Cyber-Physical Systems Security—A Survey <s> 2) Smart Grids Vulnerabilities: a) SG V3, grid communication vulnerabilities: <s> Control systems for energy such as Supervisory Control And Data Ac- quisition (SCADA) involve a hierarchy of sensing, monitoring, and con- trol devices connected to centralized control stations/centers. With in- creasing connectivity to commercial o-the-shelf technologies these sys- tems have become vulnerable to cyber attacks. To assist the energy sector in dealing with these cyber attacks, we propose the development of a taxonomy. In this work we take a first step towards a taxonomy by developing a comprehensive model of attacks, vulnerabilities, and damages in control systems. We populate the model with a survey of available literature from industry, academia, and national laboratories. <s> BIB001 </s> Cyber-Physical Systems Security—A Survey <s> 2) Smart Grids Vulnerabilities: a) SG V3, grid communication vulnerabilities: <s> Remote terminal units (RTUs) are perimeter supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) devices that measure and control actual physical devices. Cyber security was largely ignored in SCADA for many years, and the cyber security issues that now face SCADA and DCS, specifically RTU security, are investigated in this research. This dissertation presents a new role based access control model designed specifically for RTUs and process control. The model is developed around the process control specific data element called a point, and point operations. The model includes: assignment constraints that limit the RTU operations that a specific role can be assigned and activation constraints that allow a security administrator to specify conditions when specific RTU roles or RTU permissions cannot be used. ::: RTU enforcement of the new access control model depends on, and is supported by, the protection provided by an RTU's operating system. This dissertation investigates two approaches for using minimal kernels to reduce potential vulnerabilities in RTU protection enforcement and create a security hardened RTU capable of supporting the new RTU access control model. The first approach is to reduce a commercial OS kernel to only those components needed by the RTU, removing any known or unknown vulnerabilities contained in the eliminated code and significantly reducing the size of the kernel. The second approach proposes using a microkernel that supports partitioning as the basis for an RTU specific operating system which isolates network related RTU software, the RTU attack surface, from critical RTU operational software such as control algorithms and analog and digital input and output. ::: In experimental analysis of a prototype hardened RTU connected to real SCADA hardware, a reduction of over 50% was obtained in reducing a 2.4 Linux kernel to run on actual RTU hardware. Functional testing demonstrated that different users were able to carryout assigned tasks with the limited set of permissions provided by the security hardened RTU and a series of simulated insider attacks were prevented by the RTU role based access control system. Analysis of communication times indicated response times would be acceptable for many SCADA and DCS application areas. Investigation of a partitioning microkernel for an RTU identified the L4 microkernel as an excellent candidate. Experimental evaluation of L4 on real hardware found the IPC overhead for simulated critical RTU operations protected by L4 partitioning to be sufficiently small to warrant continued investigation of the approach. <s> BIB002 </s> Cyber-Physical Systems Security—A Survey <s> 2) Smart Grids Vulnerabilities: a) SG V3, grid communication vulnerabilities: <s> We present a potential class of cyber attack, named false data injection attack, against the state estimation in deregulated electricity markets. With the knowledge of the system configuration, we show that such attacks will circumvent the bad data measurement detection equipped in present SCADA systems, and lead to profitable financial misconduct such as virtual bidding the ex-post locational marginal price (LMP). We demonstrate the potential attacks on an IEEE 14-bus system. <s> BIB003 </s> Cyber-Physical Systems Security—A Survey <s> 2) Smart Grids Vulnerabilities: a) SG V3, grid communication vulnerabilities: <s> This article has given a broadbrush description of issues related to smart-grid security. Designing solutions in at this stage, before widespread deployment, would be beneficial; in some cases solutions exist, whereas in others research investments will be needed. Several open questions about goals still require discussion, especially around such topics as how (and how much) privacy can be supported. <s> BIB004 </s> Cyber-Physical Systems Security—A Survey <s> 2) Smart Grids Vulnerabilities: a) SG V3, grid communication vulnerabilities: <s> With the increase in use of information technology in advanced demand side management and given the growth in power consumption in the computation and communications sectors, a new class of cyberintrusion plans is emerging that aims to alter the load through the Internet and by means of automatic and distributed software intruding agents. These attacks work by compromising direct load control command signals, demand side management price signals, or cloud computation load distribution algorithms to affect the load at the most crucial locations in the grid in order to cause circuit overflow or other malfunctions and damage the power system equipment. To gain insights into these less-examined yet important intrusion strategies, in this paper, we identify a variety of practical loads that can be volnurable to Internet-based load altering attacks. In addition, we overview a collection of defense mechanisms that can help in blocking these attacks or minimizing the damage caused by them. Our simulation results based on the standard setting in the IEEE 24-bus Reliability Test System show that our proposed cost-efficent load protection strategy can significantly reduce the cost of load protection while it guarantees that no Internet-based load altering attack may overload the power distribution system. <s> BIB005 </s> Cyber-Physical Systems Security—A Survey <s> 2) Smart Grids Vulnerabilities: a) SG V3, grid communication vulnerabilities: <s> Electricity theft is estimated to cost billions of dollars per year in many countries. To reduce electricity theft, electric utilities are leveraging data collected by the new Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI) and using data analytics to identify abnormal consumption trends and possible fraud. In this paper, we propose the first threat model for the use of data analytics in detecting electricity theft, and a new metric that leverages this threat model in order to evaluate and compare anomaly detectors. We use real data from an AMI system to validate our approach. <s> BIB006 </s> Cyber-Physical Systems Security—A Survey <s> 2) Smart Grids Vulnerabilities: a) SG V3, grid communication vulnerabilities: <s> It is often appealing to assume that existing solutions can be directly applied to emerging engineering domains. Unfortunately, careful investigation of the unique challenges presented by new domains exposes its idiosyncrasies, thus often requiring new approaches and solutions. In this paper, we argue that the “smart” grid, replacing its incredibly successful and reliable predecessor, poses a series of new security challenges, among others, that require novel approaches to the field of cyber security. We will call this new field cyber-physical security. The tight coupling between information and communication technologies and physical systems introduces new security concerns, requiring a rethinking of the commonly used objectives and methods. Existing security approaches are either inapplicable, not viable, insufficiently scalable, incompatible, or simply inadequate to address the challenges posed by highly complex environments such as the smart grid. A concerted effort by the entire industry, the research community, and the policy makers is required to achieve the vision of a secure smart grid infrastructure. <s> BIB007 </s> Cyber-Physical Systems Security—A Survey <s> 2) Smart Grids Vulnerabilities: a) SG V3, grid communication vulnerabilities: <s> The development of a trustworthy smart grid requires a deeper understanding of potential impacts resulting from successful cyber attacks. Estimating feasible attack impact requires an evaluation of the grid's dependency on its cyber infrastructure and its ability to tolerate potential failures. A further exploration of the cyber-physical relationships within the smart grid and a specific review of possible attack vectors is necessary to determine the adequacy of cybersecurity efforts. This paper highlights the significance of cyber infrastructure security in conjunction with power application security to prevent, mitigate, and tolerate cyber attacks. A layered approach is introduced to evaluating risk based on the security of both the physical power applications and the supporting cyber infrastructure. A classification is presented to highlight dependencies between the cyber-physical controls required to support the smart grid and the communication and computations that must be protected from cyber attack. The paper then presents current research efforts aimed at enhancing the smart grid's application and infrastructure security. Finally, current challenges are identified to facilitate future research efforts. <s> BIB008 </s> Cyber-Physical Systems Security—A Survey <s> 2) Smart Grids Vulnerabilities: a) SG V3, grid communication vulnerabilities: <s> The Smart Grid, generally referred to as the next-generation power system, is considered as a revolutionary and evolutionary regime of existing power grids. More importantly, with the integration of advanced computing and communication technologies, the Smart Grid is expected to greatly enhance efficiency and reliability of future power systems with renewable energy resources, as well as distributed intelligence and demand response. Along with the silent features of the Smart Grid, cyber security emerges to be a critical issue because millions of electronic devices are inter-connected via communication networks throughout critical power facilities, which has an immediate impact on reliability of such a widespread infrastructure. In this paper, we present a comprehensive survey of cyber security issues for the Smart Grid. Specifically, we focus on reviewing and discussing security requirements, network vulnerabilities, attack countermeasures, secure communication protocols and architectures in the Smart Grid. We aim to provide a deep understanding of security vulnerabilities and solutions in the Smart Grid and shed light on future research directions for Smart Grid security. <s> BIB009
The power system infrastructure in smart grids relies on almost the same protocols in ICS, such as Modbus and DNP3, thus the same vulnerabilities still hold in smart grids. In addition, IEC 61 850 has also been introduced recently as an advancement of these protocols in substations' communications. The lack of security properties in these protocols has a different impact in the context of smart grids. For example, protocols that lack encryption, make the data in transit vulnerable to eavesdropping, which results in a number of attacks such as the inference of customers' usage patterns BIB006 , BIB007 , or even injection of false information due to the lack of authentication BIB005 , BIB009 . It is also possible to inject the network with bogus packets that aim to flood it, resulting in a DoS attack; or to inject false information, resulting in decisions based on false information BIB008 , BIB003 . In addition, smart grids consist of heterogeneous components run by different entities. For example, a generation plant of a grid interacts with a transmission plant, where the transmission plant, in turn, interacts with a distribution plant, and finally the distribution delivers the electricity to end users. Each type of interaction is usually run and administered by different companies, which introduces vulnerabilities in communication and collaboration BIB001 , BIB002 , BIB007 . b) SG V4, vulnerabilities with smart meters: Smart meters rely on two-way communications, which contribute to a number of new security concerns about an attacker's abilities to exploit such interaction BIB004 . For example, a smart meter may have a backdoor that an attacker could exploit to have full control over the device. Santamarta  analyzed a smart meter's available documentation and found out that there is a "factory login" account. Aside from the customers' accounts with limited capabilities used for basic configurations, this factory login account gives full control to the user over the smart meter. What's more, the communication is transmitted through telnet which is known for major security weaknesses, e.g., sending data in clear text without encryption. Once full control over the smart meter is gained, three potential attacks arise. 1) Power disruption, either directly, by malicious interactions with other devices to change their desired power consumption, or indirectly, by injecting false data in a way that the control center receives false information and consequently, makes wrong decisions. 2) Using the meter as "bot" to launch attacks possibly against other smart meters or systems within the smart grid network. 3) The meter's collected data could be tampered with so that the bill reflects false data to reduce the cost to the consumer  .