The POWER Initiative: Energy Transition as Economic Development

Summary: With the decline of the U.S. coal industry, managing the economic effects of energy transition has become a priority for the federal government. The Partnerships for Opportunity and Workforce and Economic Revitalization (POWER) Initiative, and the broader POWER Plus Plan of which it was a part, represent the U.S. government's efforts to ease the economic effects of energy transition in coal industry-dependent communities in the United States, and especially in Appalachia. Launched in 2015 by the Obama Administration as a multi-agency effort utilizing various existing programs, the POWER Plus plan received partial backing through appropriations for Fiscal Year 2016 (FY2016) to the Appalachian Regional Commission, the Economic Development Administration, and for abandoned mine land reclamation.

Summary: While certain proposed provisions of POWER Plus were never enacted or funded, other elements of the POWER Initiative continue under the Trump Administration. Continuing programs include the Assistance to Coal Communities program within the Economic Development Administration, the POWER Initiative under the Appalachian Regional Commission (the only program to retain the original branding), and a funding program for abandoned mine land reclamation. Of these efforts, the Appalachian Regional Commission's POWER Initiative is the largest of the initiative's economic development programs, having funded nearly $150 million in projects (out of over $600 million in proposed projects) since it was first launched in FY2016. The Appalachian Regional Commission's POWER Initiative is regionally targeted to declining coal communities in Appalachia, unlike the Economic Development Administration's Assistance to Coal Communities program, which has a national scope. To date, the initiative has reportedly leveraged approximately $772 million of private investment into the Appalachian regional economy. This report provides background on the origins, development, and activities of the POWER Initiative.

U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) has forecast U.S. coal production to decline through 2050, with the sharpest reduction to occur by the mid-2020s. Consequently, the coal industry's decline has contributed to economic distress in coal-dependent communities, including increased unemployment and poverty rates.

In response, the Obama Administration launched the Partnerships for Opportunity and Workforce and Economic Revitalization (POWER) Plus Plan, which addressed the coal sector's decline through funding for (1) economic stabilization, (2) social welfare efforts, and (3) environmental efforts. The economic elements were organized within the POWER Initiative, a multi-agency federal initiative to provide economic development funding and technical assistance to address economic distress caused by the effects of energy transition principally in coal communities. Although the initiative began as a multi-agency effort as part of the POWER Plus Plan, the POWER Initiative currently operates as a funded program administered by the Appalachian Regional Commission (ARC) in its 420-county service area.

This report considers the background of the POWER Initiative and the broader effort of which it was originally a part, the POWER Plus Plan. It broadly surveys the state of POWER elements in the current administration, including elements of the initiative in the Economic Development Administration (EDA), the Appalachian Regional Commission (ARC), and funded efforts for abandoned mine land reclamation. The Appalachian Regional Commission's POWER Initiative program is the largest of these, and the only program to retain the POWER Initiative branding. This report considers its scope and activities as well as its funding history.

The POWER Initiative is supported by Congress as reflected by consistent annual appropriations. The POWER Initiative may also be of interest to Congress as an economic development program that actively facilitates and eases the repercussions of energy transition in affected communities in Appalachia. More broadly, in light of the projected continued decline of the coal industry, as well as proposals to address greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from hydrocarbon combustion, congressional interest in programs to address economic dislocations as a result of energy transition is likely to accelerate.

The POWER Initiative was launched in 2015 as a multi-agency federal effort to provide grant funding and technical assistance to address economic and labor dislocations caused by the effects of energy transitionâprincipally in coal communities around the United States. The POWER Initiative was a precursor to a broader effort known as the POWER Plus Plan (dubbed POWER+ by the Obama Administration). This latter plan was launched using preexisting funds, and was intended to develop an array of grant programs across multiple agencies to facilitate energy transition and ameliorate the negative effects of that transition. Most legislative elements of the POWER+ Plan were carried out under existing authorities rather than new legislation. Certain features continue to be activeâparticularly elements of the POWER Initiative within the ARC and the EDA.

The POWER+ Plan was organized to address three areas of concern:

1. economic diversification and adjustment for affected coal communities; 2. social welfare for coal mineworkers and their families, and the accelerated clean-up of hazardous coal abandoned mine lands; and 3. tax incentives to support the technological development and deployment of carbon capture, utilization, and sequestration technologies.

The POWER+ Plan was proposed in the FY2016 President's Budget as a multi-agency approach to energy transition. As proposed, the POWER+ Plan involved the participation of the Department of Labor (DOL), the Appalachian Regional Commission (ARC), the Small Business Administration (SBA), the Economic Development Administration (EDA), the Department of Agriculture (USDA), the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the Department of the Treasury, the Department of Energy (DOE), the Corporation for National and Community Service, and the Department of the Interior (DOI). The FY2016 President's Budget requested approximately $56 million in POWER+ Plan grant funds: (1) $20 million for the DOL; (2) $25 million for the ARC; (3) $6 million for the EDA; and (4) $5 million for the EPA. In addition, a portion of USDA rural development fundsâ$12 million in grants and $85 million in loansâwere aligned to POWER+ Plan priorities. Also, the plan sought $1 billion for abandoned mine land reclamation and an additional $2 billion for carbon capture and sequestration technology investments.

The Obama Administration described the POWER Initiative as a "down payment" on the POWER+ Plan, and focused on the Plan's economic development elements using existing funding sources ( Table 1 ). Those existing funding sources (or "Targeted Funds" in Table 1 ) refer to funds that were set aside by the respective federal executive agency in support of the POWER+ Plan in FY2015. These funding amounts are only those funds made available initially, and do not account for additional appropriations or set-asides made available as the program progressed. The EDA was initially designated as the lead agency for the POWER Initiative, with significant funding elements from the ARC, SBA, and DOL. While led by the EDA, POWER Initiative grants were determined by the individual awarding agency. Grants were divided into two funding streams: (1) planning grants; and (2) implementation grants.

The POWER Initiative was announced in March 2015, with the first tranche of grants awarded in October 2016. With the exception of certain parts of the POWER Initiative and funding for reclaiming abandoned mine land (AML), broad elements of the POWER+ Plan were not enacted by Congress. Since the end of the Obama Administration, the ARC is the only federal agency with a POWER Initiative-designated program.

POWER Elements in the Current Administration

As of November 2019, the POWER Initiative exists solely as a funded program of the ARC, and is no longer a multi-agency initiative. However, certain other elements originally included in the POWER+ Plan and the POWER Initiative continue to receive appropriations and continue to be active, but they are not designated as such by the Trump Administration.

The EDA Assistance to Coal Communities (ACC) Program

The EDA continues to receive appropriations for its Assistance to Coal Communities (ACC) program. The ACC program was a grant-making element launched as a part of the EDA's role in the POWER Initiative.

In FY2019, $30 million was designated for the ACC program as part of appropriations to the EDA. The FY2019 appropriations represent the fifth consecutive fiscal year of funding for the program, and reflect 300% growth from approximately $10 million appropriated in FY2015. However, the Trump Administration's FY2017 Budget sought to eliminate the ACC program; and subsequent Administration Budget requests have proposed eliminating the EDA entirely, including the ACC program.

While the ACC is an active outgrowth of the POWER Initiative and POWER+ Plan, it is no longer associated with the POWER Initiative and instead is identified as a separate program drawing on Economic Adjustment Assistance (EAA) funds. Because it draws on EAA funding, ACC investments may only be used for projects located in, or substantially benefiting, a community or region that meets EDA distress criteria.

"An unemployment rate that is, for the most recent 24-month period for which data are available, at least one percentage point greater than the national average unemployment rate; Per capita income that is, for the most recent period for which data are available, 80 percent or less of the national average per capita income; or A Special Need, as determined by EDA."

Abandoned Mine Land (AML) Reclamation Investments

One of the pillars of the POWER+ Plan was funding for the social welfare of miners and for cleanup and reclamation of former mine and other coal-related "brownfield" sites. While certain legislative proposals for these purposes were never enacted, Congress has approved annual funding since FY2016 for economic development grants to states for Abandoned Mine Land reclamation.

The FY2016 appropriation of $90 million directed funds to be divided equally among the three Appalachian states with the greatest amount of unfunded AML needs ( P.L. 114-13 ). The $105 million appropriated for FY2017 set aside $75 million to be divided this way, with the balance of that amount being available more broadly to other eligible AML reclamation applicants ( P.L. 115-31 ). FY2018 appropriations of $115 million set aside $75 million for the three states demonstrating the greatest unmet need ( P.L. 115-141 ).

For FY2019, the Department of the Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2019, Division E of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2019 ( P.L. 116-6 ), appropriated $115 million, which was subdivided further: $75 million for the three Appalachian states with the greatest amount of unfunded needs; $30 million for the next three Appalachian states with the "subsequent greatest amount of unfunded needs"; and $10 million for federally recognized Indian Tribes.

The Appalachian Regional Commission (ARC) is the only federal agency that continues to receive regular appropriated funding for energy transition activities under the POWER Initiative designation. While the POWER Initiative was launched as a multi-agency effort, only the ARC chose to designate its contributions as the POWER Initiative.

The ARC was established in 1965 to address economic distress in the Appalachian region (40 U.S.C. Â§14101-14704). The ARC's jurisdiction spans 420 counties in Alabama, Georgia, Kentucky, Ohio, New York, Maryland, Mississippi, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee, Virginia, and West Virginia ( Figure 1 ).

The ARC is a federal-state partnership, with administrative costs shared equally by the federal government and member states, while economic development activities are federally funded through appropriations. Thirteen state governors and a federal co-chair oversee the ARC. The federal co-chair is appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate.

The ARC's POWER Initiative program prioritizes federal resources to projects and activities in coal communities that exhibit elements that

produce multiple economic development outcomes (e.g., promoting regional economic growth; job creation; and/or employment opportunities for displaced workers); are specifically identified under state, local, or regional economic development plans; and have been collaboratively designed by state, local, and regional stakeholders.

The ARC funds three classes of grants as part of the POWER Initiative: (1) implementation grants, with awards of up to $1.5 million; (2) technical assistance grants, with awards of up to $50,000; and (3) broadband deployment projects, with awards of up to $2.5 million.

For FY2019, $45 million in grant funding was made available, of which $15 million was reserved for broadband projects. POWER investments are subject to the ARC's grant match requirements, which are linked to the Commission's economic distress hierarchy.

Those economic distress designations are, in descending order of distress

distressed (80% funding allowance, 20% grant match); at-risk (70%); transitional (50%); competitive (30%); and attainment (0% funding allowance).

Special allowances at the discretion of the commission may reduce or discharge matches, and match requirements may be met with other federal funds when allowed. Designations of county-level distress in the ARC's service area are represented in Figure 1 .

POWER investments are also aligned to the ARC's strategic plan. The current strategic plan, adopted in November 2015, prioritizes five investment goals:

1. entrepreneurial and business development; 2. workforce development; 3. infrastructure development; 4. natural and cultural assets; and 5. leadership and community capacity.

Given its programmatic breadth, POWER investments may link to any one of these investment goals. POWER investment determinations are made according to annual objectives outlined in the request for proposals, as well as broader investment priorities, which are building a competitive workforce; fostering entrepreneurial activities; developing industry clusters in communities; and responding to substance abuse.

The ARC has designated $50 million annually ("activities in support of the POWER+ Plan" ) for POWER activities ( Table 4 ). According to the ARC, over $148 million in investments have been made since FY2016 through 185 projects in 312 counties across the ARC's service area, leveraging an estimated $772 million of private investment. Figure 2 is a representation of the ARC's POWER Initiative projects tallied by state.

While the POWER Initiative does not receive appropriations separate from that of the ARC as a whole, congressional intent is signaled in House Appropriations Committee reports, which specify amounts to be reserved for the POWER Initiative. In committee report language, it is described as activities "in support of the POWER+ Plan."

Table 4 shows appropriations set aside for the POWER Initiative from FY2016 to FY2019, and for the ARC as a whole.

The ARC received approximately $610 million in requests for POWER Initiative grant funding from FY2016 to FY2018 ( Table 5 ). This suggests that there was unmet demand for the POWER Initiative in the Appalachian region alone (the ARC's service area, as depicted in Figure 1 ).

The Energy Information Administration projects that coal production overall will continue to decline as a consequence of falling market demand. In particular, the EIA forecasts coal to account for 24% of U.S. electric energy generation in 2019 and 2020, down from 28% in 2018. By 2050, coal is projected to decline to 17% of U.S. electricity generation, nuclear is projected to account for 12%, renewables 31%, and natural gas 39%, according to EIA projections.

Coal's decline is a function of market forces, particularly its higher cost relative to natural gas and renewable energy options. In the future, under current policies, coal's cost disadvantage is expected to continue, and could be accelerated if policies are adopted to reduce GHG emissions that contribute to climate change. Even with federal incentives to invest in carbon capture, utilization, and storage as a means to mitigate fossil fuel-related emissions, coal may still not be competitive in many situations. As a result of falling demand, noncompetitive coal producers and their communities are expected to face continued economic dislocation.

Should it wish to broaden or intensify federal efforts to address energy transition in local communities, Congress may have several options. In the past, Congress has demonstrated bipartisan interest in the federal government providing assistance to populations adversely affected by the ongoing energy transitions. It has done so through its appropriations for the ARC's POWER Initiative, the EDA's ACC program, and the AML investments. In combination with evidence of unmet demand for federal assistance, as measured by unfunded requests to the ARC ( Table 5 ), Congress may consider reviewing the balance among needs, appropriations, and effectiveness of past efforts.

Congress could conduct a review of the POWER Initiative and the efficacy of its performance and resources. This potential review suggests some particular considerations:

Geography : While the ACC is available for the nation as a whole, the ARC's POWER Initiative is restricted to the ARC's service area in the Appalachian region. Congress may consider expanding the POWER Initiative to be available more broadly across the nation, or in a more targeted fashion as demonstrated by the ARC's program. Alternatively, funding could be made available nationwide to any eligible coal community, such as through other federal regional commissions and authorities and/or EDA regions. Funding : Projections of U.S. coal production (cited earlier) suggest that the ongoing transition in U.S. energy systems may lead to further localized economic distress without the development of new regional opportunities. Congress may consider the level of funding for POWER Initiative programs in the context of those economic needs. Funding levels could be tied to the overall scale of the challenge, allocated to areas with the greatest need, and made in consideration of data-driven evaluations of the program effectiveness. In assessing scale, Congress may consider macroeconomic factors as well as social and environmental policy objectives. Energy Type : Congress may also consider expanding the POWER Initiative program beyond the coal industry to other energy industries or regions perceived to be in decline. For example, economic strain and job losses following the closure of other electrical generating units, such as aging nuclear power plants, may signal additional types of displacement. EIA forecasts anticipate a modest decline in nuclear power generation by 2050 as older, less efficient reactors are retired. Nuclear-industry communities may face similar issues of economic distress and labor dislocation. Congress may also consider other public policy goals, such as reducing GHGs, to assist in promoting renewable energy types and carbon capture technologies.

Should Congress consider such efforts, the ARC's POWER Initiative program could serve as a potential model to be scaled or replicated as needed. In addition, other models have also been proposed in bills introduced in the 116 th Congress that would assist coal communities in transition.

Although the POWER+ Plan was not enacted in its entirety, some of its legacy programs continue to receive annual appropriations and remain active. The persistence of such programs suggests support among many policymakers for federal efforts to rectify, or at least attenuate, economic distress as a consequence of energy transition. In addition, were Congress to pursue policy efforts reflective of broadening concern for climate issues, a POWER Initiative-type program could be developed to also facilitate energy transition from fossil fuel-based energy sources to a mix of renewables and other alternatives.

Although the POWER+ Plan did not continue beyond the Obama administration, several constituent programs have continued to receive congressional backing, and applicant volumeâat least in the case of the ARC's POWER Initiativeâmay suggest further demand for additional federal resources in addressing energy transition issues. More broadly, these mechanisms could also be purposed to facilitate federal resources for other related issues, such as related to ecological/environmental resilience and adaptation.

The POWER Initiative, as originally conceived or in its current form as a program of the ARC, has not been subjected to a formal evaluation by the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) or other research organization of its effectiveness as either a mechanism for alleviating community economic distress caused by the declining coal industry, or economic development more broadly. One recent GAO report mentioned the Assistance to Coal Communities program, but did not seek to analyze its activities or efficacy. Similarly, older GAO reports exist that feature the Abandoned Mine Land Reclamation program (prior to its current configuration), and the Appalachian Regional Commission, but may be of limited relevance when evaluating current programming, including more recent activities such as the POWER Initiative. Meanwhile, a number of anecdotal and media reports appear to tout the POWER Initiative's success and viability. The ARC, for its part, reports that the POWER Initiative has "invested over $190 million in 239 projects touching 326 counties across Appalachia." According to the ARC, those investments are "projected to create or retain more than 23,000 jobs, and leverage more than $811 million in additional private investment."

In the ARC's 2018 Performance and Accountability Report, the ARC reported that the annual outcome target for "Students, Workers, and Leaders with Improvements" in FY2018 was exceeded by 55% "likely due to" investments from the POWER Initiative; similarly, the ARC reported the outcome target for "Communities with Enhanced Capacity" in FY2018 was exceeded by 125%, "due in part to priorities established for the POWER Initiative." The same report also noted that the ARC launched a new monitoring and evaluation effort on the POWER Initiative in September 2018 encompassing "approximately 135 POWER grants" in FY2015-FY2017. The results of that assessment have not yet been released.


Covert Action and Clandestine Activities of the Intelligence Community: Framework for Congressional Oversight In Brief

Summary: Since the mid-1970s, Congress's oversight of the Intelligence Community (IC) has been a fundamental component of ensuring that the IC's seventeen diverse elements are held accountable for the effectiveness of their programs supporting United States national security. This has been especially true for covert action and clandestine intelligence activities because of their significant risk of compromise and potential long-term impact on U.S. foreign relations. Yet, by their very nature, these and other intelligence programs and activities are classified and shielded from the public. Congressional oversight of intelligence, therefore, is unlike its oversight of more transparent government activities with a broad public following. In the case of the Intelligence Community, congressional oversight is one of the few means by which the public can have confidence that intelligence activities are being conducted effectively, legally, and in line with American values.

Summary: Covert action is defined in statute (50 U.S.C. Â§3093(e)) as "an activity or activities of the United States Government to influence political, economic, or military conditions abroad, where it is intended that the role of the United States Government will not be apparent or acknowledged publicly." When informed of covert actions through Presidential findings prior to their executionâas is most often the caseâCongress has a number of options: to provide additional unbiased perspective on how these activities can best support U.S. policy objectives; to express reservations about the plan and request changes; or withhold funding. Although Congress does not have the authority to approve or disapprove covert actions, it can have (and has had) influence on the President's decision.

Summary: The term c landestine describes a methodology for a range of activities wherein both the role of the United States and the activity itself are secret. Clandestine activities can involve traditional intelligence or unconventional military assets. Like covert action, their impact can be strategic even though a specific activity may be tactical in scope. Their secret character suggests the potential harm to sources and methods in the event of an unauthorized or unanticipated public disclosure.

Summary: Congressional oversight of covert action can be organized around a framework of five issue areas: (1) the activity's statutory parameters, (2) U.S. national security interests, (3) U.S. foreign policy objectives, (4) funding and implementation, and (5) risk assessment. These categories enable Congress to analyze and assess the specific elements of each activity from a strategic point of view. By extension, Congressional oversight of anticipated clandestine intelligence activities that might also shape the political, economic or military environment abroad can apply the same framework and, as with covert action oversight, address the risk of compromise, unintended consequences, and loss of life.

Summary: This report is accompanied by two related reports: CRS Report R45175, Covert Action and Clandestine Activities of the Intelligence Community: Selected Definitions in Brief , by Michael E. DeVine, and CRS Report R45191, Covert Action and Clandestine Activities of the Intelligence Community: Selected Congressional Notification Requirements in Brief , by Michael E. DeVine.

The present structure of congressional oversight of the Intelligence Community (IC) largely resulted from investigations by two congressional committees in the 1970sâin the Senate, chaired by Idaho Senator Frank Church, and in the House, chaired by Representative Otis Pikeâthat suggested a need for permanent committees in each chamber: today's Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI). It is important to note, however, that oversight of intelligence is a function of more than just the two congressional intelligence committees. Ten other committeesâthe Armed Services, Foreign Affairs/Foreign Relations, Homeland Security, Judiciary, and Appropriations committees of both chambersâexercise oversight responsibility to varying degrees over intelligence programs or IC elements that fall under their jurisdiction.

The Church and Pike committees' oversight focused primarily on two themes: investigation of past abuses and IC organizational reform. Over the succeeding years those efforts have been both beneficial and occasionally burdensome. In protecting against the IC's abuse of its authorities, Congress has helped ensure intelligence activities were legal, ethical and consistent with American values. Congress's influence in IC organizational reform has resulted in improved performance and accountability. On other occasions, however, congressional oversight has tended toward micromanagement resulting in strains in the relationship with the IC.

This report posits a potential framework for congressional oversight of intelligence-related programs and activities using the existing committee structure and notification standards for the most sensitive intelligence activities: covert action and clandestine intelligence collection. The framework may assist Congress in assessing the premises justifying each of these activities, their impact on national security, operational viability, funding requirements, and possible long-term or unintended consequences.

Unlike areas with a broad public following, such as health care, veterans' services, and agriculture, intelligence programs and activities are generally classified, receive little public exposure, and have no natural public constituency. Highly classified covert action and clandestine intelligence programs do not often have visibility outside of Congress. Congressional oversight, therefore, provides one of the few meaningful checks on the President's execution of intelligence policy and programs that may have significant bearing on U.S. foreign relations and national security.

Among the recommendations of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States (the "9/11 Commission") were those aimed at strengthening intelligence oversight. Since the Church and Pike committees of the 1970s, Congress occasionally has been able to refine its oversight of the IC. However, it has not been able to sustain its early momentum. As the Final Report of the 9/11 Commission put it,

"...the oversight function of the Congressâ¦diminished over time. In recent years, traditional review of the administration of programs and implementation of laws has been replaced by 'a focus on personal investigations, possible scandals, and issues designed to generate media attention.' The unglamorous but essential work of oversight has been neglected, and few members past or present believe it is performed well....[T]he executive branch needed help from Congress in addressing the questions of counterterrorism strategy and policy, looking past day-to-day concerns....Congress...often missed the big questionsâas did the executive branch."

Since 9/11, the Senate especially has made progress toward following through with organizational reform of the oversight process, following through on several of the 9/11 Commission's recommendations. S.Res. 445 (108 th Congress) amended Senate rules governing intelligence oversight ( S.Res. 400 ) aimed at increasing the authority of the SSCI relative to the standing committees, promoting bipartisanship, and building expertise. However, a number of factors have complicated Congress's efforts to improve oversight. This poses risks to national security when involving the most sensitive aspects of intelligenceâcovert action and clandestine activitiesâdue to their potential impact on U.S. foreign relations.

Moreover, greater integration of military operations and intelligence activities has resulted in some confusion over the proper congressional jurisdiction for exercising oversight on Capitol Hill. Congress has expressed concern that the Department of Defense's (DOD) overuse of terms that are not defined in statute, such as operational preparation of the environment (OPE), to describe operations that may resemble intelligence activities allows DOD to circumvent the more stringent oversight requirements of the congressional intelligence committees.

Despite these challenges, congressional oversight remains an important check on policy and decisions of the executive branch, to insure intelligence programs and activities are ethical, legal and properly aligned with U.S. national security and foreign policy objectives. Congressional oversight of covert action can be organized around a framework of five issue areas: (1) the activity's statutory parameters, (2) U.S. national security interests, (3) U.S. foreign policy objectives, (4) funding and implementation, and (5) risk assessment. These categories enable Congress to analyze and assess the specific elements of each activity from a strategic point of view. By extension, Congressional oversight of anticipated clandestine intelligence activities that might also shape the political, economic or military environment abroad can apply the same framework and, as with oversight of covert action, address the risk of compromise, unintended consequences, and loss of life.

A conceptual framework for congressional oversight of covert action begins with its statutory definition: Covert action is codified as "an activity or activities of the United States Government to influence political, economic, or military conditions abroad, where it is intended that the role of the United States Government will not be apparent or acknowledged publicly." There are a number of exceptions in the statutory definition of covert action; these include some activities that could use clandestine methodology. Exceptions include activities primarily intended to collect intelligence; traditional counterintelligence activities; traditional military activities, or support to traditional military activities; traditional law enforcement activities, or routine support to law enforcement; and traditional diplomatic activities. How these exceptions are defined and applied to actual practice is not always straightforward and can complicate congressional oversight. For example, Congress has expressed concern that DOD too frequently applies the term traditional military activities to describe operations that in many respects resemble covert action. This is important insofar as it results in different committees being informed of the activity and different standards for the timeliness of notification.

Oversight also requires a solid grasp of the U.S. national security interests and foreign policy objectives that each administration details its National Security Strategy, National Defense Strategy, and other strategy and policy documents. Covert action statutorily must support "identifiable foreign policy interests of the United States." Although not required by statute, it would be logical for clandestine intelligence (and military) activities that do not constitute covert action but have in common a high risk of compromise of sources and methods, a high impact on U.S. foreign relations, and a potential for the loss of life also to support identifiable (clearly articulated, documented) foreign policy objectives expressly. Moreover, congressional overseers may wish to identify or have expressly identified for them, the executive branch's assumptions about the international environment since these assumptions influence policy that in turn, influences decisions on covert action and clandestine activities.

A Framework for Oversight; Lines of Inquiry for Congress

Although Congress has no statutory prerogative to veto covert action when informed through a presidential finding, it can influence conduct of an operation through the exercise of congressional constitutional authority and responsibilities to authorize war, legislate, appropriate funds, and otherwise interact with the executive branch. As former CIA Inspector General L. Britt Snider wrote,

If the committees do not support a particular operation or have concerns about aspects of it, an administration would have to think twice about proceeding with it as planned. If it is disclosed or ends in disaster, the administration will want to have had Congress on board. If it is going to last more than a year, the committees' support will be needed for continued funding. The committees are also likely to be better indicators of how the public would react if the program were disclosed than the administration's in-house pundits.

As congressional oversight committees assess each impending covert action from a strategic point of view, Congress may wish to organize its review using the following five issue areas:

1. the activity's statutory parameters; 2. U.S. national security interests; 3. U.S. foreign policy objectives; 4. funding and implementation; and 5. risk of compromise, failure, loss of life, and unintended consequences.

By extension, oversight of anticipated clandestine intelligence activities that might also shape the political, economic, or military environment abroad can apply the same framework, and, like oversight of covert action, address the risk of compromise, unintended consequences, and loss of life.

Section 3093(a)(5) of Title 50, U. S. Code specifies that "a finding [for a covert action] may not authorize any action that would violate the Constitution or any statute of the United States." Congressional oversight, then, ensures a covert action does not violate the law, to include any domestic law enacted to fulfill the terms of a non-self-executing treaty.

Does the covert action or clandestine intelligence activity violate domestic U.S. law? Does the activity violate any domestic law connected to a non-self-executing treaty? Is the activity likely to violate international law? What are the national security implications of conducting a covert action that may violate international law? Is the risk justified by the operation's importance to U.S. national security? Would Congress likely choose to provide limitations on the covert action through legislation? Does the covert action or clandestine activity, if conducted during hostilities, comply with the laws of armed conflict in accordance with DOD policy?

Congressional oversight of covert action is generally recognized to be especially important to ensuring proper checks and balances, particularly under circumstances in which it is likely that no one outside of a small number of authorized intelligence professionals will know anything about the covert action or clandestine activity. Yet, the 9/11 Commission observed,

Congress had a distinct tendency to push questions of emerging national security threats off its own plate, leaving them for others to consider. Congress asked outside commissions to do the work that arguably was at the heart of its own oversight responsibilities.

Oversight, in accordance with notification requirements of Title 50, enables Congress to provide a timely check on the development of a covert action or clandestine intelligence activity that might have serious flaws. Maintaining necessarily tight security surrounding planning for intelligence activities may present a challenge, because the few individuals outside the intelligence community with access may offer only limited perspective, overlook essential details, and too easily accept premises that might not bear up against broader scrutiny.

What are the underlying premises of the threat and the international or regional environment that justify the covert action or clandestine activity? Is there any precedent for the particular covert action outlined in the presidential finding? If so, what were the similarities and differences with the covert action described in the current finding that may give perspective regarding the risk to U.S. personnel, unintended consequences, and implications for U.S. national security? What are the implications of involving third parties or countries in the covert action? Does the covert action or clandestine activity conform to American and democratic values, and promote free and fair elections? What are plausible long-term unintended consequences of the covert action? Do these possible long-term effects challenge the premises for conducting the covert action in the first place? What might be some plausible second/third order effects of not conducting the covert action?

Section 3093(a) of Title 50, U. S. Code specifies "[T]he President may not authorize the conduct of a covert action by departments, agencies, or entities of the United States Government unless the President determines such an action is necessary to support identifiable foreign policy objectives of the United States and is important to the national security of the United States."

Is the covert action being initiated as an instrument of policy in support of "identifiable" foreign policy objectives elaborated in the National Security Strategy? Is covert action a viable means of achieving these objectives? Are there other means by which the United States might achieve the same objectives involving less risk? Is the covert action consistent with American values to the extent that it is something the American people would support (if the activity were known to the public)?

Congress can provide another level of review to ensure important details for successfully implementing the activity are not overlooked. Moreover, Congress's constitutional responsibility for appropriating funds extends to its oversight of sensitive intelligence activities like covert action. As former CIA Director and former Member of Congress Leon Panetta once remarked, "I do believe in the responsibility of the Congress not only to oversee our operations but to share in the responsibility of making sure that we have the resources and capability to help protect this country."

Is the department or agency named in the presidential finding as the lead agency for the covert action best suited to achieve the objectives? Are the operational elements planned for the covert action comprehensive and developed to achieve tactical success? Is the covert action or clandestine activity sufficiently funded over its projected duration to achieve the objectives?

"The executive branch is chiefly concerned with achieving the objectives of the president, whatever they might be. Because of this, it is sometimes tempted to downplay the risk and accentuate the gain." Congress's relative distance from conceiving and planning the activity may enable it to provide more dispassionate risk assessment and more tempered analysis of likely outcomes.

Does the covert action involve an unacceptable risk of escalating into a broader conflict or war? In the event of an unauthorized or untimely disclosureâor a popular perception of U.S. involvementâwhat are the risks to U.S. national security, U.S. personnel, or relations with states in the region? What are the consequences of failure of the covert action or clandestine intelligence activity to U.S. lives, U.S. national security, and relations with states in the region? If U.S. Armed Forces are involved, is the covert action or clandestine activity being conducted such that U.S. Armed Forces retain full protection under the terms of the Geneva Conventions? Is it plausible for the U.S. role to remain secret and deniable? Or is there substantial or unacceptable risk of compromising U.S. sponsorship to the detriment of U.S. national security? What risks does the covert action or clandestine activity pose to uninvolved American citizens who might be in the vicinity?

Statute requires the President update Congress with notifications of changes in conditions from those described in the original notification of a covert action. Congressional oversight consequently extends to periodically reviewing changes in the operational environment on the ground that may suggest a different outcome, a change in strategy, a shift in U.S. interests, or the development of unintended consequences. Along these lines, Â§3093(d)(1) and (2) of Title 50 U. S. Code includes the following provision:

The President shall ensure that the congressional intelligence committees, or, if applicable, [the Gang of Eight], are notified in writing of any significant change in a previously approved covert action, or any significant undertaking pursuant to a previously approved finding, in the same manner as findings are reported pursuant to subsection (c).

In determining whether an activity constitutes a significant undertaking for these purposes, the President shall consider whether the activity-

involves significant risk of loss of life; requires an expansion of existing authorities, including authorities relating to research, development, or operations; results in the expenditure of significant funds or other resources; requires notification; gives rise to a significant risk of disclosing intelligence sources or methods; or presents a reasonably foreseeable risk of serious damage to the diplomatic relations of the United States if such activity were disclosed without authorization.

Former CIA Inspector General L. Britt Snider has suggested that Congress, in carrying out its oversight responsibility, might be vulnerable to failure to review the premises and conditions for the covert action that may have changed, perhaps significantly, subsequent to the initial notification. The risk, as articulated by Snider is that "If members are satisfied with what they hear from administration witnesses [during the initial notification], not only will they acquiesce in the implementation of the operation, they are apt to devote less attention to it down the road." To guard against this outcome, this provision of the covert action statute underscores the importance of being alert to the possible tactical, political, and environment changes that warrant continued oversight to ensure the activity continues to be in the U.S. national interest.

Do the original premises or environmental conditions justifying the activity remain valid? Have there been any outcomes to suggest the intelligence activity is achieving its intended result? Does the activity continue to have the funding necessary to be effective? Have there been any changes in conditions on the ground that might influence a significant change in how the activity is executed? Is there an increase in the risk of premature or unauthorized disclosure? Do American citizens face a greater threat of exposure? Does the risk involved remain acceptable? Does the activity still conform to the statutory guidelines on the conduct of covert action or significant clandestine intelligence activities?


The Army’s Modernization Strategy: Congressional Oversight Considerations

Summary: In October 2019, the Army published a new modernization strategy aimed at transforming the Army in order to conduct Multi-Domain Operations (MDO) which are intended to address the current and future actions of near-peer competitors Russia and China. The Army's Modernization Strategy is part of a hierarchy of strategies designed, among other things, to inform the Service's respective modernization plans. These strategies include the National Security Strategy (NSS), the National Defense Strategy (NDS), the National Military Strategy (NMS), and the Army Strategy.

Summary: The Army's Modernization Strategy establishes six material modernization priorities:

Summary: Long Range Precision Fires. Next Generation of Combat Vehicles. Future Vertical Lift. Army Network. Air and Missile Defense. Soldier Lethality.

Summary: Because the Army's Modernization Strategy covers the years from 2020 to 2035, the possibility exists for a variety of Army modernization hearings spanning a number of different Congresses. In this regard a common oversight architecture could potentially provide both an element of continuity and a means by which Congress might evaluate the progress of the Army's modernization efforts. Such a potential architecture might examine:

Summary: Is the Army's Modernization Strategy appropriate given the current and projected national security environment? Is the Army's Modernization Strategy achievable given a number of related concerns? Is the Army's Modernization Strategy affordable given current and predicted future resource considerations?

Summary: For FY2020, funding requested for programs related to the Army's six modernization priorities, $8.9 billion, accounted for less than a quarter (23%) of its overall acquisition budget. The service projected $57.3 billion in research, development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E) and procurement funding for programs related to its six modernization priorities over the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP) from FY2020 through FY2024. This amount, if authorized and appropriated by Congress, would reflect an increase of $33.1 billion from spending projections for the five-year period in the FY2019 budget request. Meanwhile, the Army projected a total of $187.5 billion for its acquisition accounts (in nominal dollars) over this period, including $128.8 billion for procurement and $58.7 billion for RDT&E. Thus, for the FY2020 FYDP, funding for programs related to the Army's six modernization priorities accounts for less than a third (31%) of its overall acquisition budget.

Summary: This report provides a number of possible questions and observations related to a potential Army modernization oversight architecture which could serve to provide both an element of continuity for hearings and a standard by which Congress might evaluate the efficacy of Army Modernization.

Congress is responsible for funding, establishing rules regulating the Army, and conducting oversight of a number of functions including manning, equipping, training, and readiness. On an annual basis, shortly after the President's Budget Request is transmitted to Congress, congressional defense authorizing committees and subcommittees typically hold three separate oversight hearings focused on (1). the Army's budget request; (2). the Army's posture; and (3). Army modernization. In addition to these three hearings, Congress sometimes conducts additional hearings on a wide variety of topics to include specific weapons systems under development and other Army efforts, programs, or initiatives. The Army's 2019 Modernization Strategy, intended to guide Army modernization efforts through at least 2035, is arguably ambitious and proposes the development of a number of new weapons systems and capabilities that could also have implications for force structure as well. In its oversight role of the Army's modernization process, Congress may consider a common oversight architecture that provides both an element of continuity for hearings and a standard by which Congress might evaluate the efficacy of the Army Modernization Plan.

What is the Purpose of the Army's Modernization Strategy?1

The 2019 Army Modernization Strategy (AMS) aims to transform the Army into a force that can operate in the air, land, maritime, space, and cyberspace domains (i.e. multi-domain), by 2035. The previous 2018 AMS Report to Congress introduced the Army's six materiel modernization priorities (see below). The 2019 AMS expands the Army's approach beyond those six priorities, outlining a more holistic approach to modernization while maintaining the Army's six Materiel Modernization Priorities from the 2018 AMS. Army Modernization involves modernizing 1) how they fight (doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures); 2) what they fight with (equipment); and 3) who they are (Army culture and personnel). This report will focus on the "what they fight with" component of Army Modernization as well as associated force structure issues.

The Army wants to transform itself into a force capable of implementing its new proposed operational concept referred to as Multi-Domain Operations (MDO) described below.

According to the Army, in order to successfully execute MDO, the Army will need to change how it physically postures the force and how it organizes units. In addition, the Army says it will require new authorities and the ability to employ new capabilities and emerging technologies. The Army, in addition to integrating fully with the other Services, will need access to national-level capabilities and require a high level of day-to-day Interagency involvement to successfully prosecute MDO. In this regard, MDO would require not only Department of Defense (DOD) "buy in" and resources, but would also need similar support from the other members of the Interagency and Congress as well.

National Security Strategy, National Defense Strategy, National Military Strategy, and the Army Strategy11

The Army's Modernization Strategy is part of a hierarchy of strategies intended, among other things, to inform the Service's respective modernization plans. These strategies include:

National Security Strategy (NSS): published by the Administration, it is intended to be a comprehensive declaration of global interests, goals, and objectives of the United States relevant to national security. National Defense Strategy (NDS): published by DOD, it establishes objectives for military planning in terms of force structure, force modernization, business processes, infrastructure, and required resources (funding and manpower). National Military Strategy (NMS): published by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), it supports the aims of the NSS and implements the NDS. It describes the Armed Forces' plan to achieve military objectives in the near term and provides the vision for ensuring they remain decisive in the future. The NMS is a classified document. The Army Strategy : articulates how the Army achieves its objectives and fulfills its Title 10 duties to organize, train, and equip the Army for sustained ground combat. The Army Strategy provides guidance for budget planning and programming across multiple Future Year Defense Programs (FYDP).

All strategies share a common theme, that of "return to great power competition" which posits that "Russia and China are competitors to the United States and both nations are looking to overturn the current rules-based international order." This requires the U.S. military to focus its doctrine and resources on countering this perceived threat. In this regard, the aforementioned strategies also re-focus the Service's modernization efforts towards defeating the perceived Chinese and Russian military threat.

As previously noted, the possibility exists for a variety of Army Modernization-hearings spanning a number of different Congresses. In this regard, a common oversight architecture could potentially provide both an element of continuity and a means by which Congress might evaluate the progress of the Army's modernization efforts. Such a potential architecture might examine:

To support this potential oversight architecture, a number of topics for discussion are provided for congressional consideration.

Is the Army's Modernization Strategy Appropriate?

Does the Army's Modernization Strategy Support the National Security, National Defense, and National Military Strategies?

The Army contends its modernization strategy addresses the challenges of the future operational environment and directly supports the 2018 National Defense Strategy's (NDS) line of effort, "Build a More Lethal Force." The congressionally established Commission on the National Defense Strategy for the United States (Section 942, P.L. 114-328 ) questions this assertion, noting:

We came away troubled by the lack of unity among senior civilian and military leaders in their descriptions of how the objectives described in the NDS are supported by the Department's readiness, force structure, and modernization priorities , as described in the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP) and other documents. (Emphasis added.)

While the Commission's finding is directed at DOD as a whole, it suggests there are questions concerning how modernization priorities and plans support the National Defense Strategy and, by association, the National Security and Military strategies as well. While the aforementioned strategic documents all feature the central theme of "return to great power competition" vis-Ã -vis Russia and China, it is not readily apparent to many observers how the Army's modernization priorities directly support this goal. In this regard, a more detailed examination of the Army's new Modernization Strategy's alignment with the National Security, National Defense, and National Military Strategies could prove beneficial to policymakers.

Does the Army's Modernization Strategy Address the Military Strategies of Peer Competitors?

While it can be considered essential that the Army's Modernization Strategy aligns with and supports the National Security, National Defense, and National Military strategies of the United States, it can be argued that of equal importance is whether the Army's Modernization Strategy takes into account the military strategies of peer competitors. A May 2019 study offers a summary of Russian and Chinese strategies and suggests a U.S. response:

The core of both countries' challenge to the U.S. military lies in what are commonly called anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) systems: in more colloquial terms, a wide variety of missiles, air defenses, and electronic capabilities that could destroy or neutralize U.S. and allied bases, surface vessels, ground forces, satellites, and key logistics nodes within their reach. Both China and Russia have also developed rapidly deployable and fearsomely armed conventional forces that can exploit the openings that their A2/AD systems could create.

Despite these advances, both China and Russia still know that, for now, they would be defeated if their attacks triggered a full response by the United States. The key for them is to attack and fight in a way that Washington restrains itself enough for them to secure their gains. This means ensuring that the war is fought on limited terms such that the United States will not see fit to bring to bear its full weight. Focused attacks designed to pick off vulnerable members of Washington's alliance network are the ideal offensive strategy in the nuclear age, in which no one can countenance the consequences of total war.

The most pointed form of such a limited war strategy is the fait accompli. Such an approach involves an attacker seizing territory before the defender and its patron can react sufficiently and then making sure that the counterattack needed to eject it would be so risky, costly, and aggressive that the United States would balk at mounting itânot least because its allies might see it as unjustified and refuse to support it. Such a war plan, if skillfully carried out in the Baltics or Taiwan, could checkmate the United States.

The U.S. military must shift from one that surges to battlefields well after the enemy has moved to one that can delay, degrade, and ideally deny an adversary's attempt to establish a fait accompli from the very beginning of hostilities and then defeat its invasion. This will require a military that, instead of methodically establishing overwhelming dominance in an active theater before pushing the enemy back, can immediately blunt the enemy's attacks and then defeat its strategy even without such dominance.

From an operational perspective, new systems developed as part of the Army's Modernization Strategy would potentially need to not only provide a technological improvement over legacy systems but also support the Army's operational conceptâin this case Multi Domain Operations (MDO)âintended to counter Russia and China. A detailed examination of how these systems directly counter Russian and Chinese military capabilities and strategies could prove beneficial to policymakers.

Is the Army's Modernization Strategy Relevant to Other Potential Military Challenges?

In February 2011, then-Secretary of Defense Robert Gates told West Point Cadets;

We can't know with absolute certainty what the future of warfare will hold, but we do know it will be exceedingly complex, unpredictable, andâas they say in the staff collegesâ"unstructured." Just think about the range of security challenges we face right now beyond Iraq and Afghanistan: terrorism and terrorists in search of weapons of mass destruction, Iran, North Korea, military modernization programs in Russia and China, failed and failing states, revolution in the Middle East, cyber, piracy, proliferation, natural and man-made disasters, and more. And I must tell you, when it comes to predicting the nature and location of our next military engagements, since Vietnam, our record has been perfect. We have never once gotten it right, from the Mayaguez to Grenada, Panama, Somalia, the Balkans, Haiti, Kuwait, Iraq, and moreâwe had no idea a year before any of these missions that we would be so engaged.

If former Secretary of Defense Gates' admonition that we have never accurately predicted our next military engagement holds true, it is a distinct possibility that a direct conventional confrontation with Russia or China posited by the National Security Strategy might not come to pass. In the case of China, it has been suggested it is more likely U.S. and Chinese interests will clash in the form of proxy wars and insurgencies as opposed to a great power war. The recent U.S.âIranian confrontation is an example of such a non-great power military challenge with the potential for a rapid escalation or a protracted proxy war. With this in mind, some may consider any strategy not relevant to other potential military challenges other than great power war to be ill-conceived. To insure the Army's new Modernization Strategy is relevant, an examination of how its applies to potential adversaries other than China and Russia as well as other possible military challenges not related to great power competition could be useful to policymakers.

Does the Army's Modernization Strategy Complement the Other Service's Modernization Strategies?

The Army Missionâour purposeâremains constant: To deploy, fight, and win our Nation's wars by providing ready, prompt, and sustained land dominance by Army forces across the full spectrum of conflict as part of the Joint Force.

As part of this Joint Force, it can be argued the Army's Modernization Strategy should complement the modernization strategies of the other Services and vice versa. In order for the Service's modernization strategies to complement one another, a joint war-fighting concept is essential and, at present, no such a concept is agreed by all Services. According to the Army:

A Joint war-fighting concept would provide a common framework for experimentation and validation of how the joint force must fight, what capabilities each of the services must have, and how the Joint force should be organizedâfurther allowing civilian leaders to make cross-service resource decisions.

While the Army favors and is promoting MDO for adoption by the other Services, the Air Force is focusing on Multi Domain Command and Control, the Navy on Distributed Maritime Operations, and the Marine Corps on the Marine Corps Operating Concept. While these operating concepts share some common themes such as great power competition and a need to be able to operate in a variety of domains, they differ in approach but not to an extent where a common joint warfighting concept could not be agreed upon.

Despite this lack of a common joint warfighting concept, the Army claims its modernization programs are aligned with the other Services. Army leadership has noted that "the three of us [Army, Air Force, and the Department of the Navy] are completely aligned," citing the "development of a hypersonic weapon as a good example." While the Army might be collaborating now more than ever with the Air Force and Navy as it claims, collaborating at the programmatic level does not necessarily constitute a complementary relationship of the Service's modernization strategies. In this regard, Congress might decide to examine the relationship between the Service's modernization strategies to insure they are complementary.

Is the Army's Modernization Strategy Achievable?

What is the Scope of the Army's Modernization Strategy?

Army officials reportedly have identified 31 modernization initiativesânot all of them programs of recordâintended to support the Army's six modernization priorities. The Army notes that "there are interdependencies among the 31 initiatives which need to fit together in an overall operational architecture." Examples of a few of the higher-visibility initiatives grouped by modernization priority include:

Long Range Precision Fires: Strategic Long Range Cannon (SLRC). Precision Strike Missile (PrSM). Extended Range Cannon Artillery (ERCA). Next Generation Combat Vehicle: (NGCV) : Optionally Manned Fighting Vehicle (OMFV). Robotic Combat Vehicle (RCV): 3 variants. Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle (AMPV). Mobile Protected Firepower (MPF). Decisive Lethality Platform (DLP). Future Vertical Lift: Future Attack Reconnaissance Aircraft (FARA). Future Attack Unmanned System (FUAS). Future Long Range Assault Aircraft. Air And Missile Defense: Maneuver Short-Range Air defense (M-SHORAD). Indirect Fire Protection Capability (IFPC). Soldier Lethality: Next Generation Squad Weapons â Automatic Rifle (NGSW-AR). Next Generation Squad Weapons â Rifle (NGSW-R).

While some of these initiatives are currently in development and procurement, others are still in the requirements definition and conceptual phase. With so many initiatives and interdependencies, it is reasonable to ask "can the Army's modernization effort survive the failure of one or more of the 31 initiatives?" Another potential way of gauging if the Army is "overreaching" would be to establish how much modernization is required before the Army considers itself sufficiently modernized to successfully implement MDO as currently envisioned. One question for the Army might be "What are the Army's absolute "must-have" systems or capabilities to ensure the Army can execute MDO at its most basic level?"

Are the Army's Modernization Priorities Correct?

In March 2019 testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee, then Secretary of the Army Mark Esper and Chief of Staff of the Army Mark Milley stated:

To guide Army Futures Command, the Army established a clear set of modernization priorities that emphasize rapid maneuver, overwhelming fires, tactical innovation, and mission command. Our six modernization priorities will not change , and they underscore the Army's commitment to innovate for the future. We have one simple focusâto make Soldiers and units more capable and lethal. Over the last year, we identified $16.1B in legacy equipment programs that we could reinvest towards 31 signature systems that are critical to realizing Multi-Domain Operations and are aligned with these priorities.

While the Army's prioritization of and commitment to its modernization initiatives can be viewed as essential to both resourcing and executing the Army's Modernization Strategy, some defense experts have questioned the Army's modernization priorities.

For example, the Heritage Foundation's August 2019 report "Rebuilding America's Military Project: The United States Army," suggests different modernization priorities:

Given the dependence of MDO on fires and the poor state of Army fire systems, the inclusion and first placement of long-range precision fires is logical. Based on the importance of the network to MDO and the current state of Army tactical networks, logically the network should come next in priority. Third, based on the severely limited current capabilities, should come air and missile defense, followed by soldier lethality in fourth. Next-generation combat vehicles are fifth; nothing has come forward to suggest that there is a technological advancement that will make a next-generation of combat vehicles significantly better. Finally, the last priority should be future vertical lift, although a persuasive argument could be made to include sustainment capabilities instead. Nowhere in the MDO concept is a compelling case made for the use of Army aviation, combined with the relative youth of Army aviation fleets.

Aside from differing opinions from defense officials and scholars, world events might also suggest the need to re-evaluate the Army's modernization priorities. One example is the September 14, 2019 attack against Saudi Arabian oil facilities, believed to have been launched from Iran, which employed a combination of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and cruise missiles. It has been pointed out U.S. forces are ill-prepared to address this threat although the Army has a variety of programs both underway and proposed to mitigate this vulnerability. If the September 14, 2019 attacks are replicated not only in the region but elsewhere by other actors, it might make a compelling case to reprioritize Army air and missile defense from fifth out of six modernization priorities to a higher level to address an evolving and imminent threat. Apart from the Army's stated modernization priorities, there might also be other technologies or systems that merit inclusion based on changing world events.

How will the Army Manage its Modernization Strategy?

First established in 2018, Army Futures Command (AFC) is intended to:

Modernize the Army for the future-will integrate the future operational environment, threat, and technologies to develop and deliver future force requirements, designing future force organizations, and delivering materiel capabilities.

According to the Army's 2019 Modernization Strategy:

Modernization is a continuous process requiring collaboration across the entire Army, and Army Futures Command brings unity of effort to the Army's modernization approach. AFC, under the strategic direction of Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA), develops and delivers future concepts, requirements, and organizational designs based on its assessment of the future operating environment. AFC works closely with the Army's modernization stakeholders to integrate and synchronize these solutions into the operational force.

While this broad statement provides a basic modernization management concept, it does not address specific authorities and responsibilities for managing Army modernization.

Many in Congress have expressed concerns with the relationship between AFC and the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisitions, Logistics, and Technology (ASA (ALT)) who has a statutory role in the planning and resourcing of acquisition programs. The Senate Appropriations Committee's report accompanying it's version of the Department of Defense Appropriations Bill, 2020, directs the Army to clearly define modernization responsibilities:

ARMY ACQUISITION ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

The Committee has supported efforts by the Army to address modernization shortfalls and deliver critically needed capabilities to the warfighter through establishment of Cross-Functional Teams [CFTs] and ultimately the stand-up of Army Futures Command [AFC]. However, questions remain on the roles and responsibilities of AFC and the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics & Technology) [ASA(ALT)]. As an example, the Committee recently learned of a newly created Science Advisor position within AFC, which seems to be duplicative of the longstanding role of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army for Research and Technology. Additionally, the Committee was concerned to learn that funding decisions on investment accounts, to include science and technology programs, would be directed by AFC rather than ASA(ALT).

While the Committee supports AFC's role in establishing requirements and synchronizing program development across the Army, it affirms that ASA(ALT) has a statutory role in the planning and resourcing of acquisition programs. The ASA(ALT) should maintain a substantive impact on the Army's long-range investments, not just serve as a final approval authority. Therefore, the Committee directs the Secretary of the Army to provide a report that outlines the roles, responsibilities, and relationships between ASA(ALT) and AFC to the congressional defense committees not later than 90 days after enactment of this act. The report shall include a clear description of the responsibilities of each organization throughout the phases of the planning, programming, budgeting, and execution of resources . (Emphasis added.)

While the Army has placed significant emphasis on the "revolutionary" nature of AFC and its role in modernization, questions may remain about whether AFC will provide a significant level of "value added" to Army modernization and not encroach on the statutory responsibilities of the ASA (ALT) as well as other major Army organizations having a role in modernization.

How Long Will It Take to Fully Implement the Army's Modernization Strategy?

According to the Army's 2019 Modernization Strategy, the Army plans to build a "MDO ready force by 2035." In order for this goal to be achieved, the Army assumes that:

The Army's budget will remain flat, resulting in reduced spending power over time. Demand for Army forces will remain relatively constant while it executes this strategy. Research and development will mature in time to make significant improvements in Army capabilities by 2035. Adversary modernization programs will stay on their currently estimated trajectories in terms of capability levels and timelines.

It is not clear if "MDO ready" equates to a "fully modernized" Army or if a certain undefined level of modernization is sufficient for the Army to successfully execute MDO. Originally, Army officials were hoping to field the M-2 Bradley replacementâthe Optionally Manned Fighting Vehicle (OMFV)âby 2026. They also planned to field one brigade's worth of OMFVs per yearâmeaning that it would have taken until 2046 to field OMFVs to all Armored Brigade Combat Teams (ABCTs). On January 16, 2020, the Army decided to cancel the current OMFV solicitation and revise and re-solicit the OMFV requirements on a competitive basis at an unspecified time in the future. Given this cancellation, it may take longer than 2046 to field all OMFVs unless significant budgetary resources are applied to the program.

With the Army's somewhat optimistic assumptions about the budget, demand for forces, mature research and development, and the pace of adversary modernization, as well as the scope and complexity of overall Army Modernization, some policymakers may raise questions about whether a full realization of Army modernization initiatives is possible by 2035.

What Kind of Force Structure Will Be Required to Support Modernization?

In order to support MDO, Army officials reportedly noted in March 2019 that the Army was preparing to make major force structure changes within the next five years. These force structure changes will also be needed to support Army Modernization as new weapons systems could likely require new units and might also mean that existing units are deactivated or converted to different kinds of units. Potential questions for policymakers include:

What kinds of new units will be required as a result of Army Modernization? Will existing units be deactivated or converted to support Army Modernization? Will additional endstrength be required to support Army Modernization or will fewer soldiers be needed? Will new Military Operational Specialties (MOSs) be required to support Army Modernization? How will new units be apportioned between the Active and Reserve Components? Where will these new units be stationed in the United States and overseas? Will new training ranges or facilities be required to support Army Modernization?

Is the Army's Modernization Strategy Affordable?

Army officials have said they eliminated, reduced, or consolidated almost 200 legacy weapon systems catalogued in the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP) as part of an effort to shift more than $30 billion to programs related to the "Big Six" modernization priorities. The budget review process, known as "Night Court," was initiated by then-Army Secretary Mark Esper.

Army officials have said additional reviews will yield lower levels of savings. They have also acknowledged uncertainty in budget assumptions, including total projected funding for the service and long-term costs for modernization priorities as they shift from research, development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E) to procurement activities. Army Lieutenant General James Pasquarette, Deputy Chief of Staff of the Army for Programs (G-8), has said:

Our strategy right now assumes a topline that's fairly flat. I'm not sure that's a good assumption. So, when the budget does go down ... will we have the nerve to make the hard choices to protect future readiness? Often that's the first lever we pullâwe try and protect end-strength and current readiness at the cost of future readiness.... We don't really have a clear picture of what those bills are right now [for long-term costs of modernization priorities].... There are unrealized bills out there that we're going to have to figure out how to resource and so, right now, I think they're underestimated.

Some policymakers and observers have raised questions about the affordability of the Army's modernization strategy. This section seeks to provide context to this question by detailing the Army's requested funding for programs related to its six modernization priorities for FY2020 and the accompanying FYDP, historical and projected funding for the service's RDT&E and procurement efforts in real terms (i.e., inflation-adjusted dollars), changes in the service's budget allocations over time, and planned funding for the service's major defense acquisition programs.

Selected Army Modernization Funding in the FY2020 Budget Request

According to information provided by the Army, the service requested $8.9 billion in RDT&E and procurement funding for programs related to its six modernization priorities in FY2020. This amount reflects an increase of $3.9 billion (78%) from the FY2019 enacted amount of $5 billion. See Table 1 for a breakdown of projected funding by priority.

For FY2020, the Army requested a total of $38.7 billion for its acquisition accounts, including $12.4 billion for RDT&E and $26.3 billion for procurement. Notably, for FY2020, funding requested for programs related to the Army's six modernization priorities, $8.9 billion, accounted for less than a quarter (23%) of its overall acquisition budget request.

Potential questions for policymakers include:

How has the Army identified funding to pay for programs related to its six modernization priorities? What officials and organizations have been involved? What is the status of these reviews? How can the Army provide more transparency in identifying sources of funding from these reviews? Why does funding for programs related to the Army's six modernization priorities account for a relatively small share of its overall acquisition budget? Should the Army devote a larger share of its overall acquisition budget to its six modernization priorities? What would be some challenges in doing so? When does the Army expect to fully resource programs related to its modernization priorities? How much of the Army's overall acquisition budget should go toward modernization priorities, current acquisition programs, and legacy programs? Some programs related to the Army's six modernization priorities, such as Future Vertical Lift, saw a higher percentage increase in requested funding for FY2020 than others, such as Air and Missile Defense. Do the percentage increases reflect the level of priority the Army is assigning these individual programsâor rising costs associated with new stages of development? The Army's FY2020 unfunded priorities list included $242.7 million for "modernization requirements" and $403.9 million for "lethality requirements," among funding for other requirements. Why was the service unable to fund these requirements in its regular budget request?

Selected Army Modernization Funding in the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP)

The service projected $57.3 billion in RDT&E and procurement funding for programs related to its six modernization priorities over the FYDP from FY2020 through FY2024. This amount, if authorized and appropriated by Congress, would reflect an increase of $33.1 billion (137%) from projections for the five-year period in the FY2019 budget request. See Table 2 for a breakdown of the projected cost by program.

For the five-year period through FY2024, the Army projected a total of $187.5 billion for its acquisition accounts (in nominal dollars), including $58.7 billion for RDT&E and $128.8 billion for procurement. Notably, for the FY2020 FYDP, funding for programs related to the Army's six modernization priorities accounts for less than a third (31%) of its overall acquisition budget.

In addition to the previous list, potential questions for policymakers include:

How realistic are the Army's assumptions for funding programs related to its six modernization priorities, given uncertainty about their long-term costs and the projected decrease in real terms (i.e., inflation-adjusted dollars) in Army procurement and RTD&E funding over the Future Years Defense Program? Should the level of planned funding change for certain programs to reflect different priorities? What additional tradeoffs or divestments does the Army plan to make to its current acquisition programs or legacy weapon systems in order to fund programs related to its six modernization priorities? What programs may be cut?

Army RDT&E and Procurement Funding: A Historical Perspective55

Taken together and adjusted for inflation (in constant FY2020 dollars), the Army's acquisition accountsâincluding RDT&E and procurementâhave experienced several buildup and drawdown cycles in past decades, with some of the biggest increases occurring during periods of conflict. See Figure 1 .

For example, the service's acquisition budget spiked in FY1952 during the Korean War, again in FY1968 during the Vietnam War, and again in FY2008 during the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. The FY2008 peak was driven in part by the service's procurement of Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles and other programs intended to protect troops in combat zones from roadside bombs.

In terms of a non-war peak, the Army received a combined total of $48.7 billion (in constant FY2020 dollars) for RDT&E and procurement in FY1985 during the Cold Warâan era in which the service's "Big Five" acquisition programs entered service, including the UH-60 Black Hawk utility helicopter (1979), M1 Abrams tank (1980), M2 Bradley fighting vehicle (1981), Patriot air defense system (1981), and AH-64 Apache attack helicopter (1986).

The Army projects combined RDT&E and procurement funding will continue to decline in real dollars. The combined level of funding for these accounts is projected to decline from $38.7 billion in FY2020 to $34.3 billion in FY2024 (in constant FY2020 dollars), a decrease over the FYDP of $4.4 billion (11%). Even so, the FY2024 level would remain higher than the Army's historical average of $32.2 billion (in constant FY2020 dollars) for RDT&E and procurement.

How may the projected decrease in RDT&E and procurement funding in constant FY2020 dollars over the Future Years Defense Program impact the Army's ability to execute its modernization strategy? If the Army's overall acquisition budget is projected to decrease (in real terms), and funding for programs related to its modernization strategy is projected to increase, what kinds of tradeoffs or divestments does the Army plan to make to its current acquisition programs or legacy weapon systems? How much, if any, of the increase in RDT&E and procurement funding in FY2018 went to programs related to the Army's six modernization priorities? To what extent will projected costs for programs related to the Army's six modernization priorities increase as they shift from RDT&E to procurement activities?

The share of funding that the Congress has allocated to Army appropriations accounts has changed over time. Because every dollar spent on military personnel, operation and maintenance, and military construction is a dollar that cannot be spent on RDT&E or procurement, Army budget allocation decisions may impact the service's ability to execute its modernization strategy.

For example, the Army uses funds from its Operation and Maintenance (O&M) account to pay the salaries and benefits of most of its civilian employees, train soldiers, and purchase goods and services, from fuel and office supplies to health care and family support. (Today, the account also covers most of the service's costs for Overseas Contingency Operations, or OCO. ) In FY1985, during the Reagan-era buildup, O&M accounted for a smaller share of the Army budget (28%) than it does today (41%) and than it has historically (36%). In the same year, procurement accounted for a larger share of the Army budget (26%) than it does today (14%) and than it has historically (16%). See Figure 2 .

What changes in spending on military personnel could impact the Army's ability to execute its modernization strategy, particularly if the service increases end-strength? What changes in spending on operations and maintenance could impact the Army's ability to execute its modernization strategy? What changes in spending on Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) could impact the Army's ability to execute its modernization strategy? How is the Army reviewing potential ways to control military personnel or operations and maintenance costs to be able to spend more on RDT&E and procurement in support of programs related to its modernization strategy?

Planned Funding for Current Army Major Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAPs)

Including funding planned for FY2020 and FY2021 as part of the FY2020 President's budget request, the Army has an outstanding balance of $120.6 billion (in then-year dollars) for current major defense acquisition programs. Programs with balances greater than $10 billion include the following:

CH-47F . The CH-47F Chinook Block II modernization program is intended to increase the carrying capacity of the cargo helicopter in part by upgrading its rotor blades and flight control and drive train components (estimated balance: $25.9 billion); Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV) . 59 This program is intended to replace a portion of the Humvee fleet with a new light-duty vehicle (estimated balance: $20.8 billion, $3 billion of which is projected to come from services other than the Army); and Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle (AMPV). 60 This program is intended to replace the M113 armored personnel carrier family of vehicles with a new armored vehicle (estimated balance: $11.7 billion).

For the cumulative funding status of each of the Army's current major defense acquisition programs as of the FY2020 President's budget re quest, including prior-year amounts and outstanding balances, see Figure 3 .

For projected funding for each of the Army's current major defense acquisition programs as of the FY2020 President's budget request, see Figure 4 .

As part of the FY2020 President's budget request, the Army proposed reducing funding for some current modernization programs, including the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV) and the Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle (AMPV), in part to pay for modernization priorities.

As previously discussed, DOD has not yet designated many of the programs related to the Army's six modernization priorities as major defense acquisition programs (MDAPs). However, DOD appears to have designated as pre-major defense acquisition programs (pre-MDAPs) some programs related to the Army's six modernization priorities, such as Future Vertical Lift. When possible, the Army plans to begin equipping units with technology on a limited basis in coming years in advance of fully equipping units to take advantage of new technologies as soon as practicable. See Table 3 .

Potential questions for policymakers include:

How do programs included in the Army's six modernization priorities relate to current major defense acquisition programs? Should the Army fund certain current major defense acquisition programs, such as Integrated Air and Missile Defense, at higher levels to better conform to programs related to its six modernization priorities? How may resourcing requirements for programs related to the Army's six modernization priorities impact funding for its current major defense acquisition programs?

Given the rapidly changing and unpredictable security challenges facing the United States and the scope of the Army's modernization program, congressional oversight could be challenged in the future as the Army attempts to develop and field an array technologies and systems. A potential oversight framework which constantly evaluates the relevance, the feasibility, and affordability of the Army's modernization efforts could benefit both congressional oversight and related budgetary activities.