Some extracts of despatch...
..-bome extracts of despatches from India will be found in tsisday's paper, which describe as much of our military iperations against the Burmese on tho cossts of Aracan and Peu as it ris deemed prudent to make public. These relate,to a stockade cor,test at Kemmendine, by the trbops undertSir ARCHdBALDCAM Be LL; and some further details of the cilture of the island of Cheduba,byBrigadier-General IM'CREAGH, -who attacked 600 of the Barmese entrenched in it, with a force of S00 men. We are assured, that not. withstanding the above local and detached successes, much dissatisfaotion, and no small alarm, prevail at Calcutta re- specting the state and prospects of this uRtimely war. Since the affairs of the 10th antt 11th of June, the accounts agree in saying that nothing had been either done or attempted on the side of Rangoon-the reason assigned being a scarcity of provisions; a-ac that our troops were unhealtlhy. In the mean time, the campaign was to open on the northern frontier; with a force (as estimated) of 20,000 men, under the orders of the Commnander-in-Chief; although Sir E. PAGET is alleged by other comm nieations to have actually thrown up his command, after a strong but vain remonstrance against the supineness and imbeclity of Lord A2isiEnsT'a Government. The declared object of the nortbern army was to march by Chittagong, upon the lBur- I mese capital, depending on t1w. co-operation of the force collected at Rangoon. The combined expeditions were to include a bQdy of $o,ooo men-a proof in itself of the seri- Qts importance attached to this contest with a people whose numbers are formidable and their admsitted courage more so. But a proof still stronger of that real importance is, that even the above broad scale of preparations is held lby the authorities most looked up to as not commensurate with the accasion. It may, perhaps, be worth recollecting, that in the list of arms and ordnance captared at Cheduba are enumerated 5 European 6-pouaders, 40 European muskeis, and a qaantity of European flints. We admit that suchi means of destruction may have been procured by open commerce., and that no inference at all unfavour- able to the feelings of the State supplying them (in regard to England) ought to be drawn, without a more particutlar knowledge of the facts. It is even very possible tbat Carren and Birmingham may have been the birth-places of these military supplies. If so, it would be a relief to the public distrust of foreign Powers to make known a truth so tranquillizing. People are looking to the frontier of the Indus-unreasonably, perhaps, but almost instinctively-for grounds of complicated apprehension on the subject of Asiatic affairs.