Survey on Remote Electronic Voting <s> I. Introduction <s> Since 1998, the Swiss government has actively pursued the implementation of electronic voting ("e-voting") in its elections. This case study examines how these systems have worked in the test cantons of Geneva and Zurich. The evidence and analysis in this case study suggest that e-voting might serve as a powerful tool to ::: augment the participation rate, the quality of voting, and aid in the implementation of political rights. This study also evaluates the risks of e-voting, noting that the concerns around integrity often associated with electronic voting have for the most part not materialized in the Swiss case. Questions such as the digital divide in access to networked technologies are also a real concern that should be addressed by the government as it expands the system. ::: ::: Available at: http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/sites/cyber.law.harvard.edu/files/Gerlach-Gasser_SwissCases_Evoting.pdf <s> BIB001 </s> Survey on Remote Electronic Voting <s> I. Introduction <s> This paper discusses the Norwegian experiences in piloting a verifiable, remote voting system in a legally binding, public election. First, we provide a highlevel description of the system used. We then go into detail about the major challenges that were encountered in the implementation and execution of the system. In particular, the generation and printing of return codes and the key management are described in detail. We also discuss the relationship between the Norwegian Electoral Management Body and the system integrators, indicating how verifiability may enable new models of cooperation. <s> BIB002
Electronic voting sees a lot of adoption recently. Electronic voting systems are for example used in national-wide elections in Estonia  , for country council elections in Norway BIB002 and for canton wide votes in Switzerland BIB001 . To compete with traditional paper ballots, electronic voting system must ensure that the voter has the same or better privileges regarding anonymity, integrity of the vote and many more. Electronic voting is not trivial and can not be compared with for example e-commerce, even if it may come to mind. Ecommerce has not found solutions for double spending and other fraud techniques and just recalculates fees and prices accordingly -this is obviously not possible for e-voting. Because of the unique situation and requirements that electronic voting exists in it is quite hard to develop an e-voting system that can be used in real-world elections and inspires trust in the voter. Our main contribution is the documentation of the current state of e-voting research. In the following section properties which need to be fulfilled by modern and secure electronic voting systems are defined. In Section 3 possible attack vectors are discussed. Sections 4 and 5 give an overview over existing evoting schemes and systems. Open problems in e-voting are discussed in section 5 and section 6 gives a brief overview of related work.