Recent hurricanes, wildfires, and flooding have highlighted the challenges the federal government faces in responding effectively to natural disasters. The 2017 and 2018 hurricanes and wildfires affected millions of individuals and caused billions of dollars in damages. In March 2019, the Midwest experienced historic flooding that affected millions of acres of agriculture and damaged significant infrastructure. Since 2005, federal funding for disaster assistance is at least $450 billion. Increasing reliance on federal help to address natural disasters is a key source of federal fiscal exposure, particularly as certain extreme weather events become more frequent and intense due to climate change.

This statement discusses, among other things, FEMA's progress and challenges related to disaster resilience, response, recovery, and workforce management. This statement is based on GAO reports issued from March 2011 through May 2019, and also includes preliminary observations from ongoing GAO reviews of FEMA operations. For ongoing work, GAO reviewed federal laws; analyzed documents; interviewed agency officials; and visited disaster damaged areas in California, Florida, South Carolina, North Carolina, Puerto Rico, Texas, and the U.S. Virgin Islands, where GAO also interviewed FEMA and local officials.

GAO's issued and ongoing work identified progress and challenges in the Federal Emergency Management Agency's (FEMA) disaster resilience, response, recovery, and workforce management efforts, as discussed below.

Disaster Resilience. GAO found that federal and local efforts to improve resilience can reduce the effects and costs of future disasters. FEMA has made progress in this area, but in July 2015, GAO found that states and localities faced challenges using federal funds to maximize resilient rebuilding following a disaster. GAO recommended that the Mitigation Framework Leadership Group—an interagency body chaired by FEMA—create a national strategy to better plan for and invest in disaster resilience. FEMA is working to address this recommendation and plans to publish the strategy by July 2019.

Response and Recovery. In September 2018, GAO reported that the response to the 2017 disasters in Texas, Florida, and California showed progress since Hurricane Katrina in 2005. Specifically, FEMA and state officials' pre-existing relationships and exercises aided the response and helped address various challenges. However, GAO and FEMA identified challenges that slowed and complicated FEMA's response to Hurricane Maria, particularly in Puerto Rico. GAO's issued and ongoing work also identified challenges in implementing FEMA Public Assistance grants. For example, FEMA and Puerto Rico officials identified challenges with Public Assistance policies and guidance that have complicated and slowed the recovery. GAO did not make recommendations, but continues to evaluate recovery efforts and will report its findings later this year.

FEMA Workforce Management. GAO has previously reported on long-standing workforce management challenges, such as ensuring an adequately-staffed and trained workforce. For example, GAO reported in September 2018 that the 2017 disasters overwhelmed FEMA's workforce and a lack of trained personnel with program expertise led to complications in its response efforts, particularly after Hurricane Maria. While FEMA has taken actions to address several of GAO's workforce management-related recommendations since 2016, a number of recommendations remain open as the 2019 hurricane season begins. Also, GAO is currently reviewing FEMA's workforce management efforts and lessons learned from the 2017 disasters and will report its findings early next year.

GAO has made numerous recommendations in its prior reports to FEMA designed to address the challenges discussed in this statement. As of May 2019, FEMA has addressed about half of these recommendations and GAO is monitoring FEMA's ongoing efforts.

Thank you for the opportunity to discuss our work on the Federal  Emergency Management Agency’s (FEMA) disaster preparedness,  response, and recovery operations. Recent hurricanes, wildfires, and  other events have highlighted the challenges the federal government  faces in responding effectively to natural disasters—both in terms of  immediate response and long-term recovery efforts. According to FEMA’s  2017 after action report, the 2017 hurricanes and wildfires collectively  affected 47 million people, and hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and Maria all  rank among the top five costliest hurricanes on record. The 2018  hurricane season followed with hurricanes Florence and Michael, causing  nearly $50 billion of damage, according to the National Oceanic and  Atmospheric Administration. Furthermore, the deadly and destructive  wildfires continued into 2018, including the Camp Fire in northern  California, which destroyed more than 18,500 buildings and was the  costliest and deadliest wildfire in the state’s history. In March 2019, the  Midwest experienced historic flooding that affected millions of acres of  agriculture, numerous cities and towns, and caused widespread damage  to public infrastructure. Collectively, these extreme weather events have  stretched and strained federal response and recovery efforts and staff.

The rising number of natural disasters and increasing state, local, and  tribal reliance on federal disaster assistance is a key source of federal  fiscal exposure—which can come from federal responsibilities, programs,  and activities, such as national flood insurance, that may legally commit  or create the expectation for future spending. Since 2005, federal  funding for disaster assistance is at least $450 billion, most recently for  catastrophic hurricanes, flooding, wildfires, and other losses in 2017 and  2018. Disaster costs are projected to increase as extreme weather  events become more frequent and intense due to climate change—as  observed and projected by the U.S. Global Change Research Program  and the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine.

One way to save lives, reduce future risk to people and property, and  minimize federal fiscal exposure from natural hazards is to enhance  disaster resilience. For example, in September 2018, we reported that  elevated homes and strengthened building codes in Texas and Florida  prevented greater damages during the 2017 hurricane season.  Furthermore, in October 2018, the DRRA was enacted, which focuses on  improving preparedness, mitigation, response and recovery. Specifically,  the DRRA contains provisions that address many areas of emergency  management, including wildfire mitigation, public assistance, and  individual assistance, among others.

My testimony today discusses our prior and ongoing work on FEMA’s  progress and continued challenges in four key areas: (1) resilience and preparedness, (2) response, (3) recovery, and (4) selected FEMA  management issues. My statement today is based on products we issued  from March 2011 through May 2019, along with preliminary observations  from our ongoing reviews on federal disaster preparedness, response,  recovery, and FEMA management issues for a number of congressional  committees and subcommittees. To perform our prior work, we reviewed  federal laws related to emergency management, analyzed FEMA  documentation, and interviewed relevant agency officials. More detailed  information on the scope and methodology for our prior work can be  found in each of the issued reports listed in Enclosure I. To develop our  preliminary observations from ongoing work, we reviewed federal laws  such as the DRRA, and analyzed FEMA documents, including policies,  procedures, and guidance specific to emergency management. Moreover,  we conducted site visits to areas throughout the nation that were affected  by disasters in 2017, 2018, and 2019, including California, Florida, North  Carolina, South Carolina, Puerto Rico, Texas, and the U.S. Virgin Islands  (USVI). During these visits, we met with federal, state, territorial, and local  government and emergency management officials to discuss disaster  response and recovery efforts for hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and Maria in  2017, the California wildfires, and hurricanes Florence and Michael in  2018. See the list of our ongoing reviews in Enclosure II.

We conducted the work on which this statement is based in accordance  with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards  require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate  evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions  based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained  provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on  our audit objectives.

We have previously reported on various aspects of national  preparedness, including examining the extent to which FEMA programs  encourage disaster resilience and identifying gaps in federal  preparedness capabilities. We have found that when federal, state, and  local efforts aligned to focus on improving disaster resilience and  preparedness, there was a noticeable reduction in the effects of the  disaster. However, our prior and ongoing work also highlight opportunities  to improve disaster resilience and preparedness nationwide.

Hazard mitigation is a key step in building resilience and preparedness  against future disasters. In July 2015, we found that states and localities  experienced challenges when trying to use federal funds to maximize  resilient rebuilding in the wake of a disaster. In particular, they had  difficulty navigating multiple federal grant programs and applying federal  resources towards their most salient risks because of the fragmented and  reactionary nature of the funding. In our 2015 report, we recommended  that the Mitigation Framework Leadership group—an interagency body  chaired by FEMA—create a National Mitigation Investment Strategy to  help federal, state, and local officials plan for and prioritize disaster  resilience. As of May 2019, according to FEMA officials, the Mitigation  Framework Leadership group is on track to address the recommendation,  and they expect the strategy to be published by July 2019.

In September 2017, we reported that the methods used to estimate the  potential economic effects of climate change in the United States—using  linked climate science and economics models—could inform decision  makers about significant potential damages in different U.S. sectors or  regions, despite the limitations. For example, for 2020 through 2039,  one study estimated between $4 billion and $6 billion in annual coastal  property damages from sea level rise and more frequent and intense  storms. We found that the federal government has not undertaken  strategic government-wide planning on the potential economic effects of  climate change to identify significant risks and craft appropriate federal  responses. As a result, we recommended the Executive Office of the  President, among others, should use information on the potential  economic effects of climate change to help identify significant climate  risks facing the federal government and craft appropriate federal  responses, such as establishing a strategy to identify, prioritize, and guide  federal investments to enhance resilience against future disasters;  however, as of June 2019, officials have not taken action to address this  recommendation.

In November 2017, we found that FEMA had taken some actions to better  promote hazard mitigation as part of its Public Assistance grant  program. However, we also reported that more consistent planning for,  and more specific performance measures related to, hazard mitigation  could help ensure that mitigation is incorporated into recovery efforts.  We recommended, among other things, that FEMA (1) standardize  planning efforts for hazard mitigation after a disaster and (2) develop  performance measures for the Public Assistance grant program to better  align with FEMA’s strategic goal for hazard mitigation in the recovery  process. FEMA concurred with our recommendations, and as of March  2019, officials have reported taking steps to increase coordination across  its Public Assistance, mitigation, and field operations to ensure hazard  mitigation efforts are standardized and integrated into the recovery  process. Additionally, FEMA officials reported taking actions to begin  developing disaster-specific mitigation performance measures. However,  FEMA has yet to finalize these actions, such as by proposing  performance measures to FEMA senior leadership. As such, we are  continuing to monitor FEMA’s efforts to address these recommendations.

In March 2011, we reported that FEMA had not completed a  comprehensive and measurable national preparedness assessment of  capability gaps—for example the amount of resources required to save  lives, protect property and the environment, and meet basic human needs  after an incident has occurred. Developing such an assessment would  help FEMA to identify what capability gaps exist and what level of  resources are needed to close such gaps. Accordingly, we suggested that  FEMA complete a national preparedness assessment to evaluate  capability requirements and gaps at each level of government to enable  FEMA to prioritize grant funding. As of December 2018, FEMA had  efforts underway to assess urban area, state, territory, and tribal  preparedness capabilities to inform the prioritization of grant funding;  however, the agency had not yet completed a national preparedness  assessment with clear, objective, and quantifiable capability requirements  against which to assess preparedness. We are continuing to monitor  FEMA’s efforts to complete such an assessment.

Furthermore, in March 2015, we reviewed selected states’ approaches to  budgeting for disaster costs to help inform congressional consideration of  the balance between federal and state roles in funding disaster  assistance. Specifically, we reported that none of the 10 states in our  review maintained reserves dedicated solely for future disasters, and  some state officials reported that they could cover disaster costs without  dedicated disaster reserves because they generally relied on the federal  government to fund most of the costs associated with disaster response  and recovery.

In response to the 2017 disasters, we also have ongoing work to review  national preparedness capabilities to assist communities in responding to  and recovering from disasters. Based on our preliminary observations,  some states and localities we interviewed reported that while they are  prepared to deal with immediate response issues in the aftermath of a  disaster, gaps exist in their capacity to support longer term recovery. One  reason for this, according to these state and local officials, is because  federal preparedness grant funds are largely dedicated to maintaining  response capabilities and sustaining personnel costs for local emergency  management officials. While these preparedness grants fund critical  elements of the national preparedness system, there are some limitations  to using them. Specifically, some state and local officials told us that the  preparedness grant activities are generally focused on terrorism issues  rather than all-hazards. In addition, they reported that the preparedness  grants are generally spent on maintaining response capabilities rather  than to enhance their capacity for disaster recovery—such as additional  training and exercises. In addition to the state, territory, and urban region  assessments that FEMA is conducting, FEMA is currently in the process  of developing the first national Threat and Hazard Identification and Risk  Assessment. This national assessment may help FEMA and  policymakers better understand how to target federal resources in a way  that enhances the nation’s capacity to respond and recover from future  catastrophic or sequential disasters. We are continuing to evaluate  national preparedness efforts and plan to report on FEMA’s Threat and  Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment process in January 2020.

In September 2018, we reported that the response to the 2017 hurricanes  and wildfires in Texas, Florida, and California showed progress made  since the 2005 federal response to Hurricane Katrina. We also found  that FEMA coordinated closely with Texas, Florida, and California  emergency management officials and other federal, local, and volunteer  emergency partners to implement various emergency preparedness  actions prior to the 2017 disasters in each state, and to respond to these  disasters. According to FEMA and state officials, these actions helped  officials begin addressing a number of challenges they faced such as  meeting the demand for a sufficient and adequately-trained disaster  workforce and complex issues related to removing debris in a timely  manner after the hurricanes and wildfires.

In contrast, we also reported in September 2018, that in Puerto Rico and  the USVI a variety of challenges—such as the far distance of the  territories from the U.S. mainland, limited local preparedness for a major  hurricane, and outdated local infrastructure—complicated response  efforts to hurricanes Irma and Maria. Many of the challenges we identified  are also described in FEMA’s 2017 Hurricane Season FEMA After-Action  Report, including:  the sequential and overlapping timing of the three hurricanes—with  Maria being the last of the three—caused staffing shortages and  required FEMA to shift staff to the territories that were already  deployed to other disasters;  the far distance of both territories from the U.S. mainland complicated  efforts to deploy federal resources and personnel quickly; and  the incapacitation of local response functions due to widespread  devastation and loss of power and communications, and limited  preparedness by Puerto Rico and the USVI for a category 5 hurricane  resulted in FEMA having to assume response functions that territories  would usually perform themselves.

We also reported that FEMA’s 2017 Hurricane Season FEMA After-Action  Report noted that FEMA could have better leveraged information from  preparedness exercises in the Caribbean, including a 2011 exercise after- action report for Puerto Rico which indicated that the territory would  require extensive federal support during a large scale disaster in moving  commodities from the mainland to the territory and to distribution points  throughout.

In our September 2018 report, we also found that FEMA’s efforts in  Puerto Rico after Hurricane Maria were the largest and longest single  response in the agency’s history. According to FEMA, the agency’s  response included, among other things, bringing in approximately $1  billion in food and supplies; and distributing food, commodities, and  medicine via approximately 1,400 flights, which constituted the longest  sustained air operations in U.S. disaster history. FEMA officials  explained that the agency essentially served as the first responder in the  early response efforts in Puerto Rico, and many of services FEMA  provided—such as power restoration, debris removal, and commodity  distribution—were typically provided by territorial or local governments.

We also reported in September 2018, that in the USVI, recent disaster  training and the pre-positioning of supplies due to the anticipated impact  of Hurricane Irma facilitated the response efforts for Hurricane Maria,  which made landfall less than two weeks later. According to FEMA’s  federal coordinating officer, the lead federal official in charge of response  for the USVI, the federal government deployed assets, including urban  search and rescue teams and medical assistance teams. In addition, due  to the sequence of Hurricane Irma hitting the USVI immediately before  Hurricane Maria, the Department of Defense (DOD) already had  personnel and resources (i.e., ships) deployed to the area, which enabled  DOD to respond to Hurricane Maria faster than it otherwise would have.

Additional challenges we have reported on regarding response operations  have included providing short-term housing and sheltering for disaster  survivors. The Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) 2017 National  Preparedness Report states that providing effective and affordable short- term housing for disaster survivors has been a longstanding and  continuing challenge. For example, following the California wildfires,  local officials faced challenges identifying shelter for displaced survivors,  in part due to a housing shortage that existed before the wildfires.  Federal, state, and local officials formed housing task forces which  facilitated a joint decision-making approach to address these challenges.

While this approach has enabled the state to meet its most pressing  short-term housing needs, according to FEMA officials, the state faces  other challenges in the long term. For example, FEMA officials in the  region covering California told us that because of the nature of damage  following a wildfire and because of housing shortages in California, some  of FEMA’s forms of housing assistance have been less relevant in the  wake of the California wildfires than for other disasters. We will continue  to evaluate these and other challenges and plan to report in fall 2019.

We also have ongoing work to review efforts to provide mass care— which includes sheltering, feeding and providing emergency supplies— following the 2017 hurricanes. Our preliminary observations indicate that  during and immediately following the hurricanes, the number of people  seeking public shelters outpaced the capacity. In Texas and Florida,  emergency managers we spoke with described having unprecedented  numbers of residents needing shelters but not always enough staff initially  to operate the shelters. In Texas, Puerto Rico, and the USVI, hurricanes  Harvey, Irma, and Maria flooded or destroyed many buildings planned for  use as shelters, according to emergency management and local  government officials in these areas. As a result, some remaining shelters  were at maximum capacity. In the USVI, residents of some public housing  units that had sustained significant damages sought help at the territory’s  Department of Human Services because there was no more space in the  shelters, according to local government officials. While they were turned  away from the shelters, these families were able to take refuge in the  lobby of the Department of Human Services building. We will continue to  evaluate these and other challenges and plan to report in summer 2019.

In December 2018 and April 2019, we reported that, in response to  hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and Maria, as well as the 2017 California  wildfires, FEMA and other federal partners relied heavily on advance  contracts—which are established before a disaster to provide for life- sustaining goods and services such as food, water and transportation typically needed immediately after a disaster—and post disaster  contracts—which can be used for various goods and services, such as  debris removal and installation of power transmission equipment.

FEMA is required to coordinate with states and localities and encourage  them to establish their own advance contracts with vendors. In  December 2018, we reported on inconsistencies we found in that  coordination and in the information FEMA used to coordinate with states  and localities on advance contracts. As a result of this and other  challenges identified, we made nine recommendations to FEMA,  including that it update its strategy and guidance to clarify the use of  advance contracts, improve the timeliness of its acquisition planning  activities, revise its methodology for reporting disaster contracting actions  to Congress, and provide more consistent guidance and information for  contracting officers in coordinating with states and localities to establish  advance contracts. FEMA concurred with all of these recommendations,  and we are continuing to monitor its efforts to implement each  recommendation.

Furthermore, in April 2019, we reported on challenges that we found in  the federal government’s use of post-disaster contracts. These  challenges included a lack of transparency about contract actions,  challenges with requirements development, and with interagency  coordination. In our report, we found that FEMA had begun taking some  steps to address the consistency of post-disaster contract requirements  with contracting officers, but that inaccurate or untimely estimates in the  contracts we reviewed sometimes resulted in delays meeting the needs of  survivors. As a result of our findings in this report, we made 10  recommendations to FEMA and other federal agencies that use these  post-disaster contracts related to improving the management of such  contracts. FEMA and other agency officials concurred with nine of the  recommendations and have reported taking actions to begin  implementing them. We will continue to monitor FEMA’s progress in  fully addressing these recommendations.

FEMA provides multiple forms of disaster recovery assistance after a  major disaster has been declared, including Public Assistance and  Individual Assistance. Through these grant programs, FEMA obligates  billions of dollars to state, tribal, territorial, and local governments, certain  nonprofit organizations, and individuals that have suffered injury or  damages from major disaster or emergency incidents, such as  hurricanes, tornados, or wildfires. In September 2016, we reported that,  from fiscal years 2005 through 2014, FEMA obligated almost $46 billion  for the Public Assistance program and over $25 billion for the Individual  Assistance program. According to FEMA’s May 2019 Disaster Relief  Fund report, total projected obligations through fiscal year 2019 for the  Public Assistance and Individual Assistance programs for just the 2017  hurricanes—Harvey, Irma, and Maria—are roughly $16 billion and $7  billion, respectively. Given the high cost of these programs, it is  imperative that FEMA continue to make progress on the challenges we  have identified in our prior and ongoing work regarding its recovery  efforts.

FEMA’s Public Assistance program provides grants to state, tribal,  territorial, and local governments for debris removal; emergency  protective measures; and the repair, replacement, or restoration of  disaster-damaged, publicly owned facilities. It is a complex and multistep  program administered through a partnership among FEMA, the state, and  local officials. Prior to implementing the Public Assistance program,  FEMA determines a state, territorial or tribal government’s eligibility for  the program using the per capita damage indicator. In our September  2018 report on federal response and recovery efforts for the 2017  hurricanes and wildfires, we reported on FEMA’s implementation of the  Public Assistance program, which has recently undergone significant  changes as a result of federal legislation and agency initiatives.  Specifically, we reported on FEMA’s use of its redesigned delivery model  for providing grants under the Public Assistance program, as well as the  alternative procedures for administering or receiving such grant funds that  FEMA allows states, territories, and local governments to use for their  recovery. Our prior and ongoing work highlights both progress and  challenges with FEMA’s Public Assistance program, including the  agency’s methodology for determining program eligibility, the redesigned  delivery model, and the program’s alternative procedures.

Criteria for Determining Public Assistance Eligibility

In September 2012, we found that FEMA primarily relied on a single  criterion, the per capita damage indicator, to determine a jurisdiction’s  eligibility for Public Assistance funding. However, because FEMA’s  current per capita indicator, set at $1 in 1986, does not reflect the rise in  (1) per capita personal income since it was created in 1986 or (2) inflation  from 1986 to 1999, the indicator is artificially low. Our analysis of actual  and projected obligations for 508 disaster declarations in which Public  Assistance was awarded during fiscal years 2004 through 2011 showed  that fewer disasters would have met either the personal income-adjusted  or the inflation-adjusted Public Assistance per capita indicators for the  years in which the disaster was declared. Thus, had the indicator been  adjusted annually since 1986 for personal income or inflation, fewer  jurisdictions would have met the eligibility criteria that FEMA primarily  used to determine whether federal assistance should be provided, which  would have likely resulted in fewer disaster declarations and lower federal  costs.

We recommended, among other things, that FEMA develop and  implement a methodology that that more comprehensively assesses a  jurisdiction’s capacity to respond to and recover from a disaster without  federal assistance, including fiscal capacity and consideration of  response and recovery capabilities. DHS concurred with our  recommendation and, in January 2016, FEMA was considering  establishing a disaster deductible, which would have required a  predetermined level of financial or other commitment before FEMA would  have provided assistance under the Public Assistance program. In August  2018, FEMA told us that it was no longer pursuing its proposed disaster  deductible due to concerns about the complexity of the proposal. FEMA is  considering options that leverage similar approaches, but does not have  an estimated completion date for implementation. In addition, the DRRA  requires FEMA to initiate rulemaking to (1) update the factors considered  when evaluating requests for major disaster declarations, including  reviewing how FEMA estimates the cost of major disaster assistance, and  (2) consider other impacts on the capacity of a jurisdiction to respond to  disasters, by October 2020. Until FEMA implements a new methodology,  the agency will not have an accurate assessment of a jurisdiction’s  capabilities and runs the risk of recommending that the President award  Public Assistance to jurisdictions that have the capacity to respond and  recover on their own.

Prior to our September 2018 report, we had previously reported on the  Public Assistance program in November 2017. Specifically, we reported  that FEMA redesigned the delivery model for providing grants under the  Public Assistance program. As part of the redesign effort, FEMA  developed a new, web-based case management system to address past  challenges, such as difficulties in sharing grant documentation among  FEMA, state, and local officials and tracking the status of Public  Assistance projects. Both FEMA and state officials involved in testing of  the redesigned delivery model stated that the new case management  system’s capabilities could lead to greater transparency and efficiencies  in the program. However, we found that FEMA had not fully addressed  two key information technology management controls that are necessary  to ensure systems work effectively and meet user needs. We  recommended, among other things, that FEMA (1) establish controls for  tracking the development of system requirements, and (2) establish  system testing criteria, roles and responsibilities, and the sequence and  schedule for integration of other relevant systems. FEMA concurred with  these recommendations and has fully implemented the first  recommendation. Regarding the second recommendation, FEMA has not  yet finalized its decision on whether to integrate its new case  management system with its current grants management system. As of  March 2019, we are awaiting a final decision from officials to determine  whether their actions fully address our recommendation.

FEMA’s original intention was to implement the redesigned delivery  model for all future disasters beginning in January 2018. However, in  September 2017, FEMA expedited full implementation of the redesigned  model shortly after Hurricane Harvey made landfall. In September 2018,  we reported that local officials continued to experience challenges with  using the new Public Assistance web-based, case management system  following the 2017 disasters, such as not having sufficient guidance on  how to use the new system and delays with FEMA’s processing of their  projects.

In February 2019, we also reported that FEMA and the USVI were  transitioning from using the standard Public Assistance program to using  Public Assistance alternative procedures. FEMA and USVI officials  stated that the alternative procedures will give the USVI more flexibility in  determining when and how to fund projects and allow the territory to use  any excess funds for cost-effective hazard mitigation measures, among  other uses. Further, when using the alternative procedures, the Bipartisan  Budget Act of 2018 allows FEMA, the USVI and Puerto Rico to repair and  rebuild critical services infrastructure—such as medical and education  facilities—so it meets industry standards without regard to pre-disaster  condition (see Figure 1).

Regarding the implementation of the Public Assistance program in Puerto  Rico, in March 2019, we reported that Puerto Rico established a central  recovery office to oversee federal recovery funds and was developing an  internal controls plan to help ensure better management and  accountability of the funds. In the interim, FEMA instituted a manual  process for reviewing each reimbursement request before providing  Public Assistance funds to mitigate risk and help ensure financial  accountability. We also reported that officials we interviewed from FEMA,  Puerto Rico’s central recovery office, and municipalities said they  experienced initial challenges with the recovery process, including  concerns about lack of experience and knowledge of the alternative  procedures; concerns about missing, incomplete, or conflicting guidance  on the alternative procedures; and concerns that municipalities had not  been fully reimbursed for work already completed after the hurricanes,  causing financial hardships in some municipalities. FEMA officials  stated that the agency is taking actions to address reported recovery  challenges, such as additional training for new FEMA employees and  drafting supplemental guidance for the alternative procedures process.  We continue to monitor FEMA’s efforts in our ongoing work.

As part of our ongoing work, we are continuing to examine hurricane  recovery efforts in the USVI and Puerto Rico. Our preliminary  observations indicate that the USVI plans to take a cautious approach in  pursuing permanent work projects using the Public Assistance alternative  procedures program, which requires the use of fixed-cost estimates.  Specifically, USVI officials we interviewed told us that developing such  fixed-cost estimates that accurately incorporate the future impact of  inflation and increases in materials and labor costs for certain projects  was difficult. Further, these officials stated that since the territory is  financially responsible for any costs that exceed these fixed-cost  estimates, the USVI plans to pursue projects that do not include high  levels of complexity or uncertainty to reduce the risk of cost overruns.

From our ongoing work on Puerto Rico’s recovery efforts, we have  learned that, in March 2019, Puerto Rico’s central recovery office  released the Disaster Recovery Federal Funds Management Guide,  including an internal controls plan for the operation of the recovery office.  On April 1, 2019, FEMA removed the manual reimbursement process and  began a transition to allow the central recovery office to take responsibility  for review and reimbursement approval of federal recovery funds. We will  review this transition process as a part of our ongoing work. Our  preliminary observations also indicate that some of the challenges we  reported in our March 2019 report continue. For example, officials from  Puerto Rico’s central government agencies told us they did not feel they  had sufficient guidance on the FEMA Public Assistance program and  where they did, written and verbal FEMA guidance was inconsistent or  conflicting. For example, officials from one agency expressed their desire  for more FEMA guidance communicated in writing as it frequently  happened that different FEMA officials would interpret existing guidance  differently. Similarly, officials from two agencies described situations  where they had initially been directed to follow one interpretation of a  policy, only to be directed to follow a different, conflicting interpretation in  the subsequent months. Puerto Rico agency officials also stated that the  lack of sufficient instruction led to a “back and forth” with FEMA for  clarifications, which led to delays in the phases of project development.  FEMA officials in Puerto Rico stated that the agency has developed  specific guidance for disaster recovery in Puerto Rico and that there are  various ways, such as in-person meetings, where officials from Puerto  Rico can obtain clarification. We are continuing to examine this issue as  part of our ongoing review of Puerto Rico’s recovery.

In addition, our preliminary observations from our ongoing work for both  the USVI and Puerto Rico indicate that FEMA, USVI and Puerto Rico  officials have reported challenges with the implementation of the  flexibilities authorized by section 20601 of the Bipartisan Budget Act. This  section of the Act allows for the provision of assistance under the Public  Assistance alternative procedures to restore disaster-damaged facilities  or systems that provide critical services to an industry standard without  regard to pre-disaster condition. Officials from Puerto Rico’s central  government stated that they disagreed with FEMA’s interpretation of the  types of damages covered by section 20601 of the Bipartisan Budget Act  of 2018. In response, FEMA officials in Puerto Rico stated they held  several briefings with Puerto Rico’s central recovery office to explain  FEMA’s interpretation of the section. Further, FEMA officials in the USVI  told us that initially, they had difficulty obtaining clarification from FEMA  headquarters regarding how to implement key components of section  20601 of the Act. As of May 2019, FEMA officials in the USVI stated that  they continue to move forward with developing alternative procedures  projects. USVI officials also told us that FEMA had been responsive and  helpful in identifying its options for using the new authorities the Act  provides. We will continue to evaluate these identified challenges and any  efforts to address them, as well as other aspects of recovery efforts in the  USVI and Puerto Rico, and plan to report our findings in late 2019 and  early 2020, respectively.

The Individual Assistance program provides financial and direct  assistance to disaster victims for expenses and needs that cannot be met  through other means, such as insurance. In May 2019, we reported on  FEMA’s effort to provide disaster assistance under the Individual  Assistance program to older adults and people with disabilities following  the 2017 hurricanes. We found that aspects of the application process  for FEMA assistance were challenging for older individuals and those with  disabilities. Further, according to stakeholders and FEMA officials,  disability-related questions in the Individual Assistance registration  materials were confusing and easily misinterpreted. While FEMA had  made some efforts to help registrants interpret the questions, we  recommended, among other things, that FEMA (1) implement new  registration-intake questions that improve FEMA’s ability to identify and  address survivors’ disability-related needs, and (2) improve  communication of registrants’ disability-related information across FEMA  programs. DHS concurred with the first recommendation and described  steps FEMA plans to take, or is in the process of taking, to address it.  However, DHS did not concur with the second recommendation, noting  that it lacks specific funding to augment its legacy data systems. FEMA  officials stated that they began a long-term data management  improvement initiative in April 2017, which they expect will ease efforts to  share and flag specific disability-related data. While we acknowledge  FEMA’s concerns about changing legacy systems when it has existing  plans to replace those systems, we continue to believe there are other  cost-effective ways that are likely to improve communication of  registrants’ disability-related information prior to implementing the system  upgrades. For example, FEMA could revise its guidance to remind  program officials to review the survivor case file notes to identify whether  there is a record of any disability-related needs.

We also have work underway to assess FEMA’s Individuals and  Households Program, a component program of Individual Assistance.  Through this program, as of April 2019, FEMA had awarded roughly $4.7  billion in assistance to almost 1.8 million individuals and households for  federally-declared disasters occurring in 2017 and 2018. Specifically, we  are analyzing Individuals and Households Program expenditures and  registration data for recent years; reviewing FEMA’s processes, policies,  and procedures for making eligibility and award determinations; and  examining survivors’ reported experiences with this program, including  any challenges, for major disaster declarations occurring in recent years.  We plan to report our findings in early 2020.

FEMA’s experiences during the 2017 disasters highlight the importance of  continuing to make progress on addressing the long-standing workforce  management challenges we have previously reported on and continue to  observe in our ongoing work. In September 2018, we reported that the  2017 disasters—hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and Maria, as well as the  California wildfires—resulted in unprecedented FEMA workforce  management challenges, including recruiting, maintaining, and deploying  a sufficient and adequately-trained FEMA disaster workforce. FEMA’s  available workforce was overwhelmed by the response needs caused by  the sequential and overlapping timing of the three hurricanes. For  example, at the height of FEMA workforce deployments in October 2017,  54 percent of staff were serving in a capacity in which they did not hold  the title of “Qualified”—according to FEMA’s qualification system  standards—a past challenge we identified. FEMA officials noted that staff  shortages, and lack of trained personnel with program expertise led to  complications in its response efforts, particularly after Hurricane Maria.

In February 2016, we reported on, among other things, FEMA’s efforts to  implement, assess, and improve its Incident Management Assistance  Team program. We found that while FEMA used some leading practices  in managing the program, it lacked a standardized plan to ensure that all  national and regional Incident Management Assistance Team members  received required training. Further, we found that the program had  experienced high attrition since its implementation in fiscal year 2013. We  recommended, among other things, that FEMA develop (1) a plan to  ensure that Incident Management Assistance Teams receive required  training, and (2) a workforce strategy for retaining Incident Management  Assistance Team staff. DHS concurred with the recommendations. FEMA  fully implemented our first recommendation by developing an Incident  Management Assistance Team Training and Readiness Manual and  providing a training schedule for fiscal year 2017. In response to the  second recommendation, FEMA officials stated in July 2018 that they  plan to develop policies that will provide guidance on a new workforce  structure, incentives for Incident Management Assistance Team  personnel, and pay-for-performance and all other human resource  actions. We are continuing to monitor FEMA’s efforts to address this  recommendation.

In November and December 2017, we reported on staffing challenges in  FEMA’s Public Assistance program. In November 2017, we reported on  FEMA’s efforts to address past workforce management challenges  through its redesigned Public Assistance delivery model. As part of the  redesign effort, FEMA created consolidated resource centers to  standardize and centralize Public Assistance staff responsible for  managing grant applications, and new specialized positions to ensure  more consistent guidance to applicants. However, we found that FEMA  had not assessed the workforce needed to fully implement the redesigned  model, such as the number of staff needed to fill certain new positions, or  to achieve staffing goals. Further, in December 2017, we reported on  FEMA’s management of its Public Assistance appeals process, including  that FEMA increased staffing levels for the appeals process from 2015 to  2017. However, we found that FEMA continued to face a number of  workforce challenges, such as staff vacancies, turnover, and delays in  training, which contributed to processing delays.

Based on our findings from our November and December 2017 reports,  we recommended, among other things, that FEMA (1) complete  workforce staffing assessments that identify the appropriate number of  staff needed to implement the redesigned Public Assistance delivery  model, and (2) document steps for hiring, training, and retaining key  appeals staff, and address staff transitions resulting from deployments to  disasters. FEMA concurred with our recommendations to address  workforce management challenges in the Public Assistance program and  have reported taking some actions in response. For example, to address  the first recommendation, FEMA officials have developed preliminary  models and estimates of staffing needs across various programs,  including Public Assistance, and plan to reevaluate the appropriate  number of staff needed and present recommendations to senior  leadership by the end of June 2019. To address the second  recommendation, FEMA has collected information on the amount of time  regional appeals analysts spend on appeals, and the inventory and  timeliness of different types of appeals. FEMA officials stated in  September 2018 that they plan to assess this information to prepare a  detailed regional workforce plan. As of June 2019, we are evaluating  plans and documents provided by FEMA to determine whether they have  fully addressed this recommendation.

In our March 2019 report on the status of recovery efforts in Puerto Rico,  we also reported Puerto Rico officials’ concerns about FEMA staff  turnover and lack of knowledge among FEMA staff about how the Public  Assistance alternative procedures are to be applied in Puerto Rico. As  part of our ongoing work, we are continuing to examine recovery efforts in  Puerto Rico. Our preliminary observations indicate that the concerns we  reported on in our March 2019 report continue. For example, Puerto Rico  agency officials said that the lack of continuity in FEMA personnel has  been a challenge for communication and project development. Further,  officials from all seven Puerto Rico government agencies we interviewed  felt that the FEMA staff they interacted with did not have a complete  understanding of FEMA processes and policies. We are continuing to  evaluate FEMA’s recovery efforts in Puerto Rico and plan to issue our  findings in late 2019.

In April 2019, we reported on the federal government’s contracting efforts  for preparedness, response, and recovery efforts related to the 2017  hurricanes and California wildfires. We found, among other things, that  contracting workforce shortages continue to be a challenge for disaster  response and recovery. Further, although FEMA’s 2017 after-action  report recommended increasing contract support capacities, it did not  provide a specific plan to do so. We also found that while FEMA  evaluated its contracting workforce needs in a 2014 workforce analysis, it  did not specifically consider contracting workforce needs in the regional  offices or address Disaster Acquisition Response Team employees. In  our April 2019 report, we recommended, among other things, that FEMA  assess its workforce needs—including staffing levels, mission needs, and  skill gaps—for contracting staff, to include regional offices and Disaster  Acquisition Response Teams, and develop a plan, including timelines, to  address any gaps. FEMA concurred with this recommendation and  estimates that it will implement it in September 2019.

In our May 2019 report on FEMA disaster assistance to older adults and  people with disabilities following the 2017 hurricanes, we found that  FEMA began implementing a new approach to assist individuals with  disabilities in June 2018, which shifted the responsibility for directly  assisting individuals with disabilities from Disability Integration Advisors— which are staff FEMA deploys specifically to identify and recommend  actions needed to support survivors with disabilities—to all FEMA staff.  To implement this new approach, FEMA planned to train all of the  agency’s deployable staff and staff in programmatic offices on disability  issues during response and recovery deployments. According to FEMA, a  number of Disability Integration Advisors would also deploy to advise  FEMA leadership in the field during disaster response and recovery. We  found that while FEMA has taken some initial steps to provide training on the changes, it has not established a plan for delivering comprehensive  disability-related training to all staff who will be directly interacting with  individuals with disabilities. We recommended, among other things, that  FEMA develop a plan for delivering training to FEMA staff that promotes  competency in disability awareness and includes milestones and  performance measures, and outlines how performance will be monitored.  DHS concurred with this recommendation; however, officials stated that  FEMA is developing a plan to include a disability integration competency  in the guidance provided for all deployable staff, rather than through  training. We will monitor FEMA’s efforts to develop this plan and fully  address our recommendation.

In addition to our prior work on FEMA’s workforce management  challenges related to specific programs and functions, we are continuing  to evaluate FEMA’s workforce capacity and training efforts during the  2017 and 2018 disaster seasons. Our preliminary observations indicate  that there were challenges in FEMA’s ability to deploy staff with the right  kinds of skills and training at the right time to best meet the needs of  various disaster events. For example, according to FEMA field leadership  we interviewed, for some of the functions FEMA performs in the field,  FEMA had too few staff with the right technical skills to perform their  missions—such as inspections of damaged properties—efficiently and  effectively. For other functions, these managers also reported that they  had too many staff in the early stages of the disaster, which created  challenges with assigning duties and providing on-the-job training. For  example, some managers reported that they were allocated more staff  than needed in the initial phases of the disaster, but many lacked  experience and were without someone to provide direction and mentoring  to ensure they used their time efficiently and gained competence more  quickly. Groups of FEMA field managers we interviewed told us that  difficulties deploying the right mix of staff with the right skills led to  challenges such as making purchases to support FEMA operations,  problems with properly registering applicants for FEMA programs, or poor  communication with nonfederal partners. Nonetheless, FEMA staff have  noted that, despite any suboptimal circumstances during disaster  response, they aimed to and have been able to find a way to deliver the  mission.

As part of this ongoing work, FEMA field leadership and managers also  reported challenges using agency systems to ensure the availability of the  right staff with the right skills in the right place and time. FEMA uses a  system called the Deployment Tracking System to, among other things,  help identify staff available to be deployed and activate and track  deployments. To help gauge the experience level and training needs of its  staff, the agency established the FEMA Qualification System (FQS),  which is a set of processes and criteria to monitor staff experience in  competently performing tasks and completing training that correspond to  their job titles. According to the FQS guidance, staff who have been able  to demonstrate proficient performance of all the relevant tasks and  complete required training receive the designation “qualified,” and are  expected to be ready and able to competently fulfill their responsibilities.  Those who have not, receive the designation “trainee,” and can be  expected to need additional guidance and on-the-job training. FQS  designations feed into the Deployment Tracking System as one key  variable in how the tracking system deploys staff. Among other  challenges with FEMA’s Deployment Tracking System and Qualification  System, FEMA managers and staff in the field told us an employee’s  recorded qualification status was not a reliable indicator of the level at  which deployed personnel would be capable of performing specific duties  and responsibilities or their general proficiency in their positions, making it  more difficult for managers to know the specialized skills or experience of  staff and effectively build teams. We are continuing to assess these and  other reported workforce challenges and plan to report our findings in  January 2020.

In April 2019, we reported on FEMA’s Grants Management Modernization  program, which is intended to replace the agency’s 10 legacy grants  management systems and modernize and streamline the grants  management environment. We found that, of six important leading  practices for effective business process reengineering and information  technology requirements management, FEMA fully implemented four and  partially implemented two for the Grants Management Modernization  program. The two partially implemented leading practices were (1)  establishing plans for implementing new business processes and (2)  establishing complete traceability of information technology requirements.

In addition, we found that the program’s initial May 2017 cost estimate of  about $251 million was generally consistent with leading practices for a  reliable, high-quality estimate; however, it no longer reflected the current  assumptions about the program at the time of our review. Moreover, the  program’s schedule–specifically its final delivery date of September  2020—did not reflect leading practices for project schedules, as the date  was not informed by a realistic assessment of development activities.  Lastly, we found that FEMA fully addressed three and partially addressed  two of five key cybersecurity practices. The two partially addressed  practices were (1) assessing security controls, and (2) obtaining an  authorization to operate the system. We made 8 recommendations to  FEMA to implement leading practices related to reengineering processes,  managing information technology requirements, scheduling system  development activities, and implementing cybersecurity. DHS concurred  with all of our recommendations and provided estimated completion dates  for implementing each of them through July 2020.

Thank you, Chairman Thompson, Ranking Member Rogers and Members  of the Committee. This concludes my prepared statement. I would be  happy to respond to any question you may have at this time.

If you or your staff has any questions concerning this testimony, please  contact Christopher P. Currie at (404) 679-1875 or curriec@gao.gov.  Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public  Affairs may be found on the last page of this statement. Key contributors  to this statement were Joel Aldape (Assistant Director), Amanda R.  Parker (Analyst-in-Charge), Matthew T. Lowney, Rebecca Mendelsohn,  and David (Ben) Nelson. In addition, Aditi Archer, Bryan Bourgault,  Lorraine Ettaro, Aaron Gluck, Kathryn Godfrey, Taylor Hadfield, Eric  Hauswirth, Robert (Denton) Herring, Adam Hoffman, Susan Hsu, Sara  Kelly, Amy Moran Lowe, Heidi Nielson, Danielle Pakdaman, Sara Pelton,  Amanda Prichard, and Johanna Wong made contributions to this  statement. Key contributors for the previous work that this is based on are  listed in each product.

Opportunities to Reduce Potential Duplication in Government Programs,  Save Tax Dollars, and Enhance Revenue. GAO-11-318SP, March 1,  2011.

Federal Disaster Assistance: Improved Criteria Needed to Assess a  Jurisdiction’s Capability to Respond and Recover on Its Own. GAO-12- 838, September 12, 2012.

Fiscal Exposures: Improving Cost Recognition in the Federal Budget.  GAO-14-28, October 29, 2013.

Emergency Preparedness: Opportunities Exist to Strengthen Interagency  Assessments and Accountability for Closing Capability Gaps. GAO-15-20,  December 4, 2014.

High-Risk Series: An Update. GAO-15-290, February 11, 2015.

Budgeting for Disasters: Approaches to Budgeting for Disasters in  Selected States. GAO-15-424, March 26, 2015.

Hurricane Sandy: An Investment Strategy Could Help the Federal  Government Enhance National Resilience for Future Disasters. GAO-15- 515, July 30, 2015.

Disaster Response: FEMA Has Made Progress Implementing Key  Programs, but Opportunities for Improvement Exist. GAO-16-87,  February 5, 2016.

Disaster Recovery: FEMA Needs to Assess Its Effectiveness in  Implementing the National Disaster Recovery Framework. GAO-16-476,  May 26, 2016.

Federal Disaster Assistance: Federal Departments and Agencies  Obligated at Least $277.6 Billion during Fiscal Years 2005 through 2014.  GAO-16-797, September 22, 2016.

Climate Change: Information on Potential Economic Effects Could Help  Guide Federal Efforts to Reduce Fiscal Exposure. GAO-17-720,  September 28, 2017.

Disaster Assistance: Opportunities to Enhance Implementation of the  Redesigned Public Assistance Grant Program. GAO-18-30, November 8,  2017.

Disaster Recovery: Additional Actions Would Improve Data Quality and  Timeliness of FEMA’s Public Assistance Appeals Processing. GAO-18- 143, December 15, 2017.  2017 Disaster Contracting: Observations on Federal Contracting for  Response and Recovery Efforts. GAO-18-335, February 28, 2018.

Federal Disaster Assistance: Individual Assistance Requests Often  Granted but FEMA Could Better Document Factors Considered. GAO-18- 366, May 31, 2018.  2017 Hurricanes and Wildfires: Initial Observations on the Federal  Response and Key Recovery Challenges. GAO-18-472, September 4,  2018.

Homeland Security Grant Program: Additional Actions Could Further  Enhance FEMA’s Risk-Based Grant Assessment Model. GAO-18-354,  September 6, 2018.

Continuity of Operations: Actions Needed to Strengthen FEMA’s  Oversight and Coordination of Executive Branch Readiness. GAO-19- 18SU, November 26, 2018.  2017 Disaster Contracting: Action Needed to Better Ensure More  Effective Use and Management of Advance Contracts. GAO-19-93,  December 6, 2018.

U.S. Virgin Islands Recovery: Status of FEMA Public Assistance Funding  and Implementation. GAO-19-253, February 25, 2019.

High-Risk Series: Substantial Efforts Needed to Achieve Greater  Progress on High-Risk Areas. GAO-19-157SP, March 6, 2019.

Puerto Rico Hurricanes: Status of FEMA Funding, Oversight, and  Recovery Challenges. GAO-19-256, March 14, 2019.

Huracanes de Puerto Rico: Estado de Financiamiento de FEMA,  Supervisión y Desafíos de Recuperación. GAO-19-331, March 14, 2019.

Disaster Recovery: Better Monitoring of Block Grant Funds Is Needed.  GAO-19-232, March 25, 2019.

FEMA Grants Modernization: Improvements Needed to Strengthen  Program Management and Cybersecurity. GAO-19-164, April 9, 2019.  2017 Hurricane Season: Federal Support for Electricity Grid Restoration  in the U.S. Virgin Islands and Puerto Rico. GAO-19-296, April 18, 2019.

Disaster Contracting: Actions Needed to Improve the Use of Post- Disaster Contracts to Support Response and Recovery, GAO-19-281,  April 24, 2019.

Disaster Assistance: FEMA Action Needed to Better Support Individuals  Who Are Older or Have Disabilities. GAO-19-318, May 14, 2019.

1.  Review of U.S. Virgin Islands recovery planning and progress;  2.  Puerto Rico disaster recovery planning and progress;  3.  2017 wildfire response and recovery;  4.  Federal internal control plans for disaster assistance funding;  5.  Electricity grid restoration and resilience after the 2017 hurricane  6.  Mass care sheltering and feeding challenges during the 2017  7.  Department of Transportation highway and transit emergency relief  8.  Drinking water and wastewater utility resilience;  9.  Review of disaster death count information in selected states and  10. Department of Health and Human Services disaster response efforts;  11. Disaster and climate change impacts on Superfund sites;  12. FEMA Public Assistance program fraud risk management efforts;  13. Wildland fire collaboration on fuel reduction efforts;  14. Preparedness challenges and lessons learned from the 2017  15. FEMA workforce management and challenges;  16. Small Business Administration response to 2017 disasters;  17. Development of the GAO disaster resilience framework;  18. FEMA Individuals and Households Program operations and  19. National Flood Insurance Program post-flood enforcement;  20. Emergency alerting capabilities and progress;  21. National Flood Insurance Program buyouts and property acquisitions;  22. Economic costs of large-scale natural disasters and impacts on  23. Community Development Block Grants – disaster recovery; and  24. Disaster Housing Assistance Program.

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We testified before a House committee about FEMA's disaster preparedness, response, and recovery operations, based on our 2011-2019 reports and ongoing work.