Space Command and Control: Comprehensive Planning and Oversight Could Help DOD Acquire Critical Capabilities and Address Challenges

Since the early 1980s, the Air Force has been working to modernize and consolidate its space command and control systems into a single comprehensive platform. The past three programs to attempt this have ended up significantly behind schedule and over budget. They also left key capabilities undelivered, meeting the easier requirements first and deferring more difficult work to subsequent programs. At the same time, the need for a consolidated space command and control capability has been growing.

The House Armed Services Committee report accompanying a bill for the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018 contained a provision for GAO to review DOD's newest efforts to develop space command and control capabilities. This report describes the status of these efforts and identifies challenges the Air Force faces in bringing them to fruition.

To conduct this work, GAO analyzed acquisition and strategy documentation, management directives, and lessons learned; and compared Air Force development plans with leading industry practices for software development, DOD guidelines, and best practices included in a draft GAO guide for assessing Agile software development programs.

Given emerging and evolving threats in the space domain, as well as significant development problems in similar prior efforts, the Air Force is prioritizing the Space Command and Control (C2) program. Early prototype work on the program's software began in 2016. As of mid-2019, the program had delivered some initial capabilities; however, the capabilities delivered so far are not approved for use in operations. Because the program is still early in development, it has not yet established a time frame for certifying these capabilities for operational use. Further, the foundational elements of the program, including the infrastructure and software platform, are still being conceptualized. All Space C2 program capabilities will be significantly more automated than past development efforts and are being designed to allow operators to identify and monitor threats to U.S. space assets, identify courses of action to mitigate or eliminate those threats, communicate these actions to decision makers, and direct actions in response.

To develop Space C2's technologically complex software, the Air Force is following a modernized, iterative process called Agile development—a relatively new approach for Department of Defense (DOD) programs (see figure).

The Space C2 program is facing a number of challenges and unknowns, from management issues to technical complexity. Additionally, DOD officials have not yet determined what level of detail is appropriate for acquisition planning documentation for Agile software programs. They are also not certain about the best way to provide oversight of these programs but are considering using assessments by external experts. These knowledge gaps run counter to DOD and industry best practices for acquisition and put the program at risk of not meeting mission objectives. Additionally, software integration and cybersecurity challenges exist, further complicating program development. The Air Force has efforts underway to mitigate some of these challenges in the near term, but until the program develops a comprehensive acquisition strategy to more formally plan the program, it is too early to determine whether these efforts will help to ensure long-term program success.

GAO is making two recommendations, including that DOD should ensure the Air Force develops a comprehensive acquisition strategy for the Space C2 program. DOD concurred with the recommendations.

The Department of Defense (DOD) plans to spend more than $65 billion  from fiscal years 2019 to 2023 to acquire space systems that provide  essential capabilities for an array of functions and objectives, including  U.S. national security, commerce and economic growth, transportation  safety, and homeland security. For example, DOD’s Global Positioning  System provides positioning, navigation, and timing services worldwide,  and its communications satellites provide secure communications critical  for conducting military operations. These space systems are increasingly  vulnerable to a variety of threats. Threats to orbiting space assets can be  either intentional or unintentional—ranging from adversary attacks and  signal jamming to electromagnetic radiation and collisions with space  debris. Both types of threats have increased in recent years because  foreign adversaries continue to pursue advanced capabilities and  because the number of objects in space continues to grow. Given the  high cost to acquire and field space systems and the increasing threats  these systems face, the United States’ ability to predict attacks and avoid  collisions in space is more important than ever.

To help mitigate risks to U.S. space assets, the Air Force has been  developing improved space command and control systems. Space  command and control is the ability for military commanders to make  timely, strategic decisions; take tactical actions to meet mission goals;  and counter threats to U.S. space assets. Despite promising starts and  some capabilities delivered, the Air Force’s last three programs to  improve space command and control capabilities over more than three  decades have ended significantly over budget and schedule and with key  capabilities going undelivered. The Air Force’s newest effort—called  Space Command and Control (C2)—is a software-intensive program that  plans to deliver deferred requirements from past programs as well as to  develop and field new advanced capabilities through a different approach  to software acquisitions than DOD has used in the past.

Due to the importance of the new Space C2 program, the House Armed  Services Committee report accompanying a bill for the National Defense  Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018 contained a provision for us to  review DOD’s efforts to develop space command and control capabilities.  This report (1) assesses the status of and plans for ongoing Air Force  efforts to develop advanced command and control capabilities for space,  and (2) identifies challenges the Air Force faces in developing these  capabilities.

To address the objectives, we analyzed DOD test reports and program evaluations from prior  reviewed DOD documentation of prior, current, and future plans to  provide integrated command and control capabilities;  reviewed draft DOD guidance for software development and a draft  GAO guide for assessing modernized software development  approaches;  compared Air Force plans to leading industry practices for software  development; and analyzed program office planning documents, including acquisition  and strategy documents, management directives, lessons learned,  and critical review reports.

We also interviewed DOD officials from offices and organizations that  include the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and  Sustainment; Combined Space Operations Center; Air Force Space  Command; National Space Defense Center; and Air Force Space and  Missile Systems Center, among others. See appendix I for additional  information on our objectives, scope, and methodology.

We conducted this performance audit from January 2018 to October 2019  in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.

Since the early 1980s, the Air Force has been working to modernize and  consolidate its space command and control systems and improve its  space situational awareness. Effective command and control systems are  important because DOD space capabilities are globally distributed and  operated from geographically diverse locations. With new threats against  space assets, the ability to quickly respond or take action can mean the  difference between mission success and failure. Space situational  awareness is the current and predictive knowledge and characterization  of space objects and the operational environment upon which space  operations depend. Good space situational awareness data are the  foundation of command and control systems because the data are critical  for planning, operating, and protecting space assets and informing  government and military operations.

The Air Force’s last three space command and control programs over  more than three decades have ended significantly over budget and  schedule, and key capabilities have gone undelivered. Those programs  were  the Cheyenne Mountain Upgrade,  the Combatant Commanders’ Integrated Command and Control  System, and  the Joint Space Operations Center Mission System.

Some capabilities were deferred from one program to the next, making  the true cost growth in each program significantly higher when compared  to original program content. This deferral was due in part to the  complicated nature of the planned work. Enabling a single system to  command and control numerous assets in space and on the ground at  multiple levels of information classification is a technically challenging  task. In addition, as discussed below, we found that the Air Force made  optimistic cost and schedule estimates for these programs, and thus did  not assign adequate resources to their development.

Begun in 1981, the Cheyenne Mountain Upgrade was intended to  modernize systems that provide critical strategic surveillance and attack  warning and assessment information. We issued 11 reports on the  Cheyenne Mountain Upgrade program between 1988 and 1994. In 1991,  we found that the program planned to complete only a portion of its  requirements in an attempt to stay within budget and schedule  constraints. We also found that the Air Force had adopted a strategy of  deferring some requirements on the optimistic assumption that these  requirements could be achieved during later stages of system  development. We concluded that while such deferrals may have  permitted the Air Force to meet revised short-term goals, they also  masked the magnitude of problems the program experienced as it moved  forward. We also found that DOD had not formally evaluated the  performance risks related to deferring requirements and concluded that  the strategy of deferral significantly raised the risk that system  development would be more costly and take longer. DOD declared the  program operational in 1998; however, some critical capabilities were not  delivered. At that time, the program was nearly $1 billion over budget and  11 years late. That same year, DOD determined that some of the  program’s components were not well integrated and would be  unresponsive to future mission needs.

Combatant Commanders’ Integrated Command and Control System

DOD initiated the Combatant Commanders’ Integrated Command and  Control System program in 2000 to modernize and integrate the  Cheyenne Mountain Upgrade computer systems and to replace a space  situational awareness data computer system called the Space Defense  Operations Center (SPADOC). At that time, the SPADOC system was  significantly overtaxed and in need of replacement by a system that could  handle larger volumes of data. In 2006, we found that Combatant  Commanders’ Integrated Command and Control System program costs  had increased by approximately $240 million, 51 percent over initial  estimates, and the program was at least 3 years behind schedule. In  addition, we found that that some capabilities had been deferred  indefinitely, resulting in increased risks to performing future operations.  Further, we found that the Air Force did not effectively assess the  appropriateness of the program’s requirements prior to initiating the  program, leading to significant additions, deletions, and modifications to  the program’s initial requirements. Consequently—similar to what  transpired within the Cheyenne Mountain Upgrade program—significant  amounts of work were deferred to address the cost increases associated  with requirements changes. Ultimately, the Combatant Commanders’  Integrated Command and Control System program was not able to  successfully replace SPADOC.

Joint Space Operations Center Mission System

Started in 2009, the Joint Space Operations Center Mission System  (JMS) was the Air Force’s most recent effort to meet command and  control capability and space situational awareness data needs and replace the SPADOC system. JMS was a software-intensive system and  was supposed to be delivered in three increments.

Increment 1 was to provide the foundational structure for the overall  program.

Increment 2 was to deliver numerous operational capabilities to users,  including replacing SPADOC by the end of fiscal year 2014 with the  ability to automatically determine if objects in space were likely to  collide (called conjunction assessments), which was a key  performance parameter for the program.

Increment 3 was to provide additional command and control  capabilities and the ability to incorporate data from highly classified  special access programs.

Of the three planned increments, Increment 1 is the only one that is fully  operational today. JMS Increment 2 encountered significant challenges  during development, and in 2016 the program experienced a critical  change because of significant schedule delays and cost increases.  Specifically, JMS Increment 2 planned to delay delivery by more than 1  year, in turn increasing total program costs by over 25 percent. According  to the August 2016 JMS Critical Change Report, which the program office  submitted to Congress in September 2016 as a result of the critical  change, several issues contributed to Increment 2’s challenges. These  included an overly aggressive schedule, inadequate staffing,  underestimating the amount of work required to integrate various pieces of the system that were developed by different groups, and numerous  concurrent development efforts. An independent program assessment  team comprised of military, intelligence, and contractor staff determined  that the JMS program had underestimated the complexity of developing  the system. Further, the program reported that its organizational structure  proved problematic. For example, the program reported that program- related contracts were awarded and administered outside the program  office, which limited program flexibility and support and hampered  effective oversight. As a result of the critical change, the program re- estimated its costs, established new schedule goals, and deferred a  number of capabilities and requirements to Increment 3.

Even after these changes, JMS Increment 2 was not successful at  delivering its planned capabilities. Air Force operational testing in 2018  revealed significant issues with JMS Increment 2 performance. The Air  Force’s test team determined that Increment 2 was not suitable for  operations, as it was unable to provide conjunction assessments or  maintain the catalog of space objects, another key performance  parameter. In the wake of these findings and the numerous issues found  in testing, the Air Force stopped further development on JMS Increment  2. When development ended, JMS was almost 3 years behind schedule  and $139 million (42 percent) over budget. Air Force leadership placed  the JMS Increment 2 program in sustainment and transferred three of the  12 planned Increment 2 capabilities into operations; the remaining nine  capabilities were to be used for planning and analytic purposes only, as  they were not reliable enough for operational use. Key requirements from  Increment 2, including automated conjunction assessments and the ability  to maintain a high-accuracy space catalog, as well as all of the  requirements from Increment 3, were deferred to a subsequent effort,  called the Space C2 program.

Because JMS was unable to replace SPADOC, the system is still in use  today. Since 2000, the Air Force has been addressing unique space  surveillance requirements for follow-on systems to SPADOC. Air Force  officials we spoke with stated that the system’s ability to continue  operations is a growing concern. While work is underway to move  SPADOC onto a more modernized platform and infrastructure, the Air  Force has not established a schedule for that effort. In the meantime, Air  Force officials told us that large amounts of data are going unprocessed  as the volume of available sensor data today is greater than ever  before—and is expected to increase exponentially in the next year as new  DOD sensors come online.

The Space C2 program is the Air Force’s latest software-intensive  program to develop capabilities to anticipate and respond to emerging  threats in space and ensure the uninterrupted availability of capabilities to  the warfighter. SPADOC is expected to be retired as Space C2  capabilities become operational. The Air Force expects to spend between  $72 million and $108 million per year on the Space C2 program, which is  managed by the Air Force’s Space and Missile Systems Center, through  fiscal year 2024.

The Air Force’s Space C2 Program Is in Its Early Planning Stages and Is Taking a New Approach to Software Development

While it is still early in the planning and development stages, the Air  Force’s Space C2 program office expects to deliver a consolidated space  command and control system over the next few years using a new  system design. The program also plans to use a modernized, iterative  software development process called Agile development to more quickly  and responsively provide capability to users. According to Air Force  officials, this development approach is relatively new to DOD programs.  Therefore, the Space C2 program and DOD officials are working to  determine the appropriate level of detail needed for the program’s  planning documents as well as the best way to provide oversight of a  non-traditional development approach.

The Space C2 Program Plans to Consolidate Capabilities Using a New System Design

The Space C2 program is intended to consolidate operational level  command and control capabilities for DOD space assets into an  integrated system, allowing operators and decision makers to have a  single point of access to command and control space assets around the  globe in a timely manner. A consolidated space command and control  capability will: allow operators to comprehensively identify and monitor threats to  identify possible courses of action to mitigate or eliminate threats,  communicate courses of action to decision makers, and direct action to respond to threats.

A consolidated space command and control capability is necessary,  according to Air Force and DOD officials we met with, because the space  domain has transitioned from a benign environment to one that—like  ground, sea, and air domains—is contested by foreign adversaries.  According to these officials, DOD needs the ability to respond to the  increased threats to U.S. space assets in near real-time. Consequently,  the Air Force is planning for Space C2 program capabilities to be  significantly more automated than in the past, requiring high-quality  software development and architecture planning.

As shown in figure 1, the Space C2 program itself will consist of multiple  layers. Program officials explained that the foundational layer is the  computing infrastructure, which must be secure from vulnerabilities and  have adequate processing power to accommodate the complexity of the  system. On this infrastructure will run the software platform, which forms  the backbone of the operating system. The Space C2 program plans to  procure the platform commercially. The software platform will contain  standards that developers will need to comply with to create applications  that will work on the platform. Some applications may be targeted to a  broad number of users, and some may be more niche capabilities for a  particular group of users. Space C2 program officials told us they believe  this structure will allow them to be flexible in meeting multiple user needs  more responsively than has been possible in past DOD programs. Users  include, for example, space system operators responsible for predicting  and avoiding space object collisions, and other operators responsible for  responding to conflicts in space. The program also expects applications  from a variety of developers, both commercial and government, to run on  the platform, thus presenting opportunities for companies that do not  regularly do business with DOD to participate in the program.

The work being done for the Space C2 program is spread out among  multiple Air Force groups. For example, the Air Force Research  Laboratory has been developing applications for the Space C2 program  both internally and with commercial partners since 2016. The Laboratory  is also working on some battlespace awareness capabilities that may  eventually run on the Space C2 program’s platform. Additionally,  officials from the Air Force Rapid Capabilities Office stated that they have  been working on common interface standards for applications, and this  work will feed into the Space C2 program. As the Enterprise Manager, the  Space C2 program manager is responsible for integrating all of the  development work selected for use in the Space C2 program, irrespective  of its origin.

A principal component of the Space C2 program is a data repository that  will be populated with data from a wide variety of commercial, civil,  military, and intelligence space sensors. Eventually the program plans for  operators using the Space C2 program’s platform and applications to be  able to retrieve data from the data repository. The data will be  electronically tagged with its appropriate classification level and will be  accessible to users according to their individual security clearances.

The overall design of the Space C2 program is for data to be gathered  from sensors, placed into the data repository, and then be available for  various applications to process and provide timely information to space  operators and commanders on threats to space assets and anomalies in  the space environment. Operators and commanders will then be able to  promptly direct actions, such as tasking sensors to collect additional data  or respond to threats. Figure 2 shows the proposed construct of the  Space C2 program, including the various actions that can be taken in  response to the data collected by the sensors.

The Air Force Plans to Use an Agile Software Development Approach for Space C2 Development

The Space C2 program is planning to use an approach new to DOD in  terms of software development, known as Agile. Agile development is a  flexible, iterative way of developing software that delivers working  capabilities to users earlier than the traditional, incremental DOD software  development processes, known as the waterfall approach. Agile practices  integrate planning, design, development, and testing into an iterative life  cycle to deliver software early and often, such as every 60-90 days. The  frequent iterations of Agile development are intended to effectively  measure progress, reduce technical and programmatic risk, and be  responsive to feedback from stakeholders and users. This is different  from the way DOD has developed software in the past, in which  requirements were solidified in advance of development and the software  was delivered as a single completed program at the end of the  development cycle—with no continual involvement or feedback from  users or ability to modify requirements. Traditional software development  mirrored the development of a hardware system. We have previously  reported on past DOD software programs that experienced challenges  due, in part, to that traditional development approach. The differences  between the two approaches are illustrated in figure 3.

The Space C2 program is one of the first DOD software-intensive  programs to move away from the traditional approach and into the more  modernized Agile development methodology. Program officials told us  that many of the problems with JMS’s development stemmed from its  more traditional approach, and that with the Space C2 program they  wanted to avoid circumstances that did not lead to program success.  Considering that past software development problems were caused, at  least in part, by the traditional method of software development, utilizing a  different approach could be a positive step. However, the current DOD  acquisition instruction does not include guidance for Agile software  programs. According to DOD officials, new software guidance is in  development, and this guidance is expected to offer pathways for  developing Agile programs. DOD has also developed a draft template to  assist Agile programs with developing their acquisition strategies, though  the template and associated software guidance are in the early stages of  development. In the meantime, however, Space C2 program officials  confirmed that they are currently operating without specific software  acquisition guidance. Space C2 officials also clarified that while official  Agile software acquisition guidance has not yet been formally published,  the program office has been actively engaged with the Office of the Under  Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment on refining draft  policy and guidance. The program office noted that its program activities  over the past year have been informed by and are consistent with this  draft guidance.

The Space C2 program has submitted preliminary planning documents to  the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment for  approval. While officials in the Under Secretary’s office expect these  documents to be modified and expanded upon in late 2019, the Under  Secretary gave the program approval to begin its development under an  Agile process, signifying her support for using alternative approaches. In  addition, Air Force officials told us that the Commander of Air Force  Space Command has requested frequent briefings on the program’s  development process, and while he does not have approval authority over  the program, he is monitoring the program closely. Plans show that the program is conducting 90-day development iterations with the goal of  providing working software at the end of each cycle.

As of August 2019, the program had completed three program  development iterations, and reported delivering capabilities which  included: expanding the commercial data available in the data repository;  tasking various sensors; and providing a tool for visualization and  analytics. The Air Force noted that these capabilities were deployed in a  relatively short time; however, most capabilities delivered so far are  considered to be available for use “at your own risk,” since they have not  yet been fully approved for use in operations. Though the Air Force has  not yet published a time frame for certifying these capabilities for  operational use, the new development approach is underway and  delivering some early capabilities. DOD officials noted that the  foundational elements of the Space C2 system, including the  infrastructure and software platform, should be completed prior to  significant application development; however, at this early stage of the  program, the schedule indicating the time frame in which these elements  will be completed appears to be still in development.

DOD Is Establishing Agile Software Development Expertise

For government programs, some level of insight and oversight is essential  when using public funds to develop a system. According to DOD officials,  DOD is embracing Agile development because software can be delivered  quickly and can be more responsive to user needs. However, according  to GAO’s upcoming guide for assessing Agile development programs,  known as the Agile Assessment Guide, sound engineering principles are  still beneficial when employing this approach. For example, continuous  attention to technical excellence and good design requires the developers  to consider security requirements throughout development. This is  particularly true with complex programs that process sensitive data with  complex security requirements. In past work, we have found that teams  overlooking security requirements may end up developing systems that  do not comply with current federal requirements (for example  cybersecurity requirements for information technology programs),  resulting in the software not becoming operational until these components  are addressed. In addition, the Agile Assessment Guide notes that  transitioning to Agile software development can be challenging because  Agile methods require organizations to do more than implement new  tools, practices, or processes. Agile requires a re-evaluation of existing  organizational structures, planning practices, business and program  governance, and business measures, in addition to technical practices  and tools. However, Agile does not mean eliminating the need for  documentation, planning, oversight, architecture, risk analysis, or  baseline schedule, for example.

Leading practices for Agile software development—as described in  GAO’s upcoming Agile Assessment Guide—state that, among other  things, programs should have the following characteristics: a product owner who manages the requirements prioritization,  communicates operational concepts, and provides continual feedback  to the development team;  staff who are appropriately trained in Agile methods; management that has established an Agile supportive environment; a program strategy that reflects the mission, architectural, safety- critical components, and dependencies; organization’s acquisition policy and guidance that require the  contract type and the acquisition strategy to be aligned to support  Agile implementation; an architecture that is planned upfront to enable flexibility and to  provide support to Agile methods; and mission goals that drive the prioritization of the most advantageous  requirements (e.g., security and privacy) that are well understood and  reviewed throughout development.

Recognizing the need to change traditional processes to accommodate  more iterative software development, both the Air Force and Under  Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment have created  software advisor positions. The Air Force Chief Software Officer and the  Special Assistant for Software Acquisition are working to improve and  modernize the way DOD acquires software. In addition, DOD is looking  into how to use industry practices to modernize the way it develops  software. For example, the Office of the Secretary of Defense has a  Development Security Operations (DevSecOps) pathfinder program for  software, which helps programs define and develop a technical digital  roadmap and leverages industry and Office of the Secretary of Defense  expertise in developing appropriate infrastructure for software programs.  The DevSecOps concept emphasizes rapid prototyping, security, and  continuous integration and delivery of software products. In a May 2019  Acquisition Decision Memorandum, the Under Secretary of Defense for  Acquisition and Sustainment directed the Space C2 program to become a  pathfinder program. This is a positive step, because it should increase  input into the program’s acquisition planning by the Office of the  Secretary of Defense software development experts.

The Office of the Secretary of Defense has other groups that draw on  private-sector software development expertise to help DOD programs,  including the Defense Digital Service and the Defense Innovation  Board. These groups’ missions include improving DOD’s technology  and innovation, and the groups can be valuable DOD resources for  helping the Space C2 program develop its plans and Agile processes.  The Defense Innovation Board conducted a review of some of the Space  C2 program’s software acquisition plans in December 2018. According to  the Office of the Secretary of Defense officials we spoke with, this  informal review was beneficial and resulted in real-time feedback on the  approach the program was taking, as well as suggestions for areas to  focus on. In the May 2019 memorandum, the Under Secretary of Defense  for Acquisition and Sustainment noted that in October 2019 she will  determine if an independent technical assessment of the Space C2  program is necessary. Considering the stated benefits of the prior Defense Innovation Board review of the Space C2 program, as well as  the fact that using Agile processes for a DOD program is relatively new  and includes many unknowns, independent reviews could help ensure the  program is on a successful path.

As the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Air Force have made  an effort to increase in-house Agile software development expertise,  programs like the Space C2 program—especially in light of its early stage  of development—could benefit from periodic attention from the experts at  its disposal, including input from independent, external reviews to help  ensure the necessary software development steps are taken to set  programs up for success. DOD programs following traditional acquisition  processes conduct internal reviews at major milestones, and GAO best  practices for knowledge-based acquisitions also include conducting  independent program reviews at these milestones. The draft GAO Agile  Assessment Guide notes that while traditional DOD program milestone  reviews are not used for Agile programs, Agile programs rely on other  review methods such as stakeholder demonstrations and retrospective  program reviews during each iteration of work. In addition, the GAO  Schedule Assessment Guide, which identifies best practices for  managing a program’s schedule, states that programs should conduct  periodic reevaluations of risks, and that an independent view in this is  valuable. Such reviews offer greater objectivity, as the reviewers are not  responsible for the activities being evaluated, and programs benefit from  the wide variety of expertise and experience represented by the external  review team. In addition, in many cases, having these external reviews  periodically can prove useful.

The Air Force’s Space C2 Program Faces Challenges in Multiple Areas and Plans Are Underway to Address Some, but Not All of Them

The Space C2 program faces a number of management, technical, and  workforce challenges. Some of these challenges may ultimately be  overcome by time and experience, and the Air Force has efforts  underway to mitigate others in the near-term. But it is too early to  determine whether these efforts will be sufficient to achieve program  success.

The Space C2 program faces several management challenges. The Air  Force has been working on developing various parts of the Space C2  program since 2016, but as previously noted, the program is working from  a draft acquisition strategy and does not yet have an overall program  architecture. These plans are important for providing direction for a  program and facilitating effective oversight by establishing a business  case for the effort. A business case establishes that the program is  necessary and that it can be developed with the resources available, and  typically includes: a requirements document, an acquisition strategy,  sound cost estimates based on independent assessments, and a realistic  assessment of risks, including those relating to technology and schedule.

In addition, according to Air Force officials, the Space C2 Enterprise  Manager has management responsibility—but not authority—over  multiple development efforts included in the Space C2 enterprise. For  example, technology maturation and risk reduction activities are divided  across three program offices, managed by two program executive  officers, and reliant upon multiple sources of information. This division of  work is being done in part because the various organizations have areas  of expertise that the program was hoping to leverage. However, such  distribution of activities among many organizations can result in  synchronization and coordination challenges. JMS’s development was  hampered by similarly-split responsibilities for development contracts for  various efforts. Because space is becoming an increasingly contested  domain, DOD has noted that its ability to effectively respond to space  threats has increased the importance of focused leadership in national  security space, to include Space C2. See table 1 for additional details of  management challenges facing the Space C2 program.

According to officials from the Space C2 program and the Office of the  Secretary of Defense, the Space C2 program was allowed to begin  development work without an acquisition strategy, due to the program’s  urgency. In May 2019, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition  and Sustainment tasked the Space C2 program office with revising its  preliminary acquisition strategy to be consistent with DOD’s draft template  for software acquisition. DOD’s draft template contains specific elements  for ongoing planning and evaluation that are to be included in DOD  software acquisition strategies moving forward, including acquisition and contracting approach; program management structure, including authorities and oversight plans for platform and infrastructure development;  requirements management and development approach, and plans for  prioritization;  risk management plans, including how the program will identify and  mitigate risks; metrics for measuring quality of software, and how those results will  be shared with external stakeholders; manpower assessment identifying program workforce needs and state  of expertise in Agile methods;  requirements for reporting program progress to decision makers; and  yearly funding levels.

We have also noted these factors in our previous reports that identify the  need to develop a sound, executable business case at the outset of a  program, and the importance of using knowledge-based decision making  in DOD acquisition programs. In addition, our work on best practices for  knowledge-based acquisitions has emphasized that the success of any  effort to develop a new product hinges on having the right knowledge at  the right time, and that a better opportunity exists to meet program goals  when the knowledge is available early. However, given that DOD’s draft  template is still subject to change, including these elements in the  finalized acquisition strategy would help position the program for success.

The Space C2 program also faces significant technical challenges, as  described in table 2. For example, the program is planning to meet  previously deferred requirements that proved too complex for prior  programs to achieve. It also plans to address new and emerging threats  to space assets, for which requirements are not yet defined. In addition,  the program plans to use an Agile software development approach, the  processes of which DOD has yet to show proficiency in applying, as  discussed above. Integration of the multiple types of software planned for  Space C2 is also likely to present considerable technical challenges.  Further, cybersecurity is a growing concern for DOD space programs,  including Space C2.

In addition to the management and technical risks we identified, limited  availability of staff with expertise in Agile software development poses a  challenge to the Space C2 program and to DOD in general. The Space  C2 program manager stated that the program is undertaking an effort that  is fast-paced in nature and needs to be rapidly fielded, and she  expressed confidence in her staff’s abilities to meet the development  demands. However, various DOD officials told us that a lack of qualified  software developers within DOD, and within the Space C2 program, is an  issue. Agile software development methods are different from the  traditional approaches used by DOD, and according to DOD officials,  proficiency in Agile methods requires specific training. Software  developers with this training are in high demand in the private sector, and  according to DOD officials, sufficient numbers may not be immediately  available for the Space C2 program.

One industry best practice for software development states that to be  successful, programs should ensure that each development team has  immediate access to people with specialized skills including contracting,  architecture, database administration, development, quality assurance,  operations (if applicable), information security, risk analysis, and business  systems analysis. As early as March 2009, DOD acknowledged it had a  top priority to establish a cadre of trained information technology  professionals, and that the lack thereof was a significant impediment to  successful implementation of any future software development process.  Furthermore, a 2018 Defense Science Board report highlights the lack of  Agile software expertise in DOD, citing no modern software expertise in  program offices or the broader acquisition workforce. Moreover, the  report states that DOD defense prime contractors need to build their own  internal competencies in modern software methodologies. Similarly, we  found in March 2019 that DOD faces several challenges related to hiring,  assigning, and retaining qualified personnel to work on space acquisition  programs, similar to the challenges it faces more generally with the  acquisition workforce. We also noted that DOD is taking steps to address  these challenges where possible.

In May 2019, the DOD’s Defense Innovation Board issued a  congressionally mandated study on software acquisition and practices.  The report stated that numerous past studies have recognized the  deficiencies in software acquisition and practices within DOD. The report  also noted the importance of digital talent and stated that DOD’s current  personnel processes and culture will not allow its military and civilian  software capabilities to grow fast or deep enough to meet its mission  needs. In addition, the report stated that new mechanisms are needed for  attracting, educating, retaining, and promoting digital talent and for  supporting the workforce to follow modern practices, including developing  software in close coordination with users. Finally, the report emphasized  that the military services and Office of the Secretary of Defense will need  to create new paths for digital talent (especially internal DOD talent) by  establishing software development as a high-visibility, high-priority career  track and increasing the level of understanding of modern software within  the acquisition workforce. This is the case for all DOD space programs,  including Space C2.

DOD’s ability to command and control U.S. space assets, as well as  anticipate and respond to the threats these assets face, is critical.  However, over more than three decades, DOD’s efforts to improve its  space command and control capabilities—commensurate with the space  threats that have continued to grow in frequency and type—have been  fraught with development problems. The Air Force has again undertaken  a program to meet the nation’s ongoing and future consolidated  command and control needs, while trying to overcome past problems with  a modern software development process. The Space C2 program is  making a concerted effort to learn from past software development  mistakes while forging a new path for Agile development. Though DOD is  taking steps to ensure that the Space C2 program has a comprehensive  approach in place for managing, identifying, and mitigating challenges  associated with this approach, key program plans and agency-wide  guidance are still in draft form, leaving uncertainty as to how program  development and oversight will ultimately proceed. Finalizing a robust  acquisition strategy containing the key elements for ongoing planning and  evaluation would position the program for success.

Striking the right balance between trying new development methods and  working within DOD’s knowledge-based framework will be essential for  meeting cost, schedule, and performance goals. Periodic assessments of  the program’s approach to developing software, done by independent  software development experts, could not only help ensure the reviews are  balanced, but would also help ensure the Space C2 program effectively  addresses the challenges it faces and is situated for success. Such  reviews would also help the Space C2 program to identify potential  roadblocks, and ultimately, potential solutions. Effectively addressing the  challenges facing the Space C2 program will help ensure that needed  space command and control capabilities are no longer deferred, but  actually delivered.

We are making two recommendations to the Department of Defense.

The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment should  ensure that the Air Force’s finalized Space C2 program’s acquisition  strategy includes, at a minimum, the following elements: acquisition and contracting approach; program management structure, including authorities and oversight plans for platform and infrastructure development;  requirements management and development approach, and plans for  prioritization;  risk management plans, including how the program will identify and  mitigate risks; metrics for measuring quality of software, and how those results will  be shared with external stakeholders; manpower assessment identifying program workforce needs and state  of expertise in Agile methods;  requirements for reporting program progress to decision makers; and  yearly funding levels. (Recommendation 1)

The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment should  ensure that the Air Force’s Space C2 program conducts periodic  independent reviews to assess the program’s approach to developing  software and provide, as needed, advice to the program and  recommendations for improving the program’s development and  progress. Participants could include, but are not limited to, officials from  the Defense Innovation Board, the Defense Digital Service, the office of  the Air Force Chief Software Advisor, and the Under Secretary of  Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment’s Special Assistant for Software  Acquisition. (Recommendation 2)

We provided a draft of this product to the Department of Defense for  comment. In its comments, reproduced in appendix II, DOD concurred  with our recommendations. DOD also provided technical comments,  which we incorporated as appropriate.

We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional  committees, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Air Force, and  the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment. In  addition, the report will be available at no charge on GAO’s website at  http://www.gao.gov.

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact  me at (202) 512-4841 or ChaplainC@gao.gov. Contact points for our  Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on  the last page of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to  this report are listed in appendix III.

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

The House Armed Services Committee report accompanying a bill for the  National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018 contained a  provision for us to review the Department of Defense’s (DOD) efforts to  develop space command and control capabilities. This report (1)  assesses the status of and plans for ongoing Air Force efforts to develop  advanced command and control capabilities for space, and (2) identifies  challenges the Air Force faces in developing these capabilities.

To assess the status of and plans for ongoing Air Force efforts to develop  advanced command and control capabilities for space, we analyzed Air  Force Space Command and Control (C2) Program Increment  Demonstration and Planning Retrospective reports for the first three  increments and examined acquisition strategies for relevant programs,  including acquisition strategies and addenda for Joint Space Operations  center (JSPOC) Mission System (JMS) Increments 1 and 2. We also  examined the Air Force’s draft acquisition strategy for Space C2 and  DOD’s draft acquisition strategy for Major Agile Software Programs;  reviewed Space C2 document mapping planned capabilities to the  specific requirements that will be met by program deliveries; and  analyzed status updates from the Space C2 program and the Combined  Space Operations Center and program update briefings prepared for  congressional staff by the JMS and Space C2 programs and the National  Space Defense Center. In addition, we analyzed Space C2 program  plans in conjunction with interim DOD guidance for Agile Software  Acquisition, the Joint Chiefs of Staff Cyber Survivability Endorsement  Implementation Guide, the Office of the Secretary of Defense guidance  on cybersecurity operational test and evaluation procedures in acquisition  programs and DOD Enterprise Development, Security and Operations  (DevSecOps) processes; and examined the Principal DOD Space  Advisor’s Capabilities Based Assessment which included issues relating  to Space C2. We also reviewed Air Force Broad Agency Announcements  and Requests for Information for Space Battle Management Command  and Control and Space Situational Awareness capability development. In  addition, we obtained information from 12 of the 16 companies with whom  the Air Force is working to obtain their perspectives of the Air Force’s  approach to developing Space C2 capabilities.

To identify challenges the Air Force faces as it develops advanced  command and control capabilities for space, we analyzed the JMS Critical  Change Certification; examined Joint Requirements Oversight Council  memoranda pertaining to the JMS critical change management and  certification; reviewed the Air Force’s Space and Missile Systems Center  evaluation of commercial capability gaps and capabilities; reviewed the  JMS Program Manager briefing on lessons learned; and examined the  DOD test and evaluation report on JMS Increment 2 (Service Pack 9). We  also reviewed a selected chapter of GAO’s draft Agile Assessment Guide  (Version 13), which is intended to establish a consistent framework based  on best practices that can be used across the federal government for  developing, implementing, managing, and evaluating agencies’  information technology investments that rely on Agile methods. To  develop this guide, GAO worked closely with Agile experts in the public  and private sector; some chapters of the guide are considered more  mature because they have been reviewed by the expert panel. We  reviewed this chapter to ensure that our expectations for how the Air  Force should apply best practices for development of software  capabilities for space command and control are appropriate for an Agile  program and are consistent with the draft guidance that is under  development, and we compared Space C2 program plans to the practices  outlined in the guide. Additionally, since Agile development programs may  use different terminology to describe their software development  processes, the Agile terms used in this report are specific to the Space  C2 program. We also compared Air Force development plans with interim  and established DOD guidelines for software development, and GAO best  practices for knowledge-based decision-making in weapons system  development. We also reviewed prior GAO reports on the Cheyenne  Mountain Upgrade, the Combatant Commanders’ Integrated Command  and Control System, software acquisition, and cybersecurity.

Additionally, we interviewed DOD officials from the Office of the Under  Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment; Joint Chiefs of  Staff, Force Structure, Resources, and Assessment Directorate; U.S.  Strategic Command; Air Force Combined Space Operations Center;  Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency; Missile Defense Agency;  Office of the former Principal DOD Space Advisor; Air Force Space  Command; Air Force Research Laboratory; Defense Digital Service;  Office of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation; Air Force Rapid  Capabilities Office; National Space Defense Center; and Air Force Space  and Missile Systems Center. Finally, we interviewed officials from  commercial companies that are known in the space community to have  potential input into the development of space command and control  capabilities to understand how the Space C2 program plans to integrate  commercial capabilities into the program.

Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense

Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

In addition to the contact named above, Rich Horiuchi, Assistant Director,  Emily Bond, Claire Buck, Maricela Cherveny, Burns Eckert, Laura Hook,  and Roxanna Sun made key contributions to this report. Assistance was  also provided by Pamela Davidson, Kurt Gurka, Jennifer Leotta, Harold  Podell, Marc Schwartz, James Tallon, Eric Winter, and Alyssa Weir.

The Air Force has been working to develop a single modernized computer system to enable more effective operations of military and other government satellites and space systems. Such a system could better respond to threats ranging from jamming attacks to space debris. The past three programs to attempt this have ended up significantly behind schedule and over budget. The programs also deferred more difficult work.

The Air Force’s latest effort takes a new approach to development. We recommended the Air Force ensure that this includes independent software development reviews and other steps to improve its acquisition strategy.