A Survey on Evaluation Schemes for Routing Misbehaviors in Manet <s> Related Work <s> In this paper, we address the problem of service availability in mobile ad-hoc WANs. We present a secure mechanism to stimulate end users to keep their devices turned on, to refrain from overloading the network, and to thwart tampering aimed at converting the device into a "selfish" one. Our solution is based on the application of a tamper resistant security module in each device and cryptographic protection of messages. <s> BIB001 </s> A Survey on Evaluation Schemes for Routing Misbehaviors in Manet <s> Related Work <s> We introduce a game-theoretic setting for routing in a mobile ad hoc network that consists of greedy, selfish agents who accept payments for forwarding data for other agents if the payments cover their individual costs incurred by forwarding data. In this setting, we propose Ad hoc-VCG, a reactive routing protocol that achieves the design objectives of truthfulness (i.e., it is in the agents' best interest to reveal their true costs for forwarding data) and cost-efficiency (i.e., it guarantees that routing is done along the most cost-efficient path) in a game-theoretic sense by paying to the intermediate nodes a premium over their actual costs for forwarding data packets. We show that the total overpayment (i.e., the sum of all premiums paid) is relatively small by giving a theoretical upper bound and by providing experimental evidence. Our routing protocol implements a variation of the well-known mechanism by Vickrey, Clarke, and Groves in a mobile network setting. Finally, we analyze a very natural routing protocol that is an adaptation of the Packet Purse Model [8] with auctions in our setting and show that, unfortunately, it does not achieve cost-efficiency or truthfulness. <s> BIB002 </s> A Survey on Evaluation Schemes for Routing Misbehaviors in Manet <s> Related Work <s> The communication in Mobile Ad hoc Network (MANET) is multi-hop in nature wherein each node relays data packets of other nodes thereby spending its resources such as battery power, CPU time and memory. In an ideal environment, each node in MANET is supposed to perform this community service truthfully. However this is not the case and existence of selfish nodes is a very common feature in MANETs. A selfish node is one that tries to utilize the network resources for its own profit but is reluctant to spend its own for others. If such behaviour prevails among large number of the nodes in the network, it may eventually lead to disruption of network. This paper studies the impact of selfish nodes concentration on the quality of service in MANETs. <s> BIB003
In recent years remarkable studies were carried out in the domain of routing misbehaviors as to identify the detrimental nodes to prevent data loss and diminishing performance characteristics. One of such a scheme is the use of virtual currency named as a nugget BIB003 BIB001 . The virtual currency is readily supplied in the system on behalf of source or destination to make them forwardable nodes. The cost of a packet may depend on several parameters such as required total transmission power and the battery status of the intermediate nodes. Packets sent by or destined to nodes that do not have a sufficient amount of nugget are discarded. The major drawback of this approach is the demand for trusted hardware to secure and maintain the record of the currency at central level. Ad hoc VCG BIB002 protocol is one such protocol that deploys monetary transfers to discover an energyefficient path between the source and the destination.