Immigration Benefits: Additional Actions Needed to Address Fraud Risks in Program for Foreign National Victims of Domestic Abuse

In fiscal year 2018, foreign nationals filed nearly 13,000 VAWA self-petitions alleging domestic abuse by a U.S. citizen or LPR family member. The Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended by VAWA, provides for immigration relief for self-petitioning foreign nationals who are victims of battery or extreme cruelty committed by their U.S. citizen or LPR family member. The self-petition process allows such victims to obtain classification as an immigrant and ultimately apply for LPR status.

GAO was asked to review fraud risks in the self-petition process and how, if at all, DHS assists U.S. citizens or LPRs who may have been falsely identified as domestic abusers. This report examines the extent to which (1) USCIS has adopted relevant leading practices in GAO's Fraud Risk Framework for the self-petition program; and (2) DHS provides assistance to U.S. citizens or LPRs who may have been falsely identified as domestic abusers in the self-petition process, and steps DHS takes when suspected fraud is identified. GAO reviewed documents, interviewed officials, analyzed program data, and assessed the agency's approach to managing fraud risks against GAO's Fraud Risk Framework.

Within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) has responsibility for the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) self-petition program for foreign national victims of battery or extreme cruelty committed by their U.S. citizen or lawful permanent resident (LPR) spouse or parent, or their adult U.S. citizen son or daughter. According to USCIS officials, the self-petition program is vulnerable to fraud, such as self-petitioners' use of false or forged documents. USCIS has adopted some, but not all, of the leading practices in GAO's Fraud Risk Framework. While USCIS has established a culture and a dedicated entity to manage fraud risks for the program, it has not fully assessed fraud risks and determined a fraud risk profile to document its analysis of the types of fraud risks the program could be vulnerable to. Further, the number of self-petitions filed has grown by more than 70 percent over the past 5 fiscal years. At the end of fiscal year 2018, USCIS had received 12,801 self-petitions and had over 19,000 self-petitions pending adjudication. Planning and conducting regular fraud risk assessments would better position USCIS to identify fraud risks when reviewing self-petitions. USCIS has instituted some fraud controls, such as developing antifraud training for self-petition adjudicators, but has not developed and implemented a risk-based antifraud strategy based on a fraud risk assessment. Developing and implementing an antifraud strategy would help USCIS better ensure its controls are addressing potential fraud risks in the program.

DHS provides assistance to victims of immigration-related crimes and refers suspected self-petition fraud for review and investigation. Within DHS, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement provides professional services and assistance to potential victims of immigration-related crimes, including self-petition fraud. As shown in the figure below, USCIS also has a referral process for suspected fraud in self-petitions, which may result in a referral for criminal investigation. According to agency data, from fiscal year 2014 to March 2019, USCIS created 2,208 fraud referral leads and cases that involved a VAWA self-petition. Total leads and cases increased from 198 in fiscal year 2014 to 801 in fiscal year 2019 as of March 2019, an increase of about 305 percent.

GAO is making three recommendations, including that USCIS conduct regular fraud risk assessments to determine a fraud risk profile for the program and develop an antifraud strategy with specific control activities. DHS concurred.

In fiscal year 2018, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS)  data indicate that foreign nationals filed nearly 13,000 petitions alleging  domestic abuse by a U.S. citizen or lawful permanent resident (LPR)  family member; about 90 percent of these filings alleged abuse by  spouses. The Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended by the  Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) of 1994 and subsequent  reauthorizations, provides for immigration relief for self-petitioning foreign  nationals who are victims of battery or extreme cruelty committed by their  U.S. citizen or LPR spouse or parent or their adult U.S. citizen son or  daughter (self-petition program or process). Such foreign nationals  claiming to have suffered domestic abuse may self-petition for  classification as an immigrant, and ultimately apply for lawful permanent  resident status. The decision by the Department of Homeland Security  (DHS) to approve a VAWA self-petition is a consequential one, as the  program allows a victim to seek relief independent of their abuser. If the  self-petition is approved, a foreign national has established that he or she  is a qualifying victim of domestic abuse, and will generally not be subject  to immigration enforcement as he or she goes through the process of  obtaining work authorization and LPR status. According to DHS’s Office  for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties (CRCL), VAWA self-petition relief brings  safety, security, and stability to legitimate victims who might not otherwise  be able to escape domestic abuse. However, approving a self-petition  with a fraudulent claim jeopardizes the integrity of the self-petition  program by enabling an ineligible individual to remain in the United States  as an immigrant and potentially obtain LPR status without lawful  entitlement.

DHS is responsible for managing the self-petition program. Specifically, a  team of adjudicators within DHS’s USCIS Vermont Service Center  adjudicates self-petitions—a petition filed with USCIS by a foreign  national seeking to demonstrate he or she is a person qualified for  immigration relief under the VAWA self-petition provisions of the  Immigration and Nationality Act. Within USCIS, the Fraud Detection and  National Security Directorate (FDNS) is responsible for determining  whether individuals filing a self-petition pose a threat to national security  or public safety or are engaging in self-petition fraud, a type of  immigration benefit fraud. The directorate maintains program oversight  over the Center Fraud Detection Operations (CFDO) comprised of  immigration officers who conduct administrative investigations of self- petition fraud. DHS’s U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)  Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) is responsible for conducting  criminal investigations regarding immigration-related document and  benefit fraud, including instances of self-petition fraud referred by the  directorate and other sources.

You asked us to review issues related to fraud risks in the self-petition  process and how, if at all, U.S. citizens or LPRs who may have been  falsely identified as domestic abusers in the self-petition process are  assisted by DHS. This report examines the extent to which (1) USCIS has  adopted relevant leading practices in GAO’s A Framework for Managing  Fraud Risks in Federal Programs (Fraud Risk Framework) for the self- petition program; and (2) DHS provides assistance to U.S. citizens or  LPRs who may have been falsely identified as domestic abusers in the  self-petition process, and steps DHS takes when suspected fraud is  identified.

To evaluate the extent to which USCIS has adopted relevant leading  practices in GAO’s Fraud Risk Framework for the self-petition program,  we reviewed policies and procedures from USCIS offices, including FDNS  and CFDO, and ICE and compared them to leading practices of the  components of GAO’s Fraud Risk Framework we identified as relevant  based on the entirety of our review.

We also interviewed USCIS officials on a range of program topics,  including the VAWA self-petition adjudication process, perspectives on  the program, and VAWA fraud detection efforts. More specifically, we  conducted a site visit to the Vermont Service Center to conduct interviews  with senior management, senior adjudication staff, and adjudication staff,  as well as CFDO staff located in Vermont. Our interviews included 23 of  the 25 adjudicators who reviewed self-petitions at the time of our  interview with them. We also reviewed self-petition filings with  adjudication staff that illustrated a petition approval, a petition denial, and  a self-petition that was referred for fraud investigation. These reviews  allowed us to observe and discuss the Vermont Service Center staff’s  application of law and evidentiary standards in their adjudication of the  self-petition filings. This includes the manner by which the staff evaluates  the filings for credibility or indications of fraud or inconsistencies. During  our review, we also interviewed officials from the Department of State,  USCIS headquarters and its Service Center Operations (which oversees  the Vermont Service Center), FDNS and its Reports and Analysis Branch,  and USCIS’s Office of Performance and Quality. These interviews  provided us with perspectives on the VAWA self-petition program, and  helped inform our inquiries to self-petition program officials and other  USCIS and DHS officials.

In addition, we reviewed and analyzed self-petition program data from  USCIS. More specifically, we analyzed data from fiscal years 2009  through January 2019 on self-petition filings, approvals, denials, and  outcomes; referrals made for fraud investigations; the extent to which  adjudication staff at the Vermont Service Center seek to obtain more  complete evidence from self-petitioners; data relevant to examine  whether data analytics could be a useful antifraud tool for the program;  self-petitioners’ countries of birth; and whether self-petitioners ultimately  obtain U.S. citizenship following approval of self-petitions. Within the  overall data, we analyzed it as appropriate for the issue at hand, such as  by year or by population summaries. We assessed the reliability of these  data by reviewing relevant documentation and interviewing officials about  how the data are collected and maintained, and evaluating the summary  data prepared by USCIS for completeness, plausibility, and  reasonableness. We determined that these data were sufficiently reliable  for our purposes of examining program trends, outcomes, data  availability, and steps in the self-petition adjudication process. We  assessed USCIS’s practices against GAO’s Fraud Risk Framework and  Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government.

To examine the extent to which DHS provides assistance to U.S. citizens  or LPRs who may have been falsely identified as domestic abusers in a  self-petition, and steps DHS takes when suspected fraud is identified, we  reviewed USCIS and ICE documents, including policies, procedures, and  guidance documents. We interviewed officials from ICE’s HSI and the  Victims Of Immigration Crime Engagement Office (VOICE), which was  created to provide support to victims of crimes committed by removable  foreign nationals. We also obtained data from the VOICE office on the  disposition of the more than 1,500 calls made to the office in fiscal year  2018, the most recent complete fiscal year for which data were available  at the time of our review. We analyzed data from FDNS’s case  management system about the number of fraud cases associated with  self-petitions that were opened from fiscal year 2014 through March 2019  and the disposition of those cases. To assess the reliability of these  data, we reviewed policies about how data are entered into the system  and interviewed FDNS officers and USCIS headquarters officials. We  determined that the data were sufficiently reliable for the purpose of  providing information on cases related to possible instances of self- petition fraud received and processed by the directorate. We also  reviewed an agreement between USCIS and ICE that addresses referral of cases of suspected fraud from the directorate to ICE for criminal  investigation.

We conducted this performance audit from July 2018 to September 2019  in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.

VAWA Self-Petition Eligibility Requirements and Confidentiality Protections

To adjudicate a self-petition filed by a foreign national claiming to have  suffered domestic abuse, USCIS adjudicators determine whether the self- petitioner has established the statutory eligibility requirements. A foreign  national satisfies the applicable eligibility requirements by demonstrating  that he or she (1) has a qualifying relationship with a U.S. citizen or LPR,  such as a marriage; (2) was battered or subjected to extreme cruelty by  his or her U.S. relative during the qualifying relationship; (3) is residing  or has resided with the abusive U.S. citizen or LPR during the qualifying  relationship; and (4) is of good moral character. A foreign national filing a  VAWA self-petition as an abused spouse is also required to demonstrate  that he or she entered into or intended to enter into the marriage in good  faith and not in order to evade U.S. immigration law. For a good moral  character determination, the petitioner typically should submit a local or  state police clearance letter or a state-issued criminal background check  from each place where he or she has lived for 6 months or more in the  past 3 years immediately prior to filing the VAWA petition.

The burden of proof is on the self-petitioner to demonstrate, by a  preponderance of the evidence, that he or she has satisfied the statutory  eligibility requirements. Considered evidence may include, for example, a  criminal background check to establish the good moral character of a self- petitioner or testimony in the form of an affidavit to establish abuse on the  part of the U.S. citizen or LPR relative. If the self-petition is approved, the  point at which the petitioner will be able to apply for and obtain LPR  status will depend on whether he or she is an immediate relative of a U.S.  citizen (i.e., U.S. citizen’s unmarried child under age 21, spouse, or,  where the citizen is at least 21, their parent), or other relative of a U.S.  citizen or LPR, who, unlike immediate relatives, are subject to annual  immigration limits.

Under U.S. immigration law, there are confidentiality protections for  VAWA self-petitioners. Any information about the self-petitioner is  considered confidential and, with certain exceptions, officials from DHS  are prohibited from releasing any information about the petitioner,  including that the petitioner has sought immigration relief. In addition,  adjudicators are prohibited from using information provided solely by the  alleged abuser to make an adverse determination of admissibility or  deportability against self-petitioners, unless such adverse information has  been corroborated through independent sourcing consistent with  departmental policy. Finally, according to DHS policy, DHS officials  typically do not take enforcement actions, such as executing an order of  removal, against abuse victims when they are present at certain  locations, such as domestic violence shelters, victims’ services programs,  and community-based organizations.

The self-petition adjudication process begins when a foreign national  submits a Form I-360, “Petition for Amerasian, Widow(er), or Special  Immigrant,” with supporting evidence, to USCIS. USCIS’s Vermont  Service Center then begins the pre-adjudication phase and takes several  actions. First, the service center makes a prima facie determination,  which is an initial review of self-petition filings, to determine whether the  self-petitioner has submitted evidence that, on its face, is responsive to  each of the eligibility requirements noted above, in order to allow qualified  aliens access to certain public benefits, if needed. If the self-petitioner has  not submitted evidence to address each of the eligibility requirements,  USCIS policy directs the service center to issue a request for evidence to  the self-petitioner to provide additional evidence for the full adjudication of  the petition. In addition, the service center conducts a safe address  assessment on the self-petition to identify the address to be used for  future communications with the self-petitioner to protect the self- petitioner’s confidentiality and safety. Finally, the service center’s  Background Check Unit uses the TECS database to determine whether  the self-petitioner is connected to any administrative or criminal  investigations, is the subject of a national security concern, or is a public  safety threat. The Vermont Service Center also checks the TECS  database to determine whether any derogatory information exists on the  foreign national that may impact the submitted self-petition.

Figure 1 provides an overview of the USCIS self-petition process.

To begin the adjudication phase, an adjudicator incorporates a self- petition filing into the self-petitioner’s Alien file. Adjudicators stated they  review the evidence available in the self-petition filing and the Alien file  and generally take one of three actions—approve, deny, or refer the  petition for an administrative investigation. Adjudication may also be  withheld.

Approve. If a USCIS adjudicator determines that the evidence  submitted by the self-petitioner satisfies the eligibility requirements  noted above, the self-petition is approved. Once USCIS approves a  self-petition, DHS will generally defer any removal action against the  individual, as he or she goes through the process of applying for LPR  status. According to USCIS data, of the 82,357 self-petitions  adjudicated from fiscal year 2009 through fiscal year 2018, 72 percent  were approved. Self-petitioners who obtain LPR status are not eligible  for U.S. citizenship until they have been an LPR in the United States  for at least 3 years.

Deny. An adjudicator may deny a self-petition if the petitioner has not  demonstrated that he or she is more likely than not eligible for petition  approval, considering all credible evidence provided by the self- petitioner. In some circumstances, an adjudicator will issue a  request for evidence to the petitioner to provide an opportunity for the  petitioner to send additional information or documents. In response to  this request, the petitioner has an opportunity to provide additional  evidence; if that evidence does not sufficiently demonstrate that the  petitioner meets the eligibility requirements, or additional evidence is  not provided, USCIS may deny the self-petition. In other  circumstances, an adjudicator will issue a notice of intent to deny to  the self-petitioner in cases where it does not appear likely that the  self-petitioner could overcome the deficiencies. This provides the self- petitioner an opportunity to respond. If the self-petitioner’s response  does not sufficiently demonstrate that the petitioner meets the  eligibility requirements or a response is not provided, the self-petition  is subsequently denied. An adjudicator may also deny a self-petition if  the petitioner abandons his or her self-petition or withdraws the self- petition by providing notice to USCIS in writing. According to USCIS  data, among self-petitions adjudicated from fiscal year 2009 through  fiscal year 2018, about 28 percent were denied. Of that, about 3  percent were withdrawn, revoked, or closed administratively. If a self- petition is denied and the self-petitioner has other valid immigration  status, he or she may remain in the United States. Otherwise, the self- petitioner may be placed in removal proceedings.

Adjudication withheld. An adjudicator may also withhold  adjudication of a visa petition or other application if there is an  ongoing investigation involving eligibility, in connection with a benefit  request, and disclosure of information to the applicant or petitioner  concerning the adjudication would prejudice the investigation. If  adjudication is withheld from a self-petition, USCIS takes no further  adjudicative action at that time, pending completion of the related  investigation.

Refer a petition for an administrative investigation. In addition to  approving or denying a self-petition, an adjudicator may refer a self- petition to CFDO for an administrative investigation in cases when an  adjudicator suspects fraudulent activity within the self-petition. In such  cases, CFDO completes an administrative investigation and returns a  Statement of Findings to the adjudicator. The Statement of Findings  indicates whether fraud was found, not found, or whether the  administrative investigation was inconclusive in finding fraud. After  reviewing the Statement of Findings, immigration officers stated the  adjudicator continues the adjudication process for the self-petition and  may ultimately approve or deny the self-petition.

According to USCIS data, the total number of VAWA self-petitions filed by  foreign nationals increased from 7,360 in fiscal year 2014 to 12,801 in  fiscal year 2018, an increase of about 74 percent. The number of filings  by spouses—a subset of the above petitioners—increased from 7,131 in  fiscal year 2014 to 11,213 in fiscal year 2018, an increase of 57 percent.  Filings by spouses represented about 93 percent of self-petition filings  from fiscal year 2014 to fiscal year 2018. See table 1.

Immigration benefit fraud involves the willful or knowing misrepresentation  of material facts for the purpose of obtaining an immigration benefit  without lawful entitlement. According to USCIS officials, self-petition  fraud is a form of immigration benefit fraud which can occur in a number  of ways, such as through document fraud, including submission of  falsified affidavits, or making false statements material to the adjudication.  For example, a self-petitioner may submit a fraudulent marriage certificate  with his or her self-petition in an attempt to establish a qualifying  relationship with a U.S. citizen or LPR. Or a self-petitioner may submit a  fraudulent affidavit falsely attesting that he or she was battered or  subjected to extreme cruelty during the qualifying relationship with the U.S. citizen or LPR. For the purposes of this report, self-petition fraud is  construed broadly to include any misrepresentation of material fact(s),  such as making false statements, submitting forged or falsified  documents, or conspiring to do so, in support of a VAWA self-petition.  USCIS may deny, or revoke approval of, a self-petition upon determining  that the self-petitioner is, or was, not eligible for petition approval by a  preponderance of evidence, due to fraud material to the adjudication  process. While it is unlawful to fraudulently obtain approval of an  immigration benefit, U.S. immigration law does allow VAWA self- petitioners who may have committed such fraud to retain eligibility for  LPR status when they or their family would otherwise suffer extreme  hardship.

GAO’s A Framework for Managing Fraud Risks in Federal Programs  (Fraud Risk Framework) is a comprehensive set of leading practices  that serves as a guide for program managers to use when developing  efforts to combat fraud in a strategic, risk-based manner. The  framework describes leading practices for establishing an organizational  structure and culture that are conducive to fraud risk management;  assessing fraud risks; designing and implementing controls to prevent  and detect potential fraud; and monitoring and evaluating to provide  assurances to managers that they are effectively preventing, detecting,  and responding to potential fraud. Under the Fraud Reduction and Data  Analytics Act of 2015, agencies are required to establish financial and  administrative controls that are aligned with the Fraud Risk Framework’s  leading practices. In addition, guidance from the Office of Management  and Budget affirms that managers should adhere to the leading practices  identified in the framework.

The Fraud Risk Framework includes control activities that help agencies  prevent, detect, and respond to fraud risks, as well as structures and  environmental factors that influence or help managers achieve their  objectives to mitigate fraud risks. The framework consists of four  components for effectively managing fraud risks: commit, assess, design  and implement, and evaluate and adapt. Leading practices for each of  these components include the following:

Commit: create an organizational culture to combat fraud at all levels  of the agency, and designate an entity within the program office to  lead fraud risk management activities.

Assess: assess the likelihood and impact of fraud risks and  determine risk tolerance and examine the suitability of existing  controls and prioritize residual risks.

Design and implement: develop, document, and communicate an  antifraud strategy, focusing on preventive control activities.

Evaluate and adapt: collect and analyze data from reporting  mechanisms and instances of detected fraud for real-time monitoring  of fraud trends, and use the results of monitoring, evaluations, and  investigations to improve fraud prevention, detection, and response.

Figure 2 provides an overview of the Fraud Risk Framework and its  control activities.

USCIS Has Established a Culture and Structure to Manage Fraud Risks for the Self-Petition Program but Has Not Implemented Other Fraud Risk Management Practices

USCIS Has Established an Antifraud Culture and a Dedicated Entity to Manage Fraud Risks in the Self-Petition Program

USCIS has an antifraud culture and a dedicated entity for managing fraud  risks in the self-petition program. The first component of GAO’s Fraud  Risk Framework—commit—provides that agencies should commit to  combating fraud by creating an organizational culture and structure  conducive to fraud risk management. In particular, agencies should  create an organizational culture to combat fraud at all levels, by  demonstrating a senior-level commitment to integrity and combatting  fraud, and by involving all levels of the agency in setting an antifraud tone  that permeates the organizational culture. The first component of the  Fraud Risk Framework also calls for an agency to create a structure with  a dedicated entity to lead fraud risk management activities.

Consistent with the Fraud Risk Framework, we found USCIS has  promoted an antifraud culture in several ways. It has demonstrated a  senior-level commitment to combating fraud and involvement at all levels.  Within the Vermont Service Center, senior officials who oversee the  VAWA self-petition unit, as well as adjudicators who review petitions, are  evaluated on activities related to managing fraud risks in the self-petition  process. For example, according to performance appraisal  documentation, senior officials are evaluated on their ability to  consistently identify immigration fraud. Specifically, experienced  adjudicators and supervisors stated that they are evaluated on their ability  to review fraud referral sheets submitted by adjudicators to determine  whether the adjudicator has appropriately identified and described  suspected fraudulent activity in a self-petition. In addition, senior officials  told us they independently review a sample of self-petitions adjudicated  during each fiscal year for quality assurance purposes, to include  identification of suspected fraud. Adjudicators are evaluated by their  supervisors on their ability to identify fraud within the self-petition  adjudication process, which includes identifying suspected fraudulent  activities in self-petitions, submitting fraud referral sheets to their  supervisors, and collaborating with CFDO on resolving self-petition  adjudications where suspected fraudulent activity has been identified.

In addition to being evaluated on their ability to identify fraud, officials  have implemented several activities that contribute to an antifraud tone.  For example, officials at the Vermont Service Center stated that VAWA  self-petition unit adjudicators and CFDO immigration officers collaborate  and share information to combat potential fraud through activities that  include monthly meetings, regular contact through their co-location, and  an electronic bulletin board. Officials stated that during monthly meetings,  immigration officers answer questions from adjudicators on fraudulent  schemes and activities uncovered in their administrative investigations of  self-petitions. In addition, adjudicators we spoke to stated that because  they are co-located with CFDO, they have direct access to immigration  officers to obtain feedback on identifying suspected fraudulent self- petitions prior to submitting a formal fraud referral sheet. Finally, CFDO  maintains an electronic bulletin board for sharing information with  adjudicators on new potentially fraudulent activities they have identified  through their administrative investigations. Adjudicators we spoke to  stated that the bulletin board assists with identifying fraud indicators  during adjudication.

We also found that USCIS has created a dedicated entity to lead fraud  risk management activities for the self-petition program. According to  USCIS officials, the CFDO unit at the Vermont Service Center, in  conjunction with FDNS headquarters, is that dedicated entity. Within the  Vermont Service Center, CFDO officials stated the CFDO unit consists of  three immigration officers and a supervisory immigration officer who have  defined antifraud responsibilities, such as conducting administrative  investigations of self-petition filings that are referred by adjudicators who  suspect fraudulent activity. In addition, the immigration officers are  responsible for liaising with law enforcement entities, such as ICE HSI, to  provide logistical support in law enforcement matters. According to the  officials, CFDO and FDNS fulfill other fraud risk management  responsibilities described in GAO’s Fraud Risk Framework, including  leading or assisting with fraud training for adjudicators.

USCIS Has Not Fully Assessed Fraud Risks in the Self-Petition Program

While USCIS has taken some steps to assess fraud risks in the self- petition program, the agency has not conducted a formal assessment of  such program risks. The second component of the Fraud Risk  Framework—assess—calls for federal managers to plan regular fraud risk  assessments, and to assess risks to determine a fraud risk profile. A  fraud risk profile is the summation of key findings and conclusions from a  fraud risk assessment, including the analysis of the types of internal and  external fraud risks, their perceived likelihood and impact, managers’ risk  tolerance, and the prioritization of risks. The fraud risk assessment should  be tailored to the program, and in identifying and assessing risks to  determine the fraud risk profile, the focus should be on likelihood and  impact of inherent fraud risks. This means not only fraud risks already  known through program experience, but also other fraud risks that may  not yet have been experienced but can be identified, based on the nature  of the program. Such risks can be either internal or external to the  program.

USCIS has not assessed fraud risks and determined a fraud risk profile  for the self-petition program, as USCIS officials told us that they were  unfamiliar with the concept of a comprehensive fraud risk management  process, as provided in the Fraud Risk Framework. Instead, USCIS  officials said they viewed fraud risk management more practically, from  the standpoint of adjudicating self-petitions and referring suspected  fraudulent activity to CFDO. As part of those efforts, CFDO staff review  fraud referrals to determine potential fraud schemes and trends that may  exist in the self-petition program. While these are positive steps, they do  not constitute an assessment of program fraud risks that would position  USCIS to develop a fraud risk profile for the self-petition program. More  specifically, the Fraud Risk Framework calls for agencies to identify  inherent fraud risks of a program, examine the suitability of existing fraud  controls, and then to prioritize “residual” fraud risks—that is, risks  remaining after antifraud controls are adopted.

According to USCIS officials we spoke with, the self-petition program is  vulnerable to fraud. For example, USCIS officials stated that they have  seen cases in which self-petitioners submitted false or forged leases in an  attempt to show they resided with the alleged abuser during a period of  abuse, as well as foreign marriage or divorce certificates later found to be  falsified in an attempt to establish that the self-petitioner entered into a  marriage with a U.S. citizen in good faith. While these are examples of  individual fraudulent activities, USCIS officials cannot be assured they  have identified inherent fraud risks to the program without undertaking a  fraud risk assessment as provided in the Fraud Risk Framework. USCIS  officials we spoke with acknowledged the benefits of conducting a fraud  risk assessment and noted that a formal analysis of self-petition fraud  referrals and administrative investigations could help to better understand  the extent of fraud risks that exist in the self-petition program.

Further, the Fraud Risk Framework highlights the need for fully assessing  fraud risks when there are changes to the program or operating  environment—conditions that apply in the case of the self-petition  program. USCIS data indicate that the number of self-petitions filed has  been growing in the past 5 fiscal years, and at the end of fiscal year 2018,  USCIS had received 12,801 self-petitions and had over 19,000 self- petitions pending adjudication. In this environment, identification of  inherent fraud risks, coupled with assessments of the likelihood and  expected impact of those risks, could help USCIS better target its fraud  prevention and detection efforts. Planning and conducting regular fraud  risk assessments, as provided in the Fraud Risk Framework, would better  position USCIS to identify fraud risks in the self-petition program.  Regularly assessing fraud risks in the self-petition program to determine a  fraud risk profile would also help USCIS better determine the extent to  which the agency has designed and implemented adequate fraud  prevention controls.

USCIS Has Established Controls to Combat Fraud but Has Not Developed a Risk-Based Antifraud Strategy Tailored to the Self-Petition Program

USCIS has controls designed to help prevent and detect fraud in the self- petition program, but has not developed a risk-based antifraud strategy  for the program consistent with the Fraud Risk Framework. The third  component of the Fraud Risk Framework—design and implement—calls  for agencies to design and implement a strategy with specific control  activities to address risks identified in the fraud risk assessment. In  particular, managers should develop and document an antifraud strategy  based on the fraud risk profile (developed as part of the fraud risk  assessment of the second component of the Framework), and design and  implement specific control activities to prevent and detect fraud. The  basis for these activities should be the prioritized residual risks identified  earlier, meaning that the agency adopts a risk-based antifraud control  strategy. This approach is in line with Standards for Internal Control in  the Federal Government, which requires managers to design a response  to analyzed risks.

USCIS has instituted some fraud controls for the self-petition program,  particularly controls related to preventing and detecting fraud. USCIS’s  specific fraud control activities include, for example, the Vermont Service  Center Background Check Unit conducting TECS checks on foreign  nationals who submit self-petitions during the pre-adjudication stage to  determine whether the self-petitioner is connected to any administrative  or criminal investigations, is the subject of a national security concern, or  is a public safety threat. In addition, USCIS has a process for adjudicators  to refer petitions when they suspect fraudulent activities to CFDO for  administrative investigation. Specifically, USCIS official stated that in  cases where an adjudicator suspects potential fraud in a self-petition, the  adjudicator is to complete and submit a supervisor-approved fraud  referral sheet to CFDO. After receiving a referral, the center is to  determine whether the referral has sufficient information to warrant an  administrative investigation. CFDO also provides fraud training to  adjudicators.

While these controls help USCIS prevent and detect potential fraud in the  self-petition program, USCIS has not developed and implemented a risk- based antifraud strategy based on a fraud risk assessment as provided  under the Fraud Risk Framework. This is because, as noted earlier, the  agency has not undertaken an assessment of inherent program fraud  risks. USCIS officials told us that even with adjudicator and CFDO staff  experience with identifying and investigating potential fraud in self- petitions, unknown fraud risks may nevertheless remain. USCIS officials  acknowledged the benefits of conducting a fraud risk assessment, such  as designing and implementing new control activities, as well as revising  existing controls, if they determine that controls are not effectively  designed to reduce the likelihood or impact of an inherent fraud risk to a  tolerable level. USCIS officials told us that adjudicators and CFDO staff  conducting administrative investigations have identified trends in  fraudulent activities; however, officials also stated that it is difficult for staff  to identify fraud risks that are present but that are not identified through  adjudication or investigation. Examining antifraud controls, and adjusting  them as necessary based on an antifraud strategy, would help the  Vermont Service Center to better ensure that its controls are addressing  fraud risks in the self-petition program, including inherent risks.

USCIS Has Plans to Develop Tailored Antifraud Training For the Self- Petition Program

USCIS is developing training on fraud-related issues for the self-petition  program. The third component of the Fraud Risk Framework, discussed  earlier, identifies training as a leading antifraud practice and as an  antifraud control to increase fraud awareness of possible fraud  schemes. Training and education intended to increase fraud awareness  among managers and employees, among others, can serve as a  preventive measure to help create a culture of integrity and compliance  within the program. Increasing fraud awareness can also enable  managers and employees to better detect potential fraud. To achieve  these benefits, the Fraud Risk Framework notes that a leading practice is  to require all employees to attend training upon hiring and on an ongoing  basis thereafter. Training should convey fraud-specific information that is  tailored to the program and its fraud risk profile. Specifically, it should  include information on fraud risks, such as examples of specific types of  fraud that employees are likely to encounter, and information on how to  identify fraud schemes.

USCIS has a training program in place for new adjudicators that provides  general information on identifying potential fraudulent activities as part of  any adjudication and has plans to develop new fraud awareness training  tailored specifically to the self-petition program. According to CFDO  officials, USCIS provides general training to new adjudicators during a 6- day classroom training program. During this training, new adjudicators are  instructed on eligibility and evidence requirements across several  application types, including the VAWA self-petition. The training includes  information on eligibility requirements, supporting documentation needed,  and evidentiary requirements for these applications. Application forms are  used to teach adjudicators fraud identification, and adjudicators are given  a list of common fraud indicators to assist when reviewing applications,  according to adjudicators. This training also includes a 2-hour  presentation on the VAWA self-petition program where general fraud  concepts, such as document fraud, are discussed.

While adjudicators receive general training when hired, USCIS had not  provided tailored antifraud training on the self-petition prior to fiscal year  2019. Adjudicators we spoke to noted that fraud schemes continue to  evolve, and that fraud schemes and tactics are becoming more  sophisticated and thus more difficult to identify during adjudication of  VAWA self-petitions. Adjudicators we spoke to also noted that ongoing  training that included information on evolving fraud schemes and tactics  specific to the self-petition program would help increase their ability to  identify potentially fraudulent activities. Further, adjudicators noted that  additional training on how to identify potential fraud when a petitioner  submits an attested affidavit would help to identify potentially fraudulent  self-petitions.

In response to our discussions and adjudicator feedback, a senior CFDO  official stated that they recognized the need for fraud training, including  training tailored to the self-petition program, and planned to hire an  additional four immigration officers in fiscal year 2019 to increase fraud  training for adjudicators, among other duties. In response to discussions  we had during our review, officials at the center also stated they planned  to develop and implement tailored fraud training for the self-petition  program by the end of fiscal year 2019. CFDO officials stated they also  plan to continually update the training based on any new potentially  fraudulent activity identified in the self-petition program.

USCIS Has Not Used Data Analytics as an Antifraud Tool for the Self- Petition Program

USCIS has data analytics capabilities, but has not applied these  capabilities as an antifraud tool for the self-petition program. The third  component of the Fraud Risk Framework, discussed earlier, cites data  analytics as a leading practice in developing specific control activities to  prevent and detect fraud—in particular, to mitigate the likelihood and  impact of fraud. In addition, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal  Government provide for ongoing monitoring of operations and internal  controls, and data analytics can aid in this task.

According to the Fraud Risk Framework, data analytics can include a  variety of techniques, such as data mining (identifying suspicious activity  or transactions, including anomalies, outliers, and other red flags, within  data) and data matching (comparing information in one source to another  to identify inconsistencies), which can enable programs to identify  potential fraud. Further, predictive analytics can identify particular types of  behavior, including fraud, before transactions are completed.

According to USCIS officials, the agency has developed and uses data  analytics capabilities as part of its efforts to identify and prevent fraud  within immigration benefit programs. These officials said the agency has  not had sufficient resources to pursue data analytics separately for each  type of immigration benefit program. Thus, they stated that USCIS  deploys its data analytics resources strategically across immigration  benefit programs, based on factors including, among other things, the  volume of filings or applications for specific benefit programs, the amount  of data available for electronic analysis, and whether the type of  application is one that can lead to a change in immigration status, such as  asylum or permanent residency. Under this approach, for example,  USCIS officials stated that marriage and employment-based benefit  programs are areas where there is a greater amount of electronic data  available for analysis.

USCIS’s development and use of data analytics in other programs are  positive actions in helping the agency in its efforts to prevent and detect fraud risks to immigration benefit programs. However, USCIS has not  conducted a comprehensive assessment of fraud risks in the self-petition  program to provide an understanding of the likelihood and impact of  program risks and to help inform the level of resources USCIS should  allocate to addressing those risks. Consistent with the Fraud Risk  Framework, using data analytics capabilities in the self-petition program  could help position USCIS to better identify and assess fraud risks in the  program. Such data analysis does not by itself necessarily confirm the  existence of fraud, but the use of data analytics could help USCIS to  determine indicators of potential fraud. Further, consistent with the Fraud  Risk Framework, this type of analysis can aid in decisions on prioritization  of investigative resources.

According to the Fraud Risk Framework, specific data analytic tests that  are most effective in helping managers prevent or detect potential fraud  vary by program because of the different fraud risks programs face. By  using information on previously encountered fraud schemes or known  fraud risks, managers can identify signs of fraud that may exist within  their data. In the absence of an assessment of fraud risks in the self- petition program, we asked USCIS officials about fraud risks or schemes  they have identified in the program and analyzed program data to identify  examples of ways USCIS could use program data to better prevent or  detect potential self-petition program fraud. As examples, we analyzed  variables that generally serve to identify individuals, such as address and  Social Security number, because multiple instances of the same identifier  in program data can indicate misuse of personally identifying information.  In addition, we examined other variables associated with self-petition  filings and outcomes of self-petition adjudications, as trends in variables  associated with denial outcomes, for example, can provide indicators of  potential fraud. We offer the following examples not as illustrations of  confirmed or even potential fraud, but rather to help illustrate the use of  data analytics as a tool for helping to prevent and detect fraud in the self- petition program.

For example, one area in which we identified multiple instances of the  same variable was with addresses. While not necessarily indicative of  fraud, our review of USCIS data showed that from fiscal year 2009 to  January 2019, thousands of self-petition filings had addresses that were  used in multiple self-petition filings. According to USCIS officials, this is  not unexpected and further research would be required to authoritatively  explain the multiple address use we identified. The self-petitioner program  also allows self-petitioners to use a “safe address” for communications, in  an effort to ensure confidentiality in filing of the petition. According to  USCIS officials, self-petitioners often use an assisting attorney or  representative’s business address as their safe address. In prior work on  other immigration benefits, we have highlighted where DHS officials have  used multiple instances of the same address in program data to target  investigative follow-up. Our analysis of data on the number of times  unique addresses were used in filing self-petitions showed, for instance,  37,201 filings had addresses used at least 10 times each from fiscal year  2009 to January 2019. In some cases, an address was used hundreds of  times—–in a group of 6,302 self-petitions, there were 31 instances in  which addresses were used 100 or more times. Table 2 provides  examples of multiple uses of addresses, which we selected for illustrative  purposes from among all the multiple uses of addresses we identified. It  shows, for example, in the last row, that there was one unique address  that was used 845 times in self-petition filings, all of which were separate  filings. Thus, the total number of self-petitions involved with this address  was 845.

Another example of multiple instances of the same variable was  identification numbers. In particular, our review of USCIS data showed  that from fiscal year 2009 to January 2019, there were thousands of self- petition filings that used duplicative identifying numbers – Social Security  numbers and Alien numbers. According to USCIS officials, as with  multiple uses of the same address, further research would be required to  authoritatively explain the multiple identification number use we identified.  For example, according to USCIS officials, a foreign national parent and  child may file separate self-petitions, resulting in multiple petitions using  the same Social Security number. Also, it is common for people to file  more than one self-petition if, for instance, they are able to obtain  additional evidence after a decision is made. Our analysis of the number  of times unique Social Security numbers were provided in self-petition  filings, as well as unique Alien numbers, showed that for each, there were  several thousand filings in which the numbers were used in multiple self- petition filings. In prior work, we have highlighted examples where  multiple instances of the same Social Security number in program or  payment data has indicated Social Security number misuse, such as  where multiple individuals may have been using the same Social Security  number for employment, and use of Social Security numbers to create  synthetic identities, to obtain benefits for ineligible individuals using the  Social Security numbers of eligible applicants. Table 3 provides  examples of multiple uses of Social Security and Alien Registration  numbers, selected for illustrative purposes from among all the multiple  uses of identification numbers we identified. It shows, for example, in the  last row, that there were 28 instances in which a unique Alien number  was used in five different self-petition filings, all of which were separate  filings. Thus, the total number of self-petitions involved with these 28  Alien numbers was 140.

Another example of multiple instances of the same variables was  assistance provided to self-petitioners by attorneys or other organizations.  According to USCIS officials, self-petitions filed with assistance are  expected, as organizations specialize in providing assistance to  petitioners and applicants for immigration benefits, including self-petitions.  Thus, USCIS officials noted that the appearance of the same attorneys or  other organizations in program data is not necessarily indicative of fraud  without further investigation. However, USCIS officials also noted that  application “mills,” in which a relatively large number of incomplete or  deficient self-petitions are submitted through a single preparer, also exist  and could indicate avenues for further investigation. For example, if  investigation revealed submission of self-petitioner affidavits or other  supporting evidence across multiple self-petitions and using common  information, such as duplicate wording, that could be an indicator of  potential fraud. In July 2019, the U.S. Attorney for the District of Vermont  announced an indictment against a self-petition preparer, charging the  man with filing false statements with USCIS, including more than 1,800  fraudulent submissions for more than 1,000 self-petitioners over four  years. The preparer is alleged to have falsely claimed that his clients  were victims of abuse, without their authorization, according to the U.S.  Attorney’s office.

Our analysis of USCIS data from fiscal year 2009 to January 2019  showed that a large portion of self-petitions were filed with assistance by  either attorneys or by other organizations. In the case of attorneys,  according to our analysis, about 80 percent of self-petitions were filed by  foreign nationals with assistance from attorneys or accredited  representatives from fiscal year fiscal year 2009 through January 2019.  However, while USCIS collects attorney identifying information on the  paper form that self-petitioners submit, officials told us the agency does  not capture this information electronically. Therefore, it is not available  for analysis. Such analysis could indicate particular attorneys’ or  representatives’ relative shares of self-petitions, and allow USCIS to  conduct further analysis, as appropriate. In the case of organizations  providing assistance, we found that about 70 percent of self-petitioners  from fiscal year 2009 through January 2019 listed various organizations in  their filings, and we identified a number of organizations assisting  hundreds of self-petitioners each. For example, in one case an  organization was listed as providing assistance in over 500 filings and in  another case two entities were listed as providing assistance in over 400  filings each. However, according to USCIS officials, one legal  organization providing assistance for 500 filings over a 10-year period is  not uncommon or necessarily an indicator of fraud, given that, unlike  other petitions, most VAWA self-petitions are filed with the assistance of  an attorney or legal representative.

Consistent with leading practices as described in the Framework,  analyses of multiple uses of unique identifiers or instances of certain  variables in self-petition program data could help USCIS identify areas for  more targeted review, to determine what accounts for the duplicates in  the program data and the extent to which they or other variables could be  indicators of potential fraud. Moreover, according to the Fraud Risk Framework, data analytics, such as data mining, can identify suspicious  activity or transactions, including anomalies, outliers and other red flags in  a program’s data. Activity or transactions that deviate from expected  patterns can potentially indicate fraudulent activity and program  managers who effectively use data analytics to detect potential fraud look  for unusual transactions or data entries that do not fit an expected  pattern. However, as noted earlier, USCIS has not applied data analytics  as an antifraud tool for the self-petition program. For example, as  previously discussed, while adjudicating self-petitions, USCIS officers  may request additional evidence from petitioners for reasons including  incomplete or inconsistent information provided in filings, or suspected  fraud, USCIS officials told us. The officials told us the agency does not  compile data on the nature of these requests for additional evidence,  which number in the thousands annually.

Maintaining and analyzing such data—especially when adjudicators are  requesting further information because they suspect possible fraud— could provide program-level insights into where self-petitions are  incomplete or suspected to be fraudulent. Further, as noted earlier,  USCIS does not assess data on the outcomes of self-petition  adjudications to determine whether there are any trends or patterns in  such data that could be indicative of fraud. In particular, denials or  referrals can be based on multiple factors, including potential fraud.  Analyzing such outcomes for any patterns or trends that could suggest  potential fraud could help USCIS strengthen its efforts to identify and  prevent fraud risks in the self-petition program. For example, USCIS  officials told us they sometimes observe patterns or trends among self- petitions that may seem suspicious and warrant further review and noted  as an example an increase in cases involving potentially false claims of  abuse from self-petitioners from one country. While not necessarily  indicative of fraud, and to provide some example of trend analysis on data  on the outcomes of self-petition adjudications, we analyzed data on the  outcomes of adjudications from the 10 countries with the largest number  of self-petition filings and found the denial rate by country of birth of the  self-petitioner varied by as much as a factor of three. Additional analysis  across data on adjudication outcomes could help better identify areas for  further investigation or review.

In addition, the Fraud Risk Framework notes that one leading practice for  using data analytics as an antifraud tool is to verify key information,  including self-reported data and information necessary to determine  eligibility. To effectively prevent and detect instances of potential fraud,  managers are to take steps to verify reported information, particularly self- reported data and other key data necessary to determine eligibility for  programs or receiving benefits. For example, according to officials,  USCIS does not check the validity of key identification information  submitted by self-petitioners, and it does not analyze outcomes across  characteristics of self-petitions—practices our prior work indicates could  strengthen USCIS’s use of data analytics. More specifically, although  USCIS may conduct background checks on self-reported self-petitioner  information, officials told us the agency does not have the capability to  check the validity of Social Security numbers or passport information that  self-petitioners report in their Form I-360 filings. Nevertheless, USCIS  officials told us the agency routinely performs overseas verification of self- petitioner documents, such as birth certificates, marriage/divorce  certificates, and passports.

Based on our analysis of USCIS data, the agency maintains data that  could be used for data analytics. For example, the majority of self-petition  filings have full name information, addresses, Alien numbers, and, to a  lesser extent, Social Security numbers. This relative completeness of  data items provides opportunities for data-matching, which, as noted, is a  key data analytics technique. USCIS officials told us that generally, they  see the value of developing a data analytics capability for the self-petition  program, noting that such a capability would be beneficial both in aiding  fraud detection and prevention efforts, as well as by allowing timely,  accurate reporting on self-petitioner data as part of routine program  management and oversight. However, officials also noted that while  expanding the range of electronic self-petitioner data maintained would  increase analytical capabilities, there would be a cost to implementation,  which would need to be balanced against the benefit of the additional  antifraud tool, and any data analytics would need to be conducted so as  to not target individuals or groups solely based on certain self-petitioner  characteristics indicated by data.

In other work, we have noted that leading practices in data analytic  techniques alone may not be sufficient to prevent fraud in obtaining  benefits but can help an agency prioritize and enhance fraud  investigations. Developing and implementing a data analytics capability  for the self-petition program would provide USCIS with tools to aid in  identifying potential fraud in self-petition filings and aid in focusing  resources. Further, analysis and insights developed through use of data  analytics could inform the self-petition program’s periodic fraud risk  assessments, which, as described earlier, are a key aspect of the fraud  risk management process.

DHS Provides Assistance to Potential Victims of Immigration-Related Crimes and Refers Suspected Self- Petition Fraud for Review and Investigation

DHS VOICE Office Provides Assistance to Potential Victims of Immigration-Related Crimes

The DHS VOICE Office provides assistance to potential victims of  immigration-related crimes. In April 2017, in response to Executive Order  13768, ICE established the VOICE Office to provide professional services  and assistance to potential victims and family members of victims of  crimes committed by removable aliens. The office’s assistance to  potential U.S. citizen and LPR victims includes, among other things,  providing ICE community relations officers who serve as local  representatives to help potential victims understand the immigration  enforcement and removal process; victim assistance specialists who  provide potential victims with direct service referrals for matters such as  counseling; and information, such as the potential offenders’ immigration  and custody status. In addition, the office provides referral information to  the ICE HSI tip line and answers questions and concerns regarding  immigration enforcement through the VOICE Office’s toll-free hotline.

Data collected by the VOICE Office from hotline calls shows that in fiscal  year 2018, a total of 1,543 calls were made to the VOICE Office. Of those  1,543 calls, 130 calls, or 8 percent, were from self-identified victims of  marriage-related fraud requesting assistance. VOICE officials indicated  that they would consider VAWA self-petition fraud as a subset of marriage  fraud; however, self-petition fraud is not separately identifiable in their  data. Of those 130 calls, the Office referred 78 alleged victims to ICE’s  HSI Tip Line. For example, in one case from fiscal year 2018, a caller  claimed that his or her spouse married the caller for immigration purposes  and attempted to falsely press criminal domestic violence charges against  the caller as a means of obtaining immigration status. The Office offered  the caller local victim services and referred the caller to both USCIS and  the ICE HSI Tip Line.

Of the remaining 52 calls from self-identified victims of marriage-related  fraud, the office provided the caller with an ICE community relations  officer, and the officer recommended actions to victims, such as calling  the ICE HSI Tip Line, or providing the victim with a victim assistance  specialist to discuss available resources. For example, in another case  from fiscal year 2018, a caller claimed his or her spouse married the  caller to obtain immigration relief, and falsely accused the caller of  domestic violence to obtain legal residency. The VOICE office referred  the caller to ICE HSI and explained the victim assistance services  available to the caller. See figure 3 for a description of calls made to the  VOICE Office and subsequent office action.

According to CRCL officials, assessing tips from self-identified victims of  immigration fraud poses a challenge, since domestic abusers may use  the immigration system against their victims by providing false tips in  order to have them removed. Per statutory protections for self-petitioners,  DHS treats tips as inherently suspect, and is barred from making adverse  determinations of inadmissibility or deportability in adjudications based  solely on information provided by certain individuals, such as the alleged  abuser or a member of the abuser’s household. However, DHS may  consider such information if it can be independently corroborated  consistent with DHS policy. As for the alleged abuser’s information,  which may have been included in a VAWA self-petition, USCIS officials  noted that USCIS never provides such information to anyone including  law enforcement even where allegations of criminal conduct are reported  with a self-petition. As a result, U.S. citizens and LPRs face no  consequences solely from being named in a self-petition regardless of its  outcome.

DHS Has a Referral Process for Suspected Fraud in Self-Petitions, Which May Result in a Referral to ICE for Criminal Investigation

DHS has a referral process for suspected fraud in self-petitions, which  may result in a referral to ICE for criminal investigation. Within USCIS,  FDNS immigration officers review self-petition fraud referrals, conduct  administrative investigations when warranted, and in limited  circumstances, refer cases to ICE for criminal investigation. Fraud  referrals related to self-petitions typically originate from five sources: (1)  the TECS checks that the Vermont Service Center Background Check  Unit conducts prior to adjudication, which include notifications that  indicate potential national security concerns, public safety threats, and  fraud leads in the preadjudication screening process; (2) USCIS  adjudicators reviewing self-petitions at any time during the adjudication  process; (3) other USCIS offices that may encounter potential self-petition  fraud in the course of their work on other USCIS applications; (4) other  law enforcement sources, including other federal law enforcement  entities; and (5) benefit fraud tips received from the general public. After  receiving a referral, FDNS immigration officers determine whether the  referral has sufficient information to warrant further investigation.

According to FDNS’s fraud detection standard operating procedures,  FDNS immigration officers either determine that the referral becomes a  lead and the lead is accepted, or the referral is declined. After accepting  the referral, immigration officers are responsible for conducting an  administrative investigation to, among other things, obtain relevant  information needed by Vermont Service Center adjudicators to render the  appropriate adjudicative decision. If, after conducting research and  analyzing the information associated with a lead, the FDNS immigration  officer determines that a reasonable suspicion of fraud is articulated and  actionable, the lead is elevated to a case.

Upon conclusion of the administrative investigation, FDNS immigration  officers close the accepted lead and case and record their findings in a  Statement of Findings. The Statement of Findings concludes the  administrative investigation with one of three types of findings: (1) Fraud  Found: the investigation determined fraudulent activities exist in the self- petition; (2) Fraud Not Found: the investigation did not uncover fraudulent  activities in the self-petition; or (3) Inconclusive: the investigation could  not make a determination of whether fraudulent activity occurred. Once  completed, the Statement of Findings is returned to the appropriate  referral source.

In cases where FDNS immigration officers find self-petition fraud, the  case can be referred to ICE’s HSI for criminal investigation. According to  a 2008 immigration benefit fraud memorandum of agreement between  USCIS and ICE, FDNS is to refer individual petitions involving suspected  fraud to HSI where (1) the alien is the subject of a TECS record; (2)  USCIS suspects misconduct on the part of the self-petitioner’s attorney,  notary, interpreter, or preparer of the application; or (3) evidence of a  criminal conviction of an offense that is not grounds for inadmissibility or  removability is present, among other things. Typically, referrals are sent  to the National Lead Development Center, where they are distributed to  ICE Special Agent In-Charge local offices for further investigation,  according to FDNS officials. If a referral is the result of a task team,  petitions may be referred directly to ICE Special Agent In-Charge local  offices. ICE either accepts the referral and conducts a criminal  investigation or declines the referral and sends it back to FDNS. If a  referral is declined by ICE, FDNS continues its administrative  investigation. Figure 4 provides an overview of the self-petition fraud  referral process.

According to FDNS data, from fiscal year 2014 to March 2019, FDNS  created 2,208 fraud referral leads and cases that involved a VAWA self- petition. Total leads and cases increased from 198 in fiscal year 2014 to  801 in fiscal year 2019 (data as of March 2019), an increase of about 305  percent. USCIS officials attributed this increase to an overall increase in  the number of self-petitions filed and an increase in fraud leads and cases  obtained through USCIS’s fraud tip hotline. FDNS data showed that 2,151  leads and cases were accepted by FDNS between fiscal year 2014 and  March 2019, or about 97 percent. Table 5 shows the number of fraud  leads and cases that contain a self-petition and the disposition of  accepted leads and cases between fiscal years 2014 and March 2019.

From fiscal year 2014 to March 2019, FDNS found a disposition for 631 of  the closed cases that involved a VAWA self-petition. According to USCIS  officials, a fraud lead or case is not typically closed within the same year  that it is filed. This accounts for differences between the total number of  fraud cases and leads filed and the total number of completed cases and  closed leads within the same fiscal year. Of the 631 closed cases with a  disposition, FDNS found fraud in 332, or 53 percent. Table 6 shows the  disposition of closed self-petition fraud leads and cases between fiscal  year 2014 and March 2019.

According to FDNS data, from fiscal year 2014 to March 2019, FDNS  made 68 fraud referrals to ICE for criminal investigation that involved a  VAWA self-petition. We inquired with ICE about the status and disposition  of these cases. As previously mentioned, for purposes of accepting a  referral for criminal investigation, ICE does not make distinction between  self-petition fraud and marriage fraud investigations. As a result,  information on the 68 fraud referrals to ICE is encompassed in ICE’s  immigration benefit fraud investigation data and could not be separated  for analysis. Therefore, we could not provide status and disposition  information on these referrals.

The VAWA self-petition program is designed to protect foreign nationals  who are victims of domestic abuse. The decision to approve or deny a  VAWA self-petition is consequential, as the program allows an eligible  foreign national victim to remain in the country, obtain work authorization,  and apply for LPR status independent of their abuser. According to  CRCL, VAWA self-petition relief brings safety, security and stability to  legitimate victims who might not otherwise be able to escape domestic  abuse. However, approving a fraudulent petition could affect the integrity  of the program. USCIS has implemented some aspects of GAO’s Fraud  Risk Framework in managing the self-petition program, such as having a  dedicated antifraud entity, but could improve efforts to detect and prevent  potential fraud in the program. More specifically, conducting regular fraud  risk assessments and determining a fraud risk profile for the program  could help USCIS identify fraud risks in the self-petition program and  better determine the extent to which the agency has designed and  implemented adequate fraud prevention controls. Further, basing  antifraud controls on inherent risks identified through regular fraud risk  assessments could help ensure USCIS’s antifraud controls are  addressing fraud risks in the self-petition program. Lastly, developing and  implementing a data analytics capability could provide USCIS with tools  to aid in identifying potential fraud in self-petition filings. Analysis and  insights developed through the use of data analytics could inform the self- petition program’s regular fraud risk assessments.

We are making the following three recommendations to USCIS:  The Director of USCIS should plan and conduct regular fraud risk  assessments of the self-petition program to determine a fraud risk profile,  as provided in GAO’s Fraud Risk Framework. (Recommendation 1)

The Director of USCIS should develop and implement an antifraud  strategy with specific control activities, based upon the results of fraud  risk assessments and a corresponding fraud risk profile, as provided in  GAO’s Fraud Risk Framework. (Recommendation 2)

The Director of USCIS should develop and implement data analytics  capabilities for the self-petition program, as a means to prevent and  detect fraud, as provided in GAO’s Fraud Risk Framework.  (Recommendation 3)

We provided a draft of this report to DHS for review and comment. DHS  provided comments, which are reproduced in full in appendix I and  discussed below. DHS also provided technical comments, which we  incorporated as appropriate.

In its comments, DHS concurred with our three recommendations and  described actions planned to address them.

With respect to our first recommendation that USCIS plan and conduct  regular fraud risk assessments of the self-petition program to determine a  fraud risk profile, DHS stated that the USCIS FDNS plans to capture data  digitally for both I-360 and I-751 self-petitions filed on the basis of  domestic abuse, and discuss any patterns observed with stakeholders in  order to develop a fraud risk profile. Further, DHS stated USCIS will use  the results of data analytics to conduct and update regular fraud risk  assessments.

With regard to our second recommendation that USCIS develop and  implement an antifraud strategy with specific control activities based upon  the results of fraud risk assessments and a corresponding fraud risk  profile, DHS stated USCIS plans to create an antifraud strategy that  includes both adjudicators and FDNS officers in order to emphasize fraud  detection prior to adjudication of self-petitions.

With respect to our third recommendation that USCIS develop and  implement data analytics capabilities for the self-petition program as a  means to prevent and detect fraud, DHS stated that USCIS will apply  their data analytics capabilities, driven by the results of the self-petition  fraud risk assessments, to develop analytic tools that verify information  provided by self-petitioners and identify indicators of potential fraud.  Further, DHS stated that USCIS will use the results of data analytics to  inform antifraud training and will distribute the results to USCIS senior  leadership when warranted.

We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional  committees and the Acting Secretary of Homeland Security. In addition,  this report is available at no charge on the GAO website at  http://www.gao.gov.

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact  Rebecca Gambler at (202) 512-8777 or GamblerR@gao.gov or Rebecca  Shea at (202) 512-6722 or SheaR@gao.gov. Contact points for our Office  of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last  page of our report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this report  are listed in appendix II.

Appendix I: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security

Appendix II: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgements

In addition to the contacts named above, Jeanette Henriquez (Assistant  Director), Kelsey M. Carpenter, Pamela Davidson, April Gamble, Eric  Hauswirth, Brandon Jones, Brendan Kretzschmar, Sasan J. “Jon” Najmi,  Christopher H. Schmitt, and Eli Stiefel made key contributions to this  report.

The Violence Against Women Act self-petition program is intended to protect foreign nationals who suffered domestic abuse at the hands of a family member who is a U.S. citizen or lawful permanent resident. Successful petitioners can obtain work authorization and permanent resident status independent of their abuser.

The number of petitions filed grew by over 70% over the past 5 fiscal years. However, the number of petitions referred for potential fraud also increased by about 305%.

We made 3 recommendations to U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, including that the agency improve its ability to use data to better detect potential fraud.