Is there a proof of Gödel's Incompleteness Theorem without self-referential statements? For the proof of Gödel's Incompleteness Theorem, most versions of proof use basically self-referential statements. 
My question is, what if one argues that Gödel's Incompleteness Theorem only matters when a formula makes self-reference possible?
Is there any proof of Incompleteness Theorem that does not rely on self-referential statements?

Roughly speaking, the real theorem is that the ability to express the theory of integer arithmetic implies the ability to express formal logic.
Gödel's incompleteness theorem is really just a corollary of this: once you've proven the technical result, it's a simple matter to use it to construct variations of the Liar's paradox and see what they imply.
Strictly speaking, you still cannot create self-referential statements: the (internal) self-referential statement can only be interpreted as such by invoking the correspondence between external logic (the language in which you are expressing your theory) and internal logic (the language which your theory expresses).
