Hardware Security For and Beyond CMOS Technology: An Overview on Fundamentals, Applications, and Challenges <s> Confidentiality and Integrity of Hardware <s> The multinational, distributed, and multistep nature of integrated circuit (IC) production supply chain has introduced hardware-based vulnerabilities. Existing literature in hardware security assumes ad hoc threat models, defenses, and metrics for evaluation, making it difficult to analyze and compare alternate solutions. This paper systematizes the current knowledge in this emerging field, including a classification of threat models, state-of-the-art defenses, and evaluation metrics for important hardware-based attacks. <s> BIB001 </s> Hardware Security For and Beyond CMOS Technology: An Overview on Fundamentals, Applications, and Challenges <s> Confidentiality and Integrity of Hardware <s> The increasing cost of integrated circuit (IC) fabrication has driven most companies to"go fabless"over time. The corresponding outsourcing trend gave rise to various attack vectors, e.g., illegal overproduction of ICs, piracy of the design intellectual property (IP), or insertion of hardware Trojans (HTs). These attacks are possibly conducted by untrusted entities residing all over the supply chain, ranging from untrusted foundries, test facilities, even to end-users. To overcome this multitude of threats, various techniques have been proposed over the past decade. In this paper, we review the landscape of IP protection techniques, which can be classified into logic locking, layout camouflaging, and split manufacturing. We discuss the history of these techniques, followed by state-of-the-art advancements, relevant limitations, and scope for future work. <s> BIB002
Besides the severe threats on data security at runtime, as outlined above, other threats such as reverse engineering (RE), piracy of chipdesign intellectual property (IP), illegal overproduction, counterfeiting, or insertion of hardware Trojans represent further challenges for hardware security. These threats arise mainly due to the globalized and distributed nature of modern supply chains for electronics, which span across many entities and countries nowadays BIB001 . A multitude of protection schemes have been proposed, which can be broadly classified into IP protection, Trojan defense, and physically-unclonable functions (PUFs). All these schemes seek to protect the hardware from different attackers, which include untrusted foundries, untrusted testing facilities, untrusted endusers, or a combination thereof. Next, I provide an overview on these schemes; more details can also be found in, e.g., BIB001 BIB002 .