U.S. Secret Service: Investigative Operations Confer Benefits, but Additional Actions Are Needed to Prioritize Resources

Commonly known for protecting the President, the Secret Service also investigates financial and electronic crimes (e.g., counterfeit currency and identity theft). In recent years, Congress and a panel of experts established by the Secretary of Homeland Security have raised concerns that the Secret Service's investigative operations may negatively affect its protective operations.

GAO was asked to review the Secret Service's investigative operations. This report examines, among other things, the extent to which the Secret Service's (1) investigative operations support or negatively affect its protective operations; (2) Office of Investigations has developed a plan to combat its priority criminal threats; and (3) staffing model accounts for federal employee compensation limits. GAO analyzed Secret Service data related to investigation and protection activities from 2014 through 2018; conducted semi-structured interviews with current and former special agents and federal prosecutors; and reviewed Secret Service policies and guidance. This is a public version of a sensitive report that GAO issued in September 2019. Information that the Secret Service deemed sensitive has been omitted.

The operations of the U.S. Secret Service (Secret Service) Office of Investigations, which conducts criminal investigations into financial and electronic crimes, generally support Secret Service protective operations in a variety of ways. For example, special agents in the Office of Investigations perform temporary protective assignments, such as during presidential campaigns or augment protective operations by securing a site in advance of a visit by a protectee. GAO found that personnel in the Office of Investigations spent 11.2 million hours supporting protective operations from fiscal years 2014 through 2018. Most of the 40 current and former special agents GAO interviewed said that their investigative duties did not negatively affect protection. However, over half identified that they were frequently or sometimes required to work on investigations while assigned to temporary protective operations. Details associated with this topic are sensitive and have been omitted from this report.

In December 2017, the Secret Service developed a plan to align its resources to combat what it identified as priority criminal threats (e.g., criminal activity with significant economic and financial impacts). However, available documentation of efforts taken does not consistently demonstrate synchronized efforts across the agency to counter the priority criminal threats, as envisioned in the plan. Further, the Secret Service does not have a systematic approach for identifying cases that address priority criminal threats. Absent a documented process for aligning resources and identifying cases, Secret Service will continue to lack assurance that its resources are aligned to combat its priority threats.

The Office of Investigations employs a staffing model to determine how many special agents are needed in its field offices. The staffing model takes into account the number of law enforcement premium pay and standard overtime hours special agents are expected to work. However, it does not consider annual caps on federal employee salaries. As a result, the agency may be underestimating the number of staff needed to meet its workload demands.

GAO is making six recommendations, including that the Secret Service establish a documented process to ensure that resources are dedicated to priority criminal threats, identify investigations that address these threats, and ensure compensation limits are accounted for when estimating staffing needs. The Department of Homeland Security concurred with each of GAO's recommendations.

The U.S. Secret Service (Secret Service) has two primary areas of  responsibility: providing protection and conducting criminal investigations.  As part of its protective activities, the Secret Service protects, among  others, the President, the Vice President, the President-elect, the Vice  President-elect, and their immediate families. The Secret Service also  investigates certain financial and electronic crimes, such as  counterfeiting, identity theft, credit card fraud, and network intrusions. To  execute its protective and investigative responsibilities, the Secret  Service—a component agency of the Department of Homeland Security  since 2003—relies on thousands of special agents and other personnel.  In fiscal year 2019, Secret Service was appropriated around $2.1 billion.

After a September 2014 security incident in which an intruder was able to  enter the White House, the Secretary of Homeland Security established  an independent panel of experts—the U.S. Secret Service Protective  Mission Panel—to review the Secret Service’s protective activities. The  panel stated in its final report that protection must be the Secret Service’s  first priority, and that the agency “should give serious consideration to  whether there are collateral or non-essential missions that can be shed.”  The panel also stated that it believes the Secret Service’s investigations  provide benefits to its protective activities. Since the 2014 incident,  Congress has also examined the Secret Service’s dual areas of  responsibility. For example, in December 2015 the House Committee on  Oversight and Government Reform issued the committee report United  States Secret Service: An Agency in Crisis. The committee report stated  that Secret Service investigations place an additional burden on its  special agents and distract the agency from providing protection. The  committee report also recommended the Secret Service take steps  related to agency leadership, personnel and staffing, and budgeting.  Finally, in response to Secret Service special agents not being fully  compensated for all of their overtime hours worked, Congress held  hearings and legislation was passed to provide additional pay for certain  special agents in calendar years 2016 through 2020.

You requested that we review the Secret Service’s areas of responsibility,  with a focus on how investigative operations affect the agency’s  protective operations. This report addresses the following questions:  1.  How, if at all, do the Secret Service’s investigative operations support  or negatively affect its protective operations?  2.  To what extent do the Secret Service and selected federal entities  investigate similar financial crimes, and to what extent do selected  federal prosecutors find this to be beneficial?  3.  To what extent has the Secret Service developed a plan to combat its  priority criminal threats?  4.  To what extent does the Secret Service Office of Investigations’  staffing model ensure compensation limits are accounted for when  estimating staffing needs?

This is a public version of a sensitive GAO report that we issued in  September 2019. Secret Service deemed some of the information in our  September report as sensitive, which must be protected from public  disclosure. Therefore, this report omits sensitive information on whether  Secret Service’s investigative operations negatively affect its protective  operations. Although the information provided in this report is more  limited, the report addresses the same objectives as the sensitive report  and uses the same methodology.

To determine how the Secret Service’s investigative operations potentially  support or negatively affect protective operations, we reviewed Secret  Service policies and guidance, including those related to the Office of  Investigations’ roles and responsibilities. We also analyzed Secret  Service time and attendance data for fiscal years 2014 through 2018 to  determine the number of hours special agents spent on investigation and  protection activities. We focused on fiscal years 2014 through 2018 as it  was the most recent data available at the time of our review; included a  fiscal year in which the Secret Service experienced the operational tempo  of a presidential campaign (i.e., fiscal year 2016); and included data from  two administrations. Based on our review of the data and related controls,  we determined that the data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of  reporting the number of hours that special agents in the Office of  Investigations expended on different activities and the number of cases  opened and closed during fiscal years 2014 through 2018.

We also interviewed Secret Service officials at headquarters and selected  field offices. We visited the Secret Service Miami, Florida field office;  West Palm Beach, Florida resident office; New York City, New York field  office; and White Plains, New York resident office. We selected office  locations using criteria such as highest number of criminal investigation  and protection hours and geographic diversity. We also conducted semi- structured interviews with 40 Secret Service special agents, including 30  current and 10 former special agents, to discuss their views on  investigation and protection activities. The information obtained from our  interviews cannot be generalized across all current and former special  agents; however, the information provided examples and perspectives on  how investigative operations can support or negatively affect protective  operations. In addition, we reviewed the Secret Service’s December 2017  Office of Investigations Priorities and Roadmap (Roadmap) to assess  whether the agency is leveraging the expertise it has developed for  investigative purposes to advance special agents’ ability to perform  protective responsibilities.

To determine the extent that the Secret Service and selected federal  agencies conduct similar investigations, we analyzed federal prosecutor  data from the Department of Justice’s Legal Information Office Network  System (LIONS). We analyzed the data to identify the six LIONS  categories wherein Secret Service referred the highest number of active  financial crime cases to federal prosecutors during fiscal years 2013  through 2017. We further analyzed the data to identify other federal law  enforcement agencies that referred the highest number of cases in the  same six LIONS categories during fiscal years 2013 through 2017. Based  on our data analyses, we selected the following four law enforcement  agencies: Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI); U.S. Postal Inspection  Service (USPIS), the Department of Homeland Security’s investigative  arm, Homeland Security Investigations (HSI); and Internal Revenue  Service Criminal Investigation (IRS-CI). In the course of our work, LIONS  data from 2018 became available, so we used data from 2014 through  2018 to describe the number of cases in each offense category that each  agency referred to U.S. Attorneys’ Offices (USAO). The information  obtained from selected federal agencies cannot be generalized across all  federal agencies. However, the information provides examples of how  federal law enforcement agencies can conduct similar types of  investigations. In addition, the data may not account for all financial  crimes cases each agency contributed investigative resources to. This is  because the data only includes cases referred by each investigative  agency wherein the agency was identified as the lead investigative  agency as determined by the U.S. Attorneys who entered the data into  LIONS. To assess the reliability of the data, we discussed LIONS quality  controls with Department of Justice officials and reviewed the data for any  obvious errors and anomalies, among other things. Based on our  assessment, we determined that the data were sufficiently reliable for the  purposes of describing the extent to which selected federal law  enforcement agencies conducted investigations similar to those  conducted by the Secret Service during fiscal years 2014 through 2018.

In addition to analyzing LIONS data, we held semi-structured interviews  with federal prosecutors from 12 USAOs to gather federal prosecutors’  views on Secret Service investigations. We selected USAOs with the  highest number of ongoing cases of the types Secret Service investigates  the most during fiscal years 2013 through 2017 (the latest year for which  data was available when making our selections), among other criteria.  The information obtained from selected USAOs cannot be generalized  across all federal prosecutors; however, the information provided  examples of the benefits and drawbacks of selected federal agencies and  the Secret Service conducting similar types of investigations.

To determine the extent to which Secret Service has developed a plan to  combat its priority criminal threats, we reviewed Office of Investigations  policies and guidance. For example, we reviewed the December 2017  Roadmap, and guidance related to the Secret Service’s Significant Case  Database. In addition, as discussed earlier, we interviewed officials from  the Office of Investigations at headquarters and selected field offices. In  addition, we reviewed Standards for Internal Control in the Federal  Government to assess whether the Secret Service has the necessary  control activities and information to combat its priority criminal threats and  carry out its responsibilities.

To assess the extent to which the Office of Investigations’ staffing model  accounts for compensation limits for special agents, we reviewed  documentation on the staffing model. We also received a briefing on the  development and use of the Office of Investigations staffing model and  the assumptions and statistical methods used in the staffing model from  officials in the Office of Investigations. To describe the ways in which  federal law affects special agent pay, we reviewed federal laws, such as  the Law Enforcement Availability Pay Act of 1994. In addition, we  reviewed data provided by the Office of Human Resources to determine  the number of special agents assigned to the Office of Investigations in  calendar years 2016 through 2018 that were not compensated for all the  time worked in each calendar year and the total sum unpaid. We  determined the data were reliable for the purposes of this report through  interviews with officials and evaluations of the system from which the data  was pulled. Finally, we reviewed Standards for Internal Control in the  Federal Government. See appendix I for further discussion of our scope  and methodology.

We conducted this performance audit from November 2017 to September  2019 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing  standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to  obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for  our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe  that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings  and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We subsequently worked  with Secret Service from October 2019 to January 2020 to prepare this  version of the original sensitive report for public release. This public  version was also prepared in accordance with these standards.

Secret Service Areas of Responsibility and Organization

The Secret Service pursues two areas of responsibility simultaneously— protection and criminal investigations. The Secret Service’s Office of  Protective Operations oversees the agency’s protective divisions,  including the Presidential Protective, Vice Presidential Protective, and  Uniformed Divisions. These divisions carry out permanent protective  details and other protection-related assignments. Permanent protectees,  such as the President and Vice President, have special agents  permanently assigned to them from the Presidential Protective Division or  Vice Presidential Protective Division. The Secret Service provides  protection for the President, Vice President, and their families at all  times. In fiscal year 2017, the Presidential and Vice Presidential  Protective Divisions provided protection for 30 presidential and vice- presidential foreign trips in addition to providing protection for members of  the President’s and Vice President’s families. The Uniformed Division  protects certain facilities, including the White House and the Treasury  Building, among others. Figure 1 illustrates an organizational chart of  offices within the Secret Service.

The Office of Investigations oversees the agency’s field activities,  including investigations into crimes targeting the nation’s financial  systems; surveys of locations a protectee may visit; investigations of  threats to protected persons and facilities; and temporary support for  protection. Figure 2 provides information about the components in the  Office of Investigations.

The Office of Investigations oversees the agency’s 21 international field  offices and 141 domestic offices, consisting of 42 field offices, 60 resident  offices, 13 resident agencies, and 26 domiciles. Special agents in these  offices conduct investigations to identify, locate, and apprehend criminal  organizations and individuals targeting the nation’s critical financial  infrastructure and payment systems. Figure 3 shows the locations of  Secret Service’s domestic field offices, resident offices, and resident  agencies.

Although the Secret Service was originally founded to investigate the  counterfeiting of U.S. currency, the agency’s investigations now span a  number of financial and computer-based crimes. Pursuant to 18 U.S.C.  § 3056(b)(2), under the direction of the Secretary of Homeland Security,  the Secret Service is authorized to detect and arrest any person who  violates any of the laws of the United States relating to coins, obligations,  and securities of the United States, including the investigation of the  counterfeiting of U.S. currency. In addition, the Secret Service is  authorized to identify, locate, and apprehend criminal organizations and  individuals that target the nation’s critical financial infrastructure and  payment systems. Secret Service special agents investigate financial  crimes such as access device fraud (including credit and debit-card  fraud); identity crimes and theft; business email compromise; bank fraud;  and illicit financing operations. In addition, the agency investigates  cybercrimes, including network intrusions, ransomware, and  cryptocurrency, among other criminal offenses. The Secret Service also  provides forensic and investigative assistance in support of investigations  involving missing and exploited children. Finally, Secret Service special  agents may investigate and make arrests for any offense against the  United States committed in their presence, or any felony cognizable  under the laws of the United States if they have reasonable grounds to  believe that the person to be arrested has committed or is committing  such felony. For more information on the evolution of the Secret  Service’s statutory authorities, see appendix III.

Secret Service Special Agent Career Progression and Pay

The Secret Service has established three phases for a special agent’s  career, in which the special agent contributes to both investigative and  protective operations—Phase 1: Career Entry/Field Office Assignment;  Phase 2: Protective Assignment; and Phase 3: Post-Protective Field,  Protection, or Headquarters Assignment. During Phase 1, after being  hired and receiving 7 months of training, the special agent is assigned to  a field office for at least 3 years, where the special agent performs  investigations and participates in temporary protective assignments  locally and away from the special agent’s home office. In Phase 2, the  special agent is assigned for up to 8 years to a permanent protective  detail or to one of the Secret Service’s specialty divisions, such as the  Office of Strategic Intelligence and Information. In Phase 3, the special  agent may return to a field office, serve in headquarters-based  specialized roles, or continue permanent protection duty. Figure 4  illustrates the Secret Service’s special agent career progression model.

Secret Service special agents are paid in accordance with the Office of  Personnel Management’s general schedule, which determines the pay  structure for the majority of civilian white-collar Federal employees. In  addition to standard pay under the general schedule, special agents are  eligible for law enforcement availability pay (LEAP). The Law  Enforcement Availability Pay Act of 1994, as amended, established a  uniform compensation system for federal criminal investigators who, by  the nature of their duties, are often required to work excessive and  unusual hours. The purpose of LEAP is to provide premium pay to  criminal investigators to ensure their availability for unscheduled work in  excess of a 40-hour workweek based on the needs of the employing  agency. The LEAP Act authorized a 25 percent increase in base salary  (LEAP premium pay) as long as specific requirements of the LEAP Act  are met. Among these requirements is a condition that criminal  investigators maintain an annual average of 2 or more unscheduled duty  hours per workday.

Federal employees under the general schedule are subject to caps on  pay equal to the highest pay level in the general schedule. In recent  years, legislation has been enacted to raise this pay cap for Secret  Service special agents who, due to the high number of hours they  worked, were not otherwise compensated for all hours worked. In 2016,  the Overtime Pay for Protective Services Act of 2016 authorized any  officer, employee, or agent employed by the Secret Service who performs  protective services for an individual or event protected by the Secret  Service during 2016 to receive an exception to the limitation on certain  premium pay within certain limits. The Secret Service Recruitment and  Retention Act of 2018 extended the Secret Service-specific waiver of the  pay cap for basic and premium overtime pay through 2018 and included  agents within the Secret Service Uniformed Division. Subsequently, the  Secret Service Overtime Pay Extension Act extended the Secret Service- specific waiver through 2020.

Office of Investigations Generally Supports Protection, but Has Not Identified Investigations That Best Prepare Agents for Protection

The Office of Investigations Supports Protective Operations in Numerous Ways

The Secret Service’s Office of Investigations supports protective  operations in a variety of ways. According to our analysis of Secret  Service data, special agents assigned to the Office of Investigations  expended 11.2 million hours supporting protective operations during fiscal  years 2014 through 2018. These 11.2 million hours accounted for 41  percent of all protection hours recorded by Secret Service law  enforcement personnel during that period. Figure 5 shows the number  of hours Secret Service law enforcement personnel expended on  protection, including the percentage expended by special agents in the  Office of Investigations.

The Office of Investigations conducts numerous tasks in support of  protective operations, including temporary protective assignments,  protective intelligence investigations, and critical systems protection.

Temporary protective assignments. When a Secret Service protectee  travels, special agents in the Office of Investigations carry out numerous  tasks, on a temporary basis, to assist the agency’s protective operations.  These special agents facilitate preparations for a protectee visit and  safeguard locations. For example, special agents may review the  vulnerabilities of a site, conduct motorcade route planning, and coordinate  with special agents on the permanent protective detail and with state and  local law enforcement. In addition, these special agents provide physical  protection when the protectee arrives. Special agents assigned to the  Office of Investigations also travel to provide temporary protection and  assist during presidential campaigns and National Special Security  Events. During presidential campaigns, these special agents may  accompany certain presidential candidates and their family members to  provide 24/7 protection, and may also work on advance teams that  provide site security for campaign events.

Protective intelligence investigations. The Office of Investigations  assists with the agency’s protective intelligence efforts by investigating  threats against protected persons, including the President, and protected  facilities, such as protectee residences. According to a Senior Secret  Service official, special agents in the Office of Investigations locate,  interview, and monitor individuals that make threats to a protectee. In  fiscal year 2018, the Secret Service opened 2,011 protective intelligence  investigations.

Critical systems protection. The Critical Systems Protection program  identifies, assesses, and mitigates risk posed by information systems to  persons and facilities protected by the Secret Service. The program is  coordinated by special agents in the Office of Investigations, and  according to a Senior Secret Service official, the program draws on the  investigative experience that special agents have developed in the Office  of Investigations. For example, the official told us that, through the Critical  Systems Protection program, the agency may monitor electronic systems  that could be compromised in a hotel where a protectee is staying.

Additional Ways the Office of Investigations Benefits Protection

The Office of Investigations can provide other benefits to protective  operations, such as providing support during periods of increased  protection demand and, according to special agents we interviewed,  developing relationships with local law enforcement that assist with  protective operations. Below are examples of these potential benefits.

Support during periods of increased protection demand. The Office  of Investigations can shift the focus of its special agents from  investigations to protection during periods of increased protection  demand. For example, according to Secret Service officials, in fiscal year  2016, the Office of Investigations shifted special agents from criminal  investigations to help meet the additional protection demands of the 2016  Presidential Campaign. As shown in figure 6, in fiscal year 2014 special  agents assigned to the Office of Investigations spent 52 percent of their  time on investigations and 39 percent on protection. These percentages  shifted to 31 percent on investigations and 58 percent on protection in  fiscal year 2016. Secret Service officials told us that the percentage of  hours that special agents spent on protection remained elevated after  fiscal year 2016 due to protection demands associated with the President  and his family.

Pre-established state and local relationships. Resources and support  from local law enforcement are needed for the Secret Service to carry out  its protective operations, according to senior Secret Service officials. In  our interviews with 40 current and former special agents, 38 reported that  Secret Service personnel develop relationships with state and local law  enforcement while conducting investigations, and that these relationships  can benefit protective operations. Twenty-two special agents noted that  contacts with state and local law enforcement are pre-established as a  result of the agency’s investigative operations. Twenty special agents  reported that assets or resources are more readily provided by their state  and local partners because of the relationships they have built. In  addition, special agents said that relationships developed with state and  local law enforcement are either necessary for (11 special agents) or  improves (8 special agents) the Secret Service’s protective activities. This  is consistent with our prior reporting on the topic. Specifically, in our  February 2016 review of Secret Service field offices, we reported that  special agents in each of the 12 domestic offices we interviewed  emphasized that it would not be possible to protect visiting dignitaries  without extensive assistance from state and local law enforcement  partners. For example, state and local law enforcement partners may  provide equipment such as helicopters, vehicles, and communication  equipment during dignitary visits.

Supports employee retention and work-life balance. Secret Service  officials told us that special agents generally cannot work protective  assignments for their entire career, and that investigations help support a  more reasonable work-life balance for special agents. A senior Secret  Service official described that protective assignments require a high level  of readiness and threat consciousness, which can lead to significant  psychological stress that cannot be sustained for a 25-year career.  Another Secret Service official told us that some special agents can  spend 100 or 200 nights away from home per year on protective  assignments, and that some special agents do not want to work on  protection full-time. Seventy-five percent (30 of 40) of the special agents  we interviewed reported that their work-life balance is better while working  on an investigation versus a protective assignment. For example,  eighteen special agents reported that investigative operations have more  normal working hours than protective operations. Special agents also  reported that working protective operations requires that they spend more  time away from home than investigations (12 special agents) and requires  a work schedule dictated by someone else’s (i.e., the protectee’s)  schedule (14 special agents).

Most Special Agents We Interviewed Reported That Investigative Responsibilities Did Not Negatively Affect Protection, but Some Highlighted Multitasking Difficulties

Most special agents we interviewed did not report any instances where  they were unable to fulfill a protective assignment due to investigative  demands. Of the 40 special agents we interviewed, 35 said there had  never been an instance in which they were unable to fully execute a  protection-related assignment as a result of their investigative  responsibilities. The five special agents who said there were instances in  which they could not personally serve in an assignment reported an issue  related to staffing.  For example, a special agent would have been  assigned to a temporary protective activity, but they already had an  investigative commitment (e.g., serving as a trial witness). According to  Secret Service officials, in these instances special agents are replaced  before the protective assignment begins, and thus, there is no negative  effect on protective operations.

During the course of our interviews, 23 special agents said that during the  last two years they frequently or sometimes were required to work on  investigations while they were assigned to temporary protective  operations. Examples provided by these special agents included working  on investigations during protective shifts, before and after protective  shifts, and during breaks to pursue investigative leads and respond to  U.S. Attorneys. Additional examples associated with this topic are  sensitive and have been omitted from this report. These statements are  consistent with those expressed in an August 2016 report assessing  quality-of-life issues at the Secret Service.

While Investigations Can Help Special Agents Develop Skills for Protection, Secret Service Has Not Identified Which Specific Investigative Activities Best Prepare Special Agents for Protective Assignments

Senior Secret Service officials told us that investigations can help prepare  Phase 1 special agents for the protective responsibilities required in  Phase 2 of their career, which includes an assignment to a permanent  protective detail or a specialty division (e.g., counter-assault team).  However, the agency has not identified which types of investigations and  related activities best prepare special agents for Phase 2, or established  a framework to help ensure Phase 1 special agents work on such cases  and activities to the extent possible.

As described earlier, special agents typically start their careers as Phase  1 special agents in a field office, and work on criminal investigations.  Twenty-six of the 40 current and former special agents we interviewed  reported that investigations are important in developing the skills  necessary for protective assignments. Special agents we interviewed  offered examples of skills developed, such as communication,  interviewing, and operational planning skills; greater attention to detail;  and experience working with law enforcement partners.

Special agents further stated that certain types of investigations can offer  more skill development opportunities than other types of investigations.  For example, 18 special agents we interviewed reported that working on  protective intelligence cases can help prepare special agents for  protective operations. A senior official in the Office of Protective  Operations agreed, and told us that experience with protective  intelligence investigations allows special agents to gain insight into both  the protectees and the threats against them. In addition, six special  agents identified cyber investigations as helping prepare special agents  for protective operations. However, 15 special agents reported a type of  Secret Service investigation that does not help them develop protection  skills. For example, nine special agents said financial crime investigations  (e.g., credit card fraud) are not helpful in preparing special agents for  protection. As one special agent described, the skills developed from  financial investigations do not translate to protection. Similarly, five  special agents said that investigations into counterfeiting are not helpful in  preparing special agents for protection.

The Secret Service’s December 2017 Office of Investigations Priorities  and Roadmap states that the office must continually look to identify areas  where the expertise it has developed for investigative purposes can be  leveraged to advance the Secret Service’s ability to perform its protective  responsibilities. In addition, consistent with Standards for Internal Control  in the Federal Government, effective management of the Secret Service’s  workforce is essential to achieving results, as is continually assessing  knowledge, skill, and ability needs of the organization, and establishing  training aimed at developing and retaining employee knowledge, skills,  and abilities to meet changing organizational needs. Further, according  to leading management practices related to training and development  efforts, adequate planning allows agencies to establish priorities and  determine the best ways to leverage investments to improve  performance.

However, Secret Service officials told us the agency has not identified  which of its current types of criminal investigations and related activities  best prepare special agents for protective responsibilities, nor has it  established a framework to help ensure that Phase 1 special agents gain  experience in those areas to the extent possible. According to Secret  Service officials, a list of investigative experiences beneficial to protective  assignments existed in the past; however, the list is no longer used in  practice and a copy of the list no longer exists.

Special agents we interviewed reported that certain types of  investigations (e.g., protective intelligence investigations) are more helpful  than others in preparing them for protective assignments. Secret Service  officials agreed that identifying the types of investigations and activities  that best prepare special agents for protective responsibilities, as well as  developing a framework to help ensure Phase 1 special agents have the  opportunity to work on such cases to the extent possible, could help  better prepare their special agents for the protective responsibilities  required in Phase 2 of their careers. In addition, a framework could better  support the Secret Service’s protective operations by focusing Phase 1  training on building skills needed for successfully executing protective  responsibilities. It could also help make Phase 1 special agents more  readily available to assist the agency when faced with a surge in  protective responsibilities.

Secret Service and Selected Federal Agencies Investigate Similar Financial Crimes, Which Federal Prosecutors We Interviewed Reported to Be Beneficial

Types of financial crimes most often prosecuted by U.S. Attorneys based  on Secret Service referrals during fiscal years 2014 through 2018 were  similarly investigated by four additional federal law enforcement agencies,  including the FBI, Homeland Security Investigation, IRS Criminal  Investigation, and the U.S. Postal Inspections Service. As shown in  figure 7 below, the selected agencies served as lead investigators in a  total of 14,669 prosecuted cases across six financial crimes offense types  during fiscal years 2014 through 2018, with Secret Service serving as the  lead on 31 percent (4,620) of the cases. The Secret Service served as  the lead investigating agency on more counterfeiting and forgery, identity  theft, and aggravated identity theft cases prosecuted by U.S. Attorneys  than any of the other selected law enforcement agencies during fiscal  years 2014 through 2018. For example, the Secret Service served as the  lead investigative agency on 1,368 counterfeiting and forgery cases that  were prosecuted during this time period, while the FBI led 66 cases and  IRS Criminal Investigations led six cases that were prosecuted (see figure  7). Although Secret Service was the lead investigative agency on the vast  majority of counterfeiting and forgery prosecutions compared to the  selected agencies, some types of cases were more evenly divided among  the selected agencies. For example, between 2014 and 2018, U.S.  Attorney’s Offices prosecuted 608 aggravated identity theft cases for  which the Secret Service was the lead investigating agency, while the FBI  led 484 prosecuted cases, U.S. Postal Inspections Service led 454  prosecuted cases, and IRS Criminal Investigations led 383 prosecuted  cases.

All 12 of the federal prosecutors we interviewed told us that the benefits  of the Secret Service and selected agencies investigating similar crimes  outweigh the drawbacks. These prosecutors highlighted the following  three benefits: (1) additional staff resources; (2) agency-specific  expertise; and (3) value added by having agencies work together on  cases. For instance, three federal prosecutors we interviewed said that  the occurrence of financial and cybercrimes in their district was pervasive,  and that the number of criminal complaints they received far exceeded  the number of federal agents available to investigate. With regard to  agency-specific expertise, one federal prosecutor noted that although  multiple agencies may conduct counterfeiting investigations, the Secret  Service has expertise in this area that is appreciated by local businesses,  such as casinos. Finally, agency collaboration can benefit criminal  investigations, as in a June 2018 case in which the Department of Justice  announced a coordinated effort to disrupt schemes designed to intercept  and hijack wire transfers from businesses and individuals. The effort  included an investigation by Secret Service and the FBI in which 23  individuals were charged in the Southern District of Florida with  laundering at least $10 million.

In addition, although the Secret Service and selected federal agencies  can investigate similar crimes, federal prosecutors told us that federal  agencies prioritize different types of crimes or cases. For example, eleven  federal prosecutors told us that the Secret Service was the only agency  that referred counterfeiting cases to their district, and 6 federal  prosecutors said the Secret Service was the only agency that referred  protective intelligence or threat cases. Further, according to senior FBI  officials, they generally investigate large-scale financial crimes. On the  other hand, the Secret Service may be willing to investigate financial  crimes with smaller losses than the FBI, according to senior FBI officials  and two federal prosecutors we spoke with. Table 1 below includes the  mission and investigative priorities of the Secret Service and selected  federal agencies.

Although nine of 12 federal prosecutors we interviewed stated that there  are no drawbacks to the Secret Service investigating crimes similar to  those investigated by selected federal agencies, two of 12 federal  prosecutors and one federal agency official identified drawbacks related  to deconfliction and case assignment. Specifically, one prosecutor told  us that, in the past, there was a greater need for deconfliction between  the Secret Service and the FBI, but that deconfliction had not been an  issue in the last 18 months. In addition, FBI officials in one field office told  us that although the Secret Service and the FBI generally coordinated  and worked well together, sometimes there were instances in which they  could have deconflicted earlier in an investigation. Another federal  prosecutor told us that it may be difficult to know what federal law  enforcement agency would be best to assign an investigation since in the  early stages of an investigation, the federal prosecutor’s office may lack  adequate case information to know what law enforcement agency would  be best positioned to conduct an investigation.

Secret Service Developed a Plan to Combat Priority Criminal Threats, but Does Not Know the Extent to Which Resources Are Dedicated to Each Priority

Secret Service Has Defined Priority Criminal Threats, but Lacks a Documented Process to Consistently Ensure Resources Align with these Priorities

In December 2017, the Secret Service released the Office of  Investigations Priorities and Roadmap (Roadmap). The Roadmap states  that fiscal constraints require that the agency prioritize its efforts and take  steps to ensure that resources are aligned with its criminal investigative  priorities. It further states that the Secret Service will align enterprise-wide  investigative activities from independent or uncoordinated cases into a  systematic, well-prioritized, and targeted operation to counter the  networks of transnational criminals that present risks to financial and  payment systems.

Towards this effort, the Roadmap states that the Office of Investigations  will “counter the most significant criminal threats to the financial and  payment systems of the United States through criminal investigations,”  and that these investigations will focus on three priority criminal threats:

Criminal activity with significant economic and financial impacts to the  United States.

Criminal activity, such as cybersecurity threats, that operate at scale  and present emergent or systemic risks to financial and payments  systems.

Transnational criminal activity involving corruption, illicit finance, fraud,  money laundering, and other financial crimes.

To implement the Roadmap, the Office of Investigations was to identify  investigative targets, such as specific criminal networks or activities, and  develop campaign plans for each investigative target. As described in the  Roadmap, the campaign plans were to synchronize the efforts of the  Secret Service to counter the targets. They were also to identify  government and non-government partners for countering investigative  targets. In addition, the campaign plans to counter the most significant  criminal threats to the financial and payment systems of the United States  were to be reviewed, updated, discontinued, or newly developed on an  annual basis.

The Secret Service has not, however, employed the practices as  identified in the Roadmap because, according to Office of Investigations  officials, the approach outlined in the Roadmap is not beneficial given the  dynamic nature of the crimes they investigate. Instead, rather than  identifying investigative targets based on the most significant threats on a  yearly basis and developing campaign plans for each target as originally  planned, Secret Service officials report that their Global Investigations  Operations Center helps identify individual cases with national  significance and coordinate resources necessary to investigate these  cases throughout the year. In addition, every two weeks Office of  Investigations leadership meets with field office management to discuss  their significant cases, including discussions about resource demands for  these cases.

However, available documentation of efforts taken does not consistently  demonstrate synchronized efforts across the agency to counter  investigative targets, as envisioned in the Roadmap. This is in part  because the process for identifying cases with national significance and  coordinating related resources is not documented. The Office of  Investigations provided us with campaign plans it developed since the  Roadmap was released, and based on our review, there were  inconsistencies in the type of information provided. For example, one  campaign plan identified gas station pumps that may have been  compromised by skimming devices—that is, devices that steal credit card  related information. The plan also identified field offices responsible for  executing investigations of the gas pumps, timeframes for the  investigations, and potential partners. A different campaign plan was an  informational alert regarding business email compromises, including  details about how the attacks are executed and examples of information  the attacker is attempting to steal. However, this plan did not identify  offices responsible for combatting the attacks, timeframes, or potential  partners. The plan also does not specify what resources would be  necessary to combat the identified threat.

The Roadmap states that fiscal constraints require the Secret Service to  prioritize its efforts and take steps to ensure that resources are aligned  with its priorities. This is consistent with the recommendation of an  independent panel established by the Secretary of Homeland Security to  assess the Secret Service’s operations, which in 2014 recommended that  the Secret Service “clearly communicate agency priorities, give effect to  those priorities through its actions, and align its operations with its  priorities.” Further, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal  Government require that management should implement control activities  through policies and define objectives clearly. This involves clearly  defining what is to be achieved, who is to achieve it, how it will be  achieved, and the time frames for realizing the achievement.

Documenting a process to ensure the Office of Investigations dedicates  resources to priority criminal threats can assist the Secret Service in  combatting these threats and ensuring that resources align with its  priorities. In addition, the documented process can help ensure that  plans for addressing priority criminal threats consistently include key  information, such as offices responsible for combatting specific priority  criminal threats, timeframes for actions to be taken, potential partners,  and resources necessary to combat the identified threat.

Secret Service Lacks Data to Determine the Level of Resources Dedicated to its Priority Criminal Threats

The Roadmap identifies three priority criminal threats to the U.S. financial  and payment systems. However, according to Secret Service officials, the  agency does not have a process for identifying cases that address priority  criminal threats. In addition, the agency does not collect data on the  related expended resources, according to Secret Service officials.

Secret Service officials told us they maintain a significant case database,  which holds information about individual cases that field office  management determine to be significant. However, Secret Service  officials told us the significant case database does not currently have the  capability to identify whether a case addresses one of the three priority  criminal threats, and acknowledged that the criteria of a significant case  differ from the criteria of a priority threat outlined in the Roadmap. For  example, as stated in the significant case database guidance, “significant  cases are those that represent a significant economic or community  impact, as well as those that involve multi-jurisdictional districts or  schemes that employ emerging technologies.” However, as described  earlier in this report, the Roadmap identifies three priority criminal threats,  one of which is described as “criminal activity, such as cybersecurity  threats, that operate at scale and present emergent or systemic risks to  financial and payments systems.”

Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government states that  relevant, reliable, and timely information is needed throughout an agency  in order to achieve its objectives. However, the Secret Service does not  have a systematic process for identifying cases that address priority  criminal threats or the related expended resources, according to agency  officials. As a result, Office of Investigations management and senior  Secret Service officials lack complete information on the number of  criminal investigations and amount of resources expended agencywide to  investigate the agency’s priority criminal threats. Until the agency  identifies investigations that address each priority criminal threat and the  related resources, Office of Investigations management and senior-level  Secret Service officials will not know the extent to which its operations are  aligned with the stated priorities. Capturing and analyzing this data could  help inform future decisions on how to allocate resources for addressing  priority criminal threats.

The Office of Investigations Special Agent Staffing Model Does Not Account for Compensation Limits When Estimating Staffing Needs

Since 2017, the Office of Investigations has employed a staffing model to  determine how many special agents are necessary to sustain protective  and investigative operations in its field offices. The staffing model takes  into account the number of hours special agents are expected to work  under LEAP and standard overtime, but does not consider annual caps  on federal employee salaries.

According to the Secret Service’s Human Capital Strategic Plan for Fiscal  Years 2018 through 2025, the special agent staffing model is used to  analyze the protective workload of the field offices. In addition, the plan  stated that the model is used to determine the appropriate levels of  investigative and intelligence output while keeping travel and overtime at  “tolerable levels.” To fulfill the requirements to qualify for LEAP, Secret  Service special agents regularly work a 10-hour day, inclusive of 2 hours  of LEAP premium pay, for an annual total of 520 hours beyond the  standard work year of 2,080 hours. The Office of Investigations staffing  model also assumes special agents will work an estimated standard  overtime of 200 hours, among other hours. As a result, the staffing model  assumes that each special agent will work an estimated 2,600 hours per  year. See Figure 8.

However, if certain special agents work the hours projected under the  staffing model, they may not be compensated for all of their work time  because they may exceed the annual caps on federal employee salaries.  For example, in calendar year 2018, using the Secret Service’s pay scale  for the Washington, D.C. metro area, the standard pay cap was  $164,200. Special agents at pay grade GS 13 Step 9 would have lost  compensation if, in addition to their regular hours, they worked 520 hours  of LEAP and 200 hours of standard overtime (see table 2). Special agents  at pay grade GS 14 Step 6 would have lost compensation if, in addition to  their regular hours, they worked 520 hours of LEAP alone. Although  legislation was enacted in recent years to address compensation for  Secret Service special agents by temporarily raising the pay cap, special  agents at higher pay levels may still exceed the temporary pay cap under  the current staffing model. For instance, under the temporary cap  implemented for fiscal years 2017 and 2018, special agents at the GS 15  Step 5 pay grade would have been uncompensated for some hours if  they worked the hours projected under the staffing model. See table 2 for  additional details.

According to data received from the Secret Service, some special agents  did work time that was uncompensated despite the pay cap waivers. In  calendar years 2016 through 2018, between 8 and 80 special agents  assigned to the Office of Investigations worked some hours without being  compensated for their time each year. This resulted in more than $1  million in lost wages (see table 4). Without the pay cap waiver, between  426 and 819 special agents would have worked some hours without  being compensated for their time, which would have resulted in a total of  $15.4 million in lost wages. See Table 3 for more details.

Due to the limits on special agent compensation, the Office of  Investigation’s special agent staffing model currently plans for individuals  to work hours for which they cannot be compensated. Without adjusting  its staffing model to ensure compensation limits are accounted for when  estimating staffing needs, certain Secret Service special agents will  continue to be under-compensated for their work. Additionally, the Secret  Service-specific waiver does not apply after 2020, at which point special  agents in the Office of Investigations may further exceed the pay caps  and work some hours without compensation.

Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government states that  management should design control activities to achieve objectives and  respond to risks, such as those related to the management of human  capital and the entity’s workforce. Internal control standards also call for  the consideration of excessive pressures, noting that excessive pressure  can result in personnel “cutting corners” to meet the established goals,  and that management can adjust excessive pressures using tools such as  rebalancing workloads. The standards further state that management  should recruit, develop, and retain competent personnel to achieve the  entity’s objectives. Retention can be pursued by, among other things,  providing incentives to motivate and reinforce expected levels of  performance and desired conduct among staff. Working long hours  without being fully compensated may cause special agents to be less  focused when providing protection or to seek employment elsewhere.

Because the Secret Service’s staffing model does not consider maximum  pay cap allowances, the Secret Service will continue to overestimate the  number of hours each special agent should work and underestimate the  number of staff needed to meet its workload demands. In addition,  maximum pay cap allowances are subject to change if legislation does  not continue to increase them on an annual basis. As a result, absent  developing an updated staffing model that accounts for compensation  limits and using that model to estimate staffing needs, the Secret Service  risks special agents continuing to work some hours without  compensation, and continuing to underestimate staffing needs.

The Secret Service plays a critical role in safeguarding both the  leadership of the United States and its financial resources. The Secret  Service’s Office of Investigations provides valuable support to its  protective operations, such as by conducting protective intelligence  investigations, building special agents’ protection skills, and allowing the  agency the flexibility to shift special agents from investigations to  protection in campaign years and other protection-heavy periods.  However, the Secret Service could better leverage its investigative  responsibilities for supporting protective operations by identifying the  types of investigative activities that best prepare special agents for  protection, and developing a framework to help ensure special agents  participate in those activities to the extent possible.

In addition, selected federal prosecutors reported that the Secret  Service’s financial investigations are helpful to the law enforcement  community as a whole, bringing specialized expertise to investigations  and complementing investigations performed by other federal law  enforcement agencies. However, although the Secret Service has  identified priority criminal threats in its Roadmap, it has not employed the  actions identified in its Roadmap to pursue these threats. Rather, the  agency relies on its Global Investigations Operations Center to identify  individual cases with national significance and coordinate resources  because, according to current Office of Investigations officials, the  approach outlined in the Roadmap is not beneficial given the dynamic  nature of the crimes they investigate. Documenting the process of  identifying priority criminal threats and developing campaign plans would  help the agency better direct investigative resources towards priority  criminal threats. In addition, until the Secret Service identifies cases that  address priority criminal threats and captures data on resources used,  agency management will not be able to determine the extent to which  resources and operations are aligned with priority criminal threats.

Finally, special agents can work long hours in carrying out their  investigative and protective duties. Unless the Secret Service updates its  staffing model to account for compensation limits, the agency risks  continuing to underestimate staffing needs and having special agents  work some hours without compensation. This could affect retention,  potentially weakening the agency’s ability to provide the highest level of  quality protection.

We are making the following six recommendations to the Secret Service:  The Director of the Secret Service should identify which types of  investigations and activities best prepare special agents for protective  responsibilities. (Recommendation 1)

The Director of the Secret Service should develop a framework to help  ensure special agents have an opportunity to work, to the extent possible,  investigations and activities that best prepare them for protection.  (Recommendation 2)

The Director of the Secret Service should establish a documented  process to ensure that Office of Investigations resources are aligned with  priority criminal threats. The process should outline key information to be  included in plans for addressing priority threats. (Recommendation 3)

The Director of the Secret Service should identify investigations that  address priority criminal threats agencywide and collect data on the  resources expended to investigate the threats. (Recommendation 4)

The Director of the Secret Service should revise its special agent staffing  model to ensure compensation limits are accounted for when estimating  staffing needs. (Recommendation 5)

The Director of the Secret Service should, after revising the special agent  staffing model, use the revised model to recalculate and estimate staffing  needs. (Recommendation 6)

We provided a draft of this report to DHS for review and comment. DHS  provided written comments, which are reprinted in appendix IV, and  technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. In its  comments, Secret Service, through DHS, concurred with the six  recommendations. In addition, in its written comments the Secret Service  outlined steps to address the recommendations.

With regard to identifying which types of investigations and activities best  prepare special agents for protective responsibilities and establishing a  framework to help ensure they have an opportunity to work on them, the  Secret Service has established a pilot program to revise guidance on  preparing special agents for protection. Upon completion of the pilot  program in March 2020, the agency plans to revise a directive to give field  office supervisors a framework for identifying key training and  experiences to prepare special agents for protection. The agency  anticipates the new directive being implemented by June 2020. The  stated actions are an appropriate response to our recommendation that  the Secret Service develop and implement a framework for preparing  special agents for protective responsibilities. These actions, if  implemented effectively, should address the intent of our first two  recommendations.

Regarding the establishment of a documented process to ensure that  Office of Investigations resources are aligned with priority criminal threats,  the Secret Service plans to replace its current guidance, the INV Priorities  and Roadmap, with a new strategic document with the goal of better  aligning resources to address priority threats by March 2020. Developing  an effective strategic plan that sets goals and objectives and outlines  effective and efficient operations necessary to fulfill those objectives is  consistent with best practices. Likewise, making clear what information  should be included in investigative plans for addressing these priority  criminal threats will help the Secret Service ensure that its resources use  will be aligned with the criminal threats the agency has identified as  priorities. We will continue to monitor the Secret Service’s efforts in this  area.

To identify investigations that address priority criminal threats across the  agency, the Office of Investigations intends to revise its internal policy to  further define the role of the Global Investigative Operations Center  (GIOC), including how the GIOC will identify and track investigations into  priority criminal threats. The agency anticipates that these revisions will  be published by March 2020. To collect data on the resources expended  to address priority criminal threats, the Office of Investigations plans to  consider new and additional data collection methodologies. The agency  intends to have developed an analysis of the validity of its revised data  aggregation methodology by September 2020.

Finally, the Office of Investigations plans to address our  recommendations related to its staffing model by working with the Office  of Strategic Planning and Policy and the Office of Human Resources to  revise the staffing model to ensure compensation limits are accounted for  when estimating staffing needs. The Office of Investigations then intends  to work with these offices and the Chief Financial Officer to use the  revised model to recalculate staffing needs. As the Secret Service notes,  this recalculation is likely to result in an increase to the number of special  agents required for the agency to maintain its current level of investigative  engagement. The agency intends to complete the revision of the staffing  model by March 2020 and update staffing estimates by June 2020.

We also provided the report to the Department of Justice (DOJ). The  Executive Office of U.S. Attorneys (EOUSA), a component of the  Department of Justice, provided written comments, which are reprinted in  appendix IV. In its response, EOUSA, noted that it agreed with our  statements that Secret Service is a valuable law enforcement partner in  criminal investigations, particularly those related to counterfeit currency,  cyber fraud, and identity theft. EOUSA further emphasized that Secret  Service’s investigative mission is intrinsically valuable to federal law  enforcement efforts. DOJ also provided technical comments, which we  incorporated as appropriate.

Finally, we provided the report to the Internal Revenue Service, which did  not provide comments on the report. The U.S. Postal Service declined to  review the public version of the report.

We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional  committees, the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Attorney General of  the United States, the Postmaster General of the United States, and the  Commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service, as well as other  interested parties. In addition, the report is available at no charge on the  GAO website at http://www.gao.gov.

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact  me at (202) 512-8777 or GoodwinG@gao.gov. GAO staff who made key  contributions to this report are listed in appendix V.

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

This report addresses the following objectives: (1) how, if at all, do the  U.S. Secret Service’s (Secret Service) investigative operations support or  negatively affect its protective operations; (2) to what extent do the Secret  Service and selected federal entities investigate similar financial crimes,  and to what extent do selected federal prosecutors find this to be  beneficial; (3) to what extent has the Secret Service developed a plan to  combat its priority criminal threats; and (4) to what extent does the Office  of Investigations’ staffing model ensures compensation limits are  accounted for when estimating staffing needs. This is a public version of a  sensitive GAO report that we issued in September 2019. Secret Service  deemed some of the information in our September report as sensitive,  which must be protected from public disclosure. Therefore, this report  omits sensitive information on whether Secret Service’s investigative  operations negatively affect its protective operations. Although the  information provided in this report is more limited, the report addresses  the same objectives as the sensitive report and uses the same  methodology.

To determine how the Secret Service’s investigative operations potentially  support or negatively affect protective operations, we reviewed Secret  Service policies and guidance, including those related to Office of  Investigations roles and responsibilities, time and attendance, and  training. For example, we reviewed the Secret Service’s December 2017  Office of Investigations Priorities and Roadmap (Roadmap) to assess  whether the agency is leveraging the expertise it has developed for  investigative purposes to advance special agents’ ability to perform  protective responsibilities.

We also analyzed Secret Service data for fiscal years 2014 through 2018.  For example, we analyzed Secret Service time and attendance data to  determine the number of hours special agents spent on investigation and  protection activities. We focused on special agents in the Office of  Investigations, as these personnel are responsible for conducting criminal  investigations and temporary protective assignments. Further, the data  we analyzed focused on special agents in a field location (e.g., field office  or resident office), and thus did not include special agents at  headquarters. We focused on field staff because that is how the agency  captures and reports the hour-related data in its annual reporting. In  addition, we analyzed data on the number of investigative cases opened  and closed. We focused on fiscal years 2014 through 2018 as it was the  most recent data available at the time of our review; included a fiscal year  in which the Secret Service experienced the operational tempo of a  presidential campaign (i.e., fiscal year 2016); and included data from two  administrations. To assess the reliability of the data, we discussed with  Secret Service officials how the data are entered and maintained in their  Manhours Reporting System, which tracks special agent workload and  tasks, and their Field Investigative Reporting System, which maintains  data on field office staffing and investigations. In addition, we compared  the data to recent Secret Service annual reports and congressional  budget justifications, and inquired about any differences. We also  reviewed the data for any obvious errors and anomalies. Based on our  review of the data and related controls, we determined that the data were  sufficiently reliable for the purposes of reporting the number of hours that  special agents in the Office of Investigations expended on different  activities and the number of cases opened and closed during fiscal years  2014 through 2018.

We also interviewed Secret Service officials at headquarters and selected  field offices. We selected office locations using the following criteria:  highest number of criminal investigation and protection hours, diversity in  types of offices, geographic diversity, and presence of other federal law  enforcement agencies. In addition, we conducted semi-structured  interviews with 40 current and former Secret Service special agents.  Specifically, we randomly selected and interviewed 10 special agents  from each of the Secret Service’s three career phases (30 special agents  in total). We also interviewed 10 former special agents, including those  that retired from the Secret Service and others that left the agency for  other reasons. To select these 10 special agents, we asked special  agents that we interviewed to recommend former special agents to  participate in our study (i.e., snowball sampling) and contacted an  association for former Secret Service personnel to help identify recently  retired special agents. The information obtained from our interviews  cannot be generalized across all current and former special agents;  however, the information provided examples and perspectives on how  investigative operations can support and negatively affect protective  operations.

To determine the extent to which the Secret Service and selected federal  agencies conduct similar investigations, we analyzed federal prosecutor  data from the Legal Information Office Network System (LIONS)—a  system maintained by the Department of Justice’s Executive Office for  United States Attorneys. We analyzed the data to determine the number  and types of cases referred by the Secret Service during fiscal years  2013 through 2017, the latest years for which data was available when  making the determination. Specifically, based on our data analyses, we  identified the six LIONS categories wherein Secret Service (1) was  identified as the lead investigative agency by the US Attorney’s Office and  (2) referred the highest number of financial crime cases to federal  prosecutors during fiscal years 2013 through 2017. The categories were  counterfeiting and forgery, other white collar crime/fraud, financial  institution fraud, identity theft, aggravated identity theft, and other fraud  against businesses. Next, we identified federal law enforcement agencies  that referred the highest number of cases in these categories. Based on  our data analyses, we selected the following four law enforcement  agencies: the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the U.S. Postal  Inspection Service (USPIS), Homeland Security Investigations (HSI), and  Internal Revenue Service – Criminal Investigation (IRS-CI). In the course  of our investigation, data from fiscal year 2018 became available, and we  analyzed data from fiscal years 2014 through 2018 to determine the  extent to which our selected federal law enforcement agencies referred  similar types of cases to U.S. Attorney’s Offices as those referred by  Secret Service.

The information obtained from selected federal agencies cannot be  generalized across all federal agencies. However, the information  provides examples of how federal law enforcement agencies can conduct  similar types of investigations. In addition, the data may not account for all  financial crimes cases each agency contributed investigative resources  to. This is because the data only includes cases referred by each  investigative agency wherein the agency was identified as the lead  investigative agency as determined by the U.S. Attorneys who entered  the data into LIONS. To assess the reliability of the LIONS data, we  discussed with Department of Justice officials how the data are entered  and maintained in the system. We also reviewed the data for any obvious  errors and anomalies. Based on our reviews and discussions, we  determined that the data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of  describing the extent that selected federal law enforcement agencies  referred financial crimes cases to federal prosecutors similar to those  referred by the Secret Service during fiscal years 2014 through 2018.

To help identify potential benefits and drawbacks of the Secret Service  and selected federal agencies conducting similar types of investigations,  we conducted interviews with officials from the selected federal agencies.  Specifically, we interviewed officials at the headquarters and the Miami  and New York field office locations for each selected agency in  conjunction with site visits to Secret Service field offices in those areas. In  addition, we conducted semi-structured interviews with one  representative with a high-level understanding of the office’s activities  (e.g., criminal chief) at 12 U.S. Attorney Offices (USAO). To select U.S.  attorney districts, we established the following criteria to help ensure that  we gathered a range of perspectives and interviewed USAOs that were  likely to have experience working with Secret Service: highest number of  ongoing cases of the types Secret Service investigates the most during  fiscal years 2013 through 2017, size of USAO district (as designated by  the Department of Justice), geographic diversity, and USAOs located in a  state with a Secret Service field office. The information obtained from  selected USAOs cannot be generalized across all federal prosecutors;  however, the information provided examples of the benefits and  drawbacks of selected federal agencies and the Secret Service  conducting similar types of investigations.

To determine the extent to which the Secret Service has developed a  plan to combat its priority criminal threats, we reviewed Office of  Investigations policies and guidance. For example, we reviewed the  December 2017 Roadmap and guidance related to the Secret Service’s  Significant Case Database. In addition, as discussed earlier, we  interviewed officials from the Office of Investigations at Secret Service’s  headquarters and selected field offices. We held discussions with agency  officials to better understand whether the agency had a plan to address  priority criminal threats and whether it maintained data on the number of  cases that addressed priority criminal threats in fiscal years 2014 through  2018. We also reviewed Standards for Internal Control in the Federal  Government to assess whether the Secret Service has the necessary  control activities and information to combat its priority criminal threats and  carry out its responsibilities.

Finally, to understand how the Office of Investigations develops and uses  its staffing model, we reviewed agency guidance documents including  guidance governing personnel utilization; the Secret Service human  resources manual; and the fiscal years 2018-2025 human capital  strategic plan. We also received a briefing on the development and use of  the Office of Investigations staffing model and the assumptions and  statistical methods used in the staffing model from officials in the Office of  Investigations. To describe the ways in which federal law affects special  agent pay, we reviewed federal laws, such as the Law Enforcement  Availability Pay Act of 1994, the Overtime Pay for Protective Services  Act of 2016, and the Secret Service Recruitment and Retention Act of  2018. Finally, we reviewed data provided by the Office of Human  Resources to determine the number of special agents assigned to the  Office of Investigations in calendar years 2016 through 2018 that were  not compensated for all the time worked in each calendar year and the  total sum unpaid. We determined the data were reliable for the purposes  of this report through interviews with officials and evaluations of the  system from which the data was pulled. We also reviewed Standards for  Internal Controls and previous GAO products to assess the potential  effects of some special agents working without compensation.

Appendix II: U.S. Secret Service Expenditures for Fiscal Years 2014 through 2018

From fiscal years 2014 through 2018, the U.S. Secret Service (Secret  Service) expended $9.2 billion, with an average of $1.8 billion per fiscal  year. Secret Service officials told us that in fiscal years 2017 and 2018,  the Secret Service changed the way it collected and reported expenditure  data. Specifically, Department of Homeland Security management  directed all agency components to use the Common Appropriations  Structure (CAS). As a result, the Secret Service implemented CAS in  fiscal year 2017. In addition, the officials told us the Secret Service  updated its accounting software in fiscal year 2018, resulting in additional  changes to the accounting structure. Secret Service officials told us that  because of these changes, it is not possible to accurately compare  expenditure data across fiscal years 2014 through 2018. However, Secret  Service officials noted that in the future they will be able compare year- over-year fiscal data starting with fiscal year 2018 and beyond using a  tool within the new accounting system. A description of the expenditure  data for fiscal years 2014 through 2018 is provided below.

Secret Service officials told us that in fiscal years 2014 through 2016,  expenditure data was collected and reported according to the task being  performed. For example, a special agent’s salary was reported under the  investigation category if the special agent was performing investigation- related tasks, and it was reported under the protection category if the  special agent was performing protection-related tasks. See table 4.

According to Secret Service officials, in fiscal year 2017, the agency  implemented CAS and began to collect and report expenditure data  according to location. For example, a special agent’s salary was reported  under the investigation category if the special agent was assigned to an  Office of Investigations field office even if the special agent was  performing a protection-related task. See table 5.

In fiscal year 2018, Secret Service transferred its financial reporting to the  Oracle R12 system, which tracks data according to both location and  task. In addition, officials noted that other accounting structure changes  were made in 2018, such as changes to what activities were classified as  protection. As a result, expenditures data from fiscal year 2018 is not  comparable to fiscal years 2014 through 2017. See table 6.

Appendix III: Enactment of the U.S. Secret Service’s Investigative and Protective Duties under 18 U.S.C. § 3056

In 1865, the Secret Service was established by the Secretary of the  Treasury for the purpose of investigating the counterfeiting of U.S.  currency. Over the course of the next 50 years, the Secret Service’s role  within the department continued to evolve as additional duties, such as  Presidential protection, were assigned to it. During this time, the  authorities exercised by the Secret Service were those delegated to it  within the Department of the Treasury and, on occasion, authorities  enacted through annual appropriations, which expired at the end of the  applicable fiscal year.

In 1916, the Secret Service received its first grant of authority enacted by  permanent legislation— the Federal Farm Loan Act—which authorized  the Secret Service to investigate counterfeiting, embezzlement, fraud,  and certain other offenses in the federal farm loan system. Ten years  later, the Secret Service received another grant of authority to investigate  the counterfeiting of government requests for transportation by common  carrier. Later, the Banking Act of 1933 and its 1935 amendments  charged the Secret Service with investigating offenses similar to those  under the Federal Farm Loan Act, but as applied to the Federal Deposit  Insurance Corporation (FDIC).

In 1948, the Secret Service’s investigative authorities under the above  statutes were consolidated into a single provision of law, 18 U.S.C.  § 3056 (“the Secret Service Statute”). However, the 1948 codification  effort did not account for the investigative or protective activities that the  Secret Service was authorized to perform under a delegation of authority  or annual appropriations acts. The authorizing legislation for these  activities came three year later, with the 1951 revision of the Secret  Service Statute. As originally enacted, the Secret Service’s protective  duties extended to the President and his immediate family, the President- elect, and, upon request, the Vice President. On the investigative side,  the 1951 statute authorized the Secret Service to investigate any federal  offense related to U.S. or foreign coins, obligations and securities,  thereby expanding its jurisdiction beyond the enumerated offenses  enacted in 1948.

Over the next three decades, a series of amendments to the Secret  Service Statute added new investigative and protective duties. In 1984, a  revised version of the Secret Service Statute was enacted, which  incorporated all prior amendments while adding a new investigative  responsibility. Although there has not been another wholesale revision of  the Secret Service Statute since 1984, subsequent amendments have  further increased the Secret Service’s protective and investigative  responsibilities.

Under the current codification of its primary protective authorities, 18  U.S.C. § 3056(a), the Secret Service protects the President, the Vice  President, the President-elect, and the Vice President-elect. The Secret  Service may also provide protection, unless declined, to the immediate  families of the President, the Vice President, the President-elect, and the  Vice President-elect; former Presidents and their spouses for their  lifetimes (unless the spouse remarries); children of a former President  who are under 16 years of age; visiting heads of foreign states or foreign  governments; other distinguished foreign visitors to the United States and  official representatives of the United States performing special missions  abroad when the President directs that such protection be provided;  major Presidential and Vice Presidential candidates and, within 120 days  of the general Presidential election, the spouses of such candidates; and,  finally, former Vice Presidents, their spouses, and their children who are  under 16 years of age, for a period of not more than six months after the  date the former Vice President leaves office.

Under the current codification of its primary investigative authorities, 18  U.S.C. § 3056(b), the Secret Service conducts criminal investigations in  areas such as financial crimes, identity theft, counterfeiting of U.S.  currency, computer fraud, computer-based attacks on banking, financial,  and telecommunications infrastructure, and a wide range of financial and  cybercrimes. In addition to investigating financial and electronic crimes,  special agents conduct protective intelligence—investigating threats  against protected persons, including the President, and protected  facilities, such as protected residences.

Table 7 provides a chronology of key statutes enacting protective and  investigative authorities under the Secret Service Statute, 18 U.S.C.  § 3056. Table 8 provides a cross-reference to enumerated offenses within  the Secret Service’s investigative jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C.  § 3056(b)(1) of the Secret Service Statute. “the Secret Service is authorized to detect and arrest any person who violates . . . section  508, 509, 510, 871, or 879 of this title or, with respect to the Federal Deposit Insurance  Corporation, Federal land banks, and Federal land bank associations, section 213, 216,  433, 493, 657, 709, 1006, 1007, 1011, 1013, 1014, 1907, or 1909 of this title.”

The enumerated offenses generally involve fraud, counterfeiting,  embezzlement, and certain other misconduct in connection with  government transportation requests, federal farm loans, and the Federal  Deposit Insurance Corporation. Table 8 provides a brief description of  each of the cited offenses.

Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security

Appendix V: Comments from the Department of Justice

Appendix VI: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

In addition to the contact named above, Joseph P. Cruz (Assistant  Director), Jeffrey Fiore, Miriam Hill, Lerone Reid, and Leslie Stubbs made  key contributions to this report. Also contributing to this report were Willie  Commons III, Christine Davis, Eric Hauswirth, Susan Hsu, Grant Mallie,  Claire Peachey, Farrah Stone, Eric Warren, and Sonya Vartivarian.

The Secret Service is known for protecting the President, but it also investigates high-priority criminal threats such as cyber- and financial crimes.

Do these investigations detract from the agency’s protection mission?

We found Secret Service investigative activities also support its protective operations. Its Office of Investigations staff worked 11.2 million hours on protection in fiscal years 2014–2018.

We found ways to improve how Secret Service prioritizes its investigative resources. For example, it could identify which investigative activities best prepare agents for taking on protective duties. We recommended doing so, and more.