Northern Border Security: CBP Identified Resource Challenges but Needs Performance Measures to Assess Security Between Ports of Entry

The United States and Canada share the longest common non-militarized border between two countries, spanning nearly 4,000 miles of land and maritime borders from the states of Washington to Maine. CBP, within DHS, has primary responsibility for securing U.S. borders at and between ports of entry.

GAO was asked to review CBP's efforts to secure the northern border between ports of entry. This report examines, among other things, (1) the staffing and resource challenges that CBP identified and actions it has taken to address those challenges and (2) the extent to which CBP has developed and implemented performance measures to assess its effectiveness at securing the northern border between ports of entry. GAO reviewed agency documentation and met with DHS and CBP officials in headquarters and field locations. This is a public version of a sensitive report that GAO issued in March 2019. Information that DHS deemed sensitive has been omitted.

U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) identified staffing and resource challenges affecting its enforcement activities along the U.S.-Canada (northern) border and actions to address them, but faces competing priorities. The U.S. Border Patrol (Border Patrol) and Air and Marine Operations (AMO) are the components within CBP responsible for securing U.S. borders between ports of entry in the land, air, and maritime environments. Border Patrol identified an insufficient number of agents that limited patrol missions along the northern border. AMO identified an insufficient number of agents along the northern border, which limited the number and frequency of air and maritime missions. Border Patrol and AMO also identified a variety of resource challenges along the northern border, such as limited radar and surveillance technology coverage and inadequate facilities to process and temporarily hold apprehended individuals. While the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and CBP identified actions to address staffing and resource challenges, it is unknown whether these challenges will be addressed. This is primarily because CBP's priority is to secure the U.S.-Mexico (southwest) border. Issued in January 2017, Executive Order 13767 directed DHS to take actions to secure the southwest border by, among other things, constructing physical barriers and hiring thousands of agents.

While CBP has performance measures that assess selected border security operations or programs, some of which include data from the northern border, it does not have specific measures to assess its effectiveness at securing the northern border between ports of entry. For example, Border Patrol has performance measures that assess security in remote areas on the northern border, but the measures do not include data from maritime border areas. Developing and implementing such measures could help Border Patrol and AMO better assess the effectiveness of their northern border operations between ports of entry, including addressing challenges due to limited staffing and resources.

GAO is making two recommendations, that Border Patrol and AMO each develop and implement performance measures to assess their effectiveness at securing the northern border between ports of entry. DHS concurred with both recommendations.

The United States and Canada share the longest common non-militarized  border between two countries, spanning nearly 4,000 miles of land and  maritime borders from the states of Washington to Maine. The terrain,  which ranges from densely forested lands on the west and east coasts, to  open plains in the middle of the country, is composed of both urban and  sparsely-populated lands with limited federal, state, and local law  enforcement presence along the border. Approximately 2,400 miles of the  U.S.-Canada (northern) border consist of waterways, the Great Lakes  system, and the Strait of Juan de Fuca.

U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) within the Department of  Homeland Security (DHS) has primary responsibility for securing U.S.  borders at and between ports of entry. Historically, the United States has  primarily focused attention and resources on the nearly 2,000-mile U.S.  border with Mexico, which continues to experience significantly higher  levels of reported drug trafficking and unlawful entry than the northern  border. Further, this focus was reiterated in Executive Order 13767, which  directed DHS to obtain complete operational control of the U.S.-Mexico  (southwest) border. Such control was defined in the executive order as  the prevention of all unlawful entries into the United States, including  entries by terrorists or other unlawful (i.e. inadmissible) aliens, and  instruments of terrorism, narcotics, and other contraband. Executive  Order 13767 also directed DHS to take actions to secure the southwest  border between ports of entry, including hiring additional CBP law  enforcement personnel and constructing physical barriers along the  border. While working towards meeting the requirements of Executive  Order 13767, DHS also included improving security along the southwest  border of the United States between ports of entry as an agency priority  goal in its Annual Performance Report for Fiscal Years 2017-2019.

In June 2018, DHS released a Northern Border Strategy to establish  actions that are intended to, among other things, improve DHS’s efforts to  safeguard the northern border against terrorist and criminal threats. The  strategy states that long stretches of difficult terrain between ports of  entry provide potential opportunities for individuals who may pose a  national security risk to enter the United States undetected. The strategy  notes, however, that encounters with individuals associated with  transnational crime or terrorism remain infrequent, and sensor technology  plays an important role in locations where full-time deployment of  enforcement personnel is not practical. Further, the strategy states that  DHS will develop an implementation plan to outline roles, responsibilities,  programs, and timelines for accomplishing the strategy’s goals and  objectives for fiscal years 2020 to 2024. According to the strategy, the  implementation plan is intended to identify capability gaps for  accomplishing the strategy’s goals and objectives, which include, in part,  optimizing and appropriately prioritizing CBP technology, equipment, and  personnel utilized along the northern border between ports of entry.

You asked us to review CBP’s efforts to secure the northern border  between ports of entry. This report addresses the following questions: (1)  what threats has CBP identified along the northern border between ports  of entry; (2) what challenges, if any, has CBP identified in its staffing and  resources to secure the northern border between ports of entry, and what  actions, if any, has CBP taken to address those challenges; and (3) to  what extent has CBP developed and implemented performance  measures to assess the effectiveness of securing the northern border  between ports of entry.

This report is a public version of the prior sensitive report that we  provided to you in March 2019. DHS deemed some of the information in  the prior report as For Official Use Only—Law Enforcement Sensitive,  which must be protected from public disclosure. Therefore, this report  omits specific information on threats CBP identified along the northern  border, staffing and resource challenges CBP has identified, locations of  U.S. Border Patrol’s (Border Patrol) reported law enforcement activity and  selected technology programs, and locations and frequency of Air and  Marine Operations (AMO) missions. Although this report omits sensitive  information, it addresses the same questions as the sensitive report.

To address the threats CBP identified along the northern border between  ports of entry, we reviewed DHS and CBP policies, procedures, reports,  and assessments describing threats along the northern border between  ports of entry from fiscal years 2017 and 2018, the most recent fiscal  years available at the time of our review. In addition, we met with officials  from DHS, CBP, and the government of Canada to obtain their  perspectives on threats along the northern border.

To address the challenges CBP identified in its staffing and resources  and the actions, if any, it has taken to address them, we reviewed CBP’s  Fiscal Year 2019 Congressional Budget Justification as well as resource  assessments and plans completed from fiscal years 2016 through 2018, the most recent years for which information was available at the time of  our review. In addition, we interviewed field and headquarters CBP  officials and conducted site visits to observe CBP’s use of resources— such as surveillance technology, facilities, aircraft, and vessels—in  Michigan, New York, Vermont, Virginia, and Washington. We chose these  locations based on deployment of CBP resources, such as surveillance  technology, and reported high levels of illicit cross-border activity.  Findings from our observations and interviews during our site visits  cannot be generalized to all CBP locations along the northern border, but  provide valuable insights into how resources are used for border security  operations along the northern border.

To assess the extent to which CBP has developed and implemented  performance measures, we reviewed and analyzed documentation that  describes DHS and CBP processes for developing and implementing  performance measures, to include DHS’s Annual Performance Report for  Fiscal Years 2017 through 2019 and CBP’s Fiscal Year 2019  Congressional Budget Justification. We also reviewed reports,  assessments, and strategies that describe current performance measure  initiatives and met with DHS and CBP officials in headquarters  responsible for developing and implementing performance measures. We  compared CBP’s actions to develop and implement performance  measures to Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government  and the Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA)  Modernization Act of 2010. Additional details on our scope and  methodology are contained in appendix I.

The performance audit upon which this report is based was conducted  from October 2017 to March 2019 in accordance with generally accepted  government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan  and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide  a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit  objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable  basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We  subsequently worked with DHS from March 2019 to June 2019 to prepare  this nonsensitive version of the original sensitive report for public release.  This public version was also prepared in accordance with these  standards.

Overview of CBP’s Roles and Responsibilities

CBP is the nation’s largest federal law enforcement agency. CBP’s  Border Patrol and AMO are the uniformed law enforcement arms  responsible for securing U.S. borders between ports of entry in the air,  land, and maritime environments.

Border Patrol has primary responsibility for securing U.S. land borders  between ports of entry. Its area of responsibility along the northern border  is divided among eight sectors: Blaine, Spokane, Havre, Grand Forks,  Detroit, Buffalo, Swanton, and Houlton. Each Border Patrol sector is  further divided into Border Patrol stations and each station is assigned a  certain geographic area of responsibility within a sector. Along the  northern border, there are a total of 49 stations or between four to eight  stations per sector. For a map of Border Patrol’s northern border  sectors, see figure 1. Border Patrol agents secure the border between  ports of entry, in part, through patrolling international land borders and  waterways to detect and prevent the illegal trafficking of people, narcotics,  and contraband into the United States.

AMO has primary responsibility for securing U.S. borders in the air,  marine, and land domains and its operations along the northern border  are divided among three branches: Bellingham Air and Marine Branch in  Washington, Great Lakes Air and Marine Branch in Michigan, and  Manassas Air Branch in Virginia. Each branch is further divided into units  to conduct air or maritime missions and there are a total of seven air units  and nine marine units along the northern border. For a map of AMO’s  northern border operating locations, see figure 2. AMO Air Interdiction  Agents are federal law enforcement agents who pilot aircraft, while  Marine Interdiction Agents are federal law enforcement agents who  operate vessels. Air and Marine Interdiction Agents secure the air and  maritime environments along the border, in part, through conducting  surveillance and investigative activities to interdict smuggled narcotics  and other contraband.

Additional offices within CBP that support the activities of Border Patrol  and AMO along the northern border include the Office of Facilities and  Asset Management, Office of Information and Technology (OIT), and  Office of Intelligence.

The Office of Facilities and Asset Management is responsible for  oversight and management of CBP’s real and personal property  portfolios, including managing CBP’s facilities and motor vehicle  fleets.

OIT is responsible for managing CBP’s technology infrastructure and  information technology (IT) operations. These, according to OIT,  enable CBP mission readiness and improve the ability of all  employees, including agents in the field, to be proactive and  responsive to new threats. OIT manages all IT networks, computers,  systems, data, tactical communications, and other resources to  support CBP employees. OIT is also to provide day-to-day field  support primarily through Field Technology Officers who provide  services to CBP’s offices and components, such as repairing  equipment, upgrading systems and networks, restoring system  outages, responding to cybersecurity incidents, and deploying new  technology and equipment.

The Office of Intelligence is to develop, coordinate, and implement  CBP’s intelligence capabilities into a cohesive intelligence enterprise  that supports CBP’s primary mission to secure the borders while  facilitating legitimate trade and travel. The Office of Intelligence’s  Field Intelligence Division is to provide CBP law enforcement  personnel with current and relevant intelligence to inform decision  makers and those who respond to border related crimes, threats, and  hazards. In this division, there are two field intelligence groups with  areas of responsibility along the northern border—the Pacific  Northwest Field Intelligence Group in Washington and the Great  Lakes Field Intelligence Group in Michigan. In addition, through CBP’s  National Border Geospatial Intelligence Strategy, the Office of  Intelligence produces geospatial intelligence products for Border  Patrol sectors to identify areas of potential illicit cross-border activity.

Resources Used by CBP to Secure the Northern Border Between Ports of Entry

Border Patrol and AMO use a variety of technologies, facilities, and other  resources to secure the northern border between ports of entry. Figure 3  illustrates examples of resources used by Border Patrol and AMO, which  include the following:  surveillance technology, such as Remote Video Surveillance  Systems—systems of towers with cameras that transmit information  to video monitors at a Border Patrol facility—and unattended ground  sensors—remotely monitored sensors placed in or on the ground, or  on ground-based platforms, to detect, track, identify, and differentiate  humans, animals, and vehicles—used by Border Patrol agents to  detect and identify illicit cross-border activity;  radar systems to detect and identify aircraft and vessel incursions;  IT and communication systems to conduct operations and ensure the  safety and security of agents while on duty, including databases and  systems for processing detainees, infrastructure to operate  surveillance technology, and tactical communication equipment such  as land mobile radios; aircraft, including fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft, vehicles, including all- terrain vehicles and snowmobiles, and large and small vessels;  tactical infrastructure, including fencing, roads, and border markers  and signs; and  facilities, including buildings to house workstations and offices for  agents and civilian personnel, short-term detention facilities to  process and hold individuals arrested by Border Patrol agents,  forward operating bases in remote locations to support Border Patrol  agent operations, and hangars for aircraft and vessel storage and  repair.

Collaborative Efforts Used by CBP to Secure the Northern Border

CBP participates in a variety of collaborative efforts—including task  forces, joint operations, and partnerships with federal, state, and local law  enforcement agencies—to support its efforts to secure the northern  border between ports of entry. According to CBP officials, collaborative  efforts involve sharing intelligence and other information that informs and  guides the efficient use of agents and resources to conduct enforcement  activities. For example, AMO’s Air and Marine Operations Center  coordinates with federal, state, local, and international law enforcement  agencies to detect, identify, track, and coordinate interdiction of suspect  aviation and maritime activity near and at the borders, including the  northern border, and within the United States. Moreover, Border Patrol’s  Northern Border Coordination Center serves as a centralized coordination  center for information sharing among Border Patrol’s eight northern  border sectors, as well as with domestic and international law  enforcement partners, focusing primarily on counter-terrorism and illicit  criminal networks.

Border Patrol also collaborates with county, state, tribal, local, and other  law enforcement agencies through administration of the Operation  Stonegarden Grant Program, a part of the Homeland Security Grant  Program, to support border security activities. The grant program  provides funding to state, local, and tribal law enforcement agencies to  support joint efforts to secure U.S. borders. For example, grantees may  receive reimbursement for operational overtime costs associated with law  enforcement activities and equipment purchases, such as sensors, in  support of border security activities.

CBP’s collaborative efforts along the northern border also include  participation in various task forces with federal, state, and local law  enforcement agencies. Specifically, Border Patrol and AMO agents may  be assigned as task force officers to conduct or support casework,  investigations, and coordination among federal, state, and local law  enforcement agencies. For example, Border Patrol and AMO agents are  assigned as task force officers along the northern border on the U.S.  Immigration and Customs Enforcement-led Border Enforcement Security  Task Force in Washington, Michigan, and New York to identify,  investigate, disrupt, and dismantle transnational criminal organizations.  According to Border Patrol and AMO officials, task force officers help  enhance partnerships, information sharing, and situational awareness  along the northern border.

CBP also partners with other DHS components to support its efforts to  secure the northern border between ports of entry. For example, through  the Puget Sound Regional Coordinating Mechanism, CBP—including  Border Patrol and AMO—and the U.S. Coast Guard coordinate daily and  conduct joint operations along the maritime border between the state of  Washington and province of British Columbia. CBP also works with  DHS’s Science and Technology Directorate to identify, develop, and  evaluate technology to address capability gaps across the northern  border. For example, DHS’s Science and Technology Directorate, in  collaboration with Swanton Border Patrol sector, deployed land  surveillance technology along the northern border.

CBP Collaboration with the Government of Canada

CBP also collaborates with law enforcement agencies within the  government of Canada through the Cross-Border Law Enforcement  Advisory Committee and Integrated Border Enforcement Team  Program.

The Cross-Border Law Enforcement Advisory Committee is a national- level committee—comprised of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police,  Canada Border Services Agency, U.S. Immigration and Customs  Enforcement, CBP, and U.S. Coast Guard—that provides guidance to  initiatives involving partnerships between United States and Canadian law  enforcement agencies along the shared border.

The Integrated Border Enforcement Team Program includes the Royal  Canadian Mounted Police, Canada Border Services Agency, U.S.

Immigration and Customs Enforcement, CBP, and U.S. Coast Guard.  According to CBP, the priority of the program is to seek and identify  mutual national security threats and combat illicit cross-border activity.  According to CBP and government of Canada officials, program activities  may include real-time tactical intelligence sharing between Canadian and  U.S. law enforcement agencies and periodic meetings to coordinate  operations. These officials stated that the program helps to facilitate  timely information sharing in accordance with Canadian and U.S. laws  and regulations. For example, through the Integrated Border Enforcement  Team Charter, Border Patrol and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police  may share information related to cross-border criminal activity—such as  suspected or known illegal entries between ports of entry—without delay.

CBP Identified Terrorism, Contraband Smuggling, and Violations of U.S. Immigration Law as Threats along the Northern Border Between Ports of Entry

According to DHS’s 2017 Northern Border Threat Analysis Report, the  most common threat to U.S. public safety along the northern border  continues to be contraband smuggling; specifically, the bidirectional flow  of illicit drugs. In its fiscal year 2018 intelligence reports for its eight  northern border sectors, Border Patrol also reported contraband  smuggling as a significant threat along the northern border between ports  of entry, including bidirectional drug smuggling. According to Border  Patrol data for fiscal years 2013 through 2017, 2 percent of Border  Patrol’s total drug seizures occurred along the northern border. Examples  of smuggling activities include criminal groups with known ties to or hired  by Mexican drug trafficking organizations suspected of smuggling  narcotics into Canada and smuggling bulk currency from Canada into the  United States between land border ports of entry.

Border Patrol, in its intelligence reports, also identified contraband  smuggling for the purpose of evading customs duties, involving products  such as tobacco, prohibited fruits, and medicinal products. Further,  according to Border Patrol, criminal organizations smuggle contraband  between ports of entry because certain items such as tobacco,  agricultural, and medicinal products are prohibited for import even if  properly declared at a port of entry.

In 2017, AMO reported contraband smuggling across the northern border  both into and out of the United States between ports of entry. In its 2017  Northern Border Non-Commercial General Aviation Threat Overview,  AMO’s Air and Marine Operations Center identified illicit activity along the  northern border using general aviation aircraft, including aircraft operating  in a suspicious manner at low attitude (low-flying aircraft).

According to Border Patrol’s annual fiscal year 2018 intelligence report,  violations of U.S. immigration and travel controls, which Border Patrol  refers to generally as “illegal immigration,” along the northern border is a  threat and is frequently bidirectional between the United States and  Canada. Additionally, our analysis of Border Patrol data from fiscal  years 2013 through 2017 showed that Border Patrol agents apprehended  14,319 potentially removable aliens—foreign nationals who Border Patrol  suspected or determined were removable from the United States—along  the northern border or approximately 1 percent of its total nationwide  apprehensions of potentially removable aliens (1.97 million aliens).

According to DHS’s 2017 Northern Border Threat Analysis Report, known  illegal crossings between ports of entry by individuals on the northern  border conform to established migration patterns between large  population centers. Further, the report states that terrain, weather, and  distance are factors that constrain migrant travel between ports of entry in  remote areas of the border.

According to Border Patrol officials, the majority of individuals  apprehended along the northern border are suspected or known to have  illegally entered the United States across the southwest border and  traveled to the northern border region before being detected, while a  smaller number of individuals are suspected or known to have illegally  entered the United States from Canada between ports of entry.  Specifically, of the potentially removable aliens apprehended by Border  Patrol along the northern border during this period, we found that 61  percent (8,727) were individuals suspected or known to have illegally  entered the United States from Mexico, while 19 percent (2,782) were  individuals suspected or known to have illegally entered the United States  from Canada. The Swanton Border Patrol sector apprehended the  highest percentage of individuals who illegally entered the United States  from Canada between ports of entry during this period, 43 percent (1,206  individuals) of the total number across all eight northern border sectors.

Border Patrol, in its fiscal year 2018 intelligence reports for its eight  northern border sectors, also identified alien smuggling—bringing into, or  harboring or transporting within, the United States, foreign nationals in  violation of U.S. immigration law—organizations operating along the  northern border between ports of entry as a threat. Examples of alien  smuggling activities include alien smuggling organizations using private  residences along international waterways to provide locations for staging  an illegal entry.

According to Border Patrol officials, criminal organizations operating  along the U.S.-Canada border frequently conduct bidirectional alien  smuggling activities between the United States and Canada as agents  encounter numerous types of groups being smuggled into Canada.

CBP Identified Northern Border Staffing and Resource Challenges and Actions to Address Them but Faces Competing Priorities

CBP identified staffing and resource challenges to its operations and  enforcement activities across the northern border and has identified  actions to address them, but faces competing priorities. Border Patrol  and AMO officials we met with identified agent staffing challenges along  the northern border across all sectors and branches that limit  enforcement activities, including Border Patrol agent availability to  conduct patrol missions and a limited number and frequency of AMO  missions due to AMO agent availability. Border Patrol and AMO officials  also identified resource challenges along the northern border across all  sectors and branches, including radar and surveillance technology used  to surveil the air, maritime, and land environments; IT and communication  technology, including network infrastructure and bandwidth that allow  agents to access CBP systems and tactical communications, such as  land mobile radios for agent communication during border security  missions; and infrastructure and facilities, including tactical  infrastructure—roads, fencing, and border markers—and facilities used by  agents to secure the border.

It is unknown whether the staffing and resource challenges identified by  CBP to secure the northern border between ports of entry will be  addressed due to competing southwest border security priorities. CBP  identified actions and ongoing efforts to address agent staffing and  resource challenges to secure the northern border between ports of entry.  In June 2018, DHS released a Northern Border Strategy to establish  actions that are intended to, among other things, improve DHS’s efforts to  safeguard the northern border against various threats. DHS is  developing an implementation plan for its Northern Border Strategy which  will, among other things, identify actions to address gaps in capabilities to  secure the northern border between ports of entry. However, it is  unknown whether CBP’s northern border staffing and resource  challenges will be addressed due to competing priorities with southwest  border security. For example, instructions in Executive Order 13767  require DHS to obtain complete operational control—prevention of all  unlawful entries into the United States, including entries by terrorists,  other unlawful aliens, instruments of terrorism, narcotics, and other  contraband—of the southwest border, in part through hiring thousands of  agents and constructing a physical barrier.

CBP Identified Staffing Challenges in Securing the Northern Border and Has Ongoing Efforts to Improve Recruitment, Hiring, and Retention Border Patrol Staffing

Border Patrol officials identified staffing challenges across the northern  border sectors that have affected enforcement activities. Officials from  northern border sectors told us that an insufficient number of agents  authorized or onboard at its sectors and stations limits their ability to  conduct enforcement activities and may, at times, pose risks to agent  safety.

In addition, Border Patrol officials from northern border sectors stated that  agent availability for enforcement activities is further limited by detainee  transportation and supervision duties and requests for law enforcement  assistance from other agencies. For example, Border Patrol sector  officials stated that detainee transportation duties result in agents being  unable to conduct enforcement activities for up to 1 day and duties  related to supervision of detainees during court proceedings and  meetings with federal prosecutors may result in agents being unable to  conduct enforcement activities for up to 1 week. Further, responding to  local calls for assistance during assaults may result in agents being  unable to conduct enforcement operations for multiple hours.

Also, Border Patrol officials from northern border sectors stated that  vacancies in civilian Law Enforcement Communication Assistant positions  affect enforcement activities. Law Enforcement Communication Assistant  duties at each northern border sector are dispatching and officer safety  checks, monitoring surveillance camera feeds and unattended ground  sensor activation, and conducting intelligence research checks for agents  on duty across all stations in the sector.

Border Patrol officials told us it is difficult to recruit and retain qualified  applicants for vacant positions due to the lower General Schedule grade  of the position across Border Patrol, which is not competitive with salaries  for similar positions offered through state and local law enforcement  agencies. In August 2018, Border Patrol officials stated that they  created an additional position, the Law Enforcement Information  Specialist, with additional duties and responsibilities at a higher General  Schedule grade.

AMO identified staffing challenges across its northern border branches  which, according to AMO officials, have affected the frequency and  number of air and maritime missions. Specifically, officials at AMO  branches told us that an insufficient number of agents authorized or  onboard at its branches and units limits the frequency and number of air  and maritime missions AMO is able to conduct along the northern border.  For example, AMO officials stated that an insufficient number of Marine  Interdiction Agents limits the number of daily and weekly maritime patrol  missions. For air missions, AMO officials stated that an insufficient  number of Air Interdiction Agents may limit the ability to fulfill immediate  or previously unscheduled requests for air support.

AMO officials from northern border branches also cited agent recruitment,  hiring, and retention as a challenge for filling vacant positions. For  example, officials stated that AMO faces competition with commercial  airline companies for recruitment and retention of qualified individuals  with commercial pilot certificates, including higher salaries, as well as  delays from CBP’s lengthy application process.

AMO officials from northern branches also stated that agent availability  for air and maritime missions is sometimes limited due to temporary duty  assignments to support national missions, which can limit local operations  along the northern border. AMO officials stated that these temporary duty  assignments involve relocation of Air Interdiction Agents, aircraft, and  maintenance staff to other operating locations for multiple weeks. For  example, in 2017, Air Interdiction Agents flew missions to support  recovery efforts after the hurricanes in Texas, Florida, and Puerto Rico. In  2018, Air Interdiction Agents supported security operations during the  Super Bowl in Minneapolis, Minnesota.

CBP’s Ongoing Efforts to Address Staffing Challenges

CBP is taking actions to address agent recruitment, hiring, and retention.  We reported in June 2018 on CBP’s actions to address challenges for  recruitment, hiring, and retention of Border Patrol and AMO agents, such  as increased participation in recruitment events and offering relocation  opportunities for existing employees. According to CBP’s Fiscal Year  2019 Congressional Budget Justification, newly hired Border Patrol  agents will be assigned to the southwest border to allow for the  reassignment of more experienced agents to the northern border. As of  August 2019, Border Patrol officials expected that all sectors in fiscal year  2019, including the northern border sectors, would receive an increase in  the number of authorized agent positions. Border Patrol officials also  stated that as of June 2018, they were completing a Personnel  Requirements Determination Initiative to analyze agent allocations across  its sectors and stations to develop a staffing allocation model to optimally  align staff according to workload and area of responsibility conditions.

In June 2018, we also reported that AMO had taken steps to address  staffing challenges, such as implementing voluntary paid relocation  opportunities and pursuing additional human capital flexibilities to address  its difficulty in retaining Air Interdiction Agents, including a group retention  incentive and a special salary rate. AMO personnel who are non- bargaining unit employees and have served for at least 3 years in their  current location are also eligible for noncompetitive paid relocations.  According to AMO officials, these opportunities are posted every few  months and eligible personnel can apply for transfers to a specific duty  station based on the needs of the operational component. In September  2017, AMO submitted an official request for a 10 percent group retention  incentive for Air Interdiction Agents staffed to the northern border, among  other locations. According to the request, the incentive is intended to help  AMO retain qualified pilots in these hard-to-fill locations by raising their  salaries to be more competitive with commercial airlines.

Border Patrol officials we met with stated that Border Patrol’s Operational  Mobility and Resident Agent Programs have helped northern border  sectors to address agent staffing challenges. The Operational Mobility  Program provides Border Patrol agents with opportunities for a paid  relocation to a more desirable location at a lower cost to CBP than an  official permanent change of station transfer. Border Patrol officials stated  that the use of the Operational Mobility Program resulted in agents  electing to relocate to northern border sectors from other duty stations.  The Resident Agent Program operates in locations where Border Patrol’s  routine presence is extremely limited and is intended to improve  situational awareness by the creation of partnerships, expansion of  community outreach, and development and dissemination of intelligence.  The Resident Agent location is the physical residence of an agent in a  location where there is not an official Border Patrol station.

CBP Identified Resource Challenges Affecting Northern Border Security and Actions to Address Them Air and Maritime Radar

Officials from Border Patrol sectors and AMO branches stated that there  are gaps in air radar coverage along the northern border, limiting their  ability to detect and identify aircraft incursions. CBP has taken actions to  address these gaps in air radar coverage. In December 2017, CBP  completed an AMO-led assessment of air radar capabilities, which  identified coverage gaps and needs across the United States, including at  the northern border. In May 2018, AMO officials stated that they began  working with the Department of Defense to test technology along the  northern border to address gaps in air radar coverage.

Officials from Border Patrol sectors and AMO branches stated that there  are limited maritime radar capabilities to detect and identify vessel  incursions along the northern border. CBP has taken actions to address  these gaps in maritime radar capabilities. Border Patrol, through its  Maritime Detection Project, plans to deploy additional maritime radar  technology in Detroit and Buffalo sectors to expand maritime radar  coverage on Lake Erie. Also, in 2017, CBP participated in a 1-year DHS  pilot project with the government of Canada to share radar information in  an area along the northern border to detect vessel incursions. AMO,  through its Multi-Role Enforcement Aircraft, conducts maritime radar  patrols along portions of the northern border to address gaps in maritime  radar coverage on some of the Great Lakes and parts of the Pacific  Northwest, to detect and identify vessel incursions.

Border Patrol sector officials stated that there are challenges with land  surveillance technology that is used for agents to detect, identify, and  respond to illicit cross-border activity along the northern border. Further,  Border Patrol headquarters and sector officials stated that there are gaps  in surveillance technology coverage along the northern border to detect  and identify illicit cross-border activity. In addition, Border Patrol officials  also identified challenges with Legacy Remote Video Surveillance  Systems. For example, officials we met with identified system outages  due to delays in maintenance and replacement of parts, and poor quality  video surveillance camera images.

In March 2017, CBP completed a Border Patrol-led assessment of land  surveillance capabilities to assess gaps, including gaps in surveillance  technology coverage across all Border Patrol sectors.

Officials from Border Patrol sectors and AMO branches we met with  identified inadequate network infrastructure—including network  infrastructure and equipment nearing or past its useful life—and  bandwidth that have affected enforcement activities and other required  tasks along the northern border. For example, Border Patrol officials  stated that inadequate network infrastructure and bandwidth has delayed  or prevented the processing of detainees at some stations. AMO  officials also stated that inadequate bandwidth limits the ability of agents  to use BigPipe, a system used to coordinate operations with partner  agencies during air and maritime missions. In September 2017, DHS’s  Office of Inspector General found that outdated IT infrastructure and  equipment contributed to CBP-wide system performance and availability  challenges; a considerable portion of IT equipment and infrastructure had  reached its useful life; and OIT was unable to replace infrastructure past  its useful life because of financial constraints.

CBP’s Fiscal Year 2019 Congressional Budget Justification identifies  actions to improve network infrastructure and bandwidth, including  deploying new workstations and replacing network infrastructure  components that are past their useful life to provide reliable operations  and address vulnerabilities. OIT officials stated that pilot projects using  virtual private network connections are being implemented at CBP  locations to address bandwidth challenges and reduce costs.

Officials from Border Patrol sectors and AMO branches we met with  identified challenges with tactical communications, including gaps in land mobile radio coverage along the northern border. Border Patrol and AMO  agents responsible for securing the northern border depend on land  mobile radio systems for secure, reliable, and timely exchanges of critical  information to effectively carry out their mission. Border Patrol and AMO  officials we met with identified lack of coverage in certain areas, which  impacts agent communication during enforcement activities.

CBP has taken actions to identify coverage gaps and deploy additional  equipment to improve communications coverage along the northern  border. For example, CBP has deployed additional equipment to improve  tactical communication coverage in Border Patrol’s Houlton sector in  Maine through its Tactical Communication Modernization Program from  fiscal years 2009 through 2017. Border Patrol officials stated that they  are deploying repeater tower sites—technology used for retransmitting  and extending the range of radio communications—and other technology  to mitigate dead spots and gaps in coverage in three sectors. According  to CBP’s Fiscal Year 2019 Congressional Budget Justification, updated  handheld and mobile radios are being provided to Border Patrol and  AMO, including northern border locations, to improve tactical  communications and interoperability with law enforcement partners.

Border Patrol sector officials identified challenges due to limited tactical  infrastructure, such as a lack of barriers to impede vehicle incursions and  access to roads along the border that make it difficult to impede illegal  entries. For example in one sector, officials stated that a lack of vehicle  barriers leads to a gap in Border Patrol’s ability to impede illicit vehicle  incursions. In other sectors, officials stated that Border Patrol agents face  challenges accessing border areas due to a lack of roads or access to  maintained roads. Officials from northern border sectors also stated that  agents face challenges preventing illegal entries due to a lack of barriers  and a lack of signs or markers indicating the location of the international  border.

Officials from Border Patrol sectors and AMO branches we met with  noted that certain facilities do not have space to accommodate the  number of assigned agents and civilian personnel along the northern  border. For example, in one sector, officials stated that there is lack of  space to accommodate Law Enforcement Communication Assistants to  monitor surveillance technology and direct agents to respond to potential  illicit activity. Border Patrol officials in other sectors also stated that  certain stations in their sectors do not have adequate facilities to process  and house detainees. For example, one station lacks a dedicated  processing and interview area and detainees are processed in an open  location next to agent workstations, which may pose a safety risk to  agents, according to officials.

In November 2018, Office of Facilities and Asset Management officials  identified 20 new and major construction projects planned for the northern  border, including replacement of Border Patrol facilities with identified  challenges; however, these projects have been deferred due to lack of  funding. Further, according to Office of Facilities and Asset Management  officials, CBP has insufficient funds to address deferred maintenance  projects and a limited number of maintenance staff to repair facilities.

Officials from Border Patrol sectors we met with identified aging vehicles  that are beyond their expected service life, which affect enforcement  activities along the northern border. According to Border Patrol officials,  funding is not available to replace aging vehicles across all sectors, but  funds are allocated annually to replace a percentage of vehicles in the  northern border sectors that are beyond their expected service life.  Further, Border Patrol officials stated that the harsh climate along the  northern border creates additional burdens on agent vehicles prior to  those vehicles reaching the end of their expected service life. Officials  from Border Patrol sectors we met with identified agent vehicles that lack  the technology needed to complete monthly motor vehicle utilization  reports required by the DHS Stop Asset and Vehicle Excess Act. In  August 2018, Border Patrol officials stated that CBP was in the process of  awarding a contract for installation of vehicle reporting technology in  agent vehicles, including across the northern border sectors.

DHS Is Developing an Implementation Plan for Its Northern Border Strategy but Faces Competing Priorities with the Southwest Border

In addition to the actions identified above by CBP to address northern  border staffing and resource challenges, DHS is developing an  implementation plan for its Northern Border Strategy, which includes a  goal to enhance border security operations. The strategy states that the  implementation plan is intended to outline roles, responsibilities,  programs, and timelines for accomplishing the strategy’s goals and  objectives for fiscal years 2020 to 2024. According to DHS officials, the  department plans to use the strategy and corresponding implementation  plan to prioritize departmental resources and achieve the specified  outcomes over the 5-year period. According to DHS officials, the  implementation plan is expected to be completed in 2019 and will identify  actions to address gaps in capabilities to secure the northern border  between ports of entry; for example, gaps in domain awareness and  associated technology, among other things.

It is unknown whether the staffing and resource challenges identified by  CBP to secure the northern border between ports of entry will be  addressed due to competing southwest border security priorities.  According to Border Patrol and AMO headquarters officials, resources are  allocated across their operating areas based on threats and volume of  illicit activity, which are greatest on the southwest border. Further, Border  Patrol and AMO headquarters officials stated that resource allocation is  prioritized to the southwest border to also meet instructions in Executive  Order 13767 to obtain complete operational control—prevention of all  unlawful entries into the United States, including entries by terrorists,  other unlawful (i.e. inadmissible) aliens, instruments of terrorism,  narcotics, and other contraband—of the southwest border. While DHS is  implementing its Northern Border Strategy, including developing an  implementation plan, addressing CBP’s northern border staffing and  resource challenge will compete with its other enforcement priorities  along the southwest border.

CBP Has Not Developed Performance Measures to Assess Its Effectiveness at Securing the Northern Border Between Ports of Entry

While CBP has performance measures (strategic and management) that  assess certain border security operations or programs, some of which  include data from the northern border, it does not have specific measures  to assess its effectiveness at securing the northern border between ports  of entry.

More specifically, Border Patrol has two strategic measures that include  data from the northern border, but these measures do not assess Border  Patrol’s effectiveness at securing the northern border between ports of  entry. The two measures—the percent of recurring border surveillance  implemented in remote, low-risk areas between ports of entry and the  percent of time Border Patrol meets its goal of responding to potential  illegal activity in remote, low-risk areas—are based on information from  CBP’s National Border Geospatial Intelligence Strategy. The measures  assess Border Patrol’s use of reports developed using geospatial  intelligence technology of potential illicit cross-border activity. However,  this technology is not applied in maritime environments, so the measures  do not include data from two northern border sectors. Further, Border  Patrol’s two strategic measures combine data from the southwest and  northern borders.

Border Patrol has four management measures that also contain data from  the northern border. These measures are (1) the number of joint  operations conducted along the northern border by Border Patrol agents  and Canadian law enforcement; (2) the percent of apprehensions at  Border Patrol checkpoints; (3) the percent of Border Patrol agents who  are trained and certified to perform enforcement actions; and (4) the  percent of Border Patrol equipment assessed as ready to support law  enforcement operations.

Border Patrol’s four management measures include data from the  northern border, but do not assess Border Patrol’s effectiveness at  securing the northern border between ports of entry. Although one  management measure tracks the number of joint operations conducted  along the northern border by Border Patrol agents and Canadian law  enforcement personnel, that measure does not assess Border Patrol’s  performance in conducting those joint operations or their effectiveness.  Border Patrol’s three additional management measures include data from  the northern border combined with other areas, such as the southwest  border, and therefore are not specific to the northern border.

AMO’s one strategic and one management measure include data from  the northern border, but do not assess AMO’s effectiveness at securing  the northern border between ports of entry in the air and maritime  environments. For the strategic measure, AMO reports the percent of  detected conventional aircraft incursions resolved. The measure  represents the percent of conventional aircraft detected visually or by  sensor technology, suspected of illicit cross-border activity, which are  brought to a successful resolution by its Air and Marine Operations  Center. For the management measure, AMO reports air mission launch  rate, which is the percent of all requests made for aircraft to which AMO  was able to respond. These two measures include data across all border  areas, including the northern border, but are not specific to the northern  border.

Border Patrol officials stated that they have not developed or  implemented performance measures to assess their effectiveness at  securing the northern border between ports of entry because of  competing priorities related to developing measures for southwest border  security. According to Border Patrol officials responsible for developing  and implementing performance measures, Border Patrol’s priority is to  develop measures to assess the effectiveness of its efforts to secure the  southwest border, such as the effort to achieve complete operational  control as outlined in the Executive Order 13767 instructions and the  fiscal year 2018 DHS agency priority goal. Specifically, Border Patrol is  required to implement a measure to assess operational control for all  southwest border sectors by the end of fiscal year 2019. Border Patrol  defines operational control as its ability to impede or deny illegal border  crossings, maintain situational awareness, and apply appropriate, time- bound law enforcement response and resolution between the ports of  entry.

According to Border Patrol officials, the ongoing efforts to develop  measures for the southwest border will eventually be applied to the  northern border, but it is unknown how these ongoing efforts will be  implemented to assess Border Patrol’s performance at securing the  northern border between ports of entry. Border Patrol officials stated that  following the implementation of operational control for the southwest  border, Border Patrol plans to implement the operational control measure  along the northern border in fiscal year 2020. Border Patrol officials stated  that they are in the early stages of this process, and could not provide any  information on how operational control will be implemented for its  operations along the northern border. Further, Border Patrol officials  could not provide information on how operational control will be used to  assess Border Patrol’s performance for securing the northern border  between ports of entry.

Additionally, in 2012 we recommended that Border Patrol establish  milestones and time frames for developing performance measures to  support implementation of its 2012-2016 Strategic Plan, including  assessing progress made in securing the northern border between ports  of entry and informing resource identification and allocation efforts. DHS  concurred with our recommendations, and Border Patrol made progress  in developing new performance measures for border security. However,  we closed the recommendations as not implemented in September 2017  because the measures identified did not apply to the entire northern or  coastal borders, as well as the remaining uncertainty about when Border  Patrol would develop a new strategic plan.

AMO officials stated that they have not implemented performance  measures to assess AMO’s effectiveness at securing the northern border  between ports of entry in the air and maritime environments because of  difficulties in creating region-specific performance targets. Specifically,  AMO officials stated that it is difficult to set performance targets for a  specific region, such as the northern border, because the threat  environment is constantly changing. Also, the officials stated that AMO is  waiting for completion of the Northern Border Strategy implementation  plan before developing any performance measures specific to the  northern border. Additionally, Border Patrol and AMO have ongoing  efforts to develop border security metrics pursuant to the National  Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017. The act directs DHS to  annually report metrics and associated data and methodology, including  metrics for border security between ports of entry.

Consistent with GPRAMA, agencies should establish a balanced set of  performance measures, which reinforces the need for agencies to have a  variety of measures across program areas. Furthermore, Standards for  Internal Control in the Federal Government state that management  should determine whether performance measures for the defined  objectives are appropriate for evaluating the entity’s performance using  targets and milestones. The standards also state that management  should track entity achievements and compare actual performance to  planned or expected results using established activities such as  comparisons and assessments.

Border Patrol and AMO could leverage and use their ongoing efforts to  develop and implement performance measures to assess effectiveness at  securing the northern border between ports of entry. For example, Border  Patrol and AMO could use the metrics developed in accordance with the  Fiscal Year 2017 National Defense Authorization Act to help inform the  development of northern border performance measures. Developing and  implementing such measures could help Border Patrol and AMO better  assess the effectiveness of their northern border operations between  ports of entry, including challenges due to limited staffing and resources,  and take corrective actions, as necessary.

The United States and Canada share the longest common non-militarized  border between two countries, spanning nearly 4,000 miles; however,  CBP has historically focused attention and resources, including resources  to develop and implement performance measures, primarily on the nearly  2,000 mile U.S.-Mexico border. While Border Patrol and AMO have  performance measures that assess specific border security operations or  programs that include data from the northern border, these measures  generally combine data with other border regions and collectively the  measures do not assess effectiveness at securing the northern border  between ports of entry. Without northern border performance measures,  Border Patrol and AMO cannot assess their effectiveness at securing the  northern border between ports of entry. Developing and implementing  northern border performance measures could help Border Patrol and  AMO assess its northern border operations and address identified  challenges.

We are making two recommendations, one to Border Patrol and one to  AMO.

The Chief of Border Patrol should develop and implement performance  measures to assess its effectiveness at securing the northern border  between ports of entry (Recommendation 1).

The Executive Assistant Commissioner of AMO should develop and  implement performance measures to assess its effectiveness at securing  the northern border between ports of entry in the air and maritime  environments (Recommendation 2).

We provided a draft of this report to DHS for review and comment. DHS  provided written comments, which are reproduced in full in appendix V,  and technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate.

DHS concurred with both recommendations in the report and described  actions Border Patrol and AMO plan to take in response. Border Patrol  plans to develop and apply a measure of operational control to its  northern border sectors; however, to meet the intent of our  recommendation, Border Patrol will also need to use its measure of  operational control to assess its effectiveness at securing the northern  border between ports of entry. AMO plans to develop a performance  measure to assess its effectiveness at securing the northern border  between ports of entry and seek DHS approval through completion of a  Performance Measure Definition Form. These actions, if effectively  implemented by AMO, should address the intent of the recommendation.

We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional  committees and the Acting Secretary of the Department of Homeland  Security. In addition, the report is available at no charge on the GAO  website at http://www.gao.gov. If you or your staff have any questions  about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-8777 or  gamblerr@gao.gov. Contacts points for our Offices of Congressional  Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report.  GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix  VI.

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

This report addresses the following questions:  1.  What threats has U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP)  identified along the U.S.-Canada (northern) border between ports of  entry?  2.  What challenges, if any, has CBP identified in its staffing and  resources to secure the northern border between ports of entry, and  what actions, if any, has CBP taken to address those challenges?  3.  To what extent has CBP developed and implemented performance  measures to assess the effectiveness of securing the northern border  between ports of entry?

To address all three questions, we interviewed Department of Homeland  Security (DHS) and CBP officials from headquarters and field locations.  Specifically, we met with headquarters officials from DHS’s Office of  Strategy, Policy, and Plans; Office of Program Analysis and Evaluation;  Science and Technology Directorate; U.S. Coast Guard; and U.S.  Immigration and Customs Enforcement. From CBP, we met with  headquarters officials from the Air and Marine Operations (AMO), U.S.  Border Patrol (Border Patrol), Office of Information and Technology,  Office of Intelligence, Office of Facilities and Asset Management, and  Office of Accountability/Performance Management and Analysis Division.  We also met with officials from the government of Canada to discuss their  views on northern border security. For a list of government agencies and  entities interviewed in field locations, see table 1. In addition, we  conducted site visits in Michigan, New York, Vermont, Virginia, and  Washington, as well as the Canadian provinces of British Columbia,  Ontario, and Quebec. We chose these locations based on deployment of  CBP resources—surveillance technology such as Remote Video  Surveillance Systems—and reported levels of illicit cross-border activity  by Border Patrol, including arrests of individuals and seizures of  narcotics. Findings from our site visits cannot be generalized to all CBP  locations along the northern border, but provide valuable insights into our  research questions.

To address the first question, we reviewed DHS and CBP policies,  procedures, reports, and assessments describing threats along the  northern border between ports of entry. Specifically, we reviewed DHS’s  2017 Northern Border Threat Analysis Report and the June 2018  Northern Border Strategy. We reviewed Border Patrol policies and  procedures related to identifying and documenting threats and  intelligence reports, referred to as Intelligence Estimates, completed in  each northern border sector for fiscal years 2017 and 2018. In addition,  we reviewed Border Patrol’s national intelligence estimates for fiscal  years 2017 and 2018. We also reviewed documents describing the  results of Border Patrol’s Threats, Targets, and Operations Assessments  and Intelligence Preparation for the Operation Environment process  completed for northern border sectors from 2014 through 2017.

To analyze the number apprehensions and drug seizures along the  northern border, we obtained data from the Enforcement Integrated  Database for fiscal years 2013 through 2017, a time period for which  complete data were available at the time of our review. We assessed the  reliability of apprehension and seizure data by performing electronic  testing for obvious errors in accuracy and completeness, reviewing  existing information about the data and the systems that produced them,  and interviewing agency officials knowledgeable about the data. As a  result of our data reliability assessment, we determined that Border  Patrol’s apprehension and seizure data were sufficiently reliable for our  intended use. From AMO, we reviewed the 2017 Northern Border Non- Commercial General Aviation Threat Overview and information collected  by the Air and Marine Operations Center on vessel and aircraft border  incursions detected along the northern border from fiscal years 2013  through 2017.

To address the second question, we reviewed CBP’s Fiscal Year 2019  Congressional Budget Justification. We also reviewed the results from  Border Patrol’s capability gap assessment process for all eight northern  border sectors completed for fiscal year 2017 and associated operational  plans completed in September 2018; Border Patrol’s Surveillance  Capability Assessment completed in April 2017; and AMO’s capability  gap assessment completed in fiscal year 2016. We reviewed CBP  capability analysis reports which included requirements along the  northern border. In addition, we reviewed our relevant past work and  DHS Office of Inspector General reports on northern border security.

To determine the staffing and resource challenges across all eight  northern border sectors and three AMO branches, we also met with  officials at each sector and branch and reviewed supporting  documentation. Specifically, we analyzed responses provided by officials  in all eight northern border sectors and three AMO branches and  supporting documentation to determine challenges mentioned by officials  at two or more locations. We also reviewed supporting documentation,  including inventories of assets such as vehicles, vessels, aircraft, radar  and land surveillance technology, tactical communication equipment, and  facilities information. We obtained Border Patrol, AMO, and Office of  Information and Technology staffing information as of September 1, 2018,  the most recent data available at the time of our review, including the number of authorized, onboard, and vacant positions. To assess the  reliability of this staffing information, we examined the information for any  anomalies and interviewed agency officials knowledgeable about the  data. We found the staffing information data were sufficiently reliable for  our purposes of reporting the number of authorized, onboard, and vacant  positions.

To address the third question, we reviewed and analyzed documentation  that describes DHS and CBP processes for developing and implementing  performance measures, including DHS’s Annual Performance Report for  Fiscal Years 2017-2019, CBP’s Fiscal Year 2019 Congressional Budget  Justification, and Performance Measure Definition Forms for recently  developed performance measures. We reviewed reports, assessments,  and strategies that describe current DHS and CBP performance measure  initiatives. We also reviewed information from CBP’s National Border  Geospatial Intelligence Strategy, including information on reports derived  from geospatial intelligence technology, used as the basis for two of  Border Patrol’s performance measures that contain data from the  northern border. Additionally, we reviewed DHS’s most recent border  security metrics report. We compared CBP’s actions to develop and  implement performance measures to Standards for Internal Control in the  Federal Government and the principles outlined in Government  Performance and Results Act (GPRA) Modernization Act of 2010.

We compiled the descriptive information in the northern Border Patrol  sector profiles in appendix II from a variety of sources. We obtained  information on each sector’s geography and area of responsibility from  Border Patrol documentation. We obtained information on the number of  authorized agents from Border Patrol as of September 1, 2018. We  obtained information on the major urban areas within each sector and  population estimates from the U.S. Census Bureau and the data are  current as of July 1, 2017, the most recent estimates available at the time  of our review. Finally, we obtained geographic information on the location  of each northern Border Patrol sector and its stations from Border Patrol  and located the data geographically using MapInfo.

To analyze the number of apprehensions and drug seizures for each  northern Border Patrol sector, we obtained data from the Enforcement  Integrated Database for fiscal years 2013 through 2017, a time period for  which complete data were available at the time of our review. The data  fields we obtained included the individual’s immigration status at entry  and country of citizenship and the drug type and quantity in pounds  seized. Our analysis categorizes the sector’s apprehensions by the top  four to six countries of citizenship of the individuals apprehended by  Border Patrol and their immigration status at entry. Present without  admission from Canada indicates the individual was suspected to be  inadmissible for illegally entering the United States from Canada; present  without admission from Mexico indicates the individual was suspected to  be inadmissible for illegally entering the United States from Mexico; and  the other category is a combination of all remaining categories, such as  lawful permanent residents or other foreign nationals who may or may not  be lawfully present in the United States. Our analysis also categorizes the  sector’s number of drug seizures by the top three to six types of drugs  that Border Patrol seized most frequently, as well as the quantity in  pounds of those seizures.

We assessed the reliability of apprehension and seizure data by  performing electronic testing for obvious errors in accuracy and  completeness, reviewing existing information about the data and the  systems that produced them, and interviewing agency officials  knowledgeable about the data. As a result of our data reliability  assessment, we determined that Border Patrol’s apprehension and  seizure data were sufficiently reliable for our intended use.

We compiled the descriptive information in the northern region AMO  branch profiles in appendix III from information provided by each branch  and AMO headquarters. We obtained information on staffing for the three  northern border branches as of September 2018. We obtained the  geographic information on location of each northern region AMO branch  and unit from AMO and located the data geographically using MapInfo.

For total flight and float hours across all AMO operating locations and  regions, we reviewed CBP data on flight and float hours from fiscal years  2013 through 2017, a time period for which complete data were available  at the time of our review. For Border Patrol riverine float hours across all  locations, we reviewed and analyzed float hour data from fiscal year  2017, the most recent year for which complete data were available at the  time of our review. For data on air and marine missions across AMO’s  northern region branches and units, we reviewed CBP data on seizures of  narcotics, apprehensions, and arrests from fiscal years 2013 through  2017, a time period for which complete data were available at the time of  our review. To determine the reliability of CBP’s data on flight and float  hours, and mission information for seizures of narcotics, apprehensions,  and arrests data, we examined the data for any anomalies, reviewed CBP  guidance and documents for data collection and entry, and interviewed  CBP officials to understand their methods for collecting, reporting, and  validating the data. We found these data were sufficiently reliable for our  purposes of reporting summary data across fiscal years 2013 through  2017.

To obtain information on irregular northbound migration in appendix IV,  we met with DHS and Border Patrol officials—including the three sectors  (Blaine, Grand Forks, and Swanton sectors) with the highest reported  levels of irregular northbound migration at the time of our review—and  reviewed intelligence reports and assessments. We obtained the  descriptive information in appendix IV on irregular northbound migration  from a variety of sources.

For data from the government of Canada on the number of asylum  claimants, we downloaded publicly reported summary data on asylum  claimants from the government of Canada for 2012 through 2017.

For data on the number of individuals illegally entering Canada  between ports of entry known to Border Patrol, we collected and  reviewed information from Blaine, Grand Forks, and Swanton sectors  for calendar years 2012 through 2017. To determine the reliability of  data, we interviewed officials at each sector to understand their  methods for collecting, reporting, and validating the data. According to  Border Patrol officials at Blaine, Grand Forks, and Swanton sectors,  the number of individuals illegally entering Canada between ports of  entry was tracked through agent reporting and detection by land  surveillance technology, such as surveillance cameras and  unattended ground sensors. Based on Border Patrol’s methods for  collecting, reporting, and validating the data, we found these data  were sufficiently reliable for our purposes of reporting summary-level  data.

The performance audit upon which this report is based was conducted  from October 2017 to March 2019 in accordance with generally accepted  government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan  and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide  a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit  objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable  basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We  subsequently worked with DHS from March 2019 to June 2019 to prepare  this nonsensitive version of the original sensitive report for public release.

Appendix II: U.S. Border Patrol Northern Border Sector Profiles

To provide a descriptive overview of the northern border sectors, we  developed a profile for each of the eight U.S. Border Patrol (Border  Patrol) sectors located along the U.S.-Canada (northern) border: Blaine,  Washington; Spokane, Washington; Havre, Montana; Grand Forks, North  Dakota; Detroit, Michigan; Buffalo, New York; Swanton, Vermont; and  Houlton, Maine. These profiles are listed in order from the western-most  sector to the eastern-most sector and contain an overview of each  sector’s geography and area of responsibility and an analysis of  apprehensions and drug seizures from fiscal years 2013 through 2017.

Appendix III: Air and Marine Operations Northern Region Branches

Overview of Air and Marine Operations’s Northern Region

Within U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), Air and Marine  Operations (AMO) conducts multifaceted missions consisting of direct  support to U.S. Border Patrol (Border Patrol) and collaborative efforts with  U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s Homeland Security  Investigations and other federal, state, and local partner agencies. This  includes, but is not limited to, investigative operations, surveillance  missions, warrant service, and criminal apprehensions. AMO conducts  missions along the U.S.-Canada (northern) border through three  branches: Bellingham Air and Marine Branch in Bellingham, Washington;  Great Lakes Air and Marine Branch at Selfridge Air National Guard Base,  Michigan; and Manassas Air Branch in Manassas, Virginia. Each branch  is further divided into units to conduct air or maritime missions.

According to AMO data for fiscal years 2013 through 2017, AMO’s  Northern Region accounted for 14 percent and 22 percent of total AMO  flight and float hours, respectively, as shown in table 10. AMO  implements a requirements determination process for annual aircraft flight  and vessel float hours based on known mission requirements, funding  levels, available assets, and the needs of law enforcement partners.  Further, flight and float hours allocated across AMO’s regions are  prioritized through CBP’s Flight and Float Hour Executive Oversight  Council, which prioritizes flight and float hour allocations considering  Department of Homeland Security and CBP’s strategic objectives and  border security requirements, threats, and capacity that will be executed  over the course of the upcoming year. In February 2018, CBP also created the Flight and Float Hour Executive Steering Committee  comprised of Border Patrol and AMO executive leadership to perform  periodic audits of flight hour execution, review changing operational  environments, validate planning assumptions, and perform an evaluation  on overall return on investment to best ensure that CBP asset utilization  is consistently aligned with its priorities and threats.

AMO’s Bellingham Air and Marine Branch is located in Bellingham,  Washington, and is comprised of the Spokane and Montana Air Units and  Port Angeles and Bellingham Marine Units. For a map of those operating  locations, see figure 20. As of the end of September 2018, Bellingham Air  and Marine Branch had 38 authorized Air Interdiction Agent positions and  20 authorized Marine Interdiction Agent positions.

According to data provided by AMO for fiscal years 2013 through 2017,  missions completed by Bellingham Air and Marine Branch resulted in:

51 apprehensions of potentially removable aliens;

536 drug seizures, including: 204 methamphetamine seizures (1,033  pounds); 93 cocaine seizures (778 pounds); 155 heroin seizures (305  pounds); 65 marijuana seizures (14,132 pounds); and 19 other drug  seizures (608 pounds).

AMO’s Great Lakes Air and Marine Branch is located at Selfridge Air  National Guard Base, Michigan and is comprised of the Buffalo and  Chicago Air Units and the Sault Sainte Marie, Port Huron, Trenton,  Sandusky, Erie, Buffalo, and Rochester Marine Units. For a map of those  operating locations, see figure 21. As of September 2018, Great Lakes  Air and Marine Branch had 27 authorized Air Interdiction Agent positions  and 49 authorized Marine Interdiction Agent positions.

According to data provided by AMO for fiscal years 2013 through 2017,  missions completed by Great Lakes Air and Marine Branch resulted in:

157 apprehensions of potentially removable aliens;

1,475 drug seizures, including: 553 marijuana seizures (6,974  pounds); 474 cocaine seizures (4,408 pounds); 296 heroin seizures  (425 pounds); 87 methamphetamine seizures (1,347 pounds); and 65  other drug seizures (107 pounds).

AMO’s Manassas Air Branch is located in Manassas, Virginia, and is  comprised of the New York, Plattsburgh, and Houlton Air Units. For a  map of those operating locations, see figure 22. As of September 2018,  Manassas Branch had 35 authorized Air Interdiction Agent positions.

According to data provided by AMO for fiscal years 2013 through 2017,  missions completed by Manassas Air Branch resulted in:

57 apprehensions of potentially removable aliens;

472 drug seizures, including: 161 marijuana seizures (12,015  pounds); 141 heroin seizures (141 pounds); 134 cocaine seizures  (707 pounds); 25 methamphetamine seizures (39 pounds); and 11  other drug seizures (107 pounds).

Appendix IV: Irregular Northbound Migration from the United States to Canada

Irregular northbound migration—northbound movement of foreign  nationals from the United States across the northern border into Canada  between official ports of entry typically to make an asylum claim— increased in 2017. Specifically, in 2017 the Royal Canadian Mounted  Police reported approximately 20,000 irregular northbound migrants  intercepted between official ports of entry. The majority of interceptions  were reported in the province of Quebec (91 percent) with additional  interceptions noted in Manitoba (5 percent) and British Columbia (3  percent). In comparison, from 2012 to 2016 the total number of asylum  claimants for all of Canada (including at and between official ports of  entry) ranged from approximately 10,000 to 24,000 per year. The total  number of asylum claimants for all of Canada (including at and between  official ports of entry) increased from approximately 24,000 claimants in  2016 to approximately 50,000 claimants in 2017.

According to Border Patrol officials, in 2017 the number of individuals  crossing from the United States into Canada, other than those crossing  through official ports of entry, increased within 3 of 8 Border Patrol  sectors along the northern border: Blaine, Washington; Grand Forks,  North Dakota; and Swanton, Vermont.

Blaine Border Patrol Sector. The number of individuals entering  Canada between official ports of entry in British Columbia, north of  Blaine sector’s area of responsibility, known to Border Patrol was  approximately 1,200 individuals during the 4-year period from 2012  through 2015, according to sector officials. In 2016, the number of  individuals known to Blaine sector increased to approximately 1,100  individuals, and then increased again to approximately 1,400  individuals in 2017.

Grand Forks Border Patrol Sector. The number of individuals  entering Canada between official ports of entry in Manitoba, north of  Grand Forks sector’s area of responsibility, known to Border Patrol  was approximately 580 individuals during the 4-year period from 2012  through 2015, according to sector officials. In 2016, the number of  individuals known to Grand Forks sector increased to approximately  400 individuals, and then increased to approximately 1,000 individuals  in 2017.

Swanton Border Patrol Sector. The number of individuals entering  Canada between official ports of entry in Quebec, north of Swanton  sector’s area of responsibility, known to Border Patrol was  approximately 1,000 individuals during the 4-year period from 2012  through 2015, according to sector officials. In 2016, the number of  individuals known to Swanton sector increased to approximately  1,100 individuals, and then increased to approximately 16,800  individuals in 2017. According to Swanton Border Patrol Sector  officials, the majority of known entries into Canada by irregular  northbound migrants between official ports of entry have occurred  along Roxham Road in Champlain, New York. For a photo of a facility  constructed by the government of Canada to process irregular  northbound migrants north of Roxham Road, see figure 23.

Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and Border Patrol officials we  met with identified a bi-national agreement associated with the increased  number of irregular northbound migrants from the United States to  Canada from 2016 through 2017. Irregular northbound migrants entering  Canada between official ports of entry are not subject to the framework  established by the 2002 Safe Third Country Agreement signed by  Canada and the United States, which governs the processing of asylum  claims along the shared land border and applies only to those individuals  entering at an official port of entry, not between ports of entry. Therefore,  individuals who enter Canada by land between official ports of entry to  make an asylum claim may be allowed to stay in Canada rather than  have their claim handled by the United States. Individuals seeking to  travel to Canada to make an asylum claim, whether or not they may have  a valid asylum claim, are made aware of the potential ability to enter and  remain in Canada pending an asylum decision due to wide sharing of this  information through social media and reporting in the press. Otherwise,  for those attempting to enter Canada through an official land port of entry  to claim asylum, claimants may be returned to pursue their asylum claim  in the country of last presence, which would be the United States, unless  they qualify for one of the exceptions in the agreement.

According to DHS officials, Canadian data indicates a large percentage of  irregular northbound migrants had previously obtained nonimmigrant  visas, primarily B1/B2 visas, which authorized their temporary travel to  the United States, and subsequently entered Canada between official  ports of entry to claim asylum. DHS, in collaboration with the U.S.  Department of State, worked to identify, and as appropriate, revoke visas  of individuals seeking to enter Canada between official ports of entry.  Border Patrol intelligence reporting in 2017 identified visa fraud concerns  because individuals obtained visas to enter the United States, when it  appeared that their main intention was to enter Canada other than  through a port of entry and claim asylum.

Border Patrol officials stated that the widespread perception among  irregular northbound migrants they encounter is that Canada’s asylum policies are more welcoming than those of the United States, which has  also contributed to the increased trend in irregular northbound migration.  These officials cited both U.S. and Canadian reporting on the 2016 U.S.  Presidential Election, along with a welcoming statement by the  government of Canada, and perceived generosity of benefits upon  application for asylum in Canada as reasons that migrants seek to enter  Canada between official ports of entry and claim asylum.

According to Border Patrol officials, the northbound asylum flows from the  United States to Canada could potentially lead to future attempts to enter  the United States illegally between ports of entry from Canada by  individuals whose asylum claims are rejected by the government of  Canada. According to anecdotal reporting to Border Patrol officials, some  of the irregular northbound migrants who entered Canada from the United  States were unable to gain status in Canada or the process was not what  they had anticipated. According to the officials, these individuals  subsequently attempted to reenter the United States in an effort to gain  legal status in the United States. For example, Swanton Border Patrol  Sector reported two incidents in April 2018 in which groups of individuals  who were apprehended attempting to illegally enter the United States  from Canada stated that they were seeking to reenter the United States  after their asylum claims were rejected by the government of Canada.

Appendix V: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security

Appendix VI: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgements

In addition to the contact named above, Christopher Ferencik (Assistant  Director), David Alexander, Michele Fejfar, Eric Hauswirth, Grant  Holyoak, John Mingus, Sasan J. “Jon” Najmi, Claire Peachey, Carl  Potenzieri, and Natalie Swabb made key contributions to this report.

U.S. Customs and Border Protection provides security between ports of entry along the 4,000-mile-long border between the United States and Canada.

However, CBP told us that staffing and resource challenges limit its enforcement activities along the U.S.-Canada border. For example, there are an insufficient number of agents for patrol missions. CBP has trouble addressing these challenges because of competing priorities along the U.S.-Mexico border.

CBP also does not have specific performance measures to assess how effectively it is securing the northern border between ports of entry. We recommended that CBP develop and implement such measures.