U.S. Secret Service: Further Actions Needed to Fully Address Protective Mission Panel Recommendations

The Secret Service, a component of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), is responsible for protecting the President, the Vice President, and their families, as well as the White House complex. In October 2014, following several security lapses, the Secretary of Homeland Security established the Panel, an independent panel of experts, to review White House security and other aspects of Secret Service operations.

The Secret Service Recruitment and Retention Act of 2018 contains a provision for GAO to report on the progress made by the Secret Service in implementing the Panel's recommendations. This report addresses the extent to which the Secret Service has implemented the recommendations in the Panel's 2014 report. GAO reviewed Secret Service documents, analyzed agency training and labor-distribution data from fiscal years 2014 through 2018, and interviewed agency officials and Panel members.

The U.S. Secret Service (Secret Service) has made progress implementing the 19 recommendations related to training and personnel; technology, perimeter security, and operations; and leadership made by the U.S. Secret Service Protective Mission Panel (Panel). The Secret Service fully implemented 11 of the recommendations. For example, the agency increased the number of agents and officers in the divisions that protect the President and White House and secured approval to build a new fence around the White House complex.

The Secret Service is in the process of implementing the remaining eight recommendations. The Panel found that the security incident of September 19, 2014, when an intruder jumped the north fence and entered the White House, arose from a “catastrophic failure of training.” The Panel recommended, and the Secret Service agreed, that the Presidential and Vice Presidential Protective Divisions train for 25 percent of their work time. However, the Secret Service has not met this target and lacks a plan for achieving it. In fiscal year 2018, special agents assigned to these divisions trained for about 6 percent and 3 percent, respectively, of their regular work hours (see figure). In commenting on a draft of this report in May 2019, the Secret Service stated that it no longer agrees with the training target and plans to reevaluate it. Developing and implementing a plan for ensuring that the established training target is met given current and planned staffing levels would better ensure that agents assigned to the Presidential and Vice Presidential Protective Divisions are prepared to carry out Secret Service's protection priority.

In addition, the Secret Service does not have a policy with a documented process for collecting complete and appropriate (i.e., protection-related) training hour data for Uniformed Division officers. Implementing such a policy will better position the Secret Service to assess the training data and make informed decisions about whether and how training needs are being met.

GAO is making recommendations to the Secret Service: (1) develop and implement a plan to ensure that special agents assigned to the Presidential and Vice Presidential Protective Divisions reach annual training targets, and (2) develop and implement a policy that documents the process for collecting complete and appropriate data on Uniformed Division officer training. DHS concurred with the two recommendations.

On September 19, 2014, an intruder jumped over the north fence of the  White House complex, passed several layers of security, evaded U.S.  Secret Service (Secret Service) personnel, and entered the White House  through the north portico doors. The President was not in the White  House at the time; however, this episode highlighted several areas in  which the Secret Service needed to improve its performance. The primary  responsibility of the Secret Service, a component of the Department of  Homeland Security (DHS), is to protect the President, the First Family,  other national-level leaders, and the White House itself. The September  2014 incident followed several other security lapses involving the Secret  Service in recent years, and it prompted the then-Secretary of Homeland  Security to establish the U.S. Secret Service Protective Mission Panel  (PMP), naming four members with expertise in national security,  protective security, and leadership of complex organizations.

The PMP met with about 50 Secret Service employees, including officials  and agency leadership across all levels of seniority; met with  representatives from a broad array of organizations, including federal  agencies and metropolitan police departments; and reviewed agency  documents. The PMP concluded that the September 2014 incident  occurred in large part because of a “catastrophic failure in training.” The  PMP issued its final report in December 2014, which contained 19  recommendations that addressed three areas: (1) training and personnel;  (2) technology, perimeter security, and operations; and (3) leadership.  After the report was issued, the Secret Service committed to  implementing all of the recommendations.

The Secret Service Recruitment and Retention Act of 2018 contains a  provision for us to report on progress made by the Secret Service in  implementing the recommendations of the PMP. This report addresses  the extent to which the Secret Service has implemented  recommendations in the 2014 PMP report.

To determine the Secret Service’s progress, we reviewed the status  report that the Secret Service prepared for us in June 2018. We reviewed  documents to corroborate what Secret Service officials reported to  determine whether and to what extent the stated actions had been taken.  Among other planning and implementation documents, we reviewed the  Secret Service’s strategic plan, human capital strategic plan, training  strategic plan, and resource allocation plans. We also interviewed officials  and received written responses from various offices across the agency,  including the Offices of Protective Operations, Investigations, Training,  Technical Development and Mission Support, Strategic Planning and  Policy, and Human Resources. To further inform our assessment, we  reviewed reports related to recommendations made by the PMP,  including a December 2015 House of Representative’s Committee on  Oversight and Government Reform report on four Secret Service  security incidents; an October 2016 National Academy of Public  Administration report looking at organizational change at the Secret  Service; and a DHS Office of Inspector General report examining Secret  Service’s actions to address the panel’s recommendations. We  compared the progress on each recommendation to what the PMP  described in its December 2014 final report. We also interviewed two of  the four members of the PMP. For each recommendation, we  determined that either implementation of the recommendation was still in  progress or the recommendation was implemented. For  recommendations that we consider implemented as of March 2019, we  recognize that the Secret Service may need to take further actions to  ensure that the new activity or process continues as intended.

We assessed data on agents’ time expended from fiscal years 2014  through 2018. Specifically, to determine the share of time that special  agents across the agency, including those assigned to the Presidential  Protective Division (PPD) and the Vice Presidential Protective Division  (VPD), spent on investigation and protective assignments, training, and  other duties, we obtained and analyzed data from the Secret Service’s  Monthly Activity Reporting System on agents’ self-reported time in fiscal  years 2014 through 2018. The data describe how many hours each agent  (except for members of the Senior Executive Service) reported  conducting protection assignments, conducting investigations, or taking  part in training, among other things. To determine the share of work hours  that special agents assigned to PPD and VPD spent in training, we  compared training to regular work hours data from the Monthly Activity  Reporting System for each fiscal year 2014 through 2018. We assessed  the reliability of the data from the Monthly Activity Reporting System by  reviewing relevant documentation and interviewing knowledgeable Secret  Service officials. We determined that these data were sufficiently reliable  for our reporting objective. We further assessed actions taken by the  Secret Service to implement the Panel’s first recommendation—that  special agents working on PPD and VPD and Uniformed Division officers  meet specified training targets—against leading management practices  related to training and human capital efforts as well as Standards for  Internal Control in the Federal Government related to using quality  information.

We conducted this performance audit from May 2018 to May 2019 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.

Secret Service’s Responsibilities and Personnel

The Secret Service’s primary responsibility is to physically protect the  President, Vice President, their immediate families, and visiting foreign  dignitaries as well as the White House complex. The Office of Protective  Operations is the principal office responsible for providing protection.  Within the Office of Protective Operations, agents may be assigned to a  number of divisions, such as PPD, VPD, or one of the other divisions that  is responsible for protecting former presidents and visiting heads of state  or heads of government.

The Uniformed Division, which is also part of the Office of Protective  Operations, is charged with protecting facilities and venues for Secret  Service protectees. Uniformed Division officers control access to the  White House complex—which includes the White House itself, the  Eisenhower Executive Office Building, and the Department of the  Treasury building—and the Vice President’s residence.

The Secret Service’s secondary responsibility is to conduct criminal  investigations in areas such as financial crimes, identity theft,  counterfeiting of U.S. currency, computer fraud, and computer-based  attacks on banking, financial, and telecommunications infrastructure.  Over time, its investigative mission has grown to encompass a wide  range of financial and cybercrimes. In addition to investigating financial and electronic crimes, special agents conduct protective intelligence— investigating threats against protected persons, including the President,  and protected facilities, such as protectee residences. These activities are  conducted through the Office of Investigations, which oversees the  agency’s field office structure. Agents assigned to the field offices also  support protective operations by, for example, providing physical  protection with the assistance of federal, state, and local law enforcement  entities when a protectee travels. Because agents are trained to conduct  both criminal investigations and to provide protection, agents assigned to  investigations in field offices can contribute to protective operations when  needed.

Security Incidents Involving the Secret Service Since 2012

The Secret Service has experienced a number of protection-related  security incidents on the White House complex since April 2012. Incidents  have included attempts to gain access to the White House complex by  foot, car, and air. These incidents, among others, highlight some of the  many challenges the Secret Service confronts while providing protection.  See figure 1 for a description of selected security incidents.

Secret Service Has Made Progress Implementing the Protective Mission Panel’s Recommendations, but Recommended Training Targets Have Not Been Achieved

Secret Service Fully Implemented Some, But Not All, of the Panel’s Recommendations

The PMP’s 2014 report made 19 recommendations regarding (1) training  and personnel; (2) technology, perimeter security, and operations; and (3)  leadership. We found that the Secret Service fully implemented 11  recommendations and is in the process of implementing the remaining  eight recommendations. Table 1 summarizes the progress that the  agency has made implementing each recommendation. Appendix I  provides further details on the actions the Secret Service has taken to  address each recommendation.

Secret Service’s Priorities Have Been Communicated, but Recommended Training Targets in Support of Its Priorities Have Not Been Achieved

Secret Service Has Taken Steps to Communicate Agency Priorities and Increased Time Spent on Protection Agencywide

Following the PMP’s recommendation that the Secret Service should  “clearly communicate agency priorities, give effect to those priorities  through its actions, and align its operations with its priorities,” the Secret  Service took steps toward communicating internally and externally the  precedence of protection. For example, the agency hired a Senior  Executive Director of Communications in 2016 and formed the Office of  Communications and Media Relations in 2018 to manage the agency’s  public affairs efforts and to oversee internal agency communication.  Additionally, each year the Director of the Secret Service issues a  strategic priority memorandum that identifies priority areas for the  upcoming fiscal year budget.

Further, from fiscal year 2014 through fiscal year 2018, special agents  across the entire agency worked more hours on protection assignments  and fewer hours on investigations. Specifically, in fiscal year 2014, agents  spent 4.3 million hours (54 percent) on protection and 2.8 million hours  (36 percent) on investigations, whereas in fiscal year 2018, agents spent  4.9 million hours (59 percent) on protection and 2.2 million hours (26  percent) on investigations. The number and percentage of hours spent  on protection peaked in fiscal year 2016, but was higher in fiscal year  2018 than in fiscal year 2014. Figure 2 shows the distribution of agent  work hours.

The Secret Service has identified protection as its priority, and the Secret  Service has identified training as an essential component of protection. In  its December 2014 report, the PMP found that the security incident at the  White House on September 19, 2014, arose from a “catastrophic failure  of training”. The PMP therefore recommended, and Secret Service  agreed at the time, that special agents assigned to PPD and VPD train for  25 percent of their work time. This was to be accomplished by allowing  agents time to train during the designated training shift, known as the  “fourth shift”.

However, while training for special agents agencywide increased to 10  percent by 2018—more than triple the amount from fiscal year 2014— training for those assigned to PPD and VPD did not increase  accordingly. Specifically, special agents assigned to PPD and VPD  reported attending training for about 5.9 percent and 2.9 percent of their  regular work hours in fiscal year 2018, respectively, compared with 3.3  percent and 1.9 percent in fiscal year 2014. (See figure 3.) According to  our analysis of Secret Service self-reported data, in fiscal year 2018,  special agents assigned to PPD and VPD missed achieving the 25- percent training target by 76 and 88 percent each. Figure 3 shows the  share of regular work hours that agents assigned to PPD and VPD spent  in training in fiscal years 2014 through 2018 compared to the annual  target.

The Secret Service established the 25 percent training target for agents  assigned to PPD and VPD, and senior officials reaffirmed the target in  March 2019. However, according to a senior Office of Protective  Operations official, the fast operational tempo (i.e., heavy workload)  hampered agents’ ability to participate in training. This official told us that  the amount of protection that the Secret Service provides dictates how  often agents are assigned protection assignments during the training  shift. Senior Secret Service officials further added that the number of  protectees and the amount of travel for the current protectees is higher for  the current administration than for prior administrations, which reduces  the time agents have available for training. According to Secret Service  officials, the Secret Service’s ability to meet the PPD and VPD training  targets is dependent on increased staffing levels.

The Secret Service outlined its plans to increase staffing levels in the  Secret Service FY 2018–FY 2025 Human Capital Strategic Plan, which  was published in May 2017. The plan describes, among other things,  the agency’s human capital strategic goals, the process used to  determine staffing needs, and annual hiring targets. By the end of fiscal  year 2025, the agency plans to employ 9,595 individuals overall, including  4,807 special agents—an increase of 1,193 special agents from the end  of fiscal year 2018. To meet the special agent target, the Secret Service  assumes an average net growth of about 182 special agents per year  between fiscal years 2019 through 2025. However, the Secret Service’s  human capital strategy does not address the immediate need to help PPD  and VPD meet training targets. Even though the special agent staffing  level increased from fiscal years 2014 to 2018 by 332 agents, training  levels for agents assigned to PPD and VPD remained below the 25- percent target at 6 and 3 percent, respectively, in fiscal year 2018.

Because of the agency’s zero-fail responsibility to protect the President  and Vice President, the PMP concluded that it is imperative that the  Secret Service strive to address training deficits as soon as possible. In  addition, according to leading management practices related to training  and development efforts, adequate planning allows agencies to establish  priorities and determine the best ways to leverage investments to improve  performance. As part of the planning, agencies may need to compare  various training strategies in terms of, among other things, the availability  of resources and risk of unfavorable consequences if training investments  are not made.

The agency has focused on increasing training as part of its eight-year  human capital strategy, but the Secret Service has not developed a plan  to ensure that it meets near-term protection-related training targets. One  way that the agency could address PPD and VPD training needs in the  short term is to shift agents from investigations to protection assignments.  Because all agents are trained to provide protection and to conduct  investigations, they can be moved between investigations and protection  when dictated by operational circumstances. For example, in fiscal year  2016 agents worked about 548,000 fewer investigative hours in order to  support protection than they did in fiscal year 2015. This shift was made  to accommodate increased protection demand from candidates in the  November 2016 presidential election. See figure 5.

In fiscal year 2018, agents across the agency spent nearly 2.2 million  hours on investigations. By comparison, agents assigned to PPD and  VPD would have needed an additional 136,000 hours and 66,000 hours  of training, respectively, in fiscal year 2018 to reach the training targets.  Shifting agents from investigations to protection would reduce field  offices’ capacity to complete investigations. However, the agency’s stated  priority is protection, and training was identified by the PMP as a key  component of protection.

Increasing staffing levels, as planned, over the long term may adequately  support the protective and the investigative priorities at the levels defined  by the agency. However, the Secret Service is relying on hiring goals  alone to achieve its training-related targets, and it may not be able to  achieve its hiring goals because of, among other things, uncertainty about  whether enough funding will be requested and appropriated to expand the  agency at planned levels. For example, an increase of 89 special agents  was requested in the fiscal year 2020 budget submitted to Congress, 88  special agents short of the 177 planned for in the Secret Service FY  2018–FY 2025 Human Capital Strategic Plan. Further, the Secret Service  has not developed a plan specifically for meeting training targets for  agents assigned to PPD and VPD given current and planned staffing  levels.

While reviewing a draft of this report and after further consideration of the  resources required to achieve the PMP-recommended training targets, in  May 2019 the Secret Service stated that it no longer agrees with the  training target recommended by the PMP and plans to reevaluate it.  Developing and implementing a plan for meeting established training  targets given current and planned staffing levels will help ensure that  protection-related training targets are met in the near term and that  agents assigned to PPD and VPD are prepared to carry out Secret  Service’s priority—protection.

Secret Service Lacks a Policy with a Documented Process for Collecting Complete and Appropriate Training Data for the Uniformed Division

The PMP recommended, and Secret Service agreed, that Uniformed  Division officers—who provide protection at the White House—train for 10  percent of their work time. However, the Secret Service cannot fully  assess progress towards achieving the 10-percent training target  because it lacks complete and appropriate protection-related training data  for Uniformed Division officers. Standards for Internal Control in the  Federal Government state that management should design control  activities to achieve objectives and respond to risks, and that  management should implement control activities through policies.

Appropriate types of control activities include, for example, the accurate  and timely recording of transactions. Internal control standards also state  that management should use quality information to achieve the entity’s  objective. Quality information is appropriate, current, complete, accurate,  accessible, and provided on a timely basis.

According to Secret Service officials, training data for Uniformed Division  officers are collected through various means and systems. For example,  officials stated that they use a database called ePerson to capture certain  types of training, such as firearms and physical training requalification  sessions. In addition, officials report that Secret Service separately uses  DHS’s Performance and Learning Management System (PALMS), which  DHS designed to consolidate existing learning management systems for  each of DHS’s agencies. PALMS collects data on computer-based  training and training provided at the James J. Rowley Training Center  automatically, but requires manual entry for training provided at offsite  locations. According to Secret Service officials, there are a significant  amount of internal on-the-job training instances that do not get recorded.  As a result, training data collected on Uniformed Division training hours  are incomplete.

Further, we reviewed the training data that the Uniformed Division  provided to us and identified a number of data quality issues affecting the  data’s completeness and appropriateness. For example, certain training  was identified by location only or lacked descriptions to clearly link the  training to the skills Uniformed Division officers require while working at  the White House. Additionally, Secret Service counted training unrelated  to protection, such as training on electronic travel vouchers and  retirement planning, towards achievement of the 10-percent protection- training target. This occurred because the Secret Service lacks a policy  with a documented process identifying how to capture Uniformed Division  training information and the type of training to be captured.

According to Uniformed Division management, the Secret Service  initiated a process in 2017 to enhance the collection and compilation of  Uniformed Division training information. Specifically, each Uniformed  Division branch training coordinator is to send a list of completed training  to Uniformed Division management every 2 weeks. That training  information, along with information captured in other systems such as  PALMS, is then to be manually compiled by a Uniformed Division staff  person at Secret Service’s headquarters. However, the Secret Service  has not consistently employed the new process since initiating it in 2017.  For example, according to Secret Service officials, the individual  responsible for compiling the data was absent from the position for 3  months, and they did not know whether the data for that period were  compiled at that time. As personnel—such as the branch training  coordinators or the individual responsible for compiling the data—change  positions, it is important that the Secret Service have a policy with a  documented process to ensure that data collection continues over time  and given staff changes. Further, the process does not include  information on how or whether to capture internal on-the-job training  instances, or instruction on the type of training to be captured to  demonstrate that the training is protection-related training. Developing  and implementing a policy with a documented process to collect complete  and appropriate Uniformed Division officer training data would better  position Secret Service to assess Uniform Division officer training data  and make informed decisions about whether and how training needs and  the 10-percent training are being met.

Protecting the White House, the President, and the Vice President,  among others, is a zero-fail responsibility. As such, the Secret Service  must be prepared to face every evolving threat in a rapidly changing  environment. This involves having certain specific security skills and  routine training on an ongoing basis. In December 2014, the PMP  recommended that the Secret Service align its operations with its  priorities, and chief among these is protection. It further recommended,  and the Secret Service agreed to, achieving specified training targets.  While training alone will not guarantee the safety of the Secret Service’s  protectees, developing and implementing a plan for meeting protection- related training targets would better prepare special agents to effectively  respond to the security threats faced by the President and other  protectees. Further, the Secret Service lacks a documented process for  collecting Uniformed Division training data that the agency can use to  determine whether officers trained for 10 percent of their work hours, as  recommended by the PMP. Implementing such a policy could help the  Secret Service make informed decisions about Uniformed Division  training.

We are making the following two recommendations to the Secret Service:  The Director of the Secret Service should develop and implement a plan  to ensure that special agents assigned to PPD and VPD reach annual  training targets given current and planned staffing levels.  (Recommendation 1)

The Director of the Secret Service should develop and implement a policy  that documents the process for collecting complete Uniformed Division  officer training data and establishes the types of information that should  be collected. (Recommendation 2)

We provided a copy of this report to DHS for review and comment. DHS  provided written comments, which are reproduced in appendix II. DHS  also provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate.

In its comments, Secret Service, through DHS concurred with the two  recommendations. However, related to the first recommendation—  develop and implement a plan to ensure that special agents assigned to  PPD and VPD reach annual training targets given current and planned  staffing levels— Secret Service also stated that after further  consideration, the agency no longer believes that the annual training  target for Presidential and Vice Presidential Protective Divisions should  be set at 25 percent of their work time. We incorporated this change in  our report. In its comments, the agency stated that the Secret Service  Office of Training will work with the Office of Protective Operations to  evaluate the training metric for PPD and VPD and develop a plan  focusing on increasing capacity at training facilities, achieving staffing  growth, and creating efficiencies in protective division scheduling.

With respect to the second recommendation—to develop and implement  a policy that documents the process for collecting complete Uniformed  Division officer training data and establish the types of information that  should be collected—Secret Service, through DHS stated that it will  develop rigorous and uniform standards for collecting and reporting  training data related to the Uniformed Division branch. The agency also  stated that it will continue to add training programs to the Performance  and Learning Management System and capture informal and on-the-job  training hours for the Uniformed Division. DHS stated that the Secret  Service expects to  review the Enterprise Personnel Schedule System  within the next 2 months and anticipates these efforts will result in a more  accurate and expansive method for reporting Uniformed Division training.

We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional  committees and the Acting Secretary of Homeland Security. In addition,  the report is available at no charge on the GAO website at  http://www.gao.gov.

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact  me at (202) 512-3841 or AndersonN@gao.gov. Contact points for our  Office of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the  last page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this  report are listed in appendix II.

Appendix I: Implementation of U.S. Secret Service Protective Mission Panel Recommendations

In October 2014, the then-Secretary of Homeland Security established  the United States Secret Service Protective Mission Panel (PMP) and  tasked the independent panel to review the security incident that occurred  at the White House on September 19, 2014 as well as related security  issues. The PMP made 19 public recommendations—as well as  additional classified recommendations—to the U.S. Secret Service  (Secret Service) in three areas: (1) training and personnel; (2) technology,  perimeter security, and operations; and (3) leadership. In this appendix,  we list the 19 recommendations and accompanying text as published in  the Executive Summary to Report from the United States Secret Service  Protective Mission Panel to the Secretary of Homeland Security, dated  December 15, 2014.

The Secret Service Recruitment and Retention Act of 2018 includes a  provision that we report on a detailed summary of the Secret Service’s  progress implementing the PMP’s recommendations. Specifically, for  each recommendation, we provide our assessment of the Secret  Service’s progress, describe some of the actions the Secret Service has  taken to implement the recommendations, and identify the actions the  agency said it plans to complete.

Provide a true “Fourth Shift” for training the Presidential and Vice  Presidential Protective Divisions, so that they spend two weeks out of  every eight in training, and ensure that Uniformed Division officers are in  training for no less than 10 percent of their time.

According to the PMP, “Only with constant training can all of the teams at  the White House perform the coordinated actions needed to effectively  respond.”

Actions Taken by the Secret Service  Summary: The Secret Service instituted a fourth and fifth shift for its  Presidential Protective Division (PPD) and a fourth shift Vice Presidential  Protective Division (VPD). The fourth shift was created to provide agents  with time to participate in training educational opportunities, conduct  advances, and take leave. Implementation is still in progress because  neither PPD nor VPD special agents consistently used this time to train  and are missed the training targets established by this recommendation.  In commenting on a draft of this report in May 2019, the Secret Service  stated that it no longer agrees with the training target and plans to  reevaluate it. The Secret Service does not have a documented process  for collecting complete and appropriate Uniformed Division training data  that the agency can use to determine whether officers trained for 10  percent of their work hours.

The Secret Service adopted the PMP goal for agents assigned to PPD and VPD to train for 25 percent of their regular work hours. However, in fiscal year 2018, according to self-reported data, these agents attended training for about 5.9 percent and 2.9 percent of their regular work hours, respectively.

Although the fourth shift was developed to provide special agents assigned to PPD and VPD time away from shift work during which they could attend training, agents have largely not attended training during the fourth shift, according to agency officials. Agents are instead assigned to additional advance assignments or use leave, as agents are not allowed to take leave during the three regular shifts except in an emergency.

Additional action(s) Secret Service plans to take: In its FY 2018–FY  2025 Human Capital Strategic Plan and FY 2018 – FY 2025 Training  Strategic Plan, the Secret Service stated that increasing staffing levels  would allow the agency more flexibility with how it schedules shifts and  advance assignments, thereby freeing up special agents’ and Uniformed  Division officers’ time for training. The agency plans to have 4,807 agents  and 1,797 Uniformed Division officers by the end of fiscal year 2025, up  from 3,614 agents and 1,559 officers at the end of fiscal year 2018. The  Secret Service also plans to reevaluate the training target for special  agents assigned to PPD and VPD.

Implement integrated training focused on ensuring that all teams at the  White House know their roles in responding to specific threats.

According to the PMP, “Teams need to train with the full complement of  forces with which they will operate in real life, and the training needs to be  provided force-wide, not just to those on duty on the day that training is  scheduled.”

Status: Implemented; ongoing work may be required to ensure  recommendation is sustained.

Actions Taken by the Secret Service  Summary: To provide integrated training between different Secret  Service units, the agency conducted 10 live training exercises and six  discussion-based tabletop exercises with personnel from different units in  fiscal year 2017. About every two weeks, agents assigned to PPD and  VPD each conduct drills and training scenarios, some of which  incorporate Uniformed Division officers. In addition, the Secret Service  began offering Emergency Action and Building Defense training in  October 2014 to Uniformed Division personnel.

In fiscal year 2017, the Secret Service conducted 10 live training exercises and 6 discussion-based tabletop exercises with personnel from different units. Among the live exercises, the Secret Service conducted a readiness exercise at the White House in December 2017.

About every two weeks, agents assigned to the PPD and VPD conduct drills and training scenarios, some of which incorporate Uniformed Division officers, according to a Secret Service official. These drills take place at the White House, the Naval Observatory, the Department of Treasury building, and the Rowley Training Center.

Secret Service began offering Emergency Action and Building Defense training in October 2014 to Uniformed Division personnel. Topics addressed in the course include judgment, firearm control, constitutional law, and emergency medicine. The Emergency Action and Building Defense course is part of the training that new Uniformed Division recruits take.

In recent years, the Secret Service conducted joint training exercises with local, state, federal, and foreign tactical units. According to Secret Service officials, the agency conducted 53 of these joint training exercises in fiscal year 2015 through 2018.

Train in conditions that replicate the physical environment in which they  will operate.

According to the PMP, “A security team should also be trained so that it is  intimately familiar with the space in which it is operating.”

Actions Taken by the Secret Service  Summary: To train in conditions that replicate the White House, the  Secret Service secured approval to build a White House Mockup Training  Facility at the James J. Rowley Training Center in Beltsville, Maryland.  However, the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) fiscal year 2019  budget request to Congress did not include funding for the facility.

In 2017, the National Capital Planning Commission approved the Secret Service’s revised master plan for the Rowley Training Center, which includes the White House Mockup Training Facility.

The fiscal year 2019 Resource Allocation Plan request submitted by the Secret Service to DHS included $77.4 million for the construction project over 5 years. However, the fiscal year 2019 DHS budget request did not include funding for the facility.

Some agent and officer training takes place in the operating environment. According to a Secret Service official, agents assigned to the PPD and VPD run drills and training scenarios about every two weeks. Some of the training takes place at the White House, the Naval Observatory, and the Department of the Treasury building, although most training takes place at the Rowley Training Center. These drills and scenarios sometimes also include Uniformed Division officers. In December 2017, the Secret Service conducted a readiness exercise involving multiple units at the White House.

Additional action(s) Secret Service plans to take: The Secret Service  will proceed with construction of the White House Mockup Training  Facility when funding is available. It was not included in DHS’s fiscal year  2019 budget request.

Increase the Uniformed Division, as quickly as can be appropriately  managed, by an initial 200 positions, and the Presidential Protective  Division by 85 positions. Perform additional analyses and, likely, further  increases as necessary.

According to the PMP, “Both the Uniformed Division and the Presidential  Protective Division are currently stretched beyond their limits.”

Actions Taken by the Secret Service  Summary: The Secret Service increased the number of Uniformed  Division officers and the number of agents assigned to PPD by 214 and  151 persons, respectively, from the end of fiscal year 2014 to the end of  fiscal year 2018. Further, special agent and Uniformed Division officer  external attrition rate declined year-over-year from fiscal year 2016 to  fiscal year 2018. The Secret Service also conducted additional analyses  to determine optimal staffing levels to be reached by the end of fiscal year  2025. The Secret Service met or exceeded its hiring goals for special  agents and Uniformed Division officers in fiscal year 2016 and fiscal year  2018.

From the end of fiscal year 2014 to the end of fiscal year 2018, the Secret Service increased the number of agents assigned to PPD from 248 to 399—a net increase of 151 agents—and the number of Uniformed Division officers from 1,345 to 1,559—a net increase of 214 officers.

The Secret Service conducted additional analyses and set hiring goals in the FY 2018–FY 2025 Human Capital Strategic Plan. Specifically, by the end of fiscal year 2020, the Secret Service aims to have 3,927 special agents, 1,657 Uniformed Division officers, and 2,366 Administrative, Professional, and Technical staff. By the end of fiscal year 2025, the Secret Service aims to have 4,807 special agents, 1,797 Uniformed Division officers, and 2,991 Administrative, Professional, and Technical staff.

Additional action(s) Secret Service plans to take: The Secret Service  is planning to continually validate the human capital strategic plan to  ensure that staffing levels are responsive to changes in the agency’s  operational tempo. The Secret Service also plans to fill administrative  jobs that are currently filled by Uniformed Division officers with  Administrative, Professional, and Technical employees, so that the  Uniformed Division personnel are more focused on protection.

Reform and professionalize recruiting, hiring, promotion, and rotation  process that puts the most talented, capable individuals in place as  efficiently as possible.

According to the PMP, “The Secret Service must continue efforts to  develop a professionalized recruiting and hiring process that finds  talented individuals, evaluates candidates rigorously for the Presidential  Protective Division, and hires them quickly.”

Status: Implemented; ongoing work may be required to ensure  recommendation is sustained.

Actions Taken by the Secret Service  Summary: The Secret Service hired a Chief Human Capital Officer to run  the new Office of Human Resources. In addition, the agency implemented  several initiatives to strengthen recruiting, expedite hiring, and clarify the  promotion process.

The Secret Service reorganized the Office of Human Resources as a stand-alone directorate and hired a Chief Human Capital Officer, who is a professional administrator.

The Secret Service developed a National Recruitment Strategy for FY 2016–FY 2020 and the Recruitment and Outreach Plan for FY 2018 to help ensure that the agency is able to meet its staffing requirements through effective and targeted recruitment strategies. Recruitment strategies include increasing the agency’s social media presence, improving the training of its recruiters, and expanding cooperation with the Department of Defense to recruit service members departing the military.

The Secret Service developed a number of hiring initiatives, which according to agency officials, reduced time-to-hire for special agents and Uniformed Division officers from an average of 395 days in fiscal year 2016 to 285 days in fiscal year 2018. For example, the agency created Entry Level Assessment Centers that allow applicants to complete several application steps in one week, including the entrance examination, the Special Agent and Uniformed Division Pre- employment Review, and the security interview. The agency also established the Applicant Coordination Center to track applicant processing. In particular, the Applicant Coordination Center brings together a polygraph examiner, a nurse, a security clearance adjudicator, and a human resources specialist to usher candidates through the hiring steps. The agency also began using the web-based Applicant Lifecycle Information System to view applicant materials, process security investigations, send conditional job offers, and track candidates’ progress in one place.

The Secret Service published special agent Career Progression guidelines in September 2015 and published a revision to the special agent Merit Promotion Process for agents in May 2017.

Additional action(s) Secret Service plans to take: According to agency  officials, the Secret Service is currently revising the Uniformed Division  Merit Promotion Process and is implementing the Administrative,  Professional, and Technical Career Progression Plan. The agency also  plans to update and consolidate internal policies for agent and Uniformed  Division officer recruitment and hiring.

Ensure that the Office of Technical Development and Mission Support  proactively reviews and refreshes the Service’s technological footprint.  The Service should receive dedicated funds for technology, both within its  own budget and within DHS Science and Technology’s budget, to  accomplish these tasks.

According to the PMP, “Technology systems used on the complex must  always remain on the cutting edge, and the Secret Service must invest in  technology, including becoming a driver of research and development  that may assist in its mission.”

Actions Taken by the Secret Service  Summary: To address current technical capabilities and future needs,  Secret Service officials stated that, as of October 2018, the Office of  Technical Development and Mission Support was drafting a strategic  investment plan. According to Secret Service officials, the agency is  continuing to explore new technology to enhance its technological  capabilities to mitigate threats, including threats to airspace.

According to an agency official, as of October 2018, the Office of Technical Development and Mission Support is drafting a five-year strategic investment plan. The plan is to address current technical capabilities as well as needs into the future.

According to Secret Service officials, for more than 10 years, the Secret Service’s Science and Technology Review Committee has met quarterly to discuss protection-related technology requirements. The committee is chaired by the Chief Technology Officer, overseen by the Enterprise Governance Council, and open to representatives from all Secret Service directorates. The Enterprise Governance Council is composed of Deputy Assistant Directors from several Secret Service offices and is responsible for overseeing the agency’s investments in science and technology, information technology, and other capital assets.

Also according to agency officials, the Secret Service works with the DHS Science and Technology Directorate, partner agencies, and external stakeholders on technological issues. In particular, the Science and Technology Directorate develops pilot programs based on the Secret Service’s technical requirements.

According to an agency official, the Secret Service conducts performance reviews of different technology systems each month with the aim of evaluating the performance of every deployed system at least once per year.

In fiscal year 2017, Congress appropriated $2.5 million to the Secret Service for research and development. In addition, the Act appropriated $1.8 billion to the Secret Service for Operations and Support, and the Secret Service allocated $98.2 million to the Secret Service for the Operational Mission Support, which helps to protect  the President, Vice President, and others from emerging explosive,  chemical, biological, radiological, and cyber threats. The funding for  the Operational Mission Support program is divided between  technology operations and support; procurement, construction, and  improvements; and research and development. According to agency  officials, the Secret Service does not receive dedicated technology  funds through the DHS Science and Technology Directorate.

Additional action(s) Secret Service plans to take: Complete and  execute the Office of Technical Development and Mission Support’s 5- year strategic investment plan. The plan is intended to address research  and development regarding, among other things, ways to mitigate  emerging physical and technical threats and identify additional threats.

Replace the outer fence that surrounds the 18 acres of the White House  complex to give Secret Service personnel more time to react to intrusions.

According to the PMP, “The current seven-and-a-half-foot fence, not just  along Pennsylvania Avenue but around the compound’s entire perimeter,  must be replaced as quickly as possible.”

Actions Taken by the Secret Service  Summary: As of March 2019, the Secret Service was planning to begin  construction of the first phase of the new White House fence in May 2019.  As a temporary measure, in 2015, the Secret Service and the National  Park Service installed bike-rack barricades about 12 feet in front of the  permanent fence.

As a temporary measure, in 2015 the Secret Service and the National Park Service installed bike rack barricades about 12 feet in front of the permanent White House fence. According to Secret Service officials, the bike-rack barricades give Secret Service personnel more time to respond to fence-jumpers. The Secret Service additionally installed several interim countermeasures to the existing fences, including additional spikes.

The Secret Service is preparing to break ground and begin construction on the Phase I sections of the White House fence in May or June 2019, according to an agency official in December 2018. Phase I includes a fence surrounding the White House and its immediate grounds. The Commission of Fine Arts and the National Capitol Planning Commission approved the Phase I project in January and February 2017, respectively.

Additional action(s) Secret Service plans to take:

Phase I fence construction is scheduled to begin in May or June 2019.

Phase II planning and construction. In its fiscal year 2019 budget request, the Secret Service requested $3 million for preliminary design development of Phase II of the White House fence project. Phase II is to expand the new fence to the Treasury Building and the Eisenhower Executive Office Building.

Clearly communicate agency priorities, give effect to those priorities  through its actions, and align its operations with its priorities.

According to the PMP, “Secret Service’s leadership must make those  choices in a manner to ensure that its core protective mission remains  first priority.”

Actions Taken by the Secret Service  Summary: The Secret Service has taken steps to communicate that  protection is its priority. The agency reiterated its priorities in its 2018– 2022 Strategic Plan and hired a Director of Communications in 2016 to  manage the agency’s public affairs efforts and to oversee internal agency  communication. However, the Secret Service has not fully aligned its  operations with its priorities. For example, in response to the PMP’s 2014  report identifying that the security incident of September 2014 arose from  a “catastrophic failure of training,” the Secret Service agreed to having its  Presidential and Vice Presidential Protective Divisions train 25 percent of  their work hours. Implementation of this recommendation is in progress  because its operations do not fully align with the stated priorities, as these  divisions are not training at agreed-upon levels.

To implement this recommendation, the Secret Service sought to improve internal and external communication efforts. The agency did so by hiring a senior executive Director of Communications in 2016 and forming the Office of Communications and Media Relations in 2017 to manage the agency’s public affairs efforts and to oversee internal agency communication. In addition, in October 2015, the Secret Service developed an internal agency communication platform known as Spark!. The Spark! platform allows all employees to share ideas and submit suggestions on how to improve the agency’s performance and efficiency, thereby improving communication within the agency.

The DHS Office of Policy reviewed the dual missions of the Secret Service and issued a report that emphasized the importance of the protective and investigative missions (January 2017). Secret Service officials cited this report as evidence that the agency evaluated its priorities and resource allocation decisions.

Secret Service data show that agents increased the share of work hours spent on protection compared with investigation from fiscal year 2014 to fiscal year 2018. Overall, based on our analysis of Secret Service data, 59 percent of special agent hours in fiscal year 2018 were spent on protection and 26 percent on investigations. This is in contrast to 54 percent protection and 36 percent investigations in fiscal year 2014. However, agents worked an average of 2.2 million hours annually on investigations over that period, even though agents assigned to the PPD and VPD did not meet training targets during that time. Despite shifting resources toward protection, the Secret Service’s operations and associated resource allocation do not fully align with its stated priority, protection, because training is an essential component of agents’ protection assignments.

Promote specialized expertise in its budget, workforce, and technology  functions.

According to the PMP, “Filling important administrative functions with  agents rather than professional administrators may not be optimal.”

Status: Implemented; ongoing work may be required to ensure  recommendation is sustained.

Actions Taken by the Secret Service  Summary: To promote specialized expertise in certain business  functions, the Secret Service hired a Chief Operating Officer to run the  agency’s business functions and elevated senior civilian (non-agent)  executives, including the Chief Technology Officer and the Chief Financial  Officer, to lead key staff offices. The agency also hired new professional  administrators, instead of promoting special agents, to serve in other  senior positions, such as Chief Human Capital Officer and Chief Strategy  Officer.

The Secret Service reorganized the agency to promote specialized expertise in certain functions. In 2015, the Secret Service established the position of Chief Operating Officer. This principal administrator, who is equivalent in rank to the Deputy Director, directs the agency’s business and programmatic activities, with a focus on improving performance, hiring and retaining personnel, and aligning budgetary and strategic planning efforts.

The Secret Service professionalized the leadership of several directorates by elevating or hiring civilian senior executives, instead of placing special agents in these specialized positions. For example, in 2015, the civilian who was serving as Chief Financial Officer was placed in charge of the newly created Office of the Chief Financial Officer. Similarly, the Chief Information Officer was placed in charge of the newly created Office of the Chief Information Officer. Also, in 2015, the civilian Chief Technology Officer was placed in charge of the Office of Technical Development and Mission Support, and the Secret Service hired a civilian from outside of the agency to become Chief Human Capital Officer—a position that was formerly held by a special agent. In 2016, the agency created two additional senior, civilian positions: Chief Strategy Officer and Director of Communications.

Secret Service officials stated that the agency is currently developing a training course to instruct senior special agents in the agency budget process.

Present a zero-based or mission-based budget that will provide sufficient  resources to accomplish its mission, beginning immediately by working  within DHS to adopt a workforce staffing model.

According to the PMP, “The Service must build a new budget from the  ground up by defining its mission, determining what it will take to achieve  it, and asking for that. The mission is important enough to justify that  approach.”

Actions Taken by the Secret Service  Summary: The Secret Service has incorporated principles of mission- based budgeting in its budget formulation process. According to Secret  Service officials, modeling staffing needs is a key part of mission-based  budgeting, and personnel costs accounted for about 71 percent of the  Secret Service’s fiscal year 2018 budget. The Secret Service  developed—and continues to refine—four staffing models that use  internal and external data to establish the optimal staffing levels across  the agency. Under mission-based budgeting, also known as zero-base  budgeting, the agency is to rebuild the budget by clearly defining its  mission and desired outcomes and determining what funding level is  needed to obtain those outcomes. This process is in contrast to making  incremental changes from the prior year’s budget.  budgeting process into its overall budget formulation. The Director annually issues priority memos to guide the development of the Secret Service Resource Allocation Plan submissions to DHS. In The Secret Service has worked to incorporate a mission‐based 2016, the Office of the Chief Financial Officer introduced a mission‐ based budgeting approach for developing the FY 2018 – FY 2022 Resource Allocation Plan submission. Further, the Secret Service’s Resource Allocation Plan prioritizes the agency’s needs for inclusion in DHS’s annual budget request to Congress.

Part of the Secret Service’s mission-based budgeting approach involved assessing human capital needs. The Secret Service developed four workforce staffing models that provided a basis to identify valid baseline staffing levels for the agency, a key component to the mission-based budgeting process. According to Secret Service officials, these staffing models are designed to ensure that the agency  is staffed in such a way that its personnel are properly trained,  overtime is minimized, and proper support personnel are in place so  that it is fully prepared to meet mission demands. The Secret Service  used the results of the staffing models to develop the Secret Service  FY 2018–FY 2025 Human Capital Strategic Plan, published in May  2017, which detailed the agency’s plan to increase the workforce to  9,595 total employees by the end of fiscal year 2025.

Secret Service officials acknowledge that they still have to strengthen their budget processes. Specifically, they would like to make the budget process more analytical and data-driven. For example, agency officials want to make better use of budget data to support planning and budget requests, such as by combining financial data with programmatic information to better inform budget decisions. Agency officials want to hire one or more individuals who can better interpret and use those data.

Additional action(s) Secret Service plans to take: Secret Service  officials said they plan to continue to hone the staffing models. For  example, the agency plans to include annual leave and increased training  levels in the next iterations of the models.

Create more opportunities for officers and agents to provide input on their  mission and train its mid- and lower-level managers to encourage, value  and respond to such feedback.

According to the PMP, “Leadership and, even more critically, mid- and  lower-level managers, need to make clear that their mission requires that  they get things right—and thus that the agency values information out of  sync with the status quo or the leadership’s views.”

Actions Taken by the Secret Service  Summary: To improve communication between the workforce and senior  leaders, the Secret Service created a platform on its intranet known as  Spark! that encourages employees to submit ideas to senior leaders on  how to improve the agency’s performance.

In October 2015, the Secret Service deployed the Spark! platform, which allows all employees to share ideas and submit suggestions on how to improve the agency’s performance and efficiency. The platform allows two-way communication between leadership and the workforce. The Secret Service reported that in 2017, 96 percent of employees have contributed to a discussion on the site. The agency also reported that, as of June 2018, 51 workforce-generated ideas had been implemented or were being implemented.

According to Secret Service officials, several ideas that originated from employees have prompted changes at the agency. These developments include the formation of a new category of employees, known as Technical Law Enforcement in 2018; the introduction of a chaplaincy program in 2017; and the development of the Administrative, Technical, and Professional Career Track.

Since 2015, the Secret Service offered a training course on workplace communication called “Enhancing Workplace Communication”. According to agency data, 72 employees took the course in fiscal year 2017 and 2018.

From November 2014 to December 2015, the Secret Service contracted with Eagle Hill Consulting to conduct an independent assessment of quality-of-life issues at the Secret Service. The agency workforce was able to provide input through 47 focus groups and an agency-wide anonymous survey. In its final report dated August 22, 2016, Eagle Hill Consulting provided Secret Service management with 22 recommendations to improve quality of life for agency employees.

Additional action(s) Secret Service plans to take: The Secret Service  plans to introduce additional leadership courses for personnel at all  levels. It also plans to remove potential barriers to communication  between employees and supervisors by revising merit promotion  processes for Uniformed Division officers and for special agents.

Lead the federal protective force community.

According to the PMP, “Collaboration with protective forces like the  Federal Protective Service, the Pentagon Force Protection Agency, the  FBI Police, and the State Department’s Bureau of Diplomatic Security and  other agencies, especially on technology, could significantly increase  opportunities for innovation.”

Status: Implemented; ongoing work may be required to ensure  recommendation is sustained.

Actions Taken by the Secret Service  Summary: The Secret Service has engaged with other protective forces,  across the federal government, such as the Federal Protective Service,  through various mechanisms, including a leadership symposium and  technology sharing efforts. According to Secret Service officials, the  agency has provided assessments and assistance to other government  partners in this area.

In 2015, the Secret Service chaired a leadership symposium with other federal agencies to discuss roles, responsibilities, and procedures in the event of a critical incident in the National Capital Region and specifically at the White House.

Secret Service officials stated that the agency often consults with federal peers to benchmark capabilities and organizational structures to identify possibilities for improvement. In addition, officials stated that the Secret Service partners with other agencies, leading to technological developments. Developments to date include deployment of a fixed-site sub-sonic detection capability with the Metropolitan Police Department of the District of Columbia; a fixed- site super-sonic detection capability with the U.S. Army; and a vehicle motorcade detection capability with the Department of Defense.

The Secret Service’s Protective Intelligence and Assessment Division participates in the International Security Events Group when a Secret Service protectee will be traveling to a high-profile international event, such as the Olympics Games. The International Security Events Group is a working group for over 20 federal security and law enforcement agencies and is managed by the Department of State.

According to Secret Service officials, at the request of the Office of Management and Budget, the Secret Service has shared expertise with other agencies, including the U.S. Marshals Service, to help to standardize the protection of cabinet-level government officials.

Also according to agency officials, the Secret Service leads the federal force protective community in many areas. For example, the agency’s Hazardous Agent Mitigation Medical Emergency Response team has the capability to detect, mitigate, and response to chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear attacks on protectees, and the team consults with other agencies on these issues, according to  agency officials.

Additional action(s) Secret Service plans to take: None.

Receive periodic, outside assessments of the threats to and strategies for  protecting the White House compound.

According to the PMP, “The Secret Service should engage other federal  agencies to evaluate the threats that the agency faces and its ways of  doing business.”

Actions Taken by the Secret Service  Summary: The Secret Service regularly engages with outside partner(s)  to have the threats to and strategies for protecting the White House  complex assessed.

The Secret Service has a memorandum of agreement in place with partner agencies to ensure that the outside assessments continue.

Between 2015 and 2018, non-Secret Service partner(s) assessed the threats to and strategies for protecting the White house compound between two and four times per year.

Resume participation in international fora with comparable protective  services of friendly nations.

According to the PMP, “While most national protective forces do not  compare to the Secret Service, those of certain nations are much more  similar than they are different.”

Actions Taken by the Secret Service  Summary: The Secret Service, through the Office of Investigations and  the Office of Strategic Intelligence and Information, maintains  relationships with international partners to share information. In 2018, the  Secret Service, among other things, provided training at International Law  Enforcement Academies, which are administered by the Department of  State, and provided threat assessments to European partners.

The Office of Investigations’ International Programs Division provides training to foreign law enforcement organizations through the Department of State’s International Law Enforcement Academies. The Secret Service provides training at all five of the academy’s locations: Bangkok, Thailand; Budapest, Hungary; Gaborone, Botswana; San Salvador, El Salvador; and Roswell, New Mexico. According to agency officials, the Secret Service provided instruction on the agency’s protection methods to over 900 personnel in 2018.

The Office of Strategic Intelligence and Information maintains international partnerships to enable the sharing of information and best practices. For example, in 2018, agency officials presented threat assessments to European partners on at least two occasions.

Secret Service officials noted that the agency hosts groups of foreign law enforcement personnel for dignitary protection seminars. The seminars are intended to, among other things, encourage future cooperation.

Additional action(s) Secret Service plans to take: The Secret Service  plans to establish a process for developing proposals to enhance  intelligence and operational activities with foreign partners. The agency  also plans to formalize a process for senior executive approval of these  proposals.

Give leadership’s priorities and reform the organization’s sustained  attention and hold the agency accountable through to their completion.

According to the PMP, “Following through on reforms and  recommendations has been an issue for the Secret Service in the past.”

Status: Implemented; ongoing work may be required to ensure  recommendation is sustained.

Actions Taken by the Secret Service  Summary: To ensure that the agency implemented the PMP’s  recommendations, the Office of Strategic Planning and Policy (OSP) was  tasked with overseeing and tracking the PMP’s recommendations. This  office also coordinated the development of key strategy documents to  guide the agency’s efforts.

Secret Service executive leaders tasked OSP to oversee and track the implementation of the PMP’s recommendations. The Office of Strategic Planning and Policy coordinated the development of three key strategy documents: the FY 2018 – FY 2022 Strategic Plan, the FY 2018 – FY 2025 Training Strategic Plan, and the FY 2018 – FY 2025 Human Capital Strategic Plan.

Additionally, the OSP refined existing performance measures and is developing additional mechanisms to enhance reporting on performance goals to senior leadership. This includes monthly and quarterly reports on key performance metrics and indicators.

In January 2017, the agency revived its Enterprise Governance Council, a deliberative body made up of the deputies from each Secret Service directorate. The Enterprise Governance Council oversees agency-wide priorities, including managing the Resource Allocation Plan process, which prioritizes the Secret Service’s needs for inclusion in the annual budget request.

Implement a disciplinary system in a consistent manner that  demonstrates zero tolerance for failures that are incompatible with its  zero-failure mission.

According to the PMP, “It is clear that the rank-and-file—and even very  senior current and former members of the Secret Service—do not have  confidence that discipline is imposed in a fair and consistent manner.”

Actions Taken by the Secret Service  Summary: The Secret Service established the Office of Integrity in 2013  to centralize and standardize the disciplinary system across the Secret  Service. According to agency officials, for each substantiated incident of  employee misconduct, the Chief Integrity Officer and Deputy Chief  Integrity Officer determine what formal disciplinary action, if any, is  warranted. Further, the Discipline Review Board, composed of senior  representatives from each directorate, oversees the discipline system and  hears appeals from most personnel. (A separate process is in place for  members of the Senior Executive Service.) Disciplinary outcomes are  detailed in an annual report so as to increase transparency within the  agency.

The Office of Integrity was established in 2013 to centralize the disciplinary system across the agency. Previously, Special Agents in Charge of field offices had the responsibility of addressing employee misconduct and determining the penalty, according to an agency official.

In 2015, the Office of Integrity began publishing an annual discipline report which provides an overview of disciplinary actions taken by deciding officials and analyzes misconduct trends.

Additional action(s) Secret Service plans to take: The Secret Service  plans to conduct a formal review and periodic analysis of the Office of  Integrity to ensure that it is fulfilling its intended purpose.

Hold forces accountable for performance by using front-line supervisors  to constantly test readiness.

According to the PMP, “To be ready for a job where quick reactions and  reflexes are critical, supervisors need to drive home to their officers and  agents that the front line is constantly being tested.”

Actions Taken by the Secret Service  Summary: The Secret Service introduced new policies and plans to  study whether to introduce a “random check” program to test employees’  readiness. In addition, according to Secret Service officials, special  agents assigned to PPD and VPD run biweekly drills and training  scenarios at the White House complex and at the Vice President’s  Residence, while Uniformed Division officers are briefed on emergency  actions and responsibilities at shift changes. This recommendation is in  progress because it requires additional tests for readiness.

In December 2017, the Secret Service conducted scenario readiness exercise involving multiple units at the White House.

According to Secret Service officials, the agency runs drills and training scenarios about every 2 weeks. These drills have taken place at the White House, the Naval Observatory (the Vice President’s Residence), and at the Department of the Treasury building. Agents assigned to PPD and VPD are the primary training participants, but Uniformed Division officers are often involved as well. More recently, the training scenarios have included other groups if the practice incident is off, or near the edge, of the White House complex. For example, training scenarios may include U.S. Park Police or Secret Service personnel assigned to the Washington Field Office.

The Uniformed Division conducts daily personnel shift briefs, which cover emergency actions and responsibilities.

The Office of Protective Operations instituted training classes for personnel assigned to the Joint Operations Center. The Joint Operations Center is located away from the White House and is responsible for managing day-to-day Secret Service operations and coordinating emergency response.

Additional action(s) Secret Service plans to take: The Secret Service  plans to study whether to introduce a “random check” program to test  employees on their responsibilities at operational posts.

The next director of the Secret Service should be a strong leader from  outside the agency who has a protective, law enforcement, or military  background and who can drive cultural change in the organization and  move the Secret Service forward into a new era.

According to the PMP, “The need to change, reinvigorate, and question  long-held assumptions—from within the agency itself—is too critical right  now for the next director to be an insider.”

Actions Taken by the Secret Service  Summary: Randolph “Tex” Alles was appointed the Secret Service  director in 2017 and was in that position until 2019. He had not worked at  the Secret Service prior to taking on this role, but he served previously as  Acting Deputy Commissioner of U.S. Customs and Border Protection and  in the U.S. Marine Corps. This recommendation was implemented  through presidential action, as the Secret Service does not select its own  director.

Establish a leadership development system that identifies and trains the  agency’s future managers and leaders.

According to the PMP, “To promote from within and move the agency  forward, however, the Secret Service needs to do a better job of  identifying future leaders and preparing them for the role.”

Actions Taken by the Secret Service  Summary: The Secret Service has taken steps to improve its leadership  development system and has provided leadership training at different  levels with a focus on first-line supervisors. The agency is also developing  the “Framework for Leadership Development,” which is to identify courses  and training opportunities to promote leadership skills at all levels.

The Secret Service adopted the DHS Leadership Development Program in 2015 to encourage leadership development at all levels.

The agency has provided leadership training at different levels. For example, 409 employees have attended the Seminar for First Line Supervisors since 2015. Since 2016, 178 employees attended the Antietam Leadership Experience, which is a course for supervisors, managers, and senior team leads that focuses on leadership development and capabilities. Since 2018, 41 employees attended the Building Leaders Training Course, which is designed for non- supervisory team leads.

The Office of Human Resources, in coordination with the Rowley Training Center, has begun to develop a “Framework for Leadership Development” program to craft effective courses and training requirements tailored to individuals throughout their careers.

The Secret Service put on a number of events to emphasize the importance of leadership within the agency in fiscal year 2018 as part of the DHS’s “Leadership Year,” a department-wide effort to promote leadership skills. An intranet site on Leadership Year Resources was also created to centralize information on leadership development resources. In addition, the Director of the Secret Service recorded a video message on leadership that was posted on the agency’s intranet. The agency also established a peer-to-peer award recognition program.

The agency established the Leadership Development Council in March 2018, with representatives from each of the four occupation groups (special agents; Uniformed Division officers; Administrative, Professional, and Technical staff; and Technical Law Enforcement staff) and across all grade levels.

Additional action(s) Secret Service plans to take:  Finalize the Framework for Leadership Development and roll out the program to the agency.

Complete development of the Strategic Leadership Course for Managers, which is designated to be a two-week course to promote leadership and strategic planning.

Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security

Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

Nathan Anderson, (202) 512-3841 or andersonn@gao.gov.

In addition to the contact above, Joseph P. Cruz (Assistant Director),  Kisha Clark (Analyst-in-Charge), Willie Commons III, Elizabeth Dretsch,  Eric Hauswirth, and Eric Warren made key contributions to this report.

After an intruder ran past Secret Service personnel and entered the White House in 2014, an independent review panel found that this incident arose from a “catastrophic failure of training" in the Secret Service.

We found that the Secret Service implemented 11 of this panel's recommendations, but has yet to fully address the remaining 8. For example, the panel recommended that certain Secret Service agents train for 25% of their work time. However, these agents trained for 6% or less of their work hours in FY 2018.

We recommended that the Secret Service develop and implement a plan to reach its annual training targets.