Missile Defense: Lessons Learned From Acquisition Efforts

For over half a century, the Department of Defense has funded efforts to defend the United States from ballistic missile attacks. From 2002 to 2020, MDA has received about $174 billion to develop the BMDS and has requested about $9.2 billion for fiscal year 2021. The BMDS consists of diverse and highly complex land-, sea-, and space-based systems and assets located across the globe.

This statement summarizes lessons that GAO has identified from its prior reviews of MDA starting in 2004 that can be applied to strengthen the transparency and acquisition practices for developing and fielding missile defense elements. Specifically, this testimony provides information on (1) steps MDA has taken to increase transparency and reduce acquisition risks; and (2) ongoing challenges associated with improving transparency and reducing high risk acquisition practices. In our prior work, GAO reviewed key MDA management documents including annual program reviews, tests plans and budget documents. We also interviewed officials from MDA and from other key DOD offices.

The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) has taken important steps in recent years to improve management practices, reduce acquisition risks, and deliver capabilities to defend the United States and its allies from ballistic missile attacks. Specifically, MDA has made advances across a broad range of management activities, such as improving stakeholder outreach, reducing concurrency, (broadly defined as the overlap between product development, testing, and production), improving testing of the Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) and increasing transparency of its progress. MDA has also made progress toward improving homeland and regional defense.

However, MDA can go further to align itself with best practices as it faces ongoing challenges associated with improving transparency and reducing high risk acquisition practices. These challenges include:

Stakeholder involvement: MDA has improved its outreach to stakeholders, including the intelligence community and other DOD stakeholders, however, opportunities remain, such as obtaining more input from the defense intelligence community. While MDA is not required to do so, the community is uniquely positioned to help keep pace with emerging threats and validate threat models.

Concurrency: MDA has taken steps to reduce concurrency, but falls back on this practice when experiencing developmental delays or schedule pressures. The recently canceled Redesigned Kill Vehicle (RKV) initially aligned production decisions with flight testing. However, in response to advancements from North Korea, development and production were performed concurrently and flight testing was reduced, thereby removing the safeguards that had been put into place.

Flight test schedule changes: Despite initiating a new approach to developing its flight test schedule in 2009, MDA continues to struggle with execution. Namely, MDA is frequently revising its annual schedule by adding new tests, and deleting or delaying others—sometimes multiple times.

Transparency of test cost estimates: MDA regularly makes changes to its test schedule without reporting the impact to its costs and funding needs. We continue to believe that breaking out funding requests by test will improve transparency into planned versus actual test costs and aid departmental and congressional decision makers as they make difficult choices of where to invest limited resources.

MDA is at a pivotal crossroads, needing to balance its ability to pursue new and advanced efforts while also maintaining its existing portfolio. Congress and the Secretary of Defense are undertaking multiple reviews to determine how to address these concerns and chart a path forward for MDA.

GAO is not making any new recommendations in this statement. GAO has previously recommended that MDA take steps to increase transparency and align its acquisition approach to reduce high-risk practices. MDA concurred with certain recommendations and is taking steps to implement them.

I am pleased to be here today to discuss the Missile Defense Agency’s  (MDA) progress in developing and fielding missile defense elements, as  well as ongoing challenges that the agency faces. MDA’s mission is to  develop an integrated and layered Ballistic Missile Defense System  (BMDS) to defend the United States, its deployed forces, allies and  friends from ballistic and hypersonic missile attacks. In order to meet this  mission, MDA is developing a highly complex system that includes land-,  sea-, and space-based systems and assets located across the globe.  MDA has received approximately $174 billion from fiscal years 2002  through 2020 and is requesting an additional $9.2 billion for fiscal year  2021 to continue its efforts.

Since the fiscal year 2002 National Defense Authorization Act was  enacted, we have been mandated to prepare annual assessments of  MDA’s progress towards its acquisition goals and objectives. Since our  first report in 2003, we have reported on MDA’s progress and challenges  in acquiring and fielding BMDS capabilities. In general, we have reported  that MDA has developed, demonstrated, and fielded a limited homeland  and regional ballistic missile defense capability, but MDA has fallen short  of its goals, in part, because of high-risk acquisition practices. These  include initiating new programs without robustly assessing alternative  solutions, incorporating high levels of concurrency, and fielding  capabilities prior to completing flight testing. These practices enabled  MDA to quickly ramp up efforts in order to meet tight, presidentially  directed deadlines, but they also resulted in problems that caused some  programs to be canceled or significantly disrupted. In recent reports, we  have also identified contracting challenges; challenges in working with  warfighters and stakeholders, such as the intelligence community; and  challenges associated with testing, such as optimistic planning. We have  also reported on MDA’s need for more reliable models and simulations,  which play an integral role in validating performance.

MDA has made efforts to put newer programs on a more sound footing  and it has taken some actions to address acquisition issues, including  adopting acquisition best practices in some cases. However, MDA is not  always able to sustain its use of these best practices.

Today, I will highlight (1) steps MDA has taken to increase transparency,  reduce acquisition risks, and deliver capability; and (2) ongoing  challenges associated with improving transparency and reducing high-risk  acquisition practices. My testimony is based on reports we issued from  April 2003 to December 2019 and on preliminary observations for our  ongoing work covering fiscal year 2019. For our previous work, we  reviewed MDA management documents including their reported  baselines and test schedules. We compared these plans against MDA’s  actual delivery and testing achievements recorded in agency documents  and through interviews with agency officials and relevant officials in the  Department of Defense. More detailed information on our objectives,  scope, and methodology can be found in those reports. For our ongoing  work covering fiscal year 2019, we reviewed MDA’s planned delivery and  testing goals for fiscal year 2019. We also discussed the agency’s plans  and performance in interviews with agency officials and the BMDS  Operational Test Agency. In addition, we met with officials from the office  of the Undersecretaries of Defense for Research and Engineering and  Acquisitions and Sustainment.

We conducted the work on which this statement is based in accordance  with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards  require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate  evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions  based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on  our audit objectives.

MDA is responsible for developing a number of systems, known as  elements, with the purpose of defending against ballistic and hypersonic  missile attacks. MDA’s mission is to combine these elements into an  integrated system-of-systems known as the Ballistic Missile Defense  System (BMDS). The goal of the BMDS is to combine the abilities of two  or more elements to achieve objectives that would not have been  possible for any individual element. These emergent abilities are known  as integrated capabilities or BMDS level capabilities. Table 1 provides a  brief description of selected BMDS elements.

MDA was established in 2002 with exceptional flexibilities to manage the  acquisition of the BMDS—developed as a single program—that allow  MDA to expedite the fielding of assets and integrated ballistic missile  defense capabilities. These flexibilities allow MDA to diverge from DOD’s  traditional acquisition life cycle and defer the application of certain  acquisition policies and laws designed to facilitate oversight and  accountability until a mature capability is ready to be handed over to a  military service for production and operation.

In addition, MDA has been operating in an environment of tight  timeframes for delivering capabilities—beginning with a presidential  directive in 2002 to field a limited capability by 2004. This was followed by  a presidential announcement in 2009 to begin deploying U.S. missile  defense in Europe in 2011 finishing in 2020. This schedule required  concurrency among technology, testing and other development activities.  More recently, MDA has been directed to develop and deploy defenses  against hypersonic and cruise missile threats as soon as technologically  able. These schedule pressures compound challenges associated with  complex technology, design, and integration associated with the missile  defense mission that normally require careful planning, disciplined  engineering practices, extensive coordination, and effective management  and oversight to be successful.

MDA Has Taken Steps to Improve Management Practices, Reduce Acquisition Risks, and Deliver Capability

MDA has taken important actions to increase transparency, reduce high- risk approaches in its management of BMDS elements, and test and  deliver BMDS capability. Specifically, MDA has improved reporting in its  annual progress reports to the Congress and made advances across a  broad range of management activities, including the involvement of  stakeholders, reducing concurrency, and continued efforts to improve key  aspects of testing necessary to demonstrate delivered capability.

Increased Transparency: MDA, consistent with several of our  recommendations has increased the ability to track progress over time  in the BMDS Accountability Report (BAR). This is MDA’s annual  report that presents the current estimate of the BMDS programs’  baselines. To increase insight into MDA’s management of the BMDS,  MDA implemented significant changes to its key acquisition processes  and for the first time developed and reported detailed baselines for  each element in the BAR in 2010. As we found in March 2011, MDA’s  prior approach limited the ability for DOD and congressional decision  makers to measure MDA’s progress on cost, schedule, and testing.  While MDA’s changes were positive, over the years, we made  additional recommendations to further improve MDA’s reporting. In  response to our recommendations, MDA made improvements to the  BAR that include providing details on variances to its test plan from  year to year and including information on its use of contract actions  known as an Undefinitized Contract Actions (UCA) and Unpriced  Change Orders (UCO).

Improved Stakeholder Outreach: MDA has increased its outreach to  DOD stakeholders over the past few years. Our prior work on defense  acquisitions has shown that establishing buy-in from decision makers  is a key factor in achieving better acquisition outcomes because DOD  components provide varying perspectives due to their unique areas of  expertise and experience. For example, as we reported in December  2019, MDA has recently increased its interaction with the defense  intelligence community. Specifically, MDA engaged the defense  intelligence community on an analysis of alternatives the agency  completed in February 2017 that assessed future sensor options for  the BMDS. In addition, MDA reached out to the defense intelligence  community on another analysis of alternatives pertaining to defense  against hypersonic missiles. In fact, officials from several DOD  organizations we met with over the past two years observed that  MDA’s engagement with their organizations was improving.

Reducing Concurrency: MDA continues to take steps to reduce  concurrency, an issue we have reported on for many years.  Concurrency is broadly defined as the overlap of development,  testing, and production; coupled with an aggressive testing schedule.  MDA’s concurrent development has often left the agency committing  to production and fielding before development is complete. This  approach has resulted in performance shortfalls, cost increases, and  schedule delays. MDA has taken steps to mitigate this risk consistent  with our recommendations. For example, as we found in May 2017,  MDA took steps to reduce concurrency in the Aegis BMD SM-3 Block  IB by adding in tests and delaying the full-rate production decision  until the tests were completed. Figure 1 represents a highly  concurrent acquisition schedule as compared to an approach based  on gaining knowledge before proceeding to the next acquisition  phase.

Improving BMDS Testing: MDA has improved the accuracy of tools it  uses to assess integrated BMDS capabilities. The BMDS is a system  of systems that cannot be completely assessed using intercept flight  tests because of the system’s scope and complexity, and because of  safety constraints. Consequently, MDA, independent DOD testing  organizations, and the warfighter must rely heavily on representations  of the integrated BMDS called models and simulations in ground  testing. This approach is used, rather than live tests, to test the  operational performance of the whole BMDS against attacks with  more threats represented. Our preliminary observations for fiscal year  2019 are that the number of accredited models and simulations that  are needed to assess the integrated performance of the BMDS has  steadily risen over the last 3 years.

Over the past several years, we have reported on MDA’s progress in  delivering assets and capabilities to counter attacks as well as cyber  threats. MDA delivered important BMDS capabilities for architectures in  the United States as well as those defending U.S. troops and allies in  Europe, the Middle East, and the Eastern Pacific. For example:

Homeland Defense: In fiscal year 2017 and 2018, MDA delivered a  significant integrated capability for defending the United States,  including improvements in the ability to discriminate lethal objects in  targets, and increased capacity. This was a key achievement in  fulfilling a directive from the Secretary of Defense to increase  inventory of ground-based interceptors by the end of 2017.

Regional BMD: In fiscal year 2016, MDA delivered capabilities for the  second phase of its effort in Europe, called European Phased  Adaptive Approach (EPAA). This effort required coordinated  development of a number of elements and their integration to provide  integrated BMDS-level integrated capabilities against short and  medium range ballistic missiles. More recently, in fiscal years 2018  and 2019, MDA rapidly delivered capabilities for its effort to meet an  urgent regional need.

In addition, preliminary observations from our review covering fiscal year  2019 indicate that cybersecurity assessments in fiscal year 2019 informed  the network defense posture in U.S. Northern Command and provided  data on how to reduce mission risk for these elements operating in a  cyber-contested environment. Moreover, the agency is incorporating  lessons learned from prior cyber activities, and continues to address  issues discovered in prior testing, improving its overall cybersecurity  survivability. However, our preliminary observations indicate much  remains to be done to ensure cyber resiliency of the BMDS including the  completion of cybersecurity testing for capabilities delivered in 2017 and  2018, along with conducting element-level operational cooperative and  adversarial assessments.

MDA Faces Ongoing Challenges to Improve Transparency and Reduce High-Risk Acquisition Practices

MDA has made efforts to put some programs on a more sound footing  and it has taken actions to address the issues I just mentioned. However,  MDA can go further to align itself with best practices for acquisitions.  Today, I will highlight certain acquisition challenges MDA still faces.

Stakeholder involvement: While MDA has increased its outreach to  the stakeholders over the past few years, opportunities remain for  further engagement on key decisions. For instance, as we found in  December 2019, although MDA has been increasing its engagement  with the intelligence community, MDA provides the defense  intelligence community with limited insight into how the agency uses  threat assessments to inform its acquisition decisions. MDA is not  required to obtain the defense intelligence community’s input;  however, the community is uniquely positioned to assist MDA keep  pace with rapidly emerging threats. Moreover, this limited insight has,  in part, prevented validation of threat models designed to assess  BMDS capabilities. Without validation, any flaws or bias in the threat  models may go undetected, which can have significant implications  for the performance of MDA’s weapon systems. MDA and the defense  intelligence community recently began discussing a more suitable  level of involvement in the agency’s acquisition processes and  decisions. As we recommended in May 2017 and December 2019,  MDA also needs to strengthen its collaboration with other  stakeholders, including the warfighting community and independent  cost and technical experts. In the early stages of the RKV program,  concerns raised about the design—which ultimately was a key reason  for the cancellation of the RKV—went unheeded. For example,  preliminary observations for our assessment covering fiscal year 2019  showed that MDA and contractors did not adequately address  technical risks despite numerous warnings from stakeholders about  the performance issues. However, MDA officials indicate they are  working with stakeholders more closely as they plan for the Next  Generation Interceptor, a new more advanced interceptor.

Concurrency: Although MDA has taken steps to reduce concurrency  as we have previously recommended, the agency still turns to this  practice when experiencing developmental delays or schedule  pressures. For example, we reported in June 2019 that delays to  construction resulted in MDA’s introduction of increasing levels of  concurrency into the delivery schedule for the Aegis Ashore site in  Poland. We found that key phases of the delivery process had been  shortened from 16.5 months to 6.5 months. While overlapping  acquisition activity, in theory, could speed up the construction  process, this risky practice ultimately failed to mitigate the effects of  problematic construction practices. However, program plans indicate  that the site has experienced further delays and will not be ready for  operational use until at least 2022—a 4 year delay from the original  2018 delivery date. In addition, the recently canceled Redesigned Kill  Vehicle (RKV) program originally sought to avoid concurrency by  aligning production decisions with flight testing. However, later—in  response to the advancement of the North Korean missile threat—the  program accelerated RKV development by concurrently performing  development and production and reducing the number of necessary  flight tests. This acceleration altered the schedule for the previously  aligned flight tests and production decisions.

Contracting: Although MDA has flexibilities in managing its acquisition  process, it must follow the same contracting regulations that apply to  DOD, including the Federal Acquisition Regulation and the  Department of Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement.  These regulations allow MDA to use a particular type of contract  action called an undefinitized contract action when the negotiation of a  definitive contract is not possible in sufficient time to meet the  government’s requirements and government interests demand that  the contractor be given a binding commitment so that contract  performance can begin immediately. These actions authorize  contractors to begin work before an agreement on terms,  specifications, or price have been agreed upon. In May 2018, we  found that the average length of the undefinitized period and the not- to-exceed price of MDA’s undefinitized contract actions had increased  over the past 5 years. While MDA policy permits use of undefinitized  contracts on a limited basis, we and others have found that they can  place unnecessary cost risks on the government. As we reported in  June 2019, while MDA improved its performance in timely  definitization of these contract actions, the total not-to-exceed value of  the undefinitized contract actions MDA initiated in 2018 far exceeded  previous years we reviewed.

Transparency in test cost estimates: As we reported in May 2017,  MDA requests more than $1 billion in funding each fiscal year for the  tests outlined in its integrated test schedule based on MDA’s internally  developed test cost estimates. However, our analysis found these  estimates were inconsistent and lacked documented traceability. A  cost estimate is the summation of individual costs using established  methods and valid data. Developing and maintaining reliable cost  estimates ensures the appropriate amount of funds are needed when  requested and for the expressed purpose. We found, however, in May  2017, MDA’s testing budget lacked transparency and could be  improved. Specifically, we found that MDA’s annual budget  submission did not provide insight into the funding for each specific  test. MDA regularly makes changes to its test schedule without  reporting the impacts to its costs and funding needs. Without a  breakout of MDA’s costs by test in its annual budget submission and  BAR, how many times or how much funding has been requested,  received, or used for a specific test will continue to be unclear.  Therefore, we recommended that MDA break out funding request by  test. DOD did not concur with our recommendation and stated that  MDA’s current approach for assigning resources prior to the test  execution, is adequate. We continue to believe that breaking out  funding requests by test will improve transparency into planned  versus actual test costs and aid departmental and congressional  decision makers as they make difficult choices of where to invest  limited resources.

Changes to MDA’s Test Schedule Persist, Reducing Knowledge to Support Asset and Capability Deliveries

MDA also continues to struggle with fully achieving its annual flight testing  goals. After MDA revised its approach to developing the annual  Integrated Master Test Plan in 2009, in February 2010, we recognized the  new test schedule’s potential to address prior issues with shifting testing  requirements or test dates, and adding or deleting tests. MDA also  focused its testing to collect data necessary to support the development  of models and simulations.

However, MDA’s test plan has not stabilized. Since it formalized its  approach in 2010, MDA has continued to revise its test schedule  frequently by adding new tests, and deleting or delaying tests, in some  cases, multiple times and further into future fiscal years. As a result, less  testing is being conducted prior to delivery than originally planned, which  means less data are available to understand BMDS capabilities and  limitations. Specifically, preliminary observations from our fiscal year 2019  review show that from fiscal year 2010 through fiscal year 2019, MDA has  conducted only 37% of its planned testing as originally scheduled, while  the remainder has been either been delayed, deleted or conducted in a  later fiscal year, as shown in figure 2.

In addition, we reported in June 2019 that European Phased Adaptive  Approach (EPAA) Phase 3 testing against intermediate range ballistic  missiles (IRBM) had been reduced by 80 percent and MDA no longer  planned to conduct a flight test against a raid—a likely tactic in a real- world attack—prior to delivery. The lack of raid flight testing prevented the  accreditation of Aegis BMD models for assessment under those  circumstances in all fiscal year 2019 ground tests that included Aegis  BMD.

Balancing New Efforts with Existing Portfolio Needs will be Challenging

MDA is currently at a pivotal crossroads, needing to balance its ability to  pursue new and advanced efforts while also maintaining its existing  portfolio of BMDS elements that have not transferred to the military  services as originally planned. The new and advanced efforts, such as  hypersonic defense and a Next Generation Interceptor (NGI) for GMD,  are research and development-intensive tasks, which carry significant  technical risks and financial commitments. If MDA’s elements are not  transferred as originally intended, as they move further into production  and operations and sustainment these elements will continue to consume  a growing portion of the agency’s budget.

MDA and military services have taken some actions to prepare for  transferring the BMDS elements; however, the actions have not enabled  transfer primarily due to a lack of early and frequent coordination,  according to officials from the Undersecretary of Defense for Research  and Development and Acquisitions and Sustainment. Consequently, there  are overarching concerns related to transfer such as who funds the  sustainment of the elements which have not been resolved. Congress  and the Secretary of Defense have directed multiple reviews to determine  how to address these concerns and chart a path forward for MDA.

Chairman Cooper, Ranking Member Turner, and members of the  Subcommittee, this concludes my prepared statement. I would be happy  to respond to any questions you may have at this time.

If you or your staff members have any questions about this testimony,  please contact Cristina T. Chaplain, Director, Contracting and National  Security Acquisitions, at (202) 512-4841 or Chaplainc@gao.gov. Contact  points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may  be found on the last page of this statement.

GAO staff who made key contributions to this testimony are LaTonya  Miller (Assistant Director), Steven Stern (Analyst in Charge), Matthew  Ambrose, Pete Anderson, Helena Johnson, Michael Moran, Wiktor  Niewiadomski, Miranda Riemer, Brian Tittle, and Alyssa Weir.

Missile Defense: Delivery Delays Provide Opportunity for Increased  Testing to Better Understand Capability. GAO-19-387. Washington, D.C.:  June 2019.

Missile Defense: The Warfighter and Decision Makers Would Benefit from  Better Communication about the System’s Capabilities and Limitations.  GAO-18-324. Washington, D.C.: May 2018.

Missile Defense: Some Progress Delivering Capabilities, but Challenges  with Testing Transparency and Requirements Development Need to Be  Addressed. GAO-17-381. Washington, D.C.: May 2017.

Missile Defense: Ballistic Missile Defense System Testing Delays Affect  Delivery of Capabilities. GAO-16-339R. Washington, D.C.: Apr. 2016.

Missile Defense: Opportunities Exist to Reduce Acquisition Risk and  Improve Reporting on System Capabilities. GAO-15-345. Washington,  D.C.: May 2015.

Missile Defense: Mixed Progress in Achieving Acquisition Goals and  Improving Accountability. GAO-14-351. Washington, D.C.: Apr. 2014.

Missile Defense: Opportunity to Refocus on Strengthening Acquisition  Management. GAO-13-432. Washington, D.C.: Apr. 2013.

Missile Defense: Opportunity Exists to Strengthen Acquisitions by  Reducing Concurrency. GAO-12-486. Washington, D.C.: Apr. 2012.

Missile Defense: Actions Needed to Improve Transparency and  Accountability. GAO-11-372. Washington, D.C.: Mar. 2011.

Defense Acquisitions: Missile Defense Transition Provides Opportunity to  Strengthen Acquisition Approach. GAO-10-311. Washington, D.C.: Feb.  2010.

Defense Acquisitions: Production and Fielding of Missile Defense  Components Continue with Less Testing and Validation Than Planned.  GAO-09-338. Washington, D.C.: Mar. 2009.

Defense Acquisitions: Progress Made in Fielding Missile Defense, but  Program is Short of Meeting Goals. GAO-08-448. Washington, D.C.: Mar.  2008.

Defense Acquisitions: Missile Defense Acquisition Strategy Generates  Results but Delivers Less at a Higher Cost. GAO-07-387. Washington,  D.C.: Mar. 2007.

Defense Acquisitions: Missile Defense Agency Fields Initial Capability but  Falls Short of Original Goals. GAO-06-327. Washington, D.C.: Mar. 2006.

Defense Acquisitions: Status of Ballistic Missile Defense Program in  2004. GAO-05-243. Washington, D.C.: Mar. 2005.

Missile Defense: Actions Are Needed to Enhance Testing and  Accountability. GAO-04-409. Washington, D.C.: Apr. 2004.

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The Missile Defense Agency is developing a Ballistic Missile Defense System to protect against ballistic and hypersonic missile attacks. MDA has received about $174 billion since 2002 and is requesting another $9.2 billion for fiscal year 2021.

We’ve reported on MDA every year since 2002 and found it has fallen short of its goals, in part because of the high-risk approach it takes to developing these systems. This includes moving ahead on aggressive schedules when key technologies are not yet properly developed.

We testified that MDA has improved its approach to these acquisitions but still uses aggressive schedules and other risky practices.


Nuclear Nonproliferation: Past U.S. Involvement Improved Russian Nuclear Material Security, but Little Is Known about Current Conditions

Russia possesses the world's largest stockpile of weapons-usable nuclear materials, largely left over from the Cold War. These nuclear materials could be used to build a nuclear weapon if acquired by a rogue state or terrorist group. Starting in 1993, and for the next 2 decades, DOE worked with Russia to improve security at dozens of sites that contained these nuclear materials. In 2014, following Russian aggression in Ukraine and U.S. diplomatic responses, Russia ended nearly all nuclear security cooperation with the United States.

The Senate report accompanying the Fiscal Year 2019 National Defense Authorization Act includes a provision for GAO to review NNSA's efforts to improve Russian nuclear material security. This report (1) examines the extent to which NNSA had completed its planned nuclear material security efforts when cooperation ended and what nuclear security concerns remained, (2) describes what is known about the current state of nuclear material security in Russia, and (3) describes stakeholder views on opportunities for future U.S.-Russian nuclear security cooperation.

To address all three objectives, GAO interviewed U.S. government officials, personnel from DOE's national laboratories, and nongovernmental experts. In this report, GAO refers to all of these groups as stakeholders. GAO also reviewed relevant U.S. government plans, policies, and program documentation. GAO requested the opportunity to interview Russian officials and representatives at nuclear material sites for this review, but the Russian government denied this request.

Over more than 2 decades starting in the early 1990s, the Department of Energy (DOE) and its National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) completed many of their planned efforts to improve nuclear material security in Russia, according to DOE documentation, U.S. government officials, and nuclear security experts. These efforts, carried out primarily through NNSA's Material Protection, Control, and Accounting (MPC&A) program, included a range of projects to upgrade security at dozens of Russian nuclear material sites, such as the installation of modern perimeter fencing, surveillance cameras, and equipment to track and account for nuclear material. However, not all planned upgrades were completed before cooperation ended in late 2014. NNSA also completed many—but not all—of its planned efforts to help Russia support its national-level security infrastructure, such as by helping improve the security of Russian nuclear materials in transit. In addition, NNSA made some progress in improving each site's ability to sustain its security systems, such as by training Russian site personnel on modern MPC&A practices and procedures. NNSA documentation that GAO reviewed showed that by the time cooperation ended, Russian sites had generally improved their ability to sustain their MPC&A systems, but this documentation showed that concerns remained.

According to stakeholders, there is little specific information about the current state of security at Russian nuclear material sites because U.S. personnel no longer have access to sites to observe security systems and discuss MPC&A practices with Russian site personnel. However, stakeholders said there is some information on national-level efforts. Specifically, stakeholders said that Russia has improved regulations for some MPC&A practices, and there are signs that Russian sites receive funding for nuclear material security, though it is unlikely that Russian funding is sufficient to account for the loss of U.S. financial support. Regarding threats to Russia's nuclear material, nongovernmental experts GAO interviewed raised concerns about the risk of insider theft of Russian nuclear materials. Experts stated that it is likely that Russian sites have maintained nuclear material security systems to protect against threats from outsiders, but it is unlikely that sites are adequately protecting against the threat from insiders.

Stakeholders said that there may be opportunities for limited future cooperation between the two countries to help improve Russian nuclear material security. Such opportunities could include technical exchanges and training. These opportunities could provide the United States with better information about the risk posed by Russia's nuclear materials and could help address areas of concern, such as by training Russian personnel to help sites better address the insider threat. However, any potential cooperation faces considerable challenges, according to stakeholders, most notably the deterioration of political relations between the two countries. In addition, stakeholders said that cooperation is challenged by current U.S. law, which generally prohibits NNSA from funding nuclear security activities in Russia; by Russian antagonism toward U.S. proposals to improve nuclear material security internationally; and by Russian conditions for cooperation that the United States has not been willing to meet.

Following the collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s, the United  States was concerned that political and economic instability and a lack of  government revenues threatened the security and control of Russia’s  nuclear warheads and weapons-usable nuclear materials, including highly  enriched uranium (HEU) and plutonium. The Department of Defense  (DOD) and the Department of Energy (DOE) started programs to help the  Russian government secure its massive stockpiles of warheads and  nuclear materials; over the next 2 decades, DOE and its National Nuclear  Security Administration (NNSA) led U.S. efforts to work with Russia on  nuclear material security, spending more than $1 billion on projects in  Russia to improve security at dozens of sites holding nuclear materials.  In December 2014, following the Russian invasion of Ukraine and  ensuing U.S. sanctions, Russia announced that it was ending most U.S.  nuclear security assistance in Russia, and cooperation with NNSA was  dramatically curtailed.

Securing vulnerable nuclear materials around the world remains a top  national security priority, and it is estimated that Russia holds the largest  stockpile of nuclear materials in the world, at least 617,000 kilograms of   HEU and 120,000 kilograms of plutonium, according to a 2013 study.  The December 2018 National Strategy for Countering Weapons of Mass  Destruction Terrorism states that the United States will lead global efforts  to close off terrorists’ access to weapons of mass destruction and related  materials, including weapons-usable nuclear materials.

We have issued numerous reports on the security of nuclear materials in  Russia and other countries. For example, in 2007 we reported that DOE  and DOD had made progress improving security at Russia’s nuclear  sites, but that Russia’s ability to sustain U.S. security upgrades was  uncertain. In a 2010 classified report, we reported that NNSA programs  had made progress in securing nuclear materials in Russia, but that  NNSA planned additional work, especially in mitigating the insider threat  at major Russian nuclear material handling facilities. We suggested that  Congress consider extending NNSA’s 2013 deadline for preparing Russia  to assume responsibility for sustaining its nuclear security systems.

The Senate Armed Services Committee Report accompanying S. 2987, a  bill for the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for fiscal year  2019, includes a provision for GAO to review NNSA’s efforts to improve  Russian nuclear material security. This report (1) examines the extent to  which NNSA’s planned nuclear material security efforts in Russia were  completed when cooperation ended and what nuclear security concerns  remained, (2) describes what is known about the current state of nuclear  material security in Russia, and (3) describes stakeholder views on  potential opportunities for future U.S.-Russian nuclear security  cooperation. This report discusses the security at Russia’s civilian and  nuclear weapons complex sites that hold weapons-usable nuclear  materials. It does not address the security of Russia’s nuclear warheads  or nuclear security at Russian Ministry of Defense locations. This report is  a public version of a classified report we issued in December 2019. The  Department of Energy deemed some of the information in our December  report to be classified, which must be protected from loss, compromise, or  inadvertent disclosure. Therefore, this report omits classified information  about the location and types of security projects completed in Russia, as  well as information on perceived risks. Although the information provided  in this report is more limited, the report addresses the same objectives as  the classified report and uses the same methodology.

To address these objectives, we obtained and analyzed DOE and NNSA  documents describing U.S. government efforts to support and sustain  security at nuclear material sites in Russia. We also reviewed other  relevant documents and plans from the U.S government as well as  reports and articles from academia and nongovernmental organizations  (NGO). In addition, we identified and interviewed relevant stakeholders,  including U.S. government officials from NNSA, DOE, the State  Department, and DOD; nongovernmental experts from academia and  NGOs; and knowledgeable personnel at six U.S. national laboratories that  supported U.S. nuclear security efforts in Russia, including personnel at  Brookhaven National Laboratory, Lawrence Livermore National  Laboratory, Los Alamos National Laboratory, Oak Ridge National  Laboratory, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, and Sandia National  Laboratory. We refer to national laboratory personnel as project team  members because they implemented nuclear security projects in Russia  on NNSA’s behalf. When we use the term “stakeholders,” we are referring  to individuals from more than one of these knowledge groups. For  example, if DOE officials and experts provided a similar viewpoint, we  attributed this viewpoint to “stakeholders.” Additional details of our scope  and methodology can be found in appendix I.

The performance audit upon which this report is based was conducted  from September 2018 to November 2019 in accordance with generally  accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that  we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to  provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our  audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a  reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit  objectives. We subsequently worked with DOE from December 2019 to  January 2020 to prepare this unclassified version of the original classified  report for public release. This public version was also prepared in  accordance with these standards.

In 1991, following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the U.S. government  authorized the President to establish the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat  Reduction (CTR) program to provide nuclear security assistance to  Russia and the former Soviet states. At the time, there were significant  concerns about Russia’s ability to maintain adequate security over its  large numbers of nuclear weapons and vast quantities of weapons-usable  nuclear materials. In 1995, DOE established the Material Protection,  Control, and Accounting (MPC&A) program to equip Russia and other  countries with modern nuclear material security systems and promote  effective nuclear material security practices. The CTR umbrella  agreement with Russia—which established an overall legal framework  under which the United States would provide nuclear security assistance  to Russia—expired in June 2013. Joint nuclear security activities in  Russia, however, continued under a multilateral agreement and a related  bilateral protocol. In December 2014, in response to U.S. sanctions over  Russian actions in Ukraine, the Russian government ended nearly all  nuclear security cooperation with the United States. Until then, the  United States had been gradually transitioning responsibility to Russia for  supporting its nuclear material security systems, and it was anticipated  that the U.S. MPC&A program would continue to help Russia sustain its  nuclear material security systems until January 1, 2018. See figure 1 for  a timeline of major events during the period of cooperation.

Starting with fiscal year 2015, and with each fiscal year since, language in  annual appropriations laws and national defense authorization acts has  largely prohibited NNSA from funding new efforts in Russia, including  nuclear material security assistance, unless the prohibition is waived by  the Secretary of Energy under certain conditions.

Russian Nuclear Material Sites and Structure of Relevant Russian Governmental Organizations

Russia’s weapons-usable nuclear materials are stored and processed at  more than two dozen sites overseen by a number of Russian entities, and  the MPC&A program’s focus was on 25 of these sites at the time of our  last report in 2010. The Russian State Corporation for Atomic Energy  (Rosatom) is the Russian agency that manages much of Russia’s nuclear  security enterprise, including seven nuclear weapons complex sites  located in closed cities. These sites store and process the nuclear  materials used in Russia’s nuclear weapons. Of the other 18 sites, many  are overseen by Rosatom, but some are independent of Rosatom or  managed by other Russian government entities. These sites often hold  HEU and plutonium for research reactors or for other civilian purposes.  See figure 2 for the location of the 25 Russian nuclear material sites.  Other Russian government organizations with responsibilities in nuclear  security include the following:

Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA). MFA is responsible for  overseeing Russian policy and agreements for cooperation with the  United States, including cooperation on nuclear security.

Russian Federal Service of Environmental, Technological, and  Nuclear Supervision (Rostekhnadzor). Rostekhnadzor is the  regulator responsible for Russia’s civilian nuclear facilities.

Russian Ministry of Industry and Trade (Minpromtorg).  Minpromtorg coordinates nuclear material security activities and  develops nuclear material security regulations for Russian naval  shipbuilding sites, including Sevmash Shipyard, the primary builder of  nuclear submarines for the Russian Navy.

Russian Ministry of Defense. DOD and NNSA supported Russian  efforts to secure Russian Ministry of Defense nuclear warheads and  strategic rocket sites. That work is outside the scope of this report.

NNSA’s Material Protection Control and Accounting (MPC&A) Program

The MPC&A program was the primary NNSA program that worked with  Russia to help improve Russia’s ability to secure its nuclear materials and  its nuclear warheads. To secure Russia’s nuclear materials, the program  consisted of three main efforts:

Site-level projects. NNSA managed MPC&A projects at the 25  Russian nuclear material sites to upgrade security systems at those  sites. Teams of specialists from across DOE’s national laboratories,  referred to as U.S. project teams, identified and carried out MPC&A  upgrades on behalf of NNSA. MPC&A includes the following types of  security systems, among other things: physical protection systems, such as fences around buildings  containing nuclear materials and metal doors protecting rooms  where nuclear materials are stored; material control systems, such as seals attached to nuclear  material containers to indicate whether material has been stolen  from the containers, and badge systems that allow only authorized  personnel into areas containing nuclear material; and material accounting systems, such as nuclear measurement  equipment and computerized databases to inventory the amount  and type of nuclear material contained in specific buildings and to  track their location. Material control and material accounting are  collectively known as material control and accounting.

National-level projects. NNSA managed cross-cutting projects to  enhance Russia’s national-level infrastructure to sustain MPC&A  systems for nuclear materials, including enhancing Russian nuclear  security culture, developing Russian regulations for MPC&A  operations, and strengthening Russian inspection and oversight  capabilities.

Sustainability support for individual sites. NNSA also fostered  development of MPC&A sustainability practices and procedures at the  Russian nuclear material sites based on seven sustainability  elements, such as the presence at the site of an effective MPC&A  management structure that plans, implements, tests, and evaluates  the site’s MPC&A systems.

NNSA Completed Many of Its Planned Nuclear Security Efforts in Russia, and Had Concerns about the Sustainability of These Efforts When Cooperation Ended

Based on our review of available NNSA documentation and interviews  with project team personnel, we found that NNSA had completed many— but not all—site-level MPC&A projects at the 25 Russian nuclear material  sites when cooperation ended in 2014. NNSA also made progress on 11  cross-cutting projects that were intended to improve Russia’s national- level nuclear material security infrastructure. In addition, NNSA made  progress on supporting the ability of the 25 Russian sites to sustain  nuclear material security efforts. However, at the time cooperation ended,  NNSA still had a number of concerns about both the sustainability of  nuclear security efforts at the 25 sites and the state of Russia’s national- level nuclear material security infrastructure.

NNSA Completed Many but Not All Site-Level Projects at the 25 Russian Nuclear Material Sites

Based on our review of available NNSA documentation and interviews  with stakeholders, we determined that NNSA completed many MPC&A  projects at the 25 Russian nuclear material sites, and stakeholders said  that these upgrades significantly improved the state of nuclear material  security at the sites. In particular, they told us that during the early years  of the MPC&A program, the program completed upgrades focused  primarily on the most significant security gaps, and in later years the  program became more focused on transitioning the responsibility for  sustaining nuclear security efforts to Russia. However, not all work was  completed before cooperation ended, and project team members told us  that the extent of completion varied by site. For example, project team  members estimated that 90 percent of MPC&A projects were completed  at one site, but that projects at other sites had lower levels of project  completion.

NNSA was unable to provide a complete set of documents detailing all  projects completed and not completed across the 25 sites because  several projects were consolidated into continuing programs and have not  yet been closed out. In addition, the available site documentation did not  always include detailed information on all projects completed or not  completed. As a result we could not quantify how much planned work was  completed and not completed when cooperation ended across all 25  sites. However, based on our review of available NNSA documents, we  were able to identify many completed projects that included specific types  of physical protection measures, material access controls, and material  accounting upgrades.

Project team members we interviewed and documentation we reviewed  also indicated that some projects were not completed when cooperation  ended. NNSA documentation identifies a variety of uncompleted projects  at specific sites, such as not constructing or upgrading perimeter fencing,  not replacing aging physical protection equipment, and not upgrading  entry control points with vehicle radiation monitors. For example, at one  site there were several kilometers of modernized perimeter fencing, guard  towers, and sensors that had not been completely installed by the time  cooperation ended, according to NNSA documents and project team  members. Project team members told us that the site had plans to  complete these projects. However, because Russia ended cooperation,  the project team was unable to verify that the equipment was installed or  operating appropriately. Similarly, project team members told us about  two major efforts at another site that were terminated by Russia when  cooperation ended: a $1 million project to relocate the guard force  building to reduce the reaction time for protective forces and a $300,000  project to update software for the central alarm station and other security  systems. According to project team members, the contracts were agreed  to and associated costs obligated by NNSA, but Russia ended  cooperation before signing the agreements.

In addition, in our 2010 classified report, we found that NNSA faced  challenges in implementing MPC&A upgrades against insider and  outsider threats at some Russian nuclear material facilities to reduce the  risk of material theft. At the time of the 2010 report, NNSA had proposed  MPC&A upgrades at certain Russian sites to address these concerns,  and GAO found that progress in implementing upgrades at some  locations and in some MPC&A technical areas had been limited. For our  classified report issued in December 2019, we asked NNSA for an update  on the status of these upgrades; in response to our request, NNSA  officials told us that due to a lack of cooperation, they had not received  additional information from Russian counterparts to determine the status  of these upgrades.

NNSA Made Substantial Progress on Its Projects to Support Russia’s National- Level Nuclear Material Security Infrastructure, but Some Work Was Not Completed When Cooperation Ended

In addition to site-level MPC&A security projects, NNSA managed 11  cross-cutting projects to support Russia’s national-level nuclear material  security infrastructure, such as projects to enhance Russian nuclear  security culture, develop Russian regulations for MPC&A operations, and  strengthen Russian MPC&A inspection and oversight capabilities. We  found that—at the time cooperation ended in 2014—NNSA had made  substantial progress on its cross-cutting projects. NNSA reported that  work was fully completed or mostly completed on at least 10 of the 11  cross-cutting projects by the time cooperation ended. However, NNSA  could not provide complete documentation detailing the level of progress  for some of these projects. See table 1 below for a description of these  project areas.

We found that NNSA had planned to do more work on some national- level projects, but that the end of cooperation in 2014 resulted in some  planned work not being completed. For example, in the case of  regulations development, project team members told us that the project  teams had planned to develop numerous regulations with Rosatom, but  these were not completed because of the end of cooperation.

NNSA Made Some Progress on Improving Sites’ Abilities to Sustain Security Efforts, but NNSA Had Remaining Concerns about Sustainability When Cooperation Ended

As part of its plan to shift to Russia the responsibility for nuclear material  security efforts, NNSA supported the adoption of MPC&A sustainability  practices and procedures at the individual Russian nuclear material sites  based on seven “sustainability elements.” NNSA identified these  elements, such as performance testing of systems to evaluate MPC&A  effectiveness, as being fundamental to the long-term sustainability of a  modern nuclear material security system. See table 2 below for more  information about the seven sustainability elements.

To determine a site’s ability to sustain its security systems, project teams  periodically assessed each site based on the seven elements, and rated  sites in each element on a scale from low to high. In our 2010 classified  report, we reported the results of these sustainability assessments across  the 25 Russian nuclear material sites and found that the MPC&A program  had made limited progress and faced challenges in developing effective  practices and procedures consistent with the seven elements of  sustainability. For our classified report issued in December 2019, we  reviewed and reported on the most recent sustainability assessments,  largely conducted between 2012 and 2014.

We compared the ratings from the most recently completed site  sustainability assessments for the same 25 sites to the ratings we  reported in 2010. We found that sustainability ratings generally improved,  but low scores persisted at many sites and in some sustainability areas.  For example, we found that the number of high ratings increased over this  period by about half, and the number of low ratings decreased by about  half. We believe this indicates general progress in improving sustainability  across the sites. Of the seven sustainability elements, the MPC&A  organization sustainability element was the element most frequently rated  as “high” in the most recent assessment, and it showed the most  improvement across the 25 sites. This indicates that the ability of Russian  site organizations to plan and coordinate MPC&A operations had  improved.

We also found in our review of these assessments that NNSA had  continuing concerns when cooperation ended about both the  sustainability of MPC&A upgrades at individual Russian sites and the  state of the national-level nuclear material security infrastructure in  Russia. In their final reports after cooperation ended, U.S. project teams  documented ongoing concerns with the sustainability of MPC&A  upgrades at Russian nuclear material sites. We reviewed the concerns in  the 25 final site summary documents and interviewed project team  members who provided additional examples of these concerns. Based on  our documentation review and interviews with project team members, we  identified the six most common areas of concerns, including: (1) the  responsiveness of protective forces, (2) performance testing the  effectiveness of MPC&A systems, (3) sustainment funding, (4) physical  protection systems, (5) nuclear security culture, and (6) access and  cooperation at Russian sites.

Stakeholders we interviewed highlighted a number of national-level  concerns in other areas, such as the state of security equipment. Project  team members were concerned that some of the equipment provided in  the early years of cooperation had become outdated or obsolete by the  time cooperation ended, such as surveillance cameras and monitoring  equipment, and would need to be replaced.

Little Information Is Available on Security at Russian Sites, but Nongovernmental Experts Raised Concerns about Insider Theft Risks

There is little specific information available about the current state of  security at Russian nuclear material sites, though anecdotal evidence  suggests that nuclear material security regulations have improved and  that Russia funds some nuclear security efforts. We interviewed DOE  officials and national laboratory personnel about security risks and threats  to Russian nuclear material security. The details of these conversations  are classified. However, according to nongovernmental experts we  interviewed, the theft of nuclear materials by insiders is currently  considered the greatest threat to Russia’s nuclear materials.

Little Specific Information Is Available about Nuclear Security at Russian Sites, but Some Information Exists on National-Level Regulatory Efforts and Security Funding

According to stakeholders, little information is available about site-level  security currently at the 25 sites holding Russian nuclear material,  including the status of U.S. upgrades funded through the MPC&A  program. Stakeholders told us that this is primarily because U.S.  personnel no longer have access to the sites to observe security  improvements and discuss MPC&A practices with Russian site personnel.

According to DOE officials, the ability of U.S. project teams and other  personnel to visit Russian nuclear material sites helped provide  transparency into the state of Russian security at these facilities, such as  the status of radiation portal monitors at entry points within nuclear  material storage buildings. Since the end of cooperation, few U.S.  personnel have visited Russia’s nuclear material sites, greatly limiting  transparency into the status of U.S. security investments and Russian  security practices.

According to NNSA officials and U.S. project team personnel, NNSA  documentation—such as the U.S. project team closeout documents that  are referred to above—are based on observations primarily from 2014 or  earlier. This documentation provides the most recent direct assessments  of security at the site level. These officials stated that while such reports  are useful for identifying the state of Russian nuclear material site security  at the time cooperation ended, they likely do not provide an accurate  picture of the nuclear material security at the 25 sites currently.

Regarding national-level efforts in Russia to support nuclear security in  the country, stakeholders we interviewed said that information exists in  two main areas: development of nuclear security regulations and nuclear  security funding.

Development of nuclear security regulations. According to  stakeholders, Russia has improved its nuclear security regulations in  recent years, including since cooperation ended in 2014. Although  U.S. efforts to help Rosatom develop modern MPC&A regulations  ended in 2014, NNSA has continued work with Rostekhnadzor to  improve Russian nuclear material security regulations through a  national-level MPC&A sustainability project. Stakeholders said that  this project has resulted in Russian nuclear security regulatory  improvements. For example, this project provided technical support  on 11 regulations, including regulations to improve vulnerability  assessments of nuclear sites and nuclear materials in transit.  However, stakeholders also noted some limitations. For example, they  stated that compliance with regulations at nuclear material sites is  mostly unknown. Similarly, the effectiveness of enforcement in cases  of noncompliance is unknown, though fines are thought to be  negligible.

Nuclear security funding. Information on nuclear security funding is  limited, according to stakeholders. Some stakeholders we interviewed  stated that, based on their experiences and conversations with  Russian officials, they believed that Russia was generally providing  sufficient funding for nuclear material security at sites. However,  others doubted that Russia was providing sufficient resources to  replace the funding lost when the U.S. MPC&A program ended.  Stakeholders generally agreed that funding for nuclear security likely  varies by site. A few stakeholders expressed concern that security at  nuclear material sites could be one of the first areas cut during an  economic downturn, as nuclear security is not seen to be as  significant a priority for site managers as other operations and  revenue-generating activities at the sites.

Nongovernmental Experts Raised Concerns about Insider Theft Risks to Russian Nuclear Materials

According to nongovernmental experts we interviewed, Russia’s nuclear  security culture generally does not prioritize protection against the threat  of nuclear material theft by insiders, a threat that modern nuclear security  systems are designed and maintained to prevent. For example, experts  said that Russian nuclear material site managers were more likely to  devote resources—such as training, manpower, and funding— to  measures that protect facilities from outsider threats, and less likely to  devote resources to measures that protect facilities against insider  threats. Experts told us that while the MPC&A program advanced  Russian appreciation of the insider threat during the period of  cooperation, they were concerned that—without U.S. influence and  training—protection against insider threats would still be insufficient and  likely ignored unless the Russian government required such protection,  which was not the case when cooperation ended. As a result, according  to experts, Russian sites are likely not currently supporting MPC&A  systems adequately to counter insider threats.

One nongovernmental expert noted that Russian security services have  assumed greater control and tightened security in the closed cities that  contain the vast majority of Russia’s nuclear materials, and that this may  have reduced the near-term threat from insiders. However, according to  this expert, over time this reliance on the security services could create  vulnerabilities. For example, some Russian sites may rely too heavily on  the physical security elements of nuclear security systems—such as  guard forces—to protect nuclear materials and may become complacent  in modernizing other elements, such as material control and accounting  practices to deter and prevent insider theft risks, or measures that can  protect against other emerging, nontraditional threats such as drone or  cyber risks.

According to nongovernmental experts, other factors in the country may  also exacerbate the risk of theft posed by both outsiders and insiders to  Russia’s nuclear materials. For example, experts said the existence of  massive amounts of weapons-usable nuclear materials at many  dispersed sites across Russia is the primary factor that makes Russia’s  nuclear materials a greater threat than the nuclear materials held in most  other countries. In addition, according to experts, persistent corruption  and existing terrorist groups near some of the closed cities are other  contributing factors that could further increase the risk of theft.

According to Stakeholders, Opportunities May Exist for Cooperation to Improve Russian Nuclear Material Security, but Such Cooperation Would Face Challenges

According to stakeholders, there could be opportunities to help Russia  improve aspects of its nuclear security system that NNSA and others  identified as continuing risks. However, stakeholders noted that any future  cooperation would likely be limited in scope and would face considerable  political challenges.

Future Cooperation Would Likely Be Limited but Could Still Help Address Remaining Nuclear Material Security Risks in Russia

According to stakeholders we interviewed, there could be opportunities  for future U.S.-Russia cooperation to address some of the continuing  nuclear security risks in Russia. However, stakeholders said that any  future cooperation would likely differ dramatically from the donor-recipient  model of the past MPC&A program. The Russian government would likely  expect to be treated as an equal and would not want to be seen as a  recipient of U.S. funds for infrastructure improvements. Therefore, the  scope of future cooperation would likely be a limited partnership, would  primarily involve training and information sharing rather than directly  supporting security upgrades at Russian sites, and would require fewer  U.S. resources than the past MPC&A program did.

Stakeholders told us that engagement and cooperation are important  because of the size of the Russian nuclear complex, the large amounts of  Russian nuclear material, and the continuing security concerns in certain  areas. Stakeholders told us they believed there would be security benefits  to the United States in resuming nuclear security cooperation with Russia  in some form. Stakeholders generally identified increased transparency  and advancing security best practices as the two main benefits to nuclear  security cooperation.

Stakeholders we spoke to identified examples of opportunities for  cooperation that could support U.S. interests by providing information on  the security of Russia’s nuclear materials and by helping Russia improve  nuclear material security practices and procedures. These include the  following:

Exchange of best practices. Stakeholders noted that the United  States and Russia could share MPC&A best practices in conferences  and workshops. Best practices could cover areas such as  performance testing of MPC&A systems, insider threat protection, and  material control and accounting. Some stakeholders said that Russian  expertise, such as in nuclear forensics, could increase U.S.  knowledge and potentially improve U.S. practices in certain areas.

Technical exchanges. Stakeholders told us that there could be  benefits to both the United States and Russia from reciprocal  technical exchanges or meetings of nuclear security experts to review  specific, technical MPC&A practices that each country employs.

National laboratory personnel noted that past exchanges under the  MPC&A program allowed Russian personnel to view MPC&A systems  at U.S. facilities, which helped Russian personnel understand the  features of modern MPC&A systems, such as insider threat  prevention measures. U.S. personnel participated in reciprocal visits  to view security measures at sites in Russia, which helped them  understand Russian security practices. Stakeholders told us that such  technical exchanges could help U.S. personnel better understand the  state of Russian nuclear security funding and current Russian  practices.

Training. Experts and national laboratory personnel noted that  training Russian personnel on technical matters—such as how to  conduct comprehensive vulnerability assessments—could improve  Russian security practices.

Conversations on legal agreements. Some stakeholders said that  initiating conversations with Russia on the status of existing but  suspended legal agreements could provide an opening for other forms  of cooperation. For example, a few stakeholders mentioned an  existing—but suspended—research and development agreement  from 2013 under which future nuclear security cooperation might be   pursued if both parties were interested in reactivating the  agreement.

Cooperation within multilateral organizations. Some stakeholders  noted that existing multilateral organizations, such as the International  Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the Global Initiative to Combat  Nuclear Terrorism, could provide venues for the United States to  pursue cooperative opportunities with Russia. For example, Russia  and the United States could cooperate on developing  recommendations to the IAEA on physical protection measures for  nuclear material, which could then be shared with IAEA member  states.

Other opportunities. The Nuclear Threat Initiative, a U.S.  nongovernmental organization (NGO), and the Center for Energy and  Security Studies, a Russian NGO, coauthored a report that identified  51 mutually beneficial opportunities to cooperate in nuclear security,  nuclear safety, nuclear energy, nuclear science, and nuclear  environmental remediation. For example, the report identifies an  opportunity for Russian and U.S. experts to establish a joint research  and development program to improve nuclear security technologies to  address emerging threats to nuclear material storage sites, such as  drones.

Russia would likely insist that it and the United States be seen as equal  partners under any future arrangement or program for cooperation on  nuclear security, according to stakeholders. However, U.S. project team  personnel told us that Russian nuclear material sites often lack the  financial resources to pay travel costs for Russian personnel or to cover  costs for venues or workshops necessary for training or the exchange of  best practices. Therefore, the level of funding to support any potential  future cooperation might be disproportionate between the United States  and Russia. Because we were unable to obtain views from Russian  officials and Russian nuclear material site representatives, we were  unable to establish the extent to which Russia would be willing to pursue  any form of nuclear material security cooperation with the United States,  regardless of funding sources and requirements.

Potential Cooperation Faces Significant Challenges

Stakeholders we interviewed were generally pessimistic about  cooperation under the current political and diplomatic climate, and they  noted that the deterioration of political relations is the most significant  challenge to any future cooperation. Stakeholders identified other specific  challenges, including the following:

Funding prohibition. Some stakeholders said that provisions in  recent appropriations acts and National Defense Authorization Acts  (NDAA) prohibiting NNSA from funding nuclear security activities in  Russia have been obstacles to cooperating on nuclear security  matters. In a report submitted to Congress in May 2019, NNSA stated  that “the lack of ability to sign new contracts or engage on a modest  scale denies NNSA the insights necessary to directly monitor nuclear  material security in Russia and the sustainment of past security  improvements.” According to U.S. officials and U.S. project team  personnel, the prohibition largely prevents U.S. personnel from  sharing best practices with and training Russian counterparts, and the  existence of the prohibition discourages U.S. and Russian personnel  from interacting and maintaining relationships. Although the acts allow  the Secretary of Energy to waive the prohibition under certain  conditions, no secretary has done so since a prohibition was first  included in the fiscal year 2015 appropriations act. In addition,  according to NNSA officials we interviewed, the language describing  waiver requirements in NDAAs has become more restrictive in recent  years. Initially, the Secretary of Energy could waive the prohibition on  the basis of a notification to certain congressional committees that the   waiver was in the national security interest of the United States, an  accompanying justification, and the passage of 15 days. Starting with  the fiscal year 2017 NDAA, however, a waiver can only be issued if it  is necessary to address an urgent nuclear-related threat in Russia,  and any such waiver requires concurrence from the Secretary of  Defense and the Secretary of State.

Russian conditions on cooperation. Stakeholders we interviewed  said that Russia has set conditions on any future nuclear security  cooperation. For example, they said that Russia has indicated that it is  unwilling to discuss nuclear security cooperation with the United  States unless the United States is willing to discuss related areas,  such as nuclear energy, nuclear safety, and nuclear science.  According to stakeholders, in the past the United States has been  unwilling to discuss these other areas as a condition for cooperating  on nuclear security.

Russian antagonism to U.S. security efforts. Stakeholders noted  antagonism at some levels of the Russian government toward U.S.  nuclear security efforts. For example, although Russia participates in  nuclear security efforts at the IAEA, some stakeholders noted that  Russia regularly obstructs U.S. initiatives and recommendations in  that organization.

As noted above, stakeholders view the general deterioration of political  relations between the United States and Russia as the greatest challenge  to cooperation, and it is not clear whether Russia is prepared to reengage  with the United States on these or other options for rekindling U.S.- Russian nuclear security cooperation. We reached out to the Russian  government to request meetings with Russian government officials and  representatives of nuclear material sites who could provide Russian  perspectives on efforts to secure Russia’s nuclear materials, the status of  past U.S. nuclear material security investments, and potential  opportunities for cooperation. The Russian government declined our  requests to meet with these officials and site representatives. Therefore,  without Russian perspectives on the likelihood of possible future  cooperation, we were unable to determine whether changes to U.S.  policy, such as lifting the funding prohibition, would have any meaningful  effect on the status of nuclear security cooperation between the United  States and Russia.

We provided a draft of the classified version of this report to NNSA for  review and comment. NNSA had no comments on the report.

We are sending copies of this product to the Senate Armed Services  Committee, the NNSA Administrator, and the Secretaries of Defense and  State.  In addition, the report is available at no charge on the GAO  website at http://www.gao.gov.

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact  me at (202) 512-3841 or trimbled@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices  of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last  page of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report  are listed in appendix II.

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

This report (1) examines the extent to which the National Nuclear Security  Administration’s (NNSA) planned nuclear material security efforts in  Russia were completed when cooperation ended and what nuclear  security concerns remained, (2) describes what is known about the  current state of nuclear material security in Russia, and (3) describes  stakeholder views on potential opportunities for future U.S.-Russian  nuclear security cooperation.

For all three objectives, we identified and interviewed relevant  stakeholders, including U.S. government officials from NNSA, the  Department of Energy (DOE), the State Department, and the Department  of Defense; experts on Russian nuclear security from academia and  nongovernmental organizations (NGO); and knowledgeable personnel at  six U.S. national laboratories that supported U.S. nuclear security efforts  in Russia, including personnel at Brookhaven National Laboratory,  Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Los Alamos National  Laboratory, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Pacific Northwest National  Laboratory, and Sandia National Laboratory. We identified the  stakeholders by contacting government agencies and NGOs with nuclear  security expertise and asking them to identify other knowledgeable  stakeholders. We reached out to these other knowledgeable stakeholders  and interviewed those who responded and were willing to speak with us.  To identify nongovernmental experts, we compiled a list of individuals  who stakeholders identified as having expertise in the area of nuclear  security in Russia. We also worked with a staff librarian to conduct an  independent search of published literature to identify nongovernmental  experts who had authored multiple publications related to Russian  nuclear security. In addition, to ascertain whether an individual should be  considered a nongovernmental expert, we considered other information,  such as invitations to speak at nuclear security panels, being an editor of  nuclear security related journals, and relevant positions in academic and  other nongovernmental institutions. We interviewed six nongovernmental  experts who fit these criteria.

To examine the extent to which NNSA’s planned nuclear material security  efforts in Russia were completed when cooperation ended and what  nuclear security concerns remained, we reviewed documents prepared by  NNSA and the national laboratories for each of the 25 nuclear material  sites in Russia where the United States worked previously with Russia to  improve security. To identify NNSA sustainability programs at a national  level, we reviewed GAO reports and NNSA project documentation. We  also reviewed NNSA guidelines that detailed how project teams were to  support and assess the ability of Russian sites to sustain their material  protection, control, and accounting (MPC&A) systems. We reviewed the  NNSA documents that assessed site sustainability and analyzed how site  sustainability had changed at sites by the end of cooperation. These  documents included project team assessments for each of the 25 sites in  seven different sustainability elements. In these assessments, project  teams provided ratings from low to high on the extent to which sites were  prepared to sustain these areas. We also reviewed NNSA documents and  identified concerns that site teams documented about site sustainability.  We then analyzed the concerns from the 25 sites and grouped similar  concerns into categories. We developed these categories based on the  similarity of the concerns, definitions of key nuclear security areas in  NNSA documents, and professional judgement. We then identified the six  concerns that appeared most frequently, which accounted for about 70  percent of all concerns.

To describe what is known about the current state of nuclear security in  Russia—in addition to interviews with our stakeholder group—we  reviewed U.S. government and open-source documents. Specifically, we  reviewed reports from the International Panel on Fissile Materials, the  Nuclear Threat Institute, the National Academies of Science, and a  national laboratory; articles on Russian nuclear security; and periodic  reports on Russian nuclear security published by an expert independent  consultant. In addition to general internet searches for published  documents relating to Russian nuclear security and the MPC&A program,  we conducted literature searches of published materials with assistance  from a staff librarian; we excluded from our literature review any search  results that were published prior to 2014 or were not related to nuclear  material security in Russia. In addition to unclassified interviews with U.S.  government officials on Russian nuclear material security, we received  classified briefings from DOE. We requested threat and risk information  relating to Russian nuclear material security from the Central Intelligence  Agency, but we were not provided this information.

To describe stakeholder views on potential opportunities for future U.S.- Russia nuclear security cooperation, we interviewed those in our  stakeholder group identified above. We also reviewed administration  plans and reports, including the National Security Strategy, the National  Strategy for Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Terrorism, and  NNSA’s May 2019 Report to Congress describing NNSA’s funding of  nuclear security improvements in Russia. To inform our understanding of  the prohibition on NNSA’s expenditures on nuclear security in Russia, we  reviewed laws since fiscal year 2015 that restricted relevant NNSA  funding in some way. In addition, to obtain Russian perspectives on  nuclear material security and past U.S. efforts, we requested—through  the State Department and the U.S. Embassy in Moscow—interviews with  Russian officials at relevant Russian agencies and representatives at five  Russian nuclear material sites. However, the Russian government  declined our request to meet with these officials and representatives.

Appendix II: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

David Trimble, (202) 512-3841 or trimbled@gao.gov  In addition to the contact named above, William Hoehn (Assistant  Director), Dave Messman (Analyst in Charge), and Dan Will made key  contributions to this report. Antoinette Capaccio, Ellen Fried, Greg  Marchand, Dan Royer, and Sara Sullivan also contributed to this report.

For nearly two decades, the United States and Russia cooperated to upgrade security at dozens of Russian sites containing materials that could be used to build a nuclear weapon. This included modern fencing, surveillance cameras, and other improvements.

This work was incomplete when Russia invaded Ukraine in 2014 and cooperation was dramatically curtailed. Today, little is known about security at these sites, including the extent to which Russia has maintained U.S.-funded improvements.

Stakeholders told us there may be opportunities to work with Russia to improve nuclear material security, but that there would also be significant challenges.