Game Theory for Wireless Sensor Networks: A Survey <s> Security <s> Many random key predistribution schemes have been proposed for pairwise key establishment in sensor networks recently. A general model of security under which these key predistribution techniques can be formally analyzed for correctness is required. In this paper, we have made such an attempt. We use the well known computational model of probabilistic turn based 21 -player games to model the key predistribution schemes and have shown how this model can be translated in formally specifying a property that these schemes should have. To the best of our knowledge this is the first work where we show the significance of probabilistic turn based 21 -player games in modelling security requirement of key predistribution schemes. <s> BIB001 </s> Game Theory for Wireless Sensor Networks: A Survey <s> Security <s> This paper focuses on the design of security enforcement mechanisms for the prevention of denial of service (DoS) attacks in wireless sensor networks. In the first part, we identify the requirement for security enforcement using auction theory, which allows us to detect non-cooperative nodes. Our novel scheme for preventing DoS attacks is called Secure Auction based Routing (SAR). In the proposed protocol, nodes prefer to participate in forwarding incoming packets and gaining reputation in the network. Nodes willing to do so must compete against each other, and the competition is based on auction theory. The amount of bid that each node offers is equal to its utility value; and the price that a winner of a bid pays is a reduction in its original battery power. Since a node's truthful bidding is shown to be a dominant strategy, in order to prevent DoS attack, nodes that do not bid truthfully should be isolated. In the second part, we formulate the attack-defense problem as a non-cooperative, two-player, non-zero-sum game between an attacker and a wireless sensor network. We show that this game achieves Nash equilibrium, thus leading to a defense strategy for the network. We propose two novel schemes. The first one is called Utility based Dynamic Source Routing (UDSR), which incorporates the total utility of each en-route node in data packets, where utility is the difference between gain and cost for each node. The second scheme is based on a watch-list, where each node earns a rating from its neighbors, based on its previous cooperation in the network. Simulation results show that the proposed game theoretic framework significantly increases the chance of success in defense strategy for the wireless sensor network. <s> BIB002 </s> Game Theory for Wireless Sensor Networks: A Survey <s> Security <s> In this paper, we propose a novel coalitional game model for security issues in wireless networks. The model can be applied to not only mobile ad hoc networks but also wireless sensor networks. We define a new throughput characteristic function, on the basis of which nodes are enforced to cooperate and form coalitions. This function implies the maximal throughput and the most reliable traffic that a coalition can achieve. The fair payoff share inside the coalition is given by Shapley value after proving the feasibility of this method. Then a set of game rules is presented to establish a threatening mechanism to all players. We then describe the coalition formation procedure and explain how to integrate this game theoretic model with available wireless routing protocols. Finally, a theoretical analysis is conducted to illustrate the convergence situation and verify the correctness of the formulation. <s> BIB003 </s> Game Theory for Wireless Sensor Networks: A Survey <s> Security <s> In this paper, we use game theory to study the interactions between a malicious node and a regular node in wireless networks with unreliable channels. Since the malicious nodes do not reveal their identities to others, it is crucial for the regular nodes to detect them through monitoring and observation. We model the malicious node detection process as a Bayesian game with imperfect information and show that a mixed strategy perfect Bayesian Nash Equilibrium (also a sequential equilibrium) is attainable. While the equilibrium in the detection game ensures the identification of the malicious nodes, we argue that it might not be profitable to isolate the malicious nodes upon detection. As a matter of fact, malicious nodes and regular nodes can co-exist as long as the destruction they bring is less than the contribution they make. To show how we can utilize the malicious nodes, a post-detection game between the malicious and regular nodes is formalized. Solution to this game shows the existence of a subgame perfect Nash Equilibrium and the conditions that achieve the equilibrium. Simulation results and their discussions are also provided to illustrate the properties of the derived equilibria. <s> BIB004
In WSNs under fully distributed conditions, there is no coordinator; participants need to communicate with each other to execute the mechanism, and to accomplish the task. In this way, network security will be the most important issue BIB002 BIB003 BIB004 BIB001 . It is not only needed to design the appropriate network security protocol to protect communication security, but also to protect the participants from disclosing confidential information, such as private parameters, bids, and bidders logo. Wireless sensor network designs also need to consider the abnormal behavior of agents, the complexity of network communications and other considerations.