Predictive Mechanisms Are Not Involved the Same Way during Human-Human vs. Human-Machine Interactions: A Review <s> INTRODUCTION <s> New technology is flexible in the sense that it provides practitioners with a large number of functions and options for carrying out a given task under different circumstances. However, this flexibility has a price. Because the human supervisor must choose the mode best suited to a particular situation, he or she must know more than before about system operations and the operation of the system as well as satisfy new monitoring and attentional demands to track which mode the automation is in and what it is doing to manage the underlying processes. When designers proliferate modes without supporting these new cognitive demands, new mode-related error forms and failure paths can result. Mode error has been discussed in human-computer interaction for some time; however, the increased capabilities and the high level of autonomy of new automated systems appear to have created new types of mode-related problems. The authors explore these new aspects based on findings from their own and related studies of human-automation interaction. In particular, investigators draw on empirical data from a series of studies of pilot-automation interaction in commercial glass cockpit aircraft to illustrate the nature, circumstances, and potential consequences of mode awareness problems in supervisory control of automated resources. The result is an expanded view of mode error that considers the new demands imposed by more automated systems. <s> BIB001 </s> Predictive Mechanisms Are Not Involved the Same Way during Human-Human vs. Human-Machine Interactions: A Review <s> INTRODUCTION <s> This volume offers eloquent and carefully reasoned arguments for a human-centered approach to the development and implementation of new technology in aviation. Part I is an overview of automation in aviation and explains both the application of automation and the concept of human-centered automation. Part II traces the evolution and course of aviation automation. This covers air traffic control and management, as well as aircraft automation. Part III discusses the role of human operators in the aviation system and human-machine integration in the future system. Part IV looks to the future; it expands on novel concepts and discusses requirements for aviation automation and its certification. <s> BIB002 </s> Predictive Mechanisms Are Not Involved the Same Way during Human-Human vs. Human-Machine Interactions: A Review <s> INTRODUCTION <s> Abstract In monkeys, the rostral part of ventral premotor cortex (area F5) contains neurons that discharge, both when the monkey grasps or manipulates objects and when it observes the experimenter making similar actions. These neurons (mirror neurons) appear to represent a system that matches observed events to similar, internally generated actions, and in this way forms a link between the observer and the actor. Transcranial magnetic stimulation and positron emission tomography (PET) experiments suggest that a mirror system for gesture recognition also exists in humans and includes Broca's area. We propose here that such an observation/execution matching system provides a necessary bridge from `doing' to `communicating', as the link between actor and observer becomes a link between the sender and the receiver of each message. <s> BIB003 </s> Predictive Mechanisms Are Not Involved the Same Way during Human-Human vs. Human-Machine Interactions: A Review <s> INTRODUCTION <s> What are the neural bases of action understanding? Although this capacity could merely involve visual analysis of the action, it has been argued that we actually map this visual information onto its motor representation in our nervous system. Here we discuss evidence for the existence of a system, the 'mirror system', that seems to serve this mapping function in primates and humans, and explore its implications for the understanding and imitation of action. <s> BIB004 </s> Predictive Mechanisms Are Not Involved the Same Way during Human-Human vs. Human-Machine Interactions: A Review <s> INTRODUCTION <s> Humans have the conscious experience of 'free will': we feel we can generate our actions, and thus affect our environment. Here we used the perceived time of intentional actions and of their sensory consequences as a means to study consciousness of action. These perceived times were attracted together in conscious awareness, so that subjects perceived voluntary movements as occurring later and their sensory consequences as occurring earlier than they actually did. Comparable involuntary movements caused by magnetic brain stimulation reversed this attraction effect. We conclude that the CNS applies a specific neural mechanism to produce intentional binding of actions and their effects in conscious awareness. <s> BIB005 </s> Predictive Mechanisms Are Not Involved the Same Way during Human-Human vs. Human-Machine Interactions: A Review <s> INTRODUCTION <s> Many object-related actions can be recognized both by their sound and by their vision. Here we describe a population of neurons in the ventral premotor cortex of the monkey that discharge both when the animal performs a specific action and when it hears or sees the same action performed by another individual. These 'audiovisual mirror neurons' therefore represent actions independently of whether these actions are performed, heard or seen. The magnitude of auditory and visual responses did not differ significantly in half the neurons. A neurometric analysis revealed that based on the response of these neurons, two actions could be discriminated with 97% accuracy. <s> BIB006 </s> Predictive Mechanisms Are Not Involved the Same Way during Human-Human vs. Human-Machine Interactions: A Review <s> INTRODUCTION <s> Awareness of actions is partly based on the intentions accompanying them. Thus, the awareness of self- and other-generated actions should differ to the extent that access to own and other's intentions differs. Recent studies have found a brain circuit (the mirrorneuron system) that represents self- and other-generated actions in an integrated fashion. This system does not respond to actions made by nonagents, such as machines. We measured the estimated onset time of actions that subjects either executed themselves or observed being executed by someone else or by a machine. In three experiments, the estimates of the machine actions always differed from those of self- and other-generated actions, whereas the latter two were indistinguishable. Our results are consistent with the view that intentions are attributed to others but not to machines. They also raise the interesting possibility that people attribute intentions to themselves in the same way as they do to others. <s> BIB007 </s> Predictive Mechanisms Are Not Involved the Same Way during Human-Human vs. Human-Machine Interactions: A Review <s> INTRODUCTION <s> Neurons of the rostral part of inferior premotor cortex of the monkey discharge during goal-directed hand movements such as grasping, holding, and tearing. We report here that many of these neurons become active also when the monkey observes specific, meaningful hand movements performed by the experimenters. The effective experimenters' movements include among others placing or retrieving a piece of food from a table, grasping food from another experimenter's hand, and manipulating objects. There is always a clear link between the effective observed movement and that executed by the monkey and, often, only movements of the experimenter identical to those controlled by a given neuron are able to activate it. These findings indicate that premotor neurons can retrieve movements not only on the basis of stimulus characteristics, as previously described, but also on the basis of the meaning of the observed actions. <s> BIB008 </s> Predictive Mechanisms Are Not Involved the Same Way during Human-Human vs. Human-Machine Interactions: A Review <s> INTRODUCTION <s> � Abstract A category of stimuli of great importance for primates, humans in particular, is that formed by actions done by other individuals. If we want to survive, we must understand the actions of others. Furthermore, without action understanding, social organization is impossible. In the case of humans, there is another faculty that depends on the observation of others’ actions: imitation learning. Unlike most species, we are able to learn by imitation, and this faculty is at the basis of human culture. In this review we present data on a neurophysiological mechanism—the mirror-neuron mechanism—that appears to play a fundamental role in both action understanding and imitation. We describe first the functional properties of mirror neurons in monkeys. We review next the characteristics of the mirror-neuron system in humans. We stress, in particular, those properties specific to the human mirror-neuron system that might explain the human capacity to learn by imitation. We conclude by discussing the relationship between the mirror-neuron system and language. <s> BIB009 </s> Predictive Mechanisms Are Not Involved the Same Way during Human-Human vs. Human-Machine Interactions: A Review <s> INTRODUCTION <s> Recent advances in the cognitive neuroscience of action have considerably enlarged our understanding of human motor cognition. In particular, the activity of the mirror system, first discovered in the brain of non-human primates, provides an observer with the understanding of a perceived action by means of the motor simulation of the agent's observed movements. This discovery has raised the prospects of a motor theory of social cognition. In humans, social cognition includes the ability to mindread, and many motor theorists of social cognition try to bridge the gap between motor cognition and mindreading by endorsing a simulation account of mindreading. Here, we question the motor theory of social cognition and give reasons for our skepticism. <s> BIB010 </s> Predictive Mechanisms Are Not Involved the Same Way during Human-Human vs. Human-Machine Interactions: A Review <s> INTRODUCTION <s> It is proposed that knowledge of motor commands is used to distinguish self-generated sensation from externally generated sensation. In this paper, we show that the sense of self-agency, that is the sense that I am the one who is generating an action, largely depends on the degree of discrepancy resulting from comparison between the predicted and actual sensory feedback. In Experiment 1, the sense of self-agency was reduced when the presentation of the tone was unpredictable in terms of timing and its frequency, although in fact the tone was self-produced. In Experiment 2, the opposite case was found to occur. That is, participants experienced illusionary sense of self-agency when the externally generated sensations happened to match the prediction made by forward model. In Experiment 3, the sense of self-agency was reduced when there was a discrepancy between the predicted and actual sensory consequences, regardless of presence or absence of a discrepancy between the intended and actual consequences of actions. In all the experiments, a discrepancy between the predicted and actual feedback had no effects on sense of self-ownership, that is the sense that I am the one who is undergoing an experience. These results may suggest that both senses of self are mutually independent. <s> BIB011 </s> Predictive Mechanisms Are Not Involved the Same Way during Human-Human vs. Human-Machine Interactions: A Review <s> INTRODUCTION <s> The discovery of mirror neurons has given rise to a number of interpretations of their functions together with speculations on their potential role in the evolution of specifically human capacities. Thus, mirror neurons have been thought to ground many aspects of human social cognition, including the capacity to engage in cooperative collective actions and to understand them. We propose an evaluation of this latter claim. On the one hand, we will argue that mirror neurons do not by themselves provide a sufficient basis for the forms of agentive understanding and shared intentionality involved in cooperative collective actions. On the other hand, we will also argue that mirror neurons can nevertheless play an important role in an account of the production and understanding of joint action, insofar as they provide the basic constituents of implicit agent-neutral representations and are useful elements in a process of online mutual adjustment of participants' actions. <s> BIB012 </s> Predictive Mechanisms Are Not Involved the Same Way during Human-Human vs. Human-Machine Interactions: A Review <s> INTRODUCTION <s> Is it possible to understand the intentions of other people by simply observing their actions? Many believe that this ability is made possible by the brain’s mirror neuron system through its direct link between action and observation. However, precisely how intentions can be inferred through action observation has provoked much debate. Here we suggest that the function of the mirror system can be understood within a predictive coding framework that appeals to the statistical approach known as empirical Bayes. Within this scheme the most likely cause of an observed action can be inferred by minimizing the prediction error at all levels of the cortical hierarchy that are engaged during action observation. This account identifies a precise role for the mirror system in our ability to infer intentions from actions and provides the outline of the underlying computational mechanisms. <s> BIB013 </s> Predictive Mechanisms Are Not Involved the Same Way during Human-Human vs. Human-Machine Interactions: A Review <s> INTRODUCTION <s> We often empathically share the states of others. The discovery of ‘mirror neurons’ suggested a neural mechanism for monkeys to share the actions of others. Here we expand this view by showing that mirror neurons for actions not only exist in the premotor cortex or in monkeys and that vicarious activity can also be measured for the emotions and sensations of others. Although we still need to empirically explore the function and development of these vicarious activations, we should stop thinking of vicarious brain activity as a peculiar property of the premotor cortex: instead it seems to be a very common phenomenon which leads social stimuli to recruit a wide range of seemingly private neural systems. <s> BIB014 </s> Predictive Mechanisms Are Not Involved the Same Way during Human-Human vs. Human-Machine Interactions: A Review <s> INTRODUCTION <s> The parieto-frontal cortical circuit that is active during action observation is the circuit with mirror properties that has been most extensively studied. Yet, there remains controversy on its role in social cognition and its contribution to understanding the actions and intentions of other individuals. Recent studies in monkeys and humans have shed light on what the parieto-frontal cortical circuit encodes and its possible functional relevance for cognition. We conclude that, although there are several mechanisms through which one can understand the behaviour of other individuals, the parieto-frontal mechanism is the only one that allows an individual to understand the action of others 'from the inside' and gives the observer a first-person grasp of the motor goals and intentions of other individuals. <s> BIB015 </s> Predictive Mechanisms Are Not Involved the Same Way during Human-Human vs. Human-Machine Interactions: A Review <s> INTRODUCTION <s> When we have to physically interact with a robot, the benchmark for natural and efficient performance is our experience of daily interactions with other humans. This goal is still far despite significant advances in human-robot interaction. While considerable progress is made in various areas ranging from improving the hardware over safety measures to better sensor systems, the research on basic mechanisms of interaction and its technical implementation is still in its infancy. In the following, we give an overview of our own work aiming at improving human-robot interaction and joint action. When humans jointly collaborate to achieve a common goal, the actions of each partner need to be properly coordinated to assure a smooth and efficient workflow. This includes timing of the actions, but also, in the case of physical interaction, the spatial coordination. We thus first investigated how a simple physical interaction, a hand-over task between two humans without verbal communication, is achieved. Our results with a human as receiver and both humans and robots as delivering agent show that both the position and the kinematics of the partner's movement are used to increase the confidence in predicting hand-over in time and space. These results underline that for successful joint action the robot must act predictably for the human partner. However, in a more realistic scenario, robot and human constitute a dynamic system with each agent predicting and reacting to the actions and intentions of the other. We therefore investigated and implemented an assembly task where the robot acts as assistant for the human. Using a Bayesian estimation framework, the robot predicts assembly duration in order to deliver the next part just in time. <s> BIB016 </s> Predictive Mechanisms Are Not Involved the Same Way during Human-Human vs. Human-Machine Interactions: A Review <s> INTRODUCTION <s> Abstract The immediate experience of self-agency, that is, the experience of generating and controlling our actions, is thought to be a key aspect of selfhood. It has been suggested that this experience is intimately linked to internal motor signals associated with the ongoing actions. These signals should lead to an attenuation of the sensory consequences of one’s own actions and thereby allow classifying them as self-generated. The discovery of shared representations of actions between self and other, however, challenges this idea and suggests similar attenuation of one’s own and other’s sensory action effects. Here, we tested these assumptions by comparing sensory attenuation of self-generated and observed sensory effects. More specifically, we compared the loudness perception of sounds that were either self-generated, generated by another person or a computer. In two experiments, we found a reduced perception of loudness intensity specifically related to self-generation. Furthermore, the perception of sounds generated by another person and a computer did not differ from each other. These findings indicate that one’s own agentive influence upon the outside world has a special perceptual quality which distinguishes it from any sort of external influence, including human and non-human sources. This suggests that a real sense of self-agency is not a socially shared but rather a unique and private experience. <s> BIB017 </s> Predictive Mechanisms Are Not Involved the Same Way during Human-Human vs. Human-Machine Interactions: A Review <s> INTRODUCTION <s> Intentional binding is the perceived shortening of the time between a voluntary action and its consequent effect and has been suggested as an implicit measure of agency. This shortening has been linked to processes underlying action preparation and is also affected by post-movement feedback. Intentional binding has been demonstrated in joint action tasks involving two humans, but it is unknown whether it occurs for tasks involving a human working alongside a non-human partner. This experiment investigated the influence of high-level feedback on the experience of agency and whether binding occurs in human–computer joint action settings. Participants were involved in two versions an action task involving another ‘agent’. In one version, two participants (a genuine participant and a confederate) sat side by side, separated by a curtain that prevented vision of the other person. In baseline conditions, both participants were instructed to make a self-paced action and judge the time of the action by reporting the position of a rotating clock-hand on a computer screen. In other baseline conditions, participants judged the time of an auditory tone. In operant conditions, participants made actions and the genuine participant’s action was followed 200 ms later by a tone on every trial. To examine the effect of post-movement information on binding and explicit agency judgments, a colour cue was presented on each trial informing participants about which person’s action caused the tone. In another version of the task, participants were paired with a computer instead of a human co-actor. Post-movement information affected the genuine participant’s explicit agency judgments but had no effect on intentional binding, which always occurred. In the human–computer version, participants never showed binding, even when they explicitly judged that their action had caused the tone. We suggest that human–human partnerships result in the formation of a new ‘we’ agentic identity, but that human–computer partnerships lead to inhibition of the processes that mediate the pre-reflective sense of agency. <s> BIB018 </s> Predictive Mechanisms Are Not Involved the Same Way during Human-Human vs. Human-Machine Interactions: A Review <s> INTRODUCTION <s> It is nearly 10years since Patrick Haggard and colleagues first reported the 'intentional binding' effect (Haggard, Clark, & Kalogeras, 2002). The intentional binding effect refers to the subjective compression of the temporal interval between a voluntary action and its external sensory consequence. Since the first report, considerable interest has been generated and a fascinating array of studies has accumulated. Much of the interest in intentional binding comes from the promise to shed light on human agency. In this review we survey studies on intentional binding, focusing, in particular, on the link between intentional binding and the sense of agency (the experience of controlling action to influence events in the environment). We suggest that, whilst it is yet to be fully explicated, the link between intentional binding and the sense of agency is compelling. We conclude by considering outstanding questions and future directions for research on intentional binding. <s> BIB019 </s> Predictive Mechanisms Are Not Involved the Same Way during Human-Human vs. Human-Machine Interactions: A Review <s> INTRODUCTION <s> ‘‘Sense of agency’’ refers to the feeling of controlling an externalevent through one’s own action. On one inﬂuential view, sense ofagency is inferred after an action, by ‘‘retrospectively’’ comparingactual effects of actions against their intended effects. In contrast,a ‘‘prospective’’ component of agency, generated during actionselection, and in advance of knowing the actual effect, hasreceived less attention. Here, we used functional magneticresonance imaging to investigate prospective contributions ofaction selection processes to sense of agency. To do so, wedissociated action selection processes from action--outcomematching, by subliminally priming responses to a target. We foundthat participants experienced greater control over action effectswhen the action was compatibly versus incompatibly primed. Thus,compatible primes facilitated action selection processing, in turnboosting sense of agency over a subsequent effect. This pro-spective contribution of action selection processes to sense ofagency was accounted for by exchange of signals acrossa prefrontal--parietal network. Speciﬁcally, we found that theangular gyrus (AG) monitors signals relating to action selection indorsolateral prefrontal cortex, to prospectively inform subjectivejudgments of control over action outcomes. Online monitoring ofthese signals by AG might provide the subject with a subjectivemarker of volition, prior to action itself.Keywords: action selection, agency, angular gyrus, dorsolateral prefrontalcortex, fMRIIntroductionImagine you are the manager of a busy factory. You shouldexperience a strong feeling that your actions profoundlyinﬂuence what happens throughout the factory. But wheredoes this feeling come from, and when does it occur? Do youinfer your degree of control only retrospectively, when you seethe ﬁnished product ready for shipping or even the quarterlysales ﬁgures? Or is it prospective? Does the ease and claritywith which you make strategic decisions already give youa feeling of control before you see actual results?This everyday example illustrates the contrast between 2neuroscientiﬁc views of what has often been called ‘‘sense ofagency,’’ that is, the subjective experience of controlling one’sown actions and, through them, events in the outside world(Haggard and Tsakiris 2009). Much current research empha-sizes this sense of control arises when external events areconsistent with internal predictions of action outcomes(Blakemore et al. 1998; Farrer et al. 2008; Moore and Haggard2008; Sato 2009; Nahab et al. 2011) or are generally consistentwith our intentions (Wegner 2002; Wegner et al. 2004). For,example, if I intend to turn on the light by pressing a switch,and the light then happens to come on, I am likely to feel that Icaused the light to come on. On this view, agency is inferred‘‘retrospectively,’’ after an action has been performed, based onthe external consequences of the action. On a neural level,many studies suggest that the angular gyrus (AG) computessense of agency by retrospectively matching the predictedeffects of action against its actual effects, resulting ina perturbed sense of agency when a mismatch occurs (Farrerand Frith 2002; Farrer et al. 2003, 2008).An alternative possibility, that sense of agency might bebased on ‘‘prospective’’ processes relating to actions one ‘‘will’’shortly perform, has received less attention. Yet, there is someevidence that people can prospectively judge agency bymonitoring their performance online, whilst doing the task,and irrespective of whether subsequent intended outcomesoccurred, or did not occur, as predicted (Metcalfe and Greene2007). Here, we explore whether this prospective sense ofcontrol may depend on internal processes of action selectionand preparation occurring ‘‘before’’ movement, even whenparticipants make retrospective judgments of agency. In linewith this assumption, we investigated whether AG, which hasbeen shown to compute ‘‘retrospective’’ agency by monitoringaction outcomes (Farrer et al. 2003, 2008), may also code fora prospective sense of control by monitoring action selectionprocesses in advance of the action itself and independently ofaction outcomes.To do this, we dissociated the processes of action selectionfrom the match between actions and outcome, by subliminallypriming responses to a target. Previous research has shown thataction selection is easier (faster and less error prone) whenpreceding subliminal primes are compatible with a motorresponse to a target stimulus than when they are incompatible(Vorberg et al. 2003). Interestingly, this ﬂuency of actionselection is also relevant to sense of control. Thus, in onerecent study (Wenke et al. 2010), participants reportedstronger sense of control over action outcomes when theirresponses to a target cue had previously been subliminallyprimed by a compatible, as opposed to an incompatible, prime.Importantly, this was not simply due to the predictability of theaction outcomes, since outcome stimuli (colored patches inthis experiment) following compatible and incompatibleprimes were equally predictable. Rather, the stronger experi-ence of control when subliminal prime and target cue werecompatible could only be explained by the ‘‘ﬂuency’’ of actionselection processes—that is, by an internal signal inﬂuenced bysubliminal priming, and experienced before the action wasmade. Thus, compatible primes facilitated action selectionprocessing by making selection processes ‘‘ﬂuent.’’ Increasedﬂuency of selection in turn boosted sense of agency over actioneffects (Wenke et al. 2010). <s> BIB020 </s> Predictive Mechanisms Are Not Involved the Same Way during Human-Human vs. Human-Machine Interactions: A Review <s> INTRODUCTION <s> Sense of agency is the way in which we understand the causal relationships between our actions and sensory events. Agency is implicitly measured using intentional binding paradigms, where voluntary self-made actions and consequential sensory events are perceived as shifted closer together in time. However, a crucial question remains as to how we understand the relationship between others’ actions and sensory events. Do we use similar binding processes as for our own actions? Previous attempts to investigate this phenomenon in others’ have reached no clear consensus. Therefore, in an attempt to understand how we attribute the causal relationships between others’ actions and sensory events, we investigated intentional binding in others’ actions using an interval estimation paradigm. In a first experiment participants were required to make a button-press response to indicate the perceived interval between a self-made action and a tone, between a closely matched observed action and tone, and between two tones. For both self-made and observed actions, we found a significant perceived shortening of the interval between the actions and tones as compared with the interval between two tones, thus intentional binding was found for both self-made and observed actions. In a second experiment we validated the findings of the first by contrasting the perceived intervals between an observed action and tone with a matched visual–auditory stimulus and a tone. We again found a significant perceived shortening of the interval for observed action compared with the closely matched visual–auditory control stimulus. The occurrence of intentional binding when observing an action suggests we use similar processes to make causal attributions between our own actions, others’ actions, and sensory events. <s> BIB021 </s> Predictive Mechanisms Are Not Involved the Same Way during Human-Human vs. Human-Machine Interactions: A Review <s> INTRODUCTION <s> Recent evidence suggests the existence of we-mode processing, but little is still known about how such processing influences the sense of control during intentional joint actions. To examine this issue, dyads performed a video game in which they moved a dot to the target of their choice out of a set of targets. By having each participant control the dot movements in only one dimension (orthogonal to their partner) and by varying the target locations, participants took on different roles. By chance, they also could have congruent or incongruent intentions prior to the movements. In a decider-follower scenario, where one actor decided on the target, judgments of control and judgments of performance depended on whether a prior intention was instantiated, but not on actor role. This finding is consistent with we-mode processing. When participants had conflicting intentions that needed to be resolved online, both the dominant and the nondominant participant showed a marked reduction in the perceived quality of the performance. Thus, dynamic intention negotiation reduced we-mode processing and shifted it toward I-mode processing. The nondominant actor also reported a strongly reduced sense of control. Implications for theories on the sense of agency and for applied settings are discussed. <s> BIB022 </s> Predictive Mechanisms Are Not Involved the Same Way during Human-Human vs. Human-Machine Interactions: A Review <s> INTRODUCTION <s> When interacting with a robot, the level of mental workload, comfort and trust during the interaction are decisive factors for an effective interaction. Hence, current research focuses on the concept, whether ascribing gantry robot in assembly with anthropomorphic movements can lead to a better anticipation of its behavior by the human operator. Therefore, in an empirical study the effect of different degrees of anthropomorphism should be compared. This is based on the scientific research concerning the neural activity of the human brain when watching someone performing an action. Within the study videos of a virtual gantry robot and a digital human model during placing movements were designed to use in the functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). The aim is to investigate the underlying brain mechanism during observing the movements of the two models. <s> BIB023
Human beings are intentional agents in the sense that their behaviors do not solely consist in reacting to external stimulations but also in deliberately acting to reshape their environment. However, many of our daily actions include conspecifics or even artificial automated systems. Cooperative tasks between humans and machines tend to gain ground as machines make tasks less demanding for the human operator and yield an increase in productivity  . Nevertheless, this can cost human mastery, particularly with difficulties in understanding and coordinating with artificial systems BIB001 BIB002  . The inability to predict traditional artificial agents' behaviors has been proposed as a potential contributor of this phenomenon. Indeed, during social interactions with peers, humans can represent and predict their partner's action outcomes through the same sensorimotor system involved in action generation BIB013 . Evidence of an action/observation matching system was first discovered in the premotor area (or F5 area) of the monkey BIB008 BIB003 BIB004 BIB022 . It has been shown that the neurons of F5 area and the parietal cortex (the so-called "mirror neurons") of the monkey could fire both when executing a goal-directed action and when observing the very same action performed by another individual BIB006  . Later, an analogous system (called "mirror system")-mainly composed by the superior temporal sulcus and fronto-parietal connections-has been revealed in humans BIB009 BIB014 ). It has been hypothesized that before action execution (self-generated or observed other-generated), the mirror system could simulate the motor command allowing the simulation content to be used to predict the consequences of the action, enhancing action control or implicit action understanding BIB012 . Specifically, it has been proposed that this kind of motor simulation supports our understanding of the low-level motor intentions of others (i.e., what type of action one is doing; BIB004 , for a review see BIB015 and also our understanding of others' higher-level prior intentions (i.e., why one is doing this action;  . Note should be taken some authors argued simulating an agent's action through the mirror system was enough to understand motor intentions but not sufficient for prior intention understanding BIB010 . Still, prediction plays a fundamental role in understanding observed actions performed by conspecifics and also in action coordination during joint actions with them. Besides, there is evidence predictive mechanisms are not solely involved in action generation and understanding but also in the sense of self-agency. The sense of agency can be defined as the pre-reflexive experience of being in control of a voluntary performed action. Individuals' sense of agency can be estimated with explicit self-reported measures using Likert's scales or percentages BIB011  BIB020 , or, in order to avoid compliance biases, with implicit measures, such as sensory attenuation BIB017 or intentional binding (IB) BIB005 ; for a review see BIB019 . IB is the most common method in the experimental field and refers to the perceptive temporal attraction between the onset of a generated action (e.g., a key press) and the onset of its sensory consequence (e.g., a tone) that occurs when the action has been intentionally triggered. Several recent studies have supported that the sense of agency was not self-specific and that it could occur for other human generated actions during passive observation and joint action (Wohlschläger et al., 2003a,b; BIB021 . By contrast, the existence of deep discrepancies between the machine's real state and the operator's perception of its state is well documented  . In particular, while humans can represent the actions of human partners and thus have successful human interactions, they experience difficulties in mirroring and fitting with typical automaton-generated actions (Wohlschläger et al., 2003a,b; BIB018 BIB023 . Moreover, some studies seem to indicate humans are impaired in accurately predicting and building a joint agency (i.e., a mutually interdependent control of the environment) when acting together with a machine BIB016 BIB018 . Interestingly, this trend fades when human-like properties are endorsed by the automata BIB007 BIB016 . Turning traditional automated systems into collaborative agents is therefore one of the major challenges of the robotic sciences. In this article, we sought to review the existing data on social interactions with humans and with artificial automated systems to better understand the problems' nature encountered during interactions with traditional automata, and finally to present some means to remedy these problems.