Animal and Plant Health Import Permits in U.S. Agricultural Trade

Summary: The Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) of the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) is the U.S. government authority tasked with regulating the import, transit, and release of regulated animals, animal products, veterinary biologics, plants, plant products, pests, organisms, soil, and genetically engineered organisms. APHIS provides scientific authorities in trade partner countries and U.S. importers with animal and plant health import regulations.

Summary: APHIS requires U.S. importers to obtain animal or plant health import permits, which verify that the items being imported meet U.S. import standards. Animal and plant health import permits certify that imports follow U.S. regulations, World Trade Organization (WTO) guidelines, and/or trading partner specific requirements. These import permits are a part of broader agreements between the United States and its trading partners within the WTO on established sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures. These measures aim to protect against diseases, pests, toxins, and other contaminants. The House and Senate Agricultural Appropriations Committees appropriate funds that allow APHIS to carry out a range of activities, including those involved in issuing import permits. From FY2014 to FY2018, discretionary appropriations for APHIS have averaged nearly $900 million. About 85% of the APHIS budget is allocated to the "Safeguarding and Emergency Preparedness/Response" mission area, which includes the administration of health import permits and other efforts to prevent imports of pests and diseases into the United States.

Summary: APHIS's authority over agricultural imports is largely provided by the Animal Health Protection Act (7 U.S.C. §§8301 et seq.), the Plant Protection Act (7 U.S.C. §§7701 et seq.), and the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002 (7 U.S.C. §§8401). These laws authorize APHIS to administer animal and plant health import permits and conduct agricultural import inspections. APHIS works with other federal agencies, such as the Department of Homeland Security's Customs and Border Protection (CBP), to conduct animal and plant health monitoring programs and to determine if new pest or disease management programs are needed. In addition, Congress directs the Food and Drug Administration, the Food Safety and Inspection Service, and state-level Departments of Agriculture to participate in inspecting many products regulated by APHIS.

Summary: APHIS and CBP personnel inspect shipments of imported agricultural products and certify that the required import health permits and SPS certificates accompany each shipment. One of the major flagship programs that APHIS and CBP administer together is the Agricultural Quarantine Inspection (AQI) program, in which APHIS and CBP technical staff work to ensure that the required animal or plant health permits, sanitary certificates (for animal products), and phytosanitary certificates (for plant products) accompany each shipment. APHIS transfers funds to CBP to conduct AQI activities.

Summary: The ongoing congressional commitment to preventing plant and animal disease and pests from entering the United States through agricultural imports is evident in annual appropriations Congress provides for APHIS. Congress has directed APHIS to monitor pests and diseases and has assigned APHIS to oversee SPS activities in some free trade agreements. Moreover, legislation introduced in the 115th Congress sought to address invasive species (e.g., Areawide Integrated Pest Management, H.R. 5411) and would have directed CBP to enforce APHIS regulations to deter smuggling of plants and animals into the United States.

In the past two decades, increasing global trade liberalization, among other factors, has led to a rise in U.S. agricultural imports. The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) reports that U.S. agricultural imports reached nearly $121 billion in the 2017 calendar year ( Figure 1 ), which was twice the level of such imports in 2000. Consequently, the increasing volume of imports has heightened public concern about the potential for introducing pests and diseases. Most imported agricultural products, such as live animal and plants, are inspected by U.S. government officials and have accompanying documentation—animal and plant health import permits—certifying adherence to U.S. requirements. More than ever, the U.S. government depends on the proper use of these import permits to facilitate U.S. agricultural trade.

The USDA's Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) regulates the import, transit, and release of regulated animals, animal products, veterinary biologics, plants, plant products, pests, organisms, soil, and genetically engineered organisms. APHIS-issued import health permits verify that the health status and the production practices of an imported product meet U.S. import standards. APHIS works with foreign exporters, U.S. importers, and foreign governments to interpret and enforce APHIS-issued animal and plant health import permits.

Animal and plant health import permits include components from U.S. specific regulations and World Trade Organization (WTO) guidelines. Further, these health import permits are a part of broader agreements between the United States and its trading partners in the WTO that establish sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) standards. SPS measures aim to protect against diseases, pests, toxins, and other contaminants. Since 2000, the United States has entered into a dozen free trade agreements (FTAs), which include an SPS chapter containing specific U.S. import requirements that the partner country has agreed to recognize. Examples include specific product or processing standards, requirements for products to be produced in disease-free areas, quarantine and inspection procedures, sampling and testing requirements, residue limits for pesticides and drugs in foods, and prohibitions on certain food additives.

APHIS works with the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Customs and Border Protection (CBP), in addition to other federal agencies (e.g., Food Safety and Inspection Service, Food and Drug Administration), to enforce agricultural import regulations. CBP has authority to enforce APHIS regulations at ports of entry. APHIS and CBP personnel inspect shipments of imported agricultural products and certify that the required animal or plant health import permits and SPS documentation accompany each shipment.

APHIS Authority Over Health Import Permits

For much of the 20 th century, animal and plant health bureaus within USDA operated independently of one another. The creation of APHIS consolidated these bureaus in 1972. There are a number of statutes (e.g., Table 1 ) that have established APHIS's authority over health import permits. However, the majority of the directives are found in two key legislative actions:

1. The Animal Health Protection Act (AHPA, 7 U.S.C. § § 8301 et seq .) is the primary federal law governing the protection of animal health. It gives APHIS broad authority to detect, control, or eradicate pests or diseases of livestock or poultry. AHPA consolidated all of the animal quarantine and related laws—some dating back to the late 1800s—and replaced them with one statutory framework. While most of the authorities contained in the consolidated AHPA were taken from existing laws, some new provisions were added to fill in gaps in legal authority. 2. The Plant Protection Act of 2000 (PPA, 7 U.S.C. § § 7701 et seq . ) is the primary federal law governing plant pests in foreign and interstate commerce, covering agricultural commodities, plants, biological control organisms, articles that might be infested, means of transportation, and other pathways for moving pests. It authorizes APHIS to prohibit or restrict the importation, exportation, and interstate movement of plants, plant products, certain biological control organisms, noxious weeds, and plant pests. It also authorizes APHIS to inspect foreign plant imports, quarantine any state or premise infested with a new pest or noxious weed, and cooperate with states in certain control and eradication actions.

Both AHPA and PPA give APHIS authority to inspect agricultural imports. However, after the events of September 11, 2001, congressional concern about agroterrorism—the deliberate introduction of an animal or plant disease to infect food, causing economic losses and/or undermining social stability—triggered the strengthening of APHIS and other federal agency agricultural inspection activities. Congress passed the Public Health Security and the Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002 (16 U.S.C. §§3371-3378; commonly referred to as the Bioterrorism Act) to bolster protection of the nation's food and water supplies and prevent unauthorized access to certain animal and plant disease organisms in laboratories. Since the enactment of the Bioterrorism Act, APHIS-issued health permits have been required to accompany APHIS-regulated agricultural imports to facilitate trade.

Annual Appropriations to Conduct APHIS Health Import Permit Activities

Overall, the House and Senate Agriculture Committees maintain jurisdiction over USDA's meat and poultry inspection programs and also other food-safety-related programs administered by other USDA agencies. These House and Senate committees direct APHIS, other federal agencies, states, industry, and professional groups to facilitate international and domestic agricultural trade.

The Subcommittees on Agriculture, Rural Development, Food and Drug Administration, and Related Agencies of the House and Senate Appropriations Committees appropriate funds for APHIS. Between FY2014 and FY2018, APHIS's discretionary appropriation has averaged $877 million annually. APHIS's appropriations cover four broad mission areas: (1) Safeguarding and Emergency Preparedness/Response, (2) Agency-Wide Programs, (3) Safe Trade and International Technical Assistance, and (4) Animal Welfare. The Safeguarding and Emergency Preparedness/Response portion of the APHIS budget is responsible for monitoring animal and plant health in the United States and throughout the world and represents roughly 85% of APHIS's annual budget. Most of the animal and plant health import permit activities are housed in this mission area.

In May 2018, both the House and Senate appropriations committees reported bills ( H.R. 5961 , S. 2976 , 115 th Congress) that would have provided roughly $1 billion for the APHIS budget for FY2019. This amount was roughly $260 million more than Administration's FY2019 request and would have amounted to an increase of 7% from the FY2018 appropriation of $981.9 million. In August 2018, the Senate passed H.R. 6147 , which would have provided $1 billion for APHIS for FY2019.

When the APHIS administrator considers it necessary to take emergency action to protect U.S. agriculture or prevent pest or disease entry into the United States, the administrator may issue a Federal Order. Such Federal Orders are effective immediately, contain specific regulatory requirements, and remain in effect until they are revised by another Federal Order or until an interim rule on the subject is published.

APHIS issues Federal Orders, under the PPA, which authorizes USDA to prohibit or restrict the importation or entry of any plant, plant part, or article that USDA identifies as necessary to prevent the introduction or dissemination of a plant pest into or within the United States. For example, in June 2018, APHIS released a Federal Order prohibiting the importation of pomegranate arils from Peru into the United States due to concerns about the potential importation of the Mediterranean fruit fly ( Ceratitis capitata ). This Federal Order is still in effect as of January 9, 2019.

Obtaining an Animal or Plant Health Import Permit

Agricultural imports arrive to the Un ited States through five U.S. Customs Districts ( Figure 2 ). Although APHIS regulations are enforced at the ports of entry, they are typically mediated through health import permits.

APHIS's Plant Production Quarantine and Veterinary Services oversee the health import permit process for a "plant health import permit" or "animal health import permit," respectively ( Figure 3 ). APHIS works with several federal agencies to issue import permits.

U.S. importers obtain APHIS health import permits via the APHIS website ("ePermit") or in consultation with APHIS or state Department of Agriculture offices. Many U.S. importers use ePermit for the importation of products from abroad as well as for interstate trade. The ePermit system enables federal regulatory officials to issue, track, and verify the validity of import permits online. There is a cost to the importer associated with each ePermit application.

APHIS and the state-level authorities often request health import permit submissions alongside supporting documentation ( Figure 4 ). In many cases, a biosafety facility inspection is a part of the review process—where a facility (e.g., laboratory, greenhouse, growth chamber) must demonstrate they can adequately and safely contain certain organisms. Health import permits are normally processed and issued within 10 business days of receipt of the application.

After a health import permit is obtained, APHIS and/or CBP must inspect the APHIS-regulated product. One of the flagship programs that APHIS and CBP collaborate on and administer is the Agricultural Quarantine Inspection (AQI) program. AQI ensures that the required health permits, sanitary certificates (for animal products), and phytosanitary certificates (for plant products) accompany each shipment. APHIS transfers funds to CBP to conduct AQI activities.

APHIS collects AQI user fees from international airline passengers, operators of commercial vehicles, cruise ship passengers, and importers of shipments requiring phytosanitary treatments. Congress appropriates funding for AQI each year (e.g., operating expenses such as rent, utilities, travel, and supplies to conduct program activities). The AQI user fees recover costs that APHIS and CBP bear to administer the inspections. USDA estimates that in FY2018, AQI collected $765 million in fees, of which it transferred $539 million to DHS and retained $226 million to augment its discretionary appropriation. In a 2013 report, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) identified a gap between fee revenues and total program costs. In its report, GAO recommended aligning the division of fees between APHIS and CBP with their respective costs and that the two agencies ensure that fees are collected when due. In February 2018, APHIS announced it had implemented all of GAO's recommendations.

Role of Other Government Entities in Plant and Animal Imports

Importers must obtain APHIS-issued health import permits before beginning the inspection process. In addition to APHIS, Congress has directed other federal agencies and state-level Departments of Agriculture (see Table 2 ) to participate in inspecting APHIS-regulated products:

The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has taken steps to protect the public from terrorist attacks on the U.S. food supply and other food-related emergencies in collaboration with DHS. Since 2003, FDA has advised U.S. importers to submit "prior notice" online forms to FDA before food is imported or offered for import into the United States. Unlike APHIS, FDA does not enforce industry guidelines, but FDA does review APHIS-issued import permits to verify the disease or pest status of the agricultural product. The Food Safety Modernization Act (FSMA; P.L. 111-353 ) created new rules governing FDA's food inspection regime of both domestic and imported foods under the agency's jurisdiction. CBP and APHIS inspect agricultural products together through the AQI program. CBP officials require U.S. importers to present an APHIS-issued import permit before conducting inspections. The F ood Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS) has regulatory oversight of meat, poultry, and some egg products. FSIS often requests APHIS-issued health import permits before proceeding with meat inspections. In the case of FSIS-regulated products, FSIS requires APHIS-issued animal health import permits to ensure that the meat and/or poultry ingredients in such food products are prepared under FSIS inspection or in a foreign establishment certified by a foreign inspection system approved by FSIS. S tate-l evel D epartments of A griculture enforce APHIS regulations. States have different animal and plant health import restrictions that apply to interstate trade. Some states have heightened restrictions based on disease and pest detections. Similar to FSIS, state-level regulators typically request APHIS-issued animal or plant health import permits before conducting their inspections. State-level Departments of Agriculture often coordinate with APHIS and CBP directly (e.g., when a state detects a disease outbreak).

Congress has long been involved in efforts to prevent the entry of pest and disease threats into the United States from agricultural imports. This oversight has manifest in various congressional actions, including continuing to provide APHIS with appropriations to monitor pests and diseases, introducing legislation to address invasive species (e.g., Areawide Integrated Pest Management, H.R. 5411 , 115 th Congress), and directing CBP to enforce APHIS regulations to deter agricultural smuggling into the United States. APHIS-issued animal and plant health import permits can be a tool to prevent agricultural import threats to the United States. The sections that follow summarize selected issues that Congress has addressed by directing APHIS to undertake a specific role, assigning the agency with specific responsibilities, or authorizing it carry out certain actions.

In the event of a U.S. disease outbreak or pest infestation, APHIS is designated to be the lead U.S. agency for informing the international community (such as to the World Organization for Animal Health, also known as "OIE"). Typically, APHIS would directly contact the partner country's scientific authority to explain the nature and extent of the outbreak. In most cases, APHIS and officials of the partner country observe the SPS guidelines agreed upon under the WTO framework or, in some cases, the SPS chapters in individual FTAs. Responses to a pest or disease outbreak can include a complete ban on the importation of U.S. products impacted by the pest/disease. Under certain circumstances, a "regionalization" protocol may be applied in which a specific exporting region within the United States may be recognized as disease- or pest-free.

In the event of a trading partner experiencing a disease outbreak or pest infestation, the notification process is similar to a U.S. outbreak (e.g., informing OIE). APHIS informs U.S. importers of the trading partner outbreak. U.S. importers work with APHIS to verify that the health import permit reflects the disease or pest status of the exporting country. APHIS provides guidance to U.S. importers if their health import permits would be accepted (e.g., following SPS protocol of regionalization) or rejected (e.g., ban products from an infected trading partner).

Table 3 provides a selected listing of prominent APHIS-monitored diseases and pests that pose a threat to U.S. agriculture. Among these are disease concerns, including avian influenza and foot-and-mouth disease, and invasive plant pests such as the Asian longhorned beetle and the emerald ash borer. In some instances, agricultural imports (or even interstate shipments) can arrive into AQI with pests and diseases that could impact public health or U.S. agricultural production systems.

Congress has sometimes directed APHIS to address certain diseases through the annual appropriations process. For example, the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018 ( P.L. 115-141 ), includes a general provision providing APHIS with an additional $5.5 million—to remain available until the end of FY2019—to fund a multiple-agency response to citrus greening disease.

Agroterrorism is the deliberate introduction of an animal or plant disease with the objective of infecting food, causing economic losses and/or undermining social stability. Requiring U.S. importers to obtain APHIS-issued health import permits is one way that APHIS and the CBP protect against agroterrorism. Permits provide APHIS and CBP inspectors an opportunity to conduct random sampling to assist in disease and pest identification or to detect other potential threats.

Congress has taken steps to address potential harmful imports ("select agents") that could impact public health or animal/plant health through the Bioterrorism Act by directing the Department of Health and Human Services's (HHS) Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and APHIS to enforce the Select Agents and Toxins List under the Federal Select Agent Program. The agents and toxins on this list have been determined to pose a threat to human and animal health, plant health, or animal and plant products. Some of these agents and toxins are overseen by HHS, others by USDA, and certain ones by both agencies.

An invasive species is a nonnative (also known as an alien ) species that does or is likely to cause economic or environmental harm or harm to human health. Invasive species include plants, animals, and microbes. The introduction of invasive species into the United States—whether deliberate or unintentional—can threaten native animal and plant communities, lead to ecosystem disruptions, and contribute to extinctions of native species. Invasive species can also impact biodiversity and alter habitats and can result in the introduction of new pests and diseases. An estimated 50,000 non-native invasive animal and plant species have been introduced to the United States for over a century, with a 2011 study citing total costs exceeding $100 billion annually—including economic costs related to damages as well as management, mitigation, and recovery activities.

APHIS collects information on invasive species and monitors their impacts (e.g., on agricultural production, forest lands). The information is updated and shared with AQI and ports of entries. The health import permits provide the APHIS/CBP officials specific guidelines (e.g., identifying specific pests), depending on the origination of the product, that facilitate detection during inspecting or random sampling of the imported agricultural products. U.S. importers also work with APHIS and other federal agencies (e.g., the Environmental Protection Agency) to obtain regulations on preventing an invasive species infestation (e.g., vessel ballast water discharge).

Several statutes provide federal agencies with authorities to address invasive species in the United States. Some in Congress have expressed interest in pursuing legislation to reduce the prevalence of invasive species, such as through the introduction of "area-wide integrated pest management" (e.g., H.R. 5411 , 115 th Congress), a pest management strategy that is applied within a geographical area. This bill would have expanded the USDA Integrated Research, Education, and Extension Competitive Grants Program for qualified area-wide integrated pest management projects.

Over the past 30 years, there has been a steady increase in the movement of people and agricultural products around the world. The volume of smuggled and improperly imported agricultural products entering the United States has been a congressional concern. Products smuggled into the United States can harbor exotic plant and animal pests, diseases, or invasive species that could damage domestic crops, livestock, and the environment. If APHIS identifies an illegally imported product or a regulatory violation, it may seize the item and pursue civil and criminal penalties, if warranted. APHIS encourages distributors and retailers to purchase products that have been imported through legal channels that are typically accompanied by APHIS health import permits.

One way that Congress has attempted to prevent agricultural smuggling is through the Lacey Act. The Lacey Act dates from 1900 and prohibits the importation of any plant—with limited exceptions—that is taken or traded in violation of domestic or international laws. The act requires declarations—in addition to the APHIS-issued plant health import permits—for imported shipments of most plants or plant products. APHIS works with CBP, the U.S. Coast Guard (e.g., for fisheries violations), the National Marine Fisheries Service, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the U.S. Forest Service, and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement to enforce the Lacey Act through inspection or monitoring activities. APHIS's role in this context is to collect APHIS-issued health import permits, manage the declaration requirement, provide guidance to importers regarding the declaration, perform compliance checks, and provide enforcement agencies with information to assist their investigations. The declaration is to be made by the importer at the time of import. According to USDA, both CBP and APHIS activities have contributed to an increase in the number of declarations, with approximately 1 million declarations in FY2017, up roughly 300,000 from FY2016. This increase has coincided with the introduction of the online system in lieu of paper-based declarations.


Cybersecurity: Legislation and Hearings, 115th-116th Congresses

Summary: Most major cybersecurity legislative provisions were enacted prior to 2002, despite many recommendations having been made over the past decade. More recently, in the 115th and 116th Congresses, cybersecurity legislation has received either committee or floor action or final passage, and both chambers have held multiple hearings.

Summary: In the 116th Congress, a number of House and Senate bills have received consideration, and hearings have been held by committees in each chamber.

Summary: In the 115th Congress, 31 bills received some type of action (committee consideration or passage by one or both chambers). Five bills became public law. The House held 54 hearings on cybersecurity issues and the Senate held 40 hearings.

Cybersecurity Legislation and Hearings in the 116th and 115th Congresses

This report provides links to cybersecurity-related bills with some type of committee, floor, or chamber action (i.e., action subsequent to introduction). It also provides links to cybersecurity-related hearings. Table 1 lists House bills in the 116th Congress. Table 2 lists Senate bills in the 116th Congress. Table 3 lists House bills in the 115th Congress. Table 4 lists Senate bills in the 115th Congress.

In the 116 th Congress, the House has passed four cybersecurity-related bills and the Senate has given varying levels of consideration to four others, passing one. See Table 1 for a list of House bills and Table 2 for a list of Senate bills in the 116 th Congress .

Thirty-one bills received committee consideration or passed one or both chambers in the 115 th Congress. Five bills became public laws:

On September 28, 2018, the Department of Energy Research and Innovation Act was signed into law ( P.L. 115-246 ). The law establishes a Department of Energy policy for science and energy research and development programs; reforms National Laboratory management and technology transfer programs; and directs DOE to report to Congress on integrated research programs in cybersecurity and national security, among other issues.

On August 13, 2018, the John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019 was signed into law ( P.L. 115-232 ). The bill authorizes appropriations and sets forth policies regarding Department of Defense's military activities, including cybersecurity matters.

On December 12, 2017, the President signed the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018 ( P.L. 115-91 ), which establishes several cybersecurity efforts and new rules and programs related to information security. These include an official ban on Kaspersky Lab software (Section 1634); definition by the President of "cyberwar" (Section 1633); the Pentagon's reexamination of the Defense Department's internal organizational structure surrounding its cybersecurity-related missions (Section 1641, Section 1644, and others); and the National Science Foundation and Office of Personnel Management's launch of a joint pilot scholarship program aimed at educating and recruiting talent directly out of universities (Section 1649).

On November 21, 2017, the FITARA Enhancement Act of 2017 became law ( P.L. 115-88 ). Among other things, it requires the chief information officer of each covered agency for information technology to conduct a risk management review of those investments that have received a high-risk rating for four consecutive quarters.

On November 2, 2017, Congress passed the Strengthening State and Local Cyber Crime Fighting Act of 2017 ( P.L. 115-76 ), which authorizes a National Computer Forensics Institute within the U.S. Secret Service. The institute is to disseminate information related to the investigation and prevention of cyber and electronic crime and related threats.

CRS Report R43831, Cybersecurity Issues and Challenges: In Brief , by Eric A. Fischer CRS In Focus IF10610, Cybersecurity Legislation in the 113th and 114th Congresses , by Eric A. Fischer CRS Report R44069, Cybersecurity and Information Sharing: Comparison of H.R. 1560 (PCNA and NCPAA) and S. 754 (CISA) , by Eric A. Fischer CRS Report R43996, Cybersecurity and Information Sharing: Comparison of H.R. 1560 and H.R. 1731 as Passed by the House , by Eric A. Fischer and Stephanie M. Logan CRS Report R42114, Federal Laws Relating to Cybersecurity: Overview of Major Issues, Current Laws, and Proposed Legislation , by Eric A. Fischer CRS Report R43821, Legislation to Facilitate Cybersecurity Information Sharing: Economic Analysis , by N. Eric Weiss

The following tables list c ybersecurity hearings in the 116 th Congress . Table 5 lists House hearings arranged by date in reverse chronological order. Table 6 lists House hearings arranged by committee. Table 7 lists Senate hearings arranged by date in reverse chronological order , and Table 8 lists Senate hearings arranged by committee. CRS identified these hearings as being primarily about cybersecurity or related issues. However, no single, objective selection criterion was available for CRS to use in identifying which hearings to include. The list of hearings should therefore not be considered definitive.

Table document titles are active links to the committee's website for that particular hearing .

Table 9 lists House hearings arranged by date in reverse chronological order , and Table 10 lists House hearings arranged by committee. Table 11 lists Senate hearings by date. Table 12 lists Senate hearings arranged by committee. CRS identified these hearings as being primarily about cybersecurity or related issues. However, no single, objective selection criterion was available for CRS to use in identifying which hearings to include. The list of hearings should therefore not be considered definitive.

In the tables , the document titles are active links to the committee's website for that particular hearing .


U.S. Foreign Assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean: FY2019 Appropriations

Summary: The United States provides foreign assistance to Latin American and Caribbean nations to support development and other U.S. objectives. U.S. policymakers have emphasized different strategic interests in the region at different times, from combating Soviet influence during the Cold War to promoting democracy and open markets since the 1990s. The Trump Administration has sought to reduce foreign aid significantly and refocus U.S. assistance efforts in the region to address U.S. domestic concerns, such as irregular migration and transnational crime.

Summary: FY2019 Budget Request

Summary: For FY2019, the Trump Administration requested $1.1 billion for Latin America and the Caribbean through foreign assistance accounts managed by the State Department and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). That amount would have been $581 million, or 34%, less than the estimated $1.7 billion of U.S. assistance the region received in FY2018. The proposal would have cut funding for every type of assistance and nearly every Latin American and Caribbean nation. The Trump Administration also proposed eliminating the Inter-American Foundation—a small, independent U.S. foreign assistance agency that promotes grassroots development in the region—and consolidating its programs into USAID.

Summary: The Administration's efforts to scale back U.S. assistance could have significant implications for U.S. policy in Latin America and the Caribbean. Faced with potential cuts, U.S. agencies could accelerate efforts to transition countries in the region away from traditional development assistance toward other forms of bilateral engagement. Reductions in State Department-managed security assistance could lead to the Department of Defense taking on a larger role in U.S. security cooperation. Moreover, many argue that reductions in foreign aid, combined with other policy shifts, could contribute to a relative decline in U.S. influence in the region.

Summary: Legislative Developments

Summary: President Trump signed into law the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2019 (P.L. 116-6), on February 15, 2019. Division F of the act—the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2019—includes funding for foreign assistance programs in Latin America and the Caribbean. The measure was preceded by three short-term continuing resolutions (P.L. 115-245, P.L. 115-298, and P.L. 116-5), which funded foreign assistance programs at the FY2018 level, and a 35-day lapse in appropriations from December 22, 2018, to January 25, 2019. Although the House and Senate Appropriations Committees had approved their FY2019 foreign assistance appropriations measures (H.R. 6385 and S. 3108, respectively) in June 2018, neither bill received floor consideration prior to the end of the 115th Congress.

Summary: P.L. 116-6 and the accompanying joint explanatory statement do not specify appropriations levels for every Latin American and Caribbean nation. Nevertheless, the amounts designated for key U.S. initiatives in Central America, Colombia, and Mexico significantly exceed the Administration's request. The act provides

Summary: $527.6 million to continue implementation of the U.S. Strategy for Engagement in Central America, which is $92 million more than the Administration requested but $99 million less than Congress appropriated for the initiative in FY2018. at least $418.3 million to support the peace process and security and development efforts in Colombia, which is $153 million more than the Administration requested and $27 million more than Congress appropriated for Colombia in FY2018. $162.7 million to support security and rule-of-law efforts in Mexico, which is $84 million more than the Administration requested and $10 million more than Congress appropriated for Mexico in FY2018.

Foreign assistance is one of the tools the United States employs to advance U.S. interests in Latin America and the Caribbean. The focus and funding levels of aid programs change along with broader U.S. policy goals. Current aid programs reflect the diverse needs of the countries in the region (see Figure 1 for a map of Latin America and the Caribbean). Some countries receive the full range of U.S. assistance as they struggle with political, socioeconomic, and security challenges. Others have made major strides in consolidating democratic governance and improving living conditions; these countries no longer receive traditional U.S. development assistance but typically receive some U.S. support to address security challenges, such as transnational crime.

Congress authorizes and appropriates foreign assistance to the region and conducts oversight of aid programs and the executive branch agencies charged with managing them. The Trump Administration has proposed significant reductions in foreign assistance expenditures to shift resources to other budget priorities. The Administration also is reassessing the objectives of U.S. foreign assistance efforts, including those in Latin America and the Caribbean. However, Congress would have to approve any shifts in aid funding levels or priorities.

This report provides an overview of U.S. assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean. It examines historical and recent trends in aid to the region; the Trump Administration's FY2019 budget request for aid administered by the State Department, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and the Inter-American Foundation; and FY2019 foreign aid appropriations legislation. It also analyzes how the Administration's efforts to scale back assistance could affect U.S. policy in Latin America and the Caribbean.

Trends in U.S. Assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean

The United States has long been a major contributor of foreign assistance to countries in Latin America and the Caribbean. Between 1946 and 2017, the United States provided the region with more than $88 billion ($181 billion in constant 2017 dollars) of assistance. U.S. assistance to the region spiked in the early 1960s following the introduction of President John F. Kennedy's Alliance for Progress, an anti-poverty initiative that sought to counter Soviet and Cuban influence in the aftermath of Fidel Castro's 1959 seizure of power in Cuba. After a period of decline, U.S. assistance to the region increased again following the 1979 assumption of power by the leftist Sandinistas in Nicaragua. Throughout the 1980s, the United States provided considerable support to Central American governments battling leftist insurgencies to prevent potential Soviet allies from establishing political or military footholds in the region. U.S. aid flows declined in the mid-1990s, following the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the end of the Central American conflicts (see Figure 2 ).

U.S. foreign assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean began to increase once again in the late 1990s and remained on a generally upward trajectory through 2010. The higher levels of assistance were partially the result of increased spending on humanitarian and development assistance. In the aftermath of Hurricane Mitch in 1998, the United States provided extensive humanitarian and reconstruction assistance to several countries in Central America. The establishment of the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief in 2003 and the Millennium Challenge Corporation in 2004 also provided a number of countries in the region with new sources of U.S. assistance. In addition, the United States provided significant assistance to Haiti in the aftermath of a massive earthquake in 2010.

Increased funding for counternarcotics and security programs also contributed to the rise in U.S. assistance. Beginning with President Bill Clinton and the 106 th Congress in FY2000, successive Administrations and Congresses provided substantial amounts of foreign aid to Colombia and its Andean neighbors to combat drug trafficking in the region and end Colombia's long-running internal armed conflict. Spending received another boost in FY2008, when President George W. Bush joined with his Mexican counterpart to announce the Mérida Initiative, a package of U.S. counter-drug and anti-crime assistance for Mexico and Central America. In FY2010, Congress and the Obama Administration split the Central American portion of the Mérida Initiative into a separate Central America Regional Security Initiative (CARSI) and created a similar program for the countries of the Caribbean known as the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative (CBSI).

U.S. assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean began to decline again in FY2011. Although the decline was partially the result of reductions in the overall U.S. foreign assistance budget in the aftermath of the U.S. recession, it also reflected changes in the region. Due to stronger economic growth and more effective social policies, the percentage of people living in poverty in Latin America fell from 45% in 2002 to 30% in 2017. Some nations, such as Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Uruguay, are now in a position to provide technical assistance to other countries in the region. Other nations, such as Bolivia and Ecuador, have expelled U.S. personnel and opposed U.S. assistance projects, leading to the closure of USAID offices. Collectively, these changes have resulted in the U.S. government concentrating foreign assistance resources in fewer countries and sectors. Aid levels have rebounded since FY2014, largely due to a renewed focus on Central America in response to recent migration trends, but appropriations remain below the FY2008-FY2013 average.

Trump Administration's FY2019 Foreign Assistance Budget Request5

The Trump Administration requested $1.1 billion for Latin America and the Caribbean through foreign assistance accounts managed by the State Department and USAID in FY2019. That amount would have been $581 million, or 34%, less than the estimated $1.7 billion of assistance Congress appropriated for the region in FY2018 (see Table 1 ). The Administration also proposed eliminating the Inter-American Foundation—a small, independent U.S. foreign assistance agency that promotes grassroots development in Latin America and the Caribbean—and consolidating its programs into USAID. The proposed reductions for the region were slightly greater than the 28% reduction proposed for the global foreign aid budget. Congress ultimately did not adopt many of the Administration's proposed cuts (see " Legislative Developments ," below).

Foreign Assistance Categories and Accounts7

About $515.9 million (46%) of the Administration's proposed FY2019 foreign aid budget for Latin America and the Caribbean was requested through a new Economic Support and Development Fund (ESDF). The ESDF foreign assistance account would have consolidated aid that currently is provided through the Development Assistance (DA) and Economic Support Fund (ESF) accounts to support democracy, the rule of law, economic reform, education, agriculture, and natural resource management. Whereas the DA account is often used for long-term projects to foster broad-based economic progress and social stability in developing countries, the ESDF account, like the ESF account, would focus more on countries and programs that are deemed critical to short-term U.S. security and strategic objectives. The FY2019 request included $296.4 million (36%) less funding for the ESDF account than was provided to the region through the DA and ESF accounts combined in FY2018.

Another $151.4 million (14%) of the Administration's FY2019 request for the region would have been provided through the two Global Health Programs (GHP) accounts. This amount includes $119.2 million requested through the State Department GHP account for HIV/AIDS programs and $32.2 million requested through the USAID GHP account to support maternal and child health, nutrition, and malaria programs. Under the FY2019 request for the region, funding for the State Department GHP account would have declined by $17.5 million (13%) and funding for the USAID GHP account would have declined by $31.2 million (49%) compared with the FY2018 estimate.

The remaining $442.9 million (40%) of the Administration's FY2019 request for Latin America and the Caribbean would have supported security assistance programs, including the following:

$390 million requested through the International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) account for counter-narcotics and civilian law enforcement efforts and projects intended to strengthen judicial institutions. INCLE funding for the region would have declined by $152.2 million (28%) compared with the FY2018 estimate. $21.9 million requested through the Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining, and Related Programs (NADR) account, which funds efforts to counter global threats, such as terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and humanitarian demining programs. NADR funding would have declined by $1.7 million (7%) compared with the FY2018 estimate. $11.1 million requested through the International Military Education and Training (IMET) account to train Latin American and Caribbean military personnel. IMET funding would have declined by $1.5 million (12%) compared with the FY2018 estimate. $20 million requested through the Foreign Military Financing account to provide U.S.-made defense equipment to Colombia. FMF funding would have declined by $66 million (77%) compared with the FY2018 estimate.

The Trump Administration's FY2019 foreign assistance request would have reduced funding for nearly every country and regional program in Latin America and the Caribbean (see Table 2 ). Some of the most notable reductions that the Administration proposed are discussed below.

The FY2019 request included $435.5 million to continue the U.S. Strategy for Engagement in Central America, which would have been a $191 million (30%) cut compared with the FY2018 estimate. The strategy is designed to address the underlying conditions driving irregular migration from the Central America to the United States by promoting good governance, economic prosperity, and improved security in the region. The request included $252.8 million for CARSI (-21%), $45.7 million for El Salvador (-21%), $69.4 million for Guatemala (-42%), $65.8 million for Honduras (-18%), and $1.8 million combined for Belize, Costa Rica, and Panama (-82%). It did not include any democracy assistance to support civil society groups in Nicaragua; such assistance totaled $10 million in FY2018.

Colombia would have remained the single largest recipient of U.S. assistance in Latin America and the Caribbean under the Administration's FY2019 request; however, aid would have fallen to $265.4 million—a $125.8 million (32%) reduction compared with the FY2018 estimate. Colombia has received significant amounts of U.S. assistance to support counternarcotics and counterterrorism efforts since FY2000. The FY2019 request included funds to support implementation of the Colombian government's peace accord with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC); it sought to foster reconciliation within Colombian society, expand state presence to regions historically under FARC control, and support rural economic development in marginalized communities. The request also included funds to support Colombia's drug eradication and interdiction efforts.

Haiti, which has received high levels of aid for many years as a result of its significant development challenges, would have remained the second-largest recipient of U.S. assistance in the region in FY2019 under the Administration's request. U.S. assistance increased significantly after a massive earthquake struck Haiti in 2010 but has gradually declined from those elevated levels. The Administration's FY2019 request would have provided $170.5 million to Haiti to improve food security, increase economic opportunity, promote good governance, and address health challenges (particularly HIV/AIDS). This would have been a $13.9 million (8%) cut compared with the FY2018 estimate.

Mexico would have received $78.9 million of assistance under the FY2019 request, which would have been a $73.8 million (48%) cut compared with the FY2018 estimate. Mexico traditionally had not been a major U.S. aid recipient due to its middle-income status, but it began receiving larger amounts of counternarcotics and anti-crime assistance through the Mérida Initiative in FY2008. The Administration's FY2019 request for Mexico included funds to strengthen the rule of law; secure borders and ports; and combat transnational organized crime, including opium poppy cultivation and heroin production.

The FY2019 request included $36.2 million for the CBSI, which would have been a $21.5 million (37%) cut compared with the FY2018 estimate. The CBSI funds maritime and aerial security cooperation, law enforcement capacity building, border and port security, justice-sector reform, and crime prevention programs in the Caribbean.

In addition to the proposed reductions to State Department and USAID-managed assistance for the region, discussed above, the Trump Administration's FY2019 budget request proposed eliminating the Inter-American Foundation (IAF) and consolidating its programs into USAID. The IAF is an independent U.S. foreign assistance agency established through the Foreign Assistance Act of 1969 ( 22 U.S.C. §290f ). Congress created the agency after conducting a comprehensive review of previous assistance efforts and determining that programs at the government-to-government level had largely failed to promote social and civic change in the region despite fostering economic growth. With annual appropriations of $22.5 million in recent years, the IAF provides grants and other targeted assistance directly to the organized poor to foster economic and social development and to encourage civic engagement in their communities. The IAF is active in 20 countries in the region—including eight countries in which USAID no longer has a presence—and has focused particularly on migrant-sending communities in Central America since 2014.

The Trump Administration asserted that merging the IAF's small grants programs into USAID would "better integrate them with USAID's existing global development programs, more cohesively serve U.S. foreign policy objectives, and increase organizational efficiencies through reducing duplication and overhead." The FY2019 request included $3.5 million to conduct an orderly IAF closeout and $20 million under USAID's Latin America and Caribbean Regional program to continue providing small grants to poor and remote communities throughout the region (see Table 3 ). Opponents of the merger noted that Congress specifically created the IAF as an alternative to other U.S. agencies. They argued that USAID would not be able to maintain the IAF's distinct model and flexibility, which have allowed it to invest in innovative projects and work with groups that otherwise would be unable or unwilling to partner with the U.S. government.

On February 15, 2019, nearly four and a half months into the fiscal year, President Trump signed into law the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2019 ( P.L. 116-6 ). Division F of the act—the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2019—includes funding for foreign assistance programs in Latin America and the Caribbean. The measure was preceded by three short-term continuing resolutions ( P.L. 115-245 , P.L. 115-298 , and P.L. 116-5 ), which funded foreign assistance programs at the FY2018 level, and a 35-day lapse in appropriations from December 22, 2018, to January 25, 2019. Although the House and Senate Appropriations Committees had approved their FY2019 foreign assistance appropriations measures ( H.R. 6385 and S. 3108 , respectively) in June 2018, neither bill received floor consideration prior to the end of the 115 th Congress.

P.L. 116-6 and the accompanying joint explanatory statement do not specify foreign assistance appropriations levels for every Latin American and Caribbean nation. Nevertheless, the amounts designated for key U.S. initiatives in Central America, Colombia, and Mexico significantly exceed the Administration's request (see Table 4 ).

Central America. According to the joint explanatory statement, the act provides $527.6 million to continue implementation of the U.S. Strategy for Engagement in Central America. That amount is $92 million more than the Administration requested but $99 million less than Congress appropriated for the initiative in FY2018. Unlike previous years, the measure provides the Secretary of State with significant flexibility to decide how to allocate the funds among the nations of the region. The joint explanatory statement notes that the Secretary of State should take into account the political will of Central American governments, including their demonstrated commitment to implement reforms "to reduce illegal migration and reduce corruption and impunity."

Colombia. The act provides "not less than" $418.3 million for Colombia, which is nearly $153 million more than the Administration requested and $27 million more than Congress appropriated in FY2018. The joint explanatory statement notes that the additional funding for FY2019, appropriated through the INCLE account, is intended to "bolster Colombia's drug eradication and interdiction efforts and enhance rural security."

Mexico . According to the joint explanatory statement, the act provides $162.7 million for Mexico. That amount is nearly $84 million more than the Administration requested and $10 million more than Congress appropriated for Mexico in FY2018. The additional funding for FY2019 is intended to support security and rule-of-law efforts, such as "programs to assist the Government of Mexico in securing its borders and reducing poppy cultivation and heroin and synthetic drug production."

Venezuela. The act provides "not less than" $17.5 million for programs to promote democracy and the rule of law in Venezuela. The joint explanatory statement notes that the legislation also includes assistance for Venezuelan refugees and migrants who have been forced to leave the country.

Inter-American Foundation. The act provides $22.5 million for the IAF, which is the same amount Congress appropriated for the agency in FY2018. The joint explanatory statement designates an additional $10 million, appropriated through the DA account, as a transfer to the IAF to carry out programs in Central America.

The Trump Administration's efforts to scale back U.S. foreign assistance could have significant implications for U.S. policy in Latin America and the Caribbean in the coming years. In particular, they could accelerate U.S. efforts to transition countries in the region away from traditional development assistance and toward other forms of bilateral engagement. They also could result in the Department of Defense (DOD) taking on a larger role in U.S. security cooperation with the region. Moreover, many argue the Administration's proposed foreign assistance cuts, combined with other U.S. policy shifts and the region's growing economic ties with other countries, such as China, could contribute to a relative decline in U.S. influence in Latin America and the Caribbean.

Over the past three decades, many Latin American and Caribbean countries have made major strides in consolidating democratic governance and improving living conditions for their citizens. As nations have achieved more advanced levels of development, the U.S. government has reduced the amount of assistance it provides to them while attempting to sustain long-standing relationships through other forms of engagement. Budget cuts often have accelerated this process by forcing U.S. agencies to refocus their assistance efforts on fewer countries. In the mid-1990s, for example, budget constraints compelled USAID to close its field offices in Argentina, Belize, Chile, Costa Rica, and Uruguay. Similarly, budget cuts in the aftermath of the 2007-2009 U.S. recession contributed to USAID's decision to close its field offices in Guyana and Panama.

The Trump Administration's desire to reduce foreign assistance funding could contribute to a new round of aid transitions. The FY2019 budget request would have zeroed out traditional development assistance for Brazil, Jamaica, and Nicaragua, and would have reduced it significantly for several other countries in the region. Although it appears as though many of those reductions were not enacted in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2019 ( P.L. 116-6 ), the Administration may push for further cuts in the coming years. The Administration's National Security Strategy, released in December 2017, asserts that the United States "will shift away from a reliance on assistance based on grants to approaches that attract private capital and catalyze private sector activity." Likewise, USAID has begun to reorient all of its country partnerships around the concept of "self-reliance," placing a greater emphasis on supporting countries' abilities to plan, finance, and implement solutions to their own development challenges.

Some development experts caution that such transitions should be done in a strategic manner to ensure that partner countries are able to sustain the progress that has been made with past U.S. investments and to prevent ruptures in bilateral relations that could be exploited by competing powers or compromise U.S. interests. These experts argue that successful transitions require careful planning and close coordination across the U.S. government, as well as with partner-country governments, local stakeholders, and other international donors. In their view, a timeline of three to five years, at a minimum, is necessary for the transition process.

A decision to no longer appropriate new foreign aid funds for a given country would not necessarily lead to an abrupt end to ongoing U.S. assistance programs. In recent years, Congress has appropriated most aid for Latin America and the Caribbean through foreign assistance accounts that provide the State Department and USAID with up to two fiscal years to obligate the funds and an additional four years to expend them. As a result, U.S. agencies often have a pipeline of previously appropriated funds available to be expended on assistance programs.

If aid transitions do occur, the United States could remain engaged with its partners in the region in several ways. As large-scale development programs are closed out, the U.S. government could use smaller, more nimble programs, such as those managed by the IAF, to maintain its presence in remote areas and continue to build relationships with local leaders. As grant assistance is withdrawn, the U.S. government could help partner countries mobilize private capital by entering into trade and investment agreements or by providing loan guarantees and technical assistance through the newly authorized U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (IDFC). As former aid recipients look to share their development expertise with other nations, the U.S. government could enter into trilateral cooperation initiatives to jointly fund and implement programs in third countries that remain priorities for U.S. assistance.

Congress has demonstrated an interest in influencing the pace and shape of aid transitions. The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018 ( P.L. 115-141 ) directed the USAID Administrator to submit a report to Congress describing the conditions and benchmarks under which aid transitions may occur, the actions required by USAID to facilitate such transitions, descriptions of the associated costs, and plans for ensuring post-transition development progress. The report, submitted in October 2018, notes that USAID has selected 17 publicly available, third-party metrics to help the agency assess the relative self-reliance of every country. If, after taking into account additional country-specific information, the agency determines a country is ready to transition, USAID is to begin an in-depth, consultative assessment process to consider potential models for continued partnership. The results of that process are to inform an implementation plan that will lay out the activities, resources, and sequencing needed to ensure a successful transition. Jamaica is one of two countries worldwide that USAID is using to test the new strategic transition process.

Congress could require USAID to provide additional information as the agency continues to develop its framework for strategic transitions and moves forward with the pilot project in Jamaica. For example, in the 115 th Congress, H.R. 6385 would have required the USAID Administrator to regularly consult with Congress and development stakeholders on "efforts to transition nations from assistance recipients to enduring diplomatic, economic, and security partners."

The Trump Administration's approach toward Latin America and the Caribbean has focused heavily on U.S. national security objectives. For example, the Administration described the FY2019 foreign assistance request for the region as an effort to "break the power of transnational criminal organizations and networks; shut down the illicit pathways used to traffic humans, drugs, money and weapons; and address the underlying causes that contribute to outmigration." The Administration's FY2019 budget proposal, however, would have reduced State Department-managed security assistance to the region (INCLE, NADR, IMET, and FMF) by 33% compared with the FY2018 estimate.

Some analysts have noted that any cuts to State Department-managed security assistance programs in Latin America and the Caribbean could be offset by increased support from DOD. Congress has authorized DOD to provide a wide range of security assistance to foreign nations (referred to as security cooperation by DOD) including many activities that overlap with those traditionally managed by the State Department. For example, 10 U.S.C. §333 authorizes DOD, with the concurrence of the State Department, to train and equip foreign security forces for counterterrorism operations, counter-weapons of mass destruction operations, counter-illicit drugs operations, counter-transnational organized crime operations, and maritime and border security operations, among other purposes.

Given the number of security challenges the United States faces around the globe, however, it is unclear whether DOD would devote increased funding to security cooperation in Latin America and the Caribbean. As a result of a provision (10 U.S.C. §381) enacted as part of the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2017 ( P.L. 114-328 ), DOD is required to submit formal, consolidated budget requests for security cooperation efforts, including the specific countries or regions where they are to take place, "to the extent practicable." For FY2019, DOD requested $55.1 million for security cooperation in the areas of responsibility of U.S. Northern Command and U.S. Southern Command, which encompass the Latin American and Caribbean region. That amount would be slightly less than the estimated $58.6 million DOD obligated for security cooperation in the region in FY2018. Both of those figures exclude funds for drug interdiction and counter-drug activities, which account for the vast majority of DOD security cooperation funding for Latin America and the Caribbean. In FY2017 (the most recent year for which data are available), DOD obligations for drug interdiction and counter-drug activities in the region totaled $210.8 million.

The exclusion of drug interdiction and counter-drug activities and the lack of country-by-country data in DOD's FY2019 security cooperation request make it difficult to assess the scope of DOD's planned activities in the region and the extent to which those activities may overlap with State Department security assistance programs. This lack of information may hinder congressional efforts to establish budget priorities and shape the relative balance of U.S. assistance in Latin America and the Caribbean. It also may weaken Congress's ability to incentivize policy changes in recipient nations as State Department-managed assistance withheld to comply with legislative conditions could be replaced with less transparent DOD support. DOD asserts that "in the long-term" it intends to include "some budgeting figures by country." Congress could use legislation to clarify the breadth of information it expects to receive from DOD in its annual security cooperation budget requests.

Although the relative importance of foreign assistance in U.S. relations with Latin American and Caribbean nations has declined since the end of the Cold War, the U.S. government continues to use assistance to advance key policy initiatives in the region. In recent years, U.S. assistance has supported efforts to reduce illicit drug production and end the long-running internal conflict in Colombia, combat transnational organized crime in Mexico, and address the root causes that drive unauthorized migration to the United States from Central America. This assistance has enabled the U.S. government to influence partner countries' policies, including the extent to which they dedicate resources to activities that they otherwise may not consider top priorities.

Some analysts and Latin American officials view the Administration's efforts to cut foreign aid as part of a broader trend of U.S. disengagement from the region. They note that President Trump withdrew from the Trans-Pacific Partnership trade agreement and imposed tariffs on several Latin American nations, has been slow to fill diplomatic posts in the region, and was the first U.S. president in 25 years to skip the triennial Summit of the Americas. They contend that this has created a leadership vacuum in the region that other powers have begun to fill. For example, some analysts warn that China, which has provided more than $140 billion in state-backed finance to Latin American and Caribbean nations since 2005, has begun to leverage its significant commercial ties into other forms of power that could come at the expense of the United States. Others note that it may not be a zero-sum game and that the region's increased ties with China do not necessarily portend a loss of U.S. influence.

Research suggests that foreign aid can influence perceptions of U.S. leadership, which have declined significantly in Latin America and the Caribbean over the past two years. In 2018, 31% of the region approved of "the job performance of the leadership of the United States," an 18-point decline compared to 2016. Consistently high disapproval ratings could constrain Latin American and Caribbean leaders' abilities to support Trump Administration initiatives and conclude agreements with the United States.

Many in Congress also have expressed concerns that significant foreign assistance cuts could weaken U.S. influence around the world. In H.Rept. 115-829 , for example, the House Appropriations Committee asserted that "the magnitude of the reductions proposed for United States diplomatic and development operations and programs in the fiscal year 2019 request would be counterproductive to the economic and security interests of the nation and would undermine our relationships with key partners and allies." Similarly, in S.Rept. 115-282 , the Senate Appropriations Committee asserted that the "proposed reduction to the International Affairs budget…reinforces the perception that the United States is retreating from its preeminent role as the world's superpower." These concerns may have influenced Congress's decision not to adopt many of the Administration's proposed foreign assistance cuts for FY2019.

Appendix A. U.S. Foreign Assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean by Account and Country or Regional Program: FY2017

Appendix B. U.S. Foreign Assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean by Account and Country or Regional Program: FY2018 Estimate

Appendix C. U.S. Foreign Assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean by Account and Country or Regional Program: FY2019 Request


Appropriations Subcommittee Structure: History of Changes from 1920 to 2019

Summary: This report details the evolution of the House and Senate Appropriations Committees' subcommittee structure from the 1920s to the present. In 1920, the House adopted a change in its rules to consolidate jurisdiction over all appropriations in the Appropriations Committee. After the enactment of the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921, the House reorganized its Appropriations Committee by establishing for the first time a set of subcommittees to consider appropriations bills based on the administrative organization of the executive branch. The Senate followed suit in 1922, and the two chambers have continued under that basic organizational approach since that time.

Summary: It is possible to divide the evolution of the modern Appropriations subcommittee structure into four eras. The first era, stretching roughly from the initial reorganization in the 1920s until the end of the Second World War, was marked by stability. Most of the changes in Appropriations structure resulted from combining bills (e.g., the Treasury Department bill with the Post Office Department bill beginning in 1924), although one new bill (and subcommittee) was created when the appropriations bill for the Department of Labor was split off from the Departments of State, Justice, Commerce, and Labor bill in 1939.

Summary: The second era, from the end of the Second World War through 1970, saw a number of significant changes. During this period, Congress attempted to keep pace with executive branch reorganizations (e.g., creation of subcommittees to consider appropriations for the new Departments of Defense in 1947 and Transportation in 1967) and changing national priorities (e.g., creation of a separate appropriations bill, and later subcommittee, for foreign operations).

Summary: The third era, from 1971 through 2003, was marked by a renewed stability. While some appropriations subcommittees were renamed to reflect changes in agency and departmental status, these changes did not represent major shifts in jurisdiction.

Summary: Following major changes in organization involving nearly every subcommittee in the 108th, 109th, and 110th Congresses, the two chambers have once again settled into an era of stable organization. In 2003, both the House and Senate Appropriations Committees merged their subcommittees on Transportation and Treasury and created new subcommittees to consider appropriations for the newly created Department of Homeland Security. In 2005, both chambers undertook major reorganizations, eliminating three subcommittees in the House and one in the Senate. This reorganization, however, left the two chambers with differing subcommittee jurisdictions. In 2007 the two Appropriations Committees reorganized again to reestablish parallel subcommittees that have remained in place since.

Summary: During the first session of the 110th Congress (2007), the House created the Select Intelligence Oversight Panel of the appropriations committee to oversee spending on federal intelligence activities. This panel was eliminated in 2011 at the beginning of the 112th Congress.

Summary: This report will be updated to reflect any changes in Appropriations subcommittee structure.

Article I, Section 9, of the U.S. Constitution provides, "No money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law." The Constitution does not, however, prescribe any specific structure or process for making appropriations. The committee structure established by Congress during the 20 th century assigns a prominent role to the Appropriations Committees of the House and Senate for both the development of appropriations legislation and oversight over budget execution. The Appropriations Committees, in turn, have created a system of subcommittees designed to facilitate their ability to carry out these tasks.

The number and jurisdictions of appropriations subcommittees have evolved to meet changing needs and circumstances. For example, reorganization was undertaken at the beginning of the 108 th Congress in response to the creation of a new Department of Homeland Security. After the legislation establishing the new department was enacted, the House Appropriations Committee established a new subcommittee. This modification of subcommittee structure affected eight of the existing subcommittees and was one of the most extensive reorganizations of the Appropriations Committees since the 1920s. Shortly thereafter, a similar change was made in the Senate Appropriations Committee.

Reorganization can also be undertaken to adapt to changes in congressional priorities. For example, in the reorganization that occurred at the start of the 109 th Congress, both the House and the Senate undertook a major change in subcommittee structure. This resulted in the elimination of three appropriations subcommittees in the House and one in the Senate and ultimately affected the jurisdictions of 10 appropriations subcommittees in the House and 8 in the Senate. Another major reorganization at the beginning of the 110 th Congress again shifted subcommittee jurisdiction to reestablish parallel House and Senate subcommittees.

Consolidation and Initial Stability: 1920-1946

By the end of the First World War, the idea that the President should play a prominent role in a more centralized budgetary process gained prominence, ultimately resulting in passage of the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921. In anticipation of the more centralized executive budget system provided under the act, the House also changed its rules to require that all appropriations be considered by the Appropriations Committee. During the late 19 th century, congressional rules had assigned jurisdiction over certain general appropriations bills to committees other than the House and Senate Appropriations Committees. Notably, the appropriations bills for the District of Columbia, Indian affairs, Agriculture Department, Army, Navy, Post Office Department, and rivers and harbors (i.e., public works) were all considered by their respective legislative committees.

A subsequent, additional change involved the organization of appropriations bills. Prior to the Budget and Accounting Act, appropriations bills (and subcommittees) tended to be organized along topical lines. For example, the military activities of the War Department were considered in appropriations bills reported by the Military Affairs Committee, and the activities of the Corps of Engineers were considered in River and Harbor appropriations bills reported by the Commerce Committee. The salaries and contingent expenses for the civilian administration of the department, however, were carried in the Legislative, Executive, and Judicial bill, which was within the jurisdiction of the Appropriations Committee. A similar division existed for most departments and was true even for agencies whose appropriations were wholly within the jurisdiction of the Appropriations Committee. Funding for the activities of agencies as disparate as the Interstate Commerce Commission, the Coast Guard, and the Bureau of Mines was carried in the Sundry Civil bill, which was frequently the largest of the general appropriations bills. Nevertheless, their salaries and expenses were generally funded in the Legislative, Executive, and Judicial bill.

Concurrent with the congressional consolidation of jurisdiction over appropriations, the newly established Bureau of the Budget recommended that appropriations bills be reorganized along administrative lines, where appropriations for salaries and expenses would be carried in the same bill as funding for programs and activities administered by a department. This arrangement had previously existed only for the Department of Agriculture appropriations bill. The House Appropriations Committee adopted the bureau's concept and reorganized the structure of general appropriations bills and its subcommittees so extensively that only the structure of the Agriculture bill remained essentially unchanged.

After its reorganization, the House Appropriations Committee comprised the following subcommittees:

1. Agriculture Department; 2. Commerce and Labor Departments; 3. Deficiencies; 4. District of Columbia; 5. Independent Offices (including the Executive Office of the President); 6. Interior Department; 7. Legislative Establishment; 8. Navy Department and the Navy; 9. Post Office Department; 10. State and Justice Departments (including the judiciary); 11. Treasury Department; and 12. War Department and the Army (both military and civil functions).

By long-standing custom, the House originates all general appropriations bills. As a consequence, historically, the House has generally determined the initial content of the bills. By originating appropriations bills corresponding to its new administratively based organizational structure, the House created a jurisdictional problem for the Senate, which retained a system based on topical organization of appropriations bills, as well as multiple committees sharing jurisdiction over general appropriations bills. Confronted with the difficulty of considering the reorganized appropriations bills with its now outmoded system, the Senate reorganized its appropriations jurisdiction and subcommittees in 1922.

Information available on congressional subcommittees, including those of the Appropriations Committees, is generally sparse and unsystematic prior to enactment of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946. From available hearings and other committee documents, however, it appears that during this era the Appropriations Committees continued the practice of each subcommittee (other than the Deficiencies Subcommittee) being responsible for drafting one of the regular appropriations bills. Using data on appropriations bills to identify subcommittee structure during this period, one may conclude that the subcommittee structure of the Appropriations Committees was relatively stable. Other than name changes, the salient changes in appropriations bill structure (and, presumably, subcommittee structure) between 1922 and 1946 seem to have been limited to the following:

The combination of the bills for the Treasury and Post Office Departments beginning in the second session of the 68 th Congress (1924); The combination of the Commerce and Labor Departments bill with the State and Justice Departments bill beginning in the second session of the 68 th Congress (1924); The separation of the War Department and Army bill into two bills, one for the Military Establishment and the other for War Department Civil Functions, beginning in the first session of the 75 th Congress (1937); The separation of the Labor Department (and the Federal Security Agency) from the Departments of State, Justice, Commerce, and Labor bill beginning in the first session of the 76 th Congress (1939); and The inclusion of the Judiciary in the Legislative Branch bill during the 78 th Congress (1943-1944).

Reorganization and Multiple Changes: 1947-1970

One of the chief aims of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946 was to bring about a modernization of Congress's committee system, including its subcommittees. As a result, unlike the earlier period, information on subcommittee structure since 1946 is more readily available. In the 80 th Congress (1947-1948), the Appropriations Committees in both chambers had these 12 subcommittees:

1. Agriculture; 2. Deficiencies; 3. District of Columbia; 4. Government Corporations; 5. Independent Offices; 6. Interior Department; 7. Legislative; 8. State, Justice, and Commerce Departments and the Judiciary; 9. Treasury Department and Post Office; 10. Labor Department and Federal Security Agency; 11. War Department; and 12. Navy Department.

The idea of modernizing congressional committee structure and operations embodied in the Legislative Reorganization Act was paralleled by an interest in developing a more modern federal administrative apparatus to supplant the one that had grown in episodic bursts to meet the challenges of the Depression and World War II. Because appropriations bills continued to be organized along administrative lines, these changes in the executive branch had an impact on appropriations subcommittee structure. The four changes in party control of the House between 1947 and 1955 also contributed to an environment conducive to revision of appropriations subcommittee jurisdiction. This evolution saw the number of subcommittees fluctuate between a low of 10 and a high of 15. Despite this fluctuation, it appears that the Appropriations Committees generally continued the practice of each subcommittee being responsible for drafting one of the regular appropriations bills.

Appropriations Subcommittees that were created, abolished, or reorganized from the 80 th Congress through the 91 st Congress (1947-1970) are as follows:

A subcommittee (and appropriations bill) specifically pertaining to government corporations operated in both the House and Senate during the 80 th Congress (1947-1948).

Jurisdiction over Army civil functions was transferred to the Deficiencies Subcommittees in both the House and Senate for the 81 st Congress (1949-1950). The Senate subsequently transferred jurisdiction over deficiencies to the full committee and established a separate subcommittee for Army civil functions in the 82 nd Congress, which lasted through the 83 rd (1951-1954). The House continued to operate a Deficiencies and Army Civil Functions Subcommittee in the 82 nd Congress (1951-1952) but transferred jurisdiction over deficiencies to the full committee and created a subcommittee combining Army civil functions with military construction in the 83 rd Congress (1953-1954). A Public Works Subcommittee (including the Army civil functions as well as the Atomic Energy Commission, Bureau of Reclamation, and power marketing administrations) was established by both the House and Senate Appropriations Committees beginning in the first session of the 84 th Congress (1955). The Senate maintained separate subunits within the Public Works Subcommittee to consider matters related to the Atomic Energy Commission and Tennessee Valley Authority and related to the Bureau of Reclamation and Department of the Interior power marketing associations. These subunits operated beginning in the 84 th Congress (1955-1956), continuing through the 90 th Congress (1967-1968). A single bill was reported from the subcommittee for each fiscal year during this period.

A separate subcommittee to consider deficiencies was discontinued in the Senate after the 81 st Congress (1949-1950) and in the House after the 82 nd Congress (1951-1952). Jurisdiction over deficiencies and supplemental was subsequently exercised by the full committee. A Deficiencies Subcommittee was reestablished by the House Appropriations Committee for the 86 th through 88 th Congresses (1959-1964), after which the jurisdiction was again exercised by the full committee. The Senate Subcommittee on Deficiencies was reestablished for the second session of the 87 th Congress and met through the 91 st Congress (1962-1970).

The War and Navy Departments were consolidated to create a National Military Establishment (later the Department of Defense) during the first session of the 80 th Congress (1947), and their respective appropriations subcommittees were combined to create an Armed Services Subcommittee at the beginning of the 81 st Congress (1949). Renamed the Department of Defense Subcommittee in the first session of the 84 th Congress (1955), the House Subcommittee maintained three separate subunits for consideration of Army, Navy, and Air Force matters during the 84 th and 85 th Congresses (1955-1958), and the Senate maintained a separate subunit for intelligence activities between the 91 st and 94 th Congresses (1968-1976). During these years, there continued to be a single Department of Defense appropriations bill.

Military construction was considered part of the Defense Appropriations bill prior to the 83 rd Congress. Between the 83 rd Congress and the first session of the 85 th Congress (1953-1957), appropriations for military construction were carried primarily in deficiency and supplemental appropriations measures. In the 83 rd Congress (1953-1954), the House operated a Civil Functions and Military Construction Subcommittee, but it is otherwise not clear whether military construction matters were considered by a subcommittee in this period. A separate Military Construction Subcommittee was created by the House Appropriations Committee beginning in the second session of the 85 th Congress (1958), and a separate bill for military construction matters was considered for the first time that same year. The Senate Appropriations Committee established a separate subunit for military construction within the Defense Subcommittee in the 86 th Congress (1959-1960) and then a separate subcommittee beginning in the first session of the 87 th Congress (1961).

The House and Senate Appropriations Committees established a subcommittee to consider both legislative and judiciary matters in the 83 rd Congress (1953-1954). The two chambers subsequently returned to the former practice of a separate Legislative Subcommittee, with judiciary matters being considered by the same subcommittee as the Departments of State, Justice, and Commerce beginning in the first session of the 84 th Congress (1955).

A separate bill to fund foreign aid programs (then called the Mutual Security bill) was considered beginning in the first session of the 83 rd Congress (1953), with jurisdiction exercised by the full committee in both the House and Senate. A separate subcommittee was established by the House Appropriations Committee beginning in the first session of the 84 th Congress (1955). Foreign operations jurisdiction continued to be exercised at the full committee level by the Senate Appropriations Committee until the first session of the 91 st Congress (1969).

Jurisdiction over Commerce Department appropriations was exercised by a separate subcommittee in the 84 th through 86 th Congresses (1955-1960). The subcommittee's jurisdiction was combined with the General Government Subcommittee for the first session of the 87 th Congress (1961). Beginning in the second session of the 87 th Congress (1962), jurisdiction was transferred to a subcommittee with jurisdiction over the State, Justice, and Commerce Departments and the judiciary.

In the House, a separate subcommittee was established for general government matters (including the Executive Office of the President) in the 84 th through 86 th Congress (1955-1960). In the Senate, jurisdiction over general government matters was exercised by a Subcommittee on Independent Offices and General Government Matters beginning in the 84 th Congress (1955-1956), although separate appropriations bills for independent offices and general government matters were considered. In both the House and Senate, jurisdiction over general government matters was combined with the Commerce Department Subcommittee in the first session of the 87 th Congress (1961). Jurisdiction over general government matters was subsequently combined with the Treasury Department and Post Office Subcommittee in both chambers beginning in the second session of the 87 th Congress (1962).

A separate subcommittee was established to consider appropriations for the newly created Transportation Department by both the House and Senate Appropriations Committees beginning in the 90 th Congress (1967).

With the creation of the Transportation Subcommittee by the House Appropriations Committee in 1967, the total number of appropriations subcommittees in the House stabilized at 13. The last subcommittee added in the Senate was the Foreign Operations Subcommittee in 1969, bringing the total in that body to 14. Once the Subcommittee on Deficiencies in the Senate was eliminated at the end of the 91 st Congress (1970), the two chambers' appropriations subcommittee structures both totaled 13 and remained parallel during this period.

There were no additions, and few major changes, in the subcommittee structure of either the House or Senate Appropriations Committees between 1971 and 2002. The changes that did occur were primarily changes in subcommittee names to reflect changes in agency and departmental status. For example, the title of the Independent Offices bill evolved with the creation of the Departments of Housing and Urban Development in 1965 and Veterans' Affairs in 1988, the Public Works bill became known as the Energy and Water bill after the creation of the Department of Energy in 1977, and the title of the Departments of Labor and Health Education and Welfare was modified to reflect the creation of a separate Department of Education in 1979. However, these changes did not represent major shifts in appropriations subcommittee jurisdictions.

At the beginning of the 107 th Congress, the House and Senate had the following 13 subcommittees:

1. Subcommittee on Agriculture, Rural Development, and Related Agencies; 2. Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, State, and Judiciary; 3. Subcommittee on Defense; 4. Subcommittee on the District of Columbia; 5. Subcommittee on Energy and Water Development; 6. Subcommittee on Foreign Operations; 7. Subcommittee on Interior and Related Agencies; 8. Subcommittee on Labor, Health and Human Services, Education, and Related Agencies; 9. Subcommittee on Legislative Branch; 10. Subcommittee on Military Construction; 11. Subcommittee on Transportation; 12. Subcommittee on Treasury and General Government; and 13. Subcommittee on Veteran's Affairs, Housing and Urban Development, and Independent Agencies.

Major Changes and Renewed Stability: 2003-Present

In response to the establishment of a Department of Homeland Security (DHS), in January 2003, the chairman of the House Appropriations Committee announced that a new appropriations subcommittee would be created. This new subcommittee, consolidating appropriations jurisdiction from eight existing subcommittees over the various entities comprising the DHS, was the first major reorganization of appropriations subcommittee structure in either chamber in over 30 years. The new subcommittee was formally established when the committee organized for the 108 th Congress in February 2003. In order to keep the number of appropriations subcommittees at 13, the committee also merged the subcommittees responsible for Department of Transportation appropriations with that responsible for Treasury, Postal Service, and General Government appropriations. The Senate Appropriations Committee made a similar change when it organized in March 2003.

At the beginning of the 109 th Congress (2005), the House Appropriations Committee undertook another substantial reorganization, reducing the number of subcommittees from 13 to 10. This reduction was achieved by eliminating the Subcommittees on the Legislative Branch, District of Columbia, and the Departments of Veterans Affairs, Housing and Urban Development, and Independent Agencies (VA-HUD). The jurisdiction over the Legislative Branch appropriations bill was retained by the full committee, and the following major changes were made in House appropriations subcommittee organization:

A new subcommittee on Military Quality of Life and Veterans Affairs was created. This was accomplished by combining the previous jurisdiction of the Military Construction subcommittee with jurisdiction over the Department of Veterans Affairs (formerly exercised by the VA-HUD subcommittee), as well as those portions of the Department of Defense concerning the Defense Health Program and military facilities sustain ment and housing accounts. The former Transportation and Treasury subcommittee gained jurisdiction over three new areas: The Department of Housing and Urban Development was transferred from the eliminated VA-HUD subcommittee; the federal judiciary was transferred from the former Commerce, Justice, State, and the Judiciary subcommittee; and jurisdiction over the District of Columbia was transferred from the eliminated District of Columbia subcommittee. Jurisdiction over NASA, the National Science Foundation, and the Office of Science and Technology Policy was transferred from the eliminated VA-HUD subcommittee to the newly named Subcommittee on Science, State, Justice and Commerce, and Related Agencies. Jurisdiction over other agencies formerly exercised by the VA-HUD Subcommittee was transferred to the Interior Subcommittee (the Environmental Protection Agency) and Labor-HHS Subcommittee (AmeriCorps). Jurisdiction over Weatherization Assistance Grants exercised by the Labor-HHS Subcommittee, and energy-related accounts exercised by the Interior Subcommittee, was transferred to the Energy and Water Development Subcommittee.

This reorganization left the House with the following 10 subcommittees:

1. Subcommittee on Agriculture, Rural Development, Food and Drug Administration, and Related Agencies; 2. Subcommittee on Defense; 3. Subcommittee on Energy and Water Development, and Related Agencies; 4. Subcommittee on Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs; 5. Subcommittee on Homeland Security; 6. Subcommittee on Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies; 7. Subcommittee on Labor, Health and Human Services, Education, and Related Agencies; 8. Subcommittee on Military Quality of Life and Veterans Affairs and Related Agencies; 9. Subcommittee on Science, State, Justice and Commerce, and Related Agencies; and 10. Subcommittee on Transportation, Treasury, and Housing and Urban Development, the Judiciary, District of Columbia.

The Senate Appropriations Committee subsequently adopted a reorganization plan as well, eliminating the Subcommittee on Veterans Affairs, Housing and Urban Development, and Independent Agencies and making the following major changes:

Jurisdiction over Veterans Affairs was transferred to the Subcommittee on Military Construction. Jurisdiction over the Department of Housing and Urban Development and the federal judiciary was transferred to the former Subcommittee on Transportation, Treasury and General Government. Jurisdiction over NASA, the National Science Foundation, and the Office of Science and Technology Policy was transferred to the former Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, State, and the Judiciary. Jurisdiction over AmeriCorps was transferred to the Subcommittee on Labor, Health and Human Services, Education, and Related Agencies. Jurisdiction over the Environmental Protection Agency was transferred to the Subcommittee on Interior and Related Agencies. Jurisdiction over energy related accounts formerly exercised by the Interior Subcommittee was transferred to the Subcommittee on Energy and Water Development. Jurisdiction over the State Department was transferred to the former Subcommittee on Foreign Operations.

This reorganization left the Senate with the following 12 subcommittees:

1. Subcommittee on Agriculture, Rural Development, and Related Agencies; 2. Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice and Science; 3. Subcommittee on Defense; 4. Subcommittee on the District of Columbia; 5. Subcommittee on Energy and Water Development; 6. Subcommittee on Homeland Security; 7. Subcommittee on Interior and Related Agencies; 8. Subcommittee on Labor, Health and Human Services, Education, and Related Agencies; 9. Subcommittee on Legislative Branch; 10. Subcommittee on Military Construction and Veterans Affairs; 11. Subcommittee on State and Foreign Operations, and Related Programs; and 12. Subcommittee on Transportation, Treasury, the Judiciary, and Housing and Urban Development.

At the beginning of the 110 th Congress (2007), further major changes were made as follows:

Jurisdiction over the Departments of Transportation, Treasury, and Housing and Urban Affairs was divided to create subcommittees in both chambers on Transportation, Housing and Urban Development, and related agencies and on Financial Services and General Government (including the Treasury Department, the Judiciary, the Executive Office of the President, the Office of Personnel Management, the Postal Service, the District of Columbia, and other related agencies, such as the Federal Elections Commission, Federal Trade Commission, Securities and Exchange Commission, and Small Business Administration). Jurisdiction over defense health programs and military facilities sustainment and housing accounts was transferred from the House Military Quality of Life subcommittee to the Defense subcommittee. Jurisdiction over the State Department was transferred from the House Science, State, Justice and Commerce, and Related Agencies subcommittee to the Foreign Operations subcommittee.

In addition, the House reestablished a subcommittee with jurisdiction over the legislative branch, and the Senate eliminated a separate subcommittee on the District of Columbia. The reorganization left the two chambers with the following 12 subcommittees:

1. Subcommittee on Agriculture, Rural Development, Food and Drug Administration, and Related Agencies; 2. Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies; 3. Subcommittee on Defense; 4. Subcommittee on Energy and Water Development, and Related Agencies; 5. Subcommittee on Financial Services and General Government; 6. Subcommittee on the Department of Homeland Security; 7. Subcommittee on Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies; 8. Subcommittee on the Departments of Labor, Health and Human Services, Education, and Related Agencies; 9. Subcommittee on Legislative Branch; 10. Subcommittee on Military Construction, Veterans Affairs, and Related Agencies; 11. Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs; 12. Subcommittee on Transportation and Housing and Urban Development, and Related Agencies.

These 12 subcommittees have remained in place since 2007. In most respects, the jurisdictions of subcommittees for both the House and Senate Appropriations Committees were made parallel. The one salient exception was jurisdiction over funding for the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC). In the House, funding for CFTC is included in the Agriculture, Rural Development, Food and Drug Administration, and Related Agencies Appropriations bill, while the Senate includes it in the Financial Services and General Government Appropriations bill. Since 2007, the two chambers have alternated which of these two measures includes CFTC funding when enacted.

During the first session of the 110 th Congress (2007), based on the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission, the House created the Select Intelligence Oversight Panel of the Appropriations Committee to oversee spending on federal intelligence activities. This panel was established for three major purposes: to review and study on a continuing basis budget requests for and execution of intelligence activities, to make recommendations to relevant subcommittees of the Appropriations Committee, and to prepare an annual report to the Defense subcommittee containing budgetary and oversight observations and recommendations for use by such subcommittee in preparation of the classified annex to the bill making appropriations for the Department of Defense. This panel did not have any spending jurisdiction.

At the beginning of the 112 th Congress (2011), the Select Intelligence Oversight Panel was eliminated by H.Res. 5 , adopted on January 5, 2011.