A Survey of Routing Attacks and Security Measures in Mobile Ad-Hoc Networks <s> Solution to Node Isolation Attack: <s> Recent advances in wireless networking technologies have made it possible to construct a mobile ad hoc network (MANET) which can be applied in infrastructureless situations. However, due to their inherent characteristics, they are much more vulnerable to malicious attacks than a conventional wired network. In MANET, routing plays an important role in providing connectivity for mobile nodes who are not within the same radio range. Existing routing protocols in MANET assume a trusted and reliable environment. However, in hostile environment mobile nodes are susceptible to various types of routing attacks. This paper identifies a new routing attack, called node isolation attack, against optimized link state routing (OLSR) protocol, one of the four standard routing protocols for MANETs. We analyze in detail and demonstrate the impact of this attack in order to show the necessity for a countermeasure to guard against the attack. As a first step to defend against the attack, we present a simple technique to detect the attack and identify the source of the attack. <s> BIB001 </s> A Survey of Routing Attacks and Security Measures in Mobile Ad-Hoc Networks <s> Solution to Node Isolation Attack: <s> OLSR (Optimized Link State Routing), a table-driven proactive protocol, standardized (RFC3626) for Mobile Ad-hoc Networks (MANETs), only works properly if participating nodes cooperate in routing. Hence, if nodes inject invalid messages or withhold critical messages, routing protocol integrity may be compromised - the protocol will fail to consistently provide each node with the accurate MANET topology. Opportunities, therefore, exist to provide intrusion detection in OLSR based MANETs by detecting anomalies in OLSR semantics. In this paper we implement and analyze an Intrusion Detection System (IDS) in which each MANET node evaluates such non-conformances locally, and thereafter infers & detects possible attacks on the routing protocol. We quantify the effectiveness of the IDS in terms of false positive and false negative detection rates. Although our discussion and implementation is based on OLSR, the techniques can be applied to any link-state routing protocol. <s> BIB002
In BIB001 Kannhavong et al have shown that a malicious node can isolate a specific node and prevent it from receiving data packets from other nodes by withholding a TC message in OLSR protocol. A detection technique based on observation of both a TC message and a HELLO message generated by the MPR nodes is proposed. If a node does not hear a TC message from its MPR node regularly but hears only a HELLO message, a node judges that the MPR node is suspicious and can avoid the attack by selecting one or more extra MPR nodes. In BIB002 , Dillon et al. have proposed an IDS that detects TC link and message withholding in the OLSR protocol. Each node is set to observe whether a MPR node generates a TC message regularly or not. If a MPR node generates a TC message regularly, the node checks whether or not the TC message actually contains itself to detect the attack. The draw back of these approaches is that they cannot detect the attack if it that is launched by two colluding next hop nodes, where the first attacker pretends to advertise a TC message, but the second attacker drops this TC message.