Game Theory for Wireless Sensor Networks: A Survey <s> Evolutionary and Soft Computing <s> In self-organizing ad hoc networks, all the networking functions rely on the contribution of the participants. As a basic example, nodes have to forward packets for each other in order to enable multihop communication. In recent years, incentive mechanisms have been proposed to give nodes incentive to cooperate, especially in packet forwarding. However, the need for these mechanisms was not formally justified. In this paper, we address the problem of whether cooperation can exist without incentive mechanisms. We propose a model,based on game theory and graph theory to investigate equilibrium conditions of packet forwarding strategies. We prove theorems about the equilibrium conditions for both cooperative and noncooperative strategies. We perform simulations to estimate the probability that the conditions for a cooperative equilibrium hold in randomly generated network scenarios.. As the problem is involved, we deliberately restrict ourselves to a static configuration. We conclude that in static ad hoc networks where the relationships between the nodes are likely to be stab le-cooperation needs to be encouraged. <s> BIB001 </s> Game Theory for Wireless Sensor Networks: A Survey <s> Evolutionary and Soft Computing <s> As an emerging technology, many researches have been focused on enhancing sensor networks in the recent years. For improving the quality of service, researchers have concentrated on the notion of mobility as a means to change the network topology. Considering each node as an intelligent agent, and using the concepts of the theory of auctions, this paper introduces a novel game theoretical approach to the sensor management problem. By obviating unnecessary communication among the nodes, and offering task changing capability to them the new method addresses more network compatibility to uncertain tasks <s> BIB002 </s> Game Theory for Wireless Sensor Networks: A Survey <s> Evolutionary and Soft Computing <s> Cooperation among nodes is essential for the reliable routing of packets in large scale wireless sensor networks from nodes to base station. Most of the previous works have assumed a single governing authority with full cooperation among nodes. The assumption of node cooperation, however, cannot be applied to wireless sensor networks (WSNs) with more than one governing authority. In this paper, we introduce the concept of multi-class wireless sensor networks where each class is governed by a different authority. We study the evolution of cooperation in static and mobile multi-class wireless sensor networks using evolutionary game theory which has, to the best of our knowledge, never been attempted before. We then propose a novel localized distributive algorithm we call the patient grim strategy (PGS), and demonstrate that it provides a Nash equilibrium solution to the game theoretic problem of cooperation in multi-class static wireless sensor networks. Our simulation results show that in static multi-class WSNs populations playing the prisoner's dilemma, significant propensities to cooperate can evolve. <s> BIB003 </s> Game Theory for Wireless Sensor Networks: A Survey <s> Evolutionary and Soft Computing <s> In this paper, we propose an autonomic management framework (ASGrid) to address the requirements of emerging large-scale applications in hybrid grid and sensor network systems. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first who proposed the autonomic sensor grid system concept in a holistic manner targeted at non-trivial large applications. To bridge the gap between the physical world and the digital world and facilitate information analysis and decision making, ASGrid is designed to smooth the integration of sensor networks and grid systems and efficiently use both on demand. Under the blueprint of ASGrid, we present several building blocks that fulfill the following major features: (1) Self-configuration through content-based aggregation and associative rendezvous mechanisms; (2) Self-optimization through utility-based sensor selection and model-driven hierarchical sensing task scheduling; (3) Self-protection through ActiveKey dynamic key management and S3Trust trust management mechanisms. Experimental and simulation results on these aspects are presented. <s> BIB004 </s> Game Theory for Wireless Sensor Networks: A Survey <s> Evolutionary and Soft Computing <s> Evolutionary games have been developed in biological sciences in the aim of studying the evolution and equilibrium behavior (called evolutionary stable strategies - ESS) of large populations. While rich theoretical foundations of evolutionary games allow biologist to explain past and present evolution and predict future evolution, it can be further used in engineering to architect evolution. In this paper, we apply evolutionary games to non-cooperative networks containing large number of individual non-cooperative terminals or sensors. We study the evolution of congestion control protocols, and show how the evolution and the ESS are influenced by the characteristics of the wireless channel. We then consider the challenge of architecting the evolution: we propose some guidelines for designing a framework that supports evolution of protocols. <s> BIB005 </s> Game Theory for Wireless Sensor Networks: A Survey <s> Evolutionary and Soft Computing <s> A general mathematical model,named by GO/CSMA(Game Optimization CSMA),was proposed to optimize CSMA backoff mechanism.GO/CSMA selects τ(the probability for sending data packet) as optimization variable,and builds a model named by n-persons non-cooperative game with mixed strategy.In this paper,as special example,the throughput and successful probability of sending packet are selected as game utility function and theyplay a game among n nodes respectively and arrive at the Nash equilibrium point respectively.Further,it come into being a compromise τ* between the throughput and the probability through a multi-constrained single-objective planning optimization algorithm.At last,we design the minimum contention window CWmin on basis of τ*.The simulation experiment indicates that GO/CSMA improves the transmission efficiency of MAC protocol greatly.By extension,GO/CSMA might be used to play games and gain compromise among networks performances,such as delay,packet drop,power exhaust and fairness. <s> BIB006 </s> Game Theory for Wireless Sensor Networks: A Survey <s> Evolutionary and Soft Computing <s> Given the single-point node failure limitation of centralized sensor management schemes, decentralized sensor management (DSM) techniques are increasingly important for a simultaneous tracking and identification system. DSM options are realizable with the support of modern systems through increased bandwidth, wireless communication, and enhanced power, but require novel strategies to address constraints imposed by a large number of users Since game theory offers competitive models for distributed allocations of surveillance resources and provides mechanisms to handle the uncertainty of a surveillance area, we propose an agent-based negotiable game theoretic sensor management (ANGSm) approach. By incorporating subgame Nash Equilibrium into negotiation, all agent's needs are considered. With the DSM scheme, sensor assignment occurs locally, and with no central node, DSM reduces the risk of whole-system failures. To make the ANGSm approach more efficient and practical, a geometric feature, the range between a target and a sensor, is also incorporated in the bargaining strategy during sensor assignment. Simulation results of the geometric feature-aided game theoretic (GFGT) approach demonstrate the applicability of the proposed approach. <s> BIB007 </s> Game Theory for Wireless Sensor Networks: A Survey <s> Evolutionary and Soft Computing <s> Identifying sensor holes is one of the important subjects in wireless sensor networks. Holes happen when one or more sensors are not functioning or few sensors are missing during deployment in any designated area. The presence of holes hinders the information flow in sensor networks. Different coverage models are developed recently and very few or no attempt was made to detect the sensor holes using game models. This paper presents the potential game model for detecting holes in sensor networks. <s> BIB008 </s> Game Theory for Wireless Sensor Networks: A Survey <s> Evolutionary and Soft Computing <s> We formulate a coverage optimization problem for mobile visual sensor networks as a repeated multi-player game. Each visual sensor tries to optimize its own coverage while minimizing the processing cost. The rewards for the sensing are not prior information to the agents. We present an asynchronous distributed learning algorithm where each sensor only remembers the utility values obtained by its neighbors and itself, and the actions it played during the last two time steps when it was active. We show that this algorithm is convergent in probability to the set of global optima of certain coverage performance metric. <s> BIB009 </s> Game Theory for Wireless Sensor Networks: A Survey <s> Evolutionary and Soft Computing <s> We formulate a coverage optimization problem for mobile visual sensor networks as a repeated multi-player game. Each visual sensor tries to optimize its own coverage while minimizing the processing cost. The rewards for the sensing are not prior information for the agents. We present a synchronous distributed learning algorithm where each sensor only remembers its own utility values and actions played during the last two time steps. The algorithm is proven to be convergent in probability to the set of (restricted) Nash equilibria from which none has incentive to unilaterally deviate. <s> BIB010 </s> Game Theory for Wireless Sensor Networks: A Survey <s> Evolutionary and Soft Computing <s> In this paper, the issue of network topology control in wireless networks using a fully distributed algorithm is considered. Whereas the proposed distributed algorithm is designed applying game theory concepts to design a non-cooperative game, network connectivity is guaranteed based on asymptotic results of network connectivity. Simulations show that for a relatively low node density, the probability that the proposed algorithm leads to a connected network is close to one. <s> BIB011 </s> Game Theory for Wireless Sensor Networks: A Survey <s> Evolutionary and Soft Computing <s> In this paper, we address the incentive-based relay-selection problem over multi-source and multi-relay wireless networks. A two-side market game approach is employed to jointly consider the benefits of all sources and relays. The equilibrium concept in such games is called core. The outcomes in the core of the game cannot be improved upon by any subset of players. These outcomes correspond exactly to the price-lists that competitively balance the benefits of all sources and relays. When the price assumes only discrete values, the core of the game is defined as discrete core. The Distributed Source-Relay Assignment (DSRA) algorithm is proposed for competitive price adjustment and converges to the discrete core of the game. With small enough measurement of price, the algorithm can achieve the optimal performance compared with centralized one in terms of total profit of the system. <s> BIB012 </s> Game Theory for Wireless Sensor Networks: A Survey <s> Evolutionary and Soft Computing <s> In this paper, a "Game Theory" approach for finding an optimal path in a "Wireless Sensor Network" is discussed. WSN is one of the most interesting research fields in the communication networks, and is the center of attention in recent years. In our model, a pricing and payment technique is presented to obtain an optimal path in a WSN by considering reliability, energy and traffic load. The proposed algorithm is able to find a path which improves network lifetime, load distribution and path reliability. <s> BIB013 </s> Game Theory for Wireless Sensor Networks: A Survey <s> Evolutionary and Soft Computing <s> The aim of this study is to suggest an automated technique for distributed decision. It is based on population protocol deployed on a Wireless Sensor Networks (WSN). This approach could be used by any medical staff to detect earlier than usual some diseases on patients. Moreover, It could be easily adapted to many other fields (fire monitoring, environment supervising, …) In this context, a patient is equipped with health parameter transducers which are connected to a WSN. This WSN will perform some computations and will raise an alarm when some diseases are suspected. The algorithm is distributed, i.e., the decision may be done by any mote dealing with the disease detection. The experimentations show promising results. <s> BIB014 </s> Game Theory for Wireless Sensor Networks: A Survey <s> Evolutionary and Soft Computing <s> In this paper, we address a method for an intrusion detection system (IDS) in wireless sensor networks (WSNs). The type of the attack that we address in this paper focuses on dropping packets attacks (DPA) in WSNs and we focus on the design of security enforcement mechanisms for preventing attacks as well. we present a signaling game-theoretic model to analyze intrusion detection in wireless sensor networks. We use a signaling game to model the interactions among nodes of a wireless sensor network. We view the interaction between an attacker and an individual node as a Bayesian game with incomplete information, and construct models for such a game. We prove the authenticity of the proposed model by reaching Nash equilibrium. And achieving Nash equilibrium leads to the defense strategy for the WSN. <s> BIB015 </s> Game Theory for Wireless Sensor Networks: A Survey <s> Evolutionary and Soft Computing <s> In this paper, we propose a game-theoretical based method to fortify an intrusion detection system (IDS) in Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs). And we focus on dropping-packet attacks which are the sore point in wireless sensor networks. We claim that of course our model is not only a detective model but also a correctional model. because first we corner malicious nodes and then we give them incentives to mend their ways and try to behave in favor of other nodes in WSN. We formulate the attack-defense problem as a non-cooperative, two-player, non-zero-sum game between an attacker and a WSN. We propose a repeated game model of dropping packets which is attack-proof against DPA based on such an assumption that sensor nodes are rational. The model prevents malicious nodes from attacking by establishing subgame perfect periodic collusion-resistant punishment mechanism, and impels sensor networks to reach a cooperative Nash equilibrium. So, it leads to a defense strategy for the network. And when the malicious nodes populate less than the majority of network we show that our model is partially collusion resistant. And even we try to use the sporadic well-mannered cooperative behavior of the malicious node in favor of improving overall throughput of our WSN. Based on rationality we believe that even malicious nodes before being known as extreme notorious nodes, they try to impersonate their true type and show a little collaborative behavior. <s> BIB016 </s> Game Theory for Wireless Sensor Networks: A Survey <s> Evolutionary and Soft Computing <s> Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) have become an attractive technology to support various applications. In many situations, the region where the sensor nodes are deployed needs to be uniformly covered. This paper proposes a new technique to implement self-organization strategies for WSNs. We show that the process of iterating the computation of the Voronoi diagram generated by the sensors has a maximum fixed point which corresponds to the Nash equilibrium of a strategic game where sensor nodes move iteratively to the centers of the Voronoi cells. We have shown that this fixed-point represents the best deployment that can be achieved, from the coverage point of view. We also performed a set of experiments to show that the proposed technique outperform the existing approaches. <s> BIB017 </s> Game Theory for Wireless Sensor Networks: A Survey <s> Evolutionary and Soft Computing <s> This paper focuses on addressing the robust source prediction problem in wireless sensor networks (WSNs). In particular, the nonlinear interaction of multiple sources is handled by the fuzzy interpolation technique, which has not been fully investigated in networked data fusion systems yet. In this study, no knowledge of the joint distribution of sensor observations is assumed. A robust H∞ design using fuzzy interpolation from a game theory viewpoint is proposed. The fuzzy approximation error for the nonlinear dynamics of multiple sources is incorporated into the design. In evaluation, a theoretical analysis on the performance of the proposed multisource prediction method is provided. <s> BIB018
Researchers also attempted to use GA for WSN in other aspects. For instance, Yang et al. BIB006 proposed Game Optimization CSMA (GO/CSMA) to optimize CSMA mechanism. He and Gui BIB001 used GT model to realize NE and node set's rational division. Li et al. BIB004 first proposed an autonomic management framework (ASGrid) to smooth the integration of WSN and grid systems. Li et al. BIB007 developed an agent-based negotiable game theoretic sensor management (ANGSm) approach incorporating sub-game NE into negotiation. Holes, hindering the information flow in WSN, happen when one or more sensors are not functioning or few sensors are missing during deployment in any designated area. Reddy BIB008 presented the potential game model for detecting holes in WSN. A coverage optimization problem for mobile visual sensor networks as a repeated multi-player game was formulated. A synchronous distributed learning algorithm where each sensor only remembers its own utility values and actions played during the last two time steps was presented in literatures BIB009 BIB010 . Abdelkader et al. BIB017 proposed a technique to implement self-organization strategies for WSN. The process of iterating the computation of the Voronoi diagram generated by the sensors has a maximum fixed point which corresponds to the NE of a strategic game where sensor nodes move iteratively to the centers of the Voronoi cells. This fixed-point represents the best deployment that can be achieved from the coverage point of view. Altman et al. BIB005 applied evolutionary games to non-cooperative networks containing a large number of individual non-cooperative terminals or sensors and proposed some guidelines for designing a framework that supports evolution of protocols. A pricing and payment technique was presented in BIB013 to obtain an optimal path in a WSN by considering reliability, energy and traffic load. The proposed algorithm is able to find a path which improves network lifetime, load distribution and path reliability. A robust design using fuzzy interpolation in the viewpoint of GT was given in BIB018 . The fuzzy approximation error for the nonlinear dynamics of multiple sources is incorporated into the design. Closas et al. BIB011 proposed a distributed algorithm which is based on the non-cooperative game principle. Crosby and Pissinou BIB003 introduced the concept of multi-class wireless sensor networks where each class is governed by a different authority to study the evolution of cooperation in static and mobile multi-class WSN using evolutionary game theory. The proposed algorithm, called Patient Grim Strategy, provides an NE solution to the game theoretic problem of cooperation in multi-class static wireless sensor networks. Danak et al. BIB002 introduced a novel game theoretical approach to the sensor management problem considering each node as an intelligent agent and using the concepts of the theory of auctions. Li et al. BIB012 proposed a Distributed Source-Relay Assignment (DSRA) algorithm for competitive price adjustment. A two-side market game approach is employed to jointly consider the benefits of all sources and relays. The equilibrium concept in such games is called the core. The outcomes in the core of the game cannot be improved upon by any subset of players. These outcomes correspond exactly to the price-lists that competitively balance the benefits of all sources and relays. The core of the game is defined as discrete core when the price assumes only discrete values. A patient is equipped with health parameter transducers which are connected to a WSN. Moreover, the WSN will perform some computations and will raise an alarm when some diseases are suspected BIB014 . A distributed algorithm, i.e., the decision may be done by any mote dealing with the disease detection, is proposed to solve the problem. Estiri and Khademzadeh BIB015 presented a signaling game-theoretic model to analyze intrusion detection in WSN. They used a signaling game to model the interactions among nodes of a WSN. They viewed the interaction between an attacker and an individual node as a Bayesian game with incomplete information, and construct models for such a game. Estiri and Khademzadeh BIB016 proposed a game-theoretical based method to fortify an intrusion detection system (IDS) in WSN. They formulated the attack-defense problem as a non-cooperative, two-player, non-zero-sum game between an attacker and a WSN. They proposed a repeated game model of dropping packets which is attack-proof against dropping packets attacks based on such an assumption that sensor nodes are rational. The model prevents malicious nodes from attacking by establishing sub-game perfect periodic collusion-resistant punishment mechanism, and impels sensor networks to reach a cooperative NE.