U.S. Assistance to Central America: Department of State Should Establish a Comprehensive Plan to Assess Progress toward Prosperity, Governance, and Security

The United States has provided assistance to the Northern Triangle of Central America for many years to address poverty, weak governance, and insecurity. Introduced in 2014, and updated in 2017, the U.S. Strategy for Engagement in Central America (Strategy) supports the objectives of improving prosperity, governance, and security. State coordinates implementation of the Strategy's objectives among agencies. This report examines: (1) the projects the U.S. government has implemented from fiscal years 2013 through 2018 to support the Strategy's objectives in the Northern Triangle, (2) what is known about project results, and (3) what is known about progress toward the objectives.

GAO reviewed results for a subset of 190 projects in a nongeneralizable sample of six sectors selected based on funding, country, and objective; analyzed Strategy documents and key elements of effective strategies; interviewed officials; and conducted fieldwork in the Northern Triangle.

To support their prosperity, governance, and security objectives, the Departments of State (State), Defense (DOD), Agriculture (USDA), and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) allocated about $2.4 billion from fiscal years 2013 through 2018 for 370 projects in the Northern Triangle—El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras. USAID and State implemented most of these projects, with some supporting more than one sector and objective. For example, USAID implemented projects to address poverty, while State trained prosecutors and police to address governance and security needs.

State, USAID, and other agencies reported mixed results for the 190 projects in the six sectors GAO reviewed. For example, in fiscal year 2018, USAID assisted 1,376 individuals in workforce development programs in Guatemala, exceeding the target of 1,000, while it assisted 651 individuals in Honduras, falling short of the target of 5,000. State and USAID trained 12,557 justice system personnel in the Northern Triangle, exceeding the target of 2,275. USDA rehabilitated school kitchens in Honduras as part of its school feeding program. DOD helped Guatemala establish a budget system to increase accountability for military funds, but DOD reported persistently low public trust in Northern Triangle militaries.

Limited information is available about how U.S. assistance improved prosperity, governance, and security in the Northern Triangle. Agencies generally reported more information about progress toward prosperity than toward governance and security, in part because evaluations were conducted unevenly across agencies and sectors. In addition, project implementers did not consistently collect key information needed to evaluate progress, but officials noted improvements. Nevertheless, agency officials described examples of progress through technical assistance, and noted challenges, such as drought. GAO has reported that development of a monitoring and evaluation plan is key to assessing agencies' common goals and objectives, and mutually reinforcing results. While State has a monitoring and evaluation plan for the Strategy, the plan does not include activities by DOD and USDA that support the Strategy's objectives and thus does not establish a comprehensive approach to assessing progress.

GAO recommends that State collaborate with DOD and USDA to develop a comprehensive approach to monitoring and evaluation of projects that support Strategy objectives. State did not concur, citing lack of authority to direct other agencies' actions. GAO modified the recommendation to clarify that a collaborative effort would allow State to include information about all relevant projects as it evaluates progress under the Strategy as discussed in this report.

The three countries that make up the Northern Triangle in Central  America—El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras—have struggled with  high levels of poverty and unemployment, weak governance, and  widespread insecurity and violence, with homicide rates among the  highest in the world. These challenges have serious consequences for  the United States. For example, the region has become a significant  source of migration to the United States due to multiple factors, including  a lack of economic opportunities, high poverty rates and poor living  conditions, gang-related violence and insecurity, and the desire for family  reunification. Transnational criminal organizations have also taken  advantage of weak government institutions and justice systems in the  Northern Triangle to engage in illegal activities. All three Northern  Triangle countries, for example, are major transit countries for illegal  drugs destined for the United States and are vulnerable to the money  laundering activities of organized crime groups, particularly drug and  human trafficking organizations.

The U.S. government has committed resources and provided assistance  over many years to the Northern Triangle countries to address these  challenges. Specifically, beginning in 2008, the United States established  the Mérida Initiative to provide foreign assistance to Mexico and Central  America, including the Northern Triangle, to address violence and  criminal activity. In 2010, the United States established the Central  America Regional Security Initiative (CARSI), which created a  collaborative partnership between the United States and Central  American countries, including the Northern Triangle, to improve citizen  security. Multiple U.S. agencies implemented projects intended to  improve prosperity, governance, and security in Central America,  including the Northern Triangle, to support and complement these  initiatives.

In 2014, the U.S. government introduced the U.S. Strategy for  Engagement in Central America (Strategy) to expand assistance to Central America, including the Northern Triangle countries, by taking a  broader, more comprehensive approach to the immediate and long-term  challenges facing Central American governments. The Strategy aims to  promote prosperity, good governance, and security cooperation in the  region. Multiple U.S. agencies fund foreign assistance projects supporting  each of the three objectives. The Department of State (State) and the  U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) are responsible for  developing a plan for monitoring and evaluating U.S. assistance under  the Strategy and reporting progress toward its objectives. In 2017, State  updated the Strategy to place more emphasis on preventing illegal  immigration, combatting transnational crime, and generating export and  investment opportunities for U.S. businesses, while maintaining the  Strategy’s three objectives.

On June 17, 2019, State announced that the Department would not  provide new funds for programs in the Northern Triangle until it is satisfied  that governments in the region “are taking concrete actions to reduce the  number of illegal migrants coming to the U.S. border.” According to this  announcement, previously awarded grants and contracts would continue  as would certain new assistance to help Northern Triangle governments  “take actions that will protect the U.S. border and counter transnational  organized crime.”

You asked us to review U.S. government assistance to the Northern  Triangle. This report examines (1) the projects that the U.S. government  has implemented in the Northern Triangle from fiscal year 2013 through  fiscal year 2018 to support prosperity, governance, and security, (2) what  is known about the results of these projects, and (3) what is known about  progress toward the Strategy’s objectives.

To determine the projects that the U.S. government has implemented in  the Northern Triangle, we reviewed documents and analyzed project and  funding data on foreign assistance projects supporting prosperity,  governance, and security objectives from State, USAID, and the  Departments of Defense (DOD), Homeland Security (DHS), Justice  (DOJ), and Agriculture (USDA). We analyzed agencies’ project and  funding data to identify the number of projects implemented by agency  and country and the total funding agencies allocated for these projects  from fiscal years 2013 through 2018. We focused our analysis on State,  USAID, DOD, and USDA because they allocated the largest amounts of  funding for the largest number of projects supporting prosperity,  governance, and security objectives in the Northern Triangle during this  period. We assessed the reliability of the data that agencies reported for  these projects by reviewing information from agency officials regarding  the underlying data systems and by checking the data for consistency  and errors. When we found potential duplicate data and discrepancies,  we contacted relevant agency officials to resolve these data issues. As a  result of these steps, we determined that the data were sufficiently  reliable for the purposes of reporting the number of projects that  supported prosperity, governance, and security objectives in El Salvador,  Guatemala, and Honduras and allocations for these projects from fiscal  years 2013 through 2018.

To select a subset of the projects for review, we reviewed agencies’  project information and Strategy documents to categorize all projects into  18 sectors that generally align with the current objectives of the Strategy.  Specifically, we grouped similar projects by sector such as economic  growth, justice reform, and community based violence prevention, and  aligned them according to the Strategy’s three objectives of prosperity,  governance, and security. We then selected a judgmental sample of six of  the 18 sectors for an in-depth review of performance-related  documentation. The six sectors we selected were agricultural  development, economic growth, good government service, justice reform,  community based violence prevention, and professionalize the military  and develop defense capabilities. We selected these six sectors to  achieve a range of projects by agency, funding allocation amount, and  country, and to include projects that align with each of the three  objectives.

To determine what is known about project results, we reviewed agency  performance reports and data for the 190 projects implemented from  fiscal years 2013 through 2018 in the six selected sectors. We also  examined detailed documentation of results information, including State  and USAID’s Performance Plans and Reports (PPR) for El Salvador,  Guatemala, and Honduras for fiscal years 2013 through 2018; State’s  International Narcotics Control Strategy Reports (INCSR) for fiscal years  2013 through 2018; State and USAID’s Progress Report for the U.S.  Strategy for Central America’s Plan for Monitoring and Evaluation for  fiscal year 2018 and 2019; and State’s quarterly country cables reporting  on agencies’ progress in implementing projects in support of the  prosperity, governance, and security objectives in each of the Northern  Triangle countries for the available quarters of fiscal years 2016 through  2018. We also requested and reviewed all 23 evaluations completed from  fiscal years 2013 through 2018 related to each of the six selected sectors  in each Northern Triangle country. In addition, we examined detailed  project documentation of results information for a non-generalizable  sample of 19 projects within the six sectors, including, among other  things, quarterly, semi-annual, and annual reports from implementing  partners to assess project results. We selected these 19 projects based  on a variety of criteria, including the types of project activities and the  objectives they supported, as well as to obtain a range of funding  allocation amounts, countries, and agencies.

To examine what is known about progress toward the Strategy’s  objectives, we reviewed Strategy documents, including monitoring and  evaluation plans, to assess if they included key elements of effective  strategies that we have identified as related to assessment of progress  toward strategic goals. In assessing the monitoring and evaluation plan,  we also considered the Standards for Internal Control in the Federal  Government, which specifies that managers should identify the  information needed to achieve objectives and use such information to  evaluate performance in achieving objectives.

To support our work on all three objectives, we conducted fieldwork in El  Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras to observe selected project  activities, and to interview agency officials, implementing partners, and  project beneficiaries about project activities and results, and factors that  have affected project results. We also interviewed agency officials in  Washington, D.C. and at the U.S. Southern Command in Doral, Florida  about project activities and results, factors affecting results, and actions to  address these factors, as well as efforts to monitor and evaluate project  results. See appendix I for more details about our scope and  methodology.

We conducted this performance audit from December 2017 to September  2019 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to  obtain sufficient, appropriate, evidence to provide a reasonable basis for  our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe  that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings  and conclusions based on our audit objectives.

U.S. Assistance to Central America Has Supported Three Objectives— Prosperity, Governance, and Security

The United States historically has maintained close ties to Central  America and played a role in the region’s political and economic  development because of geographic proximity and common interests.  The United States has provided assistance to the governments of Central  America, including those of the Northern Triangle, under multiple  initiatives over many years. In 2008, the United States began a multiyear  assistance package to Central America under the Mérida Initiative to help  address violence and criminal activity, especially from drug trafficking and  other criminal organizations. In 2010, U.S. assistance continued under  CARSI. CARSI was a collaborative partnership between the United  States and Central American partner countries, including El Salvador,  Guatemala, and Honduras, designed to improve citizen security within the  region by taking a broad approach to security beyond traditional  counternarcotics activities. Multiple U.S. agencies implemented projects  in Central America, particularly in the Northern Triangle, to support and  complement these initiatives. These projects focused on, among other  things, improving law enforcement and criminal justice, promoting the rule  of law and human rights, preventing youth violence in violence-prone  areas, enhancing customs and border control, and encouraging economic  and social development.

Introduced in 2014, and updated in 2017, the Strategy is the latest U.S.  government initiative in the region. The Strategy notes that prior U.S.  assistance did not yield sustained, broad improvements in social or  economic conditions and thus the Strategy intends to take a  comprehensive, an integrated, and a whole-of-government approach that  aligns activities and resources required to achieve systemic and lasting  improvements. Under this approach, the Strategy promotes three  mutually reinforcing objectives—prosperity, governance, and security.  These three objectives seek to address challenges facing Central  American countries, including the three Northern Triangle countries. For  example:

Prosperity Challenges: Northern Triangle countries have had high  rates of poverty, low per capita income, and a lack of employment  opportunities. The World Bank reported that, in 2014, over half of the  population of Guatemala lived below the poverty line and, in 2017,  almost one-third of the population of El Salvador and more than half of  the population of Honduras lived below the poverty line. The World  Bank also reported that El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras had  among the lowest per capita incomes in Latin America in 2017. In  addition, more than 27 percent of the population aged 15 to 24 in  each of the Northern Triangle countries were not employed or seeking  education or training in 2016, according to the World Bank.

Governance Challenges: Northern Triangle countries have  experienced widespread corruption, weak government institutions,  and poor adherence to the rule of law. According to the 2018  Transparency International Corruption Perception Index, which ranks  180 countries by their perceived levels of public sector corruption, the  Northern Triangle countries ranked among the bottom half. In  addition, in 2018, Guatemala and Honduras ranked in the lowest 15  percent of countries in the World Justice Project’s Rule of Law Index,  which measures countries’ adherence to the rule of law.

Security Challenges: Northern Triangle countries have had weak  security structures, high rates of crime and gang activity, and a lack of  legitimate employment opportunities for youth susceptible to being  drawn into criminal activity. While Northern Triangle countries  experienced a decline in homicide rates from 2014 to 2017, the  average homicide rate for El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras  remains much higher than the averages for Latin America and the  Caribbean for recent years and five to 12 times higher than the 10- year average for the United States. In addition, the percentage of  people in the Northern Triangle who reported feeling safe walking in  their neighborhoods at night was about 50 percent in 2017.

Agencies reported implementing various assistance projects in the  Northern Triangle to support the prosperity, governance, and security  objectives from fiscal year 2013 through fiscal year 2018. We found that  these projects generally correspond to 18 sectors that align with the three  objectives of the current Strategy. Figure 1 shows the alignment of the 18  sectors with the objectives of the Strategy, including the six sectors we  selected for an in-depth review. Table 1 shows the definitions for each of  the 18 sectors we identified and the three objectives of the Strategy.

Multiple Agencies Provide Assistance to Central America

Multiple agencies implemented assistance projects in the Northern  Triangle to support the prosperity, governance, and security objectives  from fiscal years 2013 through 2018. State, USAID, DOD, and USDA  were the primary agencies that implemented such projects in the  Northern Triangle during this period. In particular, State and USAID  manage foreign assistance to support the Strategy’s objectives, and play  key roles in monitoring and evaluating this assistance. According to  agency officials, State’s Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs (WHA) is  responsible for managing the implementation of the Strategy’s objectives  among agencies. For example, WHA manages regular coordination  meetings with USAID and State’s Bureau of International Narcotics and  Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) as well as larger coordination meetings  with other relevant agencies, including DOD and USDA, according to  officials. In addition, WHA gathers information across agencies on a  quarterly basis to produce and disseminate cables that discuss progress  and challenges related to the Strategy’s objectives. WHA also  collaborated with USAID to develop a plan to monitor and evaluate U.S.  assistance and report results.

Agencies Allocated about $2.4 Billion from Fiscal Years 2013 through 2018 to Implement Hundreds of Projects to Support Prosperity, Governance, and Security in the Northern Triangle

State, USAID, DOD, and USDA Allocated about $2.4 Billion to Fund Projects to Support Objectives in the Northern Triangle from Fiscal Years 2013 through 2018

Based on our review of agency funding data, we found that State, USAID,  DOD, and USDA allocated about $2.4 billion in assistance to the Northern  Triangle to support projects related to prosperity, governance, and  security objectives from fiscal years 2013 through 2018. USAID  reported the largest amount of allocations with approximately $1.44  billion, while State reported $464 million, and USDA and DOD each  reported less than $235 million.

For fiscal years 2013 through 2018, the four agencies reported allocating  the largest amount of funding for projects in Guatemala, followed by  Honduras and El Salvador. Specifically, the agencies reported allocating  approximately $1.07 billion or 45 percent of total allocations to fund  projects in Guatemala, approximately $749 million or 32 percent of total  allocations to fund projects in Honduras, and approximately $496 million  or about 21 percent of total allocations to fund projects in El Salvador.  Some agencies also reported allocations for multi-country projects  implemented in two or more countries, including at least one Northern  Triangle country. For example, USAID funded a regional initiative to  improve clean energy investment and reduce overall energy consumption  throughout many Central American countries. The agencies reported  allocating approximately $53 million for multi-country assistance projects  implemented exclusively in two or three Northern Triangle countries, or  about 2 percent of the total. See Table 2 for reported amounts of  allocated funding by country and agency from fiscal years 2013 through  2018.

State, USAID, DOD, and USDA Implemented At Least 370 Projects to Support Objectives in the Northern Triangle from Fiscal Years 2013 through 2018

State, USAID, DOD, and USDA implemented at least 370 technical  assistance projects in the Northern Triangle to support prosperity,  governance, and security objectives from fiscal years 2013 through  2018. The total number of projects that we report is lower than the  actual number of projects implemented because some agencies and  bureaus could not report data at the project level. Specifically, DOD and  INL reported some broader assistance data that encompassed two or  more projects and officials told us they were unable to disaggregate this  data at the project level.

Among the four agencies, USAID implemented the largest number of  projects in the Northern Triangle during our time frame. Specifically,  USAID reported that it implemented 218 projects or 59 percent of the  projects reported across the four agencies. State reported that it  implemented 124 projects or about one-third of the projects. DOD and  USDA each reported 14 projects to support prosperity, governance, and  security or about 4 percent each of the total projects. Collectively, the  agencies reported they implemented the largest number of projects in  Guatemala (126), followed by Honduras (106), and El Salvador (86).  Agencies reported they implemented 52 multi-country projects that  included at least one Northern Triangle country. See table 3 for the  number of projects reported by country and agency.

Agency officials typically reported implementing similar types of projects  in each of the Northern Triangle countries, although there were some  differences in the number of projects implemented for each objective and  sector based on each country’s needs (see fig. 2). For example, officials  told us that agencies implemented fewer agricultural development  projects in El Salvador because its agriculture industry is small relative to  Guatemala and Honduras and the majority of its population lives in urban  rather than rural, agricultural areas. Instead, agency officials in El  Salvador said agencies focused their prosperity assistance on projects in  the economic growth sector that targeted more prominent business areas  such as technology or manufacturing. For example, USAID supported a  youth training center in El Salvador where students develop computer  skills to work in the information technology fields (See fig. 3).

Some agencies funded projects that supported multiple sectors and  objectives, while others focused on a specific sector supporting one of the  three objectives (see fig. 4). For example, USAID and State supported all  three objectives by implementing projects in a variety of sectors.  However, USDA supported only the prosperity objective by implementing  projects primarily in the agricultural development sector and DOD  supported the security objective by implementing projects primarily in the  professionalize the military and develop defense capabilities sector. We  also identified some specific assistance projects that supported more than  one of the three objectives. For example, some of USAID’s workforce  development projects targeted at-risk youth, which supported both the  prosperity and security objectives. Other USAID projects worked with  government officials in the Northern Triangle to improve health,  environment, or economic growth, which supported both the prosperity  and governance objectives. In addition, State’s rule of law projects, which  trained police and other personnel in the judicial sector, supported both  the governance and the security objectives.

Below is an overview of the agencies’ general roles and responsibilities  for supporting the three objectives:

Prosperity: USAID, State, and USDA implemented projects supporting  the prosperity objective. USAID implemented projects to assist  populations to meet basic needs, help businesses access markets for  goods and services, build a skilled workforce, and enhance health  systems and education institutions. For example, one USAID  economic growth project in El Salvador provided assistance to small  enterprises through university-affiliated training centers where  representatives of firms received training and advice to improve their  business practices. State also implemented projects to assist  businesses and entrepreneurs develop their capabilities. For example,  State implemented a multi-country project to provide training to small  and medium businesses on e-commerce platforms to access new  markets and increase sales. USDA and USAID both implemented  projects intended to help farmers improve agricultural management  practices and increase their access to markets and capital. For  example, a USAID agricultural development project in Honduras  provided training to local farmers to increase their household incomes,  strengthen access to food markets, and diversify their crops (see fig.  5). A USDA project provided schools in Honduras with food  assistance, infrastructure improvements, and trainings to support  school feeding, sought to improve educational outcomes (see fig. 6).

Governance: USAID and State were the primary agencies supporting  the governance objective. USAID projects provided technical  assistance to governments to increase accountability, transparency,  revenue collection, and provision of basic services. For example, a  USAID project in Guatemala provided technical assistance to  municipal governments to improve their financial management and  increase the quality of government-provided services such as water  and sanitation systems. State and USAID also supported this  objective by supporting projects to strengthen justice institutions,  combat corruption, improve democratic processes, and advocate for  the protection of human rights. For example, we visited a morgue in  Honduras where USAID and INL collaborated to provide forensic  training and equipment and improve evidence collection and analysis  capabilities, to better prosecute crimes (see fig. 7).

Security: State, USAID, and DOD implemented projects to support the  security objective. USAID and INL projects supported community  based activities to prevent violence by supporting community youth  centers, strengthening community policing, and implementing  workforce development projects for at-risk youth. For example, a  USAID project in Honduras provided technical training, mentorship,  and job placement support for at-risk youth. INL also provided training  and equipment to law enforcement to improve its capabilities and  reputation in communities and to better identify and prevent crime,  violence, and gang activity. For example, we visited the International  Law Enforcement Academy in El Salvador, where U.S. assistance  provides a variety of training courses to Central American and South  American police, judges, and prosecutors, to increase capacity and  coordination among law enforcement officials (see fig. 8). In addition,  State funded and DOD funded and implemented projects to train and  equip Northern Triangle militaries. DOD officials in Honduras, for  example, told us they provide a range of trainings to Honduran military  leaders at U.S. military schools.

See appendix II for a summary of U.S. assistance projects in the Northern  Triangle for our six selected sectors.

Agencies Reported That Projects Implemented from Fiscal Years 2013 through 2018 Achieved Mixed Results

State, USAID, DOD, and USDA reported mixed results, primarily focused  on outputs, for the 190 projects in the six sectors we reviewed. While  some projects in these sectors achieved the targets that agency officials  established, others did not.

We reviewed a variety of performance-related documents for the 190  projects that aligned with our six selected sectors—economic growth,  agricultural development, good government service, justice reform,  community based violence prevention, and professionalize the military  and develop defense capabilities. Specifically, we reviewed State and  USAID’s PPRs for fiscal years 2013 through 2018 for each Northern  Triangle country, and State’s INCSRs for fiscal years 2013 through  2018. We also reviewed State and USAID’s Progress Report for the  Strategy for fiscal years 2018 and 2019, and State’s quarterly country  cables reporting on agencies’ progress in implementing projects that  support the Strategy’s objectives in each of the Northern Triangle  countries for available quarters of fiscal years 2016 through 2018. In  addition, we reviewed implementer progress reports for a sample of 19  projects to obtain more detailed information on project-specific outputs  and outcomes, as well as all available evaluations related to the six  sectors completed from fiscal years 2013 through 2018.

Examples of results for projects related to each of the six sectors include  the following.

Economic Growth: USAID implemented projects to assist workers  improve their access to employment, and help firms improve their  business practices and access markets. According to the PPRs we  reviewed, USAID achieved 81 of 123 (66 percent) of its targets for  performance indicators related to the economic growth sector for  fiscal years 2013 through 2018. In addition, all nine evaluations in  the sector reported generally positive project results. For example,  according to the PPR, USAID assisted 176 firms to invest in improved  technologies and 329 firms to improve their management practices in  Guatemala in fiscal year 2017, exceeding the targets of 141 and 310,  respectively. In addition, 5,067 individuals completed workforce  development programs with U.S. assistance in the Northern Triangle  countries in fiscal year 2018, according to the PPRs. USAID reported  that 1,376 individuals completed workforce development programs in  Guatemala, which exceeded the target of 1,000. However, USAID  reported that 3,040 individuals in El Salvador and 651 individuals in  Honduras completed such programs, which did not meet the fiscal  year targets of 7,300 and 5,000, respectively. According to an  evaluation of a USAID project in El Salvador that focused on providing  training to individuals to improve their job opportunities, 3,585  individuals completed the training, which was 175 fewer than  expected due, in part, to the project’s focus on training individuals for  existing jobs and the scarcity of job opportunities for some individuals  who completed the training.

Agricultural Development: USAID and USDA implemented projects  that provided assistance to apply improved agricultural technologies  or management practices, and increase agricultural productivity and  food security. According to the PPRs we reviewed, USAID achieved  58 of 86 (67 percent) of its targets for performance indicators related  to this sector for fiscal years 2013 through 2018, and six of eight  evaluations of agricultural development projects generally reported  positive project results. For example, USAID reported in the PPR that  35,245 individuals in Honduras received short-term training with U.S.  government support on agricultural productivity or food security in  fiscal year 2018, exceeding the fiscal year target of 32,500, but  40,492 individuals received such training in Guatemala, which did not  meet the target of 52,417. According to an implementer progress  report, as of March 2017, an ongoing USDA school feeding project in  Honduras had helped to construct and rehabilitate kitchens and food  storage facilities at five of the 30 schools targeted by the project in  2017. An evaluation of a USDA project in El Salvador reported that  the project issued 307 agricultural loans to improve agricultural  production, which did not meet the target of 345 loans due, in part, to  a delay in implementing the project.

Good Government Service: USAID implemented projects to help  create accountable and effective government institutions through  improved provision of government services, increased citizen  oversight, and greater ethics and transparency. According to the  PPRs we reviewed, USAID achieved 22 of 30 (73 percent) of its  targets for performance indicators related to this sector for fiscal years  2013 through 2018. Some of the projects achieved mixed results,  according to an evaluation of projects in this sector. For example,  USAID in the PPRs reported that in Honduras it exceeded targets in  fiscal year 2018 by providing assistance to 94 local governments to  improve public service and by training over 2,600 individuals in  Guatemala in fiscal management to strengthen local government and  foster decentralization. USAID met the target for fiscal year 2018 by  having 81 public policies introduced, adopted, repealed, changed, or  implemented with citizen input in Honduras. A USAID project in  Guatemala designed to better manage public resources and  government services reported in its fiscal year 2017 annual report that  it helped 76 percent of the municipalities involved in the project  increase their average monthly revenues following the project’s  financial management training. However, an evaluation of two USAID  projects in Honduras found that one project did not meet 70 percent of  targets and struggled to successfully promote decentralization laws or  increase municipal fiscal autonomy.

Justice Reform: USAID and State provided technical assistance and  equipment to help improve the efficiency of the courts and forensic  laboratories, and strengthen the capabilities of prosecutors and  judges. According to the PPRs we reviewed, USAID achieved 27 of  41 (66 percent) of its targets for performance indicators related to this  sector for fiscal years 2013 through 2018. For example, according to  the PPRs, 2,298 government officials in El Salvador received anti- corruption training with U.S. assistance in fiscal year 2018, surpassing  the fiscal year target of 1,845. However, according to the PPRs, 150  individuals affiliated with nongovernmental organizations received  such anti-corruption training in Guatemala in fiscal year 2017, which  was below the fiscal year target of 550. The Progress Report for the  Strategy for fiscal year 2019 reported that USAID assisted 244 courts  in Guatemala to improve their case management systems in fiscal  year 2018, which surpassed the target of 220. The Progress Report  for the Strategy also reported that State and USAID trained 12,557  justice system personnel, including prosecutors and criminal  investigators, in the Northern Triangle in fiscal year 2018; which  surpassed the target of 2,275. Although State did not report targets, it  provided data in its annual INCSR on U.S.-supported trainings,  including training more than 1,000 police and justice sector personnel  in El Salvador in 2016 and 2017, and 262 students in criminal  investigations in Honduras in 2013. An evaluation of a USAID project  in Guatemala noted the project helped improve prosecution practices  and court management, but the evaluation also noted that continuous  support would be required to preserve and consolidate reforms.

Community Based Violence Prevention: USAID and State supported a  number of efforts under the security objective to prevent violence in  communities. According to the PPRs we reviewed, USAID achieved 7  of 18 (39 percent) of its targets for performance indicators related to  this sector for fiscal years 2013 through 2018. For example, in El  Salvador, 13 U.S. government-supported schools or other learning  spaces met the criteria for the safe schools program in fiscal year  2018, surpassing the target of 10 schools. However, according to the  PPR, in Honduras approximately 161,300 individuals participated in  U.S.-funded gang prevention and education in fiscal year 2018, which  did not meet the fiscal year target of 219,600. The Progress Report for  the Strategy for fiscal year 2018 reported that State’s Gang  Resistance Education and Training Program (GREAT) reached tens  of thousands of youth and hundreds of police officers received  instructor certifications to deliver anti-gang and crime prevention  training through the program in the Northern Triangle in fiscal year  2017. However, State did not report targets for the program for the  fiscal year. According to an implementer progress report, as of June  2018, an ongoing USAID project in Honduras that provides workforce  development services for at-risk youth, had enrolled 2,528 of the  project’s target of 6,500 youths for fiscal years 2017 and 2018. In  addition, 440 of the project’s target of 2,488 youths for those fiscal  years had completed the workforce development services as of June  2018, according to the report.

Professionalize the Military and Develop Defense Capabilities: DOD  and State supported efforts to professionalize the militaries of the  Northern Triangle countries and develop their defense capabilities.  While DOD and State reported positive output results for this sector,  they also reported some limitations. According to the PPRs we  reviewed, State achieved 48 of 71 (68 percent) of its targets for  performance indicators for this sector for fiscal years 2013 through  2018. For example, in fiscal year 2018, State reported that 100  military personnel in Guatemala received technical or tactical training,  which met the fiscal year target. State also reported that Guatemalan  military personnel completed 12 exercises with U.S. or coalition  personnel as a result of U.S. government assistance, which also met  the target for fiscal year 2018. However, State reported that it  supported the training of 44 fulltime peacekeeping staff in El Salvador  in fiscal year 2017, which did not meet the target of 155. In its  monitoring progress reports from fiscal years 2013 to 2018, DOD  reported that it provided international military education and training to  over 2,000 military personnel in the Northern Triangle, although DOD  did not report targets. DOD personnel also engaged directly with  Central American military personnel to improve their professionalism.  For example, in Guatemala, DOD helped to establish a defense  budget system designed to increase transparency and accountability  of funds within the Ministry of Defense. However, DOD has reported  ongoing challenges regarding the professionalism of Northern  Triangle militaries and noted that public trust in the militaries remains  low.

Limited Information Is Available on Progress toward Prosperity, Governance, and Security

Based on our review of various performance-related documents, we  found limited information on progress toward improving prosperity,  governance, and security in the Northern Triangle. Specifically, agencies  generally reported more information about progress toward prosperity  than toward governance and security. Some of the evidence about  governance and security may be limited because evaluations were  conducted unevenly across agencies and sectors. In addition, project  implementers did not consistently collect key information to assess  progress toward the Strategy’s objectives. Nevertheless, agency officials  cited examples of important results from U.S. assistance as well as  challenges to achieving progress toward the objectives. In addition, the  Strategy’s monitoring and evaluation plan is not comprehensive because,  while the plan specifies that State and USAID should track evaluations of  their projects, it does not include a plan for evaluations of projects  conducted by agencies other than State or USAID.

Agencies Reported More Information on Progress toward Prosperity than toward Governance and Security for the Sectors We Reviewed

For the sectors we reviewed, agencies generally reported more  information on progress toward prosperity for projects related to economic  growth and agricultural development, than toward governance and  security. In addition, agencies generally reported positive information on  progress toward prosperity for projects related to these sectors. For  example, an evaluation of a USAID economic growth project in  Guatemala reported the project supported 64 public-private partnerships  that managed $39.1 million in investment, primarily from the business  sector, for health, nutrition, and education activities to improve economic  growth and development. In addition, USAID reported in the PPR that  small and medium-sized firms assisted by its projects in El Salvador  increased annual sales by approximately 40 percent in fiscal year 2016,  which exceeded the target of 29 percent. In Guatemala, USAID also  helped to increase crop yields by about $62 million and reduced  household poverty by about 12.6 percent through two projects that trained  agricultural producers in farm management practices and helped them  access markets, according to an evaluation. Finally, an evaluation of a  USDA agricultural development project in El Salvador reported that it  helped generate approximately 12,930 new jobs, significantly exceeding  the project’s goal of 900 jobs, in part, through increased access to credit  and credit competency training.

In general, however, little information was available from agency reports  about progress toward the governance and security objectives. For  example, an evaluation of a USAID project in good government service in  Honduras that provided technical assistance to local governments to  improve citizen satisfaction with services reported improvements in the  quality of water and health services in most of the targeted municipalities,  although the evaluation noted that the project had not developed  appropriate indicators to measure results that were directly attributable to  the project’s activities. Despite these improvements, the evaluation  reported that the services remained largely unable to satisfy citizen needs  adequately, and there was little evidence that municipalities would have  the capabilities or resources to continue to improve the services without  donor assistance. The evaluation also noted that the project promoted  citizen advocacy by providing training to citizen oversight committees and  establishing well-attended town halls in rural municipalities. However, it  found no evidence such efforts were effective because the organizations  remained too weak to advocate effectively for improved accountability  and service.

Another evaluation of a USAID project to prevent community based  violence in Honduras reported significant reductions in homicide rates,  ranging from 42 percent to 68 percent, in four of the six targeted  communities, but also noted that these outcomes might not be  attributable to the project’s activities. Although there were no evaluations  of projects in the sector for professionalize the military and develop  defense capabilities, DOD reported in its after action reports that it trained  dozens of personnel who subsequently held positions of prominence  within Northern Triangle militaries.

The differences in results information for the three objectives are likely  due, in part, to variations in the number of evaluations agencies  conducted for their Northern Triangle projects. For example, we found  that evaluations had been conducted unevenly across the agencies and  six sectors we reviewed. Figure 9 shows the number of projects and  completed evaluations of projects in the Northern Triangle that support  the Strategy by agency and selected sector from fiscal years 2013  through 2018.

From fiscal years 2013 through 2018, agencies completed 23 evaluations  across the six sectors, which related to the 190 projects that agencies  implemented in these sectors during this period. USAID completed 16 of  these evaluations, with more than half of them in economic growth,  although only 19 of the 116 projects USAID implemented in the sectors  we reviewed related to economic growth. USDA completed six of these  evaluations in agricultural development. State completed one evaluation  in justice reform. DOD did not conduct any evaluations of its efforts to  professionalize the military and develop defense capabilities in the  Northern Triangle. In January 2017, DOD established agency-wide  guidance for conducting assessment, monitoring, and evaluation of  security cooperation programs and activities.

Project Implementers Did Not Consistently Collect Key Information to Assess Progress toward the Strategy’s Objectives, but Officials Noted Improvements

We found that project implementers for State and USAID did not  consistently collect key information to evaluate progress towards  outcomes. Specifically, 12 of the 23 evaluations we reviewed from fiscal  years 2013 through 2018 cited instances in which projects had not  established measures or collected data to measure outcomes.

Six of the 17 evaluations we reviewed for the sectors for economic growth  and agricultural development noted that implementers had not collected  sufficient data to measure the projects’ outcomes. For example, an  evaluation of a USAID project that supported municipalities to mobilize  financial resources for economic development noted that evaluators were  unable to measure whether the project’s activities improved the  municipalities’ competitiveness in providing services to businesses and  investors. The evaluators could not perform this assessment because the  project implementers did not consistently collect data to measure  improvements in the local business climate. An evaluation of USAID  projects in agricultural development in Guatemala noted that evaluators  were unable to assess the total welfare impacts of the projects, such as  changes in household incomes, because the projects had not collected  information on household or farmer incomes from all sources with which  to compare results following project activities.

All four evaluations we reviewed in the sectors for good government  service and justice reform noted that the projects did not sufficiently  establish or measure the projects’ outcomes. For example, an evaluation  of two USAID projects in Honduras for good government service found  that one project did not incorporate indicators to measure outcomes.  While the other project incorporated outcome indicators, the evaluation  found most of these indicators to be poorly defined and inadequate to  measure the project’s results. An evaluation of a State project in justice  reform in Honduras also found that project indicators were focused on  outputs and not outcomes. The evaluation also noted that the indicators  were established after the project started and thus did not establish a true  baseline or capture results from the beginning. As a result, evaluators  reported that they lacked the data to evaluate key results.

The two evaluations of projects to prevent community based violence we  reviewed discussed deficiencies with progress indicators. For example,  an evaluation of a project in Honduras that focused on reducing homicide  rates noted that the implementing partner relied on the Honduran  government to obtain data on homicides, although the government had  limited capability to document and report such data.

USAID officials noted that USAID and project implementers have made  improvements to projects’ monitoring and evaluation plans in response to  evaluation findings. For example, project implementers have added  outcome indicators and USAID officials have provided technical  assistance to implementers to help them design new methods for  collecting data in response to evaluation findings and recommendations,  according to USAID officials.

Agency Officials Described Progress and Challenges in Achieving Prosperity, Governance, and Security

Although our review of various performance-related documents related to  the six sectors show that limited information from evaluations is available  on progress toward prosperity, governance, and security, agency officials  described some important results from U.S. assistance in the Northern  Triangle related to these sectors. For example, USDA officials noted that  technical assistance and training helped to enhance crop research and  water and soil conservation, which contributed to increased agricultural  production. USAID officials noted that the technical assistance the agency  has provided to small and medium sized firms has helped them access  markets and increase sales. State and USAID officials also described  improvements in the use of forensic evidence through technical  assistance and training provided to judges and prosecutors and  enhanced court management, which contributed to timely criminal  investigations and prosecutions. In addition, State officials explained that  U.S. assistance along with support from other donors and host  governments has contributed to positive results, including the passage of  laws that prevent organized crime from donating to political campaigns,  multiple anti-corruption investigations, as well as reductions in homicide  rates through community based violence prevention projects.  Furthermore, DOD officials noted that assistance in defense planning and  management helped support oversight and accountability in the use of  military funds and enhanced the capacity of security forces to respond to  disaster relief and drug interdiction efforts.

Agency officials also noted that from fiscal years 2013 through 2018 they  achieved results toward enhanced prosperity, governance, and security  for the 180 projects that corresponded to the 12 sectors outside of the  scope of our review. In particular, USAID officials noted that environment  sector projects increased incomes for thousands of individuals through  improved management and conservation of natural resources, such as  watershed management. State officials also described important results  from projects in the human rights sector, including strengthening the  capacity of labor union networks to monitor and document hundreds of  incidents of violence against union activists in Guatemala and Honduras  and increasing the number of investigations into such incidents. In  addition, State officials identified results in the police reform sector,  including passage of police reform legislation, professionalization of  police academies, and sharing of information among law enforcement.

Agency officials we interviewed also cited examples of challenges to  achieving progress toward prosperity, governance, and security. For  example, USDA and USAID officials noted that drought and coffee rust— a fungal disease that harms coffee plants—reduced agricultural  production in affected areas. USAID officials also pointed out that the  health of the economy and labor markets affect the results of economic  growth projects, particularly with regard to firms’ sales and the placement  of individuals in jobs following their completion of workforce development  programs. In addition, State and USAID officials cited the importance of  government officials’ willingness to implement reforms as an important  factor that affects the achievement of results across sectors. Furthermore,  high turnover of civil service and military professionals affects the  achievement and sustainability of results in various sectors, according to  State, USAID, and DOD officials. Agency officials also explained that they  have taken steps to modify projects to address such challenges. For  example, USAID and USDA projects have provided technical assistance  and training to farmers on how to prevent coffee rust and cultivate coffee  varietals resistant to the disease.

Strategy’s Monitoring and Evaluation Plan Is Not Comprehensive

In its coordinating role for the implementation of the Strategy, State has  not created a comprehensive monitoring and evaluation plan that  specifies an approach to evaluating progress across all agencies. Our  prior work regarding effective foreign assistance strategies found that  development of a monitoring and evaluation plan is a key element in  terms of assessing agencies’ common goals and objectives, and mutually  reinforcing results. Additionally, we found that foreign assistance  involves the collaborative efforts of multiple agencies, and strategies that  consistently address agencies’ roles and responsibilities and include  interagency coordination mechanisms can guide effective collaboration  among agencies and prevent fragmentation. In addition, Standards for  Internal Control in the Federal Government indicates that managers  should identify the information needed to achieve objectives and use such  information to evaluate performance in achieving objectives.

State, in coordination with USAID, has developed and updated a  monitoring and evaluation plan for funds appropriated to them to  implement the Strategy in response to direction contained in committee  reports accompanying several State, Foreign Operations, and Related  Programs appropriations acts. However, the plan that State and USAID  developed for the Strategy, while consistent with the committee reports’  direction, is not comprehensive. In particular, it does not incorporate all  the relevant agencies, sectors, and activities that support the Strategy’s  objectives. The plan notes that State and USAID will monitor and  evaluate foreign assistance supporting the Strategy. While the plan  specifies that State and USAID should track completed, ongoing, and  planned evaluations of their projects supporting the Strategy’s objectives,  it does not include a plan for evaluations of projects conducted by  agencies other than State or USAID, such as DOD and USDA.  Additionally, the plan notes that each agency requires project monitoring,  including progress indicators, baselines, targets, and expected outcomes  of projects. The plan specifies that State will compile and report  performance data, which will provide an important source of information  to assess progress toward Strategy objectives. However, the plan does  not specify how State and USAID would include reporting on many  activities conducted by other agencies that support the Strategy’s  objectives.

As a result, State officials noted the monitoring and evaluation plan does  not include indicators for DOD and USDA activities that contribute to the  objectives of the Strategy, with the exception of DOD activities funded  through State. For example, State, in addition to determining the scope of  security assistance and funding level for each recipient of International  Military Education and Training (IMET) programs, also identifies annual  IMET goals and objectives for each country. DOD administers IMET in  coordination with State. State and USAID’s monitoring and evaluation  plan includes indicators to measure progress of these programs.

DOD, however, conducts a number of other programs to professionalize  the military that State and USAID have not included in the monitoring and  evaluation plan. For example, DOD provides training to Northern Triangle  militaries and Ministries of Defense that is outside of the IMET program,  such as Defense Government Management and Training engagements.  The Progress Report for the Strategy for fiscal year 2018 indicated that  under the IMET program there were 13 U.S.-trained personnel in  positions of prominence, or positions of military or government leadership,  in the Northern Triangle in fiscal year 2017. DOD, though, in a separate  report on these military training and education programs, noted there  were over 100 U.S.-trained personnel in positions of prominence in the  Northern Triangle in fiscal year 2017. In addition, the monitoring and  evaluation plan does not include any of USDA’s activities or activities  related to the health sector that support the Strategy’s objectives, despite  the fact USDA completed six evaluations of its agricultural development  projects that could be used to inform an understanding of progress toward  the Strategy’s objectives. By not capturing information on DOD and  USDA activities, State and USAID have limited ability to assess the  progress made by all U.S. government agencies in the Northern Triangle.

State officials stated that the monitoring and evaluation plan is not  inclusive of DOD and USDA activities because the legislative direction for  the plan did not require it. The Strategy, however, intends to take a  comprehensive, integrated, and whole of government approach to  engagement in Central America. DOD and USDA officials in headquarters  and at the Missions in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras told us that  their activities also support the Strategy’s objectives.

Given its coordinating role in the Strategy’s implementation and in foreign  policy objectives in general, State is well positioned to work  collaboratively with officials from other agencies to develop a  comprehensive approach to monitoring the impact of all activities across  all sectors that directly support the Strategy’s objectives. A  comprehensive monitoring and evaluation plan that specifies an approach  to evaluating progress across all agencies would help State and USAID to  determine to what extent U.S. government activities in the Northern  Triangle are achieving the Strategy’s desired results.

The Northern Triangle, an area of strategic interest to the United States,  faces high levels of poverty, weak governance, and widespread violence  and insecurity. To respond to these challenges, the U.S. government has  for many years provided assistance to the region. Multiple agencies have  allocated billions of dollars to implement hundreds of projects that have  provided technical assistance, equipment, and training to thousands of  individuals and organizations. Agencies have reported mixed results from  these projects, relative to targets set, yet little is known about progress on  meeting broader objectives to improve prosperity, governance, and  security in the region. Under the U.S. Strategy for Engagement in Central  America, State and USAID developed a monitoring and evaluation plan,  for their own projects, that is an important tool for assessing impact in the  region. A more comprehensive approach to monitoring and evaluation of  projects that may address the Strategy’s objectives to include all relevant  agencies, sectors, and activities would enable the U.S. government to  have a better understanding of progress under the Strategy and how U.S.  assistance is addressing the underlying challenges that confront El  Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras. Given State’s coordinating role in  the implementation of the Strategy among U.S. government agencies,  including DOD and USDA, it is uniquely positioned to ensure that  agencies collaborate effectively and that monitoring and evaluation are  well coordinated and documented in a comprehensive plan.

The Secretary of State, working with the Administrator of the U.S. Agency  for International Development, should collaborate with the Departments of  Defense and Agriculture and other Departments as necessary, to develop  a comprehensive approach to the monitoring and evaluation of projects  that directly support the objectives of prosperity, governance, and  security, and incorporate this approach into the Strategy monitoring and  evaluation plan.

We provided a draft of this report to State, USAID, DOD, USDA, DOJ,  and DHS. We received written comments from State, USAID, and DOD,  which we reprinted in appendixes V through VII. We received technical  comments from State, USAID, DOD, and DHS, which we incorporated as  appropriate. USDA and DOJ informed us in writing that they had no  comments.

State and USAID did not concur with our recommendations, indicating  that neither agency has the authority to direct DOD or USDA to design  and implement programs. USAID indicated that while greater interagency  coordination would be appropriate, it does not have the authority to direct  DOD or USDA to monitor and evaluate their projects against objectives  developed for the Strategy. DOD noted that while some of its programs  enable progress toward the Strategy’s objectives, it is not appropriate for  State to specify how to monitor and evaluate DOD-funded programs.  State also asserted that our recommendation is not consistent with the  explanatory statements accompanying the Department of State, Foreign  Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, which directs  State and USAID to develop a monitoring and evaluation plan for the  Strategy for programs funded by appropriations to them, but does not  direct that the plan include monitoring and evaluation of programs funded  by appropriations to DOD and USDA.

We are not recommending that State and USAID direct DOD and USDA  to monitor and evaluate projects, but rather that State collaborate with  DOD and USDA to develop a more comprehensive approach to  monitoring and evaluating projects that support the Strategy’s objectives  and that State document the results of this collaboration in the Strategy’s  monitoring and evaluation plan. We do not prescribe the format or content  for how the Strategy’s monitoring and evaluation plan might be updated.

We have modified relevant sections of our report and our  recommendation to make this clearer and eliminated the recommendation  to USAID, since State coordinates implementation of the Strategy by the  various agencies of the U.S. government. We found that DOD and USDA  have designed and implemented programs that directly support the  objectives of the Strategy. While we acknowledge that some coordination  among agencies occurs in Washington and in the Northern Triangle, we  found that such coordination does not formally extend to monitoring and  evaluation. We agree with USAID’s comment that interagency  coordination on a comprehensive monitoring and evaluation plan for the  Strategy would be appropriate. Consistent with USAID’s comment, we  believe that our recommendation encourages greater coordination among  agencies, including DOD and USDA, by ensuring that comprehensive  monitoring and evaluation efforts of the entire U.S. government are in  sync with the monitoring and evaluation plan for the Strategy. Excluding  DOD and USDA projects from the monitoring and evaluation plan for the  Strategy could result in an incomplete or unclear understanding of the  results of U.S. assistance in the Northern Triangle. Without a complete  and clear understanding of the results across all agencies involved,  agencies may miss important lessons about the types of assistance that  are most effective in achieving U.S. objectives in this region, potentially  limiting overall progress. Furthermore, while the explanatory statement  accompanying Pub. L. No. 114-113 directs State, in coordination with  USAID, to develop a monitoring and evaluation plan for funds  appropriated to them, we are recommending that State, as coordinator for  the implementation of the Strategy, work with the other agencies to  develop a more comprehensive approach to monitoring and evaluating  projects that support the Strategy’s objectives. State should update the  monitoring and evaluation plan that was created in response to the  congressional direction to document the comprehensive approach to  monitoring and evaluation.

State indicated that the credibility of our report was limited by the  following five methodological issues: (1) our inclusion of projects  implemented by DOD and USDA; (2) our inclusion of projects  implemented with funds appropriated prior to fiscal year 2016; (3) our use  of inconsistent reporting methods for funding allocations among the four  State bureaus providing data and among State, USAID, DOD, and USDA;  (4) our classification of program sectors, which was not consistent with  the sub-objectives used by State and USAID as part of the Strategy; and  (5) our exclusion of several “primary” sectors for our in-depth review, such  as police professionalization, reducing violence at the local level, and  reducing the influence of organized crime and gangs.

We believe that our methodology enhanced the credibility and reliability of  our report. Overall, we designed our objectives, scope, and methodology,  as outlined in detail in appendix I, to provide a reasonably comprehensive  review of the results of U.S. assistance to the Northern Triangle toward  achieving key U.S. objectives.

First, we chose to review all agencies that have allocated a  significant amount of funding from their appropriations to  implement projects in the Northern Triangle from fiscal year 2013  through fiscal year 2018 to support prosperity, governance, and  security. DOD and USDA officials confirmed that DOD and USDA  projects support these objectives and we believe that the inclusion  of these agencies significantly enhanced the accuracy and  completeness of our reporting on the results that have been  achieved from U.S. assistance as well as the gaps in the current  monitoring and evaluation approach and implications for State’s  ability to assess results comprehensively.

Second, we believe our inclusion of projects implemented from  fiscal years 2013 through 2018 provided a reasonable time frame  for our review because it included projects that supported the  objectives of improving prosperity, governance, and security— long standing objectives that predated appropriations for the  Strategy, and even the Strategy itself. Including projects  implemented between fiscal years 2013 and 2018 increased our  ability to report on the results of agencies’ projects and their  overall progress toward the Strategy’s objectives because projects  funded since fiscal year 2016 were in too early a stage of  implementation to report meaningfully on such results. However,  we considered, as appropriate, any results information we were  able to obtain on such projects.

Third, we acknowledge that the precision of our estimates for  reporting on funding allocations was limited due to the inconsistent  nature of reporting of financial data by different bureaus and  agencies. However, taking into consideration qualifications noted  throughout our report, we believe that our reporting of funding  allocations provides a reliable description of how agencies used  allocated funding to support prosperity, governance, and security  objectives.

Fourth, we believe that our classification of projects under different  sectors we identified provides a detailed, comprehensive, and  meaningful analysis of projects and related results. Because some  of the sub-objectives developed by State and USAID, such as  “reduce poverty,” were very broad and did not lend themselves to  an analysis of specific project sectors that supported the  Strategy’s objectives, we identified more specific sectors,  including health, economic growth, and agricultural development.  State and USAID officials validated the accuracy of our definitions,  and we revised them as appropriate, given input from agency  officials.

Fifth, our selection of six sectors for in-depth review of projects  and results limits the generalizability of our findings to all sectors,  which we note. Due to the large number of projects, sectors, and  sub-objectives associated with U.S. assistance to the Northern  Triangle, we determined that a case study approach was the most  effective methodology for our review. We devised selection criteria  to reflect a meaningful selection of projects across sectors,  agencies, and countries. Moreover, two of the sectors we selected  for in-depth review—community based violence prevention, and  justice reform—encompass several projects classified as relating  to “reducing violence at the local level,” and “reducing the  influence of organized crime and gangs.” Thus our report  addresses results in these sectors. We omitted certain sectors,  such as police professionalization, in part, because we had  ongoing work related to this sector. We acknowledge limitations  with this case study approach and do not attempt to generalize  results beyond the sectors we reviewed. We believe that this  methodological approach provides a reasonable basis for our  overall conclusion that projects in the sectors we reviewed  achieved mixed results.

USAID also raised several methodological concerns, some of which were  similar to those raised by State. In particular, USAID (1) questioned the  validity of our analysis, since it was based on a case study of six of the 18  sectors we identified, and commented that we did not discuss the  limitation of this approach; (2) questioned the validity of our use of  monitoring information relating to the achievement of annual targets to  analyze results; and (3) asserted that we focused on negative evaluation  findings to assess results and did not mention or analyze planned and  ongoing evaluations or programmatic changes made in response to  monitoring and evaluation information.

We believe our methodological approach provides a reliable basis for our  findings and conclusions, and concerns USAID raised do not limit the  credibility of our report.

First, we acknowledge the limitations of our case study approach  and included statements throughout our report to make these  limitations clear.

Second, we believe that the use of data on the achievement of  annual targets is a valid approach to assessing results, although  the agencies collecting the data may also intend to use it in  making decisions about ongoing projects. Furthermore, these data  provided only one element of our analysis. We also analyzed  State and USAID implementer progress reports, mid-point and  final evaluations, and other performance reports, which provide a  longer-term perspective on results. Collectively, we believe that  this information provides meaningful insight into the successes  and shortcomings of the projects in the sectors we reviewed.

Third, we sought to present a balanced picture of results within the  sectors we reviewed, highlighting both positive and negative  outcomes described in the reviewed documents. We reviewed  completed evaluations to provide insight into project results, but  excluded ongoing and planned evaluations because conclusions  about project results are not available until such evaluations are  completed. Similarly, our report acknowledges that agency  officials described progress and challenges to achieving the  prosperity, governance, and security objectives, as well as the  steps taken to modify projects to address such challenges.  However, such modifications fell outside the scope of our analysis  of results, absent documentation of their specific impact on the  achievement of objectives.

As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents of  this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days from the  report date. At that time, we will send copies to the appropriate  congressional committees, the Secretary of the Department of State, the  Administrator of the U.S. Agency for International Development, the  Secretary of the Department of Defense, the Secretary of the Department  of Agriculture, the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security, the  Attorney General, and other interested parties. In addition, the report is  available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov.

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact  me at (202) 512-7141 or groverj@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices  of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last  page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this report  are listed in appendix VIII.

This report examines (1) the projects that the U.S. government has  implemented in the Northern Triangle from fiscal year 2013 through fiscal  year 2018 to support prosperity, governance, security, (2) what is known  about the results of these projects, and (3) what is known about progress  toward the U.S. Strategy for Central America’s (Strategy) objectives.

To determine the projects that the U.S. government has implemented in  the Northern Triangle, we collected and analyzed agency project and  funding data concerning foreign assistance projects supporting prosperity,  governance, and security objectives from the U .S. Agency for  International Development (USAID), and the Departments of State  (State), Justice (DOJ), Homeland Security (DHS), Defense (DOD), and  Agriculture (USDA). We focused our analysis on State, USAID, DOD, and  USDA because they allocated the largest amounts of funding for the  largest number of projects in the Northern Triangle from fiscal years 2013  through 2018. We included projects from fiscal years 2013 to ensure we  examined projects that had undergone sufficient implementation to  assess results.  We obtained the data and information from several  bureaus at State that administer these projects and funds: International  Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs; Western Hemisphere Affairs;  Political-Military Affairs; and Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor. We  also obtained data from DHS and DOJ concerning projects implemented  through agreements with State, which we included under State’s project  and funding counts.

Although agencies use different terms to describe agencies’ assistance,  including programs, projects, and activities, we use the term “projects” to  refer to assistance funded by the key agencies that are implemented  directly by the agencies or through awards made to the implementing  partners. In general, the term project consists of a set of activities that are  designed and executed over a time frame to achieve a specific aim. While  agencies and bureaus typically provided us with project-level data, some  agencies and bureaus were unable to report data at the project level, and  instead provided us with data that combined multiple activities or awards  to implementing partners to accomplish a broader aim. In addition, most  agencies reported project and funding data by country, including  separating funding data for multi-country projects that were implemented  in two or more countries, including at least one Northern Triangle country.  Some agencies were not able to report multi-country projects by country,  which we included in the multi-country project category. Since most  agencies and bureaus provided us with project-level data separated by  country, we use the term “projects” to encompass all available data on  agencies’ assistance in each of the three countries.

We analyzed agencies’ data and information to identify the number of  projects implemented by agency and country and the total funding  agencies allocated for these projects from fiscal years 2013 through  2018. We excluded from our analysis those projects that encompassed  solely administrative and monitoring and evaluation activities and costs  that did not provide technical assistance, although we included the funds  allocated for these projects in our analysis of funds allocated by each  agency for projects that supported prosperity, governance, and security.

We assessed the reliability of the data that agencies reported for these  projects. We requested and reviewed information from agency officials  regarding the underlying data systems and the checks and reviews used  to generate the data and ensure its accuracy and reliability. We also  conducted logical checks and analysis to confirm the accuracy of the  data. When we found potential duplicate data and discrepancies, we  contacted relevant agency officials in Washington, D.C. and obtained  information from them necessary to resolve these data issues. As a result  of these steps, we determined that the data were sufficiently reliable for  the purposes of reporting the number of projects that supported  prosperity, governance, and security in El Salvador, Guatemala, and  Honduras and funding allocations for these projects from fiscal years  2013 through 2018.

To select a subset of the projects to review, we reviewed agencies’  project information as well as Strategy documents to categorize all  projects into 18 different sectors of assistance that generally aligned with  the current objectives of the Strategy. Specifically, we grouped similar  projects by sector such as economic growth, justice reform, and  community based violence prevention, and aligned them according to the  Strategy’s three objectives of prosperity, governance, and security. We  requested that officials from State, USAID, DOD, and USDA review our  analysis to confirm our alignment of projects to the sectors and the three  objectives. We incorporated revisions from agency officials as  appropriate. We then selected a judgmental, nongeneralizable sample of  six of the 18 sectors for an in-depth review of performance-related  documentation for projects supporting each of the objectives. The six  sectors selected included agricultural development, economic growth,  good government service, justice reform, community based violence  prevention, and professionalize the military and develop defense  capabilities. We selected these six sectors to achieve variation by  agency, funding allocation amount, country, and to include projects  supporting each of the three objectives. Specifically, we selected the six  sectors to include two sectors supporting each objective, a distribution of  projects across the three Northern Triangle countries, and the largest  amounts of allocated funding and number of projects. We excluded from  our sample selection the migration and police reform sectors because of  our ongoing work in those sectors concerning the Northern Triangle.

To determine what is known about project results, we reviewed agency  performance-related documents corresponding to the 190 projects  implemented from fiscal years 2013 through 2018 in the six sectors we  reviewed. Specifically, we examined State and USAID’s Performance  Plans and Reports for El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras for each of  fiscal years 2013 through 2018; State’s International Narcotics Control  Strategy Reports for fiscal years 2013 through 2018; State and USAID’s  Progress Report for the U.S. Strategy for Central America’s Plan for  Monitoring and Evaluation for fiscal years 2018 and 2019; and State’s  quarterly country cables reporting on agencies’ progress in implementing  projects in support of prosperity, governance, and security objectives in  each of the Northern Triangle countries for the available quarters of fiscal  years 2016 through 2018. We also requested and reviewed all 23  evaluations completed from fiscal years 2013 through 2018 by State,  USAID, and USDA related to the six selected sectors in each Northern  Triangle country. In addition, we selected a nongeneralizable sample of  19 projects within the six selected sectors to gain more in-depth  information and context about project implementation and results. For the  nongeneralizable sample of projects, we reviewed performance-related  documentation, including, among other things, implementing partners’  quarterly, semi-annual, and annual progress reports, to examine project  results. We selected the19 projects based on a variety of criteria,  including the types of project activities and the objectives they supported,  as well as to obtain a range of funding allocation amounts, countries, and  agencies. We excluded from our sample selection those projects that  encompassed solely administrative and monitoring and evaluation  activities and costs, and those that agencies reported as pilot projects not  yet implemented.

To examine what is known about progress toward the Strategy’s  objectives, we reviewed Strategy documents, including monitoring and  evaluation plans, to assess if they included key elements of effective  strategies that we have identified as related to assessment of progress  toward strategic goals. We developed these elements on the basis of  prior work related to U.S. government strategies and interagency  collaboration as well as prior work on addressing fragmentation, overlap,  and duplication in the federal government. Our prior work suggests that  strategic documents offer an opportunity to consider the roles and  responsibilities of various stakeholders involved in achieving those goals,  and information on how progress toward those goals will be measured.  The Strategy documents were reviewed and rated by two analysts to  determine the extent the planning and reporting procedures aligned with  the key elements for foreign assistance strategies in situations where  multiple agencies work together to deliver foreign assistance. These  elements related to (1) delineation of agencies’ roles and responsibilities  and coordination mechanisms; and (2) assessment of progress toward  strategic goals, including identifying activities to achieve results,  performance indicators, and monitoring and evaluation plans.  Additionally, in assessing the monitoring and evaluation plan, we considered the Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government,  which specify that managers should identify the information needed to  achieve objectives and use such information to evaluate performance in  achieving objectives.

To determine State and USAID’s rationale for not including other  agencies’ activities that support the objectives of the Strategy, we met  with State and USAID officials in Washington, D.C. We also reviewed  relevant Strategy documents and Congressional legislation, particularly  Public Law 115-31, 131, the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2017,  which State and USAID cited as the basis for the creation of the  Strategy’s results architecture and monitoring and evaluation plan.

To support our work on all three objectives, we conducted fieldwork in El  Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras. During the fieldwork, we observed  selected project activities, and interviewed agency officials, implementing  partners, and project beneficiaries about the project activities and results,  and factors that affected project results. We also interviewed agency  officials in Washington, D.C. from relevant State bureaus, USAID, DOD,  and USDA Foreign Agricultural Service as well as officials of the U.S.  Southern Command in Doral, Florida about project activities, project  results, factors affecting results and actions to address these factors, as  well as efforts to monitor and evaluate project results.

We conducted this performance audit from December 2017 to September  2019 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing  standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to  obtain sufficient, appropriate, evidence to provide a reasonable basis for  our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe  that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings  and conclusions based on our audit objectives.

Appendix II: Summary of U.S. Assistance to the Northern Triangle for Selected Sectors, Fiscal Years 2013 through 2018

This appendix provides a summary of information on U.S. Agency for  International Development (USAID), and the Departments of State  (State), Defense (DOD), and Agriculture (USDA) assistance projects in  the three Northern Triangle countries—El Salvador, Guatemala, and  Honduras—to support the prosperity, governance, and security objectives  of the U.S. Strategy for Central America (Strategy) from fiscal years 2013  through 2018.

We provide a summary of information for the following sectors we  selected by country, agency, funding allocation amount, and objective of  the Strategy. The sectors include economic growth, agricultural  development, good government service, justice reform, community based  violence prevention, and professionalize the military and develop defense  capabilities. For each sector, we provide an overview and examples of  projects, including project objectives, activities, and results that State,  USAID, DOD, and USDA reported toward improving prosperity,  governance, and security in the Northern Triangle.

The information about each sector also includes the following data,  selected to illustrate the scope of U.S. assistance in each sector and the  underlying conditions that impact prosperity, governance, and security in  the Northern Triangle:

Total number of projects: The total number of projects we identified  that supported each sector in each country from fiscal years 2013  through 2018.

Approximate Reported Funding: An estimate of the total allocated  funding reported for the projects in each sector.

Context Indicators: Data reported from various organizations relevant  to each of the sectors, including the World Bank, and reported in State  and USAID’s Progress Report for the Strategy for fiscal years 2018  and 2019. We did not independently verify these reported data.

Economic growth projects are intended to assist populations living  below the poverty line meet basic needs, help businesses improve  their business practices and access markets and investment, and  promote workforce development. USAID and State implemented 26  economic growth projects in the Northern Triangle from fiscal years  2013 through 2018.

Selected Examples of Economic Growth Projects

industries and higher education institutions to develop educational  programs and research. The project trained 100 researchers at  universities on how to complete applied research studies on the  economy. This training, along with 26 applied research studies funded  by the project, allowed for collaborative research between academia  and the private sector that had not previously existed in El Salvador.  The project also upgraded or created 28 new degree programs to  align with industry demands. The project awarded 900 scholarships to  students enrolled in these degree programs.

A USAID project in Honduras provided assistance to rural micro- enterprises to improve their access to markets and competitiveness.  The project helped 2,270 of these enterprises adopt new inputs,  technologies, and practices for a range of entrepreneurial activities,  such as installing solar panels and cultivating organically grown  coffee, according to an evaluation. It also helped micro-enterprises  achieve certifications from trade and business associations to help  them access new markets with higher quality standards to obtain  better prices for products, such as high quality chocolate.

A USAID project in El Salvador encouraged public-private  partnerships and provided funds to help municipalities mobilize  financial resources for improving economic development. It also  intended to help municipalities streamline their administrative  procedures to improve the local business climate. The streamlined  procedures reduced the time required to complete business  processes and diminished the chances for bribery and other illegal  practices, according to an evaluation.

A USAID project in El Salvador targeted over 10,000 micro- enterprises and 20 local governments to strengthen the capacity of  providers of business development services to help these micro- enterprises improve innovation and technology, access financing, and  increase exports. According to an implementer progress report, the  project provided trade capacity building assistance to at least 369  micro-enterprises to help them export. It also trained at least 491  entrepreneurs and 14 business consultants to develop export  opportunities.

A USAID project in El Salvador offered assistance to help workers  obtain employment. It provided training to more than 5,600  individuals, including at-risk youth and disabled persons, to improve  their job placement opportunities, according to an evaluation. The  project also placed 4,886 participants in new or improved jobs. The  evaluation also noted that the firms participating in the project  reported that the project’s methods reduced their recruiting and hiring  costs and risks and contributed to a decrease in employee turnover.

A USAID project in Honduras installed  irrigation systems to grow lettuce and other  crops.

Agricultural development projects are intended to assist farmers to  increase the quantity and quality of crops through training, research,  and better access to capital. They also sought to assist farmers to  gain access to markets and address food security. USAID and USDA  implemented 40 agricultural development projects in the Northern  Triangle from fiscal years 2013 through 2018.

Selected Examples of Agricultural Development Projects

Rural Population  (Approximate percent of total population,  2017)

Rural Poverty  (Approximate percent of rural population,  2014) productivity and expand trade. The project provided training to more  than 500 individuals, approximately 99 percent of whom reported  using the lessons they learned to improve their farm management  practices, according to an evaluation. In addition, approximately 97  percent of them reported that they made business decisions based on  economic considerations or analysis following the training. The project  provided 35,215 microfinance loans, valued at approximately $37.5  million. Approximately 82 percent of the beneficiaries reported an  increase in agricultural production and approximately 88 percent  reported an increase in business sales because of the loans,  according to an evaluation. Although the evaluation noted that the  loans had the potential to expand agricultural trade, the effects were  mixed.

A USDA project in Guatemala that provided school meals doubled the  number of schools that reported having access to food in six  municipalities and provided more than 40,400 school-age children   with daily meals, according to an evaluation. The evaluation also  reported that the reduction in hunger from the project contributed to a  decline in absentee rates for students at the participating schools,  from 20 percent before its implementation to 5 percent. The project  also constructed or rehabilitated kitchens at 106 schools and provided  utensils and equipment for preparing food.

A USDA school feeding project in Honduras provided meals to more  than 50,000 children in 1,047 schools. The project also conducted  education campaigns using local media to inform the population about  the importance of education and the steps for enrolling children in  school. Following the project’s implementation, school attendance for  boys increased by approximately 6 percent and for girls by  approximately 2 percent, according to an evaluation.

USAID projects in Guatemala that aimed to help small farmers  improve their farming practices and gain access to markets had mixed  results. For example, the evaluation noted that per capita incomes or  household incomes of municipalities included in the projects fared  worse than municipalities that were not. However, municipalities  included in the projects fared better in access to electricity and rates  of home ownership.

Municipal watershed reforestation project in  Guatemala supported by USAID.

Good government service projects are intended to increase the  effectiveness, efficiency, accountability, and transparency of  government services and institutions. They do so by providing training  and technical assistance to improve revenue collection and  management, promote transparency and citizen oversight, and  enhance the quality of government services. USAID funded 29 good  government service projects from fiscal years 2013 through 2018.

Selected Examples of Good Government Service Projects

Government effectiveness (est.):  (Percentage points changed 2013 to  2017) government services to better respond to citizen needs. An evaluation  noted that the project helped draft stronger decentralization laws, but  these were not passed due to lack of political will. The evaluation also  reported the project provided technical assistance and training to  municipal governments on revenue collection, fiscal management,  and financial software systems intended to help raise revenue.  However, the evaluation also found that 39 percent of municipalities  reported decreases in fiscal autonomy. The evaluation also cited  resource constraints, data inconsistencies in income records, and  concerns about the sustainability of the training.

A USAID project in Guatemala sought to strengthen select  municipalities to better manage public resources and deliver services  in a efficient and transparent manner in order to foster development.  According to the project’s 2017 annual report, 76 percent of the target  municipalities increased their average monthly revenues by 19  percent following finance management trainings.

A USAID project in El Salvador aimed to improve government  transparency and accountability. It did so by supporting citizen  oversight and government compliance with regulations and standards  related to transparency, professionalism, and ethics. According to a  2018 implementor monitoring report, the project met a majority of its  expected performance goals. In addition, 11 of the targeted  municipalities noted in their self-assessments an increased capacity  to provide access to information and promote ethics in their  institutions.

US-provided forensic equipment at a criminal  forensic lab in Honduras.

Justice reform projects are intended to provide training, equipment,  and technical assistance to the justice system to decrease impunity,  combat corruption, improve prosecution and forensic capacities, and  increase the efficiency and management of courts. USAID and State  implemented 42 projects in justice reform from fiscal years 2013  through 2018.

Selected Examples of Justice Reform Projects

Percentage of the Population with  Trust in the Courts:   (Percentage points change, 2014 and  2018) transparency, accountability, and ethics, and increase civil society  participation in government through technical assistance and training.  An evaluation found that the project increased awareness of these  topics, and led to some improvements in laws and regulations, such  as improving the legal framework for anti-corruption efforts. However,  the project was unable to achieve any significant changes intended  due to lack of political will.

A State project in Honduras implemented activities that sought to  reduce violence and homicide by increasing access to justice,  strengthening institutions and local organizations’ capacity to deliver  legal and support services for victims of violence and rehabilitation  and reintegration services for prisoners. A mid-term evaluation found  that the project successfully convened stakeholders to discuss women  and children’s access to justice and carried out a campaign to  disseminate information on human rights and access to justice. The  evaluation also found the project helped maintain, but not increase  rehabilitation and reintegration services for prisoners.

El Salvadoran police meeting with youth in a  police athletic league.

Community based violence prevention (CBVP) projects are intended  to reduce the levels of crime and violence, including addressing some  of the root causes of insecurity. USAID and State implemented 31  CBVP projects from fiscal years 2013 through 2018. These projects  sought to support anti-gang education, employment opportunities for  at-risk youth, and efforts to increase institutional capacity and citizen  responsibility for crime prevention in municipalities plagued by  violence.

Selected Examples of Community Based Violence Prevention Projects

aimed at increasing access to comprehensive, long-term social,  education, and health services for high-risk populations. As part of  these efforts, 242,029 individuals participated in U.S. government- funded gang prevention and education programs in Honduras in fiscal  year 2017.

USAID projects in Honduras worked with civil society organizations to  provide violence prevention services with a focus on vulnerable  populations. In fiscal year 2018, USAID reported that 202 people  received U.S. government-funded gender-based violence services,  including health, legal, and counseling services.

Percentage of the Population Who  Feel Safe Walking in their  Neighborhood at Night:   (Difference in percentage points, 2014  and 2017)

A USAID project in Honduras sought to lower rates of homicide and  other violent crime through alliances of communities and government  institutions, especially the police. A mid-term evaluation of the project  reported significant decreases in homicide rates, ranging from 42  percent to 68 percent, in three of the six communities where USAID  targeted its assistance.

A USAID project aimed to improve educational options for out-of- school youth by offering them alternatives to criminal and gang  activity. An evaluation of the project reported that more than 90  percent of the more than 15,000 individuals who enrolled in school did  not pass exams to demonstrate competency at the end of courses.  The evaluation further noted that 30 percent of the youth did not  remain in school, which likely resulted in a small fraction of them  meeting the goal of increasing their income.

Honduran Special Forces demonstrate U.S.  training.

Projects to professionalize the military are intended to increase the  acountability, competency, and capabilities of militaries in the  Northern Triangle. DOD and State implemented a number of these  activities from fiscal years 2013 through 2018. The projects provided  military equipment and training to military personnel and technical  assistance to Ministry of Defense personnel.

Selected Examples of Professionalize the Military and Develop Defense Capabilities Projects

Policy and a budgeting system for its Ministry of Defense that  supports transparency and accountability.

Total Number of US Trained Personnel  at National Leadership Levels:  (Fiscal year 2018)

An After Action Report of a DOD Defense Governance workshop in  Guatemala noted that DOD continued to support the Guatemalan  Ministry of Defense to identify national policy and strategy priorities,  determine capabilities, and develop a data-driven approach to  problem solving and making decisions on resources.

A DOD report noted that DOD training in El Salvador that focused on  fighting corruption had improved relations between military and civilian  institutions.

Appendix III: Evaluations Related to Selected Sectors of U.S. Assistance to the Northern Triangle, FY 2013 through 2018

Andrade Costa, Melissa, and Irene García Palud, Evaluation Report: Mid- term Evaluation of the Program, “Reducing Violence and Homicide  Through Access to Justice in Chamalecón, Satelite, and Rivera  Hernández Neighborhoods of San Pedro Sula, Honduras”, August 2018.

USAID/El Salvador Monitoring, Evaluation and Learning Initiative. Final  Performance Evaluation of the Higher Education for Economic Growth  Activity, May 17, 2018.

DevTech Systems, Inc. Programa de Monitoreo y Evaluación: Evaluación  final del Poyecto Cadenas de Valor Rurales (PCVR), August 2017.

Mendéz England and Associates, Evaluación de Desempeño de Medio  Término de la Actividad de Educación para la Niñez y Joventud 2011- 2017, August 2017.

Management Systems International, A Tetra Tech Company.  Performance Evaluation of the Partnership for Growth in El Salvador,  March 20, 2017 (Revised July 24, 2017).

Asociación de Desarrollo Organizacional Comunitaria (ADOC). Mid-term  Evaluation of the Investment for Educational Development of the  Highlands (IDEA) Project, Save the Children/USDA, 2016.

Advisem Services, Inc. Final Evaluation Report: Final Evaluation of  FINCA’s Food for Progress (FFPr) in El Salvador, November 30, 2016.

The Cadmus Group, Inc. Performance Evaluation of USAID/Honduras  Proparque Program, June 2016.

Boston College School of Social Work, Final Evaluation Report: Food for  Education (FFE) Project – USDA Catholic Relief Services (CRS)  Honduras, April 2016.

Khanti, S.A. Project Concern International, Food for Education II, Mid- term Evaluation Final Report, December 2015.

Boston College School of Social Work. Mid-term Evaluation Report: Food  for Education “Learning for Life” Guatemala, October 2015.

Social Impact, Inc. Honduras Convive! Mid-term Evaluation Report, July  10, 2015.

DevTech Systems, Inc. Final Evaluation of the USAID/Alianzas Project,  December 12, 2014.

Optimal Solutions Group, LLC. Partnership for Growth: El Salvador– United States (2011-2015), Mid-term Evaluation Final Report, September  30, 2014.

DevTech Systems, Inc. Informe final Evaluación del Proyecto Apoyo en  Políticas y Regulaciones para el Crecimiento Económico de Guatemala  (PRS), September 20, 2014.

Optimal Solutions Group, LLC. Final Report: Does Assistance to Farmers  Translate into Community Welfare Improvements? Non-Experimental  Program Evaluation of USAID Assistance to Smallholder Farmers in  Guatemala, August 18, 2014.

Notre Dame Initiative for Global Development. Food for Education Mid- term Evaluation, July 2014.

Democracy International, Inc. Final Report: Mid-term Performance  Evaluation of the Transparent Local Governance and Improved Service  Delivery Project (USAID/NEXOS) and the Decentralized Enabling  Environment Project (USAID/DEE), May 2014.

International Business and Technical Consultants, Inc. Evaluation Report:  Final Performance Evaluation of the USAID Municipal Competitiveness  Project in El Salvador, January 29, 2014.

Development Training Services, Inc. Report on the Mid-term Performance  Evaluation of the USAID Transparency and Governance Project El  Salvador, December 24, 2012.

Rivera Cira Consulting, Inc. USAID/Guatemala Final Performance  Evaluation for the Project Against Violence and Impunity (PAVI),  December 20, 2012.

Amex International and DevTech Systems, Inc. USAID/Guatemala Mid- term Performance Evaluations for Two Economic Growth Office Projects,  October 25, 2012.

International Business and Technical Consultants, Inc. Performance  Evaluation of the “Improving Access to Employment Program in El  Salvador”. October 17, 2012.

Appendix IV: U.S. Strategy for Central America Results Architecture

The Department of State (State) and the U.S. Agency for International  Development (USAID) produced the results architecture for the U.S.  Strategy for Central America (Strategy). The results architecture presents  the desired end-state of the Strategy; the three primary objectives of  prosperity, governance, and security; and sub-objectives that support  each of the primary objectives. State and USAID defined the Strategy’s  mission as to secure U.S. borders and protect U.S. citizens by addressing  the economic, governance, and security drivers of illegal immigration and  illicit trafficking, and to promote private sector investment in Central  America. The result architecture’s overall objective is an economically  integrated Central America that is fully democratic; provides economic  opportunities to its people; enjoys more accountable, transparent, and  effective public institutions; and ensures a safe environment for its  citizens. The Strategy’s prosperity objective is to work with Central  American governments to improve the business environment, create jobs,  enhance food security, expand energy security, and increase U.S.  investment and trade. The Strategy’s governance objective focuses on  reducing impunity and corruption through the creation of more  transparent, efficient governments that deliver services, including justice,  effectively. The Strategy’s security objective includes enhancing citizen  security, re-establishing state presence and security in communities at  risk, scaling up violence prevention and law enforcement activities in  communities, and targeting individuals most susceptible to gang  recruitment. Figure 10 depicts the overall summary of the Strategy’s  results architecture, which focuses on the objectives of prosperity,  governance, and security.

Appendix V: Comments from the Department of State

1.  We are not recommending that State direct DOD and USDA to  monitor and evaluate projects, but rather that State collaborate with  DOD and USDA to develop a more comprehensive approach to  monitoring and evaluating projects that support the Strategy’s  objectives and that State document the results of this collaboration in  the Strategy’s monitoring and evaluation plan. We do not prescribe  the format or content for how the Strategy’s monitoring and evaluation  plan might be updated. We have modified relevant sections of our  report and our recommendation to make this clearer and directed the  recommendation to the Secretary of State, since State coordinates  implementation of the Strategy by the various agencies of the U.S.  government. We found that DOD and USDA have designed and  implemented programs that directly support the objectives of the  Strategy. While we acknowledge that some coordination among  agencies occurs in Washington and in the Northern Triangle, we  found that such coordination does not formally extend to monitoring  and evaluation. We believe that our recommendation encourages  greater coordination among agencies, including DOD and USDA, by  ensuring that monitoring and evaluation efforts by U.S. government  agencies are in sync with the monitoring and evaluation plan for the  Strategy. Excluding DOD and USDA projects from the monitoring and  evaluation plan for the Strategy will continue to result in an incomplete  or unclear understanding of the results of U.S. assistance in the  Northern Triangle. Without a complete and clear understanding of the  results across all agencies involved, agencies may miss important  lessons about the types of assistance that are effective in achieving  U.S. objectives in the region, potentially limiting overall progress.  2.  While the explanatory statement accompanying Pub. L. No. 114-113  directs State, in coordination with USAID, to develop a monitoring and  evaluation plan for funds appropriated to them, we are recommending  that State, as coordinator for the implementation of the Strategy, work  with the other agencies to develop a more comprehensive approach  to monitoring and evaluating projects that support the Strategy’s  objectives, and that they utilize the monitoring and evaluation plan  that they have already created in response to the congressional  direction as a place to document the comprehensive approach to  monitoring and evaluation.  3.  We chose to review all agencies that have allocated a significant  amount of funding from their appropriations to implement projects in  support of prosperity, governance, and security objectives in the  Northern Triangle. State, USAID, DOD, and USDA officials confirmed  that DOD and USDA projects support the objectives of the Strategy,  and we believe that the inclusion of these agencies enhanced the  accuracy and completeness of our reporting on the results that have  been achieved from U.S. assistance as well as the gaps in the current  monitoring and evaluation approach and implications for State’s ability  to assess results comprehensively.  4.  We believe our inclusion of projects implemented from fiscal years  2013 through 2018 provided a reasonable time frame for our review  because it includes projects that supported the objectives of improving  prosperity, governance, and security—long standing objectives of  U.S. assistance to the Northern Triangle that predated appropriations  for the Strategy, and even the Strategy itself. Including projects  implemented between fiscal years 2013 and 2018 increased our  ability to report on the results of agencies’ projects and their overall  progress toward the Strategy’s objectives because projects funded  since fiscal year 2016 were in too early a stage of implementation to  report meaningfully on such results. However, we considered, as  appropriate, any results information we were able to obtain on such  projects.  5.  We acknowledge that the precision of our estimates for reporting on  funding allocations was limited due to the inconsistent nature of  reporting of financial data by different bureaus and agencies.  However, taking into consideration qualifications noted throughout our  report, we believe that our reporting of funding allocations provides a  reliable description of how agencies used allocated funding from fiscal  years 2013 through 2018 to support prosperity, governance, and  security objectives in the Northern Triangle.   6.  We believe that our classification of projects under the different  sectors we identified enabled us to provide a more detailed,  comprehensive, and meaningful analysis of projects and related  results. Because some of the sub-objectives that State and USAID  developed, such as “reduce poverty,” were very broad and did not  lend themselves to an analysis of specific project sectors that  supported the Strategy’s objectives, we identified more specific  sectors, including health, economic growth, and agricultural  development. State and USAID officials validated the accuracy of our  definitions, and we revised them as appropriate, given input from  agency officials.  7.  Our selection of six sectors for in-depth review of projects and results  limits the generalizability of our findings to all sectors, which we note.   Due to the large number of projects, sectors, and sub-objectives  associated with U.S. assistance to the Northern Triangle, we  determined that a case study approach was the most effective  methodology for our review. We devised selection criteria for our case  study to reflect a meaningful selection of projects supporting each of  the three objectives across a range of sectors, agencies, and  countries. Moreover, two of the sectors we selected for in-depth  review—community based violence prevention and justice reform— encompass several projects classified as relating to “reducing  violence at the local level,” and “reducing the influence of organized  crime and gangs.” Thus our report addresses results in these sectors.  We omitted projects relating to police professionalization, in part,  because we had ongoing work related to this sector. We acknowledge  limitations with this case study approach and do not attempt to  generalize results beyond the sectors we reviewed, but we believe our  methodological approach provided a reasonable basis for our overall  conclusions.

Appendix VI: Comments from the U.S. Agency for International Development

1.  We eliminated the recommendation to USAID because State plays a  coordinating role in the Strategy’s implementation and is well  positioned to work collaboratively with officials of other agencies,  including DOD and USDA. We believe our recommendation to State,  in which we recommend that they work with USAID, encourages  greater coordination among agencies, including DOD and USDA, to  ensure that their efforts are included in a comprehensive monitoring  and evaluation plan for the Strategy.  2.  We believe our inclusion of projects implemented from fiscal years  2013 through 2018 provided a reasonable time frame for our review  because it included projects agencies implemented to support the  long standing objectives of prosperity, governance, and security in the  Northern Triangle—objectives that the U.S. government has  supported under various initiatives that predated the Strategy and  appropriations for the Strategy. Furthermore, including projects  implemented between fiscal years 2013 and 2018 increased our  ability to report on the results of agencies’ projects and their overall  progress toward prosperity, governance, and security because  projects funded since fiscal year 2016 were in too early a stage of  implementation to report meaningfully on results. However, we  considered, as appropriate, any results information we were able to  obtain on such projects.   3.  We requested and reviewed all USAID evaluations completed during  the time frame for our review—from fiscal years 2013 through 2018 or  October 2012 through September 2018—to gain insight into the  results of projects supporting the long standing U.S. assistance  objectives of prosperity, governance, and security in the Northern  Triangle. While we reviewed four evaluations that USAID completed  at the beginning of fiscal year 2013, as shown in appendix III, three of  these were mid-point evaluations of ongoing projects that continued  implementation in fiscal years 2013 and 2014, during the time frame  for our review. Although we reviewed one final evaluation of a project  that had ended prior to the beginning of fiscal year 2013, the  evaluation was a key aspect of the project’s implementation and  lessons learned, which provided information pertinent to future USAID  programming in the areas of justice reform and security. Furthermore,  while our report noted examples of actions that agencies took in  response to challenges to achieving progress toward prosperity,  governance, and security, analysis of actions taken in the design of  specific projects based on the findings and recommendations of the  evaluations we reviewed was outside the scope of our review.    4.  We believe that our classification of projects under different sectors  we identified provides a detailed, comprehensive, and meaningful  analysis of projects and related results. Because some of the sub- objectives developed by State and USAID, such as “reduce poverty,”  were very broad and did not lend themselves to an analysis of specific  project sectors that supported the Strategy’s objectives, we identified  more specific sectors, including health, economic growth, and  agricultural development. State and USAID validated the accuracy of  our definitions, and we revised them as appropriate, given input from  agency officials. We acknowledge that our selection of a judgmental  sample of six sectors for in-depth review of projects and results limits  the generalizability of our findings to all sectors, which we noted  throughout our draft report. However, due to the large number of  projects, sectors, and sub-objectives associated with U.S. assistance  to the Northern Triangle and the extensive amount of documentation  to obtain and analyze for each project, we determined that this case  study approach was the most effective methodology for our review.  We devised our selection criteria for our case study to reflect a  meaningful selection of a significant number of projects across  objectives, sectors, agencies, and countries. We do not believe that  omitting some sectors from our in-depth review limited the credibility  of the findings of our report.  5.  We believe that the use of data on the achievement of annual targets  is a valid approach to assessing project results, although the agencies  collecting the data may also intend to use it in making decisions about  the progress of ongoing projects. These data were only one element  of our analysis. We also analyzed data and information from USAID  implementer progress reports, mid-point and final evaluations, and  other performance reports, which provided a longer-term perspective  on results. Collectively, we believe that this information provided  meaningful insight into the successes and shortcomings of the  projects in the sectors we reviewed. Our report acknowledges that  agency officials described progress and challenges to achieving the  prosperity, governance, and security objectives, as well as the steps  taken to modify projects to address such challenges. However, such  modifications fell outside the scope of our analysis of results, absent  documentation of the specific impact of such modifications on the  achievement of objectives.  6.  We reviewed completed evaluations to provide insight into project  results, but excluded ongoing and planned evaluations because  conclusions about project results are not available until such  evaluations are completed. Similarly, our draft report acknowledged  that agency officials described progress and challenges to achieving  the prosperity, governance, and security objectives, as well as the  steps taken to modify projects to address such challenges. However,  such modifications fell outside the scope of our analysis of results,  absent documentation of their specific impact on the achievement of  prosperity, governance, and security objectives.

Appendix VII: Comments from the Department of Defense

1.  We believe that the inclusion of DOD projects significantly enhanced  the accuracy and completeness of our reporting on the projects that  the U.S. government has implemented in the Northern Triangle from  fiscal years 2013 through 2018, and the important lessons learned  from these projects on progress toward the Strategy’s objectives.   State and DOD officials confirmed that DOD has designed and  implemented projects from its appropriation that support the security  objective of the Strategy in the Northern Triangle. Furthermore, we  are not recommending that State and USAID specify how DOD  monitors and evaluates such projects, but rather that State and  USAID collaborate with DOD to specify a comprehensive approach to  the monitoring and evaluation of projects across all agencies that  directly support the Strategy’s objectives. Excluding DOD projects  from the monitoring and evaluation plan for the Strategy could result  in an incomplete or unclear understanding of the results of U.S.  assistance in the Northern Triangle. Without a complete and clear  understanding of the results across all agencies involved, including  DOD, agencies may miss important lessons learned about the types  of assistance that are most effective in this region, potentially limiting  overall progress.

Appendix VIII: GAO Staff Acknowledgments

In addition to the contact named above, James Michels (Assistant  Director), Bradley Hunt (Analyst-in-Charge), Sophie Broach, Jon Fremont,  Kayli Westling, Pedro Almoguera, Neil Doherty, Mark Dowling, Justin  Fisher, Christopher Mulkins, Zamir Ruli, Aldo Salerno, and John Villecco  made key contributions to this report.

The Northern Triangle countries of El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras have long struggled with poverty, weak governance, and insecurity. In 2014, the U.S. government introduced a strategy to increase their prosperity and strengthen governance and security. Has the strategy been working?

Agencies allocated $2.4 billion for 370 projects to support these objectives from fiscal years 2013 to 2018. However, agencies reported mixed results for projects and little information on overall progress. While State and USAID had a plan to assess progress, the plan didn’t include all agencies’ activities. We recommended they develop a comprehensive plan.