Drug Policy: Preliminary Observations on the 2019 National Drug Control Strategy

Over 70,000 people died from drug overdoses in 2017, according to the most recently available Centers for Disease Control and Prevention data. Overdoses have become the leading cause of death due to injuries in the United States, and most of these deaths involve opioids. GAO has a body of work on drug policy and ongoing work on ONDCP's efforts, including issuance of the National Drug Control Strategy. GAO also noted in its March 2019 High Risk report that federal efforts to prevent drug misuse is an emerging issue requiring close attention.

This statement includes preliminary GAO observations on the 2019 National Drug Control Strategy and related findings from select GAO reports on federal opioid-related efforts. It is based on ongoing GAO work, two reports that GAO issued in March 2018 and October 2017, and selected updates on recommendations from these reports as of February 2019. For ongoing work and recommendation updates, GAO assessed the 2019 National Drug Control Strategy against statutory requirements, reviewed ONDCP and HHS documents, and interviewed ONDCP officials.

The Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP)—responsible for coordinating and overseeing efforts by more than a dozen federal agencies to address illicit drug use—issued the 2019 National Drug Control Strategy on January 31, 2019. ONDCP describes the strategy as a high-level vision of federal drug control efforts, focused on prevention, treatment and recovery. The strategy designates one overarching objective to reduce the number of lives lost to drug addiction, and provides some description of federal agencies' activities, including steps to reduce the availability of illicit drugs. However, it does not include certain information required by law, such as annual objectives that are quantifiable and measurable, or a 5-year projection for program and budget priorities. This required information could help prioritize activities across federal agencies and measure progress over time, which previous GAO work has shown to be important for achieving results. GAO will continue to assess the strategy as part of ongoing work, and make recommendations as appropriate.

The lack of information in the 2019 National Drug Control Strategy on measuring progress toward its objective to reduce lives lost is particularly concerning in light of previous GAO reports. These reports found that individual agencies could do more to assess their particular efforts related to opioids. For example, GAO reported in March 2018 on five agency-specific strategies to combat illicit opioids, and also reported in October 2017 on the Department of Health and Human Services' (HHS) efforts to expand access to medication-assisted treatment for opioid use disorder. In these reports, GAO recommended, among other things, that federal agencies establish performance measures to better determine progress toward their goals. While federal agencies have taken some action to implement these recommendations, such as establishing performance measures for access to medication-assisted treatment, additional actions to measure the effectiveness of related drug control efforts would further help to gauge agencies' success, determine if new approaches are needed, and efficiently target resources.

GAO has made prior recommendations to ONDCP, HHS, and other federal agencies to address drug misuse, including establishing performance measures with targets to better gauge progress toward achieving agency goals.

We are pleased to be here today to discuss our ongoing work related to  the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP), as well as two of our  issued reports on federal opioid-related efforts that highlight the  importance of assessing outcomes for the steps ONDCP and other  agencies are taking to control illicit drug use and reduce deaths from drug  overdoses.

While drug misuse in the nation is not a new phenomenon, the scale and  impact of illicit drug use and prescription drug misuse has reached new  levels, affecting individuals, their families, and the communities in which  they live. Drug overdoses are at their highest ever-recorded level and,  since 2011, have outnumbered deaths, respectively, by firearms, motor  vehicle crashes, suicide, and homicide, according to the Drug  Enforcement Administration. Over 70,000 people died from drug  overdoses in 2017, according to the Centers for Disease Control and  Prevention. Opioids—particularly highly potent synthetic opioids like  fentanyl—are currently the main driver of these deaths. The Council of  Economic Advisers estimated that, in 2015, the economic cost of the  opioid crisis alone was more than $500 billion when considering the value  of lives lost due to opioid-related overdoses. Primarily due to increasing  rates of opioid-related deaths and opioid use disorder, the Acting  Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS)  declared the opioid crisis a public health emergency on October 26,  2017. We highlight these issues in our latest High-Risk report, which we  issued on March 6, 2019. In that document, we identify federal efforts to  prevent drug misuse as an emerging issue requiring close attention.

Federal drug control efforts span a range of activities including  prevention, treatment, interdiction, international operations, and law  enforcement. These efforts also represent a considerable federal  investment. According to the President’s fiscal year (FY) 2019 budget,  federal drug control funding for FY 2017 was $28.8 billion. Multiple federal  agencies have ongoing efforts to respond to the opioid crisis, including  efforts to reduce the supply and demand for illicit drugs, to prevent  misuse of prescription drugs, and to treat substance use disorders. As  federal agencies engage in drug control efforts, ONDCP is responsible  for, among other things, overseeing and coordinating the implementation  of national drug control policy across the federal government.  These  responsibilities include the Director of ONDCP promulgating a National  Drug Control Strategy, and assessing and certifying the adequacy of the  National Drug Control Program agencies’ budget submissions.

In our testimony today, we will discuss our preliminary observations on  the 2019 National Drug Control Strategy and how these observations  relate to findings and recommendations from related, prior work. This  testimony is based on our ongoing examination of ONDCP’s strategies  and programs. It is also based on two prior reports, which we issued in March 2018 and October 2017, that highlight the importance of assessing  outcomes related to agency-specific efforts to address the opioid crisis.

To develop our preliminary observations, we reviewed the 2019 National  Drug Control Strategy, assessed it against relevant provisions of the  Office of National Drug Control Policy Reauthorization Act of 2006  (ONDCP Reauthorization Act of 2006), and interviewed ONDCP officials.  To perform our prior work, we reviewed and analyzed documents from  ONDCP and other relevant agencies, reviewed relevant statutory  provisions, and interviewed relevant agency officials. More detailed  information on the scope and methodologies used to conduct our prior  work can be found in each product cited in this statement. This statement  also includes selected updates related to recommendations we have  made in those reports. To conduct these updates, we reviewed  documentation provided by agency officials in February 2019 about steps  they have taken to address recommendations since the publication of  each respective report.

We conducted the work on which this statement is based in accordance  with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards  require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate  evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions  based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained  provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on  our audit objectives.

More than a dozen federal agencies—known as National Drug Control  Program agencies—have responsibilities for drug prevention, treatment,  and law enforcement activities. For example, the Department of Health  and Human Services (HHS) has led efforts to expand access to drug  treatment, and the Departments of Justice (DOJ) and Homeland Security  (DHS) have taken lead roles in limiting the availability of illicit drugs  through criminal investigations and prosecutions. The Anti-Drug Abuse  Act of 1988 established ONDCP to enhance national drug control  planning and coordination.  In this role, the office is responsible for (1)  leading the national drug control effort, (2) coordinating and overseeing  the implementation of national drug control policy, (3) assessing and  certifying the adequacy of National Drug Control Programs and the  budget for those programs, and (4) evaluating the effectiveness of  national drug control policy efforts.

Until its 2018 reauthorization, ONDCP had been operating under the  provisions of the ONDCP Reauthorization Act of 2006 pursuant to annual  appropriations acts. In October 2018, the Substance Use-Disorder  Prevention that Promotes Opioid Recovery and Treatment for Patients  and Communities Act (the SUPPORT Act) was enacted and reauthorized  ONDCP and a number of its programs.  The SUPPORT Act aims to  address overprescribing and opioid misuse in the United States and  includes provisions involving law enforcement, public health, and  healthcare financing and coverage. Under both the ONDCP  Reauthorization Act of 2006 and the SUPPORT Act, the Director of  ONDCP is required to promulgate the National Drug Control Strategy and  work with National Drug Control Program agencies to develop an annual  National Drug Control Program Budget.  Prior to the SUPPORT Act, the  Director was required to promulgate a National Drug Control Strategy on  an annual basis, while under the SUPPORT Act, generally, the National  Drug Control Strategy is required to be developed every two years.   ONDCP did not issue a National Drug Control Strategy for 2017 or 2018  despite the statutory requirement. Under both the ONDCP  Reauthorization Act of 2006 and the SUPPORT Act, the National Drug  Control Strategy is to set forth a comprehensive plan to reduce illicit drug  use and the consequences of such illicit drug use in the United States by  limiting the availability of and reducing the demand for illegal drugs.

As part of our ongoing work, we are reviewing the 2019 National Drug  Control Strategy that ONDCP issued on January 31, 2019. Agency  officials told us that they began preparing the National Drug Control  Strategy in early 2018—prior to the enactment of the SUPPORT Act in  October 2018. Officials stated that the National Drug Control Strategy  was intended to respond to the requirements of the ONDCP  Reauthorization Act of 2006, which was the applicable law at that time. In  light of ONDCP’s stated approach, we based our preliminary analysis of  the National Drug Control Strategy on the ONDCP Reauthorization Act of 2006. However, the SUPPORT Act retained certain similar requirements  for the National Drug Control Strategy contained in the prior law.

According to ONDCP, the 2019 National Drug Control Strategy provides a  high-level vision of federal drug control efforts by focusing on prevention,  treatment and recovery, and reducing the availability of illicit drugs. The  2019 National Drug Control Strategy designates one overarching  strategic objective—to reduce the number of lives lost to drug addiction— and provides some general descriptions of federal agencies’ activities.  However, our preliminary observations related to the 2019 National Drug  Control Strategy indicate that it does not include several pieces of  required information, including the following:

Quantifiable and measurable objectives. The National Drug Control  Strategy was required to include “annual quantifiable and measurable  objectives and specific targets to accomplish long-term quantifiable  goals that the  Director determines may be achieved during  each year beginning on the date on which the National Drug Control  Strategy is submitted.”  However, our work showed that the 2019  National Drug Control Strategy does not include this information.  While it lists seven items that it designates as measures of  performance or effectiveness, it does not indicate how they would be  quantified or measured, or targets to be achieved each year. For  example, one of the measures of performance relates to educating  the public, especially adolescents, about drug use. However, it lacks  information on how ONDCP would measure its efforts to educate  adolescents, as well as targets ONDCP hopes to achieve, such as the  number of adolescents educated or specific knowledge gains. Further,  none of the seven measures has a baseline of current performance or  annual targets, and four of the seven measures do not have  associated timelines—which are important ways that results could be  quantified. For example, one of the Strategy’s measures of  effectiveness is that evidence-based addiction treatment, particularly  medication-assisted treatment for opioid addiction, is more accessible  nationwide for those who need it. However, there is no information on  the current level of treatment access, any targets for expanding  access, or any associated timeline by which ONDCP hopes to  achieve desired results.

Program and budget priorities. The National Drug Control Strategy  was required to include “a 5-year projection for program and budget  priorities.”  While the 2019 National Drug Control Strategy outlines  several high-level priorities, including a top priority to address the  current opioid crisis and its associated deaths, it does not include  such a 5-year projection.

Specific assessments. The National Drug Control Strategy was  required to include specific assessments related to illicit drug use.  For example, the National Drug Control Strategy was required to  include “an assessment of the reduction of illicit drug availability.”  This assessment was to be measured by, among other things, the  quantities of cocaine, heroin, marijuana, methamphetamine, ecstasy,  and other drugs available for consumption in the United States; the  amount of marijuana, cocaine, heroin, methamphetamine, ecstasy,  and precursor chemicals and other drugs entering the United States;  and the number of illicit manufacturing laboratories seized and  destroyed as well as the number of hectares of marijuana, poppy, and  coca cultivated and destroyed domestically and in other countries.  The 2019 National Drug Control Strategy does not include this  information. In addition, the National Drug Control Strategy was  required to include “an assessment of the reduction of the  consequences of illicit drug use and availability.” This assessment  was to include the burden illicit drug users placed on hospital  emergency departments; the annual national health care cost of illicit  drug use; and the extent of illicit drug-related crime and criminal  activity. Similarly, the 2019 National Drug Control Strategy does not  include this information.

Performance measurement system. The ONDCP Director was  required to submit “as part of the National Drug Control Strategy a  description of a national drug control performance measurement  system.”  Among other things, this system was to describe the  sources of information and data that would be used for each  performance measure incorporated into the performance  measurement system. This system was also to coordinate the  development and implementation of national drug control data  collection and reporting systems to support policy formulation and  performance measurement. Further, the system was to monitor  consistency across the drug-related goals and objectives of the  National Drug Control Program agencies and ensure that each  agency’s goals and budgets support are fully consistent with the  National Drug Control Strategy. The 2019 National Drug Control  Strategy does not contain a description of such a national drug control  performance measurement system.

As part of our ongoing work, we also asked ONDCP for information  regarding how ONDCP officials determined the adequacy of National  Drug Control Program agencies’ budget submissions without a National  Drug Control Strategy in effect for 2017 and 2018. The National Drug  Control Program Budget is to provide information on federal drug control  funding requested by the executive branch to implement the National  Drug Control Strategy. National Drug Control Program agencies are  required to submit to ONDCP the portion of their annual budget requests  dedicated to drug control activity undertaken by the department, agency,  or program. Agencies are to prepare these as part of their overall budget  submission to the Office of Management and Budget for inclusion in the  President’s annual budget request. ONDCP is required to review and  certify whether these budgets are sufficient to support the relevant goals  and objectives outlined in the National Drug Control Strategy and then  include these budgets in the consolidated National Drug Control Program  Budget, which the President issues alongside his budget each year. As of  March 4, 2019, ONDCP had not provided information on how it  accomplished the required determination. In addition, as of March 4,  2019, the President’s FY 2020 budget, and the accompanying National  Drug Control Program Budget, had not been released. We will continue to  consider ONDCP’s activities in this area as part of our ongoing work.

As part of our ongoing work, we will also discuss the 2019 National Drug  Control Strategy with ONDCP and plan to examine how ONDCP intends  to address additional requirements in the SUPPORT Act. The lack of  information in the 2019 National Drug Control Strategy on assessing  progress toward its objective to reduce lives lost reflects findings in our  previous reports. Our prior work in general, and our work on federal drug  control efforts in particular, has consistently emphasized the importance  of setting clear priorities through measurable and quantifiable goals, and  assessing progress toward those goals over time, in order to achieve  results. For example:  In March 2018, we reported on federal agencies’ efforts—including  those of ONDCP—to limit the availability of and enhance their  response to illicit opioids, such as heroin and fentanyl. We reviewed  five strategies related to combating illicit opioids and determined that  only one included outcome-oriented performance measures that aim  to assess the effectiveness of its efforts—ONDCP’s Heroin Availability  Reduction Plan (HARP). In contrast, we found that ONDCP’s High  Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas (HIDTA) programs’ Heroin Response  Strategy did not include any outcome-oriented performance  measures. Outcome measures address the results of programs and  services, such as reductions in overdose deaths, and they can help in  assessing the status of program operations, identifying areas that  need improvement, and ensuring accountability for results. Among  other things, we recommended in March 2018 that ONDCP  coordinate with the HIDTAs to establish outcome-oriented  performance measures to assess progress towards the goals set out  in the Heroin Response Strategy. While ONDCP neither agreed nor  disagreed with our recommendation, ONDCP told us in June 2018  that they had engaged with leaders from the HIDTAs participating in  the Heroin Response Strategy to develop performance measures,  including some outcome performance measures. As of March 4,  2019, this recommendation has not yet been addressed and ONDCP  has not provided additional information on these efforts. We continue  to believe that establishing these measures would enhance the  HIDTAs’ ability to assess whether these efforts are producing  intended results.

In October 2017, we reported on HHS’s efforts to reduce the  prevalence of opioid misuse and the fatalities associated with it by  expanding access to medication-assisted treatment (MAT) for opioid  use disorder. These efforts included four grant programs that focus  on expanding access to MAT in various settings (including rural  primary care practices and health centers) and implementing  regulatory and statutory changes that expanded treatment capacity by  increasing patient limits for a MAT medication—buprenorphine—and  by expanding the types of practitioners who can prescribe it in an  office-based setting. We found that HHS had not established  performance measures with targets that would specify the results that  HHS  hoped to achieve through its efforts, and by when. We  concluded that without this information, HHS would not have an  effective means to determine whether its efforts are helping to expand  access to MAT or whether new approaches are needed. Among  other things, we recommended that HHS establish performance  measures with targets related to expanding access to MAT for opioid  use disorders. HHS concurred with the recommendation and in  February 2019, provided information that the agency had established  performance measures with targets to increase the number of  prescriptions for certain MAT medications, one of the potential ways  to measure access to MAT. However, the recommendation has not  yet been fully addressed, in part because HHS did not provide  information on measures related to the treatment capacity of providers  who prescribe or administer MAT medications, which HHS had  identified as another way to measure access. We continue to believe  that fully implementing this recommendation will help ensure that  invested resources in the program are yielding intended results.

As our prior work shows, using data—such as information collected by  performance measures and findings from program evaluations and  research studies—to drive decision-making can help federal agencies  improve program implementation, identify and correct problems, and  make other management decisions. Although agencies may struggle to  effectively use this approach, regular performance reviews and evidence- based policy tools can help them incorporate performance information  into federal decision-making. Without effective long-term plans, such as a  national strategy, that clearly articulate goals and objectives and without  specific measures to track performance, federal agencies cannot fully  assess whether taxpayer dollars are invested in ways that will achieve  desired outcomes. ONDCP’s responsibility to develop the National Drug  Control Strategy and coordinate among federal agencies offers the  agency an important opportunity to guide federal activities to address the  unprecedented number of drug overdose deaths. We are continuing with  ongoing and planned work to monitor and assess federal drug control  efforts.

Chairman Cummings, Ranking Member Jordan, and Members of the  Committee, this concludes our prepared statement. We would be happy  to respond to any questions you may have at this time.

If you or your staff has any questions concerning this testimony, please  contact Triana McNeil at (202) 512-8777 (McNeilT@gao.gov) or Mary  Denigan-Macauley at (202) 512-7114 (DeniganMacauleyM@gao.gov).  Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public  Affairs may be found on the last page of this statement. In addition to the  contacts named above, Joy Booth (Assistant Director), Will Simerl  (Assistant Director), Michelle Loutoo Wilson (Analyst in Charge), Billy  Commons, Helen Desaulniers, Wendy Dye, Jane Eyre, Kaitlin  Farquharson, and Jan Montgomery made key contributions to the  testimony. Other staff who made key contributions to the reports cited in  the testimony are identified in the source products.

Drug Control: DOD Should Improve Its Oversight of the National Guard  Counterdrug Program. GAO-19-27. Washington, D.C.: January 17, 2019.

Colombia: U.S. Counternarcotics Assistance Achieved Some Positive  Results but State Needs to Review the Overall U.S. Approach.  GAO-19-106. Washington, D.C.: December 12, 2018.

Opioid Crisis: Status of Public Health Emergency Authorities.  GAO-18-685R. Washington, D.C.: September 26, 2018.

Prescription Opioids: Medicare Needs Better Information to Reduce the  Risk of Harm to Beneficiaries. GAO-18-585T. Washington, D.C.: May 29,  2018.

VA Health Care: Progress Made Towards Improving Opioid Safety, but  Further Efforts to Assess Progress and Reduce Risk Are Needed.  GAO-18-380. Washington, D.C.: May 29, 2018.

Illicit Opioids: Office of National Drug Control Policy and Other Agencies  Need to Better Assess Strategic Efforts. GAO-18-569T. Washington,  D.C.: May 17, 2018.

Illicit Opioids: While Greater Attention Given to Combating Synthetic  Opioids, Agencies Need to Better Assess their Efforts. GAO-18-205.  Washington, D.C.: March 29, 2018.

Substance Use Disorder: Information on Recovery Housing Prevalence,  Selected States’ Oversight, and Funding. GAO-18-315. Washington,  D.C.: March 22, 2018.

Substance-Affected Infants: Additional Guidance Would Help States  Better Implement Protections for Children. GAO-18-196. Washington,  D.C.: January 19, 2018.

Opioid Use Disorders: HHS Needs Measures to Assess the Effectiveness  of Efforts to Expand Access to Medication-Assisted Treatment.  GAO-18-44. Washington, D.C.: October 31, 2017.

Counternarcotics: Overview of U.S. Efforts in the Western Hemisphere.  GAO-18-10. Washington, D.C.: October 13, 2017.

Preventing Drug Abuse: Low Participation by Pharmacies and Other  Entities as Voluntary Collectors of Unused Prescription Drugs.  GAO-18-25. Washington, D.C.: October 12, 2017.

Prescription Opioids: Medicare Needs to Expand Oversight Efforts to  Reduce the Risk of Harm. GAO-18-15. Washington, D.C.: October 6,  2017.

Newborn Health: Federal Action Needed to Address Neonatal Abstinence  Syndrome. GAO-18-32. Washington, D.C.: October 4, 2017.

Opioid Addiction: Laws, Regulations and Other Factors Can Affect  Medication-Assisted Treatment Access. GAO-16-833. Washington, D.C.:  September 27, 2016.

Anti-Money Laundering: U.S. Efforts to Combat Narcotics-Related Money  Laundering in the Western Hemisphere. GAO-17-684. Washington, D.C.:  August 22, 2017.

International Mail Security: Costs and Benefits of Using Electronic Data to  Screen Mail Need to Be Assessed. GAO-17-606. Washington, D.C.:  August 2, 2017.

Drug Control Policy: Information on Status of Federal Efforts and Key  Issues for Preventing Illicit Drug Use. GAO-17-766T. Washington, D.C.:  July 26, 2017.

Medicaid Expansion: Behavioral Health Treatment Use in Selected States  in 2014. GAO-17-529. Washington, D.C.: June 22, 2017.

Drug-Free Communities Support Program: Agencies Have Strengthened  Collaboration but Could Enhance Grantee Compliance and Performance  Monitoring. GAO-17-120. Washington, D.C.: February 7, 2017.

Highlights of a Forum: Preventing Illicit Drug Use. GAO-17-146SP.  Washington, D.C.: November 14, 2016.

Drug Enforcement Administration: Additional Actions Needed to Address  Prior GAO Recommendations. GAO-16-737T. Washington, D.C.: June  22, 2016.

State Marijuana Legalization: DOJ Should Document Its Approach to  Monitoring the Effects of Legalization. GAO-16-419T. Washington, D.C.:  April 5, 2016.

Firearms Trafficking: U.S. Efforts to Combat Firearms Trafficking to  Mexico Have Improved, but Some Collaboration Challenges Remain.  GAO-16-223. Washington, D.C.: January 11, 2016.

Prenatal Drug Use and Newborn Health: Federal Efforts Need Better  Planning and Coordination. GAO-15-203. Washington, D.C.: February 10,  2015.

Office of National Drug Control Policy: Office Could Better Identify  Opportunities to Increase Program Coordination. GAO-13-333.  Washington, D.C.: March 26, 2013.

Prescription Pain Reliever Abuse: Agencies Have Begun Coordinating  Education Efforts, but Need to Assess Effectiveness. GAO-12-115.  Washington, D.C.: December 22, 2011.

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Over 70,000 people died of drug overdoses in the United States in 2017. Overdoses are at their highest ever-recorded level.

This testimony includes our preliminary observations on the 2019 National Drug Control Strategy—which is intended to help coordinate more than a dozen agencies’ efforts to address illicit drug use.

The strategy does not include certain legally required information, such as specific targets against which agency success can be measured.

In prior work, we recommended that agencies establish such measures. Without them, agencies cannot truly assess whether their efforts are achieving desired outcomes.


Rail Safety: Freight Trains Are Getting Longer, and Additional Information Is Needed to Assess Their Impact

In 2017, the U.S. freight rail system moved over 1.5-billion tons of goods. The largest freight railroads—Class Is—dominate the industry and account for more than 90 percent of its annual revenue. In recent years, railroad workers and local communities have expressed safety concerns related to longer freight trains, and recent accidents involving such trains are currently under investigation by FRA. FRA does not currently place limits on freight train length.

GAO was asked to review the safety and other impacts of longer freight trains. This report examines: (1) changes in freight train length over time, (2) safety considerations for operating longer freight trains, and (3) the extent to which FRA is assessing any safety risks. GAO reviewed relevant statutes, regulations, and federal agencies' reports and plans; analyzed available data on freight train length from railroads; and interviewed federal officials and various stakeholders, including state and local officials and first responders from five states (selected to represent different railroads and regions), and officials from the railroad industry, unions, and advocacy groups.

Freight train length has increased in recent years, according to all seven Class I freight railroads. Data on train length are not publicly available; however data provided to GAO by two Class I railroads indicated that their average train length has increased by about 25 percent since 2008, with average lengths of 1.2 and 1.4 miles in 2017. Officials from all seven Class I railroads said they are currently operating longer than average trains on specific routes, although some said such trains are a small percentage of the trains they operate. One railroad said it runs a 3-mile-long train twice weekly. Officials identified increased efficiencies and economic benefits among the advantages of longer freight trains.

Stakeholders said that the arrangement of train cars and locomotives—known as “train makeup”—and the potential for blocking highway-railroad crossings are issues to consider to safely operate longer freight trains. To prevent derailment, stakeholders said it is important that longer trains are arranged appropriately and that crews are trained to operate them. While Class I railroads and others said that longer trains may decrease the frequency of blocked crossings, some state and local officials said these trains can prolong their duration, posing challenges for emergency responders unable to cross the tracks.

The Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) is studying the safety risks of and strategies for operating longer trains. As part of the study, FRA plans to analyze train-handling and braking capabilities under varying conditions. FRA officials said they plan to share their research results with relevant stakeholders; however, FRA currently has no documented strategy for sharing the results of its research. FRA officials are also analyzing which parts of the country are reporting frequently blocked crossings. However, FRA officials said they do not plan to use information from either of these efforts to determine whether longer freight trains might contribute to increases in blocked crossings, and the officials believe the issues are unrelated. Developing and implementing a strategy for sharing FRA's research results and identifying any potential impacts of longer freight trains on highway-railroad crossings would enable FRA and stakeholders to better determine what, if any, actions are needed to ensure the safe operation of longer freight trains.

GAO recommends that FRA develop and implement a strategy to share the results of its study on longer trains and work with railroads to engage state and local governments to identify and reduce impacts of longer freight trains on highway-railroad crossings. FRA concurred with GAO's recommendations.

The nation’s freight railroad network is vital to the functioning of the  economy. In 2017, the United States’ freight rail system moved over 1.5- billion tons of goods across the country, including hazardous materials,  bulk goods such as grain and coal, and consumer goods. Generally,  railroads transport these goods safely. While freight-rail traffic has grown  following the 2008 recession, train accidents have declined, according to  the Federal Railroad Administration’s (FRA) data, with train accidents  per million-train-miles decreasing by about 14 percent between 2008 and  2017.

In recent years, railroad workers and communities have expressed  concerns regarding the safety of railroads operating longer freight trains,  some of which are nearly 3 miles long. These concerns include whether train crews are adequately trained to operate longer trains, the ability of  long trains to effectively activate brakes, and the impacts on highway-rail  at-grade crossings, also known as “grade crossings”—where streets and  highways intersect with train tracks at the same level.

Some recent accidents involving longer freight trains are under  investigation by FRA, the federal rail-safety-regulating agency, and the  National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), an independent federal  agency that investigates serious transportation accidents, including those  involving rail. For example, in 2017, a freight train over 2 miles long  consisting of 178 railcars of mixed freight—including flammable and  hazardous liquid—derailed in Hyndman, Pennsylvania causing significant  damage. NTSB is currently investigating many factors associated with the  cause of the derailment, including the length, makeup, and operation of  the train. Although FRA oversees various aspects of freight railroad  safety, it has no specific regulatory requirements that limit train length or  define what constitutes a “long” train.

You asked us to review the potential impacts on railroads, workers, and  local communities of operating longer freight trains. This report examines what is known about changes in freight train length over time,  views of selected stakeholders on safety considerations for operating  longer trains and the potential impact of these trains on communities,  and  the extent to which FRA is assessing any safety risks of operating  longer trains.

To address these objectives, we analyzed data provided by Class I  railroads on average train-length in feet over time and reviewed  documents and interviewed officials from all seven Class I railroads  regarding their operation of longer trains. As data on train-length in feet  are not publicly available, we requested information from these railroads.  Five of the seven railroads provided data on average train-length in feet  over time; however, only two railroads provided data for a period of at  least 10 years. We also analyzed data from the Association of American  Railroads (AAR) to determine average number of railcars and weight per  train for calendar years 2008 through 2017, the most recent year for  which data were available. These data are the only publicly available  data on the number of railcars per train, and there are limitations to how  the data can be used. For example, the average number of railcars per  train cannot be used to precisely estimate train-length in feet due to  variations in cars’ lengths. According to our review of the data, relevant  documentation, and conversations with staff responsible for the data, we  determined these data were sufficiently reliable to describe what is known  about changes in freight train-length over time.

In addition, we reviewed relevant statutes, regulations, our prior reports,  and documentation of federal agencies’ actions and plans and  interviewed a variety of stakeholders. Specifically, we reviewed  documents and interviewed officials from federal agencies—including  FRA, NTSB, and the Surface Transportation Board (STB)—and a variety  of other relevant stakeholders, including officials from national  associations representing railroad employee unions, shippers, cities and  towns, emergency managers, and emergency responders. We also  reviewed relevant studies and interviewed academic researchers and  other experts and individuals knowledgeable about freight train  operations, including officials from Canada’s rail safety agencies and  representatives from companies that manufacture braking equipment for  the rail industry. In addition, we selected a non-generalizable sample of  five states in five of FRA’s eight geographic regions, based upon a variety  of factors, including locations where Class I railroads are known to  operate longer trains, grade-crossing complaints, and variation in FRA  region and geographic location. Based on these criteria, we selected the  following states: Florida, Illinois, Ohio, Texas, and Washington. We  reviewed documents and interviewed relevant stakeholders from all of  these states, including state-level transportation and emergency  management officials, state rail-safety inspectors, and local officials,  including emergency responders.

We identified standards for generally accepted research practices and  good practices for risk management. We also identified best practices  for strategic planning and applied relevant federal standards for internal  control that are key to helping agencies achieve their missions and  desired results. We evaluated FRA’s efforts to assess safety risks of  longer trains using these standards and selected strategic planning,  research, and risk management practices from our prior work.

We conducted this performance audit from February 2018 to May 2019 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.

The U.S. freight rail network is a private industry that moves about 40  percent of U.S. freight across about 140,000 miles of track. Freight  railroads are responsible for the safety of their trains, tracks, and  personnel. These railroads rely on their revenues for funding to perform  track inspections and maintenance. Close to 600 freight railroads operate  in the United States, and they are divided into three classes according to  revenues. The seven Class I freight railroads, those with approximately  $447.6 million or more in annual revenue over 3 consecutive years,  account for more than 90 percent of the annual revenues of the railroad- freight industry and employ 90 percent of railroad employees. Class I  freight railroads move freight over long-haul routes and face competition  from each other and from other freight-shipping modes, such as trucks  and barges. Class II and III railroads tend to operate over much smaller  geographic areas than Class I railroads and employ fewer people.

Trains operate on different types of train tracks, including main line  tracks—the primary rail arteries trains use to travel—and sidings, which  are primarily auxiliary tracks for trains to pass one another. Trains can be  stored, sorted, and assembled in railyards. Railroads use main line and  sidings to enable trains to enter and leave the yard. Outside railyards,  some sections of main line track have sidings that lead to a parallel set of  rails to allow trains to pass one another. In addition, some portions of  main line track consist of two or more parallel sets of track to allow trains  to pass one another or travel in opposite directions. See figure 1 for an  illustration of different track types and siding.

Train makeup refers to the placement of individual railcars that make up a  train. A typical train consists of a locomotive—the power and control unit  where the train operator sits at the front of the train—followed by  connected railcars. The lead locomotive pulls the train and provides  control for other functions, including braking. Freight trains carry a variety  of freight using different types of railcars that vary in capacity, length, and  weight. When assembling a train, railroads consider a variety of factors— such as each car’s weight, length, freight, and whether it is loaded or  empty—when determining its position in the train. Train make up is also  dependent on external conditions, such as variations in terrain and  weather conditions. Railroads can place radio-controlled locomotives,  called distributed power (DP) units, throughout trains to spread out pulling  and pushing power, which we discuss in more detail below.

Proper train makeup is critical for ensuring a train is able to effectively  negotiate track and prevent derailment, according to FRA. Improperly  assembled trains are more susceptible to derailment, in part because of  vertical, longitudinal, and lateral forces throughout the train—also known  as “in-train” forces—that can affect the stability of a train on its tracks,  depending on a variety of factors, including the train’s speed and terrain.  For example, excessive “in-train” forces can cause a long, heavy train to  pull apart or climb off the track upon a change of grade (e.g., going up or  down hills) or when the train enters a curve.  “Unit trains”—which carry a single commodity, such as coal or oil, to one  destination—experience in-train forces that are easier for railroads to  model and engineers to predict because the railcars are generally uniform  in size and weight. In comparison, determining train makeup is more  complex in mixed freight trains, which can experience more unpredictable  in-train forces resulting from railcars of different weights, lengths, and  freight (e.g., bulk goods such as grain and coal, consumer goods such as  automobiles, or hazardous materials). For example, if a train is  assembled in a manner in which empty railcars alternate with loaded,  heavy railcars, braking can create compression at the couplers and cause  “buckling”—when an empty train car is compressed between heavier  railcars and derails from the train tracks.

Freight trains in the United States utilize air-braking systems to control  speed and stop. A conventional air-braking system is controlled by an air  pressure signal from the leading locomotive, which sends a signal  through the train to engage brakes. Because each railcar receives this  signal sequentially, it takes multiple seconds for railcars at the end of the  train to receive the air pressure signal and begin braking, depending on  the train’s length. The application of air brakes generates in-train forces,  as railcars at the front of the train that have applied brakes will be pushed  by railcars further back that have not yet received the air signal.

Other technologies, including two-way end-of-train devices and DP, are  frequently used by U.S. railroads in conjunction with conventional brakes  to provide improved braking performance or other benefits. End-of-train  devices measure brake pressure and transmit this information via radio  signal to the front of the train. An end-of train-device can also engage air  brakes at the rear end of a train in an emergency to decrease the time  required to apply the brakes on all cars. As previously mentioned,  railroads can also place radio-controlled locomotives, called DP units,  throughout trains to spread out pulling and pushing power and improve  braking. For example, engineers can engage a DP locomotive’s air  brakes at the same time as a leading locomotive to decrease the time  needed to activate brakes throughout the train. (See fig. 2.) Engineers  can also use a locomotive’s dynamic brake system, which uses traction  generated by the engine, to slow a train.

While most railroads employ conventional brakes, railroads can also  employ electronically controlled pneumatic brakes—which provide an  electronic brake signal instantaneously throughout a train—allowing  railcars to brake faster than with conventional air brakes. As we  previously reported, electronically controlled pneumatic brakes reduce the  in-train forces that occur during braking when individual cars push and  pull against one another.

Freight trains in the United States generally operate with two crew  members—the conductor and the engineer. The conductor is responsible  for the train, freight, and crew. The engineer operates the locomotive,  including application of air brakes, dynamic brakes, and any radio- controlled DP locomotives. Train crews use hand-held radios to  communicate when they are working in different parts of the train. For  example, if the crew detects a train maintenance issue, the conductor  may need to leave the locomotive and walk the length of the train to  address the problem. In these situations, the conductor may use a hand- held radio to communicate.

The U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) is responsible for ensuring  the safety of the transportation system. Within DOT, FRA is the primary  federal agency responsible for formulating railroad safety policies and  regulations and for monitoring and enforcing railroads’ compliance with  requirements. FRA’s mission is to enable the safe, reliable, and efficient  movement of people and goods.

FRA provides regulatory oversight of the safety of U.S. railroads,  including both passenger and freight. FRA issues and enforces safety  regulations including requirements governing track, signal, and train  control systems, grade-crossing warning systems, mechanical equipment  such as locomotives and railcars, and railroad-operating practices. In  developing most of its regulations, FRA seeks input from the railroad  industry and other organizations through its Railroad Safety Advisory  Committee.

FRA provides oversight of railroad safety through a variety of activities,  including periodic inspections and enforcement actions. FRA has safety  inspectors and specialists in eight regional offices that are primarily  responsible for the enforcement of federal laws and regulations related to  railroad safety. FRA conducts inspections of railroads to monitor  compliance with safety regulations, such as those governing the transport  of hazardous materials, among other issues. In addition, 31 states  conduct inspections for compliance with federal safety regulations. FRA  trains state inspectors to enable them to conduct inspections according to  FRA’s standards.

In addition to these activities, FRA conducts other types of safety  oversight to reduce train accidents, such as analyzing railroad safety  data, investigating accidents, and reviewing complaints. FRA also funds  research and development to support its safety oversight. FRA’s Office of  Research, Development, and Technology conducts research to  understand railroad safety risks and improve safety. This work contributes  information used to inform FRA’s development of regulations, standards,  and best practices.

Other federal agencies also have roles in overseeing freight railroads,  such as through promoting safety or regulating railroad industry  economics. For example, NTSB is an independent federal agency that  produces safety studies and investigates transportation-related accidents  across all transportation modes to determine probable causes, identify  safety issues, and make recommendations to prevent recurrences. STB  oversees significant rail-service matters and resolves rate and service  disputes between railroads and their customers, known as “shippers.”  Class I railroads report data to STB on the amount and type of freight  they transport. STB produces and releases statistical data derived from  the railroad’s submitted data.

Freight Train Length Has Increased, and Railroads Identified Advantages to Operating Longer Trains

According to officials from all seven Class I freight railroads and  representatives from AAR, FRA, STB, and other stakeholders we  interviewed, freight train-length has increased in recent years; however,  the data are limited. According to data that two Class I railroads provided  to us, their average train length increased over the 10-year period of 2008  through 2017 by about 1,500 feet for one railroad (from about 6,000 to  7,500 feet, or up to about 1.4 miles) and about 1,200 feet for the other  railroad (from about 4,900 to 6,100 feet, or up to about 1.2 miles). These  data represent an increase in the average length of a train of about 25  percent for both railroads. Two additional Class I railroads reported  average train lengths between about 5,800 and 6,600 feet for the year  2017. However, we were not able to verify increases more broadly  because FRA, STB, and AAR do not collect comprehensive data on train- length in feet, and while such data are collected by Class I railroads, they  are not publicly available. Officials from two Class I railroads stated that  operating longer trains is not a new practice, and one official noted that  the railroad has been operating trains in excess of 10,000 feet in selected  rail corridors for almost 30 years. Officials from AAR added that increases  in train length over time have likely been gradual.

While two Class I railroads provided data on average freight train-length  over time, officials from each of the seven Class I railroads stated that  they operate longer trains. Railroad officials said they operate these trains  in certain rail corridors that have the capacity to accommodate longer  trains, and not over their entire rail networks. For example, officials from  one Class I railroad said they are running on a daily basis a 12,000-foot  train—which is about 2.3 miles long—and another reported that twice  weekly it operates a 16,000-foot train—which is about 3 miles long—on a  route linking the mid-west to the west coast. Both of these Class I  railroads noted that longer trains such as these are a small percentage of  the trains they operate. More specifically, one of these railroads reported  that over the previous 24 months, about 1 percent of its train-miles were  traveled by trains over 10,000 feet long, and the other reported that about  2 percent of its current train-miles were traveled by trains over 10,000 feet  long.

Other data describing the average number of railcars per train and  average weight of trains indicate an overall increase over the past 10  years. However, these measures are not proxies for freight train-length  since the length and weight of railcars can vary significantly depending on  their design and freight. Class I railroads are required to report data,  such as the freight car-miles, to STB annually, and AAR aggregates and  makes this information publicly available in various publications. We  analyzed these data and found that the average number of railcars per  freight train across all Class I railroads increased from 71.0 to 73.2  railcars per train (an increase of about 3 percent) from 2008 through  2017. Additionally, FRA and some Class I railroad officials stated that  railroads operate freight trains that have more than twice this average  number of railcars—including trains with 150 railcars or more. Similarly,  the average train weight increased from about 5,978 tons to 6,577 tons  per train (an increase of about 10 percent) from 2008 through 2017.

Class I railroad officials said that there are advantages to operating longer  freight trains in some rail corridors and that operating longer trains is part  of strategic planning for many railroads for a variety of reasons. Officials  from all Class I railroads stated that they operate longer trains in some rail  corridors as a way to increase efficiencies, such as fuel efficiency, and  decrease costs by reducing the number of train crew and other costs.  Additionally, railroad officials said that running longer trains can mean that  they do not need to operate as many trains—officials from six Class I  railroads specifically indicated they are operating fewer shorter trains as a  result of operating longer trains. Further, Class I railroad officials stated  that market forces, such as competition from the trucking industry, create  an incentive for them to increase efficiency. Class I railroad officials also  stated that the use of certain technologies, such as DP locomotives,  enables them to operate longer trains more safely. Other Class I railroad  officials attributed their increased usage of longer trains to capital  improvements on railroad tracks, such as lengthening the sidings to  accommodate longer trains.

Stakeholders Identified Considerations for Safely Operating Longer Freight Trains and Potential Impacts on Communities

Considerations for Operating Longer Trains Include Train Makeup and Handling and Crew Training

While the need for proper train makeup and handling are not unique to  longer trains, it is particularly important for their safe operation, according  to stakeholders we spoke with. As previously discussed, the length of  each train and its makeup—the manner in which its cars and locomotives  are arranged—can affect the forces involved on a moving train.  Stakeholders we spoke with said that the consequences of improper train  makeup may be more pronounced in longer trains—especially in  situations with extremes in track grade, curvature, or weather  conditions—and may add to the challenges of operating longer trains. For  example, FRA has investigated accidents in which it determined that train  makeup and handling were the probable cause and contributing factors in  train derailments of longer freight trains. According to officials from FRA,  NTSB, railroad employee unions, and other stakeholders, longer mixed- freight trains may be more difficult to handle than unit trains in certain  circumstances due to variations in car length and weight and the extent to  which additional DP locomotives are employed.

Stakeholders noted that placing additional DP locomotives within a train  can improve train handling and prevent train separations and derailments.  Stakeholders added that using DP can also help improve air brake  performance and reduce braking response time, as previously discussed.  In addition, according to stakeholders, use of properly positioned DP  locomotives can improve radio communication between the lead  locomotive and rear DP locomotives on longer trains. Union  representatives added that in their view, the safest train-braking  operations are when DP locomotives are used in conjunction with  electronically controlled pneumatic brakes. According to representatives  from AAR and Class I railroads, however, freight railroads have faced  challenges with these braking systems, including reliability issues, as we  have noted in a previous report.

While there are no comprehensive federal regulations that govern train  makeup, including use of DP locomotives, representatives of Class I  railroads told us they consider a variety of factors when determining train  makeup to ensure safe operation of all of their trains, including tonnage,  train-length, and terrain. According to one railroad, using software to  determine train makeup and predict train handling needs is an industry  standard and critical best practice. Another railroad told us they use  computer simulations to develop rules for train makeup in order to  operate longer and heavier trains. Some railroads told us they impose  length and weight restrictions on specific routes to ensure safe train  operation and manage corridor capacity. Union representatives and rail  experts we spoke with told us that in their view, railroads do not always  properly assemble their longer trains, for example placing heavy railcars  behind lighter railcars, a practice that can increase the likelihood of  derailment. These stakeholders also said that railroads do not always use  DP with longer trains, which experts attributed to the extra cost of  deploying additional locomotives. We did not independently verify how the  railroads we spoke with assemble or operate longer trains.

Stakeholders we interviewed said that it is essential that crews are  properly trained to operate longer freight trains. FRA regulations require  railroads to train and certify their train crews. More specifically, FRA  requires qualified locomotive engineers to demonstrate proficiency in  operating trains in the most demanding type of service they may be  permitted to perform, which includes operating longer trains. Railroads  are required to conduct annual performance evaluations of engineers to  ensure that they can safely operate trains according to federal railroad  safety requirements. Representatives of Class I railroads told us they  train their crews on trains and simulators with various routes, scenarios,  and train lengths. However, union representatives said that some  railroads do not provide sufficient training for crews to operate longer  trains, and that some locomotive engineers and conductors lack the  necessary training and experience to handle longer trains, a situation that  can be challenging even for properly trained crew. As discussed later,  FRA is planning to review this issue when it performs planned audits of  Class I railroads’ training programs.

Stakeholders we interviewed identified additional challenges for crews  when operating longer freight trains related to crew members’ fatigue. For  example, according to FRA, union representatives, and other  stakeholders, a longer train may require crew members to walk a long  distance if the train stops unexpectedly. For example, when there is a  mechanical or other problem that causes a train to stop, the conductor  may have to walk from the lead locomotive to the problem area and back  again. This could mean walking 4 miles to the end and back on a 2-mile- long train. Also, according to FRA officials, as with any train that is left  unattended, the crew must apply a sufficient number of handbrakes to  prevent unintended movement. With longer and heavier trains, railroads  may require additional handbrakes to be applied. According to union  representatives, such physically demanding tasks can increase crew  fatigue.

Longer Trains May Impact Grade Crossings in Communities

Stakeholders we interviewed expressed divergent views about whether  longer trains may increase or decrease blockages at grade crossings.  Our prior work has noted a connection between the volume of freight rail  traffic and the potential for grade-crossing blockages to increase. In  2014, we found that trends in freight flows, if they continue as expected,  may exacerbate congestion issues in communities, particularly along  certain corridors. FRA officials told us that complaints about blocked  highway-rail grade crossings have increased in recent years. They noted  that blocked crossings are a local concern and it is not clear the extent to  which longer freight trains are contributing to increases in reporting about  such blockages. According to FRA, trains sometimes block crossings for  a limited time or for hours if an accident or mechanical problem occurs.  They noted that such blockages can be created by trains of any length  and that in their experience, railroads prioritize movement of longer trains,  making it less likely that such trains would be responsible for prolonged  blockages of crossings. Furthermore, officials from FRA and Class I  railroads and others we spoke with pointed out that longer trains may  decrease the frequency of blocked crossings, as railroads may run fewer  trains.

In contrast, officials from the National League of Cities, as well as state  and local officials we spoke with, expressed concerns over increased  frequency of longer trains and their impact on grade crossing safety.  Although they also acknowledged that trains of any length can block  grade crossings, they raised concerns that longer trains prolong the  duration of a blockage and can block more crossings concurrently,  making it harder for vehicles to find an alternate route around the train.  Consequently, these stakeholders are concerned that longer trains create  increased delays for emergency responders and increase the likelihood of  unsafe behavior among motorists and pedestrians, as outlined below.

Delayed emergency response. According to national, state, and local  officials we interviewed, longer trains pose concerns about the  potential for emergency response delays if responders encounter a  train blocking one or more crossings and cannot quickly find an  alternate route around it. (See fig. 3.) For example, officials in Mount  Victory, Ohio, reported that 22 freight trains travel through their town  daily, including a 16,000-feet train, which is nearly 3 miles long. This  train blocks 4-to-5 grade crossings concurrently, which increases the  time to access parts of the town, according to local officials. Our prior  work has found that blocked highway-railroad grade crossings can  have significant impacts on emergency response time and  outcomes. For example, we reported an instance of a fire that  destroyed a house while train traffic blocked the only two crossings in  the town and prevented fire crews from responding in time. In another  example, a local official in Texas said that one Class I railroad  assembles trains and conducts brake checks on the main line tracks  because the trains are too long to fit into sidings and railyards.  Executing such procedures on mainline track has blocked grade  crossings for up to several hours and poses safety challenges for  surrounding communities, according to this local official. As a result of  situations like these, communities are looking for ways to mitigate  delays in emergency services when emergency vehicles must find  ways around blocked grade crossings. For instance, some local  officials in Washington and Ohio said they have revised their  emergency response plans to avoid grade crossings that are likely to  be blocked.

Motorist and pedestrian behavior. Stakeholders we spoke with  expressed concerns that longer trains may increase the likelihood of  unsafe behavior among motorists and pedestrians. For example,  fatalities can occur when motorists or pedestrians engage in risky  behavior such as trying to make it across the tracks before an  approaching train reaches the crossing. Moreover, pedestrians have  been known to crawl over, through, or under stopped trains (see fig.  4). For example, local officials in Ohio and Texas told us that they  have witnessed children crawling through stopped trains to get to  school. Research sponsored by FRA has identified driver behavior as  the main cause of highway-rail grade crossing collisions, but other  factors such as train and traffic volume can contribute to the risk of a  crash occurring.

Although there are no current federal regulations that directly address  blocked crossings or limit the amount of time trains can block grade  crossings, some states and localities have attempted to address this  issue. For example, some states and localities have passed laws  limiting the duration of blocked crossings and proposed fines for  railroads, but state and local officials and other stakeholders we spoke  with said that federal law preempts such efforts. Other states and local  communities have attempted to address blocked crossings through  studies and communication with federal agencies and railroads, with  mixed success. For example, the Texas Department of Transportation  has undertaken mobility studies for the towns of El Paso and Laredo to  identify options to address blocked crossings, such as constructing  bridges or underpasses. According to officials with the Texas Department  of Transportation, these studies identified alternatives that may help  alleviate some of the vehicular/rail conflicts if they were implemented;  however, the implementation of alternatives for any potential projects are  constrained by the availability of funds. In other examples, local officials  from Ohio and Illinois told us they have contacted Class I railroads and  FRA to find solutions when idle trains lead to blocked crossings,  especially when emergency access is a concern but continue to face  challenges. Class I railroads and FRA officials said they work with local  communities to find solutions to these issues.

Additionally, state and local officials noted that they do not have access to  information on the length of trains that travel through their communities.  Some added that freight railroads are not required to provide such data  and that local efforts to gather this information, such as through  videotaping train movements and analyzing data, are costly. This  circumstance makes it challenging for state and local officials to assess  the extent to which longer trains may or may not be contributing to  blocked crossings.

FRA Is Studying Operational Risks of Longer Trains but Lacks a Strategy for Sharing Research Results and Is Not Fully Assessing Community Risks

FRA Is Studying Operational Risks of Longer Freight Trains

In the fall of 2017, FRA began a study to understand operational risks of  long freight trains. The study is examining issues related to train  makeup and handling, including the use of DP locomotives, crew training  and fatigue, and braking performance for longer trains. The study intends  to identify strategies to reduce any risks identified. According to FRA, as  the railroad industry has increased the length of freight trains, past  accepted practices for train makeup and handling may not be appropriate  for longer trains. For example, according to FRA, the current performance  standard for air brakes was last updated in 1947 and based on tests for  trains with up to 150 cars. FRA officials stated the study will conduct air  brake tests to evaluate brake performance for trains with 150-to-250  railcars and use this data to conduct computer simulations of trains in a  variety of configurations—for example, with and without DP and with DP  locomotives at different locations throughout a train—to evaluate in-train  forces. According to FRA officials, this information will help FRA  determine whether rail safety issues exist for trains with over 150 railcars  and if regulatory actions are necessary.

The study employs a two-phase approach that includes data analysis,  literature review, computer simulations, and brake testing. FRA officials  said the agency plans to complete the first phase of its study and issue a  report by the end of 2020 and issue a report on the second phase by the  end of 2021. Table 1, below, outlines specific tasks of the study by phase.

As we previously mentioned, FRA provides oversight of railroad safety  through a variety of activities to ensure compliance with regulations, such  as conducting inspections of railroad operations and reviewing and  approving new and materially modified railroad crew training programs.  According to FRA officials, these activities address safety for all freight  trains, including longer trains. In addition to these activities, FRA plans to  begin new, more in-depth audits of Class I railroads’ training programs on  a systematic basis in 2019 to determine whether engineers are being  adequately trained to operate longer trains and perform other types of  demanding service. According to FRA, these audits will determine  whether locomotive engineer certification programs are in compliance  with federal rail safety regulations. For example, federal regulations  require that railroads provide training to their engineers—through  classroom lessons and in trains or simulators—on the most demanding  type of service they may be called upon to perform. According to FRA  officials, this would include operation of longer freight trains in challenging  terrain. FRA plans to audit the training programs of three Class I railroads  by the end of 2019, selected based upon safety risk factors, with  additional audits of other railroads planned for the following year. Once  the audits are complete, FRA plans to discuss its findings with each  audited railroad and make recommendations for improvements, as  needed.

FRA Lacks a Strategy for Sharing the Results of Its Study on Longer Trains

While FRA’s study to assess operational safety risks of longer trains is  under way, the agency lacks a current, documented strategy for how it  will use and share the results of its research with relevant stakeholders.  According to FRA officials, after internal review and approval, the agency  routinely shares its research results at conferences and on its website.  However, FRA’s strategic plan for research and development, which  outlined how the agency shares research results and engages with  internal and external stakeholders in support of FRA’s rail safety mission,  expired in 2017. More specifically, this plan outlined key internal and  external stakeholders and their roles—including labor and industry  partners—and specific outreach strategies, such as holding periodic,  public events to present FRA’s research and development. This plan also  stated that FRA’s research provides the scientific and technological basis  for its rulemaking and regulation enforcement and that effectively sharing the results of its studies increases the likelihood that its research will have  “real world” impacts. According to FRA officials, the agency is currently  updating its strategic plan for research and development, which will  outline FRA’s goals and objectives for its research, and expects to finalize  the plan by the summer of 2019. FRA does not have any other  documented policies in place for how it will use or disseminate the results  of its study.

Federal internal control standards call for management to communicate  quality information—using appropriate methods—both internally and  externally in order to achieve an entity’s objectives and respond to risks.  Further, our work on best practices for strategic planning has found that  formulating specific strategies and linking them with goals and objectives  is critical for agencies to achieve these goals and objectives. In addition,  we previously identified generally accepted research standards for sound  studies, standards that include presentation of results. These standards  call for relevant stakeholders to be informed of research results and any  recommendations upon completion of a study.

The Transportation Research Board—a part of the National Academies of  Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine which provides research-based  solutions to improve transportation, among other things—has found that  organizations that develop processes and a systematic approach to  implementing research are more effective and efficient at applying  research results. FRA’s study is a first step for determining how, if at all,  makeup and handling for longer trains as well as their crews’ needs may  differ from shorter trains. If study results are effectively shared with  relevant stakeholders, then those best situated to act on the results may  be more likely to do so. For example, FRA officials—who have  rulemaking and enforcement authority—could identify and implement  changes needed to improve the safety of longer train operations, such as  by issuing relevant guidance, rulemaking, or other actions. Similarly,  external stakeholders, such as Class I railroads and workers, would have  the opportunity to use study results to inform their practices and policies,  such as making changes to internal train-makeup rules or operators’  training programs for longer trains. As FRA updates its strategic plan for  research and development, formulating specific strategies for how it will  share its research results with internal and external stakeholders would  help to ensure FRA is in the best position to achieve its research goals  and objectives in support of the agency’s mission of enabling the safe,  efficient, and reliable transportation of people and goods.

FRA Is Not Fully Assessing Community Impacts Related to Longer Trains

While FRA is taking steps to assess operational safety risks of longer  trains through its study and other efforts, it is not assessing whether  longer freight trains impact communities by blocking more grade  crossings. Safety at grade crossings has been a longstanding issue in the  United States, and according to stakeholders we spoke with, some of  these issues may be exacerbated by longer trains. In 2006, as part of its  report on the impacts of blocked grade crossings on emergency response  services, FRA stated that future growth in rail and highway traffic will  likely increase blocked crossings, and more recently FRA officials stated  that this is still the case. In addition, while collisions at grade crossings  have declined over time, FRA also expects the risk of grade-crossing  incidents to grow as both rail and highway traffic increase during the next  decade. However, FRA officials also stated that there is no evidence that  more blocked crossings results in more grade-crossing incidents. Further,  according to FRA, the agency is not in a position to address community- specific public safety issues. We have previously reported that the  amount of time that grade crossings are blocked depends on a number of  factors and is typically a function of the number, speed, and length of  trains.

Although there are no federal regulations directly addressing blocked  grade crossings, to gauge the extent of reported instances of blocked  crossings, in early 2018, FRA began to track data on the location of  blocked-crossing complaints from state rail-safety managers in nine  states. FRA officials stated they intend to use this data to identify communities where frequently blocked grade crossings are reported and  work with the railroads and communities for resolution. However, FRA  officials said they do not plan to explore any potential impacts of longer  trains on grade crossings in communities, as FRA officials have stated  they do not believe that longer trains are having an impact on blocked  crossings. For example, FRA does not plan to use any of the information  gathered in its longer train study—which will include a sampling of the  routes longer trains travel—to inform the agency’s work on blocked  crossings because FRA officials stated that they do not expect the study  will yield relevant information. State and local officials we spoke with, as  previously mentioned, expressed concerns about the potential for longer  trains to increase the number of blocked grade crossings, causing delays  for emergency responders and affecting the behavior of motorists and  pedestrians.

Federal internal control standards state that effective use of information  and communication are vital for an entity to achieve its objectives. These  standards call for management to use quality information—relevant,  reliable information that is current, complete, accurate, accessible, and  timely—to achieve an agency’s objectives and respond to risks. Further,  we previously identified essential practices for agencies to help manage  risks and identify opportunities that could impact the achievement of  agencies’ goals. These risk-management practices call on agencies to  systematically identify risks and use the best information available to  assess them.

Community officials acknowledged that while they believe longer trains  are making blocked crossings worse, they do not have access to  information needed to confirm this observation. As previously discussed,  some local communities continue to face challenges after reaching out to  FRA and Class I railroads to find solutions to issues related to grade  crossings. As these issues continue to evolve and FRA works to identify  locations where blocked crossings are reported, working with railroads  and local communities to identify any potential impacts of longer trains on  grade crossings would help FRA to determine whether and how longer  trains are affecting these communities and what could be done to address  those impacts. In addition, it would allow FRA to determine whether it  should take additional action to ensure that longer trains are operating  safely and to work with railroads to minimize their impact to the  communities through which they travel.

FRA faces a challenging task in assessing the safety impacts of longer  trains and has taken some important steps to collect needed information  through its study of longer trains’ operations. However, without  documented strategies for how it plans to communicate the results of its  research, FRA may lose an opportunity to effectively work with internal  and external stakeholders—such as railroads, railroad workers, and local  communities—to address any risks of operating longer trains in support of  the agency’s mission of enabling the safe, efficient, and reliable  transportation of people and goods. In addition, local community officials  we spoke with raised concerns that longer trains are creating safety risks  by causing emergency response delays and exacerbating dangerous  motorist and pedestrian behavior, but acknowledged that they lack  access to information on longer trains. FRA, however, is uniquely  positioned to assess whether these concerns have merit. As FRA has  stated, it expects that future growth in rail and highway traffic will increase  incidences of blocked crossings and the risk of grade-crossing incidents.  As traffic continues to grow—including railroads’ potential increased use  of longer trains—having better information could be useful to FRA and  other stakeholders. Without examining the potential impacts of longer  trains on local communities, including on blocked grade crossings, FRA  may lose an opportunity to identify what, if any, additional actions should  be taken to ensure the safety of longer trains and the communities  through which they travel.

We are making the following two recommendations to FRA:

The Administrator of FRA should develop a strategy for sharing FRA’s  research results with internal and external stakeholders and  implement that strategy for its research on the safety impacts of very  long trains. (Recommendation 1)

The Administrator of FRA should work with railroads to engage state  and local governments to (a) identify community-specific impacts of  train operations, including longer trains, where streets and highways  cross railroad rights-of-way and (b) develop potential solutions to  reduce those impacts. (Recommendation 2)

We provided a draft of this report to DOT, NTSB, and STB for their review  and comment. In its comments, reproduced in appendix I, DOT concurred  with the recommendations. DOT and STB also provided technical  comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. NTSB had no  comments.

As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce the contents of  this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days from the  report date. At that time, we will send copies of this report to the  appropriate congressional committees, the Secretary of Transportation,  the Chairman of NTSB, the Chairman of STB, and other interested  parties. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on the GAO  website at http://www.gao.gov.

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact  me at (202) 512-2834 or FlemingS@gao.gov. Contact points for our  Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on  the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this  report are listed in appendix II.

Appendix I: Comments from the U.S. Department of Transportation

Appendix II: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

In addition to the contact named above, Andrew Huddleston (Assistant  Director); Jean Cook (Analyst in Charge); Jason Coates; Philip Farah;  David Hooper; Rosa Leung; Gail Marnik; John Mingus; Madhav Panwar;  Malika Rice; Kelly Rubin; and Michelle Weathers made key contributions  to this report.

Freight trains have been getting longer—nearly 3 miles in some cases. This has raised concerns that trains may block traffic more often at road-crossings, impeding emergency responders and prompting unsafe pedestrian behavior (such as climbing through stopped trains). Braking and other operations can also be more complex for these longer trains.

The Federal Railroad Administration is studying potential safety risks and the best ways to operate longer trains.

We recommended that FRA broadly share its research results, and work with railroads and state and local officials on ways to solve road-crossing issues.