Cyber-Physical Systems Security—A Survey <s> b) MD V2, communication vulnerabilities in cybercomponents: <s> Our study analyzes the security and privacy properties of an implantable cardioverter defibrillator (ICD). Introduced to the U.S. market in 2003, this model of ICD includes pacemaker technology and is designed to communicate wirelessly with a nearby external programmer in the 175 kHz frequency range. After partially reverse-engineering the ICD's communications protocol with an oscilloscope and a software radio, we implemented several software radio-based attacks that could compromise patient safety and patient privacy. Motivated by our desire to improve patient safety, and mindful of conventional trade-offs between security and power consumption for resource-constrained devices, we introduce three new zero-power defenses based on RF power harvesting. Two of these defenses are human-centric, bringing patients into the loop with respect to the security and privacy of their implantable medical devices (IMDs). Our contributions provide a scientific baseline for understanding the potential security and privacy risks of current and future IMDs, and introduce human-perceptible and zero-power mitigation techniques that address those risks. To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first in our community to use general-purpose software radios to analyze and attack previously unknown radio communications protocols. <s> BIB001 </s> Cyber-Physical Systems Security—A Survey <s> b) MD V2, communication vulnerabilities in cybercomponents: <s> Medical devices used for critical care are becoming increasingly reliant on software; however, little is understood about the security vulnerabilities facing medical devices and their software. To investigate this open question, we analyze the security of software that controls a modern Automated External Defibrillator (AED) used for treating cardiac arrhythmias. This report represents the first public embedded software security analysis of a medical device. We identify several software security vulnerabilities and discuss key insights and open challenges in improving software-controlled medical devices to be resistant to malware. We found the AED would accept counterfeit firmware updates. We did not locate any standard cryptographic controls. We conclude with recommendations and open challenges in securing medical devices. <s> BIB002 </s> Cyber-Physical Systems Security—A Survey <s> b) MD V2, communication vulnerabilities in cybercomponents: <s> Wearable and implantable medical devices are being increasingly deployed to improve diagnosis, monitoring, and therapy for a range of medical conditions. Unlike other classes of electronics and computing systems, security attacks on these devices have extreme consequences and must, therefore, be analyzed and prevented with utmost effort. Yet, very little work exists on this important topic and the security vulnerabilities of such systems are not well understood. We demonstrate security attacks that we have implemented in the laboratory on a popular glucose monitoring and insulin delivery system available on the market, and also propose defenses against such attacks. Continuous glucose monitoring and insulin delivery systems are becoming increasingly popular among patients with diabetes. These systems utilize wireless communication links, which are frequently utilized as a portal to launch security attacks. Our study shows that both passive attacks (eavesdropping of the wireless communication) and active attacks (impersonation and control of the medical devices to alter the intended therapy) can be successfully launched using public-domain information and widely available off-the-shelf hardware. The proposed attacks can compromise both the privacy and safety of patients. We propose two possible defenses against such attacks. One is based on rolling-code cryptographic protocols, and the other is based on body-coupled communication. Our security analysis shows that the proposed defenses have the potential to mitigate the security risks associated with personal healthcare systems. <s> BIB003
As most medical devices rely on wireless communications, this implies the devices' vulnerability to a range of wireless-based attacks such as jamming, noise, eavesdropping, replay, and injection attacks. Communications between ICDs and their programmers are vulnerable to eavesdropping due to the lack of encryption. Besides this confidentiality violation, the lack of encryption allows replay attacks BIB001 . In addition, patients with IMDs or wearable devices could be vulnerable to a number of privacy invasion attacks ranging from discovering the existence of the devices, the devices type, to some physiological measures gathered by the device. In addition, if a device's unique information is inferred, a patient could be vulnerable to tracing attacks  . c) MD V3, software vulnerabilities: The role of software has been growing in medical devices, and so has the likelihood of software vulnerabilities. As a result, recalls of medical devices due to software-related defects has increased  , BIB002 . Failure of a device due to a software flaw could result in critical health conditions. Furthermore, Hanna et al. BIB002 presented the first publicly known software security analysis for medical devices. They found that one type of medical devices, namely automated external defibrillator, to have four vulnerabilities: arbitrary code execution due to a buffer overflow vulnerability, weak authentication mechanism, improper credentials' storage, unauthorized firmware update due to improper deployment of the cyclic redundancy check (CRC). In addition, certain assumptions by a device designers could lead to undesired consequences. For example, Li et al. BIB003 showed how a CRC check in the code can lead to dangerous attacks such as replaying outdated measures and sending unauthorized commands.