Game Theory for Wireless Sensor Networks: A Survey <s> Intrusion Detection <s> In this paper, we consider the problem of detecting an intruding packet in a communication network. Detection is accomplished by sampling a portion of the packets transiting selected network links (or router interfaces). Since sampling entails incurring network costs for real-time packet sampling and packet examination hardware, we would like to develop a network packet sampling strategy to effectively detect network intrusions while not exceeding a given total sampling budget. We consider this problem in a game theoretic framework, where the intruder picks paths (or the network ingress point if only shortest path routing is possible) to minimize chances of detection and where the network operator chooses a sampling strategy to maximize the chances of detection. We formulate the game theoretic problem, and develop sampling schemes that are optimal in this game theoretic setting. <s> BIB001 </s> Game Theory for Wireless Sensor Networks: A Survey <s> Intrusion Detection <s> In this paper, we propose a new technique for handling security issues in mobile wireless sensor networks. We define a non cooperative game between an attacker and the sensor network. The attacker and the sensor network are the players of the game, where each one tries to maximize its own payoff. The sensor network tries to defend the sensor nodes against intrusions. We formulate the attack-defense game as a two-player, nonzero-sum, non-cooperative game. and show that this game achieves Nash equilibrium, thus leading to a defense strategy for the network, and significantly increases the chance of detecting intrusions. <s> BIB002 </s> Game Theory for Wireless Sensor Networks: A Survey <s> Intrusion Detection <s> Based on cooperative game theory, we propose a new technique for handling security issues in mobile wireless sensor networks. We define a game between sensor nodes and concentrate on three fundamental factors: cooperation, reputation and quality of security. Stronger cooperation between two nodes implies more reliable data communication between them. And the more a node cooperates the better is its reputation, which decreases when misbehavior is detected. When security of the network is compromised, the percentage of exposed traffic measures the quality of security of sensor nodes. By incorporating these three factors, we cluster the sensor nodes such that within a cluster, the payoff function of all sensor nodes are close to each other, where payoff is the largest possible individual gain for each sensor according to a defined utility metric. We define one strategy set for each node, which guarantees reaching to an equilibrium point for payoff function. <s> BIB003 </s> Game Theory for Wireless Sensor Networks: A Survey <s> Intrusion Detection <s> So far sensor network broadcast protocols assume a trustworthy environment. However in safety and mission-critical sensor networks this assumption may not be valid and some sensor nodes might be adversarial. In these environments, malicious sensor nodes can deprive other nodes from receiving a broadcast message. We call this attack a denial-of-message attack (DoM). In this paper we model and analyze this attack, and present countermeasures. We present SIS, a secure implicit sampling scheme that permits a broadcasting base station to probabilistically detect the failure of nodes to receive its broadcast, even if these failures result from an attacker motivated to induce these failures undetectably. SIS works by eliciting authenticated acknowledgments from a subset of nodes per broadcast, where the subset is unpredictable to the attacker and tunable so as to mitigate acknowledgment implosion on the base station. We use a game-theoretic approach to evaluate this scheme in the face of an optimal attacker that attempts to maximize the number of nodes it denies the broadcast while remaining undetected by the base station, and show that SIS significantly constrains such an attacker even in sensor networks exhibiting high intrinsic loss rates. We also discuss extensions that permit more targeted detection capabilities. <s> BIB004 </s> Game Theory for Wireless Sensor Networks: A Survey <s> Intrusion Detection <s> In wireless sensor network(WSN), intrusion detection systems(IDSs)can be placed on all of nodes to make a network safer. But the always-on strategy is not an efficient choice because of wasting the source of system. The paper describes an intrusion detection way using a non cooperative game theoretic framework, which can help each cluster head node decide the probability of starting up IDS service. The method not only ensures the security of network, but also reduces the cost caused by monitoring and prolongs the lifecycle of each node. Lastly, the process of corresponding experiments and result analysis has been given in the end of the paper, and the validity of the method has been verified. <s> BIB005 </s> Game Theory for Wireless Sensor Networks: A Survey <s> Intrusion Detection <s> We envision a wireless sensor network (WSN) as an entity analogous to a biological population with individual nodes mapping to individual organisms and the network architecture mapping to the biological population. In particular, a mobile wireless sensor network consisting of hundreds or more of microchip- driven nodes is analogous to a flying insect population in several important aspects. The notions of lifetime, space distribution and environment apply to both domains. The interactions between individuals, either insects or WSN sensors, can be captured with evolutionary game theory models, in which individuals are the players and reliability are the fitness (payoff) of the players. The evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) forms the basis of network survivability. Furthermore, we introduce hybrid fault models into the proposed architecture with the notion of "Byzantine generals playing evolutionary games"[13J. This unified architecture makes it possible to dynamically (realtime) predict reliability, survivability, and fault tolerance capability of a WSN. On the node level, we introduce survival analysis to model lifetime, reliability and survivability of WSN nodes. By adopting survival analysis, rather than standard engineering reliability theory, we try to address four critical issues: (i) replacing unrealistic constant failure rates with general stochastic models, (ii) replacing unrealistic independent failures with shared frailty models that effectively address common risks or events-related dependence, and with multi-state modeling for common events dependence, (Hi) harnessing the censoring-modeling mechanisms to assess the influences of unpredictable malicious events on reliability and survivability, and (iv) addressing spatial aspects of failures with spatial survival analysis, spatial frailty. <s> BIB006 </s> Game Theory for Wireless Sensor Networks: A Survey <s> Intrusion Detection <s> Biological structures and organizations in nature, from gene, molecular, immune systems, and biological populations, to ecological communities, are built to stand against perturbations and biological robustness is therefore ubiquitous. Furthermore, it is intuitively obvious that the counterpart of bio-robustness in engineered systems is fault tolerance. With the objective to stimulate inspiration for building reliable and survivable computer networks, this paper reviews the state-of-the-art research on bio-robustness at different biological scales (level) including gene, molecular networks, immune systems, population, and community. Besides identifying the biological/ecological principles and mechanisms relevant to biological robustness, we also review major theories related to the origins of bio-robustness, such as evolutionary game theory, self-organization and emergent behaviors. Evolutionary game theory, which we present in a relative comprehensive introduction, provides an ideal framework to model the reliability and survivability of computer networks, especially the wireless sensor networks. We also present our perspectives on the reliability and survivability of computer networks, particularly wireless sensor and ad hoc networks, based on the principles and mechanisms of bio-robustness reviewed in the paper. Finally, we propose four open questions including three in engineering and one in DNA code robustness to demonstrate the bidirectional nature of the interactions between bio-robustness and engineering fault tolerance. <s> BIB007 </s> Game Theory for Wireless Sensor Networks: A Survey <s> Intrusion Detection <s> A drive mechanism for revolving the turret of a searchlight assembly. The turret is rotated in an oscillating manner over an arc of less than 360 DEG . It is particularly characterized by smooth reversal allowing the driving of a high inertia turret without rapid motor overload and failure as characterized by other prior art methods of driving such mechanisms. A partial cylindrical track is concentrically disposed about the axis of rotation and attached to the turret. In the preferred embodiment, a link chain is welded along the bottom of the track, being folded back on the ends in a tear-drop shape. A drive sprocket on a swing arm is held into engagement with the chain and driven by a constant speed motor. The sprocket alternately drives along the inside of the chain and the outside of the chain smoothly traversing between the positions around the tear-drop ends to cause a smooth deceleration and acceleration. <s> BIB008 </s> Game Theory for Wireless Sensor Networks: A Survey <s> Intrusion Detection <s> In this paper, we introduce a new concept termed dynamic hybrid fault models together with the mathematic models and approaches for applying the new concept to reliability and fault tolerance analyses. It extends the traditional hybrid fault models and their relevant constraints in agreement algorithms with survival analysis and evolutionary game theory. The new dynamic hybrid fault models (i) transform hybrid fault models into time and covariate dependent models; (ii) make real-time prediction of reliability more realistic and allows for real-time prediction of fault-tolerance; (iii) set the foundations for integrating hybrid fault models with reliability and survivability analyses by introducing evolutionary game modeling; (iv) extend evolutionary game theory in its modeling of the survivals of game players. The application domain is wireless sensor network (WSN), but the large part of the modeling architecture also applies to general engineering reliability and network survivability. <s> BIB009 </s> Game Theory for Wireless Sensor Networks: A Survey <s> Intrusion Detection <s> Wireless sensor networks (WSNs) are new technologies, foreseen to be used increasingly in the near future, and security is an important issue for them. However because of the nodes resource limitations, other schemes proposed for securing general ad hoc networks, are not appropriate for WSNs. Usually some nodes act maliciously and they are able to do different kinds of DoS attacks. In order to make the network more secure, malicious nodes should be isolated from the network. In this paper, we model the interaction of nodes in WSN and intrusion detection system (IDS) as a Bayesian game formulation and use this idea to make a secure routing protocol. By this approach nodes are motivated to act normally and gain reputation, and IDS can perform better by using the history of the game. As this game approaches to Nash equilibrium, it leads to a defense strategy for the network. <s> BIB010 </s> Game Theory for Wireless Sensor Networks: A Survey <s> Intrusion Detection <s> The problem of detecting malicious nodes in wireless sensor networks is considered. Since current security mechanisms are inadequate for wireless sensor networks, we must develop a new framework to detect malicious nodes using Zero-Sum game approach and selective node acknowledgements in the forward data path. The first few sections of the paper provide a game model with probability of cost required to defend the nodes and the subsequent sections derives the model to detect malicious nodes using the probability of acknowledgment at source. <s> BIB011 </s> Game Theory for Wireless Sensor Networks: A Survey <s> Intrusion Detection <s> In self-organized wireless network, such as ad hoc network, sensor network or mesh network, nodes are independent individuals which have different benefit; Therefore, selfish nodes refuse to forward packets for other nodes in order to save energy which causes the network fault. At the same time, some nodes may be malicious, whose aim is to damage the network. In this paper, we analyze the cooperation stimulation and security in self-organized wireless networks under a game theoretic framework. We first analyze a four node wireless network in which nodes share the channel by relaying for others during its idle periods in order to help the other nodes, each node has to use a part of its available channel capacity. And then, the fault tolerance and security problem is modeled as a non-cooperative game in which each player maximizes its own utility function. The goal of the game is to maximize the utility function in the giving condition in order to get better network efficiency. At last, for characterizing the efficiency of Nash equilibria, we analyze the so called price of anarchy, as the ratio between the objective function at the worst Nash equilibrium and the optimal objective function. Our results show that the players can get the biggest payoff if they obey cooperation strategy. <s> BIB012 </s> Game Theory for Wireless Sensor Networks: A Survey <s> Intrusion Detection <s> Wireless sensor networks have great potential to be employed in various real time fields, such as, military, industry and traffic surveillance, etc. However, due to power and memory limitations of sensor nodes, one of the major challenges about wireless sensor networks is security. Based on evolutionary game theory, the paper proposes an active defense model for wireless sensor networks where nodes have limited rationality of evolutionary learning ability. The nodes can be active and dynamic to adjust their defensive strategies so as to achieve the most effective defense, according to the attacker's different policies. The results of the simulation verify the correctness of our theoretical analysis and the feasibility and effectiveness of our model. <s> BIB013 </s> Game Theory for Wireless Sensor Networks: A Survey <s> Intrusion Detection <s> Since security threats to WSNs are increasingly being diversified and deliberate, prevention-based techniques alone can no longer provide WSNs with adequate security. However, detection-based techniques might be effective in collaboration with prevention-based techniques for securing WSNs. As a significant branch of detection-based techniques, the research of anomaly detection in wired networks and wireless ad hoc networks is already quite mature, but such solutions can be rarely applied to WSNs without any change, because WSNs are characterized by constrained resources, such as limited energy, weak computation capability, poor memory, short communication range, etc. The development of anomaly detection techniques suitable for WSNs is therefore regarded as an essential research area, which will enable WSNs to be much more secure and reliable. In this survey paper, a few of the key design principles relating to the development of anomaly detection techniques in WSNs are discussed in particular. Then, the state-of-the-art techniques of anomaly detection in WSNs are systematically introduced, according to WSNs' architectures (Hierarchical/Flat) and detection technique categories (statistical techniques, rule based, data mining, computational intelligence, game theory, graph based, and hybrid, etc.). The analyses and comparisons of the approaches that belong to a similar technique category are represented technically, followed by a brief discussion towards the potential research areas in the near future and conclusion. <s> BIB014 </s> Game Theory for Wireless Sensor Networks: A Survey <s> Intrusion Detection <s> We introduce a new layered modeling architecture consisting of dynamic hybrid fault modeling and extended evolutionary game theory for reliability, survivability, and fault tolerance analyses. The architecture extends traditional hybrid fault models and their relevant constraints in the Agreement algorithms with survival analysis, and evolutionary game theory. The dynamic hybrid fault modeling (i) transforms hybrid fault models into time- and covariate-dependent models; (ii) makes real-time prediction of reliability more realistic, and allows for real-time prediction of fault-tolerance; (iii) sets the foundation for integrating hybrid fault models with reliability and survivability analyses by integrating them with evolutionary game modeling; and (iv) extends evolutionary game theory by stochastically modeling the survival (or fitness) and behavior of `game players.' To analyse survivability, we extend dynamic hybrid fault modeling with a third-layer, operational level modeling, to develop the three-layer survivability analysis approach (dynamic hybrid fault modeling constitutes the tactical and strategic levels). From the perspective of evolutionary game modeling, the two mathematical fields, i.e., survival analysis and agreement algorithms, which we applied for developing dynamic hybrid fault modeling, can also be utilized to extend the power of evolutionary game theory in modeling complex engineering, biological (ecological), and social systems. Indeed, a common property of the areas where our extensions to evolutionary game theory can be advantageous is that the risk analysis and management are a core issue. Survival analysis (including competing risks analysis, and multivariate survival analysis) offers powerful modeling tools to analyse time-, space-, and/or covariate-dependent uncertainty, vulnerability, and/or frailty which `game players' may experience. The agreement algorithms, which are not limited to the agreement algorithms from distributed computing, when applied to extend evolutionary game modeling, can be any problem (game system) specific rules (algorithms or models) that can be utilized to dynamically check the consensus among game players. We expect that the modeling architecture and approaches discussed in the study should be implemented as a software environment to deal with the necessary sophistication. Evolutionary computing should be particularly convenient to serve as the core optimization engine, and should simplify the implementation. Accordingly, a brief discussion on the software architecture is presented. <s> BIB015
The game types for intrusion detection include non-cooperative game BIB002 BIB004  BIB001 BIB005 and Markov game. Reddy  discussed currently available intrusion detection techniques; attack models using game theory, and then propose a framework to detect malicious nodes using zero sum game approach for nodes in the forward data path. Mohi et al. BIB010 modeled the interaction of nodes in WSN and IDS as a Bayesian game formulation and use this idea to make a secure routing protocol. By this approach nodes are motivated to act rationally and gain reputation, and IDS can perform better by using the history of the game. This game approaches to NE and leads to a defense strategy for the network. Reddy and Srivathsan BIB011 developed a framework to detect malicious nodes using Zero-Sum game approach and selective node acknowledgements in the forward data path. A game theory-based scheme is introduced for finding out the vulnerable areas in WSN BIB003 BIB002 . Non-cooperative game theory-based schemes could assist detection schemes in improving their performance as well as efficiency though they are not concerned with detection directly BIB014 . Qiu et al. BIB013 proposed an active defense model for WSN where nodes have limited rationality of evolutionary learning ability based on evolutionary game theory. The nodes can achieve the most effective defense by adjusting their defensive strategies active and dynamic. Ma and Krings BIB006 BIB007 BIB008 BIB009 envisioned a WSN as an entity analogous to a biological population with individual nodes mapping to individual organisms and the network architecture mapping to the biological population. The interactions between individuals, either insects or WSN sensors, can be captured with evolutionary game theory models, in which individuals are the players and reliability are the fitness (payoff) of the players. The evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) forms the basis of network survivability. Ma and Krings BIB015 introduce a layered modeling architecture consisting of dynamic hybrid fault modeling and extend evolutionary game theory for reliability, survivability, and fault tolerance analyses. The architecture extends traditional hybrid fault models and their relevant constraints in the agreement algorithms with survival analysis, and evolutionary game theory. Selfish nodes refuse to forward packets for other nodes in order to save energy which causes the network to malfunction. At the same time, some nodes may be malicious, whose aims are to damage the network. In BIB012 , Jing and Ruiying analyzed the cooperation stimulation and security in self-organized WSN under a game theoretic framework.