Highway Emergency Relief: Federal Highway Administration Should Enhance Accountability over Project Decisions

In 2017, hurricanes in Texas, Florida, and Puerto Rico caused $1 billion in estimated damage. FHWA's Emergency Relief Program provides funding for states to repair or reconstruct federal-aid highways damaged or destroyed by natural disasters, including funding for emergency and permanent repairs. As of September 2019, FHWA has allocated $634 million in federal funds to the two states and Puerto Rico. By statute, emergency repairs are undertaken during or immediately following a disaster to quickly restore essential traffic and minimize further damage. These repairs receive 100 percent federal reimbursement if accomplished within 180 days and may proceed under expedited contracting and environmental procedures.

GAO was asked to evaluate the federal response to the 2017 disasters. This report assesses how FHWA applied program guidance to classify selected emergency relief projects, among other objectives. GAO visited 33 out of approximately 2,500 projects in Texas, Florida, and Puerto Rico; analyzed 25 emergency repair project files; and interviewed FHWA, state, and local government officials.

GAO found that the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) did not document the bases for decisions to classify projects as emergency repairs in 22 of the 25 project files reviewed. Without such documentation, it is not possible to definitively determine the justification for these decisions; GAO identified at least three projects that may have been inappropriately classified. For example, FHWA classified a $10.7 million ferry project in Lynchburg, Texas as an emergency repair to restore essential traffic. Several highways, however, were available immediately following the disaster that service the same locations and result in faster travel times than the ferry. FHWA guidance does not require officials to document decisions to classify projects as emergency repairs or clearly define what constitutes restoration of essential traffic. Designating projects as emergency repairs can increase the federal fiscal exposure in disasters. Had FHWA classified the ferry project as a permanent repair—instead of an emergency repair—the state would have been responsible for paying approximately $2.1 million in matching funds.

GAO also identified two temporary bridge projects in Puerto Rico classified as emergency repairs even though (1) work did not start within180 days of a disaster, as generally required; (2) the bridges are not to be completed until late 2019 and early 2020; and (3) both are to be replaced by permanent bridges within a couple of years. Out of approximately 1,200 eligible projects in Puerto Rico, FHWA officials reported undertaking 34, including the two bridges GAO identified, after 180 days. Officials also stated they did not document the basis for continuing to classify these projects as emergency repairs. FHWA officials in Puerto Rico stated they were not required to complete repairs within the 180 day limit established in law because Congress exempted Puerto Rico from federal matching share requirements. Further, emergency repair projects are allowed to expedite contracting and environmental procedures. After GAO raised this issue with FHWA, the agency stated that emergency repair projects are only permitted to use these expedited procedures within the first 180 days. While officials stated they plan to update guidance to include this policy, there is no specific timeline for doing so.

FHWA should (1) document decisions to classify projects as emergency repairs and more clearly define what constitutes restoration of essential traffic, and (2) identify a specific timeline for clarifying the policy on when expedited contracting and environmental procedures are permitted. DOT concurred with GAO's recommendations and provided technical comments that GAO incorporated as appropriate.

From August to September 2017, hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and Maria  made landfall on several Caribbean Islands and off the Gulf Coast,  including in Texas, Florida, and Puerto Rico, causing hundreds of millions  of dollars in damage to transportation infrastructure. When roads and  bridges are damaged and not usable, it is extremely difficult for people to  safely resume their lives and begin the lengthy recovery process. Thus,  timely assistance to rebuild transportation infrastructure after a disaster is  of critical importance.

As part of the continuing federal role in responding to and recovering from  such events, the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA), within the  Department of Transportation, administers the Emergency Relief  Program. This program provides funding for states to repair or reconstruct  federal-aid highways and roads on federal lands that have been  damaged or destroyed by natural disasters. To ensure the appropriate  use of federal funds, FHWA officials in division offices—located in each  state, Puerto Rico, and the District of Columbia—apply Emergency Relief  Program guidance for determining the eligibility of projects and the  amount of federal funds each project should receive.

Given the costs of these events and the significant fiscal challenges  facing both states and the federal government, it is increasingly important  that federal financial support be delivered in an effective, transparent, and  accountable manner so that limited funds are put to their best use. The  effective use of resources is even more paramount as disaster costs and  the federal fiscal exposure from them are projected to increase as  extreme weather events become more frequent and intense due to  climate change—as observed and projected by the U.S. Global Change  Research Program and the National Academies of Sciences,  Engineering, and Medicine.

You asked us to evaluate the federal government’s response and  recovery efforts related to 2017 natural disasters, including hurricanes  Harvey, Irma, and Maria. This report discusses efforts to repair and  rebuild transportation infrastructure in Texas, Florida, and Puerto Rico— the states and territory receiving the largest amount of funds from FHWA  for the 2017 hurricanes. Specifically, our objectives were to assess:  the estimated cost of damages caused to highways and bridges by  the 2017 hurricanes, and how FHWA applied Emergency Relief Program guidance to classify  selected projects for federal funding.

To identify the estimated cost of damages caused by the 2017 hurricanes  and the extent to which FHWA has allocated funds, we evaluated  damage inspection reports developed by state and local agencies in  Texas, Florida, and Puerto Rico following the hurricanes, as well as their  state- and territory-wide summaries of repair needs. We did not  independently verify the accuracy of state and local officials’ estimated  costs of damages. We also reviewed FHWA’s funding allocation  announcements from April 2018, February 2019, and September 2019,  and discussed the allocation process with FHWA officials.

To determine how FHWA applied Emergency Relief Program guidance to  classify selected projects, we reviewed applicable laws and regulations,  and documentation created by FHWA to manage the program and make  project eligibility determinations, including the Emergency Relief Manual  and the Emergency Relief Order. We also conducted site visits to Texas,  Florida, and Puerto Rico to examine 33 out of approximately 2,500  projects that were eligible for emergency relief funding—9 to 14 in each  state and territory. We selected projects that had relatively high estimated  repairs (typically more than $1 million); were deemed eligible for federal  funds by FHWA; and provided diversity in terms of location across each  state or territory and the type of infrastructure needing repairs (e.g., road,  bridge). This selection of projects is non-generalizable and was intended  to provide illustrative examples. As part of our visits we also interviewed  individuals involved in the construction and engineering of emergency  relief projects as well as state and local officials responsible for managing  the federal-funding approval process.

In addition, we analyzed a non-generalizable sample of 39 emergency  relief projects—25 of which included emergency repairs—to determine  whether files included documentation required in federal statute and  regulations, and recommended in FHWA program guidance. Project files  were selected because they (1) had high estimated repair costs, and (2)  provided diversity in terms of location, infrastructure, and repair type. We  used data from FHWA’s Mobile Solution for Assessment and Reporting  (MSAR) in order to select projects meeting these criteria for Texas and  Puerto Rico, and deemed the use of this data sufficiently reliable for  selection purposes through interviews with FHWA officials. Because  Florida does not use the MSAR data system to record project information,  we obtained a summary list of all projects within our scope in order to  make our selection for review. We also reviewed federal internal control  standards and interviewed FHWA officials in the headquarters office, as  well as the division offices in each state and territory that were  responsible for overseeing emergency relief funds allocated in response  to the 2017 hurricanes.

We conducted this performance audit from April 2018 to October 2019 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.

In 2017, three sequential hurricanes—Harvey, Irma, and Maria—created  an unprecedented demand for federal disaster response and recovery  resources. According to the Federal Emergency Management Agency  (FEMA), these hurricanes ranked among the top five costliest on record,  costing $125 billion (Harvey); $90 billion (Maria); and $50 billion (Irma).  As a result of these storms, Florida, Texas, and Puerto Rico faced  hardships, including devastation to infrastructure, such as highways and  bridges. The island of Puerto Rico in particular was severely affected,  which created multiple challenges for federal response efforts.  Specifically, within a 2-week period Puerto Rico was hit by both  hurricanes Irma and Maria, resulting in power outages that lasted up to 11  months and the need for commodities, such as food and water, and  requiring one of the largest recovery efforts in history. The federal  response was complicated by several factors, including the remoteness of  the island, limited local preparedness, outdated infrastructure, and  workforce capacity constraints.

The Emergency Relief Program provides assistance to repair or  reconstruct highways and bridges on federal-aid highways and roads and  bridges on federally owned public lands that have sustained serious  damage from natural disasters or catastrophic failures. FEMA is  responsible for providing funds to repair and replace roadways damaged  as a result of disasters that are not eligible for federal-aid highway  funding. For natural disasters or other events to be eligible for emergency  relief funding, the President must declare the event to be an “emergency”  or a “major disaster” under the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and  Emergency Assistance Act, or the governor must declare an emergency  with the concurrence of the Secretary of Transportation. Damage to highways must be severe, occur over a wide area, and result in unusually  high expenses to the highway agency.

Congress has provided funds for highway emergency relief since at least  1938 and, since 1972, has authorized $100 million annually in “contract  authority” for the Emergency Relief Program to be paid from the  Highway Trust Fund. Accordingly, FHWA may obligate up to $100  million of funds from the Highway Trust Fund in any one fiscal year for the  program. Congress also regularly provides funds to the Emergency  Relief Program from general revenues through supplemental  appropriations. Most recently, Congress passed the Bipartisan Budget  Act of 2018 in February 2018, and the Additional Supplemental  Appropriations for Disaster Relief Act, 2019 in June 2019, which included  more than $3 billion for the FHWA Emergency Relief Program to repair  damages caused by a number of natural disasters. According to FHWA  officials, these funds will be used to address damaged related to the 2017  hurricanes.

FHWA’s Emergency Relief Program regulations further define policies for  the program and the eligibility requirements for selecting projects. These  regulations state that emergency relief funds are not intended to correct  preexisting deficiencies or duplicate assistance available under another  federal program or compensation from insurance or other sources.  Emergency relief projects are to be promptly constructed, and  construction funds must be obligated within two years (i.e., by the end of  the second fiscal year following the disaster) unless suitable justification  is provided to FHWA. Emergency relief regulations specify the activities  that emergency relief funds may be used for as well as those activities  they may not be used for, such as reconstruction of facilities affected by  long-term, predictable developing situations or deficient bridges  scheduled for replacement with other funds.

Because the statute and its regulations are, by necessity, fairly broad,  FHWA publishes guidance to further assist the agency in administering  the Emergency Relief Program. The Emergency Relief Manual, updated  in 2013, is a guide for FHWA and state and local agency personnel for  requesting, obtaining, and administering emergency relief funds. The  manual provides additional information and examples of the types of  activities and projects that are both eligible and ineligible for funding, the  process for states to apply for emergency relief funding, and the  documents and reports that are required to be prepared. FHWA’s  Emergency Relief Order, issued in 2016, further defines the application  and review process and the roles and responsibilities of FHWA and state  personnel.

As with other federal-aid highway programs, the Emergency Relief  Program is a partnership in which states plan and execute projects to  complete necessary repairs, and FHWA provides assistance to states in  applying for funds and conducts oversight to determine eligibility and  ensure that federal requirements are met. States and territories are  required to conduct damage inspections, submit documentation to their  respective FHWA division office to determine if repairs are eligible for  federal funds, enter into project agreements, and complete final project  inspections. The FHWA division office is responsible for reviewing  damage inspections to determine whether proposed projects are eligible  for emergency relief funds. FHWA headquarters officials use the  information collected from these inspections to allocate funds to each  state or territory for particular events; division offices obligate those funds  and ultimately reimburses the states for allowable expenses.

The Emergency Relief Program’s authorizing statute and FHWA’s  regulations and guidance distinguish between federal share payable for  emergency and permanent repairs. Specifically, according to FHWA  regulations, emergency repairs are undertaken during or immediately  after a disaster to restore essential traffic, minimize the extent of damage, or protect the remaining facilities. Emergency repairs are eligible to  receive 100 percent federal reimbursement if they are accomplished  within 180 days of the disaster. By statute, this deadline may be  extended taking into consideration any delay in the ability of the state to  access damaged facilities to evaluate damage and the cost of repair.  FHWA and federal regulations also state that emergency repairs can be  completed by state and local maintenance workforces, and qualify for  categorical exclusions from the National Environmental and Policy Act’s  (NEPA) requirements. FHWA’s Emergency Relief Manual further  characterizes emergency repairs as repairs that can be completed  relatively quickly, may be temporary in nature, and typically require little  preliminary engineering or design effort, e.g., erecting barricades and  detour signs. States and local transportation agencies may begin  emergency repairs without prior FHWA authorization.

Permanent repairs are undertaken after the occurrence of a disaster to  restore the highway to its pre-disaster conditions. Permanent repairs  receive a federal share, between 80 and 90 percent, depending on the  type of roadway being repaired. However, in response to the level of  devastation in Puerto Rico, Congress provided a 100 percent federal  share for all emergency relief projects, including permanent repairs,  necessary to address damage caused by hurricanes Irma and Maria in  Puerto Rico. FHWA’s regulations state that permanent repairs are to be  done through a competitively bid contract, unless the state demonstrates  that another method is more cost effective (e.g., the use of abbreviated  plans or a shortened advertisement period). In addition, many, but not  all, permanent repairs meet the criteria for categorical exclusions from  NEPA’s requirements. FHWA’s Emergency Relief Manual indicates that  typically permanent repairs (1) should have obligated funds for  construction within 2 years, (2) require the development of plans,  specifications, and estimates, and (3) must receive prior FHWA  authorization.

Our prior work has raised concerns about FHWA’s management and  oversight of the Emergency Relief Program. In 2007 we reported on the  expanding scope of eligible activities funded by the Emergency Relief  Program over time, resulting in projects that went beyond the original  intent of the program. We recommended to FHWA and suggested that  Congress consider tightening the program’s eligibility standards, but this  recommendation has not been implemented and FHWA does not plan to  do so.

In 2012, we raised concerns about FHWA’s partnership relationship with  the states, particularly its oversight of the Emergency Relief Program,  which we first reported in November 2011. For example, we were  unable to determine the basis of FHWA’s eligibility decisions on 81  emergency relief projects representing $193 million in federal funds  because of missing or incomplete documentation. In addition, we  identified cases where FHWA showed a lack of independence in  decisions, placing its partners’ interests above federal interests. For  example, FHWA allowed two states to retain unused Emergency Relief  Program allocations to fund new emergencies, despite FHWA’s policy  that these funds are made available to other states with potentially higher- priority emergencies. We concluded that while FHWA’s partnership  relationship with the states yields benefits such as proactively identifying  issues before they become problems, it also poses risks. Thus we  recommended that FHWA develop a strategy to mitigate these risks. In  March 2014, FHWA announced it had established an enhanced risk- based oversight approach that, while not targeting the specific risks we  identified related to state partnerships, addressed the intent of our  recommendation to increase transparency and consistency.

To Date, States and Puerto Rico Have Identified $1 Billion in Highway and Bridge Damages Caused by the 2017 Hurricanes

Following hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and Maria, state and local officials  prepared damage assessments that identified more than 2,500 projects  eligible for emergency relief funds costing approximately $1 billion.  Projects range in size and cost from replacing signage and traffic signals  to multi-million dollar bridge and highway repairs (see fig. 1).

Following a number of natural disasters in 2017—including hurricanes  Harvey, Irma, and Maria—Congress appropriated more than $1 billion to  the Emergency Relief Program in February 2018 to help states repair and  rebuild federal-aid highways. As of September 2019, FHWA has allocated  $634 million to repair hurricane-related damage in Florida, Texas, and  Puerto Rico. Specifically, immediately following the hurricanes in August,  September, and November 2017 FHWA allocated $122.5 million in quick  release funding to Florida, Texas, and Puerto Rico. In April 2018, FHWA  allocated an additional $242 million to Florida, Puerto Rico, and Texas.  Further, on February 6, 2019 FHWA allocated $130 million more to  Puerto Rico for damages caused by hurricanes Irma and Maria (see fig.  2). FHWA subsequently de-allocated $69 million from Florida on February  27, 2019, because state officials determined the funds were no longer  necessary for hurricane-related repairs. Most recently, in September  2019, FHWA allocated an additional $208 million to Puerto Rico.

While the estimated repair costs exceed the amount of funds allocated by  FHWA, officials stated that additional emergency relief funds are  allocated and reimbursed approximately every 6 months and states and  territories will be reimbursed for all eligible expenses related to hurricanes  Harvey, Irma, and Maria as they are completed. These funding decisions  are to be made as FHWA continues to review and approve projects and  Congress appropriates additional funds. As we have noted in prior work,  the $100 million in annual authorized funding has not been enough to  meet the needs of the program. Therefore, states have relied on  supplemental appropriations to fund repairs caused by natural disasters  and catastrophic events.

FHWA Did Not Justify Key Decisions and May Have Inappropriately Classified Emergency Relief Projects

We identified a number of cases in which FHWA did not document  decisions to classify emergency relief projects as emergency repairs  (those necessary to restore essential traffic, undertaken during or  immediately after a disaster and generally accomplished within 180 days)  as opposed to permanent repairs (those undertaken to restore a facility to  pre-disaster conditions). Specifically, 22 out of 25 emergency repair  projects we reviewed—which account for approximately $50 million in  emergency relief funds—did not include a documented justification for  classifying repairs as an emergency repair instead of a permanent  repair. In addition, out of approximately 1,200 eligible projects in Puerto  Rico, FHWA officials reported undertaking 34 more than 180 days after  the hurricanes and continuing to classify them as emergency repairs  without documenting the basis for doing so.

Without documentation it is not possible to definitively determine the  justification for why projects were classified as emergency repairs and we  identified at least three projects that may have been inappropriately  classified because they (1) may not have been necessary to restore  essential traffic, or (2) were not undertaken during or immediately after  the disaster. For example:

The Lynchburg Ferry ($10.7 million project in Texas). This project  rebuilt the ferry docks and landings, which are used to transport up to  10 passenger vehicles at a time across the Houston Ship Channel  (1,100 feet). FHWA classified the project as an emergency repair to  restore essential traffic but did not document the basis for this  decision.

When asked, FHWA officials from the Texas Division stated that  engineers used their professional judgment to determine that the ferry  route provided essential traffic. It is not clear, however, that the ferry  was necessary to restore traffic as several alternative routes were  available immediately following the disaster on existing highways that  service the same locations and typically result in faster travel times  than the ferry (see fig. 3). According to officials, engineers did not  assess these alternative routes and there is no requirement for them  to do so.

This project was a significant commitment of emergency relief funds,  representing approximately 11 percent of the emergency relief funding  Texas received in the aftermath of Hurricane Harvey. Because the  project was classified as an emergency repair, Texas was permitted  to use a non-competitive bidding process to solicit and hire  contractors to complete the work, instead of a competitive bidding  process designed to achieve the best possible price and quality of  work. The project was completed within the required 180 day time  frame required to receive 100 percent federal reimbursement.

FHWA’s oversight of this project raises issues we cited in past work  concerning its partnership with the states, namely putting the partner’s  interest above federal interests. Had FHWA classified this project as  a permanent repair instead of an emergency repair, state and local  agencies would have been responsible for paying approximately $2.1  million in matching funds on the $10.7 million project. Moreover, prior  to the hurricane, the ferry docks and landings were in poor condition  and local officials were in the initial stages of planning a project to  replace it, including hiring a consultant to identify potential sources of  federal funds. Because substantive planning and design work had not  yet been completed, this project was eligible for emergency relief  funds, which, according to officials, resulted in a new, state-of-the-art  facility.

Ciales Bridge ($4.9 million project in Puerto Rico). This project will  install a temporary 80 meter long bridge over the Rio Grande de  Manati River. FHWA classified this project an emergency repair to  restore essential traffic and extended the project beyond 180 days but  did not document the basis for either decision, as described below.

FHWA officials said that they were not aware of another route to carry  essential traffic at the time they approved the emergency repair.  However, we identified an alternative route on a nearby roadway that  uses another bridge less than a mile away. When we asked officials  about this nearby route, they said that it is not sufficient for essential  traffic, because it is too narrow to safely accommodate two-way traffic,  has load limitations, and lacks lighting and pavement markings.  Officials stated that the temporary bridge was necessary to quickly  restore essential traffic until a new permanent bridge could be built.  However, construction on the temporary bridge is not planned for  completion until October 2019—more than 2 years after Hurricane  Maria hit, raising questions about whether an emergency situation  exists and the project is needed to quickly restore essential traffic.

FHWA also continued to classify this project as an emergency repair  even though the contract for the project was not signed within 180  days after the emergency occurred and FHWA did not document the  rationale for doing so. By statute, emergency repair projects must be  accomplished within 180 days to receive a 100 percent federal share,  but may be extended taking into consideration any delay in the ability  of the state to access damaged facilities. According to FHWA officials  in Puerto Rico, while division offices should document decisions  regarding emergency repair projects, the statutory provision that  projects can only be extended beyond 180 days if the damaged  facilities are inaccessible does not apply to Puerto Rico because it is  funded at a 100 percent federal share, and therefore, such a  determination and documentation was not necessary.

There are, however, statutory and regulatory provisions other than the  percentage of costs covered by the federal government that apply to  emergency projects, including contracting and environmental  requirements. Because this project was classified as an emergency  repair, officials used a bidding technique—called short-list bid—that  limited the number of firms which were permitted to submit proposals.  This project also received a categorical exclusion for emergencies  and was not subject to further environmental review under NEPA.  However, although these projects went forward, FHWA’s policy  regarding time limits on the use of expedited contracting and  environmental procedures is not clear. After we raised this and similar  issues on other projects with FHWA, officials stated that the  administration’s position was that emergency repair projects using  expedited contracting and environmental procedures are only  permitted within the first 180 days of a disaster. According to these  officials, as a matter of policy, 180 days after the disaster is a “pencils  down” moment when projects should be subject to permanent repair  requirements, including environmental and contracting requirements.  Officials acknowledged this policy is not well documented, and stated  they planned to address this gap in future updates to program  guidance. These updates—initially planned for 2019—have taken  more time than anticipated and are currently planned for 2020, but  officials were unable to provide a specific timeline.

The classification of the project as an emergency repair raises questions  about whether the project was an efficient use of federal funds. The $4.9  million temporary bridge involves considerable construction such as  building footings with 5-million pounds of concrete and reinforced steel  (see fig. 4) and, as stated previously, is not planned for completion until  October 2019. FHWA officials stated this structure will be torn down  within a couple of years and replaced by a $6.4 million permanent  structure.

PR-14 Bridge ($1.4 million project in Puerto Rico). This project will  construct a temporary bridge across one of a few main routes on the  south-central side of the island that is located in one of Puerto Rico’s  mountainous municipalities that is rural and relatively sparsely  populated. FHWA officials classified the temporary bridge as an  emergency repair to restore essential traffic, including the  transportation of people and commercial goods but did not document  the basis for this decision.

According to officials, this bridge was necessary to restore essential  traffic because damage caused by the hurricane led to a reduction in  the vehicle load limit from 5 tons to 3 tons. However, the basis for this  determination is not clear since the bridge was never closed to traffic  and a reduced load limit from 5 to 3 tons would not significantly affect  the type of vehicle traffic able to safely cross the bridge. For example,  the pre-existing 5-ton limit would have already prevented most types  of ambulances and commercial trucks from using the bridge, and the  3-ton limit still permits most passenger vehicles and some types of  light-duty trucks. In addition, according to officials, one of the reasons  for installing a temporary bridge instead of waiting on the planned  installation of a permanent bridge was to quickly restore traffic.  However, the temporary bridge will not be completed until February  2020—almost 2 and a half years after the hurricanes, which raises  questions about whether or not the project was necessary to quickly  restore essential traffic. As with the Ciales Bridge, FHWA did not  document the basis for classifying this project as an emergency repair  even though it was undertaken more than 180 days after the  emergency occurred. The project was contracted using a pre-existing  contract and not competitively bid and received a categorical  exclusion from NEPA requirements. Similar to the Ciales Bridge, this  $1.4 million temporary bridge will be torn down within a couple of  years and replaced by a $4.2 million permanent structure.

While officials did not document decisions to classify emergency relief  projects as emergency repairs, FHWA did improve the documentation of  emergency relief projects in some areas since the last time we examined  the program in 2011. Specifically, we found more consistent  documentation of the onsite damage inspections, cost estimates, and  FHWA oversight of eligibility determinations. For example, 39 out of 39  emergency relief projects we reviewed included photographs of the  damage and a repair cost estimate; whereas, only 24 out of 83 projects  we examined in 2011 included this information.

According to Federal Internal Control Standards, to achieve objectives  and identify and respond to risks, management should clearly document  all transactions and significant events, and define objectives clearly,  including specific terms so that they can easily be understood. FHWA  did not clearly document transactions and significant events because: (1)  in the case of classifying projects as emergency repairs, there is no  requirement to do so, and (2) in the case of extending emergency repair  projects in Puerto Rico, existing requirements did not apply. FHWA  officials stated that these decisions were made as part of an ongoing  dialogue between FHWA, the states, and Puerto Rico that is done  through emails and in-person and telephone meetings. However, by not  documenting emergency repair decisions, such as whether alternative  strategies or repairs were considered and the rationale for classifying  projects as emergency repairs after the emergency has passed, FHWA  lacks definitive explanations for its decisions. This, in turn, raises  questions as to whether those decisions were appropriate. When  questioned about individual projects, including the examples in Texas and  Puerto Rico previously discussed, officials often could not provide  concrete rationales for these decisions.

In addition, because guidance in the Emergency Relief Manual is  intentionally flexible and written to apply to a wide range of  circumstances, key terms are not clearly defined and easily understood  and applied. This is particularly true for the term “essential traffic,” which  is being broadly applied to provide support for repairs necessary to  restore any type of traffic without fully considering potential alternatives.  While FHWA’s manual generally describes projects to restore essential  traffic (e.g., detours that relieve excess traffic directly attributable to the  disaster), it does not discuss how to determine whether a project will  relieve excess traffic or require officials to evaluate alternative routes.  Moreover, FHWA’s guidance and policy are not clear on the time frames  for when emergency repair projects must adhere to contracting and  environmental requirements. This lack of clearly defined and easily  understood terms in emergency relief guidance could result in FHWA  inappropriately classifying projects as emergency repairs, which affects:  the federal fiscal exposure in a disaster,  the level of FHWA oversight because projects may begin without prior  authorization,  the extent to which projects must be competitively bid, and potentially the level of environmental review accorded a project.

Moreover, unclear guidance increases the chances that program  guidance could be inconsistently applied, potentially giving access to  emergency relief funds to one state and not another. We identified  several instances in which officials in one Division Office made  emergency repair decisions that differed from another division office. For  example, FHWA officials in Florida did not include highway finishes, such  as pavement markings, as part of emergency repair projects, while  officials in the Puerto Rico Division did. FHWA officials in Puerto Rico  also reported that FHWA officials from different division offices who came  to assist in the aftermath of the 2017 hurricanes had substantively  different interpretations of emergency relief guidance, including how to  define emergency repairs and what was and was not essential traffic.

For many years, FHWA’s Emergency Relief Program has provided crucial  funding to states and territories to rebuild transportation infrastructure,  including in the aftermath of hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and Maria. The  consecutive timing and scale of these disasters overwhelmed local, state,  and territorial governments, and Puerto Rico was hit particularly hard.  Given the level of devastation, it was imperative for the federal response  to be quick and effective, and that essential services be quickly restored  to help people rebuild and recover. However, it is not clear that  emergency relief funds are always being used for the purposes intended  or put to the highest use. In the absence of well-documented rationales  for classifying projects, more clearly defined terms and circumstances for  making these decisions, and time frames for accomplishing them, FHWA  may have inappropriately classified projects as emergency repairs. While  this represent a small percentage of projects undertaken in response to  the 2017 hurricanes, FHWA’s actions may have resulted in the federal  government forgoing millions of dollars in state contributions, thus  increasing the federal fiscal exposure in disasters. Moreover, permitting  projects to proceed under expedited contracting requirements many  months after the disaster deprived the federal government of a valuable  tool intended to ensure the best price for services it receives. Finally, in  an environment where needs outweigh funding, multi-million dollar bridge  projects are being constructed that will be torn down in a couple of years  to make way for other multi-million dollar bridge projects. FHWA’s  decision-making invites questions we have raised before about the  partnership relationship between FHWA and the states. In high stress and  politically sensitive situations like natural disasters in particular, the  relationship could lead FHWA to put states’ interests before federal ones  or give the appearance of having done so. If FHWA’s decisions are, in  fact, appropriate, documentation and clearer guidance could reduce  unnecessary skepticism, enhance transparency, and result in more  effective use of limited resources.

We are making the following two recommendations to FHWA:

The Administrator of FHWA should require FHWA division offices to  document the rationale for classifying projects as emergency repairs,  such as a description of why an emergency repair is necessary and  which alternative strategies or repairs were considered, and to more  clearly define the circumstances under which projects are classified  as emergency repairs, including what constitutes restoration of  essential traffic. (Recommendation 1)

The Administrator of FHWA should identify a specific timeline for  clarifying the policy on the acceptable time frames for accomplishing  emergency repair projects undertaken under expedited contracting  and environmental requirements, and require FHWA division offices to  document the rationale for decisions to extend projects beyond these  time frames. (Recommendation 2)

We provided a draft of this report to DOT for review and comment. In  comments, reproduced in appendix II, DOT concurred with our  recommendations. DOT also provided technical comments, which we  incorporated as appropriate.

We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional  committees and the Secretary of the Department of Transportation. In  addition, the report is available at no charge on the GAO website at  http://www.gao.gov.

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact  me at (202) 512-2834 or flemings@gao.gov. Contact points for our  Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on  the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this  report are listed in appendix III.

Appendix I: Results of GAO’s File Review of the Emergency Relief Project Documentation Available in Three FHWA Division Offices

In 2011, we reported on how Federal Highway Administration (FHWA)  officials applied Emergency Relief Program guidance to a selected group  of projects that received funding. In that review, we selected a  nongeneralizable sample of eligible Emergency Relief Program projects  in three states—New York, Texas, and Washington—that matched  criteria such as receiving more than $1 million in obligated federal funds  and approval by FHWA between fiscal years 2007 through 2010. We  reviewed those projects’ files to determine whether they included required  or recommended documentation cited in federal statute, regulations, and  FHWA program guidance. In our 2011 report, we found many instances  of missing or incomplete documentation, such as required repair cost  estimates, because FHWA lacked clear requirements for how states  submitted and FHWA approved key project documentation, leading to  FHWA division offices applying eligibility criteria differently. We  recommended that FHWA standardize their procedures for reviewing  emergency relief documentation and making eligibility decisions, including  retaining damage inspection reports with detailed repair cost estimates. In  response, FHWA issued an Order in February 2016 that included  procedures to ensure that FHWA makes eligibility determinations  consistently and transparently that we determined addressed our  recommendation.

To evaluate how FHWA officials applied Emergency Relief Program  guidance to selected projects in recent emergency events and whether  documentation had improved since our 2011 report, we conducted a file  review of 39 nongeneralizable emergency relief projects—25 of which  included emergency repairs—in Texas, Florida, and Puerto Rico. These  projects, which FHWA determined were eligible for Emergency Relief  Program funding, were necessary to repair damage caused by three 2017  hurricanes: Harvey, Irma, and Maria. The purpose of this review was to  determine whether each project file included information showing the  project met eligibility requirements or information required or  recommended in federal statute, regulations, and FHWA program  guidance. To select these 39 project files (13 projects each from Texas,  Florida, and Puerto Rico), we used the following criteria:

We reviewed those with the highest estimated cost to ensure the  inclusion of projects likely to receive the most federal funds. The 39  project files we selected represented over 38 percent of Emergency  Relief funds allocated to those three states for the 2017 hurricanes, as  of February 2019.

We selected a mix of road and bridge projects to ensure we reviewed  a selection of projects that could include different types or amounts of  documentation. States typically have more data and oversight  processes in place for bridges than other roads, as most bridges are  required to be inspected at least every 2 years.

We selected a mix of a state and local agency projects to ensure we  reviewed a selection of projects that may have been prepared with  different levels of detail. Though state agencies ultimately submit all  Emergency Relief Program requests to FHWA, local agencies prepare  some of the paperwork for projects within their jurisdictions and could  provide a different level of detail in their project files than state  agencies.

For each of the 39 projects in our review, the FHWA division offices in  Texas, Florida, and Puerto Rico provided associated project files.  Through discussions with state officials, we determined that FHWA’s  Mobile Solution for Assessment and Reporting (MSAR) was sufficiently  reliable for our purposes of obtaining documentation for file reviews for  projects located in Texas. For Puerto Rico, because state officials  acknowledged some files were not included in MSAR, we asked for state  officials to directly send us additional documentation as needed. As  Florida does not use MSAR to record project information or  documentation, we asked for state officials to send us relevant project  documentation directly. Project files from these locations included  information on project type and estimated costs as well as other relevant  documents, such as engineering reports, bridge inspection reports, or  photographs of the damage. Two analysts reviewed those files for  information that is required or recommended by statute or FHWA  guidance. This information included much of the same information we had  previously evaluated in our 2011 review. To conduct the review, one  analyst reviewed the documentation provided by FHWA’s division offices  and completed a data collection instrument, then a second analyst  reviewed the same documentation to verify the results of that review.  Afterwards, the two analysts discussed and resolved any discrepancies  and questions. The analysts then analyzed and summarized the results  for the 39 eligible projects of this review to determine whether each file  included documentation for damage and cost information, emergency  repair requirements, and eligibility determination, as detailed below:  Damage and cost information: We reviewed whether the project file  included a complete detailed damage inspection report (DDIR), which  documents an on-site inspection of the damage. FHWA’s Emergency  Relief Manual states that a complete DDIR should include a number of  details including: the type of federal-aid highway, such as an interstate,  freeway, or expressway; the average daily traffic or the typical traffic  volume in a location over a 24-hour period; the nature or type of damage,  such as a bridge collapse or landslide, and extent or amount of damage,  such as fully or partially collapsed; a field site sketch or drawing that  shows details of the damage site such as the width of the road or bridge;  a total estimated cost for repair; and documentation related to an  environmental review recommendation, which would include the potential  effects of repairs on nearby species or waterways. For the 39 projects we  included in our file review, we found that DDIR documentation generally  improved compared to the 2011 review. For instance, each of the 39  projects included a DDIR, photographs of the damage, and the repair’s  cost estimate; only 24 of the 83 eligible projects we reviewed in 2011  included each of those pieces of information. However, we found other  recommended DDIR documentation to be lacking. For example, of the 39  projects in our review, 36 did not include Average Daily Traffic and 22 did  not include the type of federal-aid highway. Figure 3 represents the  results of our review of damage and cost information.

Emergency repair requirements: We reviewed whether eligible  emergency repair projects included a documented rationale or justification  for classifying the project as an emergency repair instead of a permanent  repair. As discussed in the body of this report, by statute, emergency  repairs are repairs undertaken during or immediately after a disaster  specifically to restore essential traffic, to minimize the extent of damage,  or to protect the remaining facilities. As discussed in the body of this  report, classifying a project as an emergency repair affects the  percentage of costs covered by federal funds, level of FHWA oversight,  and the extent to which environmental and contracting requirements  apply. We found that of the 25 project files that included an emergency  repair (out of the 39 in our review), 22 did not include a documented  rationale or justification for classifying the project as an emergency repair  instead of a permanent repair.

Eligibility determination: We reviewed whether a representative of FHWA  signed and recommended eligibility for Emergency Relief funding and  whether the applicant or state representative signed and agreed with  FHWA’s recommendation. The Emergency Relief Manual states that  documentation should include an eligibility recommendation by an FHWA  representative and acknowledgement of that recommendation by the  applicant. For the 39 projects we included in our file review, we found that  documentations of FHWA and applicant signatures generally improved  compared to the 2011 review. In our current review, we found that the  FHWA and applicant or state representatives signed each of the 39  eligible project files; in our 2011 review, only 36 of the 83 eligible projects  included a signature from an FHWA representative and 47 of the 83  eligible projects included a signature from the applicant or state  representative.

Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Transportation

In addition to the contact named above, Steve Cohen (Assistant Director),  Matthew Cook (Analyst in Charge), Pedro Almoguera, Aditi Archer,  Danielle Ellingston, Lauren Friedman, Kathryn Godfrey, Hannah Laufe,  Leslie Locke, Cheryl Peterson, Malika Rice, Amy Rosewarne, and  Elizabeth Wood made key contributions to this report.

After a disaster, states and the federal government share the cost of rebuilding roads and bridges. But the federal government pays for emergency repairs to quickly reopen essential routes.

We found at least 3 projects related to the 2017 hurricanes that the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) may have inappropriately classified as emergency repairs. For example, a Texas ferry project received $10 million in emergency funds, but available highways served the same routes immediately after the hurricane.

To ensure future projects are classified appropriately, we recommended FHWA clearly define emergency repairs and document its rationales.