Selecting the World Bank President

Summary: On January 7, 2018, World Bank President Jim Yong Kim announced that he would resign by February 1, three years before the expiration of his second five-year term in 2022. Following his resignation, Dr. Kim is to join Global Infrastructure Partners (GIP), a private equity fund that invests in projects in advanced and developing countries. Prior to his nomination to the World Bank by President Barack Obama in 2012, Dr. Kim served as the president of Dartmouth College.

Summary: The nomination period for the next president ends on March 14, after which the Executive Board is to select three candidates for interviews. To date, the only candidate is David Malpass, the Treasury Department's Under Secretary for International Affairs, nominated by President Trump on February 6, 2019. Following the interviews, the Executive Board is to select the next president, something which it aims to do before the spring meetings in April 2019.

Summary: Since its founding after World War II, the presidency of the World Bank has been held by a citizen of the United States, the Bank's largest shareholder. According to an informal agreement among World Bank member countries, a U.S. candidate is chosen as the president of the World Bank and a European candidate (typically French or German) is appointed as the managing director of the International Monetary Fund (IMF).

Summary: The formal requirement for the selection of the World Bank president is that the executive directors appoint, by at least a 50% majority, an individual who is neither a member of the Board of Governors nor Board of Executive Directors. There are no requirements on how individuals are selected, on what criteria, or by what process they are vetted. Although the executive directors may select the IMF managing director by a simple majority vote, they historically aim to reach agreement by consensus. With these factors combined, the custom guaranteeing European leadership at the IMF and American leadership at the World Bank has remained in place.

Summary: This custom has been subject to increasing criticism during the past two decades. The first line of criticism is directed at the current distribution of voting power, which critics contend does not account for the increasing integration of developing countries into the global economy. A second line of criticism is directed at the method of selecting World Bank and IMF leadership, which critics argue elevates nationality above merit and undermines the legitimacy and effectiveness of the institutions. Calls for a more open, transparent, and merit-based leadership selection process have been made consistently in the past, and at times have been incorporated into communiqués of various summits, but have yet to change the leadership selection process at either institution.

World Bank President Jim Yong Kim recently announced that he was stepping down in February 2019 to join Global Infrastructure Partners, a private equity fund that invests in projects in advanced and developing countries. Kim's unexpected resignation, combined with his joining of a private firm that could directly compete with the World Bank for investments, raises questions for policymakers as they nominate and select a new president for the World Bank, a central component of the U.S.-led international economic order for the past eight decades.

According to an informal agreement among their member countries, the U.S. nominee is chosen as the World Bank president and a European candidate (typically French or German) is appointed as managing director of the International Monetary Fund (IMF). This custom has been subject to increasing criticism during the past two decades. The first line of criticism is directed at the current distribution of voting power, which critics contend does not account for the increasing integration of developing countries into the global economy. A second line of criticism is directed at the method of selecting World Bank and IMF leadership, which critics argue, elevates nationality above merit and undermines the legitimacy and effectiveness of the institutions.

This report provides information on the 2019 World Bank selection process and discusses efforts to reform the selection process.

The World Bank is a multilateral development bank (MDB) that offers loans and grants to low- and middle-income countries to promote poverty alleviation and economic development. The World Bank has near-universal membership, with 189 member nations. U.S. membership in the World Bank is authorized by a federal statute known as the Bretton Woods Agreements Act (22 U.S.C. 286 et seq .). Only Cuba and North Korea, and a few microstates such as the Vatican, Monaco, and Andorra, are nonmembers.

Two of the Bank's five facilities, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and the International Development Association (IDA), lend directly to governments to finance development projects and policy programs in member countries. The IBRD provides middle-income developing countries with loans at near-market rates using funds raised by the World Bank on international capital markets. IDA was established in 1960 due to concerns that low-income countries could not afford to borrow at the near-market rate terms offered by the IBRD. IDA provides grants and concessional loans funded by contributions from donors and transfers from the IBRD to low-income countries. A country's eligibility for IBRD or IDA financial assistance depends on its relative poverty, defined as gross national income (GNI). For 2019, countries with a per capita GNI below $1,145 are eligible for IDA funding. IBRD commitments totaled $23.6 billion in 2018. Commitments from IDA to low-income countries were $24 billion in 2018 ( Table 1 ). Three other World Bank-affiliated organizations are dedicated to promoting private sector finance and investment in low-income countries. The International Finance Corporation (IFC) promotes private sector development in developing countries by making loans and investments in small- and medium-sized companies in those countries. The Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) provides private investors with insurance coverage against noncommercial risk (expropriation, war and civil disturbance, and/or breach of contract) in developing countries. The International Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) provides dispute resolution for investment disputes between governments and foreign investors.

The United States is the largest contributor to the World Bank, having the largest share of the IBRD's subscribed capital, $46.4 billion (16.88%) of a total of $275 billion. As the largest contributor, the United States holds a single seat on the 25-member Board of Executive Directors and carries 16.32% of the total votes in Bank decisionmaking, which provides veto power on decisions requiring an 85% majority vote. The largest shareholders after the United States are Japan (6.89% of voting power), China (4.45%), Germany (4.03%), France (3.78%), and the United Kingdom (3.78%). The large voting power of the United States ensures the U.S. ability to veto major policy decisions at the Bank.

A citizen of the United States has always held the presidency of the World Bank. The World Bank's president is chairman of the Board and elected by the Board of Directors. The president is the chief of the operating staff of the Bank and conducts, under direction of the executive directors, the ordinary business of the Bank. The Bank's 12 th president, Jim Yong Kim, has served since 2012. On September 27, 2016, Dr. Kim was reelected as the World Bank president, for a second five-year term beginning July 1, 2017.

The Trump Administration has continued to support U.S. participation in the international financial institutions (IFIs) and has funded recent U.S. MDB commitments. The Trump Administration is supporting a $60.1 billion capital increase for the World Bank's main lending facility, the IBRD, which would raise its capital from $268.9 billion to $329 billion. World Bank members also endorsed a $5.5 billion capital increase for the IFC, which would more than triple the IFC's capital base from $2.57 billion to $8.2 billion. The Trump Administration supports the capital increase, which is to be accompanied by reforms designed, in part, to address a long-standing concern for many U.S. policymakers: high levels of World Bank lending to upper-middle income countries, especially China. In a statement at the 2017 IMF and World Bank spring meetings, U.S. Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin stated that, "the relationship between the World Bank and more creditworthy countries [such as China] should mature over time, with the absolute level of borrowing declining as countries become better able to finance their own development objectives."

Selecting the leadership at the two major international financial institutions—the IMF and the World Bank—is guided by a tradition that the World Bank president is an American and that the IMF managing director is a European. The informal agreement reflects the political and economic balance of power at the end of World War II. At the time, the United States believed that the World Bank should be headed by an American since the United States was the only capital surplus nation, and World Bank lending would be dependent on American financial markets. The U.S. Secretary of the Treasury at the time, Fred Vinson, believed that if an American representative headed the World Bank, the IMF must be headed by a non-American. Moreover, he noted, "it would be impracticable to appoint U.S. citizens to head both the Bank and the Fund."

Despite the growth of world capital markets, and the fact that the World Bank is no longer reliant on U.S. capital markets, the convention on the IMF and World Bank selection has remained intact. The U.S.-EU agreement is not unique. A 2009 study finds that

Informal agreements allocating positions of authority and decision making pervade international organizations. Whether in secretariats or political, judicial, and administrative bodies, tacit understandings that assign representation to certain states or groups of states are the norm, not the exception...

The Articles of Agreement of the African Development Bank (AfDB) and the Asian Development Bank (AsDB) each specify that only citizens of regional countries may serve as presidents of those banks. By tradition, the Japanese Finance Ministry nominates a Japanese citizen to be president of the AsDB. The Articles of the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) specify only that their president must come from a member country. By tradition, the IDB president is selected by a competitive process from among citizens of the Latin American countries. The EBRD president is also elected by a presumably competitive process, though only French and German citizens have served to date in that capacity and there is normally only one nominee.

Second-tier offices in these institutions have also traditionally been reserved for U.S. citizens. First deputy managing director at the IMF and executive vice president at the IDB are traditionally U.S. citizens. These individuals are appointed by the chief executive of the institution, but in the case of the IMF and IDB an individual is typically designated by the U.S. Government. At the Asian Development Bank and EBRD, one of the vice presidents for an operational region has typically been a U.S. citizen.

However, despite these restrictions, there have been successful efforts to open up the selection process across the MDBs. In 2015, the AfDB members elected Akinwumi Adesina of Nigeria, after a transparent election involving seven other candidates. Adesina garnered 58% of the total vote of AfDB shareholders. The 2012 World Bank election was the first to include several candidates and Kim's nomination was, unlike past nominations, not unanimous. The announcement of Kim's selection noted that a new selection process (introduced in 2011) yielded multiple nominees (former Nigerian Finance Minister Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala and former Colombian Finance Minister and United Nations Under Secretary-General for Economic and Social Affairs Jose Antonio Ocampo) and that the nominees received support from different member countries.

Formal Process for Selecting the World Bank President

The formal guidelines for choosing the World Bank president are laid out in the Bank's Articles of Agreements and Bylaws. Article V, Section 5, states that "[t]he Executive Board shall select a President who shall not be a Governor or an Executive Director. " This decision may be reached by a simple majority of the Executive Board. Section 13(c) of the Bank's bylaws stipulates the terms of service. World Bank presidents are elected for renewable five-year terms. Neither the articles nor the bylaws articulate any specific qualifications for the position of president of the World Bank.

The Bank's Articles of Agreement, however, are silent on any requirements on how individuals are selected, on what criteria, or by what process they are vetted. There is no formal search process for candidates. Nominations can only be made by the 25 World Bank executive directors and there is no concerted search process of the Executive Board to identify and vet possible candidates.

In 2000, two internal working groups (the World Bank Working Group to Review the Process for Selection of the President and the International Monetary Fund Working Group to Review the Process for Selection of the Managing Director) were created to discuss the selection procedure. A joint draft report of the working groups was endorsed by the executive directors on April 26, 2001, but never formally implemented. The report declared, among other things, that transparency and accountability are critical to the selection process.

Instead of implementing the 2001 report's recommendations, the Executive Board adopted in 2011 a procedure that specified qualification criteria, established a nomination period, and provided for an interview process. Critics point out that the agreed procedures remain vague and largely nontransparent. Most notably, development expertise is not included as a qualification and the decision will be taken not by public vote, but rather by consensus according to prior practice. Declaring the importance of an "open, transparent, and merit-based" process, yet continuing to perpetuate the status quo, according to three former World Bank chief economists, is hypocritical, and "destroys the trust and spirit of collaboration needed to manage the profound problems facing the world."

The decision to select a new World Bank president is to be made by a majority vote of the World Bank's Executive Board. Unlike the United Nations General Assembly, which relies on a one-person, one-vote governance system, the World Bank uses a weighted voted system. Voting is loosely based on contributions to the Bank. The five largest shareholders (United States, Japan, Germany, France, and the United Kingdom) have their own seat on the Executive Board. In addition to the five largest shareholders, China, Russia, and Saudi Arabia have enough votes to elect their own executive directors. All other countries have gravitated into mixed-state groupings or constituencies. These constituencies range in size from 3 countries (South Africa, Angola, and Nigeria) to 21. The mixed-state constituencies are flexible in their membership. Countries have periodically switched constituencies, often to a new group that will allow them to have a bigger vote or leadership role.

Unlike the eight countries that have their own ED, the influence of countries in mixed-state constituencies is not equivalent to their quota-determined voting weight. Since they vote in constituencies, small countries can easily be sidestepped by the larger countries in the constituency. For many countries at the World Bank, they "can at best express a divergent opinion orally but cannot bring it to bear in the form of a vote." Executive directors must cast their votes as single unit, even though some of the countries they represent may disagree with their position. There is no provision for splitting a constituency's vote.

There is no formal congressional involvement in the selection of Bank management. U.S. participation in the World Bank is authorized by the Bretton Woods Agreement Act of 1945. The act delegates to the President ultimate authority under U.S. law to direct U.S. policy and instruct the U.S. representatives at the Bank. The President, in turn, has generally delegated authority to the Secretary of the Treasury. With the advice and consent of the Senate, the President names individuals to represent the United States on the Executive Board of the World Bank. The position of U.S. executive director is currently vacant. The alternate executive director is Erik Bethel. The Executive Board has authority over operations and policy and must approve any loan or policy decision. The U.S. executive director is supported primarily by Treasury Department staff.

Unique among the founding members, the Bretton Woods Agreement Act requires specific congressional authorization for certain decisions, such as changing the U.S. share at the Bank or amending the Articles of Agreement. However, neither the approval of individual loans nor the selection of the managing director requires congressional approval.

Reform Efforts and the 2019 Selection Process

The European-U.S. arrangement to split the leadership at the IMF and World Bank has generated controversy, which may undermine the effectiveness of the eventual nominee. Critics of the current selection process make two general arguments. First, the gentlemen's agreement on IMF and World Bank leadership is seen as a relic of a global economy that no longer exists. Whereas the United States and Europe dominated the postwar economy, the current international economy is more diverse. Developing and emerging market countries contribute half of global output, up from 25% 30 years ago. Over the past several decades, the balance of global economic power has been shifting from the United States and Europe to China and a number of other fast-developing countries ( Figure 1 ). These economies account for rising shares of global GDP, manufacturing, and trade, and also are driven by a significant expansion of trade among the developing countries (South-South trade). These shifts are driven by growing economic integration and interdependence among economies, particularly through new global production and supply chains that incorporate inputs from many different countries.

In recent years, China has also invested in, created, and led a range of institutions and initiatives, including the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and other funding mechanisms, such as the Silk Road Fund and the New Development Bank (also known as the BRICS Bank), a collective arrangement with Brazil, Russia, India, and South Africa. At the same time, China is pursuing its own bilateral and regional trade agreements, such as the proposed Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) with 15 other countries in the Asia Pacific. China has also positioned itself to act as a lender of last resort through monetary arrangements such as the BRICs Contingent Reserve Arrangement (CRA) and the Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralization (CMIM).

In such a diverse global economy, any agreement that grants the leadership position based on nationality, critics argue, unnecessarily limits the pool of potential candidates that may be exceptionally competent in addressing the issues before the Bank. "Since the creation of the International Monetary Fund and World Bank at the end of the second world war, an American has led the Bank and a European the IMF," noted Mark Sobel, U.S. chairman of the Official Monetary and Financial Institutions Forum (OMFIF), an independent think tank, and former U.S. representative at the IMF. "It is time for a change."

According to Nancy Birdsall, senior fellow and founding president of the Center for Global Development, "the logic of an American president to ensure sustained U.S. support for the World Bank is no longer as clear as it has been." According to Birdsall, and others, the Trump Administration's "America First" rhetoric may make it harder for the United States to coalesce support for the U.S. candidate. Others argue that these concerns are overblown and that any serious effort to block the U.S. nominee would backfire. David Dollar, a former U.S. Treasury and senior World Bank official, says that, "it's a very complicated game. My instinct is that there is a very strong likelihood that the U.S. nominee will be approved. The world has an interest in the United States staying engaged with the World Bank." Devesh Kapur, a professor at Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University, puts it more bluntly, saying "powerful nations' relationships with the United States matter much more than who heads the World Bank."

Following Kim's announcement of his resignation, the Bank's Executive Board met on January 9, 2019, and issued a formal statement on the selection process. The nomination period for the next president ends on March 14, after which the Executive Board is to decide on a shortlist of three candidates. Following interviews, the Executive Board aims to select the next president before the spring meetings in April 2019.

On February 6, President Trump nominated David Malpass, Treasury's Under Secretary for International Affairs, to be the next World Bank president. Reportedly, Ivanka Trump, President Trump's oldest daughter and senior advisor, played a role in selecting the U.S. nominee. In 2017, Ms. Trump helped start a World Bank-administered fund, the Women Entrepreneurs Finance Initiative, which aims to generate $1.6 billion in capital for female entrepreneurs. The White House, according to reports, also considered Indra Nooyi, the former chief executive officer of PepsiCo; Ray Washburne, President and Chief Executive of the Overseas Private Investment Corporation; Mark Green, U.S. Agency for International Development Administrator; and Robert Kimmitt, Deputy Treasury Secretary under George W. Bush.


Senate Consideration of Presidential Nominations: Committee and Floor Procedure

Summary: Article II, Section 2, of the Constitution provides that the President shall appoint officers of the United States "by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate." This report describes the process by which the Senate provides advice and consent on presidential nominations, including receipt and referral of nominations, committee practices, and floor procedure.

Summary: Committees play the central role in the process through investigations and hearings. Senate Rule XXXI provides that nominations shall be referred to appropriate committees "unless otherwise ordered." Most nominations are referred, although a Senate standing order provides that some "privileged" nominations to specified positions will not be referred unless requested by a Senator. The Senate rule concerning committee jurisdictions (Rule XXV) broadly defines issue areas for committees, and the same jurisdictional statements generally apply to nominations as well as legislation. A committee often gathers information about a nominee either before or instead of a formal hearing. A committee considering a nomination has four options. It can report the nomination to the Senate favorably, unfavorably, or without recommendation, or it can choose to take no action. It is more common for a committee to take no action on a nomination than to reject a nominee outright.

Summary: The Senate handles executive business, which includes both nominations and treaties, separately from its legislative business. All nominations reported from committee are listed on the Executive Calendar, a separate document from the Calendar of Business, which lists pending bills and resolutions. Generally speaking, the majority leader schedules floor consideration of nominations on the Calendar. Nominations are considered in "executive session," a parliamentary form of the Senate in session that has its own journal and, to some extent, its own rules of procedure.

Summary: The Senate can call up a nomination expeditiously, because a motion to enter executive session to consider a specific nomination on the Calendar is not debatable. This motion requires a majority of Senators present and voting, a quorum being present, for approval.

Summary: After a nomination has been called up, the question before the Senate is "will the Senate advise and consent to this nomination?" A majority of Senators voting is required to approve a nomination. However, Senate rules place no limit on how long a nomination may be debated, and ending consideration could require invoking cloture. On April 6, 2017, the Senate reinterpreted Rule XXII in order to allow cloture to be invoked on nominations to the Supreme Court by a majority of Senators voting. This expanded the results of similar actions taken by the Senate in November 2013, which changed the cloture vote requirement to a majority for nominations other than to the Supreme Court. After the 2013 decision, the number of nominations subjected to a cloture process increased.

Summary: On April 3, 2019, the Senate reinterpreted Rule XXII again. The Senate reduced, from 30 hours to 2 hours, the maximum time nominations can be considered after cloture has been invoked. This change applied to all executive branch nominations except to high-level positions such as heads of departments, and it applied to all judicial nominations except to the Supreme Court and the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals. The full impact of this change is difficult to assess at this time, but it is likely to shorten the time between a cloture vote and a vote on the nomination. If Senators respond as they did to the last reinterpretation of the cloture rule, it might also increase the number of nominations subjected to a cloture process.

Summary: Nominations that are pending when the Senate adjourns sine die at the end of a session or recesses for more than 30 days are returned to the President unless the Senate, by unanimous consent, waives the rule requiring their return (Senate Rule XXXI, clause 6). If a nomination is returned, and the President still desires Senate consideration, he must submit a new nomination.

Article II, Section 2, of the Constitution provides that the President shall appoint officers of the United States "by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate." The method by which the Senate provides advice and consent on presidential nominations, referred to broadly as the confirmation process, serves several purposes. First, largely through committee investigations and hearings, the confirmation process allows the Senate to examine the qualifications of nominees and any potential conflicts of interest. Second, Senators can influence policy through the confirmation process, either by rejecting nominees or by extracting promises from nominees before granting consent. Also, the Senate sometimes has delayed the confirmation process in order to increase its influence with the executive branch on unrelated matters.

Senate confirmation is required for several categories of government officials. Military appointments and promotions make up the majority of nominations, approximately 65,000 per two-year Congress, and most are confirmed routinely. Each Congress, the Senate also considers approximately 2,000 civilian nominations, and, again, many of them, such as appointments to or promotions in the Foreign Service, are routine. Civilian nominations considered by the Senate also include federal judges and specified officers in executive departments, independent agencies, and regulatory boards and commissions.

Many presidential appointees are confirmed routinely by the Senate. With tens of thousands of nominations each Congress, the Senate cannot possibly consider them all in detail. A regularized process facilitates quick action on thousands of government positions. The Senate may approve en bloc hundreds of nominations at a time, especially military appointments and promotions.

The process also allows for close scrutiny of candidates when necessary. Each year, a few hundred nominees to high-level positions are regularly subject to Senate investigations and public hearings. Most of these are routinely approved, while a small number of nominations are disputed and receive more attention from the media and Congress. Judicial nominations, particularly Supreme Court appointees, are generally subject to greater scrutiny than nominations to executive posts, partly because judges may serve for life. Among the executive branch positions, nominees for policymaking positions are more likely to be examined closely, and are slightly less likely to be confirmed, than nominees for non-policy positions.

There are several reasons that the Senate confirms a high percentage of nominations. Most nominations and promotions are not to policymaking positions and are of less interest to the Senate. In addition, some sentiment exists in the Senate that the selection of persons to fill executive branch positions is largely a presidential prerogative. Historically, the President has been granted wide latitude in the selection of his Cabinet and other high-ranking executive branch officials.

Another important reason for the high percentage of confirmations is that Senators are often involved in the nomination stage. The President would prefer a smooth and fast confirmation process, so he may decide to consult with Senators prior to choosing a nominee. Senators most likely to be consulted, typically by White House congressional relations staff, are Senators from a nominee's home state, leaders of the committee of jurisdiction, and leaders of the President's party in the Senate. Senators of the President's party are sometimes invited to express opinions or even propose candidates for federal appointments in their own states. There is a long-standing custom of "senatorial courtesy," whereby the Senate will sometimes decline to proceed on a nomination if a home-state Senator expresses opposition. Positions subject to senatorial courtesy include U.S. attorneys, U.S. marshals, and U.S. district judges.

Over the past decade, Senators have expressed concerns over various aspects of the confirmation process, including the rate of confirmation for high-ranking executive branch positions and judgeships, as well as the speed of Senate action on routine nominations. When the Senate is controlled by the party of the President, this concern has often been raised as a complaint that minority party Senators are disputing a higher number of nominations, and have increasingly used their leverage under Senate proceedings to delay or even block their consideration. These concerns have led the Senate to make several changes to the confirmation process since 2011. The changes are taken into account in the following description of the process and are described in detail in other CRS Reports.

Receipt and Referral and "Privileged Nominations"

The President customarily sends nomination messages to the Senate in writing. Once received, nominations are numbered by the executive clerk and read on the floor. The clerk actually assigns numbers to the presidential messages, not to individual nominations, so a message listing several nominations would receive a single number. Except by unanimous consent, the Senate cannot vote on nominations the day they are received, and most are referred immediately to committees.

Senate Rule XXXI provides that nominations shall be referred to appropriate committees "unless otherwise ordered." A standing order of the Senate provides that some nominations to specified positions will not be referred unless a Senator requests referral. Instead of being immediately referred, the nominations are instead listed in a special section of the Executive Calendar , a document distributed daily to congressional offices and available online. This section of the Calendar is titled "Privileged Nominations." After the chair of the committee with jurisdiction over a nomination has notified the executive clerk that biographical and financial information on the nominee has been received, this is indicated in the Calendar. After 10 days, the nomination is moved from the "Privileged Nominations" section of the Calendar and placed on the "Nominations" section with the same status as a nomination that had been reported by a committee. (See " Executive Calendar " below.) Importantly, at any time that the nomination is listed in the new section of the Executive Calendar , any Senator can request that a nomination be referred, and it is then sent to the appropriate committee of jurisdiction.

Formally the presiding officer, but administratively the executive clerk's office, refers the nominations to committees according to the Senate's rules and precedents. The Senate rule concerning committee jurisdictions (Rule XXV) broadly defines issue areas for committees, and the same jurisdictional statements generally apply to nominations as well as legislation. An executive department nomination can be expected to be referred to the committee with jurisdiction over legislation concerning that department or to the committee that handled the legislation creating the position. Judicial branch nominations, including judges, U.S. attorneys, and U.S. marshals, are under the jurisdiction of the Judiciary Committee. In some instances, the committee of jurisdiction for a nomination has been set in statute.

The number of nominations referred to various committees differs considerably. The Committee on Armed Services, which handles all military appointments and promotions, receives the most. The two other committees with major confirmation responsibilities are the Committee on the Judiciary, with its jurisdiction over nominations in the judicial branch, and the Committee on Foreign Relations, which considers ambassadorial and other diplomatic appointments.

Occasionally, nominations are referred to more than one committee, either jointly or sequentially. A joint referral might occur when the jurisdictional claim of two committees is essentially equal. In such cases, both committees must report on the nomination before the whole Senate can act on it, unless the Senate discharges one or both committees. If two committees have unequal jurisdictional claims, then the nomination is more likely to be sequentially referred. In this case, the first committee must report the nomination before it is sequentially referred to the second committee. The second referral often is subject to a requirement that the committee report within a certain number of days. Typically, nominations are jointly or sequentially referred by unanimous consent. Sometimes the unanimous consent agreement applies to all future nominations to a position or category of positions.

Most Senate committees that consider nominations have written rules concerning the process. Although committee rules vary, most contain standards concerning information to be gathered from a nominee. Many committees expect a biographical resumé and some kind of financial statement listing assets and liabilities. Some specify the terms under which financial statements will or will not be made public.

Committee rules also frequently contain timetables outlining the minimum layover required between committee actions. A common timing provision is a requirement that nominations be held for one or two weeks before the committee proceeds to a hearing or a vote, permitting Senators time to review a nomination before committee consideration. Other committee rules specifically mandate a delay between steps of the process, such as the receipt of pre-hearing information and the date of the hearing, or the distribution of hearing transcripts and the committee vote on the nomination. Some of the written rules also contain provisions for the rules to be waived by majority vote, by unanimous consent, or by the chair and the ranking minority Member.

Committees often gather and review information about a nominee either before or instead of a formal hearing. Because the executive branch acts first in selecting a nominee, congressional committees are sometimes able to rely partially on any field investigations and reports conducted by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). Records of FBI investigations are provided only to the White House, although a report or a summary of a report may be shared, with the President's authorization, with Senators on the relevant committee. The practices of the committees with regard to FBI materials vary. Some rarely if ever request them. On other committees, the chair and ranking Member review any FBI report or summary, but on some committees these materials are available to any Senator upon request. Committee staff usually do not review FBI materials.

Almost all nominees are also asked by the Office of the Counsel to the President to complete an "Executive Personnel Financial Disclosure Report, SF-278," which is reviewed and certified by the relevant agency as well as the Director of the Office of Government Ethics. The documents are then forwarded to the relevant committee, along with opinion letters from ethics officers in the relevant agency and the director of the Office of Government Ethics. In contrast to FBI reports, financial disclosure forms are made public. All committees review financial disclosure reports and some make them available in committee offices to Members, staff, and the public.

To varying degrees, committees also conduct their own information-gathering exercises. Some committees, after reviewing responses to their standard questionnaire, might ask a nominee to complete a second questionnaire. Committees frequently require that written responses to these questionnaires be submitted before a hearing is scheduled. The Committee on the Judiciary sends form letters, sometimes called "blue slips," to Senators from a nominee's home state to determine whether they support the nomination. The Committee on the Judiciary also has its own investigative staff. The Committee on Rules and Administration handles relatively few nominations and conducts its own investigations, sometimes with the assistance of the FBI or the Government Accountability Office (GAO).

It is not unusual for nominees to meet with committee staff prior to a hearing. High-level nominees may meet privately with Senators. Generally speaking, these meetings, sometimes initiated by the nominee, serve basically to acquaint the nominee with the Members and committee staff, and vice versa. They occasionally address substantive matters as well. A nominee also might meet with the committee's chief counsel to discuss the financial disclosure report and any potential conflict-of-interest issues.

Historically, approximately half of all civilian appointees were confirmed without a hearing. All committees that receive nominations do hold hearings on some nominations, and the likelihood of hearings varies with the importance of the position and the workload of the committee. The Committee on the Judiciary, for example, which receives a large number of nominations, does not usually hold hearings for U.S. attorneys, U.S. marshals, or members of part-time commissions. The Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry and the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, on the other hand, typically hold hearings on most nominations that are referred to them. Committees often combine related nominations into a single hearing.

The length and nature of hearings varies. One or both home-state Senators will often introduce a nominee at a hearing. The nominee typically testifies at the hearing, and occasionally the committee will invite other witnesses, including Members of the House of Representatives, to testify as well. Some hearings function as routine welcomes, while others are directed at influencing the policy program of an appointee. In addition to policy views, hearings might address the nominee's qualifications and potential conflicts of interest. Senators also might take the opportunity to ask questions of particular concern to them or their constituents.

Committees sometimes send questions to nominees in advance of a hearing and ask for written responses. Nominees also might be asked to respond in writing to additional questions after a hearing. Especially for high-level positions, the nomination hearing may be only the first of many times an individual will be asked to testify before a committee. Therefore, the committee often gains a commitment from the nominee to be cooperative with future oversight activities of the committee.

Hearings, under Senate Rule XXVI, are open to the public unless closed by majority vote for one of the reasons specified in the rule. Witness testimony is sometimes made available online through the website of the relevant committee and also through several commercial services, including Congressional Quarterly. Most committees print the hearings, although no rule requires it. The number of Senators necessary to constitute a quorum for the purpose of taking testimony varies from committee to committee, but it is usually smaller than a majority of the membership.

A committee considering a nomination has four options. It may report the nomination to the Senate favorably, unfavorably, or without recommendation, or it may choose to take no action at all. It is more common for a committee to take no action on a nomination than to report unfavorably. Particularly for policymaking positions, committees sometimes report a nomination favorably, subject to the commitment of the nominee to testify before a Senate committee. Sometimes, committees choose to report a nomination without recommendation. Even if a majority of Senators on a committee do not agree that a nomination should be reported favorably, a majority might agree to report a nomination without a recommendation in order to permit a vote by the whole Senate.

The timing of a vote to report a nomination varies in accordance with committee rules and practice. Most committees do not vote to report a nomination on the same day that they hold a hearing, but instead wait until the next meeting of the committee. Senate Rule XXVI, clause 7(a)(1) requires that a quorum for making a recommendation on a nomination consist of a majority of the membership of the committee. In most cases, the number of Senators necessary to constitute a quorum for making a recommendation on a nomination to the Senate is the same that the committee requires for reporting a measure. Every committee reports a majority of nominations favorably.

Most of the time, committees do not formally present reports on nominations on the floor of the Senate. Instead, committee staff prepare the appropriate paperwork on behalf of the committee chair and file it with the clerk. The executive clerk then arranges for the nomination to be printed in the Congressional Record and placed on the Executive Calendar . If a report were presented on the floor, it would have to be done in executive session. Executive session and the Executive Calendar will be discussed in the next section. According to Senate Rule XXXI, the Senate cannot vote on a nomination the same day it is reported except by unanimous consent.

Discharging a Committee from Consideration of a Nomination

It is fairly common for the Senate to discharge a committee from consideration of an unreported nomination by unanimous consent. This removes the nomination from the committee in order to allow the full Senate to consider it. When the Senate discharges a committee by unanimous consent, it is doing so with the support of the committee for the purposes of simplifying the process.

It is unusual for Senators to attempt to discharge a committee by motion or resolution, instead of by unanimous consent, and only a few attempts have ever been successful. Senate Rule XVII does permit any Senator to submit a motion or resolution that a committee be discharged from the consideration of a subject referred to it. The discharge process, however, does not allow a simple majority to quickly initiate consideration of a nomination still in committee. It requires several steps and, most notably, a motion or resolution to discharge is debatable. This means that a cloture process may be necessary to discharge a committee. Cloture on a discharge motion or resolution requires the support of three-fifths of the Senate, usually 60 Senators, and several days.

The Senate handles executive business, which includes both nominations and treaties, separately from its legislative business. All nominations reported from committee, regardless of whether they were reported favorably, unfavorably, or without recommendation, are listed on the Executive Calendar , a separate document from the Calendar of Business , which lists pending bills and resolutions. Usually, the majority leader schedules the consideration of nominations on the Calendar. Nominations are considered in executive session, a parliamentary form of the Senate in session that has its own journal and, to some extent, its own rules of procedure.

After a committee reports a nomination or is discharged from considering it, the nomination is assigned a number by the executive clerk and placed on the Executive Calendar . Under a standing order of the Senate, certain nominations might also be placed in this status on the Executive Calendar after certain informational and time requirements are met. The list of nominations in the Executive Calendar includes basic information such as the name and office of the nominee, the name of the previous holder of the office, and whether the committee reported the nomination favorably, unfavorably, or without recommendation. Long lists of routine nominations are printed in the Congressional Record and identified only by a short title in the Executive Calendar , such as "Foreign Service nominations (84) beginning John F. Aloia, and ending Paul G. Churchill." In addition to reported nominations and treaties, the Executive Calendar contains the text of any unanimous consent agreements concerning executive business.

The Executive Calendar is distributed to Senate personal offices and committee offices when there is business on it. It is also available online by following the link to "Calendars and Schedules" on the Virtual Reference Desk under the Reference tab of the Senate website (www.Senate.gov) .

Business on the Executive Calendar , which consists of nominations and treaties, is considered in executive session. In contrast, all measures and matters associated with lawmaking are considered in legislative session. Until 1929 executive sessions were also closed to the public, but now they are open unless ordered otherwise by the Senate.

The Senate usually begins the day in legislative session and enters executive session either by a non-debatable motion or, far more often, by unanimous consent. Only if the Senate adjourned or recessed while in executive session would the next meeting automatically open in executive session. The motion to go into executive session can be offered at any time, is not debatable, and cannot be laid upon the table.

All business concerning nominations, including seemingly routine matters such as requests for joint referral or motions to print hearings, must be done in executive session. In practice, Senators often make such motions or unanimous consent requests "as if in executive session." These usually brief proceedings during a legislative session do not constitute an official executive session. In addition, at the start of each Congress, the Senate adopts a standing order, by unanimous consent, that allows the Senate to receive nominations from the President and for them to be referred to committees even on days when the Senate does not meet in executive session.

The majority leader, by custom, makes most motions and requests that determine when or whether a nomination will be called up for consideration. For example, the majority leader may move or ask unanimous consent to "immediately proceed to executive session to consider the following nomination on the Executive Calendar.... " By precedent, the motion to go into executive session to take up a specified nomination is not debatable. The nomination itself, however, is debatable.

It is not in order for a Senator to move to consider a nomination that is not on the Calendar, and, except by unanimous consent, a nomination on the Calendar cannot be taken up until it has been on the Calendar at least one day (Rule XXXI, clause 1). A day for this purpose is a calendar day. In other words, a nomination reported and placed on the Calendar on a Monday can be considered on Tuesday, even if it is the same legislative day.

If the Senate simply resolved into executive session, the business immediately pending would be the first item on the Executive Calendar . A motion to proceed to another matter on the Calendar would be debatable and subject to a filibuster. For this reason, the Senate does not begin consideration of executive business this way. Instead, the motion made to call up a nomination is a motion to proceed to executive session to consider that specific nomination. If the Senate is already in executive session, and the Leader wishes to call up a nomination, the Leader will first move that the Senate enter legislative session and then that the Senate enter executive session to take up the nomination. Both motions (to enter legislative session and to enter executive session) are not subject to debate and are decided by a simple majority. Typically they are approved by voice vote.

The question before the Senate when a nomination is taken up is "will the Senate advise and consent to this nomination?" The Senate can approve or reject a nomination. A majority of Senators present and voting, a quorum being present, is required to approve a nomination.

According to Senate Rule XXXI, any Senator who voted with the majority on the nomination has the option of moving to reconsider a vote on the day of the vote or the next two days the Senate meets in executive session. Only one motion to reconsider is in order on each nomination, and often the motion to reconsider is laid upon the table, by unanimous consent, shortly after the vote on the nomination. This action prevents any subsequent attempt to reconsider. After the Senate acts on a nomination, the Secretary of the Senate attests to a resolution of confirmation or disapproval and transmits it to the White House.

Many nominations are brought up by unanimous consent and approved without objection; routine nominations often are grouped by unanimous consent in order to be brought up and approved together, or en bloc . A small proportion of nominations, generally to higher-level positions, may need more consideration. When there is debate on a nomination, the chair of the committee usually makes an opening speech. For positions within a state, Senators from the state may wish to speak on the nominee, particularly if they were involved in the selection process. Under Senate rules, there are no time limits on debate except when conducted under cloture or a unanimous consent agreement.

Senate Rule XXII provides a means to bring debate on a nomination to a close, if necessary. Under the terms of Rule XXII, at least 16 Senators sign a cloture motion to end debate on a pending nomination. The motion proposed is "to bring to a close the debate upon [the pending nomination]." A Senator can interrupt a Senator who is speaking to present a cloture motion. Cloture may be moved only on a question that is pending before the Senate; therefore, absent unanimous consent, the Senate must be in executive session and considering the nomination when the motion is filed. After the clerk reads the motion, the Senate returns to the business it was considering before the presentation of the motion.

Unless a unanimous consent agreement provides otherwise, the Senate does not vote on the cloture motion until the second day of session after the day it is presented; for example, if the motion was presented on a Monday, the Senate would act on it on Wednesday. One hour after the Senate has convened on the day the motion "ripened," the presiding officer can interrupt the proceedings during an executive session to present a cloture motion for a vote. If the Senate is in legislative session when the time arrives for voting on the cloture motion, it proceeds into executive session prior to taking action on the cloture petition.

According to Rule XXII, the presiding officer first directs the clerk to call the roll to ascertain that a quorum is present, although this requirement is often waived by unanimous consent. Senators then vote either yea or nay on the question: "Is it the sense of the Senate that the debate shall be brought to a close?"

In April 2017, the Senate reinterpreted Rule XXII in order to allow cloture to be invoked on all nominations by a majority of Senators voting (a quorum being present), including Supreme Court justice nominations. This expanded the results of similar actions taken by the Senate in November 2013, which changed the cloture vote requirement to a majority for nominations except to the Supreme Court.

Once cloture is invoked, for most nominations there can be a maximum of two hours of post-cloture consideration. The two hour maximum includes debate as well as any actions taken while the nomination is formally pending, including quorum calls. If cloture is invoked on nominations to the highest ranking executive branch positions, or on nominations to the Supreme Court or the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals, then the maximum time for consideration after cloture is invoked is 30 hours (see Table 1 ). Under the rule, the 2 or 30 hours is floor time spent considering the nomination in the Senate, not simply the passage of time. Thus, for time to count against the 2 or 30-hour maximum, the Senate must be in session and the question must be pending. Time spent in recess or adjournment does not count, and if the Senate were to take up other business by unanimous consent, the time spent on that other business also would not count against the post-cloture time.

A hold is a request by a Senator to his or her party leader to prevent or delay action on a nomination or a bill. Holds are not mentioned in the rules or precedents of the Senate, and they are enforced only through the agenda decisions of party leaders. A standing order of the Senate aims to ensure that any Senator who places a hold on any matter (including a nomination) make public his or her objection to the matter.

Senators have placed holds on nominations for a number of reasons. One common purpose is to give a Senator more time to review a nomination or to consult with the nominee. Senators may also place holds because they disagree with the policy positions of the nominee. Senators have also admitted to using holds in order to gain concessions from the executive branch on matters not directly related to the nomination.

The Senate precedents reducing the threshold necessary to invoke cloture on nominations, and the recent precedent reducing the time necessary for a cloture process, could affect the practice of holds. In some sense, holds are connected to the Senate traditions of mutual deference, since they may have originated as requests for more time to examine a pending nomination or bill. The effectiveness of a hold, however, ultimately has been grounded in the power of the Senator placing the hold to filibuster the nomination and the difficulty of invoking cloture to overcome a filibuster. Invoking cloture is now easier because the support of fewer Senators is necessary, and in most cases, the floor time required for a cloture process is less. The large number of nominations submitted by the President for Senate consideration, however, might still lead Senators to seek unanimous consent to quickly approve nominations.

Reduced Post-Cloture Time on Nominations: Some Possible Implications

On April 3, 2019, the Senate reinterpreted Senate Rule XXII to reduce, from 30 hours to 2 hours, the maximum time allowed for consideration of most nominations after cloture is invoked. The Senate took this step by reversing two rulings by the Presiding Officer. The first vote established that "postcloture time under rule XXII for all executive branch nominations other than a position at level 1 of the Executive Schedule under section 5312 of title 5 of the United States Code is 2 hours." On the second vote, the Senate established that "postcloture time under rule XXII for all judicial nominations, other than circuit courts or Supreme Court of the United States, is 2 hours" (see Table 1 ).

It is uncommon for the Senate to reverse a decision by the Presiding Officer. Any Senator can attempt to reverse a ruling by making an appeal, and except in specific cases, appeals are decided by majority vote. In most circumstances, however, appeals are debatable, and therefore supermajority support (through a cloture process) is typically necessary to reach a vote to reverse a decision of the Presiding Officer. In the April 3 proceedings, however, the appeal was raised after cloture had been invoked. Senate Rule XXII states that after a successful cloture vote, "appeals from the decision of the Presiding Officer, shall be decided without debate." Therefore, when the Majority Leader appealed the rulings of the Presiding Officer, the questions on whether the ruling should stand as the judgment of the Senate received a vote without an opportunity for extended debate. The Senate voted that the ruling should not stand, and thereby upheld instead the position of the Majority Leader.

The future impact of these decisions on the nominations process is difficult to assess. The immediate and obvious expected impact is that the time between a cloture vote and a confirmation vote will decrease. In recent years, a vote to confirm a nominee has typically occurred the day after cloture was invoked (or on the next day of Senate session). Usually, Senators did not spend all of the time between the votes debating the nomination. Instead, Senators typically debated the nomination for some time post-cloture, but also usually entered into unanimous consent agreements that affected when the vote would occur. For example, it became common in recent Congresses for the Senate to agree, by unanimous consent, to consider the time the Senate spent in adjournment or recesses (e.g., overnight) to count as post-cloture time. The cloture rule affected the time of the vote set by unanimous consent: the rule provided for up to 30 hours of consideration of the nomination, and the Senate would agree to vote on the nomination a day later—reflecting the approximate time that the Senate could have debated the nomination under the rule. Assuming the Senate continues to establish times for voting on nominations by unanimous consent, those negotiations will be affected by the reinterpretation of the rule.

In the absence of a unanimous consent agreement, most nominations can now receive a vote two hours after a vote to invoke cloture. The two hours is not formally divided between the parties pursuant to the rule (or pursuant to the reinterpretation of the rule), but it might be divided, by unanimous consent, between the Majority and Minority Leader. Even without an explicit unanimous consent agreement, the Majority and Minority Leaders are recognized before any other Senators. In addition, a Senator can speak for a maximum of one hour post-cloture. As a result, the Majority Leader could claim the first hour, and the Minority Leader the second, or vice versa. (Of course, Senators could speak on a nomination at times other than after cloture has been invoked, even when the nomination is not formally pending before the Senate. )

It is also possible that the recent reinterpretation of the rule will affect how often the Senate relies on the cloture process to approve nominations. After the first reinterpretation of the cloture rule in 2013, the number of nominations subjected to cloture motions increased significantly in both of the Congresses when the Senate was controlled by the same party as the President (113 th (2013-2014) and 115 th (2017-2018) Congresses).

Nominations that are not confirmed or rejected are returned to the President at the end of a session or when the Senate adjourns or recesses for more than 30 days (Senate Rule XXXI, paragraph 6). If the President still wants a nominee considered, he must submit a new nomination to the Senate. The Senate can, however, waive this rule by unanimous consent, and it often does to allow nominations to remain "in status quo" between the first and second sessions of a Congress or during a long recess. The majority leader or his designee also may exempt specific nominees by name from the unanimous consent agreement, allowing them to be returned during the recess or adjournment.

The Constitution, in Article II, Section 2, grants the President the authority to fill temporarily vacancies that "may happen during the Recess of the Senate." These appointments do not require the advice and consent of the Senate; the appointees temporarily fill the vacancies without Senate confirmation. In most cases, recess appointees have also been nominated to the positions to which they were appointed. Furthermore, when a recess appointment is made of an individual previously nominated to the position, the President usually submits a new nomination to the Senate in order to comply with a provision of law affecting the pay of recess appointees (5 U.S.C. 5503(a)). Recess appointments have sometimes been controversial and have occasionally led to inter-branch conflict.