Veto Threats and Vetoes in the George W. Bush and Obama Administrations

Summary: The Framers checked congressional legislative power by providing the President the power to veto legislation and, in turn, checked the President's veto power by providing Congress a means to override that veto. Over time, it has become clear that the presidential veto power, even if not formally exercised, provides the President some degree of influence over the legislative process. Most Presidents have exercised their veto power as a means to influence legislative outcomes. Of 45 Presidents, 37 have exercised their veto power.

Summary: This report begins with a brief discussion of the ways Presidents communicate their intention to veto, oppose, or support a bill. It then examines the veto power and Congress's role in the veto process. The report then provides analysis of the use of veto threats and vetoes and the passage of legislation during the George W. Bush Administration (2001-2009) and the Obama Administration (2009-2017) with some observations of the potential influence of such actions on legislation.

Summary: As specified by the U.S. Constitution (Article I, Section 7), the President has 10 days, Sundays excepted, to act once he has been presented with legislation that has passed both houses of Congress and either reject or accept the bill into law. The President has three general courses of action during the 10-day presentment period: The President may sign the legislation into law, take no action, or reject the legislation by exercising the office's veto authority. A President's return veto may be overridden, or invalidated, by a process also provided for in Article 1, Section 7, of the U.S. Constitution.

Summary: Because Congress faces a two-thirds majority threshold to override a President's veto, veto threats may deter Congress from passing legislation that the President opposes. By going public with a veto threat, the President may leverage public pressure upon Congress to support his agenda. For purposes of this report, which focuses on the use of veto threats, the unit of analysis throughout is a veto (or a threatened veto), and the report does not distinguish between regular and pocket vetoes.

Summary: Formal, written Statements of Administration Policy (SAPs, pronounced "saps") are frequently used to express the President's support for or opposition to particular pieces of legislation and may include statements threatening to use the veto power. Among the Bush and Obama Administrations' SAPs examined later in this report, for example, 24% and 48%, respectively, contained a veto threat.

Summary: Although the relationship between Congress and a President may change every two years with each new Congress, the relationship between an Administration and its President may also change by presidential term. For example, while the number of veto threats in SAPs slowly increased during the first three Congresses of the Bush Administration, the number of veto threats grew sharply in the 110 th Congress. In comparison to the Bush Administration, the Obama Administration steadily increased its use of veto threats issued in SAPs in every subsequent Congress.

Summary: President George W. Bush exercised the veto power 12 times during his presidency. Congress attempted to override six of President Bush's 12 vetoes and succeeded four times. President Barack Obama similarly exercised the veto power 12 times during his presidency. Congress also attempted to override six of President Obama's 12 vetoes and succeeded once. During the Bush and Obama Administrations, enrolled bills that passed both chambers and were met with a statement indicating that the President intended to veto the bill (a presidential veto threat SAP) were vetoed more often than were those that were met with a statement that agencies or senior advisors would recommend that the President veto the bill (a senior advisors threat SAP).

T he constitutional system of checks and balances and the separation of powers among the legislative, executive, and judicial branches is a cornerstone of the American system of government. By separating and checking powers in this way, the Framers hoped to prevent any person or group from seizing control over the nation's government. For example, the Framers checked congressional legislative power by providing the President the power to veto legislation and, in turn, checked the President's veto power by providing Congress a means to override that veto. Over time, it has become clear that the presidential veto power, even when not formally exercised, provides the President with an important tool to engage in the legislative process.

Most Presidents have exercised their veto power in an effort to block legislation. Of 45 Presidents, 37 have exercised their veto power. As of the end of 2019, Presidents have issued 2,580 vetoes, and Congress has overridden 111. President George W. Bush vetoed 12 bills during his presidency. Congress attempted to override six of them and succeeded four times. President Barack Obama also vetoed 12 bills during his presidency. Congress attempted to override six of them and succeeded once.

Presidents have also attempted to influence the shape of legislation through the use of veto threats. Since the 1980s, formal, written Statements of Administration Policy (SAPs, pronounced "saps") have frequently been used to express the President's support for or opposition to particular pieces of legislation. SAPs sometimes threaten to use the veto power if the legislation reviewed reaches the President's desk in its current form. Among the George W. Bush Administration (2001-2009) and the Obama Administration (2009-2017) SAPs examined later in this report, for example, 24% and 48%, respectively, contained a veto threat.

This report begins with a brief discussion of the veto power and Congress's role in the veto process. It then examines the ways Presidents communicate their intention to veto, oppose, or support a bill. The report then provides and discusses summary data on veto threats and vetoes during the Bush and Obama Administrations.

As specified by the U.S. Constitution (Article I, Section 7), the President has 10 days, Sundays excepted, to act once he has been presented with legislation that has passed both houses of Congress and either reject or accept the bill into law. Within those 10 days, Administration officials consider various points of view from affected agencies (as is the case throughout the legislative process) and recommend a course of action to the President regarding whether or not to veto the presented bill.

The President has three general courses of action during the 10-day presentment period: The President may sign the legislation into law, take no action and allow the bill to become law without signature after the 10 days, or reject the legislation by exercising the office's veto authority.

The President may reject legislation in two ways. The President may veto the bill and "return it, with his Objections to that House in which it shall have originated." This action is called a "regular" or "return" veto (hereinafter return veto). Congress typically receives the objections to the bill in a written veto message.

If Congress has adjourned during the 10-day period, the President might also reject the legislation through a "pocket veto." This occurs when the President retains, but does not sign, presented legislation during the 10-day period, with the understanding that the President cannot return the bill to a Congress that has adjourned. Under these circumstances, the bill will not become law. A pocket veto is typically marked by a type of written veto message known as a "Memorandum of Disapproval." As discussed in greater detail below, this practice has sometimes been controversial, because arguably it prevents Congress from attempting to override the President's veto.

A President's return veto may be overridden, or invalidated, by a process provided for in Article 1, Section 7, of the U.S. Constitution. To override a return veto, Congress may choose to "proceed to reconsider" the bill. Passage by two-thirds of Members in each chamber is required to override a veto before the end of the Congress in which the veto is received. Neither chamber is under any constitutional, legal, or procedural obligation to conduct an override vote. It is not unusual for either chamber of Congress to make no effort to override the veto if congressional leaders do not believe they have sufficient votes to do so.

If a two-thirds vote is successful in both chambers, the President's return veto is overridden, and the bill becomes law. If a two-thirds vote is unsuccessful in one or both chambers, the veto is sustained, and the bill does not become law.

In contrast, Congress cannot override the President's pocket veto. By definition, a pocket veto may occur only when a congressional adjournment prevents the return of the vetoed bill. If a bill is pocket vetoed while Congress is adjourned, the only way for Congress to pass a version of the policy contained in the vetoed bill is to reintroduce the legislation as a new bill, pass it through both chambers, and present it to the President again for signature. Recent Presidents and Congresses have disagreed about what constitutes an adjournment that prevents the return of a bill such that a pocket veto may be used.

For purposes of the sections below concerning the use of veto threats, the unit of analysis is a veto. The analysis does not distinguish between regular and pocket vetoes.

Because Congress faces a two-thirds majority threshold to override a President's veto, veto threats may deter Congress from passing legislation that the President opposes. The veto override threshold may also prompt Congress to change a bill in response to a veto threat. The Framers of the U.S. Constitution viewed the veto power as a way of reminding Congress that the President also plays an important legislative role and that threatening to use the veto power can influence legislators into creating more amenable bills. Political scientist Richard A. Watson writes that "the veto is available to a President as a general weapon in his conflicts with Congress: Franklin Roosevelt sometimes asked his aides for 'something I can veto' as a lesson and reminder to congressmen that they had to deal with a President."

Veto threats are, therefore, an important component in understanding the use of the President's veto power. In recent presidencies, these threats have generally been expressed either through SAPs or verbally. President Trump has also used social media to communicate his intention to veto, oppose, or support a bill.

Signaling Policy Intentions Before a Veto

Presidents may signal their intention to support, oppose, or veto a bill early in the legislative process using both verbal and written means. For example, Presidents can mention in a speech that they intend to veto legislation, or they can authorize others (such as a press secretary) to verbally indicate the Administration's position on specific legislation. Presidents can also issue, through the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), formal, written SAPs to communicate their intention to veto, oppose, or support a bill.

Verbal veto threats may include commentary related to the President's strategy for working with Congress along with a threat to veto legislation if the President's policy agenda is not heeded. For example, at a press conference President George W. Bush explained, "I want the Members of Congress to hear that once we set a budget we're going to stick by it. And if not, I'm going to use the veto pen of the President of the United States to keep fiscal sanity in Washington, D.C." In another instance, President Obama said that the House "is trying to pass the most extreme and unworkable versions of a bill that they already know is going nowhere, that can't pass the Senate and that if it were to pass the Senate I would veto. They know it." In these remarks, both President Bush and President Obama used their words to attempt to deter Congress from passing bills that did not match the President's policy agenda and unambiguously remind the public of their veto power.

Formal, written SAPs are frequently used to express the President's support for or opposition to particular pieces of legislation. The decision to issue a SAP is a means for the President to insert the Administration's views into the legislative debate. While SAPs provide Presidents an opportunity to assert varying levels of support for or against a bill, perhaps the most notable statement in a SAP is whether the Administration intends to veto the bill. Members of Congress may pay particular attention to a SAP when a veto threat is being made. At least one congressional leader has characterized SAPs as forerunner indicators of a veto.

SAPs are often the first public document outlining the Administration's views on pending legislation and allow for the Administration to assert varying levels of support for or opposition to a bill. Because written threats are typically required to be scrutinized by the Administration through the central legislative clearance process in advance of their release, written SAP veto threats are often considered more formal than verbal veto threats.

When a SAP indicates that the Administration may veto a bill, it appears in one of two ways:

1. A statement indicating that the President intends to veto the bill (hereinafter a presidential veto threat) or 2. A statement that agencies or senior advisors would recommend that the President veto the bill (hereinafter a senior advisors veto threat).

These two types of SAPs indicate degrees of veto threat certainty. Generally speaking, a presidential veto threat signals the President's strong opposition to the bill. A senior advisors veto threat, on the other hand, may signal that the President may be more likely to enter into negotiations in order to reach a compromise with Congress on the bill.

By publicly issuing a veto threat, the President may leverage public pressure upon Congress to support the President's agenda. Furthermore, many SAPs propose a compromise to Congress wherein the President would not exercise a veto. In addition, a President or an Administration's senior advisors may not always issue a veto threat prior to a decision to veto passed legislation. As discussed below, both Presidents Bush and Obama vetoed legislation for which they never issued a written veto threat.

During both the Obama and Bush Administrations, roughly three-quarters of SAPs issued were on non-appropriations bills, and roughly one-quarter concerned appropriations bills. Each SAP signaled the Administration's intent to veto, oppose, or support a bill. There are fundamental differences between non-appropriations bill SAPs and appropriations bill SAPs.

Non-appropriations bill SAPs typically involve specific policy objections, such as how a program operates or what constituency the program is designed to serve. Appropriations bill SAPs, in contrast, often involve more general budgetary policy objections, such as the perceived need to balance the budget or to reallocate resources for other purposes. Therefore, the President may generally support a particular provision in an appropriations bill on programmatic policy grounds but oppose it for budgetary reasons. Or the President may oppose a particular provision in an appropriations bill for both programmatic and budgetary reasons.

This report focuses on the impact of the President's veto threat in non-appropriations bill SAPs given their more targeted nature.

Veto Threats During the George W. Bush and Obama Administrations

Data in this report were compiled from SAPs located on the archived White House websites of the Bush and Obama Administrations. Using the classification of SAPs on each website, analysis was conducted with only non-appropriations SAPs for reasons described above. The analysis examined each SAP and individually assessed whether the SAP contained a veto threat, the type of threat (presidential or senior advisor), and whether the veto threat concerned a part of the bill or the whole bill. The analysis considers each SAP to be an individual veto threat. In instances where one bill received veto threats in multiple SAPs, veto threats were counted individually and not combined. To assess the final outcome of bills, the analysis used information on bill statuses located at Congress.gov and does not track whether bills that received a SAP were later combined into other legislative vehicles. The inherent limitations in this methodology make it difficult to determine direct effects of any veto threat on the final outcome of a bill. However, in the aggregate, general trends may be observed.

The proportion of non-appropriation bill SAPs with veto threats steadily increased over the course of each of the two presidencies reviewed. SAPs containing veto threats as a proportion of all SAPs was at its highest at the conclusion of both President Bush's and President Obama's second terms. Figure 1 illustrates this trend by showing SAP veto threats as a percentage of issued SAPs.

George W. Bush Administration Veto Threats

While the Bush Administration remained relatively consistent in the number of veto threats issued in SAPs during its first six years, the number of threats increased during the final two years of the Administration. The Bush Administration issued a total of 491 SAPs on non-appropriations bills. Just under one-quarter (24%) of the non-appropriations bill SAPs contained a veto threat: 24 presidential veto threats and 94 senior advisors veto threats. Of bills that received a presidential veto threat, one was signed by the President, seven were vetoed, and the remaining 16 did not make it to the President's desk. Of bills that received a senior advisors veto threat, 16 were signed, one was vetoed, and the remaining 77 were not passed by both chambers. Seven of the 12 Bush Administration vetoes were preceded by a SAP containing a veto threat.

While the number of veto threats in SAPs slowly increased during the first three Congresses of the Bush Administration (two in the 107 th Congress, three in the 108 th Congress, and seven in the 109 th Congress), the number of veto threats grew sharply in the 110 th Congressâto 107 veto threatsâcoinciding with Democrats gaining control of both chambers of Congress during the Republican President's final two years in office. This might suggest (and is supported by Obama Administration data) that the partisan constitution of Congress, as well as whether the Administration is in its first or second term, may impact the number of veto threats issued. Below, Figure 2 illustrates this change in the number of veto threats over time across the four Congresses associated with President Bush's two terms in office.

Nevertheless, presidential veto threats in the Bush Administration remained a fraction of overall veto threats and often resulted in an actual veto. The rarity with which the Bush Administration issued presidential veto threats suggests that the Administration viewed them as a message to be used sparingly.

Although the relationship between Congress and a President may change every two years with each new Congress, the relationship between an Administration and its President may also change by presidential term. Compared to a President's first term, in a second term Administration, executive branch officials may become more adept in coordinating the veto power. Additionally, a second-term President cannot be re-elected, which may allow the Administration to take a stronger position on unfavorable legislation. Alternatively, it could be that the President lacks the political influence necessary to advance his legislative agenda and instead relies on veto power to block legislative vehicles more often as his presidency concludes. Figure 3 presents veto threat percentages by presidential term for the Bush Administration, showing an increase in the President's second term.

During President Bush's first term (2001-2005), 98% of SAPs did not contain a veto threat, 1% contained a senior advisors veto threat, and 1% contained a presidential veto threat. During President Bush's second term (2005-2009), 60% did not contain a veto threat, 32% contained a senior advisors veto threat, and 8% contained a presidential veto threat.

In comparison to the Bush Administration, the Obama Administration steadily increased its use of veto threats issued in SAPs in every subsequent Congress. The Obama Administration issued 472 SAPs on non-appropriations bills. Just under half (48%) of these contained a veto threat: 43 presidential veto threats and 186 senior advisors veto threats. Of bills that received a presidential veto threat, four were ultimately signed by the President, five were vetoed, and 34 did not make it to the President's desk. Of bills that received a senior advisors veto threat, 17 were signed, two were vetoed, and 167 were not passed by the two chambers. Six of the 12 Obama Administration vetoes were preceded by a SAP containing a veto threat.

President Obama (a Democrat) issued more veto threats in his SAPs with each passing Congress. (Democrats controlled both chambers during the 111 th Congress and the Senate during the 112 th Congress, and Republicans controlled the House during the 113 th Congress and both chambers during the 114 th Congress. ) Below, Figure 4 illustrates this change in the number of veto threats over time by Congress.

Although the number of veto threats increased over the course of the Obama presidency (eight in the 111 th Congress, 54 in the 112 th Congress, 63 in the 113 th Congress, and 104 in the 114 th Congress), the number of presidential veto threats remained small when compared to the total number of veto threats, varying from a low of 14.3% in the 111 th Congress to a high of 28.3% in the 114 th Congress. The increase over time in total number of veto threats may indicate that President Obama was presented with more legislation he was likely to oppose. However, the increase is mostly composed of senior advisors veto threats. This suggests that the Administration nonetheless treated presidential veto threats, compared to senior advisors veto threats, as a tool to be used more rarely.

As with the Bush Administration, President Obama's use of veto threats in the first and second terms differ. Figure 5 presents veto threat percentages by presidential term as opposed to by Congress.

During President Obama's first term (2009-2013), 69% of SAPs did not contain a veto threat, 27% contained a senior advisors veto threat, and 4% contained a presidential veto threat. During President Obama's second term (2013-2017), 39% of SAPs did not contain a veto threat, 49% contained a senior advisors veto threat, and 13% contained a presidential veto threat.

CRS analyzed all veto threats contained in SAPs on non-appropriations legislation across these two Administrations and determined whether the veto threat was isolated to a provision of the bill (a partial bill veto threat) or if the veto threat was not particularized (a whole bill veto threat).

President Bush issued partial bill veto threats and whole bill veto threats an equal amount of the time. However, the type of threat he used in each category varied. Of partial bill veto threats, 7% were presidential veto threats and the remaining 93% were senior advisors veto threats. Of whole bill veto threats, 34% were presidential veto threats and the remaining 66% were senior advisors veto threats.

In contrast, President Obama issued partial bill veto threats more sparingly (8% versus 92% for whole bill veto threats). Similar to President Bush, however, of partial bill veto threats, 6% were presidential veto threats and the remaining 94% were senior advisors veto threats. Of whole bill veto threats, 20% were presidential veto threats and the remaining 80% were senior advisors veto threats.

The difference in frequency of partial and whole bill veto threats across the Administrations may suggest that the two Presidents viewed the use of veto threats differently: One President may have used partial threats to negotiate more with Congress, whereas another President preferred to threaten a veto only when he viewed an entire bill as unfavorable. Likewise, the increased frequency of partial bill senior advisors veto threats suggests that both Presidents preferred to use presidential veto threats in rejecting an entire bill and leaving senior advisors veto threats for negotiations where only part of a bill is unfavorable.

Legislative Action Following a Veto Threat

A presidential veto threat in a SAP may be more likely than a senior advisors veto threat to deter passage of a bill because of the President's direct association with the threat. However, an analysis of these two Administrations does not necessarily support this argument. Figure 6 shows that bills appeared less likely to pass when the bill received a senior advisors veto threat versus a presidential veto threat. This may be due to a number of factors, including that senior advisors threats are more frequently issued than presidential veto threats (279 senior advisors threats and 67 presidential veto threats were issued across these two presidencies) or that Congress may perceive it to be beneficial to pass presidentially threatened legislation anyway based on certain political calculations and circumstances.

During the Bush and Obama Administrations, enrolled bills that passed both chambers and were met with a presidential veto threat SAP were vetoed more often than were those that were met with a senior advisors threat. Figure 7 shows the outcomes of bills receiving veto threats that were passed by Congress and sent to the President. Across both the Bush and Obama Administrations, a bill that received a presidential veto threat and was passed was followed by a veto 70.6% of the time, whereas a bill that received a senior advisors veto threat was later vetoed 8.3% of the time.

When a President vetoes a bill, it marks the end of the President's ability to procedurally affect whether or not a bill becomes law. Whether or not that specific bill becomes law is no longer in the President's hands. Congress may or may not elect to attempt an override.

George W. Bush Administration Vetoes and Ensuing Congressional Action

President Bush exercised the veto power 12 times. Four of these vetoes were overridden. Six vetoed bills were forewarned with a written veto threat. (Four received a presidential threat, and two received senior advisors threats.) Three additional bills received statements noting the Administration's opposition to the bill but did not include a veto threat. None of the bills that Congress later overrode were preceded by a presidential veto threat.

Three-quarters of President Bush's vetoes (9 of 12) were preceded by a written statement of opposition to the bill. President Bush also issued multiple written veto threats on four bills that would later receive a veto: Three bills received two threats each, and one bill received two statements of opposition.

Obama Administration Vetoes and Ensuing Congressional Action

President Obama vetoed 12 bills, and Congress overrode his veto once. As was true for President Bush, six of President Obama's vetoes were preceded by a written veto threat (four presidential and two senior advisors threats). Unlike the patterns observed for the Bush presidency, however, all of President Obama's veto threats were whole bill veto threats.

Whereas President Bush also communicated in SAPs his opposition to three bills short of threatening a veto, President Obama either did not issue a SAP at all or issued one that contained a veto threat. One of President Obama's vetoed bills received two veto threats. President Obama's approach of issuing either no statement at all on a bill or a statement containing a veto threat marks a different approach from the one used by President Bush.


Reauthorization of the Federal Public Transportation Program

Summary: The federal public transportation program is currently authorized through FY2020 as part of the Fixing America's Surface Transportation (FAST) Act ( P.L. 114-94 ). This report highlights several major issues that may arise as Congress considers program reauthorization.

Summary: Public transportation includes local buses, subways, commuter rail, light rail, paratransit (often service for the elderly and disabled using small buses and vans), and ferryboat, but excludes Amtrak, intercity buses, and school buses. The FAST Act authorized $61.1 billion for five fiscal years beginning in FY2016, an average of $12.2 billion per year. Of the total amount, 80% was authorized from the mass transit account of the Highway Trust Fund, and 20% was authorized from the general fund of the U.S. Treasury. Most federal funding from the mass transit account is distributed to transit agencies through formula programs. Most of the general funding authorized is for the Capital Investment Grants (CIG) Program, also known as New Starts, which provides discretionary funding for large capital projects to create and extend rail and bus rapid transit systems.

Summary: Reauthorization issues discussed in this report include the following:

Summary: Funding levels and the solvency of the mass transit account . Annual spending from the mass transit account is projected to exceed annual revenues by about $5 billion through FY2025. Bringing receipts and expenditures into balance would require a cut in spending of the federal transit program, an increase in revenues paid into the account, or a combination of the two. Revenue options include increasing taxes that are dedicated to the mass transit accounts and transferring money from the general fund. C hanges to two federal loan programs that may be used for transit capital expenditures , t he Transportation Infrastructure Finance and Innovation Act (TIFIA) program and the Railroad Rehabilitation and Infrastructure Finance (RRIF) program . Issues include TIFIA's share of project costs, the speed and cost of obtaining a loan, and the authorization of federal funding to pay the credit risk premium of RRIF loans. Declining public transportation ridership . Options include linking federal formula funds to transit agencies' success in boosting ridership; redirecting CIG funding from building new rail facilities to refurbishing lines in dense cities where rail transit currently carries large numbers of riders; and funding research projects to explore partnerships between transit agencies and firms offering new mobility options such as ridesharing and bike sharing. F unding the CIG program . CIG has been proposed as a major source of funding for the Gateway Program, which is intended to build new rail tunnels and repair existing tunnels between New Jersey and New York. The amount sought for the Gateway Program is equal to several years of funding for CIG, at recent funding levels, and could overwhelm a program that is responsible for aiding projects throughout the country. Public transportation and climate change. Congress may consider how to reduce greenhouse gas emissions from surface transportation and adaptation provisions that aim to make the public transportation system more resilient. Options considered might include dedicated funding for resilience projects and greater funding for buying low and no emission buses. Buy America . This law places domestic content restrictions on federally funded transportation projects, including procurement of rolling stock. Issues that might arise include the share of components and subcomponents that have to be domestically sourced, the availability of waivers, and the standardization of requirements across modes.

Approximately 27 million trips are taken on public transportation on an average day. Federal assistance to public transportation is provided primarily through the public transportation program administered by the Department of Transportation's (DOT's) Federal Transit Administration (FTA). The federal public transportation program was authorized from FY2016 through FY2020 as part of the Fixing America's Surface Transportation (FAST) Act ( P.L. 114-94 ). This report discusses the major issues that may arise as Congress considers reauthorization.

In federal law, public transportationâalso known as public transit, mass transit, and mass transportationâincludes local buses, subways, commuter rail, light rail, paratransit (often service for the elderly and disabled using small buses and vans), and ferryboats, but excludes Amtrak, intercity buses, and school buses (49 U.S.C. Â§5302). About 48% of public transportation trips are made by bus, 38% by heavy rail (also called metro and subway), 5% by commuter rail, and 6% by light rail (including streetcars). Paratransit accounts for about 2% of all public transportation trips, and ferries about 1%.

Public transportation accounts for about 3% of all daily transportation trips and about 7% of commute trips. Although ridership is heavily concentrated in a few large cities and their surrounding suburbs, especially the New York City metropolitan area, public transportation is provided in a wide range of places including small urban areas, rural areas, and Indian land.

The Federal Public Transportation Program

Most federal funding for public transportation is authorized in multiyear surface transportation acts. The FAST Act authorized $61.1 billion for five fiscal years beginning in FY2016, an average of $12.2 billion per year. The authorization for FY2020 is $12.6 billion. Of the total five-year amount, 80% was authorized from the mass transit account of the Highway Trust Fund. Funding authorized from the Highway Trust Fund is provided as contract authority, a type of budget authority that may be obligated prior to an appropriation. The other 20% was authorized from the general fund of the U.S. Treasury as appropriated budget authority.

Funding for public transportation is sometimes provided under other authorities. The FY2018, FY2019, and FY2020 appropriations acts ( P.L. 115-141 , P.L. 116-6 , P.L. 116-94 ), for example, provided additional general fund money for several programs that typically receive funding only from the Highway Trust Fund, thereby raising the general fund share of federal public transportation expenditures to about 28% in FY2018, 26% in FY2019, and 21% in FY2020. Funding for the Public Transportation Emergency Relief Program, which provides grants for emergency repairs following natural disasters or other emergencies, is typically from the general fund provided in supplemental appropriations acts. Transit projects can also be funded with money transferred (or "flexed") from federal highway programs by state and local officials. In FY2016, the last year for which data are available, $1.3 billion in highway funds was flexed to transit. Excluding flexed highway funds and emergency relief funding, funding provided in FY2017 through FY2020 was above the level authorized in the FAST Act ( Figure 1 ).

There are six major programs for public transportation authorized by the FAST Act: (1) Urbanized Area Formula; (2) State of Good Repair; (3) Capital Investment Grants (CIG) (also known as "New Starts"); (4) Rural Area Formula; (5) Bus and Bus Facilities; and (6) Enhanced Mobility of Seniors and Individuals with Disabilities. Typically, funding for all of these programs, except CIG, comes from the mass transit account of the Highway Trust Fund. CIG funding comes from the general fund. There are also a number of other much smaller programs ( Figure 2 ).

The average of $12.2 billion per year authorized for the federal public transportation program in the FAST Act represented about a 14% increase (unadjusted for inflation) from the previous authorization, the Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21 st Century Act (MAP-21; P.L. 112-141 ). The Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works reported a bill in August 2019 ( S. 2302 ) that would reauthorize highway infrastructure programs through FY2025 with a 27% increase over the funding provided by the FAST Act. A similar increase in the annual authorization of public transportation funding would provide for federal expenditures of about $15.5 billion per year.

A higher level of federal funding might improve the condition and performance of public transportation infrastructure. One indicator of the condition of public transportation infrastructure is the reinvestment backlog, which DOT defines as "an indication of the amount of near-term investment needed to replace assets that are past their expected useful lifetime." DOT estimated the reinvestment backlog to be $98 billion in 2014, about 13% of the total value of transit assets.

In its biennial Conditions and Performance report, DOT projects how various future spending levels might affect the condition of public transportation infrastructure. The most recent report was published in November 2019 and used 2014 as the base year for projections. Capital expenditures on public transportation in 2014, DOT noted, totaled $17.7 billion from all sources, including federal, state, and local government support. Of this amount, $11.3 billion was spent on preserving the existing system and $6.4 billion on expansion. If this spending pattern were to continue over the 20 years between 2015 and 2034, DOT estimates, the investment backlog would grow to $116 billion (in 2014 inflation-adjusted dollars), an increase of 18%.

DOT constructed two scenarios to estimate how much spending would be needed to eliminate the backlog and accommodate new riders. Under the assumption of low ridership growth, DOT estimated, $23.4 billion would be needed annually, an increase of about 32% (in 2014 inflation-adjusted dollars). In a scenario projecting high ridership growth, $25.6 billion would be needed annually, an increase of 45% (in 2014 inflation-adjusted dollars). DOT did not estimate the spending necessary if ridership is stagnant or dropping. However, it did estimate that $18.4 billion annually (adjusted for inflation) would eliminate the reinvestment backlog over 20 years if there was no spending on expansion.

The focus of the federal public transportation program is on capital expenditures, but the program also supports operational expenses in some circumstances, as well as safety oversight, planning, and research. Greater federal support for transit operations could increase the quantity of transit service offered or reduce fares. In the past, particularly in the 1970s and early 1980s, such support caused the costs of providing service to increase, particularly through increases in wages and fringe benefits and by expanding services on routes with less demand. With greater flexibility to use federal funding for operating expenses, transit agencies could neglect maintenance and asset renewal, leading to a more rapid decline in the condition of capital assets. Existing flexibility to use capital funds for maintenance may help agencies preserve equipment and facilities.

DOT does not make any recommendations about the relative shares of public transportation funding that should be borne by federal, state, and local governments. The federal share of government spending on public transportation has been around 15% to 20% over the past 30 years. A higher level of funding by the federal government may not necessarily translate into more spending overall if transit providers substitute federal dollars for their own.

The solvency of the Highway Trust Fund and its two accounts, the highway account and the mass transit account, is a major issue in reauthorization of funding for the public transportation program. Outlays from the mass transit account have outpaced receipts for over a decade, an imbalance the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) projects will continue in the future under current law. For the five-year period beginning in FY2021, CBO expects the gap between revenues and outlays to total $26 billion, an average of $5.2 billion annually ( Table 1 ).

The primary revenue source for the Highway Trust Fund is motor fuel taxes, which were last raised in 1993. Currently, of the 18.3 cents-per-gallon tax on gasoline and 24.3 cents-per-gallon tax on diesel that go to the Highway Trust Fund, 2.86 cents is deposited in the mass transit account. Congress has chosen to transfer general fund monies into the mass transit account to permit a higher level of spending than motor fuel tax revenues alone could sustain. These transfers have totaled $29 billion since they began in 2008. The FAST Act transferred $18.1 billion to the mass transit account from the general fund.

According to FTA, a balance of at least $1 billion in the mass transit account is required to ensure that the agency has sufficient funds to make mandated payments to transit agencies. CBO estimates that if Congress were to extend current law without providing for further transfers from the general fund to the mass transit account, the balance in the mass transit account would be about $300 million at the end of FY2021 and would reach zero at some point in FY2022. This would likely require FTA to slow payments to transit agencies. Outlays also outpace receipts in the highway account, but solvency problems are expected to arrive earlier in the mass transit account.

Bringing the receipts and outlays of the mass transit account into balance would involve a cut in program spending, an increase in revenues paid into the account, or a combination of the two. An increase in revenues could involve a commitment to regular transfers from the general fund. With the highway account facing similar problems, another possible change would be to redirect revenues from the mass transit account to the highway account and to fund the transit account with a general fund appropriation each year. This likely would make transit funding less certain, and it would not make up the entire shortfall in the highway account.

In addition to grants, the federal government supports public transportation infrastructure with direct loans and tax preferences for municipal bonds. Changes to two major federal loan programs relevant to public transportationâthe Transportation Infrastructure Finance and Innovation Act (TIFIA) program and the Railroad Rehabilitation and Infrastructure Finance (RRIF) programâcould be considered in reauthorization.

TIFIA provides long-term, low-interest loans and other types of credit assistance for the construction of surface transportation projects (23 U.S.C. Â§601 et seq.). Although the maximum federal share of project costs that may be provided by the TIFIA program was raised in MAP-21 from 33% to 49%, DOT has stated that it will provide more than 33% only in exceptional circumstances. To date, TIFIA has not covered more than 33% of the cost of any project. By limiting the TIFIA share in this way, DOT appears to be trying to maximize the leveraging of nonfederal resources, but it may be excluding projects that may not be financially viable without greater federal assistance. Public transportation projects typically cover a relatively small share of their costs from user fees, thus they usually need more government support than highway and bridge projects. Congress could direct DOT to consider a higher federal share in more circumstances or across the board.

Some project sponsors have stated that the lengthy process and upfront costs for obtaining TIFIA assistance led them not to seek TIFIA loans. The FAST Act required DOT to expedite projects thought to be lower-riskâthose requesting $100 million or less in credit assistance with a dedicated revenue stream unrelated to project performance and standard loan termsâbut this has apparently not had a significant effect: two projects have received TIFIA loans of less than $100 million since the passage of the FAST Act. Congress could make small TIFIA loans more attractive by changing a requirement that project sponsors obtain two credit ratings; at present, that requirement applies to TIFIA loans for projects with debt of $75 million or more. Less stringent requirements for credit ratings may increase the risk to the government of these loans. Reauthorization legislation also could incorporate various proposals that have been suggested to speed up approvals, such as requiring more frequent meetings of the DOT officials who make recommendations on project loans to the Secretary of Transportation (known as the Council on Credit and Finance), hiring additional staff to more quickly assess applications, and mandating that DOT regularly publish information about the time it takes loan applications to reach milestones.

The RRIF program was originally created to support freight railroads, particularly small freight railroads known as short lines, but loans are increasingly being made to commuter railroads. Legislative changes have made RRIF loans more attractive to commuter railroads. Recent changes also permit loans for transit-oriented development, that is economic development projects, including commercial and residential development, physically or functionally related to a passenger rail station. Several large loans have been made to transit agencies for commuter rail projects in the past few years, including $908 million to the Dallas Area Rapid Transit to finance a project from Dallas-Fort Worth Airport, $220 million to the Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority for positive train control (PTC), and almost $1 billion to the New York Metropolitan Transportation Authority, also for PTC.

The federal government requires project sponsors to make a payment known as a credit risk premium to offset the risk of a default. No federal funding has been authorized to pay the credit risk premiums for RRIF borrowers, although $25 million was made available for this purpose in the 2018 appropriations act. To enhance the attractiveness of RRIF for public transportation projects, Congress could authorize a federal subsidy for the credit risk premium from the Highway Trust Fund. Alternatively, Congress could provide for the credit risk premium from the general fund directly or as part of another program. For example, the Further Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2020 ( P.L. 116-94 ) makes RRIF credit risk premiums eligible for grants under the BUILD Transportation Discretionary Grants Program. Another RRIF-related proposal is to extend the authority to provide loans for transit-oriented development projects, which expires on September 30, 2020.

Because the CIG program receives funding from the general fund, not the Highway Trust Fund, appropriators have greater influence over its funding than they do over other transit programs. Nevertheless, the authorization sets a benchmark for the program's funding level, creates the program's overall structure, and can provide more or less discretion for FTA in the program's implementation. These characteristics could be more important in reauthorization than usual because of disagreements about the existence and operation of the program between Congress and the Trump Administration.

During the Obama Administration, FTA, among others, recommended significant increases in CIG funding to accommodate demand by project sponsors, especially because projects to expand the capacity of existing transit facilities, known as Core Capacity projects, were made eligible for funding beginning in FY2013. FTA noted in its FY2017 budget submission that the number of projects in the CIG "pipeline" had grown from 37 in FY2012 to 63 in FY2016. In addition, FTA asked Congress in its FY2017 budget request to increase annual CIG funding from the $2.3 billion authorized by the FAST Act to $3.5 billion, to accelerate projects to "not only potentially lower financing costs incurred on these projects, but also allow FTA to better manage the overall program given the ever growing demand for funds."

For FY2018 and FY2019, the Trump Administration proposed that funding should be limited to projects with existing commitments from the federal government, and that CIG funding should be phased out. In its funding recommendation for FY2018, FTA noted that "future investments in new transit projects would be funded by the localities that use and benefit from these localized projects." House and Senate appropriators rejected this approach, directing FTA to continue working with project sponsors to develop projects, including issuing project evaluation ratings, and requiring the allocation of appropriations, with deadlines, to projects that have met the program requirements.

With pressure for continued operation of the program, FTA has made several announcements of allocations of CIG funding to new projects. In July 2019, FTA stated that from the beginning of the Trump Administration in January 20, 2017, FTA had made CIG funding commitments to 25 new projects totaling $7.63 billion. It appears that FTA has dropped its call for phasing out the program; it recommended funding of $1.5 billion in FY2020, including $500 million for new projects. Congress agreed to nearly $2 billion for the program in the Further Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2020 ( P.L. 116-94 ).

The Gateway Program, which involves a set of projects in a 10-mile section of the Northeast Corridor (NEC) between Penn Station in Newark, NJ, and Penn Station in New York City, would be designed to improve intercity passenger rail service by Amtrak, which owns the underlying infrastructure, as well as commuter rail service provided by New Jersey (NJ) Transit. NJ Transit ridership in the corridor is approximately 50 million passenger trips per year, making this among the most heavily traveled public transportation routes in the country.

The project sponsorsâthe Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, in cooperation with the Gateway Program Development Corporation, New Jersey Transit Corporation, and Amtrakâhave proposed $7 billion in CIG program funding for the costliest Gateway Program project to date. The $14 billion project is for the construction of a new tunnel under the Hudson River, the restoration of the current tunnel that was damaged by Hurricane Sandy in 2012, and the preservation of the Hudson Yards right-of-way linking the proposed new tunnel with Pennsylvania Station in New York City. In addition, the project sponsors propose to borrow several billion dollars for tunnel construction from the federal government through the RRIF program. NJ Transit, the lead sponsor of the $1.6 billion Portal North Bridge project across the Hackensack River in New Jersey, has proposed a CIG grant to cover about half the cost. The Gateway Program overall is estimated to cost about $30 billion.

The federal amount sought for the Gateway Program is equal to several years of funding for CIG, at recent funding levels, and could potentially overwhelm a program that is responsible for aiding projects throughout the country. The largest CIG grant since FY2007 is $2.6 billion. FTA typically pays out such grants in smaller amounts over a prolonged construction period; single-year allocations of funding for individual projects have rarely exceeded $200 million.

The proposed use of federal loans in conjunction with federal grants for the Gateway Program is also controversial. The statute governing TIFIA (23 U.S.C. Â§603(b)(8)) states that proceeds from a TIFIA loan "may" be used as a nonfederal share of project costs if the loan will be repaid from nonfederal funds. The Trump Administration has been critical of CIG project sponsors using both federal grants and loans on public transportation projects. In June 2018, FTA circulated a letter stating the following:

given the competitive nature of this discretionary program, the [CIG] statute specifically urges FTA to consider the extent to which the project has a local financial commitment that exceeds the required non-government share of the cost of the project. To this end, FTA considers U.S. Department of Transportation loans in the context of all Federal funding sources requested by the project sponsor when completing the CIG evaluation process, and not as separate from the Federal funding sources.

The appropriations committees have taken action to prevent this policy from being implemented. For instance, Section 165 of Division G of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2019 ( P.L. 116-6 ), states that "none of the funds made available under this Act may be used for the implementation or furtherance of new policies detailed in the 'Dear Colleague' letter distributed by the Federal Transit Administration to capital investment grant program project sponsors on June 29, 2018." In a potential reauthorization, Congress could seek to eliminate permanently DOT's discretion to block project sponsors from combining CIG grants and TIFIA loans on a single project. Bills pending in the House, H.R. 731 and H.R. 1849 , would allow recipients of TIFIA and RRIF support to elect to have the loans treated as nonfederal funds.

Applying for CIG funding requires the development of extensive data and the preparation of many detailed reports and other documents, all of which are reviewed by FTA in making project approval determinations. Legislative changes in MAP-21 and the FAST Act sought to simplify the process. For example, MAP-21 reduced the number of separate FTA approvals for more expensive projects from four to three, and for less expensive projects from three to two. The less expensive projects, known as small starts projects, are those that cost $300 million or less to build and require $100 million or less of CIG funding. Moreover, MAP-21 authorized the use of project justification warrants in certain cases "that allow a proposed project to automatically receive a satisfactory rating on a given criterion based on the project's characteristics or the characteristics of the project corridor." The FAST Act created an Expedited Project Delivery for Capital Investment Grants Pilot Program to more quickly review up to eight projects involving public-private partnerships in which the federal grant is 25% or less of the project cost. The federal share of a CIG project is typically about 50%.

There have been no comprehensive evaluations of whether these changes have resulted in projects progressing more quickly through the CIG pipeline. However, there are options that could be considered to further speed CIG projects. For instance, the threshold for projects to qualify as small starts could be increased, and the use of warrants could be permitted in more circumstances. FTA has been slow to implement the Expedited Project Delivery for Capital Investment Grants Pilot Program. Increasing the permitted maximum federal share of project costs under the pilot program, currently 25%, might make the program more attractive to transit agencies.

According to data from the American Public Transportation Association (APTA), annual transit ridership reached a modern-era high of 10.7 billion trips in 2014. Since then, it has fallen by almost 8% to 9.9 billion trips in 2018. National trends in public transportation ridership are not necessarily reflected at the local level; thus, different areas may have different reasons for growth or decline. But at the national level, the two factors that most affect public transportation ridership are competitive factors and the supply of transit service. Several competitive factors, notably increased car ownership, the relatively low price of gasoline over the past few years, and the growing popularity of bikeshare, scooters, and ridesourcing services such as Lyft and Uber, appear to have reduced transit ridership. The amount of transit service supplied has generally grown over time, along with government investment, but average fares have risen faster than inflation, possibly deterring riders.

The future of public transportation ridership in the short to medium term is likely to depend on population growth, the public funding commitment to supplying transit, and factors that make driving more or less attractive, such as the price of parking, the extent of highway congestion, and the implementation of fuel taxes, tolls, and mileage-based user fees.

Under current law, federal grants to transit agencies are based mainly on population, population density, and the amount of service provided. Congress could address the issue of declining ridership by tying the allocation of federal formula funds to agencies' success in boosting ridership or fare revenue.

Over the long term, the introduction of fully autonomous vehicles could reduce transit ridership, unless restrictions or fees make them an expensive alternative. However, there is significant uncertainty about when, or whether, fully autonomous vehicles will affect ridership. Given this uncertainty, federal capital funding might focus on buses, which last about 10 years, and not new rail systems that take many years to build and will remain in service for decades. Another option would be to redirect CIG funding from building new rail systems and lines to refurbishing rail transit in the large and dense cities where rail transit currently carries large numbers of riders.

The emergence of new mobility options may have reduced transit ridership, but it also may present an opportunity for transit agencies to provide new services to improve customer mobility. FTA has funded some pilot projects through the Research, Development, Demonstration, and Deployment program. An option in reauthorization would be to fund a program that focuses on boosting transit ridership through mobility and technological innovations.

Surface transportation is a major source of carbon dioxide (CO 2 ) in the atmosphere, the main human-related greenhouse gas (GHG) contributing to climate change. At the same time, the effects of climate change on environmental conditions, such as extreme heat and global sea level rise, pose a threat to transportation infrastructure. Surface transportation reauthorization may seek to address environmental conditions with mitigation provisions that aim to reduce GHG emissions from surface transportation and adaptation provisions that aim to make the surface transportation system more resilient. S. 2302 , the reauthorization bill reported by the Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works in August 2019, included provisions that address climate change.

GHG emissions from the transportation sector come mainly from passenger cars and light trucks. Public transportation might contribute to a reduction of GHG emissions if trips made in personal vehicles, particularly single-occupant trips, are made by trains and buses instead. The efficiency of public transportation in terms of GHG emissions depends, in part, on the amount of ridership in relation to the amount of transit supplied. GHG emissions from public transportation are also dependent on the sources of fuel used to power trains and buses, including the way in which electricity is generated.

Specific policy options that might be considered to reduce GHG gases from public transportation vehicles could include funding for alternatives to diesel-powered buses, particularly electric buses using electricity generated from renewable sources. This could include a higher level of funding for the Low or No Emission Vehicle (Lo-No) Program. In the FAST Act, the discretionary Lo-No Program was funded as a $55 million annual set-aside from the Bus and Bus Facilities Program. Another possibility would be to require buses purchased using federal funds to have low or no emissions. Electric buses cost more to purchase than traditional diesel-powered buses, although the lifecycle cost is comparable. To overcome this, the federal government could offer low-interest or no-interest loans for the nonfederal share of the cost of buying electric buses.

Adaptation is action to reduce the vulnerabilities and increase the resilience of the transportation system to the effects of climate change. Although much of the funding administered by FTA can be used to assess the potential impacts of climate change on public transportation infrastructure and to apply adaptation strategies, there is currently no dedicated surface transportation funding for adaptation projects. Reauthorization could create a new grant program dedicated to adaptation planning and projects or require that funds from other programs be set aside for such purposes.

The Public Transportation Emergency Relief (ER) Program (49 U.S.C. Â§5324; 49 C.F.R. Â§602) provides federal funding on a reimbursement basis to states, territories, local government authorities, Indian tribes, and public transportation agencies for damage to public transportation facilities or operations as a result of a natural disaster or other emergency and to protect assets from future damage, so-called resilience projects.

FTA's ER program does not have a permanent annual authorization. Rather, all funds are authorized on a "such sums as necessary" basis and require an appropriation from the Treasury's general fund. Because of this, FTA cannot provide funding immediately after a disaster or emergency is declared. Transit agencies, therefore, typically rely on the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) to fund immediate needs beyond the capacity of state and local government. This could slow the response of transit agencies and blur the lines of responsibility between FTA and FEMA if funds are later appropriated for the ER program. Adding a quick-release mechanism to FTA's ER program would allow FTA funds to be approved and distributed within a few days of a disaster. Such a program already exists for the Federal Highway Administration, with an annual authorization of funds from the Highway Trust Fund, and FTA's program could similarly be authorized an amount from the mass transit account of the fund. Such an authorization, however, would place a new claim on resources of the mass transit account.

The FTA's ER program does not have a limit on the amount that can be spent on resilience projects. Although this may allow for better projects, it can result in Congress appropriating larger amounts than might otherwise be necessary, and it could also be a way for transit agencies to fund betterments and new facilities that have little direct connection to the goals of repairing damages and making the transit systems resilient to future natural hazards. A separate resilience program and changes to the ER program may be a more effective way to protect public transportation infrastructure from future disasters.

Public transportation is a relatively safe mode of passenger transportation compared with traveling by car and light truck. The fatality rate per passenger mile for cars and light trucks is about double that of transit buses and five times that of heavy rail. While the fatality rate per passenger mile for commuter rail is more comparable with cars and light trucks, most commuter rail fatalities are nonusers, such as trespassing pedestrians and those in vehicles struck at grade crossings.

The federal government's role in public transportation safety has been expanded significantly since 2008. One of the major changes was the requirement in the Rail Safety Improvement Act of 2008 ( P.L. 110-432 ) for commuter railroads, along with Amtrak and freight railroads, to install positive train control (PTC), systems that use signals and sensors to monitor and control railroad operations.

The federal requirement for PTC resulted in significant capital costs for commuter rail agencies, of which about 10% has been borne by the federal discretionary and formula funds. In addition to the initial costs of installing PTC, commuter rail agencies claim that there will be ongoing costs associated with PTC estimated to be about $160 million per year. Consequently, PTC implementation may have a detrimental effect on the overall financial condition of commuter rail agencies, and, without more funding from federal, state, or local government, may have a detrimental effect on the condition of commuter rail assets. Commuter rail agencies have proposed the creation of a new federal PTC funding program that could pay some or all of these ongoing costs. Separately, proposals have been advanced to dedicate federal funding for commuter railroads to improve the safety of highway-rail grade crossings.

With the aim of protecting American manufacturing and manufacturing jobs, Buy America laws place domestic content restrictions on federally funded transportation projects. Buy America requirements vary according to the specific DOT funding program and administering agency. For projects funded by FTA there is a 100% U.S.-made requirement for iron, steel, and manufactured goods. However, Buy America does not apply to rolling stock if more than 70% of components, by value, are produced domestically and final assembly is in the United States. An addition to Buy America law in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020 ( P.L. 116-92 , Â§7613) prohibits transit agencies purchasing railcars and buses from certain government-owned, -controlled or -subsidized companies, such as the China Railway Rolling Stock Corporation and BYD, even if they are otherwise Buy America-compliant.

Waivers of Buy America requirements can be provided by DOT agencies under certain circumstances, but these can be difficult and time-consuming to obtain. To speed up the waiver process, Congress could require that a waiver decision be made within a specific number of days. Each DOT agency has its own Buy America requirements, creating complications when a project involves funding from more than one of the agencies. Congress might seek to standardize Buy America requirements across the department. Other proposals have been to make Buy America requirements more stringent. For example, the Buy America 2.0 Act ( H.R. 2755 , 116 th Congress) would increase the share of public transit rolling stock components and subcomponents that must be produced in the United States by five percentage points annually beginning in FY2021, reaching 100% by FY2026. Such measures may make it more costly and time-consuming for transit agencies to procure vehicles.


Paid Family Leave in the United States

Summary: Paid family leave (PFL) refers to partially or fully compensated time away from work for specific and generally significant family caregiving needs, such as the arrival of a new child or serious illness of a close family member. Although the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 (FMLA; P.L. 103-3) provides eligible workers with a federal entitlement to unpaid leave for a limited set of family caregiving needs, no federal law requires private-sector employers to provide paid leave of any kind. Currently, employees may access paid family leave if it is offered by an employer. In addition, workers in certain states may be eligible for state family leave insurance benefits that can provide some income support during periods of unpaid leave.

Summary: As defined in state law and federal proposals, family caregiving activities that are eligible for PFL or family leave insurance generally include caring for and bonding with a newly arrived child and attending to serious medical needs of certain close family members. Some permit leave for other reasons, but in practice, day-to-day needs for leave to attend to family matters (e.g., a school conference or lapse in child care coverage), minor illness, and preventive care are not included among "family leave" categories.

Summary: Employer provision of PFL in the private sector is voluntary. According to a national survey of employers conducted by the Bureau of Labor Statistics, 16% of private-industry employees had access to PFL through their employers in March 2018. The availability of PFL was more prevalent among professional and technical occupations and industries, high-paying occupations, full-time workers, and workers in large companies (as measured by number of employees). Recent announcements by several large companies indicate that access may be increasing among certain groups of workers.

Summary: In addition, some states have enacted legislation to create state paid family leave insurance (FLI) programs, which provide cash benefits to eligible workers who engage in certain caregiving activities. California, Rhode Island, and New Jersey currently operate FLI programs, which offer 4 to 10 weeks of benefits to eligible workers. Three other states and the District of Columbia have enacted FLI programs, but they are not yet fully implemented and paying benefits. The New York program began phased implementation in 2018. The District of Columbia FLI legislation took effect in April 2017, and Washington State's FLI law took effect in July 2017; benefit payments start in 2020 for both programs. Massachusetts' family leave program was signed into law in June 2018; its benefit payments are to begin in January 2021.

Summary: Many advanced-economy countries entitle workers to some form of paid family leave. Whereas some provide leave to employees engaged in family caregiving (e.g., of parents, spouses, and other family members), many emphasize leave for new parents, mothers in particular. The United States is the only Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) member to not offer paid leave to new mothers.

Summary: In December 2017, Congress passed H.R. 1 (P.L. 115-97), which included tax incentives to employers to voluntarily offer paid family and medical leave to employees. Proposals to expand national access to paid family leave have been introduced in the 116th Congress, such as the Family and Medical Insurance Leave Act (FAMILY Act; S. 463/H.R. 1185), which proposes to create a national wage insurance program for persons engaged in family caregiving activities or who take leave for their own serious health condition (i.e., a family and medical leave insurance program), and the New Parents Act (S. 920/ H.R. 1940) which would allow parents of a new child to receive Social Security benefits for the purposes of financing parental leave. Others have proposed using the tax code to provide tax advantages to individuals with caregiving responsibilities.

Paid family leave (PFL) refers to partially or fully compensated time away from work for specific and generally significant family caregiving needs, such as the arrival of a new child or serious illness of a close family member. Although the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 (FMLA; P.L. 103-3 ) provides eligible workers with a federal entitlement to unpaid leave for a limited set of family caregiving needs, no federal law requires private-sector employers to provide paid leave of any kind.

Currently, employees may access PFL if offered by an employer. In addition, some states have created family leave insurance (FLI) programs, which provide cash benefits to eligible workers who engage in certain (state-identified) family caregiving activities. In these states, workers can access PFL by combining an entitlement to unpaid leave with state-provided insurance benefits. Some Congressional proposals to expand national access to paid family leave expand upon these existing mechanisms. A new tax credit, created in December 2017 ( P.L. 115-97 ), seeks to expand voluntary employer-provided PFL, and—similar to the state insurance approach—the Family and Medical Insurance (FAMILY Act; S. 463 / H.R. 1185 ), which proposes to create a national wage insurance program for persons engaged in family caregiving activities or who take leave for their own serious health condition. The New Parents Act ( S. 920 / H.R. 1940 ) would allow parents of a new child to receive Social Security benefits, to be repaid at a later date, for the purposes of financing parental leave. Others proposals, such as the Working Parents Flexibility Act of 2019 ( H.R. 1859 ) and the Freedom for Families Act ( H.R. 2163 ), would amend the tax code to provide tax-advantages to individuals with caregiving responsibilities.

Members of Congress who support increased access to paid leave generally cite as their motivation the significant and growing difficulties some workers face when balancing work and family responsibilities, and the financial challenges faced by many working families that put unpaid leave out of reach. In general, expected benefits of expanded access to PFL include stronger labor force attachment for family caregivers and greater income stability for their families, and improvements to worker morale, job tenure, and other productivity-related factors. Potential costs include the financing of payments made to workers on leave, other expenses related to periods of leave (e.g., hiring a temporary replacement or productivity losses related to an absence), and administrative costs. The magnitude and distributions of costs and benefits will depend on how the policy is implemented, including the size and duration of benefits, how benefits are financed, and other policy factors.

This report provides an overview of paid family leave in the United States, summarizes state-level family leave insurance programs, notes PFL policies in other advanced-economy countries, and notes recent federal legislative action to increase access to paid family leave.

Throughout their careers, many workers encounter a variety of family caregiving obligations that conflict with work time. Some of these are broadly experienced by working families but tend to be short in duration, such as episodic child care conflicts, school meetings and events, routine medical appointments, and minor illness of an immediate family member. Others are more significant in terms of their impact on families and the amount of leave needed, but occur less frequently in the general worker population, such as the arrival of a new child or a serious medical condition that requires inpatient care or continuing treatment. Although all these needs for leave may be consequential for working families, the term family leave is generally used to describe the latter, more significant, group of needs that tend to require longer periods of time away from work.

As defined in state law and federal proposals, family caregiving activities that are eligible for PFL or leave insurance benefits generally include caring for and bonding with a newly arrived child and attending to the serious medical needs of certain close family members; some also allow leave or benefits for workers with certain military family needs. In practice, day-to-day needs for leave to attend to family matters (e.g., a school conference or lapse in child care coverage), minor illness (e.g., common cold), or preventive care are not included among family leave categories.

Employer-provided PFL in the private sector is voluntary. According to a national survey of employers conducted by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), 16% of private-industry employees had access to PFL (separate from other leave categories) through their employer in March 2018. These statistics, displayed in Table 1 , further show that PFL was more prevalent among managerial and professional occupations; information, financial, and professional and technical service industries; high-paying occupations; full-time workers; and workers in large companies (as measured by number of employees). Recent announcements by several large companies suggest that access may be increasing among certain groups of workers. Among new company policies announced in recent years, some emphasize parental leave (i.e., leave taken by mothers and fathers in connection with the arrival of a new child), and others offer broader uses of family leave.

A 2017 study by the Pew Research Center (Pew) examined U.S. perceptions of and experiences with paid family and medical leave; its results provide insights into the need for such leave among U.S. workers and its availability for those who need it. Pew reports, for example, that 27% of persons who were employed for pay between November 2014 and November 2016 took leave (paid and unpaid) for family caregiving reasons or their own serious health condition over that time period, and another 16% had a need for such leave but were not able to take it. Among workers who were able to use leave, 47% received full pay, 36% received no pay, and 16% received partial pay. Consistent with BLS data, the Pew study indicates that lower-paid workers have less access to paid leave; among leave takers, 62% of workers in households with less than $30,000 in annual earnings reported they received no pay during leave, whereas this figure was 26% among those with annual household incomes at or above $75,000.

State-Run Family Leave Insurance Programs

Some states have enacted legislation to create state paid FLI programs, which provide cash benefits to eligible workers who engage in certain caregiving activities. Four states—California, New Jersey, New York, and Rhode Island—have active programs. Three additional programs—those in the District of Columbia (DC), Washington State, and Massachusetts—await implementation.

Table 2 summarizes key provisions of state FLI laws and shows the following:

The maximum weeks of benefits available to workers and wage replacement rates vary across states. Existing state FLI programs offer between 4 weeks (Rhode Island) and 10 weeks (New York) of benefits. Starting July 1, 2020, New Jersey is to increase benefit weeks from 6 to 12. When its plan is implemented, DC is to offer 8 weeks of paid family leave in 2020, and Washington State is to offer 12 weeks of paid family leave in the same year. New York's entitlement is to increase to 12 weeks of benefits when its plan is fully implemented in 2021. Massachusetts is to provide up to 12 weeks for family leave, unless leave is used to provide care to a seriously ill or injured military service member, when up to 26 weeks may be used. Program eligibility typically involves in-state employment of a minimum duration, minimum earnings in covered employment, or contributions to the insurance funds. All state FLI programs currently in operation are financed entirely by employee payroll tax receipts; however, when implemented, the DC program is set to be financed by employers. Massachusetts' and Washington State's programs are to be jointly financed by employers and employees, with some exceptions. Some FLI programs (e.g., Rhode Island) provide job protection directly to workers who receive FLI benefits, meaning that employers must allow a worker to return to his or her job after leave has ended. Workers in other states may receive job protection if they are entitled to leave under federal or state family and medical leave laws, and coordinate such job-protected leave and FLI benefits.

Many advanced-economy countries entitle workers to some form of paid family leave. Whereas some provide leave to employees engaged in family caregiving (e.g., of parents, spouse, and other family members), many emphasize leave for new parents, mothers in particular.

As of 2016, the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) family leave database counts 34 of its 35 members as providing some paid parental leave (i.e., to care for children) and maternity leave, with wide variation in the number of weeks and rate of wage replacement across countries. This is shown in Figure 1 , which plots the OECD's estimates of weeks of full-wage equivalent leave available to mothers. Weeks of full-wage equivalent leave are calculated as the number of weeks of leave available multiplied by the average wage payment rate. For example, a country that offers 12 weeks of leave at 50% pay would be said to offer 6 full-wage equivalent weeks of leave (i.e., 12 weeks x 50% = 6 weeks).

A smaller share (27 of 35) of OECD countries provides paid leave to new fathers. In some cases, fathers are entitled to less than a week of leave, often at full pay (e.g., Greece, Italy, and the Netherlands), whereas others provide several weeks of full or partial pay (e.g., Portugal provides five weeks at full pay, and the United Kingdom provides two weeks at an average payment rate of 20.2%). Some countries provide a separate entitlement to fathers for child caregiving purposes. This type of parental leave can be an individual entitlement for fathers or a family entitlement that can be drawn from by both parents. In the latter case, some countries (e.g., Japan, Luxembourg, and Finland) set aside a portion of the family entitlement for fathers' use, with the goal of encouraging fathers' participation in caregiving. Figure 2 summarizes paid leave entitlements reserved for fathers in OECD countries in 2016; it plots the OECD's estimates of weeks of full-wage equivalent paternity leave and parental leave reserved for fathers.

The OECD examined the availability of family caregiver leave among its member countries in 2011 and found that of the 25 countries for which it could identify information, 14 had polices providing paid leave to workers with ill or dying family members; these are summarized in Table 3 . Qualifying needs for leave, leave entitlement durations, benefit amounts, and eligibility conditions varied considerably across the countries included in the OECD study.

Recent Federal PFL Legislation and Proposals

The overarching goal of PFL legislative activity in the 116 th Congress has been to increase access to leave by reducing the costs associated with providing or taking leave. The Strong Families Act, which became law in December 2017 ( P.L. 115-97 ), allows employers to claim tax credits for a portion of wages paid to certain employees taking family or medical leave; this approach potentially increases access to PFL for workers while reducing the costs to employers of providing the leave. A second approach addresses costs incurred by workers taking leave. For example, the establishment of a national family leave insurance program, such as that proposed in the Family and Medical Insurance Leave Act (FAMILY Act; S. 463 / H.R. 1185 ), would provide cash benefits to eligible individuals who are engaged in certain caregiving activities, potentially making the use of unpaid leave (e.g., as provided by FMLA or voluntarily by employers) affordable for some workers. Proposals such as the New Parents Act ( S. 920 / H.R. 1940 ) would allow eligible new parents to receive to up to three months of Social Security benefits, in return for deferring retirement (or early retirement) by a period of time determined by the Social Security Administration to cover the costs of the parental benefit. Other approaches include proposals to create tax-advantaged parental leave savings accounts (e.g., the Working Parents Flexibility Act of 2019, H.R. 1859 ) and tax-advantaged distributions from health savings accounts for family and medical leave purposes (e.g., the Freedom for Families Act, H.R. 2163 ).

In addition, the President's FY2020 budget proposes to provide six weeks of financial support to new parents through state unemployment compensation (UC) programs. A similar approach was taken in 2000 by the Clinton Administration, which—via Department of Labor regulations—allowed states to use their UC programs to provide UC benefits to parents who take unpaid leave under the FMLA, other approved unpaid leave, or otherwise take time off from employment after the birth or adoption of a child. The Birth and Adoption Unemployment Compensation rule took effect in August 2000, and it was later removed from federal regulations in November 2003.