Predictive Mechanisms Are Not Involved the Same Way during Human-Human vs. Human-Machine Interactions: A Review <s> The Sense of Agency during Passive Observation of Machines <s> Contents: S.W. Draper, D.A. Norman, C. Lewis, Introduction. Part I:User Centered System Design. K. Hooper, Architectural Design: An Analogy. L.J. Bannon, Issues in Design: Some Notes. D.A. Norman, Cognitive Engineering. Part II:The Interface Experience. B.K. Laurel, Interface as Mimesis. E.L. Hutchins, J.D. Hollan, D.A. NormanDirect Manipulation Interfaces. A.A. diSessa, Notes on the Future of Programming: Breaking the Utility Barrier. Part III:Users' Understandings. M.S. Riley, User Understanding. C. Lewis, Understanding What's Happening in System Interactions. D. Owen, Naive Theories of Computation. A.A. diSessa, Models of Computation. W. Mark, Knowledge-Based Interface Design. Part IV:User Activities. A. Cypher, The Structure of Users' Activities. Y. Miyata, D.A. Norman, Psychological Issues in Support of Multiple Activities. R. Reichman, Communication Paradigms for a Window System. Part V:Toward a Pragmatics of Human-Machine Communication. W. Buxton, There's More to Interaction Than Meets the Eye: Some Issues in Manual Input. S.W. Draper, Display Managers as the Basis for User-Machine Communication. Part VI:Information Flow. D. Owen, Answers First, Then Questions. C.E. O'Malley, Helping Users Help Themselves. L.J. Bannon, Helping Users Help Each Other. C. Lewis, D.A. Norman, Designing for Error. L.J. Bannon, Computer-Mediated Communication. Part VII:The Context of Computing. J.S. Brown, From Cognitive to Social Ergonomics and Beyond. <s> BIB001 </s> Predictive Mechanisms Are Not Involved the Same Way during Human-Human vs. Human-Machine Interactions: A Review <s> The Sense of Agency during Passive Observation of Machines <s> Awareness of actions is partly based on the intentions accompanying them. Thus, the awareness of self- and other-generated actions should differ to the extent that access to own and other's intentions differs. Recent studies have found a brain circuit (the mirrorneuron system) that represents self- and other-generated actions in an integrated fashion. This system does not respond to actions made by nonagents, such as machines. We measured the estimated onset time of actions that subjects either executed themselves or observed being executed by someone else or by a machine. In three experiments, the estimates of the machine actions always differed from those of self- and other-generated actions, whereas the latter two were indistinguishable. Our results are consistent with the view that intentions are attributed to others but not to machines. They also raise the interesting possibility that people attribute intentions to themselves in the same way as they do to others. <s> BIB002 </s> Predictive Mechanisms Are Not Involved the Same Way during Human-Human vs. Human-Machine Interactions: A Review <s> The Sense of Agency during Passive Observation of Machines <s> Abstract Introspectively, the awareness of actions includes the awareness of the intentions accompanying them. Therefore, the awareness of self-generated actions might be expected to differ from the awareness of other-generated actions to the extent that access to one’s own and to other’s intentions differs. However, we recently showed that the perceived onset times of self- vs. other-generated actions are similar, yet both are different from comparable events that are conceived as being generated by a machine. This similarity raises two interesting possibilities. First we could infer the intentions of others from their actions. Second and more radically, we could equally infer our own intentions from the actions we perform rather than sense them. We present two new experiments which investigate the role of action effects in the awareness of self- and other-generated actions by means of measuring the estimated onset time. The results show that the presence of action effects is necessary for the similarity of awareness of self- and other-generated actions. <s> BIB003 </s> Predictive Mechanisms Are Not Involved the Same Way during Human-Human vs. Human-Machine Interactions: A Review <s> The Sense of Agency during Passive Observation of Machines <s> Sense of agency is the way in which we understand the causal relationships between our actions and sensory events. Agency is implicitly measured using intentional binding paradigms, where voluntary self-made actions and consequential sensory events are perceived as shifted closer together in time. However, a crucial question remains as to how we understand the relationship between others’ actions and sensory events. Do we use similar binding processes as for our own actions? Previous attempts to investigate this phenomenon in others’ have reached no clear consensus. Therefore, in an attempt to understand how we attribute the causal relationships between others’ actions and sensory events, we investigated intentional binding in others’ actions using an interval estimation paradigm. In a first experiment participants were required to make a button-press response to indicate the perceived interval between a self-made action and a tone, between a closely matched observed action and tone, and between two tones. For both self-made and observed actions, we found a significant perceived shortening of the interval between the actions and tones as compared with the interval between two tones, thus intentional binding was found for both self-made and observed actions. In a second experiment we validated the findings of the first by contrasting the perceived intervals between an observed action and tone with a matched visual–auditory stimulus and a tone. We again found a significant perceived shortening of the interval for observed action compared with the closely matched visual–auditory control stimulus. The occurrence of intentional binding when observing an action suggests we use similar processes to make causal attributions between our own actions, others’ actions, and sensory events. <s> BIB004 </s> Predictive Mechanisms Are Not Involved the Same Way during Human-Human vs. Human-Machine Interactions: A Review <s> The Sense of Agency during Passive Observation of Machines <s> The sense of agency is the experience of controlling both one’s body and the external environment. Although the sense of agency has been studied extensively, there is a paucity of studies in applied ‘real-life’ situations. One applied domain that seems highly relevant is human-computer-interaction (HCI), as an increasing number of our everyday agentive interactions involve technology. Indeed, HCI has long recognized the feeling of control as a key factor in how people experience interactions with technology. The aim of this review is to summarize and examine the possible links between sense of agency and understanding control in HCI. We explore the overlap between HCI and sense of agency for computer input modalities and system feedback, computer assistance, and joint actions between humans and computers. An overarching consideration is how agency research can inform HCI and vice versa. Finally, we discuss the potential ethical implications of personal responsibility in an ever-increasing society of technology users and intelligent machine interfaces. <s> BIB005 </s> Predictive Mechanisms Are Not Involved the Same Way during Human-Human vs. Human-Machine Interactions: A Review <s> The Sense of Agency during Passive Observation of Machines <s> Every day we make attributions about how our actions and the actions of others cause consequences in the world around us. It is unknown whether we use the same implicit process in attributing causality when observing others' actions as we do when making our own. The aim of this research was to investigate the neural processes involved in the implicit sense of agency we form between actions and effects, for both our own actions and when watching others' actions. Using an interval estimation paradigm to elicit intentional binding in self-made and observed actions, we measured the EEG responses indicative of anticipatory processes before an action and the ERPs in response to the sensory consequence. We replicated our previous findings that we form a sense of implicit agency over our own and others' actions. Crucially, EEG results showed that tones caused by either self-made or observed actions both resulted in suppression of the N1 component of the sensory ERP, with no difference in suppression between consequences caused by observed actions compared with self-made actions. Furthermore, this N1 suppression was greatest for tones caused by observed goal-directed actions rather than non-action or non-goal-related visual events. This suggests that top-down processes act upon the neural responses to sensory events caused by goal-directed actions in the same way for events caused by the self or those made by other agents. <s> BIB006
Similarly, a clear distinction between the sense of agency felt by an individual after observing another human vs. a machine has been made by several authors (Poonian and Cunnington, 2013, experiment 2; Wohlschläger et al., 2003a,b) . As no shared goal is engaged, the sense of agency may be mediated by the predictive system activations. However, failures in predictive mechanisms during the observation of machines may be at the source of the difficulties experienced in having a sense of agency during machine-generated actions (Wohlschläger et al., 2003a,b) . In BIB002 's study, participants were placed in front of a lever that triggered a tone 250 ms after being pushed on. There was a machine-action condition in which participants looked at the lever move automatically. Participants had to estimate the onset time of the lever press. The perceived onset time of the action in the machine-action condition was perceived earlier than the onset of self-generated and otherhuman-generated actions. In another experiment, BIB003 replicated the paradigm of the BIB002 's study except that this time, the participants, the experimenter and the lever were wearing a rubber glove BIB003 ). The participants' task was to estimate the onset time of the lever press. Results in selfaction and other-action conditions fitted those of Wohlschläger et al. (2003b)'s experiment. However, for the machine-action condition, the authors found a significant difference compared to the former experiment. Indeed, when the lever was wearing the rubber glove, participants judged the onset of the action closer to the tone than when the lever had a usual appearance, but it was still distinctive from the perceived onset of self and other generated actions. Thus, when the actor was a machine, individuals did not sense agency even though they tended to when the machine had humanoid physical features. In another study BIB004 , the participants had to observe a video showing either a human or an automated system button press that triggered a tone after a certain temporal delay that they had to estimate. The participants expressed less IB when the sensory effect was triggered by the automated system compared to the biological agent. In addition, no perceptual attenuation occurred when perceptual effects were triggered by an observed machine BIB006 . In sum, joint action with a machine and passive observation of a machine can create a cognitive gap compared to human interactions BIB001 BIB005 . This problem might stem from the opacity of traditional automated system that restrains human ability to predict the system's intentions. Thus, two non-exclusive hypotheses are opened to us. According to the first hypothesis, the sense of we-agency relies on a low-level motor prediction system. During joint actions with traditional automated systems, the predictive system fails to be engaged because humans cannot simulate the machine motor schemes using their own cognitive system (e.g., a button or lever automatic depression). According to the second hypothesis, the high level belief according to which we are interacting with an automated system (e.g., in Obhi and Hall, 2011b study) is enough to inhibit the sense of we-agency. Regrettably, no study to date has investigated the relationship between the potential action/observation matching system activation elicited during interaction with human-like automata and one observer's sense of agency.