Freedom of Information Act: DHS Needs to Reduce Backlogged Requests and Eliminate Duplicate Processing

FOIA requires federal agencies to provide the public with access to government records and information based on the principles of openness and accountability in government. Each year, individuals and entities file hundreds of thousands of FOIA requests. DHS continues to receive and process the largest number of FOIA requests of any federal department or agency. For fiscal year 2018, over 40 percent of federal FOIA requests (about 396,000) belonged to DHS.

GAO was asked to summarize its November 2014 and June 2018 reports which addressed, among other things, (1) DHS's methods to reduce backlogged FOIA requests and (2) duplication in DHS's processing of FOIA requests.

In conducting this prior work, GAO evaluated the department's and components' FOIA policies, procedures, reports, and other documentation; and interviewed agency officials. GAO also followed up on its recommendations to determine their implementation status.

The Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) responsibilities for processing Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests are split between the department's Privacy Office, which acts as its central FOIA office, and FOIA offices in the department's component agencies, such as U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services and Immigration and Customs Enforcement. In 2018, GAO reported that DHS had implemented several methods to reduce backlogged FOIA requests, including sending monthly emails to its components on backlog statistics and conducting oversight. In addition, several DHS components, implemented actions to reduce their backlogs. Due to efforts by the department, the backlog dropped 66 percent in fiscal year 2015, decreasing to 35,374 requests. Although there was initial progress by the end of fiscal year 2015, the number of backlogged requests increased in fiscal years 2016 and 2018 (see figure). One reason DHS was struggling to consistently reduce its backlogs is that it lacked documented, comprehensive plans that would provide a more reliable, sustainable approach to addressing backlogs and describe how it will implement best practices for reducing backlogs over time.

DHS attributed the increase in its FOIA backlogs to several factors, including the increased numbers and complexity of requests received and the volume of responsive records for those requests. Until it develops a plan to implement best practices to reduce its backlogs, DHS will likely continue to struggle to reduce the backlogs to a manageable level.

In addition, in 2014 GAO reported that certain immigration-related requests were processed twice by two different DHS components. The duplicate processing of such requests by the two components contributed to an increase in the time needed to respond to the requests. GAO continued to report this issue in its 2019 annual product on opportunities to reduce fragmentation, overlap, and duplication.

In its prior reports, GAO made five recommendations to DHS. These included, among other things, that DHS (1) take steps to develop and document a plan that fully addressed best practices with regard to reducing the number of backlogged FOIA requests and (2) eliminate duplicative processing of immigration-related requests. The department agreed with the recommendations. However, as of October 2019, DHS had not fully implemented all of them.

Thank you for the opportunity to participate in today’s hearing regarding  Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) implementation at the Department of  Homeland Security (DHS). FOIA, which was enacted into law more than  50 years ago, requires federal agencies to provide the public with access  to government records and information based on the principles of  openness and accountability in government.

Each year, individuals and entities file hundreds of thousands of FOIA  requests for information on numerous topics that contribute to the  understanding of government actions. Given the significance of FOIA,  Congress has had a longstanding interest in the manner in which the act  is being implemented, including the extent to which federal agencies  respond to FOIA requests and the timeliness of the responses.

DHS is one of the many agencies that respond to FOIA requests. DHS  continues to receive and process the largest number of these requests of  any federal department or agency—annually receiving and processing  over 40 percent of all requests within the federal government.

In 2014 and 2018, we issued reports that discussed key aspects of FOIA  at DHS. Our work examined, among other things, the department’s  implementation of selected FOIA requirements; DHS’s methods to reduce  backlogged requests; and duplication in the department’s processing of  FOIA requests.

At your request, my testimony for this hearing summarizes the results  discussed in our prior reports on FOIA implementation at DHS. Detailed  information about our objectives, scope, and methodology for that work  can be found in the issued reports. In addition, we reviewed information  that DHS provided to us on the current status of its efforts to implement  recommendations from those reports and its current FOIA workload and  backlog.

We conducted the work on which this statement is based in accordance  with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards  require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate  evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions  based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained  provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on  our audit objectives.

The Freedom of Information Act establishes a legal right of access to  government information on the basis of the principles of openness and  accountability in government. Before FOIA’s enactment in 1966, an  individual seeking access to federal records faced the burden of  establishing a “need to know” before being granted the right to examine a  federal record. FOIA established a “right to know” standard, under which  an organization or person could receive access to information held by a  federal agency without demonstrating a need or reason. The “right to  know” standard shifted the burden of proof from the individual to a  government agency and required the agency to provide proper  justification when denying a request for access to a record.

Any person, defined broadly to include attorneys filing on behalf of an  individual, corporations, or organizations, can file a FOIA request. For  example, an attorney can request labor-related workers’ compensation  files on behalf of his or her client, and a commercial requester, such as a  data broker who files a request on behalf of another person, may request  a copy of a government contract. In response, an agency is required to  provide the relevant record(s) in any readily producible form or format  specified by the requester, unless the record falls within a permitted  exemption that provides limitations on the disclosure of information.

FOIA Amendments and Guidance Call for Improvements in How Agencies Process Requests

Various amendments have been enacted and guidance issued to help  improve agencies’ processing of FOIA requests. For example:

The Electronic Freedom of Information Act Amendments of 1996  (1996 FOIA amendment) strengthened the requirement that federal  agencies respond to a request in a timely manner and reduce their  backlogged requests.

Executive Order 13392, issued by the President in 2005, directed  each agency to designate a senior official as its chief FOIA officer.  This official was to be responsible for ensuring agency-wide  compliance with the act. The chief FOIA officer was directed to review  and report on the agency’s performance in chief FOIA officer reports.

The OPEN Government Act, which was enacted in 2007 (2007 FOIA  amendment), made the 2005 executive order’s requirement for  agencies to have a chief FOIA officer a statutory requirement. It also  required agencies to include additional statistics, such as more details  on processing times, in their annual FOIA reports.

The FOIA Improvement Act of 2016 (2016 FOIA amendment)  addressed procedural issues, including requiring that agencies (1)  make records available in an electronic format if they have been  requested three or more times; (2) notify requesters that they have not  less than 90 days to file an administrative appeal, and (3) provide  dispute resolution services at various times throughout the FOIA  process. Further, the act required OMB, in consultation with the  Department of Justice, to create a consolidated online FOIA request  portal that allows the public to submit a request to any agency through  a single website.

The 1996 FOIA amendment required agencies, including DHS, to  generally respond to a FOIA request within 20 working days. Once  received, the request is to be processed through multiple phases, which  include assigning a tracking number, searching for responsive records,  and releasing the records to the requester.

In responding to requests, FOIA authorizes agencies to use nine  exemptions to withhold portions of records, or the entire record. These  nine exemptions can be applied by agencies to withhold various types of  information, such as information concerning foreign relations, trade  secrets, and matters of personal privacy. FOIA allows a requester to  challenge an agency’s final decision on a request through an  administrative appeal or a lawsuit. Agencies generally have 20 working  days to respond to an administrative appeal.

DHS Covers Many Areas of Government Information

Created in 2003, DHS assumed control of about 209,000 civilian and  military positions from 22 agencies and offices that specialize in one or  more aspects of homeland security. By the nature of its mission and  operations, the department creates and has responsibility for vast and  varied amounts of information covering, for example, immigration, border  crossings, law enforcement, natural disasters, maritime accidents, and  agency management.

According to its 2018 Chief FOIA Officer Report, DHS’s organizational  structure consists of 24 offices, directorates, and components. FOIA  requests are split between the department’s Privacy Office, which acts as  its central FOIA office, and FOIA offices in the department’s component  agencies.

Three of the major operational components of DHS are:

U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) promotes an  awareness and understanding of citizenship, and ensures the integrity  of the nation’s immigration system. Its records include asylum  application files and other immigration-related documents.

Customs and Border Protection (CBP) secures the border against  transnational threats and facilitates trade and travel through the  enforcement of federal laws and regulations relating to immigration,  drug enforcement, and other matters. The agency maintains records  related to agency operations, activities, and interactions.

Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) promotes homeland  security and public safety through the criminal and civil enforcement  of federal laws governing border control, customs, trade, and  immigration. It maintains information related to the law enforcement  records of immigrants and detainees, as well as information pertaining  to human trafficking/smuggling, gangs, and arrest reports.

According to its 2018 Chief FOIA Officer Report, DHS and its component  agencies reported that they processed 374,945 FOIA requests in fiscal  year 2018—the most of any federal government agency. As of its 2018  report, the department had a backlog of 53,971 unprocessed requests— the largest backlog of any federal agency.

DHS Implemented Six Key FOIA Requirements to Help Improve its FOIA Operations

Amendments and guidance relating to FOIA call for agencies, including  DHS, to implement key requirements aimed at improving the processing  of requests. Among others, these requirements call for agencies to (1)  update response letters, (2) implement tracking systems, (3) provide  FOIA training, (4) provide records online, (5) designate chief FOIA  officers, and (6) update and publish timely and comprehensive  regulations. As we noted in our June 2018 report, DHS had implemented  these six FOIA requirements.

Update response letters: The FOIA amendments require that certain  information be included in agency response letters. For example, if part of  a FOIA request is denied, agencies are required to inform requesters that  they may  seek assistance from the FOIA public liaison of the agency or the  National Archives and Records Administration’s Office of Government  Information Services (OGIS);  file an appeal to an adverse determination within a period of time that  is not less than 90 days after the date of such adverse determination;  and  seek dispute resolution services from the FOIA public liaison of the  agency or OGIS.

DHS had updated its FOIA response letters to include this specific  information, as required per the amendments.

Implement tracking systems: DHS used commercial automated  systems, as called for by various FOIA amendments and guidance, and  had established telephone or internet services to assist requesters in  tracking the status of a request. The department used modern  technology (e.g., mobile applications) to inform citizens about FOIA. The  commercial systems allowed requesters to submit a request and track the  status of that request online. In addition, DHS developed a mobile  application that allowed FOIA requesters to submit a request and check  its status. The department’s FOIA tracking systems were compliant with  requirements of Section 508 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (as  amended), which required federal agencies to make their electronic  information accessible to people with disabilities.

Provide FOIA training: DHS’ chief FOIA officer offered FOIA training  opportunities to staff in fiscal years 2016 and 2017, as required by the  2016 FOIA amendments. Specifically, the department provided training in  responding to, handling, and processing FOIA requests.

Provide records online: DHS posted records online for three categories  of information, agency final opinions and orders, statements of policy, and  frequently requested orders as required by 2009 memorandums from  both the President and the Attorney General.

Designate chief FOIA officers: DHS designated its Chief Privacy Officer  as its Chief FOIA Officer. This position was a senior official at the  assistant secretary or equivalent level, as required by a 2005 executive  order and the 2007 FOIA amendments.

Update and publish timely and comprehensive regulations: Guidance  from the Department of Justice Office of Information Policy (OIP)  encourages agencies to, among other things, describe their dispute  resolution process; describe their administrative appeals process; notify  requesters that they have a minimum of 90 days to file an administrative  appeal; include a description of unusual circumstances and restrictions on  an agency’s ability to charge certain fees when FOIA’s times limits are not  met; and update agency regulations in a timely manner (i.e., update  regulations by 180 days after the enactment of the 2016 FOIA  amendment). DHS had addressed these five requirements in updating its  regulations, as called for in the 2016 FOIA amendment and in related OIP  guidance.

DHS Identified Methods for Backlog Reduction, but Still Had Fluctuations

The Attorney General’s March 2009 memorandum called on agency chief  FOIA officers to review all aspects of their agencies’ FOIA administration  and report to Justice on steps that have been taken to improve FOIA  operations and disclosure. Subsequent Justice guidance directed  agencies that had more than 1,000 backlogged requests in a given year  to describe their plans to reduce their backlogs. Beginning in calendar  year 2015, these agencies were to describe how they had implemented  their plans from the previous year and whether that had resulted in a  backlog reduction.

In June 2018, we reported that DHS received about 191,000 to about  326,000 requests per year—the most requests of any agency—for a total  of 1,320,283 FOIA requests in fiscal years 2012 through 2016. Further,  the department had a backlog ranging from 28,553 in fiscal year 2012 to  53,971 in fiscal year 2018. The total numbers of these requests and  backlogs are shown in table 1.

We also reported that DHS, in its chief FOIA officer reports from fiscal  years 2012 to 2016, stated that it had implemented several methods to  reduce backlogs. According to the reports, the DHS Privacy Office, which  is responsible for oversight of the department’s FOIA program, worked  with components to help address the backlogs. The reports noted that the  Privacy Office sent monthly emails to component FOIA officers on FOIA  backlog statistics, convened management meetings, conducted oversight,  and reviewed workloads. Leadership met weekly to discuss the oldest  pending requests, appeals, and consultations, and determined steps  needed to process those requests.

In addition, in 2018, we noted that several other DHS components  reported implementing actions to reduce backlogs. CBP hired and trained  additional staff, encouraged requesters to file requests online, established  productivity goals, updated guidance, and used better technology.  USCIS, the National Protection and Programs Directorate, and ICE  increased staffing or developed methods to better forecast future  workloads to ensure adequate staffing. ICE also implemented a  commercial off-the-shelf web application, awarded a multimillion-dollar  contract for backlog reduction, and detailed employees from various other  offices to assist in the backlog reduction effort. Due to these efforts by the  Privacy Office and other components, the backlog dropped 66 percent in  fiscal year 2015, decreasing to 35,374 requests.

Yet, despite the continued efforts, the backlog numbers increased again.  According the 2018 Chief FOIA Officer’s report, the department ended  2018 with a backlog of 53,971 requests. DHS attributed these increases  to several factors, including an increase in the number of requests  received, the increased complexity and volume of responsive records for  those requests, and the loss of staff needed to process the requests.

In June 2018, we reported that one reason DHS was struggling to  consistently reduce its backlogs is that it lacked documented,  comprehensive plans that would provide a more reliable, sustainable  approach to addressing backlogs. In particular, it did not have  documented plans that described how it intended to implement best  practices for reducing backlogs over time. These best practices, as  identified by Justice’s OIP, included specifying how DHS would use  metrics to assess the effectiveness of backlog reduction efforts and  ensuring that senior leadership supports backlog reduction efforts.

In our June 2018 report, we recommended that the department take steps  to develop and document a plan that fully addresses best practices with  regard to the reduction of backlogged FOIA requests. In response, DHS  reported that it had initiated a department-wide compliance assessment  and stated that it planned to use the results of the assessment to help  guide it in identifying best practices and areas of improvement. As of this  month (October 2019), the department stated that the draft plan is  currently with the components for review and is pending clearance.

Until it has a final plan that fully addresses best practices, DHS will likely  continue to struggle to reduce its backlogs to a manageable level. This is  particularly important, as the number and complexity of requests will likely  increase over time.

Duplication Exists in Certain Components’ Processing of Immigration Files

Among the most frequent FOIA requests made to DHS are those for  immigration files. These files usually contain various types of information  pertaining to immigrants, including asylum applications, law enforcement  records, and border crossing documents. As such, they may contain  information and records that are generated by various DHS components  or other agencies.

In 2014, we reported that within DHS, three components—USCIS, CBP,  and ICE—created most of the documents included in immigration files.  USCIS was the custodian of the files, and all FOIA requests for such files  were either initiated with, or referred to, USCIS for processing.  Specifically, to process a FOIA request for an immigration file, the USCIS  staff to whom the request was assigned first manually entered the  requester’s data, such as a name and address, into USCIS’s FOIA  system to establish a record of the request. Next, the staff retrieved and  scanned the documents in the requested file and reviewed the  documents. If all of the documents were generated by USCIS, the staff  made redactions as needed, sent the documents to the requester, and  closed out the request.

Further, if the FOIA request covered files containing documents  generated by CBP, then USCIS was able to process the request on the  basis of an agreement to that effect with CBP. By having USCIS process  such requests for CBP documents, the two components avoided  duplication in their response to a FOIA request.

In November 2014, however, we reported that USCIS and ICE did not  have such an agreement for documents generated by ICE. Thus, the  USCIS staff was to identify any such documents and make them available  to ICE’s FOIA staff for their separate processing. In doing so, we noted  that USCIS and ICE engaged in duplicative processing of FOIA requests  for those immigration files containing documents related to law  enforcement activities that were generated by ICE.

Specifically, to facilitate ICE’s review of such files, USCIS staff transferred  copies of the ICE-generated documents to a temporary electronic storage  drive maintained by USCIS. ICE retrieved the documents, and the ICE  staff then re-entered the data to create a new FOIA request in ICE’s FOIA  processing system. The staff then proceeded with processing the  requested documents, and released them to the requester—in essence,  undertaking a new, and duplicate, effort to respond to the FOIA request.  Figure 1 depicts the duplication that occurred in USCIS’s and ICE’s  downloading and re-entering of data to respond to FOIA requests for  immigration files.

We noted that, up until April 2012, USCIS and ICE had an agreement  whereby USCIS processed ICE’s documents contained in an immigration  file. However, the components’ officials stated that, since that agreement  ended, the components had not made plans to enter into another such  agreement. According to ICE’s FOIA Officer, USCIS’s processing of ICE’s  documents in immigration files was viewed as being too costly.

Nonetheless, while there would be costs associated with USCIS  processing ICE’s documents in immigration files, the potential existed for  additional costs to be incurred in the continued duplicate processing of  such files.

Our work has noted that duplication exists when two or more agencies  or programs are engaged in the same activities or provide the same  services to the same beneficiaries. We concluded that the duplicate  processing of a single FOIA request by USCIS and ICE staff contributed  to an increase in the time needed to respond to a FOIA request for  immigration files. Because USCIS did not send the immigration file to ICE  until it had completed its own processing of the relevant documents— which, according to USCIS, took on average 20 working days—ICE  usually did not receive the file to begin its own processing until the 20-day  time frame for responding to a request had passed.

We pointed out that re-establishing an agreement that allows USCIS to  process ICE-generated documents included in requests for immigration  files, to the extent that the benefits of doing so would exceed the cost,  could enable the two components to eliminate duplication in their  processes for responding to such a request. Further, it could help reduce  the time needed by these components in responding to a request.  Therefore, in November 2014, we recommended that DHS direct the  Chief FOIA Officer to determine the viability of re-establishing the service- level agreement between USCIS and ICE to eliminate duplication in the  processing of immigration files. We stressed that, if the benefits of doing  so would exceed the costs, DHS should re-establish the agreement. We  also reported on our finding and recommendation regarding duplicate  processing in our reports and updates on fragmentation, overlap, and  duplication, issued in 2015 through 2019.

In response, DHS indicated that it was working on a system intended to  address the duplication. Specifically, in August 2018, DHS’s Privacy  Office Director of Correspondence/Executive Secretary stated that the  Privacy Office was leading a working group in collaboration with the  Office of the Chief Information Officer to develop requirements for a single  information technology solution for processing incoming FOIA requests.  The director added that DHS used three disparate systems to track,  manage, and process FOIA requests and that moving USCIS and ICE to  one processing solution should result in processing benefits and lower  overall administrative costs. We continue to track DHS’s progress in  implementing this recommendation. However, as of October 2019, DHS’s  Privacy Office stated that these actions were still in progress.

In conclusion, DHS has implemented a number of key FOIA practices.  However, it does not have a comprehensive plan to address its FOIA  backlog, nor has it yet addressed duplication in its FOIA process.  Addressing both of these issues is important, as the number and  complexity of requests will likely increase over time and DHS may be  challenged in effectively responding to the needs of requesters and the  public.

Chairwoman Torres Small, Ranking Member Crenshaw, and Members of  the Subcommittee, this completes my prepared statement. I would be  pleased to respond to any questions that you may have.

If you or your staffs have any questions about this testimony, please  contact Vijay A. D’Souza, Director, Information Technology and  Cybersecurity, at (202) 512-6240 or dsouzav@gao.gov. Contact points  for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be  found on the last page of this testimony statement. GAO staff who made  key contributions to this testimony include Neela Lakhmani and Anjalique  Lawrence (assistant directors), Kara Epperson, Christopher Businsky,  Nancy Glover, and Scott Pettis.

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the  United States. The published product may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety  without further permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain  copyrighted images or other material, permission from the copyright holder may be  necessary if you wish to reproduce this material separately.

The Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requires federal agencies to provide the public with access to government records. The Department of Homeland Security continues to receive the largest number of FOIA requests of any federal department or agency, almost 396,000 in FY 2018.

DHS’s backlog of unfulfilled FOIA requests almost doubled between 2012 and 2018. But DHS doesn’t have a plan to address this backlog of more than 50,000 requests—which means it will likely continue to struggle with backlogs.

DHS also continues to have a duplicative process for FOIA requests for certain immigration files, which slows processing times.


Satellite Communications: DOD Should Develop a Plan for Implementing Its Recommendations on a Future Wideband Architecture

DOD officials estimate spending an average of $4 billion each year to acquire and sustain wideband satellite communications that provide fast and reliable voice, video, and data transmissions critical to military operations. DOD is considering how to meet its future wideband needs across many different operating environments and scenarios. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016 required DOD to conduct a Wideband Communications Services AOA to identify ways to replace current systems as the satellites reach the end of their service lives.

The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 contained a provision for GAO to assess DOD's analysis. This report addresses (1) whether the Wideband AOA was comprehensive, (2) how DOD solicited input from stakeholders, and (3) the conclusions DOD reached through the Wideband AOA.

GAO reviewed the Wideband AOA along with DOD policies, documentation, and analyses; interviewed DOD officials and commercial stakeholders; and assessed the AOA against best practices for a comprehensive AOA process.

The Department of Defense (DOD) conducted a comprehensive analysis of alternatives (AOA) process for wideband satellite communications, as determined through an assessment of the AOA against relevant GAO best practices. A comprehensive analysis of alternatives process indicates that the analysis team thoroughly addressed a wide range of possible satellite system alternatives.

DOD used multiple methods to obtain stakeholder input, in accordance with its Wideband AOA study plan. For example, the study team incorporated input from across the military services and operational users, among others. Moreover, the Air Force and Defense Information Systems Agency conducted interrelated studies to provide additional information to the Wideband study team.

DOD's analysis concluded that integrating military and commercial systems into a hybrid architecture would be more cost effective and capable than either acquisition approach alone. However, DOD also found that it needs more information to select its next satellite communications architecture and made recommendations for further study. Examples of these recommendations include:

Develop an enterprise satellite communications terminal strategy – DOD found the magnitude of replacing user terminals to work with new systems was challenging and that more information on emerging technology and possible changes to terminal acquisition approaches would help DOD address this challenge.

Invest in commercial technologies – DOD found that it lacked detailed technical information on commercial systems' cyber protections and that additional information on such protections would help DOD determine the extent to which they would meet DOD's needs.

Such recommendations align with GAO's acquisition best practices for knowledge-based decision-making and have the potential to improve the department's satellite communications acquisitions. However, DOD stakeholders said there is no formal plan to guide and coordinate implementation of the AOA recommendations. Without such a plan, DOD is at increased risk of not having the information it needs to make timely, knowledge-based decisions on future systems to provide critical communications for military operations.

GAO is recommending that DOD develop a plan to guide implementation of the Wideband AOA recommendations. DOD provided technical comments on a draft of this report, which GAO incorporated as appropriate.

Department of Defense (DOD) officials estimate spending an average of  $4 billion each year to acquire and sustain wideband satellite  communications capabilities, including developing and fielding military  satellite systems, contracting for commercial satellite communications  services, and acquiring and operating satellite ground terminals.  Wideband satellite communication capabilities provide fast and reliable  voice, video, and data communications on a global scale to support  critical military operations. For example, wideband satellite  communications provide military leaders information on their operational  environment and allow commanders to communicate with geographically  dispersed units to help ensure coordinated, successful operations.

DOD is considering how best to meet its future wideband communication  needs. Several factors shape these needs, including an expected  increase in military systems that depend on satellite-provided data; many  changing operating environments and scenarios; and growing threats to  DOD space systems. For example, in recent years, threats to DOD space  systems that provide communications have increased, including anti- satellite weapons, communications jamming, cybersecurity risks, and  environmental hazards in space, such as orbital debris.

Congress, in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016,  required DOD to conduct an analysis of alternatives (AOA) for a follow-on  wideband communications system to the Wideband Global SATCOM  system that includes space, air, and ground layer communications  capabilities for DOD. DOD conducted a Wideband Communications  Services (Wideband) AOA from December 2016 to June 2018. The  National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 required DOD to  submit its analysis to us for review and assessment. DOD provided the  AOA to us in June 2019, after the Office of the Secretary of Defense  finished its reviews. This report addresses (1) whether DOD conducted a  comprehensive analysis of satellite communications alternatives in  accordance with GAO best practices; (2) how DOD solicited and  incorporated input from military and commercial stakeholder communities  during the Wideband AOA; and (3) the conclusions DOD reached through  the Wideband AOA.

To conduct this work, we reviewed the Wideband AOA report and all  supporting documents, such as AOA working group appendixes on  technologies and alternatives, cost analysis, and ground terminals that  communicate with satellites, among others. We also reviewed detailed  cost models, schedules, and other Wideband AOA supporting  documentation. We compared the Wideband AOA against DOD’s  Wideband Communication Services AOA Study Plan. We reviewed  related reports on an Air Force pilot program and documents the Navy  and Army prepared to support the AOA. We also reviewed DOD  documentation related to wideband communication including the  Wideband MILSATCOM Roadmap Report, the National Security Satellite  Communications Systems Synchronization Roadmap, the 2017  Commercial Satellite Communications Expenditures and Usage Report,  and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction on Department of  Defense Satellite Communications. Using information from these  documents, combined with information from interviews with DOD officials  who led or participated in the AOA, we assessed the Wideband AOA  against the six criteria from our Analysis of Alternatives Best Practices  that assess the comprehensiveness of the AOA process. Appendix I  contains additional details on our AOA Best Practices.

In addition to materials from the Wideband AOA appendixes, we reviewed  DOD requests for information from industry to examine how the  department incorporated input from commercial stakeholders. To support  our work across all reporting objectives, we interviewed officials from the  Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment;  Office of the Secretary of Defense-Cost Assessment and Program  Evaluation; DOD Chief Information Officer; the Defense Information  Systems Agency; the Joint Chiefs of Staff-Force Structure, Resource and  Assessment; Air Force Space Command Space and Missile Systems  Center; Army Space and Missile Defense Command and the Program  Executive Office Command Control Communications-Tactical; Office of  the Chief of Naval Operations; and Marine Corps Systems Command.  Finally, we interviewed a broad range of commercial industry  stakeholders, including satellite communications providers.

We conducted this performance audit from October 2018 to December  2019 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing  standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to  obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for  our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe  that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings  and conclusions based on our audit objectives.

DOD uses military and commercial satellite communications (SATCOM)  to meet its global communications requirements. DOD acquires wideband  capacity through two methods:

DOD purpose-built: DOD obtains some of its SATCOM through its  purpose-built systems, which include Wideband Global SATCOM  (WGS) satellites. While DOD awards contracts to commercial  companies to build these systems, the department is responsible for  the systems’ procurement, operations and sustainment; therefore,  they are considered purpose-built.

Commercial contracts: DOD also purchases commercial SATCOM  services to supplement its purpose-built systems, such as for  satisfying users who have needs beyond available military satellite  resources, supporting training on ground systems, or meeting the  needs of unique users. In these cases, DOD acquires commercial  SATCOM bandwidth through several competitively selected vendors,  who are responsible for operating and sustaining their own systems.

Military SATCOM architectures fall into three types: protected, which provides secure, assured communications; wideband, which supports worldwide capacity for high data rate  communications, including high-quality voice and imagery; and narrowband, which provides reliable and secure communications less  vulnerable to adverse weather conditions or other physical limitations,  such as distance, dense foliage, and terrain.

DOD’s primary wideband satellite communications system, WGS,  currently provides a portion of DOD’s required SATCOM bandwidth, but  the Air Force estimates its satellite constellation’s capabilities will begin to  degrade in the late 2020s. The Air Force is adding at least one more  satellite to the WGS constellation and plans for an enhanced WGS-11 to  provide the capacity of two satellites. During the Wideband AOA, DOD  estimated that adding this satellite to the constellation would extend the  availability of wideband communications to 2031. According to the Air  Force, there is potential for adding a 12th WGS satellite to the  constellation.

Like other types of space systems, DOD’s wideband SATCOM systems  generally involve four types of interrelated segments that make a space  capability fully functional. As illustrated in figure 1, they include (1) the  space segment—namely the satellites; (2) the ground segment, with  network services and also including satellite and payload control systems  and data processing subsystems and facilities; (3) user equipment, such  as radios, terminals, and routers needed by the warfighter to use the  capability; and (4) launch vehicles and facilities.

Within the space segment, satellites operate in several different types of  orbits to meet different communication and mission needs, as shown in  figure 2. The orbital location of a satellite can affect its capacity to  transmit data, or what parts of the Earth can receive its signal. For  example, highly elliptical orbits are necessary for providing long dwell  times over northern latitudes due to the curvature of the Earth, while other  orbits cover remaining latitudes.

Wideband satellites operate in different radio frequency spectrum bands.  DOD typically relies on C, X, Ku, and Ka-bands to provide wideband  connectivity, determined by where and how users are operating. Each of  these frequency bands has advantages and disadvantages for various  applications. Satellite transponders operating at the lower C-band  frequencies are less susceptible to degradation from rain than other  bands. In the United States, the X-band is specifically designated for use  by the U.S. government and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The  Ku-band operates at higher frequencies and can communicate with  smaller antennas and offer more flexibility. The still-higher-frequency Ka- band satellites can transmit more data than C, X, and Ku-band satellites,  but their signals are more susceptible to degradation from water vapor  and rain than satellites in lower frequency bands. Commercial satellite  communication providers have historically operated primarily in the Ku- band but are now expanding services in the Ka-band to offer higher data  rates.

An AOA is a key first step in DOD’s acquisition process and assesses  alternative solutions for addressing future needs. DOD acquisition  guidance provides the purpose and procedures associated with  conducting an AOA to support decision making. DOD experts in areas  such as cost estimating, technological analysis, and acquisitions, along  with military and commercial stakeholders, comprise the AOA study team.  The study team is involved in the day-to-day work of the AOA process  and conducts the analyses that form the foundation of the assessment.  During the AOA study period, the study team develops alternatives to  satisfy capability gaps that they assess against pre-established  performance requirements.

We have identified 22 best practices for an AOA process. Of these, 6  best practices are associated with a “comprehensive” AOA.  Comprehensive means that the AOA process ensures that the mission  need is defined in a way to allow for a robust set of alternatives, that no  alternatives are omitted, and that each alternative is examined thoroughly  for the project’s entire life cycle. Without a clearly defined mission need  and comprehensive list of alternatives, the AOA process could overlook  the alternative that best meets the mission need. Furthermore, without  considering the complete life cycle of each alternative, decision makers  will not have a comprehensive picture of the alternatives analyzed.

DOD Conducted a Comprehensive Analysis of Wideband SATCOM Alternatives

DOD completed its analysis of wideband SATCOM alternatives in June  2018 and identified 11 alternatives that represent several possible  approaches to SATCOM acquisitions. We found the Wideband AOA to be  a comprehensive assessment.

DOD Developed Alternatives to Inform Future SATCOM Decisions

The Office of the Secretary for Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment  completed the Wideband AOA in June 2018 to support decision making  for future wideband architectures. Several subsystems comprise a  SATCOM architecture and can include the number, type, orbital location,  and capacity of satellites and associated ground or user segments. WGS  constellation satellites will begin reaching their end of life in the early  2030s, which means DOD will need to begin launching replacement  system satellites in the late 2020s. DOD satellite systems take, on  average, over 7 years to develop and launch the first satellite of a  purpose-built system. Given these time frames, the Wideband AOA study  team focused on possible alternatives DOD could begin developing as  early as 2019. In October 2016, the Office of the Secretary of Defense- Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation developed the Wideband  Communications Services Analysis of Alternatives Study Plan. This Study  Plan provided the schedule and tasks to be conducted for the Wideband  AOA. These tasks included identifying study questions to be addressed  and listing measures of performance and effectiveness. The Study Plan  also described the organizational structure and methodology for  executing the Wideband AOA.

The Wideband AOA study team developed 11 alternatives that broadly  represented three different acquisition approaches: legacy DOD  SATCOM procurement focused on purpose-built systems with some  commercially-contracted services; commercial-focused SATCOM  procurement; and a strategy that would transition from a mainly purpose- built system to a more commercial SATCOM-oriented model. Historically,  DOD has bought purpose-built SATCOM assets, including satellites and  supporting ground systems, while contracting for supplemental  commercial bandwidth. Table 1 summarizes the architectures and these  approaches.

The Wideband AOA Process Was Comprehensive

Our assessment of the Wideband AOA found that it met our criteria for a  comprehensive AOA process. Table 2 shows our determinations of how  fully the Wideband AOA met each of our six best practices. Appendix I  provides more detail on our AOA best practices.

Based on our analysis, we found that the Wideband AOA study team  thoroughly addressed a wide range of possible satellite system  alternatives. Moreover, the Wideband AOA study examined the ground  segment systems—including user terminals—which will communicate  with the satellite system DOD chooses to replace WGS. Although user  terminals were not the primary focus of this AOA, DOD officials told us  this effort was the first time DOD has studied and consolidated  department-wide costs for these terminals, which they said provided  valuable context to decision-makers. We discuss this new information on  terminals in further detail later in this report.

In Accordance with Its Study Plan, DOD Used Multiple Methods to Obtain Stakeholder Input

As set forth in the AOA Study Plan, the Wideband AOA study team  solicited and incorporated input from across DOD stakeholders, such as  the military services, operational users, and SATCOM partner nations.  The study team also solicited and incorporated information from  commercial SATCOM vendors to inform its alternatives. Additionally, the  Wideband AOA study team incorporated information from interrelated  studies, referred to as pilots and pathfinders, that the Air Force and  Defense Information Systems Agency conducted. These studies  recommended ongoing experimentation and adaptation to identify,  incorporate, and guide future commercial SATCOM development, as well  as changes to DOD’s approach to SATCOM acquisitions.

Military and Commercial Stakeholders Provided Input to the AOA

As set forth in its Study Plan, the Wideband AOA study team obtained  military input from across DOD and information from commercial  SATCOM vendors to inform its alternatives. AOA working groups were  one of several mechanisms DOD used to obtain stakeholder input. The  AOA study plan directed the establishment of eight working groups to  consolidate subject matter experts for relevant SATCOM topics, as shown  in table 3. Each working group, task force, and team conducted its  analysis and wrote an appendix to the AOA report summarizing its  methodology, inputs, and results. Each team also provided its own  conclusions or recommendations, which contributed to the overall findings  and recommendations of the AOA report.

Military service representatives who participated in the Wideband AOA  described to us how their personnel were involved in many or all of the  working groups. AOA study leaders also emphasized the quality of the  input from the working groups and were confident the AOA successfully  captured the perspectives of acquisition, operational, and user  communities—personnel responsible for buying, controlling, and using  wideband SATCOM.

In addition to the working groups, the Wideband AOA study team  developed functional requirements for the alternatives by requesting  SATCOM user demand data from the services, and invited SATCOM  partner nations to participate in the AOA—a portion of which accepted.  These efforts provided additional information from user communities.  Wideband AOA study team leaders described how they relied on a formal  Joint Chiefs of Staff process to obtain inputs from the military services on  their current and projected bandwidth demands. Through this process,  the department obtained SATCOM user demand data from combatant  commands, military services, and their sub-commands. The AOA study  team then used these results to develop an aggregate user demand  projection that was foundational to the AOA. Any viable alternative had to  provide sufficient bandwidth to meet future user demand.

DOD requested inputs from commercial SATCOM vendors and the  Commercial Working Group used these to identify the space system  subcomponents, namely technical characteristics, including frequency  bands, orbit, and satellite mass that the Technologies and Alternatives  Working Group eventually combined into the 11 final alternatives. The  Commercial Working Group’s intent in identifying these subcomponents  was to represent capabilities the SATCOM industry will have on-orbit by  2023, without depicting any single vendor’s potential system. The  Commercial Working Group also incorporated results from DOD pilot and  pathfinder efforts (discussed below) to develop a roadmap for DOD to  implement an enterprise management approach to SATCOM  procurement and operations.

DOD Pilot and Pathfinder Efforts Provided Additional Information to the Wideband AOA Study Team

The Air Force and Defense Information Systems Agency conducted  interrelated pilot and pathfinder studies before and during the Wideband  AOA that provided information on SATCOM business arrangements, user  terminal prototyping, and acquisition efficiencies. In 2014 and 2015,  Congress authorized, and then directed, DOD to carry out a pilot program  on the acquisition of commercial satellite communication services. As  part of this pilot, DOD initiated pathfinder projects to test the feasibility of  these new business arrangements. The Air Force and Defense  Information Systems Agency studied and prototyped methods to improve  commercial SATCOM acquisition and provide more flexible satellite  connections for mobile SATCOM users. The agencies did so by  contracting with commercial SATCOM providers for the following:

Air Force Pilot – define and demonstrate prototyping to improve  access to commercial SATCOM. The Air Force completed phases 1  and 2 of this 3-phase pilot program, studying preferential purchasing  approaches that incentivize industry and the types of SATCOM  architectures that enable such purchasing, such as a managed  services approach that consolidates commercial SATCOM  procurement for DOD users. Phase 1 studied commercial satellite  communication architecture and business structures. The Wideband  AOA’s Commercial Working Group used the phase 1 results in its  modeling of SATCOM enterprise management. Phase 2  demonstrated a flexible modem-to-terminal interface to allow a  terminal to “roam” or switch between different manufacturers’ satellite  constellations. Phase 3 is ongoing and focuses on network integration  risk reduction efforts.

Air Force Pathfinders – prove that innovative business  arrangements can meet DOD requirements and reduce costs.  Through the pathfinder research efforts, the Air Force purchased an  on-orbit transponder as well as pre-launch transponder to  demonstrate different strategies for buying SATCOM. The final  pathfinder effort is ongoing and is to demonstrate how access to  shared bandwidth and more flexible ground systems can improve  SATCOM access for warfighters. These types of capabilities help  users to move more quickly and easily, with a reliable SATCOM  connection.

Defense Information Systems Agency Pathfinders – examine how  acquisition efficiencies improve SATCOM services. The pathfinders’  findings provided observations on market trends for SATCOM  contracting, namely that pricing will continue to decrease. The  pathfinders also showed that DOD’s typical SATCOM requirements  are not stable from year to year, meaning DOD cannot accurately  predict when or where it will need surge SATCOM capacity. The  pathfinders also identified management challenges to aggregating  SATCOM requirements.

The pilot and pathfinder efforts recommended ongoing experimentation  and adaptation to identify, incorporate, and guide developing commercial  SATCOM capabilities, as well as changes to DOD’s traditional approach  to SATCOM acquisitions. In particular, both the Air Force and Defense  Information Systems Agency recommended that DOD adapt to changing  business models, especially for managed services in commercial  SATCOM, in which DOD would purchase SATCOM services but would  not own or manage the systems and data rates. Changing business  models could also include greater coordination with the SATCOM  industry, so DOD can better incorporate commercial technology into  future systems. The Defense Information Systems Agency also  recommended that DOD pursue an alignment of common types of user  terminals and SATCOM architectures. For example, many programs use  a different approach to procuring terminals and SATCOM architectures,  which prevents DOD from taking advantage of commonalities that could  save resources. Such commonalities include users in the same  geographic area. These Air Force and Defense Information Systems  Agency recommendations overlap with half of the findings and  recommendations of the Wideband AOA.

DOD Concluded That Future Wideband SATCOM Requires a Hybrid Approach and More Knowledge, but It Lacks a Plan to Implement AOA Recommendations

DOD concluded in the Wideband AOA that integrating purpose-built  satellite systems and commercially-provided systems into a hybrid  architecture would be more cost effective and capable than any single  purpose-built or commercial system alone. The AOA study team  recommended actions to obtain more information on transitioning to a  more integrated architecture of purpose-built and commercial systems  and reducing risk. However, DOD does not have a plan to implement  these recommendations and inform timely decision-making.

DOD Concluded That Future Wideband Communications Require a Hybrid Approach

During the AOA, DOD found that integrating purpose-built satellites and  commercially-provided systems into a hybrid architecture would save  costs and provide more capability than any single purpose-built or  commercial system alone. The department currently uses a mix of  purpose-built and commercial SATCOM contracts, but DOD has not  historically managed these systems in coordination, or with an enterprise  approach. DOD considered 11 architectures in its final analysis and all  were to some extent hybrids of purpose-built and commercial systems  because the AOA study team found that DOD requires a combination of  military and commercial system capabilities. The Wideband AOA report  identified three of the 11 potential architectures that would best meet  DOD’s wideband SATCOM needs:

Legacy Purpose-Built and Commercial Contracting Architecture -  Procure and field a new purpose-built constellation for X and Ka-band  capabilities with anti-jam technologies and upgraded antennas. DOD  would continue to contract for commercial SATCOM as needed.

Commercial-Oriented Architecture - Pursue advanced commercial  high capacity satellites with steerable beams over the Ka-band. Also  procure 10 purpose-built satellites to meet the military’s requirement  for X-band communications.

Transitional Step to Commercial Architecture - Transition to  commercially-managed services architecture in low-Earth orbit for  approximately 5,000 users over the long term. DOD would procure  and field the modernized, purpose-built legacy architecture described  above, then modify its suite of user terminals to align with the new  low-Earth orbit satellites, emphasizing a cost-effective strategy to do  so. For users who do not transition to the new commercial satellites,  the purpose-built constellation provides continued X and Ka-band  capability.

During the Wideband AOA, DOD found that any post-WGS solution must  continue to provide purpose-built SATCOM capabilities. For example,  some users require X-band communications and identified this as the  single most important capability to maintain. However, commercial  constellations provide limited X-band communications due to this band’s  historical use for military communications. The companies and  international partners that do offer X-band communications provide  fragmented coverage that does not fully meet DOD’s needs. In addition,  commercial satellite constellations do not offer services in all of the areas  DOD operates, such as over oceans and in polar regions.

At the same time, because purpose-built systems alone cannot meet all  military requirements, DOD found it will need to rely on commercial  capabilities as part of a future architecture. Consequently, the AOA study  team assessed alternatives that would expand DOD’s use of emerging  commercial technologies. For example, DOD expects certain operations,  like aerial vehicle flights that rely on wideband SATCOM, to increase and  drive demand for commercial SATCOM capabilities. Moreover, the AOA  study team found that emerging commercial capabilities could meet  routine military needs, such as training, at a competitive cost. The AOA  study team concluded integrating these capabilities into a future  architecture would be beneficial.

AOA Recommendations Focus on Gaining Additional Knowledge for Decision-Making and Reducing Risk

In its Wideband AOA report, the AOA study team made a series of  recommendations focused on maintaining current wideband capabilities  and overcoming near-term information gaps in transitioning to new  SATCOM acquisition and management approaches. All of the  recommendations focused on gaining information needed to transition to  a hybrid architecture of purpose-built and commercial systems in the long  term. Table 4 provides examples of DOD’s recommendations and the  additional knowledge DOD needs to obtain as it pursues a post-WGS  solution.

The Wideband AOA recommendations also addressed risks associated  with any new SATCOM architecture, which the study team found include:  (1) the uncertain stability and maturity of emergent commercial SATCOM  systems and (2) the magnitude of replacing or modifying SATCOM user  terminals.

Commercial Technology Stability and Maturity: DOD found in the  Wideband AOA that the commercial SATCOM market needs time to  grow and stabilize as industry seeks to build a consumer base,  especially for low-Earth-orbit-based internet services. The AOA study  team found that if commercial companies cannot close their  businesses cases around proposed solutions, DOD investments or  programs that rely on those proposed solutions may fail. Further,  many commercial systems, especially those based in low-Earth orbit,  are still maturing. SATCOM providers have not yet worked closely  with DOD to see how they would need to modify such constellations  to operate with future DOD systems, including ground systems.  Wideband AOA stakeholders—military and commercial—also  described their struggle to share information on technical  requirements, new capabilities, and pricing. For example, military  stakeholders wanted more detailed engineering data on emerging  commercial capabilities while commercial stakeholders wanted  additional information on proposed alternatives for providing cost  data. Commercial stakeholders also sought to protect their proprietary  information. DOD’s recommendation to invest in and shape  commercial SATCOM development is aimed at reducing this risk and  improving information sharing between DOD and the SATCOM  industry.

Replacing or Modifying User Terminals: Managing user terminal  development and upgrades is complex and, according to DOD  officials, is one of the largest challenges the department faces in  selecting a post-WGS architecture. In its analysis, DOD found that  managing upgrades or replacement costs and schedules for over  17,000 terminals of approximately 135 different designs was a major  challenge. The AOA’s analysis showed that out-of-cycle terminal  replacement would drive significant costs and affect DOD operations.  For example, vehicles like Humvees or ships have maintenance  periods that are scheduled years in advance. Changing terminals  could require unscheduled maintenance, potentially disrupt personnel  planning, and cost more than if the terminals were upgraded on their  planned refresh cycles.

Certain users also cannot transition to commercial SATCOM and still  meet operational requirements. For example, Navy stakeholders told  us their terminals were not considered for transition to commercial  systems during the Wideband AOA due to a number of issues,  including Ku-band radio frequency interference, all-weather  availability, open ocean coverage, and network constraints. Both our  past work and the Wideband AOA found that DOD faces ongoing  risks in aligning its satellite and ground control systems. We have  reported that these risks have arisen, in part, because user terminal  development programs are typically managed by different military  acquisition organizations than those managing the satellites and  ground control systems. The AOA recommendation to develop an  enterprise SATCOM terminal strategy is aimed at reducing the risk  user terminals present to DOD’s post-WGS SATCOM architecture.

DOD Does Not Have a Formal Plan to Implement AOA Recommendations

DOD’s recommendations that focus on gaining additional knowledge align  with GAO’s acquisition best practices for knowledge-based decision- making and risk reduction, but DOD lacks a formal plan to implement  these recommendations. More specifically, DOD’s recommendation to  gain knowledge about the viability and maturity of commercial SATCOM  system technologies corresponds with our best practices that outline the  importance of ensuring needed technologies are proven to work as  intended before programs begin. According to officials we spoke with  from various DOD organizations involved in the Wideband AOA and  SATCOM acquisitions, they have work ongoing that provides relevant  information, including Air Force pathfinders and a study of ground  infrastructure supporting WGS. However, these officials told us that there  is no formal plan to guide post-AOA efforts including coordinating and  providing the knowledge DOD needs to mitigate risks and inform timely  decisions on DOD’s next wideband communications architecture. If DOD  does not develop and implement a plan—including roles, responsibilities,  and time frames—for building knowledge, then DOD risks not having  enough information to make timely, knowledge-based decisions on  systems that provide critical communications for military operations. For  example, the Wideband AOA recommended developing an enterprise  terminal strategy to centralize user terminal procurement. Without a plan  to guide such an effort, it is unclear what organization within DOD would  begin working with the military services to develop this strategy and  potentially adjust the services’ acquisition approach to terminals.

At the same time, it is important to note that DOD space acquisition is  facing a changing leadership environment, and developing and  implementing a plan for post-AOA efforts would need to take place in the  midst of such changes. In 2016, we reported that for over 2 decades,  fragmentation and overlap in DOD space acquisition management and  oversight had led to ineffective and untimely decision-making, leading to  delays in space system development and increasing the risk of capability  gaps across critical weapons systems. DOD and Congress are taking  steps designed to ultimately streamline decision-making and clarify  authorities for space; however, it will likely take several years to  implement such changes. Moreover, it is unclear the extent to which  these changes will affect acquisition of user terminals—a long-standing  challenge for DOD because the organizations responsible for buying  terminals are not the same organizations that buy satellites. The changes  being instituted include:

Re-established United States Space Command. In August 2019,  the President re-established the U.S. Space Command as a unified  combatant command. DOD will form today’s Space Command with  some offices from Strategic Command responsible for space  operations, with the mission to protect and defend space assets.  Although U.S. Space Command does not conduct space acquisitions,  it is responsible for the satellite operators who help systems like WGS  function—stakeholders in a post-WGS decision.

Transferred commercial SATCOM procurement to Air Force  Space Command. At the direction of the National Defense  Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018, Air Force Space Command  assumed responsibility for procuring commercial satellite  communications for DOD in December 2018. The Defense  Information Systems Agency previously managed most commercial  SATCOM acquisitions and is still responsible for other types of ground  segment systems.

Proposed Establishment of a United States Space Force. Early in  2019, the President and DOD proposed the establishment of a U.S.  Space Force as a sixth branch of the U.S. Armed Forces within the  Department of the Air Force. The Space Force would include the  uniformed and civilian personnel conducting and directly supporting  space operations from all DOD armed forces, assume responsibilities  for all major military space acquisition programs—including those for  SATCOM, and create the appropriate career tracks for military and  civilian space personnel. Congress is deliberating the final  composition of the proposed Space Force.

Established the Space Development Agency. In March 2019, DOD  established the Space Development Agency to unify and integrate  efforts across DOD to define, develop, and field innovative satellite  solutions, including communications. The Space Development  Agency is focused on a low-Earth-orbit constellation to provide  communications and other satellite-based operational support for  DOD, which could also provide information for selecting a post-WGS  architecture. As of this time, DOD has not determined how this new  organization will mesh with the Air Force Space and Missile Systems  Center that acquires satellite systems; the Defense Advanced  Research Projects Agency, which creates breakthrough technologies  and capabilities; and similar organizations within the department.

The Wideband AOA’s recommendations for gathering additional  information to reduce risk and inform DOD’s decision-making are good  first steps to ensure any post-WGS architecture will effectively and  efficiently meet DOD’s needs. The addition of one or two more WGS  satellites provides some extra time for DOD to field new satellites, avoid  capability gaps, and implement the AOA recommendations. However, given the typical 7-year development timelines for space systems, DOD  will need to decide on a way forward within the next several years so that  new satellites will be available when needed. Attempting to implement the  Wideband AOA recommendations without developing a plan for guiding  multiple knowledge-building efforts across DOD raises risk that  information gaps will not be closed in time to be useful or not closed at all.  Consequently, it is important for DOD to coordinate these efforts and  focus on how best to obtain a future wideband architecture that provides  critical communications for military operations.

The Secretary of Defense should ensure that the Under Secretary of  Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment develop and implement a plan  to guide and coordinate efforts to implement the Wideband AOA  recommendations to support timely, informed decisions on its next  wideband satellite communications architecture. (Recommendation 1)

We provided a draft of this report to DOD for review and comment. DOD  provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate.

We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional  committees, the Secretary of Defense, and other interested parties. In  addition, the report is available at no charge on the GAO website at  http://www.gao.gov.

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact  me at (202) 512-4841 or by email at chaplainc@gao.gov. Contact points  for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be  found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key  contributions to this report are listed in appendix III.

Appendix I: Best Practices for the Analysis of Alternatives Process

The analysis of alternatives (AOA) process is an analytical study that is  intended to compare the operational effectiveness, cost, and risks of a  number of potential alternatives to address valid needs and shortfalls in  operational capability. This process helps ensure that the best alternative  that satisfies the mission need is chosen on the basis of the selection  criteria, such as safety, cost, or schedule.

GAO has identified 22 best practices for an AOA process by (1) compiling  and reviewing commonly mentioned AOA policies and guidance used by  different government and private-sector entities and (2) incorporating  experts’ comments on a draft set of practices to develop a final set of  practices.

These practices can be applied to a wide range of activities and situations  in which a preferred alternative must be selected from a set of possible  options, as well as to a broad range of capability areas, projects, and  programs. These practices can also provide a framework to help ensure  that entities consistently and reliably select the project alternative that  best meets the mission need. The guidance below is meant as an  overview of the key principles that lead to a successful AOA process and  not as a “how to” guide with detailed instructions for each best practice  identified because each entity may have its own process in place.

The 22 best practices that GAO identified are grouped into the following  five phases:  Initialize the AOA Process: includes best practices that are applied  before starting the process of identifying, analyzing, and selecting  alternatives. This includes determining the mission need and  functional requirements, developing the study time frame, creating a  study plan, and determining who conducts the analysis.

Identify Alternatives: includes best practices that help ensure the  alternatives that will be analyzed are sufficient, diverse, and viable.

Analyze Alternatives: includes best practices that compare the  alternatives selected for analysis in terms of costs, benefits, and risks.  The best practices in this category help ensure that the team  conducting the analysis uses a standard, quantitative process to  analyze the alternatives.

Document and Review the AOA Process: includes best practices  that are applied throughout the AOA process, such as documenting in  a single document all steps taken to initialize, identify, and analyze  alternatives, selecting a preferred alternative, and independently  reviewing the AOA.

Select a Preferred Alternative: includes the final step of comparing  alternatives and selecting a preferred alternative that best meets the  mission need.

The five phases address different themes of analysis necessary to  complete the AOA process and comprise the beginning of the AOA  process (defining the mission need and functional requirements) through  the final step of the AOA process (select a preferred alternative).

There are three key entities who are directly involved in the AOA process:  the customer, the decision maker, and the AOA team.

The customer refers to the group that implements the final decision  (i.e. the program office, agency, and the like). A complex AOA  process that impacts multiple agencies can have multiple customers.

The decision maker is the person or entity who signs off on the final  decision and analysis documented by the AOA report, and who will  select the preferred alternative based on the established selection  criteria. The decision maker should remain informed throughout the  AOA process. For example, the decision maker could form a  committee that consists of management and other groups  independent of the AOA process who possess the required technical  expertise or broad organizational knowledge to keep the decision  maker apprised of and to inform the AOA process.

The AOA team is the group involved in the day-to-day work of the  AOA process and who conducts the identification and assessment of  alternatives that is the foundation of the AOA process.

We assessed the Department of Defense’s (DOD) Wideband  Communication Services AOA against the “comprehensive”  characteristic. Overall, the AOA met the six best practices we identified.  Table 5 shows the relevant AOA best practices for the “comprehensive”  characteristic.

Appendix II: Department of Defense Wideband Communications Services Analysis of Alternatives Recommendations

The Department of Defense (DOD) made the following recommendations  in its Wideband Communications Services Analysis of Alternatives (AOA)  report:  1.  Immediately conduct a business case analysis that examines  incorporating anti-jam and cybersecurity features that improve upon  legacy capability into the Wideband Global SATCOM (WGS) Space  Vehicle (SV) 11/12 procurement.  2.  Investigate the impacts of WGS SV 11/12 to ground infrastructure,  mission management, and user terminals to understand necessary  modifications.  3.  Develop and implement a DOD Enterprise Satellite Communications  (SATCOM) Terminal Strategy that targets an approved Joint  Information Environment architecture, reduces complexity of terminal  diversity and programmatic governance, facilitates rapid  modernization, and drives innovating business reforms, optimizing  cost, schedule, and performance and interoperability.  4.  Fund a purpose-built capability post-WGS SV 11/12 meeting user  demands, including all weather capabilities, with a recommended start  in fiscal year 2020, including consideration of alternate orbital regimes  and approaches to cost-effectively meet needs while addressing  proliferation, protection, and resiliency. The purpose is to ensure  availability of DOD SATCOM resources to meet requirements where  anticipated commercial offerings fail to materialize or are insufficient.  5.  Continue efforts to invest in and shape commercial capabilities to  support future DOD needs, including protection features, resilience,  contested and all-weather capabilities, and polar coverage.  Additionally, invest in and shape commercial industry development  and risk reduction efforts focused on cybersecurity, terminal  militarization/weapon system integration, management and control,  technology assessment and development, and spectrum access.  6.  Continue to fund existing and new SATCOM risk reduction efforts,  evaluate blended commercial/military constellations, and expand the  scope of pilots to include development of architectural standards and  interface controls for enterprise management and control, terminal  recapitalization plans, and means for terminals and/or weapon system  platforms to transition satellite constellations and any DOD managed  services.  7.  Fund the design and implementation of a prototype wideband  enterprise SATCOM management and control capability based on an  approved Joint Information Environment architecture that integrates  the management of Military, Commercial, and International Partner- provided SATCOM services and networks and supports the  Enterprise Operational Management requirement in the Joint Space  Communications Layer Initial Capabilities Document Change 1.  8.  Plan for investment in Protected Tactical Waveform capabilities to  commercial and military band terminals to align with the Protected  Anti-Jam Tactical SATCOM planned ground and space milestones.  9.  Fund pilot efforts to identify risks and opportunities to use  commercially-managed services for Army’s Combat Support Logistics  Very Small Aperture Terminals and ways to mitigate that risk.  10. Pursue partnership opportunities with Norway and Canada to achieve  earlier Arctic coverage capability.

Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

Cristina T. Chaplain, (202) 512-4841 or chaplainc@gao.gov.

In addition to the contact named above, Rich Horiuchi, Assistant Director;  Burns C. Eckert (Analyst in Charge); Erin Cohen; Emile Ettedgui; Jon  Felbinger; Kurt Gurka; Stephanie Gustafson; Jennifer Leotta; Roxanna  Sun; and Jay Tallon made key contributions to this report.

DOD spends billions of dollars each year to acquire fast and reliable wideband satellite communications for its worldwide military operations—while also navigating growing threats, such as anti-satellite weapons.

To replace existing satellite systems as they reach the end of their service lives and meet future communication needs, DOD analyzed satellite system alternatives. DOD concluded it needs more information to select the next wideband satellite system and recommended further study.

We recommended that DOD develop a plan to coordinate and guide how these studies and recommendations for future systems will be implemented.