An extended systematic literature review on provision of evidence for safety certification <s> Model-Based Evidence Specification (5%): <s> The process can fail to deliver its expected outputs and consequently contribute to the introduction of faults into the software system. The process may fail due to ambiguous and unsuitable notations, unreliable tool-support, flawed methods and techniques or incompetent personnel. However, not all process activities pose the same degree of risks and therefore require the same degree of rigour. In this paper, we define an extendable metamodel for describing lifecycle processes. The metamodel embodies attributes which facilitate the automated analysis of the process, revealing possible process failures and associated risks. The metamodel also provides the capability to automatically verify the compliance of the process with certification standards. The metamodel is evaluated against processes from the aerospace and automotive domains. <s> BIB001 </s> An extended systematic literature review on provision of evidence for safety certification <s> Model-Based Evidence Specification (5%): <s> This paper considers the benefits from applying information modelling as the basis for creating an electronically-based safety case. It highlights the current difficulties of developing and managing large document-based safety cases for complex systems such as those found in Air Traffic Control systems. After a review of current tools and related literature on this subject, the paper proceeds to examine the many relationships between entities that can exist within a large safety case. The paper considers the benefits to both safety case writers and readers from the future development of an ideal safety case tool that is able to exploit these information models. The paper also introduces the idea that the safety case has formal relationships between entities that directly support the safety case argument using a methodology such as GSN, and informal relationships that provide links to direct and backing evidence and to supporting information. <s> BIB002 </s> An extended systematic literature review on provision of evidence for safety certification <s> Model-Based Evidence Specification (5%): <s> Several safety-related standards exist for developing and certifying safety-critical systems. System safety assessments are common practice and system certification according to a standard requires submitting relevant system safety information to appropriate authorities. The RTCA DO-178B standard is a software quality assurance, safety-related standard for the development of software aspects of aerospace systems. This research introduces an approach to improve communication and collaboration among safety engineers, software engineers, and certification authorities in the context of RTCA DO-178B. This is achieved by utilizing a Unified Modeling Language (UML) profile that allows software engineers to model safety-related concepts and properties in UML, the de facto software modeling standard. A conceptual meta-model is defined based on RTCA DO-178B, and then a corresponding UML profile, which we call SafeUML, is designed to enable its precise modeling. We show how SafeUML improves communication by, for example, allowing monitoring implementation of safety requirements during the development process, and supporting system certification per RTCA DO-178B. This is enabled through automatic generation of safety and certification-related information from UML models. We validate this approach through a case study on developing an aircraft's navigation controller subsystem. <s> BIB003 </s> An extended systematic literature review on provision of evidence for safety certification <s> Model-Based Evidence Specification (5%): <s> Increasingly, licensing and safety regulatory bodies require the suppliers of software-intensive, safety-critical systems to provide an explicit software safety case – a structured set of arguments based on objective evidence to demonstrate that the software elements of a system are acceptably safe. Existing research on safety cases has mainly focused on how to build the arguments in a safety case based on available evidence; but little has been done to precisely characterize what this evidence should be. As a result, system suppliers are left with practically no guidance on what evidence to collect during software development. This has led to the suppliers having to recover the relevant evidence after the fact – an extremely costly and sometimes impractical task. Although standards such as the IEC 61508 – which is widely viewed as the best available generic standard for managing functional safety in software – provide some guidance for the collection of relevant safety and certification information, this guidance is mostly textual, not expressed in a precise and structured form, and is not easy to specialize to context-specific needs. To address these issues, we present a conceptual model to characterize the evidence for arguing about software safety. Our model captures both the information requirements for demonstrating compliance with IEC 61508 and the traceability links necessary to create a seamless chain of evidence. We further describe how our generic model can be specialized according to the needs of a particular context, and discuss some important ways in which our model can facilitate software certification. <s> BIB004
We classify in this category those techniques that characterize the structure of safety evidence using models. We identified the following approaches in the studies: Sector-specific UML meta-models  [PS122] and UML profiles built specifically for standards such as DO-178B BIB003 and IEC61508 BIB004 . Data modelling using entity-relationship diagrams to structure the data content in large safety cases including the evidence aspects BIB002 . Process models capturing the activities or processes that produce the artefacts used as evidence and present them using a tree-based structure BIB001 .