
                    (D) Lesnoy (Sverdlovsk-45).
                    (E) Ozersk (Chelyabinsk-65).
                    (F) Snezhinsk (Chelyabinsk-70).
                    (G) Trechgornyy (Zlatoust-36).
                    (H) Seversk (Tomsk-7).
                    (I) Zhelenznogorsk (Krasnoyarsk-26).
                    (I) Zelenogorsk (Krasnoyarsk-45).
            (2) Russian nuclear complex.--The term ``Russian Nuclear 
        Complex'' refers to all of the nuclear cities.
Urges the President to enter into negotiations with the Russian Federation for the Federation's development of a plan to restructure its nuclear complex in order to meet changes in Russian nuclear security requirements by 2010. Directs the Secretary to carry out a program to encourage students in the United States and the Russian Federation to pursue careers in nonproliferation.
Authorizes appropriations. Expresses the sense of Congress that availability of Initiative funds after FY 2001 should be contingent upon: (1) demonstrable progress in enhancing and accelerating Initiative activities; and (2) the development and implementation of Russia's nuclear restructuring plan.
Expresses the sense of Congress that: (1) there should be a National Coordinator for Nonproliferation Matters to coordinate various Federal nonproliferation programs, including the Initiative; and (2) such Coordinator position should be similar to the Coordinator position filled by the President under the Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of 1996.
{"src": "billsum_test", "title": "Nuclear Weapons Complex Conversion Act of 2000"}