Defense Management: More Progress Needed for DOD to Meet Outstanding Statutory Requirements to Improve Collaboration

DOD has had longstanding organizational and management challenges that hinder collaboration. Section 911 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2017 directed the Secretary of Defense to, among other things, issue an organizational strategy that identifies critical objectives that span multiple functional boundaries, establish cross-functional teams to support this strategy, and provide related guidance and training.

The NDAA for Fiscal Year 2017 also included a provision for GAO periodically to assess DOD's actions in response to section 911. GAO has issued a series of reports since June 2017 and made a number of recommendations to DOD. This report assesses the extent to which DOD has made progress in (1) implementing the requirements of section 911 and (2) establishing cross-functional teams.

GAO reviewed documentation, interviewed cross-functional team members and other DOD officials, and compared DOD's actions to section 911 requirements and leading practices for cross-functional teams.

Since GAO's August 2019 report, the Department of Defense (DOD) has taken actions to complete three additional statutory requirements of section 911 of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2017, but has not completed three remaining requirements. These requirements are intended to support cross-functional teams and to promote department-wide collaboration (see table). Cross-functional teams rely on individuals with different types of expertise to work toward a common, well-defined goal, and are thought to deliver better and faster solutions to complex and fast-moving problems.

DOD's approved organizational strategy addresses key requirements of section 911, including identifying critical objectives that would benefit from the use of cross-functional teams and providing for the appropriate use of these teams. However, the strategy did not include practical, specific implementation steps to guide DOD's efforts to advance a collaborative culture, which had been included in earlier draft versions of the strategy. These steps had aligned with GAO's leading practices for mergers and organizational transformations. Specific implementation steps like those included in earlier drafts of the organizational strategy offered DOD a clear path forward for pursuing the goals of section 911 and for promoting a collaborative culture. Absent identifying and documenting specific implementation steps, it is less clear how DOD intends to implement the organizational strategy and assess progress toward its goals.

DOD's existing cross-functional team charged with improving electromagnetic spectrum operations and defending its communication systems from attacks is continuing its work by issuing a statutorily mandated report, among other efforts, but DOD has not clarified responsibility for funding the team. GAO will continue to monitor DOD's progress toward providing such support to the team as GAO recommended in August 2019. In addition, DOD has designated the Close Combat Lethality Task Force and the Protecting Critical Technology Task Force as new cross-functional teams, although they meet only some of the section 911 requirements. DOD officials said they will ensure that the newly designated teams meet these requirements, including providing required training.

In this report, GAO recommends that DOD identify and document specific implementation steps to advance a collaborative culture, consistent with GAO's leading practices. GAO also reiterates the importance of addressing its prior recommendations. DOD concurred with GAO's recommendation.

Three years ago, in the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for  Fiscal Year 2017, Congress required the Department of Defense (DOD)  to take specific actions to address longstanding organizational and  management challenges that were hindering department-wide  collaboration and integration. While DOD had improved coordination  across the combatant commands and Joint Chiefs of Staff, Congress was  concerned that the department was continuing to face organizational and  management challenges among the military departments and within the  Office of the Secretary of Defense. In particular, DOD’s military  departments and functional organizations were not always working well  together to accomplish departmental objectives.

Section 911 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2017 directed the Secretary of  Defense to, among other things:  formulate and issue an organizational strategy for DOD that identifies  the critical objectives and other organizational outputs that span  multiple functional boundaries and would benefit from the use of  cross-functional teams to ensure collaboration and integration across  the department; establish cross-functional teams that, among other things, address the  critical objectives and outputs outlined in the department’s  organizational strategy;  issue guidance on cross-functional teams and provide training to  members of those established teams and their supervisors on  elements of successful cross-functional teams; and provide training on leadership, modern organizational practice,  collaboration, and the operation of cross-functional teams to  individuals who have been appointed by the President and confirmed  by the Senate to a position within the Office of the Secretary of  Defense, or request waivers from this requirement.

The John S. McCain NDAA for Fiscal Year 2019 subsequently introduced  new requirements on DOD’s implementation of section 911. Among other  things, sections 918 and 1053(c) of the act required the Secretary of  Defense to establish a cross-functional team pursuant to section 911 of  the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2017 on electronic warfare to identify gaps in  electronic warfare and joint electromagnetic spectrum operations,  capabilities, and capacities within the department across personnel,  procedural, and equipment areas.

Cross-functional teams rely on individuals with different types of expertise  to work toward a common, well-defined goal, and are thought to deliver  better and faster solutions to complex and fast-moving problems. As of  our August 2019 report, DOD had established two cross-functional teams  under section 911: the Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations (EMSO)  cross-functional team, which was formed in February 2019, and one that  has since been disestablished. The disestablished team had been responsible for managing the transfer of background investigations for  certain DOD personnel from the Office of Personnel Management to  DOD. Because those responsibilities were transferred to a newly created  Personnel Vetting Transformation Office within DOD, department officials  made the decision to disestablish the team. The team was disestablished  as of January 2019. As discussed later in this report, DOD has since  identified two additional cross-functional teams related to close-combat  lethality and protecting critical technology.

Section 911 included a provision for us—every 6 months after the date of  enactment on December 23, 2016, through December 31, 2019—to  submit to the defense committees a report setting forth a comprehensive  assessment of the actions that DOD has taken pursuant to section 911  during each 6-month period and cumulatively since the enactment of the  NDAA for Fiscal Year 2017. Since June 2017, we have issued five reports  and made 11 recommendations to DOD.

In our most recent report, issued in August 2019, we reported that DOD  was up to 21 months late in fully addressing several requirements of  section 911, largely because the Chief Management Officer (CMO) had  not approved the documents drafted to meet the requirements or  coordinated department-wide review of the documents and provided them  for Secretary of Defense issuance. We also reported that DOD had  established its cross-functional team on EMSO, but that funding for the  team was delayed in part because of disagreements over responsibility  for funding the team. We recommended, and DOD concurred, that the  Secretary of Defense ensure that the CMO meets specific internal  deadlines for review and approval of outstanding requirements of section  911, and that DOD clarify roles and responsibilities for providing funding  for the EMSO cross-functional team. See table 1 below for an overview of  DOD actions and GAO reports in response to section 911. Additionally,  see appendix I for more information on the status of DOD’s  implementation of the recommendations made in these reports.

In this sixth and final report required by section 911, we assess the extent  to which DOD has made progress in implementing (1) the requirements of  section 911 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2017 related to DOD’s  organizational strategy and associated guidance and training, and (2)  cross-functional teams under section 911.

To address our first objective, we reviewed documentation and  interviewed Office of the CMO (OCMO) officials on DOD’s efforts to  finalize its draft organizational strategy; DOD’s guidance on cross- functional teams; and its training for cross-functional team members, their  supervisors, and presidential appointees. We interviewed OCMO officials  regarding DOD’s report on the successes and failures of cross-functional  teams. We compared DOD’s efforts to the requirements in section 911 of  the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2017.

To address our second objective, we reviewed documentation and  interviewed OCMO and other officials involved in the establishment of  cross-functional teams to discuss their efforts to implement these teams.  We also interviewed and surveyed the members of the EMSO cross- functional team about their experiences on the team. While designing the  survey, we pretested the instrument with two members of the EMSO team  and took their feedback into account when finalizing the survey  instrument. Twelve of the 13 members of the EMSO team responded to  our survey. We evaluated the information collected against the  requirements for cross-functional teams in section 911 of the NDAA for  Fiscal Year 2017, as well as leading practices from our prior work on  implementing effective cross-functional teams.

We conducted this performance audit from August 2019 to January 2020  in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.

DOD Finalized Its Organizational Strategy and Guidance on Cross- Functional Teams but Removed Specific Implementation Steps from the Strategy and Has Not Implemented Remaining Section 911 Requirements

DOD has completed three additional statutory requirements of section  911 since our August 2019 report, but has not completed three remaining  requirements, as shown in table 2. We previously reported that DOD had  completed four of the statutory requirements, specifically awarding a  contract for a study to determine how to best implement cross-functional  teams, providing the results of the study to Congress, establishing any  cross-functional teams to address critical department objectives and  outputs, and reporting to Congress on the establishment of the cross- functional teams. Thus, in total, DOD has completed seven of the 10  statutory requirements. For more detail on all 10 statutory requirements,  see appendix II.

DOD Finalized Its Organizational Strategy but the Strategy Lacks Specific Implementation Steps

On October 29, 2019, the Secretary of Defense approved DOD’s  organizational strategy. In preparing the strategy for review and  approval, OCMO obtained input on the draft organizational strategy from  other DOD and OSD components, consistent with a recommendation  from our February 2018 report that OCMO obtain stakeholder input on the  development of the organizational strategy. We found that the strategy  addresses key requirements of section 911, including identifying critical  objectives that would benefit from the use of cross-functional teams and  providing for the appropriate use of these teams. As part of the  organizational strategy, DOD also identified the actions it has taken to  streamline the organizational structure and processes of the Office of the  Secretary of Defense, another requirement of section 911. For example,  the strategy states that DOD has delegated authority to approve certain  global force management actions to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of  Staff and delegated certain acquisition oversight functions to the military  departments. Further, consistent with our recommendation from our  February 2018 report that the CMO address how the department will  promote and achieve a collaborative culture, the organizational strategy  includes a short reference to our leading practices for mergers and  organizational transformations.

However, while the approved organizational strategy cites the leading  practices, it does not include specific implementation steps that explain  how DOD will follow these practices. Earlier drafts of the organizational  strategy that we had reviewed included more specific implementation  steps, but those steps were removed during the internal DOD review  process. As we reported in August 2019, a January 2019 draft of the  organizational strategy included practical implementation steps DOD  planned to take to advance a collaborative culture, each of which were  shown to align with our leading practices for mergers and organizational  transformations. For example, consistent with the leading practice for  establishing a coherent mission and integrated strategic goals to guide  the transformation, the January 2019 draft proposed that the CMO  develop an implementation plan with goals and milestones for its efforts  to implement the organizational strategy, communicate those goals and  milestones, and report periodically on the achievement of the goals.  However, in place of these specific steps, the approved organizational  strategy simply lists these leading practices and makes a broad statement  that DOD is committed to further incorporating and institutionalizing these  practices at every opportunity.

An OCMO official told us these implementation steps were removed as  the OCMO prepared the draft for department-wide coordination and  submission to the Secretary of Defense for review and approval.  According to that official, OCMO officials made this change because the  Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense were newly confirmed, and  OCMO officials did not want to commit them to a specific course of action.  That official also told us that DOD might use its senior leadership forums,  such as the Deputy’s Management Action Group (DMAG), to monitor  implementation of the organizational strategy and identify opportunities to  improve collaboration, including implementation of our leading practices.

However, the official acknowledged that any plan to use such forums for  monitoring implementation has not been finalized.

As we stated in making our February 2018 recommendation that the  department address how it would promote and achieve a collaborative  culture, section 911 identified several outcomes that DOD should achieve  to advance such a culture. We also noted that DOD could use our  leading practices for mergers and organizational transformations to  address how the department will advance a culture that is collaborative,  team-oriented, results-driven, and innovative. We further stated that DOD  would be better positioned to transform and meet its mission if it  incorporated these leading practices in its organizational strategy as a  way to better articulate how the department will achieve the outcomes  that advance a collaborative culture across DOD and address the  requirements of section 911.

Specific implementation steps like those included in earlier drafts of the  organizational strategy offered the department a clear path forward for  pursuing the goals of section 911 and promoting a collaborative culture.  Absent these steps, such as developing an implementation plan with  goals and milestones, it is less clear how DOD intends to implement the  organizational strategy and assess progress toward its goals. Identifying  and documenting specific implementation steps to advance a  collaborative culture—such as those OCMO included in earlier drafts of  the organizational strategy—is necessary to fully address the  requirements of section 911.

DOD Finalized Guidance on Cross-Functional Teams and Plans More Detailed Guidance to Fulfill All Section 911 Requirements

On December 12, 2019, the Secretary of Defense approved DOD’s  guidance on cross-functional teams. We found that this two-page  guidance addresses most, but not all, of the 911 requirements and  leading practices for cross-functional teams. Specifically, it addresses in  whole or in part six of the seven section 911 requirements and six of the  eight leading practices.

The Secretary-approved guidance also directs the CMO to develop more  detailed implementing guidance. It will be important for the CMO to  develop and issue this detailed implementing guidance to fully address  section 911 requirements and our leading practices for effective cross- functional teams, consistent with a recommendation in our February 2018  report. According to an OCMO official, OCMO plans to use previously  drafted terms of reference as the basis for the CMO’s more detailed  implementing guidance. Based on our review, when the Secretary of  Defense approved guidance is considered along with the draft terms of  reference expected to serve as detailed implementing guidance, both  documents will fully address all section 911 requirements and leading  practices for effective cross-functional teams. We will monitor the  department’s progress in issuing this guidance as part of our normal  process of assessing DOD’s efforts to implement our recommendations.

DOD Has Not Addressed Requirements for Training and Analysis

Training for Cross-Functional Teams Members and Their Supervisors

DOD has not approved its curriculum for training for cross-functional team  members and their supervisors. In February 2018, we reported that  DOD’s draft curriculum for cross-functional team members and their  supervisors addressed the section 911 requirements for that training.  We reported in August 2019 that DOD had provided required training  using its draft curriculum to members of the EMSO team—DOD’s only  established section 911 team at the time—but had not provided training to  their supervisors.

According to DOD’s comments on our August 2019 report, DOD expected  the draft curricula for training for cross-functional team members and their  supervisors to have been approved simultaneously with the issuance of  the Secretary’s guidance on cross-functional teams. According to OCMO  officials, however, DOD has contracted for the delivery of the required  training for cross-functional team members and their supervisors. One of  those officials also told us OCMO now expects that training to be  completed in 2020. Another OCMO official told us that the OCMO has  been further refining the draft curriculum based on feedback from the  members of the EMSO team and external experts before submitting the  curriculum for review and approval.

DOD has not provided required training on cross-functional teams and  related subjects to presidential appointees and the curriculum has not  been approved. Section 911 required presidentially appointed, Senate- confirmed officials to receive training on leadership, modern  organizational practice, collaboration, and the operation of cross- functional teams within 3 months of their appointment or to receive a  waiver from the President of the United States. As of October 2019, 23 of  36 such positions had been filled and the officials had been in their  positions for more than 3 months; none had received the statutorily  mandated training.

According to DOD’s comments on our August 2019 report, DOD expected  the draft training curricula for presidential appointees to have been  approved simultaneously with the issuance of the Secretary’s guidance  on cross-functional teams. According to OCMO officials, however, DOD  has contracted for the delivery of the required training for presidential  appointees. One of those officials also told us they now expect that  training to be provided in 2020. An OCMO official told us that OCMO has  been further refining the draft curriculum and discussing possible venues  for providing this training for presidential appointees, including one of the  weekly meetings that the Deputy Secretary of Defense has with all Office  of the Secretary of Defense presidential appointees.

Analysis of Successes and Failures of Cross-Functional Teams

DOD has not completed the required analysis of the successes and  failures of its cross-functional teams. Section 911 requires DOD’s  analysis to be completed with support from external experts in  organizational and management sciences within 18 months of the  establishment of the first cross-functional team under section 911.  Because the first cross-functional team was established in August 2017,  this analysis was due in February 2019. According to OCMO officials,  DOD has contracted with an organization to help develop the analysis.  One of the officials also told us DOD expects the analysis to be  completed in 2020. Another OCMO official told us in December 2019 that  work on the assessment, including a survey and structured interviews,  was underway, and that an initial draft report was expected by the end of  December 2019.

DOD’s Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations Cross-Functional Team Is Continuing Its Work and DOD Has Expanded the Number of Teams

DOD’s Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations Cross-Functional Team Is Continuing to Work toward Its Mission but Resource Issues Remain

DOD’s EMSO team is continuing to work toward its mission to develop  requirements and specific plans to improve EMSO capabilities across the  department and to achieve operational superiority. The team is  developing 13 initiatives in four areas—governance, organization,  capabilities and gaps, and training and readiness. In addition, the team  issued a report required by section 1053 of the John S. McCain National  Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019, which included the  mandated assessments of the electronic warfare capabilities of the  Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China in consultation  with the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency. Section 1053 also  required the team to, among other things, update the department’s  Electronic Warfare Strategy in coordination with the Electronic Warfare  Executive Committee. According to an EMSO official, the team is  developing a new strategy, which is scheduled for completion in June  2020.

The EMSO team is continuing to demonstrate leading practices for  effective cross-functional teams, similar to what we reported in August  2019. Specifically, at that time, we reported that the EMSO team was  demonstrating leading practices for effective cross-functional teams, such  as a well-defined team structure and well-defined team goals. Based on  the results of our recent survey of individual team members, most team  members believe the team is demonstrating open and regular  communication, an inclusive team environment, has an empowered  cross-functional team leader, and has well-defined team goals.

However, our survey results show that team members responded less  favorably to questions about senior management support than to  questions about the other leading practices. Specifically, less than half of  the respondents agreed with the statements that DOD’s senior leadership  provides the team with sufficient resources for its work, supported the  team as a priority, and supported the team’s goals and objectives. In their  survey responses and during interviews, team members expressed their  concerns about the lack of resources, such as funding and sufficient  office space to perform their work.

According to team officials, they are continuing to work with the OCMO to  resolve the team’s resource issues. In our August 2019 report, we stated  that the team’s progress was negatively affected by funding delays  resulting from disagreements among senior leadership over the  responsibility for funding the team. The disagreement had been resolved  for fiscal year 2019, but had not yet been resolved for future fiscal years.  We recommended, and DOD concurred, that the CMO and EMSO cross- functional team clarify roles and responsibilities for providing  administrative support and funding for the team beyond fiscal year 2019  in accordance with the memorandum establishing the team.

According to EMSO team officials, however, funding for future years has  not been identified. The team has discussed its funding needs with the  OCMO and staff from the Office of the Deputy Secretary of Defense, but  there is still no clarity regarding responsibility for funding the team. The  team’s budget submission as part of DOD’s fiscal year 2021 budget  process was withdrawn because the amount requested was smaller than  the amounts typically reviewed in the process. According to an EMSO team official, the OCMO is providing funding for the team incrementally  on a quarterly basis, and is facing challenges with funding the team’s  request for a contract due to the department operating under a continuing  resolution. According to another EMSO team official, the team is  maintaining the status quo with its current funding and is not considering  any additional initiatives.

We also reported in our August 2019 report that, according to a team  official, while the team had its own office space, the space did not have  the level of security required to allow the team to work on a third of its  initiatives. Team officials have since told us the team plans to move to an  appropriately secure space in early 2020. We will continue to monitor  DOD’s progress to secure resources and office space for the team as part  of our normal process of assessing DOD’s efforts to implement our  recommendations.

DOD Has Expanded the Number of Cross- Functional Teams

In its approved organizational strategy, DOD identified two existing task  forces to expand the number of cross-functional teams. First, the  Secretary of Defense established the Close Combat Lethality Task Force  in February 2018 to develop, evaluate, recommend, and implement  improvements to U.S. squad-level infantry combat formations and  strengthen the combat, lethality, survivability, resiliency, and readiness of  infantry squads. Second, the Secretary of Defense established the  Protecting Critical Technology Task Force in October 2018 to address  concerns over the security of the department’s critical technology and the  loss of classified information and controlled unclassified information that  puts DOD’s investments at risk and erodes the lethality and survivability  of U.S. forces. According to an OCMO official, the OCMO updated the  organizational strategy and designated these two task forces as cross- functional teams as a result of input from DOD senior leadership during  their review of the draft organizational strategy.

Based on our review of the documents used to establish the two task  forces, we found that they would meet only some of the requirements we  reviewed for cross-functional teams as mandated by section 911. For  example, we found that the documentation for the Close Combat Lethality  Task Force, as it was established, shows that the task force has a clearly  established objective; is directed to develop recommendations such as  policy changes and investment decisions; and is directed to make  decisions on cross-functional issues—some of the key section 911  requirements. Similarly, we found that the documentation for the  Protecting Critical Technology Task Force, as established, shows that the  director of the task force has the authority to select the membership from  across the department, another key requirement. However, based on the  documents we reviewed, we found that the teams would not meet other  requirements. For example, we found that the documentation for both  teams did not ensure that those team members and leaders who are  supervisors receive training in elements of successful cross-functional  teams. According to an OCMO official, the OCMO will ensure that these  task forces identified as cross-functional teams meet the requirements of  section 911. For example, the OCMO will provide the required training.

DOD’s newly issued guidance on cross-functional teams could help  ensure that existing and any new cross-functional teams meet section  911 requirements. In addition, it could help provide these existing and any  new teams with the information, direction, and authority they need to  comply with mandated requirements for cross-functional teams. For  example, section 911 permits the Secretary to delegate to cross- functional teams any decision-making authority that the Secretary  considers appropriate to achieve the objectives of the teams; DOD’s  guidance delineates the decision-making authority of cross-functional  teams.

More than 3 years after the passage of the National Defense  Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017, DOD has begun to take key steps  to address the requirements of section 911 and to promote a more  collaborative culture in the department, including issuing its organizational  strategy and making greater use of cross-functional teams under the act.  Even as it has taken these steps, challenges for the departments’  ongoing implementation of section 911 remain. The department has still  not addressed key requirements to help promote a collaborative culture  and, according to officials, still has not identified responsibility for funding  one of its cross-functional teams established under section 911. Further,  specific implementation steps that would have offered the department a  clear path forward for pursuing the goals of section 911 and promoting a  collaborative culture at DOD were removed from DOD’s approved  organizational strategy—a disappointing development. Identifying and  documenting specific implementation steps to encourage a collaborative  culture is necessary to fully address the requirements of section 911 and  encourage such a culture.

The Secretary of Defense should ensure that the Chief Management  Officer identify and document specific implementation steps to advance a  collaborative culture, consistent with our leading practices for mergers  and organizational transformations.

We provided a draft of this report to DOD for review and comment. In its  written comments, which are reproduced in Appendix IV, DOD concurred  with our recommendation. DOD also provided additional information on  the steps that DOD has taken or plans to take to advance a collaborative  culture, such as the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense’s use of  DOD’s senior governance forums to encourage collaboration across the  department. DOD also stated that it plans to incorporate policies based  on best practices for cultivating a collaborative organizational climate into  the CMO’s guidance on the implementation of cross-functional teams as  well as future National Defense Strategies and National Defense  Business Operations Plans.

We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional  committees and to the Secretary of Defense and Chief Management  Officer. In addition, the report is available at no charge on the GAO  website at http://www.gao.gov.

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact  me at (202) 512-2775 or fielde1@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices  of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last  page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this are  listed in appendix V.

Appendix I: Prior GAO Reports on the Department of Defense’s (DOD) Implementation of Section 911 of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2017

Section 911 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2017 included a provision for  us—every 6 months after the date of enactment on December 23, 2016,  through December 31, 2019—to submit to the congressional defense  committees a report. Each report is to set forth a comprehensive  assessment of the actions that DOD has taken pursuant to section 911  during each 6-month period and cumulatively since the NDAA’s  enactment. Table 3 identifies our five prior reports on DOD’s  implementation of section 911 and the status of the 11 recommendations  from those reports.

Appendix II: Summary of Requirements in Section 911 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017

Section 911 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year  2017 requires the Secretary of Defense to take several actions. Table 4  summarizes these requirements, the due date, and the date completed, if  applicable, as of December 2019.

Appendix III: Leading Practices for Implementing Effective Cross-Functional Teams

In February 2018, we reported on eight leading practices for  implementing effective cross-functional teams. Table 5 identifies these  leading practices and their related key characteristics.

Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of Defense

Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

In addition to the contact named above, Margaret Best (Assistant  Director), Daniel Ramsey (Analyst-in-Charge), Sierra Hicks, Alexa Kelly,  Richard Powelson, and Paulina Reaves made key contributions to this  report. Other contributors included Tracy Barnes, Arkelga Braxton,  Michael Holland, Ned Malone, Judy McCloskey, Jeremy Rogers, Ron  Schwenn, and Sarah Veale.

The FY 2017 National Defense Authorization Act required DOD to address issues that were preventing its departments and offices from collaborating with each other.

DOD has completed some of the requirements in this act. For example, DOD’s strategy for collaboration identifies critical objectives that would benefit from cross-functional teams (where individuals with different types of expertise work toward a common goal). However, DOD did not include practical, specific implementation steps to guide DOD’s efforts to advance a collaborative culture.

We recommended that DOD identify and document such steps.