A Survey of Routing Attacks and Security Measures in Mobile Ad-Hoc Networks <s> ROUTING ATTACKS IN MANETS <s> An ad hoc network is a group of wireless mobile computers (or nodes), in which individual nodes cooperate by forwarding packets for each other to allow nodes to communicate beyond direct wireless transmission range. Prior research in ad hoc networking has generally studied the routing problem in a non-adversarial setting, assuming a trusted environment. In this paper, we present attacks against routing in ad hoc networks, and we present the design and performance evaluation of a new secure on-demand ad hoc network routing protocol, called Ariadne. Ariadne prevents attackers or compromised nodes from tampering with uncompromised routes consisting of uncompromised nodes, and also prevents a large number of types of Denial-of-Service attacks. In addition, Ariadne is efficient, using only highly efficient symmetric cryptographic primitives. <s> BIB001 </s> A Survey of Routing Attacks and Security Measures in Mobile Ad-Hoc Networks <s> ROUTING ATTACKS IN MANETS <s> We consider the problem of incorporating security mechanisms into routing protocols for ad hoc networks. Canned security solutions like IPSec are not applicable. We look at AODV[21] in detail and develop a security mechanism to protect its routing information. We also briefly discuss whether our techniques would also be applicable to other similar routing protocols and about how a key management scheme could be used in conjunction with the solution that we provide. <s> BIB002 </s> A Survey of Routing Attacks and Security Measures in Mobile Ad-Hoc Networks <s> ROUTING ATTACKS IN MANETS <s> An ad hoc network is a collection of wireless computers (nodes), communicating among themselves over possibly multihop paths, without the help of any infrastructure such as base stations or access points. Although many previous ad hoc network routing protocols have been based in part on distance vector approaches, they have generally assumed a trusted environment. We design and evaluate the Secure Efficient Ad hoc Distance vector routing protocol (SEAD), a secure ad hoc network routing protocol based on the design of the Destination-Sequenced Distance-Vector routing protocol (DSDV). In order to support use with nodes of limited CPU processing capability, and to guard against denial-of-service (DoS) attacks in which an attacker attempts to cause other nodes to consume excess network bandwidth or processing time, we use efficient one-way hash functions and do not use asymmetric cryptographic operations in the protocol. SEAD performs well over the range of scenarios we tested, and is robust against multiple uncoordinated attackers creating incorrect routing state in any other node, even in spite of any active attackers or compromised nodes in the network. <s> BIB003 </s> A Survey of Routing Attacks and Security Measures in Mobile Ad-Hoc Networks <s> ROUTING ATTACKS IN MANETS <s> Most recent ad hoc network research has focused on providing routing services without considering security. We detail security threats against ad hoc routing protocols, specifically examining AODV and DSR. In light of these threats, we identify three different environments with distinct security requirements. We propose a solution to one, the managed-open scenario where no network infrastructure is pre-deployed, but a small amount of prior security coordination is expected. Our protocol, authenticated routing for ad hoc networks (ARAN), is based on certificates and successfully defeats all identified attacks. <s> BIB004 </s> A Survey of Routing Attacks and Security Measures in Mobile Ad-Hoc Networks <s> ROUTING ATTACKS IN MANETS <s> Secure operation of the routing protocol is one of the major challenges to be met for the proliferation of the mobile ad hoc networking (MANET) paradigm. Nevertheless, security enhancements have been proposed mostly for reactive MANET protocols. The proposed secure link state routing protocol (SLSP) provides secure proactive topology discovery, which can be beneficial to network operation in a number of ways. SLSP can be employed as a stand-alone protocol, or fit naturally into a hybrid routing framework, when combined with a reactive protocol. SLSP is robust against individual attackers, is capable of adjusting its scope between local and network-wide topology discovery, and is capable of operating in networks of frequently changing topology and membership. <s> BIB005 </s> A Survey of Routing Attacks and Security Measures in Mobile Ad-Hoc Networks <s> ROUTING ATTACKS IN MANETS <s> Security has become a primary concern in order to provide protected communication between mobile nodes in a hostile environment. Unlike the wireline networks, the unique characteristics of mobile ad hoc networks pose a number of nontrivial challenges to security design, such as open peer-to-peer network architecture, shared wireless medium, stringent resource constraints, and highly dynamic network topology. These challenges clearly make a case for building multifence security solutions that achieve both broad protection and desirable network performance. In this article we focus on the fundamental security problem of protecting the multihop network connectivity between mobile nodes in a MANET. We identify the security issues related to this problem, discuss the challenges to security design, and review the state-of-the-art security proposals that protect the MANET link- and network-layer operations of delivering packets over the multihop wireless channel. The complete security solution should span both layers, and encompass all three security components of prevention, detection, and reaction. <s> BIB006 </s> A Survey of Routing Attacks and Security Measures in Mobile Ad-Hoc Networks <s> ROUTING ATTACKS IN MANETS <s> Low rate TCP denial-of-service attacks are a new type of DoS attacks that are carefully orchestrated to exploit the fixed minimum TCP RTO property and thereby deny services to legitimate users. This type of attacks is different from traditional flood-based attacks and hence conventional solutions to detect these attacks are not applicable. We propose a novel approach to detect these attack flows at edge routers. A flow exhibiting a periodic pattern is marked malicious if its burst length is greater than or equal to RTTs of other connections with the same server and its time period is equal to the fixed minimum RTO. A carefully designed light weight data structure is proposed to store the necessary flow history at edge routers. Simulation results show that such flows can be detected by our proposed approach, which does not require any modification to TCP congestion control algorithms like randomizing the fixed minimum RTO. <s> BIB007 </s> A Survey of Routing Attacks and Security Measures in Mobile Ad-Hoc Networks <s> ROUTING ATTACKS IN MANETS <s> Initial work in ad hoc routing has considered only the problem of providing efficient mechanisms for finding paths in very dynamic networks, without considering security. Because of this, there are a number of attacks that can be used to manipulate the routing in an ad hoc network. In this paper, we describe these threats, specifically showing their effects on ad hoc on-demand distance vector and dynamic source routing. Our protocol, named authenticated routing for ad hoc networks (ARAN), uses public-key cryptographic mechanisms to defeat all identified attacks. We detail how ARAN can secure routing in environments where nodes are authorized to participate but untrusted to cooperate, as well as environments where participants do not need to be authorized to participate. Through both simulation and experimentation with our publicly available implementation, we characterize and evaluate ARAN and show that it is able to effectively and efficiently discover secure routes within an ad hoc network. <s> BIB008 </s> A Survey of Routing Attacks and Security Measures in Mobile Ad-Hoc Networks <s> ROUTING ATTACKS IN MANETS <s> Mobile ad hoc network (MANET) is a self-configuring network that is formed automatically via wireless links by a collection of mobile nodes without the help of a fixed infrastructure or centralized management. The mobile nodes forward packets for each other, allowing communication among nodes outside wireless transmission range hop by hop. Due to dynamic infrastructure-less nature and lack of centralized monitoring points, the ad hoc networks are vulnerable to attacks. Attacks on ad hoc network routing protocols disrupt network performance and reliability. This paper attempts to provide a comprehensive overview of attacks and secure routing. It first analyzes the reason that ad hoc network is vulnerable to attacks. Then it presents the well known attacks and the popular secure protocols. <s> BIB009
All of the routing protocols in MANETs depend on active cooperation of nodes to provide routing between the nodes and to establish and operate the network. The basic assumption in such a setup is that all nodes are well behaving and trustworthy. Albeit in an event where one or more of the nodes turn malicious, security attacks can be launched which may disrupt routing operations or create a DOS (Denial of Service) BIB007 condition in the network. Due to dynamic, distributed infrastructureless nature of MANETs, and lack of centralized authority, the ad hoc networks are vulnerable to various kinds of attacks. The challenges to be faced by MANETs are over and above to those to be faced by the traditional wireless networks. The accessibility of the wireless channel to both the genuine user and attacker make the MANET susceptible to both passive eavesdroppers as well as active malicious attackers. The limited power backup and limited computational capability of the individual nodes hinders the implementation of complex security algorithms and key exchange mechanisms. There is always a possibility of a genuine trusted node to be compromised by the attackers and subsequently used to launch attacks on the network. Node mobility makes the network topology dynamic forcing frequent networking reconfiguration which creates more chances for attacks. The attacks on MANETs can be categorized as active or passive. In passive attacks the attacker does not send any message, but just listens to the channel. Passive attacks are non disruptive but are information seeking, which may be critical in the operation of a protocol. Active attacks may either be directed to disrupt the normal operation of a specific node or target the operation of the whole network. A passive attacker listens to the channel and packets containing secret information (e.g., IP addresses, location of nodes, etc.) may be stolen, which violates confidentiality paradigm. In a wireless environment it is normally impossible to detect this attack, as it does not produce any new traffic in the network. The action of an active attacker includes; injecting packets to invalid destinations into the network, deleting packets, modifying the contents of packets, and impersonating other nodes which violates availability, integrity, authentication, and nonrepudiation paradigm. Contrary to the passive attacks, active attacks can be detected and eventually avoided by the legitimate nodes that participate in an ad hoc network BIB006 . In  , the authors have surveyed attacks on MANETs and their countermeasures on protocol layer wise criteria. In  , B.Kannhavong et al. have surveyed newer attacks like flooding, black hole, link withholding, link spoofing, replay, wormhole, colluding misrelay and their countermeasures. In  , BIB009 the authors have presented an overview of secure routing protocols (Authenticated routing for ad hoc networks (ARAN) BIB008 , Ariadne BIB001 , Secure AODV (SAODV) BIB002 , Secure Efficient Ad hoc Distance vector routing protocol (SEAD) BIB003 , Secure Routing Protocol (SRP) BIB004 , Secure Link-State Protocol (SLSP) BIB005 ) in MANETs. In this article, we will survey the current state of art of routing attacks and their security measures. The first approach to develop security solutions is the understanding of potential threats. Supported by this threat analysis and capabilities of potential attackers, the well known routing attacks in MANETs are discussed. Flooding Attack:  Routing Table Overflow: The attacker node floods the network with bogus route creation packets to fake (non-existing) nodes or simply sends excessive route advertisements to the network. The purpose is to overwhelm the routing-protocol implementations, by creating enough routes to prevent new routes from being created or to overwhelm the protocol implementation. Proactive routing protocols, as they create and maintain routes to all possible destinations are more vulnerable to this attack.