Combating Nuclear Terrorism: DHS Should Address Limitations to Its Program to Secure Key Cities

Countering the threat that a terrorist could smuggle nuclear or radiological materials into the United States is a top national security priority. In fiscal year 2007, DHS initiated the STC program to reduce the risk of the deployment of a nuclear or radiological weapon by establishing capability in state and local agencies to detect and deter such threats. Since the program began, five participating cities have spent almost $145 million in program funds.

GAO was asked to review the STC program. This report examines (1) the extent to which DHS tracks cities' use of program funds and assesses their performance; (2) what assurance DHS has that cities can sustain capabilities gained through the STC program and the challenges, if any, that cities face in sustaining such capabilities; and (3) potential changes to the STC program and how DHS plans to implement them, the basis for these changes, and the extent to which DHS has communicated with cities about the impact of making changes. GAO reviewed DHS documents, conducted site visits to all cities in the program, and interviewed DHS and city officials.

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) does not collect information to fully track cities' use of Securing the Cities (STC) program funds for approved purposes and to assess their performance in the program. To reduce the risk of successful deployment of nuclear or radiological weapons in U.S. cities, the program establishes local threat detection and deterrence capabilities. DHS tracks cities' spending of program funds and some performance data through cities' quarterly reports but does not collect other data on itemized expenditures and to assess how effectively cities achieved performance metrics and program milestones or how they performed in drills that simulate a threat. For example, DHS does not compare information on expenditures to the purchase plans it approved for cities. As a result, DHS does not know the dollar amounts cities actually spent on program purchases. Expenditure data GAO requested show that cities spent most funds on detection equipment—that is, $94.5 million of the $144.8 million cities spent through June 30, 2018. By regularly collecting expenditure information from cities and comparing it to approved purchase plans, DHS could better ensure these funds were spent consistent with program goals.

DHS does not have assurance that cities can sustain threat detection and deterrence capabilities gained through the STC program. DHS has not enforced planning requirements for sustaining those capabilities and has taken limited action to help cities do so, although encouraging sustainment is one of its primary program goals. Officials from the five cities in the program told GAO that they anticipate funding challenges that will adversely impact their ability to sustain capabilities over time. For example, several city officials said they cannot rely on other DHS or federal grant programs or local sources of funding once STC funding ends. Unless DHS analyzes risks related to sustainment, works with cities to address these risks, and enforces sustainment-planning requirements for cities in the program in the future, program participants could see their radiological detection programs and related capabilities deteriorate.

DHS has not (1) fully developed potential changes or documented a plan for making changes to the STC program; (2) identified the basis for such changes; and (3) consistently communicated with cities, raising concerns about how the changes will impact them. DHS officials told GAO that the agency is considering several potential changes to the STC program that would broaden its geographic reach and scope and centralize acquisition of detection equipment, among other things, but it has not fully developed or documented these changes and does not have a strategy or plan for implementing them. A law enacted in December 2018 requires DHS to develop an implementation plan for the STC program. The law's requirements would provide DHS an opportunity to identify the basis for potential changes, and assessing such changes would provide more reasonable assurance that they would strengthen the program. Further, most city officials GAO interviewed said that in an August 2018 meeting, DHS provided a high-level overview of potential changes and little detail on how such changes would be implemented or affect city operations. If DHS does not clearly communicate to cities how the program will operate under potential changes, these cities could face difficulties planning for the future and achieving the program's detection and deterrence objectives.

GAO is making four recommendations including that DHS regularly collect detailed information from cities on program expenditures; analyze risks related to sustainment, work with cities to address these risks, and enforce sustainment-planning requirements for cities in the program; and clearly communicate to cities how the existing program will operate until a new program is in effect. DHS concurred with GAO's recommendations.

The United States faces an enduring threat that terrorists could smuggle  in nuclear or radiological materials to use in a terrorist attack. U.S. efforts  to counter such threats are considered a top national priority, according to  the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). DHS is responsible for  ensuring that equipment and technologies necessary to detect these  materials are integrated, as appropriate, with other border security  systems.

According to DHS officials, in fiscal year 2007, DHS initiated the Securing  the Cities (STC) program, which seeks to prevent the successful  planning, movement, and deployment of a nuclear or radiological weapon  and component materials within the United States by enhancing the  nuclear detection capabilities of federal, state, local, tribal, and territorial  agencies. DHS intends for this capability to be sustained even after cities  are no longer eligible for STC funding. Accordingly, the STC program  funds the purchase of commercial radiation detection devices and other  detection equipment and provides detection training for up to 5 years,  after which cities are expected to obtain alternative sources of support to  sustain capabilities they developed under the program.

Since the program began, the five cities participating in the program have  spent almost $145 million in program funds. According to DHS officials,  DHS launched the program in the New York City, Jersey City, and  Newark area (New York—New Jersey) in fiscal year 2007, then  expanded the program to Los Angeles—Long Beach in fiscal year 2012;  the National Capital Region in fiscal year 2014; Houston in fiscal year  2015; and Chicago in fiscal year 2016. After New York—New Jersey,  each city added to the program was eligible for up to $30 million in STC  funds over 5 years. The agency intends to expand the program to  additional cities and geographic regions and make other changes to the  scope and goals of the program in coming years, according to agency  officials. The annual program budget for the STC program was $40  million at the outset of the program in fiscal year 2008; over the past 4  years, the annual budget has been about $22 million (see fig. 1).

DHS’s Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) implemented the STC  program for the program’s first decade. During this time, DNDO was the  primary entity in the U.S. government responsible for implementing  domestic nuclear detection efforts to support a managed and coordinated  strategy to counter nuclear or radiological threats. DHS designed the STC  program to be part of the interior layer of the Global Nuclear Detection  Architecture (GNDA). The GNDA is a multilayered framework  encompassing many different federal programs, projects, and activities to  detect and deter nuclear smuggling in foreign countries, at the U.S.  border, and inside the United States.

In October 2017, DHS initiated an intradepartmental reorganization under  which DNDO was consolidated with other offices, including the Office of  Health Affairs, into a new office known as the Countering Weapons of  Mass Destruction Office (CWMD). The Countering Weapons of Mass  Destruction Act of 2018, signed into law on December 21, 2018,  redesignates DNDO as CWMD and directs the establishment of the STC  program under CWMD. CWMD’s mission includes additional priorities  beyond detecting and deterring nuclear or radiological threats, such as  defending against chemical and biological threats. To reflect current  operations at DHS, we refer to CWMD throughout the remainder of this  report as the entity that implements or has implemented the STC  program.

You asked us to review the activities, results, and outcomes of the STC  program. This report examines (1) the extent to which DHS tracks cities’  use of funds and assesses their performance; (2) what assurance DHS  has that cities can sustain capabilities gained through the STC program  and the challenges, if any, that cities face in sustaining such capabilities;  and (3) potential changes to the STC program and how DHS plans to  implement them, the basis for these changes, and the extent to which  DHS has communicated with current cities about the impact of making  changes.

To determine the extent to which DHS tracks cities’ use of funds and  performance, we reviewed relevant laws, DHS documents, and data and  information that the cities provided to DHS at our request. Specifically, we  requested that DHS ask for data from all five cities participating in the  program on expenditures made with program funds, and analyzed these  data. We also reviewed documents related to program operations such as  notices of funding opportunities and financial assistance awards, quarterly  financial reports from cities participating in the program, and audits of the  STC program. We did not specifically evaluate whether cities’ purchases  with program funds aligned with CWMD’s approved purchase plans for  cities because some data were not available and because of reporting  lags in data that were available. However, we assessed available data’s  reliability by reviewing related documentation, interviewing knowledgeable  officials, and tracing a selection of data from source documents. Through  these steps, we determined that these data were sufficiently reliable for  summarizing the amount of funds spent on program activities and  equipment purchases by type.

In addition, we reviewed documents related to the STC program’s  performance, such as CWMD’s Program Management Plan for the  Securing the Cities Program (“Program Management Plan”) and  quarterly performance reports that cities provide to CWMD. We also  visited all five cities participating in the program to interview program  managers and local officials and to observe facilities, equipment, and  training exercises. Further, we compared DHS’s implementation of the  STC program with federal internal control standards for control activities  and information and communication, as well as with leading practices  described in our prior work.

To examine what assurance DHS has that cities can sustain capabilities  gained through the STC program and the challenges, if any, that cities  face in sustaining such capabilities, we collected and reviewed cities’  plans for sustaining capabilities once program funds are no longer  available. We also reviewed DHS’s guidance documents for preparing  sustainment plans, such as CWMD’s Project Management Plan and  sustainment plan template. We also interviewed DHS and city officials  about how they were preparing to sustain capabilities developed under  the program and about any challenges they faced or expected to  encounter in the future. For example, we asked the officials about other  sources of funds cities could use for sustainment once STC funds are no  longer available. In addition, we compared DHS’s implementation of  sustainment planning under the STC program with federal internal control  standards for risk assessment.

To examine potential changes to the STC program and DHS’s plan for  implementing them, the basis for these changes, and the extent to which  DHS has communicated the impact of these changes to cities in the  program, we reviewed DHS’s budget justifications and other agency  documents. We also interviewed DHS and officials at other key  agencies—the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Department  of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)—that  coordinate with DHS on nuclear and radiological security issues. In  addition, we interviewed city officials about their communications with  DHS regarding making changes to the program, including during our site  visits to these cities. Further, we compared DHS’s communication with  cities about making program changes with federal internal control  standards for information and communication, as well as with  recommended practices that are described in our prior work.

We conducted this performance audit from November 2017 to May 2019  in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.

This section provides an overview of (1) the impact of nuclear or  radiological events, (2) U.S. efforts to combat nuclear or radiological  smuggling, (3) STC program goals and phases, (4) how the STC program  operates, and (5) STC program activities.

Impact of Nuclear or Radiological Events

We previously reported that a terrorist’s use of either an improvised  nuclear device or a radiological dispersal device could have devastating  consequences, including not only loss of life but also enormous  psychological and economic impacts. An improvised nuclear device is a  crude nuclear bomb made with highly enriched uranium or plutonium. A  radiological dispersal device —frequently referred to as a dirty bomb— would disperse radioactive materials into the environment through a  conventional explosive or through other means. Depending on the type of  radiological dispersal device, the area contaminated could be as small as  part of a building or a city block or as large as several square miles. If  either type of device were used in a populated area, hundreds of  individuals might be killed or injured from the explosion or face the risk of  later developing health effects because of exposure to radiation and  radioactive contamination.

U.S. Efforts to Combat Nuclear or Radiological Smuggling

U.S. efforts to counter nuclear or radiological threats are considered a top  national priority. Federal agencies that have a role in combating nuclear  or radiological smuggling are responsible for implementing their own  programs under the GNDA. The GNDA comprises programs run by U.S.  agencies, including DHS, the FBI, and NNSA, as well as partnerships  with local, state, tribal, and territorial governments; the private sector; and  international partners. These programs are designed to encounter, detect,  characterize, and report on nuclear or radiological materials that are “out  of regulatory control”, such as those materials that have been smuggled  or stolen. Under DHS’s reorganization, there is no longer a specific  directorate in charge of GNDA responsibilities, according to CWMD  officials. However, CWMD officials said that GNDA responsibilities, such  as identifying gaps in current nuclear detection capabilities, will be  distributed throughout CWMD components.

CWMD initiated the STC program with three primary goals: (1) enhance  regional capabilities to detect and interdict unregulated nuclear and other  radiological materials, (2) guide the coordination of STC cities in their  roles defined by the GNDA, and (3) encourage participants to sustain  their nuclear or radiological detection programs over time.

According to the Program Management Plan, for each city, the STC  program consists of three phases that provide for the development,  integration, and sustainment of nuclear or radiological detection capability  by cities to support state, local, and tribal operations.

Phase 1: Development of initial operating capability. CWMD  provides a mechanism for cities to develop initial operating capability  to detect and report the presence of nuclear or radiological materials  that are out of regulatory control. During phase 1, efforts focus on  satisfying the immediate needs of state and local agencies in  developing detection and reporting capabilities. This phase of the  implementation is expected to take 3 years.

Phase 2: Integration. CWMD provides additional resources to cities  to allow them to develop enhanced detection, analysis,  communication, and coordination functionality. These resources build  on the integration of state and local capabilities with U.S. government  activities and the GNDA that existed prior to cities’ participation in the  STC program or were established during phase 1. This phase is  expected to take about 2 years.

Phase 3: Sustainment. CWMD provides indirect support to cities to  sustain their capabilities. CWMD maintains a relationship with local  program operators through assistance with alarm response and  subject matter expertise. For example, it provides advice to cities on  training, practice exercises, and questions as they arise.

As of March 2019, Chicago and Houston are in phase 1 of the program,  the National Capital Region is in phase 2, and New York—New Jersey  and Los Angeles—Long Beach are in phase 3.

The STC program operates as a cooperative agreement between CWMD  and eligible cities. Accordingly, a substantial amount of interaction is  expected between CWMD and program participants. A full cooperative  agreement package for the STC program includes a notice of funding  opportunity, notice of financial assistance award (assistance award), and  general guidance documents for the program. It also includes  requirements for cities to develop performance metrics for achieving key  program tasks, such as purchasing equipment and conducting training,  and to submit quarterly financial and performance reports.

CWMD seeks applications for the program through a notice of funding  opportunity, which lays out eligibility criteria and other requirements.  According to CWMD officials, after New York—New Jersey was accepted  into the STC program, CWMD opened up eligibility for the program to  cities in DHS’s Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI) identified as having  the highest risk for a terrorist attack. In the application process, one  local government entity applies as the principal partner for the city (e.g.,  the New York Police Department is the principal partner for New York— New Jersey).

Once CWMD accepts a city into the program, the city receives an  assistance award, which details the approved budget for the year and  may include an approved purchase plan. DHS prefers that a lead  agency within the city distributes funds or any equipment purchased with  program funds to the other state and local partners, such as police  departments of neighboring jurisdictions, fire departments, or public  health officials, among others. According to CWMD officials, every year  cities in the program must apply for the next increment of funding from the  program; if a city’s application is approved, it receives an amendment to  its assistance award. There is a 5-year period of performance— corresponding to phases 1 and 2—under which the cities are eligible to  receive and obligate funding. CWMD officials told us that they can grant  an extension to cities to obligate the funds if they have not been able to  do so within the original 5-year period. In phase 3 of the program, CWMD  may provide technical assistance or subject matter expertise to cities but  no further funding.

Cities in the STC program may spend their funds on nuclear and  radiological detection equipment, training, and administrative program  costs, among other things. Several types of detection equipment may be  approved for purchase.

Personal radiation detectors (PRD) are wearable radiation  detectors, approximately the size of a cell phone. When exposed to  elevated radiation levels, the devices alarm with flashing lights, tones,  vibrations, or combinations of these. Most PRDs numerically display  the detected radiation intensity (on a scale of 0 to 9) and thus can be  used to alert the officer of a nearby radiation source. However, they  typically are not as sensitive as more advanced detectors and cannot  identify the type of radioactive source.

Radiation detection backpacks are used for primary screening and  for conducting wide area searches, according to CWMD officials.  These officials said the size of the detector contained within the  backpack allows the operator greater detection sensitivity as  compared to a PRD. CWMD officials also said these devices are  especially useful for screening a large venue for radiological materials  prior to occupancy by the public.

Radiation isotope identification devices are radiation detectors that  can analyze the energy spectrum of radiation, which enables them to  identify the specific radioactive material emitting the radiation. Such  devices are used to determine if detected radiation is coming from a  potential threat or from naturally occurring radioactive material, such  as granite.

Mobile detection systems contain larger detectors. Typically, mobile  detection systems interface with a laptop computer to display alarms  and analysis, and are capable of both detection and identification.  This type of system may be mounted on vehicle platforms, such as  cars, trucks, vans, boats, or helicopters.

Figure 2 shows examples of such equipment.

Such equipment and associated training are the basis for the capability  provided through the STC program. Officials we interviewed in one STC  city told us that in order to operate the equipment, law enforcement, fire,  health, and other state and local personnel must take training on the  process for screening and for resolving alarms related to suspected  nuclear or radiological material. As shown in figure 3, primary screening is  the first step of the process: if an officer is able to determine the source of  the alarm and deems it a nonthreat, then the case is resolved. According  to CWMD officials, PRDs often detect nuclear or radiological materials  that do not actually pose threats, such as radiation from medical  treatments and from naturally occurring substances such as granite. An  officer who is not able to determine the source of the alarm should initiate  a secondary screening process; according to CWMD officials, secondary  screening varies by locality. Officers with advanced training conduct  secondary screening by using equipment such as radiological isotope  identification devices to identify the type of source material detected.

If, after secondary screening, officers still suspect a threat, they can  contact technical “reachback,” which is a system that puts officers on the  ground in communication with off-site specialists and resources. This  technical reachback can provide greater expertise, including the ability to  analyze the energy spectrum detected during screening and improve  identification of the source and nature of the potential threat. CWMD  officials said that the technical reachback may occur at the state and local  or national level. State and local technical reachback procedures may  vary, but national level technical reachback is standardized with 24-hour  call centers run by the Department of Energy or U.S. Customs and Border  Protection.

According to CWMD officials, at any point in the screening process, if a  secondary screening device is utilized, it is standard protocol for the  officer to alert the FBI of the incident. If a threat is suspected, the FBI can  deploy a team that is trained to respond to such a threat.

DHS Does Not Collect Information to Fully Track Cities’ Use of STC Funds for Approved Purposes and Assess Cities’ Performance

DHS’s CWMD does not collect information to fully track cities’ use of STC  funds for approved purposes and to assess the cities’ performance in the  program. Specifically, CWMD tracks cities’ spending using program  funds and some performance data through quarterly reports that it  collects from cities, but does not collect other key data to track itemized  expenditures and to assess how effectively cities achieved key  performance metrics and program milestones or how they performed in  exercises or drills that simulate a nuclear or radiological threat.

CWMD Tracks Some Spending Data but Does Not Collect Data to Ensure That Funds Are Spent as Approved

CWMD tracks cities’ spending using program funds through quarterly  financial reports it collects from cities, according to CWMD officials, but  does not collect other key data to ensure that funds are spent for  approved purposes and not spent on unrelated program activities.  Specifically, CWMD provides each city eligible for additional funding an  assistance award every year that includes an approved budget for  spending categories such as program staff and equipment, but CWMD  officials told us that CWMD does not track itemized expenditures to  ensure that program funds were spent according to this budget.  According to CWMD’s program agreements with cities, cities must have  written approval from DHS in advance of spending obligated program  funds for all equipment purchases in the amount of $5,000 or more per  unit cost. However, CWMD officials told us that because of time and  resource constraints, they do not collect data that cities maintain in their  internal systems on the expenditures they actually made with program  funds, even though CWMD’s program agreements with cities typically  specify that CWMD or DHS’s Grants and Financial Assistance Division  (GFAD) may access these data at any time.

Furthermore, although GFAD officials told us that CWMD, in conjunction  with the Grants Officer at GFAD, has the authority to conduct  programmatic and financial audits and site visits to cities, these audits are  infrequent and limited in their ability to ensure that cities’ expenditures  were in accordance with CWMD’s approved purchase plans, which take  into account program goals and objectives. According to these officials, in  the program’s history, GFAD has conducted a total of two desk audits in  two STC cities—New York—New Jersey and Los Angeles—Long Beach.  GFAD initiated these two audits in 2015 and, according to GFAD officials,  examined a small random sample of purchases. GFAD officials said they  do not currently plan to conduct any additional audits in STC cities  because of resource constraints.

The extent of CWMD’s tracking of cities use of STC program funds is not  consistent with federal internal control standards, which state that  program management should design control activities to achieve  objectives, such as comparing actual performance to planned or expected  results and analyzing significant differences. However, according to  CWMD officials, CWMD does not compare information on expenditures to  cities’ approved purchase plans. As a result, DHS does not know the  dollar amounts cities actually spent on program purchases. By regularly  collecting detailed information from cities on expenditures made using  program funds and comparing that information to approved purchase  plans, CWMD would have greater assurance that cities spent funds as  approved and that the expenditures are in keeping with program goals  and objectives.

Because CWMD does not regularly collect or maintain data on how cities  spent program funds, we requested that it ask cities for these data and  provide them for our review. Table 1 summarizes STC program funds  obligated to and spent by each city and shows that New York—New  Jersey spent about three-quarters of all STC funds—about $110 million of  the $145 million cities spent as of June 30, 2018. As discussed above,  New York—New Jersey was the pilot city for the program and was not  subject to the $30 million limit on program funding. In addition to program  funds, CWMD provided cities with nonmonetary assistance in the form of  training, among other things.

These data also show that cities spent most STC funds on equipment  purchases. Specifically, about two-thirds of STC funds spent were for  equipment to detect nuclear or radiological threats—about $95 million of  the $145 million spent. Among the four cities that have purchased  equipment, the largest equipment purchase category was PRDs, at over  $40 million. Cities also reported purchasing equipment such as  backpacks that contain radiation detectors; radiation isotope identification  devices, which identify the type of radiation that is emitted from a source;  and mobile systems that detect radiation from a vehicle on the ground or  in the air. In addition, cities spent STC funds on training, staff, and  contracts for training and other services, according to the data.  Collectively, cities spent about 6 percent of program funds on training, 3  percent on staff, and 14 percent on contracts for training and other  services. (See table 2.)

CWMD Tracks Some Performance Data but Does Not Collect Data to Ensure That Performance Metrics and Program Milestones Are Achieved

CWMD tracks some performance data in quarterly reports it collects from  cities, but it does not collect data to ensure that key performance metrics  and program milestones identified in the Program Management Plan are  achieved. For example, the quarterly reports CWMD collects from cities  show the quantities of equipment, by type, that cities purchased with STC  funds over the course of the program (see table 3), but these reports do  not show whether the quantities of equipment met cities’ targets for  equipment purchases. In addition, these reports do not show how much  cities spent to purchase equipment for the program.

CWMD’s notices of funding opportunity require cities to identify and  submit key performance metrics for measuring progress against their  objectives and a schedule of program milestones as part of their  application to the STC program. According to the CWMD officials, each  STC city submitted a Gantt chart—which plots planned activities over  time—as part of its initial application. However, over the course of the  program, CWMD found this tool had limited value and later gave each city  the latitude to manage its program timeline as it deemed appropriate.

In addition to the Gantt charts, CWMD officials said they provided cities  with templates to develop checklists to document their progress against  their objectives and compare their progress to planned actions. However,  CWMD officials told us that they view this checklist as a guide to help  cities plan rather than a firm program requirement, and cities have not  submitted these checklists. Until CWMD requires cities to submit  checklists or equivalent information on their progress in the STC program,  it will not have complete information on how cities are performing  compared to the key performance metrics and program milestones they  identified for themselves.

CWMD Does Not Consistently Collect Information on How Cities Performed during Drills and Exercises

CWMD does not consistently collect information on how cities performed  during STC program-funded exercises and drills that test cities’ ability to  detect a simulated nuclear or radiological threat. CWMD’s notices of  funding opportunity entered into after 2007 generally state under program  performance reporting requirements that cities must submit operational  reports, such as exercise after-action summaries. CWMD officials told us  that they have provided STC cities with a template for preparing after- action reports—which assess a city’s performance during an exercise and  include improvement plans following exercises that the program funded.  These reports and plans could provide greater insight than quarterly  performance reports on the effectiveness of cities’ capabilities.  Nonetheless, available performance data show that CWMD did not  enforce this requirement and that cities have submitted very few after- action reports. In their quarterly performance reports, the four cities other  than New York—New Jersey reported completing 231 drills and exercises  but only five after-action reports and one improvement plan. Officials from  New York—New Jersey, whose performance reporting requirements  differ from those of other cities according to CWMD officials, said that  they complete over 100 drills and exercises per year but do not complete  after-action reports because of the amount of paperwork that would be  required.

CWMD officials said that they did not enforce the requirement to submit  after-action reports and improvement plans because they felt they could  not force cities to report this information. Officials also told us that even  though cities are aware of requirements in CWMD’s notices of funding  opportunity to provide these reports and plans, cities may be reluctant to  complete them because they could highlight weaknesses in their  capabilities.

We have previously found that a leading practice to promote successful  data-driven performance reviews includes participants engaging in  rigorous and sustained follow-up on issues identified during reviews.  Until CWMD more fully assesses cities’ performance by consistently  enforcing reporting requirements on how cities performed during  exercises, it cannot assess the extent to which cities could effectively  detect or deter a nuclear or radiological threat.

DHS Does Not Have Assurance That Cities Can Sustain Capabilities Gained through the Program, and Cities Face Funding Challenges

DHS’s CWMD does not have assurance that cities can sustain threat  detection and deterrence capabilities gained through the STC program,  and cities anticipate funding challenges once STC program funding ends.  Specifically, CWMD has not enforced sustainment planning requirements  and has taken limited action to help cities sustain their capabilities, even  though encouraging sustainment is one of its primary program goals.  Cities anticipate funding challenges that will adversely affect their ability  to sustain capabilities after the program.

CWMD Has Not Enforced Sustainment Planning Requirements and Has Taken Limited Action to Help Cities Sustain Capabilities

CWMD identified a key goal related to sustainment of cities’ nuclear or  radiological detection program overtime in its Project Management Plan  and requires cities to plan for sustainment. However, CWMD has not  enforced sustainment planning requirements and has taken limited action  to help cities sustain capabilities. CWMD’s program agreements generally  require cities to submit plans describing how they will sustain capabilities  gained through the program. For example, some of CWMD’s program  agreements state that these sustainment plans must (1) explain how the  city will support and sustain STC capabilities after completing the  program, (2) describe potential sources of future financial support, and (3)  commit to obtaining future financial assistance beyond CWMD support.

However, CWMD accepted sustainment plans from four cities that did not  identify how they will sustain capabilities once program funding ended.  Each of the cities’ plans clearly state that they will have difficulty  sustaining the program without additional federal funds. (See fig.4.) We  also found that three of the four sustainment plans submitted to CWMD  provide little detail about the specific equipment or training cities expect  they will need after program funding ends. CWMD, however, did not take  steps to address these concerns because CWMD officials said that they  viewed finding alternative sources of funding to sustain capabilities as the  cities’ responsibility.

CWMD officials told us that they provide some ongoing technical  assistance to cities in the sustainment phase of the program, but this  assistance does not include additional funding. Thus far, New York—New  Jersey is the only city of the two cities in the sustainment phase that has  received technical assistance.

Furthermore, CWMD did not consistently take steps to ensure that cities  planned for sustainment when making purchasing decisions. As  previously noted, program agreements generally require sustainment  plans. Under CWMD’s Project Management Plan, CWMD expects cities  to submit those sustainment plans to CWMD within 24 months of their  initial award date. However, New York—New Jersey and Los Angeles— Long Beach did not submit their sustainment plans until many years after  they began to receive STC funding. New York—New Jersey, for example,  did not submit a draft sustainment plan until 2015, nearly 8 years after the  city initially received funding because CWMD did not include a  sustainment plan requirement for the city until its award for fiscal year  2011 and allowed 36 months to complete a sustainment plan. Similarly,  Los Angeles—Long Beach did not submit a draft sustainment plan until  2017—5 years after the city initially received funding. In its program  agreement with Los Angeles—Long Beach, CWMD required that a  sustainment plan be submitted within 18 months of the award date, but  CWMD did not enforce this requirement and accepted a sustainment plan  from Los Angeles—Long Beach that was significantly delayed. It is  unclear whether New York—New Jersey and Los Angeles—Long Beach  ever finalized their draft sustainment plans.

CWMD identified sustainment as a program goal but has not enforced its  own requirements related to this goal or taken steps to analyze the risks  sustainment challenges pose to its program’s success. Federal internal  control standards state that program management should identify,  analyze, and respond to risks related to achieving the defined objectives.  Unless CWMD analyzes risks related to sustainment, works with cities to  address these risks, and enforces sustainment planning requirements for  cities that join the program in the future, program participants could see  their radiological detection programs and related capabilities deteriorate  over time.

Cities Anticipate Funding Challenges to Sustaining Capabilities

Officials from all five cities raised concerns to us about their ability to  maintain capabilities over time without a dedicated source of funding once  STC program funding ends. For example, New York—New Jersey  officials told us that they informed CWMD they would not be able to  maintain capabilities past 2021 without additional funds. Houston  conducted an analysis of the funds needed to sustain the program and  estimated that it would generally need over $1 million per year, primarily  to replace equipment. City officials also said that they are already  experiencing challenges that will have implications for funding and  sustainment of the program. For example, Chicago officials said they are  facing challenges regarding funding for training. These officials said  CWMD told them that the company that conducted training in the other  STC cities—at no cost to those cities—will no longer be the designated  training entity. But a new training company has not been put in place.

CWMD has not communicated a new plan for training Chicago’s officers  on equipment that has already been purchased, and Chicago officials told  us that they do not have additional funds to purchase training. Chicago  officials said that if they do not receive future years of funding to conduct  training on the already-purchased equipment, their planned capabilities  could go to waste.

According to several city officials, cities cannot rely on other DHS grant  programs or federal grant programs or local sources of funding to sustain  the STC program. Specifically, the officials said that cities’ ability to obtain  funds from DHS’s UASI for sustainment may be limited, in part because  of ineligibility by some partner agencies within an STC city. For example,  law enforcement agencies in Santa Ana, California, received support from  the STC program as part the Los Angeles—Long Beach city region, but  they would not be eligible for UASI funds because Santa Ana is not in the  Los Angeles—Long Beach UASI region. Moreover, UASI funds may not  be sufficient to meet demand from cities. Houston city officials said that in  fiscal year 2017, the city had requested $40 million in UASI funds from  the UASI Committee, which distributes UASI funds in each city. But the  committee had only $23 million to disperse to Houston. According to  CWMD officials, other DHS grant programs within the Federal Emergency  Management Agency—such as the Homeland Security Grant Program— may not provide a guaranteed source of consistent funding. Further,  CWMD, NNSA, FBI, and city officials that we interviewed said they were  not aware of any other federal grant program that cities could utilize to  sustain nuclear or radiological detection capabilities. At a local level,  several city officials said that there are competing funding priorities, such  as preventing school shootings and addressing the opioid crisis, that  require more money and attention because they affect the local  community more directly every day.

DHS Has Not Fully Developed or Documented Potential Program Changes, Including the Basis for Making Changes, or Communicated Their Impact on Current STC Cities

DHS has not (1) fully developed potential changes or documented a plan  for making changes to the STC program; (2) identified the basis for such  changes; and (3) clearly communicated with the cities, raising concerns  about how the changes will impact them.

CWMD Has Not Fully Developed or Documented Potential Changes to the STC Program and Does Not Have a Strategy or Plan for Implementing Them

CWMD officials told us that the agency is considering several potential  changes to the STC program that would broaden its geographic reach  and scope, but it has not fully developed or documented these changes  and does not have a strategy or plan for implementing them. According to  these officials, CWMD has not made any final decisions about potential  changes and therefore has not developed any formal strategic  documents. Based on our interviews with CWMD and city officials and  some limited information in DHS’s fiscal year 2019 budget justification, we  found that CWMD is considering making the following changes to the  STC program:

New program goals. CWMD officials told us that the STC program’s  new goals would be to (1) enhance regional capabilities to detect,  analyze, report, and interdict nuclear and other radioactive threats; (2)  provide defense in large geographic regions; and (3) maximize  deployment of detection equipment to nonfederal agencies to support  federal nuclear detection priorities. The first program goal is one of the  original program goals. However, CWMD officials said that under this  proposal, CWMD would no longer include encouraging cities to  sustain capabilities over time as a program goal because CWMD has  discussed centralizing acquisition of detection equipment.

Expansion of the program’s geographic coverage. Although  legacy cities would still receive support under the new version of the  STC program, CWMD officials said that the new program would  provide national coverage and would include detection and deterrence  activities in regions well outside of cities that UASI identified as having  the highest level of threat and risk for a terrorist attack. Prior to  proposing this change, CWMD had included in DHS’s fiscal year 2018  budget justification its intent to select a sixth and seventh city to  participate in the program by the end of fiscal year 2018, which  CWMD officials told us did not occur. In DHS’s fiscal year 2019  budget justification, CWMD stated its intent to support the  development of nuclear or radiological detection capability for broader  regions.

Centralized acquisition of detection equipment. Instead of  providing funding to STC cities to purchase detection equipment  directly, CWMD officials told us that they would plan to centralize the  acquisition process and purchase equipment on behalf of cities and  regions. CWMD officials told us that they expect most of this  equipment to be PRDs.

A greater role for other agencies. CWMD officials said that although  the STC program would remain a CWMD-only program, CWMD  expects to work closely with the FBI, NNSA, and other DHS  components, such as the U.S. Coast Guard and U.S. Customs and  Border Protection, to detect and deter nuclear or radiological threats.  Currently, according to CWMD officials, CWMD is working with the  FBI and NNSA on a Domestic Detection Concept of Operations to  coordinate their capabilities and functions. In addition, CWMD officials  said that they plan to align the STC program with the existing FBI  stabilization program, which responds to nuclear or radiological  threats that have been detected. According to CWMD officials,  CWMD would rely on FBI-led stabilization teams for guidance on  selecting and distributing detection equipment for the STC program.  Each stabilization team would have a partner STC program office to  test, calibrate, and distribute detection equipment and to train  operators, and the STC program would provide funding to cities to  maintain these offices.

Inclusion of chemical and biological weapon detection and  deterrence within the program’s scope. The Countering Weapons  of Mass Destruction Act of 2018 includes chemical and biological  weapon detection and deterrence under the scope of CWMD but  limits the STC program to detecting and deterring nuclear or  radiological threats. CWMD officials told us that they had planned to  add chemical and biological detection and deterrence efforts to the  STC program, but such a change would now require a statutory  change.

The changes that CWMD is considering making to the STC program  would be significant in scope. However, CWMD officials confirmed that  CWMD has not documented these potential changes for key  stakeholders, such as cities or partner agencies or provided strategic  documents to describe how it plans to implement any changes. FBI  officials we interviewed said that although the FBI supports greater  coordination between CWMD and FBI-led stabilization teams, these  programs will remain distinct and independent, with separate and  dedicated lines of funding and personnel. These officials also said that  CWMD and the FBI will not share equipment or technicians. According to  NNSA officials, there is no new role defined for NNSA in the STC  program, although NNSA leadership has asked its Radiological  Assistance Program to contribute to the STC program where possible.  NNSA officials also said that NNSA and CWMD will continue to  coordinate on how information flows at a federal level if a nuclear or  radiological threat has been detected.

CWMD officials told us that they first introduced potential program  changes to five STC cities at a meeting in February 2018 and met with  leadership from these cities in August 2018 to discuss these changes  further. In November 2018, we contacted officials from the STC cities to  determine whether they understood how the STC program would  continue. Officials from the STC cities made statements that indicated  confusion and uncertainty about the future of the program. For example:

Officials from one city told us they believed that changes to the STC  program would apply only to new cities joining the program, even  though CWMD officials told us that the changes would affect all cities  going forward.

Officials in another city told us that they left the August meeting with  the impression that the changes presented were only preliminary  proposals up for discussion and that the program could evolve in any  number of directions. However, documents CWMD provided to us  during interviews show CWMD’s intention to make several of the  specific changes described above, even though the agency’s  proposals for the STC program have not yet been finalized.

Officials in most cities told us they believed that CWMD may provide  them separate funding under the new program for sustaining  capabilities developed to date, but CWMD officials told us that no final  decisions had been made regarding future support for legacy cities.

Most city officials we interviewed said that the August meeting provided a  high-level overview of potential changes and little detail on how such  changes would be implemented or affect city operations.

Our past work has discussed the importance of strategic planning. We  have reported that, among other things, strategic plans should clearly  define objectives to be accomplished and identify the roles and  responsibilities for meeting each objective. By developing a written  strategic plan (or implementation plan) for any potential changes to the  STC program, CWMD would provide clarity on what specific changes are  planned and how CWMD plans to implement them. For example, given  the uncertainty around the future direction of the program, a written  strategy would help shed light on the exact role that CWMD envisions for  partner federal agencies and how it plans to utilize these partnerships to  acquire and distribute equipment.

In October 2018, we briefed staff on the Senate Committee on Homeland  Security and Governmental Affairs and House Committee on Homeland  Security on our ongoing work, including our preliminary findings on the  benefits of (1) developing an implementation plan for potential changes to  the STC program and (2) assessing the effect of changes on the  program. The recent Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of  2018, signed into law on December 21, 2018, requires that CWMD  develop an implementation plan that among other things, identifies the  goals of the program and provides a strategy for achieving those goals.  The act requires CWMD to submit this implementation plan to Congress  by December 21, 2019. In addition, the law requires a subsequent report  assessing effectiveness and proposing changes for the program, which  could provide clarity on how proposed changes would align with STC  program strategy and how CWMD plans to implement them. CWMD is  also required to consult with and provide information to appropriate  congressional committees before making any changes to the STC  program, including an assessment of the effect of the changes on the  capabilities of the STC program.

CWMD Has Not Identified a Clear Basis for Program Changes

CWMD has not identified a clear basis for making program changes, and  the extent to which these changes can be attributed to new priorities  under DHS’s reorganization is unclear. CWMD officials told us that they  have not conducted any studies or analyses that would justify making  changes to the program. In DHS’s fiscal year 2019 budget justification,  CWMD discussed the importance of using the STC program to build  capabilities far outside the immediate target areas, (i.e., cities) and the  need to detect threats along the air, land, or sea pathways into and within  the country that terrorists could potentially use to reach their targets.  However, according to CWMD officials, CWMD has not identified a  change in the nature or level of nuclear or radiological threats to explain  its intent to move from its original city-focused model for the STC program  to a more national approach. In addition, as stated above, CWMD does  not collect information to fully assess the performance of cities currently in  the program and therefore does not have a performance-based rationale  for changing its program goals. CWMD officials said that the uncertainty  surrounding making changes reflect a program under transition within an  agency under transition—that is, the reorganization from DNDO to  CWMD.

The Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of 2018 requires that  before making changes to the STC program, the Assistant Secretary of  CWMD brief appropriate congressional committees about the justification  for proposed changes. This briefing is to include, among other things, an  assessment of the effect of changes, taking into consideration previous  resource allocations and stakeholder input. This new requirement would  provide DHS an opportunity to identify the basis for potential changes.

Assessing such changes could provide more reasonable assurance that  they would strengthen the program and not result in unintended  consequences, such as reducing capabilities in current cities.

CWMD Has Not Clearly Communicated with the Cities, Raising Concerns about How Potential Program Changes Will Impact Them

CWMD has not clearly communicated with the cities currently in the STC  program about the status of potential program changes, raising concerns  among these cities about how the changes will impact them. Although  CWMD officials told us that the STC program would still support cities  currently in the program, CWMD has not communicated to cities the  levels of funding or other resources they can expect to receive going  forward under the new version of the program. Notably, CWMD has not  explained how expanding the program’s geographical coverage would  affect cities currently in the program, including any effect on the  availability of resources for these cities.

City officials told us that they had several concerns, including the  following, about CWMD’s potential changes for the STC program:

Ability to choose equipment that meets a city’s needs. Some city  officials we interviewed expressed concerns that the potential  changes could detract from their ability to decide which types of  equipment and support would best meet their needs. For example,  officials in one city expressed concern that their planned calibration  laboratory, which is used to maintain equipment, could become  obsolete if CWMD chose to distribute PRDs that differ from the type  the city currently uses. Furthermore, some city officials questioned  whether CWMD and local FBI-led stabilization teams could  adequately assess the specific equipment needs of state and local  partner agencies within current STC cities. FBI officials told us that  they do not assess the equipment needs of state and local partner  agencies, but instead share information with those partners should  they wish to acquire similar resources in order to maintain state, local,  and federal capabilities.

Scope of the program. Several city officials said concerns arose  when CWMD requested that STC cities test toxic compound meters in  2018, raising questions about the scope of the program. These  devices are designed to detect the presence of certain chemical  weapons, but the STC program does not include detecting or  deterring chemical weapons. Therefore, several officials felt that the  request to test the devices was outside the scope of their mission.  CWMD officials said that although the meters were not connected with  the STC program, it made sense to reach out to the STC cities as  CWMD already had a relationship with the cities and they were  deemed appropriate locations.

Role of the FBI. Some city officials told us that they had heard from  CWMD that the FBI could play an expanded role in secondary  screening in the future, which they felt could be problematic because  of the FBI’s limited staff presence in field locations. FBI officials we  interviewed said that they did not plan to conduct additional secondary  screening in the future; instead they plan to formalize the secondary  screening process that is already in place in STC cities. According to  FBI officials, the bureau would always respond to situations requiring  a threat assessment.

Effect on future funding, including for sustainment activities.

CWMD recently informed National Capitol Region officials that they  would not receive an expected fifth year of funding because of  planned program changes. City officials said that this change came as  a surprise to them and now they will only be able to buy approximately  90 percent of the equipment they had originally planned to purchase.  In addition, these officials said that they planned to use much of the  fifth year funding for sustainment activities, such as training classes,  and that this loss would adversely affect their current sustainment  plans. CWMD officials said that under the new program, CWMD will  take responsibility for sustaining the nuclear or radiological detection  equipment distributed to cities, but, as described above, these officials  said that no final decisions have been made regarding future support  for legacy cities.

Several city officials said that CWMD had not adequately responded to  their concerns and that there has been less communication from CWMD  about the STC program since 2017 as a result of the DHS reorganization.  Further, several city officials said that they expected CWMD to set up  quarterly meetings with STC city leadership following the August meeting,  but they had not received any notifications about additional meetings.  CWMD officials told us that they intend to have more frequent meetings  with STC city leadership in the future but were unable to schedule a  meeting during the first quarter of fiscal year 2019. Federal internal  control standards state that management should externally communicate  the necessary quality information to achieve the entity’s objectives. If  CWMD does not clearly communicate to the cities how the existing  program will operate until a new program is developed and implemented,  these cities could face difficulties planning for the future and achieving the  program’s detection and deterrence objectives.

DHS’s STC program has taken steps to address a top-priority threat to  national security by providing high-risk cities with resources to develop  nuclear or radiological detection capabilities. However, in implementing  the program, CWMD does not collect key data to track itemized  expenditures and to assess how effectively cities achieved key  performance metrics and program milestones or how well they performed  in exercises or drills that simulate a nuclear or radiological threat. By  regularly collecting detailed information from cities on expenditures made  using program funds and comparing that information to approved  purchase plans, CWMD would have greater assurance that cities spent  funds as approved, and consistent with program goals, and that the  expenditures are in keeping with program objectives. In addition, until  CWMD requires cities to submit checklists or equivalent information on  their progress in the STC program, it will not have complete information  on how cities are performing compared to the key performance metrics  and program milestones they identified for themselves. Further, until  CWMD more fully assesses cities’ performance by consistently enforcing  requirements, as applicable, that cities report on how they performed  during exercises, it cannot assess the extent to which cities could  effectively detect or deter a nuclear or radiological threat.

CWMD identified sustainment as a program goal but has not enforced its  own requirements related to this goal or taken steps to analyze the risks  sustainment challenges pose to its program’s success. Unless CWMD  analyzes these risks, works with cities to address them, and enforces  sustainment planning requirements for future cities, program participants  could see their radiological detection capabilities deteriorate over time.

CWMD officials told us that the agency is considering several potential  changes to the STC program that would broaden its geographic reach  and scope, but it has not fully developed or documented these changes  and does not have a strategy or plan for implementing them. The  Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of 2018 requires that the  Secretary of Homeland Security develop a strategy and implementation  plan for the STC program and a subsequent report assessing  effectiveness and proposing changes for the program, which could  provide clarity on how proposed changes would align with STC program  strategy and how CWMD plans to implement them. CWMD also has not  provided a clear basis for proposed program changes. The act further  requires that, before making changes, the Assistant Secretary of CWMD  brief appropriate congressional committees about the justification for  proposed changes, which should include an assessment of the effect of  changes. This new requirement could help ensure that changes will  strengthen the program and not result in unintended consequences, such  as reducing capabilities in current cities. In the meantime, CWMD has not  clearly communicated how its proposed changes will impact cities  currently in the STC program, raising concerns among these cities about  how the changes will impact them. If CWMD does not clearly  communicate to the cities how the existing program will operate until a  new program is developed and implemented, these cities could face  difficulties planning for the future and achieving the program’s detection  and deterrence objectives.

We are making the following four recommendations to CWMD:

The Assistant Secretary of CWMD should ensure that the office  regularly collects detailed information from cities on expenditures  made using program funds and compares that information to  approved purchase plans to ensure that these funds were spent as  approved, consistent with program goals, and that the expenditures  are in keeping with the objectives of the program. (Recommendation  1)

The Assistant Secretary of CWMD should more fully assess cities’  performance by collecting information from cities on achieving key  performance metrics and program milestones and enforcing reporting  requirements on performance during exercises. (Recommendation 2)

The Assistant Secretary of CWMD should analyze risks related to  sustaining detection capabilities, work with cities to address these  risks, and enforce sustainment planning requirements for future cities.  (Recommendation 3)

The Assistant Secretary of CWMD should clearly communicate to  cities how the existing program will operate until a new program is  developed and implemented. (Recommendation 4)

We provided a draft of this product to DHS, the FBI, and NNSA for review  and comment. In its comments, reproduced in appendix I, DHS concurred  with our recommendations in the draft report. DHS identified actions it  would take to address these recommendations, including revising  quarterly reporting requirements to include detailed information on  expended funds, performance metrics, program milestones, and exercise  activities. In addition, DHS said it would engage with cities to procure and  distribute equipment and to refurbish or replace it when appropriate, and  would conduct on-site senior-level meetings with all current STC cities to  continue discussions about new procedures, partnerships, and  sustainment of capability. We believe these actions, if implemented as  described, would address the intent of our recommendations. DHS also  provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. The  FBI and NNSA told us that they had no comments on the draft report.

We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional  committees, the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Secretary of  Energy, the Assistant Attorney General for Administration of the  Department of Justice, and other interested parties. In addition, the report  is available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov.

If you or your staff members have any questions about this report, please  contact me at (202) 512-3841 or trimbled@gao.gov. Contact points for  our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found  on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to  this report are listed in appendix II.

Appendix I: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security

Appendix II: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

In addition to the contact named above, Ned H. Woodward (Assistant  Director), Keya Cain (Analyst in Charge), and Alexandra Jeszeck made  key contributions to this report. Chris P. Currie, Pamela Davidson, R.  Scott Fletcher, Juan Garay, Tom James, Benjamin Licht, Greg Marchand,  Cynthia Norris, and Kiki Theodoropoulos also contributed to this report.

DHS's Securing the Cities program seeks to give state and local agencies the ability to detect and deter nuclear terrorism, including dirty bombs. It provides funding for equipment, such as radiation detectors, and training for up to 5 years. Participating cities are required to submit plans and show potential future funding sources for sustaining these programs after DHS funding ends.

We found DHS does not fully track program spending and performance, and has not addressed challenges to sustaining these programs.

We made 4 recommendations, including that DHS collect more spending information and address sustainment challenges.