The Disaster Relief Fund: Overview and Issues

Summary: The Disaster Relief Fund (DRF) is one of the most-tracked single accounts funded by Congress each year. Managed by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), it is the primary source of funding for the federal government's domestic general disaster relief programs. These programs, authorized under the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, as amended (42 U.S.C. 5121 et seq.), outline the federal role in supporting state, local, tribal, and territorial governments as they respond to and recover from a variety of incidents. They take effect in the event that nonfederal levels of government find their own capacity to deal with an incident is overwhelmed.

Summary: The appropriation which feeds the DRF predates current disaster relief programs and FEMA itself. It dates back to a half-million dollar deficiency appropriation to the President in 1948 that was drafted to allow him to use these resources to provide temporary emergency assistance to communities in the wake of unspecified potential natural disasters. Although the appropriation was provided with one particular Upper Midwest flooding incident in mind, the legislative language allowed the funding to be used more broadly, if the President wished to do so. This policy of providing general disaster relief was a shift from previous policy, which largely left emergency management, disaster relief, and disaster recovery in the hands of other levels of government and private relief organizations. Prior to the development of the general relief program, when the federal government got involved in disaster response and recovery, it was on an ad hoc, case-by-case basis. By comparison, the annual appropriation for the DRF in FY2018—70 years after the initial appropriation for general disaster relief—was $7.9 billion.

Summary: The evolving federal role in disaster relief is partially illuminated in the funding stream provided for it through the DRF. What is a fixture of federal policy today was not a given a century ago. Examining the history of the program and its funding through the DRF may help Congress consider future approaches to disaster relief.

Summary: This report introduces the DRF and provides a brief history of federal disaster relief programs. It goes on to discuss the appropriations that fund the DRF, and provides a funding history from FY1964 to the present day, discussing factors that contributed to those changing appropriations levels. It concludes with discussion of how the budget request for the DRF has been developed and structured, given the unpredictability of the annual budgetary impact of disasters, and raises some potential issues for congressional consideration.

Summary: This report is updated on an annual basis.

The current emergency management policy environment assumes this federal role in domestic disaster relief as the default position and the availability of resources through the DRF a necessary requirement. However, this was not always the case. The concept of general disaster relief from the federal government predates both FEMA and the Stafford Act, but federal involvement in relief after natural and man-made disasters was very rare before the Civil War, and was at times considered unconstitutional. Domestic disaster relief efforts became more common after the Civil War, but were not seen as a necessary obligation of the federal government. Standing federal domestic disaster relief programs and a pool of resources to fund them only emerged after the Second World War. Prior to the development of these programs, domestic disaster relief and recovery was a matter for private nongovernmental organizations and state and local governments.

Once established, the federal role in domestic disaster response and recovery grew, proving politically popular and resilient despite periodic concerns about management, execution, and budgetary impacts. As the DRF is the source of funding for most general disaster relief programs, it is an indicator of the scope of those programs and the volume of taxpayer-funded aid they provide. Understanding the trends in the growth of the federal government's role in general disaster relief and recovery, and the associated costs of that role, may be useful as Congress considers changes in both emergency management and budgetary policies.

This report introduces the DRF and outlines how its resources are made available through a series of simple questions, presents a brief history of the federal government's involvement in domestic disaster relief, describes how the request for general disaster relief funding has been formulated over time, and examines the congressional response to those requests. It also provides the funding history for the DRF, and discusses several issues before Congress connected to the fund and the general disaster relief programs it supports.

What is the Disaster Relief Fund and how is it used?

The DRF is the primary source of funding for the federal government's general disaster relief program—response and recovery efforts pursuant to a range of domestic emergencies and disasters in existing law—as opposed to specific relief and recovery initiatives that may be enacted for individual incidents.

What determines whether an incident qualifies as an emergency or disaster?

Under the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act ( P.L. 93-288 , as amended; hereinafter "the Stafford Act"), the President can declare that an emergency exists or a major disaster is occurring. These declarations make state, tribal, territorial, and local governments eligible for a variety of assistance programs, many of which are funded from the DRF. Usually declarations are made at the request of a state, tribal, or territorial government.

Does all federally funded disaster relief come from the DRF?

While the DRF funds Stafford Act disaster relief and recovery programs, several other federal departments and agencies have significant roles in disaster preparedness, relief, recovery, and mitigation. They include the Department of Housing and Urban Development, the Small Business Administration, U.S. Department of Agriculture, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, and the Department of Health and Human Services. While FEMA may fund some of their activities from the DRF through mission assignments, their larger programs are funded through separate appropriations.

What federal government activities are funded under the DRF?

The role of the federal government has evolved over the years, but emergency response and disaster relief has historically been a federalized "bottom-up" operation, starting from the local or tribal governments affected, backed up by the state or territorial government, and then turning to the federal government if their capacity is overwhelmed. The broadening of the federal role has been a factor in which activities are funded under the DRF.

Currently, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) coordinates federal disaster response and recovery efforts, and manages the DRF, which funds activities in five categories:

1. Activity pursuant to a major disaster declaration— This activity represents the vast majority of spending from the DRF. FEMA's primary "Direct Disaster Programs" are the Individual Assistance (IA), Public Assistance (PA), and the Hazard Mitigation Grant Program (HMGP) programs. Federal assistance provided by other federal agencies at FEMA's direction through "mission assignments" is also paid for from the DRF. 2. Pre declaration surge activities —These are activities undertaken prior to an emergency or major disaster declaration to prepare for response and recovery, such as deploying response teams or prepositioning equipment. 3. Activit y pursuant to an emergency declaration —This is federal assistance to supplement state and local efforts in providing emergency services in any part of the United States. 4. Fire Management Assistance Grants (FMAGs) for large wildfires —This is assistance for the mitigation, management, and control of any fires on public or private lands that could, if unchecked, worsen and result in a major disaster declaration. 5. Disaster Readiness and Support (DRS) activities —These are ongoing, non-incident specific activities that allow FEMA to provide timely disaster response, operate its programs responsively and effectively, and provide oversight of its emergency and disaster programs.

Under what statute is the Disaster Relief Fund authorized?

The DRF is not separately authorized as a distinct entity, but the activities it funds are authorized under the Stafford Act (42 U.S.C. 5121 et seq.).

Where are appropriations for the Disaster Relief Fund provided?

Since FY1980—FEMA's first annual appropriation—the DRF has been funded through its own appropriation within FEMA's budget, first under the heading "Disaster Relief," and then "Disaster Relief Fund" starting in FY2012. FEMA's annual appropriations were first provided through the VA, HUD, and Independent Agencies Appropriations Act, but have been included in the Department of Homeland Security Appropriations act since FY2004. Since the first "Disaster Relief" appropriation for FY1948, most of the DRF's appropriations have been provided through supplemental appropriations.

Are specific Disaster Relief Fund appropriations for specific disasters?

DRF appropriations have historically been provided for general disaster relief, rather than specific presidentially declared disasters or emergencies.

The most recent iterations of the accompanying language indicate the funds are provided for the "necessary expenses in carrying out the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act," thus covering all past and future disaster and emergency declarations. Previous versions of the appropriations language going back to 1950 also referenced the legislation authorizing general disaster relief rather than targeting specific disasters. On a number of occasions, specific disasters have been mentioned in the appropriation, but funding was not specifically directed to one disaster over others.

While many disaster supplemental appropriations bills are associated with a specific incident or incidents—such as P.L. 113-2 , "the Sandy Supplemental"—the language in that act does not limit the use of the disaster relief appropriation to that specific incident.

Since the enactment of P.L. 112-74 , Congress has received regular reporting on spending from the DRF. Monthly reports on such spending since March 2013 are available on FEMA's website. Currently, the reports include information on DRF balances, actual and projected obligations from the DRF for large-scale disasters broken down by disaster declaration, and obligations and expenditures aggregated by incident. These reports also include estimates of the DRF balance through the end of the current fiscal year.

Historical Context for Federal Disaster Relief Funding

Disaster relief has not always been a part of the mission of the federal government. For nearly 80 years, federal domestic disaster relief was minimal, extremely narrow in scope, and largely ignored the humanitarian side of the relief equation, leaving that to private organizations and local levels of government. Even as the country emerged from the Civil War with more of a national identity and a sense that the federal government could act to provide relief in some circumstances, disaster aid remained limited, responding only after the fact on a case-by-case basis. Only after World War II did the concept emerge of a federal role in responding to disasters broadly defined, led by the President and funded in advance, as opposed to case-by-case responses to needs in the wake of the most severe events led by ad hoc congressional action. Over the ensuing years, the general disaster relief program and its funding grew, adopting concepts of assistance that had been reserved for catastrophic events. In the 1970s, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) was established, institutionalizing the federal role in disaster response, recovery, mitigation, and preparedness—the role we recognize today. At the heart of that role is the set of relief programs that have evolved since the 1940s, known collectively as the Stafford Act, which are funded by the Disaster Relief Fund appropriation.

The Constitution provides little specific direction on the question of how the United States should confront disasters. While allusions to the intent of the Constitution speak to promoting domestic tranquility and promoting the general welfare, limitations on the federal role in state affairs combined with practical politics of the day to limit federal involvement in disaster relief and recovery in the early years of the country.

The federal government did provide disaster relief on some occasions. Some observers note at least 128 instances from 1803 to 1947 when natural disasters prompted the federal government to provide some type of ad hoc relief on a case-by-case basis for specific incidents after they occurred. Prior to the Civil War, these measures largely consisted of refunds of duties paid on goods destroyed in customs house fires, allowance for delayed payments of bonds, and land grants for resettlement.

Proponents of disaster relief argued that the "general welfare" clause of the Constitution warranted the federal role in disaster relief. Opponents did not find this justification convincing, as it was nonspecific, and argued that certain natural disasters (such as flooding of the Mississippi River) were foreseeable, and therefore state and local governments had an obligation to be prepared; that it was improper for the government to provide relief for specific places with money it collected for the common good; and that the federal government could not afford to provide universal relief.

As the U.S. economy became more robust, federal revenues grew, weakening the position of those in Congress who opposed a federal role in disaster assistance on the basis of the lack of such resources.

Congressional willingness to provide assistance was not always sufficient to ensure its provision, however. In 1887, President Grover Cleveland vetoed a bill that would have provided $10,000 to pay for seeds for farmers in Texas after a drought, arguing as follows:

I can find no warrant for such an appropriation in the Constitution; and I do not believe that the power and duty of the General Government ought to be extended to the relief of individual suffering which is in no manner properly related to the public service or benefit. A prevalent tendency to disregard the limited mission of this power and duty should, I think, be steadfastly resisted, to the end that the lesson should be constantly enforced that though the people support the Government, the Government should not support the people.

The friendliness and charity of our countrymen can always be relied upon to relieve their fellow-citizens in misfortune. This has been repeatedly and quite lately demonstrated. Federal aid in such cases encourages the expectation of paternal care on the part of the Government and weakens the sturdiness of our national character, while it prevents the indulgence among our people of that kindly sentiment and conduct which strengthens the bonds of a common brotherhood.

Much of the disaster relief provided in this period was nongovernmental in nature. In 1881, Clara Barton founded the American National Red Cross (ANRC), which provided disaster aid from funds it raised from private sources. One year before a catastrophic earthquake struck San Francisco in 1906, revised incorporating legislation for the ANRC tasked the organization with "mitigating the sufferings caused by pestilence, famine, fire, floods, and other great national calamities, and to devise and carry on measures for preventing the same." In the days after the earthquake, President Theodore Roosevelt issued an appeal for assistance from the public to be channeled through the ANRC:

In the face of so horrible and appalling a national calamity as that which has befallen San Francisco, the outpouring of the nation's aid should, as far as possible, be entrusted to the American Red Cross, the national organization best fitted to undertake such relief work.... In order that this work may be well systematized and in order that the contributions, which I am sure will flow in with lavish generosity, may be wisely administered, I appeal to the people of the United States, to all cities, chambers of commerce, boards of trade, relief committees and individuals to express their sympathy and render their aid by contributions to the American Red Cross.

While the federal government provided assistance in response and recovery in the San Francisco case on an ad hoc basis, the majority of the assistance provided was through private means. Congress appropriated $2.5 million in the days after the quake for the Secretary of War to provide "subsistence and quartermaster's supplies ... to such destitute persons as have been rendered homeless or are in needy circumstances as a result of the earthquake and commissary stores to such injured and destitute persons as may require assistance," but nonfederal cash contributions to the ANRC and the local relief organizations exceeded $9 million in the two years following the disaster.

The ANRC served as the major institutional source of relief for disaster victims in the United States, serving communities and individuals in cooperation with state and local governments with relatively little direct contributions from the federal government for many years. The Red Cross continued to play a leading role in nongovernmental disaster relief as the federal government's role in disaster aid evolved and expanded through the 20 th century and into the 21 st .

1947-1950: General Disaster Relief Funding from the Federal Government Begins

After the Second World War, the federal government started becoming more involved in disaster relief beyond specific incident-by-incident relief efforts. In 1947, P.L. 80-233 authorized the federal government to provide surplus property to state and local governments for disaster relief under the Disaster Surplus Property Program. Less than eight months later, the Administrator of the Federal Works Agency noted in a letter to President Harry S. Truman that the program would not provide adequate relief to communities over the longer term.

The next year, Congress made its first appropriation for general disaster relief. The Second Deficiency Appropriation Act, 1948, which was enacted on June 25, 1948, provided funding directly to the President as follows:

Disaster Relief: To enable the President, through such agency or agencies as he may designate, and in such manner as he shall determine, to supplement the efforts and available resources of State and local governments or other agencies, whenever he finds that any flood, fire, hurricane, earthquake, or other catastrophe in any part of the United States is of sufficient severity and magnitude to warrant emergency assistance by the Federal Government in alleviating hardship, or suffering caused thereby, and if the governor of any State in which such catastrophe shall occur shall certify that such assistance is required, $500,000, to remain available until June 30, 1949, and to be expended without regard to such provisions regulating the expenditure of Government funds or the employment of persons in the Government service as he shall specify: Provided, That no expenditures shall be made with respect to any such catastrophe in any State until the governor of such State shall have entered into an agreement with such agency of the Government as the President may designate giving assurance of expenditure of a reasonable amount of the funds of the government of such State, local governments therein, or other agencies, for the same or similar purposes with respect to such catastrophe: Provided further, That no part of this appropriation shall be expended for departmental personal services: Provided further, That no part of this appropriation shall be expended for permanent construction: Provided further, That within any affected area Federal agencies are authorized to participate in any such emergency assistance.

Although this legislation comes with broad latitude for the President in expending these funds, this appropriation contained several hallmarks that continue in today's disaster relief structure:

the President makes the determination that a disaster has occurred, and that federal aid is required; the state has a role in certifying the need and committing state resources to be eligible for federal support; aid is to "supplement the efforts and available resources of State and local governments or other agencies," rather than to fund the entire relief effort; and the President may direct federal agencies to participate in emergency assistance.

The conditions laid out in this appropriation were echoed in the next two appropriations, provided in 1949, which totaled $1 million.

1950-1966: The Disaster Relief Act of 1950—General Relief and Specific Relief

The Disaster Relief Act of 1950 formalized the structure outlined in the initial appropriations legislation, and indicated for the first time that

it is the intent of Congress to provide an orderly and continuing means of assistance by the Federal Government to States and local governments in carrying out their responsibilities to alleviate suffering and damage resulting from major disasters, to repair essential public facilities in major disasters, and to foster the development of such State and local organizations and plans to cope with major disasters as may be necessary.

Section 8 of the act limited the authorized disaster relief funding to $5 million in total. This restriction did not effectively constrain funding, however. The first supplemental appropriation for general disaster relief authorized under the Disaster Relief Act for 1950 provided $25 million, and a waiver of the Section 8 limitation. The first authorized annual appropriation for general disaster relief was for $800,000, enacted August 31, 1951, less than two months later. Annual appropriations were "to be available until expended," rather than expiring as previous general disaster relief appropriations had, and their use for administrative expenses was statutorily capped at 2% per year.

Under the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations, the federal government's role in disaster relief expanded further. Federal general disaster relief programs broadened in 1962, with the inclusion of several American territories, and grants for repair of state facilities.

However, Congress still passed specific legislation authorizing relief programs pursuant to other major disasters. In 1964 and 1965, post-disaster legislation provided specific relief for victims of an earthquake in Alaska, flooding in western states, and victims of Hurricane Betsy in Florida, Louisiana, and Mississippi. In a history of disaster relief legislation, one observer described the situation thus:

In 1962, 1964, and 1965, Congress had sought to preserve P.L. 81-875 [the Disaster Relief Act of 1950] and yet provide disaster assistance in the case of the very big disasters by special legislation only for the states named. Although no one at the time appeared aware that the new types of assistance would become precedents for general legislation, it was in the nature of the system that ultimately they would be reenacted for general use.

1966-1974: The Disaster Relief Act of 1966—General Relief Broadens

The Disaster Relief Act of 1966 abolished the Disaster Relief Act of 1950, and revised the general disaster assistance program by providing more assistance to public colleges and universities, as well as authorizing assistance to repair local public facilities. According to some observers, the agencies charged with carrying out most of the disaster relief activity felt the 1966 legislation was unnecessary and the work could be carried out under existing authorities.

The Disaster Relief Act of 1969 was enacted in response to Hurricane Camille, although the expansion of the federal role in disaster assistance it represented had been included in legislation since 1965. It included broader public and individual assistance, including temporary housing, food assistance, unemployment assistance, and the federal government funding up to half the cost of repair and restoration of public facilities, and providing matching funds to help states develop preparedness plans. Not all of these costs would be borne by the funding provided to the President, and the programs were only authorized through calendar 1970, but they represented a significant broadening of federal government involvement.

The Disaster Relief Act of 1970 consolidated the previous disaster relief legislation into a single act, and made many of the Camille-driven programs permanent, including a permanent program to provide temporary housing assistance, and programs for debris removal and permanent repair and replacement of state and local public facilities.

1974-Present: The Era of Federally Coordinated Emergency Management

The Disaster Relief Act of 1974 provided for a more robust preparedness program, and introduced the concept of "emergency" declarations to accommodate assistance in cases where an incident did not rise to the "major disaster" threshold.

The Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Amendments of 1988 ( P.L. 100-707 , hereinafter DREAA) was enacted 14 years later; it renamed the Disaster Relief Act of 1974 as the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (the aforementioned Stafford Act). It made the following programmatic changes:

Authorized the President to declare an emergency under the Stafford Act in "any occasion or instance" in which federal aid is needed—allowing for assistance without a major disaster declaration; Defined a "major disaster" as "any natural catastrophe ... or, regardless of cause, any fire, flood, or explosion, in any part of the United States, which in the determination of the President causes damage of sufficient severity and magnitude to warrant major disaster assistance...." Established a 75% minimum level of assistance for the immediate response, debris removal, and repair of public facilities; and Provided for a 50/50 cost share for hazard mitigation grants.

Over the course of the 40 years after the original $500,000 appropriation for general disaster relief with associated programmatic language, the now-renamed Stafford Act and the DREAA are the pieces of legislation that structure the current relationship between the federal and state government in emergency management and disaster relief. These laws, which appear at 42 U.S.C. 5121 et seq., continue to be amended through such vehicles as the Sandy Recovery Improvement Act ( P.L. 113-2 , Division B) and the Disaster Recovery Reform Act of 2018 ( P.L. 115-254 , Division D). Other CRS analyses will address such amendments to the general disaster relief program in detail.

Appropriations for General Disaster Relief

Types of Appropriations for Disaster Relief

General disaster relief activities by the federal government under the Stafford Act are funded through the appropriations process. Three types of appropriations support these activities:

Supplemental Appropriations are requested by the Administration on an ad hoc basis, generally to address a need not sufficiently covered in the annual appropriations process. These move on a short timetable and generally do not go through the complete committee process. More than 85% of net appropriations for the DRF have been provided through supplemental appropriations.

Annual Appropriations: Requested by the Administration in February as a part of the annual budget process, these are expected to be passed by Congress and enacted into law prior to the start of the fiscal year in October. Annual appropriations measures fund the core activities of the government and are developed through the committee process.

Continuing Appropriations: Provided when annual appropriations work remains unresolved at the beginning of the new fiscal year, these appropriations are temporary budget authority provided at a rate for operations based on the prior fiscal year to allow the government to continue functioning. The measure that provides them is termed a "continuing resolution," or "CR." These continuing appropriations may expire (in the case of an interim CR), or extend to the end of the fiscal year (in the case of a "long-term" CR).

Supplemental Appropriations for Disaster Relief

The current Disaster Relief Fund concept can trace its birth back to an appropriations bill in the 1940s—the Second Deficiency Appropriations Act, 1948. Deficiency appropriations bills, which provided funding to meet unanticipated needs during the fiscal year, were a forerunner of modern supplemental appropriations bills. As the severity, frequency, and resultant costs to the federal government of the array of disasters that will strike the United States in a given year have always been unpredictable in an annual budgetary context, disaster relief funding frequently has been provided through deficiency, and later supplemental, appropriations.

When Congress and the Administration began to express concerns about the budget deficit in the 1980s, efforts were made to restrain supplemental spending by limiting it to cases of "dire emergency." With the implementation of budget control in the 1990s, a special designation for emergency spending was created. If both Congress and the Administration agreed certain spending was an emergency requirement, budget limits would be adjusted to accommodate that spending. Congress used the emergency designation on a disaster relief appropriation for the first time in an FY1992 supplemental appropriations act. Congress continues to use emergency designations in supplemental appropriations legislation to provide budgetary flexibility.

At one point, Congress was statutorily required to use the designation for disaster relief appropriations. Under the terms of the aforementioned FY1992 supplemental appropriations act, beginning in FY1993, Congress required "all amounts appropriated for disaster assistance payments [under the Stafford Act] that are in excess of either the historical annual average obligation of $320,000,000, or the amount submitted in the President's initial budget request, whichever is lower" to be designated as emergency requirements under a specific provision of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985. This practice of emergency designation above a particular threshold was followed until FY2000, when a clause appeared in the appropriation noting that discretionary appropriations were being provided notwithstanding the restrictions of this section of the U.S. Code.

With the passage of the Budget Control Act in 2011, which provided additional budgetary flexibility for the costs for major disasters, supplemental disaster relief appropriations declined in frequency, but remained a primary contributor to balances in the DRF. See the " DRF Funding History: FY1964-FY2018 " section below for details.

As was noted above, the first general disaster relief funding was provided in an appropriations act in 1948, and carried its own authorizing provisions. Stand-alone authorization for general disaster relief first came in 1950.

Once the initial separate authorization was put in place for general disaster relief, appropriations were provided for FY1952, FY1956-FY1958, and FY1962. With the broadening of the relief program to cover more types of damages and the authorization of aid on general terms that had only been made on a case-by-case basis before the mid-1960s, appropriations for general disaster relief became more common—and larger. Annual appropriations for general disaster relief have been provided each year since FY1964, with only two exceptions. Each time this occurred, the DRF was deemed to have an adequate unobligated balance to meet anticipated needs.

As will be discussed later in this report, the adoption of a special designation for the costs of major disasters under the Stafford Act as a part of the Budget Control Act of 2011 ( P.L. 112-25 ) made it easier to provide budget authority to the DRF in the annual appropriations process. In the seven appropriations cycles since the implementation of this designation in FY2012, more budget authority was provided for the DRF in annual appropriations measures than in the 63 prior cycles combined, accounting for inflation.

Since the FY2013 budget request, FEMA has bifurcated its annual appropriations request between the costs of major disasters—the "Disaster Relief Category"—and everything else funded by the DRF—"Base Disaster Relief," which includes funding for emergency designations, fire management assistance, pre-disaster declaration surge activities, and Disaster Readiness and Support Programs. The former category is eligible for the designation as "disaster relief," a designation that triggers an upward adjustment of statutory discretionary spending limits to accommodate it without triggering sequestration. The latter category is not, and scores as discretionary spending.

Even though the DRF is a "no-year" fund, and its appropriations are available until expended, it does get temporary replenishment from continuing resolutions (CRs) at times, until its annual appropriations are finalized.

In FY1982, for the first time, interim general disaster relief funding was provided in a CR through an "anomaly," a provision providing funds at an operating rate different from that base rate of operations provided in the resolution.

These "anomaly" provisions may also provide flexibility that can help avoid some of the complications that can arise under the constraints of operating under continuing appropriations. For example, CRs generally provide funding at a constant rate of operations, with certain restrictions. This can complicate disaster response and recovery, when calls for funding vary in scale and timing from year to year. When FEMA responds to major disasters of significant size while operating under a CR, either FEMA requests special flexibility from the Office of Management and Budget (OMB)—which apportions funding to agencies—or CRs direct flexibility to be provided to ensure adequate resources are available for disaster response and recovery. An example of this can be found in the initial FY2019 CR. Section 124 of Division C of P.L. 115-245 provides that the funds provided under the CR "may be apportioned up to the rate for operations necessary to carry out response and recovery activities."

The following figures show appropriations for the DRF from FY1964 through FY2018.

Each fiscal year shows a gross total of annual appropriations and discretionary appropriations (represented by a two-part bar) and a net total (represented by a black mark on each bar), which takes into account rescissions and transfers from the DRF. An inset graphic provides the scale to include funding levels for several outlier years, while showing the detail of appropriations for the more typical years. The first figure shows data in nominal dollars, and the second shows constant FY2018 dollars.

The figures show an increase in appropriations for the DRF starting in the 1990s, largely due to increases in supplemental appropriations. Annual appropriations rose significantly in the early 2000s and again starting in FY2013. Even with the surge in appropriations for the 2017 catastrophic series of disasters, which included Hurricane Harvey, Hurricane Maria, and the California wildfires, FY2005 remains the single highest year for appropriations for the DRF, when a series of hurricanes, including Katrina, Rita, and Wilma hit the southeastern United States.

A table showing the underlying data for each figure appears in the Appendix .

Factors in Changing Appropriations Levels

FEMA's budget justifications have noted for years, in one form or another, that "[t]he primary cost driver associated with Major Disasters is disaster activity." Although year-to-year disaster relief appropriations are largely driven by disaster activity and ongoing recovery needs, when analyzing historical data over an extended time frame, other factors such as programmatic changes in general disaster relief and certain changes in the budget process may also warrant consideration.

The two largest factors affecting year-to-year disaster relief appropriations are disaster activity, which varies in frequency and severity, and the ongoing recovery costs from previous disasters. Federal involvement in disaster response and recovery occurs when lower levels of government find their capabilities are overwhelmed and turn to the federal government for help. Reduced (or increased) numbers of calls for relief mean reduced (or increased) need for disaster relief appropriations.

The incidents that lead to expenditures from the DRF vary in scale. Equally powerful storms may strike a community a glancing blow or a direct hit. An earthquake may hit a rural area, or a major city with complex infrastructure. Stricken communities, states, territories, and tribes have varying levels of preparedness for particular types of disaster. Some observers have noted that as the U.S. population grows and develops property in disaster-prone areas, and as patterns of severe weather shift, the costs of disasters are likely to continue to rise. According to the National Centers for Environmental Information of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, from 1980 through October 2018, the United States has averaged six weather-related disaster events that each cost $1 billion or more each year. 2016 had 15 such events, 2017 had 16, and 2018, as of October 9, had 11. Spending to help large, complex communities rebuild disaster-damaged facilities and infrastructure and mitigate against future disasters is a significant multiyear cost largely paid for from the Disaster Relief Fund.

Using Figure 2 , one can contrast this period of high-frequency, high-impact events of the 2010s to the relatively calm period of the 1980s. Without the driver of large disasters, DRF appropriations remained modest. Over the period from FY1981 to FY1991, abnormally low levels of disaster activity led to no supplemental appropriations for 7 of those 11 fiscal years, and no annual appropriations in either FY1984 or FY1991—the only two fiscal years that has occurred since FY1964. By contrast, over the last six years, the DRF has required sustained high levels of appropriations, including three of its five highest total appropriations by fiscal year, even adjusting for inflation.

Over the long term, alterations to the scope of federal disaster relief programs affect the type and level of federal spending when disasters occur. The Disaster Relief Act of 1950 authorized funding to repair local public facilities at the President's discretion. As the brief history above relates, the federal program for general disaster relief has evolved into a much broader program, of which local public facilities is only one facet.

This evolution has occurred gradually. Some of this evolution was the result of incorporating assistance offered in response to specific disasters in the 1960s and 1970s into the general relief programs under the Stafford Act. Another facet of this evolution was the broadening of the federal role in helping respond to smaller-scale incidents, including proactive declarations prior to potential disasters to reduce their impact. In addition, disaster relief programs funded through the DRF now include disaster mitigation programs that are not limited to mitigating the disaster that triggered them, but are also intended to reduce the impact (and by extension, the cost) of disasters over the long term.

The impacts of programmatic expansions are reflected in Figure 2 , with the trend of increased general disaster relief appropriations on a small scale associated with expansions under the Disaster Relief Act of 1969 and the Disaster Relief Act of 1970, and on a larger scale with the expansion of programs under the Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Amendments of 1988. While the decrease in disaster activities in the 1980s reduced the annual demand for disaster relief appropriations, once the number of declared disasters rose again, and emergencies and mitigation also drew on DRF resources, demand for those resources grew rapidly.

This evolution continues, with reform legislation frequently following on the heels of exceptionally large disasters, or complexes of disasters. This was the case when the federal response to a series of hurricanes and wildfires in 2017 helped drive interest in the Disaster Recovery Reform Act of 2018.

Changes in congressional budget processes have at times been discussed as a means of limiting the budgetary impact of disaster relief spending. However, the budget controls that have been approved and implemented have more often been provided with provisions to ensure disaster relief budget authority remains available if needed.

Prior to 1985, Congress provided appropriations to fund the federal government without specific statutory limitations on overall spending. The 1985 Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act put limits on deficit spending in place. The Budget Enforcement Act of 1990 placed express limits on discretionary spending for the first time.

The 1990 act also provided an exception to those limits, allowing Congress, together with the President, to declare certain spending to be an emergency requirement, and therefore not subject to those limits. This was used to provide additional appropriations for disaster relief. Although the original set of discretionary limits expired, the emergency spending designation has continued as part of the appropriations process.

In 2011, the Budget Control Act ( P.L. 112-25 ) not only reestablished statutory spending limits, but also provided a special designation for the costs of major disasters, in addition to the emergency designation. The amount of funding that can be designated as disaster relief—defined as spending pursuant to a major disaster declaration—is limited by a formula based on past spending on disaster relief. It is not a restriction on how much can be spent on disasters, however—funding in excess of the allowable adjustment for disaster relief is still eligible for an emergency designation. This formula was adjusted by the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018 to account for emergency-designated spending on disasters. The special designation for disaster spending will expire along with the discretionary spending limits in 2021.

The impact of these changes in the budget process on disaster relief appropriations appears to be limited to the structure of the total appropriations, rather than the amount. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) noted that in the 1970s, "about 5%" of supplemental funding was for disasters. In a report reviewing supplemental appropriations enacted during the 1980s, CBO indicated that number fell to less than 1%. This can be attributed to the drop in disaster activity discussed above. In a similar report on the 1990s, CBO observed an increase in the use of supplemental appropriations to provide disaster relief, noting the following:

[I]n the 1990s, Presidents Bush and Clinton tended to request—and the Congress tended to provide in regular appropriations—less than what would eventually be spent in those disaster-related accounts. (Some observers say the underfunding was an effort to keep total appropriations under the [budget enforcement] caps.) When a disaster or emergency arose, the Congress enacted supplemental appropriations during the fiscal year, usually at the request of the President. That supplemental funding was designated emergency spending and was therefore not counted under the discretionary spending caps.

Figure 1 and Figure 2 do not show a distinct impact of budget controls on the overall level of disaster spending. However, they do show an increase in the amount of funding provided in annual appropriations versus supplemental appropriations starting in FY2012. The addition of the disaster relief designation under the Budget Control Act enabled higher funding levels for disasters in the annual appropriations bills, as disaster relief-designated appropriations did not compete with other appropriations for limited discretionary resources, within the allocations provided to the subcommittee funding FEMA, or within the overall discretionary spending limit. In the early years of the disaster relief designation, this increased annual funding also reduced the frequency and urgency of supplemental appropriations for the DRF. However, Congress has provided emergency-designated relief for catastrophic disasters in supplemental appropriations, whether statutory budget controls were in place or not.

The responsibility for managing DRF appropriations has shifted among agencies as the general disaster relief function grew. In March 1951, President Truman initially delegated the authority for directing federal agencies in a disaster to the Housing and Home Finance Administrator at the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD); then in January 1953 the responsibility was shifted to the Federal Civil Defense Administration in the Department of Defense (DOD). In 1961, the authority was moved within the department to the Office of Civil Defense Mobilization, which had its name changed in 1961 to the Office of Emergency Planning, and changed again in 1968 to the Office of Emergency Preparedness. It remained with that office until its abolishment in 1973, when disaster relief powers were transferred from DOD back to HUD, where those powers were exercised by the Federal Disaster Assistance Administration (FDAA).

Although management responsibilities were vested in various parts of the federal bureaucracy, appropriations for general disaster relief were provided directly to the Executive Office of the President from FY1948 through FY1973. For FY1974, funds were still described as "Funds Appropriated to the President," but they were provided within HUD's appropriations.

1978: The Creation of the Federal Emergency Management Agency

In 1978, responding to support for a more cohesive emergency management structure at the federal level, President Jimmy Carter issued Reorganization Plan #3, which created the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). At the time, disaster relief functions were vested in three agencies: the FDAA (at HUD, managing general federal disaster relief), the Federal Preparedness Agency (FPA—part of the General Services Administration); and the Defense Civil Preparedness Agency (DCPA—part of the Department of Defense). This was the first time that emergency management functions at the national level were expressly centralized into a single federal agency. FEMA had a three-part role:

Mobilizing federal resources, Coordinating federal efforts with state and local governments, and Managing the efforts of the public and private sectors in disaster responses.

FY1980 was the first year appropriations for "Disaster Relief" were provided to FEMA.

Calculation of the Annual Appropriations Request

A review of selected FEMA budget justifications shows how the executive branch has discussed its decision on how much to request for disaster relief.

In the early 1980s (1983-1985), FEMA provided justifications for the Disaster Relief appropriation that included management and coordination, individual assistance, and public assistance activities. These activities were also supported under the Emergency Management Planning and Assistance appropriation and the Salaries and Expenses appropriation for FEMA. These justifications noted that actual disaster relief requirements were based on unpredictable external factors. The FY1984 justification noted, "The budget requests mentioned are based on average projection of disaster occurrence. Any significant change from the projected totals, through either more or larger size incidents, could generate an increased request."

However, despite that uncertainty, a request for a specific budget number leads to questions about the basis for that particular number. In the FY1986 process, FEMA explicitly noted it was projecting its anticipated need "on the basis of past experience with disasters." Between September 1984, when FEMA submitted its budget request to the Office of Management and Budget for review, and February 1985, when the budget justification was provided to Congress, additional "experience" was apparently accumulated that reduced the projected demand for disaster relief from $350 million to $275 million.

By the FY1989 appropriations cycle, the language justifying the request had evolved into "an assessment of historical averages," and included specific data on the average annual disaster relief obligations for a seven-year period, as well as the disaster relief obligations for the most recently concluded fiscal year. The budget justification then included a request, noting the request and the projected obligation data that justified it included $30 million in savings through unspecified "legislative and administrative reforms."

By the late 1980s and into the 1990s, concerns about deficit spending led to the discussion of budget controls, and ultimately their implementation.

The FY1992 request highlighted the difficulty in simply using averages of past obligations. According to the justification, the average annual obligation from 1981 to 1989 of $270 million was exceeded by the FY1990 obligation of over $2 billion for costs related to Hurricane Hugo and the Lomo Prieta earthquake.

The FY1994 request included a great deal of information on prior-year activities, discussing these elements in the context of average levels of obligations, and noting the impact of larger disasters in prior years, but did little to specifically justify the request level of $292 million.

For FY1995, the budget discussion evolved, as FEMA justified the request on the basis of the first five years of activities under the Stafford Act, and the series of major disasters that had struck. The use of the five-year average continued through the 1990s and early 2000s, with disaster support costs—the costs of maintaining disaster response capabilities that are not attributable to a specific disaster—included as well. Certain very large disasters were not included in the average. For example, for FY1999, FEMA explicitly excluded the costs of the Northridge earthquake, plus disaster support costs. For FY2003, not only was Northridge excluded from the average, but so were the impacts of the 9/11 terrorist attacks.

By FY2009, the justification had again evolved: "Coupled with funding from recoveries of prior year obligations and unobligated funds carried forward, the appropriation request will fund the five-year average obligation level for direct disaster activity (excluding extraordinary events, such as the terrorist attack of September 11, 2001, the 2004 hurricanes in Florida and other states, and Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, and Wilma in 2005 and 2006 and excluding disaster readiness and support functions)." In FY2011, the Administration simplified the request language by referring to disasters that cost less than $500 million as "non-catastrophic disaster activity." That year, in addition to the request for the DRF based on the five-year average of "non-catastrophic" disaster relief obligations, the Administration made a concurrent request for $3.6 billion for the costs of prior catastrophic storms and wildfires.

The Budget Control Act Era: Ten-Year Averages, Reserves, and Flexibility

The 2010s saw continued debate on deficit spending, coupled with a continuing desire to fund disaster relief programs. When Congress passed the Budget Control Act of 2011 ( P.L. 112-25 ), it created statutory caps on spending as well as a special mechanism to exempt some of the costs of major disasters from those caps. (See " Changes in the Budget Process " for details.)

A $500 million reserve fund was included in the Administration's budget request for FY2012. This was intended to help ensure resources were available on short notice in hurricane season. This rose to $1 billion in FY2015. For FY2019, the reserve request increased to $2 billion "due to the uncertainty around the availability of additional supplemental funding to continue addressing the 2017 hurricanes."

In FY2013, FEMA shifted from using a 5-year average to using a 10-year average of non-catastrophic obligations, plus the estimated requirements for past catastrophic disasters, plus the reserve, as the basis for their overall DRF request.

Emergency Contingency Funding and Reserve Funds

At times, the Administration and Congress have examined methods of speeding up or broadening the availability of funds to address emergencies and disasters by changing how they were appropriated. Examples of this include the use of contingent appropriations and the proposal to establish a reserve fund for disaster relief.

In some of its first exercises of the emergency designation, Congress chose to provide a portion of the appropriation for the DRF as emergency-designated budget authority contingent on the Administration specifically requesting the additional funds and designating them as an emergency requirement. An example of this structure can be found in P.L. 103-75 , a supplemental appropriations bill for FY1993:

For an additional amount for ''Disaster relief", $1,735,000,000, and in addition, $265,000,000, which shall be available only to the extent an official budget request for a specific dollar amount, that includes designation of the entire amount of the request as an emergency requirement as defined in the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, as amended, is transmitted by the President to Congress, to remain available until September 30, 1997, for the Midwest floods and other disasters: Provided , That the entire amount is designated by Congress as an emergency requirement pursuant to section 251(b)(2)(D)(i) of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, as amended, and title I, chapter II, of Public Law 102-229.

The FY2002 annual disaster relief appropriation was the last annual appropriation that included this type of contingent appropriation.

While current appropriations requests for the DRF include a special appropriated reserve within the DRF for unanticipated catastrophic disasters, the concept of a budgetary reserve fund outside the DRF has also been proposed in the past, which would enable appropriations for broader non-Stafford disaster relief initiatives.

In FY2002, alongside a request for the DRF that included disaster support costs and funding for prior-year disasters, the Administration proposed the creation a of $5.6 billion National Emergency Reserve allowance to support the costs of "significant new disasters." The DRF, the Small Business Administration (SBA) Disaster Loan Program, and wildfire programs at the Department of Agriculture and Department of the Interior would have been the primary recipients of this funding. The annual reserve would have been established in the budget resolution, and based on the average annual spending on "extraordinarily large events." It would have been allocated to the appropriations subcommittees to fund presidential requests for emergency requirements if two criteria were met: "the events were sudden, urgent, unforeseen, and not permanent; and adequate funding for a normal year has been provided for the applicable program by the Appropriations Committees." Unused reserve amounts could be rolled over into the next year. The proposal was not ultimately adopted.

The federal government has defined a role for itself in emergency management and disaster recovery, as a backstop for state, local, territorial, and tribal governments, with roles in providing limited relief for individuals and support for mitigation efforts. FEMA's DRF appropriation funds a great deal of the federal effort. As the DRF appropriation is simply an amount of budget authority provided to support a role in disasters that is defined through separately crafted laws and policies, many of the issues related to the DRF are less about the appropriation than they are about that separately defined federal role.

Should the purpose of the DRF be rescoped?

Despite the magnitude of funding provided through the DRF for a range of activities and programs, other appropriations support disaster-related activities in other departments and agencies. As noted earlier, HUD, USDA, DOT, DOD, and SBA all fund various disaster relief and recovery programs.

At various times in the past, efforts have been made to fund activities through the DRF that are not part of the current portfolio of Stafford Act programs. The Stafford Act already encompasses a wide range of emergency management, disaster relief, and disaster response activities. Making non-Stafford programs eligible for DRF funding is something Congress could choose to do, but it would not provide any obvious policy or budgetary advantage. Existing non-Stafford programs have their own funding streams, management, and oversight. Providing their resources through a new appropriation could complicate their funding stream and congressional oversight. While making the programs eligible for funding from the DRF could make additional budget authority available, it would be more transparent and direct for Congress to simply fund the program through its existing appropriation.

There is no special budgetary treatment for appropriations for the DRF—only for appropriations which are designated for the costs of major disasters under the BCA. Shifting discretionary spending out of one appropriations subcommittee's jurisdiction into another provides no overall budgetary benefit—the total amount of spending remains the same. Subcommittee allocations are set and reset every year (sometimes multiple times each year) at the discretion of the House and Senate appropriations committees, so such a move could well result in no net impact on available resources.

The concept of a broader funding stream providing discretionary resources for DRF, SBA, and USDA disaster relief programs has also been considered before. Such an idea, floated by a previous Administration but rejected by Congress, might have made more resources available in the immediate aftermath of a disaster, but it is not clear that reorganizing funding would make the programs subject to more thorough oversight or make them more effective. It could limit the ability of Congress to provide specific oversight or direction through appropriations to the separate programs.

Congress could also break up the DRF into appropriations for the individual Stafford Act programs or groups of programs. This might allow for additional specific congressional oversight and direction, but it could reduce the flexibility that exists within the DRF to shift its resources to meet unanticipated disaster needs by segmenting the available resources.

Appropriations are frequently provided on the basis of what can be spent on a project in a given fiscal year. This thinking informs part of the funding request, as it includes a basis of spending on open disasters, where recovery is ongoing. A 10-year average informs the portion of the DRF budget request that pays for response and recovery from disasters that cost less than $500 million. Previous and current Administrations have sought additional reserve funds over and above those projected needs to pay for potential "no notice" events. On the other hand, from FY2014 to FY2017, almost $2.5 billion in funding was rescinded from unobligated balances in the DRF. In the present constrained budget environment, Congress continues to weigh the proper level of reserves for FEMA to keep on hand in the DRF.

What accommodations should be made in the federal budget for disaster relief?

While disaster relief is a relatively small part of the discretionary budget, and an even smaller part of the overall federal budget, disaster relief spending is anticipated to continue growing in the coming years. In modern history, Congress has been generally willing to provide resources for major disasters on an as-needed basis. However, discussions of deficit and debt continue in Congress, and may increase in frequency and volume as the Budget Control Act nears expiration in FY2021. The central question is this: Does disaster relief represent enough of a priority for the federal government to maintain the status quo notwithstanding potential increasing costs?

When budget controls were put in place in the 1980s, 1990s, and 2010s, exceptions were provided to help ensure relief and recovery efforts would continue to be funded. With the expiration of the Budget Control Act statutory caps on discretionary spending, one limitation on disaster relief spending—albeit one with a limited practical effect, as noted above—will go away. The allowable adjustment for disaster relief will expire as well, which may have more of an impact, as Congress has used it to move disaster relief spending more fully into the annual appropriations process. The adjustment has effectively allowed most of the annual DRF appropriation to be provided without competing against other homeland security priorities for the discretionary funding provided under the Homeland Security appropriations subcommittee's allocation. Congress may consider whether they want that process to continue.

Congress may also debate whether to try to limit disaster relief spending. The most direct means of doing this would not be to change the DRF appropriation, but by changing the underlying laws that authorize the programs it funds. Implementing relief limits or deductibles for states or smaller jurisdictions, larger nonfederal cost shares, or changes in the declaration process may prove unpopular, and having to vote for them once in more durable authorizing legislation may be more practical than doing so annually in appropriations legislation, which expires.

Appendix. General Disaster Relief Appropriations, FY1964-FY2018


Farm Policy: USDA’s 2018 Trade Aid Package

Summary: In early 2018, the Trump Administration—citing concerns over national security and unfair trade practices—imposed increased tariffs on certain imported products in general and on U.S. imports from China in particular. Several of the affected foreign trading partners (including China) responded to the U.S. tariffs with their own retaliatory tariffs targeting various U.S. products, especially agricultural commodities.

Summary: On July 24, 2018, Secretary of Agriculture Sonny Perdue announced that the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) would be taking several temporary actions to assist farmers in response to trade damage from what the Administration has characterized as "unjustified retaliation." Specifically, the Secretary said that USDA would authorize up to $12 billion in financial assistance—referred to as a trade aid package—for certain agricultural commodities using Section 5 of the Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) Charter Act (15 U.S.C. 714c). USDA intends for the trade aid package to provide short-term assistance in response to the ongoing trade disputes. However, the Secretary stated that there would not be further trade-related financial assistance beyond this $12 billion package. The aid package includes (1) a Market Facilitation Program (MFP) of direct payments (valued at up to $10 billion) to producers of soybeans, corn, cotton, sorghum, wheat, hogs, and dairy who are most affected by the trade retaliation (sweet cherries and almonds were added to this list in September); (2) a Food Purchase and Distribution Program to partially offset lost export sales of affected commodities ($1.2 billion); and (3) an Agricultural Trade Promotion (ATP) Program to expand foreign markets ($200 million).

Summary: USDA's Farm Service Agency will administer the MFP by providing payments in two potential tranches: a first round announced on August 27, 2018, initially valued at $4.7 billion; and an equivalent-valued second round announced on December 17, 2018. However, producers need only sign up once for the MFP to be eligible for first and second payments. The sign-up period for soybeans, corn, cotton, sorghum, wheat, hogs, and dairy started September 4, 2018. The sign-up period for fresh sweet cherries and shelled almonds started on September 24. To be eligible, a producer must have an ownership share in the commodity, be actively engaged in farming, and be in compliance with adjusted gross income restrictions and conservation provisions. Eligible producers should apply after their harvest is complete. Initially, producers were given a deadline of January 15, 2019, to complete an application. However, USDA extended the deadline until February 14, 2018, due to the government shutdown.

Summary: USDA used 2017 production data to estimate that approximately $9.6 billion would be distributed in MFP payments for corn, cotton, sorghum, soybeans, wheat, dairy, hogs, fresh sweet cherries, and shelled almonds, with over three-fourths ($7.3 billion) of MFP payments provided to soybean producers. MFP payments are capped on a per-person or per-legal-entity basis at a combined $125,000 for eligible crop commodities, a combined $125,000 for dairy production and hogs, and, separately, a combined $125,000 for fresh sweet cherries and shelled almonds.

Summary: In addition to the MFP payments, the Administration announced a Food Purchase and Distribution Program that is to undertake $1.2 billion in government purchases of excess food supplies. USDA has targeted an initial 29 commodities for purchases and distribution through domestic nutrition assistance programs. Purchasing orders and distribution activities are to be adjusted based on the demand by the recipient food assistance programs geographically.

Summary: The smallest piece of the trade aid package is an allocation of $200 million to the ATP to boost the trade promotion efforts at USDA's Foreign Agricultural Service, including foreign market development for affected agricultural products. On January 31, 2019, USDA awarded $200 million to 57 organizations through ATP.

Summary: USDA's use of its discretionary authority under the CCC Charter Act to make direct payments without further congressional action has historically been somewhat intermittent and limited in its scale. While the use of this authority is not without precedent, the scope and scale of this trade aid package has increased congressional and public interest. Furthermore, the significant variation in the announced MFP payment rates for affected commodities has elicited questions about equitable treatment among affected commodities. On September 13, USDA released a description of its MFP payment methodology, which is based strictly on the estimated direct trade "damage"—that is, export losses resulting from retaliatory tariffs. Indirect effects—such as the decline in market prices and resultant "lost value" for many of the affected commodities—were not included in the payment calculation.

In early 2018, the Trump Administration—citing concerns over national security and unfair trade practices—imposed increased tariffs on certain imported products in general and on U.S. imports from China in particular. Several of the affected foreign trading partners responded to the U.S. tariffs with their own retaliatory tariffs targeting various U.S. products, especially agricultural commodities.

On July 24, 2018, Secretary of Agriculture Sonny Perdue announced that the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) would be taking several temporary actions to assist farmers in response to trade damage from what the Administration has characterized as "unjustified retaliation." Specifically, USDA would authorize up to $12 billion in financial assistance—referred to as the "trade aid" package—for certain agricultural commodities under Section 5 of the Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) Charter Act (15 U.S.C. 714c). The Secretary said that most of the funding would go to agricultural commodities most directly affected by the trade retaliation—corn, cotton, soybeans, sorghum, wheat, hogs, and dairy (sweet cherries and almonds were added to this list in September)—but that some funding would also be used for the purchase, distribution, and trade promotion of a variety of affected commodities.

The trade-aid package includes a Market Facilitation Program (MFP) of direct payments to affected producers, a Food Purchase and Distribution Program, and an Agricultural Trade Promotion (ATP) program. Payments under the MFP program would be made in two rounds: a first round announced on August 27, 2018, initially valued at $4.7 billion; and an equivalent-valued second round announced on December 17, 2018. Secretary Perdue stated that there would not be further trade-related financial assistance beyond this $12 billion package as producers would be able to adjust their production activities in 2019 to reflect market conditions related to the trade dispute.

This report provides background on the trade dispute that triggered the trade-aid package as well as the authority used by USDA to respond to the trade dispute with financial assistance. Then the report describes the three components of the trade-aid package with details on their implementation.

Tariffs as the Origin of the Trade Aid Package

In March 2018, the Trump Administration began applying a 25% tariff to U.S. steel imports and 10% tariff to U.S. aluminum imports from certain countries, citing national security concerns. In April, in response to alleged unfair trade practices by the Chinese government, the Administration placed additional tariffs on a number of Chinese products that are exported to the United States. China, Canada, Mexico, the European Union, and Turkey subsequently enacted retaliatory tariffs on U.S. food and agricultural products, in addition to other goods, in response to the U.S. actions. The retaliatory tariffs from those countries now apply to more than 800 U.S. food and agricultural products across meats, grains, dairy products, specialty and horticultural crops, seafood, and alcoholic beverages. The export value for the targeted products to the retaliating countries totaled about $26.9 billion in 2017—about 18% of total U.S. agricultural exports.

China, which is subject to the largest set of U.S. tariff increases—including both the U.S. steel and aluminum tariffs and the U.S. tariffs in response to unfair trade practices—also has the most expansive list of retaliatory tariffs. All told, China, which was the second-leading export market by value for U.S. food and agriculture products in 2017, has levied retaliatory tariffs on about 800 U.S. food and agricultural products that were worth about $20.6 billion in exports to that country in 2017. Among China's retaliatory tariffs is a 25% tariff on soybeans, its top agricultural product import by value from the United States. China imported about $12 billion worth of U.S. soybeans in 2017, accounting for 57% of the value of all U.S. soybean exports that year. With the higher tariffs in place, China is now purchasing more soybeans from Brazil and elsewhere to meet its demand. China has also targeted other key U.S. products, including sorghum, wheat, pork and pork offal, dairy products, fruits and nuts, seafood, and whiskey.

Among other countries, Canada—the leading export market for U.S. agriculture and food products in 2017—has imposed retaliatory tariffs of 10% on about 20 food and agricultural products, mostly processed foods. U.S. exports of those products to Canada in 2017 were valued at $2.6 billion. Mexico, the third-leading export market for U.S. agriculture and food products by value in 2017, has imposed tariffs ranging from 15% to 25% on cheese, pork, and some prepared foods. U.S. exports of those products to Mexico were valued at about $2.5 billion in 2017. The European Union has levied tariffs on a small number of U.S. prepared foods, corn, and rice, which were worth about $1 billion in 2017. Turkey has imposed retaliatory tariffs on U.S. nuts, rice, and some prepared foods, imports of which amounted to some $250 million in 2017.

U.S. agriculture and food products have been targeted with increased tariffs by foreign nations for several reasons. First, the United States exports a large amount of agriculture and food products, so many countries have the choice of retaliating against those goods. Second, agricultural commodities are easily substituted from among potential suppliers, so curbing imports from one country would not necessarily limit an importing country's access to the commodity. For example, China has turned primarily to Brazil for more of its soybean imports. Third, given the geographic nature of the production of some agriculture and food products, countries can target certain goods in order to negatively and disproportionately affect the constituents of specific U.S. lawmakers. For example, all of the retaliating countries have imposed retaliatory tariffs on whiskey, some specifically on Bourbon whiskey, which is largely produced in Kentucky, rather than on all distilled beverages or alcohol more generally.

The primary authority for the trade aid package is the Secretary of Agriculture's discretion to use the general powers of the CCC. The CCC is a wholly government-owned entity that exists solely to finance authorized programs that support U.S. agriculture. It is federally chartered by the CCC Charter Act of 1948 (P.L. 80-806; 15 U.S.C. 714 et seq. ), as amended. Most CCC-funded programs are classified as mandatory spending programs and therefore do not require annual discretionary appropriations in order to operate. The CCC instead borrows from the U.S. Treasury to finance its programs consistent with its permanent, indefinite authority to borrow up to $30 billion. Congress replenishes the CCC borrowing authority by appropriating funding to cover the CCC's net realized losses.

Typically, Congress passes laws, such as omnibus farm bills, that specifically direct USDA on how to administer CCC activities and in what amounts to fund them. The underlying authorization for the CCC, however, also provides the Secretary with general powers to take certain actions in support of U.S. agriculture at the discretion of the Secretary. This discretionary use has historically been somewhat intermittent and limited in its scale, but it is the basis of the MFP and ATP announced by the Administration.

USDA also has discretionary authority to purchase U.S. agricultural commodities under a provision known as Section 32. The name refers to its authorization in Section 32 of the act of August 24, 1935 (P.L. 74-320; 7 U.S.C. 612c), as amended. Most of Section 32's mandatory funding is transferred to the USDA's child nutrition account, but the Secretary has broad discretion in how to spend the remaining unallocated funding—some of which is used to purchase agricultural commodities. The premise is that removing products from normal marketing channels helps to reduce supply and thereby increase prices and farm income. Purchased commodities are diverted to domestic food assistance programs as discussed below (see " Food Purchase and Distribution Program ").

The Administration's trade aid announcement does not specify whether the CCC or Section 32 authority is being used to make the purchases under the announced Food Purchase and Distribution Program. However, the scale of the $1.2 billion program indicates that the CCC is most likely the source since the typical annual amount of funding available in Section 32 for purchases is rarely more than half of this amount. Whether from the CCC or Section 32, the Administration's purchases appear to use distribution channels similar to those under Section 32.

On August 27, 2018, Secretary Perdue announced the first round of trade assistance. As part of the August 27 announcement, Secretary Perdue provided details on each of the three trade aid package components, including an initial tranche of $6.1 billion in designated outlays out of a potential $12 billion in total program spending. The MFP was to provide initial estimated direct payments of $4.7 billion to qualifying agricultural producers. A Food Purchase and Distribution Program is to undertake $1.2 billion in government purchases of excess food supplies. The ATP program, funded with an additional $200 million, is to help finance foreign market development for affected agricultural products. On December 17, 2018, Secretary Perdue revised the first round of MFP outlays upward slightly to $4.8 billion, and announced an equivalent $4.8 billion in potential second-round outlays.

The MFP provides direct financial assistance to producers of commodities that are significantly impacted by actions of foreign governments resulting in the loss of traditional exports. USDA initially determined that qualifying commodities include corn, upland cotton, extra-long-staple cotton, sorghum, soybeans, wheat, dairy, and hogs. On September 21, 2018, USDA announced that fresh sweet cherries and shelled almonds are also eligible for MFP payments.

USDA's Farm Service Agency (FSA) is to administer the MFP by providing payments in two potential tranches. However, producers need only sign up once for the MFP to be eligible for first and second payments. Under the sign-up period, producers can submit MFP applications beginning on the following dates: September 4, 2018, for producers of soybeans, sorghum, corn, wheat, cotton, dairy, and hogs; and September 24, 2018, for producers of shelled almonds and fresh sweet cherries. Eligible producers should apply after their harvest is complete. Initially, producers were given a deadline of January 15, 2019, to complete an application. However, USDA extended the deadline to February 14 due to a partial shutdown of the federal government. The current deadline for producers to certify their 2018 production is May 1, 2019.

USDA used 2017 production data to estimate that approximately $9.6 billion would be distributed in MFP payments for corn, cotton, sorghum, soybeans, wheat, dairy, hogs, fresh sweet cherries, and shelled almonds, with over three-fourths ($7.3 billion) of MFP payments provided to soybean producers ( Table 1 ).

U.S. producers of corn, cotton, sorghum, soybeans, wheat, dairy, hogs, fresh sweet cherries, and shelled almonds are eligible for MFP payments at this time. Eligible applicants must

have an ownership interest in the commodity and be actively engaged; have an average adjusted gross income for tax years 2014, 2015, and 2016 of less than $900,000 per year; comply with the provisions of the "Highly Erodible Land and Wetland Conservation" regulations, often called the conservation compliance provisions.

USDA Determination of MFP Per-Unit Payment Rates

USDA determined MFP payments based on its estimated "direct trade damage"—that is, the difference in expected trade value for each affected commodity with and without the retaliatory tariffs ( Table A-3 ). The estimated "trade damage" for each affected commodity was then divided by the crop's production in 2017 to derive a per-unit payment rate. Indirect effects—such as any decline in market prices and resultant "lost value" for many of the affected commodities—are not included in the payment calculation (see Appendix B ).

USDA's trade-aid package is thus linking MFP commodity payments only to the trade loss associated with each identified MFP commodity. Neither final trade effect, with or without retaliatory tariffs, is observable because much of the affected agricultural production had yet to be harvested and sold at the time the payment rates were calculated, and markets had yet to fully adjust to whatever new trade patterns would emerge from the trade dispute. As a result, USDA estimated both export values (with and without retaliatory tariffs) using a global trade model that took into account the availability of substitute supplies from export competitors, and the availability of demand for U.S. agricultural exports from alternate importers.

How Will Farm-Level MFP Payments Be Determined?

MFP payments are tied directly to a producer's actual level of production of eligible commodities in 2018. A producer's total potential MFP payment for an eligible commodity equals the announced payment rate per unit (see column two of Table 1 ) times the harvested (and certified) production during 2018 or in the case of hogs, the inventory during the period of July 15 to August 15, 2018. During the first payment period (announced by USDA on September 27), MFP payments were set equal to the announced MFP payment rate times 50% of a producer's harvested (and certified) production. The second payment rate (announced on December 17) applied to the remaining 50% of the producer's production.

The MFP is separate from and in addition to the current safety net support provided by the Agricultural Risk Coverage (ARC) and Price Loss Coverage (PLC) support programs or crop insurance coverage where revenue insurance protects against low prices, low yields, or a combination of both. Furthermore, by coupling the payments directly to production, those regions of the country where drought or other yield-reducing factors have negatively impacted production during 2018 may receive less aid through MFP than other regions.

According to USDA, as of February 7, 2019, $6.4 billion in payments have been made to farmers. FSA offices closed on December 28, 2018, due to a lack of funding under the government shutdown. Producers who have not yet applied for payments or certified their 2018 production must wait for FSA offices to reopen before receiving MFP payments. However, USDA has said that producers that have already applied and certified their 2018 production will continue to receive MFP payments during the government shutdown.

USDA announced that MFP payments are capped on a per-person or per-legal-entity basis under three separate payment limits: a combined $125,000 for eligible crops (corn, cotton, sorghum, soybeans, and wheat), a combined $125,000 for livestock (dairy production and hogs), and a combined $125,000 for eligible specialty crops (fresh sweet cherries and shelled almonds). Furthermore, MFP payments do not count against other 2014 farm bill payment limitations. There are no criteria in place to calculate whether losses covered under revenue support programs (e.g., ARC and PLC) of the 2014 farm bill might be duplicated by MFP. As a result, the same program acres that are eligible for ARC or PLC payments may be eligible for MFP payments.

WTO Compliance of Trade Retaliation Assistance Payments

Due to its potential price tag ($12 billion) and the coupled nature of the MFP payments, there is considerable interest from policymakers and market observers about whether these payments will be fully compliant with World Trade Organization (WTO) commitments. It would appear that, if the United States restricts MFP payments to $12 billion or less, and its other amber box payments adhere to the recent annual average of $4.9 billion since 2010, then total U.S. amber box payments would be below its $19.1 billion limit on trade-distorting farm subsidies at the WTO. However, several economists have suggested there is considerable uncertainty in how much the eventual MFP payments will be. For example, Darci Vetter, former chief U.S. agricultural negotiator at the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, said that current low agricultural commodity prices cause her to worry that billions of dollars in "additional payments will put us over our [amber box] $19 billion cap," exposing the United States to a potential legal challenge. Joe Glauber, a former USDA chief economist, stated, "I would be very hesitant to say categorically, 'No, we're not going to hit our $19.1 [billion ceiling].'"

While soybean growers and most farm-advocacy groups have generally been supportive of the payments, some commodity groups—most notably associations representing corn, wheat, and milk—contend that the MFP payments are insufficient to fully compensate their industries (see Table A-4 and Appendix B for a comparison of "trade loss" and "market loss"). The National Corn Growers Association claims that recent trade disputes have lowered corn prices by $0.44/bu. for a loss of $6.3 billion on the projected 2018 harvest. Similarly, the National Association of Wheat Growers estimates that a $0.75/bu. price decrease will result in nearly $2.5 billion in lost value, while the National Milk Producers Federation calculates that milk prices are now estimated to be $1.10/cwt. lower than just prior to the trade retaliation, causing over $1.2 billion in losses based on milk futures prices.

Many specialty crop groups similarly contend that their interests are not being fully compensated for tariff-related export losses by the USDA trade aid programs. For example, a recent study suggests that, in California alone, specialty crops may suffer trade-related losses of over $3.3 billion this year.

The Administration is allocating about $1.2 billion of its trade aid package to purchasing various agricultural commodities and distributing them through domestic nutrition assistance programs. USDA typically purchases agricultural commodities for domestic distribution in two ways: (1) "entitlement purchases" for the mandated, preplanned needs of a feeding program; and (2) "contingency purchases" (also called "bonus buys") that are usually triggered as a surplus removal mechanism to raise market prices of a commodity without displacing normal demand.

The new $1.2 billion of purchases is under the second category of contingency purchases. Contingency purchases are statutorily authorized under the Secretary's discretion to support agriculture by making purchases under the CCC or Section 32 as discussed above. These are mandatory funds and do not need to be appropriated.

When USDA purchases commodities, especially for distribution to nutrition assistance programs, the Agricultural Marketing Service (AMS) announces its purchasing intentions with product specifications. Vendors who are approved to sell to USDA may submit offers. The purchased products would be distributed through regular USDA nutrition assistance channels that provide in-kind assistance, such as food banks participating in the Emergency Food Assistance Program, the Commodity Supplemental Food Program, child nutrition programs such as the National School Lunch Program, and the Food Distribution Program on Indian Reservations. However, not all of these programs have the authority to accept contingency/bonus purchases.

The Administration's August 27 announcement listed 29 commodities targeted for purchases totaling $1.2 billion ( Table A-1 ). It also mentions two additional commodities (sweet cherries and almonds) that total $175 million, with program details to be determined ( Table A-2 ). The announced purchase values were set for each affected commodity using the same gross trade damage formula that was used to calculate the MFP per-unit payment rate described earlier.

The largest purchases that were announced include pork ($559 million), apples ($93 million), dairy ($85 million), and pistachios ($85 million). USDA said that the breadth of commodities and scale of purchases was based on economic analyses of the effect of tariffs. Purchasing orders and distribution activities are to be adjusted based on the demand by the recipient food assistance programs geographically. As of December 17, 2018, USDA had procured some portion of 16 of the 29 commodities included in the program, totaling more than 4,500 truckloads of food. USDA's AMS will continue purchasing commodities for delivery throughout 2019.

In FY2017, the AMS purchased $2.2 billion of commodities for distribution for domestic nutrition assistance. Of this total, $735 million was from Section 32 ($270 million in contingency purchases that are most similar to those under the trade aid package and $465 million in entitlement purchases), and $1.5 billion was entitlement purchases from the USDA's Food and Nutrition Service budget. No purchases were made with CCC funds. Thus, the new program of contingency purchases is several times larger than a typical annual amount and a relatively large increase in the amount distributed through nutrition programs.

The third and smallest element of the trade aid package is the ATP program. The Administration is allocating $200 million of the trade aid package to boost trade promotion efforts of USDA's Foreign Agricultural Service (FAS). The program is to operate in a manner similar to FAS's Market Access Program (MAP) and Foreign Market Development Program (FMDP). These funds are to provide cost-share assistance to eligible U.S. agricultural organizations to promote U.S. food and agricultural goods overseas and develop new markets to help offset the adverse effects of the retaliatory tariffs. The money—which would nearly double the amounts made available annually for the MAP and FMDP trade promotion programs for one year—can be used for such activities as consumer advertising, public relations, point-of-sale demonstrations, participation in trade fairs and exhibits, market research, and technical assistance. Further, ATP money is not limited to certain commodities and is to be available to all sectors of agriculture.

While the $200 million for ATP is considerably less than the other programs in the trade aid package, it is a notable increase for USDA's trade promotion programs, which are authorized at $234 million annually. Though all sectors of agriculture can apply for ATP funding through eligible U.S. organizations, it is unclear whether USDA intends to give preference to certain commodities—such as those that are not eligible for other programs under the trade aid package or those most impacted by the tariffs.

The application period for ATP closed in November 2018 with more than $600 million in requested activities from more than 70 organizations. On January 31, 2019, USDA's FAS announced the full $200 million in ATP funding awards.

The broad discretionary authority granted to the Secretary under the CCC Charter Act to implement the trade aid package also allows the Secretary to determine how the aid is to be calculated and distributed. Using this authority is not without precedent, but the scope and scale of its use for the trade aid package has increased congressional and public interest. USDA has declared this trade aid package to be a temporary, one-time response to foreign tariffs imposed on selected U.S. commodities.

Most farm commodity and advocacy groups have been supportive of the trade aid package even as they have called for solutions that restore export activity.

However, some stakeholders have begun to question the equity of the distribution of MFP payments due to difficulties in isolating specific market effects and the initial lack of transparency around the formulas for determining MFP payment rates. Now that the formulas are public, several commodity groups question the rationale for determining MFP payments based on "trade damage" rather than the broader "market loss" measure.

Some trade economists and market watchers have suggested that the potential effects of the trade aid package and the imposition of tariffs and retaliatory tariffs could be longer lasting because they have created uncertainty about U.S. trade policy behavior and have called into question U.S. reliability as a trading partner. Further, the use of CCC authority to mitigate tariff-related losses may establish a precedent for future situations.

Appendix A. Food Purchases in the Trade Aid Package

Appendix B. Trade Loss versus Opportunity Cost

USDA has elected to base MFP payments strictly on estimated trade loss. In contrast, several commodity groups have calculated the "lost market value" and view it as a better measure of the economic damage from the retaliatory tariffs (see " Industry Response to MFP Payment Allocation "). These two "loss" measures are described here.

Trade loss is the value of lost export sales due to a change in foreign demand ( Table A-3 ). With respect to retaliatory tariffs, it is the difference in U.S. agricultural exports with and without the tariffs. It also appears in USDA export forecasts. For example, in May 2018, USDA forecast U.S. agricultural export sales to China for FY2018 of $21.6 billion; by August 2018, USDA had revised its forecast down to $19 billion and initially projected agricultural export sales to China in FY2019 of only $12 billion. Thus, from May to August the U.S. agricultural export outlook to China had declined by $2 billion, while the FY2019 forecast had fallen by as much as $9 billion.

Lost Market Value (or the Opportunity Cost of Missed Sales)

Lost market value describes the opportunity cost of missed sales associated with a drop in market prices. For example, if soybean prices were $10.00 per bushel in March and $8.00 per bushel in October, the opportunity cost of not selling in March (whether from on-farm stocks or by forward contracting the crop in the field) but instead waiting to sell after harvest in October would be $2.00 per bushel. All physical quantities of a commodity available on the farm—including commodities in storage as well as in the field—are potentially subject to a missed sales opportunity. Furthermore, until the producer actually sells the commodity, the realized market value and true opportunity cost remain unknown.

If a trade dispute contributes to a drop in the market price of a commodity, then the associated "lost market value" would affect all quantities of the affected commodity, whether exported or used domestically. This appears to be the type of "loss" being measured by most U.S. commodity groups. However, the retaliatory tariffs are only one of a number of factors that influence market prices. In particular, the outlook for record U.S. soybean and near-record corn harvests in 2018 has likely had an important effect on pressuring market prices lower during the May to September period. This production effect should be excluded from any estimate of trade-based market loss.

Changes in USDA's monthly price forecasts from May to September may provide an upper-bound estimate of the trade impacts ( Table A-4 ), since this period coincides with the escalating trade conflicts when the retaliatory tariffs were applied. However, they include the production effect and thus likely overstate any trade impact. According to USDA, during the May-September period, farm prices for MFP commodities declined 18% for soybeans, 8% for sorghum, and 8% for corn but rose 2% for wheat and 15% for cotton. At first glance, these price changes seem out of sync with the MFP payment rates. Sorghum could receive a payment rate that is nearly three times as large as its estimated price decline from May to September. In contrast, corn—which has experienced a price decline identical to sorghum—could receive a payment rate that amounts to 3% of the price decline that corn prices experienced over this same period.

However, given the number of factors influencing market prices over this period, it may not be possible to establish with confidence what market prices would have been in the absence of the retaliatory tariffs. Any viable estimate would have to be generated from a global economic model featuring all major agricultural commodities that compete for land and other inputs in production; may substitute for each other in alternative uses; and captures the interactions of all relevant market factors such as policy, technology, and expected prices, production, and demand. For example, wheat and cotton are to receive per-unit MFP payment rates while experiencing an increase in farm prices during the May-September period. However, 2018 has been a year of poor international wheat harvests, and it could be that wheat prices might have moved to much higher levels in the absence of retaliatory tariffs.