Land Ports of Entry: CBP Should Update Policies and Enhance Analysis of Inspections

CBP, within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), is the lead federal agency charged with a dual mission of facilitating the flow of legitimate travel and trade at the nation's borders while keeping terrorists and their weapons, criminals and their contraband, and inadmissible aliens out of the country. GAO was asked to review CBP's process for inspecting passenger vehicles, pedestrians, and commercial vehicles at land POEs to secure the border. This report examines to what extent CBP (1) has processes and policies for inspections, (2) monitors inspection activities, and (3) has measures to assess its efforts to detect illegal activity of passengers, pedestrians, and commercial vehicles at land POEs. To address these questions, GAO analyzed CBP documents and data related to inbound inspections; interviewed officials; and observed operations at a non-generalizable sample of seven land POEs, selected to reflect a range of traffic volumes and geographic locations, among other things. This is a public version of a sensitive report that GAO issued in June 2019. Information that DHS deemed sensitive has been omitted.

U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) has processes for inspecting passenger vehicles, pedestrians, and commercial vehicles at U.S. land ports of entry (POE). These processes include reviewing travel documents, screening against law enforcement databases, and using canines and X-ray equipment (see figure below). However, because CBP has not updated many of its policies—in a few cases for almost 20 years—they do not always reflect changes in technology or processes, such as those for conducting searches and handling fentanyl. By reviewing and updating policies, CBP could help ensure officers have guidance needed to consistently and properly perform inspections.

CBP has various mechanisms at the port, field office, and national levels to monitor inspection activities at land POEs, but opportunities exist to enhance analysis of the results from its national level Self-Inspection Program (SIP) and covert operational testing. The SIP is an annual self-assessment that POEs are to conduct to determine compliance with CBP policies. CBP analyzes the results of the SIP annually to identify systemic compliance issues across CBP that year; however, it does not analyze noncompliance at individual POEs over time. By analyzing these data, CBP could better identify and address deficiencies at individual POEs. In addition, CBP has produced three comprehensive assessments, which analyzed aggregated results for certain types of covert tests, such as fraudulent document tests, conducted at land POEs in fiscal years 2013, 2014, and 2018. However, CBP has not done so for other types of tests, such as canine contraband detection tests, conducted from fiscal years 2013 through 2018. By implementing a policy for periodically conducting such analyses, CBP could identify vulnerabilities, trends, and best practices occurring more broadly.

CBP uses various sets of measures to assess its efforts to detect illegal activity at land POEs. CBP performance measures generally reflect the key attributes of effective measures, but CBP does not set an ambitious and realistic target for one measure. CBP's target for the land border interception rate—the estimated percentage of major violations in privately-owned vehicles that CBP intercepts out of the projected total number of major violations—is lower than the actual reported rate for fiscal years 2015 through 2018. A more ambitious target for the interception rate would better encourage CBP to review past performance of inspection activities that impact the measure and challenge CBP to identify ways to improve performance .

GAO recommends that CBP: (1) review and update policies related to land POE inspections in accordance with CBP guidance; (2) analyze the SIP results to identify and address reoccurring inspection deficiencies at individual POEs; (3) implement a policy to conduct periodic comprehensive analyses of covert test findings; and (4) develop a more ambitious target for the land border interception rate measure. DHS concurred.

In fiscal year 2018, about 104 million passenger vehicles, 46 million  pedestrians, and 12 million commercial vehicles entered the United  States through 110 land ports of entry (POE) along the border, according  to U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP). Within the Department of  Homeland Security (DHS), CBP is the lead federal agency charged with a  dual mission of facilitating the flow of legitimate travel and trade at our  nation’s borders while also keeping terrorists and their weapons, criminals  and their contraband, and inadmissible aliens out of the country.

Land POEs continue to be a key drug smuggling route for Mexican  transnational criminal organizations. According to the Drug Enforcement  Administration, the most common smuggling method used by Mexican  transnational criminal organizations involves transporting illicit drugs  through U.S. land POEs in passenger vehicles with concealed  compartments or commingled with legitimate goods on tractor trailers. In  fiscal year 2018, CBP data show that it had seized nearly 363,000  pounds of drugs at land POEs, including approximately 265,000 pounds  of marijuana, 70,000 pounds of methamphetamine, 20,000 pounds of  cocaine, and 1,400 pounds of fentanyl, among other drugs.

Enforcing U.S. immigration law, including by detecting and interdicting the  illegal movement of people, is also a key part of CBP’s border security  mission. According to CBP, its officers encountered nearly 139,000  inadmissible individuals at land POEs in fiscal year 2018. The lack of  required travel documents, such as a visa, was the most common reason  cited by CBP for determining individuals to be inadmissible.

You asked us to review CBP’s process for inspecting passenger vehicles,  pedestrians, and commercial vehicles at land POEs to secure the border.  This report addresses the following questions:  1.  To what extent does CBP have processes and policies in place for  inspection of passengers, pedestrians, and commercial vehicles at  land POEs?  2.  To what extent does CBP monitor inspection activities at land POEs?   3.  To what extent does CBP have measures to assess its efforts to  detect illegal activity of passengers, pedestrians, and commercial  vehicles at land POEs?

This report is a public version of a sensitive report that we issued in June  2019. DHS deemed some of the information in our June report to be  sensitive, which must be protected from public disclosure. Therefore, this  report omits sensitive information about the results of certain monitoring  activities, planned actions to address deficiencies identified through these  monitoring activities, and information on one performance measure.  Although the information provided in this report is more limited, the report  addresses the same objectives as the sensitive report and uses the same  methodology.

To address all of the above questions, we focused on inbound inspection  activities at land POEs designed to identify and interdict contraband, such as narcotics, and determine the admissibility of travelers. We analyzed  CBP policies, procedures, and reports on inbound inspections. We also  visited a nonprobability sample of land POEs to observe inspections and  interview CBP POE officials on inspection processes, efforts to monitor  the implementation of inspection activities, and use of performance  measures. Specifically, we conducted site visits to seven POEs: Nogales  and Douglas, AZ; San Ysidro and Otay Mesa, CA; El Paso and Marcelino  Serna, TX, and Buffalo-Niagara Falls, NY. We selected these land POEs  using a combination of the following factors: a range of traffic volume;  presence of crossings for passenger vehicles, pedestrians, and  commercial vehicles; a range of geographic locations; proximity to other  ports; and presence of unique or new inspection processes or technology.  The results of our site visits cannot be generalized more broadly to all  land POEs. However, they provide important context and insights into  how CBP is conducting, monitoring, and assessing the effectiveness of  inspections. During our site visits we also interviewed CBP Field Office  officials responsible for overseeing land POE operations. Further, we  interviewed CBP headquarters officials responsible for overseeing  inspection processes, policies, technology, efforts to monitor and assess  compliance, and performance measurement at land POEs.

To determine the extent to which CBP has processes and policies in  place for the inspection of passengers, pedestrians, and commercial  vehicles at land POEs, we also analyzed DHS and CBP directives, policy  memoranda, standard operating procedures, and documentation on  technology. These processes include the use of law enforcement  databases, non-intrusive inspection equipment, and canines to screen  individuals, vehicles, and cargo seeking entry to the United States. We  assessed the timeliness of CBP’s policies using CBP’s Office of Field  Operations Policy Management Handbook, which establishes guidelines  for reviewing and updating CBP policies.

To determine the extent to which CBP monitors inspection activities at  land POEs, we also analyzed CBP documentation, including directives,  policy memoranda, standard operating procedures, reports, and  assessments. Additionally, we analyzed Self-Inspection Program (SIP)  reports and data from 2013 to 2018 to determine the extent to which CBP  analyzes SIP results. To assess the reliability of SIP data, we reviewed  documentation on system controls, interviewed knowledgeable CBP  officials, and analyzed the data for any potential gaps and errors. We  determined the data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of reporting  SIP results related to operations at land POEs for 2013 through 2018. To  determine the extent the CBP analyzes covert testing at land POEs, we  analyzed test protocols, summaries of test results, and comprehensive  assessments of aggregated test results from fiscal years 2013 through  2018. We assessed CBP’s monitoring efforts using Standards for Internal  Control in the Federal Government, including the standards related to  using quality information to support internal control systems, remediating  deficiencies, and documenting policies.

To determine the extent to which CBP has measures to assess its efforts  to detect illegal activity of passengers, pedestrians, and commercial  vehicles at land POEs, we reviewed CBP reported performance data from  fiscal years 2013 through 2018, a time period chosen to show recent trends in performance. To assess the reliability of the data, we reviewed  documentation on the methodology to calculate performance measures  and relevant systems, interviewed knowledgeable CBP officials, and  analyzed the data for any potential errors. We found the data were  sufficiently reliable for the purposes of reporting recent performance  results. We also analyzed documents, including performance and  accountability reports, strategic plans, and management reports. We  assessed CBP’s performance measures using the attributes of successful  performance measures we have previously identified.

The performance audit upon which this report is based was conducted  from January 2018 to June 2019 in accordance with generally accepted  government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan  and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide  a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit  objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable  basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We  subsequently worked with DHS from June 2019 to August 2019 to  prepare this version of the original sensitive report for public release. This  public version was also prepared in accordance with these standards.

CBP’s Office of Field Operations (OFO) is responsible for inspecting  pedestrians, passengers, and cargo at 110 land POEs, which have a  combined total of 173 crossings (see figure 1). OFO has 20 field offices  nationwide that oversee the operations of all POEs within their designated  areas of responsibility.

Travelers seeking entry to the United States through a land POE are  required to present valid travel documents. In response to a  recommendation from the 9/11 Commission and the Intelligence Reform  and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, DHS and the Department of State  implemented the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative, which requires all  travelers to present documents that denote identity and citizenship, such  as a passport, when entering the United States. Foreign nationals may  have particular travel document requirements, such as a visa or other  entry permit, which vary based on such factors as nationality and the  purpose of travel. See table 1 for examples of the types of acceptable  documents for travelers coming into the United States through land  POEs.

There are also documentary requirements for commercial vehicles with  cargo seeking entry into the United States. The Trade Act of 2002, as  amended, establishes requirements for commercial vehicles with cargo to  electronically submit information to CBP at least 1 hour in advance of  arrival at a land POE. The information required includes data on the  vehicle (e.g., Vehicle Identification Number or license plate number), the  shipper, the carrier, scheduled date and time of arrival, and the  description and weight of the cargo, among other things. Commercial  vehicles with cargo valued less than $2,500 are considered “informal  entries” that are exempt from the advance cargo information reporting  requirements.

CBP Has Processes for Inspections at Land POEs, But Has Not Updated Related Policies Consistent with CBP Guidance

CBP’s Inspection Processes Include Screening to Identify Higher-Risk Travelers, Vehicles and Cargo and Conducting Physical Inspections

CBP inspects travelers and cargo seeking to enter the country through  land POEs. These inspections involve a targeting process in which CBP  uses law enforcement databases to identify and target higher-risk  passengers, pedestrians, commercial vehicles, and cargo before arrival at  a land POE.

Targeting. CBP uses law enforcement, intelligence, and other  enforcement data to identify higher-risk individuals, vehicles, or cargo for  additional scrutiny upon their arrival at a land POE. Most cargo-carrying  commercial vehicles must submit an electronic manifest (e-manifest) with  information on the shipment to CBP at least 1 hour in advance of arrival  at a land POE. CBP personnel at the POEs are to use the e-manifest and  CBP’s Automated Targeting System to identify high-risk inbound cargo.  The Automated Targeting System is a decision support tool that  compares traveler, cargo, and conveyance information against law  enforcement, intelligence, and other enforcement data using risk-based  targeting scenarios and assessments. It draws on many law enforcement,  intelligence, and other enforcement databases, including the Terrorist  Screening Database, the Department of Justice’s National Crime  Information Center, the Social Security Administration Death Master File,  and the National Insurance Crime Bureau’s private database of stolen  vehicles. CBP policy requires that high-risk cargo be targeted for  additional research and analysis and generally will also require the high- risk cargo to undergo a secondary examination once it arrives at the  POE.

In addition, CBP personnel at the POEs or field offices may review  seizure and arrest reports, and other law enforcement information to  identify individuals or vehicles that have associations with known  criminals and place a “lookout” on them in TECS, CBP’s system for  processing travelers. TECS will flag travelers with lookouts for additional  inspection if they arrive at the land POE. CBP personnel at the POEs or  field offices may also use this information to develop products on recent  trends that can help inform inspections.

Once passengers, pedestrians, and commercial vehicles arrive at a land  POE, CBP has various processes for inspecting them, including  preprimary, primary, and secondary inspections, as explained below (see  figure 2).

Preprimary. In the preprimary area, both commercial vehicles and  passenger vehicles will generally pass through radiation portal monitors  that are designed to detect radiation and help prevent the smuggling of  nuclear material into the United States (see figure 3).

In the passenger vehicle environment, the preprimary area also contains  license plate readers and Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) readers  to capture information on vehicles and RFID-enabled travel documents.  Examples of RFID-enabled travel documents include passport cards and  border crossing cards. When a vehicle enters the preprimary inspection  lane, a sensor grid determines that a vehicle has entered the lane. The  sensors deploy a flash strobe that illuminates the area and license plate  reader cameras take a picture of the front and rear of the vehicle. The  information associated with the license plate number is run against law  enforcement databases to alert the officer during the primary inspection if  there is a potential issue with the vehicle or its occupants. Similarly, as a  vehicle approaches the primary inspection area, travelers are directed to  hold up their RFID travel documents to be read by RFID readers. Some  land POEs may also have RFID readers for pedestrians. See figure 4 for  examples of a license plate reader and RFID reader.

The preprimary area is also used to direct travelers to different lanes  according to the type of travel documents they have. For example, CBP  may use signs to designate specific lanes for travelers with RFID or other  machine readable documents (“Ready lanes”) or for trusted travelers (see  figure 5).

Primary inspection. During the primary inspection, CBP officers inspect  travelers, vehicles, and cargo to determine compliance with U.S. law and  admissibility to the United States. A CBP officer is to examine travel  documents to ensure their validity and visually match the traveler to the  photo identification to confirm the traveler’s identity. All travelers’ names  and license plates generally are to be screened against law enforcement  databases. As previously discussed, this screening process may begin in  the preprimary area when license plate and RFID readers collect data on  vehicles and travelers with RFID travel documents. CBP officers may also  manually enter data on travelers and vehicles during the primary  inspection. A CBP officer is to interview travelers to obtain a declaration  of citizenship, the purpose of travel, and items acquired outside the  United States. For commercial vehicles, the CBP officer may also review  the manifest and the results of targeting, if any. All CBP officers  conducting primary inspections are to wear personal radiation detectors— small devices designed to be worn on a belt—to help detect radiation and  help ensure the safety of officers and the traveling public.

If the inspection cannot be completed at the primary inspection location, a  more thorough inspection is required and the travelers, vehicles, or cargo  are to be referred for secondary inspection. Travelers, vehicles, or cargo  can be directed to secondary inspection for a wide range of issues,  including when:  radiation is detected (either on the traveler or from his or her vehicle),  the traveler does not have required travel documents,  the officer has questions about the validity of travel documents,  the traveler’s information matches information that may be of concern  from law enforcement or intelligence data, or  the officer suspects that the traveler is carrying contraband.

Foreign visitors to the United States (with the exception of Canadian  citizens and Mexican citizens using border crossing cards) may also be  referred to secondary inspection to complete processing of their  admission records, referred to as Form I-94s. Additionally, CBP selects  passenger vehicles at random to be sent to a secondary inspection for a  Compliance Examination (COMPEX). COMPEX is a program designed to  help measure the effectiveness of CBP’s inspections and is discussed in  more detail later in this report.

Secondary inspection. A secondary inspection may include a CBP  officer conducting further questioning of travelers or additional  examination of the traveler, vehicle, or cargo. CBP may use canines, non- intrusive inspection (NII) X-ray, Gamma-ray, or radiation detection  equipment, or physically examine the traveler, vehicle, or cargo. CBP  may also examine a traveler’s electronic devices, such as computers,  tablets, and mobile phones. To examine cargo, CBP may require the  contents to be offloaded. When foreign visitors are referred to a  secondary inspection to process Form I-94 admission records, CBP  officers are to conduct interviews and additional database screening,  including biometric checks of fingerprints. CBP policy calls for  documentation, immigration, and other admissibility issues to be resolved  before a traveler or vehicle is permitted to enter the country. Below, figure  6 shows a canine examination and figure 7 shows an example of NII  equipment and scans of vehicles with indicators of contraband smuggling.

CBP also has additional processes to enhance preprimary, primary, or  secondary inspections at land POEs, including:

Canines. CBP has canines that can detect concealed humans,  narcotics, currency, firearms, and agriculture products. Depending on  availability, land POEs may deploy officers with canines to walk  among the vehicles in preprimary waiting to reach an inspection  booth. Canines may also be used in the pedestrian and commercial  vehicle environments. As previously mentioned, canines are also  used for some secondary searches.

Anti-Terrorism Contraband Enforcement Teams. These teams  conduct special operations that focus on anti-terrorism and the  interdiction of narcotics, alien smugglers, and fraudulent documents,  among other contraband. For example, at one POE we visited,  members of the Anti-Terrorism Contraband Enforcement Team told us  they often walk among the passenger vehicles in the preprimary area  to look for indicators of illicit activity.

Tactical Terrorism Response Teams. These teams provide  immediate counterterrorism response capabilities at some land POEs.  Members of Tactical Terrorism Response Teams receive  counterterrorism training and are responsible for interviewing known  and suspected terrorists at ports of entry to help determine  admissibility and collect intelligence.

Blitzes and other local practices. CBP officers at land POEs may  perform “blitzes”, in which inspections are enhanced for a period of  time. For example, CBP officials told us that blitzes may include  looking in all vehicle trunks during the primary inspection or sending  additional vehicles for NII (X-ray) exams during a certain period of  time. Officers at the POEs we visited also discussed other local  initiatives to enhance inspections. For example, one POE we visited  used NII to screen all commercial vehicles. Another POE we visited  partnered with the local authority that manages an international bridge  to deploy license plate readers for commercial vehicles before the  vehicles enter the bridge into the United States. The bridge authority  uses the license plate reading to check if the commercial vehicle has  submitted the required e-manifest to CBP; only those commercial  vehicles that have submitted the required e-manifests are allowed to  cross. Officials from CBP told us that, in the future, CBP and the  bridge authority plan to deploy additional technology in the preprimary  area on the non-U.S. side of the border, including facial recognition  and NII.

In addition, CBP has plans to make future improvements to inspection  processes. For example, CBP is conducting tests to use facial recognition  technology as part of inspections at land POEs. According to CBP, facial  recognition technology may enhance its ability to detect imposters by  matching facial images of those arriving with images on file. CBP began a  facial recognition test in the passenger vehicle environment at the  Anzalduas, Texas land POE in August 2018 and expects the test to run  for up to 1 year. In September 2018, CBP initiated a project at the Port of  San Luis, Arizona to demonstrate the feasibility of acquiring photos of all  arriving pedestrians and comparing those photos to photos on file.  Subsequently, in October 2018, CBP officials stated they extended this  demonstration project to the Port of Nogales, Arizona. According to CBP,  these pedestrian demonstration projects built upon an earlier pilot project  at the Port of Otay Mesa, California, which ran from February through  May 2016. Testing this technology is one of CBP’s key efforts in  developing the capability to fulfill DHS’ statutory responsibility to collect  biometric information from arriving and departing aliens.

Many of CBP’s Policies Related to Inspections at Land POEs Have Not Been Reviewed and Updated to Reflect Changes Consistent with CBP Guidance

CBP has numerous directives, handbooks and other official instructions  that specify policies and procedures for inspections at land POEs.  However, many of these documents have not been reviewed and updated  as required by OFO’s January 2016 OFO Policy Management Handbook.  This guidance states that all of OFO’s policies must be reviewed and  updated, as necessary at least once every 3 years to help ensure the  timely provision of uniform and relevant policy. In some cases, the  policy documents issued by OFO or its program offices have not been  reviewed and updated for almost two decades. See table 2 below for a list  of such policies we identified that have not been reviewed and updated to  reflect changes in processes since their issuance consistent with OFO’s  policy management requirements.

As a result of policies not being reviewed and updated by OFO, these  policies, as currently written, do not fully reflect changes in technology,  operating conditions, or inspection processes. For example:

The 2008 policy on processing travelers and vehicles at land POEs  does not include information on the Consolidated Secondary  Inspection System, the current system used to record secondary  inspections. It also directs officers to follow guidance in the Inspector’s  Field Manual, which has since been discontinued.

The 1999 Compliance Measurement directive refers to procedures for  a paper-based system, while the system is now electronic, according  to officials.

The 2004 Personal Search Handbook does not incorporate the 2015  National Standards on Transport, Escort, Detention, and Search  policy that prohibited CBP officers from observing personal cavity  searches conducted by medical personnel.

The 1999 Narcotics Interdiction Handbook and the 2002 canine  policies do not address fentanyl. Fentanyl is a synthetic opioid that  requires special handling and has been a main contributor to the  recent spike in overdose deaths in the United States, according to the  Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.

OFO’s Planning, Program, Analysis, and Evaluation (PPAE) Quality  Assurance Enterprise Division (QAED) is responsible for monitoring that  each program office review and update, as needed, the policies for its  programs. QAED has an internal tracking system and sends out  reminders to CBP program offices about policies that need to be  reviewed, and updated, if necessary. QAED officials acknowledged that  many policies need to be updated because some are almost 20 years old  and many technological and other changes have occurred that may not  be described in existing policies.

CBP officials stated that they are in the process of updating some  policies, including the 1999 Compliance Measurement directive, the 2002  Canine Enforcement Program Handbook, the 2004 Personal Search  Handbook, and the 2008 Primary Processing of Travelers and Vehicles  Seeking Entry to the United States at Land Ports of Entry directive.  Officials attributed the lack of timely updating to several factors. OFO  officials responsible for reviewing and updating policies said that the  process can be time-consuming and difficult, as there may be many  needed changes or may include conducting site visits to identify best  practices and areas for improvement. In addition, QAED officials  responsible for monitoring policy updates said QAED has 12 staff and is  responsible for three OFO-wide mission areas in addition to policy  management, as well as a number of other responsibilities within PPAE.  Further, according to QAED officials, they do not have authority to require  cognizant program offices to review and update their policies in line with  the OFO Policy Management Handbook. QAED officials agreed that CBP  and OFO could better ensure compliance with OFO’s policy updating  requirements.

OFO’s 2016 OFO Policy Management Handbook states that the timely  provision of uniform and relevant policy facilitates informed decision- making at all levels of the organization and that an effective policy  management program is critical to the success of any organization. By  reviewing and updating as necessary all relevant policies related to land  POE inspections consistent with OFO’s policy handbook, CBP could  better ensure that officers have guidance needed to consistently and  properly inspect vehicles and their passengers, pedestrians, and  commercial vehicles.

CBP Uses Various Mechanisms to Monitor Inspection Activities at Land POEs, But Does Not Fully Analyze the Results of Some National Monitoring Programs CBP Monitors Inspections at Land POEs Using Mechanisms Deployed at the Port, Field Office, and National Levels

CBP uses various mechanisms at the port, field office, and national levels  to monitor inspection activities at land POEs to help ensure that CBP  officers are following policies and procedures. At the POE level,  supervisors and port management monitor many of the inspection tasks  in real-time by reviewing computer-based records and logs of inspections  and observing inspections. CBP also provides tools to the ports to assist  with supervisory monitoring efforts, such as Enforcement Link Mobile  Operations Red Flag (ELMOrf)—a computer application that provides  alerts to supervisors via mobile device when certain types of events occur  during primary inspections that warrant supervisory oversight. Table 3  below provides key monitoring mechanisms CBP uses for its land POE  inspections at the port level.

At the field office level, field office staff may monitor land POE activities  within their area of responsibility through periodic assessments of  supervisor monitoring duties, such as inspection report reviews. In  addition, all field offices have Integrity Officers tasked with identifying  potential corruption and officer training issues at the ports. Table 4 below  provides key monitoring mechanisms CBP uses for its land POE  inspections at the field office level.

CBP’s national level initiatives include its Self-Inspection Program (SIP)  and the Operational Field Testing Division’s covert testing program. The  Self-Inspection Program is an annual internal self-assessment of various  CBP component offices and includes assessment of various inspection  activities at POEs. Table 5 below provides key monitoring mechanisms  CBP uses for its land POE inspections at the national level.

CBP Conducts Analysis of the Results of National Level Monitoring Programs, But Opportunities Exist to Enhance Analyses

CBP Analyzes Self-Inspection Program Results Each Year, But Does Not Analyze Results of Individual POEs to Identify Reoccurring Deficiencies

CBP produces CBP-wide analyses of the SIP results it collects annually,  but the analyses are not done in a manner—such as at the port level and  over multiple years—that would allow CBP to identify potentially  reoccurring deficiencies at individual POEs. The Management Inspections  Division issues a report each year which provides comprehensive SIP  results across CBP offices for that year and highlights compliance issues  identified (referred to as the SIP Summary Analysis Report). Similarly,  OFO issues an annual report which provides comprehensive results and  highlights compliance issues identified across OFO’s programs for that  year. See figure 8 for an overview of the SIP process.

With regard to the 2018 SIP Summary Analysis Report, the Management  Inspections Division reported that approximately 80 percent of all SIP  worksheets, which document the results of the self-assessments,  submitted across CBP in the 2018 cycle had no deficient conditions. The  report also identified the six worksheets with the highest number of  deficient conditions across OFO and the questions associated with the  most corrective actions for those worksheets. For worksheets that the  report did not highlight, additional summaries of the OFO data are  provided, including the number of worksheets submitted and the number  of worksheets reporting corrective actions.

OFO’s SIP annual report also provides summaries of the SIP results, but  with additional analysis specific to OFO. The 2018 OFO SIP annual report  calculated an overall compliance rate of 92.4 percent across the 31,947  questions for worksheets completed by OFO that year. The report also  provided summaries of data used to calculate compliance rates for each  worksheet assigned to OFO and included trends in compliance rates for  each over 3 years. Additionally, the report provided summaries of the  data for each OFO field office that includes number of worksheets  submitted, the number of deficient conditions in the given year, and the  number of corrective actions for each POE under the field office.  Beginning in 2017, the OFO report provided an analysis of any SIP  worksheet question with a compliance rate below 90 percent in a given  year and the actions planned or taken to increase future compliance.

While these reports provide useful summary data of CBP’s monitoring of  inspections activities and recommendations for increasing compliance for  some programs and processes, our analysis of SIP results showed that  opportunities exist for CBP to identify potential reoccurring deficiencies at  individual land POEs over time. Specifically, our analysis of SIP results  from 2013 through 2018 identified reoccurring instances of  noncompliance at individual land POEs indicating the possibility that the  corrective actions taken each year to address the deficiencies did not fully  remediate them.

We found that management at the land POEs with reoccurring instances  of deficiencies took corrective actions each year to address the identified  deficiencies, and in some instances, management proposed and  implemented the same corrective action in multiple years to try to resolve  the identified deficiency. While the Management Inspections Division and  OFO reports provide some useful analysis to identify programs or specific  activities across CBP to target for remediation each year, these reports  have not positioned CBP to identify and more effectively address  reoccurring deficiencies at individual POEs.

Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government provides that  management should use quality information to achieve the entity’s  objectives and management should process the obtained data into quality  information that supports the internal control system. Furthermore,  management should remediate identified internal control deficiencies on a  timely basis and the audit resolution process is completed only after  action has been taken that (1) corrects identified deficiencies, (2)  produces improvements, or (3) demonstrates that the findings and  recommendations do not warrant management action. Additionally,  management, with oversight from the oversight body, is to monitor the  status of remediation efforts so that they are completed on a timely basis.

Management Inspections Division and OFO officials stated that their  analyses are designed to identify systemic compliance issues across  OFO. In addition, OFO officials stated that port management is  responsible for addressing compliance issues of individual land POEs.  However, without an analysis to identify reoccurring deficiencies at all  individual land POEs, the Management Inspections Division and OFO are  not well positioned to determine whether CBP may need to take  additional or alternative actions to more effectively address the  deficiencies at these ports. By enhancing analysis of the SIP data to  include analysis at the port level over time, CBP could better identify  potential reoccurring deficiencies with inspections at land POEs and could  be better positioned to more fully remediate them and ensure compliance  with inspection policies.

CBP Has Produced Comprehensive Analyses of Some Covert Testing Results, But Does Not Have a Policy to Conduct These Analyses on a Periodic Basis

CBP has produced comprehensive analyses of the results from some of  its covert operational tests conducted at land POEs in fiscal years 2013,  2014 and 2018. These comprehensive assessments of aggregated covert  test results provide analysis of trends, common vulnerabilities, and best  practices used in inspections across land POEs; however, CBP has not  developed comprehensive assessments for various other covert tests it  conducted during this time frame. Of the 213 land POE tests conducted  from fiscal years 2013 through 2018, 78 were included in comprehensive  assessments.

CBP’s Operational Field Testing Division (OFTD) is responsible for  covertly assessing and evaluating the integrity of CBP’s personnel,  technologies, and policies and procedures at land POEs. From fiscal  years 2013 through 2018, OFTD conducted a variety of tests of  inspections at land POEs including: fraudulent document and imposter  tests, canine contraband detection tests, biological agent detection tests,  NII equipment contraband detection tests, radiation detection capabilities  tests, and assessments of Tactical Terrorism Response Teams. See  figure 9 for an overview of the process for fraudulent document and  imposter covert testing.

For tests conducted from fiscal years 2013 to 2018, OFTD produced  three comprehensive assessments related to tests it conducted at land  POEs. One assessment compiled the results of 129 fraudulent  document and imposter tests conducted at 10 land POEs and 14 airports  in fiscal years 2012 and 2013. Another assessment covered 34 NII  equipment tests conducted in fiscal years 2013 and 2014 at land POEs  and seaports, of which nine of the tests were at land POEs. The third  assessment, issued in 2018, covered 33 NII equipment tests conducted in  fiscal year 2018 at six land POEs.

While OFTD produced comprehensive assessments for these tests,  OFTD did not comprehensively analyze the results of various other types  of covert tests conducted from fiscal years 2013 through 2018. Such  covert tests included 34 tests for canine detection of contraband, 11 for  agricultural and biological agent detection, seven for radiation detection,  and seven for Tactical Terrorism Response Team response.  Additionally, OFTD conducted another 72 fraudulent document and  imposter tests and six NII equipment tests over this time period that were  not included in the comprehensive assessments described above.  Overall, we found that 135 of 213 tests conducted from fiscal years 2013  through 2018 were not included in comprehensive assessments.

For tests not included in comprehensive assessments, analysis of the test  is limited to a test summary document that is produced following a test or  group of tests conducted during a field visit to one location. The  summaries identify officer actions during the test and record whether the  test resulted in an interdiction of the test subject. Some of the summaries  also include findings, identify leading practices, and provide  recommendations to the POE where the test or tests were conducted to  improve the inspections. While these summaries provide useful  information, they encompass the results of tests at individual POEs and  do not provide an evaluation of aggregated test results that could more  broadly identify vulnerabilities, trends, and best practices across land  POEs as provided in the comprehensive assessments.

According to OFTD officials, they have drafted a policy and standard  operating procedures that would address comprehensive analysis of  covert testing results, but these have been in development for 3 years  and have not been finalized. OFTD did not provide further details or  documentation of the draft policy or procedures or a date for completion.  Additionally, OFTD officials stated that in some cases they did not have a  sufficient number of covert test results to conduct a comprehensive  analysis. OFTD officials also stated that an additional comprehensive  assessment of fraudulent document and imposter tests was not needed  as OFTD completed this type of assessment in 2013 and no new findings  were generated by subsequent tests.

We recognize that the small number of certain tests limit OFTD’s ability to  conduct comprehensive analyses. However, we found that from fiscal  years 2013 through 2018 over half (135 of 213) of the tests conducted at  land POEs were not included in a comprehensive assessment and a  formalized policy could better position OFTD to be able to conduct these  analyses moving forward. Further, our analysis of covert test interdiction  rates suggests that additional periodic comprehensive analysis could help  inform CBP management of vulnerabilities, systemic inspection  deficiencies, leading practices observed, and ways to improve inspection  processes. Moreover, the reasons for non-interdiction in the fraudulent  document and imposter covert tests conducted since the last  comprehensive assessment may be different due to changes in  inspection technologies, training, personnel, or the threat environment.  OFTD officials agreed and stated that another comprehensive  assessment is being developed based on covert tests focused on facial  recognition technologies.

Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government provides that  management should implement control activities through policies,  including documenting such policies. In addition, management should  monitor the internal control system through ongoing monitoring and  separate evaluations. These evaluations are to be used periodically and  may provide feedback on the effectiveness of ongoing monitoring.  Furthermore, management should evaluate and document issues  identified through separate evaluations to identify internal control  deficiencies and monitor changes in the internal control system.

By implementing a policy for conducting periodic comprehensive analyses  of its covert operational test results, CBP would be better positioned to  understand the effectiveness of inspection policies, personnel, and  technologies across land POEs over time. Furthermore, periodic analyses  could help identify inspection vulnerabilities that may be occurring more  broadly, trends in these vulnerabilities, and best practices in mitigating  such vulnerabilities on a more consistent basis.

CBP Has Performance Measures to Assess Its Land POE Inspections but Has Not Set a Target for One Measure That Drives Performance Improvements

CBP uses various sets of performance measures including organizational  performance measures, internal performance measures, program and  port-specific measures, and measures required by the National Defense  Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 (NDAA). CBP reports  organizational measures externally to inform program management while  internal measures track additional areas of performance to inform OFO  management. In addition, some CBP programs and ports track measures  specific to their performance at land POEs. DHS also reports measures  that cover CBP’s efforts to detect illegal activity at land POEs as required  by the NDAA. These performance measures generally reflect attributes of  effective measures, however, CBP has not set an ambitious target for one  measure—the land border interception rate.

CBP Uses Various Sets of Measures to Evaluate Its Efforts to Detect Illegal Activity at Land POEs

CBP tracks and externally reports the results of performance measures  annually in its Organizational Performance Measures Overview. The  Overview states that it serves as a tool for leadership to manage  programs using performance information and includes performance  measure descriptions, targets, results, and trends over time. CBP  developed and reports on two measures that cover the detection of illegal  activity among inbound passenger vehicle and cargo traffic at land POEs:  (1) the estimated percentage of land border privately-owned vehicles with  passengers who are compliant with laws, rules, and regulations; and (2)  the percentage of inbound cargo identified as high-risk that is assessed or  scanned prior to departure or at arrival at a U.S. air, land, and sea POE.  CBP also tracks, but does not report, data on the percentage of high-risk  inbound cargo assessed or scanned prior to departure or upon arrival at  U.S. land POEs, which in fiscal year 2018 was 97.7 percent. See figures  10 and 11 for CBP’s reported results for these measures by fiscal year.

CBP measures the percentage of privately-owned vehicles with  passengers who are compliant with all federal, state, and local laws and  regulations through its COMPEX program. COMPEX is a statistical  survey in which vehicles cleared for entry into the United States by CBP  are randomly selected for a comprehensive audit through a computer- generated random sample. CBP is to conduct an audit of the selected  vehicles by doing a secondary inspection using a standardized system of  checks to identify any violations that were missed during the routine  inspection.

Violations found in the COMPEX audits represent violations missed by  CBP and are used by CBP to estimate the total number of violations  missed by CBP operations. According to officials, CBP uses these data— along with data on violations CBP officers identify during the normal  inspection process—to calculate the overall estimated percentage of land  border privately-owned vehicles with passengers compliant with laws,  rules, and regulations. As shown in Figure 10, CBP has set a target rate  of 99.5 percent compliance. From fiscal years 2015 through 2018, CBP  reported estimated rates of over 99 percent compliance. While CBP  nearly met its target across all of these years, CBP plans to work with  field office management and review COMPEX secondary inspection  findings to identify noncompliance trends and identify the underlying  reasons for noncompliance. In addition, CBP plans to develop materials  to educate travelers on relevant laws and requirements.

As previously discussed, in the cargo environment, CBP identifies  potentially high-risk cargo through the Automated Targeting System. CBP  then tracks the percentage of such cargo assessed or scanned prior to  arrival or at a land POE. As shown in Figure 11, CBP has set a target rate  of identifying 100 percent of potentially high-risk cargo. For fiscal years  2014 through 2017, CBP reported rates of 99 percent or higher, and in  2018, the rate was 97.9 percent. According to CBP, it did not meet its  target rate of 100 percent in fiscal year 2018 because of challenges  related to changes in high-risk status that occur en route, data entry  errors, and logistical or scheduling errors. OFO plans to address these  challenges by working with internal stakeholders to resolve status- tracking problems and information-processing errors and by working with  shippers and carriers to rectify logistical and scheduling issues.

In addition to its externally-reported organizational performance  measures, OFO tracks two performance measures internally that relate to  efforts to detect illegal activity among inbound traffic at land POEs: the  percentage of individuals screened against law enforcement databases  for entry into the United States and the land border interception rate for  passengers in privately-owned vehicles with major violations. See figure  12 for CBP’s performance by fiscal year.

CBP uses COMPEX data to estimate the land border interception rate for  privately-owned vehicles containing passengers with major violations  (interception rate). This represents the number of major violations in  privately-owned vehicles at the border that CBP intercepts divided by the  estimated total number of major violations.

CBP tracked the percentage of individuals screened against law  enforcement databases for entry into the United States across fiscal  years 2013 through 2018, but plans to discontinue use of this measure  beginning in fiscal year 2019 according to CBP officials. CBP officials  stated that this measure was originally created to track progress toward  electronic screening of travel documents as part of the Western  Hemisphere Travel Initiative. This measure tracks the percentage of  travelers screened against law enforcement databases using  electronically readable documents. According to CBP officials, there have  been a variety of technology infrastructure upgrades and changes to  vehicle processing software at land POEs that have reduced the  relevance of this measure for land POE operations and CBP plans to  discontinue its use as a result.

Some CBP programs that operate as part of the inspection process track  performance data on the results of their program activities. For example,  CBP tracks results from the Canine Program. Canine handlers are to  enter performance data into the Canine Tracking System locally at land  POEs. They track data on the numbers of days canine officers worked,  searches conducted, and fines and arrests that result from canine  searches.

In addition, some land POEs track performance data on local efforts to  detect illegal activity. For example, officials at one POE we visited track  data on the numbers and types of seizures, arrests, and immigration  enforcement actions that occur at the port.

Metrics Required by National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017

In 2018, DHS began reporting additional metrics to measure the  effectiveness of border security at land POEs in response to the National  Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 (NDAA). The NDAA  requires DHS to produce an annual report for appropriate congressional  committees, the Comptroller General, and certain other entities. This  report is to include certain metrics to measure the effectiveness of border  security between POEs, at POEs, in the maritime environment, and with  respect to aviation assets and other air and marine operations in the land  domain.

DHS submitted the fiscal year 2017 Border Security Metrics Report in  response to the NDAA requirement in May 2018. Nine of the metrics in DHS’s fiscal year 2017 report cover CBP’s efforts to detect illegal activity  at land POEs, although many of these measures group land POE data  with other types of ports. DHS reported data for 7 of these 9 metrics. In  some instances, DHS reported that it did not have the specific data  needed for a required metric and provided other available data instead.  DHS reported data in response to the following required metrics related to  land ports of entry in the fiscal year 2017 Border Security Metrics Report:  total inadmissible travelers at ports of entry (DHS does not have a  methodology to estimate total inadmissible travelers, and therefore  presented data on known inadmissible travelers),  refusal rate at ports of entry,  illicit drugs seized at ports of entry, port of entry illicit drug seizure rate, major infractions at ports of entry (DHS does not have a methodology  to estimate all major infractions, and therefore included data on known  passenger infractions),  cocaine seizures effectiveness rate at land ports of entry, and  secondary examination rate.

CBP did not leverage existing data from the COMPEX program to  estimate all major infractions in the fiscal year 2017 Border Security  Metrics Report, but began reporting these data in the fiscal year 2018  report. The NDAA requires DHS to report the number of infractions  related to travelers and cargo committed by major violators who are  interdicted by OFO at ports of entry and the estimated number of such  infractions committed by major violators who are not so interdicted. In  the fiscal year 2017 DHS Border Security Metrics Report, DHS reported  the number of known major infractions at ports of entry. DHS also  reported that they did not have a methodology to estimate the number of  infractions among those who are not interdicted. However, CBP estimates  the number of undetected major infractions through the COMPEX  program. CBP officials stated there was likely a miscommunication within  CBP that led to the DHS Office of Immigration Statistics—the DHS office  that compiled the Border Security Metrics Report— not using COMPEX  data to report the estimated number of major infractions in the 2017  Border Security Metrics Report. In addition, the DHS Office of Immigration  Statistics was not aware that CBP’s COMPEX was applicable for  purposes of reporting this metric. As a result of our review, DHS included  an estimate of the number of major infractions not interdicted by CBP  using data from the COMPEX program in the fiscal year 2018 Border  Security Metrics Report.

CBP Performance Measures Generally Reflect Key Attributes of Effective Measures but CBP Does Not Set an Ambitious Target for One Measure

CBP organizational and internal performance measures for detecting  illegal activity at land POEs generally reflect key attributes of effective  performance measures that we previously identified. Based on our  analysis of CBP’s organizational and internal performance measures,  these measures generally reflect the key attributes listed in table 6. For  example, CBP clearly defines its externally-reported organizational  measures and presents baselines and trends in its Organizational  Performance Measures Overview. In addition, CBP’s Organizational  Performance Measures Overview provides linkage between its externally-reported organizational measures and DHS mission. CBP performance  measures also have limited overlap with each other presenting new  information beyond what other measures provide.

Our analysis of CBP’s measures found that they focus on the commercial  and passenger-owned vehicle environments and currently provide limited  coverage of the pedestrian traveler environment. According to CBP  officials, the agency is in the process of expanding the two COMPEX  measures to include pedestrian travelers at land POEs, which would  provide greater coverage of CBP’s core program activities for detecting  illegal activity at land POEs. According to CBP officials, CBP began  collecting COMPEX data for all pedestrian POEs in 2015. CBP officials  stated they are in the process of reviewing the collected data and are  working to refine the methodology and operational issues that may impact  the reliability of the results. After CBP resolves these data issues, CBP  will begin reporting the results of COMPEX audits in the pedestrian  environment, according to CBP officials.

Our analysis of CBP’s measures also found that CBP generally sets  ambitious but realistic targets for its organizational and internal  performance measures. However, CBP’s target for the land border  interception rate is lower than the actual reported rate for fiscal years  2015 through 2018.

We previously identified critical success factors for goal-setting and  performance measurement efforts. Creating ambitious but realistic and  measurable “stretch” goals based on current performance levels, among  other things, supports the organization in achieving performance  improvements. In addition, the Office of Management and Budget  Circular A-11 states that agencies are expected to set ambitious goals to  push them to achieve significant performance improvements beyond  current levels.

OFO officials stated they set the target for the land border interception  rate following methodological changes OFO implemented in the  COMPEX program in 2015. However since that time, OFO officials in the  Strategic Transformation Office—the office that reviews and provides  input into targets for CBP’s organizational performance measures—stated  they have not reviewed this target because it is an internal measure and  they do not review these as they would for the externally-reported  organizational measures. Nevertheless, OFO officials stated they use this  measure internally for performance management and to report results to OFO management. Because OFO sets a target for the interception rate  and uses this measure internally, a more ambitious target for the measure  would better encourage CBP to review its performance of inspection  activities that impact the measure and challenge them to identify ways of  improving performance.

Inspecting travelers and cargo seeking entry to the United States through  land POEs is critical to preventing terrorists and other inadmissible  persons, as well as nuclear materials, narcotics, and other contraband,  from entering the country. OFO has implemented processes and  deployed technology to screen and examine travelers and cargo at POEs;  however, by reviewing and updating its inspection policies in accordance  with its own established time frames, CBP could better ensure that  officers have guidance needed to consistently and properly inspect  passengers, pedestrians, and commercial vehicles. Further, while CBP  has taken steps to monitor compliance with inspection policies through  the SIP and covert operational tests, it could more fully analyze the  results. By identifying and addressing reoccurring SIP deficiencies at  individual land POEs and implementing a policy to conduct periodic  comprehensive analyses of covert test findings, CBP could be better  positioned to enhance inspections and address vulnerabilities. Lastly,  CBP has established various measures to assess the effectiveness of its  inspections; however, establishing an ambitious and realistic target for its  major violations interception rate could encourage additional  improvements in performance.

We are making the following four recommendations to CBP:  The Commissioner of CBP should review and update policies related to  land port of entry inspections in accordance with OFO guidance.  (Recommendation 1)

The Commissioner of CBP should analyze the results of the Self- Inspection Program over time and at a level necessary to identify and  address potentially reoccurring inspection deficiencies at individual ports  of entry. (Recommendation 2)

The Commissioner of CBP should implement a policy to conduct periodic  comprehensive analyses of covert test findings. (Recommendation 3)

The Commissioner of CBP should develop a new target for the land  border interception rate for passengers in privately-owned vehicles with  major violations that sets an ambitious and realistic goal based on past  performance. (Recommendation 4)

We provided a draft of this report to DHS for its review and comment.  DHS provided comments, which are reproduced in appendix I. In its  comments, DHS concurred with the four recommendations. DHS also  provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate.

With regard to the first recommendation that CBP update policies related  to land POE inspections in accordance with OFO guidance, DHS stated  that OFO has initiated a process to modernize handbooks, policy  memoranda, and directives. With regard to the second recommendation  that CBP analyze SIP results over time and at a level necessary to  identify and address potentially reoccurring deficiencies at individual  POEs, DHS stated that OFO plans to begin training on how to conduct  this analysis so it may be conducted for 2021 SIP results. With regard to  the third recommendation that CBP implement a policy to conduct  periodic comprehensive analyses of covert test findings, DHS stated that  CBP is in the process of writing a policy that will document procedures for  comprehensive reporting, including periodic reviews of corrective actions  taken to mitigate vulnerabilities. With regard to the fourth  recommendation that CBP develop a new target for the land border  interception rate, DHS stated that OFO will set a new target for fiscal year  2020 using data from the previous three fiscal years. If fully implemented,  these actions will meet the intent of our recommendations.

We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional  committees, the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security, and  other interested parties. In addition, the report is available at no charge on  the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov.

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact  me at (202) 512-8777 or gamblerr@gao.gov. Contact points for our  Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on  the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this  report are listed in appendix II.

Appendix I: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security

Appendix II: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

In addition to the contact named above, Kirk Kiester (Assistant Director),  Heather May (Analyst in Charge), Carl Barden, Michele Fejfar, Eric  Hauswirth, Susan Hsu, Richard Hung, Jeff Love, Mara McMillen, Sasan J.  “Jon” Najmi, and Jonathan Tumin made key contributions to this report.

Customs and Border Protection is responsible for keeping trade and travel flowing across U.S. borders while also intercepting terrorists, criminals, and contraband. Inspecting the millions of people and vehicles coming from Canada and Mexico is part of the job.

However, CBP's inspection policies are outdated and don't reflect new technology or threats. For example, key policies do not address how to handle the dangerous drug fentanyl. This leaves officers without guidance they need to do inspections properly and consistently.

We made 4 recommendations to improve management and oversight of inspections, including that CBP update its policies.