Cyber-Physical Systems Security—A Survey <s> 1) Criminal Threats: <s> Medical devices used for critical care are becoming increasingly reliant on software; however, little is understood about the security vulnerabilities facing medical devices and their software. To investigate this open question, we analyze the security of software that controls a modern Automated External Defibrillator (AED) used for treating cardiac arrhythmias. This report represents the first public embedded software security analysis of a medical device. We identify several software security vulnerabilities and discuss key insights and open challenges in improving software-controlled medical devices to be resistant to malware. We found the AED would accept counterfeit firmware updates. We did not locate any standard cryptographic controls. We conclude with recommendations and open challenges in securing medical devices. <s> BIB001 </s> Cyber-Physical Systems Security—A Survey <s> 1) Criminal Threats: <s> Modern automobiles are pervasively computerized, and hence potentially vulnerable to attack. However, while previous research has shown that the internal networks within some modern cars are insecure, the associated threat model--requiring prior physical access--has justifiably been viewed as unrealistic. Thus, it remains an open question if automobiles can also be susceptible to remote compromise. Our work seeks to put this question to rest by systematically analyzing the external attack surface of a modern automobile. We discover that remote exploitation is feasible via a broad range of attack vectors (including mechanics tools, CD players, Bluetooth and cellular radio), and further, that wireless communications channels allow long distance vehicle control, location tracking, in-cabin audio exfiltration and theft. Finally, we discuss the structural characteristics of the automotive ecosystem that give rise to such problems and highlight the practical challenges in mitigating them. <s> BIB002 </s> Cyber-Physical Systems Security—A Survey <s> 1) Criminal Threats: <s> The development of a trustworthy smart grid requires a deeper understanding of potential impacts resulting from successful cyber attacks. Estimating feasible attack impact requires an evaluation of the grid's dependency on its cyber infrastructure and its ability to tolerate potential failures. A further exploration of the cyber-physical relationships within the smart grid and a specific review of possible attack vectors is necessary to determine the adequacy of cybersecurity efforts. This paper highlights the significance of cyber infrastructure security in conjunction with power application security to prevent, mitigate, and tolerate cyber attacks. A layered approach is introduced to evaluating risk based on the security of both the physical power applications and the supporting cyber infrastructure. A classification is presented to highlight dependencies between the cyber-physical controls required to support the smart grid and the communication and computations that must be protected from cyber attack. The paper then presents current research efforts aimed at enhancing the smart grid's application and infrastructure security. Finally, current challenges are identified to facilitate future research efforts. <s> BIB003 </s> Cyber-Physical Systems Security—A Survey <s> 1) Criminal Threats: <s> Balancing security, privacy, safety, and utility is a necessity in the health care domain, in which implantable medical devices (IMDs) and body area networks (BANs) have made it possible to continuously and automatically manage and treat a number of health conditions. In this work, we survey publications aimed at improving security and privacy in IMDs and health-related BANs, providing clear definitions and a comprehensive overview of the problem space. We analyze common themes, categorize relevant results, and identify trends and directions for future research. We present a visual illustration of this analysis that shows the progression of IMD/BAN research and highlights emerging threats. We identify three broad research categories aimed at ensuring the security and privacy of the telemetry interface, software, and sensor interface layers and discuss challenges researchers face with respect to ensuring reproducibility of results. We find that while the security of the telemetry interface has received much attention in academia, the threat of software exploitation and the sensor interface layer deserve further attention. In addition, we observe that while the use of physiological values as a source of entropy for cryptographic keys holds some promise, a more rigorous assessment of the security and practicality of these schemes is required. <s> BIB004
• ICS: An attacker whose familiar with the system (source) could exploit wireless capabilities (vector) to remotely control an ICS application and possibly disrupt its operations (consequence). • Smart Grids: Thieves (source) who aim to rob a house (target) might be able to infer private information, such as a house inhabitant's presence, from the communications between the smart meter and the utility company (vector) to perform a successful robbery (consequence) BIB003 . • Medical Devices: A criminal hacker (source) might aim to harm a patient and affect his/her health condition (target) by using wireless tools to inject or retransmit previously captured legitimate commands (vector) to change the device's state and expected operations resulting in an undesired health condition (consequence)  . In addition, an attacker (source) might also be able to cause harm (target) by jamming the wireless signals exchanged between medical devices to maintain a stable health condition (vector) resulting in the unavailability of the device and its failure to deliver the expected therapies (consequence)  , BIB001 , BIB004 . • Smart Cars: A hacker (source) could attack a car's ECUs (target) by exploiting weakness in the wireless interfaces (vector) to cause a collision or loss of control (consequence) BIB002 .