Iran’s Nuclear Program: Tehran’s Compliance with International Obligations

Summary: Several U.N. Security Council resolutions adopted between 2006 and 2010 required Iran to cooperate fully with the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA's) investigation of its nuclear activities, suspend its uranium enrichment program, suspend its construction of a heavy-water reactor and related projects, and ratify the Additional Protocol to its IAEA safeguards agreement. However, Tehran has implemented various restrictions on, and provided the IAEA with additional information about, its nuclear program pursuant to the July 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), which Tehran concluded with China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States. On the JCPOA's Implementation Day, which took place on January 16, 2016, all of the previous resolutions' requirements were terminated. The nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and U.N. Security Council Resolution 2231, which the Council adopted on July 20, 2015, compose the current legal framework governing Iran's nuclear program. Iran has complied with the JCPOA and resolution.

Summary: Iran and the IAEA agreed in August 2007 on a work plan to clarify outstanding questions regarding Tehran's nuclear program. The IAEA had essentially resolved most of these issues, but for several years the agency still had questions concerning "possible military dimensions to Iran's nuclear programme." A December 2, 2015, report to the IAEA Board of Governors from agency Director General Yukiya Amano contains the IAEA's "final assessment on the resolution" of the outstanding issues.

Summary: This report provides a brief overview of Iran's nuclear program and describes the legal basis for the actions taken by the IAEA board and the Security Council. It will be updated as events warrant.

Iran ratified the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1970. Article III of the treaty requires non-nuclear-weapon states-parties to accept comprehensive International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards; Tehran concluded a comprehensive safeguards agreement with the IAEA in 1974. In 2002, the agency began investigating allegations that Iran had conducted clandestine nuclear activities; the IAEA ultimately reported that some of these activities had violated Tehran's safeguards agreement. Following more than three years of investigation, the IAEA Board of Governors referred the matter to the U.N. Security Council in February 2006. Since then, the council adopted six resolutions requiring Iran to take steps to alleviate international concerns about its nuclear program. This report provides a brief overview of Iran's nuclear program and describes the legal basis for the actions taken by the IAEA board and the Security Council.

For more detailed information about Iran's nuclear program, see CRS Report RL34544, Iran's Nuclear Program: Status , by Paul K. Kerr. For more information about the July 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) concerning Iran's nuclear program, see CRS Report R43333, Iran Nuclear Agreement , by Kenneth Katzman and Paul K. Kerr.

Iran's nuclear program has generated widespread concern that Tehran is pursuing nuclear weapons. Tehran's construction of gas centrifuge uranium enrichment facilities has been the main source of proliferation concern. Gas centrifuges enrich uranium by spinning uranium hexafluoride gas at high speeds to increase the concentration of the uranium-235 isotope. Such centrifuges can produce both low-enriched uranium (LEU), which can be used in nuclear power reactors, and highly enriched uranium (HEU), which is one of the two types of fissile material used in nuclear weapons. HEU can also be used as fuel in certain types of nuclear reactors. Iran also has a uranium conversion facility, which converts uranium oxide into several compounds, including uranium hexafluoride. Tehran claims that it wants to produce LEU for its current and future power reactors.

Iran's construction of a reactor moderated by heavy water has also been a source of concern. Although Tehran says that the reactor, which Iran is building at Arak, is intended for the production of medical isotopes, it was a proliferation concern because the reactor's spent fuel would have contained plutonium well-suited for use in nuclear weapons. In order to be used in nuclear weapons, however, plutonium must be separated from the spent fuel—a procedure called "reprocessing." Iran has said that it will not engage in reprocessing. Pursuant to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), which Iran concluded in July 2015 with China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States (collectively known as the "P5+1"), Tehran has rendered the Arak reactor's original core inoperable. Iran has also begun to fulfill a JCPOA requirement to redesign and rebuild the Arak reactor based on a design agreed to by the P5+1 so that it will not produce weapons-grade plutonium. The agreement also requires Iran to export the spent fuel from this reactor and all other nuclear reactors.

Iran and the IAEA agreed in August 2007 on a work plan to clarify the outstanding questions regarding Tehran's nuclear program. Most of these questions, which had contributed to suspicions that Iran had been pursuing a nuclear weapons program, were subsequently resolved. Then-IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei, however, told the IAEA board June 2, 2008, that there was "one remaining major [unresolved] issue," which concerns questions regarding "possible military dimensions to Iran's nuclear programme." The IAEA agency did not make any substantive progress on these matters for some time.

Tehran has questioned the authenticity of some of the evidence underlying the agency's concerns and maintains that it has not done any work on nuclear weapons. Iran also expressed concern to the IAEA that resolving some of these issues would require agency inspectors to have "access to sensitive information related to its conventional military and missile related activities." The IAEA, according to a September 2008 report from ElBaradei, stated its willingness to discuss with Iran

modalities that could enable Iran to demonstrate credibly that the activities referred to in the documentation are not nuclear related, as Iran asserts, while protecting sensitive information related to its conventional military activities.

Indeed, the agency made several specific proposals, but Tehran did not provide the requested information.

The IAEA Board of Governors adopted a resolution on November 18, 2011, stating that "it is essential" for Iran and the IAEA "to intensify their dialogue aiming at the urgent resolution of all outstanding substantive issues." IAEA and Iranian officials met 10 times between January 2012 and May 2013 to discuss what the agency termed a "structured approach to the clarification of all outstanding issues related to Iran's nuclear programme." However, during an October 2013 meeting, IAEA officials and their Iranian counterparts decided to adopt a "new approach" to resolving these issues. Iran signed a joint statement with the IAEA on November 11, 2013, describing a "Framework for Cooperation." According to the statement, Iran and the IAEA agreed to "strengthen their cooperation and dialogue aimed at ensuring the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear programme through the resolution of all outstanding issues that have not already been resolved by the IAEA." Iran subsequently provided the agency with information about several of the outstanding issues. Iran later agreed in May 2014 to provide information to the IAEA by August 25, 2014, about five additional issues, including alleged Iranian research on high explosives and "studies made and/or papers published in Iran in relation to neutron transport and associated modelling and calculations and their alleged application to compressed materials." Iran subsequently provided information about four of these issues.

According to the JCPOA, Iran was to "complete" a series of steps set out in an Iran-IAEA "Roadmap for Clarification of Past and Present Outstanding Issues." According to IAEA Director General Yukiya Amano, this road map set out "a process" under a November 24, 2013, Joint Plan of Action between Iran and the P5+1, "to enable the Agency, with the cooperation of Iran, to make an assessment of issues relating to possible military dimensions to Iran's nuclear programme." According to a December 2, 2015, report from Amano to the IAEA Board of Governors, "[a]ll the activities contained in the road-map were implemented in accordance with the agreed schedule." The road map required Amano to present this report, which contains the agency's "final assessment on the resolution" of the aforementioned outstanding issues.

In response, the board adopted a resolution on December 15, 2015, that notes Iran's cooperation with the road map and "further notes that this closes the Board's consideration" of the "outstanding issues regarding Iran's nuclear programme." Since the IAEA has verified that Iran has taken the steps required for Implementation Day to take effect, the board is no longer focused on Iran's compliance with past Security Council resolutions and past issues concerning Iran's safeguards agreement. Instead, the board is focused on monitoring and verifying Iran's JCPOA implementation "in light of" United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231, which the Council adopted on July 20, 2015. This latter resolution requests the IAEA Director General "to undertake the necessary verification and monitoring of Iran's nuclear-related commitments for the full duration of those commitments under the JCPOA."

The December 2015 IAEA resolution requests the Director General to issue quarterly reports to the board regarding Iran's "implementation of its relevant commitments under the JCPOA for the full duration of those commitments." The Director General is also to report to the Board of Governors and the Security Council "at any time if the Director General has reasonable grounds to believe there is an issue of concern" regarding Tehran's compliance with its JCPOA or safeguards obligations. The JCPOA and Resolution 2231 also contain a variety of reporting provisions for the IAEA. For example, the resolution requests the agency's Director General

to provide regular updates to the IAEA Board of Governors and, as appropriate, in parallel to the Security Council on Iran's implementation of its commitments under the JCPOA and also to report to the IAEA Board of Governors and in parallel to the Security Council at any time if the Director General has reasonable grounds to believe there is an issue of concern directly affecting fulfilment of JCPOA commitments.

Several U.N. Security Council Resolutions required Iran to cooperate fully with the IAEA's investigation of its nuclear activities, suspend its uranium enrichment program, suspend its construction of a heavy-water reactor and related projects, and ratify the Additional Protocol to its IAEA safeguards agreement. Tehran has signed, but not ratified, its Additional Protocol. Resolution 1929, which the council adopted in June 2010, contains these requirements and also required Tehran to refrain from "any activity related to ballistic missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons." Iran has also continued its extensive ballistic missile program. Resolution 1929 also required Iran to comply with the modified Code 3.1 of its subsidiary arrangements. (See " Potential Noncompliance Since September 2005 .") Iran did not take any of these steps prior to concluding the JCPOA, but did limit and reverse some aspects of its nuclear program since the government began implementing the November 2013 Joint Plan of Action. Moreover, pursuant to the Joint Plan of Action and its November 2013 agreement with the IAEA, Iran provided some information to the agency required by the modified Code 3.1.

Pursuant to the JCPOA, Tehran has since implemented additional restrictions on its uranium enrichment program and heavy-water reactor program, as well as begun implementing its additional protocol and the modified Code 3.1. On the JCPOA's Implementation Day, which took place on January 16, 2016, all of the previous Security Council resolutions' requirements were terminated pursuant to U.N. Security Council Resolution 2231, which along with the NPT, composes the current legal framework governing Iran's nuclear program. Although the IAEA reports findings of its inspection and monitoring activities and the JCPOA-established Joint Commission monitors the parties' implementation of the agreement, compliance determinations are national decisions. "Iran continued to adhere" to its JCPOA commitments during 2017, according to an April 2018 State Department report covering that period. All official reports and statements from the United Nations, European Union, the IAEA, and the non-U.S. participating governments also indicate that Iran has complied with the JCPOA and related Resolution 2231 requirements.

The most recent report from IAEA Director General Amano states that the IAEA has continued verification and monitoring of the restrictions described in Section T of the JCPOA, which prohibits a number of nuclear weapons-related activities. The agreement, as noted, describes arrangements for agency inspectors to gain access to Iranian sites, including military sites, other than those that Tehran has declared to the agency, "if the IAEA has concerns regarding undeclared nuclear materials or activities, or activities inconsistent with" the JCPOA. The agreement also provides for alternative means to clarify the matter. The IAEA has not reported whether it has requested access to any Iranian military facilities, but the agency has a number of methods other than inspections, such as analyzing open-source information and receiving intelligence briefings from governments, to monitor Iranian compliance with these and other JCPOA commitments. According to the April 2018 State Department report

[t]he IAEA continues to exercise its full authorities in pursuing any new safeguards-relevant or JCPOA-related information in Iran, including any new concerns regarding weaponization should they arise, through implementation of Iran's Safeguards Agreement, Additional Protocol, and the enhanced transparency and verification measures contained in the JCPOA.

There are no apparent disputes between Iran and the IAEA with respect to Iranian cooperation with the agency. Amano noted in an October 2, 2018, statement that the IAEA has been able to access "all the sites and locations in Iran which" agency inspectors "needed to visit." Similarly, a February 2019 report from Amano states that the IAEA "has conducted complementary accesses under the Additional Protocol to all the sites and locations in Iran which it needed to visit."

As noted, Iran is a party to the NPT and has concluded a comprehensive safeguards agreement with the agency. Such agreements are designed to enable the IAEA to detect the diversion of nuclear material from peaceful purposes to nuclear weapons uses, as well as to detect undeclared nuclear activities and material. Safeguards include agency inspections and monitoring of declared nuclear facilities. Although comprehensive safeguards agreements give the IAEA the authority "to verify the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities, the tools available to it to do so, under such agreements, are limited," according to the agency.

As a practical matter, the IAEA's ability to inspect and monitor nuclear facilities, as well as obtain information, in a particular country pursuant to that government's comprehensive safeguards agreement is limited to facilities and activities that have been declared by the government. Additional Protocols to IAEA comprehensive safeguards agreements increase the agency's ability to investigate undeclared nuclear facilities and activities by increasing the IAEA's authority to inspect certain nuclear-related facilities and demand information from member states. Iran signed such a protocol in December 2003 and agreed to implement the agreement pending ratification. Tehran stopped adhering to its Additional Protocol in 2006.

The IAEA's authority to investigate nuclear-weapons-related activity is limited. Then Director General ElBaradei explained in a 2005 interview that the IAEA does not have "an all-encompassing mandate to look for every computer study on weaponization. Our mandate is to make sure that all nuclear materials in a country are declared to us." Similarly, a February 2006 report from ElBaradei to the IAEA board stated that "absent some nexus to nuclear material the agency's legal authority to pursue the verification of possible nuclear weapons related activity is limited." There is no requirement that there be any nexus to nuclear material in order for the IAEA to request access to a facility, but there are disagreements among IAEA member states regarding the extent of the agency's rights to access locations where there is no reason to suspect the presence of nuclear material. Such disagreements could play a role if the IAEA Board is required to consider a request for special inspections in Iran or another country (see Appendix B ). Therefore, the closer the connection between nuclear material and the location in question, the more likely the Board would be to approve such an inspection.

The current public controversy over Iran's nuclear program began in August 2002, when the National Council of Resistance on Iran (NCRI), an Iranian exile group, revealed information during a press conference (some of which later proved to be accurate) that Tehran had built nuclear-related facilities that it had not revealed to the IAEA. The United States had been aware of at least some of these activities, according to knowledgeable former officials. Prior to the NCRI's revelations, the IAEA had expressed concerns that Iran had not been providing the agency with all relevant information about its nuclear programs, but had never found Tehran in violation of its safeguards agreement.

In fall 2002, the IAEA began to investigate Iran's nuclear activities at the sites named by the NCRI; inspectors visited the sites the following February. Adopting its first resolution on the matter in September 2003, the IAEA board called on Tehran to increase its cooperation with the agency's investigation, suspend its uranium enrichment activities, and "unconditionally sign, ratify and fully implement" an Additional Protocol.

In October 2003, Iran concluded a voluntary agreement with France, Germany, and the United Kingdom, collectively known as the "E3," to suspend its enrichment activities, sign and implement an Additional Protocol to its IAEA safeguards agreement, and comply fully with the IAEA's investigation. As a result, the agency's board decided to refrain from referring the matter to the U.N. Security Council. As noted, Tehran signed this Additional Protocol in December 2003, but has never ratified it.

Ultimately, the IAEA's investigation, as well as information Iran provided after the October 2003 agreement, revealed that Iran had engaged in a variety of clandestine nuclear-related activities, some of which violated the country's safeguards agreement (see Appendix A ). After October 2003, Iran continued some of its enrichment-related activities, but Tehran and the E3 agreed in November 2004 to a more detailed suspension agreement. However, Iran resumed uranium conversion in August 2005 under the leadership of then-President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who had been elected two months earlier.

On September 24, 2005, the IAEA Board of Governors adopted a resolution (GOV/2005/77) that, for the first time, found Iran to be in noncompliance with its IAEA safeguards agreement. The board, however, did not refer Iran to the Security Council, choosing instead to give Tehran additional time to comply with the board's demands. The resolution urged Iran

to implement transparency measures including access to individuals, documentation relating to procurement, dual use equipment, certain military owned workshops, and research and development locations; to reestablish full and sustained suspension of all enrichment-related activity; to reconsider the construction of the research reactor moderated by heavy water; to ratify promptly and implement in full the Additional Protocol; and to continue to act in accordance with the provisions of the Additional Protocol.

No international legal obligations required Tehran to take these steps. But ElBaradei's September 2008 report asserted that, without Iranian implementation of such "transparency measures," the IAEA would "not be in a position to progress in its verification of the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran."

Iran announced in January 2006 that it would resume research and development on its centrifuges at Natanz. The next month, the IAEA Board of Governors referred Iran's case to the U.N. Security Council. Tehran announced shortly after that it would stop implementing its Additional Protocol. (For details, see " Iran and the U.N. Security Council " below.)

Potential Noncompliance Since September 2005

Iran further scaled back its cooperation with the IAEA in March 2007, when the government told the agency that it would stop complying with a portion of the subsidiary arrangements for its IAEA safeguards agreement. That provision (called the modified code 3.1), to which Iran agreed in February 2003, requires Tehran to provide design information for new nuclear facilities "as soon as the decision to construct, or to authorize construction, of such a facility has been taken, whichever is earlier." Beginning in March 2007, Iran argued that it was only obligated to adhere to the previous notification provisions of its subsidiary arrangements, which required Tehran to provide design information for a new facility 180 days before introducing nuclear material into it.

This decision constituted the basis for Iran's stated rationale for its subsequent refusal to provide the IAEA with some information concerning its nuclear program. For example, Tehran had refused to provide updated design information for the heavy-water reactor under construction at Arak. As part of the November 2013 Joint Plan of Action, Iran submitted this information to the IAEA on February 12, 2014. Similarly, Tehran had refused to provide the IAEA with design information for a reactor that Iran intends to construct at Darkhovin. Although Iran provided the agency with preliminary design information about the Darkhovin reactor in a September 22, 2009, letter, the IAEA requested Tehran to "provide additional clarifications" of the information, according to a November 2009 report. Amano reported in September 2010 that Iran had "provided only limited design information with respect to" the reactor. IAEA reports since 2012 do not appear to address this issue.

Tehran also argued, based on its March 2007 decision, that its failure to notify the IAEA before September 2009 that it has been constructing a gas-centrifuge uranium enrichment facility, called the Fordow facility, near the city of Qom was consistent with the government's safeguards obligations. Exactly when Iran decided to construct the facility is unclear. Amano reported in May 2012 that the IAEA has requested information from Iran regarding the Fordow construction decision. But Tehran, according to Amano's November 2015 report, has not yet provided all of this information. Subsequent reports from Amano have not addressed the issue.

Both the 2007 decision, which the IAEA asked Iran to "reconsider," and Tehran's refusal to provide the design information appear to be inconsistent with the government's safeguards obligations. Although Article 39 of Iran's safeguards agreement states that the subsidiary arrangements "may be extended or changed by agreement between" Iran and the IAEA, the agreement does not provide for a unilateral modification or suspension of any portion of those arrangements. Moreover, the IAEA legal adviser explained in a March 2009 statement that Tehran's failure to provide design information for the reactors is "inconsistent with" Iran's obligations under its subsidiary arrangements. The adviser, however, added that "it is difficult to conclude that" Tehran's refusal to provide the information "in itself constitutes noncompliance with, or a breach of" Iran's safeguards agreement. Nevertheless, a November 2009 report from ElBaradei described Tehran's failures both to notify the agency of the decision to begin constructing the Fordow facility, as well as to provide the relevant design information in a timely fashion, as "inconsistent with" Iran's safeguards obligations. The report similarly described Iran's delay in providing design information for the Darkhovin reactor.

Iran may also have violated its safeguards agreement if it decided to construct other new nuclear facilities without informing the IAEA. The agency has investigated whether Iran has made such decisions. For example, the IAEA has asked the government for information about Iranian statements that the government is planning to construct new uranium enrichment facilities, is designing a nuclear reactor similar to a research reactor located in Tehran, is producing fuel for four new research reactors, and is planning to construct additional nuclear power reactors. Pursuant to its November 2013 agreement with the IAEA, Iran has provided at least some of this information to the agency.

Iran's March 2007 decision regarding the provision of information to the IAEA also formed the basis for Tehran's refusal until August 2009 to allow agency inspectors to verify design information for the Arak reactor. This action also appeared to be inconsistent with Tehran's safeguards agreement. Article 48 of that agreement states that the IAEA "may send inspectors to facilities to verify the design information provided to the Agency"; in fact, the agency has a "continuing right" to do so, according to a November 2008 report from ElBaradei. Moreover, the legal adviser's statement characterized Iran's refusal to allow IAEA inspectors to verify the Arak reactor's design information as "inconsistent with" Tehran's obligations under its safeguards agreement. IAEA inspectors visited the reactor facility in August 2009 to verify design information, according to a report ElBaradei issued the same month. Inspectors have visited the facility several more times, according to reports from Amano.

In addition to the lapses described above, Iran's failure to notify the IAEA of its decision to produce enriched uranium containing a maximum of 20% uranium-235 in time for agency inspectors to adjust their safeguards procedures may, according to a February 2010 report from Amano, have violated Iran's IAEA safeguards agreement. Article 45 of that agreement requires that Tehran notify the IAEA "with design information in respect of a modification relevant for safeguards purposes sufficiently in advance for the safeguards procedures to be adjusted when necessary," according to Amano's report, which describes Iran's enrichment decision as "clearly relevant for safeguards purposes."

The IAEA board has neither formally found that any of the Iranian actions described above are in noncompliance with Tehran's safeguards agreement, nor referred these issues to the U.N. Security Council. The IAEA board adopted a resolution on November 27, 2009, that described Iran's failure to notify the agency of the Fordow facility as "inconsistent with" the subsidiary arrangements under Iran's safeguards agreement, but this statement did not constitute a formal finding of noncompliance. A September 13, 2012, IAEA board resolution expressed "serious concern" that Tehran has not complied with the obligations described in IAEA Board of Governors and U.N. Security Council resolutions, but the September resolution did not contain a formal finding of noncompliance.

As noted, Iran announced in January 2006 that it would resume research and development on its centrifuges at Natanz. In response, the IAEA board adopted a resolution (GOV/2006/14) on February 4, 2006, referring the matter to the Security Council and reiterating its call for Iran to take the measures specified in the September resolution. Two days later, Tehran announced that it would stop implementing its Additional Protocol.

On March 29, 2006, the U.N. Security Council President issued a statement, which was not legally binding, that called on Iran to "take the steps required" by the February IAEA board resolution. The council subsequently adopted six resolutions concerning Iran's nuclear program: 1696 (July 2006), 1737 (December 2006), 1747 (March 2007), 1803 (March 2008), 1835 (September 2008), and 1929 (June 2010). The second, third, fourth, and sixth resolutions imposed a variety of restrictions on Iran.

Resolution 1696 was the first to place legally binding Security Council requirements on Iran with respect to its nuclear program. That resolution made mandatory the IAEA-demanded suspension and called on Tehran to implement the transparency measures called for by the IAEA board's February 2006 resolution. Resolution 1737 reiterated these requirements but expanded the suspension's scope to include "work on all heavy water-related projects." It is worth noting that the Security Council has acknowledged (in Resolution 1803, for example) Iran's rights under Article IV of the NPT, which states that parties to the treaty have "the inalienable right ... to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful Purposes." As noted, Resolution 1929 also required Tehran to refrain from "any activity related to ballistic missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons" and to comply with the modified Code 3.1 of its subsidiary arrangement.

Resolution 2231, which the U.N. Security Council adopted on July 20, 2015, states that all of the previous resolutions' requirements would be terminated when the council receives a report from the IAEA stating that Iran has implemented the nuclear-related measures by Implementation Day, as described by the July 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. As noted, Implementation Day took place on January 16, 2016. Resolution 2231 also "reaffirms that Iran shall cooperate fully as the IAEA requests to be able to resolve all outstanding issues, as identified in IAEA reports." The IAEA Board of Governors' December 2015 resolution noted that the board had closed its consideration of the "outstanding issues regarding Iran's nuclear programme."

The JCPOA spells out a process for Iran or the P5+1 to resolve disputes over alleged breaches of their JCPOA commitments pursuant to the agreement. Both the JCPOA and Resolution 2231 contain a "snap back" mechanism to reimpose sanctions should Iran fail to resolve satisfactorily a P5+1 claim regarding Iranian JCPOA noncompliance. This mechanism provides that any permanent UN Security Council member would be able to veto a Security Council resolution that would preserve U.N. sanctions relief in the event of Iranian noncompliance. The JCPOA specifies that, in such a case, "the provisions of the old U.N. Security Council resolutions would be re-imposed, unless the U.N. Security Council decides otherwise." The other P5+1 states are able to invoke this mechanism, but whether the United States may do so is unclear because Resolution 2231 provides that only a "JCPOA participant state" may bring a noncompliance finding to the Security Council; U.S. officials have stated that the United States is no longer participating in the agreement.

Authority for IAEA and U.N. Security Council Actions

The legal authority for the actions taken by the IAEA Board of Governors and the U.N. Security Council is found in both the IAEA Statute and the U.N. Charter. The following sections discuss the relevant portions of those documents.

Two sections of the IAEA Statute explain what the agency should do if an IAEA member state is found to be in noncompliance with its safeguards agreement. Article III B. 4. of the statute states that the IAEA is to submit annual reports to the U.N. General Assembly and, "when appropriate," to the U.N. Security Council. If "there should arise questions that are within the competence of the Security Council," the article adds, the IAEA "shall notify the Security Council, as the organ bearing the main responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security."

Additionally, Article XII C. states that IAEA inspectors are to report noncompliance issues to the agency's Director General, who is to report the matter to the IAEA Board of Governors. The board is then to "call upon the recipient State or States to remedy forthwith any non-compliance which it finds to have occurred," as well as "report the non-compliance to all members and to the Security Council and General Assembly of the United Nations."

In the case of Iran, the September 24, 2005, IAEA board resolution (GOV/2005/77) stated that the board

found that Iran's many failures and breaches of its obligations to comply with its NPT Safeguards Agreement, as detailed in GOV/2003/75 [a November 2003 report from then-Director General ElBaradei], constitute non compliance in the context of Article XII.C of the Agency's Statute;

According to the resolution, the board also found

that the history of concealment of Iran's nuclear activities referred to in the Director General's report [GOV/2003/75], the nature of these activities, issues brought to light in the course of the Agency's verification of declarations made by Iran since September 2002 and the resulting absence of confidence that Iran's nuclear programme is exclusively for peaceful purposes have given rise to questions that are within the competence of the Security Council, as the organ bearing the main responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security.

ElBaradei issued the report cited by the resolution, GOV/2003/75, in November 2003. It described a variety of Iranian nuclear activities, which are detailed in Appendix A , that violated Tehran's safeguards agreement. ElBaradei subsequently reported that Iran has taken corrective measures to address these safeguards breaches. As noted above, the 2005 resolution called on Iran to take a variety of actions that Tehran was not legally required to implement.

Several articles of the U.N. Charter, which is a treaty, describe the Security Council's authority to impose requirements and sanctions on Iran. Article 24 confers on the council "primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security." The article also states that the "specific powers granted to the Security Council for the discharge of these duties are laid down" in several chapters of the charter, including Chapter VII, which describes the actions that the council may take in response to "threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression."

Chapter VII of the charter contains three articles relevant to the Iran case. Security Council resolutions that made mandatory the IAEA's demands concerning Iran's nuclear program invoked Chapter VII. Article 39 of that chapter states that the council

shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security.

Resolution 1696 invoked Article 40 of Chapter VII "in order to make mandatory the suspension required by the IAEA." As noted, that resolution did not impose any sanctions on Iran. Article 40 states that

the Security Council may, before making the recommendations or deciding upon the measures provided for in Article 39 [of Chapter VII], call upon the parties concerned to comply with such provisional measures as it deems necessary or desirable.

Resolutions 1737, 1747, 1803, and 1929, which did impose sanctions, invoked Article 41 of Chapter VII. According to Article 41, the Security Council

may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the Members of the United Nations to apply such measures. These may include complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations.

As noted, Security Council resolution 1835 did not impose new sanctions, but reaffirmed the previous resolutions and called on Iran to comply with them.

It is worth noting that Article 25 of the U.N. Charter obligates U.N. members "to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council." Moreover, Article 103 of the Charter states that

[i]n the event of a conflict between the obligations of the Members of the United Nations under the present Charter and their obligations under any other international agreement, their obligations under the present Charter shall prevail.

The IAEA also has an obligation to cooperate with the Security Council, "[b]y virtue of its Relationship Agreement with the United Nations." As noted, Security Council Resolution 2231 requests the IAEA Director General "to undertake the necessary verification and monitoring of Iran's nuclear-related commitments for the full duration of those commitments under the JCPOA."

Whether Iran has violated the NPT is unclear. The treaty does not contain a mechanism for determining that a state-party has violated its obligations. Moreover, there does not appear to be a formal procedure for determining such violations. An NPT Review Conference would, however, be one venue for NPT states-parties to make such a determination.

The U.N. Security Council has never declared Iran to be in violation of the NPT; neither the council nor the U.N. General Assembly has a responsibility to adjudicate treaty violations. However, the lack of a ruling by the council on Iran's compliance with the NPT has apparently had little practical effect because, as noted, the council has taken action in response to the IAEA Board of Governors' determination that Iran has violated its safeguards agreement.

Iran's violations of its safeguards agreement appear to constitute violations of Article III, which requires NPT non-nuclear-weapon states-parties to accept IAEA safeguards, in accordance with the agency's statue, "for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfillment of its obligations assumed under this Treaty with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices."

Tehran may also have violated provisions of Article II which state that non-nuclear-weapon states-parties shall not "manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices" or "seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices."

As noted, the IAEA investigated evidence of what then-IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei described in June 2008 as "possible military dimensions to Iran's nuclear programme." Such activities may indicate that Tehran has violated both Article II provisions described above. Moreover, a November 2007 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) stated that "until fall 2003, Iranian military entities were working under government direction to develop nuclear weapons." This past program could be a violation of Article II, although the estimate does not provide any detail about the program. Nevertheless, the IAEA has never reported that Iran has attempted to develop nuclear weapons.

Despite the lack of such an IAEA conclusion, a 2005 State Department report regarding states' compliance with nonproliferation agreements argued that the country had violated Article II of the NPT:

The breadth of Iran's nuclear development efforts, the secrecy and deceptions with which they have been conducted for nearly 20 years, its redundant and surreptitious procurement channels, Iran's persistent failure to comply with its obligations to report to the IAEA and to apply safeguards to such activities, and the lack of a reasonable economic justification for this program leads us to conclude that Iran is pursuing an effort to manufacture nuclear weapons, and has sought and received assistance in this effort in violation of Article II of the NPT.

The report also stated that Iran's "weapons program combines elements" of Tehran's declared nuclear activities, as well as suspected "undeclared fuel cycle and other activities that may exist, including those that may be run solely by the military."

The State Department's 2005 reasoning appears to be based on an interpretation of the NPT which holds that a wide scope of nuclear activities could constitute violations of Article II. The 2005 report states that assessments regarding Article II compliance "must look at the totality of the facts, including judgments as to" a state-party's "purpose in undertaking the nuclear activities in question." The report also includes a list of activities which could constitute such noncompliance.

The 2005 State Department report cites testimony from then-Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Director William Foster during a 1968 Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing. Foster stated that "facts indicating that the purpose of a particular activity was the acquisition of a nuclear explosive device would tend to show non-compliance" with Article II. He gave two examples: "the construction of an experimental or prototype nuclear explosive device" and "the production of components which could only have relevance" to such a device. However, Foster also noted that a variety of other activities could also violate Article II, adding that the United States believed it impossible "to formulate a comprehensive definition or interpretation."

It is worth noting that the 2005 State Department report's arguments appear to rely heavily on the notion that a state's apparent intentions underlying certain nuclear-related activities can be used to determine violations of Article II. This interpretation is not shared by all experts. The 2005 report "primarily reflected activities from January 2002 through December 2003." Whether the State Department assesses that Iran has violated Article II since then is unclear. A version of the report released in 2010, which primarily reflected activities from January 1, 2004, through December 31, 2008, states that "the issues underlying" the 2005 report's conclusion regarding Iran's Article II compliance "remain unresolved." Subsequent versions of the report reiterated the 2010 report's assessment until 2016, when the State Department assessed that "previous issues leading to NPT noncompliance findings [regarding Iran] had been resolved." As noted, the 2007 NIE assessed that Iran halted its nuclear weapons program in 2003; subsequent U.S. official statements have consistently reiterated that Tehran has not yet decided to build nuclear weapons. The United Kingdom's then-Foreign Secretary William Hague would not say whether Iran had violated Article II when asked by a Member of Parliament in March 2012.

Appendix A. Iranian Noncompliance with Its IAEA Safeguards Agreement

The November 2003 report (GOV/2003/75) from IAEA Director General ElBaradei to the agency's Board of Governors details what the September 2005 board resolution described as "Iran's many failures and breaches of its obligations to comply with its safeguards agreement."

Iran has failed in a number of instances over an extended period of time to meet its obligations under its Safeguards Agreement with respect to the reporting of nuclear material and its processing and use, as well as the declaration of facilities where such material has been processed and stored.

The report detailed some of these failures and referenced other failures described in two earlier reports (GOV/2003/40 and GOV/2003/63) from ElBaradei to the IAEA board.

According to GOV/2003/40, Iran failed to declare the following activities to the agency:

The importation of natural uranium, and its subsequent transfer for further processing. The processing and use of the imported natural uranium, including the production and loss of nuclear material, and the production and transfer of resulting waste.

declare the facilities where nuclear material (including the waste) was received, stored, and processed; provide in a timely manner updated design information for a research reactor located in Tehran; as well as provide in a timely manner information on two waste storage sites.

GOV/2003/63 stated that Iran failed to report uranium conversion experiments to the IAEA. According to GOV/2003/75, Iran failed to report the following activities to the IAEA:

The use of imported natural uranium hexafluoride for the testing of centrifuges, as well as the subsequent production of enriched and depleted uranium. The importation of natural uranium metal and its subsequent transfer for use in laser enrichment experiments, including the production of enriched uranium, the loss of nuclear material during these operations, and the production and transfer of resulting waste. The production of a variety of nuclear compounds from several different imported nuclear materials, and the production and transfer of resulting wastes. The production of uranium targets and their irradiation in the Tehran Research Reactor, the subsequent processing of those targets (including the separation of plutonium), the production and transfer of resulting waste, and the storage of unprocessed irradiated targets.

Iran also failed to provide the agency with design information for a variety of nuclear-related facilities, according to the report. These included the following:

A centrifuge testing facility. Two laser laboratories and locations where resulting wastes were processed. Facilities involved in the production of a variety of nuclear compounds. The Tehran Research Reactor (with respect to the irradiation of uranium targets), the hot cell facility where the plutonium separation took place, as well as the relevant waste handling facility.

Additionally, the report cited Iran's "failure on many occasions to co-operate to facilitate the implementation of safeguards, through concealment" of its nuclear activities.

As noted, Iran's obligations under its Additional Protocol to provide access to certain locations are unclear; Tehran may refuse to grant the IAEA access to certain facilities. In such a case, the IAEA Director General could call for a special inspection; the inspection could require approval from the IAEA Board of Governors. According to the IAEA, an inspection is deemed to be special when it is in addition to IAEA routine inspections or "involves access to information or locations" that have not been identified to the IAEA as part of the agency's implementation of safeguards in that country. Such inspections "are foreseen in all Agency safeguards agreements, principally as a means for the Agency to resolve unforeseen verification problems," according to a 1991 IAEA document. Paragraph 73 of the model safeguards agreement, INFCIRC 153, states that comprehensive safeguards agreements should provide for the IAEA's ability to "make special inspections," subject to certain procedures, if the agency

considers that information made available by the State, including explanations from the State and information obtained from routine inspections, is not adequate for the Agency to fulfill its responsibilities under the Agreement.

According to the 1991 document, a special inspection could be triggered by the IAEA's receipt of "plausible information, which is not adequately explained by the State or otherwise resolved" by other IAEA inspections that the country has "nuclear material in a nuclear activity" outside of IAEA safeguards, or that the state has an undeclared nuclear facility that it had been required to report to the agency.

The IAEA Director General "has the authority ... to determine the need for, and to direct the carrying out of, special inspections," according to another 1991 IAEA paper. In the event that the IAEA argues for a special inspection in a country, the agency and the government "must hold immediate consultations," according to the 1991 paper. Any dispute regarding the inspection request must be resolved according to dispute settlement provisions described in INFCIRC 153. However, paragraph 18 of INFCIRC 153 states that

if the Board, upon report of the Director General, decides that an action by the State is essential and urgent in order to ensure verification that nuclear material subject to safeguards under the Agreement is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices the Board shall be able to call upon the State to take the required action without delay, irrespective of whether procedures for the settlement of a dispute have been invoked.

If the state refuses the inspection, the IAEA Board of Governors can take action according to paragraph 19 of INFCIRC 153, including reporting the matter to the U.N. Security Council.

Appendix C. Extended Remarks by William Foster Regarding Possible NPT Article II Violations

On July 10, 1968, then-Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Director William Foster testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee about the NPT. In response to a question regarding the type of nuclear activities prohibited by Article II of the treaty, Foster supplied the following statement:

Extension of Remarks by Mr. Foster in Response to Question Regarding Nuclear Explosive Devices

The treaty articles in question are Article II, in which non-nuclear-weapon parties undertake "not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices," and Article IV, which provides that nothing in the Treaty is to be interpreted as affecting the right of all Parties to the Treaty "to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes…in conformity with Articles I and II of this Treaty." In the course of the negotiation of the Treaty, United States representatives were asked their views on what would constitute the "manufacture" of a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device under Article II of the draft treaty. Our reply was as follows:

"While the general intent of this provision seems clear, and its application to cases such as those discussed below should present little difficulty, the United States believe [sic] it is not possible at this time to formulate a comprehensive definition or interpretation. There are many hypothetical situations which might be imagined and it is doubtful that any general definition or interpretation, unrelated to specific fact situations could satisfactorily deal with all such situations.

"Some general observations can be made with respect to the question of whether or not a specific activity constitutes prohibited manufacture under the proposed treaty. For example, facts indicating that the purpose of a particular activity was the acquisition of a nuclear explosive device would tend to show non-compliance. (Thus, the construction of an experimental or prototype nuclear explosive device would be covered by the term 'manufacture' as would be the production of components which could only have relevance to a nuclear explosive device.) Again, while the placing of a particular activity under safeguards would not, in and of itself, settle the question of whether that activity was in compliance with the treaty, it would of course be helpful in allaying any suspicion of non-compliance.

"It may be useful to point out, for illustrative purposes, several activities which the United States would not consider per se to be violations of the prohibitions in Article II. Neither uranium enrichment nor the stockpiling of fissionable material in connection with a peaceful program would violate Article II so long as these activities were safeguarded under Article III. Also clearly permitted would be the development, under safeguards, of plutonium fueled power reactors, including research on the properties of metallic plutonium, nor would Article II interfere with the development or use of fast breeder reactors under safeguards."


Summary: The Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018 (P.L. 115-123), signed into law on February 9, 2018, created a joint select committee of the House and Senate. The Joint Select Committee on Budget and Appropriations Process Reform was to be made up of 16 Members from the House and Senate—4 chosen by each of the chambers' party leaders. The act charged the joint select committee with formulating recommendations and legislative language to "significantly reform the budget and appropriations process." The law directed the committee to make a report no later than November 30, 2018, to be submitted, along with legislative language, to the President, the Speaker of the House, and the majority and minority leaders of the House and Senate.

Summary: The act included procedures intended to allow the Senate to reach a timely vote on the question of whether or not to consider any legislation embodying the recommendations of the joint select committee. Under the terms of the act, the Senate would be able to vote on a motion to proceed to consider any reported joint committee bill before the conclusion of the 115th Congress (2017-2018). Consideration of the motion to proceed (and all debatable motions and appeals in connection therewith) was to be limited to 10 hours, equally divided and controlled by the majority and minority leaders (or their designees) with support of at least three-fifths of the Senate (60 votes if there is no more than one vacancy) necessary to approve the motion. The act did not specify any procedures governing consideration of the bill once the Senate had agreed to take it up. There were also no provisions in the act concerning the consideration of the recommendations of the joint select committee in the House nor any provisions concerning resolving any differences between the House and Senate. Such actions would have occurred under the regular procedures of each chamber.

Summary: During its lifespan, the joint select committee held five days of hearings, taking testimony from 12 outside witnesses and 27 Members, including then-Speaker of the House Paul Ryan and then-House Minority Leader Nancy Pelosi.

Summary: Formal and informal discussions among committee members resulted in draft legislation to be considered in a markup that concluded on November 29, 2018. The chief recommendation in the draft provided for the budget resolution to be adopted for a two-year cycle rather than the current annual cycle. By unanimous consent, the committee members applied a voting rule for the adoption of amendments consistent with the rule required by the act for final adoption of any recommendations requiring separate majorities of the appointees from each party. The final vote on reporting the bill as amended was not agreed to by a roll-call vote of one aye and seven noes of the Members appointed by the Speaker of the House and the Senate majority leader and seven ayes and zero noes of the Members appointed by the House minority leader and the Senate minority leader.

What Was the Joint Select Committee and Why Was It Created?

On February 9, 2018, President Trump signed the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018 into law ( P.L. 115-123 ). Subtitle B of Title IV provided for the creation of a Joint Select Committee on Budget and Appropriations Process Reform. The creation of this committee echoed a number of special panels created by Congress in the past in order to study and make recommendations on various issues unconstrained by existing committee jurisdictions. Prior examples include committees tasked with studying a wide spectrum of issues, including both budget process—such as the Joint Committee to Study Budget Control (created by P.L. 92-599)—and other topics, such as the Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities (also known as the Church Committee after its chairman, Senator Frank Church, created by S.Res. 2 , 94 th Congress).

What Was the Authority and Jurisdiction of the Joint Select Committee?

The act directed the joint select committee to "provide recommendations and legislative language that will significantly reform the budget and appropriations process."

What Was the Membership of the Committee?

The act required that the committee be composed of 16 members, with 4 members appointed by each of the Speaker of the House, the minority leader of the House, the majority leader of the Senate, and the minority leader of the Senate. Members were appointed to serve for the life of the committee, with any vacancy to be filled within 14 calendar days.

The act further stated that the committee would be led by cochairs. One cochair was to be appointed jointly by the Speaker of the House and the majority leader of the Senate, with the other cochair to be appointed jointly by the House and Senate minority leaders.

The four members of the joint select committee appointed by then-Speaker Paul Ryan were House Budget Committee Chairman Steve Womack (who served as committee cochair), House Rules Committee Chairman Pete Sessions, and Representatives Rob Woodall and Jodey Arrington. The four members appointed by then-House Minority Leader Nancy Pelosi were House Appropriations Committee ranking member Nita M. Lowey (who served as committee cochair), House Budget Committee ranking member John Yarmuth, and Representatives Lucille Roybal-Allard and Derek Kilmer.

The four members appointed by Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell were Senators Roy Blunt, David Perdue, James Lankford, and Joni Ernst. The four members appointed by Senate Minority Leader Charles Schumer were Senators Sheldon Whitehouse, Michael Bennet, Brian Schatz, and Mazie Hirono.

Under the act, the joint select committee terminated on December 31, 2018.

How Was the Committee Staffed and Funded?

Federal agencies (including legislative branch agencies) were tasked with providing technical assistance to the committee if requested in writing by the cochairs, and employees of the legislative branch could be detailed to the committee on a nonreimbursable basis consistent with the rules and regulations of the Senate.

The act provided an authorization for use of not more than $500,000 from the appropriations account for ''Expenses of Inquiries and Investigations'' of the Senate with such sums to be disbursed by the Secretary of the Senate, in accordance with Senate rules and procedures, upon vouchers signed by the joint panel's cochairs.

What Were the Responsibilities of the Committee?

The committee was required to hold its first meeting not later than 30 calendar days after the date of enactment, with the cochairs of the committee required to provide an agenda to committee members at least 48 hours in advance of any meeting. The initial organizing meeting was held on March 7, 2018, with additional working group meetings held on August 22, September 13, and September 26, 2018, and a markup held on November 15, 27, and 29, 2018.

The committee was also authorized and expected to hold hearings and take testimony from witnesses. Each cochair was entitled to select an equal number of witnesses for each hearing. Witnesses appearing before the committee were required to file a written statement of proposed testimony at least two calendar days before his or her appearance.

The law specified that nine members of the committee would constitute a quorum for purposes of voting and meeting, and five members of the committee would constitute a quorum for holding hearings.

The act stated that the committee provide recommendations and legislative language to significantly reform the budget and appropriations process. The committee was required to vote by November 30, 2018, on (1) a report containing a detailed statement of the findings, conclusions, and recommendations of the committee and (2) proposed legislative language to carry out those recommendations.

The text of any report and proposed legislative language were required to be made publicly available in electronic form at least 24 hours prior to its consideration by the joint select committee. The act required the report and the proposed legislative language to be approved by a majority of each of (1) the committee members appointed by the Speaker of the House and the majority leader of the Senate and (2) the committee members appointed by the House and Senate minority leaders. The law specified that nine members of the committee would constitute a quorum for purposes of voting, with no proxy voting permitted.

If the committee voted to report recommendations and legislative language, members were to be allowed the opportunity to file supplemental, minority, or additional views to be included in a committee report.

What Was to Happen Once the Committee Reported?

Under the act, if the committee had approved a report and legislative language, it would have been required to make them available to the public "promptly" and submit them to the President, the Vice President, the Speaker of the House, and the majority and minority leaders of each chamber within 15 calendar days of approval.

Upon receipt of proposed legislative language, the Senate majority leader (or his designee) was required to introduce it in the Senate (by request) on the next day on which the Senate was in session. There were no provisions in the law concerning the introduction of the recommendations of the joint select committee in the House.

Were There Procedures Established for Congressional Consideration of the Committee's Recommendations?

The Bipartisan Budget Act established certain unique procedures for Senate consideration of any legislative language reported by the joint select committee. These procedures were intended to allow the Senate to reach a timely vote on the question of whether or not to consider legislation embodying the recommendations of the joint select committee, but the act did not specify any procedures governing consideration of the bill once the Senate agreed to take it up. There were no provisions in the act concerning the consideration of the recommendations of the joint select committee in the House. There were also no provisions concerning resolving any differences between the House and Senate or the consideration of a veto message from the President. Such actions would have occurred under the regular procedures of each chamber.

Once any recommendations of the joint select committee were introduced in the Senate, the bill would be referred to the Senate Committee on the Budget, which was required to report the bill favorably, unfavorably, or without recommendation within seven session days—but without any revisions. If the Budget Committee failed to report the bill within that period, it would be automatically discharged from consideration of the bill, and the bill would be placed on the Senate Calendar of Business.

Not later than two days of Senate session after a joint committee bill was reported or discharged from the Budget Committee, the majority leader (or his designee) could move to proceed to consider it. Should the majority leader (or his designee) not make such a motion within two session days, any Senator could do so.

The motion to consider a joint committee bill—and all debatable motions and appeals in connection with the motion—would be considered for a maximum of 10 hours, evenly divided between the majority leader and the minority leader (or their designees). A nondebatable motion to further limit debate would be in order and would require a vote of three-fifths of all Senators—60 votes if there is not more than one vacancy—to pass.

In order for the recommendations of the joint select committee to be considered by the full Senate, the act required that the motion to proceed be agreed to by a vote of three-fifths of all Senators—60 votes if there is not more than one vacancy.

The act further specified that all points of order against the motion to proceed are waived and that a motion to postpone the motion to proceed or a motion to reconsider a vote on it are not in order.

Finally, the act directed that not later than the last day of the 115 th Congress (2017-2018), the Senate must vote on a motion to proceed to a bill containing recommendations of the joint select committee.

If the Senate approved the motion to proceed, the joint committee bill could then be considered under the regular rules of the Senate, meaning that it would be fully debatable and fully amendable (possibly including by nongermane amendments) and that cloture might need to be invoked on one or more questions (requiring the support of three-fifths of all Senators) in order to reach a final vote.

The joint select committee held five days of public hearings.

April 17: current challenges facing the budget and appropriations process in Congress and possibilities for improvement; May 9: challenges of the current procedural framework, particularly as it relates to the ability of Members to work effectively and in a bipartisan manner regardless of political dynamics; May 24: the role of the budget resolution and possible options to bolster its impact and influence on subsequent budgetary actions; June 27: testimony heard from 27 Members of the House and Senate (and written statements received from 5 others), including Speaker of the House Paul Ryan and Hou se Minority Leader, Nancy Pelosi; July 17: former Members' historical perspective on enacting budgetary legislation in the context of the challenges presented by both the politics and the framework of the budget and appropriations process.

The committee held multiple meetings, both formal and informal, to provide its members a forum to discuss reforms to the budget and appropriations process. These meetings—including working sessions on August 22, September 13, and September 26, 2018—provided the basis for the recommendations that were subsequently incorporated into draft legislation to be considered by the committee as the cochair's mark.

The cochair's mark included a recommendation that the budget resolution be adopted for a two-year cycle rather than the current annual cycle. The draft also addressed a number of related concerns, such as allowing reconciliation instructions for both years of a biennium, providing for a revision of the budget resolution in the second session of a Congress to update it for scoring purposes, and revising the requirements concerning the submission and content of the President's budget in the second year of a biennium. The recommendations also provided for a change in the membership of the Senate Budget Committee to be comprised of eight members from the majority and seven members from the minority, including the chairs and ranking members from the Appropriations and Finance Committees, and for the House and Senate Budget Committees to hold a joint hearing on the fiscal state of the nation.

On November 15, 2018, the committee began marking up the draft legislation. In that markup, the committee agreed by unanimous consent to apply a voting rule for the adoption of amendments consistent with the rule required by the act for final adoption of any recommendations. This agreement required separate majorities of the appointees from each party. The markup continued on November 27 and 29. The final vote on reporting the draft bill, as amended, was not agreed to by a roll-call vote of one aye and seven noes of the Members appointed by the Speaker of the House and the Senate majority leader and seven ayes and zero noes of the Members appointed by the House minority leader and the Senate minority leader.


The Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) Block Grant: Responses to Frequently Asked Questions

Summary: The Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) block grant funds a wide range of benefits and services for low-income families with children. TANF was created in the 1996 welfare reform law (P.L. 104-193). This report responds to some frequently asked questions about TANF; it does not describe TANF rules (see, instead, CRS Report RL32748, The Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) Block Grant: A Primer on TANF Financing and Federal Requirements, by Gene Falk).

Summary: TANF Funding and Expenditures. TANF provides fixed funding for the 50 states, the District of Columbia, the territories, and American Indian tribes. The basic block grant totals $16.5 billion per year. States are also required in total to contribute, from their own funds, at least $10.3 billion annually under a maintenance-of-effort (MOE) requirement.

Summary: Though TANF is best known for funding cash assistance payments for needy families with children, the block grant and MOE funds are used for a wide variety of benefits and activities. In FY2017, expenditures on basic assistance totaled $7.1 billion—23% of total federal TANF and MOE dollars. Basic assistance is often—but not exclusively—paid as cash. In addition to funding basic assistance, TANF also contributes funds for child care and services for children who have been, or are at risk of being, abused and neglected. Some states also count expenditures in prekindergarten programs toward the MOE requirement.

Summary: The TANF Assistance Caseload. A total of 1.2 million families, composed of 3.1 million recipients, received TANF- or MOE-funded assistance in September 2018. The bulk of the "recipients" were children—2.3 million in that month. The assistance caseload is heterogeneous. The type of family once thought of as the "typical" assistance family—one with an unemployed adult recipient—accounted for 32% of all families on the rolls in FY2016. Additionally, 31% of cash assistance families had an employed adult, while 38% of all TANF families were "child-only" and had no adult recipient. Child-only families include those with disabled adults receiving Supplemental Security Income (SSI), adults who are nonparents (e.g., grandparents, aunts, uncles) caring for children, and families consisting of citizen children and ineligible noncitizen parents.

Summary: Cash Assistance Benefits. TANF cash benefit amounts are set by states. In July 2017, the maximum monthly benefit for a family of three ranged from $1,021 in New Hampshire to $170 in Mississippi. Only New Hampshire (at 60% of the federal poverty guidelines) had a maximum TANF cash assistance amount for this sized family in excess of 50% of poverty-level income.

Summary: Work Requirements. TANF's main federal work requirement is actually a performance measure that applies to the states. States determine the work rules that apply to individual recipients. TANF law requires states to engage 50% of all families and 90% of two-parent families with work-eligible individuals in work activities, though these standards can be reduced by "credits." Therefore, the effective standards states face are often less than the 50% or 90% targets, and vary by state. In FY2017, states achieved, on average, an all-family participation rate of 53.0% and a two-parent rate of 69.5%. In FY2017, two jurisdictions did not meet the all-family participation standard: Nevada and Guam. This is a reduction from FY2012, when 16 states did not meet that standard. In FY2017, nine jurisdictions did not meet the two-parent standard. States that do not meet work standards are at risk of being penalized by a reduction in their block grant.

This report provides responses to frequently asked questions about the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) block grant. It is intended to serve as a quick reference to provide easy access to information and data. Appendix B presents a series of tables with state-level data. This report does not provide information on TANF program rules (for a discussion of TANF rules, see CRS Report RL32748, The Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) Block Grant: A Primer on TANF Financing and Federal Requirements , by Gene Falk).

On January 24, 2019, the President signed legislation ( P.L. 116-4 ) that funds TANF and related programs through June 30, 2019. The legislation permits states to receive their quarterly TANF grants for the 2 nd quarter (January through March) and 3 rd quarter (April through June) of FY2019. Additional legislation would be required to pay TANF grants in the final quarter (July through September) of FY2019.

TANF programs are funded through a combination of federal and state funds. In FY2018, TANF has two federal grants to states. The bulk of the TANF funding is in a basic block grant to the states, totaling $16.5 billion for the 50 states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, Guam, the Virgin Islands, and American Indian tribes. There is also a contingency fund available that provides extra federal funds to states that meet certain conditions.

Additionally, states are required to expend a minimum amount of their own funds for TANF and TANF-related activities under what is known as the maintenance of effort (MOE) requirement. States are required to spend at least 75% of what they spent in FY1994 on TANF's predecessor programs. The minimum MOE amount, in total, is $10.3 billion per year for the 50 states, the District of Columbia, and the territories.

How Much Has the Value of the TANF Basic Block Grant Changed Over Time?

TANF was created in the 1996 welfare reform law, the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRWORA, P.L. 104-193 ). A TANF basic block grant amount—both nationally and for each state—was established in the 1996 welfare reform law. The amount established in that law for the 50 states, District of Columbia, territories, and tribes was $16.6 billion in total. From FY1997 through FY2016, that amount remained the same. It was not adjusted for changes that occur over time, such as inflation, the size of the TANF assistance caseload, or changes in the poverty population. During this period, the real (inflation-adjusted) value of the block grant declined by one-third (33.1%). Beginning with FY2017, the state family assistance grant was reduced by 0.33% from its historical levels to finance TANF-related research and technical assistance. The reduced block grant amount is $16.5 billion.

Table 1 shows the state family assistance grant, in both nominal (actual) and real (inflation-adjusted) dollars for each year, FY1997 through FY2018. In real (inflation-adjusted) terms, the FY2018 block grant was 36% below its value in FY1997.

Figure 1 shows the uses of federal TANF grants to states and state MOE funds in FY2017. In FY2017, a total of $31.1 billion of both federal TANF and state MOE expenditures were either expended or transferred to other block grant programs. Basic assistance—ongoing benefits to families to meet basic needs—represented 23% ($7.1 billion) of total FY2017 TANF and MOE dollars.

TANF is a major contributor of child care funding. In FY2017, $5 billion (16% of all TANF and MOE funds) were either expended on child care or transferred to the child care block grant (the Child Care and Development Fund, or CCDF). TANF work-related activities (including education and training) were the third-largest TANF and MOE spending category at $3.3 billion, or 11% of total TANF and MOE funds. TANF also helps low-wage parents by helping to finance state refundable tax credits, such as state add-ons to the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC). TANF and MOE expenditures on refundable tax credits in FY2017 totaled $2.8 billion, or 9% of total TANF and MOE spending.

TANF is also a major contributor to the child welfare system, which provides foster care, adoption assistance, and services to families with children who either have experienced or are at risk of experiencing child abuse or neglect, spending about $2.2 billion on such activities. TANF and MOE funds also help fund state prekindergarten (pre-K) programs, with total FY2017 expenditures for that category also at $2.5 billion. TANF and MOE funds are also used for short-term and emergency benefits and a wide range of other social services.

For state-specific information on the use of TANF funds, see Table B-1 and Table B-2 .

How Much of the TANF Grant Has Gone Unspent?

TANF law permits states to "reserve" unused funds without time limit. This permits flexibility in timing of the use of TANF funds, including the ability to "save" funds for unexpected occurrences that might increase costs (such as recessions or natural disasters).

At the end of FY2017 (September 30, 2017, the most recent data currently available), a total of $5.1 billion of federal TANF funding remained neither transferred nor spent. However, some of these unspent funds represent monies that states had already committed to spend later. At the end of FY2017, states had made such commitments to spend—that is, had obligated—a total of $1.8 billion. At the end of FY2017, states had $3.3 billion of "unobligated balances." These funds are available to states to make new spending commitments. Table B-3 shows unspent TANF funds by state.

How Many Families Receive TANF- or MOE-Funded Benefits and Services?

This number is not known. Federal TANF reporting requirements focus on families receiving only ongoing assistance . There is no complete reporting on families receiving other TANF benefits and services.

Assistance is defined as benefits provided to families to meet ongoing, basic needs. It is most often paid in cash. However, some states use TANF or MOE funds to provide an "earnings supplement" to working parents added to monthly Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) allotments. These "earnings supplements" are paid separately from the regular TANF cash assistance program. Additionally, TANF MOE dollars are used to fund food assistance for immigrants barred from regular SNAP benefits in certain states. These forms of nutrition aid meet an ongoing need, and thus are considered TANF assistance.

As discussed in a previous section of this report, TANF basic assistance accounts for about 24% of all TANF expenditures. Therefore, the federal reporting requirements that pertain to families receiving "assistance" are likely to undercount the number of families receiving any TANF-funded benefit or service.

How Many Families and People Currently Receive TANF- or MOE-Funded "Assistance"?

Table 2 provides assistance caseload information. A total of 1.2 million families, composed of 3.1 million recipients, received TANF- or MOE-funded assistance in September 2018. The bulk of the "recipients" were children—2.3 million in that month. For state-by-state assistance caseloads, see Table B-4 .

How Does the Current Assistance Caseload Level Compare with Historical Levels?

Figure 2 provides a long-term historical perspective on the number of families receiving assistance from TANF or its predecessor program, from July 1959 to September 2017. The shaded areas of the figure represent months when the national economy was in recession. Though the health of the national economy has affected the trend in the cash assistance caseload, the long-term trend in receipt of cash assistance does not follow a classic countercyclical pattern. Such a pattern would have the caseload rise during economic slumps, and then fall again during periods of economic growth. Factors other than the health of the economy (demographic trends, policy changes) also have influenced the caseload trend.

The figure shows two periods of sustained caseload increases: the period from the mid-1960s to the mid-1970s and a second period from 1988 to 1994. The number of families receiving assistance peaked in March 1994 at 5.1 million families. The assistance caseload fell rapidly in the late 1990s (after the 1996 welfare reform law) before leveling off in 2001. In 2004, the caseload began another decline, albeit at a slower pace than in the late 1990s. During the recent 2007-2009 recession and its aftermath, the caseload began to rise from 1.7 million families in August 2008, peaking in December 2010 at close to 2.0 million families. By September 2018, the assistance caseload had declined to 1.2 million families.

Table B-5 shows recent trends in the number of cash assistance families by state.

What Are the Characteristics of Families Receiving TANF Assistance?

Before PRWORA, the "typical" family receiving assistance has been headed by a single parent (usually the mother) with one or two children. That single parent has also typically been unemployed. However, over the past 20 years the assistance caseload decline has occurred together with a major shift in the composition of the rolls. Figure 3 shows the change in the size and composition of the assistance caseload under both AFDC (1988 and 1994) and TANF. In FY1988, an estimated 84% of AFDC families were headed by an unemployed adult recipient. In FY2016, families with an unemployed adult recipient represented 32% of all cash assistance families. This decline occurred, in large part, as the number of families headed by unemployed adult recipients declined more rapidly than other components of the assistance caseload. In FY1994, a monthly average of 3.8 million families per month who received AFDC cash assistance had adult recipients who were not working. In FY2016, a monthly average of 485,000 families per month had adult recipients or work-eligible individuals, with no adult recipient or work-eligible individual working.

With the decline in families headed by unemployed adults, the share of the caseload represented by families with employed adults and "child only" families has increased. In FY2017, families with all adult recipients unemployed and families with employed adult recipients each represented 31% of all assistance families. The latter category includes families in "earnings supplement" programs separate from the regular TANF cash assistance program. "Child-only" families are those where no adult recipient receives benefits in their own right; the family receives benefits on behalf of its children. The share of the caseload that was child-only in FY2017 was 38%. In FY2017, families with a nonrecipient, nonparent relative (grandparents, aunts, uncles) represented 14% of all assistance families. Families with ineligible, noncitizen adults or adults who have not reported their citizenship status made up 9% of the assistance caseload in that year. Families where the parent received Supplemental Security Income (SSI) and the children received TANF made up 9% of all assistance families in FY2017.

TANF Cash Benefits: How Much Does a Family Receive in TANF Cash Per Month?

There are no federal rules that help determine the amount of TANF cash benefits paid to a family. (There are also no federal rules that require states to use TANF to pay cash benefits, though all states do so.) Benefit amounts are determined solely by the states.

Most states base TANF cash benefit amounts on family size, paying larger cash benefits to larger families on the presumption that they have greater financial needs. The maximum monthly cash benefit is usually paid to a family that receives no other income (e.g., no earned or unearned income) and complies with program rules. Families with income other than TANF often are paid a reduced benefit. Moreover, some families are financially sanctioned for not meeting a program requirement (e.g., a work requirement), and are also paid a lower benefit.

Figure 4 shows the maximum monthly TANF cash benefit by state for a single mother caring for two children (family of three) in July 2016. The benefit amounts shown are those for a single-parent family with two children. For a family of three, the maximum TANF benefit paid in July 2017 varied from $170 per month in Mississippi to $1,201 per month in New Hampshire. The map shows a regional pattern to the maximum monthly benefit paid, with lower benefit amounts in the South than in other regions. Only New Hampshire (at 60% of the federal poverty guidelines) had a maximum TANF cash assistance amount for this sized family in excess of 50% of poverty-level income.

TANF's main federal work requirement is actually a performance measure that applies to the states, rather than individual recipients. States determine the work rules that apply to individual recipients.

What Is the TANF Work Participation Standard States Must Meet?

The TANF statute requires states to have 50% of their caseload meet standards of participation in work or activities—that is, a family member must be in specified activities for a minimum number of hours. There is a separate participation standard that applies to the two-parent portion of a state's caseload, requiring 90% of the state's two-parent caseload to meet participation standards.

However, the statutory work participation standards are reduced by a "caseload reduction credit." The caseload reduction credit reduces the participation standard one percentage point for each percentage point decline in a state's caseload. Additionally, under a regulatory provision, a state may get "extra" credit for caseload reduction if it spends more than required under the TANF MOE. Therefore, the effective standards states face are often less than the 50% and 90% targets, and vary by state and by year.

States that do not meet the TANF work participation standard are at risk of being penalized through a reduction in their block grant. However, penalties can be forgiven if a state claims, and the Secretary of HHS finds, that it had "reasonable cause" for not meeting the standard. Penalties can also be forgiven for states that enter into "corrective compliance plans," and subsequently meet the work standard.

Have There Been Changes in the Work Participation Rules Enacted Since the 1996 Welfare Reform Law?

The 50% and 90% target standards that states face, as well as the caseload reduction credit, date back to the 1996 welfare reform law. However, the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 (DRA, P.L. 109-171 ) made several changes to the work participation rules effective in FY2007

The caseload reduction credit was changed to measure caseload reduction from FY2005, rather than the original law's FY1995. The work participation standards were broadened to include families receiving cash aid in "separate state programs." Separate state programs are programs run with state funds, distinct from a state's "TANF program," but with expenditures countable toward the TANF MOE. HHS was instructed to provide definition to the allowable TANF work activities listed in law. HHS was also required to define what is meant by a "work-eligible" individual, expanding the number of families that are included in the work participation calculation. States were required to develop plans and procedures to verify work activities.

The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA, P.L. 111-5 ), a law enacted in response to the sharp economic downturn of 2007-2009, held states "harmless" for caseload increases affecting the work participation standards for FY2009 through FY2011. It did so by allowing states to "freeze" caseload reduction credits at pre-recession levels through the FY2011 standards.

What Work Participation Rates Have the States Achieved?

HHS computes two work participation rates for each state that are then compared with the effective (after-credit) standard to determine if it has met the TANF work standard. An "all-families" work participation rate is computed and compared with the all-families effective standard (50% minus the state's caseload reduction credit). HHS also computes a two-parent work participation rate that is compared with the two-parent effective standard (90% minus the state's caseload reduction credit).

Figure 5 shows the national average all-families work participation rate for FY2002 through FY2017. For the period FY2002 through FY2011, states achieved an average all-families work participation rate hovering around 30%. The work participation rate increased since then. In FY2016, it exceeded 50% for the first time since TANF was established. However, it is important to note that the increase in the work participation rate has not come from an increase in the number of recipients in regular TANF assistance programs who are either working or in job preparation activities. This increase stems mostly from states creating new "earnings supplement" programs that use TANF funds to aid working parents in the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP, formerly food stamps) or who have left the regular TANF assistance programs for work.

How Many Jurisdictions Did Not Meet the All-Families Standard?

Figure 6 shows which states did not meet the TANF all-families work participation standards from FY2006 through FY2017. Before FY2007, the first year that DRA was effective, only a few jurisdictions did not meet TANF all-families work participation standards. However, in FY2007, 15 jurisdictions did not meet the all-families standard. This number declined to 9 in FY2008 and 8 in FY2009.

In FY2012, despite the uptick in the national average work participation rate, 16 states did not meet the all-family standard, the largest number of states that did not meet their participation standards in any one year since the enactment of TANF. FY2012 was the year that ARRA's "freeze" of the caseload reduction credit expired, and states were generally required to meet higher standards than in previous years.

The number of jurisdictions that did not meet the all-families standard declined over the FY2012 to FY2017 period. In FY2017, two jurisdictions did not meet the all-family participation standard: Nevada and Guam.

Have States Met the Two-Parent Work Participation Standard?

In addition to meeting a work standard for all families, TANF also imposes a second standard—90%—for the two-parent portion of its cash assistance caseload. This standard can also be lowered by caseload reduction.

Figure 7 shows whether each state met its two-parent work participation standard for FY2006 through FY2017. However, the display on the table is more complex than that for reporting whether a state met or did not meet its "all family" rate.

A substantial number of states have reported no two-parent families subject to the work participation standard. These states are denoted on the table with an "NA," indicating that the two-parent standard was not applicable to the state in that year. Before the changes made by the DRA were effective, a number of states had their two-parent families in separate state programs that were not included in the work participation calculation. When DRA brought families receiving assistance in separate state programs into the work participation rate calculations, a number of states moved these families into solely state-funded programs. These are state-funded programs with expenditures not countable toward the TANF maintenance of effort requirement, and hence are outside of TANF's rules.

For states with two-parent families in their caseloads, the table reports "Yes" for states that met the two-parent standard, and "No" for states that did not meet the two-parent standard. Of the 28 jurisdictions that had two-parent families in their FY2017 TANF work participation calculation, 19 met the standard and 9 did not.