The Role of the House Minority Leader: An Overview

Summary: The House minority leader, the head of the "loyal opposition," is elected every two years by secret ballot of his or her party caucus or conference. The minority leader occupies a number of important institutional and party roles and responsibilities, and his or her fundamental goal is to recapture majority control of the House.

Summary: From a party perspective, the minority leader has a wide range of assignments, all geared toward retaking majority control of the House. Five principal party activities direct the work of the minority leader. First, he or she provides campaign assistance to party incumbents and challengers. Second, the minority leader devises strategies, in consultation with like-minded colleagues, to advance party objectives. Third, the minority leader works to promote and publicize the party's agenda. Fourth, the minority leader, if his or her party controls the White House, confers regularly with the President and his aides about issues before Congress, the Administration's agenda, and political events generally. Fifth, the minority leader strives to promote party harmony so as to maximize the chances for legislative and political success.

Summary: From an institutional perspective, the rules of the House assign a number of specific responsibilities to the minority leader. For example, Rule XIII, clause 6, grants the minority leader (or a designee) the right to offer a motion to recommit with instructions; and Rule II, clause 6, states that the Inspector General shall be appointed by joint recommendation of the Speaker, majority leader, and minority leader. The minority leader also has other institutional duties, such as appointing individuals to certain federal or congressional entities.

The minority leader of the modern House is the head of the "loyal opposition." As the minority party's nominee for Speaker at the start of a new Congress, the minority leader traditionally hands the gavel to the Speaker-elect, who is usually elected on a straight party-line vote. The speakership election illustrates the main problem that confronts the minority leader: the subordinate status of the minority party in an institution noted for majority rule. As David Bonior, D-MI, explained: "This body, unlike the other, operates under the principle that a determined majority should be allowed to work its will while protecting the rights of the minority to be heard." Minority party lawmakers are certain to be heard, but whether they will be heeded is sometimes another matter. Thus, the uppermost goal of any minority leader is to recapture majority control of the House.

The minority leader is elected every two years by secret ballot of his or her party caucus or conference. These party leaders are typically experienced lawmakers when they win election to this position. The current minority leader, Kevin McCarthy, R-CA, served 12 years in the House, including as majority leader, prior to assuming his current role (a position he also held during his time in the California state assembly). Speaker Nancy Pelosi, D-CA, served in the House for 16 years when she first became minority leader in the 108 th Congress (2003-2004). Following her first tenure as Speaker from 2007 to 2010, Pelosi was again elected minority leader in the 112 th Congress (2011-2012), at which point she was a 24-year veteran of the House. When her predecessor, John Boehner, R-OH, was elected minority leader in the 110 th Congress (2007-2008), he had served in the House for 18 years including as majority leader, committee chair (Education and the Workforce), and, prior to that, chair of the Republican Conference. Richard Gephardt, D-MO, began his tenure as minority leader in the 104 th Congress (1995-1996) as an 18-year House veteran and a former majority leader and chair of the Democratic Caucus. Gephardt's predecessor, Robert Michel, R-IL, became minority leader in 1981 after 24 years in the House. Much like his successors, John Rhodes, R-AZ, had served in the House for 20 years when he was elected minority leader in 1973.

While the position itself is usually occupied by Members with significant House experience, the roles and responsibilities of the minority leader are not well-defined. To a large extent, the duties of the minority leader are based on tradition and custom. Representative Bertrand Snell, R-NY, minority leader from 1931 to 1938, described the position in the following way:

He is spokesman for his party and enunciates its policies. He is required to be alert and vigilant in defense of the minority's rights. It is his function and duty to criticize constructively the policies and programs of the majority, and to this end employ parliamentary tactics and give close attention to all proposed legislation.

Since Snell's description, other responsibilities have been added to the job. Broadly speaking, the role of the minority leader in the contemporary Congress is twofold: to serve as the leader and spokesperson for the minority party, and to participate in certain institutional prerogatives afforded to Members in the minority. How the minority leader handles these responsibilities is likely to depend on a variety of elements, including personality and contextual factors; the size and cohesion of the minority party; whether or not the party controls the White House; the general political climate both inside and outside the House; and expectations of the party's performance in upcoming elections. The next section of the report discusses the historical origin of this position, and the sections that follow take account of the various party and institutional responsibilities of the minority leader.

To a large extent, the position of minority leader is a late-19 th -century innovation. Prior to this time congressional parties were often relatively disorganized, so it was not always evident who functioned as the opposition floor leader. Decades went by before anything like our modern two-party congressional system emerged on Capitol Hill with official titles for those who were selected as party leaders. However, from the beginning days of Congress, various House Members intermittently assumed the role of "opposition leader." Some scholars suggest that Representative James Madison of Virginia informally functioned as the first "minority leader" because in the First Congress he led the opposition to Treasury Secretary Alexander Hamilton's fiscal policies.

During this early period, it was common for neither major party grouping (Federalists and Republicans) to have an official leader. In 1813, for instance, a scholar recounts that the Federalist minority of 36 Members needed a committee of 13 "to represent a party comprising a distinct minority" and "to coordinate the actions of men who were already partisans in the same cause." In 1828, a foreign observer of the House offered this perspective on the absence of formal party leadership on Capitol Hill:

I found there were absolutely no persons holding the stations of what are called, in England, Leaders, on either side of the House.... It is true, that certain members do take charge of administration questions, and certain others of opposition questions; but all this so obviously without concert among themselves, actual or tacit, that nothing can be conceived less systematic or more completely desultory, disjointed.

Internal party disunity compounded the difficulty of identifying lawmakers who might have informally functioned as a minority leader. For instance, "seven of the fourteen speakership elections from 1834 through 1859 had at least twenty different candidates in the field. Thirty-six competed in 1839, ninety-seven in 1849, ninety-one in 1859, and 138 in 1855." With so many candidates competing for the speakership, it is not at all clear that one of the defeated lawmakers then assumed the mantle of "minority leader." The Democratic minority from 1861 to 1875 was so completely disorganized that they did not "nominate a candidate for Speaker in two of these seven Congresses and nominated no man more than once in the other five. The defeated candidates were not automatically looked to for leadership."

In the judgment of one congressional scholar, since 1883 "the candidate for Speaker nominated by the minority party has clearly been the Minority Leader." However, this assertion is subject to dispute. On December 3, 1883, the House elected Democrat John G. Carlisle of Kentucky as Speaker. Republicans nominated J. Warren Keifer of Ohio, who was Speaker the previous Congress. But Keifer was viewed by his colleagues as a discredited leader in part because as Speaker he arbitrarily handed out "choice jobs to close relatives ... all at handsome salaries." Keifer received "the empty honor of the minority nomination. But with it came a sting—for while this naturally involves the floor leadership, he was deserted by his [party] associates and his career as a national figure terminated ingloriously." Representative Thomas Reed, R-ME, who later became Speaker, assumed the de facto role of minority floor leader in Keifer's stead. "[A]lthough Keifer was the minority's candidate for Speaker, Reed became its acknowledged leader, and ever after, so long as he served in the House, remained the most conspicuous member of his party."

Although congressional historians disagree as to the exact time period when the minority leadership emerged officially as a party position, it seems safe to conclude that the position was established during the latter part of the 19 th century. This era was "marked by strong partisan attachments, resilient patronage-based party organizations, and ... high levels of party voting in Congress." These conditions were conducive to the establishment of a more highly differentiated House leadership structure in which Members assumed more specialized roles within the institution. (See the Appendix for a list of House minority leaders selected since 1899.)

One other historical point merits brief mention. Until the 61 st Congress (1909-1910), "it was the custom to have the minority leader also serve as the ranking minority member on the two most powerful committees, Rules and Ways and Means." Today, the minority leader no longer serves on these committees but does chair the Republican Steering Committee, a party leadership committee responsible for making recommendations to the Conference regarding the committee assignments of House Republicans.

The minority leader has a number of formal and informal party responsibilities. Formally, the rules of each party specify certain roles and responsibilities for their leader. For example, under Republican Conference rules for the 116 th Congress (2019-2020), the minority leader nominates party members to the Committees on Rules and House Administration, subject to Conference approval. Republican Conference rules also authorize the minority leader to appoint a "Leadership Member" to the Committee on the Budget who "will serve as the second highest-ranking Republican on the committee," and to "recommend to the House all Republican Members of such joint, select, and ad hoc committees as shall be created by the House, in accordance with law."

Beyond their formal responsibilities, minority leaders are expected to handle a wide range of informal party assignments. Lewis Deschler, a former House Parliamentarian (1928-1974), summarized the diverse duties of a party's floor leader:

A party's floor leader, in conjunction with other party leaders, plays an influential role in the formulation of party policy and programs. He is instrumental in guiding legislation favored by his party through the House, or in resisting those programs of the other party that are considered undesirable by his own party. He is instrumental in devising and implementing his party's strategy on the floor with respect to promoting or opposing legislation. He is kept constantly informed as to the status of legislative business and as to the sentiment of his party respecting particular legislation under consideration. Such information is derived in part from the floor leader's contacts with his party's members serving on House committees, and with the members of the party's whip organization.

These and several other party roles merit further discussion because they influence significantly the minority leader's overarching objective: to retake majority control of the House. "I want to get [my] members elected and win more seats," said former Minority Leader Richard Gephardt, D-MO. "That's what [my party colleagues] want to do, and that's what they want me to do." Five activities illustrate how minority leaders seek to accomplish this primary goal.

Minority leaders are typically energetic and aggressive campaigners for party incumbents and challengers. For example, they assist in recruiting qualified and competitive candidates; they establish "leadership PACs" to raise and distribute funds to House candidates of their party; they encourage party colleagues not to retire or run for other offices so as to limit the number of open seats the party would need to defend; they coordinate their campaign activities with congressional and national party campaign committees; they encourage outside groups to back their candidates; they travel around the country to speak on behalf of party candidates; and they encourage incumbent colleagues to make significant financial contributions to the party's campaign committee. In the weeks leading up to the 2018 congressional elections, for instance, Minority Leader Pelosi was actively campaigning for Democratic incumbents and challengers:

With 21 days until the midterm elections, the California Democrat and House minority leader is crisscrossing the country fundraising and rallying the Democratic troops—and plotting her return to the speakership.... In the third quarter [of 2018], Pelosi will report raising $34.2 million for Democrats, including $30.5 million for the DCCC [Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee]. She is by far the biggest source of cash for House Democrats and House Democratic candidates.

The minority leader, in consultation with other party colleagues, has a range of strategic options that can be employed to advance minority party objectives. The options selected depend on a wide range of circumstances, such as the visibility or significance of the issue and the relative degree of cohesion within the majority and minority parties. For instance, a majority party riven by internal dissension—as occurred during the early 1900s when "progressive" and "regular" Republicans were at loggerheads, or beginning in the late 1930s when a "conservative coalition" of Southern Democrats and like-minded Republicans emerged—may provide the minority leader with greater opportunities to achieve party priorities than if the majority party exhibited high degrees of party cohesion (and could simply outvote the minority). Among the variable strategies available to the minority party, which can vary from bill to bill and be used in combination or at different stages of the lawmaking process, are the following:

Cooperation . The minority party supports and cooperates with the majority party in building winning coalitions on the floor. Inconsequential Opposition . The minority party offers opposition, but it is of marginal significance, typically because the minority is so small. Withdrawal . The minority party chooses not to take a position on an issue, perhaps because of intraparty divisions or to spotlight divisions within the majority party. Innovation . The minority party develops alternatives and agendas of its own and attempts to construct winning coalitions on their behalf. Partisan Opposition . The minority party offers strong opposition to majority party initiatives, but does not counter with policy alternatives of their own. Participation . The minority party is in the position of having to consider the views and proposals of a same-party President and to assess their majority-building role with respect to the President's priorities.

A look at one minority leadership strategy—partisan opposition—may suggest why it might be employed in specific circumstances. The purposes of obstruction are several, such as frustrating the majority party's ability to govern or attracting media attention to the alleged ineffectiveness of the majority party. "We know how to delay," remarked Minority Leader Gephardt. Dilatory motions to adjourn, appeals of the presiding officer's ruling, or numerous requests for roll call votes, including on noncontroversial items like approving the House Jou rnal , are standard time-consuming parliamentary tactics. By stalling action on the majority party's agenda, the minority leader may be able to launch a campaign against a "do-nothing Congress" and convince enough voters to elevate the party to the House majority. To be sure, the minority leader recognizes that outright opposition carries risks. As a congressional scholar explains, "A program of consistent opposition to majority party proposals and a refusal to engage in compromise, while electorally valuable, means forsaking policy gains that may otherwise have been achieved."

Promote and Publicize the Party's Agenda

Another important aim of the minority leader is to develop an electorally attractive agenda of ideas and proposals that unites party members and appeals to core electoral supporters as well as independents and swing voters. Despite the minority leader's limited ability to set the House's agenda, there are still opportunities to raise minority priorities. For example, the minority leader may file discharge petitions in an effort to bring minority priorities to the floor. If the required 218 signatures on a discharge petition can be obtained—a number that demands at least some support from the majority—minority initiatives can be brought to the floor even despite opposition from the majority leadership or the committee(s) of jurisdiction (or both). As a GOP minority leader explained, the challenge here is to "keep our people together, and to look for votes on the other side."

Minority leaders may engage in a range of activities to publicize their party's priorities and to criticize those of the opposition. For instance, to keep their party colleagues "on message," they ensure that their party colleagues are sent packets of suggested press releases or "talking points" for constituent meetings in their districts; they help to organize "town hall meetings" in Members' districts around the country to publicize the party's agenda or a specific priority, such as health care or tax reform; they sponsor party "retreats" to discuss issues and assess the party's public image; they create "theme teams" to craft party messages that might be conveyed during the one-minute, morning hour, or special order period in the House; they conduct surveys of party colleagues to discern their policy preferences; they establish websites and Twitter feeds to highlight party priorities; they organize task forces or issue teams to formulate party programs and to develop strategies for communicating these programs to the public; and they appear on various media programs or write newspaper articles to win public support for the party's agenda.

House minority leaders also hold joint news conferences with party colleagues and consult with their counterparts in the Senate. The overall objectives are to develop a coordinated communications strategy, to share ideas and information, and to present a united front on issues. Minority leaders also make floor speeches and may close debate for their side on major issues before the House. They must also be prepared "to debate on the floor, ad lib , no notes, on a moment's notice," remarked Minority Leader Michel. In brief, minority leaders are key strategists in developing and promoting the party's agenda and in outlining ways to respond to the opposition's arguments and proposals. A "Dear Colleague" letter delivered to House Democratic offices ahead of the August 2018 recess illustrates the point. In the letter, Minority Leader Pelosi outlined the party's agenda and provided this guidance to her Democratic colleagues:

A key part of our For The People agenda is to clean up corruption to make Washington work for the American people.... To honor the pledge of our For The People agenda, a Democratic majority will swiftly act to pass tougher ethics and campaign finance laws and crack down on the conduct that has poisoned the GOP Congress and the Trump Administration.... In district events and on social media, we must drive home the clear contrast between the corruption of the GOP Congress and the better deal that Democrats are offering the American people. We will own August with strength, confidence and clarity, as we make our case to the American people.

If his or her party controls the White House, the minority leader confers regularly with the President and his aides about issues before Congress, the Administration's agenda, and political events generally. Strategically, the role of the minority leader will vary depending on whether the President is of the same party or the other party. In general, minority leaders will work to advance the goals and aspirations of their party's President in Congress. When Robert Michel, R-IL, was minority leader (1981-1994), he typically functioned as the "point man" for Republican Presidents. President Ronald Reagan's 1981 policy successes in the Democratic-controlled House were due in no small measure to Minority Leader Michel's effectiveness in wooing so-called "Reagan Democrats" to support, for instance, the Administration's landmark budget reconciliation bill. There are occasions, of course, when minority leaders will fault the legislative initiatives of their President. On an Administration proposal that could adversely affect his district, Michel stated that he might "abdicate my leadership role [on this issue] since I can't harmonize my own views with the administration's." Minority Leader Gephardt publicly opposed a number of President Clinton's legislative initiatives, from "fast track" trade authority to various budget issues, and Minority Leader Pelosi came out against a multilateral trade agreement with Asian-Pacific countries negotiated by the Obama White House.

When the President and House majority are of the same party, then the House minority leader assumes a larger role in formulating alternatives to executive branch initiatives and in acting as a national spokesperson for his or her party. "As Minority Leader during [President Lyndon Johnson's] Democratic administration, my responsibility has been to propose Republican alternatives," said Minority Leader Gerald Ford, R-MI. Greatly outnumbered in the House, Minority Leader Ford devised a political strategy that allowed Republicans to offer their alternatives in a manner that provided them political protection. As Ford explained,

We used a technique of laying our program out in general debate. When we got to the amendment phase, we would offer our program as a substitute for the Johnson proposal. If we lost in the Committee of the Whole, then we would usually offer it as a motion to recommit and get a vote on that. And if we lost on the motion to recommit, our Republican members had a choice: They could vote against the Johnson program and say we did our best to come up with a better alternative. Or they could vote for it and make the same argument. Usually we lost; but when you're only 140 out of 435, you don't expect to win many.

Ford also teamed with Senate Minority Leader Everett McKinley Dirksen, R-IL, to act as national spokesmen for their party. They held a press conference every Thursday following the weekly joint leadership meeting, a tradition that began with Ford's predecessor as minority leader, Charles Halleck, R-IN. When Minority Leaders Dirksen and Halleck appeared together they were dubbed the "Ev and Charlie Show" by the press, and the "Republican National Committee budgeted $30,000 annually to produce the weekly news conference."

Minority status, by itself, is often an important inducement for minority party members to stay together, to accommodate different interests, and to submerge intraparty factional disagreements. To hold a diverse membership together often requires extensive consultations and discussions with rank-and-file Members and with different factional groupings. As Minority Leader Gephardt said,

We have weekly caucus meetings. We have daily leadership meetings. We have weekly ranking Member meetings. We have party effectiveness meetings. There's a lot more communication. I believe leadership is bottom up, not top down. I think you have to build policy and strategy and vision from the bottom up, and involve people in figuring out what that is.

Gephardt added that "inclusion and empowerment of the people on the line have to be done to get the best performance" from the minority party. Other techniques for fostering party harmony include the appointment of task forces composed of party colleagues with conflicting views to reach consensus on issues; daily meetings in the l eader's office (or at breakfast, lunch, or dinner) to lay out floor strategy or political objectives for the minority party; periodic retreats to allow party members to discuss issues and interact with one another outside the confines of Capitol Hill; and the creation of new leadership positions as a way to reach out and involve a greater diversity of party members in the leadership structure.

Beyond the party responsibilities of the minority leader are a number of institutional obligations associated with their position as a top House official. Many of these assignments or roles are spelled out in the standing rules of the House, while others have devolved upon the position in other ways. To be sure, the minority leader is provided with extra staff resources—beyond those accorded him or her as a Representative—to assist in carrying out diverse leadership functions. There are limits on the institutional role of the minority leader, because the majority party exercises disproportionate influence over the legislative agenda, partisan ratios on committees, staff resources, administrative operations, and the day-to-day schedule and management of floor activities.

Under the rules of the House, the minority leader has certain roles and responsibilities. They include, among others, the following:

Under Rule XIII, clause 6(c), the Rules Committee may not issue a "rule" that prevents the minority leader or a designee from offering a motion to recommit with instructions during initial House consideration of a bill or joint resolution. This motion allows the minority leader (or a designee) to offer a policy alternative to what the majority is proposing and obtain a floor vote on the minority's preferred solution.

Under Rule IX, clause 2, a resolution "offered as a question of privilege by the Majority Leader or the Minority Leader ... shall have precedence of all other questions except motions to adjourn." This rule further references the minority leader with respect to the division of time for debate of these resolutions. If offered by the majority or minority leader, a valid question of privilege—one that involves "the rights of the House collectively, its safety, dignity and the integrity of its proceedings"—receives immediate consideration by the House.

Rule II, clause 6, states that the "Inspector General shall be appointed for a Congress by the Speaker, the Majority Leader, and the Minority Leader, acting jointly." This rule further states that the minority leader and other specified House leaders shall be notified of any financial irregularity involving the House and receive audit reports of the inspector general.

Under Rule X, clause 2, not later "than March 31 in the first session of a Congress, after consultation with the Speaker, the Majority Leader, and the Minority Leader, the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform shall report to the House the authorization and oversight plans" of the standing committees along with any recommendations it or the House leaders have proposed to ensure the effective coordination of committees' oversight plans.

Committee on Ethics: Investigative Subcommittees

Rule X, clause 5, stipulates, "At the beginning of a Congress, the Speaker or a designee and the Minority Leader or a designee each shall name 10 Members, Delegates, or the Resident Commissioner from the respective party of such individual who are not members of the Committee on Ethics to be available to serve on investigative subcommittees of that committee during that Congress."

Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence

Another institutional prerogative of the minority leader is attendance at meetings of the Intelligence Committee. Rule X, clause 11, provides, "The Speaker and the Minority Leader shall be ex officio members of the select committee but shall have no vote in the select committee and may not be counted for purposes of determining a quorum thereof." In addition, each leader "may designate a respective leadership staff member to assist in the capacity of the Speaker or Minority Leader as ex officio member."

In addition, the minority leader has a number of other institutional functions. For instance, the minority leader is sometimes statutorily authorized to appoint individuals to certain federal entities. The minority leader also selects three Members to serve as Private Calendar objectors—the majority leader names the other three—and serves on various commissions and groups, including the House Office Building Commission, the United States Capitol Preservation Commission, and the Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group. After consultation with the Speaker the minority leader may convene an early organizational party caucus or conference. Informally, the minority leader maintains ties with majority party leaders to learn about the schedule and other House matters, consults with the majority with respect to reconvening the House per the usual formulation of conditional concurrent adjournment resolutions, and forges agreements or understandings with them insofar as feasible. By House tradition, time is not charged to their side when party leaders, including the minority leader, make extended remarks on the floor.

Given the concentration of agenda control and other institutional resources in the majority leadership, the minority leader faces real challenges in promoting and publicizing the party's priorities, serving the interests of his rank-and-file Members, managing intraparty conflict, and forging party unity. The ultimate goal of the minority leader is to lead the party into majority status. Yet there is no set formula on how this is to be done. "If the history of elections is any guide," wrote a congressional scholar, "it seems apparent that the congressional record of the minority party is only one of many factors that may result in majority status. Most of the other factors cannot be controlled by the minority party and its leaders ."

There is one central dilemma that confronts the minority leader: inferior numbers. This limitation can be overcome on occasion with the right strategic approach, but on many issues this might not be possible. One study of the House minority party summarizes the strategic challenge succinctly:

The minority party in the House faces a strategic problem: how do you respond when given only a small slice of the legislative pie? Do you accept the slice you've been given, bargain for more, or use every means at your disposal to win the right to cut the pie yourself? It is this problem, and how the minority party chooses to solve it, that underlies the logic of minority party politics in the House of Representatives.

Appendix. House Minority Leaders, 1899-2019


Israel: Background and U.S. Relations in Brief

Summary: Strong relations between the United States and Israel have led to bilateral cooperation in many areas. Matters of particular significance to U.S.-Israel relations include

Summary: Israel's ability to address the threats it faces in its region. Shared U.S.-Israel concerns about Iran and its allies on the nuclear issue and in Syria and Lebanon. Israeli-Palestinian issues. Israeli domestic political issues, including elections scheduled for 2019.

Summary: Israel relies on a number of strengths to manage potential threats to its security and existence. It maintains conventional military superiority relative to neighboring states and the Palestinians. It also takes measures to deter attack and defend its population and borders from evolving asymmetric threats such as rockets and missiles, cross-border tunneling, drones, and cyberattacks. Additionally, Israel has an undeclared but presumed nuclear weapons capability.

Summary: Against a backdrop of strong bilateral cooperation, Israel's leaders and supporters routinely make the case that Israel's security and the broader stability of the region remain critically important for U.S. interests. A 10-year bilateral military aid memorandum of understanding (MOU)—signed in 2016—commits the United States to provide Israel $3.3 billion in Foreign Military Financing annually from FY2019 to FY2028, along with additional amounts from Defense Department accounts for missile defense. All of these amounts remain subject to congressional appropriations.

Summary: Israeli officials seek to counter Iranian regional influence and prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu released new Israeli intelligence on Iran's nuclear program in April 2018, days before President Trump announced the U.S. withdrawal from the 2015 international agreement that constrains Iran's nuclear activities. It is unclear whether Israel might take future military action in Iran if Iranian nuclear activities resume. Since 2018, Israel has conducted a number of military operations in Syria against Iran and its allies, including Lebanese Hezbollah. Israel and Iran also appear to be competing for military advantage over each other at the Israel-Lebanon border. Amid uncertainty in the area, in March 2019 President Trump recognized Israel's claim to sovereignty over the Golan Heights, changing long-standing U.S. policy that held—in line with U.N. Security Council Resolution 497 from 1981—the Golan was occupied Syrian territory whose final status was subject to Israel-Syria negotiation.

Summary: The prospects for an Israeli-Palestinian peace process are complicated by many factors. Palestinian leaders cut off high-level political contacts with the Trump Administration after it recognized Jerusalem as Israel's capital in December 2017. U.S.-Palestinian tensions have since worsened amid U.S. cutoffs of funding to the Palestinians and diplomatic moves—including the May 2018 opening of the U.S. embassy to Israel in Jerusalem. Palestinian leaders interpreted these actions as prejudicing their claims to a capital in Jerusalem and to a just resolution of Palestinian refugee claims. Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu has welcomed these U.S. actions. The Trump Administration has suggested that it will release a proposed peace plan after Israeli elections, which are scheduled for April 9, 2019. Speculation continues about how warming ties between Israel and Arab Gulf states may affect Israeli-Palestinian diplomacy, though Saudi Arabia said that the U.S. policy change on the Golan Heights would negatively affect the peace process. Bouts of tension and violence between Israel and Hamas in Gaza have continued—reportedly accompanied by indirect talks between the two parties that are being brokered by Egypt and aim for a long-term cease-fire.

Summary: Domestically, Israel is preparing for the April 9 elections, which are closely contested. Former top general Benny Gantz is combining with former Finance Minister Yair Lapid to challenge Netanyahu, whom the attorney general has recommended be indicted for corruption in three separate cases. The elections and subsequent government formation process will have significant implications for Israel's future leadership and policies.

Introduction: Major Issues for U.S.-Israel Relations

Strong relations between the United States and Israel have led to bilateral cooperation in many areas. Matters of particular significance include the following:

Israel's own capabilities for addressing threats, and its cooperation with the United States. Shared U.S.-Israel concerns about Iran, within the context of the U.S. exit from the 2015 international nuclear agreement, and growing tension involving Iran and Hezbollah at Israel's northern border with Syria and Lebanon. Israeli-Palestinian issues, including those involving Jerusalem, Hamas and the Gaza Strip, funding for Palestinians, and a possible Trump Administration peace plan. Israeli domestic political issues, including probable corruption-related indictments against Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu and closely contested elections that are scheduled for April 9, 2019.

For background information and analysis on these and other topics, including aid, arms sales, and missile defense cooperation, see CRS Report RL33476, Israel: Background and U.S. Relations , by Jim Zanotti; and CRS Report RL33222, U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel , by Jeremy M. Sharp.

Israel relies on a number of strengths to manage potential threats to its security and existence. These strengths include robust military and homeland security capabilities, as well as close cooperation with the United States.

Military Superiority and Homeland Security Measures

Israel maintains conventional military superiority relative to its neighbors and the Palestinians. Shifts in regional order and evolving asymmetric threats during this decade have led Israel to update its efforts to project military strength, deter attack, and defend its population and borders. Israel appears to have reduced some unconventional threats via missile defense systems, reported cyber defense and warfare capabilities, and other heightened security measures.

Israel has a robust homeland security system featuring sophisticated early warning practices and thorough border and airport security controls; most of the country's buildings have reinforced rooms or shelters engineered to withstand explosions. Israel also has proposed and partially constructed a national border fence network of steel barricades (accompanied at various points by watch towers, patrol roads, intelligence centers, and military brigades) designed to minimize militant infiltration, illegal immigration, and smuggling from Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, and the Gaza Strip. Additionally, Israeli authorities have built a separation barrier in and around parts of the West Bank.

Israel is not a party to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and maintains a policy of "nuclear opacity" or amimut . A 2017 report estimated that Israel possesses a nuclear arsenal of around 80-85 warheads. The United States has countenanced Israel's nuclear ambiguity since 1969, when Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir and U.S. President Richard Nixon reportedly reached an accord whereby both sides agreed never to acknowledge Israel's nuclear arsenal in public. Israel might have nuclear weapons deployable via aircraft, submarine, and ground-based missiles. No other Middle Eastern country is generally thought to possess nuclear weapons.

Israeli officials closely consult with U.S. counterparts in an effort to influence U.S. decisionmaking on key regional issues, and U.S. law requires the executive branch to take certain actions to preserve Israel's "qualitative military edge," or QME. Additionally, a 10-year bilateral military aid memorandum of understanding (MOU)—signed in 2016—commits the United States to provide Israel $3.3 billion in Foreign Military Financing and to spend $500 million annually on joint missile defense programs from FY2019 to FY2028, subject to congressional appropriations.

Israel's leaders and supporters routinely make the case that Israel's security and the broader stability of the region remain critically important for U.S. interests. They also argue that Israel is a valuable U.S. ally. The United States and Israel do not have a mutual defense treaty or agreement that provides formal U.S. security guarantees.

Iran remains of primary concern to Israeli officials largely because of (1) Iran's antipathy toward Israel, (2) Iran's broad regional influence, and (3) the probability that some constraints on Iran's nuclear program could loosen in the future. In recent years, Israel and Arab Gulf states have discreetly cultivated closer relations with one another in efforts to counter Iran.

Iranian Nuclear Agreement and the U.S. Withdrawal

Prime Minister Netanyahu has sought to influence U.S. decisions on the international agreement on Iran's nuclear program (known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, or JCPOA). He argued against the JCPOA when it was negotiated in 2015—including in a speech to a joint session of Congress—and welcomed President Trump's May 2018 withdrawal of the United States from the JCPOA and accompanying reimposition of U.S. sanctions on Iran's core economic sectors. A few days before President Trump's May announcement, Netanyahu presented information that Israeli intelligence operatives apparently seized in early 2018 from an Iranian archive. He used the information to question Iran's credibility and highlight its potential to parlay existing know-how into nuclear-weapons breakthroughs after the JCPOA expires. In his September 2018 speech before the U.N. General Assembly, Netanyahu claimed that Iran maintains a secret "atomic warehouse for storing massive amounts of equipment and materiel." An unnamed U.S. intelligence official was quoted as saying in response, "so far as anyone knows, there is nothing in [the facility Netanyahu identified] that would allow Iran to break out of the JCPOA any faster than it otherwise could."

After Netanyahu publicly exposed the Iranian nuclear archive, some former Israeli officials speculated about what action Israel might consider taking against Iranian nuclear facilities if Iran abrogates the JCPOA and expands nuclear activities currently restricted under the agreement. However, Netanyahu had said in an interview that he was not seeking a military confrontation with Iran.

Israel and Iran have engaged in hostile action over Iran's presence in Syria. In the early years of the Syria conflict, Israel primarily employed air strikes to prevent Iranian weapons shipments destined for the Iran-backed group Hezbollah in Lebanon. Later, as the Syrian government regained control of large portions of the country with Iranian backing, Israeli leaders began pledging to prevent Iran from constructing and operating bases or advanced weapons manufacturing facilities in Syria. Since 2018, Israeli and Iranian forces have repeatedly targeted one another in and over Syrian- and Israeli-controlled areas. In January 2019, Prime Minister Netanyahu said that Israel had targeted Iranian and Hezbollah targets in Syria "hundreds of times." Limited Israeli strikes to enforce "redlines" against Iran-backed forces could expand into wider conflict, particularly if there is a miscalculation by one or both sides.

U.S. involvement in Syria could be one factor in Israeli calculations on this issue. The U.S. base at Al Tanf in southern Syria has reportedly "served as a bulwark against Iran's efforts to create a land route for weapons from Iran to Lebanon." Israeli officials favor continued U.S. involvement in Syria, while also preparing for the possibility that they may need to take greater direct responsibility for countering Iran there.

Russia's advanced air defense systems in Syria could make it more difficult for Israel to operate there. Since 2015, Russia has operated an S-400 system at Russia's Khmeimim air base in Lattakia, a city on Syria's Mediterranean coast. To date, however, Russia does not appear to have acted militarily to thwart Israeli air strikes against Iranian or Syrian targets, and Israel and Russia maintain communications aimed at deconflicting their operations.

In addition to the S-400 that it owns and operates, Russia delivered an S-300 air defense system for Syria's military to Khmeimim airbase in October 2018. The delivery followed Syria's downing of a Russian military surveillance plane in September 2018 under disputed circumstances, shortly after an Israeli operation in the vicinity. According to an Israeli satellite imagery analysis company, three launchers appeared to be operational as of February 2019. It is unclear to what extent Russia has transferred the S-300 to Syrian military control, and how this might affect future Israeli military action in Syria. An Israeli journalist wrote that "Israel has the knowledge, experience and equipment to evade the S-300, but the fact that additional batteries, manned by Russian personnel, are on the ground, will necessitate greater care [when carrying out future operations against Iran-aligned targets in Syria]." Since the September 2018 incident, Israeli air strikes appear to have decreased somewhat.

On March 25, 2019, President Trump signed a proclamation stating that the United States recognizes the Golan Heights (hereinafter, the Golan) to be part of the State of Israel. The proclamation stated that "any possible future peace agreement in the region must account for Israel's need to protect itself from Syria and other regional threats" —presumably including threats from Iran and the Iran-backed Lebanese group Hezbollah. Israel gained control of the Golan from Syria during the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, and effectively annexed it unilaterally by applying Israeli law to the region in 1981 (see Figure 2 ).

President Trump's proclamation changed long-standing U.S. policy on the Golan. Since 1967, successive U.S. Administrations supported the general international stance that the Golan is Syrian territory occupied by Israel, with its final status subject to negotiation. In reaction to the U.S. proclamation, others in the international community have insisted that the Golan's status has not changed. In Congress, Senate and House bills introduced in February 2019 ( S. 567 and H.R. 1372 ) support Israeli sovereignty claims to the Golan, and would treat the Golan as part of Israel in any existing or future law "relating to appropriations or foreign commerce."

For decades after 1967, various Israeli leaders, reportedly including Prime Minister Netanyahu as late as 2011, had entered into indirect talks with Syria aimed at returning some portion of the Golan as part of a lasting peace agreement. However, the effect of civil war on Syria and the surrounding region, including an increase in Iran's presence, may have influenced Netanyahu to shift focus from negotiating with Syria on a "land for peace" basis to obtaining international support for Israel's claims of sovereignty. As part of the periodic conflict in Syria between Israel and Iran , some Iranian missiles have targeted Israeli positions in the Golan.

The Syrian government has denounced the U.S. policy change as an illegal violation of Syrian sovereignty and territorial integrity, and insisted that Syria is determined to recover the Golan. Additionally, observers have argued that the policy change could unintentionally bolster Syrian President Bashar al Asad within Syria by rallying Syrian nationalistic sentiment in opposition to Israel's claims to the Golan and deflecting attention from Iran's activities inside Syria.

Since 1974, the U.N. Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) has patrolled an area of the Golan Heights between the regions controlled by Israel and Syria, with about 880 troops from five countries stationed there as of January 2019. During that time, Israel's forces in the Golan have not faced serious military resistance to their continued deployment, despite some security threats and diplomatic challenges. Periodic resolutions by the U.N. General Assembly have criticized Israel's occupation as hindering regional peace and Israel's settlement and de facto annexation of the Golan as illegal.

Hezbollah's forces and Israel's military have sporadically clashed near the Lebanese border for decades—with the antagonism at times contained in the border area, and at times escalating into broader conflict. Speculation persists about the potential for wider conflict and its regional implications. Israeli officials have sought to draw attention to Hezbollah's buildup of mostly Iran-supplied weapons—including reported upgrades to the range, precision, and power of its projectiles—and its alleged use of Lebanese civilian areas as strongholds.

Ongoing tension between Israel and Iran over Iran's presence in Syria raises questions about the potential for Hezbollah's forces in Lebanon to open another front against Israel. After the September 2018 incident leading to Russia's installation of an S-300 system in Syria (discussed above), Iran reportedly began directly transferring weapons to Hezbollah in Lebanon while reducing Syria's use as a transshipment hub. One Israeli media account warned that Hezbollah's threat to Israel is increasing because of initiatives to build precision-weapons factories in Lebanon and to set up a military infrastructure in southern Syria. In late 2018 and early 2019, Israel's military undertook an effort—dubbed "Operation Northern Shield"—to seal six Hezbollah attack tunnels to prevent them from crossing into Israel. Israeli officials claim that they do not want another war, while at the same time taking measures aimed at constraining and deterring Hezbollah, including through consultation with the U.N. Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL).

President Trump has expressed interest in brokering a final-status Israeli-Palestinian agreement, and his Administration has supposedly prepared a proposal to facilitate negotiations, but the Administration has repeatedly postponed releasing the proposal. Many factors may account for the delays, including recent U.S. actions regarding Jerusalem, tension in and around the Gaza Strip, reduced funding for the Palestinians, Israeli settlements in the West Bank, and political jockeying and domestic constraints among Israelis and Palestinians.

The U.S. decision—announced in December 2017—to recognize Jerusalem as Israel's capital and move the U.S. embassy there has fed U.S.-Palestinian tensions. Israeli leaders generally celebrated the change, but Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) Chairman and Palestinian Authority (PA) President Mahmoud Abbas strongly objected. Many other countries opposed President Trump's actions on Jerusalem, as reflected in action at the United Nations. Claiming U.S. bias favoring Israel, Palestinian leaders broke off high-level political contacts with the United States shortly after the December 2017 announcement and have made efforts to advance Palestinian national claims in international fora. However, the PA continues security coordination with Israel in the West Bank.

U.S.-Palestinian tensions appear to have influenced Administration decisions to cut off various types of U.S. funding to the Palestinians, and arguably have dimmed prospects for restarting Israeli-Palestinian talks. In a September 2018 address before the U.N. General Assembly, PLO Chairman/PA President Abbas denounced Administration actions that he characterized as taking disputed Israeli-Palestinian issues—such as Jerusalem's status and Palestinian refugee claims—off the negotiating table.

Funding for economic and humanitarian needs in the West Bank and Gaza could become even scarcer. In February 2019, Israel announced that it would withhold a portion of the tax revenue it collects for the PA because—pursuant to a law passed by the Knesset in 2018—Israel had determined that amount represented PLO/PA payments made on behalf of individuals allegedly involved in terrorist acts. In response, Abbas announced that the PA would completely reject monthly revenue transfers from Israel if it withheld any amount, even though the transfers comprise approximately 65% of the PA budget. For February, Israel withheld approximately $11 million from the $193 million due to the PA, with the PA rejecting the entire amount as a result. The PA is reportedly seeking temporary financial support from the private sector and local banks, and also asking the Arab League to follow through on its 2010 decision to provide $100 million per month as a "financial safety net" for the PA.

At the end of January 2019, U.S. bilateral aid to the Palestinians—including nonlethal security assistance that Israel generally supports—ended completely due to the Anti-Terrorism Clarification Act (ATCA, P.L. 115-253 ), which became law on October 3, 2018. Two months after the law's enactment, PA Prime Minister Rami Hamdallah informed Secretary of State Michael Pompeo that the PA would not accept aid that subjected it to federal court jurisdiction. Apparently, U.S. aid will not resume unless Congress amends or repeals the ATCA, or the Administration channels the aid differently.

Assistant to the President and Senior Advisor Jared Kushner has stated that the Administration will publicly release a peace plan sometime after Israeli national elections, which are set to occur on April 9, 2019. According to Kushner, the peace plan contains detailed proposals on the various issues that divide Israel and the PLO. Many observers express skepticism about the prospect that these proposals can serve as a basis for the serious resumption of bilateral talks, but Kushner has reportedly said that the Administration is focusing on formulating "realistic solutions," and that "privately, people are more flexible." U.S. officials hope to surmount potential obstacles to the peace plan in the Israeli and Palestinian domestic arenas by obtaining political and economic support for the U.S. initiative from key Arab states in the region, including Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Jordan, and Egypt. A number of Arab states share common interests in working behind the scenes with Israel to counter Iranian regional influence.

While some diplomatic developments have fed speculation about warming Arab-Israeli ties, reports suggest that key Arab Gulf states remain reluctant to embrace more formal relations with Israel without a resolution of the Palestinian issue. Saudi Arabia's press agency responded to the U.S. recognition of Israel's claims to sovereignty in the Golan Heights by saying that it "will have significant negative effects on the peace process in the Middle East and the security and stability of the region."

In a statement with implications both for domestic and international audiences, Prime Minister Netanyahu reportedly said that the March 2019 change in U.S. policy on the Golan proves that countries can retain territory captured in a defensive war. His statement prompted speculation over the possibility that Israeli leaders might consider annexing part of the West Bank and whether the situation in the Golan is sufficiently similar to invite comparison. Days before the April elections, Netanyahu asserted that if he were to lead the next government, he would apply Israeli law to West Bank settlements.

April 2019 Elections and Other Domestic Issues

The closely contested Israeli national elections—scheduled for April 9, 2019—and the subsequent government formation process will have significant implications for the country's leadership and future policies. Prime Minister Netanyahu faces a challenge from the centrist Blue and White party under the combined leadership of former top general Benny Gantz and former Finance Minister Yair Lapid. Some setbacks for Netanyahu during the campaign have included the attorney general's announcement of probable corruption-related indictments against Netanyahu, new media allegations of possible misconduct relating to Israel's procurement of German submarines, and questions about some individuals or groups possibly spreading rumors against Netanyahu's opponents via social media. Yet, some observers calculate that Netanyahu's Likud could possibly get fewer Knesset seats than Blue and White and still form the next coalition. For more information on the actors involved in the elections, see CRS Insight IN11068, Israel: April 2019 Elections and Probable Indictments Against Prime Minister Netanyahu , by Jim Zanotti and this report's Appendix .

In July 2018, the Knesset passed a Basic Law defining Israel as the national homeland of the Jewish people. Some observers have expressed concern that the law might further undermine the place of Arabs in Israeli society, while others view its effect as mainly symbolic. In March 2019, Netanyahu said that Israel is a Jewish, democratic state with equal rights for all its citizens, and "the nation-state not of all its citizens, but only of the Jewish people," reviving domestic debate about the 2018 law and perhaps seeking support during the election campaign from sympathetic voter groups.

Appendix. Major Israeli Political Parties and Their Leaders