Federal Land Management Agencies: Additional Actions Needed to Address Facility Security Assessment Requirements

A 2014 government report predicted that the rate of violent domestic extremist incidents would increase. In recent years, some high-profile incidents have occurred on federal lands, such as the armed occupation of a FWS wildlife refuge in 2016. Federal land management agencies manage nearly 700 million acres of federal lands and have law enforcement divisions that protect their employees and secure their facilities.

GAO was asked to review how land management agencies protect their employees and secure their facilities. For the four federal land management agencies, this report examines, among other things, (1) what is known about the number of threats and assaults against their employees and (2) the extent to which agencies met federal facility security assessment requirements. GAO analyzed available government data on threats and assaults; examined agencies' policies, procedures, and documentation on facility security assessments; compared the agencies' methodologies against ISC requirements; and interviewed land management agency, ISC, and FBI officials.

Data from the four federal land management agencies—the Forest Service within the U.S. Department of Agriculture and the Bureau of Land Management (BLM), Fish and Wildlife (FWS), and National Park Service (Park Service) within the Department of the Interior—showed a range of threats and assaults against agency employees in fiscal years 2013 through 2017. For example, incidents ranged from telephone threats to attempted murder against federal land management employees. However, the number of actual threats and assaults is unclear and may be higher than what is captured in available data for various reasons. For example, employees may not always report threats because they consider them a part of the job. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) data for fiscal years 2013 through 2017 also showed that the FBI initiated under 100 domestic terrorism investigations into potential threats against federal land management agencies. The majority of these investigations involved BLM and individuals motivated by anti-government ideologies.

The four federal land management agencies have completed some but not all of the facility security assessments on their occupied federal facilities as required by the Interagency Security Committee (ISC). Officials at the four agencies said that either they do not have the resources, expertise, or training to conduct assessments agency-wide. FWS has a plan to complete its assessments, but BLM, the Forest Service, and the Park Service do not. Such a plan could help these agencies address the factors that have affected their ability to complete assessments. The ISC also requires that agencies conduct assessments using a methodology that meets, among other things, two key requirements: (1) consider all of the undesirable events (e.g., arson and vandalism) identified as possible risks to facilities, and (2) assess the threat, vulnerability, and consequence for each of these events. The Forest Service's methodology meets these two requirements and the Park Service's methodology partially meets the requirements, but BLM and FWS have not yet established methodologies for conducting facility security assessments. Without developing a plan for conducting all of the remaining facility security assessments and using a methodology that complies with ISC requirements, agencies may not identify the risks their facilities face or identify the countermeasures—such as security cameras or security gates—they could implement to mitigate those risks.

GAO is making six recommendations: that BLM, the Forest Service, and the Park Service develop a plan for completing facility security assessments and that BLM, FWS, and the Park Service take action to ensure their facility security assessment methodologies comply with ISC requirements. The agencies generally concurred with the recommendations.

Federal lands comprise roughly one-third of the land in the United States  and are largely concentrated in 12 western states. The economy in  several of these states is closely tied to activities related to the use of  natural resources on federal lands, such as logging, mining, oil and gas  development, and raising livestock, as well as recreation and tourism.  Four federal land management agencies—the Forest Service in the U.S.  Department of Agriculture and the Bureau of Land Management (BLM),  Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS), and National Park Service (Park  Service) in the Department of the Interior—are primarily responsible for  managing these federal lands. As part of this effort, the agencies’ law  enforcement programs employed about 2,200 field law enforcement  officers, as of September 30, 2018. These officers enforce federal laws,  respond to incidents of potential illegal activity, and develop and  implement practices to safeguard employees and facilities. In some  cases, they may also receive assistance from state and local law  enforcement entities or other federal agencies, such as the Federal  Bureau of Investigation (FBI) in the U.S. Department of Justice.

Among other things, the FBI analyzes possible security threats and  investigates cases of domestic terrorism. One domestic terrorism threat to  federal land management agencies and employees involves anti- government extremism, in part because agency employees are often the  most visible representatives of the federal government in some rural  western communities. A 2014 Department of Homeland Security report  predicted that the rate of violent domestic extremist incidents motivated  by anti-government ideology would increase in the coming years, with a  focus on several targets, including government facilities and personnel.  According to FBI officials, the threat from anti-government extremism in  the United States grew from 2013 through 2017. The FBI noted that while  making anti-government statements is not against the law, seeking to  advance anti-government ideology through force or violence is illegal and  may trigger the involvement of federal, state, and local law enforcement  entities. For example:  In 2014, a 24-year dispute over intentional unauthorized grazing on  federal lands in Nevada led to a high-profile confrontation between  armed ranchers and their supporters—who were motivated by anti- government ideologies—and federal law enforcement officials,  according to BLM officials. The officers were attempting to enforce a  federal court order authorizing BLM to seize and impound the  trespassing cattle.

In 2015, according to BLM officials, two Oregonian mine operators  who had constructed unauthorized structures on BLM lands and  conducted operations beyond casual use received a Notice of  Noncompliance letter from BLM. The letter was mailed and hand  delivered by BLM law enforcement, who were assisted by local law  enforcement. The letter directed the mine operators to either cease  mining operations or file a plan of operations for mining on public  lands if they wished to continue. In response, a group of militia  members who were motivated by anti-government ideologies staged  armed patrols to prevent BLM officials from shutting down mining  operations at the site, according to BLM officials.

In 2016, a group of individuals motivated, according to FWS officials,  by anti-government ideologies staged an armed occupation of the  Malheur National Wildlife Refuge in rural Oregon. The individuals  occupied the refuge for nearly 6 weeks, during which time federal,  state, and local law enforcement engaged in a coordinated response.  Damages to the land and facilities at the refuge, plus the local, state,  and FWS law enforcement responses, cost over $9 million, according  to local and federal officials.

Following the 1995 bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in  Oklahoma City, the Interagency Security Committee (ISC), chaired by  the Department of Homeland Security, was established by executive  order and directed to develop security standards for federal facilities.  One such standard, which we refer to in this report as the ISC Standard,  defines the criteria and processes executive agencies and departments  are to follow when assessing risks to their facilities through facility  security assessments. The ISC Standard also guides agencies and  departments in determining which protective measures (referred to as  countermeasures)—such as identification badges, blast-resistant  windows, and security gates—to implement based on the results of their  facility security assessments. Our past work has found that some federal  agencies have not fully followed the ISC Standard, leaving agencies’  facilities and employees exposed to risk.

You asked us to review how the federal land management agencies  protect their employees and secure their facilities. For the four federal  land management agencies, this report examines: (1) what is known  about the number of threats and assaults against their employees, (2) the  approaches agencies used to protect their employees from threats and  assaults and any factors affecting their ability to do so, and (3) the extent  to which agencies met federal facility security assessment requirements.

For the first objective, we obtained and analyzed data on the number of  incidents of threats and assaults against these employees (including  volunteers and contractors) from the four land management agencies’ law enforcement databases for fiscal years 2013 through 2017. These data  were the most recent available at the time we began our review. We also  obtained data for this time period from the FBI on investigations into  potential domestic terror threats to land management agencies. We took  steps to assess the reliability of the data, including interviewing agency  officials about circumstances whereby incidents of threats and assaults  may not appear in the database and reviewing the data for logical  inconsistencies. We determined that the data were sufficiently reliable for  the purposes of our reporting objective. We note important qualifications  related to each dataset throughout the report, as appropriate. Because of  these qualifications, we did not analyze the data for annual trends.

For the second objective, we examined requirements and policies  regarding federal land management agencies’ responsibilities for  protecting employees against threats and assaults. We also interviewed  headquarters and selected field unit officials about the agencies’  approaches to protecting their employees from threats and assaults, as  well as factors that hinder their ability to do so, and we obtained  supporting documentation where available. We conducted semi- structured interviews with officials during site visits to a nongeneralizable  sample of 11 of the 35 regional or state offices and 14 field units across  the federal land management agencies. We selected sites to visit from  March through July 2018 in Colorado, Nevada, Oregon, and Utah, since  the majority of federal lands are located in the West and some field units  in these states had been affected by actions of individuals holding anti- government beliefs. BLM’s field structure consists of state offices that  oversee field units, whereas FWS, the Forest Service, and the Park  Service have regional offices that are responsible for overseeing field  units. We refer broadly to all non-headquarters units, including regional,  state, and field units, as “field units” throughout this report. Findings from  the interviews we conducted at our site visits provide useful insights but  cannot be generalized to those units we did not include in our review. We  also obtained and analyzed information from each agency on the number  of field law enforcement officers they had at the end of fiscal years 2013  and 2018, the most recent year for which data were available. We took  steps to assess the reliability of these data and found them to be  sufficiently reliable for the purposes of our reporting objective.

For the third objective, we reviewed the ISC Standard, identified  requirements that agencies are responsible for meeting, and interviewed  ISC officials about these requirements. We reviewed documents on the  four land management agencies’ inventories of occupied facilities and  assessed whether the agencies had conducted facility security  assessments on those facilities as required. We interviewed  headquarters and field officials about their inventories and to determine  their plans, if any, for completing the remaining assessments. We also  examined the extent to which agencies’ facility security risk assessment  methodologies complied with two key requirements in the ISC Standard.  These requirements included whether the agencies’ methodologies (1)  consider all 33 undesirable events identified in the ISC Standard and (2)  evaluate three factors of risk—threat, vulnerability, and consequence—for  each undesirable event. We analyzed the agencies’ methodologies and  compared them against the requirements in the ISC Standard. We  interviewed headquarters officials about their agencies’ methodologies.  Appendix I provides additional details about our objectives, scope, and  methodology.

We conducted this performance audit from November 2017 to September  2019 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing  standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to  obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for  our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe  that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings  and conclusions based on our audit objectives.

Land Management Agency Law Enforcement Divisions

Federal land management agencies have law enforcement divisions that  protect their employees and secure their facilities across nearly 700  million acres of federal lands (see fig. 1). To do so, the four agencies’  law enforcement divisions employ uniformed law enforcement officers  who patrol federal lands, respond to illegal activities, conduct routine  investigations, and, depending on the agency, may also provide expertise  in assessing facilities’ security. Each agency also maintains a law  enforcement data system in which law enforcement officers record and  track incidents of suspected illegal activity on federal lands. These  systems can be used in conducting investigations, identifying trends in  crime data, and assisting with decision making regarding staffing,  resource allocations, and budgetary needs.

BLM. BLM’s Office of Law Enforcement and Security is charged with  promoting the safety and security of employees and visitors, as well  as environmental protection, across approximately 245 million acres  of BLM lands in 12 states. At the end of fiscal year 2018, BLM had  194 field law enforcement officers engaged in such duties.  According to agency documentation, these law enforcement officers  also coordinate with state agencies and county law enforcement  officers on large-scale recreational events, such as Burning Man.  These field law enforcement officers may also be tasked with  conducting facility security assessments.

FWS. FWS’s division of Refuge Law Enforcement helps ensure the  safety and security of visitors, employees, government property, and  wildlife and their habitats on approximately 150 million acres of land.  At the end of fiscal year 2018, FWS had 231 field law enforcement  officers on the agency’s 567 wildlife refuges. According to agency  documents, FWS law enforcement officers serve as ambassadors by  providing important services to the public beyond law enforcement,  such as providing visitors with information and guidance regarding  fishing, hunting, hiking, and wildlife viewing opportunities. These field  law enforcement officers may also be tasked with conducting facility  security assessments.

Forest Service. The Forest Service’s Law Enforcement and  Investigations division is charged with protecting natural resources,  employees, and visitors on approximately 193 million acres of  National Forest System lands in 44 states. At the end of fiscal year  2018, the Forest Service had 417 field law enforcement officers.  Additionally, law enforcement officers may be tasked with conducting  facility security assessments.

Park Service. The Park Service’s division of Law Enforcement,  Security, and Emergency Services is charged with protecting  resources, managing public use, and promoting public safety and  visitor enjoyment across the agency’s 85 million acres, 418 park units,  23 national scenic and national historic trails, and 60 wild and scenic  rivers. At the end of fiscal year 2018, the Park Service had 1,329  field law enforcement officers stationed at 240 of the Park Service’s  units. Field law enforcement officers may also be tasked with  conducting facility security assessments.

ISC’s Facility Security Assessment Requirements

The ISC Standard applies to all facilities in the United States occupied by  federal employees for nonmilitary purposes, including federal land  management agencies’ facilities. This includes existing facilities, new  construction, or major modernizations; facilities owned, to be purchased,  or leased; stand-alone facilities; special-use facilities; and facilities on  federal campuses. Among other things, the ISC Standard requires  agencies to assess the risks faced by each of their facilities. According to  Department of Homeland Security officials, since 2010, executive  departments and agencies responsible for protecting their own facilities  have been required to conduct facility security risk assessments as part of  the ISC Standard’s risk management process. The ISC Standard states  that risk is a measure of potential harm from an undesirable event that  encompasses threat, vulnerability, and consequence. The ISC Standard  then defines these terms as follows:

Undesirable event: An incident, such as vandalism, active shooters,  and explosive devices that has an adverse impact on the facility  occupants or visitors, operation of the facility, or mission of the  agency.

Threat: The intention and capability of an adversary to initiate an  undesirable event.

Vulnerability: A weakness in the design or operation of a facility that  an adversary can exploit.

Consequence: The level, duration, and nature of the loss resulting  from an undesirable event.

Based on the assessed level of risk, the ISC Standard provides a method  for agencies to identify which countermeasures, such as security cameras  or security gates, should be implemented to protect the facility against  each of the undesirable events. According to the ISC Standard, once an  initial assessment is completed, facility security reassessments should be  conducted at least once every 3 to 5 years, depending on the facility’s  security level, to reassess whether existing countermeasures remain  adequate for mitigating risks. Beginning in fiscal year 2020, the ISC will  require departments and agencies to report their compliance with the  requirement to conduct facility security assessments on occupied  facilities. Figure 2 shows the steps of the ISC Risk Management  Process, and figure 3 shows some examples of facility countermeasures.

Because facility security assessments are a key component of the ISC’s  risk management framework, the ISC Standard includes requirements for  agencies’ risk assessment methodologies. Specifically, among other  things, the ISC Standard requires that agencies use facility security  assessment methodologies that (1) consider all 33 of the undesirable  events identified in the ISC Standard, and (2) evaluate the three factors  of risk (threat, vulnerability, and consequence) to each undesirable event.  During facility security assessments, ratings are assigned to the threat,  vulnerability, and consequence of an undesirable event, and the  combined ratings produce an overall measurement of risk. In our  hypothetical facility security assessment example shown in figure 4, each  component of risk is assigned a rating of between 1 (very low) and 5 (very  high) based on the facility’s conditions. These ratings are then multiplied  to produce an overall estimate of risk for each undesirable event.  Agencies can use this and other information resulting from a facility  security assessment to make security-related decisions and direct  resources to implement countermeasures to address unmitigated risk.

Available Data Show a Range of Threats and Assaults against Land Management Agency Employees, but Not All Incidents are Captured in the Data

Available federal law enforcement data show a range of threats and  assaults against the four federal land management agencies’ employees  in fiscal years 2013 through 2017. For example, incidents ranged from  threats conveyed by telephone to attempted murder against federal land  management agency employees. Additionally, FBI data on its  investigations into potential domestic terror threats to land management  agencies show a wide variety of statutes and regulations that may have  been violated. However, not all incidents are captured in the federal land  management agencies’ data because not all incidents are reported to the  agencies’ law enforcement officials. Additionally, some incidents are  investigated by state or local law enforcement and recorded in their data  systems rather than in land management agencies’ systems. As a result,  the number of actual threats and assaults is unclear and may be higher  than what is represented in available data.

Our analysis of data from each of the four land management agencies  and the FBI showed the following:

BLM. BLM data for fiscal years 2013 through 2017 included 88  incidents of threats and assaults against BLM employees and cited  eight different statutes or regulations. A federal law prohibiting people  from assaulting, resisting, or impeding certain federal officers or  employees, 18 U.S.C. § 111, was the statute most frequently cited in  BLM’s data. Examples of incidents that identified this statute include  an individual harassing a BLM law enforcement officer by repeatedly  swerving and cutting off the officer on the highway, an individual  making threats against a BLM employee on Facebook and YouTube,  and an incident during which an employee was stabbed outside a  federal building. Twenty-one of the 88 incidents occurred in fiscal year  2013, when BLM categorized incidents using uniform crime reporting  codes rather than federal statutes, regulations, or state laws. These  incidents include, for example, an incident in which an individual  attempted to murder a law enforcement officer with a firearm. Table 1  provides additional information on threats and assaults against BLM  employees for fiscal years 2013 through 2017.

FWS. FWS data for fiscal years 2013 through 2017 included 66  incidents of threats and assaults against FWS employees and cited  nine different statutes and regulations. A federal law prohibiting  people from assaulting, resisting, or impeding certain federal officers  or employees, 18 U.S.C. § 111, was the statute most frequently cited  in FWS’s data and included a variety of incidents, such as a law  enforcement officer who was assaulted with a tree branch during a  suspected drug trafficking incident at the border. According to FWS  officials, when law enforcement officers cite violations of state  statutes, they enter the violation into the law enforcement data system  under a generic description such as “Assault: simple, on officer,” and  then manually enter the relevant state statute. Of the total FWS  incidents, 26 were recorded under unspecified state statutes. These  incidents included, for example, an officer who was assaulted while  arresting an individual driving under the influence and an officer who  received a death threat during an arrest. Table 2 provides additional  information on threats and assaults against FWS employees for fiscal  years 2013 through 2017.

Forest Service. Forest Service data for fiscal years 2013 through  2017 included 177 incidents of threats and assaults against Forest  Service employees and cited seven different statutes or regulations.  Officials said that the data provided to us generally included only the  most serious offense that occurred during an incident, due to  limitations on linking records in Forest Service’s data system. For  example, if both a verbal threat and physical assault occurred during  an incident, only the physical assault would be included in the data.  Therefore, potential violations of some statutes or regulations that  occurred during incidents of threats and assaults may not be recorded  in the data. About half of the Forest Service incidents involved  potential violations of 36 C.F.R. § 261.3(a), which includes interfering  with a forest officer, among other things. Such incidents included: an  individual telling a Forest Service employee that his dog would “rip her  head off” if she approached his camp; threatening graffiti written on a  law enforcement officer’s personal residence; and a death threat to a  law enforcement officer. Table 3 provides additional information on  threats and assaults against Forest Service employees for fiscal years  2013 through 2017.

Park Service. Park Service data for fiscal years 2013 through 2017  included 29 incidents of threats and assaults against Park Service  employees and cited six different offense descriptions. According to  a Park Service official, some incident records cite a statute or  regulation. However, all agency incident records include offense  codes that are unique to the Park Service and are associated with the  type of violation, such as assault or disorderly conduct. Unlike with  statutes and regulations, a perpetrator does not need to be identified  for the law enforcement officer to cite an offense code. Three of the  six Park Service offense codes relate to assault. Incidents that cited  these codes included an individual ramming an employee’s patrol  vehicle and a death threat left on an employee’s personal cell phone.  Table 4 provides additional information on threats and assaults  against Park Service employees for fiscal years 2013 through 2017.

FBI. FBI data for fiscal years 2013 through 2017 show that the FBI  initiated under 100 domestic terrorism investigations into potential  threats to federal land management agencies, and that these  investigations most frequently cited eight specific statutes.  Investigations can either be initiated by the FBI or referred to the FBI  by land management agencies. Land management agency officials  said they refer only the most serious incidents to the FBI—such as the  armed occupation of Malheur National Wildlife Refuge. The FBI  receives information from a variety of sources, including from  confidential human sources; public tips; and state, local, tribal, and  federal partners. According to FBI officials, an investigation into a  domestic terrorism threat may only be initiated if there is information  indicating potential violent criminal activity committed in furtherance of  ideology. Our analysis of FBI data showed that the majority of the  domestic terrorism investigations involved BLM, and the majority  involved individuals motivated by anti-government ideologies. Most  of the domestic terrorism investigations cited more than one statute or  regulation as having been potentially violated, and the severity of the  threat varied. For example, some investigations involved written  threats and threats conveyed by telephone to government officials. In  one example, the investigation involved a subject posting a BLM law  enforcement officer’s personal information on Twitter, which resulted  in over 500 harassing phone calls and several death threats. Table 5  provides information on the percentage of FBI investigations citing  various statutes and regulations related to threats to federal land  management agencies for fiscal years 2013 through 2017. incidents of threats. According to officials at all four agencies,  employees do not always report threats to agency law enforcement.  For example, some field unit employees said that in certain  circumstances, they consider receiving threats a normal part of their  job. Specifically, field unit employees we interviewed at three land  management agencies cited incidents in which they were yelled at, for  example, by hunters, permittees, or attendees of public planning  meetings. While this behavior may be threatening, some employees  told us it was “a part of the job,” and they did not report such  incidents. In addition, some officials described being threatened while  off-duty, such as by being harassed in local stores or being monitored  at their home, which officials said in some cases they did not report  because it was a common occurrence. Additionally, according to  agency officials, threats are subject to interpretation, so employees  may be reluctant to report an incident unless it involves an explicit  threat of physical harm or death.

During an incident, some threats and assaults may not be  recorded in agency data systems by agency law enforcement  officers. BLM and Forest Service officials told us that when a single  incident involves multiple offenses, the less serious offenses are  unlikely to be recorded in the data system. Therefore, the entirety of  what occurred during the incident may not be captured in the data  system. For example, according to one BLM official we interviewed, if  an incident involved a verbal threat and a physical assault, it would  likely be recorded into the data system as an assault. there were trucks regularly parked outside  their homes, with individuals holding anti- government beliefs, who appeared to be  monitoring them and their families. One  official stated that “They were holding us  hostage in our own homes.”

Some incidents are investigated by state or local law  enforcement and recorded in their data systems, rather than in  land management agencies’ systems. Some incidents of threats  and assaults to federal employees may be investigated by state or  local law enforcement entities. Specifically, during our site visits,  officials from all four land management agencies stated that their  employees are instructed to call 911 in the case of an emergency,  such as a threat or assault, and that, generally, a local law  enforcement officer—such as a county sheriff’s deputy—will respond  to the call. Land management agency officials said that when state or  local law enforcement respond to an incident, even those that occur  on federal lands, the incident would be recorded in those entities’ data  systems and may not be entered into the land management agency’s  law enforcement data system. Additionally, according to agency  officials at all four land management agencies, due to resource  constraints, many of their field units do not have any law enforcement  officers or have a limited law enforcement presence, which limits the  agencies’ ability to respond to and therefore record incidents of  threats and assaults. For example, according to agency officials, as of  October 2018, 178 of 418 Park Service units had no law enforcement  presence. Furthermore, even when field units had dedicated law  enforcement officers, the officers might not have been available to  immediately respond to incidents, so employees might instead have  contacted local law enforcement.

Given these reasons, the actual number of incidents of threats and  assaults is unclear and may be greater than the number reported and  entered in the land management agencies’ law enforcement data  systems, according to federal land management agency officials.

Land Management Agencies Use Various Approaches to Protect Employees, but Several Factors May Affect Their Ability to Do So Agencies Use Various Approaches to Protect Employees, Including Building Relationships with External Law Enforcement Entities and the Public

Federal land management agencies use various approaches to protect  their employees from threat and assaults, including building relationships  with external law enforcement entities and the public; receiving,  collecting, and disseminating intelligence; and offering training to agency  employees. Agency officials we interviewed cited four factors that can  affect their ability to protect employees, including that employees often  work in remote locations.

Federal land management agencies use various approaches to protect  their employees from threats and assaults. Specifically:

Agencies deploy their law enforcement officers to protect  employees and resources. All four federal land management  agencies have their own law enforcement divisions with law  enforcement officers who are tasked with protecting employees and  resources in the field. According to agency officials we interviewed,  where available, agency law enforcement officers respond to  incidents, including threats and assaults against employees. When  necessary, agencies also deploy additional law enforcement officers  to assist local officers. For example, during the armed occupation of  the Malheur National Wildlife Refuge, FWS officials said the agency  deployed FWS law enforcement officers from around the country to  field units in western states to provide additional security for FWS  employees. Similarly, according to BLM documents, BLM officers are  sometimes deployed from their home field units for various reasons,  such as assisting with large-scale recreational events and supporting  fire investigations and natural disaster recovery.

Agencies build relationships with local, state, and other federal  agency law enforcement entities, as well as the public. Federal  land management agencies build relationships with local, state, and  other federal agency law enforcement entities to help protect  employees and resources in the field and to assist with coordinating  law enforcement responses, according to agency officials. These  officials said such relationships are important because not all field  units have a law enforcement officer, and those that do often rely on  local law enforcement for assistance with incidents of threats or  assaults against agency employees. For example, officials at one field  unit in Nevada stated that during a high-profile court case involving  the agency, the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department kept a  patrol car outside the field unit for several days to help ensure the  safety of the field unit’s employees. Agency field officials said that  building relationships with the public—both visitors and local  citizens—can help keep their employees safe by cultivating trust and  reducing potential tension over federal land management practices.  For example, officials at one field unit drafted talking points for  employees in the event that visitors asked them about a high-profile  incident of anti-government behavior directed at a federal land  management agency. The talking points outlined the agency’s  responsibilities and authorities and, according to agency officials,  were aimed at dispelling misunderstandings about federal land  management policies. Additionally, officials at several field units we  visited stated that their law enforcement officers are focused on  educating, rather than policing, visitors.

Agencies receive, collect, and disseminate intelligence  information. To varying degrees, federal land management agencies  receive, collect, and disseminate intelligence information, which helps  them anticipate, prepare for, and react to threats against employees  and facilities. For example, officials we interviewed from all four  agencies said that they receive intelligence information from various  sources, including Interior’s Office of Law Enforcement and Security,  the Department of Homeland Security, FBI, Federal Protective  Service, and Joint Terrorism Task Forces. Additionally, after the  armed occupation of Malheur National Wildlife Refuge, FWS created  a new risk and threat assessment coordination unit to collect  intelligence, inform decision-making, and improve coordination with  other Interior bureaus. Agency officials said they disseminate  intelligence information about potential threats to their field units so  that field personnel can respond appropriately to the threat—including  encouraging employees to telework, directing employees to  temporarily stop field work, or temporarily closing their field unit.

Agencies have developed plans and guidance to promote  employee safety. Agency officials have developed a variety of written  plans and guidance to promote employee safety. For example,  agencies are required to develop occupant emergency plans for most  occupied facilities. Occupant emergency plans we obtained covered  employee safety, including what to do in the event of a bomb threat or  active shooter event. Additionally, some field units developed other  documents that outlined actions employees are to take to remain safe,  such as plans to address critical incidents or protests at their field  unit.

Agencies offer various types of safety training. All four federal  land management agencies offer a variety of training to help protect  employees and promote their safety, according to agency documents  and officials. Examples of topics addressed in agencies’ training  include understanding anti-government ideologies, communicating  techniques for de-escalating conflicts, and responding to an active  shooter event.

Several Factors Can Affect Land Management Agencies’ Efforts to Protect Their Employees from Threats and Assaults

Agency officials cited four factors that can affect agencies’ efforts to  protect their employees:

Agency employees work with the public and are often easily  recognizable. Agency officials said their employees are required to  interact with the public as part of their official duties, which can put  them at risk of being threatened or assaulted. FWS officials said they  temporarily closed field units in an adjacent state during the beginning  of the armed occupation of the Malheur National Wildlife Refuge to  reduce the likelihood that their employees would interact with  members of the public who were traveling to Malheur to participate in  the occupation. FWS and Park Service officials stated that their  employees are easily recognizable because they typically wear  uniforms, which may put them at greater risk of being harassed or  threatened by individuals who hold anti-government beliefs. (See  figure 5 for examples of uniforms.) In response, on certain occasions,  some agency officials direct their employees to wear street clothes  instead of their uniforms. Officials we interviewed indicated that  whenever they are concerned about a potential safety issue at their  field unit, such as a protest, they may encourage eligible employees  to telework from home instead of reporting to their work station.

Employees often work in remote locations to fulfill agency  missions. Agency officials stated that it can be difficult to protect  employees because, as part of their field work, employees may be  dispersed across hundreds of miles of federal lands and may be  located hours or days away from the nearest agency law enforcement  officer. (See figure 6 for an example of a remote location.) As a result,  some agency officials said they sometimes direct employees to  postpone fieldwork if there is a known or anticipated risk of threats or  assaults. In addition, according to officials, various field units have  developed check-in and check-out procedures to keep track of  employees when they are in the field and to help verify that they  report back to the office after concluding their fieldwork. Additionally,  some field units have purchased satellite communication devices that  operate when cell or radio signals are not available, so that  employees conducting remote field work can call for help if needed.

The number of agency field law enforcement officers has  declined. As of the end of fiscal year 2018, the overall number of field  law enforcement officers at each of the four land management  agencies had declined from fiscal year 2013, which agency officials  noted as a factor straining their efforts to protect employees. For  example, the Park Service had the lowest decrease of 7 percent,  whereas the Forest Service had the greatest decrease of 22 percent.  (See table 6.) Figure 7 shows the total number of acres for which  federal land management agencies are responsible, the number of  field law enforcement officers they had as of the end of fiscal year  2018, and the ratio of officers to acres of federal land. In addition, field  officials from the three Interior agencies stated that as a result of  various requirements to send law enforcement officers to support  border protection efforts, their law enforcement officers are  occasionally absent from their field units when deployed 14 days or  more to the border. To help address the effects of border  deployments, some agency officials told us that they seek  opportunities to share law enforcement resources among field units  and with other land management agencies and that they typically  deploy law enforcement officers from field offices across the agency  to minimize the effects on any one unit.

Anti-government sentiment can be unpredictable, difficult to  respond to, and disruptive. Agency officials we interviewed said that  the risk to employee safety posed by individuals holding anti- government sentiments can be unpredictable and that incidents of  threats and assaults against employees by such individuals are  generally sporadic. For example, BLM, FWS, and Forest Service  officials said it would have been difficult to predict that armed  individuals would occupy FWS’s Malheur National Wildlife Refuge,  since they were protesting BLM actions. BLM and FWS agency  officials said they believed that the occupiers chose Malheur National  Wildlife Refuge because it was an easier target. In addition, some  agency field unit officials told us that incidents of threats and assault  from individuals holding anti-government beliefs generally occur when  agency personnel are conducting normal operating activities, such as  during routine traffic stops or when they are collecting park entrance  fees, making them difficult to predict. Officials from one field unit also  noted that while their agency wants to ensure employee safety, it is  contrary to their mission to close a field unit every time there is a  potential anti-government threat—such as threats made on social  media. However, during the armed occupation of the Malheur National  Wildlife Refuge, refuges in an adjacent state were closed out of  caution, and FWS employees turned away visitors who had driven  hundreds of miles to view wildlife, according to FWS officials. To help  address the potential disruption posed by unpredictable anti- government threats, some agencies and field units developed plans  and guidance that prescribed various actions field units and their  employees could take to help ensure employees’ safety while also  counteracting the disruptive effects of threats and attacks on a  facility’s operations.

Land Management Agencies Have Not Met Certain Facility Security Assessment Requirements

The four federal land management agencies have completed some but  not all of the facility security assessments on their occupied federal  facilities as required by the ISC Standard and three do not have a plan for  doing so. Furthermore, the Forest Service has a facility security  assessment methodology that complies with key requirements described  in the ISC Standard, but BLM, FWS, and the Park Service do not.

The Four Land Management Agencies Have Not Completed All Facility Security Assessments, and Three of the Four Agencies Do Not Have Plans for Doing So

The ISC Standard requires that agencies complete facility security  assessments on all occupied facilities and suggests that agencies  establish annual objectives for conducting assessments. As suggested in  the ISC Standard, to do so, agencies may need to consider several  things, such as:  the number and locations of needed facility security assessments, by  establishing which facilities in the agency’s inventory are occupied  and grouping them into campuses, if desired;  the agency’s organizational structure, to determine entities  responsible for conducting the assessments;  training needs of entities responsible for conducting the assessments; which facilities or campuses should be prioritized for assessments, if a schedule for completing the assessments, given the agency’s  available resources and priorities.

The four land management agencies have not completed facility security  assessments on all occupied facilities, and agency officials cited various  reasons for not doing so. FWS has a plan to complete its assessments,  but BLM, the Forest Service, and the Park Service do not. Specifically:

FWS. FWS has conducted five facility security assessments on its  approximately 465 occupied facilities and has a plan for completing  the remaining assessments. According to FWS headquarters  officials, FWS employees have limited physical security expertise to  conduct facility security assessments; therefore, the agency has  developed a plan to meet the ISC Standard’s requirement using  contractors. Specifically, in May 2019, FWS hired a project manager  to implement a new facility security assessment program and,  according to agency documentation, the new program will, among  other things, employ contracted assessors to conduct facility security  assessments agency-wide. Agency officials said FWS will hire the  assessors after the project manager and other agency officials  complete preliminary tasks such as developing ISC-compliant policies  and procedures, establishing the number and locations of facility  security assessments needed, and developing an electronic tracking  system for the assessors to use while conducting assessments.  Once these tasks are completed—which could take up to 1 year,  according to officials—FWS is to develop a schedule for assessors to  complete the remaining assessments.

BLM. BLM has conducted 21 facility security assessments on its  approximately 280 occupied facilities, but officials do not know when  they will complete the remaining assessments and do not have a plan  to do so. BLM headquarters officials we interviewed said that the  agency is decentralized and its state offices are responsible for the  security of facilities in their states, including scheduling and  conducting facility security assessments. However, some BLM state  and field officials we interviewed said they do not have the resources  or expertise to conduct the assessments, and BLM does not offer  relevant training. In June 2019, the agency issued a hiring  announcement for a headquarters-level security manager. According  to officials, once hired, the security manager is to establish training for  field employees to conduct facility security assessments and monitor  state offices’ compliance with the requirement to conduct  assessments. Headquarters officials noted that state offices will  remain responsible for scheduling and conducting their own  assessments. However, as of June 2019, the agency had not  developed a plan for how the security manager would implement  agency-wide training given available resources, or ensure state  offices’ compliance with the requirement to conduct assessments.

Forest Service. The Forest Service has conducted at least 135  facility security assessments on its approximately 1,135 occupied  facilities, but officials do not know when they will complete the  remaining assessments and do not have a plan for doing so.  Forest Service headquarters officials we interviewed said that the  agency is decentralized and its regional offices are responsible for the  security of facilities in their regions, including scheduling and  conducting facility security assessments. However, some regional  officials we interviewed said they do not have resources or sufficient  staff expertise to conduct the assessments. Forest Service  headquarters officials stated that they have partnered with the U.S.  Department of Agriculture’s Office of Homeland Security to offer  facility security assessment training to Forest Service regional  employees. Additionally, Forest Service headquarters officials stated  that with the assistance of the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s Office  of Homeland Security, they were restructuring their physical security  program. Under the new structure, headquarters will oversee  compliance at a national level and each region will have a team  responsible for facility security assessments in their region, which  agency officials said will establish lines of authority to account for the  agency’s decentralized structure. However, the Forest Service  headquarters official responsible for leading this effort said that, due in  part to staff turnover, restructuring the physical security program has  been difficult. As of June 2019, the Forest Service does not have a  documented plan for how the restructured program will operate, how  to ensure sufficient staff are trained to complete the assessments  given available resources, or how and when regions will complete all  of their assessments.

Park Service. The Park Service has conducted at least 148 facility  security assessments on its approximately 1,505 occupied facilities,  but officials do not know when they will complete the remaining   assessments and do not have a plan to do so. Park Service  headquarters officials we interviewed said that the agency is  decentralized and the superintendents of its 418 park units are  responsible for the security of facilities within their parks, including  scheduling and conducting facility security assessments. However,  some park unit officials we interviewed said they do not have the  resources or sufficient staff with expertise to conduct the  assessments. Park Service headquarters officials stated that they  have developed a program to offer facility security assessment  training to park employees. In February 2019, according to agency  officials, the Park Service hired a security manager who will  standardize the agency’s facility security assessment practices,  expand facility security assessment training opportunities, and monitor  parks’ compliance with the requirement to conduct assessments.  Headquarters officials noted that park units will remain responsible for  scheduling and conducting their own assessments. However, as of  June 2019, the agency had not developed a documented plan for how  to ensure sufficient staff are trained to complete the assessments  given available resources, or how the security manager would ensure  park units’ compliance with the requirement to conduct assessments.

Not complying with the ISC Standard’s requirement to complete facility  security assessments on all occupied facilities could leave federal agencies exposed to risks in protecting their employees and facilities.  Specifically, without conducting all of the required assessments, agencies  may not identify the degree to which undesirable events can impact their  facilities or identify the countermeasures they could implement to mitigate  the risks of those events. Officials from BLM, the Forest Service, and the  Park Service acknowledged that completing the remaining facility security  assessments is important and that developing an agency-wide plan to do  so may help them as they work towards compliance with this ISC  Standard requirement. In the process of developing their plans, the  agencies could take into consideration their organizational structure,  available resources, and training needs, all of which may affect how  quickly they can complete their assessments. Furthermore, developing a  plan for completing facility security assessments will require agencies to  identify the number and locations of their required assessments, which  may help them fulfill the fiscal year 2020 ISC compliance reporting  requirement.

BLM, FWS, and the Park Service Do Not Have Facility Security Assessment Methodologies that Fully Comply with Two Key Requirements in the ISC Standard

Three of the four federal land management agencies have not developed  a facility security assessment methodology that complies with two key  requirements in the ISC Standard. Specifically, according to the ISC  Standard, methodologies must, among other things, (1) consider all 33 of  the undesirable events identified in the Standard, such as active shooters,  vandalism, and explosive devices; and (2) evaluate the three factors of  risk—threat, vulnerability, and consequence—for each undesirable  event.

According to our analysis of agency documentation and interviews with  agency officials, the extent to which each agency’s facility security  assessment methodology complied with the two key ISC Standard  requirements we evaluated varied. As of June 2019, the Forest Service’s  facility security assessment methodology met the two key ISC Standard  requirements we evaluated, and the Park Service’s methodology partially  met the requirements. BLM and FWS did not have established facility  security assessment methodologies as of June 2019. Specifically:

Forest Service. The Forest Service utilizes an ISC-compliant facility  security assessment methodology developed by the U.S. Department  of Agriculture. The methodology adheres to the two key ISC Standard  requirements that we evaluated.

Park Service. The Park Service developed a risk assessment  methodology, but it only partially adheres to the two key ISC Standard  requirements we evaluated. Specifically, the Park Service’s risk  assessment methodology does not include a step to assess the  consequences of specific undesirable events, as required by the ISC  Standard. Park Service officials indicated the agency’s commitment to  conducting facility security assessments using an ISC-compliant  methodology and said that they plan to submit the Park Service’s risk  assessment methodology to the ISC to be certified as compliant with  requirements in the ISC Standard. A Park Service official  acknowledged, however, that the agency needs to update its  methodology to include a step to assess the consequences of specific  undesirable events, and the official stated that the agency does not  plan to submit the methodology to the ISC until those changes have  been made. As of June 2019, officials did not have a timeframe for  doing so.

BLM. BLM officials said that, as of June 2019, the agency did not  have an established methodology for conducting facility security  assessments. Officials told us that, once hired, the new BLM  security manager will develop an assessment methodology and that  the agency intends to employ a methodology that complies with the  ISC Standard. However, BLM officials do not know when the  security manager will be hired, and the agency has not documented  requirements for the security manager to adhere to the ISC  Standard’s requirements.

FWS. FWS officials said that, as of June 2019, the agency did not  have an established methodology for conducting facility security  assessments., Officials told us that the agency intends to employ a  methodology that complies with the ISC Standard and provided a  high-level description of what they expect the methodology to include.  However, this description did not indicate that the agency would  evaluate consequences of specific undesirable events, as required by  the ISC Standard.

According to FWS officials, because staff do not have the expertise to conduct facility  security assessments, in 2011, the agency developed physical security survey checklists  as an interim solution for assessing facilities. These checklists allowed staff to document  the presence or absence of countermeasures identified in the ISC Standard. However,  FWS headquarters officials acknowledged that these checklists were not an ISC- compliant risk assessment methodology since they do not consider undesirable events or  measure risk, as required by the ISC Standard.

By not using a methodology that fully complies with the ISC Standard,  agencies could face adverse effects, such as an inability to make  informed resource allocation decisions for their physical security needs  and providing facilities—and the facilities’ occupants—with an  inappropriate or insufficient level of protection. Specifically, according to  the ISC Standard, when agencies do not use methodologies that comply  with risk assessment requirements in the ISC Standard, facilities may  have either less protection than needed, resulting in unmitigated risks, or  more protection than needed, resulting in wasted resources.

To carry out their critical missions to manage the resources on over 700  million acres of federal lands, BLM, FWS, Forest Service, and Park  Service officials and facilities are often the most visible and vulnerable  representatives of the federal government in remote areas and have been  subject to a range of threats and assaults. One way for these agencies to  address the safety risks posed by unpredictable anti-government  sentiment or other threats is to follow the ISC Standard requirements for  conducting facility security assessments. However, BLM, FWS, the Forest  Service, and the Park Service have not conducted all required facility  security assessments, and BLM, the Forest Service, and the Park Service  do not have a plan for doing so. Agency officials stated that this is due, in  part, to decentralized organizational structures, limited available  resources, and insufficient training. Without a plan for conducting all of  the remaining assessments, agencies may not identify the degree to  which undesirable events can impact their facilities or identify  countermeasures they could implement to mitigate the risks of those  events.

In addition, as of June 2019, BLM, FWS, and the Park Service do not  have facility security assessment methodologies that fully comply with two  key requirements in the ISC Standard—namely, to consider the 33  undesirable events identified in the Standard and to evaluate risk factors  for each of these events. Without using a methodology that complies with  the ISC Standard, the agencies could face adverse effects, including an  inability to make informed resource allocation decisions for their physical  security needs and providing facilities—and the facilities’ occupants—with  an inappropriate or insufficient level of protection.

We are making a total of six recommendations, including two to BLM, one  to FWS, one to the Forest Service, and two to the Park Service.  Specifically:

The Director of BLM should develop a plan to conduct all required  facility security assessments agency-wide, taking into consideration  the agency’s organizational structure, available resources, and  training needs. (Recommendation 1)

The Chief of the Forest Service should develop a plan to conduct all  required facility security assessments agency-wide, taking into  consideration the agency’s organizational structure, available  resources, and training needs. (Recommendation 2)

The Director of the Park Service should develop a plan to conduct all  required facility security assessments agency-wide, taking into  consideration the agency’s organizational structure, available  resources, and training needs. (Recommendation 3)

The Director of the Park Service should update the agency’s facility  security assessment methodology to comply with requirements in the  ISC Standard, including a step to consider the consequence of each  undesirable event. (Recommendation 4)

The Director of BLM should develop a facility security assessment  methodology that complies with requirements in the ISC Standard to  assess all undesirable events and consider all three factors of risk for  each undesirable event. (Recommendation 5)

The Director of FWS should develop a facility security assessment  methodology that complies with requirements in the ISC Standard to  assess all undesirable events and consider all three factors of risk for  each undesirable event. (Recommendation 6)

We provided a draft of this report to the Departments of Agriculture,  Homeland Security, Interior, and Justice for their review and comment.  The Forest Service, responding on behalf of the U.S. Department of  Agriculture, generally agreed with the report and our recommendation  and cited its efforts to develop a plan to complete required facility security  assessments. The Forest Service’s written comments are reproduced in  appendix III. Interior, responding on behalf of BLM, FWS, and the Park  Service, concurred with our recommendations and provided examples of  actions the three agencies planned to take. Specifically, regarding our  recommendation that BLM and the Park Service develop a plan to  conduct facility security requirements agency-wide, BLM intends to revise  its policy and develop such a plan, and the Park Service intends to  develop a plan that includes training and tools so that park unit staff can  conduct the required assessments. Regarding our recommendation that  BLM, FWS, and the Park Service develop methodologies that comply with  requirements in the ISC Standard, the agencies cited various efforts to do  so, including revising policies and developing new tools, training, and  data system modules. Interior’s written comments are reproduced in  appendix IV. The Department of Homeland Security provided a technical  comment that we incorporated. The Department of Justice told us that  they had no comments.

As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce the contents of  this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days from the  report date. At that time, we will send copies to the appropriate  congressional committees; the Attorney General; and the Secretaries of  Agriculture, Homeland Security, and the Interior. In addition, the report  will be available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov.

If you or your staff members have any questions about this report, please  contact me at (202) 512-3841 or fennella@gao.gov. Contact points for  our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found  on the last page of this report. GAO staff members who made key  contributions to this report are listed in appendix V.

Our objectives were to examine for the four federal land management  agencies, (1) what is known about the number of threats and assaults  against their employees, (2) the approaches the agencies used to protect  their employees from threats and assaults and any factors affecting their  ability to do so, and (3) the extent to which agencies met facility security  assessment requirements.

For the first objective, we obtained and analyzed data on threats and  assaults against land management agency employees from the law  enforcement databases of the Forest Service within the U.S. Department  of Agriculture and the Bureau of Land Management (BLM), Fish and  Wildlife (FWS), and National Park Service (Park Service) within the  Department of the Interior for fiscal years 2013 through 2017. These  data were the most recent available at the time we began our review. We  also obtained and analyzed data from the Federal Bureau of Investigation  (FBI) regarding its investigations into potential domestic terror threats to  land management agencies.

Each land management agency’s law enforcement division records data  on threats and assaults to employees, as part of its broader mission to  enforce laws that safeguard employees and protect resources. The data  systems, however, were not specifically designed for reporting threats  and assaults against employees, and they do not include the suspect’s  motivation for a crime, such as anti-government extremist ideologies.  Since each agency collects and maintains data in a different data system  and has agency-specific reporting requirements for incidents, the data  differ in how they were originally recorded by field law enforcement  officers and how they were queried and reported by headquarters officials  responding to our request for data. As such, if data were not entered, or  not entered correctly, they would not have been captured in agency  queries. According to agency officials at the four land management  agencies, they queried their data systems to identify records of incidents  that pertained to threats and assaults against employees. BLM, Forest  Service, and Park Service officials then conducted record-level reviews  and removed records that they determined were not threats or assaults,  contained errors, were duplicative, or did not contain sufficient information  to make a conclusive determination. We did not systematically review  the records they removed. Information about each agency’s data system  and limitations related to the agency’s data are as follows:

BLM. BLM maintains its data in the Incident Management, Analysis,  and Reporting System (IMARS). IMARS is used by most Interior  bureaus for incident management and reporting and to prevent,  detect, and investigate known and suspected criminal activity. Each  bureau uses a different, customized version of IMARS. BLM officials  said that beginning in fiscal year 2014, BLM began collecting data on  violations of federal statutes, regulations, and state laws during  incidents. Prior to that, BLM used a generic description of each  offense. Officials also said that when multiple offenses occur during  an incident, the less serious offenses are unlikely to be entered into  the system. Therefore, some offenses that occurred during incidents  of threats and assaults may be excluded from these data.

FWS. FWS maintains its data the agency’s Law Enforcement  Management Information System (LEMIS). According to FWS  documents, LEMIS is used to process and store investigations,  intelligence, and other records. FWS officials said the agency  changed data systems during our reporting time frame. Specifically,  FWS originally stored fiscal year 2013 and 2014 data in the Law  Enforcement-Information Management and Gathering System and  imported the data into LEMIS in July 2014. We assessed the data  across the two systems by comparing incidents per year and types of  violations that occurred, and we found that the data were comparable.  According to agency officials, they did not review the incidents before  providing them to us; therefore, some incidents may not have been  actual threats or assaults.

Forest Service. The Forest Service maintains its data in the Law  Enforcement and Investigations Management Attainment Reporting  System (LEIMARS). Forest Service officials said LEIMARS is used to  record criminal and claims activity in the national forests, which  include verified violations of criminal statutes and agency policy, as  well as incidents that may result in civil claims for or against the  government. Incidents are recorded in LEIMARS in one of three types  of law enforcement report categories: (1) an incident report, which  records when an offense occurred but the perpetrator was unknown;  (2) a warning notice, which is issued when an offense occurred but  the law enforcement officer determined that the offense was  inadvertent or committed due to lack of understanding or  misinformation; and (3) a violation notice, which is issued for an  offense that violates the U.S. Code or Forest Service regulations and  the perpetrator was known. We present these three types of reports  as incidents. A Forest Service official identified 125 incidents for which  the agency could not determine whether a threat or assault to an  employee occurred. We excluded these 125 incidents from our  analysis. Officials told us that they only provided data on the most  serious offense occurring during an incident due to limitations on  linking records in the Forest Service’s data system; they also told us  that there may be a minor amount of overlap between violation  notices and incident reports.

Park Service. As with BLM, Park Service data is maintained in the  IMARS data system. According to a Park Service official, some but  not all Park Service incident records cite a federal statute or  regulation. However, all Park Service incident records include offense  codes—which are unique to the Park Service—that are associated  with the type of violation, such as assault or disorderly conduct. Unlike  with the statutes and regulations, a perpetrator does not need to be  identified for the law enforcement officer to cite an offense code.  Therefore, the Park Service provided data to us by offense code, and  we were not able to present the data by the statute or regulation that  was potentially violated.

We also obtained data from the FBI on investigations into potential  domestic terror threats to land management agencies. FBI investigation  data is maintained in the Sentinel data system, which is FBI’s case  management system. FBI officials provided data from the FBI’s domestic  terrorism program on three types of investigations: assessments,  preliminary investigations, and full investigations. We reported data on the  full investigations because of the limited information available on  assessments and preliminary investigations. Before providing the data to  us, an FBI official reviewed the record of each domestic terrorism  investigation initiated in fiscal years 2013 through 2017 to determine  whether the investigation was relevant to threats to BLM, FWS, the Forest  Service or the Park Service. These data represent all potential violations  known at the time the FBI agent first opened the case and therefore  include various potential violations beyond threats and assaults against  federal employees. According to agency officials, in some cases, the FBI  agent opening the case may not have been able to fully identify all  relevant subsections of the statute or regulation that was potentially  violated. To account for this, we report FBI’s data at the statute or  regulation level.

Since we relied on the professional judgement of agency officials to  review and interpret incident data, we may be unable to replicate the final  data selection drawn from each agency’s database, even if we retrieved  the data using the same method and search criteria. We independently  assessed the reliability of each agency’s data by (1) reviewing related  documentation about the data system; (2) conducting manual reviews of  the data for missing data, outliers, and obvious errors; (3) reviewing  related internal controls; and (4) interviewing agency officials  knowledgeable about the data, among other things. In our interviews, we  asked agency officials about data entry practices, data system  capabilities and limitations, and circumstances whereby incidents of  threats and assaults might not appear in the database. Based on our  review, we determined that the data were sufficiently reliable for the  purposes of reporting descriptive summary information on the number of  threats and assaults against federal land management employees during  fiscal years 2013 through 2017.

To address our second objective, we examined policies and requirements  regarding federal land management agencies’ responsibilities for  protecting employees against threats and assaults. We also interviewed  headquarters and selected field unit officials about the agencies’  approaches to protecting their employees from threats and assaults and  factors that may affect their ability to do so, and we obtained supporting  documentation where available. We conducted site visits from March  through July 2018 to a nongeneralizable sample of 11 of the 35 regional  or state offices and 14 field units across the federal land management  agencies. We selected sites in Colorado, Nevada, Oregon, and Utah,  since the majority of federal lands are located in the West and some field  units in these states had been affected by actions of individuals motivated  by anti-government ideologies. Specifically, we conducted site visits to  five BLM field units, nine FWS field units, seven Forest Service field units,  and four Park Service field units. The number of field units we interviewed  varied on several factors, including how many field units regional and  state offices invited to the meeting. Findings from the interviews we  conducted at our site visits provide useful insights but cannot be  generalized to those units we did not include in our review. Based on our  site visit interviews, we identified four primary factors affecting agencies’  abilities to protect their employees from threats and assaults. We also  collected information from each agency on the number of field law  enforcement officers they had at the end of fiscal years 2013 and 2018,  the most recent year for which data were available—to analyze any  changes in resources. We took steps to assess the reliability of these  data, including comparing the data to agency budget justifications and  interviewing agency officials, and found them to be sufficiently reliable for  the purpose of reporting the number of field law enforcement officers  agencies had in fiscal years 2013 and 2018.

For the third objective, we examined government-wide requirements  promulgated by the Interagency Security Committee (ISC) and  documented in ISC’s Risk Management Process for Federal Facilities,  which we refer to in this report as the ISC Standard, and its related  appendixes. We interviewed ISC officials to learn more about the  development of the requirements in the ISC Standard and variations, if  any, in how agencies are expected to implement them. To determine  whether agencies met the requirement to conduct facility security  assessments on all of their occupied facilities, we obtained documents on  the agencies’ inventories of occupied facilities and assessed whether the  agencies had conducted security assessments on those facilities. We  interviewed headquarters and field officials about their inventories and  their plans, if any, for completing the remaining assessments. We also  examined the extent to which agencies’ facility security risk assessment  methodologies complied with two key requirements in the ISC Standard.  These included that methodologies must: (1) consider all 33 of the  undesirable events identified in the Standard and (2) evaluate the three  factors of risk—threat, vulnerability, and consequence—for each  undesirable event. We analyzed the agencies’ methodologies and  compared them against requirements in the ISC Standard. We also  interviewed agency officials about the methodologies.

Appendix II: The Interagency Security Committee’s 33 Undesirable Events, as of June 2019

Appendix III: Comments from the U.S. Department of Agriculture

Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of the Interior

Anne-Marie Fennell, (202) 512-3841 or fennella@gao.gov.

In addition to the individual named above, Casey L. Brown (Assistant  Director), Tanya Doriss (Analyst in Charge), Charles W. Bausell, Charles  A. Culverwell, John W. Delicath, Emily E. Eischen, Cindy K. Gilbert,  Richard P. Johnson, Vanessa E. Obetz, Dan C. Royer, and Breanna M.  Trexler made key contributions to this report.

Federal land management agencies have law enforcement divisions to help protect employees and facilities on nearly 700 million acres of land. Security incidents on federal land include the 2016 armed occupation of a wildlife refuge by individuals motivated by anti-government beliefs.

Federal employees have been subject to a range of threats and assaults. But agencies have not completed all of the required facility security assessments. Officials said they do not have resources or expertise to do so.

We recommended that agencies develop a plan to address these factors and complete their assessments so they can reduce risks.