DHS Border Barrier Funding

Summary: The purpose of barriers on the U.S.-Mexico border has evolved over time. In the late 19 th and early 20 th centuries, fencing at the border was more for demarcation, or discouraging livestock from wandering over the border, rather than deterring smugglers or illegal migration.

Summary: Physical barriers to deter migrants are a relatively new part of the border landscape, first being built in the 1990s in conjunction with counterdrug efforts. This phase of construction, extending into the 2000s, was largely driven by legislative initiatives. Specific authorization for border barriers was provided in 1996 in the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA), and again in 2006 in the Secure Fence Act. These authorities were superseded by legislation included in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008, which rewrote key provisions of IIRIRA and replaced most of the Secure Fence Act. The result of these initiatives was construction of more than 650 miles of barriers along the nearly 2,000-mile border.

Summary: The Trump Administration has driven the second phase of construction of border barriers. On January 25, 2017, the Administration issued Executive Order 13767, "Border Security and Immigration Enforcement Improvements." Section 2(a) of the E.O. indicates that it is the policy of the executive branch to "secure the southern border of the United States through the immediate construction of a physical wall on the southern border, monitored and supported by adequate personnel so as to prevent illegal immigration, drug and human trafficking, and acts of terrorism."

Summary: The debate over funding for and construction of a "border wall system" in this phase has created congressional interest in the historical context of border barrier funding.

Summary: There has not been an authoritative compilation of data on the level of federal investment in border barriers over time. This is in part due to the evolving structure of the appropriations for agencies charged with protecting the borderâaccount structures have shifted, initiatives have come and gone, and appropriations typically have not specified a precise level of funding for barriers as opposed to other technologies that secure the border. Funding was not specifically designated for border barrier construction until FY2006.

Summary: The nearly $4.5 billion in appropriations provided by Congress for border barrier planning and construction since the signing of the E.O. exceeds the amount provided for those purposes from FY2007 to FY2016 combined by almost $2 billion. Most of the contracts that have been awarded thus far are for improvements to, or replacements of, the existing barriers at the border. However, a significant portion of the funds appropriated to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is available for construction of barriers where they do not currently exist.

Summary: The Administration took steps in FY2019 to secure funding beyond the levels approved by Congress for border barriers. These included:

Summary: transferring roughly $601 million from the Treasury Forfeiture Fund to U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP); using $2.5 billion in Department of Defense funds transferred to the Department's counterdrug programs to construct border barriers; and reallocating up to $3.6 billion from other military construction projects using authorities under the declaration of a national emergency.

Summary: This report provides an overview of the funding appropriated for border barriers, based on data from CBP and congressional documents, and a primer on the Trump Administration's efforts to enhance the funding for border barriers, with a brief discussion of the legislative and historical context of construction of barriers at the U.S-Mexico border. It concludes with a number of unanswered questions Congress may wish to explore as this debate continues. An appendix tracks reported barrier construction mileage on the U.S.-Mexico border by year.

Congress and the Donald J. Trump Administration are debating enhancing and expanding barriers on the southwest border. The extent of these barriers, and how construction of these barriers will be funded has become a central part of the interactions between Congress and the Trump Administration on border security and funding legislation for the broader federal government.

The debate has revealed the lack of an authoritative compilation of data on the details of federal investment in border barriers. This is in part due to the evolving structure of the appropriations for agencies charged with protecting the borderâaccount structures have shifted, initiatives have come and gone, and appropriations prior to FY2017 typically did not specify a precise level of funding for barriers as opposed to other technologies that secure the border. The Trump Administration's continued advocacy for funding for a "border wall system" has led to a congressional interest in the historical context for border barrier funding.

This report briefly contextualizes the history of U.S. enforcement of the U.S.-Mexico border, before turning to funding for border barriers within the contemporary period, accounting for changing appropriations structures.

Establishment and Policing of the U.S.-Mexico Border

The Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo in 1848, with the cession of land to the United States, ended the Mexican-American War and set forth an agreed-upon boundary line between the United States and Mexico. The physical demarcation of the boundary was essentially set by the Gadsden Purchase, finalized in 1854, with some minor adjustments since then.

Securing U.S. borders has primarily been the mission of the U.S. Border Patrol, which was established by Congress by an appropriations act in 1924. Initially, a relatively small force of 450 officers patrolled both the northern and southern borders between inspection stations, guarding against the smuggling of contraband and unauthorized migrants.

The Immigration Act of 1924 established immigration quotas for most countries, with the exception of those in the Western Hemisphere, including Mexico. (While some specific limitations existed, per-country quotas for Western Hemisphere countries did not exist until 1976. ) Earlier policies had set categorical exclusions to entry (e.g., for Chinese and other Asian immigrants) that were exceptions to an otherwise open immigration policy. Between 1942 and 1964, the Bracero Program brought in nearly 5 million Mexican agricultural workers to fill the labor gap caused by World War II. Both employers and employees became used to the seasonal work, and when the program ended, many continued this employment arrangement without legal authorization. Debates about enhancing enforcement of immigration laws ensued in the late 1970s and 1980s, largely in concert with counter-drug smuggling efforts and interest in curbing the rise in unauthorized flows of migrant workers.

A significant effort to construct barriers on the southern border as a deterrent to illegal entry by migrants or smugglers into the United States began in the early 1990s. In 1991, U.S. Navy engineers built a ten-foot-high corrugated steel barrier between San Diego and Tijuana made of surplus aircraft landing mats, an upgrade to the previous chain-link fencing.

In 1994, the Border Patrol (then part of the Department of Justice under the Immigration and Naturalization Service, INS) released a strategic plan for enforcing immigration laws along the U.S. border, as a part of a series of immigration reform initiatives. The plan, developed by Chief Patrol Agents, Border Patrol headquarters staff, and planning experts from the Department of Defense Center for Low Intensity Conflict, described their approach to improving control of the border through a strategy of "prevention through deterrence," under which resources were concentrated in major entry corridors to establish control of those areas and force traffic to more difficult crossing areas.

The Border Patrol will increase the number of agents on the line and make effective use of technology, raising the risk of apprehension high enough to be an effective deterrent. Because the deterrent effect of apprehensions does not become effective in stopping the flow until apprehensions approach 100 percent of those attempting entry, the strategic objective is to maximize the apprehension rate. Although a 100 percent apprehension rate is an unrealistic goal, we believe we can achieve a rate of apprehensions sufficiently high to raise the risk of apprehension to the point that many will consider it futile to continue to attempt illegal entry.

Prior to 1996, federal statute neither explicitly authorized nor required barrier construction along international borders. In 1996, the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) was enacted, and Section 102(a) specifically directed the Attorney General to "install additional physical barriers and roads ... in the vicinity of the United States border to deter illegal crossings in areas of high illegal entry into the United States."

From INS (in Department of Justice) to CBP (in Homeland Security)

Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the U.S. government changed its approach to homeland security issues, including control of the border. As a part of the establishment of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in 2003, INS was dismantled, and the Border Patrol and its responsibility for border security were moved from the Department of Justice to DHS as a part of U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP). DHS and CBP were stood up in 2003, and received their first annual appropriations in FY2004.

DHS Border Barriers: Legislative Era (2005-2016)

During the 109 th and the first session of the 110 th Congresses (2005-2007), comprehensive immigration reform legislation and narrower border security measures were debated. One result was that Congress explicitly authorized and funded new construction of border barriers, significantly increasing their presence.

Enacted Authorizations and Appropriations

In the 109 th Congress, two bills were enacted that amended Section 102 of IIRIRA, easing the construction of additional border barriers. Section 102 of the REAL ID Act of 2005 ( P.L. 109-13 , Div. B) included broad waiver authority that allowed for expedited construction of border barriers. The Secure Fence Act of 2006 ( P.L. 109-367 ) directed the Secretary of Homeland Security to "achieve and maintain operational control over the entire international land and maritime borders of the United States," mandated the construction of certain border barriers and technology on the border with Mexico by the end of 2008, and required annual reports on progress on border control.

This was a different approach in border barrier legislation. Past immigration policy bills had included border barriers as a part of a suite of remedies across government to the border security problem in the context of immigration policy. The Secure Fence Act instead provided authorization for DHS alone to achieve "operational control" of the border through barriers, tactical infrastructure, and surveillance while largely not addressing the broader set of immigration policies that could contribute to improved border security. In addition, the Secure Fence Act substantially revised IIRIRA Section 102(b) to include five specific border areas to be covered by the installation of fencing, additional barriers, and technology.

The FY2006 DHS Appropriations Act ( P.L. 109-90 ) provided the first appropriations specifically designated for the Border Patrol (now under CBP and a part of DHS) to construct border barriers. The act specified $35 million for CBP's San Diego sector fencing. This funding was part of a surge in CBP construction spending from $91.7 million in FY2005âand $93.4 million in the FY2006 requestâto $270.0 million for FY2006 enacted appropriations. This direction also represented the first specific statutory direction provided to CBP on the use of its construction funds.

Toward the end of 2007, Congress amended Section 102 of IIRIRA through Section 564 of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008. Congress again required the construction of reinforced fencing along at least 700 miles of the U.S.-Mexico border, where it would be "most practical and effective," but also included flexibility in implementing this requirement, stating that:

nothing in this paragraph shall require the Secretary of Homeland Security to install fencing, physical barriers, roads, lighting, cameras, and sensors in a particular location along an international border of the United States, if the Secretary determines that the use or placement of such resources is not the most appropriate means to achieve and maintain operational control over the international border at such location.

Starting in FY2007 and continuing through FY2016, border barrier funding in CBP's budget was included in the "Border Security Fencing, Infrastructure, and Technology" (BSFIT) appropriation. When BSFIT was established in the Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2007 ( P.L. 109-295 ), it consolidated border technology and tactical infrastructure funding from other accounts, including CBP's Construction appropriation and Salaries and Expenses appropriation.

According to the FY2007 DHS appropriations conference report, Congress provided $1,512,565,000 for BSFIT activities for FY2007: $1,187,565,000 from annual appropriations in P.L. 109-295 , and $325,000,000 in prior enacted supplemental appropriations from P.L. 109-234 and other legislation. Congress directed portions of that initial appropriation to two specific border security projects, and withheld $950 million until a spending plan for a border barrier was provided. Starting in FY2008, a PPA for "Development and Deployment" of technology and tactical infrastructure was included at congressional direction under the BSFIT appropriation.

The BSFIT Development and Deployment PPA is, over the tenure of CBP, the most consistently structured year-to-year direction from Congress to CBP regarding putting border security technology and infrastructure in the field, covering FY2008-FY2016.

The BSFIT Development and Deployment structure remained unchanged until the implementation of the Common Appropriations Structure (CAS) for DHS in the FY2017 appropriations cycle, which redistributed BSFIT funding to the Operations and Support (OS) appropriation and the Procurement, Construction, and Improvements (PC&I) appropriation. Border barrier design and construction funding, other than ports of entry, is now included in the Border Security Assets and Infrastructure PPA along with several other activities.

Figure 1 shows the requested and enacted levels for the Development and Deployment PPA from FY2008 through FY2016. Although it doesn't show an almost $1.2 billion FY2007 appropriation for border infrastructure before the Development and Deployment PPA was implemented, it does indicate the early high levels of investment in border infrastructure, which then tapered off. The dashed line shows the size of the budget request for these elements.

While the new structure of appropriations made it clear that funding was being directed to border security enhancements, the level of detail was not always sufficient to identify the funding level for barrier construction. CRS was able to obtain this more granular information directly from CBP, which provided a breakdown to CRS of its spending on border barriers beginning with FY2007. The primary program that funded barrier construction in this period was the Tactical Infrastructure (TI) Program.

Figure 2 and Table 1 present funding data provided by CBP for border barriers under the TI program. The funding provided in FY2007 to FY2009 resulted in increased border barrier construction (which extended for a few years into the early 2010s). As the funds for construction were expended, CBP transitioned its border barrier activities to primarily maintenance and minor repairs, until FY2017.

CBP has indicated in follow-up communications that no further historical data are available, as barrier construction was conducted by several entities within CBP, and not centrally tracked. In addition, the definitions of tactical infrastructure may allow for inclusion of some elements only peripherally related to border barriers. Taking these factors into account, given the limited mileage constructed prior to FY2007 (see Appendix for details), the above data present the best available understanding of appropriations and spending on border barriers in the 2007-2016 period.

DHS Border Barriers: Executive Era (2017-Present)

On January 25, 2017, the Trump Administration issued Executive Order 13767, "Border Security and Immigration Enforcement Improvements." Section 2(a) of the EO indicates that it is the policy of the executive branch to "secure the southern border of the United States through the immediate construction of a physical wall on the southern border, monitored and supported by adequate personnel so as to prevent illegal immigration, drug and human trafficking, and acts of terrorism." The EO goes on to define "wall" as "a contiguous, physical wall or other similarly secure, contiguous, and impassable physical barrier."

For FY2017, changes were made both in the structure of how funds were appropriated, and how CBP organized those funds among its authorized activities. This complicates efforts to make detailed comparisons in funding levels between the present and time periods prior to FY2016.

When DHS was established in 2003, components of other agencies were brought together over a matter of months, in the midst of ongoing budget cycles. Rather than developing a new structure of appropriations for the entire department, Congress and the Executive continued to provide resources through existing account structures when possible. CBP's budget structure evolved over the DHS's early years, including the institution of the Border Security Fencing, Infrastructure, and Technology (BSFIT) account in FY2007.

At the direction of Congress, in 2014 DHS began to work on a new Common Appropriations Structure (CAS), which would standardize the format of DHS appropriations across components.

After several years of negotiations with Congress, DHS made its first budget request in the CAS for FY2017, and implemented the new budget structure while operating under a continuing resolution in October 2016. This resulted in the BSFIT structure being eliminated. The funding that had been provided under its appropriation would now be provided under the CBP Operations and Support (OS) and Procurement, Construction, and Improvements (PC&I) appropriations.

Aside from the appropriations structure, changes within CBP's internal account structure occurred during FY2017. The "Wall Program" was established at CBP during FY2017. The Wall Program is a lower-level PPA nested within the new Border Security Assets and Infrastructure activity, which in turn is a part of the CBP PC&I appropriation. According to CBP, the Wall Program oversees the execution of the FY2017 TI program funding and "will be responsible for all future wall construction." CBP first directed appropriations to the Wall Program in FY2018 ($1.375 billion).

CBP's TI Program continues to manage the funding for maintenance of new and replacement border barriers, as it has since FY2007.

Table 2 shows appropriations for border barriers requested by the Administration and provided by Congress in the DHS appropriations acts. Each fiscal year is discussed in detail after Table 2 .

The Trump Administration submitted a supplemental appropriations request in March 2017 for a variety of priorities, including CBP staffing and border wall construction. The request for additional CBP PC&I funding included $1.38 billion, of which $999 million was for "planning, design, and construction of the first installment of the border wall."

The FY2017 DHS Appropriations bill included a sixth title with the congressional response to the supplemental appropriations request. It included $341.2 million to replace approximately 40 miles of existing primary pedestrian and vehicle barriers along the southwest border "using previously deployed and operationally effective designs, such as currently deployed steel bollard designs, that prioritize agent safety" and to add gates to existing barriers.

The Administration requested $1.72 billion for the Border Security Assets and Infrastructure PPA, including $1.57 million for construction of border barriers. In the FY2018 appropriations measure, Congress provided $1.74 billion, which, according to a House Appropriations Committee summary, included funding for "over 90 miles of physical barrier construction along the southern borderâincluding replacement, bollards, and levee improvements." Section 230 of the bill specified the following $1.375 billion for the following activities under the CBP PC&I appropriation:

$445 million for 25 miles of primary pedestrian levee fencing in Rio Grande Valley (RGV) sector; $196 million for primary pedestrian fencing in RGV sector; $251 million for secondary replacement fencing in San Diego sector; $445 million for replacement of existing primary pedestrian fencing; and $38 million for border barrier planning and design.

The section went on to note that the funding for primary fencing "shall only be available for operationally effective designs deployed as of [May 5, 2017], such as currently deployed steel bollard designs that prioritize agent safety."

The Administration initially requested $1.647 billion for the Border Security Assets and Infrastructure PPA. Budget justification documents noted that $1.6 billion was requested for the border wall. The Administration reportedly requested $5.0 billion for the wall from Republican congressional leadership. However, no publicly available modification of its request was presented to Congress until January 6, 2019. At that time, in the midst of a lapse in annual appropriations due in part to conflict over border barrier funding, the acting head of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) submitted a letter seeking $7 billion in additional border related funding. The $7 billion included $4.1 billion more for "the wall" than the Administration originally requested. The letter indicated that the total request of $5.7 billion would pay for "approximately 234 miles of new physical barrier and fully fund the top 10 priorities in CBP's Border Security Improvement Plan."

P.L. 116-6 , the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2019, included $1.375 billion for CBP "for the construction of primary pedestrian fencing, including levee pedestrian fencing, in the Rio Grande Valley Sector." Funding could only be used for "operationally effective designs deployed as of [May 5, 2017], such as currently deployed steel bollard designs that prioritize agent safety."

Border Barrier Funding Outside the Appropriations Process

The same day that the President signed the FY2019 consolidated appropriations act into law, he declared a national emergency on the southern border of the United States. A fact sheet accompanying the declaration indicated the President's intent to make additional funding available for border barriers through three methods, sequentially. These methods and related actions are:

1. Drawing about $601 million from the Treasury Forfeiture Fund A letter from the Department of the Treasury on February 15, 2019, indicated that those funds would be made available to DHS for "law enforcement border security efforts" ($242 million available March 2, and $359 million after additional forfeitures were received). According to court documents, Treasury transferred the full $601 million to DHS on September 27, 2019. CBP will reportedly use the funds as follows: $261 million for future-year real estate planning and acquisition for border barrier construction along the southwest border. $340 million for border barrier projects in the Rio Grande Valley Sector, of which $124 million is for construction; and $216 million is for construction management costs, increased project costs, and real estate planning and acquisition. 2. Making up to $2.5 billion available through the Department of Defense's support for counterdrug activities (authorized under 10 U.S.C. Â§284) $1 billion has been reprogrammed within the Department of Defense to its Drug Interdiction and Counter Drug Activities account, and that funding, in turn, was transferred for the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers to do certain DHS-requested work on border barriers. On May 10, 2019, the Department of Defense announced an additional $1.5 billion reprogramming of funding that had been dedicated to a variety of initiatives, including training and equipping Afghan security forces, programs to dismantle chemical weapons, and other activity for which savings or program delays had been identified. The DOD indicated that the funding would construct an additional 80 miles of border barriers. Use of both of these tranches of reprogrammed funds to pay for border barrier projects had been blocked by a court injunction until July 26, 2019, when the Supreme Court ruled that the government could proceed with the use of the funds while a lower court determines the legality of the transfer that made the funds available. 3. Reallocating up to $3.6 billion from various military construction projects under the authority invoked by the emergency declaration On September 3, 2019, Secretary of Defense Mark Esper issued a memorandum with the determination that "11 military construction projects â¦ along the international border with Mexico, with an estimated total cost of $3.6 billion, are necessary to support the use of the armed forces in connection with the national emergency [at the southern border]." The memorandum indicates $1.8 billion in unobligated military construction funding for overseas projects would be made available immediately, while $1.8 billion in domestic military construction projects would be provided once it is needed.

In February 2019, The Administration requested $5 billion in border barrier funding for FY2020, to support the construction of approximately 206 miles of border wall system.

The House Appropriations Committee included no funding for border barriers when it reported its FY2020 DHS appropriations bill. In addition, the bill would have restricted the ability to transfer or reprogram funds for border barrier construction and proposed rescinding $601 million from funding appropriated for border barriers in FY2019. The Senate Appropriations Committee took the opposite approach when it reported S. 2582 , recommending $5 billion for border barrier construction. It also did not include any of the House bill's proposed restrictions or the rescission. Neither the House nor the Senate considered these appropriations bills on the floor.

The FY2020 DHS Appropriations Act ( P.L. 116-93 , Div. D)âwhich was passed as part of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2020âincluded $1.375 billion for "construction of barrier system along the southwest border." The barrier system design restrictions are similar to prior years, with a new exception for designs that help "mitigate community or environmental impacts." There is an additional requirement that the barriers are to be built in the highest priority locations identified in CBP's Border Security Improvement Plan.

Comparing DHS Border Barrier Funding Across Eras

Figure 3 presents a comparison of the total funding made available in the first and second eras of DHS efforts to support planning and construction of barriers on the U.S.-Mexico border.

This comparison is made with two important caveats: the data sources and funding structures are different in the two eras. In the legislative era (FY2007-FY2016), detailed information was provided directly to CRS in a communication from CBP. It was tracked for "tactical infrastructure," which included funding for border roads and other TI. In the executive era (FY2017 to the present), data from CBP and appropriations measures (which has been more detailed with respect to barrier planning and construction) are generally consistent, but the Administration uses the specifically defined "border wall" program to track most of the funding. A small amount of funding for barrier replacement and supporting infrastructure was provided through the tactical infrastructure PPA in FY2018.

Questions Relevant to Future DHS Border Barrier Funding

Section 4 of E.O. 13767, "Physical Security of the Southern Border of the United States," focuses almost entirely on the construction of "a physical wall" on the U.S.-Mexico border as a means of obtaining operational control of the nearly 2,000-mile border. CBP has indicated that it cannot provide authoritative historical data prior to FY2007 on the level of funding invested in border barrier planning and construction. To briefly recap the funding that has been provided by Congress in response to the Trump Administration's initiative, the $4.47 billion in appropriations provided by Congress to CBP for border barrier planning and construction during the Trump Administration exceeds the amount provided for those purposes in the BSFIT account for the 10 years from FY2007 to FY2016 by $2 billion. Of the $4.47 billion:

$1.04 billion was specifically directed to barrier replacement projects;

$2.02 billion was specifically directed to construction needs in the Rio Grande Valley Sector; and

$1.41 billion has been provided for planning and construction of border barriers without specific direction in regards to location or whether the funding was for barrier replacement or construction of additional miles of barriers.

Despite the historically high volume of resources provided, the Administration has taken unprecedented stepsânoted aboveâin an attempt to more than double the funding level appropriated to CBP by Congress for barrier construction since the signing of E.O. 13767.

$601 million was provided to DHS in FY2019 from the Treasury Forfeiture Fund. As noted in " Border Barrier Funding Outside the Appropriations Process ," $124 million of that funding is being used for construction, while $477 million is for real estate planning and acquisition, increased project costs, and construction management costs.

Generally, the Administration, in its discussion about border barriers, relies on the U.S. Border Patrol Impedance and Denial Prioritization Strategy , which includes a list of projects for barrier construction. There are no known authoritative cost estimates for the total construction or operation and maintenance costs of these projects if they are all completed, or publicly available assessments of how completion of various projects might affect CBP's operational costs. Furthermore, GAO reported in 2016 that the border barriers' contributions to CBP goals were not being adequately measured. GAO reported in 2018 that CBP's methodology for prioritizing border barrier deployments did not use cost estimates that included data on topography, land ownership, and other factors that could impact the costs of individual barrier projects.

The Administration's stated intent is to expand the amount of border barriers on the southwest border, and this issue will likely be part of debates on the budgets for the current and future fiscal years. Congress may wish to obtain the following information and explore the following questions in assessing border barrier funding proposals:

1. What are the projected operation and maintenance costs for the existing southwest border barriers? How will those change with additional replacements, upgrades, or new construction of barriers? 2. What are the projected land acquisition and construction costs of CBP's remaining top priority border barrier projects, based on unique topography, land ownership, and strategic intent of the projects? What steps is CBP taking to control the growth of those costs? Who within the Administration is providing oversight of how these funds are used, and are they reporting their findings to Congress? 3. Are existing barriers and completed improvements having measurable impacts on attempted illegal entry into the U.S. and smuggling of contraband? How are CBP and other stakeholders making their assessments? Is CBP getting its desired tactical or strategic outcomes? 4. Are the operational benefits worth the financial and operational costs, or are there more efficient ways to achieve the desired tactical or strategic outcomes? 5. How should Congress respond to the Administration's exercise of reprogramming and transfer authorities to provide funding for border barrier work above the amount Congress provided to CBP for that purpose?

Appendix. Tracking Barrier Construction on the U.S.-Mexico Border

The United States' southern border with Mexico runs for nearly 2,000 miles over diverse terrain, through varied population densities, and across discontinuous sections of public, private, and tribal land ownership. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Customs and Border Protection (CBP) is primarily responsible for border security, including the construction and maintenance of tactical infrastructure, but also the installation and monitoring of surveillance technology, and the deployment of border patrol agents to impede unlawful entries of people and contraband into the United States (e.g., unauthorized migrants, terrorists, firearms, and narcotics).

Built barriers, such as fencing, are a relatively new feature on the southern border. These structures vary in age, purpose, form, and location. At the end of FY2015, approximately 653 milesâroughly one-third of the international boundaryâhad a primary layer of barriers. Approximately 300 miles of the "primary fence" was designed to prevent vehicles from entering, and approximately 350 additional miles was designed to block people on footâ"pedestrian fencing." CBP has used various materials for pedestrian fencing, including bollard, steel mesh, and chain link, and employed bollard and Normandy-style fencing for vehicle barriers. Across 37 discontinuous miles, the primary layer is backed by a secondary layer of pedestrian fencing as well as an additional 14 miles of tertiary fencing (typically to delineate property lines).

On January 10, 2020, the Administration announced the completion of the first 100 miles of the "new border wall system" under the Trump Administration. Based on CBP's information, the 100 miles of new border wall system largely replaces less formidable existing barriers with 18- to 30-foot bollard style fencing designed to obstruct both vehicles and pedestrians. It does not represent additional miles of the primary layer of border barriers.

CBP has not announced the completion of any additional miles of primary fencing since 2015, but sections of legacy fencing and breached areas have been replaced or repaired and other improvements have been made.

An interactive online project by inewsource (a nonprofit, nonpartisan investigative online newsroom in San Diego) and KPBS (a Public Broadcasting Service television and radio station in San Diego, California) used data obtained via a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request to Customs and Border Protection to account for every mile of existing border fencing by the year built. The data are used in this appendix to produce Figure A-1 showing the number of miles of primary border barrier constructed for the period 1960-2018 (annual data shown in Table A-1 ).

Small areas of the border had fencing prior to 1990. By 1993, fencing in the San Diego area had been completed, covering the first 14 miles of the border east from the Pacific Ocean and a few other areas. Under the provisions of IIRIRA, the Secretary of Homeland Securityâand, prior to 2003, the Attorney Generalâhas the discretion to determine the appropriate amount of additional barriers to build, as well as their location. Approximately 40 additional miles of primary fence were constructed on the southern border through 2005. The vast majority of the existing primary barriersâmore than 525 milesâwere constructed between 2007 and 2009 (see Table A-1 and Figure A-1 ).


U.S. Farm Income Outlook: February 2020 Forecast

Summary: This report uses the U.S. Department of Agriculture's (USDA) farm income projections (as of February 5, 2020) to describe the U.S. farm economic outlook for 2020. Two major indicators of U.S. farm well-being are net farm income and net cash income. Net farm income represents an accrual of the value of all goods and serviced produced on the farm during the yearâsimilar in concept to gross domestic product. In contrast, net cash income uses a cash flow concept to measure farm well-being: Only cash transactions for the year are included. Thus, crop production is recorded as net farm income immediately after harvest, whereas net cash income records a crop's value only after it has been sold in the marketplace.

Summary: According to USDA's Economic Research Service (ERS), national net farm income is forecast at $96.7 billion in 2020, up $3.1 billion (+3.3%) from 2019. The forecast rise in 2020 net farm income stands in contrast with a projected decline of over $10.8 billion in net cash income (-9.0%). Last year's (2019) net cash income forecast included $14.7 billion in sales of on-farm crop inventories, which helped to inflate the 2019 net cash income value to $120.4 billion. The 2020 net cash income forecast includes a much smaller amount ($0.5 billion) in sales from on-farm inventories, thus contributing to the decline from 2019.

Summary: Government direct support payments to the agricultural sector are expected to continue to play an important role in farm income projections. USDA projects $15 billion in farm support outlays for 2020, including the $3.7 billion of 2019 Market Facilitation Program (MFP) paymentsâthe third and final tranche of payments under the $14.5 billion program. If realized, the 2020 government payments of $15 billion would represent a 36.6% decline from 2019 but would still be the second largest since 2006. The $23.6 billion in federal payments in 2019 was the largest taxpayer transfer to the agriculture sector (in absolute dollars) since 2005. The surge in federal subsidies in 2019 was driven by large payments (estimated at $14.3 billion) under the MFP initiated by USDA in response to the U.S.-China trade dispute. The Administration has not announced a new MFP for 2020.

Summary: Weather conditions and planting prospects for 2020 are unknown this early in the year. Commodity prices are under pressure from abundant global supplies and uncertain export prospects. Despite the signing of a Phase I trade agreement with China on January 15, 2020, it is unclear how soonâif at allâthe United States may resume normal trade with China or how international demand may evolve in 2020.

Summary: Farm asset value in 2020 is projected up year-to-year at $3.1 trillion (+1.3%). Farm asset values reflect farm investors' and lenders' expectations about long-term profitability of farm sector investments. Another critical measure of the farm sector's well-being is aggregate farm debt, which is projected to be at a record $425.3 billion in 2020âup 2.3% from 2019. Both the debt-to-asset and the debt-to-equity ratios have risen for eight consecutive years, potentially suggesting a continued slow erosion of the U.S. farm sector's financial situation.

Summary: At the farm household level, average farm household incomes have been well above average U.S. household incomes since the late 1990s. However, this advantage derives primarily from off-farm income as a share of farm household total income. Since 2014, over half of U.S. farm operations have had negative income from their agricultural operations.

The U.S. farm sector is vast and varied. It encompasses production activities related to traditional field crops (such as corn, soybeans, wheat, and cotton) and livestock and poultry products (including meat, dairy, and eggs), as well as fruits, tree nuts, and vegetables. In addition, U.S. agricultural output includes greenhouse and nursery products, forest products, custom work, machine hire, and other farm-related activities. The intensity and economic importance of each of these activities, as well as their underlying market structure and production processes, vary regionally based on the agro-climatic setting, market conditions, and other factors. As a result, farm income and rural economic conditions may vary substantially across the United States.

Annual U.S. net farm income is the single most-watched indicator of farm sector well-being, as it captures and reflects the entirety of economic activity across the range of production processes, input expenses, and marketing conditions that have prevailed during a specific time period (see box "Measuring Farm Profitability" for a definition of net farm income ). When national net farm income is reported together with a measure of the national farm debt-to-asset ratio, the two summary statistics provide a quick and widely referenced indicator of the economic well-being of the national farm economy.

USDA's February 2020 Farm Income Forecast

In the first of three official U.S. farm income outlook releases scheduled for 2020 (see box "ERS's Annual Farm Income Forecasts" below), the U.S. Department of Agriculture's (USDA) Economic Research Service (ERS) projects that U.S. net farm income will rise 3.3% year-over-year in 2020 to $96.7 billion, up $3.1 billion from last year ( Figure 1 and Table A-1 ). The February forecast of $96.7 billion is 6.3% above the 10-year average of $89.9 billion (in nominal dollars) but is well below 2013's record high of $123.7 billion. In contrast, net cash income (calculated on a cash-flow basis) is projected lower in 2020 (down 10.8% from 2019) at $109.6 billionâ4.7% below the 10-year average of $115.0 billion.

The divergence in year-to-year changes between the two measures of net income is due to their different treatment of harvested crops. Net farm income includes a crop's value after harvest even if it remains in on-farm storage. In contrast, net cash income includes a crop's value only when it is sold. Thus, crops placed in on-farm storage are included in net farm income but not net cash income.

In 2018, U.S. farmers harvested a record soybean crop and the third-largest corn crop on record. That same year the U.S.-China trade dispute emerged as an impediment to trade and contributed to a widespread drop in soybean prices. However, the Administration assured producers that the trade dispute was temporary and would soon be resolved in their favor. As a result, many producers of soybeans and other crops held on to their crops in the hopes of capturing higher prices after the trade dispute was resolved. However, by mid-2019 there was no end in sight to the trade dispute, and farmer cash flows necessitated selling from on-farm inventories to meet household and farm operation needs. As a result, the net cash farm income forecast for 2019 included $14.7 billion in sales from on-farm crop inventories, whereas the 2020 forecast includes a much smaller amount ($0.5 billion) in sales from on-farm inventories. This difference accounts for much of the decline in the 2020 net cash farm income projection.

When adjusted for inflation and represented in 2019 dollars ( Figure 2 ), both the net farm income and net cash income for 2019 are projected to be above their average values since 1940 of $88.2 billion and $101 billion, respectively. For historical perspective, both net cash income and net farm income achieved record nominal highs in 2013 but fell to recent lows in 2016 ( Figure 1 ) before trending higher during 2017-2019. Government farm subsidies are projected at $15 billion in 2020âdown nearly 37% from 2019 but still the second-highest since 2006 ( Figure 12 ). In 2019, support from traditional farm programs was bolstered by large direct government payments in response to trade retaliation under the trade dispute with China. Direct government payments of $23.6 billion in 2019 represented 25.2% of net farm incomeâthe largest share since a 27.6% share in 2006. The share of net farm income from government sources in 2020 is projected to decline to 15.5% ( Figure 11 ). Farm asset values and debt levels are projected to reach record levels in 2020âasset values at $3.1 trillion (+1.3% year-over-year) and farm debt at $425.3 billion (+2.3%)âpushing the projected debt-to-asset ratio up to 13.5%, the highest level since 2003 ( Figure 19 ). For the 2019-2020 marketing year for crops and the 2020 calendar year for livestock, USDA forecasts a mixed outlook for major commodity prices: Corn, soybeans, sorghum, oats, rice, hogs, and milk will be up slightly from 2019, while prices for barley, cotton, wheat, choice steers, broilers, and eggs are expected to be lower ( Table A-4 ).

Abundant domestic and international supplies of grains and oilseeds contributed to a fifth-straight year of relatively weak commodity prices in 2019 ( Figure A-1 through Figure A-4 , and Table A-4 ). However, the commodity price projections for 2020 are subject to substantial uncertainty associated with as-yet-unknown domestic production and international commodity market developments. Three major factors dominated U.S. agricultural markets during 2019 and have contributed to uncertainty over the supply, demand, and price prospects for most major commodities heading into 2020: surplus stocks, wet weather, and international trade disputes.

First, large corn and soybean stocks kept pressure on commodity prices throughout the grain and feed complex in 2019 ( Figure 3 ). Second, adverse weather conditions during the spring planting and fall harvesting periods contributed to market uncertainty regarding the size of the 2019 corn and soybean crops. Third, the U.S.-China trade dispute led to declines in U.S. exports to Chinaâa major market for U.S. agricultural productsâand added to market uncertainty. In particular, the United States was displaced by Brazil as the world's preeminent exporter of soybeans to China.

Weather conditions and planting prospects for 2020 are unknown this early in the year. Also, despite the signing of a Phase I trade agreement with China on January 15, 2020, it is unclear how soonâif at allâthe United States may resume normal trade with China or how international demand may evolve heading in 2020.

USDA Projects Corn, Soybean, and Wheat Stocks Lower in 2019

Corn and soybeans are the two largest U.S. commercial crops in terms of both value and acreage. For the past several years, U.S. corn and soybean crops have experienced strong growth in both productivity and output, thus helping to build stockpiles at the end of several successive marketing years through the 2018 season.

In 2018, U.S. farmers produced a record U.S. soybean harvest of 4.4 billion bushels and record-ending stocks (909 million bushels or a 22.9% stocks-to-use ratio) that year ( Figure 3 ). The record soybean harvest in 2018, combined with the sudden loss of the Chinese soybean market, kept downward pressure on U.S. soybean prices. Despite a smaller crop and lower stocks in 2019, the reduction in volume of U.S. soybean exports to China has prevented a major price recovery.

Similarly, several consecutive years of bumper U.S. corn crops have built domestic corn supplies. U.S. corn ending stocks in 2019 are projected down slightly to 1.8 billion bushels after three consecutive years of above 2-billion-bushel ending stock totals. U.S. wheat and cotton supplies are also expected to decline relative to use levels in 2019 but remain high relative to the historical average thus limiting price recovery.

Because the livestock sectors (particularly dairy and cattle but hogs and poultry to a lesser degree) have longer biological lags and often require large capital investments up front, they are slower to adjust to changing market conditions than is the crop sector. As a result, USDA projects livestock and dairy production and prices an extra year into the future (compared with the crop sector) through 2020, and market participants consider this expanded outlook when deciding their market interactions (e.g., buy, sell, expand herd sizes).

Background on the U.S. Cattle-Beef Sector

During the 2007-2014 period, high feed and forage prices plus widespread drought in the Southern Plainsâthe largest U.S. cattle production regionâresulted in an 8% contraction of the U.S. cattle inventory. Reduced beef supplies led to higher producer and consumer prices and record profitability among cow-calf producers in 2014. This was coupled with a subsequent improvement in forage conditions, all of which helped to trigger the slow rebuilding phase in the cattle cycle that started in 2014 ( Figure 4 ). The expansion continued through 2019 despite weakening profitability, primarily due to the lag in the biological response to the strong market price signals of late 2014.

However, the cattle expansion appears to show the first signs of contraction in USDA's January 2020 U.S. cattle inventory report. The estimated cattle and calf population was down slightly from a year earlier at 94.4 million (compared with 94.8 million in January 2019). A factor working against continued expansion in cattle numbers is that producers are now producing more beef with fewer cattle as a result of heavier weights for marketed cattle.

Robust Production Growth Projected Across the Livestock Sector

Similar to the cattle sector, U.S. hog and poultry flocks have been growing in recent years, but unlike cattle they are expected to continue to expand in 2020. USDA projects production of beef (+1.2%), pork (+4.5%), broilers (+4.3%), and eggs (+1.8%) to expand robustly through 2020. A key uncertainty for the meat-producing sector is whether demand will expand rapidly enough to absorb the continued growth in output or whether surplus production will begin to pressure prices lower. USDA projects that combined domestic and export demand for 2020 will flatten for red meat (+0.0%) but expand for poultry (+3.9%).

Livestock-Price-to-Feed-Cost Ratios Signal Lower Profitability Outlook

The changing conditions for the U.S. livestock sector may be tracked by the evolution of the ratios of livestock output prices to feed costs ( Figure 5 ). A higher ratio suggests greater profitability for producers. The cattle-, hog-, and broiler-to-feed ratios have all exhibited significant volatility during the 2017-2019 period but in general have trended downward during 2018 and 2019, suggesting eroding profitability. The milk-to-feed price ratio has trended upward since mid-2018 into 2020. This result varies widely across the United States. Many marginally profitable cattle, hog, broiler, and milk producers face continued financial difficulties.

Continued strong production growth of between 1% and 5% for red meat and poultry suggests that prices are vulnerable to weakness in demand. USDA projects that the price increase for hogs will slow in 2020, up 2.2% after 4.4% growth in 2019 ( Table A-4 ). Similarly, U.S. milk production is projected to continue growing in 2020 (+1.7%). Despite this production growth, USDA projects U.S. milk prices up slightly in 2020 (+1.3%).

Projected farm-sector revenue sources in 2020 include crop revenues (46% of sector revenues), livestock receipts (43%), government payments (3%), and other farm-related income (7%), including crop insurance indemnities, machine hire, and custom work. Total farm sector gross cash income for 2020 is projected down (-0.3%) to $430.9 billion, driven by declines in both direct government payments (-36.6%) and other farm-related income (-8.0%). Cash receipts from crop receipts (+1.0%) and livestock product (+4.6%) are up a combined (+4.6%) ( Figure 6 ).

Total crop sales peaked in 2012 at $231.6 billion when a nationwide drought pushed commodity prices to record or near-record levels. In 2020, crop sales are projected at $198.6 billion, up 1.0% from 2019 ( Figure 7 and Figure 8 ). Projections for 2020 and percentage changes from 2019 include

Feed cropsâcorn, barley, oats, sorghum, and hay: $60.1 billion (+2.0%); Oil cropsâsoybeans, peanuts, and other oilseeds: $36.8 billion (-2.3%); Fruits and nuts: $31.0 billion (+6.3%); Vegetables and melons: $20.1 billion (-1.8%); Food grainsâwheat and rice: $11.3 billion (+1.4%); Cotton: $7.1 billion (+2.1%); and Other including tobacco, sugar, greenhouse, and nursery: $31.2 billion (-0.6%).

The livestock sector includes cattle, hogs, sheep, poultry and eggs, dairy, and other minor activities. Cash receipts for the livestock sector grew steadily from 2009 to 2014, when it peaked at a record $212.3 billion. However, the sector turned downward in 2015 (-10.7%) and again in 2016 (-14.1%), driven largely by projected year-over-year price declines across major livestock categories ( Table A-4 , Figure 9 , and Figure 10 ).

In 2017, livestock sector cash receipts recovered with year-to-year growth of 8.1% to $175.6 billion. Cash receipts increased slightly in 2018 (+0.5%) and 2019 (+0.6%). In 2020, cash receipts are projected up strongly (+4.6%) for the sector at $185.8 billion as increased cattle, hogs, and dairy sales offset declines in poultry. Projections for 2020 (and percentage changes from 2019) include

Cattle and calf sales: $69.0 billion (+1.6%), Poultry and egg sales: $40.1 billion (+1.7%), Dairy sales: $42.5 billion (+5.2%), Hog sales: $27.1 billion (+18.4%), and Miscellaneous livestock: $7.1 billion (+2.0%).

Historically, direct government farm program payments have included

Direct payments (decoupled payments based on historical planted acres); Price-contingent payments (both coupled and decoupled program outlays linked to market conditions); Conservation payments (including the Conservation Reserve Program and other environmental-based outlays); Ad hoc and emergency disaster assistance payments (including emergency supplemental crop and livestock disaster payments and market loss assistance payments for relief of low commodity prices); and Other miscellaneous outlays, including payments under ad hoc programs initiated by the Administration such as the Market Facilitation Program (MFP) or the cotton ginning cost-share programs but also legislatively authorized programs such as the biomass crop assistance program, peanut quota buyout, milk income loss, tobacco transition, and other miscellaneous programs.

Projected government payments of $15.0 billion in 2020, if realized, would represent a 36.6% decline from 2019 but would still be the second-largest since 2006. The $23.6 billion in federal payments in 2019 was the largest taxpayer transfer to the agriculture sector (in absolute dollars) since 2005 ( Figure 12 and Table A-1 ). The surge in federal subsidies in 2019 was driven by large "trade-damage" payments made under the MFP initiated by USDA in response to the U.S.-China trade dispute. MFP payments (reported to be $14.6 billion) in 2019 include outlays from the 2018 MFP program that were not received by producers until 2019, as well as payments under the first and second tranches of the 2019 MFP program. In 2020, MFP payments are projected to decline to $3.7 billion representing the third and final tranche of payments from the 2019 MFP program. No new MFP program has been announced for 2020 by the Administration.

USDA permanent disaster assistance is projected higher year-over-year in 2020 at $2.5 billion (+14.2%). Most of the $2.5 billion comes from a new, temporary program, the Wildfire and Hurricane Indemnity Program Plus, enacted through the Disaster Relief Act of 2019 ( P.L. 116-20 ). Payments under the Price Loss Coverage program are projected at $3.9 billion in 2020, up from $1.9 billion in 2019. In contrast, Agricultural Risk Coverage outlays are projected to decline to $39 million, down from $641 million in 2019 (see "Price Contingent" in Figure 12 ).

Conservation programs include all conservation programs operated by USDA's Farm Service Agency and the Natural Resources Conservation Service that provide direct payments to producers. Estimated conservation payments of $4.2 billion are forecast for 2020, up (+4.4%) from $4.0 billion in 2019.

Total government payments of $15.0 billion represents a 3.5% share of projected gross cash income of $432.2 billion in 2020 ( Figure 6 ). In contrast, government payments are expected to represent 15.5% of the projected net cash income of $109.6 billion ( Figure 11 ). The government share of net farm income reached a peak of 65.2% in 1984 during the height of the farm crisis of the 1980s. The importance of government payments as a percentage of net farm income varies nationally by crop and livestock sector and by region.

The 2018 farm bill ( P.L. 115-334 ) made several changes to the previous Margin Protection Program (MPP) for dairy, including a new nameâthe Dairy Margin Coverage (DMC) programâand expanded margin coverage choices from the original range of $4.00-$8.00 per hundredweight (cwt.). Under the 2018 farm bill, as a cushion against low milk prices, producers have the option of buying coverage to insure a margin between the national farm price of milk and the cost of feed up to a threshold of $9.50/cwt. on the first 5 million pounds of milk coverage.

The DMC margin differs from the USDA-reported milk-to-feed ratio (shown in Figure 5 ) but reflects the same market forces. In August 2019, the formula-based milk-to-feed margin used to determine government payments rose to $9.85/cwt., thus exceeding the newly instituted $9.50/cwt. payment threshold ( Figure 13 ) and decreasing the likelihood of DMC payments in the near future. Since then, the DMC margin continued its rise to $12.21 in November 2019. These increases in the DMC margin decrease the likelihood that DMC payments will be available during the first half of 2020. Despite these price movements, USDA projects that the DMC program will make $637 million in payments in 2020, up from $279 million in 2019.

Total production expenses for 2020 for the U.S. agricultural sector are projected to be up by $10.4 billion (+3.0%) from 2019 in nominal dollars at $354.7 billion ( Figure 14 ). Production expenses peaked in both nominal and inflation-adjusted dollars in 2014 then declined for five consecutive years in inflation-adjusted dollars but are projected to turn up again in 2020.

Production expenses affect crop and livestock farms differently. The principal expenses for livestock farms are feed costs, purchases of feeder animals and poultry, and hired labor. In contrast, fuel, seed, pesticides, interest, and fertilizer costs are major crop production expenses. USDA projects that all expense categories with the exception of interest rates will be up in 2020 ( Figure 15 ). But how have production expenses moved relative to revenues? A comparison of the indexes of prices paid (an indicator of expenses) versus prices received (an indicator of revenues) reveals that the prices received index generally declined from 2014 through 2016, rebounded in 2017, then trended lower through 2019 ( Figure 16 ). Farm input prices (as reflected by the prices paid index) showed a similar pattern but with a smaller decline from their 2014 peak and have climbed steadily since mid-2016, suggesting that farm sector profit margins have been squeezed since 2016.

A measure of the farm sector's financial well-being is net worth as measured by farm assets minus farm debt. A summary statistic that captures this relationship is the debt-to-asset ratio.

The U.S. farm income and asset-value situation and outlook suggest a slowly eroding financial situation heading into 2020 for the agriculture sector as a whole. Considerable uncertainty clouds the economic outlook for the sector, reflecting the mixed outlook for prices and market conditions, an increasing dependency on international markets to absorb domestic surpluses, and an increasing dependency on federal support to offset lost trade opportunities due to ongoing trade disputes.

Farm asset values (see box "Measuring Farm Wealth: The Debt-to-Asset Ratio" below for details)âwhich reflect farm investors' and lenders' expectations about long-term profitability of farm sector investmentsâare projected to be up 1.3% in 2020 to a nominal $3.1 trillion ( Table A-3 ). The projected rise in asset value is due to increases in both real estate values (+1.5%) and non-real-estate values (+0.6%). Real estate is projected to account for 83% of total farm sector asset value. Inflation-adjusted farm asset values (using 2019 dollars) are projected lower in 2020 (-0.6%). In inflation-adjusted terms, farm asset values peaked in 2014 ( Figure 17 ). Crop land values are closely linked to commodity prices. The leveling off of crop land values since 2015 reflects stagnant commodity prices ( Figure 18 ).

Total farm debt is forecast to rise to a record $425.3 billion in 2020 (+2.3%) ( Table A-3 ). Farm equityâor net worth, defined as asset value minus debtâis projected to be up slightly (+1.1%) at $2.7 trillion in 2020 ( Table A-3 ). The farm debt-to-asset ratio is forecast up in 2020 at 13.6%, the highest level since 2003 but still relatively low by historical standards ( Figure 19 ). If realized, this would be the eighth consecutive year of increase in the debt-to-asset ratio.

A farm can have both an on-farm and an off-farm component to its income statement and balance sheet of assets and debt. Thus, the well-being of farm operator households is not equivalent to the financial performance of the farm sector or of farm businesses because of the inclusion of nonfarm investments, jobs, and other links to the nonfarm economy.

Average farm household income (sum of on- and off-farm income) is projected at $118,908 in 2020 ( Table A-2 ), down 1.5% from 2019 and 11.4% below the record of $134,165 in 2014. About 18% ($20,926) of total farm household income in 2020 is projected to be from farm production activities, while the overwhelming majority, at 82% ($97,982), is earned off the farm (including financial investments). The share of farm income derived from off-farm sources had increased steadily for decades but peaked at about 95% in 2000 ( Figure 20 ). Since 2014, over half of U.S. farm operations have had negative income from their agricultural operations.

Since the late 1990s, farm household incomes have surged ahead of average U.S. household incomes ( Figure 21 ). In 2018 (the last year for which comparable data were available), the average farm household income of $112,211 was about 25% higher than the average U.S. household income of $90,021 ( Table A-2 ).

Figure A-1 to Figure A-4 present USDA data on monthly farm prices received for several major farm commoditiesâcorn, soybeans, wheat, upland cotton, rice, milk, cattle, hogs, and chickens. The data are presented in an indexed format where monthly price data for year 2010 = 100 to facilitate comparisons.

Table A-1 to Table A-3 present aggregate farm income variables that summarize the financial situation of U.S. agriculture. In addition, Table A-4 presents the annual average farm price received for several major commodities, including the USDA forecast for the 2019-2020 marketing year for major program crops and 2020-2021 for livestock products.