Coast Guard Cutter Procurement: Background and Issues for Congress

Summary: The Coast Guard's program of record (POR) calls for procuring 8 National Security Cutters (NSCs), 25 Offshore Patrol Cutters (OPCs), and 58 Fast Response Cutters (FRCs) as replacements for 90 aging Coast Guard high-endurance cutters, medium-endurance cutters, and patrol craft. The Coast Guard's proposed FY2020 budget requests a total of $657 million in procurement funding for the NSC, OPC, and FRC programs.

Summary: NSCs are the Coast Guard's largest and most capable general-purpose cutters; they are intended to replace the Coast Guard's 12 aged Hamilton-class high-endurance cutters. NSCs have an estimated average procurement cost of about $670 million per ship. Although the Coast Guard's POR calls for procuring a total of 8 NSCs to replace the 12 Hamilton-class cutters, Congress through FY2019 has funded 11 NSCs, including the 10th and 11th in FY2018. Six NSCs have been commissioned into service. The seventh was delivered to the Coast Guard on September 19, 2018, and the eighth was delivered on April 30, 2019. The ninth through 11th are under construction; the ninth is scheduled for delivery in 2021. The Coast Guard's proposed FY2020 budget requests $60 million in procurement funding for the NSC program; this request does not include funding for a 12th NSC.

Summary: OPCs are to be smaller, less expensive, and in some respects less capable than NSCs; they are intended to replace the Coast Guard's 29 aged medium-endurance cutters. Coast Guard officials describe the OPC program as the service's top acquisition priority. OPCs have an estimated average procurement cost of about $421 million per ship. On September 15, 2016, the Coast Guard awarded a contract with options for building up to nine OPCs to Eastern Shipbuilding Group of Panama City, FL. The first OPC was funded in FY2018 and is to be delivered in 2021. The second OPC and long leadtime materials (LLTM) for the third were funded in FY2019. The Coast Guard's proposed FY2020 budget requests $457 million in procurement funding for the third OPC, LLTM for the fourth and fifth, and other program costs.

Summary: FRCs are considerably smaller and less expensive than OPCs; they are intended to replace the Coast Guard's 49 aging Island-class patrol boats. FRCs have an estimated average procurement cost of about $58 million per boat. A total of 56 have been funded through FY2019, including six in FY2019. Four of the 56 are to be used by the Coast Guard in the Persian Gulf and are not counted against the Coast Guard's 58-ship POR for the program, which relates to domestic operations. Excluding these four OPCs, a total of 52 FRCs for domestic operations have been funded through FY2019. The 32nd FRC was commissioned into service on May 1, 2019. The Coast Guard's proposed FY2020 budget requests $140 million in acquisition funding for the procurement of two more FRCs for domestic operations.

Summary: The NSC, OPC, and FRC programs pose several issues for Congress, including the following:

Summary: whether to provide funding in FY2020 for the procurement of a 12th NSC; whether to fund the procurement in FY2020 of two FRCs, as requested by the Coast Guard, or some higher number, such as four or six; whether to use annual or multiyear contracting for procuring OPCs; the annual procurement rate for the OPC program; the impact of Hurricane Michael on Eastern Shipbuilding of Panama City, FL, the shipyard that is to build the first nine OPCs; and the planned procurement quantities for NSCs, OPCs, and FRCs.

This report provides background information and potential oversight issues for Congress on the Coast Guard's programs for procuring 8 National Security Cutters (NSCs), 25 Offshore Patrol Cutters (OPCs), and 58 Fast Response Cutters (FRCs). The Coast Guard's proposed FY2020 budget requests a total of $657 million in procurement funding for the NSC, OPC, and FRC programs.

The issue for Congress is whether to approve, reject, or modify the Coast Guard's funding requests and acquisition strategies for the NSC, OPC, and FRC programs. Congress's decisions on these three programs could substantially affect Coast Guard capabilities and funding requirements, and the U.S. shipbuilding industrial base.

The NSC, OPC, and FRC programs have been subjects of congressional oversight for several years, and were previously covered in other CRS reports that are now archived. CRS testified on the Coast Guard's cutter acquisition programs most recently on November 29. The Coast Guard's plans for modernizing its fleet of polar icebreakers are covered in a separate CRS report.

Older Ships to Be Replaced by NSCs, OPCs, and FRCs

The 91 planned NSCs, OPCs, and FRCs are intended to replace 90 older Coast Guard ships—12 high-endurance cutters (WHECs), 29 medium-endurance cutters (WMECs), and 49 110-foot patrol craft (WPBs). The Coast Guard's 12 Hamilton (WHEC-715) class high-endurance cutters entered service between 1967 and 1972. The Coast Guard's 29 medium-endurance cutters include 13 Famous (WMEC-901) class ships that entered service between 1983 and 1991, 14 Reliance (WMEC-615) class ships that entered service between 1964 and 1969, and 2 one-of-a-kind cutters that originally entered service with the Navy in 1944 and 1971 and were later transferred to the Coast Guard. The Coast Guard's 49 110-foot Island (WPB-1301) class patrol boats entered service between 1986 and 1992.

Many of these 90 ships are manpower-intensive and increasingly expensive to maintain, and have features that in some cases are not optimal for performing their assigned missions. Some of them have already been removed from Coast Guard service: eight of the Island-class patrol boats were removed from service in 2007 following an unsuccessful effort to modernize and lengthen them to 123 feet; additional Island-class patrol boats are being decommissioned as new FRCs enter service; the one-of-a-kind medium-endurance cutter that originally entered service with the Navy in 1944 was decommissioned in 2011; and Hamilton-class cutters are being decommissioned as new NSCs enter service. A July 2012 Government Accountability Office (GAO) report discusses the generally poor physical condition and declining operational capacity of the Coast Guard's older high-endurance cutters, medium-endurance cutters, and 110-foot patrol craft.

NSCs, OPCs, and FRCs, like the ships they are intended to replace, are to be multimission ships for routinely performing 7 of the Coast Guard's 11 statutory missions, including

search and rescue (SAR); drug interdiction; migrant interdiction; ports, waterways, and coastal security (PWCS); protection of living marine resources; other/general law enforcement; and defense readiness operations.

Smaller Coast Guard patrol craft and boats contribute to the performance of some of these seven missions close to shore. NSCs, OPCs, and FRCs perform them both close to shore and in the deepwater environment, which generally refers to waters more than 50 miles from shore.

National Security Cutters ( Figure 1 )—also known as Legend (WMSL-750) class cutters because they are being named for legendary Coast Guard personnel —are the Coast Guard's largest and most capable general-purpose cutters. They are larger and technologically more advanced than Hamilton-class cutters, and are built by Huntington Ingalls Industries' Ingalls Shipbuilding of Pascagoula, MS (HII/Ingalls).

The Coast Guard's acquisition program of record (POR)—the service's list, established in 2004, of planned procurement quantities for various new types of ships and aircraft—calls for procuring 8 NSCs as replacements for the service's 12 Hamilton-class high-endurance cutters. The Coast Guard's FY2019 budget submission estimated the total acquisition cost of a nine-ship NSC program at $6.030 billion, or an average of about $670 million per ship.

Although the Coast Guard's POR calls for procuring a total of 8 NSCs to replace the 12 Hamilton-class cutters, Congress through FY2018 has funded 11 NSCs, including the 10 th and 11 th in FY2018. The seventh was delivered to the Coast Guard on September 19, 2018, and the eighth was delivered on April 30, 2019. The ninth through 11th are under construction; the ninth is scheduled for delivery in 2021. The Coast Guard's proposed FY2020 budget requests $60 million in procurement funding for the NSC program; this request does not include funding for a 12 th NSC.

For additional information on the status and execution of the NSC program from a May 2018 GAO report, see Appendix C .

Offshore Patrol Cutters ( Figure 2 , Figure 3 , and Figure 4 )—also known as Heritage (WMSM-915) class cutters because they are being named for past cutters that played a significant role in the history of the Coast Guard and the Coast Guard's predecessor organizations —are to be somewhat smaller and less expensive than NSCs, and in some respects less capable than NSCs. In terms of full load displacement, OPCs are to be about 80% as large as NSCs. Coast Guard officials describe the OPC program as the service's top acquisition priority. OPCs are being built by Eastern Shipbuilding Group of Panama City, FL.

The Coast Guard's POR calls for procuring 25 OPCs as replacements for the service's 29 medium-endurance cutters. The Coast Guard's FY2019 budget submission estimated the total acquisition cost of the 25 ships at $10.523 billion, or an average of about $421 million per ship. The first OPC was funded in FY2018 and is to be delivered in 2021. The second OPC and long leadtime materials (LLTM) for the third were funded in FY2019. The Coast Guard's proposed FY2020 budget requests $457 million in procurement funding for the third OPC, LLTM for the fourth and fifth, and other program costs.

The Coast Guard's Request for Proposal (RFP) for the OPC program, released on September 25, 2012, established an affordability requirement for the program of an average unit price of $310 million per ship, or less, in then-year dollars (i.e., dollars that are not adjusted for inflation) for ships 4 through 9 in the program. This figure represents the shipbuilder's portion of the total cost of the ship; it does not include the cost of government-furnished equipment (GFE) on the ship, or other program costs—such as those for program management, system integration, and logistics—that contribute to the above-cited figure of $421 million per ship.

At least eight shipyards expressed interest in the OPC program. On February 11, 2014, the Coast Guard announced that it had awarded Preliminary and Contract Design (P&CD) contracts to three of those eight firms—Bollinger Shipyards of Lockport, LA; Eastern Shipbuilding Group of Panama City, FL; and General Dynamics' Bath Iron Works (GD/BIW) of Bath, ME. On September 15, 2016, the Coast Guard announced that it had awarded the detail design and construction (DD&C) contract to Eastern Shipbuilding. The contract covers detail design and production of up to 9 OPCs and has a potential value of $2.38 billion if all options are exercised.

For additional information on the status and execution of the OPC program from a May 2018 GAO report, see Appendix C .

Fast Response Cutters ( Figure 5 )—also called Sentinel (WPC-1101) class patrol boats because they are being named for enlisted leaders, trailblazers, and heroes of the Coast Guard and its predecessor services of the U.S. Revenue Cutter Service, U.S. Lifesaving Service, and U.S. Lighthouse Service —are considerably smaller and less expensive than OPCs, but are larger than the Coast Guard's older patrol boats. FRCs are built by Bollinger Shipyards of Lockport, LA.

The Coast Guard's POR calls for procuring 58 FRCs as replacements for the service's 49 Island-class patrol boats. The POR figure of 58 FRCs is for domestic operations. The Coast Guard, however, operates six Island-class patrol boats in the Persian Gulf area as elements of a Bahrain-based Coast Guard unit, called Patrol Forces Southwest Asia (PATFORSWA), which is the Coast Guard's largest unit outside the United States. Providing FRCs as one-for-one replacements for all six of the Island-class patrol boats in PATFORSWA would result in a combined POR+PATFORSWA figure of 64 FRCs.

The Coast Guard's FY2019 budget submission estimated the total acquisition cost of the 58 cutters at $3.748.1 billion, or an average of about $65 million per cutter. A total of 56 FRCs have been funded through FY2019, including six in FY2019. Four of the 56 (two of the FRCs funded in FY2018 and two of the FRC funded in FY2019) are to be used for replacing PATFORSWA cutters and consequently are not counted against the Coast Guard's 58-ship POR for the program. Excluding these four OPCs, a total of 52 FRCs for domestic operations have been funded through FY2019.

The 32nd FRC was commissioned into service on May 1, 2019. The Coast Guard's proposed FY2020 budget requests $140 million in acquisition funding for the procurement of two more FRCs for domestic operations.

For additional information on the status and execution of the FRC program from a May 2018 GAO report, see Appendix C .

Funding in FY2013-FY2020 Budget Submissions

Table 1 shows annual requested and programmed acquisition funding for the NSC, OPC, and FRC programs in the Coast Guard's FY2013-FY2020 budget submissions. Actual appropriated figures differ from these requested and projected amounts.

One issue for Congress is whether to whether to provide funding in FY2020 for the procurement of a 12 th NSC. Funding long leadtime materials (LLTM) for a 12 th NSC in FY2020 could require tens of millions of dollars; fully funding the procurement of a 12 th NSC in FY2020 could require upwards of $700 million.

Supporters of providing funding for a 12 th NSC in FY2020 could argue that a total of 12 NSCs would provide one-for-one replacements for the 12 retiring Hamilton-class cutters; that Coast Guard analyses showing a need for no more than 9 NSCs assumed dual crewing of NSCs—something that has not worked as well as expected; and that the Coast Guard's POR record includes only about 61% as many new cutters as the Coast Guard has calculated would be required to fully perform the Coast Guard's anticipated missions in coming years (see " Planned NSC, OPC, and FRC Procurement Quantities " below, as well as Appendix A ).

Skeptics or opponents of providing funding for a 12 th NSC in FY2019 could argue that the Coast Guard's POR includes only 8 NSCs, that the Coast Guard's fleet mix analyses (see " Planned NSC, OPC, and FRC Procurement Quantities " below, as well as Appendix A ) have not shown a potential need for more than 9 NSCs, and that in a situation of finite Coast Guard budgets, providing funding for a 12 th NSC might require reducing funding for other FY2020 Coast Guard programs.

Whether to Procure Two FRCs or a Higher Number in FY2020

Another issue for Congress is whether to fund the procurement in FY2020 of two FRCs, as requested by the Coast Guard, or some higher number, such as four or six. Supporters of funding the procurement of a higher number could argue that FRCs in past years have been procured at annual rates of up to six per year; that procuring them at higher annual rates reduces their unit procurement costs due to improved production economies of scale; and that procuring four or six FRCs in FY2020 would accelerate the replacement of aging and less-capable Island-class patrol boats with new and more capable FRCs.

Opponents of procuring more than two FRCs in FY2020, while acknowledging these points, could argue that in a situation of finite Coast Guard funding, procuring more than two could require offsetting reductions in funding for other FY2020 Coast Guard programs, producing an uncertain net result on overall Coast Guard capabilities, and that replacing Island-class patrol boats, while desirable, is not so urgent a requirement that the procurement of FRCs needs to be accelerated beyond what the Coast Guard plans under its FY2020 budget submission.

Annual or Multiyear (Block Buy) Contracting for OPCs

Another issue for Congress is whether to acquire OPCs using annual contracting or multiyear contracting. The Coast Guard currently plans to use a contract with options for procuring the first nine OPCs. Although a contract with options may look like a form of multiyear contracting, it operates more like a series of annual contracts. Contracts with options do not achieve the reductions in acquisition costs that are possible with multiyear contracting. Using multiyear contracting involves accepting certain trade-offs.

One form of multiyear contracting, called block buy contracting, can be used at the start of a shipbuilding program, beginning with the first ship. (Indeed, this was a principal reason why block buy contracting was in effect invented in FY1998, as the contracting method for procuring the Navy's first four Virginia-class attack submarines.) Section 311 of the Frank LoBiondo Coast Guard Authorization Act of 2018 ( S. 140 / P.L. 115-282 of December 4, 2018) provides permanent authority for the Coast Guard to use block buy contracting with economic order quantity (EOQ) purchases (i.e., up-front batch purchases) of components in its major acquisition programs. The authority is now codified at 14 U.S.C. 1137.

CRS estimates that if the Coast Guard were to use block buy contracting with EOQ purchases of components for acquiring the first several OPCs, and either block buy contracting with EOQ purchases or another form of multiyear contracting known as multiyear procurement (MYP) with EOQ purchases for acquiring the remaining ships in the program, the savings on the total acquisition cost of the 25 OPCs (compared to costs under contracts with options) could amount to roughly $1 billion. CRS also estimates that acquiring the first nine ships in the OPC program under the current contract with options could forego roughly $350 million of the $1 billion in potential savings.

One potential option for the subcommittee would be to look into the possibility of having the Coast Guard either convert the current OPC contract at an early juncture into a block buy contract with EOQ authority, or, if conversion is not possible, replace the current contract at an early juncture with a block buy contract with EOQ authority. Replacing the current contract with a block buy contract might require recompeting the program, which would require effort on the Coast Guard's part and could create business risk for Eastern Shipbuilding Group, the shipbuilder that holds the current contract. On the other hand, the cost to the Coast Guard of recompeting the program would arguably be small relative to a potential additional savings of perhaps $300 million, and Eastern arguably would have a learning curve advantage in any new competition by virtue of its experience in building the first OPC.

The current procurement profile for the OPC, which reaches a maximum projected annual rate of two ships per year, would deliver OPCs many years after the end of the originally planned service lives of the medium-endurance cutters that they are to replace. Coast Guard officials have testified that the service plans to extend the service lives of the medium-endurance cutters until they are replaced by OPCs. There will be maintenance and repair expenses associated with extending the service lives of medium-endurance cutters, and if the Coast Guard does not also make investments to increase the capabilities of these ships, the ships may have less capability in certain regards than OPCs.

One possible option for addressing this situation would be to increase the maximum annual OPC procurement rate from the currently planned two ships per year to three or four ships per year. Doing this could result in the 25 th OPC being delivered about four years or six years sooner, respectively, than under the currently planned maximum rate. Increasing the OPC procurement rate to three or four ships per year would require a substantial increase to the Coast Guard's Procurement, Construction, and Improvements (PC&I) account, an issue discussed in Appendix B .

Increasing the maximum procurement rate for the OPC program could, depending on the exact approach taken, reduce OPC unit acquisition costs due to improved production economies of scale. Doubling the rate for producing a given OPC design to four ships per year, for example, could reduce unit procurement costs for that design by as much as 10%, which could result in hundreds of millions of dollars in additional savings in acquisition costs for the program. Increasing the maximum annual procurement rate could also create new opportunities for using competition in the OPC program. Notional alternative approaches for increasing the OPC procurement rate to three or four ships per year include but are not necessarily limited to the following:

increasing the production rate to three or four ships per year at Eastern Shipbuilding—an option that would depend on Eastern Shipbuilding's production capacity; introducing a second shipyard to build Eastern's design for the OPC; introducing a second shipyard (such as one of the other two OPC program finalists) to build its own design for the OPC—an option that would result in two OPC classes; or building additional NSCs in the place of some of the OPCs—an option that might include descoping equipment on those NSCs where possible to reduce their acquisition cost and make their capabilities more like that of the OPC. Such an approach would be broadly similar to how the Navy is using a descoped version of the San Antonio (LPD-17) class amphibious ship as the basis for its LPD-17 Flight II (LPD-30) class amphibious ships.

Impact of Hurricane Michael on OPC Program at Eastern Shipbuilding

Another potential issue for Congress concerns the impact of Hurricane Michael on Eastern Shipbuilding of Panama City, FL, the shipyard that is to build the first nine OPCs. A May 22, 2019, press report states:

A Category 5 hurricane that battered Florida's panhandle region last fall, including shipbuilder Eastern Shipbuilding Group, will impact the new medium-endurance cutter ship the company is building for the Coast Guard but at the moment it's unclear what the effects will be on cost and schedule, Coast Guard Commandant Adm. Karl Schultz said on Tuesday [May 21].

Eastern Shipbuilding's analysis of Hurricane Michael's impact on the Offshore Patrol Cutter (OPC) is due to the Coast Guard by May 31, and from there the service expects to have an understanding on the way forward with the program before the end of June, Schultz said in response to questions from Rep. Garret Graves (R-La.), during a hearing hosted by the House Transportation and Infrastructure Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation Subcommittee. He said Eastern Shipbuilding will provide "perspectives" on the cost and schedule and any other impacts.

"It's safe to say that we understand the impacts of a Category 5 hurricane on Eastern Shipbuilding Group will have an impact on the OPC program," Shultz said. He expects there to be some "puts and takes" after Eastern Shipbuilding submits its analysis.

Rep. Peter DeFazio (D-Ore.), citing a press report earlier in the hearing, said that Sen. Marco Rubio (R-Fla.) has inserted language in a draft disaster assistance bill allowing the Coast Guard and Eastern Shipbuilding to renegotiate the firm fixed-price contract the shipbuilder is working under for the OPC to account for damage to shore side facilities from Hurricane Michael and increased labor costs.

DeFazio said he is skeptical of the company's claim, noting, "I'm pretty sure they had insurance," and adding that "I question whether or not this has something to do with their original bid, which some thought was low." He also said he has concerns that a former Coast Guard Commandant that works for Eastern Shipbuilding has said he'll have authority to negotiate with his former service.

Retired Adm. Robert Papp, the 24th commandant of the Coast Guard, runs Eastern Shipbuilding's Washington, D.C., operations.

Eastern Shipbuilding did not respond to a query from Defense Daily about impacts to the OPC program from Hurricane Michael and any relief it may need from the current contract.

Schultz said that the OPC contract can't be renegotiated without legislative authorities from Congress. He said the Coast Guard, in response to an "ask" from Congress, provided language to help with drafting the proposed legislation related to the OPC in the disaster bill.

Schultz also said that the Coast Guard is not involved in Eastern Shipbuilding's lobbying efforts with Congress.

As the Senate continues to negotiate the particulars of the supplemental disaster relief bill that seems poised to go to a vote next week, a new provision to save something many likely didn't know was at risk has been added.

A new line in the draft bill will let Eastern Shipbuilding Group renegotiate its contract with the U.S. Coast Guard to build up to 25 new off-shore patrol cutters.

"Under the old contract we were prohibited from negotiating for additional money for increased costs," said Admiral Bob Papp, President of Washington Operations for Eastern.

That meant that after Hurricane Michael, they would be unable to negotiate with the Coast Guard to help cover a slew of new costs associated with both the project and the hurricane, such as the damage from the Category 5 storm that needed repairs, the prolonged schedule and the "skyrocketing" costs of labor, Papp said. The contract—the largest in the Coast Guard's history at more than $10 billion—didn't account for a natural disaster.

It was going to be hard, Papp said, for Eastern to complete the project and to "stay healthy" without some negotiations. At stake in the community are 900 planned jobs and up to 5,000 indirect jobs officials believe will help jump-start the region's manufacturing economy.

But an official in Sen. Marco Rubio's office said the latest version of the supplemental disaster relief bill now includes a provision that will allow negotiations.

Rubio, according to the official, spoke with the President Donald Trump on Air Force One following the president's rally in Panama City Beach last week, helping to secure the language that made it into the bill.

"We've waited far too long (for disaster relief), and we're also involved in some Florida-specific issues," Rubio said in a recent video. "For example, the Hurricane had an impact on a very important Coast Guard project that's in Northwest Florida and we want to make sure that project stays on target and continues to feed jobs because Northwest Florida desperately needs those jobs to recover. We're very hopeful. Cautiously optimistic, that next week can be a very good week."

Papp thanked the area's congressional delegation for stepping up to advocate for this project, saying the company is "honored and delighted" to receive help.

A January 28, 2019, press release from Eastern Shipbuilding stated:

Panama City, FL, Eastern Shipbuilding Group [ESG] reports that steel cutting for the first offshore patrol cutter (OPC), Coast Guard Cutter ARGUS (WMSM-915), commenced on January 7, 2019 at Eastern's facilities. ESG successfully achieved this milestone even with sustaining damage and work interruption due to Hurricane Michael. The cutting of steel will start the fabrication and assembly of the cutter's hull, and ESG is to complete keel laying of ARGUS later this year. Additionally, ESG completed the placement of orders for all long lead time materials for OPC #2, Coast Guard Cutter CHASE (WMSM-916).

Eastern's President Mr. Joey D'Isernia noted the following: "Today represents a monumental day and reflects the dedication of our workforce - the ability to overcome and perform even under the most strenuous circumstances and impacts of Hurricane Michael. ESG families have been dramatically impacted by the storm, and we continue to recover and help rebuild our shipyard and community. I cannot overstate enough how appreciative we are of all of our subcontractors and vendors contributions to our families during the recovery as well as the support we have received from our community partners. Hurricane Michael may have left its marks but it only strengthened our resolve to build the most sophisticated, highly capable national assets for the Coast Guard. Today's success is just the beginning of the construction of the OPCs at ESG by our dedicated team of shipbuilders and subcontractors for our customer and partner, the United States Coast Guard. We are excited for what will be a great 2019 for Eastern Shipbuilding Group and Bay County, Florida."

A November 1, 2018, statement from Eastern Shipbuilding states that the firm

resumed operations at both of its two main shipbuilding facilities just two weeks after Hurricane Michael devastated Panama City Florida and the surrounding communities….

… the majority of ESG's [Eastern Shipbuilding Group's] workforce has returned to work very quickly despite the damage caused by the storm. "Our employees are a resourceful and resilient group of individuals with the drive to succeed in the face of adversity. This has certainly been proven by their ability to bounce back over the two weeks following the storm. Our employees have returned to work much faster than anticipated and brought with them an unbreakable spirit, that I believe sets this shipyard and our community apart" said [Eastern Shipbuilding] President Joey D'Isernia. "Today, our staffing levels exceed 80% of our pre-Hurricane Michael levels and is rising daily."

Immediately following the storm, ESG set out on an aggressive initiative to locate all of its employees and help get them back on the job as soon as practical after they took necessary time to secure the safety and security of their family and home. Together with its network of friends, partners, and customers in the maritime community, ESG organized daily distribution of meals and goods to employees in need. Additionally, ESG created an interest free deferred payback loan program for those employees in need and has organized Go Fund Me account to help those employees hardest hit by the storm. ESG also knew temporary housing was going to be a necessity in the short term and immediately built a small community located on greenfield space near its facilities for those employees with temporary housing needs.

ESG has worked closely with its federal, state and commercial partners over the past two weeks to provide updates on the shipyard as well as on projects currently under construction. Power was restored to ESG's Nelson Facility on 10-21-18 and at ESG's Allanton Facility on 10-24-18 and production of vessels under contract is ramping back up. Additionally, all of the ESG personnel currently working on the US Coast Guard's Offshore Patrol Cutter contract have returned to work….

"We are grateful to our partners and the maritime business community as a whole for their support and confidence during the aftermath of this historic storm. Seeing our incredible employees get back to building ships last week was an inspiration," said D'Isernia. "While there is no doubt that the effects of Hurricane Michael will linger with our community for years to come, I can say without reservation that we are open for business and excited about delivering quality vessels to our loyal customers."

An October 22, 2018, press report states the following:

U.S. Coast Guard officials and Eastern Shipbuilding Group are still assessing the damage caused by deadly category 4 Hurricane Michael to the Panama City, Fla.-based yard contracted to build the new class of Offshore Patrol Cutters.

On September 28, the Coast Guard awarded Eastern Shipbuilding a contract to build the future USCGC Argus (WMSM-915), the first offshore patrol cutter (OPC). The yard was also set to build a second OPC, the future USCGC Chase (WMSM-916). Eastern Shipbuilding's contract is for nine OPCs, with options for two additional cutters. Ultimately, the Coast Guard plans to buy 25 OPCs.

However, just as the yard was preparing to build Argus , Hurricane Michael struck the Florida Panhandle near Panama City on October 10. Workers from the shipyard and Coast Guard project managers evacuated and are just now returning to assess damage to the yard facilities, Brian Olexy, communications manager for the Coast Guard's Acquisitions Directorate, told USNI News.

"Right now we haven't made any decisions yet on shifts in schedule," Olexy said….

Since the yard was just the beginning stages of building Argus , Olexy said the hull wasn't damaged. "No steel had been cut," he said.

Eastern Shipbuilding is still in the process of assessing damage to the yard and trying to reach its workforce. Many employees evacuated the area and have not returned, or are in the area but lost their homes, Eastern Shipbuilding spokesman Justin Smith told USNI News.

At first, about 200 workers returned to work, but by week's end about 500 were at the yard, Smith said. The company is providing meals, water, and ice for its workforce.

"Although we were significantly impacted by this catastrophic weather event, we are making great strides each day thanks to the strength and resiliency of our employees," Joey D'Isernia, president of Eastern Shipbuilding, said in a statement.

Planned NSC, OPC, and FRC Procurement Quantities

Another issue for Congress concerns the Coast Guard's planned NSC, OPC, and FRC procurement quantities. The POR's planned force of 91 NSCs, OPCs, and FRCs is about equal in number to the Coast Guard's legacy force of 90 high-endurance cutters, medium-endurance cutters, and 110-foot patrol craft. NSCs, OPCs, and FRCs, moreover, are to be individually more capable than the older ships they are to replace. Even so, Coast Guard studies have concluded that the planned total of 91 NSCs, OPCs, and FRCs would provide 61% of the cutters that would be needed to fully perform the service's statutory missions in coming years, in part because Coast Guard mission demands are expected to be greater in coming years than they were in the past. For further discussion of this issue, about which CRS has testified and reported on since 2005, see Appendix A .

Summary of Appropriations Action on FY2020 Acquisition Funding Request

Table 2 summarizes appropriations action on the Coast Guard's request for FY2020 acquisition funding for the NSC, OPC, and FRC programs.

Appendix A. Planned NSC, OPC, and FRC Procurement Quantities

This appendix provides further discussion on the issue of the Coast Guard's planned NSC, OPC, and FRC procurement quantities.

The Coast Guard's program of record for NSCs, OPCs, and FRCs includes only about 61% as many cutters as the Coast Guard calculated in 2011 would be needed to fully perform its projected future missions. The Coast Guard's planned force levels for NSCs, OPCs, and FRCs have remained unchanged since 2004. In contrast, the Navy since 2004 has adjusted its ship force-level goals eight times in response to changing strategic and budgetary circumstances.

Although the Coast Guard's strategic situation and resulting mission demands may not have changed as much as the Navy's have since 2004, the Coast Guard's budgetary circumstances may have changed since 2004. The 2004 program of record was heavily conditioned by Coast Guard expectations in 2004 about future funding levels in the PC&I account. Those expectations may now be different, as suggested by the willingness of Coast Guard officials in 2017 to begin regularly mentioning the need for an PC&I funding level of $2 billion per year (see Appendix B ).

It can also be noted that continuing to, in effect, use the Coast Guard's 2004 expectations of future funding levels for the PC&I account as an implicit constraint on planned force levels for NSCs, OPCs, and FRCs can encourage an artificially narrow view of Congress's options regarding future Coast Guard force levels and associated funding levels, depriving Congress of agency in the exercise of its constitutional power to provide for the common defense and general welfare of the United States, and to set funding levels and determine the composition of federal spending.

The Coast Guard estimated in 2009 that with the POR's planned force of 91 NSCs, OPCs, and FRCs, the service would have capability or capacity gaps in 6 of its 11 statutory missions—search and rescue (SAR); defense readiness; counterdrug operations; ports, waterways, and coastal security (PWCS); protection of living marine resources (LMR); and alien migrant interdiction operations (AMIO). The Coast Guard judges that some of these gaps would be "high risk" or "very high risk."

Public discussions of the POR frequently mention the substantial improvement that the POR force would represent over the legacy force. Only rarely, however, have these discussions explicitly acknowledged the extent to which the POR force would nevertheless be smaller in number than the force that would be required, by Coast Guard estimate, to fully perform the Coast Guard's statutory missions in coming years. Discussions that focus on the POR's improvement over the legacy force while omitting mention of the considerably larger number of cutters that would be required, by Coast Guard estimate, to fully perform the Coast Guard's statutory missions in coming years could encourage audiences to conclude, contrary to Coast Guard estimates, that the POR's planned force of 91 cutters would be capable of fully performing the Coast Guard's statutory missions in coming years.

In a study completed in December 2009 called the Fleet Mix Analysis (FMA) Phase 1, the Coast Guard calculated the size of the force that in its view would be needed to fully perform the service's statutory missions in coming years. The study refers to this larger force as the objective fleet mix. Table A-1 compares planned numbers of NSCs, OPCs, and FRCs in the POR to those in the objective fleet mix.

As can be seen in Table A-1 , the objective fleet mix includes 66 additional cutters, or about 73% more cutters than in the POR. Stated the other way around, the POR includes about 58% as many cutters as the 2009 FMA Phase I objective fleet mix.

As intermediate steps between the POR force and the objective fleet mix, FMA Phase 1 calculated three additional forces, called FMA-1, FMA-2, and FMA-3. (The objective fleet mix was then relabeled FMA-4.) Table A-2 compares the POR to FMAs 1 through 4.

FMA-1 was calculated to address the mission gaps that the Coast Guard judged to be "very high risk." FMA-2 was calculated to address both those gaps and additional gaps that the Coast Guard judged to be "high risk." FMA-3 was calculated to address all those gaps, plus gaps that the Coast Guard judged to be "medium risk." FMA-4—the objective fleet mix—was calculated to address all the foregoing gaps, plus the remaining gaps, which the Coast Guard judge to be "low risk" or "very low risk." Table A-3 shows the POR and FMAs 1 through 4 in terms of their mission performance gaps.

Figure A-1 , taken from FMA Phase 1, depicts the overall mission capability/performance gap situation in graphic form. It appears to be conceptual rather than drawn to precise scale. The black line descending toward 0 by the year 2027 shows the declining capability and performance of the Coast Guard's legacy assets as they gradually age out of the force. The purple line branching up from the black line shows the added capability from ships and aircraft to be procured under the POR, including the 91 planned NSCs, OPCs, and FRCs. The level of capability to be provided when the POR force is fully in place is the green line, labeled "2005 Mission Needs Statement." As can be seen in the graph, this level of capability is substantially below a projection of Coast Guard mission demands made after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 (the red line, labeled "Post-9/11 CG Mission Demands"), and even further below a Coast Guard projection of future mission demands (the top dashed line, labeled "Future Mission Demands"). The dashed blue lines show future capability levels that would result from reducing planned procurement quantities in the POR or executing the POR over a longer time period than originally planned.

FMA Phase 1 was a fiscally unconstrained study, meaning that the larger force mixes shown in Table A-2 were calculated primarily on the basis of their capability for performing missions, rather than their potential acquisition or life-cycle operation and support (O&S) costs.

Although the FMA Phase 1 was completed in December 2009, the figures shown in Table A-2 were generally not included in public discussions of the Coast Guard's future force structure needs until April 2011, when GAO presented them in testimony. GAO again presented them in a July 2011 report.

The Coast Guard completed a follow-on study, called Fleet Mix Analysis (FMA) Phase 2, in May 2011. Among other things, FMA Phase 2 includes a revised and updated objective fleet mix called the refined objective mix. Table A-4 compares the POR to the objective fleet mix from FMA Phase 1 and the refined objective mix from FMA Phase 2.

As can be seen in Table A-4 , compared to the objective fleet mix from FMA Phase 1, the refined objective mix from FMA Phase 2 includes 49 OPCs rather than 57. The refined objective mix includes 58 additional cutters, or about 64% more cutters than in the POR. Stated the other way around, the POR includes about 61% as many cutters as the refined objective mix.

Compared to the POR, the larger force mixes shown in Table A-2 and Table A-4 would be more expensive to procure, operate, and support than the POR force. Using the average NSC, OPC, and FRC procurement cost figures presented earlier (see " Background "), procuring the 58 additional cutters in the Refined Objective Mix from FMA Phase 2 might cost an additional $10.7 billion, of which most (about $7.8 billion) would be for the 24 additional FRCs. (The actual cost would depend on numerous factors, such as annual procurement rates.) O&S costs for these 58 additional cutters over their life cycles (including crew costs and periodic ship maintenance costs) would require billions of additional dollars.

The larger force mixes in the FMA Phase 1 and 2 studies, moreover, include not only increased numbers of cutters, but also increased numbers of Coast Guard aircraft. In the FMA Phase 1 study, for example, the objective fleet mix included 479 aircraft—93% more than the 248 aircraft in the POR mix. Stated the other way around, the POR includes about 52% as many aircraft as the objective fleet mix. A decision to procure larger numbers of cutters like those shown in Table A-2 and Table A-4 might thus also imply a decision to procure, operate, and support larger numbers of Coast Guard aircraft, which would require billions of additional dollars. The FMA Phase 1 study estimated the procurement cost of the objective fleet mix of 157 cutters and 479 aircraft at $61 billion to $67 billion in constant FY2009 dollars, or about 66% more than the procurement cost of $37 billion to $40 billion in constant FY2009 dollars estimated for the POR mix of 91 cutters and 248 aircraft. The study estimated the total ownership cost (i.e., procurement plus life-cycle O&S cost) of the objective fleet mix of cutters and aircraft at $201 billion to $208 billion in constant FY2009 dollars, or about 53% more than the total ownership cost of $132 billion to $136 billion in constant FY2009 dollars estimated for POR mix of cutters and aircraft.

A December 7, 2015, press report states the following:

The Coast Guard's No. 2 officer said the small size and advanced age of its fleet is limiting the service's ability to carry out crucial missions in the Arctic and drug transit zones or to meet rising calls for presence in the volatile South China Sea.

"The lack of surface vessels every day just breaks my heart," VADM Charles Michel, the Coast Guard's vice commandant, said Dec. 7.

Addressing a forum on American Sea Power sponsored by the U.S. Naval Institute at the Newseum, Michel detailed the problems the Coast Guard faces in trying to carry out its missions of national security, law enforcement and maritime safety because of a lack of resources.

"That's why you hear me clamoring for recapitalization," he said.

Michel noted that China's coast guard has a lot more ships than the U.S. Coast Guard has, including many that are larger than the biggest U.S. cutter, the 1,800-ton [sic:4,800-ton] National Security Cutter. China is using those white-painted vessels rather than "gray-hull navy" ships to enforce its claims to vast areas of the South China Sea, including reefs and shoals claimed by other nations, he said.

That is a statement that the disputed areas are "so much our territory, we don't need the navy. That's an absolutely masterful use of the coast guard," he said.

The superior numbers of Chinese coast guard vessels and its plans to build more is something, "we have to consider when looking at what we can do in the South China Sea," Michel said.

Although they have received requests from the U.S. commanders in the region for U.S. Coast Guard cutters in the South China Sea, "the commandant had to say 'no'. There's not enough to go around," he said.

Potential oversight questions for Congress include the following:

Under the POR force mix, how large a performance gap, precisely, would there be in each of the missions shown in Table A-3 ? What impact would these performance gaps have on public safety, national security, and protection of living marine resources? How sensitive are these performance gaps to the way in which the Coast Guard translates its statutory missions into more precise statements of required mission performance? Given the performance gaps shown in Table A-3 , should planned numbers of Coast Guard cutters and aircraft be increased, or should the Coast Guard's statutory missions be reduced, or both? How much larger would the performance gaps in Table A-3 be if planned numbers of Coast Guard cutters and aircraft are reduced below the POR figures? Has the executive branch made sufficiently clear to Congress the difference between the number of ships and aircraft in the POR force and the number that would be needed to fully perform the Coast Guard's statutory missions in coming years? Why has public discussion of the POR focused mostly on the capability improvement it would produce over the legacy force and rarely on the performance gaps it would have in the missions shown in Table A-3 ?

Appendix B. Funding Levels in PC&I Account

This appendix provides background information on funding levels in the Coast Guard's Procurement, Construction, and Improvements (PC&I) account.

As shown in Table B-1 , the FY2013 budget submission programmed an average of about $1.5 billion per year in the PC&I account. As also shown in the table, the FY2014-FY2016 budget submissions reduced that figure to between $1 billion and $1.2 billion per year.

The Coast Guard has testified that funding the PC&I account at a level of about $1 billion to $1.2 billion per year would make it difficult to fund various Coast Guard acquisition projects, including a new polar icebreaker and improvements to Coast Guard shore installations. Coast Guard plans call for procuring OPCs at an eventual rate of two per year. If each OPC costs roughly $400 million, procuring two OPCs per year in an PC&I account of about $1 billion to $1.2 billion per year, as programmed under the FY2014-FY2016 budget submissions, would leave about $200 million to $400 million per year for all other PC&I-funded programs.

Since 2017, Coast Guard officials have been stating more regularly what they stated only infrequently in earlier years: that executing the Coast Guard's various acquisition programs fully and on a timely basis would require the PC&I account to be funded in coming years at a level of about $2 billion per year. Statements from Coast Guard officials on this issue in past years have sometimes put this figure as high as about $2.5 billion per year.

Using Past PC&I Funding Levels as a Guide for Future PC&I Funding Levels

In assessing future funding levels for executive branch agencies, a common practice is to assume or predict that the figure in coming years will likely be close to where it has been in previous years. While this method can be of analytical and planning value, for an agency like the Coast Guard, which goes through periods with less acquisition of major platforms and periods with more acquisition of major platforms, this approach might not always be the best approach, at least for the PC&I account.

More important, in relation to maintaining Congress's status as a co-equal branch of government, including the preservation and use of congressional powers and prerogatives, an analysis that assumes or predicts that future funding levels will resemble past funding levels can encourage an artificially narrow view of congressional options regarding future funding levels, depriving Congress of agency in the exercise of its constitutional power to set funding levels and determine the composition of federal spending.

Past Coast Guard Statements About Required PC&I Funding Level

At an October 4, 2011, hearing on the Coast Guard's major acquisition programs before the Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation subcommittee of the House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee, the following exchange occurred:

Can you give us your take on what percentage of value must be invested each year to maintain current levels of effort and to allow the Coast Guard to fully carry out its missions?

ADMIRAL ROBERT J. PAPP, COMMANDANT OF THE COAST GUARD:

I think I can, Mr. Chairman. Actually, in discussions and looking at our budget—and I'll give you rough numbers here, what we do now is we have to live within the constraints that we've been averaging about $1.4 billion in acquisition money each year.

If you look at our complete portfolio, the things that we'd like to do, when you look at the shore infrastructure that needs to be taken care of, when you look at renovating our smaller icebreakers and other ships and aircraft that we have, we've done some rough estimates that it would really take close to about $2.5 billion a year, if we were to do all the things that we would like to do to sustain our capital plant.

So I'm just like any other head of any other agency here, as that the end of the day, we're given a top line and we have to make choices and tradeoffs and basically, my tradeoffs boil down to sustaining frontline operations balancing that, we're trying to recapitalize the Coast Guard and there's where the break is and where we have to define our spending.

An April 18, 2012, blog entry stated the following:

If the Coast Guard capital expenditure budget remains unchanged at less than $1.5 billion annually in the coming years, it will result in a service in possession of only 70 percent of the assets it possesses today, said Coast Guard Rear Adm. Mark Butt.

Butt, who spoke April 17 [2012] at [a] panel [discussion] during the Navy League Sea Air Space conference in National Harbor, Md., echoed Coast Guard Commandant Robert Papp in stating that the service really needs around $2.5 billion annually for procurement.

At a May 9, 2012, hearing on the Coast Guard's proposed FY2013 budget before the Homeland Security subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations Committee, Admiral Papp testified, "I've gone on record saying that I think the Coast Guard needs closer to $2 billion dollars a year [in acquisition funding] to recapitalize—[to] do proper recapitalization."

At a May 14, 2013, hearing on the Coast Guard's proposed FY2014 budget before the Homeland Security Subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations Committee, Admiral Papp stated the following regarding the difference between having about $1.0 billion per year rather than about $1.5 billion per year in the PC&I account:

Well, Madam Chairman, $500 million—a half a billion dollars—is real money for the Coast Guard. So, clearly, we had $1.5 billion in the [FY]13 budget. It doesn't get everything I would like, but it—it gave us a good start, and it sustained a number of projects that are very important to us.

When we go down to the $1 billion level this year, it gets my highest priorities in there, but we have to either terminate or reduce to minimum order quantities for all the other projects that we have going.

If we're going to stay with our program of record, things that have been documented that we need for our service, we're going to have to just stretch everything out to the right. And when we do that, you cannot order in economic order quantities. It defers the purchase. Ship builders, aircraft companies—they have to figure in their costs, and it inevitably raises the cost when you're ordering them in smaller quantities and pushing it off to the right.

Plus, it almost creates a death spiral for the Coast Guard because we are forced to sustain older assets—older ships and older aircraft—which ultimately cost us more money, so it eats into our operating funds, as well, as we try to sustain these older things.

So, we'll do the best we can within the budget. And the president and the secretary have addressed my highest priorities, and we'll just continue to go on the—on an annual basis seeing what we can wedge into the budget to keep the other projects going.

At a March 12, 2014, hearing on the Coast Guard's proposed FY2015 budget before the Homeland Security subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee, Admiral Papp stated the following:

Well, that's what we've been struggling with, as we deal with the five-year plan, the capital investment plan, is showing how we are able to do that. And it will be a challenge, particularly if it sticks at around $1 billion [per year]. As I've said publicly, and actually, I said we could probably—I've stated publicly before that we could probably construct comfortably at about 1.5 billion [dollars] a year. But if we were to take care of all the Coast Guard's projects that are out there, including shore infrastructure that that fleet that takes care of the Yemen [sic: inland] waters is approaching 50 years of age, as well, but I have no replacement plan in sight for them because we simply can't afford it. Plus, we need at some point to build a polar icebreaker. Darn tough to do all that stuff when you're pushing down closer to 1 billion [dollars per year], instead of 2 billion [dollars per year].

As I said, we could fit most of that in at about the 1.5 billion [dollars per year] level, but the projections don't call for that. So we are scrubbing the numbers as best we can.

At a March 24, 2015, hearing on the Coast Guard's proposed FY2016 budget before the Homeland Security subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee, Admiral Paul Zukunft, Admiral Papp's successor as Commandant of the Coast Guard, stated the following:

I look back to better years in our acquisition budget when we had a—an acquisition budget of—of $1.5 billion. That allows me to move these programs along at a much more rapid pace and, the quicker I can build these at full-rate production, the less cost it is in the long run as well. But there's an urgent need for me to be able to deliver these platforms in a timely and also in an affordable manner. But to at least have a reliable and a predictable acquisition budget would make our work in the Coast Guard much easier. But when we see variances of—of 30, 40% over a period of three or four years, and not knowing what the Budget Control Act may have in store for us going on, yes, we are treading water now but any further reductions, and now I am—I am beyond asking for help. We are taking on water.

An April 13, 2017, press report states the following (emphasis added):

Coast Guard Commandant Adm. Paul Zukunft on Wednesday [April 12] said that for the Coast Guard to sustain its recapitalization plans and operations the service needs a $2 billion annual acquisition budget that grows modestly overtime to keep pace with inflation.

The Coast Guard needs a "predictable, reliable" acquisition budget "and within that we need 5 percent annual growth to our operations and maintenance (O&M) accounts," Zukunft told reporters at a Defense Writers Group breakfast. Inflation will clip 2 to 3 percent from that, but "at 5 percent or so it puts you on a moderate but positive glide slope so you can execute, so you can build the force," he said.

In an interview published on June 1, 2017, Zukunft said the following (emphasis added):

We cannot be more relevant than we are now. But what we need is predictable funding. We have been in over 16 continuing resolutions since 2010. I need stable and repeatable funding. An acquisition budget with a floor of $2 billion. Our operating expenses as I said, they've been funded below the Budget Control Act floor for the past five years. I need 5 percent annualized growth over the next five years and beyond to start growing some of this capability back.

But more importantly, we [need] more predictable, more reliable funding so we can execute what we need to do to carry out the business of the world's best Coast Guard.

Appendix C. Additional Information on Status and Execution of NSC, OPC, and FRC Programs from May 2018 GAO Report

This appendix presents additional information on the status and execution of the NSC, OPC, and FRC programs from a May 2018 GAO report reviewing DHS acquisition programs.

Regarding the NSC program, the May 2018 GAO report states the following:

DHS's Under Secretary for Management (USM) directed the USCG to complete follow-on operational test and evaluation (OT&E) by March 2019. According to USCG officials, the program's OTA began follow-on OT&E in October 2017, which will test unmet key performance parameters (KPP) and address deficiencies found during prior testing. The NSC completed initial operational testing in 2014, but did not fully demonstrate 7 of its 19 KPPs, including those related to unmanned aircraft and cutter-boat deployment in rough seas. According to USCG officials, operators have since demonstrated these KPPs during USCG operations. For example, USCG officials stated that they successfully demonstrated operations of a prototype unmanned aircraft on an NSC. However, the USCG will not evaluate the NSC's unmanned aircraft KPP until the unmanned aircraft undergoes initial OT&E, currently planned for June 2019. In addition, the NSC will be the first USCG asset to undergo cybersecurity testing. However, this test has been delayed over a year with the final cyber test event scheduled for August 2018 because of a change in NSC operational schedules, among other things.

The DHS USM also directed the USCG to complete a study to determine the root cause of the NSC's propulsion system issues by December 2017; however, as of January 2018, the study was not yet complete. GAO previously reported on these issues—including high engine temperatures, cracked cylinder heads, and overheating generator bearings that were impacting missions—in January 2016....

The USCG initially planned to implement a crew rotational concept in which crews would rotate while NSCs were underway to achieve a goal of 230 days away from the cutter's homeport. In February 2018, USCG officials told GAO they abandoned the crew rotational concept because the concept did not provide the USCG with the expected return on investment. Instead, USCG officials said a new plan has been implemented that does not rotate crew and is anticipated to increase the days away from home port from the current capability of 185 days to 200 days.

Regarding the OPC program, the May 2018 GAO report states the following:

DHS approved six key performance parameters (KPP) for the OPC related to the ship's operating range and duration, crew size, interoperability and maneuverability, and ability to support operations in moderate to rough seas. The first OPC has not yet been constructed, so the USCG has not yet demonstrated whether it can meet these KPPs. The USCG plans to use engineering reviews, and developmental and operational tests throughout the acquisition to measure the OPC's performance.

USCG officials told GAO that the program completed an early operational assessment on the basic ship design in August 2017, which entailed a review of the current design plans. The program plans to refine the ship's design as needed based on preliminary test results. However, as of December 2017, USCG officials had not received the results of this assessment.

The USCG plans to conduct initial operational test and evaluation (OT&E) on the first OPC in fiscal year 2023. However, the test results from initial OT&E will not be available to inform key decisions. For example, the results will not be available to inform the decision to build 2 OPCs per year—which USCG officials said is scheduled to begin in fiscal year 2021. Without test results to inform these key decisions, the USCG must make substantial commitments prior to knowing how well the ship will meet its requirements....

The USCG is in the process of completing the design of the OPC before starting construction, which is in-line with GAO shipbuilding best practices. In addition, USCG officials stated that the program is using state-of-the-market technology that has been proven on other ships as opposed to state-of-the-art technology, which lowers the risk of the program.

Regarding the FRC program, the May 2018 GAO report states the following:

In February 2017, DHS's Director, Office of Test and Evaluation (DOT&E) assessed the results from the program's July 2016 follow-on operational test and evaluation (OT&E) and determined that

• the program met its six key performance parameters, and

• the FRC was operationally effective and suitable.

During follow-on OT&E, the OTA found that several deficiencies from the program's initial OT&E had been corrected. For example, the OTA closed a severe deficiency related to the engines based on modifications to the FRC's main diesel engines. However, five major deficiencies remain. According to USCG officials, the remaining deficiencies are related to ergonomics (e.g., improving the working environment for operators) and issues with stowage space. USCG officials stated that they plan to resolve the remaining deficiencies by fiscal year 2020.

DOT&E noted that these deficiencies do not prevent mission completion or present a danger to personnel, but recommended that they be resolved as soon as possible. USCG officials indicated that they plan to resolve the remaining deficiencies through engineering or other changes....

The USCG continues to work with the contractor—Bollinger Shipyards, LLC—to address issues covered by the warranty and acceptance clauses for each ship. For example, 18 engines—9 operational engines and 9 spare engines—have been replaced under the program's warranty. According to USCG documentation, 65 percent of the current issues with the engines have been resolved through retrofits; however, additional problems with the engines have been identified since our April 2017 review. For example, issues with water pump shafts are currently being examined through a root cause analysis and will be redesigned and are scheduled to undergo retrofits starting in December 2018. We previously found that the FRC's warranty resulted in improved cost and quality by requiring the shipbuilder to pay for the repair of defects. As of September 2017, USCG officials said the replacements and retrofits completed under the program's warranty allowed the USCG to avoid an estimated $104 million in potential unplanned costs—of which $63 million is related to the engines.

For a discussion of some considerations relating to warranties in shipbuilding and other acquisition programs, see Appendix D .

Appendix D. Some Considerations Relating to Warranties in Shipbuilding and Other Acquisition Programs

This appendix presents some considerations relating to warranties in shipbuilding and other defense acquisition.

In discussions of Navy and Coast Guard shipbuilding, one question that sometimes arises is whether including a warranty in a shipbuilding contract is preferable to not including one.

Including a warranty in a shipbuilding contract (or a contract for building some other kind of military end item), while potentially valuable, might not always be preferable to not including one—it depends on the circumstances of the acquisition, and it is not necessarily a valid criticism of an acquisition program to state that it is using a contract that does not include a warranty (or a weaker form of a warranty rather than a stronger one).

Including a warranty generally shifts to the contractor the risk of having to pay for fixing problems with earlier work. Although that in itself could be deemed desirable from the government's standpoint, a contractor negotiating a contract that will have a warranty will incorporate that risk into its price, and depending on how much the contractor might charge for doing that, it is possible that the government could wind up paying more in total for acquiring the item (including fixing problems with earlier work on that item) than it would have under a contract without a warranty.

When a warranty is not included in the contract and the government pays later on to fix problems with earlier work, those payments can be very visible, which can invite critical comments from observers. But that does not mean that including a warranty in the contract somehow frees the government from paying to fix problems with earlier work. In a contract that includes a warranty, the government will indeed pay something to fix problems with earlier work—but it will make the payment in the less-visible (but still very real) form of the up-front charge for including the warranty, and that charge might be more than what it would have cost the government, under a contract without a warranty, to pay later on for fixing those problems.

From a cost standpoint, including a warranty in the contract might or might not be preferable, depending on the risk that there will be problems with earlier work that need fixing, the potential cost of fixing such problems, and the cost of including the warranty in the contract. The point is that the goal of avoiding highly visible payments for fixing problems with earlier work and the goal of minimizing the cost to the government of fixing problems with earlier work are separate and different goals, and that pursuing the first goal can sometimes work against achieving the second goal.

The Department of Defense's guide on the use of warranties states the following:

Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) 46.7 states that "the use of warranties is not mandatory." However, if the benefits to be derived from the warranty are commensurate with the cost of the warranty, the CO [contracting officer] should consider placing it in the contract. In determining whether a warranty is appropriate for a specific acquisition, FAR Subpart 46.703 requires the CO to consider the nature and use of the supplies and services, the cost, the administration and enforcement, trade practices, and reduced requirements. The rationale for using a warranty should be documented in the contract file....

In determining the value of a warranty, a CBA [cost-benefit analysis] is used to measure the life cycle costs of the system with and without the warranty. A CBA is required to determine if the warranty will be cost beneficial. CBA is an economic analysis, which basically compares the Life Cycle Costs (LCC) of the system with and without the warranty to determine if warranty coverage will improve the LCCs. In general, five key factors will drive the results of the CBA: cost of the warranty + cost of warranty administration + compatibility with total program efforts + cost of overlap with Contractor support + intangible savings. Effective warranties integrate reliability, maintainability, supportability, availability, and life-cycle costs. Decision factors that must be evaluated include the state of the weapon system technology, the size of the warranted population, the likelihood that field performance requirements can be achieved, and the warranty period of performance.


Federal Data on Hate Crimes in the United States

Summary: A relatively recent series of high-profile crimes where the offenders' actions appeared to be motivated by their bias or animosity towards a particular race, ethnicity, or religion might contribute to a perception that hate crimes are on the rise in the United States. These incidents might also generate interest among policymakers about how the federal government collects data on hate crimes committed in the United States.

Summary: The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) started its Hate Crime Statistics program pursuant to the requirement in the Hate Crime Statistics Act (HSCA, P.L. 101-275 ) that the Department of Justice (DOJ) collect and report data on crimes that "manifest evidence of prejudice based on race, gender and gender identity, religion, disability, sexual orientation, or ethnicity, including where appropriate the crimes of murder, non-negligent manslaughter; forcible rape; aggravated assault, simple assault, intimidation; arson; and destruction, damage or vandalism of property." In addition to the FBI's Hate Crime Statistics program, DOJ also collects data on hate crime victimizations through the Bureau of Justice Statistics' (BJS') National Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS). The NCVS measures self-reported criminal victimizations including those perceived by victims to be motivated by an offender's bias against them for belonging to or being associated with a group largely identified by the characteristics outlined in the HSCA.

Summary: Scholars, advocates, and members of the media have pointed out that there is a significant disparity between the number of hate crimes reported by the FBI each year and the number of hate crime victimizations reported by BJS. This has led some to criticize the hate crime data published by the FBI as an undercount of the number of hate crimes committed in the United States each year. However, this statistics gap can be partially explained by the different measures and methodologies utilized by the FBI and BJS to collect these data. For example, the FBI only reports on crimes that have been reported to the police, while BJS collects reports of criminal victimizations that may or may not meet the statutory definition of a hate crime and may or may not have been reported to the police. There are a number of reasons why some victims do not report their victimization to the police, including fear of reprisal, not wanting the offender to get in trouble, believing that police would not or could not do anything to help, and believing the crime to be a personal issue or too trivial to report.

Summary: There are also several reasons why a hate crime that was reported to the police might not be subsequently reported to the FBI for their Hate Crime Statistics program. Deciding whether a crime meets the statutory definition of a hate crime requires law enforcement agencies to investigate allegations of hate crime motivations before making a final determination. Reporting by law enforcement agencies to the FBI might be hampered by the fact that some law enforcement agencies do not have the training necessary to investigate potential bias-motivated offenses effectively. In addition, differing definitions between the FBI and state statutes as to what constitutes a hate crime generate confusion as to which standard should be used to determine whether a hate crime occurred and should be reported.

Summary: In 2021, the FBI plans to transition to the National Incident Based Reporting System (NIBRS) and will no longer accept non-NIBRS compliant data from law enforcement agencies. Policymakers might have an interest in how NIBRS differs from the FBI's current hate crime reporting program and whether full participation in NIBRS might improve the quality and completeness of federal hate crime data. However, like the FBI's current crime reporting program, participation in the NIBRS program is voluntary, and policymakers might consider steps Congress could take to promote wide-scale adoption of NIBRS.

T he United States has experienced a series of high-profile violent crimes where the offenders' actions appeared to be motivated by their bias or animosity towards a particular race, ethnicity, or religion. For example, shootings at synagogues in Pittsburgh, PA, and Poway, CA; a driver speeding his car into protestors at a "Unite the Right" rally in Charlottesville, VA; a shooting at a Walmart in El Paso, TX, where the shooter allegedly said he was targeting "Mexicans" and espoused concerns about the "invasion" of the United States by immigrants; and reports of hate crimes against Asian-Americans during the Coronavirus pandemic contribute to a perception that hate crimes are on the rise in the United States. The salience of these events and how they are covered in the media might also contribute to the perception that there is a growing number of hate crimes (also known as bias crimes or bias-motivated offenses) being perpetrated in communities across the country. Policymakers might turn to hate crime data collected by the Department of Justice (DOJ) to understand if there has actually been an increase in hate crimes in the United States and, if so, the nature of the increase. Policymakers might also utilize these same data to craft a policy response to hate crimes that is grounded in the data and conduct oversight of the federal government's efforts to combat these crimes.

This report begins with an overview of federal sources of data on hate crimes. This includes a brief overview of the Hate Crime Statistics Act (HCSA, P.L. 101-275 ), which requires DOJ to collect and report data on hate crimes, and the two systems DOJ employs to collect these data: the Federal Bureau of Investigation's (FBI's) Hate Crime Statistics Program and the Bureau of Justice Statistics' (BJS') National Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS). The report then discusses two salient issues regarding hate crime statistics: the large difference between the number of hate crimes reported by the FBI and the number of hate crime victimizations reported by BJS, and concerns about law enforcement agencies underreporting hate crimes to the FBI. The report concludes with a discussion of whether the wide-scale adoption of the FBI's National Incident Based Reporting System (NIBRS) might serve as a means of improving federal hate crime data.

The HCSA requires DOJ to collect and report data on crimes that "manifest evidence of prejudice based on race, gender and gender identity, religion, disability, sexual orientation, or ethnicity, including where appropriate the crimes of murder, non-negligent manslaughter; forcible rape; aggravated assault, simple assault, intimidation; arson; and destruction, damage or vandalism of property." Congress required DOJ to collect these data because, at the time, few states collected data on hate crimes and there were no national data. Policymakers believed that national data would reveal the scope of the problem and provide a basis for more effective law enforcement efforts to address hate crimes.

Over the years since the HCSA was enacted, Congress has expanded the definition of what constitutes a hate crime for data collection purposes. The act initially required DOJ to collect data on hate crimes based on race, religion, sexual orientation, or ethnicity. In 2009, Congress amended the act to require DOJ to collect data on hate crimes based on the victims' gender or gender identity ( P.L. 111-84 ) or disability ( P.L. 103-322 ). P.L. 111-84 also required DOJ to collect and report data on hate crimes committed by and against juveniles.

The HCSA initially included a sunset provision that would have ended the requirement for DOJ to collect hate crime data after 1994. However, the Church Arson Prevention Act ( P.L. 104-155 ) removed that provision.

To meet the requirements of the HCSA and subsequent amendments, DOJ collects and reports data on hate crimes that occur in the United States through two sources: the Hate Crime Statistics program and the NCVS.

DOJ fulfills the HCSA's requirement by collecting supplemental data on hate crimes through the FBI's Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) program. The Hate Crime Statistics Program collects data about hate crime offenders' bias motivations for the set of offenses already reported to the UCR program. Under the Hate Crime Statistics Program, the victim of a hate crime can be an individual, a business, an institution, or society as a whole.

Hate Crime Statistics Program data is collected and reported to the FBI by law enforcement agencies across the country. Agency participation in the Hate Crime Statistics Program, like the UCR program, is voluntary but most agencies participate. In 2018, more than 16,100 law enforcement agencies in all 50 states and the District of Columbia participated in the Hate Crime Statistics Program. The agencies that participated represented jurisdictions that include nearly 307 million people. For a point of comparison, in 2008 there were a reported 17,985 state and local law enforcement agencies that employed at least one full-time officer or the equivalent in part-time officers.

The FBI requires law enforcement agencies to use a two-step process for investigating hate crimes before reporting them to the Hate Crime Statistics Program. In the first step, the law enforcement officer that initially responds to a potential hate crime incident is responsible for determining whether there is any indication that the offense was motivated by bias against an individual's perceived membership in one of the groups specified in the HCSA. If there is an indication of a bias motivation, the incident is designated as a suspected bias-motivated crime and forwarded to an investigator. In the second step, the investigator is responsible for reviewing the facts of the incident and making the final determination as to whether the crime meets the HCSA definition of a hate crime. According to the FBI, an agency should only report an incident as a hate crime when a law enforcement investigation reveals sufficient evidence to lead a reasonable and prudent person to conclude that the offender's actions were motivated, in whole or in part, by his or her bias.

Law enforcement agencies can submit data on single and multiple bias incidents. Single bias incidents are those in which one or more of the offenses committed during an incident are motivated by the same bias. Multiple bias incidents are those in which one or more of the offenses committed during an incident are motivated by two or more biases.

Annual hate crime data published by the FBI differs from traditional UCR crime data published by the FBI in an important way. For most crimes, the FBI estimates full-year crime data for law enforcement agencies that submit less than 12 months of data to the UCR. In contrast, hate crime data published by the FBI only includes offenses reported by the police; no estimation for missing data is done by the FBI for the Hate Crime Statistics Program.

BJS has collected data on hate crime victimizations through the NCVS since 2003. The NCVS data is collected through annual interviews with residents of a nationally representative sample of households. All people age 12 or older in the sampled households are interviewed. The NCVS collects self-reported data on non-fatal personal crime victimizations (sexual assault, robbery, aggravated and simple assaults, and personal larceny) and property crime victimizations (burglary, motor vehicle theft, and other thefts) regardless of whether the crimes were reported to the police.

The NCVS uses the same HCSA definition of a hate crime as the FBI. The NCVS collects data on crimes that victims perceive to be motivated by an offender's bias against them based on their race, gender and gender identity, religion, disability, sexual orientation, or ethnicity. Hate crime victimizations are counts of "a single victim or household that experienced a criminal incident believed by the victim to be motivated by hate." In the NCVS data, hate crime victimizations for personal crimes are counts of individual victims, while hate crime victimizations for property crimes are counts of victimized households.

In order for a victimization to be classified as a hate crime in the NCVS, the victim has to report one of three types of evidence of the offender's bias: (1) the offender used hate language, (2) the offender left hate signs or symbols at the scene, or (3) police investigators confirmed that a hate crime occurred.

Table 1 compares the methodologies of the UCR Hate Crime Statistics Program and the NCVS.

Differences in the Two National Measures of Hate Crimes

A perennial issue that can cause confusion for those unfamiliar with the FBI's and BJS's data collection goals and methodologies is the difference between the number of hate crime incidents reported by the FBI and the number of hate crime victimizations reported by BJS. For example, for 2018 (the most recent data available) the FBI reported that there were approximately 7,100 hate crime incidents that involved approximately 8,800 victims. In comparison, BJS reported that there were an estimated 198,000 hate crime victimizations in 2017.

What might explain the difference in the two national measures of hate crimes? The answer lies partially in the fact that the data reported by the FBI and BJS reflect different goals for collecting data on hate crimes. The FBI data only reflect hate crime incidents that are reported to law enforcement, and where law enforcement concludes that a hate crime has occurred and reports it to the FBI's Hate Crime Statistics Program. In contrast, the goal of the NCVS hate crime data collection effort is to estimate the total number of hate crime victimizations that occur each year, including victimizations that are not reported to law enforcement agencies (i.e., a portion of the dark figure of crime). Because the NCVS collects data on reported and unreported hate crime victimizations, its totals will always be larger than the FBI's hate crime data.

Another explanation for the difference between the two measures are the different standards needed to be met to be counted as a hate crime in the FBI's Hate Crime Statistics Program and the NCVS. For a hate crime to be counted by the FBI, law enforcement must have sufficient evidence that would lead a reasonable and prudent person to conclude that the offender's actions were motivated, in whole or in part, by his or her bias. In contrast, under the NCVS, an incident is counted as a hate crime if the victim believes that the offense was based on their race, ethnicity, religion, disability, sexual orientation, gender, or gender identity, and the offender used hate language, hate symbols, or a law enforcement investigation concluded that a hate crime had occurred. An independent investigation of the perceived bias is not necessary in every case for the NCVS interviewers to include the offense as a hate crime.

The goals and methodologies described above help explain why the NCVS estimates of hate crime victimizations are higher than the number of hate crime incidents reported by the FBI. At the same time, the FBI's Hate Crime Statistics Program collects data on a larger number of victim types and crimes that may be motivated by the offender's bias than the NCVS. For example, the FBI collects data on bias motivated homicides and vandalisms, which are not be captured by the NCVS. Law enforcement agencies can also report data on hate crimes against individuals, businesses, religious institutions, other institutions, and society as a whole to the FBI, whereas the NCVS only collects data on hate crimes against individuals (i.e., personal crimes) and households (i.e., property crimes).

Are Hate Crimes Underreported to the FBI by Law Enforcement?

A common criticism of the FBI's hate crime data is that a large proportion of participating law enforcement agencies report zero hate crimes in a given year ( zero-reporting agencies ), leading some advocacy groups to accuse the zero-reporting agencies of underreporting hate crimes. The evidence presented to support these accusations are discrepancies between hate crime figures reported by the FBI and the self-reported hate crime figures tabulated by community organizations serving the communities that are often the targets of hate crime (e.g., organizations serving the LGBTQ, Jewish, Muslim, or Arab communities).

Research suggests that some law enforcement agencies have underreported the number of hate crime incidents to the FBI. In one study, researchers reviewed a sample of assault incident reports from seven local law enforcement agencies across the country that were not classified as hate crimes to see if there was any indication that the offenses had a bias motivation. Incidents where there was a clear indication that bias was a predominant motivating factor in the assault were coded as bias- motivated , and other incidents were coded as ambiguous if there was an indication of bias but also evidence of some other identifiable triggering event or alternative motivation. The study found that for some of the incidents, there was evidence that they were motivated by the alleged perpetrator's bias, but that these misclassification errors were relatively infrequent and varied by law enforcement agency. The estimated proportion of misclassified cases for each agency ranged from zero to 8% of all assault incidents when both bias- motivated and ambiguous incidents were considered and from zero to 3% when only bias- motivated cases were considered. While the proportion of misclassified assault cases for any individual agency is relatively low, if the percentage of misclassified cases reported in this study was generalizable to the universe of all assaults, it would account for thousands of hate crimes that were not reported to the Hate Crime Statistics Program.

Another study of the accuracy of hate crime reporting utilized incident-based crime data (see discussion of expanding the National Incident Based Reporting System, below) from four local law enforcement agencies to evaluate whether hate crimes were being misclassified. This study looked at all criminal incidents, not just assaults, reported to the four agencies in 2008 and examined not only whether hate crimes were misclassified as non-bias-motivated offenses, but also whether non-bias-motivated offenses were wrongly classified as hate crimes and how these errors compared to misclassification errors for other non-hate crimes. This study found that undercounting of hate crimes was the most common misclassification error in the records they examined. The researchers noted that "extending error rates to the population suggest that the estimated number of bias crimes that go unaccounted is noticeable."

Even though the research described above did not focus on local law enforcement agencies who reported zero hate crimes, it is these agencies in particular that critics argue are likely to have underreported hate crimes. As shown in Figure 1 , the vast majority of agencies that participate in the Hate Crime Statistics Program are zero-reporting agencies, leading critics to assume that hate crimes are significantly underreported to the FBI.

In order for a law enforcement agency to be considered a "participant," it has to submit data on the number of hate crimes for at least part of the year or a letter signed by the police chief certifying that no hate crimes occurred that year in its jurisdiction. From 1996 to 2017, at least 80% of Hate Crime Statistics Program participating law enforcement agencies in any given year reported zero hate crimes. The proportion of participating law enforcement agencies that were zero-reporting agencies generally increased from 2001 to 2014. There was a slight decrease in this proportion after 2014, but in 2018 nearly 9 out of 10 participating law enforcement agencies reported zero hate crimes.

Aside from misclassification errors, there are several reasons that might explain why a law enforcement agency does not report any hate crimes in a given year. The first, and most straightforward, reason is because no hate crimes occurred. Given that law enforcement agency jurisdictions include communities with as little as a few hundred residents, it is not implausible that some residents, especially those that live in very small and homogeneous communities, did not experience any hate crimes. Second, in order for a law enforcement agency to report a hate crime to the FBI, it must be reported to the police. Data from the NCVS indicates that on average, half of hate crime victimizations were not reported to the police from 2013 to 2017. Hate crime victims might choose not to report the incident to the police for a variety of reasons, including

fear of retaliation, embarrassment that they were victimized, a belief that the crime was not motivated by the perpetrator's bias, lack of familiarity with a state's hate crime laws, distrust of law enforcement, a belief that law enforcement will not investigate the case, fear of being exposed as a member of the LGBTQ community, or fear of being re-traumatized by the criminal justice system.

Even when a hate crime is reported to state and local law enforcement, an investigation must be conducted into the perceived bias to determine if the offense was bias-motivated before reporting it to the FBI as a hate crime. This step can be challenging for law enforcement agencies, especially small agencies with relatively few resources. When there is evidence that a hate crime might have occurred, law enforcement agencies have to complete additional investigative steps to determine whether an offense meets the statutory definition of a hate crime, and in some cases law enforcement officers might not be trained sufficiently on recognizing biases in crimes to conduct such investigations. Few states provide mandatory training for law enforcement officers on investigating, identifying, and reporting hate crimes, and in the states that do, there is little oversight to confirm that law enforcement officers are receiving the training and applying it correctly.

Ambiguity in the circumstances surrounding hate crimes can also lead to an undercounting. Under the Hate Crime Statistics Program, law enforcement agencies report the number of hate crimes that were "motivated in whole or in part by bias." Law enforcement officers might have difficulty applying this standard in cases where a bias motivation might not be obvious, especially when considering hate crimes that were motivated "in part" by an offender's bias. While a cross burning on the front yard of a black family's home is an unambiguous hate crime, in other cases the motivation of the alleged perpetrators might not be so clear. These ambiguous hate crimes can be classified into two categories: response/retaliation events and target-selection events.

Response/retaliation events are those where the offense was first triggered by something other than bias, but at some point bias exacerbates the incident into a hate crime. For example, a white motorist and a black motorist get into a dispute because their cars were involved in an accident. However, after a few minutes, the white motorist assaults the black motorist while yelling racial slurs. In this case, the incident was not initiated because of the white motorist's bias against the black motorist, but the white motorist's bias eventually resulted in him assaulting the black motorist. Target-selection events are those where a target of a crime is selected because of the offender's bias against members of the group, but the offender's bias in not obvious. For example, someone might rob men leaving bars that are known to be frequented by same sex couples because the offender believes they will be less likely to report the offense because they might not want to be identified as being a member of the LGBTQ community.

In addition to issues related to law enforcement officer training on identifying hate crimes for submission to the FBI, differences in how a hate crime is defined under state law and under the HCSA can create its own ambiguities. For example, gender identity is a protected class under the HCSA, but it might not be a recognized bias motivation under a state's laws. As such, if a law enforcement officer is more familiar with the state's hate crime definition, he or she might not identify an offense based on gender-bias as a potential hate crime. As one group of researchers noted:

Even when potential bias crimes are reported to a participating agency, the agency must then recognize any indications of bias, determine whether the incident is bias motivated, document the motivation, and submit the incident to UCR. Empirical evidence suggests that the processing of bias-crime reporting across participating law enforcement agencies is variable and subject to much error and interpretation by local departments.

Improving Hate Crime Data: Considerations for Policymakers

Congress passed the HCSA with the intent of collecting national data on bias-motivated offenses that could be used to inform federal hate crime policy. While DOJ has taken steps to collect these data, the hate crime data reported by the FBI is incomplete and the NCVS self-reported hate crime victimization data likely includes incidents that would not meet the legal standard needed to be charged as hate crime. Hate crime data "missing" from the FBI's Hate Crime Statistics program results from a series of complications associated with collecting these data (e.g., victims might not report the offense to the police, law enforcement agencies might fail to correctly identify potential hate crimes, or law enforcement agencies might not routinely and systematically report hate crime data to the FBI). Policymakers may have an interest in what steps Congress could take to help improve the quality of the FBI's hate crime data. One option on the horizon might be the wide-scale adoption of the National Incident Based Reporting System (NIBRS).

The FBI is in the process of phasing out the UCR summary reporting system and having all law enforcement agencies submit data through NIBRS. The FBI reports that it will begin collecting only NIBRS-compliant data from law enforcement agencies starting on January 1, 2021. To support state and local law enforcement agencies' transitions to NIBRS, state and local governments that are not certified as NIBRS compliant have been required since FY2018 to use 3% of their award under the Edward Byrne Memorial Justice Assistance Grant (JAG) program to achieve compliance.

Compared to the UCR summary reporting system, NIBRS collects more data on a wider variety of offenses. NIBRS asks participating law enforcement agencies to collect and report incident-level data on offenders, victims, the relationship between victims and offenders, and the circumstances surrounding the incident for 52 different offenses. In comparison, the current summary reporting system is largely a tabulation of the number of eight Part I offenses reported to the police.

As a part of NIBRS, reporting agencies can identify whether an offense was motivated by an offender's bias against the victim for each reported offense. Under the Hate Crime Statistics Program, law enforcement agencies that are not currently submitting NIBRS-compliant data submit a supplemental summary report to the FBI when there is evidence that one or more crimes in their jurisdiction involved a bias motivation. It has been argued that hate crime reporting will increase as more agencies adopt NIBRS because reporting the presence or absence of bias motivations is built into NIBRS. In addition to making it easier for law enforcement agencies to report hate crimes to the FBI, NIBRS provides data on a wider variety of offenses, including those that were motivated by offenders' bias against their victims, and data on the context of hate crimes (e.g., locations where hate crimes occur, the relationship between alleged perpetrators and victims of hate crimes, whether alleged offenders are residents of the community where they committed their offenses, the weapons used in the offenses (if any), and the types and seriousness of injuries sustained by hate crime victims).

While the FBI might stop accepting crime data from non-NIBRS compliant law enforcement agencies next year, participation in the program is still voluntary. If a law enforcement agency does not believe it is worth the time and effort to adopt NIBRS and the state does not mandate that it participates in the program, there is no federal mandate or incentive for the agency to participate. Therefore, policymakers might have an interest in what steps Congress could take to promote wide-scale adoption of the program. Congress could consider placing a condition on a program such as JAG that would require law enforcement agencies to submit NIBRS data to the FBI or face a penalty under the program. However, the JAG program already provides a financial incentive to participate fully in the FBI's crime reporting program. Half of a state's allocation is based on its proportion of the average number of violent crimes reported in the United States over the past three years, and allocations for local governments are based on their proportion of the average number of violent crimes reported in the state over the past three years. The Bureau of Justice Assistance reports that NIBRS data will be used to calculate JAG awards once NIBRS replaces the summary reporting system. In addition, in order for local governments to be eligible for a direct award under the program, they have to have submitted violent crime data for 3 of the past 10 years. Yet, even with these incentives some law enforcement agencies in the United States do not participate in the UCR because compiling the data can be difficult and time consuming, and many small agencies might not have the resources needed to fully comply with the FBI's data collection and submission requirements. Thus, Congress could also consider authorizing a new grant program that would provide funding to state and local governments to cover expenses related to transitioning to NIBRS, such as purchasing new software and computers, or training officers on how to use NIBRS.

While NIBRS might provide some administrative efficiency with regard to reporting hate crimes, it does not address some of the other issues law enforcement agencies currently have with reporting hate crimes through the UCR program. Implementing NIBRS does not address hate crime victims being reluctant to report an offense to the police, the need for training for law enforcement officers on how to identify potential hate crimes, or the need to improve law enforcement agencies processes for investigating potential hate crimes, nor will it resolve differences between the HCSA and state hate crime definitions.