Improving Interdisciplinary Communication With Standardized Cyber Security Terminology: A Literature Review <s> B. INFRASTRUCTURE <s> Although awareness is constantly rising, that industrial computer networks (in a very broad sense) can be exposed to serious cyber threats, many people still think that the same countermeasures, developed to protect general-purpose computer networks, can be effectively adopted also in those situations where a physical system is managed/controlled through some distributed Information and Communication Technology (ICT) infrastructure. Unfortunately, this is not the case, as several examples of successful attacks carried out in the last decade, and more frequently in the very recent past, have dramatically shown. Experts in this area know very well that often the peculiarities of industrial networks prevent the adoption of classical approaches to their security and, in particular, of those popular solutions that are mainly based on a detect and patch philosophy. This paper is a contribution, from the security point of view, to the assessment of the current situation of a wide class of industrial distributed computing systems. In particular, the analysis presented in this paper takes into account the process of ensuring a satisfactory degree of security for a distributed industrial system, with respect to some key elements such as the system characteristics, the current state of the art of standardization and the adoption of suitable controls (countermeasures) that can help in lowering the security risks below a predefined, acceptable threshold. <s> BIB001 </s> Improving Interdisciplinary Communication With Standardized Cyber Security Terminology: A Literature Review <s> B. INFRASTRUCTURE <s> Abstract Cyber situational awareness is attracting much attention. It features prominently in the national cyber strategies of many countries, and there is a considerable body of research dealing with it. However, until now, there has been no systematic and up-to-date review of the scientific literature on cyber situational awareness. This article presents a review of cyber situational awareness, based on systematic queries in four leading scientific databases. 102 articles were read, clustered, and are succinctly described in the paper. The findings are discussed from the perspective of both national cyber strategies and science, and some directions for future research are examined. <s> BIB002 </s> Improving Interdisciplinary Communication With Standardized Cyber Security Terminology: A Literature Review <s> B. INFRASTRUCTURE <s> Supervisory control and data acquisition SCADA systems are widely used to monitor and control industrial processes. They provide the key functionality of real-time monitoring, logging/archiving, report generation, and automation for smart grid, which is a promising power delivery system for the near future. On the basis of these functionalities, various SCADA architectures, including hardware and software architecture, have been proposed and standardized; however, the most open and expediently growing areas in the smart grid are the infrastructure and technologies for the SCADA communication and security. In this paper, we provide a review for many documented standards in SCADA, and we also review its state-of-the-art communication and security aspects. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. <s> BIB003 </s> Improving Interdisciplinary Communication With Standardized Cyber Security Terminology: A Literature Review <s> B. INFRASTRUCTURE <s> The massive proliferation of information and communications technologies (hardware and software) into the heart of modern critical infrastructures has given birth to a unique technological ecosystem. Despite the many advantages brought about by modern information and communications technologies, the shift from isolated environments to "systems-of-systems" integrated with massive information and communications infrastructures (e.g., the Internet) exposes critical infrastructures to significant cyber threats. Therefore, it is imperative to develop approaches for identifying and ranking assets in complex, large-scale and heterogeneous critical infrastructures. To address these challenges, this paper proposes a novel methodology for assessing the impacts of cyber attacks on critical infrastructures. The methodology is inspired by research in system dynamics and sensitivity analysis. The proposed behavioral analysis methodology computes the covariances of the observed variables before and after the execution of a specific intervention involving the control variables. Metrics are proposed for quantifying the significance of control variables and measuring the impact propagation of cyber attacks.Experiments conducted on the IEEE 14-bus and IEEE 300-bus electric grid models, and on the well-known Tennessee Eastman chemical process demonstrate the efficiency, scalability and cross-sector applicability of the proposed methodology in several attack scenarios. The advantages of the methodology over graph-theoretic and electrical centrality metric approaches are demonstrated using several test cases. Finally, a novel, stealthy cyber-physical attack is demonstrated against a simulated power grid; this attack can be used to analyze the precision of anomaly detection systems. <s> BIB004 </s> Improving Interdisciplinary Communication With Standardized Cyber Security Terminology: A Literature Review <s> B. INFRASTRUCTURE <s> In this paper, we focus on the cyber-physical system consisting of interdependent physical-resource and computational-resource networks, e.g., smart power grids, automated traffic control system, and wireless sensor and actuator networks, where the physical-resource and computational-resource network are connected and mutually dependent. The failure in physical-resource network might cause failures in computational-resource network, and vice versa. A small failure in either of them could trigger cascade of failures within the entire system. We aim to investigate the issue of cascading failures occur in such system. We propose a typical and practical model by introducing the interdependent complex network. The interdependence between two networks is practically defined as follows: Each node in the computational-resource network has only one support link from the physical-resource network, while each node in physical-resource network is connected to multiple computational nodes. We study the effect of cascading failures using percolation theory and present detailed mathematical analysis of failure propagation in the system. We analyze the robustness of our model caused by random attacks or failures by calculating the size of functioning parts in both networks. Our mathematical analysis proves that there exists a threshold for the proportion of faulty nodes, above which the system collapses. Using extensive simulations, we determine the critical values for different system parameters. Our simulation also shows that, when the proportion of faulty nodes approaching critical value, the size of functioning parts meets a second-order transition. An important observation is that the size of physical-resource and computational-resource networks, and the ratio between their sizes do not affect the system robustness. <s> BIB005
This category includes most of the paper that address technological problems of cyber security, though more specifically, those problems related to the actual infrastructure of cyberspace, and not necessarily programming solutions to every problem that businesses or academic researchers might address -for example, a software tool for managing finances is a category C., Business, topic. The Infrastructure category includes papers that discuss various aspects of cyber security of critical infrastructure, as well as security issues concerning the operation of cyberspace, such as cryptography. It also encompasses papers describing methods for intrusion detection, reverse engineering, and computer forensics, among other issues. BIB002 systematically review 102 papers, drawn from IEEE Xplore, Scopus, Springer link, and Web of Science, in an effort to create a research agenda in the area of cyber situational awareness. Topics they cover include game theory, cognition, vulnerability detection, attack detection, other network analysis, broader primers; a great variety of articles on securing industrial control systems (ICSs)/SCADA (such as power grids); some concepts of emergency management; various tools, architectures, and algorithms on a host of topics, including attribution; and many papers on ''visualization,'' for cyber situational awareness. They note deficits of papers in nation-wide or other high-level cyber situational awareness, despite cyber situational awareness being extremely popular with policy-makers; in teamwork (in various senses of the word) and information exchange, and in military strategy BIB002 . Franke et al. recommend more attention be paid to these areas, and also to efforts to deceive attackers, and to confidentiality and integrity. They suggest that researchers perform experiments to measure how particular solutions contribute to the overall understanding of a situation, and enumerate further directions for game-theoretic research, data fusion algorithms for low-level and high-level information, like sensors and NLP, and empirical work and exercises. Among efforts for cyber situational awareness, ICSs research is well-endowed. Genge et al. (2015) provide a detailed description of their ''cyber attack impact assessment methodology,'' which has the potential to be a general purpose tool to use in analyses assessing impacts from attacks on cyber-physical systems BIB004 . This carries implications for securing cities and countries with it, although these applications were not detailed in the paper. BIB005 detail an in-depth cyber-physical network architecture that, provably and in simulations, resists collapsing as a result of errors on either the cyber or the physical side, as a way of preventing cascading failures BIB005 . BIB003 review a number of papers on SCADA implementation and security, providing a comprehensive reference. They describe two main categories of security issues in SCADA systems: direct threats (terrorist attacks, etc.) and indirect security threats (e.g. viruses, bugs). Gao et al. reiterate a common notion that SCADA security cannot be approached like traditional IT security, as availability and safety are paramount in SCADA systems, and SCADA infrastructure is less dynamic and less globally networked than traditional IT systems BIB003 . BIB001 provide a literature review about the conceptual state of security for critical infrastructure and cyber-physical systems at the component and system level, including policy enforcement. They also provide a host of resources for industrial networks and mention future areas of research in great detail BIB001 . It is clear from these papers that there is no shortage of work being done on cyberphysical systems security. However, research of the connections and interactions of critical infrastructure with the rest of cyberspace and society is somewhat behind, as is research of the interaction of cyber-physical systems security and traditional cyber security. Not integrating cyber-physical security with concepts concerning other areas of cyber security is a common ailment among these papers. It is equally important for other STEM fields besides cyber-physical systems, who are now researching cyber security, to also integrate with traditional ''computer science'' cyber security researchers in this manner.