Cyber-Physical Systems Security—A Survey <s> 4) Smart Cars Controls: a) Unimplemented promising controls: <s> This work presents a study of current and future bus systems with respect to their security against various malicious attacks. After a brief description of the most well-known and established vehicular communication systems, we present feasible attacks and potential exposures for these automotive networks. We also provide an approach for secured automotive communication based on modern cryptographic mechanisms that provide secrecy, manipulation prevention and authentication to solve most of the vehicular bus security issues. <s> BIB001 </s> Cyber-Physical Systems Security—A Survey <s> 4) Smart Cars Controls: a) Unimplemented promising controls: <s> The automobile industry has grown to become an integral part of our everyday life. As vehicles evolve, the primarily mechanical solutions for vehicle control are gradually replaced by electronics and software solutions forming in-vehicle computer networks. An emerging trend is to introduce wireless technology in the vehicle domain by attaching a wireless gateway to the in-vehicle network. By allowing wireless communication, real-time information exchange between vehicles and between infrastructure and vehicles become reality. This communication allows for road condition reporting, decision making, and remote diagnostics and firmware updates over-the-air. However, allowing external parties wireless access to the in-vehicle network creates a potential entry-point for cyber attacks. In this paper, we investigate the security issues of allowing external wireless communication. We use a defense-in-depth perspective and discuss security challenges for each of the prevention, detection, deflection, countermeasures, and recovery layers. <s> BIB002 </s> Cyber-Physical Systems Security—A Survey <s> 4) Smart Cars Controls: a) Unimplemented promising controls: <s> An upcoming trend for automotive manufacturers is to create seamless interaction between a vehicle and fleet management to provide remote diagnostics and firmware updates over the air. To allow this, the previously isolated in-vehicle network must be connected to an external network, and can thus be exposed to a whole new range of threats known as cyber attacks. In this paper we explore the applicability of a specification-based approach to detect cyber attacks within the in-vehicle network. We derive information to create security specifications for communication and ECU behavior from the CANopen draft standard 3.01 communication protocol and object directory sections. We also provide a set of example specifications, propose a suitable location for the attack detector, and evaluate the detection using a set of attack actions. <s> BIB003 </s> Cyber-Physical Systems Security—A Survey <s> 4) Smart Cars Controls: a) Unimplemented promising controls: <s> The main focus of the paper is to secure the onboard communication of automobiles. The current trend in the automotive domain is to incorporate technologies known from the consumer segment (e.g., WLAN, Ethernet) into the car. This makes it easier for an attacker to attack the on-board networks of the car, even without having physical access. To detect attacks against the automotive networks such as CAN and FlexRay, we introduce the concept of the so called “security gateway” which is part of the automotive architecture and is located on transition points, where different networks connect with each other. A language was created to specify the correct application behavior and to configure the security gateway. Using this representation of the application behavior the security gateway not only detects failures caused by an attacker but also detects failures caused by malfunctions. <s> BIB004 </s> Cyber-Physical Systems Security—A Survey <s> 4) Smart Cars Controls: a) Unimplemented promising controls: <s> The modern automobile is controlled by networked computers. The security of these networks was historically of little concern, but researchers have in recent years demonstrated their many vulnerabilities to attack. As part of a defence against these attacks, we evaluate an anomaly detector for the automotive controller area network (CAN) bus. The majority of attacks are based on inserting extra packets onto the network. But most normal packets arrive at a strict frequency. This motivates an anomaly detector that compares current and historical packet timing. We present an algorithm that measures inter-packet timing over a sliding window. The average times are compared to historical averages to yield an anomaly signal. We evaluate this approach over a range of insertion frequencies and demonstrate the limits of its effectiveness. We also show how a similar measure of the data contents of packets is not effective for identifying anomalies. Finally we show how a one-class support vector machine can use the same information to detect anomalies with high confidence. <s> BIB005
A number of security controls have been proposed to secure the in-car network, most of which have not been implemented. For example, Wolf et al. BIB001 proposed three controls that would secure the bus network: authentication gateway, encryption, and firewalls. In addition, Larson and Nilsson BIB002 called for redesigning security in cars, and proposed embracing of the defense-in-depth security paradigm, i.e., prevention, detection, deflection, countermeasures, and recovery. b) IDS: Most of the proposed IDS are designed for CAN protocol, and only a few for other protocols such as FlexRay and LIN. For example, Larson et al. BIB003 proposed a specification-based IDS that is implemented in each ECU, whereas Seifert and Obermaisser BIB004 proposed a behaviorbased IDS that supports FlexRay networks, besides CAN. In addition, Miller and Valasek  demonstrated a proof-ofconcept low-cost attack detection system that detects anomalies in the CAN network, and the great opportunities for implementing such a system at low cost and no manufacturing overhead. Furthermore, Cho and Shin  proposed an anomaly based IDS that is clock-based such that it measures and utilizes the intervals of periodic messages in order to uniquely identify ECUs. The authors call it "fingerprinting." Taylor et al. BIB005 proposed a frequency-based IDS that detects anomalies between the frequency of current and historical packets that have strict frequencies.