Game Theory for Wireless Sensor Networks: A Survey <s> Preventing DoS Attacks <s> Based on cooperative game theory, we propose a new technique for handling security issues in mobile wireless sensor networks. We define a game between sensor nodes and concentrate on three fundamental factors: cooperation, reputation and quality of security. Stronger cooperation between two nodes implies more reliable data communication between them. And the more a node cooperates the better is its reputation, which decreases when misbehavior is detected. When security of the network is compromised, the percentage of exposed traffic measures the quality of security of sensor nodes. By incorporating these three factors, we cluster the sensor nodes such that within a cluster, the payoff function of all sensor nodes are close to each other, where payoff is the largest possible individual gain for each sensor according to a defined utility metric. We define one strategy set for each node, which guarantees reaching to an equilibrium point for payoff function. <s> BIB001 </s> Game Theory for Wireless Sensor Networks: A Survey <s> Preventing DoS Attacks <s> This paper focuses on the assessment of the properties of security enforcement mechanisms for prevention of denial of service (DoS) attacks in wireless sensor networks. First part of the paper demonstrates the requirement for security enforcement using auction theory that allows detection of non cooperative nodes. In the proposed protocol, nodes prefer to participate in forwarding incoming packets and gaining reputation in the network. Nodes willing to do so must compete against each other. The competition is based on auction theory. We also formulate attack-defense problem as a non-cooperative nonzero-sum two-player game between an attacker and a wireless sensor network. This game achieves Nash equilibrium and thus leading to a defense strategy for the network. This approach is called utility based dynamic source routing (UDSR), which incorporates the total utility of each route in data packets. Results show that the proposed game frameworks significantly increase the chance of success in defense strategy for the wireless sensor network <s> BIB002 </s> Game Theory for Wireless Sensor Networks: A Survey <s> Preventing DoS Attacks <s> In order to isolate malicious nodes in wireless sensor and actor networks and provide a secure routing, we formulate the attack-defense problem as a two-player, nonzero-sum, non-cooperative game between an attacker and a wireless sensor and actor network. We show that this game achieves Nash equilibrium and thus leads to a defense strategy for the network. We propose two novel schemes for preventing denial of service attack. The first approach is called utility based dynamic source routing (UDSR). It incorporates the total utility of each route in data packets, where utility is a value that we are trying to maximize in the game theoretic approach. The second approach is based on a watch-list, where each node earns a rating from its neighbors, based on its previous cooperation in the network. Results show that the proposed game frameworks significantly increase the chance of success in defense strategy for the wireless sensor and actor networks. <s> BIB003 </s> Game Theory for Wireless Sensor Networks: A Survey <s> Preventing DoS Attacks <s> In wireless access, transmitter nodes need to make individual decisions for distributed operation and do not necessarily cooperate with each other. We consider a single-receiver random access system of non-cooperative transmitters with the individual objectives of optimizing their throughput rewards, transmission energy costs and delay costs. The non-cooperative transmitter behavior may be purely selfish or may also reflect malicious objectives of generating interference to prevent the successful transmissions of the other nodes as a form of denial of service attack. Our goal is to evaluate the interactions between selfish and malicious nodes that have the dual objectives of optimizing their individual performance measures and blocking the packet transmissions of the other selfish nodes. We assume saturated packet queues of infinite buffer capacities and consider a general multi-packet reception channel that allows packet captures in the presence of simultaneous transmissions. In this context, we formulate a non-cooperative random access game of selecting the individual probabilities of transmitting packets to a common receiver. We derive the non-cooperative transmission strategies in Nash equilibrium. The analysis provides insights for the optimal strategies to block random access of selfish nodes as well as the optimal defense mechanisms against the possible denial of service attacks of malicious nodes in wireless networks. The results are also compared with the cooperative equilibrium strategies that optimize the total system utility (separately under random access and scheduled access). A pricing scheme is presented to improve the non-cooperative operation. For distributed implementation, we formulate a repeated game of the best-response strategy updates and introduce adaptive heuristics (based on the channel feedback only) provided that the system parameters are not explicitly known at the individual transmitters. <s> BIB004 </s> Game Theory for Wireless Sensor Networks: A Survey <s> Preventing DoS Attacks <s> In this paper we formulate the prevention of Denial of Service (DoS) attacks in wireless sensor networks as a repeated game between an intrusion detector and nodes of a sensor network, where some of these nodes act maliciously. We propose a protocol based on game theory which achieves the design objectives of truthfulness by recognizing the presence of nodes that agree to forward packets but fail to do so. This approach categorizes different nodes based upon their dynamically measured behavior. Through simulation we evaluate proposed protocol using packet throughput and the accuracy of misbehaving node detection. <s> BIB005 </s> Game Theory for Wireless Sensor Networks: A Survey <s> Preventing DoS Attacks <s> Focusing on dropping packets attacks in sensor networks, we propose a model of dropping packets attack-resistance as a repeated game based on such an assumption that sensor nodes are rational. The model prevents malicious nodes from attacking by establishing punishment mechanism, and impels sensor networks to reach a collaborative Nash equilibrium. Simulation results show that the devised model can effectively resist the dropping packets attacks(DPA) by choosing reasonable configuration parameters. <s> BIB006 </s> Game Theory for Wireless Sensor Networks: A Survey <s> Preventing DoS Attacks <s> The high node density, large scale node number and limitation of resource in wireless sensor networks introduce significant challenges when preventing active denial of services (DoS) attacks. This paper established an attacking-defending gaming model, where the strategy space and payoff matrix are given to both the intrusion detection system (IDS) and the malicious nodes. The Nash equilibrium of mixed strategy is then achieved. Simulation results show that our gaming model can detect active DoS attacks effectively. <s> BIB007 </s> Game Theory for Wireless Sensor Networks: A Survey <s> Preventing DoS Attacks <s> Denial-of-service (DoS) attack is a serious threat to the communication networks in smart grid, which may result in severe instability of power systems. A jammer can send strong interference to jam the data transmission if wireless communication systems are used for conveying system state information from a remote sensor to a controller in the wide area system monitoring and control. When being jammed by a jammer, the remote sensor can utilize multiple channels to avoid the jamming interference. Hence, the jamming and anti-jamming are modeled as a zero-sum stochastic game. In this game, the actions of the sensor and jammer are dependent on the current system state. A quadratic function is used as the payoff function, thus facilitating the LQG control of the power system. The Nash equilibrium of the game is analyzed, including the existence and the corresponding computation. Numerical simulations are carried out for a seven-dimensional linear system of power grid and demonstrate the increase of reward when proper anti-jamming actions are taken. <s> BIB008
The game types for preventing DoS attacks include non-cooperative game BIB002 BIB003 BIB004 , cooperative game BIB001 , and repeated game BIB005 BIB006 . The jamming and anti-jamming issues are modeled as a zero-sum stochastic game in literature BIB008 to defend DoS attack. In this game, the actions of the sensor and jammer are dependent on the current system state. A quadratic function is used as the payoff function, thus facilitating the LQG control of the power system. The NE of the game is analyzed, including the existence and the corresponding computation. Numerical simulations are carried out for a seven-dimensional linear system of power grid and demonstrate the increase of reward when proper anti-jamming actions are taken. Dong et al. BIB007 established an attacking-defending gaming model which can detect active DoS attacks effectively, where the strategy space and payoff matrix are given to both the IDS and the malicious nodes.