James Webb Space Telescope: Technical Challenges Have Caused Schedule Strain and May Increase Costs

JWST, a large, deployable telescope, is one of NASA's most complex projects and top priorities. Problems discovered during integration and testing caused multiple delays that led NASA to replan the project in June 2018. Now estimated to cost $9.7 billion, the project's costs have increased by 95 percent and its launch date has been delayed by over 6.5 years since its cost and schedule baselines were established in 2009. Prior to the replanning process, an independent review board assessed the project and made recommendations to improve performance and oversight.

Conference Report No. 112-284 included a provision for GAO to assess the project annually and report on its progress. This is GAO's eighth report. This report assesses the extent to which (1) the project is executing within its revised cost and schedule targets and (2) NASA has implemented and sustained key improvements to performance and oversight established following the June 2018 replan. GAO reviewed relevant NASA policies, analyzed NASA and contractor data, and interviewed NASA and contractor officials.

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration's (NASA) James Webb Space Telescope (JWST) project has made significant progress since GAO's last report in March 2019, such as completing testing of the observatory's individual elements and integrating them together in August 2019. However, new technical challenges have required the project to use more schedule reserve—extra time set aside in the project's schedule to accommodate unforeseen risks or delays—than planned. As of October 2019, the project had used about 76 percent of its available schedule reserve and no longer plans to launch in November 2020 (see figure). The project is now managing to a March 2021 launch date but estimates only a 12 percent likelihood that this date will be achieved. NASA plans to reassess the launch date in the spring of 2020.

The project used much of the schedule reserve in April 2019 to address issues with two components needed to transmit science data to ground control. The contractor has been able to mitigate some of the schedule loss and continues to look for new efficiencies. Technical challenges also resulted in longer employment of the contractor workforce than planned, which could result in additional cost increases. NASA continues to monitor multiple, other risks that could place further schedule and cost strains on the project.

Since NASA replanned the project again in June 2018, the agency has taken steps meant to improve performance and oversight. NASA has addressed all recommendations from an independent review board, but in doing so sometimes took actions that differed from those outlined in the board's report. NASA has sustained, and in some cases expanded, oversight initiatives following the revised cost and schedule commitments that, in many cases, were designed to enhance communication between the government and the contractor.

GAO is not making any new recommendations at this time. GAO has made several recommendations to NASA on the management of this project in previous reports and NASA has agreed with and taken action on many of them. Most recently, in March 2019, GAO recommended that NASA complete a joint cost and schedule confidence level analysis for JWST. NASA concurred and completed the analysis in October 2019 to support a key project review.

The James Webb Space Telescope (JWST) is one of the National  Aeronautics and Space Administration’s (NASA) most complex projects  and top priorities. Its innovative technologies and design are meant to  help NASA and others understand the origins of the universe and the  creation and evolution of the first stars and galaxies, among its other  missions. However, the program has a long history of cost growth and  schedule delays driven in part by technical complexity and workmanship  issues. In June 2018, NASA established a new cost commitment of $9.7  billion for JWST and a launch readiness date of March 2021, $828 million  more and 29 months later than the cost and schedule commitments  established in 2011 when the program last revised its cost and schedule  estimates through a replan.

In November 2011, Conference Report No. 112-284, which accompanied  the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, included a  provision for GAO to assess the JWST program annually and to report to  the Committees on Appropriations on key issues relating to program and  risk management, achievement of schedule and cost goals, program  technical status, and oversight mechanisms. This report is our eighth in  response to that provision. For this report, we assessed the extent to  which (1) the JWST project is executing within the revised schedule and  cost targets established in 2018, and (2) NASA implemented and  sustained key improvements to performance and oversight undertaken  since 2018.

To assess the extent to which the project is executing within its revised  cost and schedule targets, we examined the status of the project’s  schedule, cost, and technical risks. Specifically, we analyzed monthly  JWST status reports provided to NASA management to monitor schedule  reserve levels and usage, identify potential risks and technical challenges  that may affect the project’s schedule, and gain insights on the project’s  progress. We also reviewed contractor documentation and NASA audit  reports for further information on the schedule and cost implications of  technical challenges identified by the project. We compared the project’s  revised cost and schedule baseline to the project’s current forecasts to  determine what changes have been made, including changes to  workforce. We interviewed officials from NASA Headquarters, JWST  project officials at Goddard Space Flight Center (Goddard), NASA  Independent Verification and Validation officials, and contractors  concerning project progress and remaining technology, cost, and  schedule risks.

To assess the extent to which NASA has implemented and sustained  improvements to performance and oversight, we reviewed prior GAO  reports to identify steps the project took to conduct contractor oversight.  We interviewed officials and collected relevant documents to identify new  steps the project is taking to enhance contractor oversight from these  previous initiatives. Further, we collected documentation and interviewed  cognizant NASA officials on the status of agency efforts to implement 32  independent review board recommendations developed during the 2018  replan process. We examined award fee documentation related to the  JWST development contract letters to examine the relationship between  contractor performance and major changes to the project’s cost and  schedule estimates and to provide an update on the contractor’s most  recent performance.

We conducted this performance audit from April 2019 to January 2020 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.

When complete, JWST will be a large, deployable space telescope,  optimized for infrared observations. It is the scientific successor to the  aging Hubble Space Telescope launched 29 years ago. JWST is being  designed for a 5-year mission to find the first stars, study planets in other  solar systems, search for the building blocks of life elsewhere in the  universe, and trace the evolution of galaxies from their beginning to their  current formation. JWST is intended to operate in an orbit approximately  1.5 million kilometers—or 1 million miles—from Earth. With a 6.5-meter  (21.3 foot) diameter mirror, JWST is expected to operate at about 100  times the sensitivity of the Hubble Space Telescope. Its science  instruments are designed to observe faint infrared sources and therefore  are required to operate at extremely cold temperatures. To help keep  these instruments cold, the JWST project will rely on a multi-layered,  tennis court-sized sunshield to protect the mirrors and instruments from  the sun’s heat.

The JWST project is divided into three major segments: observatory,  ground, and launch. When complete, the observatory segment will  include several elements (Optical Telescope Element, Integrated Science  Instrument Module, and spacecraft) and major subsystems (sunshield  and cryocooler). Additionally, JWST is dependent on software to deploy  and control various components of the telescope, and to collect and  transmit data back to Earth. The elements, major subsystems, and  software are being developed through a mixture of NASA, contractor, and  international partner efforts. See figure 1 for the elements and major  subsystems of JWST and appendix I for more details, including a  description of the elements, major subsystems, and instruments.

JWST depends on more deployment events—steps after launch that  configure the observatory for its mission and place it in orbit—than a  typical science mission. Due to the observatory’s large size, it is nearly  impossible to perform deployment tests of the fully assembled  observatory in a thermal vacuum chamber to simulate the space  environment, so the verification of deployment elements is accomplished  by a combination of lower level component tests in flight-simulated  environments; ambient deployment tests for subsystem, element, and  observatory levels; and detailed analysis and simulations at various levels  of assembly. Figure 1 shows the multiple layers of integration and testing  for major components of the JWST observatory.

For the majority of work remaining, the JWST project is relying on two  contractors: Northrop Grumman and the Association of Universities for  Research in Astronomy’s Space Telescope Science Institute. Northrop  Grumman plays the largest role, developing the sunshield, the Optical  Telescope Element, the spacecraft, and the Mid-Infrared Instrument’s  cryocooler, in addition to integrating and testing the observatory. Space  Telescope Science Institute’s role includes soliciting and evaluating  research proposals from the scientific community, and receiving and  storing the scientific data collected, both of which are services that the  Institute currently provides for the Hubble Space Telescope. Additionally,  the Institute is developing the ground system that manages and controls  the telescope’s observations and will operate the observatory on behalf of  NASA. JWST will be launched on an Ariane 5 rocket, provided by the  European Space Agency.

History of Cost Growth and Schedule Delays

The JWST program has a history of significant schedule delays and  project cost increases, which resulted in both the 2011 and 2018 replans.  Prior to approving the project’s development, cost estimates for JWST  ranged from $1 billion to $3.5 billion, with expected launch dates ranging  from 2007 to 2011. Due to early technical and management challenges,  contractor performance issues, and low levels of cost reserve, the JWST  program experienced schedule overruns, launch delays, and cost growth.  The program underwent a replan in September 2011 and then a  rebaseline; further, Congress placed an $8 billion cap on the formulation  and development costs for the project. However, in June 2018, after a  series of launch delay announcements due to technical and workmanship  issues identified during spacecraft element integration, NASA notified  Congress that it had revised the JWST program’s cost and schedule  estimates again. NASA estimated that it would now require $828 million in  additional resources over the program’s lifecycle and 29 more months  beyond the estimates agreed to in the 2011 rebaseline to complete the  project. Since the project’s costs and schedule were baselined in 2009,  costs have increased by 95 percent and its launch date has been delayed  by over 6.5 years.

Prior to this more recent replan, NASA established an Independent  Review Board (IRB) in April 2018, comprised of technical experts from  outside the JWST program to evaluate all factors that may affect the  successful completion of remaining mission steps. The board released its  final report in May 2018 in which it made 32 recommendations that  address a range of technical, organizational, and other factors. The IRB  took into account varying technical and workmanship errors, human  mistakes, adequacy of integration and test staff, and other considerations  when it analyzed the project’s organizational and technical issues. The  IRB recommended, among other actions, that the project conduct an audit to identify potential embedded design flaws; establish corrective  actions to detect and correct human mistakes during integration and  testing; establish a coherent, agreed-upon, and factual narrative on  project status and communicate that status regularly across all relevant  stakeholders; and, finally, augment integration and test staff to ensure  adequate long-term staffing and improve employee morale. These  recommendations also included reconsidering the proposed launch date.

In March 2019, we found that NASA had considered many of the  program’s risks while developing its 2018 replan schedule and cost  baseline but recommended that additional analysis be completed to  provide NASA and Congress with better insight into project resourcing  and affordability. A Joint Cost and Schedule Confidence Level is an  integrated analysis of a project’s cost, schedule, risk, and uncertainty, the  result of which indicates a project’s likelihood of meeting cost and  schedule targets. The project did not complete such an analysis as part  of its second replan. NASA policy says this tool may be used to inform  planning. Though not required by NASA policy, we recommended that  one be conducted given the long history of program challenges and the  significant and complex integration events that still needed to be  completed. NASA agreed with our recommendation and completed this  analysis in October 2019. GAO plans to conduct a separate, more  detailed engagement on this analysis and its findings in the future. See  appendix II for more information on this and other GAO  recommendations.

Schedule and Cost Reserves for NASA Projects

The JWST project, like other complex development efforts we have  reviewed, faces numerous risks and potential unforeseen technical  challenges, which often become apparent during integration and testing.  To accommodate unanticipated challenges and manage risk, projects  include extra time in their schedules, referred to as schedule reserve, and  extra funds in their budgets, referred to as cost reserve. Schedule reserve  is allocated to specific activities, elements, and major subsystems in the  event of delays or to address unforeseen risks. Each JWST element and  major subsystem has been allocated schedule reserve. When an element or major subsystem exhausts schedule reserve, it may affect schedule  reserve on other elements or major subsystems whose progress is  dependent on prior work being finished. Cost reserve is additional funding  within the project manager’s budget that can be used to address and  mitigate unanticipated issues for any element or major subsystem.  Goddard—the NASA center with responsibility for managing JWST— issued procedures detailing the cost and schedule reserve requirements  for formulating and executing spaceflight programs.

When NASA constructed its 2018 replan for the JWST project, it took into  account the remaining integration and test activities planned prior to  launch, known technology challenges that presented risks to schedule, as  well as potential future risks. The project’s replan reflected a planned  schedule reserve above the level indicated by Goddard policy, which  would have been approximately 5 months at that time. Instead, the new  schedule included a total of 293 days or 9.6 months of schedule reserve,  with approximately 6 months of this reserve to be managed at the project  level and the remainder held by the program at NASA headquarters.  Following the replan, the project and the contractor worked toward a  launch date in November 2020, which would have required none of the  schedule reserve managed at the NASA headquarters level. However,  the committed launch date under the replan, where all available schedule  reserve is utilized, is now March 2021.

NASA’s cost-plus-award-fee contract with Northrop Grumman has  spanned approximately 17 years, during which time there have been  significant variances in performance. These types of contracts are  suitable when uncertainties in scope of work or cost of services prevent  the use of contract types where prices are fixed. Award fee contracts  provide contractors the opportunity to obtain additional fee beyond the  costs charged to the government for enhanced levels of performance in  areas identified in the contract’s award fee plan. Award fees may be used  when key elements of performance cannot be defined objectively, and, as  such, require the project officials’ judgment to assess contractor  performance. For JWST’s contract with Northrop Grumman, these areas  include cost, schedule, technical, and business management and are  established in the contract’s award fee plan, which allows for the award of  a scaled fee based on assessed performance. This plan has been revised  over the life of the contract to incentivize performance in certain areas,  but it has always required Northrop Grumman to meet a minimum  standard to receive any award fee. Over the course of the JWST contract,  nearly $250 million dollars will have been available to Northrop Grumman  through this incentive. We have found that when NASA and the contractor  have made revisions to fee evaluation criteria to focus on certain aspects  of performance, the contractor has been responsive to the new criteria  during its work on the JWST project.

Little Margin for Error Remains with Challenging Integration and Test Work Ahead

Though the JWST project has made significant progress since our last  report in March 2019, technical challenges have required the use of most  of the project’s available schedule reserve. According to NASA officials,  the contractor has found ways to replenish reserve, but NASA is still  reviewing some of these methods and the project continues to work  through significant integration and testing events with less than a quarter  of the schedule reserve allotted to it in June 2018. The technical  challenges have resulted in prolonged employment of the contractor  workforce, which is the primary driver for increased costs.

NASA Has Completed Key Testing and Integration Steps and Continues to Address Known Risks

Following the June 2018 replan, the project has achieved a number of  integration and testing milestones and has taken steps to address  previously identified technical challenges. Since our March 2019 JWST  report, the program has completed testing on the individual component  elements of the observatory and has integrated them to start observatory  level testing, the last of five phases of integration and testing. Leading up  to observatory integration, the project completed thermal vacuum testing  of the spacecraft element in May 2019. This testing helped to ensure that  JWST hardware will function properly in the vacuum of space and  withstand significant temperature variations during deployment and  operation, and provided data to corroborate modelling on which the  observatory’s mission is based. Further, the project completed the last  major testing milestone for optical telescope and science instrumentation  elements—deployment of the secondary mirror assembly—in August  2019. This secondary mirror focuses the light collected by the 18 hexagonal primary mirrors of JWST into a beam and directs it toward  scientific equipment aboard the observatory. Integration of the  observatory components was completed in August 2019, and the  program has deployed the sunshield as part of observatory integration  and testing.

NASA has also taken steps to address challenges noted in our previous  reports. For example,  In February 2018, we found that Northrop Grumman planned to  modify the design of the sunshield’s membrane tensioning system in  response to a risk of a cable snagging during deployment. NASA  approved this redesign in May 2019 and employed a new approach to  cable management that involves modification and replacement of  certain cable clips and routing cables differently to manage slack that  could cause snags.

We found in March 2019 that the project office identified concerns that  trapped air in the folded sunshield membrane could put too much  stress on the observatory when the launch vehicle fairing  depressurizes—the fairing is the part of the rocket that encapsulates  JWST during flight. NASA, Northrop Grumman, European Space  Agency, and European vendors responsible for operating and  producing the launch vehicle have worked together to study this issue  and have designed vents for the fairing that will mitigate the risk of  damage to JWST. The new fairing vent design is expected to be  tested aboard a rocket planned to launch in the spring of 2020.

Technical Challenges Have Significantly Reduced Schedule Margin, with Considerable Integration and Testing Ahead

Despite the major accomplishments of the past year, the program has  identified new technical issues that present risk for meeting the 2018  replan’s schedule requirements. Multiple technical issues have  contributed to the use of schedule reserve since the June 2018 replan,  but two identified in March and April 2019 have had the most significant  effect. The program identified two significant anomalies during pre-testing  events for the spacecraft element’s thermal vacuum testing, which first  delayed thermal vacuum testing and then required additional time for  investigation and implementation of solutions. Specifically, a traveling  wave tube amplifier and a command and telemetry processor had errant  powering issues during testing. These are important components of the  observatory’s communication systems that enable JWST to send large  amounts of science data and telemetry to the ground segment at high  speed.

Though the anomalies occurred at the same time and were both power- related, NASA does not believe they are related and has initiated  separate review boards to determine solutions. The amplifier failure is  attributed to workmanship issues on the part of a subcontractor. As of  October 2019, the exact cause of the processor anomaly remained under  investigation, but the electrical problem had been isolated to faults within  specific circuit cards. NASA has taken steps to address the risks  presented by both anomalies: it has received replacement amplifiers and  has upgraded and tested an engineering model processor to replace the  faulty one aboard the observatory if necessary.

As a result of technical issues discovered since the June 2018 replan, the  JWST program has had to use significantly more schedule reserve than it  planned to and has been working towards the replan’s formally committed  launch date of March 2021. As of October 2019, the project had used 224  days of schedule reserve, or about 76 percent of the total project and  program-held schedule reserve incorporated into the June 2018 replan.  All project-held schedule margin was used by March 2019, a point at  which the project would have retained approximately 4 months of reserve  according to its original plan. At one point since our March 2019 report,  the project had as little as 18 percent of its total schedule reserve left, but  contractor-led corrective action plans regained time through found  efficiencies. As a result of these challenges, the project’s reserve fell  below what is indicated by Goddard policy. NASA determined in May  2019 that the November 2020 launch date that the project had hoped to  achieve was no longer feasible, and switched focus to meeting the  committed launch date of March 2021. Figure 2 shows the level of  planned reserve for JWST, reserve indicated by Goddard policy, and the  project’s actual use of schedule reserve.

Since then, however, the JWST project has determined that the March  2021 launch readiness date may not be feasible either, based on a  detailed assessment of risks, costs, and schedule. In October 2019, the  project completed a joint cost and schedule confidence level analysis in  response to a GAO recommendation made in a previous report on the  JWST program. Because of schedule delays resulting from technical  challenges coupled with remaining risks faced by the project, the analysis  assessed only a 12 percent confidence level for the project’s ability to  meet the March 2021 launch readiness date. NASA typically establishes  its cost and schedule baseline commitments at 70 percent confidence  level. According to the analysis, this 70 percent baseline confidence level  is associated with a July 2021 launch date. The project does not currently  intend to change the launch readiness date in response to this analysis  alone, but plans to assess the feasibility of the launch readiness date  again in spring 2020 after significant technical tasks are completed.

NASA and Northrop Grumman have a plan to recover schedule reserve  but certain portions of the plan remain under technical review. Following  the amplifier and processor anomalies, Northrop Grumman developed a  corrective action plan to recover schedule reserve, and the contractor and  NASA continue to look for ways to gain efficiencies. In June 2019,  Northrop Grumman suggested a number of potential schedule  optimization steps that were reviewed by NASA management. Northrop  Grumman has begun to be implement some of these steps. If all steps  are taken, the contractor estimates 65 days of project schedule will be  recovered, nearly doubling the amount of reserve available to the project  when the anomalies were discovered. Among the efforts described in this  corrective action plan are to streamline aspects of vibration testing and to  modify build and repair schedules so that a major panel on the spacecraft  will only have to be opened once. Combined, these two steps would save  an estimated 46 days. However, officials noted that for the plan for a  single panel opening to remain viable, corrective actions for the amplifier  and processor replacements would need to remain on schedule. The  project continues to review some of Northrop Grumman’s proposed  efficiencies, but more than half of these schedule savings have already  been incorporated into the schedule reserve forecast.

The project also continues to identify and monitor risks that could  potentially result in further use of schedule margin. As suggested by the  IRB, the project has led a number of audits looking for embedded risks.  As of November, most of the audits planned have been completed and  NASA identified some new risks. The following are some of the risks the  project is monitoring that could affect schedule:

The project found that certain bolts, determined to be deficient on  another Northrop Grumman program, were used during the  construction of the observatory. A study of this issue found that the  bolts used did not meet specifications and could pose a mechanical  strength risk. The unused bolts have been identified and isolated, but  501 were installed in the observatory. NASA is performing strength  testing to determine if the bolts are strong enough, but some of the  deficient bolts may need to be replaced, pending the findings of these  tests.

The project reported in August 2019 that grounding straps on the  spacecraft’s momentum flap came loose during vibration testing. This  flap will act as balance against solar pressure that could cause  unwanted movement of the observatory while in orbit. Observatory- level vibration testing cannot begin until the flap is removed, repaired,  and replaced aboard the spacecraft.

In September 2019, the project found that a non-explosive actuator on  one of its membrane retention devices did not fire as planned. These  devices, which help to unfurl the sunshield of the spacecraft, are  supposed to be electrically redundant, but only one of the two  mechanisms used to fire the actuator worked during the test. The  program reports that there are approximately 180 actuators on the  JWST and the failure of any one of these actuators could result in the  total loss of JWST science mission objectives. If the redundancy for  the actuators is reduced, it would have a major impact on system  reliability.

The project is evaluating whether it needs to replace certain  membrane retention devices that may not be able to withstand the  coupled pressure placed upon them by the launch and newly  designed fairing ventilation. Testing in the past did not account for all  aspects of the pressures placed upon this hardware during launch  and spaceflight. The project indicated that it is completing an analysis  to determine if stronger devices need to be installed.

The JWST project office reviews and reports on these and other risks  monthly. As of October 2019, the project is tracking 50 risks—three more  than when we last reported on JWST—of which 12 continue to be  assessed as moderate concerns. Of the 50, 23 have been assessed to be  at acceptable levels of risk but continue to be monitored should changes  affect their status. For example, the risk associated with cabling within  the sunshield was elevated in October 2019 when the project found that  further testing was needed to ensure slack did not present an  unacceptable threat to the spacecraft during deployment. Finally, nine of  the 50 risks currently tracked by the project are related to the more than  300 single points of failure aboard the observatory.

The project must conduct significant integration and testing activities in  the coming months that could present further challenges. Our previous  work on major NASA acquisition programs found that integration and  testing is the phase when challenges are most likely to be found and  schedules can slip. The science elements and the spacecraft have only  recently been integrated. NASA will have to manage seven top-level  integration and testing steps between October 2019 and December 2020  to include observatory-level vibration testing, sunshield deployment and  stow, and electrical testing and repairs. Currently, this will all have to be  completed with a diminished amount of schedule reserve. Northrop  Grumman and NASA officials we interviewed agreed that no other major  complication, such as those on the scale of the traveling wave tube  amplifier and command and telemetry processor anomalies, can happen  without putting the March 2021 launch date in jeopardy.

Technical Challenges May Also Drive Additional Costs for the Project

As we found in March 2019, changes to JWST project’s life-cycle cost  estimate are principally driven by schedule extension, which requires  keeping the contractor’s workforce longer than expected to complete  integration and testing. We also found that NASA’s cost estimate for the  2018 replan was based on a more gradual workforce reduction schedule  than previously used by the Northrop Grumman. NASA continues to  forecast an overall reduction in contractor and government workforce  following the project’s launch readiness date with continued, steady  support by the Space Telescope Science Institute during remaining  development and post-launch phases of the program (see figure 3).

The program reports that cost reserve is generally sufficient for planned  work but technical challenges could cause workforce costs to increase.  The cost and schedule analysis completed by the project in October 2019  indicated that the project will not exceed the cost commitment established  in the 2018 replan even if launch is delayed further by a few months.  According to officials, funding is sufficient to continue work even if the  launch date slips 3-4 months past the March 2021 launch date.  However, the technical issues identified during integration and testing  activities have required the contractor workforce to remain engaged,  instead of drawing down as planned. Rather than see a temporary drop in  contractor work hours as hardware deliveries were completed ahead of  observatory-level testing and integration activities, the project has  maintained contractor workforce levels to address the issues described  above. The contractor now forecasts approximately 15 percent more  workforce hours between 2019 and 2022, the year following launch (see  figure 4). Approximately $133 million in cost reserve funding will be used  by the project over the next 2 fiscal years to accommodate increasing  workforce retention costs.

NASA Has Addressed Recommendations and Sustained Oversight Improvements Since 2018

Since the June 2018 replan, NASA has taken steps to improve the JWST  project by implementing Independent Review Board (IRB)  recommendations, pursuing other oversight initiatives, and continuing to  incentivize contractor performance through the use of award fees. NASA  addressed all IRB recommendations even though the agency did not  always agree with the IRB on the specific steps needed to address the  recommendations. Further, NASA has sustained, and in some cases  expanded, the oversight initiatives that were started prior to our last  report. The cost plus award fee contract used for JWST development  efforts provides the project with a means to incentivize contractor  performance related to cost, schedule, technical, and business  management goals. Since the 2018 replan, Northrop Grumman’s award  fee evaluations have improved but remain below its average for the  contract.

NASA Has Completed Its Implementation of IRB Recommendations

NASA assessed all IRB recommendations as closed in October 2019.  The IRB made 32 recommendations covering a range of topics from  improving communication with stakeholders to identifying embedded  problems. NASA implemented its recommendation to establish March  2021 as the committed launch date for JWST through the June 2018  replan. Responsibility for implementing the remaining 31  recommendations was split among headquarters, the program office, and  the project. The 10 headquarters- and program-level recommendations  covered high-level recommendations dealing with entities outside of the  project or communication between upper-level NASA management and  the project. The remaining 21 recommendations were implemented at the  project level and included lower-level actions related to assessing,  preparing for, and improving day-to-day work.

NASA assessed most recommendations as implemented prior to an IRB  follow-up assessment, but the IRB found that more work was required for  some to completely align with the board’s intent. In February 2019, the  IRB found that the steps NASA took for approximately one-third of its  recommendations were either inadequate or needed additional work, with  the remainder found to be appropriate. Specifically, the IRB categorized  21 of the recommendation responses as appropriate, eight responses as  appropriate with additional work needed, and three responses as  inadequate. The IRB’s monitoring of the JWST project ended with the  February 2019 follow up (see figure 5).

Though NASA agreed with the intent of all the IRB recommendations, it  took a different approach than described in the IRB report when  implementing the three recommendations where the agency’s response  was assessed to be inadequate. NASA conducted additional work for the  majority of recommendations assessed by the IRB to be incomplete.  However, NASA determined that a few of the IRB recommendations  managed at the headquarters level should not be implemented the way  they were delineated in the IRB report. Specifically,

The IRB found that the JWST reporting structure was complex,  confusing, and ineffective. The IRB made two recommendations for  NASA to update its reporting chain. The IRB believed the Science  Mission Directorate Associate Administrator should have responsibility  of the entire JWST program and the Goddard Space Flight Center  Director should be responsible for all aspects of the JWST project.  The IRB asserted that restricting the involvement of the Goddard  director will reduce the probability of JWST success. NASA agreed  that it is important to have clear organizational roles and  responsibilities but had a difference of opinion about the best course  of action. In November 2018 and July 2019, NASA announced  updates to the JWST reporting structure. However, both times it  reduced the role of the Goddard director in favor of more direct line of  accountability from the JWST program to the Science Mission  Directorate Associate Administrator and the NASA Associate  Administrator. NASA asserts that these changes will provide more  clear accountability for program performance and allow for expedited  decision making.

The IRB recommended that NASA’s Launch Services Program should  have accountability for the JWST launch. NASA has taken actions to  increase the involvement of the Launch Services Program but NASA  maintains that it is not prudent or possible for the Launch Services  Program to be accountable for the launch because the European  Space Agency is contributing the launch vehicle and managing the  launch. The IRB recognized the unique circumstances of using an  international launch vehicle but continued to assert the importance of  Launch Services Program accountability. A minority of IRB members  were of the opinion that NASA took appropriate action.

NASA Has Sustained Key Oversight Improvements and Made Additional Improvements Since 2018

NASA has sustained increased oversight and involvement with Northrop  Grumman following the announcement of an anticipated cost cap breach  in March 2018. Previously reported improvements included both the  implementation of IRB recommendations and the pursuit of self-initiated  activities, like greater NASA on-site coverage and Northrop Grumman’s  culture change campaign designed to shift focus toward quality  assurance. Our March 2019 report, provided examples of these changes  and initiatives. Table 1 below provides a summary of our previous report  findings and the current status of the changes NASA and Northrop  Grumman made in providing oversight and ensuring quality.

Since we last reported in March 2019, NASA has made additional  oversight changes to further enhance communication with and oversight  of the contractor. Most of these changes emphasize greater involvement  of NASA specialists in meetings and reviews. NASA officials reported that  its increased presence with the contractor has had positive effects for  both ensuring project outcomes and increasing morale of the government  and contractor workforce. For example, NASA integration and testing  leadership is present and embedded in Northrop Grumman’s meetings— directly participating in planning sessions, reporting, and reviews of  failures and anomalies. As a result, the project was able to plan for early  integration of the observatory and completed key integration activities  without being the primary driver of the project’s schedule. According to  officials, expanded participation has helped to ensure more realistic  exercises that include procedural concerns as well as engineering  considerations. NASA officials said that the increased participation has  allowed NASA input to be incorporated early—potentially reducing issues  in the future. Further, NASA officials believe that the consistent presence  of NASA personnel has improved morale—an item highlighted by the  IRB—and helped foster greater unity of effort between government and  contractor workforces.

Contractor Award Fee Has Fluctuated over Time, but Performance Has Improved Recently

NASA has regularly assessed contractor performance through award fee  assessments since the beginning of the contract in 2002. Award fee  documentation over the course of the Northrop Grumman contract  indicates that contractor performance was assessed as below its average  before periods of significant cost and schedule growth. On average,  Northrop Grumman has been rated as very good with about three-fourths  of evaluations assessing its performance as either excellent or very good.  For the award fee evaluations that fall below Northrop Grumman’s  average score, cost performance has contributed to the majority of these  dips and schedule performance has contributed to almost half. In  particular, schedule performance has reduced the contractor’s overall  evaluation for all award fee periods since April 2017. The latest dip below  the contractor’s average preceded lifecycle cost growth of $828 million  and schedule growth of nearly 2.5 years (see figure 6).

Since our March 2019 report, Northrop Grumman’s ratings have improved  but remain below its average. For the award fee period from October  2017 through March 2018, Northrop Grumman received an unsatisfactory  rating, which resulted in the contractor receiving no award fee for the first  and only time in the life of the contract. The unacceptable rating was  driven by cost and schedule performance—including the anticipation of  breaching the $8 billion congressional cost cap established in response to  the 2011 rebaseline. In the following two periods, Northrop Grumman has  improved its evaluation, but schedule performance remains a concern.  During the last award fee period assessed, NASA was internally  managing to a November 2020 launch date. Shortly after the award fee  period ended, the project found it could no longer support the November  2020 date and began managing to the March 2021 launch date.

We are not making recommendations in this report. We provided a draft  of this report to NASA for comment. NASA provided technical comments  that, among other things, clarified implementation of schedule recovery  steps and updated progress on observatory repairs. We incorporated  suggested technical changes as appropriate.

We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional  committees, the NASA Administrator, and other interested parties. In  addition, the report is available at no charge on the GAO website at  http://www.gao.gov.

If you or your staff have any questions on matters discussed in this report,  please contact me at (202) 512-4841 or chaplainc@gao.gov. Contact  points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may  be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key  contributions to this report are listed in appendix IV.

Appendix I: Elements and Major Subsystems of the James Webb Space Telescope (JWST) Observatory

Appendix II: Status of Previous GAO Recommendations on Management of the James Webb Space Telescope Program

In its previous reports on the James Webb Space Telescope (JWST), the  GAO has made several recommendations. These recommendations are  listed below. Comments reflect the status of the program at the time GAO  closed the recommendation.

Appendix III: List of Independent Review Board (IRB) Recommendations

Appendix III: List of Independent Review Board  (IRB) Recommendations Telescope (JWST) launch success at the same level of responsibility they  have for U.S. launches, or the National Aeronautics and Space Administration  (NASA) should contract with Aerospace Corporation for similar accountability.  2  The Goddard Space Flight Center (Goddard) and Northrop Grumman Project  Offices should be established as consistent and factual source of all JWST  mission status  3  Communications of status and details appropriate for stakeholders need to be  presented clearly and frequently.  4  NASA headquarters should be responsible for developing a “communication  plan” (messaging strategy) for JWST.  5  Communicating complexity, risk, and science return for JWST is critically  important.  6  Use the same criticality and assessment charts for all JWST reporting.  7  NASA should implement a JWST reporting structure where the Science  Mission Directorate Associate Administrator has responsibility for the entire  JWST program and the Goddard Space Flight Center Director is responsible  for all aspects of the project.  8  NASA should revise NASA policy directives to be consistent with the  recommendation.  9  Assure consistent, sustained and meaningful engagement of the Science  Working Group (SWG).  10  Appoint an executive committee of NASA-selected members of the SWG to  act as conduits to the broader community on mission challenges.  11  NASA should designate a Commission Manager.  12  NASA should implement sunshield hardware and simulation elements to aid in  sunshield anomaly identification and resolution.  13  Northrop Grumman should establish corrective actions in1) processes, 2)  training, 3) personnel certification, 4) discipline to ensure individual  accountability and 5) a failure-proof “safety net” through a robust testing,  analysis, and inspection process.  14  Goddard and Northrop Grumman should conduct an audit including forensic  engineering, hardware pedigree assessment, drawing checks, etc., to identify  potential embedded problems.  15  Goddard should conduct an audit of the JWST project residual risk, reviewing  the objective evidence of (a) the completed Test As You Fly and Single Point  Failures mitigation plans, and (b) failure corrective action effectiveness to  determine the “as built” residual risk.  16  The project should reconcile the “as built” residual risk with the expected “as  designed” residual risk.  17  NASA should define security requirements and plan for JWST transport to  launch site.  18  Develop contingency operations and sparing plan for spacecraft/launch site  operations.  19  Develop “pathfinder” JWST simulator and contamination protection systems for  integration “dry runs.”  20  Assess shipping vessel contamination environment and develop contingency  plans for off-nominal shipping operation.  21  It is critically important that Goddard JWST Project Office maintain  responsibility and provide adequate support to ensure Space Telescope  Science Institute (STScI) mission operations readiness  22  The Project should review all simulators/testbeds and required usage against  pre-launch tests and rehearsals, post-launch deployment anomaly resolution,  fault isolation, and correction.  23  The Goddard JWST Project Office should develop a staffing plan that meets  the needs of integration and test and operational readiness.  24  The project should develop and approve a transition plan that defines the level  of mission operations responsibility for STScI as a function of time with  independent gate reviews at transition points.  25  Management should unambiguously emphasize the priority of mission success  to “working level” personnel.  26  Employees must feel empowered to stop or slow down if the pace or  procedures can jeopardize mission success.  27  NASA should assess “top ten” mission success enhancements and implement  where appropriate.  28  Responsible Design Engineers should be involved and responsible for their  element through the successful commissioning of the observatory.  29  The project should augment integration and test staff; this is critically important  to execute the integration and test program.  30  Augment integration and test staff to achieve more realistic work schedules.  31  Implement strategies for improving team morale, such as periodic science  lectures for Northrop Grumman personnel and families.  32  The Webb IRB recommends the launch date be established as March 2021  (based upon the Project’s 5/18 assessment of the impact of the membrane  cover assembly acoustic anomaly).

In addition to the contact named above, Raj Chitikila (Assistant Director),  Christina Cota-Robles, Carrie Rogers, Ajani Skeete, Jay Tallon, and  Thomas Twambly made key contributions to this report. Assistance was  also provided by Hannah Brookhart, Brian Bothwell, Lorraine Ettaro,  Emile Ettedgui, Laura Greifner, Kaelin Kuhn, Christine Pecora, Roxanna  Sun, and Alyssa Weir.

The James Webb Space Telescope is the planned successor to the Hubble Telescope. Costs for the project have already increased by 95% and the launch date has been delayed by more than 6.5 years.

Technical issues with certain spacecraft components in 2019 have made it unfeasible for the project to launch by its goal of November 2020. Instead, the project is working towards its official rescheduled launch date of March 2021. But a recent cost and schedule analysis, which we recommended in our last report, found the project unlikely to meet this date.