Predictive Mechanisms Are Not Involved the Same Way during Human-Human vs. Human-Machine Interactions: A Review <s> Predictive Systems for the Sense of We-Agency with Machines <s> Intentional binding is the perceived shortening of the time between a voluntary action and its consequent effect and has been suggested as an implicit measure of agency. This shortening has been linked to processes underlying action preparation and is also affected by post-movement feedback. Intentional binding has been demonstrated in joint action tasks involving two humans, but it is unknown whether it occurs for tasks involving a human working alongside a non-human partner. This experiment investigated the influence of high-level feedback on the experience of agency and whether binding occurs in human–computer joint action settings. Participants were involved in two versions an action task involving another ‘agent’. In one version, two participants (a genuine participant and a confederate) sat side by side, separated by a curtain that prevented vision of the other person. In baseline conditions, both participants were instructed to make a self-paced action and judge the time of the action by reporting the position of a rotating clock-hand on a computer screen. In other baseline conditions, participants judged the time of an auditory tone. In operant conditions, participants made actions and the genuine participant’s action was followed 200 ms later by a tone on every trial. To examine the effect of post-movement information on binding and explicit agency judgments, a colour cue was presented on each trial informing participants about which person’s action caused the tone. In another version of the task, participants were paired with a computer instead of a human co-actor. Post-movement information affected the genuine participant’s explicit agency judgments but had no effect on intentional binding, which always occurred. In the human–computer version, participants never showed binding, even when they explicitly judged that their action had caused the tone. We suggest that human–human partnerships result in the formation of a new ‘we’ agentic identity, but that human–computer partnerships lead to inhibition of the processes that mediate the pre-reflective sense of agency. <s> BIB001 </s> Predictive Mechanisms Are Not Involved the Same Way during Human-Human vs. Human-Machine Interactions: A Review <s> Predictive Systems for the Sense of We-Agency with Machines <s> Sense of agency is the way in which we understand the causal relationships between our actions and sensory events. Agency is implicitly measured using intentional binding paradigms, where voluntary self-made actions and consequential sensory events are perceived as shifted closer together in time. However, a crucial question remains as to how we understand the relationship between others’ actions and sensory events. Do we use similar binding processes as for our own actions? Previous attempts to investigate this phenomenon in others’ have reached no clear consensus. Therefore, in an attempt to understand how we attribute the causal relationships between others’ actions and sensory events, we investigated intentional binding in others’ actions using an interval estimation paradigm. In a first experiment participants were required to make a button-press response to indicate the perceived interval between a self-made action and a tone, between a closely matched observed action and tone, and between two tones. For both self-made and observed actions, we found a significant perceived shortening of the interval between the actions and tones as compared with the interval between two tones, thus intentional binding was found for both self-made and observed actions. In a second experiment we validated the findings of the first by contrasting the perceived intervals between an observed action and tone with a matched visual–auditory stimulus and a tone. We again found a significant perceived shortening of the interval for observed action compared with the closely matched visual–auditory control stimulus. The occurrence of intentional binding when observing an action suggests we use similar processes to make causal attributions between our own actions, others’ actions, and sensory events. <s> BIB002 </s> Predictive Mechanisms Are Not Involved the Same Way during Human-Human vs. Human-Machine Interactions: A Review <s> Predictive Systems for the Sense of We-Agency with Machines <s> Many studies suggest that individuals are not able to build a sense of we-agency during joint actions with automated artificial systems. We sought to examine whether or not this lack of sense of control was linked with individuals' inability to represent automaton-generated action into their own cognitive system. Indeed, during human interactions, we automatically represent our partner's actions in our own sensorimotor system. This might sustain our capacity to build a sense of we-agency over our partner-generated actions. However, to our knowledge, no studies have investigated the potential relation between our ability to use our sensorimotor system to represent a partner's action and we-agency. Our approach consisted in performing a pilot study coupling together a Simon target detection task wherein RTs served as an index of action co-representation and an implicit measure of one's sense of agency as indicated by intentional binding phenomenon. The preliminary observations suggested that individuals could represent other-generated action and have a sense of agency over these actions provided that their partner was another human and not an artificial automated system. <s> BIB003
Numerous studies related to agency in dyads tend to highlight a clear distinction between the sense of agency felt by an agent when he is interacting with another human vs. with a simplistic machine (Wohlschläger et al., 2003a,b; BIB001 BIB002 BIB003 .