Cyber-Physical Systems Security—A Survey <s> 1) ICS Vulnerabilities: <s> This article investigates the vulnerabilities of Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems which monitor and control the modern day irrigation canal systems. This type of monitoring and control infrastructure is also common for many other water distribution systems. We present a linearized shallow water partial differential equation (PDE) system that can model water flow in a network of canal pools which are equipped with lateral offtakes for water withdrawal and are connected by automated gates. The knowledge of the system dynamics enables us to develop a deception attack scheme based on switching the PDE parameters and proportional (P) boundary control actions, to withdraw water from the pools through offtakes. We briefly discuss the limits on detectability of such attacks. We use a known formulation based on low frequency approximation of the PDE model and an associated proportional integral (PI) controller, to create a stealthy deception scheme capable of compromising the performance of the closed-loop system. We test the proposed attack scheme in simulation, using a shallow water solver; and show that the attack is indeed realizable in practice by implementing it on a physical canal in Southern France: the Gignac canal. A successful field experiment shows that the attack scheme enables us to steal water stealthily from the canal until the end of the attack. <s> BIB001 </s> Cyber-Physical Systems Security—A Survey <s> 1) ICS Vulnerabilities: <s> Medical devices used for critical care are becoming increasingly reliant on software; however, little is understood about the security vulnerabilities facing medical devices and their software. To investigate this open question, we analyze the security of software that controls a modern Automated External Defibrillator (AED) used for treating cardiac arrhythmias. This report represents the first public embedded software security analysis of a medical device. We identify several software security vulnerabilities and discuss key insights and open challenges in improving software-controlled medical devices to be resistant to malware. We found the AED would accept counterfeit firmware updates. We did not locate any standard cryptographic controls. We conclude with recommendations and open challenges in securing medical devices. <s> BIB002 </s> Cyber-Physical Systems Security—A Survey <s> 1) ICS Vulnerabilities: <s> It is often appealing to assume that existing solutions can be directly applied to emerging engineering domains. Unfortunately, careful investigation of the unique challenges presented by new domains exposes its idiosyncrasies, thus often requiring new approaches and solutions. In this paper, we argue that the “smart” grid, replacing its incredibly successful and reliable predecessor, poses a series of new security challenges, among others, that require novel approaches to the field of cyber security. We will call this new field cyber-physical security. The tight coupling between information and communication technologies and physical systems introduces new security concerns, requiring a rethinking of the commonly used objectives and methods. Existing security approaches are either inapplicable, not viable, insufficiently scalable, incompatible, or simply inadequate to address the challenges posed by highly complex environments such as the smart grid. A concerted effort by the entire industry, the research community, and the policy makers is required to achieve the vision of a secure smart grid infrastructure. <s> BIB003
The physical exposure of many ICS components, such as RTUs and PLCs, that are scattered over a large area is a vulnerability in itself. With insufficient physical security provided to these components, they become vulnerable to physical tampering or even sabotage. For example, a water canal's sensors rely on solar panels as a source of energy so they can communicate with the control center. These panels were stolen, and therefore, the control center lost critical data necessary for the desired operations BIB001 . 2) Smart Grids Vulnerabilities: Like ICS, smart grids' field devices are placed in unprotected environments. A huge number of physical components are highly exposed without physical security, and thus vulnerable to direct physical destruction. For example, power lines are vulnerable to malicious, accidental, and natural attacks. For example, in Northern Ohio, overgrown trees caused a large blackout affecting over 50 million people  . In addition, smart meters attached to buildings, houses, and remote areas make them an easy target to various physical attacks. Mo et al. BIB003 suggested that it is even infeasible to achieve adequate physical protection of all assets in smart grids. Therefore, it is necessary to devise prevention and detection solutions. 3) Medical Devices Vulnerabilities: Medical devices, whether implantable or wearable, sometimes could be vulnerable to physical access. That is, the attacker's ability to physically deal with the medical device. For example, for maintenance purposes, an attacker exploiting the absence of the device's owner, tampers with it, and potentially performs malicious activities such as malware installation, or modification of the configurations such that the device delivers unadvised treatment that could threaten the patient's health. In addition, by physical access to a device, it is also possible to get the device's serial number, which is useful for some attacks  . In general, physical access to the device opens many possibilities to various attacks. Hanna et al. BIB002 recommended protecting medical devices from physical access by any potential attacker. Another subtle vulnerability to consider is the mobility of medical devices' users. It could be a vulnerability by itself. As the device's designers cannot control patients' surroundings, the devices could be vulnerable to unpredicted physical attacks when a patient is in an insecure location. This is especially true for politically motivated attacks  .