Cyber-Physical Systems Security—A Survey <s> d) Security extensions: <s> Our study analyzes the security and privacy properties of an implantable cardioverter defibrillator (ICD). Introduced to the U.S. market in 2003, this model of ICD includes pacemaker technology and is designed to communicate wirelessly with a nearby external programmer in the 175 kHz frequency range. After partially reverse-engineering the ICD's communications protocol with an oscilloscope and a software radio, we implemented several software radio-based attacks that could compromise patient safety and patient privacy. Motivated by our desire to improve patient safety, and mindful of conventional trade-offs between security and power consumption for resource-constrained devices, we introduce three new zero-power defenses based on RF power harvesting. Two of these defenses are human-centric, bringing patients into the loop with respect to the security and privacy of their implantable medical devices (IMDs). Our contributions provide a scientific baseline for understanding the potential security and privacy risks of current and future IMDs, and introduce human-perceptible and zero-power mitigation techniques that address those risks. To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first in our community to use general-purpose software radios to analyze and attack previously unknown radio communications protocols. <s> BIB001 </s> Cyber-Physical Systems Security—A Survey <s> d) Security extensions: <s> We're about to acquire a significant new cyber- vulnerability. The world's energy utilities are starting to install hundreds of millions of 'smart meters' which contain a remote off switch. Its main purpose is to ensure that customers who default on their payments can be switched remotely to a prepay tariff; secondary purposes include supporting interruptible tariffs and implementing rolling power cuts at times of supply shortage. The off switch creates information security problems of a kind, and on a scale, that the energy companies have not had to face before. From the viewpoint of a cyber attacker - whether a hostile government agency, a terrorist organisation or even a militant environmental group - the ideal attack on a target country is to interrupt its citizens' electricity supply. This is the cyber equivalent of a nuclear strike; when electricity stops, then pretty soon everything else does too. Until now, the only plausible ways to do that involved attacks on critical generation, transmission and distribution assets, which are increasingly well defended. Smart meters change the game. The combination of commands that will cause meters to interrupt the supply, of applets and software upgrades that run in the meters, and of cryptographic keys that are used to authenticate these commands and software changes, create a new strategic vulnerability, which we discuss in this paper. <s> BIB002 </s> Cyber-Physical Systems Security—A Survey <s> d) Security extensions: <s> The Smart Grid, generally referred to as the next-generation power system, is considered as a revolutionary and evolutionary regime of existing power grids. More importantly, with the integration of advanced computing and communication technologies, the Smart Grid is expected to greatly enhance efficiency and reliability of future power systems with renewable energy resources, as well as distributed intelligence and demand response. Along with the silent features of the Smart Grid, cyber security emerges to be a critical issue because millions of electronic devices are inter-connected via communication networks throughout critical power facilities, which has an immediate impact on reliability of such a widespread infrastructure. In this paper, we present a comprehensive survey of cyber security issues for the Smart Grid. Specifically, we focus on reviewing and discussing security requirements, network vulnerabilities, attack countermeasures, secure communication protocols and architectures in the Smart Grid. We aim to provide a deep understanding of security vulnerabilities and solutions in the Smart Grid and shed light on future research directions for Smart Grid security. <s> BIB003 </s> Cyber-Physical Systems Security—A Survey <s> d) Security extensions: <s> Balancing security, privacy, safety, and utility is a necessity in the health care domain, in which implantable medical devices (IMDs) and body area networks (BANs) have made it possible to continuously and automatically manage and treat a number of health conditions. In this work, we survey publications aimed at improving security and privacy in IMDs and health-related BANs, providing clear definitions and a comprehensive overview of the problem space. We analyze common themes, categorize relevant results, and identify trends and directions for future research. We present a visual illustration of this analysis that shows the progression of IMD/BAN research and highlights emerging threats. We identify three broad research categories aimed at ensuring the security and privacy of the telemetry interface, software, and sensor interface layers and discuss challenges researchers face with respect to ensuring reproducibility of results. We find that while the security of the telemetry interface has received much attention in academia, the threat of software exploitation and the sensor interface layer deserve further attention. In addition, we observe that while the use of physiological values as a source of entropy for cryptographic keys holds some promise, a more rigorous assessment of the security and practicality of these schemes is required. <s> BIB004 </s> Cyber-Physical Systems Security—A Survey <s> d) Security extensions: <s> Wireless communications are increasingly important in health-care applications, particularly in those that use implantable medical devices (IMDs). Such systems have many advantages in providing remote healthcare in terms of monitoring, treatment and prediction for critical cases. However, the existence of malicious adversaries, referred to as nodes, which attempt to control implanted devices, constitutes a critical risk for patients. Such adversaries may perform dangerous attacks by sending malicious commands to the IMD, and any weakness in the device authentication mechanism may result in serious problems including death. In this paper we present a physical layer (PHY) authentication technique for IMDs that does not use existing methods of cryptology. In addition to ensuring authentication, the proposed technique also provides advantages in terms of decreasing processing complexity of IMDs and enhances overall communications performance. <s> BIB005 </s> Cyber-Physical Systems Security—A Survey <s> d) Security extensions: <s> The cardiac interpulse interval (IPI) has recently been proposed to facilitate key exchange for implantable medical devices (IMDs) using a patient's own heartbeats as a source of trust. While this form of key exchange holds promise for IMD security, its feasibility is not fully understood due to the simplified approaches found in related works. For example, previously proposed protocols have been designed without considering the limited randomness available per IPI, or have overlooked aspects pertinent to a realistic system, such as imperfect heartbeat detection or the energy overheads imposed on an IMD. In this paper, we propose a new IPI-based key-exchange protocol and evaluate its use during medical emergencies. Our protocol employs fuzzy commitment to tolerate the expected disparity between IPIs obtained by an external reader and an IMD, as well as a novel way of tackling heartbeat misdetection through IPI classification. Using our protocol, the expected time for securely exchanging an 80-bit key with high probability (1-10−6) is roughly one minute, while consuming only 88 μJ from an IMD. <s> BIB006 </s> Cyber-Physical Systems Security—A Survey <s> d) Security extensions: <s> The Internet-of-Things relies on ad-hoc connections, which also requires an on-demand approach to the negotiation of security parameters. We propose a new approach to shared key derivation for Body Area Networks (BANs). Body area networks are quickly becoming increasingly important in the world of healthcare with wide application in the treatment and monitoring of chronic patients using on-body devices. Advancements in the field will result in quicker response times in emergency situations, and detect complications in patients at a much earlier stage potentially saving many lives. In this paper, we have used motion sensors instead of the more common physiological signals that need physical access to the body, like electrocardiograms (ECG), to pair devices and secure communication in Body Area Networks. Our method considers the acceleration of the devices that needs to communicate. These measurements tend to be similar as devices are deployed on the same host body, which means that these could be used to derive shared keys. We show that these measurements results in derived keys that are unpredictable and exhibit significant difference with previous keys. This is an improvement over existing schemes where keys vary for different hosts but tend to be similar over time. <s> BIB007
The trend of adding-on security to existing components of smart grids has been emerging. Protocols like DNP3, IEC 61850, and IEC 62351 are extended to capture security properties. For example, Secure DNP3 protocol is an extended DNP3 that have basic authentication, integrity and confidentiality services. The security features are added by inserting a security layer in the communication stacks of these protocols BIB003 . e) Smart meters' disabling prevention: To prevent remote attackers who exploit the disabling feature in smart meters, Anderson and Fuloria BIB002 suggested that smart meters should be programmed to notify customers in enough time in advance, before the command takes effect and disables meters. This measure helps in the early detection of DoS attempts before they take place. 3) Medical Devices Controls: a) Authentication: Halperin et al. BIB001 proposed a cryptographic-based authentication and key-exchange mechanism to prevent unauthorized parties from accessing IMDs. Both mechanisms do not consume batteries as a source of energy. Instead, they rely on external radio frequency. In addition, out-of-band authentication is deployed in some wearable and implantable devices. By which, authentication is performed using additional channels, other than the channels used for communication, such as audio and visual channels BIB004 . In addition, biometrics, such as electrocardiograms, physiological values, heart rate BIB006 , glucose level, and blood pressure, can all be used for key generation for encrypted communication in the body sensor network BIB004 . In addition, patients' movement can be another property by which keys are derived BIB007 . In addition, Ankarali et al. BIB005 proposed a physical layer authentication technique for IMDs that relies on pre-equalization.