Predictive Mechanisms Are Not Involved the Same Way during Human-Human vs. Human-Machine Interactions: A Review <s> The Sense of Agency during Joint Actions with Machines <s> We investigate the processes underlying the feeling of control over one's actions ("sense of agency"). Sense of agency may depend on internal motoric signals, and general inferences about external events. We used priming to modulate the sense of agency for voluntary and involuntary movements, by modifying the content of conscious thought prior to moving. Trials began with the presentation of one of two supraliminal primes, which corresponded to the effect of a voluntary action participants subsequently made. The perceived interval between movement and effect was used as an implicit measure of sense of agency. Primes modulated perceived intervals for both voluntary and involuntary movements, but the modulation was greatest for involuntary movements. A second experiment showed that this modulation depended on prime-movement (temporal) contiguity. We propose that sense of agency is based on a combination of internal motoric signals and external sensory evidence about the source of actions and effects. <s> BIB001 </s> Predictive Mechanisms Are Not Involved the Same Way during Human-Human vs. Human-Machine Interactions: A Review <s> The Sense of Agency during Joint Actions with Machines <s> Intentional binding is the perceived shortening of the time between a voluntary action and its consequent effect and has been suggested as an implicit measure of agency. This shortening has been linked to processes underlying action preparation and is also affected by post-movement feedback. Intentional binding has been demonstrated in joint action tasks involving two humans, but it is unknown whether it occurs for tasks involving a human working alongside a non-human partner. This experiment investigated the influence of high-level feedback on the experience of agency and whether binding occurs in human–computer joint action settings. Participants were involved in two versions an action task involving another ‘agent’. In one version, two participants (a genuine participant and a confederate) sat side by side, separated by a curtain that prevented vision of the other person. In baseline conditions, both participants were instructed to make a self-paced action and judge the time of the action by reporting the position of a rotating clock-hand on a computer screen. In other baseline conditions, participants judged the time of an auditory tone. In operant conditions, participants made actions and the genuine participant’s action was followed 200 ms later by a tone on every trial. To examine the effect of post-movement information on binding and explicit agency judgments, a colour cue was presented on each trial informing participants about which person’s action caused the tone. In another version of the task, participants were paired with a computer instead of a human co-actor. Post-movement information affected the genuine participant’s explicit agency judgments but had no effect on intentional binding, which always occurred. In the human–computer version, participants never showed binding, even when they explicitly judged that their action had caused the tone. We suggest that human–human partnerships result in the formation of a new ‘we’ agentic identity, but that human–computer partnerships lead to inhibition of the processes that mediate the pre-reflective sense of agency. <s> BIB002 </s> Predictive Mechanisms Are Not Involved the Same Way during Human-Human vs. Human-Machine Interactions: A Review <s> The Sense of Agency during Joint Actions with Machines <s> Sense of agency (SoA) is a compelling but fragile experience that is augmented or attenuated by internal signals and by external cues. A disruption in SoA may characterise individual symptoms of mental illness such as delusions of control. Indeed, it has been argued that generic SoA disturbances may lie at the heart of delusions and hallucinations that characterise schizophrenia. A clearer understanding of how sensorimotor, perceptual and environmental cues complement, or compete with, each other in engendering SoA may prove valuable in deepening our understanding the agency disruptions that characterise certain focal neurological disorders and mental illnesses. Here we examine the integration of SoA cues in health and illness, describing a simple framework of this integration based on Bayesian principles. We extend this to consider how alterations in cue integration may lead to aberrant experiences of agency. <s> BIB003 </s> Predictive Mechanisms Are Not Involved the Same Way during Human-Human vs. Human-Machine Interactions: A Review <s> The Sense of Agency during Joint Actions with Machines <s> Many studies suggest that individuals are not able to build a sense of we-agency during joint actions with automated artificial systems. We sought to examine whether or not this lack of sense of control was linked with individuals' inability to represent automaton-generated action into their own cognitive system. Indeed, during human interactions, we automatically represent our partner's actions in our own sensorimotor system. This might sustain our capacity to build a sense of we-agency over our partner-generated actions. However, to our knowledge, no studies have investigated the potential relation between our ability to use our sensorimotor system to represent a partner's action and we-agency. Our approach consisted in performing a pilot study coupling together a Simon target detection task wherein RTs served as an index of action co-representation and an implicit measure of one's sense of agency as indicated by intentional binding phenomenon. The preliminary observations suggested that individuals could represent other-generated action and have a sense of agency over these actions provided that their partner was another human and not an artificial automated system. <s> BIB004
The sense of agency during joint actions with traditional automated systems In Obhi and Hall (2011b)'s study, the participants had to tap a touchpad at the time of their choice, which triggered a tone after a certain delay. The participants were either paired with a human partner or with a computer, separated from them by a curtain. They thought that their partner could also trigger the tone but in fact, it was always the naïve participant who triggered the sensory effect. The participants had to judge the onset time of their own action or the tone with the help of a clock. Participants' beliefs about the initiator of the action always fitted the false given feedback. Interestingly, during the joint actions with the computer, the participants did not demonstrate IB when they were convinced that the tone was machine-generated, and most intriguing, when they were convinced that they were responsible for the tone. That is, regardless of participants' beliefs no experience of agency took place despite the fact that it was indeed the participant who caused the sensory effect. To explain these results, the authors argued that the automatic "we identity" formation may not occur when the partner is not a human being BIB002 . Also, one must take into consideration the cue integration framework which suggests that the sense of self-agency is built by the dynamic integration of internal and external cues BIB003 . Indeed, these authors proposed that both internal motoric signals and external situational signals contribute to the sense of self-agency via an integrative processing in which each cue is weighted by its reliability, with a higher intrinsic weighting for the internal cues by default. However, under certain circumstances (e.g., when the motoric information is weak or absent and when the external cues are subsequently presented), internal cues can be bypassed so that the sense of self-agency becomes mainly context-dependent BIB001 ). In BIB002 study, a false feedback about the presumed initiator of the tone was given to the participant after each trial. This could have reinforced the situational cues weighting, explaining why the explicit judgments of self-agency of the participants always matched the given feedback despite the fact that the participants always performed the action that triggered the tone. However, at the implicit level, the participants did not manifest IB even when they were convinced (with the feedbacks) that they had effectively triggered the sensory consequence. This suggests that during joint actions with a machine, high-level meta-cognitive knowledge about the nature of the partnership can disrupt the sense of self-agency if the partner involved in the shared task is not an intentional agent. In addition, BIB004 investigated the sense of we-agency during interactions with a computer. They made participants estimate temporal intervals between the computer target detections and a tone that was triggered 400, 900, or 1,400 ms after the detection. These estimations had to be performed either during the passive observation of the computer (computer observation condition) or when the participants had to perform a complementary target detection task with the computer (human-computer joint go-nogo condition). The temporal estimations served as an implicit measure of the participants' sense of agency over the action performed by the computer. The authors found no differences in the participants' estimations between the computer observation condition and human-computer joint go-nogo condition. Indeed, no temporal attraction occurred in the joint action condition, supporting that being involved in a common task with a traditional automaton, such as a computer does not create a sense of shared agency in the human cognitive system. This is to relate to the absence of Social Simon effect during joint actions with a computer . An interesting perspective could be to implement an interface with a virtual avatar in order to see if the sense of joint agency could be enhanced. Indeed, it can be possible that interacting with a human-like agent could stimulate the co-representation of the action performed by the computer, reinforcing the sense of we-agency.