Maritime Infrastructure: A Strategic Approach and Interagency Leadership Could Improve Federal Efforts in the U.S. Arctic

Arctic sea ice has diminished, lengthening the navigation season and increasing opportunities for maritime shipping. However, the U.S. Arctic lacks maritime infrastructure—such as a deep-draft port and comprehensive nautical charting—to support increased traffic. The lack of infrastructure exacerbates risks inherent to shipping in the Arctic such as vast distances and dangerous weather.

This report examines (1) how U.S. Arctic shipping trends have changed since 2009 and factors that have shaped shipping in the region, and (2) the extent to which U.S. agencies' efforts to address Arctic maritime infrastructure gaps have aligned with leading management practices. GAO collected U.S. Coast Guard traffic data from 2009 through 2019 and interviewed 20 stakeholders selected to represent a range of views. GAO also analyzed Arctic strategies, interviewed selected agencies involved with maritime infrastructure, and compared efforts to leading management practices.

Maritime shipping activity, as indicated by the number of vessels in the U.S. Arctic, generally increased from 2009 through 2019. Domestic maritime activity declined after the discontinuation of offshore oil and gas exploration activities in Alaska's Chukchi Sea in 2015. However, since 2015, international activities related to natural gas development, particularly in the Russian Arctic, have increased, according to stakeholders. Factors affecting decisions of ship operators about whether to operate in the U.S. Arctic include increased operating costs of Arctic-capable ships, environmental changes that have caused more volatile weather and ice conditions, and concerns over environmental impacts.

Agencies have taken some steps to address Arctic maritime infrastructure gaps identified by federal agencies, such as a lack of nautical charting, but federal efforts lack a current strategy and interagency leadership. Examples of agency actions include the U.S. Coast Guard developing recommended shipping routes and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration continuing to chart Arctic waters. To guide federal efforts, the White House developed a National Strategy for the Arctic Region in 2013 and established an interagency Arctic Executive Steering Committee (AESC) in 2015. However, agency officials and stakeholders noted the strategy is now outdated due to changing conditions in the Arctic. As a result, federal efforts lack a current government-wide strategy that aligns with key management practices such as identifying goals, objectives, and establishing performance measures. Moreover, U.S. Arctic interagency groups do not reflect leading collaboration practices, such as sustained leadership and inclusion of all relevant stakeholders, and the White House has not designated which entity is to lead U.S. Arctic maritime infrastructure efforts. For example, the AESC is now dormant according to agency officials and staff at the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP), which chairs the AESC. Without a current strategy and a designated interagency entity with these collaboration practices in place, agencies may miss opportunities to leverage resources and target infrastructure improvements in areas that would best mitigate risks.

GAO is making three recommendations, including that OSTP and other appropriate entities within the Executive Office of the President: develop and publish a strategy to address gaps and designate the interagency mechanism responsible for leading federal efforts. OSTP neither agreed nor disagreed but noted it is considering the need for and role of additional federal coordination. GAO stands by its recommendations.

As we have previously reported, climate change has led to widespread  effects, including warming in the Arctic that has exceeded the warming in  the rest of the world. Since 1900, the Arctic region has warmed by about  3.6 degrees Fahrenheit—double the rate of the global temperature  increase—leading to a significant decline in sea ice cover over the last  four decades. Record low levels of sea ice have made Arctic waters  navigable for longer periods of time and have increased opportunities for  shipping in the region. This change presents potential economic  opportunities as well as safety and environmental risks, particularly given  the lack of maritime infrastructure in the region. In particular, the U.S.  Arctic does not have the typical elements of a maritime transportation  system such as a deep-draft port, comprehensive waterways charting,  and robust communications infrastructure, according to the U.S.  Committee on the Marine Transportation System (CMTS), a federal  interagency coordinating committee focused on the maritime  transportation system. These infrastructure gaps exacerbate the inherent  challenges of maritime activity in the Arctic—vast distances, dangerous  weather, and extreme ice conditions—that can pose safety risks to  mariners and environmental risks to the fragile Arctic ecosystem.

Within the United States, there are a variety of stakeholders that play a  role in maritime infrastructure in the Arctic, including several federal  agencies, such as the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration  (NOAA), U.S. Coast Guard, and U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. Given the  range of federal agencies involved with the region, federal efforts require  interagency collaboration. Previous administrations have taken steps to  guide federal efforts in the Arctic, including developing a National  Strategy for the Arctic Region (National Strategy), which was issued in  2013. In addition, CMTS has issued several reports on Arctic maritime  shipping and infrastructure priorities. In 2014, we reported that CMTS was  developing a process to monitor agencies’ progress in addressing  recommended infrastructure priorities.

You asked us to review federal efforts related to Arctic maritime shipping  and infrastructure. This report examines (1) how U.S. Arctic shipping  trends have changed since 2009 and the factors that have shaped  shipping in this region, and (2) the extent to which federal agencies’  efforts to address gaps in maritime infrastructure in the U.S. Arctic aligned  with leading management practices.

In this report, the term “Arctic” refers to the entire region north of the  Arctic Circle. With regard to the “U.S. Arctic,” we use the definition set by  the International Maritime Organization (IMO), the United Nations agency  responsible for the safety and security of shipping and the prevention of  pollution by ships. The IMO set this definition, which for the U.S. Arctic is  bounded by a line at 60 degrees north that crosses the Bering Sea, as  part of its International Code for Ships Operating in Polar Waters (Polar  Code), which includes requirements for ships operating in the Arctic. This  definition differs from the one established by the Arctic Research and  Policy Act of 1984, which included all contiguous seas surrounding  Alaska. We selected the IMO definition of the U.S. Arctic in part to  exclude the Aleutian chain of islands in the southern portion of Alaska  that are located along the great circle route, the shortest path between  ports on either side of the North Pacific, and as a result receive high  volumes of commercial maritime traffic.

To describe how U.S. Arctic shipping trends have changed since 2009,  we reviewed U.S. Coast Guard annual traffic data from 2009 through  2019. In designing our review, we originally selected the decade of 2009  through 2018 for our analysis, as 2018 was the most recent year for  which data were available at that time. However, in April 2020 as we were  finalizing our report, the U.S. Coast Guard provided us with 2019 data,  which we included in order to provide the most recent information  available. These data include the annual number of vessels by vessel  type (tugs, research, etc.) and number of vessel transits through the  Bering Strait. To assess the reliability of the data, we reviewed  documentation and interviewed officials from the U.S. Coast Guard as  well as a representative from the Marine Exchange of Alaska, which  manages an Automatic Identification System vessel tracking system that  produces Arctic shipping data that is used by the U.S. Coast Guard. We  determined these data were sufficiently reliable for the purpose of  describing shipping trends. To identify and describe the factors that have  shaped U.S. Arctic shipping over the past decade, we also interviewed  or received written responses from 20 stakeholders selected to capture a  range of known interests.

To evaluate agencies’ efforts to address gaps in maritime infrastructure in  the U.S. Arctic, we reviewed relevant reports and strategies and  interviewed officials from federal agencies, CMTS, and the White House  Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP). Specifically, we  collected information on agency actions identified in CMTS reports from  2013, 2016, and 2018. We reviewed our previous work, the 2013  National Strategy and subsequent implementation plans, and agency- specific Arctic strategies. The federal agencies we interviewed were:  NOAA within the Department of Commerce (including National Weather  Service; Oceanic and Atmospheric Research; National Ocean Service;  and National Environmental Satellite, Data, and Information Service);  U.S. Coast Guard within the Department of Homeland Security (both  headquarters and District 17 in Alaska); and the Departments of  Transportation, State, Interior, and Defense (including the Office of the  Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy and Force  Development; the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations for Policy and  Posture; and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers). We selected these  agencies and entities based on their role in Arctic coordination and  strategic efforts.

To determine the extent to which federal efforts to address gaps in  maritime infrastructure in the U.S. Arctic aligned with leading  management practices, we compared collected information to the Office  of Management and Budget’s (OMB) risk management guidance and  selected key practices and characteristics of risk management, national  strategies, and interagency collaboration, based on prior work. We  selected these practices because they are important to leading complex  government-wide and interagency efforts. We focused on interagency  collaborative efforts to address maritime infrastructure in the U.S. Arctic  and did not assess interagency efforts related to other objectives, such as  research, military strategy, or international relations.

We conducted this performance audit from February 2019 to April 2020 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.

Alaska’s location makes the United States an Arctic nation. Alaska has  over 6,000 miles of coastline, and is bordered by the Beaufort, Chukchi,  and Bering Seas; the Arctic Ocean; and the Bering Strait, whose  jurisdiction is divided between the United States and Russia (see fig. 1).  According to the 2010 Census, the U.S. Arctic coastal regions are home  to about 26,000 people, including the cities of Nome, located near the  Bering Strait, and Utqiagvik (formerly Barrow), the northernmost city in  the United States. The U.S. Arctic coastal region is sparsely populated  even by the standards of Alaska, which has the lowest population density  of any state in the nation. Specifically, this region accounted for about 4  percent of Alaska’s total population of approximately 710,000 according  to the 2010 Census. Alaska is also the largest state in the nation, and— given its size, terrain, environment, and population distribution—its  transportation system is unique. Much of Alaska’s rail and highway  infrastructure is located in the south central part of the state, and many  U.S. Arctic cities and villages are accessible only by air or water.

As Arctic waterways become more accessible due to declining sea ice,  opportunities have increased to use maritime transportation to bring  natural resources to market. The U.S. Arctic remains a frontier economy;  many of its products and much of the value of commercial activities derive  from natural resources. According to an assessment of undiscovered but  technically recoverable oil and gas resources by the Bureau of Ocean  Energy Management, the outer continental shelf regions of the U.S.  Arctic’s Chukchi and Beaufort Seas contain about 24 billion barrels of oil  and about 105 trillion cubic feet of natural gas. The U.S. Arctic also  contains $1 trillion worth of minerals, such as zinc, nickel, and lead. The  extraction of these natural resources presents technical challenges and  requires large financial investments given the Arctic environment.

Although warming over the past decades has made trans-Arctic maritime  routes more accessible, Arctic sea ice extent remains seasonal, with most  shipping occurring during a narrow window extending from summer to  early fall. Arctic sea ice typically reaches its maximum extent in March  and its minimum in September each year; as a result, the shipping  season is typically from June through October. The minimum sea ice  extent in September 2019 was tied with 2007 and 2016 as the second  lowest on record since satellite observations began in 1979; the 13 lowest  extents in the satellite record have all occurred in the last 13 years. As  shown in figure 2, the September (minimum) sea ice extent in 2019 had a  much smaller coverage area than the median September extent from  1981 to 2010. This contraction of sea ice over time has increased  accessibility to the two key trans-Arctic maritime routes: the Northwest  Passage (NWP) through the Canadian archipelago, and the Northern Sea  Route (NSR) along the northern border of Russia. These two routes  enable shipments between non-Arctic destinations, such as between Asia  and Europe. However, most traffic in the U.S. Arctic is destinational,  meaning it transports goods to and from the U.S. Arctic. Such traffic  includes transporting natural resources extracted from the U.S. Arctic to  the global marketplace and shipping supplies to U.S. Arctic communities.

Maritime shipping in the U.S. Arctic involves challenges, given that the  region lacks many of the typical elements of a maritime transportation  system. See table 1 for examples of the types of maritime infrastructure  gaps that CMTS and federal agencies have reported in the U.S. Arctic.

Many federal agencies are involved with, and have a role in, U.S. Arctic  maritime shipping and infrastructure (see table 2). Although these  agencies’ missions are not specifically tied to the U.S. Arctic, they extend  to the U.S. Arctic like any other geographic region of the country.

Other state, local, and international organizations also play a role. For  example, the state of Alaska’s Department of Environmental  Conservation is involved with oil spill response. In addition, the North  Slope Borough, a municipal government that encompasses an area of  nearly 95,000 square miles along Alaska’s northern coast, has a search  and rescue department that provides airborne emergency response.  Alaska Native organizations represent communities that have inhabited  the Arctic region for thousands of years and have cultures that are  particularly sensitive to environmental changes, since they rely on hunting  animals such as whales, seals, and walruses. To represent local  concerns, the Arctic Waterways Safety Committee, which is comprised of  subsistence hunters and others, was created in October 2014 to develop  best practices for safe and efficient use of Arctic waterways. Alaska  Native Corporations are private entities that manage land and assets on  behalf of Alaska Natives. Lastly, international forums such as the Arctic  Council and international organizations such as the IMO also have a role  in establishing Arctic maritime policies and regulations.

For nearly 50 years the U.S. government has articulated its interest in the  Arctic through a series of strategies. For example, in 1971 a then- classified memo from National Security Council (NSC) under the Nixon  Administration called for the sound and rational development of the Arctic,  guided by the principles of minimizing adverse environmental effects,  promoting international cooperation, and protecting security interests,  including the preservation of the freedom of the seas. These same  priorities, along with promoting scientific research, were underscored by  the Reagan Administration in 1983. In January 2009, the George W.  Bush Administration issued an Arctic Region Policy, which outlined  priorities for maritime transportation in the Arctic including to facilitate  safe, secure, and reliable navigation and protect maritime commerce and  the environment. More recently, the Obama Administration issued a  National Strategy for the Arctic Region (National Strategy) in May 2013,  which identified three goals for the region: to advance U.S. security  interests, pursue responsible stewardship, and strengthen international  cooperation. Subsequent implementation plans for the National Strategy  indicated maritime shipping and infrastructure fell under all three of these stated goals. For example, “preparing for increased activity in the  maritime domain” fell under advancing U.S. security interests, “charting  the Arctic region” fell under pursuing responsible stewardship, and  “promoting waterways management” fell under strengthening international  cooperation.

As federal strategies related to the Arctic region have evolved over the  years, so have the interagency groups to implement and guide these  efforts. Interagency activity in the U.S. Arctic has historically been  coordinated through the NSC, including the 1971 and 1983 strategies. In  1984, legislation established the U.S. Arctic Research Commission as  well as the Interagency Arctic Research Policy Committee (IARPC).  More recently, to enhance coordination of national efforts in the Arctic,  particularly those related to the 2013 National Strategy, a 2015 Executive  Order established the interagency Arctic Executive Steering Committee  (AESC). AESC is chaired by the Director of the Office of Science and  Technology Policy (OSTP), which is an office within the White House that  leads interagency science and technology policy coordination efforts.  AESC also includes NSC as a member, along with 20 other federal  departments and entities. The 2016 National Strategy Implementation  Framework assigned portions of the strategy’s areas of focus to  interagency groups; specifically, NSC was assigned responsibility for  advancing national security interests, OSTP for pursuing responsible  stewardship, and the Department of State for strengthening international  cooperation.

The U.S. Committee on the Marine Transportation System (CMTS), which  was required in 2010 to coordinate the establishment of domestic  transportation policies in the Arctic to ensure safe and secure maritime  shipping, has issued several relevant reports, including a 10-year  projection of maritime activity in 2015, and a 10-year prioritization of  infrastructure needs in the U.S. Arctic in 2016—both of which were  directed by the 2014 National Strategy implementation plan.  More  recently, CMTS issued a 2018 report revisiting its 2016 near-term  recommendations for prioritizing infrastructure needs in the U.S. Arctic  and a 2019 update to its projections of Arctic maritime shipping activity  from 2020 to 2030.  These and other reports addressing maritime  infrastructure in the U.S. Arctic are listed in appendix I.

Maritime Shipping in the U.S. Arctic Generally Increased from 2009 through 2019 but Remains Limited and Was Affected by Several Factors

Maritime Shipping in the U.S. Arctic Increased from 2009 through 2019 with a Range of Vessel Types Represented

U.S. Coast Guard data indicate the number of vessels in the U.S. Arctic  increased from 2009 through 2019 (see fig. 3). The types of vessels the  U.S. Coast Guard tracks in the U.S. Arctic includes vessels conducting  marine scientific research; tugs that provide communities with supplies;  and adventurer vessels such as private yachts. U.S. Coast Guard data  also include bulk cargo vessels from the Red Dog mine, one of the largest  zinc mines in the world. The mine trucks its zinc ore to a facility on the  Chukchi Sea, where it is stored for maritime transport during the shipping  season. The U.S. Coast Guard District responsible for the U.S. Arctic  counts more types of vessels in its area of interest—such as research,  tug, and adventurer—than are typically counted for the purposes of  tracking commercial shipping.

Even at its peak, maritime shipping in the U.S. Arctic remained limited  compared to global commercial shipping, although CMTS recently  reported that the number of flag states, or countries where vessels are  registered, has increased. Specifically, the 307 vessels in the U.S. Arctic  in 2019 represented a small portion of the total number of shipping  vessels operating globally. For comparison, according to the United  Nations Conference on Trade and Development, in 2015 the world fleet of  commercial shipping vessels was approximately 89,000. However, in its  2019 traffic projections report, CMTS analyzed U.S. Coast Guard data  and other data sources and found that between January 2015 and  December 2017, the number of flag states in the U.S. Arctic increased.  CMTS noted this indicates a shift away from regionally focused operators  toward a more diverse and international set of operators. CMTS found  that the majority of vessels were flagged to the United States (about 41  percent) or Russia (about 24 percent) over this time period, with the  remaining 35 percent from 35 other flag states, each with a considerably  smaller percentage than the United States or Russia.

Given that a single vessel can make multiple trips per shipping season,  U.S. Coast Guard also measures maritime activity by the number of  transits that vessels make per year through the Bering Strait, a key  convergence point for trans-Arctic routes that connects the NWP and  NSR to the Pacific Ocean. According to U.S. Coast Guard data, the  number of transits through the Bering Strait has ranged from as few as  280 in 2009, to as many as 514 in 2015 (see fig. 4). There were far fewer  transits through the Bering Strait than through some other convergence  points for established major maritime transportation routes that have  more developed maritime infrastructure. For example, the number of  transits through the Panama Canal, which like the NWP connects the  Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, was almost 14,000 in 2018 and the number  of vessels that transited the Suez Canal, which like the NSR enables  shipping between Asia and Europe, was over 18,000.

Factors Affecting Arctic Maritime Shipping Included Changes in Domestic and International Demand and Unpredictable Conditions

Stakeholders told us that along with factors such as demand that shape  shipping trends worldwide, factors unique to the Arctic also play a role,  such as potential cost savings due to shorter routes; additional operating  costs incurred by Arctic-capable ships; environmental hazards like  unpredictable weather and sea ice; and a lack of maritime infrastructure  typically found along shipping routes. The 20 stakeholders we interviewed  representing the shipping industry, research institutions, and state, local,  and Alaska Native groups among others, described the following factors  that affect U.S. Arctic maritime shipping.

As mentioned earlier, diminished sea ice has presented opportunities for  maritime shipping of natural resources extracted from the Arctic, such as  oil, gas, and minerals. However, such activities decreased domestically  after Royal Dutch Shell, PLC (Shell) discontinued its offshore oil and gas  exploration of the Burger prospect in Alaska’s Chukchi Sea in 2015. As  shown in figure 4, the number of transits in the Bering Strait steadily  declined from 514 in 2015 to 369 in 2018. Specifically, CMTS reported  that Shell demobilized its drill ship, anchor handling vessels, and anti- pollution ships from the study area prior to the start of the 2016 shipping  season. One stakeholder said there was a reduction in the number of  seasonal transits after Shell suspended exploration activities, since Shell  had previously accounted for more than a hundred transits through the  Bering Strait. Other traffic related to domestic natural resource extraction  stayed at consistent levels. Specifically, representatives from the Red  Dog zinc mine reported that from 1999 to 2019 they consistently shipped  between 21 and 26 cargo vessels per year, averaging 24 vessels per  year over the 20-year period. Meanwhile, several stakeholders said  international activities related to natural resource development,  particularly in the Russian Arctic, have recently increased, and that  Russia has been investing heavily in Arctic infrastructure. The U.S. Coast  Guard attributed increased cargo traffic levels in 2016 to construction  projects in the Russian Arctic, particularly a liquefied natural gas (LNG)  facility on the Yamal peninsula (see fig. 3 above). In 2017, a Russian  LNG tanker, the Christophe de Margerie, became the first ship to transit  the NSR without being accompanied by an icebreaker.

Demand for tourism cruises in the U.S. Arctic has increased slightly  recently. A representative from an Arctic cruise industry association told  us that the overall cruise industry worldwide grows 5 to 10 percent a year  and that there is growing demand for expedition cruises to farther-flung  areas like the Arctic. In both 2016 and 2017, the cruise ship Crystal  Serenity transited the NWP with over a thousand passengers on board.  Stakeholders noted that cruise ship voyages in the U.S. Arctic, such as  the Crystal Serenity voyages, raised concerns for passenger safety given  the lack of infrastructure, particularly for search and rescue. However,  according to an Arctic cruise industry association representative, the  number of smaller ships purpose-built for Arctic conditions is growing; the  association estimates 25 to 30 such vessels are under construction.

Domestic and foreign research vessels have also increased in number in  the U.S. Arctic due to greater interest in the region’s changing  environment. For example, according to National Science Foundation  officials, their polar-capable vessel Sikuliaq entered service in 2016.  Internationally, China has increased its activity in the Arctic since gaining  observer status on the Arctic Council in 2013 and now operates two  icebreaking research vessels. One stakeholder said that such  investments by countries such as China may be the first step towards  achieving longer-term economic goals for those countries.

Trans-Arctic routes can reduce travel time between certain destinations  compared to traditional routes and may therefore reduce fuel and labor  costs. For example, the route from Shanghai, China, to Northwestern  Europe via the NSR is 27 percent shorter than via the Suez Canal. The  operators of the Russian LNG tanker that transited the NSR in 2017, the  Christophe de Margerie, reported they completed the journey in 19 days,  30 percent faster than the Suez Canal. For reasons such as these,  according to news reports, Russia has announced plans to develop the  NSR and ship 80 million tons of goods through the route by 2024.  Similarly, an official from a Canadian ship owner and operator told us  that, depending on the vessel’s origin and destination, using the NWP can  be 10-15 days faster than using the Panama Canal, resulting in a cost  savings of $100,000 to $150,000.

Although trans-Arctic routes have the potential for cost savings due to  shorter distances, they require additional investments not necessary for  traditional routes that may offset those savings. For example,  representatives of one carrier said Arctic-capable ships cost three to four  times more than ordinary ships because they require more steel and  higher power output to withstand ice conditions. The additional steel also  limits the amount of cargo the vessel can carry; representatives from  another carrier noted every ton of steel used to construct the ship is a ton  of cargo that the ship cannot carry in order to recoup expenses. The size  of vessels that can safely operate in the region is also constrained by  draft limitations that specify the maximum weight and size at which ships  can navigate the shallow waters of the Arctic. By contrast, the trend  among ocean carriers over the past decades, which have capitalized on  advances in fuel-efficient engine technology, is toward constructing  increasingly larger vessels to capture economies of scale. In addition,  stakeholders told us that shippers operating in the Arctic must invest in  special onboard equipment and prepare for contingencies due to the lack  of maritime infrastructure usually found in traditional routes, such as  deep-draft ports, harbors of refuge, reliable communications, and search  and rescue infrastructure. Stakeholders noted Arctic voyages also require  additional training for crew members on navigating in ice conditions.

Shippers must determine whether the cost savings obtained from shorter  trans-Arctic routes outweigh the additional operating expenses. For  example, although Maersk, one of the largest shipping companies in the  world, successfully completed a trial passage of a container ship through  the NSR in September 2018, the company emphasized at the time that  the transit was a “one-off trial designed to gain operational experience in  a new area and to test vessel systems” and that it did not view the route  as a commercially viable alternative to existing routes. In a press release,  Maersk noted that the NSR was only feasible for around 3 months a year  and required the use of more costly ice-classed vessels. Despite this,  news reports in June 2019 indicate Maersk is exploring sending more  goods through the NSR in cooperation with a Russian icebreaker  company in response to demand for the transport of goods from Asia to  West Russia.

Unpredictable Conditions and Lack of Infrastructure

Although diminished sea ice has prolonged the shipping season and  opened up shipping routes, environmental changes have also resulted in  less predictable conditions, such as more volatile weather and sea ice.  One stakeholder involved with Arctic research noted that the conditions  that have led to open waters can also lead to harsher conditions such as  strong low pressure systems, gale force winds, and storms. Such  conditions pose challenges for shipping—one shipper representative said  that it is difficult to load barges in shallow waters and that typically loading  and unloading activities have to be suspended with swells above 3 feet.  In addition, stakeholders told us variation in ice conditions from year to  year makes planning Arctic voyages difficult to do with reasonable  accuracy. For example, while warming trends might suggest that overall  sea ice diminishes further each year, one carrier representative noted its  vessel encountered severe ice conditions in June 2018. This  representative noted that diminished overall ice coverage can lead to  localized conditions with more mobile and older ice migrating into  shipping lanes. The unpredictable and harsh weather and ice conditions,  combined with the vast distances and lack of maritime infrastructure,  pose safety risks. For example, according to stakeholders, the “tyranny of  distance” in the Arctic stretches the limited search and rescue  capabilities, resulting in slow incidence response. Furthermore, a lack of a  designated harbor of refuge means vessels do not have a place to moor  safely in case of emergency. As a result, a representative from the  International Union of Marine Insurance noted that in the Arctic even a  minor incident, such as a small engine failure, can result in substantial  damages and even loss of life.

Some stakeholders we interviewed expressed concerns about impacts of  shipping on wildlife, including the species that Alaska Natives rely on for  food. One stakeholder noted that awareness has grown in the past 10  years of the environmental impact of shipping. Such impacts include  emissions containing sulphur oxide and black carbon from ships’ engines  that could damage the fragile Arctic ecosystem. As a result of such  environmental concerns, the IMO is currently considering a ban on heavy  fuel oil in the Arctic. In addition, in 2019 several major carriers, including  CMA CGM, Hapag-Lloyd, and Mediterranean Shipping Company,  announced they would not pursue trans-Arctic shipping. Furthermore, in  2019 Nike and Ocean Conservancy launched the Arctic Corporate  Shipping Pledge, a voluntary commitment by consumer goods and  shipping logistics companies to not send ships through the Arctic. The  pledge also supports precautionary Arctic shipping practices to enhance  the environment and human safety, which may include a heavy fuel oil  ban and an evaluation of low impact shipping corridors that protect  important ecological and cultural areas. A representative of one carrier we  spoke with said a heavy fuel oil ban in the Arctic could increase the cost  of transporting cargo and, as a result, severely impact shipping in the  region.

Agencies Have Taken Some Steps to Address Gaps in Maritime Infrastructure in the U.S. Arctic, but Federal Efforts Lack a Current Strategy and Consistent Leadership

While agencies have taken actions to address maritime infrastructure  gaps, federal efforts lack (1) a government-wide assessment of risks  posed by gaps in maritime infrastructure, (2) a current government-wide  strategy for addressing maritime infrastructure that includes goals,  performance measures, and appropriate responses to prioritized risks,  and (3) an interagency mechanism and consistent leadership to guide  agency actions related to maritime infrastructure. Without these elements,  federal agencies may lack information on which to base decisions and  prioritize actions, assurance that their investments are directed to  prioritized risks, and the ability to demonstrate progress in addressing  maritime infrastructure. Furthermore, agencies may miss opportunities to  work together and leverage resources towards achieving broader  outcomes.

Agencies Have Taken Actions to Address Navigation and Other Gaps in U.S. Arctic Infrastructure

Agencies have taken some actions since 2013, when CMTS first reported  on gaps in U.S. Arctic infrastructure. For example, U.S. Coast Guard  reported that it has taken a flexible approach to addressing infrastructure  gaps by establishing seasonal, forward operating bases in the U.S. Arctic  as needed to provide search and rescue support in areas where major  shipping activity is occurring. See table 3 for selected examples of agency  actions.

Federal Efforts Lack a Government-wide Risk Assessment to Inform Decisions in the U.S. Arctic

Although federal agencies have taken some steps to address gaps in  U.S. Arctic infrastructure, those efforts are not based on a government- wide assessment of the economic, environmental, and safety risks posed  by maritime infrastructure gaps to inform investment decisions in the U.S.  Arctic. Rather, agency officials said that they currently base Arctic  infrastructure decisions on their agency-specific missions, strategies, and  collaborative efforts. Specifically, agency officials said that securing the  resources to address U.S. Arctic infrastructure is challenging because  such projects must compete with other established agency mission areas.  For example, officials told us that infrastructure investments may not  compete as well against other agency-established priorities in other parts  of the country, in part, because the Arctic is an emerging region and  because of the considerable costs of developing infrastructure in the  harsh Arctic environment.

Leading management practices we reviewed note the importance of  assessing risks in order to select and prioritize countermeasures to  prevent or mitigate risks. A 2016 Office of Management and Budget  (OMB) circular emphasized the importance of risk assessment and called  for agencies to use a structured and systematic approach to identify risks  and assess the causes, sources, probability of the risk occurring, and  potential outcomes, and then prioritize the results of the analysis. Such  an approach can be used by decision makers to evaluate the  effectiveness of, and to prioritize, countermeasures relative to the  associated costs. Risk management is a widely endorsed strategy for  helping policymakers make decisions about allocating finite resources  and taking actions in conditions of uncertainty. Such a framework is  especially applicable to the U.S. Arctic given the uncertain conditions in  the region and safety and environmental risks described above.

Without a risk assessment, agencies lack assurance that their  investments are addressing the highest-priority risks. In particular, we  found that agencies’ actions to address maritime infrastructure gaps were  not fully consistent with the areas that the stakeholders we interviewed  identified as the most critical (see fig. 5). For example, 11 of the 20  stakeholders we interviewed identified charting Arctic waters as the  highest priority to address, and in May 2019 NOAA reported that it had  acquired nearly 1,500 square nautical miles of hydrographic survey data  in the Arctic over the prior 3 years. This is, however, less than 1 percent  of the over 200,000 square nautical miles of waters NOAA has identified  as significant to navigation in the U.S. Arctic. In addition, nine  stakeholders identified addressing gaps in communications in the U.S.  Arctic as a key priority. However, CMTS reports indicate no change in the  status of communications capabilities in the U.S. Arctic between 2013  and 2018.

CMTS has in the past noted the importance of conducting a risk  assessment to inform Arctic decision-making. Specifically, CMTS’s 2013  report noted that greater access to the U.S. Arctic and increased activity  presents additional risks for people, vessels, and the environment in the  fragile region and that managing that risk requires an in-depth  understanding of the issues and trade-offs associated with key decisions.  Although CMTS reported that developing an assessment tool that  provides a quantifiable level of risk and that accounts for the unique risk  elements in the Arctic was a challenge for the nation, it proposed a model  for determining risk that considered the likelihood of adverse events  actually occurring, vulnerability to damage, and potential consequences.  CMTS further stated that, given the rate at which other nations are  progressing with Arctic shipping and development, the United States  should decide the acceptable degree of risk for Arctic operations.

Although CMTS has provided useful information on maritime  infrastructure gaps to decision makers and described possible risks to the  U.S. Arctic, it has not systematically assessed the risks posed by these  gaps. For example, in 2016, CMTS made near-, mid-, and long-term  recommendations for addressing maritime infrastructure needs, but noted  this ordering was not intended to create a hierarchy of infrastructure  needs from most to least important. CMTS officials told us that they have  not systematically assessed risks posed by maritime infrastructure gaps  in the U.S. Arctic because CMTS’s priorities are established by its  member agencies, and that CMTS has not been directed to conduct such  an assessment by its members. However, CMTS is required by statute to,  among other things, coordinate the establishment of domestic  transportation policies in the Arctic to ensure safe and secure maritime  shipping and make recommendations with regard to federal policies that  impact the marine transportation system. Furthermore, according to  CMTS officials, there is nothing in CMTS’s authority that would prevent it  from doing a risk assessment.

Given its previous reports and work in the U.S. Arctic and its coordinating  role with its member agencies, CMTS is well suited to conduct a  government-wide assessment of the risks posed by gaps in maritime  infrastructure in the U.S. Arctic. For example, CMTS published a traffic  projections report in September 2019 that aimed to provide decision  makers with a wide-ranging portrait of potential changes in vessel activity  in the U.S. Arctic over the next decade. To inform its risk assessment,  CMTS can draw on the expertise of its member agencies, such as U.S.  Coast Guard and NOAA. For example, U.S. Coast Guard officials told us  that they have responded to the unpredictable economic changes in the  U.S Arctic—including fluctuations in the level and type of maritime activity  in the region—by investing in icebreakers and seasonal forward operating  bases, rather than developing permanent infrastructure. In addition,  CMTS can also draw on numerous reports discussing maritime  infrastructure in the U.S. Arctic that have been published since 2013, as  detailed in appendix I. For example, in 2019 the University of Alaska’s  Arctic Domain Awareness Center held a series of workshops on the  factors that impact the ability of the U.S. Coast Guard and other  stakeholders to conduct safe, secure, and effective operations in the  Arctic environment.

A government-wide risk assessment could better enable agencies to  evaluate potential U.S. Arctic infrastructure expenditures and assess the  extent to which these expenditures will mitigate identified risks. For  example, a report on the U.S. Coast Guard’s Arctic capabilities suggested  that a systematic analysis of needs and risks in the U.S. Arctic could help  the agency generate momentum for closing Arctic capability gaps. By  conducting such a risk assessment, agencies would have better  information on which to base decisions for agency expenditures in the  U.S. Arctic and prioritize appropriate actions in response to risks.

Federal Interagency Efforts Lack a Current Strategy and Consistent Interagency Leadership to Guide Agency Actions Related to Maritime Infrastructure

We found that the federal interagency efforts to address U.S. Arctic  maritime infrastructure lack a current strategy and consistent interagency  leadership to guide agencies’ actions. Although several agencies have  developed strategies to guide their own agencies’ efforts, these do not  provide government-wide direction or establish current government-wide  goals, objectives, and performance measures as leading management  practices call for. Moreover, the federal agencies lack clarity on which  interagency entity is responsible for guiding federal efforts and providing  consistent leadership to ensure government-wide objectives are met.

The federal government lacks a current government-wide strategy for  addressing U.S. Arctic maritime infrastructure gaps that includes key  characteristics, such as goals, objectives, and performance measures,  and appropriate responses to risks. Agency officials and stakeholders  said the 2013 National Strategy is outdated because conditions in the  U.S. Arctic have changed since 2013. In particular, agency officials said  national security is a growing concern in the Arctic. OSTP officials agreed  that conditions had changed in the Arctic, but could not state whether the  2013 National Strategy was still current. Our past work on interagency  collaboration found that written agreements documenting how  participating agencies collaborate, such as strategies, are most effective  when they are regularly updated and monitored. The changing  conditions in the Arctic described above make a current government-wide  strategy for maritime infrastructure in the U.S. Arctic particularly  important.

In our past work, we have reported that complex interagency efforts— such as those to address maritime infrastructure in the U.S. Arctic—can  benefit from developing a national strategy. Our prior work has identified  key characteristics of national strategies, which we refer to in this report  as a government-wide strategy, including: (1) problem definition and risk  assessment which addresses the threats the strategy is directed towards;  and (2) goals, objectives, and performance measures to gauge and  monitor results. Furthermore, our prior enterprise risk management work  has noted that risk assessment should include a ranking of risks based on  priorities in relation to strategic objectives, and that senior leaders should  determine if a risk requires treatment or not based on risk tolerance or  appetite. Leaders then review the prioritized list of risks and select the  most appropriate response to address the risk. These key  characteristics help managers determine the extent of investment needed  and facilitate effective targeting of federal resources; this is especially  important when multiple agencies are involved, as is the case with  maritime infrastructure in the U.S. Arctic.

Although several federal agencies have recently updated their Arctic  strategies, these agency-specific Arctic strategies are not linked to a current government-wide strategy for the Arctic region and are not  specifically focused on addressing Arctic maritime infrastructure gaps.  Specifically:

U.S. Coast Guard. In April 2019, U.S. Coast Guard published its  Arctic Strategic Outlook, which supersedes its 2013 Arctic Strategy.  The updated strategy established three lines of effort: (1) enhance  capability to operate effectively in a dynamic Arctic domain, (2)  strengthen the rules-based order, and (3) innovate and adapt to  promote resilience and prosperity. We recommended in 2016 that  the U.S. Coast Guard develop measures for assessing how its actions  have helped to mitigate Arctic capability gaps and design and  implement a process to systematically assess its progress.  However, as of February 2020, the U.S. Coast Guard has not  implemented these recommendations. U.S. Coast Guard officials  state that they are currently developing an implementation plan and  Strategic Metrics Framework for the Arctic Strategic Outlook.

U.S. Navy. In January 2019, the U.S. Navy published its Arctic  strategy, which updated its previous strategy from 2014. The  updated strategy included the following strategic objectives: defend  U.S. sovereignty and the homeland from attack; ensure the Arctic  remains a stable, conflict-free region; preserve freedom of the seas;  and promote partnerships to achieve the above objectives.

Department of Defense. In June 2019, Department of Defense  updated its 2016 Arctic strategy which included the following as part  of its approach: (1) building Arctic awareness, (2) enhancing Arctic  operations, and (3) strengthening the rules-based order in the Arctic.

NOAA. NOAA officials originally told us that they were working to  complete an update to NOAA’s strategic plan for the Arctic in 2019.  However, as of February 2020, officials told us that this update is  currently on hold pending the completion of a new government-wide  National Strategy. As mentioned previously, OSTP staff said they  could not state whether the 2013 National Strategy was still current,  and OSTP provided no additional information as to whether a new  strategy was in development. NOAA officials told us that the agency’s  current three priorities in the Arctic are (1) weather and water  (including weather and water research, observations, and Arctic  contributions to global weather monitoring); (2) blue economy  (including ocean mapping, seafood competitiveness, tourism, and  coastal resilience); and (3) innovative partnerships in Alaska and the  Arctic.

CMTS has taken some steps to monitor agencies’ progress in addressing  maritime infrastructure, but the current lack of performance measures  makes it difficult to monitor agencies’ progress over time. We reported in  2014 that CMTS was developing a process to monitor such progress and  noted that such monitoring would help agencies develop a shared  understanding of current priorities and actions needed. However, while  CMTS did issue reports that described the status of maritime  infrastructure in the U.S. Arctic in 2016 and 2018, the reports did not  include goals or performance measures to assess agencies’ progress.  According to officials, CMTS did not develop or include performance  measures to monitor agencies’ progress because it does not have the  authority to designate agencies’ priorities, and that agencies are best  situated to identify priorities in pursuit of their individual missions.

Priorities in the U.S. Arctic are currently based on each agency’s mission,  which makes it difficult to take a government-wide approach to  responding to risks. To improve unity of effort, the U.S. Coast Guard has  expressed support for a national approach to Arctic planning in both its  2013 and 2019 Arctic strategies. Without a current government-wide  strategy that includes goals and objectives, agencies lack assurance that  their investments are directed to prioritized risks. Furthermore, without  performance measures, agencies are not able to demonstrate, and  decision makers are unable to monitor, the extent to which agency  actions have addressed maritime infrastructure gaps.

We have previously reported that federal agencies use a variety of  mechanisms, including interagency groups, to implement interagency  collaborative efforts and that such mechanisms benefit from key features  such as sustained leadership and inclusion of all relevant participants,  such as stakeholders. We also reported that leadership should be  sustained over time to provide continuity for long-term efforts and that  having top-level commitment from the President, Congress, or other high- level officials can strengthen the effectiveness of interagency  collaborative groups. We also found that lack of continuity is a frequent  issue with interagency mechanisms that are tied to the Executive Office of  the President, particularly when administrations change, and that  transitions and inconsistent leadership can weaken a collaborative  mechanism’s effectiveness. In addition, our prior work has noted the  importance of ensuring that all relevant participants are included in the  collaborative effort, such as participants with the appropriate knowledge,  skills, and abilities to contribute.

There are many interagency groups involved in the U.S. Arctic, including:

AESC was established by Executive Order in 2015 to shape national  priorities and set strategic direction in the Arctic.

NSC Arctic Policy Coordinating Committee (PCC) is the current  interagency forum for executive-level Arctic collaboration, according to  agency officials.

CMTS is the main forum for collaboration regarding maritime  infrastructure according to agency officials.

These interagency groups vary in the extent to which they meet the key  features noted above. Specifically:

Sustained leadership: Both the NSC, which, as mentioned  previously, has traditionally played a role in Arctic collaboration dating  back to 1971, and the AESC, which was chaired by the OSTP within  the White House, would have top-level commitment given their  proximity to the White House. However, according to agency officials,  the AESC has not met in the past 2 years and is now dormant. OSTP  staff told us that they are not aware of any current AESC activities.  Meanwhile, although CMTS has been active in the area of U.S. Arctic  maritime infrastructure for the past decade, CMTS officials said CMTS  does not sit within the Executive Office of the President. As a result,  CMTS officials note their role is to facilitate an interagency  partnership, share information among member agencies, and provide  information to decision-makers to support agencies’ efforts. CMTS’s  statutory authority addresses, among other things, the coordination of  federal policies that impact the maritime transportation system,  including in the U.S. Arctic, rather than the development and  execution of government-wide policies.

Inclusion of relevant stakeholders: The AESC, when it was active,  included a wide range of over 20 federal departments and entities,  including those less associated with maritime infrastructure such as  the Department of Agriculture. For the NSC Arctic PCC, we were  unable to verify the participants, so it is unclear whether relevant  stakeholders are involved. However, agency officials noted the PCC’s  focus is on national security rather than on maritime infrastructure,  which may indicate not all maritime infrastructure stakeholders are  included. Lastly, CMTS includes stakeholders involved directly with  maritime transportation. For example, officials from the U.S. Army  Corps of Engineers noted that they actively participate in CMTS,  including its Arctic Integrated Action Team, but do not participate in  other interagency groups, where they are often represented by higher- level Department of Defense officials.

The Executive Office of the President has not designated an interagency  group as responsible for developing or executing the administration’s  strategy for maritime infrastructure in the U.S. Arctic. We have previously  reported that interagency efforts can benefit from the leadership of a  single entity to provide assurance that federal programs are well  coordinated and based upon a coherent strategy. Agency officials said  priorities in the U.S. Arctic have shifted to national security under the  current administration, which may have led executive-level interagency  collaboration efforts to move from AESC to the NSC Arctic PCC.  However, it is unclear whether the NSC Arctic PCC includes the relevant  stakeholders. Moreover, the shift in Arctic priorities to security issues  does not diminish the importance of Arctic maritime infrastructure. As  indicated in the 2013 National Strategy, maritime shipping and  infrastructure are a key component of overarching goals in the region like  advancing U.S. security interests, pursuing responsible stewardship, and  strengthening international cooperation.

Without an interagency mechanism with sustained leadership and  inclusion of relevant stakeholders to direct federal efforts related to U.S.  Arctic maritime infrastructure, agencies may miss opportunities to  leverage resources toward achieving a broader outcome. For example, as  noted earlier, stakeholders we spoke to identified communications as a  key infrastructure gap. According to U.S. Coast Guard officials,  communications is a whole-of-government effort, requiring partnerships  across agencies including the Department of Defense. Without an  interagency collaboration mechanism designated to lead these efforts, it  is unclear who has responsibility for such whole-of-government efforts to  address maritime infrastructure in the U.S. Arctic.

The U.S. Arctic, including the Bering Strait, is an essential part of the  increasingly navigable Arctic and a key convergence point for maritime  transportation routes connecting the Pacific and Atlantic oceans. The  risks inherent to Arctic shipping—including vast distances, extreme ice  conditions, and unpredictable weather—are exacerbated by gaps in  maritime infrastructure in the U.S. Arctic. While agencies have taken  some actions to address these gaps, without a government-wide  assessment of risks posed by maritime infrastructure gaps in the U.S.  Arctic and a current strategy to address those risks, agencies lack  assurance that their actions are effectively targeting priority areas.

Without a strategy that includes goals, objectives, and performance  measures, agencies cannot demonstrate the results of their efforts, and  decision makers cannot gauge the extent of progress in addressing  maritime infrastructure gaps. In addition, without a designated  interagency group to provide sustained leadership, agencies lack the  ability to leverage resources to address maritime infrastructure and  achieve government-wide priorities in the complex and changing U.S.  Arctic.

The U.S. Committee on the Marine Transportation System should:

Complete a government-wide assessment of the economic,  environmental, and safety risks posed by gaps in maritime  infrastructure in the U.S. Arctic to inform investment priorities and  decisions. (Recommendation 1)

The appropriate entities within the Executive Office of the President,  including the Office of Science and Technology Policy should:

Develop and publish a strategy for addressing U.S. Arctic maritime  infrastructure that identifies goals and objectives, performance  measures to monitor agencies’ progress over time, and the  appropriate responses to address risks. (Recommendation 2)

Designate the interagency group responsible for leading and  coordinating federal efforts to address maritime infrastructure in the  U.S. Arctic that includes all relevant stakeholders. (Recommendation  3)

We provided a draft of this report to the Executive Office of the  President’s Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP); the U.S.  Committee on the Marine Transportation System (CMTS); and the  Departments of Homeland Security, Commerce, Defense, Interior, State,  and Transportation for comment. With the exception of the Department of  Defense, all of these entities provided technical comments, which we  incorporated as appropriate. Only CMTS provided written comments,  which were transmitted via letter from the Department of Transportation,  and are reprinted in appendix II.

In its technical comments, the Department of Homeland Security’s U.S.  Coast Guard provided Arctic traffic data for the 2019 shipping season. As  stated in our report, we originally selected the decade of 2009 through  2018 for our analysis when designing our review, as 2018 was the most  recent year for which data were available at that time. In response to the  U.S. Coast Guard’s comments submitted in April 2020, we revised our  report to include data from the 2019 shipping season on (1) the number of  vessels in the U.S. Coast Guard District 17 Arctic area of interest and (2)   the number of transits in the Bering Strait, to ensure the report contained  the most current information available.

In its written comments, CMTS partially concurred with our  recommendation that CMTS complete a government-wide assessment of  the economic, environmental, and safety risks posed by gaps in maritime  infrastructure in the U.S. Arctic to inform investment priorities and  decisions. However, CMTS also noted several areas of disagreement  with our conclusions, which we address here:  First, CMTS noted that GAO’s draft report contained dated information  and that the 2019 data contradicts GAO statements that suggest a  decrease in vessel activity since 2015. CMTS noted that the 2019 data  shows that vessel traffic has increased steadily over the last decade, and  that although growth slowed between 2015 and 2017, “it did not stall.”  However, we dispute this characterization. The 2019 shipping data  included in this report emphasizes the finding from our draft report that  maritime shipping activity generally increased over the time period of our  review. However, this trend does not reflect a steady increase throughout  the entire timeframe or “slowed growth” between 2015 and 2017 as  CMTS indicates. Specifically, the data show year-to-year decreases in the  number of vessels from 2015 to 2017 in the U.S. Coast Guard District 17  Arctic area of interest (see fig. 3) and in the number of transits in the  Bering Strait from 2015 to 2018 (see fig. 4). CMTS’s own 2019 report  indicated that the number of vessels had decreased from a peak in 2015,  after Shell’s decision in 2015 to not pursue further exploratory drilling  efforts. As such, we stand by our description of the overall growth in  maritime activity in the U.S. Arctic since 2009, as well as the pattern of  declining traffic within that period from 2015 through 2018.

Second, CMTS also noted in its written comments that our use of data  from 2009 to 2018 in the draft report do not lead to the conclusions and  recommendation to assess infrastructure risks and prioritize future  investment in the Arctic. We dispute this characterization. Our decision to  include the 2019 data further emphasizes the finding in our draft report of  a general increase in maritime activity in the U.S. Arctic and the need for  an assessment of risks posed by gaps in maritime infrastructure. As we  note in the report, CMTS has reported that the U.S. Arctic does not have  the typical elements of a maritime infrastructure system such as a deep- draft port or robust communications infrastructure. These infrastructure  gaps exacerbate the inherent challenges of maritime activity in the  Arctic—vast distances, dangerous weather, and extreme ice conditions— that can pose safety risks to mariners and environmental risks to the  fragile Arctic ecosystem. While agencies have taken some steps to  address infrastructure gaps, without a risk assessment, agencies lack  assurance that their investments are addressing the highest-priority risks.  As such, we stand by our conclusion and recommendation that increasing  maritime traffic poses risks, and a government-wide assessment of those  risks would inform federal decisions on investments to appropriately  address risks.

Third, CMTS disagreed with GAO’s statement that a government-wide  risk assessment could better enable agencies to evaluate potential U.S.  Arctic infrastructure expenditures. Although CMTS agreed that  understanding infrastructure gaps is critical to improving the Arctic marine  transportation system, CMTS contends that such risk assessments are  the responsibility of each agency as directed by the Office of  Management and Budget (OMB). As we note in the report, many  agencies have a role in U.S. Arctic maritime shipping and infrastructure  and although agencies and others have conducted many reviews of  maritime infrastructure in the U.S. Arctic (see appendix I), agency-by- agency assessments do not reflect or analyze risks from a government- wide perspective.

CMTS itself has previously noted the importance of evaluating risks on a  government-wide basis. Specifically, in 2013 CMTS noted that increased  activity in the U.S. Arctic presents additional risks for the people, vessels,  and the environment and that managing that risk requires an in-depth  understanding of the issues and trade-offs associated with key decisions,  such as how to prioritize investments. As our report states, CMTS stated  that developing a tool to assess the unique risk elements in the Arctic was  a challenge for the nation, and it proposed a model for determining risk  that considered the likelihood of adverse events actually occurring,  vulnerability to damage, and potential consequences. This model is  similar to the 2016 OMB circular, which called for agencies to, among  other things, assess the causes, sources, probability of the risk occurring,  and potential outcomes. As stated in our report, given its previous work  in the U.S. Arctic and its coordinating role with its member agencies,  CMTS is well suited to conduct a government-wide assessment of the  risks posed by gaps in maritime infrastructure in the U.S. Arctic. As such,  we stand by our recommendation.

Based on these items, CMTS did not agree to perform and lead a  government-wide risk assessment. Instead, as an “alternate action” to  address GAO’s recommendation, CMTS noted it plans to update a table  of information published in its past reports on infrastructure gaps in the  U.S. Arctic and provide an inventory of existing risk assessments and  their criteria, which agencies can then use to improve their own  assessments to inform decisions. In our view, the proposed action  described by CMTS would not provide the same level of information  proposed by CMTS itself in 2013 and by OMB’s 2016 circular, which calls  for, among other things, assessing the causes, sources, probability of the  risk occurring, and potential outcomes.

As stated in our report, CMTS is uniquely positioned as a federal  interagency coordinating committee focused on the maritime  transportation system to draw on the expertise of its member agencies,  such as U.S. Coast Guard and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric  Administration, to complete this risk assessment. Moreover, CMTS is  required by statue to coordinate the establishment of domestic  transportation policies in the Arctic to ensure safe and secure maritime  shipping and make recommendations with regard to federal policies that  impact the marine transportation system. Furthermore, according to  CMTS officials, there is nothing in CMTS’s authority that would prevent it  from doing a risk assessment. As such, we stand by our recommendation  as written and do not believe CMTS’s alternate action is sufficient to  address the recommendation.

In comments provided via email, OSTP neither agreed nor disagreed with  the report’s recommendations. OSTP acknowledged the Arctic is of  critical national importance and noted interagency coordination can be  implemented through the entities of the National Science and Technology  Council, which is located within OSTP. OSTP noted the need for, and role of additional federal coordination, such as the Arctic Executive Steering  Committee, is under consideration by OSTP. We continue to believe that  the appropriate entities within the Executive Office of the President,  including OSTP, should designate the interagency group responsible for  leading and coordinating federal efforts to address maritime infrastructure  in the U.S. Arctic that includes all relevant stakeholders. As we note in our  report, without an interagency collaboration mechanism designated to  lead these efforts, it is unclear who has responsibility for whole-of- government efforts to address U.S. Arctic maritime infrastructure.

In addition, we stand by our other recommendation to OSTP and other  entities within the Executive Office of the President to develop and  publish a strategy for addressing U.S. Arctic maritime infrastructure that  identifies goals and objectives, performance measures to monitor  agencies’ progress over time, and the appropriate responses to address  risks. As we note in the report, without such a strategy agencies lack  assurance that their actions are effectively targeting priority areas and  decision makers cannot gauge the extent of progress in addressing  maritime infrastructure gaps.

We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional  committees; the Executive Office of the President; the U.S. Committee on  the Marine Transportation System; the Secretaries of Homeland Security,  Commerce, Defense, Interior, State, and Transportation; and other  interested parties. In addition, this report is available at no charge on the  GAO website at http://www.gao.gov.

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact  me at (202) 512-2834 or vonaha@gao.gov. Contact points for our Office  of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last  page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this report  are listed in appendix III.

Appendix I: Reports Relevant to Maritime Infrastructure in the U.S. Arctic Published Since 2013

National Ocean Council. National Ocean Policy Implementation Plan.  Washington, D.C.: April 2013.

White House. National Strategy for the Arctic Region. Washington, D.C.:  May 10, 2013.

U.S. Coast Guard. United States Coast Guard Arctic Strategy.  Washington, D.C.: May 2013.

U.S. Committee on the Marine Transportation System. U.S. Arctic Marine  Transportation System: Overview and Priorities for Action. Washington,  D.C.: 2013.

The White House. Implementation Plan for the National Strategy for the  Arctic Region. Washington, D.C.: January 30, 2014.

U.S. Navy. The United States Navy Arctic Roadmap for 2014 to 2030.  Washington, D.C.: February 2014.

GAO. Maritime Infrastructure: Key Issues Related to Commercial Activity  in the U.S. Arctic over the Next Decade. GAO-14-299. Washington, D.C.:  March 19, 2014.

U.S. Department of Commerce. National Oceanic and Atmospheric  Administration. NOAA’s Arctic Action Plan: Supporting the National  Strategy for the Arctic Region. Silver Spring, M.D: April 2014.

GAO. Arctic Issues: Better Direction and Management of Voluntary  Recommendations Could Enhance U.S. Arctic Council Participation.  GAO-14-435. Washington, D.C.: May 16, 2014.

Brigham, L. W. Alaska and the New Maritime Arctic Executive Summary:  Executive Summary of a Project Report to the State of Alaska  Department of Commerce, Community and Economic Development.  Fairbanks, A.K.: February 1, 2015.

The International Council on Clean Transportation. A 10-Year Projection  of Maritime Activity in the U.S. Arctic Region. Washington, D.C.: January  2015. This report was contracted and coordinated under the U.S.  Committee on the Marine Transportation System.

Executive Order No. 13689. Enhancing Coordination of National Efforts in  the Arctic. 80 Fed. Reg. 4191. January 26, 2015.

The White House. Arctic Executive Steering Committee. National  Strategy for the Arctic Region Implementation Report. Washington, D.C.:  January 30, 2015.

Alaska Arctic Policy Commission. Final Report of the Alaska Arctic Policy  Commission.  Anchorage and Bethel, A.K.: January 30, 2015.

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. Alaska District. Alaska Deep-Draft Arctic  Port System Study:  Draft Integrated Feasibility Report, Draft  Environmental Assessment (EA), and Draft Finding of No Significant  Impact (FONSI). Nome, AK: February 2015.

GAO. Arctic Planning: DOD Expects to Play a Supporting Role to Other  Federal Agencies and Has Efforts Under Way to Address Capability  Needs and Update Plans. GAO-15-566. Washington, D.C.: June 19,  2015.

Arctic. Status on Implementation of the AMSA 2009 Report  Recommendations. Tromsø, Norway: April 2015.

World Economic Forum. Global Agenda Council on the Arctic. Arctic  Investment Protocol: Guidelines for Responsible Investment in the Arctic.  Geneva, Switzerland: November 2015.

U.S. Coast Guard. Arctic Strategy Implementation Plan. Washington,  D.C.: December 2015.

Arctic Economic Council, Telecommunications Infrastructure Working  Group. Arctic Broadband: Recommendations for an Interconnected Arctic.  Tromsø, Norway: Winter 2016.

Copenhagen Business School and Arctic Institute. Arctic Shipping:  Commercial Opportunities and Challenges. CBS Maritime, January 2016.

The White House. Arctic Executive Steering Committee. 2015 Year in  Review:  Progress Report on the Implementation of the National Strategy  for the Arctic Region. Washington, D.C.:  March 2016.

The White House. Arctic Executive Steering Committee. 2015 Year in  Review:  Progress Report on the Implementation of the National Strategy  for the Arctic Region; Appendix A, Implementation Framework for the  National Strategy for the Arctic Region. Washington, D.C.:  March 2016.

U.S. Committee on the Marine Transportation System. Arctic Marine  Transportation Integrated Action Team. A Ten-Year Prioritization of  Infrastructure Needs in the U.S. Arctic. Washington, D.C.: April 15, 2016.

GAO. Coast Guard: Arctic Strategy is Underway but Agency Could Better  Assess How Its Actions Mitigate Known Arctic Capability Gaps.  GAO-16-453. Washington, D.C.: June 15, 2016.

Department of Defense. Report To Congress On Strategy To Protect  United States National Security Interests In The Arctic Region.  Washington, D.C.: December 2016.

RAND Corporation. Maintaining Arctic Cooperation with Russia: Planning  for Regional Change in the Far North. RR-1731-RC. Santa Monica, CA:  2017.

U.S. Committee on the Marine Transportation System. Recommendations  and Criteria for Using Federal Public-Private Partnerships to Support  Critical U.S. Arctic Maritime Infrastructure. Washington, D.C.: January  2017.

Arctic Council, Emergency Prevention, Preparedness and Response.  Circumpolar Oil Spill Response Viability Analysis: Technical Report.  March 7, 2017.

Council of Foreign Relations. Arctic Imperatives: Reinforcing U.S.  Strategy of America’s Fourth Coast, New York, N.Y.:  March 2017.

Ocean Conservancy. Navigating the North: An Assessment of the  Environmental Risks of Arctic Vessel Traffic.  Anchorage, A.K.:  June 28,  2017.

Center for Strategic and International Studies, Maritime Futures: The  Arctic and the Bering Strait Region.  Washington, D.C.: November 2017.

RAND Corporation. Identifying Potential Gaps in US Coast Guard Arctic  Capabilities.RR-2310-DHS. Santa Monica, CA: 2018.

U.S. Committee on the Marine Transportation System. Revisiting Near- Term Recommendations to Prioritize Infrastructure Needs in the U.S.  Arctic. Washington, D.C.: 2018.

Department of Defense. Report to Congress on Assessment of  Requirement for a Strategic Arctic Port. Washington, D.C.: January 2018.

Department of Homeland Security, Office of the Chief Financial Officer.    Arctic Search and Rescue:  Fiscal Year 2017 Report to Congress.  Washington, D.C.: March 13, 2018.

International Union of Marine Insurance. IUMI Position Paper: Arctic  Sailings. Hamburg, Germany: August 2018.

U.S. Coast Guard Acquisition Directorate, Research & Development  Center. Alaska AIS Transmit Prototype Test, Evaluation, and Transition  Summary Report for the Near Shore Arctic Navigational Safety  Information System (ANSIS). New London, C.T.: October 2018.

GAO. Arctic Planning: Navy Report to Congress Aligns with Current  Assessments of Arctic Threat Levels and Capabilities Required to  Execute DOD’s Strategy. GAO-19-42. Washington, D.C.: November 8,  2018.

Alaska Federation of Natives. Indigenous Engagement with Their  Countries’ Military and Civilian Services/ Government on Maritime Arctic  Issues. Anchorage, A.K.: December 2018.

RAND Europe. The Future of Arctic Cooperation in a Changing Strategic  Environment, PE-268-RC. Cambridge, United Kingdom: 2018.

U.S. Navy. Strategic Outlook for the Arctic. January 2019.

U.S. Coast Guard. Arctic Strategic Outlook. April 2019.

Department of Defense. Office of the Secretary of Defense. Annual  Report to Congress on Military and Security Developments Involving the  People’s Republic of China 2019. Washington, D.C.: May 2, 2019.

Pompeo, Michael, R. Secretary of State. U. S. Department of State.  Looking North: Sharpening America’s Arctic Focus. Remarks. Rovaniemi,  Finland, May 6, 2019.

Pompeo, Michael R. Secretary of State. U.S. Department of State.  Remarks. Arctic Council Ministerial Meeting. Rovaniemi, Finland, May 7,  2019.

Department of Defense. Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for  Policy. Report to Congress on Department of Defense Arctic Strategy.  Washington, D.C.: June 2019.

U.S. Committee on the Marine Transportation System. A Ten-Year  Projection of Maritime Activity in the U.S. Arctic Region. 2020-2030:  Washington, D.C.: September 2019.

Congressional Research Service. Changes in the Arctic: Background and  Issues for Congress. Washington, D.C.: November 27, 2019.

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Alaska District. Port of Nome Modification  Feasibility Study:  Draft Integrated Feasibility Report and Supplemental  Environmental Assessment. Nome, A.K.: December 2019.

Congressional Research Service. Changes in the Arctic: Background and  Issues for Congress. Washington, D.C.: January 23 2020.

Appendix II: Comments from the U.S. Committee on the Marine Transportation System

In addition to the contact named above, Susan Fleming, Director; Matt  Barranca, Assistant Director; Emily Larson, Analyst in Charge; Chuck  Bausell; Geoff Hamilton; Georgeann Higgins; Ned Malone; John Mingus;  Jan Montgomery; Kaleb Mount; Fatima Sharif; Curtia Taylor; Sarah  Veale; and Laurel Voloder made key contributions to this report.

Climate change has led to record low levels of ice in the U.S. Arctic—prolonging the shipping season and opening up shipping routes. This may expand economic opportunities, but harsh weather and ice conditions—plus the lack of maritime infrastructure—pose safety risks. For example, not having a designated harbor of refuge means ships don’t have a place to moor in an emergency.

Agencies have taken steps to address infrastructure gaps, but federal efforts lack consistent leadership and a current strategy. We recommended designating an interagency group and developing a strategy to lead efforts in addressing the region’s maritime infrastructure.