Nuclear Waste Cleanup: DOE Faces Project Management and Disposal Challenges with High-Level Waste at Idaho National Laboratory

Decades of defense activities at DOE's Idaho National Laboratory produced two forms of waste that EM has managed as HLW: liquid SBW and granular calcine waste. Under an agreement with the state, DOE must treat the waste to prepare it for removal from Idaho by 2035. Construction on the IWTU, EM's facility to treat such waste, was completed in 2012, but initial testing of the SBW treatment process revealed design problems. EM has since been working to reengineer the IWTU. Total project construction and reengineering expenditures have reached nearly $1 billion as of February 2019.

GAO was asked to review EM's efforts to treat and dispose of the SBW and calcine waste. This report examines (1) the extent to which EM's management of the IWTU follows selected project management best practices; (2) challenges EM faces in disposing of the SBW; and (3) challenges EM faces in treating and disposing of the calcine waste.

GAO reviewed agency documents and IWTU project data from March 2017 through February 2018, analyzed EM project management efforts against selected project management best practices for cost and schedule, and interviewed DOE officials.

The Department of Energy's (DOE) Office of Environmental Management (EM) has not fully followed selected project management best practices in managing the reengineering of the Integrated Waste Treatment Unit (IWTU), shown in the figure, to treat 900,000 gallons of liquid sodium-bearing waste (SBW) that must be solidified for disposal. EM's cost and schedule estimates for IWTU reengineering did not fully meet selected best practices for cost (i.e., did not account for all costs) and schedule estimates (e.g., did not have a valid critical path). For example, EM did not follow best practices for a comprehensive cost estimate because EM did not include both government and contractor costs over the entire project. As of February 2019, EM has experienced approximately $64 million in added costs and a more than 1-year delay in IWTU reengineering. Without fully following best practices for cost and schedule estimates, EM is at risk of future cost overruns and delays in meeting its target disposal milestones.

Based on GAO's review of EM documents, EM faces challenges with its plans for SBW disposal at its preferred disposal site, the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP), an underground repository for waste contaminated by nuclear elements, near Carlsbad, New Mexico. These challenges include a statutory prohibition on the disposal of high-level waste (HLW) at WIPP. Further, EM does not have a strategy or timeline to address these challenges or to identify an alternative disposal pathway. Without such a strategy or timeline, EM risks not meeting its commitments with Idaho to prepare the SBW for removal from the state by 2035.

EM faces challenges implementing its selected technology to further treat 1.2 million gallons of granular calcine waste and selecting a potential waste disposal pathway. For example, DOE has identified challenges with retrofitting the IWTU for calcine waste treatment. As a result, EM is deferring further development of its plans to treat the calcine waste. EM officials said that the agency is making progress toward calcine waste disposal by testing options for removing the waste from its storage bins, a precursor to treating or packaging the waste for disposal. However, EM does not have a strategy or timeline for determining its next steps for the treatment and disposal of calcine waste. Such a strategy could help EM in seeking alternatives to its selected treatment technology and provide assurance that it will meet its commitments with Idaho for removing calcine waste from the state by the end of 2035.

GAO is making five recommendations, including that DOE develop a strategy for the disposal of the waste. DOE generally agreed with all of these recommendations.

During the Cold War era, the U.S. government conducted a wide range of  nuclear energy research and defense activities at the Department of  Energy’s (DOE) Idaho National Laboratory (INL) near Idaho Falls. Since  the early 1990s, the state of Idaho has raised concerns about the  potential for legacy waste from these activities to contaminate the Eastern  Snake River Plain Aquifer, which is situated beneath the INL site. Two  types of waste were of principal concern: (1) 900,000 gallons of sodium- bearing waste (SBW), a liquid waste that contains large quantities of  sodium and other nitrates, and (2) 1.2 million gallons of calcine waste, a  highly radioactive dried waste. In a 1995 court-approved agreement  between DOE and the state of Idaho (1995 settlement agreement), DOE  agreed to treat the SBW to a solid form by December 31, 2012, and treat  the SBW and the calcine waste so that it is ready for disposal outside of  the state by a target date of 2035. However, in the decades since DOE  signed this and other agreements with the state of Idaho, DOE continues  to struggle to meet the 2012 milestone.

The Idaho Department of Environmental Quality monitors DOE’s  compliance with this and other agreements regarding cleanup milestones  at INL. Within DOE, the Office of Environmental Management (EM), as  part of its Idaho Cleanup Project, oversees the cleanup of radioactive and  hazardous waste at INL, including SBW and calcine waste. EM manages  both of these wastes as high-level waste (HLW) that also contains  hazardous chemicals, which is referred to as mixed HLW. In 2005, EM  contracted for the design and construction of a facility known as the  Integrated Waste Treatment Unit (IWTU) to treat the SBW and, following  significant facility modifications, to treat the calcine waste for disposal.  EM stated in a 2005 Federal Register notice that its preferred disposal  site for the solidified SBW is DOE’s Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP),  the nation’s repository for defense-related transuranic waste located near  Carlsbad, New Mexico. EM also stated in a 2002 environmental impact  statement that it plans to dispose of the calcine waste in a geologic  repository once the waste has been treated to meet standards for land  disposal.

EM expended $571 million from December 2006 through April 2012 to  develop and construct the IWTU to treat the SBW, at which point the  agency declared construction complete and transitioned the management  of the IWTU from a capital asset project to an operations activity.  However, during system testing of the facility in June 2012, the IWTU  experienced a malfunction that damaged equipment and revealed  problems with the facility’s design and inadequate oversight and  management systems, according to DOE and contractor reports. As a  result, as of June 2019, EM had not started IWTU operations to treat  waste as planned. The DOE Office of Inspector General in 2016 found  that significant lapses in DOE’s project management contributed to  problems with the facility.

Since 2012, EM has been attempting to prepare the IWTU to treat the  SBW to meet its commitments to the state of Idaho. In 2016, EM awarded  its multiyear contract for the Idaho Cleanup Project to Fluor Idaho, LLC.  As part of the contract, EM adopted a four-phased approach that Fluor  Idaho proposed called the IWTU Resolution of Technical Issues Project  (the IWTU reengineering project). The four phases are (1) identifying  problems, (2) implementing changes, (3) confirming fixes through testing,  and (4) conducting performance testing using a small amount of  radioactive waste. Under this approach, the cost and schedule of each  phase were to be determined based on the results of the previous phase,  according to EM officials with the Idaho Cleanup Project.

From April 2012 through February 2019, EM expended $416 million  toward getting the facility to begin treating waste as planned. As of March  2019, the project was in phase two, and EM officials with the Idaho  Cleanup Project estimated that phase three may begin in summer 2019,  and phase four in early 2020. Through February 2019, construction and  operations expenditures for the IWTU have reached nearly $1 billion.  Further, because EM missed a deadline to initiate treatment of the SBW  in the IWTU and deadlines in the 1995 settlement agreement, DOE is  prohibited from shipping spent nuclear fuel to INL and is required to pay  the state of Idaho financial penalties that have reached $6,000 per day.  Through June 2019, DOE had accrued financial penalties of $6.2  million, and these penalties will continue to accrue until DOE initiates  waste treatment in the IWTU.

We have previously reported that EM faces substantial future cleanup  costs and has decades of additional work remaining at contaminated  DOE sites, such as at INL. DOE’s total environmental liability grew to  $494 billion in fiscal year 2018 and represents the largest share of the  federal government’s environmental liability (86 percent). Because of  substantial and increasing estimated cleanup costs like this, we have  included the federal government’s environmental liability on our list of  agencies and program areas that are at high risk of fraud, waste, abuse,  and mismanagement or that are most in need of transformation.  Further, we have also previously found problems with EM’s management  of capital asset projects and operations activities. DOE’s management  of projects and contracts has been on our high-risk list since 1990  because DOE’s record of inadequate project management and oversight  of contractors has left the department vulnerable to fraud, waste, abuse,  and mismanagement. In our February 2019 high-risk report, we note that  while DOE has made some progress toward addressing its challenges  with contract and project management, EM needs to take action to  understand the root causes of its challenges and incorporate program  and project management best practices into its policies.

You asked us to review EM’s efforts to treat and dispose of the SBW and  calcine waste at INL. This report examines (1) the extent to which EM’s  management of the IWTU reengineering project follows selected project  management best practices; (2) the challenges, if any, EM faces in the  disposal of the SBW; and (3) the challenges, if any, EM faces in the  treatment and disposal of the calcine waste.

To address all three objectives, we visited INL in December 2017 to  obtain documentation and interview officials from EM, which exercises its  responsibility for the hazardous waste cleanup at INL through its Idaho  Cleanup Project. We also interviewed representatives at INL from Fluor  Idaho, LLC, EM’s current contractor for the cleanup of both the SBW and  calcine waste at the site. Further, we visited Hazen Research, Inc., a  subcontractor to Fluor Idaho, to observe pilot testing facilities for the  IWTU reengineering project and discuss the status of the project with an  EM Idaho Cleanup Project official and representatives from Hazen  Research, Inc., and Fluor Idaho.

To assess the extent to which EM’s management of the IWTU  reengineering project follows selected project management best  practices, we selected project management best practices related to  developing project cost and schedule estimates and project monitoring,  such as through the use of an earned value management (EVM) system  and independent reviews. We selected these best practices because  they have been identified as being central to DOE’s management of  projects from our previous work as well as included in the Project  Management Institute’s A Guide to the Project Management Body of  Knowledge—Sixth Edition. To assess the IWTU reengineering project’s  cost estimate, we compared EM’s estimates for phases one and two of  the reengineering project to best practices from GAO’s Cost Estimating  and Assessment Guide (cost guide), focusing on the comprehensiveness  characteristic. To assess the IWTU reengineering project’s schedule  estimate, we compared EM’s March 2018 integrated master schedule for  the project to best practices from GAO’s Schedule Assessment Guide  (schedule guide), focusing on the well-constructed and comprehensive  characteristics. To assess EM’s monitoring of the project, we used our cost guide to assess data from EM’s EVM system for the IWTU  reengineering project from March 2017 through February 2018, which  included phases one and two of the project. Lastly, to assess the extent  to which DOE has conducted independent reviews of the IWTU  reengineering project, we reviewed DOE’s policy related to reviews of  projects with commissioning or start-up risks and documentation that  EM’s Idaho Cleanup Project prepared for these reviews.

To examine challenges EM faces in the disposal of the SBW, we  reviewed federal laws, regulations, and DOE’s order and manual for  radioactive waste management. We also reviewed documentation  related to EM’s plans for the disposal of the SBW, such as environmental  impact statements. We interviewed DOE officials from its Office of the  General Counsel, EM’s Office of Regulatory Compliance, EM’s Office of  Nuclear Materials, EM’s Office of Waste and Materials Management, and  EM’s Idaho Cleanup Project. We also conducted interviews with officials  from Idaho’s Department of Environmental Quality and New Mexico’s  Environment Department, as well as representatives from two  environmental advocacy groups, to obtain their perspectives on the  challenges facing EM’s SBW disposal efforts.

To examine challenges EM faces in the treatment and disposal of the  calcine waste, we reviewed laws, regulations, and DOE documents,  including a 2016 analysis of alternatives report on calcine waste  treatment and disposal. We also interviewed officials from EM’s Idaho  Cleanup Project and Office of Nuclear Materials, contractor  representatives from Fluor Idaho, and officials from the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) responsible for implementing the Resource  Conservation and Recovery Act, as amended (RCRA). Additional  details on our objectives, scope, and methodology can be found in  appendix I.

We conducted this performance audit from September 2017 to  September 2019 in accordance with generally accepted government  auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the  audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable  basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We  believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.

This section provides an overview of (1) the legal framework governing  mixed HLW, (2) the status of EM’s IWTU reengineering project, (3) EM’s  requirements for capital asset projects and operations activities, (4)  DOE’s policy for the review of projects with start-up risks, and (5) our best  practices for assessing cost and schedule estimates.

The treatment and disposal of mixed HLW at INL is governed by a  number of federal laws that define the roles of federal agencies and  states in managing mixed HLW, as well as cleanup agreements among  DOE, the state of Idaho, and other parties. DOE primarily regulates  radioactive components of HLW under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as  amended, and the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, as amended.  These acts define HLW as (1) the highly radioactive waste material  resulting from the reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel, including liquid  waste produced directly in reprocessing and any solid material derived  from such liquid waste that contains fission products in sufficient  concentrations, and (2) other highly radioactive material that the Nuclear  Regulatory Commission determines by rule, consistent with existing law,  requires permanent isolation. DOE considers calcine waste HLW  because it is solidified liquid waste produced during the reprocessing of  spent nuclear fuel. EM manages the SBW as mixed HLW because,  according to reports from DOE and National Academies,  (1) the SBW  was produced in the later stages of spent nuclear fuel reprocessing, (2)  the tanks in which the SBW is stored previously held HLW, (3) the SBW is  stored in a location at INL where waste is managed as HLW, and (4) the  waste contains hazardous chemicals subject to RCRA and EPA’s  implementing regulations or authorized state programs that operate in lieu  of the federal program. HLW must be disposed of in a geologic repository  unless the Nuclear Regulatory Commission approves an alternative  disposal site.

DOE Order 435.1 and Manual 435.1-1 describe the department’s policy  and requirements for managing DOE’s radioactive waste, including HLW,  to ensure that it is managed in a manner that is protective of worker and  public health and safety and the environment. Manual 435.1-1 also  established processes to determine whether waste resulting from  reprocessing spent nuclear fuel can be managed as transuranic waste or  low-level waste if certain criteria are met, which is referred to as a  determination that the waste is incidental to reprocessing. According to  the manual, HLW is waste incidental to reprocessing if, among other  things, the waste has been processed, or will be processed, to remove  key radionuclides to the maximum extent technically and economically  practicable.

Hazardous components of mixed HLW are regulated by EPA or  authorized states under RCRA. EPA’s regulations require hazardous  waste to meet certain treatment standards before land disposal of the  waste unless a variance is granted. The regulations specify that the  treatment standard (i.e., the required method for treatment) for Idaho’s  mixed HLW is vitrification—the immobilization of waste in glass. Where  EPA has authorized states to implement hazardous waste management  programs, those state programs operate instead of the federal program.  EPA, under RCRA, has authorized the state of Idaho to administer its  own hazardous waste management program. EPA has also authorized  New Mexico to administer its own hazardous waste management  program. Pursuant to such authorization, New Mexico’s Environment  Department issues the permit for hazardous waste storage and disposal  at WIPP under the New Mexico Hazardous Waste Act.

As of March 2019, EM’s IWTU reengineering project was in phase two of  the four-phased approach to get the facility operational, according to EM  Idaho Cleanup Project officials. According to project reports, phase one  focused on identifying fixes to resolve problems with the facility’s  equipment and waste treatment process, for example, by performing  engineering analyses and chemistry studies. Phase two has focused on  implementing these fixes, for example, by modifying a piece of equipment  that separates solidified waste before it is moved to storage canisters,  according to the contractor’s project plan. Figure 1 summarizes the four- phased approach for the IWTU reengineering project.

According to EM documents, as of February 2019 total expenditures on  phases one and two were approximately $150 million, about $64 million  more than original costs estimated for those two phases combined, and  the project was over 1 year behind schedule. Phase two has taken longer  and cost more than initially estimated because of additional problems and  required modifications to the facility as the work has progressed,  according to EM Idaho Cleanup Project officials. Appendix II provides  information on the actual costs of phases one and two compared to  estimated costs. As previously noted, EM officials with the Idaho Cleanup  Project estimated in March 2019 that phase three may begin in summer  2019. Further, these officials stated that phase three will involve a 6- month outage to continue implementing changes to the facility prior to the  start of a 60-day performance test using a simulated waste form. EM  Idaho Cleanup Project officials stated that phase four could begin in early  2020 and that EM and Fluor Idaho had yet to determine whether an  outage would need to occur before starting testing with a small amount of  the SBW.

EM’s Requirements for Capital Asset Projects and Operations Activities

EM divides its cleanup work into capital asset projects and operations  activities, two types of activities governed by different applicable project  management policies:

Capital asset projects. DOE Order 413.3B governs EM’s program  and project management activities for the acquisition of capital assets,  with the stated goal of delivering fully capable projects within the  planned cost, schedule, and performance baseline. The order  establishes five critical decision points of project development that  each end with a major approval milestone that cover the life of a  project. The order specifies requirements that must be met, including  developing and managing project cost and schedule estimates to  move a project past each critical decision milestone. EM capital asset  projects include construction projects and cleanup projects, such as  soil and water remediation and facility decommissioning and  demolition.

Operations activities. Operations activities are recurring facility or  environmental operations, as well as activities that are project-like,  with defined start and end dates, according to EM policy. EM  operations activities include operating waste processing facilities and  the stabilization, packaging, transportation, and disposition of nuclear  waste. EM manages operations activities based on requirements  listed in a cleanup policy that it issued in July 2017. In February  2019, we found that EM cleanup site managers have discretion in how  to classify cleanup work because DOE and EM have not established  requirements on what work should be managed as an operations  activity under EM’s cleanup policy or as a capital asset project under  DOE Order 413.3B. Further, we found that operations activities have  less stringent management requirements than capital asset projects.  We recommended that EM establish requirements for classifying work  as an operations activity and revise its cleanup policy to follow  program and project management leading practices. DOE generally  agreed with our recommendations.

Beginning in January 2005, EM managed the development and  construction of the IWTU facility as a capital asset project. Once EM  determined that construction on the facility was complete in April 2012,  the project exited the capital asset oversight process established in DOE  Order 413.3B and has since been managed as an operations activity,  according to EM Idaho Cleanup Project officials. DOE officials also told us  that the IWTU reengineering project has been managed as an operations  activity because the facility has been constructed and is now in a period  of maintenance and repair. Figure 2 shows a picture of the exterior of  the IWTU facility.

DOE’s Policy for the Monitoring of Projects with Start-up Risks

In August 2016, DOE’s Deputy Secretary of Energy issued a  memorandum establishing a new oversight requirement for selected  projects for which an extended period of transition to operations is likely— the phase after construction is complete but before full operational  capability is attained—called the operational release milestone.  According to the memorandum, DOE created the operational release  milestone in the department’s project life cycle to provide additional  oversight after the completion of the project under DOE’s Order 413.3B.  DOE officials from the Office of Project Management stated that the  operational release milestone was largely created in response to EM’s  experience with the IWTU facility not operating as expected. Under these  new requirements, program offices are to provide DOE’s Project  Management Risk Committee (PMRC) with regular updates on selected  projects until full operational capability of each facility is attained.  Specifically, program offices are required to (1) develop and execute a  plan that describes how the program will reach operational capability,  which is referred to as an operational release plan, and (2) provide  progress updates to the PMRC on the project, as described below.

Operational release plan. Officials from DOE’s Office of Project  Management—which serves as the secretariat for the PMRC—stated  that the purpose of the operational release plan is for the program  office to describe what steps are required for the project to reach its  operational capability. According to EM’s guidance, the operational  release plan should present the key processes, activities,  interrelationships, risks, management and oversight, decision  milestones and approvals, and overall schedule to achieve  operational release.

Progress updates. According to the memorandum and the PMRC’s  standard operating procedures, program offices are to provide the  PMRC with quarterly progress updates on selected projects, including  lessons learned, until full operational capability is attained.

GAO’s Best Practices for Developing Cost and Schedule Estimates

The GAO’s cost guide and schedule guide compiled best practices  corresponding to the characteristics of high-quality and reliable cost and  schedule estimates. According to the cost guide, a high-quality, reliable  cost estimate has four characteristics: comprehensive, well-documented,  accurate, and credible. A comprehensive cost estimate has enough detail  to ensure that cost elements are neither omitted nor double-counted. If a  cost estimate is not comprehensive (that is, complete), then it cannot fully  meet the other characteristics (i.e., well-documented, accurate, or  credible). In addition, according to the schedule guide, a high-quality,  reliable schedule has four characteristics: comprehensive, well- constructed, controlled, and credible. A comprehensive schedule  captures all government and contractor activities necessary to accomplish  a project’s objectives, and a well-constructed schedule sequences all  activities using the most straightforward logic possible. If a schedule is not  comprehensive, with all activities accounted for, it is uncertain whether all  activities are scheduled in the correct order, resources are properly  allocated, missing activities will appear on the critical path, or a schedule  risk analysis can account for all risk. If a schedule is not well-constructed,  it will not be able to properly calculate dates and predict changes in the  future, among other things.

EM Has Not Fully Followed Selected Best Practices for Cost and Schedule Estimates, and Unreliable Data May Limit EM’s Ability to Measure Performance

EM has not fully followed selected project management best practices for  cost and schedule estimates for the IWTU reengineering project. EM  generally followed best practices for a reliable EVM system to measure  the performance of the reengineering project. However, in analyzing  IWTU reengineering project data from March 2017 through February  2018, we found that the system is producing unreliable data, which may  limit EM’s ability to measure the project’s performance. Further, EM has  taken some steps toward meeting requirements under DOE’s process for  monitoring projects with start-up risks.

EM Has Not Fully Followed Selected Best Practices for Cost and Schedule Estimates for the IWTU Reengineering Project

EM has not fully followed (i.e., has partially met) selected best practices in  developing the cost and schedule estimates we reviewed for phases one  and two of the IWTU reengineering project and future planned IWTU  operations. We made the following observations based on our analysis  of these cost estimating documents and a March 2018 project schedule:

Comprehensive cost estimate (partially met): EM partially met best  practices for a comprehensive cost estimate. According to our cost  guide, a comprehensive cost estimate should reflect the project’s  technical requirements and current schedule and account for all  possible costs. While the cost estimate was based on documented  technical information, it was not based on a standardized work  breakdown structure. Without a standard, product-oriented work  breakdown structure to facilitate the tracking of resource allocations  and expenditures, EM may not be able to reliably estimate the cost of  future similar programs. While assumptions are listed in EM’s  documents describing the cost estimates, no document discusses  whether the assumptions came from inputs from technical subject  matter experts or whether the assumptions are associated with  specific risks. Since assumptions are best guesses, best practices  state that the risk associated with any of these assumptions changing  need to be identified and assessed.

Further, the IWTU reengineering project’s cost estimate was not  complete because it did not account for all possible costs. According  to our cost guide, a life cycle cost estimate provides an exhaustive  and structured accounting of all resources and associated cost  elements required to develop, produce, deploy, and sustain a  particular program. The project’s cost estimate did not reflect all life  cycle costs, in part because estimates for phases three and four of the  project had not been developed at the time of our review. Best  practices state that all costs be included in an estimate, even in early  stages, such as at a rough order of magnitude. EM officials from the  Idaho Cleanup Project said that a cost estimate was not developed for  the total cost of the IWTU reengineering project because of the  approach for negotiating the cost and schedule baseline prior to the  start of each phase. Without developing a cost estimate for the IWTU  reengineering project that is comprehensive (e.g., accounts for all  possible costs), EM will not have reasonable assurance that it can  successfully plan program resource requirements.

Well-constructed schedule estimate (partially met): EM partially  met best practices for a well-constructed schedule. According to our  schedule guide, a well-constructed schedule includes activities that  are logically sequenced; a valid critical path; and a reasonable  amount of total float, meaning an accurate reflection of the schedule’s  flexibility. EM’s March 2018 schedule had minimal sequencing  issues and a continuous critical path, with the exception of an external  dependency, and the critical path was free of lags and constraints.  However, there were long duration activities on the critical path that  should be reevaluated to determine if they can be broken into more  manageable pieces. Without a valid critical path, management cannot  focus on activities that will detrimentally affect the key program  milestones and deliveries if they slip. Additionally, the schedule  estimate included unreasonably large values of positive and negative  float. According to best practices, a schedule should identify  reasonable values of float so that the schedule’s flexibility can be  determined to help accommodate for delays. EM officials from the  Idaho Cleanup Project explained that the amount of total float was a  result of the methods they used to structure the logic of the schedule  estimate, which according to our best practices may have caused the  schedule to be overly optimistic. According to scheduling best  practices, without accurate values of total float, the schedule cannot  be used to identify activities that could be permitted to slip and thus  release and reallocate resources to activities that require more  resources to be completed on time. Inaccurate values of total float  also falsely depict true program status, which could lead to decisions  that may jeopardize the program. In addition, the March 2018  schedule contained 14 activities with large amounts of negative float,  meaning that these activities were behind schedule. Without fully  developing a well-constructed schedule estimate for the IWTU  reengineering project, EM will not have reasonable assurance that it  can successfully achieve its plans to reengineer the IWTU and begin  treatment of the SBW without further delays.

Comprehensive schedule estimate (substantially met): EM  substantially met best practices for a comprehensive schedule.  According to our schedule guide, a comprehensive schedule includes  all activities for both the government and its contractors to accomplish  their objective, assigns resources (e.g., labor and materials) to all  activities, and establishes how long each activity will take. EM’s March  2018 schedule substantially captured all activities, but it may not have  been planned to the level of detail for the work necessary to  accomplish a program’s objectives as defined in the program’s work  breakdown structure. For example, the schedule had activities that  were described as level of effort but were not assigned the level of  effort activity type. Level of effort activities represent effort that has no  measurable output and, according to best practices, should be clearly  marked so they do not interfere with the critical path. Further, the  schedule substantially met the best practice of assigning resources to  all activities. For example, the schedule assigned resources to  specific materials and equipment as well as to travel, training, and  labor.

Appendix II contains the full results of our analysis of selected best  practices for the cost and schedule of the IWTU reengineering project.

As previously noted, EM is managing the IWTU reengineering project as  an operations activity. We reported in February 2019 that EM manages  operations activities using less stringent requirements than those used for  capital asset projects, posing cost and schedule risks. For example,  under EM’s 2017 cleanup policy, there is no requirement for operations  activities to follow best practices for cost estimates developed during  contract execution. We recommended that EM review and revise its 2017  cleanup policy to include project management leading practices related to  scope, cost, schedule performance, and independent reviews. DOE  concurred with our recommendation and stated that EM was already in  the process of reviewing its policy for necessary updates, revisions, and  modifications, and that EM would consider our recommendation, as  appropriate, during this process.

EM officials with the Idaho Cleanup Project acknowledged that they do  not have an estimate for the total cost or a completion date for the IWTU  reengineering project or a schedule for when waste treatment operations  will begin and be completed. An EM Idaho Cleanup Project official told us  that Fluor Idaho submitted cost and schedule estimates for phases three  and four of the reengineering project in January 2019 and that EM  requested an independent cost estimate for this work from the Defense  Contract Audit Agency, with contract negotiations between EM and Fluor  Idaho for these phases estimated to begin in spring 2019. In addition,  EM officials from the Idaho Cleanup Project acknowledged that a  schedule for waste treatment operations at the project has not been  developed. Further, these officials noted that design modifications to the  IWTU are expected to reduce its operating capability, lengthening the  time needed to treat the SBW. As a result, EM and Fluor Idaho plan to  renegotiate the cost of their contract related to the treatment of the waste  in the project, according to EM Idaho Cleanup Project officials.  Specifically, because of the modifications to the project, the rate at which  the SBW is treated will be slower than initially estimated, according to EM  officials from the Idaho Cleanup Project. Treatment of all 900,000 gallons  of the SBW was originally estimated to be completed in 10 months, but  agency officials now estimate that treatment may take from 3 to 7 years— as much as eight times longer than originally planned. As previously  noted, EM has already experienced approximately $64 million in added  costs and, as of February 2019, a delay of over 1 year. Without fully  following best practices for a comprehensive cost estimate and well- constructed schedule estimate for SBW waste treatment operations, EM  cannot be assured that it has reliable cost and schedule estimates for  decision-making, placing it at risk of continued cost overruns and delays  in achieving its plans to reengineer the IWTU and begin treatment of the  SBW.

EM Generally Followed Best Practices for Measuring Project Performance and Has Taken Some Steps toward Meeting Requirements for Monitoring the IWTU Reengineering Project

EM’s EVM System for the IWTU Reengineering Project Generally Followed Best Practices, but Unreliable Data May Limit EM’s Ability to Measure Performance

We analyzed IWTU reengineering project data for March 2017 through  February 2018 from EM’s EVM system and found that while EM has  followed (i.e., fully met or substantially met) some best practices for a  reliable EVM system, the system is producing unreliable data. These  unreliable data may limit EM’s ability to measure the project’s  performance. EVM is a management tool used to measure the value of  work accomplished in a given period and compare it with the planned  value of work scheduled for the same period and with the actual cost of  the work accomplished. EVM data can alert project managers to potential  problems sooner than expenditures alone can, and EVM’s use as a  management tool is considered a best practice for conducting cost and  schedule performance analysis for projects, according to our cost guide.  EM requires the use of an EVM system under its contract with Fluor Idaho  for the Idaho Cleanup Project.

Overall, we found that EM followed best practices to ensure that its EVM  data for the IWTU reengineering project were (1) comprehensive and (2)  used by leadership for decision-making. However, EM did not follow (i.e.,  partially met) best practices to ensure that the data resulting from the  EVM system are reliable. Specifically:

EM substantially met best practices for a comprehensive EVM  system by, for example, requiring the contractor’s EVM system to  comply with the guidelines established by the Earned Value  Management Systems EIA-748-D Intent Guide; EM conducted a  compliance review of Fluor Idaho’s EVM system in March 2017 and  found some areas in need of improvement. In addition, EM has an  EVM surveillance system in place under its contract with Fluor Idaho,  and EM officials from the Idaho Cleanup Project stated that they  review data from the EVM system each month.

EM substantially met best practices ensuring that leadership uses  the EVM data for decision-making. For example, Fluor Idaho updated  data in its EVM system monthly during the period we reviewed, and  EM reported issues in a monthly review briefing between EM and the  contractor, according to EM Idaho Cleanup Project officials. Agency  management also tracked the causes of cost and schedule variances  in the data. However, the monthly reports did not contain all the  information that best practices recommended. Specifically, the  performance measurement baseline was not included in the  contractor performance reports provided, so we could not determine  how the performance measurement baseline changed as the project  evolved.

EM partially met best practices ensuring that the EVM system  provides reliable data because, for instance, the system contained  numerous anomalies, leading the system to produce unreliable data.  Specifically, we found one or more anomalies present in all months of  data reviewed, such as missing or negative values. While EM was  able to explain the causes for most of these anomalies, negative  values should occur rarely, if ever, in EVM reporting because they  imply the undoing of previously scheduled or performed work.  According to best practices, all anomalies should also be identified  and the reason for each should be fully explained in EM’s monthly  EVM reports. However, EM did not document the reasons for these  anomalies in its monthly reports. EM officials from the Idaho Cleanup  Project said that most of the anomalies in the data were due to the  phase two estimate including authorized unpriced work—that is,  additional work that EM agreed to let the contractor perform without  first negotiating or independently verifying the costs. If errors in EVM  reports are not detected, then EVM data will be skewed, resulting in  bad decision-making and limiting EM’s ability to use the EVM system  to measure project performance.

Appendix III provides detailed information on EM’s performance on each  EVM best practice. An EVM system that produces unreliable data may  contribute to EM’s challenges in measuring the performance of its  operations activities. Our findings in this regard are consistent with our  prior reports examining EM’s use of EVM systems in other contracts. For  example, in February 2019 we reviewed the use of EVM systems in the  21 contracts EM uses to execute its operations activities, including Fluor  Idaho’s contract for the cleanup at INL, and found that EM has not  followed best practices to ensure that these systems (1) are  comprehensive, (2) provide reliable data, and (3) are used by EM  leadership for decision-making. We recommended that EM update its  cleanup policy to require that EVM systems be maintained and used in a  way that follows EVM best practices, such as ensuring the reliability of the  data in the system. Without following best practices for ensuring EVM  data reliability for the IWTU reengineering project’s EVM system, EM  leadership may not have access to reliable performance data with which  to make informed decisions as it manages billions of dollars’ worth of  cleanup work and provides information to Congress and other  stakeholders on the cleanup work every year.

EM Has Taken Some Steps toward Meeting Requirements for Monitoring the IWTU Reengineering Project under DOE’s Process for Projects with Start-up Risks

In 2016, DOE instituted independent review requirements to monitor  facilities with commissioning or start-up risks, and EM has taken some  steps toward meeting those requirements for the IWTU reengineering  project. As previously noted, DOE’s policy requires program offices to  (1) develop and execute an operational release plan and (2) provide  progress updates to the PMRC on the project each quarter. We made the  following observations on EM’s actions to meet these requirements for  the reengineering of the IWTU project:

EM developed an operational release plan for the IWTU project in  December 2016, which preceded EM’s developing guidance for these  plans. We found that the operational release plan included the  majority of elements that EM’s guidance later required.

EM has provided five progress update briefings to the PMRC on the  IWTU reengineering project, according to DOE documents, but these  briefings have not occurred each quarter as required by DOE’s policy.  Officials from DOE’s Office of Project Management told us that  briefings generally occur when progress has been made on a project.  EM’s guidance for operational release plans also states, with regard  to progress update briefings, that an alternate reporting schedule may  be proposed for PMRC approval. The PMRC made recommendations  in three of these five briefings. For example, the PMRC recommended  that EM revisit and review documents to ensure that the delegated  authority is clear, current, and appropriate prior to facility start-up and  the introduction of radioactive materials. According to documentation  prepared following EM’s most recent briefing to the PMRC in February  2019, the PMRC recommended an update on the project in July 2019.

EM Faces Three Main Challenges to Its Plans for SBW Disposal but Does Not Have a Strategy or a Timeline to Manage Those Challenges

Based on our review of EM documentation and plans, the agency does  not have a strategy or timeline to address its three main challenges for  disposing of the SBW or for identifying an alternative disposal pathway.  EM identified WIPP as its preferred disposal site for the SBW in a 2005  Record of Decision document, but in March 2019 EM officials told us  that a final decision on the disposal path for the SBW had not been made.  The three main challenges EM faces in its plan to dispose of the SBW at  its preferred disposal site are: (1) the permit for WIPP prohibits the SBW  from being disposed of at WIPP, (2) federal law prohibits HLW from being  disposed of at WIPP, and (3) there are existing capacity limitations to  disposal at the WIPP facility. EM has taken some steps to address these  challenges, as discussed further below.

WIPP permit’s prohibition of the disposal of certain tank waste. New  Mexico amended its permit for WIPP in 2004 to prohibit waste that has  ever been managed as HLW, including the SBW at INL, from being  disposed at WIPP unless the disposal of such waste is specifically  approved through a permit modification. In 2013, DOE and its contractor  responsible for operating and managing the facility filed a request with the  state of New Mexico to modify the WIPP permit to remove this prohibition,  which could allow the SBW to be disposed of at WIPP if EM determined  that the SBW is waste incidental to reprocessing. However, the process  was put on hold following the suspension of operations at WIPP in 2014,  according to officials from DOE’s Carlsbad Field Office and New Mexico’s  Environment Department. In April 2019, officials from New Mexico’s  Environment Department said that they anticipated holding discussions  with DOE and its contractor for the facility regarding the prohibition after  the renewal of the WIPP permit in July 2020. However, a representative  from a New Mexico environmental organization said that this proposed  modification would likely face strong public opposition. This  representative noted that previous DOE attempts to expand the types of  waste that could be disposed of at WIPP caused significant public concern in New Mexico. Further, New Mexico Environment Department  officials told us that processing permit modifications of this nature would  likely require public hearings and opportunities for input and may take as  long as 2 years or more to complete.

Federal statutory prohibition on HLW disposal at WIPP. The Waste  Isolation Pilot Plant Land Withdrawal Act prohibits disposal of HLW at  WIPP. Therefore, to enable EM to dispose of the SBW at WIPP, the  SBW would need to be classified as non-HLW, or the act would need to  be amended to remove the prohibition. DOE has a process for  determining that certain waste resulting from reprocessing spent nuclear  fuel, such as the SBW and calcine waste, could be managed as either  transuranic waste or low-level waste, which are not HLW. Under DOE  Order 435.1 and Manual 435.1-1, DOE may determine that waste is  incidental to reprocessing and therefore manage the waste as transuranic  waste or low-level waste if it meets certain criteria. EM began  developing documentation supporting a waste incidental to reprocessing  determination for the SBW in 2001. For example, in September 2001, EM  requested consultation from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, which  oversees the nuclear power industry, on a draft waste incidental to  reprocessing determination so that the SBW could be managed as  transuranic waste and disposed of at WIPP rather than in an HLW  repository.

DOE’s Authority to Determine That Certain  Waste Is Not HLW  In 2002, while litigation over the Department  of Energy’s (DOE) authority to use DOE Order  435.1 and Manual 435.1-1 was pending, DOE  sought enactment of legislation clarifying its  authority to manage portions of tank waste  that have low levels of radioactivity as low- level waste. In response, Congress enacted  section 3116 of the Ronald W. Reagan  National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal  Year 2005 in October 2004. Under section  3116, radioactive waste resulting from the  reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel is not high- level waste (HLW) if the Secretary of Energy,  in consultation with the Nuclear Regulatory  Commission, determines that it meets  specified conditions. These conditions include  that the waste does not require disposal in a  deep geologic repository and has had highly  radioactive radionuclides removed to the  maximum extent practical. However, section  3116 only applies to waste stored at DOE  sites in Idaho and South Carolina that is not  transported from those states. Therefore,  DOE cannot use section 3116 to classify the  sodium-bearing waste (SBW) as transuranic  waste for disposal as DOE’s agreements with  Idaho require the SBW to be removed from  the state.

However, DOE’s authority to use Order 435.1 and Manual 435.1-1 to  classify the SBW and other waste from reprocessing as non-HLW was  challenged in a federal lawsuit in 2001, resulting in EM suspending its  development of the waste incidental to reprocessing determination.  Following the dismissal of the lawsuit on procedural grounds, EM  restarted the internal process for developing the waste incidental to  reprocessing determination for the SBW, according to EM officials and  documents. For example, EM identified the waste incidental to  reprocessing determination for the SBW as a priority item for executive  decision-making in a 2017 EM study on mission operations. Internal  discussions about this determination continued between EM and DOE  into 2018, but the waste incidental to reprocessing determination was not  finalized, according to EM officials.

In October 2018, EM published a notice in the Federal Register seeking  public comment on its proposed interpretation of the statutory definition of  HLW, which EM officials said could help the agency make a decision  about the classification of the SBW. EM also published a supplemental  notice in June 2019 to modify the interpretation and provide additional  information to the public, such as on the role of the Nuclear Regulatory  Commission and states. Table 1 presents the statutory definition, the  proposed interpretation from the October 2018 Federal Register notice,  and the modified interpretation from the June 2019 Federal Register  notice. EM officials told us that under the new interpretation, waste  would be disposed of in accordance with its characteristics (which  determines risk) instead of solely based on the source of the waste  (which does not determine risk).

Stakeholders, including members of the public, state and local  governments, tribes, and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, expressed  a range of perspectives about EM’s proposed interpretation in public  comments. For example, some stakeholders submitted comments  expressing concern about the Nuclear Regulatory Commission being  excluded from the determination of what is HLW under the interpretation.  These comments also stated that the interpretation is contrary to federal  law and that the interpretation will elicit legal challenges. Other  stakeholders expressed support for the interpretation in comments  submitted to EM stating, for example, that the proposed interpretation  could accelerate the cleanup of tank waste at DOE sites and result in cost  savings.

According to an EM document, potential benefits of the interpretation, if  implemented, include a more risk-based approach to waste classification,  which could provide a more cost-effective and timely approach to DOE’s  cleanup mission. However, EM officials stated that it was premature to  discuss the administrative actions, such as revising orders or regulations  that would be required to implement the new interpretation. The June  2019 Federal Register notice states that DOE will consider what actions  may be needed and appropriate to update applicable DOE directives,  such as Order 435.1 and Manual 435.1-1, in light of this interpretation and  address any revisions in future actions. EM officials also told us that they  did not have a timeline for implementing the new interpretation. Further,  EM officials stated that if the HLW interpretation is implemented,  alternative disposal options could also be considered for the SBW, but  they declined to specify what those options could be.

Limitations on disposal at WIPP. Further, existing limitations in the  disposal space at WIPP could affect the disposal of the SBW at the  facility. We reported in September 2017 that DOE does not currently have  sufficient disposal space at WIPP for the waste identified in its 2016  annual inventory report—a document that tracks waste intended to be  disposed of at the facility. Specifically, DOE will need to expand the  repository to accommodate this waste as well as other potential waste,  such as the SBW, for which DOE has yet to determine if it meets all of  WIPP’s waste acceptance criteria. In March 2019, DOE officials stated  that WIPP could be expanded within the current Waste Isolation Pilot  Plant Land Withdrawal Act boundary for the site to accommodate the  current planned waste and additional waste inventories. Specifically,  DOE officials said that mining for a new disposal panel and design work  for additional disposal panels was under way, and mining of the additional  panel was scheduled to commence in 2021. Further, in September 2017  we also reported that additional potential waste beyond what is captured  in the inventory could exceed WIPP’s statutory capacity. However, in  December 2018, New Mexico’s Environment Department approved a  modification to the WIPP permit—which was requested by DOE and its  contractor that operates and manages WIPP—that will change the way  waste volume is calculated to exclude empty space inside waste packing.  According to DOE officials, this means that additional waste can be  disposed of at WIPP under the existing statutory limit. Further, DOE  officials stated that the revised counting methodology will reduce an  overstatement in the volume of record for emplaced waste by about 30  percent. However, in January 2019 three environmental organizations  filed lawsuits challenging the modification, which the court consolidated  and, in May 2019, stayed pending mediation.

EM officials said that if the office is not able to dispose of the SBW at  WIPP, its plan is to dispose of the SBW—once it is treated to a solid form  in the IWTU—with the calcine waste in an HLW geologic repository.  However, there is still no HLW disposal site in the United States. In 2008,  DOE submitted a license application to the Nuclear Regulatory  Commission for an HLW repository at Yucca Mountain, Nevada, about  100 miles northwest of Las Vegas. In 2010, however, DOE terminated its  efforts to obtain a license for the Yucca Mountain repository.

Under the 1995 settlement agreement with the state of Idaho, DOE is  required to treat the SBW so that it is ready for disposal outside of the  state by a target date of 2035. An EM official responsible for the  disposition of the SBW at INL told us that EM has not developed a  strategy, including a timeline, for addressing challenges, including the  WIPP permit prohibition, the federal law prohibition, and existing capacity  limitations, that could affect EM’s ability to meet this target date.  According to standards for internal control, federal agency management  should identify, analyze, and respond to risks related to achieving a  defined objective. Until it develops such a strategy, including a timeline,  to implement the actions required to achieve its preferred disposal  pathway, or an alternative, for the SBW, EM will not have reasonable  assurance that it can achieve its preferred plan for disposal or begin  identifying an alternative. Moreover, if EM implements its new  interpretation of HLW and uses this definition to classify the SBW as non- HLW, there is significant risk for extended litigation, which may delay to  EM’s plans to dispose of the SBW at its preferred disposal site.

Because of Technological and Disposal Path Challenges, EM Has Suspended Its Plans to Treat Calcine Waste but Has Not Formally Identified an Alternative Approach EM Is Suspending Development of Its Selected Treatment Technology for Calcine Waste Because of Technological and Disposal Path Challenges

EM faces challenges implementing its selected treatment technology for  calcine waste and faces uncertainties with a waste disposal pathway. As  a result, the agency is suspending further development of its plan to treat  calcine waste for land disposal, according to EM documents and officials.  EM Idaho Cleanup Project officials told us that the agency is continuing to  make progress toward its milestones for calcine waste disposal by  considering alternatives for processing the waste for land disposal and  conducting a pilot project to remove it from the oldest storage vessel.  However, EM does not have a strategy or timeline for determining its next  steps for the ultimate treatment and disposal of calcine waste.

Because of challenges with implementing its chosen treatment  technology as well as selecting a potential waste disposal pathway, EM is  suspending further development of its plan to treat calcine waste for land  disposal, according to EM documents and officials. In December 2009  EM identified hot isostatic pressing as its preferred treatment technology  for preparing the calcine waste for land disposal outside of Idaho. Hot  isostatic pressing is a manufacturing process that applies elevated  temperatures and pressurized gas to materials in a containment vessel,  resulting in a ceramic waste form. EM officials from the Idaho Cleanup  Project told us that while hot isostatic pressing is a technology used in  other industries, such as in industrial manufacturing, it has not been used  before to treat HLW. Further, hot isostatic pressing would require a  variance or an EPA regulation establishing a new treatment standard  prior to land disposal. According to EM Idaho Cleanup Project officials  and agency documents, EM selected hot isostatic pressing as the  treatment technology because EM’s analyses assumed it would result in  significant cost savings for disposal at Yucca Mountain compared to other  methods.

In February 2011, an independent DOE review team issued a preliminary  technology readiness assessment for using hot isostatic pressing for  calcine waste treatment as part of DOE’s process for managing capital  asset projects. The review team identified several concerns, such as  whether components of the technology would be mature enough to meet  EM’s planned milestones and challenges with EM’s decision to retrofit  and reuse the IWTU for the calcine waste treatment mission. EM officials  from the Idaho Cleanup Project said that the decision to retrofit and reuse  the IWTU for the calcine waste after treating the SBW resulted from  reluctance within DOE to build another “first-of-a-kind” treatment facility.  However, the review team’s report stated that the decision to retrofit the  facility may result in logistical and physical maintenance challenges  because of space limitations and height requirements.

Based on the results of an independent analysis of alternatives for calcine  waste disposition, published in April 2016, EM decided to suspend  developing the hot isostatic pressing technology, according to EM officials  from the Idaho Cleanup Project. DOE initiated this analysis of  alternatives in response to a new requirement from the Secretary of  Energy and because hot isostatic pressing is not a mature technology for  HLW, according to EM’s summary report for the analysis. The report  identified uncertainties and challenges with the use of hot isostatic  pressing when compared to other potential treatment options given,  including that hot isostatic pressing is significantly different than vitrification and  would require the development and acceptance of testing protocols to  validate that it produces a robust waste form, hot isostatic pressing had the second greatest estimated cost (more  than $2 billion) of the options assessed in the analysis of alternatives, hot isostatic pressing represented the highest operational safety risk  of all of the options assessed given its use of high pressures and  temperatures, and other treatment options may perform better for managing the waste  because of significant advances in technology since the selection of  hot isostatic pressing in 2009.

The independent team performing this analysis also concluded that  uncertainties regarding plans for an HLW geologic repository also affect  EM’s ability to move forward with selecting a treatment technology.  According to EM officials from the Idaho Cleanup Project and documents,  EM’s selection of hot isostatic pressing was based on assumptions  developed based on sending the waste to the Yucca Mountain disposal  facility. Specifically, an important factor in the selection of hot isostatic  pressing as the treatment technology was its ability to provide the lowest  volume of final waste, while producing a robust waste form, which would  reduce disposal costs at Yucca Mountain. As previously noted, the  licensing for developing the Yucca Mountain facility was terminated in  2010. The team performing the analysis of alternatives concluded that  because selecting an appropriate treatment technology greatly depends  on the calcine waste’s disposal path and associated waste form  performance requirements, EM should defer making a final decision on  the treatment technology until the performance objectives of the disposal  path are better defined.

EM Is Focusing on Interim Activities for Calcine Waste Treatment and Disposal but Does Not Have a Strategy, Including a Timeline, for Addressing Challenges

While further decisions regarding a treatment technology for the calcine  waste are suspended, EM officials from the Idaho Cleanup Project said  that they are taking steps to demonstrate to regulators from Idaho’s  Department of Environmental Quality that they are making progress to  prepare the calcine waste for disposal outside the state. Under DOE’s  1995 settlement agreement with Idaho, treatment of all calcine waste is to  be completed by a target date of December 31, 2035. Further, DOE is  required to meet interim milestones for the cleanup of the waste under a  site treatment plan that DOE developed for the Idaho Department of  Environmental Quality. EM officials from the Idaho Cleanup Project told  us that they planned to work with the Idaho Department of Environmental  Quality to make changes to milestones specific to calcine waste in the  site treatment plan, and Idaho Department of Environmental Quality  officials stated in December 2018 that preliminary discussions on this  topic occurred in September 2018. Further, EM Idaho Cleanup Project  officials identified actions that EM is taking at the site to study alternatives  to treatment and aspects of the disposal process.

EM officials from the Idaho Cleanup Project stated that with the  suspension of developing hot isostatic pressing, they are studying the  potential packaging of the calcine waste for disposal without additional  treatment, or “direct disposal.” The analysis of alternatives report  identified direct disposal as having significant cost savings over other  technologies. However, the team performing the analysis of  alternatives also found that this method has a high degree of  regulatory uncertainty and it is not clear whether it would be accepted  by stakeholders, such as state regulators and the public. EPA  officials told us that if EM wanted to proceed with plans for the direct  disposal of the calcine waste in a geologic repository, EM would need,  among other things, to seek a no-migration variance from EPA. A  petition for a no-migration variance must demonstrate, to a  reasonable degree of certainty, that the hazardous components would  not leak or escape once the HLW is buried underground for as long as  the waste remains hazardous. EPA officials added that there is a very  high bar for such variances; only one such request has been  approved since 1984, and it was later rescinded. In February 2019, an  EM Idaho Cleanup Project official told us that EM has met with  officials from the Idaho Department of Environmental Quality and EPA  to receive their preliminary input on this approach.

EM Idaho Cleanup Project officials said that they are focusing in the  near term on developing and testing a system to retrieve the calcine  waste from its storage vessels, called bin sets. According to EM  documents, retrieval of the calcine waste from the bin sets is a  precursor to treating or packaging the waste for disposal, and there  are several challenges to address in developing an effective retrieval  system. As a result, EM directed its contractor to conduct a project  to retrieve calcine waste from the oldest bin set and move it to a  partially empty bin set under EM’s contract for hazardous waste  cleanup at INL. The project serves to both test different forms of  technologies and also to cease use of the older bin set, which does  not have the same structural integrity as the other bin set because of  its design, according to EM officials from the Idaho Cleanup Project  and documents. The project is estimated to cost $50 million over 5  years, according to these officials. Fluor Idaho’s plan for the calcine  waste retrieval project involves developing a full-scale mock-up of the  retrieval process for testing in fiscal years 2019 and 2020, with the  commissioning and start-up of the full-scale system and transfer of the  waste to occur in fiscal year 2021. In February 2019, an EM official  told us that $6 million was obligated to the pilot project in fiscal year  2019 in part because of increased costs for the IWTU reengineering  project and cleanup of transuranic waste at INL.

Despite these efforts, EM officials from the Idaho Cleanup Project  acknowledged that the agency has no plan to issue a new Record of  Decision or amend the 2010 Record of Decision selecting the treatment  option for calcine waste. Although EM identified challenges with using hot  isostatic pressing for the treatment of the calcine waste in its technical  readiness assessment in 2011 and analysis of alternatives in 2016, an  EM official told us that the agency does not have a strategy for  determining its next steps in treating this waste for land disposal.  According to standards for internal control, federal agency management  should identify, analyze, and respond to risks related to achieving a  defined objective. Without developing a strategy, including a timeline, to identify and develop a treatment approach for the calcine waste, EM does  not have reasonable assurance that it will meet milestones for the  completion of treatment of all calcine by a target date of December 31,  2035.

EM has been working since 2005 to construct and operate the IWTU to  treat the SBW and calcine waste at INL. Despite declaring construction  complete in 2012 at a cost of $571 million, EM is still working to repair  and reengineer the IWTU following the discovery of facility problems  during testing, with expenditures surpassing $416 million. EM has made  progress in identifying the engineering problems plaguing the facility and  implementing technical changes and expects to complete the second of  the four phases of the reengineering project in mid-2019, with its next  series of system testing to begin in early 2020. However, EM has  experienced significant cost increases and schedule delays in phase two  of the IWTU project, and additional engineering and testing remains to be  completed before beginning a multiyear effort to treat the SBW. EM’s  ability to achieve the project’s estimated cost and schedule in phase two  may have been hampered because EM has not fully followed best  practices for ensuring that the cost estimate is complete and the schedule  estimate is well-constructed. By ensuring that the cost estimate for future  phases of the IWTU reengineering project and the SBW treatment  operations is comprehensive (e.g., account for all possible costs), EM will  have greater assurance that it can successfully plan program resource  requirements. Moreover, by developing a well-constructed schedule  estimate for the IWTU reengineering project and the SBW treatment  operations, EM will have greater assurance that it can successfully  achieve its plans to reengineer the IWTU and begin treatment of the SBW  without further delays. Further, while EM is using an EVM system to  measure the performance of the project and generally followed best  practices for EVM systems, the system produces unreliable data. By  following best practices for ensuring EVM data reliability for the IWTU  reengineering project’s EVM system, EM leadership will have better  access to reliable performance data as it manages billions of dollars’  worth of cleanup work and provides information to Congress and other  stakeholders on the cleanup work every year.

EM faces long-standing challenges to implementing its preferred  alternative for disposing of the treated SBW at WIPP. Key among these  challenges are provisions in federal law and the WIPP permit that prevent  EM from disposing of the SBW at WIPP. EM has taken some steps  toward addressing these challenges, such as seeking public comment on  its new interpretation of the statutory definition of HLW that according to  EM could allow the waste to be disposed of at WIPP or an alternative to  an HLW geologic repository. However, EM has no strategy or timeline for  making any changes to DOE policies and regulations that may be  required to implement its new interpretation or for making decisions  regarding disposing of the SBW. Until it develops such a strategy,  including a timeline, to implement the actions required to achieve its  preferred disposal pathway, or an alternative, for the SBW, EM will not  have reasonable assurance that it can achieve its preferred plan for  disposal or begin the process of identifying an alternative. Further, if EM  implements its new interpretation of HLW and uses this definition to  classify the SBW as non-HLW, there is significant risk for extended  litigation, which may delay EM’s plans to dispose of the SBW at its  preferred disposal site.

Moreover, EM faces challenges in completing treatment of the calcine  waste by a target date of December 31, 2035, in light of its decision to  suspend development of the selected treatment technology, hot isostatic  pressing, and the absence of an HLW geologic repository. Even though  EM is studying alternatives to using hot isostatic pressing to prepare the  calcine waste for disposal, it has not developed a strategy or a timeline  for determining its plans for treating this waste for disposal. Without  developing such a strategy, including a timeline, for the treatment and  disposal of the calcine waste to ensure that EM meets the milestone for  completing the treatment of the waste by December 31, 2035, EM does  not have reasonable assurance that it can meet its milestones.

We are making five recommendations to DOE:

The Secretary of Energy should direct the Assistant Secretary of EM  to develop cost estimates for the IWTU reengineering project and the  SBW treatment operations that meet best practices for being  comprehensive (e.g., account for all costs). (Recommendation 1)

The Secretary of Energy should direct the Assistant Secretary of EM  to develop schedule estimates for the IWTU reengineering project and  the SBW treatment operations that meet best practices for being well- constructed. (Recommendation 2)

The Secretary of Energy should direct the Assistant Secretary of EM  to follow best practices for ensuring the reliability for the IWTU  reengineering project’s EVM system. (Recommendation 3)

The Secretary of Energy should direct the Assistant Secretary of EM  to develop a strategy, including a timeline, for implementing the  actions required to achieve its preferred disposal pathway, or an  alternative, for the SBW. (Recommendation 4)

The Secretary of Energy should direct the Assistant Secretary of EM  to develop a strategy, including a timeline, to identify and develop a  treatment approach for the disposal of the calcine waste to ensure  that EM meets the milestone for completing the treatment of this  waste by the target date of December 31, 2035. (Recommendation 5)

We provided a draft of this report for review and comment to the  Secretary of Energy and the Administrator of the EPA. DOE provided  written comments on the draft report, which are presented in appendix IV.  EPA did not provide written comments. DOE and EPA both provided  technical comments that we incorporated in the report as appropriate.

DOE agreed with our recommendations related to the management of the  IWTU reengineering project, including developing cost and schedule  estimates that meet best practices and ensuring the reliability of the EVM  system for the project. Regarding the cost estimate, DOE committed to  developing cost estimates that meet best practices and stated that cost  estimates for phases three and four of the IWTU reengineering project  have been developed and reviewed by the Defense Contract Audit  Agency. For the schedule estimate, DOE stated that the schedules for  phases three and four have been developed and that the inclusion of  these phases in the schedule is in accordance with best practices for the  well-constructed characteristic. With regard to the EVM system, DOE  stated that cost and performance data will be included in the EVM system  in accordance with EVM best practices once contract negotiations are  completed, which the agency estimated would conclude by December 31,  2019.

DOE also agreed with our recommendations to develop a strategy,  including a timeline, for the disposal of the SBW and calcine waste. DOE  further stated that EM is in the process of developing a site options  analysis for INL and other EM sites to identify opportunities to complete  cleanup work through more efficient and innovative approaches over the  next decade. This analysis is expected to be completed in fiscal year  2020, according to DOE. DOE stated that EM’s HLW interpretation issued  in June 2019 could potentially open new disposal pathways for some  reprocessing waste, such as SBW and calcine, while noting that  decisions about whether and how this interpretation will apply to existing  wastes have yet to be made.

In its written comments, DOE disagreed with our recommendation to seek  clarification from Congress on DOE’s authority to classify the SBW as  other than HLW if such clarification is necessary to avoid extended  litigation. DOE stated the agency does not require additional clarification  from Congress to classify reprocessing waste as other than HLW. We are  deleting our recommendation but continue to believe that there is  significant risk for extended litigation if EM implements its new  interpretation of HLW and uses this definition to classify the SBW as non- HLW. Extended litigation may delay EM’s plans to dispose of the SBW at  its preferred disposal site.

We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional  committees, the Secretary of Energy, the Administrator of the  Environmental Protection Agency, and other interested parties. In  addition, the report is available at no charge on the GAO website at  http://www.gao.gov.

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact  me at (202) 512-3841 or trimbled@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices  of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last  page of this report. GAO staff who made significant contributions to this  report are listed in appendix V.

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

Our report examines (1) the extent to which the Department of Energy’s  (DOE) Office of Environmental Management’s (EM) management of the  Integrated Waste Treatment Unit (IWTU) reengineering project follows  selected project management best practices; (2) challenges EM faces in  the disposal of the sodium-bearing waste (SBW); and (3) challenges EM  faces in the treatment and disposal of the calcine waste. To address  these three objectives, we conducted a site visit to DOE’s Idaho National  Laboratory (INL) in December 2017. During the site visit, we obtained  documentation and interviewed officials from EM, which is responsible for  hazardous waste cleanup at INL through its Idaho Cleanup Project. We  also interviewed representatives from Fluor Idaho, LLC, which is the  private contractor that manages hazardous waste cleanup at INL for EM,  including the cleanup of the SBW and calcine waste. In addition, we  conducted a site visit to Hazen Research, Inc., a subcontractor to Fluor  Idaho, to observe pilot testing facilities for the IWTU reengineering project  and discuss the status of the project with an EM official from the Idaho  Cleanup Project and representatives from Hazen Research, Inc., and  Fluor Idaho.

To assess the extent to which EM’s management of the IWTU  reengineering project meets selected project management best practices,  we first identified areas deemed to be important to project management  based on our previous work on DOE projects and leading practices from  the Project Management Institute, which are generally recognized as  leading practices for project management. Specifically, we reviewed the  project management leading practices identified in the Project  Management Institute’s A Guide to the Project Management Body of  Knowledge—Sixth Edition. From this review, we selected project  management practices related to developing cost and schedule estimates  and conducting project monitoring through the use of earned value  management (EVM) and independent reviews. We then conducted  assessments of these best practices, as discussed below.

Cost. To determine the extent to which the cost estimate for the IWTU  reengineering project is reliable, we conducted an abridged analysis of  the IWTU reengineering project’s cost estimate, focusing on its  comprehensiveness. Typically, in analyzing a cost estimate against best  practices in GAO’s Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide (cost guide),  we examine four characteristics, each defined by multiple criteria:  credible.

For this review, we assessed the cost estimate for the IWTU  reengineering project against the comprehensive characteristic, in part  because EM officials told us that they had yet to develop a cost estimate  for the program beyond phases one and two at the time of our review.  Specifically, we reviewed the cost estimate for the operation of the IWTU  and the IWTU reengineering project, which, at the time of our review, was  only developed for phases one and two of the project. If a cost estimate is  not comprehensive (that is, complete), then it cannot fully meet the well- documented, accurate, or credible best practice characteristics. For  instance, if the cost estimate is missing some cost elements, then the  documentation will be incomplete, the estimate will be inaccurate, and the  result will not be credible because of the potential underestimating of  costs and the absence of a full risk and uncertainty analysis. See  appendix II for a summary assessment of the IWTU reengineering  project’s cost estimate compared to selected best practices.

Schedule. To assess EM’s schedule for the IWTU reengineering project,  we conducted an abridged analysis of the IWTU reengineering project’s  schedule, focusing on comprehensiveness and the degree to which it is  well-constructed. Typically, in analyzing a schedule estimate against best  practices in GAO’s Schedule Assessment Guide (schedule guide), we  examine four characteristics, each defined by multiple criteria:  controlled.

For this review, we assessed the IWTU reengineering project schedule  that EM provided in March 2018 against the well-constructed  characteristic, in part because EM officials told us that they had yet to  develop a schedule estimate for the totality of the reengineering project  because of Fluor Idaho’s phased approach. If a schedule estimate is not  well-constructed, it will not be able to properly calculate dates and predict  changes in the future. When activities are missing logic links, the  schedule will not be able to automatically transmit these delays to future  activities that depend on them. When this happens, the schedule will not  allow a sufficient understanding of the program as a whole, and users of  the schedule will not have confidence in the dates and the critical path. In  addition, we evaluated the comprehensive characteristic because it  contributed to our analysis of EM’s EVM system, as described below. See  appendix II for a summary assessment of the IWTU reengineering  project’s schedule estimate compared to selected best practices.

EVM. In addition, we analyzed EM’s use of EVM as a way to assess its  monitoring of the IWTU reengineering project’s cost and schedule. EVM  measures the value of work accomplished in a given period and  compares it with the planned value of work scheduled for the period and  with the actual cost of the work accomplished. It is an industry standard  and is considered a best practice for conducting cost and schedule  performance analysis for projects. Our EVM analysis focused on Fluor  Idaho’s EVM data for the IWTU reengineering project contained in cost  performance reports from March 2017 to February 2018 and the project  schedule that EM provided in March 2018. Specifically, we compared this  project documentation with EVM best practices as identified in our cost  guide. Our research has identified a number of best practices that are  the basis of effective EVM and should result in reliable and valid data that  can be used for making informed decisions. These best practices have  been collapsed into three high-level characteristics of a reliable EVM  system, which are establish a comprehensive EVM system, ensure that the data resulting from the EVM system are reliable, and ensure that the program management team is using EVM data for  decision-making purposes.

See appendix III for our summary assessment of the IWTU reengineering  project’s EVM data compared to best practices. EVM data are considered  reliable if the overall assessment ratings for each of the three  characteristics are substantially or fully met. If any of the characteristics  are not met, minimally met, or partially met, then the EVM data cannot be  considered reliable.

Independent reviews. To assess the extent to which DOE has  conducted independent reviews of the IWTU reengineering project, we  examined DOE and EM policies to identify requirements for conducting  reviews of operations activities. Specifically, we reviewed a 2016 DOE  memorandum that established that DOE’s Project Management Risk  Committee (PMRC) would provide independent review of selected  projects in the operational release phase, the PMRC’s standard operating  procedures, and EM’s guidance for projects in the operational release  milestone. We examined documentation from the PMRC’s reviews of the  IWTU reengineering project, including documentation that EM officials  from the Idaho Cleanup Project prepared for these reviews and  recommendations that the PMRC made to EM for the project. In addition,  we spoke with officials from DOE’s Office of Project Management, which  serves as the secretariat of the PMRC; EM’s Office of Acquisition &  Project Management; and EM’s Idaho Cleanup Project about independent  reviews of projects in the operational release phase.

To examine challenges EM faces in the disposal of the SBW, we  reviewed federal laws, regulations, and DOE policies on radioactive  waste management, including those described in DOE Order 435.1 on  radioactive waste management and its implementation manual. In  addition, we examined EM’s October 2018 and June 2019 Federal  Register notices, which provide DOE’s new interpretation of the statutory  definition of high-level radioactive waste (HLW). We also reviewed  documentation related to EM’s plans for disposing of the SBW at DOE’s  Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) in New Mexico, such as Record of  Decision documents for proposed actions that require development of  environmental impact statements, and the hazardous waste facility permit  for WIPP that the New Mexico Environment Department issued. We  interviewed DOE officials from the Office of the General Counsel; officials  from EM’s Idaho Cleanup Project and Carlsbad Field Office, which is  responsible for DOE’s oversight of WIPP; and officials from EM’s Office of  Regulatory Compliance, Office of Nuclear Materials, and Office of Waste  and Materials Management. We also interviewed officials from Idaho’s  Department of Environmental Quality and New Mexico’s Environment  Department, as well as representatives from two environmental advocacy  groups in Idaho and New Mexico, to obtain their perspectives on the  challenges facing EM’s SBW disposal efforts.

To examine challenges EM faces in the treatment and disposal of the  calcine waste, we reviewed federal laws, regulations, and documents that  DOE and EM’s contractors for the Idaho Cleanup Project prepared  related to the calcine waste cleanup mission. For example, we reviewed  documents assessing treatment and disposal alternatives for calcine  waste, including a 2016 analysis of alternatives report that EM prepared  and a 2015 contractor-prepared report assessing the feasibility of the  direct disposal of calcine waste. We interviewed officials from EM’s Idaho  Cleanup Project and Office of Nuclear Materials; EM’s Chief Engineer;  and representatives from EM’s contractor, Fluor Idaho, about plans for  treating and disposing of the calcine waste and the retrieval pilot project.  In addition, we reviewed Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)  Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, as amended (RCRA)  regulations, guidance, and documents concerning land disposal  requirements. We also interviewed officials from EPA’s Office of Land and  Emergency Management and Region 10 about EPA’s responsibilities for  implementing RCRA. Lastly, we interviewed officials from the Idaho  Department of Environmental Quality about how EM’s calcine waste  treatment and disposal efforts address milestones in the Idaho Settlement  Agreement.

We conducted this performance audit from September 2017 to  September 2019 in accordance with generally accepted government  auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the  audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable  basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We  believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.

Appendix II: Cost and Schedule Estimates Compared to Actual Costs and Schedule for the Integrated Waste Treatment Unit Reengineering Project

Table 2 describes the initial cost and schedule estimates for the four  phases of the Integrated Waste Treatment Unit reengineering project  compared to actual expenditures and schedule as of February 2019.

Table 3 details our assessment of the Office of Environmental  Management’s (EM) cost estimate for phases one and two of the  Integrated Waste Treatment Unit (IWTU) reengineering project compared  to selected best practices for cost estimating published in GAO’s Cost  Estimating and Assessment Guide (cost guide). For this review, we  assessed the cost estimate for the IWTU reengineering project against  the comprehensive characteristic, in part because EM officials told us that  they had yet to develop a cost estimate for the program beyond phases  one and two, at the time of our review of these documents. We assessed  the comprehensive characteristic for the IWTU reengineering cost  estimate because if a cost estimate is not comprehensive—that is,  complete—then it cannot fully meet the other best practice  characteristics. According to our analysis, EM’s cost estimate for the  IWTU reengineering project partially met best practices for a  comprehensive cost estimate.

Table 4 details our assessment of EM’s schedule for the IWTU  reengineering project compared to selected best practices for project  schedules published in GAO’s Schedule Assessment Guide (schedule  guide). For this review, we assessed the schedule against the well- constructed characteristic, in part because EM officials told us that they  had yet to develop a schedule for the totality of the reengineering project  because of the contractor’s phased approach. We assessed the well- constructed characteristic because, among other reasons, if a schedule is  not well-constructed, it will not be able to properly calculate dates and  predict changes in the future. In addition, we evaluated the  comprehensive characteristic as it is needed to evaluate an earned value  management system. According to our assessment, EM’s schedule for  the reengineering project partially met best practices related to the well- constructed characteristic and substantially met best practices related to  the comprehensive characteristic.

Appendix III: Assessment of EM’s EVM Data for the IWTU Reengineering Project Compared with Best Practices

Table 5 details our assessment of March 2017 to February 2018 data  from the Department of Energy’s (DOE) Office of Environmental  Management’s (EM) earned value management (EVM) system for the  Integrated Waste Treatment Unit (IWTU) reengineering project. EVM  measures the value of work accomplished in a given period and  compares it with the planned value of work scheduled for that period and  with the actual cost of work accomplished. By using the metrics derived  from these values to understand performance status and to estimate cost  and time to complete, EVM can alert program managers to potential  problems sooner than expenditures alone can. Our research has  identified a number of best practices that are the basis of effective EVM  and should result in reliable and valid EVM data that can be used for  making informed decisions. Specifically, EM followed (i.e., substantially  met) best practices to ensure that its EVM system is (1) comprehensive  and (2) used by leadership for decision-making, but did not follow (i.e.,  partially met) best practices to ensure that the data resulting from the  EVM system are reliable.

Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of Energy

In addition to the contact named above, Casey L. Brown (Assistant  Director), Emily Ryan (Analyst in Charge), Juaná Collymore, Jennifer  Echard, Richard P. Johnson, Jason Lee, Eli Lewine, Katrina Pekar- Carpenter, Karen Richey, Jeanette Soares, Sheryl Stein, Farrah M.  Stone, Paul Sturm, and Sara Sullivan made key contributions to this  report.

Decades of nuclear energy research at the Department of Energy’s Idaho National Laboratory produced two forms of high-level radioactive waste. DOE must treat all 2 million gallons of this waste and prepare it for removal from Idaho by 2035.

DOE finished an on-site treatment facility for one form of this waste in 2012, but initial testing revealed problems and a need for more work. Total project spending approached $1 billion in February. We found DOE could improve how it manages the work. DOE may also need to retrofit the facility to treat the other form of waste.

We made 5 recommendations, including ways to better manage DOE’s facility work.