Army Readiness: Progress and Challenges in Rebuilding Personnel, Equipping, and Training

The 2018 National Defense Strategy emphasizes that restoring and retaining readiness across the entire spectrum of conflict is critical to success in the emerging security environment. The top priority for Army leadership is readiness. The Army has undertaken a variety of efforts since 2016 to prepare for potential large-scale combat operations against major adversaries. This statement provides information on the Army's progress and challenges in readiness rebuilding in the areas of (1) force structure and personnel, (2) equipment repair and modernization, and (3) training for potential large-scale conflict. Also, GAO summarizes recommendations to address these challenges and actions taken by the Army to address them.

This statement is based on previously published GAO work since 2016. This prior work related to, among other things, Army readiness, skills shortages, equipment maintenance and modernization, acquisition, training, force structure. GAO also updated information and incorporated preliminary observations from ongoing work related to warfighting concepts.

In GAO's prior and ongoing work, GAO found that the Army has made progress in rebuilding readiness and projects that it will reach its readiness goals by 2022. While the Army continues to make progress, it faces challenges in staffing its evolving force structure, repairing and modernizing its equipment, and training its forces for potential large-scale conflicts (see table).

Looking to the future, the Army plans to grow its forces, provide them with modernized equipment, and train units to conduct large-scale, decisive-action operations. All of these efforts are underway as the Army contemplates the implications of future warfare—which it reports is likely to require operations in multiple domains, especially cyber. As a result, it is important for the Army to balance its efforts to rebuild and sustain the operational readiness of its existing force with its preparations for future threats.

GAO has made 44 recommendations in prior unclassified work described in this statement. DOD and the Army have generally concurred with them, have implemented seven, and have actions underway to address others. Continued attention to these recommendations can assist and guide the Army moving forward as it seeks to rebuild the readiness of its force and transforms for the future.

Thank you for the opportunity to be here today to discuss issues related  to Army readiness.

In June 2017, we issued a report highlighting five key mission challenges  facing the Department of Defense (DOD). In that report, we noted that  the United States faces an extremely challenging national security  environment. At the same time, it is grappling with addressing an  unsustainable fiscal situation in which DOD accounts for approximately  half of the federal government’s discretionary spending. As DOD faces  this environment, it is working both to rebuild the readiness of its current  forces and to modernize to meet future threats. Since we issued that  report in 2017, DOD released a new National Defense Strategy in  January 2018 that prioritizes the long-term challenges posed by highly  capable adversaries and emphasizes the need to rebuild readiness.

This statement provides information on the Army’s progress in rebuilding  readiness and some of the challenges it faces in the areas of (1) force  structure and personnel, (2) equipment repair and modernization of the  force, including warfighting concepts, and (3) training for potential large- scale conflict. We also summarize our recommendations to address these  challenges and actions the Army has taken to implement them.

This statement is based on our body of prior work published from 2016  through 2019, as well as preliminary observations from our ongoing work.   The prior work that we drew from examined a range of issues related to  Army readiness, including the Army’s sustainable readiness process,  force structure changes, cyber training, the Patriot missile system, depot  maintenance, acquisition, and requirements development. To perform  our prior work, we analyzed Army readiness, personnel, maintenance,  acquisition, and training data, and interviewed cognizant Army officials  involved in operations and requirements development. In addition, we  issued several classified reports since 2016 examining some of these  issues and made recommendations to the Army. The statement also  includes updates to information as of February 2019 as appropriate,  based on Army documentation and discussions with Army officials. In  addition, we drew from ongoing work relating to our review of the Army’s  efforts to develop new warfighting concepts and force structure.  The  reports cited throughout this statement contain more details on the scope  of the work and the methodology used to carry it out.

We have been performing the work on which this statement is based from  2016 to February 2019 in accordance with generally accepted  government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan  and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide  a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit  objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable  basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.

DOD has reported that more than a decade of conflict, budget  uncertainty, and reductions in force structure have degraded military  readiness. In response, DOD has made rebuilding the readiness of the  military forces a top priority. The 2018 National Defense Strategy states  that the central challenge to U.S. prosperity and security is the  reemergence of long-term, strategic competition with China and Russia.  Further, the strategy stresses that restoring and retaining readiness for  large-scale combat is critical to success in this emerging security  environment. Nevertheless, DOD reported that readiness of the total  military force remains low and has remained so since 2013. In June 2017,  we found that Army readiness goals and timelines for rebuilding  readiness are not clear for all portions of the force, especially for the  reserve component, although the Army is making progress in these  areas.

Across the department, DOD has made progress in developing a plan to  rebuild the readiness of the military force, with the military services  providing regular input on the status of their readiness recovery efforts.  In August 2018, we reported that the Office of the Secretary of Defense  developed a Readiness Recovery Framework that the department is  using to guide the services’ efforts, and plans and to regularly assess,  validate, and monitor readiness recovery. The Office of the Secretary of  Defense and the services have recently revised readiness goals and  accompanying recovery strategies, metrics, and milestones to align with  the 2018 National Defense Strategy and Defense Planning Guidance.  According to The Army Strategy, the Army projects that it will reach its  readiness goals by 2022, at which point its priority is expected to shift to  modernization. We have ongoing work assessing DOD’s progress in  achieving its overall readiness goals in each of five warfighting domains:  ground, sea, air, space, and cyberspace.

The number one stated goal of Army leadership is readiness, including  recovering the readiness lost from years of sustained conflict while  preparing for potential large-scale combat operations against a global  competitor such as Russia or China. These efforts are occurring in a  challenging context that requires DOD to make difficult decisions  regarding how best to address continuing operational demands while  preparing for future challenges. An important aspect of this, across all of  the military services, is determining an appropriate balance between  maintaining and upgrading legacy weapon systems currently in  operational use, and modernizing to ensure the ability to outpace  advancing competitors. Our work has shown that the Army has improved  ground force readiness in recent years; however, the Army has also  identified capability shortcomings in its weapon systems and platforms  that have yet to be addressed through its modernization efforts.

In an effort to achieve higher, more consistent levels of readiness over  longer time periods, the Army is implementing a redesigned way to  generate forces called the sustainable readiness concept. A key part of  the concept includes determining readiness objectives by unit type, which  are developed by comparing the numbers of key unit types against  planned and potential warfighting demands. In addition, since 2014 the  Army has invested significantly in stocks of warfighting equipment that are  being stored in Europe, and has begun deploying armored formations to  the continent on a continuous basis for training and exercises to enhance  its readiness against potential Russian aggression.

As the Army works to rebuild and sustain higher readiness of its current  force, the service is moving to update its doctrine, equipment, and  formations to conduct operations in a more complex warfighting  environment. The Army believes that it must be able to operate not only  on land against potential adversaries, but also have the capability to act  against them in other domains, namely air, sea, cyber, and space. The  new Army Operating Concept, published in December 2018, describes  how the Army would operate in a “multi-domain” environment. It identifies  readiness as being key to deterring aggression from potential adversaries  and, should conflict occur, addresses how Army forces would operate in  multiple domains to penetrate anti-access and area denial systems. To  support this concept, the Army’s modernization strategy aims to build the  next generation of weapon systems and platforms that are more agile,  lethal, resilient, and sustainable on the future battlefield. We have  ongoing work reviewing the Army’s efforts to develop its multi-domain  operations concept and to field capabilities to support such operations.

The Army Has Increased Personnel and Force Structure, but Manning and Management Challenges Remain

The Army is growing slightly from a previously-planned size of 980,000  uniformed personnel to just over 1 million personnel. The Army is also  adjusting its force structure to address increasing operational risks as it  prepares for potential combat operations against a major adversary.  However, our work shows that the Army faces challenges in filling and  maintaining key skills in a number of areas, and in managing the time  Army personnel spend away from their home station.

The Army Is Adding End Strength and Capacity to Its Force, Reversing a Planned Decline

In 2016, we reported that the Army was planning to reduce its end  strength from a high of about 1.11 million uniformed personnel in fiscal  year 2011 to an end strength of 980,000 by fiscal year 2018. The Army  stated that at this level it could execute the National Defense Strategy,  but at significant risk. Army leadership testified in March 2015 that if there  were further end strength reductions, the Army would not be able to  execute the defense strategic guidance. We reported in 2016 that the  Army needed to assess the risks associated with the planned reductions  and better document its force-planning process. The Army concurred with  both of our recommendations, changed the way it assessed risk, and  made adjustments to its force structure based on these assessments.

After our 2016 report, Congress partly reversed these planned reductions  by authorizing end-strength increases in fiscal years 2017 through 2019.  The principal increase occurred in 2017, when Congress authorized an  end strength of 1.018 million uniformed personnel, or 28,000 more than  the Army had planned for that year. The Army’s authorized end strength  since 2011, including planned end strength in 2017 and 2018, are  summarized in figure 1.

Additionally, as we found since our 2016 report was published, the Army  has added or plans to add capacity, including converting two infantry  brigades into armored brigades and activating two new Mobile Short  Range Air Defense battalions by fiscal year 2022, to better prepare the  force for large-scale combat against major adversaries. Also, to support  combat forces during a conflict, the Army is activating additional combat  sustainment formations that are responsible for supply, distribution, and  transportation. Our ongoing work has found that over the next few years  the Army is building or plans to build several new cyber and electronic  warfare units to operate at various levels within the force to make the  Army more effective in contested environments.

The Army Faces Challenges in Meeting Authorized End Strength, Filling Key Skills Shortages and Managing Personnel Time Away from Home

According to the Chief of Staff of the Army, in a January 2019 speech, the  Army has used its end strength increases to increase the manning of  combat units. The goal of Army leadership is to fill operational units to  100 percent by the end of fiscal year 2019, and 105 percent by the end of  fiscal year 2020. However, in preparing this statement we found that, in  three of the past four years, the Army has fallen short of meeting its  overall end strength authorizations. Army officials told us that these  differences from the authorized end strength fall under the Secretary of  Defense’s authority to reduce the end strengths by a certain amount.  Moreover, these officials added that in 2015 and 2016, the Army was  drawing down end strength and planning further reductions. However, the  Army fell short of its end strength authorization by 0.38 percent in 2017,  and fell short again by 2.56 percent in 2018. The percentage differences  between authorized and actual end strength for the total Army, from 2015  through 2018, are summarized in figure 2.

As we prepared this statement, Army officials told us that the primary  reason why it has struggled to meet its authorized end strength is  because it has had difficulty meeting recruiting goals, which have  negatively affected the Army’s ability to expand the force. For example,  Army officials told us the Army was short of its goal for 2018 by 6,500  new recruits for the regular Army. Army officials told us that the Army  does not expect to be able to achieve its authorized end strength for fiscal  year 2019. Looking ahead, the Army is considering revisions to its  expansion plans and now expects to reach a new end strength goal by  2025.

In addition to challenges in meeting authorized end strength, our past and  ongoing work indicates that the Army faces challenges in filling and  maintaining key skills in a number of areas, and in managing the time  Army personnel spend away from their home station. Both of these  challenges can negatively affect readiness. For example:

Accelerated activation of Security Force Assistance Brigades led  to manning challenges. In December 2018, we reported that the  Army’s decision to deploy the first security force assistance brigade 8  months earlier than planned posed challenges to manning the unit.  The Army currently plans to activate up to six of these brigades (one  in the U.S. Army National Guard) by the end of fiscal year 2019. The  Army views the Security Force Assistance Brigades to be critical to  restoring the readiness of its combat forces. Prior to their formation,  the Army met security force assistance missions by, among other  things, pulling senior leaders and other personnel with specific ranks  and skills from active-duty brigades, which compromised their  readiness for large-scale combat.

The Army has had difficulty filling new cyber and electronic  warfare units. During our ongoing work, we have found that the Army  has had difficulty filling new formations with personnel to conduct  operations in the cyber domain, including electronic warfare.  In  October 2018, the Army activated part of a Multi-Domain Task Force,  which is focused on intelligence, information, cyber, electronic  warfare, and space missions and is being used in major exercises in  the Pacific region. However, Army headquarters officials told us that  the Army activated the unit as a pilot, or a test, unit and with an  accelerated timeline to learn how the new formation should be  structured, equipped, and trained. Based on our ongoing work, filling  the unit with personnel with the right skills has been a slow process.  Near the end of January 2019 the unit was staffed at 50 percent, and  the Army projects it will reach 75 percent by August 2019, according  to Army headquarters officials. The officials added that many of the  shortages are in senior level and cyber positions. Meanwhile, Army  documentation obtained during our ongoing work shows that the  service is considering options for creating more task forces for other  regions. Additionally, there are plans for new cyber and electronic  warfare force structure supporting Brigade Combat Teams. Army  officials stated that these will be fielded in an accelerated manner as  well, adding that filling these units could be challenging because cyber  personnel are in high demand. Army headquarters officials said they  are exploring options to address the challenges.

Army depots have had difficulty filling and maintaining critical  skills in their workforces. For our December 2018 report, officials  told us that Army depots experienced consistent challenges in hiring  critical personnel. Also, we reported that workload fluctuations usually  resulted in too little workload to maintain proficiency in certain skills.  For example, we reported that a hiring freeze at Corpus Christi Army  Depot in 2017 caused shortages of civilian flight test pilots, who are  responsible for test flights before returning aircraft to service after  maintenance. The Army, however, had not assessed how effective  the depots have been at hiring, training, and retaining the critical skills  of their workforce. We recommended that the Army do this, as  personnel challenges such as these have affected depots’ ability to  meet mission requirements and created maintenance delays for some  equipment. The Army concurred with our recommendation and stated  that it would assess the effectiveness of the depots’ hiring, training,  and retention programs to ensure Army requirements are met and  critical skills are maintained.

The Army has had difficulty manning ballistic missile defense  units. As we reported in October 2017, the Army’s Patriot and  Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) ballistic missile  defense forces have been in high demand for many years. Army  officials told us at the time that with reductions in end strength, the  Army in 2016 stopped its practice of assigning extra personnel to  these units to ensure operational requirements would be met. Army  officials stated that the high aptitude standards and specialized nature  of operating Patriot and THAAD systems reduced the number of  eligible recruits. Officials also stated that enlistment shortfalls could  have long-term effects on these forces’ operations and career  development. Since we issued our report, Army officials told us that  fewer-than-expected new recruits had advanced into Patriot and  THAAD career fields in 2018, but the Army was forecasting  improvements.

High personnel tempos can negatively affect personnel. In 2018,  we reported that the pace of operations has had a negative effect on  Army readiness, including Brigade Combat Teams and Combat  Aviation Brigades. We also reported that managing personnel  tempo—the amount of time that individual service members spend  away from home on official duties—had been a persistent challenge  for the Army. In 2015, the Army issued a regulation identifying a  personnel tempo threshold for its service members, but officials told  us that the threshold is not enforced and stated the regulation was  published only to emphasize that personnel tempo data was a priority.  We found that personnel tempo data collected by DOD was  incomplete. However, we estimated from the data that at least 41  percent of Army service members who were away from their home  station in fiscal year 2016 were away for more than 7 months.  Because time away from home can stress the force, we  recommended that DOD or the Army take steps to clarify and follow  personnel tempo guidance on thresholds, and also take steps to  emphasize the collection of complete and reliable personnel tempo  data to allow monitoring. DOD concurred with both  recommendations.

The Army Is Developing New Warfighting Concepts and Modernizing Equipment, but Faces Challenges in Maintenance Timeliness and Managing Modernization Efforts

The Army Is Developing Concepts for Future Warfare and Modernizing Its Equipment to Support Future Readiness

The Army is in the process of updating and developing new concepts and  equipment to deal with a future environment that will be increasingly  lethal, competitive, complex, and dynamic. The Army anticipates that it  will have to contend with a resurgent Russia and a rising China, as well  as regional challenges from North Korea and Iran. According to the  Army, these adversaries have improved their military capabilities, in  particular their ability to prevent U.S. forces from massing close to the  potential battlefield, thereby eroding advantages that the Army has  enjoyed for decades. Once deployed, the Army stated it expects that its  forces will be constantly under surveillance and potentially under attack.

To counter the adversaries’ threats, the Army is focusing on updating  warfighting concepts and modernizing the force. In December 2018, the  Army published a new Army Operating Concept that is specifically  designed to deter and defeat China and Russia, and addresses large- scale ground combat. The concept emphasizes that the Army must  demonstrate its readiness to conduct multi-domain operations—such as  ground, air, and cyber—as a key part of deterring adversaries from  escalation.

To support its readiness for future missions in this complex environment,  the Army has begun to update or upgrade multiple weapon systems. In  April 2018, the Army published its Army Modernization Strategy, which  identified six priorities that are key to operationalizing multi-domain  operations, including long-range precision fires and next generation  combat vehicles, as shown in table 1. All six of these priorities involve  modernizing equipment and/or acquiring new equipment with improved  capabilities.

The Army has identified the need to make changes to how it develops  and acquires new weapons systems. To that end, the Army established  the Army Futures Command to provide unity of command, accountability,  and modernization at the speed and scale required to prevail in future  conflicts.

The Army Faces Equipping Challenges Due to Maintenance and Modernization Management Issues

Our prior work has found that the Army has faced challenges with  managing maintenance efforts and developing requirements for future  weapon systems. Some of the challenges include the following:

The Army lacks an implementation plan to guide its retrograde  and reset activities, which could lead to inconsistent reset  efforts. As we reported in May 2016, officials from different Army  entities disagreed about which documents constituted their guidance  for implementing retrograde and reset, suggesting that there was  confusion about the Army’s strategies for these activities. We  recommended that the Army develop an implementation plan for its  retrograde and reset efforts. In August 2018, however, we reported  that the Army did not have plans to act on this recommendation.  According to one official, this was because guidance and plans are  adjusted based on the unique circumstances of each situation.  Given the Army’s drawdown of equipment used during operations in  Iraq and Afghanistan is coming to a close, we continue to believe that  an implementation plan for retrograde and reset of equipment used  during any future operations would help ensure that the Army more  consistently and effectively budgets for and distributes resources.

The Army has not comprehensively assessed the causes of reset  maintenance delays for Patriot equipment, which can limit unit  training time. In June 2018, we reported that of seven Patriot  battalions undergoing reset in fiscal years 2014 through 2017, only  one received all of its equipment back from depot maintenance within  the Army’s policy of 180 days, as shown in figure 3.

Since delays in returning equipment to units can reduce units’ training  time, we recommended that the Army analyze the various factors  affecting reset delays—such as equipment arriving late to the depot,  supply chain delays, and worker errors—to identify their relative  importance and inform corrective actions. The Army concurred with our  recommendation, stating that it will identify and address factors that may  affect reset timeliness.

The Army’s near-term modernization efforts face management  challenges. In September 2018, we reported that the Army had not  established processes for evaluating its modernization efforts against  its overarching objective of outpacing rapidly advancing competitors,  such as Russia or China. Also, we found that the Army had not fully  estimated the costs of its near-term modernization efforts. Further,  we found that the Army’s April 2018 modernization strategy report set  near-term goals for closing critical capability gaps and a longer term,  overarching objective of being able to decisively defeat major  adversaries. The strategy also identified the cost of key modernization  investments through fiscal year 2023, but did not discuss tens of  billions in already-programmed modernization-related investments, or  describe how the funding would support upgrades for existing weapon  systems. Moreover, the strategy did not disclose the extent to which  the Army had relied on Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO)  appropriations for upgrading weapon systems. Army officials told us at  the time that the Army had been preparing to analyze its efforts to  address specific warfighting capability gaps, but had not decided on  an overall evaluation approach. Additionally, officials told us that the  Army planned to reflect its analysis of near-term modernization  investments in the fiscal year 2020 budget submission. We  recommended that the Army (1) develop a plan to finalize the  processes for evaluating how its near-term investments contribute to  the Army’s ability to decisively defeat a major adversary, and (2)  finalize its cost analysis of near-term investments and report those  costs to Congress. The Army concurred with our recommendations.

The Army has been unable to ensure that requirements for new  warfighting capabilities are feasible. In June 2017, we reported that  the Army had prioritized combat readiness and rebuilding force  structure over resourcing its requirements development process to  meet future readiness needs. We reported that even though the  Army made some improvements in this area, officials were unable to  ensure requirements for major defense acquisition programs were  well-informed and feasible because of workforce constraints. For  example, we found that the Army’s requirements development  workforce declined by 22 percent from 2008 to 2017, with some  requirements development centers reporting more significant  reductions. In that report, we recommended that the Army assess the  resources necessary for the requirements development process and  determine whether shortfalls can be addressed given other funding  priorities. The Army concurred with our recommendation. In 2018,  Army officials told us that the Army plans to implement this  recommendation once Army Futures Command is fully operational  and key Army development entities are reorganized under its  command.

The Army has not fully applied leading practices for technology  development in its modernization efforts. We reported in January  2019 that while the Army has generally applied leading practices  identified by GAO to its modernization efforts, it may be beginning  weapon systems development at a lower level of maturity than what  leading practices recommend. As we concluded in that report,  establishing Army Futures Command creates unique opportunities for  the Army to improve its modernization efforts. However, proceeding  into weapon systems development before technology is sufficiently  mature raises the risk that the resulting systems could experience  cost increases, delivery delays, or failure to deliver desired  capabilities. The Army concurred with our four recommendations to  apply leading practices and lessons learned as it moves forward with  its modernization efforts. In its response to our January 2019 report,  the Army stated that it would conduct operational technology  demonstrations and was exploring a train-the-trainer program, among  other actions.

The Army Has Made Progress Implementing Its Training Priorities and Addressing Past Issues, but Faces Some Implementation Challenges

Our prior work has shown that the Army has made progress in preparing  the force for large-scale combat operations by increasing training  exercises and reducing mandatory training requirements. It also has  addressed past issues we reported on, including making better use of  virtual training devices and accounting for the training needs of supporting  units in its Pacific Pathways exercises. Moreover, our prior and ongoing  work has shown that the Army faces implementation challenges in  training new units that the Army plans to field on shortened schedules.

The Army Has Made Progress Implementing Its Training Priorities and Addressing Past Challenges

Army units are receiving more frequent training for large-scale  combat. Our prior work has shown that the Army has made progress  in preparing the force for large-scale combat by increasing training  exercises. After a decade of focusing its training on counterinsurgency  operations, the Army assessed that opportunities to train thousands of  company commanders, field-grade officers, and battalion  commanders on tasks related to large-scale combat were lost.  However, in August 2016, we reported that the Army increased the  number of brigades that had completed a decisive-action exercise  from one brigade combat team in fiscal year 2011 to 14 brigade  combat teams in fiscal year 2015, while at the same time decreasing  training for counterinsurgency. We noted in a September 2016  report that a key part of the Army’s plan to rebuild readiness was to  ensure that soldiers have repeated training experience on their core  competencies. Since we completed our work, the Army is funding up  to 26 brigade combat teams to go through a decisive-action training  event at its combat training centers in fiscal year 2019.

Mandatory training and directed tasks have been reduced. In  August 2016, we also reported that the Army had determined that  mandatory training requirements and directed tasks were too  numerous and were creating challenges for commanders in balancing  their units’ training time with these other requirements. Additionally,  we identified steps the Army had taken to make these requirements  less burdensome. We reported, for example, that the Army had  delegated authority to two-star commanders to exempt units, as  needed, from certain mandatory training. We reported that the Army  had begun to lock in a unit’s planned training six weeks in advance, in  an effort to protect units from external tasks that could affect training  schedules of brigades and their subordinate units. The early setting of  training schedules was intended to prevent an external task from  interfering with that training. We did not make any recommendations  related to reducing mandatory training; however; since we completed  our work, the Secretary of the Army has directed the elimination of  numerous individual training requirements, such as eliminating certain  requirements to train in avoiding accidents, and other administrative  tasks, such as maintaining a physical reference library of corrosion  prevention and control publications.

The Army is making better use of virtual devices to train and  prepare units. In the same 2016 report, we identified a number of  challenges the Army faced in using virtual training devices to help  units prepare for major conflict. Using such devices is important  because of the challenges of training for combat in a live environment,  such as limited range availability and resource constraints. We  reported that the Army had taken some steps to improve the  integration of virtual training devices into its operational training.  However, our work identified several factors that limited the Army’s  ability to conduct training with virtual training devices, including  outdated virtual training policies, a lack of guidance for analyzing the  effectiveness of virtual training devices, and the need to better  integrate devices in training strategies. As of January 2019, the Army  has implemented two of the three recommendations we made in our  report. Specifically, the Army published a training analysis best- practices guide, analyzed virtual training devices’ effectiveness, and  analyzed regular Army formations’ readiness training models, among  other steps to implement these recommendations. Additionally, the  Army further plans to modify its policy on virtual training devices in  2021, which would require that training developers consider the  amount of time available to train with or expected usage rates of new  virtual training devices. Further, in preparing this statement, Army  officials told us that the Army has used acquisition authorities  provided by Congress to prototype new technologies to replace  existing simulators. It is investing in these prototypes based on the  usage rates of the older training equipment, and at the same time  involving operational forces in the prototyping for their feedback and  to help inform requirements.

The Army is taking some steps to improve its Pacific Pathways  initiative. In November 2016, we reported on an initiative, known as  Pacific Pathways, intended to strengthen relationships with allies and  build readiness by combining certain exercises with partner nations.  The Army began the Pacific Pathways initiative—which deploys a  battalion-size task force to the Asia-Pacific region to conduct multiple  exercises over 90 days—as a way of building the readiness of its  participating units. We found that the size and complexity of the  operations under Pacific Pathways created potentially unique training  opportunities for supporting units—such as transportation units—to  exercise the capabilities they would be required to provide in a  contingency. However, we found that the Army could improve its  approach by fully synchronizing Army plans, stakeholders, and  objectives into the exercises. The Army has implemented two of the  recommendations that we made in our report to modify processes and  guidance so that stakeholders are integrated into the planning, and  also to seek and incorporate the training objectives of supporting  units. U.S. Army Pacific officials have stated that they do not plan to  implement the recommendation to perform a cost-benefit analysis of  Pacific Pathways because it is not required.

The Army Faces Challenges with Training Pilots for Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS), and Personnel for New Cyber Units

Our prior and ongoing work has identified some challenges that the Army  faces in training personnel in particular specialties, especially as it stands  up new units on shortened schedules. These include:

A lack of training facilities and airspace creates challenges for  UAS pilot training and further steps could be taken to enhance  pilot candidate selection. In January 2017, we reported that the  Army’s UAS pilot training strategy did not account for some  challenges the Army faced, such as a lack of adequate training  facilities and limited available airspace. The Army used flexibilities to  overcome some of these challenges, but at the time of our report it  was too early to tell whether these flexibilities would be enough to  overcome training shortfalls. In addition, we found that the way the  Army assessed whether service members were good candidates for  UAS pilot training could have been improved. For example, we  reported that the Army used only 3 of the 78 identified competencies  that an Army-Air Force research team identified as “moderately,”  “highly,” or “extremely important” for UAS pilots. We made  recommendations on these issues, and DOD partially concurred,  stating that although the actions we recommended were prudent or  already an integral part of workforce management, additional Army  guidance would be unnecessary.

Fielding and deploying new types of units can pose challenges  to training. The accelerated pace at which the Army is creating new  units can pose challenges to training and readiness. As previously  discussed, the Army is activating new units to sustain readiness and  to operate in a more complex environment. However, the Army’s  approach can pose training challenges, and negatively affect  readiness. Also, our ongoing work indicates that the Army is fielding  new cyber units at an accelerated pace, resulting in the units not  having either fully trained personnel or the equipment to conduct  training, according to Army officials. For example, the Army is  planning to add uniformed personnel who specialize in cyber  operations to its combat units and as part of newly established Multi- Domain Task Forces, but there is not yet a clear understanding of the  tasks they will have to perform or an updated training strategy to  support them, according to Army officials. Army officials stated that  this will affect the readiness of the units to perform their missions, but  they are taking steps to clarify and update these issues.  - - - - -  In sum, while the Army has made progress in rebuilding readiness, it  continues to face challenges meeting its goals. Moreover, the Army will  need to balance the readiness of its existing force with plans to grow and  modernize. We have made 44 recommendations that the Army has  generally concurred with; the Army has implemented 7 of them, and taken  actions to begin implementing many others. These recommendations  provide a partial roadmap to address important readiness challenges, and  implementing our recommendations to improve the management of  personnel, equipment maintenance, and training would help the Army  meet current threats and assist it as it refocuses on readiness for large- scale combat operations. In addition, sustained management attention  and continued congressional oversight will be needed to ensure that the  Army demonstrates progress in addressing its personnel, equipment, and  training challenges.

Chairman Sullivan, Ranking Member Kaine, and Members of the  Subcommittee, this concludes my prepared statement. I would be  pleased to respond to any questions you may have at this time.

If you or your staff have questions about this testimony, please contact  John H. Pendleton, Director, Defense Capabilities and Management at  (202) 512-3489 or pendletonj@gao.gov.

Contact points for our offices of Congressional Relations and Public  Affairs may be found on the last page of this statement. GAO staff who  made key contributions to this testimony are Kevin O’Neill (Assistant  Director), Matthew Spiers (Analyst In Charge), Steven Bagley, Rebecca  Beale, Cynthia Grant, Kris Keener, Alberto Leff, Amie Lesser, Jon R.  Ludwigson, Shahrzad Nikoo, Marcus Oliver, Richard Powelson, James A.  Reynolds, Cary Russell, Michael Silver, Matthew Ullengren, Nicole  Volchko, Erik Wilkins-McKee, Matthew Young, and Delia Zee.

Appendix I: Implementation Status of Prior GAO Recommendations Related to Army Readiness

Over the past 4 years, we issued several reports related to Army  readiness that are cited in this statement. Table 2 summarizes the status  of key GAO recommendations related to Army and DOD components in  coordination with the Army since 2016, which include a total of 44  recommendations. The Department of Defense has implemented 7 of  these recommendations to date. For each of the reports, the specific  recommendations and their implementation status are summarized in  tables 3 through 19.

Army Modernization: Steps Needed to Ensure Army Futures Command  Fully Applies Leading Practices, GAO-19-132. Washington, D.C.: January  23, 2019.

DOD Depot Workforce: Services Need to Assess the Effectiveness of  Their Initiative to Maintain Critical Skills [Reissued with revisions on  December 26, 2018.], GAO-19-51. Washington, D.C.: December 14,  2018.

Navy and Marine Corps: Rebuilding Ship, Submarine, and Aviation  Readiness Will Require Time and Sustained Management Attention,  GAO-19-225T. Washington, D.C.: December 12, 2018.

Air Force Readiness: Actions Needed to Rebuild Readiness and Prepare  for the Future, GAO-19-120T. Washington, D.C.: October 10, 2018.

Army Modernization: Actions Needed to Measure Progress and to Fully  Identify Near-Term Costs, GAO-18-604SU. Washington, D.C.: September  28, 2018.

Military Readiness: Analysis of Maintenance Delays Needed to Improve  Availability of Patriot Equipment for Training, GAO-18-447. Washington,  D.C.: June 20, 2018.

Military Readiness: Clear Policy and Reliable Data Would Help DOD  Better Manage Service Members’ Time Away from Home, GAO-18-253.  Washington, D.C.: April 25, 2018.

European Reassurance Initiative: DOD Needs to Prioritize Posture  Initiatives and Plan for and Report their Future Cost, GAO-18-128.  Washington, D.C.: December 8, 2017.

Military Readiness: Personnel Shortfalls and Persistent Operational  Demands Strain Army Missile Defense Units and Personnel,  GAO-18-168SU. Washington, D.C.: October 5, 2017.

Army Weapon Systems Requirements: Need to Address Workforce  Shortfalls to Make Necessary Improvements, GAO-17-568. Washington,  D.C.: June 22, 2017.

Supply Chain Management: DOD Could More Efficiently Use Its  Distribution Centers, GAO-17-449. Washington, D.C.: June 21, 2017.

Army Readiness: Progress Made Implementing New Concept, but  Actions Needed to Improve Results, GAO-17-458SU. Washington, D.C.:  June 8, 2017.

Unmanned Aerial Systems: Air Force and Army Should Improve Strategic  Human Capital Planning for Pilot Workforces, GAO-17-53. Washington,  D.C.: January 31, 2017.

Comprehensive Assessment and Planning Needed to Capture Benefits  Relative to Costs and Enhance Value for Participating Units [Reissued on  November 30, 2016], GAO-17-126. Washington, D.C.: November 14,  2016.

Military Readiness: DOD’s Readiness Rebuilding Efforts May Be at Risk  without a Comprehensive Plan, GAO-16-841. Washington, D.C.:  September 7, 2016.

Patriot Modernization: Oversight Mechanism Needed to Track Progress  and Provide Accountability, GAO-16-488. Washington, D.C.: August 25,  2016.

Army Training: Efforts to Adjust Training Requirements Should Consider  the Use of Virtual Training Devices, GAO-16-636. Washington, D.C.:  August 16, 2016.

Military Readiness: DOD Needs to Incorporate Elements of a Strategic  Management Planning Framework into Retrograde and Reset Guidance,  GAO-16-414. Washington, D.C.: May 13, 2016.

Army Planning: Comprehensive Risk Assessment Needed for Planned  Changes to the Army’s Force Structure, GAO-16-327. Washington, D.C.:  April 13, 2016.

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the  United States. The published product may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety  without further permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain  copyrighted images or other material, permission from the copyright holder may be  necessary if you wish to reproduce this material separately.

The Army is working toward rebuilding its current forces and modernizing to meet future threats.

We testified on the Army's progress and challenges. For example, the Army has planned to expand its forces—e.g., by creating cyber and electronic warfare units—to prepare for threats from strong adversaries. The Army has also had trouble hiring and retaining critical personnel for its maintenance depots.

Continued attention to our 44 prior recommendations can guide the Army as it rebuilds and transforms itself.


Telecommunications: Fully Implementing Established Transition Planning Practices Would Help Agencies Reduce Risk of Costly Delays

GSA is responsible for contracts that provide telecommunications services for federal agencies. In preparation for the expiration of current telecommunications programs, GSA has developed a successor program, called EIS. GSA and agencies now must carry out the task of successfully transitioning to EIS. Previous contract transitions experienced significant delays. Those delays during the last transition resulted in hundreds of millions of dollars in missed savings.

GAO was asked to summarize its draft report currently out for comment at selected agencies. The draft discusses (1) selected agencies' plans for, and status in, transitioning to EIS; and (2) the extent to which selected agencies were implementing established transition planning practices. In preparing the report on which this testimony is based, GAO administered a survey to 19 selected agencies that spent at least $10 million on telecommunications in fiscal year 2018 regarding their plans for and status in transitioning to EIS. GAO also selected five of these agencies for further review based on, among other things, agency size and structure. For these agencies, GAO evaluated documentation to determine the extent to which they had implemented five planning practices identified in a previous GAO report.

GAO's preliminary results show that, as of October 2019, the 19 selected agencies reviewed were in different stages of transitioning from their soon-to-be-expiring telecommunications contracts to the new Enterprise Infrastructure Solutions (EIS) program, which has generally lower rates for services. All of these agencies reported that they plan to fully transition to EIS program contracts before the current contracts expire in May 2023. However, 11 agencies did not plan to fully transition by the General Services Administration's (GSA) September 30, 2022, milestone. The majority of the selected agencies also did not meet GSA's milestones for completing critical contracting actions in 2019 (see table). While transitioning to EIS is a complex undertaking, delays in making this transition will cause agencies to miss out on potential cost savings that would result from the generally lower rates for services on the EIS program contracts.

GAO's preliminary results indicate that five of the 19 agencies that were selected for further review had partially implemented established planning practices that can help agencies successfully transition their telecommunications services to new contracts. These practices are to: (1) develop an accurate inventory of telecommunications services, (2) perform a strategic analysis of telecommunications requirements, (3) develop a structured transition management approach, (4) identify the resources needed for the transition, and (5) develop a transition plan. The agencies provided several reasons for partially implementing the practices. For example, transition officials at three agencies said that they were not responsible for tracking all of the telecommunications services in use at their agencies; as such, they were unable to provide complete telecommunications inventories. The agencies also planned to implement certain practices after they issue their EIS task orders. However, the limited time remaining to complete the transition makes it critical that agencies conduct early planning with the information available and fully implement these transition planning practices to reduce the risk that the agencies experience the types of delays and missed savings that occurred in previous transitions.

GAO's draft report contains 25 recommendations to the five agencies to fully implement the transition planning practices.

I am pleased to be here today to discuss the General Service  Administration’s (GSA) Enterprise Infrastructure Solutions (EIS) program.  GSA is responsible for ensuring that federal agencies have access to the  telecommunications services and solutions that they need to meet  mission requirements. According to data provided by the agency, in fiscal  year 2019, federal agencies spent about $2.5 billion on services acquired  through GSA’s current telecommunications contracts—awarded under  programs known as Networx, Washington Interagency  Telecommunications System 3, and Regional Local Service Agreements.

In preparation for the end of these current contracts in May 2023, GSA  developed a successor program, known as EIS. As part of this program,  on August 1, 2017, GSA announced that it had awarded EIS contracts— with a combined value of up to $50 billion—to 10 vendors. Agencies now  have to undertake the difficult task of transitioning their  telecommunications services to the EIS contracts. This transition is  expected to involve more than 135 agencies, about 32 types of services,  and millions of voice and data circuits.

The last two GSA government-wide telecommunications contract  transitions experienced significant delays that led to hundreds of millions  of dollars in increased costs and missed savings. In particular, the  transition that began in 1998 experienced delays that hindered the timely  achievement of program goals and resulted in an estimated $74 million in  missed savings.

The most recent transition to Networx, which began in 2007, took 33  months longer than planned and the majority of agencies experienced  transition delays. In 2013, we reported that these delays led to an  increase of $66.4 million in costs to GSA and an estimated $329 million in  lost savings as a result of agencies continuing to order services from a  predecessor contract even after the services were available through  Networx at generally lower rates. We pointed out that inadequate project  planning was a key factor that contributed to the delays.

As you requested, this statement summarizes key preliminary findings  from our ongoing review and the related draft report that discusses  selected federal agencies’ efforts to transition to EIS. Specifically, the  draft report (1) describes selected agencies plans for, and status in,  transitioning from their current telecommunications contracts to EIS  program contracts; and (2) assesses the extent to which selected  agencies had implemented established telecommunications transition  planning practices. The draft report is currently with the selected agencies  for their review and comments. We anticipate issuing the final report in  April 2020.

In that report, for our first objective, we developed and administered a  survey to 19 selected agencies that spent at least $10 million on  telecommunications in fiscal year 2018. The 19 agencies were: the  Departments of Agriculture, Commerce (Commerce), Defense,  Education, Energy , Health and Human Services (HHS), Homeland  Security, Housing and Urban Development, the Interior, Justice, Labor,  State (State), Transportation, the Treasury, and Veterans Affairs (VA);  GSA, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), the  Small Business Administration, and the Social Security Administration.

In the survey, we asked each agency to identify its plans for the transition  to EIS, including the planned number of key contracting actions (fair  opportunity solicitations and task orders), planned schedules for  transitioning to EIS contracts, and key factors that contributed to delays, if  any, in meeting GSA’s critical milestones for 2019. We also interviewed  relevant agency officials to obtain additional insights on their survey  responses.

To address the second objective, we selected for review, a  nongeneralizable subset of five agencies from the 19 agencies included  in the first objective. We selected these agencies based on, among other  things, agency size and structure. The selected agencies were  Commerce, HHS, NASA, State, and VA. For these agencies, we obtained  and evaluated documentation to determine the extent to which they had  implemented five established planning practices and associated activities  identified in our prior work. More information on our scope and  methodology can be found in the report that we are planning to issue in  April 2020.

The work upon which this testimony is based is being conducted in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.

GSA’s existing government-wide telecommunications program is called  Networx. As part of this program, in 2007 GSA awarded two sets of  Networx contracts—called Networx Universal and Networx Enterprise— which had an estimated combined value of $20 billion. These contracts  provide similar services, such as voice and data services, wireless  services, video and audio conferencing, as well as mobile and fixed  satellite services. One differing characteristic between the contracts is  that Networx Enterprise contracts have a focus on internet-based  services. The Networx Enterprise contracts also require  telecommunications services to be available in a smaller geographic area  than Networx Universal.

Networx Universal contracts were set to expire in March 2017 and  Networx Enterprise contracts were set to expire in May 2017; however,  GSA has twice extended these Networx contracts. According to GSA  officials, the most recent extension, which GSA announced in November  2018, is to include one base year and two 1-year options, plus an  additional option for the number of months required for the contracts to  reach May 31, 2023. If the extension is executed and all options are  exercised, the Networx contracts will expire in May 2023.

In addition, GSA provides telecommunications services through programs  called Washington Interagency Telecommunications System 3 and  Regional Local Service Agreements:

Washington Interagency Telecommunications System 3: These  contracts support a variety of telecommunications services available  to all federal agencies in Washington, D.C., and surrounding Maryland  and Virginia counties. For example, among other things, these  contracts provide data and voice services, as well as cloud services.  These contracts were set to expire on or before May 2020. As of  December 2019, GSA planned to extend these contracts. GSA  officials stated that the extension is to include one base year and two  1-year options, plus an additional option for the number of months  required for the contracts to reach May 31, 2023. If the extension is  executed and all options are exercised, the contracts will expire in  May 2023.

Regional Local Service Agreements: These contracts provide local  telecommunications services in every state and major city in the  United States. According to GSA officials, the expiration dates for  these contracts ranged from October 2019 through March 2023. As of  December 2019, GSA was in the process of extending these  contracts. Specifically, GSA officials reported that certain contracts  had already been extended to May 2023, and the officials planned to  extend the remaining contracts through May 2023, as well.

According to data provided by GSA officials, in fiscal year 2019, federal  agencies spent approximately $2.5 billion on services acquired through  Networx, Washington Interagency Telecommunications System 3, and  Regional Local Service Agreements contracts. About $2 billion of this  spending was on services acquired through Networx alone.

Enterprise Infrastructure Solutions Provides Contracts for Agencies to Acquire IT and Telecommunications Services

GSA’s EIS program is the replacement for the agency’s Networx,  Washington Interagency Telecommunications System 3, and Regional  Local Service Agreements telecommunications contracts. GSA intends  for EIS to address federal agencies’ global telecommunications and IT  infrastructure requirements.

GSA plans for EIS to provide agencies with traditional and emerging  services to meet current and future requirements by, among other things:  simplifying the government’s process of acquiring IT and  telecommunications products and services; providing cost savings to each agency through aggregated volume  buying and pricing (with generally lower costs for services on EIS  compared to the costs for similar services on Networx), and spending  visibility; and providing updated and expanded security services to meet current  and future government cybersecurity requirements.

In addition, GSA has identified several benefits that EIS is expected to  provide to the agencies that participate in its telecommunications  programs. These projected benefits include streamlined contract  administration, a possible 15-year period of performance, simplified  pricing, and enhanced management and operations support.

On August 1, 2017, GSA announced that it had awarded EIS contracts to  10 vendors. These contracts have a combined value of up to $50 billion  and are for a possible period of up to 15 years (one 5-year base period  and two 5-year option periods). According to GSA’s plans as of  November 2019, the transition to EIS is expected to be completed by May  2023, when the current Networx, Washington Interagency  Telecommunications System 3, and Regional Local Service Agreements  telecommunications contracts are expected to expire (if all contract  options are exercised, as discussed earlier).

To help ensure that agencies’ services are fully transitioned to EIS before  the current contracts expire, GSA issued guidance that identified several  critical milestones that agencies should meet. These milestones include:  (1) releasing all planned fair opportunity solicitations to EIS vendors by  March 31, 2019; (2) issuing all planned task orders by September 30,  2019; and (3) achieving 100 percent transition of services by September  30, 2022.

Figure 1 provides a timeline of the planned transition to EIS, including  GSA’s critical milestones, as of November 2019.

GSA, Agencies, and Contractors Have Transition Responsibilities

Central to the successful transition from GSA’s current  telecommunications services contracts to EIS are transition planning and  execution activities that involve GSA, federal agencies, the incumbent  telecommunications contractors, and EIS contractors. GSA serves as the  facilitator for all transition management activities. The agency is using  contractors to assist in tracking transition activities, in order to avoid  delays and other problems that can arise throughout the process.

In particular, GSA’s primary responsibility is to provide program  management for the current telecommunications programs (Networx,  Washington Interagency Telecommunications System 3, and Regional  Local Service Agreements) and EIS. As part of this, GSA is responsible  for  conducting government-wide strategy and project management; providing tailored assistance to agencies for transition planning and  help with contractor selection and ordering;  tracking and reporting the use of metrics that convey the relative  complexity and transition progress; and providing customer support, training, and self-help tools and  templates.

GSA developed two contracting vehicles to provide transition assistance  to agencies: (1) a Transition Coordination Center vehicle that includes  assistance with inventory validation, transition planning, and solicitation  development; and (2) a Transition Ordering Assistance vehicle that  addresses tasks including requirements development and source  selection assistance, and proposal evaluation. The Coordination Center  vehicle was put in place in January 2016 and the Ordering Assistance  vehicle was initially awarded in September 2016, but was not finalized  until March 2017, after the conclusion of a bid protest.

Agencies have principal responsibility for the transition. They are  responsible for coordinating transition efforts with the incumbent  contractors and EIS contractors to ensure that existing  telecommunications services are disconnected and that new services are  ordered under EIS. According to GSA, agencies’ responsibilities under  EIS include, among other things:  identifying key personnel, chiefly a Senior Transition Sponsor, Lead  Transition Manager, and Transition Ordering Contracting Officer; engaging expertise from Chief Information Officers, Chief Acquisition  Officers, and Chief Financial Officers to build an integrated transition  team of telecommunications managers, acquisition experts, and  financial staff; analyzing and confirming the accuracy of the inventory of active  services that must be transitioned; developing a transition plan that describes technological goals, a  transition schedule that includes GSA’s major transition milestones  (e.g., releasing all fair opportunity solicitations by March 31, 2019, and  issuing all task orders by September 30, 2019), strategy for issuing  task orders on EIS, and any constraints or risks; preparing solicitations for task orders; placing task and service orders; and  reviewing, accepting or rejecting, and paying for services.

At the agencies we reviewed, the staff responsible for the transition were  part of their agencies’ offices that were headed by the Chief Information  Officers.

Finally, the incumbent and EIS contractors are responsible for  disconnecting existing services under the current contracts and installing  new services that agencies order under EIS. They are also to collaborate  with GSA and agencies to (1) share transition planning and execution  best practices and (2) help resolve issues.

GAO’s Prior Work Has Examined Agencies’ Efforts to Plan for Transitioning between Telecommunications Contracts

We have previously reported on efforts by GSA and agencies to transition  from one telecommunications program to another. In a June 2006 report,  we identified a range of transition planning practices that can help  agencies reduce the risk of experiencing adverse effects of moving from  one broad telecommunications contract to another. These planning  practices were to: (1) develop an accurate inventory of  telecommunications assets and services, (2) perform a strategic analysis  of telecommunications requirements, (3) develop a structured transition  management approach, (4) identify the resources needed for the  transition, and (5) develop a transition plan.

Since that June 2006 report, we have reported multiple times on the  extent to which selected agencies were following the transition planning  practices. We have generally found that the selected agencies in our  reviews had not fully implemented some of the key activities of the  practices. For example, in 2008, we noted that one agency was not  planning to clearly define all key transition roles and responsibilities and  another agency was not planning to identify local and regional points of  contact. In addition, in 2017, we reported that, among other things, the  five agencies we selected had yet to fully apply most of the five planning  practices. In each of our reports we made recommendations to the  selected agencies focused on addressing the gaps in transition planning.  All five agencies in our 2017 review undertook efforts to address our  recommendations, but had not yet fully implemented them as of  November 2019.

Agencies Have Various Plans for, and Are in Different Stages of, Transitioning from Their Current Telecommunications Contracts to Enterprise Infrastructure Solutions

Based on our ongoing work, our preliminary results indicated that the 19  selected agencies have varied plans for transitioning from their current  telecommunications contracts to EIS program contracts. As of October  2019, these agencies were also in different stages of their EIS transitions.  All of the selected agencies reported that they plan to fully transition their  telecommunications services to EIS before the current contracts are set  to expire in May 2023.

However, over half of the selected agencies did not plan to complete the  transition by GSA’s September 30, 2022, milestone. In addition, the  majority of selected agencies did not meet GSA’s two critical EIS  transition milestones in 2019—to (1) release all fair opportunity  solicitations by March 31, 2019, and (2) issue all task orders by  September 30, 2019.

Selected Agencies Had Varied Plans for Completing Their Transitions to Enterprise Infrastructure Solutions

As of November 2019, the 19 selected agencies had various plans for  completing their transitions to EIS. Specifically,

Eight of the selected agencies reported that they planned to finish  their transitions to EIS by GSA’s September 30, 2022, milestone.

The 11 remaining agencies did not plan to complete their transitions  by that date.

Officials from the 11 agencies that did not plan to finish their transitions to  EIS by GSA’s September 30, 2022, milestone reported that they planned  to complete the transitions before the current telecommunications  contracts are set to expire in May 2023. However, four of these 11  agencies planned to complete their transitions in May 2023, just before  the current telecommunications contracts are set to expire.

In addition, the planned scope and amount of effort that is expected to be  required to fully transition to EIS varied among the selected agencies.  Specifically, agencies varied in the scope of their planned efforts related  to two of GSA’s critical transition milestones—to release EIS fair  opportunity solicitations and issue EIS task orders:

One selected agency planned to release 54 EIS fair opportunity  solicitations. The eighteen other selected agencies planned to release  between one and six solicitations.

Six agencies planned to issue more than five task orders. The other  thirteen agencies planned to issue between one and five EIS task  orders.

Further, the selected agencies had different plans for the types of  transitions that they would implement. Specifically,

Four of the selected agencies planned to implement primarily a like- for-like transition of their services.

The remaining 15 agencies planned to conduct a combination of a  like-for-like transition and upgrading or transforming services.

Selected Agencies Were in Different Stages of Their Transitions to Enterprise Infrastructure Solutions

As of October 2019, the 19 selected agencies were in different stages of  their EIS transitions. Eighteen of the agencies were in the acquisition  planning and/or acquisition decision phases, during which the agencies  release fair opportunity solicitations for vendor proposals and issue task  orders to selected vendors, respectively. GSA established two critical  milestones for agencies to complete these acquisition activities: (1)  release all fair opportunity solicitations by March 31, 2019, and (2) issue  all task orders by September 30, 2019.

Regarding the first milestone—to release all EIS fair opportunity  solicitations by March 31, 2019:

Five of the 19 selected agencies reported that they released all of  their solicitations by this date.

The 14 remaining selected agencies reported that they did not release  all of their solicitations by this date.

Officials from each of the five agencies that met GSA’s milestone to finish  releasing all of their planned EIS solicitations by March 31, 2019, reported  that their agencies released either one or two solicitations.

We asked officials from the 14 selected agencies that did not release all  of their planned EIS solicitations by March 31, 2019, to identify the key  factors that contributed to their agencies’ delays in releasing these  solicitations. In response, agency officials cited numerous key factors for  the delays, including the complexity of their telecommunications  requirements, changes to the agency’s or GSA’s contracting strategy, and  insufficient staff availability. Figure 2 identifies the key factors that  contributed to delays in releasing all EIS solicitations by GSA’s March 31,  2019, milestone, as identified by agency officials.

In addition, regarding GSA’s second milestone—to issue all EIS task  orders by September 30, 2019—one of the selected agencies reported  that it issued all of its task orders by this date. The 18 other agencies  reported that they did not issue all of their EIS task orders by this date.

We asked officials from the 18 agencies that did not issue all of their EIS  task orders by September 30, 2019, to identify the key factors that  contributed to their agencies’ delays in issuing these task orders. In  response, agency officials cited 19 key factors that led to the delays. Nine  of the identified factors were the same factors that officials cited for their  agencies’ delays in releasing EIS solicitations, including the complexity of  requirements and having insufficient staff available.

The officials also identified 10 other factors unique to their delays in  issuing EIS task orders. For example, officials from two agencies reported  that the EIS vendors needed clarification on the agencies’ requests for  proposals. In addition, officials from three agencies reported that they  needed clarification from the EIS vendors on the proposals that the  agencies received. Figure 3 identifies the key factors that contributed to  delays in issuing all EIS task orders by GSA’s September 30, 2019,  milestone, as identified by agency officials.

Several of the identified factors, such as the partial government shutdown  and the need for vendors to receive authorities to operate, have  subsequently been resolved. For other factors, agencies can leverage  GSA’s available EIS training and customer support to help minimize  delays in meeting GSA’s transition milestones. Nevertheless, given that  the majority of the selected agencies did not meet these transition  milestones in 2019, it will be important for agencies to meet the remaining  transition milestones to ensure that they complete the transition before  the current telecommunications contracts expire in May 2023.

Selected Agencies Had Taken Steps to Implement Established Transition Planning Practices, but None Had Fully Implemented Them

In a June 2006 report, we identified five transition planning practices that  can help agencies reduce the risk of experiencing adverse effects of  moving from one broad telecommunications contract to another.  Implementing these transition planning practices represents a  comprehensive and rigorous management approach that can help  agencies make the most of the opportunity for change that such a major  telecommunications transition provides.

Each of the five transition planning practices that we identified consists of  various activities that should be implemented to fully address the planning  practices. Table 1 identifies the five established transition planning  practices and their associated activities.

Based on our ongoing work, our preliminary results indicated that all five  selected agencies had taken steps to implement the five established  transition planning practices. However, consistent with our prior reviews  of selected agencies’ efforts to implement these planning practices, none  of the selected agencies had fully implemented any of the practices.

All of the Selected Agencies Had Developed Telecommunications Inventories, but None Were Complete

The five selected agencies had all partially implemented the first  established transition planning practice—to develop an accurate inventory  of telecommunications assets and services. In particular, all of the  selected agencies had partially implemented the two activities associated  with this practice. Table 2 summarizes the extent to which the selected  agencies had implemented the transition practice to develop an accurate  inventory of telecommunications services.

Identify a complete telecommunications inventory at every site,  facility, and component. The five selected agencies had all partially  implemented this activity. While all of these agencies had developed  inventories of their telecommunications assets and services, none of  the inventories were complete.

Establish a documented process for updating and maintaining  the inventories. All five selected agencies partially implemented this  activity by taking steps to document their inventory update and  maintenance processes. However, none of the agencies had fully  documented these processes.

Agency officials cited various reasons for partially implementing this first  planning practice. For example, officials from three of the selected  agencies—all of whom were responsible for their agencies’ transitions to  EIS—stated that they did not track all of the assets and services ordered  by the agencies. The officials added that they were not responsible for  maintaining inventories of all of their agencies’ assets and services.  Officials from another agency attributed their agency’s lack of a complete  telecommunications inventory and associated maintenance procedures to  the agency’s decentralized structure. Specifically, the officials stated that  the agency’s components were responsible for managing the services  that are unique to them. However, the officials stated that the agency did  not have a policy that required its components to maintain an inventory of  telecommunications assets and services that they acquired  independently.

Without complete and accurate telecommunications inventories, the  selected agencies may be unable to avoid unnecessary transition delays  related to an inability to plan for services not identified in the inventory. In  addition, without documented processes for maintaining their  telecommunications inventories, the agencies may not be able to  consistently and accurately incorporate into these inventories any  changes made during and after the transition (e.g., adding new services  or removing disconnected services), thus hindering their ability to ensure  that they are billed appropriately by the vendor.

The Selected Agencies Took Steps to Strategically Analyze Their Telecommunications Requirements, but None Used a Complete Inventory to Determine Needs

All of the selected agencies had partially implemented the second  established transition planning practice—to perform a strategic analysis of  telecommunications requirements. In particular, at least four agencies  had partially, but not fully, implemented two of the four activities  associated with this practice. For the other two activities, at least one  agency had partially implemented each activity. Table 3 summarizes the  extent to which the selected agencies had conducted strategic analyses  of their telecommunications requirements.

Identify current and future telecommunications needs using an  inventory of existing services. All of the selected agencies had  partially implemented this activity by identifying certain current and  future telecommunications needs. However, as discussed earlier,  none of the agencies had a complete inventory of current services. As  a result, the agencies could not use such an inventory to fully identify  their needs.

Identify areas for optimization or sharing of telecommunications  and IT resources. Three agencies had fully implemented this activity  by completing strategic analyses to identify areas for optimization or  sharing of telecommunications resources. The two remaining  agencies had partially implemented this activity. For example, one of  the two agencies had developed a draft analysis to justify the potential  optimization and sharing across the agency of a telecommunications  service for how hardware devices connect to the internet, but it had  not yet finalized this analysis. Officials from the other agency had  identified potential areas for the sharing of resources across the  agency. However, the agency did not provide a documented analysis  to justify the sharing of those resources.

Evaluate the costs and benefits of any new technology and  alternative options. Four agencies had fully implemented this activity  by evaluating the costs and benefits of various technologies and  alternative options for telecommunications services that they could  implement as part of the transition. The one remaining agency had  partially implemented this activity by evaluating the costs and benefits  of upgrading one service by which hardware devices connect to the  internet. While two of this agency’s components had also analyzed  the costs and benefits of implementing another type of service for  connecting to networks, the agency’s remaining components had not  conducted such analyses.

Determine that identified telecommunications needs and  opportunities are aligned with the agency’s mission, long-term IT  plans, and enterprise architecture plans. One agency had fully  implemented this activity by determining that its telecommunications  needs aligned with its mission and plans. The four remaining agencies  partially implemented this activity and did not demonstrate that they  had fully aligned their telecommunications needs with their agency’s  mission, long-term IT plans, or enterprise architecture plans.

Agency officials cited several reasons for not fully implementing the  activities associated with this practice. For example, officials from one  agency explained that they had not conducted and documented an  analysis to identify areas for the sharing of telecommunications resources  because they did not believe that there were any additional agency  telecommunications resources that could be shared. The officials  attributed this to the agency’s security requirements and regulations, and  noted that services on the agency’s classified network may not be shared  with services on its unclassified network. However, the agency did not  provide documentation that demonstrated that it had determined that  there were no additional resources that could be shared on its  unclassified network.

Officials from another agency stated that they thought their  telecommunications needs were aligned with the agency’s long-term IT  plans. However, the officials did not provide documentation  demonstrating this alignment.

Agencies that do not use complete inventories of their current  telecommunications services to identify their future needs are likely not  fully identifying these needs. They may also miss out on opportunities to  optimize or share services by consolidating them on EIS. In addition,  without aligning their telecommunications needs and opportunities with  their missions and plans, agencies risk missing opportunities to use the  new contract to address their highest priorities, or may make decisions  that are not aligned with their long-term goals.

All of the Selected Agencies Had Begun to Develop a Structured Management Approach, but None Had Fully Implemented It

All of the selected agencies had partially implemented the third transition  planning practice—to develop a structured management approach for the  telecommunications transition. Specifically, four of the agencies had  partially, but not fully, implemented two of the three activities associated  with this practice. Three agencies had partially implemented the other  activity. Table 4 summarizes the extent to which the selected agencies  had established a structured management approach.

Establish a transition management team and clearly define  responsibilities for key transition roles. One agency had fully  implemented this activity by establishing a transition management  team and defining all key transition responsibilities for the planning  and execution phases of the transition, including for project, asset,  human capital, and information security management; and contract  and legal expertise. The remaining four agencies had partially  implemented this activity by establishing transition management  teams, but none of these agencies had defined all key roles and  responsibilities for their transitions.

Develop transition communications plans in order to facilitate  information sharing during transition planning and execution.  Two agencies had fully implemented this activity by developing  transition communications plans and identifying all key parties that  need to be involved during the agency’s transition effort. The  remaining three agencies partially implemented this activity by  identifying stakeholders responsible for communicating transition  information to other stakeholders. However, these three agencies had  not identified the key local and regional agency transition officials  responsible for disseminating information about the transition to  employees and working with the vendor to facilitate transition  activities.

Use established project, configuration, and change management  processes in the agency’s transition planning efforts. One agency  had fully implemented this activity by demonstrating the use of all  established management processes called for in the activity. The four  remaining agencies had partially implemented this activity by  demonstrating the use of project management processes for their  transitions, such as tracking transition costs and developing  schedules and risk logs. However, one of these four agencies did not  demonstrate that it was applying approved cost and schedule  management processes to its transition. The three remaining  agencies did not demonstrate that they were applying established  configuration management processes to their transitions, and two of  the three also did not demonstrate that they had implemented change  management processes for their transitions.

Officials from the selected agencies generally attributed their lack of full  implementation of this practice to the fact that, at the time of our review,  the agencies were early in their transition planning processes. For  example, officials from one agency stated that they had not defined a role  or responsibilities related to human capital management because their  human capital needs for the transition will depend on the vendors  selected (at the time of our review, the agency had not yet selected all of  the vendors for its EIS task orders). Officials from another agency also  explained that they planned to work with their selected EIS vendors to  implement all of the key management processes for the transition.

While the selected agencies were early in their transition planning  processes at the time of our review, the limited time remaining to  complete the transition makes it critical that agencies conduct early  planning with the information that is available. Agencies that do not define  all key roles and related responsibilities for their transition management  teams risk extending their transition period as they attempt to assign  appropriate personnel and update them on transition progress and  issues. Further, without identifying all of the key officials that need to be  involved with the transition, including the local and regional agency points  of contact, agencies may lack the information that is necessary for  comprehensive understanding, accountability, and shared expectations  among all those with transition responsibilities.

All of the Selected Agencies Had at Least Partially Identified Their Transition Resource Needs, but None Had Fully Determined These Needs

All of the selected agencies had partially implemented the fourth  established transition planning practice—to identify their transition  resource needs. In particular, all of the agencies had partially  implemented three of the four activities associated with this practice. For  the remaining activity, four of the agencies had partially implemented it  and one agency had fully implemented it. Table 5 summarizes the extent  to which the selected agencies had identified their transition resource  needs.

Identify the level of funding needed to support transition  planning. One of the selected agencies had fully implemented this  activity by identifying the costs needed to support its transition  management team and all years of its transition planning efforts. The  four other agencies partially implemented this activity by developing  partial cost estimates for the transition, but none of these estimates  were complete.

Identify the organizational need for investments and justify  resource requests. The five selected agencies had all partially  implemented this activity by identifying the need for investments,  including funding to obtain GSA transition assistance; however, none  of the agencies had fully justified their resource requests for the  transition. For example, four agencies had not justified their resource  requests related to transition program management staff and one  agency lacked justification for its requests for hardware and software  upgrades.

Identify human capital needs for the entire transition effort. All of  the selected agencies had partially implemented this activity by  identifying the need for certain staff to work on the transition, including  government and contractor staff. However, none of the agencies had  conducted and documented analyses of their human capital needs, to  determine the total number of staff required to support their entire  transition efforts.

Identify and require training for the transition. All of the agencies  had partially implemented this activity by identifying training needed  by certain transition management staff. However, four agencies had  not conducted and documented analyses to identify all of the training  needed for their transitions, including training for staff carrying out the  transition or operating and maintaining new equipment or services.  The final agency had developed a draft analysis to identify training  needed by staff carrying out the transition, but it had not finalized this  analysis.

Officials from the selected agencies generally explained that they were  too early in their transition efforts to identify all of the funding, human  capital, and training needed for their transitions. However, there is limited  time remaining to complete the transition before the current  telecommunications contracts expire. If the agencies do not conduct early  planning to identify and justify all of their resources needed for the  transition, they may underestimate the complexity and demands of their  transition efforts.

In addition, without using a rigorous management approach to analyze  and document the total number of staff required to support the transition  and to identify all of the required training for transition staff, agencies risk  having insufficient staff available or may experience gaps in staff  competencies. Such gaps may lead to delays and unexpected costs as  the agencies try to quickly address the lack of resources during the  transition’s limited time frame.

All of the Selected Agencies Had Begun to Develop Transition Plans, but These Plans Were Not Complete

All of the selected agencies had partially implemented the fifth  established transition planning practice—to develop transition plans.  Specifically, all of the agencies had fully implemented one of the three  activities associated with this practice and partially implemented another  of the activities. For the remaining activity, three agencies had fully  implemented it and two had partially implemented it. Table 6 summarizes  the extent to which the selected agencies had developed transition plans.

Identify agency-specific transition objectives and measures of  success. Three agencies had fully implemented this activity by  identifying transition objectives and associated measures of success  that were based on the transition objectives. The remaining two  agencies had partially implemented this activity by identifying  transition objectives and measures of success. However, their  measures were unable to be used to assess transition progress. In  particular, the identified measures could be used to determine  success at the completion of the transition (e.g., all planned services  have been transitioned to EIS). However, the measures did not  enable the agencies to compare expected performance with actual  results in order to track progress during the course of the transition  (e.g., identifying the expected number of services that would be  moved to EIS during each year of the transition).

Identify risks that could affect transition success, including  information security risks, and evaluate the importance of these  risks relative to the agency’s mission critical systems and  continuity of operations plans. All of the selected agencies had fully  implemented this activity. Specifically, each of the agencies had  identified transition risks and evaluated the importance of those risks  relative to the agencies’ mission critical priorities.

Clearly define transition preparation tasks and develop a time  line that takes into account the agency’s mission critical  systems, contingency plans, and identified risks. All of the  selected agencies partially implemented this activity by developing  time lines with clearly defined transition preparation tasks. However,  none of these time lines accounted for all key priorities identified in the  activity.

Officials from all of the selected agencies generally said that they had not  yet developed complete transition time lines because they were focused  on activities associated with the acquisition planning phase of the  transition, including developing their EIS solicitations. Officials from all of  the agencies said that they planned to develop complete transition time  lines after they issue their EIS task orders.

While agencies’ lack of issued EIS task orders contributed to delays in  developing complete transition plans, the limited time remaining to  complete the transition makes it critical that agencies conduct early  planning with the information that is available.

In summary, although the 19 selected agencies reported that they plan to  fully transition to EIS before the current telecommunications contracts  expire in May 2023, over half of the agencies do not plan to complete the  transition by GSA’s September 30, 2022, milestone to do so. By waiting  until close to the end of the current contracts to finish the transition, these  agencies are at risk of experiencing disruptions in service if any issues  arise that result in transition delays, such as inadequate human capital  resources or the need to transition previously unidentified services.  Agencies also face a financial risk. During the last transition, significant  delays in moving to Networx—which offered generally lower rates than its  predecessor—led to hundreds of millions of dollars in missed savings.

Should agencies experience similar delays in the current transition, the  missed savings could also be significant.

In addition, five agencies we reviewed had taken steps to prepare for the  transition of their telecommunications services to EIS contracts. However,  these agencies’ lack of full implementation of established planning  practices increases the risk that they will experience adverse effects— such as schedule delays or cost increases—while transitioning to the new  contracts. Several agencies stated that they intend to implement the  planning practices after they have issued their EIS task orders. However,  limited time remains to complete the transition before the current  telecommunications contracts expire.

Further, inadequate project planning was a key factor that contributed to  delays during the prior transition to Networx. Thus, it is critical for  agencies to apply a rigorous management approach from the start of the  current transition using the information that is currently available, even  though changes may be necessary as conditions evolve. Agencies that  do not fully adopt the comprehensive approach captured in these  planning practices may not make the most of the opportunity for change,  and the potential to save costs, that such a major telecommunications  transition provides.

Accordingly, our draft report contains 25 planned recommendations to the  five selected agencies. By implementing our recommendations, the  agencies should be better positioned to reduce their risk of experiencing  the types of delays that occurred during previous transition efforts.  Because of the generally lower rates available on EIS, significant delays  would lead to agencies being unable to take advantage of readily  available cost savings.

Chairman Connolly, Ranking Member Meadows, and Members of the  Subcommittee, this concludes my prepared statement. I would be  pleased to respond to any questions that you may have.

If you have any questions concerning this statement, please contact Carol  C. Harris, Director, Information Technology Acquisition Management  Issues, at (202) 512-4456 or HarrisCC@gao.gov. Other individuals who  made key contributions include James R. Sweetman, Jr. (Assistant  Director); Emily Kuhn (Analyst-in-Charge); Christopher Businsky;  Rebecca Eyler; and Javier Irizarry.

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the  United States. The published product may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety  without further permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain  copyrighted images or other material, permission from the copyright holder may be  necessary if you wish to reproduce this material separately.

Federal agencies must transition their telecommunications services to new contracts before their current contracts expire in May 2023.

However, we testified that most agencies we looked at did not meet key dates for completing contract transition activities (such as soliciting vendor proposals or issuing work orders to selected vendors).

These agencies also do not plan to complete the transition by the September 2022 deadline set by the General Services Administration. Delays in transitioning will cause agencies to miss out on cost savings and may cause disruptions in service.

This image was updated to clarify the topic.