Border Infrastructure: Actions Needed to Improve Information on Facilities and Capital Planning at Land Border Crossings

CBP and GSA own, lease, or manage all of the nation's 167 land border crossings. CBP facilitates trade and travel at these crossings and has identified significant capital investment needs at these facilities.

GAO was asked to review land border crossing infrastructure. This report examines (1) infrastructure constraints CBP faces and the extent CBP and GSA have information on infrastructure condition, (2) the extent CBP prioritizes capital projects and (3) the extent recent GSA capital projects met cost, schedule, and scope goals and challenges CBP and GSA reported.

GAO analyzed land border crossing data and documentation, including CBP and GSA facility assessments, CBP capital investment plans for fiscal years 2014 through 2018, and data for GSA capital infrastructure projects active during those years. GAO also interviewed officials from CBP field offices that oversee all crossings about infrastructure constraints and visited 16 crossings selected based on high traffic volume and border crossings CBP has prioritized for infrastructure improvement.

The Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) reported infrastructure constraints at land border crossings including limited inspection capacity, technology challenges, and security limitations. However, CBP does not have complete information on infrastructure conditions at all land border crossings. Specifically, CBP assessed facility conditions at four of the 40 land border crossings it owns from 2016 through 2018. Further, CBP has not developed a plan to ensure it conducts such assessments, consistent with DHS policy which calls for them every three years. Developing and implementing a plan to ensure CBP executes its facility condition assessment program would enable CBP to collect more complete and current infrastructure information. In addition, while CBP and the General Services Administration (GSA) both assess facility conditions at 101 GSA-owned land border crossings, they do not consistently share or use each other's information. Doing so could enable CBP and GSA to improve the accuracy and completeness of their respective assessments.

CBP prioritizes land border crossing capital projects in a five-year plan, which by statute is to be submitted with DHS's annual budget request to Congress. In fiscal years 2014 through 2018, CBP submitted two plans on time, submitted two plans more than 100 days after submission of the budget request, and did not submit a plan in one year due to delays in the plan's review and approval process. By establishing timeframes for the review process, CBP would be better positioned to identify and address sources of delay in the review process, and improve its ability to meet statutory reporting requirements by including its five-year plan with its annual budget submission to Congress.

The 10 completed or ongoing GSA land border crossing capital projects in fiscal years 2014 through 2018 generally experienced schedule growth ranging from 0 to 59 percent, but stayed within a 10 percent cost contingency allowance. Circumstances contributing to increased project costs or schedule growth include funding lags between project design and construction, and CBP-requested changes during construction to meet evolving mission needs, according to GSA and CBP officials.

GAO is making seven recommendations, including that CBP develop a plan to ensure it conducts facility condition assessments consistent with DHS policy; that CBP and GSA share and use each other's information on facility conditions at land border crossings; and that CBP establish review timeframes for its capital investment plan.

In 2017, nearly $721 billion in trade passed through the nation’s land  border ports of entry, along with over 252 million inbound pedestrian and  passenger entries. U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), within the  Department of Homeland Security (DHS), is the lead federal agency  charged with the dual mission of facilitating legitimate trade and travel at  our nation’s borders while also keeping terrorists and their weapons,  criminals and their contraband, and inadmissible individuals out of the  country. To fulfill this mission, CBP operates 110 land ports of entry  consisting of 167 separate land border crossings and relies on  infrastructure, including inspection lanes and technologies, to identify,  screen, and inspect persons and cargo while maintaining an efficient  stream of cross-border travel and trade.

The General Services Administration (GSA) owns the majority of land  border crossings and has responsibilities related to maintenance, capital  planning, and construction at these facilities. Since CBP’s operations  depend on the condition and functionality of infrastructure at land border  crossings, GSA works closely with CBP to design, construct, and  maintain these land border crossings.

According to CBP, several of the nation’s 167 land border crossings were  built more than 70 years ago. Even land border crossings constructed as  recently as 15 to 20 years ago may require significant capital investment  to meet present day security standards and operational requirements,  according to CBP. In addition, infrastructure enhancements are critical to  facilitate increasing trade and travel at land border crossings. For  example, we reported in 2013 that CBP identified the need for additional  infrastructure to facilitate legitimate trade and travel—such as additional  passenger vehicle and commercial truck lanes—at some land border  crossings.

You asked us to review land border crossing infrastructure. This report  addresses the following questions:  1.  What infrastructure constraints, if any, does CBP face at land border  crossings, and to what extent do CBP and GSA have information  about the condition of infrastructure at land border crossings?  2.  To what extent does CBP prioritize infrastructure projects across land  border crossings?  3.  To what extent have recently completed or ongoing GSA land border  crossing capital projects met cost, schedule, and scope goals, and  what challenges, if any, have CBP and GSA reported in developing  land border crossing capital projects?

To determine what infrastructure constraints, if any, CBP faces at land  border crossings, we visited 16 land border crossings in California,  Arizona, Texas, and New York from June to September 2018 to observe  and discuss infrastructure constraints identified by local CBP officers.  We selected these locations based on a variety of factors, including high  traffic volume; the presence of passenger vehicle, pedestrian, and  commercial vehicle processing capabilities; and border crossings that  CBP has prioritized for infrastructure improvement within the next five  years, among others. We also interviewed officials from the nine CBP  Office of Field Operations (OFO) field offices that oversee CBP  operations at all 167 land border crossings to discuss infrastructure  constraints at the land border crossings they oversee. The results of our  site visits cannot be generalized more broadly to all land border  crossings. However, they provide important context and insights into the  infrastructure constraints CBP faces at such locations.

To determine the extent to which CBP and GSA have information about  the condition of infrastructure at land border crossings, we analyzed all  CBP Facility Condition Assessments (FCA) and GSA Building  Engineering Reviews conducted from 2016 through 2018. We assessed  CBP’s processes for conducting FCAs against a DHS Directive on the  Department’s Real Property Management Program to determine the  extent to which CBP conducts FCAs in compliance with DHS policy. We  also interviewed officials within CBP and GSA who are knowledgeable  about each agency’s processes to collect information on the condition of  infrastructure at land border crossings. We assessed CBP and GSA’s  processes for sharing and leveraging information on infrastructure  condition against key practices for collaboration among federal agencies.  We also reviewed system documentation and interviewed officials from  CBP’s Office of Facilities and Asset Management (OFAM) knowledgeable  about TRIRIGA—CBP’s real property management system—to determine  the extent to which TRIRIGA effectively maintains information on  infrastructure condition.

To identify the extent to which CBP prioritizes land border crossing  projects, we analyzed CBP’s five-year land port of entry capital  investment plans for fiscal years 2014 through 2018. These five-year  plans include a rank ordered list of land border crossing capital projects— those estimated to cost $3.1 million or more—and describe a high-level  process for prioritizing projects. To determine the extent to which CBP  adhered to this process to develop each five-year plan, we analyzed  supporting documentation. These supporting documents included  operational data from CBP’s strategic resource assessments and  feasibility studies that establish the feasibility, risk, and cost of  prospective land border crossing projects, among others. We also  interviewed officials from CBP OFAM to discuss its adherence to this  process, the extent to which it has established a methodology for  executing it, and whether it has formally documented such a methodology  and assessed CBP’s efforts to do so against Standards for Internal  Controls in the Federal Government. We also analyzed CBP’s five-year  plans for fiscal years 2014 through 2018 to determine whether CBP met  statutory reporting requirements by completing and submitting each five- year plan with its annual budget request to Congress.

To assess the extent to which recent GSA land border crossing capital  projects met, or are on track to meet, cost, schedule, and scope goals, we  analyzed information for projects that were active—i.e., under  construction—during fiscal years 2014 through 2018 and cost $20 million  or more. Specifically, we analyzed project performance data from GSA’s  Electronic Project Management system, including project cost and  schedule baselines and updated cost and schedule performance data as  of January 2019. To assess the reliability of these data, we examined the  data for obvious errors and discussed the data with GSA project  management officials for each of the 10 projects in our scope. We  determined the data to be sufficiently reliable for the purposes of  assessing project cost and schedule performance. We also reviewed  GSA project documents, such as planning studies, funding requests, and  progress reports. Further, to describe challenges CBP and GSA have  reported facing developing land border crossing capital projects, we  conducted interviews with GSA and CBP officials. These officials included  GSA headquarters and project management officials, as well as CBP  OFO field office officials and local CBP officers. We also conducted site  visits to land border crossings with recently completed or ongoing capital  projects, as discussed above.

We conducted this performance audit from March 2018 to July 2019 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.

CBP facilitates trade and travel, and enforces immigration and customs  laws at the nation’s 167 land border crossings along the northern and  southern border. CBP’s OFO is responsible for inspecting and processing  pedestrians, passengers, cargo, and other items at all land border  crossings. OFO has 20 Field Offices nationwide with nine that oversee  the operations of all 110 land ports of entry—which may consist of one or  more land border crossings—within their designated areas of  responsibility. CBP OFAM manages CBP’s portfolio of owned and leased  real property, including all 167 land border crossings. OFAM is  responsible for capital planning at all land border crossings and for  prioritizing capital projects across its portfolio based on need.

GSA owns 101 (60 percent) of the 167 land border crossings, partially  owns three, and leases 19 (11 percent). CBP owns 40 land border  crossings (24 percent) and leases one directly from private owners. The  National Park Service owns two and U.S. Forest Service owns one land  border crossing. For the 101 land border crossings that GSA owns, it has  occupancy agreements with CBP, which is the principal user of the  facilities. GSA has responsibilities related to capital planning and  construction at all 101 GSA-owned land border crossings. Since CBP’s operations depend heavily on the condition and functionality of  infrastructure at land border crossings, GSA works closely with OFAM to  plan, design, construct, and implement capital infrastructure  improvements to accommodate ever-growing trade and travel at land  border crossings.

GSA-owned and leased land border crossings consist of large, medium,  and small crossings along the northern and southern border. Land border  crossings owned by other federal agencies—including CBP—tend to be  small by comparison and are typically situated in remote locations along  the northern border. See appendix I for more information on the nation’s  portfolio of land border crossings.

Infrastructure at U.S. Land Border Crossings

Of the 167 land border crossings at which CBP operates, 120 are located  along the northern border and 47 are located along the southern border.  Land border crossings vary across the northern and southern border, but  are generally designed to process some combination of pedestrian,  passenger vehicle, and commercial traffic with separate facilities for each  mode. Infrastructure and layout at each land border crossing may vary  depending on a variety of factors including the modes of traffic CBP  processes at that location, traffic volume, local climate, and area-specific  threats, among others. Many large land border crossings, including GSA’s  Otay Mesa land border crossing in California, are designed to process  pedestrians, passenger vehicles, and commercial traffic and are equipped  with distinct infrastructure for each mode of traffic. Other land border  crossings are designed to process a single mode of traffic, such as San  Luis II in Arizona, which processes only commercial trucks. In general,  CBP’s inspection process at land border crossings follows a standard  sequence that includes separate areas designated for preprimary  inspection, primary inspection, and secondary inspection for each mode  of traffic and a main building which houses administrative and operational  support activities, which we describe below.

Preprimary inspection: Upon proceeding to cross the border into the  United States, pedestrians and vehicles enter the land border crossing  and are directed to preprimary inspection, where initial screening takes  place. Depending on availability, CBP may deploy officers with canines to  walk among the vehicles in preprimary waiting to reach an inspection  booth. Overhead signage may be present to help CBP actively manage  traffic by directing travelers to different lanes according to the type of  travel documents they have. For example, CBP may use signs to  designate specific lanes for travelers with Radio Frequency Identification  (RFID) or other machine readable documents (“Ready lanes”) or for  trusted travelers. Infrastructure in the pedestrian preprimary area often  includes a space for travelers to queue prior to entering primary  inspection. Infrastructure in the preprimary area for passenger vehicle  and commercial traffic includes lanes for traffic to queue and radiation  portal monitors that are designed to detect radiation and help prevent the  smuggling of nuclear material into the United States. The passenger  vehicle preprimary area also often includes screening technologies,  including license plate readers and RFID readers to capture information  on vehicles and RFID-ready travel documents such as passport cards  and border crossing cards. At some land border crossings, CBP may  use RFID readers in the commercial preprimary inspection area to  electronically transmit identification, manifest, and other information to  CBP officers prior to entering primary inspection. See figure 1 for  examples of preprimary infrastructure.

Primary inspection: After preprimary inspection, pedestrians enter the  primary inspection area, typically located within the main building.  Infrastructure for pedestrian primary inspection may include one or more  lanes and officer booths where CBP officers review traveler information.  Passenger vehicles and commercial traffic enter a primary inspection  area where CBP officers verify passenger identification and perform an  initial inspection of the vehicle, which may include a visual inspection of  vehicles’ exterior and interior. Infrastructure supporting vehicular primary  inspection includes one or more lanes and officer booths. Each booth  may be equipped with an HVAC system to keep dangerous vehicle  emissions and other fumes from entering the workspace and maintain a  safe work environment during extreme heat and cold. Primary inspection  booths are designed to be bullet and blast resistant to ensure officer  safety. See figure 2 for examples of primary inspection infrastructure.

Secondary inspection: If a pedestrian, driver, passenger or vehicle  gives reason for suspicion or if the CBP officer is unable to complete the  inspection at primary inspection for any reason, the officer may refer them  to secondary inspection. Infrastructure in the pedestrian secondary  inspection area is typically located within the main building and may  include a processing area and a separate secure room where CBP  officers can perform more thorough inspections for travelers suspected of  criminal activity. Infrastructure in the passenger vehicle secondary  inspection area may include work areas where CBP officers can search  vehicles, vehicle lifts, and non-intrusive inspection x-ray technologies to  identify contraband hidden in concealed compartments. Passengers may  wait in the pedestrian secondary inspection area while CBP officers  inspect vehicles. Infrastructure in the commercial secondary inspection  area may include a loading dock where CBP officers can manually  examine cargo and use x-ray technologies to identify hidden contraband.  In addition, CBP uses canines at some land border crossings to conduct  secondary inspections in the pedestrian, passenger, and commercial  environments. See figure 3 for examples of secondary inspection  infrastructure.

Main buildings: Land border crossings may have facilities that support  various administrative and operational activities. Infrastructure at CBP’s  main buildings may include agricultural labs, commercial facilities, traveler  processing areas, holding rooms, staff work areas, and locker rooms,  among other infrastructure. See figure 4 for examples of main building  infrastructure.

Outbound infrastructure: Pedestrians and vehicles leaving the United  States at land border crossings exit through the outbound area. Outbound  infrastructure in the passenger vehicle, bus, commercial, and pedestrian  area typically consists of one or more exit lanes and may also include  inspection booths, inspection technologies, a secondary inspection area  and support facilities, among others, to process traffic leaving the United  States. See figure 5 for examples of outbound infrastructure.

Figure 6 depicts a generic layout of a land border crossing with all modes  of traffic.

Travel, Trade, and Law Enforcement at U.S. Land Border Crossings

Travel: The volume of traffic at land border crossings varies across the  northern and southern borders. At the nation’s busiest land border  crossing—San Ysidro in California—CBP processed over 32 million  entries in 2017. Conversely, at the Whitlash land border crossing in  Montana—one of the smaller land border crossings—CBP processed  1,339 entries that same year. In total, CBP processed over 252 million  entries in 2017 including 43 million pedestrian entries, 209 million  passengers traveling to the United States in over 104 million passenger  vehicle entries, 256,000 buses, and nearly 12 million commercial truck  crossings. Figure 7 shows the largest northern and southern border  U.S. land ports of entry by volume in 2017.

Trade: In 2017, CBP processed and inspected nearly $721 billion in  traded goods (imports and exports) through U.S. land ports of entry. As  shown in figure 8, trade in goods transported via commercial truck  through the largest northern and southern border land ports of entry  impacted states across the country.

Law Enforcement: Land border crossings serve a critical role in enabling  CBP’s enforcement of immigration and customs laws. According to CBP,  its officers encountered nearly 139,000 inadmissible individuals at land  border crossings in fiscal year 2018. According to CBP, the lack of  required travel documents, such as a visa, was the most common reason  CBP officers determined individuals to be inadmissible. Further,  according to the Drug Enforcement Administration, the nation’s land  border crossings remain a target for exploitation by transnational criminal  organizations. Specifically, the Drug Enforcement Administration’s 2018  National Drug Threat Assessment found that the most common  smuggling method used by Mexican transnational criminal organizations  involves transporting illicit drugs through U.S. land border crossings in  passenger vehicles with concealed compartments or commingled with  legitimate goods on tractor trailers. In fiscal year 2018, CBP seized  363,000 pounds of drugs at land border crossings, including  approximately 265,000 pounds of marijuana, 70,000 pounds of  methamphetamine, 20,000 pounds of cocaine, and 1,400 pounds of  fentanyl.

CBP and GSA Capital Planning and Project Development Process

As part of its capital planning process, CBP is responsible for identifying  land border crossing infrastructure needs and prioritizing capital projects  across its portfolio of 167 land border crossings. At CBP-owned land  border crossings, CBP generally funds these projects and hires a  contractor to plan and execute capital infrastructure projects. At GSA- leased land border crossings, CBP and GSA typically work with the  property owner to plan and execute capital projects. The owner of the  land border crossing funds these projects, while CBP funds any  alterations needed to fulfill its mission.

At GSA-owned land border crossings, CBP typically works with GSA to  complete a feasibility study and uses this information to prioritize  infrastructure projects. According to GSA policy documents, feasibility  studies are intended to determine the technical and economic viability of  a project, define the project budget and scope, and establish an initial  project design. GSA and CBP are to further refine land border crossing  capital projects with a program development study, which updates project  plans and budgets and provides the necessary information to pursue  project funding. Each year, the Office of Management and Budget  reviews each project included in GSA’s budget request and Congress  authorizes projects and appropriates project funds as part of the federal  budget cycle. GSA typically includes CBP’s top priority land border  crossing capital infrastructure projects in its annual budget submission.  GSA may pursue project funding for design and construction in separate  budget requests or in a single appropriation, depending on the contract  vehicle used. Once funded, GSA hires one or more contractors to design  and execute the project.

Figure 9 identifies funding for CBP and GSA-owned land border crossings  in fiscal years 2009 through 2019.

CBP defines its general land border infrastructure requirements in its  Land Port of Entry Design Standards, which describe various  infrastructure at land border crossings and detail how this infrastructure  should operate. According to CBP, it updates these standards every few  years to ensure the standards reflect CBP’s changing mission, including  new technologies and infrastructure requirements.

CBP Identified Various Infrastructure Constraints at Land Border Crossings, but Does Not Have Complete Information on Infrastructure Condition at All Crossings

CBP’s Reported Infrastructure Constraints at Land Border Crossings Include Limited Capacity and Technology Challenges

CBP officers we spoke with at 16 land border crossings and OFO field  offices that oversee land border crossings reported examples of land  border crossing infrastructure constraints they face at each stage of the  inspection process including preprimary, primary, and secondary  inspections. CBP relies on infrastructure to fulfill its mission at land border  crossings. Specifically, according to CBP, well-functioning infrastructure is  a critical factor in its ability to effectively screen persons and cargo, and  facilitate cross-border travel and trade. For example, CBP officials stated  that the number of operational inspection lanes is a key variable that  affects traffic wait times. These officers also identified land border  crossing infrastructure challenges with office space and port security.  Examples of infrastructure constraints identified by CBP officers include:

Limited space in the preprimary inspection area. According to  CBP officers, land border crossings with primary inspection booths  located in close proximity to the border line with Mexico have  restricted space for CBP to conduct operations in the preprimary area.

Figure 10 below shows a photo of restricted space in the preprimary area  at a land border crossing on the southern border.

Non-functioning screening technology in the preprimary  inspection area. CBP officers stated that vehicle inspection  technologies may not always function correctly. For example, at a  land border crossing on the southern border, license plate readers  and radiation portal monitors are inoperable at least once a week  during summer months due to overheating, according to CBP officials.  Temperatures can exceed 120 degrees Fahrenheit and the  technology is exposed to the sun.

Figure 11 shows license plate readers and radiation portal monitors in the  preprimary area exposed to the sun at a land border crossing on the  southern border.

Officer inspection booths in the primary inspection area in need  of repair. CBP officers stated that officer inspection booths may be  inadequately cooled or heated resulting in officers more frequently  rotating out of the booths for health and safety reasons. At one land  border crossing, officers stated that the booth windows provide limited  visibility since the old bullet resistant glazing has deteriorated and  clouds officers’ view. At another land border crossing we visited, we  observed that the doors on the primary inspection booths do not have  working locks. Officers stated that as a result, when the land border  crossing closes overnight they are unable to secure the booths or the  computer equipment inside.

Inadequate holding facilities in the secondary inspection area.  Holding facilities at several land border crossings we visited had  holding rooms that did not meet current CBP safety requirements,  according to CBP officers. Officers at two land border crossings stated  that safety concerns included inadequate ventilation. Officers at  another land border crossing identified exposed wiring in a holding  room as a safety hazard. Other land border crossings we visited did  not have holding rooms and officers stated they detain individuals in  the lobby of the administration building as a result.

Figure 12 shows examples of holding facilities at land border crossings on  the northern and southern borders that CBP officials identified as not  meeting CBP requirements.

Lack of availability of non-intrusive inspection (NII) technology in  the secondary inspection area. CBP officers stated that the  availability of NII technology improves their ability to conduct  inspections. However, NII technology is not always available because  it may need maintenance or repair, or CBP may share the technology  with multiple land border crossings. Officers stated they may  perform manual inspections of vehicles when NII technology is not  available, which they noted can be less effective.

Inadequate facilities for canine inspection in the secondary  inspection area. CBP officers provided examples of limited facilities  for inspection canines. For example, officers at one land border  crossing stated they do not have a dedicated area to exercise  inspection canines. Officers at another land border crossing stated  they recently converted a storage closet into a climate-controlled  canine kennel within the secondary inspection building. Previously,  the CBP officers at this land border crossing kept the canines in  running vehicles with air conditioning to keep them cool.

Impeded traffic flow within the land border crossing. CBP officers  identified challenges with facilitating traffic flow within the land border  crossing. For example, the layout at a commercial land border  crossing on the southern border impedes the flow of traffic because it  requires commercial trucks to make a series of sharp turns as they  travel through the border crossing. In addition, commercial traffic  referred for secondary inspection must cut across four primary egress  lanes to enter and exit the secondary inspection area. According to  CBP officers, commercial trucks proceeding toward the border  crossing exit may need to stop or reverse direction to create space for  the trucks entering or exiting the secondary inspection area which  creates delays in processing commercial traffic.

Figure 13 shows an aerial view of a land border crossing with a diagram  of where CBP officers identified that the land border crossing layout  impedes traffic flow.

Insufficient capacity to accommodate the volume of traffic. CBP  officers stated that the number of travelers can exceed the capacity of  the facility. For example, CBP officers stated that insufficient number  of inspection lanes can result in lengthy wait times for travelers.

Limited administrative space. CBP officers stated that insufficient  administrative office space can be a challenge at land border  crossings. For example, one land border crossing we visited did not  have sufficient space for officer lockers and as a result placed some  lockers in the contraband seizure room.

Figure 14 shows lockers located in the contraband seizure room at a land  border crossing on the northern border due to insufficient administrative  space.

Port security limitations. CBP officers also described challenges  with land border crossing security. For example, officers stated the  lack of measures to prevent travelers from exiting the crossing without  authorization, such as vehicle barriers and security gates, impedes  CBP’s ability to stop drivers from fleeing the land border crossing and  entering the United States without inspection.

Figure 15 shows exit lanes constructed with temporary barriers to control  the flow of traffic leaving the land border crossing and entering the United  States.

Lack of inspection facilities for outbound traffic. CBP officers at  land border crossings without facilities to inspect outbound traffic can  face difficulties when inspecting traffic exiting the United States. For  example, at one land border crossing without outbound inspection  facilities, officials stated they park CBP vehicles in the outbound traffic  lanes to slow traffic so that CBP officers can stop and inspect vehicles  exiting the United States.

CBP Has Limited Information on the Current Condition of Infrastructure across Land Border Crossings

CBP Has Assessed Facility Conditions at Some but Not All Land Border Crossings

CBP collects information on the condition of infrastructure at some land  border crossings through contracted Facility Condition Assessments  (FCA), but has not assessed conditions at all land border crossings.  FCAs are engineering inspections that evaluate the condition of the  facility and identify repair and improvement needs. The output of an FCA  is a report that describes infrastructure deficiencies at a facility and  represents the condition of the land border crossing infrastructure at the  time of the FCA.

From 2016 through 2018, CBP and GSA assessed the condition of  infrastructure at 95 of the 167 land border crossings. As of December  2018, CBP had conducted FCAs at 74 of the 167 land border crossings  within the previous three years. In addition, according to CBP officials, in  2016 GSA funded and conducted Building Engineering Reviews at 21  land border crossings in response to conversations between CBP and  GSA on how to improve GSA service delivery at land border crossings.  CBP officials stated they use facility condition information from the 2016  Building Engineering Reviews because they contain information similar to what CBP collects through an FCA. According to GSA officials, GSA now  rarely conducts Building Engineering Reviews because they are costly  and their data quickly become obsolete. GSA now uses other tools to  assess infrastructure condition and GSA officials were not aware of any  reviews at land border crossings since 2016. See table 1 for a breakdown  of the land border crossings that CBP and GSA have assessed.

According to the assessments, the condition of infrastructure varies  across land border crossings. The facility condition index—the ratio of the  costs to correct facility infrastructure deficiencies to the total replacement  value of the facility—ranges from 0 percent to 69 percent across the 95  FCAs and Building Engineering Reviews conducted between 2016 and  2018. These assessments identified approximately $140 million in  estimated infrastructure deficiencies and the average facility condition  index is 16 percent. See table 2 for the distribution of facility condition  indices across land border crossings by ownership type. See appendix I  for facility condition index scores across CBP’s land border crossing  portfolio.

CBP began conducting FCAs at CBP-owned land border crossings in  2008. OFAM officials stated they set a goal of conducting FCAs at each  CBP-owned land border crossing on a three-year cycle, but have not  always been able to do so due to resource constraints. Our analysis  identified that CBP conducted FCAs at only four of the 40 CBP-owned  land border crossings over three years—2016 to 2018—when its goal  was to have conducted FCAs at all 40 facilities over this time frame (see  table 1 above). CBP also began conducting FCAs at GSA-owned facilities  in 2016, and at GSA-leased facilities in 2017. According to CBP officials,  they plan to conduct several FCAs at selected GSA-owned facilities each  year to obtain information on the condition of infrastructure at these  facilities, though there is no required interval at which they must assess  these facilities. CBP officials stated they prioritize GSA land border  crossings in need of capital investment when selecting which facilities to  assess.

DHS Directive 119-02-004 “DHS Real Property Facility Condition  Assessment” instructs each DHS component—including CBP—to  implement and maintain a program to ensure that the condition of real  property is assessed every three years and updated each fiscal year  through FCAs beginning in fiscal year 2018. The Directive applies to land  border crossings owned by CBP and is intended to ensure that CBP  collects information on the condition of infrastructure across these  facilities. Although CBP has a goal of conducting FCAs at CBP-owned  land border crossings every three years, it has not met this goal in recent  years as CBP assessed only four of the 40 land border crossings from  2016 through 2018. According to CBP officials, FCAs older than three  years may not accurately reflect the current condition of infrastructure at  land border crossings. According to OFAM officials, they have not  developed a plan to ensure that CBP implements its program consistent  with the Directive by conducting FCAs on a three-year cycle going  forward due to limited resources to conduct the assessments.  Specifically, CBP officials stated that CBP has not been able to fully fund  the FCA program due to other competing facility priorities. However,  developing a plan that accounts for the new requirements under the  Directive could assist CBP in planning funding needs for the FCA  program. Further, developing and implementing a plan to ensure CBP  executes its FCA program consistent with Directive 119-02-004 would  assist CBP in making resource decisions for this program. Implementing  its FCA program consistent with DHS Directive 119-02-004 would enable  CBP to collect more complete and current information on the condition of  infrastructure at land border crossings it owns.

CBP and GSA Have Not Routinely Shared Information with Each Other about Land Border Crossing Facility Conditions

CBP and GSA conduct separate assessments of facility conditions at  GSA-owned land border crossings; however, they do not routinely share  or use the results of each other’s efforts to inform their assessments of  facility condition. More specifically, separate from CBP’s process for  assessing facility condition, GSA uses its Building Assessment Tool to  assess the condition of infrastructure across its entire real property  portfolio, including land border crossings. This process is intended to  assist GSA in estimating its future costs for repairing and maintaining the  buildings in its portfolio.

Although the CBP FCA and the GSA Building Assessment Tool both  assess elements of facility condition, these assessments have different  methodologies, scopes, and purposes. We reviewed a 2018 CBP  comparative analysis of the FCAs and Building Assessment Tool  processes. CBP’s analysis showed that FCAs are detailed assessments  of all building systems that CBP uses at a land border crossing.  According to CBP officials, CBP uses FCAs to collect information on the  condition of infrastructure at land border crossings and to inform land  border crossing capital infrastructure projects. In comparison, GSA’s  Building Assessment Tool is a standardized assessment used across  GSA’s federal real property portfolio to identify, plan for, and prioritize  repair and maintenance needs across GSA properties. As a result, while  the two types of assessments may be related in some aspects, officials  from each agency stated they could not use the other’s facility  assessment in place of their own.

GSA officials assessing land border crossing infrastructure condition are  not required to consult with CBP officials who operate the port or review  any existing CBP FCAs, according to GSA officials. CBP provides GSA  with pre-assessment questionnaires prior to conducting FCAs at GSA- owned land border crossings. These questionnaires inquire about  available GSA information on facility condition. However, CBP officials  stated they do not specifically request GSA Building Assessment Tool  data, and as a result, have not generally received these data prior to  conducting a FCA.

GSA officials stated that CBP FCAs and GSA Building Assessment Tool  assessments differ in scope and as a result GSA does not use FCAs in  place of their Building Assessment Tool assessments. However, FCAs  identify infrastructure needs at land border crossings and the results  could provide GSA with an understanding of infrastructure needs  identified by CBP at land border crossings. Likewise, GSA’s Building  Assessment Tool is used to identify infrastructure in need of repair and  could provide CBP with an understanding of infrastructure needs  identified by GSA.

We have previously identified key practices for collaboration among  federal agencies. Specifically, agencies can enhance and sustain their  collaborative efforts by identifying and addressing needs by leveraging  resources. According to CBP officials, improving information sharing on  facility condition could help ensure that both CBP’s and GSA’s  assessments are as accurate and complete as possible. Moreover, using  each other’s facility condition information could enable CBP and GSA to  improve the accuracy and completeness of their respective assessments  of facility condition at land border crossings.

CBP Does Not Maintain Reliable Information on the Current Condition of Land Border Crossing Infrastructure, but Is Taking Steps to Improve Its Reliability

CBP uses a software system called TRIRIGA to manage its real property  asset portfolio, but information in this system is not fully reliable. Among  other functions, CBP uses TRIRIGA to track infrastructure needs and the  condition of facilities at land border crossings. CBP identifies  infrastructure needs through FCAs and records these data in TRIRIGA.  CBP also identifies additional infrastructure needs as they arise and  records these data in TRIRIGA. For example, an infrastructure need may  arise at a building and be recorded in TRIRIGA in the months following a  CBP FCA. CBP uses TRIRIGA data to calculate a score reflecting the  overall current condition of infrastructure at a land border crossing. CBP  uses this score on condition to inform internal planning and prioritization  of maintenance and repair projects at the local level, according to CBP  officials. In addition, CBP’s goals for facility condition data in TRIRIGA  include making facility condition information available in real time, starting  with TRIRIGA for responses to data calls and reporting, and using data in  the system for more efficient planning and decision making. However,  according to CBP officials, land border crossing facility condition data in  TRIRIGA have not been consistently reliable because some data on  infrastructure needs are duplicative, out of date, or incomplete.

Duplicate Data: CBP officials stated that in the past, OFAM officials  responsible for entering infrastructure needs into TRIRIGA created  duplicate entries in some instances. For example, OFAM officials  have identified, and entered into TRIRIGA, infrastructure needs at  land border crossings that had already been identified and entered in  the past. As a result, TRIRIGA double-counted the costs associated  with these duplicate infrastructure needs which impacted the reliability  of the calculation of the score on facility condition for the associated  land border crossing. According to OFAM officials, they have taken  several steps to improve the TRIRIGA data entry processes. During  the course of our review, OFAM officials identified internal confusion  regarding who had the authority to remove infrastructure needs from  TRIRIGA. In response, in April 2019 OFAM developed new guidelines  clarifying roles and responsibilities for accurately entering FCA data  and removing infrastructure needs from TRIRIGA. OFAM officials  stated they expect this process to avoid duplicative data entry in the  future. Further, as described earlier, by conducting FCAs for each  CBP-owned land border crossing every three years, updating them  annually consistent with DHS Directive 119-02-004, and then entering  the results into TRIRIGA in accordance with the new guidelines for  reviewing existing infrastructure needs and removing them as needed,  CBP would be positioned to more frequently review and validate these  data in the system on an ongoing basis.

Out of Date Data: Officials stated that FCA data for some land border  crossings in TRIRIGA originate from as early as 2013, the last time  CBP conducted an FCA at those border crossings. As a result,  TRIRIGA does not accurately reflect the current condition of these  facilities. Historically, CBP has updated TRIRIGA with facility condition  information collected through FCAs. As described earlier, DHS  Directive 119-02-004 directs CBP to conduct FCAs for each CBP- owned land border crossings every three years and update them  annually. By developing and implementing a plan to complete more  timely FCAs at CBP-owned land border crossings, CBP will be better  positioned to ensure that TRIRIGA is updated to reflect more current  condition information. In addition, as CBP continues to conduct FCAs  at GSA owned and leased land border crossings, CBP can continue  to update TRIRIGA with more current information on facility condition  consistent with OFAM’s April 2019 guidance on TRIRIGA data entry.

Incomplete Data: Officials stated that because CBP oversees  maintenance and repair work at CBP-owned land border crossings,  data in TRIRIGA are more reliable for these land border crossings  than for GSA-owned land border crossings where GSA is responsible  for planning and executing maintenance and repair work. CBP  officials said that while they do identify infrastructure needs at GSA- owned land border crossings and enter related information into  TRIRIGA, the information on these needs can be incomplete. CBP  officials stated that for example, a past CBP FCA may have identified  a building roof in need of repair. Following the FCA, CBP would then  enter a record of this infrastructure need in TRIRIGA. If GSA repaired  the roof during the following year as part of its planned maintenance  work, but did not inform CBP headquarters, TRIRIGA would continue  to identify a deficient roof at the land border crossing after GSA  repaired it. CBP officials stated that GSA may conduct maintenance  or repair work to address an infrastructure need without CBP’s  knowledge because CBP and GSA did not have a process for GSA to  notify CBP of maintenance and repair work the agency conducts at  land border crossings. According to OFAM officials, GSA began  sharing with OFAM monthly summary-level data on maintenance GSA  performs at land border crossings. However, these data do not  include the level of detail required to update condition data or close  out deficiencies in TRIRIGA. We previously identified key practices for  collaboration among federal agencies, including that agencies can  enhance and sustain their collaborative efforts by identifying and  addressing needs by leveraging resources. Sharing information on  GSA maintenance and repair work at GSA-owned land border  crossings at the level of detail necessary for CBP to update TRIRIGA  would enable CBP to improve the completeness and accuracy of data  in the system. As a result, CBP would have access to more complete  and accurate data to use when planning and prioritizing infrastructure  maintenance activities, improving the availability of real-time facility  condition information, and responding to data calls and reporting. For  example, more complete and accurate data in TRIRIGA would better  position CBP to identify and report to Congress on improvements  needed at land ports of entry. Specifically, the 2018 United States  Ports of Entry Threat and Operational Review Act requires CBP to  submit to Congress a threat and operational analysis that includes,  among other elements, an assessment of current and potential threats  due to security vulnerabilities and unlawful entry, and improvements  needed at ports of entry to enhance travel and trade facilitation and  reduce wait times. CBP officials stated they have not yet determined  which data they will use to develop this report, but this reporting  requirement is one potential example of how more reliable data from  TRIRIGA could be used to effectively report on the condition of land  border crossing infrastructure.

CBP Prioritizes Infrastructure Projects in Its Annual Plans but Has Not Submitted the Plans on Time or Used a Consistent Methodology

CBP Prioritizes Projects in Five-Year Capital Investment Plans but Has Not Consistently Submitted the Plans as Required

CBP prioritizes prospective land border crossing projects within its annual  Five-Year Land Port of Entry Capital Investment Plan (five-year plan).  CBP is statutorily required to complete a detailed five-year plan each  fiscal year and include it with its annual budget submission to Congress  (i.e., President’s budget), which typically occurs in February. Each five- year plan is to cover all federal land border port of entry projects with a  yearly update of total projected future funding needs delineated by land  port. According to CBP officials, CBP generally completes an initial draft  of the five-year plan in November or December each fiscal year and  submits it to CBP and GSA leadership, DHS leadership, and the Office  and Management and Budget for review and approval. However, our  analysis of CBP’s five-year plans for fiscal years 2014 through 2018  identified that CBP completed its five-year plan after the annual budget  submission in fiscal year 2016 and 2018 and did not complete a plan at  all in fiscal year 2017. Specifically, CBP submitted its fiscal year 2016  five-year plan in July 2016—163 days after CBP’s annual budget  submission—and its fiscal year 2018 plan in October 2018—235 days  after CBP’s annual budget submission. Table 3 identifies the days  between CBP’s submission of its five-year plan and budget to Congress  in fiscal years 2014 through 2018.

CBP officials stated they completed the five-year plans after the annual  budget submission in fiscal years 2016 and 2018, and did not complete a  five-year plan for Congress in fiscal year 2017, due to delays in the  review and approval process. CBP officials stated the review and  approval process may take several months to complete due to revisions  at various stages and competing priorities among stakeholders that may  slow the process. Officials also said they have little control over how long  it takes stakeholders within CBP leadership, DHS, and the Office of  Management and Budget to review and approve the five-year plan.  Consequently, according to CBP officials, CBP has not attempted to  establish time frames for completing the plan. While we acknowledge that  setting time frames for completing the plan may not guarantee timeliness,  establishing time frames for each stakeholder could help measure and  assess progress in reviewing and approving the draft plan. Standards for  Internal Control in the Federal Government state that management  should define objectives so that they are understood at all levels,  including by outlining the time frames for achievement of those  objectives. By establishing time frames for stakeholders throughout the  five-year plan review and approval process, CBP would be better  positioned to identify and address sources of delay and could improve its  ability to meet statutory reporting requirements by including its five-year  plan with its annual budget submission to Congress.

CBP Has Not Followed a Consistent Methodology for Prioritizing Capital Projects

CBP develops a list of roughly eight to twelve priority land border crossing  capital projects each year and presents these projects to Congress in the  five-year plan, but the agency has not established a consistent  methodology in developing this list. CBP’s five year plans note five broad  steps CBP follows in developing the list of priority capital projects. These  steps are applicable to the entire land border crossing portfolio— regardless of ownership—and include:  1.  Strategic Resource Assessment (SRA): According to the five-year  plan, CBP conducts SRAs cyclically to compare infrastructure  requirements across its portfolio and present a uniform picture of  capital investment needs at all land border crossings along the  northern and southern borders.  2.  Capital Project Scoring: Using data generated during the SRA, CBP  scores and ranks each land border crossing by criticality and relative  urgency of infrastructure needs.  3.  Sensitivity Analysis: CBP then applies a sensitivity analysis and  updates its initial ranking based on factors unaccounted for through  the SRA, including unique regional conditions, bilateral planning with  partners in Canada and Mexico, or interests of other federal, state, or  local agencies.  4.  Assess Feasibility and Risk: CBP coordinates with project  stakeholders—including GSA for all GSA-owned land border  crossings—to evaluate the feasibility, risk, and cost associated with  project implementation by completing a feasibility study. These  studies analyze alternatives and review environmental, cultural, and  historic preservation requirements as well as land acquisition  requirements and procurement risks. CBP also assesses the  likelihood of obtaining funding for the proposed project.  5.  Establish a Five-year Capital Investment Plan: After the SRA and  the scoring, analysis, and assessment phases, CBP prioritizes land  border crossing capital projects and develops a five-year capital  investment plan in coordination with GSA. CBP updates the plan  annually, taking into account the changing conditions at land border  crossings.

Although CBP has outlined the five broad steps it uses to prioritize  projects, our analysis of CBP’s five-year plans for fiscal years 2014  through 2018 identified that CBP did not follow a consistent methodology  across the years or across projects when prioritizing prospective land  border crossing projects. For example, in some five-year plans CBP  prioritized projects by comparing relative need at land border crossings  using more recent SRA data for some land border crossings and older  data for other land border crossings. In one such instance in fiscal year  2018, CBP compared relative need using 2015 data for some land border  crossings and data dating as far back as 2007 for other land border  crossings. Although CBP’s five-year plan states that CBP performs SRAs  cyclically, CBP has not established the frequency at which SRAs are to  be completed. In 2015, CBP completed a partial SRA update for 36 of  167 land border crossings that it considered high-priority, but has not  completed a portfolio-wide SRA since 2007.

Our analysis of CBP’s five-year plans for fiscal years 2014 through 2018  also identified that CBP had feasibility studies for some, but not all,  projects listed in the five-year plans. Specifically, our analysis identified  that CBP had feasibility studies for approximately two thirds (28 of 41) of  the projects it prioritized over these years. CBP officials told us that due to  the limited shelf-life of feasibility studies (two to three years), CBP and  GSA target high-priority land border crossing projects for feasibility  studies that are likely to receive funding within the next two to three years.  However, of the top five projects CBP ranked as the highest priority in  each of its five-year plans in fiscal years 2014 through 2018, CBP  completed feasibility studies for approximately half (12 of 20) of these  projects. Further, among the 12 projects CBP ranked in the top five in its  fiscal years 2014 through 2018 five-year plans that had feasibility studies,  10 of 12 projects had a feasibility study that was more than five years old  when CBP prioritized them.

In addition, CBP prioritized projects on each of its five-year plans by  comparing cost estimates developed through different methodologies.  Specifically, CBP prioritized projects using detailed cost estimates  developed as part of a feasibility study for some projects and order of  magnitude cost estimates for projects that do not have a feasibility study  or that had an out-of-date feasibility study. These order of magnitude  cost estimates were significantly different from the cost estimates that  were later produced for these projects through feasibility studies. For  example, CBP’s fiscal year 2015 plan included an order of magnitude  cost estimate of $95 million to implement a single project at two separate  crossings—San Luis I and II. However, after completing a feasibility study  for the project in October 2017, GSA estimated it would cost $289  million—a nearly 300 percent cost increase—to complete the project.

CBP outlines the five broad steps it is to take in general to develop a list  of priority projects each year and establish an annual five-year plan and  these steps are documented at a high level. However, there is not a  detailed planning methodology that would help ensure officials  consistently and appropriately develop and assess priority projects each  year. For example, the five-year plans do not define what minimum steps  CBP personnel are to take at each step in the process, such as guidance  and procedures on which projects require feasibility studies. The plans  also do not include time frames for completing each step, such as  establishing expectations for the frequency at which CBP personnel are  to update SRA data. As a result, CBP officials told us they rely on  informal processes and procedures to complete these steps and prioritize  land border crossings in its annual five-year plans. CBP officials  acknowledged that they have not issued formal guidance documenting  the steps in its prioritization process or establishing procedures and time  frames for each step, but stated that they plan to do so going forward.  Specifically, officials told us that CBP plans to document its process for  prioritizing land border crossing projects to improve transparency, better  educate staff on roles and responsibilities, and help ensure CBP  consistently applies this process each year. While these would be positive  steps, CBP was not able to provide information on specific plans or  expected time frames for implementing these steps.

Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government state that  management should define objectives so that they are understood at all  levels by outlining what is to be achieved, how it will be achieved, and the  time frames for achievement. The standards also establish that  management should implement control activities through documented  policies. To achieve this, management should document policies that  establish each unit’s responsibility for achieving the objectives related to  an operational process.

Establishing and documenting a methodology for CBP’s annual land  border crossing capital prioritization process, including procedures and  time frames for each step, could help ensure that CBP identifies key  activities needed to prioritize projects and that CBP personnel follow a  consistent methodology across projects and across years. For example,  such a methodology could help CBP identify which projects require  feasibility studies in a given fiscal year, and how they are to use  information on project feasibility, risk, and cost when prioritizing projects.

Further, having time frames for each step could help CBP determine how  often to update SRA data across its portfolio for purposes of comparing  relative infrastructure needs at land border crossings. Lastly, establishing  and documenting a land border crossing prioritization methodology could  help CBP ensure it consistently provides Congress with more up-to-date  and complete information in its five-year plans.

Recent GSA Capital Projects Generally Experienced Schedule Growth, but Met Cost and Scope Goals; CBP and GSA Reported Some Challenges Developing Projects

Most of GSA’s 10 Land Border Crossing Projects Experienced Schedule Growth, but Stayed within Cost Contingency Allowances at Full Scope

From fiscal years 2014 through 2018, GSA initiated or completed 10  capital infrastructure projects at eight land border crossings. Among these  projects, six were complete and four were ongoing as of March 2019.  Projects at three of these border crossings—Alexandria Bay, Calexico  West, and San Ysidro—consist of multiple phases. GSA manages each  phase as a distinct project funded under separate congressional  appropriations and executed through separate contracts.

Across all 10 projects, the amount of schedule growth against the original  schedule baselines ranged from 0 percent growth to 59.2 percent growth,  though several of these projects revised their baselines to account for the  schedule growth. Half of the projects experienced less than 10 percent  schedule growth above their original schedule baselines, and the other  half experienced more than 10 percent schedule growth.

When accounting for projects for which schedule baselines were revised,  among the 10 projects, six have met or are on track to meet schedule  baselines. The Alexandria Bay project, which GSA expects to complete in  January 2020, is the only project on track to meet its original schedule  baseline. GSA revised its schedule baselines during construction for the  remaining five projects and all have met or are on track to meet these  revised baselines. More specifically, Calexico West, Derby Line, and  Nogales West-Mariposa are the three projects that are complete and met  revised schedule baselines. San Ysidro phases II and III are the two  ongoing projects that are on track to meet their revised schedule  baselines as of January 2019. See table 4 below for a breakdown of  project schedule performance.

Four of GSA’s 10 projects did not meet, or are not expected to meet, their  schedule baselines. The Tornillo-Guadalupe project experienced the most  schedule growth of the projects we reviewed. GSA completed the  Tornillo-Guadalupe project in October 2014, 470 days later than its  original baseline in July 2013 and 80 days later than its August 2014  revised baseline. Schedule growth at Tornillo-Guadalupe was primarily  due to delays in the construction of corresponding Mexican infrastructure,  unstable soil conditions, and contractor performance, according to GSA  officials. In addition to Tornillo-Guadalupe, the San Ysidro I and Laredo  projects did not meet their schedule baselines, and the Columbus project  is not on track to meet its schedule baseline, as of January 2019. Of the  four projects that experienced schedule growth against their final  schedule baselines, two projects had less than 5 percent growth and two  projects had about 10 percent growth.

While none of the 10 projects kept costs at or below baselines, eight  projects stayed within their 10 percent cost contingency allowance. The  Tornillo-Guadalupe and Derby Line projects both exceeded their cost  contingency allowance. GSA completed the Tornillo-Guadalupe project in  October 2014 at a final construction cost of $59 million—18.7 percent  above its cost baseline—due to challenges described above. GSA  completed the Derby Line project in November 2018 with a final  construction cost of $26.4 million—10.6 percent above its cost baseline— mainly due to CBP-requested changes, according to GSA officials. The  total baseline construction cost for all 10 projects, as of January 2019, is  $1.03 billion and the combined current contract value is $1.09 billion— which is about $62.9 million (6.1 percent) over baseline budgets. See  table 5 below for a breakdown of project cost performance.

GSA has completed, or expects to complete, nine out of the 10 projects at  full scope. GSA reduced scope for one project—Laredo, TX—due to cost  concerns after the construction contract award. During Laredo project  construction, GSA removed plans to build a footbridge spanning the  passenger vehicle primary lanes and cosmetic finishes to buildings to  avoid further cost overruns, according to GSA and CBP officials. See  appendix II for detailed descriptions of the ten projects.

GSA and CBP Reported Facing Various Challenges Related to Planning, Designing, and Constructing Infrastructure Projects at Land Border Crossings

Project Challenges During Planning and Design

GSA reported facing challenges planning and designing land border  crossing capital projects. These challenges included delays between  design and construction and the division of large projects into smaller  phases, which GSA officials reported led to higher costs and longer  development timelines.

Funding Lags. GSA officials reported that funding lags between project  design and construction can increase costs and extend construction  timelines. GSA has requested separate appropriations for project design  and construction using a model known as design-bid-build, which created  the potential for funding lags to occur. According to CBP and GSA  officials, the process from requesting an infrastructure project to  completing the project lasts approximately 7 years. However, GSA  experienced funding lags of up to 10 years between design and  construction. Figure 16 identifies development timelines from initial  planning through construction for our 10 selected land border crossing  capital projects.

The cost of labor and materials can escalate when funding lags occur  between design and construction. For example, after completing design  for the Calexico West project, GSA requested construction funding in  fiscal year 2010, but did not receive funding until five years later. As a  result, estimated construction costs escalated from $78.5 to $90.8 million  (16 percent). To keep project cost estimates up-to-date during funding  lags, GSA officials explained that GSA typically increases project cost  estimates over time to account for inflation, changes in the labor market,  and the cost of materials, among other factors. To help address cost  escalation, contractors have purchased materials upfront, and GSA has  combined projects that would otherwise be constructed separately. To  address increasing materials costs for the Alexandria Bay project, the  contractor purchased steel upfront in order to avoid future cost increases  due to import tariffs, according to GSA officials. The Laredo project faced  significant labor and material cost growth due to a boom in the Texas  construction market. As a result, GSA decided to combine the two Laredo  crossings into one contract to lock in prices and avoid paying higher  prices in the future.

According to GSA officials, funding lags between design and construction  may result in outdated project designs that do not reflect newer CBP  infrastructure requirements. In such instances, GSA must invest  additional time and resources to update project designs and incorporate  new CBP requirements, such as newer inspection technologies or  facilities. According to GSA officials, design refreshes can be challenging  due to a lack of continuity and staff turnover at the architecture and  engineering firms that originally designed the project. In some instances,  according to GSA officials, the original firms may not be available or  interested in redesigning the project and GSA may need to hire a new  firm. For example, GSA spent $3.3 million on design for the Columbus  project in fiscal years 2007 and 2009. However, the funding lag between  design and construction required a $7.4 million design refresh in fiscal  year 2014. In another example, GSA established the Calexico West  project’s design concept in fiscal year 2007, but didn’t receive  construction funding until fiscal year 2015. According to officials, GSA had  to spend approximately $1 million for a design refresh to account for new  CBP requirements, which resulted in a longer development timeline.

To address risks of funding lags with the design-bid-build approach, GSA  has shifted toward using contract vehicles for land border crossing capital  projects that combine design and construction into a single  appropriation. This approach allows for more precise planning, less risk  from delays, and less time for costs to escalate, according to GSA  officials.

Project Phasing. According to GSA officials, OMB may request that GSA  and CBP divide large projects into separate phases when high-cost  projects are unlikely to be funded in a single appropriation. For example,  of the eight border crossing locations represented across the 10 projects  in our review, CBP and GSA broke three projects at three locations into  phases to obtain approval: Alexandria Bay, Calexico West, and San  Ysidro.

However, for similar reasons as those related to funding lags between  design and construction, breaking up projects into smaller phases can  increase overall costs and add years to project timelines. According to  GSA and CBP officials, when appropriations do not align with project  schedules, contractors may leave the site after completing a single phase  to pursue new work opportunities. Additionally, by the time GSA receives  appropriations for latter phases, the contractor must remobilize equipment  and labor, costs of labor and material may have increased, and projects  may need design refreshes, as described above. For example, after  Calexico West phase II remained unfunded two years after phase I was  completed, GSA estimated that project costs increased by $27.7 million  due to increases in labor and materials and potential redesign work. In  another example, GSA officials told us that after originally designing the  Alexandria Bay project as a single-phase in 2010, OMB directed GSA to  break the project into two phases in 2014 to increase the likelihood of  funding. According to GSA officials, redesigning Alexandria Bay as a two- phase project added as much as $16.5 million to total project costs.  Construction costs escalated by about $58.4 million from the single-phase  estimate in fiscal year 2011 to fiscal year 2017 when phase I construction  began, an increase of 36 percent. Further, completing the Alexandria Bay  project in two phases added an additional three years to the project  timeline.

While breaking projects into phases can potentially lead to higher costs,  GSA officials told us that doing so can be an effective way to start work  on a large capital project when funding for the entire project is not  available in a single year and can be cost effective when GSA receives  appropriations for each phase in line with its planned schedule.

GSA and CBP have reported facing challenges constructing land border  crossing projects, including those related to CBP-requested changes,  geographical and environmental factors, and inadequate or incomplete  infrastructure in neighboring countries.

CBP Change Requests. CBP may request modifications to ongoing  projects through Reimbursable Work Authorizations to meet changing  infrastructure requirements, such as incorporating newer technologies  and CBP design standards. These requests range from installing new  information technology and security equipment to enhancing office,  holding facilities, or public-facing areas of the port. CBP change requests  are often necessary because the span between design and construction  can last up to 10 years, according to CBP and GSA officials. While CBP  typically pays for the cost of these modifications, GSA must incorporate  changes into existing project plans, which can result in schedule growth,  according to GSA officials. CBP-requested changes led to cost and/or  schedule growth at the Calexico West, Columbus, Derby Line, Nogales  West-Mariposa, and San Ysidro land border crossing projects, according  to GSA officials. In one example, GSA revised the Nogales West- Mariposa project’s schedule baseline from March 2014 to August 2014 to  incorporate a $10 million Reimbursable Work Authorization from CBP that  added an outbound inspection facility.

Environmental and geographical challenges. Environmental and  geographical factors including extreme climates, remote locations, and  limited space, can create construction challenges, according to CBP and  GSA officials. Extreme climates can disrupt construction activities, such  as concrete work at land border crossings. CBP officials said that at some  southern crossings concrete may crack when it dries too quickly due to  extreme heat, requiring contractors to pour concrete in the early morning  when temperatures are cooler. However, officials said that because this  work typically occurs outside of regular business hours, it often comes at  a premium and can increase project costs. Along the northern border,  contractors may not be able to do concrete work during the winter months  because temperatures can be too cold to pour concrete. At Derby Line,  because of delays earlier in construction, work extended into an  additional winter season, contributing to cost and schedule growth  because contractors were slowed or limited by weather, according to  GSA officials.

Environmental conditions surrounding construction sites also led to  construction challenges, and in turn, cost and schedule growth. The area  surrounding the Columbus land border crossing is prone to severe  flooding, and major flood events have forced CBP to close the port  several times a year, according to GSA officials. Officials also said  flooding posed a potential risk of deteriorating port structures. After GSA  spent $3.3 million to develop the original design, it spent an additional  $7.4 million on a design refresh to incorporate flood protection and update  CBP requirements to prepare for construction. In another example, GSA  and the contractor discovered unstable soil conditions during the Tornillo- Guadalupe project that resulted in a two month delay and $1.3 million  cost increase (about 3 percent of the project budget) to mitigate.

GSA officials told us they may also experience challenges accessing  labor, materials, and utilities for projects at remote land border crossings.  For example, Alexandria Bay’s remote location created logistical  challenges for transporting concrete to the site. Because the land border  crossing is on an island and only accessible via toll bridge, the contractor  determined it was more cost effective to construct a temporary concrete  plant onsite. GSA officials also stated the labor market in Alexandria Bay  is limited—due in part to its remoteness—and that labor costs were high  because the contractor had to temporarily relocate its employees to the  area. In another example, officials reported challenges with transporting  construction materials to the Tornillo-Guadalupe site due to its remote  location, contributing to 2.5 months in schedule growth.

Natural features and dense population centers surrounding land border  crossings can create challenges for contractors during construction. For  example, the Alexandria Bay project—which will triple the crossing’s  footprint when complete—required contractors to blast massive rock  formations to create more room for facilities. GSA officials stated the rock  removal entailed significant coordination with CBP because GSA required  CBP to temporarily halt vehicle processing for safety reasons when  GSA’s contractor was using dynamite. Officials also told us that snow  removal is a challenge at Alexandria Bay because there are limited  places to put plowed snow without impeding traffic and interrupting CBP  operations.

Corresponding international infrastructure. Inadequate or incomplete  infrastructure in neighboring countries can lead to project delays. GSA  officials explained that because land border crossings on both sides of  the border need to connect, capital infrastructure projects in the United  States are largely dependent on the readiness of Mexican or Canadian  infrastructure. For example, GSA completed the Tornillo-Guadalupe  project in October 2014, but delayed opening cargo processing facilities  due to Mexico’s delays in completing its new commercial facilities and  bridge system required for commercial traffic. As a result, CBP did not  begin processing inbound cargo at Tornillo-Guadalupe until March  2016—16 months after it began processing passenger vehicles.  Furthermore, after processing 277 trucks in 14 months, CBP suspended  commercial inspection operations in May 2017, citing low traffic volumes.  CBP officials said that commercial transporters were unwilling to use  underdeveloped Mexican infrastructure in the region, leading to low  commercial traffic volumes, and in turn, CBP’s decision to suspend  commercial operations. Similarly, GSA had to delay work for 3 months on  the Calexico West project because Mexico was behind schedule on its  infrastructure project, according to GSA officials. To address this issue,  GSA slowed work in that area and Mexico accelerated its schedule so  that GSA and Mexico could complete their sections simultaneously.

CBP is charged with facilitating billions of dollars in trade and travel at the  nation’s border, while also preventing terrorists, criminals and other  inadmissible individuals from entering the country. Given that CBP relies  on infrastructure at land border crossings to fulfill its mission, maintaining  the condition of the infrastructure is critical and can also be challenging,  as many land border crossings were built more than 70 years ago. By  developing and implementing a plan to ensure CBP executes its FCA  program to assess the condition of infrastructure at CBP-owned land  border crossings consistent with DHS policy, CBP would be able to  maintain more complete and current information on its overall  infrastructure needs. Also, given that GSA owns many of the land border  crossings out of which CBP operates, sharing and using certain relevant  information with each other—such as their respective facility assessments  and repairs at land border crossings—could help both agencies improve  the accuracy and completeness of their respective assessments of facility  condition.

Additionally, while CBP develops five-year plans to prioritize capital  projects at land border crossings, establishing time frames for  stakeholders who review and approve the plans would better position  CBP to identify and address sources of delay and could improve its ability  to complete a plan each year and include it in the budget submission to  Congress. Furthermore, by also establishing a methodology for  prioritizing its capital projects—including key required procedures and  time frames—CBP could better ensure consistency in its approach from  year to year.

We are making a total of seven recommendations, including five to CBP  and two to GSA:  The CBP Commissioner, in conjunction with the DHS Office of the Chief  Readiness Support Officer, should develop and implement a plan to  ensure that CBP executes its FCA program by conducting FCAs at each  CBP-owned land border crossing consistent with DHS Directive 119-02- 004. (Recommendation 1)

The CBP Commissioner should share FCA reports with GSA and use  facility condition information in GSA’s Building Assessment Tool to inform  FCAs. (Recommendation 2)

The GSA Administrator should share Building Assessment Tool reports  with CBP and use facility condition information in CBP’s FCAs to inform  its assessments through the Building Assessment Tool.  (Recommendation 3)

The GSA Administrator, in conjunction with CBP, should share with CBP  information on GSA maintenance and repair work at GSA-owned land  border crossings at the level of detail necessary to inform CBP’s data in  TRIRIGA. (Recommendation 4)

The CBP Commissioner should use information on maintenance and  repair work conducted by GSA at GSA-owned land border crossings to  update facility condition information in TRIRIGA on an ongoing basis.  (Recommendation 5)

The CBP Commissioner should establish review time frames for  stakeholders involved in its Five-year Capital Investment Plan review and  approval process. (Recommendation 6)

The CBP Commissioner should establish and document a methodology  for its annual land border crossing capital prioritization process that  includes procedures and time frames for each step. (Recommendation 7)

We provided a copy of this report to DHS and GSA for review and  comment. DHS and GSA provided comments, which are reproduced in  full in appendix III and appendix IV, respectively, and discussed below.  DHS also provided technical comments, which we incorporated as  appropriate.

In its comments, DHS and GSA concurred with our seven  recommendations and described actions planned to address them.

With respect to our first recommendation that CBP develop and  implement a plan to execute FCAs at CBP-owned land border crossings  consistent with DHS Directive 119-02-004, DHS stated that CBP intends  to develop a plan for completing FCAs at CBP-owned land border  crossings consistent with the Directive.

With regard to our second recommendation that CBP share FCA reports  with GSA and use GSA’s Building Assessment Tool to inform CBP FCAs,  DHS stated that CBP plans to provide FCA data to GSA. DHS also stated  it has already begun receiving Building Assessment tool reports from  GSA and will determine how to best use the information to inform CBP  FCAs.

With respect to our third recommendation that GSA share Building  Assessment Tool reports with CBP and use CBP’s FCAs to inform its  assessments, GSA stated it is developing a plan to share Building  Assessment Tool information and use FCA information to inform its  assessments.

With regard to our fourth recommendation that GSA share information on  its maintenance and repair work at GSA-owned land border crossings at  the level of detail necessary to inform CBP’s data in TRIRIGA, GSA  stated it will develop a plan to share information on GSA maintenance  and repair work at the level of detail necessary to inform CBP’s data in  TRIRIGA.

With respect to our fifth recommendation that CBP use information on  maintenance and repair work conducted by GSA at land border crossings  and update facility condition information in TRIRIGA on an ongoing basis,  DHS stated it has already begun receiving data from GSA on corrective  maintenance work at land border crossings and that CBP will develop a  plan for updating facility condition information in TRIRIGA using the data.

With regard to our sixth recommendation that CBP establish time frames  for stakeholders involved in its Five-year Capital Investment Plan review  and approval process, DHS  stated that CBP will establish a policy that  outlines time frames for stakeholders involved in the review and approval  process.

DHS also concurred with our seventh recommendation that CBP  establish and document a methodology for its annual land border  crossing capital prioritization process that includes procedures and time  frames for each step. Specifically, DHS stated that CBP will document the  process and procedures, and provide time frames, for each step in the  process.

We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional  committees, the Acting Secretary of Homeland Security, and the  Administrator of the General Services Administration. In addition, this  report is available at no charge on the GAO website at  http://www.gao.gov.

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact  me at 202-512-8777 or gamblerr@gao.gov. Contact points for our Office  of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last  page of our report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this report  are listed in appendix V.

Appendix I: U.S. Land Border Crossings along the Northern and Southern Borders

U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) operates at 167 land border  crossings along the northern and southern borders. Of the 167 land  border crossings, CBP owns 40. The General Services Administration  (GSA) fully owns 101, partially owns three, and leases 19. The National  Park Service owns two and the U.S. Forest Service owns one. One land  border crossing is privately owned. Further, CBP and GSA have  assessed the condition of 95 of the 167 land border crossings along the  northern and southern borders and calculated a facility condition index (0- 10% good, 10-20% fair, 20-30% poor, and 30-100% critical) and identified  the total cost of infrastructure deficiencies at each crossing. Table 6  identifies land border crossings by name, state, ownership, year  constructed, the year last renovated, facility condition index score, and  the cost of known infrastructure deficiencies, according to CBP data, and  is for informational purposes only.

Appendix II: Land Border Crossing Project Profiles

Overview of Recent GSA Land Border Crossing Capital Projects

To provide an overview of recent land border crossing capital  infrastructure projects, we developed a profile for each project that was  active during fiscal years 2014 through 2018. These profiles contain  background information on each crossing, along with basic travel, trade,  and law enforcement data. Each profile also contains information on how  infrastructure constraints affected U.S. Customs and Border Protection  (CBP) operations, and how CBP and the General Services Administration  (GSA) addressed those constraints through the capital project. Finally,  the profiles include an assessment of project cost and schedule  performance.

We compiled information in the following project profiles from a variety of  federal sources. We provide background information on each land border  crossing in the “At A Glance” section of each profile. Some land ports of  entry contain multiple land border crossings. While each project, and  associated project performance data, refers to a single crossing unless  otherwise noted, all throughput and trade data in this section is provided  at the port-level. Law enforcement data are provided at the port-level,  with the exception of arrests, which is provided at the crossing level. Daily  CBP officers assigned to the port refers to the daily average for fiscal year  2017. We obtained condition, staffing, and law enforcement data from  CBP’s Office of Facilities and Asset Management. Condition information  includes the year GSA built each individual crossing and when GSA last  modernized it through a major capital project. The number of arrests  refers to arrests at land border crossings made by CBP Office of Field  Operations officers, and does not include Border Patrol apprehensions.  We analyzed data on imports, exports, and trade values from the  Department of Transportation’s Bureau of Transportation Statistics (BTS)  TransBorder Freight Data. These data are collected by CBP, processed  and validated by the U.S. Census Bureau, and analyzed by BTS. Value of  trade includes the combined totals of imports and exports for 2017. We  also analyzed BTS’s Crossing/Entry Data to determine throughput for  pedestrians, passenger vehicles, and cargo trucks.

We analyzed project cost and schedule performance data from GSA’s  Electronic Project Management system. These data included project cost  and schedule baselines, and updated cost and schedule performance  data as of January 2019. For multi-phase projects with only one phase  included in our scope, phase costs may not equal total project costs when  combined because certain project costs, such as site acquisition, cannot  be attributed to an individual phase. Under schedule performance,  original completion date refers to the project’s baseline substantial  completion date. Revised completion date, if applicable, refers to a  project’s updated substantial completion as revised by GSA to address  project setbacks or delays. For ongoing projects, expected completion  date is the date when GSA officials expect to complete the project. For  completed projects, the actual completion date is the date the project  reached substantial completion.

We obtained information on crossing infrastructure constraints and project  plans through interviews with GSA and CBP officials and project  documents. These officials included GSA headquarters and project  management officials, as well as CBP Office of Field Operations field  office officials and local CBP officers. “Infrastructure Impacts on CBP  Operations” refers to infrastructure constraints that existed prior to GSA’s  recent capital project, while “Infrastructure Improvement Plans” describes  each project’s scope and performance.

To assess the reliability of project performance data from GSA’s  Electronic Project Management system, we examined the data for  obvious errors, and discussed the data with GSA project management  officials. We determined the data to be sufficiently reliable for our  purposes. To assess the reliability of trade data, we reviewed  documentation and conducted interviews with officials from the U.S.  Census Bureau, the original source of the validated data. Specifically, we  analyzed procedures by agencies responsible for collecting the statistics,  and reliability assessments by those agencies and outside sources. After  reviewing data dictionaries and BTS’s quality control measures for  analyzing the Census data, and conducting data quality checks, we  determined that the trade data, originally collected by Census and  released by BTS, are sufficiently reliable for providing contextual  information about the value of trade. To assess the reliability of BTS  crossing/entry data, we reviewed relevant documentation and procedures  for analyzing the data, and met with BTS officials to discuss potential  limitations. We determined the data to be sufficiently reliable for the  purposes of reporting entry data for pedestrians, passenger vehicles, and  trucks. Finally, we found the dates land border crossings were built and  last modernized may be inconsistently recorded as provided by CBP’s  Office of Facilities and Asset Management, but we provided accurate  information in the project profiles.

Built in 1974, Alexandria Bay is the seventh busiest commercial border  crossing between the United States and Canada, as of 2017. In 2017,  U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) processed about 4,100  passengers, 1,600 passenger vehicles, 4 buses, and 600 trucks per day  at Alexandria Bay. The majority of people crossing into the United States  through Alexandria Bay in passenger vehicles are tourists traveling from  the Ottawa, Kingston, Toronto, and Montreal regions, according to  General Services Administration (GSA) project documentation. In 2017,  GSA began phase I of a capital infrastructure project at Alexandria Bay.

Prior to the project, the existing crossing lacked capacity to process  growing traffic volumes which led to significant backups. These delays  effectively brought cross-border traffic to a standstill, with traffic backups  sometimes stretching three miles into Canada. The preprimary area did  not provide adequate space for commercial traffic because the bridges  connecting the United States and Canada were not designed to support  prolonged periods of heavy traffic caused by backups. The commercial  inspection facility provided enough space to unload a single commercial  truck at a time and CBP’s commercial office space was housed in mobile  trailers. GSA’s projected increases in traffic volume and updated CBP  security procedures would necessitate an increase in the federal workforce  beyond the existing crossing’s capacity.

Capital Project Performance Cost Performance

Phase I of this two-phase project will feature a new commercial building  and warehouse, new commercial inspection lanes, and a new veterinary  services building, among other enhancements. The completed two-phase  project will more than double building space and triple the crossing’s  footprint. Phase I will include five commercial inspection lanes—some of  which will be equipped to process both commercial and passenger  vehicles. After phase II, the crossing will feature five more passenger  vehicle lanes and five more commercial lanes than the existing facility. An  improved traffic pattern throughout the crossing will increase queuing  space and allow safe and secure processing of traffic entering from  Canada. Total funding for the entire project is $238 million, including $105  million for phase I, and construction began in August 2017. Phase I  remains largely on budget and on schedule for completion in January  2020. GSA is expected to begin phase II in January 2020 and complete  the project in July 2022.

Calexico West, located in downtown Calexico, California, processes  pedestrians and passenger vehicles. Inbound commercial and bus traffic  are processed at the nearby Calexico East land border crossing, which  opened in 1997 after Calexico West ceased commercial operations.  Calexico West is the main crossing linking the California Imperial Valley  agricultural industry to the Mexican state of Baja California and, according  to U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) officials, processes large  volumes of farm workers during harvest season.

CBP and General Services Administration (GSA) officials reported that the  crossing’s facilities were undersized relative to current traffic volumes and  obsolete in terms of inspection officer safety and border security.  According to GSA, the crossing’s layout was also inefficient, resulting in  bottlenecks and long lines for passenger vehicles and pedestrians.  Passenger vehicle wait times regularly exceeded 1.5 hours during peak  travel times, with outbound traffic often extending 1.5 miles into the United  States. Facilities in the main building, including agricultural inspection  laboratories, storerooms, holding cells, waiting areas, and officer work  areas, were inadequate and undersized. CBP faced challenges finding  space to install newer inspection equipment and technologies in the  existing facilities, according to CBP officials. Finally, the passenger vehicle  secondary inspection area was open to public view, enabling individuals to  observe CBP inspections.

CBP and GSA officials reported that phase I of this two-phase project  reconfigured and expanded the existing crossing to reduce congestion and  created five times more building space. Phase I delivered a new main  building, 10 of 16 planned inbound vehicle inspection lanes, and five  outbound vehicle inspection lanes. It also included a secondary vehicle  inspection facility with canine kennels. The new preprimary inspection area  is significantly larger, allowing CBP to actively manage traffic and reduce  congestion. Further, the larger preprimary inspection area allows CBP  officers to safely and effectively patrol this area with canine units,  improving the effectiveness of CBP’s inspections. GSA completed the  $94.6 million phase I construction in September 2018, about 6.4 percent  above its cost baseline and six months later than planned. Delays  associated with a corresponding infrastructure project in Mexico and CBP- requested modifications contributed to schedule growth. Phase II received  partial funding in February 2019—two years after Phase II was scheduled  to begin.

Built in 1989, Columbus processes commercial traffic, passenger  vehicles, and pedestrians. It is the only 24-hour pedestrian border  crossing in New Mexico. Commercial traffic has steadily increased from  about 5,700 trucks in 2007 to over 14,100 trucks in 2017. Historically,  according to a GSA planning study, commercial traffic spiked in August  and September during harvest season because produce is one of  Columbus’s primary imports. Pedestrian traffic is higher during the harvest  months due to farm workers and the winter when seasonal visitors cross  the border. In 2017, the General Services Administration (GSA) began a  capital infrastructure project at Columbus.

U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and GSA officials reported that  prior to this project, CBP operated from deteriorating facilities that were  reaching the end of their useful lives. The volume of commercial trucks  and travelers has increased significantly since the crossing opened and is  expected to continue to grow. Over the years, GSA added additional  facilities that, in turn, impeded traffic flow, caused backups, and threatened  officer safety. Prior to the project, CBP could inspect two trucks at a time  at the cargo loading dock. CBP also lacked the space to completely  offload cargo, limiting inspection effectiveness. The site experienced  significant flooding during major rain events that further limited inspection  space and further deteriorated infrastructure, according to officials.

CBP and GSA officials reported that the project involves a complete  demolition of existing facilities and more than triples the crossing’s  footprint with donated land. New facilities include a separate commercial  processing facility and an expanded main building with new Non-Intrusive  Inspection technologies, a hazardous material inspection area, canine  kennel, narcotics vault, and site drainage improvements to address  flooding. Processing capacity will expand from one pedestrian lane to four,  from two passenger vehicle lanes to three, and from zero commercial  lanes to one, and will increase usable commercial dock spaces from two to  12. GSA spent $3.3 million on design from 2007 to 2009. It spent another  $7.4 million in 2014 on a redesign that incorporated flood protection and  new CBP standards. GSA expects to complete the $87 million project in  April 2019--about 3 percent above its cost baseline and two months later  than planned due to CBP requested changes.

Built in 1965, Derby Line I-91 is the busiest land border crossing in  Vermont. The crossing processes passenger vehicles, buses, cargo, and  pedestrians. There are two border crossings in Derby Line, at I-91 and  about a half mile west on Route 5. The I-91 crossing is a large facility  located on a major highway whereas the Route 5 crossing is relatively  small, located on the village’s Main Street. U.S. Customs and Border  Protection (CBP) processed about 3,000 passengers per day in 2017,  along with about 1,500 passenger vehicles and 300 trucks. In 2016,  General Services Administration (GSA) began a capital infrastructure  project at the Derby Line I-91 crossing.

CBP and GSA officials reported that CBP substantially increased staffing  at the crossing over the years, resulting in overcrowded conditions. The  administrative building lacked sufficient office and storage space, had  limited secure areas to perform interviews and searches, and lacked a  secure holding area. Due to insufficient space and outdated IT systems,  the crossing could not accommodate newer inspection technologies. The  commercial secondary inspection area was too small to completely offload  cargo trucks for inspection and the vehicle lift was inoperative. The facility  also lacked sufficient space to inspect buses and luggage. The crossing  had poor lighting and inadequate perimeter security, and lacked measures  to prevent travelers from exiting the crossing without authorization. Finally,  poorly designed inbound primary inspection lanes made it difficult for  commercial trucks to navigate through the crossing, at times resulting in  long traffic delays, according to officials.

CBP and GSA officials reported that the capital project will reduce cross- border travel times and improve the traveler experience. The project  expanded the crossing’s footprint from 0.25 to 23 acres and improved  traffic flow around the crossing, while adding measures to prevent  travelers from exiting the crossing without authorization. Site  improvements included new lighting, fire protection, and storm water  management systems, among others. The project included a main  building, and a commercial secondary inspection facility for CBP to offload  and inspect trucks. GSA completed construction in November 2018 about  5 months later than originally planned and 11 percent above its cost  baseline. Cost and schedule growth were primarily due to CBP-requested  changes and contractor performance.

The Laredo Land Port of Entry is made up of four land border crossings,  each with its own bridge. In January 2019, the General Services  Administration (GSA) completed a capital project at two of these crossings  —the Convent Street Bridge (Laredo 1), and the Lincoln-Juarez Bridge  (Laredo 2). Laredo 1 and 2 are located in downtown Laredo and process  passenger vehicle and pedestrian traffic. The other two crossings–the  Colombia Solidarity Bridge (Laredo 3) and the World Trade Bridge  (Laredo 4)—primarily process cargo. The city of Laredo owns and  maintains these bridges, while GSA owns and maintains the crossings  and all property inside the crossing facilities.

U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and GSA officials reported that  volume at Laredo 1 and 2 have increased significantly in recent decades.  Prior to the capital project, facilities at Laredo 1 did not effectively separate  vehicles, bicycles, and pedestrians within the crossing, creating  congestion, safety concerns, and pedestrian queues that could extend  across the bridge into Mexico. GSA is unable to make extensive  alterations or expand Laredo 1 because it is a U.S. Historic Site and is  surrounded by businesses and homes. Laredo 2 was unable to efficiently  process current traffic volumes. For example, GSA originally designed  Laredo 2 to process up to 10 buses per day. However in 2017, Laredo 2  processed approximately 110 buses and 2,000 bus passengers each day.  To accommodate these volumes, CBP converted Laredo 2’s passenger  vehicle secondary facility to inspect buses and moved secondary vehicle  inspections to a temporary facility.

CBP and GSA officials reported that the capital project focused on  improving efficiency, safety, and security while expanding pedestrian  capacity at Laredo 1 and bus capacity at Laredo 2. GSA combined  improvements at the two crossings into one estimated $96.6 million project  ($33 million for Laredo I and $63.6 million for Laredo II) to save on labor  and material costs. At Laredo 1, GSA replaced the main building,  expanded pedestrian lanes from eight to 14, and reconfigured vehicle  lanes to integrate newer inspection technologies. At Laredo 2, GSA  enlarged the main building, built a facility to process passenger vehicle  and bus passengers, and expanded bus processing capacity from two to  eight lanes. GSA scoped out a footbridge and scaled back aesthetic  finishes to control costs. GSA completed Laredo 1 in April 2018 and  Laredo 2 in January 2019—about 3 months later than originally planned  and 6 percent above cost baseline.

Nogales West-Mariposa is one of three land border crossings in Nogales,  Arizona and is one of the busiest land border crossings in the United  States. It serves as the southern border’s main entry and distribution point  for produce entering from Mexico. Nogales West processes about half of  the agricultural commodities entering the United States from Mexico and  has facilities for pedestrian, passenger vehicle, and commercial traffic.  The other crossings in Nogales are the DeConcini (pedestrians and  passenger vehicles) and Morley Gate crossings (pedestrians). In 2010,  the General Services Administration (GSA) initiated a $180 million capital  infrastructure project.

U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and GSA officials reported that  facilities and technologies at the original Nogales West-Mariposa land  border crossing were outdated. The crossing’s layout was also inefficient  resulting in bottlenecks, congestion, and commercial traffic backups that  extended for miles into Mexico. GSA subsequently added new facilities to  accommodate bus and pedestrian inspections, but did so in a way that  further constrained space, impairing traffic movement within the crossing,  according to officials. Wait times of up to eight hours resulted in spoilage  or reduced shelf-life of perishable goods, resulting in financial losses for  businesses. The original crossing also lacked adequate space and CBP  repurposed some facilities to accommodate operational needs, including  storing evidence in holding areas.

CBP and GSA officials reported that the capital project focused on  improving operational efficiencies, processing capacity, and security and  safety of officers and the traveling public. The project entailed demolishing  all existing structures and replacing them with new facilities, including new  inspection areas, a main building, and other support facilities. GSA added  13 acres to the crossing’s footprint and expanded processing capacity  from three to eight cargo primary lanes, one to five commercial exit lanes,  23 to 56 cargo docks (including six for refrigerated inspection), four to 12  passenger vehicle primary lanes, and eight to 24 passenger vehicle  secondary inspection spaces. GSA completed the $180 million project in  August 2014 more than 5 months later than originally planned and 5.5  percent above its cost baseline. This was due to CBP-requested changes,  design deficiencies, and high site utility costs, among other reasons,  according to officials. The project resulted in reduced wait times, but led to  higher than expected operational and maintenance expenses.

Built in 1932, San Ysidro is the busiest land border crossing in the western  hemisphere, with 24/7 operations. San Ysidro processes pedestrians,  passenger vehicles, and buses. The crossing does not have any  commercial facilities for screening cargo. In 2017, U.S. Customs and  Border Protection (CBP) processed about 65,000 northbound vehicle  passengers and 23,000 northbound pedestrians each day at San Ysidro.   The General Services Administration (GSA) began construction on a  three-phase, $741 million project in 2011, with plans to complete all three  phases by late 2019.

CBP and GSA officials reported that queues and wait times at San Ysidro  steadily increased over the years and that existing facilities could no  longer accommodate the traffic volume. CBP also reported that outdated  infrastructure in the pedestrian primary inspection area created officer  safety concerns and that renovations were necessary to provide a safe  and secure work environment for CBP staff. For example, CBP officials  stated that the design and location of the existing pedestrian primary  inspection booths obstructed officers’ view of pedestrians as they entered  the primary inspection area.

CBP and GSA officials reported that to better accommodate traffic growth  and CBP’s requirements, GSA’s capital project is expanding and  reconfiguring the crossing. The project entails demolishing existing  structures and constructing new primary and secondary passenger vehicle  inspection areas, a new main building, and other support structures. The  project also includes two pedestrian processing areas—on the east and  west sides of the crossing—that connect with transportation centers in  Mexico and the United States. Once complete, the crossing will have 34  passenger vehicle lanes with 62 booths, including stacked booths that  allow CBP officers to simultaneously inspect two vehicles in most lanes.  The crossing will also add a dedicated bus lane and a total of 36  pedestrian primary inspection lanes across its two pedestrian facilities.  GSA is building the $741 million project in three stand-alone phases, with  expected completion in November 2019.

Tornillo-Guadalupe (also known as the Marcelino Serna land border  crossing) opened in 2015. Tornillo-Guadalupe replaced the Fabens land  border crossing, which dated back to 1938. U.S. Customs and Border  Protection (CBP) currently processes passenger vehicles and pedestrians  at Tornillo-Guadalupe. Although Tornillo-Guadeloupe has commercial  processing facilities, CBP ceased using these facilities in 2017 due to low  volumes of commercial traffic.

CBP and General Services Administration (GSA) officials reported that the  original Fabens land border crossing was unable to process high traffic  volumes and that the existing bridge connecting the United States and  Mexico was no longer structurally sound enough to support commercial  crossings. CBP ceased all commercial operations at Fabens in 2001,  limiting CBP to pedestrian and passenger vehicle traffic processing. The  number of CBP personnel at the crossing exceeded facility capacity and  the limited space hindered CBP’s ability to process, interview, isolate, and  detain travelers, according to CBP officials. Further, the existing septic  system was not designed for the number of employees at the facility and  the original water system was insufficient. CBP had to haul water on site to  operate its facilities and provide bottled water for its employees and the  public to drink, according to officials.

CBP and GSA officials reported that the recent capital project delivered  new passenger vehicle and pedestrian inspection facilities along with a  new main building. The project also included a dedicated bus inspection  area and a parking lot for seized vehicles. Commercial facilities included a  new bridge and commercial building, 10 covered secondary inspection  docks, two primary inspection lanes with a canopy, a hazardous materials  containment area, agriculture lab, and seized narcotics storage. The  project also added an additional 109 acres of donated farmland to the  original crossing’s 6 acre footprint. GSA completed the $73.5 million  construction project in October 2014, about 15 months later than planned  and 19 percent above its cost baseline. Unstable soil conditions and  contractor performance issues contributed to cost and schedule growth,  according to GSA. Delays associated with infrastructure in Mexico delayed  the start of cargo processing by 16 months. Despite investing in new  commercial processing facilities at the crossing, CBP suspended cargo  processing in May 2017 after 14 months, citing low traffic volumes due to  underdeveloped infrastructure in Mexico.

Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security

Appendix IV: Comments from the General Services Administration

Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

In addition to the contact named above, Michael Armes (Assistant  Director) Kirk Kiester (Assistant Director), Bruce Crise (Analyst in  Charge), Lilia Chaidez, Michele Fejfar, Eric Hauswirth, Susan Hsu, Daniel  Kuhn, Jeremy Manion, Mara McMillen, Marc Meyer, and Sasan J. “Jon”  Najmi made significant contributions to this report.

U.S. Customs and Border Protection facilitates trade and travel at the nation’s 167 land border crossings. CBP and the General Services Administration own or lease these facilities. Many were built over 70 years ago and struggle to keep up with the usage demanded of them.

We found that CBP doesn't have complete information on infrastructure conditions at these crossings. For instance, it only assessed 4 of its 40 crossings between 2016 and 2018. Additionally, both agencies assess conditions at GSA-owned land border crossings but don't consistently share or use each other’s information.

We recommended that CBP and GSA address these issues.