Cyber-Physical Systems Security—A Survey <s> d) Malware injection via the OBD-II port: <s> Abstract The IT security of automotive systems is an evolving area of research. To analyse the current situation and the potentially growing tendency of arising threats we performed several practical tests on recent automotive technology. With a focus on automotive systems based on CAN bus technology, this article summarises the results of four selected tests performed on the control systems for the window lift, warning light and airbag control system as well as the central gateway. These results are supplemented in this article by a classification of these four attack scenarios using the established CERT taxonomy and an analysis of underlying security vulnerabilities, and especially, potential safety implications. With respect to the results of these tests, in this article we further discuss two selected countermeasures to address basic weaknesses exploited in our tests. These are adaptations of intrusion detection (discussing three exemplary detection patterns) and IT-forensic measures (proposing proactive measures based on a forensic model). This article discusses both looking at the four attack scenarios introduced before, covering their capabilities and restrictions. While these reactive approaches are short-term measures, which could already be added to today’s automotive IT architecture, long-term concepts also are shortly introduced, which are mainly preventive but will require a major redesign. Beneath a short overview on respective research approaches, we discuss their individual requirements, potential and restrictions. <s> BIB001 </s> Cyber-Physical Systems Security—A Survey <s> d) Malware injection via the OBD-II port: <s> There have been many warnings that automobiles are vulnerable to the attacks through the network, CAN which connects the ECUs (Electrical Control Units) embedded in the automobiles. Some previous studies showed that the warnings were actual treats. They analyzed the packets flowing on the network and used the packets constructed based on the analysis. We show that it is possible to attack automobiles without any in-depth knowledge about automobiles and specially designed tools to analyze the packets. Experiments are performed in two phases. In the first phase, the victims automobiles are attacked with the packets constructed with the CAN IDs gathered from the sniffed packets flowing in the automobiles. It is not a problem at all to gather CANIDs since CAN is an open simple standard protocol and there are many tools to sniff CAN packets in the Internet. In the second phase, the attack packets are constructed in a completely random manner without any previous information such as CAN IDs. The packets are injected into the network via Bluetooth, a wireless channel. Through the experiments, we show the network vulnerability of automobiles. <s> BIB002
Malware injection through the OBD-II port needs physical access to the car. Hoppe et al. BIB001 showed how an injected malware can launch a number of DoS attacks such as preventing passengers from opening and closing windows and preventing the car from displaying missing airbags warning lights. e) Packet injection: This attack requires previous access to the CAN network. Once an attacker gets into the network, physically or wirelessly, many attacks are possible. For example, through the OBD-II port, it is possible to increase the engine's revolutions per minute, disturb the engine's timing, disable the engine's cylinders, and disable the engine itself. In addition, attacks on brakes are also possible by injecting random packets to the electronic brake control module such that it locks and releases the brakes resulting in unsafe driving experiences  . In addition, Lee et al. BIB002 performed fuzzing attacks on multiple cars that resulted in arbitrary behaviors that could affect passengers' safety. The fuzzing attack is simple, they captured the CAN IDs of the normal network traffic and then flood the network with packets that have the same IDs but different data fields. f) Replay attacks: This attack requires two steps: 1) intercepting the CAN network traffic when certain functions are activated and 2) retransmitting the observed packet to reactivate the same function. Koscher et al.  were successfully able to disable the car's interior and exterior lights by sending previously eavesdropped packets.