Federal Communications Commission: Progress Protecting Consumers from Illegal Robocalls

Summary: The number of robocalls continues to grow in the United States, and the figures tend to fluctuate based on the introduction of new government and industry attempts to stop them and robocallers' changing tactics to thwart those attempts (see Figure ). In 2019, U.S. consumers received 58.5 billion robocalls, an increase of 22% from the 47.8 billion received in 2018, according to the YouMail Robocall Index. In 2016, the full first year the Robocall Index was tabulated, that figure was 29.1 billion callsâhalf the number of calls in 2019. Further, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) states that robocalls make up its biggest consumer complaint category, with over 200,000 complaints each yearâaround 60% of all the complaints it receives. A robocall is any telephone call that delivers a pre-recorded message using an automatic (computerized) telephone dialing system. The Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991 ( P.L. 102-243 ) regulates robocalls. Legal robocalls are used by legitimate call originators for political, public service, and emergency messages. Illegal robocalls are usually associated with fraudulent telemarketing campaigns. The FCC estimates that eliminating illegal scam robocalls would provide a public benefit of $3 billion annually. A survey by Truecaller, a company that tracks and blocks robocalls, puts that figure as high as $10.5 billion.

Summary: Figure . Robocalls per Month, April 2019 through March 2020

Summary: (in billions)

Summary: Source: Robocall Index, https://www.robocallindex.com .

Summary: Over the past three years, the FCC has pursued a multi-part strategy for combatting illegal robocalls. The agency has

Summary: issued hundreds of millions of dollars in fines for violations of its Truth in Caller ID rules; expanded its rules to reach foreign calls and text messages; enabled voice service providers to block certain clearly unlawful calls before they reach consumers' phones; clarified that voice service providers may offer call-blocking services by default; and called on the industry to "trace back" illegal spoofed calls and text messages to their original sources.

Summary: Other wide-ranging steps by the FCC to stop illegal robocalls include mandating the implementation of call authentication technologies by the telecommunications industry, creating databases of numbers that should not be called, and establishing a reassigned numbers database. Major recent FCC regulatory actions include a June 2019 FCC Declaratory Ruling and Third Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, and a March 2020 FCC Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking. The FCC was empowered to take many of these actions by the Pallone-Thune Telephone Robocall Abuse Criminal Enforcement and Deterrence Act (TRACED Act) signed into law on December 30, 2019 ( P.L. 116-105 ).

Robocalls are the top complaint received by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) and a consistent congressional concern. A robocall, also known as "voice broadcasting," is any telephone call that delivers a pre-recorded message using an automatic (computerized) telephone dialing system, more commonly referred to as an automatic dialer or "autodialer."

The Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991 (TCPA) regulates robocalls. Legal robocalls are used by legitimate call originators for political, public service, and emergency messages, which are legal. Other legitimate uses can be, for example, to announce school closures or to remind consumers of medical appointments. Illegal robocalls are usually associated with fraudulent telemarketing campaigns, but an illegal robocall under the TCPA does not necessarily mean that the robocall is fraudulent. Illegal, fraudulent calls usually include misleading or inaccurate Caller ID information to disguise the identity of the calling party and trick called parties, which is called "spoofing." Scammers sometimes use " neighbor spoofing " so it will appear that an incoming call is coming from a local number . They may also spoof a number from a legitimate company or a government agency that consumers know and trust . Like robocalls more generally, spoofing can also be used for legitimate purposes, such as to hide the number of a domestic violence shelter or an individual employee extension at a business or government agency. This report addresses robocalls that are both illegal under the TCPA as well as intended to defraud, not robocalls that are defined only as illegal.

The number of robocalls continues to grow in the United States, and the figures tend to fluctuate based on the introduction of new government and industry attempts to stop them and robocallers' changing tactics to thwart those attempts (see Figure 1 ). In 2019, U.S. consumers received 58.5 billion robocalls, an increase of 22% from the 47.8 billion received in 2018, according to the YouMail Robocall Index. In 2016, the full first year the Robocall Index was tabulated, that figure was 29.1 billion callsâhalf the number of calls in 2019. Further, the FCC states that robocalls make up its biggest consumer complaint category, with over 200,000 complaints each yearâaround 60% of all the complaints it receives.

Over the past three years, the FCC has pursued a multi-part strategy for combatting spoofed robocalls. The agency has

The Pallone-Thune Telephone Robocall Abuse Criminal Enforcement and Deterrence Act (TRACED Act) empowered the FCC to take specific actions to fight illegal robocalls; it was signed into law on December 30, 2019 ( P.L. 116-105 ). The law requires the FCC to

administer a forfeiture penalty for violations (with or without intent) of the prohibition on certain robocalls; promulgate rules establishing when a provider may block a voice call based on information provided by the call authentication framework, called Secure Telephony Identity Revisited (STIR) and Signature-based Handling of Asserted information using toKENs (SHAKEN) (together known as "STIR/SHAKEN"), and establish a process to permit a calling party adversely affected by the framework to verify the authenticity of its calls; initiate a rulemaking to help protect subscribers from receiving unwanted calls or texts from a caller using an unauthenticated number; assemble, in conjunction with the Department of Justice, an interagency working group to study and report to Congress on the enforcement of the prohibition of certain robocalls; and initiate a proceeding to determine whether its policies regarding access to number resources could be modified to help reduce access to numbers by potential robocall violators.

STIR/SHAKEN is seen by many, including the FCC, as a particularly important part of achieving the projected cost savings associated with eliminating illegal robocalls. STIR/SHAKEN must be implemented by June 30, 2021.

Both the telecommunications industry and the FCC are taking steps to counter illegal robocalls. The telecommunications industry has developed new technologies and other tools to detect and block illegal robocalls. The FCC has taken steps to create a policy environment in which those tools can be implemented. The FCC has also expanded the scope of some existing rules and continues to target and fine illegal robocallers.

In November 2017, the FCC authorized telecommunications providers to block calls originating from numbers that should not originate calls, or that are invalid, unallocated, or unused, without violating call completion rules. In December 2018, the FCC adopted a declaratory ruling clarifying that wireless providers are authorized to take measures to stop unwanted text messaging as well as unwanted calls. The FCC has also encouraged companies that block calls to establish an appeals process for erroneously blocked callers.

Do Not Originate Registry and Other Call Blocking

The telecommunications industry has now widely implemented the blocking of numbers that should not originate calls, called the "Do Not Originate" (DNO) Registry. In November 2017, the FCC promulgated rules on the creation and use of the DNO Registry. The rules explicitly allow service providers to block calls from two categories of number: (1) numbers that the subscriber has asked to be blocked, such as "in-bound only" numbers (numbers that should not ever originate a call); and (2) unassigned numbers, as the use of such a number indicates that the calling party is intending to defraud a consumer.

USTelecom, a trade association representing telecommunications-related businesses in the United States, maintains this registry and works with industry to implement DNO call blocking for in-bound numbers associated with government agencies.

On December 20, 2019, the FCC released a public notice seeking comments for its first of two staff reports on call blocking issues mandated by the TRACED Act. The agency asked for comments on

the availability and effectiveness of call blocking tools offered to consumers; the impact of the FCC's actions on illegal calls; the impact of call blocking on 911 services and public safety; and any other issues parties would like to see addressed.

Comments were due January 29, 2020, and reply comments were due February 28, 2020.

Illegitimate robocallers nearly always spoof their originating number. That is, they deliberately falsify the Caller ID information they are transmitting to disguise their identity. One way to help consumers recognize spoofing and identify scams is to verify who is calling through Caller ID authentication. Over the past few years, the telecommunications industry developed a set of protocols, the STIR/SHAKEN framework that enables phone companies to verify that the Caller ID information transmitted with a call matches the caller's phone number. Once fully implemented, STIR/SHAKEN is expected to reduce the effectiveness of illegal spoofing and enable the identification of illegal robocallers. The FCC mandated the adoption of STIR/SHAKEN on March 31, 2020. These steps are discussed in detail in the section of this report, " FCC Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, March 2020 ."

More than 30 voice service providers participate in the USTelecom Industry Traceback Group (ITG), which was formally established in May 2016. The ITG is a collaborative effort of companies across the wireline, wireless, voice over internet protocol, and cable industries that actively trace and identify the source of illegal robocalls. The ITG coordinates with federal and state law enforcement agencies to identify non-cooperative providers so those agencies can take enforcement action, as appropriate.

During 2019, ITG members conducted more than 1,000 tracebacks, associated with more than 10 million illegal robocalls. This activity has resulted in more than 20 subpoenas and/or civil investigative demands from federal and state enforcement agencies. The ITG published its first status report in January 2020.

When a consumer cancels service with a voice provider, the provider may reassign the number to a new consumer. If callers are unaware of the reassignment, they can make unwanted calls to the new consumer, unintentionally violating the Telephone Consumer Protection Act.

In March 2018, the FCC proposed that one or more databases be created to provide callers with the comprehensive and timely information they need to discover potential number reassignments before making a call. In December 2018, the commission authorized the creation of a reassigned numbers database to enable callers to verify whether a telephone number has been permanently disconnected and is therefore eligible for reassignmentâbefore calling that numberâthereby helping to protect consumers with reassigned numbers from receiving unwanted calls. On January 24, 2020, the FCC requested public comment on the technical requirements developed for the database by the North American Numbering Council (NANC). Comments were due February 24, 2020, and reply comments were due March 9, 2020.

FCC Declaratory Ruling and Third Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, June 2019

On June 6, 2019, the FCC adopted a declaratory ruling and third further notice of proposed rulemaking (FNPRM), "Advanced Methods to Target and Eliminate Unlawful Robocalls and Call Authentication Trust Anchor."

The declaratory ruling empowers phone companies to block suspected illegal robocalls by default (customers may opt out) and asserts the FCC's view that carriers can allow consumers to opt in to more aggressive call-blocking tools, known as white-listing. Both blocking by default and opt-in white-listing tools seek to stop unwanted calls on the voice provider's network before calls reach the consumer's phone.

Call-blocking programs have become more popular and effective in the past few years. There are numerous blocking tools for different platforms, and the number of available tools is growing. Many service providers only offer these programs on an opt-in basis, limiting their potential impact. Providing a call-blocking program as the default option can significantly increase consumer participation while maintaining consumer choice.

White-list programs require consumers to specify the telephone numbers from which they wish to receive callsâall other calls are blocked. Smartphones have provided a new way to implement white-list programs, because they store the consumer's contact list. When the consumer's contacts change, the white list can be updated. The declaratory ruling asserts the FCC's view that nothing in the Communications Act of 1934 or the FCC's rules prohibits a service provider from offering opt-in white-list programs.

The FNPRM requested feedback on several proposals: a safe harbor for providers that implement blocking of calls that fail caller authentication under STIR/SHAKEN, protections for critical calls, mandating Caller ID authentication, and measuring the effectiveness of robocall solutions. Comments were due on July 24, 2019, and reply comments were due on August 23, 2019.

Safe Harbor for Call-Blocking Programs Based on Potentially Spoofed Calls

The FCC proposed a narrow safe harbor for voice service providers that offer call-blocking programs that take into account (1) whether a call has been properly authenticated under the SHAKEN/STIR framework and (2) may potentially be spoofed. The safe harbor limits liability for voice service providers if they block a legal robocall. Among other elements, the FCC proposed a safe harbor for voice service providers that choose to block calls that fail SHAKEN/STIR authentication and asked whether there might be other instances where authentication would fail. The FCC also asked how it could ensure that wanted calls are not blocked and sought comment as to how to identify and remedy the blocking of wanted calls.

The FCC requested comments on whether it should require voice providers offering call-blocking to maintain a "critical calls list" of emergency numbers that must not be blocked. Such lists would include, for example, the outbound numbers of 911 call centers and other government emergency services. The blocking prohibition would apply only to STIR/SHAKEN-authenticated calls.

The FCC requested comments on its proposal to mandate implementation of the STIR/SHAKEN authentication framework, if major voice providers fail to meet the end-of-2019 deadline for voluntary implementation. This is the topic of the FCC order issued on March 31, 2020, and is discussed in detail in the next section of this report, " FCC Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, March 2020 ."

Measuring the Effectiveness of Robocall Solutions

The FCC requested feedback on whether it should create a mechanism to provide information to consumers about the effectiveness of voice providers' robocall solutions and, if so, how it should define and evaluate that effectiveness. The FCC also asked how it could obtain the information needed for such an evaluation.

The FCC published its latest guidance and proposals on March 31, 2020, in a new order and FNPRM.

The new rules require implementation of Caller ID authentication using STIR/SHAKEN. Specifically, the rules require "all originating and terminating voice service providers to implement STIR/SHAKEN in the Internet Protocol (IP) portions of their networks by June 30, 2021, a deadline that is consistent with Congress's direction in the recently-enacted TRACED Act," described earlier in, " The Telephone Robocall Abuse Criminal Enforcement and Deterrence Act ." Most experts say that widespread deployment of STIR/SHAKEN will reduce the effectiveness of illegal spoofing, allow law enforcement to identify bad actors more easily, and help phone companies to identify calls with illegally spoofed Caller ID information before those calls reach their subscribers.

expanding the STIR/SHAKEN implementation mandate to cover intermediate voice service providers; extending the implementation deadline by one year for small voice service providers pursuant to the TRACED Act; adopting requirements to promote caller ID authentication on voice networks that do not rely on IP technology; and implementing other aspects of the TRACED Act.

Comments to the FNPRM are due on May 15, 2020, and reply comments are due on May 29, 2020.

Other FCC actions to fight illegal robocallers include ongoing enforcement actions, an extension of a robocall ban to international callers, and the establishment of a hospital robocall protection group.

Since January 2017, the FCC has imposed or proposed about $240 million in forfeitures against robocallers. One case involved an individual who made more than 96 million illegal robocalls over the course of three months. Another involved an individual who conducted a large-scale robocalling campaign that marketed health insurance to vulnerable populations. In both cases, the illegal calls disrupted an emergency medical paging service.

Extension of Robocall Ban to International Callers

In 2018, Congress amended the Communications Act of 1934 to prohibit spoofing activities directed at U.S. consumers from callers outside the United States and Caller ID spoofing using alternative voice and text messaging services. To implement these amendments, the FCC issued rules in July 2019 that expanded the act's prohibition on the use of misleading and inaccurate Caller ID information.

The TRACED Act of 2019 required the FCC to establish a Hospital Robocall Protection Group. For most consumers, robocalls are a potentially fraudulent nuisance. For hospitals, though, the robocalls can present challenges that are increasingly threatening doctors and patients:

At Tufts Medical Center, administrators registered more than 4,500 calls between about 9:30 and 11:30 a.m. on April 30, 2018, said Taylor Lehmann, the center's chief information security officer. Many of the messages seemed to be the same: Speaking in Mandarin, an unknown voice threatened deportation unless the person who picked up the phone provided their personal information.

The FCC began soliciting nominations for the group in March 2020. Once established, the group is to be charged to develop and issue best practices regarding (1) how voice service providers can better combat unlawful robocalls made to hospitals; (2) how hospitals can better protect themselves from such calls; and (3) how the federal government and state governments can help combat such calls.

The FCC has taken wide-ranging steps to stop illegal robocalls, including imposing fines on law breakers; mandating the implementation of call authentication technologies by the telecommunications industry; creating databases of numbers that should not be called; and providing regulatory permission to implement call blocking. Although these steps appear to be having some impact, scammers remain determined to continue their attempts to defraud consumers using robocalls. Historically, decreases in the number of robocalls are sometimes followed shortly thereafter by spikes in those numbers, illustrating how robocallers continue to overcome measures to stop them (e.g., by changing their originating numbers). Most of the tools being used against robocalls have been developed recently, while some are still under development. Therefore, it may take telecommunications providers some time to fully implement them, and it may be some time before a long-term and ongoing decrease in robocall numbers will be realized. The positive impacts of FCC initiatives on fraudulent robocalls, as well as potential negative impacts on the telemarketing industry due to blocking legitimate calls, may be the subject of continued oversight by Congress.


War Legacy Issues in Southeast Asia: Unexploded Ordnance (UXO)

Summary: More than 40 years after the end of the Vietnam War, unexploded ordnance (UXO) from numerous conflicts, but primarily dropped by U.S. forces over Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam during the Vietnam War, continues to cause casualties in those countries. Over the past 25 years, the United States has provided a total of over $400 million in assistance for UXO clearance and related activities in those three countries through the Department of Defense (DOD), Department of State (DOS), and United States Agency for International Development (USAID), as well as funding for treatment of victims through USAID and the Leahy War Victims fund. Although casualty numbers have dropped in recent years, no systematic assessment of affected areas has been done, and many observers believe it may still take decades to clear the affected areas.

Summary: War legacy issues such as UXO clearance and victim assistance may raise important considerations for Congress as it addresses the impact of U.S. participation in conflicts around the world and how the United States should deal with the aftermath of such conflicts. The continued presence of UXO in Southeast Asia raises numerous issues, including appropriate levels of U.S. assistance for clearance activities and victim relief; coordination in efforts among DOD, DOS, and USAID; the implications of U.S. action on relations with affected countries; whether U.S. assistance in Southeast Asia carries lessons for similar activity in other parts of the world, including Iraq and Afghanistan; and, more generally, efforts to lessen the prevalence of UXO in future conflicts.

Summary: Many observers argue that U.S. efforts to address UXO issues in the region, along with joint efforts regarding other war legacy issues such as POW/MIA identification and Agent Orange/dioxin remediation, have been important steps in building relations with the affected countries in the post-war period. These efforts that have proceeded furthest in Vietnam, where the bilateral relationship has expanded across a wide range of economic and security initiatives. In Cambodia and Laos, where bilateral relations are less developed, UXO clearance is one of the few issues on which working-level officials from the United States and the affected countries have cooperated for years. Although some Cambodians and Laotians view U.S. demining assistance as a moral obligation and the U.S. government has viewed its support for UXO clearance as an important, positive aspect of its ties with the two countries, the issue of UXO has not been a major factor driving the relationships.

Summary: The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2019 ( P.L. 116-6 ) provides $196.5 million for "conventional weapons destruction" around the world, including $159.0 million for "humanitarian demining," with $3.85 million appropriated for Cambodia, $30.0 million for Laos, and $15.0 million for Vietnam.

Summary: The Legacies of War Recognition and Unexploded Ordnance Removal Act ( H.R. 2097 ) would authorize $50 million per year for fiscal years 2020 to 2024 for humanitarian assistance in Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam to develop national UXO surveys, conduct UXO clearance, and finance capacity building, risk education, and support for UXO victims.

The remnants of the Vietnam War (1963-1975) and other regional conflicts have left mainland Southeast Asia as a region heavily contaminated with unexploded ordnance, or UXO. More than 45 years after the United States ceased its extensive bombing of Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam, hundreds of civilians are still injured or killed each year by UXO from those bombing missions or by landmines laid in conflicts be tween Cambodia and Vietnam (1975-1978), China and Vietnam (1979-1990) and during the Cambodian civil war (1978-1991). While comprehensive surveys are incomplete, it is estimated that more than 20% of the land in Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam are contaminated by UXO.

Over more than 25 years, Congress has appropriated more than $400 million to assist Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam in clearing their land of UXO. More than 77% of the assistance has been provided via programs funded by the Department of State. In addition, the United States has provided treatment to those individuals maimed by UXO through U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) programs and the Leahy War Victims Fund.

Despite ongoing efforts by the three countries, the United States, and other international donors, it reportedly could take 100 years or more, at the current pace, to clear Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam of UXO. During that time period, more people will likely be killed or injured by UXO. In addition, extensive areas of the three nations will continue to be unavailable for agriculture, industry, or habitation, hindering the economic development of those three nations.

In 2016, President Obama pledged $90 million over a three-year period for UXO decontamination programs in Laosâan amount nearly equal to the total of U.S. UXO assistance to that nation over the previous 20 years. The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2019 ( P.L. 116-6 ) provides $196.5 million globally for "conventional weapons destruction," including $159.0 million for "humanitarian demining," under the Department of State's International Security Assistance programs. Of the humanitarian demining funds, $3.85 million is appropriated for Cambodia, $30.0 million for Laos, and $15.0 million for Vietnam. The act also provides $13.5 million for global health and rehabilitation programs under the Leahy War Victims Fund.

Moving forward, the 116 th Congress will have an opportunity to consider what additional efforts, if any, the U.S. government should undertake to address the war legacy issue of UXO in mainland Southeast Asia in terms of the decontamination of the region and the provision of medical support or assistance to UXO victims. Beyond the immediate assistance such UXO-related programs would provide to Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam, U.S. aid on this war legacy issue may also foster better bilateral ties to those nations. For example, some observers view U.S. assistance to Vietnam for the war legacy issue of Agent Orange/dioxin contamination as playing an important role in improving bilateral relations.

Unexploded ordnance (UXO) is defined as military ammunition or explosive ordnance which has failed to function as intended. UXO is also sometimes referred to as Explosive Remnants of War (ERW) or "duds" because of their failure to explode or function properly. UXO includes mines, artillery shells, mortar rounds, hand or rocket-propelled grenades, and rocket or missile warheads employed by ground forces (see Figure 1 ). Aerial delivered bombs, rockets, missiles, and scatterable mines that fail to function as intended are also classified as UXO. While many of these weapons employ unitary warheads, some weaponsâprimarily certain artillery shells, rocket and missile warheads and aerial bombsâemploy cluster munitions, which disperse a number of smaller munitions as part of their explosive effect. Often times, these submunitions fail to function as intended. In addition, abandoned or lost munitions that have not detonated are also classified as UXO.

The probability of UXO detonating is highly unpredictable; it depends on whether or not the munition has been fired, the level of corrosion or degradation, and the specific arming and fusing mechanisms of the device. "Similar items may respond very differently to the same actionâone may be moved without effect, while another may detonate. Some items may be moved repeatedly before detonating and others may not detonate at all." In all cases, UXO poses a danger to both combatants and unaware and unprotected civilians.

Military munitions are used in a variety of ways. Some are used in direct force-on-force combat against troops, combat vehicles, and structures. Others, such as emplaced anti-personnel and anti-vehicle mines or scatterable mines, can be used to attack targets, deny enemy use of key terrain, or establish barriers to impede or influence enemy movement. Cluster munitions can either explode on contact once dispensed or can remain dormant on the ground until triggered by human or vehicular contact. The military utility of cluster weapons is that they can create large areas of destruction, meaning fewer weapons systems and munitions are needed to attack targets.

Two particular classes of ordnanceâmines and cluster munitionsâhave received a great deal of attention. Emplaced mines by their very nature pose a particular threat because they are often either buried or hidden and, unless their locations are recorded or some type of warning signs are posted, they can become easily forgotten or abandoned as the battlefield shifts over time. Cluster munitions are dispersed over an area and are generally smaller than unitary warheads, which can make them difficult to readily identify (see Figure 2 ). Since the conclusion of the Vietnam War, many of the newer mines and cluster munitions have a self-destruct or disarming capability. However, as long as their explosive charge remains viable, they pose a hazard to people.

Both mines and cluster munitions have been subject to international protocols to limit or ban their development, transfer, and use. The 1999 Ottawa Convention "prohibits the use, stockpiling, production, and transfer of anti-personnel landmines (APLs). It requires states to destroy their stockpiled APLs within four years and eliminate all APL holdings, including mines currently planted in the soil, within 10 years." The 2010 Convention on Cluster Munitions prohibits all use, stockpiling, production and transfer of cluster munitions. The United States has refused to sign either convention, citing the military necessity of these munitions. The United States has, however, been a States Party to the Convention on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) since 1995, which "aims to protect military troops from inhumane injuries and prevent noncombatants from accidentally being wounded or killed by certain types of arms." In 2009, the United States ratified Protocol V of the CCW, Explosive Remnants of War. Protocol V "covers munitions, such as artillery shells, grenades, and gravity bombs, that fail to explode as intended, and any unused explosives left behind and uncontrolled by armed forces." Under Protocol V "the government controlling an area with explosive remnants of war is responsible for clearing such munitions. However, that government may ask for technical or financial assistance from others, including any party responsible for putting the munitions in place originally, to complete the task. No state-party is obligated to render assistance."

The United States has undertaken a variety of initiativesâincluding mandating changes to munitions design and adopting federal safeguards and policy regulating their usageâto help limit the potential hazards posed to noncombatants by these UXO.

On June 19, 2008, then-Secretary of Defense Robert Gates issued a new policy on the use of cluster munitions. The policy stated that "[c]luster munitions are legitimate weapons with clear military utility," but it also recognized "the need to minimize the unintended harm to civilians and civilian infrastructure associated with unexploded ordnance from cluster munitions." To that end, the policy mandated that after 2018, "the Military Departments and Combatant Commands will only employ cluster munitions containing submunitions that, after arming, do not result in more than 1% unexploded ordnance (UXO) across the range of intended operational environments."

On November 30, 2017, then-Deputy Secretary of Defense Patrick Shanahan issued a revised policy on cluster munitions. The revised policy reverses the 2008 policy that established an unwaiverable requirement that cluster munitions used after 2018 must leave less than 1% of unexploded submunitions on the battlefield. Under the new policy, combatant commanders can use cluster munitions that do not meet the 1% or less unexploded submunitions standard in extreme situations to meet immediate warfighting demands. Furthermore, the new policy does not establish a deadline to replace cluster munitions exceeding the 1% rate, and these munitions are to be removed only after new munitions that meet the 1% or less unexploded submunitions standard are fielded in sufficient quantities to meet combatant commander requirements. However, the new DOD policy stipulates that the Department "will only procure cluster munitions containing submunitions or submunition warheads" meeting the 2008 UXO requirement or possessing "advanced features to minimize the risks posed by unexploded submunitions."

Although UXO in Southeast Asia can date back to World War II, the majority of the hazard is attributed to the Vietnam War. While an undetermined amount of UXO associated with the Vietnam War was from ground combat and emplaced mines, an appreciable portion of UXO is attributed to the air war waged by the United States from 1962 to 1973, considered by some to be one of the most intense in the history of warfare. One study notes the United States

dropped a million tons of bombs on North Vietnam. Three million more tons fell on Laos and Cambodiaâsupposedly "neutral" countries in the conflict. Four million tons fell on South VietnamâAmerica's ally in the war against communist aggression. When the last raid by B-52s over Cambodia on August 15, 1973, culminated American bombing in Southeast Asia, the United States had dropped more than 8 million tons of bombs in 9 years. Less than 2 years later, Cambodia, Laos, and South Vietnam were communist countries.

The U.S. State Department in 2014 characterized the problem by country.

Cambodia: Nearly three decades of armed conflict left Cambodia severely contaminated with landmines and unexploded ordnance (UXO). The Khmer Rouge, the Royal Cambodian Armed Forces (RCAF), the Vietnamese military, and, to a lesser extent, the Thai army, laid extensive minefields during the Indochina wars. These minefields are concentrated in western Cambodia, especially in the dense "K-5 mine belt" along the border with Thailand, laid by Vietnamese forces during the 1980s. UXOâmostly from U.S. air and artillery strikes during the Vietnam War and land battles fought along the border with Vietnamâcontaminates areas in eastern and northeastern Cambodia. While the full extent of contamination is unknown, the Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor reports that a baseline survey completed in 2012 of Cambodia's 124 mine-affected districts found a total of 1,915 square kilometers (739 square miles) of contaminated land. Laos: Laos is the most heavily bombed country per capita in the world as a result of the Indochina wars of the 1960s and 1970s. While landmines were laid in Laos during this period, UXO, including cluster munitions remnants (called "bombies" in Laos), represents a far greater threat to the population and account for the bulk of contamination. UXO, mostly of U.S. origin, remains in the majority of the country's 18 provinces. Vietnam: UXO contaminates virtually all of Vietnam as a result of 30 years of conflict extending from World War II through the Vietnam War. The most heavily contaminated provinces are in the central region and along the former demilitarized zone (DMZ) that divided North Vietnam and South Vietnam. Parts of southern Vietnam and areas around the border with China also remain contaminated with UXO.

The Kingdom of Cambodia is among the world's most UXO-afflicted countries, contaminated with cluster munitions, landmines, and other undetonated weapons. U.S. bombing of northeastern Cambodia during the Vietnam War, the Vietnamese invasion in 1979, and civil wars during 1970s and 1980s all contributed to the problem of unexploded ordnance. In 1969, the United States launched a four-year carpet-bombing campaign on Cambodia, dropping 2.7 million tons of ordnance, including 80,000 cluster bombs containing 26 million submunitions or bomblets. Up to one-quarter of the cluster bomblets failed to explode, according to some estimates. In addition, the Vietnamese army mined the Cambodia-Thai border as it invaded the country and took control from the Khmer Rouge in 1979. The Vietnamese military, Vietnam-backed Cambodian forces, the Khmer Rouge, and Royalist forces reportedly all deployed landmines during the 1979-1989 civil war period. Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen occasionally has referred to the U.S. bombing of Cambodia, which occurred between 1969 and 1973, when criticizing the United States; however, the historical event has not been a major issue in recent U.S.-Cambodian relations.

There have been over 64,700 UXO casualties in Cambodia since 1979, including over 19,700 deaths. The Cambodia Mine/ERW Victim Information System (CMVIS) has recorded an overall trend of significant decreases in the number of annual casualties: 58 in 2017 compared to 111 in 2015, 186 in 2012 and 286 in 2010. Despite progress, the migration of poor Cambodians to the northwestern provinces bordering Thailand, one of the most heavily mined areas in the world, has contributed to continued casualties. Cambodia, with 25,000 UXO-related amputees, has the highest number of amputees per capita in the world. The economic costs of UXO include obstacles to infrastructure development, land unsuitable for agricultural purposes, and disruptions to irrigation and drinking water supplies.

Open Development Cambodia, a website devoted to development-related data, reports that since the early 1990s, about 580 square miles (1,500 square kilometers) of land has been cleared of UXO. Â Estimates of the amount of land still containing UXO vary. According to some reports, about 50% of contaminated land has been cleared, and an estimated 630 square miles (1,640 square kilometers) of land still contain UXO. Many of the remaining areas are the most densely contaminated, including 21 northwestern districts along the border with Thailand that contain anti-personnel mines laid by the Vietnamese military and that account for the majority of mine casualties.

Between 1993 and 2017, the U.S. government contributed over $133.6 million for UXO removal and disposal, related educational efforts, and survivor assistance programs in Cambodia. These activities are carried out largely by U.S. and international nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), in collaboration with the Cambodian Mine Action Center, a Cambodian NGO, and the Cambodian government. USAID's Leahy War Victims Fund has supported programs to help provide medical and rehabilitation services and prosthetics to Cambodian victims of UXO. Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining and Related Programs (NADR) funding for demining activities was $5.5 million in both 2015 and 2016, $4.2 in 2017, and $2.9 million in 2018. Global donors contributed over $132 million between 2013 and 2017, mostly for clearance efforts. In 2017, the largest contributors of demining and related assistance were the United States, United Kingdom, Australia, Japan, and Germany, providing approximately $10.6 million in total.

In 2018, the Cambodian government and Cambodian Mine Action and Victim Assistance Authority (CMAA), a government agency, launched the National Mine Action Strategy (NMAS) for 2018-2025. The goal of removing UXO from all contaminated areas by 2025 would require the clearance of 110 square kilometers per year at a cost of about $400 million. The NMAS estimated that at the current rate of progress, however, Cambodia would need a little over 10 years to complete clearance of all known mined areas. Some experts are concerned that declining international assistance could jeopardize clearance goals. In 2017, total international demining support to Cambodia decreased by 61%, largely due to lower contributions from Australia and Japan.

From 1964 through 1973, the United States military reportedly flew 580,000 bombing runs and dropped over 2 million tons of cluster munitions, including over 270 million cluster bombs, on the small land-locked country. The total was more than the amount dropped on Germany and Japan combined in World War II. An estimated one-third of these munitions failed to explode. The Lao government claims that up to 75-80 million submunitions or bomblets released from the cluster bombs remain in over one-third of the country's area. Military conflicts during the French colonial period and the Laotian Civil War during the 1960s and 1970s have also contributed to the problem of UXO/ERW.

The U.S. bombing campaign in Laos was designed to interdict North Vietnamese supply lines that ran through Laos. The bombing campaign also supported Lao government forces fighting against communist rebels (Pathet Lao) and their North Vietnamese allies. Cluster munitions were considered the "weapon of choice" in Laos because they could penetrate the jungle canopy, cover large areas, and successfully attack convoys and troop concentrations hidden by the trees. The most heavily bombed areas in Laos were the northeastern and southern provinces, although UXO can be found in 14 of the country's 17 provinces. The bombings in the northeast were intended to deny territory, particularly the Plain of Jars, to Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese forces and, in the south, to sever the Ho Chi Minh Trail, which crossed the border into eastern Laos. The northeastern part of Laos was also used as a "free drop zone" where planes that had taken off from bases in Thailand and had been unable to deliver their bombs, could dispose of them before returning to Thailand.

According to the Geneva-based Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor , since 1964, there have been over 50,000 mine and ERW casualties in Laos, including over 29,000 people killed. An estimated 40% of victims are children. In 2012, the Lao government's Safe Path Forward Strategic Plan II set a target to reduce UXO-related casualties to 75 per year by 2020, from levels between 100-200 victims annually during the 2000s. The country has already met these goals: in 2017, the number of reported casualties was 41, including four killed.

Cluster munitions have hampered economic development in the agricultural country. UXO contamination affects one-quarter of all Lao villages, and 22% of detonations occur through farming activities. Unexploded ordnance adversely affects not only agricultural production, but also mining, forestry, the development of hydropower projects, and the building of roads, schools, and clinics. Expenditures on demining efforts and medical treatment divert investment and resources from other areas and uses. Many injured UXO survivors lose the ability to be fully productive. According to the Lao government, there appears to be a significant correlation between the presence of UXO and the prevalence of poverty.

Lao PDR officials state that the country needs $50 million annually for ongoing UXO/ERW clearance, assistance to victims, and education, of which the Lao government contributes $15 million. International assistance comes from numerous sources, including Japan, the United States, and the United Nations Development Program (UNDP). The United States has contributed a total of $169 million for UXO clearance and related activities since 1995, with funding directed to international NGOs and contractors. That makes Laos the third largest recipient of conventional weapons destruction funding over that period, after Afghanistan and Iraq. In 2016, the United States announced a three-year, $90 million increase in assistance covering FY2016-FY2018. Half the amount, or $45 million, is aimed at conducting the first nationwide cluster munitions remnant survey, while the other half is aimed at clearance activities.

Since the early 1990s, the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) has been involved in training Lao personnel in demining techniques. U.S. UXO clearance and related humanitarian aid efforts, administered by the State Department (DOS), began in 1996. U.S. support also helped to establish the Lao National Demining Office, the UXO Lao National Training Center, and the Lao National Regulatory Authority.

The United States finances the bulk of its mine clearance operations through the NADR foreign aid account. NADR demining programs constitute the largest U.S. assistance activity in Laos, which receives little U.S. development aid compared to other countries in the region. It has been channeled primarily to international nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), the UNDP's trust fund for UXO clearance, and the Lao National Unexploded Ordnance Program (UXO Lao). Laos also has received humanitarian assistance through the USAID Leahy War Victims Fund for prosthetics, orthotics, and rehabilitation ($1.4 million in 2011-2013).

For many years in the 1990s and 2000s, UXO-related clearance programs were one of the primary areas of substantive cooperation between the United States and Laos. Some argue that such activity has helped foster bilateral ties with a country whose authoritarian government is deeply inward looking. When President Obama became the first U.S. President to visit Laos in 2016, announcing the $90 million UXO aid package, he said: "Given our history here, I believe that the United States has a moral obligation to help Laos heal. And even as we continue to deal with the past, our new partnership is focused on the future."

War Legacy issuesâAgent Orange/dioxin contamination, MIAs, and UXOâplayed an important role in the reestablishment of diplomatic relations between the United States and Vietnam, and it led to the development of a comprehensive partnership between the two nations. Vietnam's voluntary effort to locate and return the remains of U.S. MIAs was a significant factor in the restoration of diplomatic relations. U.S. assistance to decontaminate Da Nang airport of Agent Orange/dioxin likely contributed to the two nations' move to a comprehensive partnership. While not as prominent, U.S. UXO assistance to Vietnam most likely has been a factor in establishing trust between the two governments.

The UXO in Vietnam are remnants from conflicts spanning more than a century, potentially as far back as the Sino-French War (or Tonkin War) of 1884-1885 and as recent as the Cambodian-Vietnamese War (1975-1978) and the border conflicts between China and Vietnam from 1979 to 1991. According to one account, during Vietnam's conflicts with France and the United States (1945-1975), more than 15 million tons of explosives were deployedâfour times the amount used in World War II. It is generally presumed, however, that the majority of the UXO in Vietnam are from the Vietnam War, also known in Vietnam as "the Resistance War Against America" (1955-1975).

Estimates of the amount of UXO in Vietnam vary. According to one source, "at least 350,000 tons of live bombs and mines remain in Vietnam." Another source claims "around 800,000 tons of unexploded ordnance remains scattered across the country."

Viewed in terms of land area, the Vietnamese government estimates that between 6.1 and 6.6 million hectares (23,500-25,500 square miles) of land in Vietnamâor 19% to 21% of the nationâis contaminated by UXO. An official Vietnamese survey started in 2004 and completed in 2014 estimated that 61,308 square kilometers (23,671 square miles) was contaminated with UXO. According to the survey, UXO is scattered across virtually all of the nation, but the province of Quang Tri, along the previous "demilitarized zone" (DMZ) between North and South Vietnam, is the most heavily contaminated (see Figure 3 ).

Figures on the number of UXO casualties in Vietnam also vary. One source says, "No one really knows how many people have been injured or killed by UXO since the war ended, but the best estimates are at least 105,000, including 40,000 deaths." In its report on UXO casualties in Vietnam, however, the Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor listed the casualty figures for 1975-2017 as 38,978 killed and 66,093 injured. For 2017 only, the Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor reported eight deaths and six injured.

A survey of UXO casualties determined that the three main circumstances under which people were killed or injured by UXO were (in order): scrap metal collection (31.2%); playing/tampering (27.6%); and cultivating or herding (20.3%). In some of Vietnam's poorer provinces, people proactively seek out and collect UXO in order to obtain scrap metal to sell to augment their income, despite the inherent danger.

On March 8, 2018, Vietnam's Ministry of National Defence (MND) established the Office of the Standing Agency of the National Steering Committee of the Settlement of Post-war Unexploded Ordnance and Toxic Chemical Consequences, or Office 701, to address the nation's UXO issue. Office 701 is responsible for working with individuals and organizations to decontaminate Vietnam of UXO to ensure public safety, clean the environment, and promote socio-economic development. Under a 2013 directive by the Prime Minister, the Vietnam National Mine Action Center (VNMAC) was established within the MND with responsibility for proposing policy, developing plans, and coordinating international cooperation for UXO clearance. The MND's Center for Bomb and Mine Disposal Technology (BOMICEN) is the central coordinating body for Vietnam's UXO clearance operations. In addition, Vietnam created a Mine Action Partnership Group (MAPG) to improve coordination of domestic and international UXO clearance operations.

BOMICEN typically sets up project management teams (PMTs) that work with provincial or local officials to identify, survey, and decontaminate UXO. The PMTs usually interview local informants about possible UXO sites and then conduct field evaluations to determine if UXO is present and suitable for removal by Vietnam's Army Engineering Corps. The PMTs also collect information about the decontamination site and report back to BOMICON about the location and type of UXO removed.

Besides the clearance operations directly conducted by Vietnam, several nations and international organizations conduct UXO removal projects in Vietnam, including the Danish Demining Group (DDG), the Mines Advisory Group (MAG), Norwegian People's Aid (NPA), and PeaceTrees Vietnam. In 2016, the Korea International Cooperation Agency (KOICA), in cooperation with VNMAC and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), initiated a $32 million, multi-year UXO project in the provinces of Binh Dinh and Quang Binh. The joint project began operations in March 2018 and is scheduled to end in December 2020.

NGOs working in Vietnam report some issues in their collaboration with the MND, which has declared portions of contaminated provinces off limits for UXO surveying and decontamination. Many of these areas contain villages and towns inhabited by civilians. In addition, the MND has not been providing information about any UXO clearance efforts being conducted in these areas. The lack of information sharing has hindered efforts to establish a nationwide UXO database that is being used to refine UXO location and clearance techniques.

Since 1993, the United States has provided UXO and related assistance to Southeast Asia via several different channels, including the Center for Disease Control (CDC), the Department of Defense (DOD), the Department of State (DOS), and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)(see Table 1 ). For all three countries covered by this report, most of the assistance has been provided by DOS through its Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining and Related Programs/Conventional Weapons Destruction (NADR-CWD) account. USAID assistance to Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam has consisted primarily of Leahy War Victims Fund programs for prostheses, physical rehabilitation, training, and employment. Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam have been the largest recipients of U.S. conventional weapons destruction (CWD) funding in East Asia.

In December 2013, the United States and Vietnam signed a Memorandum of Understanding on cooperation to overcome the effects of "wartime bomb, mine, and unexploded ordnance" in Vietnam. In their November 2017 joint statement, President Trump and President Tran Dai Quang "committed to cooperation in the removal of remnants of explosives from the war."

U.S. Department of State and USAID Activities

Department of State and USAID demining and related assistance support the work of international NGOs in Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam. International NGOs work primarily with local NGOs in Cambodia and, to a greater extent, collaborate with government entities in Laos and Vietnam. The main areas of assistance are clearance, surveys, and medical assistance. In Cambodia, the Department of State and USAID support programs that collaborate with and train Cambodian organizations in clearance activities, conduct geographical surveys, help process explosive material retrieved from ERW, and provide mine risk education. In Laos, U.S. assistance includes clearance and survey efforts, medical and rehabilitation services, education and training assistance to victims and families, and mine risk education. In Vietnam, the United States provides mine clearance and survey support, capacity building programs, and medical assistance and vocational training for victims.

U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) and UXO Remediation Activities

DOD's role in remediating UXO in Southeast Asia falls under the category of "Support to Humanitarian Mine Action (HMA)." Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) Instruction "Department of Defense Support to Humanitarian Mine Action, CJCSI 3207.0IC" dated September 28, 2018, covers DOD's responsibilities in this regard. DOD's stated policy is

to relieve human suffering and the adverse effects of land mines and other explosive remnants of war (ERW) on noncombatants while advancing the Combatant Commanders' (CCDRs') theater campaign plan and U.S. national security objectives. The DOD HMA program assists nations plagued by land mines and ERW by executing "train-the-trainer" programs of instruction designed to develop indigenous capabilities for a wide range of HMA activities.

It is important to note that U.S. Code restricts the extent to which U.S. military personnel and DOD civilian employees can actively participate in UXO activities as described in the following section:

Exposure of USG Personnel to Explosive Hazards.

By law, DOD personnel are restricted in the extent to which they may actively participate in ERW clearance and physical security and stockpile management (PSSM) operations during humanitarian and civic assistance. Under 10 U.S.C. 401(a)(1), Military Departments may carry out certain "humanitarian and civic assistance activities" in conjunction with authorized military operations of the armed forces in a foreign nation. 10 U.S.C. 407(e)(1) defines the term "humanitarian demining assistance" (as part of humanitarian and civic assistance activities) as "detection and clearance of land mines and other ERW, and includes the activities related to the furnishing of education, training, and technical assistance with respect to explosive safety, the detection and clearance of land mines and other ERW, and the disposal, demilitarization, physical security, and stockpile management of potentially dangerous stockpiles of explosive ordnance." However, under 10 U.S.C. 407(a)(3), members of the U.S. Armed Forces while providing humanitarian demining assistance shall not "engage in the physical detection, lifting, or destroying of land mines or other explosive remnants of war, or stockpiled conventional munitions (unless the member does so for the concurrent purpose of supporting a United States military operation)." Additionally, members of the U.S. Armed Forces shall not provide such humanitarian demining and civic assistance "as part of a military operation that does not involve the armed forces." Under DOD policy, the restrictions in 10 U.S.C. 407 also apply to DOD civilian personnel.

In general terms, U.S. law restricts DOD to "train-the-trainer" type UXO remediation activities unless it is required as part of a U.S. military operation involving U.S. armed forces.

U.S. Indo Pacific Command and UXO Remediation in Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos72

U.S. Indo Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM) is responsible for U.S. military activities in Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos. As part of USINDOPACOM's Theater Campaign Plan, selected UXO remediation activities for Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos are briefly described in the following sections:

Vietnam: USINDOPACOM has tasked U.S. Army Pacific (USARPAC) as the primary component responsible for land-based UXO operations and the Pacific Fleet (PACFLT) as the primary component responsible for underwater UXO operations in Vietnam. FY2018 accomplishments and FY2019 and FY2020 plans are said to include:

Trained individuals on International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) Level I and II;

Trained individuals on Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) instructor development;

Familiarized individuals on EOD equipment;

Conducted medical first responder training;

Trained individuals on medical instructor development;

Trained individuals on underwater remote vehicle operations; and

Trained individuals on ordnance identification.

Continue training on International Mine Action Standards Level I;

Train individuals on how to develop training lanes for demining;

Increase Vietnamese medical first responder force structure; and

Plan to train on IMAS Level II with qualified IMAS Level I students;

Plan to enhance advanced medical-related technique training;

Plan to train in maritime UXO techniques;

Plan to conduct mission planning and to conduct a full training exercise; and

Cambodia: USINDOPACOM has tasked Marine Forces Pacific (MARFORPAC) to be responsible for land-based UXO operations in Cambodia. Plans for FY2019 through FY2021 include:

Familiarize students on EOD Level I equipment;

Review medical first responder training;

Train on medical instructor development;

Train in IMAS Demining Non-Technical Survey/Technical Survey (NTS/TS) techniques.

Plan to continue to develop capacity with IMAS EOD Level I and II training;

Plan to continue to build capacity with IMAS Demining Non-Technical Survey/Technical Survey techniques;

If EOD Level I and II training successful, plan to initiate EOD Level III training in late FY2020;

Plan to increase student knowledge of lane training development;

Plan to exercise IMAS Level II concepts;

Plan to increase Cambodian medical first responder force structure; and

Plan to continue EOD instructor development.

Plan to train on IMAS EOD Level II and EOD Level III with the qualified Level I and Level II students to increase their numbers;

Plan to train on IMAS Demining NTS/TS with the qualified students to increase their numbers;

Plan to enhance advanced medical-related techniques;

Plan to conduct mission planning and a full training exercise; and

Plan to conduct instructor development events.

Laos: USINDOPACOM has tasked Marine Forces Pacific (MARFORPAC) to be responsible for land-based UXO operations in Laos. Plans for FY2019 through FY2021 include:

Conduct training on EOD instructor development;

Conduct familiarization on EOD Level I equipment;

Conduct a review of medical first responder training;

Conduct medical instructor development training; and

Conduct training on ordnance identification.

Plan to continue to build capacity with training in IMAS EOD Level I and II;

Plan to increase knowledge on lane training development;

Plan to increase medical first responder force structure and knowledge; and

Plan to train on IMAS EOD Level II with the qualified Level I and Level II students to increase their numbers;

Plan to enhance advance medical-related techniques;

Plan to conduct mission planning and conduct a full training exercise; and

Continue to conduct instructor development.

The U.S. government has been providing UXO-related assistance to Southeast Asia for over 25 years, with contributions amounting to over $400 million. Despite this sustained level of support, as well as the efforts of the governments of Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam, it may take decades to clear these three nations of the known UXO contamination. These estimates, however, are based on incomplete information, as systematic nationwide UXO surveys have not been completed in either Cambodia or Laos.

The Legacies of War Recognition and Unexploded Ordnance Removal Act ( H.R. 2097 ) would authorize $50 million each year for fiscal years 2020 to 2024 for address the UXO issue in Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam. The legislation also would authorize the President to provide humanitarian assistance for developing national UXO surveys, UXO clearance, and support for capacity building, risk education and UXO victims assistance in each nation. It would require the President to provide an annual briefing on related activities to the House Committee on Appropriations, the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Senate Committee on Appropriations, and the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations.

Southeast Asia's ongoing UXO challenge may present a number of issues for Congress to consider and evaluate. Among those issues are

F undin g levels âIt is uncertain how much money it would take to decontaminate all three nations or provide adequate assistance to their UXO victims. Given this uncertainty, is the level of U.S. assistance being provided to Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam to conduct humanitarian demining projects adequate to significantly reduce the UXO casualty risk in a reasonable time period? In addition, is the recent distribution of funding across the three nations equitable given their relative degrees of UXO contamination and their internal ability to finance demining projects? Coordination across agencies âIs there appropriate coordination across the U.S. agenciesâthe Department of Defense, the Department of State, and USAIDâin providing demining assistance in Southeast Asia? Are these agencies utilizing the appropriated funds efficiently and effectively? Focus on clearance âMost of the appropriated funds have been for humanitarian demining projects and technical support, with less funding for assistance to UXO victims. The focus on clearance, rather than assistance on UXO victims, may in part be due to a concern about possible post-conflict liability issues. In light of past practices, should the U.S. government increase its support for UXO victims in Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam beyond those being currently provided via the Leahy War Victims Fund? Implications for bilateral relations âHas the amount and types of U.S. UXO assistance to Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam been a significant factor in bilateral relations with each of those nations? In Vietnam, work on war legacy issues formed an early part of building normalized relations in the post-War periodâties that have broadened into closer strategic and economic linkages. In Cambodia and Laos, UXO-related assistance has been one of the broadest areas for substantive cooperation between the United States and two countries with which the United States has had relatively cool relations. Would a change in the amount or type of assistance provided be beneficial to U.S. relations with Cambodia, Laos, or Vietnam? Should the U.S. government use UXO assistance to pressure other entities, such as Vietnam's MND, to be more cooperative in the UXO decontamination effort? UXO p revention âThe Department of Defense has implemented a policy that is to eventually replace all cluster munitions with ones whose failure rate is below 1%. Should the U.S. government undertake additional efforts to reduce the amount of post-conflict UXO from U.S. munitions, including prohibiting the use of U.S. funding for certain types of submunitions that may leave UXO? Given DOD's current views and policies on cluster munitions and landmines, does this preclude the United States from joining the 2010 Convention on Cluster Munitions or 1999 Ottawa Convention on Landmines? Precedents and lessons for other parts of the world âAre there lessons that can be drawn from U.S. assistance for UXO clearance and victim relief in Southeast Asia that may be applicable to programs elsewhere in the world, including Afghanistan and Iraq? Have the levels of assistance the United States has offered in Southeast Asia signaled a precedent for other parts of the world?

During the 115 th Congress, legislation was introduced that would have addressed some of these general issues associated with UXO, though none directly addressed the current situation in Southeast Asia. The Unexploded Ordnance Removal Act ( H.R. 5883 ) would have required the Secretary of Defense, in concurrence with the Secretary of State, to develop and implement a strategy for removing UXO from Iraq and Syria. The Cluster Munitions Civilian Protection Act of 2017 ( H.R. 1975 and S. 897 ) would have prohibited the obligation or expenditure of U.S. funds for cluster munitions if, after arming, the unexploded ordnance rate for the submunitions was more than 1%.


FEMA Individual Assistance Programs: An Overview

Summary: Following a presidential declaration of emergency or major disaster, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) may provide three primary forms of assistance: Individual Assistance (IA), Public Assistance (PA), and Hazard Mitigation Assistance (HMA). IA, which is the focus of this report, provides aid to affected individuals and households. PA provides grants to local, state, territorial, and Indian tribal governments, as well as certain private nonprofit organizations for emergency protective measures, debris removal operations, and repair or replacement of damaged public infrastructure. HMA funds pay for mitigation and resiliency projects and programs to reduce the threat or impacts of future disasters.

Summary: State, territorial, and Indian tribal governments do not automatically receive IA when a disaster occurs. Instead, the governor or tribal chief executive must request that the President declare an emergency or major disaster and that IA be authorized. When drafting such a request, the state, territorial, or Indian tribal government must demonstrate that the incident exceeds their capacity to effectively respond without federal assistance. FEMA then evaluates the request using a set of factors and provides a recommendation to the President. The evaluation of the IA factors, in addition to helping FEMA determine whether or not to recommend the President declare a major disaster, helps FEMA identify the types of IA that are needed.

Summary: This report provides brief descriptions of the categories of IA authorized under the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (Stafford Act; P.L. 93-288 , as amended; 42 U.S.C. Â§Â§5121 et seq.):

Summary: 1. Mass Care and Emergency Assistance; 2. Crisis Counseling Assistance and Training Program; 3. Disaster Unemployment Assistance; 4. Disaster Legal Services; 5. Disaster Case Management; and 6. Individuals and Households Program.

Summary: The information regarding the Individuals and Households Program (IHP) is covered in greatest detail herein, because it is the primary assistance program for providing federal assistance to individuals and households following a presidential declaration of emergency or major disaster. The IHP provides financial and/or direct assistance to eligible individuals and households who, as a result of a disaster, have uninsured or under-insured necessary expenses and serious needs that cannot be met through other means or forms of assistance. Forms of financial assistance include some categories of Housing Assistance (e.g., Rental Assistance) and Other Needs Assistance (ONA), and forms of direct assistance include other categories of Housing Assistance (e.g., Transportable Temporary Housing Units).

Summary: The IA program information is based on the guidance that FEMA released in March 2019, to serve as a comprehensive IA program policy resource; the Individual Assistance Program and Policy Guide (IAPPG) applies to emergencies and disasters declared on or after March 1, 2019.

Summary: This report also briefly describes the updated factors considered when evaluating a governor's request for IA pursuant to a presidential declaration of emergency or major disaster, which became effective June 1, 2019. As required by Section 1109 of the Sandy Recovery Improvement Act of 2013 (SRIA, Division B of P.L. 113-2 ), FEMA released these updated factors to establish more objective criteria for evaluating the need for assistance, clarify eligibility requirements, and expedite a presidential declaration determination.

Following a presidential declaration of emergency or major disaster, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) may provide three primary forms of assistance: Individual Assistance (IA), Public Assistance (PA), and Hazard Mitigation Assistance (HMA). IA, which is the focus of this report, provides aid to affected individuals and households, and can take the form of assistance for housing and for other needs through the Individuals and Households Program, crisis counseling, disaster unemployment assistance, disaster legal services, and disaster case management services, as well as mass care and emergency assistance. PA provides grants to local, state, territorial, and Indian tribal governments, as well as certain private nonprofit organizations, for emergency protective measures, debris removal operations, and repair or replacement of damaged public infrastructure. HMA funds pay for mitigation and resiliency projects and programs to reduce the threat or impacts of future disasters. This report provides brief descriptions of the categories of IA authorized under the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (Stafford Act; P.L. 93-288, as amended; 42 U.S.C. Â§Â§5121 et seq.). The information is based on the program guidance that FEMA released in March 2019, to serve as a comprehensive IA program policy resource; the Individual Assistance Program and Policy Guide (IAPPG) applies to emergencies and disasters declared on or after March 1, 2019.

State, territorial, and Indian tribal governments do not automatically receive IA when a disaster occurs. Following an incident , the governor or tribal chief executive must request that the President declare an emergency or major disaster and that IA be authorized. When drafting a request for a major disaster declaration authorizing IA, the state, territorial, or Indian tribal government must demonstrate that the incident exceeds their capacity to effectively respond without federal assistance. FEMA then evaluates the request using a set of factors before providing a recommendation to the President. In March 2019, FEMA released the updated factors considered when evaluating a governor's request for IA, which became effective June 1, 2019. Thus, this report also lists and briefly describes the updated IA factors.

Various types of FEMA IA may be provided to disaster survivors. The available IA options depend on the type of declaration (i.e., an "emergency" or "major disaster"), and the type(s) of IA requested by the governor of the affected state or the tribal chief executive. These requests must be authorized by FEMA (for information on the factors considered when determining whether to authorize IA, see the " IA Factors " section, below) . FEMA's IA program includes

1. Mass Care and Emergency Assistance ; 2. Crisis Counseling Assistance and Training Program ; 3. Disaster Unemployment Assistance ; 4. Disaster Legal Services ; 5. Disaster Case Management ; and 6. Individuals and Households Program.

A brief description of each form of IA is included below.

Mass Care and Emergency Assistance (MC/EA) involves the provision of life-sustaining services to disaster survivors prior to, during, and following an incident through short-term recovery. MC/EA includes seven service "activities": (1) sheltering; (2) feeding; (3) distribution of emergency supplies; (4) support for individuals with disabilities and others with access and functional needs; (5) reunification services for adults and children; (6) support for household pets, service animals, and assistance animals; and (7) mass evacuee support.

Crisis Counseling Assistance and Training Program16

The Crisis Counseling Assistance and Training Program (CCP) provides grant funding to eligible local, state, territorial, and Indian tribal governments, as well as nongovernmental organizations. CCP supplements efforts to assist individuals and communities with recovering from the effects of a disaster through community-based outreach and the provision of services, such as crisis counseling, psycho-education, and coping skills development. CCP also provides support by linking the disaster survivor with other resources, such as individuals and agencies that help survivors in the recovery process. The program provides short- to intermediate-term assistance to support mental and emotional health needs. Two CCP programs provide assistance for different lengths of time: (1) the Immediate Services Program provides funding for up to 60 days following a major disaster declaration; and (2) the Regular Services Program provides funding for up to nine months from the notice of award.

Disaster Unemployment Assistance (DUA) provides benefits to individuals who were previously employed or self-employed, were rendered jobless or whose employment was interrupted as a direct result of a major disaster, and are ineligible for regular unemployment insurance. DUA may also provide re-employment assistance. DUA benefits may continue for up to 26 weeks following the declaration of a major disaster.

Disaster Legal Services (DLS) are provided free to low-income individuals who require them because of a major disaster. The provision of services is "confined to the securing of benefits under the [Stafford] Act and claims arising out of a major disaster." Assistance may include help with insurance claims, drawing up new wills and other legal documents lost in the disaster, help with home repair contracts and contractors, and appeals of FEMA decisions. Disaster Legal Services are provided through an agreement with the American Bar Association's Young Lawyers Division. Neither the statute nor the regulations establish cost-share requirements or time limitations for DLS.

The Disaster Case Management (DCM) program partners case managers with disaster survivors to develop and implement disaster recovery plans that address their unmet needs. The program is time-limited, and shall not exceed 24 months from the date of the major disaster declaration.

The Individuals and Households Program (IHP) provides financial and/or direct assistance to eligible individuals and households who, as a result of a disaster, have uninsured or under-insured necessary expenses and serious needs that cannot be met through other means or forms of assistance. The IHP is the primary way FEMA assists disaster survivors. Although it may meet basic needs, it cannot compensate for all losses. The categories of IHP assistance are Housing Assistance and Other Needs Assistance (ONA) (see Table 1 ). The period of assistance is generally limited to 18 months following the date of the emergency or major disaster declaration.

Multiple types of Housing Assistance may be provided to meet disaster survivors' post-disaster housing needs. Housing Assistance includes the subcategories of Financial Housing Assistance and Direct Housing Assistance. The appropriate types of housing assistance depend on various considerations, including, but not limited to, cost-effectiveness; availability; suitability; and access to services. The federal cost share for FEMA housing assistance is 100%. The following sections provide a brief overview of each type of Housing Assistance organized by subcategory.

Financial Housing Assistance is grant funding provided directly to the individual or household by FEMA. Some types of Financial Housing Assistance are subject to a limit on the amount of Financial Housing Assistance an individual or household is eligible to receive.

Lodging Expense Reimbursement (LER) provides funding for out-of-pocket short-term lodging costs and taxes when the applicant is displaced from their primary residence because it is uninhabitable or inaccessible. Rental Assistance (including Initial Rental Assistance and Continued Rental Assistance) provides funding to rent alternate housing accommodations while the applicant is displaced from their primary residence because it is uninhabitable, inaccessible, affected by a utility outage, or unavailable. Home Repair Assistance provides funding to repair an owner-occupied primary residence, utilities, and infrastructure, subject to the maximum amount of financial assistance. Home Replacement Assistance provides funding to help replace a disaster-destroyed owner-occupied primary residence, subject to the maximum amount of financial assistance.

Direct Housing Assistance is housing provided to the individual or household by FEMA or the state, territorial, or Indian tribal government. Direct Housing Assistance is not subject to the limit on the maximum amount of financial assistance an individual or household is eligible to receive. However, FEMA may only provide Direct Housing Assistance when Rental Assistance (a type of Financial Housing Assistance) is not available or is insufficient.

Multifamily Lease and Repair (MLR) places disaster survivors in leased, repaired or improved multifamily temporary housing units (e.g., apartments). Transportable Temporary Housing Units (TTHUs) place disaster survivors in purchased or leased temporary housing units. TTHU sites must meet specific requirements, including (1) providing access to available and functional utilities; (2) complying with government ordinances; and (3) satisfying federal floodplain management and Environmental Planning and Historic Preservation (EHP) compliance review requirements. Direct Lease places disaster survivors in leased residential properties. Permanent Housing Construction (PHC) is a last resort used to provide home repair and new construction services to homeowners in insular areas or another location where no alternative housing resources are available.

Other Needs Assistance (ONA) provides a grant of financial assistance for other disaster-related necessary expenses and serious needs, and includes the subcategories of SBA-Dependent ONA and Non-SBA-Dependent ONA. ONA is subject to a limit on the amount of assistance an individual or household is eligible to receive. Further, ONA assistance may be somewhat limited because some ONA-eligible items and amounts available to be awarded are predetermined by FEMA and the state, territorial, or Indian tribal government. The federal cost share for ONA is 75%, and the non-federal cost share is the remaining 25%. The following sections provide an overview of each type of ONA organized by subcategory.

FEMA and the SBA collaborate in determining applicant eligibility for SBA-Dependent ONA. To receive SBA-Dependent types of ONA, applicants must first apply for an SBA disaster loan. SBA-Dependent ONA is only available to individuals or households who do not qualify for an SBA disaster loan or whose SBA disaster loan amount is insufficient.

Personal Property Assistance provides funding to repair or replace eligible items damaged or destroyed as a result of a disaster. Transportation Assistance provides funding to repair or replace a vehicle damaged by a disaster. Moving and Storage Assistance provides funding to relocate and store essential personal property while repairs are made, and then return the property to the repaired primary residence. Group Flood Insurance Policy enables FEMA or the state, territorial, or Indian tribal government to pay $600 for three years of flood insurance for real and personal property through the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP). Upon the expiration of the group policy, the applicant must purchase and maintain their own flood insurance; failure to do so may affect future IHP eligibility.

Non-SBA-Dependent types of ONA may be awarded regardless of the individual or household's SBA disaster loan status.

Funeral Assistance provides funding to assist with eligible expenses. Medical and Dental Assistance provides funding to assist with eligible expenses. Childcare Assistance is provided in the form of a one-time payment that covers up to eight cumulative weeks of childcare and eligible expenses to care for children aged 13 and under, and/or children up to age 21 who have a disability. Miscellaneous Expenses provides funding for reimbursement of eligible items purchased or rented after a disaster to assist with recovery. Critical Needs Assistance (sometimes referred to as "Immediate Needs Assistance") is provided in the form of a one-time payment of $500 to individuals or households who need life-saving and life-sustaining items because they are displaced from their primary dwelling as a result of a disaster. Clean and Removal Assistance is provided in the form of a one-time payment to address floodwater contamination for individuals or households whose primary residence experienced flood damage (any assistance received will be deducted from any subsequent award of Home Repair Assistance).

IA Factors for a Major Disaster Declaration

State, territorial, and Indian tribal governments do not automatically receive Individual Assistance (IA) when an incident occurs. The governor or tribal chief executive must request that the President declare an emergency or major disaster and that IA be authorized. This is because federal assistance is intended to supplementânot supplantâlocal, state, territorial, or Indian tribal government response and recovery efforts. In making such a request, the governor or tribal chief executive is claiming and must demonstrate that they are unable to effectively respond to the incident without federal assistance.

The governor or tribal chief executive's request for a presidential declaration of emergency or major disaster must include information about the actions and resources that have been or will be committed, and an estimate of the amount and severity of the disaster-caused damages, in addition to other required information. Specific factors are considered by FEMA when evaluating the need for supplemental federal assistance to individuals (i.e., IA) pursuant to a request for a major disaster declaration. FEMA provides a recommendation to the President, and the decision to grant a declaration request is at the President's discretion. The authority to designate assistance types to be made available is delegated to the FEMA Assistant Administrator for the Disaster Assistance Directorate.

On March 21, 2019, as required by Section 1109 of the Sandy Recovery Improvement Act of 2013 (SRIA, Division B of P.L. 113-2 ), FEMA issued a final rule revising the factors considered when evaluating a governor's request for IA. The factors were revised to establish more objective criteria for evaluating the need for assistance, clarify eligibility requirements, and expedite a presidential declaration determination. These factors became effective June 1, 2019. In addition to the revised factors, FEMA also produced guidance for use by state, territorial, and Indian tribal governments when drafting requests for major disaster declarations authorizing IA. In addition to determining IA eligibility, the factors are also used to identify the types of IA that will be made available to the requesting state/territory/Indian tribal government.

The factors considered when evaluating a governor's request for a major disaster declaration authorizing Individual Assistance are intended to assess the "severity, magnitude, and impact of a disaster, as well as the capabilities of the affected jurisdictions." "FEMA will always consider all relevant information submitted as part of a declaration request." As was the case prior to the adoption of the revised IA factors, major disaster declarations are made at the President's discretion and the IA factors do not limit presidential discretion. Brief descriptions of the factors are as follows:

1. State Fiscal Capacity and Resource Availability requires an evaluation of the resources available to the local and state/territorial/Indian tribal government, nongovernmental organizations, and the private sector, combined with the circumstances that contribute to a lack of sufficient resources, resulting in a need for supplemental federal assistance. This factor includes two subfactors: a. Fiscal Capacity evaluates the state's ability to raise revenue for disaster response and recovery using one of two variables: (1) increasing or decreasing, or higher or lower state total taxable resources (TTR); or (2)Â higher or lower state gross domestic product (GDP), which may be considered as the primary alternative to TTR for requesting territories or when TTR data is unavailable. Higher or lower per capita personal income by local area may also be considered with TTR or state GDP when FEMA needs to better assess the need for supplemental federal assistance within a local area. In addition, other factors may be considered because even states with a high fiscal capacity may be affected by disasters that overwhelm their capabilities, or the variables (i.e., TTR and state GDP) may not accurately reflect a state's fiscal capacity due to extenuating circumstances; and b. Resource Availability evaluates whether the disaster-caused needs can be met using non-Stafford Act sources. Two variables are considered: (1)Â resources and services provided by local and state/territorial/Indian tribal governments, and nongovernmental and private sector organizations; and (2)Â the cumulative effect of recent disasters occurring in the previous 24-month period. 2. Uninsured Home and Personal Property Losses considers the results of the FEMA-State Preliminary Damage Assessment (PDA) process to evaluate the extent of damage and estimated cost of assistance. The subfactors considered include (1) the "peril that caused the disaster damage" because it may affect insurance coverage; (2) the percentage of affected applicants with insurance for the peril that caused the damage; (3) whether the concentration of damages is in one area or if it is widespread; (4) the number of homes damaged and degree to which they are damaged (i.e., whether habitability is affected); (5) the estimated cost of assistance based on the PDA data and historical data; (6) the estimated rate of homeownership for the affected homes, which may influence whether the IHP is needed, and what types of housing assistance should be made available; and (7) other relevant PDA data that may demonstrate a need for supplemental federal assistance. 3. Disaster Impacted Population Profile evaluates the recovery challenges of the impacted population considering the affected community's demographics as compared with national averages. 4. Impact to Community Infrastructure evaluates the disaster's impact by considering disruption, damage, or destruction for more than 72 hours to any of the following three subfactors: (1) Life-Saving and Life-Sustaining Services that provide an "essential community function that ... will affect public health and safety", such as police, fire, and emergency medical services (EMS), medical facilities, and water treatment services; (2) Essential Community Services that improve quality of life, such as schools and childcare providers, and social services; and (3) Transportation Infrastructure and Utilities that, for example, render housing uninhabitable or inaccessible, or affect the delivery of services. 5. Casualties , including the number of individuals who are missing, injured, or deceased as a result of a disaster, indicate the level of trauma, which may influence the appropriate types of IA assistance to provide.

Disaster Related Unemployment identifies the number of individuals who may have lost work or become unemployed as a result of the disaster and who do not qualify for standard unemployment insurance.