2020 Census: Further Actions Needed to Reduce Key Risks to a Successful Enumeration

The Bureau, a component of the Department of Commerce (Commerce), is responsible for conducting a complete and accurate decennial census of the U.S. population. The decennial census is mandated by the Constitution and provides vital data for the nation. A complete count of the nation's population is an enormous undertaking as the Bureau seeks to control the cost of the census, implement operational innovations, and use new and modified IT systems. In recent years, GAO has identified challenges that raise serious concerns about the Bureau's ability to conduct a cost-effective count. For these reasons, GAO added the 2020 Census to its High-Risk list in February 2017.

GAO was asked to testify about the reasons the 2020 Census remains on the High-Risk List and the steps the Bureau needs to take to mitigate risks to a successful census. To do so, GAO summarized its prior work regarding the Bureau's planning efforts for the 2020 Census. GAO also included preliminary observations from its ongoing work examining the IT systems readiness and cybersecurity for the 2020 Census. This information is related to, among other things, the Bureau's progress in developing and testing key systems and the status of cybersecurity risks.

The 2020 Decennial Census is on GAO's list of high-risk programs primarily because the Census Bureau (Bureau) (1) is using innovations that are not expected to be fully tested, (2) continues to face challenges in implementing information technology (IT) systems, and (3) faces significant cybersecurity risks to its systems and data. Although the Bureau has taken initial steps to address risk, additional actions are needed as these risks could adversely impact the cost, quality, schedule, and security of the enumeration.

Innovations : The Bureau is planning several innovations for the 2020 Census, including allowing the public to respond using the internet. These innovations show promise for controlling costs, but they also introduce new risks, in part, because they have not been used extensively, if at all, in earlier enumerations. As a result, testing is essential to ensure that key IT systems and operations will function as planned. However, citing budgetary uncertainties, the Bureau scaled back operational tests in 2017 and 2018, missing an opportunity to fully demonstrate that the innovations and IT systems will function as intended during the 2020 Census. To manage risk to the census, the Bureau has developed hundreds of mitigation and contingency plans. To maximize readiness for the 2020 Census, it will also be important for the Bureau to prioritize among its mitigation and contingency strategies those that will deliver the most cost-effective outcomes for the census.

Implementing IT systems : The Bureau plans to rely heavily on IT for the 2020 Census, including a total of 52 new and legacy IT systems and the infrastructure supporting them. To help improve its implementation of IT, in October 2018, the Bureau revised its systems development and testing schedule to reflect, among other things, lessons learned during its 2018 operational test. However, GAO's ongoing work has determined that the Bureau is at risk of not meeting near-term IT system development and testing schedule milestones for two upcoming 2020 Census operational deliveries, including address canvassing (i.e., verification of the location of selected housing units). These schedule management challenges may compress the time available for the remaining system development and testing, and increase the risk that systems will not function as intended. It will be important that the Bureau effectively manages IT implementation risk to ensure that it meets near-term milestones for system development and testing, and that it is ready for the major operations of the 2020 Census.

Cybersecurity : The Bureau has established a risk management framework that requires it to conduct a full security assessment for each system expected to be used for the 2020 Census and, if deficiencies are identified, to determine the corrective actions needed to remediate those deficiencies. As of March 2019, the Bureau had over 500 corrective actions from its security assessments that needed to be addressed, including nearly 250 that were considered “high-risk” or “very high-risk.” However, of these 250 corrective actions, the Bureau identified 115 as being delayed. Further, 70 of the 115 were delayed by 60 or more days. According to the Bureau, these corrective actions were delayed due to technical challenges or resource constraints. Resolving identified vulnerabilities within the Bureau's established time frames can help reduce the risk that unauthorized individuals may exploit weaknesses to gain access to sensitive information and systems.

To its credit, the Bureau is also working with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to support its 2020 Census cybersecurity efforts. For example, DHS is helping the Bureau ensure a scalable and secure network connection for the 2020 Census respondents and to strengthen its response to potential cyber threats. During the last 2 years, as a result of these activities, the Bureau has received 17 recommendations from DHS to improve its cybersecurity posture. However, the Bureau lacks a formal process for tracking and completing corrective actions for these recommendations which would help to ensure that DHS's efforts result in improvements to the Bureau's cybersecurity posture.

In addition to addressing risks which could affect innovations and the security of the enumeration, the Bureau has the opportunity to improve its cost estimating process for the 2020 Census, and ultimately the reliability of the estimate itself, by reflecting best practices. In October 2017, the 2020 Census life-cycle cost estimate was updated and is now projected to be $15.6 billion, a more than $3 billion (27 percent) increase over its earlier estimate. GAO reported in August 2018 that although the Bureau had taken steps to improve its cost estimation process for 2020, it needed to implement a system to track and report variances between actual and estimated cost elements. According to Bureau officials, they plan to release an updated version of the 2020 Census life-cycle estimate in the spring of 2019. To ensure that future updates to the life-cycle cost estimate reflect best practices, it will be important for the Bureau to implement GAO's recommendation related to the cost estimate.

Over the past decade, GAO has made 97 recommendations specific to the 2020 Census to help address these risks and other concerns. Commerce has generally agreed with these recommendations and has taken action to address many of them. However, as of April 2019, 24 of the recommendations had not been fully implemented. Of the 24 open recommendations, 11 were directed at improving the implementation of the innovations for the 2020 Census. To ensure a cost-effective enumeration, it will be important for the Bureau to address these recommendations.

GAO is making two recommendations to the Bureau to (1) better ensure that cybersecurity weaknesses are addressed within prescribed time frames, and (2) improve its process for addressing cybersecurity weaknesses identified by DHS.

We are pleased to be here today to discuss the U.S. Census Bureau’s  (Bureau) progress in preparing for the 2020 Decennial Census.  Conducting the decennial census of the U.S. population is mandated by  the Constitution and provides vital data for the nation. The information  that the census collects is used to apportion the seats of the House of  Representatives; redraw congressional districts; allocate billions of dollars  each year in federal financial assistance; and provide a social,  demographic, and economic profile of the nation’s people to guide policy  decisions at each level of government. Further, businesses use census  data to market new services and products and to tailor existing ones to  demographic changes.

A complete count of the nation’s population is an enormous undertaking.  The Bureau, a component of the Department of Commerce (Commerce),  is seeking to control the cost of the 2020 Census while it implements  several innovations and manages the processes of acquiring and  developing information technology (IT) systems. In recent years, we have  identified challenges that raise serious concerns about the Bureau’s  ability to conduct a cost-effective count of the nation, including issues with  the agency’s research, testing, planning, scheduling, cost estimation,  systems development, and cybersecurity risk management practices.

Over the past decade, we have made 97 recommendations specific to the  2020 Census to help address these and other concerns. Commerce has  generally agreed with our recommendations and has made progress in  implementing them. However, 24 of the recommendations had not been  fully implemented as of April 2019, although the Bureau had taken initial  steps to address many of them, and one recommendation has been  closed but not implemented.

We also added the 2020 Decennial Census to our high-risk list in  February 2017, and it remains on our high-risk list today. As preparations  for the next census continue to ramp up, fully implementing our  recommendations to address the risks jeopardizing the 2020 Census is  more critical than ever.

At your request, our testimony today will describe (1) why the 2020  Decennial Census remains a high-risk area and (2) the steps that  Commerce and the Bureau need to take going forward to mitigate the  risks jeopardizing a secure and cost-effective census.

The information in this statement is based primarily on our prior work  regarding the Bureau’s planning efforts for 2020. For that body of work,  we reviewed, among other things, relevant Bureau documentation,  including the 2020 Census Operational Plan; recent decisions on  preparations for the 2020 Census; and outcomes of key IT milestone  reviews.

In the summer of 2018 we visited the Bureau’s 2018 End-to-End test site  in Providence County, Rhode Island to observe door-to-door field  enumeration during the non-response follow-up, an operation where  enumerators personally visit to count the household. We also discussed  the status of our recommendations with Commerce and Bureau staff.  Other details on the scope and methodology for our prior work are  provided in each published report on which this testimony is based.

In addition, we included information in this statement from our ongoing  work on the readiness of the Bureau’s IT systems for the 2020 Census.  Specifically, we collected and reviewed documentation on the status and  plans for system development and testing, and for addressing  cybersecurity risk, for the 2020 Census. This includes the Bureau’s  integration and implementation plan, memorandums documenting  outcomes of security assessments, and reports prepared by the  Department of Homeland Security (DHS) for the Bureau on cybersecurity  risks. We also interviewed relevant agency officials.

We provided a copy of the applicable new information that we are  reporting in this testimony to the Bureau and DHS for comment on April  12, 2019.The Bureau provided technical comments, which we addressed  as appropriate.

We conducted the work on which this statement is based in accordance  with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards  require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate  evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions  based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained  provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on  our audit objectives.

As shown in table 1 the cost of counting the nation’s population has been  escalating with each decade. The 2010 Census was the most expensive  in U.S. history at about $12.3 billion, and was about 31 percent more  costly than the $9.4 billion 2000 Census (in 2020 dollars). According to  the Bureau, the total cost of the 2020 Census in October 2015 was  estimated at $12.3 billion and in October 2017 that cost estimate grew to  approximately $15.6 billion, approximately a $3 billion increase.

Additionally, Bureau officials told us that while the estimated cost of the  census had increased to $15.6 billion, it was nevertheless managing the  2020 Census to a lower cost of $14.1 billion. Bureau officials explained  that the $14.1 billion includes all program costs and contingency funds to  cover risks and general estimating uncertainty. The remaining $1.5 billion  estimated cost is additional contingency for “unknown unknowns”—that  is, low probability events that could cause massive disruptions—and  several what-if scenarios such as an increase in the wage rate or  additional supervisors needed to manage field operations.

Moreover, as shown in figure 1, the average cost for counting a housing  unit increased from about $16 in 1970 to around $92 in 2010 (in 2020  constant dollars). At the same time, the return of census questionnaires  by mail (the primary mode of data collection) declined over this period  from 78 percent in 1970 to 63 percent in 2010. Declining mail response  rates has led to higher costs because the Bureau sends temporary  workers to each non-responding household to obtain census data.

Achieving a complete and accurate census has become an increasingly  daunting task, in part, because the population is growing larger, more  diverse, and more reluctant to participate in the enumeration. In many  ways, the Bureau has had to invest substantially more resources each  decade to conduct the enumeration.

In addition to these external societal challenges that make achieving a  complete count a daunting task, the Bureau also faces a number of  internal management challenges that affect its capacity and readiness to  conduct a cost-effective enumeration. Some of these issues—such as  acquiring and developing IT systems and preparing reliable cost  estimates—are long-standing in nature.

At the same time, as the Bureau looks toward 2020, it also faces newly  emerging and evolving uncertainties. For example, on March 26, 2018,  the Secretary of Commerce announced his decision to add a question to  the decennial census on citizenship status. On January 15, 2019, the  U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York ruled on one of a  number of legal challenges to the Secretary’s decision. That ruling is  being appealed, thus, leaving the use of the question uncertain.

The U.S. Supreme Court is scheduled to begin hearing arguments in April  2019 regarding the addition of the citizenship question to the census  form. In our prior work we have noted the risks associated with late  changes of any nature to the design of the census if the Bureau is unable  to fully test those changes under operational conditions.

The Bureau also faced budgetary uncertainties that, according to the  Bureau, led to the curtailment of testing in 2017 and 2018. However, the  Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018 appropriated for the Periodic  Censuses and Programs account $2.544 billion, which more than doubles  the Bureau’s request in the President’s Fiscal Year 2018 Budget of  $1.251 billion. According to the explanatory statement accompanying the  act, the appropriation, which is available through fiscal year 2020, is  provided to ensure the Bureau has the necessary resources to  immediately address any issues discovered during operational testing,  and to provide a smoother transition between fiscal year 2018 and fiscal  year 2019.

The availability of those resources enabled the Bureau to continue  preparations for the 2020 Census during the 35 days when appropriations  lapsed for the Bureau. Moreover, the Consolidated Appropriations Act,  2019 appropriated for the Periodic Censuses and Programs account  $3.551 billion. According to Bureau officials, this level of funding for fiscal  year 2019 is sufficient to carry out 2020 Census activities as planned.

Importantly, the census is conducted against a backdrop of immutable  deadlines. In order to meet legally mandated reporting requirements,  census activities need to take place at specific times and in the proper  sequence. Thus, it is absolutely critical for the Bureau to stay on  schedule. Figure 2 shows some dates for selected decennial events.

The Bureau Has Begun Opening Offices and Hiring Temporary Staff

The Bureau has begun to open its area census offices (ACO) for the 2020  Census. It has signed leases for all 248 ACOs, of which 39 of the offices  will be open for the address canvassing operation set to begin in August  2019 where staff verifies the location of selected housing units. The  remaining 209 offices will begin opening this fall. In 2010 the Bureau  opened 494 census offices. The Bureau has been able to reduce its  infrastructure because it is relying on automation to assign work and to  record payroll. Therefore there is less paper—field assignments, maps,  and daily payroll forms—to manually process.

For the 2020 Census, the Bureau is refining its recruiting and hiring goals,  but tentatively plans to recruit approximately 2.24 million applicants and  hire nearly 500,000 temporary field staff from that applicant pool for two  key operations: address canvassing, and nonresponse follow-up, where  they visit households that do not return census forms to collect data in  person. In 2010 the Bureau recruited 3.8 million applicants and hired  628,000 temporary workers to conduct the address canvassing and  nonresponse follow-up field operations. According to Bureau officials, it  has reduced the number of temporary staff it needs to hire because  automation has made field operations more efficient and there is less  paper.

As of April 15, 2019, for its early operations efforts which includes hiring  listers for address canvassing, the Bureau has processed approximately  264,000 applicants which represent 128.4 percent of its 205,000  recruiting goal. The Bureau is also in the process of hiring approximately  1,500 partnership specialists needed by June 2019 to help increase  awareness and participation in the 2020 Census in minority communities  and hard-to-reach populations. As of April 17, 2019, the Bureau has hired  467 partnership specialists, and another 329 applicants are waiting to  have their background checks completed.

Moreover, Bureau officials also stated that the current economic  environment (i.e., the low unemployment rate compared to the economic  environment of the 2010 Census) has not yet impacted their ability to  recruit staff. The Bureau will continue to monitor the impact of low  unemployment on its ability to recruit and hire at the local and regional  levels.

The Bureau Plans to Rely Heavily on IT for the 2020 Census

For the 2020 Census, the Bureau is significantly changing how it intends  to conduct the census, in part by re-engineering key census-taking  methods and infrastructure, and making use of new IT applications and  systems. For example, the Bureau plans to offer an option for households  to respond to the survey via the internet and enable field-based  enumerators to use applications on mobile devices to collect survey  data from households. To do this, the Bureau plans to utilize 52 new and  legacy IT systems, and the infrastructure supporting them, to conduct the  2020 Census.

A majority of these 52 systems have been tested during operational tests  in 2017 and 2018. For example, the Bureau conducted its 2018 End-to- End test, which included 44 of the 52 systems and was intended to test all  key systems and operations in a census-like environment to ensure  readiness for the 2020 Census.

Nevertheless, additional IT development and testing work needs to take  place before the 2020 Census. Specifically, officials from the Bureau’s  Decennial Directorate said they expect that the systems will need to  undergo further development and testing due to, among other things, the  need to add functionality that was not part of the End-to-End test, scale  system performance to support the number of respondents expected  during the 2020 Census, and address system defects identified during the  2018 End-to-End test.

To prepare the systems and technology for the 2020 Census, the Bureau  is also relying on significant contractor support. For example, it is relying  on contractors to develop a number of systems and components of the IT  infrastructure, including the IT platform that is intended to be used to  collect data from households responding via the internet and telephone,  and for non-response follow-up activities. Contractors are also deploying  the IT and telecommunications hardware in the field offices and providing  device-as-a-service capabilities by procuring the mobile devices and  cellular service to be used for non-response follow-up.

In addition to the development of technology, the Bureau is relying on a  technical integration contractor to integrate all of the key systems and  infrastructure. The contractor’s work is expected to include, among other  things, evaluating the systems and infrastructure and acquiring the  infrastructure (e.g., cloud or data center) to meet the Bureau’s scalability  and performance needs; integrating all of the systems; and assisting with  technical, performance and scalability, and operational testing activities.

2020 Census Identified by GAO as a High-Risk Area

In February 2017, we added the 2020 Decennial Census as a high-risk  area needing attention from Congress and the executive branch. This  was due to significant risks related to, among other things, innovations  never before used in prior enumerations, the acquisition and  development of IT systems, and expected escalating costs.

Among other things, we reported that the commitment of top leadership  was needed to ensure the Bureau’s management, culture, and business  practices align with a cost-effective enumeration. We also stressed that  the Bureau needed to rigorously test census-taking activities; ensure that  scheduling adheres to best practices; improve its ability to manage,  develop, and secure its IT systems; and have better oversight and control  over its cost estimation process.

Our experience has shown that the key elements needed to make  progress toward being removed from the High-Risk List are top-level  attention by the administration and agency leaders grounded in the five  criteria for removal, as well as any needed congressional action. The five  criteria for removal that we identified in November 2000 are as follows:

Leadership Commitment. The agency has demonstrated strong  commitment and top leadership support.

Capacity. The agency has the capacity (i.e., people and resources) to  resolve the risk(s).

Action Plan. A corrective action plan exists that defines the root  causes and solutions, and that provides for substantially completing  corrective measures, including steps necessary to implement  solutions we recommended.

Monitoring. A program has been instituted to monitor and  independently validate the effectiveness and sustainability of  corrective measures.

Demonstrated Progress. The agency has demonstrated progress in  implementing corrective measures and in resolving the high-risk area.

These five criteria form a road map for efforts to improve, and ultimately  address, high-risk issues. Addressing some of the criteria leads to  progress, while satisfying all of the criteria is central to removal from the  list.

As we reported in the March 2019 high-risk report, the Bureau’s efforts  to address the risks and challenges for the 2020 Census had fully met  one of the five criteria for removal from the High-Risk List—leadership  commitment—and partially met the other four, as shown in figure 3.  Additional details about the status of the Bureau’s efforts to address this  high-risk area are discussed later in this statement.

The 2020 Census Remains High Risk Due to Challenges Facing the Enumeration

The 2020 Census is on our list of high-risk programs because, among  other things, (1) innovations never before used in prior enumerations are  not expected to be fully tested, (2) the Bureau continues to face  challenges in implementing IT systems, (3) the Bureau faces significant  cybersecurity risks to its systems and data, and (4) the Bureau’s cost  estimate for the 2020 Census was unreliable. If not sufficiently  addressed, these risks could adversely impact the cost and quality of the  enumeration. Moreover, the risks are compounded by other factors that  contribute to the challenge of conducting a successful census, such as  the nation’s increasingly diverse population and concerns over personal  privacy.

Key Risk #1: The Bureau Has Redesigned the Census with the Intent to Control Costs, but Has Scaled Back Critical Tests

The basic design of the enumeration—mail out and mail back of the  census questionnaire with in-person follow-up for non-respondents—has  been in use since 1970. However, a lesson learned from the 2010  Census and earlier enumerations is that this traditional design is no  longer capable of cost-effectively counting the population.

In response to its own assessments, our recommendations, and studies  by other organizations, the Bureau has fundamentally re-examined its  approach for conducting the 2020 Census. Specifically, its plan for 2020  includes four broad innovation areas: re-engineering field operations,  using administrative records, verifying addresses in-office, and  developing an internet self-response option (see table 2).

If they function as planned, the Bureau initially estimated that these  innovations could result in savings of over $5 billion (in 2020 constant  dollars) when compared to its estimates of the cost for conducting the  census with traditional methods. However, in June 2016, we reported that  the Bureau’s initial life-cycle cost estimate developed in October 2015  was not reliable and did not adequately account for risk. As discussed  earlier in this statement, the Bureau has updated its estimate from $12.3  billion and now estimates a life-cycle cost of $15.6 billion, which would  result in a smaller potential savings from the innovative design than the  Bureau originally estimated. According to the Bureau, the goal of the cost  estimate increase was to ensure quality was fully addressed.

While the planned innovations could help control costs, they also  introduce new risks, in part, because they include new procedures and  technology that have not been used extensively in earlier decennials, if at  all. Our prior work has shown the importance of the Bureau conducting a  robust testing program, including the 2018 End-to-End test. Rigorous  testing is a critical risk mitigation strategy because it provides information  on the feasibility and performance of individual census-taking activities,  their potential for achieving desired results, and the extent to which they  are able to function together under full operational conditions. To address  some of these challenges we have made numerous recommendations  aimed at improving reengineered field operations, using administrative  records, verifying the accuracy of the address list, and securing census  responses via the internet.

The Bureau has held a series of operational tests since 2012, but  according to the Bureau, it scaled back its most recent field tests because  of funding uncertainties. For example, the Bureau canceled the field  components of the 2017 Census Test including non-response follow-up, a  key census operation. In November 2016, we reported that the  cancelation of the 2017 Census Test was a lost opportunity to test, refine,  and integrate operations and systems, and that it put more pressure on  the 2018 End-to-End test to demonstrate that enumeration activities will  function under census-like conditions as needed for 2020.

However, in May 2017, the Bureau scaled back the operational scope of  the 2018 End-to-End test and, of the three planned test sites, only the  Rhode Island site would fully implement the 2018 End-to-End test. The  Washington and West Virginia sites would test just one field operation. In  addition, due to budgetary concerns, the Bureau decided to remove three  coverage measurement operations (and the technology that supports  them) from the scope of the test. However, removal of the coverage  measurement operations did not affect testing of the delivery of  apportionment or redistricting data.

Without sufficient testing, operational problems can go undiscovered and  the opportunity to improve operations will be lost, in part because the  2018 End-to-End test was the last opportunity to demonstrate census  technology and procedures across a range of geographic locations,  housing types, and demographic groups under decennial-like conditions  prior to the 2020 Census. To manage risk to the census, the Bureau has  developed hundreds of mitigation and contingency plans. To maximize  readiness for the 2020 Census, it will also be important for the Bureau to  prioritize among its mitigation and contingency strategies those that will  deliver the most cost-effective outcomes for the census.

We reported on the 2018 End-to-End test in December 2018 and noted  that the Bureau had made progress addressing prior test implementation  issues but still faced challenges. As the Bureau studies the results of its  testing to inform the 2020 Census, it will be important that it addresses  key program management issues that arose during implementation of the  test. Namely, by not aligning the skills, responsibilities, and information  flows for the first-line supervisors during field data collection, the Bureau  limited its role in support of enumerators within the re-engineered field  operation. The Bureau also lacked mid-operation training or guidance,  which, if implemented in a targeted, localized manner, could have further  helped enumerators navigate procedural modifications and any  commonly encountered problems when enumerating. It will be important  for the Bureau to prioritize its mitigation strategies for these  implementation issues so that it can maximize readiness for the 2020  Census.

Key Risk #2: The Bureau Faces Challenges in Implementing IT Systems

We have previously reported that the Bureau faces challenges in  managing and overseeing IT programs, systems, and contractors  supporting the 2020 Census. Specifically, we have noted challenges in  the Bureau’s efforts to manage, among other things, the schedules and  contracts for its systems. As a result of these challenges, the Bureau is at  risk of being unable to fully implement the systems necessary to support  the 2020 Census and conduct a cost-effective enumeration.

The Bureau Has Made Initial Progress against Its Revised Development and Testing Schedule, but Risks Missing Near-term Milestones

To help improve its implementation of IT for the 2020 Census, the Bureau  recently revised its systems development and testing schedule.  Specifically, in October 2018, the Bureau organized the development and  testing schedule for its 52 systems into 16 operational deliveries. Each  of the 16 operational deliveries has milestone dates for, among other  things, development, performance and scalability testing, and system  deployment. According to Bureau officials in the Decennial Directorate,  the schedule was revised, in part, due to schedule management  challenges experienced, and lessons learned, while completing  development and testing during the 2018 End-to-End test.

The Bureau has made initial progress in executing work against its  revised schedule. For example, the Bureau completed development for  the systems in the first operational delivery—for 2020 Census early  operations preparations—in July 2018, and deployed these systems into  production in October 2018.

However, our current work has determined that the Bureau is at risk of  not meeting several near-term systems testing milestones. As of April  2019, six systems that are expected to be used in a total of two  operational deliveries are at risk of not meeting milestone dates which  would signal that the systems have completed development and are  ready for testing. These six systems are needed for, among other things,  field assignment management and worker performance tracking during  address canvassing, data collection for operations, business and support  automation, and customer support during self-response. According to  Bureau documentation, these systems were at risk due, in part, to the  lack of finalized system requirements and specifications. Figure 4  presents an overview of the status for all 16 operational deliveries, as of  April 2019.

The at-risk systems previously discussed add uncertainty to a highly  compressed time frame over the next 4 months. Importantly, between  April and August 2019, the Bureau is expected to begin integration testing  for the systems in seven operational deliveries, including internet self- response and non-response follow-up. Officials from the Bureau’s  integration contractor noted concern that the current schedule leaves little  room for any delays in completing the remaining development and testing  activities.

In addition to managing the compressed testing time frames, the Bureau  also has to quickly finalize plans related to its IT infrastructure. For  example, in March 2019, the Bureau’s technical integration contractor  stated that it needed the Bureau to obtain approval from federal partners  for its Trusted Internet Connection or finalize alternative plans in order to  complete performance and scalability testing in a timely manner. As of  mid-April 2019, the Bureau stated that it was still awaiting final approval.  Given that these plans may impact systems being tested this summer or  deployed into production for the address canvassing operation in August  2019, it is important that the Bureau quickly addresses this matter.

Our past reporting noted that the Bureau faced significant challenges in  managing its schedule for system development and testing that occurred  in 2017 and 2018. We reported that while the Bureau had continued to  make progress in developing and testing IT systems for the 2020 Census,  it had experienced delays in developing systems to support the 2018  End-to-End test. These delays compressed the time available for system  and integration testing and for security assessments. In addition, several  systems experienced problems during the test. We noted then, and  reaffirm now, that continued schedule management challenges may  compress the time available for the remaining system and integration  testing and increase the risk that systems may not function or be as  secure as intended.

The Bureau has acknowledged that it faces risks to the implementation of  its systems and technology. As of March 2019, the Bureau had identified  about 330 active risks for the 2020 Census program, through its risk  management process, including 20 high risks that may have substantial  technical and schedule impacts if realized. Taken together, these risks  represent a cross-section of issues, such as the effects of late changes to  technical requirements, the need to ensure adequate time for system  development and performance and scalability testing, contracting issues,  privacy risks, and skilled staffing shortages. Going forward, it will be  important that the Bureau effectively manages these risks to better  ensure that it meets near-term milestones for system development and  testing, and is ready for the major operations of the 2020 Census.

Key Risk #3: The Bureau Faces Significant Cybersecurity Risks to Its Systems and Data

The risks to IT systems supporting the federal government and its  functions, including conducting the 2020 Census, are increasing as  security threats continue to evolve and become more sophisticated.  These risks include insider threats from witting or unwitting employees,  escalating and emerging threats from around the globe, and the  emergence of new and more destructive attacks. Underscoring the  importance of this issue, we have designated information security as a  government-wide high-risk area since 1997 and, in our most recent  biennial report to Congress, ensuring the cybersecurity of the nation was  one of nine high-risk areas that we reported needing especially focused  executive and congressional attention.

Our prior and ongoing work has identified significant challenges that the  Bureau faces in securing systems and data for the 2020 Census.  Specifically, the Bureau has faced challenges related to completing  security assessments, addressing security weaknesses, resolving  cybersecurity recommendations from DHS, and addressing numerous  other cybersecurity concerns (such as phishing).

The Bureau Has Made Progress in Completing Security Assessment, but Critical Work Remains

Federal law specifies requirements for protecting federal information and  information systems, such as those systems to be used in the 2020  Census. Specifically, the Federal Information Security Management Act of  2002 and the Federal Information Security Modernization Act of 2014 (FISMA) require executive branch agencies to develop, document, and  implement an agency-wide program to provide security for the information  and information systems that support operations and assets of the  agency.

In accordance with FISMA, National Institute of Standards and  Technology (NIST) guidance, and Office of Management and Budget  (OMB) guidance, the Bureau’s Office of the Chief Information Officer  (CIO) established a risk management framework. This framework  requires system developers to ensure that each of the Bureau’s systems  undergoes a full security assessment, and that system developers  remediate critical deficiencies.

According to the Bureau’s risk management framework, the systems  expected to be used to conduct the 2020 Census will need to have  complete security documentation (such as system security plans) and an  approved authorization to operate prior to their use. Currently, according  to the Bureau’s Office of the CIO:

Fourteen of the 52 systems have authorization to operate, and will not  need to be reauthorized before they are used in the 2020 Census

Thirty-two of the 52 systems have authorization to operate, and may  need to be reauthorized before they are used in the 2020 Census

Six of the 52 systems do not have authorization to operate, and will  need to be authorized before they are used in the 2020 Census.

Figure 5 summarizes the authorization to operate status for the systems  being used in the 2020 Census, as reported by the Bureau in April 2019.

As we have previously reported, while large-scale technological changes  (such as internet self-response) increase the likelihood of efficiency and  effectiveness gains, they also introduce many cybersecurity challenges.  The 2020 Census also involves collecting personally identifiable  information (PII) on over a hundred million households across the  country, which further increases the need to properly secure these  systems. Thus, it will be important that the Bureau provides adequate  time to perform these security assessments, completes them in a timely  manner, and ensures that risks are at an acceptable level before the  systems are deployed. We have ongoing work examining how the Bureau  plans to address both internal and external cyber threats, including its  efforts to complete system security assessments and resolve identified  weaknesses.

The Bureau Has Identified a Significant Number of Corrective Actions to Address Security Weaknesses, but Has Not Always Been Timely in Completing Them

FISMA requires that agency-wide information security programs include a  process for planning, implementing, evaluating, and documenting  remedial actions (i.e., corrective actions) to address any deficiencies in  the information security policies, procedures, and practices of the agency.  Agencies must establish procedures to reasonably ensure that all  information security control weaknesses, regardless of how or by whom  they are identified, are addressed through the agency’s remediation  processes.

For each identified control weakness, the agency is required to develop  and implement a plan of actions and milestones (POA&M) based on  findings from security control assessments, security impact analyses,  continuous monitoring of activities, audit reports, and other sources.  Additionally, the Bureau’s framework requires that security assessment  findings that need to be remediated are to be tracked as POA&Ms. These  POA&Ms are expected to provide a description of the vulnerabilities  identified during the security assessment that resulted from a control  weakness.

As of March 2019, the Bureau had over 500 open POA&Ms to remediate  for issues identified during security assessment activities, including  ongoing continuous monitoring. Of these open POA&Ms, 247 (or about  48 percent) were considered “high-risk” or “very high-risk.”

While the Bureau established POA&Ms for addressing these identified  security control weaknesses, it did not always complete remedial actions  in accordance with its established deadlines. For example, of the 247  open “high-risk” or “very high-risk” POA&Ms we reviewed through March  2019, the Bureau identified 115 as being delayed. Further, 70 of the 115  had missed their scheduled completion dates by 60 or more days. In  addition, the number of open “high-risk” or “very high-risk” POA&Ms that  the Bureau identified as delayed has substantially increased since June  2018, as shown in figure 6.

According to the Bureau, these POA&Ms were identified as delayed due  to technical challenges or resource constraints to remediate and close  them. However, without resolving identified vulnerabilities in a timely  manner, the Bureau faces an increased risk, as continuing opportunities  exist for unauthorized individuals to exploit these weaknesses and gain  access to sensitive information and systems.

The Bureau Has Begun Implementing DHS’s Cybersecurity Recommendations, but Has Not Established a Formal Process to Address Them

The Bureau is working with federal and industry partners, including the  Department of Homeland Security, to support the 2020 Census  cybersecurity efforts. Specifically, the Bureau is working with DHS to  ensure a scalable and secure network connection for the 2020 Census  respondents (e.g., virtual Trusted Internet Connection with the cloud),  improve its cybersecurity posture (e.g., improve risk management  processes and procedures), and to strengthen its response to potential  cyber threats (e.g., federal cyber incident coordination).

Federal law describes practices for strengthening cybersecurity by  documenting or tracking corrective actions. As previously mentioned,  FISMA requires executive branch agencies to establish a process for  planning, implementing, evaluating, and documenting remedial actions to  address any deficiencies in their information security policies, procedures,  and practices. GAO’s internal control standards also state that agencies  should establish effective internal control monitoring that includes a  process to promptly resolve the findings of audits and other reviews.  Specifically, agencies should document and complete corrective actions  to remediate identified deficiencies on a timely basis. This would include  correcting identified deficiencies or demonstrating that the findings and  recommendations do not warrant agency action.

Since January 2017, DHS has been providing cybersecurity assistance  (including issuing recommendations) to the Bureau in preparation for the  2020 Census, and the Bureau has reported making progress in  addressing those recommendations. Specifically, DHS has been  providing cybersecurity assistance to the Bureau in five areas: management coordination and executive support, including a  cybersecurity threat intelligence and information sharing enhancement  through, among other things, a DHS cyber threat briefing to the  Bureau’s leadership; network and infrastructure security and resilience, including National  Cybersecurity Protection System (also called EINSTEIN) support;  incident response and management readiness through a Federal  Incident Response Evaluation assessment; and  risk management and vulnerability assessments on specific targets  provided by the Bureau.

In the last 2 years, as a result of these activities, DHS has provided 17  recommendations for the Bureau to strengthen its cybersecurity efforts.  Among other things, the recommendations pertained to strengthening  incident management capabilities, penetration testing and web  application assessments of select systems, and phishing assessments to  gain access to sensitive PII. Due to the sensitive nature of the  recommendations, we are not identifying the specific recommendations or  specific findings associated with them in this statement.

As of February 2019, the Bureau had fully completed actions to address  three recommendations, needed to further improve on actions taken for  one recommendation it indicated had been completed, and needed to  complete actions in progress for the remaining 13 recommendations (as  summarized in table 3).

However, the Bureau had not established a formal process for  documenting, tracking, and completing corrective actions for all the  recommendations provided by DHS. To the Bureau’s credit, it had  incorporated the corrective actions associated with the three completed  recommendations into its formal process used for tracking POA&Ms,  which includes identifying remediation activities, resources required,  milestones, and completion dates. The Bureau did not incorporate the  remaining 14 recommendations into the POA&M process. Instead, in  November 2018, the Bureau created an informal document to track the 17  DHS recommendations, but this document does not consistently include  details such as the resources required, expected completion date, or  whether the recommendations do not warrant agency action.

Until the Bureau implements a formal process for tracking and  implementing appropriate corrective actions to remediate identified  cybersecurity weaknesses from DHS, and addresses the identified  deficiencies, it faces an increased likelihood that these weaknesses will  go uncorrected and may be exploited to cause harm to agency’s 2020  Census IT systems and gain access to sensitive respondent data.  Implementing a formal process would also help to ensure that DHS’s  efforts result in improvements to the Bureau’s cybersecurity posture.

The Bureau Faces Several Other Cybersecurity Challenges in Implementing the 2020 Census

The Bureau faces other significant cybersecurity challenges in addition to  those previously discussed. More specifically, we previously reported  that the extensive use of IT systems to support the 2020 Census redesign  may help increase efficiency, but that this redesign introduces critical  cybersecurity challenges. These challenges include those related to the  following:

Phishing. We have previously reported that advanced persistent  threats may be targeted against social media web sites used by the  federal government. In addition, attackers may use social media to  collect information and launch attacks against federal information  systems through social engineering, such as phishing. Phishing is a  digital form of social engineering that uses authentic-looking, but fake,  emails, websites, or instant messages to get users to download  malware, open malicious attachments, or open links that direct them  to a website that requests information or executes malicious code.  Phishing attacks could target respondents, as well as Bureau  employees and contractors. The 2020 Census will be the first one in  which respondents will be heavily encouraged to respond via the  internet. This will likely increase the risk that cyber criminals will use  phishing in an attempt to steal personal information.

Disinformation from social media. We previously reported that one  of the Bureau’s key innovations for the 2020 Census is the large-scale  implementation of an internet self-response option. The Bureau is  encouraging the public to use the internet self-response option  through expanded use of social media. However, the public  perception of the Bureau’s ability to adequately safeguard the privacy  and confidentiality of the 2020 Census internet self-responses could  be influenced by disinformation spread through social media.  According to the Bureau, if a substantial segment of the public is not  convinced that the Bureau can safeguard public response data  against data breaches and unauthorized use, then response rates  may be lower than projected, leading to an increase in cases for  follow-up and subsequent cost increases.

Ensuring that individuals gain only limited and appropriate  access to 2020 Census data. The Bureau plans to enable a public- facing website and Bureau-issued mobile devices to collect PII (e.g.,  name, address, and date of birth) from the nation’s entire population— estimated to be over 300 million. In addition, the Bureau is planning to  obtain and store administrative records containing PII from other  government agencies to help augment information that enumerators  did not collect.

The number of reported security incidents involving PII at federal  agencies has increased dramatically in recent years. Because of  these challenges, we have recommended, among other things, that  federal agencies improve their response to information security  incidents and data breaches involving PII, and consistently develop  and implement privacy policies and procedures. Accordingly, it will be  important for the Bureau to ensure that only respondents and Bureau  officials are able to gain access to this information, and enumerators  and other employees only have access to the information needed to  perform their jobs.

Ensuring adequate control in a cloud environment. The Bureau  has decided to use cloud solutions as a key component of the 2020  Census IT infrastructure. We have previously reported that cloud  computing has both positive and negative information security  implications and, thus, federal agencies should develop service-level  agreements with cloud providers. These agreements should specify,  among other things, the security performance requirements— including data reliability, preservation, privacy, and access rights— that the service provider is to meet. Without these safeguards,  computer systems and networks, as well as the critical operations and  key infrastructures they support, may be lost; information—including  sensitive personal information—may be compromised; and the  agency’s operations could be disrupted.

Ensuring contingency and incident response plans are in place  to encompass all of the IT systems to be used to support the  2020 Census. Because of the brief time frame for collecting data  during the 2020 Census, it is especially important that systems are  available for respondents to ensure a high response rate.  Contingency planning and incident response help ensure that, if  normal operations are interrupted, network managers will be able to  detect, mitigate, and recover from a service disruption while  preserving access to vital information. Implementing important  security controls, including policies, procedures, and techniques for  contingency planning and incident response, helps to ensure the  confidentiality, integrity, and availability of information and systems,  even during disruptions of service. Without contingency and incident  response plans, system availability might be impacted and result in a  lower response rate.

The Bureau’s CIO has acknowledged these cybersecurity challenges and  is working to address them, according to Bureau documentation. In  addition, we have ongoing work looking at many of these challenges,  including the Bureau’s plans to protect PII, use a cloud-based  infrastructure, and recover from security incidents and other disasters.

Key Risk #4: The Bureau Will Need to Control Any Further Cost Growth and Develop Cost Estimates That Reflect Best Practices

Since 2015, the Bureau has made progress in improving its ability to  develop a reliable cost estimate. We have reported on the reliability of the  $12.3 billion life-cycle cost estimate released in October 2015 and the  $15.6 billion revised cost estimate released in October 2017. In 2016 we  reported that the October 2015 version of the Bureau’s life-cycle cost  estimate for the 2020 Census was not reliable. Specifically, we found that  the 2020 Census life-cycle cost estimate partially met two of the  characteristics of a reliable cost estimate (comprehensive and accurate)  and minimally met the other two (well-documented and credible). We  recommended that the Bureau take specific steps to ensure its cost  estimate meets the characteristics of a high-quality estimate. The Bureau  agreed and has taken action to improve the reliability of the cost estimate.

In August 2018 we reported that while improvements had been made, the  Bureau’s October 2017 cost estimate for the 2020 Census did not fully  reflect all the characteristics of a reliable estimate. (See figure 7.)

In order for a cost estimate to be deemed reliable as described in GAO’s  Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide and thus, to effectively inform  2020 Census annual budgetary figures, the cost estimate must meet or  substantially meet the following four characteristics:

Well-Documented. Cost estimates are considered valid if they are  well-documented to the point they can be easily repeated or updated  and can be traced to original sources through auditing, according to  best practices.

Accurate. Accurate estimates are unbiased and contain few  mathematical mistakes.

Credible. Credible cost estimates must clearly identify limitations due  to uncertainty or bias surrounding the data or assumptions, according  to best practices.

Comprehensive. To be comprehensive an estimate should have  enough detail to ensure that cost elements are neither omitted nor  double-counted, and all cost-influencing assumptions are detailed in  the estimate’s documentation, among other things, according to best  practices.

The 2017 cost estimate only partially met the characteristic of being well- documented. In general, some documentation was missing, inconsistent,  or difficult to understand. Specifically, we found that source data did not  always support the information described in the basis of estimate  document or could not be found in the files provided for two of the  Bureau’s largest field operations: Address Canvassing and Non- Response Follow-Up. We also found that some of the cost elements did  not trace clearly to supporting spreadsheets and assumption documents.

Failure to document an estimate in enough detail makes it more difficult to  replicate calculations, or to detect possible errors in the estimate; reduces  transparency of the estimation process; and can undermine the ability to  use the information to improve future cost estimates or even to reconcile  the estimate with another independent cost estimate. The Bureau told us  it would continue to make improvements to ensure the estimate is well- documented.

Increased Costs Are Driven by an Assumed Decrease in Self- Response Rates and Increases in Contingency Funds and IT Cost Categories

The 2017 life-cycle cost estimate includes significantly higher costs than  those included in the 2015 estimate. The largest increases occurred in  the Response, Managerial Contingency, and Census/Survey Engineering  categories. For example, increased costs of $1.3 billion in the response  category (costs related to collecting, maintaining, and processing survey  response data) were in part due to reduced assumptions for self- response rates, leading to increases in the amount of data collected in the  field, which is more costly to the Bureau.

Contingency allocations increased overall from $1.35 billion in 2015 to  $2.6 billion in 2017, as the Bureau gained a greater understanding of  risks facing the 2020 Census. Increases of $838 million in the  Census/Survey Engineering category were due mainly to the cost of an IT  contract for integrating decennial survey systems that was not included in  the 2015 cost estimate. Bureau officials attribute a decrease of $551  million in estimated costs for Program Management to changes in the  categorization of costs associated with risks.

Specifically, in the 2017 version of the estimate, estimated costs related  to program risks were allocated to their corresponding work breakdown  structure (WBS) element. Figure 8 shows the change in cost by WBS  category for 2015 and 2017.

More generally, factors that contributed to cost fluctuations between the  2015 and 2017 cost estimates include:

Changes in assumptions. Among other changes, a decrease in the  assumed rate for self-response from 63.5 percent in 2015 to 60.5  percent in 2017 increased the cost of collecting responses from  nonresponding housing units.

Improved ability to anticipate and quantify risk. In general,  contingency allocations designed to address the effects of potential  risks increased overall from $1.3 billion in 2015 to $2.6 billion in 2017.

An overall increase in IT costs. IT cost increases, totaling $1.59  billion, represented almost 50 percent of the total cost increase from  2015 to 2017.

More defined contract requirements. Bureau documents described  an overall improvement in the Bureau’s ability to define and specify  contract requirements. This resulted in updated estimates for several  contracts, including for the Census Questionnaire Assistance  contract.

However, while the Bureau has been able to better quantify risk; in  August 2018 we also reported that the Secretary of Commerce included a  contingency amount of about $1.2 billion in the 2017 cost estimate to  account for what the Bureau refers to as “unknown unknowns.” According  to Bureau documentation these include such risks as natural disasters or  cyber attacks. The Bureau provides a description of how the risk  contingency for “unknown unknowns” is calculated; however, this  description does not clearly link calculated amounts to the risks  themselves. Thus, only $14.4 billion of the Bureau’s $15.6 billion cost  estimate has justification. According to Bureau officials, the cost estimate  remains at $15.6 billion, but they are managing the 2020 Census at a  lower level of funding—$14.1 billion and, at this time, do not plan to  request funding for the $1.2 billion contingency fund for unknown  unknowns or $369 million in funding for selected discrete program risks  for what-if scenarios such as an increase in the wage rate or additional  supervisors needed to manage field operations. Instead of requesting  funding for these contingencies upfront the Bureau plans to work with  OMB and Commerce to request additional funds, if the need arises.

According to Bureau officials they anticipate that the remaining $1.1  billion in contingency funding included in the $14.1 billion will be sufficient  to carry out the 2020 Census. In June 2016 we recommended the Bureau  improve control over how risk and uncertainty are accounted for. This  prior recommendation remains valid given the life-cycle cost estimate still  includes the $1.2 billion unjustified contingency fund for “unknown  unknowns”.

Moreover, given the cost growth between 2015 and 2017 it will be  important for the Bureau to monitor cost in real-time, as well as,  document, explain and review variances between planned and actual  cost. In August 2018 we reported that the Bureau had not been tracking  variances between estimated life-cycle costs and actual expenses. Tools  to track variance enable management to measure progress against  planned outcomes and will help inform the 2030 Census cost estimate.  Bureau officials stated that they already have systems in place that can  be adapted for tracking estimated and actual costs. We will continue to  monitor the status of the tracking system.

According to Bureau officials it plans to release an updated version of the  2020 Census life-cycle estimate in the spring of 2019. To ensure that  future updates to the life-cycle cost estimate reflect best practices, it will  be important for the Bureau to implement our recommendation related to  the cost estimate.

Continued Management Attention Needed to Keep Preparations on Track and Help Ensure a Cost- Effective Enumeration

2020 Challenges Are Symptomatic of Deeper Long-Term Organizational Issues

The difficulties facing the Bureau’s preparation for the decennial census  in such areas as planning and testing; managing and overseeing IT  programs, systems, and contractors supporting the enumeration;  developing reliable cost estimates; prioritizing decisions; managing  schedules; and other challenges, are symptomatic of deeper  organizational issues.

Following the 2010 Census, a key lesson learned for 2020 that we  identified was ensuring that the Bureau’s organizational culture and  structure, as well as its approach to strategic planning, human capital  management, internal collaboration, knowledge sharing, capital decision- making, risk and change management, and other internal functions are  aligned toward delivering more cost-effective outcomes.

The Bureau has made improvements over the last decade, and continued  progress will depend in part on sustaining efforts to strengthen risk  management activities, enhancing systems testing, bringing in  experienced personnel to key positions, implementing our  recommendations, and meeting regularly with officials from its parent  agency, Commerce.

Going forward, we have reported that the key elements needed to make  progress in high-risk areas are top-level attention by the administration  and agency officials to (1) leadership commitment, (2) ensuring capacity,  (3) developing a corrective action plan, (4) regular monitoring, and (5)  demonstrated progress. Although important steps have been taken in at  least some of these areas, overall, far more work is needed. We discuss  three of five areas below.

The Secretary of Commerce has successfully demonstrated leadership  commitment. For example, the Bureau and Commerce have strengthened  this area with executive-level oversight of the 2020 Census by holding  regular meetings on the status of IT systems and other risk areas. In  addition, in 2017 Commerce designated a team to assist senior Bureau  management with cost estimation challenges. Moreover, on January 2,  2019, a new Director of the Census Bureau took office, a position that  had been vacant since June 2017.

With regard to capacity, the Bureau has improved the cost estimation  process of the decennial when it established guidance including:  roles and responsibilities for oversight and approval of cost estimation  processes, procedures requiring a detailed description of the steps taken to  produce a high-quality cost estimate, and a process for updating the cost estimate and associated documents  over the life of a project.

However, the Bureau continues to experience skills gaps in the  government program management office overseeing the $886 million  contract for integrating the IT systems needed to conduct the 2020  Census. Specifically, as of February 2019, 15 of 44 positions in this office  were vacant.

For the monitoring element, we found to track performance of decennial  census operations, the Bureau relied on reports to track progress against  pre-set goals for a test conducted in 2018. According to the Bureau, these  same reports will be used in 2020 to track progress. However, the  Bureau’s schedule for developing IT systems during the 2018 End-to-End  test experienced delays that compressed the time available for system  testing, integration testing, and security assessments. These schedule  delays contributed to systems experiencing problems after deployment,  as well as cybersecurity challenges. In the months ahead, we will  continue to monitor the Bureau’s progress in addressing each of the five  elements essential for reducing the risk to a cost-effective enumeration.

Further Actions Needed on Our Recommendations

Over the past several years we have issued numerous reports that  underscored the fact that, if the Bureau was to successfully meet its cost  savings goal for the 2020 Census, the agency needed to take significant  actions to improve its research, testing, planning, scheduling, cost  estimation, system development, and IT security practices. As of April  2019, we have made 97 recommendations related to the 2020 Census.  The Bureau has implemented 72 of these recommendations, 24 remain  open, and one recommendation was closed as not implemented. Of the  24 open recommendations, 11 were directed at improving the  implementation of the innovations for the 2020 Census. Commerce  generally agreed with our recommendations and is taking steps to  implement them. Moreover, in April 2018 we designated 15  recommendations as “priority.” Priority recommendations are those  recommendations that we believe warrant priority attention from heads of  key departments and agencies. Eight of these 15 priority  recommendations have been closed as implemented over the past year.

On July 19, 2018, in response to our April 2018 letter calling his attention  to our priority recommendations, the Commerce Secretary concurred that  there was still much work to be done, and that the number of our priority  recommendations concerning the 2020 Census was reflective of  Commerce’s focus on ensuring a successful census in 2020. On April 23,  2019, we sent an updated priority recommendation letter to the  Commerce Secretary that included five new recommendations from our  recent work and also reflected the department’s progress on  implementing past recommendations.

We believe that attention to these recommendations is essential for a  cost-effective enumeration. The recommendations included implementing  reliable cost estimation and scheduling practices in order to establish  better control over program costs, as well as taking steps to better  position the Bureau to develop an internet response option for the 2020  Census.

In addition to our recommendations, to better position the Bureau for a  more cost-effective enumeration, on March 18, 2019, we met with OMB,  Commerce, and Bureau officials to discuss the Bureau’s progress in  reducing the risks facing the census. We also meet regularly with Bureau  officials and managers to discuss the progress and status of open  recommendations related to the 2020 Census, which has resulted in  Bureau actions in recent months leading to closure of some  recommendations. We are encouraged by this commitment by Commerce  and the Bureau in addressing our recommendations. Implementing our  recommendations in a complete and timely manner is important because  it could improve the management of the 2020 Census and help to  mitigate continued risks.

In conclusion, while the Bureau has made progress in revamping its  approach to the census, it faces considerable challenges and  uncertainties in implementing key cost-saving innovations and ensuring  they function under operational conditions; managing the development  and testing of its IT systems; ensuring the cybersecurity of its systems  and data; and developing a quality cost estimate for the 2020 Census and  preventing further cost increases. For these reasons, the 2020 Census is  a GAO high-risk area.

Regarding cybersecurity, the Bureau’s involvement of DHS to improve its  cybersecurity posture, including cyber threat briefings and vulnerability  assessments, is a positive step forward. However, the Bureau’s corrective  actions to address its high-risk and very high-risk security weaknesses  are frequently delayed—often for months—which increases the risk that  these weaknesses could be exploited to cause harm to the agency’s  systems. In addition, the Bureau’s process for addressing DHS’s  cybersecurity recommendations has shortcomings, which increases the  risk that the underlying deficiencies identified by DHS may be exploited to  gain access to the Bureau’s systems and sensitive data.

Going forward, continued management attention and oversight will be  vital for ensuring that risks are managed, preparations stay on track, and  the Bureau is held accountable for implementing the enumeration, as  planned. Without timely and appropriate actions, the challenges  previously discussed could adversely affect the cost, accuracy, schedule,  and security of the enumeration. We will continue to assess the Bureau’s  efforts and look forward to keeping Congress informed of the Bureau’s  progress.

We are making the following two recommendations to Commerce:  The Secretary of Commerce should direct the Director of the Census  Bureau to direct the Census Bureau’s CIO to take steps to ensure that  identified corrective actions for cybersecurity weaknesses are  implemented within prescribed time frames. (Recommendation 1)

The Secretary of Commerce should direct the Director of the Census  Bureau to direct the Bureau’s CIO to implement a formal process for  tracking and executing appropriate corrective actions to remediate  cybersecurity weaknesses identified by DHS, and expeditiously address  the identified deficiencies. (Recommendation 2)

Chairman Serrano, Ranking Member Aderholt, and Members of the  Subcommittee, this completes our prepared statement. We would be  pleased to respond to any questions that you may have.

If you have any questions about this statement, please contact Robert  Goldenkoff at (202) 512-2757 or by email at goldenkoffr@gao.gov or Nick  Marinos at (202) 512-9342 or by email at marinosn@gao.gov. Contact  points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may  be found on the last page of this statement. Other key contributors to this  testimony include Jon Ticehurst (Assistant Director); Ty Mitchell  (Assistant Director); Lisa Pearson (Assistant Director); Andrea Starosciak  (Analyst in Charge); Christopher Businsky, Rebecca Eyler, Scott Pettis,  Lindsey Pilver; Kate Sharkey; Kevin R. Smith; Umesh Thakkar; and Tim  Wexler.

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the  United States. The published product may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety  without further permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain  copyrighted images or other material, permission from the copyright holder may be  necessary if you wish to reproduce this material separately.

In an effort to control rising costs, the Census Bureau plans to implement several innovations for the 2020 Census, including new IT systems.

This testimony describes why the 2020 Census, which we added to our High Risk List in February 2017, remains there today. It also covers the steps the Commerce Department and Census Bureau need to take to reduce risk. These include completing IT system development and testing and addressing cybersecurity issues.

We have made 97 recommendations on the 2020 Census. As of April 2019, 72 had been implemented. This testimony also makes 2 new recommendations to improve Bureau cybersecurity efforts.