Unmanned Aerial Systems: Air Force Should Take Additional Steps to Improve Aircrew Staffing and Support

High demand and constant combat operations have created challenges for Air Force RPA pilots and sensor operators who conduct missions across the world. In January 2017, the Air Force approved a combat-to-dwell policy to better balance RPA units' time in combat with non-combat activities. It plans to fully implement the policy in 2024.

Senate Report 115-262 included a provision that GAO review ongoing challenges in the Air Force RPA community. This report assesses, among other things, the extent to which the Air Force (1) met overall RPA pilot and sensor operator staffing targets and tracked its progress in implementing its combat-to-dwell policy and (2) identified and met instructor staffing levels at its RPA formal training unit. GAO analyzed selected Air Force accession, retention, and instructor staffing data; held non-generalizable focus groups at three RPA military bases; and interviewed officials at various levels of the RPA enterprise.

The Air Force does not have enough pilots and sensor operators to meet its staffing targets for its unmanned aircraft—also called remotely piloted aircraft (RPA). It also does not track its overall progress in accessing and retaining enough RPA personnel needed to implement its combat-to-dwell policy, which is intended to balance RPA units' time spent in combat with non-combat activities. Officials stated that to fully implement combat-to-dwell the Air Force needs to access and retain more RPA personnel because since fiscal year 2016 it has had fewer RPA personnel than authorized (see figure for RPA sensor operator example). The Air Force has provided financial incentives to address retention of RPA personnel, but it does not yet have enough historical data to help predict RPA pilot retention trends going forward given the newness of the career field. Officials additionally expressed specific concerns about sensor operator retention particularly due to the possibility of lucrative private-sector jobs. Further, the Air Force does not have a comprehensive metric (or set of metrics) to know whether its accession and retention efforts are on track to generate the additional RPA personnel needed to implement its combat-to-dwell policy by 2024. Without a metric (or set of metrics), it is unclear whether any adjustments are needed to meet its implementation timeframes.

The Air Force has not fully identified the number of RPA pilot and sensor operator instructor positions needed at its formal training unit and since 2016 has experienced instructor staffing shortages. Specifically, the number of instructor positions required is understated because they are based on a 2009 program of instruction with 49 training days while the current program of instruction is 83 training days. Moreover, since fiscal year 2016, the formal training unit has had fewer assigned instructors than authorized positions even though those numbers of instructor positions are underestimates of actual needs. To help address the effect of the instructor gap, officials temporarily reduced the length of training. Without updated information to inform the number of required instructors, the Air Force does not know the correct number of instructor positions necessary to train RPA aircrews to be ready to complete their mission.

GAO recommends that the Air Force establish a comprehensive metric (or set of metrics) to track the progress of its efforts to access and retain enough RPA personnel needed to implement its combat-to-dwell policy, and update the number of required RPA instructor positions. The Air Force partially concurred with the first recommendation and concurred with the second one. GAO continues to believe the first recommendation is valid, as discussed in the report.

For about 25 years, the Air Force’s use of various unmanned aircraft,  which it commonly calls Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPA), has enabled it to  counter threats by providing intelligence and surveillance 24 hours a day,  seven days a week, as well as delivering weapons on targets as needed.  RPA aircrews consist of two people—a pilot who in most cases is a rated  officer (i.e., an officer possessing aviation expertise) and a sensor  operator who is an enlisted servicemember. The pilot flies the aircraft  and the sensor operator controls the aircraft’s sensors that record video  and other intelligence information. Since the attacks of September 2001,  the demand for RPAs and skilled RPA pilots and sensor operators has  grown dramatically. To meet this personnel demand, the Air Force  depends on a combination of accessing new recruits, training them, and retaining sufficient quantities of pilots and sensor operators with specific  skills and competencies while also addressing their health and wellness.

In late 2015, the Air Force’s Air Combat Command established the  Culture and Process Improvement Program (CPIP), which identified  concerns and issues affecting units specifically operating the Air Force’s  attack RPAs. The CPIP identified that this RPA workforce lacked an  established requirement for “dwell time”—the time a unit spends in non- combat operations, such as training. Following a state of constant surge  since 2007 and having RPA units engaged in continuous combat  operations, the Chief of Staff of the Air Force in January 2017 approved a  combat-to-dwell policy for specific RPA units that allows a unit to focus  either on combat or training, not both simultaneously. This new policy was  developed because the traditional Department of Defense (DOD)  deployment-to-dwell policy did not apply to the in-garrison combat  operations that the attack RPA units conduct within the United States.  This combat-to-dwell policy will provide these attack RPA units  reconstitution and readiness opportunities, such as mission qualification  training; upgrade training; continuation training; professional military  education; and leave. The Air Force plans to implement this policy fully in  fiscal year 2024.

Since at least 2013, Congress has expressed concern over various Air  Force RPA personnel issues such as whether the Air Force has an  adequate number of RPA pilots; their education and promotion rates; and  other training-related challenges. Congress has also taken various  legislative actions related to the oversight of RPA personnel issues,  including increasing the maximum amount of aviation financial incentives  for RPA pilots as a result of the National Defense Authorization Act for  Fiscal Year 2016. Further, in July 2017, a congressional committee  directed the Air Force to provide a report explaining actions it was taking  to address RPA pilot retention and the mental health of RPA pilots and  airmen. As of February 2020, the Air Force had not provided us this  report.

In our prior work, we have noted the high work demands and stress levels  among RPA aircrews and challenges associated with the management of  the RPA career field. In April 2014, we found shortages of RPA pilots and  that the Air Force faced challenges recruiting, developing, and retaining  pilots and building their morale. The Air Force has implemented six of  the seven recommendations we made in our report. Additionally, in May  2015, we reported that the Air Force had staffed its RPA training  squadrons at Holloman Air Force Base at 63 percent of its planned  staffing levels. This shortage was a key reason that the Air Force had  shortages of RPA pilots across the service, according to an Air Force  Headquarters official.

Further, in January 2017, we found, among other things, that the Air  Force had not fully tailored a human capital planning strategy to address  persistent gaps in the number of RPA pilots. In that report, we directed  three recommendations to the Air Force. Although the Air Force has not  fully implemented any of these recommendations as of February 2020, it  has taken some steps to (1) expand its strategy to address additional  issues affecting RPA pilot shortages; (2) monitor how its efforts to  implement its strategy is achieving the intended goals; and (3) explore the  potential use of additional financial and non-financial incentives that  would enable it to increase the RPA pilot workforce.

The Senate Armed Services Committee report accompanying a bill for the  National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019 included a  provision for us to review the ongoing challenges in the Air Force RPA  community. In this report, we assessed the extent to which the Air Force  (1) met its overall RPA pilot and sensor operator staffing targets and  tracked its progress in implementing its combat-to-dwell policy; (2)  identified and met its RPA pilot and sensor operator instructor staffing  levels at its RPA formal training unit; and (3) addressed quality of life  issues affecting its RPA workforce.

While the Air Force targeted its efforts to develop improvements for the  challenges specifically affecting its MQ-1 Predator and MQ-9 Reaper  RPA communities, the Air Force retired its MQ-1 Predator RPA in 2018.  Therefore, we focused our review on the MQ-9 Reaper RPA community.

As part of our first objective, we evaluated the Air Force’s accession  efforts to obtain sufficient quantities of RPA pilots and sensor operators  and its ability to meet established staffing levels. First, we compared the  number of RPA pilots and sensor operators who entered active duty with  the numbers in the Air Force’s accession targets for fiscal years 2015  through 2019 to determine how consistently the Air Force met those  targets. Additionally, we obtained data on staffing requirements,  authorizations, and numbers of assigned RPA pilots and sensor operators  for fiscal years 2016 through 2019. We compared the number of RPA  pilots and sensor operators assigned to their respective authorizations to  determine how consistently the Air Force met those targets. We also  interviewed officials from Headquarters Air Force to obtain their  perspectives on accession-related issues and officials from Air Combat  Command, and Air Force Special Operations Command to obtain their  perspectives on RPA pilots and sensor operators staffing issues.

As part of the first objective, we also evaluated the Air Force’s retention  efforts to obtain sufficient quantities of RPA pilots and sensor operators.  Regarding the retention financial incentives the Air Force has offered to  RPA pilots, we analyzed information about the following availabilities for  fiscal years 2015 through 2018: (1) Aviation Retention Pay; (2) Aviation  Career Incentive Pay, also known as Aviator Pay; (3) RPA Assignment  Incentive Pay; (4) Critical Skills Retention Bonuses; (5) Aviation Bonuses;  and (6) Aviation Incentive Pay. Regarding RPA sensor operators, we  analyzed information about the availability of the following financial  incentives: (1) RPA Sensor Operator Incentive Program; (2) Critical Skills  Incentive Pay; (3) Selective Retention Bonuses; and (4) Special Duty  Assignment Pay.

Further, regarding metrics and other information the Air Force uses to  measure RPA pilot and sensor operator retention, we interviewed  Headquarters Air Force officials regarding any retention goals set for  each group. Next, we analyzed data from the Air Force’s Rated Officer  Retention Analysis reports for fiscal years 2015 through most of fiscal  year 2019 regarding the acceptance rates of aviation retention bonuses  by RPA pilots. Regarding sensor operators, we analyzed sensor operator  reenlistment data for fiscal year 2014 through most of fiscal year 2019  and calculated various measures of sensor operator retention. We also  conducted interviews with officials at Headquarters Air Force; Air Combat  Command; Air Force Special Operations Command; and Air Force  Personnel Center about RPA pilot and sensor operator retention-related  issues.

As another part of the first objective, we discussed with Headquarters Air  Force officials what metrics or measures they use to track their progress  in implementing the Air Force’s policy to better balance RPA personnel’s  involvement between combat and non-combat operations, known as the  combat-to-dwell policy. We compared the Air Force’s efforts to monitor its  overall progress in balancing its accession and retention efforts to obtain  sufficient quantities of RPA pilots and sensor operators needed to  implement the combat-to-dwell policy against the timeline goal  established by the Air Force. We also compared their efforts to  requirements in the Standards of Internal Control in the Federal  Government, which states that management should review actual  performance, track achievements, and compare them to plans, goals, and  objectives.

For the second objective, we obtained information describing how the  number of required instructor positions were determined at the Holloman  Air Force Base, New Mexico, training unit and compared that process to  requirements in the Standards of Internal Control in the Federal  Government regarding the importance of management using quality  information to achieve its objectives. Further, we compared the actual  numbers of RPA pilots and sensor operators who were assigned to  instructor positions to the authorized numbers of these positions at the Air  Force’s RPA formal training unit at Holloman Air Force Base for fiscal  years 2016 through 2019. We concentrated our analysis on the number of  instructor positions at Holloman Air Force Base because this location is  the largest MQ-9 Reaper RPA formal training unit in the Air Force.  Additionally, we obtained documentation of training processes for RPA  pilots, sensor operators, and instructors. Further, we interviewed officials  at Holloman Air Force Base officials from the 49th Wing leadership;  training squadron leaders; and pilot and sensor operator instructors and  students to better understand the training process, recent changes to the  process, the adequacy of staffing at the unit, and other issues affecting  the RPA enterprise overall. Further, we interviewed officials from the  Headquarters 19th Air Force RPA Training Branch, Air Force Education  and Training Center, San Antonio, Texas, regarding the overall RPA  undergraduate training process and curriculum.

To determine the reliability of the data used in the first two objectives, we  assessed the data for errors, omissions, and inconsistencies; and  interviewed officials from Headquarters Air Force operations directorate,  Headquarters Air Force personnel directorate, and the Air Force  Personnel Center who were familiar with the systems from which the data  were extracted. We also used fiscal years 2014 through 2016 pilot  retention reports from our prior work on Air Force fighter pilots and the  applicable reliability assessment information. We determined that the  data were sufficiently reliable for our purposes of reporting overall  accession, staffing, and retention trends for RPA pilot and sensor operator as well as instructor position staffing trends at the Air Force’s  formal training unit at Holloman Air Force Base, New Mexico.

For our third objective, we selected three RPA operational bases to visit  and across those locations, we conducted 14 focus groups with RPA  pilots and sensor operators. During these focus groups, we asked  questions to gain their experiences and perspectives regarding such  topics as training, quality of life issues, health and wellness issues,  availability of base support services, and positive and negative aspects of  being RPA pilots or sensor operators. We selected Cannon Air Force  Base, New Mexico, and Creech Air Force Base, Nevada, because they  have the largest population of MQ-9 Reaper RPA operators in Air Force  Special Operations Command and Air Combat Command, respectively. In  addition, we selected Shaw Air Force Base, South Carolina, to obtain  information from unit leaders and aircrew working at a base with RPA  operations newly established since the beginning of fiscal year 2018.

The 14 focus groups we conducted ranged in size from five to 11  participants across the three sites, with 105 total participants. We  conducted five focus groups at Shaw Air Force Base; four focus groups at  Cannon Air Force Base; and five focus groups at Creech Air Force Base.  Of the 14 focus groups, eight focus groups were with RPA pilots and six  focus groups were with RPA sensor operators. The participants were  assigned to focus groups based on: (1) occupation as an RPA pilot or  sensor operator, (2) their rank or grade, and (3) for pilots, whether they  had prior experience as a manned aircraft pilot. We conducted a content  analysis of the comments from each of the focus groups by coding them  into a combination of seven primary and 43 sub-categories. Additionally,  following each focus group, we administered a questionnaire to  participants that included questions about such topics as their training  experiences and their perceptions of staffing in their units and the RPA  enterprise. The information that we obtained during the focus groups and  from the questionnaire reflect the opinions provided by a cross section of  RPA pilots and sensor operators who attended the focus groups at the  three locations we visited. However, our findings are not generalizable to  all servicemembers at these locations or to all servicemembers within the  Air Force. Further details about the focus group methodology are included  in appendix I.

At the three RPA locations we visited, we also observed and recorded the  operating hours for selected base services such as the childcare, dining,  housing, and medical facilities on a data collection instrument to  document the availability of these services. In addition, we interviewed  senior and squadron leaders, health professionals and chaplains, and  base services officials at each of these locations. Further, we interviewed  officials at Headquarters Air Force; Air Combat Command; and Air Force  Special Operations Command about the Air Force’s CPIP in addressing  quality of life issues affecting the RPA community.

Additionally, through a literature search, we identified 87 separate journal  articles, studies, books, professional and academic publications, and  legislative materials, among other things, published as far back as 2010  that related to issues associated with RPA personnel workforce issues.  By a review of each item’s abstract or full text, we assessed the  publications’ relevance as high, medium or low to our engagement. From  that assessment, we identified 23 publications as highly relevant to our  engagement. We used these publications as background contextual  information to inform our review and, where applicable, in support of  findings related to the quality of life issues affecting RPA personnel. A list  of the studies and publications related to RPA personnel workforce issues  that we assessed to be highly relevant to our review is found in appendix  II.

We conducted this performance audit from February 2019 to June 2020  in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.

Air Force Use of RPAs and Basing Locations

The Air Force operates several types of RPAs: the MQ-9 Reaper; RQ-4  Global Hawk; and RQ-170 Sentinel. The MQ-9 Reaper RPA community  has about four times the number of pilots and eight times the number of  sensor operators assigned as compared to the next largest RPA  community (the RQ-4 Global Hawk). Additionally, the MQ-9 Reaper  RPA provides persistent intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance  and strike capabilities against high-value, fleeting, and time-sensitive  targets. It is operated by an aircrew that includes an officer pilot and  enlisted sensor operator. See figure 1.

The Air Force RPAs operate remote split operations, which divides the  control of the RPA among geographically separated units. Remote split  operations employ a launch and recovery ground control station unit  aircrew who controls the RPA’s take-off and landing at an overseas  operating location while a crew based in the continental United States  (i.e., the Mission Control Element unit) flies the RPA the remainder of the  mission via electronic links. Remote split operations result in fewer  personnel deployed overseas, consolidates flying multiple aircraft from  one location, and as such, simplifies command and control functions as  well as the logistical supply challenges for the weapon system. RPA  operations include Active Duty and Air National Guard personnel and  locations. Figure 2 shows the location of bases involved in RPA training  and MQ-9 Reaper RPA operational locations with the active-duty sites  bolded.

Over nearly two decades, the number of combat lines and flying hours for  RPAs has grown substantially. Specifically, in 2008, the Air Force flew 33  RPA combat lines but in 2015, the number had increased to 60 RPA  combat lines. A combat line is the measure of the capability to provide  near-continuous 24-hour flight presence of an RPA over a specific region  on Earth, to include time flying to and from a specific target area. In doing  so, the RPA can provide air action against hostile targets that are in close  proximity to friendly forces, gather intelligence, or, if necessary, employ its  weapons to strike identified targets. Additionally, the number of combat  flying hours has also increased from calendar year 2000, as shown in  figure 3 below, and reached 4 million cumulative combat hours in March  2019.

In March 2016, General Herbert J. Carlisle, then-commander of Air  Combat Command, testified to the Senate Armed Services Committee’s  Subcommittee on Airland that the RPA enterprise has been “a victim of its  own success” with “an insatiable demand for RPA forces” that was taxing  the capability of the community. To meet the demand for RPA pilots, the  Air Force has pursued efforts to increase the number of RPA pilots. For  example, the Air Force trained traditional manned-aircraft pilots to fly  RPAs and placed graduates of manned-aircraft pilot training into RPA  training rather than in advanced manned-aircraft training. In 2010, the Air  Force created a dedicated RPA pilot career field (i.e., 18X specialty code)  and developed a training program for pilots who specialize in flying RPAs.  In December 2013, there were 1,366 Air Force RPA pilots, of which 249  were dedicated RPA pilots (18 percent). Six years later, in December  2019, the number of total Air Force RPA pilots had grown to 1,768, with  1,127 of those being dedicated RPA pilots (64 percent).

MQ-9 Reaper RPA pilots and sensor operators complete multiple phases  of training designed to generate combat mission capable aircrews within  approximately a year of starting training. First, the pilots initially attend  RPA Flight Training in Pueblo, Colorado, and then Undergraduate RPA  Training at Randolph Air Force Base, Texas, which includes instrument  qualification in simulators and an RPA fundamentals course. Second,  they complete MQ-9 Initial Qualification Training at the formal training unit  at either Holloman Air Force Base in New Mexico, March Air Reserve  Base in California, or Hancock Field Air National Guard Base near  Syracuse, New York. Finally, they are assigned to an operational  squadron, where they complete unit-specific Mission Qualification  Training that can vary in length. According to officials at two RPA bases,  their respective Mission Qualification Training was taking between six to  10 weeks or as much as 17 weeks to complete.

MQ-9 Reaper RPA sensor operators go through a similar pipeline. They  complete courses on aircrew fundamentals and the basics of being a  sensor operator at Lackland Air Force Base, Texas, and Randolph Air  Force Base, Texas, respectively. Then, they complete training at the MQ- 9 Reaper RPA formal training unit at Holloman Air Force Base, New  Mexico; March Air Reserve Base, California; or Hancock Field, Syracuse,  New York. Finally, they complete unit-specific Mission Qualification  Training in the operational unit at which they are assigned after  graduation. Figure 4 shows the MQ-9 Reaper RPA aircrew training  pipeline.

The Air Force Has RPA Pilot and Sensor Operator Staffing Shortages and Does Not Track Its Progress toward Implementing Its Combat-to-Dwell Policy as Planned

The Air Force does not have enough RPA pilots and sensor operators to  meet its staffing targets, and it does not track its overall progress to  access and retain sufficient quantities of RPA personnel that is needed to  implement its combat-to-dwell policy as planned. More specifically, the Air  Force has not consistently met its accession targets for RPA pilots and  sensor operators and has had fewer RPA pilots and sensor operators  than it has needed for most years between fiscal years 2016 through  2019. The Air Force has offered financial retention incentives to RPA  pilots and sensor operators; however, it does not directly measure RPA  pilot and sensor operator retention rates and retention concerns exist.  Moreover, the Air Force does not track the overall progress being made  from its accession and retention efforts to maintain a sufficient quantity of  RPA pilots and sensor operators needed to implement as planned its  combat-to-dwell policy—a policy intended to better balance RPA units’  time in combat operations with time spent away from those operations to  accomplish other activities such as training.

The Air Force Has Experienced Staffing Shortages in RPA Pilots and Sensor Operators

The Air Force Has Not Consistently Met Accession Targets for RPA Pilots and Sensor Operators

The Air Force met its accession targets for its RPA pilots in only one year  during fiscal years 2015 through 2019 and it did not meet any of its  sensor operator accession targets during those years. However, this is  not a new trend. In 2014, we reported that the Air Force did not achieve  its accession targets for RPA pilots in fiscal years 2012 and 2013 and  recommended that the Air Force develop a tailored accession strategy for  RPA pilots to help ensure that it can meet and maintain required staffing  levels to meet its mission. The Air Force concurred with the  recommendation and took steps to address accession issues for RPA  pilots, such as having officers with RPA pilot experience serve at the U.S.  Air Force Academy as instructors and as ROTC detachment commanders  and instructors at several large, nationally recognized universities, thus  giving attention to the career field among future Airmen. Because of these  actions to address RPA accessions, the Air Force met the intent of our  recommendation. Since then, however, the Air Force has not consistently  met its annual accession targets from fiscal years 2015 through 2019, as  shown in figure 5.

As shown in figure 5, for the 5-year period between fiscal years 2015 and  2019, the average accession target fill rates for pilots and sensor  operators were 95 and 88 percent, respectively. Air Force officials told us  that they do not believe the RPA pilot career field is facing an accessions  problem and thus there is no need to offer an accession bonus because  the overall population of RPA pilots has been steadily growing year after  year. These officials attribute the trend to the appealing RPA mission.  Participants in 12 of 14 focus groups we conducted agreed that the ability  to affect front line combat operations and missions every day was a  positive aspect of the job.

For sensor operators, Air Force officials told us that the number entering  active-duty service reflects the number who had finished Basic Military  Training and their first RPA-specific training course. These numbers  would have been higher but Air Force officials stated they have  determined that about 11 percent are disqualified during Basic Military  Training sensitive skills screening. This screening involves identifying  individuals upon entry into the service with behavioral or mental health  issues and is used for, among other things, determining a trainee’s job  classification and qualification for sensitive occupations. According to  Headquarters Air Force officials, the 711th Human Performance Wing at  Wright Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio, has ongoing research to help  better identify the right types of airmen for RPA positions beyond the  vocational aptitude battery test given to determine how qualified an  enlistee is for certain occupations. They said that they expect the results  of that research to be disseminated in early fiscal year 2021.

The Air Force Generally Has Had Fewer RPA Pilots and Sensor Operators Than It Has Needed since 2016

According to Air Force data, the service has had fewer RPA pilots and  sensor operators as compared to both their respective requirements and  authorizations for almost the entire time between fiscal years 2016  through 2019. More specifically, the number of RPA pilot and sensor  operator requirements has increased every year in support of the Air  Force’s plan to create a new wing by 2024 that is needed to implement  the combat-to-dwell policy. These Air Force requirements represent  minimum essential resources needed to accomplish approved missions  and functions that are valid, unconstrained, and realistic.

After establishing the number of required positions, the Air Force fills  these required positions to the extent possible based first on the number  of those positions funded by Congress (i.e., authorizations) and then the  number of trained and qualified personnel available to assign to those  positions. Since fiscal year 2016, the overall number of authorized and  assigned Air Force RPA pilots and sensor operators has increased.  However, for a majority of the time in fiscal years 2016 through 2019, the  Air Force’s number of assigned RPA pilots and sensor operators were  less than both of their respective authorizations and requirements, as  shown in figures 6 and 7.

The overall number of assigned RPA pilots has increased; however, this  trend has not been enough to meet the increased number of authorized  positions in this RPA career field. For example, for RPA pilots, there was  a 22-percent gap between authorizations (1,168) and assigned (908) in  August 2015 which was similar to the 20-percent gap between  authorizations (1,652) and assigned (1,320) in September 2019. The Air  Force’s Rated Officer Retention Analysis report for fiscal year 2019 states  that each of the four rated groups (pilots, combat system officers, air  battle managers and RPA pilots) ended fiscal year 2019 in a deficit.  Current projections indicate that the pilot deficit will continue into the near  future. The report went on to say that while the number of assigned RPA  pilots actually grew in fiscal year 2019, increases in the requirements for  this career field reduced or negated the effect of the increase.  Additionally, there was less than a 10 percent gap between the number  authorized and assigned sensor operators during fiscal year 2016.  However, by September 2019, a gap of 28 percent had developed (1,277  authorizations versus 919 assigned).

The Air Force Has Provided Financial Incentives to Retain RPA Personnel but Does Not Directly Measure RPA Pilot and Sensor Operator Retention Rates and Retention Concerns Exist

To encourage the retention of RPA pilots and sensor operators, the Air  Force has provided financial incentives for many years. For example, the  National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 authorized RPA  pilots to receive aviation incentive pay up to $1,000 a month and an  aviation retention bonus up to $35,000 to those who are willing to extend  their service. In addition, the Air Force has offered a number of financial  incentives to RPA sensor operators. At various times in January 2010  through November 2019, RPA sensor operators were eligible for monthly  aviation incentive pay, critical skills incentive pay, or special duty  assignment pay to address retention issues and have occasionally been  eligible for Selective Retention Bonuses. In November 2019, the Air  Force offered a Selective Retention Bonus to RPA sensor operators who  were eligible to reenlist and had between 17 months to 6 years of military  service.

To measure long-term retention trends among pilots other than RPA  pilots, the Air Force calculates two retention metrics—the Cumulative  Continuation Rate and the Total Active Rated Service rate. However,  the number of RPA pilots (i.e., Air Force Specialty Code 18X pilots) is still  too few to have enough data to calculate reliably these standard retention  metrics since the career field was not established until 2010. Officials at  Headquarters Air Force and Air Combat Command told us that to  calculate the Total Active Rated Service metric, the Air Force would need  about 20 years of data; however, the RPA pilot career field is too new to  have that amount of data. These RPA pilots have a 6 year Active Duty  Service Commitment, which begins at the end of their undergraduate  RPA training at Randolph Air Force Base. According to Air Force officials,  the first group of 18X pilots’ service commitments ended in fiscal year  2019. Senior leaders at an RPA base we visited said that due to the  newness of the RPA pilot 18X career field, the Air Force does not  currently have enough historical data to help predict retention trends  going forward. They also noted that until the combat-to-dwell policy is  implemented, it is unknown what effect it will have on RPA personnel  retention.

According to Air Force officials, the Air Force tries to retain about 60 to 65  percent of those who have completed their initial service commitment and  are eligible to be retained. However, this target is based on the average  aviation retention bonus acceptance rates (i.e., the percentage of pilots  accepting the retention bonuses) for healthy and established career fields  where the number of required positions are not substantially increasing  and which are able to meet between 95 to 100 percent of their staffing  requirements. However, as previously discussed, RPA pilot requirements  have increased about 74 percent in the 5 years from fiscal years 2015  through 2019. Therefore, these Headquarters Air Force officials stated  that use of the 60 to 65 percent target may not be an appropriate target  for RPA pilot retention.

In the case of RPA pilots, if the Air Force met that target, Air Force  officials said the service would still be understaffed due to the growing  requirements, so the retention target would need to be higher. Further,  they stated that while aviation retention bonus acceptance rates are  leading indicators of retention, they are not measures of actual retention  rates and there are limitations to using this approach. For example, one  limitation is that pilots may choose to stay in the Air Force but not take the  aviation retention bonus to exercise more control and flexibility over their  career. In these cases, actual retention would be higher than the aviation  retention bonus acceptance rate suggests.

According to the Air Force’s annual Rated Officer Retention Analysis  reports we reviewed, the combined aviation retention bonus acceptance  rates for RPA pilots both with and without previous manned aircraft  experience completing their initial service commitment were  approximately 55 percent in fiscal year 2016, 64 percent in fiscal year  2017, and 60 percent in fiscal years 2018 and 2019. Our comparison of  the aviation retention bonus acceptance rates for RPA pilots with previous  manned aircraft experience to those without that experience suggests  that the pilots without that experience have consistently had lower bonus  acceptance rates, as shown in table 1.

As far back as April 2014, we reported that there were indications the Air  Force could be facing challenges retaining RPA pilots in the future.  Despite the existence of incentive payments, pilots in seven of the 10  focus groups we conducted at that time indicated that retention of RPA  pilots was or would be a challenge. We recommended that the Air Force  develop a retention strategy that was tailored to the needs and challenges  of the RPA pilots to help ensure the Air Force could meet and retain  required staffing levels to meet its mission. The Air Force took some  steps to address RPA pilot retention, such as expanding RPA operations  to an additional base to increase assignment choices and decreasing the  number of combat lines that RPA aircrews were flying to reduce their  workload. Further, in July 2018, officials said that the Air Force  established a new division at Headquarters to serve as a focal point for  overseeing RPA personnel matters for the service. Because of these  actions to address RPA retention, the Air Force met the intent of our  recommendation.

However, in our current review, we found indicators of concern regarding  RPA pilot retention. For example, officials in varying leadership positions  in the Air Force raised concerns about RPA pilot retention. Air Combat  Command officials stated that they assume that about 30 percent of RPA  pilots each year will have to be replaced due to attrition. Senior leaders at  one RPA base that we visited told us that not having dwell time as a  break from constant combat operations negatively impacts RPA  personnel resiliency and retention. They said that to get a break from  combat operations, RPA personnel turn to the Air National Guard or  separate. They noted that people join the Air Force to see and do things,  not to be exposed to constant combat operations in less than appealing  locations. Further, according to RPA officials, personnel stated in exit  interviews that they wanted more temporary duty opportunities,  deployments, exercises, and other opportunities for better career  development. Similarly, senior leaders at another location we visited said  that the lack of training and leadership opportunities affects retention.  They noted that there are hundreds of pilots at Creech Air Force Base,  but only one wing commander, and this has a chilling effect given the  limited leadership opportunities available.

With regard to RPA sensor operators, Headquarters Air Force officials  stated that the Air Force does not have an RPA-specific sensor operator  retention goal, but rather it generally aims to retain about the same  amount as other career enlisted aviator career fields have historically  retained, which is about 70 percent. However, according to a February  2017 memorandum, the RPA sensor operators experienced a steady  decline in retention since 2012. This memorandum requested Special  Duty Assignment Pay for RPA sensor operators stating that airmen in this  career field were placed under enormous personal and professional  demands. It also stated that in a 2-year sample, 2014-2016, the Air Force  Personnel Center reported a 31 percent reenlistment decrease for first  term RPA sensor operators, a 7 percent decrease for second term RPA  sensor operators, and a 16 percent decrease for career RPA sensor  operators.

Specifically, the memorandum said that in 2016 the reenlistment rates for  RPA sensor operators were 44 percent, 54 percent, and 74 percent for  first-term, second-term, and career RPA sensor operators, respectively.  In comparison, these rates were 19 percent, 22 percent, and 16 percent  lower than the average rate across all Air Force Career Enlisted Aviators.  The Air Force approved this Special Duty Assignment Pay for RPA  sensor operators effective in November 2017. Additionally, effective  October 2018 and again in July 2019 and November 2019, RPA sensor  operators were eligible to receive Selective Retention Bonuses.  Coinciding with the start of these financial incentives in fiscal year 2018,  Air Force data showed increases in RPA sensor operator reenlistment  rates as compared to fiscal year 2017 reenlistment rates (see table 2).

While Air Force data show improvements in RPA sensor operator  reenlistment rates, officials we spoke with shared concerns about  retention-related issues specifically regarding sensor operators. For  example, a senior leader at one RPA base we visited said that there is an  acknowledged retention problem within the sensor operator community  citing one of the factors being the perception among sensor operators  that private contractors pay more than the Air Force. An Air Force  document justifying the Selective Retention Bonus states that contractors  are targeting experienced RPA sensor operators for six-figure salaries of  greater than $100,000 per year.

Similarly, a senior leader at one RPA base we visited stated that  contractors are paying sensor operators 2 to 4 times as much as the Air  Force does, essentially making the Air Force a pipeline for RPA  personnel to become government contractors. Moreover, participants in  each of the senior RPA sensor operators (i.e., E5-E9) focus groups that  we conducted told us that they thought the retention bonuses and  financial incentives were too small to matter in their retention decision- making. In a questionnaire we administered to the 105 participants across  the 14 focus groups, nearly half (19 of 41) of the sensor operators  responded they were “somewhat dissatisfied” or “very dissatisfied” with  their total compensation versus 20 percent (13 of 64) of pilots who  responded they were “somewhat dissatisfied” or “very dissatisfied.”

The Air Force Does Not Track Its Progress in Implementing Its Combat- to-Dwell Policy within Its Projected Timeframe

The Air Force does not track its overall progress of accessing and  retaining sufficient quantities of RPA pilots and sensor operators needed  to achieve its goal of implementing the combat-to-dwell policy in fiscal  year 2024. Specifically, in a February 2018 briefing to Congress, the Air  Force stated it planned to fully implement the combat-to-dwell policy in  fiscal year 2024. Headquarters Air Force officials stated that in order to  meet this 2024 goal, the Air Force is working to increase the number of  trained RPA pilots and sensor operators through its accession, training,  and retention efforts because they said it cannot implement the combat- to-dwell policy if it lacks sufficient quantities of available personnel.

Several senior leaders at each of the locations we visited discussed the  importance of achieving and sustaining a sufficient level of staffing that is  needed to implement the dwell policy. One senior leader emphasized that  the Air Force made “getting to dwell” its cornerstone promise.

Officials stated that pilots and sensor operators are currently only able to  accomplish training that can be done while completing combat missions  because the RPA personnel are currently flying 24/7 combat missions.  The January 2017 combat-to-dwell policy emphasized the need for the  implementation of dwell time within the RPA community to allow these  units to focus on either combat operations or training, but not both at the  same time. This policy states that it is essential for preventing future risk  to the mission and preserving the combat capability of the RPA force.  Headquarters Air Force officials stated that they were hopeful that  implementing the combat-to-dwell policy would improve quality of life and  reduce burnout among RPA personnel by allowing them to take a break  from combat operations to give them time to rest and train.

Officials acknowledged that poor quality of life conditions for RPA  personnel negatively affects retention. According to an Air Force  instruction related to the RPA community, it is important to build a  sustainable and healthy force and retention affects virtually all aspects of  the Air Force’s effort to meet its goal of attaining the proper number of  aircrew personnel. Further, it states that understanding the connection  between the accession of new recruits, the training and production  requirements of new aircrew members, and the ability of units to absorb  newly trained aircrews into the structure and operations of the forces is  critical to maintaining a healthy aircrew force and to achieve Air Force  goals.

However, the Air Force does not know its overall progress toward  achieving its goal of having sufficient quantities of RPA pilots and sensor  operators to implement the combat-to-dwell policy in fiscal year 2024 as  planned. Thus far, Headquarters Air Force officials said that the Air Force  has been focused on retaining as many RPA pilots and sensor operators  as possible in an effort to meet the increasing staffing authorizations. The  Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government states that  management should track achievements and actual performance,  compare to plans, goals and objectives and analyze significant  differences. Specifically, officials explained that it does not have a  comprehensive metric (or set of metrics) which allows them to track  changes in the number of its RPA pilots and sensor operators from its  combined accession and retention efforts over a projected timeline. This  prevents the Air Force from being able to compare its progress against its  goal of having sufficient numbers of RPA pilots and sensor operators to  fully implement the policy as planned by fiscal year 2024. The Air Force  RPA officials stated that the Air Force does not have a metric (or set of  metrics) that measures a “glide path to health and stability of the RPA  workforce” by balancing both accessions and retention of RPA personnel  in order to know when changes might be needed over time to achieve the  goal of implementing the combat-to-dwell policy.

Without such a metric (or a set of metrics), it is unclear whether the Air  Force is on track to have enough RPA pilots and sensor operators to  achieve implementation of its combat-to-dwell policy or to know if  adjustments are needed to its accession and retention efforts or to the  policy’s implementation timeframe. Taking such action is critical for the Air  Force to be able to position itself to address long-standing RPA pilot and  sensor operator shortages and documented challenges in the  management of these communities through its combat-to-dwell policy.  Absent such action, a key component of the Air Force’s workforce will not  be well-positioned to meet its mission for the nation.

The Air Force Has Not Fully Identified the Number of Instructor Positions Needed and Has Experienced Training Unit Staffing Shortages

The Air Force Has Not Fully Identified Its Pilot and Sensor Operator Instructor Positions Needed at Its Holloman Air Force Base Formal Training Unit

The number of active-duty RPA pilot and sensor operator instructor  positions required at the Holloman formal training unit are understated  and do not reflect the current training instructor needs. More specifically,  the number of instructor positions needed were developed using a 2009  program of instruction with a length of 49 training days and were never  updated to reflect changes to the syllabus length, which as of July 2019,  was 83 training days. Air Force documentation showed that if 100 percent  of the formal training unit’s currently identified active-duty instructor  positions were filled, they could provide only 47 percent of the total  course instruction currently identified. To provide the rest of the course  instruction, the formal training unit relies heavily on contractors. Air Force  information shows that, as of July 2019, contractors provided 53 percent  of instruction, active-duty personnel provided 27 percent, and 20 percent  remained unaccomplished (i.e., not provided).

The Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government states that  management should use quality information to make informed decisions  to achieve its objectives. Quality information is, among other things,  current, complete, and accurate. Further, a 2017 report to Congress on  the implementation progress of the Air Force’s actions to ensure a  sustainable RPA operational force stated having maximum instructor  staffing was critical to generating new RPA pilots.

However, the Air Force continues to use the out-of-date, inaccurate, and  incomplete number of active-duty RPA pilot and sensor operator  instructor position requirements that were originally developed based on  the 2009 program of instruction. Without using quality information, the Air  Force does not fully know the number of active-duty RPA pilot and sensor  operator instructor positions necessary for sufficiently training RPA  aircrews. As such, it may not be fully addressing the challenges affecting  the training unit’s staffing and ability to produce the needed number of  aircrews to support the continued demand for RPAs and the  implementation of its combat-to-dwell policy as planned.

The Air Force Has Experienced Staffing Shortages at Its Holloman Formal Training Unit since Fiscal Year 2016

Since fiscal year 2016, the Holloman formal training unit has been unable  to meet the authorized instructor position staffing levels even though the  numbers of those positions are based on an out-of-date number of  training days from the 2009 program of instruction that underestimates  actual instructor requirements. In 2015, top senior Air Force leaders  developed the Get Well Plan, and the Secretary of the Air Force and  other top senior leadership helped develop the plan’s two goals to staff  100 percent of the positions for (1) instructors at the RPA pilot school and  (2) combat RPA pilots. In the March 2017 report to Congress, the Air  Force again emphasized that maximum instructor staffing was critical to  generating new RPA pilots and that it had achieved this goal as planned  and it would stabilize and sustain the Get Well Plan’s goals into the  future. We found that both the number of RPA pilot and sensor operator  instructors assigned peaked at the end of 2016 and early 2017 in  accordance with this Air Force goal. However, the assigned numbers of  both RPA pilot and sensor operator instructors have not stabilized or  been sustained and have fallen since that time as shown in figures 8 and  9.

Specifically, authorized RPA pilot instructor positions within the three RPA  training squadrons at Holloman Air Force Base (i.e., the 6th, 9th, and the  29th squadrons) were filled at 75 percent (110 of 147) as of September  2019. That fill rate is almost 20 percent less than the highest fill rate for  these positions in March 2017 (137 of 147, or 93 percent). Similarly,  authorized RPA sensor operator instructor positions within these same  training squadrons as of September 2019 were filled at 58 percent (82 of  141), down from the highest fill rate of 91 percent (128 of 141) in  November 2016. A training official explained that the inability to maintain  the level of staffing, even when considering it was an underestimation of  the true requirement, is an example of the issues experienced in the RPA  community. He stated that when RPA pilots and sensor operators at  squadrons leave the Air Force that means there are fewer of them overall  available to conduct the missions and to be sent to the formal training unit  to serve as instructors. Fewer instructors at the training unit means a  greater workload on the instructors already there, which affects the  morale of the instructors and may result in those individuals leaving the  Air Force. It also limits the ability of the formal training unit to meet the  expectations of producing newly trained aircrews that are supposed to fill  the staffing need at the squadrons. Overall, this cycle contributes to the  challenge the Air Force faces in being able to retain and produce RPA  pilots and sensor operators.

Moreover, the gap in instructor staffing is compounded by a majority of  instructors arriving at the Holloman formal training unit not having prior  operational squadron-level instructor experience, according to training  officials. According to an Air Force instruction regarding RPA training, any  aircrew member designated for instructor duties at a formal training unit  should already be an instructor in the applicable aircraft. However, for  example, at Holloman’s formal training unit, officials told us that for the  training session from August 2019 to May 2020, 17 of 25 of the new  incoming instructors did not have previous squadron-level instructor or  evaluator experience.

In these instances, they said the new instructors would need additional  training to qualify them fully to teach certain classes. According to training  officials, being an instructor at a formal training unit is not the same as  being an instructor at an operational squadron. For example, in an  operational squadron, an instructor is expected to take an individual that  is fully qualified in the aircraft and get them up to speed on the squadron’s  specific mission and to assist in increasing the squadron’s overall level of  efficiency through continued supervised training. At the formal training  unit, however, instructors are laying the foundation for new aircrew  students that are not familiar with the aircraft, its operation, or its various  mission sets. Officials stated that because the formal training unit is  receiving inexperienced instructors rather than fully qualified ones, the  training unit must provide more upgrade training to these student  instructors to qualify them to teach any classes. While the instructors are  going through the upgrade and any other training needed to become fully  qualified, they are filling an instructor staff position but not fully  contributing to the development of new RPA pilots or sensor operators.

Air Force training officials acknowledge that staffing at its Holloman  formal training unit is a concern and that they need more instructors. They  said that shortening the length of training was one approach to  addressing the instructor gap and, in June 2019, the commander of the  19th Air Force (Air Education and Training Command) directed syllabus  modifications. According to training officials, the modifications suspended  about 15 percent of the training and thereby, shortened the length of the  course. These modifications are scheduled until the end of October 2020  unless deemed necessary to extend them into fiscal year 2021.

The Air Force Has Not Fully Implemented the Initiatives It Developed to Address Quality of Life Issues Affecting the RPA Community and Long-Standing Concerns Remain

In 2015, the Air Force developed over 140 initiatives to address quality of  life challenges facing its RPA units but has not fully implemented them.  While the Air Force has been aware that the RPA community faces such  issues as work-related physical and mental ailments, lack of base  services, and other challenges to its quality of life, long-standing concerns  we have identified previously, as well as others, remain.

The Air Force Has Not Fully Implemented the Initiatives It Developed to Address Quality of Life Issues Affecting the RPA Community

The Air Force’s Air Combat Command established the Culture and  Process Improvement Program (CPIP) in 2015 to identify and address  stress and quality of life issues within the Air Force’s MQ-1 Predator and  MQ-9 Reaper RPA communities. This effort collected nearly 2,500 inputs  from the RPA community through surveys and in-person engagement.  Following this input, the Air Force developed over 140 initiatives to  address concerns in eight different areas, such as missions, quality of life,  locations and basing options, and training. These initiatives varied widely  in scope and specificity and they addressed the RPA enterprise, such as  pilots, sensor operators, intelligence personnel, and maintainers across  active-duty personnel and the Reserve component. In February 2018, the  Air Force briefed Congress, reporting that 57 percent of CPIP initiatives  were complete and 43 percent were ongoing. According to Air Force  officials, examples of initiatives completed include: expanding RPA combat operations to Shaw Air Force Base, South  Carolina, to provide additional assignment options; establishing an advanced weapons instructor course specifically for  redesignating MQ-9 Reaper RPA squadrons from “Reconnaissance”  to “Attack;” establishing a medal to specifically recognize the contributions of  personnel that operate and support the RPA enterprise; and, authorizing RPA aircrews to log combat time when flying an aircraft  within designated hostile airspace, regardless of the aircrew’s physical  locations.

The CPIP report finalized just over a year later in June 2019 states that  the Air Force had achieved “an almost 90 percent solution” and the most  significant of the initiatives had been accomplished. It went on to say that  there were 17 initiatives remaining open at that time and that the Air  Force would no longer track those initiatives because they had reached  the point of diminishing returns. Additionally, the office established to  track the CPIP initiatives was closed because Air Combat Command  officials told us that the office is no longer needed and all remaining  initiatives have been staffed to other offices of primary responsibility.  However, in our review, we found examples of quality of life initiatives  labeled complete where the objective had not yet been fully achieved.  Examples we found include: an initiative to create a new MQ-9 RPA wing to be led by an RPA pilot  was labeled with a status of “complete” even though Headquarters Air  Force officials confirmed that no new MQ-9 Reaper RPA wing has yet  been created; an initiative to have aircrews’ shiftwork schedules rotate every 4 to 6  months; however, each of the squadrons at the RPA operational  bases we visited had a shift work schedule that rotated for 5 to 8  weeks; an initiative to grant appropriate clearances to allow medical and  chaplain personnel into all RPA operational areas; however, at one  location we visited, medical officials and a chaplain we spoke with  said that they do not have the required clearance levels to meet with  RPA personnel within their secured facilities;  two initiatives to improve spousal opportunities, although one vaguely  stated that the “Air Force should think big and think flexible as it needs  to consider society’s shift to the two-income family” and the other  called for providing better family services and support. However, we  found that while these services may exist at RPA bases, they are not  always accessible to RPA personnel or their families for a variety of  reasons, as we discuss below; an initiative to provide childcare support for workers performing 24/7  operations, although we found childcare was not available at certain  facilities we visited; and, an initiative to make Creech Air Force Base its own installation, add a  Missions Support Group, and improve base infrastructure and  services. Creech did receive its own command authority and is no  longer an auxiliary facility under Nellis Air Force Base and a Mission  Support Group was established in July 2019. However, its plans to  create officer and non-commissioned officer housing and an  additionally medical facility are not expected to be completed until  between fall 2021 and fall 2022, according to a Creech official.

According to Air Force officials, an initiative marked as “complete” means  that the Air Combat Command CPIP office had completed its portion of  the initiative and another Air Force entity had taken it over for further  action as necessary and may still be in process. Therefore, the 57  percent of initiatives that the Air Force reported to Congress in February  2018 as completed and the “almost 90 percent solution” discussed in the  June 2019 CPIP final report may not present a transparent account of  what has been completed and what remains to be accomplished.  Reporting planned tasks as “complete” as the Air Force did could create  perception gaps regarding the effects of CPIP. Interviews we had with  senior leaders at multiple bases yielded concerns that CPIP is effectively  over without accomplishing key objectives and that CPIP is going to be  perceived as a failed promise by the Air Force.

Quality of Life Challenges Affecting the RPA Community are Long Standing and Still Continue

Along with the CPIP initiatives developed in 2015 as discussed above,  academic studies published since 2010 and our previous 2014 report on  RPA job dissatisfaction identified challenges facing the RPA community.  For example, in April 2011, a study by researchers at the U.S. Air Force  School of Aerospace Medicine found that there are several important  operational stressors to consider when assessing the health and well- being of RPA operators. More specifically, the researchers noted, for  many operators that participated in the study, the most commonly cited  stressors associated with occupational stress included, but not limited to,  the following: (1) long hours and low manning; (2) frequently changing  shift work and shift changes; (3) geographically undesirable locations; (4)  limited base resources and rural settings; and (5) human-machine  interface difficulties such as poor ergonomics and temperature control of  work stations. The study concluded that it stood to reason such stressors  could lead to both physical and psychological distress when faced on an  unending basis.

Three years after the issuance of that study, in April 2014, we reported  that RPA pilots faced multiple, challenging working conditions, including  work shifts that frequently rotate, long hours, and increased workloads.  More specifically, we reported in 2014 that  In seven of the 10 focus groups conducted at that time, RPA pilots  said continuously rotating to new shifts disrupted their ability to spend  time with their family and friends and caused sleep problems. They  said that these changes to their sleep schedules resulted in significant  fatigue both at home and when they returned to work.

In seven of the 10 focus groups conducted at that time, RPA pilots  described working long hours because, for example, they had to  perform administrative duties and attend briefings in addition to flying  their combat shifts.

High work demands on RPA pilots limit the time they have available  for training and development and negatively affects their work-life  balance.

During the course of our current review, we heard various positive  comments about how RPA pilots or sensor operators like the RPA  mission and being able to contribute on a daily basis to combat  operations. However, as discussed below, we also found examples of  how long-standing challenges that others and we reported about years  ago regarding the physical and mental health of RPA personnel and the  availability of base support services continue to exist.

Shift Work and Sleep Issues  In 12 of the 14 focus groups we conducted, participants stated that the  frequent rotations are a key challenge of shift work and that their  schedules rotated approximately every 5 to 8 weeks. However, members  of the Human Performance Team at Creech Air Force Base stated  studies have shown that it is better for individuals to stay on shifts for  longer periods of time, such as 3 to 4 months, to allow their circadian  rhythms to adjust. Additionally, focus group participants told us that  rotating shift work is difficult for RPA personnel’s relationships.  Participants in 13 of the 14 focus groups indicated that shift work has  negatively affected their family or social life. Additionally, rotating shifts  and the limited time with family creates a dilemma on weekends for  personnel, especially for those on the midnight shift that covers roughly  midnight to 8 a.m. These individuals must decide whether to maintain  their work sleep schedule which limits time with family, or instead to align  with their family’s sleep schedule which limits their ability to adapt to the  work schedule. Some comments from participants include “I destroy my  circadian rhythm to spend time with my kids” and “Shift work is disruptive  to lives. It is hard to be tied into the community. Shift work can be really  isolating.”

Crew rest is compulsory for aircrew members prior to performing any  aircraft operations. Aircrew members are individually responsible to  ensure they obtain sufficient rest during a crew rest period. If crew rest is  interrupted, individuals should immediately inform appropriate leadership  and will either begin a new crew rest period or not perform flight duties.  According to health officials at one of the bases, though, it is well known  that RPA aircrew members often do not accurately report how much rest  they get. Participants in one focus group agreed with this statement and  said that they do not want to be restricted from flying and affect the  mission and cause the work to fall on other squadron members.  Participants in 12 of our 14 focus groups that we conducted stated that it  is difficult to get adequate sleep. Sample participant comments include:  “I can’t sleep anymore. Before the military, I could get 10 hours of  sleep. Now it’s like 2-4. You’re physically and mentally exhausted.”  “I feel perpetually tired. I haven’t felt healthy in years.”  “We did an internal survey of how much sleep people on nights for  months at a time were getting, and it was like 3-4 hours. And they are  flying combat for 8-12 hours at a time.”

Back, Eyes, and Other Physical Issues  In 12 of 14 focus groups, participants said the working environment is  harmful to health in areas such as the neck, back, eye, and hearing.  Participant comments included:  “I’ve been losing hearing …over the last 6 years from   computer fans, air conditioning units, the use of multiple  communication devices, etc.”  “Just sitting in the seat for 8, 10, or 12 hours affects our posture. It is  bad on our backs. I didn’t have lower back problems, and I work out a  lot, but I started having lower back problems.”  “My eyesight has been getting worse.”

See figure 10 for an example of a pilot flying a simulated mission in an  RPA cockpit.

During our site visits for this review, participants in 14 focus groups that  we conducted said that maintaining fitness was difficult. They said they  are not motivated to work out as they are frequently exhausted after flying  long shifts and then completing other extra duties as well. Further,  participants in 11 of 14 focus groups told us that nutrition is difficult for  RPA crews. For example, participants said that they consume energy  drinks, soda, and sugary foods to stay awake during the midnight shift.

Studies have shown negative psychological effects on RPA aircrews. An  Air Force study from 2010 of the psychological attributes critical to the  performance of RPA sensor operators noted it is important that RPA  sensor operators be aware prior to training that they would be targeting  and destroying enemy combatants. It stated that it was likely that some  candidates might choose not to become sensor operators once they fully  understand their role in precision-strike operations. These motivational  attributes were not deemed critical to performance, but were deemed  critical to retention and job satisfaction. Participants in 10 of our 14 focus  groups we conducted said that some crew members—either themselves  or others—did not initially understand what the job entails, such as killing.  One focus group participant noted “the first time you know what you’re  getting into emotionally is the first day of training at Holloman, which is  too late because you already have wings.”

Participants in 13 of 14 focus groups we conducted stated that witnessing  or causing violence has a negative psychological impact but two-thirds of  our survey respondents (66 of 105) said that the Air Force has not  assessed their level of stress and fatigue related to their role as an RPA  pilot or sensor operator. A study published in 2018 described how RPA  aircrew members are affected by their own actions in combat as well as  by connections with either people who they target or support on the  ground regardless of the physical distance separating them. One focus  group participant commented “F-16s drop  and then go. For RPA  aircrews, we get in and we are there for 20 hours. We watch who we  employ weapons on, then get the battle damage assessment, including  seeing body parts…on the ground.”

RPA personnel stated that their base’s services are not consistently  available to RPA aircrews rotating shifts to conduct missions 24 hours  every day or to their families as they live in remote locations. Collectively,  participants in all 14 focus groups we conducted expressed concerns  about the availability of services such as medical services, childcare,  spouse and family support services, and base locations and housing.

Some level of health care is provided at each RPA base we visited, but  the extent to which these services are available varies. For example, the  Cannon Air Force Base mission briefing we received in June 2019 noted  some “sustainability challenges” such as the base’s inadequate  availability of specialty medical care. The briefing noted that the base had  made over 2,000 referrals related to 10 areas of specialty medical care.  Additionally, because these referrals were to facilities outside the local  area, the base had incurred about $500,000 in travel reimbursements for  this medical care—the highest of all Air Force locations—and about $21  million in TRICARE expenses per year, according to officials. Further,  we found examples during our site visits of health services without  adequate staffing. For example, during our visit to Shaw Air Force Base in  May 2019, a medical technician stated that Shaw had two medical  technicians for the RPA community though staffing documents state they  are supposed to have six medical technicians and two doctors. At Creech  Air Force Base, we visited the medical and dental facility and learned that  a psychologist position had been unfilled for 9 months as of our visit in  August 2019.

We also found that the hours of available medical services are limited and  not convenient for shift workers such as RPA aircrews. For example,  officials at Creech stated occupational therapy is offered only once a  month, optometry twice a month, and nutrition on an as-needed basis. In  addition, Creech has two family health personnel, a behavioral health  officer who is available every Wednesday and Friday, and one flight  surgeon who comes over from Nellis Air Force Base is available twice a  week. A 2018 internal assessment done for Creech leadership estimated  that 20,714 man-hours are wasted each year due to personnel needing to  obtain medical services, the equivalent of losing 11.5 people in a given  year.

To address health issues, Creech Air Force Base has a Human  Performance Team that includes chaplains, religious affairs airmen, a  psychologist, a mental health tech, and a physiologist. While team  members are physically located at Creech, they told us that they are also  responsible for RPA units at all the bases under the same wing, including  Creech, Ellsworth Air Force Base, South Dakota; Whiteman Air Force  Base, Missouri; and Shaw Air Force Base, South Carolina. Further, at  Shaw Air Force Base, a religious affairs airman made similar comments  about serving a large variety of military personnel, not just the RPA  community and a chaplain at Cannon Air Force Base said that he can be  assigned responsibility for up to as many as 2,000 to 3,000 people at a  time.

Childcare is not limited for 24/7 shift workers at certain facilities although  a CPIP initiative called for childcare support for workers performing 24/7  operations, citing the Missile Care childcare program offered at Minot Air  Force Base. To this end, the Air Force established two programs, RPA  Care and RPA 2 Care. The RPA Care program provides additional care  outside the normal work hours at no additional cost to members who are  already purchasing full-time care from the Child Development Center.  However, in 12 of 14 focus groups we conducted, participants said that  they found childcare services were of low quality or limited for 24/7 shift  workers. For example, Cannon Air Force Base has two Child  Development Centers, but they operate Monday through Friday from 6  a.m.to 6 p.m., and focus group participants noted a long waiting list for  admission. At Creech Air Force Base, there is no childcare on base and  at Shaw Air Force Base, participants said it was difficult finding available  childcare to aid RPA personnel working shiftwork. For example, one RPA  aircrew member was permanently assigned to the day shift because of  childcare issues.

Spouse and Family Support Issues  RPA personnel have complained about the issues associated with  working at remote location, such as the Creech Air Force Base, Nevada,  and Cannon Air Force Base, New Mexico, locations. In 9 of 14 focus  groups, participants made various comments regarding the limited  spousal opportunities and family support issues such as the following:  “I got orders to Cannon…. The problem is I’ll be bringing my wife  there who has no job opportunities. There will be a lot of military  spouses competing for jobs. I’ve already decided I’ll leave at the end  of my contract and then will go to the Guard. I’ve told my wife I’ll get  out because I don’t want to hurt her quality of life.”  “I loved the mission at Cannon, but the facilities and area and schools  are absolutely terrible.”  “I’m fed up with Cannon and this area in general.”

RPA bases vary in housing available for personnel with Cannon and  Creech Air Force Bases reporting inadequate housing situations. At  Cannon, officials stated that lack of dormitory space was forcing first-term  Airmen off base. During our visit in June 2019, Cannon housing officials  provided a report that stated that the shortfall in dormitory space  continues to put Airmen and the Air Force Special Operations Command  mission at risk. The report said that the locations off base where first-term  Airmen can afford to live are usually in the worst crime-ridden parts where  there is a far greater propensity for trouble. This can create morale issues  and a distraction from the mission, according to the report.

Additionally, Creech Air Force Base does not have any permanent on- base housing. At Creech, unaccompanied first-term Airmen must live in  the dormitories on Nellis Air Force Base, which is approximately 50 miles  away. The remoteness of Creech Air Force Base and the lack of basic  services offered only at Nellis Air Force Base creates an unusual level of  stress brought on by the added time, effort, and expense Creech Airmen  experience that those at almost every other continental United States  installation do not. In fact, a 2018 internal assessment for Creech  leadership calculated that a junior airman who must live at Nellis Air  Force Base would have a one-way commuting time of 63 minutes if they  drive a personal vehicle or 105 minutes if they take the shuttle. To help  address the housing and access to medical facilities, Creech Air Force  Base senior officials said that a plan to create officer and non- commissioned officer housing and a medical facility on the northwest side  of Las Vegas has been approved, but it is not expected to be completed  until between fall 2021 and fall 2022.

Many of the RPA workforce issues we identified at the time of our 2014  review continue to exist today. These workforce issues include the  challenges to the RPA workforce’s quality of life due to stressful working  conditions, including work shifts that frequently rotate, long hours, and  increased workloads. In 2017, we recommended that the Air Force should  monitor the extent to which its RPA human capital efforts are achieving  the Air Force’s overall programmatic goals. The Air Force had not  implemented this recommendation as of February 2020. Because long- standing RPA quality of life and workforce management issues affecting  RPA personnel continue to exist, we believe that this recommendation is  still valid and would aid the Air Force in its efforts to address many of the  challenges facing this career field. Therefore, we are not making any  additional quality of life related recommendations.

A healthy RPA workforce is one that balances supply with demand and  addresses quality of life conditions to motivate and sustain performance  and retention. Successful efforts to assess, train and retain RPA pilots  and sensor operators would allow the Air Force to grow sufficient  quantities of its RPA workforce to meet its goal of implementing its  combat-to-dwell policy. While the total number of Air Force RPA pilots  and sensor operators has increased between 2015 and 2019, the number  of positions required to meet the constant demand is increasing at a  faster pace. Additionally, the Air Force has not achieved its accession  targets for pilots and sensor operators for most of those years. Moreover,  the inability to use standard retention metrics due to the newness of the  RPA pilot career field is hindering the Air Force’s ability to determine  accurately if sufficient quantities of RPA personnel are remaining in the  service to grow its RPA workforce. Further, the Air Force currently does  not have a comprehensive metric (or set of metrics) to track the overall  progress toward having sufficient numbers of RPA personnel through its  accessions and retention of RPA personnel to meet its prescribed  timeline for implementing its combat-to-dwell policy. This policy is  intended to balance the time RPA units spend in combat with non-combat  activities, to provide relief from those combat operations that it has  conducted constantly for many years, to improve the quality of life of  these RPA aircrew members. Without a metric, it is unclear whether the  Air Force is on course to achieve implementation of its combat-to-dwell  policy. As such, the Air Force cannot know if adjustments are needed  specifically to that policy and its implementation timeline or to its overall  personnel management efforts to access, train and retain sufficient  numbers of RPA personnel.

Further, the Air Force previously prioritized having maximum instructor  staffing at the training units to help increase the production of new RPA  aircrews. However, the number of instructor positions required at the RPA  formal training unit at Holloman Air Force Base is out-of-date and does  not reflect what is needed to teach the current training curriculum.  Additionally, this formal training unit has consistently experienced staffing  shortages since fiscal year 2016. As such, without updated information,  the Air Force does not know the number of instructor positions necessary  for sufficiently training RPA aircrews and it may not fully address the  challenges affecting the training unit’s staffing and ability to produce the  needed number of aircrews to support the continued demand for RPAs  and the implementation of the combat-to-dwell policy as planned.

The Air Force developed initiatives with its 2015 Culture and Process  Improvement Program to address quality of life issues and other  challenges affecting the RPA community, but has not fully implemented  them. We also identified workforce management challenges in our  previous work. We believe that our prior recommendation that the Air  Force monitor its human capital efforts would help address these  challenges. We believe the Air Force should implement our prior  recommendation to aid the Air Force in its attempts to improve the quality  of life issues that still exist within the RPA community.

We are making the following two recommendations to the Secretary of  the Air Force.

The Secretary of the Air Force should ensure that a comprehensive  metric (or set of metrics) is established to track the progress of its  combined accession and retention efforts to obtain sufficient quantities of  RPA pilots and sensor operators needed to achieve its objective of  implementing the combat-to-dwell policy as planned. (Recommendation  1)

The Secretary of the Air Force should ensure that the number of  instructor positions needed at the RPA training unit at Holloman Air Force  Base is updated by applying more complete, accurate and timely  information to better reflect the training curriculum and instructor needs.  (Recommendation 2)

We provided a draft of this report to DOD for review and comment. In  written comments reproduced in appendix III, the Department of the Air  Force partially concurred with our first recommendation and concurred  with our second recommendation. In concurring with our second  recommendation to ensure the number of instructor positions needed at  the RPA training unit at Holloman Air Force Base is updated, the Air  Force noted that it has requested an updated study to determine the  appropriate number of instructor positions.

With regard to our first recommendation—to establish a comprehensive  metric (or set of metrics) to track the progress of its combined accession  and retention efforts—the Air Force noted that it already has efforts to  monitor accession, production, and retention for RPA pilots and sensor  operators. Additionally, it expects that standard retention metrics used in  other rated career fields will provide increased utility as the RPA career  field matures. The Air Force acknowledges in its comments, however,  that these efforts could be better integrated to allow for greater analysis,  to include tracking progress in meeting the combat-to-dwell policy by  2024. We continue to believe that in developing a specific metric (or set of  metrics) the Air Force would be in a better position to evaluate the status  of its combined accession and retention efforts to obtain the proper  number of RPA personnel to achieve its combat-to-dwell implementation  goal.

We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional  committees, the Secretary of Defense, and the Secretary of the Air Force.  In addition, this report will be available at no charge on the GAO website  at http://www.gao.gov .

If you or your staff have any questions regarding this report, please  contact me at (202) 512-3604 or farrellb@gao.gov. Contact points for our  Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on  the last page of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to  this report are listed in appendix IV.

To obtain the perspectives of Air Force remotely piloted aircraft (RPA)  pilots and sensor operators regarding training, availability of services and  support to RPA personnel and their families; quality of life issues;  retention issues; and other challenges facing the RPA career field, we  analyzed participants’ comments from 14 focus groups at three different  RPA operational locations. These locations were: Shaw Air Force Base,  South Carolina; Cannon Air Force Base, New Mexico; and Creech Air  Force Base, Nevada. We selected Cannon and Creech Air Force Bases  because they have the largest population of RPA operators in Air Force  Special Operations Command and Air Combat Command, respectively. In  addition, we selected Shaw Air Force Base to obtain the perspectives of  RPA pilots and sensor operators working at a base with newly  established RPA operations since 2018.

To obtain a balance of perspectives from RPA pilots and sensor  operators with varying levels of experience and responsibilities, we  conducted focus group sessions with active-duty MQ-9 Reaper RPA  pilots and sensor operators who were divided by their occupation, Air  Force Specialty Code, and rank at the selected locations. Specifically,  we used the following categories as shown in table 3 for the formation of  the focus groups.

The 14 focus groups we held ranged in size from five to 11 participants  across the three sites with 105 total participants. We conducted five focus  groups at Shaw Air Force Base; four focus groups at Cannon Air Force  Base; and five focus groups at Creech Air Force Base. Of the 14 focus  groups, eight focus groups were with RPA pilots and six focus groups  were with RPA sensor operators. These sessions involved structured  small-group discussions designed to gather in-depth information that is  not easily obtained from other methods.

We requested that our point of contact at each location gather  approximately 8 to 12 participants to attend the five pre-defined focus  groups. We conducted focus groups with RPA pilots and sensor  operators separately because they have different roles and  responsibilities and to encourage active participation and minimize the  risk of participants being the same group as immediate supervisors. We  segmented our groups by this characteristic in order to compare and  contrast their perspectives on training, retention, and quality of life issues  and to identify meaningful similarities and differences.

Participants in the focus groups were not randomly selected by using a  probability sampling method, but recruited by unit leadership based on  shift availability and correspondence with the characteristics we  requested. Because scheduling availability was the primary factor  affecting participation, coupled with the fact that questions for focus group  sessions were not shared in advance, we considered the risk of  leadership selectively picking participants to be minimal.  Methodologically, focus groups are not designed to (1) demonstrate the  extent of a problem or to generalize results to a larger population, (2)  develop a consensus to arrive at an agreed-upon plan or make decisions  about what actions to take, or (3) provide statistically representative  samples or reliable quantitative estimates. Instead, they are intended to  generate in-depth information about the reasons for the focus group  participants’ attitudes on specific topics and to offer insights into their  concerns about and support for an issue.

A facilitator who used a standard script and list of questions to guide the  discussion and encourage participants guided the focus group  participants to share their thoughts and experiences. We confirmed at the  start of each session that participants met the inclusion criteria for the  respective group. Due to the low numbers of 18X pilot participants at the  O3-O5 rank and 11U/12U pilot participants at Cannon Air Force Base, we  conducted a focus group of the available participants together instead of  separately. Additionally, at Creech Air Force Base, we encountered three  situations where participants were currently full-time Reserve pilots, but  because all had former active-duty experience and dismissing them  would result in too few participants in the group, we allowed them to stay  in the focus groups in order to have a sufficient number of participants.  This situation occurred in the O1-O2 18X pilot focus group, the O3-O5  18X pilot focus group, and the E5-E9 1U0XX sensor operator focus  group. The core questions that the GAO facilitator asked during each of  the focus groups are listed in table 4.

During the focus group meetings, three GAO members independently  took separate sets of detailed notes to document the participants’  comments. Afterward, each member’s notes were compiled into one final  official record documenting the comments made in each of the focus  groups we conducted. Then, these records were consolidated into one  database to be used for coding each comment and to facilitate the team’s  content analysis of all the comments. To identify common categories and  themes from the participants’ comments across all focus groups, the team  met, reviewed and discussed the official record of each of the 14 focus  groups. From that meeting, the team identified 43 categories across  seven areas of inquiry; see table 5 for a list of the categories and themes.

Using the categories and themes identified, the team conducted a pre- test by having two groups of two coders independently code an identical  subset of the comments to determine their levels of coding consistency  and accuracy before attempting to code all 1,848 individual recorded  comments. After the pretest, the two groups split the list of comments in  half and each coder independently coded the comments contained in  their list into the categories and themes under which the coder believed  the comment fell. Once completed, the coders within each group met to  discuss any discrepancies in each of their coding and to make any  necessary adjustments in the coding. Where discrepancies could not be  resolved between coders, an independent third team member determined  which code would be used. Once the coding of all 1,848 comments was  finalized, the team’s methodologist prepared a report that presented all  comments that fell within each of the categories and themes. The team  used this information as the basis for frequency tabulation and qualitative  analysis of focus group comments.

In addition to discussing the RPA pilots’ and sensor operators’  perspectives in a focus group setting, we administered a questionnaire to  each participant at the end of each session before the participants were  dismissed. All participants completed the questionnaire. A GAO  methodologist with a social science background and knowledge of small  group methods and survey administrations reviewed the focus group  script and the questionnaire. In addition, we pre-tested both the focus  group protocol and the questionnaire on our first site visit to Shaw Air  Force Base and both were used again at the remaining RPA locations,  Cannon and Creech Air Force Bases, without any changes.

Appendix II: Reports and Studies on Air Force Remotely Piloted Aircraft Personnel

The Department of Defense (DOD), the military services, and  organizations outside DOD have produced reports and studies that  addressed issues associated with Air Force remotely piloted aircraft  (RPA) personnel, including the following:  Armour, Cherie, and Jana Ross. “The Health and Well-Being of Military  Drone Operators and Intelligence Analysts: A Systematic Review.”  Military Psychology, 2017.

Bryan, Craig J., Tanya Goodman, Wayne Chappelle, Lillian Prince, and  William Thompson. “Subtypes of severe psychological distress among US  Air Force remote warriors: A latent class analysis.” Military Psychology,  2018.

Campo, Joseph L. “Distance in War: The Experience of MQ-1 and MQ-9  Aircrew.” Air and Space Power Journal, 2015.

Chappelle, Wayne L., Kent McDonald, Lillian Prince, Tanya Goodman,  Bobbie N. Ray-Sannerud, and William Thompson. “Symptoms of  Psychological Distress and Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder in United  States Air Force “Drone” Operators.” Military Medicine, 2014.

Chappelle, Wayne, Emily Skinner, Tanya Goodman, Julie Swearingen,  and Lillian Prince. “Emotional reactions to killing in remotely piloted  aircraft crewmembers during and following weapon strikes.” Military  Behavioral Health, 2018.

Chappelle, Wayne, Julie Swearingen, Tanya Goodman, Sara Cowper,  Lillian Prince, and William Thompson. Occupational Health Screenings of  U.S. Air Force Remotely Piloted Aircraft (Drone) Operators. Report,  Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, OH: Air Force Research Laboratory,  2014.

Chappelle, Wayne, Kent McDonald, and Raymond King. Psychological  Attributes Critical to the Performance of MQ-1 Predator and MQ-9 Reaper  U.S. Air Force Sensor Operators. Report, Brooks City-Base, TX: Air  Force Research Laboratory, 2010.

Chappelle, Wayne, Kent McDonald, Billy Thompson, and Julie  Swearangen. Prevalence of High Emotional Distress and Symptoms of  Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder in U.S. Air Force Active Duty Remotely  Piloted Aircraft Operators (2010 USAFSAM Survey Results). Report,  Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, OH: Air Force Research Laboratory,  2012.

Chappelle, Wayne, Kent McDonald, Lillian Prince, Tanya Goodman,  Bobbie N. Ray-Sannerud, and William Thompson. “Assessment of  Occupational Burnout in United States Air Force Predator/Reaper “Drone”  Operators.” Military Psychology, 2014.

Chappelle, Wayne, Tanya Goodman, Laura Reardon, and Lillian Prince.  “Combat and operational risk factors for post-traumatic stress disorder  symptom criteria among United States Air Force remotely piloted aircraft  “Drone” warfighters.” Journal of Anxiety Disorders, 2019.

Chappelle, Wayne, Tanya Goodman, Laura Reardon, and William  Thompson. “An analysis of post-traumatic stress symptoms in United  States Air Force drone operators.” Journal of Anxiety Disorders, 2014.

Cooke, Nancy J., Kristen Barrera, Howard Weiss, and Claude Ezzell.  “Psychosocial Effects of Remote Operations.” In Remotely Piloted Aircraft  Systems: A Human Systems Integration Perspective, by Nancy J. Cooke,  Leah J. Rowe, Winston Bennett, Jr. and DeForest Q. Joralmon. West  Sussex: John Wiley & Sons, 2017.

Goodman, Tanya, Lillian Prince, Wayne Chappelle, and Craig Bryan. A  Reassessment of Risk Factors and Frequency of Suicide Ideation Among  U.S. Air Force Remote Warriors. Report, Wright-Patterson AFB, OH: Air  Force Research Laboratory, 2018.

Hardison, Chaitra M., Eyal Aharoni, Christopher Larson, Steven Trochlil,  and Alexander C. Hou. Stress and Dissatisfaction in the Air Force’s  Remotely Piloted Aircraft Community. Santa Monica, CA: RAND  Corporation, 2017.

Hijazi, Alaa, Christopher J. Ferguson, Harold Hall, Mark Hovee, F.  Richard Ferraro, and Sherrie Wilcox. “Psychological Dimensions of Drone  Warfare.” Current Psychology, 2017.

Martin, Kiel M., Daniel J. Richmond, and John G. Swisher. “Sustaining the  Drone Enterprise: How Manpower Analysis Engendered Policy Reform in  the United States Air Force.” INFORMS Journal on Applied Analytics,  2017.

Martin, Matt. “Remote-Split Operations and Virtual Presence: Why the Air  Force Uses Officer Pilots to Fly RPAs.” 18th International Symposium on  Aviation Psychology. Dayton, 2015.

Ouma, Joseph A., Wayne L. Chappelle, and Amber Salinas. Facets of  Occupational Burnout Among U.S. Air Force Active Duty and National  Guard/Reserve MQ-1 Predator and MQ-9 Reaper Operators. Report,  Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, OH: Air Force Research Laboratory,  2011.

Terry, Tara L., Chaitra M. Hardison, David Schulker, Alexander C. Hou,  and Leslie Adrienne Payne. Building a Healthy MQ-1/9 RPA Pilot  Community: Designing a Career Field Planning Tool. Santa Monica, CA:  RAND Corporation, 2018.

Wood, III, Joe, et al. Prevalence of Posttraumatic Stress Disorder in  Remotely Piloted Aircraft Operators in the United States Air Force.  Report, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, OH: Air Force Research  Laboratory, 2016.

Wood, III, Joe D, et al. “Relationship Between Spiritual Well-being and  Post-traumatic Stress Disorder Symptoms in United States Air Force  Remotely Piloted Aircraft and Intelligence Personnel.” Military Medicine,  2018.

Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense

Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

Brenda S. Farrell, (202) 512-3604 or farrellb@gao.gov  In addition to the contact named above, key contributors to this report  were Lori Atkinson, Assistant Director; Rebecca Beale, Brad Crofford,  Caitlin Cusati, Felicia Lopez, Terry Richardson, Ophelia Robinson,  Pamela Snedden, and John Van Schaik.

Unmanned Aerial Systems: Air Force Pilot Promotion Rates Have  Increased but Oversight Process of Some Positions Could Be Enhanced.  GAO-19-155. Washington D.C.: February 7, 2019.

Unmanned Aerial Systems: Air Force and Army Should Improve Strategic  Human Capital Planning for Pilot Workforces. GAO-17-53. Washington  D.C.: January 31, 2017.

Unmanned Aerial Systems: Actions Needed to Improve DOD Pilot  Training. GAO-15-461. Washington, D.C.: May 14, 2015.

Air Force: Actions Needed to Strengthen Management of Unmanned  Aerial System Pilots. GAO-14-316. Washington, D.C.: April 10, 2014.

Since 9/11, demand has grown dramatically for the Air Force’s remotely piloted aircraft (“drones”), and their pilots and sensor operators. The intensity of operations, shift work, and other factors take a toll on these personnel. The Air Force is trying to reduce burnout and improve retention.

A goal of the Air Force is to have enough pilots and sensor operators by 2024 to allow breaks from combat operations. But we found the Air Force hasn’t met its staffing goals for these personnel and doesn’t track its progress in achieving the 2024 goal.

We made 2 recommendations, including that the Air Force better track its staff-building efforts.