Voter Registration: Information on Federal Enforcement Efforts and State and Local List Management

The NVRA was intended to increase the number of eligible citizens who register to vote in federal elections, protect the integrity of the electoral process, and ensure that accurate and current voter registration rolls are maintained.

GAO was asked to examine issues related to the NVRA's voter registration and voter registration list maintenance requirements, as well as issues related to election fraud. This report addresses (1) DOJ's efforts to ensure states and localities comply with NVRA requirements to offer registration opportunities and administer voter registration list maintenance programs, and address potential instances of election fraud; and (2) how selected data sources are used at the state and local level to help maintain voter registration lists, and perspectives on how these data sources help ensure list accuracy and address potential voter eligibility and fraud issues.

GAO analyzed data on DOJ's efforts to ensure NVRA compliance and address election fraud–as measured by matters initiated and cases filed--for fiscal years 2001 through 2017 (the last full year of data available when requested from DOJ). This period covered eight federal elections. GAO also interviewed DOJ officials. GAO selected six commonly received data sources that may be used in list maintenance efforts. GAO reviewed literature and interviewed state and local election officials in five states for perspectives on how the data sources are used and any benefits and limitations. These states used at least five of the data sources and provided geographic diversity. The results from these five states are not generalizable, but provide insight into state and local perspectives on list maintenance.

From fiscal years 2001 through 2017, the Department of Justice's (DOJ) Voting Section (which enforces the civil provisions of voting rights laws) initiated matters (e.g., investigations), filed cases against state or local governments in federal court, and engaged in other efforts to enforce provisions of the National Voter Registration Act of 1993 (NVRA). Specifically, the Voting Section:

initiated 99 matters involving allegations of NVRA violations related to voter registration opportunities and list maintenance;

filed 14 cases involving allegations of NVRA violations; eight included list maintenance allegations; four included registration opportunities allegations; and two included both types of allegations; and

DOJ's Public Integrity Section (which supervises nationwide election law enforcement and prosecutes selected cases involving alleged corruption by government officials), and U.S. Attorneys' Offices (which enforce criminal laws within their districts) engaged in efforts to address election fraud from fiscal years 2001 through 2017, including filing cases against individuals in federal court. For example:

The Section initiated 33 matters and filed 19 cases related to election fraud, accounting for about three percent of its overall caseload. Of these cases,17 involved vote buying and false information charges.

U.S. Attorneys' Offices initiated 525 matters and filed 185 cases related to election fraud, accounting for about .02 percent of their overall caseload. Of these cases, 52 involved charges such as vote buying and voting more than once, and 49 involved conspiracy.

GAO reviewed six data sources election officials may use to maintain voter registration lists and remove voters who become ineligible due to a move, death, or disqualifying criminal conviction: (1) the U.S. Postal Service's National Change of Address (NCOA), (2) the Interstate Voter Registration Crosscheck Program, (3) returned mail, (4) the public version of the Social Security Administration's Death Master File, (5) state vital records, and (6) U.S. Attorneys' records on felony convictions. Election officials GAO interviewed and literature reviewed reported benefits and limitations associated with each source. According to officials, each source helps improve list accuracy, despite some limitations, and list maintenance efforts in general help reduce opportunities for election fraud. For example, officials said that NCOA data helped them maintain accurate lists by identifying registrants who moved outside the election jurisdiction; however, they also noted that NCOA data may not capture all address changes because people do not always notify the U.S. Postal Service when they move.

GAO incorporated technical comments provided by federal agencies and state and local election officials as appropriate.

The National Voter Registration Act of 1993 (NVRA), also known as the  “motor voter” law, was intended to increase the number of eligible citizens  who register to vote in federal elections, protect the integrity of the  electoral process, and ensure that accurate and current voter registration  rolls are maintained. Among its provisions, the law expanded the number  of locations and opportunities for citizens to register to vote, including  when conducting certain transactions at a motor vehicle agency or at a  public assistance agency. The NVRA also outlined various requirements  for the processing of registration forms and maintenance of voter  registration lists for federal elections. List maintenance provisions require  that states conduct a general program that makes a reasonable effort to  remove the names of certain ineligible voters, but also contain safeguards  against improper removal.

In managing the voter registration process and maintaining voter  registration lists, state and local election officials must balance two NVRA-related goals—(1) minimizing the burden on eligible people of  registering to vote; and (2) ensuring that voter lists are accurate and  current (limited to those eligible to vote), which includes ensuring that  appropriately registered voters are not improperly removed from the voter  registration lists. State and local election officials use data from a number  of sources to maintain their voter registration lists and work toward these  goals. Accurate voter registration lists may improve election-day  efficiency and may also limit opportunities for potential election fraud.  Over the years, news and other reports have highlighted concerns that  voter registration list maintenance practices in certain states designed, in  part, to deter potential election fraud may have hindered the ability of  some eligible voters to cast their ballots. The Department of Justice (DOJ)  is responsible for monitoring compliance, conducting investigations, and  filing litigation in federal court to enforce the NVRA, and also plays a role  in investigating and prosecuting potential instances of election fraud.

You asked us to examine federal, state, and local efforts to ensure  compliance with the NVRA’s voter registration and voter registration list  maintenance requirements, including state and local procedures for  checking the accuracy of voter registration lists. You also asked us to  examine issues related to election fraud. This report addresses the  following questions:  1.  What efforts has DOJ taken to ensure states and localities are  complying with NVRA requirements to offer registration opportunities  and administer voter registration list maintenance programs, and to  address potential instances of election fraud?  2.  How are selected data sources used at the state and local level to  help maintain voter registration lists, and what are perspectives on  how these data sources help ensure list accuracy and address  potential voter eligibility and fraud issues?

To address DOJ efforts to ensure NVRA compliance, we reviewed and  analyzed case management data from the Civil Rights Division’s  Interactive Case Management System (ICM) for matters initiated and  cases filed in federal court that involved NVRA provisions from fiscal  years 2001 through 2017. We reviewed ICM data from the Civil Rights  Division’s Voting Section, which enforces the civil provisions of the NVRA,  among other voting laws, as well as the Appellate Section, which  represents the United States in civil rights cases in federal courts of  appeal. We also reviewed aggregate data on all Voting Section matters  and cases during this period.

To assess the reliability of these data, we reviewed available system  documentation, such as the ICM data dictionary, and interviewed officials  from the Civil Rights Division to discuss the mechanisms in place to  ensure data quality. We reviewed the data to assess the extent of any  missing variables or inconsistencies and worked with agency officials to  resolve any such inconsistencies and correct the data as appropriate. For  cases filed, we also reviewed and analyzed court documents to assess  the reliability of information recorded in ICM. We found the data  sufficiently reliable to provide information on the nature and  characteristics of DOJ’s efforts to ensure NVRA compliance through  initiating matters and filing cases. We also interviewed agency officials to  obtain information on any additional efforts to ensure NVRA compliance  outside of litigation, and to obtain perspectives on enforcement priorities  during the period of our review.

To describe DOJ efforts to address potential instances of election fraud,  we reviewed and analyzed case management data from the two DOJ  components responsible for prosecuting election fraud: the Criminal  Division’s Public Integrity Section, and the U.S. Attorneys’ Offices. The  Public Integrity Section uses the Automated Case Tracking System  (ACTS) maintained by the Criminal Division, and the U.S. Attorneys’  Offices used the Legal Information Office Network System (LIONS)  before transitioning to a new data system called CaseView, both of which  were maintained by the Executive Office for United States Attorneys  (EOUSA). We reviewed and analyzed data related to the components’ election fraud matters initiated and cases filed in federal court from fiscal  years 2001 through 2017. Specifically, we reviewed all matters and  cases that were either categorized as “election fraud” or “election crime  other” in ACTS and LIONS, based on the judgment of the DOJ attorney,  or included individual charges related to registering to vote or casting a  ballot. To identify individual charges, we interviewed officials from both  components and reviewed DOJ guidance on the federal prosecution of  election offenses. We developed a list of charges that were related to  elections only, and involved registering to vote or casting a ballot, and  provided the list to DOJ to ensure the list was accurate and complete.

We assessed the reliability of these data by reviewing data system user  manuals and data dictionaries, identifying any duplicate data, identifying  missing data fields or inconsistencies, and working with agency officials to  resolve issues or identify potential limitations. We found the data  sufficiently reliable to provide information on the nature and  characteristics of DOJ’s efforts to address potential instances of election  fraud. We also interviewed agency officials to obtain perspectives on data  trends we identified. The databases we reviewed track federal matters  and prosecutions only and do not include information on any state or local  investigations or prosecutions.

To address how selected data sources are used at the state and local  level to maintain voter registration lists, we identified and selected six  data sources which are commonly received by state election offices and  may be used to help maintain voter registration lists and identify ineligible  voters. To identify data sources which officials receive and may use, we  first sent a structured questionnaire to state election directors for each of  the 49 states and the District of Columbia with voter registration  requirements, and summarized their responses to identify commonly  received data sources. We conducted pretests with 4 states to ensure  that the questionnaire items were clear and answerable. Then, from the list of commonly received sources, we selected sources that can be used  to address three of the five list maintenance categories outlined in the  NVRA: change in residence (moves), deaths, and felony convictions. We  also selected at least (1) one nationwide source that captures data from  all states; (2) one state source that only includes data specific to the  particular state that receives data from the source; and (3) one interstate  data exchange that involves sharing data between multiple states. We  selected sources from each of these categories in order to identify  potential issues that may arise when election officials match their voter  registration data with various other types of data sources.

The six data sources we selected are: (1) U.S. Postal Service National  Change of Address (NCOA), (2) Interstate Voter Registration Crosscheck  Program (Crosscheck), (3) returned mail, (4) the public version of the  Social Security Administration Death Master File (DMF), (5) state vital  records, and (6) U.S. Attorneys’ Offices’ records on federal felony  convictions. We searched literature from scholarly and peer reviewed  publications; government reports; dissertations; conference papers;  books; articles; association, think tank, and other nonprofit organizations;  and working papers published from 2001 through 2018 to identify  publications that were potentially relevant to how the six selected data  sources are used for voter registration list maintenance. From the  publications relevant to the six selected data sources, we collected  information regarding benefits or limitations associated with using these  data sources for voter registration list maintenance.

Additionally, we visited and conducted interviews with state and local  jurisdiction election officials from five selected states (Florida, Michigan,  Nebraska, Oregon, and Virginia) to obtain information on policies and  procedures for using the selected data sources. We also obtained state  and local election officials’ perspectives on the benefits and limitations  associated with using the selected data sources to address voter  registration list accuracy and potential voter eligibility and fraud issues.  We selected these five states by first identifying how many of the selected  data sources states use, and creating a list of states that use at least five  of the six selected sources. We then narrowed the list to five states by  considering variation in states’ population size, when possible, and  geographic diversity in order to capture possible regional differences in  election administration practices. We corroborated the information we  gathered through these interviews by reviewing relevant state statutes  and other documentation. While the perspectives of officials we spoke  with cannot be generalized to other states and local election jurisdictions,  they provided a range of perspectives on the topics within the scope of  our review. We also interviewed officials from the agencies that  administer the selected data sources, where applicable, including the  U.S. Postal Service and the Social Security Administration, to obtain their  perspectives on the use of these sources for voter registration list  maintenance and identifying potential voter eligibility and fraud issues.

We conducted this performance audit from November 2017 to June 2019  in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.

In passing the NVRA in 1993, Congress found that unfair registration laws  and procedures can have a direct and damaging effect on voter  participation in federal elections. The NVRA was intended, in part, to  establish procedures to increase the number of eligible citizens who  register to vote in federal elections, as well as to protect the integrity of  the electoral process and ensure accurate and current voter registration  rolls. As such, the NVRA includes provisions focusing on both increasing  opportunities for voter registration and improving voter registration list  maintenance. Table 1 below includes a summary of these provisions.

The Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA), which amended the NVRA,  requires states to implement an interactive computerized statewide voter  registration list and perform regular list maintenance. HAVA requires  states to perform regular list maintenance by comparing their voter  registration lists against state records on felons and deaths. HAVA also  established the Election Assistance Commission to assist the states  regarding HAVA compliance and to serve as a national clearinghouse of  election administration information, among other purposes.

DOJ Role in NVRA and Election Fraud Enforcement

In the United States, the authority to regulate elections is shared by  federal, state, and local officials. DOJ is responsible for (1) civil  investigations and enforcement under federal voting rights laws, such as  the NVRA, and (2) criminal investigations and prosecutions under federal  election crime statutes, such as those prohibiting double voting or voting  by noncitizens.

With regard to enforcement of NVRA provisions:  the Civil Rights Division’s Voting Section (Voting Section), within DOJ,  enforces the civil provisions of federal laws that protect the right to  vote, including provisions of the NVRA, as well as HAVA, the Voting  Rights Act of 1965, and the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens  Absentee Voting Act, among others. In addition to DOJ’s role in  enforcing the NVRA, the law also allows a private party (a person or  organization) who is aggrieved by a violation of the NVRA to bring a  civil action against the state or local agency responsible for voter  registration.

With regard to enforcement of federal election crime statutes:  the Criminal Division’s Public Integrity Section supervises DOJ’s  nationwide response to election crimes, such as voter fraud and  campaign finance offenses, and reviews all major investigations and  criminal charges proposed by U.S. Attorneys’ Offices relating to  election crime. Public Integrity Section attorneys investigate and  prosecute selected cases involving alleged corruption (including  election crimes) by federal, state, or local government officials.

U.S. Attorneys’ Offices investigate and prosecute a wide range of  criminal activities, including federal election fraud, within their  respective federal judicial districts. Each U.S. Attorney exercises  wide discretion in the use of his or her resources to further the  priorities of the local jurisdictions and needs of their communities.

DOJ’s civil and criminal enforcement actions are recorded in case  management systems which differentiate between matters and cases.

A matter is defined as an activity, such as an investigation of an  allegation, that has not yet resulted in the filing of a complaint,  indictment, or information in court. A matter may eventually become  a case, or may be closed without further action.

A case is defined as an activity that has resulted in the filing of a  complaint, indictment, or information in court. Cases typically start as  matters.

The process for initiating matters and filing cases varies across the three  DOJ components we reviewed. For example, within the Criminal Division,  staff are to open a matter when they have worked on an investigation for  a minimum of 30 minutes.

State and Local List Maintenance Roles and Responsibilities Under the NVRA

States are responsible for the administration of state and federal  elections, and states regulate various aspects of elections including, for  example, registration procedures, absentee and early voting  requirements, and Election Day procedures. Within each state,  responsibility for managing, planning, and conducting elections is largely  a local process, residing with about 10,500 local election jurisdictions  nationwide. Under the NVRA and HAVA, states are required to have a  voter registration list maintenance program, and state and local election  jurisdictions are responsible for ensuring that the registration lists are  accurate, and that ineligible voters are lawfully removed.

The NVRA specifies certain categories under which jurisdictions may  remove registrants from voter registration lists, including:  if a registrant has moved outside of a jurisdiction and either (1)  confirmed the move in writing or (2) failed to respond to address  confirmation mailings and failed to vote in two consecutive federal  general elections subsequent to the mailing; death of the registrant;  criminal conviction of the registrant, as provided for in state law; and mental incapacity of the registrant, as provided for in state law.

State and local election officials can only remove registrants from the  voter registration list after meeting certain requirements outlined in the  act. Specifically, the NVRA stipulates that list maintenance activities must  be uniform, non-discriminatory, and in compliance with the Voting Rights  Act; and that programs to systematically remove ineligible voters must not  be undertaken within 90 days of a federal election, except under certain  circumstances. As noted above, election officials may remove a  registrant from the voter registration list for change of residence if the  registrant confirms the move in writing, or fails to respond to an address  confirmation notice and fails to vote in two subsequent federal general  elections following the mailing of the address confirmation notice. While  state procedures differ, states generally designate registrants who are  sent an address confirmation notice or fail to respond to the address  confirmation notice in a timely manner as “inactive.” The “inactive” status  generally indicates that the election officials may need to receive  information from the registrant or other sources to confirm the registrant’s  address. See figure 1 for an illustration of the NVRA confirmation and  removal process for registrants who may have moved outside of the  jurisdiction.

States and local jurisdictions use different data sources and different  processes and procedures to obtain information under the NVRA removal  categories and to maintain accurate voter registration lists. For example,  election offices in some states collaborate with their state’s motor vehicles  agencies—such as a Department of Motor Vehicles—to acquire  information on changes to registrants’ addresses or other identifying  information. Some states also participate in interstate exchanges—such  as the Electronic Registration Information Center (ERIC) and  Crosscheck—to compare information from their voter registration lists and  other state and local sources. States may also use national databases— such as the U.S. Postal Service’s NCOA database or the Social Security  Administration’s public DMF—to identify registrants who have moved to  another jurisdiction or state, or who have died. Multiple factors such as  state laws, costs, the security of voter registration information, and related  privacy considerations play a role in election officials’ list maintenance  activities and procedures. In some states, the state maintains the  responsibility for matching some data sources (such as data on deaths  and moves) against the voter registration list and removing certain  ineligible voters; whereas in other states, local jurisdictions have a larger  role in the list maintenance process.

DOJ Engaged in Various Efforts to Enforce the NVRA and Address Election Fraud from Fiscal Years 2001 through 2017

DOJ’s Voting Section Initiated Matters, Participated in Cases, and Engaged in Other Efforts to Enforce the NVRA’s Registration Opportunity and List Maintenance Requirements

Within DOJ, the Voting Section has the authority to initiate a matter or  pursue a case under the NVRA, among the other voting laws for which it  is responsible. According to Section officials, the Section identifies  potential NVRA violations through several means, including reviewing  publically available federal elections and other data, reviewing publically  available federal and third party reports, receiving complaints, and  conducting compliance investigations that may include visits to state and  local offices. Officials stated that after initiating and conducting an  investigation (or matter), the Section makes a recommendation to the  head of the Civil Rights Division who then decides which action to take,  such as pursuing litigation by filing a case against a state or local election  jurisdiction.

The Voting Section categorizes its NVRA-related matters and cases as  related to providing registration opportunities for voters (registration  opportunities), or related to the rules regarding maintenance of voter  registration lists under specified conditions, which includes both wrongful  removals of eligible voters and failure to remove ineligible voters (list  maintenance). In addition to enforcing the NVRA through initiating  matters and filing cases, the Voting Section participated in NVRA cases  as an amicus curiae or “friend of the court,” entered into settlement  agreements with states to address issues related to NVRA provisions,  and engaged in other efforts to assess compliance with NVRA  requirements.

More NVRA Registration Opportunity Matters than List Maintenance Matters Initiated

According to Civil Rights Division data we analyzed, the Voting Section  initiated 1,295 matters from fiscal years 2001 through 2017 to investigate  issues related to provisions of statutes such as the NVRA, HAVA, and the  Voting Rights Act. Of these 1,295 matters, 99 involved allegations under  the NVRA. As shown in figure 2, the Section initiated the largest number  of NVRA matters during this period in fiscal years 2008 (15) and 2011  (25).

In initiating matters under the NVRA, the Voting Section investigated  issues related to state and local jurisdiction efforts to provide registration  opportunities for voters and issues related to list maintenance.  Specifically, of the 99 NVRA matters the Voting Section initiated, 58  matters involved registration opportunity issues, 17 involved list  maintenance issues, and 5 involved both registration opportunity and list  maintenance issues. As shown in figure 3, the Section initiated  registration opportunity matters in each year except fiscal year 2007. The  Section initiated the most registration opportunity matters in fiscal years  2008 (13), 2011 (10), and 2013 (7). The Section did not initiate any list  maintenance matters in some years, and initiated between one and four  in other years.

From fiscal years 2001 through 2017, the Voting Section participated in  234 cases, including those with claims brought under statutes such as the  NVRA, HAVA, and the Voting Rights Act. Of the 234 total cases, 23  involved claims brought under the NVRA. Figure 4 shows the total  number of cases, and the number of NVRA related cases, in which the  Section participated, by fiscal year.

In contrast to matters, the Voting Section filed more cases related to list  maintenance allegations under the NVRA than cases related to  registration opportunities. Of the 23 cases where the Section took action  to enforce the NVRA, the Section was the plaintiff or plaintiff intervenor in  14 cases. As shown in figure 5, eight of the 14 NVRA cases the Section  filed as the plaintiff or plaintiff intervenor involved allegations under the  law’s list maintenance provisions, and two involved allegations under both  the list maintenance and registration opportunity provisions. The  remaining four cases involved allegations under the law’s registration  opportunity provisions. Of the 10 total cases involving list maintenance  allegations, eight were filed between fiscal years 2002 and 2007. See  appendix II for a summary of each NVRA related case the Section filed  from fiscal years 2001 through 2017.

With regard to list maintenance cases, as shown in figure 5, the Voting  Section filed 10 such cases from fiscal years 2001 through 2017. NVRA  list maintenance cases may involve two types of allegations: (1) in  conducting a required program to remove ineligible voters from the voter  registration list, a state or local jurisdiction did not incorporate certain  safeguards, thus unlawfully removing eligible voters; and (2) a state or  local jurisdiction did not have an adequate program to remove ineligible  voters from the voter registration list. We reviewed the allegations in each  of the 10 cases involving NVRA list maintenance claims and found that:

Four of the 10 cases (filed in fiscal years 2002, 2007, 2012, and 2017)  involved claims that the state or local jurisdiction unlawfully removed  voters from registration lists. For example, in one case the Section  alleged that the state systematically removed voters from its voter  registration rolls within 90 days of a federal election, in violation of the  NVRA, among other claims.

Four of the 10 cases (filed in fiscal years 2006 and 2007) involved  claims that the state or local jurisdiction did not have an adequate  program to remove ineligible voters from registration lists. For  example, in one case the Section alleged that a state failed to conduct  a program that makes a reasonable effort to identify and remove  ineligible voters from the state’s registration list, and that, as a result,  the state had counties with excessively high registration totals  compared to the voting age population.

Two of the 10 cases (filed in fiscal years 2004 and 2006) involved  both types of claims. For example, in one case the Section alleged  that a number of local jurisdictions in one state did not regularly  remove persons who died from their voter registration lists, resulting in  ineligible voters remaining on the lists. The Section further alleged  that local jurisdictions in the state did not always follow NVRA notice  and timing requirements with respect to voters who may have moved,  resulting in the unlawful removal of voters from voter registration lists.

With regard to registration opportunities, the Voting Section filed six cases  involving allegations under the NVRA’s registration opportunities  provisions from fiscal years 2001 through 2017. We reviewed the  allegations in each of these six cases and found that:

Three of the six cases involved claims that the state failed to offer  voter registration opportunities in public assistance offices and offices  that provide state-funded programs primarily serving persons with  disabilities. For example, in one case the Section alleged that  employees in state offices that provide public assistance, and  employees in state-funded programs serving persons with disabilities,  failed to distribute voter registration applications. The Section also  alleged that such offices failed to train and monitor their employees to  ensure that they distribute voter registration applications to clients and  transmit completed applications to the state and local election offices.

One of the six cases involved claims that the state failed to offer voter  registration opportunities in both motor vehicle and public assistance  offices. Specifically, the Section alleged that the state did not provide  a voter registration form with the state’s driver’s license application  form. The Section further alleged that employees in state offices that  provide public assistance, and employees in state-funded programs  serving persons with disabilities, failed to distribute voter registration  applications, among other claims.

Two of the six cases involved claims that local election jurisdictions  failed to process and register voter registration applicants. For  example, in one case the Section alleged that a local election office  did not process voter registration applications submitted by applicants  at least 30 days before an election in a timely manner, which resulted  in eligible applicants not being able to vote in their appropriate  precincts in that election.

DOJ officials have provided various perspectives on the department’s  NVRA enforcement efforts. For example, in October 2009, we reported  that the Assistant Attorney General for the Civil Rights Division prioritized  NVRA list maintenance cases from fiscal years 2001 through 2007.  Specifically, we reported that, according to Voting Section officials, the  department focused during this period on both ensuring states had a list  maintenance program and ensuring that such programs incorporated  required safeguards. In a 2013 report, the DOJ Office of Inspector  General reported that Civil Rights Division leadership initiated an effort to  enforce the NVRA’s list maintenance provisions in late 2004. The report  further noted that Civil Rights Division leadership placed a higher priority  on the enforcement of the NVRA’s ballot access, or registration,  provisions between 2009 and 2012. Section officials we interviewed for  this review did not identify any overall Section-wide priorities between  fiscal year 2010 and fiscal year 2017 that focused specifically on either  list maintenance or registration. These officials explained that the Section  cycles through the various NVRA provisions over time, but provided  limited details and did not directly attribute any increase in matters or  cases over time to Section initiatives or priorities. Officials further noted  that the Section pursued fewer NVRA related cases after 2010 in part due  to resource limitations and other priorities within the Section. For  example, officials stated that the Section handled a number of Voting  Rights Act cases during this time, which required a significant amount of  staff time and resources.

NVRA Amicus Participation Increased Since Fiscal Year 2012

In addition to initiating matters, and filing NVRA cases as a plaintiff, the  Voting Section engaged in efforts to enforce the NVRA’s registration  opportunity and list maintenance provisions by participating as an amicus  curiae or “friend of the court” in eight NVRA cases from fiscal year 2001  through fiscal year 2017. The Section participated in seven of these  eight cases between fiscal years 2012 and 2017. Four of the eight  cases involved registration opportunity complaints and four involved list  maintenance complaints. According to Voting Section officials, amicus  participation increased in these years in part because it was a way for the  Section to participate in cases in a manner which did not require a  significant amount of resources. Specifically, officials stated that filing an  amicus brief takes considerably less time and fewer staff resources than  litigating a case.

Out-of-Court Settlement Agreements with States Addressed NVRA Registration Opportunities

The Voting Section entered into five out-of-court settlement agreements  with states (in lieu of filing a case) to address allegations of NVRA non- compliance between fiscal years 2008 and 2017. All five of the  agreements were related to the law’s registration opportunity provisions.  For example, in one settlement agreement, a state agreed to make  modifications to its internet site and the forms, procedures, and electronic  system used at its motor vehicle offices in order to meet the requirements  of section 5 of the NVRA, which stipulates that states offer voter  registration opportunities at state motor vehicle agencies. The state  further agreed to produce a compliance plan to meet these goals and to  develop and implement a mandatory NVRA training program, among  other things. The agreement included monitoring procedures, such as  requiring the state to provide DOJ with quarterly reports of the number of  in-person driver’s license applications received and completed voter  registration forms accepted and transmitted to county boards of elections.

According to Voting Section officials, the determination of the appropriate  type of enforcement action in a matter, such as a settlement agreement  or court order, can depend on a range of factors. For example, officials stated that relevant factors can include the nature, scope, and length of  the violation, the level of cooperation by relevant actors regarding  remedies, and the authority of relevant officials under state law to take  remedial actions. The NVRA settlement agreements we reviewed are all  multi-year agreements and Section officials noted that they try to  collaborate with the state or jurisdiction regarding the appropriate steps  (e.g., generating monthly, quarterly or biannual reports) for measuring  and monitoring compliance during the period of the agreement. Section  attorneys monitor settlement agreements by reviewing each required  report and conferring with managers about progress towards compliance.

Efforts to Assess Compliance with NVRA Requirements

According to Voting Section officials, the Section engaged in various  efforts to assess state and local jurisdiction compliance with NVRA  registration opportunity and list maintenance requirements, including  conducting reviews of federal election administration and other data, and  compliance investigations. Specifically, Section officials said that they  conduct periodic reviews of the U S. Election Assistance Commission’s  biennial Election Administration and Voting Survey (EAVS) to assess  compliance with different NVRA provisions. For example, officials noted  they may review EAVS data summarizing states’ motor vehicle agency  driver license and voter registration transactions to help determine  whether states are following NVRA section 5. In addition to using EAVS  data, officials said they review publically available third party reports,  which often include state specific registration data and other qualitative  information about state processes. Section officials said this information  can help them identify states that are potentially not in compliance with  the NVRA. Officials also said that Section investigators have conducted  observations at motor vehicle agencies and social services agencies as  part of their efforts to assess and enforce NVRA compliance.

Section officials noted that these efforts are not conducted on a regular  schedule; rather, they are conducted periodically, on an intermittent,  rolling basis. These officials said such efforts may lead them to request  additional information from states, conduct compliance investigations, and  initiate enforcement actions if necessary. For example:

The DOJ Office of Inspector General reported that, in 2004, the Voting  Section reviewed census and voter registration data for all 50 states  to determine which states had more people registered to vote than the  voting-age population. The Inspector General further reported that,  based on the results of the research, the Section sent letters to 12  states requesting information on their efforts to remove ineligible  voters from their registration lists, and ultimately filed two cases as a  result of this enforcement initiative.

In June 2017, the Voting Section sent letters to the 44 states subject  to the NVRA requesting information related to states’ compliance with  the law’s list maintenance provisions. Section officials stated that, as  of March 2019, two actions have resulted from this effort: (1) the  Section became a plaintiff-intervenor in a June 2018 case against  Kentucky for having an inadequate list maintenance program; and  (2) the Section entered into a February 2019 memorandum of  understanding with the state of Connecticut regarding its efforts to  identify registered voters who have died. Officials noted that the  effort begun in 2017 does not have any specific time frames, goals, or  objectives but that the Section is reviewing the data states provided  and focusing detailed reviews on states whose data suggest possible  non-compliance.

Section officials said that in general, assessing compliance with NVRA  section 8 (list maintenance) is more challenging than for the other  sections, such as section 5 (voter registration opportunities at motor  vehicles agencies). For registration opportunity provisions, they can send  an investigator to the agency to observe whether the agency is offering  people the opportunity to register as part of their standard transactions.  However, officials noted there is no observation they can conduct to  determine if list maintenance is occurring as required. As such, officials  stated that DOJ is uniquely dependent on information and data from the  states and local jurisdictions to indicate whether list maintenance efforts  are taking place and what type. Officials further noted that they may have  reduced time to analyze data or otherwise pursue more general  enforcement efforts in time periods where the Section is overseeing a  high number of defensive cases (ones in which the U.S. government is  the defendant).

DOJ’s Public Integrity Section and U.S. Attorneys’ Offices Initiated Matters and Filed Cases to Address Potential Election Fraud

Federal, state, and local authorities share responsibility for addressing  allegations of election fraud. Within the federal government, DOJ has  jurisdiction over election fraud investigations and prosecutions in  elections where a federal candidate is on the ballot. In the absence of a  federal candidate on the ballot, DOJ may have jurisdiction where facts  exist to support the application of federal criminal laws that potentially  apply to both federal and non-federal elections. According to DOJ  officials, federal authorities would ordinarily defer to state and local  authorities in deciding who would pursue an election fraud investigation or  case because of states’ primary authority over the election process.

DOJ’s Federal Prosecution of Election Offenses states that election fraud  usually involves the corruption of one of three processes: the obtaining  and marking of ballots, the counting and certification of election results, or  the registration of voters. Within DOJ, the Public Integrity Section and  U.S. Attorneys’ Offices maintain certain data on the election fraud matters  and cases they initiate and prosecute. Within their respective  databases, DOJ attorneys select a program category for each matter and  case, which helps define the type of criminal act being investigated or  prosecuted, for example, election fraud or health care fraud. U.S.  Attorneys’ Offices use the program category “election fraud” for all  election related charges; attorneys in the Public Integrity Section use  either “election fraud” or “election crime other.” According to DOJ officials,  categorization of matters and cases as election fraud (or any other  category) is at the discretion of the investigating or prosecuting attorney  based upon an examination of the facts. We refer to matters and cases  that were either categorized as election fraud or election crime other, or  included individual charges we identified as “election fraud related.”  Election fraud related matters and cases in the DOJ databases we  reviewed included charges brought under a wide variety of statutes,  including those related to providing false information in registering or  voting and vote buying (52 U.S.C. § 10307(c)) and voting by noncitizens  (18 U.S.C. § 611), as well as more general charges such as the general  federal conspiracy charge (18 U.S.C. § 371).

The Public Integrity Section Initiated 33 Matters and Filed 19 Cases Related to Election Fraud from Fiscal Years 2001 through 2017

From fiscal years 2001 through 2017, the Public Integrity Section initiated  1,408 matters, of which 33 were election fraud related, or about two  percent of its overall matters. As shown in figure 6, the Section initiated  10 of the 33 election fraud related matters in fiscal year 2011, six in fiscal  year 2013, four in fiscal year 2003, and four in fiscal year 2012.

From fiscal years 2001 through 2017, the Public Integrity Section filed  695 cases; of which 19 were election fraud related, or about three percent  of its overall caseload. As shown in figure 7, the Section filed election  fraud related cases in five of those fiscal years, with seven of the 19  cases filed in fiscal year 2003 and five filed in fiscal year 2014.

Public Integrity Section officials stated that the Section’s involvement in  election fraud related matters and cases may vary over time depending  on a variety of factors, including the number of complaints received and  staffing levels within the Section. Officials stated that the Section  allocates attorneys to work on election related matters and cases as  needed, if resources allow. U.S. Attorneys’ Offices are required to consult  with the Public Integrity Section with regard to all federal criminal matters  that focus on corruption of the election process, in addition to federal  patronage and campaign finance-related crimes. The Section reviews this  information and consults with U.S. Attorneys’ Offices on their elections  related work. U.S. Attorneys’ Offices may also request assistance with a  case if they lack sufficient resources to prosecute a complex case, or if  the office needs to recuse itself. If the Section does not have sufficient  staff available, officials stated that they may not have the ability to offer  assistance in investigating matters and prosecuting cases. In these  circumstances, officials said that the U.S. Attorney’s Office would likely  proceed with the case without the Section’s assistance, except in recusal  cases.

The Public Integrity Section initiated at least one election fraud related  matter in 11 of 12 regional federal circuits as shown in figure 8. The  Section initiated the most matters in the Sixth Circuit (10 of 33) and the  Fifth Circuit (seven of 33).

The Public Integrity Section filed election fraud related cases in four of the  94 federal judicial districts nationwide. These four districts are located in  three states: Kentucky, Texas, and Massachusetts. Specifically, the  Section filed 11 of its 19 cases in the Eastern District of Kentucky; five  cases in the Southern District of Texas; two cases in the Western District  of Kentucky; and one case in the District of Massachusetts.

The Public Integrity Section prosecuted election fraud related cases with  charges under six statutes. As shown in table 2, the Section most  frequently brought charges under 52 U.S.C. § 10307(c) which was  charged in 17 of the 19 cases the Section filed. This statutory provision  prohibits giving false information for purposes of registering or voting,  vote buying, and conspiring to vote illegally.

Public Integrity Section officials stated the Section did not focus its efforts  on particular types of election fraud, but vote buying (generally charged  under 52 U.S.C. § 10307(c)) was the most frequent type of election fraud  related crime the Section prosecuted during the period of our review.  Officials said vote buying is the most common type of election fraud  related crime that has come to their attention in recent decades and noted  that it tends to occur in communities that are more insular and isolated  and have higher levels of poverty. For example, officials observed that in  rural communities with high levels of poverty, some residents may be  more vulnerable to vote-buying efforts due to their difficult circumstances  or the power of local officials who seek to buy votes to provide or cut off  needed services. Officials stated that matters and cases tend to be  geographically concentrated because, while the Section does not have  any formal initiatives in particular circuits or districts, they are in close  contact with U.S. Attorney’s Offices nationwide and can offer additional  assistance in those areas that may be more vulnerable to recurring or  frequent election fraud.

Example of Public Integrity Section Election Fraud Prosecutions  Seven cases filed in the Eastern District of Kentucky in fiscal year 2003, in which 10  defendants were charged, concerned the 1998 primary election for multiple Knott County  government positions and candidates, including county judge executive (the county  executive) and county clerk.

The 1998 primary election also included a contest for federal office (U.S. Senator). The presence of  a candidate for federal office on a ballot is sufficient to establish federal jurisdiction under most  election fraud related statutes as the federal candidate’s election could be, or could appear to be,  tainted by the fraud.

U.S. Attorneys’ Offices Initiated 525 Matters and Filed 185 Cases Related to Election Fraud from Fiscal Years 2001 through 2017

From fiscal years 2001 through 2017, U.S. Attorneys’ Offices initiated  more than 2.2 million criminal matters (i.e., investigations), of which 525  were election fraud related, or 0.02 percent of their overall matters. As  shown in figure 9, U.S. Attorney’s Offices initiated between 11 and 65  election fraud related matters each year during this time period. U.S.  Attorneys’ Offices initiated the most election fraud related matters in fiscal  years 2003 (44), 2004 (53), 2005 (65), and 2011 (46). The percentage of  election fraud related matters of all matters initiated ranged from 0.01  percent to 0.06 percent.

From fiscal years 2001 through 2017, U.S. Attorneys’ Offices filed just  over 1 million criminal cases. Of these, 185 cases were election fraud  related, or 0.02 percent of their overall caseload. According to officials  from EOUSA, which provides guidance, direction, and oversight to the  U.S. Attorneys’ Offices, election fraud was one of the least frequent  crimes addressed by U.S. Attorneys’ Offices. In fiscal year 2017, the most  frequent felony cases filed by U.S. Attorneys’ Offices were for  immigration, drugs, and violent crime offenses. Officials further noted that  election fraud related cases were taken seriously and thoroughly  investigated when facts supporting such charges were uncovered. As  shown in figure 10, U.S. Attorneys’ Offices filed the most election fraud  related cases in fiscal years 2003 through 2005, and in fiscal years 2007  and 2017, with 15 or more cases filed each fiscal year. U.S. Attorneys’  Offices filed fewer than five election fraud related cases during fiscal  years 2001, 2002, and 2015. The percentage of election fraud related  cases of all cases filed ranged from less than 0.01 percent to 0.03  percent.

From fiscal years 2001 through 2017 U.S. Attorneys’ Offices initiated at  least one election fraud related matter in 85 of the 94 federal judicial  districts. As shown in figure 11, three districts cumulatively accounted for  145 out of 525 matters, or approximately 28 percent of all election fraud  related matters initiated. Of these three, two judicial districts, the Southern  District of Florida and the Eastern District of Kentucky accounted for  nearly one quarter of all election fraud related matters U.S. Attorneys’  Offices initiated.

About half of the 185 election fraud related cases filed by U.S. Attorneys’  Offices occurred in three of the 94 federal judicial districts. As shown in  figure 12, the Southern District of Florida filed 42 cases (23 percent), the  Eastern District of Kentucky filed 36 cases (19 percent), and the Eastern  District of Wisconsin filed 15 cases (eight percent). U.S. Attorneys’  Offices filed the remaining cases (92 cases, or 50 percent) in 42 federal  judicial districts; of these, 20 districts had only one election fraud related  case during the time period. EOUSA officials said that there could be a  number of reasons why cases occurred more frequently in some districts  than others. These officials noted that individual U.S. Attorneys utilizing  their prosecutorial discretion may have taken an interest in election fraud  or encountered evidence of a series of election fraud related crimes that  generated a number of matters or cases. For example, according to the  respective U.S. Attorneys’ Offices:  In the Southern District of Florida, a 2004 case involving allegations of  noncitizen voting resulted in the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration  Services referring a series of additional similar investigations to the  U.S. Attorney’s Office;  In the Eastern District of Kentucky, a drug investigation in 2003  revealed evidence of vote buying that led to a series of vote buying  cases; and  In the Eastern District of Wisconsin, 14 of the 15 cases filed were  uncovered in a joint investigation regarding the results of the 2004  presidential election, which showed a discrepancy between the  number of ballots counted and individuals voting in one Wisconsin  county. That investigation ultimately determined the discrepancy was  caused by clerical error, but also uncovered 10 individuals who voted  despite being ineligible due to their felon status and four who voted  more than once.

U.S. Attorneys’ Offices utilized approximately 100 different statutes in  bringing charges in election fraud related cases. Table 3 shows the  statutes charged in 15 or more election fraud related cases filed by U.S.  Attorneys’ Offices. The most frequently charged statute was 52 U.S.C. §  10307 (prohibited voting acts), charged in 52 cases, with subsection (c)  (false information in registering or voting and vote buying) charged in 38  of those cases. The next three statutes of 18 U.S.C. § 371 (conspiracy),  18 U.S.C. § 1001 (false statements), and 18 U.S.C. § 611 (voting by  noncitizens) were each charged in 38 or more cases. EOUSA officials  explained that U.S. Attorneys’ Offices select charges based on the  specific facts and circumstances of a case. These officials noted that the  offices may use some statutes, such as 18 U.S.C. § 371 and 18 U.S.C. §  1001, more frequently in cases due to their generality, which makes them  widely applicable to different types of criminal conduct.

Selected Data Sources on Moves, Deaths, and Convictions Used to Maintain Voter Registration Lists, and Their Reported Benefits and Limitations

Each of the selected data sources we reviewed is one tool election  officials may use to maintain their voter registration lists. These selected  data sources are used to identify (1) registrants who move—U.S. Postal  Service National Change of Address (NCOA), Interstate Voter  Registration Crosscheck Program (Crosscheck), and returned mail; (2)  deceased registrants—the public version of the Social Security  Administration Death Master File (DMF) and state vital records; and (3)  registrants with disqualifying felony convictions—U.S. Attorneys’ records  on felony convictions. State and local election officials may use a variety  of other databases or lists (data sources) to identify ineligible registrants  who should be removed from voter registration lists, and state policies  and procedures for using various data sources to identify and remove  registrants from voter lists vary.

Despite variations, election officials with whom we spoke stated that list  maintenance—including the use of the selected data sources—provides  benefits such as cost savings, smoother Election Day processes,  reductions in administrative burden, and fewer opportunities for election  fraud. Moreover, election officials told us that each of the selected data  sources helps improve voter registration list accuracy, despite some  limitations. For example, officials identified benefits from using these data  sources, such as helping reduce the number of address errors on voter  registration lists and helping identify and remove registrants who have  moved outside of the election jurisdiction, are deceased, or have a  disqualifying criminal conviction from voter registration lists. Officials also  identified limitations with using these selected sources. In particular, three  of the six selected data sources consist of administrative records  collected for purposes other than voter registration, which can present  some challenges when election officials use these sources to maintain  their voter registration lists. For example, election officials noted that  such data sources may inaccurately indicate that registrants moved  unless election officials conduct additional work to verify the information.  In addition, these data sources may not include the records for some  registrants who are deceased and should be removed from the voter  registration lists. Appendix III includes a description of a range of data  sources states may use to maintain their voter registration lists.

With regard to possible election fraud, state officials from all five selected  states we visited noted that list maintenance activities in general help to  identify or prevent election fraud because accurate and complete voter  registration lists make it more difficult for individuals to commit fraud.  Specifically, duplicate registrations—more than one registration for the  same person across election jurisdictions—and ineligible registrations,  such as those for deceased individuals, if present in voter registration  lists, may provide opportunities for a person to vote more than once or  vote using someone else’s identity. Thus, registration lists that contain  one registration for each eligible registrant with accurate and current  identifying information help to prevent election fraud from occurring. The  majority of election officials we interviewed did not specify any one data  source used to identify election fraud; however, state officials from  Michigan and Oregon noted that the limited instances of election fraud in  their states, in their view, is in part the result of their strong voter  registration list maintenance efforts which have helped to reduce  opportunities for fraud.

In using data sources as a tool for maintaining voter registration lists,  state and local election offices utilize data-matching procedures by which  attributes of one registration record are compared to attributes of another  record from another database or list to identify registrants who should be  removed from voter registration lists under the NVRA’s removal  categories. States are required to have computerized statewide voter  registration lists, which allow election officials to conduct electronic data  matching of their voter registration list to other databases or lists. These  other databases or lists may include federal or state administrative  records, interstate databases, and local lists or other information.

Information on Data Matching Procedures  Procedures for determining that a voter registration record is a “match” to another record  may vary across states, local election offices, and interstate data matching programs. In  general, a “match” should accurately identify the same individual across the two data  sources being matched. However, data matching may result in improper indications of a  match when a non-match should be indicated (false positives). False positive matches  pose risks that election officials may improperly remove registrants from voter  registration lists. Data matching can also result in improper indications of a non-match  when a match should be indicated (false negatives), posing risks that election officials  may fail to remove ineligible registrants from voter registration lists.  According to a National Academy of Sciences report, the quality of the underlying data  (from either the voter registration list or other data sources used for matching) may  contribute to false positive or false negative matches.

National Academy of Sciences, Improving State Voter Registration Databases, The National  Academies Press, 2010.  Further, matching procedures may differ with regards to how data in specific data fields are  compared across databases to determine a match. For example, some procedures may require that  the name from the voter registration list exactly match the name from the other data source (e.g. each  letter, hyphen, space, or apostrophe must match). An exact match requirement would not accept as a  match the name entries “Mary Jones-Smith” and “Mary Jones Smith”, even if all other data fields  match across data sources and the entries represent the same individual, thus resulting in a false  negative match.

Below we discuss in detail the selected data sources and their benefits  and challenges, as identified by literature we reviewed and election  officials with whom we spoke.

Data Sources Used to Identify Registrants Who Move

According to reports we reviewed, registrants who move from one  election jurisdiction to another jurisdiction within the state or to another  state account for the majority of ineligible registrants and duplicate  registrations on voter registration lists. When individuals register to vote,  their voter registrations are linked to their residential address. This  connection between a voter’s registration and residence is intended to  ensure reliable and accurate voter registration lists, and to ensure that  voters only vote for races and ballot questions that affect the communities  in which they live.

According to the 2016 Election Administration and Voting Survey (EAVS),  the most common reason for a registrant’s removal from the rolls was  cross-jurisdiction change of address (31.1 percent of removals), followed  by registrants failing to respond to a confirmation notice sent as part of  the NVRA process and subsequently not voting in the following two  federal elections (26.1 percent of removals). As previously discussed,  under the NVRA, data that indicate a registrant’s change of address and  a potential move can be used to start the address confirmation notice  process, but cannot, on their own, result in the automatic removal of  registrants from voter registration lists.

U.S. Postal Service National Change of Address (NCOA)

The NCOA database comprises change-of-address records with the  names and addresses of individuals, families, and businesses who filed a  change of address with the U.S. Postal Service. Election officials can  access the NCOA data by obtaining a license to directly receive the data  from the U.S. Postal Service or having their voter registration list  processed by a licensed third-party service provider.

Election officials in the five states we visited compare selected records or  the entire voter registration list against the NCOA database at the state or  local level and at varying frequency to identify registrants who have  potentially moved and to start the address confirmation and registrant  removal process. For example Nebraska, Oregon, and Virginia state  election officials said that they compare their statewide voter registration  lists to NCOA on a bi-annual, monthly, and annual basis, respectively, to  identify registrants who have potentially moved. In contrast, Florida and  Michigan officials said they do not use NCOA data at the state level,  though state laws provide local election officials the option of comparing  their local jurisdiction’s voter registration list to NCOA when they conduct  list maintenance activities related to changes in address. Although initial  data comparisons of NCOA with the voter registration lists can be  conducted at either the state or local level, in all of the states we visited  when the results of the NCOA data-matching indicated a potential move,  local election officials managed the results of the confirmation notices that  were sent to registrants to confirm their address. Local election officials  subsequently updated addresses on the voter registration lists with  responses they received from the confirmation notices, or flagged  registrants for potential removal if the registrants did not respond to the  confirmation notice or the notice was returned undeliverable.

State election officials from Nebraska, Oregon, and Virginia, and local  officials from five of the jurisdictions we visited, reported that the primary  benefit to using NCOA data is that it helps them to maintain accurate  voter registration lists by (1) providing current and accurate addresses for  their registrants, and (2) identifying registrants who have potentially  moved and no longer reside in the voting jurisdiction. For example, local  officials in one jurisdiction reported that they mailed approximately 60  percent fewer confirmation notices in 2017 compared to 2010 due to  improvements in the accuracy of address information in their voter  registration lists after using NCOA data during this period. Local officials  in another jurisdiction reported they used the NCOA data as part of a one- time list maintenance effort, which generated over 100,000 confirmation  mailings and resulted in the removal of a number of ineligible voters who  no longer resided in the jurisdiction. Election officials also noted that using  NCOA data to update voter registration lists may result in administrative  efficiencies such as a more efficient election administration process and  cost savings. For example, state officials from Oregon, a vote-by-mail  state, said that NCOA data help them to maintain clean voter registration  lists by providing current and accurate addresses for their registrants,  which reduces mailing costs incurred from sending ballots to individuals  who have moved out of the state. Further, local officials from one  jurisdiction said that using NCOA data helped to reduce the number of  address errors in the poll books and, as a result, decrease the number of  registrants voting by provisional ballots on Election Day.

A report we reviewed and election officials we interviewed cited a number  of limitations to using NCOA data for voter registration list maintenance  purposes. Specifically, in 2015 the U.S. Postal Service Office of the  Inspector General reported that the NCOA data do not capture all change  of address information because people do not always notify the U.S.  Postal Service when they move. As a result, election officials may not  be able to identify registrants who do not report changes of address to the  U.S. Postal Service. Another limitation election officials cited is that an  indication of a change in address in NCOA data does not necessarily  reflect a change in residence, which is what determines the eligibility of a  registrant to vote in a given election jurisdiction. According to U.S. Postal  Service officials, the main purpose of the NCOA database is to maintain  current and updated addresses for mail delivery and a change of address  form may reflect a change in mailing address rather than a permanent  change in residence.

Nebraska, Oregon, and Virginia state officials and officials from three  local jurisdictions reported that they have difficulty determining whether a  registrant’s change in address as indicated in the NCOA data is a  permanent change in residence or a change in mailing address due to a  temporary move or other mailing needs. For example, military personnel  may prefer to maintain their voter registration at their home of record.  Upon assignment to another duty location they may file a change of  address with postal authorities for mailing purposes, even if it is not a  change of residence for voting purposes. Officials from two local  jurisdictions reported similar issues for individuals who retain residency in  the jurisdiction while attending college outside the jurisdiction. Further,  registrants who had vacation homes outside the jurisdiction in the  summer or winter months could be identified as registrants who  potentially changed residences on a permanent basis using the NCOA  data, according to Nebraska election officials. As a result of the potential  difference between mailing and residential addresses, Virginia state  election officials and election officials from two local jurisdictions reported  that registrants may be inaccurately flagged for confirmation mailings.  They told us that registrants would not be automatically removed after  being flagged for confirmation mailings; however, they would be required  to respond to the mailing or vote in one of the next two federal elections,  as prescribed by the NVRA, to stay on the voter registration list.

Officials also told us that they may have to take additional steps to use  NCOA data to identify registrants who potentially moved and to update  voter registration lists. For example, officials from one local jurisdiction  that matches its county voter registration list to NCOA data noted that it  can take a significant amount of time and resources to standardize their  voter registration data to the NCOA format and to calibrate their data  matching procedures to avoid false positive matches. Such false positive  matches would inaccurately indicate an address change. These local  officials said that they take steps to ensure that they do not get an  indication of a change in address based on the standardization of an  address (e.g. a “Street” to “ST” difference in address between the two  data sources). Oregon state election officials and officials from one local  jurisdiction further noted that they may have to do additional work to  determine the appropriate election jurisdiction to which the address in the  NCOA data should be assigned. Officials explained that some street  addresses or buildings, like apartment complexes, cross election  jurisdiction boundaries, which makes it difficult to determine within which  election jurisdiction an address or a specific unit of an apartment complex  falls. Oregon state officials said that local tax assessor data may help  election officials reconcile these jurisdictional boundary issues.

Interstate Voter Registration Crosscheck Program (Crosscheck)

Crosscheck is an interstate data sharing program that compares  participating states’ voter registration lists against one another to identify  registrants who are registered in more than one state, which may indicate  a move, and to identify individuals who may have voted in more than one  state. The Crosscheck program began in 2005 with four participating  states—Kansas, Iowa, Missouri, and Nebraska—and had grown to  include 31 participating states by 2016. To participate in the Crosscheck  program, each state signs a memorandum of understanding upon joining  the program. Then, in January of each year, member states provide  information such as full name, date of birth, and address for registered  voters, as well as turnout data for the previous calendar year to  Crosscheck program administrators—the Kansas Secretary of State’s  office—in a prescribed format. Using the information provided by member  states, Crosscheck program administrators return to each participating  state a list of registrations in that state that share the same first name, last  name, and date of birth, with a registration in another participating state.  Crosscheck results also include other identifying information that varies  depending on whether the member states provided the data. There are  no membership or annual fees associated with joining or participating in  Crosscheck.

Of the states we visited, Michigan, Nebraska, and Virginia participated in  the Crosscheck program for multiple years, while Oregon and Florida  each participated once in 2012 and 2013, respectively. Oregon and  Florida state officials explained that they did not use the Crosscheck data  they received to conduct any voter registration list maintenance activities.  Michigan, Nebraska, and Virginia state officials said that they received  and processed Crosscheck data at the state level before sending a  subset of results to the local jurisdictions to conduct additional verification  and list maintenance activities.

According to some state and local election officials we interviewed,  Crosscheck data can be beneficial as one of the data sources used to  identify registrants who may have moved out of state or whose moves are  not captured by other data sources. Specifically, officials from four local  jurisdictions told us that using Crosscheck data in conjunction with other  data sources, such as the NCOA, helps keep voter registration lists  accurate. Further, state election officials from Virginia and election  officials from one jurisdiction reported that the fact that neighboring states  participate in the Crosscheck program is particularly beneficial to them  because their residents are more likely to move to neighboring states and  the Crosscheck data may capture the change in residence if these  residents also registered to vote in the neighboring states.

Nebraska state officials also noted that Crosscheck data complement the  NCOA change of address data. In particular, Crosscheck data can  provide information on registrants who did not record change of address  information under NCOA, who had not responded to a notice sent as a  result of NCOA data and had moved a second time, or whose moves  were not recent and may not be captured in the most recent change of  address information provided by NCOA. Nebraska state officials noted  that the Crosscheck data were particularly helpful in this manner the first  year that Nebraska participated in Crosscheck and whenever a new state  joined the program. In addition, election officials from Nebraska and state  officials from Michigan identified Crosscheck data on possible instances  of double voting as a source which could potentially help determine whether an individual might have voted in two or more states. For  example, officials from two local jurisdictions said that they identified a  few potential instances of double voting using Crosscheck data. They  referred these instances of potential double voting to their Secretary of  State.

According to reports we reviewed and state officials we interviewed in all  five states we visited, Crosscheck data contain numerous matches when  a non-match should be indicated (false-positive matches) because the  program uses matching criteria that rely on data elements, such as  names and birth dates, that may be shared by more than one person.  Specifically, the Crosscheck program matches participating states’ voter  registration information by comparing registrants’ first name, last name,  and date of birth. However, according to reports we reviewed, the odds  are sufficiently high that two registrants could have the same name and  birth date in groups as large as statewide (or multistate) voter registration  lists. Nebraska state officials noted that when there were four  participating Crosscheck states in 2005, a match indicating a duplicate  registration was more likely to be a valid match (rather than a false  positive); however as the number of participating states increased, the  quality of the matched results has dropped substantially. Oregon state  officials told us that they submitted data to the Crosscheck program in  2012 and that many of the resulting 20,000 potential duplicate registration  matches were false-positive matches. Florida state officials also expressed concern about the reliability and quality of the matching  criteria, in addition to the number of false positive matches in the data  they received.

In addition, a study on double voting found that Crosscheck data may not  provide enough information for election officials to determine whether a  match indicating potential duplicate registrations or double voting is  valid. As previously discussed, Crosscheck results for potential  duplicate registrations are based on a match of the first name, last name,  and date of birth. Crosscheck results provided to participating states may  also include additional information—such as registrants’ middle name,  suffixes, registration address, and the last four digits of a registrant’s  Social Security number, if available—which election officials can use to  help determine whether a match is a valid indication of a duplicate  registration. In particular, the last four digits of the Social Security  number can help distinguish between two distinct individuals who happen  to share the same first name, last name, and date of birth. Using  Crosscheck data returned to Iowa in 2012 and 2014, the study found that  two-thirds of potential duplicate registrations identified by Crosscheck  data did not include the last four digits of the Social Security number  associated with at least one of the registration records in the match.  Thus, the study concluded that more often than not, an election  administrator would not have enough information to distinguish which  matches are valid indications of duplicate registrations.

Further, Nebraska state officials noted that the reliability of the data  provided by participating states can affect the reliability of Crosscheck  information on double voting. For example, Nebraska state officials  reported that one state incorrectly sent Crosscheck its 2014 voting history  data the year participating states were to provide their 2016 data to the  Crosscheck program. These officials noted that the incorrect voter history  data made it appear as though many people had double voted. Nebraska  officials said that once they identified this issue, they omitted any  matched results involving the state that had provided the 2014 data from  their review of registrants who potentially double voted.

According to the Crosscheck 2014 Participation Guide, processing the  duplicate registrations and researching possible double votes require a  commitment of time from state and local officials. State election officials  from Michigan, Nebraska, Oregon, and Virginia and officials from two  local jurisdictions told us that they have spent a significant amount of time  and staff resources to review the Crosscheck data and determine which  matched records represent valid matches. State officials from the three  states that participated in Crosscheck for multiple years (Michigan,  Nebraska, and Virginia) said they implemented additional criteria to refine  the Crosscheck data they received in order to identify valid matches of  potentially duplicate registrations and send confirmation notices,  according to the NVRA requirements. For example, Michigan state  officials said that they further filter the Crosscheck results they receive to  determine valid potential matches of duplicate registrations. Specifically,  they filter Crosscheck results to include duplicate registrations where the  registrants’ first names, middle initials, last names, dates of birth, and last  four digits of Social Security numbers are an exact match. In addition,  state election officials review the registration dates provided in the  Crosscheck results to confirm that the registrant’s most recent voter  registration activity occurred outside of Michigan before providing a  refined list of valid potential matches to responsible local officials who  conduct the address confirmation process. In its June 2017 Annual List  Maintenance Report, Virginia state officials reported that they also review  whether the last four digits of the Social Security number on Crosscheck  results they receive match, to determine valid potential matches of  duplicate registrations.

While election officials from two jurisdictions we visited identified  Crosscheck as a source which helped them identify potential instances of  election fraud, such as instances of double voting, Nebraska state  officials also noted the data were not generally reliable for these purposes  without additional investigation. According to one study we reviewed,  Crosscheck data on both double voting and duplicate registrations yield a  high number of false-positive matches. Additionally, in another report,  the New Hampshire Department of State found that of approximately  90,000 match records of duplicate registrations New Hampshire received  from Crosscheck in 2017, only a small portion of the records were  considered potential instances of double voting.

Election officials can use the returned mail from targeted list maintenance  mailing efforts and returned “undeliverable” mail from other mailings to  registrants to send address confirmation notices to registrants who have  potentially moved outside the election jurisdiction. These confirmation  notices are subsequently used to update addresses on the voter  registration lists with results of the confirmation mailing or flag registrants  for potential removal. Specifically, targeted list maintenance mailing  efforts may include sending a notice to all or a group of registrants in  order to determine whether the registrant may have moved from the  address on record. For example, Florida law states that local election  officials can send notices to registrants who have not voted in the last 2  years and who have not made a written request that their registration be  updated during the two year period. Targeted list maintenance mailing  efforts may result in either a response from the registrants or returned  undeliverable mail. Returned undeliverable mail occurs when the U.S.  Postal Service cannot deliver mail to the address specified on the label,  indicating a potential change in the registrant’s address and therefore  residence. In addition to targeted list maintenance mailings, election  offices may send other notices—such as sample ballots, or information  about changes in polling locations—which may also generate returned  undeliverable mail. See figure 13 for an example of other voter  registration notices (not part of a targeted list maintenance effort) that  may be returned to election officials as undeliverable and therefore  indicate a potential move.

Election officials from all five states we visited use returned mail from  targeted list maintenance mailing efforts, or from other mailings to voters,  to update registrants’ addresses or to send a notice to the registrants to  confirm their address.

According to Nebraska state election officials, returned undeliverable mail  is a valuable tool for identifying registrants who may have moved. Local  election officials we spoke with also said that returned undeliverable mail  can provide them with a timely indication that a registrant has potentially  moved. Furthermore, election officials told us that because mailings can  be conducted on a periodic basis, processing returned mail at the time of  receipt can help election officials distribute the list maintenance workload  throughout the year. Specifically, election officials from four local  jurisdictions said that returned undeliverable mail from voter notices sent  to registrants periodically throughout the year is usually a more recent  indicator of registrants’ changes in address compared to largescale list  maintenance activities such as an annual mailing based on NCOA data.  Further, officials from one local jurisdiction also noted that staying on top  of returned undeliverable mail throughout the year helps reduce the  workload during the state’s annual NCOA confirmation mailing, which  would otherwise be too big to manage if the jurisdiction only processed  address changes once a year.

According to reports we reviewed as well as officials we interviewed,  returned undeliverable mail may not be a reliable indicator that a person  has moved, which can result in an inflation of the number of registrants  who are flagged as inactive. For example, in 2015, the U.S. Postal  Service Office of the Inspector General reported that approximately 60  percent of returned undeliverable mail is a result of the mail not getting  delivered by postal service employees or insufficient address information  on the mail, as opposed to the registrant having moved without notifying  the U.S. Postal Service. Further, according to one report we reviewed, a  registrant may not have received the mailing, or the mailing may be  returned undeliverable for a number of reasons, including that the  registrant may be temporarily away from his/her permanent residence;  may not be listed on the mailbox of the residential address such as when  the registrant shares an address with roommates or family members; or  may live in a non-traditional residence such as homeless shelter or  government building that will not accept mail for residents.

In addition, Virginia state officials noted that using returned undeliverable  mail can inflate the number of registrants who are flagged as inactive and  can also result in additional costs. Specifically, these state election  officials told us that they usually have a low response rate from  registrants for mailings, including targeted mailings for list maintenance  purposes or confirmation mailings. Registrants who are sent a  confirmation notice or do not respond to confirmation mailings are then  generally flagged as inactive. Nebraska state officials said that having  inactive registrants on the registration lists has resulted in costs to local  jurisdictions in the past because local officials were formerly required to  mail a ballot to all registered voters, including those that were on the  inactive list, when a special election was conducted by mail. Further,  local election officials in one state said that inflated numbers of inactive  registrants on voter registrations lists may result in fewer than needed  voting precincts, to the extent that election officials determine the number  of precincts based only on the number of active registrants on the lists.

Data Sources Used to Identify Deceased Registrants

The NVRA provides for states to remove deceased registrants from  registration lists by reason of death. This may be carried out by the state’s  department of elections, local election jurisdictions, or a combination of  the two, as provided by state law. According to the 2016 EAVS, states  removed over 4 million registrants due to death from November 2014  through November 2016, which accounted for 24.6 percent of the total number or registrants removed from voter registration lists. According  to a National Association of Secretaries of State 2017 report, in most  states, information on deceased registrants is provided by a state office of  vital statistics, the state department of health, or a similar state-level  entity. Additionally, the report notes that a number of states permit  election officials to remove a deceased registrant using information from  sources such as obituary notices, copies of death certificates, and  notification from close relatives.

Social Security Administration’s Public Death Master File (DMF)

The public version of the DMF contains nearly 101 million records of  deaths reported to the Social Security Administration from 1936 through  March 1, 2019. It is a subset of the Social Security Administration’s full  death file; it does not include state-reported death data, but includes other  death data reported by family members, funeral directors, post offices,  financial institutions, and other federal agencies such as the Department  of Veterans Affairs and Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services. The  public DMF accounts for about 19 percent fewer death records than the  full death file. The Social Security Act limits the sharing of the full death  file to federal benefit-paying agencies, and other specifically enumerated  purposes.

Generally, DMF records include the Social Security number, full name,  date of birth, and date of death of deceased individuals. Agencies or  other entities, including election administrators, having a legitimate  business purpose for the information can purchase the DMF from the  National Technical Information Service of the U.S. Department of  Commerce, which is authorized to distribute the DMF. Subscribers to the  DMF are required to purchase monthly or weekly updates to the DMF to  ensure that the records are up-to-date.

Of the five states we visited, Florida, Michigan, Oregon, and Virginia  compare their statewide voter registration list against DMF data on a  regular basis, and Nebraska used the data once in 2014, to identify and  remove registrants who had died. Specifically, Florida and Michigan  directly receive the DMF data and conduct data-matching with their  state’s voter registration list to identify deceased registrants on a weekly  basis. Oregon and Virginia use DMF data through their participation in the  Electronic Registration Information Center (ERIC) program. On a  monthly basis, ERIC provides Oregon and Virginia state election officials  a report on their deceased registrants based on matches of DMF data  with these states’ voter registration lists.

States’ procedures for removing deceased registrants from the voter  registration list vary, depending on requirements outlined in state law.  For example, Virginia state law provides that local election officials have  the authority to determine the qualification of an applicant for  registration. Further, the Virginia law requires election officials to send  a cancellation notice once a voter registration record is cancelled due to  death. As a result, Virginia state officials forward all valid matches of  potentially deceased registrants to the responsible local official who  reviews the match, marks the registrant as deceased in the voter  registration database, cancels the registration, and sends a cancellation  notice. In contrast, Michigan law allows either state or local officials to  cancel a voter registration upon receipt of reliable information that the  registrant is deceased. In addition, according to Michigan state election  officials we met with, there is no legal requirement for officials to send  notices of cancellation due to death. Michigan state election officials told us that they cancel voter registrations based on data-matching with  DMF data at the state level.

State election officials from all five selected states and officials from one  local jurisdiction reported that they have found DMF data to be useful for  identifying registrants who have died. Further, state election officials from  four selected states stated that the DMF data are accurate and reliable.  For example, officials said that they have experienced very few instances  where they have had to reverse cancelled registrations because a  registrant was incorrectly identified as deceased based on DMF data.  Nebraska and Oregon state officials also noted that DMF data are  particularly useful for identifying registrants who died out of state. Officials  said that out-of-state death information would not be captured by other  data sources they use, such as state vital records data. In addition,  Michigan state officials noted that historically they would receive  notification of a person’s death closer to the date of death when using  DMF data than when using death data from the state vital records  office.

We previously reported that state-reported deaths, which the DMF does  not include, are expected to account for a larger proportion of all Social  Security Administration death records over time. As a result, we  reported that agencies that purchase the DMF, including election offices,  will likely continue to access fewer records over time as compared with  those government agencies that obtain the Social Security  Administration’s full death file. We also reported that because the  deaths reported by states are generally more accurate than other death  information reported to the Social Security Administration by post offices,  financial institutions, and other government agencies, it is likely that  agencies using the DMF could encounter more errors than agencies  using the Social Security Administration’s full death file. According to  Social Security Administration officials, Social Security death data are  accurate when used to administer the Social Security Administration  benefit programs, which includes removing deceased individuals from the  beneficiary rolls and informing surviving spouses and children of their  eligibility for benefits. Virginia state officials further noted that DMF death  information can be less timely in identifying an individual as deceased  when compared to state death records because state records are  collected during the death certification process while the Social Security  Administration relies on the transmission of information after the death  certification from other entities, such as other government agencies, to  identify an individual as deceased.

Election officials can also use state vital records to identify and remove  registrants who are deceased from their voter registration lists. Due to the  federal requirement for state election officials to coordinate with the  designated state agency responsible for compiling records of deaths,  most states receive state level information on deceased registrants from  their state office of vital statistics. State death records are collected  electronically by most states, and maintained in each state’s Electronic  Death Registration System. As of December 2018, 46 states, the  District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico used an Electronic Death  Registration System to collect and maintain death data within their  jurisdiction.

All five states we visited receive data on deceased individuals at varying  intervals from their state vital records office and match these records to  the statewide voter registration list to identify and remove deceased  registrants. For example, on a daily basis, Florida state election officials  receive state death data electronically from the Florida Bureau of Vital  Statistics. They use the information to identify potentially deceased  registrants and provide a list of these individuals to local election  officials. Nebraska state election officials receive state death data from  their state department of health on a weekly basis, Oregon and Virginia  receive death information from their respective state departments of  health on a monthly basis, and Michigan officials said they receive the  information periodically, on either a weekly or bi-weekly basis.

According to state election officials from Florida, Nebraska, Oregon, and  Virginia and local election officials from four of the jurisdictions we visited,  state vital records on deceased individuals are generally accurate and  reliable, in part because state vital records data are reviewed and  validated. Specifically, state vital records data on deceased individuals  are linked to information on the death certificate which is validated by  authorized persons, such as physicians and funeral directors, during the  death certification process. Virginia state officials said that in comparison,  other sources such as the Social Security DMF data may include reported  deaths that are not directly linked to the death certification, from entities  such as post offices and financial institutions.

Additionally, officials from one jurisdiction told us that state death records  are helpful in identifying people who died in another jurisdiction in the  state. Further, officials from this jurisdiction noted that in the past they  reviewed obituaries to identify deceased registrants, but that they have  seen a decline in the use of obituaries to announce deaths and state  death records help fill the information gap previously provided by  obituaries. Nebraska state officials also noted that state death records  can help prevent fraudulent registrations because state officials are able  to check new registrations against death records received from the state  health department.

Nebraska state officials and officials from two local jurisdictions said that  one limitation of state death records is that they generally only include  information on deaths that have occurred in the state, and as a result  election officials lack death records for residents who died out of state.  From our interviews with the state vital records officials in the states we  visited and information we reviewed on national death sources, we  learned that, in some states, state death records may include information  on deaths that occurred out of state, through the state’s participation in  interstate data exchanges.

Additionally, while some state officials found state death records timely for  updating voter registration lists, Michigan state officials said their state  death records were not as timely as DMF data. Specifically, Michigan  state election officials said they used to receive notification approximately  six months after a person’s death when using state death records,  compared to within two weeks of death using DMF data. Officials  explained that the lag in the death notification when using the state death  records was due to low participation rates in the state’s Electronic Death  Registration System when the system was first implemented. Michigan  state election officials noted that state death records have improved and  are timelier as the participation rate in the state Electronic Death  Registration System has increased in recent years. Oregon state  officials also noted that state death records may be less timely than the  data counties receive from their local health departments, and thus local election officials may have received notice of an individual’s death from  the county health department prior to receiving the state vital records  data.

Data Source Used to Identify Registrants with Disqualifying Felony Convictions

State laws regarding the voting eligibility of individuals with a felony  conviction vary. In some states, individuals who were previously  convicted of a felony are not permitted to vote unless they are pardoned,  or their voting rights are specifically restored by the government; in other  states, the right to vote is reinstated automatically at the end of the  individual’s sentence or after a designated period of time following the  end of the sentence. Additionally, in some states, individuals with felony  convictions may vote if they are on probation or have been granted  parole; and, in two states, felons are allowed to vote even while  incarcerated. Election officials are generally required to remove  registrants with a felony conviction from voter registration lists, in  accordance with state law.

U.S. Attorneys’ Records on Felony Convictions

U.S. Attorneys are required by law to notify the states’ chief election  officials of felony convictions in federal court. The notices must contain  a person’s name, age, residence address, date of entry of the judgment,  a description of the offenses of which the individual was convicted, and  the sentence imposed by the court.

Election officials from all five states we visited said that they receive  records from U.S. Attorneys on residents who are convicted of a federal  felony. Florida, Nebraska, and Virginia use this information to remove  registrants from their voter registration lists given the nature of their state  laws, which restrict voting eligibility after a felony conviction until rights  are restored or for a period after completion of the sentence. Michigan  and Oregon prohibit individuals from voting while serving their sentences  after conviction, but voting rights are automatically reinstated once a  person is released from prison. As such, state officials from Michigan  told us that they do not use U.S. Attorneys’ records to remove voters from  their voter registration lists. Oregon officials noted they use U.S.  Attorneys’ records on federal felony convictions to change a registrant’s  status to “inactive.”

Election officials from three states in our review that use U.S. Attorneys’  felony conviction records to remove registrants from voter registration lists  said that this information was valuable, as they would not be able to  acquire information about federal convictions from state sources. While  federal conviction information can be helpful to election officials, an  official from one local jurisdiction said that it can be difficult to determine  whether the individual identified by a U.S. Attorney’s Office as having a  federal conviction is the same person as the registrant. This is because  criminals may have used aliases or provided incorrect Social Security  numbers when registering to vote, which results in a less confident match.  In addition, the information state and local officials receive on federal  convictions is not required to include an individual’s projected date of  release or date of sentence completion, which state and local officials  from Florida and Nebraska said could help them determine whether the  registrant is ineligible to vote and thus should be removed from voter  registration lists. This makes it difficult for election officials to determine if  the registrant’s sentence was already completed by the time they receive  the information. In Nebraska, where voting rights are reinstated two years  after a sentence is completed, election officials said it is initially difficult to  know whether the individual’s voter registration is valid without the date of  release or sentence completion.

To mitigate limitations related to the lack of a projected release date or  sentence completion date, Florida election officials said that they review  case judgments which provide the details of the case, including date of  sentence completion, to determine if the registrant’s sentence was  completed and then check if the registrant’s rights were restored.

Nebraska state election officials said they review court records and also  noted that they would contact the local U.S. Attorney’s Office to obtain the  federal release date for a particular registrant.

We provided a draft of this report to DOJ, the U.S. Postal Service, the  Social Security Administration, the Election Assistance Commission, the  Crosscheck program, and election offices in the five states and ten local  jurisdictions we visited. DOJ, the U.S. Postal Service, the Election  Assistance Commission, and the Crosscheck program did not provide  written comments. The Social Security Administration submitted a letter  noting that it did not have any substantive comments, which is  reproduced in appendix IV. We incorporated technical comments from  DOJ, the U.S. Postal Service, the Social Security Administration,  Crosscheck, and state and local officials as appropriate.

We are sending copies of this report to the Attorney General, the  Postmaster General, the Social Security Administration, the Election  Assistance Commission, election offices in the five selected states and  ten local jurisdictions that participated in our research, appropriate  congressional committees and members, and other interested parties. In  addition, the report is available at no charge on the GAO website at  http://www.gao.gov.

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact  me at (202) 512-8777 or gamblerr@gao.gov. Contact points for our  Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on  the last page of this report. GAO staff who made significant contributions  to this report are listed in appendix V.

Appendix I: National Voter Registration Act of 1993 Cases Filed by Private Parties

In addition to the Department of Justice’s (DOJ) role in enforcing the  National Voter Registration Act of 1993 (NVRA), the law allows a private  party (a person or organization) who is aggrieved by a violation of NVRA  provisions to bring a civil action against a state or local agency  responsible for voter registration. In some cases, DOJ may participate in  these private party cases by intervening on behalf of the plaintiff (as a  plaintiff intervenor) or defendant, or by filing an amicus brief. The NVRA  includes provisions that focus on both increasing opportunities for voter  registration and improving voter registration list maintenance. Table 4  includes a summary of these provisions.

To identify cases filed by private parties that included a claim under the  NVRA, we searched an online legal database (Lexis Advance) for U.S.  Circuit Courts of Appeals decisions from fiscal years 2008 through 2018  that contained the term “National Voter Registration Act.” We reviewed  the decisions and also obtained and reviewed related case documents,  including district court decisions, dockets, and complaints, to determine  whether a claim had been filed under the NVRA and the nature of the  claim, among other case information. We focused on cases that reached  the federal appellate level because decisions issued by the U.S. Circuit  Courts of Appeals create binding precedent for all of the districts in that  circuit, among other considerations.

Summary of NVRA Cases Filed by Private Parties that Reached the U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals from Fiscal Year 2008 through Fiscal Year 2018

We identified 19 cases that were filed by private parties with claims under  the NVRA that reached the U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals (federal  appellate level) from fiscal years 2008 through 2018. Eleven of the 19  cases included claims that were related to NVRA provisions that require  states to provide registration opportunities. Six cases included claims  related to the NVRA requirement to remove voters from registration lists  under specified conditions (list maintenance).

Private parties filed 11 cases involving claims under the NVRA’s  registration opportunity provisions that reached the U.S. Circuit Courts of  Appeals. We reviewed the claims in each of the 11 cases and found that:  five of the 11 cases involved a claim under section 5 related to voter  registration opportunities at motor vehicle offices;  four of the 11 cases involved a claim under section 7 related to  registration opportunities at public assistance offices;  two of the 11 cases involved a claim under section 6 related to mail-in  registration application forms; and one of the 11 cases involved claims under section 8 related to the  requirement that states register voters whose applications are  received at least 30 days before an election.

Private parties filed six cases involving list maintenance claims under the  NVRA that reached the U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals. NVRA list  maintenance cases may involve two types of allegations under section 8:  (1) in conducting a required program to remove ineligible voters from the  voter registration list, a state or local jurisdiction did not incorporate  certain safeguards, with the potential effect of unlawfully removing eligible  voters; and (2) a state or local jurisdiction did not have an adequate  program to remove ineligible voters from the voter registration list. Five of  the six cases included a claim under section 8 related to the potential  unlawful removal of voters from voter registration lists. The sixth case  included a claim under section 8 related to the inadequate removal of  ineligible voters from voter registration lists.

DOJ Participated in Nearly Half of All NVRA Private Party Cases that Reached the U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals from Fiscal Years 2008 through 2018

DOJ submitted an amicus brief or statement of interest in nine of the 19  NVRA cases filed by private parties that reached the U.S. Circuit Courts  of Appeals between fiscal years 2008 through 2018. Five of the nine  cases in which DOJ participated involved issues related to registration  opportunities:

DOJ participated in all four of the cases that included a claim under  section 7 related to registration issues involving public assistance  offices. For example, in one case, plaintiffs alleged that the state of  New Mexico failed to provide voter registration forms to applicants for  public assistance who did not decline, in writing, to register to vote.  DOJ submitted a brief in support of the plaintiffs.

DOJ participated in one case that included a claim under section 6  related to mail-in voter registration application forms.

DOJ also participated in one case under section 8 that related to the  public disclosure of records concerning voter registration list maintenance  activities.

The remaining three cases involved issues related to list maintenance,  specifically allegations that an election jurisdiction’s list maintenance  program did not have appropriate safeguards to protect against the  unlawful removal of eligible voters. For example, in one case, plaintiffs  alleged that the state of Ohio violated the NVRA by using failure to vote  as the sole trigger to start the confirmation process for removing voters  from registration rolls based on a change of residence. In 2016, DOJ filed  an amicus brief in support of the plaintiffs. In 2017, the case was  appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court and the department reversed its  original position and filed a brief supporting the state’s list maintenance  practices. In June 2018, the Supreme Court upheld Ohio’s process for  removing voters on change-of-residence grounds and ruled that failure to  vote could serve as evidence that a registrant had moved.

Appendix II: Cases with National Voter Registration Act of 1993 Claims Filed by the Department of Justice, Voting Section

Within the Department of Justice (DOJ), the Civil Rights Division’s Voting  Section enforces the civil provisions of federal laws that protect the right  to vote, including the National Voter Registration Act of 1993 (NVRA), the  Help America Vote Act, the Voting Rights Act of 1965, and the Uniformed  and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act, among others. From fiscal  years 2001 through 2017, the Voting Section participated in 234 cases,  including 14 cases involving NVRA claims in which the Section was the  plaintiff or the plaintiff intervenor. Cases with NVRA claims included  allegations related to providing registration opportunities for voters, and  allegations related to the requirement to remove voters from registration  lists under specified conditions (list maintenance). Table 5 below  provides a brief summary of the allegations in each case.

Appendix III: Data Sources and Site Selection Methods

To address how selected data sources are used at the state and local  level and to obtain perspectives on how these sources help maintain  voter registration lists, we selected and reviewed six commonly received  data sources that may be used to remove ineligible voters who have  moved, died, or committed a disqualifying criminal conviction. We also  selected state and local election offices in five states and conducted  interviews with election officials to obtain information on policies and  procedures for using selected data sources, and perspectives on their  benefits and limitations. This appendix describes our data source and site  selection methodologies, and additional information on the data sources  and sites we selected.

To determine which data sources to include in our review, in June 2018  we sent a structured questionnaire to state election directors for each of  the 49 states and the District of Columbia with voter registration  requirements to identify commonly received data sources which states  can potentially use to conduct voter registration list maintenance. The  National Voter Registration Act of 1993 (NVRA) specifies certain  categories under which election officials may remove registrants from  voter registration lists including:  1.  if a registrant has moved outside of a jurisdiction and either (a)  confirmed the move in writing or (b) failed to respond to an address  confirmation mailing and failed to vote in two consecutive federal  general elections subsequent to the mailing;  2.  death of the registrant;  3.  criminal conviction of the registrant, as provided for in state law; and  4.  mental incapacity of the registrant, as provided for in state law.

We asked state election directors to identify the sources from which data  were received at either the state or local level at any point between  January 2017 and May 2018. We summarized responses from election  directors in 35 states and the District of Columbia to identify commonly  received data sources. Table 6 provides a summary of responses to the  structured questionnaire, with the data sources organized according to  the NVRA categories that may be used to remove registrants from voter  lists.

From the list of commonly received sources above, we then selected six  data sources that can be used to address the following NVRA categories  for removing registrants—move outside election jurisdiction, death, and,  disqualifying criminal conviction. These categories each account for more  than 1 percent of total removals from voter registration lists nationwide,  based on the most recent data reported to the U.S. Election Assistance  Commission. We did not select any data source that addresses the  “disqualifying mental incapacity” NVRA removal category since it  accounted for less than 1 percent of total removals nationwide for this  time period. Specifically, we selected three sources that address moves,  two sources that address deceased registrants, and one source that  addresses disqualifying criminal convictions, to generally reflect recent  data reported on the distribution of registrant removals, by removal  category, from voter registration lists nationwide.

We also selected (a) at least one nationwide source that captures data  from all states; (b) at least one source that only includes data specific to  the particular state or local jurisdiction that receives data from the source;  and (c) one interstate data exchange that involves the sharing of data  between multiple states. We selected sources from each of these  categories in order to identify potential issues that may arise when  election officials match their voter registration data with various other  types of data sources. Table 7 presents the data sources we selected for  further review.

To obtain information on policies and procedures for using selected data  sources for voter registration list maintenance, and election officials’  perceptions on the benefits and limitations of using them, we selected five  states that indicated in their responses to our questionnaire that they  have received data from at least five of the six selected data sources  between January 2017 and May 2018. We also considered variation in  states’ population size, when possible, and geographic diversity in order  to capture possible regional differences in election administration  practices. See table 8 for a list of the states we selected and a summary  of the selected data sources received by each state.

For each of the five selected states, we selected two local election  jurisdictions (counties or cities/towns)–one with a larger population and  one with a smaller population–based on the recommendation of the state  election officials, population size, and other factors. See table 9 for  demographic information on the states and local jurisdictions we visited.

Appendix IV: Comments from the Social Security Administration

Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

In addition to the contact named above, Tom Jessor (Assistant Director),  David Alexander, Justine Augeri, Colleen Candrl, Jamarla Edwards,  Jonathan Ferguson, Alana Finley, Eric Hauswirth, Richard Hung, Amanda  Miller, Heidi Nielson, Kevin Reeves, Christine San, Janet Temko-Blinder,  Jeff Tessin, and Sarah Turpin made key contributions to this report.

The National Voter Registration Act of 1993 sought to increase the number of citizens who register to vote in federal elections, protect the integrity of the electoral process, and ensure accurate voter registration lists.

Among other things, we looked at the tools state and local election officials use to maintain voter registration lists, which include Postal Service change of address forms and death records. We also reviewed the Department of Justice’s efforts to ensure compliance with the Act and address election fraud in 2001–2017. During this time, DOJ's Voting Section investigated 99 alleged violations of the Act and filed 14 cases.