Wildfire: Information on Forest Service Response, Key Concerns, and Effects of the Chetco Bar Fire

A wildfire known as the Chetco Bar Fire began in the summer of 2017 in southwest Oregon and burned more than 190,000 acres over nearly 4 months. Since the fire began in a national forest, the Department of Agriculture's Forest Service played a key role in managing the firefighting response. Because the fire also threatened other lands, state and private firefighting entities were also involved.

GAO was asked to review the Forest Service's response to and the effects of the Chetco Bar Fire. This report describes (1) key events of the Chetco Bar Fire and the Forest Service's firefighting response, (2) key concerns raised by Forest Service officials and stakeholders about the Forest Service's response, and (3) effects of the fire on local communities and resources.

GAO reviewed federal documents related to key events and the response, such as incident action plans and daily status summaries; analyzed reports on effects of the fire; and visited burned areas. GAO also interviewed Forest Service, state, and local officials involved in the response, as well as other stakeholders—such as representatives of nongovernmental organizations and community members—to discuss key concerns and effects of the fire. To identify the stakeholders, GAO reviewed documents and interviewed Forest Service officials and stakeholders, who suggested others to interview.

The Chetco Bar Fire was first reported in July 2017, burning in the Rogue River-Siskiyou National Forest in Oregon. Because of the remote, steep terrain, initial Forest Service attempts to fight the fire at close range were unsuccessful. The fire grew slowly over the next month. Firefighters, directed by the Forest Service, responded in various ways, such as by constructing “firelines”—clearing vegetation—in an effort to stop the fire's spread. In mid-August, strong, hot winds caused the fire to expand rapidly, from 8,500 acres to more than 90,000 acres over several days, threatening thousands of homes. Firefighters continued constructing firelines and dropped water and retardant on the fire to try to contain it. In September, the weather changed and cooler days and rain moderated the fire. Firefighers fully contained the fire in November (see figure).

Forest Service officials and stakeholders raised a number of key concerns about the Forest Service's response to the Chetco Bar Fire. For example, some said that if the Forest Service's response had been more aggressive, it might have kept the fire from growing and threatening homes. Forest Service officials said that in making firefighting decisions, they prioritized firefighter safety and considered the likelihood that a particular response would be successful. The agency has taken steps to improve decision-making for future wildfires, such as developing a tradeoff analysis tool to help decision makers assess firefighting options.

Forest Service officials, stakeholders, and documents identifed various effects of the fire. Some of these sources cited negative effects including destruction of six homes, damage to roads and trails, and damage to habitat for the northern spotted owl. However, the fire likely improved habitat for some species, such as woodpeckers that eat beetles that feed on burned trees, according to officials.

A wildfire known as the Chetco Bar Fire began in the summer of 2017 in  southwest Oregon and burned for several months before it was declared  contained in November of that year. The fire, which started in the Rogue  River-Siskiyou National Forest, was first reported on July 12, at which  point it was estimated to be between one quarter and one half acre in  size. The Chetco Bar Fire grew slowly in its initial weeks and then spread  quickly the next month, threatening communities such as Brookings,  Oregon. The fire burned over 190,000 acres and, according to the  Department of Agriculture’s Forest Service and Department of the  Interior’s Bureau of Land Management (BLM), cost an estimated  $58 million in federal funds to suppress.

Since the Chetco Bar Fire began in a national forest, the Forest Service  played a key role in managing the firefighting response. Because the fire  also threatened and burned BLM and private lands, other firefighting  entities entered into “unified command” with the Forest Service and  therefore were involved in deciding how to respond to the fire. In  particular, the Oregon Office of the State Fire Marshal and Coos Forest  Protective Association were in unified command with the Forest Service  for about a month over the course of the fire.

During and after the Chetco Bar Fire, local officials, community members,  and other stakeholders raised concerns about whether the Forest Service  could have done more to suppress the fire. Questions have also been  raised about effects the fire may have had on local communities and  resources.

You asked us to review the Forest Service’s response to and the effects  of the Chetco Bar Fire. This report describes (1) key events in the Chetco  Bar Fire and the Forest Service’s firefighting response, (2) key concerns  raised by Forest Service officials and stakeholders about the Forest  Service’s response to the Chetco Bar Fire, and (3) effects of the Chetco  Bar Fire on local communities and resources.

To describe key events in the Chetco Bar Fire and the Forest Service’s  firefighting response, we reviewed documents from federal agencies,  including executive summaries and transition plans from the various  incident management teams, long-term assessments of the fire, daily  incident status summaries, incident action plans, and transcripts of radio  transmissions. We reviewed information on firefighting assets (for  example, personnel, aircraft, and equipment) from daily incident status  summaries, dispatch records, and documents on orders placed for  firefighting assets. This information was generated by the Resource  Ordering and Status System, an interagency computer software system  that automates the asset ordering and dispatching process. To determine  the reliability of the information from this system and other sources, we  reviewed agency documents and interviewed agency officials and  determined that the information was sufficiently reliable for the purpose of  describing assets used to fight the Chetco Bar Fire. We also reviewed  federal policies and guidance related to firefighting, including 2017  interagency standards for fire (known as the Red Book) and the Forest  Service Chief’s letter of intent for wildland fire, which provided direction to  the agency for the 2017 fire season.

In addition, we interviewed federal, state, and local officials who were  directly involved in the firefighting response. Specifically, we interviewed  members of incident management teams and other Forest Service staff  assigned to the Chetco Bar Fire, and senior officials from BLM and  nonfederal agencies that entered into unified command with the Forest  Service, including the Oregon Office of the State Fire Marshal and Coos  Forest Protective Association. We refer to all entities involved in  responding to the fire as cooperators. We also interviewed Forest Service  officials from headquarters, the Pacific Northwest Region, and the Rogue  River-Siskiyou National Forest. To gain a better understanding of the  Chetco Bar Fire’s location and the geographic features of the area, in  April 2019 we flew over the ignition point of the fire and key areas to  which the fire spread, and in June 2019 we visited burned areas on the  ground. We were accompanied by officials from the Rogue River-Siskiyou  National Forest during our visits. In describing the Chetco Bar Fire, we  divided the fire into phases to reflect changes in fire size and behavior,  the risk to structures and resources, and the nature of the response.

To describe key concerns raised by Forest Service officials and  stakeholders about the Forest Service’s response to the Chetco Bar Fire,  we reviewed agency documents and other documents on aspects of the  response. We also interviewed Forest Service officials and  stakeholders—including cooperators, other state and local officials,  representatives of nongovernmental organizations, and community  members affected by the Chetco Bar Fire—to discuss key concerns that  arose from the response. We identified stakeholders through a review of  agency documents and interviews with agency officials, and we asked  those stakeholders to suggest others. We held a combination of 34  individual interviews and group discussions with 60 Forest Service  officials and a combination of 24 individual interviews and group  discussions with 65 stakeholders. We analyzed the concerns raised and  grouped them into categories. One GAO analyst conducted the initial  categorization, and a team of analysts reviewed the categories and came  to agreement on the categorization. Because this was a nonprobability  sample, the views of agency officials and stakeholders are not  representative of all views but provide illustrative examples of the types of  concerns raised about the response to the Chetco Bar Fire. We did not  assess the compliance of individual firefighters or agency officials with  applicable firefighting guidance, in part because responding to wildfire  requires considerable professional judgment.

To describe the effects of the Chetco Bar Fire on local communities and  resources, we reviewed reports and other documents related to the  effects of the fire. In particular, we reviewed one report prepared for the  city of Brookings on the effects of the Chetco Bar Fire on the city and two  reports on the effects of the 2017 fire season in Oregon in general. We  interviewed the authors of these reports to discuss their methodologies,  their sources of data, and any limitations on their methodologies and  reported data, and we determined the reports to be reasonable for our  purposes. Other information we reviewed included post-fire damage  assessments and documents regarding air quality during the fire. In  addition, we discussed the effects of the Chetco Bar Fire during our  interviews with agency officials and stakeholders. To gain a better  understanding of the fire’s effects on the ground, in June 2019 we visited  several locations affected by the fire. We grouped the effects identified  into categories. One analyst conducted the initial categorization, and a  team of analysts, including an economist, reviewed the categories and  came to agreement on them. To help determine whether we captured the  main effects of the Chetco Bar Fire in these categories, we compared our  categories of effects identified with two reports on the general effects of  wildfire. We did not include some identified effects because they were of  relatively small magnitude or we lacked sufficient data to reliably report on  them. Examples of effects we excluded were local government costs for  fire suppression and emergency response, and possible effects on local  tax revenue and insurance premiums.

We conducted this performance audit from March 2019 to April 2020 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.

Background Rogue River-Siskiyou National Forest

The Rogue River-Siskiyou National Forest, located mainly in  southwestern Oregon and extending into northern California,  encompasses nearly 1.8 million acres. The west side of the forest lies  within the Klamath-Siskiyou ecoregion, which is known for its ecological  diversity, with 28 coniferous tree species and numerous rare and endemic  plants. The forest also contains diverse topography, with steep terrain  and rugged geological features across several mountain ranges, including  the Klamath Mountains, Siskiyou Mountains, Cascade Range, and Coast  Range. Access to the forest is limited, due to many roadless areas and  over 340,000 acres of wilderness, including the 180,000-acre Kalmiopsis  Wilderness, where the Chetco Bar Fire began. Cities and communities in  Oregon near the fire include Brookings and Gold Beach—along the coast  of the Pacific Ocean—as well as Agness, Cave Junction, and Selma in  Curry and Josephine counties. Figure 1 shows the final perimeter of the  fire in southwest Oregon.

The part of southwestern Oregon where the Rogue River-Siskiyou  National Forest is located is a fire-adapted ecosystem, meaning that most  native species and plant communities have evolved with fire, and many  are adapted to or dependent on periodic wildfires. The historic fire interval  in the area where the Chetco Bar Fire occurred varied, as did the historic  severity of fires, according to a Forest Service ecologist. The forest  experienced a number of fires over the 30 years before the Chetco Bar  Fire occurred. In 1987, the Silver Fire burned nearly 100,000 acres.  Fifteen years later, in 2002, the Biscuit Fire burned nearly 500,000 acres,  including areas previously burned by the Silver Fire. The Chetco Bar  Fire started in the areas burned by both the Silver and Biscuit Fires. In  2018, the year after the Chetco Bar Fire, the forest experienced another  large fire, the Klondike Fire, which burned about 175,000 acres, abutting  the burn scar of the Chetco Bar Fire in some places.

Frequency and Risk of Wildfires in the Western United States

The occurrence of large fires in the western United States has been  increasing, while, at the same time, fire seasons have been increasing in  length, according to recent assessments. Some of these assessments  have found that these increases are due in part to climate change, which  has contributed to increasing temperatures and droughts in the West, as  well as a later onset of fire-season-ending rains. We have previously  found that the cost of disasters, including wildfires, is projected to  increase as extreme weather events such as droughts become more  frequent and intense due to climate change.

Moreover, land use practices have increased the risk that severe and  intense wildfires will affect people and communities. As we have  previously described, land use practices over the past century have  reduced forest and rangeland ecosystems’ resilience to fire. In  particular, fire suppression—with 95 percent or more of fires suppressed  for nearly a century—and timber harvesting and reforestation have  contributed to abnormally dense accumulations of vegetation, and these  accumulations can fuel uncharacteristically large or severe fires. In some  parts of southwestern Oregon, significant vegetation has built up, according to Forest Service and other documents. As a result,  southwestern Oregon, as well as other parts of the country, is under high  to very high risk from fire, according to a risk assessment and Forest  Service presentation. At the same time, development in and around  wildland areas continues to increase, placing more people, businesses,  and infrastructure at risk of being affected by fires.

Because a single firefighting entity may not be able to handle all wildfires  in its jurisdiction, agencies in the United States use an interagency  incident management system that depends on the close cooperation and  coordination of federal, state, tribal, and local fire protection agencies.  The Forest Service is the predominant federal firefighting agency in terms  of funding. Other federal firefighting agencies include the Bureau of  Indian Affairs, BLM, Fish and Wildlife Service, and National Park Service.  Federal and nonfederal firefighting entities generally share their  firefighting personnel, equipment, and supplies and work together to fight  fires, regardless of who has jurisdiction over the burning lands.  Agreements between cooperating entities govern these firefighting efforts  and contain general provisions for sharing firefighting assets and costs.

On a large wildfire, firefighting efforts generally fall into two phases—initial  attack and extended attack. The initial attack phase consists of the efforts  to control a fire during the first “operational period” after the fire is  reported, generally 24 hours. While the majority of fires on Forest  Service land are controlled and suppressed during initial attack, some  fires require further firefighting efforts. Such additional efforts are referred  to as extended attack.

The Forest Service and its interagency cooperators use an incident  management system designed to provide appropriate leadership of  firefighting efforts. There are five types of incidents, ranging in complexity  from type 5 (least complex) to type 1 (most complex). The fire’s  complexity determines the type of incident commander and management  team assigned. For example, for a type-5 incident, the incident  commander may be a local employee qualified to direct initial attack  efforts on a small fire with two to six local firefighters. In contrast, for a  type-1 incident, the incident commander is one member of a highly  qualified incident management team, often with more than 500 firefighters  and other personnel. There are sixteen interagency type-1 incident  management teams that operate nationwide and are typically deployed to  fires for 14-day assignments. In addition, the Forest Service has four  type-1 incident management teams under its National Incident  Management Organization (NIMO). The Forest Service calls these “short”  teams; each team has seven full-time members, but they can add  additional members as needed. NIMO teams generally handle complex  fires, including long-duration fires, so as not to tie up critical firefighting  personnel over a long time.

A single incident management team, under the direction of the agency  administrator (the line officer, such as the forest supervisor or district  ranger, responsible for management of the incident), is typically in charge  of a fire, but the incident management system may be expanded into a  unified command structure when multiple jurisdictions are involved. This  structure brings together incident commanders from the relevant  jurisdictions to facilitate a coordinated and integrated interagency  response. In such cases, members of the unified command work together  to develop a common set of incident objectives and strategies, maximize  the use of firefighting assets, and enhance the individual jurisdictions’  efficiency.

Once assigned to a fire, an incident management team works with local  line officers and fire management staff to determine the strategy and  tactics to use in managing the fire. The strategy is the overall plan  designed to control the fire; for example, to protect structures and contain  the fire within a certain geographic area. Tactics are actions taken to  accomplish the objectives set out in the strategy. For example, the fire  may be attacked directly, with firefighters working at the fire’s edge to  extinguish it. If direct attack is not possible, practical, or safe—because  the fire is burning too intensely or on very steep slopes, for example— firefighters may choose to attack it indirectly. In such cases, firefighters  typically select an area away from the fire and construct a “fireline,” where  vegetation is cleared in an effort to stop the fire’s spread at that point or  slow it sufficiently to allow firefighters to attack directly. Firefighters often  incorporate geographic features such as roads, rocky areas, ridgelines,  and rivers into firelines to increase their effectiveness. In some cases  firefighters conduct burnout operations, in which they intentionally set fire  to fuels between a fireline and the main fire perimeter to slow or contain a  rapidly spreading fire by depriving it of fuel.

In carrying out strategies and tactics, firefighters use a variety of  firefighting assets, both on the ground and in the air. Ground-based  assets include firefighting crews, wildland fire engines, and machinery  such as bulldozers, which firefighters use to help construct firelines.  When providing personnel to fight fires, the Forest Service and other  federal agencies generally rely on a “militia” strategy whereby personnel  within each agency are trained to serve in firefighting roles when needed,  in addition to performing their day-to-day work responsibilities. Air-based  assets include helicopters and fixed-wing air tankers. Helicopters  generally drop water directly on a fire, whereas air tankers generally drop  fire retardant ahead of the fire, often near a fireline that has been  constructed, to slow a fire’s spread. Air tankers range in size from small  single-engine air tankers, which are maneuverable but carry only small  amounts of retardant, to large aircraft such as converted DC-10s or  Boeing 747s—referred to as “very large air tankers”—which can carry  substantial amounts of retardant but whose use can be limited in  mountainous terrain because of their size.

The level of risk that decision makers and firefighters are willing to accept  in any given situation depends on the experience and training of those  involved. Overall, agency firefighting doctrine emphasizes safety above  all other concerns; Forest Service policy, for example, states, “In  conducting wildland fire suppression, responsible officials shall give first  priority to the safety of firefighters, other personnel, and the public.”  Firefighters and other personnel who respond to wildland fire incidents  are required to complete training to help them identify risks as well as  develop appropriate strategies and tactics to respond to different  situations.

Key Events of the Chetco Bar Fire and Forest Service’s Response Included an Unsuccessful Initial Firefighting Attack and Rapid Spread of the Fire by Strong Winds

The Chetco Bar Fire grew slowly in the summer of 2017 before  undergoing a period of rapid growth driven by strong, hot winds. In  response, the Forest Service and other agencies undertook various  firefighting strategies and tactics over different phases of the fire,  described below. Figure 2 provides a timeline of the fire’s key events.

Initial Firefighting Attack in Remote, Steep Terrain Was Not Successful (July 12-13, 2017)

In the initial phase (July 12-13, 2017), the Chetco Bar fire was relatively  small and inaccessible. When the fire was first detected on July 12, it was  estimated to be between one quarter and one half acre in size, burning in  remote, steep terrain in the Kalmiopsis Wilderness in the Rogue River- Siskiyou National Forest. The fire’s initial location was several miles  from the closest road access point. No properties or other “values at risk”  (such as structures, other property, and natural and cultural resources  that could be damaged by a wildfire) were in the immediate vicinity of the  fire, according to Forest Service documents and officials.

The Forest Service was notified of the Chetco Bar Fire at 2:43 p.m. on  July 12 and, at 4:14 p.m., four Forest Service firefighters rappelled from a  helicopter to assess the fire. The rappellers landed on a ridge above the  fire to create a helispot (a temporary helicopter landing area) so that  additional firefighters and equipment could more easily be brought to the  fire. The rappellers requested and received permission from the district  ranger for chainsaw use in the Kalmiopsis Wilderness to prepare the  helispot, and they worked on cutting trees and clearing brush until late  that evening, according to Forest Service documents and national forest  officials. The rappellers estimated that the helispot was 60 percent  cleared by the end of the first day, according to national forest officials.

While the rappellers were working, the Forest Service helicopter returned  to its base near Grants Pass, Oregon, to attach a bucket to drop water  onto the fire. In the meantime, two helicopters from the Oregon  Department of Forestry headed to the fire. The three helicopters dropped  about 17,000 gallons of water the first day, according to Forest Service  documents. Forest Service officials said these water drops were intended  to slow the spread of the fire while the rappellers worked to clear the  helispot.

Anticipating that the helispot would be completed shortly, the Forest  Service ordered two 20-person crews to assist in firefighting efforts the  next day. As the rappellers set up camp for the night, incident command  radioed them to say that the fire appeared to be holding at about three  quarters of an acre.

The next morning, July 13, the Forest Service brought in four additional  rappellers to continue working on the helispot throughout the morning and  into the afternoon (see fig. 3). One of the rappellers walked the perimeter  of the fire and determined that the fire had grown to about 10 acres  overnight. While the rappellers were working, two helicopters dropped  about 18,000 gallons of water that day and a single engine air tanker  dropped 1,200 gallons, according to a Forest Service document.

The crew bosses for the two crews that had been ordered the previous  day flew over the fire early afternoon of July 13, according to Forest  Service documents. They estimated the fire had grown to about 15 acres  and observed a number of spot fires (smaller fires separate from the main  fire) caused by burning material rolling down the hill. They expressed  safety concerns about bringing crews into that area and also determined  the helispot needed more work before a helicopter could land safely.

Since the crews would need to be shuttled in by helicopter, the crew  bosses decided not to bring in the requested crews, according to officials.

Later that day, the incident commander requested a helicopter to remove  the eight rappellers from the fire because of safety concerns and a low  probability of success at containing the fire, according to the incident  commander and Forest Service documents. The rappellers said that it  was taking much longer to complete the helispot than initially anticipated  and they did not have a good safety zone or escape route. They also  noted that there was unburned vegetation on the slope between the fire  and the helispot they were constructing—a dangerous situation if the fire  started to spread quickly. The rappellers were removed by 5:00 p.m., at  which time the helicopters also stopped dropping water. Figure 4 shows  the ignition point of the Chetco Bar Fire and the fire’s growth as of July  13, 2017.

Fire Grew Slowly over Several Weeks as Firefighters Pursued Indirect Strategies (July 14-August 16, 2017)

In the second phase of the fire, Rogue River-Siskiyou National Forest  officials assigned a type-3 incident management team to manage the  response to the Chetco Bar Fire, following the unsuccessful initial attack.  Forest Service documents indicated that fire behavior was moderate over  the next several weeks, averaging around 150 acres of growth per day.  The Chetco Bar Fire was a relatively low-priority fire during this phase,  since it was far from values at risk and it remained within the Kalmiopsis  Wilderness, while other fires in the region were threatening communities  and resources, according to Forest Service documents and incident  management team officials.

Because firefighters had been unable to suppress the fire during initial  attack, national forest officials said they anticipated, based on knowledge  of previous fires in the area, that the Chetco Bar Fire would become a  long-term incident. The type-3 incident management team completed a  long-term assessment and began working to contain the fire using long- term, indirect strategies. Under the type-3 team, crews scouted potential  locations to fight the fire and started building firelines some distance  away, approximately 6 miles from the fire and outside of the wilderness  boundary, according to a Forest Service document and an incident  management team official. Several additional fire crews were assigned to  work on the fire during this time, with staffing fluctuating between  approximately 40 and 140 people per day.

As the type-3 team’s 2-week rotation was ending, national forest officials  decided to bring in a NIMO team to assume command of the fire. Officials  said they brought in a NIMO team because it consisted of type-1-qualified  staff who could be staffed on the fire for longer than 2 weeks, and the  team could expand or contract as needed. The NIMO team took  command of the fire on July 29, with the fire estimated at 2,181 acres in  size, and started updating the type-3 team’s long-term assessment and  developing a long-term implementation plan. The plan identified  13 trigger points, referred to as “management action points,” to help guide  decision-making on protecting high values at risk if certain conditions  were met. For example, the plan laid out actions to prevent the fire from  crossing the Chetco River—the first trigger point identified—and actions  to be taken if the fire crossed the river.

The NIMO team continued the type-3 team’s efforts to construct a series  of firelines away from the main fire and, according to a team summary  document, completed all of the firelines by August 17. Forest Service  officials told us that for these firelines to be effective, firefighters would  have needed to burn the vegetation between the lines and the fire itself  (known as a burnout). National forest and NIMO team officials said that  the teams had not yet taken this step because they considered it an  unnecessary risk as long as the fire remained north of the Chetco River.  These officials said that burnout operations pose risks if the fire set by  firefighters burns in a different direction than intended, and such  operations can unnecessarily burn a larger area of the forest if the fire  does not reach the burnout. Therefore, one national forest official said  firefighters will prepare firelines but not conduct burnout operations until  the incident management team determines they are needed—particularly  since safety risks can be associated with conducting burnout operations.  Figure 5 shows the Chetco Bar Fire’s growth from July 14 through August  16, 2017.

Fire Expanded Rapidly because of Strong Winds, and Firefighting Response Began to Escalate (August 17-August 21, 2017)

As the fire burned into August, hotter and drier weather created  conditions for more active fire behavior in the third phase of the fire.  Chetco Effect winds developed in mid-August 2017, causing the Chetco  Bar Fire to rapidly expand and intensify (see sidebar). The Forest Service  was aware of the potential for such winds, as fire behavior modeling and  the July 2017 long-term assessment showed the potential for these winds  to increase fire behavior dramatically by mid-August. The winds,  combined with dry fuels and heavy vegetation, created conditions that led  to extreme fire behavior.

Chetco Effect Winds  Chetco Effect winds, also known as Brookings  Effect winds, are warm, dry, and strong winds  flowing down the Chetco River Basin toward  Brookings, Oregon (see figure below). Such  winds are more broadly referred to as Foehn  or downslope winds, other examples being the  Santa Ana winds in southern California and  the Diablo winds in northern California. Chetco  Effect winds can happen any time and  generally occur two to four times a year,  according to the National Weather Service.

The Chetco Effect winds first occurred the evening of August 15 and  morning of August 16, but the fire remained north of the Chetco River.  When the winds returned the evening of August 16 and morning of  August 17, the fire crossed the river and began expanding rapidly, in part  because heavy vegetation on the south side of the river fueled the fire  under the winds. Many officials and stakeholders said nothing could be  done to moderate the fire’s behavior when the Chetco Effect winds were  in effect. The fire increased in size from 8,500 acres on August 17 to  91,551 acres on August 21 (see fig. 6). As a result, the Chetco Bar Fire  became a much higher priority fire, according to Forest Service  documents.

The NIMO team ordered additional crews on August 17, in anticipation of  conducting burnout operations along 10 miles of fireline in an attempt to  slow the fire, according to Forest Service documents. However, the  Chetco Effect winds caused the fire to move rapidly toward and past the  fireline before the Forest Service could conduct the planned burnouts.  Even though the fireline was completed prior to being overrun by the fire,  national forest officials told us that the weather conditions were not  favorable for burnout operations, as the winds would have blown the  burnout fires back toward private timberlands and populated areas. The  winds also caused embers to fly far ahead of the fire during this time,  creating spot fires 1 to 2 miles or more ahead of the main flame front.

On August 18, the Chetco Bar Fire began spreading from national forest  onto private timberlands and unincorporated areas containing homes.  As the fire began to threaten homes and other structures, the NIMO team  directed firefighters to take appropriate action to try to protect those  structures, if fire behavior allowed. For example, between August 18  and 21, Forest Service documents indicated that firefighters cleared  brush around several structures and homes in a small community known  as Wilderness Retreat and along two Forest Service roads. On August  19, the fire burned rapidly toward Wilderness Retreat and firefighters  conducted an emergency burnout, which successfully protected the  community, according to a NIMO team document and national forest  officials. Around this time in another area, the Chetco Bar Fire burned  six primary residences and more than 20 other structures, according to  state and Forest Service documents. On August 20, the fire traveled  6 miles toward Brookings in a single day, and threatened more than  3,000 homes during this phase.

As the Chetco Bar Fire burned toward Brookings, the NIMO team notified  the Curry County Sheriff that residents would need to be evacuated.  However, the rapid spread of the fire provided limited time to notify  residents and conduct evacuations, according to a NIMO team document  and national forest officials. The Curry County Sheriff’s Office issued the  first evacuation notices on August 18, and additional evacuation notices  were issued between August 19 and 21.

As the fire expanded, the NIMO team ordered additional firefighting  assets, increasing the ground assets assigned from 65 firefighters and  1 fire engine on August 17, 2017, to 788 firefighters and 90 fire engines  by August 21. However, some assets ordered were not available because  they were assigned to other fires in the region. In addition to ground  assets, additional aircraft were ordered and assigned to assist the  firefighting effort—such as two large and one very large air tankers, which  dropped retardant on the fire on August 17 and August 18. The incident  management team had requested two additional air tankers, but the  requests were cancelled since aircraft were unavailable, according to a  Forest Service document. Some ordered drops from air tankers also were  cancelled because of poor visibility from smoke. Six helicopters were  ordered during this phase, four of which were assigned to the fire, but the  helicopters also were unable to fly due to smoke, according to flight  communication logs and an incident management senior official.

With the Chetco Bar Fire’s rapid growth, national forest officials decided  to order a type-1 incident management team on August 21. Since  mobilizing the team would take time, a type-2 team already in the vicinity was brought in to assist the NIMO team on August 19. The type-1 team  arrived on August 23 and assumed command on August 26, according to  a team document.

Firefighting Response Continued to Escalate and Fire Burned Actively but Rate of Spread Slowed (August 22-September 22, 2017)

In the fourth phase, the Chetco Bar Fire continued to burn actively  through the end of August and into September 2017, but the rate of its  spread generally slowed. However, high temperatures and low humidity  contributed to the fire growing from 97,758 acres on August 22 to 191,067  acres on September 22 (see fig. 7). Evacuations continued in the early  part of this phase, threatening more than 8,500 homes during parts of  September, but evacuation orders began to be lifted as the risk to homes  declined.

During this phase, the Forest Service ordered more firefighting assets,  resulting in over 1,700 firefighters in total assigned to the fire. Between  September 6 and 19, the fire began expanding to the east and the fire  was divided into an east and west zone, with separate incident  management teams assigned to each zone. Firefighters constructed  firelines to the south and west of the fire. Forest Service documents  indicated the agency put in 128 miles of fireline cut by bulldozers and  52 miles of hand cut fireline, and used 141 miles of existing roads and  25 miles of natural features as firelines. Air tankers and helicopters  continued supporting firefighters, dropping over 950,000 gallons of water,  55,000 gallons of retardant, and 10,000 gallons of gel during this phase,  according to Forest Service documents. However, smoke from the fire  hampered air operations, with one type-1 team reporting it was unable to  conduct air operations for about half of the days it was in command  (August 26 through September 9). Firefighters gained substantial  control of the fire during this phase, going from 0 percent containment on  August 22 to 97 percent containment by September 22.

Fire Intensity Moderated because of Changing Weather, and Fire Was Ultimately Contained (September 23-November 2, 2017)

In mid- to late-September, the weather started to change, with cooler  days and more moisture, which helped to moderate the fire’s behavior. By  September 23, the area had received several inches of rain, which nearly  contained the fire, according to an incident management team document.  Firefighting assets were released as the fire was contained. The Chetco  Bar Fire was declared fully contained on November 2—nearly 4 months  after it was detected. The fire burned a total of approximately 191,197  acres, according to the Forest Service’s Burned Area Emergency  Response (BAER) report (see fig. 8).

Officials and Stakeholders Raised Concerns about the Response to the Chetco Bar Fire, Such as the Aggressiveness of Firefighting and Extent of Communication

Forest Service officials and stakeholders we interviewed raised a number  of concerns about the Forest Service’s response to the Chetco Bar Fire.  Many of these concerns related directly to the Forest Service’s response  to the fire; some related to broader agency programs that may have had  an effect on fire behavior. We grouped these concerns into five  categories: (1) aggressiveness of firefighting response, (2) availability of  firefighting assets, (3) communication with cooperators,  (4) communication with the public, and (5) timber harvest and other fuel  reduction activities. The Forest Service has taken steps that may help  address some of the concerns, such as those related to communication.  Agency officials and stakeholders expressed differing views about some  of the concerns and whether changes were necessary.

Some national forest officials and many stakeholders we interviewed said  that the Forest Service was not aggressive enough in fighting the Chetco  Bar Fire before the Chetco Effect winds arrived in mid-August. Several of  these stakeholders said if the Forest Service had used more aggressive  firefighting strategies and tactics, the agency could have prevented the  fire from getting as large as it did and threatening homes. Some of these  officials and stakeholders raised concerns about whether incident  management teams and line officers appropriately balanced the risks of  different firefighting decisions during the fire. Some said the strategies  and tactics taken early on may have put hundreds of firefighters and the  public at risk later in the fire.

National forest and incident management team officials said that in  attempting to suppress the Chetco Bar Fire, they adopted firefighting  strategies and tactics that considered firefighter safety, the values at risk,  and the probability of success. National forest officials said that when  deciding how to respond to the fire, they prioritized firefighter safety and  also considered the likelihood that a particular response would be  successful, in accordance with 2017 Forest Service guidance. As  previously discussed, in the early stages of the Chetco Bar Fire,  firefighters expressed concerns about their safety and the likelihood of  success of certain tactics. In addition, national forest officials noted that  after the rappellers asked to be pulled out of the fire and other firefighters  expressed safety concerns, line officers were hesitant to send in  additional firefighters. Other officials and stakeholders said the area  where the Chetco Bar Fire started is very dangerous, with some noting  that it is one of the most dangerous areas in the region and possibly the  country to fight fire.

Specific concerns about the aggressiveness of the Forest Service’s  response included the following:

Number of firefighters. Some officials and several stakeholders  raised concerns about the Forest Service not sending in more  firefighters at the beginning of the Chetco Bar Fire to try to contain it  before it threatened homes. In response, national forest officials said  that the four rappellers that were sent on the first day were part of an  18-person crew stationed near Grants Pass, Oregon. They were the  only crew members available to respond on July 12, as the remaining  crew members had just returned from another fire assignment, and  firefighters are generally required to take 2 days off after completing a  standard 14-day fire assignment. As previously noted, safety  concerns also factored into decisions to remove the rappellers and not  add crews on the second day of the fire.

Absence of smokejumpers. Some stakeholders raised concerns  that the Forest Service did not send smokejumpers into the Chetco  Bar Fire in its early stages, saying that smokejumpers may have been  more effective at suppressing the fire when it was small. In  response, national forest officials said that the rappellers who were  sent to the fire were located much closer to the ignition point than the  closest smokejumpers and were able to respond more quickly. These  officials also said that rappellers can be more effective in rough terrain  with heavy timber, since they do not need an open space to land with  parachutes and can be dropped closer to the fire.

Use of helicopters. Several stakeholders raised concerns about the  Forest Service stopping the use of helicopters to drop water on the  fire after the rappellers were removed. According to interagency  guidance and Forest Service officials, water drops are not as effective  at containing a fire without crews on the ground (to build firelines, for  example), and they did not want to expose helicopter crews to  unnecessary risk for actions that were unlikely to be effective. In  addition, officials said that the water drops were causing burning logs  and other debris to roll down the hill and create spot fires. Interagency  guidance discusses the importance of coordinating air and ground  firefighting tactics, noting that the effectiveness of aircraft is  dependent on the deployment of ground assets.

Use of indirect strategies. Several stakeholders raised concerns  about incident management teams not engaging the fire more directly  in the first several weeks rather than constructing fireline miles away.  Some of these stakeholders described this indirect approach as a  “watch and wait” or “let it burn” approach. In response, officials said  that they looked for locations and opportunities to fight the fire directly,  but the fire’s remote location and rugged terrain made this difficult.  One official estimated it would have taken firefighters 2 days to hike to  the fire because of the distance and trail conditions.

Number of burnout operations. Several officials raised concerns  about the Forest Service not conducting burnout operations before the  Chetco Effect winds arrived in mid-August. However, as previously  noted, officials stated that there are risks in conducting such  operations.

Limited use of chainsaws. Some national forest officials raised  concerns about limited use of chainsaws in the Kalmiopsis  Wilderness, saying this prevented them from making quicker progress  in constructing fireline. For example, two national forest fire  management officials said that in trying to clear a wilderness trail to  use as a fireline, the crew used handsaws rather than chainsaws after  the initial attack, which made the task more difficult and time  consuming.

Limited action to protect homes. Several stakeholders raised  concerns about incident management teams not doing more to protect  homes, stating that firefighters and equipment in the vicinity of homes  that later burned were not used to help protect those homes. In  response, national forest and headquarters officials said that although  the agency tries to prevent fires from reaching homes, protecting  homes and other private structures is the responsibility of state and  local entities. Moreover, headquarters officials noted that Forest  Service firefighters are not trained or equipped to defend structures.

Forest Service officials said that since the Chetco Bar Fire, the agency  has expanded tools that may help address some of these concerns for  future fires. They noted that some of these tools were not widely available  at the time of the Chetco Bar Fire but are becoming more common. In  particular, the Forest Service has an evolving risk management  assistance program aimed at improving decision-making on fires by  developing a strategic evaluation process. This program includes risk- management assistance teams that can be deployed to fires to assist with  key decisions and exercises to help incident management teams and line  officers analyze different firefighting options, according to program  documents. For example, the Forest Service developed a tradeoff  analysis tool through which decision makers assess different firefighting  options and rate them according to how well they address firefighter  safety, public safety, and values at risk. During the 2018 Klondike Fire,  national forest officials said they brought in a risk-management team to  facilitate analysis of firefighting options and included cooperators in the  discussions. Officials said these discussions helped everyone understand  the risks and tradeoffs of various firefighting options, adding transparency  to the process.

Several officials and stakeholders raised concerns about the number of  firefighting assets assigned to the Chetco Bar Fire. According to Forest  Service documents and officials, firefighting assets were stretched thin  fighting other fires in the region, and there were a number of times  throughout the Chetco Bar Fire when assets, such as management  teams, crews, and helicopters, were requested but were unavailable (see  table 1). For example, an incident management team that was heading to  the Chetco Bar Fire was diverted to the Eagle Creek Fire, which was  threatening homes and other structures near Portland, Oregon. Further,  some officials said limited availability of certain firefighting assets with  specific capabilities, such as infrared drones that can “see” through  smoke or cloud cover, hindered their ability to fight the fire when visibility  was limited. Some officials also emphasized the importance of having  more long-term fire analysts assigned to national forests and incident  management teams to help develop and interpret fire behavior models  and long-term assessments that, in turn, could help protect people and  values at risk. However, other officials said that having additional assets  likely would not have made a significant difference in the response to the  Chetco Bar Fire because of the difficult terrain where the fire started and  because of the Chetco Effect winds.

Beyond their specific concerns with the Chetco Bar Fire, some  stakeholders also observed the Forest Service would likely benefit from  having additional firefighting assets in the future, as the frequency and  intensity of fires are likely to increase. Forest Service officials  acknowledged that there were not enough firefighting assets in 2017,  given the number of large fires that year. As a result, they said they had  to make difficult decisions regarding prioritizing assets, with fires  threatening life and property receiving higher priority.

Forest Service officials said that the agency is working to increase the  number of some types of firefighting assets. For example, headquarters  officials said that the agency was in the process of developing a drone  program. In addition, officials said that the agency is working on  increasing the availability of some assets, such as air tankers and  helicopters, through the use of different contracting authorities.

Several officials and stakeholders raised concerns about communication  among the various cooperators before and during the Chetco Bar Fire. In  particular, some said that differences in firefighting approaches—due in  part to cooperators’ differing missions, responsibilities, and priorities—had  not been fully clarified in advance, leading some cooperators to express  frustration with the Forest Service’s response to the fire. For example,  according to some officials and stakeholders, the Oregon Department of  Forestry and Coos Forest Protective Association generally place more  emphasis on protecting timberlands than the Forest Service, and this  sometimes leads to differences in the agencies’ preferred approaches to  responding to fires. For example, when determining where to construct a  fireline, Forest Service officials may identify a location aimed to keep a  fire from reaching homes, whereas cooperators from the Oregon  Department of Forestry or Coos Forest Protective Association may prefer  a location that also protects timberlands.

In addition, some stakeholders said that the frequent rotation of incident  management teams—generally about once every 2 weeks—made it  difficult for local cooperators to coordinate with those teams. One official  noted that rotation of teams can make it difficult to build trust and maintain  good communication with cooperators and the public. However, Forest  Service headquarters officials said that the agency has studied the  structure and use of incident management teams in the past, and the  agency has not identified a better approach.

Several officials and some stakeholders noted lessons learned from the  Chetco Bar Fire. For example, they cited the need to do more pre-season  fire planning, such as meeting with cooperators before the fire season  begins to discuss coordination among agencies and planning how they  might respond to fires in certain situations. Some also noted the need to  improve communication and transparency with cooperators during fires,  such as through the use of risk-management assistance teams previously  discussed. Officials and stakeholders said that communication among  cooperators in the region has improved since the Chetco Bar Fire, helping  to develop a shared understanding of the potential firefighting response in  different locations and under different conditions.

Many officials and several stakeholders said the Forest Service did not  provide sufficient or timely information to the public about the danger from  the Chetco Bar Fire and what the agency was doing to fight it. In  particular, several officials raised concerns about the Forest Service waiting to hold its first public meeting until over a month after the fire was  detected. Several officials and some stakeholders said that in the  absence of sufficient information, misinformation and rumors—such as  incorrect information on evacuations in certain areas—spread, leading to  frustration, anger, and fear on the part of the public. Officials and  stakeholders said another lesson learned was the importance of  communicating accurate and timely information through various means,  including public meetings and social media.

Officials and stakeholders told us that the Rogue River-Siskiyou National  Forest is taking steps to help ensure that it communicates more  effectively during fires. For example, national forest officials said that  since the Chetco Bar Fire, they have increased their level of  communication with local communities. Officials also said they are now  more proactive in monitoring social media and ensuring they post correct  information on fires, among other things. As a result, officials and  stakeholders said that public perception of the 2018 Klondike Fire was  much more positive than of the Chetco Bar Fire, even though both fires  burned more than 175,000 acres.

Timber Harvest and Other Fuel Reduction Activities

fueled the Chetco Bar Fire and made firefighting efforts more dangerous  by leaving snags (standing dead trees) that could injure or kill  firefighters.

Following wildfires, the Forest Service may  consider whether to leave burned trees and  allow the burned area to recover naturally or to  harvest some of those trees—called salvage  harvesting—with the intention of generating  funds to help pay for the recovery of natural  resources or infrastructure, such as trails or  roads, among other purposes. Considerable  scientific uncertainty exists about whether and  how quickly harvested areas recover compared  with unharvested areas. Disagreement also  exists about the extent salvage harvesting  generates funding, considering the cost of  planning, preparing, and administering sales of  salvaged trees.  Following the Chetco Bar Fire, the Forest  Service determined that 13,626 acres of the  burned area were potentially available for  salvage harvesting. These areas had 50 to  100 percent tree mortality and were in areas of  the Rogue River-Siskiyou National Forest  where timber harvesting aligned with existing  management objectives, according to an  official. The Forest Service narrowed the area  that it proposed putting up for salvage  harvesting to 4,090 acres, removing areas that  lacked economically viable timber, were  inaccessible to logging equipment, were in  roadless areas, or had sensitive wildlife habitat,  among other factors. The total number of acres  the Forest Service offered for salvage  harvesting was 2,194 acres across 13 sales,  according to an official. Of the 13 salvage sales  offered, eight were sold, totaling 1,957 acres,  and five were not sold. Of these five offers,  three did not receive bids, and two were  dropped by the Forest Service due to market  changes or other considerations.

In contrast, several Forest Service officials and some stakeholders said  that higher levels of timber harvest and fuel reduction would not have  made a large difference in the Chetco Bar Fire because of the fire’s  intensity and rate of spread under the Chetco Effect winds. Several said  that if there had been more timber harvest, the forest might have been  replanted in ways that could have made the fire worse. Specifically, when  replanting is done following timber harvest, trees may be planted more  densely and uniformly than would occur if vegetation were allowed to  grow back naturally, according to a Forest Service ecologist and some  stakeholders. In addition, slash (debris from logging operations) is  sometimes left on the ground after timber harvest, which can fuel future  fires. As a result, areas where timber has been harvested may burn more  severely during future fires, according to some officials and stakeholders.

Rogue River-Siskiyou National Forest officials said the forest has been  carrying out many fuel reduction activities and has exceeded its fuel  reduction target every year from fiscal year 2014 through fiscal year 2019  (see appendix I for a map of past timber harvests and other fuel reduction  activities). As part of its fuel reduction efforts, the forest is creating some  larger breaks in vegetation by connecting areas where fuel reduction  activities have taken place, according to officials. Further, national forest  officials are maintaining some firelines that were built during previous  fires, including the Chetco Bar Fire, to aid in their response to future fires.  Agency officials said these efforts are part of a broader effort to move  towards spatial fire planning, where areas at risk and effective places to  contain wildfires are identified before fires start.

Chetco Bar Fire Had Various Effects on Homes and Infrastructure, Public Health, Local Businesses and Workers, and Natural and Cultural Resources

Forest Service officials and stakeholders we interviewed and reports and  other documents we reviewed identified a variety of effects the Chetco  Bar Fire had on local communities and resources. We grouped these  effects into four categories: (1) homes and infrastructure, (2) public  health, (3) local businesses and workers, and (4) natural and cultural  resources. Most of the identified effects were negative, although some  positive short- and long-term effects were identified. For example, the  Chetco Bar Fire damaged habitat for many wildlife species, but some  species that prefer burned landscapes likely benefitted from the fire,  according to officials.

The Chetco Bar Fire destroyed six homes and damaged one home,  according to Forest Service and state documents. The fire also  threatened over 8,500 homes, causing more than 5,000 residents to be  evacuated over the course of the fire, according to Forest Service  documents. In addition, Forest Service and state documents stated that  the fire destroyed more than 20 other structures and damaged at least  eight more, such as garages and other outbuildings.

After a severe wildfire, soil erosion can  increase and cause adverse effects. As fires  burn, they destroy plant material, such as  roots and leaves, that help prevent erosion  during severe rainstorms. Plant roots help  stabilize the soil, and leaves slow runoff by  allowing water to seep into the soil. In some  severe fires, burning vegetation creates a gas  that penetrates the soil. As the soil cools, this  gas condenses and forms a waxy coating that  causes the soil to repel water. Rainwater and  melted snow can then flow across these  surfaces and cause erosion. Erosion can  reduce water quality and damage roads. In  addition, because burned soil does not absorb  as much water as unburned soil, seeds have  a harder time germinating, and surviving  plants find it more difficult to obtain moisture. the 63 miles of trails within the fire perimeter. Further, a campground  within the national forest was partially damaged and closed to the public  while being repaired.

Erosion following the Chetco Bar Fire also washed approximately 40,000  cubic yards of sediment into the Port of Brookings Harbor. A port official  said that dredging the harbor is estimated to cost $4 million. The official  noted that the commission governing the port was pursuing grants, such  as disaster grants from the Federal Emergency Management Agency, to  help with dredging costs but was unsure whether total costs could be  covered.

Local officials said that post-fire erosion could also negatively affect  drinking water infrastructure, since the Chetco Bar Fire burned about  80 percent of Brookings’ watershed. Brookings received a grant to  evaluate the fire’s effect on the city’s water system, according to a local  official. The city hired a consultant, who reported in June 2018 that the  quality of the water was generally excellent and that no significant water  quality effects from the fire had been observed.

People with existing lung disease may not  be able to breathe as deeply or vigorously  as they normally would during exposure  to high levels of particulate matter.  Healthy people may also experience  these effects.  susceptibility to respiratory infections and  aggravate existing respiratory diseases,  such as asthma and chronic bronchitis. smoke (see sidebar). Most healthy individuals recover quickly from  smoke exposure and will not experience long-term health effects,  according to an Environmental Protection Agency document; however,  the smoke exposure effects are more sudden and serious for sensitive  groups, including children, older adults, and people with existing heart or  lung disease. Local health officials and a national forest official also  raised concerns about the potential long-term effects of exposure to  wildfire smoke, but little data exist on such effects.

The Forest Service reported that four towns in the vicinity of the Chetco  Bar Fire experienced, on average, about 9 days of unhealthy or worse air  quality, although the severity and duration of wildfire effects on air quality  varied by town (see fig. 10). Of these towns, Brookings had the most  days—three—measured as “hazardous,” the worst category. The four  towns also experienced about 5 days, on average, that were measured  as being unhealthy for sensitive groups.

Many residents also experienced mental and emotional effects from the  Chetco Bar Fire, according to local health officials and some  stakeholders. A local health official said that some residents  experienced post-traumatic stress disorder after the fire, with some  residents becoming hypervigilant of smoke and sirens. Some  stakeholders noted that the 2018 Klondike Fire, which burned nearby, led  to additional mental and emotional stresses for those affected by the  Chetco Bar Fire.

The Chetco Bar Fire’s effects on local businesses and workers included  damage to the tourism and logging industries. Local businesses lost  revenue in the short term because of decreased summer tourism during  the Chetco Bar Fire, according to some documents and many  stakeholders. According to estimates from the Oregon Tourism  Commission, businesses—including tourism-dependent ones such as  hotels and restaurants—lost over $1 million in both Curry and Jackson  counties, and businesses in Josephine County lost over $160,000 during  the 2017 fire season. For example, the Oregon Shakespeare Festival  canceled nine outdoor performances because of wildfire smoke, resulting  in losses estimated at about $600,000, according to a company  document. In addition, one vineyard in Cave Junction lost an estimated  $10,000 to $20,000 in revenue because of reduced tasting room sales  and vacation rentals, according to an Oregon vineyard association  spokesperson.

The decrease in tourism also had short-term negative effects on workers  in the tourism industry. According to a report, workers in Curry County  lost income, in part due to employee furloughs, because of wildfires in  2017. Another document cited that Josephine County lost an estimated  100 jobs in 2017 because of the Chetco Bar Fire.

Following the fire, the governor of Oregon created the Chetco Bar Fire  Recovery Council to help the region recover from the fire. The council  assessed economic damage, identified recovery needs, and identified  potential state funding for those needs. For example, in November  2017, the council identified a potential need for state economic  development funds to assist local businesses. However, the council  reported in March 2018 that three businesses affected by the fire had  received federal loans from the U.S. Small Business Administration and  that there was no longer a clear need for state economic development  funds.

In addition, some stakeholders we interviewed and documents we  reviewed raised concerns that if summer wildfire smoke became common  in southern Oregon, it could have a long-term negative effect on tourism.  However, a 2019 report found that wildfire smoke had a minimal effect on  people’s willingness to consider traveling to southern Oregon in the  future. One local business has set up air quality monitors at a tourist  attraction to inform tourists of the current air quality.

The Chetco Bar Fire burned 14,130 acres of nonfederal timberlands,  according to the Forest Service’s BAER report. One privately owned  lumber company was particularly hard hit, with the fire burning about  10,000 acres of its timberlands, according to company representatives.

This loss was about 10 percent of the company’s timberlands and  represented about 5 years of its average harvest.

Following the fire, the company salvage-harvested approximately  6,000 acres of the burned timber, which company representatives said  provided some short-term economic benefits for the company and,  according to one stakeholder, also temporarily increased employment for  loggers and truck drivers in the area. However, the long-term effects of  the fire on the company are unknown. One representative said,  depending on future market conditions, the loss of timber from the Chetco  Bar Fire could lead the company to lay off employees or could jeopardize  its future.

Effects on Natural and Cultural Resources

The severity of the Chetco Bar Fire varied across the forest, which led to  varied effects on soil and vegetation. As shown in figure 11, within the  perimeter of the Chetco Bar Fire, burn severity ranged as follows: unburned or very low (19 percent, or 36,027 acres);  low (40 percent, or 76,613 acres); moderate (34 percent, or 64,545 acres); and high (7 percent, or 14,012 acres).

The severity with which soil burns during a fire affects both the potential  for erosion following the fire and the severity of damage to vegetation.  Areas of the Chetco Bar Fire that burned at moderate and high severity  had increased potential for erosion, according to the BAER report. As  previously discussed, post-fire erosion damaged roads and other  infrastructure. Further, the BAER report noted that severely burned areas  may have lower soil productivity and vegetation growth. However, most of  the native vegetation in the area is adapted to fire and is likely to recover  over time, according to the BAER report. Moreover, a Forest Service  ecologist said the Chetco Bar Fire helped create a more diverse forest  structure (characterized as a mosaic of different species and age classes)  that benefits many plant and animal species (see fig. 12). For example,  nine sensitive plant species found in the area burned by the Chetco Bar  Fire thrive in early post-fire ecosystems, according to a Forest Service  document. Further, officials said rapid regrowth of vegetation, such as a  moss that thrives after fires, helped reduce erosion and limit potential  future damage to roads and trails.

Forest Service officials and documents noted that they did not expect  widespread, long-term negative effects on vegetation from the Chetco Bar  Fire, but they identified two negative effects:  Invasive plants. More than a thousand individual invasive plants  (such as noxious weeds) were introduced to an approximately 13,000- acre area of the national forest during the Chetco Bar Fire, mainly via  firefighters’ boots and equipment. Invasive plants can, in some cases,  displace native plants, compromise the quality and quantity of habitat  for wildlife and fish, and increase wildfire risk. A national forest  official said that it is labor intensive and costly to eradicate invasive  plants because they have to be pulled out by hand. The official said  the agency does not have the resources to remove all of the invasive  plants brought in during the fire and is prioritizing removal of those  that are the fastest growing, most disruptive, and affect the most  highly valued resources. In addition, the National Forest Foundation  administered a $7,000 grant to remove invasive plants on 10 of the  affected acres in June and July 2019.

Redwood stands. The Rogue River-Siskiyou National Forest  contains the northernmost naturally occurring coast redwood tree  stands, and the Chetco Bar Fire burned about 12 percent of the total  area of redwood stands within the forest, or about 60 acres, according  to a Forest Service ecologist. However, most of the area burned at  low severity, though parts burned at moderate or high severity. The  ecologist said redwoods are adapted to survive fire, noting that larger  trees will usually resprout from dormant buds under the bark along the  entire length of the trunk (see fig. 13). Smaller trees and larger trees  burned at high severity can be killed at the top but are often able to  resprout.

In the short-term, the Chetco Bar Fire killed or damaged habitat for many  wildlife species, although the exact effect of the fire on wildlife is  unknown, according to a Forest Service official. Most wildlife species are  expected to recover, but the effects on some threatened and sensitive  species could be longer lasting, according to Forest Service documents  and officials. For example, half of the 13 known northern spotted owls—a  species that is federally listed as threatened under the Endangered  Species Act—living within the perimeter of the fire were estimated to have  died from the fire, according to a Forest Service biologist. In addition,  this biologist said the fire’s effect on the population of a seabird called the  marbled murrelet, as well as on two mammals—Pacific marten and  fisher—is unknown, although it negatively affected their habitats.

National forest officials said the Chetco Bar Fire also likely benefitted  some wildlife species because the mosaic landscape resulting from the  fire is preferred by some wildlife, including deer, elk, migratory birds,  butterflies, and woodpeckers. For example, black-backed woodpeckers  thrive in partly burned areas because they eat wood-boring beetles that  feed on recently burned trees.

Erosion resulting from the Chetco Bar Fire likely had short-term negative  effects on fish populations, including the threatened coho salmon,  according to the BAER report. Sediment in the water makes it harder for  fish to breathe and can smother their eggs. In addition, over time,  increased sediment in streams and rivers can disrupt salmon migration  because salmon use their sense of smell to navigate to their native  stream to spawn, and sediment can mask that smell. Some stakeholders  said they were concerned that the loss of shade from trees might lead to  warmer river water, thereby harming salmon. However, a Forest Service  biologist said that vegetation near the river has regrown since the fire and  there is no indication that the temperature of the river water has  increased.

The fire may provide some long-term benefits for salmon and other fish  species. Specifically, erosion following the fire is likely to increase the  supply of downed trees and coarse gravel in streams and rivers, which  provide places for fish to lay their eggs and hide, according to a study and  a Forest Service biologist.

Some cultural resources—including archaeological sites, historic  structures, and areas significant to contemporary Native American tribes—were negatively affected by the Chetco Bar Fire. The Forest  Service reported that 130 known and recorded Native American  archaeological sites were located within the perimeter of the Chetco Bar  Fire, 49 of which the agency characterized as isolated sites containing  one to three stone artifacts. The effect of the Chetco Bar Fire on known  and recorded sites—and on any cultural sites not previously identified—is  not fully known. Following the fire, as part of its BAER report, the Forest  Service assessed some of these sites, including a prehistoric Native  American village site and an area culturally important to Native American  tribes. This report noted a number of cultural artifacts, such as  arrowheads and tools, that were discolored by the fire or were displaced  or moved during or after the fire by, for example, soil disruption caused by  trees falling or roots burning and collapsing. The report also stated  additional damage could occur in the future; for example, increased  erosion could further damage some cultural sites, and vegetation loss  could make artifacts more visible, increasing the potential for looting and  vandalism. To help mitigate some of the effects, the Forest Service  planted some of the burned area with native grass seed to reestablish  ground cover and reduce erosion.

In addition to the fire damaging cultural resources, a Forest Service  archaeologist said fire suppression activities caused some damage. For  example, Native American arrowheads and tools were unearthed when a  bulldozer constructed a fireline. The archeologist said that they took  precautions to minimize suppression impacts on cultural resources, for  instance by avoiding using heavy equipment in areas where cultural  resources were known to be located.

We provided a draft of this report to the Departments of Agriculture and  the Interior for review and comment. In an email dated April 17, 2020, the  Forest Service, responding on behalf of the Department of Agriculture,  said it generally agreed with the draft report. The Forest Service also  provided a technical comment, which we incorporated. The Department of  the Interior told us it had no comments on the report.

As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents of  this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days from the  report date. At that time, we will send copies to the appropriate  congressional committees, the Secretary of Agriculture, the Secretary of  the Interior, and other interested parties. In addition, the report will be  available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov.

If you or your staff members have any questions about this report, please  contact me at (202) 512-3841 or fennella@gao.gov. Contact points for  our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found  on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to  this report are listed in appendix II.

Appendix I: Map of Timber Harvests and Other Fuel Reduction Activities in the Area of the Chetco Bar Fire

Figure 14 shows the timber harvests and other fuel reduction activities— such as thinning vegetation or conducting prescribed burns—done in the  area of the Chetco Bar Fire from 2008 through 2017.

Appendix II: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

Anne-Marie Fennell, (202) 512-3841 or fennella@gao.gov  In addition to the individual named above, Jonathan Dent (Assistant  Director), Lesley Rinner (Analyst-in-Charge), Elizabeth Jimenez, and  Jesse Lamarre-Vincent made key contributions to this report. Philip  Farah, Ellen Fried, Richard P. Johnson, John Mingus, Edward J. Rice,  Sara Sullivan, and Elizabeth Wood made additional contributions.

A large 2017 wildfire in southwest Oregon destroyed 6 homes and threatened thousands more. Its smoke also contributed to respiratory and other health problems in nearby communities and hurt businesses and workers. The fire grew slowly over its first month before strong, hot winds caused a rapid expansion, as shown in this map.

Local officials, community members, and others questioned whether the Forest Service could have done more to suppress the fire. Forest Service officials said firefighters initially faced dangerous conditions and a low likelihood of success in remote, steep terrain, and that they prioritized firefighter safety.