FY2019 National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 5515)

Summary: For FY2019, the Trump Administration requested $708.1 billion to fund programs falling under the jurisdiction of the House and Senate Armed Services Committees and subject to authorization by the annual National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA).

Summary: The annual National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) authorizes appropriations for the Department of Defense (DOD) and defense-related atomic energy programs of the Department of Energy. In addition to authorizing appropriations, the NDAA establishes defense policies and restrictions, and addresses organizational administrative matters related to DOD. Unlike an appropriations bill, the NDAA does not provide budget authority for government activities.

Summary: The President's FY2019 budget request for DOD reflected in part the department's efforts to align its priorities with the 2018 National Defense Strategy and conform to discretionary spending limits set by the Budget Control Act of 2011 (BCA; P.L. 112-25 ) as amended by the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018 (BBA 2018; P.L. 115-23 ).

Summary: Of the $708.1 billion, the Trump Administration's request included $639.1 billion in discretionary funding for the so-called base budgetâthat is, funds intended to pay for defense-related activities that DOD and other agencies would pursue even if U.S. armed forces were not engaged in contingency operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, and elsewhere. The remaining $69 billion of the request, designated as funding for Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO), would fund the incremental costs of those ongoing contingency operations, as well as any other costs that Congress and the President agreed to so designate.

Summary: The request was consistent with discretionary spending limits (or caps) on defense activities originally established by the Budget Control Act of 2011 (BCA; P.L. 112-25 ) and amended by the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018 (BBA 2018; P.L. 115-123 ). The FY2019 defense spending cap is $647 billion and applies to discretionary defense programs (excluding OCO). The cap includes programs outside the scope of the NDAA and for which the Administration requested approximately $8 billion. Thus, the portion of the cap applicable to spending authorized by the NDAA is approximately $639 billion.

Summary: On May 24, 2018, the House voted 351-66 to pass H.R. 5515 , an amended version of the FY2019 NDAA reported by the House Armed Services Committee. On June 18, 2018, the Senate voted 85-10 to pass its version of H.R. 5515 , after replacing the House-passed text of H.R. 5515 with an amended version of the FY2019 proposal reported by the Senate Armed Services Committee ( S. 2987 ). On July 25, 2018, a conference committee reported a revised version of the bill ( H.Rept. 115-874 ). On July 26, 2018, the House voted 359-54 to approve the conference report. On August 1, the Senate voted 87-10 to approve the conference report. The conference version authorized approximately the same amount as the President's request, though with several billions of dollars of adjustments to amounts within the appropriation titles. On August 13, 2018, President Donald J. Trump signed the bill into law ( P.L. 115-232 ).

Summary: Congressional authorization of FY2019 defense authorizations reflected a running debate about the size of the defense budget given the strategic and budgetary issues facing the United States.

The annual National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) authorizes appropriations for the Department of Defense (DOD) and defense-related atomic energy programs of the Department of Energy.

In addition to authorizing appropriations, the NDAA establishes defense policies and restrictions, and addresses organizational administrative matters related to DOD. The bill incorporates provisions governing military compensation, the department's acquisition process, and aspects of DOD policy toward other countries, among other subjects. Enacted to authorize annual defense appropriations since FY1962, the bill also sometimes serves as a vehicle for legislation that originates in congressional committees other than the armed services committees.

Unlike an appropriations bill, the NDAA does not provide budget authority for government activities. While the NDAA does not provide budget authority, historically it has provided a fairly reliable indicator of congressional sentiment on funding for particular programs. The bill authorizes funding for DOD activities at the same level of detail at which budget authority is provided by the corresponding defense and military construction appropriations bills. As defense authorization and appropriations bills can differ on a line-item level, some observers view defense authorizations as funding targets rather than amounts. According to the Government Accountability Office (GAO), "An authorization act is basically a directive to Congress itself, which Congress is free to follow or alter (up or down) in the subsequent appropriation act."

In addition, committee reports accompanying the NDAA often contain language directing an individual, such as a senior DOD official, to take a specified action by a date certain. Although such directive report language is not legally binding, agency officials generally regard it as a congressional mandate and respond accordingly.

Table 1 and Table 2 below provide an overview of legislative actions taken on the FY2019 NDAA, along with relevant funding authorization figures for budget functions in different versions of the bill considered by the 115 th Congress.

For FY2019, the Trump Administration requested $708.1 billion to fund programs falling under the jurisdiction of the House and Senate Armed Services Committees and subject to authorization by the annual National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA).

On May 24, 2018, the House voted 351-66 to pass H.R. 5515 (Roll no. 230), an amended version of the FY2019 NDAA reported by the House Armed Services Committee. That bill would have authorized approximately the same amount as the President's request, including $639.1 billion ($1.1 million less than the request) for the so-called base budgetâthat is, funds intended to pay for defense-related activities that DOD and other agencies would pursue even if U.S. armed forces were not engaged in contingency operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, and elsewhere. The remaining $69 billion ($158,000 less than the request), designated as funding for Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO), would have funded the incremental costs of those ongoing contingency operations, as well as any other costs that Congress and the President agreed to so designate.

On June 18, 2018, the Senate voted 85-10 to pass its version of H.R. 5515 (Record Vote Number 128), after replacing the House-passed text of H.R. 5515 with an amended version of the FY2019 proposal reported by the Senate Armed Services Committee ( S. 2987 ). That bill would have authorized $707.9 billion, including $639.4 billion ($492.4 million more than the request) for the base budget and $68.5 billion ($515.4 million less than the request) for OCO.

On July 23, 2018, a conference committee reported a compromise version of the bill ( H.Rept. 115-863 ). However, the initial conference report required revision due in part to technical issues. On July 25, 2018, the conference committee reported a revised conference report ( H.Rept. 115-874 ). That bill authorized approximately the same amount as the President's request, though with several billions of dollars of adjustments to amounts within the appropriation titles.

On July 26, 2018, the House voted 359-54 to approve the conference report (Roll no. 379). On August 1, the Senate voted 87-10 to approve the conference report (Record Vote Number 181). On August 13, 2018, President Donald J. Trump signed the bill into law ( P.L. 115-232 ).

The legislation marked the first NDAA since the FY1997 act enacted prior to the start of the fiscal year.

House and Senate conferees authorized $708.1 billion in discretionary budget authority for national defense programs in the final version of the conference report for H.R. 5515 ( H.Rept. 115-874 ), an increase of $16 billion (2.3%) from the FY2018 enacted amount. While that figure was approximately the same amount as the President's request for FY2019, it included billions of dollars in adjustments to amounts for individual DOD appropriation titles, as well as for atomic energy defense programs and other defense-related activities. See Table 2 .

For example, of the $616.9 billion authorized for DOD base budget activities, the conference report included $132.3 billion for procurement, an increase of $1.8 billion (1.3%) from the President's request; $91.7 billion for research, development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E), an increase of $670 million (less than 1%) from the request; $198.5 billion for operation and maintenance, a decrease of $960 million (less than 1%) from the request; $147.1 billion for military personnel, a decrease of $1.2 billion (approximately 1%) from the request; and $10.3 billion for military construction and family housing, a decrease of $123 million (1.2%).

The conference report also included $21.9 billion for atomic energy defense programs, an increase of $108.6 million (less than 1%) from the President's request; and $300 million for other defense-related activities, an increase of $86 million (40%) from the request.

Congressional authorization of FY2019 defense authorizations reflects a running debate about the size of the defense budget given the strategic and budgetary issues facing the United States.

The President's FY2019 budget request for DOD was shaped in part by the department's efforts to align its priorities with its 2018 National Defense Strategy and conform to discretionary spending limits set by the Budget Control Act of 2011 (BCA; P.L. 112-25 ) as amended by the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018 (BBA 2018; P.L. 115-23 ).

On December 18, 2017, the Trump Administration released its first National Security Strategy (NSS). The NSS maintains that, in addition to the threats posed to the United States by rogue regimes and violent extremist organizations that have been a central focus of national security policy since the end of the Cold War, great power rivalry and competition have once again become a central feature of the international security landscape. To advance U.S. interests effectively within this strategic context, the Administration argues, the United States must improve domestic American security and bolster economic competitiveness while rebuilding its military.

The NSS further argues that that since the 1990s, the United States has "displayed a great degree of strategic complacency," largely as a result of overwhelming and unchallenged U.S. military and economic superiority. Operations in the Balkans, Africa, Afghanistan, and Iraq, while challenging and complex undertakings, did not require fundamental revision of the capabilities of the United States. Yet both China and Russia appear to be developing capabilities and concepts that potentially "overmatch," or demonstrate technological superiority, to U.S. military capabilities.

Released in January 2018, DOD's 11-page unclassified summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS) articulates how the department plans to advance U.S. objectives outlined in the White House's National Security Strategy (NSS). Consistent with comparable documents issued by prior Administrations, the NDS maintains that there are five central external threats to U.S. interests: China, Russia, North Korea, Iran, and terrorist groups with global reach. In a break from previous Administrations, however, the NDS views retaining the U.S. strategic competitive edge relative to China and Russia as a higher priority than countering violent extremist organizations. It also contends that, unlike most of the period since the end of the Cold War, the Joint Force must now operate in contested domains where freedom of access and maneuver is no longer assured.

Accordingly, the NDS summary called for "increased and sustained investment" to counter evolving threats from China and Russia: "Long-term strategic competitions with China and Russia are the principal priorities for the Department, and require both increased and sustained investment, because of the magnitude of the threats they pose to U.S. security and prosperity today, and the potential for those threats to increase in the future." The NDS organizes DOD activities along three central interconnected "lines of effort": rebuilding military readiness and improving the joint force's lethality, strengthening alliances and attracting new partners, and reforming the department's business practices.

In June 2017, several months before the release of the NDS, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Marine General Joseph Dunford recommended that Congress increase the regular, or base, defense budget between 3% and 5% a year above inflation ("real growth") to maintain the U.S. competitive advantage against strategic competitors such as China and Russia. "We know now that continued growth in the base budget of at least 3% above inflation is the floor necessary to preserve just the competitive advantage we have today and we can't assume that our adversaries will stand still," he said.

Congressional action on the FY2019 NDAA was shaped in part by a focus on controlling federal spending amid rising federal debt. The Budget Control Act emphasized limiting discretionary spending, including defense spending. However, mandatory spending makes up the largest share of federal spending and is projected to increase at a faster rate than discretionary spending. See Figure 1 .

As the 115 th Congress considered the President's FY2019 request for defense spending, OMB had estimated that since 9/11, outlays for defense discretionary programs in nominal dollars (not adjusted for inflation) would increase 122% from $306.1 billion in FY2001 to $678 billion in FY2019, while outlays for non-defense discretionary programs would increase 83% from $343 billion in FY2001 to $626 billion in FY2019. OMB had also estimated that outlays for mandatory programs would increase 172% from $1 trillion in FY2001 to $2.7 trillion in FY2019, while outlays for net interest payments on the national debt would increase 76% from $206.2 billion in FY2001 to $363.4 billion in FY2019.

The Congressional Budget Office had projected mandatory spending and net interest payments would increase at faster rates than defense and nondefense discretionary spending over the next decade. CBO had also projected net interest payments on the national debt would surpass defense discretionary outlays in FY2023.

President Donald J. Trump's FY2019 budget request, released on February 12, 2018, included $726.8 billion for national defense, a major federal budget function that encompasses defense-related activities of the federal government.

National defense is one of 20 major functions used by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to organize budget data and is the largest in terms of discretionary spending. The national defense budget function (identified by the numerical notation 050) comprises three subfunctions: DODâMilitary (051); atomic energy defense activities primarily of the Department of Energy (053); and other defense-related activities (054), such as FBI counterintelligence activities.

The $726.8 billion national defense budget request included $716 billion in discretionary budget authority and $10.8 billion in mand atory budget authority.

Portion of Defense Budget Subject to NDAA

Of the $726.8 billion requested for national defense, approximately $708.1 billion was subject to authorization by the annual National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA). The remainder of the request was either for mandatory funds not requiring annual authorization or for discretionary funds under the jurisdiction of other congressional committees.

Of the $708.1 billion, the Trump Administration's revised request included $639.1 billion in discretionary funding for the so-called base budget âthat is, funds intended to pay for defense-related activities that the Department of Defense (DOD) and other agencies would pursue even if U.S. armed forces were not engaged in contingency operations, designated Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO), in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, and elsewhere. The remaining $69 billion of the request would fund the incremental costs of OCO, as well as any other costs that Congress and the President agreed to so designate.

The request was consistent with discretionary spending limits (or caps) on defense activities originally established by the Budget Control Act of 2011 (BCA; P.L. 112-25 ) and amended by the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018 (BBA 2018; P.L. 115-123 ). The FY2019 defense spending cap was $647 billion and applied to discretionary defense programs (excluding OCO). The cap included programs outside the scope of the NDAA and for which the Administration requested approximately $8 billion. Thus, the portion of the cap applicable to spending authorized by the NDAA was approximately $639 billion.

As part of an agreement to increase the statutory limit on public debt, the BCA aimed to reduce annual federal budget deficits by a total of at least $2.1 trillion from FY2012 through FY2021 compared to projected levels, with approximately half of the savings to come from defense. The spending limits (or caps) apply separately to defense and nondefense discretionary budget authority. The caps are enforced by a mechanism called sequestration that automatically cancels previously enacted appropriations by an amount necessary to reach pre-specified levels. The BCA effectively exempted certain types of discretionary spending from the statutory limits, including funding designated for Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO)/Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). In the past, Congress has amended the legislation to raise the spending limits (thus lowering its deficit-reduction effect by corresponding amounts), but, as of July 2019, it had not changed the limits for FY2020 and FY2021.

Of the $686.1 billion for DOD, the Trump Administration's initial request included $597.1 billion for the base budget. The remaining $89 billion was designated as funding for OCO. However, in an amendment to the budget after Congress raised spending caps as part of the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018 (BBA 2018; P.L. 115-123 ), the Administration removed the OCO designation from $20 billion of funding, in effect, shifting that amount into the base budget request. In a statement on the budget amendment, White House Office of Management and Budget Director Mick Mulvaney said the amended request fixed "long-time budget gimmicks" in which OCO funding had been used for base budget requirements. Beginning in FY2020, "the Administration proposes returning to OCO's original purpose by shifting certain costs funded in OCO to the base budget where they belong," he wrote.

The Administration requested authorization for an active-duty end-strength of 1.3 million personnel, an increase of 15,600 personnel from the enacted FY2018 level; and for a reserve component end-strength of 824,700 personnel, an increase of 800 personnel from the enacted FY2018 level.

The House version of the bill would have supported the Administration's request, while the Senate amendment would have authorized an end-strength of 9,439 fewer personnel than requested, including 8,639 fewer active-duty personnel and 800 fewer reserve component personnel. The act authorizes the Administration's requested end-strength. See Table 3 .

Title 37, Section 1009, of the United States Code (37 U.S.C. Â§1009) provides a permanent formula for an automatic annual increase in basic pay that is indexed to the annual increase in the Employment Cost Index (ECI), a survey prepared by the Department of Labor's Bureau of Labor Statistics, for "wages and salaries" of private industry workers. The FY2019 budget request proposed a 2.6% increase in basic pay for military personnel in line with the formula in current law. The Senate amendment included a provision that would have waived the automatic increase in basic pay under 37 U.S.C. Â§1009 and specified a pay raise of 2.6%. The enacted bill contains no provision relating to a general increase in basic pay, thereby leaving in place the automatic adjustment of 37 U.S.C. Â§1009 amounting to 2.6% in 2019.

Title V of the act contains provisions that modified key parts of the Defense Officer Personnel Management Act (DOPMA; P.L. 96-513 ) governing the appointment, promotion, and separation of military officers. Changes include allowing civilians with operationally relevant training or experience to enter the military up to the rank of O-6âa colonel in the Army, Air Force, or Marine Corps; or captain in the Navyâand creating an "alternative promotion" process for officers in specialized fields.

The Administration requested $11.4 billion in new budget authority for DOD military construction and family housing projects, including $10.5 billion in base budget funding and $921 million in Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) funding. See Table 4 .

The act authorizes less funding than requested for some of the most valuable military construction projects. For example, the act authorizes

$105 million for the MIT-Lincoln Laboratory, West Lab Compound Semiconductor Laboratory and Microsystem Integration Facility (CSL/MIF), at Hanscom Air Force Base, MA ($120 million less than requested); $181 million for Phase 1, Increment 2 of the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency complex known as Next NGA West (N2W) in St. Louis, MO ($33 million less than requested); and $140 million for Phase 2 of the long-range discriminating radar system complex at Clear Air Force Station, AK ($44 million less than requested).

Most of the $921 million requested for military construction using OCO funds was for projects related to the European Deterrence Initiative (see the " European Deterrence Initiative (EDI) " section). The act authorizes an additional $30.4 million for flight line support facilities and an additional $40 million for a personnel deployment processing facility, both at Al Udeid Air Base, Qatar. The act does not authorize the $69 million requested for a high-value detention facility at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.

Congress generally exercises its legislative powers to affect defense acquisitions through Title VIII of the NDAA, typically entitled Acquisition Policy, Acquisition Management, and Related Matters . In some years, the NDAA also contains titles specifically dedicated to aspects of acquisition, such as Title XVII of the FY2018 NDAA, entitled Small Business Procurement and Industrial Base Matters .

Congress has been particularly active in legislating acquisition reform over the last four years. For FY2016-FY2019, NDAA titles specifically related to acquisition reform contained an average of 80 provisions (318 in total), compared to an average of 47 such provisions (466 in total) in the NDAAs for the preceding 10 fiscal years.

Examples of recent acquisition reform-related provisions include the following:

Changes to the role of the Chiefs of the Military Services and the Commandant of the Marine Corps (collectively referred to as the Service Chiefs) in the acquisition process (Section 802 of P.L. 114-92 , the FY2016 NDAA); Splitting the office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD [AT&L]) into two separate offices: the office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment (USD A&S) and the office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering (USD R&E) (Section 901 of P.L. 114-328 , the FY2017 NDAA); Strengthening the role of the military departments in acquisitions (see, for example, Section 897 of P.L. 114-328 , the FY2017 NDAA); Increasing the government-wide simplified acquisition threshold from $150,000 to $250,000 (Section 805 of P.L. 115-91 ); and, Creating or expanding numerous rapid acquisition authorities, such as establishing middle tier acquisition pathways for rapid production and fielding (Section 804 of the FY2016 NDAA), and expanding and making permanent authorities relating to prototyping and follow-on production conducted using procurement authorities known as other transactions (Section 815 of P.L. 114-92 , the FY2016 NDAA) .

While the FY2019 NDAA generally does not include sweeping defense acquisition system reform-related provisions similar to those included in the FY2016-FY2018 NDAAs, it does include numerous provisions making other changes relating to defense acquisitions, such as the following:

Creating a framework to consolidate defense acquisition-related statutes in a new Part V of Subtitle A of Title 10, U.S. Code (Sections 801-809); Increasing the DOD micro-purchase threshold from $5,000 to $10,000 (Section 821); Requiring DOD to conduct a study of the frequency and effects of so-called "second bite at the apple" bid protests involving the same contract award or proposed award filed through both the Government Accountability Office (GAO) and the U.S. Court of Federal Claims (Section 822); Splitting the Title 41 definition of commercial item into separate definitions for commercial product and commercial service (Section 836); and Limiting the government-wide use of lowest price technically acceptable (LPTA) source selection criteria (Section 880).

The act authorizes $6.3 billion in OCO funding for the European Deterrence Initiative (EDI), an effort DOD began in 2014 to reassure NATO allies in Central and Eastern Europe of a continued U.S. commitment to their national security after the Russian military intervention in Ukraine, in addition to $250 million for Ukraine security assistance. Of the latter amount, $50 million was authorized for "lethal assistance," including anti-armor weapon systems, mortars, crew-served weapons and ammunition, grenade launchers and ammunition, small arms and ammunition; as well as counter-artillery radars, including medium-range and long-range counter-artillery radars that can detect and locate long-range artillery. Most of the EDI funding is intended for prepositioning a division-sized set of equipment in Europe and boosting the regional presence of U.S. forces.

The act authorizes $1.4 billion in OCO funding for activities to counter the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) by training and equipping Iraqi Security Forces and vetted Syrian opposition forces. The act includes a provision (Section 1233) limiting the use of roughly half of the $850 million for Iraq until the Secretary of Defense submits a report to the congressional defense committees on the U.S. strategy in Iraq. Another provision (Section 1231) limits the use of all of the $300 million for Syria until the President submits a report to congressional committees on the U.S. strategy in Syria. The Administration submitted the required reports to Congress in early 2019.

In response to concerns from some Members of Congress that certain foreign direct investment, primarily by Chinese firms, may pose risks to U.S. national defense and economic security, Title XVII of the act incorporates provisions designed to limit foreign access to sensitive U.S. technology. Subtitle A of Title XVII, the Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act of 2018 (FIRRMA), expands the purview of the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) to address national security concerns in part by amending the current process for the committee to review, on behalf of the President, the national security implications of foreign direct investment in U.S. companies. Subtitle B of Title XVII, the Export Controls Act of 2018, includes provisions to expand controls for exporting certain "dual-use" civilian and military items in part by requiring the establishment of an "interagency process to identify emerging and foundational technologies."

Prohibition on Chinese Telecommunications Equipment50

In response to concerns from some Members of Congress that Chinese telecommunications equipment manufacturers may pose a security risk to U.S. communications infrastructure, the act includes a provision (Section 889) prohibiting the heads of federal agencies from procuring telecommunications equipment or services from companies linked to the government of China, including Huawei Technologies Company and ZTE Corporation, among others. Huawei filed suit against the United States over the provision, arguing that it amounts to an unconstitutional "bill of attainder."

Another provision of the act (Section 1091) prohibits DOD from obligating funds authorized to be appropriated by the act or otherwise available for Chinese language instruction provided by Confucius Institutes, language and culture centers affiliated with China's Ministry of Education, unless the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness issues a waiver. It also bars DOD use of any obligated funds to support a Chinese language program at an institution of higher education that hosts a Confucius Institute.

DOD has described upgrading the nuclear triadâthat is, submarines armed with submarine-launched ballistic missiles, land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles, and strategic bombers carrying gravity bombs and air-launched cruise missilesâas its "number one priority."

The Trump Administration's 2018 Nuclear Posture Review, released in February 2018, reiterated the findings of previous reviews "that the nuclear triadâsupported by North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) dual-capable aircraft and a robust nuclear command, control, and communications systemâis the most cost-effective and strategically sound means of ensuring nuclear deterrence."

The department said that programsâsuch as the Columbia-class ballistic missile submarine, B-21 long-range strike bomber, and Long-Range Standoff (LRSO) cruise missileâto replace the existing inventory of systems intended to deliver nuclear weapons would be "fully funded" for the year if its FY2019 budget requests were met.

See Table 5 for information on the FY2019 budget request and authorizations for selected strategic offense and long-range systems.

Columbia-Class Ballistic Missile Submarine58

The Columbia-class program, previously known as the Ohio replacement program (ORP) or SSBN(X) program, is a program to design and build a new class of 12 ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) to replace the Navy's current force of 14 Ohio-class SSBNs. The Navy has identified the Columbia-class program as its top priority program. The service wants to procure the first Columbia-class boat in FY2021. The Navy's proposed FY2019 budget requested $3 billion in advance procurement (AP) funding and $705 million in research and development funding for the program. The budget also included $1.3 billion to continue refurbishing the Trident II (or D-5) missiles that arm the submarines. The act authorizes $3.2 billion for the Columbia-class program. The act supports the President's request for refurbishment of the Trident II missiles, and increased research-and-development funding for the effort.

The budget request included $2.3 billion to continue development of the B-21 long-range bomber, which the Air Force describes as one of its top three acquisition priorities. Acquisition of the airplane is slated to begin in 2023. The new bomberâlike the B-2s and B-52s currently in U.S. serviceâcould carry conventional as well as nuclear weapons. For the latter role, the request included $615 million to continue development of the Long-Range Standoff Weapon (LRSO), a cruise missile that would replace the 1980s-vintage Air-Launched Cruise Missile (ALCM) currently carried by U.S. bombers. The act supports the President's budget request for the B-21 bomber. The act authorizes an increase of $85 billion for the LRSO to $700 million.

The budget request included $345 million to continue developing a new, land-based intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), known as the Ground-Based Strategic Deterrent (GBSD), which in 2029 would begin replacing the Minuteman III missiles currently in service. The act authorizes an increase of $69 million to $414 million for the new Ground-Based Strategic Deterrent.

The budget request included $65 million for the W76-2 warhead modification program. The effort is intended to modify an unspecified number of Trident II MK4/W76 warheads, each of which has a yield of 100 kilotons, into a lower-yield variant referred to as the W76-2. The atomic weapons used at Hiroshima and Nagasaki were roughly 15 and 20 kilotons, respectively. The Trump Administration's February 2018 Nuclear Posture Review called for "low-yield" nuclear options to preserve "credible deterrence against regional aggression." The act authorizes the requested funding.

Since the late 1940s, the United States has developed and deployed ballistic missile defenses (BMD) to defend against enemy missiles. Since the start of an expanded initiative under President Ronald Reagan in 1985, BMD has been a key national security interest in Congress. Lawmakers have since appropriated more than $200 billion for a broad range of research and development programs and deployment of BMD systems. The United States has deployed a global array of networked ground-, sea-, and space-based sensors for target detection and tracking, an extensive number of ground- and sea-based hit-to-kill (direct impact) and blast fragmentation warhead interceptors, and a global network of command, control, and battle management capabilities to link those sensors with those interceptors.

The Trump Administration's FY2019 budget request included a total of $12.9 billion for defense against ballistic missiles, of which $9.9 billion would be allocated to the Missile Defense Agency (MDA).

See Table 6 for information on the FY2019 budget request and authorization actions for selected ballistic missile defense systems.

The Administration requested a total of approximately $2.6 billion for the Ground-Based Midcourse Defense (GMD), which included funding for systems and related improvements such as Common Kill Vehicle Technology, Pacific Discriminating Radar, and Long Range Discrimination Radar. As of November 2017, the system comprised 44 interceptor missiles at two sites, including 40 at Fort Greely in Alaska and four at Vandenberg Air Force Base in California. The interceptors are intended to destroy intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) with ranges in excess of 5,500 kilometers launched toward U.S. territory from countries such as North Korea. The department is adding another site at Fort Greely with 20 interceptors as part of a plan to expand the system to include 64 interceptors. The request included funding for an additional four interceptors and 10 silos, as well as continued development of a new warhead called the Redesigned Kill Vehicle (RKV) intended to replace the existing warhead known as the Exoatmospheric Kill Vehicle (EKV).

While the House and Senate generally supported the request for the GMD systemâthey authorized the procurement request and most of the RDT&E requestâconferees included a provision (Section 1683) that requires at least one successful flight intercept test of the RKV before it could enter production. The provision also requires the director of the Missile Defense Agency to report on ways to accelerate the fielding of the additional 20 interceptors with RKVs at Fort Greely.

The Administration's budget request included $1.1 billion for procurement and additional development work associated with the Terminal High-Altitude Air Defense (THAAD) interceptors, intended to intercept short-, medium-, and intermediate-range ballistic missiles. THAAD is a transportable system designed to defend troops abroad and population centers. In testing, the system has generally performed well by most measures, but it has not operated in combat. Both the House and Senate supported the Administration's request for $874 million in procurement for 82 THAAD interceptors and increased funding for associated research and development.

The request included $1.4 billion in procurement funding for the Army's Patriot system, including 240 Patriot Advanced Capability (PAC-3)/Missile Segment Enhancement (MSE) interceptors. The most mature U.S. BMD system, Patriot was used with mixed results in combat in the 1991 and 2003 wars against Iraq and is fielded around the world by the United States and other countries that have purchased the system. Patriot is a mobile system and designed to defend relatively small areas such as military bases and airfields. Patriot works with THAAD to provide an integrated and overlapping defense against incoming missiles in their final phase of flight. The act supports the Administration's request.

The act includes a provision (Section 241) requiring the Secretary of the Army to report on the survivability of air defense artillery, including "an analysis of the utility of relevant active kinetic capabilities, such as a new, long-range counter-maneuvering threat missile and additional indirect fire protection capability units to defend Patriot and Terminal High Altitude Area Defense batteries."

The President's budget request included $9.3 billion in funding for National Security Space (NSS) acquisition programs.

National Security Space is one of 12 Major Force Programs (MFP) of the DOD and includes funding for space launches, satellites, and support activities. MFP-12 includes funding for some classified programs and, for the most part, does not include funding for National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) and National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) programs.

See Table 7 for information on the FY2019 budget request and authorization actions for selected military space programs.

The budget request for NSS acquisition programs included approximately $2 billion to continue acquiring satellite launchers under the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV) program and to continue developing a replacement for the Russian-made rocket engine used in some national security space launches since the early 2000s. The act supported the budget request.

The act includes a provision (Section 1603) to designate the EELV program as the National Security Space Launch (NSSL) program, effective March 1, 2019. The provision also requires the Secretary of Defense to consider both "reusable and expendable launch vehicles" in any future solicitations "for which the use of a reusable launch vehicle is technically capable and maintains risk at acceptable levels."

The budget request included approximately $1.5 billion for the GPS satellite program and related projects. The technology provides worldwide positioning, navigation, and timing (PNT) information to military and civilian users. Funding would support launch of two GPS III satellites, development of GPS Next Generation Operational Control System (OCX), and integration of Military GPS User Equipment (MGUE) intended in part to provide a more powerful jam-resistant signal and information to military personnel in contested environments. The act authorizes $18 million less than the requested $1.4 billion in research and development funding due to what the conferees described as "insufficient justification."

The budget request included $842 million for the Space-Based Infrared System (SBIRS), including $704 million for research, development, test, and evaluation and $138 million for procurement. The system is a successor to the Defense Support Program (DSP) designed in part to provide early warning of a strategic missile attack on the United States and to support missile defense activities. The request was intended to support launch of Geosynchronous Earth Orbit (GEO) satellites and development of Next-Generation Overhead Persistent Infrared (OPIR) satellites. The act authorizes increasing RDT&E funding by $100 million to $804 million to "accelerate sensor development."

The act includes a provision (Section 1613) requiring the Secretary of Defense to evaluate supply chain vulnerabilities for protected satellite communications and OPIR. The conference report accompanying the bill directs the head of the Government Accountability Office (GAO) "to review the early planning for the next generation OPIR system and associated ground capabilities," and assess, in part, "to what extent will the next generation OPIR system continue to fulfill existing key SBIRS capabilities?"

Advanced Extremely High Frequency and Satellite Communications Projects

The budget request included $842 million for Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) and Satellite Communications (SATCOM) projects, including $677 million in research, development, test, and evaluation and $91 million in procurement. The projects are intended in part to provide communications that are secure, survivable, and resistant to jamming. Funding was to support the fifth and sixth AEHF satellites, as well as activities to improve AEHF operational resiliency through programs such as Protected Tactical Service (PTS), Protected SATCOM Services-Aggregated (PSCS-A), and Protected Tactical Enterprise Service (PTES). The act supports the budget request.

The act includes a provision (Section 1614) requiring the Secretary of Defense to report on how the evolved strategic satellite program, PTS, and PTES "will meet the requirements for resilience, mission assurance, and the nuclear command, control, and communication missions of the Department of Defense."

The act includes a provision (Section 1601) requiring the President, with the advice and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and through the Secretary of Defense, to establish U.S. Space Command as a subordinate unified command under U.S. Strategic Command "for carrying out joint space warfighting operations."

The provision states the commander of U.S. Space Command is responsible for "ensuring the combat readiness of forces assigned to the space command" and "monitoring the preparedness to carry out assigned missions of space forces assigned to unified combatant commands other than the United States Strategic Command."

In addition to modernizing the ground forces' existing armored combat vehicles such as the M-1 Abrams tank, M-2 Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicle (IFV), and Stryker wheeled combat vehicle, the Administration's FY2019 budget request included funding for newer capabilities, including mobile defense against cruise missiles and unmanned aircraft, and improved firepower and mobility for infantry units.

See Table 8 for information on the FY2019 budget request and authorizations for selected ground vehicle programs.

The act authorizes most of the approximately $2.7 billion requested to upgrade the Army's fleet of M-1 Abrams tanks, the service's main battle tank that entered service in 1980. The funding was intended to upgrade a portion of the fleet with a system enhancement package (SEP) that includes new armor, electronics, and weapons stations. It was also to equip three brigades with the Trophy active protection system (APS), designed in part to automatically acquire, track, and respond with hard or soft kill capabilities to a variety of threats, including rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs) and anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs).

The act authorizes more funds than requested to accelerate two other components of the Army's current combat vehicle fleet. It authorizes $413 million, $44 million more than requested, to replace the flat underside of many types of the Stryker wheeled combat vehicles with a V-shaped bottom intended to more effectively mitigate the explosive force of buried landmines or improvised explosive devices (IEDs). It also authorized $529 million, $110 million more than requested, to replace the chassis and powertrain of the M-109 Paladin self-propelled howitzer with the more powerful and robust chassis of the Bradley troop carrier.

The act authorizes fewer funds than requested for components of the Army's existing combat vehicle fleet. It authorizes $875 million, $172 million less than requested, to continue modernizing the Bradley primarily due to a "program decrease." It also authorizes $244 million, $22 million less than requested, for the Amphibious Combat Vehicle (ACV), a successor to the Marine Corps' AAV-7 amphibious troop carrier; and $797 million, $31 million less than requested, for the Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle (AMPV), intended to the place the Vietnam-era M-113 tracked personnel carrier.

The act includes a provision (Section 254) requiring the Secretary of the Army to develop a strategy to competitively procure a new transmission for the Bradley fighting vehicle, including an analysis of potential cost savings and performance improvements from a transmission common to the Bradley family of vehicles, including the AMPV and Paladin.

The Administration requested $449 million to develop and begin purchasing vehicles intended to boost the lethality and mobility of Army Infantry Brigade Combat Teams (IBCTs). The bulk of the funds were to develop a lightweight tank, designated Mobile Protected Firepower (MPF). The remainder of the funds were to begin purchasing four-wheel-drive, off-road vehicles for reconnaissance missions and troop transport, designated Light Reconnaissance Vehicle (LRV) and Ground Mobility Vehicle (GMV), respectively.

The act authorizes $370 million for the programs, $79 million less than requested, with most of the reduction due to a "Mobile Protected Firepower decrease."

The act includes a provision (Section 248) requiring the Secretary of the Army to submit a report to the Armed Services Committees on active protection systems (APS) for armored combat and tactical vehicles. Specifically, the provision required the report to: assess the effectiveness of such systems recently tested on the Abrams, Bradley, and Stryker; discuss plans for further testing, proposals for future development, and a timeline for fielding; and describe how the service plans to incorporate such systems into new armored combat and tactical vehicles, such as MPF, AMPV, and the Next Generation Combat Vehicle (NGCV), the Army's replacement for the Bradley.

The Administration requested $504 million for programs intended to enhance mobile Army defense against aircraft, including unmanned aerial systems and cruise missiles. These include a Stryker combat vehicle equipped to launch Stinger missiles, designated Interim Maneuver Short-Range Air Defense systems (IM-SHORAD), and a larger, truck-mounted missile launcher, designated Indirect Fire Protection Capability (IFPC).

The act authorizes $565 million for the programs, $61 million more than requested, driven by an increase to IFPC for "interim cruise missile defense."

The act includes a provision (Section 241) requiring the Secretary of the Army to submit a report to the Armed Services Committees on the service's efforts to improve the survivability of air defense artillery, including an analysis of new technology and additional units to defend Patriot and THAAD batteries.

In December 2016, the Navy adopted a new force goal of 355 shipsâa total similar to the 350-ship fleet President Trump had called for during the 2016 election campaign. The 355-ship plan replaced a previous 308-ship plan the Navy had adopted in March 2015.

The Navy's proposed FY2019 budget requested the procurement of 10 combat ships, including two Virginia-class attack submarines, three DDG-51 class destroyers, one Littoral Combat Ship (LCS), two TAO-205 class oilers, one Expeditionary Sea Base ship, and one towing, salvage, and rescue ship.

The act authorizes $1.9 billion more than the request, including funding for the 10 combat ships requested, as well as two additional LCSs. The act authorizes procurement of a fourth Ford-class aircraft carrier (CVN-81). The act also authorizes procurement of additional noncombat ships, including a cable ship that was not requested and three more ship-to-shore connectors than the five that were requested.

See Table 9 for summary information on the FY2019 budget request and authorization actions for selected shipbuilding programs.

The Administration's $1.6 billion request to fund a Ford-class aircraft carrier was intended as the fourth of eight annual increments to cover the estimated $12.6 billion cost of what will be the third ship of the Ford class. That ship, designated CVN-80 and named Enterprise , is slated for delivery to the Navy at the end of FY2027.

While the act does not authorize appropriations for a fourth Ford-class aircraft carrier (CVN-81), the law allows for the procurement to occur in conjunction with CVN-80. Proponents of such an arrangement, known as block buy contracting, contend that it could accelerate the delivery of the fourth ship and reduce the overall cost of the two vessels.

The act includes a provision (Section 121) stating that before the funds could be used for a block buy, the Secretary of Defense would have to certify to the congressional defense committees an analysis demonstrating that the approach would "result in significant savings compared to the total anticipated costs of carrying out the program through annual contracts."

In addition to the Administration's request of $646 million to procure a Littoral Combat Ship, the act authorizes $950 million to procure two more LCSs, which conferees described as a "program increaseâtwo ships." The increase more than offset a decrease of $37.7 million in procurement funding for the program to "align plans and other costs with end of production."

The act authorizes an additional $500 million for an LPD-17-class amphibious landing transport or a variant of that ship designated LX(R) and an additional $182.5 million for three more air-cushion landing craft in addition to the five requested to haul tanks and other equipment ashore from transport ships.

The act includes provisions intended to address factors perceived to have contributed to the two separate collisions in 2017 involving Pacific Fleet destroyers that resulted in the deaths of 17 U.S. sailors. A provision (Section 322) requires that Navy ships be subject to inspections with "minimal notice" to the crew and annual reports on "the material readiness of Navy ships as compared to established material requirements standards," among other topics. Another provision (Section 323) limited to 10 years the time that aircraft carriers, amphibious ships, cruisers, destroyers, frigates, and littoral combat ships can be based outside the United States. Another provision (Section 526) stated the Secretary of the Navy is to require key watch standersâthat is, a person standing watch on a ship, such as an officer of the deck, engineering officer of the watch, conning officer or piloting officerâto "maintain a career record of watchstanding hours and specific operational evolutions."

The act, for the most part, authorizes funding for the Administration's request for military aircraft acquisition.

The act authorizes additional funding for 15 more aircraft than requested, including six AH-64 Apache attack helicopters, five UH-60 Black Hawk utility helicopters, two MQ-9 Reaper reconnaissance and attack unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), one RQ-4 Global Hawk long-range reconnaissance UAV, and one E-2 Hawkeye airborne surveillance aircraft. The act authorizes less funding than requested for other programs, including the MQ-25 Stingray carrier-based refueling and reconnaissance UAV and the KC-46 refueling tanker aircraft.

See Table 10 for information on the FY2019 budget request and authorizations for selected aircraft programs.

The budget request included $8.8 billion for the procurement of 77 F-35 Lightning II aircraft as part of the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) program. The quantity includes 48 Air Force F-35As, equipped for conventional runway operations, 20 Marine Corps F-35Bs, equipped for short takeoff and vertical landing (STOVL) operations; and nine Navy F-35Cs, equipped for aircraft carrier operations.

The House version of the bill generally would have supported the Administration's request, while the Senate amendment would have cut funding associated with two aircraftâone F-35A and one F-35Câdue to "program realignment." While the act authorizes $133 million (1%) less procurement funding than requested, it authorizes the requested quantity of F-35 aircraft.

The act includes a provision (Section 1282) limiting the delivery of any F-35s to Turkey (which plans to buy 100 of the aircraft) until the Secretary of Defense submits a report to congressional committees on the Turkish government's plan to purchase the S-400 air and missile defense system from Russia. The report was to include "an assessment of impacts on other United States weapon systems and platforms operated jointly with the Republic of Turkey," including the F-35, Patriot surface-to-air missile system, CH-47 Chinook heavy-lift helicopter, AH-64 Apache helicopter, UH-60 Black Hawk helicopter, and F-16 Fighting Falcon fighter jet.

To compensate for the slower-than-planned fielding of the F-35 aircraft, the budget request included funds to mitigate a shortfall in the Navy's fleet of strike fighters by buying new F/A-18s and upgrading planes of that type already in service. The House version of the bill and the Senate amendment would have supported the request. The act generally supports the request, authorizing $56 million (3%) less than the $2 billion requested for 24 F/A-18s and $18 million (1%) more than the $1.5 billion requested to modify existing versions of the aircraft.

Section 127 of the act requires the Secretary of the Navy to work to modify the F/A-18 aircraft "to reduce the occurrence of, and mitigate the risk posed by, physiological episodes affecting crewmembers of aircraft," by replacing the cockpit altimeter, upgrading the onboard oxygen system generation system, redesigning aircraft life support systems, and installing equipment associated with improved physiological monitoring and alert systems.

The act authorizes $300 million in procurement funding not included in the President's request to begin buying an unspecified number of new OA-X light attack aircraft. Section 246 of the act requires the Secretary of the Air Force to submit to the congressional defense committees a report on the service's OA-X "experiment" and how the program incorporates partner nation requirements.

The act authorizes $201 million for modifications to the A-10 Thunderbolt II ground-attack aircraft known as the Warthog, including $65 million more than the President's request for additional wing replacements.

The Administration requested $2.6 billion to procure 15 KC-46A Pegasus aircraft as part of low-rate initial production (LRIP). The KC-46A Pegasus is an aerial refueling tanker intended to replace approximately one-third of the existing Cold War-era KC-135 Stratotanker fleet. The House version of the bill would have cut the procurement quantity to 12 planes and the Senate amendment to 14 planes. While the act authorizes $213 million (8%) less than requested in procurement funding for the program, it authorizes the requested quantity of aircraft. Section 146 of the act limits the use of the funding to procure some of the aircraft until the Secretary of the Air Force certifies to the congressional defense committees the plane's refueling and mission avionics systems meet FAA and Air Force requirements.

Combat Support and Surveillance Aircraft

The act authorizes $1.1 billion to procure five E-2D Advanced Hawkeye early-warning aircraft, $152 million and one aircraft more than the Administration's request. The report accompanying the Senate Armed Services Committee's version of the bill noted "the vital contributions of the E-2D Advanced Hawkeye to present and future carrier air wing operations" and recommended the increase, which was included on the Chief of Naval Operations' unfunded priorities list.

The President's budget request included an Air Force plan to develop a network of sensors called Advanced Battle Management System (ABMS) rather than move forward, as planned, with recapitalizing the E-8C Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS) aircraft, which provides airborne battle management, command and control, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. The House version of the bill would have authorized $623 million not included in the request to fund the E-8C recapitalization. The act authorizes $30 million to "continue JSTARS recap [ground moving target indicator] radar development." The act also includes a provision (Section 147) limiting funds to retire any JSTARS aircraft until the Secretary of Defense certifies to the congressional defense committees that ABMS is ready for operations.

The act authorizes $820 million to procure 31 MQ-9 Reapers, a reconnaissance and ground-attack unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV), $46 million and two aircraft more than the Administration's request, to accelerate development of ABMS.

The act authorizes $780 million to procure four MQ-4 Global Hawks, a long-range reconnaissance UAV, $81 million and one aircraft more than the Administration's request. The report accompanying the House Armed Services Committee's version of the bill recommends an increase in funding to procure an additional EQ-4 variant equipped with the Battlefield Airborne Communications Node (BACN) to improve tactical communications.

The act authorizes $567 million to continue research and development of the MQ-25 Stingray, a carrier-based aerial refueling and reconnaissance UAV, $117 million less than the Administration's request due to what conferees described as "Insufficient Air Vehicle budget justification." Section 219 of the act instructs the Secretary of the Navy to work to modify the aircraft carrier USS George Washington (CVN-73) to support the fielding of the MQ-25.

The act authorizes $1.5 billion to procure 66 AH-64 Apache attack helicopters (including new and remanufactured models), $168 million and six helicopters more than the request "to address [Army National Guard] shortfalls."

Similarly, the act authorizes $1.3 billion to procure 73 UH-60 Black Hawk utility helicopters (including new models and upgrades), $85 million and five helicopters more than the request for "additional UH-60Ms for [Army National Guard]."

Following are the full citations of CRS products identified in tables by reference number only.

CRS Report R41129, Navy Columbia (SSBN-826) Class Ballistic Missile Submarine Program: Background and Issues for Congress , by Ronald O'Rourke.

CRS Report R44463, Air Force B-21 Raider Long-Range Strike Bomber , by Jeremiah Gertler.

CRS Report R43049, U.S. Air Force Bomber Sustainment and Modernization: Background and Issues for Congress , by Jeremiah Gertler.

CRS Report R41464, Conventional Prompt Global Strike and Long-Range Ballistic Missiles: Background and Issues , by Amy F. Woolf.

CRS Report RL33745, Navy Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Program: Background and Issues for Congress , by Ronald O'Rourke.

CRS Report R44498, National Security Space Launch at a Crossroads , by Steven A. Hildreth.

CRS Report R43240, The Army's Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle (AMPV): Background and Issues for Congress , by Andrew Feickert.

CRS Report R42723, Marine Corps Amphibious Combat Vehicle (ACV): Background and Issues for Congress , by Andrew Feickert.

CRS Report R44968, Infantry Brigade Combat Team (IBCT) Mobility, Reconnaissance, and Firepower Programs , by Andrew Feickert.

CRS Report RS20643, Navy Ford (CVN-78) Class Aircraft Carrier Program: Background and Issues for Congress , by Ronald O'Rourke.

CRS Report RL32418, Navy Virginia (SSN-774) Class Attack Submarine Procurement: Background and Issues for Congress , by Ronald O'Rourke.

CRS Report RL32109, Navy DDG-51 and DDG-1000 Destroyer Programs: Background and Issues for Congress , by Ronald O'Rourke.

CRS Report RL33741, Navy Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Program: Background and Issues for Congress , by Ronald O'Rourke.

CRS Report R44972, Navy Frigate (FFG[X]) Program: Background and Issues for Congress , by Ronald O'Rourke.

CRS Report RL30563, F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) Program , by Jeremiah Gertler.

CRS Report RL34398, Air Force KC-46A Tanker Aircraft Program , by Jeremiah Gertler.

CRS Report RS22103, VH-71/VXX Presidential Helicopter Program: Background and Issues for Congress , by Jeremiah Gertler.

CRS Report R43618, C-130 Hercules: Background, Sustainment, Modernization, Issues for Congress , by Jeremiah Gertler and Timrek Heisler.

CRS Report RL31384, V-22 Osprey Tilt-Rotor Aircraft Program , by Jeremiah Gertler.

CRS Insight IN10931, U.S. Army's Initial Maneuver, Short-Range Air Defense (IM-SHORAD) System , by Andrew Feickert.

CRS In Focus IF10954, Air Force OA-X Light Attack Aircraft Program , by Jeremiah Gertler.


PFAS and Drinking Water: Selected EPA and Congressional Actions

Summary: Per- and polyfluoroalkyl substances (PFAS) are fluorinated chemicals that have been used in an array of commercial, industrial, and U.S. military applications for decades. Some of the more common applications include nonstick coatings, food wrappers, waterproof materials, and fire suppressants. Detections of some PFAS in drinking water supplies and uncertainty about potential health effects associated with exposure to particular PFAS above certain concentrations have increased calls for the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to address these substances in public water supplies. For those few PFAS for which scientific information is available, animal studies suggest that exposure to particular substances above certain levels may be linked to various health effects, including developmental effects; changes in liver, immune, and thyroid function; and increased risk of some cancers. In 2009, EPA listed certain PFAS for formal evaluation under the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA) to determine whether regulations may be warranted. EPA has not issued drinking water regulations for any PFAS but has taken various actions to address PFAS contamination.

Summary: In the 116 th Congress, Members have introduced more than 40 bills to address PFAS through various means. The National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for FY2020, P.L. 116-92 , includes multiple PFAS provisions regarding primarily the Department of Defense (DOD), but several involve EPA and other federal agencies. Among the EPA provisions, Title LXXIII, Subtitle A, directs EPA to require public water systems to conduct additional monitoring for PFAS and creates a grant program for public water systems to address PFAS and other emerging contaminants. The House of Representatives passed H.R. 535 , a broad PFAS bill, on January 10, 2020. Among SDWA provisions, H.R. 535 would direct EPA to issue drinking water regulations for at least two PFAS within two years and establish a separate standard-setting process for PFAS.

Summary: In February 2019, EPA released its PFAS Action Plan, which discusses the agency's current and proposed actions to address these substances under its various statutory authorities. Regarding SDWA, the plan notes that EPA is following the statutory process for evaluating PFASâparticularly perfluorooctanoic acid (PFOA) and perfluorooctane sulfonate (PFOS)âto determine whether national primary drinking water regulations are warranted. The Fall 2019 Regulatory Agenda indicated that EPA planned to propose preliminary regulatory determinations for PFOA and PFOS by the end of 2019 and finalize determinations by January 2021.

Summary: The absence of a national health-based drinking water standard for any PFAS has increased interest in the SDWA process for regulating contaminants. The statute prescribes a risk- and science-based process for evaluating and regulating contaminants in drinking water. The evaluation process includes identifying contaminants of potential concern, assessing health risks, collecting occurrence data (and developing reliable analytical methods necessary to do so), and making determinations as to whether a national drinking water regulation is warranted for a contaminant.

Summary: PFAS include thousands of diverse chemicals, and setting drinking water standards for individual or groups of PFAS raises technical and scientific challenges. For example, SDWA requires EPA to make determinations and set standards using the best available peer-reviewed science and occurrence data. However, data on the potential health effects and occurrence are available for few of these substances. Further, EPA may face challenges in developing test methods and identifying treatment technologies for a diverse array of PFAS. Contamination of drinking water by PFAS can pose challenges for states and communities, and some have called for EPA to establish enforceable standards. State drinking water regulators have noted that many states may face significant obstacles in setting their own standards.

Summary: For contaminants not regulated under SDWA, EPA is authorized to issue non-enforceable health advisories, which provide information on health effects, testing methods, and treatment techniques for contaminants of concern. In 2016, EPA established health advisory levels for PFOA and PFOS in drinking water at 70 parts per trillion (separately or combined).

Summary: SDWA also authorizes EPA to take actions it deems necessary to abate an imminent and substantial endangerment to public health from a contaminant present in or likely to enter a public water system or an underground source of drinking water. Actions may include issuing orders requiring persons who caused or contributed to the endangerment to provide alternative water supplies or to treat contamination. Since 2002, EPA has used this authority to require responses to PFOA and/or PFOS contamination of water supplies associated with four sites, including three DOD sites.

The detection of certain per- and polyfluoroalkyl substances (PFAS) in some public water supplies has generated public concern and increased congressional attention to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) efforts to address these substances. Over the past decade, EPA has been evaluating several PFAS under the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA) to determine whether national drinking water regulations may be warranted. EPA has not issued SDWA regulations for any PFAS but has taken various actions to address PFAS contamination. Using SDWA authorities, in 2016, EPA issued non-enforceable health advisories for two PFASâperfluorooctanoic acid (PFOA) and perfluorooctane sulfonate (PFOS)âin drinking water.

The 116 th Congress has held hearings on PFAS and passed legislation to address PFAS contamination issues through various authorities and departments and agencies. The National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2020 ( P.L. 116-92 ) includes several PFAS provisions involving the Department of Defense (DOD) and other federal agencies. Of the EPA provisions related to drinking water, Title LXXIII, Subtitle A, directs EPA to require public water systems to conduct additional monitoring for PFAS and establishes a grant program for public water systems to address PFAS and other emerging contaminants. On January 10, 2020, the House passed H.R. 535 , a broad PFAS bill that would direct EPA and other federal agencies to take numerous actions to address PFAS. Among its provisions, H.R. 535 would amend SDWA to direct EPA to regulate PFAS in drinking water and would authorize grants for communities for treatment technologies. Other bills would variously direct EPA to take regulatory and other actions under several environmental statutes, including SDWA. Similar to H.R. 535 , multiple SDWA bills would require EPA to establish final or interim drinking water regulations for some or all PFAS, require monitoring for more of these substances, or authorize grants to assist communities in treating PFAS in drinking water. (See Table 1 .)

PFAS are a large, diverse group of fluorinated compounds, some of which have been used for decades in a wide array of commercial, industrial, and U.S. military applications. Since the 1940s, more than 1,200 PFAS compounds have been used in commerce, and about 600 are still in use today. The chemical characteristics of PFAS have led to the widespread use of these substances for beneficial purposes (such as firefighting) and in the processing and manufacture of many commercial products, such as nonstick cookware, food wrapper coatings, stain-resistant carpets, waterproof clothing, and food containers.

The two PFAS most frequently detected in water supplies are PFOA and PFOS. Since 2002, U.S. manufacturers have phased out the production and most uses of PFOS. In coordination with EPA, manufacturers completed the phase-out of PFOA production by 2015. EPA reports that food and consumer products represent a large portion of exposure to PFOA and PFOS, while drinking water can be an additional source in the small percentage of communities with contaminated water supplies.

Among the thousands of different PFAS, few have sufficient health effects studies for determining a threshold at which adverse effects are not expected to occur. Most studies of potential health effects of PFAS have focused on PFOA and PFOS because of their predominant historical use. For those PFAS for which scientific information is available, animal studies suggest that exposure to particular substances above certain levels may be linked to various health effects, including developmental effects; changes in liver, immune, and thyroid function; and increased risk of some cancers. A discussion of these studies and their results is beyond the scope of this report.

In 2016, EPA reported that public water systems in 29 states had detected at least one PFAS in their water supplies. In total, 63 public water systems serving approximately 5.5 million people reported detections of PFOA and PFOS (separately or combined) above EPA's health advisory level of 70 parts per trillion (ppt). EPA has reported that PFAS contamination of drinking water "is typically localized and associated with a specific facility." According to the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry, PFAS may have been released to surface or ground water from manufacturing sites, industrial use, use and disposal of PFAS-containing consumer products (e.g., unlined landfills), fire/crash training areas, wastewater treatment facilities, and the spreading of contaminated biosolids. A discussion of PFAS use, including at U.S. military installations, and PFAS disposal is not included in this report.

Uncertainty about potential health effects that may be associated with exposure to specific PFAS above particular concentrationsâcombined with the absence of a federal health-based drinking water standardâhas posed challenges and created uncertainty for states, water suppliers and their customers, homeowners using private wells, and others regarding treatment or other potential responses. State drinking water regulators and others have called for greater federal leadership to address these substances through several federal laws and, specifically, have urged EPA to set federal drinking water standards for one or more PFAS under SDWA. Representatives of public water systems have supported EPA's commitment to follow the statutory process for regulating contaminants in drinking water, which prioritizes regulating those that occur at levels and frequency of public health concern.

SDWA provides EPA with several authorities to address emerging contaminants in public water supplies and drinking water sources. These include the authority to (1) issue health advisories, (2) regulate contaminants in water provided by public water systems, and (3) issue enforcement orders in certain circumstances. For more than a decade, EPA has been using SDWA authorities to evaluate several PFASâparticularly PFOA and PFOSâto determine whether national drinking water regulations may be warranted. To date, EPA has not promulgated drinking water regulations for any PFAS but has taken a number of related actions.

In February 2019, EPA issued a PFAS Action Plan, which identifies and discusses the agency's current and proposed efforts to address PFAS through several statutory authorities, including SDWA. These actions range from potential regulatory actions to public outreach on PFAS. Many of these actions support EPA's evaluation of PFAS for potential regulation under SDWA. These include research and development of analytical methods needed to accurately measure substances in drinking water, development of additional toxicity information to increase understanding of potential health risks associated with exposures to different PFAS, and research on drinking water treatment effectiveness and costs for various PFAS. EPA also plans to generate occurrence data for more PFAS to determine their frequencies and concentrations in public water supplies. Further, EPA is working with federal, state, and tribal partners to develop risk communication materials on PFAS and plans to develop an interactive map on potential PFAS sources and occurrence. Table A-1 includes EPA's selected actions and associated timelines relevant to addressing PFAS in drinking water.

The challenges of regulating individual substances or categories of PFAS in drinking water are multifaceted and may raise several policy and scientific questions. Technical issues involve availability of data, detection methods, and treatment techniques for related but diverse contaminants. Scientific questions exist about health effects attributed to many individual PFAS and whether health effects can be generalized from one or a category of PFAS to others. Policy and regulatory considerations may involve setting priorities among numerous unregulated contaminants, the value of establishing uniform national drinking water standards, and the ability to demonstrate the relative risk-reduction benefits compared to compliance costs to communities associated with regulating individual or multiple PFAS. The absence of a federal health-based standard can pose challenges for states and communities with PFAS contamination. State drinking water regulators have noted that many states may face significant obstacles in setting their own standards.

This report provides an overview of EPA's ongoing and proposed actions to address PFAS under SDWA authorities, with particular focus on the statutory process for evaluating PFASâparticularly PFOA and PFOSâfor potential regulation. It also reviews PFAS-related legislation introduced in the 116 th Congress, with emphasis on bills that would amend SDWA. This report does not address the status of scientific research on health effects that may be associated with exposure to one or more PFAS, nor does it discuss federal actions regarding other environmental statutes, such as the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA) and the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA).

SDWA provides EPA with several authorities to address emerging contaminants in drinking water supplies and sources. The act authorizes EPA to promulgate regulations that include enforceable standards and monitoring requirements for contaminants in water provided by public water systems. For contaminants that are not regulated under the act, SDWA authorizes EPA to issue contaminant-specific health advisories that include technical guidance and identify concentrations that are expected to be protective of sensitive populations. In addition, if the appropriate state and local authorities have not acted to protect public health, SDWA authorizes EPA to take actions to abate an imminent and substantial endangerment to public health from "a contaminant that is present in or is likely to enter a public water system or an underground source of drinking water."

Evaluating Emerging Contaminants for Regulation

SDWA specifies a multistep process for evaluating contaminants to determine whether a national primary drinking water regulation is warranted. The evaluation process includes identifying contaminants of potential concern, assessing health risks, collecting occurrence data (and developing reliable analytical methods necessary to do so), and making determinations as to whether or not regulatory action is needed for a contaminant.

To make a positive determination that a national drinking water regulation is warranted for a contaminant, EPA must find that

a contaminant may have an adverse health effect; it is known to occur or there is a substantial likelihood that it will occur in public water systems with a frequency and at levels of public health concern; and in the sole judgment of the EPA Administrator, regulation of the contaminant presents a meaningful opportunity for health risk reduction for persons served by water systems.

Identifying Contaminants That May Warrant Regulation

SDWA Section 1412(b) requires EPA to publish, every five years, a list of contaminants that are known or anticipated to occur in public water systems and may require regulation under the act. Before publishing a final contaminant candidate list (CCL), EPA is required to provide an opportunity for public comment and consult with the scientific community, including the Science Advisory Board.

In 2009, EPA placed PFOA and PFOS on the third such list (CCL 3) for evaluation. In preparing the CCL 3, EPA considered over 7,500 chemical and microbial contaminants and screened these contaminants based on their potential to occur in public water systems and potential health effects. EPA selected 116 of the contaminants on the proposed CCL based on more detailed evaluation of occurrence, health effects, expert judgement, and public input.

In 2016, EPA published the fourth list, CCL 4, which carried over many CCL 3 contaminants, including PFOA and PFOS. EPA carried forward these contaminants to continue evaluating health effects, gathering national occurrence data, and developing analytical methods.

Monitoring for Emerging Contaminants in Public Water Systems

To generate data on the nationwide occurrence of emerging contaminants in public water supplies, EPA is required to administer a monitoring program for unregulated contaminants. SDWA directs EPA to promulgate, every five years, an unregulated contaminant monitoring rule (UCMR) that requires public water systems to test for no more than 30 contaminants. Only a representative sample of systems serving 10,000 or fewer people is required to conduct monitoring. EPA uses data collected through UCMRs to estimate whether the occurrence of the contaminant in public water supplies is local, regional, or national in scope.

UCMRs set a minimum reporting level (MRL) for each contaminant. MRLs are not health based; rather, they establish concentrations for reporting and data collection purposes. EPA makes the UCMR monitoring results available to the public and reports the number of detections above the MRL and also detections above EPA's health-based reference levels (discussed below), where available. The act includes an authorization of appropriations to cover monitoring and related costs for small systems (serving 10,000 persons or fewer). However, large systems pay UCMR monitoring and laboratory costs.

In 2012, EPA issued the third UCMR (UCMR 3), under which 4,864 public water systems tested their drinking water for six PFASâincluding PFOA and PFOSâbetween January 2013 and December 2015. Among these systems, EPA reported the following monitoring results for PFOA and PFOS:

117 of the public water systems reported detections of PFOA at levels above the MRL of 20 ppt, and 95 reported detections of PFOS at concentrations above the MRL of 40 ppt.

Overall, 63 of the 4,864 (1.3%) water systems that conducted PFAS monitoring reported at least one sample with PFOA and/or PFOS (separately or combined) concentrations exceeding EPA's health advisory level of 70 ppt for PFOA and PFOS. Actual exposures among individuals served by these systems would be expected to vary depending on water use and consumption. EPA estimates that these 63 water systems serve approximately 5.5 million individuals. Of the 63 systems:

9 reported detections of both PFOS and PFOA above 70 ppt; 4 reported detections of PFOA above 70 ppt; 37 reported detections of PFOS above 70 ppt; and 13 reported detections of PFOA and PFOS (combined but not separately) above 70 ppt.

Systems with PFOA or PFOS detections above 70 ppt were located in 21 states, the Pima-Maricopa Indian community, and 2 U.S. territories.

EPA's PFAS Action Plan notes that the agency intends to propose monitoring requirements for other PFAS when it proposes the next UCMR (UCMR 5) in 2020. As of January 2020, EPA has developed an analytical method to detect 29 PFAS in drinking water supplies. The plan states that the agency would use the monitoring data gathered through UCMR 5 to evaluate the national occurrence of additional PFAS. The agency is currently working to develop analytical methods to support monitoring for additional PFAS.

SDWA requires EPA, every five years, to make a regulatory determinationâa determination of whether or not to promulgate a national primary drinking water regulationâfor at least five contaminants on the CCL. To consider a contaminant for a regulatory determination (RD), EPA requires, at a minimum, a peer-reviewed risk assessment and nationally representative occurrence data. In selecting contaminants for an RD, SDWA requires EPA to give priority to those that present the greatest public health concern while considering a contaminant's health effects on specified subgroups of the population (e.g., infants, children, pregnant women) who may be at greater risk of adverse health effects due to exposure to a contaminant.

As noted above, to make a positive determination to regulate a contaminant, EPA must find that (1) a contaminant may have an adverse health effect; (2) it is known to occur or there is a substantial likelihood that it will occur in public water systems with a frequency and at levels of public health concern; and (3) in the sole judgment of the EPA Administrator, regulation of the contaminant presents a meaningful opportunity for health risk reduction for persons served by water systems. SDWA directs EPA to publish a preliminary determination and seek public comment prior to making an RD. EPA may also make RDs for contaminants not listed on the CCL if EPA finds that the statutory criteria regarding health effects and occurrence are satisfied.

EPA has issued RDs for CCL 1 through CCL 3. EPA published final determinations that no regulatory action was appropriate or necessary for nine contaminants on CCL 1 (2003) and 11 contaminants (including perchlorate) on CCL 2 (2008). In the most recent RD (2016), EPA determined that regulation was not needed for four of the 116 contaminants listed on CCL 3. EPA delayed a determination on a fifth contaminant, strontium, "in order to consider additional data and decide whether there is a meaningful opportunity for health risk reduction by regulating strontium in drinking water."

In 2014, when EPA published preliminary RDs for contaminants on CCL 3 (including PFOA and PFOS), UCMR 3 monitoring was underway and national occurrence data were not available. EPA did not include any PFAS among the contaminants selected for the third RD. In November 2016, EPA included PFOA and PFOS on the agency's list of unregulated contaminants for which sufficient health effect and occurrence data were available to make RDs.

The next round of RDs is scheduled for 2021, although SDWA does not prevent EPA from making determinations outside of that five-year cycle. In the Fall 2019 Unified Regulatory Agenda , EPA expected to propose preliminary determinations for two PFASâPFOA and PFOSâby the end of 2019, followed by final determinations by January 2021.

Developing Regulations and Standards for Emerging Contaminants

Once the Administrator makes a determination to regulate a contaminant, SDWA allows EPA 24 months to propose a "national primary drinking water regulation" and request public comment. EPA is required to promulgate a final rule within 18 months after the proposal. SDWA authorizes EPA to extend the deadline to publish a final rule for up to nine months, by notice in the Federal Register .

For each contaminant that EPA determines to regulate, EPA is required to establish a non-enforceable maximum contaminant level goal (MCLG) at a level at which no known or anticipated adverse health effects occur and which allows an adequate margin of safety. An MCLG is based solely on health effects data and does not reflect cost or technical feasibility considerations. EPA derives an MCLG based on an estimate of the amount of a contaminant that a person can be exposed to on a daily basis that is not anticipated to cause adverse health effects over a lifetime. This amount is derived using the best available peer-reviewed studies and incorporates uncertainty factors to provide a margin of protection for sensitive subpopulations. In developing an MCLG, EPA also estimates the general population's exposure to a contaminant from drinking water and other sources (e.g., food, dust, soil, and air). After considering other exposure routes, EPA estimates the proportion of exposure attributable to drinking water (i.e., the relative source contribution). When exposure information is not available, EPA uses a default assumption that 20% of exposure to a contaminant is attributable to drinking water. EPA applies the relative source contribution to ensure that an individual's total exposure from all sources remains within the estimated protective level.

The MCLG provides the basis for calculating a drinking water standard. Thus, EPA's ability to develop a drinking water regulation for a contaminant is dependent, in part, on the availability of peer-reviewed scientific studies.

Drinking water regulations generally specify a maximum contaminant level (MCL)âan enforceable limit for a contaminant in public water supplies. SDWA requires EPA to set the MCL as close to the MCLG as feasible. When assessing feasibility, the law directs EPA to consider the best available (and field-demonstrated) treatment technologies, taking cost into consideration. If the treatment of a contaminant is not feasibleâtechnologically or economicallyâEPA may establish a treatment technique in lieu of an MCL. Each regulation also establishes associated monitoring, treatment, and reporting requirements. These regulations can cover multiple contaminants and, generally, establish an MCL for each contaminant covered by the regulation.

Regulations generally take effect three years after promulgation. EPA may allow up to two additional years if the Administrator determines that more time is needed for public water systems to make capital improvements. (States have the same authority for individual water systems. ) The law directs EPA to reviewâand if necessary reviseâeach regulation every six years and requires that any revision maintain or provide greater health protection.

For emerging contaminants of concern, data may be limited, particularly regarding a contaminant's potential health effects and occurrence in public water supplies. SDWA authorizes EPA to issue health advisories for contaminants in drinking water that are not regulated under the act. These advisories provide information on a contaminant's health effects, chemical properties, occurrence, and exposure. They also provide technical guidance on identifying, measuring, and treating contaminants.

Health advisories include non-enforceable levels for concentrations of contaminants in drinking water. EPA sets health advisories at levels that are expected to protect the most sensitive subpopulations (e.g., nursing infants) from any deleterious health effects, with a margin of protection, over specific exposure durations (e.g., one-day, 10-day, or lifetime). These non-regulatory levels are intended to help states, water suppliers, and others address contaminants for which federal (or state) drinking water standards have not been established. Some states may use health advisories to inform their own state-specific drinking water regulations.

Health advisories may be used to address various circumstances: to provide interim guidance while EPA evaluates a contaminant for possible regulation, to provide information for contaminants with limited or localized occurrence that may not warrant regulation, and to address short-term incidents or spills. EPA has issued health advisories for more than 200 contaminants to address different circumstances and subsequently established regulations for many of these contaminants.

In May 2016, EPA issued health advisory levels for lifetime exposure to PFOA and PFOS in drinking water. EPA established the Lifetime Health Advisory level for PFOA and PFOS at 70 ppt, separately or combined. In calculating the health advisory level, EPA applied a relative source contribution of 20% (i.e., an assumption that 20% of PFOS and/or PFOA exposure is attributable to drinking water and 80% is from diet, dust, air or other sources). These levels are intended to protect the most sensitive subpopulations (e.g., nursing infants), with a margin of safety, over a lifetime of daily exposure. The Lifetime Health Advisories replaced Provisional Health Advisories that EPA issued in 2009 to address short-term exposures to PFOA and PFOS.

SDWA Section 1431 grants EPA "emergency powers" to issue orders to abate an imminent and substantial endangerment to public health from "a contaminant that is present in or is likely to enter a public water system or an underground source of drinking water" and if the appropriate state and local authorities have not acted to protect public health. This authority is available to address both regulated and unregulated contaminants. The EPA Administrator "may take such actions as he may deem necessary" to protect the health of persons who may be affected. Actions may include issuing orders requiring persons who caused or contributed to the endangerment to provide alternative water supplies or to treat contamination. When using this authority, EPA generally coordinates closely with states.

EPA reports that it has used its emergency powers under Section 1431 to require responses to PFOA and/or PFOS releases and related contamination of drinking water supplies at four sites, three of which involved the Department of Defense (DOD).

Warminster Naval Warfare Center, Pennsylvania. In 2014, EPA issued an administrative enforcement order directing the U.S. Navy to address PFOS in three drinking water supply wells at and near this National Priorities List site. Former Pease Air Force Base, New Hampshire. In August 2015, EPA issued an administrative enforcement order to require the U.S. Air Force to design and construct a system to treat water systems contaminated from releases of PFOA and PFOS at the former Pease Air Force Base in New Hampshire. Horsham Air Guard Station/Willow Grove, Pennsylvania . In 2015, EPA issued an order directing the Air Guard/Air Force to treat onsite drinking water wells and to provide treatment for private offsite wells. Chemours Washington Works Facility , West Virginia/Ohio. EPA issued three emergency orders to this facility in 2002, 2006, and 2009âand amended the 2009 order in 2017 to incorporate the 2016 Lifetime Health Advisory levelârequiring DuPont and Chemours to offer water treatment, connection to a public water system, or bottled water where PFOA concentrations exceeded 70 ppt.

Related Legislation in the 116th Congress

In the 116 th Congress, more than 40 bills have been introduced to address PFAS through a broad range of actions and federal agencies. The NDAA for FY2020 (P.L 116-92) and House-passed H.R. 535 include provisions to reduce exposures to PFAS in drinking water and to prevent or remediate the contamination of groundwater, surface water, and drinking water supplies from releases of these substances.

This discussion focuses primarily on legislation that amends the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA) or otherwise affect public water systems. Table 1 briefly describes relevant provisions of such bills offered in the 116 th Congress.

In the context of SDWA, congressional attention has focused primarily on whether EPA might set drinking water standards (MCLs) for PFOA, PFOS, and/or other PFAS. SDWA directs EPA to follow a regulatory development process for contaminants, which includes consideration of technical feasibility and the assessment of health risk reduction benefits and costs, among other factors. On occasion, Congress has directed EPA to promulgate a regulation for a particular contaminant within a specified time frame. Congress has used this approach to prompt EPA to regulate certain contaminants already under review and/or to specify a deadline for issuing regulations under development. In the case of PFAS, representatives of public water systems and others have cautioned against bypassing SDWA's science-based and risk-driven process. As regulatory compliance costs are borne by communities, public water suppliers have urged that regulations be data-driven to better ensure risk reduction benefits. Others have urged "federal leadership" to provide more certainty to states and communities with contaminated water supplies. State drinking water regulators have noted that some states may lack the resources to assess and/or the authority to regulate drinking water contaminants that are not federally regulated, including PFAS. As with certain other contaminants, some states have urged EPA to set national standards. A further concern is that state-by-state actions could create public confusion regarding the safety of drinking water.

Enacted December 20, 2019, the NDAA for FY2020 ( P.L. 116-92 ) contain PFAS provisions specific to DOD, EPA, and several other federal agencies. Some NDAA provisions involve the use of aqueous film forming foam, while others address DOD remediation of PFAS-contaminated drinking water, groundwater, and surface water. Among the EPA provisions, the NDAA addresses drinking water as follows:

Section 7311 requires EPA to add to UCMR 5 all PFAS or categories of PFAS with validated test methods. Section 7312 amends SDWA to establish a grant program within the Drinking Water State Revolving Fund to assist water systems in addressing emerging contaminants with an emphasis on PFAS. Section 7312 authorizes appropriations of $100 million annually for FY2020-FY2024 for this purpose.

On January 10, 2020, the House passed H.R. 535 , a broad PFAS bill. H.R. 535 contains a range of provisions that would address PFAS using multiple authorities, including several EPA-administered laws. Regarding drinking water, the bill includes several specific provisions, some of which would amend SDWA:

Section 5 would amend SDWA to require EPA, within two years of enactment, to promulgate a national primary drinking water regulation for PFAS with standards for PFOA and PFOS at a minimum. It would establish a separate regulatory process for PFAS to accelerate EPA's promulgation of drinking water standards. Among other provisions, this section would require EPA to propose a regulation for a PFAS within 18 months (rather than 24 months) of making a determination to regulate it. This section would allow EPA, when developing regulations, to rely on health risk information for one PFAS to make reasoned extrapolations regarding the health risks of other PFAS. It would also direct EPA to issue a health advisory within a year of finalizing a toxicity value for a single PFAS or class of PFAS. Section 6 would prohibit EPA (but not states) from imposing penalties for violations of PFAS drinking water regulations until five years after the date of promulgation (to allow systems time to make capital improvements as needed for compliance). Section 7 would add SDWA Section 1459E to direct EPA to establish a competitive grant program to assist community water systems with installing treatment technologies to address PFAS contamination. To support this program, Section 7 would authorize annual appropriations of $125 million for FY2020 and FY2021 and $100 million for FY2022-FY2024. EPA would be required to give funding priority to community water systems that (1) serve a "disadvantaged community or a disproportionately exposed community," (2) provide at-least a 10% cost share, or (3) demonstrate the capacity to maintain the treatment technology.

Other bills introduced in the 116 th Congress would variously require EPA to establish an MCL for specific PFAS or for PFAS as a group. These include S. 1507 (as reported), S. 1473 , and H.R. 2377 . Additionally, S. 1507 and H.R. 2800 would require public water systems to conduct monitoring for more PFAS in drinking water. Several billsâincluding S. 1507 , H.R. 2533 / H.R. 2741 (Title II), and H.R. 1417 / S. 611 âwould authorize grants for public water systems and/or households to treat PFAS in drinking water. In contrast, H.R. 2570 would direct EPA to establish PFAS manufacturing fees to support the "PFAS Treatment Trust Fund." Amounts in the trust fund would be available to EPA, without further appropriation, to make grants to community water systems and municipal wastewater treatment works for costs associated with PFAS removal.

Appendix. Selected Drinking-Water-Related Actions by EPA