Thursday, Oct. 28.
AfMr. Ti fDA?, stated that this case caine on to be argued on a special verdict tbund for the plaintiffs, on an action brought by them against the house of Barclay, Tritton, and Co., for the re- covery of a large sum of money upon three several bills of ex- change, bearing the names of that honse as enlorsers. This was for the palment of the money twice over, and the only question for the Court s decision (M51r. Tindal conceived) was, whether the Hon. E:ast india Company had proceeded against thl right parties, The allegation in the eounts was, that when the bills were presented to Barclay, Tritton, and Co., for payment they had tipon the back of them, " Barclay, Tritton, and Co.," ana he was bound to say, that when a bill is presented for payment to a Party, with that party's name upon it, it does import true genuineness as against that party; but then it was his duty to contend that it also imported a warranty by that endorser of the genuineness of' the prior endorser; and in support of this doctrine he would cite " Smith v. Chester," Ist Term Rep. p. 654. It appeared that agentleman of the name of Carr had a general power of attorney from Mir. Hope, tu collect monies, &c. bitt which, according to a former decision of the Court, did not authonze Mr. Carr to endorse bills of exchange; he, however did endorse the bills now in question, which were Dut into the hands of Messrs. Barclay, Tritton, and Co., who presenited them to the East India Company, and the Company acted upon them, under the no- tion that Mr. Carr ha.t been properly authorized to endorse ; but that tuming out not to have been so, this action was brought against Afessrs. Barclay, Tritton, and Co. for the purpose of compelling them to reimburse the sum, amounting to between 20,0001. and 30,0001., so paidl by the Company. The learned Counsel supposed the objections to be made on the other side would be, that the East India Company knew the tenour of the power of attorney befbre they paid the morney, and at aniy rate the Statute of Limitations would bar the claim. As to the forner, he could only contend, that the endorsement of Ml essrs. Barclay, Tritton, and Co., was a warranty rf the legality of the tbrmiier endorsement ; and with respect to the Statute of i mitations he was Teady to argue the case upon that point, if the Court wished to hear hiin. The East lndia Company were only trustees for a large body of creditors, and they did not consider that they would have discharged their duty had they not pushed the law against the defendants to the extent to which they . had done, and now solicited the opinion of the Court upon the ques- tion, whether the defendants ought not to reimburse the money. The l,ORDn CJIIEF JU:STICE said, there was no wish on the part of the Court to trouble the learned gentleman on the Statute of Limi- tations, because they were perfectly satisfied on the other part of the case, that the plaintiff' could not maintain the present action against the defendants. If we only look at the case (continued his Lordship), we clearly find that the plaintiffi, befbre they paid those bills, took such tneans as they thought proper, to satisfy themselves upon the anthoritv of Carr to endorse ; it appears that the very power of attorney was exhibited before then,, but it dtlcs not appear that it was exhibited before the defendants,er that they then had ever known any thing whatever about it ; therefore the defendants nmust be taken to stand in the situation of having re- ceived a sum of money from the plaintiffts, after the plaintiffsl had taken such nmeana as they thought they ought to lhave taken to satisfy themselves that they were justilied in paying it. It ta,ns out, hoW- ever, that the power of attorncy was not good, and that the defend- ants were agents who received the money, atid who antervards paid it over to their principals, in doing of which, certainly, they were justitiet If before they had paid it to their prinl pal, they had had notice not to pay it, because Messrs. Davies and Carr had before drawn it out of thieir hands, or that there had been a fraud practised, theniAlessrs. Barclay,Tritton, and Co. might have been justified in re- fusing to pay itover when called upon by their principals, btit that was not so; and therefore I am of opinion that the plaintifis are not en- titled to recover. Mr. .Justice BAYLEY.-1\1 opinion in this case, that the plain- tiffs are not entitled to recover, is not founded on the feet that the defendants were merely agents of AMessrs. Davies and Carr; be- cauise, in the course of the proceedings, they have never intisted upon that, and therefore it cannot be said they have deluded the East India Company into the belief that they were printiPa]S though really only agents; but my opinion is feunded on these legal ru!es-namelyy that in this case, at the utmost, the plaintiffs can only contend tdat both parties are Innocent; anel also, that in this case there were tneans of knowledge on the part of the plaintiffs, which means of knowledge do not appear to ha.ve come within the knowledge and reach of the defendants: and therefore, if, after pos- sesaing all the ineans of knowledge which have transpired, theey think fit to pay tite money, and are entitled to get that money back again, it would work grat injustice. In this case the defendants! are not the parties who get the money from the plaintiffs; there are interniediate parties, and the plaintiffs were to look at the power of attorney to see that it would authorize the endorsement. Now I am not at present prepared to accede to the principle contended for at the bar, titat every endorser to a bill of exchange warrants the validity of the prior endorsement; it seems to me, that to lay that down as a general principle would ivork great mischief. It appears here, that the plaintiffii, before they pay the bills, see the power of attorney, anti have it before them in their own books, by virtue of wlitch the endorsenent is madIe, and it is for them a to judge whether that p.;wer of attorney gave authority to make! the endorsement; in fact, it did ngt givc that authority, but! they thought propet to assume that it did, and upon that as- seimption they matle that payment to a party upon whom no blame attaches, who were not bound to look at the power of atterney, and who had not the powe, of attorney to look at: therefore, it seems to me, that the present plaintiffs are no, entitled to call upon the defendants after the lapse of Ia years, to reimburse them with the moDey, no fault attachIng to the det'endants. Put it in this case, .hat Ba.rclay, Tritton, and Co. were not agents, but principals; if, in 1809, when these bills became dlue, and were presented to the East India Company for payment, thtey had reftiserI to pay thleln, what w ould Barclay, Tritton, anct Co. have done ? They woull, of course, have called upon Davies anid Carr to pav themn. I tfiir.k, on the whole, tlherefore it would work very great injustice, and instead of being benelicial to the negotiating of bills of excliange, it would be very in- jurious; and I do not see how with conscience, the plaintifls ould receive the money back from ithe defendants. Mr. Justice H OLROYD and llr. Justice LITT LE D,A.E concurred. i NURSDAI.-. OCT. 28. EAST rv-n - - I .-