Sensors to Increase the Security of Underwater Communication Cables: A Review of Underwater Monitoring Sensors <s> Man-Made Threats <s> Since the 9/11 attack in 2001, international society has taken several measures to combat terrorism. The most significant change is adoption of the 2005 Protocol to the 1988 Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation Convention (SUA Convention). In the 2005 Protocol, the State Parties agreed to broaden the scope of SUA Convention by designating as unlawful such activities as the use of vessels in subversive activities and in transport of weapons of mass destruction and their related materials. One of the key problems is whether a state has capacity or willingness to participate in such a complex regime. In this chapter, examples of Japanese capacity building efforts are given to examine what might be done to address these problems. While governmental efforts are a key to capacity building, the chapter also addresses the need for private organizations to participate in activities of maritime security capacity building. Keywords: Japanese capacity building; maritime security; mass destruction weapons; private organizations; Safety of Maritime Navigation; SUA Convention; Suppression of Unlawful Acts; terrorism <s> BIB001 </s> Sensors to Increase the Security of Underwater Communication Cables: A Review of Underwater Monitoring Sensors <s> Man-Made Threats <s> Introduction - Why Submarine Cables? Douglas Burnett, Tara Davenport, Robert Beckman PART I: BACKGROUND Chapter 1 - The Development of Submarine Cables Stewart Ash Chapter 2 - The Submarine Cable Industry: How Does it Work? Mick Green PART II: INTERNATIONAL LAW ON SUBMARINE CABLES Chapter 3 - Overview of the International Legal Regime Governing Submarine Cables Douglas Burnett, Tara Davenport, Robert Beckman PART III: CABLE OPERATIONS - LAW AND PRACTICE Chapter 4 - The Planning and Surveying of Submarine Cable Routes Graham Evans, Monique Page Chapter 5 - The Manufacture and Laying of Submarine Cables Keith Ford-Ramsden, Tara Davenport Chapter 6 - Submarine Cable Repair and Maintenance Keith Ford-Ramsden, Douglas Burnett Chapter 7 - The Relationship between Submarine Cables and the Marine Environment Lionel Carter Chapter 8 - Out-of-Service Submarine Cables Douglas Burnett PART IV: PROTECTING CABLESHIPS AND SUBMARINE CABLES Chapter 9 - Protecting Cableships Engaged in Cable Operations Mick Green, Douglas Burnett Chapter 10 - Submarine Cables and Natural Hazards Lionel Carter Chapter 11 - Protecting Submarine Cables from Competing Uses Bob Wargo, Tara Davenport Chapter 12 - Protecting Submarine Cables from Intentional Damage: The Security Gap Robert Beckman PART V: SPECIAL PURPOSE SUBMARINE CABLES Chapter 13 - Power Cables Malcolm Eccles, Joska Ferencz, Douglas Burnett Chapter 14 - Marine Scientific Research Cables Lionel Carter, Alfred H.A. Soons Chapter 15 - Military Cables J. Ashley Roach Chapter 16 - Submarine Cables and Offshore Energy Wayne Nielsen, Tara Davenport) PART VI: APPENDICES AND KEYWORD INDEX Appendix 1 - Timeline of the Submarine Cable Industry Appendix 2 - Overview of the Major Submarine System Suppliers (1850 -2012) Appendix 3 - Excerpts of Most Relevant Treaty Provisions Keyword Index <s> BIB002
In this study, man-made threats are divided in accidental and intentional man-made threats. Accidental man-made threats include man-made actions that can cause unintentionally cable faults, such as fishing trawls or anchors. There are different types of fishing trawls used in the fishing industry, most of them being able to damage underwater cables. Clam dredges can dig into the seabed up to 0.2 m, while scallop dredges scour the bottom. Both gear types are mainly used in shallow waters and can cause damage to insufficiently buried cables. Otter and beam trawls scour the seabed for harvesting bottom fish. Stow nets are used in tidal flows, where large anchors are utilized to slow their movement. As an example, such anchors have caused damage to even wellburied cables off the coast of China BIB002 . Anchor-provoked cable damages occur either due to ships anchoring outside approved anchorages, or due to anchor dragging by a vessel underway. Most of the cable faults occur due to negligence from fishing and shipping activities. However, there are intentional man-made incidents provoked by human beings acting deliberately to damage cables. As an example: on 23 March 2007, two cable faults were detected: one in the TVH (Thailand-Vietnam-Hong Kong, length: 3354 km) fiber-optic underwater cable system, and another in the APCN (Asian Pacific Cable Network, length: 12,083 km) system; 98 km and 79 km of cable were stolen from TVH and ACPN, respectively. Estimates of damage to the two systems exceed USD 7.2 M BIB001 . In this study, the threats provoking cable faults are categorized as: natural hazard threats and man-made threats. More details in the following subsections. In this study, man-made threats are divided in accidental and intentional man-made threats. Accidental man-made threats include man-made actions that can cause unintentionally cable faults, such as fishing trawls or anchors. There are different types of fishing trawls used in the fishing industry, most of them being able to damage underwater cables. Clam dredges can dig into the seabed up to 0.2 m, while scallop dredges scour the bottom. Both gear types are mainly used in shallow waters and can cause damage to insufficiently buried cables. Otter and beam trawls scour the seabed for harvesting bottom fish. Stow nets are used in tidal flows, where large anchors are utilized to slow their movement. As an example, such anchors have caused damage to even well-buried cables off the coast of China BIB002 . Anchor-provoked cable damages occur either due to ships anchoring outside approved anchorages, or due to anchor dragging by a vessel underway. Most of the cable faults occur due to negligence from fishing and shipping activities. However, there are intentional man-made incidents provoked by human beings acting deliberately to damage cables. As an example: on 23 March 2007, two cable faults were detected: one in the TVH (Thailand-Vietnam-Hong Kong, length: 3354 km) fiber-optic underwater cable system, and another in the APCN (Asian Pacific Cable Network, length: 12,083 km) system; 98 km and 79 km of cable were stolen from TVH and ACPN, respectively. Estimates of damage to the two systems exceed USD 7.2 M BIB001 . It was proven that fishermen (probably deliberately) misunderstood the decision of the Vietnam government to allow them salvage aging copper cables (deployed before 1975), as they salvaged all but one of the country's underwater cable links regardless of cable age BIB001 . Another relevant example: in 2013, the South East Asia-Middle East-Western Europe 4 (SEA-ME-WE 4) cable was intentionally cut by divers, crippling Internet speeds by 60% in Egypt BIB002 . Until today, there has been no major terrorist attack targeting underwater cables. However there is a growing amount of reports suggesting that underwater cables could be destroyed by terrorist groups BIB002 , or tapped to gain access to the data transferred [19] . In December 2010, the US State Department strongly disapproved a WikiLeaks list of critical infrastructures, which included underwater cable information, providing terrorists a target list  . 3) that comprise the underwater environment where underwater cables are installed. In more detail, the components that are shown are: the different cable diameters by water depth, the water depth ranges at which the cable is supposed to be buried, the different maritime zones, and the most prevalent threats. It was proven that fishermen (probably deliberately) misunderstood the decision of the Vietnam government to allow them salvage aging copper cables (deployed before 1975), as they salvaged all but one of the country's underwater cable links regardless of cable age BIB001 . Another relevant example: in 2013, the South East Asia-Middle East-Western Europe 4 (SEA-ME-WE 4) cable was intentionally cut by divers, crippling Internet speeds by 60 % in Egypt BIB002 . Until today, there has been no major terrorist attack targeting underwater cables. However there is a growing amount of reports suggesting that underwater cables could be destroyed by terrorist groups BIB002 , or tapped to gain access to the data transferred [19] . In December 2010, the US State Department strongly disapproved a WikiLeaks list of critical infrastructures, which included underwater cable information, providing terrorists a target list  . Figure 5 presents a schematic synthesis of the different components (covered in sections 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3) that comprise the underwater environment where underwater cables are installed. In more detail, the components that are shown are: the different cable diameters by water depth, the water depth ranges at which the cable is supposed to be buried, the different maritime zones, and the most prevalent threats. 