Disaster Response: FEMA and the American Red Cross Need to Ensure Key Mass Care Organizations are Included in Coordination and Planning

Three catastrophic hurricanes affected more than 28 million people living in Texas, Florida, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands in 2017. Hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and Maria—which all made landfall within four weeks—caused a combined $265 billion in damage, and led to unprecedented demands for food and shelter, according to FEMA. FEMA and the Red Cross are the primary agencies responsible for coordinating mass care under the federal disaster response framework. GAO was asked to review their efforts. This report examines (1) FEMA's and the Red Cross' coordination of mass care in response to the 2017 hurricanes, and (2) FEMA's support and use of assessments of mass care capabilities for the 2017 hurricanes. GAO reviewed relevant federal laws, federal frameworks, and written agreements between federal, state, or local governments and various voluntary organizations providing mass care services. GAO also interviewed state, territorial, local, and voluntary organization officials in Florida, Puerto Rico, Texas, and the U.S. Virgin Islands; as well as officials from Red Cross, FEMA, other relevant federal agencies, and voluntary organizations.

Following the three major U.S. hurricanes in 2017, disaster relief efforts of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and the American Red Cross (Red Cross) benefitted from locating key partners in the same place. In-person coordination was critical to maintaining communication in Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands given the prolonged power outages and damage to public structures (see photo). However, some needs related to mass care—such as shelter, food, and supply distribution—were unmet. For example, local officials in Texas said flooded roads prevented trucks from delivering supplies. Providers encountered challenges in part because state and local agreements with voluntary organizations did not always clearly detail what mass care services could be provided. Additionally, FEMA guidance and training materials do not explicitly encourage states and localities to include in their written agreements the specific assistance each agency or organization can provide. This limits the benefits of mass care coordination and may put disaster victims at risk.

State, territorial, and local grantees of federal disaster preparedness grants are required to regularly submit information on their capabilities to FEMA, and FEMA has provided related guidance and technical assistance. However, the information some grantees provided to FEMA was not specific enough to aid its response in 2017. Moreover, FEMA does not require grantees to specify the organizations providing mass care services in their capabilities assessments. Also, FEMA does not have systematic protocols for providing feedback to grantees to improve their assessments. These limitations hinder FEMA's efforts to strengthen emergency preparedness.

GAO is making six recommendations, including that FEMA emphasize the importance of defining roles and responsibilities in its guidance to states and localities, require them to solicit information from key mass care providers in assessing capabilities, and develop protocols for providing feedback to grantees on capability assessments. FEMA agreed with all but one of GAO's recommendations; GAO maintains its recommendations are valid.

Three catastrophic hurricanes affected over 28 million people living in  Texas, Florida, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands during the  summer and fall of 2017. Hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and Maria—which all  made landfall within a 4-week time period—caused a combined $265  billion in damage, and each ranks among the five costliest hurricanes on  record, according to the Federal Emergency Management Agency  (FEMA), a component of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS).  FEMA reported that the extraordinary scale and rapid succession of these  hurricanes led to unprecedented demands to feed and shelter those  affected by the storms, and complicated efforts to distribute supplies,  which are key components of mass care after disasters. FEMA and the  American Red Cross (Red Cross) are the primary agencies responsible  for coordinating mass care under the federal disaster response  framework. These agencies supported various partners—often voluntary  organizations—to provide over 1 million shelter nights and, in Puerto Rico  and the U.S. Virgin Islands, the longest feeding mission in FEMA’s  history. However, stakeholders have raised questions about the provision  of mass care services by federal, state, local, and voluntary responders,  particularly for populations such as low-income families, the elderly, and  individuals who have disabilities.

We were asked to review mass care coordination in response to the 2017  hurricanes. This report is also part of GAO’s comprehensive evaluation of  the federal government’s preparedness, response, and recovery efforts  related to Hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and Maria. This review addresses (1)  the extent to which FEMA and the Red Cross effectively coordinated  mass care in response to the 2017 hurricanes, and (2) the extent to which  FEMA supported and used state and local assessments of mass care  capabilities for the 2017 hurricanes.

To address both objectives, we reviewed federal guidance and related  documents, as well as relevant federal laws. In addition, we visited Texas,  Florida, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands, which we selected  based on the path of the hurricanes and damage sustained. In these  locations, we interviewed state and local officials, including those from  departments of emergency management, health, housing, human  services, and education. Our interviews included city officials from  Houston, Texas, Miami, Florida, and Humacao, Puerto Rico. In addition,  we interviewed representatives of local voluntary organizations, such as  food banks, advocacy groups, and faith-based organizations that  provided mass care services after the storms. At the national level, we  interviewed officials from several federal agencies—FEMA, Department  of Health and Human Services, U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA),  and the Corporation for National and Community Service—to learn about  their roles in planning for, coordinating, and providing mass care and  related services after major disasters. We also interviewed  representatives of the Red Cross and national voluntary organizations,  such as the Salvation Army, Feeding America, and World Central  Kitchen, to gather information about their experiences with and  observations of mass care coordination in response to the 2017  hurricanes. We evaluated FEMA’s and Red Cross’ actions against federal  internal control standards for information and communication.

To address the first objective, we also reviewed FEMA and Red Cross  documents that outline mass care responsibilities, guidance for  developing feeding plans, and Red Cross sheltering standards and  procedures. We reviewed written agreements between FEMA and  selected voluntary organizations that support mass care, as well as  agreements between the Red Cross and other voluntary organizations,  states, and localities that were within the scope of our review. We  evaluated FEMA’s and Red Cross’ coordination of mass care against  their stated responsibilities outlined in the National Response Framework  (including Emergency Support Function #6), FEMA’s Federal Response  Interagency Operational Plan, and against our prior work on interagency  collaboration.

To address the second objective, we reviewed self-assessments of mass  care capabilities submitted by all states to FEMA in 2017. We analyzed  mass care capability information for six grantees of DHS preparedness  funds: Florida, Puerto Rico, Texas, and the U.S. Virgin Islands, as well as  two urban areas within these states and territories—Houston, Texas, and  Miami, Florida. We selected these grantees because they were severely  affected by the three 2017 hurricanes our study focused on. For each of  these six grantees, we analyzed mass care capability information that  was available to FEMA before and after the 2017 hurricanes, and  conducted interviews with officials responsible for capabilities  assessments. To assess the reliability of these data, we interviewed  knowledgeable FEMA officials about their process for ensuring grantees  submit accurate capabilities information, and reviewed the submissions  ourselves to identify missing or invalid data elements. We found the data  to be sufficiently reliable for the purposes of our reporting objectives. In  addition, we reviewed FEMA’s guidance and requirements for assessing  capabilities that was available to grantees before and after the 2017  hurricanes, including instructions on how to enter information into the self- assessment templates. We evaluated changes made to the guidance  after the hurricanes against FEMA’s stated goals in its 2018 strategic  plan, and interviewed FEMA preparedness officials about the intended  purpose of the changes. We also reviewed available resources, such as  training and webinars designed to support grantees in preparing their  capabilities assessments.

We conducted this performance audit from May 2018 to September 2019,  in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.

Disaster Response Roles and Responsibilities

Disaster response can involve many federal, state, territorial, tribal,  private sector, and voluntary organizations. The National Response  Framework describes how the federal government, states and localities,  and other public and private sector institutions should respond to  disasters and emergencies. For example, state, local, tribal, and territorial  governments are to play the lead roles in disaster response and recovery.  Local emergency agencies—police, firefighters, and medical teams—are  to be the first responders. In serving individuals who have disabilities and  others who have access or functional needs, disaster responders at all  levels are responsible for ensuring compliance with any applicable  requirements for equal opportunity and non-discrimination.

Federal agencies become involved in responding to a disaster when  effective response and recovery are beyond the capabilities of the state  and local governments. The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and  Emergency Assistance Act (Stafford Act) authorizes federal funding and  support to assist states and localities in responding to a disaster. This  federal support is available under the Stafford Act when the President  declares a major disaster or emergency in response to a request by the  governor or by the chief executive of a tribal government. Under the  National Response Framework, DHS is the federal agency with primary  responsibility for coordinating disaster response, and within DHS, FEMA  has lead responsibility. In addition to DHS, at least 29 other federal  agencies carry out disaster assistance programs and activities.

The National Response Framework identifies 15 emergency support  functions (ESFs)—such as communication, transportation, and energy— and designates a federal department or agency as the coordinating  agency for each function. Under the National Response Framework,  FEMA is designated as the coordinating agency for ESF-6, which  includes mass care, emergency assistance, temporary housing, and  human services. The National Response Framework also designates  primary and support agencies for each ESF. Both FEMA and the Red  Cross are the primary agencies for ESF-6. As co-primary agencies,  FEMA and the Red Cross are responsible for working closely to  coordinate mass care and related services across sectors, including  identifying resource needs, organizations with mass care capacity to  address those needs, and establishing strategies to address resource  gaps (see fig. 1). According to ESF-6, Red Cross also provides  technical assistance to FEMA and serves as its principal mass care  subject matter expert. The Red Cross works with FEMA to provide such  assistance to state and local partners, according to FEMA. In addition, the  Red Cross and FEMA facilitate the mobilization of resources and  coordination within the whole community for the provision of mass care  services. The Red Cross role in ESF-6 has shifted over time. At the time  of Hurricane Katrina, Red Cross was a primary agency, but in the 2008  update to ESF-6 it became a support agency. However, in a 2013 update,  Red Cross was shifted back to the primary agency role and given new  responsibilities such as working with FEMA to identify available mass  care capacity, anticipate mass care requirements, and establish  strategies to address gaps in coordination. These responsibilities, among  others, remain in effect under the current ESF structure.

FEMA and Red Cross coordinate mass care with the support of other  federal agencies such as USDA, the Department of Health and Human  Services, and the Department of Defense (DOD), as well as voluntary  organizations and partners at the state and local levels. There are also  over a dozen federal agencies named as having supporting roles in ESF- 6 (see app. I for a list of ESF-6 support agencies). For example, DOD and  its Army Corps of Engineers provides construction and engineering  support for temporary housing and sheltering, including inspecting shelter  facilities to ensure accessibility and suitability. In addition, ESF-6 names  over 50 members of the National Voluntary Organizations Active in  Disaster (NVOAD) that provide a wide range of services in support of  mass care and other ESF-6 activities, including the Salvation Army,  Southern Baptist Convention Disaster Relief, and Feeding America.

State and local governments are vital to mass care provision and  assessing their own communities’ response capabilities. According to  ESF-6, local government agencies coordinate with voluntary  organizations and the private sector to coordinate activities that meet  immediate needs of disaster survivors. When those needs exceed local  resources, the state may provide additional support. When these  resources are insufficient, federal assistance may be requested through  the FEMA regional office.

We found in 2018 that FEMA faced a number of challenges that slowed  and complicated its response efforts to the 2017 hurricanes, especially  Hurricane Maria in Puerto Rico. The sequential and overlapping timing  of the three hurricanes strained staffing resources and created logistical  challenges in deploying additional assistance (see fig. 2). In particular,  FEMA had already deployed staff and resources to support the response  efforts for Hurricane Harvey in Texas when the other major hurricanes  made landfall shortly thereafter. Moreover, FEMA’s response efforts in  Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands were complicated by a number of  factors, including their distance from the continental United States and  limited local preparedness for a major hurricane. We have previously  reported that there is increasing reliance on the federal government for  disaster assistance as the number of natural disasters increases and that  costs will likely continue to rise as the climate changes.

FEMA identified key findings related to mass care in its After-Action  Report for the 2017 hurricanes, noting differences in shelter populations  across the states, as well as the duration of shelter stays (see fig. 3).  FEMA also reported facing challenges transitioning survivors out of group  shelters in a timely fashion.

In order to qualify for federal emergency preparedness funding, states  and eligible urban areas (grantees) are required to regularly submit  information to FEMA on their ability to respond to a disaster.  Specifically, grantees first identify their own capability targets—such as  for sheltering disaster victims—through the Threat and Hazard  Identification and Risk Assessment, and then assess their progress  toward these targets annually in the Stakeholder Preparedness Review  (capabilities assessments). In fiscal year 2018, FEMA awarded $402  million to states and territories through the State Homeland Security  Program, and $580 million to urban areas through the Urban Area  Security Initiative, both of which require grantee capability assessments.  FEMA provides guidance and technical assistance to state and local  partners in their self-assessment efforts. According to officials, FEMA  does not conduct its own evaluations of state, local, and voluntary  organizations’ capabilities.

FEMA and Red Cross Coordinated Mass Care for 2017 Hurricanes but Some Needs Went Unfulfilled

Co-location Helped FEMA and Red Cross Facilitate Mass Care Coordination after Disasters

FEMA and Red Cross established joint operation centers where they co- located with key partners such as the Salvation Army and NVOAD for  each of the 2017 hurricanes, which facilitated coordination of shelter,  feeding, and supply distribution. In addition to co-locating at FEMA’s  National Response Coordination Center in Washington, D.C., FEMA, the  Red Cross, and key mass care partners also co-located in state and local  emergency operations centers (see fig. 4).

Our prior work has found co-location of staff enhances interagency  collaboration. Co-location contributed to relationship-building that  facilitated communication and coordination of mass care services,  according to FEMA, Red Cross, and emergency management officials in  all four states we visited. See figure 5 for examples of how various  agencies and sectors prepared food and supplies for mass care  operations.

Co-location meant workers could communicate face-to-face, as key  partners needed to collaborate and communicate resource requests to  FEMA and other agencies. In the U.S. Virgin Islands, DOD provided  airplanes that enabled workers to fly between the islands to attend face- to-face meetings, according to FEMA regional officials. According to  officials in two states we visited, this type of face-to-face communication  facilitated building relationships. Moreover, officials in one state told us  that co-location enabled them to communicate survivor needs directly to  FEMA, which could then provide assistance. This was especially critical  when power and cell phone service were out, particularly in Puerto Rico  and the U.S. Virgin Islands, which experienced prolonged power outages  and disabled electronic communications. Officials from federal agencies  and the Red Cross described some additional benefits of co-location:

USDA Food and Nutrition Service (FNS) officials said co-located ESF- 11 (Agriculture and Natural Resources) staff in the National Response  Coordination Center provided food inventories to staff at the ESF-6  desk.

Red Cross officials said they were able to quickly obtain supply trucks  after Hurricane Harvey in Texas because the Red Cross had  representatives at FEMA’s National Response Coordination Center.  As we previously reported, DOD provided high-water vehicles,  amphibious vehicles, and boats to transport supplies for the Red  Cross and support FEMA logistics efforts.

Officials in one state noted that in-person communication was  especially useful for coordinating mass care when FEMA’s on-line  system for submitting resource requests could not be used (see text  box).

Web Emergency Operations Center  Resource requests can be communicated through the Federal Emergency  Management Agency’s (FEMA) Web Emergency Operations Center (WebEOC), an  electronic system that processes and tracks resource requests from state or local  governments. WebEOC supports emergency management processes and functions  by providing a real-time operating picture for FEMA headquarters, regions, and  federal, state, local, and tribal strategic partners. In 2015, the Department of Homeland  Security’s Office of Inspector General (OIG) found that WebEOC was not sufficiently  integrated with key agency systems and could cause delays in providing disaster  assistance. In 2017, WebEOC was used in two of our four selected states, and a  predecessor system to WebEOC was used by one of FEMA’s regional offices,  according to officials in these areas. WebEOC was useful in tracking resource  requests, but in-person communication was more helpful for coordinating mass care,  according to FEMA regional officials. In cases where staff could not access WebEOC,  requests to FEMA were presented on paper, according to state officials. In 2018,  FEMA reported that it had provided every state with FEMA WebEOC accounts so  state users could submit resource requests directly to FEMA. WebEOC also allows  FEMA to share aggregated data, such as shelter counts and feeding information,  according to FEMA officials.

FEMA, Red Cross, and Other Agencies Faced Mass Care Challenges, and Some Needs Were Unmet

Federal officials and partners in Texas, Florida, Puerto Rico, and the U.S.  Virgin Islands described many challenges they encountered in  coordinating mass care. While the concurrence and intensity of the 2017  hurricanes presented many unforeseen challenges, several state and  local governments and voluntary organizations told us about issues  related to mass care coordination and planning. As a result, some supply  distribution, sheltering, and feeding needs went unmet.

Miscommunication: Miscommunication among disaster workers  affected supply distribution. For example, FNS officials reported  challenges with delivering baby formula for about 28,000 infants in  Puerto Rico through FEMA. One shipment of baby formula was lost  and discovered frozen and unusable in Puerto Rico because FEMA  officials were not aware that the products had been delivered,  according to FNS’ 2018 After-Action Report. The report also stated  that some perishable infant formula and food remained at a port in  Florida several weeks after delivery. FEMA officials told us they  shipped nearly 400 containers of infant formula and food in the first 3  months after Hurricane Maria, but that competition for port clearances  made it challenging to coordinate, prioritize, and track supplies. As a  result, some who needed these supplies may not have received them.  FEMA officials also noted that they believe survivor needs were met  by a combination of disaster relief supplies and the restoration of  capacity at grocery stores. According to FNS’2018 After- Action  Report, their officials met with FEMA and completed training on  FEMA’s logistics system in 2018 to be able to better track future  shipments of these products.

Insufficient shelter staff: In Texas and Florida, emergency managers  we spoke with described having unprecedented numbers of residents  needing shelters but not enough staff initially to operate them. To  address this gap, they said they relied on members of the state  National Guard or local government and community organizations to  staff shelters, but in some instances, shelters continued to have  insufficient numbers of workers. To improve shelter staffing for future  disasters, emergency managers in Florida told us they are working on  training additional county employees to serve as shelter staff.

Serving individuals who have disabilities: Public shelters faced  challenges in some cases serving individuals who have disabilities, as  we previously reported. For example, we reported in 2019 that some  individuals who have disabilities faced challenges accessing services  from local shelters, including restrooms. In another example, the lack  of a quiet space in public shelters for individuals with autism  negatively impacted their mental health, according to officials from an  advocacy group.

Extensive damage to hurricane shelters: In Texas, Puerto Rico, and  the U.S. Virgin Islands, Hurricanes Harvey, Maria, and Irma damaged  many buildings planned for use as hurricane shelters, according to  emergency management and local government officials in these  areas. As a result, some remaining shelters were at maximum  capacity. In some cases, survivors and staff had to relocate to  alternate sites during the hurricanes. For example, an arena in  Humacao, Puerto Rico, and a Department of Human Services building  in the U.S. Virgin Islands served as shelters when intended shelter  buildings were destroyed by Hurricanes Maria and Irma, respectively  (see fig. 6).

Damaged roads and communications infrastructure: Damaged and  flooded roads and the affected terrain in all four states contributed to  challenges in distributing supplies, especially in Puerto Rico and the  U.S. Virgin Islands. In Puerto Rico, FEMA received complaints from  municipalities that food was not reaching neighborhoods in need.  Impassable roads and no ability to communicate challenged FEMA’s  plans, which had designated certain partners to distribute meals.  Several weeks after Hurricane Maria hit, FEMA redesigned its  distribution strategy, which included identifying the most vulnerable  municipalities and having liaisons from the Puerto Rico Emergency  Management Agency and the municipalities help coordinate the  distribution. This enabled food to reach neighborhoods in need.

Insufficient supplies: According to Puerto Rico Department of  Education officials, FEMA was initially reluctant to provide water to  schools serving as shelters because the schools were supposed to  have their own water supply from the Puerto Rico Department of  Education’s warehouses. However, Puerto Rico Department of  Education officials said they only had enough water for shelter  residents for 30 days. The agency requested help to meet additional  needs, but FEMA did not have enough water or food boxes to help  supplement the schools’ supply. There were several thousand people  sheltered in the schools, but according to these officials, the Puerto  Rico Department of Education was responsible for providing food and  water to survivors whether or not they were shelter residents. Once  the Puerto Rico Department of Education officials met with FEMA and  demonstrated their need for water, they were able to secure supplies  from FEMA.

Early relocation of survivors to hotels: In Texas, the early relocation of  survivors from shelters to eligible hotels under FEMA’s Transitional  Sheltering Assistance program challenged mass feeding operations,  according to two Texas emergency management officials and  representatives of two voluntary organizations. As a result, some  survivors did not receive food assistance, as described below.

FEMA’s Transitional Sheltering Assistance program and the Department  of Agriculture’s Disaster Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (D- SNAP), while not considered to be a central part of mass care under the  National Response Framework, provide assistance to survivors after  disasters and provide services that may intersect with mass care  activities. According to officials in Texas and Florida, some aspects of  how these programs were implemented contributed to unmet needs.

Transitional Sheltering Assistance program: After the initial response  effort ends and mass shelters close, FEMA’s Transitional Sheltering  Assistance program is intended to provide short-term sheltering  assistance to survivors who are still unable to return home. States  request FEMA approval for Transitional Sheltering Assistance when  they determine there is a need for short-term assistance. According to  officials in Texas, the Transitional Sheltering Assistance program was  activated earlier than they expected before mass shelters closed,  resulting in survivors leaving early to stay in program-eligible hotels.  According to these officials, the early activation resulted in the inability  to track where survivors were located and where survivors needed  assistance. According to an official at a voluntary organization,  survivors in program-eligible hotels were going without food and some  were eating coffee grounds in their hotel rooms because they had no  food and no money to purchase food. Officials from state agencies  and voluntary organizations that could provide assistance told us they  could not get information from the hotels about how many survivors  were guests at specific hotels, due to the hotels’ reluctance to provide  guests’ information. When voluntary organizations tried to set up  feeding operations at hotels, some hotels did not want the  organizations to set up feeding operations on hotel premises,  according to organizational representatives. One state official also  said some hotels did not allow food distribution because of concerns  about food sitting in rooms or the hotels’ preference that their guests  use their restaurant facilities.

D-SNAP: D-SNAP provides temporary food assistance for households  affected by a natural disaster. D-SNAP usually begins after grocery  stores have re-opened and families are able to purchase and prepare  food at home. USDA’s FNS offers guidance to states that choose to  operate a D-SNAP program on where and how to operate D-SNAP  registration sites, including guidance on serving individuals who have  disabilities and the elderly. For example, FNS guidance states that D- SNAP registration sites should offer extra cooling measures in a  special waiting area for individuals who have disabilities and the  elderly, and move these individuals to the front of regular registration  lines. FNS’ After-Action Report identified, and state and county  officials in Texas and Florida said they observed, D-SNAP registration  sites that did not appropriately serve elderly individuals or those who  have disabilities, such that some elderly survivors fainted while  waiting in the heat. In one state we visited, officials from a local  voluntary organization said the state government did not work with  community-based groups to identify local D-SNAP registration sites.  As a result, D-SNAP registration sites did not align with where  survivors needed assistance, and according to these officials  approximately 50,000 applicants came to one site and were turned  away after waiting for hours in the heat. To help address these  challenges, some elderly individuals and individuals with disabilities in  Florida were allowed to register for D-SNAP over the phone in  December 2017 and in May 2018, according to a state official.

Coordination Efforts Do Not Include Specific Agreements and Regular Evaluation

While the National Response Framework indicates that many agencies  participating in disaster response formalize their responsibilities in written  agreements, we found that key mass care partners did not have such  agreements or that they did not clearly outline responsibilities at the time  of the 2017 hurricanes. Although Red Cross has written agreements with  some state and local partners, counties we visited in Florida, Texas, and  the U.S. Virgin Islands—states where Red Cross shelters disaster  victims—did not have written agreements that clearly specified what mass  care services would be provided by the Red Cross. In Florida, several  counties we visited did not have formal agreements with the Red Cross  during the 2017 hurricane season. In lieu of a formal agreement, one of  the counties had an email from the Red Cross stating that the Red Cross  could support one of 15 shelters, according to officials and documents we  reviewed. In some cases, even when written agreements were  established, there were still unclear roles and expectations. For example,  another Florida county did have an agreement in place, but county  officials said they found out after the 2017 hurricane season started and  shortly before Hurricane Irma that the Red Cross could support only eight  shelters—a substantial decrease from previous years. Further, when  counties did have written agreements with the Red Cross, the  agreements did not always clearly define responsibilities. The  agreements also did not specify how and at what point sheltering and  feeding needs and capabilities should be communicated by the Red  Cross to counties, which exacerbated challenges in providing these  services after the hurricanes.

After the 2017 hurricane season, officials in three states we visited said  they have been working toward clarifying responsibilities in written  agreements. Red Cross officials also said they have been developing  letters of intent with local government partners since 2017, which  describe what services can be provided by the Red Cross in these  localities. However, our review of some of these new finalized  agreements found they lack consistency and detail in what each of the  parties can deliver regarding sheltering, feeding, and supply distribution.  For example, Red Cross’ agreement with one Florida county specifies it  can operate two shelters for about 1,000 residents, while its agreement  with another county states it will “support shelters as resources allow.”

Red Cross officials said written agreements may be difficult to change as  needs and capabilities change over the course of the response to a  disaster. Outside of written agreements, Red Cross officials said they  collaborate with government agencies in other ways, such as participating  in mass care exercises to create a shared understanding of mass care  roles and work on jointly-developed response plans. Red Cross officials  also told us that they need to be clearer with local jurisdictions about what  they can and cannot provide, and that they need to reach mutual  understanding with local governments about shared planning  assumptions, such as the peak shelter population and what the Red  Cross could provide within specified timeframes. According to Red Cross  officials, neither they nor local governments established clear  expectations in the past. In August 2017, the Red Cross launched a  nationwide readiness initiative focusing on mass care planning  discussions with local governments. This initiative also includes clarifying  planning assumptions with local governments on a recurring basis.

FEMA provides some guidance to states and localities about how to  effectively coordinate with mass care partners, as well as a training  course that encourages establishing written agreements. FEMA’s  training materials for the mass care planning and operations course  describe the differences in types of agreements that states and localities  might establish with mass care partners, and specifically suggest defining  the roles and responsibilities of each party. In addition, FEMA has helped  developed tools for stakeholders to use when specifically coordinating  mass care operations, such as the Multi-Agency Feeding Support Plan  Template. This tool guides states, voluntary organizations, and other  partners to clearly establish roles and responsibilities related to specific  aspects of feeding, including the delivery of supplies and networking with  other organizations to identify unmet needs. FEMA officials noted that all  of their mass care templates encourage this type of planning for roles and  responsibilities. However, FEMA guidance and training materials do not  suggest detailing the specific responsibilities of each entity for mass care  services in the written agreements. For example, the guidance does not  explicitly prompt states and localities to use their written agreements to  specifically establish how much shelter and feeding assistance an  agency, government, or organization can provide.

Our prior work has found that clarifying responsibilities through written  agreements is critical to effective interagency collaboration. When an  agency, government, or organization does not specifically indicate how  much shelter and feeding assistance it can provide in a disaster, its  partners may have unfounded expectations. For example, in Texas,  officials in one city said when one large mass shelter first opened, there  were only a small number of Red Cross volunteers, which was insufficient  to operate and manage a shelter with tens of thousands of survivors; this  was short of city officials’ understanding that Red Cross would fully staff  the location from the beginning. Without further guidance from FEMA on  how to establish effective written agreements, unmet expectations  between state and local partners and voluntary organizations may persist  and place disaster survivors at risk.

Our prior work has also found that federal agencies engaged in  collaborative efforts need to create the means to evaluate their activities  in order to identify areas for improvement. In addition, federal internal  control standards state that management should establish an  organizational structure, assign responsibility, and delegate authority to  key roles in order to achieve objectives. Moreover, the organizational  structure should be evaluated periodically in order to meet the objectives  and adapt to new situations. FEMA is responsible for coordinating and  supporting the federal response to major disasters and relies significantly  on the Red Cross as its co-primary agency under ESF-6. While FEMA  and the Red Cross conduct after-action reviews following certain major  disasters, including for the 2017 hurricane season, these reviews are  focused on response and recovery efforts and do not include a broader  review of roles and responsibilities of the co-primary agencies. Based  on its findings on the 2017 hurricane season, FEMA called for some  revisions to the National Response Framework and ESF annexes related  to coordination across sectors. Accordingly, FEMA is currently revising  the framework, which is considered a living document to be regularly  reviewed to reflect experience gained from its use. However, FEMA has  not proposed revisions to ESF-6 as part of its current review of the  National Response Framework and ESF annexes. Specifically, FEMA  has not reviewed whether the current structure of ESF-6 leadership roles  and responsibilities is best suited for coordinating mass care, or whether  there are responsibilities that should be shifted. ESF-6 is unique among  ESFs in that it has a voluntary organization serving as a co-primary  agency. Further, the Red Cross’ role under ESF-6 has changed multiple  times since Hurricane Katrina. According to FEMA officials, FEMA is not  required to review ESF-6 leadership roles and responsibilities, and  instead focuses on the overall improvement of mass care delivery,  including mass care activities and services. However, FEMA’s ESF  Leadership Group noted that it was not always clear which agency that is  part of an ESF is best suited to carry out a task.

Evaluating collaborative efforts can help key decision makers within the  agencies obtain feedback for improving both policy and operational  effectiveness. Moreover, the National Response Framework is  considered a living document, and DHS plans regular reviews to evaluate  consistency with existing and new policies, evolving conditions, and the  experience gained from its use. As we have previously reported, in  disasters in which the federal government is involved, the extent and  effectiveness of the Red Cross’s activities could have a direct impact on  the nature and scope of the federal government’s activities. Given the  challenges experienced with mass care during the response to the 2017  hurricanes, FEMA is missing an opportunity to identify areas for  improvement and strengthen interagency coordination by not reviewing  ESF-6 leadership roles and responsibilities.

Pre-existing Relationships Facilitated Mass Care Coordination, but Some Community Groups Were Not Integrated with Response Efforts

Many FEMA, Red Cross, local government officials, and representatives  from local voluntary organizations we interviewed emphasized the  importance of pre-existing relationships among established partners in  coordinating mass care during the 2017 hurricanes. Relationships  between these established mass care partners were often formed during  non-disaster periods through regular conference calls and mass care  training exercises. For example, officials in all four state emergency  management departments we visited described positive relationships  developed with FEMA staff through regular joint training exercises.  FEMA’s Voluntary Agency Liaisons (VALs) help facilitate relationships  between FEMA and established mass care partners. For example, VALs  serve as contacts for non-governmental organizations active in disasters  on a routine basis and during disaster response. In one FEMA regional  office, officials said VALs serve as mass care specialists and regularly  participate in calls with mass care partners.

While such pre-existing relationships among established mass care  partners facilitated mass care coordination, officials from voluntary  organizations that did not have pre-existing relationships—unaffiliated  organizations—reported challenges connecting with established mass  care organizations, such as FEMA and the Red Cross, to share  knowledge that could have informed response efforts. During the 2017  hurricane response, officials from unaffiliated organizations such as local  advocacy groups and faith-based organizations told us they experienced  challenges sharing critical information regarding needs, resources, and  capabilities with established mass care organizations. These  coordination challenges affected their ability to provide mass care  services to certain populations. For example:

A group of community organizations in Florida representing low- income and migrant populations had information on the location of  people needing assistance, but reported difficulties in locating FEMA  and Red Cross officials with whom to share that information.

Representatives of a community group that assists victims of  domestic violence in the U.S. Virgin Islands said there was no  centralized way to share critical information and no plan for how to  best address the issues facing these survivors. For example, they  said the Red Cross had mapped damaged areas but was not sharing  that information with community groups that could have provided  assistance. This group said these maps could have been used to help  locate people who were at particular risk. Red Cross officials stated  that they experienced challenges in sharing damage assessment  information in the U.S. Virgin Islands due to technology issues, which  prevented them from being able to share these data securely with  other organizations.

Representatives from several faith-based organizations in multiple  states told us they had food, water, and supplies, as well as local  knowledge of need. Two of these representatives said FEMA and the  Red Cross did not share information with them as to where they had  already distributed supplies. This information was important so as to  not duplicate efforts and to ensure those who still needed supplies  were not overlooked, according to these representatives.

Some migrant populations in all four areas we visited were hesitant to  seek or receive assistance from federal, state, and local government  agencies due to their undocumented immigration status, according to  emergency management officials and community group  representatives. Officials from multiple local voluntary organizations  said they knew where migrant populations were located and what  types of assistance they needed; they were trusted by these  populations, but had difficulty finding FEMA or Red Cross  representatives for sharing this information.

Established mass care partners, including FEMA and the Red Cross, may  not share information with unaffiliated organizations due to concerns  about privacy, according to officials. Local governments also may not  receive such information, because FEMA shares it with the states and the  states are responsible for determining when to share it with local  governments, according to FEMA officials. Local governments and  unaffiliated organizations told us, however, that they do not need  personally identifiable information, and that aggregated information about  overall resource needs in certain locations would be sufficient for their  purposes. For example, county officials in two states told us it was difficult  to get FEMA data that would have helped them target areas for  assistance, including those that other agencies might not have been able  to reach. Similarly, the leader of a group that coordinates local voluntary  organizations said they only needed aggregate-level data to identify  needs in different counties. In addition, the Red Cross told us that mass  care partners could access certain information from their RC View portal,  which provides situational awareness information that supports resource  requests and needs assessments. However, the Red Cross did not  share such information with all its partners during the 2017 hurricanes  because the technology was not yet ready. As of May 2019, Red Cross  officials told us they are working on providing access to their RC View  portal for several key partners, and that they intend to expand access to  RC View to additional organizations in the future.

ESF-6 states that Red Cross, in conjunction with FEMA, will facilitate the  mobilization of private sector partners for the provision of mass care  services. FEMA’s most recent strategic plan emphasizes the importance  of a whole community approach to disaster response because individuals  and local communities are the true first responders in a disaster. FEMA  guidance states that the integration of non-traditional responders (which  may include unaffiliated organizations) providing mass care services may  be necessary during severe disasters. Federal internal control  standards also emphasize the importance of communicating externally to  key stakeholders. By not engaging in information sharing with  unaffiliated organizations, FEMA and the Red Cross may miss  opportunities to more accurately and efficiently coordinate mass care. As  a result, those in need may not receive critical assistance in a timely way.

Red Cross’ Training for Staff Deployed to Disaster Areas  Red Cross provides training for its staff and volunteers deployed to disaster areas.  This training includes information on the area of deployment, the nature of the  disaster, and any cultural sensitivities they need to be aware of, according to Red  Cross officials. However, unfamiliarity with local traditions and norms challenged Red  Cross personnel when they arrived at disaster sites in 2017, and some local  governments and community groups said this affected mass care coordination. Red  Cross officials said they initially did not have enough Spanish speakers in Puerto Rico  during the response to Hurricane Maria, for example. To address this need, they used  Spanish-speaking workers from the International Red Cross community in Mexico and  South America to assist with mass care coordination, according to Red Cross officials.  As a result of challenges encountered during the 2017 hurricane season, Red Cross  officials said that they have made changes to their approach intended to increase their  engagement with the Latino community. This effort includes having materials  translated into Spanish. To counter concerns among some disaster survivors about  providing immigration status information, Red Cross officials said they have taken  steps to clarify that the Red Cross does not collect this information.

FEMA Did Not Collect Key Information on Capabilities of Mass Care Partners Prior to the 2017 Hurricanes and its Updated Approach Has Limitations

Mass Care Capabilities Data Collected by FEMA Were Not Useful for the 2017 Hurricane Response, but FEMA is Making Changes

Information on the mass care capabilities of state and local jurisdictions  that FEMA collected in 2016 and 2017 was not specific enough to aid the  agency in its response to the 2017 hurricanes, according to FEMA’s After- Action Report and agency officials. The reporting process at the time of  the 2017 hurricanes did not require grantees to report specific estimates  of their current capabilities for providing mass care, which resulted in an  incomplete picture of capabilities. With regard to mass care capabilities,  FEMA did not ask grantees to report the number of people they could  shelter, or how long they could maintain sheltering operations. For  example, one state affected by the 2017 hurricanes identified gaps in the  state’s capability to provide cots, blankets, laundry facilities, kitchens, and  shelter facilities, but did not quantify the shortfall in its assessment  submitted in December 2016. In addition, it was optional for grantees to  describe deficiencies in their mass care capabilities at the time of the  2017 hurricanes, according to FEMA officials. One grantee affected by  the 2017 hurricanes had indicated in its assessment from December 2016  that there were gaps in several mass care capabilities, such as shelter  equipment and training for family reunification. However, this grantee  chose not to include an additional description of what those gaps were.

As a result of these limitations, FEMA and its grantees did not have  specific information on state, territorial, and urban mass care capabilities  or gaps at the time of the 2017 hurricanes. Officials from several states  told us they were not aware of capabilities assessments being used  during the response to the 2017 hurricanes, but some said this  information could have been useful. For example, an official in one state  said the information could be used for resource targeting. In submissions  from the year following the 2017 hurricanes, 35 state and territorial  grantees did not provide gap descriptions for mass care, which were  optional at the time.

According to FEMA, the agency recognized the limitations of the  capabilities assessment data it had been collecting and began revising its  methodology prior to 2017. FEMA’s After-Action Report for the 2017  hurricanes stated that one reason the agency began revising its  capabilities assessment methodology was to provide more actionable  information to use during response. Revisions were implemented for the  2018 reporting period that could result in FEMA collecting more specific  and descriptive data on mass care capabilities, such as the number of  people for whom the grantee can provide shelter, food, water, and  relocation assistance as part of mass care (see table 1).

FEMA’s 2018 guidance encouraged grantees to use a standardized  format developed by FEMA, which allows grantees to insert community- specific numbers into a template when they report capability targets and  estimates. The new standardized format also generates a quantitative  statement of a grantee’s capability gaps (see table 2).

Other new changes in FEMA’s revised approach will also allow the  agency to collect more specific information on mass care capabilities. For  example, starting in 2018, grantees were required to:

Report the extent to which capabilities have been lost, built, or sustained over the previous year.

Describe intended approaches for addressing capability gaps and sustaining capabilities built, including investments in resources.

Describe the extent to which funding sources contributed to building or sustaining capabilities and improving disaster outcomes.

Rate their level of confidence (1-5 scale) in the accuracy of their capability assessment for each target.

These data elements have the potential to inform both disaster planning  and response operations.

FEMA’s Updated Approach to Collecting Mass Care Capabilities Data Does Not Require Input from Key Mass Care Providers

FEMA revised its methodology for collecting capabilities assessment data  in 2018, but it does not collect key information that could better inform its  mass care planning. FEMA does not specifically require grantees to solicit  the input of key partners in assessing mass care capabilities, according to  officials, even though mass care generally depends on the work of such  organizations. For example, the Salvation Army and the Southern Baptist  Convention Disaster Relief often play key roles in mass care feeding, and  the Red Cross manages sheltering in many locations, but they are not  always included in mass care capabilities assessments submitted by  grantees.

FEMA officials told us that the new methodology should naturally foster  engagement between grantees and their stakeholders, which should  provide a better understanding of local capabilities for sheltering and  feeding. According to these officials, under the new framework, FEMA  requires grantees to report the number and type of government agencies  and nongovernment organizations that participated in estimating  capabilities (see fig. 7).

However, by not requiring that grantees solicit input from organizations  that provide mass care, or that grantees name specific organizations in  their submissions, FEMA may rely on capabilities assessments  developed without consultation with voluntary organizations providing key  mass care services. We found that two of the six grantees included in our  review did not report participating with the Red Cross, faith-based  organizations, or other VOAD groups, in their 2018 assessments. An  official from one of these jurisdictions confirmed that they had never  reached out to voluntary organizations to take part in the assessment  process, due to staff turnover and lack of time, despite relying on these  organizations for providing mass care. An official from another jurisdiction  said it is detrimental not to have voluntary partners’ input when preparing  capabilities assessments because these partners are critical to providing  mass care and play vital roles in disaster response.

According to FEMA’s guidance, all organizations—not just government  agencies—should be involved in preparedness efforts, and grantees  should involve stakeholders throughout the process. FEMA’s guidance  encourages a whole-community approach in which grantees include  community stakeholders and subject-matter experts in estimating  capabilities. Further, federal internal control standards emphasize the  importance of designing systems for obtaining information that help an  agency achieve its objectives. Without including key mass care providers  when estimating capabilities and naming them in their capabilities  assessments, grantees and FEMA may not collect reliable mass care  capability estimates, or know who to contact in response to a disaster.  States and localities may not be able to efficiently allocate their own  resources to areas of unmet need and may be more reliant on outside  resources during disaster response, which could have implications for the  allocation of federal resources.

FEMA Does Not Have a Systematic Process to Provide Feedback to Grantees on their Mass Care Capabilities Assessments

FEMA reviews grantees’ capabilities assessments using standard  checklists, but does not have a systematic process for providing feedback  to grantees on their submissions in order to improve the usefulness of the  information in them. FEMA officials use the checklists to assess the  completeness and reasonableness of the submissions. Specifically,  FEMA regional officials use the checklists to look for outliers,  inconsistencies, invalid information, and inputs that to do not align with  FEMA guidance or information that does not pass a “common sense”  check. For example, one 2018 checklist we reviewed included comments  from FEMA that the grantee’s capabilities assessment was only partially  “complete and reasonable” because it showed no gaps for most  capabilities, which might suggest that the targets it set are too low. FEMA  officials told us that if the checklist identifies shortcomings in a grantee’s  assessment, the regional office will send the assessment back to the  grantee and communicate what needs to be changed. However, regional  offices vary in their approaches to following up with grantees to obtain  more information when potential issues are identified, and FEMA has not  provided them with written guidance to standardize this feedback  process. FEMA officials from two regional offices told us that the  headquarters and regional preparedness divisions discussed follow-up  protocols by phone, but they did not provide documentation that identified  conditions or considerations for when to follow up with grantees or  provide feedback. As a result, grantees may not receive consistent  feedback from FEMA on their assessment of mass care capabilities and  the information provided may remain incomplete.

Rather than systematically providing feedback on the content of  capabilities assessments, FEMA officials told us that they focus on  identifying areas in which they can provide support to grantees. Their  view is that communities know more about their own capabilities than the  federal government does, and that it would not be appropriate to suggest  major changes to the submitted assessments. Officials from one FEMA  region said they view these submissions as self-assessments that are  used for maintaining relationships with states and to help states better  understand their capabilities and gaps. Officials also said that the FEMA  regional office or the national preparedness office, or both, examine  grantees’ disaster scenarios described in the assessments, the grantees’  self-assessed scores, and areas of grantee strengths and weaknesses to  determine how FEMA can better support them. FEMA officials said they  also phone grantees after each submission cycle to discuss challenges,  including how to improve FEMA’s technical assistance and support, and  how to make the process more useful for grantees. State officials we  spoke to said that especially since the 2017 hurricanes, they have  received more upfront guidance from FEMA than previously. Generally,  FEMA’s support to grantees includes published guidance, annotated  examples, technical assistance webinars, and a help desk for phone and  email assistance. In 2018, FEMA also began piloting readiness visits  where FEMA regional officials met with state and local grantees to  discuss capability gaps identified in their assessments, according to  officials.

However, officials from three of the six grantees included in our review  said that they did not receive key feedback from FEMA about their mass  care capabilities assessments that would have been useful. An official in  one state said it did not receive helpful feedback from FEMA prior to the  2017 hurricane season and, in particular, the official would have liked  FEMA to confirm whether the state had completed its assessment  correctly and completely, or if other information was needed. Officials  from another state said that they did not receive any substantive feedback  on their 2017 assessment. Officials from one urban area grantee said  they did not receive technical feedback on areas of least readiness, and  noted it would be helpful if FEMA could provide insight on the information  provided in cases where the grantee had assigned a low confidence level  in its capability assessment.

Officials from four of the six grantees we spoke with said they would like  additional clarity about the process from FEMA. For example, one state  official said that understanding how FEMA uses capabilities information  would have helped the grantee know how to improve its responses; get  other agencies to participate more in the process; and solicit better, more  tailored information from partners. This official noted that FEMA  addressed this issue in 2019 by sharing more information about how it  uses capabilities information. An official from another state said the  state preparedness office would like input about how to obtain information  from other agencies and how to assess capabilities at the local level.

FEMA has an opportunity to use its review of capability assessments to  improve its ability to assist with future disasters. After reviewing the 2018  submissions that used the new methodology, FEMA officials told us they  are planning to develop criteria for evaluating future submissions and  establish a regular process for providing feedback. By not systematically  following up with grantees thus far, FEMA limits the extent to which it can  build and supplement the emergency preparedness capabilities of these  grantees. According to FEMA, it routinely analyzes capabilities  assessment information for this purpose. FEMA has a strategic goal that  involves supporting emergency managers in building the capacity to self- evaluate, monitoring the completion of improvement actions, and sharing  insights. Providing feedback to grantees, including on the effective use  of capability assessments as well as potential pitfalls, may help grantees  develop their capability assessments and inform plans for how FEMA and  the grantee will respond to disasters. Without clear protocols for providing  feedback, grantees and FEMA may not possess complete, accurate, and  reliable information on communities’ mass care capabilities, which will  limit the effectiveness of the capability assessment process in contributing  to the goal of national preparedness.

The 2017 hurricane season presented unprecedented challenges for  mass care service providers, and for survivors in Florida, Puerto Rico,  Texas, and the U.S. Virgin Islands. While many partners coordinated  extensively on the mass care response to 2017 hurricanes, unmet needs  in sheltering, feeding, and supply distribution should spur FEMA and the  Red Cross to consider the sufficiency of current agreements, especially  with state and local governments. In particular, the 2017 hurricanes  highlighted the importance of state and local governments understanding  the services that mass care providers can deliver, particularly when  disasters are severe or overlapping. Without FEMA providing more  targeted guidance to help states and localities develop specific written  agreements with voluntary organizations providing mass care services,  expectations for what these organizations can provide may be unclear,  putting disaster victims at risk.

Moreover, without proactively considering the roles and responsibilities  that the federal disaster framework establishes for agencies and  organizations coordinating mass care, DHS lacks assurance that  responsibilities are assigned to the entities best suited to carry them out.  In addition, mass care coordination efforts during the 2017 hurricane  season illustrated the importance of appropriately sharing information  about capabilities and resources as part of advance preparation. During a  disaster, local community groups are often the most informed about  where needs exist, but also may not be connected with established mass  care partners. Further leveraging community groups could prove vital for  meeting mass care needs in a large-scale disaster, especially for the  most vulnerable populations.

FEMA does not explicitly require grantees to involve key mass care  providers in their capabilities assessments. This may make it difficult for  grantees to be well informed as to what they are actually capable of  delivering locally. Further, FEMA has not documented a consistent,  systematic approach to following up with partner governments on their  reporting of mass care capabilities, while some grantees have said that  additional feedback would be useful for preparedness and response  efforts. As a result, some grantees may be ill-prepared to meet the mass  care needs of the public during future disasters.

We are making a total of six recommendations, including the following  recommendation to the Secretary of Homeland Security:  To strengthen the mass care response to future disasters, the Secretary of Homeland Security should direct FEMA to periodically review the current structure of ESF-6 leadership roles and responsibilities for coordinating mass care. (Recommendation 1)

In addition, we are making the following four recommendations to the  FEMA Administrator:  To better clarify what mass care services voluntary organizations can provide, especially for severe or overlapping hurricanes, FEMA should strengthen its guidance to state and local governments to emphasize the importance of clearly defining roles and responsibilities related to mass care when state and local governments develop written agreements with partner organizations. This could include creating a guidance document or memo that calls attention to the issue and brings together existing resources, such as the Multi-Agency Feeding Plan Template and training materials, in a comprehensive and accessible manner. (Recommendation 2)

To ensure assistance reaches all survivors, FEMA should develop mechanisms for the agency and its partners to leverage local community groups, such as conducting regular outreach to communicate and share aggregate information with these groups. (Recommendation 3)

To ensure more accurate mass care capability assessments, FEMA should require grantees to solicit capabilities information from key mass care service-delivery providers in making capability estimates and identify these providers in their submissions. (Recommendation 4)

To build the emergency preparedness capabilities of grantees, FEMA should develop systematic, documented protocols to determine the conditions under which it will follow up and provide feedback to grantees about mass care capability assessments. (Recommendation 5)

We are also making the following recommendation to the American Red  Cross:  To ensure assistance reaches all survivors, Red Cross should develop mechanisms for it and its partners to leverage local community groups, such as conducting regular outreach to communicate and regularly share aggregate information with these groups. (Recommendation 6)

Agency Comments, Third-Party Views, and Our Evaluation

We provided a draft of this report to DHS and the American Red Cross  (Red Cross) for review and comment. DHS and American Red Cross  provided written comments, which are reproduced in appendices II and  III, and described below. In addition to its formal letter, DHS provided  technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. We also  provided relevant excerpts of the draft report to third parties, such as  state and local government agencies and voluntary organizations we  interviewed. These third parties provided technical comments, which we  incorporated as appropriate.

In its formal letter, DHS concurred with four of our recommendations and  did not concur with one recommendation. Specifically, DHS and FEMA  did not concur with our recommendation that FEMA should require  grantees to include key mass care service-delivery providers in making  capability estimates and identify these providers in their submissions. The  letter noted the importance of involving stakeholders and subject matter  experts at multiple levels of government and across sectors in order to  develop complete and accurate assessments. However, DHS and FEMA  said that requiring communities to include the key mass care providers in  capabilities assessments is not the most effective approach for achieving  this outcome. Because grantees cannot control which partners  participate, DHS and FEMA said implementing this recommendation  would increase the burden on grantees and could put certain  communities at a disadvantage. In addition, DHS and FEMA said that  because capabilities assessments are not limited to mass care, such a  requirement may have unintended consequences for other partners.  Instead, the letter stated that FEMA plans to continue working with the  mass care community to identify the best solution, including encouraging  collaboration at all levels of government.

We modified our recommendation to address their concern. Specifically,  we clarified that FEMA should require grantees to solicit information from  key mass care partners and to identify these partners in their submission.  This change acknowledges that grantees cannot compel partners to  participate, but they can, at a minimum, invite such partners to participate  in the process. We continue to believe that grantees should be required to  make an effort to include mass care providers in developing their mass  care capability assessments, as this is vital for developing high quality  assessments. FEMA has emphasized the importance of having an active  relationship and ongoing communication with key partners before  disasters strike. In its Strategic Plan, FEMA states that pre-disaster  coordination and communication among partners is critical to improve  response and recovery outcomes. Thus, we do not believe it would be an  undue burden to reach out to such partners as part of the capability  assessment process.

With regard to the remaining recommendations, DHS and FEMA  described steps they have taken or plan to take to address the issues  raised. While DHS concurred with recommendation 1 to direct FEMA to  periodically review the ESF-6 leadership roles and responsibilities, the  department considers this issue to be resolved because FEMA routinely  conducts after-action reports and recently established a working group  focused on performance metrics and corrective actions. We agree that  these actions are important parts of effectively overseeing and evaluating  ESF activities and results. While these efforts may address the  responsibilities of ESF agencies, they may overlook the overall leadership  roles of ESF agencies. In order to fully implement the recommendation,  DHS and FEMA would also need to establish a process for reviewing the  structure of ESF leadership roles on a regular basis.

In concurring with recommendation 3, DHS and FEMA detailed several  approaches they use to connect with local resources, including  collaborating with VOAD groups at national, state, and local levels, and  indicated that they consider this recommendation already implemented.  Given the information gathered from several unaffiliated organizations in  areas affected by the 2017 disasters, it is clear there is more work to be  done in terms of sharing critical information about mass care needs and  resources. Therefore, we continue to encourage FEMA to develop  additional mechanisms to enhance outreach to organizations that may not  be aware of existing approaches such as collaboration with the VOAD  groups.

Red Cross agreed with our recommendation to leverage local community  groups through outreach and information-sharing. Red Cross noted  several ongoing activities to engage such community groups and said the  organization intends to continue expanding outreach, data-sharing, and  engagement initiatives.

We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional  committees, the Secretary of Homeland Security, American Red Cross,  and other interested parties. In addition, the report is available at no  charge on the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov.

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact  me at (202) 512- 7215 or larink@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices  of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last  page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this report  are listed in appendix IV.

Appendix I: National Response Framework Emergency Support Function #6 (June 2016 version) Agencies and Responsibilities

Department of Homeland Security - Federal Emergency Management

Department of Homeland Security - Federal Emergency Management Support Agencies with Roles Directly Related to Mass Care  (Feeding, Sheltering, Supply Distribution, and Family Reunification):

Corporation for National and Community Service

Department of Defense/ U.S. Army Corps of Engineers

National Center for Missing & Exploited Children

National Voluntary Organizations Active in Disaster (National VOAD)

Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security

Appendix III: Comments from the American Red Cross

In addition to the contact named above, Scott Spicer (Assistant Director),  Amy Moran Lowe (Analyst-in-Charge), Grace Cho, and Michael Walton  made key contributions to this report. Also contributing to this report were  Joel Aldape, Aditi Archer, Susan Aschoff, James E. Bennett, Deirdre  Gleeson Brown, Alicia Cackley, Sarah Cornetto, Elizabeth Curda, Chris  Currie, Kelly DeMots, Erin Guinn-Villareal, Camille Henley, Denton  Herring, Sara Schibanoff Kelly, James Lawson, Matthew T. Lowney,  Sheila R. McCoy, Jean McSween, Amanda R. Parker, Sara Pelton,  Brenda Rabinowitz, Michelle Sager, Brian Schwartz, Almeta Spencer,  Manuel Valverde, Jr., and Su Jin Yon.

Disaster responders faced unprecedented demands for food and shelter after Hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and Maria hit within four weeks in 2017, according to FEMA.

FEMA and the Red Cross coordinate with state, local, and volunteer organizations to provide food and shelter after major disasters. We found that the agreements state and local governments made with response organizations didn’t always include information about their capacity to provide services. In some cases food and shelter needs were not met.

We made 6 recommendations aimed at improving the coordination of response activities and the measurement of response capabilities.