SBA Surety Bond Guarantee Program

Summary: The Small Business Administration's (SBA's) Surety Bond Guarantee Program is designed to increase small businesses' access to federal, state, and local government contracting, as well as private-sector contracts, by guaranteeing bid, performance, and payment bonds for small businesses that cannot obtain surety bonds through regular commercial channels. The program guarantees individual contracts of up to $6.5 million, and up to $10 million if a federal contracting officer certifies that such a guarantee is necessary. The SBA's guarantee currently ranges from 80% to 90% of the surety's loss if a default occurs. In FY2018, the SBA guaranteed 10,800 bid and final surety bonds with a total contract value of nearly $6.5 billion.

Summary: A surety bond is a three-party instrument between a surety (who agrees to be responsible for the debt or obligation of another), a contractor, and a project owner. The agreement binds the contractor to comply with the contract's terms and conditions. If the contractor is unable to successfully perform the contract, the surety assumes the contractor's responsibilities and ensures that the project is completed. Surety bonds encourage project owners to contract with small businesses that may not have the credit history or prior experience of larger businesses and may be at greater risk of failing to comply with the contract's terms and conditions.

Summary: Surety bonds are important to small businesses interested in competing for federal contracts because the federal government requires prime contractors—prior to the award of a federal contract exceeding $150,000 for the construction, alteration, or repair of any building or public work of the United States—to furnish a performance bond issued by a surety satisfactory to the contracting officer in an amount that the officer considers adequate to protect the government.

Summary: P.L. 112-239, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013, increased the program's bond limit to $6.5 million, or up to $10 million if a federal contracting officer certifies that such a guarantee is necessary. The limit had been $2 million since 2000, with a temporary increase from February 17, 2009, through September 30, 2010, to $5 million, and up to $10 million if a federal contracting officer certified in writing that such a guarantee was necessary. Advocates of raising the program's bond limit argued that doing so would increase contracting opportunities for small businesses and bring the limit more in line with limits of other small business programs, such as the 8(a) Minority Small Business and Capital Ownership Development Program and the Historically Underutilized Business Zone (HUBZone) Program. Opponents argued that raising the limit could lead to higher amounts being guaranteed by the SBA and, as a result, increase the risk of program losses.

Summary: This report examines the program's origin and development, including (1) the decision to supplement the original Prior Approval Program with the Preferred Surety Bond Guarantee Program that initially provided a lower guarantee rate (not to exceed 70%) than the Prior Approval Program (not to exceed 80% or 90%, depending on the size of the contract and the type of small business) in exchange for allowing preferred sureties to issue SBA-guaranteed surety bonds without the SBA's prior approval; (2) P.L. 114-92, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016, which increased the Preferred Surety Bond Guarantee Program's guarantee rate from not to exceed 70% to not to exceed 90% of losses; and (3) the decision to increase the program's bond limit.

The Small Business Administration (SBA) administers several programs to support small businesses, including loan guaranty programs to enhance small business access to capital; contracting programs to increase small business opportunities in securing federal contracts; direct loan programs for businesses, homeowners, and renters to assist their recovery from natural disasters; and small business management and technical assistance training programs to assist business formation and expansion. Congressional interest in these programs has increased in recent years, primarily because assisting small business is viewed as a means to enhance economic growth.

The SBA's Surety Bond Guarantee Program has been operational since April 1971. It is designed to increase small business' access to federal, state, and local government contracting, as well as private-sector contracting, by guaranteeing bid, performance, payment, and specified ancillary bonds "on contracts … for small and emerging contractors who cannot obtain bonding through regular commercial channels." The program guarantees individual contracts of up to $6.5 million, and up to $10 million if a federal contracting officer certifies that such a guarantee is necessary. The $6.5 million limit is periodically adjusted for inflation. The SBA's guarantee currently ranges from 80% to 90% of the surety's loss if a default occurs.

In FY2018, the SBA guaranteed 10,800 bid and final surety bonds (a payment bond, performance bond, or both a payment and performance bond) with a total contract value of nearly $6.5 billion. Although the surety industry does not report the total value of the bonds it issues each year, estimates based on the total amount of premiums collected by the private sector in recent years suggest that the SBA's Surety Bond Guarantee Program represents, by design, a relatively small percentage of the market for surety bonds (from about 1.1% to 6.7% of the value of surety bonds issued by the private sector).

A surety bond is a three-party instrument between a surety (that agrees to be responsible for the debt or obligation of another), a contractor, and a project owner. The agreement binds the contractor to comply with the contract's terms and conditions. If the contractor is unable to successfully perform the contract, the surety assumes the contractor's responsibilities and ensures that the project is completed. The surety bond reduces the risk of contracting.

Surety bonds are viewed as a means to encourage project owners to contract with small businesses that may not have the credit history or prior experience of larger businesses and are considered to be at greater risk of failing to comply with the contract's terms and conditions. The four general types of surety bonds are

bid bonds guarantee that the bidder on a contract will enter into the contract and furnish the required payment and performance bonds if awarded the contract, payment bonds guarantee that suppliers and subcontractors will be paid for work performed under the contract, performance bonds guarantee that the contractor will perform the contract in accordance with its terms and conditions, and ancillary bonds ensure completion of requirements outside of performance or payment, such as maintenance.

Surety bonds are important to small businesses interested in competing for a federal contract because the federal government requires prime contractors, prior to the award of a federal contract exceeding $150,000 for the construction, alteration, or repair of any building or public work of the United States, to furnish a performance bond issued by a surety satisfactory to the officer awarding the contract, and in an amount the contracting officer considers adequate, to protect the government. Prime contractors are also required to post a payment bond with a surety satisfactory to the contracting officer for the protection of all persons supplying labor and material in carrying out the work provided for in the contract. Both bonds become legally binding upon award of the contract and their "penal amounts," or the maximum amount of the surety's obligation, must generally be 100% of the original contract price plus 100% of any price increases. Most state and local governments have adopted similar legislation, often called "Little Miller Acts," referencing the Miller Act of 1935 that established the federal requirement. Many private project owners also require contractors to furnish a surety bond before awarding them a contract.

This report opens with an examination of the SBA's Surety Bond Guarantee Program's legislative origin and provides a historical summary of the major issues that have influenced the program's development, including

the decision to supplement the original Prior Approval Program with a Preferred Surety Bond Guarantee Program (PSB program) that initially provided SBA-approved sureties a lower guarantee rate (not to exceed 70%) than those participating in the Prior Approval Program (not to exceed 80% or 90%, depending on the size of the contract and the type of small business) in exchange for allowing preferred sureties to issue SBA-guaranteed bonds to small businesses without the SBA's prior approval; P.L. 114-92 , the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016, which increased the PSB program's guarantee rate from not to exceed 70% to not to exceed 90% of losses; and the decision to increase the program's bond limit.

It then examines the program's current eligibility standards and requirements, and provides performance statistics, including the number and amount of bond guarantees issued annually.

In addition, it provides data concerning the number and amount of final bonds guaranteed from FY1971 through FY2017 (see Table A-1 ) and for bid and final bonds combined from FY2000 through FY2017 (see Table A-2 ).

P.L. 91-609, the Housing and Urban Development Act of 1970, authorized the SBA's Surety Bond Guarantee Program. The act amended Title IV of the Small Business Investment Act of 1958 (P.L. 85-699, as amended) to provide the SBA authority to guarantee any surety against loss as the result of a breach of the terms of a bid bond, payment bond, or performance bond by a principal on any contract up to $500,000. The act specified that (1) the principal of the bond is a small business, (2) the bond is required as a condition of bidding on the contract or serving as a prime contractor or subcontractor on the project, (3) the small business is not able to obtain such bond on reasonable terms and conditions without the guarantee, (4) the SBA determines that there is a reasonable expectation that the small business will perform the covenants and conditions of the contract, (5) the contact meets SBA requirements concerning the feasibility of the contract being completed successfully and at a reasonable cost, and (6) the bond's terms and conditions are reasonable in light of the risks involved and the extent of the surety's participation. The act also required that the SBA's guarantee not exceed 90% of the loss incurred by the surety in the event of a breach of the bond's terms and conditions by the small business.

The SBA was authorized to finance the program through the Leasing Guarantee Revolving Loan Fund within the Department of the Treasury, which renamed that fund the Lease and Surety Bond Guarantee Revolving Fund. The act authorized the transfer of $5 million from the SBA's Business Loan and Investment Revolving Fund to the Lease and Surety Bond Guarantee Revolving Fund, raising that fund's capital to $10 million available without fiscal year limitation, to support both the lease guarantee program and the surety bond guarantee program. The act also recommended that the program be appropriated up to $1.5 million each fiscal year for three fiscal years after its date of enactment (December 31, 1970) if additional funding were needed to offset the program's expenses.

The SBA was directed to administer the program "on a prudent and economically justifiable basis." It was authorized to offset the program's administrative costs by charging a uniform annual fee, subject to periodic review to ensure that the fee is the "lowest fee that experience under the program shows to be justified," and uniform fees for the processing of applications for guarantees. The SBA also was authorized to "obligate the surety to pay the Administration such portions of the bond fee as the Administration determines to be reasonable in light of the relative risks and costs involved."

The program's sponsors argued in 1970 that "there is widespread evidence that a significant number of construction contracting organizations find varying degrees of difficulty in obtaining surety bonds" and that "the major share of these organizations are small businesses, and many of them are headed by minority groups." They argued that the Surety Bond Guarantee Program would "facilitate the entry and advancement of small and minority contractors in the construction business." At that time, witnesses at congressional hearings testified that surety bonds were not necessarily required for most private sector construction contracts, but they were required for most public sector construction contracts.

Initial Demand and Costs Exceed Expectations

The SBA implemented the program on a pilot basis on April 5, 1971, in Kansas City. The program later was expanded to Los Angeles and became nationwide on September 2, 1971. Initially, the SBA guaranteed 90% of the amount of all of the surety bonds in the program and charged sureties 10% of the bond premium paid to the surety company by the contractor. It also charged small business applicants for payment and performance bonds 0.2% of the contract price upon their obtaining the contract. It did not charge for the processing of bid bonds, rejected applications, or applications that did not result in a contract award. Contractors wishing to participate in the program were required to have less than $750,000 in gross annual receipts for the past fiscal year or to have averaged less than $750,000 in gross annual receipts over the past three fiscal years. This size standard was more stringent than for other SBA programs, and it was designed "to reach that segment of small business which was obviously intended to benefit from the legislation as evidenced by the limit of $500,000 on any one contract."

Demand for the program exceeded the SBA's expectations. In 1971, the SBA estimated that it would guarantee about 8,000 contracts amounting to about $540 million from FY1972 through FY1974. Instead, it guaranteed 16,118 contracts amounting to nearly $1.1 billion (see Table A-1 in the Appendix). Because the demand for the program exceeded expectations and the initial fees proved to be insufficient to recoup the program's expenses, in 1974, the SBA requested an additional $25 million for the program. The SBA argued that the additional funds were necessary to take into account the program's projected growth and to establish a reserve fund "to protect against having to suspend [the] program in the fact of more rapid growth than is projected."

In response to the SBA's request for additional funding for the program, Congress held congressional hearings to reassess the need for the program and to explore options concerning how to finance the program's proposed expansion. The financing discussions focused on the relative merits of relying primarily on higher fees to increase the program's revenue, reductions in the guarantee percentage to reduce the program's expenses, or additional appropriations to finance the program's proposed expansion. Although the SBA has periodically increased the program's fees and later instituted a tiered system of guarantee percentages, historically, the SBA has tried to keep the program's fees as low as economically feasible and the guarantee percentage as high as economically feasible to encourage the program's use. As an SBA official testified before Congress in 1975:

SBA's loss exposure could be reduced by a decrease in the guarantee extended to sureties from 90% to 80%. Before proceeding with this recommendation, a thorough analysis will have to be made of the adverse effect on the willingness of sureties to participate in the program which would result from the increase from 10% to 20% of the sureties' share of the loss potential.

An increase in contractor's fees would obviously be beneficial to the operating income of the program, but would also increase the bids which small business-contractors would have to make, thus placing them at a competitive disadvantage with contractors with more ready access to bonding.

Moreover, as mentioned previously, the SBA is required by statute to ensure that the fees are the lowest "that experience under the program shows to be justified."

Determining the program's appropriate size became a recurring theme at congressional hearings, and continues to be of congressional interest today. For example, Congress has regularly requested testimony from representatives of the surety bond industry and various construction organizations concerning the extent to which the program is necessary to assist small businesses generally, and minority-owned small businesses in particular, in gaining access to surety bonds. Congress has also periodically asked the Government Accountability Office (GAO) to examine the need for the SBA's surety bond guarantee program and to recommend ways to improve the program's management. That testimony and GAO's reports have supported a need for the program, but, as will be discussed, have had somewhat limited usefulness in helping Congress determine the program's appropriate size.

In 1974, Congress responded to the SBA's request for additional funding by passing P.L. 93-386 , the Small Business Amendments of 1974. It established a separate Surety Bond Guarantees Revolving Fund account (hereinafter Revolving Fund) within the Department of the Treasury to support the program. The act also increased the total contract amount that could be guaranteed to $1 million from $500,000 and recommended that the Revolving Fund receive $35 million in additional funding.

The Ford Administration objected to providing additional appropriations for the Revolving Fund. Instead, the Administration recommended that the Revolving Fund receive a $20 million transfer from the SBA's Business Loan and Investment Revolving Fund. The transfer would provide the program access to additional capital without affecting the federal budget deficit. Congress approved the Administration's proposal.

As shown in Table 1 , the Revolving Fund received $130.5 million in additional appropriations for FY1976 through FY1979 and continued to receive additional appropriations during the 1980s and 1990s. In addition, the program's bond limit was increased to $1.25 million from $1 million in 1986. As discussed below, the increased appropriations and bond limit were not sufficient to continue the program's growth. Instead, both the number and amount of final surety bonds guaranteed by the SBA began to slowly diminish. This general trend continued until the maximum individual surety contract amount was increased, first on a temporary basis by P.L. 111-5 , the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, and later, on a permanent statutory basis, by P.L. 112-239 , the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013.

As shown in Table 1 , Congress did not appropriate funding for the Revolving Fund from FY2000 to FY2004, allowing the program to cover the cost of claim defaults through its reserve. Congress also increased the program's bond limit to $2 million from $1.25 million in 2000.

Congress provided the Revolving Fund $2.9 million in FY2005, $2.86 million in FY2006, $2.86 million in FY2007, and $3 million in FY2008. During the 111 th Congress, P.L. 111-5 provided the Revolving Fund a separate appropriation of $15 million to support a temporary increase in the program's bond limit to $5 million, and up to $10 million if a federal contracting officer certified in writing that a guarantee in excess of $5 million was necessary, from $2 million. Those funds were in addition to the $2 million appropriation that had already been approved for FY2009.

In FY2010, the Revolving Fund received $1 million. Congress has not approved appropriations for the Revolving Fund since then, noting that there have been sufficient funds in the program's reserve to cover the cost of anticipated claim defaults.

As mentioned previously, the SBA relied primarily on increased appropriations to finance the program's expansion during the 1970s, but it also increased the program's fees charged to applicants and sureties. For example, in 1976, the SBA increased its fees to sureties to 20% from 10% of the bond premium, instituted a deductible clause on bond claims, and generally limited its approval for bid, participation, and performance bonds to $250,000 unless specified circumstances were met. In 1977, it increased the contractor applicant fee for payment and performance bonds to 0.5% from 0.2% of the contract price upon obtaining the contract. The program's current fee structure is discussed later in this report.

Both the number and amount of final surety bonds guaranteed by the SBA increased relatively rapidly during the 1970s (see Table A-1 in the Appendix). The number of final surety bonds guaranteed by the SBA increased from 1,339 in FY1972 to 20,095 in FY1979, and the amount guaranteed by the SBA increased from $94.4 million in FY1972 to $1.39 billion in FY1979.

During the 1980s and 1990s, both the number and amount of final surety bonds guaranteed by the SBA generally declined, in both nominal and inflation-adjusted dollars. A review of congressional testimony during that period suggests that there was no single, discernible factor to account for the program's slow contraction. Because the demand for surety bonds tends to fluctuate with changes in the economy, the program might have been expected to contract somewhat during recessions, but the economy experienced periods of both economic growth and decline during the 1980s and 1990s. There also was no indication that the ability of small businesses to access surety bonds in the private marketplace without the SBA's assistance had materially improved, which, if that had been the case, might have contributed to the decline by reducing the number of small businesses applying for assistance.

One possible contributing factor to the decline in SBA-guaranteed surety bonds during that period was the continuing reluctance of many surety companies to participate in the program, either because they did not view the program as particularly profitable or they "had developed alternative methods to the program, such as requiring collateral or funds controls and underwriting programs based in part on credit scores, in order to write small and emerging contractors." Another possible contributing factor was a change in the way the program was perceived by congressional leaders and their reluctance to provide additional resources to continue the program's expansion.

During the 1970s, at congressional hearings, witnesses praised the program as a great success in helping small businesses access surety bonds and compete for government contracts. During the 1980s and 1990s, congressional hearings focused less on the program's successes and more on its shortcomings. For example, in 1982, the chair of the Senate Committee on Small Business indicted that the program was subject to "the most insidious types of fraud," including "evidence of involvement of organized crime figures." In addition, reports by both GAO and the SBA's inspector general questioned the SBA's management of the program, arguing, among other things, that the SBA lacked useful underwriting guidelines for surety companies and adequate procedures for verifying applicants' information.

During the 1980s, the SBA guaranteed, on average, 11,840 final surety bonds each fiscal year, with the SBA's share of those bonds' value averaging $1.0 billion. During the 1990s, the SBA guaranteed, on average, 5,859 final surety bonds each fiscal year, with the SBA's share of those bonds' value averaging $823 million. During the first decade of the 2000s, the SBA guaranteed, on average, about 1,802 final surety bonds each fiscal year, with the SBA's share of those bonds' value averaging about $385 million.

Since then, as indicated in Table 2 and Table A-1 , the number and amount of final surety bonds guaranteed by the SBA has generally increased. This increase is likely due to generally improving economic conditions and the increase in 2013 of the maximum individual contract amount that could be guaranteed from $2 million to $6.5 million, and up to $10 million if a federal contracting officer certifies that such a guarantee is necessary.

The Preferred Surety Bond Guarantee Program

The surety bonding process begins when a contractor applies for a bond. As GAO has reported

Surety companies are generally corporations that are licensed under various insurance laws and, under their charters, have legal power to act as a surety (making themselves responsible for another's obligations) for others. Most surety companies accept business only through independent agents and brokers. In screening a bond applicant, a surety attempts to measure the contractor's ability to undertake and complete the job. When the surety's evaluation of the contractor's acceptability to perform the contract is favorable, the surety underwrites the bond. If the surety does not provide a bond to the bond applicant, the appropriate forms are forwarded to SBA for consideration of a surety bond guarantee.

Initially, the SBA surety guaranteed program's bonds were underwritten and issued by large, "standard" surety companies. However, these companies' participation in the program soon began to decline, reportedly because of the administrative burdens associated with the program, such as the SBA's requirement that sureties submit all bond applications to the SBA for review and approval. In addition, the administrative costs of dealing with relatively small bonds versus relatively large ones may have also played a role in the larger, standard surety companies leaving the program. As a congressional witness testified in 1976:

You have a professional underwriter, who ... is going to be asked to spend 3 or 4 days looking into a $25,000 first-time application. There are many expenses involved. That same underwriter could very easily be writing four or five bonds for $10 million for contractors that everyone knows can perform. And it becomes a matter of how much time and resources can the surety industry devote to this type of business.

Another reason may have been the outbreak of the Israeli-Egyptian War in 1973, which was followed by a tripling of oil prices and double-digit inflation. This led to the failure of many smaller contracting companies. In response to the economic downturn, many surety companies enhanced their underwriting standards to protect themselves from rising defaults. As a result, many of the larger surety companies became increasingly reluctant to participate in a program in which the profit margins were relatively small given the required paperwork and the program's limitation on the bond amount, and when the risk of defaults was at a historically high level.

As standard sureties left the program, "specialty" surety companies filled the void. Initially, specialty sureties devoted almost all their business exclusively to SBA-guaranteed surety bonds. These companies later expanded their business into offering other high-risk bonds not normally handled by standard sureties. Specialty sureties typically required the contractor to provide collateral for the projects they bonded, and, in most cases, charged higher premiums than standard sureties.

In 1982, the SBA invited officials from the Surety Association of America, representing the standard surety companies, to recommend ways to encourage their participation in the program. As mentioned previously, at that time, some specialty surety companies had been accused of associating with organized crime and GAO and the SBA's inspector general had reported fraud and mismanagement in the program. This may help to explain why the SBA was interested in encouraging the larger, more established surety companies to return to the program. The SBA also hoped that greater participation by the larger sureties would lead to lower premiums for small business contractors.

During this outreach period, standard surety companies indicated a willingness to increase their participation in the program if the SBA would create a second special program, similar to the SBA's 7(a) loan guarantee program's Preferred Lenders Program. Under the proposal, a surety meeting specified qualification standards would be designed as a "preferred surety" and would be allowed to issue SBA-guaranteed surety bonds prior to receiving the SBA's approval. To participate in the preferred program, the surety's underwriting and administrative standards and procedures would be pre-approved by the SBA, and the surety's decisions would be subject to regular, annual audits. In addition, the SBA's reporting and access to records requirements would be retained. As a measure of their confidence in their own underwriting standards and claims decisions, the standard surety firms indicated that they would accept a 70% guarantee against losses as opposed to the then-allowed 80% or 90% guarantee against losses, as long as firms would not be required to seek the SBA's prior approval for underwriting decisions, bond administration, and claims procedures.

Congress subsequently authorized the proposed Preferred Surety Bond Guarantee Program in P.L. 100-590 , the Small Business Administration Reauthorization and Amendment Act of 1988 (Title II, the Preferred Surety Bond Guarantee Program Act of 1988). The program was initially authorized on a three-year trial basis, and it was provided permanent statutory authority by P.L. 108-447 , the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2005.

As discussed in " 114th Congress: Preferred Surety Bond Guarantee Rates " below, P.L. 114-92 , the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016, increased the SBA's guarantee for preferred sureties from not less than 70% to not less than 90% of losses.

Small Business Eligibility Standards and Program Requirements

The SBA is authorized to guarantee surety bonds issued to contractors or subcontractors when

the business, together with its affiliates, meets the SBA's size standard for the primary industry in which it is engaged; the bond is required; the applicant is not able to obtain such bond on reasonable terms and conditions without a guarantee; and there is a reasonable expectation that the applicant will perform the covenants and conditions of the contract, and the terms and conditions of the bond are reasonable in light of the risks involved and the extent of the surety's participation.

The applicant must also "possess good character and reputation," as demonstrated by (1) not being under indictment, being convicted of a felony, or having a final civil judgment stating that the applicant has committed a breach of trust or has violated a law or regulation protecting the integrity of business transactions or business relationships; (2) not having a regulatory authority revoke, cancel, or suspend a license held by the applicant, which is necessary to perform the contract; and (3) never having obtained a bond guarantee by fraud or material misrepresentation or failing to keep the surety informed of unbonded contracts or of a contract bonded by another surety.

Applicants must also certify the percentage of work under the contract to be subcontracted. The SBA does not guarantee bonds for applicants that are primarily brokers or have effectively transferred control over the project to one or more subcontractors. Applicants must also certify that they are not presently debarred, suspended, proposed for debarment, declared ineligible, or voluntarily excluded from transactions with any federal department or agency. In addition, the SBA will not guarantee a bond issued by a particular surety if that surety, an affiliate of that surety, or a close relative or member of the household of that surety or affiliate owns, directly or indirectly, 10% or more of the business applying for the guarantee. This conflict of interest prohibition also applies to ownership interests in any of the applicant's affiliates.

As mentioned previously, the SBA guarantees contracts up to $6.5 million, and up to $10 million if a federal contracting officer certifies that such a guarantee is necessary. There is no limit to the number of bonds that can be guaranteed for any one contractor.

The SBA guarantees up to 90% of the loss incurred and paid by a surety if the contract is $100,000 or less, or if the bond is issued on behalf of a socially and economically disadvantaged-owned and controlled small business, a qualified HUBZone small business, a veteran-owned and controlled small business, or a service-disabled veteran-owned and controlled small business. The guarantee rate is 80% if the contract is greater than $100,000, and the business is not owned and controlled by socially and economically disadvantaged individuals, a qualified HUBZone small business, or a veteran-owned or service-disabled veteran-owned small business.

The SBA does not charge principals (small business applicants) application or bid bond guarantee fees. If the SBA guarantees a final bond, the principal must pay a contractor fee equal to a percentage of the contract amount, which is determined by the SBA and published in the Federal Register . The FY2019 contractor fee is 0.6% of the contract price for a final bond. The contractor fee is rounded to the nearest dollar, paid to the surety, and the surety remits the fee to the SBA.

Sureties also charge principals a premium for issuing and servicing the bond. Sureties are not allowed to charge principals a premium that is more than the amount permitted under applicable state law. Premiums vary depending on the surety's assessment of the risk involved and job size; typically ranging from 1.5% to 3.0% of the contract amount.

Surety Eligibility Standards and Program Requirements

Sureties interested in participating in the Prior Approval Program or the Preferred Surety Bond Guarantee Program (PSB program) must apply in writing to the SBA. Applicants must be a corporation listed by the U.S. Treasury as eligible to issue bonds in connection with federal procurement contracts.

The SBA considers several factors when evaluating sureties for the PSB program:

the surety must have an underwriting limitation of at least $6.5 million on the Department of the Treasury's list of acceptable sureties; the surety must agree that it will neither charge a bond premium in excess of that authorized by the appropriate state insurance department nor impose any non-premium fee unless such fee is permitted by applicable state law and approved by the SBA; the surety's premium income from contract bonds guaranteed by any government agency (federal, state, or local) can account for no more than one-quarter of the surety's total contract bond premium income; and the surety must vest the underwriting authority for SBA guaranteed bonds to its own employees and final settlement authority for claims and recovery to employees in the surety's permanent claims department.

The SBA also considers the surety's rating or ranking designation assigned by a recognized authority. Sureties participating in the PSB program are not eligible to participate in the Prior Approval Program. However, this prohibition does not apply to the surety's affiliates provided that the affiliate is not a participant in the PSB program, their affiliation has been fully disclosed to the SBA, and the affiliate has been approved to participate in the Prior Approval Program.

Sureties in the Prior Approval Program must obtain the SBA's approval before issuing a guaranteed bond. Sureties in the PSB program may issue, monitor, and service SBA-guaranteed bonds without prior approval. However, these sureties must notify the SBA electronically of all bonds issued and, for final bonds, they must report and submit to the SBA on a monthly basis all contractor and surety fees that are due. These sureties are also subject to a periodic maximum guarantee authority amount set by the SBA. In addition, effective August 21, 2017, sureties are required, during their initial nine months in the PSB program, to obtain the SBA's prior written approval before executing a bond greater than $2 million. The SBA argued that it was in the taxpayer's interest to require newer sureties to "demonstrate an understanding of the program before being allowed to issue bonds larger than $2 million without SBA's oversight."

The terms and conditions of the SBA's bond guarantee agreements with the surety, including the guarantee percentage, may vary from surety to surety, depending on past experience with the SBA. The SBA may take into consideration, among other things, the rating or ranking assigned to the surety by recognized authorities, the surety's loss rate, average contract amount, average bond penalty per guaranteed bond, and the ratio of bid bonds to final bonds, all in comparison with other sureties participating in the same SBA Surety Bond Guarantee Program (Prior Approval or PSB programs).

Sureties are required, among other things, to

evaluate the credit, capacity, and character of a principal using standards generally accepted by the surety industry and in accordance with the SBA's standard operating procedures on underwriting and the surety's principles and practices on unguaranteed bonds; reasonably expect that the principal will successfully perform the contract to be bonded; provide bond terms and conditions that are reasonable in light of the risks involved and the extent of the surety's participation; be satisfied as to the reasonableness of cost and the feasibility of successful completion of the contract; ensure that the principal remains viable and eligible for the program; monitor the principal's progress on guaranteed contracts; maintain documentation of job status requests; take all reasonable action to minimize risk of loss, including, but not limited to, obtaining from each principal a written indemnity agreement, secured by such collateral as the surety or the SBA finds appropriate, which covers actual losses under the contract and imminent breach payments; and in the case of loss, pursue all possible sources of salvage and recovery.

Participating sureties are subject to audits by SBA-selected and -approved examiners. Prior Approval Program sureties are audited at least once each year and PSB sureties are audited at least once every three years.

The SBA does not charge sureties (or small businesses) application or bid bond guarantee fees. It does require sureties to pay a guarantee fee on each SBA-guaranteed bond (other than bid bonds). The surety fee, which is determined by the SBA and published in the Federal Register , is a percentage of the bond premium. The FY2019 surety fee is 20% of the bond premium that the surety charges the small business, rounded to the nearest dollar. The surety fee is due within 60 days after the SBA's approval of the prior approval payment or performance bond. The SBA does not receive any portion of a surety's non-premium charges.

As shown in Table 2 , the number and amount of bid bonds guaranteed by the SBA has generally increased in recent years. For example, in FY2007, the SBA guaranteed 4,192 bid bonds totaling $1.7 billion. In FY2018, the SBA guaranteed 7,354 bid bonds totaling $4.7 billion.

Table 2 also shows that the number and amount of SBA-guaranteed final bonds declined somewhat from FY2007 through FY2009 (coinciding with the 2007-2009 recession), and has generally increased since then. Recent increases are likely due to generally improving economic conditions and legislation that temporarily ( P.L. 111-5 ) and then permanently ( P.L. 112-239 ) raised the program's maximum individual contract amount from $2 million to $5 million, and up to $10 million if a federal contracting officer certifies that such a guarantee is necessary.

As shown in Table 3 , excluding program costs of about $4 million annually, the program has experienced a net positive cash flow in each of the past 12 fiscal years.

There is about $97 million in the Surety Bond Guarantee Program Revolving Fund.

Historically, the program's default rate has averaged about 3% to 5%. According to the SBA, on average, the default rate on larger contracts tends to be lower than for smaller contracts and the recovery rate for larger contract defaults tends to be greater than for smaller contract defaults.

Currently, 28 sureties participate in the Prior Approval Program and 6 participate in the PSB program. Agents empowered to represent a participating surety company are located, or licensed, in all 50 states, American Samoa, the District of Columbia, Guam, the Marshall Islands, Micronesia, the Northern Mariana Islands, Palau, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands. About 80% of the SBA's surety bonds are issued through the Prior Approval Program and 20% through the PSB program.

Congressional Issues: Bond Limits and Guarantee Rates

P.L. 111-5 , the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA), provided the program an additional appropriation of $15 million and temporarily increased, from February 17, 2009, through September 30, 2010, the maximum bond amount from $2 million to $5 million. The act also authorized the SBA to guarantee a bond of up to $10 million if a federal contracting officer certified in writing that a guarantee in excess of $5 million was necessary. It also revised the program's size standard to "the size standard for the primary industry in which such business concern, and the affiliates of such business concern, is engaged, as determined by the Administrator in accordance with the North American Industry Classification System." The new size standard (e.g., up to $36.5 million in average annual receipts over the previous three years for most heavy construction contractors, and up to $15 million in average annual receipts over the previous three years for specialty trade contractors) increased the number of businesses that qualified for the program. Using its rulemaking authority, the SBA made ARRA's temporary size standard permanent on August 11, 2010.

Proponents argued that the increased bond limit and size were necessary to "ensure that small businesses are able to secure the surety bonds they need to compete for contracts, grow, and hire more employees." They also argued that "in our current economic recession, small businesses are finding it even more difficult to secure the credit lines necessary to get bonds in the private sector." In their view, the temporary changes would create "significant opportunities to create jobs now in which small businesses will participate and be the driving engine for creation of new jobs in our country."

There was no apparent organized opposition to these specific temporary changes to the Surety Bond Guarantee Program. However, there was opposition to ARRA's package of program enhancements for the SBA as a whole, which among other things, provided the SBA $730 million in additional funding, including $255 million for a temporary, two-year small business stabilization program to guarantee loans of $35,000 or less to small businesses for qualified debt consolidation, later named the America's Recovery Capital (ARC) Loan program and $375 million to temporarily subsidize fees for the SBA's 7(a) and 504/CDC loan guaranty programs and increase the 7(a) program's maximum loan guaranty percentage to 90%. Instead of modifying the SBA's program requirements and increasing the SBA's appropriation, opponents advocated business tax reduction, reform of financial credit market regulation, and federal fiscal restraint as the best means to assist small businesses, generate economic growth, and create jobs.

On September 12, 2011, the Obama Administration advocated, as part of its proposed American Jobs Act, a temporary increase in the SBA surety bond limit to $5 million until the end of FY2012. The Administration argued that raising the program's bond limit "will make it easier for small businesses to take advantage of contracting opportunities generated by the American Jobs Act's proposed infrastructure investments."

On December 7, 2012, the Administration also recommended, as part of its request for an additional $60.4 billion in federal resources to address damage caused by Hurricane Sandy, that the SBA surety bond limit be increased to $5 million to enable "more small businesses to participate in the recovery efforts."

There were several legislative efforts during the 112 th Congress to increase the program's bond limit. S. 1334 , the Expanding Opportunities for Main Street Act of 2011, and its companion bill in the House, H.R. 2424 , would have reinstated and made permanent ARRA's higher limits (up to $5 million and up to $10 million if a federal contracting officer certifies in writing that a guarantee in excess of $5 million is necessary). Neither of these bills was reported by a committee for consideration by the House or the Senate.

S. 1660 , the American Jobs Act of 2011, and its companion bill in the House, H.R. 12 , would have provided $3 million in additional funding to pay for the cost of temporarily increasing the program's bond limit to $5 million from $2 million until the end of FY2012. Cloture on a motion to proceed to S. 1660 was not invoked in the Senate on October 11, 2011, by a vote of 50 to 49. H.R. 12 was not reported by a committee for consideration in the House.

On December 12, 2012, the Senate Committee on Appropriations released its draft of the Hurricane Sandy Emergency Assistance Supplemental bill. It included a provision to increase the program's bond limit to $5 million. This provision was later removed following congressional approval of H.R. 4310 , the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013, which became law ( P.L. 112-239 ) on January 2, 2013. It increased the program's bond limit to $6.5 million, and up to $10 million if a federal contracting officer certifies that such a guarantee is necessary.

There was relatively little discussion in the legislative record concerning the reasons for increasing the surety bond program's bond limits, and even less discussion of the reasons for not increasing the limits. Hearings were not held on S. 1334 and H.R. 2424 . Also, only one witness during hearings on H.R. 4310 addressed the SBA surety bond program. That witness supported an increase in the surety bond limit to $5 million, and up to $10 million if a contracting officer certifies its necessity.

Advocates argued that bond limits should be raised to bring them more in line with the contracting amounts for other small business programs, such as the 8(a) Minority Small Business and Capital Ownership Development Program, the Historically Underutilized Business Zone (HUBZone) program, the Women-Owned Small Business Federal Contract program, and the Service-Disabled Veteran-Owned Small Business Concerns Program. For example, under 8(a) Minority Small Business and Capital Ownership Development Program, federal contracting officials, at that time, could provide a sole source award to a 8(a) small business if the anticipated award price of the contract did not exceed $6.5 million for manufacturing contracts (now $7.0 million) or $4 million for other contract opportunities, and the contracting officer believed that the award could be made at a fair and reasonable price. Advocates argued that raising the program's bond limit would provide more consistency across small business contracting programs and make it easier for agencies experiencing difficulty issuing contracts in increments of $2 million or less (e.g., the Department of Defense [DOD], the General Services Administration, and the Department of State) to participate in the program.

Advocates also argued that small businesses awarded contracts exceeding $2 million under the other small business contracting programs are at risk of not being able to complete those contracts due to difficulties in securing a surety bond. For example, the House Committee on Armed Services' Panel on Business Challenges in the Defense Industry argued that the SBA surety bond program's limit should be increased to $6.5 million to match the 8(a) program's $6.5 million threshold for manufacturing contracts and to "increase the opportunities for small businesses to compete for federal contracts, especially in those departments, such as the Department of Defense, where the average size of construction contracts awarded to small businesses for FY2010 exceeded $5.9 million—nearly triple the size for which SBA can provide bonding support."

There was no organized opposition to raising the program's bond limits. One possible argument that could have been raised is that higher limits could lead to higher amounts being guaranteed by the SBA and, as a result, increase the risk of program losses. However, the SBA's experience with Recovery Act bonds (over $2 million) suggested that raising the limit may not lead to an increased risk of program losses. The SBA reported that the program's default rate on Recovery Act bonds was lower, in 2009 and 2010, than for its other bonds. The SBA guaranteed 166 Recovery Act bid bonds valued at $518 million and 52 Recovery Act final bonds valued at $145.4 million. There were two defaults, with a bond value of $2.7 million and $2.2 million, respectively.

In an effort to enhance surety participation in the SBA's program, H.R. 776 , the Security in Bonding Act of 2013, introduced and referred to the House Committee on the Judiciary and the House Committee on Small Business on February 15, 2013, would have increased the PSB program's guarantee rate from not to exceed 70% to not to exceed 90% of losses. The bill was reported favorably by both committees on May 21, 2014, and included in H.R. 4435 , the Howard P. "Buck" McKeon National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015, which was passed by the House on May 22, 2014. This provision was not included in the final version of the bill which was subsequently passed by Congress.

Advocates of increasing the PSB program's guarantee rate argued that

Despite the different guarantee amounts and the differing levels of review, both the PAP [Prior Approval Program] and PSBP [Preferred Surety Bond Guarantee Program] have similar levels of default. However, over the years, the PSBP program has become less effective for small businesses since only four sureties currently participate in the program because the guarantee rates are no longer competitive enough to encourage commercial sureties to participate. Therefore, since the PSBP is the more efficient program and … does not expose taxpayers to any risk, this legislation amends the SBIA [Small Business Investment Act] to standardize the guarantee rate at 90 percent.

The SBA did not formally endorse the proposed guarantee rate increase. However, in its FY2015 and FY2016 congressional budget justification documents, the SBA indicated that it "will investigate establishing a single guaranty percentage in the Prior Approval and PSB programs and restructuring the Prior Approval program." Also, when asked at a congressional hearing held on May 23, 2013, about the proposed guarantee rate increase, an SBA official testified that

We are looking very closely at the program. We have seen a decline in the preferred sureties going down from 50% to 14% of our program, which is a very small number. We would like to see more participation in that program. Because of the additional cash flow we have, we do not expect it to increase our costs. And we have some history in our other programs that demonstrate that having the same guarantee level is not a disincentive.

There was no discussion in the legislative record during the 113 th Congress opposing an increase in the guarantee rate for the PSB program. One possible objection might have been that increasing the guarantee rate could increase the risk of program losses and result in higher program fees. Higher fees, in turn, could cause hardship for some companies seeking a surety bond.

114th Congress: Preferred Surety Bond Guarantee Rates Increased

H.R. 838 , the Security in Bonding Act of 2015, was introduced and referred to the House Committee on the Judiciary and the House Committee on Small Business on February 10, 2015. The bill would have increased the PSB program's guarantee rate from not to exceed 70% to not to exceed 90%, specify requirements concerning the pledge of assets by individual sureties, and require GAO to examine the effects of these changes on small businesses.

The House-passed version of H.R. 1735 , the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016, included H.R. 838 's provisions. The Senate-passed version of the bill did not. The conference agreement for H.R. 1735 , which became P.L. 114-92 , included H.R. 838 's provision to increase the PSB program's guarantee rate from not to exceed 70% to not to exceed 90% of losses and its provision to specify requirements concerning the pledge of assets by individual sureties, subject to a one-year delay "to allow for the necessary rulemaking." Congress specified additional requirements concerning the pledge of assets by individual sureties as a means to ensure that "individual sureties have sufficient assets to redeem the bonds."

The SBA's final rule implementing the increased PSB program's guarantee rate was effective as of September 20, 2017.

The SBA has reported that it is focusing on "strengthening relationships with individual surety companies and the large network of bond agents and producers across the country in order to reach more small businesses in need of bonding." As part of this outreach effort, the SBA has reported that it will continue to emphasize "process improvements that will streamline the application requirements for small businesses and surety companies and their agents." For example, in August 2012, the SBA announced a "Quick APP" for surety bonds up to $250,000 that provides a streamlined underwriting and application process by combining "two applications into one to make it easier and faster for small businesses and contractors, including veteran-owned small businesses, to compete for contracts." The SBA increased the Quick APP (now called the Quick Bond Program) eligibility threshold to $400,000 in 2017.

In addition, the SBA reported in 2016 that it was also considering combing the Prior Approval Program and PSB program into a single program featuring the streamlined bond approval and monitoring processes under the PSB program. Several industry groups, including the National Association of Surety Bond Producers and The Surety & Fidelity Association of America, have recommended that the programs be merged, the emphasis on reduced regulatory burdens under the PSB program be maintained, and the program's fees kept as low as economically feasible as a means to encourage more sureties to participate in the program.

Perhaps because the proposal has not been formally introduced as a bill, there are no public statements opposing the merger of the two programs. Opposition might come from (1) those who are not convinced that the Surety Bond Guarantee Program is necessary to supplement the private market for surety bonds and would prefer that the program be eliminated rather than reformed or (2) those who believe that a federal program is necessary to supplement the private market for surety bonds, but the existing program is sufficient to meet that need and does not require changes to encourage its expansion. Still other opponents might argue that providing additional authority to sureties to approve and monitor bonds could increase the risk of defaults and program losses.

Throughout the program's history, both congressional testimony and GAO examinations have indicated that smaller contracting firms, and especially minority-owned and women-owned small business contracting firms, often have a more difficult time accessing surety bonds in the private marketplace than larger firms. For example, in 1995, GAO reported that "it is not unusual for a small construction company to have some difficulty in obtaining a surety bond." GAO found that about one in three of the smallest contracting firms it surveyed, compared with about one in six of the larger contracting firms it surveyed, reported that they were required to provide collateral. GAO also reported

The experiences of the minority-owned firms differed from those of the firms not owned by minorities in several areas. For example, these firms were more likely to be asked to provide certain types of financial documentation, as well as to provide collateral or to meet other conditions; were more likely to be denied a bond and to report losing an opportunity to bid because of delays in processing their request for a bond; and were more likely to depend on jobs requiring bonds for a higher proportion of their revenues.

The women-owned firms differed from the firms not owned by women in a few key respects. For example, they … were more likely to be asked to provide more types of financial or other documentation to obtain a bond.

In addition, the minority-owned firms reported more often than the firms not owned by minorities that they had to (1) establish an escrow account controlled by the surety company, (2) hire a CPA or a management or consulting firm selected by the surety company to manage the contract, and (3) enter into an arrangement that allows the surety company to manage the job even when the firm is not in default.

Although congressional testimony and GAO examinations have supported the need for a program such as the SBA's Surety Bond Guarantee Program, that testimony and GAO's surveys of businesses have been somewhat less useful in helping Congress determine the appropriate size for the program. For example, a review of congressional hearings since the program's inception suggests that congressional witnesses representing the surety companies and various construction organizations, including minority-owned small contracting businesses, have focused their testimony on the need to reduce the SBA's paperwork requirements, which are designed to prevent fraud but increase the sureties' costs; keep the program's fees as low as possible; and keep the program's guarantee rates as high as possible. The SBA's testimony has tended to focus on the need to attract more sureties to the program so that it can reverse the slow downward trajectory the program has experienced over the past two decades in the number and amount of final bonds guaranteed. There has been relatively little testimony provided concerning the broader issue of how large the program should be in comparison with the private sector and what measures or metrics could be used to help make that determination.

One possible starting point for determining the program's size in comparison with the private sector is to examine congressional testimony concerning the supply and demand for sureties in the private sector. That testimony suggests that the supply and demand for sureties tends to fluctuate with changes in the overall economy, with the supply of sureties contracting during economic recessions and expanding during economic expansions and the demand for sureties slowing during economic recessions and increasing during economic expansions. Arguably, federal policies could take these fluctuations into account—enacting policies that expand federal support for surety guarantees when supply is tight and reducing federal support for surety guarantees when supply is more plentiful. Of course, when making these decisions, it is necessary to first establish measures or metrics to determine current market conditions. In addition, this line of reasoning assumes that having a federal presence in the surety marketplace is desirable, an assumption not held by all. Ultimately, although having established measures or metrics concerning the supply and demand for surety bonds might be helpful in determining the appropriate size for the SBA's Surety Bond Guarantee Program, that decision will largely rest on personal views concerning the role of the federal government in the private marketplace and the level of acceptable risk in assisting small businesses to gain greater access to surety bonds.

Appendix. SBA Surety Bond Guarantee Program Statistics


Small Business Administration (SBA) Funding: Overview and Recent Trends

Summary: This report examines the Small Business Administration's (SBA's) appropriations (new budget authority, minus rescissions and sequestration) over time, focusing on developments and trends since FY2000. It also provides total available funding (which includes carryover from the prior fiscal year, carryover into the next fiscal year, account transfers, rescissions, and sequestration) and, for entrepreneurial development noncredit programs, actual and anticipated expenditures for comparative purposes.

Summary: SBA appropriations, as a whole, have varied significantly from year to year since FY2000 and across all three of the agency's major spending categories: disaster assistance, business loan credit subsidies, and "other programs," a category that includes salaries and expenses, business loan administration, the Office of Inspector General, the Office of Advocacy, and entrepreneurial development programs. Overall, the SBA's appropriations have ranged from a high of $2.359 billion in FY2018 to a low of $571.8 million in FY2007. Much of this volatility is due to significant variation in appropriations for disaster assistance, which ranged from a high of $1.7 billion in FY2006 to a low of $0 in FY2009. This variation can be attributed primarily to supplemental appropriations provided to address disaster needs arising from the impact of major hurricanes, such as Hurricanes Katrina and Sandy, and more recently, Hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and Maria.

Summary: The SBA's appropriations for business loan credit subsidies have also varied since FY2000, ranging from a high of $319.7 million in FY2013 ($337.3 million before sequestration and rescission) to a low of $1.3 million in FY2006 and FY2007. This variation is due to the impact of changing economic conditions on the SBA's guaranteed loan portfolios. During good economic times, revenue from SBA fees and collateral liquidation is typically sufficient to cover the costs of purchasing guaranteed loans that have defaulted. During and immediately following recessions, however, that revenue is typically insufficient to cover the costs of purchasing guaranteed loans that have defaulted.

Summary: The SBA's appropriations for other programs, as a collective, have also varied since FY2000, ranging from a high of $1.6253 billion in FY2010 to a low of $455.6 million in FY2007. This variation is primarily due to congressional response to changing economic conditions. For example, Congress approved significant, temporary increases in appropriations for the SBA's other programs spending category in FY2009 and FY2010. Overall, since FY2000, appropriations for other programs have increased at a pace that exceeds inflation. This report provides appropriations for all five major components of the other programs spending category, including the SBA's entrepreneurial development programs.

Summary: The SBA's appropriations for FY1954 through FY1999 are provided in the Appendix.

The Small Business Administration (SBA) currently administers several types of programs to support small businesses, including loan guaranty and venture capital programs to enhance small businesses' access to capital; contracting programs to increase small businesses' opportunities in federal contracting; direct loan programs for businesses, homeowners, and renters to aid in their recovery from natural disasters; and small business management and technical assistance training programs to assist in business formation and expansion. Congressional interest in these programs has increased in recent years, primarily because small businesses are viewed as a means to stimulate economic activity and create jobs. Many Members of Congress also regularly receive constituent inquiries about the SBA's programs.

This report examines appropriations for the SBA (new budget authority, minus rescissions and sequestration) over time, focusing on developments and trends since FY2000.

This report also provides total available funding (which includes carryover from the prior fiscal year, carryover into the next fiscal year, account transfers, rescissions, and sequestration) and, for comparative purposes, actual and anticipated expenditures for the SBA's entrepreneurial development noncredit programs.

SBA appropriations, as a whole, have varied significantly from year to year since FY2000 and across all three major SBA spending categories: appropriations for disaster assistance, business loan credit subsidies, and "other programs," a spending category that includes appropriations for salaries and expenses, business loan administration, the Office of Inspector General, the Office of Advocacy, and entrepreneurial development noncredit programs.

The variation in appropriations for disaster assistance since FY2000 is largely due to supplemental appropriations provided to address disaster needs arising from the impact of major hurricanes.

Business loan credit subsidies represent the net present value of cash flows to and from the SBA over the life of the agency's loan portfolios. For guaranteed loans, the net present value of cash flows is affected by several factors, but it is primarily the difference between the cost of purchasing loans that have defaulted and the revenue generated from fees and collateral liquidation. For direct (Microloan) lending, it is primarily the cost of offering below-market interest rates to Microloan intermediaries.

The variation in appropriations for SBA business loan credit subsidies since FY2000 is primarily due to the impact of changing economic conditions on the SBA's guaranteed loan portfolios. During good economic times, revenue from SBA fees and collateral liquidation is typically sufficient to cover the SBA's cost of purchasing guaranteed loans that have defaulted. During and immediately following economic slowdowns, however, revenue from SBA fees and collateral liquidation is typically insufficient to cover the SBA's cost of purchasing guaranteed loans that have defaulted. The shortfall occurs because the SBA's cost of purchasing guaranteed loans tends to increase when the economy slows (primarily because guaranteed loans are more likely to default during and immediately following recessions) and revenue from loan liquidation tends to be constrained during slow economic times (primarily because commercial real estate values typically fall during and immediately following recessions). As a result, additional appropriations are needed to cover these expenses, which are guaranteed by the "full faith and credit of the United States."

Since FY2000, the variation in appropriations for the other programs spending category is attributable primarily to congressional response to changing economic conditions. As the report will discuss, appropriations for this spending category have generally increased at a pace that exceeds inflation. In addition, Congress approved significant, temporary increases in appropriations for SBA programs in the other programs spending category in FY2009 and FY2010. It approved these temporary increases primarily as a means to enhance small businesses' access to capital, which had become constrained during and immediately following the Great Recession (December 2007 to June 2009).

The SBA's appropriations for FY1954 through FY1999 are provided in the Appendix .

As shown in Table 1 , the SBA's appropriations have varied significantly since FY2000, ranging from a high of $2.359 billion in FY2018 to a low of $571.8 million in FY2007. Much of this volatility is due to significant variation in appropriations for disaster assistance, which ranged from a high of $1.7 billion in FY2006 to a low of $0 in FY2009. This variation is attributable primarily to supplemental appropriations provided to address disaster needs arising from the impact of major hurricanes, such as Hurricanes Katrina, Sandy, Harvey, Irma, and Maria.

In addition, as shown in Table 1 , appropriations for business loan credit subsidies have varied significantly since FY2000, ranging from a high of $319.7 million in FY2013 ($337.3 million before sequestration and rescission) to a low of $1.3 million in FY2006 and FY2007. As mentioned previously, the variation in appropriations for business loan credit subsidies results primarily from the impact of changing economic conditions on the SBA's loan portfolios. During good economic times, revenue from fees and collateral liquidation is typically sufficient to cover the costs of purchasing defaulted loans. During and immediately following recessions, revenue from fees and collateral liquidation is typically not sufficient to cover those costs.

As shown in Table 1 , appropriations for the all other programs category have also varied since FY2000, ranging from a high of $1.6253 billion in FY2010 to a low of $455.6 million in FY2007. Much of this variation resulted from significant, temporary increases in appropriations for the SBA's other programs in FY2009 ($724.0 million) and FY2010 ($962.5 million). These additional appropriations were approved primarily as a means to enhance small businesses' access to capital, which had become constrained during and immediately following the Great Recession. As mentioned previously, from FY2000 to FY2019, appropriations for the SBA's other programs spending category, as a whole, have exceeded the rate of inflation.

For comparative purposes, Table 1 also presents the SBA's total available funds. As indicated in the table, the SBA's carryovers and account transfers tend to reduce variation in its budget from one fiscal year to the next. Much of this "evening out" process is due to disaster assistance appropriations, which are provided in one fiscal year and then typically spent over several fiscal years.

SBA Funding Within the Other Programs Category

The following section examines appropriations and total available funding for FY2000-FY2019 for the five main components of the SBA's other programs spending category: (1) salaries and expenses, (2) business loan administration, (3) the Office of Inspector General (OIG), (4) the Office of Advocacy (Advocacy), and (5) entrepreneurial development (ED) noncredit programs.

The SBA's salaries and expenses account currently provides funding for the following:

office operating budgets, which are used by program and administrative offices for daily operations, such as travel, supplies, and contracted services; agency-wide costs, such as rent and telecommunications, which are managed centrally; employee compensation and benefits, which are also managed centrally; and reimbursable expenses for programs for which the SBA receives reimbursable budget authority from other federal government agencies.

Several adjustments were made to the SBA's reported appropriations for its salaries and expenses account to enable meaningful comparisons over time. For example, prior to FY2014, appropriations for the SBA's ED programs were included in the salaries and expenses account. They now have their own, separate appropriations account. Therefore, to allow for meaningful comparisons with current appropriations, Table 2 lists and deducts the reported appropriations for ED programs prior to FY2014 from the reported appropriations for salaries and expenses.

In addition, the SBA previously included appropriations for congressional initiatives (earmarks) under the salaries and expenses account. Therefore, to allow for meaningful comparisons with current appropriations and focus the comparison on administrative expenses, appropriations for earmarks are deducted from the reported appropriations for salaries and expenses.

Prior to FY2012, Advocacy was funded through the salaries and expenses' executive direction subaccount. Advocacy now has its own, separate appropriations account. To allow for meaningful comparisons with current appropriations, Table 2 lists Advocacy's funding provided through the salaries and expenses' executive direction subaccount prior to FY2012 and deducts that amount from the reported appropriation s for salaries and expenses .

As discussed in greater detail below (see "Office of Advocacy"), data concerning Advocacy's funding provided through the salaries and expenses' executive direction subaccount are not available for FY2006-FY2010. However, in FY2003, FY2004, and FY2005, Advocacy's funding provided through the salaries and expenses' executive direction subaccount was 79% of its reported total cost. The estimates provided in the table for FY2006-FY2010 were derived by multiplying Advocacy's total program cost reported for each of those fiscal years by 79%.

As shown in Table 2 , the SBA's appropriations for salaries and expenses have varied from year to year, with increases in some years and decreases in others. Overall, appropriations for the SBA's salaries and expenses have increased from $176.490 million in FY2000 to $267.500 million in FY2019. This increase has exceeded the rate of inflation.

The SBA has statutory authorization to transfer appropriations from the business loan administration account into the salaries and expenses account. As evidenced by the amounts listed in the total available funds column in the table, the SBA exercised that authority in every fiscal year from FY2000 to FY2018 (and is expected to do so again in FY2019), transferring the entire appropriation for business loan administration into the salaries and expenses account in each of those fiscal years.

Appropriations for the SBA's business loan administration account have varied since FY2000, increasing in some years and decreasing in others (see Table 3 ). Overall, appropriations for SBA business loan administration increased from $129 million in FY2000 to $155.150 million in FY2019. The program's recommended appropriations have not kept pace with inflation.

As evidenced by the $0.0 balance in the total funds available column for the business loan administration account, the SBA has routinely transferred all business loan administration appropriations to the salaries and expenses account. The combined appropriations for SBA salaries and expenses and business loan administration increased from $305.490 million in FY2000 to $422.650 million in FY2019. This increase has not kept pace with inflation.

According to the SBA, the OIG's mission is to "provide independent, objective oversight to improve the integrity, accountability, and performance of the SBA and its programs for the benefit of the American people." The office was created within the SBA by the Inspector General Act of 1978 ( P.L. 95-452 , as amended). The inspector general, who is nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate, directs the office. The Inspector General Act provides the OIG with the following responsibilities:

promote economy, efficiency, and effectiveness in the management of SBA programs and supporting operations; conduct and supervise audits, investigations, and reviews relating to the SBA's programs and support operations; detect and prevent fraud, waste, and abuse; review existing and proposed legislation and regulations and make appropriate recommendations; maintain effective working relationships with other governmental agencies and nongovernmental entities regarding the inspector general's mandated duties; keep the SBA administrator and Congress informed of serious problems and recommend corrective actions and implementation measures; comply with the comptroller general's audit standards; avoid duplication of Government Accountability Office activities; and report violations of federal criminal law to the U.S. attorney general.

As shown in Table 4 , the OIG's appropriations have increased from $11.405 million in FY2000 to $21.900 million in FY2019. This increase has exceeded the rate of inflation.

The OIG typically receives a transfer of appropriations from the disaster assistance account for auditing expenses. It was also provided additional appropriations in FY2006, FY2013, and FY2018 for expenses related to the review of SBA disaster loans following major hurricanes (e.g., Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, and Wilma in 2005, Hurricane Sandy in 2012, and Hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and Maria in 2018) and in FY2009 to conduct reviews and audits of $730 million provided to the SBA by P.L. 111-5 , the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009.

The SBA indicates that its Office of Advocacy is "an independent voice for small business within the federal government." The chief counsel for Advocacy, who is nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate, directs the office. Advocacy's mission is to "encourage policies that support the development and growth of American small businesses" by

intervening early in federal agencies' regulatory development processes on proposals that affect small businesses and providing Regulatory Flexibility Act compliance training to federal agency policymakers and regulatory development officials; producing research to inform policymakers and other stakeholders on the impact of federal regulatory burdens on small businesses, document the vital role of small businesses in the economy, and explore and explain the wide variety of issues of concern to the small business community; and fostering two-way communication between federal agencies and the small business community.

As shown in Table 5 , Advocacy's funding has increased from $5.620 million in FY2000 to $9.120 million in FY2019. This increase has exceeded the rate of inflation.

P.L. 111-240 , the Small Business Jobs Act of 2010, enhanced Advocacy's independence by ending the practice of funding Advocacy through the SBA's salaries and expenses' executive direction subaccount. Instead, P.L. 111-240 requires the President to provide a separate statement of the appropriations request for Advocacy, "which shall be designated in a separate account in the General Fund of the Treasury." The act also requires the SBA administrator to provide Advocacy with "appropriate and adequate office space at central and field office locations, together with such equipment, operating budget, and communications facilities and services as may be necessary, and ... necessary maintenance services for such offices and the equipment and facilities located in such offices." In addition, Congress has provided Advocacy its own, separate appropriations amount since FY2012.

As mentioned previously, prior to FY2012, the SBA reported Advocacy's total program cost, which includes funding provided through the salaries and expenses' executive direction subaccount, agency-wide overhead costs (rent, telecommunications, etc.), and other support costs (e.g., management and administrative support, including human resources support). From FY2000 to FY2005, the SBA provided relatively detailed information concerning Advocacy's budget, including the amount of funding Advocacy received through the salaries and expenses' executive direction subaccount. Also, Advocacy's FY2013 congressional budget justification document included the amount of funding Advocacy received through the salaries and expenses' executive direction subaccount in FY2011. However, those data are not available for FY2006-FY2010, and it was therefore necessary to estimate Advocacy's funding from the salaries and expenses' executive direction subaccount for those years. The estimates provided in the table were derived by multiplying Advocacy's total program cost for each of those fiscal years by 79%, which was the proportion of Advocacy's total program costs provided from the salaries and expenses' executive direction subaccount in FY2003, FY2004, and FY2005.

Entrepreneurial Development Noncredit Programs18

The SBA's entrepreneurial development (ED) noncredit programs provide a variety of management and training services to small businesses. Congress provides appropriations for

eight management and technical assistance training programs: Small Business Development Centers, the Microloan Technical Assistance Program, Women Business Centers, SCORE, the Program for Investment in Microentrepreneurs (PRIME), Veterans Programs (including Veterans Business Outreach Centers, Boots to Business, Boots to Business: Reboot, Veteran Women Igniting the Spirit of Entrepreneurship [VWISE], and Entrepreneurship Bootcamp for Veterans with Disabilities), the 7(j) Technical Assistance Program, and the Native American Outreach Program; two relatively long-standing nontraining programs: the National Women's Business Council and HUBZone administration; three initiatives: the Entrepreneurial Development Initiative (Clusters), the Entrepreneurship Education Initiative, and Growth Accelerators; and the Step Trade and Export Promotion (STEP) Pilot Grant program.

Initially, the SBA provided its own management and technical assistance training programs. Over time, however, the SBA has increasingly relied on third parties to provide that training. The SBA reports that more than 1 million aspiring entrepreneurs and small business owners receive training from an SBA-supported resource partner each year.

Congress specifies appropriations in appropriations acts for the Small Business Development Center (SBDC) program, the Microloan Technical Assistance program, and the STEP program. Congress provides an overall appropriation for the SBA's ED programs and recommends appropriations for the SBA's other ED programs, typically in the conference agreement or "Explanatory Statement" accompanying the appropriations act. As a result, the following tables refer to appropriations for the SBDC and Microloan Technical Assistance programs and recommended appropriations for other ED programs. Although not legally binding, the SBA has traditionally adhered to these recommended funding amounts.

SBDCs provide free or low-cost assistance to small businesses using programs customized to local conditions. SBDCs support small business in marketing and business strategy, finance, technology transfer, government contracting, management, manufacturing, engineering, sales, accounting, exporting, and other topics. They are funded by grants from the SBA and matching funds. There are 63 lead SBDC service centers, at least one in each state (with four in Texas and six in California), the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, Guam, and American Samoa. These lead SBDC service centers manage more than 900 SBDC outreach locations.

As shown in Table 6 , appropriations for SBDCs have increased from $84.179 million in FY2000 to $131.000 million in FY2019. This increase has exceeded the rate of inflation. In addition, as shown in the table, SBDCs received an additional $50 million in temporary funding in FY2010, which was spent over two fiscal years.

The SBA reports actual and anticipated expenditures for its ED programs in its annual budget justification document. SBDC expenditures in FY2000-FY2018 and anticipated SBDC expenditures in FY2019 are presented in the table's last column for comparative purposes.

The SBA's Microloan lending program is designed to address the perceived disadvantages faced by women, low-income, veteran, and minority entrepreneurs and business owners in gaining access to capital for starting or expanding their business (see P.L. 102-140 , the Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 1992). Under the Microloan program, the SBA provides direct loans to qualified nonprofit intermediary Microloan lenders who, in turn, provide "microloans" of up to $50,000 to small business owners, entrepreneurs, and nonprofit child care centers.

The SBA's Microloan Technical Assistance program is part of the SBA's Microloan program but receives a separate appropriation. It provides grants to Microloan intermediaries to offer management and technical training assistance to Microloan program borrowers and prospective borrowers. There are currently 147 active Microloan intermediaries, serving 49 states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico.

As shown in Table 7 , the Microloan Technical Assistance program's appropriations have varied over the years. Overall, Microloan Technical Assistance Program appropriations have increased from $23.112 million in FY2000 to $31.000 million in FY2019. This increase has been less than the rate of inflation.

Microloan Technical Assistance expenditures in FY2000-FY2018 and anticipated Microloan Technical Assistance expenditures in FY2019 are presented in the table's last column for comparative purposes.

Women Business Centers (WBCs) provide financial, management, and marketing assistance to small businesses, including start-up businesses, owned and controlled by women. Since its inception, the program has targeted the needs of socially and economically disadvantaged women (see P.L. 100-533 , the Women's Business Ownership Act of 1988). Currently, there are 121 WBCs located throughout most of the United States and the territories.

As shown in Table 8 , WBC's recommended appropriations have increased from $8.966 million in FY2000 to $18.500 million in FY2019. This increase has exceeded the rate of inflation.

WBC expenditures in FY2000-FY2018 and anticipated WBC expenditures in FY2019 are presented in the table's last column for comparative purposes.

The SBA provides financial assistance to SCORE (formerly the Service Corps of Retired Executives) to provide in-person mentoring and online training to small business owners and prospective owners. SCORE's 320 chapters and more than 800 branch offices are located throughout the United States and partner with more than 11,000 volunteer counselors, who are working or retired business owners, executives and corporate leaders, to provide management and training assistance to small businesses "at no charge or at very low cost."

As shown in Table 9 , SCORE's recommended appropriations have increased from $3.487 million in FY2000 to $11.700 in FY2019. This increase has exceeded the rate of inflation.

SCORE expenditures in FY2000-FY2018 and anticipated SCORE expenditures in FY2019 are presented in the table's last column for comparative purposes.

Program for Investment in Microentrepreneurs

The Program for Investment in Microentrepreneurs (PRIME) provides grants to nonprofit microenterprise development organizations or programs that have "a demonstrated record of delivering microenterprise services to disadvantaged entrepreneurs; an intermediary; a microenterprise development organization or program that is accountable to a local community, working in conjunction with a state or local government or Indian tribe; or an Indian tribe acting on its own, if the Indian tribe can certify that no private organization or program referred to in this paragraph exists within its jurisdiction."

As shown in Table 10 , PRIME's recommended appropriations have varied, starting at $14.964 million in FY2001 (the program's first recommended appropriation) and falling to $2 million in FY2006 and FY2007. PRIME has received $5.0 million since FY2015.

PRIME expenditures in FY2001-FY2018 and anticipated PRIME expenditures in FY2019 are presented in the table's last column for comparative purposes.

The Obama Administration argued that PRIME overlaps and duplicates the SBA's Microloan Technical Assistance program and recommended in its FY2012-FY2017 budget requests that PRIME receive no appropriations. As shown in the table, in FY2013, the Obama Administration eliminated PRIME's appropriation as part of the SBA's sequestration process.

The Trump Administration recommended in its FY2018 and FY2019 budget requests that the PRIME program receive no appropriations.

The SBA's Office of Veterans Business Development (OVBD) administers several management and training programs to assist veteran-owned businesses, including

the Entrepreneurship Bootcamp for Veterans with Disabilities Consortium of Universities, which provides "experiential training in entrepreneurship and small business management to post-9/11 veterans with disabilities" at eight universities; the Veteran Women Igniting the Spirit of Entrepreneurship (V-WISE) program, which is administered through a cooperative agreement with Syracuse University, offers women veterans a 15-day, online course focused on entrepreneurship skills and the "language of business," followed by a 3-day conference (offered twice a year at varying locations) in which participants "are exposed to successful entrepreneurs and CEOs of Fortune 500 companies and leaders in government" and participate in courses on business planning, marketing, accounting and finance, operations and production, human resources, and work-life balance; the Operation Endure and Grow Program, which is administered through a cooperative agreement with Syracuse University, offers an eight-week online training program "focused on the fundamentals of launching and/or growing a small business" and is available to National Guard and reservists and their family members; the Boots to Business program (started in 2012), which is "an elective track within the Department of Defense's revised Training Assistance Program called Transition Goals, Plans, Success (Transition GPS) and has three parts: the Entrepreneurship Track Overview—a 10-minute introductory video shown during the mandatory five-day Transition GPS course which introduces entrepreneurship as a post-service career option; Introduction to Entrepreneurship—a two-day classroom course on entrepreneurship and business fundamentals offered as one of the three Transition GPS elective tracks; and Foundations of Entrepreneurship—an eight-week, instructor-led online course that offers in-depth instruction on the elements of a business plan and tips and techniques for starting a business"; the Boots to Business Reboot program (started in 2014), which assists veterans who have already transitioned to civilian life; and the Veterans Business Outreach Centers (VBOC) program, which provides veterans and their spouses management and technical assistance training at 15 locations, including assistance with the Boots to Business program, the development and maintenance of a five-year business plan, and referrals to other SBA resource partners when appropriate for additional training or mentoring services.

Prior to FY2016, Congress recommended appropriations for VBOCs and, in FY2014 and FY2015, for the Boots to Business initiative ($7.0 million in FY2014 and $7.5 million in FY2015). Funding for the OVBD's other veterans assistance programs were provided through the SBA's salaries and expenses account.

Starting in FY2016, Congress has recommended appropriations for OVBD's programs as a whole: $12.3 million in FY2016, FY2017, and FY2018, and $12.7 million in FY2019. This increase has not kept pace with inflation.

OVBD expenditures in FY2015-FY2018 and anticipated OVBD expenditures in FY2019 are presented in the table's last column for comparative purposes.

Recommended appropriations for VBOCs from FY2000-FY2015 are presented in Table 12 for historical comparisons. As the data indicate, recommended appropriations for VBOCs increased from $0.613 million in FY2000 to $3.000 million in FY2015. This increase has exceeded the rate of inflation.

OVBD expenditures in FY2000-FY2015 are presented in the table's last column for comparative purposes.

The SBA's 7(j) Technical Assistance Program provides "a wide variety of management and technical assistance to eligible individuals or concerns to meet their specific needs, including: (a) counseling and training in the areas of financing, management, accounting, bookkeeping, marketing, and operation of small business concerns; and (b) the identification and development of new business opportunities." Eligible individuals and businesses include "8(a) certified firms, small disadvantaged businesses, businesses operating in areas of high unemployment, or low income or firms owned by low income individuals."

As shown in Table 13 , recommended appropriations for the 7(j) Technical Assistance Program have varied since FY2000, with increases in some years and decreases in others. Overall, the SBA's 7(j) Technical Assistance Program's recommended appropriations have decreased from $3.584 million in FY2000 to $2.800 million in FY2019.

7(j) Technical Assistance Program expenditures in FY2000-FY2018 and anticipated 7(j) Technical Assistance Program expenditures in FY2019 are presented in the table's last column for comparative purposes.

The SBA's Native American Outreach (NAO) program provides management and technical educational assistance to American Indians, Alaska natives, native Hawaiians, and "the indigenous people of Guam and American Samoa … to promote entity-owned and individual 8(a) certification, government contracting, entrepreneurial education, and capital access." The program's management and technical assistance services are available to members of these groups living in most areas of the nation.

As shown in Table 14 , the NAO program's recommended appropriations have varied somewhat since FY2003 (the first year it received recommended appropriations), ranging from $1.0 million to $2.0 million. The program's recommended appropriations have not kept pace with inflation. NAO program expenditures in FY2003-FY2018 and anticipated NAO expenditures in FY2019 are presented in the table's last column for comparative purposes.

The National Women's Business Council (NWBC) is a bipartisan federal advisory council created to serve as an independent source of advice and counsel to the President, Congress, and the SBA on economic issues of importance to women business owners. The council's mission "is to promote bold initiatives, policies, and programs designed to support women's business enterprises at all stages of development in the public and private sector marketplaces—from start-up to success to significance."

As shown in Table 15 , the recommended appropriation for the NWBC has increased from $0.598 million in FY2000 to $1.500 million in FY2019. This increase has exceeded the rate of inflation.

NWBC expenditures in FY2000-FY2018 and NWBC anticipated expenditures in FY2019 are presented in the table's last column for comparative purposes.

The HUBZone program helps small businesses located in designated Historically Underutilized Business Zones (HUBZones) to compete for federal contracts. Federal agencies may award contracts directly to HUBZone-certified small businesses through a sole-source contract, limit contact competitions to HUBZone-certified firms through a contract set-aside, or provide HUBZone-certified firms a price evaluation preference in full and open competitions.

The HUBZone program was initially funded through the SBA's salary and expenses account. As shown in Table 16 , Congress started recommending an appropriation for the program in FY2004. This recommended appropriation remained relatively stable until FY2015, when it increased to $3.0 million. With this increase, the HUBZone program's recommended appropriations have exceeded inflation.

The HUBZone program's expenditures in FY2000-FY2018 and the HUBZone program's anticipated expenditures in FY2019 are presented in the table's last column for comparative purposes.

The Entrepreneurial Development Initiative (Regional Innovation Clusters)

The SBA reports that "regional innovation clusters are on-the-ground collaborations between business, research, education, financing and government institutions that work to develop and grow a particular industry or related set of industries in a particular geographic region." The SBA has supported regional innovative clusters since FY2009, and the initiative has received recommended appropriations from Congress since FY2010.

As shown in Table 17 , funding for the Entrepreneurial Development Initiative (Regional Innovation Clusters) has been reduced from a recommended appropriation of $10.0 million in FY2010 to $5.0 million in FY2019. The table's last column indicates that the SBA's expenditures for the initiative have often been less than the amount appropriated.

The Trump Administration recommended in its FY2018 and FY2019 budget requests that the Entrepreneurial Development Initiative receive no appropriations.

The SBA's Entrepreneurship Education initiative offers high‐growth small businesses in underserved communities "a seven‐month executive leader education series" consisting of "more than 100 hours of specialized training, technical resources, a professional networking system, and other resources to strengthen their business model and promote economic development within urban communities." At the conclusion of the training, "participants produce a three‐year strategic growth action plan with benchmarks and performance targets that help them access the necessary support and resources to move forward for the next stage of business growth."

As shown in Table 18 , the Entrepreneurship Education initiative received its first recommended appropriation from Congress in FY2014 ($5.0 million), $7.0 million in FY2015, $10.0 million in FY2016, FY2017, and FY2018, and $3.5 million in FY2019.

The SBA describes growth accelerators as "organizations that help entrepreneurs start and scale their businesses." Growth accelerators are typically run by experienced entrepreneurs and help small businesses access seed capital and mentors. The SBA claims that growth accelerators "help accelerate a startup company's path towards success with targeted advice on revenue growth, employee growth, sourcing outside funding and avoiding pitfalls."

As shown in Table 19 , the Growth Accelerator initiative received its first recommended appropriation from Congress in FY2014 ($2.5 million), $4.0 million in FY2015, $1.0 million in FY2016, FY2017, and FY2018, and $2 million in FY2019. It provides $50,000 matching grants each year to universities and private sector accelerators "to support the development of accelerators and their support of startups in parts of the country where there are fewer conventional sources of access to capital (i.e., venture capital and other investors)."

The Trump Administration recommended in its FY2018 and FY2019 budget requests that the Growth Accelerator Initiative receive no appropriations.

Appendix. SBA Appropriations, FY1954-FY1999