Missile Defense: Further Collaboration with the Intelligence Community Would Help MDA Keep Pace with Emerging Threats

MDA is developing missile defense capabilities to defend the United States, deployed forces, and regional allies from missile attacks. However, missile threats continue to emerge, as adversaries continue to improve and expand their missile capabilities.

The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 included a provision that GAO annually assess and report on the extent to which MDA has achieved its acquisition goals and objectives, and include any other findings and recommendations. This report is a public version of a classified report GAO issued in May 2019, which addresses (1) the challenges MDA and the defense intelligence community face in meeting the agency's threat assessment needs and (2) the extent to which MDA engages the defense intelligence community on missile defense acquisitions. GAO reviewed MDA's threat-related acquisition processes and interviewed relevant officials from the defense intelligence community, MDA, test community, and warfighters. Information deemed classified by DOD has been omitted.

The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) is experiencing delays getting the threat assessments needed to inform its acquisition decisions. Officials from the defense intelligence community—intelligence organizations within the Department of Defense (DOD)—told GAO this is because they are currently overextended due to an increased demand for threat assessments from a recent upsurge in threat missile activity, as well as uncertainties related to their transition to new threat processes and products. The delays are exacerbated because MDA does not collectively prioritize the various types of threat assessment requests submitted to the defense intelligence community or provide resources for unique requests, as other major defense acquisition programs are generally required to do. Without timely threat assessments, MDA risks making acquisition decisions for weapon systems using irrelevant or outdated threat information, which could result in performance shortfalls.

MDA has increased its outreach to the defense intelligence community over the past few years, but opportunities remain for further engagement on key threatrelated processes and decisions. Specifically, MDA provides the defense intelligence community with limited insight into how the agency uses threat assessments to inform its acquisition decisions. MDA is not required to obtain the defense intelligence community's input, and instead has discretion on the extent to which it engages the defense intelligence community. However, the defense intelligence community is uniquely positioned to assist MDA and its involvement is crucial for helping MDA keep pace with rapidly emerging threats. Moreover, this limited insight has, in part, prevented the defense intelligence community from validating the threat models MDA builds to test the performance of its weapon systems. Without validation, any flaws or bias in the threat models may go undetected, which can have significant implications on the performance of MDA's weapon systems. MDA and the defense intelligence community recently began discussing a more suitable level of involvement in the agency's acquisition processes and decisions.

Note: the threat missile coverage depicted is notional and not representative of MDA's actual threat coverage.

GAO is making three recommendations to improve how MDA: prioritizes and resources its threat assessment needs; obtains input from the defense intelligence community on key threat-related processes and decisions for missile defense acquisitions; and validates its threat models. DOD concurred with all three recommendations, citing actions it is already taking. While DOD has taken some positive steps, GAO believes more action is warranted.

The threat of ballistic missiles to the United States, deployed forces, and  regional allies continues to increase, as indicated by recent missile tests  by foreign adversaries that have demonstrated both increased capabilities  and the potential to reach the United States. Ultimately, the challenge for  the United States is how to contend with these foreign adversaries’ threat  capabilities, which are becoming more mobile, reliable, accurate, and  capable of achieving longer ranges. The Department of Defense’s (DOD)  Missile Defense Agency (MDA) is working to address this challenge by  developing the Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) to detect, track,  and defend against these threats to the homeland and abroad. MDA uses  information on foreign adversaries’ missile capabilities, which is primarily  derived from threat assessments prepared by the defense intelligence  community (Defense Intelligence Agency and the military services’  intelligence production centers), to inform its BMDS acquisition decisions.  Defense acquisition and intelligence leaders have recognized that greater  consideration of threat capabilities in design and testing decisions  throughout a weapon system’s lifecycle can reduce developmental costs  and operational risk. With today’s rapidly evolving threat capabilities, it is  not only fiscally prudent to ensure that weapon systems are informed by  defense intelligence community threat assessments, it is also vital to our  national security, as each decision shapes future defensive capabilities.

Various National Defense Authorization Acts since 2002 have included  provisions for us to prepare annual assessments of MDA’s progress  toward meeting its acquisition goals. Specifically, the National Defense  Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, as amended, included a provision  for us to report annually on the extent to which MDA has achieved its  acquisition goals and objectives, and include any other findings and  recommendations on MDA’s acquisition programs and accountability, as  appropriate. To date, we have issued 16 reports citing MDA’s progress  and challenges in developing and delivering the BMDS, including our most recent report issued in June 2019. For this review, we assessed (1)  what challenges, if any, MDA and the defense intelligence community  face in meeting the agency’s threat assessment needs and (2) the extent  to which MDA engages the defense intelligence community on BMDS  acquisition. This report is a public version of a classified report that we  issued May 1, 2019. DOD deemed some of the information in our May 1,  2019 report as classified, which must be protected from loss,  compromise, or inadvertent disclosure. Therefore, this report omits  classified information on specific foreign adversary threats or threat space  coverage by the BMDS. Although the information provided in this report is  more limited, the report addresses the same objectives as the classified  report and uses the same methodology.

To assess the challenges that MDA and the defense intelligence  community face in meeting the demands for threat assessments, we  reviewed summaries of meetings, requested responses from both MDA  and the defense intelligence community via a questionnaire, and  examined other documentary evidence. We compared this information to  GAO best practices on inter-governmental agency collaboration,  scheduling, and cost estimating. We also interviewed officials from the  defense intelligence community and MDA to better understand their  perspectives on past and current collaboration, challenges and workload,  and status and implications associated with recent revisions to threat  assessment policies and processes.

To evaluate the extent to which MDA engages the defense intelligence  community on BMDS acquisition, we identified the processes MDA has  established for using defense intelligence community threat assessments  to inform BMDS acquisition. To identify these processes, we reviewed  relevant DOD and MDA policies, agency engineering documents, and  briefings that either establish or provide overviews of the agency’s threat-  related requirements and processes, including threat model validation.  We assessed MDA’s implementation of its processes for incorporating  threat assessments into its acquisitions by comparing the threat  capabilities that the BMDS is being designed to defend against to those  projected by the defense intelligence community. We omitted information  on the threats that the BMDS is designed to defend against and other  detailed information on threat capabilities throughout this report because  it is classified. We discussed and corroborated our assessment of MDA’s  implementation of its processes with knowledgeable officials within MDA,  the defense intelligence community, DOD test and evaluation offices, the  military services, joint staff, and two major MDA contractors.

The performance audit upon which this report is based was conducted  from February 2018 to May 2019 in accordance with generally accepted  government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan  and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide  a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit  objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable  basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We  subsequently worked with DOD from May 2019 to December 2019 to  prepare this unclassified version for public release based on the original  classified report. This public version was also prepared in accordance  with these standards.

Ballistic missiles, which foreign adversaries generally use as a deterrent  or instrument of coercion, are becoming increasingly important weapons  to support military and political objectives. These weapons continue to  proliferate and show advances in mobility, reliability, in-flight  maneuverability, accuracy, and ability to reach longer distances.

According to the defense intelligence community, there has been a  dramatic increase in ballistic missile capabilities over the last decade, and  the over 20 countries that already possess ballistic missiles are likely to  pursue further expansions in their quantities and capabilities. Figure 1  shows the lineup of operational ballistic missiles from North Korea and  Iran, two of the various countries that pose threats to the United States  and its allies and are of concern to the BMDS.

Ballistic missile threats are generally categorized by their range (i.e.,  ground distance covered between the launch point and impact of the  missile) as shown in figure 2 below. The configuration of a ballistic  missile is also largely determined by the range a missile is expected to  travel. For example, longer range ballistic missiles typically have two or  three distinct sections, known as stages, that separate during flight and  each has an independent propulsion system to ensure the warhead  reaches its target. Shorter range ballistic missiles generally only have one  section, or a single stage, that remains intact until the warhead reaches  its intended target and detonates.

Ballistic missiles may also carry countermeasures or adversaries may  employ tactics and techniques, both of which are intended to confuse  missile defense systems. For example, countermeasures can include  penetration aids that are released during flight, such as decoys, which are  intended to complicate the ability of missile-tracking sensors and missile  defense interceptors to identify the warhead among the multiple objects.  Challenging tactics and techniques can include structured attacks, such  as simultaneously launching a number of missiles or outfitting a single  missile with multiple warheads. In addition, some newer missiles are  capable of traveling at greater speeds, performing maneuvers during all  phases of flight, and remaining in the atmosphere for longer durations of  their flight. These newer missiles, generally referred to as hypersonics,  possess a combination of high speed, maneuverability, and relatively low  altitude that can make them a challenging target for missile defense  systems to track and engage. According to a publicly released  intelligence assessment, nearly all adversaries that possess ballistic  missiles have devised various means to confuse missile defense  systems.

Defense Intelligence Community’s Roles in Assessing Missile Threats and Supporting MDA Acquisitions

In November 2010, the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) established  the Defense Intelligence Ballistic Missile Analysis Committee (DIBMAC)  to oversee and coordinate intelligence analysis and threat assessment  production activities pertaining to foreign ballistic missile developments.  Under the leadership of this committee, the defense intelligence  community performs important stakeholder, advisor, and oversight  functions in support of MDA’s acquisitions by (1) producing threat  assessments; (2) providing advice on important threat-related issues  pertaining to BMDS acquisition; and (3) validating threat models and  reports. Table 1 provides further explanation of these roles and additional  information on the defense intelligence community is in appendix I.

In November 2013, DOD’s acquisition leadership issued a memorandum  that requested DIA work with the acquisition community to produce more  timely, relevant, and dynamic defense intelligence community threat  assessments for DOD acquisition programs. The memorandum notes  that DOD acquisition program officials expressed concerns about the  timeliness of threat assessments due to the lengthy process and varying  timelines that sometimes left them with threat assessments that did not  contain the most up-to-date information. In addition, the defense  intelligence community noted its concerns with the significant duplication  in producing certain threat assessments, which placed a huge burden on  its manpower and resources. Consequently, DOD leadership directed the  acquisition customers and defense intelligence community to work  together to improve threat assessments and in 2016 the defense  intelligence community set forth its planned revisions to threat  assessment processes and products. Subsequent revisions include  creating a library of threat modules and replacing a former type of threat  assessment with a new Validated Online Lifecycle Threat (VOLT) report,  among others. These revisions were codified in the defense intelligence  community’s policies in September 2016 and in DOD policy in August  2017. However, defense intelligence community officials noted that they  are still in the process of implementing these revisions.

MDA’s Responsibility for Defending Against Ballistic Missile Threats

MDA is developing a variety of missile defense systems, known as  elements, including sensors, interceptors, and battle management and  communication capabilities. The ultimate goal is to integrate these various  elements to function as a layered system called the Ballistic Missile  Defense System (BMDS). The BMDS elements, when integrated, are  designed to destroy enemy missiles of various ranges, speeds, sizes, and  performance characteristics in different phases of flight, as seen in figure  3 below.

When MDA was established in 2002, the agency was granted exceptional  flexibilities to diverge from DOD’s traditional acquisition lifecycle and defer  the application of acquisition policies and laws designed to facilitate  oversight and accountability until a mature capability is ready to be  handed over to a military service for production and operational use. In  particular, MDA was exempted from DOD’s standard requirements-setting  process and instead uses a unique and flexible requirements-setting  process that is intended to enable MDA to quickly develop and field useful  but limited capabilities, which can be incrementally improved over time  and adapted to address changes in the threat.

MDA also implemented a tailored process that is intended to use defense  intelligence community threat assessments in a way that enables the  BMDS to defend against a broad range of uncertain and evolving threats.  MDA uses defense intelligence community threat assessments as the  foundation for developing threat models and establishing wide-ranging  critical threat parameters upon which to design, develop, and test the  BMDS. Specifically, MDA’s process includes the following:

Design: MDA uses threat assessments to select a set of threat  models in which it incrementally designs BMDS capabilities to defend  against. MDA combines the capabilities from the selected threat  models into parameters, forming what MDA refers to as the  “parametric threat space.” MDA assigns subsets of the threat space to  each of the BMDS elements to inform the design of their respective  systems.

Development: MDA assigns specific threat models to each of the  elements for use in simulations as they are undergoing development.  MDA uses these threat models to verify that the element’s system  design has the capability necessary to defend against its assigned  threat space.

Test: Toward the end of BMDS element development, MDA  coordinates with the warfighter and test and evaluation communities  to select specific threat models for use in testing to assess the  performance of the BMDS elements. MDA also uses its threat models  to prepare for flight tests to help ensure that the BMDS elements have  a high probability of achieving their test objectives, such as  successfully intercepting the target.

Operational capability: MDA uses its threat models as the  foundation for algorithms, which are embedded into the BMDS to  enable its sensors and interceptors to determine which object(s)  amongst a group of objects (e.g., countermeasures, debris, etc.) is  lethal. This capability is referred to as “discrimination.”

Mounting Challenges Are Delaying the Availability of Threat Assessments, but Opportunities Exist to Help MDA Receive the Information It Needs

Various challenges have recently emerged that have affected the  availability of the threat assessments MDA needs to inform the agency’s  acquisition decisions. Challenges include an upsurge in threat missile  activity, which has increased the overall demand for threat assessments;  a transition period as the defense intelligence community works through  how to implement recent revisions to its processes and products; and  MDA’s request for accelerated support from the defense intelligence  community. Defense intelligence community officials say they are  contending with all of these challenges without the provision of additional  manpower or resources. Consequently, defense intelligence community  officials have stated that their manpower and resources are constrained,  which can affect the timely delivery of threat assessments to customers,  such as MDA. If MDA does not have the threat information it needs when  it is needed, the delay of information could result in setbacks for the  agency’s weapon system design, development, and testing, or could put  the agency in the position of moving forward without the requisite  information, thereby increasing the risk of performance shortfalls and  costly retrofits. However, MDA has opportunities to mitigate these  challenges by collectively prioritizing its threat assessment requests and  working through existing venues with the defense intelligence community  to determine what additional resources may be needed to secure the  accelerated support that it needs.

Various Challenges Are Delaying the Availability of Defense Intelligence Community Threat Assessments MDA Uses for Acquisition Design and Testing Decisions

One challenge for the defense intelligence community is a recent upsurge  in threat missile activity, which has increased MDA’s requests for threat  assessments. For example, ballistic missile flight testing has more than  doubled from 2005 to 2016, from about 70 tests in 2005 to nearly 180  tests in 2016, and the most notable increases have occurred since 2010  (see figure 4).

This upsurge of threat missile activity increases the urgency for the  defense intelligence community to provide the requisite type of threat  assessments to MDA to enable the agency to counter and defeat such  threats; however, defense intelligence community officials have said that  manpower and resource constraints have limited their ability to do so. In  2016, we reported on how the defense intelligence community’s  manpower and resource constraints have impacted its ability to provide  threat assessments. Since then, defense intelligence community  officials have said that the manpower and resource constraints have not  been resolved, but threat missile activity has increased. For example,  some countries have recently displayed or flight tested new threat  missiles capable of reaching the United States. When new threat missiles  emerge, MDA requests missile-specific threat assessments—known as  reference documents—from the defense intelligence community to  understand their size, performance characteristics, and signature when  detected by a sensor. This detailed information on the threat missiles  enables MDA to build the threat models used to design, develop, and test  BMDS weapon systems.

Defense intelligence community officials have said that, although  important, missile-specific threat assessments utilize considerable  manpower and resources because they can be labor-intensive, lengthy,  and take months, and at times a year or longer, to prepare. According to  these officials, one way to minimize the workload and shorten the  preparation timeframe is for MDA to differentiate the specific information  that it needs from anything that might be extraneous. As a simplified and  hypothetical example, defense intelligence community officials explained  that MDA may only need some simple, general information about a  missile or conversely it may need complex, highly-detailed information on  everything about the missile from tip to tail. The amount of time and effort  it would take defense intelligence community officials to gather the  information in these two scenarios would vary significantly. MDA officials  have acknowledged that some extraneous information may be gathered  and included in these threat assessments but noted that, at the time they  request a threat assessment, they may not yet fully understand what  information is essential for their purposes. Therefore, they prefer to have  as much information as possible, with the ability to determine whether  and how to use it. Defense intelligence community officials, however, told  us that they believe this is an inefficient use of their manpower and  resources, especially given current constraints.

Another challenge for the defense intelligence community is the  implementation of recent revisions to its threat assessment processes  and products, which apply to all DOD acquisition programs. In 2016, in  response to the November 2013 memorandum from DOD’s acquisition  leadership, the defense intelligence community began overhauling its  threat assessment processes and products to produce more timely,  efficient, and relevant information. See table 2 for an overview of these  revisions.

While each of these revisions has potential benefits, defense intelligence  community officials have said that implementing the revisions has been  more time-consuming and difficult than anticipated, which has affected  their ability to provide certain threat assessments to MDA when needed.  For example, MDA and the defense intelligence community were initially  uncertain about the responsibilities and processes for creating a VOLT  report for the BMDS. Although it took some time to resolve these  uncertainties, MDA is now compiling its own country-specific threat  assessments—known as the BMDS VOLT report—which DIA then  validates. The military services generally have their own defense  intelligence production centers, and therefore, a means for compiling  VOLT reports. MDA, however, uses information from multiple defense  intelligence production centers and does not possess its own production  center. In September 2017, MDA reached out to DIA on this matter and  DIA responded that, per the DOD policy update, it does not see anything  that would preclude MDA, as a DOD component, from compiling VOLT  reports. DIA stated that MDA compiling its own VOLT report aligns the  agency with the rest of the DOD acquisition community.

MDA is waiting on threat modules from the defense intelligence  community to prepare its preliminary BMDS VOLT report, which MDA will  use to inform acquisition decisions. MDA needs specific threat modules  from the defense intelligence community, including those for six specific  countries, in order to compile its preliminary BMDS VOLT report.  However, defense intelligence community officials have said that they are  still in the process of creating some of the digitized threat modules MDA  needs, because it has taken more time and effort than they expected to  standardize the threat modules’ content and coordinate production across  multiple defense intelligence community production centers.  Consequently, MDA is planning to publish its preliminary BMDS VOLT  report in 2019 (table 3).

In the meantime, without the preliminary BMDS VOLT report or digitized  threat modules used to compile the BMDS VOLT report, MDA is reliant on  threat assessments written between 2014 and 2016 for some of its  acquisition decisions. For example, MDA recently made design decisions  for certain BMDS elements using these threat assessments, although  these threat assessments have not yet been updated. Consequently,  these weapon systems that MDA recently made design decisions for  could have capability gaps or performance shortfalls that present risks for  the warfighter. MDA has attempted to fill the void for digitized threat  modules and the preliminary BMDS VOLT report by submitting ad hoc  requests for threat assessments to the defense intelligence community,  but this has only added to the defense intelligence community’s workload  and exacerbated delays.

Request for Accelerated Delivery of Threat Modules

Moving forward, MDA has asked the defense intelligence community to  provide the digitized threat modules on an accelerated schedule to  ensure the agency can compile BMDS VOLT reports in a timely manner  to inform its acquisition decisions; however, some defense intelligence  production centers have said that an accelerated schedule will be difficult,  if not impossible, without additional manpower and resources.  Specifically, MDA wants the defense intelligence community to provide  the digitized threat modules every year, as opposed to every two years as  required by DOD policy. MDA has stressed the importance of having  these digitized threat modules on an accelerated schedule in order to be  responsive to threat advancements and mitigate the potential for  capability gaps or performance shortfalls in its weapon systems. Defense  intelligence community officials have acknowledged MDA’s need to have  the digitized threat modules on an accelerated schedule but are  concerned about their ability to provide them due to personnel and  resourcing issues at some defense intelligence production centers. For  example, two defense intelligence production centers have said that  MDA’s request for an accelerated schedule is currently unrealistic due to  their manpower and resource levels. Defense intelligence officials have  said that once the initial digitized threat modules are created, the threat  modules will be easier and quicker to update, but whether they can  provide them annually is still being determined.

Opportunities Exist That Could Help MDA and the Defense Intelligence Community Address Threat Assessment Availability Challenges

Although MDA has the capability to centrally and collectively prioritize its  threat assessment requests submitted to the defense intelligence  community, it currently prioritizes its threat assessment needs through  two distinct, individual lanes—country-specific and missile-specific— supplemented by informal discussions with the defense intelligence  community. According to MDA, the individual lanes are as follows:  1.  Country-specific threat assessments (i.e., threat modules for  BMDS VOLT reports) are prioritized via the VOLT Threat Steering  Group, which is co-chaired by MDA and DIA. The VOLT Threat  Steering Group’s objectives are to determine MDA’s threat module  requirements, to achieve concurrence on the threat modules used in  the BMDS VOLT report, and to review the BMDS VOLT production  schedule. The first VOLT Threat Steering Group meeting was held in  April 2018 and during that meeting, MDA presented its prioritized list  of threat assessments by adversary country to the defense  intelligence community personnel in attendance.  2.  Missile-specific threat assessments (i.e., reference documents  used to build threat models) are prioritized via an annual intelligence  mission data process managed by the Joint Staff. Through the  intelligence mission data process, MDA prioritizes the data it needs  for threat missiles by most to least critical—119 total threat missiles in  2018.

With these two individual lanes for prioritization, MDA treats each type of  threat assessment as independent and unrelated. According to MDA, the  agency maintains these individual lanes for prioritizing its threat  assessment requests because the requests can be more easily managed  by the defense intelligence community components that develop the  threat assessments. For example, MDA stated that requests for  missile-specific threat assessments are often routed to intelligence  production centers while requests for country-specific threat assessments  are often routed to DIA’s regional centers (see appendix I for more  information on defense intelligence community components). According  to MDA, the vast majority of new requirements submitted to the defense  intelligence community are also accompanied by an informal verbal  discussion and if MDA’s priorities shift because a new threat emerges,  MDA stated that it can convey that shift to the defense intelligence  community in an effort to work out the best path forward.

If the defense intelligence community cannot meet MDA’s needs, MDA  stated that it works with the defense intelligence community to determine  the best course of action for resolving prioritization issues. For example,  MDA cited a recent example where it had worked with the U.S. Navy’s  Office of Naval Intelligence to develop a threat model production schedule  for two threat systems; however, the emergence of a new threat shifted  MDA’s priorities. MDA was able to understand the effect of choosing one  system ahead of the others based on the priority and projected production  timelines. MDA cited another recent example where it had similarly  worked with the U.S. Air Force’s National Air and Space Intelligence  Center to prioritize production of a threat model for a new, unique threat.  After some initial informal discussions and questions about whether the  threat model production effort was a top priority for MDA, both agreed in a  meeting in January 2019 to lower the priority for the model production  effort. The specific threats referenced in the examples above have been  omitted because they are classified.

However, MDA’s approach of prioritizing its threat assessment needs  through individual lanes creates the potential for unresolved, competing  priorities because the defense intelligence community produces threat  assessments collaboratively rather than disparately. Defense intelligence  community officials told us that the underlying analyses that support both  country-specific and missile-specific threat assessments are developed  and reviewed by many of the same subject matter experts and managers  within the defense intelligence community. Defense intelligence  community officials told us that they have no way of knowing whether the  information to build a specific threat model is a greater or lesser priority  than updating a particular threat module needed to support the BMDS  VOLT report. Our prior best practices work found that successful  commercial companies employ a formal process for prioritizing their  investments collectively rather than as independent and unrelated  initiatives. MDA instead stovepipes its threat assessment prioritization  through individual lanes and informally discusses its collective priorities  with the defense intelligence community. Consequently, MDA’s requests,  and resulting output from the defense intelligence community, may not be  based on the collective order of importance, as depicted in figure 5.

MDA relies on both country- and missile-specific threat assessments for  its acquisitions, as each characterizes threats in unique ways and for  different purposes, and it uses other requests to fill information gaps, as  needed. Thus, all of MDA’s requests are important, but one among them  may be the most important or urgent due to the timing of an upcoming  design or testing decision. In the example illustrated above in figure 5, the  most important request is for a country-specific threat assessment;  however, it will not likely be the next one out of the defense intelligence  community’s queue because there is a missile-specific request ahead of  it. Hence, MDA may have the information it needs to build the threat  model used to test one weapon system’s performance, but it may delay  the country-specific information it needs to make design decisions for  another. This delay in the country-specific information could put MDA in a  position of moving forward with design decisions without the requisite  information or relying on outdated information, which increases the risk  for performance shortfalls and costly retrofits.

One opportunity that MDA has to address the availability of threat  assessments from the defense intelligence community is to collectively  prioritize its threat assessment requests based on the order of  importance. We have previously identified collective prioritization as a  best practice—specifically, that it is important for an agency to regularly  evaluate the totality of its needs or tasks, to determine whether specific  ones should be prioritized ahead of others, based on the costs, benefits,  and risks. While MDA has no formal requirement to collectively prioritize  its threat assessment requests, defense intelligence community officials  said that they have had discussions with MDA through existing venues  and requested that it do so to ensure it has the most urgently needed  information.

MDA has the capability to collectively prioritize its threat assessment  requests because all of the requests go through a centralized intelligence  requirements group within the agency’s engineering directorate. This  group has insight into the totality of the agency’s threat assessment  requests and is uniquely positioned to make determinations about the  order of importance among them. As the group submits requests to the  defense intelligence community, the defense intelligence community  responds to the requests in the order that they were received, because,  as we previously found, the defense intelligence community is not  required to prioritize the requests, does not currently possess the  capability to do so, and would not be in a position to dictate to an agency  what is most important.

Another opportunity for MDA to address the availability of threat  assessments is through further collaboration with the defense intelligence  community to determine the extent of additional resources that would be  needed to enable accelerated support. When intelligence support  requirements exceed the defense intelligence community’s  responsibilities, DOD acquisition programs are generally required to  account for resources to augment intelligence support. For example,  according to defense intelligence community officials, the Air Force is  providing one of the defense intelligence community’s production centers  with additional resources to collect data and devise tools primarily to  support a specific major defense acquisition program via a military  interdepartmental purchase request because the program’s request  exceeds the defense intelligence community’s responsibilities.  According to MDA, intelligence mission data shortfalls are currently  identified through an annual departmental review process. MDA stated  that in fiscal year 2019 DOD approved budgeting additional funding in the  future to help address intelligence mission data shortfalls for all of the  military services, including MDA.

MDA has not provided the defense intelligence community with additional  resources for an accelerated schedule to update threat modules more  frequently. MDA has requested that the defense intelligence community  update the digitized threat modules it needs to compile a BMDS VOLT  report every year to ensure that it has the updated threat information  needed for acquisition decisions; however, the defense intelligence  community is only required to update the digitized threat modules every  two years. Some defense intelligence community officials have  acknowledged MDA’s need to have an accelerated schedule, but have  communicated to MDA that given its current manpower and resource constraints, the accelerated schedule is unrealistic without additional  resources. Thus, MDA’s request for the defense intelligence community  to update the digitized threat modules faster exceeds what the defense  intelligence community is currently able to do given its manpower and  resource constraints.

With existing venues, like the VOLT Threat Steering Group, MDA and the  defense intelligence community have a forum to further collaborate and  identify what additional resources are needed and the potential funding  scenarios to support an accelerated schedule for threat module  production. Without collaboration through these existing venues, MDA  and the defense intelligence community may not be utilizing an available  method to ensure their individual needs are met. According to our best  practices for inter-governmental agency collaboration, it is important for  the inter-reliant agencies to collaboratively identify the resources— information, manpower, and funding—needed to accomplish their  respective missions. Doing so enables the agencies to have a common  understanding and explore opportunities to leverage each other’s  resources; thus, realizing benefits that would not be available if they were  working separately. Therefore, working together, MDA and the defense  intelligence community would be better positioned to determine how to  best meet their respective needs.

Opportunities Exist for MDA to Further Engage the Defense Intelligence Community on BMDS Acquisition to Address the Challenges of Keeping Pace with the Threat

MDA uses defense intelligence community threat assessments to inform  its acquisitions, but the agency has not fully engaged the defense  intelligence community on challenges in preparing the BMDS for existing  and emerging threats. According to MDA, the rapid pace of threat  evolution presents significant challenges for the agency to sufficiently  plan for emerging threats. Although the defense intelligence community is  uniquely positioned to assist MDA in addressing these challenges, the  agency generally limits the defense intelligence community’s insight into  and input on critical threat-related BMDS acquisition processes and  decisions, such as establishing the BMDS threat space and assigning  threat parameters and threat models to BMDS elements. Major defense  acquisition programs are generally required to engage the defense  intelligence community on how to design and test weapon systems, but  MDA generally does not, due to the acquisition flexibilities DOD has  granted to the agency. Moreover, DIA is currently unable to validate  MDA’s threat models, as required by DOD policy, because MDA does not  follow the department’s best practices on models and simulations. MDA  has steadily increased its outreach to the defense intelligence community  and other stakeholders over the past few years, but opportunities remain  for more comprehensive engagement on key challenges the agency  faces with keeping pace with the threat.

MDA Faces Challenges in Preparing the BMDS for Existing and Emerging Threats

According to MDA, the rapid pace of threat evolution presents significant  challenges for the agency to sufficiently plan for emerging threats. MDA  currently faces some difficult choices regarding what steps it needs to  take and in what order to address recent threat advancements. In making  these decisions, MDA has an opportunity to engage the defense  intelligence community on whether and how it should make changes to  the BMDS threat space, threat parameters, and threat models the agency  uses as design requirements and test cases for BMDS elements. As  previously noted, the defense intelligence community plays important  stakeholder, advisor, and oversight roles for MDA’s acquisitions. Although  the department has provided MDA with flexibilities on following many of  the requirements that specifically define when and how major defense  acquisition programs are to engage the defense intelligence community,  DOD policy requires MDA to vet its threat models and consult with the  defense intelligence community on threat-related acquisition matters.

DOD, senior defense officials, and expert panels supported by DOD have  consistently maintained that the defense intelligence community’s direct  involvement in MDA’s acquisitions is critical to staying ahead of the  threat:  In a written response following a 2002 congressional hearing, a senior  defense official stated that every effort was being made to coordinate  development of the document establishing the BMDS threat space  with the defense intelligence community and that the defense  intelligence community’s participation was critical to the agency’s  success.

In 2010, DOD’s Ballistic Missile Defense Review similarly found the  need to maintain a strong focus by the defense intelligence  community on the ballistic missile threat and that accurate and timely  intelligence should play a vital role in informing BMDS planning.

In 2010, an expert panel known as JASON (not an acronym) found  that MDA lacked sufficient plans for improving discrimination and that  the agency risked falling behind the evolution of the threat’s  countermeasure capabilities. The study recommended that DOD  form stronger two-way connections between MDA and defense  intelligence agencies.

In 2012, the National Research Council found that MDA did not follow  through on efforts to improve discrimination and that much of the  agency’s expertise on discrimination was lost in the late 2000s. The  study recommended that MDA seek assistance from experts with  experience in understanding sensor data for threat missiles.

In 2018, DOD’s National Defense Strategy stated that modernizing  missile defense, among other items, was necessary to keep pace with  adversaries and that the department must expand the role of  intelligence analysis throughout the acquisition process in order to  streamline rapid, iterative approaches for delivering performance at  what DOD refers to as “the speed of relevance.”

During a 2018 congressional hearing, the Under Secretary of Defense  for Research and Engineering stated that catching up to near-peer  adversaries in missile defense can be achieved by exceeding their  technical capabilities and that the intelligence community was critical  to making sure that we are outpacing our adversaries.

MDA Limits the Defense Intelligence Community’s Insight Into and Input on Some Critical Threat- Related BMDS Acquisition Processes and Decisions

Although MDA uses defense intelligence community threat assessments  to inform BMDS acquisition, the defense intelligence community generally  has limited insight into the BMDS, which is unprecedented among major  defense acquisition programs. When MDA was established in 2002, DOD  granted the agency exceptional flexibilities to diverge from the standard  acquisition framework that most major defense acquisition programs  follow. These flexibilities enable MDA to forego obtaining the defense  intelligence community’s input on some critical threat-related BMDS  acquisition processes and decisions, such as how MDA establishes the:  threat space that informs overall BMDS design and development;  threat parameters assigned to each BMDS element as design  requirements; and  threat models assigned to each BMDS element as test cases for  design reviews and testing.

However, according to MDA, the new BMDS VOLT report will serve as  the source document for specific details on the BMDS threat space, threat  parameters, and threat models.

Although MDA may leverage the defense intelligence community’s threat  assessments, MDA has not included the defense intelligence community  in these key threat-related BMDS acquisition processes and decisions.  For example, in response to a questionnaire we sent to MDA in May  2018, agency officials stated that decisions related to the threat  parameters it assigns to the different BMDS elements should be left to  MDA, as it is within the agency’s purview and authority to design threats  as it deems necessary for research, development, test, and evaluation  purposes. Moreover, MDA indicated that the defense intelligence  community should provide the agency with the best intelligence  information on adversary missile capabilities, in a timely manner, to  support the agency’s mission. As such, MDA stated it does not support  obtaining the defense intelligence community’s concurrence on the threat  parameters it assigns to the BMDS elements.

MDA has provided the defense intelligence community with some insight  into the BMDS but not to the same extent DOD generally requires of  major defense acquisition programs. For example, MDA has held a  number of “immersion days” over the past nine years, which allow the  defense intelligence community to receive briefings from MDA programs  on priorities, future developments, and weapon system operations.  According to MDA, it also assigns intelligence portfolio managers to  BMDS elements and their mission, among other items, is to keep the  defense intelligence community informed on key program developments  and how intelligence feeds into the agency’s threat-related acquisition  processes and decisions. In addition, MDA has briefed the DIBMAC on  how it uses threat assessments to inform BMDS acquisition. However,  defense intelligence community officials stated that they generally lack  fundamental information on the BMDS and have no visibility into the  BMDS threat space, threat parameters, or test cases MDA assigns to the  BMDS elements.

In contrast, for most major defense acquisition programs, the defense  intelligence community is integrally involved in determining the:  threat(s) of record upon which requirements of the weapon system  are based;  key performance parameters and attributes of the weapon system;  threat parameters that could critically degrade or negate the weapon  system; and operational threat environment the weapon system is tested against.

These insights, enabled by DOD’s standard requirements-setting process  and acquisition framework, are intended to provide the defense  intelligence community with in-depth knowledge of the design and  performance requirements for most major DOD weapon systems.

Officials from other various organizations we met with, such as the Joint  Staff, contractors, warfighters, and test and evaluation, expressed  concerns about MDA’s ability to unilaterally define the threats it designs  the BMDS against. As one MDA prime contractor told us, what really  matters is how the BMDS would perform in the real world against real  threats. Defense intelligence community officials acknowledged that  MDA, as the BMDS developer, has a legitimate need to explore threat  capabilities beyond those that the intelligence community has observed  from specific adversaries. However, defense intelligence community  officials rejected a sentiment expressed to us by MDA officials that the  defense intelligence community lacks expertise in understanding the  bounds of threat capabilities. To the contrary, according to defense  intelligence community officials, this is exactly the type of analysis at  which the defense intelligence community excels. In choosing not to  engage the defense intelligence community on these key threat-related  BMDS acquisition processes and decisions, MDA runs the risk of not  sufficiently planning for existing and emerging threats.

MDA’s reluctance to provide the defense intelligence community with  insight into or input on some threat-related BMDS acquisition processes  and decisions is consistent with how MDA has engaged other DOD  stakeholders and oversight groups. Our prior work on defense  acquisitions has shown that establishing buy-in from decision makers is a  key enabler of achieving better acquisition outcomes because DOD  components provide varying perspectives due to their unique areas of  expertise and experience. However, in May 2017, we found that MDA  generally limits the warfighter’s input on the requirements it pursues and  overlooked stakeholder concerns on the acquisition strategy for a  redesigned kill vehicle for the Ground-based Midcourse Defense  system. We made recommendations aimed at increasing stakeholder  engagement and oversight in BMDS acquisition, such as coordinating  operational requirements with the warfighter and obtaining input from  DOD’s Office for Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation (CAPE) on  acquisition strategies for new efforts. DOD’s acting Assistant Secretary of  Defense (Acquisitions) did not concur with the recommendations, stating  that warfighters lacked the skillset to determine operational BMDS  requirements and existing DOD policy does not require MDA to obtain  CAPE’s concurrence on acquisition policies. We continue to maintain that  DOD should implement the recommendations.

DIA Is Currently Unable to Validate MDA’s Threat Models, as Generally Required by DOD Policy

MDA builds its own threat models to support BMDS design, development,  and testing but it does not validate its threat models with DIA, which is  inconsistent with DOD policy and best practices. Although the defense  intelligence community builds threat models, MDA cannot currently use  those models as-is because they are generally not compatible with MDA’s  modeling and simulation framework. Even with MDA using its own  threat models, DOT&E has found that integrating the various BMDS  models and presenting them with a common threat scene has been an  extremely challenging task for MDA. Moreover, MDA’s BMDS modeling  and simulation architecture requires highly detailed threat models for  simulations to function properly. Defense intelligence community officials  stated that they generally do not need the same level of detail MDA  requires for the types of analyses the defense intelligence community  performs. In addition, according to a March 2018 MDA memorandum, the  agency was previously told by representatives of the DIBMAC that they  do not have the staff or resources to produce the high volumes of detailed  threat models that MDA needs to support BMDS development and  testing. Therefore, MDA continues to build its own threat models for use  in BMDS development and testing.

MDA uses defense intelligence community threat assessments to build its  threat models, but independent evaluators have not been able to fully  trace MDA’s threat models to defense intelligence community threat  assessments. According to a briefing MDA presented to the defense  intelligence community in September 2018, every target, model, and test  can be traced back to defense intelligence data. However, in August  2018, the U.S. Army issued a memorandum for MDA stating that the  BMDS Operational Test Agency (OTA)—the agency responsible for  independently analyzing the verification and validation data for models  used in operational testing—was only able to certify some of the threat  models used in a recent ground test. In other ground tests, though, the  BMDS OTA was able to trace MDA’s threat models back to defense  intelligence community threat assessments. In February 2019, DOT&E  reported that (a) credible threat models are the linchpins of BMDS models  and simulation; (b) reducing threat model uncertainty is a high priority;  and (c) MDA and the BMDS OTA should ensure that MDA-developed  threat models are representative of the defense intelligence community’s  understanding of the threat.

MDA also has not implemented best practices established by DOD’s  Models and Simulation Coordination Office that would enable DIA to be in  a position to validate MDA’s threat models. According to DOD best  practices on modeling and simulation, the validation agent should: (1) be  brought on in the beginning of the modeling and simulation development  process; (2) work closely with the model developers as the models are  built and tested; and (3) perform validation as a continuing activity of the  overall process of developing and preparing a model for use or reuse in a  simulation. Conversely, defense intelligence community officials stated  that they lack sufficient insight into and input on how MDA builds and  uses threat models. For example, the defense intelligence community has  emphasized to MDA that caveats need to be carried through with the  model data and voiced concerns about the engineering judgments the  agency makes in its threat models, because these judgments could lead  to the BMDS performing well or poorly for reasons not based on the  actual threat. Given these uncertainties and the defense intelligence  community’s lack of insight into the purposes for which MDA uses its  threat models, DIA lacks the insight and input necessary to validate  MDA’s threat models.

Although MDA has previously expressed interest in validating its threat  models with the defense intelligence community, long-standing obstacles  remain. During a May 2018 meeting between MDA and the DIBMAC,  defense intelligence community officials identified the lessons they have  learned from working with other acquisition programs to validate threat  models. Model validation can be achieved if the acquisition program: establishes a partnership with the defense intelligence community; prioritizes its threat modeling needs;  recognizes there are limits to how many threat models can be built in  a given time; provides in-depth insight into its threat modeling needs and weapon  system’s capabilities; discusses how the models will be applied;  jointly defines model acceptance criteria early in the process; provides resources, including funding and staff; and  invests in the defense intelligence community’s capability and  capacity.

MDA officials stated that the agency desires to have its threat models  validated but noted that the defense intelligence community does not  validate models produced by other organizations. MDA officials also  emphasized that the defense intelligence community cannot meet MDA’s  timeline for building threat models, whereas the agency can. In addition,  MDA officials indicated to us that they do not believe it is practical to  provide the amount of insight defense intelligence community officials told  us they would need in order to validate MDA’s threat models. MDA  officials told us that the only way in which the defense intelligence  community could obtain such insight is by being co-located with MDA’s  threat modelers as the models are being built. However, the 2010 JASON  study found that this type of close working arrangement between MDA  engineers and defense intelligence analysts is necessary to effectively  plan for emerging threats. Defense intelligence community officials also  clarified for MDA that the defense intelligence community can validate  models produced by another agency but it would require the defense  intelligence community having detailed knowledge of everything used to  produce the model.

As a result, although DOD policy generally requires that threat models  used to support acquisition decisions be validated by DIA, MDA has yet to  validate any of the numerous threat models it has developed since  2004. Without independent validation, MDA runs the risk that DOD and  congressional decisionmakers may not have confidence that the agency’s  plans and proposals for developing the BMDS are appropriate and  sufficient to address the threat because any flaws or bias in MDA’s threat  models can have significant implications on the BMDS’s overall  performance. According to a Federally Funded Research and  Development Center publication describing its efforts supporting MDA  threat modeling, acquisition influences can place pressure on MDA threat  modelers to tailor the missile threats to suit the currently feasible BMDS  design. In May 2017, we found a parallel circumstance where, in the  absence of warfighter validation of MDA-established requirements, the  agency made critical design choices for three new BMDS efforts. These  design choices reflected the needs and preferences of MDA ahead of the  warfighter, potentially compromising performance to the extent of not  being able to defeat current and future threats.

MDA Has Steadily Increased Its Outreach to DOD Stakeholders Over the Past Few Years, but Opportunities Remain for Further Engagement

MDA has undertaken a number of efforts over the past few years to  generally increase stakeholder involvement in BMDS acquisition. The  engagement efforts, in large part, are a result of efforts led by MDA’s  previous director to improve the agency’s relationship with department  stakeholders. In addition to previously serving as the Deputy Director for  MDA, the Director also held a variety of assignments in operational,  acquisition, and staff units within DOD. When we met with the MDA  Director in March 2018, he told us that he wanted to change the agency’s  culture of limiting stakeholder input, noting that he had recently provided  updated guidance to his leadership team and agency personnel on  bringing stakeholders in early, engaging them more frequently and  substantively, and ensuring that the agency has obtained their buy-in on  major undertakings. The MDA Director also stated that he was willing to  take some actions that could effectively address a recommendation we  made in May 2017 intended to provide the warfighter with greater input on  operational requirements for ballistic missile defense. Officials from  several DOD organizations we met with over the course of our review  observed that MDA’s engagement with their respective organizations was  improving.

In 2018, MDA began working with the defense intelligence community to  determine a more appropriate level of involvement for the defense  intelligence community throughout MDA’s acquisition activities. MDA and  defense intelligence community officials agreed during a May 2018  meeting that processes could be put in place to develop  intelligence-based countermeasure assessments if adequate resources  are provided. MDA officials also acknowledged that the defense  intelligence community would benefit from having a better understanding  of how the BMDS responds to threats and agreed to work towards  providing such information. Defense intelligence community officials  stated that increased insight would allow them to better focus their  intelligence collection, analysis, and production by knowing which threat  parameters MDA most often uses and the specificity of those parameters.  The defense intelligence community and MDA also agreed that providing  defense intelligence community engineers with MDA program-level  access would improve the support the defense intelligence community  provides to MDA.

MDA has also recently increased its outreach to the defense intelligence  community on some early BMDS planning decisions, although  opportunities for more comprehensive engagement remain. For example,  MDA engaged the defense intelligence community on an analysis of  alternatives the agency completed in February 2017 that assessed future  sensor options for the BMDS. According to MDA officials, they are also  engaging the defense intelligence community on another analysis of  alternatives pertaining to defense against hypersonic missiles. In addition, MDA worked with the defense intelligence community to establish threat  space parameters for some specific threat systems. Also, as noted  earlier, over the last nine years, MDA has held 18 “immersion day” events  with the defense intelligence community, half of which occurred in the last  two years. Moving forward, MDA has opportunities to more  comprehensively engage the defense intelligence community on updating  the BMDS threat space and determining threat parameters and threat  models assigned as design requirements and test cases for BMDS  elements.

In addition, MDA has recently begun placing greater emphasis on  ensuring its models are credible. According to an internal MDA  memorandum signed by the MDA Director in April 2018, a culture exists  within the agency that generally tolerates the use of models that have not  been sufficiently vetted and is too willing to accept the associated risk.  The memorandum states that the agency’s goal is for all MDA personnel  to help address this culture problem and that model verification,  validation, and accreditation is a high priority for MDA. During a meeting  with the BMDS OTA in October 2018, officials confirmed that MDA is  taking steps to address the challenges raised in the memorandum.

MDA also increased its outreach to the defense intelligence community in  2016 to coordinate on threat modeling efforts. In the past three years,  MDA and the defense intelligence community have collaborated to quickly  model several newly-observed threat missiles, according to MDA.  Figure 6 below shows that MDA held 93 threat model coordination  meetings with the defense intelligence community over the last four  years, with more frequent meetings occurring in early 2016 and again in  early-to-mid 2018. In addition, MDA is working with the defense  intelligence community to address compatibility issues that currently  prevent MDA from directly using the defense intelligence community’s  threat models in BMDS ground testing. MDA plans to include a few  missile trajectory models produced by the defense intelligence community  in the models and simulation framework for the agency’s upcoming  Ground Test-08 campaign.

The Technical Interchange Meetings and pathfinder efforts for MDA  directly using defense intelligence community threat models are  improving collaboration between MDA and the defense intelligence  community on threat modeling efforts. However, they do not provide MDA  with a pathway for validating its threat models with DIA. Even if  compatibility issues that currently prevent MDA from using defense  intelligence community threat models could be resolved, the defense  intelligence community is currently not resourced to build threat models  for MDA. Moreover, although MDA has indicated that the Technical  Interchange Meetings can include any topic of interest, the meetings do  not provide defense intelligence officials with sufficient insight into how  MDA builds its models, including the assumptions, caveats, or intended  use of the models.

According to MDA, the agency continues to hold discussions with the  defense intelligence community and explore process improvements, as  well as technical and resource requirements, to ensure the creation of  valid, threat-representative models for BMDS development. In March  2018, the MDA Director told us that one of his priorities was to ensure  that the agency was using appropriately validated models and  acknowledged the importance of ensuring its threat models are  sufficiently representative. In April 2018, MDA subsequently began  holding meetings with the DIBMAC to define the issues preventing the  defense intelligence community from validating MDA’s threat models.  MDA and the defense intelligence community met five times in 2018 to  identify actions that would facilitate working together to develop threat  models the defense intelligence community would be comfortable  validating. During these meetings, both organizations agreed on specific  actions intended to increase the defense intelligence community’s  involvement in MDA’s threat modeling process. To achieve threat model  validation, an initial plan was developed that included a combination of (a)  MDA directly using aspects of defense intelligence community threat  models; and (b) MDA partnering with the defense intelligence community  to build threat models. MDA and the defense intelligence community plan  to hold follow-on meetings in 2019 to further discuss the plan and review  actions.

MDA is reliant on threat assessments from the defense intelligence  community, as they inform what weapon systems the agency pursues,  the design of those systems, and how those systems are tested prior to  being delivered to the warfighter for operational use. However, the  defense intelligence community has been facing a variety of challenges  that are affecting its ability to provide MDA the threat assessments it  needs, when it needs them. If MDA does not have the threat  assessments it needs, when needed, the agency’s weapon systems are  at risk of being designed or tested against irrelevant or outdated  information, which could result in performance shortfalls and costly  retrofits. MDA has opportunities to mitigate these challenges and risks by  collectively prioritizing its threat assessment requests and working  through existing venues with the intelligence community to determine if  and to what extent additional resources may be needed to secure the  support that it needs. If MDA does not take advantage of these  opportunities, the defense intelligence community’s challenges will likely  continue, which will impact the availability of threat assessments and  increase the likelihood that MDA’s weapon systems will not be designed  or tested against the most up-to-date threat information.

In addition, MDA faces a steep challenge in developing the BMDS and  fielding capabilities at a rate that keeps pace with the threat. MDA was  previously informed by expert panels and senior defense leaders that it  needed to work more closely with the defense intelligence community to  better prepare for future threats or risk falling behind the threat. Given  these challenges, it is imperative for MDA to make the most out of its  available resources. Aside from providing MDA with threat assessments,  the defense intelligence community is a resource MDA has yet to fully tap  into. The defense intelligence community is uniquely qualified to assist  MDA on fundamental and critically important BMDS acquisition processes  and decisions, such as establishing the BMDS threat space and the  threat parameters and models it assigns to the BMDS elements.  Moreover, after nearly 15 years of building numerous threat models, MDA  has yet to fully implement a plan for DIA to validate these threat models,  as generally required by DOD policy. However, MDA has recently begun  laying the groundwork for more comprehensive engagement with the  defense intelligence community through efforts which have the potential  to address long-standing obstacles that have prevented DIA from  validating MDA’s threat models. Resolving these issues would help MDA  keep pace with emerging threats and improve the BMDS’s viability to  defend against the complex missile threats of the future.

We are making a total of three recommendations to DOD:  The Director, MDA should coordinate with the defense intelligence  community on the agency’s collective priorities for threat assessments  and work with the defense intelligence community to determine if  additional resources are needed to support the agency’s threat  assessment needs. (Recommendation 1)

The Director, MDA should fully engage the defense intelligence  community on key threat-related missile defense acquisition processes  and decisions, including providing insight into and obtaining input from the  defense intelligence community on the threat space MDA establishes for  the BMDS and the threat parameters and threat models MDA assigns to  BMDS elements as design requirements and test cases.  (Recommendation 2)

The Secretary of Defense should require the Director, MDA and the  Director, DIA to coordinate on establishing a process for MDA to obtain  validation of its threat models. (Recommendation 3)

DOD provided written comments in response to the classified version of  this report (GAO-19-92C), indicating that the department concurred with  all three of our recommendations. An edited version of DOD’s comments  is reprinted in appendix II as some information had to be omitted due to  classification. In addition, the summarized version of DOD’s comments  below is reflective of the content in the classified version. DOD provided  us with technical comments and a significant amount of new information  in response to the classified version of this report. We incorporated this  information into our report, as appropriate, but the new information did not  substantively change our findings and did not alter our recommendations.  Although DOD concurred with our third recommendation, DOD also  raised concerns about statements in our report related to our third  recommendation that the department believes are inaccurate. We do not  believe DOD’s concerns are warranted because our findings are based  on evidence we obtained during our review—evidence that we believe is  sufficient and appropriate and provides a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions. We address this in further detail below.

DOD concurred with our first recommendation that the Director, MDA  should coordinate with the defense intelligence community on the  agency’s collective priorities for threat assessments and determine  whether additional resources are needed. In its response, DOD stated  that MDA will continue to follow established processes to identify threat  assessment needs and to determine if additional resources are required.  However, our review found that these established processes—prioritizing  exclusively through distinct, individual threat assessment lanes—have not  proven entirely effective. In addition, although MDA has participated in the  department’s intelligence mission data review process since 2016, the  agency has yet to provide the defense intelligence community with  additional resources to address known funding and manpower shortages.  Moreover, this review process is limited to intelligence mission data and  does not cover all of the other types of threat assessments that MDA  needs. As such, we maintain that MDA should take additional steps  beyond continuing existing processes to address the challenges MDA  currently faces in obtaining the threat assessments it needs, when it  needs them.

DOD also concurred with our second recommendation that the Director,  MDA should provide insight into and obtain input from the defense  intelligence community on the threat space MDA establishes for the  BMDS and the threat parameters and threat models the agency assigns  to BMDS elements as design requirements and test cases. DOD stated in  its response that MDA has and will continue to fully engage the defense  intelligence community on key threat-related missile defense acquisition  processes and decisions. The efforts MDA has recently undertaken to  expand its outreach to the defense intelligence community are positive  steps. However, we have yet to see MDA provide the defense intelligence  community with further insight into or input on the threat space the  agency has established for the BMDS or the assignment of threat models  and threat parameters to BMDS elements. We will continue to monitor  MDA’s ongoing efforts to see whether it takes this next step toward more  fully engaging the defense intelligence community.

DOD concurred with our third recommendation that the Secretary of  Defense should require the MDA and DIA Directors to coordinate on  establishing a process for MDA to obtain validation of its threat models. In  its response, DOD stated that the department will re-examine the most  cost-effective approach to meet the intent of DIA validation to support  development and fielding of effective BMDS elements. More specifically,  DOD stated that MDA and the DIBMAC are currently having extensive  discussions regarding how the defense intelligence community can best  support MDA’s threat modeling requirements. As noted in our report, the  discussions MDA has had with the defense intelligence community over  the course of 2018 demonstrate that the department is beginning to  consider substantive measures to address the long-standing issue of  MDA not using DIA-validated threat models. However, MDA and defense  intelligence community officials have also cautioned that obstacles remain  and that alternative solutions may need to be explored. We will continue  to monitor these ongoing discussions and any results that emerge.

DOD also stated in its response that it was concerned that statements in  our report pertaining to our third recommendation imply that MDA has not  coordinated with DIA on validating its threat models and that our report  could be interpreted as saying MDA does not internally conduct threat  model validation. To be clear, our review did, in fact, find that, until  recently, MDA did not sufficiently coordinate with DIA on establishing a  process for creating valid threat models for use in MDA simulations.  Furthermore, we explain in our report that MDA was told that the defense  intelligence community can validate MDA’s threat models if it has  sufficient insight into how MDA builds its models—insight which MDA  officials previously told us was unnecessary. Additionally, although MDA  may internally validate its threat models for each ground test, the BMDS  OTA was not able to certify many of those threat models, in part, because  some models could not be traced back to the defense intelligence  community’s threat assessments. We therefore excluded MDA’s internal  threat model validation process from our report, as it is not a comparable  substitute for DIA threat model validation.

We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional  committees and the Secretary of Defense. In addition, the report is  available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov.

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact  me at (202) 512-4841 or chaplainc@gao.gov. Contact points for our  Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on  the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this  report are listed in appendix Ill.

Appendix I: Defense Intelligence Components Responsible for Assessing Foreign Ballistic Missiles

In its entirety, the intelligence community is a federation of 17 agencies  and organizations that span the executive branch of the U.S. government.  The defense intelligence components responsible for assessing foreign  ballistic missile threats are headed by the Defense Intelligence Agency  and overseen and coordinated by the Defense Intelligence Ballistic  Missile Analysis Committee. Table 4 below identifies each component  and its respective focus areas.

Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense

In addition to the contact named above, LaTonya Miller (Assistant  Director), Rose Brister, Lori Fields, Laura Greifner, Kurt Gurka, Helena  Johnson, Kevin O’Neill, Jay Tallon, Brian Tittle, Hai Tran, Alyssa Weir,  and Robin Wilson made key contributions to this report.

The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) uses information from the intelligence community to determine how to design and test its weapon systems.

We found that MDA has recently increased its interaction with the intelligence community, but further collaboration could help MDA keep pace with evolving threats. For example, MDA has previously relied on some outdated threat information, risking its weapon systems' performance. MDA can improve how it prioritizes requests for threat information to ensure it gets the needed information on time.

We made recommendations to improve how MDA interacts with and leverages information from the intelligence community.