Cyber-Physical Systems Security—A Survey <s> E. Smart Cars Challenges <s> An upcoming trend for automotive manufacturers is to perform remote diagnostics and firmware updates over the air, which allows identifying hardware problems and correction of software flaws with minimal customer inconvenience. These procedures require that the previously isolated in-vehicle network permits external communication, which introduces a number of security risks, e.g., cyber attack threats. In this paper, we identify cyber attack threats and classify the electronic control units (ECUs) in the in-vehicle network to assist in determining which ones to protect and restrict access to. We divide the ECUs into five categories: powertrain, vehicle safety, comfort, infotainment, and telematics. We then use four safety integrity levels to classify the ECU categories. Moreover, we define safety effect levels of security threats which are used to classify identified attacks in the remote diagnostics and firmware updates over the air procedures. The safety and security levels are combined to classify the ECU categories. From the results we conclude that ECU categories such as powertrain and vehicle safety require further protection prior to introducing remote connectivity. As a conclusion, we suggest that automotive manufacturers should emphasize security or restrict the remote diagnostics and firmware updates over the air procedures to certain ECUs. <s> BIB001 </s> Cyber-Physical Systems Security—A Survey <s> E. Smart Cars Challenges <s> The ultimate resource for making embedded systems reliable, safe, and secure Embedded Systems Security provides: A broad understanding of security principles, concerns, and technologies Proven techniques for the efficient development of safe and secure embedded software A study of the system architectures, operating systems and hypervisors, networking, storage, and cryptographic issues that must be considered when designing secure embedded systems Nuggets of practical advice and numerous case studies throughout Written by leading authorities in the field with 65 years of embedded security experience: one of the original developers of the world's only Common Criteria EAL 6+ security certified software product and a lead designer of NSA certified cryptographic systems. This book is indispensable for embedded systems and security professionals, new and experienced. An important contribution to the understanding of the security of embedded systems. The Kleidermachers are experts in their field. As the Internet of things becomes reality, this book helps business and technology management as well as engineers understand the importance of "security from scratch." This book, with its examples and key points, can help bring more secure, robust systems to the market. Dr. Joerg Borchert, Vice President, Chip Card & Security, Infineon Technologies North America Corp.; President and Chairman, Trusted Computing Group Embedded Systems Security provides real-world examples of risk and exploitation; most importantly the book offers clear insight into methods used to counter vulnerabilities to build true, native security into technology. Adriel Desautels, President and CTO, Netragard, LLC. Security of embedded systems is more important than ever. The growth in networking is just one reason. However, many embedded systems developers have insufficient knowledge of how to achieve security in their systems. David Kleidermacher, a world-renowned expert in this field, shares in this book his knowledge and long experience with other engineers. A very important book at the right time. Prof. Dr.-Ing. Matthias Sturm, Leipzig University of Applied Sciences; Chairman, Embedded World Conference steering board Gainan understanding of the operating systems, microprocessors, and network security critical issues that must be considered when designing secure embedded systemsContains nuggets of practical and simple advice on critical issues highlightedthroughout the textShort and to -the- point real case studies included to demonstrate embedded systems security in practice <s> BIB002 </s> Cyber-Physical Systems Security—A Survey <s> E. Smart Cars Challenges <s> This paper is an introduction to security challenges for the design of automotive hardware/software architectures. State-of-the-art automotive architectures are highly heterogeneous and complex systems that rely on distributed functions based on electronics and software. As cars are getting more connected with their environment, the vulnerability to attacks is rapidly growing. Examples for such wireless communication are keyless entry systems, WiFi, or Bluetooth. Despite this increasing vulnerability, the design of automotive architectures is still mainly driven by safety and cost issues rather than security. In this paper, we present potential threats and vulnerabilities, and outline upcoming security challenges in automotive architectures. In particular, we discuss the challenges arising in electric vehicles, like the vulnerability to attacks involving tampering with the battery safety. Finally, we discuss future automotive architectures based on Ethernet/IP and how formal verification methods might be used to increase their security. <s> BIB003
1) Secure Integration: Incompatible security assumptions occur at the boundaries of the integrations when manufacturers integrate COTS and third party components into smart cars. The lack of the products' internal details results in this mismatch. Therefore, manufacturers need to ensure a secure integration of COTS and third party components. Sagstetter et al. BIB003 suggested the adoption of formal methods such as a model-based design that is combined with verification methods to verify the correctness of any assumptions about COTS and third party components. In addition, access control measures need to be implemented to prevent unauthorized operations, especially that originate from COTS and third party components BIB001 . This ensures that the security posture assumed by a car's manufacturer is not compromised. 2) Effective Separation: Although gateway ECUs are supposed to separate CAN network traffic into high and low bandwidths, various attacks were able to bypass it and gain access to restricted bandwidths  . However, some manufactures actually have deployed effective separation between critical and noncritical ECUs by deploying them in separate networks  . However, this practice is not that common among manufacturers. Another promising solution is the use of Ethernet/IP communications and the replacement of gateway ECUs by Master-ECUs BIB003 . One the one hand, this should provide more bandwidth, so cryptographic solutions can work without causing communication overhead, and much higher speeds. On the other hand, it requires manufacturers to replace the legacy ECUs and network architecture which is a very costly operation. 3) Heterogeneity of Components: It is difficult to suggest that all components produced by different original equipment manufacturers should be replaced by components produced only by car manufacturers. This might be an impractical solution given the complexity and highly skilled specialty involved in designing different components that are integrated with cars. Instead, both parties must be in accord in terms of security requirements, assessment and testing. Manufacturers must incorporate security engineers from the early design phase BIB002 .