Predictive Mechanisms Are Not Involved the Same Way during Human-Human vs. Human-Machine Interactions: A Review <s> Predictive Systems for Shared Action with Other Humans <s> Recent empirical studies have implicated the use of the motor system during action observation, imitation and social interaction. In this paper, we explore the computational parallels between the processes that occur in motor control and in action observation, imitation, social interaction and theory of mind. In particular, we examine the extent to which motor commands acting on the body can be equated with communicative signals acting on other people and suggest that computational solutions for motor control may have been extended to the domain of social interaction. <s> BIB001 </s> Predictive Mechanisms Are Not Involved the Same Way during Human-Human vs. Human-Machine Interactions: A Review <s> Predictive Systems for Shared Action with Other Humans <s> Body movement provides a rich source of information about other people’s goals and intentions. In the present study, we examined a particular aspect concerned with the interpretation of bodily movement—how well people can distinguish between different social intentions by observing a reach-to-grasp movement. To ascertain to what extent intention-from-motion judgements rely on visual kinematics, we compared prediction performance on a typical temporal-occlusion video task with prediction performance on a temporal-occlusion point-light task. In the video task, participants observed videos showing a model reaching towards and grasping a wooden block with different intents: to cooperate with a partner in building a tower, compete with an opponent to be the first to put the object in the middle of the working surface, or perform an individual action. In the point-light task, participants observed point-light displays of the same movements. Although predictions were more accurate for the video task, prediction performance was not disrupted for the point-light task, suggesting that essential kinematic information available in point-light displays was indeed sufficient for intention-from-motion judgement. Importantly, the same kinematic landmarks were used to discriminate between social intentions for the video and the point-light task. This suggests that observers not only have the ability to use kinematic information when no other information is available, but they use kinematic information to discriminate between intentions when watching the motion of others under full light conditions. <s> BIB002 </s> Predictive Mechanisms Are Not Involved the Same Way during Human-Human vs. Human-Machine Interactions: A Review <s> Predictive Systems for Shared Action with Other Humans <s> This eye tracking study investigated the degree to which biological motion information from manual point-light displays provides sufficient information to elicit anticipatory eye movements. We compared gaze performance of adults observing a biological motion point-light display of a hand reaching for a goal object or a non-biological version of the same event. Participants anticipated the goal of the point-light action in the biological motion condition but not in a non-biological control condition. The present study demonstrates that kinematic information from biological motion can be used to anticipate the goal of other people’s point-light actions and that the presence of biological motion is sufficient for anticipation to occur. <s> BIB003 </s> Predictive Mechanisms Are Not Involved the Same Way during Human-Human vs. Human-Machine Interactions: A Review <s> Predictive Systems for Shared Action with Other Humans <s> Abstract We examined the hypothesis that predictive gaze during observation of other people's actions depends on the activation of corresponding action plans in the observer. Using transcranial magnetic stimulation and eye-tracking technology we found that stimulation of the motor hand area, but not of the leg area, slowed gaze predictive behavior (compared to no TMS). This result shows that predictive eye movements to others' action goals depend on a somatotopical recruitment of the observer's motor system. The study provides direct support for the view that a direct matching process implemented in the mirror-neuron system plays a functional role for real-time goal prediction. <s> BIB004 </s> Predictive Mechanisms Are Not Involved the Same Way during Human-Human vs. Human-Machine Interactions: A Review <s> Predictive Systems for Shared Action with Other Humans <s> In spite of the remarkable progress made in the burgeoning field of social neuroscience, the neural mechanisms that underlie social encounters are only beginning to be studied and could - paradoxically - be seen as representing the "dark matter" of social neuroscience. Recent conceptual and empirical developments consistently indicate the need for investigations that allow the study of real-time social encounters in a truly interactive manner. This suggestion is based on the premise that social cognition is fundamentally different when we are in interaction with others rather than merely observing them. In this article, we outline the theoretical conception of a second-person approach to other minds and review evidence from neuroimaging, psychophysiological studies, and related fields to argue for the development of a second-person neuroscience, which will help neuroscience to really "go social"; this may also be relevant for our understanding of psychiatric disorders construed as disorders of social cognition. <s> BIB005 </s> Predictive Mechanisms Are Not Involved the Same Way during Human-Human vs. Human-Machine Interactions: A Review <s> Predictive Systems for Shared Action with Other Humans <s> How does our brain choose the best course of action? Choices between material goods are thought to be steered by neural value signals that encode the rewarding properties of the choice options. Social decisions, by contrast, are traditionally thought to rely on neural representations of the self and others. However, recent studies show that many types of social decisions may also involve neural value computations. This suggests a unified mechanism for motivational control of behaviour that may incorporate both social and non-social factors. In this Review, we outline a theoretical framework that may help to identify possible overlaps and differences between the neural processes that guide social and non-social decision making. <s> BIB006
Many studies suggest that acting jointly with someone else or observing someone else performing an action will engage the same representational structures underlying action execution. Joint actions can be defined as interdependent interactions involving two (or more) co-agents whose actions are directed at a common goal. Successful joint action requires co-agents accurately predicting consequences not only of their own actions but also of their co-agents' actions in order to correctly perform the complementary action in time and in space with respect to the joint goal. Based on one's own internal predictive models, motor simulation enables predictions about the actions of partners BIB001 . Interestingly, several studies have shown that being involved in a joint action is not a necessary condition for predictive mechanisms activation, as these mechanisms can be elicited during the mere passive observation of others BIB002 BIB003 BIB004 . The claim that the same predictive mechanisms are involved during self-generated and observed other-generated actions is debated BIB005 BIB006 .