Social Security: Revisiting Benefits for Spouses and Survivors

Summary: Social Security auxiliary benefits are paid to the spouse, former spouse, survivor, child, or parent of a Social Security-covered worker and are equal to a specified percentage of the worker's basic monthly benefit amount (subject to a maximum family benefit amount). For example, the spouse of a retired worker may receive up to 50% of the retired worker's basic benefit and the widow(er) of a retired worker may receive up to 100% of the retired worker's basic benefit.

Summary: When auxiliary benefits were first established, most households consisted of a single earner—usually the husband—and a wife who cared for children and remained out of the paid workforce. As a result, benefits for nonworking spouses were structured to be relatively generous. A woman who was never employed but is married to a man with high Social Security-covered wages may receive a Social Security spousal benefit that is higher than the retirement benefit received by a single woman, or a divorced woman who was married less than 10 years, who worked a full career in a low-wage job.

Summary: In recent decades, this household structure has changed in part because women have entered the workforce in increasing numbers. The labor force participation rate of women with children under the age of 18 increased from 47% in 1975 to 70.8% in March 2016. As a result, many women now qualify for Social Security benefits based on their own work records. Women are, however, more likely than men to take breaks in employment to care for family members, which can result in fewer years of contributions to Social Security and employer-sponsored pension plans.

Summary: Beneficiaries who qualify for multiple benefits do not receive both benefits in full, however. For example, for a beneficiary eligible for his or her own retired-worker benefits as well as spousal benefits, the spousal benefit is reduced by the amount of the retired-worker benefit. The beneficiary receives a reduced spousal benefit (if not reduced to zero) in addition to his or her retired-worker benefit. This effectively means the beneficiary receives the higher of the two benefit amounts. Because of this, a two-earner household may receive lower total Social Security benefits than a single-earner household with identical total Social Security-covered earnings.

Summary: Another change since 1939 has been an increase in the number of men and women who remain single or who have divorced. Persons who have never been married, or divorced before 10 years of marriage, do not qualify for Social Security spousal or survivors benefits under current law.

Summary: Proposals to modify the Social Security auxiliary benefit structure are often motivated by desire to improve adequacy for certain beneficiaries, or equity between a two-earner household and a one-earner household with similar earning profiles. For example, some proposals address the adequacy of benefits for certain groups of beneficiaries, such as elderly and widowed women. Although Social Security plays an important role in the retirement security of aged women, about 13.9% of widowed women aged 65 or older, 15.8% of divorced elderly women, and 21.5% of never-married elderly women have family incomes below the official poverty line in 2017.

Social Security provides dependent benefits and survivors benefits , sometimes collectively referred to as auxiliary benefits , to the spouses, former spouses, widow(er)s, children, and parents of retired, disabled, or deceased workers. Auxiliary benefits are based on the work record of the household's primary earner.

Social Security spousal benefits (i.e., benefits for a wife or husband of the primary earner) are payable to the spouse or divorced spouse of a retired or disabled worker. Social Security survivors benefits are payable to the survivors of a deceased worker as a widow(er), as a child, as a mother or father of the deceased worker's child(ren), or as a dependent parent of the deceased worker. Although Social Security is often viewed as a program that primarily provides benefits to retired or disabled workers, 33% of new benefit awards in 2017 were made to the dependents and survivors of retired, disabled, and deceased workers.

Spousal and survivors benefits play an important role in ensuring women's retirement security. However, women continue to be vulnerable to poverty in old age, due to demographic and economic reasons. This report presents the current-law structure of auxiliary benefits for spouses, divorced spouses, and surviving spouses. It makes note of adequacy and equity concerns of current-law spousal and widow(er)'s benefits, particularly with respect to female beneficiaries, and discusses the role of demographics, the labor market, and current-law provisions on adequacy and equity. The report concludes with a discussion of proposed changes to spousal and widow(er) benefits to address these concerns.

Origins of Social Security Auxiliary Benefits

The original Social Security Act of 1935 (P.L. 74-271) established a system of Old-Age Insurance to provide benefits to individuals aged 65 or older who had "earned" retirement benefits through work in jobs covered by the system. Before the Old-Age Insurance program was in full operation, the Social Security Amendments of 1939 (P.L. 76-379) extended monthly benefits to workers' dependents and survivors. The program now provided Old-Age and Survivors Insurance (OASI).

The 1939 amendments established benefits for the following dependents and survivors: (1) a wife aged 65 or older; (2) a child under the age of 18; (3) a widowed mother of any age caring for an eligible child; (4) a widow aged 65 or older; and (5) a surviving dependent parent aged 65 or older.

In its report to the Social Security Board (the predecessor to the Social Security Administration) and the Senate Committee on Finance, the 1938 Social Security Advisory Council justified creating spousal benefits on the grounds of the adequacy of household benefits:

The inadequacy of the benefits payable during the early years of the old-age insurance program is more marked where the benefits must support not only the annuitant himself but also his wife. In 1930, 63.8 per cent of men aged 65 and over were married. Payment of supplementary allowances to annuitants who have wives over 65 will increase the average benefit in such a manner as to meet the greatest social need with the minimum increase in cost. The Council believes that an additional 50 percent of the basic annuity would constitute a reasonable provision for the support of the annuitant's wife.

The Social Security Board concurred in its own report, which it wrote based on the council's report. The board also found that benefit adequacy was the primary justification for spousal benefits:

The Board suggests that a supplementary benefit be paid for the aged dependent wife of the retired worker which would be related to his old-age benefit. Such a plan would take account of greater presumptive need of the married couple without requiring investigation of individual need.

Since 1939, auxiliary benefits have been modified by Congress many times, including the expansion of benefits to husbands, widowers, and divorced spouses. The legislative history of auxiliary benefits is outlined in detail in Appendix A .

Auxiliary benefits for a spouse, survivor, or other dependent are based on the benefit amount received by a primary earner (an insured worker). The primary earner may receive a Social Security retirement or disability benefit. Social Security retirement benefits are based on the average of a worker's highest 35 years of earnings (less up to 5 years for years of disability) from covered employment. A worker's basic benefit amount ( primary insurance amount or PIA) is computed by applying the Social Security benefit formula to the worker's career-average, wage-indexed monthly earnings ( average indexed monthly earnings or AIME). The benefit formula replaces a higher percentage of the preretirement earnings of workers with low career-average earnings than for workers with high career-average earnings.

The primary earner's initial monthly benefit is equal to his or her PIA if benefits are claimed at full retirement age (FRA, which ranges from age 65 to age 67, depending on year of birth). A worker's initial monthly benefit will be less than his or her PIA if the worker begins receiving benefits before FRA, and it will be greater than his or her PIA if the worker begins receiving benefits after FRA. The purpose of the actuarial adjustment to benefits claimed before or after FRA is to ensure that the worker receives roughly the same total lifetime benefits regardless of when he or she claims benefits (assuming he or she lives to average life expectancy).

Auxiliary benefits are paid to the spouse, former spouse, survivor, child, or parent of the primary earner. Auxiliary benefits are determined as a percentage of the primary earner's PIA, subject to a maximum family benefit amount. For example, the spouse of a retired or disabled worker may receive up to 50% of the worker's PIA, and the widow(er) of a deceased worker may receive up to 100% of the worker's PIA. As with benefits paid to the primary earner, auxiliary benefits are subject to adjustments based on age at entitlement and other factors. A basic description of auxiliary benefits is provided in the following sections, with more detailed information provided in Appendix B .

Social Security provides a spousal benefit that is equal to 50% of a retired or disabled worker's PIA. A qualifying spouse must be at least 62 years old or have a qualifying child (a child who is under the age of 16 or who receives Social Security disability benefits) in his or her care. A qualifying spouse may be either married to or separated from the worker. An individual must have been married to the worker for at least one year before he or she applies for spousal benefits, with certain exceptions. In addition, the worker must be entitled to (generally, collecting) benefits in order for an eligible spouse to become entitled to benefits.

If a spouse claims benefits before FRA, his or her benefits are reduced to take into account the longer expected period of benefit receipt. An individual who is entitled to a Social Security benefit based on his or her own work record and to a spousal benefit in effect receives the higher of the two benefits (see " Dually Entitled Beneficiaries " below).

Under current law, surviving spouses (including divorced surviving spouses) may be eligible for aged widow(er) benefits beginning at the age of 60. If the surviving spouse has a qualifying disability and meets certain other conditions, survivors benefits are available beginning at the age of 50. The aged widow(er)'s basic benefit is equal to 100% of the deceased worker's PIA.

A qualifying widow(er) must have been married to the deceased worker for at least nine months and must not have remarried before the age of 60 (or before age 50 if the widow[er] is disabled). Widow(er)s who remarry after the age of 60 (or after age 50 if disabled) may become entitled to benefits based on the prior deceased spouse's work record. Widow(er)s who are caring for children under the age of 16 or disabled may receive survivors benefits at any age and do not have to meet the length of marriage requirement—see " Mothers and Fathers " below.

If an aged widow(er) claims survivors benefits before FRA, his or her monthly benefit is reduced (up to a maximum of 28.5%) to take into account the longer expected period of benefit receipt. In addition, survivors benefits may be affected by the deceased worker's decision to claim benefits before FRA under the widow(er)'s limit provision (see Appendix B ). As with spouses of retired or disabled workers, a surviving spouse who is entitled to a Social Security benefit based on his or her own work record and a widow(er)'s benefit receives in effect the higher of the two benefits (see " Dually Entitled Beneficiaries " below).

Social Security provides benefits to a surviving spouse or divorced surviving spouse of any age who is caring for the deceased worker's child, when that child is either under the age of 16 or disabled. Mother's and father's benefits are equal to 75% of the deceased worker's PIA, subject to a maximum family benefit. There are no length of marriage requirements for mother's and father's benefits, whether the beneficiary was married to, separated from, or divorced from the deceased worker; however, remarriage generally ends entitlement to mother's and father's benefits.

Spousal benefits are available to a divorced spouse beginning at the age of 62, if the marriage lasted at least 10 years before the divorce became final and the person claiming spousal benefits is currently unmarried. A divorced spouse who is younger than 62 years old is not eligible for spousal benefits even with an entitled child in his or her care. Survivors benefits are available to a divorced surviving spouse beginning at the age of 60 (or beginning at age 50 if the divorced surviving spouse is disabled) if the divorced surviving spouse has not remarried before the age of 60 (or before age 50 if disabled), or if the surviving divorced spouse has an entitled child in his or her care.

Divorced spouses who are entitled to benefits receive the same spousal and survivors benefits as married or separated persons. If a divorced spouse claims benefits before FRA, his or her benefits are reduced to take into account the longer expected period of benefit receipt. In addition, a divorced spouse who is entitled to a Social Security benefit based on his or her own work record and a spousal or survivor benefit receives in effect the higher of the two benefits (see " Dually Entitled Beneficiaries " below).

A divorced person who was married to a primary earner for less than 10 years does not qualify for spousal benefits on that spouse's record (although he or she may qualify for benefits based on his or her own record or on another spouse's record). First marriages that end in divorce have a median duration of 8 to 12 years. Table 1 shows that the proportions of males and females who have a marriage that lasted longer than 10 years was higher from 1960 to 1964 than those in recent decades. About 83% of women who married for the first time during the early 1960s stayed married for 10 years or longer; however, for women who married between 1970 and 1999, about 71%-75% of women's first marriages have lasted for 10 years or more. This percentage dropped to 58% for women who first married during the early 2000s.

Other data suggest that, for men and women aged 15 to 44 between 2006 and 2010, the probability of a first marriage lasting 10 years or longer was 68%. The probability that a first marriage would remain intact for at least 10 years was 73%, 56%, and 68% for Hispanic, black, and white women, respectively. In addition, among the women who were first divorced in 2012, 60% of them had a marriage lasting for 10 or more years.

A person may qualify for a spousal or survivor benefit as well as for a Social Security benefit based on his or her own work record (a retired-worker benefit). In such cases, the person in effect receives the higher of the worker benefit and the spousal or survivor benefit. When the person's retired-worker benefit is higher than the spousal or survivor benefit to which he or she would be entitled, the person receives only the retired-worker benefit. Conversely, when the person's retired-worker benefit is lower than the spousal or survivor benefit, the person is referred to as dually entitled and receives the retired-worker benefit plus a spousal or survivor benefit that is equal to the difference between the retired-worker benefit and the full spousal or survivor benefit. In essence, the person receives a total benefit amount equal to the higher spousal benefit.

Women have increasingly become entitled to Social Security benefits based on their own work records, either as retired-worker beneficiaries only or as dually entitled beneficiaries. As shown in Figure 1 , the percentage of women aged 62 or older entitled to benefits based on their own work records—as retired workers or as dually entitled beneficiaries—grew from 43% in 1960 to 79.3% in 2017. More than half of this growth was in the percentage of dually entitled beneficiaries. The percentage of women aged 62 or older entitled to benefits based solely on their own work records fluctuated between 36% and 42% between 1960 and 2005, before increasing to 54.2% in 2017. In 2017, 45.7% of women aged 62 or older relied to some extent on benefits received as a spouse or survivor: 25% of spouse and survivor beneficiaries were dually entitled and 20.7% received spousal or survivors benefits only.

As shown in Table 2 , among wives who were dually entitled spousal beneficiaries in December 2017, the retired-worker benefit accounted for 68% of the combined monthly benefit (the retired-worker benefit with a top-up provided by the spousal benefit) and the spousal benefit accounted for 32% of the combined monthly benefit, on average. Among widows who were dually entitled survivor beneficiaries, the retired-worker benefit and the widow(er)'s benefit each accounted for about half of the combined monthly benefit, on average. Many more women than men are dually entitled to retired-worker benefits and spousal or widow(er)'s benefits. As shown in the table, in December 2017, about 6.9 million women and 235,533 men were dually entitled to benefits.

Women, Social Security, and Auxiliary Benefits

Spousal and survivors benefits play an important role in ensuring women's retirement security. In December 2017, about 25.4 million elderly (aged 65 and older) women received Social Security benefits, including 13.3 million women who received only retired-worker benefits, 2.1 million women who were entitled solely as the spouse of a retired worker, 3.2 million women who were entitled solely as the survivor of a deceased worker, and 6.7 million women who were dually entitled to a retired-worker benefit and a spousal or survivor benefit. In 2017, Social Security provided 50% or more of family income for more than 53% of elderly women in beneficiary families and 90% or more of family income for about 28% of elderly women in beneficiary families.

Women, however, continue to be vulnerable to poverty in old age for several reasons. These reasons can generally be split into demographic reasons and economic reasons. In addition, the design of auxiliary benefits can lead to equity concerns.

With respect to demographic and economic reasons that lead to adequacy concerns,

Women on average live longer than men, and thus more women are likely to be widowed than are men. Women reaching the age of 65 in 2017 are likely to live another 20.7 years, on average, compared with another 18.2 years for men. About 5% of women aged 50-59, about 16% of women aged 60-75, and about 56% of women aged 75 and older are currently widowed. By comparison, about 2% of men aged 50-59, about 5% of men aged 60-75, and about 21% of men aged 75 and older are widowed. As a consequence, women may spend more time in retirement and are more vulnerable to inflation and the risk of outliving other assets. The real value of private pension benefits declines with age, as private pensions are generally not adjusted for inflation, and some private pensions cease with the death of the retired worker. Women are more likely to take employment breaks to care for children or parents, and thus have a lower labor force participation rate than men. During 2016, 88.5% of men and 74.3% of women aged 25-54 participated in the labor force. The rate for women with children under three years old was lower, at 63%. Breaks in employment result in fewer years of contributions to Social Security and employer-sponsored pension plans and thus lower retirement benefits. The median earnings of women who are full-time wage and salary workers are 82% of their male counterparts. Because Social Security and private pension benefits are linked to earnings, this "earnings gap" can lead to lower benefit amounts for women than for men.

Social Security benefits are designed in a way that can result in inequities between households with similar earning profiles. Spousal and survivors benefits were added to the Social Security system in 1939. At that time, the majority of households consisted of a single earner—generally the husband—and a wife who was not in the paid workforce but instead stayed home to care for children. However, in recent decades, women have increasingly assumed roles as wage earners or as heads of families.

A beneficiary who qualifies for both a retired-worker benefit and a spousal benefit does not receive both benefits in full. Instead, the spousal benefit is reduced by the amount of the retired-worker benefit; this effectively means the beneficiary receives the higher of the two benefit amounts. Because of this, a two-earner household receives lower combined Social Security benefits than a single-earner household with identical total Social Security-covered earnings, despite paying more in Social Security taxes. Moreover, after the death of one spouse, the disparity in benefits may increase: in a one-earner couple, the surviving spouse receives two-thirds of what the couple received on a combined basis, whereas in some two-earner couples with roughly equal earnings, the surviving spouse receives roughly one-half of what the couple received on a combined basis.

Social Security is credited with keeping many of the elderly out of poverty. However, in 2017, 6.5% of Social Security beneficiaries aged 65 or older were below the poverty line. Figure 2 highlights the differences in poverty status among men and women aged 65 or older who received Social Security benefits in 2017, after Social Security is combined with other sources of income such as earnings from work, pensions, income from assets, and cash assistance.

Figure 2 shows that married beneficiaries have significantly lower poverty rates than nonmarried beneficiaries and that nonmarried women aged 65 or older—including widowed, divorced, and never-married women—are more likely to be in poverty than their male counterparts. Particularly vulnerable among women are divorced beneficiaries and the never-married. Among women aged 65 and older, about 13.7% of divorced Social Security beneficiaries and 18.0% of never-married Social Security beneficiaries have total incomes below the official poverty line in 2017. Among Social Security beneficiaries aged 65 and over, poverty rates are also high among never-married men, at a rate of 17.5% in 2017.

The reasons for the disparity in poverty rates among elderly men and women relate in part to women's lower lifetime earnings, which affect Social Security benefits and private pensions. Low lifetime earnings can be due to lower labor force participation of women and the earnings gap. In addition, women live two to three years longer than men on average, making them more likely to exhaust retirement savings and other assets before death. In addition, if the deceased husband was receiving a pension, the widow's benefit may be significantly reduced, or the pension may cease with the husband's death, depending on whether the couple had a joint and survivor annuity and how the joint and survivor annuity was structured. Elderly widows also may be at risk if assets are depleted by health-related expenses prior to the spouse's death.

During the past several decades, the labor force participation rate among women increased, but still remained below the rate among men. In 1950, about 34% of women aged 16 or older participated in the labor force, compared with about 86% of men aged 16 or older. By 2016, about 57% of women aged 16 or older participated in the labor force, compared with 69% of men in the same age group. Women are also more likely than men to work part-time (i.e., less than 35 hours per week in a sole or principal job). In 2016, 25% of women in wage and salary jobs worked part-time, compared with 12% of men.

Women with children under the age of 18 have increasingly entered the labor force in recent decades (see Figure 3 ). However, women with children have fewer years of paid work, on average. By the age of 50, women without children who were born between 1948 and 1958 had worked on average about two years less than men overall (i.e., men with and without children). For a woman with two children, however, the gap at the age of 50 was about 6.5 years less than the average man with or without children. In 2017, about 69% of mothers were employed, compared with 91% of fathers.

In addition to childcare, women are also more likely than men to provide care to a spouse, a parent, or some other adult relative. One survey estimates that, among 39.8 million caregivers who have provided unpaid care to an adult in 2015, 60% of them are female. Some researchers find that female caregivers tend to work fewer hours per week and earn a lower wage than non-caregivers. Another study shows that women who leave work to provide care may face relatively low probabilities of returning to work.

Another reason why women receive lower retired-worker benefits than men is that full-time women workers earn about 80%-82% of the median weekly earnings of their male counterparts. In 2016, women who were full-time wage and salary workers had median weekly earnings of $749, or about 82% of the $915 median earned by their male counterparts. The women's-to-men's earnings ratio was about 62% in 1979 and, after increasing gradually during the 1980s and 1990s, has ranged between 80% and 82% since 2004.

In 2016, the earnings gap between women and men varied among age groups (see Table 3 ). Among full-time workers, women aged 16-24 earned about 95% as much as men; women aged 25-34 earned about 89% as much as men; and women aged 55-64 earned about 74% as much as men.

Over time, the earnings gap between women and men has narrowed for most age groups. For example, among full-time workers aged 25-34, the women's-to-men's earnings ratio increased from 68% in 1979 to 89% in 2016. For workers aged 35-44, the earnings ratio increased from 58% in 1979 to 83% in 2016. Similarly, for workers aged 45-54, the earnings ratio increased from 57% in 1979 to 78% in 2016. Part of the earnings gap can be attributed to differences between men's and women's years of education, full-time work experience, and occupations.

Comparing the annual earnings of women and men may understate differences in total earnings across longer periods. Using a 15-year time frame (1983-1998), one study found that women in the prime working years of 26 to 59 had total earnings that were 38% of what prime-age men earned, in total, over the same 15-year period. Another study found that women born between 1955 and 1959 who worked full-time, year-round each year would have an average lifetime loss of $531,500 by age 59, compared with men.

As women enter the work force in greater numbers, more women will qualify for Social Security benefits based on their own work records, instead of a spousal benefit that is equal to 50% of the husband's PIA. However, retired-worker and disabled-worker benefits for women continue to be lower than those for men on average for a variety of reasons, as discussed above. Consequently, after the death of a husband, the survivor's benefit, which is equal to 100% of the husband's PIA, will continue to play an important role in the financial well-being of widows.

Although Social Security provides essential income support to nonworking spouses and widows, the current-law spousal benefit structure can lead to a variety of incongruous benefit patterns that have been documented in the literature. For example, a woman who was never employed but is married to a man with high Social Security-covered wages may receive a Social Security spousal benefit that is higher than the retirement benefit received by a single woman, or a woman who was married less than 10 years, who worked a full career in a low-wage job.

The current system provides proportionately more benefits relative to payroll-tax contributions to one-earner couples (which predominated when Social Security was created in the 1930s) than to single persons or to couples with two earners, on average. As a result, the current system can lead to situations in which Social Security provides unequal benefits to one-earner and two-earner couples with the same total household lifetime earnings. Putting this in a different perspective, some two-earner couples may have to contribute significantly more to Social Security to receive the same retirement and spousal benefits that the system provides to a one-earner couple with identical total household earnings. As women's share of household income has increased, and also as women have increasingly become heads of families, these anomalies could become more relevant.

Table 4 illustrates the disparate treatment of one-earner and two-earner couples with examples developed by the American Academy of Actuaries. In the table, a one-earner couple with household earnings of $50,000 is compared with two different two-earner couples. The second couple in the comparison is a two-earner couple with the same total household earnings ($50,000) as the one-earner couple, with the earnings evenly split between the two spouses (each spouse earns $25,000). The third couple in the comparison is a two-earner couple in which one spouse earns $50,000 (the same as the primary earner in the one-earner couple) and the other spouse earns half that amount, or $25,000, for total household earnings of $75,000.

As the table illustrates, a one-earner couple may receive higher retirement and survivors benefits than a two-earner couple with identical total household earnings. Specifically, the first couple with one earner receives a total of $2,655 in monthly retirement benefits, compared with the second couple with two earners, who receives a total of $2,240 in monthly retirement benefits. Similarly, the survivor of the one-earner couple receives $1,770 in monthly benefits (either as a retired worker or as a surviving spouse). In comparison, the survivor of the two-earner couple with identical total household earnings receives $1,120 in monthly benefits.

In the third couple shown in Table 4 , both spouses work in Social Security-covered employment, but in this example one spouse earns $50,000 annually and the other spouse earns $25,000. This couple receives monthly benefits that are $235 higher than the monthly benefits received by the one-earner couple ($2,890 compared with $2,655); however, this couple has earned much more over time ($25,000 annually) and contributed commensurately more in Social Security payroll taxes ($1,550 annually). The survivor benefit received by the third couple is identical to that received by the one-earner couple. Thus, the current-law Social Security spousal benefit structure requires some two-earner couples to make substantially higher contributions for similar benefit levels. With higher earnings but similar benefits to the one-earner couple, the third couple's replacement rate of 46% (i.e., family total monthly benefits as a percentage of preretirement earnings) is lower than that of the one-earner couple, which is 64%.

After the death of one spouse, the disparity in benefits between one-earner and two-earner couples may increase, as shown in the table. For the one-earner couple, the surviving spouse receives a benefit equal to two-thirds of the couple's combined benefit (for a reduction equal to one-third of the couple's combined benefit). For a two-earner couple with equal earnings (the second couple), the surviving spouse receives a benefit equal to one-half of the couple's combined benefit.

Further, the surviving spouse in the first couple (the one-earner couple) receives a larger monthly benefit than the survivor of the second couple (a two-earner couple with earnings evenly split)—$1,770 compared with $1,120—although both couples paid the same amount of Social Security payroll tax contributions. Similarly, compared with the one-earner couple, the surviving spouse in the third couple (a two-earner couple with unequal earnings and higher total earnings than the one-earner couple) receives the same monthly benefit ($1,770) although the couple paid a higher amount of Social Security payroll tax contributions. For both two-earner couples in these examples, after the death of one spouse, the second earnings record does not result in the payment of any additional benefits.

When spousal and survivors benefits were first established, most households consisted of a single earner—usually the husband—and a wife who cared for children and remained out of the paid workforce. As a result, benefits for nonworking spouses were structured to be relatively generous. Over the past six decades, women's earnings have increased and the share of households who have one earner has declined, and thus the share of women beneficiaries who received Social Security benefits solely based on husband's earnings record has decreased (see Figure 1 ).

In addition to inequities among couples with different work histories and earnings levels, the current structure of Social Security auxiliary benefits creates inequities among the divorced. Divorced spouses with 9½ years of marriage, for example, receive no Social Security spousal and survivors benefits, whereas divorced spouses with 10 or more years of marriage may receive full spousal and survivors benefits.

The current structure of Social Security spousal and survivors benefits raises other considerations for lawmakers with respect to potential policy changes.

Social Security automatically provides pension rights to one or more eligible divorced spouses, in contrast to private pensions. Further, the benefit payable to the primary earner is not reduced for benefits paid to a current or one or more former spouses, again in contrast to private pensions. Divorced spouses receive a higher benefit after the death of their former spouse (the primary earner): benefits for a divorced spouse are equal to 50% of the primary earner's PIA, while benefits for a divorced surviving spouse are equal to 100% of the primary earner's PIA. This can create volatility in the income of divorced spouses. Widow(er)s who had high-earning spouses may face disincentives to marry a lower-earning second husband (if remarriage occurs before the eligibility age for widow[er]'s benefits).

In response to the adequacy, equity, and other program design issues described above, policymakers and researchers have proposed a number of ways to restructure Social Security auxiliary benefits. Some of these proposals are discussed in the following section.

Proposals for Restructuring Social Security Spousal or Survivors Benefits

A number of proposals have been put forward to modify the current structure of Social Security spousal and survivors benefits. These proposals have different potential consequences for benefit levels of current, divorced, and surviving spouses; for the redistribution of benefits among couples from different socioeconomic levels; for the eligibility of means-tested programs such as Supplemental Security Income; and for work incentives.

Earnings sharing has been suggested as a way to address the unequal treatment of one-earner versus two-earner couples under current law. As noted above, Social Security often provides higher benefits to one-earner couples than to two-earner couples with the same total household earnings. In addition, earnings sharing has sometimes been suggested as a way to provide benefits to divorced women whose marriages did not last long enough (at least 10 years) to allow them to qualify for divorced spousal or survivors benefits. By definition, earnings sharing would not affect never-married persons.

Under the most basic form of earnings sharing, spousal and survivors benefits would be eliminated. Instead, for each year of marriage, a couple's covered earnings would be added together and divided evenly between the spouses. For years when an individual is not married, his or her own earnings would be recorded. If a person has multiple marriages, the earnings sharing would occur during each period of marriage. Both members of a couple would have individual earnings records reflecting shared earnings as a member of the couple as well as any earnings before or after the marriage. Social Security benefits would be computed separately for each member of the couple, based on the individual earnings records and using the current-law benefit formula. For couples who were married for the entire career of one or both members, both members of the couple would receive identical benefits and the couple's combined benefit would be equal to twice that of either member of the couple. The two spouses would receive different benefits, however, if either had earnings before or after the marriage.

Earnings sharing proposals would reduce benefits for the majority of individuals, relative to current law, and in the absence of other benefit enhancements. For example, a 2009 Social Security Administration (SSA) study (hereinafter, 2009 SSA Study) found that 61% of individuals would receive average benefit reductions of about 17%. About 11% of individuals would experience no change in benefits, and 28% would experience benefit increases averaging about 10%. Among married couples, the benefit decrease under earnings sharing proposals would be substantially larger among individuals in one-earner married couples than two-earner married couples. This is mainly because the current system on average provides proportionately more benefits relative to payroll-tax contributions to one-earner couples than to couples with two earners, but under earnings sharing, couples with the same total lifetime earnings generally would receive the same benefits regardless of their individual earnings profiles, all things being equal.

Studies have found that the largest benefit reductions under earnings sharing could affect widows and divorced women. The 2009 SSA study found that about 93% of widows would experience an average benefit reduction of 27% while 45% of divorced women would experience benefit reductions averaging about 22%. A 2016 study found that 39% of divorced women and 62% of widows would experience a median decrease in benefits of 6% and 14%, respectively.

The decline in widow's benefits results from eliminating the surviving spouse benefit under current law and replacing it with earnings credits. The widow's benefit under current law is equal to 100% of the husband's PIA, where the husband's PIA is determined based on unshared earnings. Although earnings sharing would increase the amount of earnings credited to the surviving wife (assuming the husband was the higher earner), the benefit payable to the surviving wife based on shared earnings would be lower than the current-law widow's benefit. Another study found that the gains experienced by divorced spouses and some married women under earnings sharing would come largely at the expense of widowed men and women.

Some earnings sharing proposals would mitigate these effects by providing enhanced benefits to survivors or other targeted groups. For example, an "inheritance provision" could allow a surviving spouse to count all (instead of half) of a deceased spouse's earnings (or those of a deceased former spouse) during each year of marriage, in addition to all of his or her own earnings. An inheritance provision would protect some, though not all, surviving spouses. For example, the 2009 SSA study found that 40% of widows would receive lower benefits relative to current law under earnings sharing with an inheritance provision (compared with 93% without the inheritance provision).

Alternatively, benefits for surviving spouses could be based on an amount equal to two-thirds of the combined benefit the couple was receiving when both members of the couple were alive (see " Survivor's Benefit Increased to 75% of Couple's Combined Benefit " below), or special provisions could be targeted to surviving disabled spouses.

Provisions to protect survivors from benefit reductions, however, would reduce the amount of savings that would otherwise be achieved through program changes. Similarly, provisions to increase benefits for survivors relative to current law would increase program costs. A higher survivor benefit could be self-financed by reducing, on an actuarially fair basis, the combined benefit the couple receives while both members of the couple are alive.

Under the current Social Security program, a divorced spouse must have been married to the worker for at least 10 years to qualify for spousal and survivors benefits based on the worker's record, as discussed above. Benefits for divorced spouses are equal to 50% of the worker's PIA; benefits for divorced surviving spouses are equal to 100% of the worker's PIA. One approach to extend Social Security spousal and survivors benefits to more divorced spouses would be to lower the 10-year marriage requirement (for example, to 5 or 7 years). Proposals to lower the length-of-marriage requirement for divorced spouses would improve benefit adequacy for some, although not all, divorced women.

One study estimated that lowering the marriage-duration requirement from 10 to 7 years would increase benefits for about 8% of divorced women and 2% of widowed women aged 60 or older in the year 2030. Lowering the marriage-duration requirement to 5 years (with a proportional decrease to benefit amounts) would increase benefits for about 11% of all divorced women in the year 2030. The study found that, among divorced women aged 60 and over who would receive higher benefits as a result of lowering the marriage-duration requirement to 5 or 7 years, the outcomes were moderately progressive in the sense that they channeled a greater share of benefit increases to low-income and non-college-educated divorced women in old age. For example, under a 7-year marriage-duration requirement, about 10% of divorced women in the lowest retirement income quintile would receive a benefit increase compared with around 4% in the highest quintile who would receive a benefit increase. Among divorced women who gain, women in the lowest retirement income quintile would see a median benefit increase of 79%, compared with a median increase of 25% among women in the highest quintile. An earlier study found a similar result.

Some researchers contend that the 50% benefit rate for divorced spouses (50% of the worker's PIA) is not sufficient to prevent many divorced spouses from falling into poverty. The 50% benefit rate for spouses initially was established to supplement the benefit received by a one-earner couple (i.e., in 1939, a spousal benefit was provided for a dependent wife to supplement the benefit received by the worker). Some observers contend that it may not be sufficient for persons (divorced spouses) who may be living alone. As described above, about 13.7% of divorced women and 10.3% of divorced men aged 65 and older have incomes below the poverty line, compared with 2.1% and 2.4% of married women and men respectively in 2017 (see Figure 2 ).

Another type of benefit modification would increase benefits for the oldest old (for example, beneficiaries aged 80 or older, or after 20 years of benefit receipt) by a specified percentage such as 5%. One rationale for this proposal is that beneficiaries tend to exhaust their personal savings and other assets over time, becoming more reliant on Social Security at advanced ages. Another rationale is that, after the age of 60, Social Security retirement benefits do not keep pace with rising living standards. In particular, the formula for computing a worker's initial retirement benefit is indexed to national average wage growth through the age of 60 and then to price inflation (the Consumer Price Index for Urban Wage and Clerical Workers, or CPI-W) starting at the age of 62. Once a beneficiary begins receiving benefits, his or her benefits increase each year with price inflation (the annual cost-of-living adjustment, based on the CPI-W) so that the initial benefit amount is effectively fixed in real terms. Some argue that the CPI-W is an inaccurate measure of price inflation that seniors face.

According to one study, a 5% bump-up in benefits at the age of 80 would result in a slight decline in poverty rates among widows and nonmarried retired-worker beneficiaries aged 80 or older (declines of 3 percentage points and 4 percentage points, respectively). The same study found that this option is not targeted toward low-income beneficiaries: less than 30% of the additional benefits would accrue to beneficiaries in the bottom quintile of the income distribution. Another SSA study finds that a 5% benefit increase in the individual's primary insurance amount for beneficiaries aged 85 or older in 2030 would decrease the projected poverty rate from 1.5% to 1.2%.

Alternatively, a benefit increase for the oldest old could be limited to beneficiaries who receive a below-poverty-level benefit. One proposal along these lines would provide a benefit to persons aged 82 or older that would be prorated based on the number of years the person contributed to Social Security.

Other proposals would link the Social Security COLA to the Experimental Consumer Price Index for Americans Aged 62 and Older (CPI-E), which grows faster than the CPI-W on average, and is projected to increase Social Security benefits. Although the changes were targeted to all Social Security beneficiaries, those who received COLAs under the new policy for many years, such as the very old or people who had been disabled for a long period, tend to receive the largest benefit increase.

Social Security already has a "special minimum" benefit designed to help workers with long careers at low wages. A worker is awarded the special minimum benefit only if it exceeds the worker's regular benefit. The value of the special minimum benefit, which is indexed to prices, is rising more slowly than the value of the regular Social Security benefit, which is indexed to wages. As a result, the number of beneficiaries who receive the special minimum benefit under current law declines each year, and the Social Security Administration projected that the special minimum benefit provision would have no effect on people turning 62 years old in 2019 or later.

Some observers argue that a carefully designed minimum benefit has the potential to reduce poverty rates among older women, including divorced and never-married women, more efficiently than existing spousal and survivors benefits. Minimum benefit proposals are aimed at improving the adequacy of benefits, in comparison with some other proposals that address issues of equity among individuals and couples with different marital statuses.

Most minimum benefit proposals would require the worker to have between 30 and 40 years of Social Security-covered earnings to qualify for a minimum benefit at the poverty line or somewhat above it (for example, 120% of the poverty line). These work tenure requirements are intended to address, although not resolve, concerns that providing a minimum benefit could discourage work effort. Setting eligibility for a full minimum benefit at 30 to 40 years of covered earnings would allow many workers to take several years out of the labor force to care for children (or other family members) and still receive a higher benefit than they would have qualified for in the absence of a minimum benefit. Arguably, intermittent work histories play a greater role than long-term low earnings in leading to below-poverty-level benefits among women. Therefore, proposals for a minimum benefit based on a specified number of years of covered employment could be combined with modified spousal benefits or with a caregiver credit to balance recognition of longer work effort with recognition of the requirements of caregiving.

To maintain the minimum benefit at a constant ratio to average living standards, some proposals would link the minimum benefit to wage growth instead of setting the minimum benefit equal to a specified percentage of the poverty line. The official poverty line is indexed to price growth, whereas living standards rise with increases in wages and productivity. Wage growth generally outpaces price growth.

The 2010 National Commission on Fiscal Responsibility and Reform and the Bipartisan Policy Center both proposed packages that included, among other measures, provisions to create new minimum benefits. Some researchers propose modernizing the special minimum benefit by tying it to a poverty level that is in line with the recommendations of the National Academy of Social Insurance. If a new minimum benefit is provided, it would be necessary to address interactions between Social Security benefits and eligibility for Supplemental Security Income, Medicaid, and other means-tested programs for low-income individuals.

Caregiver Credits and Drop-out Years for Caregiving

Women are more likely than men to take career breaks to care for a child or other relative, as discussed above. The Social Security retired-worker benefit is based on the average of a worker's 35 highest years of covered earnings. If a worker has fewer than 35 years of earnings, for example due to years of unpaid caregiving, years of no earnings are entered as zeros in the computation of career-average earnings. Years of zero earnings lower the worker's career-average earnings, resulting in a lower initial monthly benefit.

One approach is to replace years of low or zero earnings with a caregiver credit equal to a specified dollar amount. Some proposals would provide the same fixed credit to all eligible persons. Other proposals would link the amount of the credit to foregone earnings, so that higher earners would receive higher credits. The latter proposal would require that the caregiver have been in the paid labor force previously. Some proposals to base benefits on caregiving, rather than on marriage, would eliminate the current spousal benefit.

A second approach is to drop years of caregiving , up to a fixed maximum number of years, from the benefit computation period. This approach could be implemented either by dropping years of zero earnings or by dropping years of low earnings. The proposal to drop years of zero earnings (rather than low earnings) would require a person to leave the workforce completely. This could be problematic for many women, making the proposal less likely to reach as many women as a caregiver credit. Allowing a parent to drop up to 5 years of zero (or low) earnings for caring for a child at home would cause the parent's AIME to be calculated based on the highest 30 years of earnings, rather than the highest 35 years of earnings (the benefit computation periods would be reduced from 35 years to 30 years). This change in the benefit computation would result in higher initial monthly benefits for these workers (and higher benefits for family members who receive benefits based on their work records).

The Social Security Disability Insurance program allows up to three "drop-out" years for caregiving. Policies to credit years of caregiving in the provision of public pension benefits have been implemented in other countries in a variety of ways. In making such a provision, one question to consider is whether the credit should be available only to parents who have stopped working completely or also to parents who continue to work part-time or full-time. Another question to consider is whether to provide credits only for the care of young children or also for the care of other immediate family members such as an aging parent. For example, Canada excludes years of caring for children under the age of 7 from the averaging period in the pension calculation and from the contributory period under its earnings-related scheme, while Germany provides one pension point (equal to a year's contributions at the national average earnings) for three years per child, which can be taken by either the employed or nonemployed parent, or shared between parents (there are also credits for working while children are under the age of 10).

Other recent proposals, however, would count additional years of earnings (more than 35 years) in the Social Security benefit computation. For example, some proposals would increase the averaging period from 35 to 38 years. These proposals are aimed at helping improve Social Security's projected long-range financial position and at encouraging people to work longer. Such proposals generally would affect women disproportionately.

A criticism of proposals to drop or credit years of caregiving is that they may be of most benefit to higher-wage households that can afford to forego one spouse's earnings over a period of several years. Lower-wage spouses, and single working mothers, may not be in a position to stop working for any period of time. In addition, a practical issue involves ascertaining that years out of the workforce are actually spent caring for children or other family members.

Survivor's Benefit Increased to 75% of Couple's Combined Benefit

Under current law, an aged surviving spouse receives the higher of his or her own retired-worker benefit and 100% of the deceased spouse's PIA. This leads to a reduction in benefits compared with the combined benefit the couple was receiving when both members of the couple were alive. The reduction ranges from one-third of the combined benefit for a one-earner couple to one-half of the combined benefit for some two-earner couples. However, there is not always a corresponding reduction in household expenses for the surviving member of the couple. Some contend that 75% of the income previously shared by the couple more closely approximates the income needed by the surviving spouse to maintain his or her standard of living.

One frequently mentioned proposal would increase the surviving spouse's benefit to the higher of (1) the deceased spouse's benefit, (2) the surviving spouse's own benefit, and (3) 75% of the couple's combined monthly benefit when both spouses were alive. The couple's combined monthly benefit when both spouses were alive would be the sum of (1) the higher-earner's benefit and (2) the higher of the lower-earner's worker benefit and spousal benefit. Some proposals for a 75% survivor benefit would target the provision to lower-income households by capping the survivor benefit, for example, at the benefit amount received by the average retired-worker beneficiary.

A 75% minimum survivor benefit would increase benefits for many surviving spouses, both in dollar terms and as a replacement rate for the combined benefit received by the couple when both spouses were alive. For a one-earner couple, the benefit for the surviving spouse would increase from 100% to 112% of the worker's benefit (112% = 75% of 150% of the worker's benefit that the couple received when both spouses were alive). For a two-earner couple with similar earnings histories, the surviving spouse's benefit would increase from roughly 50% of the couple's combined benefit when both spouses were alive (under current law, the surviving spouse receives the benefit received by the higher-earning spouse while he or she was alive) to 75% of the couple's combined benefit when both spouses were alive.

A 75% minimum survivor benefit provision would "reward" the second income of a two-earner couple and improve equity between one-earner and two-earner couples. Under current law, upon the death of either spouse, the earnings record of the lower-earning spouse does not result in the payment of any additional benefits (i.e., in addition to the benefits payable on the earnings record of the higher-earning spouse). Stated another way, the earnings record of the lower-earning spouse effectively "disappears" with the death of either spouse.

Because a 75% survivor benefit would increase costs to the Social Security system, some have proposed financing it through a gradual reduction in the spousal benefit from 50% to 33% of the primary earner's benefit, while both spouses are alive. For a one-earner couple, the couple's combined benefit would be reduced from 150% to 133% of the worker's benefit. This is broadly consistent with the structure of private annuities, where the annuity payout is lower to adjust for a longer expected payout period. As a result, more dually entitled spouses would likely qualify for a retirement benefit based on their own work record only, because more dually entitled spouses would likely have a retired-worker benefit of their own that is equal to at least 33% (rather than 50%) of the higher-earning spouse's retired-worker benefit.

Reducing a one-earner couple's combined monthly benefit to 133% of the worker's benefit, as a way to finance a 75% survivor benefit, could be problematic for low-income couples. Effectively, the increased survivor benefit would help the survivors of both one-earner and two-earner couples, but it would be financed by reducing the combined benefits of one-earner couples from 150% to 133% of the worker's benefit. In addition, unless this proposal were modified for divorced spouses, it would also reduce the spousal benefits received by divorced spouses from 50% to 33% of the primary earner's benefit. After the death of the primary earner, benefits for a divorced spouse would jump to 100% of the primary earner's benefit, creating income volatility unless this outcome is addressed for divorced spouses.

Although the 75% survivor benefit option could increase benefits for vulnerable groups such as aged widows, it would not address the needs of other vulnerable groups, such as individuals who were never married or who divorced before reaching 10 years of marriage. In addition, a 75% survivor benefit option would provide somewhat more additional benefits to higher-income beneficiaries than to lower-income beneficiaries. To address this outcome, as noted above, some proposals would cap the 75% survivor benefit at the average retired-worker benefit.

Although more women have qualified for Social Security benefits based on their own earning records in recent decades, Social Security auxiliary benefits continue to play a crucial role in improving income security for older women, as well as for young surviving spouses and children of deceased workers. Some policymakers and researchers, however, have expressed concerns about the current structure of Social Security auxiliary benefits on both equity and adequacy grounds. For example, the current structure can lead to situations in which a one-earner couple receives higher retirement and survivors benefits than a two-earner couple with identical total household earnings. In addition, auxiliary benefits do not reach certain groups, such as persons who divorced before 10 years of marriage or mothers who never married.

Some proposals have been suggested to increase Social Security benefits to certain, but not all, vulnerable groups. For example, an enhanced widow(er)'s benefit would provide income support to many elderly women and men, but it would not help those who divorced before 10 years of marriage or who never married. Similarly, a caregiver credit for workers who stay at home to care for young children would increase benefits for never-married and divorced women, but it would not help those without children, whether married or unmarried.

The consideration of potential changes to Social Security spousal and survivors benefits involves balancing improvements in benefit equity, for example, between one-earner and two-earner couples, with improvements in benefit adequacy for persons who experience relatively higher poverty rates, such as never-married men and women. In addition, the policy discussion about auxiliary benefits may involve balancing benefit increases for spouses and survivors, divorced spouses, or never-married persons with other potential program changes to offset the higher program costs in light of the Social Security system's projected long-range financial outlook.

Appendix A. Major Changes in Social Security Auxiliary Benefits

Appendix B. Summary of Possible Adjustments to Social Security Spousal and Widow(er)'s Benefits Under Current Law

Social Security benefits for spouses and widow(er)s are based on a percentage of the worker's primary insurance amount (PIA), with various adjustments for age at entitlement and other factors. The following section describes some of the adjustments that apply to benefits for spouses and widow(er)s.

Age-Related Benefit Adjustment for Spouses

Spousal benefits (including those for divorced spouses) are reduced when the spouse claims benefits before full retirement age (FRA) to take into account the longer expected period of benefit receipt (assuming the individual lives to average life expectancy). A spouse who claims benefits at the age of 62 (the earliest eligibility age for retirement benefits) may receive a benefit that is as little as 32.5% of the worker's PIA.

Age-Related Benefit Adjustments for Widow(er)s

The earliest age a widow(er) can claim benefits is age 60. If a widow or widower (including divorced and disabled widow(er)s) claims survivors benefits before FRA, his or her monthly benefit is reduced by a maximum of 28.5% to take into account the longer expected period of benefit receipt (assuming he or she lives to average life expectancy).

In addition, survivors benefits may be affected by the deceased worker's decision to claim benefits before FRA. If the deceased worker claimed benefits before FRA (and therefore was receiving a reduced benefit) and the widow(er) claims survivors benefits at FRA, the widow(er)'s benefit is reduced under the widow(er)'s limit provision . Under the widow(er)'s limit provision, which is intended to prevent the widow(er)'s benefit from exceeding the deceased worker's retirement benefit, the widow(er)'s benefit is limited to (1) the benefit the worker would be receiving if he or she were still alive, or (2) 82.5% of the worker's PIA, whichever is higher.

Benefit Adjustments Based on Other Factors

Benefits for spouses and widow(er)s may be subject to other reductions, in addition to those based on entitlement before FRA. For example, under the dual entitlement rule, a Social Security spousal or widow(er)'s benefit is reduced or fully offset if the person also receives a Social Security retired-worker or disabled-worker benefit (see " Dually Entitled Beneficiaries " above). Similarly, under the g overnment p ension o ffset (GPO), a Social Security spousal or widow(er)'s benefit is reduced or fully offset if the person also receives a pension based on his or her own employment in certain federal, state, or local government positions that are not covered by Social Security. In some cases, a spousal or widow(er)'s benefit may be reduced to bring the total amount of benefits payable to family members based on the worker's record within the maximum family benefit amount.

Under the Social Security retirement earnings test (RET), auxiliary benefits may be reduced if the auxiliary beneficiary is below the FRA and has earnings above specified dollar thresholds. Also, under the RET, benefits paid to spouses may be reduced if the benefits are based on the record of a worker beneficiary who is affected by the RET (excluding benefits paid to divorced spouses who have been divorced for at least two years).

Table B-1 shows the percentage of a worker's PIA on which various categories of spousal and widow(er)'s benefits are based. It also shows the age at which benefits are first payable on a reduced basis (the eligibility age) and the maximum reduction to benefits claimed before FRA relative to the worker's PIA.


Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC): A Primer

Summary: The Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) is a federal agency established by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA; P.L. 93-406). It was created to protect the pensions of participants and beneficiaries covered by private sector defined benefit (DB) plans. These pension plans provide a specified monthly benefit at retirement, usually either a percentage of salary or a flat dollar amount multiplied by years of service. Defined contribution (DC) plans, such as 401(k) plans, are not insured. PBGC is chaired by the Secretary of Labor, with the Secretaries of the Treasury and Commerce serving as board members.

Summary: PBGC runs two distinct insurance programs: one for single-employer pensions and a second for multiemployer plans. Single-employer pension plans are sponsored by one employer and cover eligible workers employed by the plan sponsor. Multiemployer plans are collectively bargained plans to which more than one company makes contributions. PBGC maintains separate reserve funds for each program.

Summary: A firm must be in financial distress to end an underfunded single-employer plan and for PBGC to become the trustee of the plan. Multiemployer plans do not terminate. When a multiemployer plan becomes insolvent and is not able to pay promised benefits, PBGC provides financial assistance to the plan in the form of loans, although PBGC does not expect the loans to be repaid.

Summary: In FY2018, PBGC insured about 25,000 DB pension plans covering approximately 37 million people. PBGC became the trustee of 58 newly terminated single-employer pension plans and began providing financial assistance to an additional 6 multiemployer pension plans. PBGC paid benefits to 861,371 participants in 4,919 single-employer pension plans and 62,300 participants in 78 multiemployer plans.

Summary: There is a statutory maximum benefit that PBGC can pay. Participants receive the lower of their benefit as calculated under the plan or the statutory maximum benefit. If a participant's benefit is higher than the statutory maximum benefit, the participant's benefit is reduced. Participants in single-employer plans that terminate in 2019 and are trusteed by PBGC may receive up to $67,295 per year if they begin taking their pension at the age of 65. The single-employer maximum benefit is adjusted depending on the age at which the participant begins taking the benefit and on the form of the benefit (e.g., the maximum benefit is lower for a joint-and-survivor annuity). The maximum benefit for participants in multiemployer plans that receive financial assistance depends on the number of years of service in the plan. For example, a participant with 30 years of service may receive up to $12,870 per year. Currently, most workers in single-employer plans taken over by PBGC and multiemployer plans that receive financial assistance from PBGC receive the full pension benefit that they earned. However, among participants in multiemployer plans that were terminated and likely to need financial assistance in the future, 49% have a benefit below the PBGC maximum guarantee and 51% have a benefit larger than the PBGC maximum guarantee.

Summary: At the end of FY2018, PBGC had a total deficit of $51.4 billion, which consisted of a $2.4 billion surplus from the single-employer program and a $53.9 billion deficit from the multiemployer program. PBGC's single-employer program has been on the Government Accountability Office's (GAO's) list of high-risk government programs since 2003. PBGC's multiemployer program was added in 2009. PBGC projects the financial position of the single-employer program to improve slightly, but the financial position of the multiemployer program is expected to worsen considerably over the next 10 years.

The Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) is a federal agency established by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA; P.L. 93-406 ). It was created to protect the pe nsions of participants and beneficiaries covered by private sector defined benefit (DB) plans. These pension plans provide a specified monthly benefit at retirement, usually either a percentage of salary or a flat dollar amount multiplied by years of service. Defined contribution (DC) plans, such as 401(k) plans, are not insured.

PBGC runs two distinct insurance programs: one for single-employer pension plans and a second for multiemployer plans. Single-employer pension plans are sponsored by one employer and cover eligible workers employed by the plan sponsor. Multiemployer plans are collectively bargained plans to which more than one company makes contributions. PBGC maintains separate reserve funds for each program.

In FY2018, PBGC insured about 25,000 DB pension plans covering about 37 million people. It paid or owed benefits to 1.4 million people. PBGC is the trustee of 4,919 single-employer plans. PBGC provided financial assistance to 78 multiemployer pensions. PBGC pays a maximum benefit to plan participants. Most workers in single-employer plans taken over by PBGC and multiemployer plans that receive financial assistance from PBGC receive the full pension benefit that they earned. However, among participants in multiemployer plans that were terminated and likely to need financial assistance in the future, 49% have a benefit below the PBGC maximum guarantee and 51% have a benefit larger than the PBGC maximum guarantee.

PBGC is a government-owned corporation. A three-member board of directors, chaired by the Secretary of Labor, administers the corporation. The Secretary of Commerce and the Secretary of the Treasury are the other members of the board of directors. The Director of PBGC is appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate. ERISA also provides for a seven-member Advisory Committee, appointed by the President, for staggered three-year terms. The Advisory Committee advises PBGC on issues, such as investment of funds, plan liquidations, and other matters.

The Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21 st Century Act (MAP-21; P.L. 112-141 ) altered some of the governance structures of PBGC. Some of these changes include setting the term of the PBGC Director at five years, unless removed by the President or by the board of directors; requiring that the Board of Directors meet at least four times each year; and establishing a Participant and Plan Sponsor Advocate within PBGC to act as a liaison between PBGC, participants in plans trusteed by PBGC, and the sponsors of pension plans insured by PBGC.

PBGC is required by ERISA to be self-supporting and receives no appropriations from general revenue. ERISA states that the "United States is not liable for any obligation or liability incurred by the corporation," and some Members of Congress have expressed a reluctance to consider providing financial assistance to PBGC. The most reliable source of PBGC revenue is the premiums set by Congress and paid by the private-sector employers that sponsor DB pension plans. Other sources of income are assets from terminated plans taken over by PBGC, investment income, and recoveries collected from companies when they end underfunded pension plans. The Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act of 1980 ( P.L. 96-364 ) requires that PBGC's receipts and disbursements be included in federal budget totals.

The sponsors of private-sector pension plans pay a variety of premiums to PBGC. The sponsors of single-employer and multiemployer pension plans pay a flat-rate, per-participant premium. The sponsors of underfunded single-employer pension plans pay an additional premium that is based on the amount of plan underfunding. In addition, pension plans that are terminated in certain situations pay a per-participant premium per year for three years after termination.

Single-employer flat-rate premium : The sponsors of single-employer DB pension plans pay an annual premium of $80 for each participant in the plan. Single-employer variable-rate premium : In addition to the flat-rate premium, the sponsors of underfunded single-employer DB pension plans pay an additional annual premium of $43 for each $1,000 of unfunded vested benefits. There is a per-participant limit of $541 for this premium. Single-employer termination premium : The sponsors of single-employer DB pension plans that end in certain situations pay an annual premium of $1,250 per participant per year for three years following plan termination. Multiemployer flat-rate premium : The sponsors of multiemployer DB pension plans pay an annual premium of $29 for each participant in the plan in 2019.

In the Appendix, Table A-1 and Table A-2 provide a history of PBGC premium rates.

Table 1 details the amounts of premium income in FY2017 and FY2018.

PBGC covers only those DB plans that meet the qualification requirements of Section 401 of the Internal Revenue Code (IRC). DC plans (such as 401(k) and 403(b) plans) are not insured by PBGC. Plans must meet these requirements to receive the tax benefits available to qualified pension plans. If a plan meets the requirements of IRC Section 401, the employer's contributions to the plan are treated as a tax-deductible business expense, and neither the employer's contributions to the plan nor the investment earnings of the plan are treated as taxable income to the participants. When a pension plan participant begins to receive income from the plan, it is taxed as ordinary income.

In general, to be qualified under the IRC, a pension plan must be established with the intent of being a permanent and continuing arrangement; must provide definitely determinable benefits; may not discriminate in favor of highly compensated employees with respect to coverage, contributions, or benefits; and must cover a minimum number or percentage of employees.

Pension plans specifically excluded by law from being insured by PBGC include governmental plans, church plans, plans of fraternal societies financed entirely by member contributions, plans maintained by certain professionals (such as physicians, attorneys, and artists) with 25 or fewer participants, and plans established and maintained exclusively for substantial owners of businesses.

PBGC's single-employer and multiemployer insurance programs operate differently and PBGC maintains separate reserve funds for each program. Funds from the reserve of one program may not be used for the other program.

In the single-employer program, PBGC becomes the trustee of the terminated, underfunded single-employer DB pension plans. The assets of the terminated plan are placed in a trust fund operated by PBGC. The participants in the trusteed plans receive their benefits from PBGC.

In the multiemployer program, PBGC does not become the trustee of plans. PBGC makes loans to multiemployer DB pension plans when the plans become insolvent. An insolvent multiemployer plan has insufficient assets available from which to pay participant benefits.

An employer can voluntarily terminate a single-employer plan in either a standard or distress termination. The participants and PBGC must be notified of the termination. PBGC may involuntarily terminate an underfunded plan if the sponsor is unable to fund its pension obligations.

A company may voluntarily end its pension plan if the plan's assets are sufficient to cover benefit liabilities. In such cases, PBGC does not pay any benefits to plan participants. Its role is to confirm that the requirements for termination have been met by the plan. Generally, benefit liabilities equal all benefits earned to date by plan participants, including vested and nonvested benefits (which automatically become vested at the time of termination), plus certain early retirement supplements and subsidies. Benefit liabilities also may include certain contingent benefits. If assets are sufficient to cover benefit liabilities (and other termination requirements, such as notice to employees, have not been violated), the plan distributes benefits to participants. The plan provides for the benefit payments it owes by purchasing annuity contracts from an insurance company, or otherwise providing for the payment of benefits, for example, by providing the benefits in lump-sum distributions.

Assets in excess of the amounts necessary to cover benefit liabilities may be recovered by the employer in an asset reversion. The asset reversion is included in the employer's gross income and is subject to a nondeductible excise tax. The excise tax is 20% of the amount of the reversion if the employer establishes a qualified replacement plan or provides certain benefit increases in connection with the termination. Otherwise, the excise tax is 50% of the reversion amount.

When an underfunded plan terminates in a distress or involuntary termination, the plan goes into PBGC receivership. PBGC becomes the trustee of the plan, takes control of any plan assets, and assumes responsibility for liabilities under the plan. PBGC makes payments for benefit liabilities promised under the plan with assets received from two sources: (1) assets in the plan before termination and (2) assets recovered from employers. The balance, if any, of guaranteed benefits owed to beneficiaries is paid from PBGC's revolving funds.

If assets in the plan are not sufficient to cover benefit liabilities, the employer may not terminate the plan unless the employer meets one of four criteria necessary for a "distress" termination:

1. The plan sponsor, and every member of the controlled group (companies with the same ownership) of which the sponsor is a member, has filed or had filed against it a petition seeking liquidation in bankruptcy or any similar federal law or other similar state insolvency proceedings; 2. The plan sponsor, and every member of the sponsor's controlled group, has filed or had filed against it a petition to reorganize in bankruptcy or similar state proceedings. This criterion is also met if the bankruptcy court (or other appropriate court) determines that, unless the plan is terminated, the employer will be unable to continue in business outside the reorganization process and approves the plan termination; 3. PBGC determines that termination is necessary to allow the employer to pay its debts when due; or 4. PBGC determines that termination is necessary to avoid unreasonably burdensome pension costs caused solely by a decline in the employer's work force.

These requirements were added by the Single Employer Pension Plan Amendments Act of 1986 (SEPPAA; P.L. 99-272 ) and modified by the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987 ( P.L. 100-203 ) and the Retirement Protection Act of 1994 (RPA; P.L. 103-465 ). They are designed to ensure that the liabilities of an underfunded plan remain the responsibility of the employer, rather than PBGC, unless the employer meets strict standards of financial need indicating genuine inability to continue funding the plan.

PBGC may terminate a plan involuntarily, either by agreement with the plan sponsor or pursuant to a federal court order. PBGC may institute such proceedings only if

the plan in question has not met the minimum funding standards, the plan will be unable to pay benefits when due, the plan has a substantial owner who has received a distribution greater than $10,000 (other than by reason of death) and the plan has unfunded vested benefits, or the long-run loss to PBGC with respect to the plan is expected to increase unreasonably if the plan is not terminated.

PBGC must terminate a plan if the plan is unable to pay benefits that are currently due. A federal court may order termination of the plan to protect the interests of participants, to avoid unreasonable deterioration of the plan's financial condition, or to avoid an unreasonable increase in PBGC's liability under the plan.

Table 2 provides information on the number of terminations since 1974 by single-employer DB pension plans and the number of these terminations that resulted in PBGC becoming trustee of the pension plan. From FY1974 through FY2016, PBGC became the trustee of 4,769 single-employer DB pension plans. The number of single-employer plan terminations that result in claims against PBGC is a relatively small fraction of all plan terminations. Most pension plan terminations are standard terminations.

Following a distress or involuntary termination, the plan's sponsor and every member of that sponsor's controlled group are liable to PBGC for the plan's shortfall. The shortfall is measured as the value of the plan's liabilities as of the date of the plan's termination minus the fair market value of the plan's assets on the date of termination. The liability is joint and several, meaning that each member of the controlled group can be held responsible for the entire liability. Generally, the obligation is payable in cash or negotiable securities to PBGC on the date of termination. Failure to pay this amount upon demand by PBGC may trigger a lien on the property of the contributing employer's controlled group. Often, however, a plan undergoing a distress termination is sponsored by a company that is in bankruptcy proceedings, in which case PBGC does not have legal authority to create (or perfect) a lien against the plan sponsor. In such instances, PBGC has the same legal standing as other creditors of the plan sponsor, and its ability to recover assets is limited.

When an underfunded plan terminates, the benefits PBGC will pay depend on the statutory limit on guaranteed benefits, the amount of the terminated plan's assets, and recoveries by PBGC from the employer that sponsored the terminated plan.

Within limits set by Congress, PBGC guarantees any retirement benefit that was nonforfeitable (vested) on the date of plan termination other than benefits that vest solely on account of the termination, and any death, survivor, or disability benefit that was owed or was in payment status at the date of plan termination. Generally, only that part of the retirement benefit that is payable in monthly installments (rather than, for example, lump-sum benefits payable to encourage early retirement) is guaranteed. Retirement benefits that commence before the plan's normal age of retirement are guaranteed, provided they meet the other conditions of guarantee. Contingent benefits (for example, early retirement benefits provided only if a plant shuts down) are guaranteed only if the triggering event occurs before plan termination. Following enactment of the Pension Protection Act of 2006 (PPA; P.L. 109-280 ), PBGC guarantee for such benefits is phased in over a five-year period commencing when the event occurs.

Maximum Benefits for Participants in Single-Employer Pension Plans

ERISA sets a maximum on the individual benefit amount that PBGC can guarantee.

The ceiling for single-employer plans is adjusted annually for national wage growth. The maximum pension guarantee is $67,295 a year for workers aged 65 in plans that terminate in 2019. This amount is adjusted annually and is decreased if a participant begins receiving the benefit before the age of 65 (reflecting the fact that they will receive more monthly pension checks over their expected lifetime) or if the pension plan provides benefits in some form other than equal monthly payments for the life of the retiree. The benefit is increased if a participant begins receiving the benefit after the age of 65 (reflecting the fact that they will receive fewer monthly pension checks over their expected lifetime). Table 3 contains examples of PBGC's annual maximum benefit for individuals who begin receiving benefits at the ages of 60, 65, or 70 and who receive either a straight-life annuity or a joint and 50% survivor annuity.

The reduction in the maximum guarantee for benefits paid before the age of 65 is 7% for each of the first 5 years under age 65, 4% for each of the next 5 years, and 2% for each of the next 10 years. The reduction in the maximum guarantee for benefits paid in a form other than a straight-life annuity depends on the type of benefit, and if there is a survivor's benefit, the percentage of the benefit continuing to the surviving spouse and the age difference between the participant and spouse.

Only "basic benefits" are guaranteed. These include benefits beginning at normal retirement age (usually 65), certain early retirement and disability benefits, and benefits for survivors of deceased plan participants. Only vested benefits are insured. The average monthly benefit received by retirees in FY2015 was $606. In a study released in 2008, PBGC indicated that more than 80% of PBGC recipients in single-employer plans trusteed by PBGC received their full benefits. Among participants whose benefits were reduced, the average reduction was 28%.

Assets of a terminated plan are allocated to pay benefits according to a priority schedule established by statute. Under this schedule, some nonguaranteed benefits are payable from plan assets before certain guaranteed benefits. For example, benefits of participants who have been receiving pension payments for more than three years have priority over guaranteed benefits of participants not yet receiving payments.

PBGC also is required to pay participants a portion of their unfunded, nonguaranteed benefits based on a ratio of assets recovered from the employer to the amount of PBGC's claim on employer assets (called Section 4022(c) benefits).

In the case of multiemployer plans, PBGC insures plan insolvency, rather than plan termination. Accordingly, a multiemployer plan need not be terminated to qualify for PBGC financial assistance. A plan is insolvent when its available resources are not sufficient to pay the plan benefits for the plan year in question, or when the sponsor of a plan in reorganization reasonably determines, taking into account the plan's recent and anticipated financial experience, that the plan's available resources will not be sufficient to pay benefits that come due in the next plan year.

If it appears that available resources will not support the payment of benefits at the guaranteed level, PBGC will provide the additional resources needed as a loan, which PBGC indicates are rarely repaid. PBGC may provide loans to the plan year after year. If the plan recovers from insolvency, it must begin repaying loans on reasonable terms in accordance with regulations. Only one multiemployer plan has repaid any of its financial assistance.

Benefits for Participants in Multiemployer Pension Plans

PBGC guarantees benefits to multiemployer plans as it does for single-employer plans, although a different guarantee ceiling applies. Multiemployer plans determine benefits by multiplying a flat dollar rate by years of service, so the benefit guarantee ceiling is tied to this formula. The benefit guarantee limit for participants in multiemployer plans equals a participant's years of service multiplied by the sum of (1) 100% of the first $11 of the monthly benefit rate and (2) 75% of the next $33 of the benefit rate. For a participant with 30 years of service, the guaranteed limit is $12,870. This benefit formula is not adjusted for increases in the national wage index. PBGC estimated in 2015 that 79% of participants in multiemployer plans that receive financial assistance received their full benefit. However, in plans that may need financial assistance in the future, only 49% of participants would receive their full benefit payment. Among ongoing plans (neither receiving PBGC financial assistance nor terminated and expected to receive financial assistance), the average benefit is almost twice as large as the average benefit in terminated plans. This suggests that a larger percentage of participants in plans that receive PBGC financial assistance in the future are likely to see benefit reductions as a result of the PBGC maximum guarantee level.

The most commonly used measure of PBGC's financial status is its net financial position, which is the difference between PBGC's assets and its liabilities. At the end of FY2018, PBGC's assets were $112.3 billion, PBGC liabilities were $163.7 billion, and its net financial position was -$51.4 billion.

PBGC's main assets are the value of its trust fund and revolving funds. The trust fund contains the assets of the pension plans of which PBGC becomes trustee and the returns on the trust fund investments. The revolving funds contain the premiums that plan sponsors pay to PBGC, transfers from the trust fund that are used to pay for participants' benefits, and returns on the revolving funds' investments in U.S. Treasury securities.

PBGC's main liabilities are the estimated present values of (1) future benefits payments in the single-employer program and (2) future financial assistance to insolvent plans in the multiemployer program.

Table 4 provides information on the net financial position of PBGC from FY1999 through FY2018. PBGC has had an end of fiscal year deficit each year since FY2002.

The weakness in the economy in 2001, particularly in the steel and airline industries, led to large and expensive plan terminations that created a deficit for PBGC. By the end of 2004, the single-employer program had a deficit of $23.3 billion. For the first time since FY2001, partly as a result of increases to the premiums that employers pay, the single-employer program showed a surplus in FY2018.

The multiemployer program had a surplus from FY1982 to FY2002, but PBGC reported deficits each year since. PBGC projects that the multiemployer program will be likely become insolvent in FY2025 and there is a less than 1% chance that the program will remain solvent in FY2026. Both the single-employer and multiemployer programs are on the Government Accountability Office's (GAO's) list of high-risk government programs.

Benefit Payments in the Single-Employer Insurance Program

Table 5 shows that approximately 825,000 participants received monthly payments from PBGC in FY2015 (the most recent year for which comprehensive data on benefit payments are available). The average monthly payment was $536 and the median monthly payment was $279. Among retiree payees, the average monthly benefit was $606 and among beneficiary payees, the average monthly benefit was $307. Approximately 40,000 participants received a lump-sum payment in FY2015, and the average amount of the lump-sum payment was $2,054.

Finances of the Single-Employer Insurance Program

Figure 1 displays the net financial position of PBGC's single-employer program from FY1980 to FY2018. In FY1996, PBGC showed a surplus in its single-employer program for the first time in its history. That surplus peaked at $9.7 billion in FY2000, helped by the strong performance of the equity markets in the mid- and late 1990s. In FY2018, PBGC the single-employer program showed a surplus of $2.44 billion. The improvement in the financial condition of the single-employer program is a result of several factors, such as investment income (there has not been an investment loss since FY2008) and increase in premium income (premium income was 3.6 times greater in FY2018 compared to FY2008).

Finances of the Multiemployer Insurance Program

Table 6 provides data on the number of plans that have received financial assistance and the annual amounts of the financial assistance from FY1995 to FY2018. Seventy-eight multiemployer plans received financial assistance in FY2018. The FY2018 annual report indicated that approximately 62,300 multiemployer plan participants received financial assistance in FY2018 and that approximately 27,800 participants will receive benefits in the future because they are in plans that are currently receiving financial assistance.

Figure 2 indicates that the financial condition of the multiemployer insurance program has been worsening. The deficit in the multiemployer insurance program increased from $8.3 billion in FY2013 to $42.4 billion in FY2014, and $65.1 billion in FY2017. It decreased to $53.8 billion in FY2018. The large increase in the deficit in FY2014 was the result of the increase in the likelihood of the insolvency of several large multiemployer pension plans in financial distress.

PBGC's budgetary cash flows are based on its premium income, interest income, benefit outlays, and the interaction of PBGC's trust and revolving funds. The trust fund contains the assets of the pension plans of which PBGC becomes trustee and the returns on the trust fund investments. Revolving funds contain the premiums that plan sponsors pay to PBGC, transfers from the trust fund that are used to pay for participants' benefits, and returns on the revolving funds' investments in U.S. Treasury securities.

When PBGC becomes trustee of a single-employer pension plan, the assets of the terminated pension plan are transferred to PBGC and placed in a nonbudgetary trust fund. Transfers of assets to the trust fund do not appear in the federal budget and the assets of this trust fund do not appear on the federal balance sheet. The assets of the trust fund are managed by private-sector money managers in accordance with an investment policy established by PBGC's Board of Directors. The current investment policy establishes assets allocations of 30% for equities and other nonfixed income assets, and 70% for fixed income. Trust fund investments totaled $70.2 billion at the end of FY2018.

ERISA authorized the creation of seven revolving funds for PBGC, although only three revolving funds have been used by PBGC. The revolving funds contain the premiums paid by single-employer and multiemployer pension plan sponsors, returns on revolving funds' investments, and transfers from the trust fund that are used to pay benefits. Each year, PBGC transfers funds from the trust fund to the revolving funds to pay for a share of participants' benefits.

The investments of the revolving funds are, by law, invested exclusively in U.S. Treasury securities. The revolving funds' assets at the end of FY2018 were $1.8 billion for Fund 1, $2.1 billion for Fund 2, and $29.3 billion for Fund 7, for a total of $33.2 billion.

The revolving funds are on-budget accounts: increases or decreases in the revolving funds appear as on-budget federal receipts and outlays. The funds' gross outlays include PBGC benefit payments and administrative expenses and receipts include premiums paid, interest on federal securities, and reimbursements from the trust fund.

Because increases in the premiums paid by pension plan sponsors to PBGC are increases in federal revenue, some stakeholders and policymakers have criticized recent PBGC premium increases because they feel increases in premiums are used to offset other federal spending, do not address the financial condition of PBGC, and may discourage employers from maintaining their DB pension plans.

In its FY2017 Projections Report, PBGC estimated its financial condition over the next 10 years. The report indicated that the single-employer program's deficit is likely to shrink and the multiemployer program is likely to run out of money in FY2025. PBGC projected that the single-employer program was likely to emerge from deficit by FY2018 (which it did). The average estimate of PBGC's simulations was a $26 billion surplus for the single-employer program in 10 years.

PBGC projected that there is a 90% chance that the multiemployer program will be insolvent before the end of FY2025 and a 99% chance that the multiemployer program will be insolvent by 2026. This is a result of the likely insolvency of several large multiemployer pension plans. PBGC's FY2018 Annual Report indicated that the multiemployer program's probable exposure to future financial assistance would be $53.8 billion. Premium levels are likely inadequate to provide continued financial assistance to insolvent multiemployer plans. The financial assistance to these plans could exhaust PBGC's ability to guarantee participants' benefits. PBGC has indicated that once resources are exhausted in the PGBC's multiemployer program, insolvent plans would be required to reduce benefits to levels that could be sustained through premium collections only.

The Multiemployer Pension Reform Act of 2014 (MPRA, enacted as part of P.L. 113-235 ), allowed, among other provisions, multiemployer DB pension plans that expect to become insolvent to reduce benefits to participants in these plans. An insolvent plan has no assets from which to pay any benefits. Plans that reduce benefits to forestall insolvency would not require financial assistance from PBGC, and would reduce the amount of future financial assistance PBGC would expect to provide. This would likely improve PBGC's financial condition. PBGC indicated that there is uncertainty in how the provisions of MPRA that allow benefit suspensions and plan partitions will be used. PBGC estimated that the effect of MPRA would likely not change PBGC projections of future solvency.

In response to the increasing concerns of policymakers and stakeholders (such as participants, participating employers, and plans), the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018 ( P.L. 115-123 ) created a new joint select committee of the House and Senate: The Joint Select Committee on Solvency of Multiemployer Pension Plans. The committee was tasked with formulating recommendations and legislative language by November 30, 2018, that would "significantly improve the solvency of multiemployer pension plans and the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation." The committee did not release a report containing recommendations or legislative language by the deadline.

Table A-1 provides historical data on the single-employer program premium levels.

Table A-2 provides historical data on the multiemployer program premium levels.