This report is for media and the general public.

The SMM recorded significantly fewer ceasefire violations compared to previous days this week, most of which were assessed as related to live-fire exercises. It experienced a number of freedom-of-movement restrictions but it did reach border areas not controlled by the Government*. It conducted crater analysis and assessed that most craters were fresh and caused by 122mm multiple launch rocket systems impacts.

The SMM recorded ceasefire violations in several areas of Donetsk and Luhansk regions. The SMM did not note any ceasefire violations in the area around Donetsk airport. Most ceasefire violations on both sides of the contact line were assessed as related to live-fire exercises in areas known to the SMM as training grounds. A number of other explosions were recorded elsewhere[1]. Near “Lugansk People’s Republic” (“LPR”)-controlled Pervomaisk (57km west of Luhansk), for example, the SMM heard 22 undetermined explosions approximately 10km south-east of its position.

The SMM conducted crater analysis at several locations. In government-controlled Krasnohorivka (21km west of Donetsk), Zoriane (30km west-north-west of Donetsk) and Oleksandropil (30km west of Donetsk), the SMM analysed five craters. It assessed that four of them were caused by multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS; BM-21 Grad 122mm) rockets (two in Zoriane and two in Oleksandropil), which was evident from the shrapnel found at the sites. The rockets were assessed to have been fired from an east-south-easterly direction. The SMM assessed that the crater in Krasnohorivka was caused by a 125mm tank round, but the direction could not be determined precisely as the fuse tunnel could not be ascertained. The SMM assessed all craters as being less than 48 hours old, which was supported by the residents’ assertions that the shelling had occurred on 8 and 9 December.

In Debaltseve “Donetsk People’s Republic" (“DPR”)-controlled, 58km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM visited the hospital, formerly funded by the Ukrainian Railway Company, and observed damage to the building ceiling consisting of two holes, one containing remnants of an MLRS rocket (assessed as 122mm Grad), in a part of the hospital that still has to be repaired. The SMM met the head doctor, who said that the facility was experiencing a deficit of supplies, in particular anaesthetics, physiotherapy equipment, overhead lighting for performing surgeries (lamps) and vehicles for transporting patients. According to him, the hospital had last been provided with humanitarian assistance in September and had only one of its three surgery rooms functional for emergencies, due to lack of overhead lighting. The interlocutor also said that the section of the hospital treating infectious diseases was yet to be repaired due to severe damage caused by shelling.

In relation to the implementation of the Addendum to the Package of measures, the SMM revisited Ukrainian Armed Forces permanent weapons storage sites, where all previously recorded weapons were present.

Aerial surveillance imagery available to the SMM revealed on 7 December the presence – in violation of the relevant withdrawal line – of a probable tank near government-controlled Verkhnotoretske (26km north of Donetsk).

In areas beyond the withdrawal lines – but outside permanent storage sites – the SMM observed 31 tanks (T64 or T72) at a known training area near Kruhlyk (“LPR”-controlled, 31km south-west of Luhansk).

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of heavy weapons foreseen in the Minsk Package of measures. “DPR” members have yet to provide the requested inventory of heavy weapons and locations of designated permanent storage sites for these weapons, as requested by the SMM on 16 October. Members of the “LPR” had provided the SMM with an inventory of heavy weapons, their serial numbers and the locations at which they are said to be stored, as requested by the SMM. The Ukrainian military authorities had earlier provided an inventory list of military equipment featuring weapons systems as well as their serial numbers, but not the locations to which the weapons are to be permanently withdrawn.

The SMM visited an “LPR” heavy weapons permanent storage site and noted that six declared towed howitzers (D30, 122mm) were missing.

The SMM revisited locations beyond the respective withdrawal lines known to the SMM as heavy weapons holding areas, even though they did not comply with the specific criteria set out in the 16 October notification.

At such Ukrainian Armed Forces holding areas, the SMM observed: ten self-propelled howitzers (6 2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm and 4 2S3 Akatsiya, 152mm) and 36 towed howitzers (18 2A65 Msta-B, 152mm and 18 2A36 Giatsint, 152mm). Two areas were observed to be abandoned, as they had been for over two months. The SMM had previously noted there in total 11 MLRS (BM21 Grad, 122mm).

At such “DPR” holding areas, the SMM observed four MLRS (BM-21 Grad 122mm) and four towed artillery pieces (D-30, 122mm).

Aerial surveillance imagery available to the SMM revealed on 7 December the presence – in violation of the respective withdrawal line – of 12 howitzers near “LPR”-controlled Yurivka (26km south-west of Luhansk). The SMM had noted these weapons there on three previous occasions since late November (see SMM Daily Report 7 December 2015).

The SMM monitored border crossing points in government- and non-government- controlled areas. In “DPR”-controlled Novoazovsk (53km north-east of Mariupol), the SMM noted a calm situation. In government-controlled Markivka (108km north of Luhansk) the SMM met the deputy chief commander of the Ukrainian Border Guard detachment. He told the SMM that no incidents had occurred along the Ukraine-Russian Federation border in his area of responsibility. He also said that there were 225 cases of Ukrainian citizens from “LPR”-controlled areas crossing into Russia and back into Ukraine from 9 to 10 December via the Milove (108km north-east of Luhansk) crossing point. The SMM met the deputy head of the Border Control Police Department of the Svatove region, Bilokurakyne district (man, 40s) in government-controlled Lozno-Oleksandrivka (147km north of Luhansk). He told the SMM that the nearby border crossing point at government-controlled Petrivka (149km north of Luhansk) had been closed since 16 February 2015 by decree of the Minister of Internal Affairs and was unable to say when the crossing point may be re-opened. He also said that the nearest operating border crossing point was in government-controlled Bilolutsk (129km north of Luhansk), which was under another district Border Guard department's control.

The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to water pipes at the outskirts of Pervomaisk (“LPR”-controlled, 57km west of Luhansk); the pipes had sustained damage due to shelling in March 2015. The SMM spoke to two members of the Luhansk Water Company repair team, who said that since that time two-thirds of the city of Pervomaisk had been without running water, which affected around 16,000 to 20,000 people. They said that the damaged pipe also affected water supply to the “LPR”-controlled towns of Kirovsk (50km north-west of Luhansk), Stakhanov (50km west of Luhansk) and Irmino (54km west of Luhansk).

On 9 December the SMM visited the site of the damaged electric pylons near Chaplynka (77km south-east of Kherson) in the vicinity of the administrative boundary line between Kherson and Crimea. The SMM observed two activists in black uniforms bearing the insignia of the “Azov Civil Corps” guarding the site. The interlocutors told the SMM they would be stationed there until the end of the blockade. They also said that some Right Sector activists had left the area altogether, which was why the “Azov Civil Corps” would increase their numbers at the administrative boundary line. The SMM observed that only one of the pylons was operational (see SMM Daily Report 8 December 2015), while the other two were still on the ground. The head of the Chaplynka Police Unit assured the SMM that no evidence of mines had been found at the site, despite the mine warning signs the SMM observed.

On 9 December the SMM observed a military convoy of vehicles and heavy weapons such as MLRS in Odessa region. The SMM followed up on this with authorities and was informed that these heavy weapons had been redeployed from the Anti-terrorist Operation zone.

The SMM continued to monitor the situation in Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnepropetrovsk, Chernivtsi, and Kyiv.

*Restrictions to SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to the fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM is restrained in fulfilling its monitoring functions by restrictions imposed by the parties and security considerations, including mine threats, damaged infrastructure, and the unpredictability of the situation in Donbas. “LPR” members continue to prevent the SMM from monitoring many areas alongside the international border in parts of Luhansk region not controlled by the Government.

Denial of access:

In “DPR”-controlled Horlivka (38km north-north-east of Donetsk), the SMM was denied access to School No.16 due to a “lack of approval by DPR authorities.” According to Horlivka’s “deputy mayor”, such approval must be given by the “DPR” “chairman” and is required for the SMM to engage in any kind of activity in Horlivka.

Armed men stopped the SMM at the last “DPR” checkpoint before the entrance to the village of Staromarivka (government-controlled, 46km north-north-east of Mariupol). The “DPR” members at the checkpoint were hostile towards the SMM, pointing their weapons at the SMM vehicles.

At a “DPR” checkpoint west of Oktiabr (29km north-east of Mariupol), the “checkpoint commander” informed the SMM that it must stay on the main road and proceed directly to the next checkpoint, and should not travel through other areas of Oktiabr.

Armed men stopped the SMM at the “DPR”-checkpoint at the entrance to Prymorske (“DPR”-controlled, 39km north-east of Mariupol). After a 41-minute delay, the SMM proceeded through the checkpoint. However, the checkpoint “commander” told the SMM that it should not travel off the main road or enter the villages.

Delay:

At the “DPR” checkpoint at the outskirts of Debaltseve, the SMM was held by armed “DPR” members for 30 minutes, who repeatedly requested its patrol plan and passports, not accepting the SMM ID cards. After the SMM showed the OSCE red books, the armed men became hostile. The SMM was eventually let through.

The SMM was stopped by two armed men at a temporary checkpoint near “LPR”-controlled Komsomolskyi (56km south-east of Luhansk). They checked the patrol plan and requested that the SMM wait for clearance from their “headquarters”. Meanwhile, a second SMM patrol was also stopped there and their patrol plans were also collected. The SMM noted that only its vehicles were being stopped while civilian vehicles were permitted to pass. When the SMM asked the armed personnel about that, they informed the SMM that they had received instructions to stop SMM patrols from transiting the area. Both patrols were allowed to proceed a short while later.

[1] For a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table.

* Please see the section at the end of this report entitled “Restrictions to SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to the fulfilment of its mandate”.