Cyber-Physical Systems Security—A Survey <s> 4) Smart Cars Vulnerabilities: a) SC V1, communication vulnerabilities in cybercomponents: <s> An improved process for preparing the 2-alkylamino-5-alkylpyridine and 2-amino-5-alkylpyridine amination products of 3-alkylpyridines, comprising the step of initially reacting the base directly with the sodium salt of a primary alkylamine to produce the 2-alkylamino form, wherein the alkyl group in each reactant has from 1 to about 20 carbon atoms. The sodium salt is preferably preformed in situ by adding the alkylamine to a dispersion of sodium in an organic solvent heated to about 100 DEG -120 DEG C. The substituted amination preferably proceeds at a temperature of about 100 DEG -140 DEG C. in a solvent such as toluene and under an inert nitrogen atmosphere. The ratio of 2,5-:2,3- isomer products of the reaction is up to about 10:1 or more, with the effective yield of the 2,5-alkylated isomer being about 25% or more. This recovered 2-alkylamino-5-alkylpyridine product is readily dealkylated by reaction with hydrobromic or hydriodic acid with or without the presence of a pyridine hydrohalide salt to obtain the 2-amino-5-alkylpyridine product which has proven uses in herbicidal, insecticidal and pharmaceutical applications. <s> BIB001 </s> Cyber-Physical Systems Security—A Survey <s> 4) Smart Cars Vulnerabilities: a) SC V1, communication vulnerabilities in cybercomponents: <s> Modern automobiles are pervasively computerized, and hence potentially vulnerable to attack. However, while previous research has shown that the internal networks within some modern cars are insecure, the associated threat model--requiring prior physical access--has justifiably been viewed as unrealistic. Thus, it remains an open question if automobiles can also be susceptible to remote compromise. Our work seeks to put this question to rest by systematically analyzing the external attack surface of a modern automobile. We discover that remote exploitation is feasible via a broad range of attack vectors (including mechanics tools, CD players, Bluetooth and cellular radio), and further, that wireless communications channels allow long distance vehicle control, location tracking, in-cabin audio exfiltration and theft. Finally, we discuss the structural characteristics of the automotive ecosystem that give rise to such problems and highlight the practical challenges in mitigating them. <s> BIB002 </s> Cyber-Physical Systems Security—A Survey <s> 4) Smart Cars Vulnerabilities: a) SC V1, communication vulnerabilities in cybercomponents: <s> Intelligent vehicle technologies have been developed rapidly. Modern vehicles include many Electronic Control Units (ECUs) and in-vehicle networks. While these technologies offer accurate vehicle control and increase the convenience and safety of drivers, their vulnerabilities also have been analyzed and exploited. Nevertheless, open platforms, such as the Android OS, have been introduced into vehicle systems without careful consideration about security issues. In this paper, we indicate the security problems of an Android OS-based telematics system. Our target device's firmware is offered on a public Web site and is easily analyzed using public analysis tools. This means that our analysis methods are more scalable and practical than previous ones for remote attacks that require difficult analysis skills, such as signal processing and reverse engineering. We also found that the device allows malicious firmware to be updated because of a problem related to misuse of certificates. Furthermore, we conducted attack experiments using a real vehicle. <s> BIB003
Cellular interfaces usually serve two purposes: 1) enabling hands-free phone calls and 2) enabling manufactures to perform services remotely such as remote diagnostics, software updates, crash response, and stolen car recovery. TCUs provide cars with such cellular communication channels, among others. However, privacy concerns have emerged from using the cellular interface as a tracking tool where both GPS and the microphone are parts of the TCU. This connection reveals a target's whereabouts, or can become a spying tool via eavesdropping on the in-car conversations by exploiting the microphone BIB002 ,  . Bluetooth is one of the most vulnerable attack vectors in smart cars  . When a passenger wants to pair a phone with the car, the only authentication measure is a Personal Identification Number (PIN), prompted by the car's TCU. This measure is insufficient, and attackers can brute-force the PIN, intercept it, or even inject a false PIN by spoofing the Bluetooth's software. In addition, Bluetooth connections could expose the car to traceability attacks if an attacker successfully extracts the Bluetooth's media access control address, which is unique and traceable BIB002 . b) SC V2, software vulnerabilities: Software is at the heart of every ECU, and smart cars' reliance on it has significantly increased. This, in turn, increases the likelihood of software bugs and security vulnerabilities BIB001 . For example, if a piece of software is vulnerable to malicious code injection, it would expose the car to various attacks depending on the injected software. Jo et al. BIB003 showed how a TCU running on an Android OS was exploited to unlock doors and trace GPS due to vulnerabilities in the OS. On the other hand, the media player can directly connect to the CAN bus. This implies that any vulnerability in the player can affect other ECUs because of this connection. Checkoway et al. BIB002 identified two vulnerabilities. 1) A malicious specially crafted CD could affect the media player's ECU and "reflash" it with malicious data. 2) The media player is vulnerable to an arbitrary code execution, thanks to its ability to parse different media files.