Court Of King's Bench, We...
LAW R7.POR1. This W2s an 'action against a lady, named Lee, for goods sold. The defendant pleaded, in abatement, that ahe was a married wo- man. The plamtifiF reolied, that before the cause of action accrued, she was divorced al mensa el thoro by sentence of the Ecclesiastical Court, was separated from ]er husband, allowed a sufficient sum for her support, and obtained credit as a feme sok. To this replication the defendant demurred, and its validity was now to be argured. 3I1r Dov!Lt,for the defendant, contended that the replication was bad both in form and stsbstance. It was bad in form, because it contained more than one ground of defence, and because it insuf. ficiently r-cited the sentence of the spiritual court; it was bad ir, substance, because that sentence did not dissolve the marriage like a divorce of d vinc,do matrintonii, but rnerely suspended it tor cer- tain purposee. By the very terms of the Slivorce, the marriage- tie remained undissolved, for it only provided for the separa- tion of the parties until they should be reconciled to each other; so that the mere act of the parties might, zt any time, put an end to its operation, and children born after suc1 re-union would be born in wedlock. Befbre the case of" Alarshzal v. Rutton," 8 Term Reports, p. 545, the old common law had been broken in upon, and effect had been sometimes given to the contracts of marned women living apart from their husbands ; but by, that case, the old law was re- stored, and it was solemnly decided, after two arguments before the twelve Judges, that a feme covert cannot contract and be sued as a feme sole, even though she be living apart from her husband, and have a separate maintenince secured' to her by deed. The language of Lord Kenyon, in giying judgment, was suffli ciently extensive to govern this case, and established that a worman, once marriedt, could not be sued until the marriage-tie was entirely brol?en. The learned Counsel was proceeding to cite other cases, but was stopped by The COURT, who expressed a desire to hear what could be urged on the other side. Mr. ABRAHAMI, on behalf of the plaintiff, hoped to convince the Court that the case was entirely new. In the cases referred to, the separation hid been veluntary but here it was sanctioned by a court of competent jurisdiction, and for a sufficient cause. In the early periods of the lav, a divorce in the Spiritual CGurt was regarded as dissolving the marriage altogether; and after this construction was overthrown, the Court. whil holding that a husband might release the legacy bequeathed to a divorced wife, intimated that she might sue alone. If she could not bind herself, she might he left to starve or driven to inramious courses, because her husband was clearly not liable to maintain her. Ir. Justice BAYLEY.-NO; she may support herself by her la- bour it doesfnot follow that she may contract debts. The LORD CHIEF JUSTIcE.-You have not alleged the goods to be necessaries; and how can they be if she has an allowance? If she had 1,001I. a year, and lost it at the gaming-table, might she then go in debt s'or every thing ? MNlr. Justice BAYLEY.-Your replication goes this lengthi-that she has an indefinite right to bind hersef as aferne solc. AMr. ABRAHAx admitted that hc must go that length, and was proceeding to answer the formal objections, but The LORD CIItEF JUSTICE said, he need not refer to these, as the Court were clearly of opinion that the replication was bad in sub- stance. The defendant pleaded that she was a married womrian, and that plea was true, notwithstanding the divorce. Judgment, there- fore, must be given for the defendant on the detnurrer. COURT OF KlING'S BENCH, WESTMINSTER, OCT. 28. LEWIS V. LEE.