Security Assistance: Actions Needed to Assess U.S. Activities and Ensure Timely Inspections of Equipment Transferred to Lebanon

Since 2013, State and DOD have obligated nearly $1.5 billion in assistance to support Lebanese security forces. U.S. support for Lebanon is complicated due to the prominent role in the country of Hizballah, an Iranian-backed terrorist organization, which retains considerable influence as a major political party and a militia. The U.S. support includes equipment and training to build the capacity of Lebanese security forces. The equipment provided is subject to end-use monitoring requirements, which seek to ensure items are properly accounted for in Lebanon's inventory.

GAO was asked to review U.S. security assistance provided to Lebanon since 2013. For fiscal years 2013 through 2018, this report (1) examines to what extent State and DOD assessed progress toward achieving strategic objectives related to security; (2) describes safeguards to limit the risk of U.S. assistance benefitting terrorist organizations; and (3) evaluates State and DOD end-use monitoring checks of equipment provided to Lebanese security forces. GAO analyzed State and DOD reports, documents, and data; and interviewed officials in Washington, D.C. and Beirut, Lebanon.

The Departments of State (State) and Defense (DOD) reported progress in meeting security objectives in Lebanon, but gaps in performance information limit their ability to fully assess the results of security-related activities. State and DOD report improvements in Lebanese security forces' capabilities in key areas, such as border security. As part of monitoring such improvements and assessing the performance of security activities in Lebanon, State created related indicators but has not established targets for all of these indicators. Furthermore, State's data were incomplete for 11 of the 15 indicators GAO analyzed. For example, performance data for three indicators did not identify the number or percentage of people who received security training, as called for by the indicator. Without addressing these gaps, State has limited ability to determine to what extent it is achieving the intended results of its security-related activities in Lebanon.

State and DOD use two primary safeguards to limit the risk of terrorist organizations benefitting from U.S. assistance to Lebanon. First, State routinely reviews the leadership of the Lebanese military and police forces and has determined they are not controlled by a foreign terrorist organization. Second, State and DOD vet potential trainees to ensure they do not have known or suspected ties to terrorism.

Consistent with end-use monitoring requirements, State and DOD conducted required inventory checks of equipment provided to Lebanese security forces, but DOD did not meet its timeliness standards for nearly one-third of its observations. According to DOD officials, the method DOD uses to determine when it should complete annual inspections does not consider the date of the equipment's last inspection, which results in some inspections taking longer than prescribed by DOD's timeliness standards. Without conducting checks in a timely manner, DOD cannot fully ensure the equipment is properly accounted for and safeguarded.

GAO is making three recommendations: 1) State should establish, as appropriate, and consolidate targets for its security-related performance indicators; 2) State should collect complete performance data for security-related indicators; and 3) DOD should revise its approach for determining when end-use monitoring inspections are to be completed to consider the date of last inspection. State and DOD concurred with these recommendations.

Since 2013, the United States has obligated nearly $1.5 billion in security  assistance to support the Lebanese security forces. The Departments of  Defense (DOD) and State (State) have provided equipment and training  to build the capacity of the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) and Internal  Security Forces (ISF) to secure the country’s borders and exert sovereign  authority over Lebanese territory. Bordering Israel and Syria, Lebanon  plays an important role in the security, stability, and economy of the  Middle East because of its geostrategic location and religiously diverse  population. However, Lebanon faces numerous challenges, including the  prominent role of Hizballah, an Iranian-backed group designated by the  United States as a foreign terrorist organization (FTO), which retains  considerable influence within Lebanon as a major political party and a  powerful militia.

You asked us to review U.S. security assistance to Lebanon since fiscal  year 2013. For fiscal years 2013 through 2018, this report (1) examines to  what extent State and DOD assessed the progress of their efforts to meet  strategic objectives related to security for Lebanon; (2) describes the  safeguards State and DOD have put in place to limit the risk of U.S.  security assistance provided to Lebanon benefitting terrorist  organizations; and (3) analyzes to what extent State and DOD conducted end-use monitoring checks of equipment provided to Lebanese security  forces.

To determine to what extent State and DOD assessed the progress of  their efforts, we reviewed State and DOD assessments and reporting on  security assistance programs operating in Lebanon from fiscal years 2013  through 2018. We also reviewed the 2018 Integrated Country Strategy  (ICS) for Embassy Beirut and compared it to standards in State’s Foreign  Affairs Manual and federal standards for internal control. We requested  information on Embassy Beirut’s assessment of progress on 19 security- related activities and performance indicators from its 2018 Lebanon ICS.  Embassy Beirut provided information on each of these activities and  indicators as of May 2019 and we reviewed the information provided to  determine if it was complete. We determined the information was  complete if it included relevant data decision makers needed to assess  performance or make resource allocation decisions. For example, if the  information required for an indicator was quantitative in nature (such as  the number or percentage of people trained), then we considered the  information provided to be relevant if it included quantitative data that  directly addressed the indicator.

To determine what safeguards U.S. agencies have put in place to limit the  risk of U.S. security assistance benefitting terrorist organizations, we  reviewed legislative requirements, State policy guidance on  counterterrorism vetting, and agency documentation, including a risk  assessment and memos. We reviewed what safeguards State and DOD  use to limit the risk of U.S. security assistance benefitting terrorist  organizations, but did not analyze how they made determinations when  applying these safeguards.

To evaluate to what extent State and DOD conducted compliance checks  of equipment provided to Lebanese security forces, we reviewed their  standards for end-use monitoring (EUM) to determine what requirements the agencies established for their respective programs. To assess how  State conducted compliance checks in accordance with its standards, we  reviewed annual EUM reports for 2013 through 2018 from its Bureau of  Internal Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) and analyzed INL  EUM data. In Beirut, Lebanon, we visited two ISF sites to observe the  ISF’s processes for safeguarding and inventorying equipment. To assess  how DOD conducted compliance checks in accordance with its  standards, we analyzed data for 2013 through 2018 for items requiring  enhanced EUM from its Security Cooperation Information Portal (SCIP)  database. We conducted logic tests and interviewed DOD officials and  determined that the data were sufficiently reliable for our purposes. We  also visited three LAF facilities in Tripoli, Lebanon to observe DOD  procedures for conducting end-use monitoring and safeguarding  equipment. For all three objectives, we interviewed State and DOD  officials in Washington, D.C. and Beirut, Lebanon. (See app. I for more  information about our objectives, scope, and methodology.)

We conducted this performance audit from October 2018 to December  2019 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing  standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to  obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for  our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe  that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings  and conclusions based on our audit objectives.

Lebanon is a small, religiously diverse country bordering the  Mediterranean Sea (see fig. 1).

Religious tensions among Lebanon’s Maronite Christians, Sunni Muslims,  Shiite Muslims, and others, have for many years contributed to conflicts  within Lebanon as well as with neighboring countries. According to State,  Lebanon’s political system is characterized by sectarian divisions and  pressures from external and internal forces that limit its ability to function.  Upon gaining independence from France in 1943, Lebanese leaders  adopted a power-sharing agreement, in which each of the country’s  officially recognized religious groups were to be represented in the  government according to their share of the population based on the 1932  census. This unwritten agreement established a status quo in which the  president must be a Maronite Christian (the largest single denomination in  1932), the prime minister a Sunni Muslim, and the speaker of parliament  a Shia Muslim.

Tensions over the balance of power among these groups have provoked  conflict. During the Lebanese Civil War from 1975 to 1990, both Syrian  and Israeli forces occupied the country. In the midst of the civil war and  Israel’s occupation of southern Lebanon, Hizballah emerged in Lebanon  as a powerful Islamic militant group. In 2000, Israeli forces withdrew from  southern Lebanon. In 2005, owing to pressure from the international  community, Syrian forces withdrew from Lebanon following the  assassination of Lebanon’s prime minister. Parliamentary elections in that  year led to a member of Hizballah holding a cabinet position for the first  time, and at least one member of Hizballah has held a cabinet position  ever since.

Instability arising from the Syrian civil war that began in 2011 has also  exacerbated sectarian conflict and created new challenges within  Lebanon. In particular, that war has caused an influx of over 1.3 million  Syrian refugees into Lebanon, a country with a population of only 4.5  million. The Syrian civil war has also increased the risk of terrorist  incidents in Lebanon, as foreign terrorist fighters have crossed Lebanese  borders going to and from the conflict.

U.S. Security-Related Objectives and Associated Funding

Since 2013, the United States’ primary goal in providing security  assistance to Lebanon has been to strengthen its state institutions to  allow them to exert sovereign authority and enhance security. Since at  least 2015, the primary objectives supporting this goal have focused on 1)  building the capacity of Lebanese security forces to exert sovereign  authority over Lebanese territory, including at the border and by  maintaining internal security; and 2) enhancing the capacity of Lebanese  security forces to respond to terrorist and criminal threats. Through both  these objectives, the U.S. also seeks to delegitimize and marginalize  Hizballah by helping to support legitimate state institutions.

To achieve these objectives, a number of agencies and offices within  State and DOD provide support to the LAF, which is generally responsible  for providing border security, counterterrorism, and national defense, and to the ISF, or national police force, which is generally responsible for  maintaining law and order within Lebanon. See table 1.

U.S. support for Lebanese forces has included a variety of assistance,  including training, equipment, and sustainment, as shown in figure 2.

State and DOD reported that they obligated nearly $1.5 billion in security  assistance funding for Lebanon in fiscal years 2013 through 2018. The  largest security assistance programs were State’s Foreign Military  Financing program, which provides grants and loans to foreign  governments for the acquisition of U.S. defense equipment, services, and  training, and DOD’s Global Train and Equip program, which funds training  and equipment for foreign military forces to conduct counterterrorism  operations and enhance maritime and border security. These two  programs collectively accounted for nearly 80 percent of assistance. State  provided about 56 percent of the overall funding and DOD contributed 44  percent, as shown in figure 3.

End-Use Monitoring for Security Assistance

DOD and State are required to conduct end-use monitoring (EUM) for  some of the equipment provided to Lebanon. In 1996, Congress  amended the Arms Export Control Act to require the President to  establish a program for monitoring the end-use of defense articles and  defense services sold, leased, or exported under the act, including  through Foreign Military Sales, Foreign Military Financing, or the Foreign  Assistance Act of 1961. The law requires that the program be designed  to provide reasonable assurances that recipients are complying with  restrictions imposed by the U.S. government on the use, transfer, and  security of defense articles and defense services, and that such articles  and services are being used for the purposes for which they are  provided. DOD’s Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) is  responsible for EUM for Foreign Military Sales. The President is also  required to take all reasonable steps to ensure that equipment made  available to foreign countries for international narcotics control under the  Foreign Assistance Act are used only in ways consistent with the  purposes for which such equipment was made available. State’s INL  implements this requirement through its End-Use Monitoring Program.

DSCA administers the Golden Sentry program, which DOD uses to  comply with requirements related to the end-use of defense articles and  services transferred to foreign governments. DOD officials at the Office of  Defense Cooperation-Beirut conduct the EUM activities established and  overseen by DSCA. DSCA’s policy manual for EUM, the Security  Assistance Management Manual, and the associated standard operating  procedures for Beirut require DOD officials to, among other things,  conduct two levels of monitoring: routine EUM and enhanced EUM.

Routine EUM: DOD conducts routine EUM for defense articles and  services that do not have any unique conditions associated with their  transfer. In conducting routine EUM, DOD personnel are required to  observe and report any potential misuse or unapproved transfer of  U.S.-origin defense articles. Routine EUM is to be conducted in  conjunction with other required security-related duties, using any  readily available information. For example, U.S. officials might  observe how a host country’s military uses U.S. equipment when they  visit a military installation on other business. DOD policy states that  routine EUM must be documented at least quarterly. DOD policy does  not require inventories and physical security checks as part of routine  EUM.

Enhanced EUM: DOD conducts enhanced EUM for defense services,  technologies, or articles specifically identified as sensitive. Lebanon  has five types of sensitive defense articles that require enhanced  EUM—night vision devices, sniper rifles, light attack aircraft,  unmanned aerial vehicles, and Hellfire missiles. DOD policy requires  serial number inventories for defense articles needing enhanced EUM  within 90 days of delivery of the articles and thereafter within one year  of the last inventory performed. In addition, the purchase agreements  authorizing the sale of an item may contain specialized notes directing  the purchaser to adhere to certain physical security and accountability  requirements.

In addition to enhanced and routine EUM, DSCA is required to conduct  periodic Compliance Assessment Visits to evaluate the Office of Defense  Cooperation in Beirut’s compliance with DOD’s EUM policy and the  Lebanese government’s compliance with physical security and  accountability requirements.

U.S. Agencies Have Reported Progress and Challenges in Meeting Security Objectives in Lebanon, but Performance Information Gaps Limit Monitoring of Activities

U.S. Agencies Reported Both Progress and Challenges in Meeting Security Objectives in Lebanon

According to State and DOD assessments, reports, and interviews with  State and DOD officials, the LAF’s border security and counterterrorism  capabilities have demonstrated some notable improvements from 2013 to  2018. For example, a 2013 DOD assessment noted that the Lebanese  government lacked effective control over its sovereign territory and  indicated the LAF leadership was reluctant to engage aggressively in  counterterrorism operations. By 2018, however, U.S. agencies reported  that, following the expansion of LAF Land Border Regiments, Lebanon  had established control of a large part of its borders for the first time in its  history. In addition, U.S. agencies reported that the LAF had enhanced its  capacity in counterterrorism and counter-narcoterrorism, resulting in more  operations. In 2017, for example, the LAF undertook a successful  operation to expel ISIS elements along the border with Syria, making  Lebanon, DOD officials noted, the only country in the region to  successfully expel ISIS from its territory without the involvement of U.S.  ground forces.

Similarly, State reported improvements in the ISF’s capabilities. For  example, INL reported that its ISF training program has become  increasingly specialized because of the force’s improved capabilities.  According to State reporting, from 2008 through 2012, INL focused its  training for the ISF on basic skills. As the ISF became more capable,  however, INL reported that the ISF assumed responsibility for all basic  training, allowing INL to focus its resources on providing specialized  courses. Some examples of these specialized courses include advanced  technical radio training and advanced interview and interrogation training.

INL also reported that providing equipment and facilities to the ISF helped  further to enhance ISF capabilities. For instance, INL reported that the  ISF uses the academy INL constructed for it in 2015 in Aramoun for  advanced forensics training. In addition, the ISF improved its overall  investigative capacity and counterterrorism capabilities since 2013, as  shown in a 2017 assessment of State’s Antiterrorism Assistance program.

U.S. officials stated that the quality of the working relationship between  the U.S. and Lebanon is an important component of success, and  Lebanese officials said that U.S. assistance is critical to achieving their  mission. U.S. officials noted that the LAF and ISF have been some of the  most committed U.S. partners in the region. The LAF and ISF officials we  met with also said that U.S. assistance enhances their capabilities and  allows them to do their jobs more effectively. One ISF unit, for example,  stated that buses purchased with U.S. assistance allow it to transport  large numbers of personnel to mission locations. In addition, one LAF unit  noted that U.S.-provided armored personnel carriers form the backbone  of the LAF’s armored brigades.

Despite reported progress, U.S. agencies indicated that some challenges  remain for the ISF and the LAF. While the ISF’s capabilities have  improved since 2013, U.S. officials said it continues to be more capable in  and around Beirut than in other parts of the country. As a result, the LAF  often provides internal security to supplement the ISF outside of the  capital. Additionally, the ISF needs to improve its internal coordination of  cybercrime cases and analyses of digital evidence, according to a 2017  assessment of State’s Antiterrorism Assistance program. For example,  the ISF units handling digital investigations and processing, the  assessment noted, were fractured and divided, resulting in overwhelming  workloads for some units and underutilization of others. DOD  assessments also noted that the LAF continues to have some capability  gaps, including an ongoing need for equipment and challenges with  operating and maintaining U.S.-provided equipment. For example, LAF  personnel have expressed concerns about the complexity and  sustainability of some U.S. systems, such as the M2 Bradley Fighting  Vehicles and A-29 light attack aircraft. Additionally, while U.S. officials  stressed they have no desire for direct confrontation between Lebanese  security forces and Hizballah, U.S. agencies report that Hizballah’s  presence within Lebanon remains a challenge for both the ISF and LAF.  In 2018, for example, State reported that Hizballah was the most capable  terrorist organization in Lebanon and that it continued to exert control  over some areas of the country.

Embassy Beirut Has Taken Steps to Review Performance, but Information Gaps Limit its Ability to Monitor Security- Related Activities

In addition to periodically assessing long-term performance, State’s  Foreign Affairs Manual and internal guidance outline a number of good  practices for ICS management. First, the Foreign Affairs Manual says all  missions, such as Embassy Beirut, should have an ICS with a hierarchy  of goals, objectives, sub-objectives, and, as needed, key activities.  Second, missions must assess progress against ICS strategic objectives  at least annually. Third, State internal guidance says it is a good practice  for missions to establish ICS performance indicators with targets to show  the expected change over the course of each period of performance.  Fourth, it is also a good practice for missions to practice regular, ongoing  data collection against key performance indicators to gauge the direct and  near-term effects of activities.

The 2018 ICS for Lebanon includes a hierarchy of goals, objectives, and  sub-objectives, in line with the guidance in State’s Foreign Affairs  Manual. For instance, the Lebanon ICS has objectives with sub- objectives that include activities outlining how to accomplish those  objectives. The 2018 ICS contains 19 security-related activities with  corresponding performance indicators for State and DOD activities, such  as training Lebanese security forces in counterterrorism or border security  operations. The hierarchy included in the 2018 ICS represents an  improvement from the previous ICS, developed in 2015, which included  information on goals, objectives, and sub-objectives, but did not outline  specific activities or performance indicators. State guidance notes the  benefit of such a hierarchy is that it shows the individuals who work on  such activities how their actions contribute to achieving mission  objectives.

According to State officials, Embassy Beirut conducted an annual review  of the ICS in October 2019. The goals of the annual review, according to  State officials, were to assess progress against the ICS objectives and to  remove or add goals, objectives, and key activities as needed. In July  2019, Embassy Beirut officials told us that they planned to conduct a  review of the ICS approximately one year after its approval, which was in  August 2018. However, State officials told us that leadership turnover in  the summer of 2019 resulted in Embassy Beirut delaying the review until  October 2019.

Embassy Beirut, however, has not established targets for all of the 19  security-related performance indicators in its 2018 ICS. The Foreign  Affairs Manual emphasizes that having targets to indicate the expected  change over the course of each period of performance is a good practice.  Several of Embassy Beirut’s security-related ICS indicators lack such  targets, making it difficult for State to use the indicators to assess  progress because it cannot compare the actual results of activities to the  expected results. For example, several of the embassy’s security-related  performance indicators deal with the number of people trained or  improvements in specific capabilities of the security forces. Because the  embassy has not established targets for these particular indicators, State  cannot quantify the results it expects to achieve or determine how the  actual results compare to those expectations. State officials noted that  some bureaus have established performance indicators that are the same  as, or similar to, security-related performance indicators in the ICS and  some of those indicators have targets. For example, INL officials noted  that INL has a Country Plan for Lebanon that has performance indicators  and targets similar to some of the security-related performance indicators  found in the ICS. However, many of the security-related activities included  in the ICS are implemented by more than one agency or bureau.  Therefore, the performance indicators for these activities would require  targets that account for all the implementers.

Additionally, Embassy Beirut did not have complete performance data for  its security-related ICS performance indicators. State’s Foreign Affairs  Manual emphasizes that regular, ongoing data collection against  performance indicators to gauge the direct and near-term effects of  activities is a good practice. Federal standards for internal control also  state that agencies should use quality information that is, among other  things, complete. Information is complete if it includes relevant data  needed by decision makers to assess performance or to allocate  resources. When we requested information on progress made toward the  security-related indicators in the 2018 ICS, Embassy Beirut provided  incomplete data for 11 of the 15 security-related indicators we analyzed.  Data for six of these 11 were incomplete because the indicator called for  quantitative data that were not included. For example, three of the six  quantitative indicators called for data on the number or percentage of  people trained. Embassy Beirut provided information that stated training  had occurred, but did not quantify the number or percentage of people  trained, as called for by the indicators. Data for the other five of these 11  indicators were incomplete because the indicators called for qualitative  data that were not included. For example, three of the five qualitative  indicators dealt with improving the capacity or capabilities of Lebanese  units, but the information Embassy Beirut provided did not include a  description of whether or how Lebanese units improved in those areas.  Embassy Beirut provided complete data for four of the 15 indicators we  analyzed, as shown in table 2. For three of the four indicators, Embassy  Beirut provided the quantitative data called for by the indicator. For the  remaining indicator, which dealt with number of personnel trained and the  completion of facility upgrades, the embassy provided data on the  number of personnel trained and a description of the status of the  upgrades.

According to Embassy Beirut officials, individual programs have targets  and collect performance data associated with the security-related ICS  performance indicators, but the Embassy did not have such information  consolidated in a centralized document covering the time period we  reviewed. Officials further noted that the ICS contains performance  indicators, but not specific targets, as the ICS was not a vehicle for  establishing specific targets when it was drafted in 2018. Additionally,  State officials at headquarters stated that they do collect performance  data related to some of the Lebanon ICS security-related indicators, but  they did not provide evidence that this data is available to or used by  Embassy Beirut as part of its ICS review. To review targets and indicators  as part of the annual ICS review, Embassy Beirut officials said they  planned to use evaluations and assessments of programs conducted by  State and DOD headquarters entities or third parties. However, these  assessments and evaluations cannot provide complete data on Embassy  Beirut’s security-related performance indicators because not all of the  security assistance programs in Lebanon have conducted them. In  addition, these assessments and evaluations do not take place annually,  which limits Embassy Beirut’s ability to use them on an ongoing basis to  monitor strategic activities.

Without setting targets and collecting complete data on performance  indicators, Embassy Beirut will be limited in its ability to monitor its  progress toward achieving the expected results of its security-related  activities. State documents indicate that sound program design and  performance management serve as the basis for efficient and effective  use of department resources to achieve strategic objectives. If Embassy  Beirut does not address the gaps in its performance information, it will be  limited in its ability to ensure the intended alignment of policy, planning,  resources, and programs through its annual reviews of the ICS.

State and DOD Use Two Primary Safeguards to Limit the Risk That U.S. Assistance for Lebanon Will Benefit Terrorist Organizations

State and DOD’s two primary safeguards to limit the risk that U.S.  security assistance to Lebanon will benefit terrorist organizations are: 1)  reviewing Lebanese security organizations for ties to terrorist  organizations and 2) vetting individual recipients of assistance.

For the first safeguard, State examines Lebanese security organizations  for associations with foreign terrorist organizations (FTO) prior to  providing support. Annual State, Foreign Operations, and Related  Appropriations acts for fiscal years 2013 through 2018 included  provisions to restrict funding for the ISF or the LAF if they are controlled  by a U.S.-designated FTO. According to State officials, under these  provisions, State regularly evaluates the LAF and ISF to determine if they  have strong individual or organizational connections or alignment of  purpose with Hizballah or any other FTO. State officials said they have  determined that both the LAF and ISF are independent institutions that  Hizballah does not control. State officials added that some longstanding  divisions exist between Hizballah and the ISF, in particular. For example,  one State official noted that Hizballah has assassinated ISF leaders in the  past. Furthermore, members of the ISF are not allowed to be members of  any political party, according to State officials.

Second, State and DOD vet members of the Lebanese security forces  who will receive U.S. assistance, such as training, for ties to terrorism.  State and DOD vet by checking the names and other biographic or  biometric information of potential recipients of assistance against  information about known or suspected terrorists and their supporters.

State and DOD officials conduct name-check vetting using one or more of  three methods:  In-country screening: State officials said they review a variety of  sources in Lebanon to screen all potential recipients of State and  DOD-funded training. Consular Affairs officials use State’s  Independent Namecheck application to vet all potential trainees in  country. This application allows overseas posts to screen names of  individuals through State’s Consular Lookout and Support System  (CLASS) database. CLASS contains records from numerous U.S.  agencies on persons with immigration violations and terrorism  connections, among other potential visa ineligibilities. In addition,  officials said they may examine other sources, including local law  enforcement or U.S. intelligence community sources.

Terrorist Screening Center: State INL sends the names of potential  ISF trainees to the Terrorist Screening Center, a multi-agency center  administered by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, for further  vetting. INL officials noted that this step does not result in many more  exclusions beyond the initial in-country screening, but it serves as an  additional check to ensure INL funding does not benefit FTOs.

Nonimmigrant visa vetting: Any potential trainees who apply to come  to the U.S. for training undergo vetting for a nonimmigrant visa, which  includes interagency counterterrorism checks. According to DOD  officials, a majority of their LAF trainees receive training in the United  States. Some trainees under State programs also receive training in  the United States.

Officials said they believe these vetting procedures provide sufficient  assurances that LAF and ISF trainees are not members of an FTO. They  also stated they receive a relatively small number of “hits,” or indications  that screening uncovered derogatory information. In these cases, officials  said they remove the individual from the training roster and screen a  substitute applicant instead.

According to State officials, INL is in the process of moving its namecheck  vetting from the Terrorist Screening Center to an internal State office.  From 2012 to 2017, State piloted a counterterrorism vetting program for  five countries, including Lebanon, through the Risk Analysis and  Management (RAM) team in State’s Bureau of Administration. Vetting  for Lebanon conducted through the pilot focused primarily on vetting  contractors and grantees that would potentially implement U.S.  assistance programs, including a security assistance program in 2015.  RAM officials said that they resumed vetting in February 2019 for some  programs in Lebanon, as determined by programming offices based on  program-specific risk assessments that identify risks that can be mitigated  through namecheck vetting. These officials said all the screening they  conducted for Lebanon during the initial pilot phase was for programs  determined to be of low or medium risk and, as of November 2019, they  had not found derogatory information for any of the screened individuals.

State and DOD Conducted All Required Checks of Equipment in Lebanon, but DOD Did Not Meet Its Timeliness Standards on Nearly One-Third of Observations

State Inspected All Equipment Provided to the ISF Annually, in Accordance with Its Standards

INL conducted annual inspections of equipment it provided to the ISF, as  required by State policy. According to INL’s annual EUM reports, from  2013 through 2018, INL annually inspected 100 percent of the equipment  valued at over $2,500 and defense articles regardless of value provided  to the ISF, either by on-site inspection or host government verification.

During our visit to an ISF site in Beirut, Lebanon, we found that all 16  items included in our random, non-generalizable sample were either  physically present or accounted for through documentation. We  observed 12 of the 16 items, such as police motorcycles and buses. The  ISF provided documentation showing that the remaining four items, all  trucks, were unavailable for inspection because the ISF had deployed  them on missions. Figure 4 shows police motorcycles provided to the  ISF that were inventoried by serial number.

DOD Conducted Enhanced EUM Checks for All Items Requiring Them, but Did Not Meet Its Timeliness Standards for Nearly One-Third of Observations

To provide reasonable assurance that recipients comply with U.S.  government restrictions on the use and security of defense articles,  DOD’s EUM standards require the Office of Defense Cooperation in  Beirut to conduct enhanced EUM for designated sensitive defense  articles, such as night vision devices provided to the LAF. U.S. officials  must conduct an initial inventory of equipment requiring enhanced EUM  within 90 days of delivery and must visually inventory 100 percent of  enhanced EUM-designated defense articles within one year of the last  inventory, or within 90 days of an acceptable reason for missing an  inspection (such as the item was deployed), and enter inventory  information into DOD’s SCIP database.

DOD officials accounted for all of the 2,991 items subject to enhanced  EUM from 2013 through 2018 at least once, according to our analysis of  SCIP data. DOD officials in Beirut said they conducted serial number  inventories of all items requiring enhanced EUM from 2013 through 2018,  as required by DOD’s EUM program.

During our visit to Lebanon in April 2019, DOD officials in Beirut  physically observed nearly 100 percent (270 of 271) of the defense  articles requiring enhanced EUM at the three LAF locations we visited.  Only one of the 271 items was unavailable for inspection and the LAF  provided documentation showing it was out for repair. Figure 5 shows  night vision devices provided to the LAF that were inventoried by serial  number.

DOD reporting, including a 2017 DSCA Compliance Assessment Visit  and U.S. Central Command Inspector General reports, indicates that the  LAF has generally complied with DOD requirements to account for and  secure equipment and conduct compliance checks of all required  equipment. DOD officials said the LAF is transparent about the location of  the equipment and goes out of its way to ensure DOD officials are able to  account for it. The officials also said the LAF is rigorous about  safeguarding all required equipment and consistently meets standards  equivalent or similar to U.S. standards for equipment accountability.

While our analysis showed that DOD generally accounted for items  requiring enhanced EUM, we also found that DOD did not always conduct  inspections consistent with its timeliness standards. If DOD does not  inspect an item within the timeframes required by its standards, DOD  considers the inspection delinquent. Our analysis of the duration  between inspections from 2014 through 2018 showed delinquencies in  each year and, in total, 32 percent (4,533) of the 14,287 recorded  observations we analyzed for timeliness were delinquent. We found that  86 percent of the 2,874 items we analyzed for timeliness had at least one  delinquent inspection during the 6 years we reviewed, and 61 percent had  two or three delinquent inspections. While inspections were often  delinquent, we found that the length of time items remained delinquent  was not extensive, with the average length of each delinquency lasting  2.6 months. Only 1 percent of recorded observations showed a  delinquency of 6 months or longer. Figure 6 shows the duration of  delinquencies for those inspections that were delinquent.

Officials from both the Office of Defense Cooperation in Beirut and DSCA  stated that the method that DSCA uses to determine inspection due dates  for annual inspection plans impedes the Office of Defense Cooperation’s  ability to meet DOD’s timeliness standards. DSCA assigns due dates for  items based on a general category code instead of an individual item’s  serial number, which according to DOD officials, does not allow the Office  of Defense Cooperation-Beirut to plan inspections in a way that meets  DOD’s timeliness standards. For example, one type of night vision  device represents 61 percent of the 2,991 items requiring enhanced  EUM. Because these items all have the same general category code,  DSCA designates all of them as due for inspection on the same day,  regardless of when DOD officials last inspected each individual item. As a  result, the inspection due dates DSCA establishes may be inconsistent  with DOD’s guidance, which complicates planning and could result in  some items having nearly 2 years between inspections before DCSA  flags them as delinquent.

Addressing how DSCA determines inspection due dates for items  requiring enhanced EUM is important for ensuring the Office of Defense  Cooperation has the information it needs to meet DOD’s timeliness  standards for equipment accountability. According to DOD officials, as of  April 2019, equipment on order for the LAF would double the number of  items subject to enhanced EUM inspections. This increase underscores  the importance of providing the Office of Defense Cooperation-Beirut  accurate inspection due dates for the equipment provided to Lebanon. By  not assigning inspection due dates consistent with DOD standards, DSCA  hinders the Office of Defense Cooperation’s ability to plan effectively. It  also increases the likelihood DOD will experience continued delays in  conducting the required checks that ensure the proper safeguarding and  usage of sensitive defense articles.

Recognizing Lebanon’s importance to the security and stability of the  Middle East, U.S. agencies invested nearly $1.5 billion in security  assistance to the country from fiscal years 2013 through 2018. However,  the prominent role of Hizballah in the Lebanese government complicates  the U.S. relationship with Lebanon and heightens the importance of  ensuring strong management controls over U.S. assistance. U.S.  agencies report that the LAF and ISF have improved in their capabilities  to secure Lebanon’s border and to combat terrorist activity. Embassy  Beirut has also taken a number of steps to track progress toward meeting  U.S. security-related objectives. Gaps in the embassy’s performance  information, however, limit its ability to monitor the ongoing progress of  specific activities and to make informed decisions about where to allocate  resources and attention. State and DOD did conduct end-use checks of  all required items and their reporting indicates the LAF and ISF have  generally taken appropriate steps to safeguard equipment. DOD,  however, did not meet its timeliness standards for nearly one-third of all  observations of sensitive equipment from 2013 through 2018. DSCA does  not assign inspection due dates in a way that is consistent with DOD  standards, which may limit DOD’s ability to fully ensure items requiring  enhanced end-use monitoring are safeguarded and used as intended in a  timely manner.

We are making a total of three recommendations, including two to State  and one to DOD:

The Secretary of State should direct the Department’s relevant  bureaus to work with Embassy Beirut to establish, as appropriate, and  consolidate targets for each of the security-related performance  indicators. (Recommendation 1)

The Secretary of State should direct the Department’s relevant  bureaus to work with Embassy Beirut to collect and review  performance data for key security-related performance indicators.  (Recommendation 2)

The Secretary of Defense should direct DSCA to revise the inspection  due dates it establishes for items requiring enhanced EUM for the  Office of Defense Cooperation in Beirut to align with DOD’s standards  for EUM by considering the date of last inspection. (Recommendation  3)

We provided a draft of this report to the Departments of State and  Defense for comment. In its comments, reproduced in appendix II, State  concurred with the recommendations that Embassy Beirut 1) establish, as  appropriate, and consolidate targets for; and 2) collect and review  performance data for its security-related performance indicators. State  also provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate.

We requested comments on a draft of this product from DOD. The  Director for Egypt, Israel, and the Levant in the Office of the Secretary of  Defense for Policy provided us with the Department’s comments in an  email stating that DOD concurs with the recommendation that DOD direct  DSCA to revise the inspection due dates it establishes for items requiring  enhanced EUM for the Office of Defense Cooperation in Beirut to align  with DOD’s standards for EUM by considering the date of last inspection.  The Director noted that the current SCIP EUM software complicates  annual inventory planning and reporting and that DSCA’s EUM personnel  have documented a software modification requirement that would allow  them to implement the recommendation. Additionally, she stated that final  design and budget decisions for fiscal year 2021 are not yet complete and  the magnitude of this software modification is a major task that is core to  EUM programming.

We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional  committees and the Secretaries of State and Defense. In addition, the  report is available at no charge on the GAO website at  http://www.gao.gov.

If you or your staff has any questions about this report please contact me  at (202) 512-2775 or fielde1@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of  Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page  of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are  listed in appendix III.

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

For fiscal years 2013 through 2018, we (1) examined to what extent the  Department of State (State) and the Department of Defense (DOD)  assessed the progress of their efforts to meet strategic objectives related  to security for Lebanon; (2) described what safeguards State and DOD  have put in place to limit the risk of U.S. security assistance provided to  Lebanon benefitting terrorist organizations; and (3) analyzed to what  extent State and DOD conducted end-use monitoring (EUM) checks of  equipment provided to Lebanese security forces.

To determine to what extent State and DOD assessed the progress of  their efforts, we reviewed agency documentation and interviewed State,  DOD, and Lebanese government officials. We reviewed Embassy Beirut’s  Integrated Country Strategies (ICS), for fiscal years 2015 through 2018 to  determine agencies’ strategic objectives for security assistance. We  compiled information from State and DOD assessments and performance  reporting on security assistance programs operating in Lebanon from  fiscal years 2013 through 2018, including assessments, evaluations, and  surveys. While we did not independently evaluate the quality of these  documents, we did review their methodologies and determined that the  approaches taken generally appeared reasonable. We also reviewed  State and DOD performance reporting, such as program annual reports  and Embassy Beirut’s Performance Plans and Reports for fiscal years  2013 through 2018. We then reviewed the compiled evidence to  determine what this reporting showed about to what extent agencies had  made progress toward their strategic objectives from fiscal years 2013  through 2018.

We reviewed Embassy Beirut’s process for monitoring progress on its  2018 ICS—including what information the embassy compiles and how it  determines whether programs are achieving their intended results. We  reviewed State’s Foreign Affairs Manual and federal standards for internal  control to identify key practices for ICS management. We compared the  2018 ICS to these key practices and requested information on Embassy  Beirut’s assessment of progress on 19 security-related activities and  indicators included in its 2018 Lebanon ICS. Embassy Beirut provided  information for each of the activities and indicators as of May 2019. We  reviewed the information provided by Embassy Beirut to determine if it  was complete. Four of the 19 performance indicators covered activities  for which performance data was not yet available. We did not include  these four indicators in our analysis. For the remaining 15 indicators, we  determined that Embassy Beirut provided complete data if it included  relevant data needed by decision makers to assess performance.  According to federal internal control standards, relevant data have a  logical connection with identified information requirements. For example,  if the information required for an indicator was quantitative in nature (such  as the number or percentage of people trained), then we considered the  information provided to be relevant if it included quantitative data that  directly addressed the indicator.

To describe what safeguards U.S. agencies have put in place to prevent  U.S. security assistance from benefitting terrorist organizations, we  reviewed legislative requirements, State policy guidance, and agency  documentation. We reviewed annual appropriations acts from fiscal years  2013 through 2018 to determine what, if any, restrictions were placed on  funding for Lebanon to ensure assistance did not benefit terrorist  organizations. We reviewed State policy guidance on counterterrorism  vetting and interviewed State and DOD officials in Washington, D.C. and  Beirut, Lebanon about the steps they take to prevent assistance from  benefitting U.S.-designated foreign terrorist organizations, including  Hizballah. We reviewed agency documentation, including a risk  assessment, an interagency memo, and State memos requesting the  release of funding. We reviewed what safeguards State and DOD use to  limit the risk of U.S. security assistance benefitting terrorist organizations,  but did not analyze how the agencies made determinations when  applying these safeguards.

To evaluate to what extent State and DOD conducted EUM checks of  equipment provided to Lebanese security forces, we reviewed agency  documentation and data and interviewed State and DOD officials in  Washington, DC and Beirut, Lebanon. We also reviewed State and DOD  EUM standards to determine what requirements the agencies established  for their respective programs and conducted site visits in Lebanon.

To evaluate to what extent State conducted EUM checks in accordance  with its standards, we reviewed State’s Bureau of International Narcotics  and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) annual end-use monitoring reports for  2013 through 2018 and analyzed INL EUM data. We also interviewed  State officials in Washington, D.C. and Beirut, Lebanon about their  processes for conducting and recording EUM. Because INL officials told  us its EUM annual reports are the agency’s official documents for tracking  adherence to EUM requirements, we used the reports in our analysis of  State’s compliance with its standards. We interviewed INL officials about  any identified discrepancies within the annual reports or between the  annual reports and INL’s EUM data and determined that the reports were  sufficiently reliable for our purposes. In Beirut, Lebanon, we visited two  Lebanese Internal Security Forces (ISF) sites to observe the ISF’s  processes for safeguarding and inventorying equipment. At the ISF’s  Mobile Forces site, we reviewed a random, nongeneralizable sample of  16 items requiring EUM—all of which were vehicles, including buses,  motorcycles, and trucks. We reviewed the serial numbers of items that  were available on-site and reviewed ISF documentation accounting for  those items that were not immediately available.

To evaluate to what extent DOD had conducted EUM checks in  accordance with its standards, we analyzed data from DOD’s Security  Cooperation Information Portal (SCIP) database for 2013 through 2018  and interviewed officials from DOD’s Defense Security Cooperation  Agency (DSCA) in Washington, D.C. and the Office of Defense  Cooperation in Beirut, Lebanon. To analyze SCIP data, we compared  observations recorded in the database against DOD’s standards. DOD’s  Security Assistance Management Manual standards for EUM state that  Security Cooperation Offices, like the Office of Defense Cooperation in  Beirut, must visually inventory 100 percent of in-country enhanced EUM- designated defense articles within one year from the last inventory  performed, except for those enhanced EUM-designated defense articles  not available for observation (such as deployed or returned to the United  States for repair), or as stipulated otherwise in the SCIP-EUM database  or by separate policy memo. According to DOD’s standards, enhanced  EUM-designated items not available for inventory during their annual  inventory cycle due to deployment, returned to the United States for  repair, or other legitimate reason, must be inventoried within 90 days after  returning from deployment or repair.

Each observation in the SCIP database represented a single inspection  or attempted inspection of an item and includes, among other things, the  item’s serial number, equipment category type, location, status, and date  observed. Because we analyzed multiple years of data, DOD recorded  more than one observation for almost all items.

To evaluate to what extent DOD met its standards, we used the following  parameters in our analysis:

We determined that an observation met the requirement for being  inventoried within one year from the last inventory performed if it  occurred within 12 months of the last observation of the same item.  Using a standard of 12 months between visits provides a small  amount of leeway to account for the fact that security conditions,  Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) scheduling, or other factors (such as  the 365th day falling on a holiday or weekend) outside of the Office of  Defense Cooperation’s control could impact the exact date on which  inventories were scheduled. If, for example, an item was inspected in  February 2017 and again in February 2018, our analysis would  consider it timely regardless of the actual date of inspection.

We considered items that were unavailable for inspection due to  deployment, repair, and security conditions to be accounted for  because they were unavailable for legitimate reasons. If the Office of  Defense Cooperation recorded an observation showing that an item  was unavailable for legitimate reasons within 12 months of the last  observation, we considered that observation to be timely. Because the  SCIP dataset we analyzed does not include the date an item was  returned from deployment or repair, we determined that a reinspection  was timely if it was conducted within 4 months of the observation  indicating the item was unavailable for inspection. We used a 4-month  standard by examining the average and median length of time for a  reinspection, which were 3.7 months and 3 months, respectively. The  4-month standard provides some time for an item to be returned  before triggering the 90-day reinspection requirement. After we  applied the 4-month standard, 367 observations, or about 3 percent of  all observations we analyzed for timeliness, were still considered  delinquent because they had not been reinspected within 4 months.  On average, the items that were considered delinquent under this  standard were reinspected about 8 months after they were considered  delinquent, or about 12 months after the last attempted visit,  indicating, on average, that these items were not inspected again until  the next annual cycle. Because we do not know the date on which an  item was returned, however, our analysis may slightly over-count  delinquencies resulting from an item being unavailable for inspection.

Our analysis only examined the time between recorded observations.  Therefore, it did not count any items that were delinquent as of the end of  2018 if no observation had been recorded. The SCIP dataset includes no  observation for 609 items in 2018. Of these, 117 were disposed of, lost,  or expended in combat prior to 2018, 476 were observed in 2017 but  delinquent as of the end of 2018, and 16 items were last observed before  2017. Additionally, due to data limitations, we did not analyze whether the  first observation for each item was timely. Because our data set started in  2013, we did not have data on the date of the last observation for items  delivered prior to 2013. DOD’s standards also state that DOD officials  must first inspect items requiring enhanced end-use monitoring within 90  days of the item’s delivery. However, the SCIP data we analyzed only  included the date the item was entered into SCIP, rather than the item’s  delivery date, so we could not analyze whether the first inspection for  items delivered after 2013 was timely. We did not include these  observations in our analysis of timeliness.

We conducted logical tests of the SCIP data, interviewed knowledgeable  DOD officials about the database, and discussed our analysis with DSCA  and ODC officials. We determined the data were sufficiently reliable for  our purposes.

We traveled to Tripoli, Lebanon and visited three LAF facilities to observe  DOD procedures for conducting end-use monitoring and to see how the  LAF safeguarded the equipment provided to them. We observed DOD’s  enhanced end-use monitoring process for the 271 items in these three  locations.

Appendix II: Comments from the Department of State

Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

Elizabeth Field, (202) 512-2775 or fielde1@gao.gov.

In addition to the contact named above, Biza Repko (Assistant Director),   Kara Marshall (Analyst-in-Charge), Adam Brooks, Lisa G. Shibata, Aldo  Salerno, Neil Doherty, Martin de Alteriis, and Ashley Alley made key  contributions to this report.

The United States provided nearly $1.5 billion in weapons, training, and other assistance to Lebanese security forces between 2013 and 2018. We reviewed how State and DOD oversaw and assessed the effectiveness of this assistance in several areas.

State and DOD found Lebanese forces improved in key areas, such as border security, but gaps in performance information limited State's ability to measure progress.

State and DOD conducted required inventory checks on U.S.-provided equipment. However, DOD was sometimes late in doing so.

We recommended actions to collect better performance information and ensure timely inspections.