Cyber-Physical Systems Security—A Survey <s> 3) Political Threats: <s> SCADA is the acronym of Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition, which is a communication technology scheme for collecting data from distant facilities and also controlling them on control systems. By SCADA technology it is not necessary to assign operators to remote locations for operating the facilities there. In the beginning SCADA system was locally introduced, and it has been applied to larger and wide-area systems as the information technology evolves. As SCADA system expands to wide area, it has been connected to common communication infrastructure while it was a locally independent control system network initially. Since the Internet came up, all different kinds of communication networks have been being integrated into the Internet for both technological and economic efficiencies. But it also causes the SCADA system to be revealed to the cyber security risks common on the Internet at the same time. Today many major utility services are provided on SCADA networks, so it is very critical to protect the system from those risks. The damage would be very serious if one of the SCADA systems are attacked and thereby stop normal operation, therefore it should be considered to take countermeasures against the threats. Cyber security problem requires multidirectional approach considering many different aspects of vulnerabilities in the system. This paper analyzes the SCADA network vulnerabilities on the aspects of cyber security. <s> BIB001 </s> Cyber-Physical Systems Security—A Survey <s> 3) Political Threats: <s> In this paper, we show the need for improved Process Control System (PCS) security, and describe some of the promising research areas in PCS security. One implementation of PCS in critical infrastructure and factory automation is a supervisory, control, and data acquisition (SCADA) system, a real-time industrial process control system which centrally monitors and controls remote and/or local processes utilizing plant, equipment, or devices (such as switches, valves, pumps, relays, etc.) while collecting and logging field data. Current SCADA systems are distributed, networked, and dependent on open protocols for the internet, which are exposed to remote cyber terrorism. They are particularly vulnerable to unauthorized access. We give some examples of SCADA processes with natural gas control systems in USA and the Ubiquitous Sensor Network (USN) in Korea. We also examine a representative vulnerability and corresponding measures for security, and present an example of concrete measures for the security of mass transportation as a critical infrastructure. <s> BIB002 </s> Cyber-Physical Systems Security—A Survey <s> 3) Political Threats: <s> Modern automobiles are pervasively computerized, and hence potentially vulnerable to attack. However, while previous research has shown that the internal networks within some modern cars are insecure, the associated threat model--requiring prior physical access--has justifiably been viewed as unrealistic. Thus, it remains an open question if automobiles can also be susceptible to remote compromise. Our work seeks to put this question to rest by systematically analyzing the external attack surface of a modern automobile. We discover that remote exploitation is feasible via a broad range of attack vectors (including mechanics tools, CD players, Bluetooth and cellular radio), and further, that wireless communications channels allow long distance vehicle control, location tracking, in-cabin audio exfiltration and theft. Finally, we discuss the structural characteristics of the automotive ecosystem that give rise to such problems and highlight the practical challenges in mitigating them. <s> BIB003 </s> Cyber-Physical Systems Security—A Survey <s> 3) Political Threats: <s> Increasing awareness of ICS security issues has brought about a growing body of work in this area, including pioneering contributions based on realistic control system logs and network traces. This paper surveys the state of the art in ICS security research, including efforts of industrial researchers, highlighting the most interesting works. Research efforts are grouped into divergent areas, where we add “secure control” as a new category to capture security goals specific to control systems that differ from security goals in traditional IT systems. <s> BIB004
• ICS: A hostile nation (source) could initiate a cyberwar against another nation (target) by remotely attacking its CI, e.g., nuclear plants and gas pipelines, by spreading malware or accessing field devices (vector) resulting in a plant's shutdown, sabotaging components, or environmental pollution (consequence)  , BIB001 , BIB004 , BIB002 ,  BIB003 .