Water Scarcity: DOD Has Not Always Followed Leading Practices to Identify At-Risk Installations

DOD reported in January 2019 that critical installations are at risk of water scarcity—that is, of not having sufficient water available to meet their mission needs. According to military department officials, installations depend on water for activities such as training, weapons testing, fire suppression, and sanitation. In its 2018 Fourth National Climate Assessment , the U.S. Global Change Research Program reported that warming temperatures will continue to cause worsening droughts and the decline of surface water quality.

Senate Report 115-262 included a provision for GAO to review DOD's identified or potential effects of water scarcity. For this report, GAO evaluated the extent to which DOD has assurance that it is using reliable information to identify installations at risk of water scarcity. GAO analyzed DOD's six assessments conducted from April 2017 through January 2019 to identify installations at risk of water scarcity and compared the assessments with five leading practices for identifying and analyzing water scarcity. GAO also interviewed officials from OSD and the military departments and contacted a nongeneralizable sample of 17 installations identified in OSD's assessments to reflect diversity in military service, mission, and water scarcity.

GAO found that the Department of Defense (DOD) does not have assurance that it is using reliable information regarding which installations are at risk for water scarcity. When comparing the results of six Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and military department assessments on installations vulnerable to water scarcity, GAO found that they varied markedly, raising questions about their quality and about which source of information DOD is using to determine which installations are vulnerable to water scarcity (see figure).

An OSD official stated that the three OSD-produced assessments provided the best information available on which installations are at risk of water scarcity. However, GAO found that these assessments did not reflect four of five leading practices for identifying and analyzing water scarcity—practices that contribute to a reliable assessment of water availability. Specifically, OSD did not always (1) identify current water availability, (2) identify future water availability, (3) take into account all sources of water, or (4) precisely identify locations. Further, although GAO found that the three military department assessments aligned with all leading practices, OSD officials disagreed as to whether these assessments can and should be used to identify installations at risk of water scarcity across the defense enterprise. Until OSD resolves the question as to whether it should conduct a department-wide assessment of installations that aligns with leading practices or whether it should rely on the military department assessments, the department will not have assurance that it is using reliable information to assess water scarcity.

GAO recommends that the Office of the Secretary of Defense assess whether it should conduct a coordinated, department-wide assessment aligned with leading practices or rely on military department assessments to determine which DOD installations are at risk of water scarcity. DOD concurred with GAO's recommendation.

The Department of Defense (DOD) reported in January 2019 that critical  installations are at risk of water scarcity—not having sufficient water  available to meet their mission needs. According to officials from the  military departments, installations depend on water to support DOD  missions—using water, for example, for training, weapons testing, fire  suppression, and sanitation. According to DOD, water scarcity can impair  testing activities and increase prohibitions on testing and training when  combined with increased temperatures, and contributes to heat-related  illnesses. In its 2018 Fourth National Climate Assessment, the U.S.  Global Change Research Program reported that changes in precipitation  and warming temperatures will continue to cause worsening droughts and  the decline of surface water quality. According to the assessment, these  changes will reduce the availability of water in parts of the United States  and increase the risk of water scarcity.

Because of the effects these and other changes in the climate could have  on federal programs, we have included Limiting the Federal  Government’s Fiscal Exposure by Better Managing Climate Change  Risks on our High Risk List since 2013. We noted in our March 2019  High Risk report that disaster costs are projected to increase as extreme  weather events become more frequent and intense due to climate  change, as observed and projected by the National Academies of  Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine and the U.S. Global Change  Research Program. Further, we have previously reported about the  challenges in managing water resources and the risks of water scarcity.  In May 2014, we reported on the risk of water scarcity that state water  managers face. According to these managers, experts, and literature we  reviewed, we found that freshwater shortages are expected to continue  into the future and, in particular, 40 of 50 state water managers expected  shortages in some portion of their states under average conditions in the  next 10 years. In April 2016, we found that in times when water scarcity  occurred, conflicts among users increased over the use of limited  freshwater resources, including irrigation, power production, and  municipal water use.

Since 2015, Congress has directed DOD to conduct three assessments  that, in part, required the department to identify installations at risk of  water scarcity. The three military departments have also required such  assessments. Senate Report 115-262, accompanying a bill for the John  S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019,  included a provision for us to review DOD’s water resource management  practices and the identified or potential effects of water scarcity. This  report evaluates the extent to which DOD has assurance that it is using  reliable information to identify installations at risk of water scarcity.

To address our objective, we reviewed statutes and congressional  committee reports that directed DOD to conduct assessments for climate- related purposes, including for identifying installations at risk of water  scarcity. We also analyzed information contained in the six DOD  assessments conducted from April 2017 through January 2019 in  response to congressional or military department reporting requirements  that identify installations at risk of water scarcity—three Office of the  Secretary of Defense (OSD) assessments and three military department  assessments—to determine the extent to which the assessments  identified the same or different installations. To discuss the  methodologies used in the six assessments, we interviewed officials who  were knowledgeable about the various assessments: officials from OSD’s  Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Sustainment; each of the  military departments with responsibilities for water management at  military installations; CNA, which completed the Department of the  Navy’s assessment; and the University of Nebraska-Lincoln’s National  Drought Mitigation Center, which hosts the U.S. Drought Monitor map that  shows parts of the United States in drought.

We compared the methodologies used to develop OSD’s three  assessments and the military departments’ three assessments with five  leading practices for identifying and analyzing risks of water scarcity. We  derived the five leading practices from the Department of Energy’s and  the United States Environmental Protection Agency’s compilation of 14  water efficiency best management practices, and principles published in  the University of Nebraska–Lincoln’s National Drought Mitigation Center’s  10-Step Drought Planning Process. These leading practices are: (1)  identify current water availability, (2) identify future water availability, (3)  take into account all sources of water, (4) precisely identify locations, and  (5) comprehensively include all locations. According to the 10-Step  Drought Planning Process, data and information derived from these  leading practices contribute to a reliable assessment of water availability.  To obtain information about water scarcity at individual installations, we  selected a nongeneralizable sample of active-duty installations in the  contiguous United States. To develop this sample, we included  installations that were identified by DOD assessments as having water- related vulnerabilities and by military department officials in interviews as  having ongoing pilot studies or issues related to water scarcity. We also  included installations that had historically experienced water scarcity,  those that had recently experienced water scarcity, and those that are  projected to experience water scarcity in the future. From these criteria,  we selected a nongeneralizable sample of 17 installations that were  identified in OSD’s three assessments that reflected diversity in military  service, mission, and water scarcity. We visited five of the installations  in person and sent the remaining 12 installations a list of questions similar  to those used during our site visits. The installation officials provided  information such as how water is being used for mission related activities  and whether water scarcity had affected or was expected to affect the  installation’s mission related activities. To determine the extent to which  DOD has assurance it is using accurate and reliable information about  installations at risk of water scarcity to manage water resources across  the department, we compared the information DOD has from the various  assessments with Standards for Internal Control in the Federal  Government on using quality information to achieve agency objectives.  See appendix I for a more detailed description of our scope and  methodology.

We conducted this performance audit from September 2018 to November  2019 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing  standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to  obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for  our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe  that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings  and conclusions based on our audit objectives.

Factors Affecting Water Scarcity in the United States

Water scarcity occurs when the demand for water in a given area  approaches or exceeds available water supplies. In April 2016, we  reported that drinkable water has traditionally been assumed to be  reliable, cheap, and abundant. However, with parts of the United  States—especially the Southwest—facing recurring drought and  persistent water scarcity, that view has been challenged. Water is also  not always available when and where it is needed, in the amount or  quality desired, or in a cost-effective manner. In times of water scarcity,  there are often competing demands for water—such as irrigation, power  production, municipal water supplies, and supporting aquatic life. As we  reported in May 2014, state water managers expect freshwater shortages  to continue into the future.

According to the United States Global Change Research Program’s  Fourth National Climate Assessment, significant changes in water  availability are evident across the country and are expected to persist in  the future due to changes in precipitation and rising temperatures. For  example, droughts occurring from deficits in precipitation, soil moisture,  and snow runoff will likely occur more frequently. Further, since a warmer  atmosphere holds more water, when rain does fall high-intensity events  can occur more frequently. These sudden downpours will increase the  mobility of pollutants, such as sediments and nutrients, and of algae,  which can reduce the quality and quantity of available drinking water. The  assessment noted that in some regions of the United States, the supplies  of water are already stressed by increasing consumption, and continued  warming will add to this stress, adversely affecting the availability of water  in parts of the United States and increasing the risk of water scarcity.

DOD’s Reliance on Water for Mission-Critical and Support Activities

The military departments rely on water at installations to conduct and  support their missions. For example, according to military department  officials, water is necessary to operate missions such as rocket launches   for cooling and for noise and fire suppression (see sidebar), to maintain  temperatures to properly store equipment such as parachutes, and for  firefighting training (see fig. 1).

Rocket Launch at Vandenberg Air Force  Base, California  According to Vandenberg Air Force Base  officials, water is used in multiple ways during  rocket launch activities. For example, water is  necessary for noise and vibration  suppression, heat reduction, and fire  suppression as needed. The officials stated  that between 60,000 to 100,000 gallons of  water are needed for each launch. In 2018,  there were nine launches. With an anticipated  increase in launches in the future, they  expect the demand for water to increase as  well.

OSD officially reorganized its acquisition organization on January 31,  2018, in response to Section 901of the National Defense Authorization  Act for Fiscal Year 2017. Under the reorganization, responsibilities of  the former Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and  Logistics were divided between two new offices—the Under Secretary of  Defense for Research and Engineering and the Under Secretary of  Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment. According to DOD,  responsibilities for energy, installations, and environment were transferred  from the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition,  Technology and Logistics to the newly created Office of the Under  Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment in 2018.  According to an OSD official, within this office, responsibilities for water  management at military installations are delegated to two deputy  assistant secretaries under the Office of the Assistant Secretary of  Defense for Sustainment—the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of  Defense for Environment, who is responsible for water resources  management in general, and the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary  of Defense for Energy, who is responsible for overseeing planning for  water at the installation level.

Each of the military departments has designated an office or multiple  offices with responsibilities for water policy and implementing programs to  support that policy at installations. Specifically:

Air Force: The Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Installations,  Environment, and Energy is responsible for procedures to manage the  Air Force’s water consumption, throughput, and requirements, in  alignment with policies and strategic direction. Within this office, the  Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Environment, Safety  and Infrastructure provides strategic direction, policy, and oversight  for water management.

Navy: The Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Energy,  Installations, and Environment is responsible for establishing policy  and overseeing water resource management. This office, along with  the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations Shore Readiness Division,  and the Commander, Navy Installations Command, makes policy,  guidance, and many major investment decisions related to  installations’ water departments. Within the Department of the Navy,  the Marine Corps also has its own offices responsible for water policy.  Specifically, the Deputy Commandant for Installations and Logistics is  responsible for establishing energy and water management policy for  Marine Corps installations in accordance with the Commandant’s  direction. The Commander, Marine Corps Installations Command, is  responsible for water management, such as overseeing program  planning and execution, and serving as the Marine Corps Installations  Energy Program Manager.

Army: The Assistant Secretary of the Army for Installations, Energy,  and Environment establishes policy, provides strategic direction, and  supervises all matters pertaining to energy and environmental  programs, among other responsibilities. Within this office, the Deputy  Assistant Secretary of the Army for Energy and Sustainability provides  strategic leadership, policy guidance, program oversight, and  outreach for energy, water, and sustainability throughout the Army  enterprise.

OSD’s and the Military Departments’ Six Assessments Identifying Installations at Risk of Water Scarcity

OSD-level entities and the three military departments conducted six  assessments between April 2017 and January 2019 that, despite having  varied focus areas, all included at least one component focused on  vulnerability to water scarcity. The Office of the Under Secretary of  Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment conducted the most recently  reported (January 2019) OSD-level assessment, in response to a  congressional reporting requirement. OSD-level entities in place before  OSD’s 2018 reorganization conducted the other two assessments,  reporting their results in January 2018 and July 2018—also responses to  congressional reporting requirements. The Air Force’s, Navy’s, and  Army’s three assessments span different time frames, encompass  different scopes, and respond to different internal reporting requirements.  The Air Force reported its results in November 2018; the Navy’s  assessment conducted by CNA reported its results in December 2017;  and the Army reported in April 2017. Table 1 provides a summary of  these assessments, including responsible offices and focus areas.

DOD Does Not Have Assurance That It Is Using Reliable Information to Identify Installations at Risk of Water Scarcity

We found that DOD does not have assurance that it is using accurate and  reliable information regarding which installations are at risk for water  scarcity. When we compared the results of the OSD assessments and the  military department assessments, we found that they varied markedly,  raising questions about their quality and about which source of  information DOD is using to determine which installations are vulnerable  to water scarcity. An OSD official told us that the OSD assessments  constitute the best DOD information available on installations at risk of  water scarcity, but we found that the assessments do not align with  leading practices for identifying and analyzing water scarcity—practices  that contribute to a reliable assessment of water availability. In contrast,  we found that the military department assessments do align with these  leading practices, but OSD officials disagree as to whether these  assessments can and should be used to identify installations at risk of  water scarcity across the defense enterprise. As a result, DOD cannot be  assured that it is using reliable information for water resource  management.

OSD and Military Department Assessments Differ on Which Installations Are at Risk of Water Scarcity

The three OSD assessments and the three military department  assessments varied markedly in their results regarding which installations  are vulnerable to water scarcity. Collectively, the six assessments  identified a total of 102 individual installations at risk of water scarcity, as  shown in figure 2. Only one installation, Vandenberg Air Force Base in  California, was identified in all three OSD assessments and the applicable  military department (Air Force) assessment.

Of the 102 individual installations identified in the six assessments as  vulnerable to water scarcity, 42 (41 percent) were included in multiple  assessments. OSD identified more installations for each military  department as at risk than did the military departments themselves.  Specifically, across its three assessments, OSD identified 95 installations  as being at risk—48 Air Force installations, 29 Navy or Marine Corps  installations, and 18 Army installations. The military departments  collectively identified a total of 27 installations as being at risk—14 Air  Force installations, nine Navy or Marine Corps installations, and four  Army installations.

Below is a more detailed description of the installations identified as being  at risk of water scarcity in the six assessments, by the military  departments.

Air Force: Of the 48 Air Force installations identified across the OSD  assessments, only three—Kirtland Air Force Base, New Mexico;  McConnell Air Force Base, Kansas; and Vandenberg Air Force Base,  California—appeared in all of them. In addition, as noted above, only  one Air Force installation was identified both in all three OSD  assessments and the Air Force assessment—Vandenberg Air Force  Base, California. Of the 14 Air Force installations identified within the  Air Force assessment, 13 appeared in at least one of the OSD  assessments.

Navy: Of the 29 Navy or Marine Corps installations identified across  the OSD assessments, three installations—Marine Corps Air Station  Yuma, Arizona; Naval Base Coronado, California; and Naval  Weapons Station Seal Beach, California—appeared in at least two of  the OSD assessments. Of the nine Navy installations, including the  Marine Corps installations identified within the Navy assessment, four  appeared in at least one of the OSD assessments.

Army: Of the 18 total Army installations identified across the OSD  assessments, only one—White Sands Missile Range, New Mexico— appeared in all three. However, the Army’s assessment did not  identify that installation as being at risk. In addition, one of the OSD  assessments—the climate vulnerability survey—identified more than  three times as many Army installations as being at risk as the Army’s  own assessment. Of the four Army installations identified within the  Army assessment, three appeared in at least one of the OSD  assessments.

Given the different scopes of these assessments, it is understandable  that they would produce different results. However, the substantial  differences in results raise questions about whether the assessments that  produced them were methodologically sound and about which source of  information DOD is using to identify installations at risk of water scarcity— information needed for water resource management.

OSD’s Assessments Do Not Align with Leading Practices

Although an OSD official told us that the OSD assessments constitute the  best DOD information available on installations at risk of water scarcity,  we found that they did not incorporate four of five leading practices for  identifying and analyzing water scarcity. Specifically, our analysis shows  that, in conducting their assessments, OSD officials did not always (1)  identify current water availability, (2) identify future water availability, (3)  take into account all sources of water, or (4) precisely identify locations,  as shown in table 2.

Below is a detailed comparison of each OSD assessment against the five  leading practices.

OSD’s climate vulnerability survey. Of the three OSD assessments,  the climate vulnerability survey reflects the most (3 out of 5) leading  practices. Specifically, we found that the methodology used in the climate  vulnerability survey  followed the leading practice for identifying current water availability.  The survey collected and analyzed drought-related information in a  timely and systematic manner by having a question about current  drought conditions on its web-based self-reporting survey. did not follow the leading practice for identifying future water  availability. The survey focused only on current and past water  availability. did not follow the leading practice for taking into account all sources of  water. The survey did not account for all sources of water (e.g.,  precipitation, soil moisture, streamflow, groundwater levels, reservoir  and lake levels, and snowpack) because it did not include a question  about the sources of the water.  followed the leading practice for precisely identifying locations. The  survey went directly to all DOD installations and inquired about  drought conditions at sites owned or managed by the installation, in  addition to the installation itself. This enabled DOD to know the  precise location of installations and their associated sites relative to  identified drought-prone areas of the state or region and vulnerable  economic sectors, individuals, or environments.  followed the leading practice for comprehensively including all  locations. The survey was completed for all primary installations and  associated sites worldwide.

OSD’s energy report and climate change report. OSD used the U.S.  Drought Monitor map to conduct its assessments for both OSD’s energy  report and climate change report. According to an OSD official, use of the  U.S. Drought Monitor map constitutes DOD’s best approach for  identifying military installations vulnerable to water scarcity. However, we  determined that, in doing so, OSD did not follow four of the five leading  practices. Specifically, using the U.S. Drought Monitor Map to produce  the energy report and climate change report, OSD did not follow the leading practice for identifying current water  availability and did not follow the leading practice for identifying future  water availability. According to the cofounder of the U.S. Drought  Monitor, the conditions reflected on the U.S. Drought Monitor maps  are retrospective—weekly assessments of drought conditions based  on how much, if any, precipitation occurred from 1 week to several  years before the day the map was issued. This is problematic  because drought conditions can change from month to month (see fig.  3), and the months chosen may not be representative of the annual  drought condition. An OSD official stated that OSD used data from the  U.S. Drought Monitor map as of April 2018 for the energy report and  only the summer months of 2018 for the climate change report, which  is unlikely to reflect current water availability for an entire year.  According to the cofounder of the U.S. Drought Monitor, the U.S.  Drought Monitor maps also do not show projections of future water  scarcity, which would be necessary to fully assess an installation’s  vulnerability to water scarcity. did not follow the leading practice for taking into account all sources of  water. According to the cofounder of the U.S. Drought Monitor, U.S.  Drought Monitor maps do not take into account all sources of water  that might be available to a specific installation. The U.S. Drought  Monitor maps do not fully assess the availability of water from  groundwater sources (e.g., aquifers) or nonlocal sources (e.g.,  reservoir water delivered by canals). did not follow the leading practice for precisely identifying locations.

According to the co-founder of the U.S. Drought Monitor, U.S. Drought  Monitor maps only display regional drought conditions, not drought  information applicable to precise locations. For this reason, the  Drought Monitor Portal warns that the large-scale maps generated  should not supersede locally provided information about water  availability conditions. Therefore, OSD may have inaccurately  identified installations as being at risk of water scarcity.  followed the leading practice for comprehensively including all  locations. Since the energy report used a map of all installations  within the contiguous U.S. to conduct its analysis, and the climate  change report included all 79 mission-assurance locations within its  scope, these assessments constituted a comprehensive approach.

The information we collected from installations identified by OSD as being  at risk of water scarcity also indicates weaknesses in OSD’s approach. Of  the 17 installations that were identified in OSD’s assessments as being at  risk of water scarcity and that we contacted or visited, officials from 12  stated that they did not anticipate water scarcity affecting their future  mission-related activities, disagreeing with the conclusions of OSD’s  assessments. For example:

Officials at Naval Weapons Station Seal Beach, California, told us the  installation does not expect water scarcity to affect its mission-related  activities because none of its water-using facilities (i.e., administrative  facilities) on the installation are particularly water-intensive. They  stated the installation’s water is provided by the City of Seal Beach,  which in turn is supplied by a larger water company. According to the  officials, there are proposed plans to construct a nearby desalination  plant, which would prevent water scarcity issues.

Officials at Moody Air Force Base, Georgia, stated that the installation  is not vulnerable to water scarcity now or over the next 20 years  because the base has its own water-treatment plant with wells that  draw water from the Floridan aquifer, which spans an area of 100,000  square miles in the southeastern United States, underlying the entire  state of Florida and parts of Alabama, Georgia, Mississippi, and South  Carolina. According to the officials, use of the aquifer is  unconstrained; in addition, Moody Air Force Base holds water permits  that create a 64 percent surplus capacity of daily water availability to  support current or new mission growth.

Officials at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, stated that the installation is in  the Southeast region of the United States, which is not known as a  region with water scarcity issues. They stated that the region’s  primary threats, from a water scarcity perspective, are pollution and  population growth. In addition, the officials said that the two public  utilities from which it purchases its water are not expected to hit a  critical demand for water until the year 2060 or later.

When we informed an OSD official of the results of our analysis, the  official stated that OSD did not have any concerns about the information it  provided to the Congress in its three assessments. Specifically, the  official said the climate vulnerability survey might have had different  responses depending on the perspective of the responder, but it provided  useful qualitative data. The official also maintained that the U.S. Drought  Monitor was the best source of information, and is a resource produced  by the federal government. However, as outlined above, while the drought  monitor is a useful source of information, it is not intended to be used in  the manner in which DOD has employed it.

Military Department Assessments Align with Leading Practices

Unlike the OSD level assessments, we found that the assessments  produced by the military departments are aligned with all five leading  practices (see table 3).

Below are detailed examples of how the military department assessments  were compared against the five leading practices. Specifically, we found  that the military department assessments:  followed the leading practice for identifying current water availability.  For example, the Navy contacted installation staff directly and  analyzed water use and billing data directly from departmental water- system databases to assess the extent to which the Navy was facing  water-related challenges (which included water availability and  quality).  followed the leading practice for identifying future water availability.  For example, the Air Force assessment considered future water  availability by considering long-term effects from climate change,  future water restrictions, and changes in water access rights. In  addition, the Navy assessment considered future water availability by  considering sea-level rise, water rights, diminishing groundwater  supplies, and emerging water pollutants.  followed the leading practice for taking into account all sources of  water. For example, the Army assessment considered alternate water  sources by requiring installations to identify and enumerate their  potable sources of water as a measure of redundancy.  followed the leading practice for precisely identifying locations. For  example, the Navy assessment used geospatial data on hazards to  water as well as data published by Naval Facilities Command. This  enabled the Navy to precisely identify installation and site locations for  water and sewer infrastructure, including pumps, storage, sewer lines,  and water-treatment plants relative to those hazards.  followed the leading practice for comprehensively including all  locations. According to service officials and an agency document, the  scope of each military department assessment included all respective  installations within each military department.

Installations we contacted that were identified in the military department  assessments as being at risk of water scarcity generally agreed with the  assessments. Of the seven installations that were identified in military  department assessments as being at risk of water scarcity and that we  contacted or visited, officials from six (86 percent) agreed that they  anticipated water scarcity may affect their future mission activities or  otherwise noted risks of water scarcity that could affect their  installations. For example:

Officials at Mountain Home Air Force Base, Idaho, stated that water  use on the installation was significantly curtailed in 2017 and 2018  (and was anticipated to be curtailed in 2019) due to the inability to  produce sufficient quantities of water to meet demand.

Officials from F. E. Warren Air Force Base, Wyoming, stated that  drought is a continual threat to the area. The officials stated that if the  area does not receive adequate precipitation or snowmelt, the city  may place a water restriction for the installation.

Officials from Marine Corps Air Station Yuma, Arizona, stated that  future mission activities could be impacted by water scarcity,  especially as the population of the installation continues to grow with  the arrival of additional air squadrons.

OSD Officials Disagree on What Information They Should Use for Identifying Installations at Risk of Water Scarcity

As noted earlier in this report, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of  Defense for Sustainment is responsible for water management at all  military installations. Individuals from this office with whom we spoke  agreed that having accurate information about water scarcity data across  DOD is important to help fulfill these responsibilities and inform senior  decision-making, including budget development, resourcing, and risk  management. However, these officials disagree about whether it would  be feasible to rely on the military department assessments, which we  found align with leading practices, to identify installations at risk of water  scarcity across DOD.

According to one OSD official, the military department assessments  should not be used to consider water scarcity across DOD as a whole  because their methodologies differed and therefore are not comparable to  one another. The assessments do not reflect a coordinated, department- wide assessment. For example, the Air Force assessment reported  vulnerability to water scarcity as four distinct qualitative ratings, each  combining likelihood and severity, without any numerical data. The  Army’s assessment, in contrast, reported vulnerability using 34 distinct  numerical scores for each installation, averaged into four distinct  categories. While both assessments were aligned with leading practices,  this OSD official believes that the differences in their specific approaches  and subsequent results make it difficult to compare vulnerability to water  scarcity across military departments.

According to another OSD official, it would be appropriate for DOD to rely  on the results of the military department assessments because  responsibilities for prioritizing projects and for allocating funds to those  projects lie with the military departments. As such, there is not a concern  that the departments assessed vulnerability differently. According to this  official, were the department to issue a new DOD-wide report on water  scarcity, it would simply be a “rollup” of the military department  assessments, with an update of current status.

According to Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government,  management should use quality information—information that is, among  other things, appropriate, current, complete, and accurate—to achieve the  entity’s objectives. In identifying information requirements, management  should consider the expectations of both internal and external users, as  well as the entity’s objectives and related risks. Because the OSD-level  assessments do not align with leading practices for identifying and  analyzing water availability, OSD lacks assurance that it has quality  information and risks potentially using or providing to Congress unreliable  information. Further, while the military department assessments are  aligned with leading practices, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of  Defense for Sustainment has not determined whether they are sufficient  for meeting its policy-making and oversight objectives and whether the  risk presented by combining results from assessments that used varying  methodologies is an acceptable level of risk. Until this question is  resolved, the department will not have assurance that it is using accurate  and reliable information to assess water scarcity.

DOD’s installations rely on billions of gallons of water to operate and  conduct their missions, but critical installations are at risk of water  scarcity, and the risks are only projected to increase. The substantial  differences in results of DOD’s assessments to identify installations at risk  of water scarcity raise questions about whether the assessments were  methodologically sound and about which source of information OSD is  using for water resource management. OSD’s approach to assessing  installations at risk of water scarcity did not consistently apply leading  practices for identifying current and future water availability, taking into  account all sources of water, and precisely identifying locations—yet an  OSD official told us that the OSD assessments constitute the best DOD  information available on installations at risk of water scarcity. In contrast,  the military departments did apply all leading practices in their  assessments on installations at risk of water scarcity; however, OSD  officials were not in agreement as to whether these assessments could  be used at a departmental level. By assessing and documenting whether  OSD should conduct a coordinated, department-wide assessment aligned  with leading practices or should rely on the military department  assessments for identifying and analyzing water availability, OSD would  have greater assurance that it has the information that it needs to  manage water scarcity across the department and that Congress needs  to better understand the threat of water scarcity to DOD’s mission.

The Secretary of Defense should ensure that the Assistant Secretary of  Defense for Sustainment (1) assesses whether DOD should conduct a  coordinated, department-wide assessment aligned with leading practices  for identifying and analyzing water availability or rely on military  department assessments to determine which DOD installations are at risk  of water scarcity and (2) documents this decision. (Recommendation 1)

We provided a draft of this report for review and comment to DOD. In  written comments, DOD concurred with our recommendation. DOD  comments are reprinted in their entirety in appendix III. DOD also  provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriated.

We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional  addressees; the Secretary of Defense; and the Secretaries of the Air  Force, the Navy, and the Army. In addition, this report will be available at  no charge on the GAO website at www.gao.gov.

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact  me at (202) 512-2775 or fielde1@gao.gov.

Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public  Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made  key contributions to this report are listed in appendix IV.

Appendix I: Objective, Scope, and Methodology

In this report, we evaluate the extent to which the Department of Defense  (DOD) has assurance that it is using reliable information to identify  installations at risk of water scarcity.

We reviewed statutes and congressional committee reports that directed  DOD to conduct assessments for climate-related purposes, including for  identifying installations at risk of water scarcity. We also analyzed  information contained in the six DOD assessments conducted from April  2017 through January 2019 that identify installations at risk of water  scarcity—three Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) assessments  and three military department assessments—to determine the extent to  which the assessments identified the same or different installations.  Specifically, we analyzed the following DOD assessments:  two OSD assessments that focused on climate-related risks to  installations:

Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,  Technology and Logistics, Department of Defense Climate- Related Risk to DOD Infrastructure Initial Vulnerability  Assessment Survey (SLVAS) Report (January 2018). We  analyzed information on military installations vulnerable to drought  in this assessment.

Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and  Sustainment, Report on Effects of a Changing Climate to the  Department of Defense (January 2019). We analyzed information  on military installations vulnerable to drought in this assessment. one OSD assessment that focused on installation energy  performance, which included an appendix with information on military  installations vulnerable to water scarcity:

Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Energy,  Installations, and Environment, Department of Defense Annual  Energy Management and Resilience Report (AEMRR) Fiscal Year  2017 (July 2018). We analyzed the information on military  installations vulnerable to water scarcity in this assessment.  three military department assessments that contained information on  water-related risks:

U.S. Air Force, Summary Information on Installations with Water  Hazards (Provided November 2018). We analyzed information on  military installations with catastrophic and critical water hazards in  this assessment.

U.S. Navy, including the Marine Corps, CNA, Assessing Water  Risk at DON Installations—Identifying Hazards and Water  Management Challenges (December 2017). We analyzed  information on military installations with water availability risk in  this assessment.

U.S. Army, FY17 Installation Status Report (Mission Capacity)  Water Data Analysis (April 2017). We analyzed information on  military installations with minor and severe potable water risk.

In analyzing these six assessments, we focused on active-duty military  installations in the contiguous United States at risk of water scarcity.  Further, to discuss the methodologies used in the six assessments, we  interviewed officials who were knowledgeable about the various  assessments: officials from the OSD’s Office of the Assistant Secretary of  Defense for Sustainment, each of the military departments with  responsibilities for water management at military installations, CNA, which  completed the Department of the Navy’s assessment, and the University  of Nebraska–Lincoln’s National Drought Mitigation Center, which hosts  the U.S. Drought Monitor map that shows parts of the United States in  drought.

We compared the methodologies used to develop OSD’s three  assessments and the military departments’ three assessments with five  leading practices for identifying and analyzing risks of water scarcity. We  derived the five leading practices from the Department of Energy’s and  the United States Environmental Protection Agency’s compilation of 14  water efficiency best management practices, and principles published in  the University of Nebraska–Lincoln’s National Drought Mitigation Center’s  10-Step Drought Planning Process. These leading practices are: (1)  identify current water availability, (2) identify future water availability, (3)  take into account all sources of water, (4) precisely identify locations, and  (5) comprehensively include all locations. According to the 10-Step  Drought Planning Process, data and information derived from these  leading practices contribute to a reliable assessment of water availability.  We discussed these five leading practices we identified with officials from  the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Sustainment and the  military departments and gained their agreement about using these  practices for determining installations at risk of water scarcity. We then  determined whether, in their respective methodologies, OSD’s and the  military departments’ assessments had followed each of these five  leading practices. Specifically, we considered the  “identify current water availability” leading practice as “followed” if  OSD’s and the military departments’ assessment was annually  reporting water use or status of water supply, and the leading practice  as “not followed” if the assessment was not annually reporting water  use or status of water supply;  “identify future water availability” leading practice as “followed” if  OSD’s and the military departments’ assessment noted whether  climate change was a factor in their assessment or considered future  water availability from non-climate-change-related factors and the  leading practice as “not followed” if the assessment did not note  whether climate-change was a factor in their assessment or consider  future water availability from non-climate-change-related factors;  “take into account all sources of water” leading practice as “followed”  if OSD’s and the military departments’ assessment noted  consideration of alternate water sources (such as groundwater,  purchase agreements, additional reservoirs, etc.) and the leading  practice as “not followed” if the assessment did not note consideration  of alternate water sources (such as groundwater, purchase  agreements, additional reservoirs, etc.);  “precisely identify locations” leading practice as “followed” if OSD’s  and the military departments’ assessment noted the specific location  of the installation they were reviewing and provided data specifically  from that installation, and the leading practice as “not followed” if the  assessment did not note the specific location of the installation they  were reviewing and provide data specifically from that installation; and  “comprehensively include all locations” leading practice as “followed”  if OSD’s and the military departments’ assessment considered all the  locations at potential risk of water scarcity within the scope of their  assessment, and the leading practice as “not followed” if the  assessment did not consider all the locations at potential risk of water  scarcity within the scope of their assessment. Specifically, for OSD’s  Department of Defense Climate-Related Risk to DOD Infrastructure  Initial Vulnerability Assessment Survey (SLVAS) Report and its  Department of Defense Annual Energy Management and Resilience  Report (AEMRR) Fiscal Year 2017, the scope of the assessments  included all DOD installations; for OSD’s Report on Effects of a  Changing Climate to the Department of Defense, the scope of the  assessment included 79 mission-assurance priority installations; and  for the military department assessments, the scope included all  respective installations within each military department.

To obtain information about water scarcity at individual installations, we  selected a nongeneralizable sample of active-duty military installations in  the contiguous United States. To develop this sample, we included  installations that were identified by DOD assessments as having water- related vulnerabilities and by military department officials in interviews as  having ongoing pilot studies or issues related to water scarcity. We also  included installations that had (1) historically experienced water scarcity  (prior to 2014); (2) recently experienced water scarcity (from 2014 to  2019); and (3) are projected to experience severe water scarcity (over the  next 20 years or longer). From these criteria, we selected a  nongeneralizable sample of 17 installations that were identified in OSD’s  three assessments that reflected diversity in military service, mission, and  water scarcity (see table 4).

We visited five of these installations in person and contacted the  remaining 12 installations by email. We selected the five installations to  visit because three installations (Naval Air Facility El Centro, California;  Marine Corps Air Station Yuma, Arizona; and Luke Air Force Base,  Arizona) provided diversity among military services and were in close  proximity to each other, which allowed us to visit multiple locations in one  trip; one installation (Vandenberg Air Force Base, California) had been  identified in all three OSD assessments and the applicable military  department assessment as being at risk of water scarcity; and one  installation (Fort Bragg, North Carolina) provided geographic diversity and  inclusion of at least one installation per military service in our sample. For  the remaining 12 installations, we developed and sent by email a list of  similar questions and document requests that we used during our site  visits. We received responses from all 12 installations. Results from our  nongeneralizable sample cannot be used to make inferences about all  DOD installations. However, the information from these installations  provides valuable insights about how water is being used by these  installations for their mission-related activities and whether water scarcity  had affected or was expected to affect their mission-related activities. To  determine the extent to which DOD has assurance it is using accurate  and reliable information about installations at risk of water scarcity to  manage water resources across the department, we compared the  information DOD has from the various assessments with Standards for  Internal Control in the Federal Government on using quality information to  achieve agency objectives.

Appendix II: List of Installations Identified in Department of Defense (DOD) Assessments as Being at Risk of Water Scarcity

Table 5 provides a list of the 102 individual active-duty military  installations in the contiguous United States that were identified in at least  one of six DOD assessments—three Office of the Secretary of Defense  assessments and three military department assessments—as being at  risk of water scarcity.

Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense

Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

In addition to the contact named above, Brian Lepore (Director), Jodie  Sandel (Assistant Director), Barbara Wooten (Analyst-In-Charge), Tracy  Barnes, Chaneé Gaskin, Gina Hoover, Mae Jones, Mary Jo LaCasse,  Amie Lesser, Shahrzad Nikoo, Paulina Reaves, and Edward Rice made  key contributions to this report.

Do military installations have enough water to meet mission needs?

DOD completed 6 assessments—3 at the department level and 3 at the military-service level—and found 102 installations at risk of water scarcity. But these assessments were conducted differently and produced different results. The department-level assessments didn’t follow leading practices, and officials disagreed over whether the service-level assessments could be used across DOD.

We recommended that DOD assess whether it should conduct a better department-wide assessment or use the approach in the service-level assessments to identify installations at risk of water scarcity.