A survey of survivability in mobile ad hoc networks <s> III. ISSUES AND MECHANISMS FOR SECURITY IN MANETS <s> This paper describes two techniques that improve throughput in an ad hoc network in the presence of nodes that agree to forward packets but fail to do so. To mitigate this problem, we propose categorizing nodes based upon their dynamically measured behavior. We use a watchdog that identifies misbehaving nodes and a pathrater that helps routing protocols avoid these nodes. Through simulation we evaluate watchdog and pathrater using packet throughput, percentage of overhead (routing) transmissions, and the accuracy of misbehaving node detection. When used together in a network with moderate mobility, the two techniques increase throughput by 17% in the presence of 40% misbehaving nodes, while increasing the percentage of overhead transmissions from the standard routing protocol's 9% to 17%. During extreme mobility, watchdog and pathrater can increase network throughput by 27%, while increasing the overhead transmissions from the standard routing protocol's 12% to 24%. <s> BIB001 </s> A survey of survivability in mobile ad hoc networks <s> III. ISSUES AND MECHANISMS FOR SECURITY IN MANETS <s> An ad hoc network is a collection of wireless computers (nodes), communicating among themselves over possibly multihop paths, without the help of any infrastructure such as base stations or access points. Although many previous ad hoc network routing protocols have been based in part on distance vector approaches, they have generally assumed a trusted environment. We design and evaluate the Secure Efficient Ad hoc Distance vector routing protocol (SEAD), a secure ad hoc network routing protocol based on the design of the Destination-Sequenced Distance-Vector routing protocol (DSDV). In order to support use with nodes of limited CPU processing capability, and to guard against denial-of-service (DoS) attacks in which an attacker attempts to cause other nodes to consume excess network bandwidth or processing time, we use efficient one-way hash functions and do not use asymmetric cryptographic operations in the protocol. SEAD performs well over the range of scenarios we tested, and is robust against multiple uncoordinated attackers creating incorrect routing state in any other node, even in spite of any active attackers or compromised nodes in the network. <s> BIB002 </s> A survey of survivability in mobile ad hoc networks <s> III. ISSUES AND MECHANISMS FOR SECURITY IN MANETS <s> As mobile ad hoc network applications are deployed, security emerges as a central requirement. In this paper, we introduce the wormhole attack, a severe attack in ad hoc networks that is particularly challenging to defend against. The wormhole attack is possible even if the attacker has not compromised any hosts, and even if all communication provides authenticity and confidentiality. In the wormhole attack, an attacker records packets (or bits) at one location in the network, tunnels them (possibly selectively) to another location, and retransmits them there into the network. The wormhole attack can form a serious threat in wireless networks, especially against many ad hoc network routing protocols and location-based wireless security systems. For example, most existing ad hoc network routing protocols, without some mechanism to defend against the wormhole attack, would be unable to find routes longer than one or two hops, severely disrupting communication. We present a new, general mechanism, called packet leashes, for detecting and thus defending against wormhole attacks, and we present a specific protocol, called TIK, that implements leashes. <s> BIB003 </s> A survey of survivability in mobile ad hoc networks <s> III. ISSUES AND MECHANISMS FOR SECURITY IN MANETS <s> Attacks where adversaries have full control of a number of authenticated devices and behave arbitrarily to disrupt the network are referred to as Byzantine attacks. Traditional secure routing protocols are vulnerable to this class of attacks since they usually assume that once authenticated, a node can be trusted to execute the protocol correctly. We present a detailed description of several Byzantine attacks (black hole, flood rushing, wormhole and overlay network wormhole), analyze their mechanisms and describe the major mitigation techniques. Through simulation, we perform a quantitative evaluation of the impact of these attacks on an insecure on-demand routing protocol. The relative strength of the attacks is analyzed in terms of the magnitude of disruption caused per adversary. An implementation of the On-Demand Secure Byzantine Routing protocol (ODSBR) was created in order to quantify its ability to mitigate the considered attacks. ODSBR was chosen because its design addresses a wide range of Byzantine attacks. <s> BIB004 </s> A survey of survivability in mobile ad hoc networks <s> III. ISSUES AND MECHANISMS FOR SECURITY IN MANETS <s> Wormhole attacks enable an attacker with limited resources and no cryptographic material to wreak havoc on wireless networks. To date, no general defenses against wormhole attacks have been proposed. This paper presents an analysis of wormhole attacks and proposes a countermeasure using directional antennas. We present a cooperative protocol whereby nodes share directional information to prevent wormhole endpoints from masquerading as false neighbors. Our defense greatly diminishes the threat of wormhole attacks and requires no location information or clock synchronization. <s> BIB005 </s> A survey of survivability in mobile ad hoc networks <s> III. ISSUES AND MECHANISMS FOR SECURITY IN MANETS <s> Buttyan L.et al.found out a security flaw in Aridane and proposed a secure routing protocol,EndairA, which can resist attacks of active-1-1 according to ref[9].But unfortunately we discover an as yet unknown active-0-1 attack,"man-in-the-middle attack",which EndairA can't resist.So we propose a new secure routing protocol,En- dairALoc.Analysis shows that EndairALoc can not only inherit security of EndairA,but also resist"man-in-the-mid- dle attack"and even wormhole attack.Furthermore EndairALoc uses pairwise secret keys instead of public keys Endai- rA used,so compared with EndairA,EndairALoc can save more energy in the process of routing establishment. <s> BIB006 </s> A survey of survivability in mobile ad hoc networks <s> III. ISSUES AND MECHANISMS FOR SECURITY IN MANETS <s> Multipath routing minimizes the consequences of security attacks deriving from collaborating malicious nodes in MANET, by maximizing the number of nodes that an adversary must compromise in order to take control of the communication. In this paper, we identify several attacks that render multipath routing protocols more vulnerable than it is expected, to collaborating malicious nodes. We propose a novel on-demand multipath routing protocol, the Secure Multipath Routing protocol (SecMR) and we analyze its security properties. The SecMR protocol can be easily integrated in a wide range of on-demand routing protocols, such as DSR and AODV. <s> BIB007 </s> A survey of survivability in mobile ad hoc networks <s> III. ISSUES AND MECHANISMS FOR SECURITY IN MANETS <s> Since mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs) are infrastructureless and multi-hop by nature, transmitting packets from any node to another usually relies on services provided by intermediate nodes. This reliance introduces a new vulnerability; one node could launch a Black Hole DoS attack by participating in the routing protocol and including itself in routes, then simply dropping packets it receives to forward. Another motivation for dropping packets in self-organized MANETs is resource preservation. Some solutions for detecting and isolating packet droppers have been recently proposed, but almost all of them employ the promiscuous mode monitoring approach (watchdog (WD)) which suffers from many problems, especially when employing the power control technique. In this paper we propose a novel monitoring approach that overcomes some WD's shortcomings, and improves the efficiency in detection. To overcome false detections due to nodes mobility and channel conditions we propose a Bayesian technique for the judgment, allowing node redemption before judgment. Finally, we suggest a social-based approach for the detection approval and isolation of guilty nodes. We analyze our solution and asses its performance by simulation. The results illustrate a large improvement of our monitoring solution in detection versus the WD, and an efficiency through our judgment and isolation techniques as well. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. <s> BIB008 </s> A survey of survivability in mobile ad hoc networks <s> III. ISSUES AND MECHANISMS FOR SECURITY IN MANETS <s> Thank you for reading global positioning system theory and practice. Maybe you have knowledge that, people have search hundreds times for their favorite novels like this global positioning system theory and practice, but end up in infectious downloads. Rather than reading a good book with a cup of coffee in the afternoon, instead they are facing with some malicious bugs inside their desktop computer. global positioning system theory and practice is available in our digital library an online access to it is set as public so you can get it instantly. Our digital library spans in multiple locations, allowing you to get the most less latency time to download any of our books like this one. Merely said, the global positioning system theory and practice is universally compatible with any devices to read. <s> BIB009
MANETs are susceptible to many security issues. Characteristics as dynamic topology, resource constraint, limited physical security and no centralized infrastructure make those networks vulnerable to passive and active attacks  . In passive attacks, packets containing secret information might be eavesdropped, violating the confidentiality principle. Active attacks include injecting packets to invalid destinations, deleting packets, modifying the content of packets, and impersonating other nodes. The classification of attacks by network protocol stack is the more frequent. Table I summarizes the main attacks for MANETs according to network layers. Some attacks are also categorized as byzantine or misbehavior attacks, being generated by network node whose actions cannot be trusted or do not conform to protocol specifications. Blackhole, wormhole, rushing, Sybil, sinkhole, HELLO flooding and selective forwarding are examples of byzantine attacks. Moreover, these attacks are also related to selfishness problem. The goal of a selfish node is to make use of the benefits of participating in the ad hoc network without having to expend its own resources in exchange BIB004 . Researchers have actively explored many mechanisms for securing mobile ad hoc networks. These mechanisms are based essentially on customized cryptographic primitives, protocols for path diversity, protocols that overhear neighbor communication, and protocols that use specialized hardware  . Cryptographic primitives have been used to provide authentication, integrity and confidentiality of secure routing protocols [25] -  . In general, HMAC (message authentication code used for authentication  ), digital signatures and symmetric or asymmetric cryptographic operations are applied with these purposes. However, this mechanism generally increases the network overhead. MANET constraint resources prevent the usage of complex encryption methods. Furthermore, no existence of infrastructure and dynamic topology increase the difficulty for the key management and distribution, and mainly these mechanisms cannot defend against internal attacks. Path diversity techniques aim to increase route robustness by discovering multipath routes and using these paths to provide redundancy in data transmission  , BIB006 , BIB007 . Multipath routing protocols can use all routes found simultaneously and transmit the same data more than one time; or can use them on demand, as an alternative. However, many of those protocols do not apply mechanisms to authenticate intermediary nodes in routes, making them vulnerable to impersonation and Sybil attacks. Techniques for monitoring neighbor communication and behavior in wireless channel have been proposed to detect and minimize misbehaving nodes  , BIB001 - BIB008 . Generally, these techniques assume that wireless interfaces support promiscuous mode operation. Promiscuous mode means that if a node A is within range of a node B, it can overhear communications to and from B even if those communications do not directly involve the node A. By means of this mechanism, nodes can monitor others and announce those that have misbehavior as dropping or tampering packets. Finally, hardware, as GPS (global position system) BIB009 or directional antennas, has been used to help in preventing and detecting wormhole attacks BIB003 , BIB005 . Pering et. al, for example, introduce the notion of packet leash as a general mechanism for detecting and defending against them BIB002 . A leash is any information added to a packet and designed to restrict its transmission distance. Leashes are classified as geographical or temporal. A geographical leash ensures that the recipient of the packet is within a certain distance from the sender, and to take localization positions, the GPS can be used. In BIB005 , a directional antenna scheme was proposed to also detect those attacks. The scheme restricts the communication among nodes based on distance information, which is calculated according to received signals. Unfortunately, these schemes are specific to wormhole attacks.