A Survey on Efforts to Evolve the Control Plane of Inter-Domain Routing <s> Coordination among ASs <s> Security issues related to the cloud computing are relevant to various stakeholders for an informed cloud adoption decision. Apart from data breaches, the cyber security research community is revisiting the attack space for cloud-specific solutions as these issues affect budget, resource management, and service quality. Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack is one such serious attack in the cloud space. In this paper, we present developments related to DDoS attack mitigation solutions in the cloud. In particular, we present a comprehensive survey with a detailed insight into the characterization, prevention, detection, and mitigation mechanisms of these attacks. Additionally, we present a comprehensive solution taxonomy to classify DDoS attack solutions. We also provide a comprehensive discussion on important metrics to evaluate various solutions. This survey concludes that there is a strong requirement of solutions, which are designed keeping utility computing models in mind. Accurate auto-scaling decisions, multi-layer mitigation, and defense using profound resources in the cloud, are some of the key requirements of the desired solutions. In the end, we provide a definite guideline on effective solution building and detailed solution requirements to help the cyber security research community in designing defense mechanisms. To the best of our knowledge, this work is a novel attempt to identify the need of DDoS mitigation solutions involving multi-level information flow and effective resource management during the attack. <s> BIB001 </s> A Survey on Efforts to Evolve the Control Plane of Inter-Domain Routing <s> Coordination among ASs <s> In spite of significant on-going research, the Border gateway protocol (BGP) still encompasses conceptual vulnerability issues regarding impersonating the ownership of IP prefixes for ASes (Autonomous Systems). In this context, a number of research studies focused on securing BGP through historical-based and statistical-based behavioural models. This paper suggests a novel method based on tracking the connectivity of suspicious ASes, which are received from a program tracing IP prefix hijacking signature. The paper uses Full Cross-Validation test to investigate the accuracy of the invented method and studies the similarity and differences between malicious and benign observations before they are classified. Classification might not be the appropriate technique to deal with IP prefix hijack detection on its own; therefore we propose to combine the two methods (signature and classification-based) in order to cover the limitations of both techniques. From a processing perspective, the outputs from signature-based method are used as inputs for the classification-based. The main features are extracted from the ASpath attributes of potentially suspicious ASes. The features are considered a mixture of the behavioural characteristics of connectivity among routers. The best five supervised classifiers were used in the previous researches and go with the characteristics of dataset will be used in this paper to evaluate the detection method. Under different learning algorithms, Random Forest and J48 classifiers, the detection method is able to detect the hijacks with 81% accuracy. <s> BIB002
The inter-domain routing on the Internet is characterized by the use of best efforts for carrying network traffic, where thousands of distributed and connected ASs make their own decisions about how traffic should be routed and forwarded. Besides, it is assumed that packets can be lost and suffer delays, but the overall network will still to be operational and functional. Although the resilience requirement is one of the main concerns, other attributes are desirable for the inter-domain routing environment. For example, some network applications, such as Voice over IP (VoIP), require guarantees from the network for its appropriate utilization, and to provide end-to-end requirements, it is fundamental to have some level of coordination among ASs. In the inter-domain routing, the coordination between ASs depends on the technology used. In general, each AS provides the manual configuration of BGP router peers to exchange NLRI. Those configurations are aligned with the routing policies and describe what is or not allowed to be advertised between neighbor ASs. Thus, the coordination among domains is often restricted to ASs that have a previous business relationship or some type of an agreement, such as a customer-to-provider relationship. For example, if a stub AS requests (usually via e-mail) the verification of the BGP configuration to a transit AS that does not have any formal relationship with the requested AS, it is expected that the request may not be fulfilled by the transit AS (often ignored). One motivation for improving the coordination among ASs for inter-domain routing is security  18] . For example, that it is difficult to enforce and track the origin of ASs that advertise a given IP prefix is a security issue that threatens the inter-domain routing system. Relying on the BGP attributes (e.g., AS-Path attribute) for such tasks has demonstrated its ineffectiveness over the last few decades. Thereby, deliberate network attacks (e.g., Man-In-The-Middle (MITM) or Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) BIB001 attacks), or even misconfigurations or errors BIB002 in a BGP router can cause and affect connectivity problems on the whole Internet. Those issues occur because the standard control plane of the BGP was not designed to provide security mechanisms for ASs' trust of the NLRI advertised on the Internet.