Advances in cognitive radio networks: A survey <s> J. Cooperation Stimulation and Enforcement <s> In autonomous ad hoc networks, nodes usually belong to different authorities and pursue different goals. In order to maximize their own performance, nodes in such networks tend to be selfish, and are not willing to forward packets for the benefits of other nodes. Meanwhile, some nodes might behave maliciously and try to disrupt the network and waste other nodes' resources. In this paper, we present an attack-resilient cooperation stimulation (ARCS) system for autonomous ad hoc networks to stimulate cooperation among selfish nodes and defend against malicious attacks. In the ARCS system, the damage that can be caused by malicious nodes can be bounded, the cooperation among selfish nodes can be enforced, and the fairness among nodes can also be achieved. Both theoretical analysis and simulation results have confirmed the effectiveness of the ARCS system. Another key property of the ARCS system lies in that it is completely self-organizing and fully distributed, and does not require any tamper-proof hardware or central management points. <s> BIB001 </s> Advances in cognitive radio networks: A survey <s> J. Cooperation Stimulation and Enforcement <s> In autonomous mobile ad hoc networks (MANET) where each user is its own authority, the issue of cooperation enforcement must be solved first to enable network functioning, such as packet forwarding, which becomes very difficult under noise and imperfect monitoring. In this paper, we focus on cooperation enforcement in autonomous mobile ad hoc networks under noise and imperfect observation and study the basic packet-forwarding function using the repeated game models with imperfect information. A belief-based packet forwarding framework is proposed to obtain cooperation-enforcement strategies solely based on each node's own past actions and its private imperfect observation of other nodes' information. The simulation results illustrate that the proposed belief-based packet forwarding approach can enforce the cooperation with only a small performance degradation compared with the unconditionally cooperative outcomes when noise and imperfect observation exist <s> BIB002 </s> Advances in cognitive radio networks: A survey <s> J. Cooperation Stimulation and Enforcement <s> In autonomous mobile ad hoc networks, nodes belong to different authorities and pursue different goals; therefore, cooperation among them cannot be taken for granted. Meanwhile, some nodes may be malicious, whose objective is to damage the network. In this paper, we present a joint analysis of cooperation stimulation and security in autonomous mobile ad hoc networks under a game theoretic framework. We first investigate a simple yet illuminating two-player packet forwarding game and derive the optimal and cheat-proof packet forwarding strategies. We then investigate the secure routing and packet forwarding game for autonomous ad hoc networks in noisy and hostile environments and derive a set of reputation-based cheat-proof and attack-resistant cooperation stimulation strategies. When analyzing the cooperation strategies, besides Nash equilibrium, other optimality criteria, such as Pareto optimality, subgame perfection, fairness, and cheat-proofing, have also been considered. Both analysis and simulation studies have shown that the proposed strategies can effectively stimulate cooperation among selfish nodes in autonomous mobile ad hoc networks under noise and attacks, and the damage that can be caused by attackers is bounded and limited <s> BIB003 </s> Advances in cognitive radio networks: A survey <s> J. Cooperation Stimulation and Enforcement <s> Presenting the fundamentals of cooperative communications and networking, this book treats the concepts of space, time, frequency diversity and MIMO, with a holistic approach to principal topics where significant improvements can be obtained. Beginning with background and MIMO systems, Part I includes a review of basic principles of wireless communications and space-time diversity and coding. Part II then presents topics on physical layer cooperative communications such as relay channels and protocols, performance bounds, multi-node cooperation, and energy efficiency. Finally, Part III focuses on cooperative networking including cooperative and content-aware multiple access, distributed routing, source-channel coding, and cooperative OFDM. Including end-of-chapter review questions, this text will appeal to graduate students of electrical engineering and is an ideal textbook for advanced courses on wireless communications. It will also be of great interest to practitioners in the wireless communications industry. Presentation slides for each chapter and instructor-only solutions are available at www.cambridge.org/9780521895132. <s> BIB004
In the last decade there has been tremendous developments in cooperative communications. A thorough and detailed discussion about various issues on cooperative communications and networking can be found in BIB004 , in which the underlying assumption is that all nodes are unconditionally cooperative. However, this assumption is often not valid because a rational node is considered selfish with a tendency to maximize its own utility. Cooperation is very important when a cognitive user cannot complete his/her task by him/herself alone. Often a cognitive radio network is not centralized but autonomous, and users are either individuals or belong to different authorities and pursue different goals, so cooperation among these selfish users cannot be taken for granted. In BIB001 , cooperation stimulation and enforcement among cognitive nodes on routing a packet in autonomous networks is investigated. Each node keeps a record on the cooperation degree between any other nodes in the network, which represents the difference between the contributions of two nodes to each other. When the cooperation degree is very low, no cooperation could happen among the nodes. By maintaining a proper positive cooperation degree, cooperation among selfish nodes can be enforced. A credit mechanism is further introduced in BIB003 , where the number of packets forwarded by one node for another node is bounded by a threshold (credit line), and the threshold is adapted to the number of the forwarding requests between the pair of nodes in real time. Cooperation enforcement under noise and imperfect observation is further studied in BIB002 . Since the nodes need to infer the future actions of others based on their own imperfect observation in a noisy environment, a belief evaluation framework is considered, where Bayes' rule is used to assign and update each node's belief values.