Disaster Assistance: FEMA Has Taken Steps toward Better Supporting Individuals Who Are Older or Have Disabilities

Three sequential hurricanes—Harvey, Irma, and Maria—affected more than 28 million people in 2017, according to FEMA. Hurricane survivors aged 65 and older and those with disabilities faced particular challenges evacuating to safe shelter, accessing medicine, and obtaining recovery assistance. In June 2018, FEMA began implementing a new approach to assist individuals with disabilities.

This statement describes (1) reported challenges faced by these individuals in accessing disaster assistance from FEMA and its nonfederal partners following the 2017 hurricanes; and (2) the extent to which FEMA has implemented changes in how it supports these individuals. This statement is based on a May 2019 GAO report and selected updates. For the report, GAO analyzed FEMA documents and data from FEMA call centers and also visited 2017 hurricane locations to interview state, territorial, and local officials. GAO also interviewed FEMA officials from headquarters and deployed to each disaster location. To update FEMA's progress toward addressing its recommendations, GAO interviewed FEMA officials and analyzed agency documents.

GAO's May 2019 report found that some individuals who are older or have disabilities may have faced challenges registering for and receiving assistance from the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and its nonfederal partners (such as state, territorial, and local emergency managers).

FEMA's registration did not include an initial question that directly asks individuals if they have a disability or if they would like to request an accommodation. GAO recommended that FEMA use new registration-intake questions to improve the agency's ability to identify and address individuals' disability-related needs. FEMA concurred and, in May 2019, updated the questions to directly ask individuals if they have a disability.

GAO found that the substantial damage caused by the 2017 hurricanes prevented or slowed some individuals with disabilities from obtaining food, water, and other critical goods and services from states, territories, and localities. Officials from one state reported that few public transportation services, including paratransit, were functional following the 2017 hurricane affecting the state. The officials said this may have prevented people with disabilities from maintaining their health and wellness—such as by shopping for groceries or going to medical appointments—after the storm.

GAO's May 2019 report also found that FEMA had taken limited steps to implement the agency's new approach to assist individuals with disabilities.

GAO recommended the agency establish and disseminate objectives for implementing its new approach. FEMA concurred, and developed a draft strategic plan that includes strategic goals and objectives for the new approach, which the agency plans to finalize and disseminate in 2019.

GAO recommended that FEMA, as part of its new approach, develop a plan for delivering training to all FEMA staff deployed during disasters that promotes competency in disability awareness. In concurring with this recommendation, FEMA described its plan to incorporate a disability awareness competency into the job requirements for all deployable staff, but has not yet developed a plan for training.

GAO's May 2019 report also recommended that FEMA develop a timeline for completing the development of training on incorporating the needs of individuals with disabilities into emergency planning, which it planned to offer to its nonfederal partners. FEMA concurred with GAO's recommendation and, in June 2019, officials began procuring external consulting services to develop a replacement course. According to officials, the course will take about 1 year to develop and will be ready to field by August 2020.

In the May 2019 report, GAO made seven recommendations to FEMA; FEMA concurred with six. FEMA has established new registration questions and a timeline to offer training to its partners. GAO continues to believe its recommendations to develop a plan to train its staff on disability awareness, among other actions, are valid.

Thank you for the opportunity to discuss our recent work on disaster  assistance for individuals who are older or have disabilities. For instance,  individuals with disabilities that affect their ability to evacuate, shelter, or  recover from hurricanes and other large-scale disasters can face  particular challenges obtaining disaster assistance. Some of these  individuals, who otherwise function independently in their day-to-day  lives, may rely on supports that disasters can interrupt. For example, after  Hurricane Maria made landfall on Puerto Rico as a category 4 hurricane,  the two suppliers of oxygen on the island of Puerto Rico lost production  capabilities due to a lack of power. According to a disability rights  organization’s report, this lack of production capabilities threatened the  health of approximately 50,000 Puerto Ricans who depended on oxygen.

The sequential Hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and Maria caused widespread  damage to critical infrastructure, livelihoods, and property in 2017. As a  result, obtaining food, water, medicine, and transportation was  challenging for those affected by the hurricanes, and was particularly  challenging for some individuals with disabilities. State, territorial, and  local emergency management and private organization partners turned to the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) for help, including  from FEMA disability integration staff who were responsible for providing  assistance to individuals with disabilities. In June 2018, near the start of  the 2018 hurricane season, FEMA announced plans to reorganize its  workforce to more thoroughly incorporate disability integration principles  into all preparedness, response, and recovery activities nationwide and  reduce reliance on disability integration staff in FEMA’s Office of Disability  Integration and Coordination (ODIC).

My statement today discusses information from our May 2019 report on  disaster assistance for individuals who are older or have disabilities.  Specifically, this statement addresses (1) reported challenges these  individuals faced in accessing disaster assistance from FEMA and its  nonfederal partners following the 2017 hurricanes; and (2) the extent to  which FEMA has implemented changes in how it supports these  individuals.

This statement is primarily based on the May 2019 report as well as  selected updates. For that report we analyzed FEMA policies,  procedures, guidance, and memoranda and assessed these documents  against goals and objectives in FEMA’s 2018-2022 Strategic Plan,  Department of Homeland Security (DHS) policy for ensuring  nondiscrimination for individuals with disabilities, and federal standards  for internal control. We obtained and analyzed data from FEMA call  centers that operate FEMA’s helpline. We also visited Florida, Puerto  Rico, Texas, and the U.S. Virgin Islands in June and July 2018 to  interview state or territorial emergency managers, public health and  human services officials, and representatives of nonprofit disability  organizations, among others. We also interviewed FEMA officials from  headquarters and staff deployed to each disaster location, including staff  focused on assisting individuals with disabilities. More detailed  information on the scope and methodology for that work can be found in  appendix I of the issued report. To update progress FEMA has made  toward addressing our recommendations from the May 2019 report, we  interviewed FEMA officials and analyzed documents they provided.

We conducted the work on which this statement is based in accordance  with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards  require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate  evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions  based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained  provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on  our audit objectives.

Registering for and Receiving Assistance from FEMA and Its Partners Posed Challenges for Individuals with Disabilities Following the 2017 Disasters

Aspects of FEMA’s Application Process for Assistance Created Challenges for Individuals with Disabilities

To receive FEMA assistance under FEMA’s Individuals and Households  Program, through which disaster survivors can receive help with housing  and other needs, individuals must register by answering a standard series  of intake questions. In our May 2019 report, we found that some  individuals with disabilities may have faced long wait times and unclear  registration questions, and that FEMA’s internal communication across its  programs about survivors’ disability-related needs was ineffective.

Long wait times: Individuals who tried to apply for assistance using  the helpline confronted long wait times, which may have posed  greater challenges for those with disabilities. In the days after  Hurricane Maria affected Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands— when survivors from Harvey and Irma were concurrently contacting  the helpline—up to 69 percent of calls went unanswered and the daily  average wait time for answered calls peaked at almost an hour and a  half, according to our analysis of FEMA data. While long wait times  could be burdensome for all individuals, state officials and disability  advocates we interviewed said long wait times were especially  burdensome for people with certain disabilities, such as those with  attention disorders or whose assistive technology prevents multi- tasking when waiting on hold.

Unclear registration questions: FEMA’s registration process did not  give individuals a clear opportunity to state they have a disability or  request an accommodation because the registration did not directly  ask registrants to provide this information. According to FEMA  officials at the time, information about disability-related needs can  help FEMA staff match individuals with disabilities with appropriate  resources in a timely and efficient manner and target additional  assistance, such as help with the application process. However,  individuals with disabilities may not have requested accommodations  or reported their disability and related needs during FEMA’s  registration-intake due to the unclear questions. As a result, the  registration process may have under-identified people with disabilities.  For example, in Puerto Rico, an estimated 21.6 percent of people  have disabilities, according to 2017 Census data. However, less than  3 percent of all registrants in the territory answered “yes” to the  disability-related question in response to Hurricanes Irma and Maria.

Ineffective communication across FEMA programs: Individuals  may have faced challenges receiving necessary assistance because  FEMA did not effectively track and communicate information about  individuals’ disability-related needs across its assistance programs  after such needs were identified. FEMA officials we interviewed for the  May 2019 report explained that accommodation requests and  disability-related information identified after registration-intake are  recorded in a general “notes” section of a registrant’s case file, which  can be easily overlooked as a case file is passed along to subsequent  FEMA officials.

In our May 2019 report we recommended that FEMA implement new  registration-intake questions to improve FEMA’s ability to identify and  address survivors’ disability-related needs. FEMA concurred with this  recommendation, and officials reported that in May 2019 the agency  updated the questions to directly ask individuals if they have a disability.  According to FEMA’s analysis of applications for assistance following  recent disasters, which used the updated questions, the percentage of  registrants who reported having a disability increased. FEMA officials  stated this increase gives them confidence the change has improved  FEMA’s ability to identify and address disability-related needs of  individuals affected by disasters.

We also recommended that FEMA improve its communication of  registrants’ disability-related information across FEMA programs, such as  by developing an alert within survivor files that indicates an  accommodation request. FEMA did not concur with this recommendation,  explaining that the agency lacks specific funding to augment the legacy  data systems that capture and communicate registration information. In  its comments on our May 2019 report, FEMA stated that it began a long- term initiative in April 2017 to improve data management and exchange,  and improve overall data quality and standardization. After FEMA  completes this initiative, which officials said will be in 2024, FEMA  expects that efforts to share and flag specific disability-related data will be  much easier. We believe that in the interim, FEMA could explore other  cost-effective ways to improve communication, such as through agency  guidance that encourages program officials to review registrants’ case file  notes. As FEMA moves ahead with its initiatives to improve data, we  encourage it to consider and ultimately implement technology changes,  such as developing an alert within files that indicates an accommodation  request, to help improve communication across FEMA programs.

Officials Reported that Individuals with Disabilities Faced Challenges Obtaining Critical Goods and Services

State, territorial, and local governments are primarily responsible for  response and recovery activities in their jurisdictions, including those  involving health and safety. In our May 2019 report, we found that the  substantial damage caused by the 2017 hurricanes prevented or slowed  some individuals with disabilities from obtaining food and water.  According to territorial and nonprofit officials in Puerto Rico and the U.S.  Virgin Islands, as well as survivors we interviewed in the U.S. Virgin  Islands, this was due to centralized distribution models, in which the  majority of food and water was distributed to centralized locations around  the islands. Officials from one governmental agency in Puerto Rico said  this posed a major barrier to people with mobility challenges or without  caregivers receiving food and water because they had to rely on home  delivery, which took time and in some cases, did not happen. We also  found that Hurricane Maria survivors faced challenges obtaining needed  medication and oxygen in Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands,  according to territorial and nonprofit officials.

State, territorial, and local agencies are also primarily responsible for  administering shelters, when necessary, for those affected by a disaster.  We found in our May 2019 report that individuals with disabilities affected  by the 2017 hurricanes may have faced challenges accessing basic  services from local shelters, including restrooms and food, according to  state, territorial, local, and nonprofit officials in Florida, Puerto Rico,  Texas, and the U.S. Virgin Islands. For example, nonprofit officials in  Florida and Puerto Rico described instances of shelter residents with  impairments that prevented them from accessing shelter restrooms.

We also found that transportation was especially challenging for those  who relied on public transportation or were unable to walk long distances,  such as people with disabilities, according to state, territorial, local, and  nonprofit officials we interviewed. For example, Florida state officials  reported that few public transportation services, including paratransit,  were functional following Hurricane Irma. This may have prevented some  people with disabilities from maintaining their health and wellness—such  as by shopping for groceries or going to medical appointments—after the  storm, according to state officials.

Officials we interviewed from Texas, Florida, and Puerto Rico for our May  2019 report said they had difficulty obtaining FEMA data that could help  them deliver assistance to individuals, including those with disabilities.  The officials explained that data—including names and addresses— showing who has registered for and received assistance from FEMA can  help local governments and nonprofits identify who in their community  needs assistance. To better facilitate authorized nonfederal partners  obtaining these needed data, we recommended that FEMA develop and  publicize guidance for partners who assist individuals with disabilities on  how to request and work with FEMA staff to obtain the data, as  appropriate. FEMA concurred with this recommendation and officials told  us in July 2019 that the agency plans to publish data-sharing guidelines  on its website, among other actions.

FEMA Had Taken Limited Steps to Effectively Implement Its New Disability Integration Approach

FEMA Began Implementing Changes without Communicating Objectives to Regional Staff.

Before initiating its new approach to disability integration, ODIC  distributed an explanatory memorandum and other documentation to  FEMA staff. For example, an April 2018 memorandum to FEMA Regional  Administrators outlined a proposal to add new disability integration staff in  each FEMA region to foster day-to-day relationships with state, territorial,  and local emergency managers and disability partners. Also, ODIC  distributed a document that described FEMA’s new approach to  deployments. Under the new approach, fewer disability integration staff  are to be deployed to disasters and all deployable staff and staff in  programmatic offices are to receive training on disability issues during  response and recovery deployments.

However, in our May 2019 report, we found that these documents did not  articulate objectives that could help the agency define success for the  new approach. We concluded that without a set of common objectives for  FEMA’s new disability integration approach, FEMA risks inconsistent  application across its regions. In our report, we recommended that FEMA  establish and disseminate a set of objectives for the new approach.  FEMA concurred with this recommendation, and in July 2019 officials  provided us with the draft of ODIC’s strategic plan for 2019-2022, which  includes strategic goals and objectives that the new disability integration  approach can help achieve. ODIC officials told us they will be working  throughout 2019 with FEMA’s Office of External Affairs to disseminate the  plan agency-wide and to nonfederal partners. We will continue to monitor  FEMA’s progress toward sharing the objectives of its new approach to  disability integration with critical stakeholders.

FEMA Had Not Documented Plans for Training All Deployed Staff on Disability Competencies, but Has Taken Steps to Offer Training to Nonfederal Partners

To implement FEMA’s new deployment model, which will shift the  responsibility of directly assisting individuals with disabilities from  disability integration staff to all FEMA staff, FEMA planned to train all  deployable staff and staff in programmatic offices on disability issues. We  reported in May 2019 that FEMA officials emphasized the need to  integrate disability competencies throughout FEMA’s programmatic  offices and deployable staff. However, we found that the agency did not  have written plans—including milestones, performance measures, or a  plan for monitoring performance—for developing new comprehensive  training for all staff. Starting in the 2018 hurricane season, FEMA had  taken initial steps toward training some deployed staff on disability issues.  For example, FEMA required all staff to complete a 30-minute training on  basic disability integration principles and offered targeted “just-in-time”  training to deployed staff. We concluded that developing a training plan  would better position FEMA to provide training to all staff to help achieve  FEMA’s intended goals.

In our May 2019 report, we recommended that FEMA develop a plan for  delivering training to FEMA staff that promotes competency in disability  awareness. In its letter commenting on our May 2019 report, FEMA  stated that ODIC is developing a plan to introduce the disability  competency in FEMA’s position task books for all deployable staff. The  letter explained further that ODIC’s plan will describe how FEMA will  communicate the disability integration competency throughout the  agency, establish milestones for measuring how effectively the  competency is integrated across the agency, and outline how ODIC will  monitor and measure integration of the competency across the  deployable workforce.

In July 2019, FEMA officials told us ODIC plans to hire new staff to focus  on integrating the disability competency FEMA-wide. According to the  officials, after the position task books are updated, ODIC will work with  FEMA’s training components to ensure that disability-related training is  consistent with the content of the position task books. FEMA officials also  noted that the Field Operations Division, and not ODIC, is responsible for  measuring how effectively the disability competency is integrated across  FEMA. We will continue to monitor FEMA’s progress toward developing a  plan for delivering training to promote competency in disability awareness  among its staff. As noted in our May 2019 report, the plan for delivering  such training should include milestones, performance measures, and how  performance will be monitored.

In our May 2019 report, we found that deploying a smaller number of  disability integration staff and shifting them away from providing direct  assistance to individuals with disabilities may result in nonfederal partners  (such as state, territorial, and local emergency managers) providing more  direct assistance to individuals with disabilities than they did previously. In  February 2017, we reported that the comprehensive introductory training  course on disability integration that FEMA offered to its nonfederal  partners included substantial information on how to incorporate the needs  of people with disabilities in emergency planning. However, according to  officials, FEMA stopped offering this 2-day course in September 2017.  ODIC officials told us during our 2019 review they had determined that  the course, as designed, did not provide actionable training to emergency  management partners to meet the needs of individuals with disabilities  and planned to replace it.

However, we found in May 2019 that although officials had plans to  replace the course with new training, they had not provided a timeline,  which would help ensure that partners are provided with timely  information on inclusive emergency management practices. We  recommended that FEMA develop a timeline for completing the  replacement course and, in June 2019, FEMA officials said they had  begun procuring external consulting services to redevelop it. According to  the officials, ODIC had evaluated alternatives to the suspended course  and determined that an in-person, exercise-based course with remote  participation capabilities would be an appropriate replacement. FEMA  officials said the course will take about 1 year to develop and will be  ready to field by August 2020.

In conclusion, FEMA has taken a number of steps toward addressing our  recommendations related to how it supports individuals with disabilities in  obtaining disaster assistance. ODIC’s draft strategic plan for 2019-2022,  which articulates objectives for the new approach to disability integration,  is likely to help facilitate consistent implementation agency-wide. In  addition, we are hopeful that FEMA’s revised registration-intake  questions, as well as data sharing guidance for nonfederal partners, will  help FEMA and its partners better identify and assist registrants with  disabilities. However, we continue to believe that implementing changes  to disability integration before staff have been fully trained may leave  FEMA staff ill-prepared to identify and address the challenges that  individuals with disabilities face while recovering from disasters. We will  continue to monitor FEMA’s actions as it makes additional progress  toward addressing our recommendations.

Chairman Payne, Ranking Member King, and Members of the  Subcommittee, this completes my prepared statement. I would be  pleased to respond to any questions that you may have at this time.

If you or your staff have any questions about this testimony, please  contact Elizabeth Curda, Director, Education, Workforce, and Income  Security Issues at (202) 512-7215 or curdae@gao.gov. Contact points for  our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found  on the last page of this statement. GAO staff who made key contributions  to this testimony are Sara Schibanoff Kelly (Assistant Director), Sara  Pelton (Analyst-in-Charge), and David Reed.

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the  United States. The published product may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety  without further permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain  copyrighted images or other material, permission from the copyright holder may be  necessary if you wish to reproduce this material separately.

In June 2018, FEMA started to shift responsibility for helping people with disabilities affected by disasters away from its staff trained on disability issues to all staff and to state, local, and nonprofit partners.

In our May 2019 report, we recommended, among other things, that FEMA develop plans to train its staff and nonfederal partners on disability issues.

We testified that FEMA has taken steps to implement some recommendations from our report, including planning training for its nonfederal partners on disability issues. However, as of July 2019, FEMA had no written plans to train its own staff.


Air Travel and Communicable Diseases: Status of Research Efforts and Action Still Needed to Develop Federal Preparedness Plan

The transmission of COVID-19 has been greatly aided by air travel. In light of the pandemic and warnings about the risks of air travel, U.S. passenger airline traffic fell by 96 percent in April 2020 as compared to April 2019. COVID-19 is only the latest communicable disease threat to raise public health concerns regarding the spread of contagion through air travel. Ensuring that the United States is prepared to respond to disease threats from air travel, as well as conducting the necessary research to reduce the risks of contagion, are two vital responsibilities of the federal government.

This statement provides information on (1) the U.S. aviation system's preparedness to respond to communicable disease threats and (2) FAA's management of its R&D portfolio, including the extent to which disease transmission on aircraft and at airports has been the focus of FAA research. This statement is based on GAO-16-127 issued in December 2015 and GAO-17-372 issued in April 2017. GAO conducted updates to obtain information on the actions agencies have taken to address these reports' recommendations.

The United States still lacks a comprehensive plan for national aviation preparedness to limit the spread of communicable diseases through air travel. In December 2015 during the Ebola epidemic, GAO recommended that the Department of Transportation (DOT) work with relevant stakeholders, such as the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), to develop a national aviation-preparedness plan for communicable disease outbreaks. GAO concluded that the absence of a national plan undermined the ability of the public-health and aviation sectors to coordinate on a response or to provide consistent guidance to airlines and airports. Moreover, Annex 9 to an international aviation treaty to which the United States is a signatory contains a standard that obligates member states to develop such a plan. DOT is now confronting an even more widespread public health crisis—the Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) global pandemic—without having taken steps to implement this recommendation. Not only could such a plan provide a mechanism for the public-health and aviation sectors to coordinate to more effectively prevent and control a communicable disease threat, it could also help minimize unnecessary disruptions to the national aviation system, disruptions that to date have been significant. Some aviation stakeholders have publicly highlighted the resulting piecemeal approach to adopting standards during the response to COVID-19, such as various airline and airport policies regarding facemasks, as demonstrating the need for a more coordinated response. The existence of a national plan might have reduced some of the confusion among aviation stakeholders and passengers. While DOT agrees that a national aviation preparedness plan is needed, the agency continues to suggest that HHS and the Department of Homeland Security have responsibility for communicable disease response and preparedness planning. GAO continues to believe that DOT is in the best position to lead this effort given its oversight responsibilities and ties with relevant aviation stakeholders.

The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has sponsored limited federal research into disease transmission onboard aircraft and in airports. FAA's research goals focus on areas like improving airport operations and air space management, and developing new technologies, which FAA has aligned to DOT's strategic goals related to safety, infrastructure, and innovation. Based on prior work and interviews with FAA officials, GAO found that FAA's research in cabin safety for crew and passengers does not focus on disease transmission. For example, according to FAA officials, ongoing research that most closely relates to disease contamination is research related to monitoring the quality of “bleed air,” which is outside air that is drawn through jet engines into an aircraft cabin. In 2017, GAO found that FAA could be more strategic in how it develops its research and development (R&D) portfolio, chiefly in identifying long-term research needs and explaining how FAA selects projects. Of the three recommendations GAO made in that report to improve FAA's management of its R&D portfolio, FAA fully addressed one, issuing guidance in 2018 on prioritizing and selecting R&D projects. While FAA has made some progress addressing GAO's recommendations on research portfolio development and reporting, further attention to these recommendations could help ensure that FAA strategically identifies research priorities across the agency.

GAO made several recommendations in its prior work, including that DOT develop a comprehensive national aviation-preparedness plan, and that FAA identify long-term R&D priorities, among other things. Progress has been made in addressing some of the recommendations. Continued attention is needed to ensure that the remainder of these recommendations are addressed.

Thank you for the opportunity to discuss our body of work relating to  reducing the risk of communicable disease transmission in the aviation  sector and the status of the Department of Transportation’s (DOT)  aviation research and development on this topic. The outbreak of  Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) is having profound effects around  the world. Its global transmission was greatly aided and accelerated by air  travel, which totaled more than 4.5 billion passengers in 2019, mostly  before the widespread outbreak. In light of the resulting pandemic and  warnings about the risks of air travel, U.S. passenger airline traffic fell by  96 percent in April 2020, as compared to April 2019. COVID-19 is only  the latest communicable disease to raise concerns about the spread of  contagion through air travel. Since 2002, there have been six major public  health epidemic threats with global ramifications, including the severe  acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) in 2003 and the Ebola virus disease  in 2014. More than any other mode of transportation, air travel creates the  potential for infection to move quickly from one part of the world to  another. In December 2015, we recommended that the Secretary of  Transportation should work with relevant federal stakeholders to develop  a national aviation-preparedness plan for communicable disease  outbreaks.

In order to identify technologies and solutions to improve the safety of the  civil aviation system, the federal government conducts research and  development (R&D) to advance U.S. technological leadership and foster  a dynamic aerospace industry. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)  within DOT, along with the National Aeronautics and Space  Administration (NASA), is responsible for the management of the federal  government’s civil aviation R&D. The Centers for Disease Control (CDC)  within the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) also  sponsors health-related research involving air transportation.

My testimony today is based largely on reports we issued in 2015 on air  travel and communicable disease and in 2017 on FAA’s management of  commercial aviation R&D. Specifically, this testimony describes: (1) the  U.S. aviation system’s preparedness to respond to communicable  disease threats from abroad and (2) FAA’s management of its R&D  portfolio, including the extent to which disease transmission on aircraft  and at airports has been the focus of FAA research.

To conduct our prior work, we reviewed available documents and  interviewed officials from the key federal departments with responsibilities  for conducting aviation research and for preparing for communicable  disease threats from abroad and responding to them. In addition, we  interviewed a range of stakeholders to discuss aviation preparedness and  research, and potential opportunities to improve those areas. More  detailed information on our objectives, scope, and methodology can be  found in each of the reports.

For this statement, we contacted DOT, Department of Homeland Security  (DHS), and HHS officials to determine the status of a national aviation- preparedness plan for the aviation system as recommended in our 2015  report. In addition, we interviewed FAA officials to learn about actions  FAA has taken to address the recommendations we made in our 2017  report to improve the development, tracking, and reporting of the federal  government’s civil-aviation research and development portfolio. We also  reviewed aviation-related research on communicable disease from the  past 10 years, selected based on key word searches.

We conducted the work on which this testimony is based in accordance  with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards  require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate  evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions  based on audit objectives. We believe the evidence obtained provides a  reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit  objectives.

In the United States, the roles and responsibilities related to preparing for,  assessing, and responding to communicable disease threats in the civil  aviation system require immense coordination among a number of federal  agencies and aviation stakeholders. Each federal agency has a different  mission, which affects its responsibilities for protecting against  communicable disease threats. The DHS and HHS are the lead agencies  for responding to a communicable disease threat. They focus on  protecting our borders at ports of entry, including airports, from threats  from abroad and protecting the nation from domestic and foreign health,  safety, and security threats, respectively. FAA is responsible for civil  aviation and commercial space transportation flight safety in the United  States and the safe and efficient movement of air traffic in the national  airspace system, as well as for the safety of U.S. airlines, other U.S.  operators, and FAA-certificated aircrews worldwide. As part of this  responsibility, FAA regulates and certificates airports, airlines, and airmen  and provides guidance.

In the case of a communicable disease threat, numerous federal, state,  and local entities may be called upon to respond, depending on their legal  authority and whether the threat is identified before, during, or after the  flight. For example, before boarding, HHS and DHS may identify travelers  who are not allowed travel, based on public health threats. The CDC can  prohibit the introduction of nonresident foreign nationals into the United  States from designated countries or places, but only for such time as the  CDC deems necessary for public health. During a flight, CDC regulations  require pilots to immediately report to CDC any deaths or the occurrence  of any travelers with signs or symptoms that may indicate a  communicable disease infection during international flights coming to the  United States. And, once an aircraft with a suspected ill passenger  approaches an airport, federal or local public health officials, first  responders (e.g., fire or emergency medical technicians), airport  authorities, air traffic control personnel, or a combination of these  stakeholders may make decisions about and lead certain aspects of the  response based on the situation and available response protocols or  preparedness plans. In addition, some response-related roles and  responsibilities are established in law or by interagency agreements, and  others may be defined in FAA-required airport-emergency plans, although  those plans are not required to address communicable disease threats.

In addition, FAA supports and coordinates a range of R&D activities for  the civil aviation system. The inventory of FAA’s R&D activities is expressed in the National Aviation Research Plan (NARP) and in FAA’s  Fiscal Year R&D Annual Review. FAA is required to submit both of these  documents annually to Congress. According to FAA’s most recent  NARP, FAA’s research budget from all accounts in FY 2017 was $422.3  million. FAA’s research budget supports activities conducted by FAA as  well as a range of partners, including other government agencies,  universities, and private sector organizations.

FAA’s process for developing its commercial aviation research portfolio  spans the agency. To develop the NARP and its R&D portfolio, FAA’s  program planning teams, which focus on specific research program  areas, identify R&D projects to meet one of DOT’s three strategic goals  and FAA’s five R&D goals. Further, an executive board in FAA provides  guidance and oversight over the agency’s portfolio development process,  and a statutorily created advisory committee—consisting of individuals  that represent corporations, universities, associations, and others— conducts external reviews of FAA’s R&D programs for relevance, quality,  and performance. This advisory committee also makes recommendations  to FAA on the proposed R&D portfolios and budgets.

In the Continued Absence of a Comprehensive National Plan, the U.S. Aviation System Remains Insufficiently Prepared to Respond to Communicable Disease Threats

In 2015, we found that the United States lacked a comprehensive national  aviation-preparedness plan to limit the spread of communicable diseases  through air travel, though some individual airport and airline preparedness  plans did exist. Accordingly, we recommended that DOT work with  relevant stakeholders, such as HHS, to develop a national aviation- preparedness plan for communicable disease outbreaks. We emphasized  that a comprehensive national plan would provide a coordination  mechanism for the public-health and aviation sectors to more effectively  prevent and control a communicable disease threat while also minimizing  unnecessary disruptions to the national aviation system. Additionally, U.S.  airports and airlines are not required to have individual preparedness  plans for communicable disease threats and no federal agency tracks  which airports and airlines have them. As such, the extent to which U.S.  airports and airlines have such plans is unknown. However, all 14 airports  and 3 airlines we reviewed in 2015 had independently developed  preparedness plans for responding to communicable disease threats from  abroad. These plans generally addressed the high-level components that  we identified as common among applicable federal and international  guidance for emergency preparedness, such as establishment of an  incident command center and activation triggers for a response. While the  14 airports and 3 airlines had plans that address communicable diseases,  representatives from these airports and airlines reported facing multiple  challenges in responding to threats. Identified challenges that included  obtaining guidance; communication and coordination among responders;  and assuring employees have appropriate training, equipment, and  sanitary workplaces. As we stated in our 2015 report, a national aviation  preparedness plan to respond to communicable disease outbreaks could  help address these challenges.

As of June 2020, DOT, DHS, and HHS stated that the federal government  still has not developed a national aviation-preparedness plan to respond  to communicable disease outbreaks. In making our recommendation in  2015, we pointed to Annex 9 to the Chicago Convention—an international  aviation treaty to which the United States is a signatory—which contains a  standard that obligates International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO)  member states to develop a national aviation-preparedness plan for  communicable disease outbreaks. DOT and CDC officials in 2015  stated that some elements of a national aviation-preparedness plan  already exist, including plans at individual airports. However, as we  discussed in our 2015 report, individual airport plans are often contained  in multiple documents, and FAA reported that the plans are intended to  handle communicable disease threats posed by passengers on one or  two flights, rather than an epidemic—which may require involvement from  multiple airports on a national level. Most importantly, a national aviation- preparedness plan would provide airports and airlines with an adaptable  and scalable framework with which to align their individual plans, to help  ensure that individual airport and airline plans work in concert with one  another.

DOT and CDC officials agreed in 2015 and continue to agree today that a  national aviation-preparedness plan could add value. DOT, however,  maintains that those agencies that have both legal authority and expertise  for emergency response and public health—namely DHS and HHS—are  best positioned to take the lead role in developing such a plan within the  existing interagency framework for national-level all-hazards emergency  preparedness planning. We continue to believe that DOT would be in the  best position to lead the effort because FAA and DOT have stronger and  deeper ties to, as well as oversight responsibility for, the relevant  stakeholders that would be most involved in such a broad effort, namely  airlines, airports, and other aviation stakeholders. In addition, DOT’s  Office of the Secretary is the liaison to ICAO for Annex 9 to the Chicago  Convention, in which the relevant ICAO standard is contained.

In response to the current COVID-19 pandemic and in the absence of a  national aviation-preparedness plan, DOT officials pointed to ongoing  efforts to engage with interagency partners at DHS and HHS, as well as  industry stakeholders, to better collaborate on the aviation sector’s  communicable disease response and preparedness. For example, DOT  told us that it has facilitated conference calls between federal and private  sector stakeholders and has collaborated with CDC to update interim guidance for airline crews related to communicable diseases, specifically  COVID-19. While these actions are helpful, some aviation stakeholders  have publicly highlighted piecemeal response efforts that may have led to  some of the confusion among stakeholders and chaos at certain airports  that occurred earlier this year following the COVID-19 travel bans and  increased screening efforts. For example, stakeholders described actions  taken by individual airlines in the absence of FAA guidance, such as to  cease operations to certain countries, and a piecemeal approach to  establishing standards for safely continuing or expanding service, such as  various airline and airport policies regarding facemasks. This piecemeal  approach points to the continued need for DOT to implement our 2015  recommendation to develop a coordinated effort to plan for and respond  to communicable disease threats. We have included this open  recommendation as one of 16 high priority recommendations to DOT.

FAA Has Taken Steps to Improve Its R&D Portfolio Management, but Has Conducted Limited Research on Disease Transmission in Aircraft and Airports FAA is Taking Steps to Improve the Formulation and Management of its R&D Portfolio Based on GAO Recommendations

While a national aviation-preparedness plan can help better manage the  response to the next aviation pandemic, other efforts such as research  and development are also key. In 2017, we found that FAA’s actions  related to the management of its R&D portfolio were not fully consistent  with statutory requirements, agency guidance, and leading practices. As  part of that work, we assessed FAA’s actions to manage its R&D portfolio  in three key areas: (1) developing its portfolio of R&D projects, (2)  tracking and evaluating those projects, and (3) reporting on its portfolio.  We found that FAA could be more strategic in how it develops its R&D  portfolio, chiefly in identifying long-term research needs and in improving  disclosure of how projects are selected. As a result of these deficiencies,  we found that FAA management could not be assured that the highest  priority R&D was being conducted. We also found that while FAA tracks  and evaluates its research projects consistent with leading practices, it  did not fully address all statutory reporting requirements, such as  identifying long-term research resources in the National Aviation  Research Plan (NARP) or preparing the R&D Annual Review in  accordance with government performance-reporting requirements. These  reporting deficiencies can limit the usefulness of the reports to internal  and outside stakeholders. Accordingly, in 2017, we recommended that  DOT direct FAA to (1) take a more strategic approach to identifying long- term R&D research priorities across the agency, (2) disclose how  research projects are prioritized and selected, and (3) ensure that the  NARP and R&D Annual Reviews meet statutory requirements for content.  DOT agreed with all three recommendations.

As of June 2020, FAA has fully addressed one of our recommendations  and taken partial action on two other recommendations. Specifically, FAA fully responded to our recommendation that FAA disclose the process it  uses for prioritizing and selecting research projects by updating in 2018  its internal guidance documents to allow better transparency over project  selection. In partially responding to our recommendation to take a more  strategic approach to identifying research priorities across the agency, in  June 2019, FAA issued a redesigned National Aviation Research Plan  (NARP) for 2017-2018. The redesigned plan is a good first step. Also as  part of an effort to be more strategic, FAA is beginning to take actions to  understand emerging aviation issues requiring FAA’s research attention.  This recommendation has not been fully addressed as, according to FAA  officials, the agency is still developing guidance to ensure that future  NARPs take a strategic approach and incorporate emerging issues into  future plans. FAA officials told us they plan to finalize the guidance by the  end of 2020. Similarly, with respect to our recommendation aimed at  achieving compliance with statutory reporting requirements, the  redesigned 2017-2018 NARP included a list of agreements with federal  and nonfederal entities on research activities, resource allocation  decisions, and a description of technology transfer to government,  industry, and academia, among other items. Officials told us that they are  finalizing the 2019 R&D Annual Review, which has been redesigned to  address other statutory reporting requirements, and will develop guidance  to ensure that future documents meet those requirements.

Disease Transmission Research Has Received Limited FAA Focus in Recent Years

FAA has sponsored limited federal research into disease transmission  onboard aircraft and in airports. FAA’s research goals focus on areas like  improving airport operations and air space management, and developing  new technologies, which FAA has aligned to DOT’s strategic goals  related to safety, infrastructure, and innovation. Based on our prior work  and interviews with FAA officials, we found that FAA’s research in cabin  safety for crew and passengers does not focus on disease transmission.  For example, according to FAA officials, as of June 2020, ongoing  research that most closely relates to disease contamination is research  related to monitoring the quality of “bleed air,” which is outside air that is  drawn through jet engines into an aircraft cabin. FAA officials said that  its Civil Aerospace Medical Institute is participating in this research.

Even so, FAA has funded some programs that are relevant to mitigating  communicable disease transmission at airports and on aircraft. For  example, in 2015 the Transportation Research Board’s Airports  Cooperative Research Program (ACRP), which is funded by FAA’s  Airport Improvement Program (AIP), decided to hold a series of  workshops on topics that are of significance to airports and that are not  being addressed by other federal research programs. The decision to  hold the first ACRP workshop on communicable disease occurred toward  the end of the Ebola virus outbreak. ACRP has also issued reports on  reducing communicable disease transmission at airports and aircraft.  These reports have provided information and guidance to airports and  airlines on infectious disease mitigation onboard aircraft and ways to  respond to a communicable disease in airports. For example, a 2013  ACRP report recommends reducing the amount of time aircraft ventilation  systems are shutdown at the gate, so that an aircraft’s high efficiency  particulate air (HEPA) systems, which can capture more than 99 percent  of the airborne microbes, continue to operate. ACRP also has a research  project currently under way for publication early next year on effective  collaboration to prevent, respond to, and mitigate disease threats.

Prior to 2014, FAA also funded some research on disease transmission  on aircraft through its Centers of Excellence research consortium.  Specifically, in 2004, FAA established the Airliner Cabin Environment  Research (ACER) Center of Excellence, which conducts research on, among other things, the safety and health of passengers and crew inside  the cabin. In 2010 and 2012, ACER published research on air quality in  airline cabins and disease transmission in aircraft. A researcher we  interviewed who is affiliated with ACER said that the Center established a  laboratory in 2006, called ACERL, which is currently conducting research  on the dispersion of airborne particles (including viruses) in the aircraft  cabin for CDC’s National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health. As  of 2014, ACER began operating independently as a consortium  academia, government, and others and is no longer being funded solely  by FAA.

FAA and DOT principally look to HHS and the CDC for guidance on  passenger health issues. HHS has statutory responsibility for preventing  the introduction, transmission, and spread of communicable diseases into  the United States and among the states. Within HHS, CDC has defined  its mission as protecting America from health, safety and security threats,  both foreign and domestic. CDC alerts travelers about disease outbreaks  and steps they can take to protect themselves. CDC also has the  authority to quarantine passengers traveling from foreign countries, if  necessary, to prevent the introduction, transmission, or spread of  communicable disease. CDC’s National Institute for Occupational Safety  and Health has conducted research and issued guidance in the past on  disease transmission in aircraft and cabin crew health and, as previously  noted, is funding current research through the ACER Center. CDC has  also issued COVID-19 guidance for cabin crew safety.

Some Technologies Could Be Useful to Reduce the Risks of Communicable Disease in Air Travel

There are a variety of technologies that could help address infectious  disease transmission associated with air travel, but these technologies  are at various stages of maturity. For example, the initial screening of  passengers for fevers is typically done with handheld infrared  thermometers and has been reportedly discussed for use by  Transportation Security Agents. Reports also state that the mass  screening of crowds using thermal cameras has been used in some  airports in Asia, but such scanners are still being tested for standalone  use in the United States, with some concerns reported about the  accuracy of the results. Aircraft disinfection has traditionally been done by  cleaning crews, but a number of methods are being developed using  heat, chemicals, and UV light, and are under examination by researchers.

Chairwoman Horn, Ranking Member Babin, and Members of the  Subcommittee, this completes my prepared remarks. I would be pleased  to respond to any questions that you or other Members of the  Subcommittee may have at this time.

If you or your staff have any questions about this statement, please  contact me at (202) 512-2834 or krauseh@gao.gov. Contact points for  our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found  on the last page of this statement.

GAO staff who made key contributions to this testimony are Jonathan  Carver, Assistant Director; Paul Aussendorf; Roshni Davé; Hayden  Huang; Delwen Jones; Molly Laster; Cheryl Peterson; Gretchen Snoey;  and Elizabeth Wood.

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the  United States. The published product may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety  without further permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain  copyrighted images or other material, permission from the copyright holder may be  necessary if you wish to reproduce this material separately.

COVID-19 is only the latest disease to raise concerns over contagions spread through air travel. In 2015, during the Ebola epidemic, we recommended that the Department of Transportation develop a comprehensive national aviation-preparedness plan for communicable disease outbreaks.

However, it has yet to do so. Such a plan could have improved coordination between public-health and aviation sectors during COVID-19 to address issues like passenger screening.

We also found that FAA has conducted limited research on disease transmission during air travel or in airports. We earlier recommended FAA improve how it sets research priorities.


Reverse Mortgages: FHA's Oversight of Loan Outcomes and Servicing Needs Strengthening

This testimony summarizes the information contained in GAO's September 2019 report, entitled Reverse Mortgages: FHA Needs to Improve Monitoring and Oversight of Loan Outcomes and Servicing ( GAO-19-702 ).

The vast majority of reverse mortgages are made under the Federal Housing Administration's (FHA) Home Equity Conversion Mortgage (HECM) program. In recent years, a growing percentage of HECMs insured by FHA have ended because borrowers defaulted on their loans. While death of the borrower is the most commonly reported reason why HECMs terminate, the percentage of terminations due to borrower defaults increased from 2 percent in fiscal year 2014 to 18 percent in fiscal year 2018 (see figure). Most HECM defaults are due to borrowers not meeting occupancy requirements or failing to pay property charges, such as property taxes or homeowners insurance. Since 2015, FHA has allowed HECM servicers to put borrowers who are behind on property charges onto repayment plans to help prevent foreclosures, but as of fiscal year-end 2018, only about 22 percent of these borrowers had received this option.

FHA's monitoring, performance assessment, and reporting for the HECM program have weaknesses. FHA loan data do not currently capture the reason for about 30 percent of HECM terminations (see figure). FHA also has not established comprehensive performance indicators for the HECM portfolio and has not regularly tracked key performance metrics, such as reasons for HECM terminations and the number of distressed borrowers who have received foreclosure prevention options. Additionally, FHA has not developed internal reports to comprehensively monitor patterns and trends in loan outcomes. As a result, FHA does not know how well the HECM program is serving its purpose of helping meet the financial needs of elderly homeowners.

FHA has not conducted on-site reviews of HECM servicers since fiscal year 2013 and has not benefited from oversight efforts by the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB). FHA officials said they planned to resume the reviews in fiscal year 2020, starting with three servicers that account for most of the market. However, as of August 2019, FHA had not developed updated review procedures and did not have a risk-based method for prioritizing reviews. CFPB conducts examinations of reverse mortgage servicers but does not provide the results to FHA because the agencies do not have an agreement for sharing confidential supervisory information. Without better oversight and information sharing, FHA lacks assurance that servicers are following requirements, including those designed to help protect borrowers.

I am pleased to be here today to discuss oversight of reverse mortgages  made under the Home Equity Conversion Mortgage (HECM) program,  which is administered by the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) within  the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). Reverse  mortgages are loans that allow seniors to convert part of their home  equity into payments from a lender while still living in their homes. While  reverse mortgages can help senior homeowners meet financial needs,  they also can present risks to borrowers.

The vast majority of reverse mortgages are made under the HECM  program. As of the end of fiscal year 2018, FHA had insured more than 1  million HECMs, which included about 630,000 active loans and about  468,000 terminated loans. HECMs are originated and serviced by private  FHA-approved lenders and servicers. FHA insures these entities against  losses on the loans and charges borrowers premiums to help cover the  potential cost of insurance claims. While not involved in administering the  HECM program, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB)  collects consumer complaints about reverse mortgages and supervises  nonbank reverse mortgage lenders and servicers for compliance with,  and enforces violations of, federal consumer financial protection laws.

HECMs terminate when a borrower repays or refinances the loan or when  the loan becomes due and payable because the borrower died, moved, or  defaulted (see fig. 1). Defaults occur when borrowers fail to meet  mortgage conditions such as paying property charges (for example,  property taxes and homeowners insurance) or meeting occupancy  requirements. These borrowers risk foreclosure and loss of their homes if  they cannot satisfy the debt or correct the condition that resulted in the  default.

Certain features of the HECM program can help borrowers delay and, in  some cases, avoid foreclosure. If a borrower falls behind on property  charges, servicers must generally temporarily advance property charges  on a borrower’s behalf (known as servicer advances). However, servicers  may initiate foreclosure proceedings if the borrower does not catch up.  Additionally, since 2015, FHA has made program changes to allow  servicers to offer foreclosure prevention options to distressed HECM  borrowers and nonborrowing spouses of deceased borrowers.

My testimony summarizes findings from our report on the HECM  program, which is being released today. Specifically, I will discuss (1)  what FHA data show about HECM terminations and the use of  foreclosure prevention options; (2) FHA’s assessment and monitoring of  HECM portfolio performance and foreclosure prevention options; (3)  FHA’s and CFPB’s oversight of HECM servicers; and (4) FHA’s and  CFPB’s collection, analysis, and response to consumer complaints about  HECMs. For this work, we analyzed FHA loan data and reviewed FHA  and CFPB documents on HECM servicer oversight. We also reviewed  FHA and CFPB data on consumer complaints related to reverse  mortgages. We interviewed agency officials, the five largest HECM  servicers (representing 99 percent of the market), and legal aid  organizations representing HECM borrowers. We conducted the work on  which this statement is based in accordance with generally accepted  government auditing standards. More details on our methodology can be  found in the issued report.

HECM Defaults Have Increased, and Use of Foreclosure Prevention Options Is Limited

Our analysis of FHA data found that 272,155 HECMs terminated from  fiscal years 2014 through 2018. The number of terminations rose from  about 24,000 in fiscal year 2014 to a peak of roughly 82,000 in fiscal year  2016, before declining to about 60,000 in fiscal year 2018.

In recent years, a growing percentage of HECMs have terminated  because borrowers defaulted on their loans. While death of the borrower  is the most commonly reported reason why HECMs terminated, the  percentage of terminations due to defaults increased from 2 percent in  fiscal year 2014 to 18 percent in fiscal year 2018 (see fig. 2). Most  defaults were due to borrowers not meeting occupancy requirements or  failing to pay property charges. For about 30 percent of terminations, we  were unable to readily determine a termination reason from FHA’s data.

We also found that servicers’ use of foreclosure prevention options for  HECM borrowers was limited or FHA did not have readily available data  to assess the extent of use. For example, since 2015, FHA has allowed  HECM servicers to offer borrowers who are behind on property charges  repayment plans to help prevent foreclosures, but as of the end of fiscal  year 2018, only about 22 percent of these borrowers had received this  option. Also, while FHA created a low-balance extension in 2016—which  allows HECM servicers to delay calling a HECM due and payable if the  borrower owes less than $2,000 in unpaid property taxes or hazard  insurance—FHA officials told us they do not track how often servicers use  this option. Our analysis of FHA data found that approximately 8,800  HECMs that terminated in fiscal years 2014 through 2018 had unpaid  property charges of less than $2,000 at the time of termination. Some of  these HECMs may have been eligible for a low-balance extension when  they terminated.

Additionally, we found that it is difficult to estimate the universe of HECMs  potentially eligible for mortgagee optional election assignments—an  option to help nonborrowing spouses stay in their homes after a  borrowing spouse dies. Under this option, if required conditions and time  frames are met, the servicer can assign the HECM to FHA. The  assignment defers repayment of the HECM as long as the nonborrowing  spouse fulfills certain conditions. According to information generated by  FHA, HECM servicers submitted 1,445 requests for mortgagee optional  election assignments from June 2015 (when FHA made this option  available) through September 2018. In total, FHA approved roughly 70  percent of the requests and denied the remaining 30 percent. However,  nonborrowing spouses were not listed on loan documentation for HECMs  originated prior to August 4, 2014. As a result, FHA does not know how  many eligible nonborrowing spouses could have, but did not, apply for the  mortgagee optional election assignment, or how many are potentially  eligible to apply for it in the future. FHA has begun reaching out to HECM  borrowers to inform them of the mortgagee optional election process and  ask them to self-identify whether there is a nonborrowing spouse  associated with their loan.

Weaknesses Exist in HECM Termination Data, Performance Assessment, and Portfolio Monitoring

FHA’s monitoring, performance assessment, and reporting for the HECM  program have weaknesses. Since fiscal year 2013, FHA has used the  Home Equity Reverse Mortgage Information Technology (HERMIT)  system to collect data on the servicing of HECMs, but the system does  not contain comprehensive and accurate data about the reasons why  HECMs terminate, a key servicing event. According to the HERMIT User  Guide, servicers should provide a reason in HERMIT when they terminate  a HECM. However, as noted previously, for about 30 percent of the  HECMs that terminated in fiscal years 2014 through 2018, we were  unable to determine the reason for termination. FHA officials told us  termination reasons are available on an individual loan basis in HERMIT  but not in an extractable form. FHA does not regularly track and report on  HECM termination reasons, due partly to this system limitation.

In the report being released today, we are recommending that FHA take  steps to improve the quality and accuracy of HECM termination data.  These steps may include updating the termination reasons in the  HERMIT system for recording these data or updating the HERMIT User  Guide to more clearly instruct servicers how to record termination  reasons. FHA agreed with this recommendation. Comprehensive and  accurate data on HECM terminations would provide FHA with a better  understanding of loan outcomes—information FHA and Congress need in  order to know how well the program is helping seniors age in place.

FHA also has not established comprehensive performance indicators for  the HECM portfolio and has not regularly tracked key performance  metrics, such as the percentage of HECM terminations due to borrower  defaults, the proportion of active HECMs with delinquent property  charges, or the percentage of distressed borrowers who have received  foreclosure prevention options. For example, HUD’s most recent strategic  plan and corresponding performance report do not include HECM-specific  performance indicators, and the last comprehensive evaluation of the  HECM program was done in 2000. FHA officials told us they were in the  planning phase for a new evaluation of the program but had not set a  start date and did not expect the evaluation to include an analysis of the  reasons for HECM terminations or the use of foreclosure prevention  options for borrowers in default. We are recommending that FHA  establish, periodically review, and report on performance indicators for  the HECM program and examine the impact of foreclosure prevention  options in the forthcoming HECM program evaluation. FHA agreed with  this recommendation. Better performance assessment could provide FHA  important information about how well the HECM program is working.

Additionally, we found shortcomings in FHA’s internal reporting and  analysis for the HECM program. For example, FHA has not developed  internal reports to comprehensively monitor patterns and trends in loan  outcomes, such as the percentage of HECM terminations due to borrower  defaults. FHA has generated some reports from HERMIT to help oversee  the HECM portfolio, but it has been slow to develop regular and  comprehensive reporting mechanisms. FHA officials told us that while  data on defaults and foreclosure prevention options have generally been  available in HERMIT since 2015, FHA was unable to obtain reports on  these topics until 2018 because of funding limitations with their HERMIT  system contractor. Our review of the regular and ad hoc reports FHA has  received from its HERMIT system contractor found that many are lists of  loans that meet criteria and do not provide summary statistics that could  be used to readily identify patterns or trends in metrics. Further, we found  the reports required additional analysis to generate meaningful  management information. In the report being released today, we  recommend that FHA develop analytic tools, such as dashboards or  watch lists, to better monitor outcomes for the HECM portfolio, such as  reasons for terminations, defaults, use of foreclosure prevention options,  or advances paid by servicers on behalf of HECM borrowers. FHA agreed  with this recommendation. With more robust program analysis and  internal reporting, FHA would be better positioned to detect and respond  to emerging issues and trends in the HECM portfolio.

Finally, we found that FHA has not fully analyzed the implications of how  it prioritizes foreclosures for HECMs that servicers have assigned to FHA.  FHA officials told us the agency generally does not foreclose on  borrowers whose HECMs have been assigned to FHA and who are in  default due to unpaid property charges. As a result, defaulted borrowers  whose loans have not been assigned to FHA face a greater risk of  foreclosure than defaulted borrowers with FHA-assigned loans. In  addition, FHA’s process may create a financial incentive for HECM  borrowers with assigned loans to not pay their property charges.  Therefore, we are recommending that FHA analyze the implications of its  prioritization process. FHA agreed with our recommendation. Such  analysis would help FHA to better understand how its process for  prioritizing foreclosures for assigned loans affects the HECM portfolio,  HECM borrowers, neighborhoods, and FHA’s insurance fund.

FHA’s Oversight of Servicers and Collaboration on Oversight between FHA and CFPB Are Limited

FHA’s oversight of HECM servicers has been limited in recent years. FHA  has not performed comprehensive on-site reviews of HECM servicers’  compliance with program requirements since fiscal year 2013 and does  not have current procedures for conducting these reviews. FHA officials  said they planned to resume the HECM servicer reviews in fiscal year  2020, starting with three servicers that account for most of the market.  However, as of August 2019, FHA had not developed updated review  procedures (they were last updated in 2009) and did not have a risk- based method for prioritizing reviews. In the report being released today,  we recommend that FHA develop and implement procedures for  conducting on-site reviews of HECM servicers, including a risk-rating  system for prioritizing and determining the frequency of reviews. FHA  agreed with this recommendation. By resuming HECM servicer on-site  reviews and adopting a risk-rating system, FHA would be better  positioned to ensure that servicers are following program requirements,  including those designed to help protect borrowers.

Additionally, we found that while CFPB has examined reverse mortgage  servicers and plans to continue doing so, according to CFPB officials the  bureau does not share results with FHA because the agencies do not  have an agreement in place to share supervisory information. CFPB  officials said CFPB and FHA had taken initial steps in 2017 toward  developing an information-sharing agreement. However, as of August  2019, an information-sharing agreement had not been completed.  Accordingly, we are recommending that FHA and CFPB work together to  complete an agreement for sharing the results of CFPB’s examinations of  HECM servicers with FHA. CFPB generally agreed with this  recommendation, and FHA neither agreed nor disagreed. Sharing these  results could aid FHA’s oversight of HECM servicers by providing  additional information about the servicers’ performance and operations.

CFPB Collects and Analyzes Consumer Complaints on Reverse Mortgages, but FHA Does Not Use All Available Data

CFPB began collecting reverse mortgage consumer complaints in  December 2011 and has collected about 3,600 complaints since then.  CFPB officials told us they use consumer complaints as part of their  criteria for selecting entities to examine, including reverse mortgage  servicers, and to inform CFPB’s educational publications. We conducted  a detailed analysis of a random, generalizable sample of 100 consumer  complaint narratives drawn from all the reverse mortgage complaints  CFPB received in calendar years 2015 through 2018. Based on our  review of complaint narratives, we found that some of the issues  consumers cited most commonly were foreclosures, poor communication  from lenders or servicers, problems at loan origination, estate  management, and unfair interest rates, fees, or costs.

FHA collects and records inquiries and complaints about HECMs, and it  has access to CFPB data on reverse mortgage complaints. However,  FHA does not use its inquiry and complaint data to help inform HECM  program policies and oversight, and the way data are collected does not  produce quality information for these purposes. Additionally, we found  that FHA has not leveraged CFPB complaint data for HECM program  oversight.

According to FHA officials, FHA’s two main methods for collecting  customer inquiries and complaints are hotlines operated by the agency’s  National Servicing Center and the FHA Resource Center. From calendar  years 2015 through 2018, the National Servicing Center received about  105,000 HECM-related calls. During this same period, the FHA  Resource Center received 147 HECM-related calls. In April 2019, the  FHA Resource Center became the primary entity for collecting, recording,  and responding to all HECM-related calls. FHA officials told us they  transferred these responsibilities from the National Servicing Center to  the FHA Resource Center to help improve call management.

While this change could help improve customer service, it does not fully  resolve limitations we found in FHA’s approach to collecting and  recording HECM inquiries and complaints that diminish the usefulness of  the information for program oversight. For example, both the National  Servicing Center and the FHA Resource Center do not collect call  information in a way that would allow FHA to readily analyze the data for  themes. Specifically, both centers do not reliably differentiate between  inquiries and complaints—a potentially important distinction for  determining appropriate agency-level responses. Additionally, while both  the centers collect data on the reason for calls, neither does so in a  systematic way that would allow FHA to readily determine how frequently  issues are being raised. For example, neither center’s data systems  contain standardized categories or menus with options for recording  reasons for calls.

FHA officials said the agency uses complaint and inquiry data to improve  customer service. However, FHA does not analyze data for other  purposes that could enhance program oversight, such as determining  which HECM servicers and lenders receive the most complaints, targeting  entities for on-site reviews, or identifying topics that may need additional  borrower education. In the report being released today, we recommend  that FHA collect and record consumer inquiries and complaints in a  manner that facilitates analysis of the type and frequency of the issues  raised. FHA neither agreed nor disagreed with our recommendation. We  also recommend that FHA periodically analyze available internal and  external consumer complaint data about reverse mortgages to help  inform management and oversight of the HECM program. FHA agreed  with this recommendation. By improving the collection and use of  consumer complaint data and better monitoring its own and CFPB’s  complaint data, FHA could improve its ability to detect and respond to  emerging consumer protection issues regarding HECMs.

Chairman Clay, Ranking Member Duffy, and Members of the  Subcommittee, this completes my statement. I would be pleased to  respond to any questions that you may have at this time.

If you or your staff have any questions about this testimony, please  contact Alicia Puente Cackley, Director, Financial Markets and  Community Investment at (202) 512-8678 or cackleya@gao.gov. Contact  points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may  be found on the last page of this statement. GAO staff who made key  contributions to this testimony are Beth Faraguna and Steve Westley  (Assistant Directors), Holly Hobbs (Analyst in Charge), Steven Campbell,  William Chatlos, John Karikari, Matthew Levie, Marc Molino, Jennifer  Schwartz, and Tyler Spunaugle.

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the  United States. The published product may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety  without further permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain  copyrighted images or other material, permission from the copyright holder may be  necessary if you wish to reproduce this material separately.

Reverse mortgages allow seniors to convert part of their home equity into payments from a lender while still living in their homes. Seniors run the risk of defaulting and losing their homes if they don’t continue to pay taxes and meet other conditions.

We testified that defaults increased from 2% of loan terminations in 2014 to 18% in 2018, mostly due to borrowers failing to meet occupancy requirements or pay taxes or insurance.

The Federal Housing Administration could do a better job evaluating the performance of its reverse mortgage program and overseeing the companies that service the loans. We made 9 recommendations in a related report.


High Risk: Important Progress Made, but More Work Needed to Strengthen DHS Management

GAO has regularly reported on government operations identified as high-risk because of their increased vulnerability to fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement, or the need for transformation to address economic, efficiency, or effectiveness challenges. In 2003, shortly after the department was formed, we designated Implementing and Transforming DHS as a high risk area to the federal government because DHS had to transform 22 agencies into one department, and failure to address associated risks could have serious consequences for U.S. national security. In 2013, we reported that although challenges remained for DHS, the department had made considerable progress. As a result, we narrowed the scope of the high-risk area to focus on strengthening DHS management functions (human capital, acquisition, financial management, and information technology). discusses DHS's progress and remaining actions needed to strengthen and integrate its management functions.

This statement discusses DHS’s progress and remaining actions needed to strengthen and integrate its management functions. This statement is based on our 2019 high-risk update and other reports issued from February 2017 through March 2019. Among other things, GAO analyzed DHS strategies and other documents related to the department's efforts to address its high-risk areas.

As GAO reported in its 2019 high-risk update, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has continued its efforts to strengthen and integrate its acquisition, information technology, financial, and human capital management functions. As a result, the department has continued to meet three out of five criteria for removal from GAO's High-Risk List (leadership commitment, action plan, and monitoring) and partially meet the remaining two criteria (capacity and demonstrated progress). With regard to leadership commitment, DHS's top leadership has continued to demonstrate support for addressing the department's management challenges through, for example, its Integrated Priorities initiative to strengthen the integration of DHS's business operations across the department. Additionally, DHS has established an action plan for addressing the high-risk area and has issued 14 updated versions since 2011.This action plan also demonstrates DHS's ongoing monitoring of these efforts as it describes DHS's progress to-date and planned corrective actions.

The two key areas where additional work is needed are DHS's capacity and demonstrated progress. With regard to capacity, DHS needs to make additional progress identifying and allocating resources in the areas of acquisition, information technology, and financial management. With regard to demonstrated progress, DHS should show the ability to achieve sustained improvement across 30 outcomes that GAO identified and DHS agreed were needed to address the high-risk area. GAO found in its 2019 high-risk update that DHS fully addressed 17 of these outcomes, while work remains to fully address the remaining 13. DHS has made some progress in recent years regarding human capital and information technology outcomes, but needs to continue implementing its action plan to show measurable, sustainable progress in achieving the 13 outcomes not yet fully addressed.

Since 2003, GAO has made about 2,800 recommendations to DHS to strengthen its management efforts, among other things. DHS has implemented more than 75 percent of these recommendations which have strengthened program management and performance measurement.

I am pleased to be here today to discuss the Department of Homeland  Security’s (DHS) management challenges and its progress in addressing  them. As you know, in 2002, when DHS was created, department  leadership faced the daunting task of transforming 22 agencies—several  with major management challenges—into one department. At that time,  we recognized that the creation of DHS was an enormous undertaking  that could take years to implement, and failure to effectively address  management challenges could have serious national security  consequences. In 2003, shortly after the department was formed, we  designated Implementing and Transforming DHS as a high-risk area to  the federal government. Today, the work to strengthen DHS’s  management continues.

Since 2003, we have narrowed the focus of this high-risk area as DHS  has matured and evolved. In 2013, we reported that although challenges  remained for DHS across its range of missions, the department had made  considerable progress in transforming its original component agencies  into a single cabinet-level department. As a result, we narrowed the  scope of the high-risk area to focus on strengthening DHS management  functions (human capital, acquisition, financial management, and  information technology) and changed the name of the high-risk area to  Strengthening DHS Management Functions to reflect this focus.

In the last decade, DHS has taken many steps to strengthen its  management including developing a more strategic approach to human  capital planning, improving acquisition process compliance, and  improving its information technology (IT) investment framework. DHS has  implemented more than 75 percent of the approximately 2,800  recommendations we have made since 2003, which have strengthened  program management and performance measurement, among other  things. However, significant challenges remain in the areas of acquisition  management and financial reporting. In May 2018, we found that many of  the acquisition programs we assessed were not on track to meet their  schedule and cost goals, as I will explain in greater detail later in this  statement. Further, components’ financial management systems and  business processes need to be modernized to facilitate the department’s  ability to have ready access to reliable information for informed decision  making. We continue to closely monitor DHS’s work in these areas and  regularly meet with DHS management to discuss progress.

Our five criteria for removing areas from the High-Risk List guide our  discussions with DHS and our assessments of its progress. Specifically,  the agency must have (1) a demonstrated strong commitment and top  leadership support to address the risks; (2) the capacity—the people and  other resources—to resolve the risks; (3) a corrective action plan that  identifies the root causes, identifies effective solutions, and provides for  substantially completing corrective measures in the near term, including  but not limited to steps necessary to implement solutions we  recommended; (4) a program instituted to monitor and independently  validate the effectiveness and sustainability of corrective measures; and  (5) the ability to demonstrate progress in implementing corrective  measures.

My statement discusses DHS’s progress and remaining actions needed  to strengthen and integrate its management functions. This statement is  based on our 2019 high-risk update and other reports we issued from  February 2017 through March 2019. For these products we analyzed  DHS strategies and other documents related to the department’s efforts  to address its high-risk areas and interviewed DHS officials, among other  things. More detailed information on the scope and methodology of our  prior work can be found within each specific report. We conducted the  work on which this statement is based in accordance with generally  accepted government auditing standards.

DHS Has Made Important Progress in Strengthening Its Management, but Considerable Work Remains

DHS Has Met 3 of 5 Criteria for Removal from the High-Risk List

DHS’s efforts to strengthen and integrate its acquisition, IT, financial, and  human capital management functions have resulted in the department  meeting 3 out of 5 criteria for removal from the High-Risk List—leadership  commitment, action planning, and monitoring progress. DHS has partially  met the remaining two criteria—capacity and demonstrated, sustained  progress, as shown in figure 1.

With regard to leadership commitment, DHS’s top leadership, including  the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Homeland Security, has continued  to demonstrate commitment and support for addressing the department’s  management challenges. They have also taken actions to institutionalize  this commitment to help ensure the long-term success of the  department’s efforts. One such effort is the Under Secretary for  Management’s Integrated Priorities initiative to strengthen the integration  of DHS’s business operations across the department. During monthly  leadership meetings with the Under Secretary for Management, the  department’s Chief Executive Officers have been providing status  updates on their respective actions to address this high-risk designation.  Furthermore, top DHS leaders, such as the Under Secretary for  Management and the department’s Chief Executive Officers, routinely  meet with GAO management to discuss progress on high-risk areas.

With regard to having an action plan and monitoring effectiveness, in  January 2011, DHS produced its first Integrated Strategy for High-Risk  Management and has issued 14 updated versions, most recently in  September 2018. The September 2018 strategy describes DHS’s  progress to-date, planned corrective actions to further strengthen its  management functions, and includes performance measures to monitor  key management initiatives. DHS’s Management Directorate leads this  ongoing effort and DHS’s strategy and approach, if effectively  implemented and sustained, provides a path for DHS to be removed from  our High-Risk List.

DHS has partially met the criteria for capacity but needs to make  additional progress identifying and allocating resources in certain areas— namely acquisition, IT, and financial management—to fully demonstrate  its capacity. DHS has analyzed components’ acquisition program staffing  assessments but has yet to conduct an in-depth analysis across  components or develop a plan to address any gaps. With regard to IT  staffing, DHS has not fully identified or reported to Congress or the Office  of Personnel Management (OPM) on its department-wide cybersecurity  specialty areas of critical needs, such as cybersecurity management or  incident response, as required by law. Additionally, DHS’s financial  statement auditor has identified several capacity-related issues, including  resource limitations and inadequate management and staff training, as  causes for the material weaknesses reported.

The final criterion is demonstrated progress, which remains partially met.  In 2010, we identified, and DHS agreed, that achieving 30 specific  outcomes in the areas of acquisition management, IT management,  financial management, human capital management, and management  integration would be critical to addressing the department’s management  challenges. As such, these 30 outcomes became the key criteria by which  we gauge DHS’s demonstrated progress.

We reported in March 2019 that DHS has fully addressed 17 of the 30  needed outcomes, mostly addressed four, partially addressed six, and  initiated actions to address the remaining three, as shown in table 1.

In the last 2 years, DHS has made particular progress in the areas of  human capital and IT management. Specifically, since 2017 DHS has  taken steps to fully address 4 outcomes. The department fully addressed  two key human capital outcomes by (1) demonstrating that components  are basing hiring decisions and promotions on human capital  competencies and (2) strengthening employee engagement efforts. In  addition, in the last 2 years DHS has fully addressed two IT outcomes by  (1) providing ongoing oversight and support to troubled IT investments to  help improve their cost, schedule, and performance; and (2)  demonstrating significant progress in implementing its IT strategic  workforce planning initiative.

Important progress and remaining work in all of the five key areas include:

Acquisition management. DHS continues to face challenges in  funding its acquisition portfolio. In May 2018, we found that recent  enhancements to DHS’s acquisition management, resource  allocation, and requirements policies largely reflect key portfolio  management practices. However, we also found that of the 24 major  acquisition programs we assessed with approved schedule and cost  goals, 10 were on track to meet those goals during 2017—a decrease  from 2016.

In addition, we found that DHS’s portfolio of major acquisition  programs was not affordable from fiscal years 2018 to 2022 because  the planned costs exceeded the planned budget. DHS has taken  steps to strengthen acquisition requirements development across the  department, such as reestablishing the Joint Requirements Council in  June 2014 to review and validate DHS acquisition requirements.  However, opportunities remain to further strengthen DHS’s acquisition  process by, for example, using the Joint Requirements Council to (1)  identify overlapping or common requirements and (2) make  recommendations to senior leadership to help ensure that DHS uses  its finite investment resources wisely and maintains a balanced  portfolio of investments that combine near-term operational  improvements with long-term strategic planning.

IT management. DHS has updated its approach for managing its  portfolios of IT investments across all components. As part of the  revised approach, the department is using its capital planning and  investment control process and the Joint Requirements Council to  assess IT investments across the department on an ongoing basis.  For example, as part of its capital planning process for the fiscal year  2020 budget, the Office of the Chief Information Officer worked with  the components to assess each major IT investment to ensure  alignment with DHS’s functional portfolios, and to identify  opportunities to share capabilities across components. This updated  approach should enable DHS to identify potentially duplicative  investments and opportunities for consolidating investments, as well  as reduce component-specific investments.

Additionally, DHS has continued to take steps to enhance its  information security program. In November 2018, the department’s  financial statement auditor reported that DHS had made progress in  correcting its prior year IT security weaknesses. However, for the 15th  consecutive year, the auditor designated deficiencies in IT systems  controls as a material weakness for financial reporting purposes.  Work also remains in implementing our six open recommendations  concerning DHS’s cybersecurity workforce assessment  requirements.

DHS also faces challenges in fulfilling its pivotal role in government- wide cybersecurity efforts, as identified in our Ensuring the  Cybersecurity of the Nation high-risk area. DHS has established the  National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center,  which functions as the 24/7 cyber monitoring, incident response, and  management center for the federal civilian government. However,  DHS has continued to be challenged in measuring how the center is  performing its functions in accordance with mandated implementing  principles.

Financial management. DHS received a clean audit opinion on its  financial statements for 6 consecutive years—fiscal years 2013 to  2018. However, in fiscal year 2018, its auditor reported two material  weaknesses in the areas of financial reporting and information  technology controls and financial systems, as well as instances of  non-compliance with laws and regulations. These deficiencies hamper  DHS’s ability to provide reasonable assurance that its financial  reporting is reliable and the department is in compliance with  applicable laws and regulations.

Further, DHS components’ financial management systems and  business processes need to be modernized; the current systems  affect the department’s ability to have ready access to reliable  information for informed decision-making. As we reported in 2017,  DHS officials have faced various challenges in their efforts to address  this—lack of sufficient resources, aggressive schedule, complex  requirements, and increased costs. Effectively modernizing financial  management systems for the Coast Guard, Federal Emergency  Management Agency, and Immigration and Customs Enforcement  would help address DHS’s risk in this area.

Human capital management. DHS has continued to strengthen its  employee engagement efforts by implementing our 2012  recommendation to establish metrics of success within components’  action plans for addressing its employee satisfaction problems.

Further, DHS has conducted audits to better ensure components are  basing hiring decisions and promotions on human capital  competencies. OPM’s 2018 Federal Employee Viewpoint Survey data  showed that in the past 2 years, DHS’s score on the Employee  Engagement Index increased by 4 points—from 56 in 2016 to 60 in  2018—which was 1 point more than the government wide increase  over the same period. While this improvement is notable, DHS’s 2018  score ranked 20th among 20 large and very large federal agencies.  Increasing employee engagement and morale is critical to  strengthening DHS’s mission and management functions.

Management integration. Since 2015, DHS has focused its efforts to  address crosscutting management challenges through the  establishment and monitoring of its Integrated Priorities initiative. The  department updated these priorities in September 2017. Each priority  includes goals, objectives, and measurable action plans that are  discussed at monthly leadership meetings led by senior DHS officials,  including the Under Secretary for Management. DHS needs to  continue to demonstrate sustainable progress integrating its  management functions within and across the department.

In closing, it is clear that significant effort is required to build and integrate  a department as large and complex as DHS, which has grown to more  than 240,000 employees and approximately $74 billion in budget  authority. Continued progress for this high-risk area depends primarily on  addressing the remaining outcomes. In the coming years, DHS needs to  continue implementing its Integrated Strategy for High-Risk Management  to show measurable, sustainable progress in implementing corrective  actions and achieving outcomes. In doing so, it remains important for  DHS to maintain its current level of top leadership support and sustained  commitment to ensure continued progress in executing its corrective  actions through completion;  continue to identify the people and resources necessary to make  progress towards achieving outcomes, work to mitigate shortfalls and  prioritize initiatives as needed, and communicate to senior leadership  critical resource gaps;  continue to implement its plan for addressing this high-risk area and  periodically provide assessments of its progress to us and Congress;  closely track and independently validate the effectiveness and  sustainability of its corrective actions, and make midcourse  adjustments as needed; and make continued progress in achieving the 13 outcomes it has not fully  addressed and demonstrate that systems, personnel, and policies are  in place to ensure that progress can be sustained over time.

We will continue to monitor DHS’s efforts in this high-risk area to  determine if the outcomes are achieved and sustained over the long term.

Madam Chairwoman Torres Small, Ranking Member Crenshaw, and  Members of the Subcommittee, this completes my prepared statement. I  would be happy to respond to any questions you may have at this time.

If you or your staff members have any questions about this testimony,  please contact me at (404) 679-1875 or curriec@gao.gov. Contact points  for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be  found on the last page of this statement. Other individuals making key  contributions to this work include Claudia Becker, Assistant Director;  Imoni Hampton, Analyst-in-Charge; Michele Fejfar, Melissa Greenaway,  James Lawson, and Tom Lombardi. Key contributors for the previous  work that this is based on are listed in each product.

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the  United States. The published product may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety  without further permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain  copyrighted images or other material, permission from the copyright holder may be  necessary if you wish to reproduce this material separately.

When the Department of Homeland Security was created in 2002, its leadership faced the daunting task of transforming 22 agencies—several with major management challenges—into one department.

Although DHS has remained on our High Risk List since 2003, the department has made considerable progress. This testimony discusses DHS’s progress and actions still needed to strengthen and integrate its management functions. Significant challenges remain regarding financial reporting and acquisition management. For example, in 2018, we found that many of the acquisition programs we assessed were expected to be late and exceed their budgets.