Space Acquisitions: DOD Faces Significant Challenges as it Seeks to Accelerate Space Programs and Address Threats

DOD space systems provide critical capabilities that support military and other government operations. They can also be expensive to acquire and field, costing billions of dollars each year.

As DOD seeks to replenish its satellite constellations, it faces a number of challenges to ensuring funds are used effectively. Because space-based capabilities are fundamental to U.S. national security and civilian activities, it is essential that DOD manage its space system acquisitions carefully and avoid repeating past problems.

This statement provides an update on DOD's space acquisitions, focusing on challenges facing acquisitions of new space systems.

This statement is based on GAO reports issued over the past 10 years on DOD space programs. In addition it draws on recent work performed in support of GAO's 2019 annual reports on the progress of major defense acquisition programs as well as duplication, overlap, and fragmentation across the federal government, among other sources.

DOD is simultaneously undertaking new major acquisitions to replenish its missile warning, protected communications, navigation, and weather satellites. At the same time, it is boosting efforts to increase space situational awareness and protect space assets. Such widespread acquisition acitivites could face a wide range of resource and management challenges that GAO has reported on, including:

Growing threats to satellites . Threats to satellites from both adversaries— such as jamming and cyber attacks—and space debris are increasing. DOD is making changes to how it designs its space systems to increase the resilience and survivability of space capabilities. But it has been challenged in adopting new approaches, such as using commercial satellites to host payloads, and in prioritizing cybersecurity for all of its weapon systems. For hosted payloads, GAO recommended, and DOD concurred, that the department bolster and centralize collection and analysis of cost, technical, and lessons learned data.

Implementing leadership changes . DOD is planning major changes to leadership for space. It recently proposed legislation to establish a United States Space Force—initially to be housed within the Department of the Air Force—that would, according to the President's Space Policy Directive, consolidate existing military space activities and minimize duplicative efforts across DOD. GAO found in July 2016 that changes are needed to reduce fragmentation that has negatively affected space programs for many years. But open questions remain about governance as new programs get underway and whether the changes themselves may result in further fragmentation. For example, it is unclear at this time how the new Space Development Agency will mesh with organizations currently involved in testing and acquiring new space technologies.

Having the right resources and know-how . While there is increased attention on funding for space and building the Space Force, new programs can still face resource challenges. DOD has begun over 9 new space programs at a time when it is also seeking increased investments in ships, aircraft, and the nuclear triad, among other programs. Moreover, it is unclear whether DOD has a sufficient workforce to manage its new programs. GAO issued a report earlier this month that found DOD does not routinely monitor the size, mix, and location of its space acquisition workforce. Further, DOD has difficulty attracting and retaining candidates with the requisite technical expertise. GAO recommended that DOD collect and maintain data on its space acquisition workforce. DOD did not concur, but GAO maintains that DOD should have better information on such personnel, especially in light of its proposal for establishing the Space Force. GAO also found in March 2019 that key software-intensive space programs often did not effectively engage users to understand requirements and obtain feedback. GAO recommended, and DOD concurred, that the department ensure its guidance addressing software development provides specific, required direction on the timing, frequency, and documentation of user involvement and feedback.

Past GAO reports have recommended that DOD adopt acquisition best practices to help ensure cost and schedule goals are met. DOD has generally agreed and taken some actions to address these recommendations.

I am pleased to have the opportunity to discuss the Department of  Defense’s (DOD) space system acquisitions. DOD’s space systems  provide critical capabilities that support military and other government  operations and can take years to develop, produce, and launch. These  systems can also be expensive to acquire and field, amounting to billions  of dollars each year. Given the time and resource demands of DOD’s  space systems and the need for funds to be used effectively, and  because space-based capabilities are fundamental to U.S. national  security and civilian activities, it is essential that DOD manage space  system acquisitions carefully and avoid repeating past problems.

My statement will focus on (1) the current status and cost of major DOD  space programs and (2) challenges facing acquisitions of new space  systems.

This statement is based on our reports on DOD space programs issued  over the past 10 years and recent work performed in support of our  annual weapon systems assessments to be issued later this year. It is  also based on space-related work in support of our forthcoming 2019  annual report on duplication, overlap, and fragmentation across the  federal government; and our updates on cost increases, investment  trends, and improvements in the last year. More information on our  objectives, scope, and methodology is available in our related products,  which are listed at the end of this statement.

More detailed information on our objectives, scope, and methodology for  our work can be found in the issued reports. We conducted the work on  which this statement is based in accordance with generally accepted  government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan  and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide  a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit  objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable  basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.

DOD space systems support and provide a wide range of capabilities to a  large number of users, including the military services, the intelligence  community, civil agencies, and others. These capabilities include  positioning, navigation, and timing; meteorology; missile warning; and  secure communications, among others. Space systems can take a long  time to develop and involve multiple segments, including space, ground  control stations, terminals, user equipment, and launch, as figure 1 below  shows. DOD satellite systems are also expensive to acquire. Unit costs  for current DOD satellites can range from $500 million to over $3 billion.  The associated ground systems can cost over $6 billion to develop and  maintain and the cost to launch a satellite can climb to well over $100  million.

Table 1 provides highlights of the current status of DOD’s major space  programs. As the table shows, DOD is also in the beginning phases of  acquiring several constellations of new satellites and ground processing  capabilities—including for missile warning, protected communications,  space-based environmental monitoring, and space command and control.  We have work underway to assess the Air Force’s space command and  control development efforts and examine DOD’s analysis of alternatives  for wideband communication services. For a more complete description of  these major space programs, see appendix I. In addition, DOD is  exploring alternatives for acquiring wideband satellite communications as  well as funding development of new launch vehicles as it pursues a new  acquisition strategy for procuring launch services.

Our prior work has shown that many major DOD space programs have  experienced significant cost increases and schedule delays. For instance,  the total program cost for the Advanced Extremely High Frequency  (AEHF) satellite program, a protected satellite communications system,  has grown 117 percent since the program’s original cost estimate and its  first satellite was launched more than 3.5 years late. For the Space Based  Infrared System (SBIRS), a missile warning satellite program, the  program cost grew 265 percent from its original estimate and the launch  of the first satellite was delayed roughly 9 years. Both programs moved to  the production phase where fewer problems tend to surface, and where  there is typically less risk of significant cost and schedule growth. A more  recent major satellite program, Global Positioning System (GPS) III, has  seen an almost 4-year delay due to technical issues and program cost  growth of about 32 percent.

Cost and schedule growth has also been a challenge for satellite ground  systems and user equipment. Ground system delays have been so  lengthy, that satellites sometimes spend years in orbit before key  capabilities can be fully exploited. For example,

The command and control system for GPS III satellites, known as the  Next Generation Operational Control System, or OCX, is  approximately 5 years behind schedule. As a result, the Air Force has  had to start two separate back-up efforts to modify the current ground  system to ensure the continuity of GPS capabilities and to make anti- jamming capabilities available via Military Code, or M-code, until OCX  is delivered. Our ongoing review of GPS includes an assessment of  OCX schedule risk and potential impacts on OCX delivery,  acceptance, and operation. We expect to issue our report on GPS in  spring 2019.

Development of GPS user equipment that can utilize the M-Code  signal has lagged behind the fielding of GPS M-code satellites for  more than a decade, due to prolonged development challenges. In  December 2017, we found that while DOD had made some progress  on initial testing of the receiver cards needed to utilize the M-code  signal, additional development was necessary to make M-code work  with the over 700 weapon systems that require it. We also found that  DOD had begun initial planning to transition some weapon systems to  use M-code receivers, but significantly more work remained to  understand the cost and schedule of transitioning to M-code receivers  across DOD. Further, in December 2017, we found that multiple  entities were separately maturing their own receiver cards. We  recommended that DOD assign responsibility to a single organization  to collect test data, lessons learned, and design solutions so that  common design solutions are employed and DOD could avoid  duplication of efforts. DOD concurred with the recommendation, but  has not yet taken action on it.

We have previously reported that over 90 percent of the capabilities to  be provided by Mobile User Objective System communications   satellites—currently, five satellites are in orbit, the first of which  launched in 2012—are being underutilized because of difficulties with  integrating the space, ground, and terminal segments and delays in  fielding compatible user terminals.

Largely because of technical and management challenges, the Joint  Space Operations Center Mission System (JMS) Increment 2  program—intended to replace and improve upon an aging space  situational awareness and command and control system—was almost  3 years behind schedule and 42 percent over budget before the Air  Force stopped development work last year. Earlier this month, we  reported that operational testing in 2018 found that JMS Increment 2  was not operationally effective or suitable due, in part, to missing  software requirements, urgent deficiencies that affected system  performance, and negative user feedback.

Cost and schedule growth in DOD’s space programs is sometimes driven  by the inherent risks associated with developing complex space  technology; however, over the past 10 years we have identified a number  of other management and oversight problems that have worsened the  situation. These include making overly optimistic cost and schedule  estimates, pushing programs forward without sufficient knowledge about  technology and design, and experiencing problems in overseeing and  managing contractors, among others. We have also noted that some of  DOD’s programs with operational satellites, such as SBIRS, were also  exceedingly ambitious, which in turn increased technology, design, and  engineering risks. While SBIRS and other satellite programs provide  users with important and useful capabilities, their cost growth has  significantly limited the department’s buying power at a time when more  resources may be needed to protect space systems and recapitalize the  space portfolio.

Challenges Facing Acquisitions of New Space Systems

DOD faces significant challenges as it replenishes its satellite  constellations. First, DOD is confronted with growing threats in space,  which may require very different satellite architectures and acquisition  strategies. Second, DOD is in the midst of planning major changes to its  leadership for space. While these changes are designed to streamline  decision-making and bring together a dispersed space workforce, they could cause some disruption to space system acquisition programs.  Third, in fiscal year 2016, Congress gave DOD authority to speed up  acquisition timeframes by streamlining acquisition processes and  oversight. GAO is examining DOD’s application of streamlining to its  weapons programs. For space, challenges with past streamlining efforts  may offer some lessons learned. And fourth, DOD may face resource and  capacity challenges in taking on multiple space acquisitions at one time.  For example, our work and other reports point to potential gaps in the  space acquisition workforce and ongoing difficulties managing software  development.

Growing Threats to Satellites Require New Approaches

According to Air Force Space Command and others, U.S. space systems  face intentional and unintentional threats that have increased rapidly over  the past 20 years. These include radio frequency interference (including  jamming), laser attacks, kinetic intercept vehicles, and ground system  attacks. Additionally, the hazards of the already-harsh space environment  (e.g., extreme temperature fluctuations and radiation) have increased,  including numbers of active and inactive satellites, spent rocket bodies,  and other fragments and debris. According to a February 2019 Defense  Intelligence Agency report, China and Russia in particular are developing  a variety of means to exploit perceived U.S. reliance on space-based  systems and challenge the U.S. position in space. The report also states  that Iran and North Korea have demonstrated some counterspace  capabilities that could pose a threat to militaries using space-based  services.

In response, recent governmentwide and DOD strategic and policy  guidance have stressed the need for U.S. space systems to be survivable  or resilient against such threats and DOD has taken steps to be more  resilient in some of its new programs. As we found in October 2014, one  way to do this is to build more disaggregated systems, including  dispersing sensors onto separate satellites; using multiple domains,  including space, air, and ground to provide full mission capabilities;  hosting payloads on other government or commercial spacecraft; or some  combination of these. With capabilities distributed across multiple  platforms, rather than centralized onto just a few satellites, it may be more  difficult for an adversary to target all assets to attack full system  capabilities, and if an attack does take place, the loss of one smaller  satellite or payload could result in less capability loss than damage to, or  loss of, a large multifunctional satellite. In addition to disaggregation,  DOD could make satellites more maneuverable and build in defense  capabilities to protect themselves as a means to increase survivability.

We also found in October 2014 that some of these options could have  beneficial impacts on acquisition. For example, acquiring smaller, less  complex satellites may require less time and effort to develop and  produce. This may be in part due to improved requirements discipline, as  more frequent production rates may allow program managers to delay  new requirements to the next production cycle instead of incorporating  them into ongoing timelines midstream. Building more, less-complex  satellites might also provide DOD the opportunity to use commercial  products and systems that have already been tested in the market. At the  same time, however, addressing the need to make satellites more  resilient could introduce complications. For example, DOD may need to  acquire higher quantities of satellites, which may make it more difficult to  manage acquisition schedules. In addition, potentially more development  and production contracts may result in more complexity for program  offices to manage, requiring increased oversight of contractors. Adding  more satellites and new technologies may also complicate efforts to  synchronize satellite, terminal, and ground system schedules, limiting  delivery of capabilities to end users.

Our work has also found potential barriers to making satellites more  resilient. For example, in October 2014, we found that disaggregation  could require DOD to make significant cultural and process changes in  how it acquires space systems—for instance, by relying on new  contractors, relinquishing control to providers who host government  payloads on commercial satellites, using different contracting methods,  and executing smaller but more numerous and faster-paced acquisition  programs. It will likely require DOD to be more flexible and agile when it  comes to satellite acquisitions, especially with regard to coordinating  satellite delivery with interdependent systems, such as user equipment.  Yet, as we have previously found, DOD’s culture has generally been  resistant to changes in space acquisition approaches, and fragmented  responsibilities have made it very difficult to coordinate and deliver interdependent systems. Senior leaders have recognized the need to  change the space acquisition culture, and as discussed below, changes  are being made to space leadership and acquisition approaches.

More recently, in July 2018, we found that two factors have contributed to  DOD’s limited use of commercially hosted payloads. First, DOD officials  identified logistical challenges to matching government payloads with any  given commercial host satellite. For example, most of the offices we  spoke with cited size, weight, and power constraints, among others, as  barriers to using hosted payloads. Second, while individual DOD offices  have realized cost and schedule benefits from using hosted payloads,  DOD as a whole has limited information on costs and benefits of hosted  payloads. Further, the knowledge DOD obtained is fragmented across the  agency—with multiple offices collecting piecemeal information on the use  of hosted payloads. The limited knowledge and data on hosted payloads  that is fragmented across the agency has contributed to resistance  among space acquisition officials to adopting this approach. We  recommended, and DOD concurred, that the department bolster and  centralize collection and analysis of cost, technical, and lessons learned  data on its use of hosted payloads.

Lastly, in October 2018, we found that DOD faced mounting challenges in  protecting its weapon systems—satellites and their ground systems  included—from increasingly sophisticated cyber threats. We reported  that this was due to the computerized nature of weapon systems, DOD’s  late start in prioritizing weapon system cybersecurity, and DOD’s nascent  understanding of how to develop more secure weapon systems. In  operational testing, DOD routinely found mission-critical cyber  vulnerabilities in systems that were under development, yet program  officials GAO met with believed their systems were secure and even  discounted some test results as unrealistic. Using relatively simple tools  and techniques, testers were able to take control of systems and operate  largely undetected, due in part to basic issues such as poor password  management and unencrypted communications. DOD has recently taken  several steps to improve weapon system cybersecurity, including issuing  and revising policies and guidance to better incorporate cybersecurity  considerations. Further, in response to congressional direction, DOD has  also begun initiatives to better understand and address cyber  vulnerabilities.

Space Leadership Changes Are a Positive Step, But Have Some Risk

We and others have reported for over two decades that fragmentation  and overlap in DOD space acquisition management and oversight have  contributed to program delays and cancellations, cost increases, and  inefficient operations. For example, in February 2012 we found that  fragmented leadership contributed to a 10-year gap between the delivery  of GPS satellites and associated user equipment. The cancellations of  several large programs over the past 2 decades were in part because of  disagreements and conflicts among stakeholders.

In July 2016, in response to a provision of a Senate Report  accompanying a bill for the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal  Year 2016, we issued a report that reviewed space leadership in more  depth and concluded that DOD space leadership was fragmented. We  identified approximately 60 stakeholder organizations across DOD, the  Executive Office of the President, the Intelligence Community, and civilian  agencies. Of these, eight organizations had space acquisition  management responsibilities; eleven had oversight responsibilities; and  six were involved in setting requirements for defense space programs. At  the same time, many experts stated that no one seemed to be in charge  of space acquisitions. Our report highlighted the pros and cons of various  options to reorganize space functions recommended in prior  congressionally-chartered studies. The issue has taken on more  importance in recent years, as DOD has realized satellites are highly  vulnerable to attacks and needs to make dramatic changes in space  system architectures and operations. We have found that leadership has  not been focused enough to overcome interagency rivalries and  resistance to change, and it has not been able to get concurrence on  future architectures.

The President’s Administration and DOD have taken significant steps to  change space leadership. Most recent is the President’s Space Policy  Directive-4, issued on February 19, 2019, and DOD’s subsequent  legislative proposal submitted on March 1, 2019, to establish a United  States Space Force as a sixth branch of the United States Armed Forces  within the Department of the Air Force. The Policy Directive states that  this is an important step toward a future military department for space and  that the Space Force will (1) consolidate existing forces and authorities  for military space activities, as appropriate, to minimize duplication of  effort and eliminate bureaucratic inefficiencies; and (2) not include the  National Aeronautics and Space Administration, the National Oceanic and  Atmospheric Administration, the National Reconnaissance Office, or other  non-military space organizations or missions of the United States  Government.

According to the Policy Directive, the Space Force would include the  uniformed and civilian personnel conducting and directly supporting  space operations from all DOD Armed Forces, assume responsibilities for  all major military space acquisition programs, and create the appropriate  career tracks for military and civilian space personnel across all relevant  specialties. Pertaining to organization and leadership, the Policy Directive  creates a civilian Under Secretary of the Air Force for Space, to be known  as the Under Secretary for Space, appointed by the President, and  establishes a Chief of Staff of the Space Force, who would serve as a  member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Furthermore, the Policy Directive states that as the Space Force matures,  and as national security requires, it will become necessary to create a  separate military department, to be known as the Department of the  Space Force. This department would take over some or all  responsibilities for the Space Force from the Department of the Air Force.  The Policy Directive requires the Secretary of Defense to conduct  periodic reviews to determine when to recommend that the President  seek legislation to establish such a department.

Our past work has identified fragmentation in space leadership, but  because implementation has not yet occurred, it remains to be seen  whether this policy directive and proposed legislation would resolve these  issues. In implementing these changes there are many complexities to  consider. For example, because space capabilities are acquired and used  across the military services and defense agencies, it will be important to  address many details on how to implement a Space Force among these  equities. Our past work suggests that without close attention to the  consequences of the compromises that will inevitably have to be made to  carve out a new force structure from existing space functions, there is risk  of exacerbating the fragmentation and ineffective management and  oversight the Space Force is intended to address. For instance, earlier  this month, DOD established the Space Development Agency to unify  and integrate efforts across DOD to define, develop, and field innovative  solutions. But it is unclear how this new organization will mesh with the  Air Force Space and Missile Systems Center, which acquires satellites,  the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, which creates  breakthrough technologies and capabilities, and similar organizations.

Moreover, even if changes are implemented effectively, they are only a  first step toward addressing space acquisition problems. As we discuss  below, programs will still need to embrace acquisition best practices, such  as using demonstrable knowledge to make decisions. Our prior work has  found that they will also need to be open to flexible and innovative  approaches, and work effectively with a very wide range of stakeholders,  including those that will not be part of the Space Force, such as the  intelligence agencies, civilian space agencies, the current military  services, as well as entities within the Office of the Secretary of Defense  who help oversee and manage acquisitions. Senior leaders have  acknowledged that additional changes are needed and have taken steps  to help bring them about, such as the restructuring of the Air Force’s  Space and Missile Systems Center, which is designed to break down  stovepipes and streamline acquisition processes.

Past Streamlining Efforts Offer Lessons Learned

DOD is managing a number of new space acquisition programs using a  new authority, established under Section 804 of the National Defense  Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016, which is to provide a streamlined  alternative to the traditional DOD acquisition process. Specifically, the  programs—which include follow-on missile warning and protected  communications satellites, among others—will be exempted from the  acquisition and requirements processes defined by DOD Directive  5000.01 and the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development  System. Instead, program managers are encouraged to use a tailored  approach to documentation and oversight to enable them to demonstrate  new technologies or field new or updated systems within 2 to 5 years. We  have ongoing work looking across the military departments at how  middle-tier acquisition authority is being implemented, including for the Air  Force’s space acquisition programs, and plan to issue a report later this  spring.

GAO and others have highlighted lessons learned from past efforts to  streamline, specifically with an approach adopted for space systems in  the 1990s known as Total System Performance Responsibility  (TSPR). TSPR was intended to facilitate acquisition reform and enable  DOD to streamline its acquisition process and leverage innovation and  management expertise from the private sector. Specifically, TSPR gave a  contractor total responsibility for the integration of an entire weapon  system and for meeting DOD’s requirements. We found in May 2009 that  because this reform made the contractor responsible for day-to-day  program management, DOD did not require formal deliverable  documents—such as earned value management reports—to assess the  status and performance of the contractor. As a result, DOD’s capability  to lead and manage the space acquisition process diminished, which  magnified problems related to unstable requirements and poor contractor  performance. Further, the reduction in DOD oversight and involvement  led to major reductions in various government capabilities, including cost- estimating and systems-engineering staff. This, in turn, led to a lack of  technical data needed to develop sound cost estimates.

Best practices that we identified in the aftermath of TSPR include  retaining strong oversight and insight into programs; using quantifiable  data and demonstrable knowledge to make decisions to proceed, not  allowing development to proceed until certain thresholds are met,  empowering program managers to make decisions on the direction of the  program but also holding them accountable for their choices, and  canceling unsuccessful programs. Similarly, in its study of TSPR  programs, the Defense Science Board/Air Force Scientific Advisory Board  Joint Task Force emphasized the importance of managing requirements,  sufficiently funding programs, participating in trade-off studies, and  assuring that proven engineering practices characterize program  implementation, among other actions. See appendix II for a more  complete list of the best practices we have identified for developing  complex systems.

DOD May Face Resource and Capacity Challenges in Taking on Multiple Programs at One Time

DOD is simultaneously undertaking new major acquisition efforts to  replenish its missile warning, protected communications, GPS, and  weather satellites. At the same time, it is boosting efforts to increase  space situational awareness and protect space assets. It is also helping  to fund the development of new launch vehicles, and it is considering  additional significant acquisitions in wideband satellite communications  and in support of missile defense activities. While there is increased  attention within DOD on funding for space and building the Space Force,  such widespread acquisition activities could still pose resource  challenges. For example:

Funding requests for space system modernization have in the past 10  years represented a small percentage (3.9 to 5 percent) of total  weapon system modernization funding DOD requested. Space is  competing with ships, aircraft, and the nuclear triad, among other  programs for funding. This can be challenging, because over the past  2 years, DOD has begun over 9 new space acquisition programs to  recapitalize current space capabilities and enhance system  resiliency. In the past, we have found that it has been difficult for  DOD to fund multiple new space programs at one time, particularly  when it was concurrently struggling with cost overruns and schedule  delays from its legacy programs. For example, OCX system  development challenges have resulted in a $2.5 billion cost increase  and approximate 5-year delay to the system becoming operational— using more resources for a longer time—at a cost to other programs.

It is unclear whether DOD has a sufficient workforce to manage  multiple new space programs. We issued a report this month that  found DOD did not routinely monitor the size, mix, and location of its  space acquisition workforce. We collected and aggregated data  from multiple DOD space acquisition organizations and found that at  least 8,000 personnel in multiple locations nationwide were working  on space acquisition activities at the end of 2017. Echoing concerns  raised in our prior work, we also found that DOD had difficulty  attracting and retaining candidates with the requisite technical  expertise. Officials from the Air Force’s Space and Missile Systems  Center were concerned that there are not enough experienced mid- level acquisition personnel and also expressed concern that the bulk  of military personnel assigned to program management positions  were more junior in rank than the Center was authorized to obtain. We  recommended that DOD (1) identify the universe of its space  acquisition programs and the organizations that support them, and (2)  collect and maintain data on the workforce supporting these  programs. DOD concurred with our first recommendation but not the  second.

Software is an increasingly important enabler of DOD space systems.

However, DOD has struggled to deliver software-intensive space  programs that meet operational requirements within expected time  frames. Although user involvement is critical to the success of any  software development effort, we found in our report issued earlier this  month on DOD software-intensive space programs that key programs  that experienced cost or schedule breaches often did not effectively  engage users to understand requirements and obtain feedback.  Program efforts to involve users and incorporate feedback frequently  did not match plans. The lack of user engagement has contributed to  systems that were later found to be operationally unsuitable. The  programs we reviewed also faced challenges in delivering software in  shorter time frames, and in using commercial software, applying  outdated tools and metrics, as well as having limited knowledge and  training in newer software development techniques. DOD  acknowledged these challenges and is taking steps to address them,  including identifying useful software development metrics and ways to  include them in new contracts. We recommended, and DOD  concurred, that the department ensure its guidance addressing  software development provides specific, required direction on the  timing, frequency, and documentation of user involvement and  feedback. Moreover, it should be noted that software development  has been a struggle for other non-space weapons programs as well.  The Defense Innovation Board recently reported that the department’s  current approach to software development is broken and is a leading  source of risk to DOD—it takes too long, is too expensive, and  exposes warfighters to unacceptable risk by delaying their access to  the tools they need to assure mission success.

Chairman Fischer, Ranking Member Heinrich, and Members of the  Subcommittee, this concludes my statement. I am happy to answer any  questions that you have.

If you or your staff have any questions about this statement, please  contact me at (202) 512-4841 or chaplainc@gao.gov. Contacts for our  Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on  the last page of this statement. Individuals who made key contributions to  this statement include Rich Horiuchi, Assistant Director; Burns C. Eckert;  Emily Bond; Claire Buck; Maricela Cherveny; Erin Cohen; Susan Ditto;  Laura Hook, and Anne Louise Taylor. Key contributors for the previous  work on which this statement is based are listed in the products cited.

Appendix I: Status of Major Department of Defense Space Acquisitions

Appendix II: Best Practices GAO Has Identified for Space and Weapons Systems Acquisitions

Our previous work on weapons acquisitions in general, and space  programs in particular, identified best practices for developing complex  systems. We summarize these best practices in table 3, below.

DOD Space Acquisitions: Including Users Early and Often in Software  Development Could Benefit Programs. GAO-19-136. Washington, D.C.:  March 18, 2019.

Defense Space Systems: DOD Should Collect and Maintain Data on Its  Space Acquisition Workforce. GAO-19-240. Washington, D.C.: March 14,  2019.

Weapon Systems Cybersecurity: DOD Just Beginning to Grapple with  Scale of Vulnerabilitie., GAO-19-128. Washington, D.C.: October 9, 2018.

Military Space Systems: DOD’s Use of Commercial Satellites to Host  Defense Payloads Would Benefit from Centralizing Data. GAO-18-493.  Washington, D.C.: July 30, 2018.

Weapon Systems Annual Assessment: Knowledge Gaps Pose Risks to  Sustaining Recent Positive Trends. GAO-18-360SP. Washington, D.C.:  April 25, 2018.

Global Positioning System: Better Planning and Coordination Needed to  Improve Prospects for Fielding Modernized Capability. GAO-18-74.  Washington, D.C.: December 12, 2017.

Space Launch: Coordination Mechanisms Facilitate Interagency  Information Sharing on Acquisitions GAO-17-646R. Washington D.C.:  August 9, 2017  Satellite Acquisitions: Agencies May Recover a Limited Portion of  Contract Value When Satellites Fail. GAO-17-490. Washington, D.C.:  June 9, 2017  Space Acquisitions: DOD Continues to Face Challenges of Delayed  Delivery of Critical Space Capabilities and Fragmented Leadership.  GAO-17-619T. Washington, D.C.: May 17, 2017.

Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs.  GAO-17-333SP. Washington, D.C.: March 30, 2017.

Global Positioning System: Observations on Quarterly Reports from the  Air Force. GAO-17-162R. Washington, D.C.: October 17, 2016.

Defense Space Acquisitions: Too Early to Determine if Recent Changes  Will Resolve Persistent Fragmentation in Management and Oversight.  GAO-16-592R. Washington, D.C.: July 27, 2016.

Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle: DOD Is Assessing Data on  Worldwide Launch Market to Inform New Acquisition Strategy.  GAO-16-661R. Washington, D.C.: July 22, 2016  Defense Weather Satellites: DOD Faces Acquisition Challenges for  Addressing Capability Needs. GAO-16-769T, Washington, D.C.: July 7,  2016.

Defense Weather Satellites: Analysis of Alternatives is Useful for Certain  Capabilities, but Ineffective Coordination Limited Assessment of Two  Critical Capabilities. GAO-16-252R. Washington, D.C.: March 10, 2016.

Space Acquisitions: Challenges Facing DOD as it Changes Approaches  to Space Acquisitions. GAO-16-471T. Washington, D.C.: March 9, 2016.

Space Acquisitions: GAO Assessment of DOD Responsive Launch  Report. GAO-16-156R. Washington, D.C.: October 29, 2015.

Space Situational Awareness: Status of Efforts and Planned Budgets.  GAO-16-6R. Washington, D.C.: October 8, 2015.

GPS: Actions Needed to Address Ground System Development Problems  and User Equipment Production Readiness. GAO-15-657. Washington,  D.C.: September 9, 2015.

Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle: The Air Force Needs to Adopt an  Incremental Approach to Future Acquisition Planning to Enable  Incorporation of Lessons Learned. GAO-15-623. Washington, D.C.:  August 11, 2015.

Defense Satellite Communications: DOD Needs Additional Information to  Improve Procurements. GAO-15-459. Washington, D.C.: July 17, 2015.

Space Acquisitions: Some Programs Have Overcome Past Problems, but  Challenges and Uncertainty Remain for the Future. GAO-15-492T.  Washington, D.C.: April 29, 2015.

Space Acquisitions: Space Based Infrared System Could Benefit from  Technology Insertion Planning. GAO-15-366. Washington, D.C.: April 2,  2015.

Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs.  GAO-15-342SP. Washington, D.C.: March 12, 2015.

Defense Major Automated Information Systems: Cost and Schedule  Commitments Need to Be Established Earlier. GAO-15-282. Washington,  D.C.: February 26, 2015.

DOD Space Systems: Additional Knowledge Would Better Support  Decisions about Disaggregating Large Satellites. GAO-15-7. Washington,  D.C.: October 30, 2014.

U.S. Launch Enterprise: Acquisition Best Practices Can Benefit Future  Efforts. GAO-14-776T. Washington, D.C.: July 16, 2014.  2014 Annual Report: Additional Opportunities to Reduce Fragmentation,  Overlap, and Duplication and Achieve Other Financial Benefits.  GAO-14-343SP. Washington, D.C.: April 8, 2014.

Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs.  GAO-14-340SP. Washington, D.C.: March 31, 2014.

Space Acquisitions: Acquisition Management Continues to Improve but  Challenges Persist for Current and Future Programs. GAO-14-382T.  Washington, D.C.: March 12, 2014.

Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle: Introducing Competition into  National Security Space Launch Acquisitions. GAO-14-259T.  Washington, D.C.: March 5, 2014.

The Air Force’s Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle Competitive  Procurement. GAO-14-377R. Washington, D.C.: March 4, 2014.

Space Acquisitions: Assessment of Overhead Persistent Infrared  Technology Report. GAO-14-287R. Washington, D.C.: January 13, 2014.

Space: Defense and Civilian Agencies Request Significant Funding for  Launch-Related Activities. GAO-13-802R. Washington, D.C.: September  9, 2013.

Global Positioning System: A Comprehensive Assessment of Potential  Options and Related Costs is Needed. GAO-13-729, Washington, D.C.:  September 9, 2013.

Space Acquisitions: DOD Is Overcoming Long-Standing Problems, but  Faces Challenges to Ensuring Its Investments are Optimized.  GAO-13-508T. Washington, D.C.: April 24, 2013.

Satellite Control: Long-Term Planning and Adoption of Commercial  Practices Could Improve DOD’s Operations. GAO-13-315. Washington,  D.C.: April 18, 2013.

Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs.  GAO-13-294SP. Washington, D.C.: March 28, 2013.

Launch Services New Entrant Certification Guide. GAO-13-317R.  Washington, D.C.: February 7, 2013.

Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle: DOD Is Addressing Knowledge  Gaps in Its New Acquisition Strategy. GAO-12-822. Washington, D.C.:  July 26, 2012.

Space Acquisitions: DOD Faces Challenges in Fully Realizing Benefits of  Satellite Acquisition Improvements. GAO-12-563T. Washington, D.C.:  March 21, 2012.

Space and Missile Defense Acquisitions: Periodic Assessment Needed to  Correct Parts Quality Problems in Major Programs. GAO-11-404.  Washington, D.C.: June 24, 2011.

Space Acquisitions: Development and Oversight Challenges in Delivering  Improved Space Situational Awareness Capabilities. GAO-11-545.  Washington, D.C.: May 27, 2011.

Space Acquisitions: DOD Delivering New Generations of Satellites, but  Space System Acquisition Challenges Remain. GAO-11-590T.  Washington, D.C.: May 11, 2011.

Global Positioning System: Challenges in Sustaining and Upgrading  Capabilities Persis., GAO-10-636. Washington, D.C.: September 15,  2010.

Defense Acquisitions: Challenges in Aligning Space System  Components. GAO-10-55. Washington D.C.: October 29, 2009.

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This testimony updates the Senate on DOD space system acquisitions, such as satellites and ground equipment.

Our work has found many major DOD space programs exceed their budgets and are late. For instance, the cost of a satellite communications system has grown 117% and its first launch was delayed more than 3.5 years.

Today, as DOD is simultaneously undertaking major acquisitions to replenish missile warning, communications, navigation, and weather satellites, it faces:

Growing threats to satellites including cyber attacks and space debris

Funding and acquisition workforce challenges


Independence Day Celebrations: Estimated Costs for Fourth of July Events on the National Mall for 2016 through 2019

The Second Continental Congress formally adopted the Declaration of Independence on July 4, 1776. Since that day, Americans have celebrated this holiday through events held in towns and cities across the country. In the nation's capital, Washington, D.C., visitors have celebrated on the National Mall by attending federally sponsored events such as the National Independence Day Parade; A Capitol Fourth Concert; Independence Day Fireworks Display; and in 2019, A Salute to America.

GAO was asked to review the impacts and estimated costs associated with the Fourth of July events on the National Mall. Specifically, this report describes the following for the Fourth of July events on the National Mall for 2016 through 2019: (1) the total costs federal agencies and state and local jurisdictions are estimated to have incurred and (2) the appropriations that were used to pay for the estimated federal costs; the extent, if any, to which the federal government reimbursed costs incurred by state and local jurisdictions; and the extent, if any, to which federal agencies delayed, deferred, or canceled other programs or activities as a result of resources being used for Fourth of July events.

To perform this work, GAO reviewed documentation and interviewed personnel from federal agencies and state and local jurisdictions about their estimated costs and resources used for the events.

From 2016 through 2019, hundreds of personnel from numerous federal agencies, state and local jurisdictions, and private entities planned, produced, and executed events on the National Mall that celebrated Independence Day of the United States. The National Park Service (NPS) was responsible for the overall execution of Fourth of July events on the National Mall. In addition, various federal agencies—including the Department of Homeland Security, United States Capitol Police, United States Coast Guard, and Department of Justice—helped to ensure safety. Beyond the federal effort, the District of Columbia Government (DC Government) and local law enforcement played a role in the overall events. Further, given the crowds and potential for high temperatures in July in Washington, D.C., it was important that organizers—including the Department of Health and Human Services—ensured adequate medical resources were available to attendees and participants.

The estimated costs for the events held in 2016, 2017, and 2018 ranged from $6 million to $7 million annually, and included contract costs with private entities tasked with producing and executing the concert and fireworks. They also included the costs for overtime and holiday pay for federal employees working at the events. In 2019, with the addition of the Salute to America event, the Department of Defense (DOD) and Executive Office of the President undertook additional efforts. Estimated costs for the 2019 events on the National Mall increased to more than $13 million. This increase was attributable to the cost for DOD to transport several vehicles to the National Mall, the production and execution of the Salute to America event, and the additional security involved because the President attended the event.

In addition, there were costs not directly attributable to the events, including salaries of some federal employees who performed duties during the events, as well as costs for fuel and depreciation on DOD assets. These costs were classified as not directly attributable to the Fourth of July events because they would have been incurred regardless of whether the events occurred. For example, according to DOD, the flight time related to the military flyovers for the Salute to America event were required training hours that pilots must complete annually, and therefore the related expenses, such as pilot salaries and fuel costs, were not included in event cost estimates.

Finally, federal agencies and the DC Government primarily used annual federal appropriations to pay for the event costs. The DC Government received an appropriation each year to provide for public safety at certain events within the District of Columbia. According to DC Government officials, DC Government obligated the entire amount appropriated in fiscal year 2019 for the various events in the District of Columbia, including the Fourth of July events on the National Mall. DC Government officials stated that they did not request additional appropriations from Congress because they used funds from other appropriations to cover the cost of events exceeding the fiscal year 2019 appropriation. Agency officials did not identify any federal activities that were delayed, deferred, or canceled because of the resources used for the Fourth of July events on the National Mall in 2016, 2017, 2018, and 2019.

The Second Continental Congress formally adopted the Declaration of  Independence on July 4, 1776. Since that day, Americans have  celebrated their country’s birth through various events held in towns and  cities across the country. In the nation’s capital, Washington, D.C.,  visitors have celebrated on the National Mall by attending federally  sponsored events, such as the National Independence Day Parade; A  Capitol Fourth Concert; Independence Day Fireworks Display; and in  2019, the Salute to America. Each year, these events bring thousands of  Americans to the National Mall to watch events sponsored and produced  by the federal government and private entity donations. The planning,  production, and execution of these events are extensive and involve the  expenditure of federal dollars and use of resources from various federal  agencies. As with any large federal event, it is important to have an  understanding of the costs and the events’ effect on other federal  government operations.

In an effort to better understand the events and their costs, you asked us  to review the impacts and estimated costs associated with the Fourth of  July events on the National Mall, including whether federal expenditures  for the events complied with appropriations law. This report describes for  the Fourth of July events on the National Mall for 2016 through 2019 (1)  the total costs that federal agencies and state and local jurisdictions are  estimated to have incurred and (2) the appropriations that were used to  pay for the estimated federal costs; the extent, if any, to which the federal  government has reimbursed costs incurred by state and local  jurisdictions; and the extent, if any, to which federal agencies delayed,  deferred, or canceled other programs or activities as a result of resources  being used for Fourth of July events. We are issuing a separate legal  decision on agency communications to the public regarding the Fourth of  July events.

To assess the impact and estimated costs associated with the Fourth of  July events on the National Mall, we obtained and reviewed  documentation, such as financial data, contracts, and relevant  agreements, from federal agencies and state and local jurisdictions that  contributed resources to the events. In addition, we reviewed cost  documents and other agency records to gain an understanding of the  assets, including financial, physical, and human capital that agencies  devoted to the events. We also interviewed federal agency and state and  local officials.

The scope of our review consisted of estimated costs that federal  agencies and state and local jurisdictions incurred for the events and  associated appropriation accounts. For the purpose of this engagement,  we defined estimated costs as the costs that agencies estimated to have  been directly traceable to the planning, production, and execution of the  specific Fourth of July events on the National Mall. For example, we  included the transportation costs of moving material, equipment, and  supplies to the National Mall for Fourth of July events, as well as overtime  and holiday pay expenses for federal employees. The estimated costs  also include the costs associated with contracts specifically related to the  events that various federal agencies awarded to private entities.

We excluded costs that are not directly traceable to the planning,  production, and execution of the specific Fourth of July events on the  National Mall and that would have been incurred regardless of whether  the events took place, such as salary costs for civilian federal employees  and military personnel who performed duties during the events. Also, we  excluded the costs to operate and maintain Department of Defense  (DOD) aircraft that were used in the Salute to America event because the  aircraft were existing DOD assets. In addition, according to DOD, the  flying hours associated with the event were used to meet annual pilot  training requirements that were required regardless of the events on the  Fourth of July. Cost estimates were provided by and attributable to each  agency, and we did not independently verify the data during this audit; all  costs included in this report are estimates.

Appendix I describes our scope and methodology in more detail.

We conducted this performance audit from July 2019 through June 2020  in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.

Each year more than a dozen federal agencies and state and local  jurisdictions were involved in the Fourth of July events on the National  Mall. Some were involved in the overall planning, production, and  execution of the events as a whole, while others played specific roles in  only one event. Figure 1 shows the overall geographic layout of each  event that occurred on the National Mall.

Overall Event Organization, Security, and Attendee and Participant Health

For 2016 through 2019, the National Park Service (NPS) was responsible  for the overall organization and execution of Fourth of July events on the  National Mall, including the National Independence Day Parade; A Capitol  Fourth Concert; Independence Day Fireworks Display; and in 2019, A  Salute to America. Successful completion of these events depended on  NPS, including United States Park Police (Park Police), coordinating with  federal agencies and state and local jurisdictions to ensure that attendees  could safely and securely attend each event. In addition, during the 2019  events, because of the addition of the Salute to America event and  attendance by the President of the United States, additional federal  agencies were involved with the planning, production, and execution of  the events.

Overall event security for the 2016 though 2019 events on the National  Mall was coordinated among several federal agencies and state and local  jurisdictions. Specifically, the following organizations provided security  personnel and assets for the events overall:

Park Police provided overall coordination with federal, state, and local  law enforcement agencies and assisted with event security.

State and local law enforcement agencies assisted with security,  traffic, and crowd control.

The District of Columbia Government (DC Government) provided a  comprehensive command, control, and coordination system, in  conjunction with federal partners, to ensure seamless event activities  and the safety and security of all attendees. The DC Government  tasked multiple offices in its organization to help with ensuring event  security, including the Metropolitan Police Department, which  deployed uniformed officers in areas surrounding the National Mall  and provided traffic control and road closures.

The National Guard deployed hundreds of personnel who provided  security, movement of supplies, and crowd management at road  intersections and metro stations.

The Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority provided buses  to barricade road closures for 2016 through 2018.

The Federal Bureau of Investigation; Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco,  Firearms and Explosives; and Department of Energy deployed  specialized law enforcement and security support units during all of  the Fourth of July events on the National Mall.

Given the large crowds and potential for high temperatures in July in  Washington, D.C., it was important that organizers ensured that adequate  medical resources were available to attendees and participants for the  2016 through 2019 events. This was accomplished by coordination  between the following federal agencies and state and local jurisdictions:

The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) provided  medical aid stations for attendees and participants and veterinarian  services for NPS working animals at various locations on the National  Mall. In 2019, HHS provided additional efforts, including a larger  medical aid station at the end of the parade route to assist with heat  casualties and a command and control team to coordinate and  support HHS personnel on the National Mall.

The Federal Emergency Management Agency participated in the  public safety planning for the Fourth of July events on the National  Mall in 2016 through 2018. Because of increased security levels in  2019, the agency coordinated the support of federal agencies and  state and local jurisdictions, and deployed an emergency response  team.

The DC Government deployed numerous personnel from its offices,  including Fire and Emergency Medical Services and the Department  of Health to respond to health emergencies at the events.

The Smithsonian Institution (SI) and the Federal Protective Service  (FPS) assisted by providing their facilities as safe havens for citizens  to seek shelter in the event of severe weather or other emergency.  Each year, SI staffed its facilities near the National Mall with security  protection officers, grounds cleanup crews, and emergency medical  technician support as part of its assistance. In addition, FPS  personnel staffed federal buildings near the National Mall and  operated safe haven locations.

For 2016 through 2019, the National Independence Day Parade ran along  Constitution Avenue NW from 7th Street NW to 17th Street NW. A private  entity produced the parade, and obtained a Public Gathering Permit from  NPS. The entity managed the parade, its participants, and associated  costs, with funding from nonfederal sponsors. NPS participated in the  parade by coordinating with an additional private entity, which fully funded  the creation and operation of a parade float for NPS. In addition, several  military bands regularly participated in the parade.

To ensure security for the parade, the Park Police requested assistance  annually from the DC Government, National Guard, and FPS. The DC  Government assisted by ensuring roads were closed to vehicle traffic on  the parade route, the National Guard assisted by providing personnel and  assets for road closure, and FPS provided personnel to ensure parade- route safety.

For 2016 through 2019, the Capitol Fourth Concert was broadcast live  from the West Lawn of the U.S. Capitol by the Public Broadcasting  Service. As we have previously reported, a private entity in the District of  Columbia has produced the annual concert for many years. The private  entity received federal funding from NPS through a cooperative  agreement that provided funding from NPS and the Department of the  Army and sponsorships from other private entities. The private entity was  responsible for producing the concert, including the selection of musical  acts and coordination with DOD for military band attendees.

Because of its jurisdiction over the Capitol grounds, the United States  Capitol Police (Capitol Police) provided perimeter security and security  screening of concert attendees, in coordination with multiple federal  agencies and local jurisdictions. In addition, the Architect of the Capitol  provided security barriers, fencing, ground protection, turf restoration,  trash removal, and setup and teardown of the security elements on the  Capitol grounds.

For 2016 through 2019, annually, NPS entered into a contract with a  private entity that was responsible for producing and executing the  fireworks display. For 2016 through 2018, the fireworks were launched  from the Reflecting Pool between the Lincoln Memorial and the  Washington Monument, with that area being restricted to visitors for  safety and security. However, in 2019, the launch site was relocated to  the West Potomac Park.

The Park Police provided security over the fireworks and coordinated with  federal law enforcement agencies, which provided security and  conducted a sweep of the fireworks launch area. Many attendees of the  fireworks display viewed the show from their personal watercraft on the  Potomac River. The United States Coast Guard (Coast Guard) provided  security on Potomac River waterways to ensure attendee safety and to  establish a secured perimeter for the launch site.

In 2019, the Salute to America event was held for the first time in front of  the Lincoln Memorial. The event included military band performances, a  military display, a speech by the President of the United States, military  aircraft flyovers, and a fireworks display. The planning of the event began  after a meeting at the White House where the Secretaries of the Interior  and Defense were tasked with event planning, production, and execution.  The Executive Office of the President (EOP) coordinated the content of  the event and contracted with a private entity, which was responsible for  general event production. NPS and EOP entered into a reimbursable  agreement whereby EOP, and the private entity with which it contracted,  coordinated and produced the event, paid for with NPS appropriations.  The EOP determined the guest list and distributed tickets for the event.  According to EOP, it distributed tickets in a manner similar to that for  other White House events.

The Secretary of the Interior tasked NPS with permitting for the event,  coordinating with the United States Secret Service (Secret Service) on  security and with the DC Government on movement of DOD assets,  relocating the existing contracted fireworks display from the Reflecting  Pool to the West Potomac Park and coordinating the acceptance of an  additional donated fireworks display. The DC Government had additional  responsibilities in 2019 compared to prior years because of the vehicles  that the Department of the Army provided for the Salute to America event.  For example, DC Government personnel consulted with engineers to  verify that affected roads, sewer pipes, and bridges could withstand the  weight of bringing in the M2 Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicles and  conducted damage assessments after the event, during which no  damage was identified.

The DOD Joint Staff received orders from the Secretary of Defense  directing United States Northern Command (NORTHCOM) to organize a  flyover and provide support to the Salute to America event. NORTHCOM  tasked the Coast Guard, Department of the Army, Department of the  Navy, United States Marine Corps, and United States Air Force to ensure  that various DOD assets were in attendance. The Department of the  Army stood up a Joint Operations Center within its Joint Force  Headquarters Branch, National Capital Region, to coordinate the various  DOD assets involved. Prior to the President’s speech, several military  bands performed for the audience in front of the Lincoln Memorial.  Displayed on both sides of the performing bands were two M2 Bradley  Infantry Fighting Vehicles provided by the Department of the Army.

At designated times during the President’s speech, DOD aircraft  participated in flyovers, including

Air Force B-2 Stealth Bombers, Air Force One, F-22 Raptors, and F-

Navy F/A 18 Hornet Blue Angels and F-35 Lightning IIs;

Marine Corps MV22 Osprey helicopters and Marine One;

Army AH-64 Apache and CH-47 Chinook helicopters; and

Coast Guard H-65 Dolphin and H-60 Jayhawk helicopters and HC- 144 Medium Range Surveillance Aircraft.

Following the President’s speech and associated flyovers, a fireworks  display, donated by two private entities through a donation agreement  with NPS, was presented from the Lincoln Memorial.

Because the President, Vice President, and other government officials  attended the event, the Secret Service had primary responsibility for  security of the event and surrounding areas, in coordination with the Park  Police. The Secret Service requested the assistance of the Transportation  Security Administration, which provided security screening for the event.  The Coast Guard provided additional support on the Potomac River  during the event, because of the additional firework display, and  requested the assistance of the United States Customs and Border  Protection, which provided additional waterway security. The Federal  Aviation Administration provided an air traffic controller that shut down the  airspace around the National Mall and assisted with the Salute to America  flyovers. Because of the additional fireworks, the Park Police provided  additional security at the storage site of the fireworks and additional road  closures. The Park Police coordinated with state and local law  enforcement to provide escorts for the M2 Bradley Infantry Fighting  Vehicles.

Fourth of July Events on the National Mall Costs Estimated at Millions of Dollars Annually

According to estimates we obtained, federal agencies and state and local  jurisdictions combined spent millions of dollars annually for the Fourth of  July events on the National Mall during 2016 through 2019. Not all costs  were tracked separately by the organizations for each of the Fourth of  July events. Therefore, in order to develop a comprehensive estimate of  the costs, we grouped costs into five categories, which include general  event costs as well as costs for each of the specific events held on the  National Mall. Table 1 summarizes the event costs we obtained, by year  and event.

In addition to costs that could be directly attributed to Fourth of July  events on the National Mall, there were other costs incurred associated  with federal personnel and assets that we did not capture as event costs  because they would have been incurred regardless of whether the Fourth  of July events had occurred. For example, costs such as salaries of  federal civilian, military, and law enforcement personnel who worked  during the events were not included in cost estimates because those  salaried personnel would have been paid even if the Fourth of July events  did not occur.

We categorized costs attributable to more than one specific event, or to  agencies that did not track costs by event, as general event costs.  According to documents we reviewed and interviews with agency officials,  more than $2 million was spent annually on general event costs. Table 2  contains general event cost by federal agency and state or local  jurisdiction, and by year.

General event costs consisted primarily of the personnel and supplies  costs for HHS medical aid stations, Department of the Interior overtime,  holiday pay and supply costs, and costs for DC Government personnel  payroll. Specifically, federal and local law enforcement agencies provided  security, screening of attendees, traffic control, road blockades, and  escorts for participants at all the events. These agencies incurred  salaries, overtime, and overtime with differential pay for civilian and law  enforcement personnel. Other costs included providing personnel and  supplies for fire and emergency medical services, crowd control,  information and directions for attendees, cleaning of the grounds, and  safe haven areas in case of an emergency.

National Independence Day Parade Event Costs

According to documents we reviewed and agency officials we  interviewed, no federal agency recorded costs specifically attributable to  the National Independence Day Parade for 2016 through 2019. A private  entity produced the parade and managed its participants and associated  costs, which was funded through nonfederal sponsors. The security  during the event, provided by the National Guard and FPS, was not  included in cost estimates because those salaried personnel would have  been paid regardless of the parade. The majority of federal participants in  the parade were local ceremonial military personnel, including military  bands, marching platoons, color guards, Army Old Guard fife and drum  corps, an Army anthem vocalist, and other ceremonial military  participants who would have received their salaries and benefits on the  Fourth of July even if the parade did not occur.

According to documents we reviewed and agency officials we  interviewed, the concert cost the federal government an estimated $4  million annually from 2016 through 2019. The concert takes place on the  grounds of the Capitol and the costs are primarily for the contractor that  plans and executes the concert. NPS provided minimal operations  support to the entity that produced the concert but was responsible for  funding the concert from its annual appropriations and with additional  funding that the Department of the Army provides each year. Table 3  contains the concert cost by agency for 2016 through 2019.

The Capitol Police is the primary law enforcement agency responsible for  security and screening the attendees on the Capitol grounds. The Capitol  Police estimated that it incurred several hundred thousand dollars  annually in overtime and holiday pay costs that would not have been  incurred had the concert not taken place. The Architect of the Capitol  incurred other concert costs for its involvement. Additionally, DOD had  bus rental costs for movement of ceremonial military personnel in 2017.

Other costs not considered directly attributable to the concert included  salaries and benefits of federal military participants. The salary costs for  these personnel would have been incurred regardless of their  participation in the Fourth of July events.

Independence Day Fireworks Display Event Costs

Independence Day Fireworks Display event costs were estimated from  $253,000 to $409,000 annually from 2016 through 2019 (see table 4).  Each year, NPS contracted with a private entity, which produced and  executed the fireworks display. The cost associated with this contract was  the majority of the cost of the event. In addition to the contract costs,  other fireworks display event costs included paying overtime for security  personnel during the event, conducting security sweeps prior to the event,  securing areas for storage of fireworks, closing roads, and performing  cleanup after the fireworks. In addition, the Coast Guard had personnel  travel costs in 2019.

Other event costs not considered directly attributable to the fireworks  display were for Coast Guard personnel and boats that patrolled a  security perimeter around the event area. The Coast Guard stated that  these boats and personnel would have been operating on the Fourth of  July regardless of whether the fireworks display event occurred.

The 2019 Salute to America Event cost an estimated $4.3 million,  primarily related to the EOP contract with a private entity to plan and  execute the event (see table 5). The cost of that contract was  approximately $2.45 million and was funded with NPS appropriations  through a Memorandum of Agreement with EOP. The movement of DOD  ground assets to the Washington, D.C., area was also a cost for the  event. Specifically, DOD used a contractor to transport vehicles and other  military equipment to the event area at a cost of more than $1.12 million.  The Secret Service had significant involvement with events on the  National Mall, and specifically with the Salute to America event, because  the President, Vice President, and other government officials attended. In  order to prepare for and execute security, the Secret Service used  numerous special agents from its Washington, D.C., Field Office, and  incurred overtime pay and cost for materials. In addition, the airspace in  the area was shut down for this event, which included a fireworks display.  Various federal agencies incurred overtime costs for storing the donated  fireworks and for keeping additional roads closed.

While DOD and the Coast Guard provided military flyovers during the  Salute to America event, most of the costs associated with the flyovers,  such as crew salaries, fuel, and asset depreciation, were not attributable  to the event. According to DOD and the Coast Guard, flying hours  associated with the event were used to satisfy annual training  requirements for their pilots. However, some travel costs were incurred  for pilots and crew, which we included in the cost estimates in table 5.  Finally, the estimate includes salaries for a small number of DOD civilian  personnel who were paid holiday or overtime pay.

Fourth of July Events’ Funding Sources, Reimbursements to State and Local Jurisdictions, and Effects on Other Federal Activities

We found that the majority of the agencies funded costs of the Fourth of  July events with annual appropriations and did not receive any other  funding. NPS used amounts from multiple appropriation accounts to pay  for costs of the Fourth of July events for 2016 through 2019. For the  Salute to America event in 2019, NPS used the Operation of the National  Park System, Centennial Challenge, and Federal Lands Recreation  Enhancement Act (FLREA) accounts to cover costs. NPS obligated  $2.45 million of the FLREA amounts to pay for the private entity with  which the EOP contracted to plan and execute the event. NPS also used  the Centennial Challenge appropriation account to pay for certain costs  attributable to the Salute to America event. NPS used the Operation of  the National Park System account to fund the other Fourth of July events  during 2016 through 2019.

The Department of the Army transferred funds from its annual  appropriations for fiscal years 2016 through 2019 to NPS to support the  Capitol Fourth and Memorial Day concerts. The Army entered into an  agreement with NPS each fiscal year and transferred a lump sum to NPS.  NPS allocated the funding for the two concerts each fiscal year.

The DC Government received an appropriation each fiscal year from the  federal government for emergency planning and security costs in the  District of Columbia that remains available until expended. This  appropriation is for the costs of providing public safety at events related to  the presence of the National Capital in the District of Columbia. According  to DC Government officials, DC Government obligated the entire amount  appropriated in fiscal year 2019 for the various events in the District of  Columbia, including the Fourth of July events on the National Mall. DC  Government officials stated that they did not request additional  appropriations from Congress because they used funds from other  appropriations to cover the cost of events exceeding the fiscal year 2019  appropriation.

Park Police reimbursed local law enforcement outside of the District of  Columbia for assistance with security, traffic, and crowd control, costs  which were estimated from $85,000 to $132,000 annually from 2016  through 2019. These costs are included as regular operations.

Finally, according to the officials at agencies we contacted, none of them  delayed, deferred, or canceled any programs or activities as a result of  resources being used for the Fourth of July events for 2016 through 2019.

We provided a draft of this report to the EOP, DOD, Department of the  Interior, Department of Homeland Security, Capitol Police, Architect of the  Capitol, DC Government, SI, American Red Cross, Department of  Energy, HHS, Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority,  Department of Transportation, and Department of Justice for review and  comment. The EOP, DOD, Department of the Interior, DC Government,  Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority, and Department of  Justice provided technical comments, which we incorporated as  appropriate. The Department of Homeland Security, Capitol Police,  Architect of the Capitol, SI, Department of Energy, HHS, and Department  of Transportation informed us that they had no comments on the draft  report and the American Red Cross did not provide comments.

As agreed with your offices, unless you publically announce the contents  of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 8 days from the  report date. At that time, we will send copies to the Executive Office of the  President, the Secretary of the Interior, the Acting Secretary of Homeland  Security, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Health and Human  Services, and other interested parties. In addition, the report will be  available at no charge on the GAO website at https://www.gao.gov.

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact  me at (202) 512-2989 or kociolekk@gao.gov. Contact points for our  Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on  the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this  report are listed in appendix III.

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

Our objectives were to describe for the Fourth of July events on the  National Mall for 2016 through 2019 (1) the total costs that federal  agencies and state and local jurisdictions are estimated to have incurred  and (2) the appropriations that were used to pay for the estimated federal  costs; the extent, if any, to which the federal government has reimbursed  costs incurred by state and local jurisdictions; and the extent, if any, to  which federal agencies delayed, deferred, or canceled other programs or  activities as a result of resources being used for Fourth of July events.

To accomplish these objectives, we obtained and reviewed  documentation, such as financial data, contracts, and relevant  agreements, from federal agencies and state and local jurisdictions that  contributed resources to the events. Agencies we contacted were the  Executive Office of the President, Department of Defense (DOD),  Department of the Interior, Department of Homeland Security, United  States Capitol Police, Architect of the Capitol, District of Columbia  Government, Smithsonian Institution, American Red Cross, Department  of Energy, Department of Health and Human Services, Washington  Metropolitan Area Transit Authority, Department of Transportation, and  Department of Justice. In addition, we reviewed cost documents and  other agency records to gain an understanding of the assets, including  financial, physical, and human capital that each agency devoted to the  events. In addition, we interviewed officials about estimated costs; any  reimbursed costs; and any delayed, deferred, or canceled programs or  activities.

The scope of our review consisted of estimated costs of the events and  associated appropriations incurred by federal agencies and state and  local jurisdictions. For the purposes of this engagement, we defined  estimated costs as the costs that are directly traceable to the planning,  production, and execution of the specific Fourth of July events on the  National Mall. For example, we included the transportation costs of  moving material, equipment, and supplies to the National Mall for Fourth  of July events as well as personnel overtime and holiday pay expenses  for federal employees. The costs also included contracts that various  federal agencies awarded to private entities that were specifically  attributable to the events.

We excluded costs that are not directly attributable to the planning,  production, and execution of the specific Fourth of July events on the  National Mall, such as salary costs for civilian federal employees and  military personnel who performed duties during the events that would  have been incurred regardless of whether the events took place. Also, we  excluded the costs to operate and maintain DOD aircraft that were used  in the Salute to America event. According to DOD, the aircraft were  existing DOD assets, and the flying hours associated with the event were  used by DOD to meet annual pilot training requirements that were  required regardless of the events on the Fourth of July. In addition, we  excluded the cost associated with private entity parade participation and  firework donations. Finally, cost estimates were provided by and  attributable to each agency and department, and we did not  independently verify the data during this audit.

Appendix II: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

Kristen Kociolek, (202) 512-2989 or kociolekk@gao.gov  In addition to the contact named above, Jonathan Meyer (Assistant  Director), Kevin Scott (Auditor in Charge), and John Ledford made major  contributions to this report. Other key contributors include Carl Barden,  Anthony Clark, Marcia Carlsen, Elizabeth Erdmann, Pat Frey, Richard  Geiger, Jason Kelly, Jason Kirwan, Quang Nguyen and Shahrzad Nikoo.

Each Fourth of July, the nation’s capital is home to Independence Day celebrations like the national Independence Day parade, “A Capitol Fourth” concert, the Independence Day fireworks display, and in 2019, “A Salute to America”—all broadcast throughout the country.

The extensive planning, production, and execution of these events involves resources from multiple federal agencies and state and local jurisdictions for security and medical response, among other things. Estimated costs for these events from 2016-2018 ranged between $6-7 million annually, and in 2019, more than $13 million—paid for primarily with annual federal appropriations.