Cyber-Physical Systems Security—A Survey <s> V. REAL-WORLD CPS ATTACKS <s> This paper presents and analyzes a selection of 21 “myths” identified from the authors' experience as being the most common in power utilities and the most harmful to their cybersecurity posture. For each one, tangible and referenced elements, typically sparse and dispersed, are presented in this single and up-to-date reference to support their rationalization. This paper also provides generic recommendations supporting power utilities on the ongoing and challenging process of dispelling the identified myths. <s> BIB001 </s> Cyber-Physical Systems Security—A Survey <s> V. REAL-WORLD CPS ATTACKS <s> The pervasiveness of Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) in various aspects of the modern society grows rapidly. This makes CPS to increasingly attractive targets for various kinds of attacks. We consider cyber-security as an integral part of CPS security. Additionally, the necessity exists to investigate the CPS-specific aspects which are out of scope of cyber-security. Most importantly, attacks capable to cross the cyber-physical domain boundary should be analyzed. The vulnerability of CPS to such cross-domain attacks has been practically proven by numerous examples, e.g., by the currently most famous Stuxnet attack. In this paper, we propose taxonomy for description of attacks on CPS. The proposed taxonomy is capable of representing both conventional cyber-attacks as well as cross-domain attacks on CPS. Furthermore, based on the proposed taxonomy, we define the attack categorization. Several possible application areas of the proposed taxonomy are extensively discussed. Among others, it can be used to establish a knowledge base about attacks on CPS known in the literature. Furthermore, the proposed description structure will foster the quantitative and qualitative analysis of these attacks, both of which are necessarily to improve CPS security. <s> BIB002
We review reported cyber, cyber-physical, and physical attacks on the four CPS applications that exploited the aforementioned vulnerabilities in Section IV. In general, publicly known attacks are rare BIB001 , and it is infeasible to find attacks that represent exploitations of all vulnerabilities in Section IV. Instead, we consider attacks that have been realized by experimentation or in real life. At the end of this section, we describe the discussed cyber-physical attacks using a cyberphysical taxonomy proposed by Yampolskiy et al. BIB002 in Tables II-V for attacks on ICS, smart grids, wearable and IMDs, and smart cars, respectively. Their proposal dissects CPS attacks into six-dimensional description, by which allows us to gather more insights about each attack. The description includes the attacked object (influenced element), the resulting changes on the attacked object from the attack (influence), indirectly affected components (affected element), changes on the CPS application (impact), how the attack took place (method), and preceding attacks needed to make an attack successful (precondition). we also integrate our CPS framework into this taxonomy by highlighting CPS aspects in the attack tables with C, CP, and P, for cyber, cyber-physical, or physical aspects, respectively. In this section, we categorize the attacks based on the damages' location. Attacks that do not reach sensors/actuators are considered purely cyber, while attacks that directly impact physical components are physical. Whereas, attacks that indirectly impact physical components, through cyber components, are cyber-physical.