Cyber-Physical Systems Security—A Survey <s> 4) Privacy Threats: <s> Modern automobiles are, among other things, sophisticated local area networks connecting multiple embedded computers. It is not rare for vehicles to be communications hubs with multiple wireless connections. Wireless connections may be with other vehicles, local infrastructure, or corporate servers. Some high profile research into the information security of automotive applications has been done. This research has been piece-meal, looking for vulnerabilities in specific implementations of isolated applications. Although most of this work concentrates on car theft, modern automotive systems are subject to a much wider range of potential abuses. We use the term automotive system to be inclusive, since, in addition to the automobile itself, applications like VANETs (ex. vehicle ad hoc networks), and online services (ex. On-Star, remote diagnostics) are subject to compromise. In this work, we consider the automotive system stakeholders and assets they need to protect. We use this security information to help map the automotive security research literature onto the taxonomy CERT uses to describe on-line security incidents, in order to find which threats are not being adequately addressed. <s> BIB001 </s> Cyber-Physical Systems Security—A Survey <s> 4) Privacy Threats: <s> Modern automobiles are pervasively computerized, and hence potentially vulnerable to attack. However, while previous research has shown that the internal networks within some modern cars are insecure, the associated threat model--requiring prior physical access--has justifiably been viewed as unrealistic. Thus, it remains an open question if automobiles can also be susceptible to remote compromise. Our work seeks to put this question to rest by systematically analyzing the external attack surface of a modern automobile. We discover that remote exploitation is feasible via a broad range of attack vectors (including mechanics tools, CD players, Bluetooth and cellular radio), and further, that wireless communications channels allow long distance vehicle control, location tracking, in-cabin audio exfiltration and theft. Finally, we discuss the structural characteristics of the automotive ecosystem that give rise to such problems and highlight the practical challenges in mitigating them. <s> BIB002 </s> Cyber-Physical Systems Security—A Survey <s> 4) Privacy Threats: <s> Abstract The IT security of automotive systems is an evolving area of research. To analyse the current situation and the potentially growing tendency of arising threats we performed several practical tests on recent automotive technology. With a focus on automotive systems based on CAN bus technology, this article summarises the results of four selected tests performed on the control systems for the window lift, warning light and airbag control system as well as the central gateway. These results are supplemented in this article by a classification of these four attack scenarios using the established CERT taxonomy and an analysis of underlying security vulnerabilities, and especially, potential safety implications. With respect to the results of these tests, in this article we further discuss two selected countermeasures to address basic weaknesses exploited in our tests. These are adaptations of intrusion detection (discussing three exemplary detection patterns) and IT-forensic measures (proposing proactive measures based on a forensic model). This article discusses both looking at the four attack scenarios introduced before, covering their capabilities and restrictions. While these reactive approaches are short-term measures, which could already be added to today’s automotive IT architecture, long-term concepts also are shortly introduced, which are mainly preventive but will require a major redesign. Beneath a short overview on respective research approaches, we discuss their individual requirements, potential and restrictions. <s> BIB003 </s> Cyber-Physical Systems Security—A Survey <s> 4) Privacy Threats: <s> Medical cyber-physical systems (MCPS) are life-critical, context-aware, networked systems of medical devices. These systems are increasingly used in hospitals to provide high-quality continuous care for patients. The need to design complex MCPS that are both safe and effective has presented numerous challenges, including achieving high assurance in system software, intoperability, context-aware intelligence, autonomy, security and privacy, and device certifiability. In this paper, we discuss these challenges in developing MCPS, some of our work in addressing them, and several open research issues. <s> BIB004
• Medical Devices: A hacker (source) aiming to reveal the existence of a disease, a medical device, or any other information that a patient considers private (target) by intercepting the communications of a patient's medical device via wireless hacking tools (vector), which results in a violation of privacy and confidentiality (consequence)  . In addition, as the medical devices communicate with other parties, such as hospitals, a large amount of private data is stored in various locations. This could tempt an attacker (source) with spying motivations (motive) to gain an unauthorized access to such data (target) through penetrating the networks that connect among the involved legitimate parties (vector) resulting in privacy invasion (consequence) BIB004 . • Smart Cars: A hacker (source) might be able to intercept private conversations in a car (target) by exploiting vulnerabilities in the TCU (vector) resulting in privacy invasion (consequence) BIB002 . • Smart Cars: A hacker, or a law enforcement agent, (source) could track a car (target) by exploiting the global positioning system (GPS) navigation system (vector), which is mainly used for guiding and directing drivers, resulting in privacy violations (consequence) BIB001 , BIB002 . • Smart Cars: Cars manufacturers (source) can covertly gather cars' logs stored in ECUs (vector) to reveal some driving habits and traffic violations (target) without drivers' consent or knowledge which is a violation of privacy (consequence) BIB001 , BIB003 . Another threat is that manufacturers (source) could gather driving habits information (target) that could provide insurance companies with a pool of personal information that might be useful for insurance plans' customization or accident investigations BIB001 .