A survey on automation of security requirements in service-based business processes <s> Textual extensions of BPMN <s> Risk management has become an essential mechanism for business and security analysts, since it enable the identification, evaluation and treatment of any threats, vulnerabilities, and risks to which organizations maybe be exposed. In this paper, we discuss the need to provide a standard representation of security countermeasures in order to automate the selection of countermeasures for business processes. The main contribution lies in the specification of security pattern as standard representation for countermeasures. Classical security pattern structure is extended to incorporate new features that enable the automatic selection of security patterns. Furthermore, a prototype has been developed which support the specification of security patterns in a graphical way. <s> BIB001 </s> A survey on automation of security requirements in service-based business processes <s> Textual extensions of BPMN <s> Modern information systems are large-sized and comprise multiple heterogeneous and autonomous components. Autonomy enables decentralization, but it also implies that components providers are free to change, retire, or introduce new components. This is a threat to security, and calls for a continuous verification process to ensure compliance with security policies. Existing verification frameworks either have limited expressiveness—thereby inhibiting the specification of real-world requirements—, or rely on formal languages that are hardly employable for modeling and verifying large systems. In this paper, we overcome the limitations of existing approaches by proposing a framework that enables: (1) specifying information systems in SecBPMN, a security-oriented extension of BPMN; (2) expressing security policies through SecBPMN-Q, a query language for representing security policies; and (3) verifying SecBPMN-Q against SecBPMN specifications via an implemented query engine. We report on the applicability of our approach via a case study about air traffic management. <s> BIB002 </s> A survey on automation of security requirements in service-based business processes <s> Textual extensions of BPMN <s> Dealing with security is a central activity for todays organizations. Security breaches impact on the activities executed in organizations, preventing them to execute their business processes and, therefore, causing millions of dollars of losses. Security by design principles underline the importance of considering security as early as during the design of organizations to avoid expensive fixes during later phases of their lifecycle. However, the design of secure business processes cannot take into account only security aspects on the sequences of activities. Security reports in the last years demonstrate that security breaches are more and more caused by attacks that take advantage of social vulnerabilities. Therefore, those aspects should be analyzed in order to design a business process robust to technical and social attacks. Still, the mere design of business processes does not guarantee that their correct execution, such business processes have to be correctly implemented and performed. We propose SEcure Business process Engineering (SEBE), a method that considers social and organizational aspects for designing and implementing secure business processes. SEBE provides an iterative and incremental process and a set of verification of transformation rules, supported by a software tool, that integrate different modeling languages used to specify social security aspects, business processes and the implementation code. In particular, SEBE provides a new modeling language which permits to specify business processes with security concepts and complex security constraints. We evaluated the effectiveness of SEBE for engineering secure business processes with two empirical evaluations and applications of the method to three real scenarios. <s> BIB003
This security annotation can have none, one or more parameters. Each parameter is particular to some BPMN modelling elements, such as activities and data objects. It is possible to observe that Mülle proposes an in-depth security language in which a substantial number of constraints can be expressed. All of these annotations are specified and appear in the modelled BPMN business process. However, depending on the number of security constraints, the business model can become overloaded, because a considerable number of text annotations may be required to express the user security needs. Other relevant work related to textual annotation in BPMN is BIB003 and BIB002 . The authors propose SecBPMN, a security extension for the BPMN standard. This security extension introduces security requirements in business processes using both graphical notations and textual annotation. Most initiatives focus on only one of these possibilities. BIB003 and BIB002 proposes both a considerable set of graphical notation, which can be used directly in the BPMN diagram and a query language for representing security policies named SecBPMN-Q. It is possible to highlight that Salnitri contributed in both graphical notation and textual annotation areas. The interesting point of this initiative is the possibility to enrich the BPMN diagram with both graphical and textual information, increasing the security enrichment options. However, as mentioned in the previous subsection, users may not feel comfortable in analysing a BPMN diagram overloaded with security information. And specifically, in this case, both with graphical and textual notations. In another related initiative, BIB001 proposes a standard representation to express security countermeasures to allow their automation. This initiative adopts security patterns for dealing with security risks. In short, the author suggests an approach that uses security patterns for the selection of specific countermeasures for specific risks. This selection is carried out based on information provided in the requirements artefacts and primary business goals. To accomplish that, a formal ontology was proposed to represent concepts such as security intentions, security goals, risk attribute, risk type and security level BIB001 . The author also proposes that risks can be inserted into the business process high-level model. To illustrate this proposition, Figure 7 shows an example in which a user request arrives and should be: 1 received and analysed by the system 2 processed. The business expert annotates the security risks (related to authentication and availability) in the BPMN business process using BPMN elements. One of the main contributions of Varela-Vaca's approach is to define how to incorporate security risks into BPMN and associate possible security patterns that can be used to treat these risks. Despite that, considering that the risks are inserted in the BPMN diagram as simple texts, the BPMN diagram may become too overloaded if there are a high number of security risks. Table 1 summarises the approaches presented previously. The most relevant initiatives were categorised considering three aspects: 1 adoption of graphical notation 2 adoption of textual annotations 3 if the initiative supports the security properties enrichment, e.g., by specifying with cryptography algorithm should be used in the confidentiality enforcement. The main reason for including the security properties enrichment in this comparison is based on the fact that, depending on the context, the business expert may require a more detailed modelling approach or not. It is worth observing that two different kinds of approaches are somehow conflicting. The first kind proposes graphical notations, i.e., the insertion of graphical symbols to represent security in BPMN diagrams. In turn, the second type advocates the use of textual annotations, i.e., the insertion of text in the mentioned diagram. One particular approach advocates the use of both approaches in the same diagram, but as previously mentioned, the diagram may become overloaded with different types of notations and semantics.