Navy Maintenance: Persistent and Substantial Ship and Submarine Maintenance Delays Hinder Efforts to Rebuild Readiness

The 2018 National Defense Strategy emphasizes that restoring and retaining readiness is critical to success in the emerging security environment. The Navy is working to rebuild its readiness while also growing and modernizing its aging fleet of ships. A critical component of rebuilding Navy readiness is implementing sustainable operational schedules, which hinge on completing maintenance on time. We have reported that the Navy faces persistent challenges with completing required maintenance on time.

This statement provides information on (1) the magnitude of maintenance delays for Navy ships and submarines, (2) factors contributing to maintenance delays, and (3) the Navy's efforts to address these factors. GAO also discusses its prior recommendations on the factors contributing to Navy maintenance delays and the Navy's progress in addressing the recommendations.

This statement is based on previously published work from 2015 through 2019 on Navy maintenance, ship acquisition, crew size, ship maintenance and deployment schedules, the condition of Naval shipyards, and recruiting skilled maintenance personnel.

The Navy continues to face persistent and substantial maintenance delays that affect the majority of its maintenance efforts and hinder its attempts to restore readiness. From fiscal year 2014 to the end of fiscal year 2019, Navy ships have spent over 33,700 more days in maintenance than expected. The Navy was unable to complete scheduled ship maintenance on time for about 75 percent of the maintenance periods conducted during fiscal years 2014 through 2019, with more than half of the delays in fiscal year 2019 exceeding 90 days. When maintenance is not completed on time, fewer ships are available for training or operations, which can hinder readiness.

GAO identified multiple factors that contribute to maintenance delays, including insufficient shipyard capacity, shortage of skilled personnel, and deferred maintenance during operational deployments, among others. Ships awaiting or delayed in maintenance incur operating and support costs. For example, GAO estimated that the Navy spent more than $1.5 billion in support costs from fiscal years 2008 through 2018 due to delayed maintenance for attack submarines.

The Navy has several efforts underway to improve its maintenance operations, but they will take years to implement, and will require sustained management attention and funding above current levels. For example, the Navy estimates it will take 20 years to improve the infrastructure at its shipyards, 4 years to restore ship crew levels, and several years to improve maintenance planning. Until the Navy addresses these challenges, it will be hindered in its ability to rebuild readiness and prepare for the future, particularly as it grows the size of the fleet.

GAO made 17 recommendations in prior work cited in this statement. The Department of Defense generally concurred with most of GAO's recommendations, and has fully implemented 6. Continued attention is needed to ensure that the remainder of these recommendations are addressed.

Thank you for the opportunity to be here today to discuss our work related  to Navy ship and submarine maintenance challenges.

The Department of Defense (DOD) has reported that more than a decade  of conflict, budget uncertainty, and reductions in force structure have  degraded its readiness. In response, the department has made rebuilding  readiness a priority. The 2018 National Defense Strategy emphasizes  that restoring and retaining readiness is critical to success in the  emerging security environment. Nevertheless, DOD reports that the  readiness of the total military force remains low and has remained so  since 2013. DOD’s readiness rebuilding efforts are occurring while the  department is making difficult decisions regarding how best to address  continuing operational demands while preparing for future challenges.  Our work shows that an important aspect of rebuilding readiness, across  all of the services, is determining an appropriate balance between  maintaining and upgrading legacy weapon systems currently in  operational use and procuring new ones to overcome rapidly advancing  future threats.

The Navy is working to rebuild its readiness while also growing and  modernizing its aging fleet of aircraft carriers, submarines, and surface  ships. A critical component of rebuilding Navy readiness is implementing  sustainable operational schedules, including a carefully orchestrated  cycle of maintenance, training, and operations for the entire fleet of 290  ships. Completing maintenance on time is integral to this effort. The  Navy’s plan to grow the size of the fleet also depends on ships receiving  sufficient and timely maintenance to remain operational so that they can  reach their expected service lives and remain in the fleet.

This statement provides information on the (1) magnitude of maintenance  delays for Navy ships and submarines, (2) factors contributing to  maintenance delays, and (3) the Navy’s efforts to address these factors.

We also discuss our prior recommendations on Navy maintenance  challenges and the Navy’s progress in addressing them in appendix I.

This statement is based on prior reports we issued from 2015 through  2019 examining Navy maintenance challenges, shipyard workforce and  capital investment, ship crewing, scheduling, and force structure. To  perform our prior work, we analyzed Navy documentation and data on  shipyard condition, shipyard performance, condition of overseas  homeported ships, and workforce, among others; reviewed Navy and  DOD guidance; and conducted interviews with Navy officials. The reports  cited throughout this statement contain more details on the scope of the  work and the methodology used to carry it out. This statement also  includes selected updates as of November 2019, as appropriate, based  on Navy data, documentation, and discussions with Navy officials.

We conducted the work on which this testimony is based in accordance  with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards  require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate  evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions  based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained  provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on  our audit objectives.

Maintenance for the nuclear elements of the fleet (i.e., aircraft carriers  and submarines) is generally performed at the four public Naval  shipyards, while maintenance for the conventional elements of the fleet  (e.g., cruisers, destroyers, amphibious assault ships, and Military Sealift  Command ships) is generally performed at private shipyards and ship  repair companies throughout the United States, as shown in figure 1.

A number of organizations and commands within the Navy share  responsibilities for setting maintenance policies and planning, scheduling,  and executing ship maintenance, from the offices of the Secretary of the  Navy and Chief of Naval Operations, to fleet commanders and ships’  crews.  Naval Sea Systems Command is the primary Navy ship  maintenance organization. It is charged with, among other things,  maintaining ships to meet fleet requirements within defined cost and  schedule parameters; managing critical modernization, maintenance, and  inactivation programs; life-cycle management of maintenance  requirements; and management and oversight of the public naval  shipyards. Its offices also perform contract administration, program  management, and planning for future maintenance periods informed by  the historical maintenance needs of Navy ships.

Persistent and Substantial Maintenance Delays for Ships and Submarines Reduce Time for Training and Operations and Result in Additional Costs

Our work has found that the Navy has been generally unable to complete  ship and submarine maintenance on time, resulting in reduced time for  training and operations and additional costs in a resource-constrained  environment. The Navy’s readiness recovery is premised on the  adherence to set deployment, training, and maintenance schedules.  However, we reported in May 2016 on the difficulty that both the public  and private shipyards were having in completing maintenance on time.  We reported that, from 2011 through 2014, about 72 percent of scheduled  maintenance for surface combatants, and 89 percent of scheduled  maintenance for aircraft carriers, was completed late. We updated these  data as of November 2019 to include ongoing and completed  maintenance periods through the end of fiscal year 2019, and found that  the Navy continues to struggle to complete maintenance on time, as we  discuss below. The Navy was unable to complete scheduled ship  maintenance on time about 75 percent of the time during fiscal years  2014 through 2019, which equates to about 33,700 days of maintenance  delays (see figure 2).

Furthermore, these delays have been growing longer and more frequent.  In fiscal year 2014, about 20 percent of the Navy’s maintenance periods  were more than 90 days late. However, in fiscal year 2019, more than 57  percent of its maintenance periods were similarly late (see figure 3).

When maintenance is not completed on time, there are two primary  effects. First, fewer ships are available to conduct training or operations,  which can hinder readiness. For example, in fiscal year 2019,  maintenance delays resulted in the Navy losing the equivalent of 19  surface ships. Second, maintenance delays are costly. In November  2018, we examined attack submarine maintenance delays and reported  that the Navy incurred significant operating and support costs to crew and  maintain attack submarines that are delayed during maintenance  periods. We estimated that from 2008 to 2018, the Navy spent $1.5  billion to support attack submarines that provided no operational  capability—attack submarines sitting idle no longer certified to conduct  normal operations—while waiting to enter the shipyards and those  delayed in completing their maintenance at the shipyards. We  recommended that the Navy analyze how it allocates its maintenance  workload across public and private shipyards. DOD concurred with our  recommendation, and in December 2018, the Navy analyzed its workload  allocation and moved two additional attack submarine maintenance  availabilities to the private shipyards, with the possibility of moving  additional availabilities to the private sector over the next 5 years.

Navy Maintenance Challenges Stem from Multiple Interrelated Factors

The Navy’s ability to successfully maintain its ships—completing all  required maintenance on-time and within estimated cost—is affected by  numerous factors that occur throughout a ship’s lifecycle (see figure 4).  Some of these factors involve decisions made during the acquisition  phase, years before a ship arrives at a shipyard for maintenance, while  others manifest during operational use of the ship or during the  maintenance process, as illustrated in figure 4.

These decisions can be interrelated; for example, decisions to increase  deployment lengths to meet the Navy’s operational demands can result in  declining ship conditions and material readiness. The declining condition  of the ships can increase the time that ships spend undergoing  maintenance at the shipyards. Increased maintenance time at shipyards  can lead to decisions to make further operational schedule changes to  extend deployment lengths for other ships to compensate for ships  experiencing maintenance delays.

Acquisition Decisions Affect Maintenance Timeliness

While our statement today focuses on factors occurring during operations  and the maintenance process, we have previously reported that long-term  sustainment costs can be affected by decisions made early in the  acquisition process. The decisions made during the acquisition phase of a  weapon system can affect maintenance strategies used throughout the  lifecycle, as 80 percent of a program’s operating and support costs are  fixed at the time a program’s requirements are set and the ship is  designed. For example, the littoral combat ship (LCS) program initially  planned to operate the ship with 40 sailors using contractors to complete  all of the onboard maintenance tasks. After challenges with the first LCS  deployments, the Navy began revising the ships maintenance strategy,  including adding more sailors onboard the ship. In addition, decisions to  acquire or not acquire rights to technical data can have far-reaching  implications for DOD’s ability to sustain the systems and competitively  procure parts and services. Furthermore, the Navy has shown a  willingness to provide ships to the fleet that still have a number of  unresolved construction and quality deficiencies, which add to its  maintenance burden. For example, the Navy delivered the USS  Somerset amphibious transport dock to the fleet with 52 significant  defects, including an electronic system crucial to the ship’s mission  effectiveness that the fleet had to replace shortly after it received the ship.  We have ongoing work on the effect that acquisition decisions can have  on maintenance that we expect to issue in early 2020.

Operational Decisions Affect Maintenance Timeliness

Some causes of delays are created or exacerbated during an operational  deployment. Our work has shown that to meet heavy operational  demands over the past decade with a smaller fleet, the Navy has  increased ship deployment lengths and has reduced or deferred ship  maintenance. Decisions to reduce crew sizes between 2003 and 2012  also left crews overburdened and contributed to deferred maintenance.  These decisions have resulted in declining ship conditions across the  fleet and have increased the amount of time that ships require to  complete maintenance in the shipyards. Increased maintenance periods,  in turn, have compressed the time during which ships are available for  training and operations. Specifically, the Navy:

Decreased crew levels. We reported in 2017 that the Navy’s effort to  reduce crew sizes between 2003 through 2012 corresponded with  increases in maintenance costs that outweighed the savings achieved  through reduced personnel costs. Navy officials told us that shifts in  maintenance workload from the organizational- and intermediate- levels to depot-level maintenance increased overall maintenance  costs. This change occurred in part because reduced crew sizes  resulted in minor maintenance being deferred, which developed into  more costly issues that had to be addressed later at the depot level.

Extended deployments. We have previously reported that Navy  decisions to extend deployments can lead to maintenance challenges,  as these decisions have resulted in declining ship conditions across  the fleet, and have increased the amount of time that ships require to  complete maintenance in the shipyards.

Deferred maintenance. We reported in 2015, 2016, and 2017 that  maintenance deferred while a ship is deployed can develop into more  costly issues that must be addressed later, often during depot-level  maintenance. Deferred maintenance can lead to new work at the  shipyards, as the degraded ship conditions result in the need for  additional maintenance. For example, maintenance officials told us  that the focus for ships homeported overseas is on mission readiness,  so overseas-homeported ships place priority on the maintenance of  combat systems. This means that systems with the potential to reduce  ship service life—such as fuel and ballast tanks that require extended  in-port periods to properly maintain—can be subject to maintenance  deferrals in order to allow the ship to sustain a high operational  tempo.

Challenges during the Maintenance Process Affect Timeliness

In our prior work, we identified numerous challenges that occur during the  Navy’s planning and execution of a ship’s maintenance period that  contribute to delays. For example:

Difficulties in adhering to the maintenance planning process. We  reported in 2016 that the Navy must accurately define the work for  each ship’s maintenance period. To do this, the Navy’s maintenance  planning process specifies planning milestones intended to ascertain  the ship’s condition, identify the work needed, and plan for its  execution. Missing or meeting planning milestones late can contribute  to maintenance delays. However, the Navy does not always adhere to  its own maintenance planning process due to high operational tempo,  scheduling difficulties, or personnel shortages, among other factors,  resulting in shipyards discovering the need for additional repairs after  maintenance has begun and adding time to the schedule for planning,  contracting, or waiting for parts.

Navy shipyards have shortages of skilled personnel. The Navy  has reported a variety of workforce challenges at the four public  shipyards such as hiring personnel in a timely manner and providing  personnel with the training necessary to gain proficiency in critical  skills. The Navy has noted that some occupations require years of  training before workers become proficient. According to Navy officials,  a large portion of its workforce is inexperienced. For example, we  reported in December 2018 that 45 percent of the Puget Sound and  30 percent of the Portsmouth Naval Shipyards’ skilled workforce had  fewer than 5 years of experience. According to DOD officials,  workforce shortages and inexperience contribute to maintenance  delays. For example, at Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard in 2014 and  2015, two submarines were delayed approximately 20 months each,  in part because of shortages in ship fitters and welders, among other  skilled personnel. Most of DOD’s depots, which include the naval  shipyards, have taken actions to maintain critical skills through  retention incentives, bonuses, and awards. However, we found that  neither the depots, their higher-level service component commands,  nor the services have conducted an assessment to determine the  effectiveness of these actions.

The condition of facilities and equipment at Navy shipyards is  generally poor. We reported in September 2017 that poor condition  of facilities and equipment at the shipyards contributed to  maintenance delays for aircraft carriers and submarines, hindering the  shipyards’ ability to support the Navy. Specifically, we found that the  average condition of shipyard facilities was poor and that shipyard  equipment was generally past its expected service life. For example,  four of the five dry docks at Norfolk Naval Shipyard face flooding  threats from extreme high tides and storm swells and average one  major flooding event per year. In 2009 a dry dock at Norfolk Naval  Shipyard required emergency repairs to prevent flooding while the  USS Tennessee (SSBN-734) was undergoing maintenance.  According to the Navy’s report on the incident, several days of high  tides and winds, coupled with multiple leaks in the dry dock’s granite  block joints, resulted in the dry dock flooding at an estimated rate of  3,000 gallons per minute before workers could repair it. In addition, at  Puget Sound Naval Shipyard—located in an area identified by the U.  S. Geological Survey as a “High Seismic Hazard Zone”—a 7.0  magnitude or greater earthquake could damage or ruin the only dry  dock on the west coast that is capable of performing maintenance on  aircraft carriers. We have also previously reported that the Navy  shipyards do not track when facility problems leads to maintenance  delays.

Furthermore, the average age of equipment at the shipyards is  beyond its average expected service life (see table 1). Equipment that  is past its expected service life can pose an increased risk for  maintenance delays or higher maintenance costs, affecting the  depots’ ability to conduct work. As we have previously reported, aging  equipment can present a number of challenges, such as more  frequent breakdowns, less effective or efficient operation, and safety  hazards.

The Navy shipyards lack the capacity to conduct required  maintenance in the future. We also reported in 2019 that the naval  shipyards cannot support 68 of the 218—almost a third—of the  maintenance periods that aircraft carriers and submarines will require  through 2040, due to a lack of dry dock capacity. Specifically,  several of the Navy’s 17 dry docks will become obsolete after the Los  Angeles-class submarines are retired because they will be too small  or lack the appropriate shore-side support for newer classes of  submarines. For example, only 14 dry docks can support the early- flight Virginia-class submarines and only 11 dry docks can support the  Virginia-class submarines outfitted with the longer Virginia Payload  Module. In addition, no dry docks can currently support repairs to  the Ford class aircraft carrier, even though the Navy accepted delivery  of the first ship of that class in 2017. Private shipyards have told the  Navy that they could have some additional capacity to conduct  maintenance, but are hesitant to invest in creating this capacity  without more certainty from the Navy.

The Navy Has Taken Some Steps to Address Maintenance Delays, but Corrective Actions Will Take Years to Implement The Navy Developed a Shipyard Infrastructure Optimization Plan, but It Will Require Significant Time and Resources to Implement

The Navy has begun to implement a major effort—the Shipyard  Infrastructure Optimization Plan—that is intended to significantly improve  the condition of shipyard facilities and equipment, but it will require  significant time and resources to implement. This plan is designed to  address the bulk of the Navy’s dry-dock capacity issues as well as identify  the optimal placement of facilities and major equipment at each public  shipyard. The Navy estimates these changes can ultimately increase its  maintenance efficiency by reducing the distance that workers and  material will have to travel around the shipyards during the maintenance  period. According to the Navy, this equates to recovering about 328,000  labor days per year—an amount roughly equal to that of an additional  submarine maintenance period annually. In addition, the Navy has  created a program office to oversee its shipyard improvement effort,  which we believe demonstrates leadership attention and commitment to  the effort. However, the Navy estimated that the replacement of the  facilities will take 20 years (see figure 5). Further, the Navy estimates that  it will take 30 years to bring the average age of its equipment to within  industry standards.

The Navy estimated in 2018 that this effort will require $21 billion over 20  years to implement. However, this $21 billion estimate does not include  inflation and other significant costs, such as those for utilities, roads, or  environmental remediation. Our analysis of the Navy’s preliminary  estimate is that it is understated due to a lack of inflation adjustments,  which could add billions to the final cost. Navy officials stated that the $21  billion estimate is an initial indicator of the scope of the effort and is not  intended as a cost estimate in its budget. However, even that $21 billion  estimate would require funding levels beyond what the Navy has  requested for shipyard infrastructure in recent years. We recommended in  November 2019 that the Navy should prepare more accurate cost  estimates using best practices so that the Navy can request accurate  funding from Congress and avoid common pitfalls associated with  inaccurate estimates such as cost overruns, missed deadlines, and  performance shortfalls. We recommended that the Navy take steps to  improve its cost estimate prior to the start of its primary facility  improvement effort; the Navy has concurred with this recommendation.

Other Navy Efforts Are in Early Stages and Will Need Additional Time to Produce Results

The Navy has additional efforts underway that should help reduce  maintenance delays, though the results of these efforts likely will not be  seen for several years. For example:

Revising the size of ship crews. The Navy has taken steps to  address some of our recommendations regarding the size of ship  crews. Specifically, the Navy has begun reviewing and revising its  ship crew levels—most notably adding 32 crewmembers to its DDG- 51 destroyers and 23 crewmembers to its LPD-17 fleet. However,  officials noted that the process to update crew levels throughout the  fleet would take about 4 years to complete. The Navy will also need to  demonstrate that it actually can assign crew members to these ships  to meet the higher crew levels. We have ongoing work examining this  issue and plan to report on our findings in winter of 2020.

Hiring additional workers at shipyards. Shipyards have increased  hiring, going from about 30,600 workers in fiscal year 2014 to about  37,400 workers in fiscal year 2019. However, Navy officials have  stated that it takes several years for workers to reach full productivity.  In the past, officials expected that new hires would take about 5 years  to become fully productive, although the Navy has testified that they  hope to reduce that time through new training techniques.

Performance to Plan. The Navy has begun an analytical effort to  better understand maintenance challenges and its capacity needs for  the future, called “Performance to Plan.” According to Navy officials  and plans, this effort is intended to help the Navy improve full and  timely completion of maintenance, including for aviation, surface  ships, and submarines. For example, the effort for surface ship  maintenance currently involves a pilot program looking at how to  better plan and execute maintenance periods for DDG 51-class  destroyers, including examining how to improve the accuracy of  forecasted maintenance requirements and duration and better adhere  to planning milestones, among other outcomes. We are encouraged  by this effort, but note that it remains in the early stages, and it is not  clear whether or when the pilot effort will be extended to examine the  entire surface fleet.

In sum, the Navy faces significant challenges in maintaining its current  fleet and reaping full benefit of the ships it has in its inventory today due  to persistent and substantial maintenance delays. The Navy has made  progress identifying the causes of their maintenance challenges and has  begun efforts to address them. However, delays continue to persist and  these challenges will require years of continued management attention  and substantial investment to be resolved.

As part of this sustained management attention, the Navy would benefit  from a continued focus on implementing our prior recommendations.  Since 2015, we have made 17 recommendations to the Navy to address  various concerns we identified with its maintenance process. The Navy  agreed with 14 of those recommendations, partially concurred with 1  recommendation, and disagreed with 2 recommendations. However, as  of November 2019, the Navy had fully implemented 6 of these  recommendations. While the Navy has taken some additional action on  the 11 remaining unimplemented recommendations, taking additional  steps to fully address these recommendations could help the Navy  address its maintenance challenges and better position it to sustain the  current and future fleet.

Looking to the future, the Navy is seeking to grow the fleet over the next  15 years. However, if it increases the size of the fleet before addressing  its maintenance challenges, it is likely that the Navy will be faced with a  growing number of both maintenance delays and ships that are  unavailable for use. Even assuming the Navy’s efforts to improve  shipyard operations succeed, it will be years before the Navy can  maintain a significantly larger fleet.

Chairmen Perdue and Sullivan, Ranking Members Hirono and Kaine, and  Members of the Subcommittees, this concludes my prepared statement. I  would be pleased to respond to any questions you may have at this time.

If you or your staff have questions about this testimony, please contact  Diana Maurer, Director, Defense Capabilities and Management at (202)  512-9627 or maurerd@gao.gov.

Contacts points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public  Affairs may be found on the last page of this statement. GAO staff who  made key contributions to this testimony are Suzanne Wren (Assistant  Director), James Lackey (Analyst-in-Charge), A. S. Bagley, Chris Cronin,  Amie Lesser, Felicia Lopez, Tobin McMurdie, Carol Petersen, Clarice  Ransom, Matt Thompson, and Sally Williamson.

Appendix I: Implementation Status of Prior GAO Recommendations Related to Ship and Submarine Maintenance

In recent years, we have issued a number of reports related to ship and  submarine maintenance. Table 1 summarizes the recommendations in  these reports. The Department of Defense (DOD) concurred with most of  the 17 recommendations; however, to date DOD has fully implemented 6  of the recommendations. For each of the reports, the specific  recommendations and any progress made in implementing them are  summarized in tables 2 through 9.

Report numbers with a C or RC suffix are classified. Report numbers with  a SU suffix are sensitive but unclassified. Classified and sensitive but  unclassified reports are available to personnel with the proper clearances  and need to know, upon request. Report numbers with a T suffix are  testimonies.

Naval Shipyards: Key Actions Remain to Improve Infrastructure to Better  Support Navy Operations. GAO-20-64. Washington, D.C.: November 25,  2019.

Military Depots: Actions Needed to Improve Poor Conditions of Facilities  and Equipment that Affect Maintenance Timeliness and Efficiency.  GAO-19-242. Washington, D.C.: April 29, 2019.

DOD Depot Workforce: Services Need to Assess the Effectiveness of  Their Initiatives to Maintain Critical Skills. GAO-19-51. Washington, D.C.:  December 14, 2018.

Navy and Marine Corps: Rebuilding Ship, Submarine, and Aviation  Readiness Wil Require Time and Sustained Management Attention.  GAO-19-225T. Washington, D.C.: December 12, 2018.

Navy Readiness: Actions Needed to Address Costly Maintenance Delays  Facing the Attack Submarine Fleet. GAO-19-229. Washington, D.C.:  November 19, 2018.

Navy Readiness: Actions Needed to Address Costly Maintenance Delays  Affecting the Attack Submarine Fleet. GAO-19-192C. Washington, D.C.:  October 31, 2018  Military Readiness: Update on DOD’s Progress in Developing a  Readiness Rebuilding Plan. GAO-18-441RC. Washington, D.C.: August  10, 2018. (SECRET)

Navy Shipbuilding: Past Performance Provides Valuable Lessons for  Future Investments. GAO-18-238SP. Washington, D.C.: June 6, 2018.

Weapon Systems Annual Assessment: Knowledge Gaps Pose Risks to  Sustaining Recent Positive Trends. GAO-18-360SP. Washington, D.C.:  April 25, 2018.

Columbia Class Submarine: Immature Technologies Present Risks to  Achieving Cost Schedule and Performance Goals. GAO-18-158.  Washington, D.C.: December 21, 2017.

Navy Readiness: Actions Needed to Address Persistent Maintenance,  Training, and Other Challenges Affecting the Fleet. GAO-17-809T.  Washington, D.C.: September 19, 2017.

Naval Shipyards: Actions Needed to Improve Poor Conditions that Affect  Operations. GAO-17-548. Washington, D.C.: September 12, 2017.

Navy Readiness: Actions Needed to Address Persistent Maintenance,  Training, and Other Challenges Facing the Fleet. GAO-17-798T.  Washington, D.C.: September 7, 2017.

Navy Shipbuilding: Policy Changes Needed to Improve the Post-Delivery  Process and Ship Quality. GAO-17-418. Washington, D.C.: July 13, 2017.

Department of Defense: Actions Needed to Address Five Key Mission  Challenges. GAO-17-369. Washington, D.C.: June 13, 2017.

Navy Force Structure: Actions Needed to Ensure Proper Size and  Composition of Ship Crews. GAO-17-413. Washington, D.C.: May 18,  2017.

Military Readiness: DOD’s Readiness Rebuilding Efforts May Be at Risk  without a Comprehensive Plan. GAO-16-841. Washington, D.C.:  September 7, 2016.

Navy and Marine Corps: Services Face Challenges to Rebuilding  Readiness. GAO-16-481RC. Washington, D.C.: May 25, 2016.  (SECRET//NOFORN)

Military Readiness: Progress and Challenges in Implementing the Navy’s  Optimized Fleet Response Plan. GAO-16-466R. Washington, D.C.: May  2, 2016.

Navy Force Structure: Sustainable Plan and Comprehensive Assessment  Needed to Mitigate Long-Term Risks to Ships Assigned to Overseas  Homeports. GAO-15-329. Washington, D.C.: May 29, 2015.

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The Navy continues to face persistent and substantial maintenance delays that hinder its ability to stay ready for operations and training. Since fiscal year 2014, Navy ships have spent over 33,700 more days in maintenance than expected. Insufficient shipyard capacity and a shortage of skilled workers are among the contributing factors we identified.

The Navy has efforts underway to improve its maintenance operations. They will require years to implement, sustained management attention, and greater funding.

In the reports upon which this testimony is based, we made 17 recommendations. Only 6 have been fully carried out.