FY 2019 Government Shutdown: Selected Agencies Could Improve Contingency Planning for Potential Shutdown Scenarios and Strengthen Some Internal Controls

A lapse in appropriations resulted in the federal government partially shutting down from December 22, 2018, to January 25, 2019.

GAO was asked to evaluate agency contingency plans and operations during the FY 2019 shutdown. This report assesses the extent to which selected agencies and selected components (1) had contingency plans that were consistent with applicable OMB guidance, (2) planned for a potential prolonged shutdown and changed operations during the shutdown, and (3) had shutdown policies and procedures consistent with relevant internal control principles.

GAO selected CBP, IRS, ITA, and USTR as agency components for review because they are under the jurisdiction of the Senate Committee on Finance and were affected by the FY 2019 shutdown. GAO reviewed OMB's guidance, agencies' contingency plans, and other documentation. GAO interviewed agency and component officials.

The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) issues shutdown guidance for agencies in Circular A-11. Of four selected agency components, three—U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), and the International Trade Administration (ITA)—operated in fiscal year (FY) 2019 under contingency plans that included most of the key information elements specified in Circular A-11 . The plan that the fourth one—Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR)—operated under, authored by the Executive Office of the President, did not include a majority of the key information elements.

OMB guidance instructs agencies to have plans in place for both short and prolonged—longer than 5 days—shutdowns. None of the four selected agencies' FY 2019 contingency plans fully addressed anticipated changes in the event of a prolonged shutdown. GAO found that IRS, ITA, and USTR internally discussed and planned for anticipated operational changes in the event of a prolonged FY 2019 shutdown. CBP officials said they only focused on short-term operational needs. Having a comprehensive plan for a potential prolonged shutdown would help provide clearer workforce expectations during any future shutdowns.

Having sufficient internal controls, such as documented policies and procedures, in place prior to a shutdown can help agencies implement changes in day-to-day operations during a shutdown. Selected agency components all incorporated some internal controls in their shutdown-related activities, as shown in the table below. However, none of the agency components had controls for limiting both physical and virtual workspace access for employees during a shutdown, each citing the difficulty of implementing such controls. Having these controls in place would help components ensure that they operate consistently with their contingency plans and avoid misuse of government resources.

GAO is making 14 recommendations, including that certain agency components improve contingency plans, document shutdown procedures, and improve controls for physical and virtual workspace access during a shutdown. CBP and ITA agreed with the recommendations directed to them; IRS partially agreed with one and disagreed with two; and USTR did not state whether it agreed or disagreed, but has begun taking steps to implement two recommendations.

From December 22, 2018, to January 25, 2019, some agencies within the  federal government shut down because of a lapse in appropriations,  making it the longest government shutdown in history. Agencies that did  not have funding curtailed activities, and an estimated 340,000  employees were furloughed for all or part of the 35-day period. While  shutdowns are not regular events, agencies are required to have  contingency plans in place that describe how they will conduct an orderly  shutdown and what limited functions will continue during a shutdown.

How well agencies plan for and operate during a shutdown is important to  ensure compliance with applicable laws and continuation of certain  functions, such as those for emergencies involving the safety of human  life or the protection of property, or carrying out core constitutional  powers. Additionally, it is important for agencies to sufficiently plan for  changes over the course of a shutdown to ensure effective operations.

You asked us to review agency contingency plans and operations during  the fiscal year 2019 shutdown. This report assesses the extent to which  (1) selected agencies’ contingency plans were consistent with Office of  Management and Budget (OMB) guidance, (2) selected agency  components planned for a potential prolonged shutdown and changed  operations during the shutdown, and (3) selected agency components’  shutdown policies and procedures were consistent with relevant internal  control principles.

We selected four agency components under the jurisdiction of the Senate  Committee on Finance that were affected by the fiscal year 2019  shutdown. When more than one component at an agency met these  criteria, we selected the component that had the largest budget and  planned number of employees performing excepted work during the  shutdown. While the four components we selected are not generalizable  to other agency components, they do reflect variation in size, funding  type, and justification for excepted work that serve as illustrative  examples of a range of experiences. As shown in table 1, these selected  agency components are

U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), Department of Homeland  Security (DHS);  Internal Revenue Service (IRS), Department of the Treasury  (Treasury);  International Trade Administration (ITA), Department of Commerce  (Commerce); and

Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR), Executive  Office of the President (EOP).

To address our first objective, we compared information in selected  agencies’ government shutdown contingency plans to key information  elements described in OMB guidance. Specifically, we identified 14 key  information elements in the 2018 OMB Circular No. A-11 Section 124— Agency Operations in the Absence of Appropriations (Circular A-11),  which details the information agencies should include in their contingency  plans. Three of our four selected agency components—CBP, ITA, and  USTR—operated under an agency-wide plan. Therefore, we evaluated  the fiscal year 2019 contingency plans for Commerce, DHS, and EOP.  Because Treasury’s contingency plan did not cover IRS, we evaluated  IRS’s contingency plans for this objective. We also reviewed written  responses from OMB and interviewed officials at selected agencies to  understand the reasons for any discrepancies between the contingency  plans and OMB guidance.

To address our second objective, we assessed the extent to which  selected agency components planned for a potential prolonged  shutdown—one longer than 5 days—as outlined in Circular A-11, and  changed operations during the shutdown. We reviewed shutdown  contingency plans and other planning documents at CBP, IRS, ITA, and  USTR to determine agency component processes for proposing,  reviewing, and approving operational changes during a government  shutdown. We interviewed officials at these agency components to  determine what operational changes components made during the fiscal  year 2019 shutdown and the key factors that led to these changes.

To address our third objective, we assessed key elements of selected  agency components’ shutdown processes to determine the extent to  which the components followed relevant internal control principles in  planning for the fiscal year 2019 government shutdown. We reviewed  Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government (Internal  Control Standards) and identified key principles related to agency  components’ shutdown processes. Relevant internal control standards  include designing and implementing appropriate policies and procedures  and effectively communicating this information to stakeholders. This  would include policies and procedures to ensure an orderly shutdown  process and compliance with applicable laws such as the Antideficiency  Act (ADA) during a potential government shutdown.

We assessed the sufficiency of selected agency components’ internal  controls based on whether the evidence gathered contained relevant  details about a component’s shutdown processes that demonstrated the  component would have reasonable assurance of achieving its shutdown  objectives. While we assessed agency components’ shutdown processes,  we did not assess the results of those processes, such as whether  components correctly or appropriately categorized activities as excepted  from the ADA.

We interviewed officials at selected agency components to understand  the reasons for any inconsistencies between component planning and  decision-making processes and internal control principles. We also  interviewed representatives of employee organizations at the agency  components we reviewed to determine if communication of shutdown- related policies and procedures was timely, sufficient, and transparent. In  addition, we interviewed officials from agency component programs to  identify illustrative examples of how components operationalized their  shutdown processes, including how they planned for the fiscal year 2019  government shutdown, communicated with employees, and recalled  furloughed employees back to work (see appendix I for a more detailed  discussion of our objectives, scope, and methodology).

We conducted this performance audit from March 2019 to June 2020 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.

Generally, Congress provides budget authority to agencies through the  passage of appropriations acts each fiscal year. Appropriations allow  agencies to incur obligations and make payments for specified purposes.  When an appropriation expires, and a new one is not enacted, a lapse in  appropriations, also called a funding gap, results and the affected agency  or program may lack sufficient budget authority to continue operations.  Funding gaps can occur at the beginning of a fiscal year when new  appropriations, or a continuing resolution, have not yet been enacted.  Funding gaps also can occur any time during the year when a continuing  resolution expires and may affect a few agencies or all agencies across  the federal government. We have previously reported that funding gaps,  actual or threatened, are both disruptive and costly.

The ADA prohibits agencies from obligating or expending funds in excess  or in advance of an available appropriation unless otherwise authorized  by law as well as from accepting voluntary services for the United States  except in cases of emergency involving the safety of human life or the  protection of property. During a lapse in appropriations, employees may  continue working if they are exempt from the lapse in appropriations or if  an exception to the ADA applies (see figure 1).

Exempt and excepted employees are defined as follows.

Exempt employees are those who perform activities funded with  budget authority that remains available despite the lapse in  appropriations, such as multiple-year or no-year carryover balances.  Available balances can also come from other authorities such as fee  income that Congress made available for obligation. For the purpose  of this report, we call employees who perform such functions exempt  employees.

Excepted employees are those who perform activities pursuant to a  statutory authority that expressly authorizes an agency to enter into  an obligation in advance of an appropriation, or to address  emergencies involving the safety of human life or the protection of  property, as described under the ADA. We have also recognized, in  our prior legal opinions, other limited exceptions that may, under  some circumstances, allow functions to continue during a lapse in  appropriations. For example, Congress and the Executive branch may  incur obligations to carry out core constitutional powers. Agencies  also may incur those limited obligations that are incidental to  executing an orderly shutdown of agency activity.

Over the past 29 years, there have been six lapses in appropriations that  led to government shutdowns, ranging in duration from 2 days to 35 days  (see figure 2). Three shutdowns occurred in the past 7 years and two of  these shutdowns were prolonged in that they lasted longer than 5 days (in  fiscal years 2014 and 2019).

In the event of a government shutdown, OMB is responsible for ensuring  that agencies have addressed the essential actions needed to effectively  manage the government shutdown. OMB does so by providing policy  guidance and shutdown-related instructions. Specifically, OMB Circular A- 11 directs federal agencies to develop contingency plans for use in the  event of a government shutdown and to update these plans on a  recurring basis. These plans are key documents that help ensure an  orderly shutdown following a lapse in appropriations, as well as continuity  of appropriate agency operations. These plans also communicate policies  and procedures to employees and external stakeholders that could be  affected by the shutdown of operations.

Three of Four Selected Agencies’ Contingency Plans Generally Followed OMB Guidance but None Addressed a Potential Prolonged Shutdown

OMB’s Circular A-11 directs agencies to prepare contingency plans in  anticipation of a lapse in appropriations. According to the guidance,  contingency plans are to include information such as: (1) summaries of  activities that will continue and those that will cease; (2) the amount of  time needed to complete the shutdown activities; (3) the number of  employees on-board prior to the shutdown; and (4) the number of  employees to be retained during the shutdown. Agencies are also to  explain the legal basis for each of their determinations to retain  employees, including a description of the nature of the agency activities in  which these employees will be engaged.

Additionally, agencies’ contingency plans are to explicitly describe any  changes in operations that would be necessary should a lapse in  appropriations extend past 5 days. According to OMB officials, OMB  reviews agencies’ contingency plans, but it does not formally approve  plans. Agencies are ultimately responsible for determining which activities  will continue during a lapse in appropriations and which activities will  cease.

Using OMB Circular A-11, we identified 14 key information elements for  agencies’ contingency plans and used these as criteria to assess the  selected agencies’ plans. Of the selected agency components, ITA and  CBP operated under the contingency plans of their respective agencies.  Similarly, USTR officials said that the component operated under EOP’s  contingency plan. IRS, in contrast, had its own contingency plan for the fiscal year 2019 shutdown because Treasury did not have a department- wide plan.

Agency contingency plans governing the shutdown operations of CBP,  IRS, and ITA included most of the key information elements described in  OMB Circular A-11. EOP did not address a majority of the key information  elements in its contingency plan, which governed USTR’s shutdown  operations. Figure 3 shows how selected agencies’ contingency plans  aligned with OMB’s guidance.

Three of our four selected agencies—Commerce, IRS, and DHS— provided summary information at the beginning of their contingency plans  about activities that would and would not continue during a lapse in  appropriations. EOP’s contingency plan did not include any information  on activities that would and would not continue. The following table shows  examples of exempt and excepted work activities from our selected  agencies’ contingency plans (see table 2).

All four agencies provided the total number of employees on-board before  the shutdown and how many would continue to work during the  government shutdown. However, EOP’s contingency plan did not break  down these employees by ADA exception categories that may include  addressing emergencies involving the safety of human life or the  protection of property or carrying out core constitutional powers, as  specified in OMB guidance. While the break out of employees by ADA  exception category was not in the DHS department-wide plan, CBP’s  component-level portion of the plan, which is not publically available  because of law enforcement sensitivities, contained these details. This  information is important for an agency to ensure it has proper oversight of  operations and the right personnel performing excepted work to be in  compliance with the ADA.

None of the agencies we reviewed provided a complete description of  potential changes to their activities and operations in the case of a  prolonged lapse in appropriations—one lasting longer than 5 days—within  their contingency plans. Officials at some of the selected agencies told us  that the purpose of their contingency plans was only to document  operations for the first 5 days of a shutdown, contrary to what is required  in OMB’s Circular A-11 for planning and documenting operations in the  anticipation of a potential prolonged shutdown.

While three of the four agency contingency plans that we reviewed— Commerce, IRS, and DHS—provided some minimal details on how  operational changes would be made in the event of a prolonged  shutdown, such as designating personnel responsible, none provided the  level of detail called for in OMB guidance. As discussed later, three of  four selected agency components—ITA, IRS, and USTR—did have  internal discussions on changes to operations in the event of a prolonged  shutdown, according to officials. However, these discussions were not  documented in the agency contingency plans.

Given that shutdowns longer than 5 days have occurred in the past, it is  important for agencies to consider and document the effects that a  potential prolonged shutdown would have on operations in their  contingency plans. Planning for potential prolonged shutdowns may  assist the agencies with effectively managing changes in operations, and  documenting these plans in public contingency plans may provide  transparency to agency actions as a shutdown continues. OMB’s  guidance states that if an agency anticipates changes during a potential  prolonged shutdown, contingency plans should include information such  as points in time when the furlough status of an employee may change,  how many employees would be affected, and the legal basis for the  changes. This information element is mentioned in two separate sections  of Circular A-11 rather than in one consolidated location.

Contingency plans for all selected agencies did not include complete  information about (1) flexibilities available to supervisors if furloughed  employees were unable to return to work on the day specified by the  agency, including use of annual leave, compensatory time off, or credit  hours; and (2) procedures for resuming program activities, including steps  to ensure appropriate oversight and disbursement of funds upon the end  of a shutdown, as specified in OMB’s guidance. Officials at selected  agencies said that this information was available in internal guidance and  fact sheets for employees, but that they did not include it in contingency  plans, which are accessible to all employees during a shutdown. Including  this information in contingency plans is important because it helps clarify  agencies’ expectations for returning employees, and its inclusion may  help agencies experience a more timely resumption of activities following  a shutdown.

As previously mentioned, USTR, as a component of EOP, operated under  EOP’s contingency plan and did not have a separate plan for the fiscal  year 2019 shutdown. While EOP’s contingency plan contained some  information on USTR such as total number of employees on-board before  the shutdown and employees to be retained during the shutdown, the  plan did not fully address 10 of the 14 information elements outlined in  OMB’s Circular A-11. Information that was not provided includes: (1) a  breakout of exempt and excepted positions by category (e.g., available  budget authority, emergencies involving safety of human life or protection  of property, etc.); (2) summaries of activities that would or would not  continue during a lapse; (3) designation of personnel responsible for  implementing and adjusting the contingency plan if conditions change;  and (4) methods for notifying employees that the shutdown has ended  and when to return to work.

Formal contingency plans that address the information elements specified  in OMB guidance help agencies prepare for and oversee shutdown  operations, and provide transparency to agency actions during a lapse in  appropriations. Without a plan that covers these elements, USTR risks  miscommunication with employees and other stakeholders that could  negatively impact an orderly shutdown and the effective resumption of  activities at the end of a lapse.

Three of Four Selected Agency Components Discussed Potential Changes during a Prolonged Shutdown, and All Made Operational Changes

IRS, ITA, and USTR Planned for Potential Operational Changes Needed in the Event of a Prolonged Shutdown, but CBP Did Not

Officials at IRS, ITA, and USTR discussed anticipated operational  changes in the event of a prolonged shutdown internally while planning  for the fiscal year 2019 shutdown. In one instance, an agency component  documented these discussions in planning documents separate from  agency contingency plans under which the component operated.  However, as mentioned previously, potential operational changes were  not documented in any of the contingency plans of our selected agencies.  Potential operational changes generally involved recalling additional  employees who had been furloughed at the beginning of the shutdown to  carry out activities that the agencies categorized as excepted from the  ADA or exempt due to other funding sources.

IRS: IRS officials said that their initial planning was for a shutdown  lasting 5 days or less. Within their contingency plan IRS noted that it  would amend the plan if the shutdown lasted longer. On December  27, 2018, 6 days into the shutdown, IRS issued an updated  contingency plan. According to IRS officials, this updated plan was  assembled by contacting each of IRS’s 23 organizational offices to  find any new activity requirements that would lead to changes in the  contingency plan. In its amended plan, IRS added approximately 60  positions as excepted or exempt. Examples of activities that  employees in these positions would support included: (1)  communications efforts through IRS websites, (2) end-of-month  financial operations, and (3) managing on-boarding for employees  hired under Public Law 115-97, commonly referred to as the Tax Cuts  and Jobs Act.

IRS officials said they knew about these operational changes at the  time of initial shutdown planning, but did not document all these  operational needs. IRS program officials told us that being informed of  anticipated operational changes as early as possible would have  helped them prepare for the shift in workload. For its fiscal year 2020  contingency plan, IRS asked plan contributors to identify “as needed”  positions that could be activated during a potential prolonged  shutdown. Plan contributors also identified positions that would be  needed if a shutdown lasting more than 5 days were to occur as IRS  approached the tax filing season.

ITA: Prior to the shutdown, ITA officials prepared a list of upcoming  activities for the next 30 to 60 days to determine the potential scope of  activities affected by a government shutdown. Activities included trade  shows, meetings, and other critical operational deadlines. According  to officials, ITA worked with their General Counsel to determine if  activities could continue as excepted from the ADA or exempted  because funding was available from another source. For those  activities that could not be deemed excepted or exempt, ITA officials  said that they were prepared to notify affected parties of the  cancellation or postponement of the activities.

For upcoming activities, ITA established dates when preparation  would need to begin. In addition, ITA officials prepared temporary  exception requests for employees to be recalled from furlough status  in time to conduct needed preparation and carry out scheduled  activities. ITA officials told us that they used and updated a tracker  daily during the shutdown to ensure that all information remained  current.

Prior to the shutdown, ITA officials also said that they collected  information on official travel planned for around the anticipated time of  the shutdown. They said that it was important to gather this  information because once employees were furloughed it becomes  more difficult to gather complete and timely information on these  travel plans.

USTR: Prior to the shutdown, USTR officials asked offices to provide  lists of positions that would need to be excepted during the first 2  weeks of a potential shutdown. This allowed USTR to anticipate  operational needs if a shutdown lasted longer than 5 days. USTR  officials said that flexibility was important as the potential shutdown  approached because it allowed offices to adjust excepted position lists  based on additional excepted activities or postponement of activities.  USTR officials said that, in their experience, it is difficult to anticipate  all the operational changes needed in the event of a shutdown longer  than 2 weeks, especially as the agency component relies on partners  at other agencies that may or may not be affected by the shutdown.

CBP: Although the non-public portion of the DHS plan for CBP  included sections that describe functions that may resume in the  event of a prolonged shutdown, CBP officials said that these sections  were not used in anticipation of the fiscal year 2019 shutdown.  Specifically, the sections provide the opportunity for officials to  indicate how many employees would be recalled to perform functions,  but in the fiscal year 2019 plan almost every section indicates zero  employees. Despite OMB guidance on prolonged shutdowns, officials  said they believe that OMB guidance was exclusively for the first 5  days of a shutdown. Use of these sections of the CBP plan would help  provide clearer expectations to the agency component’s workforce  about who may be recalled to perform work activities during a  shutdown.

For the fiscal year 2020 contingency plan, CBP officials said that they  asked offices to analyze and communicate what, if any, additional  employees would be needed to work if a shutdown were to extend  past 5 days. However, our review of the 2020 CBP plan found that,  similar to the plan for fiscal year 2019, it largely does not indicate how  many employees would be recalled to perform functions in the event  of a prolonged shutdown.

All Selected Agency Components Made Operational Changes during the Prolonged Shutdown for Varying Reasons

During the fiscal year 2019 shutdown, each agency component that we  reviewed determined that changes needed to occur that affected the  number of excepted employees working during the shutdown. According  to agency component officials, these changes were due to the length of  the shutdown, external events, and changes to the determination of  excepted work. The length of the fiscal year 2019 shutdown was the most  common reason cited by officials for operational changes.

CBP: During the fiscal year 2019 shutdown, CBP responded to an  increase in foreign nationals arriving at the southern U.S. border. In  response to this external event, CBP officials told us that they  identified a need to train additional law enforcement officers and  agents to perform excepted activities. According to the DHS  contingency plan, new hire training for law enforcement officers may  be an excepted activity if the requesting agency component  establishes a reasonable likelihood that a delay in new hire training  would compromise the safety of human life or protection of property.

According to DHS documents, this was a change from previous  shutdowns, when new hire training was not an activity excepted from  the ADA. CBP officials told us that they discussed this issue internally  before the shutdown, but processing the change through DHS’s Chief  Financial Officer, DHS General Counsel, and OMB occurred after the  shutdown began. CBP has incorporated this change into its updated,  non-public portion of DHS’s contingency plan.

IRS: As the length of the shutdown increased, IRS identified mission  requirements that it determined necessitated the recall of additional  employees. For example, as it transitioned to its filing season  operations, IRS recalled mail center employees to oversee the  collection of taxes and protection of statute expiration. IRS’s  updated fiscal year 2019 filing season contingency plan, published on  January 15, 2019, incorporated this activity along with the additional  560 employees recalled for one division to perform the work.

IRS said in the updated plan that the ADA exception for this work was  the protection of life and property. According to IRS documents,  Treasury officials evaluated plan updates for compliance with the  ADA, and then shared the plan with OMB prior to implementing  changes.

IRS also made operational changes during the fiscal year 2019  shutdown that were based on changes to the determination of which  work activities were excepted from the ADA. During the shutdown IRS  announced that it would process tax returns beginning January 28,  2019, and refund taxpayers as scheduled. In 2011, OMB directed IRS  not to pay tax refunds in the event of a lapse in appropriations.  However, at the request of Treasury and IRS, OMB revisited this  position and, on January 7, 2019, OMB informed Treasury that tax  refunds may be paid during a lapse in appropriations.

As a result of this determination, IRS added approximately 16,000  additional excepted positions to its filing season contingency plan for  the purpose of issuing refunds. This change was documented in its  updated contingency plan, published on January 15, 2019. In October  2019, we determined that the agency violated the ADA by processing  tax returns and issuing refunds to taxpayers because it lacked  available budget authority to support these activities and no exception  to the ADA permitted IRS to incur these obligations.

ITA: According to ITA officials, they updated ITA’s activity list during  the course of the fiscal year 2019 shutdown. They said the update  was needed to help determine which preparation activities could  continue for future events, such as trade shows that bring  international delegations, and which activities or events would have to  be cancelled if the shutdown continued. ITA officials said they had to  evaluate cancellation clauses in its contracts with these trade shows  to decide whether and when to cancel. ITA recalled employees on a  temporary basis, as needed, to perform these tasks. ITA officials told  us that they followed departmental guidance in requesting employee  recalls during the shutdown. ITA submitted proposed changes to  Commerce’s Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary for  Administration, which coordinated department-level review and  approval.

Commerce officials told us that senior leadership discussed changes  to the contingency plan with OMB officials over the course of the  shutdown. Despite changes to the number of excepted employees,  Commerce did not publish an updated contingency plan during the  fiscal year 2019 shutdown. Commerce officials told us that, through  discussions with OMB, they determined that publishing an updated  plan was not necessary due to the relatively small number of changes  to the total number of excepted and exempt employees.

USTR: Prior to the beginning of the shutdown, USTR estimated that it  could continue full operations for 3 to 4 weeks with available funding.  Because the shutdown lasted beyond 3 weeks, USTR furloughed a  majority of its employees on January 14, 2019, once those funds were  no longer available. In the absence of available funding, USTR  officials decided that some functions were excepted from the ADA  under the justification that the agency component works to discharge  the president’s constitutional duty and power to conduct foreign  relations. USTR officials stated that component leaders identified the  highest priority mission activities to continue during the shutdown,  such as trade negotiations with China and work related to the North  American Free Trade Agreement. Officials decided not to continue  other activities, such as preparations for the 2019 Group of 20  Summit.

USTR officials told us that, in consultation with OMB, USTR excepted  more than 74 employees, the number listed in the EOP contingency  plan published December 21, 2018. According to USTR documents,  between 88 and 101 excepted employees were working during the  last 2 weeks of the shutdown. Officials told us that these changes  were made to carry out critical, excepted activities and that changes  were communicated daily to EOP.

Two of Four Selected Agency Components Documented Shutdown Procedures, and None Had Sufficient Controls for Workspace Access during a Shutdown

Agency preparation for a government shutdown can require extensive  changes in day-to-day operations. Having established policies and  procedures prior to a shutdown can help agencies implement these  changes successfully. Establishing these policies and procedures  requires timely and transparent planning and communication to ensure  that agencies function as effectively as possible during a shutdown.  Internal controls related to planning for a government shutdown include  designating roles and responsibilities, establishing processes for planning  activities that help meet objectives, and documenting said processes.

Internal controls related to communication prior to and during a  government shutdown include ensuring that information communicated is  timely, sufficient, and delivered to all appropriate individuals. Figure 4  summarizes the extent to which selected agency components  incorporated applicable internal controls into their planning and  operations prior to and during the fiscal year 2019 shutdown, as  discussed in detail in the following sections.

Selected Agency Components’ Policies and Procedures Were Generally Consistent with Internal Control Principles for Planning and Communication, Although Level of Documentation Varied

Selected Agency Components Identified Shutdown Planning Roles and Responsibilities

The agency components we reviewed identified staff needed to plan for  the fiscal year 2019 shutdown and tasked each with certain  responsibilities. According to Standards for Internal Control in the Federal  Government (Internal Control Standards), agency component  management should implement its control activities—processes,  procedures, techniques, and mechanisms—through policies.  Documenting roles and responsibilities for implementing the policies can  help agencies meet their objectives related to managing a government  shutdown. The following examples illustrate the roles and responsibilities  of staff who helped determine which activities would continue during the  fiscal year 2019 shutdown.

CBP: CBP’s non-public portion of the DHS contingency plan  described the key responsibilities and accountable parties for  shutdown preparation. For instance, heads of offices determined  which of their employees would remain at work to perform exempt or  excepted functions during the shutdown. The CBP Hiatus Coordinator  communicated daily with Hiatus Points of Contact within each CBP  office who managed the offices’ shutdown processes. For instance,  the Hiatus Points of Contact determined what functions would  continue during the shutdown to help ensure activities aligned with  OMB guidance. Officials said that CBP’s Office of Chief Counsel  reviewed each excepted function to help ensure they met the legal  standard for each ADA exception category.

IRS: IRS internal process documents outlined the steps needed to  prepare for a shutdown and the accountable parties for  implementation. For example, IRS had a Lapse Program Manager  who coordinated shutdown activities and helped develop the  contingency plan, including identifying and evaluating excepted roles  and aligning them with people, positions, and exception categories.  IRS Chief Counsel was then responsible for reviewing the  contingency plan for compliance with the ADA, followed by a review  from Treasury’s General Counsel. According to the process  documents, Treasury ultimately approves IRS’s contingency plan.

ITA: ITA employed a “bottom-up” shutdown planning process,  according to ITA officials. As part of this process, ITA officials said  they identified activities to continue during a shutdown, as well as the  ADA exceptions to justify the activities, before submitting plans to  General Counsel for review. However, ITA did not document its roles  and responsibilities because the component relied on the planning  processes documented in Commerce’s shutdown contingency plan,  according to ITA officials. The agency’s plan provided instructions for  submitting component shutdown plans to Commerce’s Office of the  General Counsel and Office of Human Resources Management.

Commerce’s contingency plan did not, however, contain information  about component-specific roles and responsibilities related to  planning for a potential government shutdown. Without documenting  roles and responsibilities, ITA cannot ensure that the appropriate  officials take the necessary steps to effectively prepare and execute  plans for any future potential government shutdowns.

USTR: USTR instructed Assistant U.S. Trade Representatives to  indicate which employees would perform excepted work based on the  highest priority initiatives and activities. Two weeks prior to the  shutdown, the Office of Administration and General Counsel used this  information to develop a plan for the shutdown, followed by senior  leadership approval, according to USTR officials. While USTR  described the roles and responsibilities of its officials in planning for  the shutdown, USTR did not document these roles and  responsibilities because it used this same process in previous  shutdowns, and responsible parties were accustomed to the process  and knew their roles well, according to USTR officials. Documenting  roles and responsibilities would help USTR ensure that the  appropriate officials take the necessary steps to effectively prepare  and execute plans for future potential government shutdowns,  especially when officials currently familiar with the process no longer  work for USTR.

CBP and IRS Documented Their Shutdown Preparation Processes, but ITA and USTR Did Not

Internal Control Standards states that agency component management  should implement its control activities through policies. Agency  components can effectively do so, in part, by documenting processes for  implementing policies related to government shutdowns. Shutdown  preparation process documents at selected agency components included  descriptions of activities to complete prior to the shutdown, such as  updating and reviewing contingency plans, and preparing guidance and  communication for managers and employees, among other steps.

CBP: CBP’s non-public portion of the DHS contingency plan  contained actions necessary to prepare for an impending shutdown, in  addition to the roles and responsibilities discussed above. For  example, CBP officials would need to identify executive points of  contact who would continue working during the shutdown, prepare  employee communications such as furlough notices, and prepare and  distribute guidance for employee training during the shutdown,  according to CBP’s shutdown guidance. This guidance also included  descriptions of services, such as facilities maintenance, mail  operations, and use of information technology equipment that would  remain available and how, if at all, that work would be accomplished  during a shutdown.

IRS: IRS developed detailed process maps for its shutdown  processes to document its planning and implementation activities and  help improve understanding of the roles and responsibilities of staff at  each step, according to IRS officials. IRS’s planning process map  showed the order in which staff should perform certain tasks, a  description of each task, and the responsible party for each task. For  instance, the document showed who should draft, review, revise, and  approve the shutdown contingency plan, and when each step should  occur by each party. Figure 5 shows a streamlined version of IRS’s  process map for the shutdown planning phase.

Similarly, IRS’s implementation process map detailed steps for  communicating with employees prior to a shutdown and updating  contingency plans during a shutdown. During the shutdown, IRS  distributed tools and guidance with instructions for implementing each  step, according to an IRS official.

ITA: ITA prepared a list of activities scheduled for the first 80 days of  the fiscal year 2019 shutdown and determined the activities that would  continue during the shutdown. While ITA officials described the  process of assembling this list to us, they did not provide evidence to  show that they had documented the process. According to ITA  officials, ITA performed a similar exercise during the fiscal year 2014  government shutdown. Additionally, ITA officials said that they  followed Commerce’s contingency plan to plan for the fiscal year 2019  shutdown. However, that document provided general information at  the agency level. It did not provide information on the shutdown  planning processes used by ITA, such as ITA-specific actions to take  in the planning process. ITA did not provide documents showing these  processes. Documentation of shutdown planning procedures would  help ITA ensure that officials take the necessary steps to effectively  prepare for future potential government shutdowns.

USTR: USTR officials described the agency component’s shutdown  processes but did not have the processes fully documented. Instead,  USTR relied on the institutional knowledge of its officials to prepare  for the fiscal year 2019 government shutdown. USTR officials told us  that staff implementing shutdown processes for the fiscal year 2019  government shutdown also did so during the fiscal year 2014  shutdown. These officials told us that they used the same processes  for both shutdowns, and that the staff involved were familiar enough  with the processes to implement them effectively in fiscal year 2019.

USTR communicated through email the steps for employees to take  prior to furloughs, such as providing personal contact information to  supervisors. USTR also provided EOP’s shutdown guidance to  employees, which included additional information for employees, such  as limitations to work site access and seeking outside employment  while furloughed. However, EOP’s guidance did not contain details  about USTR’s shutdown preparation process.

USTR provided guidance to Assistant U.S. Trade Representatives  about identifying excepted employees, but this guidance did not  include information about other planning processes. Without  documentation of all shutdown planning procedures, USTR cannot  ensure that officials take the necessary steps to effectively prepare for  future potential government shutdowns.

Selected Agency Components Informed Employees of Shutdown Procedures

Internal Control Standards states that management should communicate  sufficient information, such as policies and procedures for implementing  shutdown processes, to all appropriate individuals in a timely manner. We  found that selected agency components used a variety of methods to  communicate shutdown-related plans with employees in a timely manner  prior to or at the beginning of the fiscal year 2019 shutdown. Methods  included distributing policies through managers, referring employees to  internal websites, and component-wide emails. Additionally, all selected  agency components communicated individual furlough decisions to  employees once the shutdown began. Representatives from employee  organizations whose members worked at CBP and IRS said that, despite  minor communication challenges between components and employees,  they generally found shutdown-related communication to employees to be  adequate.

CBP: CBP encouraged supervisors to communicate to employees  what could be expected of them should a shutdown occur, according  to CBP officials from the Office of Field Operations. DHS directed  CBP to email furlough notices to affected employees once the  shutdown began, according to CBP officials, and CBP received email  read receipts to help ensure the notices reached all employees. Each  office confirmed with CBP that notices were sent to all affected  employees, according to CBP officials.

CBP held daily meetings with management during the shutdown to  answer questions and share information, including information about  travel, pay, contract actions, review and approval of employee recalls,  and updates to the CBP contingency plan, according to CBP officials.  Organizational points of contact then shared this information with  managers, who provided appropriate information to employees.

Furloughed employees did not have permission to access internal  online resources as CBP had instructed them not to use CBP systems  during the shutdown except in limited circumstances. In response,  CBP developed a mobile application so that furloughed employees  could see such updates on their personal cell phones in the event of a  future shutdown, according to CBP officials. Representatives of CBP  bargaining unit employees told us that, aside from limited instances of  inaccurate or delayed information, CBP effectively communicated  shutdown information to employees using multiple communication  channels.

IRS: IRS hosted internal training sessions prior to the shutdown to  clarify roles and responsibilities for managers and excepted, exempt,  and furloughed employees. IRS also made resources available to  employees on its website, according to IRS officials, including  shutdown checklists and a Frequently Asked Questions document  with information on preparing for an orderly shutdown, among other  things. Two days prior to the shutdown, OMB authorized IRS to direct  managers to verbally inform employees of their furlough or excepted  status in the event of a shutdown, according to IRS officials. These  officials told us that IRS directed managers to not distribute status  letters until December 22, 2018, the first day of the partial government  shutdown. IRS’s implementation process map also shows that officials  were to send status letters at the start of a shutdown.

A representative of IRS bargaining unit employees told us IRS was  responsive to employee questions during the shutdown and tried to  address all issues raised. The representative noted that IRS had  some challenges communicating with recalled employees as the  shutdown continued but also said that IRS did the best it could, given  its limitations, and did not identify ways to improve employee  communication.

ITA: Commerce directed ITA to distribute notices to employees  explaining individuals’ furlough or excepted status after the shutdown  began, according to ITA officials. On December 26, 2018, the first  working day of the shutdown, ITA officials said they issued these  notices along with a fact sheet about tasks for employees to complete  that day. The fact sheet also communicated policies regarding  scheduled leave and workspace access during the shutdown, among  other things. ITA asked employees to confirm receipt of the notices  during the orderly shutdown period, after which ITA certified to  Commerce that it had issued all notices, according to ITA officials.

A representative for bargaining unit Foreign Service Officers at ITA  suggested that employees might benefit from receiving some  information prior to a shutdown, including standard processes that ITA  has established in policy and that remain the same between  government shutdowns.

USTR: Prior to furloughing employees, USTR instructed employees to  visit its public website daily to verify USTR’s operating status. The  website provided information on transit benefits, unemployment  compensation, and an employee assistance program, among other  things. USTR also communicated changes in operating status through  notifications to employees’ personal telephone numbers and email  accounts during the shutdown, according to USTR officials. These  officials told us that in-person communication worked well to convey  information to staff due to the small size of the agency component,  approximately 250 staff. USTR officials said they emailed all  employees about furloughs that would begin on January 14, 2019,  updated the operating status on its phone line and website, and  directed employees to stay apprised of USTR’s shutdown status.

Before furloughs began, USTR instructed employees to provide  managers with personal contact information, which, according to  officials, managers used to recall employees during the shutdown.  USTR officials said that managers also communicated with individual  employees regarding whether they would continue to work after  January 14, 2019. USTR employees were not represented by an  employee organization.

Selected Agency Components Recalled Employees during the Shutdown, but ITA and USTR Did Not Document Recall Processes

Internal Control Standards states that agency component management  should design and implement control activities, such as shutdown  processes, through policy. Agencies can effectively do so, in part, by  documenting processes and roles and responsibilities for staff  implementing those processes. During the fiscal year 2019 government  shutdown, agencies recalled employees who were previously furloughed  to return to work as the shutdown continued and circumstances changed.  While each agency component had processes to recall employees back  to work during the shutdown, not all components documented these  processes.

CBP: CBP’s non-public portion of the DHS contingency plan for fiscal  year 2019 documented the employee recall process for government  shutdowns. According to the plan, offices were to send a written  request for a recall to the Executive Assistant Commissioner,  Enterprise Services, specifying the number of employees to recall and  the justification for doing so. DHS’s Budget Division and Office of the  General Counsel also reviewed these recall requests, according to a  DHS official. As with its initial excepted and furloughed employee  notices, CBP used email read receipts to determine whether  employees received updates to their furlough or excepted statuses  and CBP recall processes. Additionally, each office had to verify with  the CBP Hiatus Coordinator that updated status notices were sent to  employees.

IRS: IRS documented its procedures for recalling newly excepted  employees during the shutdown in its implementation process map.  IRS communicated these procedures to employees during the  shutdown via its emergency web page and hotline, an updated  Frequently Asked Questions document, and engagement with the  employee organization representing IRS employees in the bargaining  unit, according to IRS officials. IRS delegated the process of recalling  employees to its 23 organizational offices. During the recall process,  IRS managers contacted excepted employees to discuss duties and  the date to report to work, according to IRS officials.

IRS had many instances where the component recalled furloughed  employees for a period of time and furloughed the employees again  when needed, according to an IRS official. This official told us that  IRS issued new furlough letters to employees each time this occurred.  Similarly, IRS offices used an intermittent furlough letter when  excepted employees planned to be away from work. According to the  IRS official, doing so provided documentation of whether those  excepted employees worked or were furloughed on a given day.

ITA: According to ITA officials, once Commerce approved a  temporary exception during the shutdown, ITA’s shutdown coordinator  issued a recall letter to employees. ITA issued recall notices for  temporary exceptions during the shutdown to perform specific work  activities. Once employees completed those activities, ITA issued  another furlough notice to those employees, according to ITA officials.  ITA had a daily employee tracking document that showed exception  start and end dates, and whether recall letters and subsequent  furlough letters were issued to each employee. However, ITA did not  document its recall process.

Similar to its shutdown planning processes, ITA officials said they  relied on Commerce’s employee recall processes instead of  documenting its own specific processes. However, Commerce’s  guidance did not contain information about how ITA developed  temporary exception requests or how ITA processed the recalls.  Without documentation of employee recall processes, ITA cannot  ensure that officials are effectively implementing their processes  during a potential future shutdown. Furthermore, officials who  previously implemented shutdown-related processes may not be  available during future shutdowns. Documentation ensures that  processes that have been deemed to be effective can be replicated by  others in the future.

USTR: USTR recalled additional employees to perform excepted work  during the shutdown. On each day after furloughs began, USTR  recalled up to 30 employees beyond the 74 excepted employees in  the Executive Office of the President’s (EOP) shutdown contingency  plan. The Chief of Staff and Deputy Chief of Staff reviewed a list of  excepted employees each day to identify adjustments to the number  of excepted employees needed, according to USTR officials. These  officials told us that when USTR offices requested employee recalls,  the Chief of Staff and Deputy Chief of Staff consulted with the  responsible Deputy U.S. Trade Representatives to make necessary  changes.

USTR officials did not have a documented process for recalling these  employees. As with its preshutdown contingency planning processes,  USTR officials said that they rely on institutional knowledge to carry  out its recall procedures. Documentation of employee recall  processes would help USTR ensure that officials effectively  implement these processes during future shutdowns, especially given  that officials who previously implemented shutdown-related processes  may not be available during future shutdowns.

Selected Agency Components Reviewed Plans and Operations to Identify Lessons Learned for Future Government Shutdowns

All agency components we reviewed said that they had reviewed or  planned to review their shutdown processes and incorporate any  identified solutions into their internal planning documents or into agency  contingency plans.

CBP: CBP incorporated changes to its policies on employee leave  and absences into its non-public portion of the DHS fiscal year 2020  contingency plan for a potential shutdown. For example, CBP’s fiscal  year 2020 plan now contains examples of when supervisors may  approve absences for excepted employees, such as for previously  approved and ongoing requests under the Family and Medical Leave  Act of 1993.

IRS: Following the fiscal year 2019 shutdown, IRS reviewed its  processes, requesting input from offices about ways to improve those  processes in the case of future government shutdowns. Some  improvements identified by offices included modifying current lapse  plans to incorporate a medium- and long-term view, hosting training  that focuses on frequently asked questions and managerial and  employee responsibilities, and creating user-friendly access to  information.

ITA: ITA planned to cooperate with partner agencies on planned  excepted activities going forward, according to ITA officials. These  officials said they were in contact with their interagency partners at the  time of our review and would work with them prior to a potential future  shutdown to determine whether to submit requests for excepted work  for certain activities.

USTR: USTR reviewed its processes for the fiscal year 2019  shutdown and determined that it operated effectively and would not  require changes for future shutdowns, according to USTR officials.

Selected Agency Components Generally Tracked Employees Working but Did Not Have Controls for Workspace Access during the Shutdown

Three Selected Agency Components Tracked the Number of Employees Who Worked during the Shutdown

Internal Control Standards states that agency component management  should implement control activities through policies. During a government  shutdown, agencies must limit the work performed to only exempt or  excepted activities. Establishing limits for the number of employees  working during a shutdown can help achieve this goal, and agencies can  document these limits in their shutdown contingency plans. Tracking the  number of employees working during a shutdown can help agencies  ensure that they operate in accordance with their established contingency  plans and prevent violations of the ADA.

CBP: According to officials, CBP did not direct program offices to  perform daily head counts of employees working and did not track the  number of employees who worked during the shutdown. CBP officials  told us that it would have been difficult to track employees because it  did not have the systems or data to match the number of planned  excepted employees with the number of employees who actually  worked during the shutdown.

Instead, CBP relied on managers to ensure that individual offices did  not exceed their approved number of excepted positions during the  shutdown. While individual offices could have opted to track the  number of employees working each day for this purpose, CBP officials  said that they did not direct all offices to do so. Tracking the number of  employees who worked during the shutdown would help CBP ensure  that controls to limit who can perform work during a shutdown function  as intended. It would also ensure that its operations are consistent  with contingency plans.

IRS: IRS tracked the number of employees who worked each day  during the shutdown but faced challenges in doing so. IRS directed  managers to ensure that the number of excepted employees in each  office did not exceed the number of approved positions in the  contingency plan, according to IRS officials. An IRS official told us that  each office had discretion for how it complied with this requirement,  such as by requiring a daily headcount of employees. For example,  during the shutdown, IRS’s Wage and Investment Division  documented the office or function under which employees worked and  the number of employees who worked in each. However, as  headcounts proved to be time consuming for offices—Wage and  Investment tracked up to 11,000 employees on one day—IRS officials  told us they plan to move to an automatic tracking system in the  future.

According to IRS officials, IRS hosted daily calls with senior  executives and Lapse Program Managers for each office to discuss  the daily implementation of the shutdown contingency plan. IRS  officials told us that the Heads of Office and Lapse Program  Managers oversaw daily operations in each of their offices to help  ensure operations were consistent with contingency plans. For  example, Wage and Investment officials told us that the Wage and  Investment Commissioner met daily with teams to discuss activities  performed to help ensure that employees performed only the work in  the contingency plan approved prior to the shutdown.

ITA: ITA maintained a daily tracker of excepted employees who were  scheduled to work each day. ITA used this tracker to record excepted  employee names, projects and tasks, exception start and end dates,  exception categories, and travel information as appropriate. Officials  used this information to determine whether employees received the  appropriate furlough or excepted status notice during the shutdown.

USTR: USTR tracked which employees worked during the shutdown  after January 14, 2019, in accordance with EOP guidance. EOP  guidance says that “all EOP components are required to compile and  report daily the name of each excepted employee and certify the  hours worked that week for the duration of a lapse in appropriations to  the  group responsible for payroll.” USTR  provided to EOP daily lists of excepted staff during the shutdown.  These lists helped account for those who were guaranteed pay for  work performed during the shutdown, according to USTR officials.

Selected Agency Components Had Insufficient Controls for Physical and Virtual Workspace Access

Internal Control Standards states that agency component management  should design and implement control activities through policies to help  meet objectives. Effective implementation includes determining the  policies necessary to operate a process based on objectives, such as  limiting physical and virtual employee access to agency component  workspaces and networks.

CBP: In its notices provided to furloughed employees at the start of  the fiscal year 2019 government shutdown, CBP advised employees  that they must remain away from their workplace unless and until  recalled. These furlough notices and CBP’s non-public portion of the  DHS contingency plan also stated that employees could not use their  government-issued devices for any purpose other than receiving  updates and emergency notification from their supervisors. However,  CBP did not have additional controls to limit employee access to  physical or virtual workspaces, according to CBP officials, such as  removing furloughed employees’ ability to logon to CBP networks or  devices. DHS officials indicated that it would be difficult to monitor  access for all excepted employees during a shutdown, especially  given that most CBP employees continued to work during the fiscal  year 2019 shutdown.

IRS: IRS did not have sufficient controls to limit building access or  virtual workspace access during the shutdown. While IRS developed  lists of excepted and exempt employees who could work during the  shutdown, IRS did not use these lists to grant or deny access to  facilities, according to IRS officials. They told us IRS primarily used  these lists to ensure it could provide sufficient services to each  building based on the number of employees expected to work during  the shutdown. IRS’s guidance to furloughed employees stated that  employees should not use government-issued mobile phones or login  to their government accounts remotely, and managers discussed this  requirement with employees, according to IRS officials. IRS also  directed employees not to use other government-furnished equipment  such as computers, according to IRS officials.

However, we found no additional controls to limit virtual network  access during the shutdown. During the shutdown, IRS frequently  substituted which excepted employees performed excepted functions,  resulting in a rotating workforce, according to IRS officials. IRS  officials believed it would be difficult to control physical or virtual  access for all excepted employees in future shutdowns since access  needs changed as frequently as each hour depending on which  employees worked.

ITA: ITA followed Commerce procedures to develop building access  security lists to help ensure building access for excepted and exempt  employees during the shutdown, according to ITA officials. Prior to the  shutdown, Commerce directed agency components to prepare and  submit building access security lists to the department’s Office of  Security each day. If an employee tried to enter the headquarters  building during the shutdown, the Office of Security would contact an  ITA official to verify whether that employee could enter, according to  ITA officials.

These officials told us that employees not on the building access  security list were not granted access to the headquarters building  during the shutdown. While ITA had controls to limit physical  workspace access during the shutdown, it did not have sufficient  controls in place to limit virtual access. According to ITA officials, all  furloughed employees were instructed not to use their government  devices or access the ITA network virtually, and furlough notices  stated that furloughed employees could not work at an alternative  worksite during the shutdown. However, ITA officials believed that  implementing additional controls, such as turning off network access  for furloughed employees, would complicate its process for granting  temporary exceptions for employees during a shutdown.

USTR: USTR provided employees with EOP guidance prior to  implementing furloughs on January 14, 2019. This guidance instructs  furloughed employees not to access their place of work or use  government-issued cell phones or computers. USTR officials told us  they did not have controls in place to monitor employee building  access or prevent furloughed employees from entering physical USTR  workspaces. These officials told us they provided adequate  communications, instructions, and guidance to employees about who  can access physical and virtual workspaces.

USTR officials also told us that they did not have controls in place to  monitor or limit employee access to virtual USTR workspaces.  According to these officials, USTR does not maintain or monitor the  EOP-provided mobile communications devices and information  technology network. Instead, provision and control of  telecommunications and information technology, such as the ones  identified, is the responsibility of the Presidential Information  Technology Community.

While agency components may face challenges implementing workspace  access controls, such as limiting network access for a large number of  employees, these steps are nevertheless important to take. Having  sufficient controls to limit who can perform work during a shutdown would  help agency components ensure that they operate consistently with the  ADA and with contingency plans that are designed to help them operate  effectively and avoid misuse of government resources during a shutdown.  Agency component management can tailor controls to meet the  component’s unique needs. Specific controls used by an agency  component may be different than those used by other components based  on a number of factors, such as differences in mission, size, or  operational environment of the component.

Government shutdowns are disruptive events that have spanned multiple  weeks in recent years. Given the length of some shutdowns, it is  important for agencies to have robust plans and established internal  controls to effectively communicate, plan for potential changes, and  manage operations prior to and during a shutdown. In addition,  documentation of these plans and controls helps ensure that agencies  can replicate their actions in the event of future shutdowns.

According to OMB, agencies should have detailed contingency plans in  place prior to a potential lapse in funding to ensure an orderly shutdown  of operations. While three of four agencies’ contingency plans that we  reviewed addressed most elements laid out in OMB’s guidance, we  identified three elements for which all selected agencies had missing or  incomplete information in their contingency plans. When asked about  these deficiencies, agency officials often cited internal documents or  discussions as addressing these information elements. Internal  documentation and guidance can be useful in planning for a potential  shutdown, but they do not provide the level of transparency of  contingency plans, which are generally available to the public and  furloughed employees. Contingency plans that address all information  elements specified in OMB guidance ensure that agencies are prepared  for potential shutdown scenarios, and provide transparency to agency  actions during a lapse in appropriations.

In addition to contingency plans, the agency components we reviewed all  had internal processes related to planning for and managing operations  during a shutdown. However, not all agency components documented  these processes. Without documentation of shutdown operations,  agencies may not be able to cease operations in a timely manner, and  agencies’ actions may not be transparent to OMB, Congress, and the  public during future shutdowns. Additionally, proper documentation of  processes can help preserve institutional knowledge that might otherwise  be lost.

During a lapse in funding, agencies must ensure that they do not violate  the ADA, which prohibits agencies from obligating or expending funds in  the absence of appropriations unless otherwise authorized by law, and  from accepting voluntary services for the United States except in cases of  emergency involving the safety of human life or the protection of property.  Contingency plans are one control that agencies use in this effort.  Agencies must have assurance that the contingency plan is being  followed daily during a shutdown. This assurance can be verified through  controls that (1) track and document the number of employees who  actually worked daily during the shutdown, and (2) limit physical and  virtual workspace access to appropriate employees. Three of four agency  components we reviewed tracked employees who worked, one had  sufficient controls on physical access to workspaces, and none had  sufficient controls to limit virtual access. Without these controls, agencies  are at an increased risk that contingency plans will not be followed, thus  diminishing their value as a mechanism to ensure ADA compliance.

We are making a total of 14 recommendations, including four to USTR,  three each to CBP and IRS, two to ITA, and one each to the Departments  of Commerce and Homeland Security.

The Secretary of Commerce should align the agency’s contingency plan  with OMB guidance by including (1) plans for a potential prolonged  shutdown; (2) flexibilities available to supervisors if furloughed employees  were unable to return to work after the end of the shutdown; and (3)  procedures for resuming program activities, including steps to ensure  appropriate oversight and disbursement of funds upon the end of a  shutdown. (Recommendation 1)

The Secretary of Homeland Security should align the agency’s  contingency plan with OMB guidance by including (1) plans for a potential  prolonged shutdown; (2) flexibilities available to supervisors if furloughed  employees were unable to return to work after the end of the shutdown;  and (3) procedures for resuming program activities, including steps to  ensure appropriate oversight and disbursement of funds upon the end of  a shutdown. (Recommendation 2)

The Commissioner of Internal Revenue should align the agency’s  contingency plan with OMB guidance by including (1) plans for a potential  prolonged shutdown; (2) flexibilities available to supervisors if furloughed  employees were unable to return to work after the end of the shutdown;  and (3) procedures for resuming program activities, including steps to  ensure appropriate oversight and disbursement of funds upon the end of  a shutdown. (Recommendation 3)

The U.S. Trade Representative, in consultation with EOP as appropriate,  should align the component’s contingency plan with OMB guidance. This  could be accomplished through (1) revisions to the EOP contingency  plan; or (2) by creating a separate USTR plan. (Recommendation 4)

The Under Secretary for International Trade should document the  component’s shutdown processes, including roles and responsibilities,  planning processes for potential shutdowns, and recall processes for  furloughed employees during a shutdown. (Recommendation 5)

The U.S. Trade Representative should document the component’s  shutdown processes, including roles and responsibilities, planning  processes for potential shutdowns, and recall processes for furloughed  employees during a shutdown. (Recommendation 6)

The Commissioner of CBP should develop internal controls to track and  document which employees worked and what work was performed daily  during a government shutdown. (Recommendation 7)

The Commissioner of CBP should develop internal controls to limit  access to physical workspaces to appropriate employees during a  government shutdown. (Recommendation 8)

The Commissioner of Internal Revenue should develop internal controls  to limit access to physical workspaces to appropriate employees during a  government shutdown. (Recommendation 9)

The U.S. Trade Representative should develop internal controls to limit  access to physical workspaces to appropriate employees during a  government shutdown. (Recommendation 10)

The Commissioner of CBP should develop internal controls to limit  access to virtual workspaces to appropriate employees during a  government shutdown. (Recommendation 11)

The Commissioner of Internal Revenue should develop internal controls  to limit access to virtual workspaces to appropriate employees during a  government shutdown. (Recommendation 12)

The Under Secretary for International Trade should develop internal  controls to limit access to virtual workspaces to appropriate employees  during a government shutdown. (Recommendation 13)

The U.S. Trade Representative should, in consultation with EOP, develop  internal controls to limit access to virtual workspaces to appropriate  employees during a government shutdown. (Recommendation 14)

We provided a draft of this report to Commerce, DHS, EOP, IRS, OMB,  and USTR for review and comment. We received written comments from  Commerce, DHS, and IRS, summarized below and reproduced in  appendixes II, III, and IV. USTR provided comments via email, also  summarized below. OMB did not provide comments, citing its focused  efforts on addressing the national emergency response to the coronavirus  pandemic. DHS, EOP, IRS, and USTR provided technical comments,  which we incorporated as appropriate.

Commerce agreed with all three recommendations directed to it and ITA,  and stated that ITA has taken steps to address two of the  recommendations. Commerce stated that ITA has documented its  shutdown planning processes and recall processes for furloughed  employees during a shutdown (recommendation 5). According to  Commerce, ITA has also established and documented internal controls to  limit virtual workspace access to excepted or exempt employees during a  government shutdown (recommendation 13). In addition, Commerce  stated that it will develop an action plan to address the recommendation  to better align its contingency plan with OMB guidance (recommendation  1).

DHS agreed with all four recommendations directed to it and CBP, and  stated that it has begun to take steps to better address OMB guidance on  contingency plans (recommendation 2). In addition, DHS stated that CBP  plans to analyze existing systems to determine which is best suited to  track and document employee work during a government shutdown and  will ensure that the chosen system is available should a future shutdown  occur (recommendation 7).

For the recommendation on developing controls for physical workspaces  (recommendation 8), DHS stated that because CBP does not have  systems capable of efficiently restoring physical access for furloughed  employees, it would have to reinstate employee access individually and  the cost would be substantial. DHS stated that CBP plans to update  procedures to ensure more comprehensive workspace access guidance  for furloughed employees.

With regard to the recommendation on developing controls for virtual  workspace access (recommendation 11), DHS stated that CBP believes  that furloughed employees must be able to passively monitor the status of  the government shutdown and access important agency communications  using DHS-issued electronic devices. Additionally, disabling and  reactivating thousands of employee user accounts during a shutdown  posed a significant burden.

DHS said that CBP plans to update shutdown procedures to clarify  allowed use of DHS-issued electronic devices by furloughed employees.  We agree that CBP should update procedures on workspace access as  suggested, and continue to believe that physical and virtual access  controls are important during shutdowns in order to prevent misuse of  government resources. We encourage CBP to improve their systems to  be able to efficiently implement such controls.

IRS partially agreed with one recommendation addressed to it and  disagreed with two others. IRS agreed with one element of our  recommendation to include additional detail in its agency contingency  plan (recommendation 3) and stated that it is in the process of adding  procedures for resuming program activities following a government  shutdown into its contingency plan.

IRS did not agree with the other elements of the recommendation  because it believes it has already addressed plans for a potential  prolonged shutdown and flexibilities for supervisors if employees are  unable to return to work at the end of a shutdown in its contingency plans.  We agree that while IRS has included some details on these elements in  its plans, we continue to believe that it should provide more detail, such  as points in time when the furlough status of an employee may change,  how many employees would be affected, and the legal basis for the  changes, within its publically available contingency plan to fully address  these elements.

IRS disagreed with our recommendations on developing controls for  physical and virtual workspace access during a shutdown  (recommendations 9 and 12). For both recommendations, IRS stated that  it believes that it has effective controls in place to manage physical and  virtual workspace access during a shutdown. In addition, IRS said that it  believes that implementing additional access controls do not justify the  corresponding resource investments.

We continue to believe that IRS should improve its access controls, which  currently rely on managers and furlough letters to communicate limits on  workspace access. While we recognize the costs of increased access  controls, government shutdowns are unique events that require additional  access controls in order to prevent potential misuse of government  resources.

In USTR’s emailed comments, its Assistant U.S. Trade Representative for  Administration neither agreed nor disagreed with the four  recommendations addressed to it. The official, however, stated that  USTR has already begun addressing our recommendations on aligning  its contingency plan with OMB guidance (recommendation 4) and  documenting its shutdown processes (recommendation 6), and has made  EOP aware of the recommendations on developing controls for physical  and virtual workspace access during a shutdown (recommendations 10  and 14).

As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce the contents of  this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days from the  report date. At that time, we will send copies to the appropriate  congressional committees, the Secretary of Commerce, the Acting  Commissioner of U.S. Customs and Border Protection, the Acting  Secretary of Homeland Security, the Commissioner of the Internal  Revenue Service, the Acting Under Secretary for International Trade, the  Director of the Office of Management and Budget, the U.S. Trade  Representative, and other interested parties. In addition, the report will be  available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov.

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact  me at (202) 512-9110 or mctiguej@gao.gov. Contact points for our  Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on  the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this  report are listed in appendix V.

James R. McTigue, Jr.  Director, Strategic Issues.

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

This report assesses the extent to which (1) selected agencies’  contingency plans were consistent with applicable Office of Management  and Budget (OMB) guidance, (2) selected agency components planned  for a potential prolonged shutdown and changed operations during the  shutdown, and (3) selected agency components’ shutdown policies and  procedures were consistent with relevant internal control principles.

We selected four agency components under the jurisdiction of the Senate  Committee on Finance that were affected by the fiscal year 2019  shutdown. When more than one agency component at an agency met  these criteria, we selected the component that had the largest budget and  the greatest planned number of employees performing excepted work  during the shutdown. While the four components we selected are not  generalizable to other agency components, they do reflect variation in  size, funding type, and justification for excepted work that serve as  illustrative examples of a range of experiences. These selected agency  components are

U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), Department of Homeland  Security (DHS);  Internal Revenue Service (IRS), Department of the Treasury  (Treasury);  International Trade Administration (ITA), Department of Commerce  (Commerce); and

Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR), Executive  Office of the President (EOP).

To address our first objective, we compared information in selected  agencies’ government shutdown contingency plans to key information  elements described in OMB guidance. Specifically, we identified 14 key  information elements in the 2018 OMB Circular No. A-11 Section 124— Agency Operations in the Absence of Appropriations (Circular A-11), the  applicable guidance, at the beginning of the partial government shutdown  that began on December 22, 2018. This document details the  information agencies should include in their contingency plans, such as  significant agency activities that will continue or cease during a shutdown,  the number of employees who will continue to work during a shutdown,  and necessary actions for resuming orderly operations after a shutdown.

Three of our four selected agency components—CBP, ITA, and USTR— operated under an agency-wide plan. Therefore, we evaluated the fiscal  year 2019 contingency plans for Commerce, DHS, and EOP. Each  component of DHS has a non-public, for official use only, portion of the  agency-wide plan, and we included CBP’s non-public portion in our  evaluation. Because Treasury’s contingency plan did not cover IRS, we  evaluated IRS’s contingency plans for this objective. We also reviewed  written responses from OMB and interviewed officials at selected  agencies to understand the reasons for any discrepancies between the  contingency plans and OMB guidance.

To address our second objective, we assessed the extent to which  selected agency components planned for a potential prolonged  shutdown—one longer than 5 days—as outlined by Circular A-11, and  changed operations during the shutdown. We reviewed shutdown  contingency plans and other planning documents at CBP, IRS, ITA, and  USTR to determine agency component processes for proposing,  reviewing, and approving operational changes during a government  shutdown. We interviewed officials at these agency components to  determine what operational changes components made during the fiscal  year 2019 shutdown and the key factors that led to these changes.

To address our third objective, we assessed selected agency  components’ shutdown processes to determine the extent to which the  components followed relevant internal control principles in planning for  the fiscal year 2019 government shutdown. We reviewed our Standards  for Internal Control in the Federal Government (Internal Control  Standards) and identified key principles related to agency components’  shutdown processes. Relevant internal control standards include  designing and implementing appropriate policies and procedures and  effectively communicating this information to stakeholders. This would  include policies and procedures to ensure an orderly shutdown process  and compliance with applicable laws such as the Antideficiency Act  (ADA).

We developed a questionnaire for selected agency components based on  these internal control principles that reflected practices we determined to  be associated with effectively implementing the controls in the context of  a government shutdown, such as documentation of shutdown processes  or employee communication. We reviewed the results of this  questionnaire, reviewed agency component contingency plans and other  internal planning documents, and interviewed component officials to  determine the extent to which components followed these internal control  principles. We assessed the sufficiency of selected agency components’  internal controls based on whether the evidence gathered contained  relevant details about a component’s shutdown processes that  demonstrated the component would have reasonable assurance of  achieving its shutdown objectives. While we assessed agency  components’ shutdown processes, we did not assess the results of those  processes, such as whether components correctly or appropriately  categorized activities as excepted from the ADA.

We interviewed officials at selected agency components to understand  the reasons for any inconsistencies between component planning and  decision-making processes and internal control principles. We also  interviewed representatives of employee organizations at the agency  components we reviewed to determine if communication of shutdown- related policies and procedures was timely, sufficient, and transparent.

In addition, we selected one program office within each reviewed agency  component to identify illustrative examples of how components  operationalized their shutdown processes. For CBP, IRS, and ITA, we  selected the program offices with the largest budget based on available  budget data. Based on this criterion, we selected CBP’s Office of Field  Operations, IRS’s Wage and Investment division, and ITA’s Global  Markets office. Selection of these program offices provided for a variety of  justifications for excepted work and number of planned excepted  employees. Due to the size of USTR, the agency component does not  manage based on program offices, according to USTR officials. Because  of this, we did not select a program office within USTR. We reviewed  documents and interviewed officials in these program offices to determine  how they planned for the fiscal year 2019 government shutdown,  communicated with employees, and recalled furloughed employees back  to work, among other things.

We conducted this performance audit from March 2019 to June 2020 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.

Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Commerce

Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security

Appendix IV: Comments from the Internal Revenue Service

Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

James R. McTigue, Jr. at (202) 512-9110 or mctiguej@gao.gov.

In addition to the individual named above, Danielle Novak, Assistant  Director; Shelby Kain, Analyst-in-Charge; Alyssia Borsella; Kendall Chan;  Jacqueline Chapin; Ann Czapiewski; Kristine Hassinger; J. Andrew  Howard; Ulyana Panchishin; Steven Putansu; and Melissa Wolf made  major contributions to this report. Ted Hu and Triana McNeil also  contributed to the report.

Generally, federal agencies are only allowed to spend the money that Congress has given them. During a government shutdown, agencies may not have funds—raising questions about whether work may continue. How do agencies plan for this?

We reviewed 4 agencies’ contingency plans and operations during FY 2019’s partial shutdown. The plans generally followed federal guidance, but didn’t cover prolonged shutdown scenarios.

None had computer network controls to prevent logging on

Our recommendations are to help improve these agencies’ shutdown plans and operations.