Cyber-Physical Systems Security—A Survey <s> 4) Smart Cars Vulnerabilities: a) SC V3, communication vulnerabilities in cyberphysical-components: <s> The automobile industry has grown to become an integral part of our everyday life. As vehicles evolve, the primarily mechanical solutions for vehicle control are gradually replaced by electronics and software solutions forming in-vehicle computer networks. An emerging trend is to introduce wireless technology in the vehicle domain by attaching a wireless gateway to the in-vehicle network. By allowing wireless communication, real-time information exchange between vehicles and between infrastructure and vehicles become reality. This communication allows for road condition reporting, decision making, and remote diagnostics and firmware updates over-the-air. However, allowing external parties wireless access to the in-vehicle network creates a potential entry-point for cyber attacks. In this paper, we investigate the security issues of allowing external wireless communication. We use a defense-in-depth perspective and discuss security challenges for each of the prevention, detection, deflection, countermeasures, and recovery layers. <s> BIB001 </s> Cyber-Physical Systems Security—A Survey <s> 4) Smart Cars Vulnerabilities: a) SC V3, communication vulnerabilities in cyberphysical-components: <s> Abstract The IT security of automotive systems is an evolving area of research. To analyse the current situation and the potentially growing tendency of arising threats we performed several practical tests on recent automotive technology. With a focus on automotive systems based on CAN bus technology, this article summarises the results of four selected tests performed on the control systems for the window lift, warning light and airbag control system as well as the central gateway. These results are supplemented in this article by a classification of these four attack scenarios using the established CERT taxonomy and an analysis of underlying security vulnerabilities, and especially, potential safety implications. With respect to the results of these tests, in this article we further discuss two selected countermeasures to address basic weaknesses exploited in our tests. These are adaptations of intrusion detection (discussing three exemplary detection patterns) and IT-forensic measures (proposing proactive measures based on a forensic model). This article discusses both looking at the four attack scenarios introduced before, covering their capabilities and restrictions. While these reactive approaches are short-term measures, which could already be added to today’s automotive IT architecture, long-term concepts also are shortly introduced, which are mainly preventive but will require a major redesign. Beneath a short overview on respective research approaches, we discuss their individual requirements, potential and restrictions. <s> BIB002 </s> Cyber-Physical Systems Security—A Survey <s> 4) Smart Cars Vulnerabilities: a) SC V3, communication vulnerabilities in cyberphysical-components: <s> Embedded electronic components, so-called ECU (Electronic Controls Units), are nowadays a prominent part of a car's architecture. These ECUs, monitoring and controlling the different subsystems of a car, are interconnected through several gateways and compose the global internal network of the car. Moreover, modern cars are now able to communicate with other devices through wired or wireless interfaces such as USB, Bluetooth, WiFi or even 3G. Such interfaces may expose the internal network to the outside world and can be seen as entry points for cyber attacks. In this paper, we present a survey on security threats and protection mechanisms in embedded automotive networks. After introducing the different protocols being used in the embedded networks of current vehicles, we then analyze the potential threats targeting these networks and describe how the attackers' opportunities can be enhanced by the new communication abilities of modern cars. Finally, we present the security solutions currently being devised to address these problems. <s> BIB003 </s> Cyber-Physical Systems Security—A Survey <s> 4) Smart Cars Vulnerabilities: a) SC V3, communication vulnerabilities in cyberphysical-components: <s> Contemporary vehicles are getting equipped with an increasing number of Electronic Control Units (ECUs) and wireless connectivities. Although these have enhanced vehicle safety and efficiency, they are accompanied with new vulnerabilities. In this paper, we unveil a new important vulnerability applicable to several in-vehicle networks including Control Area Network (CAN), the de facto standard in-vehicle network protocol. Specifically, we propose a new type of Denial-of-Service (DoS), called the bus-off attack, which exploits the error-handling scheme of in-vehicle networks to disconnect or shut down good/uncompromised ECUs. This is an important attack that must be thwarted, since the attack, once an ECU is compromised, is easy to be mounted on safety-critical ECUs while its prevention is very difficult. In addition to the discovery of this new vulnerability, we analyze its feasibility using actual in-vehicle network traffic, and demonstrate the attack on a CAN bus prototype as well as on two real vehicles. Based on our analysis and experimental results, we also propose and evaluate a mechanism to detect and prevent the bus-off attack. <s> BIB004
Smart cars are vulnerable to many attacks due to the lack of security considerations in their design BIB001 . In-vehicle communication protocols, such as CAN and LIN, lack encryption, authentication, and authorization mechanisms. Here we review the vulnerabilities in the most common protocol, CAN. The CAN protocol has a number of vulnerabilities that contribute to most of the attacks on smart cars. For example, CAN protocol lacks critical security properties such as encryption, authentication, and has weak authorization and network separation. Due to the lack of encryption, TPMS is vulnerable to eavesdropping and spoofing  . Tracing a car is possible by exploiting the unique ID in the TPMS communications. In addition, the CAN protocol's broadcast nature increases the likelihood of DoS attacks  . CAN bus error handling mechanism makes it vulnerable to DoS BIB004 . Another security property, common in computer security literature, is nonrepudiation, where there is no way to identify the origin of a particular message BIB002 . Clearly, these vulnerabilities, especially the lack of encryption and authentication, result from the isolation assumption discussed earlier. b) SC V4, comfort ECUs: More advanced features are continuously added to ECUs to improve safety and comfort. For example, ECUs like Adaptive Cruise Control (ACC), Lane Keep Assist, and Collision Prevention provide safety, where Comfort Park Assist and RKE are examples of ECUs that provide comfort. Although these components have a great impact on improving the driving experience in terms of safety and comfort, they pose a new type of attacks, i.e., cyber-physical attacks. These components are part of the CAN network, and there is a threat of attacking them and compromising their expected functions by directly exploiting their vulnerabilities, or vulnerabilities in other ECUs residing in the same network  . As an example, ACC is the next generation of cruise control. It provides the ability to detect the speed of the car ahead using laser or radar sensors, and adaptively change the current speed to maintain a safe distance between cars. A well-equipped attacker might be able to interrupt ACC sensors' operations by either introducing noise or spoofing. As a result of the attack, ACC may reduce or increase speed unexpectedly, or even cause collisions. The threat is the ability to tamper with the sensors externally, or with the ACC's ECU itself internally, possibly through other ECUs that are potentially vulnerable to remote attacks such as TPMS, RKE, or TCU. c) SC V5, vulnerabilities with X-by-wire: An emerging trend in smart cars is the "X-by-wire." It aims to gradually replace the mechanically controlled components in the car, such as the steering wheel and the brake pedal, by electronic or electro-mechanical components. Such electromechanical components would make drivers control the relevant functionality by only pressing some buttons. Steer-, drive-, brake-, shift-, and throttle-by-wire are all examples of this trend BIB003 . This implies new opportunities for attackers to launch cyber-physical attacks exploiting such new functionalities. However, this technology relies on FlexRay communication protocol, which is more advanced than CAN protocol in terms of speed and safety features. However, it is more costly and less likely to widespread in the near future BIB003 .