A Survey of Security Services, Attacks, and Applications for Vehicular Ad Hoc Networks (VANETs) <s> Hash Function-Based Authentication Schemes <s> Vehicular ad hoc network (VANET) is an emerging type of networks to allow vehicles on roads to communicate for driving safety. An vehicle can broadcast messages (e.g. accident information) to other vehicles. These messages may have impact on other vehicles as well as the traffic control system, so all messages must be signed and authenticated. On the other hand, privacy should be enforced while the real identity of the sender should be traceable by authorized party. In this poster, we first discuss the limitations of existing solutions. In particular, we describe an impersonation attack to one of the schemes, highlight the problem of communications overhead, and effectiveness of the message verification procedure. Then, we present the main ideas of our proposed scheme which can be shown to be secure and more effective than existing schemes. <s> BIB001 </s> A Survey of Security Services, Attacks, and Applications for Vehicular Ad Hoc Networks (VANETs) <s> Hash Function-Based Authentication Schemes <s> The security in vehicular ad hoc networks (VANETs) is receiving a significant amount of attention in the field of wireless mobile networking because VANETs are vulnerable to malicious attacks. A number of secure authentication schemes based on asymmetric cryptography have been proposed to prevent such attacks. However, these schemes are not suitable for highly dynamic environments like VANETs, because they cannot cope with the authentication procedure efficiently. Hence, this still calls for an efficient authentication scheme for VANETs. In this paper, we propose a decentralized lightweight authentication scheme called Trust-Extended Authentication Mechanism (TEAM) for vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) communication networks. TEAM adopts the concept of transitive trust relationships to improve the performance of the authentication procedure. Moreover, TEAM satisfies the following security requirements: anonymity, location privacy, mutual authentication to prevent spoofing attacks, forgery attacks, modification attacks and replay attacks, as well as no clock synchronization problem, no verification table, fast error detection, and session key agreement. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work to propose a hash-based authentication scheme with high security properties in VANETs. <s> BIB002 </s> A Survey of Security Services, Attacks, and Applications for Vehicular Ad Hoc Networks (VANETs) <s> Hash Function-Based Authentication Schemes <s> Vehicular ad hoc networks (VANETs) are receiving enormous research attention in the wake of rising challenges of safe driving, and demand for infotainment services on the move. Information security in VANETs is a critical design issue, since public lives could be at stake. This paper presents a novel sender authentication scheme for enhancing VANET security. The scheme makes use of hash chaining, a well-known concept in cryptography, to authenticate vehicles. The authentication process takes place at a trusted third party site, called the Authentication Centre, and the RSUs (Road Side Units) help relay information exchanged between a vehicle and the Authentication Centre. A detailed discussion of the scheme is provided in the paper, and a security analysis is presented. <s> BIB003 </s> A Survey of Security Services, Attacks, and Applications for Vehicular Ad Hoc Networks (VANETs) <s> Hash Function-Based Authentication Schemes <s> Vehicular ad hoc networks (VANETs) are supposed to improve traffic safety and drivers' experiences. In a typical VANET, a vehicle broadcasts safety messages to its neighbors. Since behaviors based on safety messages could be life-critical, authentication of these messages must be guaranteed. Many signature-based schemes have been proposed for authentication in VANETs, but few of them have addressed the problem of denial of service (DoS) attacks against signature-based authentication. In such a DoS attack, attackers can broadcast forged messages with invalid signatures to force the receiving vehicles to perform lots of unnecessary signature verifications, and thus the benign vehicles cannot verify the messages from other legitimate vehicles. Our scheme features a pre-authentication process before signature verifying process to deal with this kind of DoS attack. The pre-authentication process takes advantage of the one-way hash chain and a group rekeying scheme. Evaluations show that the proposed scheme mitigates such DoS attacks effectively. <s> BIB004
The next category of symmetric cryptography is a hash function, which is responsible to examine the message integrity without any encryption of the message. The message is an input in the hash function, which can generate a fixed string referred to as the hash value. In order to ensure the message integrity, the hash value must be attached with a sending message. Chuang et al. BIB002 introduced a decentralized-based lightweight authentication scheme named as TEAM (trust-extended authentication mechanism). This technique uses the concept of transitive trust relation, but the amount of cryptographic in TEAM is less than compared with other existing methods because it only utilizes XOR and the hash function during the authentication process. Chim et al. BIB001 introduced a method, which discussed the security and privacy issues of V2V in VANETs. This scheme utilizes one-way hash function and a secret key between vehicle and RSU. Therefore, this methodology can resolve the privacy issue, which may occur during communication. Vighnesh et al. BIB003 introduced a novel sender authentication technique for enhancing VANET security by using hash chaining and the authentication code to authenticate the vehicle. This method ensures that the secure communication between the vehicle and RSU. Confidential data is encrypted through the master key. Before sending packets to the authentication center, the RSU attaches its identity, which can eliminate the possibility of rogue RSU abusing the VANET network. He and Wen BIB004 presented a method that addresses the problem of the DOS attack against signature-based authentication. To tackle the DOS attack, the pre-authentication can be done before signature verification. In this method, the pre-authentication using the one-way hash chain cannot be classified as a full authentication scheme.