High Risk: Progress Made but Continued Attention Needed to Address Management Weaknesses at Federal Agencies Serving Indian Tribes

GAO's High-Risk List identifies federal program areas that are high risk due to their vulnerability to mismanagement, among other things. GAO added the federal management of programs that serve Indian tribes and their members to its February 2017 biennial update of high-risk areas in response to management weaknesses at Interior and HHS. GAO's recommendations identified in this high-risk area are neither reflective of the performance of programs administered by tribes nor directed at any tribally operated programs and activities.

This testimony, which is based on GAO's March 2019 High Risk report, provides examples of actions taken and progress made by these agencies to address the five criteria GAO uses for determining whether to remove a high-risk designation. For this statement, GAO also drew on findings from its reports issued from September 2011 through August 2018 and updated that work by reviewing agency documentation and interviewing agency officials.

GAO designated the federal management of programs that serve tribes and their members as high risk in 2017. Officials from the Department of the Interior's Office of the Assistant Secretary-Indian Affairs (Indian Affairs), the Bureau of Indian Education (BIE), the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA), and the Department of Health and Human Services' (HHS) Indian Health Service (IHS) have expressed their commitment to addressing the issues that led to the designation. Since GAO last testified before this committee on June 13, 2018, Indian Affairs, BIE, BIA, and IHS have demonstrated progress to partially meet each of the five criteria for removing a high-risk designation (leadership commitment, capacity, action plan, monitoring, and demonstrated progress).

However, additional progress is needed to fully address management weaknesses—particularly in the areas of retaining permanent leadership and a sufficient workforce. For example, to meet the capacity criterion, an agency needs to demonstrate that it has the capacity (i.e., people and other resources) to resolve its management weaknesses. While Indian Affairs, BIE, BIA, and IHS each made progress identifying capacity and resources to partially meet this criterion, BIE and IHS continue to face significant workforce challenges. Specifically, although BIE has conducted hiring in recent years as part of an effort to reorganize the bureau, about 50 percent of all BIE positions have not been filled according to recent BIE documentation. IHS also faces workforce challenges—GAO's August 2018 report found that IHS's overall vacancy rate for clinical care providers was 25 percent.

GAO has identified varying levels of progress at the agencies in understanding what they need to do to be removed from the list and will continue to closely monitor their progress.

GAO has made more than 50 recommendations related to this high-risk area to improve management weaknesses at some Interior and HHS agencies—specifically BIE, BIA, and IHS—of which 31 recommendations are still open. Sustained focus by Interior and HHS in fully implementing these recommendations and continued oversight by Congress are essential to achieving progress in these areas.

I am pleased to be here today to discuss the status of actions by the  Departments of the Interior (Interior) and Health and Human Services  (HHS) to address issues that led to the high-risk designation we made  related to the federal management of programs that serve tribes and their  members. We added this area to our High-Risk List in February 2017  because of our concern about the ability of agencies within these  departments to manage (1) education and health care programs that  serve tribes and their members and (2) Indian energy resources. In  particular, our prior work found numerous weaknesses in how Interior’s  Bureau of Indian Education (BIE) and Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA)— under the office of the Assistant Secretary- Indian Affairs (Indian  Affairs)—managed education and energy resources and how HHS’s  Indian Health Service (IHS) managed health care services. We reported  that these management weaknesses jeopardized the health and safety of  American Indians served by these programs and limited opportunities for  tribes and their members to use energy resources to create economic  benefits and improve the well-being of their communities. We expressed  continued concerns about challenges faced by these agencies in our  2019 High-Risk Report.

In 2016, Congress found in the Indian Trust Asset Reform Act that  “through treaties, statutes, and historical relations with Indian tribes, the  United States has undertaken a unique trust responsibility to protect and  support Indian tribes and Indians.” As further stated in that act, the  fiduciary responsibilities of the United States to Indians arise in part from  commitments made in treaties and agreements, in exchange for which  Indians surrendered claims to vast tracts of land. The act notes that this  history of federal-tribal relations and understandings has benefitted the  people of the United States and established “enduring and enforceable  ederal obligations to which the national honor has been committed.”  Agencies can improve the efficiency of federal programs under which  services are provided to tribes and their members by making  improvements to their management and oversight of such programs.

Such improvements would be consistent with the expressed view of  Congress as to the federal government’s trust responsibilities and would  strengthen confidence in the performance and accountability of the  federal government.

The focus of this high-risk area is on management weaknesses within  federal agencies that administer programs that serve tribes and their  members. However, not all federal programs are administered by federal  agencies. In accordance with federal Indian policy that recognizes the  right of Indian tribes to self-government and that supports tribal self- determination, a number of tribes have elected to take over the  administration of certain federal programs and services from BIA, BIE,  and IHS. Our recommendations identified in the high-risk area are neither  reflective of the performance of programs administered by tribes nor  directed at any tribally operated programs and activities.

When we added the federal management of programs that serve tribes  and their members to our High-Risk List in February 2017, we cited 39  open recommendations related to this high-risk area. Since then, we  added 13 recommendations in two new reports on BIE school safety and  construction, and a report on IHS provider vacancy rates. Overall, as of  March 2019, 31 recommendations remain open.

My statement today, which is largely based on our March 2019 High-Risk  Series: Substantial Efforts Needed to Achieve Greater Progress on High- Risk Areas, will address actions taken and progress made by these  agencies to address the five criteria we use for determining whether to  remove a high-risk designation (leadership commitment, capacity, action  plan, monitoring, and demonstrated progress). For this statement, we  also drew on findings from our reports issued from September 2011  through August 2018 and updated that work by reviewing agency  documentation and interviewing agency officials. To conduct our  previously issued work on which this testimony draws, we reviewed  relevant federal laws, regulations, and policies; reviewed agency  documentation; and interviewed tribal, federal, and industry officials,  among others. More detailed information on the scope and methodology  of our work can be found in each of the reports cited in our High-Risk  Series reports.

We conducted the work on which this statement is based in accordance  with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards  require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate  evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions  based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained  provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on  our audit objectives.

Since 1990, generally every 2 years at the start of a new Congress, we  call attention to agencies and program areas that are high risk due to their  vulnerability to mismanagement or that are most in need of  transformation. Our high-risk program is intended to help inform the  congressional oversight agenda and to improve government  performance. Since 1990, a total of 62 different areas have appeared on  the High-Risk List. Of these, 26 areas have been removed, and 2 areas  have been consolidated. On average, the high-risk areas that were  removed from the list had been on it for 9 years after they were initially  added.

Our experience with the High-Risk List over the past 29 years has shown  that the key elements needed to make progress in high-risk areas are  top-level attention by the administration and agency leaders grounded in  the five criteria for removing high-risk designations, which we reported on  in November 2000. When legislative and agency actions, including those  in response to our recommendations, result in our finding significant  progress toward resolving a high-risk problem, we will remove the high- risk designation. However, implementing our recommendations alone will  not result in the removal of the designation, because the condition that led  to the recommendations is symptomatic of systemic management  weaknesses. In cases in which we remove the high-risk designation, we continue to closely monitor the areas. If significant problems again arise,  we will consider reapplying the high-risk designation. The five criteria for  removing high-risk designations are as follows:

Leadership commitment. Demonstrated strong commitment and top  leadership support to address the risks.

Capacity. Agency has the capacity (i.e., people and other resources)  to resolve the risk(s).

Action plan. A corrective action plan that defines the root causes,  identifies solutions, and provides for substantially completing  corrective measures in the near term, including steps necessary to  implement solutions we recommended.

Monitoring. A program has been instituted to monitor and  independently validate the effectiveness and sustainability of  corrective measures.

Demonstrated progress. Ability to demonstrate progress in  implementing corrective measures and in resolving the high-risk area.

These five criteria form a road map for efforts to improve and ultimately  address high-risk issues. Addressing some of the criteria leads to  progress, and satisfying all of the criteria is central to removal from the  list. Figure 1 shows the five criteria for removal for a designated high-risk  area and examples of agency actions leading to progress toward  removal.

Importantly, the actions listed are not “stand alone” efforts taken in  isolation of other actions to address high-risk issues. That is, actions  taken under one criterion may be important to meeting other criteria as  well. For example, top leadership can demonstrate its commitment by  establishing a corrective action plan, including long-term priorities and  goals to address the high-risk issue and by using data to gauge  progress—actions that are also vital to addressing the action plan and  monitoring criteria. When an agency meets all five of these criteria, we  can remove the agency from the High-Risk List. We rate agency progress  on the criteria using the following definitions:

Met. Actions have been taken that meet the criterion. There are no  significant actions that need to be taken to further address this  criterion.

Partially met. Some, but not all, actions necessary to meet the  criterion have been taken.

Not met. Few, if any, actions toward meeting the criterion have been  taken.

Agencies Made Some Progress Addressing the Management Weaknesses That Led to the 2017 High- Risk Designation

Officials from Indian Affairs, BIE, BIA, and IHS expressed their  commitment to addressing the issues that led to the high-risk designation  for federal management of programs that serve tribes and their members.  Since we last testified before this committee on June 13, 2018, we met  with agency leaders and worked with each agency to identify actions the  agencies took or plan to take to address the concerns that contributed to  the designation. We determined that Indian Affairs, BIE, BIA, and IHS  demonstrated some progress to partially meet each of the criteria for  removing a high-risk designation. However, additional progress is needed  for the agencies to fully address the criteria and related management  weaknesses.

Overall Rating for Improving Federal Management of Programs That Serve Tribes and Their Members

As we reported in the March 2019 high-risk report, when we applied the  five criteria for High-Risk List removal to each of the three segments— education, energy, and health care—we determined that Indian Affairs,  BIE, BIA, and IHS have each demonstrated some progress. Overall, the  agencies have partially met the leadership commitment, capacity, action  plan, monitoring, and demonstrated progress criteria for the education,  health care, and energy areas. However, the agencies continue to face  challenges, particularly in retaining permanent leadership and a sufficient  workforce.

The following is a summary of the progress that Indian Affairs, BIE, BIA,  and IHS have made in addressing the five criteria for removal from the  High-Risk List.

To meet the leadership commitment criterion for removal of a high-risk  designation, an agency needs to have demonstrated strong commitment  and top leadership support to address management weaknesses. The  following examples show actions Indian Affairs, BIE, BIA, and IHS took to  partially meet the leadership commitment criterion.

Education. Indian Affairs’ leaders have demonstrated commitment to  addressing key weaknesses in the management of BIE schools in  several ways. For example, the BIE Director formed an internal  working group, convened meetings with other senior leaders within  Indian Affairs, and publicly stated that his agency is committed to  ensuring implementation of our recommendations on Indian  education. In addition, the BIE Director and other Indian Affairs  leaders and senior managers have met with us frequently to discuss  outstanding recommendations, actions they have taken to address  these recommendations, and additional actions they could take. We  also met with the new Assistant Secretary-Indian Affairs, who  expressed her commitment to supporting the agency’s efforts to  address weaknesses in the management of BIE schools. However, it  is important that Indian Affairs leaders be able to sustain this level of  commitment to solving problems in Indian education. Since 2012,  there have been seven Assistant-Secretaries of Indian Affairs and five  BIE Directors. There has also been leadership turnover in other key  offices responsible for implementing our recommendations on Indian  education. We have previously reported that leadership turnover  hampered Indian Affairs’ efforts to make improvements to Indian  education. We believe that ensuring stable leadership and a  sustained focus on needed changes is vital to the successful  management of BIE schools.

Energy. BIA officials demonstrated leadership commitment by,  among other things, meeting with us to discuss the agency’s progress  in addressing our recommendations. In June 2018, a permanent  Assistant Secretary for Indian Affairs was confirmed. This action  provided an opportunity to improve Indian Affair’s oversight of federal  actions associated with energy development. According to the BIA  Acting Director and the Acting Director for Trust Services, BIA held a  number of meetings with the Assistant Secretary to discuss agency  action plans for our recommendations. However, BIA does not have a  permanent Director, and BIA’s Office of Trust Service—which has  significant responsibility over Indian energy activities—does not have  a permanent Director or Deputy Director. We have seen turnover in  these leadership positions as officials have been brought in to  temporarily fill these roles. As officials are brought in temporarily,  previously identified plans and time frames for completing some  activities have changed, and BIA has found itself starting over on the  process to identify or implement corrective actions.

Health Care. IHS officials demonstrated leadership commitment by  regularly meeting with us to discuss the agency’s progress in  addressing our recommendations. In addition, IHS has chartered a  policy advisory council that will focus on issues related to strategic  direction, recommended policy, and organizational adjustments.  According to IHS, this advisory council will, among other things, serve  as a liaison among IHS leadership for issues involving strategic  direction and policy, as well as monitor and facilitate related policy  workgroups. However, IHS still does not have permanent  leadership—including a Director of IHS—which is necessary for the  agency to demonstrate its commitment to improvement. Additionally,  since 2012, there have been five IHS Acting Directors, and there has  been leadership turnover in other key positions, such as area  directors.

To fully meet the leadership commitment criterion, all agencies will need,  among other things, stable, permanent leadership that has assigned the  tasks needed to address weaknesses and that holds those assigned  accountable for progress. For a timeline of senior leadership turnover in  Indian Affairs, BIE, BIA, and IHS from 2012 through March 2019, see  Figure 3.

To meet the capacity criterion, an agency needs to demonstrate that it  has the capacity (i.e., people and other resources) to resolve its  management weaknesses. Indian Affairs, BIE, BIA, and IHS each made  some progress in identifying capacity and resources to implement some  of our recommendations, but BIE and IHS continue to face significant  workforce challenges. The following examples show actions Indian  Affairs, BIE, BIA, and IHS took to partially meet the capacity criterion.

Education. BIE and other Indian Affairs offices that support BIE  schools have made some progress in demonstrating capacity to  address risks to Indian education. For example, BIE hired a full-time  program analyst to coordinate its working group and help oversee the  implementation of our recommendations on Indian education. This  official has played a key role in coordinating the agency’s  implementation efforts and has provided us with regular updates on  the status of these efforts. BIE has also conducted hiring in various  offices in recent years as part of a 2014 Secretarial Order to  reorganize the bureau. For example, it has hired school safety  officers and personnel in offices supporting the oversight of school  spending. However, about 50 percent of all BIE positions have not  been filled, including new positions that have been added as a result  of the agency’s restructuring, according to recent BIE documentation.  Moreover, the agency reported that it has not filled the position of  Chief Academic Officer, a top-level BIE manager responsible for  providing leadership and direction to BIE’s academic programs.  Furthermore, BIE has not completed a strategic workforce plan to  address staffing and training gaps with key staff, which we previously  recommended. Such a plan is important to allow BIE and other Indian  Affairs offices to better understand workforce needs and leverage  resources to meet them. In February 2019, BIE drafted a strategic  workforce plan and reported it is currently gathering feedback on the  plan from internal stakeholders. BIE officials indicated they are  planning to finalize and implement the plan in 2019.

Energy. In November 2016, we recommended that BIA establish a  documented process for assessing the workforce at its agency  offices. BIA has taken a number of actions, such as conducting an  internal survey to identify general workforce needs related to oil and  gas development. This survey information supported staffing  decisions for the recently created Indian Energy Service Center. In  February 2019, BIA officials told us they have drafted a long-range  workforce plan to ensure BIA has staff in place to meet its  organizational needs. We will review the plan to determine if the  planned actions will help BIA identify critical skills and competencies  related to energy development and identify potential gaps.

Health Care. IHS has made some progress in demonstrating it has  the capacity and resources necessary to address the program risks  we identified in our reports. For example, among other actions, IHS  officials stated that the agency is expanding the role of internal audit  staff within its enterprise risk management program to augment  internal audits and complement audits by the HHS Inspector General  and GAO. In addition, IHS has developed a new Office of Quality,  which is expected to develop and monitor agency-wide quality of care  standards. However, IHS officials told us there are still vacancies in  several key positions, including the Director of the Office of Resource  Access and Partnerships, and the Office of Finance and Accounting.  Additionally, our August 2018 report found that IHS’s overall vacancy  rate for clinical care providers was 25 percent.

To fully meet the capacity criterion, all of the agencies need to assess  tradeoffs between these and other administration priorities in terms of  people and resources, and the agencies should provide to decision  makers key information on resources needed to address management  weaknesses.

To meet the action plan criterion, an agency needs to have a corrective  action plan that defines the root causes, identifies solutions, and provides  for substantially completing corrective measures in the near term,  including steps necessary to implement the solutions we recommended.  The following examples show actions Indian Affairs, BIE, BIA, and IHS  took to partially meet the action plan criterion.

Education. Among other actions, BIE implemented a new action plan  for overseeing BIE school spending, including written procedures and  risk criteria, which fully addressed two priority recommendations. Also,  BIE completed a strategic plan in August 2018, which we  recommended in September 2013. The plan provides the agency  with goals and strategies for improving its management and oversight  of Indian education, and establishes detailed actions and milestones  for the implementation. However, Indian Affairs has not provided  documentation that it has completed action plans on other important  issues, such as a comprehensive, long-term capital asset plan to  inform its allocation of school facility funds, which we recommended in  May 2017.

Energy. In meetings, BIA officials identified actions they have taken  towards implementing our recommendations. For instance, BIA  officials told us they have recently completed modifications to BIA’s  database for recording and maintaining historical and current data on  ownership and leasing of Indian land and mineral resources—the  Trust Asset and Accounting Management System (TAAMS). The  officials said that the modifications incorporate the key identifiers and  data fields needed to track and monitor review and response times for  oil and gas leases and agreements. BIA officials we met with have  demonstrated an understanding that addressing long-standing  management weaknesses is not accomplished through a single action  but through comprehensive planning and continued movement toward  a goal. However, the agency does not have a comprehensive action  plan to identify the root causes of all identified management  weaknesses and address the problems.

Health Care. In February 2019, IHS finalized its strategic plan for  fiscal years 2019 through 2023, and is developing a related work plan  to address certain root causes of management challenges and define  solutions and corrective measures for the agency. The strategic plan  divides these challenges into three categories: (1) access to care, (2)  quality of care, and (3) program management and operations. We will  examine the strategic plan and IHS’s work plan, once issued, to  determine whether they contain the needed elements of an action  plan.

To fully meet the action plan criterion, a comprehensive plan that  identifies actions to address the root causes of its management  shortcomings would have to come from top leadership with a commitment  to provide sufficient capacity and resources to take the necessary actions  to address management shortcomings and risks.

To meet the monitoring criterion, an agency needs to demonstrate that a  program has been instituted to monitor and independently validate the  effectiveness and sustainability of corrective measures. We have been  working with the agencies to help clarify the need to establish a  framework for monitoring progress that includes goals and performance  measures to track their efforts and ultimately verify the effectiveness of  their efforts. The following examples show actions Indian Affairs, BIE,  BIA, and IHS took to partially meet the monitoring criterion.

Education. Indian Affairs, in consultation with Department of Interior’s  Office of Occupational Safety and Health, has taken actions to  monitor corrective measures that address weaknesses with the  agency’s safety program—which covers safety at BIE schools.  However, the agency has not yet demonstrated that it is monitoring  several other areas, such as whether relevant employees are being  held to the agency’s required performance standards for safety  inspections.

Energy. BIA has taken steps to improve monitoring by holding  frequent meetings to assess its progress in implementing our  recommendations. However, BIA has not yet taken needed steps to  monitor its progress in addressing the root causes of management  weaknesses.

Health Care. IHS has taken some steps toward monitoring the  agency’s progress in addressing the root causes of their management  weaknesses. In addition to developing its new Office of Quality, IHS  has taken steps to develop a patient experience of care survey, as  well as standards for tracking patient wait times. These efforts should  be reflected in the agency’s corrective plan, as part of an overall  framework for monitoring progress that includes goals and  performance measures to track their efforts and ultimately verify the  effectiveness of their efforts.

To fully meet the monitoring criterion, the agencies need to establish  goals and performance measures as they develop action plans and take  further actions to monitor the effectiveness of actions to address root  causes of identified management shortcomings.

To meet the demonstrated progress criterion, an agency needs to  demonstrate progress in implementing corrective measures and in  resolving the high-risk area. The following examples show actions Indian  Affairs, BIA, and IHS took to partially meet the demonstrated progress  criterion.

Education. As of February 2019, Indian Affairs had addressed 11 of  the 23 outstanding education recommendations we identified in our  September 2017 testimony. Three of these recommendations were  closed after the June 2018 hearing, including a recommendation from  our 2013 report for BIE to develop a strategic plan and two  recommendations from our 2017 report on improving the oversight  and accountability for BIE school safety inspections. Overall, Indian  Affairs’ efforts since we issued our High-Risk List update in February  2017 represent a significant increase in activity implementing our  recommendations. Substantial work, however, remains to address  our outstanding recommendations in several key areas, such as in  accountability for BIE school safety and school construction projects.  For example, Indian Affairs has not provided documentation that the  inspection information its personnel collect on the safety of BIE  schools is complete and accurate. As of late February 2019, 12  recommendations related to this high-risk area remain open and  Indian Affairs concurred with all 12 recommendations. For a full  description of the status of these open recommendations, see in table  1 in appendix I.

Energy. BIA has shown significant progress developing data  collection instruments and processes needed to track and review  response times for a number of different actions associated with  energy development. For example, in our June 2015 report, we  recommended that BIA take steps to improve its geographic  information system (GIS) capabilities to ensure it can verify ownership  in a timely manner. We closed this recommendation as BIA has  made significant progress in enhancing its GIS capabilities by  integrating map-viewing technology and capabilities into its land  management data system. In addition, we recommended that BIA  take steps to identify cadastral survey needs. BIA’s enhanced map- viewing technology allows the bureau to identify land boundary  discrepancies, which can then be researched and corrected. To  address the recommendation, BIA identified unmet survey needs that  were contained within the defunct cadastral request system. BIA  developed a new mechanism for its regions and agency offices to  make survey requests and a new database to maintain survey  requests. In fall 2018, BIA completed enhancements to TAAMS that  will allow the agency to track time frames and status of oil and gas  revenue-sharing agreements-called communitization agreements  (CA) through the review process. BIA held training on the  enhancements in November 2018 and requested staff input  information on any newly submitted CAs in the system. In a meeting  on February 25, 2019, the Acting Director of BIA said that BIA had  also completed efforts to modify TAAMS, incorporating the key  identifiers and data fields needed to track and monitor review and  response times for oil and gas leases and agreements. We believe  these actions show significant progress in addressing management  weaknesses associated with outdated technology and data limitations  for tracking and monitoring the review and approval of energy related  documents. However, BIA needs to collect data from its updated  system, develop time frames, and monitor agency performance to  close open recommendations. For a full description of the status of  the agency’s open recommendations, see in table 2 in appendix II.

Health Care. IHS has made progress in implementing corrective  actions related to the management of health care programs.  Specifically, since our 2017 High-Risk Report, IHS implemented four  of our 13 open recommendations. For example, in response to our  April 2013 recommendation, to ensure that IHS’s payment rates for  contracted services do not impede patient access to physician and  other nonhospital care, IHS developed an online tool that enables the  agency to track providers that do not accept IHS’s payment rates. As  of March 2019, six out of the 13 recommendations in our 2017 High- Risk Report remain open, and we have added one additional  recommendation—for a total of seven open recommendations related  to this high-risk area. IHS officials told us that they plan to complete  the implementation of additional recommendations in 2019. For a full  description of the status of the agency’s open recommendations, see  in table 3 in appendix III.

To fully meet the demonstrating progress criterion, agencies need to  continue taking actions to ensure sustained progress and show that  management shortcomings are being effectively managed and root  causes are being addressed.

In conclusion, we see some progress in meeting all of the criteria, at all  agencies, especially related to education programs. However, permanent  leadership that provides continuing oversight and accountability is  needed. We also see varying levels of progress at all of the agencies in  understanding what they need to do to be removed from the High-Risk  List, and identifying steps that can be incorporated into corrective action  plans. We look forward to working with the agencies to track their  progress in implementing a framework for monitoring and validating the  effectiveness of planned corrective actions. Among the greatest  continuing challenges for the agencies is developing sufficient capacity,  including demonstrating that they have the people and other resources  required to address the deficiencies in their programs and activities. This  challenge cannot be overcome by the agencies without a commitment  from their leadership and the administration to prioritize fixing  management weaknesses in programs and activities that serve tribes and  their members. Sustained congressional attention to these issues will  help ensure that the agencies continue to achieve progress in these  areas.

Chairman Hoeven, Vice Chairman Udall, and Members of the Committee,  this completes my prepared statement. I would be pleased to respond to  any questions that you may have.

If you or your staff have any questions about health care issues in this  testimony or the related reports, please contact Jessica Farb at (202)  512-7114 or farbj@gao.gov. For questions about education, please  contact Melissa Emrey-Arras at (617) 788-0534 or  emreyarrasm@gao.gov. For questions about energy resource  development, please contact Frank Rusco at (202) 512-3841 or  ruscof@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional  Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this  statement. Key contributors to this statement include Kelly DeMots,  (Assistant Director), Christina Ritchie (Analyst-in-Charge), Edward  Bodine, Christine Kehr, Elizabeth Sirois, and Leigh White.

Appendix I: Status of Open Recommendations to the Department of the Interior on Indian Education

As of late February 2019, 12 of the 23 recommendations to the  Department of the Interior on Indian education we identified in our  September 13, 2017, testimony remain open.

Appendix II: Status of Open Recommendations to the Department of Interior on Indian Energy

As of February 2019, 12 of the 14 recommendations to the Department of  Interior’s Bureau of Indian Affairs cited in our 2017 High-Risk Report  remain open.

Appendix III: Status of Open Recommendations to HHS on the Indian Health Service

While federal agencies that serve Indian tribes have made some progress on management issues, our 2019 High Risk List found that agencies like the Bureau of Indian Education (BIE) and the Indian Health Service (IHS) still face challenges.

For example, although BIE has conducted hiring in recent years as part of an effort to reorganize the bureau, about 50 percent of all BIE positions have not been filled. IHS also faces workforce challenges—IHS’s overall vacancy rate for clinical care providers was 25 percent.

We've previously made a number of recommendations to address these issues.


State Department: Leadership Focus Needed to Guide Agency Reform Efforts

In 2017, State initiated a series of reform efforts in response to an executive order by the President and guidance issued by the Office of Management and Budget aimed at reorganizing and streamlining the government. GAO's prior work has shown that successful agency reform efforts follow key implementation practices, such as establishing a dedicated team to manage the implementation of reforms, and ensuring transparency by setting public goals and milestones to monitor progress.

This report examines (1) the status of the reform efforts that State reported to Congress in February 2018 and (2) the extent to which State addressed key practices critical to the successful implementation of agency reform efforts. GAO reviewed State's reform plans, proposals, and related documents; met with officials involved in State's reform efforts; and assessed implementation of the reform efforts against relevant key practices identified in GAO's prior work.

The Department of State (State) is implementing most of the 17 reform projects it reported to Congress in February 2018, but a few are stalled or discontinued. State completed one project streamlining policy formulation, and continues working to implement 13 projects on topics including human resources, information technology, and data analytics. Progress on two projects related to overseas presence has stalled, and State has discontinued a project to consolidate real property management.

State has not addressed certain key practices related to leadership focus and attention in implementing its reform efforts. Multiple transitions in State's leadership and changing priorities contributed to uncertainty about leadership support for reform projects.Top leadership is expected to drive any needed transformation by clarifying priorities and communicating direction to employees and stakeholders.

In March 2018, the President replaced the Secretary of State, a transition that created uncertainty within the agency regarding the future of ongoing reform projects. While some officials stated that the new Secretary had expressed support for data analytics and cyber security reform efforts, other officials said they were unclear as to whether their projects remained a priority. According to senior officials, the current Secretary has focused on critical needs, such as ending the hiring freeze and increasing recruitment, and on launching new initiatives.

In April 2018, State disbanded the dedicated teams overseeing its reform efforts and shifted responsibility to bureaus and offices. In some cases, officials assigned to lead reform projects reported receiving little or no direction from department leadership. GAO's prior work has highlighted the benefits of having a dedicated team to manage agency transformations.

In addition, State officials indicated that the challenges posed by these transitions were compounded by a lack of Senate-confirmed leadership in key positions. Specifically, during the first 2 years of State's reform efforts, bureaus and offices responsible for implementing 12 of State's 13 continuing reform projects reported directly to one or more officials serving in an acting capacity. For example, State did not have a Senate-confirmed Under Secretary for Management from January 2017 to May 2019, which, according to senior officials, hindered State's reform efforts.

According to State officials, taken together these leadership transitions led to several projects being scaled back, slowed down, or both.

Although uncertainties exist about leadership priorities regarding the reform efforts, the bureaus and offices responsible for implementing reform projects have taken steps to manage and monitor them, consistent with key practices. Each of the continuing projects has implementation plans that include milestones and deliverables, and some report their progress publicly. For example, State reports on the progress of some projects in its annual performance plans and reports. The lack of a dedicated team to manage the reform process, however, could slow State's overall efforts.

The Secretary of State should (1) determine which unimplemented reform projects, if any, should be implemented and communicate this determination to Congress and appropriate State personnel, and (2) establish a single dedicated team to manage the implementation of all reform efforts that the Secretary decides to pursue. State generally concurred with the recommendations.

In March 2017, the President issued Executive Order 13781, which  directed the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to propose a plan  for improving the efficiency, effectiveness, and accountability of the  executive branch by reorganizing governmental functions and eliminating  unnecessary agencies, components of agencies, and agency programs.  In April 2017, OMB issued Memorandum M-17-22, requiring executive  branch agencies to submit reform plans to OMB by September 2017.  The OMB memo included detailed guidance on how agencies should  develop these reform plans.

The Department of State (State) is the lead agency responsible for  implementing U.S. foreign policy and works to advance U.S. interests  around the world. In 2017, State initiated a series of reform efforts in  response to Executive Order 13781 and the subsequent guidance from  OMB. Our prior work has shown that the success of agency reforms  hinges on the agencies’ adherence to key practices for organizational  transformations, such as agreement on reform goals and the involvement  of Congress, federal employees, and other key stakeholders. We  previously developed key questions from our prior work on practices that  can help assess agency reform efforts.

We prepared this report under the authority of the Comptroller General to  conduct work to assist Congress with its oversight responsibilities. Our  objectives were to (1) examine the status of the reform efforts that State  included in its fiscal year 2019 Congressional Budget Justification and (2)  assess the extent to which State addressed key practices critical to the  successful implementation of agency reform efforts. For both objectives,  we reviewed State’s reform plans, proposals, and related documents, and  interviewed senior officials—at or above the assistant secretary level—as  well as implementing officials involved in State’s reform efforts.

To determine the extent to which State addressed key practices for  implementing agency reforms, we assessed State’s reform efforts against  selected practices compiled in our June 2018 report, which were distilled  from a body of work published over several decades and reviewed by  subject matter specialists. We focused our evaluation on the current  implementation phase of State’s reform efforts—from April 2018 to the  present—to avoid duplicating the reviews of earlier phases of State’s  reform efforts conducted by State’s and the U.S. Agency for International  Development’s (USAID) Offices of Inspector General (OIG). Because our  review was focused on the implementation phase of State’s reform  efforts, we limited the scope of our evaluation to implementation-related  key practices from our June 2018 report and excluded key practices  related to other phases of agency reform efforts. Specifically, we  assessed State’s implementation of its reform efforts against our prior  report’s key questions in two subcategories of practices specific to  assessing the implementation of agency reforms: (1) Leadership Focus  and Attention and (2) Managing and Monitoring. We considered the key  questions in each subcategory, the nature of State’s reform projects, and  the efforts State had taken to implement them, and then made a  qualitative judgment as to what extent, if any, State had addressed those  practices. A full description of our scope and methodology can be found  in appendix I.

We conducted this performance audit from October 2018 to August 2019  in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.

GAO’s Questions for Assessing Reform Efforts

In developing our June 2018 report to assist the Congress, OMB, and  agencies in assessing agency reform plans, we reviewed our prior work  and leading practices on organizational transformations; collaboration;  government streamlining and efficiency; fragmentation, overlap, and  duplication; and high-risk and other long-standing agency management  challenges. The resulting June 2018 report includes 58 key questions to  aid in assessing reform efforts. These questions are organized into four  broad categories and 12 subcategories. We determined that the  questions most relevant to the current implementation stage of State’s  reform efforts are found in two subcategories: (1) Leadership Focus and  Attention and (2) Managing and Monitoring. Table 1 lists the key  questions in these subcategories.

In response to the March 2017 Executive Order 13781 and the ensuing  OMB memo, State launched a “listening tour” intended to gather ideas  and feedback from State and USAID employees. As a key component of  this outreach effort, State hired a contractor to design and administer a  confidential online survey, which was sent to all State and USAID  employees in May 2017. According to the contractor’s report, the survey  had a 43 percent response rate, with 27,837 State employees and 6,142  USAID employees responding to the survey. The contractor also  conducted in-person interviews with a randomly selected cross section of  personnel, which included 175 employees from State and 94 from  USAID.

The contractor’s report on the results of the survey and the interviews  highlighted five areas for State reforms. In July 2017, the Deputy  Secretary of State created five planning teams to develop multiple  projects in those five areas. The Deputy Secretary also established an  Executive Steering Committee composed of senior State and USAID  officials to guide the five planning teams and provide direction during the  reform process. Led jointly by State and USAID, each planning team  comprised participants from a cross section of overseas and domestic  workforces. The planning teams were tasked with gathering information  and conducting analysis as described below:

Foreign Assistance Programs: Analyze current foreign assistance  programs at State and USAID to develop a future vision, ensuring  alignment with national priorities.

Overseas Alignment and Approach: Assess key diplomatic  activities and identify required platforms, including the balance of work  between headquarters and the field.

Human Capital Planning: Identify ways to promote an agile and  empowered workforce as part of an overarching talent map.

Management Support: Identify opportunities to streamline  administrative support functions at the bureau and agency levels to  ensure front line effectiveness.

Information Technology (IT) Platform Planning: Focus on  improving the employee experience through increased use of cutting- edge technology and streamlining duplicative systems and processes.

Figure 1 shows a timeline of key events in State’s initial reform efforts.

The planning teams developed specific reform projects, listed below in  table 2, which State described in the fiscal year 2019 budget justification it  submitted to Congress in February 2018. According to implementing  officials, all these projects predated the Executive Order and OMB memo  issued in the spring of 2017. They also noted, however, that the  administration’s reform-related directives helped advance State’s  preexisting efforts by focusing management attention and agency  resources on these projects.

As of April 2019, State Had One Completed and 13 Continuing Reform Projects; Two Other Projects Had Stalled and One Project Was Discontinued

As of April 2019, according to State officials and status reports, State had  completed one of its 17 reform projects; 13 projects were continuing; two  projects were stalled pending future decisions or actions; and one project  was discontinued. Table 3 provides additional details on each project and  a summary of the results of our analysis.

Loss of Leadership Focus Contributed to Staff Uncertainty about Some Reform Efforts, Although Bureaus and Offices Have Taken Steps to Manage and Monitor Continuing Projects

As State shifted into the implementation phase of its reform efforts in  early 2018, multiple transitions within the agency contributed to a loss of  leadership focus on the efforts, resulting in uncertainty about leadership’s  support for some reform projects. In February 2018, State reported to  Congress in its fiscal year 2019 budget justification that it was pursuing  the reform projects we described above. In March 2018, the first transition  affecting the implementation of those projects occurred when the  President removed the then Secretary of State and nominated the then  CIA director to replace him; in April 2018, the Senate confirmed the  current Secretary. According to senior State officials, when the new  Secretary took office, his top priority was ending the hiring freeze and  restarting a concerted recruitment effort because vacancies in key  positions and a general staffing shortfall would otherwise have led to what  one senior official described as a “cataclysmic failure” at State. These  senior officials noted that the new Secretary decided some of the existing  reform projects were not well designed and that he wanted greater  emphasis on cybersecurity and data analytics. They said he also wanted  to pursue other initiatives, including a new proposal to create a Global  Public Affairs Bureau by merging two existing bureaus. The senior  officials told us that the Secretary authorized responsible bureaus and  offices to determine whether to continue, revise, or terminate existing  reform efforts or launch new initiatives. However, State did not formally  communicate other changes in its reform priorities to Congress, such as  its plan to no longer combine State and USAID’s real property offices.

State initiated another transition in leadership of the reform efforts in April  2018 when it disbanded the dedicated planning teams overseeing the  reform efforts and delegated responsibility for implementing the reform  projects to relevant bureaus and offices. As the planning teams finished  working on their particular reform efforts and prepared to transfer these  projects to the bureaus, some planning teams provided memos and  reports on the status of their efforts and offered recommendations for the  bureaus to consider when determining next steps in implementing the  projects. Some implementing officials, however, reported that they  received little or no direction regarding their projects or any other  indication of continued interest in their project from department or bureau  leadership aside from the initial notification that the project had been  assigned to them. For example, in separate discussions with  implementing officials responsible for three different projects, the officials  reported that they had not received any direction or other guidance  related to their assigned project since it was delegated to them in April  2018. In one case, this lack of communication continued for nearly a year.  In addition, although implementing officials said that they have managed  to incorporate reform-related work into their daily responsibilities, they  noted that there were multiple benefits from having had dedicated  planning teams to lead earlier phases of State’s reform efforts. For  example, they said that the dedicated teams included senior officials and  the regular involvement of high-level leadership facilitated by these teams  had helped advance the reform efforts. These dedicated teams also  required staff to set aside time to focus on reform initiatives, which  allowed them to develop holistic solutions to reform-related challenges.  Conversely, implementing officials reported negative implications of not  having dedicated teams. For example, one implementing official  described how positive work initiated under the leadership of these  dedicated teams—including efforts to eliminate redundancies and identify  opportunities for consolidation—ended when the teams were disbanded  because the staff and resources needed to continue these efforts were no  longer available.

Various State officials noted that the prolonged absence of Senate- confirmed leadership in key positions posed additional challenges. We  have previously testified that it is more difficult to obtain buy-in on long- term plans and efforts that are underway when an agency has leaders in  acting positions because federal employees are historically skeptical of  whether the latest efforts to make improvements are going to be  sustained over a period of time. For example, State did not have a  Senate-confirmed Under Secretary for Management from January 2017  to May 2019. In November 2018, the Deputy Secretary of State told us  that the lack of a confirmed Under Secretary for Management was  hindering State’s ability to conduct business and implement reforms. The  bureaus and offices responsible for 12 of State’s 13 continuing reform  projects reported directly to an Acting Undersecretary for Management  from January 2017 through May 2019. Moreover, State officials told us  that both projects that we determined to be stalled were, among other  things, awaiting the confirmation of an Under Secretary for Management  to make key decisions. Furthermore, some implementing officials told us  that the lack of confirmed officials in leadership positions within the  bureaus responsible for implementing the projects added to a lack of  leadership focus on implementing some of State’s reform projects.

According to State officials, as of April 2019, although 13 of the reform  projects described in the fiscal year 2019 Congressional Budget  Justification were considered by State to be continuing, some had been  scaled back, slowed down, or both as a result of senior leadership’s  shifting priorities and attention. For example, one of State’s initial reform  projects was related to better management of real property. However,  State ultimately scaled back this project, effectively splitting it into two  projects: One project focused on real property process improvements is  continuing, but State has discontinued the other project to consolidate its  and USAID’s real property function. Implementing officials told us in  November 2018 that they were still pursuing the internal real property  process improvements. They said then that they expected this reform  project would likely progress at a slower pace without the dedicated team  that previously had provided direct access and frequent interaction with  senior department leadership. However, these officials recently informed  us that the pace of progress on this project actually increased under the  leadership of the bureau’s Senate-confirmed Director. The bureau was  led by acting directors from January 2017 through September 2018.

We have identified leadership focus and attention as practices vital to  successfully implementing reform efforts. These practices include  communicating clear and compelling reasons for the reforms, having a  dedicated implementation team to manage the transformation process,  and designating leaders responsible for implementing reforms and  holding them accountable. Dedicating a strong and stable implementation  team responsible for a transformation’s day-to-day management is  important to ensuring that reforms receive the focused, full-time attention  needed to be sustained and successful. One of the key responsibilities of  a dedicated team is communication, particularly answering questions  about the reform process from employees and other stakeholders. An  implementation team is also important to ensuring that reform efforts are  implemented in a coherent and integrated way. Because an agency’s  transformation process is a large undertaking, we have found that an  implementation team must have direct access to and be accountable to  top leadership. In turn, top leadership must vest the team with the  necessary authority and resources to set priorities, make timely decisions,  and move quickly to implement top leadership’s decisions regarding the  transformation.

In addition, we previously reported that the single most important element  of successful improvement initiatives is the demonstrated commitment of  top leaders. This commitment is most prominently demonstrated through  top leaders’ personal involvement in developing and directing reform  efforts. Federal standards for internal control in the federal government  also emphasize the importance of maintaining leadership continuity in  order to achieve agency objectives. As a result, in other reports, we  have recognized that agency reform efforts can take years to implement  and that the time frame required for change typically takes longer than the  tenures of political leaders. Similarly, the time it takes to nominate and  confirm officials for senior management positions can also hamper efforts  to initiate reforms or sustain momentum needed to successfully  implement reform initiatives. For these reasons, and others, we have  highlighted the need to ensure that top leadership drives the  transformation and establishes dedicated teams to manage the  transformation process.

Taken together, the leadership transitions at State had two significant  effects on State’s reform efforts. First, the transition of departmental  leadership and lack of direction and communication about subsequent  changes in leadership’s priorities contributed to uncertainty among  implementing officials about the future of individual reform projects.  Second, according to implementing officials, the transition of project  responsibility from dedicated teams to bureau-level implementing officials  resulted in fewer resources and a lack of senior leadership involvement  and attention for some projects. Absent leadership decisions,  implementing officials will continue to struggle with understanding  leadership priorities with regard to State’s reform efforts. Similarly, for any  projects that are determined to be leadership priorities, day-to-day  implementation activities will continue to be hampered by the lack of a  dedicated team to guide and manage the agency’s overall reform effort.

Although uncertainty exists about the leadership priorities regarding  reform efforts, the bureaus and offices responsible for implementing  State’s reform projects have taken steps to manage and monitor their  reform projects. Our previous work has identified monitoring as another  important practice when implementing reform efforts, including, among  other things, developing implementation plans and ensuring transparency  by publicly reporting on progress toward milestones. These practices  are also incorporated into State’s Foreign Affairs Manual and other  department policies.

We found that the relevant bureaus and offices responsible for  implementing reform projects had developed implementation plans and  that these plans identified milestones and deliverables for the projects.  For example the Human Resources Services Delivery project had an  implementation plan with milestones and deliverables, such as identifying  programs and functions for consolidation in 2019 and reducing human  resource delivery costs by 14 percent by 2022. Similarly, we found that  the implementation plan for the IT Modernization project incorporated  milestones that including, among other things, implementing a  comprehensive enterprise IT risk management program by fiscal year  2020; reducing average deployment time for new IT capabilities by 10  percent annually from fiscal year 2019 through fiscal year 2021; and  increasing workforce access to cloud-based email and business data  from 10 percent to 100 percent by September 30, 2019.

With regard to monitoring, while there is no centralized mechanism for  reporting progress on all projects, we found that each of the ongoing  projects currently has some form of progress reporting. For example,  State reports progress on projects with IT components—such as Real- Time Collaboration and Work Anytime, Anywhere and Improve  Enterprise-Wide Data Accessibility—as part of its quarterly reporting on IT  Modernization under the Government Performance and Results  Modernization Act of 2010. As a result, these projects have continued  within a formal monitoring structure that involves regular web-based  status updates and progress reporting. Other reform efforts—such as  human capital and real property projects—are monitored against  milestones established in State’s Joint Strategic Plan and progress is  reported in State’s Annual Performance Reports. Progress for certain  projects is also monitored and reported in other reports, such as State’s  joint strategic plan, IT strategy, or human capital plan. Finally, other  reform projects, such as State’s acquisition reform efforts, are reported at  the government-wide level as part of the Cross-Agency Priority Goals  outlined in the President’s Management Agenda.

State collects data and evidence in order to measure progress in  achieving outcome-oriented goals it sets for these projects. State reports  these goals and relevant performance data in its annual performance  plans and reports. For example, State uses the U.S. General Services  Administration’s Customer Satisfaction Survey to measure and report the  performance of its Human Capital Delivery Services reform efforts.  State also uses data collected through the Office of Personnel  Management’s Federal Employee Viewpoint Survey to measure  employee satisfaction, which State established as a performance  indicator for this project.

Effectively implementing major reforms can span several years and must  be closely managed. In 2017, State began a reform effort that led to 17  reform projects, most of which are unimplemented but still continuing.  State notified both OMB and the Congress of these projects.  Nevertheless, State leadership has not provided the focus necessary to  support the officials responsible for implementing all these reform  projects. When a new Secretary of State took charge in March 2018, he  transferred responsibility for implementing the reform efforts from  dedicated teams led by senior department leadership to bureaus and  offices. In addition, key political appointee positions remained filled by  officials in an acting capacity until only recently. These transitions at State  have had an effect on its reform efforts. Without explicit direction from  senior leadership, some implementing officials involved in the reform  efforts remain unclear about whether their projects are an agency priority.  Further, for the reform efforts that remain an agency priority, a dedicated  team to oversee implementation could help accelerate State’s efforts to  improve the efficiency and effectiveness of its operations.

We are making the following two recommendations to State:  The Secretary of State should determine which of the unimplemented  reform projects included in its fiscal year 2019 Congressional Budget  Justification, if any, should be implemented and communicate this  determination to Congress and appropriate State personnel.  (Recommendation 1)

The Secretary of State should establish a single dedicated team to  manage the implementation of all reform efforts that the Secretary  decides to pursue. (Recommendation 2)

We provided a draft of this report to State, USAID, and OMB for review  and comment. We received comments from State and USAID, which are  reprinted in appendixes II and III, respectively. In response to our  recommendation that State determine which reform projects should be  implemented and communicate that information to Congress and  appropriate State personnel, State indicated that it concurred but  suggested it should inform OMB instead of Congress. While we agree  that it is important for State to share information regarding its reform  efforts with OMB, we remain concerned about State’s lack of  communication with Congress regarding the status of the projects State  initially reported in its fiscal year 2019 Congressional Budget Justification.

Congress is a key stakeholder in State’s reform efforts and should be  informed of changes in State’s priorities and the status of these projects  to help ensure successful implementation.

In response to our recommendation that State establish a dedicated team  to manage the implementation of all reform projects, State suggested that  leadership of its reform projects should be decided on a case-by-case  basis with the latitude to determine whether projects will be assigned to a  higher level or within individual bureaus. We stand by our  recommendation that State should establish a single dedicated team to  manage the implementation of all its reform efforts. This is a key practice  for implementing agency reforms identified in previous GAO reports, as  well as in State’s Foreign Affairs Manual (1 FAM 014.2), which calls for  State to “dedicate an implementation team to manage the transformation  process” for major reorganizations of bureaus or offices. Because reform  efforts can span several years, dedicating a strong and stable team is  important to ensure that the transformation receives the needed attention  to be sustained and successful.

In its comments, USAID expressed several concerns about the leadership  of State’s reform efforts and State’s coordination with USAID. OMB did  not provide written comments on the report. We also received technical  comments from State and USAID, which we incorporated throughout our  report as appropriate.

We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional  committees, the Secretary of State, the Administrator of USAID, and other  interested parties. In addition, the report is available at no charge on the  GAO website at http://www.gao.gov.

If you or your staffs have any questions about this report, please contact  me at (202) 512-6881 or BairJ@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of  Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page   of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are  listed in appendix IV.

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

We prepared this report under the authority of the Comptroller General to  conduct work to assist Congress with its oversight responsibilities. This  report examines (1) the status of the reform efforts that the Department of  State (State) reported to Congress in its fiscal year 2019 Congressional  Budget Justification and (2) the extent to which State addressed key  practices we previously identified as critical to the successful  implementation of agency reform efforts. For the purposes of this review,  we use the term “reform efforts” to refer to all reform-related projects,  proposals, plans, activities, and documents related to the 16 projects  identified in State’s fiscal year 2019 Congressional Budget Justification.  The term “projects” refers specifically to the 16 reform projects identified  in State’s fiscal year 2019 Congressional Budget Justification. State  subsequently split one of these 16 projects into two separate projects;  thus, we refer to 17 reform projects throughout the report.

For both objectives, we reviewed State’s reform plans, proposals, and  related documents. We also interviewed four senior officials—generally at  or above the assistant secretary level—that had responsibility for the  reform efforts as a whole, as well as all implementing officials responsible  for each of the continuing reform projects. To determine the status of  State’s reform efforts, we reviewed documents and reports related to  each of the reform projects described in State’s fiscal year 2019  Congressional Budget Justification.

To determine the extent to which State addressed key practices for  implementing agency reforms, we assessed State’s reform efforts against  key questions identified in the implementation category of our June 2018  report. Specifically, we assessed State’s implementation efforts against  key questions from the two implementation-related subcategories of our  2018 report: (1) Leadership Focus and Attention and (2) Managing and  Monitoring. We considered the nature of each of State’s reform projects  and the efforts taken to implement them, reviewed project-specific reports  and other relevant State documents, interviewed State officials  responsible for implementing each project, and then made qualitative  determinations about the extent to which State’s overall reform efforts  addressed these criteria. A second analyst then independently reviewed  and validated each determination. Subsequently, other GAO staff  reviewed and concurred with these determinations.

We only applied criteria from our June 2018 report that we determined  were relevant to the scope of our review, which was limited to the  implementation phase of State’s reform efforts—from April 2018 to the  present—to avoid duplicating the reviews of earlier phases of State’s  reform efforts conducted by State’s and the U.S. Agency for International  Development’s Offices of Inspector General (OIG). Because State’s OIG  was also reviewing State’s reform efforts, we coordinated regularly with  State’s OIG to avoid duplication. We did not consider criteria from the first  two categories of our June 2018 report—(1) Goals and Outcomes and (2)  Process for Developing Reforms—because these applied to the initial  phases of State’s reform efforts, which were outside the scope of our  work and central to the broader historical review that State’s OIG was  conducting at the time of our review. We also did not apply criteria from  the final category of our June 2018 report—Strategically Managing the  Federal Workforce—to avoid duplicating work State’s OIG recently  conducted on State’s workforce management. For the two sub- categories that we selected, we considered the key questions in the  report in light of their relevance to State reforms efforts, and also  employed other relevant criteria, where appropriate, most notably criteria  for leadership from federal internal control standards.

Appendix II: Comments from the Department of State

Appendix III: Comments from the U.S. Agency for International Development

Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

Jason Bair, (202) 512-6881, or bairj@gao.gov.

In addition to the contact named above, Thomas Costa (Assistant  Director), Joshua Akery (Analyst in Charge), Peter Beck, David Dayton,  Martin de Alteriis, Emily Gupta, Patrick Hickey, Chris Keblitis, Sarah  Veale, and Alex Welsh made key contributions to this report.

In response to an Executive Order, the State Department launched an initiative to streamline its programs and processes in 2017 and reported specific reform projects to Congress in 2018.

We found that State is implementing most of these projects. However, some projects have been stalled or discontinued due to top leadership transitions, shifting priorities, and a lack of confirmed officials in key positions. State also lacks a dedicated team to manage these projects, which could slow its overall reform efforts.

We recommended that State establish a team to manage the implementation of all reform projects that the Secretary decides to pursue.