Data Protection: Federal Agencies Need to Strengthen Online Identity Verification Processes

Many federal agencies rely on CRAs, such as Equifax, to help conduct remote identity proofing. The 2017 breach of data at Equifax raised concerns about federal agencies' remote identity proofing processes.

GAO was asked to review federal agencies' remote identity proofing practices in light of the recent Equifax breach and the potential for fraud. The objectives of this review were to (1) describe federal practices for remote identity proofing and the risks associated with those practices, (2) assess federal agencies' actions to ensure the effectiveness of agencies' remote identity proofing processes, and (3) assess the sufficiency of federal identity proofing guidance.

To do so, GAO identified remote identity proofing practices used by six agencies (CMS, GSA, IRS, SSA, USPS, and VA) with major, public-facing web applications providing public access to benefits or services. GAO compared the agencies' practices to NIST's remote identity proofing guidance to assess their effectiveness, and compared NIST's and OMB's guidance to requirements in federal law and best practices in IT management to assess the sufficiency of the guidance.

Remote identity proofing is the process federal agencies and other entities use to verify that the individuals who apply online for benefits and services are who they claim to be. To perform remote identity proofing, agencies that GAO reviewed rely on consumer reporting agencies (CRAs) to conduct a procedure known as knowledge-based verification. This type of verification involves asking applicants seeking federal benefits or services personal questions derived from information found in their credit files, with the assumption that only the true owner of the identity would know the answers. If the applicant responds correctly, their identity is considered to be verified. For example, the Social Security Administration (SSA) uses this technique to verify the identities of individuals seeking access to the “My Social Security” service, which allows them to check the status of benefit applications, request a replacement Social Security or Medicare card, and request other services.

However, data stolen in recent breaches, such as the 2017 Equifax breach, could be used fraudulently to respond to knowledge-based verification questions. The risk that an attacker could obtain and use an individual's personal information to answer knowledge-based verification questions and impersonate that individual led the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) to issue guidance in 2017 that effectively prohibits agencies from using knowledge-based verification for sensitive applications. Alternative methods are available that provide stronger security, as shown in Figure 1. However, these methods may have limitations in cost, convenience, and technological maturity, and they may not be viable for all segments of the public.

Two of the six agencies that GAO reviewed have eliminated knowledge-based verification. Specifically, the General Services Administration (GSA) and the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) recently developed and began using alternative methods for remote identity proofing for their Login.gov and Get Transcript services that do not rely on knowledge-based verification. One agency—the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA)—has implemented alternative methods for part of its identity proofing process but still relies on knowledge-based verification for some individuals. SSA and the United States Postal Service (USPS) intend to reduce or eliminate their use of knowledge-based verification sometime in the future but do not yet have specific plans for doing so. The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) has no plans to reduce or eliminate knowledge-based verification for remote identity proofing.

Several officials cited reasons for not adopting alternative methods, including high costs and implementation challenges for certain segments of the public. For example, mobile device verification may not always be viable because not all applicants possess mobile devices that can be used to verify their identities. Nevertheless, until these agencies take steps to eliminate their use of knowledge-based verification, the individuals they serve will remain at increased risk of identity fraud.

NIST has issued guidance to agencies related to identity proofing and OMB has drafted identity management guidance, but their guidance is not sufficient to ensure agencies are adopting such methods. Sound practices in information technology (IT) management state that organizations should provide clear direction on how to implement IT objectives. However, NIST's guidance does not provide direction to agencies on how to successfully implement alternative identity-proofing methods with currently available technologies for all segments of the public. For example, the guidance does not discuss the advantages and limitations of currently available technologies or make recommendations to agencies on which technologies should be adopted. Further, most of the agencies that GAO reviewed reported that they were not able to implement the guidance because of limitations in available technologies for implementing alternative identify proofing methods. NIST officials stated that they believe their guidance is comprehensive, and at the time of our review they did not plan to issue supplemental implementation guidance to assist agencies.

The Federal Information Security Modernization Act of 2014 ( FISMA) requires that OMB oversee federal agencies' information security practices. Although OMB has the authority under this statute to issue guidance, OMB has not issued guidance requiring agencies to report on their progress in implementing NIST's identity proofing guidance. OMB staff plan to issue guidance on identity management at federal agencies, but their proposed guidance does not require agencies to report on their progress in implementing NIST guidance. Until NIST provides additional guidance to help agencies move away from knowledge-based verification methods and OMB requires agencies to report on their progress, federal agencies will likely continue to struggle to strengthen their identify proofing processes.

GAO is making recommendations to six agencies to strengthen online identify verification processes:

GAO recommends that CMS, SSA, USPS, and VA develop plans to strengthen their remote identity proofing processes by discontinuing knowledge-based verification.

GAO recommends that NIST supplement its technical guidance with implementation guidance to assist agencies in adopting more secure remote identity proofing processes.

GAO recommends that OMB issue guidance requiring federal agencies to report on their progress in adopting secure identity proofing practices.

Four agencies—Commerce (on behalf of NIST), SSA, USPS, and VA—agreed with GAO's recommendations. These agencies outlined the additional steps they plan to take to improve the security of their remote identity proofing processes. One agency, HHS (on behalf of CMS), disagreed with GAO's recommendation because it did not believe that the available alternatives to knowledge-based verification were feasible for the individuals it serves. However, a variety of alternative methods exist, and GAO continues to believe CMS should develop a plan for discontinuing the use of knowledge-based verification. OMB provided a technical comment, which GAO incorporated, but OMB did not provide any comments on GAO's recommendation.

In recent years, the risk of fraud has increased as significant amounts of  personally identifiable information (PII) have been compromised by large- scale cyberattacks. Such attacks have been widespread—impacting  federal agencies as well as retailers, hospitals, insurance companies,  consumer reporting agencies (CRA), and other large organizations. For  example, in June and July 2015, the Office of Personnel Management  (OPM) announced that it had detected two data breaches affecting  approximately 22.1 million current or former federal employees,  contractors, and their family members. Further, in 2017, the consumer  reporting agency, Equifax, announced that a breach of its online  consumer dispute portal had resulted in the compromise of records  containing the PII of at least 145.5 million individuals in the United States.

The PII stolen during such cyberattacks can be used to commit identity  fraud for financial or other gain. The Equifax breach, in particular, raised  concerns about the vulnerability of federal agencies that rely on  information maintained by CRAs to verify the identity of individuals who  apply electronically for benefits and services. Among others, the  customers of Equifax’s services included federal agencies such as the  Internal Revenue Service (IRS); Social Security Administration (SSA);  and U.S. Postal Service (USPS).

The process of using an online exchange of information to verify that an  individual is who he or she claims to be is known as remote identity  proofing. Federal agencies and other entities often rely on the information  provided by CRAs to perform remote identity proofing of individuals who  are applying for benefits and services. The Office of Management and  Budget (OMB) is developing policy guidance on identity management and  the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) has issued  technical guidance on identity proofing.

In response to your request, we issued a report on the July 2017 Equifax  data breach in August 2018. The report noted that hackers had  accessed people’s names, Social Security numbers, birth dates,  addresses, and, in some instances, driver’s license numbers. While there  was no breach of federal systems or information, agencies sought to  determine which of their customers were directly affected by the breach,  recognizing that those individuals could be at heightened risk of identity  fraud. We reported that agency officials had expressed concern about  how the breached data could be used to compromise sensitive  information or fraudulently procure government services, even from  agencies that are not direct customers of Equifax.

You also asked us to review federal programs that rely on CRAs for  remote identity proofing. In conducting this review, our specific objectives  were to (1) describe selected federal agency practices for remote identity  proofing of individuals seeking access to major web-based applications  using services provided by consumer reporting agencies and the risks  associated with those practices; (2) assess selected federal agencies’  actions to ensure the effectiveness of agencies’ remote identity proofing  processes; and (3) assess the sufficiency of federal identity proofing  guidance developed by OMB and NIST in assuring the security of federal  systems.

To address the first objective, we made a non-probability selection of  federal agencies with major public-facing web applications that use  identity proofing solutions provided by the three nationwide CRAs  (Equifax, Experian, and TransUnion). We considered “major” applications  to be those that could involve interaction with millions of individuals  across the entire country. We selected six agencies to review: the  Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), General Services  Administration (GSA), IRS, SSA, USPS, and the Department of Veterans  Affairs (VA).

In addition, we reviewed federal identity proofing guidance to obtain  detailed information about remote identity proofing concepts and  practices. We also interviewed relevant officials at NIST to understand the  current federal digital identity guidelines and obtain their views on the  risks associated with commonly-used remote identity proofing processes.  Further, we interviewed officials responsible for the identity proofing  programs at the six selected agencies and at ID.me, a commercial  provider that offers identity proofing solutions to federal agencies and  other entities, to obtain information about identity proofing techniques  used to verify remote users of electronic applications. Other than the  three nationwide CRAs, ID.me was the only commercial provider of  identity proofing solutions used by the agencies selected for this review.

To address the second objective, we compared documentation of the  remote identity proofing processes used at the six selected agencies with  federal requirements specified in NIST’s technical guidance on remote  identity proofing. We also interviewed officials at the selected agencies  to obtain information on what plans, if any, they have to improve the  security of their remote identity proofing processes in light of the Equifax  data breach and the potential for similar breaches in the future.

To address the third objective, we compared NIST’s guidance on remote  identity proofing to best practices in IT governance for providing clear and  sufficient guidance. We also interviewed officials at the selected federal  agencies who managed access to major web applications using remote  identity proofing about whether the NIST guidance provided sufficient  direction to assist them in implementing appropriate remote identity  proofing methods. In addition, we interviewed relevant NIST officials to  discuss the effectiveness of the existing remote identity proofing  guidance.

Further, we reviewed OMB’s draft policy that, when issued, is expected to  direct agencies to implement NIST’s guidance for their remote identity  proofing processes. We compared OMB’s draft policy to the Federal  Information Security Modernization Act of 2014’s (FISMA) requirements  for OMB to oversee agencies’ implementation of information security  policies. We assessed whether OMB’s draft policy included requirements  that would allow OMB to monitor agencies’ progress in implementing  NIST’s remote identity proofing guidance. In addition, we interviewed  OMB staff regarding their plans to finalize the draft policy. Appendix I  discusses our objectives, scope, and methodology in greater detail.

We conducted this performance audit from November 2017 to May 2019  in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.

Individuals engage in countless online transactions every day—from  checking their bank accounts and making retail purchases to signing up  for federal benefits and services. However, securing such transactions is  a complex endeavor. A key part of this process is verifying that the  person who is attempting to interact for the first time with an organization,  such as a federal agency or a business, is the individual he or she claims  to be. This process, known as identity proofing, is essential to prevent  fraud, which could cause harm to both individuals and organizations.

Identity proofing may occur in person or through a remote, online  process. In the case of in-person identity proofing, a trained professional  verifies an individual’s identity by making a direct physical comparison of  the individual’s physical features and other evidence (such as a driver’s  license or other credential) with official records to verify the individual’s  identity. Verification of these credentials can be performed by checking  electronic records in tandem with physical inspection. In-person identity  proofing is considered a strong method of identity proofing.

However, it may not always be feasible to require that all applicants  appear in person. In such cases, remote identity proofing is performed.  Remote identity proofing is the process of conducting identity proofing  entirely through an online exchange of information. When remote identity  proofing is used, there is no way to confirm an individual’s identity through  their physical presence. Instead, the individual provides the information  electronically, or performs other electronically verifiable actions that  demonstrate his or her identity. Because many federal benefits and  services are offered broadly to large numbers of geographically dispersed  applicants, agencies often rely on remote identity proofing to verify the  identities of applicants.

Overview of the Remote Identity Proofing Process

Remote identity proofing involves two major steps: (1) resolution and (2)  validation and verification. During the resolution step, an organization  determines which specific identity an applicant is claiming when they first  attempt to initiate a transaction, such as enrolling for federal benefits or  services, remotely. The most common form of remote interaction is  through an organization’s website. The organization starts the identity  resolution process by having the applicant provide identifying information,  typically through a web-based application form. Examples of information  that an organization may collect for identity resolution include name,  address, date of birth, and Social Security number.

The organization then electronically compares the applicant’s identifying  information with electronic records that it already has in its databases or  with records maintained by another entity, such as a CRA, to determine  (or “resolve”) which identity is being claimed. For example, if an individual  named John Smith were applying, the organization would obtain enough  identifying information about him to determine which “John Smith” he is  from among the thousands of John Smiths that it may have in its records  or that may be documented in the records of the CRA that it is using for  this process.

Once the resolution process is complete, the process of validation and  verification occurs. In this process, steps are taken to verify whether the  applicant is really who they claim to be. For example, in the case of John  Smith, it is not enough simply to determine which John Smith is being  claimed, because the claimant may not really be John Smith at all.  Organizations need to obtain electronic evidence from the remote  applicant to verify their identity. Organizations can use a variety of  techniques to accomplish this goal. Knowledge-based verification is a  technique that commonly has been used for this purpose.

With knowledge-based verification, organizations ask applicants detailed  and personal questions, under the presumption that only the real person  will know the answers to these questions. To do this, the organization  poses a series of multiple choice questions through an online web form,  and the applicant selects the appropriate responses and submits the  answers through the web form. If the applicant has chosen the correct  responses, through the remotely accessed web form, their identity is  considered to be verified, and the validation and verification step is  complete. Figure 1 depicts the typical process that organizations use for  remote identity proofing (including the use of knowledge-based  verification).

The Role of CRAs in Knowledge-Based Verification

As previously mentioned, to perform knowledge-based verification for  remote identity-proofing, federal agencies and other organizations often  use services provided by CRAs. The CRAs assemble and evaluate  consumer credit and other information from a wide variety of sources.  Equifax, Experian, and TransUnion—the three nationwide CRAs—use the  personal information they obtain about individuals from organizations,  such as financial institutions, utilities, cell phone service providers, public  records, and government sources, to compile credit files containing  detailed records about individuals. They then use the information in these  files to offer a variety of services to federal agencies and other entities.  These services can include identity verification, as well as verification of  income and employment of a candidate for a job or an applicant for  benefits or services.

To support organizations that rely on knowledge-based verification, CRAs  generate multiple choice questions that organizations can use to test  applicants’ knowledge of information in their credit files. The organizations  using the CRA services do not generate the questions themselves,  because they do not have access to the credit history information  maintained by the CRAs. Rather, the CRAs’ remote identity proofing  systems transmit the questions and multiple choice answers to the  organization through an automated electronic connection with the  organization’s website. The organization’s website then displays the  questions and multiple choice answers to the applicant through the web  application that the applicant is using to apply for access to benefits or  services.

Typically, the questions generated by CRA identity proofing systems ask  about lenders, mortgage details, current and past home addresses, or  credit card accounts. Once the applicant has selected answers to the  questions and enters them in the online application, the organization’s  automated system electronically relays the applicant’s responses to the  CRA’s remote identity proofing system; this system then compares the  responses with information in the applicant’s credit file. If this comparison  determines that the applicant correctly responded to the questions, then  the applicant’s identity is considered to be verified. The CRA’s identity  proofing system electronically transmits the results of its comparison to  the organization’s website to allow the applicant, whose identity is now  considered verified, to proceed with applying for benefits or services.

OMB and NIST Provide Guidance to Agencies on Information Security Management

The Federal Information Security Modernization Act of 2014 (FISMA) is  intended to provide a comprehensive framework for ensuring the  effectiveness of security controls over information resources that support  federal operations and assets, as well as the effective oversight of  information security risks. FISMA assigns responsibility to the head of  each agency to provide information security protections commensurate  with the risk and magnitude of the harm resulting from unauthorized  access, use, disclosure, disruption, modification, or destruction of  information systems used or operated by an agency or on behalf of an  agency.

FISMA assigns responsibility to NIST for developing comprehensive  information security standards and guidelines for federal agencies. These  include standards for categorizing information and information systems  according to ranges of risk levels and guidelines for establishing minimum  security requirements for federal information systems.

To fulfill its FISMA responsibilities, NIST has issued technical guidance  on many different aspects of information security, including identity  proofing. NIST issued its first guidance related to identity proofing in  2011. In 2017, NIST released an updated version of its guidance, which  included guidance on identity proofing that outlines technical  requirements for resolving, validating, and verifying an identity based on  evidence obtained from a remote applicant. OMB requires agencies to  implement NIST’s technical guidance on information security subjects  within one year of issuance. In the case of NIST’s updated guidelines for  remote identity proofing, agencies would have needed to implement the  guidance by June 2018 to meet OMB’s time frames.

FISMA assigns responsibility to OMB for overseeing agencies’  information security policies and practices. OMB, in turn, has established  requirements for federal information security programs and has assigned  agency responsibilities to fulfill the requirements of statutes such as  FISMA. OMB policies and guidance require agencies to employ a risk- based approach and decision making to ensure that security and privacy  capabilities are sufficient to protect agency assets, operations, and  individuals.

OMB has not issued guidance to agencies specifically on identity  proofing. However, OMB developed a draft policy document in April 2018  that is intended to provide guidance to agencies on strengthening the  security of information and information systems to ensure safe and  secure access to federal benefits and services. While it has not yet  been issued, the draft policy indicates that OMB intends to provide policy- level guidance for agencies to identify, credential, monitor, and manage  user access to information and information systems and adopt sound  processes for authentication and access control.

Selected Agencies Use a Variety of Remote Identity Proofing Techniques, Including Knowledge- Based Verification

The six agencies that we reviewed rely on a variety of remote identity  proofing techniques, including knowledge-based verification, to ensure  that the individuals who enroll for federal benefits and services are who  they claim to be. These agencies typically use knowledge-based  verification services offered by CRAs, which generate questions for the  individuals applying for benefits or services and check the applicants’  answers to verify their identity. However, to the extent that they use  knowledge-based verification, these agencies face risks because an  attacker could obtain and use an individual’s personal information to  answer knowledge-based verification questions and successfully  impersonate that individual.

Knowledge-Based Verification Poses Risks, but Alternative Techniques Have Been Developed That Are More Secure

Although commonly used by federal agencies for remote identity proofing,  knowledge-based verification techniques pose security risks because an  attacker could obtain and use an individual’s personal information to  answer knowledge-based verification questions and successfully  impersonate that individual. As such, NIST’s 2017 guidance on remote  identity proofing effectively prohibits the use of knowledge-based  verification for sensitive applications. The guidance states that the ease  with which an attacker can discover the answers to many knowledge- based questions and the relatively small number of possible responses  cause the method to have an unacceptably high risk of being successfully  compromised by an attacker. In its guidance, NIST states that the  agency no longer recommends using knowledge-based verification  because it tends to be error-prone and can be frustrating for users, given  the limitations of human memory.

According to NIST officials, private-sector providers of remote identity  proofing solutions and officials at the agencies we reviewed, alternative  methods for verifying an individual’s identity are available that are not  knowledge-based and can provide stronger security assurance than  knowledge-based verification. Specific examples of such techniques  include:

Remote assessment of physical credentials. Recently developed  technology allows an agency to remotely examine a physical  credential, such as a driver’s license or a passport, to verify an  individual’s identity. For example, an agency may have the individual  use their mobile device, such as a cell phone, to capture and submit  an image of their driver’s license to an agency or commercial provider  of identity proofing services. The agency or commercial provider can  then compare the image to documentation on file to confirm the  authenticity of the credential. Technological advances in how images  are captured and processed by mobile devices, such as cell phones,  can provide improved assurance that the photos transmitted by these  devices are genuine and that the credentials are authentic.

Verification of mobile device possession. Many individuals use  their cell phones on a near-continuous basis and keep their phones  with them. These actions create a record of the owner’s connection  with these mobile devices that is difficult for an imposter to falsify.

Accordingly, an organization can query records maintained by cell  phone carriers to verify the identity of an individual who is in  possession of a specific mobile device and phone number. By doing  this, the organization can determine how long the individual has had  that particular device, compare unique identifiers, and determine if the  location matches the individual’s billing information. The organization  can be confident that the individual legitimately possesses the device  if the device has been in use for some time and its current location  corresponds to one where the device has been known to be used by  its owner. Since an individual’s location information is obtained  directly from the device and compared with cell phone carrier records,  data entry errors by the individual, such as mistyping a phone  number, are minimized and the risk of impersonation is reduced.

Verification through mobile device confirmation codes. An  additional method that organizations use to help verify an individual’s  identity is to verify that an individual possesses a telephone number  that they have supplied as part of the remote identity proofing  process. Organizations perform verification of an individual’s  possession of a phone number by sending a code to that phone  number through the short message service (SMS) or another protocol,  and ask the individual to enter the code into the online identity  proofing application. This process can provide additional assurance  about the individual’s identity because the verification code is  transmitted through a separate electronic channel (specifically, the  telephone system) from the online application where the remote  identity proofing process was initiated.

However, unlike the process for verifying the possession of a mobile  device, the use of these codes may not prevent an imposter from  using a stolen phone or stolen phone number. An imposter may be  able to successfully complete the identity verification process if the  applicant’s possession of the physical device has not been  independently verified. In its remote identity proofing guidance, NIST  requires federal agencies to use confirmation codes as a supplement  to other identity proofing measures.

Verification through postal mail confirmation codes. Another  method that organizations use to help verify an individual’s identity is  to send a confirmation code, such as a personal identification number  (PIN), through the mail system to the individual’s address of record.  The individual then enters the PIN in the organization’s online  application to confirm that they received the code in the mail. Like the  use of mobile device confirmation codes, the use of postal mail codes  can provide additional assurance about the individual’s identity  because the code is sent through a separate medium from the online  application where the remote identity proofing process was initiated.

Even with these alternatives to knowledge-based verification, however,  there are limitations to the security assurances that can be provided. One  way to overcome these security limitations is for a trained professional to  conduct identity proofing in person. This is generally considered to be a  strong approach because it allows for direct physical comparison of an  individual’s documentation, including photographic evidence, to the  individual attempting to enroll. Verification of the credentials being  submitted can be performed by checking electronic records in tandem  with physical inspection.

Figure 2 provides examples of alternative identity verification and  validation methods that federal agencies have reported using.

Each of the alternatives to knowledge-based verification has other  limitations, including implementation challenges. For example, in-person  identity proofing is expensive to implement because it requires  organizations to staff and maintain offices or other physical access points  in multiple locations, and it can be inconvenient for applicants because it  requires travel to one of these locations. Mobile device verification may  not always be viable because not all applicants possess a mobile device  that can be used to verify their identity. In addition, fraudsters can  manipulate or “spoof” phone numbers that redirect phone calls and SMS  confirmation codes to an attacker. Sending confirmation codes by postal  mail can result in a delay in an individual being able to gain access to the  services or benefits he or she is seeking.

Several of the Selected Agencies Have Taken Steps to Better Ensure the Effectiveness of Their Remote Identity Proofing Processes, but Only Two Have Eliminated the Use of Knowledge-Based Verification

As previously discussed, in 2017, NIST released an updated version of its  technical guidance on remote identity proofing. NIST’s 2017 guidance  effectively prohibits the use of knowledge-based verification for sensitive  applications because of the security risks associated with this technique.

For applications where identity verification is important, the guidance  prohibits agencies from providing access to online applications based  solely on correct responses to knowledge-based questions. Rather, the  guidance provides detailed specifications regarding the required features  of the identity evidence (such as driver’s licenses and birth certificates)  that an individual is to provide and how agencies are to verify that  evidence. Agencies are restricted to using knowledge-based verification  only for the very limited role of linking a single piece of identity evidence  to an individual and only for applications where the identity verification  process is not of critical importance. As a result, agencies are effectively  prohibited from using traditional knowledge-based questions—the type of  questions typically used in identity verification services provided by  CRAs—as part of their processes. Thus, in order for agencies to ensure  the effectiveness of their remote identity proofing processes, they are  required to find ways to eliminate the use of knowledge-based  verification.

Three of the six agencies we reviewed—GSA, IRS, and VA—have taken  steps to enhance the effectiveness of their remote identity proofing  processes. GSA and IRS recently eliminated knowledge-based  verification from their Login.gov and Get Transcript services, respectively.  VA has implemented alternative methods, but only as a supplement to the  continued use of knowledge-based verification.

Among the other three agencies, two of them–SSA and USPS–are  investigating alternative methods and have stated that they intend to  reduce or eliminate their use of knowledge-based verification sometime in  the future; however, these agencies do not yet have specific plans for  doing so. One other agency, CMS, has no plans to reduce or eliminate  knowledge-based verification for remote identity proofing.

General Services Administration Eliminated Knowledge-Based Verification from its Login.gov Service and Is Implementing Additional Verification Techniques

GSA has implemented alternative methods to knowledge-based  verification for Login.gov. While GSA used knowledge-based verification  on its Login.gov service in the past, the agency has recently implemented  alternative verification techniques that do not rely on knowledge-based  verification.

Specifically, GSA conducts independent verification of an applicant’s  possession of a mobile device, an alternative technique we previously  discussed. GSA contracts with a third-party vendor to compare status  information about the phone number provided by an individual with  telephone company records to confirm the individual’s identity. Further,  GSA officials responsible for Login.gov stated that they plan to include  additional alternative verification methods to Login.gov in the near future.  Specifically, by the end of May 2019, the agency plans to implement  software capable of analyzing and validating photos of documentation,  such as driver’s licenses, provided by applicants to further enhance the  verification of their identities. In 2018, the agency tested this technology  through a pilot program.

GSA officials responsible for Login.gov stated that they are pursuing  several other initiatives to further enhance the verification techniques they  use for Login.gov. For example, they are researching new software  methods for confirming the authenticity of face images and other  biometric information that could be transmitted by applicants to confirm  their identity. According to the officials, additional work is needed to  ensure that a fraudulent image, such as a photo of a mask, is not being  provided in lieu of a live image—a threat known as a “presentation  attack.”

The GSA officials also said they would like to work with other federal  agencies to leverage data that have already been verified, such as  USPS-validated mailing addresses, passport and visa information  maintained by the Department of State, and IRS tax data. However, the  officials cited legal and regulatory restrictions to sharing agency data as a  challenge to being able to make use of resources such as these.

GSA’s recent elimination of knowledge-based verification from its  Login.gov identity proofing process is consistent with NIST’s 2017  guidance on remote identity proofing and reduces the risk of fraud  associated with using Login.gov. The additional enhancements and  coordination that the agency is working on, if successful, will likely further  improve the effectiveness of its remote identity proofing processes.

Internal Revenue Service Eliminated Knowledge- Based Verification and Is Examining Additional Verification Techniques

IRS has implemented alternative methods to knowledge-based  verification for Get Transcript. While IRS used knowledge-based  verification on its Get Transcript service in the past, the agency has  recently implemented alternative verification techniques that do not rely  on knowledge-based verification.

Specifically, IRS conducts independent verification of an applicant’s  possession of a mobile device and uses mobile device confirmation  codes, alternative techniques we previously discussed. IRS contracts with  a CRA to compare status information about the phone number provided  by an individual with telephone company records to confirm the  individual’s identity. Further, IRS officials responsible for Get Transcript’s  identity proofing and authentication services stated that they plan to  continue to add alternative verification methods to Get Transcript in the  future. They stated that, in June 2017, in response to the release of  NIST’s updated digital identity proofing requirements, the agency started  a task force to examine the updated requirements and make  recommendations on possible changes to IRS’s processes to meet the  updated guidance. According to the officials, the task force developed a  digital identity risk assessment process that the agency started using to  assess external facing online transactions in October 2018.

IRS’s recent elimination of knowledge-based verification from its Get  Transcript identity proofing process and the additional enhancements that  the agency is working on, if successful, will likely further improve the  effectiveness of its remote identity proofing processes.

Department of Veterans Affairs Has Implemented Some Alternative Methods, but Has No Plans to Reduce or Eliminate its Remaining Use of Knowledge-Based Verification

VA has taken steps to better ensure the effectiveness of its remote  identity proofing processes, but it continues to rely on knowledge-based  verification for certain categories of individuals. As previously mentioned,  VA relies on two different providers, a commercial identity verification  service (called ID.me) and DOD’s DS Logon, to conduct identity proofing  for its benefits systems. These providers use a mix of knowledge-based  verification and alternative techniques. DOD’s DS Logon verifies  applicants using knowledge-based verification, while the commercial  provider uses both knowledge-based verification processes as well as  stronger alternative techniques. For example, the commercial provider  uses cellular phone data to verify an applicant’s identity based on the  device subscriber’s relationship to a claimed identity and the subscriber’s  tenure with the carrier.

VA’s commercial provider can also remotely authenticate identity  documents. In this regard, applicants can scan the front and back of  driver’s licenses, state identification, and passports, and upload the  images to the commercial provider, which then analyzes the images to  ensure that the documents meet standards and contain valid information.  Further, the provider verifies applicants by having them take photos of  themselves and then using facial recognition technology to match the  applicants’ images with their identity documents.

VA officials in the agency’s information technology and benefits program  offices believe that the alternative forms of identity proofing used by its  commercial provider as a supplement to knowledge-based verification  provide an acceptable level of assurance. Nevertheless, the officials  acknowledged that it is important to eventually eliminate knowledge- based verification from the agency’s identity-proofing processes.

However, the agency does not have specific plans with time frames and  milestones to eliminate the use of knowledge-based verification. VA  officials stated that it has not yet established plans for doing so because  of its reliance on DOD’s DS Logon service, which still uses knowledge- based verification. Until it develops a specific plan with time frames and  milestones to eliminate its reliance on knowledge-based verification, VA  and the individuals it serves will continue to face a degree of identity fraud  risk that could be reduced.

Social Security Administration Intends to Eliminate Knowledge- Based Verification, but Does Not Yet Have Specific Plans for Doing So

SSA continues to rely on knowledge-based verification for its My Social  Security service, but SSA officials stated that the agency intends to  eliminate knowledge-based verification in the future. According to the  SSA Chief Information Security Officer, in fiscal year 2019, the agency  intends to pilot alternative verification methods, such as using the  commercial ID.me service. In addition, the official said SSA plans to  research other alternatives that could be used to replace knowledge- based verification, including modernizing its legacy systems so that they  can use Login.gov or another shared identity management platform. The  agency has set a goal of eliminating the use of knowledge-based  verification in fiscal year 2020.

As an interim measure to reduce the risks associated with knowledge- based verification, SSA officials stated that they limit the period of time  and the number of attempts that an individual has to answer the  knowledge-based verification questions. These limitations are designed to  prevent a potential fraudster from researching the answers to the  questions. In addition, SSA also sends a confirmation code via email or  SMS, which individuals must enter online before being given access to  their account.

SSA does not yet have specific plans and milestones to achieve its goal  of implementing enhanced remote identity proofing processes by fiscal  year 2020. SSA officials stated that they cannot develop specific plans  until they are able to identify an alternative method or methods that can  be used successfully by all members of the public with which the agency  interacts. Until SSA develops specific solutions for eliminating knowledge- based verification, the agency and the individuals that rely on its services  will remain at an increased risk of identity fraud.

United States Postal Service Intends to Eliminate Its Use of Knowledge-Based Verification, but Does Not Yet Have Complete Plans and Time frames for Doing So

USPS has not yet fully implemented alternative methods to better ensure  the effectiveness of its remote identity proofing processes. According to  officials responsible for the agency’s identity proofing program, USPS  mitigates the risk of using knowledge-based verification by sending a  written confirmation to the physical address associated with each identity- proofing transaction and provides instructions for what to do if the  transaction is unauthorized or fraudulent.

In addition to this mitigation measure, the officials reported that they  regularly evaluate new capabilities to further increase confidence in their  identity-proofing processes and are planning several additional measures  to supplement the use of knowledge-based verification. Specifically, in  September 2018, USPS began allowing customers to request a  confirmation code via the mail to allow them to enroll in Informed Delivery.  In addition, the agency is planning on implementing verification of mobile  device possession and SMS enrollment code verification in 2019 and  other techniques at a subsequent time. According to USPS officials, these  alternative techniques are expected to reduce the agency’s use of  knowledge-based verification. The officials said that USPS has not  completely eliminated the use of knowledge-based verification because  available alternatives to the agency’s current processes do not  satisfactorily address critical factors that they consider when deciding  whether to implement alternative processes. These factors include cost,  projected ability to reduce fraud and protect consumers, projected extent  of the population that could be covered, and the burden on customers to  complete the process.

The officials stated that the agency intends to implement alternative  methods in the future for its Informed Delivery service but does not yet  have specific plans with time frames and milestones. The officials noted  that part of the reason for the slow implementation of alternative methods  is that NIST technical guidance does not provide direction on how  alternative methods are to be implemented and that additional guidance  from NIST would be helpful to the agency for developing and  implementing a plan to eliminate knowledge-based verification for the  Informed Delivery service.

While the supplemental processes implemented by USPS to date may  help to reduce the risks associated with using knowledge-based  verification, they do not eliminate such risks. Until it completes a plan with  time frames and milestones to eliminate its reliance on knowledge-based  verification for Informed Delivery, USPS and its customers will remain at  increased risk of identity fraud.

Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services Has No Plans to Reduce or Eliminate its Use of Knowledge-Based Verification

CMS has not implemented alternative methods to better ensure the  effectiveness of the remote identity proofing processes used for its  Healthcare.gov service. CMS officials in the Office of Information  Technology and the Office of Consumer Information and Insurance  Oversight stated that the agency uses a two-step email verification  process to reduce the risks associated with knowledge-based verification.  Specifically, individuals applying for an account on Healthcare.gov  provide basic information (e.g., name, email address, password) and then  are asked to acknowledge an email confirmation they receive from CMS.  The email confirmation is intended to prove that the individual applying for  a Healthcare.gov account is in possession of the email address that same  individual provided to CMS.

However, this process confirms only the email address that was used to  create the account; it does not confirm the identity of the individual who is  applying for the account. CMS stated that it uses this process because  other mitigating measures are not cost effective. However, NIST’s  guidance does not permit agencies to use knowledge-based verification  on the basis of cost effectiveness. Further, the agency does not have  specific plans with time frames or milestones to eliminate its use of  knowledge-based verification for Healthcare.gov.

CMS officials acknowledge that they do not have a plan to reduce or  eliminate the use of knowledge-based verification because they have not  yet identified any effective alternatives to knowledge-based verification for  Healthcare.gov. According to these officials, based on a user study they  conducted, individuals who use the agency’s services prefer knowledge- based verification over any available alternatives. In addition, the officials  stated that certain alternatives, such as mobile device verification, may  not always be suitable for the population they serve. As one example, not  all applicants have a mobile device that could be used to remotely verify  the individual’s identity. The CMS officials noted that NIST technical  guidance does not provide direction on how alternative methods are to be  implemented, given that they may not always be suitable for the  population served by Healthcare.gov. However, until CMS takes steps to  develop a plan with time frames and milestones to eliminate the use of  knowledge-based verification, CMS and Healthcare.gov applicants will  remain at an increased risk of identity fraud.

NIST and OMB Have Not Provided Sufficient Guidance to Ensure Agencies Move to More Secure Forms of Remote Identity Proofing

While NIST has issued guidance to agencies related to identity proofing  and OMB is drafting identity management guidance, these efforts are not  sufficient to ensure that agencies adopt secure methods for remote  identity proofing. As previously discussed, NIST’s guidance effectively  prohibits the use of knowledge-based verification during the validation  and verification phases of the remote identity proofing process, but does  not provide direction to agencies on how to successfully implement  alternative methods for remote identity proofing for large and diverse  segments of the population. Further, OMB has not issued guidance  requiring agencies to report on their implementation of remote identity  proofing processes, which is essential for monitoring agencies’ progress.

NIST Guidance Does Not Provide Sufficient Direction to Agencies on How to Implement Alternative Methods for Remote Identity Proofing

Best practices in IT management state that organizations should provide  clear direction in order to achieve objectives. Specifically, the Control  Objectives for Information and Related Technologies (COBIT), a  framework of best practices for IT governance, states that organizations  should provide clear direction for IT projects, including relevant and  usable guidance, and ensure that those implementing the technology  have a clear understanding of what needs to be delivered and how.

However, NIST has not issued any supplemental implementation  guidance to its 2017 technical guidance to ensure that agencies have a  clear understanding of what needs to be done to implement alternative  methods of remote identity proofing, as called for in the technical  guidance. For example, NIST’s technical guidance provides abstract  descriptions of identity evidence that individuals must provide, such as a  credential containing a photograph or other biometric identifier as well as  anti-counterfeiting security features. The guidance states that such  credentials can be provided in person or remotely but does not detail the  processes needed for providing credentials remotely.

For example, the guidance does not discuss the advantages and  limitations of currently available technologies that agencies could  successfully use to remotely verify credentials provided by individuals or  to make recommendations to agencies on which technologies should be  adopted. As previously discussed, several potential limitations could  make choosing an alternative method difficult. Technologies such as  secure, remote verification of a physical credential may not be  commercially available. Also, some alternative technologies require that  individuals use cell phones and maintain a verifiable record of having  them in their possession. The NIST guidance does not discuss how  agencies should accommodate segments of the public who do not  possess advanced technological devices, such as cell phones, that may  be needed for successful remote verification. Because the guidance does  not include specific advice or direction on implementing alternative  technologies, agencies may be unable to determine what alternative  methods are viable for the populations they serve.

As previously discussed, several of the agencies we reviewed send  confirmation codes to applicants via cell phone, email, or postal mail, as  ways that they believe compensate for risks associated with using  knowledge-based verification. However, NIST officials do not consider  such methods for remote verification to be effective in compensating for  the risks associated with knowledge-based verification. Instead, the NIST  technical guidance requires agencies to send confirmation codes by mail  when they use any remote identity proofing method, including more  advanced, alternative verification methods, such as verification of mobile  device possession.

Officials from CMS, SSA, and USPS stated that they have not eliminated  their use of knowledge-based verification in part because the existing  NIST technical guidance does not provide direction on how alternative  methods are to be implemented, given the various limitations of those  alternative methods that agencies have identified. The officials stated that  federal agencies could benefit from additional guidance on implementing  the alternative verification techniques called for in the NIST technical  guidance.

In response to these agencies’ comments about being unable to fully  implement the remote identity proofing guidance, NIST officials stated  that agencies were expected to use their own judgment to determine how  to meet the remote identity proofing requirements. The officials added  that it was NIST’s position that the updated guidance was comprehensive  enough for agencies to follow. Thus, at the time of our review, NIST did  not have plans to assist agencies by issuing implementation guidance to  supplement its existing technical guidance. NIST officials stated that they  are available to provide assistance on an individual basis to agencies that  seek their advice.

Without additional guidance from NIST on how agencies are to implement  the alternative identity proofing methods specified in an agency’s existing  technical guidance, agencies may not be using the most effective and  secure identity-proofing methods, thus exposing their systems to risk of  fraud.

OMB Guidance Does Not Include Reporting Requirements to Facilitate Monitoring of Agencies’ Implementation of Secure Remote Identity Proofing

FISMA requires the Director of OMB to oversee agency information  security policies and practices. However, OMB has not provided agencies  with guidance establishing reporting requirements for OMB to use in  monitoring agencies’ progress in implementing secure remote identity  proofing processes. For example, OMB has not proposed including  reporting requirements for remote identity proofing in its draft policy on  identity, credential, and access management, nor has it included reporting  requirements in its FISMA reporting guidance to agencies for fiscal year  2019.

According to OMB staff, OMB plans to issue guidance to agencies on the  implementation of identity, credential, and access management. OMB  issued a draft of this guidance for public comment in April 2018.  However, the draft guidance does not include a requirement for agencies  to report on progress in implementing secure remote identity proofing  processes.

Because it does not require agency reporting on progress in  implementing secure remote identity proofing processes, OMB does not  have visibility into the extent that agencies rely on insecure methods,  particularly knowledge-based verification. Without establishing effective  oversight measures, OMB cannot adequately monitor agency progress in  implementing the secure identity proofing methods called for in NIST’s  2017 technical guidance. As a result, agencies may be at risk of  implementing weak methods of remote identity-proofing for individuals  who seek access to services and benefits from the federal government,  which may put both the federal government and individuals at risk for  fraud.

The six agencies that we reviewed rely on a variety of remote identity  proofing techniques to help ensure that the individuals who enroll for  federal benefits and services are who they claim to be. Several of the  selected agencies use knowledge-based verification processes that rely  on CRAs to pose questions to individuals and check their answers as a  way of verifying their identities before granting them enrollment in a  federal benefit or service. However, given recent breaches of sensitive  personal information, these agencies face risks because fraudsters may  be able to obtain and use an individual’s personal information to answer  knowledge-based verification questions and successfully impersonate  that individual to fraudulently obtain federal benefits and services.

Two agencies we reviewed, GSA and IRS, recently implemented remote  identity proofing processes for Login.gov and Get Transcript that allow  individuals to enroll online without relying on knowledge-based  verification. However, four agencies (CMS, SSA, USPS, and VA) were  still using knowledge-based verification to conduct remote identity  proofing. Moreover, none of the four agencies have developed specific  plans to eliminate knowledge-based methods from their processes.  Without such plans, these federal agencies and the individuals that rely  on such processes will remain at risk for identity fraud.

NIST has issued technical guidance regarding remote identity proofing,  but it may not be sufficient to help ensure that federal agencies adopt  more secure methods. NIST’s guidance does not provide direction on  how agencies can adopt more secure alternatives to knowledge-based  verification while also addressing issues of technical feasibility and  usability for all members of the public. In addition, OMB has not issued  guidance setting agency reporting requirements that OMB could use to  track implementation of more secure processes across the federal  government. Without additional guidance, federal agencies are likely to  continue to rely on risky knowledge-based verification that could be used  to fraudulently gain access to federal benefit programs and services.

We are making a total of 6 recommendations to CMS, NIST, OMB, SSA,  USPS, and VA. Specifically:  The Administrator of the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services  should develop a plan with time frames and milestones to discontinue  knowledge-based verification, such as by using Login.gov or other  alternative verification techniques. (Recommendation 1)

The Director of the National Institute of Standards and Technology should  supplement the agency’s 2017 technical guidance with additional  guidance to assist federal agencies in determining and implementing  alternatives to knowledge-based verification that are most suitable for  their applications. (Recommendation 2)

The Director of the Office of Management and Budget should issue  guidance requiring federal agencies to report on their progress in  adopting secure identity proofing processes. (Recommendation 3)

The Commissioner of Social Security should develop a plan with specific  milestones to discontinue knowledge-based verification, such as by using  Login.gov or other alternative verification techniques. (Recommendation  4)

The Postmaster General of the United States should complete a plan with  time frames and milestones to discontinue knowledge-based verification,  such as by using Login.gov or other alternative verification techniques.  (Recommendation 5)

The Secretary of the Department of Veterans Affairs should develop a  plan with time frames and milestones to discontinue knowledge-based  verification, such as by using Login.gov or other alternative verification  techniques. (Recommendation 6)

We requested comments on a draft of this report from the eight agencies  included in our review. In response, we received written comments from  six agencies—Commerce (on behalf of NIST), HHS (on behalf of CMS),  IRS, SSA, USPS, and VA. Their comments are reprinted in appendices II  through VII, respectively.

Of the six agencies to which we made recommendations, four of them  (Commerce, SSA, USPS, and VA) agreed with our recommendations,  and one agency (HHS) did not concur with our recommendation. One  agency (OMB) did not state whether it agreed or disagreed with our  recommendation. In addition, multiple agencies (GSA, IRS, OMB, USPS,  and VA) provided technical comments on the draft report, which we have  incorporated, as appropriate.

The following four agencies agreed with the recommendations that we  directed to them:

Commerce agreed with our recommendation. The department stated  that it will develop additional guidance to assist federal agencies with  alternatives to knowledge-based verification and expects to do so  within one year from issuance of this report. Comments from  Commerce are reprinted in appendix II.

SSA agreed with our recommendation. The agency stated that it will  continue to seek improvements in its existing remote identity proofing  process. SSA also stated that, in addition to a roadmap it developed  in fiscal year 2019 to update its knowledge-based verification process  to a more secure multi-factor authentication technology, it will take  steps to ensure compliance with NIST standards for remote identity  proofing. SSA’s comments are reprinted in appendix V.

USPS agreed with our recommendation. The agency stated that it will  be developing a roadmap to implement additional identity-proofing  tools and techniques through 2020. Comments from USPS are  reprinted in appendix VI.

VA agreed with our recommendation. The department stated that it  will develop a specific plan with time frames and milestones to  eliminate knowledge-based verification from the aspects of the remote  identity proofing process that it controls.

Further, in its response, VA requested that GAO direct a  recommendation to the Department of Defense (DOD) to discontinue  DS Logon and consider using Login.gov instead. However, we are not  issuing any recommendations to DOD because our scope of work did  not include auditing DOD’s remote identity proofing processes.  Nevertheless, we have adjusted our recommendations to CMS, SSA,  USPS, and VA to clarify that Login.gov is one option for identity  proofing that they should consider when developing their plans to  discontinue the use of knowledge-based verification. VA’s comments  are reprinted in appendix VII.

One agency did not concur with our recommendation. Specifically, HHS  raised several issues related to our findings. The agency stated that it  uses a risk-based approach to designing systems controls and that a  unilateral prohibition on the use of knowledge-based verification without  alternatives is not a feasible solution. We agree with this comment and  strongly support a risk-based approach to designing security controls, as  required by FISMA. However, we believe that alternatives to knowledge- based verification exist that should be assessed and incorporated as  appropriate. Similarly, HHS noted that for other applications across the  department, it has considered factors such as consumer user experience,  cost, and operational feasibility in addition to NIST guidelines. We agree  that many factors need to be considered in assessing what method or  methods of identity proofing are most appropriate for any given  application but believe it is important for agencies to develop plans for  addressing those factors that also eliminate the use of risky techniques,  such as knowledge-based verification, that could have a negative impact  on consumers and agencies.

In response to our specific recommendation to CMS, HHS stated that it  does not believe that suitable alternative methods exist that would work  for CMS’ population of users, such as those in the rural community, due  to distance or individuals without cell phones. However, we continue to  believe that CMS should develop a plan to discontinue the use of  knowledge-based verification. We recognize that there are members of  the population that may not be reached with certain identity proofing  techniques; however, a variety of alternative methods to knowledge- based verification are available that CMS can consider to address the  population it serves. Comments from HHS are reprinted in appendix III.

In addition, OMB did not state whether it agreed or disagreed with our  recommendation. Further, in an email response, OMB staff from the office  of the Federal Chief Information Officer provided a technical comment,  which we incorporated. However, OMB did not otherwise comment on the  report findings or our recommendation made to the agency.

The IRS also provided written comments on the draft report. In its  comments, the agency described the status of its efforts to strengthen  identity verification processes, including the fact that it has eliminated the  use of knowledge-based verification. Comments from IRS are reprinted in  appendix IV. Finally, GSA provided only technical comments on the draft  report, as previously mentioned.

As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents of  this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days from the  report date. At that time, we will send copies to the appropriate  congressional committees, to the Administrators of the Centers for  Medicare and Medicaid Services and General Services Administration;  the Commissioners of Internal Revenue and Social Security; Director of  the Office of Management and Budget; the Postmaster General of the  United States; and the Secretaries of the Departments of Commerce and  Veterans Affairs. In addition, the report is available at no charge on the  GAO website at http://www.gao.gov.

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact  Nick Marinos at (202) 512-9342 or marinosn@gao.gov, or Michael  Clements at (202) 512-8678 or clementsm@gao.gov. Contact points for  our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found  on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to  this report are listed in appendix VIII.

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

Our objectives were to (1) describe selected federal agency practices for  remote identity proofing of individuals seeking access to major web-based  applications using services provided by consumer reporting agencies and  the risks associated with those practices, (2) assess selected federal  agencies’ actions to ensure the effectiveness of agencies’ remote identity  proofing processes, and (3) assess the sufficiency of federal identity  proofing guidance developed by OMB and NIST in assuring the security  of federal systems.

To address the first objective, we made an initial, non-probability selection  of federal agencies that (1) maintained major public-facing web  applications to provide access to federal benefits or services and (2)  relied on identity proofing solutions provided by the three nationwide  consumer reporting agencies (CRAs)—Equifax, Experian, and  TransUnion—to verify the identities of individuals applying for such  benefits or services. We considered a “major” application to be one that  could involve interaction with millions of individuals across the entire  country. To select six agencies from this group, we reviewed prior GAO  reports to identify potential agencies for review. We then interviewed  officials at these agencies and at CRAs to confirm that these agencies  use CRAs as part of their identity proofing processes and to obtain  information about additional federal agencies that also employ CRAs for  identity proofing for major applications. We included GSA in these  interviews because its mission is to support federal agencies and it was  likely to be aware of additional federal agencies that fit our criteria. From  the information we gained from our interviews and research, we selected  these six agencies: the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services  (CMS), General Services Administration (GSA), Internal Revenue Service  (IRS), Social Security Administration (SSA), United States Postal Service  (USPS), and the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA).

At each of these agencies, we reviewed documentation that described the  current remote identity proofing processes the agencies are using for their  major public-facing web applications. In addition, we interviewed agency  officials responsible for identity proofing to obtain details of the techniques  used to verify remote users of these applications. To the extent that these  entities used CRAs to conduct knowledge-based verification as part of  their remote identity-proofing processes, we discussed the risks  associated with using knowledge-based methods as well as the potential  advantages and limitations of using alternative methods that are not  knowledge-based. We also obtained information from officials at NIST  about the risks of knowledge-based methods and the availability of  alternative methods.

To address the second objective, we assessed remote identity proofing  processes used by the selected agencies to determine the extent that  they rely on knowledge-based verification to enroll online applicants for  federal benefits and services. We also identified alternative methods used  by these agencies, either in place of or in addition to knowledge-based  verification, and assessed the extent to which agencies had implemented  these methods to mitigate the risk of using knowledge-based methods.  We compared the remote identity proofing processes at these agencies  with the requirements as specified in NIST Special Publication 800-63,  Digital Identity Guidelines, to determine whether the processes met the  requirements of the NIST guidance. We also interviewed officials  responsible for these identity proofing programs to obtain information  about agencies’ plans, if any, to eliminate the use of knowledge-based  verification from their remote identity proofing processes in the future and  obtained relevant documentation of such plans.

To address the third objective, we reviewed NIST Special Publication  800-63, Digital Identity Guidelines, to identify federal requirements for  remote identity proofing. We compared the guidance to the Control  Objectives for Information and Related Technologies (COBIT), a  framework of best practices for IT governance, to determine whether the  NIST guidance contained clear direction, including relevant and usable  guidance, to ensure that those implementing the technology have a clear  understanding of what needs to be delivered and how. To assess the  sufficiency of this guidance, we consulted with subject matter experts at  NIST, ID.me, a private-sector provider of remote verification technologies,  and relevant officials at the selected federal entities. Based on information  we had obtained about available alternative methods, we determined the  extent to which gaps existed in the NIST guidance with regard to  implementation of alternative technologies. We also obtained the views of  federal agency officials on the extent to which NIST guidance provided  sufficient direction to assist them in implementing appropriate remote  identity proofing methods.

Further, we reviewed OMB’s draft Identity, Credential, and Access  Management policy and compared it to the requirements in FISMA and  identified shortfalls. We also interviewed OMB staff to discuss the  sufficiency of the office’s current guidance and to determine whether the  office planned to issue additional guidance establishing reporting  requirements for federal entities or conduct other forms of oversight of  federal entities’ implementation of the NIST identity proofing guidance.

We conducted this performance audit from November 2017 to May 2019  in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.

Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Commerce

Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Health and Human Services

Appendix IV: Comments from the Internal Revenue Service

Appendix V: Comments from the Social Security Administration

Appendix VI: Comments from the United States Postal Service

Appendix VII: Comments from the Department of Veterans Affairs

Appendix VIII: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments

In addition to the individuals named above, John de Ferrari and John  Forrester (assistant directors); Tina Torabi (analyst-in-charge); Bethany  Benitez, Christina Bixby, Chris Businsky, Kavita Daitnarayan, Nancy  Glover, Andrea Harvey, Thomas Johnson, David Plocher, Rachel Siegel,  and Winnie Tsen made key contributions to this report.

The federal government relies on commercial credit agencies to help verify the identities of people who apply for benefits online—such as asking personal questions from credit files. However, the 2017 Equifax data breach has raised questions about this practice.

There are alternative methods to verify identity, such as comparing a photo of an ID card captured on a cell phone to documentation on file, but federal agencies have had issues with implementing them. For instance, not all applicants have cell phones.

We recommended that the National Institute of Standards and Technology provide guidance on implementing these alternative methods.