Defense Nuclear Enterprise: Systems Face Sustainment Challenges, and Actions Are Needed to Effectively Monitor Efforts to Improve the Enterprise

In 2014, the Secretary of Defense directed two reviews of DOD's nuclear enterprise. These reviews made recommendations to address problems with leadership, organization, investment, morale, policy, and procedures, as well as other shortcomings that adversely affected the nuclear deterrence mission. In 2015, DOD conducted a review focused on NC3 systems, which resulted in additional recommendations to improve NC3.

The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 includes a provision for GAO to review DOD's processes for addressing these recommendations. This report addresses the extent to which DOD has made progress in (1) the implementation and tracking of the recommendations from the 2014 and 2015 nuclear enterprise reviews and (2) addressing sustainment and maintenance-related challenges and planning for the continued sustainment and maintenance of existing defense nuclear enterprise systems. GAO reviewed documents and interviewed DOD officials. This is a public version of a classified report that GAO issued in October 2019. Information that DOD deemed classified has been omitted.

The Department of Defense (DOD) continues to make progress in implementing recommendations to improve the nuclear enterprise. These recommendations stemmed from DOD's 2014 internal and independent nuclear enterprise reviews, a U.S. Strategic Command 2014 memorandum, and an internal DOD 2015 report on nuclear command, control, and communications (NC3). Since GAO last reported—in November 2018—an additional five of the 247 sub-recommendations from the 2014 reviews have been closed; 91 remain open. In that time, DOD has also closed two more of the 13 recommendations from the 2015 review; six remain open. However, the key tracking tools DOD uses to provide visibility on the status of the recommendations do not provide current and complete information. For example, for those items that are behind schedule, many of the expected completion dates have not been updated to reflect when the items are now expected to be completed. The current DOD guidance for tracking the recommendations' status does not include a specific requirement to keep the information current in the tracking tools. Until DOD addresses these issues, it will not have a complete and accurate picture of when tasks are expected to be finished, whether progress is being made, whether efforts have stalled, or if there are other challenges. Ensuring that there is current and complete information regarding enduring recommendations would also help inform DOD's effort to monitor the health of the defense nuclear enterprise.

DOD and the military services are experiencing challenges related to sustainment and maintenance of nuclear weapon systems and have ongoing and planned initiatives intended to mitigate these challenges. All of the systems we reviewed have been operational since before 1998, making these systems at least 22 years old (see figure). The age of the systems has resulted in maintenance and supply issues. For example, the Ohio -class submarine has experienced the failure of parts that were not originally intended to be replaced. DOD and the services have ongoing and planned efforts to mitigate these challenges, such as improving maintenance processes and sources of supply.

GAO is making two recommendations for DOD to update guidance to require DOD components to keep information on recommendations current and complete. In written comments on the classified report, DOD concurred with these recommendations.

In 2014, as a response to incidents involving the nation’s nuclear forces  and their senior leadership, the Secretary of Defense directed both an  internal Department of Defense (DOD) review and an independent review  of the DOD nuclear enterprise. The DOD nuclear enterprise includes  strategic and nonstrategic nuclear forces, and the supporting  infrastructure and personnel to build, maintain, and control these assets.  The two reviews examined DOD’s nuclear deterrent mission, and the  resulting reports—Internal Assessment of the Department of Defense  Nuclear Enterprise and Independent Review of the Department of  Defense Nuclear Enterprise—identified problems with leadership,  organization, investment, morale, policy, and procedures, as well as other  shortcomings that were adversely affecting the mission. The  Commander of U.S. Strategic Command also identified some additional  areas for improvement in a memorandum. Together, the two nuclear  enterprise review reports and the Strategic Command Commander’s  memorandum (hereafter referred to collectively as the 2014 nuclear  enterprise reviews) included hundreds of recommendations to address  DOD’s management of nuclear personnel, security requirements for  nuclear weapons, and the availability of key equipment and support parts,  among other issues. In 2015, DOD conducted a review focused on  nuclear command, control, and communications (NC3) systems, which  resulted in another report, containing a dozen additional  recommendations (hereafter referred to as the 2015 NC3 report).

The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 includes a  provision for us to review—during each of fiscal years 2017 through  2021—DOD’s processes for addressing the recommendations of the  nuclear enterprise reviews and other assessments of the nuclear enterprise, including the 2015 NC3 report, and to provide a briefing to the  congressional defense committees on the results of our review. In July  2016, we reported that the process DOD had developed for tracking the  2014 review recommendations generally appeared consistent with  relevant criteria from Standards for Internal Control in the Federal  Government—including using and effectively communicating high-quality  information and performing monitoring activities. In October 2017, we  recommended that the Director of the Office of Cost Assessment and  Program Evaluation (CAPE) develop additional guidance for the  identification of risks and the documentation of these risks in DOD’s  centralized tracking tool for the recommendations of the 2014 nuclear  enterprise reviews. We also recommended that the DOD Chief  Information Officer (CIO) develop guidance to improve the tracking and  evaluation of DOD’s progress in implementing the recommendations of  the 2015 NC3 report. In November 2018, we recommended that DOD  clarify roles, responsibilities, and methods of communication and  collaboration for key defense nuclear enterprise oversight bodies,  including the Nuclear Deterrent Enterprise Review Group (NDERG).

DOD has taken steps to implement the recommendations from our  October 2017 and November 2018 reports.

In this report we evaluate the extent to which DOD and the military  services have made progress in  1.  the implementation, tracking, and evaluation of the recommendations  from the June 2014 Independent Review of the Department of  Defense Nuclear Enterprise; the September 2014 Internal  Assessment of the Department of Defense Nuclear Enterprise; the  2014 Strategic Command Commander’s memorandum; the 2015 NC3  report; and any subsequent efforts to improve the health of the  nuclear enterprise in support of the NDERG; and  2.  addressing sustainment and maintenance-related challenges and  planning for the continued sustainment and maintenance of existing  defense nuclear enterprise systems through the planned end of their  service lives.

This report is a public version of a classified report that we issued on  October 24, 2019. DOD deemed some information on sustainment and  maintenance-related challenges to be classified, which must be protected  from loss, compromise, or inadvertent disclosure. As a result, this public  report omits information that DOD identified as classified, related to (1)  mission sets and operational details for certain nuclear capable weapon  systems and (2) specific sustainment and maintenance-related  challenges for certain nuclear capable weapon systems. Although some  information has been omitted from this report, it addresses the same  objectives and uses the same methodology as the classified report.

For objective one, we reviewed key documents, including the centralized  DOD tracking tool and the military services’ internal tracking tools for the  2014 recommendations, and the DOD CIO’s tracking tool for the 2015  recommendations. We also reviewed the original recommendations found  in the 2014 nuclear enterprise reviews and the 2015 NC3 report and  applicable guidance, such as the Secretary of Defense’s 2014 memo  (Nuclear Enterprise Review Corrective Action Implementation); the 2016  Deputy Secretary of Defense memo (Transition of Nuclear Enterprise  Review Tracking Responsibilities, which includes CAPE’s Nuclear  Enterprise Review Tracking Analytic Guidance Overview); and CAPE’s  January 2018 additional guidance on risk (Additional Guidance for  Nuclear Enterprise Review Recommendation Tracking).

For objective two, we reviewed key documents associated with  sustainment and maintenance-related recommendations and interviewed  DOD and service officials. We identified the sustainment and  maintenance-related recommendations from among those 2014  recommendations that DOD had categorized as primarily relating to  operations and maintenance. We also reviewed other recommendations  that we identified as relating to sustainment and maintenance but that  DOD had categorized differently—for example, recommendations  concerning maintenance-workforce issues. We then reviewed information  about these recommendations in the centralized DOD tracking tool for  2014 recommendations and in the military services’ internal tracking  tools. We selected a nongeneralizable sample of eight nuclear weapon  systems managed by the Air Force and Navy to identify sustainment and  maintenance-related challenges for these systems and to assess DOD’s,  the Air Force’s, and the Navy’s plans for the continued sustainment and  maintenance of the systems. This nongeneralizable sample was selected  to include the airborne, land-based, and sea-based legs of the strategic  deterrent; weapon systems that provide NC3 capabilities; and missiles  used to deploy nuclear weapons. For the Air Force, we selected the B-2  Spirit, B-52 Stratofortress, Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missile  (ICBM), AGM-86B air-launched cruise missile (ALCM), and E-4B National  Airborne Operations Center (NAOC). For the Navy, we selected the Ohio- class ballistic missile submarine (SSBN), D-5 Trident submarine-launched  ballistic missile, and E-6B Mercury. We collected additional  documentation, such as life-cycle management and sustainment plans,  from the program managers for each of the weapon systems in our  sample. We interviewed officials from the program offices, maintenance  facilities, and operational units involved in the use and field maintenance  of these systems about sustainment and maintenance challenges and  their efforts to mitigate these challenges. (See app. I for a complete list of  offices we met with during our review.)

The performance audit upon which this report is based was conducted  from November 2018 to October 2019 in accordance with generally  accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that  we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to  provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our  audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a  reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit  objectives. We subsequently worked with DOD from December 2019 to  February 2020 to prepare this unclassified version of the original  classified report for public release. This public version was also prepared  in accordance with these standards.

The DOD nuclear enterprise includes strategic and nonstrategic nuclear  forces and the supporting infrastructure and personnel to build, maintain,  and control these assets. The strategic nuclear forces include a triad of  Air Force ICBMs; Air Force nuclear-capable bomber aircraft; and Navy  submarine-launched ballistic missiles carried by SSBNs; as well as  associated nuclear munitions; air refueling; and NC3 capabilities. NC3  capabilities are a key part of the defense nuclear enterprise, used to  support planning, situation monitoring, and communication of force  direction between the President and nuclear forces. Consistent with the  New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START), the United States  has limited the number of deployed delivery systems for each of the three  legs of the strategic nuclear triad (see fig. 1). The 2018 Nuclear Posture  Review states that the triad’s synergy and overlapping attributes help  ensure the enduring survivability of deterrence capabilities against attack  and the capacity to hold at risk a range of adversary targets throughout a  crisis or conflict. In addition to the strategic nuclear triad, the defense  nuclear enterprise includes nonstrategic nuclear forces: forward-deployed  fighters—referred to as dual-capable fighter aircraft―that are able to  deliver conventional or nuclear munitions; their associated nuclear weapons; and the supporting infrastructure and personnel to build,  maintain, and control nuclear assets.

NC3 capabilities are fielded through a large and complex system  comprising numerous land-, air-, and space-based components used to  ensure connectivity between the President and nuclear forces.  Responsibilities for managing NC3 are distributed among many DOD  components including military departments, combatant commands,  defense agencies, the Joint Staff, and the Office of the Secretary of  Defense. NC3 capabilities provide the President with the means to  authorize the use of nuclear weapons in a crisis.

NC3 capabilities support five important functions:

Force management: assignment, training, deployment, maintenance,  and logistics support of nuclear forces and weapons before, during,  and after any crisis.

Planning: development and modification of plans for the employment  of nuclear weapons and other operations in support of nuclear  employment.

Situation monitoring: collection, maintenance, assessment, and  dissemination of information on friendly forces, adversary forces and  possible targets, emerging nuclear powers, and worldwide events of  interest.

Decision making: assessment, review, and consultation that occur  when the employment or movement of nuclear weapons is  considered.

Force direction: implementation of decisions regarding the execution,  termination, destruction, and disablement of nuclear weapons.

Oversight of 2014 Nuclear Enterprise Reviews’ Recommendations

The NDERG is the principle integrated civilian–military governance body  for the DOD nuclear enterprise. It was established in 2014 by the  Secretary of Defense to ensure the long-term health of the nuclear  enterprise by addressing resourcing, personnel, organizational, and  enterprise policy issues identified in the 2014 nuclear enterprise reviews.  The NDERG also maintains senior-leader awareness of ongoing issues of  importance in the nuclear enterprise, ensures effective sustainment of  these critical nuclear capabilities, and provides a forum for strategic-level  coordination and integration of issues arising from other oversight  committees and councils related to the nuclear enterprise. The NDERG  consists of a group of senior officials chaired by the Deputy Secretary of  Defense with the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as vice  chair.

The NDERG is supported by a Nuclear Deterrent Working Group, which  meets biweekly and reviews the status of the implementation of the  recommendations of the nuclear enterprise reviews, and a Nuclear  Deterrent Senior Oversight Group, which meets quarterly and reviews  any recommendations that the Working Group believes are ready for the  NDERG to close. The Nuclear Deterrent Senior Oversight Group―co- chaired by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear  Matters, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and  Missile Defense Policy, the Joint Staff Deputy Director for Strategic  Stability, and a senior-level representative of the Director of CAPE―also  receives annual briefings on DOD components’ assessments of their  progress, reviews organizational changes, and discusses other issues  related to the management, operations, and health of the nuclear  enterprise—including human resources and culture, operational  availability, sustainment, and modernization and recapitalization issues  not directly addressed in other forums. The Deputy Secretary of  Defense updates the Secretary of Defense on the NDERG’s progress as  requested.

In November 2014, the Secretary of Defense directed DOD to address  the recommendations from the 2014 nuclear enterprise reviews and  directed CAPE to track and assess implementation efforts. The Joint  Staff, the Navy, the Air Force, offices within the Office of the Secretary of  Defense, and U.S. Strategic Command support CAPE’s efforts. CAPE  compiled the recommendations from the 2014 nuclear enterprise reviews.

In total, CAPE identified 175 distinct recommendations from the three  documents associated with the reviews. CAPE then identified 247 sub- recommendations within those recommendations, which were directed to  multiple military services or other DOD components. For example, if a  recommendation was directed to both the Air Force and the Navy, then  one sub-recommendation was made to the Air Force and one to the  Navy.

CAPE then worked with the military services to identify offices of primary  responsibility for implementing actions to address the recommendations,  any offices with coordinating responsibility, and any resources necessary  to implement each recommendation. CAPE has developed a centralized  tracking tool to collect information on progress in meeting milestones and  metrics. As shown in figure 2, the tracking tool includes fields for the  underlying problem statement, or root cause, and for the recommendation  and time frames with milestones for implementing the recommendation.  The tracking tool also includes performance measures (referred to as  metrics in the tracking tool) to assess both the progress (through “process  metrics”) and the effectiveness of the implementation actions (through  “outcome metrics”). The outcome metrics aid DOD in determining  whether implemented recommendations have addressed the underlying  problem that was the impetus for the original recommendation.

The tracking tool contains hundreds of unique milestones and metrics,  and additional milestones and metrics may be added as they are  identified. The Air Force and the Navy also have developed their own  methods of tracking their service-specific recommendations. In December  2016, the Deputy Secretary of Defense issued a memorandum that  directed the transition of the tracking and analysis responsibilities related  to implementing the recommendations of the 2014 nuclear enterprise  reviews from CAPE to the military departments and other DOD  components. However, CAPE remains responsible for providing  guidance to inform the analyses conducted by the military departments  and other DOD components, overseeing these analyses, and assessing  recommendations for closure. The aim of these changes was to enhance  ownership and embed the principles of robust analysis, continuous  monitoring, and responsibility throughout the department.

In January 2018, in response to a GAO recommendation, CAPE issued  additional guidance to aid the military departments and other DOD  components in identifying, assessing, and documenting risks associated  with the 2014 recommendations. The guidance instructs components to  document key risks, defined by CAPE as a risk that requires mitigation by  the leadership of the DOD components or a risk that cannot be mitigated  within a component’s existing authorities and resources—for example,  one that cannot be mitigated within the Air Force or Navy and must be  raised to a higher authority. As we reported in November 2018, in  response to the January 2018 guidance for tracking risks, the Air Force  and the Navy included in the centralized tracking tool information on key  risks for the recommendations they were responsible for or an indication  of the absence of any key risk.

Oversight of the 2015 NC3 Report’s Recommendations

The Council on Oversight of the National Leadership Command, Control,  and Communications System (NLC3S Council) was established by  statute and is responsible for oversight of the command, control, and  communications system for the national leadership of the United States.  Additionally, as recommended in the 2015 NC3 report, the NLC3S  Council reviews the recommendations from the report and assesses them  for closure. The NLC3S Council is supported by the National Leadership  Command Capabilities Executive Management Board, which comprises a  Senior Steering Group and four working groups—Stakeholders,  Resources, Assessments, and Nuclear Command and Control Issues.  The Executive Management Board ensures that the council is informed of  and presents issues that require senior leadership–level decisions. In  2018, the Secretary of Defense approved the designation of the  Commander of U.S. Strategic Command as the NC3 enterprise lead with  increased responsibilities for operations, requirements, and systems  engineering and integration. At that time, the Secretary of Defense also  approved the designation of the Under Secretary of Defense for  Acquisition and Sustainment as the NC3 enterprise capability portfolio  manager with increased responsibilities for resources and acquisition.

In November 2018, we recommended that DOD update applicable  guidance (such as the NLC3S Council’s and Executive Management  Board’s charters) and identify whether there is a need to request changes  to statutory or presidential guidance in order to clarify changes to roles  and responsibilities for oversight of NC3. According to DOD officials,  DOD is in the process of implementing these recommendations, with the  intent of having the Commander of U.S. Strategic Command and the  Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment provide  leadership with respect to NC3 capabilities, while the Executive  Management Board maintains its role for those systems that primarily  relate to non-NC3 systems, with all three entities reporting on their  respective issues to the NLC3S Council.

The NLC3S Council is co-chaired by the Under Secretary of Defense for  Acquisition and Sustainment and the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of  Staff. Members of the council include the Under Secretary of Defense for  Policy; the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering;  the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence; the Commander, U.S.  Strategic Command; the Commander, North American Aerospace  Defense Command/U.S. Northern Command; the Director, National  Security Agency; and the DOD CIO. The DOD CIO also serves as the  Secretariat for the NLC3S Council and tracks the implementation of  recommendations from the 2015 NC3 report, among other activities.  Additional organizations may participate in the NLC3S Council’s meetings  to provide subject-matter expertise. Regular participants in the NLC3S  Council include the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense  (Comptroller); senior leaders from the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force; the Director, Defense Information Systems Agency; the Director, White  House Military Office; and Director, CAPE.

Sustainment and Maintenance of the Nuclear Enterprise

The 2014 nuclear enterprise reviews included Operations and  Maintenance as 1 of 11 categories. Recommendations within this  category are primarily related to the sustainment and maintenance of  nuclear weapon systems. The reviews identified several Operations and  Maintenance core issues related to, among other things, maintenance  infrastructure, lack of leadership visibility into sustainment issues,  fragmented logistics support, and aging systems and support equipment  leading to parts obsolescence issues.

Of the 175 recommendations included in the 2014 nuclear enterprise  reviews, 30 were categorized as Operations and Maintenance. Other  categories in the 2014 reviews, such as Investment and Personnel, also  include some recommendations that are related to sustainment and  maintenance.

DOD conducts sustainment and maintenance on nuclear enterprise  weapon systems to ensure that these systems are available to support  current military operations and maintain the capability to meet future  requirements. Sustainment of weapon systems comprises logistics and  personnel services required to maintain and prolong operations of the  weapon system. DOD conducts maintenance at two levels: field level and  depot level. Field-level maintenance is performed at the unit level on the  unit’s own equipment, requires a relatively fewer number of skill sets, and  occurs more frequently. Depot-level maintenance includes the overhaul,  upgrade, or rebuilding of equipment, occurs less frequently, and requires  a greater number of skill sets. Depot maintenance includes inspection,  repair, overhaul, or the modification or rebuild of end items, assemblies,  subassemblies, and parts that, among other things, require extensive  industrial facilities, specialized tools and equipment, or uniquely  experienced and trained personnel that are not available in other  maintenance activities.

Key Sustainment and Maintenance Organizations

A number of DOD organizations are involved in the sustainment and  maintenance of nuclear weapon systems. Some key organizations  include the following:

Defense Logistics Agency. The Defense Logistics Agency manages  approximately one-fifth of the value of DOD’s overall inventory and  provides billions of dollars in consumable items on an annual basis for  depot maintenance conducted at defense industrial sites—Army and  Marine Corps depots, Navy Fleet Readiness Centers and Navy  shipyards, and Air Force Air Logistics Complexes—where combat  vehicles, planes, helicopters, and ships are repaired and overhauled.

Air Force Materiel Command. Air Force Materiel Command  conducts research, development, test, and evaluation, and provides  acquisition management services and logistics support necessary to  keep Air Force weapon systems ready for war. One of six centers  within Air Force Materiel Command, the Air Force Nuclear Weapons  Center is the nuclear-focused center synchronizing all aspects of  nuclear materiel management on behalf of the Air Force Materiel  Command commander.

Naval Sea Systems Command and Naval Air Systems Command.

Naval Sea Systems Command’s affiliated Program Executive  Offices—including the Program Executive Office for submarines and  the Program Executive Office for the Ohio-class SSBN and its  replacement, the Columbia-class SSBN—are responsible for life-cycle  management of their assigned programs. Similarly, Naval Air Systems  Command provides full life-cycle support of naval aviation aircraft,  weapons, and systems.

DOD and the Military Services Have Made Progress in Implementing Recommendations to Improve the Nuclear Enterprise but Have Not Kept Tracking Information Current

DOD continues to make progress in implementing the recommendations  from the 2014 nuclear enterprise reviews and the 2015 NC3 report, but  the key tracking tools used to provide visibility on the status of the  recommendations from these reviews do not provide current and  complete information. For example, expected completion dates for key  metrics and milestones—key methods of evaluating the department’s  progress—are not up to date. Additionally, the NDERG is working to  develop an additional approach for tracking long-term risks and  opportunities to monitor the health of the defense nuclear enterprise.  Current and complete information regarding the status and metrics for  enduring recommendations from the 2014 and 2015 studies would help  inform this effort.

Progress in Implementing Recommendations Continues

2014 Nuclear Enterprise Reviews’ Recommendations

DOD continues to make progress in implementing the recommendations  of the 2014 nuclear enterprise reviews. As of our last report, in November  2018, DOD had closed 151 sub-recommendations. Based on our review  of CAPE’s centralized tracking tool, the NDERG has closed five additional  sub-recommendations since then. As a result, as of August 2019, the  NDERG has closed 156 of the 247 sub-recommendations (see fig. 3).

DOD continues to make progress in implementing the recommendations  of the 2015 NC3 report. Since we last reported, in November 2018, DOD  has closed two additional recommendations. As of August 2019, the  NLC3S Council has closed seven of the 13 recommendations from the  NC3 report (see fig. 4). The DOD CIO has provided guidance to improve  the tracking and evaluation of DOD’s progress in implementing the  recommendations of the 2015 NC3 report, in response to our second  October 2017 recommendation.

Information on Implementation Is Not Kept Current and Complete in DOD Tracking Tools

The military services and other DOD components have not kept  information on the implementation status of the 2014 nuclear enterprise  reviews’ recommendations and 2015 NC3 report’s recommendations  current and complete. As we have previously reported, CAPE developed  a centralized tracking tool to aid in evaluating the actions that have been  taken to implement the recommendations from the 2014 nuclear  enterprise reviews and inform senior leaders across the defense nuclear  enterprise. DOD CIO collects information on the status of the 2015 NC3  report’s recommendations in a layout similar to that used for the 2014  recommendations.

Information on 2014 Nuclear Enterprise Reviews’ Recommendations Is Not Kept Current

The military departments and other DOD components are responsible for  tracking and evaluating the implementation status of the 2014 nuclear  enterprise reviews’ recommendations; CAPE provides guidance to aid in  these efforts. CAPE’s 2016 guidance indicates that the military  departments and DOD components should, as appropriate, use metrics  and milestones to analyze progress. The guidance also states that  existing data should be used, where possible, to minimize the workload of  this effort.

The centralized tracking tool developed by CAPE is the primary means by  which progress is tracked. For each of the hundreds of metrics and  milestones identified, the tracking tool includes expected completion  dates and indicates which have been met and which are behind schedule.  The tool identifies both process metrics, to aid in assessing the progress  of implementation efforts, and outcome metrics, to aid in determining  whether implemented recommendations have addressed the underlying  problem that was the impetus for the original recommendation. However  our review has found, for those metrics and milestones that are behind  schedule, many of the completion dates have not been updated to reflect  when they are expected to be completed, even if years have passed  since the original completion date lapsed. According to officials from  CAPE, the original dates were left in the tracking tool to maintain visibility  on how far past their initial expected completion dates these metrics and  milestones had gone without being resolved.

We previously found that the Air Force and Navy used their own tracking  tools in addition to DOD’s centralized tracking tool. According to Air  Force officials, they still are using their internal tracking tool to help them  note progress within the Air Force before providing inputs to DOD’s  centralized tracking tool. However, according to Navy officials, they are  no longer maintaining their internal tracking tool, because they  determined that those efforts were unnecessary and redundant with  providing inputs to the centralized tracking tool for the relatively few  recommendations that the Navy still has open.

CAPE’s 2016 guidance indicates that the goals of monitoring the  implementation of the 2014 nuclear enterprise reviews’ recommendations  are to track progress toward addressing systemic issues and to assess  changes in the overall health of the enterprise. This information provides  stakeholders within the defense nuclear enterprise with key means of  monitoring progress and evaluating the outcomes of these efforts. DOD’s  approach has been to measure the effectiveness of actions taken by  gathering supporting data and measuring the effectiveness of each  recommendation separately. However, DOD officials have noted that  some enduring recommendations—including recommendations  associated with changing a service’s culture or morale—will take time to  evaluate. In some cases, data related to outcome metrics may not be  available to evaluate the effectiveness of actions taken until years after a  service has taken key actions to address the recommendation. According  to DOD officials, this framework was established to avoid prematurely  assuming that actions taken have successfully addressed underlying  problems.

The need for the military departments and other DOD components to  keep information current, particularly estimated dates for the completion  of activities, has been emphasized at meetings of the Nuclear Deterrent  Working Group. Further, a July 2018 memorandum from the Deputy  Secretary of Defense reiterated that the components of the nuclear  enterprise, which includes the Air Force and the Navy, will continue to  track progress in implementing the recommendations from the 2014  nuclear enterprise reviews through 2020. According to officials from the  Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear Matters  and CAPE, the use of the centralized tracking tool is likely to extend  beyond 2020, and the Nuclear Deterrent Working Group—which supports  the NDERG and its Nuclear Deterrent Senior Oversight Group—is using  information from the centralized tracking tool to support additional work.  In the context of transitioning from the current centralized tracking tool— which tracks the recommendations of the 2014 nuclear enterprise  reviews—to enduring metrics used to characterize the health of the  nuclear enterprise, as discussed later in this report, the Deputy Assistant  Secretary of Defense for Nuclear Matters stated that it was not a good  use of limited personnel resources to request that all metrics and  milestones be updated. This is because many of the 2014  recommendations were minor and quickly closed. He noted that improved  information about critical recommendations transitioning to enduring  recommendations would be of use.

Information on NC3 Report Recommendations Is Incomplete

The approach that the DOD CIO has established to track the  recommendations from the 2015 NC3 report largely mirrors the approach  developed for tracking the 2014 nuclear enterprise reviews’  recommendations. However, DOD CIO officials have noted that the 2015  NC3 report recommendations are more narrowly scoped than some of the  recommendations from the 2014 reviews and therefore their tracking is  less extensive.

DOD CIO has issued guidance that requests that DOD components  provide quarterly updates on the progress of implementing the  recommendations. It specifies that the components should provide  current metrics used to track progress, as well as key milestones, at a  minimum by quarter, for the next year. The guidance further states that,  as appropriate, both process metrics—to measure whether actions taken  address a recommendation—and outcome metrics—to measure end  results of interest—should be used. However, metric and milestone  information for many of the recommendations in the tracking tool is out of  date or incomplete. In particular, many of the recommendations do not  have outcome metrics identified. DOD CIO’s guidance does request  quarterly updates from the components and provides some information  on content for those updates, but it does not specify that the information  should be kept current and complete in the tracking tool. Therefore,  information like process and outcome metrics may not be complete and  kept current beyond the next year.

Keeping Tracking Tools Current and Complete Can Aid DOD

Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government states that an  organization’s management should use high-quality information, which is  defined as information from relevant and reliable data that is appropriate,  current, complete, accurate, accessible, and provided on a timely basis.  CAPE’s guidance provides a framework for information that DOD  components should consider as they evaluate and track progress made  for the 2014 recommendations. The guidance notes that, although the  intent of the recommendations is enduring and the systemic issues  identified by the 2014 nuclear enterprise reviews should be addressed,  the specific approaches to the recommendations can be revised to  address the recommendations more effectively. Similarly, the DOD CIO’s  guidance provides a framework for information that DOD components  should consider as they evaluate and track progress made for the 2015  NC3 report recommendations.

For tracking both the 2014 nuclear enterprise reviews’ and 2015 NC3  report’s recommendations, DOD’s approaches are limited by the quality  and completeness of the data collected and tracked in the centralized  tracking tools. Specifically, CAPE’s general guidance for tracking the  2014 nuclear enterprise reviews’ recommendations does not include a  specific requirement to periodically update the information to keep it  current. DOD CIO’s guidance for tracking the 2015 NC3 report  recommendations does request quarterly updates but does not  specifically require information included in the tracking tool be complete.  Without current and complete information—including revised dates for  when metrics and milestones will be complete—the tracking tools used to  track the 2014 and 2015 recommendations do not provide a complete  and accurate picture of when tasks are expected to be completed,  whether progress is still being made to address the many issues the  department has identified, whether any efforts have stalled, or any  additional challenges. Additionally, without an accurate picture of the  department’s progress in addressing these recommendations, the  Nuclear Deterrent Working Group has less information to leverage to  support additional work to track enduring issues on behalf of the  NDERG.

DOD Is Working to Develop an Approach to Identifying and Tracking Long-Term Nuclear Risks and Opportunities

In addition to tracking the 2014 recommendations, the July 2018  memorandum from the Deputy Secretary of Defense stated that  stakeholders will develop metrics to capture long-term risks and identify  opportunities for regular reporting to the NDERG. The NDERG Charter,  issued in early June 2019, provides further direction to the Nuclear  Deterrent Senior Oversight Group and its Nuclear Deterrent Working  Group, including that members should develop metrics, data, tools, and  briefing materials to support the NDERG efforts to identify, track, and  address issues, risks, and opportunities across the nuclear enterprise.  The charter further directs the Nuclear Deterrent Senior Oversight Group  and Nuclear Deterrent Working Group members to recommend  disposition of the long-term recommendations from the 2014 nuclear  enterprise reviews and of the long-term efforts to achieve management,  operations, and health outcomes directed by the 2018 Nuclear Posture  Review.

In order to address the direction from the July 2018 Deputy Secretary of  Defense memorandum and the June 2019 NDERG Charter, DOD officials  stated that the co-chairs of the Nuclear Deterrent Senior Oversight Group  have been working with defense nuclear enterprise stakeholders to  identify long-term issues that should be tracked to monitor the health of  the enterprise. According to agency officials, they would like to adjust  how long-term issues that relate to the enduring recommendations from  the 2014 nuclear enterprise reviews are monitored. Examples include the  need to sustain the current weapon systems until they are replaced,  providing adequate funding for the acquisition of new systems, and  improving the morale of nuclear forces. Since these recommendations  are not expected to be closed as completed within the next few years, the  Nuclear Deterrent Senior Oversight Group wants to find ways to improve  how the recommendations can be tracked to monitor the health of the  enterprise. According to DOD officials, they are currently working to  identify relevant metrics from the existing tracking tool as well as existing  data sources that might be leveraged to support the long-term monitoring  of the health of the enterprise. This may be particularly helpful if the use  of the existing tool is discontinued at some point after the 2020 time  frame.

The efforts of the military services and other DOD components to  maintain current and complete information using the existing tracking  tools for the 2014 and 2015 recommendations has the potential to aid the  department. In particular, existing tools can be helpful for tracking and  assessing both enduring recommendations from those reviews as well as  additional efforts by the NDERG to assess and monitor the health of the  nuclear enterprise. For example, existing outcome metrics can aid in the  assessment of whether completed actions have addressed underlying  issues that affect the health of the enterprise, identified risks can aid the  department in addressing issues as they arise, and the use of the tools  themselves can help maintain visibility across the DOD nuclear  enterprise, including aiding the communication of timely information to  senior leaders.

DOD and the Military Services Are Experiencing Challenges to the Sustainment and Maintenance of Nuclear Systems and Have Various Initiatives to Mitigate Those Challenges

DOD and the military services are experiencing challenges related to  sustainment and maintenance of nuclear weapon systems—including  challenges identified in recommendations from the 2014 nuclear  enterprise reviews—and have ongoing and planned initiatives intended to  mitigate these challenges. The military services face challenges related to  operating weapon systems beyond their initial design life, parts availability  and parts obsolescence, small fleet size, and the maintenance workforce.  DOD and the services are mitigating sustainment and maintenance  challenges through initiatives to increase parts availability and to improve  depot-level maintenance, and through increased tracking of sustainment  and maintenance problems.

Challenges to Sustaining and Maintaining Nuclear Weapon Systems

We reviewed sustainment and maintenance for the following nuclear  weapon systems:

Minuteman III. The Minuteman III ICBM is a strategic weapon system  using a ballistic missile of intercontinental range. Missiles are  dispersed in hardened silos to protect against attack and connected to  an underground launch control center through a system of hardened  cables.

B-2 Spirit. The B-2 Spirit is a multirole bomber capable of delivering  both conventional and nuclear munitions.

B-52 Stratofortress. The B-52 Stratofortress is a long-range, heavy  bomber that can perform a variety of missions.

AGM-86B ALCM. The AGM-86B ALCM is a long-range, self-guided  missile with a nuclear warhead that is carried by the B-52H bomber.

E-4B NAOC. The E-4B NAOC is the primary survivable element of  the National Military Command System through which the President,  as Commander in Chief, and Secretary of Defense exercise national  and nuclear command and control of military forces in day-to-day and  crisis operations. In case of national emergency or destruction of  ground command and control centers, the aircraft provides a highly  survivable NC3 center to direct U.S. forces, execute emergency war  orders, and coordinate actions by civil authorities.

E-6B Mercury. The E-6B Mercury is a communications relay and,  when manned, a strategic airborne command post aircraft. It provides  survivable, reliable, and endurable airborne NC3 capabilities needed  to direct, command, and control U.S. strategic nuclear forces.

Ohio-class SSBN. The Ohio-class SSBNs are the most survivable  leg of the strategic triad, serving as launch platforms for submarine- launched ballistic missiles. They are designed specifically for stealth  and the precise delivery of nuclear warheads.

Table 1 shows examples of sustainment challenges affecting these  systems. According to DOD and service officials, while there are  acquisition programs under way to replace most of these systems, the  current nuclear enterprise systems remain necessary for years to come.  The 2014 nuclear enterprise reviews included recommendations to  sustain and maintain these systems until they are replaced, such as a  recommendation to “fully fund increasing maintenance needs as the triad  ages.” See appendixes II–VI for additional information and specific  sustainment and maintenance challenges and initiatives for select  systems.

Weapon Systems Operating Beyond Their Initial Design Life

Almost all of the nuclear weapon systems we reviewed are experiencing  challenges related to aging. Specifically, these weapon systems are being  deployed beyond their originally intended service lives, which adds to the  challenges of sustaining these systems. DOD, along with the Department  of Energy, has undertaken an extensive, multifaceted effort to sustain and  modernize U.S. nuclear weapons capabilities, including the nuclear  weapons stockpile; the research and production infrastructure; and the  NC3 system. Some of these sustainment efforts are directly linked to  recommendations from the nuclear enterprise reviews of 2014 and the  2015 NC3 report. For example, the 2014 nuclear enterprise reviews  recommended that the Air Force establish bomber and ICBM sustainment  plans for aging platforms. The 2014 nuclear enterprise reviews also  resulted in a recommendation to fully fund increasing maintenance needs  as the nuclear triad ages. Table 2 provides additional examples of related  recommendations from the 2014 reviews.

According to DOD officials, as these nuclear weapon systems have aged  they have required more maintenance in order to sustain them through  their extended service lives, and they will continue to do so until they are  replaced by new systems. For example, Air Force officials cited aircraft  age as the major factor leading to corrosion and other airframe issues  that the B-52 is experiencing. The first B-52 model was initially deployed  in 1952, and the B-52H—the model currently in use—became operational  in 1962. The Air Force now plans to sustain the B-52 until at least 2050,  which will require increased maintenance and a series of modernization  programs in the 2020s. The E-4B, first deployed in 1980, is also  experiencing significant corrosion in the galley area, necessitating a fleet- wide galley replacement program. Neither the B-52 nor the E-4B have  replacement programs identified. According to Air Force officials, aging  components have also led to structural problems with the Minuteman III ICBM. The Minuteman III was deployed in 1970 with an original planned  service life of 10 years. The Minuteman III is now expected to last until  the 2030s, when it will be replaced by the Ground Based Strategic  Deterrent system.

In addition to the weapon systems, support components and support  infrastructure are also experiencing age-related challenges. For example,  according to Air Force officials, the support infrastructure for the  Minuteman III in use today, known as the real property installed  equipment, is the original infrastructure that was fielded with the  Minuteman I weapon system in 1960, which reached operational  capability in 1962. These officials stated that challenges at these facilities  include corrosion, water intrusion, collapsed conduits, misaligned doors,  and bulging walls. The need to sustain nuclear support equipment is  reflected in a nuclear enterprise review recommendation to prioritize  nuclear support and test equipment.

Parts Availability Issues and Parts Obsolescence

Parts availability issues and parts obsolescence also affect maintenance  on existing weapon systems across the nuclear enterprise. In many  cases, the industrial base that produced specific parts for a weapon  system is no longer active or is no longer producing the part, so when  parts break there are no replacements available. For example, Air Force  officials working to maintain the B-52 fleet told us that they have trouble  finding suppliers who will produce the necessary parts for such an old  airframe. Similarly, the Ohio-class SSBN program is experiencing  challenges in sustaining submarines through their planned 42-year  service life. The Ohio-class was initially intended to be operational for 30  years. Since it will be in service longer than expected, the Navy is finding  that parts not originally intended to be replaced now need replacement.  Navy officials stated that obsolescence has a greater impact for these  parts that were never expected to fail and therefore do not have an  industrial base to support replacements than for parts that the Navy has  always planned to replace at some point during the Ohio-class service  life.

In certain scenarios, maintainers across several weapon systems have  had to reengineer parts, because the original blueprints do not exist.  Maintainers we spoke to reported long lead times to have parts fabricated  and delivered, which extends the time that a system is offline for  maintenance. The 2014 nuclear enterprise reviews included multiple  recommendations to address parts obsolescence and availability  problems in both the Air Force and the Navy, including the examples  shown in table 3.

Additionally, maintainers may cannibalize parts, a process by which parts  are taken from one asset for use in another. This process is conducted  during maintenance for both Air Force and Navy nuclear weapon  systems. For example, according to Air Force officials, parts are routinely  cannibalized from B-2 aircraft that are undergoing modifications so that  they can be used on the operational B-2 aircraft. Similarly, Navy officials  stated that parts are cannibalized from other classes of submarines to  sustain Ohio-class SSBNs when replacement parts are not available  elsewhere. Parts cannibalization has also occurred during engineered  refueling overhauls. According to Navy officials, in the past, SSBNs  completing refueling overhauls have cannibalized parts from SSBNs that  are beginning to be overhauled. The final Ohio-class SSBN to undergo an  overhaul, the USS Louisiana, will not have that option, because there will  be no other SSBNs from which to cannibalize parts; all SSBNs except the  USS Louisiana and USS Wyoming have already completed their  overhauls. According to officials from the Office of the Chief of Naval  Operations, they are not concerned about not being able to cannibalize  parts for the remaining overhauls.

Several legacy nuclear systems have a limited number of assets, which  can create challenges for meeting operational requirements while at the  same time conducting maintenance. In particular, the size of a fleet can  create challenges when it becomes difficult or impossible to meet  operational requirements. According to Air Force and Navy officials,  maintenance challenges stemming from small fleet sizes particularly  affect the B-2, E-4B, and E-6B weapon systems. Scheduling maintenance  is one such challenge, because taking one aircraft down for maintenance  will have a proportionally greater effect on the number of aircraft available  for operations than it would for a larger fleet. For example, according to  Air Force officials, the B-2 is experiencing challenges related to  maintaining aircraft availability during the extensive modernizations that  are being conducted, including integration of a new weapon and  upgrades to its radar system. Scheduling this modernization process, part  of the effort to sustain the B-2, is challenging given that there are only 20  aircraft in the fleet. Taking an aircraft down for maintenance limits the  number of aircraft available for operational use by U.S. Strategic  Command. Similarly, Air Force officials told us that the time needed for  maintenance and modernization efforts on the E-4B was a primary factor  leading to decreased aircraft availability of the E-4B, because of the small  number of aircraft in the fleet—four in total. Having only four aircraft  means that delays currently experienced during depot maintenance and  installation of modifications have larger effects on the overall availability  of the fleet. One aircraft unavailable as it undergoes these actions results  in one quarter of the fleet being unavailable for operations.

Additionally, unscheduled maintenance could exacerbate the issue of  scheduling challenges and conflict with operational requirements. Having  a small fleet with some systems in maintenance could also impede the  force’s ability to surge if needed. The B-52 fleet has experienced a unique  challenge, because it has recently been used extensively in conventional operations. According to Air Force officials, it takes time to change a B-52  configuration from conventional to nuclear to ready the aircraft for a  nuclear mission, which may affect aircraft availability. According to  officials from the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for  Nuclear Matters, reduced availability also negatively affects readiness  through the reduction of training opportunities.

Security-clearance backlogs for the maintenance workforce are a  challenge with respect to certain nuclear weapon systems. Without at  least a secret security clearance, maintainers may be limited in the  activities they can perform on a nuclear system. For example, an Air  Force official explained that without a clearance maintainers are not only  limited in the activities they can perform on the B-2, but they cannot  complete some of the training they need. To mitigate this challenge, the  Air Force sometimes chooses to issue interim clearances. But in so doing  unit commanders must accept additional risk. Specifically, since  background investigations may not be complete at the time these interim  clearances are issued, it is possible that someone who has been issued  an interim clearance will ultimately be found ineligible for that security  clearance due to information discovered during their background  investigation. Similarly, there is a backlog of top secret clearances for  missile-wing personnel working with the Minuteman III, including  maintainers. Again, the services sometimes choose to issue interim  clearances, but leadership must accept that risk, and interim clearances  may have limitations. For example, according to officials from one of the  missile wings we spoke with, a missileer in that wing with an interim top  secret clearance can complete training for the Minuteman III but cannot  be certified to be on a two-person alert team. The 2014 nuclear  enterprise reviews included several recommendations to improve various  issues related to workforce, including the examples shown in table 4.

We have previously found that problems related to security-clearance  backlogs and the resulting delays in determining clearance eligibility and  issuing initial clearances can result in millions of dollars of additional costs  to the federal government. We have also found that the backlogs can  result in longer periods needed to complete national security–related  contracts and lost opportunity costs if prospective employees decide to  work elsewhere rather than wait to get a clearance. Further, we have  found that the backlogs can result in diminishing quality of the work  because industrial contractors may be performing government contracts  with personnel who have the necessary security clearances but are not  the most experienced and best-qualified personnel for the positions  involved. Additionally, we identified the personnel security-clearance  process as a high-risk area in March 2019 and we continue to monitor  progress addressing the weaknesses in this area.

The services have taken steps to ease the effect of parts availability  issues and obsolescence. For example, partly in response to nuclear  enterprise review recommendations, the Air Force has broadened the  definition of the Minuteman III weapon system—a process the Air Force  refers to as demarcation—and instituted programmed depot maintenance  for the weapon system. The Air Force’s demarcation effort centralized  parts funding and inventory management for all of the essential  components of the Minuteman III and integrated the entire weapon  system into a standard Air Force supply process. According to Air Force  officials, the Air Force is also working with the Defense Logistics Agency  to identify and catalog parts that previously had no identification numbers  associated with them. Officials said that programmed depot maintenance  is expected to result in a steady, predictive demand level for parts, which  will help the Air Force ensure that parts are available and incentivize  vendors to manufacture parts, including previously obsolete parts for  which there was no steady source of supply. Additionally, both of these  efforts are expected to reduce the likelihood that parts will be unavailable  when needed.

Navy officials explained that for the Ohio-class SSBN, when an industrial  base supplier is not able to meet the need for certain obsolete parts, the  Navy purchases enough parts to “stock the shelf” by including in one  contract enough quantities of the part to last for the life of the SSBNs.  Additionally, the Navy has developed programs such as the Trident  Planned Equipment Replacement Program, which has identified over 300  critical parts and has them manufactured and ready to be used for  replacement when SSBNs are undergoing planned maintenance.

The Defense Logistics Agency has increased its support to the nuclear  enterprise to help ensure that parts are available when they are needed.  In 2015, the Defense Logistics Agency established a Nuclear Support  Office from its headquarters staff to synchronize resources to ensure  responsive support to the DOD nuclear enterprise. According to Defense  Logistics Agency officials, the office has 13 people, three of whom are  embedded at U.S. Strategic Command, Air Force Space Command, and  Air Force Global Strike Command. In the Defense Logistics Agency’s  2018–2026 strategic plan, supporting the nuclear enterprise is the top  objective. According to Defense Logistics Agency officials, they also have  a series of new initiatives to increase materiel availability and accomplish  activities such as paying for the cost of reverse engineering to fill in voids  that exist in technical data for nuclear enterprise systems; working in  additive manufacturing to set the standard for 3D printing and polymers  across DOD and subsequently printing parts on demand; and identifying  weaknesses in the industrial base and focusing investments in those  areas. The focus of the material availability effort is presently to find out  how to help the services when they cannot find a part and to address it in  one of the initiatives.

The Air Force and Navy have taken steps to improve depot-level  maintenance across the nuclear enterprise. For example, the Air Force  introduced programmed depot maintenance for the Minuteman III weapon  system in 2014 and transformed ICBM weapon system sustainment  processes into a standardized, integrated planning and support model.  For the E-4B, according to E-4B program officials, the Air Force has  initiated incentivized programmed depot maintenance gates that provide  contractors additional financial incentive to complete increments of depot  maintenance, as well as the entire depot maintenance process, on time or  early. The E-4B program office is implementing this incentive structure in  an effort to decrease the E-4B’s time spent in depot maintenance.  Additionally, the Air Force has several initiatives under way to mitigate B- 2 sustainment and maintenance challenges, including increasing the  intervals between depot-level maintenance and merging modernization  and depot maintenance efforts so that the aircraft is down less and  available more. In addition, there are multiple ongoing initiatives to  improve the B-2’s supply chain, including using predictive analysis and  forecasting tools to help determine how many spare parts to keep in  stock.

To sustain the Ohio-class SSBN fleet, the Navy has conducted  engineered refueling overhauls on all SSBNs except for the USS  Wyoming and USS Louisiana, the last two SSBNs to enter service. This  major maintenance is intended to help sustain the Ohio-class SSBN fleet  until its service life reaches 42 years and it is replaced by the Columbia- class SSBN. These engineered refueling overhauls have taken longer  than originally anticipated. Navy officials attribute these delays to the  submarines requiring more maintenance work than expected as well as  some delays in acquiring parts.

Increased Tracking of Sustainment and Maintenance Issues

Over the past several years, DOD and the services have increased their  attention to and tracking of nuclear weapon systems maintenance and  sustainment issues. As we have previously found, DOD and the military  services have taken steps to improve oversight of the nuclear enterprise  in response to the 2014 reviews. For example, DOD has established or  participated in a number of oversight organizations that aid in the  management of the defense nuclear enterprise, including the NDERG,  which was established in 2014 by the Secretary of Defense to ensure the  long-term health of the nuclear enterprise by addressing issues identified  in the 2014 nuclear enterprise reviews, including sustainment and  maintenance-related issues.

The Air Force and Navy have also taken actions to improve oversight of  sustainment and maintenance. For example, the Air Force, through its  Nuclear Mission Assessment effort, uses independent analyses of various  data sources to recognize challenges within the Air Force nuclear  enterprise, including sustainment and maintenance problems.  Additionally, the Air Force implemented the Nuclear Weapon System  Enterprise Review, which was developed in 2016 by the Air Force  Nuclear Weapons Center with support from Air Force Materiel Command.  According to Air Force documentation, the review provided timely insight  into the comprehensive health of individual nuclear weapon systems and  provided an assessment of how well the enterprise is performing. Nuclear  weapon systems that were specifically reported on in the Nuclear  Weapon System Enterprise Review included ALCM, Minuteman III, and  NC3 systems. The Air Force modeled its Nuclear Weapon System  Enterprise Review in part on assessment and reporting already  completed for all aircraft, including the B-2 and B-52 bombers, through its  Weapon System Enterprise Review briefings. Weapon System Enterprise Review metrics are tailored to each weapon system and have  details on data such as cost, schedule, performance, and funding. These  data are compiled into a quarterly briefing report for Air Force major  commands and Air Force headquarters. According to Air Force officials,  information included in the Nuclear Weapon System Enterprise Review  was related to 10 recommendations from the 2014 nuclear enterprise  reviews and the 2015 NC3 report. Tracking this information helped the  Air Force to close out the recommendations assigned to Air Force  Materiel Command.

According to Air Force officials, as of July 2019 the Air Force had  discontinued the use of the Nuclear Weapon System Enterprise Review.  The officials said that Air Force Nuclear Weapons Center and Air Force  Global Strike Command are currently collaborating on a replacement  presentation focused on weapon system availability; however, this effort  is not finalized. The officials further stated that the Air Force has  transitioned to an Aircraft Availability Improvement Program construct  with an aircraft readiness focus and is working to establish an equivalent  for the nonflying weapon systems (i.e., Minuteman III and NC3).

The Navy oversees its leg of the nuclear triad using the Navy Nuclear  Deterrent Mission Oversight Council. The council is a senior Department  of the Navy forum that is responsible for coordinating the Navy’s nuclear  weapon activities (safety, security, reliability, and nuclear weapons  incident response), operations, personnel, policy, material support, and  oversight functions. According to Navy officials, the Navy Nuclear  Deterrent Mission Oversight Council addresses long-term issues affecting  the Navy’s nuclear enterprise and identifies and monitors risks associated  with those issues, including the actions taken in response to sustainment  and maintenance-related recommendations from the 2014 nuclear  enterprise reviews. According to Navy officials, the Navy has also  established an SSBN Sustainment Working Group and a Trident Planned  Equipment Replacement Program Working Group to address Ohio-class  sustainment and maintenance-related issues.

DOD and the military services have made progress in addressing the  recommendations from the 2014 nuclear enterprise reviews and the 2015  NC3 report. They have done so partially by establishing and improving a  number of processes to aid in the sustainment of defense nuclear  enterprise systems. The department is modifying the NDERG’s focus  from monitoring the status of the 2014 recommendations to monitoring  the long-term health of the enterprise. This shift in focus should position  the NDERG to better perform its oversight functions as the principal  integrated civilian–military governance body for the defense nuclear  enterprise. This is important because many of the recommendations that  remain open are focused on long-term sustainment of the enterprise or  are designed to be closed only after progress in addressing the issues  can be meaningfully evaluated. It is important that the department and the  military services continue to use the successful tools they have created to  monitor these efforts and leverage these tools (and the premises behind  them) as they create new mechanisms to maintain senior-leader visibility  of the defense nuclear enterprise. Providing current, complete, and  relevant information on the status of service and DOD component actions  to address recommendations and an understanding of metrics,  milestones, and risks will allow senior leadership to maintain oversight of  the department’s progress. In particular, such visibility will help senior  leaders maintain awareness of the progress of efforts to address past  failings, determine whether efforts are having the intended effects and  achieving the desired outcomes of addressing root problems, and achieve  the desired end states of a healthy defense nuclear enterprise. These  existing processes can help inform additional processes the department  develops to monitor the health of the nuclear enterprise. The collection  and assessment of information to maintain the currency and  completeness of information in existing tools may also allow the  department to identify potential emerging issues that may negatively  affect the vital programs, infrastructure, and personnel essential to the  maintenance of an effective nuclear deterrent.

We are making the following two recommendations to DOD:

The Secretary of Defense should ensure that the Director of CAPE, in  coordination with the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for  Nuclear Matters, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for  Nuclear and Missile Defense Policy, and the Joint Staff Deputy  Director for Strategic Stability, as co-chairs of the Nuclear Deterrent  Senior Oversight Group, update the applicable guidance for methods  of tracking and evaluating progress on implementation of the  recommendations from the 2014 nuclear enterprise reviews, requiring  DOD components to keep information—including any revised time  frames—current. (Recommendation 1)

The Secretary of Defense should ensure that the Under Secretary of  Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment updates the applicable  guidance for methods of tracking and evaluating progress on  implementation of the recommendations of the 2015 NC3 report,  requiring DOD components to keep information—including metrics for  measuring progress and outcomes as well as any revised time frames  that may extend out more than 1 year—complete and current.  (Recommendation 2)

We provided a draft of the classified report to DOD for review and  comment. The department’s comments on the classified report are  reprinted in appendix VII. In its comments, DOD concurred with both of  our recommendations. DOD also provided technical comments on the  classified report, which we incorporated as appropriate.

In concurring with our first recommendation, DOD stated that the Nuclear  Deterrent Senior Oversight Group co-chairs or, as necessary, the Deputy  Secretary of Defense as the chair of the NDERG, will update the  applicable guidance to ensure that time frames and other information  associated with planned actions are kept up to date.

In concurring with our second recommendation, DOD stated that the DOD  CIO and, as appropriate, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition  and Sustainment as the NC3 capability portfolio manager, will update the  applicable guidance to ensure that metrics, time frames, and other  information associated with planned actions are kept up to date and  complete.

We are encouraged that DOD is planning to take these actions to address  our two recommendations. We believe that providing current, complete,  and relevant information on the status of service and other DOD  component actions to address recommendations and an understanding of  metrics, milestones, and risks will allow senior leadership to maintain  oversight of the department’s progress. This may also allow DOD to  identify potential emerging issues that may negatively affect the vital  programs, infrastructure, and personnel essential to the maintenance of  an effective nuclear deterrent.

We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional  committees, and to the Secretary of Defense; the Under Secretary of  Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment; the Chairman of the Joint  Chiefs of Staff; the Secretaries of the Army, of the Navy, and of the Air  Force; the Commander, U.S. Strategic Command; the Department of  Defense Chief Information Officer; and the Director of the Office of Cost  Assessment and Program Evaluation. In addition, the report is available  at no charge on the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov.

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact  me at (202) 512-9971 or kirschbaumj@gao.gov. Contact points for our  Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on  the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this  report are listed in appendix VIII.

Appendix II: Challenges for the Sustainment and Maintenance of the Minuteman III through the End of Its Service Life

Minuteman III is a strategic intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM)  weapon system that represents one leg of the nation’s nuclear triad. First  deployed in 1970 with a planned service life of 10 years, the Minuteman  III weapon system consists of missiles as well as 450 launch facilities and  45 launch control centers. The Minuteman III service life was extended  since its deployment by various service-life extension programs. Launch  facilities are connected to underground launch control centers through a  system of hardened cables. A launch facility is an unmanned site that  houses the missile and all equipment required to maintain the missile in a  launch-ready configuration. These underground facilities have been  considered part of the Minuteman III weapon system since 2014. Missile  alert facilities are manned compounds that encompass the launch control  center, a launch control support building, and a launch control equipment  building. Missile alert facilities are crewed by security personnel, a cook, a  facilities manager, and a launch crew. Launch crews, consisting of two  officers, perform around-the-clock alert in the underground launch control  center. See figure 5 for components of the Minuteman III weapon system.

Nuclear command, control, and communications (NC3) systems and  related procedures ensure launch crews in the launch control centers can  receive and authenticate the President’s authorization for the use of  nuclear weapons. In the event that connectivity is lost between a launch  control center and an associated launch facility, other NC3 capabilities  are available to carry out the direction of the President. For example,  launch control centers aside from the one that lost connectivity can  communicate with that launch facility as well as numerous other launch  facilities. Further, an E-6B aircraft configured as an Airborne Command  Post can transmit a launch command to the ICBM force through the  Airborne Launch Control System capability.

Minuteman III has undergone many life extension sustainment efforts to  maintain its warfighting capabilities. The Air Force plans to sustain  Minuteman III through 2030—50 years past its initial planned service  life—and gradually draw down the weapon system before it is finally  retired in 2036, as it is replaced by the Ground Based Strategic Deterrent  ICBM weapon system. The Ground Based Strategic Deterrent has a  planned initial operating capability date of 2029 and is to be fully deployed  by 2036. Figure 6 provides a timeline of the expected service life of the  Minuteman III ICBM weapon system.

According to Air Force officials, Minuteman III is experiencing challenges  related to aging facilities, aging infrastructure, and parts obsolescence.  Aging facilities and infrastructure continue to affect the weapon system.  According to Air Force officials, most of the real property installed  equipment in use today is the original infrastructure that was fielded with  the Minuteman I weapon system in 1960, achieving operational capability  in 1962, and only slight modifications have been made over the years.  Additionally, challenges with critical subsystems also exist, and while  there are short-term mitigation strategies for each subsystem, there are  no long-term replacements planned for the Minuteman III weapon system  except by the fielding of its replacement program: the Ground Based  Strategic Deterrent. Examples of facilities and infrastructure challenges  include corrosion, water intrusion, collapsed conduits, misaligned doors,  and bulging walls.

According to Air Force officials, even attempting to replace small items  can be difficult, because multiple subsystems must be replaced to support  the modification. Diminishing manufacturing sources, material shortages,  and obsolescence issues are additional contributing factors, because they  cause difficulties in maintaining a credible supply chain for Minuteman III  parts. Additionally, officials said that depot maintenance, interim  maintenance, and organizational maintenance have all been affected by  parts obsolescence, diminishing manufacturing sources, and material  shortages, as has NC3 equipment.

The Minuteman III weapon system is facing continued asset attrition.  According to Air Force officials, as a result of the expected attrition of  current field assets, the Minuteman III weapon system will be unable to  meet full mission requirements after 2026 should full deployment be  required. The Air Force expends four Minuteman III ICBMs per year on  testing. According to the officials, continued asset attrition is also affecting  the Minuteman III retirement schedule.

Additionally, the Air Force Minuteman III program has experienced  personnel challenges. According to Air Force officials, the Air Force has a  backlog for top secret clearances for missile wing personnel, including  maintainers, and it can take up to 2 years of a missileer’s 5-year  commitment for a top secret clearance to come through. The officials told  us a missileer can complete training with an interim top secret clearance  but cannot be certified under the Personnel Reliability Program and  therefore cannot be assigned to a two-person alert team. This makes it a  challenge for missileers with interim clearances to keep up with their  peers. Additionally, since commanders cannot assign them to alert duty, it  puts additional burden on those missileers who are cleared to perform  more alert-duty assignments. According to Air Force officials, they have  also identified challenges associated with scheduling maintenance  activities, including the need to balance longer working days with the  additional risks that maintainers face as a result of these longer days.  Officials also said that as launch control centers, launch facilities, and  other elements of the Minuteman III weapon system are dispersed over  large areas that make up the missile fields, maintainers may need to  travel several hours from their base to arrive at the location of the  maintenance activity. These increased travel times have resulted in  extended workdays for maintainers and security forces or the need to split  maintenance jobs between two shifts, which results in decreasing the  number of personnel available to work at other locations.

Minuteman III Challenge- Mitigation Efforts

To mitigate challenges associated with the Minuteman III weapon  system—including limitations in the availability of parts—the Air Force has  broadened the definition of the Minuteman III weapon system, which is a  process the Air Force calls demarcation. It was broadened to include  some additional facilities related to the Minuteman III weapon system,  and programmed depot maintenance was instituted for it. According to Air  Force officials, demarcation centralized parts funding and inventory  management for all of the essential parts of the Minuteman III and  integrated the entire weapon system into the standard Air Force supply process. Additionally, according to the officials, the ICBM System  Directorate has established a Weapon System Supply Chain  Management office to oversee the commodity and organic support  required to meet the daily needs of the warfighter and to sustain  Minuteman Ill throughout Ground Based Strategic Deterrent deployment.  The officials said the Weapon System Supply Chain Management office  conducts predictive forecasting of the demand for parts through predictive  data analysis, which tracks the potential demand for parts as well as parts  supportability as an ongoing analysis process. Additionally, the Weapon  System Supply Chain Management office does this through an analysis  tool that draws on information from multiple supply databases to identify  rising request levels in maintenance data systems and mission-capable  conditions reported from the field. This tool uses data to identify parts that  will be needed.

Additionally, Air Force Global Strike Command conducted an end-to-end  review of Minuteman III weapon system maintenance to determine  whether ICBM maintenance organizations are organized, trained, and  equipped to meet the current and future needs of the weapon system.  The review noted that a questionable manpower standard, aging  resources and equipment, and organizational inefficiencies have reduced  the effectiveness of maintenance and the health of the Minuteman III.  Subject-matter experts from various Air Force organizations and the Navy  assessed maintenance and provided recommendations on methods,  training, resources (supply and equipment), infrastructure, manpower,  support, culture, and leadership. For example, the review observed that  parts and equipment availability challenges continue to affect the mission.  From this observation the review offered several recommendations,  including that the Air Force Nuclear Weapons Center set aside all parts  for weapon system testing so that they are available when the tests  occur, every 5 years. This is intended to ensure that the parts that are set  aside are not used at the missile wings. The review also recommended a  number of efforts to improve the management of maintenance schedules,  including increased coordination and planning of maintenance schedules  in advance. According to Air Force officials, this allows maintenance  commanders to make informed decisions, in advance, regarding when  longer working days are appropriate.

A number of service-life extension programs are under way to sustain the  Minuteman III until the Ground Based Strategic Deterrent arrives.  Additionally, ICBM programmed depot maintenance was introduced in  2014 and transformed processes for ICBM weapon system sustainment  into a standardized, integrated planning and support model that performs  maintenance to refurbish portions of the weapon system. According to Air  Force officials, the idea was to have the Minuteman III weapon system  undergoing depot maintenance in ways similar to the periodic depot  maintenance that aircraft undergo. However, the depot team would have  to conduct portions of the maintenance in the missile fields instead of  bringing the weapon system to a depot. This new programmed depot  maintenance takes individual Minuteman III launch facilities offline to  conduct major maintenance. Air Force Nuclear Weapons Center works  with the Defense Logistics Agency to procure parts as part of  programmed depot maintenance planning. According to Air Force  officials, the plan is to have 57 launch facilities go through the  programmed depot maintenance process each year, with a plan to  refurbish all launch facilities over an 8-year period. Additionally, the  current programmed depot maintenance efforts are implementing a  standard set of maintenance efforts across all facilities, but some  additional issues are also being addressed on a case-by-case basis.

To track the health of the Minuteman III, the Air Force Nuclear Weapon  Center assigns predictive health measures to the systems. These  predictive health measures estimate when there will be a specific  maintenance activity needed for each weapon system part―for example,  when a part will likely fail and need to be replaced—based on  assessments of historic data and engineering analysis. It emphasizes  ICBM sustainment through reliability-centered maintenance, which allows  for the continuous evaluation of system performance. Additionally, the  predictive health measures, based on data from Air Force maintenance  data-collection systems, are analyzed monthly for all launch facilities and  launch control centers across the three missile wings. According to Air  Force officials, predictive health measures enable the Air Force to identify  early indications of when systems may need additional maintenance as  well as to analyze health trends to identify issues―such as parts  failures―across all of the Minuteman III force. Additionally, the use of  predictive health measures and reliability-centered maintenance allows  the Air Force to better plan for when maintenance activities, and related  resources, will be needed to address issues prior to when they arise.

According to Air Force officials, Air Force Global Strike Command also  collects and reports on metrics monthly, based on Integrated  Maintenance Data System write-ups and predictive health metrics.  Officials told us that the Integrated Maintenance Data System is a difficult  system to learn and no formal training on the system is available. The  data quality in the Integrated Maintenance Data System is highly  dependent on the individual expertise of whoever enters it.

Appendix III: B-2 Bomber Faces Challenges Associated with Its Small Fleet Size and Parts Obsolescence Issues

The B-2 Spirit is a multirole, dual-capable heavy bomber. The B-2 is the  only U.S. aircraft that combines a long-range capability, a large payload,  and stealth into a single platform, giving it the ability to project air power  globally. The B-2 became operational in 1997, and the current B-2  operational fleet consists of a total of 20 aircraft. The 509th Bomb Wing,  located at Whiteman Air Force Base, Missouri, is the sole operational unit  for the B-2. The 509th Bomb Wing usually maintains 15 operationally  available B-2s. At any one time, there are two aircraft undergoing  sustainment and modernization upgrades, two in programmed depot  maintenance, and one designated as a test aircraft. The Air Force plans  to sustain the B-2 into the 2030s (see fig. 7). The B-2 will eventually be  replaced by the B-21, which will assume the penetrating strike role of the  B-2. The B-21 is expected to become operational in the mid-2020s, but  no replacement schedule for the B-2 has been identified.

The B-2 is undergoing multiple modernization programs, while  maintaining existing capabilities through form, fit, and function  replacements for components that are obsolete or no longer supportable.

B-2 modernization efforts are ongoing for communications, navigation,  defensive management, weapons, and the airframe.

Because the B-2 is aging and the fleet is small, parts obsolescence is a  challenge. A unique sustainment aspect of the B-2 is the focus on  managing its low-observable stealth capability. The B-2 Low Observable  Integrated Product Team manages the Low Observable Signature and  Supportability Modifications portfolio of projects, which is aimed at  maintaining the stealth capability of the B-2 by monitoring, maintaining,  and enhancing the radar cross section (or “signature”) of the aircraft. In  addition to specific efforts to sustain the low-observable stealth capability,  every other sustainment and modernization activity for the B-2 must be  assessed early in the planning stages for any effects on this capability.

According to Air Force officials, in addition to maintaining readiness for its  nuclear mission, the B-2 platform is also in high demand to support  conventional bomber missions. However, the Air Force has a limited  number of aircraft to meet this demand. Consequently, the Air Force’s B-2  Division, along with Air Force Global Strike Command and the 509th  Bomb Wing, must carefully manage the timing of maintenance activities,  aircraft modifications, programmed depot maintenance, assignment of a  flight test aircraft, and the flying-hour program. This requires an intricate  schedule of availability of aircraft for each effort, while trying to maintain  overall operational availability for the B-2 fleet. According to Air Force  officials, small-fleet dynamics have led to high costs, diminishing vendor  and parts availability, and readiness concerns.

Various initiatives are under way to improve the availability of B-2s. A  cumulative increase of one additional aircraft available for operations is  anticipated by fiscal year 2022. Several of these initiatives are directly  related to improving sustainment of the B-2 and maintenance processes  and procedures. Examples of sustainment and maintenance-related  initiatives include the following:

The B-2 Programmed Depot Maintenance Process Improvement  initiative is a collaborative effort between the B-2 program office and  Northrop Grumman to increase capacity during the depot  maintenance process in order to incorporate modifications during  depot maintenance. This initiative is expected to result in reduced  downtime at the 509th Bomb Wing by allowing modifications that  would normally occur at the wing―making an aircraft unavailable for  operations―to occur during planned depot maintenance.

The B-2 program office increased the interval between programmed  depot maintenance periods from 7 years to 9 years. The original B-2  programmed depot maintenance interval of 7 years was driven by the  expected life of low-observable coatings. According to B-2 program  officials, they have since determined that the expected life of these  coatings is 9 years.

Additionally, the Air Force’s B-2 Division established the B-2  Obsolescence Integrated Product Team in 2018 to address management  oversight of obsolescence. The team convenes monthly to develop a  strategic plan to enhance processes, communications, and consolidation  of obsolescence issues affecting B-2 modernization and sustainment. A  list of obsolete parts, currently totaling over 100, as well as planned  mitigation strategies, is consolidated and reviewed quarterly. The  integrated product team is also developing a Diminishing Manufacturing  and Materiel Shortages Management Plan to define the structure,  process, management, and oversight of obsolescence for the life cycle of  the B-2. Further, according to Air Force documentation, for each B-2  sustainment and modernization program, the government and prime  contractor establish a joint Obsolescence Working Group that is  responsible for reviewing the program’s strategy to mitigate diminishing  manufacturing and materiel shortages.

Appendix IV: B-52 Bomber Faces Maintenance Challenges through 2050

The B-52 Stratofortress is a dual-capable heavy bomber used to meet the  United States’ airborne strategic nuclear deterrence and global precision  attack mission and objectives. The B-52 began operations in 1952. Eight  models were produced, with a total production quantity of 742. The final  version of the B-52, the “H” model, was the last model produced and  became operational in 1961. The current B-52 operational fleet consists  of a total of 76 aircraft, 46 of which are designated as nuclear capable. B- 52 operational units consist of the 2nd Bomb Wing, located at Barksdale  Air Force Base, Louisiana, and the 5th Bomb Wing, located at Minot Air  Force Base, North Dakota. The B-52 originally had a planned service life  of approximately 20 years. However, the Air Force now plans to sustain  the B-52 until at least 2050 (see fig. 8). An eventual replacement for the  B-52 has not yet been identified.

The B-52 is undergoing several modernization programs planned for  completion in the 2020s. The B-52 Commercial Engine Replacement  Program will replace the aging TF33-PW-103 engine with new  commercial-off-the-shelf engines capable of meeting the needs of the B- 52 platform to keep the B-52 viable until 2050 and beyond. The engine  replacement program was scheduled to begin in fiscal year 2019 and to  be completed in fiscal year 2023. Additional modernization programs  include installation of a Global Positioning System Interface Unit and a  radar modernization program.

According to B-52 maintainers, the biggest maintenance limitation they  are experiencing is with the engine. In 2017, an engine fan disk failure on  one of eight engines on a B-52 caused the engine to detach from the  aircraft while in flight. The Air Force has identified the resulting fan disk  inspection and replacement as a serious risk due to the time it will take to  complete and expects the inspection, removal, and replacement to have  an effect on the fleet into the 2020s. Further, the current TF33 engines  are unsupportable beyond 2030. According to Air Force officials, the  engine replacement program is expected to negatively affect aircraft  availability rates until it is completed in 2023. Air Force officials also  expressed concern that, because the new commercial engines have  many digital components, their installation could increase the B-52’s  cybersecurity risk.

At 60 years old, the B-52 is experiencing structural issues typical of aging  aircraft. The extension of the B-52’s service life into the 2050s likely  imposes additional unforeseen sustainment and modernization  challenges. The aging airframe has required increased depot-level  maintenance to correct, for example, problems related to stress corrosion  and cracking on the airframe. Further, industry is no longer able to  support these aging systems, and the systems have experienced  declining performance and system failure. According to Air Force officials,  it is difficult to maintain suppliers who will produce the necessary parts for  such an old airframe.

According to officials at both B-52 wings, a security-clearance backlog  limits the number of trained and available B-52 maintainers. Both B-52  wings also have shortages of experienced maintainers. Additionally, the  demands of the B-52’s conventional mission create challenges to  ensuring that they are available for their nuclear mission. The B-52 has  been used in operations against the Islamic State in Syria. According to  officials at both B-52 wings, the conventional mission is the day-to-day  focus of most B-52 operators and maintainers. These officials said that it  is sometimes challenging to shift their collective mindset to focus on the  nuclear mission. Further, the B-52 requires different configurations for its  conventional and nuclear missions. According to B-52 maintenance  officials, the time it takes to change the configurations affects how quickly  the aircraft can be ready for a nuclear mission. An official from one B-52  operations group expressed concern that if the B-52 continues to be used  heavily in conventional operations, it will begin to experience airframe and  personnel problems similar to those that have affected the B-1, which has  been used extensively in recent conventional bombing operations.

The B-52 engine replacement program is expected to allow the engines  to be sustained until the 2050s, when the B-52 is expected to retire. In  addition, the modern engines being installed will increase the B-52’s  range by approximately 30 percent, significantly decrease maintenance  costs and downtime, provide the additional electrical power required for  follow-on systems, and decrease the B-52’s dependency on refueling  tankers for both conventional and nuclear long-range strike sorties  because it will be able to fly longer without being refueled.

The B-52 program office is leading a B-52 Aircraft Availability  Improvement Plan, which is an enterprise-wide effort to increase the  number of B-52s available to operational units. According to officials, the  program office is leading an initiative to reduce the number of aircraft that  are at the depot at any given time from 11 to 9. This would increase the  availability of aircraft to meet operational requirements. This effort is in  the early implementation stages, and the program office has not yet  evaluated the results.

The B-52 program office mitigates parts obsolescence issues through  active vendor management, selection of vendors who use an open  systems approach, use of predictive database tools to identify  diminishing manufacturing and materiel shortages, and leveraging  industry and government reporting systems that track diminishing  manufacturing and materiel shortages.

Appendix V: Air-Launched Cruise Missile Is Experiencing Sustainment Challenges as a Result of Age and Attrition

Air-Launched Cruise Missile (ALCM) Overview

The AGM-86B ALCM is a long-range self-guided missile with a nuclear  warhead that is carried by the B-52H Stratofortress bomber. ALCM  complements the B-52 heavy bomber in its strategic mission; its primary  missions are strategic attack, interdiction, and suppression of enemy air  defenses. It is designed to be carried on the internal B-52 common  strategic rotary launcher or externally on pylons located underneath each  wing (see fig. 9). The ALCM air vehicle is powered by a low-thrust  turbofan engine and flies at subsonic speeds. After release from the  carrier aircraft, the ALCM proceeds autonomously to its target.

ALCM became operational in 1982 and, according to Air Force officials,  had an original planned service life of 10 years; it is on average 25 years beyond its planned service life (see fig. 10). Additionally, ALCM has  experienced aging issues with multiple subsystems. For example, the  officials told us the Bomber Weapons Integration Equipment, pylons,  launcher, common support equipment, ALCM-peculiar support  equipment, and automated test equipment all have aging and  supportability issues that require assessment and actions that must be  taken going forward. Air Force officials stated that because of ALCM’s  age, diminishing manufacturing sources and material shortage issues  occasionally arise that have required requalification of a product line or  qualifying a new source. Additionally, they said that ALCM maintenance  and analysis trends have highlighted that electrical components and  bearings are wearing out.

According to Air Force officials, the ALCM fleet, made up of  approximately 535 missiles in active inventory as of May 2019, is affected  by attrition resulting from testing. The ALCM is operationally tested with  six force development evaluations and two functional ground tests each  year. According to Air Force officials, the testing employs ALCM fleet  inventory missiles that are consumed during live launch and destructive  testing, thereby reducing the fleet by eight missiles per year. The officials  noted that the fleet would be sustainable longer if the decision was made  to stop testing. However, this would mean that fewer data—collected  during the annual tests—would be available to predict the life of the  missile, and the Air Force would lose full confidence that it could execute  ALCM’s mission.

According to Air Force officials, the ALCM will be sustained through 2030.  Service-life extension programs have been implemented to sustain the  weapon system, and maintenance is performed every 6 years to  exchange the missile’s engine. In order to extend the ALCM’s service life  until a replacement system is fielded, service-life extension programs  were developed through surveillance, studies, and analysis programs that  identified numerous components for replacement as a result of aging and  obsolescence issues. Officials said these programs address replacement  of aged brittle components, bearings, and circuitry and electronic  components within navigation and guidance systems. According to Air  Force officials, maintainers are being proactive in identifying parts on the  ALCM system that will experience issues in the future. Additionally,  continued monitoring through flight tests and aging surveillance programs  will enable them to identify new aging issues, which may drive additional  service-life extension efforts. To mitigate challenges that arise, there is  ongoing coordination between the ALCM and Long-Range Stand Off  program offices to develop plans to retire ALCMs as Long-Range Stand  Off production is executed through full operational capability and  complete deployment.

To mitigate challenges with support equipment, supportability trades are  being conducted for the launcher and pylon service-life extension, and a  gap analysis is being conducted to identify components, processes, and  procedures that need to be modified to ensure service life through 2030.  According to Air Force officials, maintainers are looking for ways to be  proactive in maintaining support equipment and identifying future issues  before parts break, as they are doing for the missile itself. Through the  Automatic Test Systems program office, the Electronic System Test Set is  also encountering aging and supportability issues that are being  addressed through multiyear technical insertion projects. Additionally,  predicting new effects of aging on service life grows increasingly  challenging as 2030 approaches.

Appendix VI: The Navy Plans to Sustain the Ohio-Class Ballistic Missile Submarine until It Is Replaced by the Columbia-Class

Ohio-Class Ballistic Missile Submarine (SSBN) Overview

The Ohio-class SSBNs constitute the sea-based leg of the strategic triad.  Each SSBN is capable of carrying and launching 20 D-5 Trident  submarine-launched ballistic missiles, which can deliver multiple nuclear  warheads. The first Ohio-class SSBN, the USS Ohio, entered service in  1981. The last Ohio-class SSBN, the USS Louisiana, entered service in  1997. The Navy maintains a fleet of 14 Ohio-class SSBNs. Eight of the  SSBNs are deployed in the Pacific Ocean, homeported in Bangor,  Washington, and six are deployed in the Atlantic, homeported in Kings  Bay, Georgia. According to a DOD Inspector General report, in a 1998  memorandum from the Commander of the Naval Sea Systems Command  to the Chief of Naval Operations, the Navy documented its decision to  extend the original 30-year service life of the Ohio-class SSBNs to 42  years. The report noted that this decision was supported by a Navy- directed study led by the manufacturer of the Ohio-class, General  Dynamics Electric Boat Division, which determined that extending the  service life of the Ohio-class SSBNs to 42 years was technically feasible.  Subsequently, in a 2017 memorandum from the Commander of the Naval  Sea Systems Command to the Program Executive Office for Submarines,  the Commander stated that extensions beyond 2042 were not technically  feasible. However, Navy officials said that they are beginning to consider  options in case the replacement program, the Columbia-class SSBN, is  delayed. As we previously reported, Navy officials noted that the service  has never operated a nuclear-powered submarine for as long as 42  years.

The Navy plans to replace the 14 Ohio-class SSBNs with 12 Columbia- class SSBNs. The first of the Ohio-class SSBNs is scheduled to be retired  from active service in 2027. The remaining Ohio-class SSBNs will be  retired at a rate of one per year, with the last one exiting service in 2040  (see fig. 11). According to Navy officials, they do not have a contingency  plan in case the Columbia-class SSBN acquisition dates are delayed.

However, they said that the fact that 14 Ohio-class SSBNs are being  replaced by 12 Columbia-class SSBNs provides some extra time for  replacement in case Columbia is delayed. Specifically, there will be an  estimated 2 years between when the last Columbia-class SSBN is  delivered and the last Ohio-class SSBN is retired. Navy officials also said  that they are trying to gather the necessary data to lay the ground work  now to be able to make engineering decisions in 10 years about the  feasibility of sustaining the Ohio-class SSBNs in the event that the  Columbia-class is delayed.

The Navy is experiencing challenges in sustaining the Ohio-class SSBN  through its planned 42-year service life. According to Navy officials, since  the Ohio will be in service longer than expected, the Navy is encountering  parts that need replacement that were not originally intended to be  replaced. There is no industrial base of suppliers to support the  replacement of some of these parts. In addition, the overall amount of  maintenance required for the SSBNs increases as they age. According to  Navy officials, both of these issues contribute to diminishing  manufacturing sources and material shortages for the Ohio-class SSBNs.  According to May 2019 congressional testimony by the Director of the  Navy’s Strategic Systems Programs, the D-5 Trident submarine-launched  ballistic missile has also been deployed for longer than its original  planned service life. Specifically, it has been deployed for over 25 years,  and the Navy now plans to operate the D-5 for over 50 years total. It has  undergone service-life extension programs and is operating on new  rocket motors. However, according to the Director’s testimony, this will be  more than double the historical service life of any previous sea-based  strategic deterrent system.

Engineered refueling overhauls—major maintenance periods that occur  once during an SSBN’s life—have been completed for all except the last  two Ohio-class SSBNs to enter service, the USS Wyoming and the USS  Louisiana. The USS Wyoming is currently undergoing its overhaul and is  scheduled to complete it in July 2020. The USS Louisiana was scheduled  to begin its overhaul in September 2019 and complete it in April 2022.  According to Navy officials, in the past SSBNs completing refueling  overhauls have cannibalized parts from SSBNs that are beginning to be  overhauled. The final Ohio-class SSBN to undergo an overhaul, the USS  Louisiana, will not have that option, because there will be no other SSBNs  from which to cannibalize parts. However, these officials noted that they  have not encountered any insurmountable issues thus far in planning the  Louisiana’s overhaul.

The DOD Inspector General reported in June 2018 that the Navy did not  have a contingency plan in the event that the Columbia-class is delivered  late. The Navy has identified a number of efforts under way to ensure  that it reduces risks in both the maintenance of the current Ohio-class  SSBN and the acquisition schedule of the Columbia-class SSBN.  However, as we reported in December 2017 and again in March 2019,  the Columbia-class program is facing more risks than its predecessors  from its aggressive and concurrent schedule as a result of the continued  and pressing need for it to meet the Navy nuclear deterrent requirements.  The first Ohio-class SSBN is scheduled to be retired in 2027, and another  is to follow each year until 2040. The first Columbia-class SSBN is  scheduled to enter service in fiscal year 2031, and another is to follow  each year thereafter.

We have previously reported that the Navy also plans to increase  investment in its SSBN maintenance facilities, equipment, and workforce  to improve the execution of SSBN maintenance. According to Navy  officials, they have several strategies to combat diminishing  manufacturing sources and material shortages. For example, the Ohio  program office has made “life of type” purchases for some parts for which  the industrial base cannot meet the demand. In other words, according to  program officials, the program office purchases in one contract enough of  that part to last for the entire life of the SSBN—a large enough order to  make it worth the time and cost for a manufacturer to produce the parts.  According to the officials, another solution is to retrofit the pieces being  used to build the Columbia-class SSBNs to support the needs for the  Ohio-class SSBNs. For example, the Navigation Process Unit was  retrofitted from the Columbia to use on the Ohio. This allows the Navy to  purchase these components from manufacturers who will already be  making them for the Columbia.

The Navy has initiated major modernizations on a number of systems on  the Ohio to upgrade those systems with new capabilities. According to  Navy officials, modernization efforts are being planned for navigation,  radio, and electronic communications systems, among others. The Navy  has also initiated a program to refurbish and extend the service lives of D- 5 Trident submarine-launched ballistic missiles to about 2040. As  Columbia-class SSBNs begin to replace Ohio-class SSBNs, refurbished  D-5s carried by retiring Ohio-class SSBNs will be transferred to new  Columbia-class SSBNs. Columbia-class SSBNs will continue to be armed  with these refurbished D-5s until about 2040, at which time the D-5s are  to be replaced by a successor submarine-launched ballistic missile.  According to Navy officials, maintaining one strategic weapon system  configuration during the transition to Columbia is beneficial from a cost,  performance, and risk-reduction standpoint.

In 2018, the DOD Office of Inspector General reported that the Secretary  of the Navy and the Chief of Naval Operations have formally designated  strategic nuclear deterrence as the Navy’s top priority. According to the  report, as a result, the Navy has reduced the time required for engineered  refueling overhauls of SSBNs, increased workforce size at shipyards,  accelerated and improved shipyard workforce training, and improved  SSBN maintenance procedures and schedules. However, while the Navy  was able to reduce the time required for its last two engineered refueling  overhauls, it has not hit the target of 27 months since 2010. In addition,  according to officials the Navy has created two working groups—the  SSBN/Guided Missile Nuclear Submarine Working Group and the Trident  Coordination Group—to monitor and mitigate Ohio-class sustainment and  maintenance challenges.

Appendix VII: Comments from the Department of Defense

Appendix VIII: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

Joseph W. Kirschbaum, (202) 512-9971 or kirschbaumj@gao.gov  In addition to the contact named above, key contributors to this report  were Penney Harwell Caramia, Assistant Director; R. Scott Fletcher;  Jonathan Gill; Susannah Hawthorne; Brent Helt; Joanne Landesman;  Amie Lesser; K. Ryan Lester; Ned Malone; Gabrielle Matuzsan; and  Michael Shaughnessy.

Nuclear Weapons Sustainment: Fiscal Year 2018 Nuclear Forces Budget  Estimates. GAO-19-127R. Washington, D.C.: November 2, 2018.

Defense Nuclear Enterprise: DOD Continues to Address Challenges but  Needs to Better Define Roles and Responsibilities and Approaches to  Collaboration. GAO-19-29. Washington, D.C.: November 1, 2018.

Defense Nuclear Enterprise: Processes to Monitor Progress on  Implementing Recommendations and Managing Risks Could Be  Improved. GAO-18-144. Washington, D.C.: October 5, 2017.

Nuclear Weapons: DOD Assessed the Need for Each Leg of the Strategic  Triad and Considered Other Reductions to Nuclear Force.   GAO-16-740. Washington, D.C.: September 22, 2016.

Defense Nuclear Enterprise: DOD Has Established Processes for  Implementing and Tracking Recommendations to Improve Leadership,  Morale, and Operations. GAO-16-597R. Washington, D.C.: July 14, 2016.

Nuclear Weapons Council: Enhancing Interagency Collaboration Could  Help with Implementation of Expanded Responsibilities.   GAO-15-446. Washington, D.C.: May 21, 2015.

DOD conducted several reviews of its nuclear forces. We looked at DOD’s progress in implementing recommendations from those reviews. We found that DOD has implemented some recommendations but doesn’t keep information on its progress current and complete, e.g., expected completion dates aren’t updated for items that are behind schedule.

We made recommendations to help DOD better track its progress on implementing recommendations.

In addition, DOD and the military services are struggling to sustain and maintain aging nuclear weapon systems, e.g., some submarine parts that were never intended to be replaced have failed.