Democracy Assistance: State Should Improve Information Sharing with Embassies

Congress made at least $2 billion available to agencies annually for democracy assistance abroad in fiscal years 2015 through 2018. State and USAID are the primary U.S. agencies funding democracy assistance. This assistance supports activities related to enhancing rule of law, good governance, political competition and consensus building, civil society, independent media, and human rights.

Congress included a provision in the Joint Explanatory Statement accompanying the fiscal year 2015 Continuing Appropriations Act for GAO to review agencies' roles and responsibilities in promoting democracy abroad. This report examines (1) State's and USAID's democracy assistance allocations, (2) State's and USAID's roles in providing democracy assistance and the extent to which their projects in selected countries are consistent with their defined roles, and (3) how State and USAID coordinate on democracy assistance. GAO reviewed State and USAID data and documents for fiscal years 2015 through 2018 and interviewed officials in Washington, D.C., and in the DRC, Nigeria, Tunisia, and Ukraine. GAO selected these countries because they received relatively high amounts of democracy assistance funding from State and USAID, among other factors.

The Department of State (State) and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) allocated more than $8.8 billion for democracy assistance in fiscal years 2015 through 2018.

a According to agency officials, language in the 2015 appropriations act permitted State and USAID to allocate less than the full amount directed to democracy programs by the act.

State and USAID have defined roles for democracy assistance and have obligated funding for projects in selected countries accordingly. State has identified its Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor (DRL) as the U.S. lead for promoting democracy and protecting human rights abroad and has identified its Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) as the lead for promoting the rule of law. In fiscal years 2015 through 2018, DRL's and INL's obligated funding for democracy assistance in the countries GAO reviewed—the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Nigeria, Tunisia, and Ukraine—generally reflected their defined roles. For example, 24 to 77 percent of DRL's obligated funding in these countries supported human rights, and at least 90 percent of INL's obligated funding for democracy assistance in the countries supported the rule of law. USAID's democracy assistance strategy states that USAID has the leading role in U.S. development assistance. USAID's obligations for democracy assistance in the four countries supported multiyear, multimillion-dollar projects, consistent with what USAID officials told GAO was needed for long-term development.

State and USAID coordinate on democracy assistance in various ways, but embassy officials reported gaps in information about DRL assistance. Examples of coordination mechanisms include budget allocation discussions at headquarters and working groups at embassies to help avoid project duplication. However, State officials in all four selected countries said they generally lacked information about DRL democracy assistance projects, including project descriptions and funding amounts. State's existing information-sharing mechanisms, including data systems and strategies, do not consistently address these gaps. Overseas officials' lack of complete information about DRL's projects may inhibit State's efforts to coordinate with other agencies, implementing partners, and other donors.

GAO recommends that the Secretary of State direct DRL to develop a mechanism for the sharing of democracy assistance project information between DRL and relevant embassy staff. State concurred with GAO's recommendation.

In fiscal years 2015 through 2018, Congress made available to agencies  at least $2 billion annually for democracy assistance programs abroad as  a way to promote American values, national security, and economic  opportunity overseas. Democracy assistance is provided primarily  through the Department of State (State) and the U.S. Agency for  International Development (USAID), which support activities designed to  promote human rights, good governance, the rule of law, political  competition and consensus building, civil society, and independent media. In addition, the National Endowment for Democracy (NED), a  nongovernmental, nonprofit organization, uses congressionally  appropriated funds to support democracy promotion activities. Congress  has sought clarification of agencies’ roles and responsibilities related to  democracy assistance.

The Joint Explanatory Statement accompanying the Consolidated and  Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2015, includes a provision for us  to review agencies’ roles and responsibilities in promoting democracy  abroad. This report examines (1) State’s and USAID’s allocations of  funding for democracy assistance in fiscal years 2015 through 2018, (2)  State’s and USAID’s roles in providing democracy assistance and the  extent to which their projects in selected countries during this period were  consistent with these defined roles, and (3) the extent to which State and  USAID coordinate in providing democracy assistance. In addition,  appendix I of this report provides information about NED’s democracy  assistance in fiscal years 2015 through 2018.

To examine State’s and USAID’s allocations of funding for democracy  assistance, we analyzed State and USAID allocations data for fiscal years  2015 through 2018. We assessed the reliability of the data that agencies  reported by reviewing information from agency officials regarding the  underlying data systems; we determined that the data were sufficiently  reliable for the purposes of reporting allocations data. We took similar  steps for data on democracy assistance projects in selected countries in  fiscal years 2015 through 2018.

To identify State’s and USAID’s roles in providing democracy assistance,  we reviewed strategies and other documents that included democracy- related goals and objectives. For State, we focused our review on the  roles and projects of two bureaus that State identified as leading its  provision of democracy assistance: the Bureau of Democracy, Human  Rights, and Labor (DRL) and the Bureau of International Narcotics and  Law Enforcement Affairs (INL). While State’s regional bureaus also  provide some democracy assistance, we did not include them in our  analysis. To examine the extent to which State’s and USAID’s projects in  selected countries were consistent with their defined roles, we selected  four countries where DRL, INL, and USAID recently provided democracy  assistance: the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Nigeria,  Tunisia, and Ukraine. We selected these countries on the basis of,  among other factors, State’s and USAID’s relatively large allocations for  democracy assistance in the countries in fiscal years 2015 through 2017,  the most recent data available. We analyzed obligations data for  democracy assistance projects that DRL, INL, and USAID funded in the  selected countries in fiscal years 2015 through 2018. We also reviewed  project documents, including award agreements, for selected projects.

To examine the extent to which State and USAID coordinated in providing  democracy assistance, we reviewed relevant documents, such as State’s  and USAID’s standard operating procedures, to identify the agencies’  coordination mechanisms and practices. We also drew on our prior work  identifying key practices that can enhance and sustain collaboration at  federal agencies. In addition, to address each of our objectives, we  interviewed agency officials in Washington, D.C., and the four selected  countries and conducted fieldwork in the DRC in May 2019. For more  information about our scope and methodology, see appendix II.

We conducted this performance audit from September 2018 to January  2020 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing  standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to  obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for  our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe  that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings  and conclusions based on our audit objectives.

The U.S. government supports various types of democracy assistance,  which State and USAID categorize under their democracy, human rights,  and governance portfolios. State and USAID use the Updated Foreign  Assistance Standardized Program Structure and Definitions to categorize  democracy assistance activities in six program areas: rule of law, good  governance, political competition and consensus building, civil society,  independent media and free flow of information, and human rights. Table  1 shows these six program areas and their elements.

State and USAID Entities Providing U.S. Democracy Assistance

State bureaus and offices—in particular, DRL and INL—and USAID  provide funding for democracy assistance.

State. State’s democracy assistance is provided by DRL, INL, and other  State bureaus and offices.

DRL. As the U.S. government’s primary foreign policy entity  advocating for democracy globally, DRL funds programs in every  region of the world to promote human rights, democracy, and  transparent and accountable governance.

INL. INL provides funding for programs that combat crime and  narcotics trafficking, including democracy assistance to promote the  rule of law, combat corruption, and promote good governance.

Other bureaus and offices. Other State bureaus and offices, such as  the regional bureaus and the Bureau of International Organization  Affairs, provide democracy assistance related to their geographic or  functional areas.

USAID. As the lead U.S. government agency for international  development, USAID considers democracy, human rights, and  governance to be central to its core mission. USAID missions overseas  play a primary role in providing democracy assistance, and the regional  bureaus in Washington, D.C., provide oversight of this assistance.  USAID’s Bureau for Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance,  headquartered in Washington, D.C., consists of several offices, including  two that support the bureau’s mission to promote democratic and resilient  societies: the Center of Excellence on Democracy, Human Rights, and  Governance and the Office of Transition Initiatives.

State and USAID Allocated Over $8.8 Billion for Democracy Assistance in Many of the Same Countries in Fiscal Years 2015- 2018

State and USAID Allocated Over $8.8 Billion in Democracy Assistance, with USAID Providing 67 Percent

State and USAID allocated a total of more than $8.8 billion for democracy  assistance in fiscal years 2015 through 2018. State allocated 33 percent  of this amount—a total of $2.9 billion, averaging approximately $727  million annually—to DRL, INL, and other bureaus to provide democracy  assistance. USAID allocated the remaining 67 percent—$5.9 billion,  averaging approximately $1.5 billion annually. Figure 1 shows the total  amounts that State and USAID allocated for democracy assistance in  fiscal years 2015 through 2018.

DRL, INL, and USAID Directed Democracy Assistance Allocations to Many of the Same Countries, although Program Areas Varied

In fiscal years 2015 through 2018, DRL, INL, and USAID directed  allocations for democracy assistance to many of the same countries,  although the program areas they supported varied. DRL, INL, and  USAID directed democracy assistance allocations to a combined total of  100 countries, including 33 countries where all three entities provided  such assistance (see fig. 2). DRL directed democracy assistance  allocations to 67 countries; INL, to 45 countries; and USAID, to 84  countries. State officials said that, because the countries have serious  democracy-related challenges, the agencies providing this assistance  may address these challenges from different perspectives and with  different objectives.

Although DRL and USAID directed democracy assistance allocations to  many of the same countries, DRL focused a greater percentage of its  funding in countries where citizens enjoy fewer democratic freedoms.  DRL directed 70 percent of its allocations for democracy assistance in  fiscal years 2015 through 2018 to less democratic countries—those rated  as “not free” by Freedom House’s 2018 “Freedom in the World” survey.  In contrast, USAID directed about half of its allocations for democracy  assistance during this period to “not free” countries.

Similarly, although DRL, INL, and USAID directed their allocations for  democracy assistance to many of the same countries, the entities  concentrated funding in different program areas. In fiscal years 2017 and  2018, DRL and INL directed the largest percentages of democracy  assistance allocations to encouraging human rights and promoting the  rule of law, respectively, while USAID directed about half of its democracy  assistance allocations to promoting good governance (see fig. 3).

DRL directed 36 percent (about $203 million) of democracy  assistance allocations to projects supporting human rights, 19 percent  (about $107 million) to projects supporting civil society, and 14  percent (about $76.4 million) to projects supporting independent  media and free flow of information. DRL directed the smallest  amounts to projects supporting rule of law, political competition and  consensus building, and good governance.

INL directed more than 98 percent (about $580 million) of democracy  assistance allocations to promote the rule of law.

USAID directed 49 percent (about $1.5 billion) of its democracy  assistance allocations to projects promoting good governance and 19  percent (about $600 million) to projects supporting civil society.  USAID distributed the remainder across the other four democracy  assistance program areas, allocating the smallest amounts to projects  supporting human rights and independent media and free flow of  information.

State’s DRL and INL and USAID Have Defined Roles for Democracy Assistance and Funded Projects in Selected Countries Accordingly

State’s DRL and INL and USAID have strategies that define their roles in  democracy assistance, and their funding obligations in the selected  countries in fiscal years 2015 through 2018 generally aligned with these  roles. DRL and INL strategies identify various program areas as aspects  of the bureaus’ respective roles in providing democracy assistance. For  example, DRL supports a range of democracy program areas and  emphasizes human rights, while INL focuses on the rule of law. In fiscal  years 2015 through 2018, DRL’s and INL’s funding obligations for  democracy assistance in the countries we selected for our review—the  DRC, Nigeria, Tunisia, and Ukraine—generally aligned with the roles  defined in bureau strategies and described by bureau officials. USAID  plays the leading role in U.S. development assistance overseas, including  democracy assistance, according to its 2013 strategy on democracy,  human rights, and governance. We found that USAID’s democracy  assistance in the four selected countries generally aligned with its  strategic goal of supporting democratic change to achieve broader  development goals.

DRL and INL Have Defined Roles for Democracy Assistance and Obligated Funding Accordingly

DRL’s Role Includes Human Rights and Other Democracy Assistance Program Areas, While INL Focuses on Rule of Law

DRL’s 2018 bureau strategy states that the bureau’s mission is to  “champion American ideals as a means of combating the spread of  authoritarianism, terrorism, and subversion of sovereign democracies.”  According to the strategy, DRL works through diplomatic channels to  support democracy-related areas; support human rights, labor, and  democracy defenders; and publish reports on human rights in all  countries, among other activities. In a 2015 report to Congress, State  noted that 90 percent of DRL’s programs operate in restrictive or  challenging environments. Although the report did not define restrictive  or challenging environments, DRL officials said that the bureau’s  assistance focuses on building civil society and supporting diplomatic  initiatives to improve governance, particularly in repressive and closed  societies. According to the officials, the bureau supports democracy and  human rights globally, including in areas where such programs face  threats from host governments, and is not constrained to working in  countries with a U.S. presence. DRL designs and manages all of its  democracy assistance projects from Washington, D.C. DRL officials  noted that DRL projects typically receive total allocations of at least  $500,000, have a duration of 1 to 5 years, and are implemented by U.S.- based or other large organizations.

INL’s most recent bureau strategy states that INL is at the forefront of  responding to international security challenges and that INL promotes  U.S. leadership by advancing rule-of-law principles. INL officials said  that the bureau conducts democracy assistance work to support its  provision of security assistance and that INL programming helps  governments provide accountability to their citizens. According to  agency officials, INL’s funding for democracy assistance generally  supports host-country governments through bilateral agreements and is  not always project based. INL programs can be managed by INL staff at  State’s headquarters in Washington, D.C., and at embassies overseas.  INL’s democracy assistance is implemented by its own staff, other U.S.  agencies, and U.S.-based or international organizations.

DRL and INL officials told us that they ensure consistency between their  democracy-related strategic goals and the goals in overarching  strategies, such as the government-wide National Security Strategy and  State and USAID’s Joint Strategic Plan. The most recent Joint Strategic  Plan notes that State and USAID will work to “counter instability,  transnational crime, and violence that threaten U.S. interests by  strengthening citizen-responsive governance, security, democracy,  human rights, and the rule of law.” The Joint Strategic Plan also notes  that State and USAID will focus on places that pose the greatest threat to  U.S. interests.

DRL’s and INL’s Obligations in Selected Countries Reflected Their Defined Roles

DRL’s and INL’s total obligations of funding for democracy assistance in  the four selected countries for fiscal years 2015 through 2018 generally  reflected their defined roles. DRL’s obligations for projects in the selected  countries generally reflected the bureau’s focus on supporting democracy  and human rights, as defined in DRL’s bureau strategy and described by  officials. Overall, the majority of DRL obligations in the four selected  countries focused on projects supporting civil society, human rights, and  independent media and the free flow of information. In fiscal years 2015  through 2018, 60 to 100 percent of project-level funding was dedicated to  these program areas. DRL obligations for democracy assistance projects  in the selected countries averaged more than $800,000 for 2 years.  Consistent with its stated role of protecting human rights globally, DRL  obligated at least a quarter of this funding in three of the four countries to  projects that supported human rights (see fig. 4).

Similarly, INL’s democracy assistance obligations in the selected  countries during the same period generally reflected the bureau’s focus  on supporting the rule of law, as defined in its bureau strategy and  described by officials. Data for the four countries show that INL obligated  $3.2 million in the DRC, $12.5 million in Nigeria, $$3.9 million in Tunisia,  and $5 million in Ukraine for democracy assistance for fiscal years 2015  through 2018. In Nigeria, Tunisia, and Ukraine, 100 percent of INL’s  democracy-related obligations supported the rule of law. In the DRC, 92  percent of INL’s democracy-related obligations supported the rule of law  and the remaining 8 percent supported good governance. (See apps. III  through VI for more information on State’s democracy assistance in the  DRC, Nigeria, Tunisia, and Ukraine, respectively.)

USAID’s Democracy Assistance Strategies and Projects in Selected Countries Generally Reflected the Agency’s Development Focus

USAID Provides Democracy Assistance Primarily through Overseas Missions to Support Country Development

The 2013 USAID Strategy on Democracy, Human Rights and  Governance states that USAID plays the leading role in U.S. development  assistance overseas, including democracy assistance. The strategy  explains that support for democracy, human rights, and governance is  essential to achieving the agency’s broader social and economic  development goals, which, USAID has noted, contribute to self-reliance.  USAID officials told us that, to support democracy from a development  perspective, USAID generally funds multiyear, multimillion-dollar  democracy assistance projects that are implemented by U.S.-based or  international organizations.

USAID’s democracy strategy also identifies the roles of various USAID  units involved in implementing U.S. democracy assistance. For  example, according to the strategy, USAID missions are to play the  primary role in implementing it by both designing and managing  democracy-focused programs, while USAID’s Center of Excellence on  Democracy, Human Rights, and Governance is to provide technical and  other assistance to the missions and manage some mechanisms to  support programs, among other things. Further, the strategy clarifies  relationships in terms of leading and supporting units in areas of democracy assistance and identifies roles of various other agencies,  including State.

USAID’s Democracy Assistance in Selected Countries Generally Aligned with Its Defined Role

In all four selected countries, USAID’s democracy assistance, as reflected  in country-level strategies and projects, generally aligned with the Joint  Strategic Plan and with the agency’s democracy strategy to support  democratic change in order to achieve broader development goals. We  found that the USAID country development cooperation strategy for each  of the selected countries articulated democracy assistance objectives to  support the country’s overall development. According to USAID officials,  these strategies guide the type of democracy assistance provided in a  particular country on the basis of the country’s needs and generally focus  on supporting sectoral change, such as through policy reform or  institution building. For example, the 2016 USAID strategy for Tunisia  included a development objective to promote social cohesion through  democratic consolidation. Objectives for selected USAID projects in the  four countries also reflected the agency’s goal of effecting long-term,  development-based change through democracy assistance. For  instance, consistent with its country strategy for Tunisia, USAID obligated  nearly $22 million in fiscal years 2017 and 2018 for a project designed to  improve the relationship between Tunisians and their civic and  government institutions, in part by enhancing the responsiveness of  government institutions (see fig. 5).

Other characteristics of USAID’s democracy assistance projects in the  selected countries also reflected the agency’s defined role. In each of the  four countries, a democracy office in USAID’s mission in the country  managed democracy assistance, consistent with USAID’s democracy  strategy. Overall, USAID’s democracy assistance projects in the selected  countries demonstrated that the agency implemented multiyear,  multimillion-dollar projects, consistent with what USAID officials told us  was needed to support long-term development. Data for the four  countries showed that USAID’s total obligations for democracy assistance  ranged from $49.5 million to $126 million for fiscal years 2015 through  2018 (see fig. 6). Per project, USAID’s obligations in the four countries  averaged about $7.2 million, with each project’s implementation period  averaging just over 4 years. USAID’s implementing partners were, for  the most part, U.S.-based or international organizations.

Although USAID democracy assistance obligations in the selected  countries covered a variety of program areas, they concentrated on  political competition and consensus building, good governance, and civil  society. As figure 6 shows, USAID’s obligations for rule-of-law and human  rights projects made up less than a quarter of total project-level funding  obligated in each country in fiscal years 2015 through 2018. See  appendixes III through VI for more information about USAID’s democracy  assistance projects in the DRC, Nigeria, Tunisia, and Ukraine,  respectively.

State and USAID Coordinate on Democracy Assistance in Various Ways, but Embassy Officials Reported Gaps in Information about DRL Projects

State and USAID use various mechanisms to coordinate democracy  assistance at the headquarters level, such as interagency roundtable  discussions of budget allocations. Officials at embassies in the selected  countries described interagency coordination efforts at the country level,  such as working groups, and provided examples of how coordination  helped avoid duplication and improved the effectiveness of democracy  assistance efforts. Despite the use of these mechanisms and other steps  that DRL takes to coordinate with embassies, embassy officials in all four  selected countries reported having incomplete information about DRL’s  projects in those countries.

State and USAID Coordinate Democracy Assistance through Various Mechanisms at Headquarters and Overseas

State and USAID use various mechanisms, including budget roundtables  and proposal review panels, to coordinate democracy assistance  between the agencies at headquarters. For instance, State’s Office of  U.S. Foreign Assistance Resources manages the annual allocations  budget process, which facilitates interagency coordination through  structured conversations about democracy assistance and various  bureaus’ priorities, according to State and USAID officials. These annual  democracy discussions also enable the participants to identify policy  changes and share lessons learned. USAID officials added that USAID’s  Center of Excellence on Democracy, Human Rights, and Governance  serves as the technical lead on democracy assistance issues during  these interagency budget discussions. INL officials told us that they take  the lead in democracy assistance discussions concerning security sector  assistance.

In addition, some of State’s regional bureaus, including the Bureaus of  Near Eastern Affairs and of European and Eurasian Affairs, maintain  assistance coordination offices to coordinate U.S. foreign assistance to  countries in those regions, including through strategic planning and  budget formulation processes. These offices, based in Washington, D.C.,  coordinate with embassies, other State bureaus, and USAID at various  stages of strategic planning and budget formulation. For example, country  coordinators from the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs’ assistance  coordination office are to lead roundtable discussions at least annually to  share information among U.S. government agencies and contribute to  improved planning and implementation. Some U.S. embassies in these  regions, including those in Tunisia and Ukraine, have an assistance  coordination unit to coordinate all U.S. foreign assistance in the country,  and these units work with State regional bureaus’ Washington, D.C.– based offices.

Further, when considering potential democracy assistance projects, DRL  coordinates with State and USAID counterparts both in Washington, D.C.,  and overseas through its proposal review process. DRL proposal review  panels include representatives from USAID, State regional bureaus, and  other agencies that may have relevant expertise.

State and USAID also use various interagency mechanisms to coordinate  democracy assistance at the country level within embassies overseas.  Examples of coordination mechanisms include the following.

Working groups. According to State and USAID officials in the four  selected countries, interagency working groups facilitate formal  discussions about democracy assistance projects and provide  opportunities to identify areas where agencies’ projects might  complement or duplicate one another. Working groups at each  embassy vary in number, theme, and meeting frequency, depending  on the country context and U.S. government priorities. For example,  the U.S. embassy in Ukraine has about 10 democracy-related working  groups, focused on themes including elections, anticorruption, human  rights, and the justice sector. At the U.S. embassies in the DRC and  Nigeria, agency officials told us they convened working groups on  elections, given the U.S. government’s interest in the countries’ recent  and upcoming elections. In Tunisia, where USAID reestablished a  presence in 2012 and a mission in June 2019, an interagency  development assistance working group that addresses democracy  issues, among other things, began meeting in September 2018,  according to agency officials. The officials also said that a security  assistance working group coordinated assistance related to rule-of- law issues. These working groups meet bimonthly, monthly, or  weekly, according to officials. State and USAID officials generally said  that they found the working groups were effective in helping to  coordinate democracy assistance.

Assistance coordination units. U.S. embassies in Tunisia and  Ukraine have assistance coordination units designed to coordinate  U.S. foreign assistance, including democracy assistance. Unlike the  assistance coordination unit in Ukraine, State’s Foreign Assistance  Unit in Tunisia managed democracy assistance projects in fiscal years  2015 through 2018 while also coordinating other State and USAID  assistance in the country (see app. V for more information about  democracy assistance in Tunisia during this period). According to a  State document, the assistance coordinator at an embassy in Europe  or Eurasia can be a “touch point” for agencies at the embassy to work  together on assistance issues and communicate effectively with  Washington. The assistance coordination units in both Tunisia and  Ukraine have established mechanisms to coordinate U.S. foreign  assistance within the embassies, according to officials. For instance,  the foreign assistance unit in Tunisia formalized a process by which  the ambassador’s office approves all State and USAID assistance  projects in the country. Additionally, in both countries, the assistance  coordinator participates in working groups and is involved in the  design or review of all assistance projects, according to officials.  USAID and State officials in these countries expressed varying  opinions about the units’ usefulness for coordination.

State and USAID officials in the selected countries provided the following  additional examples of coordination that, according to the officials, helped  avoid duplication and improved the effectiveness of democracy  assistance efforts.

According to State and USAID, informal coordination and information  sharing among agency officials at the embassies occur during  regularly scheduled meetings, such as weekly meetings of USAID  staff, State’s political unit staff, or embassy senior staff, and through  daily interaction.

State has developed a tool kit to help embassies with strategic  planning, including the development of action plans to document units’  roles. For example, agencies at the U.S. embassy in Nigeria created  an action plan that identified the various units supporting assistance  for elections to help prevent duplication of efforts. (Fig. 7 shows  citizens participating in Nigeria’s elections.)

State and USAID officials at embassies described other coordination  of the agencies’ democracy assistance. For example, in Nigeria,  USAID does not fund any rule-of-law projects because, according to  USAID officials, they and INL officials have decided on a clear division  of labor: INL manages all rule-of-law projects, including judicial  strengthening, judicial reforms, and anticorruption, while USAID  manages all other aspects of democracy assistance. In Ukraine,  USAID and INL developed a concept paper to guide their  collaboration to help the government establish the country’s High Anti- Corruption Court. The concept paper outlined the key roles of  USAID and INL and designed complementary projects based on each  agency’s strengths. For example, USAID was responsible for  developing training programs for judges and INL was responsible for  vetting potential judges. Officials told us that this concept paper  helped agencies maximize the potential impact of their limited  resources.

State Officials at Embassies Reported Gaps in Information about DRL’s Democracy Assistance in Selected Countries

Although DRL takes steps to coordinate with embassies in countries  where it funds democracy assistance projects, embassy officials in all four  selected countries reported having incomplete information about DRL’s  projects in those countries. DRL has various practices and processes to  coordinate with embassies. For example, DRL established a standard  operating procedure to clarify methods for coordination between itself and  State’s regional bureaus, which includes defined steps on engaging with  embassies. The procedure outlines steps in DRL’s annual planning  process, during which priorities and program strategies are set; in the  process for submitting proposed projects and awards; and in the process  for proposal review panels.

DRL officials in Washington, D.C., also pointed to various methods that  they use to coordinate with embassies. Such methods include distributing  a description of DRL’s projects by country on an annual basis, training  new Foreign Service officers in DRL’s funding mechanisms and awards  process, and providing contact information for DRL staff at headquarters  to embassy personnel. Additionally, DRL officials said that embassy  officials have at least four opportunities to provide official input during the  approximately 18-month process of designing and awarding a project.  According to DRL officials, embassy personnel designated as human  rights officers serve as DRL’s overseas points of contact.

However, at the embassies in all four countries, human rights officers or  other officials from the political units told us that they were not actively  engaged in DRL’s projects and generally lacked updated information  about DRL projects in their countries, including descriptions and funding  amounts. Embassy officials also said that, although DRL sought their  input during the process of selecting proposed democracy assistance  projects, DRL did not subsequently communicate its final selection of  projects. DRL officials said that sharing complete information can be  difficult because of the sensitivity of some DRL projects and the need to  safeguard the identities of some local partners.

In addition, DRL officials said that managing projects from Washington,  D.C., instead of overseas may affect their ability to collaborate with  embassy officials. DRL officials commented that embassy personnel’s  colocation facilitates their collaborating with one another and that the  political and other State officers who may function as in-country DRL  points of contact have numerous other duties, with limited capacity to  focus on DRL projects. DRL officials also said that frequent turnover  among State personnel makes it challenging to maintain embassy  officials’ awareness of DRL’s in-country projects. In addition, they said  that DRL is sometimes unaware of democracy assistance projects that  embassies may be funding.

Moreover, we found that existing information-sharing mechanisms,  including data systems and strategies, do not consistently address  embassy personnel’s information gaps. DRL and other State officials said  that embassy personnel may not be able to use State’s data systems to  retrieve information on projects, partly because some personnel lack  sufficient training or the permissions to access project data in certain  systems. Furthermore, the Office of Management and Budget has found  the quality of State’s publicly reported data to be low in terms of  completeness and accuracy. State’s Office of Inspector General found  that, while State has standardized and centralized its foreign assistance  budget planning and request processes, State’s inability to provide  authoritative foreign assistance financial information is a program  management challenge. In addition, the integrated country strategies for  the four selected countries for fiscal years 2015 through 2018 do not  mention DRL’s projects or general goals when discussing U.S.  government democracy-related objectives for each country.

Overseas officials’ lack of complete information about DRL’s projects  could lead to potential duplication in U.S. democracy assistance and may  inhibit State’s efforts to coordinate with other agencies, implementing  partners, and other donors. We have previously found that it is helpful  when participants in a collaborative effort have full knowledge about the  relevant resources available and have the appropriate knowledge, skills,  and abilities to contribute.

Since 2015, Congress has made available to agencies at least $2 billion  annually for democracy assistance programs abroad. State’s DRL and  INL, as well as USAID, have articulated their roles in democracy  assistance through strategies that include specific democracy-related  goals. Although State and USAID use various mechanisms to coordinate  democracy assistance at headquarters and in the field, we found that  relevant embassy officials in each of the four selected countries did not  have ready access to information about DRL projects. As a result,  embassy officials lacked an understanding of the full scope of U.S.  democracy assistance in their countries. Ensuring access to information  about DRL projects could improve State’s overseas coordination, both  internally and with other U.S. agencies, implementing partners, and  donors, as well as State’s ability to achieve important democracy  assistance goals.

The Secretary of State should direct the Assistant Secretary of State for  Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor to develop a mechanism to  facilitate the active sharing of information about democracy assistance  projects between DRL and relevant staff at embassies.

We provided a draft of this report to State, USAID, and NED for their  review and comment. In its written comments, reproduced in appendix  VII, State agreed with our recommendation and noted steps that it plans  to take to implement it. USAID also provided written comments, which are  reproduced in appendix VIII, as well as technical comments that we  incorporated as appropriate. NED officials reviewed our draft but did not  provide any comments.

We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional  committees and to the Secretary of State, the Administrator of USAID, the  President of NED, and other interested parties. In addition, the report is  available at no charge on the GAO website at https://www.gao.gov.

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact  me at (202) 512-3149 or gootnickd@gao.gov. Contact points for our  Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on  the last page of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to  this report are listed in appendix IX.

Appendix I: National Endowment for Democracy’s Democracy Assistance

The National Endowment for Democracy (NED) is a private, nonprofit,  nongovernmental organization based in Washington, D.C., whose stated  purpose is to encourage democracy throughout the world by supporting  nongovernmental organizations and actors that are working for  democratic goals. NED is funded through a grant from the Department of  State (State) pursuant to an annual congressional appropriation and  receives additional funding from State to support congressionally directed  or discretionary programs. In addition to providing grants to local  organizations in other countries, NED provides grants to its four affiliated  organizations known as the “core institutes”: the Center for International  Private Enterprise, the International Republican Institute, the National  Democratic Institute, and the Solidarity Center.

NED Allocated More Than $500 Million for Democracy Assistance Projects in 100 Countries in Fiscal Years 2015-2018

In fiscal years 2015 through 2018, NED allocated a total of about $541  million for democracy assistance projects in 100 countries— approximately $114 million in fiscal year 2015, $141 million in fiscal year  2016, $144 million in fiscal year 2017, and $142 million in fiscal year  2018. During this period, NED directed 55 percent of its funding for local  organizations to groups in countries rated “not free” by Freedom House’s  2018 “Freedom in the World” survey. Figure 8 shows the countries  where NED allocated funding for democracy assistance in fiscal years  2015 through 2018.

As figure 9 shows, in fiscal years 2017 and 2018, NED directed funding to  projects in six democracy assistance program areas. NED allocated the  largest amount during that period—about $100 million (36 percent)—to  promote good governance and allocated the next largest amount—about  $72.5 million (26 percent)—to promote political competition and  consensus building. NED allocated the smallest amount—about $8.5  million (3 percent)—to support the rule of law.

NED’s Strategy Identifies NED’s Role as Providing Democracy Assistance to Local Organizations

According to NED’s 2012 strategy, the organization focuses on providing  grants to grassroots activists in response to local needs and “seeks out  newly-emerging groups in both democratizing and authoritarian countries  around the world, helping to empower the most effective grassroots  activists.” The strategy notes that NED is guided by its founding  legislation, which established NED as an independent institution whose  mission is to promote democracy through grants to nongovernmental  organizations. These include the core institutes, whose key roles NED’s  strategy also defines.

NED officials said that the organization focuses on building the  institutional capacity of local civil society organizations, which contributes  to building democratic societies. Such capacity building can include  institutional support, including funding for basic functions such as  operational costs, and management assistance such as budget training,  which other donors tend not to provide. NED officials commented that the  organization is “demand driven” and responds to funding requests for  projects proposed by nongovernmental organizations. According to NED  documents, it supports approximately 1,500 organizations in 90 countries  with grants averaging $50,000.

NED officials noted other elements that distinguish NED’s support from  that of U.S. agencies, including continuity in its staff composition; the  significant linguistic ability of its staff, enabling close ties with local  organizations in other countries; and the relative stability of its mission  and priorities, which facilitates long-term engagement on countries’  democratic issues. In addition, NED’s nongovernmental status allows it to  provide democracy assistance in difficult environments, where, according  to NED officials, staff of local grantees face risks as a result of their work  in challenging the government and status quo. The officials said that such  risks range from detention and harassment to being killed or  “disappeared.”

NED’s Democracy Assistance Projects in Selected Countries Generally Aligned with Its Defined Role

NED’s democracy assistance projects in the countries we selected for our  review—the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Nigeria, Tunisia,  and Ukraine—generally aligned with the organization’s strategy of  supporting democracy by providing funds for indigenous civil society  organizations. (Fig. 10 shows examples of NED’s democracy assistance  projects in the DRC and Ukraine.)

Consistent with NED’s strategy of providing grants to grassroots activists,  data for projects in the four selected countries show that NED provided  grants primarily to local civil society organizations in addition to its core  institutes. NED grants to civil society organizations in the selected  countries averaged approximately $46,000 for year-long projects, and  NED renewed support for nearly all organizations on an annual basis,  reflecting the long-term support that officials said was necessary to  strengthen civil society. Grantees in the DRC told us that NED worked  closely with local partners to identify needs and design programs and that  this helped to build the partners’ organizational capacity. Consistent with  NED’s mission to support democracy in general, grantees in the selected  countries worked on projects that included all democracy assistance  program areas. NED primarily supported projects to promote political  competition and consensus building and good governance, obligating an  average of 40 percent and 36 percent of its funding for these two program  areas, respectively, across the four countries (see fig. 11).

NED’s country priorities are articulated in country summaries that it  updates each year on the basis of each country’s political context and  democratic challenges. For example, NED’s 2018 Tunisia summary  included a priority of supporting civil society to promote effective,  democratic governance and advocate for the transparency and  accountability of public institutions. The NED project that we reviewed in  Tunisia aimed to “enhance the capacity of civil society to advocate for  transparency, good governance, and promote social accountability in the  six southern governorates of Tunisia.” See appendixes III through VI for  more information about NED’s democracy assistance projects in the  DRC, Nigeria, Tunisia, and Ukraine.

NED Documents and Officials Described Coordination and Collaboration Practices

NED’s annual planning documents, which generally outline objectives for  each country where NED provides funding, include some statements  about coordination and collaboration with other donors. NED officials said  that NED senior leaders typically have standing relationships with senior  leaders at State’s Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor (DRL)  because NED receives funding from DRL for particular countries. NED  officials also told us that the U.S. Agency for International Development  (USAID) has reached out to them to strategically coordinate, although  NED does not receive funds from USAID. NED officials added that  coordination and collaboration on specific countries largely occur between  officials at the regional and country levels. For example, officials said that  NED consults with counterparts at State and USAID in the regional  bureaus and DRL and shares its list of grantees with DRL. Furthermore,  officials said that NED is aware of funding that its grantees receive from  State or USAID, because NED obtains information from potential  grantees about other funding sources during the grant proposal process.

According to NED, State, and USAID officials, additional collaboration  occurs between headquarters and overseas officials. NED, which does  not have staff overseas, manages its grants in Washington, D.C., but  collaborates with overseas counterparts. NED, State, and USAID officials  told us that when NED officials conduct site visits, which occur at least  annually, they often meet with State and USAID officials at embassies to  share information.

Appendix II: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

This report examines (1) the Department of State’s (State) and the U.S.  Agency for International Development’s (USAID) allocations of funding for  democracy assistance in fiscal years 2015 through 2018, (2) State’s and  USAID’s roles in providing democracy assistance and the extent to which  their projects in selected countries during this period were consistent with  defined roles, and (3) the extent to which State and USAID coordinate in  providing democracy assistance. In addition, appendix I provides  information about the National Endowment for Democracy’s (NED)  democracy assistance allocations, role, and coordination.

To examine aspects of State’s, USAID’s, and NED’s democracy  assistance roles and coordination efforts, we selected a nongeneralizable  sample of four countries—the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC),  Nigeria, Tunisia, and Ukraine—where the three entities provided  democracy assistance in fiscal years 2015 through 2018. In selecting  these countries as illustrative examples, we considered the following  factors, among others: (1) countries to which all three entities allocated or  obligated democracy assistance funding in fiscal years 2015 through  2017, the most recent period for which data were available; (2)  democracy assistance allocation amounts that were in the top quartile for  each entity for the same period for USAID and State, according to data  from State’s Office of U.S. Foreign Assistance, and for NED; (3)  democracy assistance obligation amounts that were in the top half of  such obligations for the same period for State’s Bureau of Democracy,  Human Rights, and Labor (DRL), according to data from USAID’s Foreign  Aid Explorer; (4) democracy assistance obligations data that confirmed  the presence of the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law  Enforcement Affairs (INL) in those countries for the same period; (5)  geographical dispersion of the countries; (6) ratings that countries  received from Freedom House’s 2018 “Freedom in the World” survey;  and (7) suggestions from State, USAID, and NED officials as well as  others with relevant expertise. We excluded countries where we had  recently reviewed U.S. democracy assistance for other reports.

We traveled to the DRC in May 2019, where we met with officials from  State, USAID, nongovernmental organizations that had implemented  U.S.-funded democracy assistance projects, and the United Kingdom’s  Department of Foreign and International Development regarding its  coordination with U.S. agencies. We conducted interviews with State and  USAID officials who were knowledgeable about democracy assistance,  interviewing officials at the embassies in Nigeria, Tunisia, and Ukraine by  phone and interviewing officials in Washington, D.C., in person.

To examine allocations for democracy assistance, we analyzed State,  USAID, and NED global democracy assistance data for fiscal years 2015  through 2018, including the total allocations, the allocations for specific  program areas, and the countries for which funding was allocated. We  used the six democracy assistance program areas included in USAID’s  and State’s Updated Foreign Assistance Standardized Program Structure  and Definitions—rule of law, good governance, political competition and  consensus building, civil society, independent media and free flow of  information, and human rights. Because NED categorizes its democracy  assistance using its own program definitions, we cross-referenced NED’s  democracy assistance awards with the U.S. government’s six program  areas, using information that NED provided. We assessed the reliability of  State’s, USAID’s, and NED’s data and determined the data to be  sufficiently reliable for reporting the total amount of democracy assistance  allocated by each entity as well as the program areas and countries for  which the funding was allocated. We also compared funding allocations  with the country’s ratings in Freedom House’s 2018 “Freedom in the  World” survey to determine the amount of funding that the entities  allocated to countries rated as free, partly free, or not free.

To identify State’s, USAID’s, and NED’s roles in providing democracy  assistance and the extent to which their projects in the selected countries  were consistent with their defined roles, we reviewed documents,  assessed information on democracy assistance projects, and interviewed  officials. While State’s regional bureaus provide some democracy  assistance, we focused on State’s democracy assistance roles and  projects for DRL and INL, both of which State has identified as leading  the provision of its democracy assistance. See appendixes III through VI  for regional bureaus’ obligations data for the four selected countries.

We reviewed State’s and USAID’s Joint Strategic Plan, FY2018-2022;  functional bureau strategies for DRL and INL; the 2013 USAID  Strategy on Democracy, Human Rights, and Governance; integrated  country strategies and country development cooperation strategies for  the four selected countries; and NED’s 2012 Strategy Document. We  also reviewed other documents that described aspects of State’s and  USAID’s roles, including agencies’ democracy-related reports to  Congress and standard operating procedures. We assessed these  documents for clarity of roles and responsibilities, based on leading  collaboration practices that we have previously identified, and we  reviewed agencies’ overarching goals related to democracy and  governance.

We reviewed information about State, USAID, and NED democracy  assistance projects in the DRC, Nigeria, Tunisia, and Ukraine. We  reviewed project documents, including award agreements, for  selected State, USAID, and NED projects that supported a variety of  democracy program areas, among other factors. We assessed State,  USAID, and NED obligations data for projects that they funded in the  selected countries in fiscal years 2015 through 2018. We determined  that these data were sufficiently reliable for reporting the total  obligations, by entity and country, for fiscal years 2015 through 2018  and for reporting types of democracy assistance. We also determined  these data to be sufficiently reliable for reporting the number of active  projects during this time period; the average award amount or  average annualized award amount; and the average duration of  projects for DRL, USAID, and NED. Because INL’s democracy  assistance generally supports the host government through bilateral  agreements and is not always project based, we were unable to report  these project characteristics for INL. In prior work, we have  recommended that State identify and address factors that affect the  reliability of INL’s democracy assistance data. State reported that as  of July 2019, INL was continuing efforts to improve data reliability;  however, because of missing data, we determined that data for INL  democracy assistance in the selected countries were unreliable for  reporting project characteristics. We also determined that because of  missing data, such as project end dates, the data from State’s Bureau  of African Affairs were unreliable for reporting some project  information for Nigeria; however, the bureau’s project data for the  DRC were sufficiently reliable for reporting on democracy assistance  and obligations in that country. In addition, we determined the data  from the Bureaus of European and Eurasian Affairs and Near Eastern  Affairs were sufficiently reliable for reporting on State’s democracy  assistance obligations and projects in Ukraine and Tunisia.

We interviewed officials in Washington, D.C., and in the four selected  countries regarding State’s, USAID’s, and NED’s roles defined in  strategies and other documents and regarding democracy assistance  projects. In addition, we interviewed agency officials regarding  democracy assistance program areas; implementation methods (such  as managing programs from headquarters or overseas as well as  types of implementing partners); and other features, including typical  scale of project funding.

To examine the extent to which the agencies coordinated their democracy  assistance, we reviewed relevant documents, such as State’s and  USAID’s standard operating procedures, to identify the agencies’  mechanisms and practices for coordinating democracy assistance. We  drew on our prior work identifying key practices that can enhance and  sustain collaboration at federal agencies. We interviewed officials in  Washington, D.C., and in the four selected countries to describe any  mechanisms that agencies use to coordinate democracy assistance.

We conducted this performance audit from September 2018 to January  2020, in accordance with generally accepted government auditing  standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to  obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for  our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe  that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings  and conclusions based on our audit objectives.

Appendix III: U.S.-Funded Democracy Assistance in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Fiscal Years 2015-2018

The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) has experienced more  than 2 decades of violence and war, exacerbated by the failure of  President Joseph Kabila to hold elections when his term ended in 2016.  In this context, the U.S. government’s key policy priority was to  encourage the DRC’s government to support credible and peaceful  elections in December 2018, according to the Department of State  (State). U.S. government democracy assistance projects aimed to build  the capacity of the DRC government, political parties, civil society, armed  forces, civilian law enforcement, and justice systems to support credible  elections and improve governance. (Fig. 12 shows examples of U.S.- funded government assistance to support the DRC’s 2018 elections.)  Other U.S. government democracy-related priorities included promoting  the rule of law and fighting corruption.

The National Endowment for Democracy’s (NED) 2018 country summary  for the DRC noted that NED should support DRC civil society’s ability to  retain its independence and to continue advocating for a peaceful and  democratic transition of power. The summary states that NED’s 2018  priorities for the DRC included supporting civil society’s engagement in  elections and ability to promote freedom of information before, during,  and after the elections.

In fiscal years 2015 through 2018, State, the U.S. Agency for International  Assistance (USAID), and NED obligated over $73 million for democracy  assistance in the DRC. State’s Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and  Labor obligated $5.5 million (8 percent) of this assistance, while State’s  Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs obligated  $3.2 million (4 percent). State’s Bureau of African Affairs also obligated  about $500,000, for one project, through the Africa Women Peace  Security Initiative. USAID obligated the majority of U.S. democracy  assistance—$54.7 million (74 percent). In addition, NED obligated $9.6  million (13 percent). Figure 13 shows State’s, USAID’s, and NED’s total  obligations, by program area, in the DRC during this period.

Table 2 shows characteristics of projects funded by State’s Bureau of  African Affairs, DRL, USAID, and NED. Three of DRL’s five projects  were implemented by organizations that also implemented USAID  projects, and the Bureau of African Affairs’ project was implemented by  an organization that also implemented USAID and DRL projects.

Table 3 shows examples of democracy assistance projects funded by  State, USAID, and NED in the DRC in fiscal years 2015 through 2018.

Appendix IV: U.S.-Funded Democracy Assistance in Nigeria, Fiscal Years 2015- 2018

While Nigeria has made important gains in democracy and institution  building, those gains are fragile, according to the U.S. Department of  State (State). The U.S. government’s recent priorities with regard to  Nigeria have included helping to strengthen the country’s democratic  governance. Challenges to democratic governance in Nigeria include  widespread intercommunal violence, terrorism, poverty, and corruption. At  the same time, Nigeria has a free press and a political environment that is  largely committed to civilian leadership, and the 2015 elections resulted in  the first peaceful transfer of power to an opposition party. In this context,  the U.S. government’s goals include strengthening Nigerian democratic  institutions, governance, and respect for human rights, such as by  assisting Nigerians to conduct credible national elections in 2019. To  achieve this goal, the U.S. government’s objectives are to (1) strengthen  good governance; (2) strengthen democratic institutions, including rule of  law, respect for human rights, and transparency and accountability in  government; and (3) reduce corruption at all levels of government.

Similarly, the National Endowment for Democracy’s (NED) 2018 country  summary for Nigeria notes the success of the country’s 2015 elections  while also acknowledging challenges including corruption, economic  stagnation, insecurity, and the political marginalization of minority groups.  NED’s 2018 priorities in Nigeria were to expand political inclusion and  strengthen rule of law by supporting NED’s core institutes and local  organizations.

In fiscal years 2015 through 2018, State, the U.S. Agency for International  Development (USAID), and NED obligated nearly $95 million for  democracy assistance projects in Nigeria. State’s Bureau of International  Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs obligated $12.5 million (13  percent), while State’s Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor  obligated $5.4 million (6 percent). State’s Bureau of African Affairs also  obligated $1.8 million for six projects. According to officials, the Bureau of  African Affairs funded these projects through the Africa Regional  Democracy Fund and the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership  program. USAID obligated the majority of U.S. democracy assistance— $66.6 million (70 percent). In addition, NED obligated $8.2 million (9  percent). Figure 14 shows State’s, USAID’s, and NED’s total obligations  for democracy assistance, by program area, in Nigeria during this period.

Table 4 shows characteristics of projects funded by the Bureau of African  Affairs, DRL, USAID, and NED in Nigeria during fiscal years 2015 through  2018.

Table 5 shows examples of democracy assistance projects funded by  State, USAID, and NED in Nigeria during fiscal years 2015 through 2018.

Appendix V: U.S.-Funded Democracy Assistance in Tunisia, Fiscal Years 2015- 2018

Since its 2011 revolution, Tunisia has been on a steady path toward  consolidating its democratic transition, but it still needs to establish critical  institutions, advance human rights, counter corruption, and improve  government transparency, according to the U.S. Department of State  (State). In this context, the U.S. government’s goals include helping  Tunisia consolidate and advance its democracy. To achieve this goal,  the U.S. government’s objectives are to (1) assist Tunisian government  institutions to become more transparent, accountable, and responsive to  citizens; (2) help Tunisian citizens understand and exercise their rights  and responsibilities in a democratic system; and (3) promote social  cohesion through democratic consolidation.

The National Endowment for Democracy’s (NED) 2018 country summary  for Tunisia similarly notes the country’s democratic progress since the  2011 revolution and adds that Tunisian civil society has been developing  quickly and freely and seeks to engage with elected officials as they  continue to consolidate democracy. NED’s 2018 priorities in Tunisia were  to (1) support civil society to promote effective, democratic governance  and advocate for transparency and accountability; (2) encourage citizens  to influence policymaking; (3) foster political inclusion of marginalized  groups; and (4) enhance the role of independent media.

In fiscal years 2015 through 2018, State, the U.S. Agency for International  Development (USAID), and NED obligated over $90 million for  democracy assistance projects in Tunisia. State’s Bureau of Near Eastern  Affairs obligated $20.7 million (23 percent) of these funds; the Bureau of  Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor obligated $9.1 million (10 percent);  and the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs  obligated $3.9 million (4 percent). USAID obligated the majority of U.S.  democracy assistance—$49.5 million (54 percent). In addition, NED  obligated $8.7 million (9 percent). Figure 15 shows State’s, USAID’s, and  NED’s total obligations for democracy assistance, by program area, in  Tunisia in fiscal years 2015 through 2018.

State’s Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs provided the majority of its  democracy assistance through the U.S.–Middle East Partnership  Initiative, which generally aims to improve governance and economic  opportunity. Many of the 11 projects funded by the bureau supported objectives that were similar to those typically supported by DRL, INL, and  USAID projects, including promoting human rights, supporting  anticorruption institutions, and strengthening political parties. The Bureau  of Near Eastern Affair’s Foreign Assistance Unit at the embassy managed  these projects.

Table 6 shows information on the characteristics of the projects funded by  DRL, the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, USAID, and NED.

Table 7 shows examples of democracy assistance projects funded by  State, USAID, and NED in Tunisia during fiscal years 2015 through 2018.

Appendix VI: U.S.-Funded Democracy Assistance in Ukraine, Fiscal Years 2015- 2018

Ukraine’s various democratic challenges include overcoming the legacy  of Soviet authoritarian rule, addressing mismanagement, and responding  to Russian aggression, according to the Department of State (State). In  this context, the U.S. government aims to support Ukraine’s democracy  by helping the country combat corruption, advance justice reforms,  bolster civil society, create responsive government, and encourage  independent media. Overall, the U.S. government seeks to help Ukraine  advance its political reforms with more transparent, responsive, and  accountable governance, becoming less corrupt and more democratic.  U.S. objectives to accomplish this goal include enhancing anticorruption  and rule-of-law processes and improving governance processes and  outcomes.

The National Endowment for Democracy’s (NED) 2018 country summary  for Ukraine noted similar challenges to the country’s democracy— Russian aggression, corruption, and a government that is not responsive  to its citizens. NED’s 2018 priorities in Ukraine included strengthening the  capacity of civil society groups, promoting reconciliation, and fostering the  development of new media.

In fiscal years 2015 through 2018, State, the U.S. Agency for International  Development (USAID), and NED obligated more than $170 million for  democracy assistance projects in Ukraine. State’s Bureau of European  and Eurasian Affairs obligated $16.7 million (10 percent) of this  assistance; the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor  obligated $9.6 million (6 percent); and the Bureau of International  Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs obligated $5.0 million (3 percent).  USAID obligated the majority of U.S. democracy assistance—$126 million  (73 percent). In addition, NED obligated $16.3 million (9 percent). Figure  16 shows State’s, USAID’s, and NED’s total obligations for democracy  assistance, by program area, in Ukraine during fiscal years 2015 through  2018.

State’s public affairs unit at the embassy in Ukraine obligated funding for,  and managed, all but one of the 613 democracy assistance projects  supported by funds from the Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs.  State’s public affairs unit awarded the projects through funding  mechanisms that were intended to support civil society and independent  media and were specifically designed for locally based implementing  organizations.

Table 8 shows characteristics of democracy assistance projects funded  by DRL, State’s Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, USAID, and  NED.

Table 9 shows examples of democracy assistance projects funded by  State, USAID, and NED in Ukraine during fiscal years 2015 through 2018.

Appendix VII: Comments from the Department of State

Appendix VIII: Comments from the U.S. Agency for International Development

Appendix IX: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgements

In addition to the contact named above, Mona Sehgal (Assistant  Director), Farhanaz Kermalli (Analyst-in-Charge), Daniela Rudstein, Tom  Zingale, Neil Doherty, Reid Lowe, and Alex Welsh made key contributions  to this report. Justin Fisher and Sarah Veale provided technical  assistance.

Congress funds efforts to bolster democracy abroad as a way to promote American values, national security, and economic opportunity. This has included work aimed at strengthening human rights, independent media, and the rule of law.

The State Department and U.S. Agency for International Development allocated over $8.8 billion for democracy assistance in fiscal years 2015-2018. The agencies coordinate their efforts in various ways and have sought to avoid duplication.

However, State could do a better job sharing information on its democracy assistance projects internally. We recommended it develop a way to do so.