Environmental Liabilities: DOE Needs to Better Plan for Post-Cleanup Challenges Facing Sites

After over 70 years of nuclear weapons production and energy research at hundreds of sites across the country, DOE faces over $500 billion in environmental liabilities associated with cleanup of hazardous contamination and long-term management of these sites. LM is responsible for the portion of these liabilities associated with long-term management of sites after active cleanup has been completed. LM oversees 100 sites across the country. Depending on the sites' clean-up standards and intended reuse, LM will likely be managing some sites for centuries.

Senate Report 116-48 accompanying the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2020 includes a provision for GAO to review LM's operations, including the nature of its environmental liability. This report examines (1) LM's environmental liability, and (2) any challenges LM faces in managing its sites and how it is addressing those challenges. GAO analyzed data on LM's environmental liability; interviewed officials at LM headquarters and those responsible for the nine sites requiring the most intensive level of management; and reviewed relevant policies, procedures, and guidance.

The environmental liability of the Department of Energy's (DOE) Office of Legacy Management (LM) was estimated at $7.35 billion in fiscal year 2019 and, according to LM officials, is expected to grow as LM acquires more sites (see figure for LM's current sites). Long-term surveillance and maintenance activities associated with radioactive and hazardous waste, such as treating residual groundwater contamination, account for about 40 percent of the costs. LM's environmental liability has generally remained stable over the past 5 years. As of September 2019, LM is scheduled to receive 52 additional sites by 2050, and officials expect LM's environmental liability to grow as a result. Officials said LM is taking steps to reduce its environmental liability at its current sites, such as exploring alternative approaches for reducing residual contamination.

LM officials identified challenges in providing long-term surveillance and maintenance of sites related to: (1) the performance of remedies that contain or reduce contamination, (2) environmental conditions, and (3) new regulatory requirements. LM is taking some actions to address these challenges. For example, at its Rocky Flats, Colorado, site, LM is repairing an aging landfill that was damaged by extreme rainfall events. However, LM has not yet planned for how to address challenges at some sites that may require new cleanup work that is not in the scope of LM's expertise and resources. By developing agreements and procedures with the entities that would be responsible for conducting this new cleanup work, LM can help mitigate risks to human health and the environment. In addition, LM has not made plans to assess the effects of climate change on its sites or to mitigate those effects, as called for in its strategic plan. By developing plans to assess the effect of climate change on its sites and to mitigate any significant impacts, LM could better ensure that its remedies will protect human health and the environment in the long term.

GAO is making three recommendations, including that DOE develop agreements and procedures for circumstances that require new cleanup work and that it develop plans to assess and to mitigate the effects of climate change on its sites. DOE agreed with all three recommendations.

Over seventy years of nuclear weapons production and energy research  by the federal government has generated large amounts of radioactive  and hazardous waste, spent nuclear fuel, uranium mill tailings, and  contaminated soil and groundwater at hundreds of sites across the  country. Even after active environmental remediation of these sites is  completed, few sites will be cleaned up to the point that they can be  released for unrestricted human access. Rather, many sites will require  surveillance and maintenance to ensure the continued protection of  human health and the environment for as long as contamination  remains—in many cases, hundreds or thousands of years into the future.  The Department of Energy (DOE) is responsible for such surveillance and  maintenance, and in 2003, it created the Office of Legacy Management  (LM) to manage those responsibilities. Specifically, LM is charged with  providing environmental surveillance, facility and site maintenance,  records management, and pension and benefit program oversight for  sites where active cleanup has been completed, among other things. For  fiscal year 2019, DOE budgeted about $159 million for LM activities.

The estimated future cost of LM’s long-term surveillance and  maintenance and other activities is known as LM’s environmental liability.  This cost is part of DOE’s overall environmental cleanup and disposal  liabilities, which DOE reported as $505.3 billion in fiscal year 2019. DOE  is responsible for the largest share of reported federal environmental  liabilities—about 85 percent in fiscal year 2019. We have previously  reported that the federal government’s environmental liabilities have been  growing for the past 20 years and are likely to continue to increase. In  2017, we designated the federal government’s environmental liabilities as  a high-risk area because of the large and expanding estimated costs of  cleaning up areas where federal activities have contaminated the  environment. We have also previously reported on challenges created by  fiscal exposures, which are responsibilities, programs, and activities that  legally may commit the federal government to future spending or create  the expectation for future spending (such as in the case of environmental  liabilities).

Senate Report 116-48 accompanying the National Defense Authorization  Act for FY 2020 includes a provision for us to review LM’s operations,  including the nature of its environmental liability. This report examines (1)  LM’s environmental liability and changes in this liability over time, and (2)  any challenges LM faces in providing long-term surveillance and  maintenance of sites, and the extent to which LM is addressing those  challenges.

To examine LM’s environmental liability and changes over time, we  reviewed environmental liability data provided by LM for fiscal years 2012  through 2019 (the time period for which comparable data were available),  including data for each LM site and activity. To assess the reliability of  these data, we reviewed accompanying documentation on LM’s sites and  its guidance on estimating its environmental liability, interviewed  knowledgeable officials from LM and DOE’s Office of the Chief Financial  Officer about the department’s systems for collecting and maintaining the  data, and conducted checks for data completeness and other factors. For  example, we confirmed the completeness of the data by verifying that the  number and types of sites represented in LM’s data align with  documentation listing its current sites as of fiscal year 2019. We found  these data to be sufficiently reliable for the purposes of our performance  audit, that is, to describe what the environmental liability estimate is and  how it has changed over time.

To examine any challenges facing LM in providing long-term surveillance  and maintenance of sites and the extent to which LM is addressing those  challenges, we reviewed relevant DOE and LM policies, procedures, and  guidance documents related to LM’s management of its sites. The control  activities component of internal control—the policies, procedures, actions,  or information systems that management designs or implements—was  significant to this objective, along with the related principle that  management should design control activities to achieve objectives and  respond to risks. We reviewed DOE documentation on policies and  procedures for providing long-term surveillance and maintenance and  compared this documentation with internal control criteria to identify any  gaps.

For both objectives, we interviewed LM headquarters officials and site- level officials responsible for the nine sites that require the most intensive  level of management, which LM refers to as category 3 sites. Appendix I  provides information about these sites. We interviewed officials from  these sites to obtain their perspectives on any trends in LM’s  environmental liability in recent years and any projected future changes,  as well any challenges facing LM in providing long-term surveillance and  maintenance of its sites and any actions or plans to address those  challenges. To develop interview questions for site-level officials, we  analyzed relevant reports from the National Academies of Science,  Engineering, and Medicine on DOE’s long-term management of post- cleanup sites. We categorized major areas of challenges identified in  these reports and used these categories to develop questions for site- level officials about potential challenges facing LM in providing long-term  surveillance and maintenance of sites. In developing these questions, we  also drew on challenges identified by LM headquarters officials. We  visited and toured one of LM’s category 3 sites—the Rocky Flats site in  Colorado. We selected this site to visit because, in the portion of LM’s  fiscal year 2019 environmental liability estimate that is broken down by  site, this site accounts for the largest amount.

We conducted this performance audit from August 2019 to May 2020, in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.

In 1999, DOE issued a report stating that, based on experience from a  decade of planning and conducting cleanup work at the sites for which it  is responsible, complete restoration to levels acceptable for unrestricted  use could not be accomplished at many of its sites. According to the  report, a variety of hazards would remain at many DOE sites after these  sites had been cleaned up in accordance with applicable requirements.  These hazards include long-lived radionuclides left in place in soils or  contained in on-site disposal cells and residual contaminants in surface  water and groundwater. The report cited technical challenges—such as  lack of existing technology for completely removing some types of  waste—and economic limitations—such as prohibitive costs to employ  available technology—as reasons why these hazards would remain. As  a result, DOE reported that long-term management would be needed at  these sites to ensure that the cleanup remedies—i.e., the actions,  systems, or other measures put in place to clean up a site—would protect  human health and the environment from these hazards into the future.  Several DOE organizations, including the Office of Environmental  Management (EM), were responsible for long-term management of post- cleanup sites until the department established LM in 2003. As of the end  of fiscal year 2019, LM had assumed responsibility for 100 sites across  the United States, including sites in Alaska and Puerto Rico (see fig. 1).

Roles and Responsibilities for Cleanup of Sites

Several different entities conducted cleanup of sites before LM assumed  responsibility for the sites. These different entities conducted cleanup  under a variety of authorities:

EM. Established in 1989, DOE’s EM is responsible for the cleanup of  legacy waste that resulted from the development and production of  nuclear weapons and government-sponsored nuclear energy  research dating back to World War II and the Cold War. Such waste  includes radioactive waste, spent nuclear fuel and nuclear material,  and contaminated soil and water, among other things. EM cleaned up  83 of the 100 sites that are now within LM’s portfolio. Key laws that  governed EM’s cleanup of these sites include the Comprehensive  Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 as  amended (CERCLA); the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act  of 1976 as amended (RCRA); and Title I of the Uranium Mill Tailings  Radiation Control Act of 1978 (UMTRCA). Title I of UMTRCA  authorizes a cleanup program for uranium mill tailings sites—which  produced uranium for nuclear weapons and other defense purposes— that were no longer operational as of 1978, the year of the law’s  enactment. DOE is generally responsible for financing the cleanup  of these sites. EM also cleaned up sites that are now within LM’s  portfolio under the Formerly Utilized Sites Remedial Action Program  (FUSRAP). This program was established in 1974 to identify,  investigate, and clean up sites where radioactive contamination  remained from Manhattan Project and early Atomic Energy  Commission operations. EM was responsible for cleaning up  FUSRAP sites until 1997, when Congress directed the U.S. Army  Corps of Engineers (USACE) to assume responsibility for the cleanup  work of the remaining designated FUSRAP sites.

USACE. USACE cleaned up 10 FUSRAP sites that are now within  LM’s portfolio. Under a memorandum of understanding signed by  DOE and USACE in 1999, DOE is responsible for the long-term  management of FUSRAP sites after USACE completes cleanup. Key  requirements that govern USACE’s cleanup of FUSRAP sites include  CERCLA and the National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution  Contingency Plan.

Private licensees. LM’s portfolio includes seven sites cleaned up by  private licensees, i.e., commercial operators who were permitted to  operate uranium mills or other facilities under a license from the  Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). In all except one case,  private licensees cleaned up these sites under Title II of UMTRCA,  which assigned responsibility to the licensee for reclamation of  uranium mill sites operating on or after the law’s enactment in 1978.  When a private licensee has completed all cleanup requirements,  NRC approves transfer of a site to LM for long-term management.

Cleanup activities conducted by these entities included decontaminating,  decommissioning, and demolishing buildings; containing and disposing of  a variety of hazardous and radioactive wastes; excavating and stabilizing  contaminated soil; constructing engineered disposal cells for  contaminated materials; containing and treating contaminated surface  water and groundwater; and preparing the land for future public,  industrial, or commercial use. Depending on the legal and regulatory  framework governing cleanup, other agencies or groups may have played  a role in setting cleanup standards and helping to select a site’s cleanup  remedy. For example, sites cleaned up under Title I of UMTRCA must  meet regulatory cleanup standards established by the Environmental  Protection Agency (EPA). For certain sites cleaned up under CERCLA  and RCRA, DOE has entered into agreements with EPA and the relevant  state regulator regarding the necessary cleanup actions, and EPA and  the state have provided input in selecting the cleanup remedy.

As cleanup of a site nears completion, LM works with the entity  responsible for cleanup to prepare the site for transition into LM’s  portfolio. The transition process for a given site may take up to 5 years,  during which time LM and the cleanup entity develop a long-term  surveillance and maintenance plan. Depending on the authority under  which a site has undergone cleanup, this plan may require approval by  regulators such as EPA or NRC. Other transition responsibilities include  identifying and preserving records and checking that administrative  institutional controls and other real property instruments are in place.  DOE considers site cleanup to be complete when, among other things,  short-term cleanup activities have been completed and long-term cleanup  measures, such as groundwater treatment, are in place. According to a  DOE document, ongoing groundwater remediation continues at many  sites after the official completion of cleanup because of the long  timeframes required to capture and remediate contaminated groundwater.

Once LM acquires a site, it places each site into one of three categories  based on the actual or anticipated long-term surveillance and  maintenance activities associated with the site.

LM has nine “category 3” sites, which require the most intensive  surveillance and maintenance due to the extent of residual  contamination, according to LM officials. These sites typically have an  ongoing remediation system—such as a groundwater treatment  system, according to officials—that LM must monitor and maintain.

LM has 49 “category 2” sites, which require routine inspection,  monitoring, and maintenance.

LM has 42 “category 1” sites, which require management of records  or stakeholder requests for information.

LM also maintains a list of 52 sites that, as of September 2019, are  expected to transition into its portfolio over the next three decades. Figure  2 illustrates sites’ transition from cleanup entities and their categorization.  Appendix II provides additional details about the current sites in LM’s  portfolio as of fiscal year 2019, and appendix III provides details about  sites that, as of September 2019, are scheduled to transition to LM by  2050. According to LM officials, LM does not have a schedule or  process for retiring sites from its portfolio. Depending on the sites’ clean- up standards and intended reuse, LM will likely be managing some sites  for centuries.

LM’s budget includes funding for other activities that are not directly  associated with its 100 sites. These activities include conducting an  inventory of abandoned defense-related uranium mines, overseeing  pensions and post-retirement benefits for former contractor workers at  closed DOE sites, and leading and coordinating DOE’s environmental  justice activities. As of fiscal year 2019, LM’s overall budget was about  $159 million.

Federal accounting standards require agencies that are responsible for  cleaning up contamination to estimate future cleanup and waste disposal  costs and to report such costs in their annual financial statements as  environmental liabilities. According to these standards, environmental  liability estimates are to include probable and reasonably estimable costs  of cleanup work. Environmental liability estimates do not include cost  estimates for work for which reasonable estimates cannot currently be  generated, such as cleanup costs at sites where no feasible remedy  exists, according to the standards.

In fiscal year 2019, DOE reported $505 billion in environmental cleanup  and disposal liabilities, of which about $64 billion are categorized by DOE  as “other legacy environment” costs. LM’s environmental liability is part of  this category, along with several other types of environmental liability  costs.

LM’s Environmental Liability Was Estimated at $7.35 Billion in Fiscal Year 2019 and Will Likely Grow as LM Acquires Additional Sites

LM estimated its environmental liability in fiscal year 2019 at $7.35 billion,  an amount that has been relatively stable over the last 5 years. However,  LM expects its environmental liability to increase as it acquires additional  sites, according to LM officials.

LM’s Environmental Liability Largely Reflects the Costs of Long-Term Surveillance and Maintenance of Its Sites

According to LM financial data, LM’s environmental liability estimate in  fiscal year 2019 was $7.35 billion. LM’s guidance defines its  environmental liability as an estimate of life-cycle costs associated with  five main activities—determined by DOE—occurring over 75 years (see  fig. 3). LM develops guidance on how its site managers should estimate  their sites’ environmental liability. In accordance with this guidance, site  managers are to develop estimates of the direct costs over the upcoming  75-year period. They are also to determine a certain amount of  contingency to account for potential changes in LM’s project scope  because of unknown and unpredictable events over the upcoming 75- year period.

As shown in figure 4, LM activities related to long-term surveillance and  maintenance of its sites accounted for about $3 billion—or 40 percent—of  its fiscal year 2019 environmental liability. LM activities related to  program direction and to archives and information management each  accounted for about 23 percent and 22 percent, respectively, of LM’s  fiscal year 2019 environmental liability, and activities related to asset  management and to communication, education, and outreach combined  for about 15 percent.

Of LM’s approximately $3 billion in costs for long-term surveillance and  maintenance, LM’s category 3 sites—the nine sites that require the most  intensive level of management—accounted for almost half of these  estimated costs (see fig. 5). The Rocky Flats site in Colorado accounted  for the largest share of this portion of the liability (about $452 million), and  the Fernald Preserve site in Ohio accounted for the second-largest share  (about $308 million). Long-term surveillance and maintenance  responsibilities for category 1 and category 2 sites, transition costs  associated with sites that LM will acquire in future years, and other  program-wide activities—such as exploring new technologies and  operating a laboratory—accounted for the remaining share (about $1.5  billion) of LM’s environmental liability related to long-term surveillance and  maintenance.

LM’s Environmental Liability Has Generally Remained Stable in Recent Years, with Some Notable Fluctuations at Individual Sites

LM’s total environmental liability has generally remained stable in recent  years, although there have been some notable fluctuations at individual  sites. In fiscal years 2015 through 2018, LM’s total environmental liability  remained between $6 billion and $7 billion per year, and increased to  slightly over $7 billion in fiscal year 2019 (see fig. 6). Most notably, LM’s  total environmental liability increased by about $2 billion (about 41  percent) between fiscal years 2014 and 2015. LM officials attributed this  increase to adopting a more thorough approach for estimating future  costs associated with sites scheduled to be transferred from USACE  under FUSRAP. LM officials said that, before fiscal year 2015, LM had  used a standard cost estimate for all of USACE’s sites, which resulted in  an underestimate of the associated liability. According to LM officials, in  fiscal year 2015 LM began estimating costs based on individual sites’  specific conditions, which allowed LM to capture more potential costs.

Similar to LM’s overall environmental liability, the long-term surveillance  and maintenance portion of LM’s environmental liability has generally  remained stable in recent years, though individual sites have seen some  notable changes. From fiscal year 2015 through 2018, LM’s  environmental liability related to long-term surveillance and maintenance  remained between about $3 billion and $3.5 billion. Similar to LM’s overall  environmental liability, the long-term surveillance and maintenance  portion of LM’s liability saw a more significant increase between fiscal  years 2014 and 2015, from about $2.2 billion to about $3.4 billion. At the  site level, of LM’s nine category 3 sites, the Fernald Preserve and Mound  sites in Ohio are examples of sites that have had mostly steady  decreases from fiscal year 2014 to 2019, which LM officials attributed in  part to adjustments to groundwater treatment strategies at Fernald  Preserve as well as transferring ownership of most of the Mound site to  another party. In contrast, several other sites (including Rocky Flats and  Grand Junction in Colorado and Weldon Spring in Missouri) saw overall  decreases from fiscal year 2014 to 2016 followed by steady increases  from fiscal year 2016 to 2019, which LM officials generally attributed to  costs of site maintenance at Rocky Flats, construction at Weldon Spring,  and planning activities for the potential closure of the disposal cell at  Grand Junction. LM officials provided additional details on specific factors  driving sites’ changes in environmental liability. For example:

At the Fernald Preserve site, the long-term surveillance and  maintenance liability has decreased overall from about $367 million in  fiscal year 2014 to about $308 million in fiscal year 2019 (about a 16  percent decrease). The site manager for Fernald attributed this  decrease to improvements in the site’s groundwater treatment  strategy. In 2014, LM made changes to optimize the site’s “pump-and- treat” system (which brings contaminated water above ground so that  it can be treated and contaminants removed) by increasing pumping  from the wells in the portion of the site with the most contamination,  according to the site manager. Further, the site manager said that this  change increased the amount of water coming from the more  contaminated areas, making the water treatment more efficient and  cost-effective in the long-term.

At the Mound site, the long-term surveillance and maintenance liability  has decreased from about $124 million in fiscal year 2014 to about  $68 million in fiscal year 2019 (about a 45 percent decrease).  According to LM officials, this decrease is in part due to a transfer in  ownership. Specifically, LM transferred ownership of the majority of  the site to the Mound Development Corporation to sell or lease  parcels of the land to third parties for commercial use. Transferring  ownership meant that LM gave up some of its responsibilities and  their associated costs (such as maintenance and repairs at buildings  that are now privately owned), although it continues to fulfill ongoing  groundwater treatment and records management responsibilities.

At the Rocky Flats site, the long-term surveillance and maintenance  liability has increased substantially since fiscal year 2016, from about  $269 million to about $452 million in fiscal year 2019 (about a 68  percent increase). According to the site manager for Rocky Flats, this  increase can be attributed to additional costs needed to repair aging  infrastructure. Specifically, a landfill on the site, which was  constructed in the 1950s, has been damaged by erosion in recent  years, and LM is currently undertaking a large-scale project to repair  and stabilize it after previous repairs failed to provide a long-term fix.  This project, which is due to be completed in the summer of 2020,  includes installing about 260 steel anchors of up to 95 feet in length  into the soil around the landfill. These anchors are intended to keep  the soil intact while drains route groundwater away from the areas of  the landfill that are particularly vulnerable to erosion.

LM’s Environmental Liability Is Likely to Grow as LM Acquires More Sites in Future Years

LM’s environmental liability is likely to grow as it acquires more sites in  future years, even as LM takes steps to reduce the environmental liability  associated with its current sites, according to LM officials. According to an  LM document, as of September 2019, LM is scheduled to acquire 52  additional sites by 2050, including six category 3 sites, 45 category 2  sites, and one category 1 site. Since LM does not account for the  environmental liability related to long-term surveillance and maintenance  for a portion of its sites until it acquires them, LM officials could not tell us  by how much its total environmental liability will increase as a result of  acquiring these sites. However, officials said that some sites  transitioning to LM in the future will be increasingly complex, which will  likely mean increased long-term surveillance and maintenance costs. In  particular, one official told us that the FUSRAP sites LM is set to acquire  from USACE will be larger and have more extensive residual  contamination than FUSRAP sites that LM had previously acquired. As a  result, these sites will likely require LM to undertake more extensive and  costly long-term surveillance and maintenance activities, according to this  official.

At the same time, LM officials said they are taking steps to help reduce  the environmental liability at LM’s current sites, such as exploring ways to  improve the cost-effectiveness of managing residual groundwater  contamination. For example:

At the Shiprock site in New Mexico, LM has initiated an environmental  assessment to evaluate the impacts of removing an evaporation pond  into which contaminated groundwater is being pumped, according to  the site manager. The site manager also told us that removing this  pond could mean reducing the scope of the site’s water pumping  activities and ultimately adopting a different groundwater treatment  strategy that could prove to be more efficient. Further, the site  manager said that this removal would result in reduced long-term  surveillance and maintenance costs associated with ongoing repairs  to the pond.

At the Tuba City site in Arizona, LM is conducting an environmental  assessment to weigh options for a new groundwater treatment  strategy. According to the site manager, the current strategy, which  involves injecting clean water into the site’s contaminated aquifer to  flush out contamination, does not cost-effectively address the root  cause of the groundwater contamination. Among other options, LM  may use its assessment to seek alternate concentration limits  accompanied by restrictions to grazing and water use, which LM  officials said could be a cost-effective way to manage residual  contamination.

LM Faces Several Challenges and Has Not Planned for Those That Require New Cleanup Work or Address Climate Change Risks

LM officials we interviewed identified a number of challenges that LM  faces in providing long-term surveillance and maintenance of sites. In  particular, officials identified challenges related to three main areas: (1)  the performance of remedies on its sites, (2) environmental conditions,  and (3) new requirements and regulations. LM is taking some actions to  address the challenges that officials identified. However, it has not  planned for how to address challenges with remedies at some sites that  may require additional cleanup work outside the scope of its expertise  and resources, and it has not developed plans to assess and mitigate  challenging environmental conditions that may become more frequent or  intense because of climate change.

Challenges with the Performance of Remedies Could Require New Cleanup Work

According to LM officials, LM faces challenges with cleanup remedies not  performing as predicted or intended at some sites. For example:

At the L-Bar site in New Mexico, officials told us that the disposal cell,  which was constructed by a private licensee under UMTRCA Title II  and holds about 2.1 million tons of radioactive mill tailings, began  experiencing erosion problems shortly after NRC transferred the site  to LM in 2004. This erosion is threatening to undermine the disposal  cell, according to LM officials (see fig. 7).

At the Monticello site in Utah, monitored natural attenuation—the  groundwater treatment remedy originally agreed to by DOE, EPA, and  the Utah state regulator—proved ineffective in meeting cleanup goals  within a few years of being implemented and of the site being  transferred to LM. As a result, in 2015, LM implemented a pump-and- treat approach that reduced contamination; however, officials told us  that the efficacy of this approach has declined over time, and LM is  again seeking to change the remedy.

To address challenges related to the performance of remedies, LM is  currently undertaking a risk analysis effort to rank sites according to  several types of risks, including the risk that a site will not attain  compliance with cleanup goals or that compliance will not be maintained  into the future. According to LM officials, LM plans to use the results of  the risk analysis to inform decisions about where to focus resources, to  identify systemic technical challenges, and to identify possible  opportunities for reducing LM’s environmental liability, such as through  technology development.

LM is also addressing challenges related to remedy performance by  updating some sites’ remedies. For example, LM has implemented an  erosion monitoring program for the L-Bar site and, at the Monticello site,  is collecting data that could allow it to seek regulatory approval for a new  groundwater compliance strategy, according to LM officials. LM officials  said that, in general, they consider such updates to be routine and to fall  within LM’s mission to provide long-term surveillance and maintenance of  these sites.

Nonetheless, LM officials told us that as LM acquires additional sites and  as remedies age, future challenges related to remedy performance could  result in the need for more extensive work, including active cleanup work  that is outside the scope of LM’s mission, capabilities, and resources. We  found that LM has developed agreements and procedures for addressing  such challenges at sites cleaned up by USACE, but has not developed  such agreements and procedures for sites cleaned up by EM or by  private licensees under Title II of UMTRCA. Specifically, regarding sites  cleaned up by USACE under FUSRAP, under the 1999 memorandum of  understanding between DOE and USACE, USACE is responsible for  carrying out additional cleanup actions when it determines such actions  are necessary. In addition, LM guidance related to transition and transfer  of FUSRAP sites includes examples of situations in which LM would  return a site to USACE for additional cleanup, such as situations in which  routine monitoring identifies new areas of contamination. Conversely, for  sites where EM was responsible for active cleanup, a 2005 memorandum  co-signed by the leadership of LM and EM includes a brief statement  about the need for LM and EM to coordinate in instances of “significant  remedy failures.” LM officials told us that structural or engineering  damage could signify evidence of a “significant remedy failure,” but said  that such criteria have not been documented. They also said that LM has  not defined a process by which such failures would be addressed. Finally,  LM officials said that there is no mechanism in place under UMTRCA for  LM to return a site to NRC or to seek recovery of costs from a private  licensee for any additional cleanup that needs to be done.

According to agency officials, LM has not developed agreements or  procedures for addressing challenges that require active cleanup work at  sites cleaned up by EM because LM has not yet encountered such  instances at any of its sites. They also noted that LM has been more  focused on long-term surveillance and maintenance and the process of  transitioning sites into its portfolio from EM and private licensees, rather  than a process for moving sites back to these entities if a cleanup remedy  fails. However, under federal internal control standards, management is  to design control activities to achieve objectives and respond to risks,  such as by clearly documenting internal control in management  directives, administrative policies, or operating manuals. By working  with EM and NRC to develop agreements and procedures for identifying  and addressing circumstances at LM sites that require new cleanup work  beyond the scope of LM’s mission, capabilities, and resources, LM can  help ensure mitigation by the most appropriate entity of the risks to  human health and the environment that such instances would present.

Challenging Environmental Conditions May Become More Frequent or Intense

LM faces challenges with environmental conditions at the sites—some of  which may become more frequent or intense—and, according to its  mission, LM must react to these challenges to ensure the sites remain  protective of human health and the environment. For example:

At the Rocky Flats site in Colorado, officials told us that extreme  rainfall events over the past few years have caused soils covering an  on-site landfill to “slump,” or slip downhill. In particular, rainfall during  2015—the site’s wettest year on record, according to LM officials— caused a 20-foot slump in the landfill.

The Boiling Nuclear Superheater site in Puerto Rico and the Pinellas  County site in Florida were both in the path of Hurricane Irma in 2017,  though neither site sustained substantial damage.

At the Weldon Spring site in Missouri, the site manager said that  tornadoes pose a risk to the site’s infrastructure, and that a strong  tornado in 2013 damaged the site’s interpretive center.

To address challenges related to environmental conditions, LM has been  repairing damages caused by extreme weather events. For example, at  the Rocky Flats site, LM is undertaking a major project to repair and  stabilize its aging landfill, as discussed earlier. At the Weldon Spring site,  LM installed a tornado shelter in 2014 and is currently building a new  interpretive center. In addition, according to the 2020 LM Site  Sustainability Plan, LM has taken a number of steps to implement  emergency and security measures, such as completing emergency drills  and tabletop exercises.

The U.S. Global Change Research Program—which coordinates and  integrates the activities of 13 federal agencies that research changes in  the global environment and their implications for society—reported in its  November 2018 Fourth National Climate Assessment that climate change  is playing a role in the increasing frequency of some types of extreme  weather, such as extremely heavy rainfall and hurricanes; these are  environmental conditions that have presented challenges at LM sites.  The assessment reported that climate models are consistent with  temperature and precipitation extremes becoming more frequent, more  intense, or longer in duration, which may make certain natural disasters  more frequent or more intense. As a result of the significant risks posed  by climate change and the nation’s fiscal condition, in February 2013, we  added Limiting the Federal Government’s Fiscal Exposure by Better  Managing Climate Change Risks to our list of areas at high risk for fraud,  waste, abuse, and mismanagement, or most in need of transformation.  In our March 2019 update to this high-risk area, we reported that the  federal government needs to improve the resilience of facilities it owns  and operates, and land it manages, against the effects of climate  change. In addition, in October 2019, we found that EPA needs to  improve management of risks from climate change at Superfund sites  where remedies may need to be operational indefinitely (see sidebar).

We Found That EPA Should Take Additional  Actions to Manage Risks from Climate Change  Superfund is the federal government’s principal  program to address sites with hazardous substances.  It was established by the Comprehensive  Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability  Act of 1980 and is administered by the Environmental  Protection Agency (EPA). EPA lists some of the most  seriously contaminated sites on the National Priorities  List (NPL) and has recorded over 500 contaminants at  those sites. Some NPL sites are located at federal  facilities, where departments such as the Department  of Energy are responsible for cleanup. However, most  NPL sites are nonfederal, where EPA generally carries  out or oversees the cleanup conducted by one or more  potentially responsible parties.  In October 2019, we reported that available federal  data on flooding, storm surge, wildfires, and sea level  rise suggest that about 60 percent of all nonfederal  NPL sites are located in areas that may be impacted  by these potential climate change effects. According to  EPA officials, remedies at nonfederal NPL sites may  have to be operational indefinitely, during which time  the potential effects of climate change may become  more extreme. We found that EPA has taken some  actions to manage risks from the potential impacts of  climate change effects at nonfederal NPL sites, but  that its actions did not fully align with essential  elements of enterprise risk management. For example,  we found that EPA officials do not always have  direction to ensure that they consistently integrate  climate change information into site-level risk  assessments and risk response decisions, according  to EPA officials. Without providing such direction, EPA  cannot ensure that remedies at nonfederal NPL sites  will protect human health and the environment in the  long-term.  We made four recommendations to EPA, including that  it provide direction on how to integrate information on  the potential impacts of climate change effects into risk  assessments and risk response decisions at  nonfederal NPL sites. EPA agreed with one  recommendation and disagreed with the other three.  We continue to believe that all four are warranted.

LM’s 2016-2025 Strategic Plan acknowledges the challenges posed by  climate change. To support the objective of improving the long-term  sustainability of environmental remedies, the plan includes a strategy to  “assess the effect of climate change on environmental remedies and  develop plans to mitigate significant impacts.” However, LM provided  minimal information about ongoing or planned efforts to carry out this  strategy. Specifically, the 2020 LM Site Sustainability Plan, which  officials said provides information about LM’s future plans to adapt to  changing climate conditions, includes the term “climate change” one  time, in reference to sustainable buildings—not to remedies. The plan  describes one pilot project conducted at the Monticello site to evaluate  the site’s main climate stressors and capacity to adapt to those  stressors, but it does not describe whether or how LM intends to use the  results of the pilot project, such as any specific plans to roll out the  project to other sites. Aside from the 2020 LM Site Sustainability Plan,  LM officials said they have a goal to review sites’ conceptual models,  which predict how remedies should perform under different conditions,  with the aim of updating the assumptions in the models to better account  for real-world conditions. However, LM did not provide details about how  it intends to meet this goal, such as a schedule for implementing this  review across its sites.

According to LM officials, LM has not developed a plan or schedule for  reviewing sites’ conceptual models because of competing priorities. In  addition, LM officials told us they have not assessed the effects of  climate change or developed plans to mitigate those effects because of  a lack of concern about the risks posed by climate change. Specifically,  site managers in charge of several of LM’s category 3 sites—including  Rocky Flats, which has the highest environmental liability of LM’s 100  sites and is currently implementing the large-scale project described  above to address erosion caused by extreme precipitation—told us that  they have not assessed the potential effects of climate change on their  sites because they do not believe climate change is a concern.

Recognizing the federal government’s significant role in managing  climate-related disaster impacts, GAO’s Disaster Resilience Framework  provides three broad principles that those who oversee or manage federal  efforts can consider when analyzing opportunities to enhance their  contribution to national disaster resilience. For instance, under the  information principle, the framework states that accessing authoritative,  understandable information can help decision makers to identify current  and future risk and the impact of risk-reduction strategies. In addition, the  integration principle states that integrated analysis and planning can help  decision makers take coherent and coordinated resilience actions. By  developing plans to assess the effect of climate change on LM’s sites and  to mitigate any significant impacts and, as part of these plans,  incorporating principles from GAO’s Disaster Resilience Framework, as  appropriate, LM could better ensure that its remedies will protect human  health and the environment in the long term.

Regulators Update or Adopt New Requirements, Making Remedies No Longer Compliant With Standards

According to LM officials, LM faces challenges when regulators update or  adopt new requirements and regulations for contaminants, meaning that  remedies in place when LM received a site may no longer meet  standards. For example:

At several sites, such as the Fernald Preserve and Mound sites in  Ohio and the Rocky Flats site in Colorado, LM officials told us they  are investigating for per- and polyfluoroalkyl substances (PFAS) or  vapor-forming chemicals, which are emerging contaminants that EM  was not required to address when cleaning up these sites. EPA has  published information regarding potential impacts to human health  and the environment from these and other emerging contaminants.  Federal regulatory standards issued by EPA in the future could affect  LM sites.

At the Bluewater site in New Mexico, LM officials said that the state  recently adopted an updated, more stringent uranium drinking water  standard. Under the new standard, the area of groundwater that is  considered contaminated is much larger than the area of groundwater  considered contaminated under the standard in place when NRC  approved transfer of the site to LM, according to officials.

To address challenges related to new requirements and regulations, LM  is monitoring changes to federal and state standards. For example, LM  participates in interagency working groups, such as a PFAS working  group led by DOE’s Office of Environment, Health, Safety, and Security.  Participation in the working groups helps LM monitor the evolution of a  federal PFAS regulatory standard, according to LM officials. In addition,  LM officials told us that they routinely review state and federal regulatory  changes, with the aim of providing sites time to prepare for any changes.  LM also evaluates its surveillance and maintenance practices against  current regulatory and best management requirements to identify any  gaps. For instance, in 2018, the contractor that provides support services  to LM reviewed site management practices listed in UMTRCA Title I and  II sites’ site management plans against current regulatory requirements.  The review identified a number of discrepancies between practices and  requirements. For example, the review found that some site management  plans were developed many years ago and had not been updated to  reflect changes in remedy requirements. LM indicated it planned to take  steps to address the discrepancies identified by this review. For example,  LM is planning to update its site management plans to include the most  current remedy requirements for each site.

At many sites contaminated from nuclear weapons production and  nuclear energy research dating back to World War II and the Cold War,  completely eliminating risks to human health and the environment is  unlikely. LM is responsible for protecting human health and the  environment from the risks that remain after other entities have cleaned  up these sites, and its mission is long-term—LM sites will require  surveillance and maintenance for hundreds or even thousands of years.  Over this period, the likelihood that cleanup remedies will experience  performance challenges is high, and these challenges may exceed the  scope of LM’s mission, capabilities, and resources. LM acquires sites  from several cleanup entities, but has not developed agreements or  procedures with EM or NRC for addressing challenges that require new,  active cleanup work. By working with EM and NRC to develop  agreements and procedures for identifying and addressing circumstances  at LM sites that require new cleanup work beyond the scope of LM’s  mission, capabilities, and resources, LM can help ensure mitigation by the  most appropriate entity of the risks to human health and the environment  that such instances would present.

Environmental conditions also present challenges to LM’s sites, and  some of these conditions may become more frequent or intense in the  future, according to the 13-agency U.S. Global Change Research  Program. To ensure the long-term protectiveness of remedies, it is  important for LM to understand how climate change may affect its sites.  LM’s strategic plan includes a strategy to assess the effects of climate  change on its sites, but the agency provided minimal information about  how it plans to carry out this strategy. GAO’s Disaster Resilience  Framework outlines a set of principles that those who oversee or manage  federal efforts can consider when analyzing opportunities to enhance their  contribution to national disaster resilience. By developing plans to assess  the effect of climate change on LM’s sites and to mitigate any significant  impacts, and, as part of these plans, incorporating principles from GAO’s  Disaster Resilience Framework, as appropriate, LM could better ensure  that its remedies will protect human health and the environment in the  long term.

We are making three recommendations to DOE:  The Secretary of Energy should direct the Director of LM and the  Assistant Secretary of the Office of Environmental Management to  develop agreements and procedures for identifying and addressing  circumstances at LM sites that require new cleanup work beyond the  scope of LM’s mission, capabilities, and resources. (Recommendation 1)

The Secretary of Energy should direct the Director of LM to work with the  Nuclear Regulatory Commission to develop agreements and procedures  for identifying and addressing circumstances at LM sites that require new  cleanup work beyond the scope of LM’s mission, capabilities, and  resources. (Recommendation 2)

The Secretary of Energy should direct the Director of LM to, as called for  in LM’s strategic plan, develop plans to assess the effect of climate  change on LM’s sites and to mitigate any significant impacts. These plans  should incorporate principles from GAO’s Disaster Resilience Framework,  as appropriate. (Recommendation 3)

We provided a draft of this report to DOE for comment. In its comments,  reproduced in appendix IV, DOE agreed with our three recommendations.   In its letter, DOE officials stated that in response to our first two  recommendations, it plans to work with DOE’s Office of Environmental  Management and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to develop  agreements and procedures for identifying and addressing new cleanup  work beyond LM’s mission scope of long-term stewardship. DOE officials  also stated that in response to our third recommendation, LM will develop  site assessment and mitigation plans, taking into account any significant  effects of climate change and incorporating principles from GAO’s  Disaster Resilience Framework, as appropriate. DOE also provided  technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate.

We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional  committee, the Secretary of Energy, and other interested parties. In  addition, the report is available at no charge on the GAO website at  https://www.gao.gov.

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact  me at (202) 512-3841 or trimbled@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices  of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last  page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this report  are listed in appendix V.

Appendix I: DOE Office of Legacy Management’s Nine Category 3 Sites as of Fiscal Year 2019

DOE considers site cleanup to be complete when, among other things, short-term cleanup activities  have been completed and long-term cleanup measures, such and groundwater treatment, are in  place.

Appendix II: List of DOE Office of Legacy Management’s 100 Sites as of Fiscal Year 2019

Appendix III: List of 52 Sites Transferring to the DOE Office of Legacy Management by Fiscal Year 2050, as of September 2019

DOE Office of Environmental  Management (EM)

Planned transfer in FY 2022  Durita Disposal site  East Tennessee Technology Park site  Gas Hills East Disposal site  Gas Hills North Disposal site  Ray Point Disposal site  Split Rock Disposal site  Planned transfer in FY 2023  Bear Creek Disposal site  Hazelwood site  private licensee  U.S. Army Corps of Engineers  (USACE)

Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of Energy

Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

David C. Trimble, (202) 512-3841 or trimbled@gao.gov.

In addition to the contact named above, Amanda K. Kolling (Assistant  Director), Katherine Killebrew (Analyst in Charge), and Rachel Pittenger  made key contributions to this report. Also contributing to this report were  Mark Braza, Ellen Fried, Susan J. Irving, Richard Johnson, Keegan  Maguigan, Katrina Pekar-Carpenter, Dan Royer, and Doris Yanger.

DOE’s Legacy Management Office oversees long-term surveillance and maintenance of cleaned-up U.S. nuclear weapons production and energy research sites. It manages activities like treating residual groundwater contamination and repairing aging landfills.

Currently, the Office oversees 100 sites and may manage some for centuries. Site numbers and costs are expected to grow.

handle new cleanup work that is outside its expertise

assess and mitigate the effects of climate change on its sites

We recommended the Office develop procedures and plans in these areas to better protect people and the environment.


Surface Transportation: TSA Should Improve Coordination Procedures for Its Security Training Program

The global terrorist threat to surface transportation–freight and passenger rail, mass transit, highway, maritime and pipeline systems–has increased in recent years, as demonstrated by a 2016 thwarted attack on mass transit in New Jersey and the 2017 London vehicle attacks. TSA is the primary federal agency responsible for securing surface transportation in the United States.

The FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018 includes a provision that GAO review resources provided to TSA surface transportation programs and the coordination between relevant entities related to surface transportation security. This report addresses TSA's: (1) allocation of resources to surface transportation programs for fiscal years 2017 and 2018; and (2) coordination within TSA to implement the Intermodal Security Training and Exercise Program. GAO analyzed TSA data on surface program resources for fiscal years 2017 and 2018, reviewed TSA program guidance, and interviewed TSA officials responsible for implementing the Intermodal Security Training and Exercise Program. This program is intended to assist transportation operators and others in enhancing security through exercises and training.

Transportation Security Administration (TSA) reported allocating most of its surface transportation program account, which was $123 million in fiscal year 2017 and $129 million in fiscal year 2018--to three offices (see figure). The surface program account represented about 1.6 percent of the agency's appropriation in both fiscal years, according to Department of Homeland Security data.

Security Operations is to conduct regulatory inspections for freight and passenger rail systems, non-regulatory security assessments, and voluntary training. Law Enforcement/Federal Air Marshal Service is to administer the Visible Intermodal Prevention and Response (VIPR) Program to augment the security of and promote confidence in surface transportation systems. Policy, Plans, and Engagement (PPE) is to develop and coordinate security policies, programs, directives, strategies, and initiatives, while overseeing industry engagement. In fiscal years 2017 through 2019, TSA reported using surface program resources for non-surface activities. For example, in fiscal year 2018, TSA reprogrammed $5 million from the Surface Programs account to the Mission Support account to address security requirements and increase hiring of transportation security officers. In that same year, about 39 percent of VIPR operations were conducted in aviation security.

TSA has not fully identified coordination roles and responsibilities for its training and exercise program for offices outside of PPE—the office with primary responsibility for the program. PPE coordinates with several other offices to accomplish the program's goals, including the Intelligence and Analysis (I&A) office that provides intelligence briefings that give background context during program exercises. I&A officials explained that while they have supported exercise planning, there is no formal role for the office in the procedure or expected time frames for providing information. As a result, I&A officials stated that they do not typically participate in the PPE planning meetings because they are not consistently invited to attend. In the absence of a policy that clearly defines all current offices that should coordinate and when, PPE may be missing consistent input and important information from relevant offices across TSA.

GAO recommends that TSA clarify roles and responsibilities for all offices involved in the coordination of surface transportation exercises, including when these offices are to coordinate. DHS concurred with the recommendation.

The global terrorist threat to surface transportation—freight and  passenger rail, mass transit, highway, maritime, and pipeline—has  increased in recent years, as demonstrated by an attempted attack on  mass transit in New Jersey in 2016 and the 2017 London vehicle  attacks. Surface transportation systems generally rely on an open  infrastructure that can be difficult to monitor and secure due to its multiple  access points and lack of access barriers. Securing these modes can be  further complicated by the number of private and public stakeholders  involved in operating and protecting them and the need to balance  security with the expeditious flow of people and goods.

Within the federal government, the Department of Homeland Security’s  (DHS) Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is the primary entity  responsible for securing surface transportation modes. TSA’s surface  domain includes nearly 140,000 miles of railroad track, over 2.7 million  miles of pipeline, and 4 million miles of roads. There are 10 billion annual  passenger trips on mass transit systems, including 25 million students on  school buses each day. TSA’s domain also includes nearly 800,000 daily  shipments of hazardous materials. TSA receives funding each fiscal year  to protect the surface transportation modes and allocates these resources  to support programs and personnel.

We previously reported that TSA’s role in surface transportation security  varies by mode. Unlike the aviation environment where TSA has  operational responsibility for screening passengers and baggage, TSA  has a limited operational role for securing surface transportation  systems. TSA mainly provides guidance and encourages voluntary implementation of security best practices to surface transportation  entities, and relies on cooperation from system operators, and local,  state, and federal security partners. For example, TSA engages with  system operators and governmental security partners through its  voluntary Intermodal Security Training and Exercise Program (I-STEP) to  enhance surface transportation security. In addition, TSA plays a  regulatory role in passenger and freight rail through inspections to ensure  operators are complying with regulatory requirements.

The FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018 included a provision for us to  review TSA’s surface transportation resources and coordination between  relevant entities related to surface transportation. This report examines  (1) TSA’s allocation of resources to surface transportation programs for  fiscal years 2017 and 2018, and (2) coordination within TSA to implement  I-STEP.

We analyzed data from TSA to determine how TSA allocated surface  transportation resources in fiscal years 2017 and 2018. Specifically, we  obtained and reviewed TSA’s budget and staffing data from the Surface  Programs account, the primary account used to fund surface  transportation programs. In addition, we reviewed documentation, such  as program guidance, and interviewed TSA officials to understand each  relevant TSA office’s role in surface transportation, such as the activities  they carried out. We also interviewed TSA officials and reviewed  documentation to identify resources that were reprogrammed or  transferred into or away from the Surface Programs account from October  1, 2016 through July 26, 2019, the most recent information available. We  analyzed data from TSA’s Activity Summary Report Database for fiscal  years 2017 and 2018 to identify the percentage of operations Law  Enforcement/Federal Air Marshal Service’s Visible Intermodal Prevention  and Response Program funded from the Surface Programs account  conducted in surface and aviation modes. We also analyzed data from  TSA’s Performance and Results Information System for fiscal year 2018,  the first full year available, to identify the percentage of time surface  inspectors reported spending on activities by transportation mode,  including aviation.

We assessed the reliability of TSA’s budget and staff data by  corroborating the figures provided to those available in DHS’  congressional budget justifications and by reviewing responses to  questionnaires sent to relevant TSA officials to understand the quality  controls on the data they provided. We assessed the reliability of TSA’s  Activity Summary Report Database by reviewing the processes and  controls that ensure the quality of data when entered. We assessed the  reliability of TSA’s Performance and Results Information System by  reviewing prior testing of the data from this system and reviewing data  collection processes and procedures that ensure data are entered  accurately and completely. We determined that these data were  sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report.

To determine how well relevant entities within TSA coordinated to plan  and implement I-STEP, we reviewed program planning and  implementation guidance and interviewed officials from relevant offices.  Specifically, we reviewed the TSA Internal Operating Procedure used to  plan and implement I-STEP exercises and then compared the internal  operating procedure to relevant federal control standards.  We  interviewed officials from PPE, the main office responsible for the  program, to understand how they plan and implement I-STEP exercises,  including the offices they coordinate with. Additionally, we interviewed  TSA officials from offices responsible for assisting PPE in planning and  implementing ISTEP, such as the office of Intelligence and Analysis, to  understand their roles and responsibilities.

We conducted this performance audit from February 2019 to November  2019 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing  standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to  obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for  our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe  that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings  and conclusions based on our audit objectives.

Federal and Other Stakeholder Roles in Surface Transportation

The Aviation and Transportation Security Act designated TSA as the  primary federal agency responsible for security in all modes of  transportation. Public and private transportation entities have the  principal responsibility to carry out safety and security measures for their  services. As such, TSA coordinates with these entities to identify  vulnerabilities, share intelligence information, and work to mitigate  security risks to the transportation modes. See table 1 for examples of the  entities TSA works with to secure the various surface transportation  modes.

TSA’s Surface Programs’ Program, Project, or Activity (Surface Programs  account) supports TSA programs that are to protect the surface  transportation system. According to DHS’s Congressional Budget  Justifications, this account received about $113 million on average  annually from fiscal years 2009 through 2018, about 1.5 percent of TSA’s  average annual appropriation of more than $7 billion. During that time,  the appropriations directed to the Surface Programs account ranged from  about $63 million to nearly $135 million annually. For example, in fiscal  year 2018, TSA’s Surface Programs account received about $129 million,  which was less than 2 percent of TSA’s appropriation (see figure 1). In  addition, the Surface Programs account staff (full-time equivalents)  ranged from 353 to 843 annually from fiscal years 2009 through 2018,  consistently representing between 0.68 and 1.53 percent of TSA’s total  staff.

TSA’s Intermodal Security Training and Exercise Program

I-STEP was created in response to provisions in the Implementing  Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007. According to  PPE, the I-STEP program offers three main services:

Exercise Management Services assist transportation operators,  emergency responders, local law enforcement, and government  officials in enhancing security preparedness and resilience;

Training Support Services help partners improve security awareness,  training gaps, security plans, emergency procedures, and incident  management skills; and

Security Planning Tools and Services help partners gain an  understanding of transportation security lessons learned and best  practices to inform risk-based decision-making.

The program conducts multi-agency, multi-jurisdictional activities ranging  from seminars to full-scale exercises. Seminars provide a starting point  for industry stakeholders developing or making major changes to their  plans and procedures. Full-scale exercises deploy personnel and  resources for real-time scripted events that focus on implementing and  analyzing plans, policies, and procedures. The voluntary exercises are  conducted across surface transportation modes including mass transit,  passenger and freight rail, highway, and pipeline.

TSA Allocated Most Surface Program Resources to Three Offices, and Some Were Used for Non- Surface Activities in Fiscal Years 2017 and 2018

TSA’s Surface Programs account received $123 million in fiscal year  2017 and $129 million in fiscal year 2018, according to DHS. Surface  activities are primarily carried out by three TSA offices—Security  Operations; Law Enforcement/Federal Air Marshal Service; and Policy,  Plans, and Engagement. TSA reported that these offices were collectively  allocated about 99 percent of the funding in TSA’s Surface Programs  account in fiscal year 2017 and 93 percent in fiscal year 2018.

Security Operations (SO). This office is to provide risk-based security  that includes regulatory compliance and other programs designed to  secure transportation. Within SO, surface transportation security  inspectors, known as surface inspectors, conduct a variety of activities to  implement TSA’s surface transportation security mission. These activities  are to include (1) regulatory inspections for freight and passenger rail  systems, (2) regulatory Transportation Worker Identification Credential  inspections, and (3) non-regulatory security assessments and training  which surface transportation entities participate in on a voluntary basis.

Law Enforcement/Federal Air Marshal Service (LE/FAMS). This office  is to conduct protection, response, detection, and assessment activities in  transportation systems. For example, LE/FAMS administers the Visible  Intermodal Prevention and Response (VIPR) program. Since late 2005,  TSA has deployed teams to conduct VIPR operations as a way to  augment security of and promote confidence in surface transportation  systems. These capabilities can include random bag searches and law  enforcement patrols at mass transit and passenger rail systems to deter  potential terrorist threats.

Policy, Plans, and Engagement (PPE). This office is to develop and  coordinate both domestic and international multimodal transportation  security policies, programs, directives, strategies and initiatives, while  overseeing engagement with industry stakeholders and associations. For  example, each modal section within PPE—mass transit, passenger and  freight rail, highway, pipeline, and maritime—is to be responsible for  outreach to their respective industry and with federal security partners.  Their primary role is to align industry interests and actions with the TSA  mission. The modes are to share intelligence and information with the  industry to develop a shared understanding of risks, conduct vulnerability  gap analysis, develop security policy, share best practices, provide risk  mitigation and training tools, and conduct drills and exercises.

These TSA offices further allocate surface program resources within their  respective offices to carry out surface transportation activities (see table  2). Within PPE’s Surface Division, PPE reported allocating six Surface  Program account staff to each surface transportation mode office— mass  transit and passenger rail, freight rail, highway and motor carrier, and  pipeline—in fiscal years 2017 and 2018.

TSA may realign funds within an appropriation account through  reprogramming and also has limited authority to realign funds between  appropriation accounts through transfers, pursuant to its appropriations  acts and subject to notification provisions. According to TSA officials,  TSA reprogrammed or transferred the following surface transportation  resources enacted from fiscal years 2017 through 2019:  In fiscal year 2018, TSA reprogramed $5 million from Surface  Programs to Mission Support activities to address security  requirements and increase hiring of transportation security officers.  Transportation security officers conduct security screening of  passengers, baggage, and cargo at airports to prevent any deadly or  dangerous objects from being transported onto an aircraft.

In fiscal year 2018, DHS transferred $100,000 from the Surface  Program account to (1) the Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s  Custody Operations account to provide adequate funding for  detention beds, (2) Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s  Transportation Removal Program account to support transportation  and removal activities for migrants, and (3) the U.S. Secret Service’s  Protection of Persons and Facilities account to support upgrading  protections for the White House. In fiscal year 2019, DHS transferred  over $6 million to the Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s  Custody Operations and Transportation Removal Program accounts  for the same purposes.

In fiscal year 2019, TSA reprogrammed $200,000 from Mission  Support and Secure Flight to Surface Programs to ensure sufficient  funds were available to make payroll payments to employees during  the fiscal year 2019 government shutdown.

Staff funded from the Surface Programs account may be used for  aviation-related activities. For example:

TSA funds VIPR teams from the Surface Program account; however,  VIPR teams are often used for aviation security activities. TSA’s  program guidance stated they use a risk-based approach to prioritize  and schedule VIPR program operations. According to TSA, in fiscal  year 2017, 41 percent of VIPR program operations were conducted in  surface modes and 59 percent were conducted in aviation security. In  fiscal year 2018, TSA reported that 61 percent of VIPR program  operations were conducted in surface modes and 39 percent were  conducted in aviation security.

TSA also funds surface inspectors and their supervisors from the  Surface Program account; however, surface inspectors can assist  with aviation-related activities, as we reported in 2017. At that time,  we found that TSA had incomplete information on the total time  surface inspectors spent on those activities because of limitations in  TSA’s data system. Since then, TSA updated its system to include a  field indicating whether the activity was conducted in the surface or  aviation mode, demonstrating that TSA has visibility over all activities  surface inspectors conduct. In fiscal year 2018, TSA reported that  surface inspectors spent about 16 percent of hours on aviation-related  activities.

TSA’s Guidance for Its Training and Exercise Program Does Not Fully Establish Coordination Procedures and Time Frames

TSA’s 2016 Surface Division Internal Operating Procedure details the  planning and implementation process of I-STEP, but does not fully  identify the roles and responsibilities for key TSA offices or time frames  for when those offices should coordinate to support training and exercise  planning. PPE has primary responsibility for planning and implementing  I-STEP under the procedure and coordinates with other TSA offices to  facilitate exercises and accomplish the program’s goals. Specifically, PPE  officials stated that SO and the Intelligence and Analysis (I&A) offices,  have important roles in helping PPE to plan and conduct tabletop  exercises using I-STEP’s online exercise tool to facilitate planning in the  field. For example, PPE officials stated that SO conducts external  outreach to surface transportation stakeholders to identify participants  and exercise locations, and I&A provides intelligence briefings that give  background context to participants.

The roles and responsibilities of SO and I&A are not captured in the  operating procedure in part because program responsibilities have  changed since the procedure was issued in 2016. For example, the  operating procedure describes PPE’s primary responsibility for industry  engagement, but does not discuss SO’s surface inspectors’ role in  stakeholder and industry outreach for I-STEP. Specifically, surface  inspectors reach out to industry stakeholders to identify participants  interested in conducting an exercise. Surface inspectors also help handle  logistics, such as coordinating with local responders and stakeholders.  However, the operating procedure has not been updated since 2016 to  capture this transition of SO responsibilities.

In the absence of a policy that clearly defines all current offices that  should coordinate and when, PPE may also be missing consistent input  and important information from relevant offices across TSA. For example,  PPE officials indicated that I&A officials can support I-STEP exercises by  providing intelligence briefings, when requested, and can assist at or  before initial PPE planning meetings. However, I&A officials stated that  they do not typically participate in the PPE planning meetings that help  identify and prioritize exercises based on risk-based intelligence  documents, because they are not consistently invited to attend. Further,  according to I&A officials, they sometimes receive a few weeks’ notice, or  no notice at all to prepare intelligence briefings for upcoming exercises.  I&A officials explained that while they have supported exercise planning,  there is no formal role for the office in the procedure or expected time  frames for providing information.

Our Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government states  management should establish an organizational structure, assign  responsibility, and delegate authority to achieve the entity’s objectives.  Management then develops the overall responsibilities from the entity’s  objectives that enable the entity to achieve its objectives. TSA officials  stated that they plan to revise the 2016 Surface Division’s Internal  Operating Procedure. This planned revision presents an opportunity to  identify and clarify roles and responsibilities for all offices involved in the  coordination of the exercise, including when they should to coordinate.

TSA allocates resources for surface transportation activities, including I- STEP voluntary training and exercises with system operators and  governmental security partners. While PPE coordinates with several  offices across TSA to accomplish the program’s goals, coordination  guidance could be improved. Although PPE has discussed the roles and  responsibilities for offices outside of PPE, how and when these offices  should coordinate has not been clearly defined in its sole guidance  document. As a result, TSA may be missing input and information from  relevant offices. Formalizing planning responsibilities, specifically with  I&A, would allow for consistent involvement in the planning process and  give analysts more time to prepare intelligence briefings for exercises.  Also, with surface inspectors performing stakeholder outreach in addition  to PPE’s primary role for industry engagement, formalizing planning and  external outreach roles and responsibilities for SO would ensure  consistent outreach in the field.

We are making the following recommendation to TSA:  The TSA Administrator should clarify roles and responsibilities for all  offices involved in the coordination of surface transportation exercises,  including when these offices are to coordinate, as part of the planned  revision of the Surface Division’s Internal Operating Procedure for I- STEP. (Recommendation 1)

We provided a draft of this report for review and comment to DHS. DHS  provided written comments, which are reproduced in Appendix I. In their  comments, DHS concurred with the recommendation and described  actions planned to address it, including an estimated timeframe for  completion. If fully implemented, these actions should address the intent  of the recommendation and better position TSA’s offices to execute roles  and responsibilities for planning and implementing I-STEP. TSA also  provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate  We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional  committees and the Acting Secretary of Homeland Security. In addition,  the report is available at no charge on the GAO website at  http://www.gao.gov.

If you or your staff have any questions concerning this report, please  contact me at (202) 512-8777 or RussellW@gao.gov. Contact points for  our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found  on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made significant  contributions to this report are listed in Appendix II.

Appendix I: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security

Appendix II: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

In addition to the contact named above, Ellen Wolfe (Assistant Director),  Amber Edwards (Analyst-in-Charge), Lilia Chaidez, Dominick Dale,  Tracey King, Leah Nash, Natasha Oliver, and Michael Silver made key  contributions to this report.

TSA is most visible at the airport, but it also has a role in protecting mass transit, rail, and other surface transportation. TSA received about $113 million a year in 2009-2018 for surface transportation activities, including training and exercises for system operators and government security partners.

TSA’s Policy, Plans, and Engagement office runs the training program, but other offices contribute—e.g., the Intelligence & Analysis office briefs trainees during exercises. But TSA may be missing out on valuable input because its guidance doesn’t say how or when the office will coordinate with other offices. We recommended clarifying the guidance.