Teen Birth Trends: In Brief

Summary: The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), the federal government's lead public health agency, has identified teen pregnancy as a major public health issue because of its high cost for families of teenage parents and society more broadly. The CDC highlights that the teen pregnancy rate has decreased steadily, dropping below CDC's target goal of 30.3 per 1,000 females aged 15 to 17 by 2015; however, the CDC also raises the concern that the United States has one of the highest rates of teen births of all industrialized countries.

Summary: This report discusses trends in teen birth ratesâor the number of births per 1,000 females aged 15 to 19 each yearâsince the 1950s. The rate of teens births peaked in 1957 at 96.3. It then decreased in most years from the 1960s through the 1980s. From 1991 onward, the rate declined except in two years, 2006 and 2007. The greatest decline in teen birth rates has occurred in recent years. For example, from 2007 to 2018, the rate declined by approximately 58%. The 2018 teen birth rate of 17.4 was a historical low since CDC began collecting and reporting birth data in the 1940s.

Summary: In nearly each year from 1991 through the recent period, the teen birth rate decreased for all racial and ethnic groups; however, the rates declined more for certain groups than others. While the birth rates for two groups (non-Hispanic blacks and Hispanics) declined more than the rate for white teens, their birth rates remained higher overall. In 2018, Hispanic (26.7), non-Hispanic black (26.2), and non-Hispanic American Indian/Alaska Native (29.4) teens had more than double the teen birth rate for non-Hispanic white (12.2) and non-Hispanic Asian or Pacific Islander (4.0) teens.

Summary: Teen birth rates have varied considerably by state and territory. In 2018, the state with the lowest reported rate was Massachusetts (7.2); the state with the highest reported rate was Arkansas (30.4). Teen birth rates have declined in rural areas over time but remain relatively higher than rates in urban areas.

Summary: Research suggests that multiple trends have led to lower U.S. teen pregnancy and birth rates. From the 1990s through 2007, the risk of teen pregnancy decreased primarily because of improved contraceptive use, including an increase in the use of certain contraception methods (e.g., condoms), an increase in the use of multiple methods of contraception, and substantial declines in foregoing the use of contraception altogether. Some of the risk of pregnancy decreased among younger teens because of decreased sexual activity. A primary factor for more recent declines in the risk of teen pregnancy has been the increasing use of contraceptives among sexually active teens. Broad economic and social variables may influence teen behaviors, such as whether they will abstain from sex or use contraceptives.

Summary: Teen pregnancy has high costs for teen parents, their children, and society more generally. Teenage mothers and fathers tend to have less education and are more likely to live in poverty than their peers who are not parents. Moreover, lower levels of education reduce teen parents' potential for economic self-sufficiency. Some analysis has looked at these societal impacts and the benefits of avoiding pregnancy during the teen years.

Summary: This report accompanies CRS Report R45183, Teen Pregnancy: Federal Prevention Programs , which discusses Congress's current approach of supporting programs that seek to prevent pregnancy among teens; and CRS In Focus IF10877, Federal Teen Pregnancy Prevention Programs , which includes summary information about the programs.

This report provides context for Congress about the U.S. teen birth rateâor the number of births per 1,000 females aged 15 to 19 each yearâand its changes since the 1950s. Over this period, the teen birth rate has generally been in decline. This decline has been most significant in recent years, with the rate reaching a record low in 2018. Multiple factors have likely contributed to the decrease, though the influence of any single factor is not fully known. Reduced teen sexual activity, particularly among younger adolescents, could be one explanation. Increases in use of contraceptives, including highly effective and multiple methods, among sexually active teens could be another. Other factors, such as broader social and economic trends, may also be at play.

Despite the decline in the teen birth rate, Congress continues to be interested in the issue of teen birth because of its high social and economic costs for both individual families and society more generally. Further, disparities persist in teen birth rates among racial and ethnic subgroups and across states.

This report accompanies CRS Report R45183, Teen Pregnancy: Federal Prevention Programs , which discusses Congress's current approach of supporting programs that seek to prevent pregnancy among teens.

Data on births are distinct from data on pregnancies. The teen birth rate refers to the number of live births per 1,000 teen girls aged 15 through 19. The teen pregnancy rate includes the number of pregnancies per 1,000 teen girls aged 15 through 19, which encompasses live births, abortions, and fetal losses . Birth data account for nearly every birth in the United States, whereas pregnancy data are based on estimates of miscarriages and abortion numbers that draw on various reporting systems and surveys. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), the federal government's lead public health agency, reports birth data on an annual basis (most recently for 2018). The CDC and the Guttmacher Institute publish teen pregnancy rates. These rates are usually published a year or two after birth data because of the time required to incorporate data from the various data sources.

This report focuses on the teen birth rate. The CDC tracks birth rates by age and other characteristics of birth mothers. In 2018, there were approximately 3.8 million births in the United States. About 180,000 of these births (4.7%) were to teenagers aged 15 to 19. Figure 1 shows the U.S. teen birth rate from 1950 through 2018 (the rate excludes the territories).

The rate ticked up in the baby boom era of the 1950s, peaking in 1957 at 96.3. It then decreased in most years from the 1960s through the 1980s. From 1991 onward, the teen birth rate declined except in two years, 2006 and 2007. The rate dropped by 72% from 1991 (61.8) to 2018 (17.4). In other words, about 6% of teens aged 15 to 19 gave birth in 1991 compared to less than 2% in 2018.

The greatest decline in the teen birth rate occurred in recent years. For example, from 2007 to 2018, the rate declined by about 58%. The 2018 teen birth rate of 17.4 was a historical low since CDC began collecting and reporting birth data in the 1940s. The CDC began tracking subgroup data for teens in 1960, when the teen birth rate was highest for both teens aged 15 to 17 (43.9 per 1,000) and teens aged 18 to 19 (166.7 per 1,000). Figure 1 indicates that the birth rate was higher in each year for the older teens compared to the younger teens. The 2018 birth rates for 15- to 17-year-olds (7.2 per 1,000) and 18- to 19-year-olds (32.3 per 1,000) were the lowest on record.

Repeat teen births have also declined over time. CDC found the number of subsequent teen births among youth aged 15 to 19 declined nationally by nearly 54% from 2004 to 2015 (the most recent analysis available). The prevalence of teen births that were repeat births was highest among Hispanic youth, followed by non-Hispanic black and non-Hispanic white youth. Over this same period, the largest declines in the number of repeat births were among black teens (21.8%), followed by Hispanic (16.8%) and white (13.9%) teens. Teen mothers have also been less likely to be married than in previous years. In 2018, the birth rate for unmarried teens aged 15 to 19 was 16.0 per 1,000. This is compared to 31.0 per 1,000 in 2010.

Despite the overall decline in the teen birth rate, the rates for certain racial and ethnic groups remain relatively high. Teen birth rates in 2018 varied based on race and ethnicity, with three groupsâHispanic (26.7), non-Hispanic black (26.2), and non-Hispanic American Indian/Alaska Native (29.4) teensâhaving more than double the teen birth rate for non-Hispanic white (12.2) and non-Hispanic Asian or Pacific Islander (4.0) teens.

Figure 2 shows the teen birth rate by race and Hispanic origin over three key years: 1991, when the teen birth rate started a long-term decline; 2007, the most recent year when the teen birth rate had ticked back up slightly; and 2018, the most recent year for which CDC compiled historical teen birth rate data by race and ethnicity. In nearly each year from 1991 through the recent period, the teen birth rate decreased for all racial and ethnic groups; however, the rates declined more for certain groups compared to others. From 2007 to 2018, birth rates fell by 55% for non-Hispanic white teens, 40% for non-Hispanic American Indian/Alaska Native teens, 58% for non-Hispanic black teens, 73% for non-Hispanic Asian/Pacific Islander teens, and 65% for Hispanic teens. While the birth rates for two groups (non-Hispanic black and Hispanic) had a greater decline than the rate for white teens, their birth rates remained higher.

In 2018, the birth rate for teens aged 15 to 19 varied considerably by state and territory. The state with the lowest reported rate was Massachusetts (7.2); the state with the highest reported rate was Arkansas (30.4).

Figure 3 shows a map with 2018 teen births rates in four data categories for the 50 states, the District of Columbia, and three of the territories. Eighteen states had rates of less than 15 per 1,000 teens aged 15 to 19: California, Colorado, Connecticut, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, and Wisconsin. Ten states had the highest teen birth rates (25 or higher): Alabama, Arkansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Tennessee, Texas, and West Virginia. The rates for the territories ranged from 19.3 in Puerto Rico to 34.4 in Guam. From 2007 (when the birth rate last ticked up) to 2018, the teen birth rate decreased in each state or territory by between 19% and 67%.

Teen birth rates have also declined in rural areas over time but remain relatively higher than rates in urban areas.

While the U.S. teen birth rate has decreased over time, it has been higher than that of most other industrialized countries. For comparison, the U.S. teen birth rate of 18.8 was about 50% higher than the rate of the United Kingdom, 12.6, in 2017 (based on the most recent international data available). The reasons for the high teen birth rate in the United States relative to other industrial countries have not been fully explored. Economic conditions and income inequality within and between countries may play a role. Further, the research literature, which is somewhat dated and limited, indicates that use of contraceptives among teens appears to be greater in other developed countries compared to the United States.

Factors Likely Contributing to the Declining Risk of Teen Pregnancy

Researchers suggest that multiple trends have driven down U.S. teen pregnancy and teen birth rates. They point to certain factors as the reason for declines over the 1990s through 2007. Research indicates that over this period, the risk of teen pregnancy decreased primarily because of improved contraceptive use, including an increase in the use of certain contraception methods (e.g., condoms), an increase in the use of multiple methods of contraception, and substantial declines in foregoing contraception. In addition, some of the risk of pregnancy decreased among younger teens, those ages 15 to 17, because of decreased sexual activity. A primary factor for more recent declines in the risk of teen pregnancy has also been the increasing use of contraceptives among sexually active teens. From 2007 through 2014, teens increased their contraceptive use, including the use of any method, the use of long-acting reversible contraceptives (LARCs; e.g., intrauterine devices, or IUDs, and birth control implants), and the use of the withdrawal method along with another method.

Broad economic and social variables may influence teen behaviors, such as whether they will abstain from sex or use contraceptives. Behavioral changes may have been driven by a confluence of factors, such as expanded educational and labor market opportunities for women and improvements in contraceptive technology. Some observers theorize that the long-term downward trend in teen birth rates is attributable to the recession that began in 2007. They contend that during economic downturns the decrease in teen birthsâlike the decrease in overall birthsâis partly due to teenagers being more careful as they witness the economic difficulties faced by their families. Despite this rationale, the teen birth rate continued to diminish after the recession (as well as during periods of economic expansion in the 1990s). Another possible explanation for the decline is the role of social media and increased use of the internet in teens' knowledge about sex and birth control. One analysis found that there were more rapid declines in rates of teen childbearing in places where the MTV show 16 and Pregnant was more widely viewed. The study extrapolated that teens changed their behavior (e.g., increasing the use of contraceptives) after viewing the show. Still, teen birth rates declined even after ratings for the show peaked.

Some observers contend that teen pregnancy prevention programs, such as those supported with federal funding, could potentially play a role in the declining birth rate for teenagers. However, the extent to which these programs have caused a decline in the teen birth rate is not fully known.

Financial and Social Costs of Teen Births

Teen pregnancy has high costs for the families of teen parents and society more generally. Teenage mothers and fathers tend to have less education and are more likely to live in poverty than their peers who are not teen parents. For example,

nearly one-third of teen girls who have dropped out of high school cite pregnancy or parenthood as a reason, about 7 out of 10 teen mothers who have moved out of their family's household live below the poverty level, and more than 60% of teen mothers receive some type of public benefits within the first year after their children are born.

Lower levels of education reduce teen parents' potential for economic self-sufficiency. At the same time, being impoverished and having less education can also increase the likelihood of teens becoming pregnant in the first place. These poorer outcomes may be explained in part by underlying differences between those who give birth as teens and those who delay childbearing: teen mothers often come from more disadvantaged backgrounds (e.g., family more likely to receive public welfare benefits, parents have lower levels of education) than their counterparts who have children at a later age. In addition, teen sexual activity even among those who do not become pregnant can increase the risk of sexually transmitted infections (STIs), which can led to long-term health issues. Adolescents aged 15 to 19 have certain STIs at a rate that is among the highest of sexually active individuals.

Further, teen childbearing can also affect the offspring of teen parents. Children of teenage mothers have poorer outcomes than children of mothers who give birth in their early 20s or later. They are generally more likely to (1) have chronic medical conditions, (2) use public health care, (3) have lower school readiness scores, (4) do poorly in school, (5) give birth during their teen years (females), and (6) be incarcerated (males). In addition to the consequences for teens and their families, teen childbearing has societal impacts.

One study examined these societal impacts, specifically estimating the cost savings to public programs that were associated with avoiding unintended pregnancies during the teen years. The Power to Decide did a simulation analysis to estimate the number of births to teenagers that had been averted due to the decrease in teen fertility rates from 1991 to 2015. The analysis then estimated total savings of $4.4 billion for this period, taking into consideration the cost savings to Medicaid that would have been associated with labor and delivery, postpartum care for the mother, and infant care; and receipt of Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF), Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), and Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants, and Children (WIC) benefits. Additional research of decreased or delayed teenage pregnancy and childbearing could help to inform the impacts for teen parents, their children, and society more generally.

Appendix. Additional Data on Teen Pregnancy


Budget Enforcement Procedures: House Pay-As-You-Go (PAYGO) Rule

Summary: The House pay-as-you-go (PAYGO) rule is generally intended to discourage or prevent Congress from taking certain legislative action that would increase the deficit. The rule requires that legislation affecting direct spending or revenues not increase the projected deficit over either a 6-year or an 11-year period. In effect, the rule requires that any legislation projected to increase direct spending or reduce revenues must be offset by equivalent amounts of direct spending cuts, revenue increases, or a combination of the two, over the two specified periods.

Summary: The House PAYGO rule applies to legislation affecting direct spending and revenues . It does not apply to discretionary spending .

Summary: This rule exempts provisions designated as an emergency from being counted in determining compliance with the PAYGO rule.

Summary: First established at the beginning of the 110 th Congress, the House PAYGO rule was modified during the 111 th Congress: at the beginning of the 111 th Congress, as part of the opening-day rules package; and again in the second session of the 111 th Congress, as part of a special rule providing for the consideration of an unrelated measure. At the beginning of the 112 th Congress, it was replaced with the Cut-As-You-Go (CUTGO) rule, which focused exclusively on the mandatory spending effects of legislation, eliminating any revenue effects from the budgetary evaluation under the rule. Most recently, at the beginning of the 116 th Congress, the PAYGO rule was reinstituted, covering both direct spending and revenues, with certain modifications.

Summary: The House PAYGO rule exists alongside similar PAYGO requirements in statute, but with some significant differences. The House rule (1) applies the PAYGO requirement during the consideration of legislation on the House floor, (2) applies generally to each measure individually, and (3) is enforced by a point of order on the House floor.

Summary: The Statutory PAYGO Act, in contrast, (1) applies the requirement to legislation after it has been enacted, (2) applies to the net effect of all legislation enacted during a session of Congress, and (3) is enforced by sequestrationâthe cancellation of budgetary resources provided by laws affecting direct spendingâto eliminate an increase in the deficit resulting from the enactment of legislation.

Summary: This report updates the previous version (dated November 30, 2010) with descriptions of the changes instituted by the CUTGO rule, adopted at the beginning of the 112 th Congress, and the current PAYGO rule, adopted at the beginning of the 116 th Congress.

T he House pay-as-you-go (PAYGO) rule is generally intended to discourage or prevent Congress from taking certain legislative action that would increase the deficit. It prohibits the consideration of direct spending and revenue legislation that is projected to increase the deficit over either a 6-year or an 11-year period. In effect, the rule requires legislation that includes provisions projected to increase direct spending or reduce revenues to also include offsetting provisions over the two specified periods.

The House PAYGO rule was first established at the beginning of the 110 th Congress and modified in the 111 th Congress. It was replaced by the cut-as-you-go (CUTGO) rule, which applied only to direct spending legislation, at the beginning of the 112 th Congress. The PAYGO rule was reinstated, with modifications, replacing the CUTGO rule, at the beginning of the 116 th Congress.

This report explains the House PAYGO rule's features, describes its legislative history, and discusses how it compares to statutory PAYGO requirements. It updates the previous version (dated November 30, 2010), largely with information about the CUTGO rule and the PAYGO rule, as adopted in the 116 th Congress.

The full text of the House PAYGO rule is provided in the Appendix .

The House PAYGO rule adopted for the 116 th Congress prohibits the consideration of legislation affecting direct spending and revenues that is projected to increase the deficit, or reduce the surplus, over either of two time periods: (1) the 6-year period consisting of the current fiscal year, the budget year, and the 4 ensuing fiscal years; or (2) the 11-year period consisting of the current year, the budget year, and the ensuing 9 fiscal years.

The House PAYGO rule applies to legislation affecting direct spending and revenues . Direct spending, also referred to as mandatory spending, has two distinguishing features: (1) it is provided or controlled in authorizing legislation; and (2) it generally continues without any annual legislative action. Examples of programs funded through direct spending include Medicare, unemployment compensation, and federal retirement. Direct spending is within the jurisdiction of the respective authorizing committees.

Revenues are the funds collected from the public primarily as a result of the federal government's exercise of its sovereign taxing power. They consist of receipts from individual income taxes, payroll taxes, corporate income taxes, excise taxes, duties, gifts, and miscellaneous receipts. Revenues are within the jurisdiction of the Committee on Ways and Means in the House.

The House PAYGO rule does not apply to discretionary spending , which is provided and controlled through the annual appropriations process. Discretionary spending is not counted for purposes of determining whether legislation increases the deficit under the House PAYGO rule.

The rule generally requires that each measure affecting direct spending and revenues not increase the deficit over either of the two time periods specified. That is, to comply with the rule, each measure that includes provisions projected to increase direct spending or reduce revenues must also include offsetting provisions projected to reduce direct spending, increase revenues, or both, by equivalent amounts. A projected deficit reduction resulting from a measure previously passed by the House, or one to be considered subsequently by the House, cannot be used to offset a deficit increase due to provisions in a measure currently under consideration.

The rule provides one exception to this measure-by-measure application. Under clause 10(b) of House Rule XXI, savings from a previously passed measure may be included in determining a separate measure's PAYGO compliance if a special rule provides that the two measures are to be combined upon engrossment.

The rule specifies that a determination of the effect of direct spending and revenue legislation on the deficit or surplus is to be based on estimates made by the Committee on the Budget relative to the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) baseline estimates. In producing its baseline estimates, CBO projects revenues, spending, and deficit or surplus levels under existing law (i.e., assuming no legislative changes). Under the rule, such baseline estimates are to be consistent with Section 257 of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, as amended.

The House PAYGO rule does not apply to direct spending increases or revenue reductions that occur under existing law. That is, if direct spending increases because more individuals qualify for benefits under existing law, for example, any increase in the deficit is not counted for PAYGO purposes and is beyond the rule's control.

The House PAYGO rule exempts provisions designated as an emergency from being counted in determining compliance with the rule. Under clause 10(c) of House Rule XXI, a determination as to whether legislation increases the deficit, or reduces the surplus, shall exclude any provision "expressly designated as an emergency for the purposes of pay-as-you-go principles." If legislation contains such a designation, the chair must put the question of consideration to the full House prior to its consideration. That is, the House must vote on whether or not to consider the legislation, even though all or certain budgetary effects would be exempt from the House PAYGO rule. If the question is decided in the affirmative (by simple majority), the legislation may then be considered. Alternatively, if the question is decided in the negative, the legislation may not be considered.

The House PAYGO rule is enforced by a point of order to prevent the consideration of legislation that does not meet the requirement. If legislation brought up on the House floor violates the rule (i.e., increases the deficit, or reduces the surplus, in either of the two fiscal-year periods), a Member may raise a point of order against it. If the point of order is sustained, the legislation may not be considered (in the case of an amendment, the amendment falls). The House rule, however, is not self-enforcing: a Member must raise the point of order to enforce it. In addition, the House rule may be waived by a special rule reported by the House Rules Committee and agreed to by the House by majority vote, by considering the legislation under the suspension of the rules procedures, or by unanimous consent.

Finally, the House PAYGO rule, as part of the standing rules of the House, is effective for the current Congress for which it is adopted.

Legislative History of the House PAYGO Rule

The House PAYGO rule was first established at the beginning of the 110 th Congress. It was modified at the beginning of the 111 th Congress, as part of the opening-day rules package, and again in the second session of the 111 th Congress, as part of a special rule providing for the consideration of an unrelated measure. In addition, its application to certain legislation was modified during the first session of the 111 th Congress, as part of the FY2010 budget resolution ( S.Con.Res. 13 ). At the beginning of the 112 th Congress, it was replaced with the CUTGO rule, which focused exclusively on the mandatory spending effects of legislation, eliminating any revenue effects from the budgetary evaluation under the rule. Most recently, at the beginning of the 116 th Congress, the PAYGO rule was reinstituted, covering both mandatory spending and revenues, with certain modifications.

Even before the 110 th Congress began, the new Democratic leadership in both chambers indicated an intention to "restore" PAYGO rules. Accordingly, the House adopted its own PAYGO rule as part of its opening-day rules package.

The original House PAYGO rule generally prohibited the consideration of legislation affecting direct spending and revenues that was projected to increase the deficit or reduce the surplus over a 6-year and an 11-year period. In this original form, as it does in its current form, the rule counted on-budget and off-budget entities (such as Social Security) in determining the effect on the deficit (referred to as the unified budget deficit ). The rule also directed the Budget Committee to use the following particular baseline estimates when determining the effect of legislation on the deficit:

after the beginning of a new calendar year but before the consideration of a budget resolution, the Budget Committee was to use the most recent baseline estimates supplied by CBO; and after the consideration of the budget resolution, the Budget Committee was to use the most recent baseline estimates supplied by CBO used in considering the budget resolution.

Lastly, the original rule provided no explicit exemptions, such as adopted in the 116 th Congress.

At the beginning of the 111 th Congress, following the customary practice, the House adopted its rules by adopting the preceding Congress's rules, including the House PAYGO rule, with certain amendments.

Three changes were made to the PAYGO rule. First, the rule was modified to require the Budget Committee to use baseline estimates supplied by CBO, replacing the particular baseline estimates specified in the original rule. Second, a provision was added to the rule to allow for an exception to its measure-by-measure application. Under this exception, which is still in the rule in the 116 th Congress, the budgetary effects of a House-passed bill may be used to determine compliance with the PAYGO requirement of a separate measure if a special rule provides that the two measures are to be combined upon engrossment. Lastly, the rule was amended to exempt provisions designated as an emergency and to provide for a question of consideration for legislation containing such a designation.

Later in the 111 th Congress, during the second session, the House further amended clause 10 of Rule XXI generally to align the House PAYGO rule with the Statutory Pay-As-You-Go Act of 2010, which was enacted earlier in the year. The changes were included in Section 5 of H.Res. 1500 , a special rule providing for the consideration of an unrelated measure.

The changes largely related to scoring issuesâwhat budgetary effects would count and not count for purposes of determining if legislation increased the deficit (or reduced the surplus). First, the rule was amended to focus on the "on-budget deficit," excluding any "off-budget" effects, such as those affecting the Social Security trust funds. Second, the rule was amended to require that determinations of the budgetary effects of legislation were consistent with the Statutory PAYGO Act. Specifically, the following scoring requirements were incorporated into the House PAYGO rule.

budgetary effects resulting from "outyear modifications" of direct spending laws contained in appropriations acts.

budgetary effects due to "timing shifts" from inside to outside the 11-year period covered by the PAYGO rule; and budgetary effects resulting from legislation extending current policy (referred to as "adjustments for current policies"), which were scheduled by statute to expire at the time, in four areas: (1) Medicare payments to physicians; (2) the estate and gift tax; (3) the alternative minimum tax (AMT); and (4) middle-class tax cuts.

At the beginning of the 112 th Congress, in adopting the rules of the House, the new Republican majority replaced the PAYGO rule with a new Cut-As-You-Go (CUTGO) rule. In general, the CUTGO rule focused on the net effect of new legislation on mandatory spending only, excluding any effects on revenues. Specifically, the rule prohibited the consideration of any legislation that would have the net effect of increasing mandatory spending over the same 6-year and 11-year periods as the previous PAYGO rule.

Excluding the projected revenue effects had at least two implications: (1) the House could consider legislation reducing revenues, regardless of whether it would increase the projected deficit, without being vulnerable to a point of order under the rule; and (2) legislation projected to increase mandatory spending could not be offset by an increase in revenues, in order to comply with the rule.

The CUTGO rule also did not continue the "adjustments for current policies," as provided in the Statutory PAYGO Act. It is worth noting that these statutory adjustments were set to expire at the end of 2011 and were not extended beyond 2011.

Other than these changes, the CUTGO rule generally retained the procedures related to the operation of the previous PAYGO rule. For example, the budgetary effects designated as emergency requirements under the Statutory PAYGO Act were excluded and also required a vote on the question of consideration, as provided in the new PAYGO rule, as described above.

The CUTGO rule was renewed, without change, in each subsequent Congress, through the 115 th Congress (i.e., through 2018).

At the beginning of the 116 th Congress, in adopting the rules of the House, the new Democratic majority reinstituted the PAYGO rule, replacing the previous CUTGO rule. Most significantly, the PAYGO rule reincorporates the projected revenue effects of legislation into the evaluation of determining a violation. The new rule, however, is not exactly the same PAYGO rule that existed at the end of the 111 th Congress. In particular, unlike the previous PAYGO rule, it includes off-budget effects, such as those that affect the receipts and outlays of the Social Security trust funds.

In general, other than these changes, the new House PAYGO rule retains the procedures related to the operation of the former CUTGO and PAYGO rules. For example, the new PAYGO rule continues to provide for combining the budgetary effects of two measures, under particular circumstances, and for excluding budgetary effects designated as an emergency, as described in the " Features of the House PAYGO Rule ," section above.

Comparison to Statutory PAYGO Requirements

The House PAYGO rule exists alongside similar PAYGO requirements in statute. Like the House rule, the Statutory Pay-As-You-Go Act of 2010 (Title I of P.L. 111-139 , 124 Stat. 8-29), enacted on February 12, 2010, is intended to discourage or prevent Congress from taking certain legislative action that would increase the on-budget deficit. It generally requires that legislation affecting direct spending or revenues not increase the deficit over the 6-year and 11-year time periods, as in the House rule. Notably, the Statutory PAYGO Act relates only to the on-budget effects of legislation, excluding any off-budget effects, such as those affecting the Social Security trust funds.

While the House PAYGO rule and the statutory requirements are similar, they are different in significant ways relating to when and how they are enforced. The House rule applies during the consideration of legislation on the House floor. That is, the House rule prohibits the consideration of the legislation on the House floor if it does not comply with the requirement. In addition, under the House PAYGO rule, each measure affecting direct spending and revenues must comply with the requirement, with the one exception of two measures combined upon engrossment, as explained above.

The Statutory PAYGO Act, in contrast, applies the requirement to legislation after it has been enacted. Moreover, instead of requiring that each enacted bill not increase the deficit, the statutory rule requires that the net effect of all bills affecting direct spending and revenues (referred to as PAYGO legislation or PAYGO acts) enacted during a session of Congress not increase the deficit. That is, under the statutory rule, the net effect of all PAYGO acts enacted during a session of Congress must not increase the deficit over either a 5-year or a 10-year period. In other words, Congress can enact legislation increasing the deficit and still comply with the statutory rule as long as separate legislation offsetting such increases in the deficit is enacted during the same year.

Reflecting the difference in when the PAYGO requirement is applied, the congressional and statutory rules also differ in how they are enforced. As noted above, the House PAYGO rule is enforced by a point of order to prevent the consideration of legislation that does not meet the requirement. In contrast, the statutory PAYGO rule is enforced by sequestrationâthe cancellation of budgetary resources provided by laws affecting direct spendingâto eliminate an increase in the deficit resulting from the enactment of legislation. The former is an internal procedure of the House, whereas the latter involves actions taken by the President and the Office of Management and Budget.

The statutory PAYGO rule provides that if the net effect of direct spending and revenue legislation enacted during a year increases the deficit (i.e., violates the PAYGO requirement), budgetary resources in certain direct spending programs are cut in order to eliminate the increase in the deficit. Specifically, the average budgetary effects (i.e., any increase or decrease in the deficit) over 5-year and 10-year periods of each PAYGO act are placed on 5-year and 10-year scorecards, respectively. The PAYGO requirement effectively is applied to the balances on each of these scorecards 14 days after Congress adjourns at the end of a session. If either scorecard shows a positive balance (referred to as a debit ) for the budget year, the President is required to issue a sequestration order cancelling budgetary resources in non-exempt direct spending programs sufficient to eliminate the balance (the larger balance if both scorecards show a positive balance).

Finally, although the House PAYGO rule must be adopted anew at the beginning of each new Congress, the Statutory PAYGO Act does not include any expiration date.

Appendix. Text of the House Pay-As-You-Go (PAYGO) Rule: Clause 10 of House Rule XXI (116th Congress)

10. (a)(1) Except as provided in paragraphs (b) and (c), it shall not be in order to consider any bill, joint resolution, amendment, or conference report if the provisions of such measure affecting direct spending and revenues have the net effect of increasing the deficit or reducing the surplus for either the period comprisingâ

(A) the current fiscal year, the budget year, and the four fiscal years following that budget year; or

(B) the current fiscal year, the budget year, and the nine fiscal years following that budget year.

(2) The effect of such measure on the deficit or surplus shall be determined on the basis of estimates made by the Committee on the Budget relative to baseline estimates supplied by the Congressional Budget Office consistent with section 257 of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985.

(b) If a bill, joint resolution, or amendment is considered pursuant to a special order of the House directing the Clerk to add as new matter at the end of such measure the provisions of a separate measure as passed by the House, the provisions of such separate measure as passed by the House shall be included in the evaluation under paragraph (a) of the bill, joint resolution, or amendment.

(c)(1) Except as provided in subparagraph (2), the evaluation under paragraph (a) shall exclude a provision expressly designated as an emergency for purposes of pay-as-you-go principles in the case of a point of order under this clause against consideration ofâ

(B) an amendment made in order as original text by a special order of business;

(2) In the case of an amendment (other than one specified in subparagraph (1)) to a bill or joint resolution, the evaluation under paragraph (a) shall give no cognizance to any designation of emergency.

(3) If a bill, joint resolution, an amendment made in order as original text by a special order of business, a conference report, or an amendment between the Houses includes a provision expressly designated as an emergency for purposes of pay-as-you-go principles, the Chair shall put the question of consideration with respect thereto.

(d) For the purpose of this clause, the terms "budget year" and "current year" have the meanings specified in section 250 of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, and the term "direct spending" has the meaning specified in such section 250 except that such term shall also include provisions in appropriations Acts that make outyear modifications to substantive law as described in section 3(4)(C) of the Statutory Pay-As-You-Go Act of 2010.