A Survey on Evaluation Schemes for Routing Misbehaviors in Manet <s> Secure incentive protocol <s> This paper describes two techniques that improve throughput in an ad hoc network in the presence of nodes that agree to forward packets but fail to do so. To mitigate this problem, we propose categorizing nodes based upon their dynamically measured behavior. We use a watchdog that identifies misbehaving nodes and a pathrater that helps routing protocols avoid these nodes. Through simulation we evaluate watchdog and pathrater using packet throughput, percentage of overhead (routing) transmissions, and the accuracy of misbehaving node detection. When used together in a network with moderate mobility, the two techniques increase throughput by 17% in the presence of 40% misbehaving nodes, while increasing the percentage of overhead transmissions from the standard routing protocol's 9% to 17%. During extreme mobility, watchdog and pathrater can increase network throughput by 27%, while increasing the overhead transmissions from the standard routing protocol's 12% to 24%. <s> BIB001 </s> A Survey on Evaluation Schemes for Routing Misbehaviors in Manet <s> Secure incentive protocol <s> Security in mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs) has received intensive attention recently, whereas the issue of selfish nodes, which may refuse to forward packets for others to save their own resources, is not well addressed yet. This kind of noncooperative action would cause a severe problem that is more likely in MANETs compared to their wired counterpart To cope with this problem, we propose SIP: a secure incentive protocol to stimulate cooperation among those possible selfish nodes. The most attractive feature of SIP is that it does not rely on any predeployed infrastructure and provides highly secure incentives for selfish nodes to be cooperative in packet forwarding with low overhead and implementation complexity. <s> BIB002 </s> A Survey on Evaluation Schemes for Routing Misbehaviors in Manet <s> Secure incentive protocol <s> The proper functioning of mobile ad hoc networks depends on the hypothesis that each individual node is ready to forward packets for others. This common assumption, however, might be undermined by the existence of selfish users who are reluctant to act as packet relays in order to save their own resources. Such non-cooperative behavior would cause the sharp degradation of network throughput. To address this problem, we propose a credit-based Secure Incentive Protocol (SIP) to stimulate cooperation among mobile nodes with individual interests. SIP can be implemented in a fully distributed way and does not require any pre-deployed infrastructure. In addition, SIP is immune to a wide range of attacks and is of low communication overhead by using a Bloom filter. Detailed simulation studies have confirmed the efficacy and efficiency of SIP. <s> BIB003
Secure Incentive protocol charges or rewards nodes for the service they receive or provide. SIP assumes that each mobile node (MN) has a tamper-proof security module such as SIM cards in GSM networks, which deals with security related functions and each intermediate node (IN) puts non forged stamps on the forwarded packets as a proof of forwarding BIB003 . BIB001 Secure Incentive Protocol, (SIP) uses "credits" as the incentives to stimulate packet forwarding. SIP is implemented in the smartcard of each MN. SIP is session-based and mainly consists of three phases. BIB002 During the first Session initialization phase, a session initiator(SI) negotiates session keys and other information with a session responder (SR) and INs between them. And each IN puts a non-forged stamp on each data packet forwarded and SI/SR collect those stamps for later rewarding use in the next Data forwarding phase. The final phase is Rewarding phase, in which each IN is awarded a certain number of credits based on the number of forwarded packets.