It is important to recognise that material evidence is still a category of empirical information and therefore adheres to an empirical tradition of knowledge production (cf. supporting Smith's (2015) 'better arguments'). The usual mode of conduct that sees archaeology interpret data, even if we can identify various archaeological **data** as unwittingly interpretive data, 6 has relied heavily on correlating analogous information. Citing ethnographic, (ethno)historical, and experimental sources of information (used as analogous verification for interpretations), Nicholas and Markey (2015) develop an argument for the use of 'traditional' or 'indigenous' knowledge in archaeology. Questions can certainly be asked about to what extent treating evidence empirically is the only valid structure of reasoning. A critical realist would not deny indigenous knowledge causal power. In explanation (why something happened or occurred in that way), indigenous knowledge will play an equally valid role alongside history, personal agencies and memories, sociocultural systems and categories, and human-environmental relationships, both internal and external to the situation or phenomenon being studied. What such knowledges demand is a structural linkage of that understanding to archaeological evidence. In this chapter, archaeological evidence has become material evidence, and all we know about this evidence is that it refers to a presence to human beings situated in the past. Therefore, the empirical information we are restricted to is material presence (see Vis, under review, 2016).