Federal Protective Service's Organizational Placement: Considerations for Transition to the DHS Management Directorate

FPS conducts physical security and law enforcement activities for about 9,000 federal facilities and the millions of employees or visitors who work in or visit these facilities. Legislation enacted in November 2018 required DHS to determine the appropriate placement for FPS. The legislation also gave the Secretary of DHS authority to move FPS within DHS. In May 2019, DHS announced its decision to place FPS within the DHS Management Directorate as a direct report to the Under Secretary for Management.

GAO has reported that FPS faces persistent challenges in meeting its mission to protect facilities, and, as of 2019, physical security continues to be part of GAO's federal real property management high-risk area. For example, FPS has not yet fully implemented its guard management system. Thus, FPS is unable to obtain information to assess its guards' capability to address physical security risks across its portfolio.

This statement describes considerations for FPS's placement in DHS's Management Directorate based upon five key organizational placement criteria GAO identified, as well as steps to transition FPS based upon GAO's prior work on organizational change.

This testimony is based on reports GAO issued from 2002 through 2019, particularly, GAO's January 2019 report on FPS's organizational placement. Detailed information on the scope and methodology for this work can be found in these published products, cited throughout this testimony.

In its January 2019 report, GAO identified five key criteria relevant for evaluating placement options for the Federal Protective Service (FPS) within the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) or other federal agencies. (See table.)

Placing FPS, in the DHS Management Directorate was not an option GAO assessed in its January 2019 report. However, GAO did assess the option of making FPS a “standalone” entity reporting directly to the Deputy Secretary of DHS. GAO found that this placement met the first criteria ( mission, goals, and objectives ) and the third criteria ( organizational culture ) but did not completely meet the other criteria. For example, FPS had joint responsibility for coordinating facility protection with other federal agencies. DHS did not have joint responsibility for coordinating facility protection with FPS. GAO recommended DHS fully evaluate placement options for FPS. DHS concurred, and officials stated they conducted an assessment. GAO has not yet received DHS's assessment of placement options.

GAO's prior work on implementing an organizational change provides valuable insights for making any transition regarding FPS. These insights include key questions to consider such as: “What are the goals of the consolidation?” “How have stakeholders been involved in the decision-making?” In addition, GAO has identified key practices for organizational transformation, practices that include ensuring that top leadership drives the transformation and establishing a communication strategy to create shared expectations, among others. These questions and practices could provide insights to DHS and FPS as they implement FPS's new placement.

I am pleased to be here today to discuss considerations related to the  Federal Protective Service’s (FPS) organizational placement. For almost  50 years, FPS has been charged with protecting federal facilities and the  millions of employees and individuals who work in or visit them. FPS  provides physical-security and law-enforcement services at about 9,000  facilities, a majority of which are held or leased by the General Services  Administration (GSA).

The organizational placement of an office or agency can affect its  performance and ability to meet its mission. Our prior work has found that  during FPS’s previous organizational placements in GSA and two  agencies within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), it  experienced a number of operational, management, and funding  challenges, which had a bearing on its ability to accomplish its mission.  Most recently, in January 2019, we reported that FPS had made progress  in addressing some of these challenges, but others persisted. We also  identified criteria DHS should consider in evaluating organizational  placement options for FPS.

In May 2019, DHS announced its decision to transfer FPS from its  Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) to its  Management Directorate, and to report to the Under Secretary for  Management. We have also previously reported on practices to consider  in implementing organizational transformations or reorganizations. In  light of DHS’s decision, this testimony describes (1) considerations for  FPS’s placement in DHS’s Management Directorate, and (2) steps to  transition FPS.

This statement is primarily based on our January 2019 report. For that  report, we reviewed our 2002 work related to organizational transformation, which we conducted prior to the creation of DHS. From  this prior work, we identified five key criteria for assessing potential  placement options for FPS and we applied those key criteria to eight  agencies that we identified as potential organizational placement options  for FPS. For each criterion, we also identified elements (i.e.,  characteristics) that were specific to FPS based on our review of FPS  documents, our prior work on topics related to the criterion, as well as our  discussions with federal officials, an association representing federal law  enforcement officers, and a former high-ranking official in the former  National Protection and Programs Directorate (NPPD)—now reorganized  as CISA—with knowledge of FPS. We identified placement options at  agencies inside and outside of DHS that have similar responsibilities,  where FPS was previously placed, or that reflected FPS’s management  preference. We also reviewed our prior work on organizational change  and Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government for relevant  management responsibilities.

Our January 2019 report includes further details on the scope and  methodology of our work.

We conducted the work on which this statement is based in accordance  with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards  require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate  evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions  based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained  provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on  our audit objectives.

While the core mission of protecting federal facilities has remained  constant as FPS has moved from one agency to another, its  responsibilities have changed. In the 1970s, GSA created FPS as part of  its Public Buildings Service (PBS). While in GSA’s PBS, FPS was  responsible for protecting GSA’s held or leased facilities, providing both  physical security and law enforcement services. To protect buildings, FPS  officers developed physical security risk assessments, installed security  equipment, and oversaw contract guard services. As a part of its law  enforcement services, among other duties, FPS officers enforced laws  and regulations aimed at protecting federal facilities and the persons in  such facilities and conducted criminal investigations.

Following the attacks on September 11, 2001, the Homeland Security Act  of 2002 was enacted. It created DHS and moved FPS from GSA to the  new department, effective in March 2003. Within DHS, FPS was placed in  U. S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), where its  responsibilities grew beyond solely protecting GSA buildings to include  homeland security activities such as implementing homeland security  directives and providing law-enforcement, security, and emergency- response services during natural disasters and special events.

In 2009, DHS proposed transferring FPS from ICE to NPPD. In explaining  this transfer in DHS’s fiscal year 2010 budget justification to Congress,  DHS stated that having FPS and NPPD’s Office of Infrastructure  Protection in the same organization would further solidify NPPD as DHS’s  lead for critical infrastructure protection. FPS was placed in NPPD and  continued to lead physical security and law enforcement services at GSA- held or GSA-leased facilities and continued its efforts in homeland  security activities. In November 2018, legislation was enacted that  reorganized NPPD to an organization that had a greater statutory focus  on managing cyber risks and authorized the Secretary of Homeland  Security to determine the appropriate placement for FPS within DHS and  begin transfer of FPS to that entity.

Throughout FPS’s organizational placements in DHS, we have reported  on persistent challenges it faced in meeting its mission to protect facilities.  In 2011, we reported on FPS’s challenges in transferring mission support  functions from ICE to NPPD. While FPS was in NPPD, we reported on  FPS’s challenges related to managing and overseeing contract guards  and collaborating with GSA and the United States Marshals Service  (Marshals) on facility security. We made recommendations to help  address these challenges and FPS has made progress on some of these  recommendations. For example, in September 2018, FPS and GSA  established a formal agreement on roles and responsibilities related to  facility protection, as we recommended. However, in our January 2019  report, we identified challenges related to other aspects of overseeing  contract guards and collaboration with other agencies on physical security  that had persisted. As of June of 2019, FPS continues to work on  establishing a contract guard-management system. However, FPS is  unable to assess its guards’ capabilities across its portfolio because the  system is not fully implemented nor does it interact with its training  system. As of 2019, federal physical security continues to be part of our  federal real-property management’s high-risk area.

Key Criteria for Evaluating Placement Options

In 2002, we reported on organizational and accountability criteria for  establishing DHS. From this prior work, we identified key criteria that are  relevant to assessing potential placement options for FPS, as shown in  table 1.

Considerations for FPS’s Placement in DHS’s Management Directorate

For our January 2019 report, we applied these key criteria for evaluating  organizational placement to eight agencies that could be potential  placement options for FPS. We found that none of the selected agencies  met all the organizational placement criteria; thus, any of the  organizational placement options could result in both benefits and trade- offs. In instances where placing FPS within DHS met our criteria (that is,  instances where DHS was similar to FPS), FPS could experience  benefits. In those instances where the criteria were not met, we reported  it would be incumbent upon any agency to consider and address any  potential trade-offs in order to ensure the decision was successful.

We reviewed FPS as a “standalone” entity reporting directly to the Deputy  Secretary of DHS and found this placement option met several key  criteria. Table 2 below summarizes our analysis.

For the first four criteria—(1) mission, goals, and objectives; (2)  responsibilities; (3) organizational culture; and (4) information sharing and  coordination—we determined that DHS met the criteria if the agency or its  subcomponents had any similarities to FPS. For the last criterion— mission support—we determined that DHS met the criterion if the agency  or its subcomponents had similarities to FPS or could provide FPS  needed mission support.

Mission, Goals, and Objectives. In January 2019, we reported that  FPS’s mission focused on the protection of federal facilities and the  people working in and visiting those facilities. DHS was similar to FPS in  that its mission statement and goals as stated in its strategic plan include  an explicit focus on the protection of infrastructure or specific facilities.  Our prior work found that placing an agency into an organization that has  a similar mission might help ensure that the agency’s mission receives  adequate funding, attention, visibility, and support. Our January 2019  work reported that one of DHS’s goals—as noted in its strategic plan  covering fiscal years 2014 to 2018—was to reduce risk to the nation’s  critical infrastructure. DHS and FPS share objectives that focus on  mitigating risks and responding to incidents.

Responsibilities. In January 2019, we reported that FPS has facility- protection and physical-security responsibilities and law-enforcement, and  contract-guard oversight responsibilities. DHS was similar to FPS as it  had responsibilities for physical security and performed law enforcement  functions. As a part of its physical security activities, FPS conducted  facility security assessments, identified countermeasures (e.g.,  equipment and contract guards) best suited to secure a facility, and  oversaw contract guards. As a part of its law enforcement activities, FPS  proactively patrolled facilities, responded to incidents, and conducted  criminal investigations. FPS also provided additional operational law  enforcement support, at the direction of the Secretary of Homeland  Security, to address emerging threats and homeland security incidents.  One of FPS’s most critical activities was overseeing about 13,500  contract guards who were posted at federal facilities and were responsible for controlling access to facilities, responding to emergency  situations involving facility safety and security, and performing other  duties. FPS was responsible for ensuring, among other things, that these  guards are performing their assigned duties and have the necessary  training and certifications. DHS, however, only used a limited number of  contract guards and therefore had less responsibility. At the time of our  review, DHS officials told us they procured about 130 guards.

Organizational Culture. In January 2019, we reported that while there  are many areas relevant to organizational culture, law enforcement was a  key aspect of FPS’s organizational culture, according to officials we  interviewed from an association of security companies and a former, high- ranking official in NPPD. DHS had a similar culture in that it was a law  enforcement agency.

Information Sharing and Coordination. In January 2019, we reported  that Component Intelligence Programs (CIP) were organizations in DHS  that collected, gathered, processed, analyzed, produced, or disseminated  information related to national homeland security. In 2016, DHS  designated a division within FPS as a CIP, a move that allowed FPS  more access to information on threats other DHS agencies have identified  and actions they plan to take. While DHS, like FPS, had access to and  could share information related to national homeland security, DHS did  not have joint responsibility for coordinating facility protection with FPS.  Rather, FPS shared this responsibility with GSA, and these two agencies  and Marshals had joint responsibility for protecting courthouses. FPS has  faced challenges with coordinating with these agencies in the past. For  example, in September 2011, we reported that FPS, Marshals, and other  agencies involved in protecting courthouses (i.e., GSA and the  Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts) faced challenges related to  coordination, such as in the implementation of roles and responsibilities  and the use or participation in existing collaboration mechanisms.

Mission Support. In January 2019, we reported that mission support was  comprised of financial management, human capital, information  technology systems for financial management, and law enforcement  training. FPS owned and used many of the key operational and business- related information technology (IT) systems and applications it needs to  carry out its mission. However, FPS received some mission support  services from other agencies in DHS, such as human capital and some  aspects of information technology. We found that if FPS changed its  organizational placement it would need mission support in these areas.  For example, FPS did not have delegated examining authority to allow it  to fill competitive civil service jobs and relied on NPPD to provide this  service. DHS had the authority to fill competitive service jobs that could  support FPS needs. Further, FPS used a financial management IT  system owned by ICE. DHS could provide FPS access to financial  management systems that can support FPS. Finally, FPS offered its own  training courses and would still need access to DHS’s Federal Law  Enforcement Training Centers.

In our January 2019 report, we did not assess FPS as a placement within  DHS’s Management Directorate. Further, we recommended DHS (1)  identify the specific goals of a change in FPS’s placement—that is, what  DHS expects to achieve by moving FPS to another agency, and (2) fully  evaluate placement options for FPS based on what DHS expects to  achieve by changing FPS’s placement, an assessment of FPS’s current  placement, and other best practices such as an analysis of alternatives  assessing the benefits and trade-offs. DHS agreed with our  recommendations. In May 2019, FPS officials told us that the Acting  Secretary’s decision to place FPS within the Management Directorate  was based upon an assessment of placement options within DHS using  criteria and analyzing the trade-offs. GAO has not yet received DHS’s  assessment of placement options. We will assess the actions DHS has  taken in response to our recommendations when we receive DHS’s  assessment.

Our prior work offers valuable insights for agencies to consider when  evaluating or implementing a reorganization or transformation, and can  provide insights for making any transition regarding FPS. These include  considering (1) key questions for consolidations and (2) leading practices  when implementing an organizational change.

Two sets of considerations for organizational transformations provide  insights for making any FPS organizational placement. First, in May 2012,  we reported on key questions for agency officials to consider when  evaluating and implementing an organizational change that involves  consolidation. Table 3 provides a summary of these key questions.  Answering these questions would help provide FPS with assurance that  important aspects of effective organizational change are addressed.

Second, we reported in July 2003 on key practices and implementation  steps for mergers and organizational transformations. The practices we  noted are intended to help agencies transform their cultures so that they  can be more results oriented, customer focused, and collaborative in  nature (see table 4).

In summary, the questions and practices for organizational change that  we previously identified could provide insights to DHS and FPS for any  transition.  .  Madam Chairwoman Torres Small, Ranking Member Crenshaw, and  Members of the Subcommittee, this concludes my prepared statement. I  would be pleased to respond to any questions that you may have at this  time.

If you or your staff has any questions concerning this testimony, please  contact Lori Rectanus at 202-512-2834 or rectanusl@gao.gov. Contact  points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may  be found on the last page of this statement. In addition to the contacts  named above: Amelia Bates Shachoy (Assistant Director); Roshni Davé;  George Depaoli (Analyst-in-Charge); Geoffrey Hamilton; Kelly Rubin;  Sarah Veale; and Amelia Michelle Weathers made key contributions to  the testimony. Other staff who made contributions to the reports cited in  the testimony are identified in the source products.

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the  United States. The published product may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety  without further permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain  copyrighted images or other material, permission from the copyright holder may be  necessary if you wish to reproduce this material separately.

The Federal Protective Service protects about 9,000 federal facilities and their occupants. FPS is part of the Department of Homeland Security, but it's been moved to two different "parent agencies" within the department in the last 15 years.

Reorganization can affect an agency's performance. After each move, FPS faced new duties and challenges. But where's the best fit?

We testified on 5 criteria to use when evaluating new placement options for FPS. For example, the department should consider whether the organizational culture (the employees' underlying beliefs, values, attitudes, and expectations) of an agency is compatible with FPS's.


Department of Homeland Security: Employee Morale Survey Scores Highlight Progress and Continued Challenges

DHS is the third-largest cabinet-level department in the federal government, employing more than 240,000 staff in a broad range of jobs, including countering terrorism and homeland security threats, providing aviation and border security, emergency response, cybersecurity, and critical infrastructure protection. Since it began operations in 2003, DHS has faced challenges with low employee morale and engagement. Federal surveys have consistently found that DHS employees are less satisfied with their jobs compared to the average federal employee. For example, DHS's scores on the FEVS and the Partnership for Public Service's rankings of the Best Places to Work in the Federal Government® are consistently among the lowest for similarly-sized federal agencies.

This statement addresses our past and ongoing work monitoring human capital management and employee morale at DHS and select work on employee engagement across the government. This statement is based on products GAO issued from September 2012 through May 2019 as well as GAO's ongoing efforts to monitor employee morale at DHS as part of GAO's high-risk work. For these products, GAO analyzed DHS strategies and other documents related to DHS's efforts to address its high-risk areas, interviewed DHS officials, conducted analyses of FEVS data, and interviewed officials from other federal agencies that achieved high employee engagement scores, among other things.

GAO provided a copy of new information in this statement to DHS for review. DHS confirmed the accuracy of this information.

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has undertaken initiatives to strengthen employee engagement through efforts at its component agencies and across the department. For example, at the headquarters level, DHS has instituted initiatives to improve awareness and access to support programs, benefits, and resources for DHS employees and their families.

In 2019, DHS improved its employee engagement scores, as measured by the Office of Personnel Management's Federal Employee Viewpoint Survey (FEVS)—a tool that measures employees' perceptions of whether and to what extent conditions characterizing successful organizations are present in their agency. As shown below, DHS increased its scores on a measure of employee engagement, the Employee Engagement Index (EEI), across 4 consecutive years, from a low of 53 percent in 2015 to 62 percent in 2019.

While DHS has made progress in improving its scores, in 2019 it remained six points below the government-wide average for the EEI. For several years, DHS and its component agencies have identified root causes for their engagement scores including concerns about leadership accountability and understaffing, among others. This statement discusses nine recommendations related to DHS employee engagement and workforce planning. DHS implemented all but one of these recommendations—to review and correct its coding of cybersecurity positions and assess the accuracy of position descriptions. Finally, filling vacancies could help ensure continued leadership commitment across DHS's mission areas.

I am pleased to be here today to discuss the importance of Department of  Homeland Security (DHS) employee engagement and morale, the  department’s progress thus far, and areas where challenges remain.

DHS is the third-largest cabinet-level department in the federal  government, employing more than 240,000 staff in a broad range of jobs,  including aviation and border security, emergency response,  cybersecurity, and critical infrastructure protection. The DHS workforce is  located throughout the nation, carrying out activities in support of DHS’s  missions to counter terrorism and homeland security threats, secure  United States borders, secure cyberspace and critical infrastructure,  preserve and uphold the nation’s prosperity and economic security,  strengthen preparedness and resilience, and champion the DHS  workforce and strengthen the department.

Since it began operations in 2003, DHS has faced challenges with low  employee morale and engagement. Federal surveys have consistently  found that DHS employees are less satisfied with their jobs than the  government-wide average of federal employees. For example, DHS’s  employee satisfaction—as measured by the Office of Personnel  Management Federal Employee Viewpoint Survey (FEVS), a tool that  measures employees’ perceptions of whether and to what extent  conditions characterizing successful organizations are present in their  agency, and the Partnership for Public Service’s rankings of the Best  Places to Work in the Federal Government®—is consistently among the  lowest for similarly-sized federal agencies.

As we stated in our 2015 report on employee engagement across the  federal government, a number of studies of private-sector entities have  found that increased levels of engagement result in better individual and  organizational performance including increased employee performance  and productivity; higher customer service ratings; fewer safety incidents;  and less absenteeism and turnover. Studies of the public sector, while  more limited, have shown similar benefits. For example, the Merit  Systems Protection Board found that higher levels of employee  engagement in federal agencies led to improved agency performance,  less absenteeism, and fewer equal employment opportunity complaints.  As we reported in 2015, across the government, key drivers of employee  morale include holding constructive performance conversations, career  development and training opportunities, work-life balance, an inclusive  work environment, employee involvement, and communication from  management. We also identified key lessons for improving employee  engagement. These key lessons include using effective management  practices to implement change, looking to other sources of data in  addition to the FEVS to form a complete picture of employee  engagement, and recognizing that improving engagement and  organizational performance takes time, which may involve several efforts  with effects seen at different points in time. Engagement is one  component of employee morale.

DHS employee morale and engagement concerns are one example of the  challenges the department faces in implementing its missions. In 2003,  shortly after the department was formed, we recognized that the creation  of DHS was an enormous undertaking that could take years to implement.  Failure to effectively address management challenges could have serious  national security consequences. As a result, in 2003, shortly after the  department was formed, we designated Implementing and Transforming  DHS as a high-risk area to the federal government. DHS subsequently  made considerable progress in transforming its original component  agencies into a single cabinet-level department. As a result, in 2013, we  narrowed the scope of the high-risk area to focus on strengthening DHS  management functions, including human capital management, and  changed the name of the high-risk area to Strengthening DHS  Management Functions to reflect this focus. We continue to monitor  DHS’s work in this area—including work to address employee morale and  engagement—and regularly meet with DHS to discuss progress.

My testimony today discusses our past and ongoing work monitoring  human capital management and employee morale at DHS and select  work on employee engagement across the government. This statement is  based on products we issued from September 2012 through May 2019 as  well as our ongoing efforts in 2019 to monitor employee morale at DHS  as part of our high-risk work. For our products we analyzed DHS  strategies and other documents related to the department’s efforts to  address its high-risk area, interviewed DHS officials, conducted analyses  of FEVS data, and interviewed officials from other federal agencies that  achieved high employee engagement scores, among other things. We  conducted the work on which this statement is based in accordance with  generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards  require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate  evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions  based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained  provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on  our audit objectives.

DHS Has Taken Steps to Improve Its Employee Engagement Scores but Still Falls below the Government-Wide Average

In connection with the Strengthening DHS Management Functions high- risk area, we monitor DHS’s progress in the area of employee morale and  engagement. In 2010, we identified, and DHS agreed, that achieving 30  specific outcomes would be critical to addressing the challenges within  the department’s high-risk management areas. These 30 outcomes are  the criteria by which we gauge DHS’s demonstrated progress. We rate  each outcome on a scale of not-initiated, initiated, partially addressed,  mostly addressed, or fully addressed. Several of these outcome criteria  relate to human capital actions needed to improve employee morale.  Specifically, we monitor DHS’s progress to:  seek employees’ input on a periodic basis and demonstrate  measurable progress in implementing strategies to adjust human  capital approaches; base hiring decisions, management selections, promotions, and  performance evaluations on human capital competencies and  individual performance; enhance information technology security through improved workforce  planning of the DHS cybersecurity workforce; and  improve DHS’s FEVS scores related to employee engagement.

Since we began monitoring DHS’s progress on these outcomes, DHS has  worked to strengthen employee engagement through several efforts both  at DHS headquarters and within its component agencies. In this  statement, we discuss nine recommendations related to DHS employee  engagement and workforce planning, eight of which have been  implemented by the department. Within DHS, the Office of the Chief  Human Capital Officer (OCHCO) is responsible for implementing policies  and programs to recruit, hire, train, and retain DHS’s workforce. As the  department-wide unit responsible for human capital issues within DHS,  OCHCO also provides guidance and oversight related to morale issues to  the DHS components.

Seeking employees’ input and demonstrating progress to adjust  human capital approaches. DHS, OCHCO, and the components have  taken action to use employees’ input from the FEVS to inform and  implement initiatives targeted at improving employee engagement. For  example, in 2017 and 2018 DHS implemented our two recommendations  for OCHCO and DHS components to establish metrics of success within  their action plans for addressing employee satisfaction problems and to  better use these plans to examine the root causes of morale challenges.  DHS components have continued to develop these employee  engagement action plans and several components report implementing  initiatives to enhance employee engagement. For example, the U.S.  Secret Service’s action plan details a sponsorship program for all newly  hired and recently relocated employees. In addition, one division of U.S.  Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) used FEVS survey data to  identify a need for increased engagement between employees and  component leadership. ICE’s employee action plan includes goals with  milestones, timelines, and metrics to improve this engagement through  efforts such as leadership town halls and leadership site visits.

At the headquarters level, DHS and OCHCO have also established  employee engagement initiatives across the department. For example,  DHS established initiatives for employees and their families that aim to  increase awareness and access to support programs, benefits, and  resources. Through another initiative—Human Resources (H.R.)  Academy—DHS provides education, training, and career development  opportunities to human resource professionals within the department.  DHS uses an Employee Engagement Steering Committee to guide and  monitor implementation of these DHS-wide employee engagement  initiatives. As a result of these steps, among other actions, we have  considered this human capital outcome area fully addressed since 2018.

Basing hiring decisions and promotions on competencies and  performance. OCHCO has conducted audits to better ensure  components are basing hiring decisions and promotions on human capital  competencies and individual performance and we have considered this  outcome fully addressed since 2017. Our past work has highlighted the  importance of selecting candidates based on qualifications, as doing  otherwise can negatively affect morale. Working to ensure that  components’ human capital decisions are based on performance and  established competencies helps create a connection between individual  performance and the agency’s success.

Enhancing information technology security through improved  workforce planning for cybersecurity positions. In February 2018, we  made six recommendations to DHS to take steps to identify its position  and critical skill requirements among its cybersecurity workforce. Since  then, DHS has implemented all six recommendations. For example, in  fiscal year 2019, regarding its cybersecurity position identification and  coding efforts, we verified that DHS had identified individuals in each  component who are responsible for leading those efforts, developed  procedures, established a process to review each component’s  procedures, and developed plans for reporting critical needs.

However, DHS has not yet implemented a recommendation we made in  March 2019 to review and correct its coding of cybersecurity positions  and assess the accuracy of position descriptions. Specifically, we stated  that DHS had not correctly categorized its information  technology/cybersecurity/cyber-related positions. We noted that having  inaccurate information about the type of work performed by 28 percent of  the department’s information technology/cybersecurity/cyber-related  positions is a significant impediment to effectively examining the  department’s cybersecurity workforce, identifying work roles of critical  need, and improving workforce planning. DHS officials stated that they  plan to implement this recommendation by March 2020. As a result, this  outcome remains mostly addressed. Until DHS accurately categorizes its  positions, its ability to effectively identify critical staffing needs will be  impaired.

Improving FEVS scores on employee engagement. Since our last  High-Risk report in March 2019, DHS has demonstrated additional  progress in its employee engagement scores, as measured by the FEVS  Employee Engagement Index (EEI). The EEI is one of three indices OPM  calculates to synthesize FEVS data. The EEI measures conditions that  lead to engaged employees and is comprised of three sub-indices related  to employees’ views on leadership, supervisors, and intrinsic work  experience. As a result of continued improvement on DHS’s EEI score,  we have moved this outcome rating from partially addressed to mostly  addressed based on DHS’s 2019 score. As shown in figure 1, DHS  increased its EEI score across 4 consecutive years, from a low of 53  percent in 2015 to 62 percent in 2019. In particular, DHS improved its  score by two points between 2018 and 2019 while the government  average remained constant over the same period. With its 2019 score,  DHS also regained the ground that it lost during an 8-point drop between  2010 and 2015.

While DHS has made progress in improving its scores including moving  toward the government average, it remains below the government  average on the EEI and on other measures of employee morale. For  example, in 2019 DHS remained six points below the government-wide  average for the EEI. In addition to the EEI and other indices OPM  calculates, the Partnership for Public Service uses FEVS data to produce  an index of the Best Places to Work in the Federal Government®. The  Partnership for Public Service’s analysis of FEVS data indicates low  levels of employee satisfaction and commitment for DHS employees  relative to other large federal agencies. In 2019, the Partnership for Public  Service ranked DHS 17th out of 17 large federal agencies for employee  satisfaction and commitment.

Across the department, employee satisfaction scores vary by component.  Some DHS components have EEI scores above the government average  and rank highly on the Partnership for Public Service’s index. For  example, the U.S. Coast Guard and U.S. Citizenship and Immigration  Services have EEI scores of 76 and 74, respectively, and rank 85th and  90th, respectively, out of 420 subcomponent agencies on the Partnership  for Public Service’s index. Further, some DHS component agencies have  improved their scores in recent years. The U.S. Secret Service raised its  EEI score 7 points between 2018 and 2019, and it moved from the last  place among all subcomponent agencies on the Partnership for Public  Service’s Ranking in 2016 to 360th out of 420 subcomponent agencies in  2019. However, other DHS component agencies continue to rank among  the lowest across the federal government in the Partnership for Public  Service rankings of employee satisfaction and commitment. For example,  in 2019 out of 420 subcomponent agencies across the federal  government, the DHS Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction office  ranked 420th, the DHS Office of Intelligence and Analysis ranked 406th,  and the Transportation Security Administration ranked 398th for  employee satisfaction and commitment. As a result, continuing to  increase employee engagement and morale remains important to  strengthening DHS’s management functions and ability to implement its  missions.

DHS employee concerns about senior leadership, among other things, is  one area that negatively affects DHS’s overall employee morale scores.  In 2015, we identified effective management practices agencies can use  to improve employee engagement across the government. One of these  practices is the direct involvement of top leadership in organizational  improvement efforts. When top leadership clearly and personally leads  organizational improvement efforts, it provides an identifiable source for  employees to rally around and helps processes stay on course. A DHS  analysis of its 2012 FEVS scores indicated DHS low morale issues may  persist because of employee concerns about senior leadership and  supervisors, among other things, such as whether their talents were being  well-used. Within the 2019 FEVS results for both DHS and government  wide, leadership remains the lowest of the three sub-indices of the EEI. In  addition, for several years DHS components have identified several root  causes of engagement scores. For example, in 2019, the Transportation  Security Administration identified the performance of managers, time  constraints and understaffing, and lack of manager and leadership  accountability for change as root causes of the component’s engagement  scores in recent years. Another component, U.S. Citizenship and  Immigration Services, identified in 2019 that the areas of leadership  performance, accountability, transparency, and training and development  opportunities were 2018 engagement score root causes.

We have previously reported that DHS’s top leadership, including the  Secretary and Deputy Secretary, have demonstrated commitment and  support for addressing the department’s management challenges.  Continuing to identify and address the root causes of employee  engagement scores and addressing the human capital management  challenges we have identified in relation to the DHS management high- risk area could help DHS maintain progress in improving employee  morale. Implementing our recommendation to review and correct DHS  coding of cybersecurity positions and assess the accuracy of position  descriptions will assist the department in identifying critical staffing needs.  In addition, as we reported in May 2019, vacancies in top leadership  positions could pose a challenge to addressing aspects of DHS’s high- risk area, such as employee morale. There are currently acting officials  serving in ten positions requiring Senate confirmation. Filling  vacancies—including top DHS leadership positions and the heads of  operational components—with confirmed appointees, as applicable, could  help ensure continued leadership commitment across DHS’s mission  areas. We will continue to monitor DHS’s progress in strengthening  management functions, and may identify additional actions DHS  leadership could take to improve employee morale and engagement.

In conclusion, DHS has made notable progress in the area of human  capital management, specifically in improving employee engagement and  morale, but still falls behind other federal agencies. It is essential for DHS  to continue improving employee morale and engagement given their  impact on agency performance and the importance of DHS’s missions.  Continued senior leadership commitment to employee engagement  efforts and filling critical vacancies could assist DHS in these efforts.

Madam Chairwoman Torres Small, Ranking Member Crenshaw, and Members  of the Subcommittee, this completes my prepared statement, I would be happy  to respond to any questions that you may have at this time.

If you or your staff have any questions concerning this statement, please  contact Christopher P. Currie at (404) 679-1875 or curriec@gao.gov.  Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public  Affairs may be found on the last page of this statement. Key contributors  to this statement were Alana Finley (Assistant Director), Mara McMillen  (Analyst-in-Charge), Nina Daoud, Michele Fejfar, Andrew Howard, and  Tom Lombardi. In addition, Colette Alexander, Richard Cederholm, Ben  Crossley, Eric Essig, Laura Ann Holland, Tammi Kalugdan, Neelaxi  Lakhmani, Shannin O’Neill, Kevin Reeves, John Sawyer, and Julia  Vieweg made contributions to this statement.

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Employees at the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) counter terrorism, provide airplane and border security, and respond to emergencies (among other critical functions).

Federal surveys have consistently found that DHS employees are less satisfied with their jobs than the average federal worker. In response, DHS has been working to increase employee morale—e.g., by improving access to benefits and resources.

We testified that DHS has made progress in improving employee morale between 2015 and 2019. However, it still ranks the lowest among large federal agencies for employee satisfaction and engagement.