Issues in Autonomous Vehicle Testing and Deployment

Summary: Autonomous vehicles have the potential to bring major improvements in highway safety. Motor vehicle crashes caused an estimated 36,560 fatalities in 2018; a study by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) has shown that 94% of crashes are due to human errors. For this and other reasons, federal oversight of the testing and deployment of autonomous vehicles has been of considerable interest to Congress. In the 115 th Congress, autonomous vehicle legislation passed the House as H.R. 3388 , the SELF DRIVE Act, and a separate bill, S. 1885 , the AV START Act, was reported from a Senate committee. Neither bill was enacted. In the 116 th Congress, interest in autonomous vehicles remains strong, but similar comprehensive legislative proposals have not been introduced. The America's Transportation Infrastructure Act of 2019, S. 2302 , which has been reported by the Senate Environment and Public Works Committee, would encourage research and development of infrastructure that could accommodate new technologies such as autonomous vehicles.

Summary: In recent years, private and government testing of autonomous vehicles has increased significantly, although it is likely that widespread use of fully autonomous vehiclesâwhere no driver attention is neededâmay be many years in the future. The pace of autonomous vehicle commercialization may have slowed due to the 2018 death in Arizona of a pedestrian struck by an autonomous vehicle, which highlighted the challenges of duplicating human decisionmaking by artificial intelligence. The National Transportation Safety Board determined that the fatality was caused by an "inadequate safety culture" at Uberâwhich was testing the vehicleâand deficiencies in state and federal regulation.

Summary: The U.S. Department of Transportation and NHTSA have issued three reports since 2016 that inform the discussion of federal autonomous vehicle policies, suggesting best practices that states should consider in driver regulation; a set of voluntary, publicly available self-assessments by automakers showing how they are building safety into their vehicles; and a proposal to modify the current system of granting exemptions from federal safety standards. On February 6, 2020, NHTSA announced its approval of the first autonomous vehicle exemptionâfrom three federal motor vehicle standardsâto Nuro, a California-based company that plans to deliver packages with a robotic vehicle smaller than a typical car.

Summary: Proponents of autonomous vehicles contend that lengthy revisions to current safety regulations could impede innovation, as the rules could be obsolete by the time they took effect. Federal and state regulatory agencies are addressing vehicle and motorist standards, while Congress is considering legislative solutions to some of the regulatory challenges.

Summary: Legislation did not pass the 115 th Congress due to disagreements on several key issues. These included the following:

Summary: The extent to which Congress should alter the traditional division of vehicle regulation, with the federal government being responsible for vehicle safety and states for driver-related aspects such as licensing and registration, as the roles of driver and vehicle merge. The number of autonomous vehicles that NHTSA should permit to be tested on highways by granting exemptions to federal safety standards, and which specific safety standards, such as those requiring steering wheels and brake pedals, can be relaxed to permit thorough testing. How much detail legislation should contain related to addressing cybersecurity threats, including whether federal standards should require vehicle technology that could report and stop hacking of critical vehicle software and how much information car buyers should be given about these issues. The extent to which vehicle owners, operators, manufacturers, insurers, and other parties have access to data that is generated by autonomous vehicles, and the rights of various parties to sell vehicle-related data to others.

Summary: Congress may address these issues in legislation reauthorizing surface transportation programs. The current surface transportation authorization expires at the end of FY2020. Policy decisions about the allocation of radio spectrum and road maintenance also may affect the rate at which autonomous vehicle technologies come into use.

Fully autonomous vehicles, which would carry out many or all of their functions without the intervention of a driver, may someday bring sweeping social and economic changes and "lead to breakthrough gains in transportation safety." Motor vehicle crashes caused an estimated 36,560 fatalities in 2018; a study by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) has shown that 94% of crashes are due to human errors.

Legislation that would encourage development and testing of autonomous vehicles has faced controversy in Congress. In the 115 th Congress, the House of Representatives passed an autonomous vehicle bill, H.R. 3388 , by voice vote in September 2017. The Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation reported a different bill, S. 1885 , in November 2017, but after some Senators raised concerns about the preemption of state laws and the possibility of large numbers of vehicles being exempted from some Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards, the Senate bill did not reach the floor. No further action was taken on either bill before the 115 th Congress adjourned.

Although some Members of Congress remain interested in autonomous vehicles, no legislative proposals have become law. Several fatal accidents involving autonomous vehicles raised new questions about how federal and state governments should regulate vehicle testing and the introduction of new technologies into vehicles offered for sale. A pedestrian was killed in Arizona by an autonomous vehicle operated by Uber on March 18, 2018, and three Tesla drivers died when they failed to respond to hazards not recognized by the vehicles. These accidents suggest that the challenge of producing fully autonomous vehicles that can operate safely on public roads may be greater than developers had envisioned, a new outlook voiced by several executives, including the Ford Motor Co. CEO. However, with the authorization of federal highway and public transportation programs set to expire at the end of FY2020, a surface transportation reauthorization bill could become a focus of efforts to also enact autonomous vehicle legislation.

While fully autonomous vehicles may lie well in the future, a range of new technologies is already improving vehicle performance and safety while bringing automation to vehicular functions once performed only by the driver. The technologies involved are very different from the predominantly mechanical, driver-controlled technology of the 1960s, when the first federal vehicle safety laws were enacted. These new features automate lighting and braking, connect the car and driver to the Global Positioning System (GPS) and smartphones, and keep the vehicle in the correct lane. Three forces are driving these innovations:

technological advances enabled by new materials and more powerful, compact electronics; consumer demand for telecommunications connectivity and new types of vehicle ownership and ridesharing; and regulatory mandates pertaining to emissions, fuel efficiency, and safety.

Manufacturers are combining these innovations to produce vehicles with higher levels of automation. Vehicles do not fall neatly into the categories of "automated" or "nonautomated," because all new motor vehicles have some element of automation.

The Society of Automotive Engineers International (SAE), an international standards-setting organization, has developed six categories of vehicle automationâranging from a human driver doing everything to fully autonomous systems performing all the tasks once performed by a driver. This classification system ( Table 1 ) has been adopted by the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) to foster standardized nomenclature to aid clarity and consistency in discussions about vehicle automation and safety.

Vehicles sold today are in levels 1 and 2 of SAE's automation rating system. Although some experts forecast market-ready autonomous vehicles at level 3 will be available in a few years, deployment of fully autonomous vehicles in all parts of the country at level 5 appears to be more distant, except perhaps within closed systems that allow fully autonomous vehicles to operate without encountering other types of vehicles. Testing and development of autonomous vehicles continue in many states and cities.

Technologies that could guide an autonomous vehicle ( Figure 1 ) include a wide variety of electronic sensors that would determine the distance between the vehicle and obstacles; park the vehicle; use GPS, inertial navigation, and a system of built-in maps to guide the vehicle's direction and location; and employ cameras that provide 360-degree views around the vehicle. To successfully navigate roadways, an autonomous vehicle's computers, sensors and cameras will need to accomplish four tasks that a human driver undertakes automatically: detect objects in the vehicle's path; classify those objects as to their likely makeup (e.g., plastic bag in the wind, a pedestrian or a moving bicycle); predict the likely path of the object; and plan an appropriate response. Most autonomous vehicles use dedicated short-range communication (DSRC) to monitor road conditions, congestion, crashes, and possible rerouting. As 5G wireless communications infrastructure is installed more widely, DSRC may evolve and become integrated with it, enabling vehicles to offer greater interoperability, bandwidth, and cybersecurity. Some versions of these autonomous vehicle technologies, such as GPS and rear-facing cameras, are being offered on vehicles currently on the market, while manufacturers are studying how to add others to safely transport passengers without drivers.

Manufacturers of conventional vehicles, such as General Motors and Honda, are competing in this space with autonomous vehicle "developers" such as Alphabet's Waymo. In addition, automakers are aligning themselves with new partners that have experience with ride-sharing and artificial intelligence:

Ford and Volkswagen have announced that they expect to use autonomous vehicle technology in a new ride-sharing service in Pittsburgh, PA, as early as 2021; GM acquired Cruise Automation, a company that is developing self-driving technology for Level 4 and 5 vehicles. GM has also invested $500 million in the Lyft ride-sharing service; Honda, after breaking off talks about partnering with Waymo, purchased a stake in GM's Cruise Automation; Volvo and Daimler have announced partnerships with ride-sharing service Uber; and BMW partnered with the Mobileye division of Intel, a semiconductor manufacturer, to design autonomous vehicle software.

As vehicle technologies advance, the security of data collected by vehicle computers and the protection of on-board systems against intrusion are becoming more prominent concerns. Many of the sensors and automated components providing functions now handled by the driver will generate large amounts of data about the vehicle, its location at precise moments in time, driver behavior, and vehicle performance. The systems that allow vehicles to communicate with each other, with roadside infrastructure, and with manufacturers seeking to update software will also offer portals for possible unauthorized access to vehicle systems and the data generated by them.

Protecting autonomous vehicles from hackers is of paramount concern to federal and state governments, manufacturers, and service providers. A well-publicized hacking of a conventional vehicle by professionals demonstrated to the public that such disruptions can occur. Hackers could use more than a dozen portals to enter even a conventional vehicle's electronic systems ( Figure 2 ), including seemingly innocuous entry points such as the airbag, the lighting system, and the tire pressure monitoring system (TPMS). Requirements that increasingly automated vehicles accept remote software updates, so that owners do not need to take action each time software is revised, are in part a response to concerns that security weaknesses be rectified as quickly as possible.

To address these concerns, motor vehicle manufacturers established the Automotive Information Sharing and Analysis Center (Auto-ISAC), which released a set of cybersecurity principles in 2016. DOT's autonomous vehicle policies designate Auto-ISAC as a central clearinghouse for manufacturers to share reports of cybersecurity incidents, threats, and violations with others in the vehicle industry.

Aside from hackers, many legitimate entities would like to access vehicle data, including vehicle and component manufacturers, the suppliers providing the technology and sensors, the vehicle owner and occupants, urban planners, insurance companies, law enforcement, and first responders (in case of an accident). Issues pertaining to vehicle data collection include vehicle testing crash data (how is it stored and who gets to access it); data ownership (who owns most of the data collected by vehicle software and computers); and consumer privacy (transparency for consumers and owner access to data). At present, no laws preclude manufacturers and software providers from reselling data about individual vehicles and drivers to third parties.

Pathways to Autonomous Vehicle Deployment Abroad

Autonomous vehicles are being developed and tested in many countries, including those that produce most of the world's motor vehicles. Several analyses have evaluated the factors that are contributing to the advancement of autonomous vehicles in various countries:

Innovation . Benchmarks in this area include the number and engagement of domestic automakers and technology developers working on automation, the partnerships they forge with academic and related businesses, the prevalence of ride-sharing services, and autonomous vehicle patents issued. V ehicle infrastructure . Autonomous vehicles will need new types of infrastructure support and maintenance, including advanced telecommunications links and near-perfect pavement and signage markings. Planning and implementing these highway improvements may enable autonomous vehicles to be fully functional sooner. In addition, many test vehicles are currently powered by electricity, so the availability of refueling stations could be a factor in their acceptance. Wo rkforce training. The increased reliance on autonomous vehicle technologies may require different workforce skills. Many traditional mechanical parts may disappear, especially if autonomous vehicles operate entirely on battery power, while the arrangement and function of dashboards and seating may be reinvented. Components suppliers that are already addressing this new product demand and reorienting their workforces will assist in the transition to autonomous vehicles. G overnment laws and regulations that encourage development and testing . Fully autonomous vehicles may not have standard features of today's cars, such as steering wheels and brake pedals, as there will not be a driver. By law or regulation, motor vehicles built today are required to have many of these features. Some governments are taking a lead by modifying vehicle requirements for purposes of pilot programs and tests. Permanent changes in standards will most likely be necessary if autonomous vehicle technologies are to be commercialized. L evel of consumer acceptance . Markets are more likely to embrace autonomous vehicles if many residents in cities see autonomous vehicles on the road, a high level of technology is in use (including internet access and mobile broadband), and ride-hailing services are more widely used.

Several surveys have been conducted analyzing many of these factors. For example, a 2018 Harvard University report highlights plans in China, South Korea, Japan, and the United States to "seize the benefits" of autonomous vehicles. In a report on innovation policies in four Asian countries (China, Japan, South Korea, and Singapore), the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific ranked Singapore first in autonomous vehicle readiness because of its policies and new laws governing their deployment and its high consumer acceptance. The report also notes that South Korea's K-City facility is "intended to be the world's largest testbed for self-driving cars."

A more detailed comparison of factors affecting autonomous vehicle development and deployment has been conducted by KPMG International, which has developed an index to measure how 25 countries are guiding autonomous vehicles ( Table 2 ).

The Netherlands ranked first overall in the KPMG report, where it was cited as "an example of how to ready a country for AVs by performing strongly in many areas , " as well as first in infrastructure. Singapore came in first on policy and legislation because it has a single government entity overseeing autonomous vehicle regulations, it is funding autonomous vehicle pilots, and it has enacted a national standard to promote safe deployment. Contributing to its rank was a World Economic Forum (WEF) report that ranked it first among 139 countries in having an effective national legislature and efficient resolution of legal disputes. Singapore also scored first place on the consumer acceptance metric, primarily because its extensive autonomous testing is being conducted throughout the island nation, thereby familiarizing residents with autonomous passenger vehicles and buses.

Two other major auto-producing countriesâGermany and Japanâfall just below the United States on technology and innovation, according to KPMG, while Japan ranks higher on autonomous vehicle infrastructure ( Table 3 ).

Vehicles operating on public roads are subject to dual regulation by the federal government and the states in which they are registered and driven. Traditionally, NHTSA, within DOT, has regulated auto safety, while states have licensed automobile drivers, established traffic regulations, and regulated automobile insurance. Proponents of autonomous vehicles note that lengthy revisions to current vehicle safety regulations could impede innovation, as the rules could be obsolete by the time they take effect.

In 2016, the Obama Administration issued the first report on federal regulations affecting autonomous vehicles. Since then, DOT has issued two follow-up reports and has said it anticipates issuing annual updates to its regulatory guidance. In addition, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) is reconsidering the allocation of electromagnetic spectrum currently reserved for motor vehicle communications, and its decisions may affect how autonomous vehicles evolve.

DOT's 2016 report proposed federal and state regulatory policies in these areas:

A set of guidelines outlining best practices for autonomous vehicle design, testing, and deployment. DOT identified 15 practices and procedures that it expected manufacturers, suppliers, and service providers (such as ridesharing companies) to follow in testing autonomous vehicles, including data recording, privacy, crashworthiness, and object and event detection and response. These reports, called Safety Assessment Letters, would be voluntary, but the report noted that "they may be made mandatory through a future rulemaking." A m odel s tate p olicy that identifies where new autonomous vehicle-related issues fit in the current federal and state regulatory structures. The model state policy, developed by NHTSA in concert with the American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators and private-sector organizations, suggests state roles and procedures, including administrative issues (designating a lead state agency for autonomous vehicle testing), an application process for manufacturers that want to test vehicles on state roads, coordination with local law enforcement agencies, changes to vehicle registration and titling, and regulation of motor vehicle liability and insurance. A streamlined review process to issue DOT regulatory interpretations on autonomous vehicle questions within 60 days and on regulatory exemptions within six months. Identification of new tools and regulatory structures for NHTSA that could build its expertise in new vehicle technologies, expand its ability to regulate autonomous vehicle safety, and increase speed of its rulemakings. Two new tools could be expansion of existing exemption authority and premarket testing to assure that autonomous vehicles will be safe. Some of the new regulatory options cited would require new statutory authority, while others could be instituted administratively. The report noted that "DOT does not intend to advocate or oppose any of the tools.â¦ [I]t intends â¦ to solicit input and analysis regarding those potential options from interested parties."

Trump Administration Policy Guidelines and Proposed SafetyÂ Rules

The two follow-up reports issued by the Trump Administration describe a more limited federal regulatory role in overseeing autonomous passenger vehicle deployment, while also broadening the scope of DOT oversight by addressing the impact of autonomous technology on commercial trucks, public transit, rail, and ports and ships. The policies described in these reports replace those recommended by the Obama Administration in several ways, including the following:

Encouraging integration of automation across all transportation modes , instead of just passenger vehicles. The October 2018 report Automated Vehicles 3.0 outlines how each of DOT's agencies will address autonomous vehicle safety within its purview. Establishing six automation principles that will be applied to DOT's role in overseeing passenger cars, trucks, commercial buses, and other types of vehicles. These include giving priority to safety; remaining technology-neutral; modernizing regulations; encouraging a consistent federal and state regulatory environment; providing guidance, research, and best practices to government and industry partners; and protecting consumers' ability to choose conventional as well as autonomous vehicles. Reiterating the traditional roles of federal and state governments in regulating motor vehicles and motorists, respectively. The reports cite best practices that states should consider implementing, such as minimum requirements for autonomous vehicle test drivers, and discuss how DOT can provide states with technical assistance. Recommending voluntary action in lieu of regulation. This could include suggesting that manufacturers and developers of autonomous driving systems issue and make public voluntary safety self-assessments to demonstrate transparency and increase understanding of the new technologies and industry development of "voluntary technical standards" to "advance the integration of automation technologies into the transportation system." The NHTSA Voluntary Safety Self-Assessment web page lists 17 companies that have filed self-assessment reports, including three major automakers. To provide a perspective, 64 companies have been issued autonomous vehicle testing permits by the State of California alone. Accelerating NHTSA decisions on requests for exemptions from federal safety standards for autonomous vehicle testing. Promoting development of voluntary technical standards by other organizations, such as the Society of Automotive Engineers, the government's National Institute of Standards and Technology, and the International Organization for Standardization.

DOT has indicated that it wants to revise regulations pertinent to autonomous vehicles, such as redefining the terms "driver" and "operator" to indicate that a human being does not always have to be in control of a motor vehicle. It also said it plans to require changes in standards for the inspection, repair, and maintenance of federally regulated commercial trucks and buses. Along these lines, NHTSA issued a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking in May 2019, requesting comments on testing and verifying how autonomous vehicle technologies may comply with existing federal safety standards.

National Transportation Safety Board Investigation and Recommendations

On November 19, 2019, the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) issued its report on the probable cause of a 2018 fatality involving an autonomous vehicle in Tempe, AZ. In that accident, a pedestrian was fatally injured by a test vehicle operated by Uber Technologies with an operator in the driver's seat. The NTSB investigation determined that the probable cause of the crash "was the failure of the vehicle operator to monitor the driving environment and the operation of the ADS [automated driving system] because she was visually distracted throughout the trip by her personal cell phone." Though the vehicle detected the pedestrian 5.6 seconds before the crash, the NTSB reported that "it never accurately classified her as a pedestrian or predicted her path."

Beyond the immediate cause of this accident, NTSB reported that an "inadequate safety culture" at Uber and deficiencies in state and federal regulation contributed to the circumstances that led to the fatal crash. Among the findings were the following:

Uber's internal safety risk-assessment procedures and oversight of the operator were inadequate, and its disabling of the vehicle's forward collision warning and automatic emergency braking systems increased risks. The Arizona Department of Transportation provided insufficient oversight of autonomous vehicle testing in the state. NHTSA provides insufficient guidance to developers and manufacturers on how they should achieve safety goals, has not established a process for evaluating developers' safety self-assessment reports, and does not require such reports to be submitted, leaving their filing as voluntary.

NTSB recommended that Uber, the Arizona Department of Transportation, and NHTSA take specific steps to address the issues it identified. It also recommended that the American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators inform all states about the circumstances of the Tempe crash, encouraging them to require and evaluate applications by developers before granting testing permits.

Connected Vehicles and Spectrum Allocation

Federal regulation of the spectrum used in vehicle communications may affect how automation proceeds. Autonomous vehicles, whose artificial intelligence and technology are generally self-contained in each vehicle, are part of a larger category of connected vehicles and infrastructure. Federal, state, and industry research and testing of vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) and vehicle-to-infrastructure (V2I) communications has been under way since the 1990s. Together, these two sets of technologies, known as V2X, are expected to reduce the number of accidents by improving detection of oncoming vehicles, providing warnings to drivers, and establishing communications infrastructure along roadways that would prevent many vehicles from leaving the road and striking pedestrians. These technologies fall within the broad category of intelligent transportation systems, which have received strong support from Congress due to their potential to improve traffic flow and safety.

For vehicles to communicate wirelessly, they use radio frequencies, or spectrum, which are regulated by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC). In 1999, the FCC allocated the 5.9 gigahertz (GHz) band solely for motor vehicle safety purposes for vehicles using DSRC. Over the past two decades, industry and government agencies have collaborated to develop, test, and deploy DSRC technologies. States have invested in DSRC-based improvements, and this technology is operating in dozens of states and cities.

As industry has continued to explore vehicle automation, an alternative, cellular-based technology has recently emerged, known as C-V2X. In December 2019, the FCC proposed rules that would reallocate the lower 45 MHz of the 5.9 GHz band for unlicensed use (e.g., Wi-Fi), and allocate the remaining 30 MHz for transportation and vehicle-related use. Of the 30 MHz, the FCC proposed to grant C-V2X exclusive use of 20 MHz of the segment. It is seeking comment on whether the remaining 10 MHz should remain dedicated to DSRC or be dedicated to C-V2X. The FCC commissioners noted that DSRC has evolved slowly and has not been widely deployed, and the rules are intended to ensure the spectrum supports its highest and best use. This decision has competitive implications for the automotive, electronics, and telecommunications industries, and may affect the availability of safety technologies and the path toward vehicle automation. DOT has called for retaining the entire 5.9 GHz band for exclusive transportation use.

Figure 3 shows that these two technologies facilitate somewhat different types of vehicle and infrastructure communications. In light of their different characteristics, the European Commission has approved DSRC use for direct V2V and V2I communications, while endorsing cellular-based technology for vehicle access to the cloud and remote infrastructure.

Industry groups in the United States took varying positions in the FCC proceedings. DSRC advocates argued that this technology has been proven by years of testing and is already deployed in many areas. They generally supported retaining the 5.9 GHz band for exclusive use for DSRC. C-V2X supporters contended that its cellular-based solution is aligned with international telecommunications standards for 5G technologies and should be allowed to use the 5.9 GHz band alongside DSRC. A group of technology companies, including device makers, argued that additional spectrum is needed to accommodate the increasing number of interconnected devices, and that the 5.9GHz band can safely be shared among transportation and non-transportation uses.

During the 115 th Congress, committees in the House of Representatives and the Senate held numerous hearings in 2017 on the technology of autonomous vehicles and possible federal issues that could result from their deployment. Initially, bipartisan consensus existed on major issues: H.R. 3388 , the SELF DRIVE Act, was reported unanimously by the House Committee on Energy and Commerce, and on September 6, 2017, the House of Representatives passed it without amendment by voice vote.

A similar bipartisan initiative began in the Senate. Prior to markup in the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, the then-chairman and ranking member issued a set of principles they viewed as central to new legislation:

prioritize safety , acknowledging that federal standards will eventually be as important for self-driving vehicles as they are for conventional vehicles; promote innovation and address the incompatibility of old regulations written before the advent of self-driving vehicles; remain technology - neutral , not favoring one business model over another; reinforce separate but complementary federal and state regulatory roles ; strengthen cybersecurity so that manufacturers address potential vulnerabilities before occupant safety is compromised; and educate the public through government and industry efforts so that the differences between conventional and self-driving vehicles are understood.

Legislation slightly different from the House-passed bill emerged: S. 1885 , the AV START Act, was reported by the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation on November 28, 2017. It was not scheduled for a floor vote prior to adjournment in December 2018 because of unresolved concerns raised by several Senators. To address some of those concerns, a committee staff draft bill that would have revised S. 1885 was circulated in December 2018 that could form the basis of future legislation.

The House and Senate bills addressed concerns about state action replacing some federal regulation, while also empowering NHTSA to take unique regulatory actions to ensure safety and encouraging innovation in autonomous vehicles. The bills retained the current arrangement of states controlling most driver-related functions and the federal government being responsible for vehicle safety. The House and Senate bills included the following major provisions. Where the December 2018 Commerce Committee staff draft proposed significant changes, they are noted in this analysis.

P reemption of state laws . H.R. 3388 would have barred states from regulating the design, construction, or performance of highly autonomous vehicles, automated driving systems, or their components unless those laws are identical to federal law. The House-passed bill reiterated that vehicle registration, driver licensing, driving education, insurance, law enforcement, and crash investigations should remain under state jurisdiction as long as state laws and regulations do not restrict autonomous-vehicle development. H.R. 3388 provided that nothing in the preemption section should prohibit states from enforcing their laws and regulations on the sale and repair of motor vehicles.

S. 1885 would also have preempted states from adopting laws, regulations, and standards that would regulate many aspects of autonomous vehicles, but would have omitted some of the specific powers reserved to the states under the House-passed bill. States would not have been required to issue drivers licenses for autonomous-vehicle operations, but states that chose to issue such licenses would not have been allowed to discriminate based on a disability. The bill provided that preemption would end when NHTSA establishes standards covering these vehicles.

The Senate staff draft sought to clarify that state and local governments would not lose their traditional authority over traffic laws. It also would have added provisions that state common law and statutory liability would be unaffected by preemption, and would have limited use of arbitration in death or bodily injury cases until new federal safety standards are in effect.

Exemption authority . Both the House and Senate bills would have expanded DOT's ability to issue exemptions from existing safety standards to encourage autonomous-vehicle testing on public roads. To qualify for an autonomous-vehicle exemption, a manufacturer would have had to show that the safety level of the vehicle equaled or exceeded the safety level of each standard for which an exemption was sought. Current law limits exemptions to 2,500 vehicles per manufacturer per year. The House-passed bill would have phased in increases over four years of up to 100,000 vehicles per manufacturer per year; the Senate bill would have permitted up to 80,000 in a similar phase-in.

H.R. 3388 provided constraints on the issuance of exemptions from crashworthiness and occupant protection standards; S. 1885 did not address those two issues. DOT would have been directed to establish a publicly available and searchable database of motor vehicles that have been granted an exemption. Crashes of exempted vehicles would have had to be reported to DOT. The Senate bill would not have required the establishment of a database of exempted vehicles, and reporting of exempt vehicle crashes would not have been required.

The Senate staff draft added a provision to ensure that vehicles exempted from federal standards would have been required to nonetheless maintain the same level of overall safety, occupant protection, and crash avoidance as a traditional vehicle. A DOT review of vehicle exemptions would have been required annually. The draft capped exemptions at no more than five years.

New NHTSA safety rules. The House bill would have required NHTSA to issue a new regulation requiring developers and manufacturers to submit a "safety assessment certification" explaining how safety is being addressed in their autonomous vehicles. The Senate bill included a similar provision requiring a "safety evaluation report," and would have delineated nine areas for inclusion in the reports, including system safety, data recording, cybersecurity risks, and methods of informing the operator about whether the vehicle technology is functioning properly. While manufacturers and developers would be required to submit reports, the legislation did not mandate that NHTSA establish an assessment protocol to ensure that minimum risk conditions are met.

The Senate staff draft would have clarified the process by which federal motor vehicle safety standards would be updated to accommodate new vehicle technologies, providing additional time for new rulemaking. Within six months of enactment, DOT would have been required to develop and publicize a plan for its rulemaking priorities for the safe deployment of autonomous vehicles.

To address concerns that autonomous vehicles might not recognize certain potential hazardsâincluding the presence of bicyclists, pedestrians, and animalsâand hence possibly introduce new vulnerabilities to motor vehicle travel, the Senate staff draft would have clarified that manufacturers must describe how they are addressing the ability of their autonomous vehicles to detect, classify, and respond to these and other road users. Manufacturers and developers would include this analysis in their safety evaluation reports.

Cybersecurity. The House-passed bill provided that no highly autonomous vehicle or vehicle with "partial driving automation" could be sold domestically unless a cybersecurity plan had been developed by the automaker. Such plans would have to have been developed within six months of enactment and would include

a written policy on mitigation of cyberattacks, unauthorized intrusions, and malicious vehicle control commands; a point of contact at the automaker with cybersecurity responsibilities; a process for limiting access to autonomous driving systems; and the manufacturer's plans for employee training and for maintenance of the policies.

The Senate bill would have required written cybersecurity plans to be issued, including a process for identifying and protecting vehicle control systems, detection, and response to cybersecurity incidents, and methods for exchanging cybersecurity information. A cybersecurity point of contact at the manufacturer or vehicle developer would have had to be named. Unlike the House-passed bill, S. 1885 would have directed DOT to create incentives so that vehicle developers would share information about vulnerabilities, and would have specified that all federal research on cybersecurity risks should be coordinated with DOT.

In addition, S. 1885 would have established a Highly Automated Vehicle Data Access Advisory Committee to provide Congress with recommendations on cybersecurity issues. Federal agencies would have been prohibited from issuing regulations pertaining to the access or ownership of data stored in autonomous vehicles until the advisory committee's report was submitted.

The staff draft would have added several cybersecurity provisions, including an additional study by the National Institute of Standards and Technology that would recommend ways vehicles can be protected from cybersecurity incidents.

Privacy. Before selling autonomous vehicles, manufacturers would have been required by the House-passed bill to develop written privacy plans concerning the collection and storage of data generated by the vehicles, as well as a method of conveying that information to vehicle owners and occupants. However, a manufacturer would have been allowed to exclude processes from its privacy policy that encrypt or make anonymous the sources of data. The Federal Trade Commission would have been tasked with developing a report for Congress on a number of vehicle privacy issues.

Although S. 1885 would not have explicitly required privacy plans by developers and manufacturers, it would have required NHTSA to establish an online, searchable motor vehicle privacy database that would include a description of the types of information, including personally identifiable information (PII), that are collected about individuals during operation of a motor vehicle. This database would have covered all types of vehiclesânot just autonomous vehiclesâand would have included the privacy policies of manufacturers. The database would also have included an explanation about how PII would be collected, retained, and destroyed when no longer relevant.

The Senate staff draft would have added new passenger motor vehicle privacy protections.

Research and advisory panels. Both bills would have established several new advisory bodies to conduct further research on autonomous vehicles and advise DOT on possible new vehicle standards. H.R. 3388 would have established a NHTSA advisory group with a broad cross-section of members to advise on mobility access for senior citizens and the disabled; cybersecurity; labor, employment, environmental, and privacy issues; and testing and information sharing among manufacturers.

S. 1885 would have established other panels, including a Highly Automated Vehicles Technical Committee to advise DOT on rulemaking policy and vehicle safety; a working group comprising industry and consumer groups to identify marketing strategies and educational outreach to consumers; and a committee of transportation and environmental experts to evaluate the impact of autonomous vehicles on transportation infrastructure, mobility, the environment, and fuel consumption. Separately, DOT would have been required to study ways in which autonomous vehicles and parts could be produced domestically, with recommendations on how to incentivize U.S. manufacturing.

The Senate staff draft would have consolidated some of the advisory committees in S. 1885 into a Highly Automated Vehicle Advisory Council with diverse stakeholder representation, and mandated to report on mobility for the disabled, senior citizens and populations underserved by public transportation; cybersecurity; employment and environmental issues; and privacy and data sharing.

No similar comprehensive autonomous vehicle legislation has been introduced in the 116 th Congress, although discussions on a bicameral bill have been ongoing. In addition, the Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works has reported America's Transportation Infrastructure Act of 2019, S. 2302 , which includes several provisions in Subtitle D addressing the possible impact of autonomous vehicles on highway infrastructure. It would establish a grant program to modernize the U.S. charging and fueling infrastructure so that it would be responsive to technology advancements, including autonomous vehicles. The legislation would also require research on ways in which roadway infrastructure should be improved for autonomous vehicles.

State and local rules and regulations may affect how autonomous vehicles are tested and deployed. The National Governors Association (NGA) has noted that state governments have a role with respect to vehicle and pedestrian safety, privacy, cybersecurity, and linkage with advanced communications networks. While supporting technology innovations in transportation, a recent NGA report notes that "the existing regulatory structure and related incentives have not kept pace with the new technology" and that "recent accidents have raised concerns about the safety of drivers, pedestrians and other road users in the period during which autonomous and non-autonomous vehicles share the road."

NGA has joined with other state and local government organizations to call for modifications in forthcoming autonomous vehicle legislation, including

clarity that states and local governments not only can enforce existing laws governing operation of motor vehicles on public roads, but also originate new statutes and regulations; requiring submission of more detailed automaker and developer reports to DOT on the safety of their technologies, so that states and cities can be assured that autonomous vehicle testing is being conducted in a safe manner; differentiation between limited vehicle testing and the commercial deployment of large numbers of autonomous vehicles through an expanded exemptions process; and expansion of plans for consumer education about "safe use and interaction" with respect to autonomous vehicles.

According to the National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL), at least 41 states and the District of Columbia considered legislation related to autonomous vehicles between 2013 and October 2019; in that time, 29 states and the District of Columbia enacted legislation, governors in 11 states issued executive orders, and 5 states issued both an executive order and enacted legislation. ( Figure 4 ).

Of the states that have enacted laws in 2017, 2018, and 2019 pertaining to autonomous vehicles, NCSL reports that the largest number of states have passed laws that clarify certain types of commercial activity, such as how closely autonomous vehicles can follow each other when they are coordinated, as in truck platooning. According to NCSL, no recent state laws have been enacted dealing with cybersecurity or vehicle inspection reports. NCSL has organized and categorized the types of state legislation ( Table 4 ). For a more thorough description of the legislation passed in 2017, 2018, and 2019, the NCSL Table of Enacted State Legislation provides more detail.

Deployment of fully autonomous vehicles will require not only a suite of new technologies, but also changes to the highway infrastructure on which those vehicles will operate. Autonomous vehicles being tested today rely on clear pavement markings and legible signage to stay in their lanes and navigate through traffic. Major highways as well as side roads in urban and rural settings will need to accommodate autonomous vehicles in addition to a large fleet of conventional vehicles with human drivers.

In this transition period to more autonomous vehiclesâwhich many anticipate will last several decades âthe Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) is expected to play a significant role through its administration of the Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices (MUTCD), which sets standards for all traffic control devices, including signs, intersection signals, and road markings. For example, overhead signage on Interstate Highways contains white lettering on a green background in all 50 statesâeasily recognizable to any U.S. driverâdue to MUTCD standards. FHWA is in the process of updating the 2009 MUTCD to address issues specific to autonomous vehicle technologies. However, state compliance with MUTCD is voluntary, and not all states uniformly apply all standards. Audi reportedly announced in 2018 that it would not make its new Level 3 autonomous vehicle technology, called Traffic Jam Pilot, available in the United States because of "laws that change from one state to the next, insurance requirements, and things like lane lines and road signs that look different in different regions." Other automakers have made similar complaints about U.S. roads.

In the near term, improvement and better maintenance of pavement markings, signage and intersection design may be the most helpful steps that federal and state transportation officials can take. Despite national standards based on MUTCD, not all states maintain their highway markings at a level that would be useful to guide autonomous vehicles. Inadequate road maintenance may affect the pace of autonomous vehicle deployment. Some 21% of major U.S. roads are in poor condition, and a road with many potholes or temporary pavement repairs may also lack continuous lane markings. Many minor roads, which are generally the responsibility of county or municipal governments, may lack road edge lines as well as center lines, potentially making it difficult for autonomous vehicles to position themselves correctly. Dirt and gravel roads may pose particular challenges for autonomous vehicles, as they generally have no pavement markings and cameras may be unable to detect potholes or edges in low-visibility conditions.

Closely tied to the need for clearer road markings and signage will be ways in which federal and state transportation agencies develop a standardized method to communicate information to vehicles and motorists about construction, road accidents, detours, and other changes to road environments. Many of the perceived benefits of autonomous vehiclesâreduced vehicle fatalities, congestion mitigation, and pollution reductionâmay depend on the ability of vehicles to exchange information with surrounding infrastructure. The Transportation Research Board (TRB) has been evaluating how states should begin now to plan and develop the types of connected vehicle infrastructure that will be necessary for full autonomous vehicle deployment. TRB's research is also focused on how cash-strapped transportation agencies can identify the large investments that will in turn be necessary to implement connectivity on top of regular maintenance of highways, bridges, and other traditional infrastructure.

Other options to facilitate autonomous vehicle travel may include designation of special highway corridors that would include all V2X systems necessary for safe autonomous vehicle operation; three European countries have agreed to build such a corridor.

Over a longer time line, the importance of highway markings may fade as automakers and developers find new ways for autonomous vehicles to navigate, including greater use of guardrails and roadside barriers, sensors, and three-dimensional maps. If highly detailed mapping is deemed to be one replacement for visual cues such as lane markings, then transportation agencies and automakers may need to develop an open standard so that all vehicles will understand the mapping technology. V2X communications through DSRC and cellular may evolve to provide a mechanism for new types of vehicle guidance.


Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania: Background and U.S.-Baltic Relations

Summary: Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, often referred to as the Baltic states , are close U.S. allies and considered among the most pro-U.S. countries in Europe. Strong U.S. relations with these three states are rooted in history. The United States never recognized the Soviet Union's forcible incorporation of the Baltic states in 1940, and it applauded the restoration of their independence in 1991. These policies were backed by Congress on a bipartisan basis. The United States supported the Baltic states' accession to NATO and the European Union (EU) in 2004.

Summary: Especially since Russia's 2014 invasion of Ukraine, potential threats posed to the Baltic states by Russia have been a primary driver of increased U.S. and congressional interest in the region. Congressional interest in the Baltic states has focused largely on defense cooperation and security assistance for the purposes of deterring potential Russian aggression and countering hybrid threats, such as disinformation campaigns and cyberattacks. Energy security is another main area of U.S. and congressional interest in the Baltic region.

Summary: Regional Security Concerns

Summary: U.S., NATO, and Baltic leaders have viewed Russian military activity in the region with concern; such activity includes large-scale exercises, incursions into Baltic states' airspace, and a layered build-up of anti-access/area denial (A2AD) capabilities. Experts have concluded that defense of the Baltic states in a conventional military conflict with Russia likely would be difficult and problematic. The Baltic states fulfill NATO's target of spending 2% of gross domestic product (GDP) on defense, although as countries with relatively small populations, their armed forces remain relatively small and their military capabilities limited. Consequently, the Baltic states' defense planning relies heavily on their NATO membership.

Summary: Defense Cooperation and Security Assistance

Summary: The United States and the Baltic states cooperate closely on defense and security issues. New bilateral defense agreements signed in spring 2019 focus security cooperation on improving capabilities in areas such as maritime domain awareness, intelligence sharing, surveillance, and cybersecurity. The United States provides significant security assistance to the Baltic states; the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020 ( P.L. 116-92 ) increased and extended U.S. assistance for building interoperability and capacity to deter and resist aggression. Under the U.S. European Deterrence Initiative (EDI), launched in 2014, the United States has bolstered its military presence in Central and Eastern Europe. As part of the associated Operation Atlantic Resolve, rotational U.S. forces have conducted various training activities and exercises in the Baltic states.

Summary: NATO has also helped to bolster the Baltic states' security. At the 2016 NATO summit, the allies agreed to deploy multinational battalions to each of the Baltic states and Poland. The United Kingdom leads the battalion deployed in Estonia, Canada leads in Latvia, and Germany leads in Lithuania. Rotational deployments of aircraft from NATO member countries have patrolled the Baltic states' airspace since 2004; deployments have increased in size since 2014.

Summary: Potential Hybrid Threats

Summary: Since 2014, when the EU adopted sanctions targeting Russia due to the Ukraine conflict, tensions between Russia and the Baltic states have grown. These conditions have generated heightened concerns about possible hybrid threats and Russian tactics, such as disinformation campaigns and propaganda, to pressure the Baltic states and promote anti-U.S. or anti-NATO narratives. A large minority of the Estonian and Latvian populations consists of ethnic Russians; Russia frequently accuses Baltic state governments of violating the rights of Russian speakers. Many ethnic Russians in the Baltic states receive their news and information from Russian media sources, potentially making those communities a leading target for disinformation and propaganda. Some observers have expressed concerns that Russia could use the Baltic states' ethnic Russian minorities as a pretext to manufacture a crisis. Cyberattacks are another potential hybrid threat; addressing potential vulnerabilities with regard to cybersecurity is a top priority of the Baltic states.

Summary: Energy Security

Summary: The Baltic states have taken steps to decrease energy reliance on Russia, including through a liquefied natural gas (LNG) terminal in Lithuania and projects to build pipeline and electricity interconnections with Poland, Finland, and Sweden.

Many U.S. officials and Members of Congress consider Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, often referred to collectively as the Baltic states , to be valued U.S. allies and among the most pro-U.S. countries in Europe. Strong ties between the United States and the Baltic states have deep historical roots. Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia gained their independence in 1918, after the collapse of the Russian Empire. In 1940, they were forcibly incorporated into the Soviet Union, but the United States never recognized their annexation. The United States strongly supported the restoration of the three countries' independence in 1991, and it was a leading advocate of their accession to NATO and the European Union (EU) in 2004.

The United States and the Baltic states work closely together in their respective bilateral relationships and within NATO, as well as in the context of U.S.-EU relations. The U.S.-Baltic partnership encompasses diplomatic cooperation in pursuit of shared foreign policy objectives, extensive cooperation on security and defense, and a mutually beneficial economic relationship. The United States provides considerable security assistance to the Baltic states, including financing assistance and defense sales, intended to strengthen their military capabilities.

Since 2014, U.S. focus on the Baltic region has increased, driven by concerns about potential threats posed by Russia. Developments related to Russia and the implications for U.S. policy and NATO likely will have continuing relevance for Congress. Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania are central interlocutors and partners in examining and responding to these challenges.

As indicated by annual security assistance appropriations, as well as resolutions and bills adopted or introduced in recent years, Congress supports the maintenance of close relations and security cooperation with the Baltic states. The House Baltic Caucus, a bipartisan group of 70 Members of the House of Representatives, and the Senate Baltic Freedom Caucus, a bipartisan group of 11 Senators, seek to maintain and strengthen the U.S.-Baltic relationship and engage in issues of mutual interest.

Although outside observers typically view Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania as a group, citizens of the three countries tend to point out that alongside the three countries' many similarities are notable differences in national history, language, and culture. Cooperation and convergence among the Baltic states remains the central trend, but each country has its own unique domestic political dynamics and the viewpoints and priorities of the three countries are not always completely aligned.

Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania stand out as the leaders of democracy among post-Soviet states and are the only post-Soviet states that have joined NATO and the EU. Since the restoration of their independence nearly 30 years ago, the three countries' governments have tended to consist of multiparty coalitions, which have maintained broadly pro-market, pro-U.S./NATO, and pro-EU orientations.

The government of Estonia is led by the center-left Center Party in a coalition with the far-right, anti-immigration Conservative People's Party of Estonia (EKRE) and the conservative Pro Patria (Fatherland) party. Juri Ratas of the Center Party is Estonia's prime minister.

The Center Party came in second in Estonia's March 2019 general election with 23.1% of the vote (26 seats in Estonia's 101-seat unicameral parliament, the Riigikogu ); it was able to form a government after it unexpectedly reversed its campaign pledge not to work with the far-right EKRE. EKRE came in third in the election with 17.8% of the vote, more than doubling its share of the vote from the 2015 election and winning 19 seats (a gain of 12 seats). The center-right Reform Party, which led a series of coalition governments from 2005 to 2016, came in first place in the 2019 election, winning 28.9% of the vote (34 seats). However, it was unable to secure enough support from potential coalition partners to form a government.

The Center Party, whose support comes largely from Estonia's Russian-speaking population (about 30% of the population), previously led a coalition government with Pro Patria and the center-left Social Democratic Party from November 2016 until the 2019 election. In late 2016, a changeover in the party's leadership reoriented the Center Party away from a Russian-leaning outlook to a clear pro-Western stance in support of Estonia's membership in NATO and the EU.

During the 2019 campaign, the Center Party advocated for a progressive tax system, higher social spending, a simplified path to citizenship for noncitizen residents, and maintenance of the country's dual Estonian- and Russian-language education system. The Reform Party, by contrast, advocated maintenance of a flat tax, tight fiscal policy, and Estonian language exams for obtaining citizenship. The Reform Party also called for rolling back Russian-language education in the country's school system.

Observers assert that EKRE benefitted in the 2019 election from antiestablishment sentiment among voters and gained support by appealing to rural Estonians who feel economically left behind. In addition to opposing immigration, EKRE is adamantly nationalist, skeptical of the EU, and anti-Russia. Some analysts suggest there is a potential for friction between the Center Party and EKRE on issues such as citizenship, immigration, and abortion policy.

In 2016, Estonia's parliament unanimously elected Kersti Kaljulaid as president. Kaljulaid is the country's youngest president (aged 46 at the time of her election) and its first female president. A political outsider with a background as an accountant at the European Court of Auditors, she was put forward as a surprise unity candidate after Estonia's political parties were unable to agree on the first round of candidates. The president serves a five-year term and has largely ceremonial duties but plays a role in defining Estonia's international image and reflecting the country's values.

Latvia's October 2018 general election produced a fragmented result, with seven parties winning seats in the country's 100-seat unicameral parliament ( Saeima ) . After three months of negotiations and deadlock, a five-party coalition government took office in January 2019. Prime Minister KriÅ¡jÄnis KariÅÅ¡ of the center-right New Unity Party (JV) leads the government.

JV leveraged its experience as a member of the previous governing coalition to put together and lead the new government despite being the smallest party in the Saeima , with eight seats. The other coalition members are the conservative, nationalist National Alliance (NA) and three new parties: the antiestablishment Who Owns the State? (KPV LV); the New Conservative Party (JKP), which campaigned on an anti-corruption platform; and the liberal Development/For! alliance. The coalition partners hold a combined 61 seats in the Saeima and appear likely to maintain the broadly center-right, fiscally conservative, and pro-European policies followed by recent Latvian governments.

At the same time, the strong showings in the election by KPV LV and JKP (each won 16 seats) appeared to reflect deepening public dissatisfaction with corruption and the political establishment following high-profile bribery and money-laundering scandals in 2018. The three parties of the previous coalition government, the centrist Union of Greens and Farmers (ZZS), the Unity Party (rebranded New Unity in 2018), and the NA, lost nearly half their total seats, dropping from a combined 61 seats to 32 seats.

The center-left Harmony Social Democratic Party (SDPS), which draws its support largely from the country's ethnic Russian population, remained the largest party in parliament, with 23 seats. With five of the seven parties in the coalition government, the SDPS and ZZS are the parliamentary opposition. The next general election is scheduled to take place in 2022.

On May 29, 2019, the Saeima elected Egils Levits to be Latvia's next president. A former judge at the European Court of Justice, Levits formally took office on July 8, 2019. Outgoing President Raimonds Vejonis of the ZZS declined to run for a second term. The president performs a mostly ceremonial role as head of state but also acts as commander-in-chief of the armed forces and has the power to propose and block legislation.

Lithuania has a centrist coalition government composed of four political parties and led by the center-right Lithuanian Peasants and Greens Union (LVÅ½S). The LVÅ½S emerged as the surprise winner of the country's October 2016 parliamentary election, winning 54 of the 141 seats in the Lithuanian parliament ( Seimas ) after winning one seat in the 2012 election.

The prime minister of Lithuania is Saulius Skvernelis, a politically independent former interior minister and police chief who was selected for the position by the LVÅ½S (while remaining independent, Skvernelis campaigned for the LVÅ½S). A major factor in the 2016 election outcome was the perception that Skvernelis and the LVÅ½S remained untainted by a series of corruption scandals that negatively affected support for most of Lithuania's other political parties.

The LVÅ½S initially formed a coalition government with the center-left Social Democratic Party of Lithuania (LSDP), which led the previous coalition government following the 2012 election. In September 2017, the LSDP left the coalition amid tensions over the slow pace of tax and pension reforms intended to reduce economic inequality. Prime Minister Skvernelis subsequently led a minority government of the LVÅ½S and the Social Democratic Labour Party of Lithuania (LSDDP), a new party that splintered off from the LSDP.

In July 2019, the LVÅ½S and the LSDDP reached an agreement to form a new coalition government with the addition of the nationalist-conservative Order and Justice Party and the Electoral Action of Poles in Lithuania-Christian Families Alliance. The four parties in the current coalition control a parliamentary majority, with a combined 76 out of 141 seats in the Seimas . The coalition's domestic agenda focuses primarily on boosting social programs, including greater spending on social insurance and increased benefits for families, students, and the elderly. The opposition parties are the center-right Homeland Union-Lithuanian Christian Democrats, which came in second place in the 2016 election with 31 seats; the LSDP; and the center-right Liberal Movement. The next general election is scheduled to take place in October 2020.

Gitanas NausÄda, a pro-European, politically independent centrist and former banker, won Lithuania's May 2019 presidential election. He replaces Dalia GrybauskaitÄ , who served as president from 2009 to 2019 and was consistently regarded as Lithuania ' s most popular politician. The powers of the Lithuanian presidency, the only presidency in the Baltic states to be directly elected, are weaker than those of the U.S. presidency. However, the Lithuanian president plays an important role in shaping foreign and national security policy, is commander-in-chief of the armed forces, appoints government officials, and has the power to veto legislation.

Efforts to combat corruption remain a focus of Lithuania's government. Following a series of bribery scandals involving leading politicians and one of the country's largest companies, the Seimas adopted a new law in 2018 appointing special prosecutors to investigate cases of political corruption.

The 2008-2009 global economic crisis hit the Baltic states especially hard; each of the three countries experienced an economic contraction of more than 14% in 2009. The social costs of the recession and the resulting budget austerity included increased poverty rates and income inequality and considerable emigration to wealthier parts of the EU. The Baltic economies have since rebounded, however, benefitting from strong domestic consumption, external demand for exports, and investment growth (including from EU funding):

Estonia's gross domestic product (GDP) grew by 5.8% in 2017 and 4.8% in 2018. It is forecast to grow by 3.2% in 2019 and 2.9% in 2020. Unemployment declined from 16.7% in 2010 to 5.4% in 2018. Latvia's GDP grew by 4.6% in 2017 and 4.8% in 2018; it is forecast to grow by 2.8% in 2019 and 2.8% in 2020. Unemployment declined from 19.5% in 2010 to 7.4% in 2018. Lithuania's GDP grew by 4.1% in 2017 and 3.5% in 2018; it is forecast to grow by 3.4% in 2019 and 2.7% in 2020. Unemployment declined from 17.8% in 2010 to 6.1% in 2018.

Despite the crisis and aftermath, each of the Baltic states fulfilled a primary economic goal when each adopted the euro as its currency (Estonia in 2011, Latvia in 2014, and Lithuania in 2015).

The public finances of the Baltic states remain well within guidelines set by the EU (which require member states to have an annual budget deficit of less than 3% of GDP and maintain government debt below 60% of GDP). Both Estonia and Latvia recorded a budget deficit below 1% of GDP in 2018, and Lithuania had a small budget surplus. Gross government debt in 2018 was approximately 8.3% of GDP for Estonia (making it the EU's least-indebted member state), 35.9% of GDP for Latvia, and 34.2% of GDP for Lithuania.

According to a study by the European Commission, foreign direct investment (FDI) in the Baltic states remains below precrisis levels. With considerable investment in the financial services sector, Sweden is the largest foreign investor in the region, followed by Finland and the Netherlands. Estonia has been the most successful of the three Baltic countries in attracting FDI, with FDI equivalent to approximately 100% of gross value added in 2015, compared to approximately 63% for Latvia and 40% for Lithuania.

U.S. and European authorities have expressed concerns about the practices of banks in the region that cater to nonresidents, largely serving account holders based in Russia and other countries of the former Soviet Union. In 2018, two scandals in particular brought attention to money-laundering challenges in the region.

In February 2018, the U.S. Department of the Treasury designated ABLV Bank, then the third-largest bank in Latvia, as a financial institution of primary money laundering concern. Treasury accused it of money laundering, bribery, and facilitating transactions violating United Nations sanctions against North Korea. Following a run on deposits and a decision by the European Central Bank not to intervene, ABLV initiated a process of self-liquidation. The Latvian government subsequently made reforming the banking sector and strengthening anti-money-laundering (AML) practices top policy priorities.

A September 2018 report commissioned by Danske Bank, Denmark's largest bank, indicated that between 2007 and 2015, some â¬200 billion (approximately $220 billion) worth of suspicious transactions may have flowed through a segment of its Estonian branch catering to nonresidents, primarily Russians. The activity continued despite critical reports by regulatory authorities and whistleblower accounts highlighting numerous failures in applying AML practices. In February 2019, the Estonian Financial Supervision Authority ordered Danske Bank to cease operations in Estonia; Danske Bank subsequently decided to cease its activities in Latvia and Lithuania (and Russia), as well.

Regional Relations with the United States

The U.S. State Department describes Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania as strong, effective, reliable, and valued allies that have helped to promote security, stability, democracy, and prosperity in Europe and beyond. Many citizens of the Baltic states remain grateful to the United States for consistently supporting their independence throughout the Cold War and playing a key role in promoting the restoration of independence in 1991. Most policymakers in the Baltic states tend to see their countries' relationship with the United States as the ultimate guarantor of their security against pressure or possible threats from Russia. All three Baltic states joined NATO and the EU in 2004 with strong U.S. support.

In addition to maintaining a pro-NATO and pro-EU orientation, the Baltic states have sought to support U.S. foreign policy and security goals. For example, they have worked closely with the United States in Afghanistan, where the three Baltic states have contributed troops to NATO-led missions since 2002-2003. The three countries also have been partner countries in the Global Coalition to Defeat the Islamic State, providing personnel, training, weapons, and funding for efforts to counter the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria since 2014.

The Trump Administration and many Members of Congress have demonstrated support for strong U.S. relations with the Baltic states. In April 2018, President Donald Trump hosted the presidents of the three Baltic states for a quadrilateral U.S.-Baltic Summit intended to deepen security and defense cooperation and reaffirm the U.S. commitment to the region. The presidential summit was followed by a U.S.-Baltic Business Summit intended to expand commercial and economic ties.

During the 115 th Congress, the Senate adopted a resolution ( S.Res. 432 ) congratulating Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania on the 100 th anniversary of their independence; applauding the U.S.-Baltic partnership; commending the Baltic states' commitment to NATO, transatlantic security, democracy, and human rights; and reiterating the Senate's support for the European Deterrence Initiative (EDI) as a means of enhancing Baltic security (on EDI, see " U.S. European Deterrence Initiative ," below).

The United States provides significant security assistance to its Baltic partners. According to the State Department, as of July 2019, U.S. security assistance to the Baltic states has included

more than $450 million in defense articles sold under the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program and more than $350 million in defense articles authorized under the Direct Commercial Sales process since 2014; more than $150 million in Foreign Military Financing (FMF) since 2015, with the aim of strengthening the Baltic states' defensive capabilities in areas such as hybrid warfare, electronic warfare, border security, and air and maritime domain awareness and enhancing interoperability with NATO forces; approximately $1.2 million annually per country in International Military Education and Training (IMET) funds contributing to the professional education of military officers; and $290 million in funding from the Department of Defense under Title 10 train and equip programs since 2015, including approximately $173 million in FY2018.

Since 1993, the Baltic states have participated in the U.S. National Guard State Partnership Program. Under the program, Estonia's armed forces partner with units from the Maryland National Guard, Latvia's armed forces partner with the Michigan National Guard, and Lithuania's armed forces partner with the Pennsylvania National Guard.

In 2017, the United States signed separate bilateral defense cooperation agreements with each of the Baltic states. The agreements enhanced defense cooperation by building on the NATO Status of Forces Agreement to provide a more specific legal framework for the in-country presence and activities of U.S. military personnel.

The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018 ( P.L. 115-91 ) authorized the Department of Defense to conduct or support a security assistance program to improve the Baltic states' interoperability and build their capacity to deter and resist aggression. The program was authorized through 2020 with a spending limit of $100 million.

In November 2018, the United States and the three Baltic states agreed to develop bilateral defense cooperation strategic road maps focusing on specific areas of security cooperation for the period 2019-2024. In April 2019, the United States and Lithuania signed a road map agreeing to strengthen cooperation in training, exercises, and multilateral operations; improve maritime domain awareness in the Baltic Sea; improve regional intelligence-sharing, surveillance, and early warning capabilities; and build cybersecurity capabilities. In May 2019, the United States signed road map agreements with Latvia and Estonia outlining similar priorities for security cooperation.

In the 116 th Congress, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020 ( P.L. 116-92 ) extended security assistance to the Baltic states for building interoperability and deterrence through 2021 and increased the total spending limit to $125 million. The act also requires the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of State to jointly conduct a comprehensive assessment of the military requirements necessary to deter and resist Russian aggression in the region.

The committee report ( S.Rept. 116-103 ) for the Senate version of the Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2020 ( S. 2474 ), recommends allocating $400 million to the Defense Cooperation Security Agency to fund a Baltics regional air defense radar system.

A sense of Congress resolution introduced in the House of Representatives ( H.Res. 416 ) would reaffirm U.S. support for the Baltic states' sovereignty and territorial integrity and encourage the Administration to further defense cooperation efforts. Partially reflected in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020, the Baltic Reassurance Act ( H.R. 3064 ) introduced in the House of Representatives would reiterate the U.S. commitment to the security of the Baltic states and require the Secretary of Defense to conduct a comprehensive regional defense assessment.

U.S. economic ties with the three Baltic states remain relatively limited, although the State Department has stated there are "growing commercial opportunities for U.S. businesses" and "room for growth" in the relationship.

In 2018, U.S. goods exports to Estonia were valued at $346.1 million and goods imports from Estonia were valued at $953.5 million. Main U.S. exports to Estonia are computer and electronic products, chemicals, machinery, and transportation equipment; Estonia's top exports to the United States are computer and electronic products, petroleum products and chemicals, electrical equipment, and medical instruments. U.S. affiliates employ about 3,570 people in Estonia, and U.S. FDI in Estonia was about $100 million in 2017. In 2018, U.S. goods exports to Latvia were valued at $510.4 million and goods imports from Latvia were valued at $727.1 million. Main U.S. exports to Latvia are transportation equipment and computer and electronic products; top U.S. imports from Latvia are beverage products and transportation equipment. U.S. affiliates employ about 1,325 people in Latvia, and U.S. FDI in Latvia was $71 million in 2017. In 2018, U.S. exports to Lithuania were valued at $706.4 million and imports from Lithuania were valued at nearly $1.268 billion. Main U.S. exports to Lithuania are used machinery, chemicals, computer and electronic products, and transportation equipment; top U.S. imports from Lithuania are petroleum and coal products, chemicals, and furniture. U.S. affiliates employ about 2,250 people in Lithuania, and Lithuania has not attracted significant levels of U.S. FDI.

Regional Security Concerns and Responses

Officials in the Baltic region have noted with concern what they view as increasing signs of Russian foreign policy assertiveness. These signs include a buildup of Russian forces in the region, large-scale military exercises, and incursions by Russian military aircraft into Baltic states' airspace.

Unlike Georgia and Ukraine, the Baltic states are members of NATO, and many observers contend the alliance's Article 5 collective defense guarantee limits potential Russian aggression in the Baltic region. Nevertheless, imposing various kinds of pressure on the Baltic states enables Russia to test NATO solidarity and credibility.

Defense experts assert that Russian forces stationed near the Baltic region, including surface ships, submarines, and advanced S-400 air defense systems, could "allow [Russia] to effectively close off the Baltic Sea and skies to NATO reinforcements." According to a RAND report based on a series of war games staged in 2014 and 2015, a quick Russian strike could reach the capitals of Estonia and Latvia in 36-60 hours.

The breakup of the Soviet Union left the Baltic states with virtually no national militaries, and their forces remain small and limited (see Table 1 ). The Baltic states' defense planning consequently relies heavily on NATO membership, and these states have emphasized active participation in the alliance through measures such as contributing troops to NATO's mission in Afghanistan. In the context of Russia's invasion of Ukraine and renewed concerns about Russia, the Baltic states have significantly increased their defense budgets and sought to acquire new military capabilities.

Lithuania has the largest military of the three Baltic states, with 19,850 total active duty personnel in 2019. According to NATO, Lithuania has increased its defense spending from $427 million in 2014 to an expected $1.084 billion in 2019, equivalent to 1.98% of GDP (NATO recommends that member states allocate 2% of GDP for defense spending). The defense ministry has moved ahead with plans to acquire new self-propelled artillery systems and portable anti-aircraft missiles, as well as elements of a medium-range air defense system. After abolishing conscription in 2008, Lithuania reintroduced compulsory military service in 2015 due to concerns about Russia, a move that brings 3,000 personnel to the armed forces per year.

According to NATO, Estonia's defense spending is expected to be 2.13% of GDP ($669 million) in 2019. The country's armed forces total 6,600 active personnel and 12,000 reserves, plus a volunteer territorial defense force with about 15,800 members. Estonia has taken steps to upgrade its air defense system and modernize a range of ground warfare equipment, including anti-tank weapons. Estonia has compulsory military service for men aged 18-27, with an eight-month basic term of conscripted service.

Latvia's armed forces total 6,210 active personnel. According to NATO figures, Latvia has more than doubled its defense spending as a percentage of GDP over the past five years, from 0.94% of GDP in 2014 to 2.01% of GDP ($724 million) in 2019. Acquisition priorities of the Latvian armed forces include self-propelled artillery, armored reconnaissance vehicles, multi-role helicopters, anti-aircraft missiles, and anti-tank missiles.

Under the European Deterrence Initiative (EDI), which was launched in 2014 and originally called the European Reassurance Initiative, the United States has bolstered security cooperation in Central and Eastern Europe with enhanced U.S. military activities in five areas: (1) increased military presence in Europe, (2) additional exercises and training with allies and partners, (3) improved infrastructure to allow greater responsiveness, (4) enhanced prepositioning of U.S. equipment, and (5) intensified efforts to build partner capacity of newer NATO members and other partners. As of December 2019, there are approximately 6,000 U.S. military personnel involved in the associated Atlantic Resolve mission at any given time, with units typically operating in the region under a rotational nine-month deployment.

The United States has not increased its permanent troop presence in Europe (about 67,000 troops, including two U.S. Army Brigade Combat Teams, or BCTs). Instead, it has focused on rotating additional forces into the region, including nine-month deployments of a third BCT based in the United States. The rotational BCT is based largely in Poland, with units also conducting training and exercises in the Baltic states and 14 other European countries. The Fourth Infantry Division Mission Command Element, based in PoznaÅ, Poland, acts as the headquarters overseeing rotational units.

EDI funding increased substantially during the first years of the Trump Administration, from approximately $3.4 billion in FY2017 to approximately $4.8 billion in FY2018 and approximately $6.5 billion in FY2019. For FY2020, the Administration requested $5.9 billion in funding for the EDI; defense officials explained that the reduced request was due to the completion of construction and infrastructure projects. In September 2019, the Department of Defense announced plans to defer $3.6 billion of funding for 127 military construction projects in order to fund construction of the U.S.-Mexico border wall, with approximately $770 million of this money to come from EDI-related projects. Affected initiatives in the Baltic states reportedly include the planned construction of a special forces operations and training facility in Estonia.

At the 2016 NATO Summit in Warsaw, the alliance agreed to deploy battalion-sized (approximately 1,100-1,500 troops) multinational battle groups to Poland and each of the three Baltic states (see Figure 2 ). These enhanced forward presence units are intended to deter Russian aggression and emphasize NATO's commitment to collective defense by acting as a tripwire that ensures a response from the whole of the alliance in the event of a Russian attack.

Germany leads the multinational battalion in Lithuania, with troop contributions from Belgium, the Czech Republic, Iceland, the Netherlands, and Norway. Canada leads the multinational battalion in Latvia, with troop contributions from Albania, the Czech Republic, Italy, Montenegro, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Spain. The United Kingdom (UK) leads in Estonia, with contributions from Denmark, France, and Iceland. (The United States leads the multinational battalion in Poland, with contributions from Croatia, Romania, and the UK. )

NATO continues to resist calls to deploy troops permanently in countries that joined the alliance after the collapse of the Soviet Union due to concerns in some member states that doing so could violate the terms of the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act. Accordingly, the enhanced NATO presence has been referred to as continuous but rotational rather than permanent .

Lacking their own fighter aircraft, the Baltic states rely on their NATO allies to police and defend Baltic airspace. NATO launched the Baltic Air Policing mission in 2004. The mission originally consisted of rotating four-month deployments of four aircraft. Following Russia's invasion of Ukraine in 2014, deployments increased to 8 to 12 aircraft at a time. The Baltic states contribute to mission costs, including by providing ground services for the aircraft and supplying aviation fuel.

In September 2019, Belgium took over as the air-policing mission's lead nation, with four Belgian and four Danish F-16s operating from Å iauliai Air Base in Lithuania, augmented by four Czech Gripen fighters based at Ãmari Air Base in Estonia. From May to August 2019, in what was the 50 th rotation of the Baltic Air Policing mission, Hungary was the lead nation, with Hungarian Gripens joined at Å iauliai by F-18s from Spain and British Eurofighters augmenting from Ãmari.

In recent years, tensions between Russia and the Baltic states have been exacerbated by reciprocal accusations of spying; illicit cyber activity, including the hacking of Baltic states' government websites; and a Russian propaganda offensive directed at Russian speakers in the Baltic states. Baltic states' support for EU sanctions on Russia due to its invasion of Ukraine also has exacerbated tensions, as have Russian retaliatory sanctions targeting agricultural products.

Many observers have expressed concerns about Russia targeting the Baltic states with hybrid warfare tactics, such as those it has used in Ukraine.

Disinformation Campaigns and Ethnic Russians in Baltic States

The presence of a large ethnic Russian population in the Baltic states is a factor in these concerns, especially given that Russian claims of persecution against Russian communities were part of Russia's pretext for intervention in Ukraine. According to statements by Russian officials, including President Vladimir Putin, one of the central principles of Russian foreign policy is acting as the defender and guarantor of the rights of Russian-speaking people wherever they live.

Russia routinely accuses Estonia and Latvia of violating the human rights of Russian-speaking minorities by discriminating against the Russian language in official usage. Although international organizations generally have rejected these charges, some segments of the countries' Russian-speaking communities are poorly integrated into society. About 230,000 people in Latvia and 76,000 people in Estonia, the majority of whom are ethnic Russians, are noncitizen residents who are not allowed to vote or hold public office because they have not passed a citizenship test, which includes language and history components. Additionally, approximately 55,000 Russian citizens live in Latvia and 89,000 Russian citizens live in Estonia.

Many in the ethnic Russian community receive their news primarily from Russian-language television and newspapers, and Russian media dominates the information market in Russian-speaking regions. In the past, Latvia and Lithuania have imposed fines and temporary bans on Russian media outlets, such as Rossiya and Sputnik , due to what authorities considered dangerous and unbalanced reporting.

Analysts have documented how Russia uses traditional media (e.g., radio, television) and social media to propagate disinformation in the Baltic states and many other European countries. Russian disinformation efforts against the Baltic states typically attempt to polarize society by portraying the Baltic states as illegitimate and dysfunctional, the EU as ineffective and divided, NATO and the United States as imperial powers, and Baltic governments as Russophobe fascist regimes that oppress their ethnic Russian populations. Russian outlets repeatedly have sought to stir up opposition to NATO deployments in the region by fabricating stories of criminal activity by deployed NATO soldiers.

There is no movement among Russian-speaking communities in the Baltic states advocating absorption by Russia, and survey data indicate that these communities are not a unified, homogenous group in terms of how they view competing political narratives. Analysts believe most members of these communities prefer to live in Estonia or Latvia rather than Russia; noncitizen residents enjoy benefits such as visa-free travel throughout the EU, and average wages are considerably higher than in Russia. Concerns remain, however, that Russia could attempt to foment tensions or civil unrest as a pretext for intervention or in an attempt to seize territory populated by ethnic Russians.

Vulnerability to potential cyberattacks is a primary concern for the Baltic states. Following a period of heightened tensions with Russia in 2007, Estonia's internet infrastructure came under heavy attack from hackers. Estonian officials said some assaults came from Russian government web servers, although many others came from all over the world. According to analysts, what appeared as a series of smaller, individual distributed denial-of-service attacks was most likely a coordinated, large-scale effort. The attacks did little long-term damage, and they gave Estonia experience in facing such incidents and prompted the country to strengthen its cyber defenses.

Estonia hosts the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defense Center of Excellence, which opened in 2008. The center fosters cooperation and information sharing on cybersecurity between NATO countries, conducts cyberwarfare research and training, and organizes exercises and conferences preparing NATO countries to detect and fight cyberattacks.

In 2018, Lithuania adopted a national Cyber Security Strategy and integrated several government agencies into the National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) under the Ministry of Defense. Lithuania's NCSC registered more than 53,000 cybersecurity incidents in 2018.

The International Telecommunication Union's Global Cybersecurity Index 2018 ranked Lithuania fourth and Estonia fifth in the world based on measurements of legal, technical, organizational, capacity building, and cooperation measures related to cybersecurity. (The UK was ranked first, United States second, and France third. )

In 2014, a decade after joining NATO and the EU, the Baltic states continued to import 100% of their natural gas from Russia. This dependence raised concerns that Russia could use energy as political and economic leverage against the Baltic states, prompting them to diversify their supply sources and improve their integration with European natural gas networks.

In 2014, a floating liquefied natural gas (LNG) terminal became operational at the Lithuanian port of KlaipÄda. The nearly 300-meter-long vessel, the Independence , has the capacity to supply 100% of Lithuania's natural gas needs and 90% of the total natural gas needs of the three Baltic countries combined. In 2014, the Lithuanian gas company Litgas signed a five-year deal with Norway's Statoil (now Equinor) to provide 540 million cubic meters of gas to the facility annually. Gazprom subsequently agreed to cut the price Lithuania pays for natural gas. The United States began exporting LNG to Lithuania in 2017. Currently, Lithuania imports nearly 58% of its natural gas from Russia, accounting for approximately 19% of its primary energy consumption.

Although Estonia and Latvia continue to import all of their natural gas from Russia, natural gas accounts for a relatively low share of the countries' overall energy supplies. Oil shale accounts for about 85% of Estonia's domestic energy supply, whereas natural gas accounts for less than 6%. Russian natural gas accounts for approximately 24% of Latvia's primary energy consumption; hydropower is Latvia's largest source of energy.

In addition to Lithuania's LNG facility, numerous initiatives aim to reduce regional energy dependence on Russia through supply diversification and increased interconnectivity. A pipeline from Poland to Lithuania, linking the natural gas networks of the Baltic states to the rest of the EU, is expected to be completed in 2021. The Baltic Connector pipeline linking the gas infrastructures of Estonia and Finland is expected to become operational in 2020. Poland opened an LNG terminal in 2015, and Finland opened one in 2019.

As a remnant of the Soviet era, the Baltic states' power grids remain connected and synchronized with those of Russia (including Kaliningrad) and Belarus; a control center in Moscow regulates frequency and manages reserve capacity for the Baltic states' electricity supply. Two strategic projects to integrate the region's power grid into the wider European electricity market became operational in 2016: the LitPol link connecting Lithuania with Poland and the 450-kilometer undersea NordBalt cable connecting Lithuania with Sweden. Previously, two connections between Estonia and Finland were the only infrastructure linking the region's electric grid to the rest of Europe. In 2018, the governments of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania reached an agreement with the European Commission on plans to synchronize their electricity grids with the rest of Europe by 2025.

Many U.S. officials and Members of Congress regard European energy security as a U.S. interest. In particular, there has been concern in the United States that Russian energy dominance could affect the ability to present a united transatlantic position when it comes to other issues related to Russia. Successive U.S. Administrations have encouraged EU member states to reduce energy dependence on Russia through diversification of supply. They also have supported European steps to develop alternative sources and increase energy efficiency. In the 116 th Congress, related bills include the European Energy Security and Diversification Act of 2019 (House-passed H.R. 1616 and S. 704 ), the Protect European Energy Security Act ( H.R. 2023 ), and the Energy Security Cooperation with Allied Partners in Europe Act of 2019 ( S. 1830 ).

The Baltic states are likely to remain strong U.S. allies and important U.S. security partners in Europe. Analysts believe close cooperation between the United States and the Baltic states will continue for the foreseeable future in areas such as efforts to deter potential Russian aggression, the future of NATO, energy security, and economic issues. The Baltic states likely will continue to look to the United States for leadership on foreign policy and security issues.

During the 116 th Congress, the activities and funding level of the EDI, bilateral security cooperation with the Baltic states, and the regional presence and activities of NATO forces may remain of interest to Members of Congress. Efforts to bolster the capabilities of the Baltic states' armed forces, including through defense sales and the provision of U.S. security assistance, also may be of congressional interest. The Baltic states likely will be of continuing importance in the area of European energy security.

In addition, Members of Congress may wish to remain informed about potential security threats to the Baltic states posed by Russia, including conventional military concerns and hybrid threats, such as disinformation campaigns and cyberattacks. Members of Congress may have an interest in assessing how the Baltic states, as well as other NATO and EU member states, can develop capabilities to counter such hybrid threats.