Nuclear Weapons: Additional Actions Could Help Improve Management of Activities Involving Explosive Materials

NNSA is responsible for the management and security of the U.S. nuclear stockpile. NNSA has ongoing and planned efforts to modernize nearly all of the weapons in the stockpile, which require new explosive components. The production of some key explosives ceased in the early 1990s, and much of the infrastructure supporting this work is aging, making it expensive and difficult to maintain.

The Senate Report accompanying a bill for the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018 included a provision for GAO to review NNSA's high explosive capabilities specific to nuclear weapons. This report examines (1) explosives activities that NNSA and its sites conduct and how NNSA manages them; (2) challenges NNSA officials and contractor representatives identified in conducting these activities and the extent to which NNSA has taken actions to address them; and (3) the extent to which NNSA's strategic plan for explosives activities describes further actions, if any, to address the challenges identified and follows leading practices for strategic planning. GAO reviewed NNSA documents related to explosives activities, including its strategic plan; compared the plan with leading practices; and interviewed NNSA officials and site representatives.

Five National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) contractor-operated sites conduct activities to design and produce explosive materials. There are about 100 different nuclear weapon components that contain explosive materials (see figure). Each site assumes primary responsibility for certain activities, but most activities require collaboration by multiple sites, according to NNSA officials and contractor representatives. In 2018, NNSA began adopting a centralized approach to managing these activities and coordinating them across its sites.

NNSA officials and contractor representatives identified several challenges related to explosives activities, such as the agency's dwindling supply of explosive materials, aging and deteriorating infrastructure, and difficulty recruiting and training qualified staff. For example, only a single container of one specialized material remains. NNSA officials and contractor representatives indicated that the agency is taking some actions to address these challenges, such as working to replenish the supply of dwindling, highly specialized materials.

NNSA's strategic plan for explosives activities addresses some of the challenges agency officials and contractor representatives have identified, and NNSA followed several key leading practices in developing its strategic plan. However, some of the plan's elements have not been fully developed consistent with selected leading practices. For instance, the plan does not include a fully developed mission statement, and some performance goals are not quantifiable. NNSA officials stated that they are aware of the strategic plan's limitations and that they released it quickly to ensure that the explosives community could use it as soon as possible. NNSA officials said that they intend to revise the strategic plan in the next year or so. As NNSA revises its strategic plan, by including fully developed elements of an effective strategic plan, NNSA would help make the strategic plan more useful in measuring goal achievement and assessing accountability.

GAO is making three recommendations, including that NNSA, as it revises its strategic plan for explosives activities, include fully developed elements of an effective strategic plan. NNSA agreed with GAO's recommendations.

Approximately 100 different explosive components are essential to the  operation of U.S. nuclear weapons. Explosives serve many functions in  nuclear weapons because they can deliver energy quickly and precisely.  To perform these precise functions, explosives for use in nuclear  weapons must be designed and manufactured to exacting specifications.  The Department of Energy (DOE) and its contractors ceased producing  some key explosives used in nuclear weapon components in the early  1990s. DOE’s National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) and its  contractor-operated sites have recently resumed their production and  testing of some explosives in support of ongoing life extension programs  (LEP) and modernization efforts for nuclear weapons. Each of these  efforts involves replacing or modernizing explosive components. Many of  the facilities that support NNSA’s LEPs and modernization efforts—and  the related activities to develop and produce explosives—were built in the  1940s and 1950s, making them costly and difficult to maintain. The age  and condition of some of these facilities also pose safety issues if  mitigation actions are not implemented, according to NNSA documents.  In this context, in December 2018, NNSA released its Defense Programs  Strategic Plan for Energetic Materials (strategic plan), which provided a  framework for addressing challenges related to managing explosive  materials and related activities, such as NNSA’s aging infrastructure, as  well as strategies to mitigate them.

A Senate committee report accompanying a bill for the National Defense  Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018 included a provision for us to  review NNSA’s high explosive capabilities specific to nuclear weapons.  This report examines (1) explosives activities that NNSA and its sites  conduct and how NNSA manages these activities; (2) challenges NNSA  officials and contractor representatives have identified in conducting  explosives activities and the extent to which NNSA has taken actions to  address these challenges; and (3) the extent to which NNSA’s strategic  plan for explosives activities describes further actions, if any, to address  the challenges NNSA officials and contractor representatives have  identified and follows leading practices for strategic planning.

To address all three objectives, we analyzed NNSA planning documents  pertaining to NNSA’s management of explosives, such as the December  2018 strategic plan. In addition to reviewing documents, we conducted  site visits at four of NNSA’s five contractor managed and operated sites  engaged in explosives activities—Lawrence Livermore National  Laboratory in Livermore, California (Livermore); Los Alamos National  Laboratory in Los Alamos, New Mexico (Los Alamos); the Pantex Plant in  Amarillo, Texas (Pantex); and Sandia National Laboratories in  Albuquerque, New Mexico (Sandia). We selected these sites because  they conduct nearly all of NNSA’s explosives activities. We interviewed  NNSA officials and contractor representatives on these site visits and in  follow-up meetings about the agency’s current explosives activities and  future plans related to the design and production, infrastructure,  workforce, and the overall management of NNSA’s explosives activities.  Findings from these site visits are not generalizable to all sites, but they  provide illustrative examples of explosives activities at some NNSA sites.  We also gathered information on the workforce at NNSA sites that is  engaged in explosives activities. We interviewed relevant contractor  representatives to ascertain the source of the workforce information they  provided and to understand any limitations or caveats associated with it.  We also interviewed contractor representatives from the Nevada National  Security Site (Nevada), which manages several large testing sites, and  the Department of Defense’s (DOD) Holston Army Ammunition Plant  (Holston), which is NNSA’s major supplier of explosive materials, to learn  about their involvement supporting NNSA’s explosives activities.

To describe challenges in conducting and managing explosives activities  that NNSA officials and contractor representatives identified, as well as  actions taken to address these challenges, we reviewed agency  documents and interviewed NNSA officials and contractor  representatives. In addition, we analyzed data from the Facilities  Information Management System (FIMS), DOE’s official real property  database, according to DOE’s order on real property management, on  NNSA’s explosives-related real property assets. “Assets” include  buildings, trailers, and other facilities and infrastructure, such as power  lines. In FIMS, officials enter data to describe the character of assets— such as their size, condition, and replacement value—as well as to  associate assets with the capability or programmatic activities (like  explosives) they support. To understand the data in FIMS and to assess  its reliability for our reporting purposes, we interviewed officials who  operate the database and reviewed reports that incorporated and used  the information. We also reviewed the 2019 FIMS user’s guide and DOE’s  guidance for how sites should characterize their assets in FIMS, including  how to associate an asset’s primary or secondary programmatic activity.  We also observed several assets during our site visits by randomly  selecting 22 assets out of the 625 listed as primary or secondary  explosives-related assets in FIMS data that NNSA officials provided in  April 2018 in order to validate selected information in FIMS about these  assets. We observed 5 assets out of 150 at Livermore, 6 out of 205 at  Los Alamos, 6 out of 183 at Pantex, and 5 out of 87 at Sandia. We  determined that the FIMS data were reliable for purposes of describing  the manner in which NNSA uses the system to characterize its  explosives-related assets.

To examine the extent to which NNSA’s strategic plan for explosives  activities describes further actions needed to address identified  challenges and follows leading practices for strategic planning, we  reviewed the practices NNSA used to develop, as well as elements NNSA  included in, its strategic plan and compared them with selected leading  practices and elements in federal strategic planning we had previously  identified. In addition, we reviewed the strategic plan (both the draft and  final versions) and interviewed NNSA and contractor officials about the  strategic planning process used and key elements included in the  strategic plan, as well as the extent to which the strategic plan included  information about further actions to address identified challenges.

We conducted this performance audit from February 2018 to May 2019 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.

Explosives include high explosives, propellants, and pyrotechnics.  Propellants and pyrotechnics are sometimes referred to as low  explosives. All three types of explosives serve essential functions in  nuclear weapons. Figure 1 illustrates key explosive-containing  components found in a generic nuclear weapon as well as the types of  explosives these components contain.

High explosives are the most common explosive by volume in nuclear  weapons. There are two classes of high explosives used in nuclear  weapons: insensitive high explosives (IHE) and conventional high  explosives (CHE). An IHE is less susceptible to accidental detonation  than a CHE and less violent upon accidental ignition, therefore it is safer  to handle. NNSA places a premium on safety throughout all phases of  explosives activities, including research and development, testing,  production, and storage, because handling any explosive material is  inherently dangerous, according to NNSA officials and contractor  representatives.

Producing a high explosive material generally follows four steps, as  shown in figure 2: (1) synthesis—producing raw explosive molecules; (2)  formulation—mixing raw explosive molecules with binding ingredients to  form an explosive mixture; (3) pressing—compacting formulated  explosives into shapes of the required density; and (4) machining— cutting away excess material to achieve the final shape. Analytical,  mechanical, safety, and performance testing are to occur after each step.

During synthesis, technicians use chemicals to produce fine, powder-like  raw explosives. During formulation, technicians combine the explosive  powder with plastic binder ingredients to produce a mixture that exhibits  the physical and performance properties desired. Formulated explosives  used by NNSA often appear like small, irregularly shaped pebbles, known  as prills, as shown in figure 3.

During pressing, the third step, technicians compact formulated  explosives into a solid form. During machining, the fourth step,  technicians use computer-controlled equipment to cut and shape the  explosive into its final shape. After the explosive has been machined,  technicians join explosive and non-explosive parts into functional  components during subassembly. Small-scale synthesis and formulation  and production-scale pressing, machining, and subassembly activities are  carried out at multiple NNSA sites.

After each step of the production process, NNSA’s sites conduct tests to  ensure that explosives meet NNSA’s safety and performance  requirements. During safety testing, scientists conduct a variety of tests to  ensure that explosives meet DOE’s safety requirements. Regarding  performance testing, scientists conduct other tests that require  specialized equipment. For example, scientists use scanning equipment,  like heat flow sensors, for thermal testing on formulated explosive  material. Scientists also conduct tests using X-ray imaging equipment to  evaluate weapon characteristics by detonating a “mockup.” The mockup  uses a high explosive main charge—the explosive material that surrounds  the nuclear core, known as the pit—and a nonfissile surrogate material  that has similar physical properties to plutonium. The mock implosion is  called a hydrodynamic test because the surrogate material and other  components become hot enough to flow like fluid.

Explosive Molecules and Formulations Used in Nuclear Weapons

High explosive molecules used in U.S. nuclear weapons include but are  not limited to high melting explosive (HMX), pentaerythritol tetranitrate  (PETN) and triaminotrinitrobenzene (TATB). First fielded in conventional  weapons in World War II, HMX and PETN were later introduced into  several components in the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile and are still  used in them today. DOE first introduced TATB into the nuclear stockpile  in 1979, and it is still the only molecule that DOE considers to be an IHE  (see sidebar). In all U.S. nuclear weapons, the main charge is made of  formulations of HMX or TATB. DOD also uses HMX and TATB in certain  conventional weapons.

TATB: NNSA’s Key Insensitive High  Explosive   Triaminotrinitrobenzene (TATB) is a key  insensitive high explosive that is currently  used in National Nuclear Security  Administration (NNSA) and Department of  Defense (DOD) military applications, including  nuclear and conventional weapons. Scientists  first synthesized TATB in 1888 but did not  initially recognize it as an explosive. In 1966,  Los Alamos National Laboratory developed  the industrial method for synthesizing TATB.  From the late 1970s to the late 1980s, two  domestic manufacturers supplied TATB to  DOD and NNSA. However, when the Cold  War ended and a U.S. nuclear test  moratorium began, the demand for TATB  declined, and both manufacturers ceased  production by 1993. DOD then acquired TATB  from a U.K.-based firm until its plant closed in  2005. Beginning in 2007, DOD and NNSA  collaborated to re-establish a manufacturing  capability for TATB in the United States.  Specifically, DOD’s Holston Army Ammunition  Plant (Holston), which is located in Kingsport,  Tennessee, began producing TATB in 2014.  DOD has qualified the Holston-produced  TATB for use in conventional weapons but  NNSA has not yet qualified it for use in  nuclear weapons because the material  properties of the formulated material are not  yet up to NNSA standards, according to NNSA  documentation. available binding ingredient to create a plastic bonded explosive. Each  explosive formulation is designed for a specific application. The  performance requirements for explosive formulations in nuclear weapons  are more stringent than those for conventional weapons for DOD  formulations to ensure both performance and safety. Explosives scientists  commonly use the term “recipe” to describe the ingredients and many  variables in the process—such as the temperature, mixing speed, or  container size—used to make explosive molecules and formulations that  meet specific performance requirements.

Ongoing and Planned LEPs and NNSA’s Other Modernization Plans

In December 2018, NNSA completed the last production unit for the W76- 1 LEP, marking the completion of warhead production for the first LEP in  which NNSA undertook full-scale design activities for weapon systems  since 1982. Five other LEPs and stockpile modernization efforts were  ongoing as of January 2019, as shown in table 1. As we concluded in an  April 2017 report, this is a particularly challenging time for NNSA, as the  agency plans to simultaneously execute LEPs and modernization efforts  along with major construction projects, such as efforts to modernize  NNSA’s uranium and plutonium manufacturing capabilities.

NNSA’s Sites, Infrastructure, and Workforce Levels for Explosives Activities

NNSA’s nuclear security enterprise consists of eight government-owned  sites managed and operated by seven contractors. Five of these sites  conduct explosives activities: Livermore, Los Alamos, Sandia, Pantex,  and Nevada. In addition to these sites, NNSA relies on several third-party  suppliers of explosive materials and related equipment. The largest of  these is Holston, which is a government-owned, contractor-operated  facility that primarily produces explosives for DOD. Holston is NNSA’s  sole supplier of explosives used in main charges.

The infrastructure that supports NNSA’s explosives activities consists of  thousands of real property assets, which are to be tracked in FIMS. The  database is managed for NNSA missions by its Office of Safety,  Infrastructure and Operations. According to NNSA officials and DOE  documents, FIMS helps managers understand the current state of NNSA  infrastructure and inform infrastructure modernization funding decisions.  We have previously reported on concerns about the accuracy of the FIMS  database with respect to certain data fields that were not assessed as  part of this review. DOE has taken sufficient steps to address  recommendations we have previously made about FIMS.

Workforce levels for explosives activities have generally increased in  recent years, which contractor representatives attribute to the increase in  workload because of LEP and modernization efforts. Table 2 shows  NNSA contractor representatives’ estimates for actual full-time  equivalents (FTE) and percentages of FTEs engaged in explosives  activities at each of the five sites over the last 5 fiscal years.

Selected Leading Practices in Federal Strategic Planning

The Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 as amended  (GPRA) requires, among other things, that federal agencies develop  strategic plans. The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) provides  guidance to federal executive branch agencies on how to prepare their  agency-wide strategic plans in accordance with GPRA requirements, as  updated and expanded by the GPRA Modernization Act of 2010. We  have reported that these requirements also can serve as leading  practices for strategic planning at lower levels within federal agencies,  such as planning for individual divisions, programs, or initiatives. In  addition, we have reported in the past on federal agencies’ strategic  planning efforts and have identified additional useful practices to enhance  agencies’ strategic plans. The leading practices in federal strategic  planning that we selected are: (1) involving stakeholders, such as federal  agencies, state governments, or others, in defining the mission and  desired outcomes, which helps ensure that their expectations and  interests are met and that resources and efforts are targeted at the  program’s highest priorities; (2) assessing external and internal forces,  which helps managers anticipate future challenges and make  adjustments before potential problems become crises; and (3) covering at  least a 4-year period while making adjustments as needed to reflect the  operating environment.

Further, our past work has shown that effective strategic plans should  include several specific elements. These elements include: (1) a  comprehensive mission statement that explains why a program exists and  what it does; (2) long-term goals and objectives that specify how an  agency will carry out its mission and explain what results are expected  from the program; (3) strategies to achieve the goals and objectives that  are specific enough to allow an agency to assess whether the strategies  will help achieve those goals; (4) a description of how performance  measures will be used to assess progress toward long-term goals; and  (5) the identification of external factors that could significantly affect  achievement of the strategic goals.

NNSA’s Sites Conduct a Range of Interdependent Explosives Design and Production Activities, and NNSA Has Adopted a Centralized Approach to Managing Them

NNSA’s five sites involved in explosives conduct interdependent activities  to design and produce explosives and about 100 different nuclear  weapon components that contain explosive materials. Each of the sites  assumes primary responsibility for certain explosives activities—such as  Livermore conducts design, research, and development of new IHE main  charge formulations; Pantex produces all main charges; Los Alamos  conducts design and production of main charge detonators as well as  explosives research and development; Sandia conducts design and  production of nonnuclear explosive components; and Nevada conducts  large experimental explosive shots to support design activities.  However, most of these activities require the participation of multiple  sites. The following examples illustrate some of the collaborative,  interdependent activities that NNSA’s sites and their suppliers undertake  to design and produce explosive components found in nuclear weapons.

Main charge for the W80-4 LEP. Livermore manages design  activities for the W80-4 LEP, including for its main charge. The main  charge used in the W80-4 warhead will consist of newly synthesized  TATB, formulated with a new binding ingredient, according to  contractor representatives. As NNSA officials and contractor  representatives explained during our site visits to Livermore and  Pantex, Livermore scientists redeveloped the specific process for  TATB synthesis and formulation that is being used in the W80-4 LEP,  first in small test batches and then in larger amounts. Next, Livermore  sent its specifications for synthesis and formulation to Holston, which  has produced successively larger batches. As the design and cost  study phase of the W80-4 LEP continues, Livermore and Pantex  continue to receive and test these batches of formulated explosive  and work with Holston to ensure that production lots meet NNSA  specifications. In coordination with Livermore, Pantex will press and  machine the finished main charges for the W80-4 when the LEP  reaches the production phase. Pantex will receive formulated TATB  from Holston and conduct its own tests to ensure the quality of the  initial production lots and pressing, machining, and subassembly  processes.

Detonators. The design and production of main charge detonators  involves several NNSA sites and their suppliers. According to  contractor representatives, Livermore and Los Alamos share the  responsibility for designing the main charge detonators, and Los  Alamos will produce all the detonators. As part of production, Los  Alamos reprocesses the PETN used in detonators from a stockpile of  DOD-grade material purchased 30 years ago. Other detonator parts  come from third-party suppliers and from NNSA’s Kansas City  National Security Campus, another NNSA site that does not have a  role in designing or producing explosives, according to contractor  representatives. Los Alamos produces and tests completed  detonators and then sends them to Pantex for weapon assembly,  according to contractor representatives.

Spin rocket motors. Sandia plays the primary role in designing spin  rocket motors. Spin rocket motors use pyrotechnics and propellants  and are a key component in the B61 and B83 bombs. Contractor  representatives at Sandia said that they supply the explosives to third- party suppliers, who produce the motors. The completed spin rocket  motors are sent to Sandia for inspection and testing, and after Sandia  approves the components, they are shipped to Pantex for weapon  assembly, according to contractor representatives.

Component manufacturing research. In addition to designing and  producing components for LEPs and modernization efforts, NNSA  sites also collaborate on other explosives research and development  programs, such as on component manufacturing processes. For  example, Los Alamos, Livermore, Sandia, and Pantex are  collaborating on additive manufacturing processes for explosives.  Additive manufacturing differs from traditional manufacturing in that it  builds components by depositing material rather than by cutting  material away during machining. This research effort seeks to  introduce additive manufacturing into the explosives production  process, producing explosive parts with highly complex geometries  while meeting NNSA’s safety and performance requirements,  according to a contractor representative.

In May 2018, according to NNSA documentation, NNSA began  implementing a new enterprise-wide approach to improve the  management and coordination of explosives activities across its sites. In  the past, each program that used explosives—such as an LEP or a  research and development program—developed or procured them  independently of other programs, without formal coordination to ensure  each program’s awareness of other programs’ requirements or time  frames. Under the new enterprise-wide approach, NNSA has taken  several steps to centralize management at an enterprise level and to  coordinate explosives activities across its sites. Specifically:  In May 2018, NNSA established the Energetic Materials Enterprise  Manager (enterprise manager) position to help coordinate NNSA’s  explosives activities. The agency issued a May 2018 memorandum  formally establishing the position, signed by the Acting Deputy  Administrator for Defense Programs. The memorandum specified that  the enterprise manager should encourage collaboration among the  sites and programs that conduct explosives activities.

In September 2018, the enterprise manager established NNSA’s  Energetics Coordinating Committee (coordinating committee) to  identify coordination challenges across the enterprise and emerging  needs for critical explosive materials, among other purposes. The  coordinating committee is composed of NNSA officials and contractor  representatives from NNSA’s sites, is chaired by the enterprise  manager, and is expected to meet at least once a year. According to  NNSA documents, the coordinating committee met twice in 2018 and  identified a number of future actions requiring input from the sites,  such as defining future needs associated with the production of main  charge explosive materials.

In December 2018, NNSA issued the strategic plan for energetic  materials. This strategic plan states that it will help NNSA organize  its efforts to meet weapon delivery schedules for the overall  energetics community. Prior to the strategic plan’s final issuance, the  enterprise manager provided a draft to coordinating committee  members to solicit their comments.

However, more recent action taken by NNSA indicates that the enterprise  approach to managing high explosives is continuing to evolve. First,  according to NNSA officials, in 2019 NNSA is planning to reorganize the  Office of Defense Programs—which is responsible for all stockpile  activities. This reorganization could affect the approach to managing high  explosives activities. Specifically, officials said part of this reorganization  is the creation of a new organization for production activities, which is  expected to divide production activities into several groups oriented  around different weapons components. It is currently unclear under which  production group explosives activities will fall because there are  production activities associated with explosives for both nuclear and  nonnuclear components, according to NNSA officials.

Second, in December 2018, NNSA officials indicated that they are  considering elevating high explosives to a “strategic material” and  managing it more similarly to NNSA’s existing approach for managing  other strategic materials, such as plutonium. NNSA’s strategic materials  managers are overseen by a senior NNSA official and appointed to  manage each material as a program, with a budget and dedicated staff,  according to NNSA documentation. NNSA does not consider the high  explosives enterprise manager to be managing a program; therefore, the  enterprise manager does not have an explosives budget or dedicated  staff, according to NNSA officials. NNSA officials said they anticipate  issuing an analysis of alternatives study in spring 2019 that will contain a  recommendation to the NNSA Administrator on how explosives activities  should be managed going forward, which could reflect a shift toward  managing high explosives as a strategic material.

NNSA Officials and Contractor Representatives Identified Management Challenges for Explosives-Related Activities and Have Taken Some Actions in Response, but Have Not Addressed Issues Affecting the Accuracy of Infrastructure Data

NNSA officials and contractor representatives have identified a number of  challenges related to NNSA’s supply of explosive materials,  infrastructure, and staff recruitment and training. First, NNSA’s supply of  certain highly specialized explosive materials is dwindling, and NNSA  officials and contractor representatives stated that it is challenging to  reproduce or procure these materials. Second, officials and contractor  representatives identified infrastructure that is aging and deteriorating,  inaccurate information on that infrastructure, and storage areas filled to  near capacity as challenges. Finally, according to NNSA contractor  representatives, there are difficulties in recruiting and training qualified  staff. NNSA has taken some actions to address these challenges, such  as starting to recreate “recipes” for specialized materials and modernize  aging infrastructure, according to NNSA officials and contractor  representatives. However, taking additional steps to improve the quality of  information about its explosives infrastructure would give the agency  more reasonable assurance that officials, contractor representatives, and  the enterprise manager have the quality information necessary to support  management decisions.

NNSA Officials and Contractor Representatives Identified Challenges in Ensuring an Adequate Supply of Specialized Explosive Materials and Have Taken Some Actions to Address Them

NNSA’s Challenges Producing Fogbank   The National Nuclear Security Administration  (NNSA) has had challenges in the past  producing materials other than explosives that  are essential to the successful operation of  nuclear weapons. In 2000, NNSA began a life  extension program (LEP) to replace or  modernize components for W76 warheads,  which are delivered by submarine-launched  ballistic missile systems. NNSA had to delay  production of the refurbished warheads when  it encountered problems in manufacturing an  important material that NNSA refers to as  “Fogbank.” In March 2009, we reported that  NNSA had lost knowledge of how to  manufacture the material because it had kept  few records of the process when the material  was made in the 1980s, and almost all staff  with expertise on production had retired or left  the agency, leaving the production process for  Fogbank dormant for about 25 years. As we  reported, NNSA’s loss of the technical  knowledge and expertise to manufacture  Fogbank resulted in a 1-year delay in the  W76-1 LEP and an unexpected cost increase  of nearly $70 million. According to NNSA  officials, production challenges with Fogbank  have since been resolved, and the last  production unit for the W76-1 LEP was  completed in December 2018.

NNSA’s supply of certain highly specialized explosive materials is  dwindling. These materials have specific chemical and physical  characteristics that fulfill precise performance requirements in nuclear  weapons, such as detonation within nanoseconds, according to  contractor representatives. One such material, titanium sub-hydride  potassium perchlorate (THKP), is used in actuators to open valves,  among other things, according to contractor representatives. TATB, the  IHE molecule used in main charges, is another such material, according  to contractor representatives. In some cases, contractor representatives  said that only one container or production lot of specialized material was  ever produced that met NNSA’s specifications. The inventories of these  materials have dwindled as ongoing LEPs, modernization efforts, and  research and development activities draw on them. For example, only a  small container of THKP remains. Additional inventory will be required to  meet the needs of four of the five ongoing LEPs and modernization  efforts, as well as for any future needs, according to contractor  representatives from Sandia. Similarly, although Pantex has a stockpile of  legacy TATB for the B61-12 LEP, contractor representatives said that  new material will be needed to meet the requirements of planned and  future LEPs and modernization efforts.

NNSA officials stated that reproducing and procuring these highly  specialized materials presents challenges for the agency. According to  NNSA documents and officials, lost recipes and a fragile supplier base  contribute to these challenges (see sidebar).

Some specialized materials were created decades ago, and the  knowledge base to successfully produce them is now gone. According to  NNSA documents, technical knowledge of material production processes  can be lost when long intervals occur between production orders. In some  cases, processes were not well documented or were infrequently  practiced and proven. Thus, NNSA sites must spend considerable effort  to recreate the recipes and techniques for producing these materials.  Sandia representatives explained that sometimes a single company or  even an individual created these materials and has since ceased  production or is now deceased. For example, THKP was produced  exclusively for Sandia by DOE’s Mound Site near Dayton, Ohio, which  closed in 1994. The THKP production process was designed by an  individual at the Mound Site who is now deceased. In some cases,  according to contractor representatives, a single container of explosives  (or a single production lot) met anticipated future needs for quality and  quantity when it was originally produced, so production was discontinued.  Contractor representatives explained that replicating the material exactly  is nearly impossible because of the large number of variables, such as  the mixing speed and temperature, that must be controlled for, even if the  ingredients are identical to those used many years ago, which is not often  the case.

To address the challenge of lost recipes, Los Alamos, Sandia, Livermore,  and Pantex are all working to reproduce materials with performance and  physical properties similar to those of legacy materials and prepare for  their full-scale production. For example, Livermore scientists said they are  conducting research to synthesize new TATB that is uniquely suited to  NNSA’s needs. According to NNSA contractor representatives, the  synthesis process will be refined until it can be replicated by Holston for  the W80-4 LEP. Additionally, Los Alamos scientists are researching the  formulation process with legacy TATB for the B61-12 main charges. The  chemical formulation of binder material used in the past has slightly  changed, affecting the structural strength of formulated TATB. Without  the proper strength, this formulated explosive cannot be pressed  effectively, according to contractor representatives. Sandia is also  working to re-establish the THKP production process.

NNSA is also working to address the challenge of lost recipes by  developing a comprehensive master list for explosive materials. The list  tracks information such as the suppliers involved and specific production  challenges. According to NNSA and contractor officials, collecting and  sharing such information across the sites related to explosive production  processes, specifications, and performance will help prevent lost recipes  in the future.

Even if the sites can replicate lost recipes for explosive materials, NNSA’s  supplier base for those materials is fragile. As previously reported and  according to NNSA documentation, finding suppliers willing and able to  provide required parts and materials can be difficult. Contractor  representatives told us that this difficulty arises because of the small  quantities of explosive parts and materials NNSA procures, the irregular  nature of NNSA’s procurements, and the agency’s exacting performance  requirements. For example, neutron generators contain explosive parts  that Sandia orders irregularly, in batches numbering only in the hundreds.  These parts have such exacting requirements for size and timing that  they are hand-made under microscopes. Sandia contractor  representatives explained that sometimes the laboratory’s part and  material orders may represent only 1 to 3 percent of a company’s total  production.

To address this challenge, NNSA is working to purchase materials more  consistently to ensure that companies can rely on NNSA as a steady  customer and be comfortable working to meet NNSA’s exacting  requirements. Contractor representatives said that ensuring consistency  in production can help maintain the expertise needed to avoid having to  reconstitute a specialized process, which can be costly. For example, the  effort to restart TATB synthesis and formulation cost approximately $13  million and added 3-1/2 years to the original TATB production schedule,  according to Los Alamos contractor representatives. Contractor  representatives at Pantex and Los Alamos said that they plan to support  continuous production of synthesized TATB and formulated explosives at  Holston in the future to avoid delays in restarting production (see  sidebar).

A Fragile Supplier Base for Other Material   The National Nuclear Security Administration  (NNSA) has identified challenges with a  fragile supplier base for other specialized  materials that are used in explosives-related  experiments and research. For example, Los  Alamos National Laboratory (Los Alamos) in  New Mexico requires highly specialized test  vessels to conduct essential nuclear weapons  research. Specifically, Los Alamos’s Dual-Axis  Radiographic Hydrodynamic Test Facility  (DARHT) uses X-ray machines to record  three-dimensional interior images of mock  nuclear materials that are imploded using  explosives. The exploding components are  contained in steel vessels. This facility is  unique because it is the world’s most powerful  X-ray machine for analysis of these  implosions (called hydrodynamic tests). The  vessels used at DARHT are made of  specialized steel that does not need to be  heat-treated during repairs, allowing the  laboratory to easily repair them after explosive  testing. There is currently a small supplier  base (domestic and international) for  manufacturing these vessels. Los Alamos  contractor representatives are concerned with  vendor availability, capability, and willingness  to produce vessels because of the small  number the laboratory has purchased in the  past—they currently have seven operational  vessels. Also, contractor representatives said  they are concerned that the workforce which  knows how to create this specialized steel is  nearing retirement. To help ensure a  continued future supply of the vessels, Los  Alamos is working with Lawrence Livermore  National Laboratory in California and the  Nevada National Security Site, which use  similar vessels, to develop a multi-year  procurement plan to encourage suppliers to  continue to produce the specialized steel  used in their manufacture.

NNSA supplier challenges are complicated further when a supplier is  foreign or there is only one domestic supplier. According to NNSA  documentation, using a foreign supplier may leave NNSA vulnerable to a  potential national security risk. Even when the only supplier is domestic,  single-point failure is a concern should that supplier delay or cease  production, according to contractor representatives. NNSA officials  provided an example involving Holston, NNSA’s sole supplier of TATB.  According to NNSA officials and contractor representatives, Holston also  serves DOD customers that order far larger quantities of explosives, and  Holston is required to prioritize those customers’ orders using DOD  procurement priority ratings, which may mean that NNSA orders are  delayed. For example, Livermore placed an order for the W80-4 main  charge explosives at Holston that was to be fulfilled by March 2019, but  that order was delayed while the plant worked to finish a DOD order with  a higher-priority rating. In addition to this delay, Livermore’s order will be  further delayed because Holston had an explosive incident in January  2019 and ceased operations for 3 weeks, according to Livermore and  DOD contractor representatives. As a result of both these delays, the  W80-4 LEP will have to postpone a hydrodynamic test and other studies,  complicating an already tight design and development schedule. This will  delay the W80-4 LEP at least 2 months, according to Livermore officials.

To minimize the potential for future production delays at Holston, NNSA is  working to elevate the priority of all its orders for explosives. Some DOD  nuclear weapon delivery platforms have the highest-priority DOD rating,  and NNSA officials said they have received permission from DOD to  apply this rating to the DOE explosives orders for the nuclear warheads  associated with those delivery platforms, including explosive orders for  the B61-12 LEP. NNSA officials said they cannot currently use the  highest-priority rating for orders associated with the W80-4 LEP because  the delivery platform for that LEP does not have the highest-priority  rating. NNSA officials are working with DOD and DOE attorneys to  obtain permission for using DOD’s highest-priority rating. A contractor  representative at Livermore said that in addition to NNSA’s efforts, the Air  Force is working separately to obtain permission to use the highest- priority rating for this delivery platform. If the Air Force is successful,  NNSA could use that delivery platform’s new high-priority rating for its  W80-4 LEP orders. The Livermore contractor representative said that  they believe the Air Force will receive permission to use the highest- priority rating before NNSA does.

In situations where a supplier cannot or will not produce a specialized  material or related component, NNSA is exploring options for producing  those materials or components itself. NNSA officials said that they are  conducting an analysis of alternatives to meet synthesis, formulation, and  production requirements to be completed by the spring of 2019. The  analysis will include an option for in-house production of TATB at Pantex.  NNSA documentation indicates that Pantex could independently produce  the TATB needed for current and future LEPs and modernization efforts  with a substantial investment, exact figures for which may be reported  upon completion of the analysis of alternatives. Similarly, contractor  representatives from Sandia said that in the absence of qualified  suppliers, they are working to produce explosive materials, such as THKP  as discussed above.

NNSA Officials and Contractor Representatives Have Identified Infrastructure and Workforce Challenges and Are Taking Actions to Address Them, but NNSA Has Not Fully Addressed the Accuracy of Infrastructure Data

NNSA has also identified challenges with its explosives infrastructure,  infrastructure data, and workforce. Specifically, NNSA’s infrastructure is  aging and deteriorating, some infrastructure data are inaccurate, and  some storage areas are near capacity. In addition, recruiting and training  qualified staff have presented a challenge to NNSA. As we have  previously reported, these challenges are shared across the nuclear  security enterprise and are not confined to explosives activities. NNSA  is taking several actions to address these challenges, as described  below, but data inaccuracies remain related to NNSA’s explosives-related  assets.

Infrastructure Is Aging and Deteriorating

According to NNSA documentation, no mission risk is greater than the  state of the agency’s aging infrastructure. The NNSA 2019 Master Asset  Plan states that 40 percent of the explosives infrastructure of NNSA’s  sites is insufficient to meet mission needs, which can lead to  contamination of explosive products or limit the use of facilities.  Contractor representatives told us that such contamination has occurred.  For example, Pantex contractor representatives said that batches of  explosives have been contaminated in its main formulation building by  rust falling from the rafters and grass blowing through cracks in the walls.  Similarly, Los Alamos contractor representatives said that detonator  subassemblies have been rejected at the laboratory because of  contamination from foreign debris, such as dust particles that enter  through cracks in exterior doors.

In addition, older facilities were not built to modern safety standards and  pose risks to explosives activities and employees, according to contractor  representatives and NNSA documents. At Los Alamos, the design of  several older facilities is insufficient to meet current needs, which  negatively affects both productivity and safety. For example, the Los  Alamos’s High Explosives Chemistry Laboratory is a 1950s era building  that is difficult to adapt to modern instrumentation, and electrical and  other system failures cause approximately 20 percent downtime, according to contractor representatives. This building is also under a state  of continuous limited operation because the laboratory must work under a  decreased net explosive limit to keep employees safe while handling  explosive materials because the facility lacks adequate blowout walls,  according to contractor representatives. Contractor representatives at  Los Alamos said that the decreased explosive limits in this facility have  hampered their productivity levels. Contractor representatives at Pantex  stated that the intrusion of water in key facilities poses electrocution risks,  can damage expensive equipment, and can affect production because of  downtime when explosives activities must be suspended because of  severe weather. Further, we observed facilities at Pantex with water leaks  in the roof and floor; some of these facilities house expensive equipment  that must be stored under plastic sheeting to prevent water damage. One  such facility is Pantex’s Analytics and Chemistry Laboratory, built in 1943  and shown in figures 4 and 5.

NNSA and its sites have taken some actions to address this infrastructure  challenge. For example, Los Alamos plans to replace its High Explosives  Chemistry Laboratory by 2026, and Pantex recently constructed a new  building to replace an aging pressing facility and has plans to begin  construction on a new analytical laboratory and a formulation building in  the 2020s. NNSA documentation states that the new pressing facility will  improve operational safety and security thereby enhancing the quality and  efficiency of operations. Pantex’s planned analytical laboratory and  formulation buildings, however, will not be completed in time to support  the currently scheduled B61-12 LEP and W88 alteration modernization  effort. Further, according to NNSA officials and contractor  representatives, site infrastructure modernization plans are budget  dependent and funding for infrastructure modernization efforts is not  always certain.

Some Infrastructure Data on Explosives-Related Assets Are Inaccurate

Contractor representatives told us and we observed during site visits that  some of the data on explosives-related assets in the FIMS real property  database were inaccurate and out of date. NNSA policy and the FIMS  user’s guide state that NNSA and sites should review and update the  capabilities, or programmatic mission(s) associated with each asset, such  as being explosives-related, every 5 years, or more frequently if mission  requirements change or there are changes in an asset’s physical  condition or use. However, 8 of the 22 randomly selected assets from the  four sites that we observed contained data in FIMS that were inaccurate  because either the information on an asset was out of date or the asset  should never have been listed as explosives-related. Some contractor  representatives told us that they did not understand why some of their  sites’ assets had been characterized as primary assets related to the high  explosives mission. For example, an inert storage closet at Pantex and a  tool shed at Livermore were labeled as primary explosives-related assets,  but according to contractor representatives, they can no longer be used to  store explosives because they do not meet appropriate safety standards.  Figure 6 illustrates the inert storage at Pantex, which officials said had not  been used for any explosives operations for at least 20 years, despite  “explosives storage” labeling on the door, but was still characterized as a  primary explosives-related asset. However, according to NNSA officials,  NNSA was, at the time of our review, in the process of revising guidance  on how to associate capabilities with assets. The contractor  representatives may not have been aware of the initial guidance the asset  was characterized under or of the change underway at the time of our site  visit.

In other cases, contractor representatives told us that the asset name did  not indicate its current use. For example, FIMS data on explosives-related  assets at Los Alamos has a “plastics building” that had not been used for  manufacturing and assembling plastics for 20 years. Although it currently  houses explosives-related work, the building’s name in FIMS had not  been updated. Additionally, Los Alamos’s FIMS data indicated that the  site had a “day room” that to contractor representatives’ knowledge had  never been used for any explosives activities although its purpose has  changed over time.

We found additional inaccuracies related to various measures of  explosives-related assets reported in FIMS. For example, we found at  least 94 erroneous entries on the gross square footage of the 1,266  assets identified as having some type of explosives-related capability.

For example, FIMS data indicated that a road at Livermore, a bunker at  Sandia, and an asset named “recreational/fitness” at Pantex were 3, 1,  and 2 gross square feet, respectively. The data listed replacement values  of at least $1 million for each of these assets. Los Alamos’s data  contained similar errors, such as electrical cables recorded as measuring  zero square feet.

NNSA officials and contractor representatives identified potential causes  for inaccuracies in the FIMS data. For example, contractor  representatives who work on explosives activities do not enter explosives- related asset information in FIMS, according to NNSA officials and  contractor representatives. Instead, FIMS administrators, who manage  information on infrastructure across NNSA sites, said they update FIMS  using information that subject matter experts or building managers  provide to them, typically in an annual data call. FIMS administrators may  therefore not be aware of information that is dated or otherwise incorrect  for explosives-related assets. In addition, entering information in certain  data fields in FIMS was difficult for assets that were not buildings,  according to one FIMS administrator. For example, piping and other  utilities may be replaced or updated in sections over time, and it can be  difficult to know which date to record for age in FIMS. Because our review  included only a limited sample of explosives-related assets, we could not  determine the full extent of the FIMS data inaccuracies.

NNSA managers use data from FIMS for planning purposes on  infrastructure modernization decisions. According to NNSA officials, data  from FIMS feeds into other databases that are used to inform  infrastructure funding decisions, such as developing the Integrated  Priority List that helps NNSA determine the most critical infrastructure  modernization projects. While NNSA relies on these data to make  planning and funding decisions, our observations of explosives-related  assets shows that these data may not be useful in informing the agencies’  infrastructure modernization decisions. Federal internal control standards  state that managers should make decisions using quality information that  is appropriate, current, complete, accurate, accessible, and provided on a  timely basis. By taking steps to improve the accuracy of FIMS data— such as by reviewing and updating information about associations of  assets with their primary and secondary programmatic missions, ensuring  that those who provide asset information to FIMS administrators  understand the data they need to provide, and clarifying how to  accurately enter information in FIMS for assets that are not buildings— NNSA would have more reasonable assurance that officials, contractor  representatives, and the enterprise manager have the quality information  necessary to support management decisions on explosives-related  activities.

Storage Areas for Explosives Are Filled to or Near Capacity

DOE’s requirements for explosives storage limit the amount and type of  explosives that can be stored in a single location, since certain explosives  may react when stored together. Explosives must be properly stored  throughout their life cycles, from the synthesis of raw explosives to their  use in weapon assembly or testing. According to a senior NNSA official  and site contractor representatives, some sites are running out of space  where they can safely store explosives. As contractor representatives  from Pantex told us and we observed on our site visit, bunkers for storing  explosives are filled to or near capacity, especially for storage in high- security areas. According to contractor representatives, this is  problematic because Pantex has the greatest need of all NNSA sites for  explosives storage because of its role in producing explosives, receiving  and holding explosive parts from across the nuclear security enterprise  prior to weapon assembly, and assembling and disassembling weapons.  Contractor representatives from Los Alamos also voiced concern about  being near their capacity to store detonator cable assemblies and other  explosives awaiting shipment for installation in weapons or for testing.

NNSA officials and contractor representatives said that they are tracking  the shortage of sufficient explosives storage and in some cases have  plans to expand current capacity. Los Alamos contractor representatives  also said that they are moving forward with constructing a small staging  facility that will be collocated with their detonator production facility. It is  expected to cost less than $5 million so it will not affect larger line item  infrastructure projects. Contractor representatives at Pantex explained  that although some storage areas have been identified for replacement,  they are, as yet, unfunded projects. In the near term, contractor  representatives said that they have other, more pressing infrastructure  modernization project needs than explosives storage. They said that they  are closely monitoring their storage capacity and expect ongoing  modernization efforts to free up some storage space as weapons are  assembled.

Difficulties in Contractors Recruiting and Training Skilled Staff

According to NNSA documents and contractor representatives, the  contractor workforce at NNSA sites needs to grow to meet the demands  of ongoing and future explosives work, but contractors face difficulty  recruiting and training qualified new staff to perform this specialized work,  which often requires a security clearance. In 2018, Pantex estimated that  it needed 211 FTE contractor staff to adequately carry out the site’s  explosives activities. However, Pantex contractor representatives  indicated that as of November 2018, they had 172 FTEs on board. A  major recruitment challenge is competition from industry. Contractor  representatives at multiple sites told us that they often compete with large  corporations and industries in the local area that offer well-paying jobs for  qualified new staff, such as for engineers. For example, site contractor  representatives told us that Los Alamos and Sandia compete with  Facebook in Albuquerque to attract qualified staff; and Pantex competes  with various oil and gas companies in Texas. To address this challenge,  contractor representatives from Pantex have recently expanded outreach  to local colleges and universities, and NNSA has held job fairs to attract  new staff.

Lengthy training and clearance processes that are required for  specialized explosives work present another challenge. Pantex  representatives said recent graduates are required to undergo on-the-job  training that can take years before they are ready to safely engage in  certain explosives activities. NNSA officials and contractor  representatives said that this training challenge is exacerbated by the  delays in processing security clearances. NNSA contractor  representatives said that some new hires have waited more than a year,  and some more than 2 years, to receive clearances to conduct required  work or training. In December 2017, we identified delays in obtaining  personnel security clearances as a government-wide risk. We also  added this issue to our March 2019 High-Risk List. To mitigate this  challenge, contractor representatives from Pantex said that they are  hiring students before they finish college so that security clearances can  be granted by the time students are ready to begin their first day on the  job or at least closer to that time. Los Alamos has decided to hire and  train individuals without clearances, who must wear red vests and be  escorted at all times while their clearances are finalized. We observed  numerous workers in this temporary and escorted status during our site  visit. Contractor representatives at Livermore said that they also use  escorts for new staff without clearances. However, contractor  representatives said that requiring additional staff as escorts is costly, can  decrease productivity, and has safety impacts because additional staff  must be present during activities involving high explosives.

NNSA’s Strategic Plan for Explosives Does Not Describe Some Management Challenges and Is Not Fully Consistent with Leading Practices for Strategic Planning

NNSA’s 2018 strategic plan for energetic materials describes some  identified explosives-related challenges discussed above, as well as  further actions to address these challenges, but does not describe other  challenges NNSA officials and contractor representatives identified. This  strategic plan incorporates some leading practices for strategic planning.  However, some of the strategic plan’s elements have not been fully  developed consistent with selected leading practices for strategic  planning.

NNSA’s Defense Programs Strategic Plan for Energetic Materials Describes Some Challenges NNSA Officials and Contractor Representatives Have Identified but Not Others

The strategic plan for energetic materials, which includes comments from  coordinating committee members, describes some of the challenges that  NNSA officials and contractor representatives identified in conducting  explosives activities, which we discussed above. Specifically, it describes  some challenges related to the supply of explosive materials and to  infrastructure modernization, including the following:

Supply of explosive materials. The strategic plan describes both the  supply of explosive materials as well as the supply of pre-cursor  ingredients as a challenge facing NNSA. The strategic plan also  identifies a number of actions NNSA is taking to bolster the supply  chain, such as re-establishing the capability to manufacture THKP.

Infrastructure modernization. The strategic plan notes that  explosives-related “facilities require recapitalization to support LEP  activities, improve efficiencies, reduce downtime, and maintain  baseline capabilities.” It also identifies several interrelated actions  NNSA is taking to address infrastructure challenges, such as re- purposing some facilities and eliminating others that are inadequate,  too costly to maintain, or no longer needed. In addition, the strategic  plan describes the challenge of adequate storage for explosives and  includes actions to annually monitor and track storage conditions at  the sites as well as provide long-term, low-temperature, moisture-free  storage for explosives.

However, based on our review of the strategic plan, it does not discuss  three of the challenges that NNSA officials and contractor representatives  had identified: the quality of data on infrastructure information, workforce  levels, and safety. First, the data quality challenge related to infrastructure  information, such as inaccuracies in FIMS, is not discussed in the  strategic plan, although NNSA officials and contractor representatives we  interviewed identified it as a challenge that may affect its planning and  decision-making related to explosives activities.

Second, the strategic plan does not discuss workforce challenges. While  the strategic plan states that NNSA “recognize(s) that staffing is an  important aspect for supporting energetics, it assumes that ongoing  efforts across the nuclear security enterprise related to workforce are  successful.” Since the enterprise manager does not track workforce levels  across the enterprise, as previously noted, it is unclear how NNSA can  determine if its contractors’ workforce efforts across the enterprise are  successful and whether levels are adequate to achieve the goals of the  strategic plan for explosives over time.

Third, outside of infrastructure improvement, the strategic plan also does  not directly discuss the challenge of safety, although it affects all  explosives activities and challenges that NNSA has identified. Because of  the inherent danger of explosives activities, safety is important, and even  when protocols are followed, unintended events can occur that affect  human safety—as illustrated by a safety incident last year. The incident  occurred at a Los Alamos facility in April 2018 when a small explosive  pellet deflagrated during pressing, causing two people to incur short-term  hearing loss. One of those people was an escort and was only required  to be present because of the delay in security clearance processing, a  challenge discussed above. According to a December 2018 Los Alamos  document, pressing operations had resumed at the facility. Although the  cause of the incident is still unclear, it provided an opportunity to make  safety improvements in the facility at Los Alamos, according to contractor  representatives. According to a Los Alamos document about the incident,  a key lesson learned was that safety records like maintenance logs, blast  calculations, and materials safety testing results need to be archived and  readily accessible to staff before the start of any work activities. The  inherent challenge of safety in explosives and key lessons learned, such  as this one, are not discussed in the strategic plan.

NNSA officials said that they are planning to revise the strategic plan for  energetic materials in 2020 but did not state that they would include the  challenges of data quality, workforce, or safety. All three of these  challenges may impede NNSA’s ability to achieve the goals described in  the plan for explosives activities. We have previously identified selected  leading practices in strategic planning. These practices specify that  agencies should define strategies that address management challenges  that threaten an agency’s ability to meet its long-term strategic goals. As  NNSA revises its strategic plan for energetic materials, by discussing the  data, workforce, and safety challenges it faces and the actions it plans to  address them, as appropriate, or documenting the rationale for why the  challenges were not included, NNSA would have better assurance that its  strategies address these challenges.

NNSA Followed Leading Practices for Strategic Planning, but Some Elements Present in Effective Strategic Plans Have Not Been Fully Developed

In developing its strategic plan for energetic materials, NNSA followed  several key leading practices in strategic planning that we have identified  in our past work, including the following:  Involving stakeholders, such as federal agencies, state  governments, or others, in defining the mission and desired outcomes  helps ensure that their expectations and interests are met and that  resources and efforts are targeted at the program’s highest priorities.  When developing the strategic plan, NNSA shared a draft with  members of the coordinating committee and incorporated their  comments to ensure that their interests and expectations were met.

Assessing external and internal forces helps managers anticipate  future challenges and make adjustments before potential problems  become crises. For example, external forces (e.g., emerging  technological trends and new statutory requirements) and internal  forces (e.g., culture, management practices, and business processes)  may influence the program’s ability to achieve its goals. When  developing the strategic plan, NNSA officials and coordinating  committee members considered external and internal forces. For  example, the officials and members discussed the availability of  explosives from external suppliers, such as Holston, compared to the  potential costs or challenges related to internal NNSA production of  explosives.

Covering at least a 4-year period, while making adjustments as  needed to reflect significant changes to the operating environment, is  also a key strategic planning practice. The strategic plan covers more  than 4 years of explosives activities. For example, there is a  performance goal to re-establish a reliable THKP supply by 2024. In  addition, NNSA officials have discussed their intention to update the  plan as their operating environment changes.

Our past work has also shown that effective strategic plans should  include specific elements. We reviewed NNSA’s Defense Programs  Strategic Plan for Energetic Materials and found that the strategic plan  includes most of these elements, but we also found that some of the  strategic plan’s elements have not been fully developed. Specifically:

Mission statement. According to leading federal strategic planning  practices, a comprehensive mission statement should explain why a  program exists and what it does. The strategic plan does not clearly  identify a mission statement but includes an overarching “strategy to  ensure the availability of energetic materials and products for the  stockpile.” When asked to identify the energetics mission statement,  the two contractor representatives who led the development of the  strategic plan told us that they consider this “strategy” to be the  energetics mission. However, a strategy cannot be a mission, since a  strategy is how a mission may be achieved.

Long-term strategic goals and objectives, strategies, and  performance goals. There are several interrelated elements on long- term strategic goals, objectives, strategies, and performance goals,  according to leading strategic planning practices. These include that  long-term strategic goals and objectives should specify how an  agency will carry out its mission and explain what results are expected  from the program. The strategic plan includes four long-term strategic  goals for meeting its mission, some strategies for achieving its goals,  and some performance goals to assess progress related to ensuring  the availability of explosives. They are also logically linked to each  other. For example, the strategic plan’s goal to sustain and modernize  the energetics infrastructure relates to the strategic plan’s strategy to  eliminate facilities that are inadequate, too costly to maintain, or no  longer needed. However, we found that responsibilities for achieving  the strategic plan’s four goals are not clearly assigned within NNSA,  and the four goals are not consistently quantifiable. For example, the  third goal is to “manage the energetics supply chain,” but the strategic  plan does not specify who is responsible for achieving this goal within  NNSA. Further, this long-term strategic goal is not quantifiable  because it describes a general process and does not define the  expected results, which may make it difficult for NNSA to assess  progress in meeting the goal.

According to leading strategic planning practices, strategies should be  specific enough to allow an assessment of whether they will help  achieve those goals, such as by describing the resources needed,  including the staff responsible to achieve a program’s goals and  objectives. We found that the strategic plan contains several  strategies for achieving goals, but some of them are not specific  enough to clearly identify the types of resources required, such as the  parties responsible for achieving them. For example, under the goal of  managing the energetics supply chain, there is a strategy to “plan,  track and assess the energetics strategic posture,” but the strategic  plan does not specify what is meant by the energetics strategic  posture or who is responsible for undertaking these actions. This  strategy is also limited because it does not describe the resources  needed to achieve the broader goal.

According to leading strategic planning practices, performance goals  should be used to assess progress toward long-term goals and should  include (1) the specific activities within the program that will be  assessed for performance and (2) the level of performance to be  achieved for each measure. We found that the strategic plan has 50  performance goals, most of which were quantifiable—or able to be  assessed for performance or progress. However, some were not  quantifiable, such as to “enhance or advance energetics formulations  for additive manufacturing.” This performance goal also does not set  milestones, such as a time frame for completion, or staff assigned to  achieve it, contrary to leading strategic planning practices. Further,  the level of performance for some goals was not fully developed. For  example, the performance goal “to reduce substandard mission- critical facilities below 10 percent” does not clarify whether the goal is  to reduce the current number of inadequate and substandard facilities  by 10 percent (a change of about 50 facilities) or reduce the total  number of inadequate and substandard facilities to be less than 10  percent of all facilities (a change of about 500 facilities). This  performance goal also does not set time frames for measuring  performance or list responsible parties associated with it. Another  performance goal that was not fully developed is to “manage the  energetics supply chain,” which falls under the long-term strategic  goal of “sustaining and modernizing the infrastructure.” In addition,  this performance goal is identical to a long-term strategic goal in the  strategic plan titled “manage the energetics supply chain.” A  performance goal should not replicate a strategic goal, since long- term strategic goals are broader in nature than performance goals.  Moreover, this particular performance goal is not quantifiable, does  not set a time frame for completion, and does not list a responsible  party to carry out specific activities to achieve the goal.

External factors. According to leading strategic planning practices,  external factors that could significantly affect achievement of the  strategic goals, such as economic trends or actions by Congress,  state and federal agencies, or other entities, should be identified. The  strategic plan identifies some external factors that could significantly  affect the achievement of strategic goals. Specifically, the strategic  plan notes that DOD’s demand for explosives from Holston could  affect NNSA’s ability to achieve its goals. According to NNSA officials  and documents, DOD’s demand for explosives is increasing, and  Holston is already struggling to meet DOD’s needs. According to  Holston contractor representatives, DOD is expanding Holston’s  production capabilities for HMX, research development explosive  (RDX), and insensitive munitions explosive (IMX) which when  completed will relieve pressure on TATB production. In addition, the  strategic plan identifies challenges to its supplier base, such as the  difficulty of sourcing explosive materials from non-U.S. suppliers and  that the small size of NNSA’s orders provides limited economic  incentive for commercial vendors. However, the strategic plan does  not identify other external factors that could significantly affect the  achievement of strategic goals, such as actions taken or not taken by  Congress. Specifically, modernizing the explosives infrastructure will  require appropriations for the significant capital investment needed,  but the uncertainty of future appropriations in a challenging fiscal  environment is an external factor not identified in the strategic plan. In  addition, the strategic plan does not acknowledge that other NNSA  programs may compete for funds or affect infrastructure  modernization priorities at a given site.

NNSA officials, including the enterprise manager, stated that they are  aware that the strategic plan for energetic materials has limitations, such  as performance goals that are not specific or are difficult to quantify.  NNSA officials said that they released the strategic plan quickly as it was  the first of its kind for explosives activities, and they believed the  explosives community would receive the most benefit it if it was published  as soon as possible, though it was not fully complete. Further, they said  that they intend to revise the strategic plan in the next year or so. As  NNSA revises its strategic plan for energetic materials, including fully  developed elements of an effective plan—such as a clear mission  statement and quantifiable performance goals that set time frames for  completion and list responsible parties who will carry out specific activities  for all strategic goals—would help NNSA make the strategic plan useful in  measuring goal achievement and assessing accountability.

NNSA is undertaking an extensive, multifaceted effort to sustain and  modernize U.S. nuclear weapons, and explosives are essential to the  functioning of these weapons. Five NNSA sites conduct a range of  interdependent activities to design and produce explosives. NNSA has  identified several challenges in carrying out these activities and is taking  actions to address them. For example, NNSA officials and contractor  representatives identified challenges related to producing highly  specialized materials and are working to re-establish their supply.  However, NNSA managers may be relying on inaccurate FIMS data on  infrastructure related to explosives activities to make modernization  decisions, because we found a number of inaccuracies in FIMS data on  explosives activities. NNSA officials and contractor representatives  identified a few potential causes for these inaccuracies; however,  because our review included only a limited sample of explosives-related  assets, we could not determine the full extent of the FIMS data  inaccuracies. According to NNSA officials, NNSA has taken some initial  steps to revise guidance, which we find encouraging as these revisions  may help improve accuracy of FIMS data. By taking additional steps to  improve the accuracy of FIMS data—such as reviewing and updating  information about associations of assets with their primary and secondary  programmatic missions, ensuring that those who provide asset  information to FIMS administrators understand the data they need to  provide, and clarifying how to accurately enter information in FIMS for  assets that are not buildings—NNSA would have more reasonable  assurance that officials, contractor representatives, and the enterprise  manager have the quality information necessary to support management  decisions on explosives-related activities.

In addition, the strategic plan for energetic materials—which represents a  positive step toward managing explosives in a forward-looking,  enterprise-wide approach—does not discuss three of the significant  challenges that NNSA officials and contractor representatives identified  related to explosives activities. NNSA officials said that they are planning  to revise the strategic plan in 2020 but did not state that they would  incorporate data quality, workforce, or safety challenges. As the agency  revises its strategic plan for energetic materials, by discussing these  challenges and actions planned to address them, as appropriate, or  documenting the rationale for why the challenges were not included,  NNSA would have better assurance that it is effectively managing  challenges that present risks to achieving its objectives.

The strategic plan for energetic materials also does not contain fully  developed elements that we have previously reported that effective  strategic plans should include, such as a fully developed mission  statement and performance goals that are quantifiable, set time frames  for completion, and list responsible parties to carry out specific activities.  NNSA officials said that they intend to revise the strategic plan in 2020.  As NNSA revises its strategic plan for energetic materials, by including  fully developed elements of an effective strategic plan—such as a fully  developed and clearly identified mission statement and performance  goals that are quantifiable, have time frames for completion, and list  responsible parties to carry out specific activities for all strategic goals— NNSA would help make the strategic plan more useful in measuring goal  achievement and assessing accountability.

We are making the following three recommendations to NNSA:  NNSA’s Energetic Materials Enterprise Manager and relevant NNSA  officials and contractor representatives at NNSA sites should take steps  to improve the accuracy of FIMS data related to NNSA’s infrastructure  supporting explosives activities. These steps should include reviewing  and updating information about associations of assets with primary and  secondary explosives missions; ensuring that those who provide asset  information to FIMS administrators understand the data they need to  provide; and clarifying how to accurately enter information in FIMS for  explosives assets that are not buildings. (Recommendation 1)

NNSA’s Energetic Materials Enterprise Manager, in consultation with  members of NNSA’s Energetics Coordinating Committee, should, as the  agency revises its Defense Programs Strategic Plan for Energetic  Materials, include discussion of identified challenges related to explosives  activities, such as data quality, workforce levels, and safety as well as any  actions to address them, as appropriate, or document the rationale for  why identified challenges were not included. (Recommendation 2)

NNSA’s Energetic Materials Enterprise Manager, in consultation with  members of NNSA’s Energetics Coordinating Committee, should, as the  agency revises its Defense Programs Strategic Plan for Energetic  Materials, include fully developed elements of an effective strategic plan,  such as a clearly identified mission statement and performance goals that  are quantifiable, set time frames for completion, and list responsible  parties to carry out specific activities for all strategic goals.  (Recommendation 3)

We provided a draft of this report to DOE and NNSA for review and  comment. In its written comments, which are summarized below and  reproduced in full in appendix I, NNSA concurred with the report’s  recommendations and described actions that it intends to take in  response to our recommendations. NNSA also provided technical  comments, which we considered and incorporated in our report as  appropriate. DOE did not comment on our findings and  recommendations.

In response to our first recommendation, NNSA stated that it recognizes  the need to improve infrastructure data consistency and accuracy and  intends to complete several actions by March 31, 2020 to improve its  infrastructure data. For example, DOE’s Infrastructure Executive  Committee is conducting a comprehensive review of the existing 178 data  elements in FIMS and has proposed deleting or adjusting 66, which it  believes will sharpen its focus on data quality for the remaining data  elements. In addition, among other actions, NNSA stated it is  implementing the Mission Dependency Index 2.0 initiative, which is  expected to provide greater consistency and accuracy on reporting asset  capability and determining consequence to mission.

In response to our second and third recommendations, NNSA stated that  it is planning to revise its Strategic Plan for Energetic Materials by  October 31, 2019. NNSA stated that the update to its plan will include a  discussion of the identified challenges to explosives activities as well as  fully developed elements of an effective strategic plan.

We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional  committees, the Secretary of Energy, and other interested parties. In  addition, this report is available at no charge on the GAO website at  http://www.gao.gov.

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact  me at (202) 512-3841 or at bawdena@gao.gov. Contact points for our  Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on  the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this  report are listed in appendix II.

Appendix I: Comments from the National Nuclear Security Administration

Appendix II: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

In addition to the contact named above, Jonathan Gill (Assistant Director),  Eric Bachhuber (Analyst in Charge), Natalie Block, Scott Fletcher, Ellen  Fried, Rob Grace, and Dennis Mayo made key contributions to this report.  Also contributing to this report were Cindy Gilbert, Penney Harwell  Caramia, Dan C. Royer, Jeanette Soares, Kiki Theodoropoulos, and  Khristi Wilkins.

The National Nuclear Security Administration works with contractors to design and make explosive materials for nuclear weapons.

Challenges to carrying out this work include:

Deteriorating conditions in many labs and other facilities

Dwindling supplies of specialized explosive materials

Delayed security clearances for new staff

NNSA did issue a plan to address these challenges. But it didn't follow strategic planning practices that ensure accountability over progress. For example, it generally didn't include measurable performance goals that identify timeframes and responsible parties.

Our recommendations address this and other concerns.