Coast Guard: Assessing Deployable Specialized Forces' Workforce Needs Could Improve Efficiency and Reduce Potential Overlap or Gaps in Capabilities

The U.S. Coast Guard, within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), is the principal federal agency charged with ensuring the security and safety of the waters under U.S. jurisdiction. To help carry out its missions, the Coast Guard maintains Specialized Forces units with the capabilities needed to handle drug interdiction, terrorism, and other threats to the U.S. maritime environment. The Coast Guard reorganized the command structure of these units in 2007 and again in 2013.

The Maritime Security Improvement Act of 2018 included a provision for GAO to evaluate Specialized Forces units and provide a report to Congress. This report examines the extent to which the Coast Guard addressed key practices and considerations for assessing reorganization of its Specialized Forces units. GAO assessed the Coast Guard report and associated workforce planning documentation and data used for its 2013 reorganization and analyzed the extent to which the agency applied key practices. GAO also analyzed guidance and data on Specialized Forces capabilities and operations to identify potential overlap or gaps and interviewed agency officials.

In reorganizing its Deployable Specialized Forces (Specialized Forces) in 2013, the Coast Guard generally applied three of five key practices for agency reorganization, including establishing goals and outcomes, engaging stakeholders, and addressing longstanding management challenges, such as training shortfalls. However, the Coast Guard did not fully apply the other two key practices—using data and evidence and addressing potential overlap and duplication within the Specialized Forces workforce. For example:

The Coast Guard has not assessed the overall Specialized Forces workforce needs, as this practice recommends. Officials from some units stated that they experienced periods of underutilization, while other units with the same or similar capabilities turned down operations for lack of available personnel.

GAO identified some overlap among the capabilities of the different Specialized Forces units and the Coast Guard missions they support—in some cases Specialized Forces units were co-located with other Specialized Forces units with many of the same capabilities and similar missions. In August 2019, Coast Guard officials acknowledged that the 2013 reorganization did not conduct an analysis of potential overlap or duplication of capabilities and agreed that overlap or gaps in Specialized Forces capabilities could exist.

Assessing workforce needs and the extent to which unnecessary overlap or duplication may exist among Specialized Forces would help ensure that the agency effectively allocates resources and uses them efficiently.

GAO makes two recommendations to DHS. First, GAO recommends that the Coast Guard conduct an analysis of its Specialized Forces' workforce needs, with which DHS concurred. Second, GAO recommends that the Coast Guard assess the extent to which unnecessary overlap or duplication exists. Although DHS did not concur, GAO continues to believe the findings documented in the report support the recommendation.

The U.S. Coast Guard, within the Department of Homeland Security  (DHS), is the principal federal agency charged with ensuring the security  and safety of the waters under U.S. jurisdiction. To help carry out its  missions, the Coast Guard maintains Deployable Specialized Forces  (Specialized Forces) units with the capabilities needed to deploy with  specialized training to handle counterdrug, terrorism, and other threats to  the U.S. maritime environment. The Coast Guard’s Specialized Forces  units specialize in maritime counterterrorism operations; focus on  antiterrorism to protect the nation’s most critical commercial and military  ports; provide marine environmental response; protect high value  maritime assets and critical infrastructure; and conduct counterdrug and  counterpiracy operations.

The Coast Guard established Specialized Forces with certain capabilities  in the 1970s and 1980s. After the terrorist attacks of September 11th,  2001, the Maritime Security Transportation Act of 2002 mandated that the  Coast Guard establish new types of Specialized Forces units with  capabilities to deter, protect against, and respond to the threat of a  terrorist attack in the maritime environment, among other things. The  Coast Guard subsequently established the units and has since developed  new Specialized Forces capabilities. The Coast Guard also reorganized  the command structure of these units in 2007 and again in 2013.

In April 2019, the Commandant of the Coast Guard testified before  Congress about challenges the Coast Guard faces in meeting its  missions and the need for additional resources. Given this Coast Guard  request, it is critical that the Coast Guard ensure it is spending existing resources as efficiently as possible, and since the 2013 reorganization,  questions have been raised as to whether this is the case with  Specialized Forces.

The Maritime Security Improvement Act of 2018 includes a provision for  GAO to evaluate the Coast Guard’s Deployable Specialized Forces. In  this report, we examined the extent to which the Coast Guard considered  key practices for assessing the reorganization of its deployable  specialized forces. In addition, we provide information on Specialized  Forces’ operations and costs in Appendix I of this report.

To examine the extent to which the Coast Guard addressed key practices  and considerations for assessing reorganization of its Specialized Forces,  we identified a 2011 Coast Guard report that made recommendations for  Specialized Forces organizational change and a 2012 review of the Coast  Guard’s report that preceded the Coast Guard’s 2013 reorganization of  these units. We verified with Coast Guard officials that these documents  were to provide the justification for the 2013 organizational change. We  assessed these reports, data, and documents against our criteria on key  practices and considerations for agency reorganization. In prior work, we  identified key practices agencies should consider for the development  and implementation of agency reforms—such as establishing goals, and  using data and evidence. We used the following scale to evaluate the  Coast Guard’s report that recommended the 2013 reorganization against  the key practices, questions, and considerations:

Generally applied—the agency documents demonstrated that Coast  Guard officials considered applicable key practices and  considerations.

Partially applied—the agency documents demonstrated that Coast  Guard officials considered some, but not all, key practices and  considerations.

Not at all applied—the agency documents did not demonstrate that  Coast Guard officials considered any key practices and  considerations.

In addition, we took the following steps:

We collected and reviewed documentation on each Specialized  Forces unit’s missions, operations, and capabilities, such as  guidance; memoranda of understanding or agreement; tactics,  techniques, and procedures; and operations reports. Additionally, we  conducted a network analysis in which we aggregated information on  Coast Guard missions, operations, and capabilities, and developed a  representation of the relationships among the Specialized Forces  units and their capabilities. Using our Duplication, Overlap, and  Fragmentation guide, we analyzed these networks to determine the  extent of potential overlap among the units’ primary, secondary, and  collateral missions and their capabilities.

We interviewed officials from Coast Guard headquarters and the  Specialized Forces to obtain their perspectives on the 2013  reorganization, current operating practices and challenges, if any, and  to assess the extent to which Coast Guard actions align with key  practices and considerations for agency reorganization. Specifically,  we visited Specialized Forces in 3 of 18 locations—Miami, FL, San  Diego, CA, and Seattle, WA—which we selected because they had  more than one type of Specialized Forces co-located. Through these  site visits or via phone, we interviewed officials representing Coast  Guard headquarters perspectives on Specialized Forces and non- headquarters officials from both Maritime Security Response Teams  (MSRTs), both Tactical Law Enforcement Teams (TACLETs), and the  National Strike Force (NSF). We also interviewed officials from two of  10 Maritime Safety and Security Teams (MSSTs), one from each of  the Coast Guard’s two operational commands—Atlantic Area  Command and Pacific Area Command—and active duty officials from  one of eight Port Security Units (PSUs), selected to obtain perspective  from a PSU co-located with another Specialized Forces unit. We also  interviewed officials from two Sectors to obtain their perspectives on  working with Specialized Forces units, whom we selected because  they were located in port areas with at least two of these units and  different operational command areas. Additionally, we interviewed  Specialized Forces officials about how the data and other inputs are  used for workforce planning.

To describe Specialized Forces operations and costs, we identified  and analyzed Coast Guard data on the number of operations and cost  information associated with Specialized Forces units. This included  the number of annual operations, personnel and operating cost levels,  and resources used to carry out Coast Guard missions for fiscal years  2016 through 2018, and planned for fiscal year 2019. To assess the  reliability of the operations, costs, and Specialized Forces missions for  fiscal years 2016 through 2018 and planned for 2019, we reviewed  documentation, such as data dictionaries, system manuals, and user  guides. We also interviewed Specialized Forces officials to better  understand the processes for inputting and monitoring the quality of  data, and how they identify and address any deficiencies. We found  the data to be sufficiently reliable for the purposes of reporting the  number of Specialized Forces operations and selected cost  information, as well as linking individual unit operations to Coast  Guard missions.

We conducted this performance audit from January 2019 to November  2019 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing  standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to  obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for  our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe  that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings  and conclusions based on our audit objectives.

Responsibilities of the Coast Guard’s Deployable Specialized Forces

The Coast Guard has 11 statutory missions, which are divided into  homeland security and non-homeland security missions (see appendix  II). The Coast Guard’s units that conduct operations to achieve its  statutory missions are organized into shore-based forces such as boat  stations, maritime patrol forces such as cutters and icebreakers, and  Specialized Forces—the latter of which can serve as a force multiplier for  the other units, such as by deploying for added capacity during homeland  security missions, including port security, drug interdiction, and defense  readiness. Table 1 details Specialized Forces teams, types of  operations they conduct, and an example of an operation.

Specialized Forces units deploy from their home locations, such as major  U.S. port areas, to conduct operations in U.S. coastal waters and  internationally. For example, some units such as MSRTs, MSSTs and  PSUs deploy with specialized boats on trailers that can be towed or air  lifted to the site of an antiterrorism patrol or defense readiness operation.  Other Specialized Forces units do not maintain the vessels, such as  cutters, or air assets, such as helicopters, from which they carry out  operations. TACLETs, for example, do not maintain any boats and rely on  and deploy via U.S. Navy or Allied vessels, as well as Coast Guard  cutters, to conduct drug interdiction operations. Figure 1 shows Coast  Guard personnel conducting a drug interdiction operation that included a  TACLET member boarding a foreign, semi-submersible vessel, which  resulted in seizing 17,000 pounds of cocaine.

The Coast Guard is the lead federal maritime law enforcement agency on  waters beyond 12 nautical miles offshore of the U.S. coast. The Coast  Guard shares responsibility for patrolling the U.S. maritime borders and  territorial sea (i.e., maritime approaches 12 nautical miles seaward of the  U.S. coast) to interdict drugs and foreign nationals illegally entering the  United States with U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s Air and Marine  Operations and Border Patrol. Outside of DHS, the Department of  Defense (DOD) is the lead federal agency for the detection and  monitoring of the aerial and maritime transit of illegal drugs into the United  States, and it operates systems, such as radar, that can be used in  support of DHS and other federal, state, and local law enforcement  activities. Figure 2 depicts the geographic areas in which Specialized  Forces operate and resources, such as vessels or aircraft, used to  support their operations.

Coast Guard Reorganized its Deployable Specialized Forces in 2007 and 2013

In July 2007, the Coast Guard reorganized the command structure of its  Specialized Forces and aligned them as an independent Coast Guard  command—the Deployable Operations Group. The Deployable  Operations Group was intended to enhance operational effectiveness and  interagency coordination in responding to a range of national  emergencies and events, such as terrorist threats or natural disasters.  Prior to the Deployable Operations Group, Specialized Forces aligned  geographically under Atlantic Area and Pacific Area commands. In 2010,  we found that the unified command structure achieved its intended  benefits of standardized training and centrally managing assets. We also  reported in 2010 that the Deployable Operations Group faced human  resource challenges such as selecting qualified candidates and achieving  and maintaining qualifications to perform certain high-skill techniques,  such as vertical insertion from a helicopter onto the deck of a ship during  maritime interdiction missions. Because of the ongoing program  changes at that time, we did not make recommendations.

In 2010, a DHS Inspector General report recommended a systematic  review and analysis of the MSST program to determine, in part, the  optimal staffing levels, training, and competency mix needed. The Coast  Guard agreed and cited planned MSST program changes in its response  to the Inspector General report. The Coast Guard’s Fiscal Year 2011  budget included a proposal to close five MSSTs and consolidate those  forces to achieve cost savings, among other things.

A 2011 Coast Guard report recommended that the Coast Guard integrate  Specialized Forces units across the Coast Guard, balance the capacity of  the Specialized Forces with proficiency and safety levels, and manage  risk. In April 2013, the Coast Guard disbanded the Deployable Operations  Group, and Specialized Forces units returned to regional commands.  Figure 3 shows the evolution of Coast Guard Specialized Forces units  since 1970.

The April 2013 reorganization of the Coast Guard’s Specialized Forces  units under regional commands more closely aligns with its original  command structure that existed prior to the 2007 creation of the  Deployable Operations Group. Figure 4 details the three command  structures—pre-Deployable Operations Group, Deployable Operations  Group, and Post-Deployable Operations Group.

Coast Guard Applied Some Key Practices when Reorganizing its Deployable Specialized Forces, but Has Not Fully Analyzed Workforce Needs or Operational Capabilities

The Coast Guard generally applied three of five key practices for agency  reform and partially applied two of five when developing its report that  recommended the 2013 reorganization of its Specialized Forces units.  Table 2 identifies the extent to which the Coast Guard’s reorganization  applied key practices and considerations.

Coast Guard Generally Applied Three of Five Key Practices for Reorganizing its Deployable Specialized Forces

Coast Guard generally applied three of five key practices for Specialized  Forces reorganization, including establishing goals and outcomes,  involving employees and key stakeholders, and addressing high risk  areas and longstanding management challenges.

Establishing goals and outcomes of reforms can help decision makers  determine what problems genuinely need to be fixed, how to balance  differing objectives, and what steps need to be taken to create long-term  gains. The Coast Guard generally applied this key practice in its analysis  of Specialized Forces units. For example, the Coast Guard’s 2011 report  cites personnel safety as a main reason to reform Specialized Forces  operations. According to Coast Guard officials, part of the rationale for  this focus was because of a training mishap and a problem with  equipment requirements. Specifically, officials stated that in 2010, a  Coast Guard member drowned while training when he entered the water  without self-inflating flotation equipment. Coast Guard officials told us that  at the time of the incident, members of Specialized Forces units would  carry in excess of 100 pounds of specialized gear and equipment.  Officials also noted that at that time there were concerns that members’  self-inflating flotation devices could inflate onboard aircraft, which in the  event of a crash in the water could result in personnel being unable to exit  the aircraft. The Coast Guard subsequently established a goal for its  reorganization to mitigate this safety risk by decreasing gear weight and  personal flotation devices.

Further, the report recommended reducing or eliminating inconsistencies  between the Specialized Forces units and the rest of the Coast Guard.  For example, a Coast Guard official told us that integration between the  Deployable Operations Group and the rest of the Coast Guard was  inconsistent, training programs were not standardized, and training took  place at 15 different locations. This resulted in difficulties sharing assets,  such as aircraft and boats, for use during training sessions. As a result of  the report findings and its recommendation, the 2013 reorganization  realigned Specialized Forces units under regional operational commands  to integrate its logistics with the rest of the Coast Guard (fig 2.).

Involve Employees and Key Stakeholders in Developing Reforms

Involving employees and key stakeholders in the process of developing  reforms is part of an integrated approach that helps facilitate the  development of reform goals and objectives, as well as incorporate  insights from a frontline perspective and increase customer acceptance of  any changes. The Coast Guard generally applied this key practice  because it involved senior officials representing the agency to develop the  goals of the reorganization, how to address them, and to make reform  recommendations to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of  Specialized Forces operations. The Coast Guard’s 2011 report included  and incorporated input from a broad range of subject matter experts  including high level officers representing a comprehensive mix of Coast  Guard units, with a diverse mix of experience, and it reflected different  programs throughout the Coast Guard to ensure a comprehensive review.  During site visits, Coast Guard officials told us the reorganization from the  Deployable Operations Group to Specialized Forces had a positive effect  by helping to ensure tactics, training, and techniques became  standardized and ensuring better cooperation within the Coast Guard as  well as with other agencies. For example, Coast Guard officials told us  that because their area of responsibility is large and busy, they use  MSSTs to augment their local capabilities and to apply the MSST’s  specialized capabilities that the local unit does not have. Coast Guard  officials also emphasized an increase in safety, particularly with a  decrease in a risk of drowning while in tactical gear.

Address High Risk Areas and Longstanding Management Challenges

Addressing long standing weaknesses in how some federal programs and  agencies operate is a key practice, which can improve the effectiveness  and responsiveness of the federal government. The Coast Guard  generally applied this key practice because it considered high risk areas  when considering Specialized Forces reorganization. Specifically, the  Coast Guard addressed retention and training, which it identified in its  2011 report to be high risk areas and longstanding management  challenges. For example, the Coast Guard’s 2011 report identified the  need for additional subject matter expertise and made recommendations  to implement training standardization across the Specialized Forces. Our  work has also identified retention and training as challenges. We found in  2010 that the Coast Guard was unable to retain qualified Specialized  Forces personnel, in part because of additional training requirements.  For example, while personnel working on a cutter may need a boat driver  certification, an MSST or MSRT member would need an additional  tactical boat driver course.

The Coast Guard subsequently developed detailed guidance for  Specialized Forces units that includes standardized training,  requirements, and qualifications to be followed regardless of the unit  location and to be applied consistently across organizational commands.  During site visits to units in the Pacific and Atlantic Areas, we observed  that equipment was standardized across Specialized Forces, and officials  we spoke with described the benefits of the standardized training and  equipment. Figure 5 shows Coast Guard MSST personnel conducting  standardized training, which officials said has the added benefit of  providing potential deterrence of illegal activities, such as drug smuggling,  in the geographic area of the training.

Coast Guard officials also told us that, prior to the 2007 reorganization to  the Deployable Operations Group, Coast Guard personnel working in  Specialized Forces units could not remain in those units and be  competitive for promotions. Coast Guard officials told us that this was  because the Coast Guard has certain requirements for career  progression, including personnel working in various assignments within a  given career path. In 2010, we reported that the Coast Guard had  developed a career path for maritime law enforcement personnel—who  are part of operations that generally address the Coast Guard’s homeland  security missions. Coast Guard officials told us that this change was a  response to challenges the agency faced retaining law enforcement  personnel. Officials said this change created a maritime law enforcement  career path within the Specialized Forces community. Coast Guard  officials we spoke with also told that us the career path has helped them  retain qualified Specialized Forces personnel.

Coast Guard Has Not Fully Used Data to Assess Workforce Needs or Evaluated Potential Overlap or Gaps in the Capabilities of its Deployable Specialized Forces Use Data and Evidence to Assess Workforce Needs

Coast Guard partially applied two of five key practices for agency  reorganization, including using data and evidence, and considering to  some extent the possibility of fragmentation, duplication, and overlap.  However, it has not used data and evidence to fully assess Specialized  Forces workforce needs and has not comprehensively evaluated the  potential for overlaps or gaps in the capabilities among them.

We have reported that agencies are better equipped to address  management and performance challenges when managers use reliable  data and evidence, such as evidence from program evaluations and  performance data that provide information on how well a program or  agency is achieving its goals. We have previously reported that when  reforming a given program, the use of data and evidence is critical for  setting program priorities and allocating resources. The Coast Guard  used some data and evidence related to a specific management  challenge—training mishaps—but did not use data and evidence to fully  assess Specialized Forces workforce needs. As previously mentioned,  the Coast Guard analyzed equipment weight data and scenarios and  made recommendations based on the results of these analyses to reduce  the risk of drowning. The 2011 report affirmed the locations of the  Specialized Forces units to ensure that unit capabilities were  geographically distributed, but it recommended additional analyses of  some unit locations, such as TACLETs. The Coast Guard found that the  geographic distribution of the Specialized Forces, at the time of the  analysis, provided coverage for their tactical law enforcement and  waterside operations and did not recommend changes to the geographic  locations of these units.

The Coast Guard partially applied this key practice because, when it  reorganized its Specialized Forces command structure in 2013, it did not  assess Specialized Forces workforce needs with regard to the number of  personnel required to conduct its operations. The Coast Guard’s 2011  report identified some capability and capacity shortfalls, including  inadequate capacity to conduct certain security operations, and  recommended an analysis of staffing levels for all Specialized Forces  units. Similarly, a 2012 Homeland Security Studies and Analysis Institute  peer review of the Coast Guard’s 2011 report on its Specialized Forces  noted the need for a more comprehensive analysis of all of the units to  ensure the effective use of their specialized capabilities.

In the eight years since the Coast Guard study recommended workforce  needs analyses, the Coast Guard has not assessed the overall  Specialized Forces workforce needs or established such an analysis as a  priority. The Coast Guard conducted a unit level analysis of its PSUs in  January 2014, but it did not use the results because the analysis focused  on non-deployed personnel. Officials stated the analysis identified gaps in  personnel and recommended that the Coast Guard expand the size of the  units to be able to fulfill mission requirements. However, Coast Guard  officials said they did not act on the recommendations of the study to  request different resource levels. Officials told us that leadership  changes among Specialized Forces can result in units, such as PSUs,  getting study results based on scope decisions with which the new leader  disagrees.

We found that the Coast Guard might not have the right mix and number  of personnel relative to the mix and number of operations Specialized  Forces conduct to meet mission demands. Our analysis of Specialized  Forces data for fiscal years 2016 through 2018 and planned for 2019  found variation in the number of operations requested of some units  during this period, even though the number of personnel remained  relatively constant. For example, our analysis of Coast Guard data found  that PSU requests—and the number of operations carried out—changed  from three operations in 2016 to six in 2018, with two operations planned in 2019, spread among a constant of approximately 1,000 personnel. In  another example, our analysis of Coast Guard data found that the of  number operations requested for MSSTs varied from 85 in 2016 to 67 in  2018, and 39 planned for 2019. Our analysis of Coast Guard data found  that the number of MSST operations carried out was 152 in 2016, 141 in  2018, and 379 planned operations in 2019, while the number of personnel  assigned to MSSTs decreased from 562 in 2016 to 547 planned for  2019.

Such variations may affect the extent to which Specialized Forces units  are used efficiently. Officials from some units we interviewed indicated  that they experienced periods of underutilization, while other similar units  turned down operations for lack of available personnel. For example, an  official at one unit described efforts to increase the number of operations  carried out by the unit, with officials describing outreach efforts to other  Coast Guard units to encourage those units to call on them for  specialized assistance. Officials at another unit conducted similar  outreach, including passing out flyers describing Specialized Forces  capabilities and contact information should the other Coast Guard units  need assistance. In contrast, officials from a different Specialized Forces  unit described instances where they had to decline operations because  they did not have enough personnel to meet the demand. Further, an  official from one Area Command responsible for assigning some of the  Specialized Forces operations stated approximately 5 percent of requests  for Specialized Forces assistance went unfulfilled.

Without an analysis of the Specialized Forces units as a whole, the Coast  Guard does not have the assurance that it has the requisite number of  personnel in the right units to conduct the required missions. Such an  analysis would better position the Coast Guard to identify capability gaps  between mission requirements and mission performance caused by  deficiencies in the numbers of personnel available, as required by the  Coast Guard Authorization Act of 2015. Coast Guard officials from  Specialized Forces units we interviewed in 2019 acknowledged that an  analysis of each unit would be useful and in August 2019, officials from  headquarters affirmed this and stated the Coast Guard aims to conduct  analyses of the individual units. We found that these analyses consider  each unit individually and do not comprehensively consider similar units,  such as Specialized Forces. Therefore, without analyzing the Specialized  Forces program as a whole, the Coast Guard may miss opportunities to  optimize the allocation of personnel among Specialized Forces units, as  well as the number of units. Using data and evidence to comprehensively  assess workforce needs across Specialized Forces units would better  position the Coast Guard to prioritize its Specialized Forces efforts to  more effectively achieve desired outcomes.

Address Fragmentation, Overlap, and Duplication, If Any Exists and is Unnecessary

As we have reported since 2011, agencies may be able to achieve  greater efficiency or effectiveness by reducing or better managing  programmatic fragmentation, overlap, and duplication. We have also  reported that these issues should be considered during agency reform  efforts. We found that the Coast Guard partially considered how to  reduce potential duplication and overlap when reorganizing the  Specialized Forces units.

The 2011 Coast Guard report identified some duplication of one  specialized unit and challenges associated with uncoordinated training  and fragmented guidance. The Coast Guard recommended the  elimination of one Specialized Forces unit with that specialized capability,  and to change training requirements to reduce the duplication of roles  within one specific Specialized Forces unit. Further, the report  recommended training standardization and associated guidance, which the Coast Guard subsequently addressed by updating its guidance and  standardizing training requirements. In addition, the Coast Guard report  recommended changes to the capabilities maintained by some units,  such as MSSTs. Specifically, the report recommended that the Coast  Guard focus MSSTs on waterside security capabilities and eliminate law  enforcement roles, among others, to reduce duplicative training costs.  Further, according to officials, in response to the Coast Guard  Authorization Act of 2010, the Coast Guard eliminated the MSST in San  Diego, California and replaced it with MSRT West, a second MSRT. The  Coast Guard also placed all regional dive lockers under MSRT West.  According to Coast Guard officials, structuring regional dive lockers under  a single command in a single geographic location is safer and more  efficient, because dive operations require a high level of subject matter  expertise in the command as well as personnel actually participating in  the dives.

However, the Coast Guard partially applied this practice because it has  not conducted the analyses necessary to fully identify potential overlap  and the extent to which it could be unnecessarily duplicative. The Coast  Guard categorizes Specialized Forces missions, such as drug interdiction  or defense readiness, as primary, secondary or collateral, and assigns  different levels of capabilities according to these categories. Specifically,  multiple Specialized Forces are used to support the same Coast Guard  missions, which often require similar capabilities from the units, such as  the ability to perform enhanced law enforcement boardings. Figure 6  provides a visual representation of the Specialized Forces missions, the  capabilities to carry out operations in support of those missions, and the  units that address the mission areas.

As shown in figure 6, MSSTs and PSUs primary and secondary missions  overlap, as do the capabilities necessary to conduct three of the same  missions—Ports, Waterways, and Coastal Security; Defense Readiness;  and Search and Rescue. MSSTs and PSUs have operational differences,  but there may be benefits to assessing when to use PSUs in place of  MSSTs or vice versa, such as when one Specialized Force can be  deployed more rapidly, or because Specialized Forces are located in  close proximity. For example, MSSTs maintain the ability to deploy almost  immediately to carry out an operation, while PSUs generally require  around 24 months to deploy. PSUs generally have a deployment  preparation cycle of at least 24 months and up to 48 months.

Moreover, the variance in Specialized Forces utilization and the  overlapping capabilities units maintain underscores a challenge and an  opportunity, particularly given the close proximity of Specialized Forces  units. For example, given that there are certain instances where  Specialized Forces units appear to be substitutable, assessing the extent  to which co-located units could be better leveraged could help the Coast  Guard more efficiently manage its resources. Figure 7 shows the  locations of Coast Guard Specialized Forces units and the close proximity  of some units, such as co-located MSSTs and PSUs, which have  overlapping primary and secondary defense readiness and ports  waterways and coastal security missions (fig. 6) and related capabilities.

In March 2019, as previously noted, Coast Guard leadership again called  for a review of PSUs, citing overlap, personnel shortages, and excessive  distance to training areas (such as waterways and weapon ranges). The  challenge this new PSU study seeks to address underscores the  importance of a contemporary and comprehensive assessment of these  units’ workforce needs. It also presents the Coast Guard with an  opportunity to consider whether it could more effectively use its co- located Specialized Forces. For example, instead of deploying a PSU  within commuting distance of an operation occurring in San Francisco,  CA that required surge capacity, the Coast Guard deployed an MSST  from Seattle, WA for 7 days, even though both Specialized Forces are to  maintain the same capabilities needed for the operation. Coast Guard  officials stated that they decided to send the MSST to meet a surge  capacity instead of the local PSU because Ports, Waterways and Coastal  Security is a secondary mission for PSUs and PSUs do not bring law  enforcement capability of boarding officers, among other things.  According to Coast Guard officials, each PSU costs around $1 million a  year to operate when not deployed to Guantanamo Bay, and two of eight  PSUs are deployed annually. Assessing Specialized Forces workforce  needs to determine the optimal mix of units and analyzing trade-offs, such  as eliminating underutilized units, could identify opportunities for the  Coast Guard to save millions of dollars over time. Elimination of even one  PSU could save around a million dollars annually. Because the exact  amount of savings would depend on the outcomes of those analyses and  currently available cost data is not available for making estimates, we  cannot precisely estimate the value of potential savings. However, given  that the Coast Guard has begun an assessment of PSUs, it is reasonable  to expect that a comprehensive analysis of Specialized Forces could find  unnecessary duplication and could recommend PSU closures. Coast  Guard officials did not state that they are considering this review as part  of a comprehensive review of Specialized Forces that would include  assessing the overlapping capabilities of other Specialized Forces units.

In August 2019, Coast Guard officials told us that overlap or gaps in  Specialized Forces’ capabilities could exist. Coast Guard officials also  stated that some overlapping capability could be beneficial. While overlap  may be beneficial, overlapping capabilities, if unnecessary, could indicate  inefficiencies, such as excess capacity in some areas, including  geographic areas, to the detriment of others where there may be  capability gaps. The Coast Guard is not currently positioned to take action  to reduce the risk of some potentially unnecessary overlap or duplication  among the Specialized Forces units because it has yet to  comprehensively assess the Specialized Forces program. Specifically, as  reported above, Coast Guard officials stated that the Coast Guard has  conducted some staffing analyses of standalone Specialized Forces  units, but has not evaluated the Specialized Forces’ workforce or  operations as a whole. Until the Coast Guard comprehensively assesses  Specialized Forces’ needs, the Coast Guard will lack a complete picture  of the extent to which overlapping capabilities are necessary or  appropriate, or where there are capability gaps or areas where certain  Specialized Forces units could be better leveraged to meet mission  requirements. Assessing the extent to which unnecessary overlap or  duplication exists among Specialized Forces’ capabilities, would better  position the Coast Guard to identify capability gaps and reallocate  resources, as needed, to use them more efficiently.

The Coast Guard’s Specialized Forces units include a range of  specialized capabilities that are vital to the agency’s ability to fulfill its  mission, and they constitute a significant force multiplier to maintain  readiness throughout major U.S. ports and cities. The Coast Guard faces  the difficult decision of determining how best to invest its limited  resources. Without having assessed its operational needs and mix of  personnel for Specialized Forces units, the Coast Guard does not have  the information it needs to ensure that it is investing its resources  efficiently. GAO’s key practices and considerations provide a framework  for agency reorganization and a decision-making approach that can help  ensure that resources are allocated efficiently and do not result in  unnecessary overlap or duplication. The Coast Guard did not fully apply  these practices when reorganizing the Specialized Forces. By  comprehensively assessing Specialized Forces’ workforce needs and  determining the extent to which overlapping capabilities are necessary, or  whether capability gaps may exist, the Coast Guard may be able to more  efficiently allocate resources for its Specialized Forces.

The Coast Guard should conduct a comprehensive analysis of its  Deployable Specialized Forces’ workforce needs. (Recommendation 1)

The Coast Guard should assess the extent to which unnecessary overlap  or duplication exists among Deployable Specialized Forces’ capabilities.  (Recommendation 2)

We provided a draft of this report to DHS for comment. DHS provided  technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. On  November 5, 2019, DHS also provided comments, reproduced in full in  appendix III. DHS concurred with one of our two recommendations, and  described actions planned to address it, but did not concur with the other.

DHS concurred with our first recommendation that the Coast Guard  should conduct a comprehensive analysis of its Specialized Forces’  workforce needs. DHS stated in its comments that the Coast Guard will  conduct individual unit analyses, prioritizing for units that were not  previously examined. Initial requests, according to the comments, will be  submitted to staff responsible for the analyses by January 31, 2020, and  estimated completion dates for the analyses are expected to be  determined after assessing the availability of funding to support the  analyses. These actions, if fully implemented, should address the intent of  the recommendation.

DHS did not concur with our second recommendation that the Coast  Guard assess the extent to which unnecessary overlap or duplication  exists among Specialized Forces’ capabilities. In its comments, DHS  stated that when the priority of the missions, capabilities, and subsequent  geographic operating areas are appropriately considered for each DSF  unit type, unnecessary overlap or duplication does not exist among DSF  capabilities. DHS further stated that our conclusions illustrate a  fundamental misunderstanding of the corresponding missions of DSF  units.

We note in our report that the way in which the Coast Guard deploys  certain Specialized Forces units may not result in overlap, but overlapping  capabilities amongst units could indicate inefficiencies in how they are  used, such as excess capacity in some areas, including geographic  areas, and missed opportunities for use in others. As noted in our report,  the Coast Guard has not conducted the analyses necessary to fully  identify potential overlap amongst units’ capabilities and the extent to  which opportunities may exist to use the units more efficiently. The Coast  Guard categorizes Specialized Forces missions, such as drug interdiction  or defense readiness, as primary, secondary, or collateral, and assigns  different levels of capabilities according to these categories. We found  that multiple Specialized Forces are used to support the same Coast  Guard missions, which often require similar capabilities from the units,  such as the ability to perform enhanced law enforcement boardings.  Further, as stated in our report, in August 2019, Coast Guard officials told  us that overlap or gaps in Specialized Forces’ capabilities could exist and  that some overlapping capability could be beneficial. While overlap may  be beneficial, overlapping capabilities, if unnecessary, could indicate  inefficiencies, such as excess capacity in some areas, including  geographic areas.

Also in its comments, DHS stated that we have not identified any  substantive examples of unnecessary overlap or duplication nor provided  any other compelling reasons for how implementing this recommendation  could enhance Coast Guard mission effectiveness. DHS cited our use of  MSST and PSU potential overlap as an example of misunderstanding  DSF unit missions and active versus reserve personnel. However, MSST  and PSU potential overlap is a prime example of why potential  unnecessary overlap should be examined by the Coast Guard.  Specifically, as noted in our report, MSST and PSU primary and  secondary missions overlap, as do the capabilities necessary to conduct  three of the same missions—Ports, Waterways, and Coastal Security;  Defense Readiness; and Search and Rescue. MSSTs and PSUs have  operational differences due to active versus reserve personnel status, but  there may be benefits to assessing when to use PSUs in place of MSSTs  or vice versa, such as when one Specialized Force can be deployed more  rapidly, or when Specialized Forces are located in close proximity.

Beyond the MSST and PSU potential overlap, active duty units such as  MSSTs and MSRTs provide an additional example. As shown in Figure 6  of our report, MSRTs and MSSTs share the primary missions of Ports,  Waterways, and Coastal Security, as well as common secondary  missions, including Drug and Migrant Interdiction. Additionally, MSRT- San Diego and MSST-Long Beach are within close proximity to one  another, offering an opportunity to examine potential overlap. Also, as  noted in our report, officials from some units we interviewed indicated that  they experienced periods of underutilization, while other similar units  turned down operations for lack of available personnel. For example, an  official at one unit described efforts to increase the number of operations  carried out by the unit, with officials describing outreach efforts to other  Coast Guard units to encourage those units to call on them for  specialized assistance. Officials at another unit conducted similar  outreach, including passing out flyers describing Specialized Forces  capabilities and contact information should the other Coast Guard units  need assistance. In contrast, officials from a different Specialized Forces  unit described instances where they had to decline operations because  they did not have enough personnel to meet the demand. Given that  there are certain instances where Specialized Forces units appear to be  substitutable, assessing the extent to which units could be better  leveraged could help the Coast Guard more efficiently manage its  resources.

In addition, in March 2019, Coast Guard leadership called for a review of  PSUs, citing overlap, personnel shortages, and excessive distance to  training areas (such as waterways and weapon ranges). As noted in our  report, the challenge this new PSU study seeks to address underscores  the importance of a contemporary and comprehensive assessment of  these units’ workforce needs and presents the Coast Guard with an  opportunity to consider whether it could more effectively use its co- located Specialized Forces. According to Coast Guard officials, each PSU  costs around $1 million a year to operate when not deployed to  Guantanamo Bay, and two of eight PSUs deploy annually. Assessing  Specialized Forces workforce needs to determine the optimal mix of units  and analyzing trade-offs, such as eliminating or moving underutilized  units, could identify opportunities for the Coast Guard to save millions of  dollars over time. As noted in our report, because the exact amount of  savings would depend on the outcomes of those analyses and cost data  that is not currently available for making estimates, we cannot precisely  estimate the value of potential savings.  However, given that the Coast  Guard has begun an assessment of PSUs, it is reasonable to expect that  a comprehensive analysis of Specialized Forces could provide either a  defensible basis for the existing structure or find unnecessary duplication  and could recommend changes to the number and location of Specialized  Forces.

In summary, as we state in our report, a comprehensive assessment of  Specialized Forces’ needs would, among other things, help the Coast  Guard have a more complete picture of the extent to which certain  Specialized Forces units could be better leveraged to meet mission  requirements. Assessing the extent to which unnecessary overlap or  duplication exists among Specialized Forces’ capabilities would better  position the Coast Guard to identify capability gaps and reallocate  resources, as needed, to use them more efficiently.

We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional  committees, the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security, and  other interested parties. In addition, the report is available at no charge on  the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov.

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact  me at (202) 512-3841 or AndersonN@gao.gov. GAO staff who made key  contributions to this report are listed in appendix IV.

Appendix I: Coast Guard Deployable Specialized Force Cost and Operations Data from 2016 to 2019 and Unit Locations

This appendix provides Coast Guard data on Deployable Specialized  Force (Specialized Forces) personnel, operations, costs, and resource  hours showing a mix of operational tempos, including variation in the  number of operations requested of some units such as Tactical Law  Enforcement Teams (TACLETs) and Port Security Units (PSUs), but  relatively constant numbers of personnel assigned to them.

Table 3 provides operational and cost details for Coast Guard Specialized  Forces units for fiscal years 2016 through 2018 and planned for 2019.

This appendix details the Coast Guard’s 11 missions, which are  characterized as non-homeland security and homeland-security missions  (see Table 4).

Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security

Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgements

Nathan J. Anderson, (202) 512-3841 or AndersonN@gao.gov.

In addition to the contact above, Ben Atwater (Assistant Director), Andrew  Curry (Analyst-in-Charge), Chuck Bausell, David Dornisch, Michele  Fejfar, Tracey King, and Calaera Powroznik made key contributions to  this report. Also contributing were: Jason Berman, Dominick Dale, Eric  Hauswirth, and Jan Montgomery.

The U.S. Coast Guard uses specialized forces to protect ports and waters from terrorism, drug activity, or environmental disasters. These forces often rely upon similar skill sets, so most of the specially trained units can perform similar if not the same missions.

However, we found this can potentially result in overlapping responsibilities and underutilized units. For example, one unit from Seattle was sent to San Francisco for a mission when there was already another local unit equipped to handle it.

We recommended the Coast Guard assess the extent of unnecessary overlap to save money and streamline specialized units.