Datasets:

learn3r

/

gov_report_memsum_oracle

like 0

crs_RL32399

crs_RL32399_0

Overview on Inspections The United States now has a unified inspections operation at the borders; one inspector ischarged with examining people, animals, plants, goods, and cargo upon entry to the country. The transfer of these functions to theDepartment of Homeland Security (DHS) marks a significant policy shift concerning all of thesefunctions, clarifying that -- although there are important commercial, economic, health,humanitarian, and immigration responsibilities -- ensuring the security of our borders is the toppriority. The decision by DHS officials to further integrate the inspection duties so that there is "oneface at the border" now means that Customs and Border Protection (CBP) inspectors are essentiallyinterchangeable and responsible for all primary inspections. (1) Some argue that this reorganization of border inspections has been long needed and willresult in a more streamlined and efficient set of procedures at the border with a clear, single, chainof command. Others warn that the different types of inspections are quite complex in their own rightand that the reorganization will serve to exacerbate competing priorities, ultimately resulting in manymore people and goods being sent to secondary inspections. Immigration Inspections. Customs Inspections. The INA requires theinspection of all aliens who seek entry into the United States; (33) and in some cases allowsfor preinspection when departing a foreign country on route to the United States. Customs inspections monitor goods being imported into the UnitedStates, including collection of duties and tariffs. Inspection Procedures. Passenger Inspection. Border Inspection Trends by Ports and Modes of Entry Border inspections conducted each year number in the hundreds of millions. Agricultural inspections were a distantthird, but APHIS still completed 44 million animal and plant inspections of passengers in FY2002. Unlike customs and immigration inspections data, APHIS data enumerate only those passengersreferred to secondary inspections for the purpose of an agricultural inspection. According to his testimony these numbers currentlystand at 22.6% of rail containers, 5.2% of sea containers, and 15.1% of trucks entering the UnitedStates. Budget and Staffing for Inspections Border inspections are funded through a combination of federal discretionary appropriationsand user fees. For FY2004, CBP was given budget authority of $2,496 million for border security,inspections, and trade facilitation at POEs. These historic funding data are not comparable across agencies and, as noted below, mayinclude activities in addition to the inspection functions. Animal and Plant Health Functions Agricultural animal and plant health inspections are funded through a combination of federalappropriations and user fees. Issues and Concerns As discussed above, CBP inspectors are charged with enforcing a host of laws andconducting hundreds of millions of inspections annually. (107) 9/11 Commission Recommendations. 5024 ) hadvarious provisions affecting border inspections. 10 as passed would expand pre-inspection programs in foreigncountries and assistance to air carriers at selected foreign airports in the detection of fraudulentdocuments; would limit the President's ability to waive general statutory requirements for U.S.citizens traveling abroad or attempting to enter the United States to bear a valid U.S. passport, so thatsuch a waiver can only be exercised with respect to U.S. citizens traveling to or from foreigncontiguous territories who are bearing identification documents designated by DHS as (1) reliableproof of U.S. citizenship, and (2) of a type that may not be issued to an unlawfully present alienwithin the United States; and would amend the present waiver authority concerning documentrequirements for arriving nationals from foreign contiguous countries or adjacent islands, so thatsuch waivers may only be granted (in non-emergency situations) through a joint determination bythe Secretary of DHS and Secretary of State on the basis of reciprocity, and then only if the arrivingforeign national is in possession of identification documents deemed secure by the Secretary of DHS. The National Intelligence Reform Act of 2004 (P.L.108-458).

The United States now has a unified inspections operation at the borders; a single inspectoris charged with examining people, animals, plants, goods, and cargo upon entry to the country. Thetransfer of these functions to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) marks a significant policyshift for all of these functions, clarifying that -- although there are important commercial, economic,health, humanitarian, and immigration responsibilities -- ensuring the security of our borders is thetop priority. The decision by DHS officials to further integrate the inspection duties so that there is"one face at the border" now means that Customs and Border Protection (CBP) inspectors areessentially interchangeable and responsible for all primary inspections. A range of legal,administrative, and policy issues have emerged with unified border inspections. Legislationimplementing the 9/11 Commission recommendations -- the National Intelligence Reform Act of2004 ( P.L. 108-458 ) -- had various provisions affecting border inspections. CBP inspectors are charged with enforcing a host of laws. Immigration law requires theinspection of all aliens who seek entry into the United States, and every person is inspected todetermine citizenship status and admissibility. All goods being imported into the United States aresubject to a customs inspection, but an actual physical inspection of all goods is not required. Therealso are laws that subject animals and plants to border inspections. This report provides a discussionof these various laws and the procedural differences in what constitutes an "inspection." Border inspections conducted each year number in the hundreds of millions. Prior to thecreation of CBP, the Department of Justice's immigration inspectors did most passenger inspections-- peaking at 534 million in FY2000 -- since all foreign nationals seeking entry into the United Statesmust be inspected. In terms of customs inspections, approximately 22.6% of rail containers; 5.2%of sea containers; and 15.1% of trucks entering the United States were physically inspected. Unlikecustoms and immigration inspections data, animal and plant health inspections data enumerate onlythose passengers referred to secondary inspections for the purpose of an agricultural inspection. There were 44 million animal and plant inspections in FY2002. Border inspections are funded through a combination of federal discretionary appropriationsand user fees. In FY2004, CBP was given budget authority of $2,496 million for border security,inspections, and trade facilitation at ports of entry. Historic funding data for inspections are notcomparable across the "legacy" agencies as the budget data often included activities in addition tothe inspection functions. Some argue that this reorganization of border inspections has been long needed and isresulting in a more streamlined and efficient set of procedures at the border with a clear, single, chainof command. Others warn that the different types of inspections are quite complex in their own rightand that the reorganization is exacerbating the conflicting priorities at the border, ultimately resultingin many more people and goods being sent to secondary inspections. Key Policy Staff: Border Inspections

crs_RL31512

crs_RL31512_0

The report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (also known as the 9/11 Commission) maintained that border security was not considered a national security matter prior to September 11, and as a result the State Department's consular officers were not treated as full partners in counterterrorism efforts. As these more stringent visa policies have gone into force, however, new concerns have arisen about visa processing delays. Visa applicants often face extensive wait times for interviews. Whether these delays are having a deleterious effect on travel and commerce has become an issue. Some now question whether sufficient resources and staff are in place to manage visa issuances in the post-September 11 world. Foreign nationals not already legally residing in the United States who wish to come to the United States generally must obtain a visa to be admitted. Nonimmigrant visas issued abroad dipped to 4.9 million in FY2003 after peaking at 7.6 million in FY2001. The FY2005 data indicated 5.4 million nonimmigrant visas were issued. The number of immigrant visas issued each year by consular officers abroad has held steady at about 0.4 million over the past decade. Combined, visitors for tourism and business comprised the largest group of nonimmigrants visas issued in FY2005, about 3.7 million down from 5.7 million in FY2000. Other notable categories were temporary workers (17%) and students or cultural exchange (9.4%). While the grounds of inadmissibility are an important basis for denying foreign nationals admission to the United States, it should be noted that more immigrant petitions who are rejected by DOS—270,615 in FY2005—were rejected because their visa application did not comply with provisions in the INA (most of these being §221(g) noncompliance) included in the last category listed in Table 1 . Since the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, considerable concern has been raised because the 19 terrorists were aliens who apparently entered the United States legally on temporary visas. From September 2005 through February 2006, GAO found that 97 of DOS's 211 visa-issuing posts reported maximum wait times of 30 or more days in at least one month. The 9/11 Commission made several recommendations that underscore the urgency of implementing legislative provisions on visa policy and immigration control that Congress enacted several years ago. The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 ( P.L. Among the other provisions in the 9/11 Commission implementation bills were: acquire and deploy technologies (e.g., biometrics) to detect potential terrorist indicators on travel documents; establish an Office of Visa and Passport Security; and train consular officers in the detection of terrorist travel patterns. The conferees retained the provision on visa revocation as a ground of inadmissibility, but P.L. 108-458 permits limited judicial review of removal if visa revocation is the sole basis of the removal. 1440 / S. 710 ) would have, among other things, further broadened the security and terrorism grounds of inadmissibility to exclude aliens who have participated in the commission of acts of torture or extrajudicial killings abroad.

Since the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, considerable concern has been raised because the 19 terrorists were aliens who apparently entered the United States with temporary visas despite provisions in immigration laws that bar the admission of terrorists. Foreign nationals not already legally residing in the United States who wish to come to the United States generally must obtain a visa to be admitted, with certain exceptions noted in law. The report of the 9/11 Commission maintained that border security was not considered a national security matter prior to September 11, and as a result the State Department's consular officers were not treated as full partners in counterterrorism efforts. The 9/11 Commission made several recommendations that underscored the urgency of implementing the provisions on visa policy and immigration control that Congress enacted several years ago. As enacted, the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (P.L. 108-458) further broadens the security and terrorism grounds of inadmissibility to exclude aliens who have participated in the commission of acts of torture or extrajudicial killings abroad or who are members of political, social, or other groups that endorse or espouse terrorist activity. It also includes provions to deploy technologies (e.g., biometrics) to detect potential terrorist indicators on travel documents; establish an Office of Visa and Passport Security; and train consular officers in the detection of terrorist travel patterns. The conferees retained the provision on visa revocation as a ground of inadmissibility but permit limited judicial review of removal if visa revocation is the sole basis of the removal. As these more stringent visa policies have gone into force, however, new concerns have arisen about visa processing delays. Visa applicants often face extensive wait times for interviews. From September 2005 through February 2006, GAO found that 97 of DOS's 211 visa-issuing posts reported maximum wait times of 30 or more days in at least one month. Whether these delays are having a deleterious effect on travel and commerce has become an issue. Some now question whether sufficient resources and staff are in place to manage visa issuances in the post-September 11 world. Meanwhile, nonimmigrant (i.e., temporary) visas issued abroad dipped to 4.9 million in FY2003 after peaking at 7.6 million in FY2001. The FY2005 data (most recent published source) indicated an upturn, as 5.4 million nonimmigrant visas were issued. Combined, visitors for tourism and business comprised the largest group of nonimmigrants visas issued in FY2005, about 3.7 million down from 5.7 million in FY2000. Other notable categories were temporary workers (17%) and students or cultural exchange (9.4%). The number of permanent resident visas issued each year by consular officers abroad has held steady at about 0.4 million over the past decade. DOS excluded 38,434 potential immigrants in FY2005 and refused 270,615 potential immigrants in FY2005 because their visa application did not comply with provisions in the INA. In terms of temporary visas, DOS excluded 25,212 potential nonimmigrants in FY2005 and refused almost 2 million potential nonimmigrants in FY2005 because the alien was not qualified for the visa.

crs_R42741

crs_R42741_0

Introduction The Federal Employees Health Benefits (FEHB) Program provides private health insurance to federal employees, retirees, and their dependents. In a typical year, FEHB provides health insurance coverage to about 8.2 million federal employees, retirees, and their dependents. FEHBA generally established parameters for eligibility; election of coverage; the types of health plans and benefits that may be offered; and the level of the government's share of premiums. It also established an Employees Health Benefits Fund to pay for program expenses and put forth provisions for studies, reports, and audits. By law, OPM has the authority to contract with insurers and to prescribe regulations to manage FEHB, among other duties. FEHBA has been amended many times since its passage. The general model of FEHB, consisting of enrollees choosing between multiple types of coverage offered by competing private insurers, has not changed. Employees and retirees have always shared the cost of premiums with the federal government, and, in general, they have always had access to the same plans at the same cost. However, many other aspects of FEHB have been modified. Congressional interest in FEHB often extends beyond FEHB's potential applicability as a model for other health care programs or as an avenue to provide coverage. Congress has a financial interest in the program, as the federal government has always paid a portion of FEHB's costs. In addition, Congress has the legislative authority to restructure FEHB to maintain or improve its function. The report includes short discussions of certain changes to the program. It discusses how Congress has conditioned the use of federal funds on policy changes being implemented in FEHB ( Table 1 ); changed the formula for determining the government's share of FEHB premiums ( Table 2 ); modified eligibility for the program ( Table 3 ); and implemented policies that affect the relationship between Medicare and FEHB ( Table 4 ). FEHB Legislative History The following are detailed summaries of selected laws or provisions of laws that established, amended, or changed the Federal Employees Health Benefits (FEHB) Program. The act established the general parameters for the program, including eligibility and enrollment procedures; the types of benefits that may be provided; the level of the government's share of premiums; and the role of the Office of Personnel Management (OPM). OPM was allowed to contract or approve the following types of health benefit plans to participate in FEHB: Service Benefit Plan—one government-wide plan (offering two levels of benefits) under which payment is made by an insurer under contracts with providers for the benefits described Indemnity Benefit Plan—one government-wide plan (offering two levels of benefits) under which an insurer agrees to pay certain sums of money for the benefits described Employee Organization Plans—plans providing health benefits to members of the organization as of July 1, 1959, that are sponsored or underwritten and administered, in whole or in part, by employee organizations; employee organization plans are available only to employees and retirees (and members of their families) who at the time of enrollment are members of the organization Comprehensive Medical Plans—either group-practice prepayment plans , which offer benefits on a prepaid basis provided by physicians practicing as a group in a common center or centers, or individual-practice prepayment plans , which offer health services on a prepaid basis provided by individual physicians who agree to accept the payments provided by the plans as full payment for covered services rendered by them Under P.L. 86-382). 105-33 modified the formula for determining the government's share of FEHB premiums.

For more than 50 years, the Federal Employees Health Benefits (FEHB) Program has been providing health insurance coverage to federal employees, retirees, and their dependents. It is the largest employer-sponsored health insurance program in the country, covering about 8.2 million enrollees each year. The program was created by the Federal Employees Health Benefits Act of 1959 (FEHBA; P.L. 86-382). FEHBA and its subsequent amendments established the parameters for eligibility; election of coverage; the types of health plans and benefits that may be offered; and the level of the government's share of premiums. They also established an Employees Health Benefits Fund to pay for program expenses and put forth provisions for studies, reports, and audits. In addition, FEHBA outlined the role of the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) in FEHB. By law, OPM has the authority to contract with insurers and to prescribe regulations to manage the program, among other duties. FEHB's general model has not changed since its inception. The program has always allowed competing private insurers to offer numerous types of coverage to enrollees within broad federal guidelines. The federal government and the employee or retiree have always shared the cost of the premium, and generally employees and retirees have had access to the same plans at the same cost. However, specific features of FEHB have been modified—in some cases, multiple times—by statutory changes, administrative actions, and judicial decisions. For example, through legislation, Congress has modified the formula for determining the government's share of premiums, and both Congress and OPM have broadened the types of health benefits FEHB plans must provide. Additionally, a Supreme Court decision in 2013 expanded FEHB eligibility to include same-sex spouses of FEHB enrollees and the children of same-sex marriages. Congress has financial and administrative interests in the program, as the government pays for a share of FEHB premiums and Congress has the legislative authority to modify FEHB. Congressional interest in the program also extends to FEHB's potential applicability as a model for other health care programs or as an avenue to provide coverage, such as by extending aspects of FEHB to Medicare. This report tracks legislative changes to FEHB. The report includes brief discussions of how Congress has changed FEHB through legislative action, including by restricting the use of federal funds; changing the formula for determining the government's share of FEHB premiums; expanding eligibility for the program; and implementing policies that affect the relationship between Medicare and FEHB. The Appendix includes detailed summaries of selected laws or provisions of laws that have amended or changed FEHB.

crs_R41693

crs_R41693_0

Introduction Medical malpractice has attracted congressional attention numerous times over the past few decades, particularly in the midst of three "crisis" periods for medical malpractice liability insurance in the mid-1970s, the mid-1980s, and the early 2000s. These periods were marked by sharp increases in medical liability insurance premiums, difficulties in finding any liability insurance in some regions and among some specialties as insurers withdrew from providing coverage, reports of providers leaving areas or retiring following insurance difficulties, and a variety of public policy measures at both the state and federal levels to address the market disruptions. The overall medical liability insurance market is not currently exhibiting the same level of crisis as in previous time periods. Nonetheless, problems with the affordability and availability of malpractice insurance persist, especially in particular regions and physician specialties (e.g., obstetricians). In addition, concern about claims for medical malpractice may affect individual provider decisions particularly through increased use of tests and procedures to protect against future lawsuits ("defensive medicine"), which may affect health care costs. The malpractice system also experiences issues with equity and access. For example, some observers have criticized the current system's performance with respect to compensating patients who have been harmed by malpractice, deterring substandard medical care, and promoting patient safety. Public policy measures that have been effective in addressing the successive insurance market disruptions, and those that may be effective in the future, have been a matter of debate. H.R. Legislation addressing medical liability reform in greater depth passed the House, as discussed below. 5, S. 218, and S. 1099) H.R. The House passed H.R. H.R. H.R. 5 , an amendment to eliminate a provision in H.R. 5 foresees a 0.5% decrease in overall health spending and a reduction in the federal budget deficit of $57 billion over a 10-year period. CBO estimates that this version of H.R. The other two amendments adopted by the House are (1) H.Amdt. H.R. 5652) H.R. FY2013 President's Budget The President's FY2013 budget does not include language on general medical malpractice reform, which is similar to the budget for FY2012. Monies for these grants have not been appropriated as of this time. Costs of Medical Malpractice Medical malpractice insurance premiums add little to the direct cost of health care relative to total health care spending, but medical malpractice tort reform may still result in savings over time by reducing indirect costs to the system. Medical malpractice insurance premiums written in 2009 totaled approximately $10.2 billion, whereas health expenditures were $2.6 trillion in 2010 as reported by the National Health Expenditure Accounts (NHEA). Indirect costs, particularly increased use of tests and procedures by providers to protect against future lawsuits ("defensive medicine"), have been estimated to be higher than direct costs, and particularly, medical malpractice insurance premiums. 5 estimated that federal tort reforms would reduce national health care spending by 0.4%-0.5% (equivalent to approximately $9 billion to $11 billion in 2010) depending on the exact provisions included. In its analyses of H.R.

As a policy area, medical malpractice involves issues related to its prevalence in the health care system; the market for provider liability insurance; and the resolution of malpractice complaints through the tort system. Medical malpractice has attracted congressional attention numerous times over the past decades, particularly in the midst of three "crisis" periods for the liability insurance market in the mid-1970s, the mid-1980s, and the early 2000s. These periods were marked by sharp increases in medical liability insurance premiums, difficulties in finding any medical liability insurance in some areas as insurers withdrew from providing coverage, reports of providers leaving areas or retiring following insurance difficulties, and a variety of public policy measures at both the state and federal levels. The effectiveness of various public policy measures in addressing the issues in the medical malpractice liability market has been a matter of debate, in part because these difficulties have arisen at the intersection of the health care, tort, and insurance systems. The overall medical liability insurance market is not currently exhibiting a comparable level of disruption to that in the "crisis" periods. Nonetheless, concerns persist regarding the affordability and availability of malpractice insurance in particular regions and for certain physician specialties (e.g., obstetricians). In addition, concern about medical malpractice claims may affect individual provider decisions and the cost of health care. In terms of direct costs, medical malpractice insurance adds relatively little to the overall cost of health care. Medical malpractice premiums in 2010 totaled approximately $10.2 billion, whereas overall health expenditures were $2.6 trillion in 2010 according, respectively, to data from insurance rating firm AM Best and the National Health Expenditure Accounts. Indirect costs, particularly increased use of services by providers to protect against future lawsuits ("defensive medicine"), have been estimated to be higher than direct costs. CBO estimated that enacting federal tort reforms would reduce health care spending by approximately 0.4%-0.5% (roughly $9 billion-$11 billion) and the federal budget deficit by between $40 billion and $57 billion over a 10-year period. The malpractice system also faces issues of equity and access. For example, some observers have criticized the current system's performance with respect to (1) compensating patients who have been harmed by malpractice, (2) deterring substandard medical care, and (3) promoting patient safety. There are differing opinions as to the extent that each of these areas has been affected by the current malpractice system. In the 112th Congress, the primary vehicle addressing medical malpractice has been H.R. 5, which focused on medical liability tort reform when introduced but was amended to include language similar to other legislation, specifically H.R. 157, H.R. 1150, H.R. 1943, and H.R. 3586. The amended version of H.R. 5 passed the House in March 2012. Language similar to the introduced version of H.R. 5 was included in H.R. 5652, the House budget reconciliation bill for FY2013, which passed the House in May 2012. The Senate has yet to consider H.R. 5 or S. 218 and S. 1099, companion bills to H.R. 5 as introduced. The President's budgets for FY2012 and FY2013 both requested $250 million for grants to test a variety of reform proposals, but this funding has not been appropriated by Congress.

crs_RL33173

crs_RL33173_0

Some were homeless before the storm—about these people little is known. First, what was the effect of the hurricane on existing voucher holders in the damaged regions? This report also reviews the forms of assistance FEMA has provided to displaced families in lieu of Section 8 vouchers. The demand for vouchers is greater than the supply. More than 2,000 PHAs participate in the program, and each receives an allocation of the more than 2 million vouchers currently authorized and funded by Congress. Some PHAs in the path of the storm temporarily ceased operations, including the Housing Authority of New Orleans (HANO) and the Housing Authority of the City of Slidell. KDHAP and the Disaster Voucher Program On September 24, 2005, the Secretaries of HUD and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) announced a new initiative for HUD-assisted families displaced by Hurricane Katrina. The Katrina Disaster Housing Assistance Program (KDHAP) was funded by DHS through its sub-agency, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)—but was administered by HUD. 109-148 ) transferred $390 million from FEMA's Disaster Relief Fund to HUD's Section 8 tenant-based rental assistance account for Katrina rental assistance. Those families who evacuated and began receiving assistance under regular portability procedures prior to the announcement of KDHAP could have chosen to transfer to KDHAP or stay within the rules of the current voucher program. For HUD-assisted families without Section 8 vouchers (for example, families who had lived in public housing before the storm), if their previous housing is not rebuilt, then the family is to receive a voucher. Displaced families could apply for existing HUD assistance, including Section 8 vouchers, if they were otherwise eligible; however, in most communities, waiting lists for vouchers are very long—in some cases up to 10 years. Prioritizing displaced families may also have budget implications. Given that many displaced families were very poor before the storm and many were at least temporarily unemployed after the storm, they may have qualified for larger subsidies than a PHA's typical caseload. Several PHAs chose to prioritize evacuees; others considered making changes but ultimately decided not to; and still others did not consider changes, given the need in their own communities. 3894 ). H.R. Creation of New Vouchers After Hurricane Katrina struck, housing policy advocates and analysts from across the political spectrum called for the creation of additional Section 8 vouchers to help house the hundreds of thousands of displaced families. DHAP In July 2007, HUD and FEMA entered into an Interagency Agreement through which FEMA will transfer responsibility for ongoing housing assistance for families displaced by Katrina to HUD. According to the FEMA notice in the Federal Register announcing the agreement, Due to the severity of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, the Department of Housing and Urban Development's (HUD) expertise in assisting families with long-term housing needs through its existing infrastructure of Public Housing Agencies (PHAs), the President determined that housing assistance should be transitioned to HUD to address this continuing need. The nation's largest housing program for the poor, the Section 8 voucher program, played a minor role in aiding displaced families, despite calls for its use from across the political spectrum. To serve other displaced families, FEMA developed a number of interim policies, ranging from the provision of trailers to the awarding of cash grants. Whether these findings and recommendations will mean that vouchers will play a larger role in future disasters is yet to be determined.

Hundreds of thousands of families were displaced from their homes by Hurricane Katrina. Many of the displaced families lacked economic means before the storm; others may have become disadvantaged because of the storm. The role of the federal government in helping to meet both the short- and long-term housing needs of displaced families remains under debate within the Administration, in Congress, and in the news media, and questions persist regarding the appropriate role of the nation's largest housing assistance program for the poor—the Section 8 voucher program—in the wake of the storm. This report focuses on three questions: What impact did the hurricane have on existing voucher holders? To what degree did the program serve displaced families who had not previously received a voucher? And should the program play a larger role in serving displaced families in the future? The voucher program played a minor role in serving the overall population of affected families. The Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) focused primarily on serving the estimated 44,000 displaced families who had already received HUD assistance or were homeless before the storm. Initially, Public Housing Authorities (PHAs) in other parts of the country were encouraged to give these families priority for existing vouchers. Later, HUD and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) announced a new Katrina Disaster Housing Assistance Program (KDHAP). Under KDHAP, FEMA funded HUD to provide vouchers to displaced, HUD-assisted families. Most recently, a supplemental funding measure transferred funding for KDHAP from FEMA to HUD's Section 8 tenant-based rental assistance account. HUD renamed the program the Disaster Voucher Program (DVP). The majority of displaced families, however, did not receive HUD assistance before the storm. To serve these families, some PHAs allowed otherwise-eligible families displaced by the hurricane to jump to the top of local waiting lists. Other PHAs considered adopting such a policy, but decided that the need was too great in their own communities. The demand for vouchers nationwide is greater than the supply; thus few existing vouchers are available to new families. Advocates from across the political spectrum called for the creation of new vouchers for displaced families. They claimed that vouchers are more cost-efficient, provide more family choice, and can avoid many of the problems associated with such policies as the temporary provision of trailers. Some Members of Congress introduced bills in the 109th Congress to authorize and fund new vouchers (S. 1637, S. 1765 and S. 1766), or to make changes to the current program (H.R. 3894), but none were enacted. In lieu of vouchers, the Administration chose to provide families with short term stays in motel rooms, cash grants, and trailers through FEMA. This approach came under criticism, and Administration reviews post-Katrina have recommended major changes to the way housing assistance is provided, including transferring temporary housing responsibilities to HUD. In July 2007, HUD and FEMA entered into an Interagency Agreement to transfer responsibility for ongoing housing assistance for Katrina evacuees from FEMA to HUD. This report may be updated, as necessary.

crs_R40548

crs_R40548_0

Introduction Prescription drug abuse is the second-most common form of illicit drug abuse among teenagers in the United States, trailing only marijuana use. The director of the White House Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP), R. Gil Kerlikowske, has called prescription drug abuse "the fastest-growing drug problem in the United States" and "a serious public health concern." Controlled substances, such as the narcotic pain relievers OxyContin® and Vicodin®, are among the most often abused prescription drugs. Young adults and teenagers may have easy access to prescription drugs via their parents' medicine cabinets, from their friends or relatives, or they may retrieve expired or unwanted medication from the trash. A possible approach to addressing the prescription drug abuse problem is to reduce the availability of such drugs by patients disposing of unwanted medications that have been accumulating in their homes. Some local and state government agencies and grassroots organizations have established drug disposal programs (often referred to as pharmaceutical "take-back" programs) to facilitate the collection of unused, unwanted, or expired medications for incineration or other method of destruction that complies with federal and state laws and regulations, including those relating to public health and the environment. However, these take-back programs often exclude controlled substance medications because federal law currently does not allow for a patient to deliver a controlled substance to another entity for disposal purposes, unless local law enforcement has obtained a waiver from the federal Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) to take custody of the unused controlled substances from patients and destroy them. As a consequence, those seeking to reduce the amount of unwanted controlled substances in their households have few alternative disposal options beyond discarding or flushing them. This report presents an overview of the Controlled Substances Act and its implementing regulations that relate to patient disposal of unwanted prescription medication, as well as describes legislation introduced in the 111 th Congress that would amend federal law to provide for more accessible methods of secure and environmentally responsible disposal of dispensed controlled substances. Secure and Responsible Drug Disposal Act of 2010 Introduced on May 24, 2010, by Senator Klobuchar, S. 3397 amends the CSA to allow an ultimate user—without being registered—to deliver controlled substances to an entity that is authorized under the CSA to dispose of them, providing that such disposal occurs in accordance with regulations issued by the Attorney General to prevent diversion of controlled substances. Also, the bill grants the Attorney General discretion to promulgate regulations that authorize long-term care facilities to dispose of controlled substances on behalf of ultimate users who reside (or have resided) at the long-term care facilities. Among other things, the findings observe that "[l]ong-term care facilities face a distinct set of obstacles to the safe disposal of controlled substances due to the increased volume of controlled substances they handle," and that "[t]he goal of this Act is to encourage the Attorney General to set controlled substance diversion prevention parameters that will allow public and private entities to develop a variety of methods of collection and disposal of controlled substances in a secure and responsible manner." On July 29, 2010, the Senate Judiciary Committee approved S. 3397 after adopting an amendment that directs the Attorney General, in developing regulations governing drug disposal, to take into consideration the public health and safety, as well as the ease and cost of program implementation and participation by various communities. On October 12, 2010, President Obama signed S. 3397 into law ( P.L. 111-273 ). Other Related Bills Representative Inslee introduced the Safe Drug Disposal Act of 2010 ( H.R. H.R. Representative Shea-Porter introduced the Safe Prescription Drug Disposal and Education Act ( H.R. H.R.

According to the White House Office of National Drug Control Policy, the intentional use of prescription drugs for non-medical purposes is the fastest-growing drug problem in the country and the second-most common form of illicit drug abuse among teenagers in the United States, behind marijuana use. Young adults and teenagers may find their parents' prescription drugs in unsecured medicine cabinets or other obvious locations in the home, or they may retrieve expired or unwanted medication from the trash. It is believed that properly disposing of unwanted medications would help prevent prescription drug abuse by reducing the accessibility and availability of such drugs. Yet throwing prescription medications into the trash or flushing them down the toilet may not be environmentally desirable. In response, many local communities and states have implemented pharmaceutical disposal programs (often referred to as drug "take-back" programs) that collect unused and unwanted medications from patients for incineration or other method of destruction that complies with federal and state laws and regulations, including those relating to public health and the environment. Prescription drugs may be categorized as either controlled substance medication or non-controlled substance medication. Pharmaceutical controlled substances, such as narcotic pain relievers OxyContin® and Vicodin®, are among the most commonly abused prescription drugs. However, community take-back programs usually only accept non-controlled substance medication, in compliance with the federal Controlled Substances Act. This statute comprehensively governs all distributions of controlled substances, and it currently does not allow for a patient to transfer a controlled substance to another entity for any purpose, including disposal of the drug. (Federal regulations provide a limited exception to this general prohibition—local law enforcement may obtain a waiver from the federal Drug Enforcement Administration to collect unused controlled substances from patients and destroy them.) As a consequence, patients seeking to reduce the amount of unwanted controlled substances in their possession have few alternative disposal options beyond discarding or flushing them. The 111th Congress has considered legislation that would create a legal framework governing disposal of controlled substances that have been dispensed to patients. On October 12, 2010, President Obama signed the Secure and Responsible Drug Disposal Act of 2010 (S. 3397) into law (P.L. 111-273). P.L. 111-273 amends the Controlled Substances Act to allow a patient to deliver controlled substances to an entity that is authorized by federal law to dispose of them, providing that such disposal occurs in accordance with regulations issued by the Attorney General to prevent diversion of controlled substances. The Attorney General is required, in developing those regulations, to take into consideration the public health and safety, as well as the ease and cost of drug disposal program implementation and participation by various communities. Also, P.L. 111-273 gives the Attorney General discretion to issue regulations that authorize long-term care facilities to dispose of controlled substances on behalf of patients who reside in those facilities. Other related bills in the 111th Congress include the Safe Drug Disposal Act of 2010 (H.R. 5809), the Safe Drug Disposal Act of 2009 (H.R. 1191, S. 1336), the Secure and Responsible Drug Disposal Act of 2009 (H.R. 1359, S. 1292), and the Safe Prescription Drug Disposal and Education Act (H.R. 5925).

crs_RS22880

crs_RS22880_0

Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930 Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930 (19 U.S.C. The U.S. International Trade Commission (ITC) administers Section 337 investigations. Section 337 Remedies and Enforcement The ITC grants two primary remedies to U.S. companies: exclusion orders and cease and desist orders. Since 2002, there has been a general uptick in the number of Section 337 cases. Concerns also have been raised about CBP enforcement of exclusion orders.

Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930 allows U.S. companies to protect themselves from imports that infringe intellectual property rights. The U.S. International Trade Commission (ITC) adjudicates complaints filed by U.S. companies alleging Section 337 violations. Primary remedies under Section 337 include exclusion orders and cease and desist orders. In recent years, there has been an increase in the number of Section 337 proceedings or actions. Members of Congress have expressed concern about the length of time for completion of Section 337 investigations and the effectiveness of enforcement of exclusion orders.

crs_RS22674

crs_RS22674_0

Introduction On May 9, 2007, President George W. Bush issued National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) 51, which is also identified as Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD) 20 (NSPD 51/HSPD 20), on National Continuity Policy. NSPD 51/HSPD 20 updates longstanding continuity policy expressed in various directives issued by previous administrations to assure that governing entities are able to recover from a wide range of potential operational interruptions. Continuity planning is not unique to government; efforts to assure essential operations are broadly integrated into many private sector industries. Unlike the private sector, however, federal continuity planning also incorporates efforts to maintain and preserve constitutional government, on the assumption that certain essential activities typically provided by government must be carried out with little or no interruption under all circumstances.

On May 9, 2007, President George W. Bush issued National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) 51, which is also identified as Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD) 20, on National Continuity Policy. The directive updates longstanding continuity directives designed to assure that governing entities are able to recover from a wide range of potential operational interruptions. Executive branch efforts to assure essential operations are similar to those that are broadly integrated into many private sector industries. Government continuity planning also incorporates efforts to maintain and preserve constitutional government, based on the assumption that certain essential activities typically provided by government must be carried out with little or no interruption under all circumstances.

crs_R44484

crs_R44484_0

Introduction On March 16, 2016, President Obama nominated Judge Merrick Garland of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit (D.C. Circuit) to fill the vacancy on the Supreme Court left by the death of Justice Antonin Scalia on February 13, 2016. Judge Garland was appointed to the D.C. Circuit in April 1997, and since February 2013 has served as the circuit court's Chief Judge, an administrative position that rotates among the active judges on the circuit. To assist Members and committees of Congress and their staff in their ongoing research into Judge Garland's approach to the law, this report identifies and briefly summarizes each of the more than 350 cases in which Judge Garland has authored a majority, concurring, or dissenting opinion. The opinions listed in this report are categorized into two tables: one table identifying opinions authored by Judge Garland on behalf of the reviewing court, and the other table identifying opinions authored by Judge Garland separate from the majority opinion. While this report identifies and briefly describes those opinions authored by Judge Garland during his tenure on the federal court, it does not analyze the implications of his judicial opinions or suggest how he might approach legal issues if appointed to the Supreme Court. Those matters are discussed in CRS Report R44479, Judge Merrick Garland: His Jurisprudence and Potential Impact on the Supreme Court , coordinated by [author name scrubbed], [author name scrubbed], and [author name scrubbed].

On March 16, 2016, President Obama nominated Judge Merrick Garland of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit (D.C. Circuit) to fill the vacancy on the Supreme Court left by the death of Justice Antonin Scalia on February 13, 2016. Judge Garland was appointed to the D.C. Circuit in April 1997, and since February 2013 has served as the circuit court's Chief Judge, an administrative position that rotates among the active judges on the circuit. To assist Members and committees of Congress and their staff in their ongoing research into Judge Garland's approach to the law, CRS attorneys have prepared tabular listings of cases in which Judge Garland authored an opinion. These opinions are categorized into two tables: one table identifying opinions authored by Judge Garland on behalf of the reviewing court, and the other table identifying opinions authored by Judge Garland that concur with or dissent from the majority opinion. While this report identifies and briefly describes judicial opinions authored by Judge Garland during his tenure on the federal court, it does not analyze the implications of his judicial opinions or suggest how he might approach legal issues if appointed to the Supreme Court. Those matters are discussed in CRS Report R44479, Judge Merrick Garland: His Jurisprudence and Potential Impact on the Supreme Court, coordinated by [author name scrubbed], [author name scrubbed], and [author name scrubbed].

crs_R44904

crs_R44904_0

Introduction Some Members of Congress have expressed interest in the judicial award of remedies for patent infringement for more than a decade. Courts are also authorized to grant injunctions in "accordance with the principles of equity." In addition, attorney fees may be awarded in "exceptional cases." This report reviews the current state of the law of patent remedies and surveys reform proposals that have come before Congress. A court may subject adjudicated patent infringers to several remedies that are awarded to the victorious patent proprietor. These remedies include injunctions, monetary damages, and attorney fees. The Patent Act also allows for damages to be increased up to three times for cases of willful infringement. In such circumstances, a court may apply "the entire market value rule": if a party can prove that the patented invention drives demand for the accused end product, it can rely on the end product's entire market value as the royalty base. This legislation was not enacted. Each litigant ordinarily pays its own fees in the United States, win or lose, in contrast to the "English Rule" where the losing party must compensate the lawyers for the prevailing litigant. In its 2014 ruling in Octane Fitness , LLC v. Icon Health & Fitness Inc. , the Supreme Court held that an "exceptional case" is "one that stands out from others with respect to the substantive strength of a party's litigating position (considering both the governing law and the facts of the case) or the unreasonable manner in which the case was litigated." 9 in the 114 th Congress, would have amended Section 285 to require a court to award attorney fees to a prevailing party in any patent case. Under this legislation, if the court finds that the position or conduct of the non-prevailing party was not objectively reasonable, then the court shall award reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party. Fees would not be shifted if special circumstances, such as undue economic hardship to a named inventor or an institution of higher education, would make an award unjust. Enhanced Damages Section 284 of the Patent Act currently provides that the court "may increase the damages up to three times the amount found or assessed." Although not subject to a "rigid formula," the award of enhanced damages may depend on such factors as whether the infringer intentionally copied the patent proprietor's product; whether the infringer acted in accordance with the standards of commerce for its industry; whether the infringer made a good faith effort to avoid infringing; whether there is a reasonable basis to believe that the infringers had a reasonable defense to infringement; and whether defendants tried to conceal their infringement. Although bills directly addressing the topic of enhanced damages have not been placed before Congress in many years, these earlier proposals were more restrictive than the standards adopted in Halo v. Pulse . In addition, under H.R. Some observers believe that this doctrine ensures that patent rights will be respected in the marketplace. §289 provides that a person who manufactures or sells "any article or manufacture to which a [patented] design or colorable imitation has been applied shall be liable to the extent of his total profit, but not less than $250." Like other sorts of patent proprietors, a design patent holder may obtain its own lost profits or reasonable royalties from the adjudicated infringer. Reactions to the ruling in Samsung v . Apple have varied. They believe that the Supreme Court's ruling adversely affects the value of design patents and obligates the lower courts to reach difficult decisions when accused infringers assert that the patented "design for an article of manufacture" is in fact less than the entirety of the product they are selling. Section 106 of the bill, titled "Restoration of patents as property rights," provides in principal part: Upon a finding by a court of infringement of a patent not proven invalid or unenforceable, the court shall presume that— (1) further infringement of the patent would cause irreparable injury; and (2) remedies available at law are inadequate to compensate for that injury. This proposal would therefore establish a presumption that two of the four eBay factors support the grant of an injunction in cases of patent infringement. Under current law, the patentee must demonstrate that the four eBay factors support the award of an injunction against an adjudicated infringer.

For more than a decade, some Members of Congress have considered bills that have proposed reforms to the law of patent remedies. Under current law, courts may award damages to compensate patent proprietors for an act of infringement. Damages consist of the patent owner's lost profits due to the infringement, if they can be proven. Otherwise the adjudicated infringer must pay a reasonable royalty. Courts may also award enhanced damages of up to three times the actual damages in exceptional cases. In addition, courts may issue an injunction that prevents the adjudicated infringer from employing the patented invention until the date the patent expires. Finally, although usually each litigant pays its own attorney fees in patent infringement cases, win or lose, the courts are authorized to award attorney fees to the prevailing party in exceptional cases. Some observers believe that the courts are adequately assessing remedies against adjudicated patent infringers. Others have expressed concerns that the current damages system systematically overcompensates patent proprietors. Some suggest that the usual rule regarding attorney fees—under which each side most often pays its own fees—may encourage aggressive enforcement tactics by "patent assertion entities," which are sometimes pejoratively called patent trolls. Damages often occur in the context of a patent that covers a single feature of a multi-component product. In addition, many of these other components are subject to additional patents with a fragmented ownership. The courts have developed such principles as the "entire market value rule" and have also addressed the concept of "royalty stacking," in order to address these issues. Legislation was introduced before Congress relating to these matters, but these bills were not enacted. Current law allows courts to award enhanced damages in exceptional cases, which ordinarily applies to circumstances of willful infringement or litigation misconduct. Recent Supreme Court decisions appear to have increased the likelihood that enhanced damages will be awarded, in contrast to earlier legislative proposals that were more restrictive. Bills in the 114th Congress would have called for the prevailing party to be awarded its attorney fees in patent litigation. Under these proposals, fees would not be awarded if the nonprevailing party's position and conduct were justified or special circumstances made the award unjust. This legislation was not enacted, but it may be reintroduced in the 115th Congress. Design patents are subject to a special damages statute which asserts that anyone who sells an "article of manufacture" containing the patented design may be liable to the patent owner "to the extent of his total profit." In its 2016 decision in Samsung v. Apple, the Supreme Court ruled that an "article of manufacture" need not consist of the entire product sold to consumers, but could also mean a portion of a multi-component product. This ruling appears to have decreased the damages available for the infringement of design patents that apply to products with multiple features. In the 115th Congress, the STRONGER Patents Act of 2017, S. 1390, would modify the principles governing the award of an injunction against an adjudicated patent infringer. S. 1390 would establish a presumption that future infringements would cause irreparable injury and that legal remedies, such as damages, are inadequate to compensate for those infringements. This proposal would increase the likelihood that patentees could obtain an injunction against infringers.

crs_RL34268

crs_RL34268_0

It (1) addresses the question of the appropriate economic basis for payment of royalties to the federal government as landowner, (2) compares royalties based on market value with alternative criteria such as royalties based on gross income from depletion and net smelter return, (3) examines the question of an appropriate royalty rate, and (4) discusses some of the likely economic effects of royalty-free provision of public lands, as well as the effects of introducing a royalty. As will be discussed below, under an ad-valorem royalty—the most prevalent type of royalty system—the royalty payments are based on the value of the mineral. Economics is very clear on this: A royalty is a factor payment, part of the rent paid, or the return, to land as both a marketable capital asset and input to production. An implication of the location system on federal lands is that all economic surplus that may be earned by the industry in the long run is retained by the industry rather than allocated to society at large. These profits are excess or surplus returns to a resource owner above the level required to produce or supply the resource, i.e., above the normal rate of return. In general, the economic concept of a royalty as a factor payment implies that the payment should be based on the market value of the producer's output, whether it be hardrock minerals, coal, or oil and gas. Most states with mineral resources imposed ad-valorem royalties at rates ranging from 2-10%. On the other hand, the hardrock mining industry has been booming over the last four years. This would likely contribute to a more economically efficient use of the nation's resources, which would tend to promote the welfare of society—a greater good for a greater number of people. Federal Tax Treatment of the Hardrock Mining Industry The U.S. hardrock minerals industry is subject to the same income tax laws which apply to all other for-profit businesses, paying federal income, payroll, and other federal taxes. Effectively, the deduction is equivalent to a reduced marginal tax rate. The percentage depletion allowance is a tax deduction against the federal income tax available to a mining firm for the costs of depleting a mineral reserve, which is part of the total production costs deductible to derive net taxable income. The percentage depletion allowance is also subject to several limitations. Deduction for Mine Closing and Reclamation Costs The Deficit Reduction Act of 1984 ( P.L. Alternative Minimum Tax There is another provision of the current IRC that attempts to limit the benefits from the special tax breaks available to the mining industry and other industries: the alternative minimum tax. This bill would: establish a new regulatory framework for administering permits to develop hardrock minerals; permanently end the sale or "patenting" of public lands for mining, which has been under moratorium since the early 1990s; establish royalty payments for hardrock mining operations on federal lands and use 75% of the proceeds for the cleanup of abandoned sites; impose an 8% gross income royalty future hardrock mining operations, and an 4% royalty rate on current mining operations; require miners to seek additional permits to explore for and develop mineral resources and meet certain standards related to reclamation of mined lands; create an abandoned mine reclamation program similar to the one currently in place for coal sites; make the income from hardrock mining fees and royalties available, subject to appropriation, to support reclamation programs and to provide assistance to certain state, local, and tribal governments; under an amendment to the Committee-approved bill, 50% of the cleanup funding would be directed to the state in which the royalties were generated; direct the Secretary of the Interior to prioritize reclamation projects that protect public health and safety, particularly from water pollution, and for projects that restore wildlife habitat; under an amendment to the Committee bill, watershed areas would be designated as eligible reclamation projects and among the top priorities for receiving cleanup funds; establish environmental standards specific to the hardrock mining industry.

Under current law, the hardrock mineral industry pays no royalty to the federal government for the privilege of extracting resources from federal lands. This differs from the federal policy toward the coal and oil/gas industries, the policy of State governments, and the leasing arrangements in the private sector, which often require bonus bids and an ad-valorem royalty on the value of the resulting output. Hardrock mining on acquired federal lands pays a 5% royalty. The current federal policy toward hardrock minerals is inconsistent with the fundamental market principle that a royalty is a factor payment, part of the rent paid, or the return, to land as both a marketable capital asset and input to production. In general, the free development of federal mining land will result in more public land developed and more minerals produced than is economically efficient. Another implication is that any economic rents, i.e., excess profits to a resource owner above the level required to produce or supply the resource in the long run, would accrue to private rather than public beneficiaries. The free development regime for hardrock minerals on federal lands was created to stimulate economic development of the west and has more recently been sustained to protect the viability of the United States hardrock mineral industry and to prevent negative economic impacts on western communities built around that industry. Introducing a royalty payment system might have an adverse economic effect on hardrock mineral producers but it would also tend to increase output in the rest of the economy and promote a more efficient use of national resources. The hardrock mining industry generally has, over the last four years, been booming, and any adverse industry effects would tend to be mitigated. The appropriate royalty system, according to economic principles, is the ad-valorem royalty based on the market value of the mineral upon extraction, adjusted for any externality-related taxes. Using "gross income for depletion purposes" is conceptually the same as market value, although it has practical advantages since that is the basis for a producer's computation of its percentage depletion allowance for tax purposes. Using net smelter return—the basis for most private royalty contracts—is conceptually the same as gross income, although there may be differences due to deductions for costs, and would require a new administrative apparatus. Using the producer's net profits as the basis would render the royalty an income tax, which would be inconsistent with mainstream economic principles that a royalty is part of a factor payment, and would likely reduce, and at times totally eliminate, royalty payments. The U.S. hardrock minerals industry pays income taxes, including the alternative minimum tax, and, in addition, is assessed a variety of claims and patent fees. In addition, hardrock mining firms qualify for some special tax benefits or subsidies: expensing (i.e., a current deduction) of exploration and development costs; the percentage depletion allowance, at rates ranging from 14% to 22% of gross income; and a deduction for mine closing and reclamation costs. The special mining tax breaks are sufficient to lower the effective marginal tax rate slightly below that for other industries. These tax rates, however, are currently much higher than the historical rates, which were either close to zero or negative.

crs_R40697

crs_R40697_0

In June 2009, the Supreme Court issued a decision in Ricci v. DeStefano , a case involving allegations of reverse discrimination by a group of white firefighters who challenged city officials in New Haven, Connecticut, over their refusal to certify a promotional test on which black and Hispanic firefighters had performed poorly relative to white firefighters. In a 5-4 vote, the Court held that the city's actions violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibits discrimination in employment on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. The case has drawn considerable attention, not only because of the controversial nature of the reverse discrimination allegations but also because the Court reversed a decision by a three-judge appellate panel that included Judge Sonia Sotomayor, who was, at the time, a nominee for the Supreme Court and who has since become a member of the Court.

This report discusses Ricci v. DeStefano, a recent Supreme Court case involving allegations of reverse discrimination by a group of white firefighters who challenged city officials in New Haven, Connecticut, over their refusal to certify a promotional test on which black and Hispanic firefighters had performed poorly relative to white firefighters. In a 5-4 vote, the Court held that the city's actions violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibits discrimination in employment on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. The case has drawn considerable attention, not only because of the controversial nature of the reverse discrimination allegations but also because the Court reversed a decision by a three-judge appellate panel that included Judge Sonia Sotomayor, who was, at the time, a nominee for the Supreme Court and who has since become a member of the Court.

crs_R43217

crs_R43217_0

Introduction This report focuses on remittances, transfers of money and capital sent by migrants and foreign immigrant communities to their home county. Of that amount, developing countries are estimated to receive about $432 billion, nearly three times the amount of official development assistance (ODA). The dramatic rise in the importance of remittances to global capital flows has led Congress and other policymakers to take a greater interest in these flows and how they are covered under U.S. and state regulation. Remittances are also subject to federal regulation to prevent money laundering and terrorist financing. Remittances can be sent through informal or formal channels. At the time, remittances were a larger source of foreign capital to developing countries than both foreign direct investment and private capital flows (debt and equity). The United States is the largest destination for international migrants and by far the largest source of global remittances. The World Bank records $56.3 billion in official remittance outflows from the United States in 2014. MSBs include the U.S. "Dodd-Frank" Measures In response to concerns from U.S. immigrant communities raised during the 110 th and 111 th Congresses over inadequate disclosure of remittance fees and insufficient consumer protection for remittance transactions, Congress created new consumer protections as part of the Dodd Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd Frank) . At the same time, costs for remittance transactions may increase since bank fee income is capped elsewhere. Remittances and U.S. Development Policy Various U.S. efforts in the past have attempted to harness remittances to promote foreign economic development by channeling remittances toward investment and by using remittances to bring a larger percentage of the remitting population into the formal financial sector. Between 50% and 100% of banks in developing countries provide remittance services, yet the number of remittance recipients in developing countries with access to other financial services (such as checking accounts or credit) remains low. Issues for Congress Key issues on remittances that Members of Congress may want to consider include the following: Regulation of Remittances Members may wish to explore the current federal and state regulatory regime for remittance providers and customers. Effective and proportional regulation of remittances reduces corruption, enhances transparency, and facilitates a more robust business environment. Members of Congress may also explore the impact of the current regulatory regime on the development of emerging payments systems for sending remittances, such as mobile, card, or Internet-based models. Remittances and U.S. Immigration Policy Members may consider the interplay of U.S. remittance policy efforts and U.S. immigration policy. Some Members of Congress, however, have raised concerns that current customer identification policies, which do not require a remittance customer to provide documentation of legal U.S. immigration status, may undermine efforts to enforce U.S. immigration laws. In addition to increased AML/CFT risk related to informal money transfer systems, shifting remittance flows to informal channels may impede policy efforts to use remittances as a means to promote access to financial services.

This report focuses on remittances, transfers of money and capital sent by migrants and foreign immigrant communities to their home country. At over $432 billion in 2015, remittances sent home by international migrants to developing countries are larger than official development assistance (ODA) and more stable than private capital flows to these countries. The United States is the largest destination for international migrants and by far the largest source of global remittances. The World Bank estimates $56.3 billion in official remittance outflows from the United States in 2014. As the market for remittances has ballooned, banks, traditional money transfer companies, and entrepreneurs have responded to increased demand by increasing the amount of remittance channels available to migrants, including mobile, Internet, and card-based options. The dramatic rise in the importance of remittances to global capital flows has led Congress and other policymakers to take a greater interest in these flows. Key issues for Congress include: Regulation of Remittances. Members may want to review the regulatory landscape for remittance providers. Effective and proportional regulation of remittances reduces corruption, enhances transparency, and facilitates a more robust business environment. At the same time, additional regulatory requirements, such as recent consumer protection requirements included in the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Consumer Protection Act, may raise concerns about the compliance costs for remittance providers and consumers. Congress may also want to consider whether current federal and state regulation are appropriate for new and emerging payments systems such as mobile and card options, which are starting to capture part of the remittance market. Members may also want to review recent efforts to improve foreign regulatory and supervisory mechanisms. Remittances are often sent to recipients in developing countries with weak regulatory systems, increasing the risk of money laundering and possible financing of terrorism. Impact on U.S. Development Policy. Remittances represent a substantial percentage of gross domestic product (GDP) in several developing countries. Whether remittances can be leveraged to support U.S. foreign development policy is another issue of concern to some Members of Congress. Some analysts argue that since remittances are comprised of private transfers between family members and friends, U.S. efforts should be directed to reducing the transaction costs involved in remittance transactions. Others note the potential beneficial development aspects of remittances, including promoting investment and access to financial services, and encouraging government programs to help stimulate these positive effects. Remittances and U.S. Immigration Policy. Members may want to consider the interplay of U.S. remittance policy and U.S. immigration policy. A major goal of U.S. policy on remittances is increasing the attractiveness of regulated remittance systems to potential remittance customers, without regard to their legal status. Thus, U.S. Treasury officials allow remittance providers to accept certain foreign-issued means of identification to meet their customer identification requirements. Some Members argue that policies like these may undermine U.S. immigration laws and advocate restricting remittances to those with legal status under U.S. immigration laws. Others argue that more restrictive identification measures would only push remittance flows toward high-risk, unregulated, and underground channels.

crs_R41713

crs_R41713_0

Both the United States and the EU provide significant government support to their agricultural sectors. According to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), in 2009 the EU and the United States together accounted for 60% of all government support to agriculture among the major developed economies. In the United States, federal farm policy has traditionally focused on price and income support programs concentrated on row crops including grains, oilseeds, cotton, as well as dairy. In contrast, the EU provides more extensive support to a broader range of farm and food products—in addition to traditional row crops, sugar, and dairy, EU support also is extended to fresh and processed fruits and vegetables, and livestock products. The EU's total agricultural support generally is much higher than in the United States although actual support levels vary based on the definition of "agricultural support." For example, when using a broad, inclusive definition of the agricultural sector (one that encompasses rural development and consumer nutrition assistance), then during the 2006-2007 period the EU spent an average of $119.7 billion per year in total government outlays, compared with $86.2 billion by the United States for a ratio of 1.4 to 1 ( Table 2 and Table 4 ). When the comparison is limited to the most market-distorting types of direct farm subsidies during the same period, then the levels are smaller but the difference is much greater ($36.9 billion in EU outlays versus $10.1 billion in U.S. outlays, for a ratio of 3.6 to 1). When the definition of support includes non-monetary forms of support such as trade barriers and border measures, then the difference in support levels is still greater. For example, the OECD estimates that in 2009 the EU accounted for nearly half (48% or $120.8 billion) of all government support for agriculture (both monetary and non-monetary) among the major developed economies, compared with a 12% share ($30.6 billion) for U.S. agricultural support outlays (for a ratio of nearly 4 to 1). In addition to the difficulties inherent in defining what constitutes support, or even what constitutes agriculture, direct spending comparisons of agricultural support levels between the U.S. and EU also are complicated by significant structural differences in their respective farm sectors. The United States has more than double the farmland base (over 1 billion acres versus about 457 million acres in the EU), while the EU has more than six times the number of farms (13.8 million versus 2.2 million) spread across its 27 member countries ( Table 2 ). As a result, EU outlays per unit of land appear much larger than in the United States, whereas U.S. outlays per farm appear much larger than in the EU. Because the United States and the EU figure so dominantly in the development and use of agricultural policy on the global level, information comparing the EU and U.S. farm support programs will likely continue to be of interest to Congress as the United States prepares for another round of domestic farm bill negotiations and the World Trade Organization (WTO) Doha negotiations move forward. However, there are several similar policy trends in both the EU and United States: agricultural support has declined as a share of total gross farm receipts, support for market-distorting commodity programs has decreased both in absolute terms and as a share of agricultural support, and support for less distorting non-commodity-type programs—e.g., conservation, rural development, agro-forestry, nutrition, and bioenergy—has increased substantially and now accounts for a majority share of total farm support. Conclusions and Policy Implications The EU is one of the United States' chief agricultural trading partners and also a major competitor in world food markets.

The European Union (EU) is one of the United States' chief agricultural trading partners but also a major competitor in world markets. Both the United States and the EU provide significant government support for their agricultural sectors. According to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), in 2009 the EU and the United States together accounted for 60% of all government support to agriculture among the major developed economies. In the United States, federal farm policy has traditionally focused on price and/or income support programs concentrated on row crops including grains, oilseeds, and cotton, as well as sugar and dairy. In contrast, the EU provides more extensive support to a broader range of farm and food products—in addition to traditional row crops, sugar, and dairy, EU support also is extended to fresh and processed fruits and vegetables, and livestock products. The EU's total agricultural support generally is much higher than in the United States, although actual support levels vary based on the definition of "agricultural support." For example, when using a broad, inclusive definition of the agricultural sector (one that encompasses rural development and consumer nutrition assistance), then, based on World Trade Organization (WTO) notification data for the 2006-2007 period, the EU government support averaged $119.7 billion per year compared with $86.2 billion by the United States, for a ratio of 1.4 to 1. When the comparison is limited to the most market-distorting types of direct farm subsidies during the same period, then the levels are smaller but the difference is much greater ($36.9 billion in EU outlays versus $10.1 billion in U.S. outlays, for a ratio of 3.6 to 1). When the definition of support includes non-monetary forms of support such as trade barriers and border measures, then the difference in support levels is still greater. For example, the OECD estimates that in 2009 the EU accounted for nearly half (48% or $120.8 billion) of all government support for agriculture (both monetary and non-monetary) among the major developed economies, compared with a 12% share ($30.6 billion) for U.S. agricultural support outlays (for a ratio of nearly 4 to 1). Direct spending comparisons of agricultural support levels between the U.S. and EU are further complicated by significant structural differences in their respective farm sectors. The United States has more than double the farmland base (over 1 billion acres versus about 457 million acres in the EU), while the EU has more than six times the number of farms (13.8 million versus 2.2 million) spread across its 27 member countries. As a result, EU outlays per acre appear much larger than in the United States, whereas U.S. outlays per farm appear much larger than in the EU. Since the 1980s, several policy trends have emerged in both the EU and United States, including (1) a decline of agricultural support as a share of gross farm receipts, (2) a decrease of support for market-distorting commodity price and income support programs, both in absolute terms and as a share of agricultural support, and (3) a substantial increase in support for less distorting non-commodity-type programs—e.g., extension, research, conservation, rural development, nutrition, and decoupled payments—now accounting for a majority share of total farm support. Because the United States and the EU figure so dominantly in the development and use of agricultural policy on the global level, comparisons of the EU and U.S. farm support programs will likely continue to be of interest to Congress as the United States prepares to begin another round of domestic farm bill negotiations and the WTO Doha negotiations move forward.

crs_RL33946

crs_RL33946_0

Introduction All of the Navy's aircraft carriers, but none of its other surface ships, are nuclear-powered. Some Members of Congress, particularly on the House Armed Services Committee, have expressed interest in expanding the use of nuclear power to a wider array of Navy surface ships, starting with the CG(X), a planned new cruiser that the Navy had wanted to start procuring around FY2017. Section 1012 of the FY2008 Defense Authorization Act ( H.R. 4986 / P.L. 110-181 of January 28, 2008) made it U.S. policy to construct the major combatant ships of the Navy, including ships like the CG(X), with integrated nuclear power systems, unless the Secretary of Defense submits a notification to Congress that the inclusion of an integrated nuclear power system in a given class of ship is not in the national interest. The Navy studied nuclear power as a design option for the CG(X), but did not announce whether it would prefer to build the CG(X) as a nuclear-powered ship. The Navy's FY2011 budget proposed canceling the CG(X) program and instead building an improved version of the conventionally powered Arleigh Burke (DDG-51) class Aegis destroyer. The cancellation of the CG(X) program would appear to leave no near-term shipbuilding program opportunities for expanding the application of nuclear power to Navy surface ships other than aircraft carriers. The study concluded that the total life-cycle cost of a nuclear-powered surface combatant would equal that of a conventionally powered version if the cost of crude oil over the life of the ship averaged about $178 per barrel. The study reached a number of conclusions, including the following: In constant FY2007 dollars, building a Navy surface combatant or amphibious ship with nuclear power rather than conventional power would add roughly $600 million to $800 million to its procurement cost. Compared to conventionally powered ships, nuclear-powered ships have advantages in terms of both time needed to surge to a distant theater of operation for a contingency, and operational presence (time on station) in the theater of operation. CG(X) vs. Medium-Size Surface Combatant . (B) Aircraft carriers.

All of the Navy's aircraft carriers, but none of its other surface ships, are nuclear-powered. Some Members of Congress, particularly on the House Armed Services Committee, have expressed interest in expanding the use of nuclear power to a wider array of Navy surface ships, starting with the CG(X), a planned new cruiser that the Navy had wanted to start procuring around FY2017. Section 1012 of the FY2008 Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 4986/P.L. 110-181 of January 28, 2008) made it U.S. policy to construct the major combatant ships of the Navy, including ships like the CG(X), with integrated nuclear power systems, unless the Secretary of Defense submits a notification to Congress that the inclusion of an integrated nuclear power system in a given class of ship is not in the national interest. The Navy studied nuclear power as a design option for the CG(X), but did not announce whether it would prefer to build the CG(X) as a nuclear-powered ship. The Navy's FY2011 budget proposed canceling the CG(X) program and instead building an improved version of the conventionally powered Arleigh Burke (DDG-51) class Aegis destroyer. The cancellation of the CG(X) program would appear to leave no near-term shipbuilding program opportunities for expanding the application of nuclear power to Navy surface ships other than aircraft carriers. A 2006 Navy study on the potential for applying nuclear-power to Navy surface ships other than aircraft carriers concluded the following, among other things: In constant FY2007 dollars, building a Navy surface combatant or amphibious ship with nuclear power rather than conventional power would add roughly $600 million to $800 million to its procurement cost. The total life-cycle cost of a nuclear-powered medium-size surface combatant would equal that of a conventionally powered medium-size surface combatant if the cost of crude oil averages $70 per barrel to $225 per barrel over the life of the ship. Nuclear-power should be considered for near-term applications for medium-size surface combatants. Compared to conventionally powered ships, nuclear-powered ships have advantages in terms of both time needed to surge to a distant theater of operation for a contingency, and in terms of operational presence (time on station) in the theater of operation.

crs_R40897

crs_R40897_0

Congressional Information Distribution Practices in Transition Periodically, concerns have been raised about the number and variety of products created to document congressional activity. Other concerns focus on the process for authorizing and distributing printed government documents to Members of Congress, congressional committees, and other officials in the House and Senate. In the field of information management, however, they reflect broader issues related to the manner in which government and private information is created, assembled, distributed, and preserved. Since its establishment in 1861, and until the emergence and integration of digital dissemination, the Government Printing Office (GPO) has compiled, formatted, printed, bound, and distributed documents that recorded the activities of Congress (and the work of other governmental entities) through a series of labor- and resource-intensive steps. As a consequence of electronic production and dissemination, some congressional materials are more readily available to wider congressional, governmental, and public audiences than when they were produced and distributed only in paper form. In light of these changes, some have argued that eliminating paper versions of some congressional documents, and relying instead on electronic versions, could result in further cost and resource savings, and might provide environmental benefits. At the same time, however, current law regarding document production, authentication, and preservation, as well as some user demand, require a number of paper-based documents to be produced and distributed as part of the official record of congressional proceedings. As a result of requirements for both electronic and paper-based versions of congressional documents, GPO oversees an information distribution process that produces and distributes most of the congressional information for which it is responsible in both electronic and printed forms. This process provides the necessary information and appropriate formats for Congress to carry out and document its activities, but it may also result in some unwanted printed copies of congressional documents being delivered to congressional users who prefer to access those resources electronically. More broadly, the transition to electronic distribution of materials may raise questions about the capacity of congressional authorities to effectively oversee GPO's management and distribution responsibilities regarding congressional information under current law and congressional practices. This report provides an overview and analysis of issues related to the processing and distribution of congressional information by the Government Printing Office (GPO). Subsequent sections address several issues, including funding congressional printing, printing authorizations, current printing practices, and options for Congress. Finally, the report provides congressional printing appropriations, production, and distribution data in a number of tables. Legislation in the 112th Congress H.R. 292 , the Stop the OverPrinting (STOP) Act. H.R. H.R. 1626 , the Prevent the Reckless, Irresponsible, Needless Typography (PRINT) Act of 2011. S. 210 On January 26, 2011, Senator Tom Coburn introduced S. 210 , the Stop the OverPrinting (STOP) Act. S. 674 On March 30, 2011, Senator Coburn introduced S. 674 , the Congressional Record Printing Savings Act of 2011.

Periodically, concerns have been raised about the number and variety of products created to document congressional activity. Other concerns focus on the process for authorizing and distributing printed government documents to Members of Congress, committees, and other officials in the House and Senate. These concerns reflect broader issues related to the manner in which government and private information is created, assembled, distributed, and preserved in light of the emergence of electronic publishing and distribution. In the 112th Congress, H.R. 292, the Stop the OverPrinting (STOP) Act, was introduced on January 12, 2011. The House passed the measure on January 18, 2011. In addition to H.R. 292, three other measures regarding congressional printing have been introduced, including H.R. 1626, the Prevent the Reckless, Irresponsible, Needless Typography (PRINT) Act of 2011; S. 210, the Stop the OverPrinting (STOP) Act; and S. 674, the Congressional Record Printing Savings Act of 2011. From its establishment in 1861, the Government Printing Office (GPO) has compiled, formatted, printed, bound, and distributed documents that have recorded the activities of Congress (and the work of other governmental entities). In current practice, approximately 97% of all government documents originate in digital form, and are distributed electronically, but are not printed. As a consequence of electronic production and dissemination, some congressional materials are now more readily available to wider congressional, governmental, and public audiences than when they were only produced and distributed in paper form. Some have argued that eliminating paper versions of some congressional documents, and relying instead on electronic versions, could result in further cost and resource savings and might provide environmental benefits. At the same time, however, current law regarding document production, authentication, and preservation, as well as some user demand, require a number of paper-based documents to be produced and distributed as part of the official record of congressional proceedings. As a result of requirements for both electronic and paper-based versions of congressional documents, GPO oversees an information distribution process that produces and distributes most of the congressional information for which it is responsible in both electronic and printed forms. This process provides the necessary information and appropriate formats for Congress to carry out and document its activities, but it may also result in some unwanted printed copies of congressional documents being delivered to congressional users who prefer to access those resources electronically. More broadly, the transition to electronic distribution of materials may raise questions about the capacity of current law and congressional practices to effectively oversee GPO's management and distribution responsibilities regarding congressional information. This report, which will be updated as events warrant, provides an overview and analysis of issues related to the processing and distribution of congressional information by the Government Printing Office. Subsequent sections address several issues, including funding congressional printing, printing authorizations, current printing practices, and options for Congress. Finally, the report provides congressional printing data in a number of tables.

crs_RL30243

crs_RL30243_0

On the national level the Federal Flag Code provides uniform guidelines for the display of and respect shown to the flag. In the 105 th Congress, the Flag Code was removed from title 36 of the United States Code and re-codified as part of title 4. Display and Use of Flag by Civilians; Codification of Rules and Customs; Definition The following codification of existing rules and customs pertaining to the display and use of the flag of the United States of America is established for the use of such civilians or civilian groups or organizations as may not be required to conform with regulations promulgated by one or more executive departments of the Government of the United States. National Anthem (a) Designation.—The composition consisting of the words and music known as the Star-Spangled Banner is the national anthem. Frequently Asked Questions on Flag Display, Use, and Associated Matters Pledge of Allegiance The Pledge of Allegiance is set forth in 4 U.S.C. Flying the Flag at Half-Staff The Flag Code sets out detailed instructions on flying the flag at half-staff on Memorial Day and as a mark of respect to the memory of certain recently deceased public officials. Display of United States Flag with Flags of Other Nations or of States The Flag Code sets out rules for position and manner of display of the flag in 4 U.S.C. Restrictions on Size and Proportions of the Flag Questions on size and dimensions usually arise in the context of the display of huge flags.

This report presents, verbatim, the United States "Flag Code" as found in Title 4 of the United States Code and the section of Title 36 which designates the Star-Spangled Banner as the national anthem and provides instructions on how to display the flag during its rendition. The "Flag Code" includes instruction and rules on such topics as the pledge of allegiance, display and use of the flag by civilians, time and occasions for display, position and manner of display, and how to show respect for the flag. The "Code" also grants to the President the authority to modify the rules governing the flag. The report also addresses several of the frequently asked questions concerning the flag. The subject matter of these questions includes the pledge of allegiance and the court decisions concerning it, the nature of the codifications of customs concerning the flag in the "Flag Code," display of the flag 24 hours a day, flying the flag in bad weather, flying the flag at half-staff, ornaments on the flag, destruction of worn flags, display of the U.S. flag with flags of other nations or of states, commercial use of the flag, size and proportion of the flag, restrictions upon display of the flag by real estate associations, and the country of origin of flags used on the caskets of veterans.

crs_R44714

crs_R44714_0

Efforts by the Obama Administration to normalize relations with Cuba following President Obama's December 2014 announcement of a major policy shift toward that country focused increased attention on migration issues, leading some policymakers to reexamine the policies on immigration and federal assistance that apply to Cuban migrants. The November 2016 death of Cuba's Fidel Castro may spur a broader reexamination of these policies. Cuban Migration Policy "Normal" immigration from Cuba to the United States has not existed since the Cuban Revolution of 1959 brought Fidel Castro to power. For more than 50 years, the majority of Cubans who have entered the United States have done so through special humanitarian provisions of federal law. Key Legislation and International Agreements U.S. policy on Cuban migration has been shaped by a 1966 law, as amended, and migration agreements between the United States and Cuba, operating in conjunction with the INA. Cuban Adjustment Act of 1966 The 1966 law commonly known as the Cuban Adjustment Act (CAA), as amended, enables Cubans who have been present in the United States for at least one year to adjust to lawful permanent resident status (becoming lawful permanent residents (LPRs) of the United States) provided they are eligible to receive an immigrant visa and are admissible to the United States for permanent residence. The CAA concerns Cubans who are already present in the United States and, as such, is distinct from U.S. policy on Cuban migrants attempting to reach the United States (see " Migration Agreements of 1994 and 1995 " and " Wet Foot/Dry Foot Policy "). "Wet foot" refers to Cubans who do not reach the U.S. shore. They are returned to Cuba unless they cite a well-founded fear of persecution, in which case they are considered for resettlement in third countries. "Dry foot" is a reference to Cubans who successfully reach the U.S. shore, are inspected by Department of Homeland Security (DHS) officers, and generally are permitted to stay in the United States. Cuban asylum seekers, like those of all nationalities, can apply for asylum from within the United States or at a U.S. port of entry, or they can be considered for refugee status abroad. Persons granted asylum or admitted to the United States as refugees can apply for LPR status after one year. Among the other pathways to permanent residence, U.S. citizens and LPRs can petition for eligible family members in Cuba to become LPRs through the U.S. family-based immigration system. Section 501(e) of the law defined the term "Cuban and Haitian entrant," which had been used by the Carter Administration to describe Mariel arrivals, for purposes of eligibility for federal assistance: (1) any individual granted parole status as a Cuban/Haitian Entrant (Status Pending) or granted any other special status subsequently established under the immigration laws for nationals of Cuba or Haiti, regardless of the status of the individual at the time assistance or services are provided; and (2) any other national of Cuba or Haiti— (A) who—(i) was paroled into the United States and has not acquired any other status under the Immigration and Nationality Act; (ii) is the subject of removal proceedings under the Immigration and Nationality Act; or (iii) has an application for asylum pending with the Immigration and Naturalization Service; and (B) with respect to whom a final, nonappealable, and legally enforceable order of removalhas not been entered. Another law, the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) of 1996, as amended, made Cuban and Haitian entrants eligible for certain federal public benefits to the same extent as refugees. Policy Proposals Steps taken by the Obama Administration to date to normalize relations with Cuba have not changed U.S. policy toward Cuban migrants. However, these efforts have raised questions about the potential for changed policies in the future through either executive or congressional action. Other legislation was introduced in the 114 th Congress that would eliminate the special treatment that Cuban entrants receive with respect to federal refugee resettlement assistance and other federal assistance.

The Obama Administration's efforts to normalize relations with Cuba focused attention on U.S. policies on immigration and federal assistance that apply to Cuban migrants in the United States—a set of policies that afford Cuban nationals unique immigration privileges. The November 2016 death of Cuba's Fidel Castro may lead to further consideration of these issues. "Normal" immigration from Cuba to the United States has not existed since the Cuban Revolution of 1959 brought Fidel Castro to power. For more than 50 years, the majority of Cubans who have entered the United States have done so through special humanitarian provisions of federal law. U.S. policy on Cuban migration has been shaped by a 1966 law known as the Cuban Adjustment Act, as amended, and U.S.-Cuban migration agreements signed in the mid-1990s, operating in conjunction with the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). Among the special immigration policies presently in place is a so-called "wet foot/dry foot" policy toward Cuban migrants who try to reach the U.S. shore by sea. "Wet foot" refers to Cubans who do not reach the United States. They are returned to Cuba unless they cite a well-founded fear of persecution, in which case, they are considered for resettlement in third countries. "Dry foot" is a reference to Cubans who successfully reach the U.S. shore and are generally permitted to stay in the country. After one year, these individuals can apply to become U.S. lawful permanent residents (LPRs) under the Cuban Adjustment Act. In addition to entering the United States under special policies and becoming LPRs through the Cuban Adjustment Act, Cubans can gain permanent admission to the United States through certain standard immigration pathways set forth in the INA. They can be sponsored for U.S. permanent residence by eligible U.S.-based relatives who are U.S. citizens or LPRs through the U.S. family-based immigration system. They can also apply for asylum from within the United States or at a U.S. port of entry, or they can be considered for refugee status abroad. Persons granted asylum or admitted to the United States as refugees can apply for LPR status after one year. Special provisions of law also make Cuban migrants in the United States eligible for federal assistance. The Refugee Education Assistance Act of 1980 defines the term "Cuban and Haitian entrant" for purposes of eligibility for federal assistance. It makes these entrants eligible for the same resettlement assistance as refugees. The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) of 1996, as amended, makes Cuban and Haitian entrants eligible for certain federal public benefits to the same extent as refugees. The steps taken by the Obama Administration to normalize relations with Cuba have raised questions about the possibility of future changes to U.S. policy toward Cuban migrants through either executive or congressional action. Regarding the latter, legislation was introduced in the 114th Congress to repeal the Cuban Adjustment Act and eliminate the special treatment that Cuban entrants receive with respect to federal refugee resettlement assistance and other federal assistance. It remains to be seen whether Congress will act on any such measures. For an overview of current issues in U.S.-Cuban relations, see CRS Report R43926, Cuba: Issues for the 114th Congress.

crs_R43086

crs_R43086_0

The President's budget sought $142.773 billion for R&D in FY2014, a 1.3% increase (0.7% CAGR) over the actual FY2012 R&D funding level of $140.912 billion. Among its provisions, the R&D funding in the President's proposed FY2014 budget maintained an emphasis on increasing support for the physical sciences and engineering, an effort consistent with the intent of the America COMPETES Act ( P.L. These acts sought to achieve this objective by authorizing increased funding for accounts at three agencies with a strong R&D emphasis in these disciplines: the Department of Energy Office of Science, the National Science Foundation, and the Department of Commerce National Institute of Standards and Technology's core laboratory research and R&D facilities construction funding (collectively referred to as the "targeted accounts"). Analysis of federal R&D funding is complicated by several factors, such as inconsistency among agencies in the reporting of R&D and the inclusion of R&D in accounts with non-R&D activities. Under President Obama's FY2014 budget request, seven federal agencies would have received 95.3% of total federal R&D funding: Department of Defense (DOD), 47.8%; Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) (primarily the National Institutes of Health), 22.4%; Department of Energy (DOE), 8.9%; National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), 8.1%; National Science Foundation (NSF), 4.3%; Department of Commerce (DOC), 1.9%; and Department of Agriculture (USDA), 1.8%. The President's request for FY2014 included $73.2 billion in defense-related R&D funding, or about 51.2% of the total R&D request. Moreover, aggregate FY2012 funding for the targeted accounts was approximately $12.529 billion, $1.631 billion less than authorized in the act, setting a pace to double over 17 years from the FY2006 level—more than twice the length of time originally envisioned in the 2007 America COMPETES Act and more than half longer than the doubling period established by the America COMPETES Reauthorization Act of 2010. 113-76 provides $12.950 billion in FY2014 funding for these accounts, an amount that sets a doubling pace of more than 20 years. In his FY2010 Plan for Science and Innovation, President Obama stated that he, like President Bush, would seek to double funding for basic research over 10 years (FY2006 to FY2016) at the ACI agencies. The President is requesting $1.704 billion for the NNI in FY2014, a reduction of $159 million (8.6%) from the FY2012 actual level of $1.863 billion. President Obama has requested $3.968 billion in FY2014 for the Networking and Information Technology Research and Development (NITRD) program. President Obama has proposed $2.652 billion for the U.S. National Network for Manufacturing Innovation The President's FY2014 budget once again proposes the establishment of a National Network for Manufacturing Innovation (NNMI) to promote the development of manufacturing technologies with broad applications. 113-76 ) states that "The agreement does not address the administration's proposal for National Network of Manufacturing Institutes (NNMI) because the NNMI legislative proposal has not been considered or approved by the Congress." Congress completed action on the FY2014 regular appropriations bills with enactment of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2014 ( P.L. The act contains the 12 regular appropriations bills that fund all federal departments and agencies and provide funding for most research and development (R&D) supported by the federal government. Prior to enactment of P.L. 113-76 , FY2014 funding was provided by two continuing resolutions ( P.L. 113-6 ). The FY2014 NSF budget request also included funding for three multi-agency initiatives: National Nanotechnology Initiative (NNI, $430.9 million), Networking and Information Technology Research and Development (NITRD, $1.227 billion), and U.S. Global Change Research Program (USGCRP, $326.4 million). 113-76 , two continuing resolutions ( P.L. 113-46 and P.L. In January 2014, DOI provided detailed information to CRS on R&D funding levels proposed by the President for each of its agencies and for broad program areas as well as for agencies' allocations of FY2014 appropriations to R&D; these data were used for much of the analysis in this section. 113-46 and P.L. For these cases, funding levels will be included in future updates of this report as the information becomes available.

Congress completed action on the FY2014 regular appropriations bills with enactment of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2014 (P.L. 113-76), in January 2014. The act contains the 12 regular appropriations bills that fund federal departments and agencies and provide funding for most research and development (R&D) supported by the federal government. Prior to enactment of P.L. 113-76, FY2014 funding was provided by two continuing resolutions (P.L. 113-46 and P.L. 113-73). Where possible, CRS has identified and included in this report R&D funding in P.L. 113-76 for agencies and programs. For accounts that include funding for both R&D and non-R&D activities, CRS generally relies on agency reporting of how much is spent on R&D activities. This report will be updated as agencies make this information available. President Obama's budget request for FY2014 included $142.773 billion for research and development (R&D), a $1.861 billion (1.3%) increase from the FY2012 actual funding level of $140.912 billion. Both historically and in the President's request, funding for R&D has been highly concentrated in a few departments. Under President Obama's request, seven federal agencies would have received 95.3% of total federal R&D funding, with the Department of Defense (47.8%) and the Department of Health and Human Services (22.4%, primarily for the National Institutes of Health) alone accounting for more than 70% of total federal R&D funding. Among the largest changes proposed in the President's request, the R&D budget of the Department of Defense would have fallen by $4.625 billion (6.3%) from its FY2012 level, while R&D funding for the Department of Commerce's National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) would have increased by $1.428 billion. The NIST growth was attributable to proposed increases in funding for its core research laboratories and the establishment of a National Network for Manufacturing Innovation (NNMI) with $1 billion in mandatory funding. As envisioned, the NNMI would seek to promote the development of manufacturing technologies with broad applications. P.L. 113-76 does not address the Administration's proposal for National Network of Manufacturing Institutes (NNMI). President Obama requested increases in the R&D budgets of NIST, the National Science Foundation, and the Department of Energy's Office of Science. These accounts were targeted for doubling over 7 years, from their FY2006 levels, by the America COMPETES Act, and over 10 years by the America COMPETES Reauthorization Act of 2010. The FY2014 request broke with President Obama's earlier budgets, which explicitly stated the goal of doubling funding for these accounts over their FY2006 aggregate level. Instead the Office of Science and Technology Policy asserted that the FY2014 request "maintains the President's commitment to increase funding for research at these three science agencies." The President's FY2014 request set a pace that would have resulted in doubling of the FY2006 level over a period of more than 17 years. FY2014 funding for these accounts provided by P.L. 113-6 sets a doubling pace of more than 20 years. The President's request continued support for three multi-agency R&D initiatives in FY2014, proposing $1.704 billion for the National Nanotechnology Initiative, a reduction of $159 million (8.6%) over FY2012, due primarily to reductions in NNI funding at DOD and NSF; $3.968 billion for the Networking and Information Technology Research and Development program, an increase of $159 million (4.2%) over FY2012; and $2.652 billion for the U.S. Global Change Research Program, an increase of $151 million (6.0%) over FY2012. In recent years, Congress has used a variety of mechanisms to complete the annual appropriations process after the start of the fiscal year. This may affect agencies' execution of their R&D budgets, including delaying or canceling some planned R&D and equipment acquisition.

crs_R44212

crs_R44212_0

Of the Central European and Baltic countries that have joined the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU), Poland is by far the most populous country, the largest economy, and the most significant military actor. The activities of the U.S. Congress frequently involve issues that have a European dimension, including economic, security, and diplomatic issues. Domestic Overview Political Dynamics The government of Poland is led by Prime Minister Beata Szydlo of the conservative Law and Justice Party (PiS). Szydlo took over as prime minister following the Law and Justice victory in the October 2015 parliamentary election. With Law and Justice winning 235 out of the 460 seats in the Sejm (lower house of parliament), the result was the first time since the end of Communist rule in 1989 that a single party secured an absolute parliamentary majority. The Law and Justice Party gained momentum in the May 2015 presidential election, when the party's candidate, Andrzej Duda, unexpectedly defeated the incumbent president, Bronislaw Komorowski of Civic Platform. The president is Poland's head of state and exercises a number of limited but important functions, including making formal appointments and overseeing the country's executive authority, influencing legislation, representing the state in international affairs, and acting as commander-in-chief of the armed forces. The 43-year old Duda formally took office as the new president of Poland in August 2015. Poland continues to use the złoty (PLN) as its national currency, and the Eurozone debt crisis that began in Greece in 2009 has dampened Polish enthusiasm for adopting the euro (19 of the 28 EU member countries use the euro as their common currency and are collectively referred to as the Eurozone). Over the period 2013 to 2022, plans call for the country to spend approximately $35 billion on military modernization. Numerous elements of Poland's military equipment modernization plans are of interest and relevance to U.S. defense planners and U.S defense industry. Response to the Migration Crisis20 In September 2015, the Civic Platform-led government voted to approve a European Commission plan to resettle 120,000 migrants currently in Greece and Italy to the other EU member states. Following the terrorist attacks in Paris in November 2015, the incoming Law and Justice Minister for European Affairs released a statement relating that the new government did not see the political possibility of respecting the EU plan. The United States strongly supported Poland's accession to NATO in 1999. Warsaw has been an ally in global counterterrorism efforts and contributed large deployments of troops to both the U.S.-led coalition in Iraq and the NATO-led mission in Afghanistan. While relations between Poland and the United States are largely positive, in recent years some Poles have expressed disappointment about unfulfilled expectations for significantly increased military assistance and a changed policy on short-term visas for Polish citizens. In addition to efforts by Members of Congress, the U.S. Administration has indicated that it has expressed its concerns over the recent developments related to the rule of law in Poland to its counterparts in Warsaw. Defense Relations While Poland has been a leading participant in NATO's "out of area" Afghanistan mission, it has also, given its enduring perception of Russia as a threat, been a leading voice in calls for NATO to focus on its traditional vocation as an alliance of territorial defense. Under the Obama Administration's European Reassurance Initiative (ERI) and the Readiness Action Plan announced at NATO's September 2014 summit in Wales, the United States and NATO have bolstered security in the region with an augmented force presence that is rotational rather than permanent, as well as increased exercises and pre-positioning of tanks and other military equipment. Trade between the United States and Poland has increased significantly over the past decade. U.S. imports from Poland represent a wide range of items, including heavy machinery, chemicals, and agricultural products. Visa Waiver Program Many Polish officials and citizens continue to express disappointment that the United States has not made Poland a Visa Waiver Program (VWP) country. Relations with Russia Historically, Poland has had a difficult relationship with Russia. Poland has been one of the countries most affected by Russian retaliatory sanctions. Because Poland continues to rely on coal for approximately 90% of its electricity generation, however, Russian gas accounts for less than 10% of Poland's primary energy supply. Poland has also been taking steps such as expanding pipeline interconnectivity with its neighbors and developing the ability to reverse the flow of gas in the Polish section of the Yamal pipeline, which runs from Russia to Germany via Belarus and Poland, in order to import natural gas from the West in the case of a crisis such as a cut-off of Russian gas. The Polish government has been a leading advocate for a stronger EU energy policy that reduces collective dependence on Russia. Many U.S. officials and Members of Congress have regarded European energy security as a U.S. interest.

Over the past 25 years, the relationship between the United States and Poland has been close and cooperative. The United States strongly supported Poland's accession to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1999 and backed its entry into the European Union (EU) in 2004. In recent years, Poland has made significant contributions to U.S.- and NATO-led military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, and Poland and the United States continue working together on issues such as democracy promotion, counterterrorism, and improving NATO capabilities. Given its role as a close U.S. ally and partner, developments in Poland and its relations with the United States are of continuing interest to the U.S. Congress. This report provides an overview and assessment of some of the main dimensions of these topics. Domestic Political and Economic Issues The Polish parliamentary election held on October 25, 2015, resulted in a victory for the conservative Law and Justice Party. Law and Justice won an absolute majority of seats in the lower house of parliament (Sejm), and Beata Szydlo took over as the country's new prime minister in November 2015. The center-right Civic Platform party had previously led the government of Poland since 2007. During its first months in office, Law and Justice has made changes to the country's Constitutional Tribunal and media law that have generated concerns about backsliding on democracy and triggered an EU rule-of-law investigation. Law and Justice had earlier gained momentum with the surprising victory of Andrzej Duda in the May 2015 presidential election. The president is Poland's head of state and exercises a number of limited but important functions. Duda was inaugurated as president of Poland in August 2015. Poland was one of the few EU economies to come through the 2008-2009 global economic crisis and the subsequent Eurozone debt crisis without major damage. Although Poland is obligated to adopt the euro as its currency at the earliest possible time, it has not yet set a target date for adoption and continues to use the złoty as its national currency. The Civic Platform-led government voted in September 2015 to approve the EU's relocation plan for 120,000 migrants, agreeing to take in more than 4,000 migrants currently in Greece and Italy. Following the Paris terrorist attacks in November 2015, the new Polish government indicated that it would no longer implement the plan. Defense Modernization Poland has been implementing an Armed Forces Technical Modernization Plan for the years 2013-2022 in which it intends to spend approximately $35 billion on a wide range of military equipment acquisitions and upgrades. Completed and prospective purchases from U.S. suppliers have a large role in this initiative. Poland increased its defense budget in 2015 and 2016. Defense Cooperation Under the Obama Administration's European Reassurance Initiative and the U.S. military's Operation Atlantic Resolve, U.S. forces have expanded their presence in Poland and increased joint training and exercises with their Polish counterparts. Some Polish leaders have expressed a wish for the establishment of permanent bases for NATO and U.S. troops on Polish territory. Visa Waiver Program Although relations between Poland and the United States are largely positive, Poland's exclusion from the U.S. Visa Waiver Program (VWP) has been a sore spot for many years. Some Members of Congress have long advocated extending the VWP to include Poland. Relations with Russia Relations between Poland and Russia have a history of tensions, and Polish leaders have tended to view Russian intentions with wariness and suspicion. Poland has been a leading advocate for forceful EU sanctions against Russia over its 2014 annexation of Crimea and subsequent role in the conflict in eastern Ukraine. Retaliatory Russian sanctions have negatively affected Poland economically, particularly in the agriculture sector. Energy Security Poland has been a leading advocate of European energy integration, promoting initiatives to expand pipeline interconnectivity in order to decrease reliance on Russia. Although Poland imports more than half of its natural gas from Russia, approximately 90% of Poland's electricity is generated by coal, and its overall dependence on energy imports is low.

crs_R41257

crs_R41257_0

In September 2009, the U.N. General Assembly adopted a resolution expressing strong support for the consolidation of four U.N. bodies addressing women's issues into one composite entity. U.N. member states, including the United States, are engaged in ongoing consultations to consider the new entity's mission, functions, governance, and funding. At this time, it is unclear how a new U.N. entity will be structured and whether it will prove effective in addressing global women's issues. This report discusses perceived weaknesses in the current U.N. system gender structure and recent steps taken by governments to address the issue. It examines U.S. policy toward the new entity, including to what extent, if any, the United States will fund the new entity, and the role the United States may play once the entity is established. It also discusses the entity in the context of broader U.N. system-wide reform efforts, its potential impact on the activities of other U.N. agencies, funds, and programs, and the involvement of other actors such as non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in its activities and governance. Existing Gender Structure The following sections briefly summarize the structure and objectives of the four U.N. gender entities that will be consolidated into one composite entity—the U.N. Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM), the Division for the Advancement of Women (DAW), the Office of the Special Adviser on Gender Issues and Advancement of Women (OSAGI), and the International Research and Training Institute for the Advancement of Women (INSTRAW). Many argue that this places UNIFEM at a financial and operational disadvantage, hindering its ability to promote and implement programs that enhance women's equality and empowerment. For example, total voluntary and regular budget contributions for UNIFEM, DAW, OSAGI, and INSTRAW in 2008 were approximately $247 million. The timeline for establishing the new entity is largely dependent on U.N. member states. It is expected that the General Assembly will address the Secretary-General's proposal during its 64 th session, which began in September 2009 and will end in September 2010. Congressional Role and Considerations Members of Congress have generally supported U.N. system activities that address the well-being of women, and may demonstrate an interest in the new gender entity. Members may focus on several issues, including (1) U.S. funding of and participation in the new entity, (2) the relevance of the entity to U.S. foreign policy, and (3) oversight of the entity's efficiency and effectiveness after it is established. Accordingly, they argue that the creation of a new gender entity would be an unnecessary expense for U.N. member states. Priorities and Resources When examining the possible role of the new entity in U.S. foreign policy, Members of Congress may wish to consider the entity's priorities in the context of existing U.S. efforts and priorities to address global women's issues—including violence against women, women's health, and women's political participation. CSW is funded through assessed contributions to the U.N. regular budget.

In recent years, many in the international community have argued for elevating the status of women's issues within the United Nations (U.N.) system. They contend that the way in which the U.N. system addresses gender issues is fragmented, weak, and under-resourced. Moreover, they argue that such efforts lack clear leadership and coordination. These weaknesses, critics maintain, hinder the U.N. system's ability to promote and implement programs that enhance gender equality. In September 2009, U.N. member states, including the United States, adopted a General Assembly resolution expressing strong support for the consolidation of four U.N. bodies addressing women's issues into one composite entity. The four entities selected for consolidation were (1) the U.N. Development Fund for Women, (2) the Division for the Advancement of Women, (3) the Office of the Special Adviser on Gender Issues and Advancement of Women, and (4) the International Research and Training Institute for the Advancement of Women. According to the United Nations, voluntary and U.N. regular budget contributions for these four bodies in calendar year 2008 totaled approximately $247 million. At this time, it is unclear how the new U.N. entity will be structured or whether it will prove effective in addressing global women's issues. U.N. member states are currently negotiating the structure, governance, and funding of the new entity. The timeline for the entity's establishment depends primarily on U.N. member states; many anticipate that the General Assembly could address the issue during its 64th session, which began in September 2009 and will end in September 2010. Members of Congress have generally supported U.N. system efforts to address women's issues and may have an interest in the new entity. Areas of congressional focus could include (1) U.S. financial contributions to and participation in the new entity, (2) the role of the new entity in the context of U.S. foreign policy priorities, and (3) oversight of the efficiency and effectiveness of the entity. This report discusses possible policy issues that may arise as the composite gender entity is established, including its funding mechanisms, the creation of an effective governance structure, the entity's possible impact on U.N. system in-country operational capacity, and the relationships and coordination between the entity and other U.N. system bodies. The report also discusses the entity in the context of broader U.N. reform efforts and examines the involvement of non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Finally, it analyzes U.S. policy toward the new entity, including its possible role in U.S. foreign policy and the level and extent of U.S. financial contributions to existing U.N. system gender entities. This report will be updated as events warrant.

crs_R43649

crs_R43649_0

Groundwater levels in many areas of the state also have declined due to increased pumping over the last three dry years. Current drought conditions in California and much of the West have fueled congressional interest in drought and its effects on water supplies, agriculture, and ecosystems. Several bills have been introduced in the 113 th Congress to address different aspects of drought in California and other regions. This report summarizes these two bills, discusses similarities and differences between the bills, and analyzes how these bills could address issues and questions associated with the drought in California. Central to addressing the drought from a federal and state perspective is the coordinated operation of the federal Central Valley Project (CVP) and the State Water Project (SWP). They also divert water from the San Joaquin and Sacramento rivers delta confluence with San Francisco Bay (Bay-Delta) and pump water south to water users in central and southern California. It passed the House on February 5, 2014. Specifically, it would amend CVPIA to broaden the purposes for which water previously dedicated to fish and wildlife can be used; add to the purposes a provision "to ensure" water dedicated to fish and wildlife purposes is replaced and provided to CVP contactors by the end of 2018 at the lowest "reasonably achievable" cost; change the definitions of fish covered by the act; broaden the purposes for which the Central Valley Project Restoration Fund (CVPRF) monies can be used; reduce revenues into the CVPRF; mandate operation of CVP and SWP according to a1994 interim agreement, the Bay-Delta Accord; and mandate development and implementation of a plan to increase CVP water yield by October 1, 2018. Bay-Delta Watershed Water Rights Preservation and Protection . 3964 and S. 2198 have few similarities in their specific approaches to addressing drought conditions in California; however, to different degrees, they both aim to provide more water for users that receive water from the CVP and SWP. The primary thematic similarity among the bills is to authorize or direct activities to increase water supplies for users, while, in some cases, decreasing or meeting the minimum water needs of the environment (e.g., fish and wildlife, and water quality). The duration of these changes varies. In some cases, they would be authorized only in times of a declared drought or decreased water supplies, and in other cases, these activities would be authorized permanently under all conditions. It is not clear for example how or when agencies would determine the effects of providing "maximum water supplies" on species viability and water quality. 3964 and S. 2198 While the two bills take significantly different approaches to increasing the reliability of water supply during dry years, some similar issue areas and provisions in the bills lend themselves to comparison. Selected Differences Between H.R. The differences hinge on the fundamental approach the bills take towards providing and allocating water supplies for users. S. 2198 generally provides authority to approve projects and actions to maximize water supplies for users within existing laws and regulations; whereas H.R. 3964 would amend existing laws that in some cases would preempt state and federal law to re-allocate water supplies and achieve its objectives. Potential Issues for Congress Drought conditions in California and proposed state and federal solutions to address them under H.R. The objective of both bills is to increase water deliveries and reliability for users; in particular water users south of the Delta. This would set maximum restrictions on water exports from the Delta depending on the time of year and guarantee a reliable supply of water for certain stakeholders, among other things. 3964 , lower water supplies for fish and the ecosystem could have short and long term environmental consequences, although the extent of these consequences is currently unknown. What are other long-term ramifications of each bill?

California is experiencing serious water shortages due to widespread drought. Even though much of the state is served by two large water infrastructure projects that store water for future use—the federal Central Valley Project (CVP) and the State Water Project (SWP)—both projects have had to reduce water deliveries to the farmers and communities that they serve. Many water users have received no water from the CVP and SWP this year and are supplementing surface water supplies with groundwater. Some water basins are experiencing overdraft of local aquifers (i.e., extracting of more ground water than will be replenished over time). The dry hydrological conditions, in combination with regulatory restrictions on water being pumped from the Sacramento and San Joaquin Rivers Delta confluence with San Francisco Bay (Bay-Delta) to protect water quality and fish and wildlife, have resulted in historic water supply cutbacks for senior water rights users in some areas. The effects are widespread and are being felt by many economic sectors. The extent and severity of the drought is also taking its toll on fish and wildlife resources and has increased concern for wildfires. California also experienced severe water supply shortages during a three-year drought, which lasted from 2008 – 2010 and during a five-year drought from 1987 to 1992. Several bills have been introduced in the 113th Congress to address California water supply and drought in particular. This report discusses the similarities and differences between two bills that have been passed by their respective chambers: H.R. 3964, which passed the House on February 5, 2014; and S. 2198, which passed the Senate on May 22, 2014. H.R. 3964 and S. 2198 have few similarities in their specific approaches to addressing drought conditions in California; however, to different degrees, they both aim to provide more water for users that receive water from the CVP and SWP. The primary thematic similarity shared between the bills is to authorize or direct activities that would attempt to increase water supplies for users while, in some cases, decreasing or meeting the minimum water needs of the environment (e.g., fish and wildlife, and water quality). The duration of the authorization for these activities varies under each bill. In some cases, activities aimed to increase water supplies are authorized in times of a declared drought or decreased water supplies, and in other cases, these activities are authorized permanently without conditions. The differences between the bills hinge on the approach the bills take towards allocating water supplies for users. S. 2198 would authorize the approval of projects and actions to maximize water supplies for users within existing laws and regulations; whereas H.R. 3964 would amend laws, and in some cases, pre-empt state and federal law to re-allocate water supplies and achieve its objectives. A short-term issue for Congress is how to address the drought, and in particular, demands for more water from the CVP and SWP without jeopardizing the continued existence of several fish species, degrading water quality, or overriding state water rights allocations. A long-term issue for Congress is how to improve the supply and reliability of federal water deliveries and stabilize, and potentially restore, the aquatic ecosystems upon which water and power users and diverse economies depend upon. Efforts to address the long-term water and environmental needs of the state have been focused, in part, on the Bay Delta Conservation Plan (BDCP). However, the BDCP is controversial and if approved is expected to take years, if not decades, to implement. In the meantime, questions continue to be raised about annual Bay-Delta pumping levels and their adequacy in providing water supply to state and federal contractors and their effects on fish and wildlife, particularly on threatened and endangered species.

crs_R42152

crs_R42152_0

In 2009, Congress passed legislation that modified DOE's loan guarantee authority and created a temporary loan guarantee program for the deployment of clean energy technologies and the development of clean energy projects. In 2011, the high-profile bankruptcy, and subsequent loan default, of Solyndra resulted in a congressional investigation and subjected DOE's loan guarantee program to a high degree of scrutiny. This report provides analysis of goals for and concerns about the use of loan guarantees as a mechanism to support the deployment of innovative clean energy technologies. The Energy Policy Act of 2005 and the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 resulted in the creation of DOE's Loan Programs Office (LPO), which was chartered to administer clean energy loan guarantee initiatives. 2. 3. Goals for Clean Energy Loan Guarantees One primary objective for providing federal loan guarantees for clean energy technologies and projects is to provide access to low cost financial capital that might not otherwise be available due to certain technology and market risks. However, the focus of this report is on system scale-up and commercial deployment due to the high-risk nature of these activities and the large amounts of capital required. By providing a source of low-cost capital for these development stages, loan guarantees could support the commercialization of new and innovative renewable energy technologies. Positioning U.S. Manufacturing for an Emerging Global Market Global renewable energy use is expected to grow. Concerns About Loan Guarantees for Innovative Energy Technologies While there are a number of goals and potential benefits associated with federal loan guarantees for innovative clean energy technologies and projects, there are also multiple concerns about loan guarantees as an incentive mechanism for clean energy. The significant cash flow demands during this stage of a company's development could result in a high risk of loan default. Solyndra, which received a loan guarantee for a manufacturing facility, might be considered an example of a new technology deployment project with high cash flow demands. As a result, risk of loss to the Section 1705 Loan Guarantee Program is effectively reduced, yet the federal government is assuming all risks associated with loan defaults under the program. Innovation is occurring in the energy marketplace through venture capital investments in new energy technologies and federal government energy innovation programs. As a result, technologies that may be commercially viable today could become outdated in less than a decade. However, government-managed loan guarantee efforts may be subject to certain pressures that might not be experienced by commercial banks. For example, Section 1705 was a temporary program, and loan guarantee authority under Section 1705 ended on September 30, 2011. Policy Options Should Congress decide to debate the use of loan guarantees, or other government financial tools, as a clean energy deployment support mechanism, several policy options might be explored as a means to achieve clean energy policy objectives. Grants or Tax Expenditures Instead of Loan Guarantees Grants for innovative clean energy technologies are a policy tool that could be used to incentivize commercialization and deployment of such technologies. A portfolio management approach, along with financial tools such as warrants, may serve to reduce the overall financial risk of loan guarantee programs. Clean Energy Financial Support Authority Should Congress decide to continue supporting development and deployment of clean energy technologies, creating an organization to manage various forms of federal financial support for such endeavors may be a policy option to consider.

Government guaranteed debt is a financial tool that has been used to support a number of federal policy objectives: home ownership, higher education, and small business development, among others. Loan guarantees for new energy technologies date back to the mid-1970s, when rapidly rising energy prices motivated the development of alternative, and renewable, sources of energy. Recently, the Energy Policy Act of 2005 created a loan guarantee program for innovative clean energy technologies (nuclear, clean coal, renewables) commonly known as Section 1703. The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 created Section 1705, a temporary loan guarantee program focused on deployment of renewable energy technologies and projects. Loan guarantee authority for the Department of Energy Loan Programs Office (LPO) Section 1705 program ended on September 30, 2011, prior to which approximately $16.15 billion of loans were guaranteed for a variety of clean energy projects. In August 2011, the high-profile bankruptcy of Solyndra, the first company to receive a Section 1705 loan guarantee, resulted in a congressional investigation and increased scrutiny of the DOE Loan Guarantee Program. As a result, Congress may decide to evaluate the use of loan guarantees as a mechanism for supporting the development and deployment of clean energy technologies. This report analyzes goals and concerns associated with innovative clean energy loan guarantees. Fundamentally, loan guarantees can provide access to low-cost capital for projects that might be considered high risk by the commercial banking and investment community. There are many goals for using loan guarantees to support innovative energy technology commercialization and deployment. Commercializing new technologies that may increase the performance and reduce the cost of clean energy generation is one objective. Also, the potential global market for clean energy technologies and systems is substantial (trillions of dollars over the next 25 years by some estimates) and loan guarantees could help position U.S. manufacturers to supply product for this growing market. Loan guarantees may also result in near- and long-term job creation as well as contribute toward reducing emissions of various pollutants. The high-risk nature of clean energy projects, however, raises some concerns about the use of loan guarantees as a mechanism to encourage the deployment of new technologies. First, loan repayment demands cash flow from development stage companies at a time when they may already have high cash flow requirements, so loan repayment obligations could actually increase the risk of default for certain projects. Second, at a project level, the government's potential return is not commensurate with the risk being assumed. Third, loan guarantees for clean energy technologies are essentially long-term commitments in a dynamic and evolving marketplace. As a result, technologies supported today could be obsolete in less than a decade, thereby increasing the risk of loan default. Finally, federally managed loan guarantee programs may be subject to certain pressures that could result in less-than-optimal decision making. Should Congress decide to continue the use of government financial tools as a clean energy technology deployment support mechanism, it may wish to consider various policy options for future initiatives. Some policy options could include (1) using grants or tax expenditures instead of loan guarantees; (2) taking equity positions in new technologies and projects through a new government-backed venture-capital-like organization; (3) authorizing the use of flexible management tools such as stock warrants, portfolio management, and convertible equity; and (4) creating a dedicated clean energy financial support authority to manage federal clean energy deployment investments. Each of these policy options is explored and discussed in this report.

crs_R43836

crs_R43836_0

With the increase in the use of horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracturing to extract oil and gas from shale, and the concomitant increase in the amount of fluids that are injected for high-volume hydraulic fracturing and for disposal, there are several indications of a link between the injected fluids and unusual seismic activity. However, the precise relationships between earthquake activity and the timing of injection, the amount and rate of fluid injected, and other factors are still not well understood, although a better understanding of these complex relationships appears to be emerging. Several studies have pointed out that, of the more than 30,000 wastewater disposal wells classified by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) as Class II, only a small fraction appears to be associated with damaging earthquakes. The potential for damaging earthquakes caused by injection of fluids for hydraulic fracturing operations, as opposed to deep-well injection of wastewater from fracking and other oil and natural gas production, appears to be much smaller. The federal Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA) authorizes EPA to regulate underground injection activities to prevent endangerment of underground sources of drinking water. The SDWA does not address seismicity; however, EPA underground injection control (UIC) program regulations include seismicity-related siting and testing requirements for hazardous waste and carbon sequestration injection wells. In February 2015, EPA released a document outlining technical recommendations and best practices for minimizing and managing the impacts of induced seismicity from oil and gas wastewater disposal wells. Deep-Well Injection of Oil and Natural Gas Wastewaters As stated above, the number of earthquakes of M greater than 3.0 in the central and eastern United States has increased dramatically since about 2009 ( Figure 1 ). In the past, Oklahoma has experienced earthquakes large enough to be felt at the surface, including two earthquakes in the range of M 5.0 or greater in 1918 and 1952. Despite the difficulty, and because of the sharp uptick in seismic activity in the central and eastern United States since 2009, on March 28, 2016, the USGS released a one-year seismic hazard forecast for 2016 that includes contributions from both induced and natural earthquakes (revised June 16, 2016). Fracking induces microseismicity, mostly less than M 1.0—too small to feel or cause damage. In some cases, fracking has led to earthquakes larger than M 2.0, including at sites in Oklahoma, Ohio, and England. In western Canada earthquakes larger than M 3.0 have been correlated to fracking. The study indicated that most of the seismic activity in the WCSB since 1985 seems to be associated with oil and gas activity, although only a small portion of fracking operations appear to be linked to seismic activity (0.3% of wells used for hydraulic fracturing). Deep-well injection has long been the environmentally preferred option for managing produced brine and other wastewater associated with oil and gas production. However, the development of unconventional formations using high-volume hydraulic fracturing has contributed significantly to a growing volume of wastewater requiring disposal and has created demand for disposal wells in new locations. Most oil and gas states and some tribes have assumed primacy for Class II wells under this provision. For example, EPA Region III now evaluates induced seismicity risk factors when considering permit applications for Class II wells. The vast majority of Class II disposal wells (and hydraulic fracturing wells) do not appear to be associated with significant seismic events; however, due to the growing volumes injected by these wells and increased seismicity in some disposal areas, an increasing concern in the United States is that injection of these fluids may be responsible for increasing rates of seismic activity. Congress may be interested in oversight of EPA's UIC program or, more broadly, in federally sponsored research on the relationship between energy development activities and induced seismicity. Although only a small fraction of the more than 30,000 U.S. wastewater disposal wells appears to be problematic for causing damaging earthquakes, such incidents may raise questions as to whether other energy-related activity—specifically, underground injection for carbon dioxide sequestration—may present similar risks.

The development of unconventional oil and natural gas resources using horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracturing has created new demand for disposal wells that inject waste fluids into deep geologic formations. Deep-well injection has long been the environmentally preferred method for managing produced brine and other wastewater associated with oil and gas production. However, an increasing concern in the United States is that injection of these fluids may be responsible for increasing rates of seismic activity. The number of earthquakes of magnitude 3.0 or greater in the central and eastern United States, where there are many injection wells, has increased dramatically since about 2009. For example, over 60 earthquakes of magnitudes 4.0 to 4.8 have occurred in central Oklahoma from 2009 to mid-year 2016. Some of these earthquakes may be felt at the surface. The largest earthquake in Oklahoma history (magnitude 5.8) occurred on September 3, 2016, near Pawnee, causing damage to several structures. Central and northern Oklahoma were seismically active regions before the recent increase in the volume of waste fluid injection. However, the sharp uptick in earthquake activity does not seem to be due to typical, random changes in the rate of seismicity, according to several studies. The relationship between earthquake activity and the timing of injection, the amount and rate of waste fluid injected, and other factors are still uncertain and are current research topics. Despite increasing evidence linking some deep-well disposal activities to human-induced earthquakes, only a small fraction of the more than 30,000 U.S. wastewater disposal wells appears to be associated with damaging earthquakes. However, the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) deemed the increase in earthquake hazard in the central United States—likely from deep-well injection—sufficient to release a new one-year seismic hazard forecast for 2016 that includes contributions from both induced and natural earthquakes. The potential for damaging earthquakes caused by hydraulic fracturing, as opposed to deep-well injection of wastewater from oil and gas activities, appears to be much smaller. Hydraulic fracturing intentionally creates fractures in rocks to increase the flow of oil and gas. The technique induces microseismicity, mostly of less than magnitude 1.0—too small to feel or cause damage at the surface. In a few cases, however, hydraulic fracturing has led directly to earthquakes larger than magnitude 2.0, including at sites in Oklahoma, Ohio, and England. In western Canada, earthquakes greater than magnitude 3.0 have been associated with hydraulic fracturing activities, although only from a very small percentage of hydraulic fracturing wells. The Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) Underground Injection Control (UIC) program under the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA) regulates the subsurface injection of fluids to protect underground drinking water sources. EPA has issued regulations for six classes of injection wells, including Class II wells used for oil and gas wastewater disposal and enhanced recovery. Most oil and gas producing states administer the Class II program. Although the SDWA does not address seismicity, EPA rules for certain well classes require evaluation of seismic risk. Such requirements do not apply to Class II wells; however, EPA has developed a framework for evaluating seismic risk when reviewing Class II permit applications in states where EPA administers this program. Although only a small fraction of U.S. wastewater disposal wells appears to be problematic for causing damaging earthquakes, the potential for injection-related earthquakes has raised an array of issues and has affected oil and gas wastewater disposal in some areas. In response to induced seismicity concerns, both EPA and state work groups have issued recommendations for best practices to minimize and manage such risks. Several states have increased regulation and oversight of Class II disposal wells. Congress may be interested in oversight of EPA's UIC program or in federally sponsored research on the relationship between energy development activities and induced seismicity.

crs_R40792

crs_R40792_0

It includes increased funding for food and medical product safety activities and cost-of-living expenses. The subcommittees on Agriculture, Rural Development, Food and Drug Administration, and Related Agencies consider FDA appropriations. 111-279 , on September 30, 2009, concerning H.R. 2997 , the agriculture appropriations bill for FY2010. Bill Language The conference agreement would provide FDA with a total program level of $3.279 billion. The two components of the total are $2.357 in direct appropriations (budget authority) and $922 million in user fees. The total, which includes $235 million in newly authorized user fees to support a new Center for Tobacco Products (and related activities of the agency-wide Office of Regulatory Affairs), would be 22.9% higher than FY2009 appropriations for FDA. Excluding the new tobacco program, to provide a comparison of similar program responsibilities, FY2010 appropriations would be 14.1% higher than FY2009 appropriations. The conference agreement would increase the budget authority to the human drugs program by $7 million and specifies that at least $52 million be made available to the Office of Generic Drugs. Current Status The FDA title of the agriculture appropriations bill as signed by the President on October 21, 2009, provides the agency with the budget authority and the authorized user fees that the President had requested, plus user fees that Congress enacted after the Administration had submitted its request. This total does not include an additional $141 million in user fees that the Administration has proposed and included in its request (concerning generic drugs, food export certification, reinspection, and food inspection and facility registration).

On October 21, 2009, the President signed into law, as P.L. 111-80, an Act making appropriations for Agriculture, Rural Development, Food and Drug Administration, and Related Agencies programs for the fiscal year ending September 30, 2010, and for other purposes. This followed House and Senate agreement to the conference report. The law provides the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) with a program level of $3.28 billion for FY2010, dividing that total authorized spending into $2.36 billion in direct appropriations (which FDA refers to as budget authority) and $922 million in user fees. The total, which includes $235 million in newly authorized user fees to support a new Center for Tobacco Products (and related activities of the agency-wide Office of Regulatory Affairs), is 22.9% higher than FY2009 appropriations for FDA. Excluding the new tobacco program, to provide a comparison of similar program responsibilities, FY2010 appropriations are 14.1% higher than FY2009 appropriations. Congress intends the increase to go toward enhanced food safety and medical product safety activities as well as cost-of-living personnel expenses. Neither the signed legislation nor any of the House- and Senate-considered bills include $141 million in proposed user fees that the Administration included in its request. The proposed fees were intended for generic drug review, food export certification, reinspection, and food inspection and facility registration. The versions of H.R. 2997 passed by the House and the Senate agreed on the appropriations to FDA. The conference agreement increased the appropriation to the human drugs program by $7 million. In its explanatory statement, the conference report includes directions and requests to FDA for studies and reports.

crs_RL32992

crs_RL32992_0

Introduction Many situations have focused congressional attention on the adequacy of the science supporting implementation of the Endangered Species Act (ESA). While most science-based actions under ESA are unchallenged, opponents of some actions under ESA accuse agencies of using "junk science," while others assert that decisions that should rest on science are instead being dictated by political concerns. Legislation to address the use of science in implementing ESA has been introduced in each Congress since the 107 th Congress, but no measures have been enacted. Listings and other actions under the ESA may affect land uses and development. There are multiple examples, such as protecting salmon in the Klamath River Basin or northern spotted owl habitat in the Pacific Northwest, where economic and social disputes have resulted from actions taken to list, protect, and recover species under the ESA. As a result, the protective posture of the ESA and the use of science in its implementation have received renewed attention. The agencies that administer the ESA, the Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) in the Department of the Interior, and the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) in the Department of Commerce, have procedures and policies in place to ensure the objectivity and integrity of the science that underpins agency decisions. At issue has been how science is used in the ESA processes for listing species, consulting on federal actions, designating critical habitat, and developing recovery plans. This report approaches the issues surrounding "sound science" by discussing (1) controversies over the last decade; (2) the role of science in general—what science is, and what it can and cannot do—as background for assessing the adequacy of science in ESA implementation; (3) the role of science in the legal and policy ESA context; (4) current requirements on the quality and use of information and science by FWS and NMFS; and (5) legislation to address concerns relating to ESA science. Over the years, these distinctions have been controversial in several respects. More recently, lumpers have had the upper hand in the scientific community. However, that tide may be changing. This process is the basis of western science. Section 515 of Appendix C of the Treasury and General Government Appropriations Act for FY2001, generally known as the Information Quality Act (IQA) or the Data Quality Act, directs OMB to (1) issue government-wide guidelines to federal agencies to ensure and maximize the quality, objectivity, utility, and integrity of information disseminated by federal agencies; (2) establish a procedure for people to seek corrections of agency information; and (3) require periodic reports to the Director of OMB of complaints regarding agency information. The ESA does not expressly address this balancing act (and certainly not quantitatively), but considering the strongly protective purpose of the ESA—to save and recover species—and considering the statutory requirement to use the "best scientific ... data available," arguably the ESA intends that all declining species should be given the benefit of the doubt and a margin of safety provided. Science can also play a role in post-listing decisions and procedures under the ESA. For example, scientific information is used in designating critical habitat for listed species. No bills have been introduced to date in the 113 th Congress to amend the ESA. They claim that access to public lands is improved when ESA decisions use peer-reviewed science to protect "truly endangered species."

The adequacy of the science supporting implementation of the Endangered Species Act (ESA) has received considerable congressional attention over the years. While many scientific decisions pass unremarked, some critics accuse agencies responsible for implementing the ESA of using "junk science," and others counter that decisions that should rest on science are instead being dictated by political concerns. Under the ESA, certain species of plants and animals (both vertebrate and invertebrate) are listed as either endangered or threatened according to assessments of the risk of their extinction. Once a species is listed, powerful legal tools are available to protect the species and its habitat. Efforts to list, protect, and recover threatened or endangered species under the ESA can be controversial. Some of this controversy stems from the substantive provisions of this law, which can affect the use of both federal and nonfederal lands. The scientific underpinnings of decisions under the ESA are especially important, given their importance for species and their possible impacts on land use and development. The Fish and Wildlife Service in the Department of the Interior and the National Marine Fisheries Service in the Department of Commerce administer the ESA, and each agency has policies and requirements to ensure the integrity and objectivity of the science that underlies ESA decisions. The Information Quality Act (P.L. 106-554, IQA or Data Quality Act) also imposes general requirements and has resulted in agency changes to carry out the goals of that act to maximize the quality, objectivity, utility, and integrity of information disseminated by the agencies. In several situations, economic and social disputes have resulted from actions taken to list, protect, and recover species under the ESA. Critics in some of these disputes assert that the science supporting ESA actions is insufficiently rigorous. Others assert that in some instances decisions were political rather than scientific. Controversy has arisen over what might be the essential elements of "sound science" in the ESA process and whether the ESA might benefit from clarification of how science is to be used in its implementation. The courts have had occasion to review the use of science by the agencies, which generally must show their decisions were not arbitrary and that they rest on credible science. For some purposes, if that science is the best available, even if it is considered imperfect or incomplete, it still may be used. Several bills affecting science as used in the ESA were introduced in recent Congresses, but to date none have been enacted. Legislative activity in the 112th Congress is summarized in CRS Report R41608, The Endangered Species Act (ESA) in the 112th Congress: Conflicting Values and Difficult Choices, by [author name scrubbed] et al. No bills concerning ESA and science have yet been introduced in the 113th Congress. This report provides a context for evaluating legislative proposals through examples of how science has been used in selected cases, a discussion of the nature and role of science in general, and its role in the ESA process in particular, together with general and agency information quality requirements and policies, and a review of how the courts have viewed agency use of science.

crs_RL33649

crs_RL33649_0

The statute also contains detailed due process provisions to ensure the provision of FAPE. 108-446 ), which reauthorized and revised IDEA. Although much of the basic structure of IDEA has been retained, P.L. 108-446 does make a number of significant changes. Among these are the definition of "highly qualified" teachers, requirements for children's participation in state and local assessments, changes in the private school provisions, exceptions to certain financial requirements, changes in procedural safeguards, and changes in compliance monitoring to focus on student performance. The U.S. Department of Education (ED) issued proposed regulations for P.L. 108-446 and issued final regulations on August 14, 2006. Although many of the regulatory provisions simply track the statutory language, reflect comments in the conference report, or include provisions in prior IDEA regulations, there are places where the regulations provide more guidance. This report will analyze the regulations with an emphasis on those areas where additional guidance is provided. The report also discusses provisions in P.L. 108-446 related to multi-year individualized education program (IEP) demonstration programs and the infants and toddlers with disabilities provisions under Part C of IDEA, for which ED has provided separate final notice or proposed regulations. ED issued additional regulations "to clarify and strengthen current regulations"on December 1, 2008. P.L.

The 108th Congress passed P.L. 108-446, which reauthorized and revised the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA). IDEA is the major federal statute authorizing funds for special education and related services for children with disabilities, and providing detailed due process provisions to ensure that these children receive a free appropriate public education (FAPE). Although much of the basic structure of IDEA has been retained, P.L. 108-446 does make a number of significant changes. Among these are the definition of "highly qualified" teachers, requirements for children's participation in state and local assessments, changes in the private school provisions, exceptions to certain financial requirements, changes in procedural safeguards, and changes in compliance monitoring to focus on student performance. On June 21, 2005, the Department of Education (ED) issued proposed regulations for P.L. 108-446. ED issued final regulations on August 14, 2006. ED issued additional regulations "to clarify and strengthen current regulations"on December 1, 2008. Although many of the regulatory provisions simply track the statutory language, reflect comments in the conference report, or include provisions in prior IDEA regulations, there are places where the regulations provide more guidance. This report analyzes the regulations, with an emphasis on those areas where additional guidance is provided. The report also discusses provisions in P.L. 108-446 related to multi-year individualized education program (IEP) demonstration programs and the infants and toddlers with disabilities provisions under Part C of IDEA, for which ED has provided separate final notice or proposed regulations.

crs_R42010

crs_R42010_0

Introduction This report provides an overview of the Obama Administration's FY2012 budget request and the status of FY2012 appropriations for accounts traditionally funded in the appropriations bill for the Departments of Labor, Health and Human Services, Education, and Related Agencies (L-HHS-ED). The L-HHS-ED bill provides appropriations for the following federal departments and agencies: the Department of Labor; the majority of the Department of Health and Human Services, except for the Food and Drug Administration (provided in the Agriculture appropriations bill), the Indian Health Service (provided in the Interior-Environment appropriations bill), and the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry (also funded through the Interior-Environment appropriations bill); the Department of Education; and more than a dozen related agencies, including the Social Security Administration, the Corporation for National and Community Service, the Corporation for Public Broadcasting, the Institute of Museum and Library Services, the National Labor Relations Board, and the Railroad Retirement Board. Discretionary Appropriations1 The L-HHS-ED bill includes both discretionary and mandatory funding. Note also that the report focuses most closely on discretionary funding. Enacted FY2012 Appropriations On December 23, 2011, President Obama signed into law the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2012 ( H.R. The law provides $163.9 billion in discretionary funding for accounts traditionally funded by the L-HHS-ED bill, which is nearly 1% less than the comparable FY2011 funding level. In addition, the law provides an estimated $576.7 billion in mandatory funding for L-HHS-ED accounts, for a total of $740.6 billion for the bill as a whole. Prior to December 23, L-HHS-ED funding for FY2012 had been provided by a series of short-term continuing resolutions ( P.L. 112-74 and P.L. 112-77 . 112-74 , both the House and Senate had initiated action on full-year FY2012 L-HHS-ED appropriations. 3070 ). The bill would have provided nearly $160 billion in discretionary funding, which is about 3% less than comparable FY2011 funding. On September 22, 2011, the Senate Committee on Appropriations reported a bill that would have provided year-long FY2012 L-HHS-ED appropriations ( S. 1599 , S.Rept. 112-74 ) and the FY2012 disaster relief law ( P.L. FY2012 DOL Appropriations Overview The final FY2012 appropriations law provides $12.6 billion in discretionary funding for DOL. This amount is $94 million (-1%) less than the comparable FY2011 funding level of $12.7 billion and $251 million (-2%) less than the President's Budget request of $12.8 billion. Enacted FY2012 amounts in the text and tables have not been adjusted to reflect the 0.189% across-the-board rescission required by Section 527 of Division F of P.L. FY2012 HHS Appropriations Overview The final FY2012 appropriations law provides $69.8 billion in discretionary funding for HHS. This amount is $693 million (-1%) less than the comparable FY2011 funding level of $70.4 billion and $3.4 billion (-5%) less than the President's Budget request of $73.1 billion. FY2012 ED Appropriations Overview The final FY2012 appropriations law provides $68.2 billion in discretionary funding for ED. This amount is $190 million (-0.3%) less than the comparable FY2011 funding level of $68.3 billion and $9.2 billion (-11.9%) less than the President's Budget request of $77.4 billion. 112-84 ) FY2012 L-HHS-Ed bills. 112-74 for most discretionary L-HHS-ED accounts. FY2012 Related Agencies Appropriations Overview The annual FY2012 appropriations law provides $13.4 billion in discretionary funding for related agencies included in L-HHS-ED appropriations. In addition, the Disaster Relief Appropriations Act, 2012 ( P.L. 112-77 ), provides $493 million in discretionary funding for the Social Security Administration (one of the L-HHS-ED related agencies), for a combined FY2012 total of $13.9 billion in discretionary appropriations. This amount is $12 million (+0.1%) more than the comparable FY2011 funding level of $13.8 billion and $1.3 billion (-8.7%) less than the FY2012 President's request of $15.2 billion. The FY2012 annual appropriations law ( P.L.

This report provides an overview of actions taken by Congress to provide FY2012 appropriations for the accounts funded by the Departments of Labor, Health and Human Services, Education, and Related Agencies (L-HHS-ED) appropriations bill. The L-HHS-ED bill provides funding for all accounts subject to the annual appropriations process at the Departments of Labor and Education. It provides annual appropriations for most agencies within the Department of Health and Human Services, with certain exceptions (e.g., the Food and Drug Administration is funded via the Agriculture appropriations bill). The L-HHS-ED bill also provides funding for more than a dozen related agencies, including the Social Security Administration. The bill includes discretionary and mandatory funding, but this report focuses primarily on discretionary funding. On December 23, 2011, following several short-term continuing resolutions for FY2012, President Obama signed into law the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2012 (P.L. 112-74) and the Disaster Relief Appropriations Act, 2012 (P.L. 112-77). Combined, these two appropriations laws provide $164 billion in discretionary funding for L-HHS-ED, which is 0.6% less than the comparable FY2011 funding level of $165 billion and 8.6% less than the FY2012 President's Budget request of $179 billion. In addition, the FY2012 annual appropriations law (P.L. 112-74) provides an estimated $577 billion in mandatory L-HHS-ED funding, for a total of $741 billion for L-HHS-ED as a whole. Note that the FY2012 amounts discussed here and throughout the report have not been adjusted to reflect the 0.189% across-the-board rescission required by P.L. 112-74, Division F, for most discretionary L-HHS-ED appropriations. Prior to the enactment of P.L. 112-74, both the House and Senate had initiated action on full-year FY2012 L-HHS-ED appropriations. On September 29, the House introduced a bill (H.R. 3070) that would have provided nearly $160 billion in discretionary funding for L-HHS-ED accounts. On September 22, the Senate Committee on Appropriations reported a bill (S. 1599, S.Rept. 112-84) that would have provided $165 billion in discretionary funding for L-HHS-ED accounts. Department of Labor (DOL): The FY2012 annual appropriations law provides $12.6 billion in discretionary funding for DOL. This amount is 0.7% less than the comparable FY2011 funding level of $12.7 billion and 2% less than the FY2012 President's request of $12.8 billion. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS): The FY2012 annual appropriations law provides $69.8 billion in discretionary funding for HHS. This amount is 1% less than the comparable FY2011 funding level of $70.4 billion and 5% less than the FY2012 President's request of $73.1 billion. Department of Education (ED): The FY2012 annual appropriations law provides $68.2 billion in discretionary funding for ED. This amount is 0.3% less than the comparable FY2011 funding level of $68.4 billion and 12% less than the FY2012 President's request of $77.4 billion. Related Agencies: The FY2012 annual appropriations law provides $13.4 billion in discretionary funding for related agencies included in L-HHS-ED appropriations. In addition, the FY2012 disaster relief appropriations law (P.L. 112-77) provides $493 million in discretionary funding for the Social Security Administration (one of the L-HHS-ED related agencies), for a combined total of $13.9 billion. This amount is 0.1% more than the comparable FY2011 funding level of $13.8 billion and 9% less than the FY2012 President's request of $15.2 billion.

crs_R44711

crs_R44711_0

The work funded by these appropriations plays a central role in the nation's security as well as an important role in U.S. global leadership in science and technology. In its annual budget request to Congress, DOD presents its RDT&E by organization and program and by the character of the work to be performed. More than 95% of DOD's RDT&E funding is appropriated in Title IV (Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation), which includes RDT&E appropriations for the Army, Navy, Air Force, a Defense-wide RDT&E account, and the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation. For example, RDT&E funds are appropriated as part of the Defense Health Program and the Chemical Agents and Munitions Destruction Program, and sometimes as part of the National Defense Sealift Fund. The RDT&E funding for this effort is requested in the Navy's Procurement request and appropriated in Title V (Revolving and Management Funds) of the appropriation act. RDT&E funds also have been requested and appropriated as part of DOD's separate funding to support Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO, formerly the Global War on Terror (GWOT)). Typically, the RDT&E funds appropriated for OCO activities in Title IX support specified PEs in Title IV. The Joint Improvised-Threat Defeat Fund (JITDF, formerly the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Fund) works to counter improvised threats (e.g., improvised explosive devices (IEDs)) through tactical responsiveness and anticipatory, rapid acquisition. Some of the funds appropriated to JIDF are used for RDT&E. In the past, these have included the Iraqi Freedom Fund (IFF), the Iraqi Security Forces Fund, the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund, and the Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability Fund. This characterization is provided in seven categories, each with a budget activity code (6.1 through 6.7) and a description (see Table 1 ). [6.4] Advanced Component Development and Prototypes (ACD&P). The funds in 6.6 are for RDT&E management may support work in any of the other RDT&E budget accounts. The National Science Foundation (NSF) collects R&D appropriations and performance data from all federal R&D agencies through its annual Survey of Federal Funds for Research and Development . DOD uses the following crosswalk to respond to the NSF survey: 6.1 funding is reported under NSF's basic research category, 6.2 funding is reported as applied research, 6.3 is reported as advanced technology development (experimental development), 6.4–6.6 funding is reported as major systems development (experimental development), and 6.7 is reported as operational systems development (non-experimental development). DOD RDT&E funding provided in other appropriations titles are not included in the character of work (6.1-6.7) taxonomy; inclusion of these funds might affect the balance among the categories.

The Department of Defense (DOD) conducts research, development, testing, and evaluation (RDT&E) in support of its mission requirements. The work funded by these appropriations plays a central role in the nation's security and an important role in U.S. global leadership in science and technology. DOD alone accounts for nearly 40% of all federal R&D appropriations ($49.2 billion of $125.3 billion, or 39.3%, in FY2017). In its annual congressional budget requests, DOD presents its RDT&E requests by organization and by its own unique taxonomy aligned to the character of the work to be performed. More than 95% of DOD RDT&E funding is provided under Title IV of the annual defense appropriations act. These funds are appropriated for RDT&E in the Army, Navy, Air Force, a Defense-wide RDT&E account, and the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation. RDT&E funding is also provided for the Defense Health Program in Title VI; the Chemical Agents and Munitions Destruction Program in Title VI; and previously the National Defense Sealift Fund in Title V, though the President's FY2019 budget does not request RDT&E funds for this purpose. In addition, some of the funds appropriated to the Joint Improvised-Threat Defeat Fund (JIDF, formerly the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Fund) have been used for RDT&E though the fund does not contain an RDT&E line item. In some years, RDT&E funds also have been requested and appropriated as part of DOD's separate funding to support Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO, formerly the Global War on Terror (GWOT)). These funds have typically been appropriated for specific activities identified in Title IV. Finally, some OCO funds have been appropriated for transfer funds (e.g., the Iraqi Freedom Fund (IFF), Iraqi Security Forces Fund, Afghanistan Security Forces Fund, and Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability Fund) which can be used to support RDT&E activities, among other things, subject to certain limitations. Parsing RDT&E funding by the character of the work, DOD has established seven categories identified by a budget activity code (numbers 6.1-6.7) and a description. Budget activity code 6.1 is for basic research; 6.2 is for applied research; 6.3 is for advanced technology development; 6.4 is for advanced component development and prototypes; 6.5 is for systems development and demonstration; 6.6 is for RDT&E management support; and 6.7 is for operational system development. DOD uses crosswalks to report its RDT&E funding to the Office of Management and Budget and to the National Science Foundation. These crosswalks use different taxonomies than DOD's for accounting for R&D funding.

crs_R41429

crs_R41429_0

Since 1974, Congress has created multiple trade preference programs designed to foster economic growth and development in less developed countries. These programs provide temporary, non-reciprocal, duty-free U.S. market access to select exports of eligible countries. The112th Congress passed extensions to three trade preference programs: (1) the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), which expired on December 31, 2010, and was renewed retroactively from that date to July 31, 2013 ( P.L. 112-40 ); (2) the Andean Trade Preference Act (ATPA) for Colombia and Ecuador until July 31, 2013 ( P.L. 112-42 ); and (3) a third-country fabric provision in the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) until September 30, 2015 ( P.L. 112-163 ). Since the GSP and ATPA programs were only extended until the end of July 2013, Congress may consider further renewal of these programs in the first session of the 113th Congress, along with possible trade preference reform options. Three bills in the 112th Congress, S. 105 , S. 1244 , and H.R. Other bills in the 112 th Congress proposing preference programs include S. 1443 , which would create a new trade preference program for selected Asian and South Pacific countries. It is embodied in the most favored nation (MFN) principle of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and its successor, the World Trade Organization (WTO). Many developed countries have unilateral trade preference programs; Congress has legislatively established five in the United States. It applies to developing countries as a whole. In addition, there are four regional programs that followed, created in the Andean Trade Preference Act (APTA), the Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act (CBERA); the Caribbean Basin Trade Partnership Act (CBTPA), the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), and the Haitian Opportunity through Partnership Encouragement (HOPE) Act (discussed in detail below). Congress conducts oversight of these programs, revising and extending them periodically. Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) Authorized by Congress in 1974, the GSP is the oldest and largest U.S. trade preference program, currently providing trade benefits to 128 countries. Congress recently extended CBTPA through September 30, 2020 in the Haiti Economic Lift Program (HELP) Act of 2010. Some developing nations, such as India and Brazil, also provide tariff concessions to least developed countries (LDCs). Also in the WTO, as a part of the Doha Round of multilateral trade negotiations, developed country members and "developing country members declaring themselves in a position to do so" agreed to provide "duty-free and quota-free" (DFQF) market access for all products originating from all least-developed countries "in a manner that ensures stability, security, and predictability." Trade preferences reflect both economic development and foreign policy goals. In addition to the economic benefits, eligibility criteria create incentives for beneficiary countries to support U.S. objectives such as adopting and enforcing internationally recognized worker rights, reducing barriers to investment, and enforcing intellectual property rights. Others in the academic world have also pointed to the benefits of focusing preference programs exclusively on the poorest of the developing countries. Legislative Options for Congress The debate in Congress over trade preferences encompasses multiple viewpoints. In the second session, the HELP Act ( P.L. 2387 , propose a new trade preference program that would provide duty-free and reduced tariff treatment for certain apparel from the Philippines.

Since 1974, Congress has created multiple trade preference programs designed to foster economic growth, reform, and development in less developed countries. These programs give temporary, non-reciprocal, duty-free U.S. market access to select exports of eligible countries. Congress has repeatedly revised and extended these programs. The112th Congress passed extensions to three trade preference programs: (1) the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) which expired on December 31, 2010 and was renewed retroactively from that date to July 31, 2013 (P.L. 112-40); (2) the Andean Trade Preference Act (ATPA) for Colombia and Ecuador until July 31, 2013 (P.L. 112-42); and (3) a "third-country fabric" provision in the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) until September 30, 2015 (P.L. 112-163). Since the GSP and ATPA programs were only extended until the end of July 2013, Congress may consider further renewal of these programs in the first session of the 113th Congress, along with possible trade preference reform options. Three bills in the 112th Congress, S. 105, S. 1244, and H.R. 2387, propose a new trade preference program that would provide duty-free and reduced tariff treatment for certain apparel from the Philippines. Other bills in the 112th Congress proposing preference programs include S. 1443, which would provide trade preferences for selected Asian and South Pacific countries. Congress established five trade preference programs. The GSP applies to all developing countries worldwide. In addition, there are four regional programs including the ATPA; the Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act (CBERA); the Caribbean Trade Partnership Act (CBTPA); the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA); and the Haitian Opportunity through Partnership Encouragement (HOPE) Act. In the second session of the 111th Congress, legislation was enacted to extend provisions in the CBPTA and HOPE Act through September 30, 2020, in the Haiti Economic Lift Program Act of 2010 (P.L. 111-171). Unlike free trade agreements, trade preferences are non-reciprocal, meaning that developing countries do not have to provide equivalent trade benefits to the United States. Countries must meet certain eligibility criteria, however, such as providing adequate protection of intellectual property, operating an open market economy under established multilateral trade rules, and adopting internationally recognized worker rights. Trade preferences are permitted by the World Trade Organization (WTO) under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) "enabling clause," which allows members to provide more favorable treatment to developing countries. Other developed countries provide similar preference programs. In the WTO Doha Development Agenda (DDA) round of multilateral trade negotiations, both developed and developing WTO members agreed to provide duty-free, quota-free (DFQF) preferential access to least-developed countries, subject to adoption of the agreement. Evaluations of the benefits of trade preferences have been mixed. Many developing countries have used tariff preferences to enhance their competitiveness in certain industries, particularly apparel. In other countries, preferences are used to export major commodities such as petroleum products, which may be less supportive of long-term economic diversification and development. Meeting the needs of the least developing countries is a core policy issue that continues to drive the debate over the design of preference programs. Consumers and some U.S. industries and workers benefit from the additional trade, others compete directly with it, therefore, perspectives on trade preferences vary despite their overall costs apparently being small. This report discusses the major U.S. trade preference programs, their possible economic effects, stakeholder interests, and legislative options.

crs_RL34723

crs_RL34723_0

The principal focus of this report is the level of arms transfers by major weapons suppliersto nations in the developing world -- where most of the potential for the outbreak of regional militaryconflicts currently exists. The developing world continues to be the primary focus of foreign arms sales activity byconventional weapons suppliers. During the period of this report, 2000-2007, conventional armstransfer agreements (which represent orders for future delivery) to developing nations comprised66.6% of the value of all international arms transfer agreements. The portion of agreements withdeveloping countries constituted 67.7% of all agreements globally from 2004-2007. In 2007, the United States led in arms transfer agreements worldwide , making agreementsvalued at over $24.8 billion (41.5% of all such agreements), up significantly from $16.7 billion in2006. In 2007, the United States ranked first in the value of all arms deliveries worldwide , makingnearly $12.8 billion in such deliveries or 41.3%. General Trends in Arms Transfers to Developing Nations The value of all arms transfer agreements with developing nations in 2007 was nearly $42.3billion, an increase from the $38.1 billion total in 2006 Chart 1 )( Figure 1 )( Table 1A ). In 2007, thevalue of all arms deliveries to developing nations ($17.2 billion) was lower than the value of 2006deliveries (over $21.4 billion), and the lowest total for the 2000-2007 period ( Charts 7 and8 )( Figure 2 )( Table 2A ). Recently, from 2004-2007, the United States and Russia have dominated the arms marketin the developing world, with both nations either ranking first or second for 3 out of these 4 yearsin the value of arms transfer agreements . From 2004-2007, Russia made nearly $39.3 billion,27.9% of all such agreements, expressed in constant 2007 dollars. During this same period, theUnited States made $34.7 billion in such agreements, 24.6% of all such agreements. Collectively,the United States and Russia made 52.5% of all arms transfer agreements with developing nationsduring this four year period. The United Kingdom, the third leading supplier, from 2004-2007 made$21.3 billion or 15.1% of all such agreements with developing nations during these years. Russia. Saudi Arabia ranked first among all developing world recipients in the value of arms transfer agreements in 2007, concluding $10.6 billion in such agreements. India ranked second inagreements at $5 billion. Pakistan ranked third with $4.2 billion in agreements. Arms Transfer Agreements With Developing Nations by Major Supplier,2000-2007 (billions of constant 2007 dollars) Source: U.S. Government Figure 1. All data are for calendar years given.

This report is prepared annually to provide Congress with official, unclassified, quantitativedata on conventional arms transfers to developing nations by the United States and foreign countriesfor the preceding eight calendar years for use in its policy oversight functions. All agreement anddelivery data in this report for the United States are government-to-government Foreign MilitarySales (FMS) transactions. Similar data are provided on worldwide conventional arms transfers byall suppliers, but the principal focus is the level of arms transfers by major weapons suppliers tonations in the developing world. Developing nations continue to be the primary focus of foreign arms sales activity byweapons suppliers. During the years 2000-2007, the value of arms transfer agreements withdeveloping nations comprised 66.6% of all such agreements worldwide. More recently, armstransfer agreements with developing nations constituted 67.7% of all such agreements globally from2004-2007, and 70.5% of these agreements in 2007. The value of all arms transfer agreements with developing nations in 2007 was nearly $42.3billion. This was an increase from $38.1 billion in 2006. In 2007, the value of all arms deliveries to developing nations was $17.2 billion, the lowest total in these deliveries values for the entire2000-2007 period (in constant 2007 dollars). Recently, from 2004-2007, the United States and Russia have dominated the arms marketin the developing world, with both nations either ranking first or second for 3 out of 4 years in thevalue of arms transfer agreements . From 2004-2007, Russia made nearly $39.3 billion, 27.9% ofall such agreements, expressed in constant 2007 dollars. During this same period, the United Statesmade $34.7 billion in such agreements, 24.6% of all such agreements. Collectively, the UnitedStates and Russia made 52.5% of all arms transfer agreements with developing nations during thisfour-year period. In 2007, the United States ranked first in arms transfer agreements with developing nationswith $12.2 billion or 28.8% of these agreements. The United Kingdom was second with $9.8 billionor 23.2% of such agreements. Russia was third with $9.7 billion or 23%. In 2007, the United Statesranked first in the value of arms deliveries to developing nations at $7.6 billion, or 44.2% of all suchdeliveries. Russia ranked second at $4.6 billion or 26.7% of such deliveries. In 2007, Saudi Arabia ranked first in the value of arms transfer agreements among alldeveloping nations weapons purchasers, concluding $10.6 billion in such agreements. India rankedsecond with $5 billion in such agreements. Pakistan ranked third with $4.2 billion.

crs_R42858

crs_R42858_0

Introduction and Program Background The Carl D. Perkins Career and Technical Education Improvement Act of 2006 (Perkins IV; P.L. 109-270 ) is intended to develop the academic and career and technical skills of secondary and postsecondary education students who elect to enroll in career and technical education (CTE) programs, particularly programs that prepare students for high-skill, high-wage, or high-demand occupations in current or emerging professions. The sanctions may include the development and implementation of improvement plans and a loss of federal funding. Perkins IV was authorized by statute through FY2012 and was funded at $1.1 billion in FY2012. The General Education Provisions Act (GEPA) automatically extends the authorization for one additional fiscal year to FY2013. Potential Reauthorization Issues The following collection of potential reauthorization issues is based on ED guidance, the Administration's blueprint for reauthorization of Perkins IV (hereinafter referred to as the Perkins Blueprint ), issues raised by stakeholder and advocacy groups, and program evaluations. On April 19, 2012, the Obama Administration announced the Perkins Blueprint in an effort to support the creation of more high quality CTE programs through a reauthorized Perkins act. A 2009 report by the Government Accountability Office (GAO; hereinafter referred to as the 2009 GAO Perkins IV report ) observed that the flexibility within the Perkins IV performance measures, which allows states flexibility to structure and evaluate their CTE programs to meet state/local needs, frustrates the evaluation of the effectiveness and outcomes of CTE programs nationally. The national evaluations provided options and recommendations to improve the Perkins acts. Given the expectations that CTE students become both technically and academically proficient, it is important that CTE teachers have technical skills, academic/disciplinary proficiency, pedagogical, and classroom management capabilities. Evidence suggests that secondary to postsecondary transitions for CTE students have been difficult to foster and maintain. Relationship with the Workforce Investment Act The Workforce Investment Act of 1998 (WIA; P.L. At the local level, the plans of secondary and postsecondary CTE providers are required to describe, if applicable, how representatives of local WIBs will be involved in assessing the Perkins' funded CTE programs and how they will be informed of the Perkins' requirements and programs. Sustainable and Relevant Business Involvement Perkins IV supports business and industry collaboration with CTE. The collaboration is fundamental to ensuring the relevance of the curriculum and technical skills taught and the existence of post-education opportunities.

The Carl D. Perkins Career and Technical Education Improvement Act of 2006 (Perkins IV; P.L. 109-270) supports the development of academic and career and technical skills among secondary education students and postsecondary education students who elect to enroll in career and technical education (CTE) programs, sometimes referred to as vocational education programs. Perkins IV was authorized through FY2012, which ended on September 30, 2012. The authorization is extended through FY2013 under the General Education Provisions Act. This report provides a summary of potential reauthorization issues that Congress may consider in the 113th Congress. Potential reauthorization issues and recommendations have been put forward by the Department of Education, the Obama Administration's blueprint for reauthorization of Perkins IV, stakeholder and advocacy groups, and program evaluations. If Congress considers reauthorization of the Perkins act, key issues may include the following: To what extent should the federal government support CTE and in what ways, given competing priorities and an environment of fiscal constraint? How can the validity, reliability, and consistency of Perkins IV performance measures be improved to better assess program effectiveness while still allowing states flexibility to structure their CTE programs to meet state/local needs? How can the technical skills, academic/disciplinary proficiency, pedagogical, and classroom management capabilities of pre-service and in-service CTE teachers be maximized to ensure CTE students are academically and technically proficient? How can the secondary to postsecondary transitions and postsecondary completions of CTE students be facilitated and increased? What kinds of relationships should be fostered between the Perkins act, the Workforce Investment Act of 1998 (WIA; P.L. 105-220), and business and industry to strengthen the nation's workforce development system? What is the optimal involvement of local business and industry representatives in the development and maintenance of CTE programs to ensure the CTE programs provide relevant curriculum and technical skills that respond to regional or national labor markets and that maximize the students' post-education opportunities? How should Perkins IV funds be allocated to the states in the event of a potential decrease in funding levels? Should the Perkins IV funding mechanism be modified to balance the continuation of CTE programs with increased innovation in the development and delivery of CTE programs?

crs_R41033

crs_R41033_0

In 2004, Congress passed the Project BioShield Act ( P.L. 108-276 ) to encourage the development of CBRN medical countermeasures. The 108 th Congress also appropriated $5.6 billion to acquire countermeasures through Project BioShield for FY2004 to FY2013. In response to perceived problems with Project BioShield countermeasure procurement, the 109 th Congress created the Biomedical Advanced Research and Development Authority (BARDA) and the position of Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response in the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) through the Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness Act ( P.L. 109-417 ). These include whether to continue diverting Project BioShield acquisition funding to other purposes; whether to change the countermeasure development and acquisition process; how to replace stockpiled countermeasures as they expire; and whether to alter federal efforts to encourage the development of broad-spectrum countermeasures. The first provision provides HHS expedited procedures for CBRN terrorism-related spending, including procuring products, hiring experts, and awarding research grants. Reporting Requirements The Project BioShield Act of 2004 requires the HHS Secretary to report annually to Congress on the use of some of the authorities granted by this law. The Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2004 ( P.L. Congress has also transferred funds from this account for purposes other than CBRN countermeasure procurement. Thus, excluding the canceled VaxGen contract, HHS has obligated approximately $2.56 billion to date. In response to perceived problems with Project BioShield countermeasure procurement, the 109 th Congress created the Biomedical Advanced Research and Development Authority (BARDA) in HHS through the Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness Act ( P.L. Policy Issues Congress continues to address several Project BioShield-related policy issues. Subsequent Congresses have rescinded or transferred more than 25% of the advance appropriation. The President's FY2012 budget requests the transfer of up to $765 million to fund BARDA activities and an independent medical countermeasure strategic investment corporation. This pattern of annual transfers from the Project BioShield special reserve fund to support countermeasure research and development activities may affect future CBRN countermeasure development and procurement activities. Transfers Unrelated to CBRN Countermeasure Research and Development Two of the transfers out of the Project BioShield special reserve fund supported programs not directly related to medical countermeasures to CBRN agents. Changing the Countermeasure Development and Acquisition Process Project BioShield represents just one piece of the federal effort to research, develop, and acquire countermeasures for civilian use.

In 2004, Congress passed the Project BioShield Act (P.L. 108-276) to encourage the private sector to develop medical countermeasures against chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) terrorism agents and to provide a novel mechanism for federal acquisition of those newly developed countermeasures. Although some countermeasures have been acquired through this law, Congress continues to address several Project BioShield-related policy issues. These include whether to continue diverting Project BioShield acquisition funding to other purposes; whether to change the countermeasure development and acquisition process; how to replace stockpiled countermeasures as they expire; and whether to alter federal efforts to encourage the development of broad-spectrum countermeasures. This law provides three main authorities: (1) relaxing regulatory requirements for some CBRN terrorism-related spending, including hiring personnel and awarding research grants; (2) guaranteeing a federal market for new CBRN medical countermeasures; and (3) permitting emergency use of unapproved countermeasures. The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) has used each of these authorities. The HHS used expedited review authorities to approve contracts and grants related to CBRN countermeasure research and development. The HHS used the authority to guarantee a government market to obligate approximately $2.5 billion to acquire countermeasures against anthrax, botulism, radiation, and smallpox. The HHS has also employed the emergency use authority several times, including during the 2009 H1N1 influenza pandemic. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Appropriations Act, 2004 (P.L. 108-90) advance-appropriated $5.593 billion for FY2004 to FY2013 for CBRN countermeasures acquisition through Project BioShield. Through FY2011, subsequent Congresses have removed $1.461 billion from this account through rescissions and transfers, more than 25% of the advance appropriation. The transfers from this account supported CBRN medical countermeasure advanced development, pandemic influenza preparedness and response, and basic biomedical research. The President's FY2012 budget requests a transfer of $765 million out of this account to support CBRN countermeasure advanced development and to establish a CBRN countermeasure strategic investment corporation. Since passing the Project BioShield Act, subsequent Congresses have considered additional measures to further encourage countermeasure development. The 109th Congress created the Biomedical Advanced Research and Development Authority (BARDA) in HHS through the Pandemic and All-Hazard Preparedness Act (P.L. 109-417). Among other duties, BARDA oversees all of HHS's Project BioShield procurements. The Pandemic and All-Hazard Preparedness Act also modified the Project BioShield procurement process. Some stakeholders question whether these changes have sufficiently improved federal countermeasure development and procurement. The Administration plans to improve the countermeasure research, development, and acquisition process based on the findings of a 2010 HHS review.

crs_RS21462

crs_RS21462_0

Response Based on U.S. and Russian press reports and discussions with U.S. and Russian officials, it appears that the U.S. response is asfollows: Russia's economic interests in Iraq will receive due consideration. There is Russia's interest inpromoting a "multi-polar world" and bolstering the stature and authority of the U.N. vis-a-vis the United States.

Now that the U.S.-led coalition has overthrown Saddam Hussein's regime in Iraq, thequestion of Russia's position on the conflict again focuses on political and economic issues, including Russia's rolein the U.N.. President Putin still appears to be trying to balance three competing interests: protecting Russian economic interestsin Iraq;restraining U.S. global dominance; and maintaining friendly relations with the United States. This report will beupdated periodically.

crs_R40669

crs_R40669_0

Most Recent Developments Energy and Water Development funding for FY2009 was included in the Omnibus Appropriations Act, 2009 ( P.L. 111-8 ). Appropriations for these programs in P.L. In addition, the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (the "Stimulus" Act, P.L. 111-5 ) included $44.325 billion to fund numerous programs in the Corps of Engineers, the Bureau of Reclamation, and the Department of Energy, to be expended in FY2009 and FY2010. President Obama's proposed FY2010 budget for Energy and Water Development programs was released in May 2009. The House passed the bill, including several amendments, July 17. The Senate passed its version of H.R. The Conference Committee reported out H.R. 3183 on September 30 ( H.Rept. 111-278 ) and the House passed it October 1 and the Senate October 15. 111-85 ). Status Overview The Energy and Water Development bill includes funding for civil works projects of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Corps), the Department of the Interior's Central Utah Project (CUP) and Bureau of Reclamation, the Department of Energy (DOE), and a number of independent agencies, including the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and the Appalachian Regional Commission (ARC). The conference bill provides $180 million for Everglades restoration. (See Title I.) Table 13 presents funding levels proposed for FY2010 for the accounts that fund DOE's Office of Environmental Management, compared to appropriations enacted for FY2009. The House endorsed the full NRC request, including funding for licensing the proposed Yucca Mountain nuclear waste repository.

The Energy and Water Development appropriations bill provides funding for civil works projects of the Army Corps of Engineers (Corps), the Department of the Interior's Bureau of Reclamation, the Department of Energy (DOE), and a number of independent agencies. Key budgetary issues for FY2010 involving these programs may include: the distribution of Corps appropriations across the agency's authorized planning, construction, and maintenance activities (Title I); support of major ecosystem restoration initiatives, such as Florida Everglades (Title I) and California "Bay-Delta" (CALFED) and San Joaquin River (Title II); funding for the proposed national nuclear waste repository at Yucca Mountain, Nevada (Title III: Nuclear Waste Disposal); several new initiatives proposed for Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) programs (Title III); and funding decisions in DOE's Office of Environmental Management. Energy and Water Development funding for FY2009 was included in the Omnibus Appropriations Act, 2009 (P.L. 111-8). In addition, the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA, the "Stimulus" Act, P.L. 111-5) included funding for numerous programs in the Corps of Engineers, the Bureau of Reclamation, and the Department of Energy, to be expended in FY2009 and FY2010. Funding for FY2010 Energy and Water Development programs is contained in H.R. 3183, which the House passed July 17, 2009. The Senate passed its version of H.R. 3183 July 29. The Conference Committee issued its report (H.Rept. 111-278) September 30, and the House passed the conference bill October 1, and the Senate October 15. The President signed the bill October 28 (P.L. 111-85).

crs_RL34323

crs_RL34323_0

Introduction The William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2007 ( H.R. H.R. As did its predecessors, H.R. When the bill reached the Senate its criminal law proposals included newly assigned sex trafficking offenses, a sex tourism offense, a coerced services offense, obstruction of justice offenses, an importation of prostitutes offense, a false statement offense, and provisions for civil liability, victim assistance, forfeiture, extraterritorial jurisdiction, Justice Department reorganization, and a model state statute. Section 221 of H.R. 2430), expands federal jurisdiction to reach persuasion, inducement, or enticement to engage in unlawful prostitution when it occurs in or affects interstate or foreign commerce, without regard to the age of the beguiled or the absence of coercion, fraud, or force. And it is not a federal crime for an American to attempt to travel in foreign commerce for the purpose of engaging in a commercial sex act with a child. Both are triggered by the commission of an underlying offense. Civil Cause of Action (Subsection 221(d)) Subsection 221(d) would enlarge the civil cause of action available to victims of violations of the involuntary servitude and trafficking provisions, 18 U.S.C. The statute of limitations for the criminal prosecution of most of the offenses under chapter 77 is 10 years, 18 U.S.C. Justice Department Enforcement (Subsection 234(a)) Subsection 234(a) renames the Justice Department's Child Exploitation and Obscenity Section and expands the responsibilities of the Innocence Lost Task Forces to include sex trafficking (proposed 18 U.S.C. 2430) offenses involving sexually exploited adults. 3887 .

The criminal law proposals found in H.R. 3887 as it passed the House include newly assigned sex trafficking offenses, a sex tourism offense, a coerced services offense, obstruction of justice offenses, an importation of prostitutes offense, a false statement offense, and provisions for civil liability, victim assistance, forfeiture, extraterritorial jurisdiction, Justice Department reorganization, and a model state statute. H.R. 3887's new sex trafficking offense would expand federal jurisdiction to reach persuasion, inducement, or enticement to engage in unlawful prostitution when it occurs in or affects interstate or foreign commerce, even in the absence of a child victim or of coercion, fraud, or force. Its amended version of 18 U.S.C. 1592 (seizure of documents in aid of trafficking) would outlaw the use of financial coercion to gain control of an individual's labor or sexual services. Its new sex tourism offense would cover arranging or attempt to arrange sex tours even when the underlying travel is not itself a federal crime. The bill also prohibits various obstructions of justice and false statements committed in connection with the employment of foreign workers. Procedurally, H.R. 3887 would enlarge the civil cause of action available to victims of violations of the involuntary servitude and trafficking provisions under an explicit 10-year statute of limitations. It would expand the availability of Crime Victim Fund programs for the benefit of the victims of sex trafficking. It would rename the Justice Department's Child Exploitation and Obscenity Section and expand the responsibilities of the Innocence Lost Task Forces to include sex trafficking offenses involving sexually exploited adults. This report is available in an abridged version – stripped of its footnotes, and most of its citations to authority as CRS Report RS22789, William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2007 (H.R. 3887 as Passed by the House): Criminal Provisions in Short, by [author name scrubbed].

crs_R41445

crs_R41445_0

The Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) contains a number of separately authorized programs, which generally distribute funds by formulas that prescribe how funds are to be allocated among state educational agencies (SEAs) or local educational agencies (LEAs) nationwide. The ESEA raises a number of legal issues, particularly relating to the First Amendment, regarding state assistance or involvement in issues of religion or religious schools. As Congress considers whether to reauthorize the ESEA, it may be concerned with the current First Amendment rules with respect to church-state issues in education. Several points of the analysis that follow stem from concerns that government assistance is improper for private religious schools, or that government involvement in particular issues may be construed as support for a religious purpose. These issues generally are governed by the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, which provides that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion...." The Supreme Court has addressed a number of First Amendment issues arising in the education context, as discussed below. These cases indicate a general rule that the First Amendment prohibits a state from utilizing "its public school system to aid any or all religious faiths or sects in the dissemination of their doctrines and ideals." This report will highlight the legal and policy issues that arise in the context of elementary and secondary education programs. In particular, it will address a variety of topics in which First Amendment concerns may be raised in education-related legislation, including teaching of creationism, school prayer, civil rights protections in schools, funding for faith-based organizations (FBOs) and school vouchers, supplemental services, and Title I reimbursement for religious schools. In 1968, the U.S. Supreme Court considered whether the First Amendment permitted schools to place limitations on teaching evolution in public school curriculum. Prayer in Schools Constitutional rules governing prayer in public schools vary depending upon the context of the particular religious expression at issue. The District of Columbia Opportunity Scholarship program is an example of a federal program that supports the enrollment of students in private elementary and secondary schools, including religiously affiliated private schools. P.L. For example, the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 specifically provided that nothing in the Elementary and Secondary Education Act shall be construed to permit discrimination based on religion. That is, the funds are not provided directly to private schools. The first section of the discussion focuses on the equitable participation requirements under Section 9501. This is followed by a discussion of the equitable participation provisions that specifically apply to Title I-A. Private school students enrolled in nonprofit elementary and secondary schools, including religiously affiliated schools, located in the LEA are eligible to receive services.

The Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) contains a number of separately authorized programs, which generally distribute funds by formulas that prescribe how funds are to be allocated among state educational agencies (SEAs) or local educational agencies (LEAs) nationwide. The ESEA raises a number of legal issues, particularly relating to the First Amendment, regarding state assistance or involvement in issues of religion or religious schools. As Congress considers whether to reauthorize the ESEA, it may be interested in the state of the law with respect to church-state issues in education. This report will highlight the legal and policy issues that arise in the context of elementary and secondary education programs. In particular, it will address a variety of contexts in which First Amendment concerns may be raised in education-related legislation, including teaching of creationism, school prayer, civil rights protections in schools, funding for faith-based organizations (FBOs) and school vouchers, supplemental services, and Title I reimbursement for religious schools. Several points of the analysis provided by this report stem from concerns that government assistance for religious schools or religious purposes in public schools is improper, or that government involvement in particular issues may be construed as support for a religious purpose. These issues are generally governed by the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, which provides that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion…." The U.S. Supreme Court has addressed a number of First Amendment issues arising in the education context, as discussed in this report. These cases indicate a general rule that the First Amendment prohibits a state from utilizing "its public school system to aid any or all religious faiths or sects in the dissemination of their doctrines and ideals." This report focuses on the Supreme Court's decisions regarding the range of topics that involve religious concerns in education. The first sections of the report address issues arising from the constitutionally permissible role of religious activity in public schools, including whether governments may impose curriculum restrictions with religious implications and whether any or all forms of prayer and religious activity in schools may be prohibited. The report then examines the legal implications of government aid to religious schools, including both aid provided directly to the schools and indirect payments such as school vouchers, including a discussion of the District of Columbia Opportunity Scholarship program. This is currently the only federally funded elementary and secondary education voucher program that provides funds for students to attend private schools, including religiously affiliated schools. The last sections of the report focus on the involvement of private schools, including religiously affiliated schools, and FBOs in current elementary and secondary education programs. The first of these sections includes a discussion of provisions governing the equitable participation of private school students in programs authorized by the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA), most recently amended by the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 (NCLB; P.L. 107-110). This is followed by an examination of FBOs' ability to serve as supplemental educational service (SES) providers for schools that have been identified for school improvement under Title I-A of the ESEA.

crs_R42941

crs_R42941_0

Introduction Medicaid is a means-tested entitlement program that finances the delivery of primary and acute medical services as well as long-term care. Medicaid is jointly funded by the federal government and the states. The federal government pays a share of each state's Medicaid costs; states must contribute the remaining portion in order to qualify for federal funds. This report describes the federal medical assistance percentage (FMAP) calculation used to reimburse states for most Medicaid expenditures, and it lists the statutory exceptions to the regular FMAP rate. In addition, this report discusses other FMAP-related issues, including FMAP changes in the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA, P.L. 111-148 as amended), federal deficit reduction proposals that would amend the FMAP rate, and the disaster-recovery FMAP adjustment. The FMAP rate is used to reimburse states for the federal share of most Medicaid expenditures, but exceptions to the regular FMAP rate have been made for certain states, situations, populations, providers, and services. The formula provides higher reimbursement to states with lower incomes (with a statutory maximum of 83%) and lower reimbursement to states with higher incomes (with a statutory minimum of 50%). Recent Issues Some recent issues related to the FMAP rate include FMAP changes in the ACA, federal deficit reduction proposals impacting the FMAP rate, and the disaster-related FMAP adjustment. Additional FMAP Increase for Certain "Expansion States." Regular FMAP rates for FY2014 range from 50% (15 states) to 73% (Mississippi). Disaster-Recovery Adjusted FMAP Rate The ACA added a disaster-recovery FMAP adjustment for states that have experienced a major, statewide disaster. This adjustment was available to states beginning the fourth quarter of FY2011. For the second and subsequent years a state qualifies for the adjustment, the FMAP rate shall be equal to the state's regular FMAP rate for that year plus 25% of the difference between the current year's regular FMAP rate and the preceding year's disaster-recovery adjusted FMAP rate. As a result, Section 3204 of the Middle Class Tax Relief and Job Creation Act of 2012 ( P.L. The effective date was later amended by Section 100123 of the Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21 st Century Act (MAP-21, P.L. The ACA added a number of exceptions to the FMAP for "newly eligible" individuals, "expansion states," disaster-affected states, primary care payment rate increases, specified preventive services and immunizations, smoking cessation services for pregnant women, specified home and community-based services, health home services for certain people with chronic conditions, home and community-based attendant services and supports, and state balancing incentive payments. Since federal Medicaid expenditures are a large and growing portion of the federal budget, controlling federal Medicaid spending has been a focus of federal deficit reduction proposals. Amending the FMAP structure has been identified as a way to reduce federal Medicaid spending by reducing the statutory FMAP floor.

Medicaid is a means-tested entitlement program that finances the delivery of primary and acute medical services as well as long-term care. Medicaid is jointly funded by the federal government and the states. The federal government's share of a state's expenditures is called the federal medical assistance percentage (FMAP) rate. The remainder is referred to as the nonfederal share, or state share. Generally determined annually, the FMAP formula is designed so that the federal government pays a larger portion of Medicaid costs in states with lower per capita incomes relative to the national average (and vice versa for states with higher per capita incomes). FMAP rates have a statutory minimum of 50% and a statutory maximum of 83%. For FY2014, regular FMAP rates range from 50.00% to 73.05%. The FMAP rate is used to reimburse states for the federal share of most Medicaid expenditures, but exceptions to the regular FMAP rate have been made for certain states, situations, populations, providers, and services. Some recent issues related to FMAP include FMAP changes in the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA, P.L. 111-148 as amended), federal deficit reduction proposals that would amend the FMAP rate, and the disaster-related FMAP adjustment. The ACA contains a number of provisions affecting FMAP rates. Most notably, the ACA provides initial FMAP rates of up to 100% for certain "newly eligible" individuals. Also, under the ACA, "expansion states" receive an enhanced FMAP rate for certain individuals. In addition, ACA provides increased FMAP rates for certain disaster-affected states, primary care payment rate increases, specified preventive services and immunizations, smoking cessation services for pregnant women, specified home and community-based services, health home services for certain people with chronic conditions, home and community-based attendant services and supports, and state balancing incentive payments. Since federal Medicaid expenditures are a large and growing portion of the federal budget, controlling federal Medicaid spending has been included in some federal deficit reduction proposals. Some of the federal deficit reduction proposals include provisions that would amend the current FMAP structure through either a blended FMAP or a reduction to the statutory FMAP floor. The ACA included a provision providing a disaster-recovery FMAP adjustment for states that have experienced a major, statewide disaster. Louisiana is the only state that has been eligible for the disaster-recovery adjusted FMAP since the fourth quarter of FY2011 (when the adjustment was first available). Both the Middle Class Tax Relief and Job Creation Act of 2012 (P.L. 112-96) and the Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21st Century Act (MAP-21, P.L. 112-141) amended the formula for the disaster-recovery adjusted FMAP. This report describes the FMAP calculation used to reimburse states for most Medicaid expenditures, and it lists the statutory exceptions to the regular FMAP rate. In addition, this report discusses other FMAP-related issues, including FMAP changes in ACA, federal deficit reduction proposals affecting the FMAP rate, and the disaster-recovery FMAP adjustment.

crs_RL34007

crs_RL34007_0

Immigration fraud is reportedly widespread, though reliable estimates of its pervasiveness are not available. Given that an estimated 12 million foreign nationals are residing in the United States without legal authorization, it is reasonable to presume that many of these unauthorized aliens are committing document fraud. The extent to which unauthorized aliens enter with fraudulently obtained documents or acquire bogus documents after entry is not known. Definition of Immigration Fraud5 Immigration fraud is generally grouped into two types—immigration-related document fraud and immigration benefit/qualification fraud. Benefit/qualification fraud encompasses the willful misrepresentation of a material fact to qualify for a status or benefit under immigration law in the absence of lawful eligibility for that benefit. Some view immigration fraud as a continuum of events because people may commit document fraud en route to benefit/qualification fraud. Investigating Immigration Fraud The types of fraud investigations range in circumstances and scope. Many investigations focus on facilitators (i.e., individuals who sell, distribute, or manufacture counterfeit or altered documents), and on organized crime syndicates that broker large-scale illegal schemes such as sham marriage rings or bogus job offers. Investigations of immigration benefit applications are another major activity. As Figure 3 further illustrates, fraud investigations declined overall from FY1992 through FY2003 in terms of actual workyears. The cuts in fraud investigations from FY1992 through FY2003 appear to have been generally across the board in terms of types of investigations pursued. CRS data analysis indicates that workyears spent investigating facilitators of counterfeit or altered documents, organizations that broker large-scale illegal schemes and persons suspected of immigration benefit fraud have all decreased over this time period. Successful prosecutions of fraud cases likewise declined from 494 convictions in FY1992 to 250 convictions in FY2003. Subsequently, the DHS Office of Immigration Statistics (OIS) published different data, reporting that indictments rose from 709 in FY2004 to 1,065 in FY2005 and that convictions rose from 533 in FY2004 to 1,135 in FY2005. In FY2005 (the most recent year OIS has published data), OIS reported 75,532 aliens were removed for immigration fraud, making up 36% of all formal removals. Improving Document Security Complementary to investigating fraud has been the effort to improve the security of immigration documents. Initially, the emphasis was on issuing documents that were tamper-resistant and difficult to counterfeit to impede document fraud and unauthorized employment. Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 the policy priorities have centered on document integrity and personal identification with a sharp focus on intercepting terrorist travel and other security risks. The integrity of the documents issued for immigration purposes and the capacity to curb immigration fraud are among the central themes that underlie the bigger issue of comprehensive immigration reform legislation.

Immigration fraud is reportedly widespread, though reliable estimates of its pervasiveness are not available. Given that an estimated12 million aliens are residing in the United States without legal authorization, it is reasonable to presume that many of these unauthorized aliens are committing document fraud. The extent to which unauthorized aliens enter with fraudulently obtained documents or acquire bogus documents after entry is not known. Immigration fraud is generally grouped into two types—immigration-related "document fraud" and immigration "benefit fraud" ("benefit fraud" involves misrepresentation of a material fact to qualify for a specific immigration status or benefit). Some view immigration fraud as a continuum of events or overlapping crimes because people may commit document fraud en route to benefit fraud. The types of fraud investigations range in circumstances and scope. Many fraud investigations focus on facilitators (i.e., individuals who sell, distribute, or manufacture counterfeit or altered documents) and on organizations that broker large-scale illegal schemes such as sham marriage rings or bogus job offers. Investigations of immigration benefit applications are another major activity. Fraud investigations declined overall from FY1992 through FY2003. The cuts in fraud investigations from FY1992 through FY2003 appear to have been generally across the board in terms of types of investigations pursued. CRS data analysis indicates that workyears spent investigating facilitators of counterfeit or altered documents, organizations that broker large-scale illegal schemes, and persons suspected of immigration benefit fraud had all decreased during that period. Successful prosecutions of fraud cases likewise declined from 494 convictions in FY1992 to 250 convictions in FY2003. Most recently, however, the DHS Office of Immigration Statistics (OIS) reports that indictments for immigration fraud rose from 709 in FY2004 to 1,032 in FY2006 and that convictions rose from 533 in FY2004 to 1,073 in FY2006. OIS also reports that 75,532 aliens were removed for immigration fraud, making up 36% of all formal removals in FY2005. Complementary to investigating fraud has been the effort to improve the security of immigration documents. Initially, the emphasis was on issuing documents that were tamper-resistant and difficult to counterfeit to impede document fraud and unauthorized employment. Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 the policy priorities have centered on document integrity and personal identification with a sharp focus on intercepting terrorist travel and other security risks. The integrity of immigration documents and the capacity to curb immigration fraud are among the central themes that underlie the bigger issue of comprehensive immigration reform legislation. Topics such as adequacy of resources, coordination among agencies and the impact of technologies on personal privacy illustrate the complexity of this debate. This report will be updated as policies change or events warrant.

crs_RL34449

crs_RL34449_0

Background1 A stable, democratic, prosperous Pakistan actively working to counter Islamist militancy is considered vital to U.S. interests. The history of democracy in Pakistan is a troubled one marked by ongoing tripartite power struggles among presidents, prime ministers, and army chiefs. Military regimes have ruled Pakistan directly for 34 of the country's 60 years in existence, and most observers agree that Pakistan has no sustained history of effective constitutionalism or parliamentary democracy. The military, usually acting in tandem with the president, has engaged in three outright seizures of power from civilian-led governments: by Gen. Ayub Khan in 1958, Gen. Zia-ul-Haq in 1977, and Gen. Pervez Musharraf in 1999. Pakistan's New Political Setting6 2007 Political Crises The year 2007 saw Pakistan buffeted by numerous and serious political crises, culminating in the December 27 assassination of former Prime Minister and leading opposition figure Benazir Bhutto, who had returned to Pakistan from self-imposed exile in October. Musharraf himself was reelected to a second five-year presidential term in a controversial October 2007 vote by the country's electoral college. Yet popular opposition to military rule had been growing steadily with a series of political crises in 2007: a bungled attempt by Musharraf to dismiss the country's Chief Justice; Supreme Court rulings that damaged Musharraf's standing and credibility; constitutional questions about the legality of Musharraf's status as president; a return to Pakistan's political stage by two former Prime Ministers with considerable public support; and the pressures of repeatedly delayed parliamentary elections which eventually took place on February 18, 2008. On November 3, 2007, President Musharraf had launched a "second coup" by suspending the country's Constitution and assuming emergency powers in his role as both president and army chief. 2008 Parliamentary Elections8 Overview On February 18, 2008, Pakistan held elections to seat a new National Assembly and all four provincial assemblies. More than $26 million in U.S. aid to Pakistan was devoted to democracy-related programs there in FY2007. Nawaz Sharif himself has accused the U.S. government of actively discouraging the restoration of the deposed judges. Role of the Pakistani Military The army's role as a dominant political player in Pakistan may be changing. Following President Musharraf's November resignation as army chief, the new leadership has shown signs of distancing itself from both Musharraf and from direct involvement in the country's governance. The command and control structure for Pakistan's nuclear weapons arsenal reportedly will not change under the new government. Implications for U.S. Policy Pakistan's relatively credible 2008 polls allowed the Bush Administration to issue an April determination that a democratically elected government had been restored in Islamabad after a 101-month hiatus. Some observers suspect the Bush Administration remains wedded to a policy that would keep the embattled Musharraf in power despite his weakness and lack of public support. Upon completion of Pakistan's February 18 elections, the State Department lauded the "step toward the full restoration of democracy." By late March, however, when a new Parliament, Prime Minister, and federal cabinet were being seated, senior Bush Administration officials appeared to be recognizing the importance of a broader array of political figures in Islamabad and were vowing to work with all of them.

A stable, democratic, prosperous Pakistan actively working to counter Islamist militancy is considered vital to U.S. interests. Pakistan is a key ally in U.S.-led counterterrorism efforts. The history of democracy in Pakistan is a troubled one marked by ongoing tripartite power struggles among presidents, prime ministers, and army chiefs. Military regimes have ruled Pakistan directly for 34 of the country's 60 years in existence, and most observers agree that Pakistan has no sustained history of effective constitutionalism or parliamentary democracy. In 1999, the democratically elected government of then-Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif was ousted in a bloodless coup led by then-Army Chief Gen. Pervez Musharraf, who later assumed the title of president. In 2002, Supreme Court-ordered parliamentary elections—identified as flawed by opposition parties and international observers—seated a new civilian government, but it remained weak, and Musharraf retained the position as army chief until his November 2007 retirement. In October 2007, Pakistan's Electoral College reelected Musharraf to a new five-year term in a controversial vote that many called unconstitutional. The Bush Administration urged restoration of full civilian rule in Islamabad and called for the February 2008 national polls to be free, fair, and transparent. U.S. criticism sharpened after President Musharraf's November 2007 suspension of the Constitution and imposition of emergency rule (nominally lifted six weeks later), and the December 2007 assassination of former Prime Minister and leading opposition figure Benazir Bhutto. To the surprise of nearly all observers, the February elections were relatively free of expected violence. The apparent absence of large-scale election-day rigging allowed opposition parties to decisively defeat Musharraf's allies in Parliament, where nearly all of the senior incumbents lost their seats. An opposition coalition took power in the National Assembly in late March. Parties opposed to Musharraf also took power in three of the country's four provincial assemblies. The result led to the Bush Administration's permanent lifting of coup-related sanctions on aid to Pakistan that had been in place for more than eight years. Political circumstances in Pakistan remain fluid, however, and the country's internal security and stability remain seriously threatened. Many observers urge a broad re-evaluation of U.S. policies toward Pakistan as developments create new centers of power in Islamabad. The Bush Administration has vigorously supported the government of President Musharraf, whose credibility and popularity decreased markedly in 2007. The powerful army's new chief, Gen. Ashfaq Pervez Kiyani, has shown signs of withdrawing the military from a direct role in governance. Moreover, Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gillani may enjoy reinvigorated influence if anticipated reversions to the country's 1973 Constitution—which empowers Parliament over the presidency—come to pass. As the nature of U.S.-Pakistan relations shifts, potential differences over counterterrorism strategy and over the status of Pakistan's deposed judges may bedevil bilateral ties. This report reviews the results of Pakistan's February 2008 vote and discusses some of the implications for U.S. policy. See also CRS Report RL33498, Pakistan-U.S. Relations, and CRS Report RL34240, Pakistan's Political Crises. This report will not be updated.

crs_RL31478

crs_RL31478_0

Some of these issues, suchas biennial budgeting, have extensive legislative histories. The Budget Resolution and Reconciliation The budget resolution represents an agreement between the House and Senate concerning theoverall size of the federal budget, and the general composition of the budget in terms of functionalcategories. Key enforcement procedures under the Budget Enforcement Act of 1990 (i.e., discretionaryspending caps and PAYGO) expire at the end of FY2002. They are as follows: extending the duration of budgetary control mechanisms, in order to retain thebudgetary discipline that has been in place since 1990; establishing a joint budget resolution that would require the President'ssignature, thereby formally and directly involving the President and Congress in deliberations on thebudget early in the process; establishing an emergency reserve fund, in order to change the way Congressand the President budget for emergencies and other unanticipated situations; creating an automatic continuing resolution to provide an automatic source offunding for discretionary activities and prevent a federal government shutdown;and changing to a biennial budget, lengthening the budget cycle to 2 years from oneyear as a way of promoting better management of both Congress's and the administration's budgetaryworkload. Extension of Budget Enforcement Mechanisms Most of the budget enforcement mechanisms under the Congressional Budget Act arepermanent. Instead of maximum deficit targets, the BEA tiedsequestration to new statutory limits on discretionary spending and a "pay-as-you-go" (PAYGO)requirement for new direct spending and revenue legislation. An adjustment for such purposes may be desirable in any extension of discretionary caps. Because the budgetresolution is in the legislative form of a concurrent resolution, it is not presented to the President forhis signature, and thus does not become law. Options and Discussion Proposals to reform the existing process of budgeting for emergencies largely involveestablishing a reserve fund for emergencies, with the appropriation of such funds tied to meetingspecific criteria concerning what constitutes an emergency. Emergency reserve fund proposals also require that appropriations from the reserve fundmeet specific criteria regarding what constitutes an emergency. Automatic Continuing Resolutions Delays in the consideration and enactment of appropriations have been a source of chronicdifficulties in the budget process. 853 , the Comprehensive Budget Process Reform Act. 981 included 2-year budget resolutions,2-year appropriations, and multiyear authorizations. The Senate took nofurther action on the proposal in the 106th Congress.

This report examines several budget process reform options that have received prominentcongressional consideration in recent years: an extension of the Budget Enforcement Act; a jointbudget resolution; an emergency reserve fund; an automatic continuing resolution; and biennialbudgeting. For each reform option, the analysis includes a summary of the procedural issues relatedto the reform option, the arguments that have been raised for and against the proposal, and thelegislative history of past proposals. First, key enforcement procedures under the Budget Enforcement Act (BEA) of 1990 expireat the end of FY2002 (i.e., September 30, 2002). These include the statutory caps on discretionaryspending and the "pay-as-you-go" (PAYGO) requirement for direct spending and revenue legislation. Possible considerations related to an extension of these budget enforcement procedures include thetime frame covered, possible categories for caps on discretionary spending, the types of automaticor permissible adjustments to the caps, and the application of the PAYGO requirement. Second, a joint budget resolution would require the President's signature, thereby formallyand directly involving the President in congressional deliberations on the budget early in the process. Under the existing budget process, there is a concurrent resolution on the budget that represents anagreement between the House and Senate concerning overall budget policy. It is not presented tothe President for his signature, and thus does not become law. Third, proposals for an emergency reserve fund are intended to change the way Congress andthe President budget for emergencies and other unanticipated situations. Instead of appropriatingfunds for such situations as the need arises, emergency reserve fund proposals would requireCongress and the President to set aside money for such purposes in the budget, with theappropriation of such funds tied to meeting specific criteria of what constitutes an emergency. Fourth, an automatic continuing resolution would provide an automatic source of fundingfor discretionary activities in the event one or more regular appropriations acts are not enacted bythe start of a new fiscal year. This reform proposal is intended to prevent a shutdown of the federalgovernment due to the expiration of funding. Finally, biennial budgeting proposals would change the budget cycle to 2 years from oneyear. This reform has been discussed as a way of promoting better management of both Congress'sand the administration's budgetary workload. Biennial budgeting proposals could involve multiyearauthorizations, 2-year budget resolutions, 2-year appropriations, or some combination of the three. This report will be updated to reflect changes in congressional concerns or actions.

crs_R41850

crs_R41850_0

Introduction This report provides an overview of the development of the process for appointing the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), briefly discusses the history of nominations to this position, and identifies related congressional hearing records and reports. Overview Federal statute provides that the Director of the FBI is to be appointed by the President by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. Since 1972, seven nominations for FBI Director have been confirmed, and two other nominations have been withdrawn. On the day after the death of long-time Director J. Edgar Hoover, L. Patrick Gray was appointed acting Director. Clarence M. Kelley was the first individual to become FBI Director through the nomination and confirmation process. P.L. 112-24 , enacted on July 26, 2011, allowed the incumbent Director to be nominated for, and appointed to, an additional two-year term. After the bill was signed, Mueller was nominated for this second term by President Barack Obama, and he was confirmed the following day by vote of 100-0. Mueller's two-year term expired on September 4, 2013. The legislative circumstances surrounding Mueller's reappointment are further detailed in Appendix A . James B. Comey Jr. As Mueller's unique two-year term drew to a close, President Obama nominated James B. Comey Jr. to succeed him. The President submitted Comey's nomination on June 21, 2013. Comey began his 10-year term of office on September 4, 2013. The Senate also agreed that, if the bill were passed by the House and signed into law, a subsequent nomination would receive expedited consideration [I]f Robert S. Mueller, III, is nominated to be Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the nomination be placed directly on the Executive Calendar; that at a time to be determined by the majority leader, in consultation with the Republican leader, the Senate proceed to executive session to consider the nomination; that there will be 2 hours for debate equally divided in the usual form; that upon the use or yielding back of time, the Senate proceed to vote without intervening action or debate on the nomination; the motion to reconsider be considered made and laid upon the table with no intervening action or debate; that no further motions be in order to the nomination; that any statements related to the nomination be printed in the Record; that the President be immediately notified of the Senate's action, and the Senate resume legislative session. 112-24 ). President Obama immediately nominated Mueller to a second, two-year term. On July 27, 2011, Mueller was confirmed by a vote of 100-0. Appendix B. Constitutionality of Extending the FBI Director's Term of Office The constitutionality of extending an officer's fixed term of office, specifically the Director of the FBI, depends on how a proposed extension reads and whether the President will be able to retain plenary authority to remove such officer.

The Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) is appointed by the President by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. The statutory basis for the present nomination and confirmation process was developed in 1968 and 1976, and has been used since the death of J. Edgar Hoover in 1972. Over this time, seven nominations have been confirmed and two have been withdrawn by the President before confirmation. The position of FBI Director has a fixed 10-year term, and the officeholder cannot be reappointed, unless Congress acts to allow a second appointment of the incumbent. There are no statutory conditions on the President's authority to remove the FBI Director. Since 1972, one Director has been removed by the President. Robert S. Mueller III was the first FBI Director to be appointed to a second term, and this was done under special statutory arrangements. He was first confirmed by the Senate on August 2, 2001, with a term of office that expired in September 2011. In May 2011, President Barack Obama announced his intention to seek legislation that would extend Mueller's term of office for two years. Legislation that would allow Mueller to be nominated to an additional, two-year term was considered and passed in the Senate and the House, and President Obama signed the bill into law (P.L. 112-24) on July 26, 2011. Mueller subsequently was nominated and confirmed to the two-year term, and he served until September 4, 2013. On June 21, 2013, President Obama nominated James B. Comey Jr., a former Deputy Attorney General, to succeed Mueller. Comey was confirmed by the Senate on July 29, 2013, and he took office on September 4, 2013. This report provides an overview of the development of the process for appointing the FBI Director, briefly discusses the history of nominations to this position, and identifies related congressional hearing records and reports. Two appendixes to the report provide information and analysis concerning the 2011 extension of the Director's tenure. Appendix A documents the successive developments that enabled this extension, including the enactment of P.L. 112-24 and Mueller's nomination and confirmation. Appendix B provides a legal overview and analysis of extending a term of office. This report will be updated as developments warrant.

crs_R42012

crs_R42012_0

Background, Recent Activity, and Current Status Trade Adjustment Assistance for Workers (TAA) provides federally-funded benefits to dislocated workers who are adversely affected by foreign trade. To be eligible for TAA benefits, separated workers must petition the Department of Labor (DOL) to establish that foreign trade contributed importantly to their job loss. It was last reauthorized by the Trade Adjustment Assistance Extension Act of 2011 (TAAEA; Title II of P.L. 112-40 ). TAAEA specified that TAA would operate under one set of eligibility and benefit provisions through December 31, 2013, and then revert to more restrictive eligibility and benefit provisions beginning January 1, 2014. 113-235 ) appropriated funds for the program with the intent of continuing full operation of the TAA for Workers program through FY2015, including the certification of new workers. Under current law, only production workers (i.e., workers that produce an "article") are eligible to be certified. The petitioning firm is a supplier or a downstream producer to a TAA-certified firm and either (1) the sales or production for the TAA-certified firm accounted for at least 20% of the sales or production of the petitioning firm or (2) a loss of business with a TAA-certified firm contributed importantly to the workers' job losses. The change in eligibility criteria is not retroactive. Alternative Trade Adjustment Assistance Eligibility Alternative Trade Adjustment Assistance (ATAA) is a wage insurance program that provides a cash payment to qualified TAA-certified workers age 50 and over who obtain new employment at a lower wage. Benefits TAA benefits include training subsidies and income support for workers who have exhausted their UI benefits and are enrolled in training. Due to the two-year period that a certification remains active and the length of the time that a worker may receive TAA benefits and services, workers certified under pre-2011 provisions may currently be eligible for other sets of benefits authorized by previous TAA provisions. The range of approved training includes a variety of governmental and private programs. Certified workers can receive an allowance equal to 90% of each of their job search and relocation expenses, up to a maximum of $1,250 for each benefit. A Relocation Allowance may be available to workers who have secured permanent employment outside their local commuting area . Trade Readjustment Allowance Trade Readjustment Allowance (TRA) is an entitlement that provides income support to certified workers who are in approved training and whose UI benefits have been exhausted. It is funded by the federal government and administered by the states through their unemployment insurance systems. The program provides a cash payment to an eligible worker equal to 50% of the difference between the worker's old wage and new wage. Group eligibility is determined by DOL and individual benefits are administered by cooperating state agencies. In FY2013, the TAA program was operating under the 2011 provisions, which meant that both production and services workers were eligible to be certified for benefits. Table 5 does not provide data on the number of TAA-certified workers who received non-training employment services such as case management and career counseling. These provisions were set to remain in place for one year until the program was scheduled to begin to be phased out after December 31, 2014. However, the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2015 ( P.L.

Trade Adjustment Assistance for Workers (TAA) provides federal assistance to workers who have been adversely affected by foreign trade. It was most recently authorized by the Trade Adjustment Assistance Extension Act of 2011 (TAAEA; Title II of P.L. 112-40). Under TAAEA, the program operated under one set of eligibility and benefit provisions through December 31, 2013, and then reverted to a more restrictive set of provisions on January 1, 2014. The TAA program was scheduled to be phased out beginning January 1, 2015, but the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2015 (P.L. 113-235) provided funding for the program and allowed it to continue full operation through FY2015. To be eligible for TAA, a group of workers must establish that they were separated from their employment either because their jobs moved outside the United States or because of an increase in directly competitive imports. Workers at firms that are suppliers to or downstream producers of TAA-certified firms may also be eligible for TAA benefits. Under current law, only production workers are eligible. Under the TAAEA provisions that were in place through December 31, 2013, both production and service workers were eligible. Service workers who were certified prior to the change in eligibility may continue to receive benefits. To establish eligibility for TAA benefits, a group of affected workers must petition the Department of Labor (DOL) and a DOL investigation must verify the role of foreign trade in the workers' job loss. Once a petition is certified by DOL, covered workers may apply for individual benefits. These benefits are funded by the federal government and administered by the states through their workforce systems. The specific group of benefits and services to which a worker is entitled is determined by the date of the petition that covers the worker. Benefits include a group of benefits and services to assist workers in returning to work. Training subsidies are available if no suitable employment is available and a certified worker meets other criteria. Eligible training options include a variety of public and private programs. Employment services are provided to TAA-certified workers through state workforce agencies. These can include case management, career counseling, job search assistance, and other non-training services. Job search and relocation allowances are available to workers who seek employment outside of their commuting area. Trade Readjustment Allowance (TRA) is an income support for TAA-certified workers who have exhausted their unemployment insurance (UI) and are enrolled in an eligible training program. TRA payments are equal to the workers' final UI benefit. Wage insurance is available to certified workers age 50 and over who obtain reemployment at a lower wage. The wage insurance program provides a cash payment equal to 50% of the difference between the worker's new wage and previous wage, up to a two-year maximum of $10,000. This report provides background on the TAA program. It begins with descriptions of eligibility and benefits under both the current and previous provisions. The report then presents information on application activity, benefit usage, and participants' employment outcomes.

crs_R43345

crs_R43345_0

Several components of the shadow banking system contributed to the breadth of the financial turmoil that began in 2007, and the magnitude of the financial panic in September 2008, according to the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (FCIC). applying the capital requirements in Section 171 of the Dodd-Frank Act to nonbanks). Furthermore, many of the proposed regulatory responses for shadow banking have policy trade-offs analogous to regulatory policies in banking, and some shadow banking sectors already have a financial regulatory regime (such as securities regulations). Many of these economic problems and potential policy responses are illustrated by the experiences of five shadow banking sectors (repos, nonbanks, asset backed commercial paper [ABCP], securitization, and MMFs) during 2007-2008, and by regulatory responses currently being considered. In many cases (but not all), the kind of regulation applied to securities market activities is fundamentally different from the regulation of chartered depository banks. Banking regulation is typically applied only to specific institutions, is risk-based, takes into account the linkages between banks through the payment system, and includes government emergency backstops, such as a lender of last resort and a deposit guarantor. The diversity of shadow banking activities and institutions makes it difficult to generalize; however, the degree to which debt financing in the financial system is covered by risk-based regulation, has access to emergency backstops, or can easily adapt to innovation in the provision of similar services may be influenced by regulatory choices for banking and shadow banking. Adjusting the focal point of intermediation from left to right, the first shadow banking example in Figure 1 illustrates a substitute for deposits (in this case repos), the second shadow banking example illustrates a substitute for firms with special bank charters (non-bank intermediaries), and the third row illustrates a substitute for holding loans (in this case selling loans through securitization). (B) Firms without bank charters—A firm does not have to be a chartered bank in order to borrow or lend, and luminated banking involves borrowing from depositors in order to offer and hold loans. Debt can be issued and traded through securities markets. (E) Money Market Mutual Funds—MMFs gather funds from investors in order to buy relatively low risk short-term debt in securities markets. Potential Policy Problems in Financial Intermediation It is difficult to generalize about the policy problems of shadow banking because the same term is used to describe firms or activities that focus on different bank-like functions. Like luminated banks, shadow banks that fund themselves with short-term obligations (albeit not deposits) in order to fund longer term assets have a maturity mismatch and are also vulnerable to interest rate risk. Information asymmetries are of particular importance to those categories of shadow banking that rely on securities markets to perform bank-like functions. Shadow banking that relies on collateral can also be subject to self-reinforcing fire sales. For example, during the mortgage crisis of 2007-2009, some forms of ABCP were collateralized by the mortgage-backed securities that they funded. Regulation and Other Policy Responses to Financial Vulnerabilities Because the term shadow banking is used to describe such a diversity of firms and practices, it would be incorrect to categorize luminated banking as regulated and shadow banking as unregulated. Securities regulation, which several categories of shadow banking involves, generally requires disclosure of material risks, but typically does not limit the risk that sophisticated securities market participants may take. Deposit Insurance One of the fundamental problems of financial intermediation is a depositor run, which may be more likely to occur during times of financial panic. Specific Sectors of Shadow Banking The report thus far has presented an economic framework to understand the disparate institutions and markets that are gathered under the term shadow banking. In each case, the report briefly describes the institution or market, links it to the description of financial intermediation described above, briefly discusses its experience during the financial crisis, and describes related policy concerns. Repurchase Agreements Description In the context of shadow banking, a repurchase agreement is analogous to a banking deposit. First, some have suggested that nonbanks that rely on repo transactions to conduct financial intermediation similar to banks should be subject to safety and soundness regulations. Before a crisis, nonbanks with more than $50 billion in assets can be subjected to safety and soundness regulation if there is a determination of systemic risk concerns under Title I. Even smaller nonbanks can be resolved by the FDIC if there is a determination that their failure could contribute to financial instability under Title II. However, Title XI of the DFA limits the ability of the Federal Reserve to provide emergency lending to a single nonbank (as it did for Bear Stearns); rather, future emergency lending facilities would have to have more general eligibility criteria. Policy Concerns Several policy changes have been implemented to attempt to address future problems in ABCP. The Dodd-Frank Act created a new regulatory framework for the securitization process, especially for residential mortgage securitization. Rather, MMFs are required to provide periodic disclosures like other firms funded through securities markets. Nonbanks often facilitate shadow banking by funding debt through securities markets. Whether offered by nonbanks or by banks, the creation and funding of debt is often subject to several economic vulnerabilities linked to financial intermediation, such as vulnerabilities to runs or fire-sales. However, the type of regulation that applies to shadow banking varies. Banking regulation is typically prudential (risk-based), but securities regulation typically is not.

Shadow banking refers to financial firms and activities that perform similar functions to those of depository banks. Although the term is used to describe dissimilar firms and activities, a general policy concern is that a component of shadow banking could be a source of financial instability, even though that component might not be subject to regulations designed to prevent a crisis, or be eligible for emergency facilities designed to mitigate financial turmoil once it has begun. This concern is magnified by the experience of 2007-2009, during which financial problems among nonbank lenders, and disruption to securitization (in which both banks and nonbanks participated), contributed to the magnitude of the financial crisis. This report provides a framework for understanding shadow banking, discusses several fundamental problems of financial intermediation, and describes the experiences of several specific sectors of shadow banking during the financial crisis and related policy concerns. Shadow banking is contrasted with luminated banking, a term which the report uses to describe chartered banks that gather funds from depositors in order to offer loans that the chartered bank holds itself. Luminated banking, like all forms of financial intermediation, is subject to well-known risks, including credit risk, interest rate risk, maturity mismatch, and the potential for runs. Each sector of shadow banking is generally subject to the same problem of financial intermediation to which the sector is analogous. For example, if a sector of shadow banking such as money market funds (MMF) has investors that are analogous to depositors in luminated banking, then the potential for runs may be similar. Or, if the sector relies on collateralized loans, such as asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP), then disruptions in the market for the underlying collateral can cause fire sales that may reinforce and magnify price declines. The regulatory regime and eligibility for emergency financial assistance for shadow banking varies from sector to sector and type of firm to type of firm. For example, the Dodd-Frank Act subjects certain large nonbank firms funded by repurchase agreements (repos) to safety and soundness regulation similar to banks. The Dodd-Frank Act prohibits emergency assistance to individual firms as was done in 2008 for Bear Stearns or AIG, but preserves the ability of the Federal Reserve to provide more generally eligible assistance to shadow banking sectors such as ABCP through the Term Asset Backed Liquidity Facility (TALF). Title II of the Dodd-Frank Act allows the FDIC to resolve the failure of any firm, including shadow banking firms, whose failure may pose a threat to financial stability. Several components of shadow banking rely on securities markets to fund debt. These securities regulations are typically activity based, applying to all securities market participants if there is no explicit exemption. Securities regulation requires disclosure of material risks, but often does not attempt to limit the risks of firms funded through securities markets. In contrast, banking regulation sometimes applies only to firms with specific charters. Furthermore, banking regulators oversee linkages between banks, such as the payment system. Thus, debt funded through securities markets is likely to be subject to regulation no matter who does it, but that regulation is unlikely to be risk-based or to incorporate linkages between firms. Banking regulation is likely to be risk based, but to miss debt funded through securities markets. Some policy options for shadow banking firms and markets are often analogous to policy options for depository banking or securities markets. Firms that engage in shadow banking could be subjected to safety and soundness regulation and capital requirements in order to limit risk and encourage resilience. Providers of short-term credit to shadow banks could be offered guarantees analogous to deposit insurance in order to minimize runs. Non-bank firms that rely on short-term credit to fund lending (or the holding of debt) can be made eligible for emergency lending facilities from a lender of last resort in order to address liquidity problems. There are alternatives to the banking approach. Banks and other firms that fund themselves with substitute for deposits could be assessed higher fees to account for potential systemic costs that current market prices might not incorporate. More financial regulation could be made activity based, rather than charter based, in order to lessen regulatory arbitrage. Differences in banking regulation and securities regulation for the funding of debt could be preserved, but each separate category of regulation could be addressed where it applies. The report analyzes five sectors of shadow banking. These sectors include (1) repos, (2) non-bank intermediaries, (3) ABCP, (4) securitization, and (5) MMFs. For each of these sectors, the report briefly defines the sector, recounts the sector's experience during the financial crisis, and outlines some related policy concerns. Each policy problem is described in the context of the general problems of financial intermediation introduced earlier in the report.

crs_R44557

crs_R44557_0

Introduction The Fair Housing Act was enacted as Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968 (P.L. 90-284). As initially enacted, the Fair Housing Act prohibited discrimination in the sale, rental, or financing of housing based on race, color, religion, and national origin. FHEO also oversees federal funding to state, local, and nonprofit organizations that investigate fair housing complaints based on federal, state, or local laws through the Fair Housing Assistance Program and Fair Housing Initiatives Program. In July 2015, HUD released new regulations that govern how certain recipients of HUD funding (those receiving Community Planning and Development formula grants and Public Housing Authorities) must affirmatively further fair housing. However, as of the date of this report, HUD had delayed implementation of new regulations. Additionally, HUD and FHEO have taken steps to protect against discrimination not explicitly directed against members of classes protected under the Fair Housing Act—issuing regulations to prevent discrimination in HUD programs based on sexual orientation and gender identity, and providing guidance to prevent discrimination that may arise from criminal background checks, nuisance ordinances, and failure to provide housing to those who do not speak English. After a brief summary of the Fair Housing Act, this report discusses each of these Fair Housing activities, as well as two other initiatives administered by FHEO, Limited English Proficiency and Section 3, the latter of which provides economic opportunities for low- and very low-income persons. If the discrimination takes place in a state or locality with its own similar fair housing enforcement agency, sometimes referred to as a Fair Housing Assistance Program (FHAP) agency, HUD must refer the complaint to that agency. HUD investigates complaints to determine if there is reasonable cause to believe a discriminatory practice has occurred or is about to occur. FHAP funds state and local fair housing agencies, and FHIP funds eligible entities that largely include private nonprofit organizations. Fair Housing Assistance Program (FHAP) FHAP funds state and local agencies that HUD certifies as having their own laws, procedures, and remedies that are substantially equivalent to the federal Fair Housing Act. Activities for which FHAP agencies receive funding include capacity building, processing complaints, administrative costs, training, and special enforcement efforts. HUD funds three activities that are provided for under the statute: Private Enforcement Initiative: Provides funds for fair housing enforcement organizations to investigate violations of the federal Fair Housing Act and similar state and local laws, and to obtain enforcement of the laws. Requirement for HUD and Grant Recipients to Affirmatively Further Fair Housing (AFFH) In addition to prohibiting discrimination, the Fair Housing Act, since its inception, has required HUD and other federal agencies that administer programs related to housing and urban development to administer their programs in a way that affirmatively furthers fair housing. The New Rule: The Assessment of Fair Housing The AFFH rule, for the first time, put in place detailed regulations that govern the process of affirmatively furthering fair housing. Further, HUD is to provide data for program participants to use in preparing their AFHs and is to publish tools that help program participants through the AFH process. Identifying fair housing issues. Racially or ethnically concentrated areas of poverty . Significant disparities in access to opportunity for any protected class. Disproportionate housing needs for any protected class. Setting goals for overcoming the effects of contributing factors. Other Requirements Overseen by HUD's Office of Fair Housing and Equal Opportunity In addition to administering fair housing programs and enforcing the law, HUD's Office of Fair Housing and Equal Opportunity (FHEO) oversees the Section 3 requirement and HUD's compliance with limited English proficiency requirements. Limited English Proficiency FHEO oversees HUD's efforts to ensure that persons with limited English proficiency have access to HUD programs. Funding has been used to translate HUD documents, provide translation services at HUD events, provide phone translations for callers to HUD, and acquire technology, among other services.

The federal Fair Housing Act, enacted in 1968 as Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act (P.L. 90-284), prohibits discrimination in the sale, rental, or financing of housing based on race, color, religion, national origin, sex, familial status, and handicap. The Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), through its Office of Fair Housing and Equal Opportunity (FHEO), receives and investigates complaints under the Fair Housing Act and determines if there is reasonable cause to believe that discrimination has occurred or is about to occur. State and local fair housing agencies and private fair housing organizations also investigate complaints based on federal, state, and local fair housing laws. In fact, if alleged discrimination takes place in a state or locality with its own similar fair housing enforcement agency, HUD must refer the complaint to that agency. Two programs administered by FHEO provide federal funding to assist state, local, and private fair housing organizations: The Fair Housing Assistance Program (FHAP) funds state and local agencies that HUD certifies as having their own laws, procedures, and remedies that are substantially equivalent to the federal Fair Housing Act. Funding is used for such activities as capacity building, processing complaints, administrative costs, and training. In FY2018, the appropriation for FHAP was $23.9 million. The Fair Housing Initiatives Program (FHIP) funds eligible entities, most of which are private nonprofit organizations. Funds are used for investigating complaints, including testing (comparing outcomes when members of a protected class attempt to obtain housing with outcomes for those not in a protected class), education, outreach, and capacity building. In FY2018, the appropriation for FHIP was $39.6 million. Another provision of the Fair Housing Act requires that HUD affirmatively further fair housing (AFFH). As part of this requirement, recipients of certain HUD funding—jurisdictions that receive Community Planning and Development grants and Public Housing Authorities—go through a process to certify that they are affirmatively furthering fair housing. In July 2015, HUD issued a new rule governing the process, called the Assessment of Fair Housing (AFH). The rule provided that funding recipients are to assess their jurisdictions and regions for fair housing issues (including areas of segregation, racially and ethnically concentrated areas of poverty, disparities in access to opportunity, and disproportionate housing needs), identify factors that contribute to these fair housing issues, and set priorities and goals for overcoming them. HUD is to provide data for program participants to use in preparing their AFHs, as well as a tool that helps program participants through the AFH process. However, as of May 2018, HUD has indefinitely delayed implementation of the AFFH rule. In response, a group of advocacy organizations has filed a lawsuit challenging HUD's failure to implement and enforce the rule. Among other activities undertaken by HUD's FHEO are efforts to prevent discrimination that may not be explicitly directed against protected classes under the Fair Housing Act. This includes issuing a regulation to prohibit discrimination in HUD programs based on sexual orientation and gender identity and releasing new guidance in 2016 addressing several issues: the use of criminal background checks in screening applicants for housing, local nuisance ordinances that may disproportionately affect victims of domestic violence, and failure to serve people who have limited English proficiency. FHEO also oversees efforts to ensure that clients with Limited English Proficiency (LEP) have access to HUD programs. Guidance from FHEO helps housing providers determine how best to provide translation services, and HUD also receives a small appropriation through the Fair Housing and Equal Opportunity account for the agency to translate documents and provide translation on the phone or at events. Another requirement overseen by FHEO is Section 3, which provides employment and training opportunities for low- and very low-income persons. Section 3 requirements apply to hiring associated with certain housing projects funded by HUD.

crs_R45398

crs_R45398_0

U.S. natural gas production has risen 33% since 2008, and crude oil production has jumped 87%. In between natural gas and crude oil is a group of hydrocarbons referred to as natural gas liquids (NGLs). NGLs are differentiated from one another by the number of carbon atoms in their molecular chain. Natural gas liquids are extracted as a mixture of hydrocarbons and other gases and are produced and separated from one of two sources: natural gas processing or crude oil refining. In 2008, U.S. production of NGLs was 653 million barrels, and in 2017 it was 1,381 million barrels, more than doubling in 10 years. Sources of Production Most of the increase in NGL production has come from tight shale natural gas formations, some of which have high concentrations of NGLs. Although NGLs may be obtained from both natural gas processing and crude oil refining, they come predominantly from the former—with over 90% of all U.S. NGL production coming from natural gas processing. Natural gas, when extracted from a wellhead, contains methane, a variety of other hydrocarbons (most of them NGLs), and various impurities including hydrogen sulfide and water. Transportation Infrastructure The rapid growth of NGL production has outpaced the development of supporting infrastructure. NGLs are expensive to transport and handle—requiring high pressures and low temperatures to keep them in a liquid state for shipment. A network of processing plants, fractionation sites, petrochemical olefin crackers, and distribution methods is necessary to move NGLs from production to their markets. Moreover, the surplus of NGLs brought about by domestic production growth is increasing the need for infrastructure to aid in exporting of NGLs and the storage of NGLs domestically. Economics The United States is by far the largest producer of NGLs in the world. As of 2017, the United States accounted for over one-third of global NGL production. These lower prices make them a very competitive feedstock for petrochemical companies to make products like plastic. Furthermore, the rising value of NGLs is driving the focus of natural gas production away from the Gulf Coast to tighter shale formations in the Midwest and Northeast that have more NGLs. As the industry makes technological improvements in extraction, production costs have declined and NGL production has increased. In 2017, approximately 37% of U.S. NGL production was exported, with Canada, Japan, and China being the largest recipients, receiving 18%, 16%, and 11% of U.S. exports, respectively. imports of NGLs have fallen by over 30%. The resultant surge in demand led to a spike in propane prices for the year. Congressional Interest Infrastructure, production, safety, the environment, and economics are all critical to the NGL market and are of interest to Congress. Other bills that have been introduced in the 115 th Congress address infrastructure, taxes, safety, and other energy topics, and are not specifically targeting NGLs. The rise in production of each NGL—ethane, propane, butane, isobutane, and pentanes—since 2008 has been large.

The U.S. oil and natural gas industries have gone through a "renaissance" of production. Technological improvements in hydraulic fracturing and horizontal drilling have unlocked enormous oil and natural gas resources from tight formations, such as shale. In conjunction with the rise in oil and natural gas production, U.S. production of natural gas liquids has also increased. Natural gas liquids (NGLs) are a group of hydrocarbons that includes ethane, propane, butane, isobutane, and natural gasoline. NGLs are differentiated from one another by the number of carbon atoms in their molecular chain. They have a wide variety of applications from specialized fuels (e.g., propane, butane) to petrochemical feedstocks for making products like plastic and fertilizers. NGLs are extracted as byproducts in the production of natural gas and oil. Of these two sources, natural gas processing is by far the most significant, contributing over 90% of NGL production in 2016. When extracted from a well, natural gas is mixed with other hydrocarbons—many of them NGLs—and various impurities. In order for the natural gas to be marketable, the NGLs and impurities must then be removed. The separated NGLs may then be discarded or undergo further processing in order to be sold. The relatively high value of NGLs combined with the rise in natural gas production has led to a rapid rise in NGL production as it has become more economical for processors to sell the separated NGLs. The United States is by far the largest producer of NGLs in the world, accounting for more than a third of global production. Domestic NGL production has more than doubled in the 10 years since 2008, reaching 1,381 million barrels in 2017. Ethane and propane are the two most prevalent NGLs, and together they account for more than 70% of all domestic production. As NGL production has risen, it has increasingly outstripped domestic consumption, which has remained relatively flat since 2010 (when EIA began to collect data). Consequently, 37% of U.S. NGL production was exported in 2017. Canada, Japan, and China are currently the largest importers of U.S. NGLs. The rapid growth of NGL production has also outpaced the development of supporting infrastructure. NGLs are expensive to transport and handle—requiring high pressures and low temperatures to keep them in a liquid state for shipment. A network of processing plants and distribution methods is necessary to move NGLs from well to market. Moreover, the surplus of NGLs brought upon by domestic production growth is increasing the need for infrastructure to aid in the exportation of NGLs internationally and the storage of NGLs domestically. While energy production and consumption have been issues of interest to Congress for decades, the supply, consumption, environment, and trade of NGLs has become a topic of congressional interest more recently. Infrastructure, production, safety, and economics are all critical to the NGL market and may be of interest to Congress. Over 30 bills that relate to NGLs have been introduced in the 115th Congress. Proposed legislation has targeted issues related to NGL storage, infrastructure permitting, data collection, and safety, among others.

crs_R40599

crs_R40599_0

Introduction Policymakers continue to be concerned with securing the economic health of the United States—including combating those crimes that threaten to undermine the nation's financial stability. In 2012, for instance, about 12.6 million Americans were reportedly victims of identity fraud. Consequently, policymakers may debate the federal government's role in preventing identity theft and its related crimes, mitigating the potential effects of identity theft after it occurs, and providing the most effective tools to investigate and prosecute identity thieves. Legislative History15 Until 1998, identity theft was not a federal crime. 105-318 ), which criminalized identity theft at the federal level. 108-275 ). With respect to identity theft prevention, the task force suggested that decreasing the use of Social Security numbers (SSNs) in the public sector and reviewing the use of SSNs in the private sector could help prevent identity theft. Legislative Recommendations More specifically, the task force recommended that Congress close gaps in the federal criminal statues to more effectively prosecute and punish identity theft-related offenses by amending the identity theft and aggravated identity theft statutes so that thieves who misappropriate the identities of corporations and organizations—and not just the identities of individuals—can be prosecuted, amending the aggravated identity theft statute by adding new crimes as predicate offenses for aggravated identity theft violations, amending the statute criminalizing the theft of electronic data by eliminating provisions requiring that the information be stolen through interstate communications, amending the computer fraud statute by eliminating the requirement that damage to a victim's computer exceed $5,000, amending the cyber-extortion statute by expanding the definition of cyber-extortion, and ensuring that the Sentencing Commission allows for enhanced sentences imposed on identity thieves whose actions affect multiple victims. These guidelines require creditors and financial institutions with "covered accounts" to develop and institute written identity theft prevention programs. Congress may consider monitoring the effects of the impending Red Flags Rule on subsequent identity theft rates. Identity theft has remained the dominant consumer fraud complaint to the FTC. However, while the number of overall identity theft complaints generally increased between 2000 (when the commission began recording identity theft complaints) and 2008, the number of complaints decreased in both 2009 and 2010 before rising again in 2011 and 2012. Identity theft case filings and convictions peaked in 2007 and 2008, and have generally declined since. Aggravated identity theft case filings and convictions, on the other hand, have largely continued to increase since aggravated identity theft was added as a federal offense in 2004. One element of this discussion centers around the fact that identity theft is often committed to facilitate other crimes and frauds (e.g., credit card fraud, document fraud, and employment fraud). Securing Social Security Numbers The prevalence of personally identifiable information—and in particular, of Social Security numbers (SSN)—has been an issue concerning policymakers, analysts, and data security experts. One document that continues to display SSNs, however, is the Medicare identification card. In order to prevent any proportion of identity theft that may result from data breaches, or to mitigate the extent of the damage resulting from breach-related identity theft, Congress may wish to consider whether to strengthen data breach notification requirements. Such requirements could affect both the notification of the relevant law enforcement authorities as well as the notification of the individual whose personally identifiable information may be at risk from the breach.

In the current fiscal environment, policymakers are increasingly concerned with securing the economic health of the United States—including combating those crimes that threaten to undermine the nation's financial stability. Identity theft is one such crime. In 2012, about 12.6 million Americans were reportedly victims of identity fraud, and the average identity fraud victim incurred a mean of $365 in costs as a result of the fraud. Identity theft is often committed to facilitate other crimes such as credit card fraud, document fraud, or employment fraud, which in turn can affect not only the nation's economy but its security. Consequently, in securing the nation and its economic health, policymakers are also tasked with reducing identity theft and its impact. Identity theft has remained the dominant consumer fraud complaint to the Federal Trade Commission (FTC). Nevertheless, while the number of overall identity theft complaints generally increased between when the FTC began recording identity theft complaints in 2000 and 2008, the number of complaints decreased in both 2009 and 2010 before rising in 2011 and 2012. Identity theft case filings and convictions peaked in 2007 and 2008, and have generally declined since. Aggravated identity theft case filings and convictions, on the other hand, have largely continued to increase since aggravated identity theft was added as a federal offense in 2004. Congress continues to debate the federal government's role in (1) preventing identity theft and its related crimes, (2) mitigating the potential effects of identity theft after it occurs, and (3) providing the most effective tools to investigate and prosecute identity thieves. With respect to preventing identity theft, one issue concerning policymakers is the prevalence of personally identifiable information—and in particular, the prevalence of Social Security numbers (SSNs)—in both the private and public sectors. One policy option to reduce their prevalence may involve restricting the use of SSNs on government-issued documents such as Medicare identification cards. Another option could entail providing federal agencies with increased regulatory authority to curb the prevalence of SSN use in the private sector. In debating policies to mitigate the effects of identity theft, one option Congress may consider is whether to strengthen data breach notification requirements. Such requirements could affect the notification of relevant law enforcement authorities as well as any individuals whose personally identifiable information may be at risk from the breach. Congress may also be interested in assessing the true scope of data breaches, particularly involving government networks. There have already been several legislative and administrative actions aimed at curtailing identity theft. Congress enacted legislation naming identity theft as a federal crime in 1998 (P.L. 105-318) and later provided for enhanced penalties for aggravated identity theft (P.L. 108-275). In April 2007, the President's Identity Theft Task Force issued recommendations to combat identity theft, including specific legislative recommendations to close identity theft-related gaps in the federal criminal statutes. In a further attempt to curb identity theft, Congress directed the FTC to issue an Identity Theft Red Flags Rule, requiring that creditors and financial institutions with specified account types develop and institute written identity theft prevention programs.

crs_RS21165

crs_RS21165_0

Republican Conference Procedures Republican Conference rules delineate procedures for the selection of standing committee chairs and ranking minority members. All other standing committee chairs or ranking minority members are nominated by the Republican Steering Committee and ratified by the full Republican Conference. The Steering Committee is composed of party leaders, selected committee leaders, class leaders, and regional representatives. Each region elects its Steering Committee member. Other chair and ranking Member nominations are made by the Democratic Steering and Policy Committee and voted on by the entire Democratic Caucus. Table 2 depicts the Democratic Steering and Policy Committee as constituted as of July 1, 2017.

House rules, Republican Conference rules, and Democratic Caucus rules each detail aspects of the procedures followed in selecting standing committee chairs and ranking minority members. The Republican Steering Committee and the Democratic Steering and Policy Committee are constituted during the early organization meetings traditionally held in November and December to determine most committee chairs and ranking minority members and to make committee assignments for most committees. Their recommendations are then forwarded to the full Republican Conference and Democratic Caucus for approval. Although structured slightly differently, both the Republican Steering Committee and the Democratic Steering and Policy Committee are composed of elected party leaders, regional members, class representatives, and other party officials. This report will be updated if rules or procedures change.

crs_RL32585

crs_RL32585_0

Introduction The 10-year statutory ban on the manufacture, transfer or possession of "semiautomatic assault weapons" (SAWs) and "large capacity ammunition feeding devices" (LCAFDs) that are capable of holding more than 10 rounds expired on September 13, 2004. Bills were introduced that would have extended the ban ( S. 2190 , S. 2498 ), made it permanent ( S. 1034 ), or expanded it to include other "military style" firearms ( H.R. 2038 / S. 1431 ). A key consideration for Congress is whether violent gun crimes, particularly crimes involving multiple gunshot victims and gunshot wounds per victim, were reduced by the ban. Second, other firearms were defined as SAWs if they included specified features. A rifle met the SAW definition if it was able to accept a detachable magazine and included two or more of the following five features: (1) a folding or telescoping stock; (2) a pistol grip that protruded conspicuously below the action of the firearm; (3) a bayonet mount; (4) a muzzle flash suppressor or threaded barrel capable of accepting such a suppressor; or (5) a grenade launcher. There were similar definitions for pistols and shotguns that were classified as SAWs. It should be noted that it is not possible to determine precisely whether all these firearms were SAWs, nor is it known to what extent these firearms contributed to the ability of the criminals to outgun the police by firing multiple shots without reloading. Arguments For and Against the Ban Ban supporters argue that assault weapons should be prohibited, because they were designed for military purposes, are firearms of choice for criminals, and are not suitable for hunting, competitive shooting, or self-defense. Furthermore, proponents of the ban underscore that the impetus for the ban was several mass murders committed with SAWs, and that these firearms are disproportionately—given their relatively small numbers compared to other firearms—used in crimes involving multiple shots fired, multiple victims, multiple gunshot wounds per victim, and police officers as victims. They note that, despite several legal challenges, the ban has been upheld as constitutional by federal courts. Opponents of the ban argue that SAWs are not designed for, or used by, military forces, and that large numbers of law-abiding gun owners use SAWs for self-defense, marksmanship, and hunting. They contend that SAWs are functionally no different from other semiautomatic firearms in that they fire only one round per pull of the trigger, and that the statutorily defined SAW features are largely cosmetic and that these banned firearms are no more lethal than other commonly available semiautomatic firearms. They also cite federal, state, and local data sources that suggest that SAWs were used in a fraction (2%) of violent crimes before the ban, and have been used in about the same percentages since the ban. They view the ban as part of a progressive intrusion on the right of citizens to own firearms. As a result, the ban expired on September 13, 2004. In statute, "SAWs" were defined in two ways. Second, other firearms were defined as SAWs, if they included specified features. Nevertheless, the study found that the firearm trace data suggested that the use of SAWs in crime had declined since the ban's enactment. Law Enforcement Officers Killed with Firearms The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) reports annually on the number of law enforcement officers killed and assaulted in the line of duty.

The 10-year ban on the manufacture, transfer or possession of "semiautomatic assault weapons" (SAWs) and "large capacity ammunition feeding devices" (LCAFDs) expired on September 13, 2004. In statute, "SAWs" were defined in two ways. First, certain firearms were defined as SAWs by make and model. Second, other firearms were defined as SAWs, if they included specified features. For example, a rifle was defined as a SAW if it was able to accept a detachable magazine and included at least two of the following features: (1) a folding/telescoping stock; (2) a protruding pistol grip; (3) a bayonet mount; (4) a muzzle flash suppressor or threaded barrel capable of accepting such a device; or (5) a grenade launcher. There were similar definitions for pistols and shotguns. Bills were introduced to extend the ban (S. 2190, S. 2498), make it permanent (S. 1034), or expand it to include other "military style" firearms (H.R. 2038/S. 1431). A key consideration for Congress is whether violent gun crimes, particularly crimes involving multiple gunshot victims and gunshot wounds per victim, were reduced by the ban. Proponents of the ban maintain that firearm trace data strongly suggest that the use of SAWs in crime had declined since the ban took effect. Opponents of the ban contend that firearm trace data are unreliable indicators of criminal gun use based on statements by federal agencies and leading researchers. Proponents also cite data on law enforcement officers killed with firearms, which suggest that SAWs and other similar firearms have been used to kill a significant number of law enforcement officers. Opponents of the ban note that it is not possible to determine precisely whether these firearms were SAWs, nor is it known to what extent these firearms contributed to the ability of the criminals to outgun the police. Proponents of the ban argue that assault weapons should be prohibited, because they were designed for military purposes; are firearms of choice for criminals; and are not suitable for hunting, competitive shooting, or self-defense. They assert that these weapons include all the "military features" that increase capacity and ease of firing. They underscore that the impetus for the ban was several mass murders committed with SAWs, and that these firearms are disproportionately—given their small numbers—used in crimes involving multiple shots fired, multiple victims, multiple gunshot wounds per victim, and police officers as victims. They note that, despite several legal challenges, the ban was upheld as constitutional by federal courts. Opponents of the ban argue that SAWs were not designed for or used by military forces and that large numbers of law abiding gun owners use SAWs for self-defense, marksmanship, and hunting. They contend that SAWs are functionally no different from other semiautomatic firearms in that they fire only one round per pull of the trigger and that the statutorily defined features of a SAW were largely cosmetic. They also cite federal, state, and local data sources that suggest that SAWs have been used in a small fraction of violent crimes before and after the ban. They view the ban as part of a progressive intrusion on the right of citizens to own firearms. As noted above, the ban expired on September 13, 2004. This report will not be updated.

crs_R43918

crs_R43918_0

Introduction This report tracks and provides an overview of actions taken by the Administration and Congress to provide FY2016 appropriations for Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies (CJS) accounts. It also provides an overview of enacted FY2015 appropriations for agencies and bureaus funded as part of the annual appropriation for CJS. The vast majority of funding for the science agencies goes to the National Aeronautics and Space Administration and the National Science Foundation. FY2015 and FY2016 Appropriations for CJS FY2015 Appropriations On December 16, 2014, President Obama signed into law the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2015 ( P.L. 113-235 ). The act provided a total of $61.753 billion for the agencies and bureaus funded by the annual CJS appropriations act, including $8.467 billion for the Department of Commerce, $27.030 billion for DOJ, $25.360 billion for the science agencies, and $896 million for the related agencies. The House-Passed FY2016 CJS Appropriations Bill H.R. 2578 would have provided a total of $62.845 billion for CJS. The House recommended $8.086 billion for the Department of Commerce, $28.007 billion for DOJ, $25.929 billion for the science agencies, and $823 million for the related agencies. The Senate Committee-Reported FY2016 CJS Appropriations Bill The Senate Committee on Appropriations recommended $62.849 billion for CJS, an amount that was 1.8% greater than the FY2015 appropriation, 5.3% below the Administration's request, and nearly equal to the House-passed amount. The amount recommended by the committee included $8.477 billion for the Department of Commerce, $27.828 billion for DOJ, $25.639 billion for the science agencies, and $906 million for the related agencies. 114-113 ). Division B of the act (the Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2016) provides $66.000 billion for CJS, which includes $9.246 billion for the Department of Commerce, $29.090 billion for the Department of Justice, $26.754 billion for the science agencies, and $910 million for the related agencies. The FY2016 appropriation for CJS is 6.9% greater than the FY2015 appropriation, but 0.5% less than the Administration's request. The data show that nominal appropriations for CJS increased starting with FY2006. After adjusting for inflation, appropriations for CJS for FY2013-FY2015 were generally at the same level they were in FY2006. The data show that the increases in CJS appropriations in FY2009 (not including ARRA funding), FY2010, and FY2011 resulted from Congress appropriating more funding for the Department of Commerce in support of the 2010 decennial census. While decreased appropriations for the Department of Commerce mostly explain the overall decrease in CJS appropriations since FY2010, there have also been cuts in funding for DOJ and NASA. DOJ's FY2015 appropriation is 4.4% below its FY2010 appropriation, and NASA's FY2014 appropriation was 3.8% below its FY2010 appropriation. Funding for the NSF has, for the most part, steadily increased over the past 10 fiscal years.

This report tracks and describes actions taken by the Administration and Congress to provide FY2016 appropriations for the Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies (CJS) accounts. It also provides an overview of FY2015 appropriations for agencies and bureaus funded as part of the annual appropriation for CJS. The Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2015 (P.L. 113-235) provided a total of $61.753 billion for the agencies and bureaus funded by the annual CJS appropriations act, including $8.467 billion for the Department of Commerce, $27.030 billion for the Department of Justice (DOJ), $25.360 billion for the science agencies, and $896 million for the related agencies. The Administration requested a total of $66.332 billion for CJS for FY2016, including $9.803 billion for the Department of Commerce, $29.240 billion for the Department of Justice, $26.258 billion for the science agencies, and $1.031 billion for the related agencies. The House passed the FY2016 CJS appropriations bill (H.R. 2578) on June 3, 2015. The House-passed bill included a total of $62.845 billion for CJS, which included $8.086 billion for the Department of Commerce, $28.007 billion for the Department of Justice, $25.929 billion for the science agencies, and $823 million for the related agencies. The Senate Committee on Appropriations approved its FY2016 CJS appropriations bill, which was offered as an amendment in the nature of a substitute to H.R. 2578, on June 16, 2015. The Senate committee-reported bill recommended $62.849 billion for CJS, which included $8.477 billion for the Department of Commerce, $27.828 billion for the Department of Justice, $25.639 billion for the science agencies, and $906 million for the related agencies. On December 18, 2015, President Obama signed into law the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016 (P.L. 114-113). Division B of the act provides $66.000 billion for CJS, which includes $9.246 billion for the Department of Commerce, $29.090 billion for the Department of Justice, $26.754 billion for the science agencies, and $910 million for the related agencies. The FY2016 appropriation for CJS is 6.9% greater than the FY2015 appropriation, but 0.5% less than the Administration's request. Over the past 10 fiscal years, nominal appropriations for CJS increased starting with FY2006, peaked in FY2010, and generally declined between FY2010 and FY2013. Nominal appropriations for CJS were relatively flat in FY2014 and FY2015. Inflation-adjusted appropriations for CJS for FY2013-FY2015 were generally at the same level they were in FY2006. The data show that the increases in CJS appropriations in FY2009, FY2010, and FY2011 resulted from Congress appropriating more funding for the Department of Commerce in support of the 2010 decennial census. While decreased appropriations for the Department of Commerce mostly explain the overall decrease in CJS appropriations since FY2010, there have also been cuts in funding for DOJ and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). DOJ's FY2015 appropriation is 4.4% below its FY2010 appropriation, and NASA's FY2014 appropriation was 3.8% below its FY2010 appropriation.

crs_R44035

crs_R44035_0

Introduction The 114 th Congress is considering legislation to provide "regulatory relief" for banks. The need for such relief, some argue, results from the increased regulation that was applied in response to vulnerabilities that became evident during the financial crisis that began in 2007. Bank failures spiked during the crisis, and changes to banking regulation were a key part of financial reform. They argue that the additional regulation has resulted in significant costs that have stymied economic growth and restricted consumers' access to credit. Others, however, contend the current regulatory structure has strengthened financial stability and increased protections for consumers. They are concerned that regulatory relief for banks could negatively affect consumers and market stability. The costs associated with government regulation are referred to as regulatory burden . Many of the legislative proposals analyzed in this report, however, would make changes to specific details of the regulation that regulators have issued. Safety and Soundness Regulations The goal of safety and soundness (or prudential) regulation is to ensure that a bank maintains profitability and avoids failure. After the spike in bank failures surrounding the crisis, many of the reforms implemented in the wake of the financial crisis were intended to make banks less likely to fail. Whereas some view these efforts as essential to ensuring the banking system is safe, others view the reforms as having gone too far and imposing excessive costs on banks. 5983 would provide them with regulatory relief without requiring them to hold more capital. This is an example of how there is already some "tiering" of regulation for large banks. Supporters of the legislation argue that it is necessary to include the Dodd-Frank Act as well as the NCUA and the CFPB in the review in order to provide a more meaningful assessment of the regulatory burden facing financial institutions. Mortgage and Consumer Protection Regulations Banks are also regulated for consumer protection. Several bills would modify regulations issued by the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, a regulator created by the Dodd-Frank Act to provide an increased regulatory emphasis on consumer protection. The Dodd-Frank Act gave the CFPB new authority and transferred existing authorities to it from the banking regulators. The Dodd-Frank Act also directed the CFPB to implement several new mortgage-related policy changes through rulemakings. The bills included in this section could be viewed in light of a broader policy debate about whether the CFPB has struck the appropriate balance between consumer protection and regulatory burden, and whether congressional action is needed to achieve a more desirable balance. Supervision and Enforcement Supervision refers to the power to examine banks, instruct banks to modify their behavior, and to impose reporting requirements on banks to ensure compliance with rules. Enforcement is the authority to take certain legal actions, such as imposing fines, against an institution that fails to comply with rules and laws. While regulators generally view their supervisory and enforcement actions as striking the appropriate balance between ensuring that institutions are well managed and minimizing the burden facing banks, others believe the regulators are overreaching and preventing banks from serving their customers. 22 / P.L. Disclosure requirements and investor protections may better inform investors about the risks that they are assuming, but can make it more costly for institutions to raise capital, and those costs might be passed on to customers in the form of higher fees or interest rates charged. While some view these existing regulatory requirements as important safeguards that ensure that investors are protected from fraud, others see them as unnecessary red tape that makes it too difficult for banks to raise the capital needed to expand or remain healthy.

The 114th Congress is considering legislation to provide "regulatory relief" for banks. The need for this relief, some argue, results from new regulations introduced in response to vulnerabilities that were identified during the financial crisis that began in 2007. Some have contended that the increased regulatory burden—the cost associated with government regulation and its implementation—is resulting in significant costs that restrain economic growth and consumers' access to credit. Others, however, believe the current regulatory structure strengthens financial stability and increases protections for consumers, and they are concerned that regulatory relief for banks could negatively affect consumers and market stability. Regulatory relief proposals, therefore, may involve a trade-off between reducing costs associated with regulatory burden and reducing benefits of regulation. This report discusses regulatory relief legislation for banks in the 114th Congress that, at the time this report was published, has seen legislative action. Many, but not all, of the bills would make changes to the Dodd-Frank Act (P.L. 111-203), wide-ranging financial reform enacted in response to the financial crisis. The bills analyzed in this report would provide targeted regulatory relief in a number of different areas: Safety and Soundness Regulations. Safety and soundness, or prudential, regulation is designed to ensure that a bank maintains profitability and avoids failure. After many banks failed during the financial crisis, the reforms implemented in the wake of the crisis were intended to make banks less likely to fail. While some view these efforts as essential to ensuring that the banking system is safe, others view the reforms as having gone too far and imposing excessive costs on banks. Examples of legislation include changes to the Volcker Rule, capital requirements, liquidity requirements applied to municipal bonds, and enhanced regulation for large banks. Mortgage and Consumer Protection Regulations. Several bills would modify regulations issued by the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), a regulator created by the Dodd-Frank Act to provide an increased regulatory emphasis on consumer protection. The Dodd-Frank Act gave the CFPB new authority and transferred existing authorities to it from the banking regulators. Many regulatory relief proposals could be viewed in light of a broader policy debate about whether the CFPB has struck the appropriate balance between consumer protection and regulatory burden. One legislative focus has been several mortgage-related CFPB rulemakings pursuant to the Dodd-Frank Act. Supervision and Enforcement. Supervision refers to regulators' power to examine banks, instruct banks to modify their behaviors, and to impose reporting requirements on banks to ensure compliance with rules. Enforcement is the authority to take certain legal actions, such as impose fines, against an institution that fails to comply with rules and laws. Although regulators generally view their supervisory and enforcement actions as striking the appropriate balance between ensuring that institutions are well managed and minimizing the burden facing banks, others believe the regulators are overreaching and preventing banks from serving their customers. Examples of legislation include changes to call reports and bank exams, as well as legislation addressing "Operation Chokepoint." Capital Issuance. Banks are partly funded by issuing capital to investors. Disclosure requirements and investor protections may better inform investors about the risks that they are assuming but can make it more costly for institutions to raise capital. Whereas some view these existing regulatory requirements as important safeguards that ensure investors are making educated decisions, others see them as unnecessary red tape that stymies capital formation. The capital issuance legislative proposals discussed in this report are generally geared toward making it easier for financial institutions to raise funds. Congress faces the question of how much discretion to give regulators in granting relief. Some bills leave it up to the regulators to determine how much relief should be granted, whereas others make relief mandatory. Some bills provide relief in areas regulators have already reduced regulatory burden. Some of the legislation is focused on providing relief for small banks, whereas other bills provide relief to the entire industry.

crs_R41313

crs_R41313_0

Background The District of Columbia Tuition Assistance Grant (DCTAG) program was created in 1999 to address concerns about the public postsecondary education offerings available to District of Columbia residents. Legislation On November 12, 1999, the District of Columbia College Access Act ( P.L. Congress defined the program's purpose as "enabl[ing] college-bound residents of the District of Columbia to have greater choices among institutions of higher education." The DCTAG program provides grants to District residents, regardless of need or merit, to attend eligible public and private not-for-profit IHEs in the United States. In May 2000, Mayor Anthony Williams exercised this administrative authority and expanded the program to provide up to $10,000 per student per year (with a cumulative cap of $50,000) toward the difference between in-state and out-of-state undergraduate tuition and fees at all public colleges and universities nationwide. Student To become and remain eligible for a grant under the DCTAG program, a student must be a resident of the District of Columbia; be a citizen, national, or permanent resident of the United States; be able to provide evidence from the Immigration and Naturalization Service that he or she is in the United States for other than a temporary purpose with the intention of becoming a citizen or permanent resident; or be a citizen of any one of the Freely Associated States; be enrolled or accepted for enrollment, on at least a half-time basis, in a degree, certificate, or other program (including a study-abroad program approved for credit by the student's home institution) leading to a recognized educational credential at an eligible institution; maintain satisfactory progress in his or her course of study, as defined by Section 484(c) of the Higher Education Act of 1965, as amended; not be in default on a federal student loan; be 24 years of age or younger at the time of initial application, unless enrolled in the program prior to the 2006–2007 academic year; have either graduated from a secondary school or received the equivalent of a secondary school diploma or have been accepted for enrollment as a freshman at an eligible institution; and be domiciled in the District of Columbia for not less than the 12 consecutive months preceding enrollment at an eligible IHE, if undergraduate study is started within three calendar years (excepting periods of National Service or service in the Armed Forces or the Peace Corps) of high school graduation or its equivalent or be domiciled in the District of Columbia for not less than five consecutive years preceding enrollment at an eligible IHE, if undergraduate study is started more than three calendar years after high school graduation or its equivalent. Post-baccalaureate students who have already earned a bachelor's degree or students whose family's federal taxable income equals or exceeds $1,000,000 annually are ineligible to participate in the DCTAG program. Students Served As of April 2013, a total of 19,664 students have received approximately $317.5 million in DCTAG awards and have attended over 600 IHEs in 49 states. Analysis of Grant Benefits While there has been a substantial increase in the amount appropriated for the DCTAG program from its inception (see Table 2 ), there has been no change to the maximum award size in response to the trend of rising postsecondary education costs, which may be leaving many program participants paying more per year for their education than in previous years or possibly limiting their choices of which institution to attend. This section of the report examines the extent to which the maximum award may be bridging the gap between in-state and out-of-state tuition. Individuals who receive DCTAG assistance are also eligible to receive Mayor's Scholars Undergraduate Fund grants.

To address concerns about the public postsecondary education offerings available to District of Columbia residents, the District of Columbia College Access Act of 1999 (P.L. 106-98) established the District of Columbia Tuition Assistance Grant (DCTAG) program. The program is meant to provide college-bound DC residents with a greater array of choices among institutions of higher education by providing grants for undergraduate education. Grants for study at public institutions of higher education (IHEs) nationwide offset the difference between in-state and out-of-state tuition and fees, up to $10,000 per year and a cumulative maximum of $50,000. Students may also receive grants of up to $2,500 per year and a cumulative maximum of $12,500 for undergraduate study at Historically Black Colleges and Universities (HBCUs) nationwide and private IHEs in the Washington, DC, metropolitan area. DCTAG program grants are provided regardless of need or merit. However, to be eligible to receive a program grant, individuals must, among other criteria, be District of Columbia residents; be enrolled or accepted for enrollment on at least a half-time basis in a degree, certificate, or credential granting program; maintain satisfactory progress in their course of study; be 24 years of age or younger; and have received a secondary school diploma or its equivalent. Post-baccalaureate students who have already earned a bachelor's degree or students whose family's federal taxable income equals or exceeds $1 million annually are ineligible to participate. As of February 2012, a total of 18,663 students have received a total of $307 million in DCTAG awards and have attended over 600 institutions of higher education (IHEs) in 49 states. There has been a substantial increase in the amount appropriated for the DCTAG program since its inception (from $17 million in FY2000 to $28.4 million in FY2013), but there has been no change to the maximum award size in response to rising postsecondary education costs, which may be leaving many program participants paying more per year for their education than in previous years or possibly limiting their choices of which institution to attend. This report first discusses the history of the DCTAG program and the events and legislation leading up to its passage. It then describes the program's administration, including recipient eligibility and the amount of award available based on the type of institution attended, award interaction with federal student aid, and funding. Next, the report presents DCTAG performance data, such as the types of institutions DCTAG recipients primarily attend and the types of students served by the program (e.g., the number of grants received, by DC ward). Finally, the report provides an analysis of grant benefits and discusses the extent to which DCTAG awards may be bridging the gap between in-state and out-of-state tuition.

crs_R41830

crs_R41830_0

To that end, real property reform legislation has been introduced in both the House and the Senate in the 112 th Congress, including the Civilian Real Property Realignment Act of 2011 (CPRA, H.R. 1734 ). Introduced May 4, 2011, by Representative Jeff Denham, CPRA would draw on the military base realignment and closure (BRAC) model, by establishing an independent commission to assess civilian federal real property and to recommend actions for reducing the government's inventory of unneeded and underutilized holdings. The bill was reported by the full committee on February 1, 2012, and passed by the House on February 7, 2012. CPRA would have a broad scope, applying to space owned and leased by all executive branch agencies and government corporations, although the bill would exclude several categories of properties, including certain military installations, properties excluded for reasons of national security, and properties owned by the United States Postal Service. The legislation would encompass most major real property asset management functions, collectively referred to as "realigning" actions, including the consolidation, reconfiguration, co-location, exchange, sale, redevelopment, and disposal of unneeded or underutilized properties. Development of Recommendations to the Commission If enacted, the first step in the CPRA process would be for federal landholding agencies to develop their own recommendations for realigning their real property portfolios and for reducing operating and maintenance costs. Agencies would submit these recommendations to the Administrator of the General Services Administration (GSA) and the Director of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) not later than 120 days after the start of each fiscal year, along with specific data on all of the properties they own, lease, or otherwise control. The OMB Director, in consultation with the GSA Administrator, would then review the recommendations submitted by the agencies and revise the submissions, as needed, using the new criteria. The Administrator would then submit the revised recommendations, along with the criteria, to a newly established Civilian Property Realignment Commission. The Commission would be composed of nine members, each serving a six year term. The chairperson would be appointed by the President, with the advice and consent of the Senate. The Commission would perform its own analysis of agency real property inventories and of the recommendations submitted by the Administrator and OMB Director. If the President disapproves of some or all of the Commission's recommendations, he would be required to submit a report to Congress and to the Commission identifying the reasons for disapproval, and the Commission would have 30 days to submit a revised list of recommendations to the President. Implementation If a joint resolution of approval were enacted, agencies would be required to begin implementation not later than two years from the date the President transmitted the recommendations to Congress, and to complete implementation no later than six years from the same date, unless notice is provided to the President and to Congress that "extenuating circumstances" have caused the delay.

In an effort to reduce the costs associated with maintaining thousands of unneeded and underutilized federal buildings, and to generate revenue through the sale of such properties, the 112th Congress is considering several real property reform bills. Perhaps the most comprehensive of these proposals is H.R. 1734, the Civilian Property Realignment Act (CPRA) of 2011. CPRA was introduced on May 4, 2011, and reported by the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, Subcommittee on Economic Development, Public Buildings, and Emergency Management on May 25, 2011. CPRA was reported by the full committee on February 1, 2012, and passed by the House on February 7, 2012. CPRA would establish a new, more centralized process for making decisions regarding the consolidation, reconfiguration, redevelopment, exchange, lease, sale, and conveyance of federal real property—actions collectively referred to as "realignment." It would apply to all space owned and leased by executive branch agencies and government corporations, although the bill would exclude several categories of properties, including certain military installations, properties excluded for reasons of national security, and properties owned by the United States Postal Service. The first step in the CPRA process would be for federal landholding agencies to develop recommendations for realigning their real property portfolios, and for reducing operating and maintenance costs. Agencies would submit these recommendations to the Administrator of the General Services Administration and the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, along with data on the properties owned and leased by each agency. The OMB Director, in consultation with the Administrator, would review the recommendations, revise them, and then submit the revised recommendations to a newly established Civilian Property Realignment Commission. The Commission would be composed of nine members, all appointed by the President, with the chairperson requiring the advice and consent of the Senate prior to being seated. The Commission would hold public hearings, conduct its own independent review of agency real property portfolios, analyze the recommendations it received from the Administrator, and submit a final list of recommendations to the President, who may return it to the Commission for revisions, submit it to Congress, or take no action. If Congress passes, and the President signs, a joint resolution approving the Commission's recommendations, then agencies would be required to begin implementing recommendations within two years of the date the President submitted recommended actions to Congress, and complete them within six years of that date. This report describes and analyzes each step in the recommendation process, evaluates provisions that are intended to facilitate implementation of the Commission's recommendations, and provides a discussion of additional transparency measures that may enhance congressional oversight of agency real property portfolios.

crs_R41839

crs_R41839_0

Introduction The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act; P.L. 111-203 ) substantially overhauled the U.S. financial regulatory system. Title X of the Dodd-Frank Act, the Consumer Financial Protection Act (CFP Act), established the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection (CFPB or Bureau) within the Federal Reserve System. The CFP Act alters the consumer financial protection landscape by consolidating regulatory authority and, to a lesser extent, supervisory and enforcement authority in one regulator—the CFPB. Not all of the CFPB's powers become effective at the same time. Some of the Bureau's authorities took effect when the Dodd-Frank Act was signed into law on July 21, 2010. However, most of the Bureau's authorities will go into effect on the "designated transfer date"—a date six to 18 months after enactment, as determined by the Secretary of the Treasury (Secretary). Currently, the designated transfer date is July 21, 2011. In addition to the effective dates set out in the CFP Act, the authority to exercise the Bureau's powers also may be affected by the appointment of a Director, and the date of the appointment. The Bureau is designed to be headed by a single Director, who is to be nominated by the President, subject to the advice and consent of the Senate. The CFP Act provides the Secretary the authority to exercise some, but not all of the Bureau's authorities until a CFPB Director is appointed. More specifically, the powers that will be transferred to the Bureau under subtitle F include "all authority to prescribe rules or issue orders or guidelines pursuant to any Federal consumer financial law," including the rulemaking authority under the 18 enumerated consumer laws, held by the HUD, FRB, OCC, OTS, FDIC, and NCUA; certain consumer compliance examination and other supervisory authorities over "larger depository institutions" (i.e., banks, thrifts, savings associations, and credit unions with more than $10 billion in assets); primary enforcement authority of consumer financial laws and regulations over larger depositories; subject to certain limitations, the FTC's authority "to prescribe rules, issue guidelines, or conduct a study or issue a report mandated under [the enumerated consumer laws] ... "; the authority to coordinate a process by which certain employees of all of the transferor agencies other than the FTC are identified to be transferred to the CFPB, as necessary to perform the transferred authorities. Although not beyond debate, CFP Act subsection 1066(a) appears to provide the Secretary the power to exercise all of the Bureau's transferred authorities, as provided under subtitle F, when they become effective and until a CFPB Director is appointed. Authorities Established by Provisions Other Than Subtitle F The powers provided to the Bureau pursuant to provisions other than those of subtitle F generally are the Bureau's "newly established" powers – i.e., the enhanced consumer protection authorities that were not explicitly provided by law to federal regulators before the Dodd-Frank Act. The Secretary's Performance of Bureau Functions Since the Date of Enactment and Potential Issues After the Designated Transfer Date Based on a review of information made publicly available by the Secretary and the Bureau, as well as the congressional testimony of multiple Treasury Department officials, it appears that the actions taken thus far by the Bureau predominately have been either administrative functions or measures taken in preparation for the exercise of the substantive authorities that will go into effect on the designated transfer date. As a result, the Secretary's interim Bureau powers arguably will be more expansive after the designated transfer date if a Bureau Director has not yet been appointed. This potential expansion of interim powers would increase the likelihood that the Bureau would move beyond administrative and preparatory steps to engaging in substantive actions that directly, and potentially significantly, impact financial institutions that participate in consumer financial markets. In practice, however, the limits of the Secretary's authorities may not always be clear. Outcomes of such lawsuits are difficult to predict in the abstract, in part, because of the innumerable facts and circumstances that could give rise to these legal claims.

The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act; P.L. 111-203) substantially overhauled the U.S. financial regulatory system. Title X of the Dodd-Frank Act, the Consumer Financial Protection Act (CFP Act), established the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection (CFPB or Bureau) within the Federal Reserve System. The CFP Act alters the consumer financial protection landscape by consolidating regulatory authority and, to a lesser extent, supervisory and enforcement authority in one regulator—the CFPB. The CFP Act empowers the Bureau through: the transfer of existing consumer protection powers from other federal regulators ("transferred powers" or "transferred authorities"); and the establishment of enhanced consumer protection authorities that were not explicitly provided by law to federal regulators prior to the Dodd-Frank Act's enactment ("newly established powers" or "newly established authorities"). The Bureau's transferred authorities will include the power to prescribe regulations under 18 federal consumer protection laws, such as the Truth in Lending Act, as well as certain consumer compliance supervisory and enforcement powers over some large banks and other depository institutions; its newly established powers will include consumer compliance supervisory and enforcement powers over certain non-depository financial institutions, such as payday lenders and mortgage brokers. Not all of the CFPB's powers become effective at the same time. Some of the Bureau's authorities took effect when the Dodd-Frank Act was signed into law on July 21, 2010. However, most of the Bureau's authorities will go into effect on the "designated transfer date"—a date six to 18 months after enactment, as determined by the Secretary of the Treasury (Secretary). Currently, the designated transfer date is July 21, 2011. In addition to the effective dates set out in the CFP Act, the authority to exercise the Bureau's powers may be affected by the appointment of a CFPB Director. The Bureau is designed to be headed by a single Director, who is to be nominated by the President and subject to the advice and consent of the Senate. If a Director is appointed before the designated transfer date, he will be able to exercise all of the powers provided to the Bureau pursuant to the CFP Act. However, a Bureau Director has not yet been appointed. Until a CFPB Director is appointed, the CFP Act provides the Secretary the authority to exercise some, but not all of the Bureau's authorities. Although not beyond debate, the CFP Act appears to provide the Secretary the authority to exercise the Bureau's transferred powers, but not the authority to exercise the Bureau's newly established powers. In practice, the limits of the Secretary's authorities may not always be clear. The actions taken thus far by the Bureau predominately have been either administrative functions or measures taken in preparation for the exercise of the substantive authorities that will go into effect on the designated transfer date. These actions appear to fall within the Secretary's limited Bureau authorities. The Secretary's interim Bureau powers arguably will be more expansive after the designated transfer date if a Bureau Director has not yet been appointed. This expansion of power would increase the likelihood that the Bureau would move beyond administrative and preparatory steps to engaging in substantive actions that directly, and potentially significantly, impact financial institutions. Parties claiming harm from these potential actions might be inclined to initiate lawsuits arguing that certain actions exceed the Secretary's authority. Outcomes of such lawsuits are difficult to predict in the abstract, in part, because of the innumerable facts and circumstances that could give rise to these legal claims.

crs_R41392

crs_R41392_0

Introduction At the end of 2010, the lower income tax rates provided in the 2001 tax cuts were to expire. President Obama had proposed to extend most of the income tax cuts, but to continue some higher tax rates for couples with income over $250,000 and singles with income over $200,000. The most important element of this proposal, as measured by revenue effect, is allowing the top two rates of 33% and 35% to expire. These rates would have risen to 36% and 36.9%. 111-312 extended all tax cuts for two years. Some critics of allowing the tax rates to rise express concerns about possible negative effects on small business owners' hiring and the dampening effect on job creation. This argument is buttressed by a popular conception that small businesses are responsible for the majority, perhaps the vast majority, of new jobs. Two aspects of targeting are considered: the fraction of small businesses affected by the rate changes and the fraction of revenue gain accruing to taxpayers other than these small businesses. The results suggest that only a small fraction of small businesses will be affected, around 2% to 3%. They also suggest that 80% of the reduced taxes are likely to accrue to non-businesses income and about 90% to non-business income or businesses without employees. The second section of the report reviews the claim that small businesses are the primary creators of jobs. This perception is based on research published originally in the 1980s. More recent research has revealed some methodological deficiencies in these original studies and suggests that small businesses contribute only slightly more jobs than other firms relative to their employment share. In addition, this differential is not due to hiring by existing small firms, but rather to startups, which tend to be small. The following section discusses perhaps the most important issue to consider, job creation as a policy justification for targeted provisions. The basic economics of market equilibrium indicate that, in the long run, there is no need for the government to intervene in the creation of jobs. In the short run, intervention is appropriate during a recession, but tax cuts to businesses and high-income individuals are not likely to be very effective for this purpose. First, self-employment offers greater opportunities to avoid or evade taxes, and avoidance and evasion are more valuable the higher the marginal tax rates. In general, research suggests that when using fiscal policy to stimulate the economy, direct spending and reducing taxes or increasing transfers to lower-income individuals is likely to be most effective. Other Justifications for Special Tax Provisions and Treatment of Small Business As the findings in this report suggest, across-the-board tax cuts for high-income individuals are not efficiently targeted to small businesses. The second is whether there are justifications for favorable treatment. As well as lack of target efficiency, evidence on the role of small business in job creation, the effects of tax changes on small business behavior, and the likelihood this provision would not be an effective demand stimulus suggest that the formulation of small business policies should be informed and guided by any market failures that may exist.

At the end of 2010, the lower income tax rates provided in 2001 were to expire. The President had proposed to extend most tax cuts, but to continue higher rates for couples with income over $250,000 and singles with income over $200,000. The most important element of this proposal, as measured by revenue effect, is allowing the top rates of 33% and 35% to expire, when they would have risen to 36% and 36.9%. P.L. 111-312, enacted in December 2010, extended all tax cuts for two years, through 2012, delaying the consideration of which tax cuts to retain. Some critics of allowing the tax rates to rise express concerns about possible negative effects on small business owners' hiring and the dampening effect on job creation. This view is buttressed by a popular conception that small businesses are responsible for the majority, perhaps the vast majority, of new jobs. The first issue addressed is how well retaining the lower levels of the top two rates target small business. Two aspects of targeting are considered: the fraction of small businesses affected by the rate changes and the fraction of revenue gain accruing to taxpayers other than these small businesses. The results suggest that only a small fraction of businesses would be affected, around 2% to 3%. They also suggest that 80% of the reduced taxes are likely to accrue to non-business income and almost 90% to either non-business income or businesses without employees. The claim that small businesses are the primary creators of jobs is based on research published originally in the 1980s. More recent research has revealed some methodological deficiencies in these original studies and suggests that small businesses contribute only slightly more jobs than other firms relative to their employment share. Moreover, this differential is not due to hiring by existing small firms, but rather to startups, which tend to be small. Some critics also question whether small business jobs should be encouraged because they tend to be lower paid, with fewer benefits and more turnover. Yet, small businesses may offer employment to workers with less education or other characteristics that lead to difficulty finding employment with larger firms. In addition to targeting efficiency and job creation issues, there is uncertainty about the effects of taxation on small businesses. An extensive literature suggests that higher taxes have no effect or actually encourage self-employment. Researchers speculate that higher taxes may lead individuals to select self-employment because the opportunities for tax evasion and avoidance are greater. In addition, taxes reduce risk (the variance in return) and greater variance in earnings likely occurs in self-employment. Evidence of effects of taxes on existing firms' hiring is limited. Perhaps the most important issue concerns job creation as a policy justification. In the long run, there is no need to address job creation as the market economy naturally generates jobs (although targeted programs, such as those for disadvantaged workers, may improve efficiency). In times of recession, the government may need fiscal stimulus, but the purpose of this stimulus is generally to increase aggregate demand. The most effective approaches are direct spending and tax cuts and transfers to lower income individuals who are more likely to spend. Tax cuts for high-income individuals or business are less likely to be spent and are less effective as a stimulus. There may be justifications for favoring small business, although small businesses, especially businesses owned by high-income individuals, are already subject to favorable treatment. Tax policy might be most appropriately formulated in the light of any imperfections in the economy that justify preferential treatment.

crs_RL34350

crs_RL34350_0

The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) establishes certain protections for private sector employees who want to form or join a labor union. These protections do not extend to supervisors. Historically, Congress has debated where to draw the line between employees who have different levels of management responsibility. It is generally agreed that employees who have significant supervisory duties, such as hiring and firing, are supervisors. However, disagreement occurs with respect to employees who have minor supervisory duties. In 2001, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the test administered by the National Labor Relations Board (hereinafter referred to as the "NLRB" or the "Board") to determine whether an employee is a supervisor was inconsistent with the NLRA. In response to NLRB v. Kentucky River Community Care, Inc ., the Board issued a decision in September 2006 in Oakwood Healthcare, Inc . in which it established new definitions for key terms that are used to identify supervisors under the NLRA. The legislation would narrow the definition of the term "supervisor" in the NLRA. 1644 / S. 969 ). Applying the new definitions for the terms "assign," "responsibly to direct," and "independent judgment," the NLRB concluded that 12 permanent charge nurses employed in 5 of 10 patient care units at Oakwood Healthcare were supervisors for purposes of the NLRA. The Board found that 12 charge nurses assigned employees to patients and assigned overall tasks to other employees. Finally, the Board found that the 12 charge nurses exercised independent judgment in assigning other staff. The RESPECT Act In the 110 th Congress, following the decision in Oakwood Healthcare Inc ., Representative Robert Andrews and Senator Chris Dodd introduced the Re-Empowerment of Skilled and Professional Employees and Construction Tradesworkers (RESPECT) Act ( H.R. A similar version of the RESPECT Act was introduced in the 112 th Congress by Senator Richard Blumenthal ( S. 2128 ). Under the RESPECT Act, an employee would be classified as a supervisor if he or she was engaged in supervisory activities at least 50% of the time. Because the act would eliminate "responsibly to direct" as a supervisory function, foremen and employees with similar duties may no longer be classified as supervisors. Under current law, an employee may be classified as a supervisor if the employee performs supervisory functions at least 10%-15% of the employee's worktime. Even if the functions "assign" and "responsibly to direct" were not removed from the current definition of supervisor, this change would reduce the number of employees who are classified as supervisors. In 1947, the Supreme Court upheld the position that the Board followed at the time that supervisors were included in the definition of employee. In response, Congress amended the NLRA to exclude supervisors from the definition of employee. The new definition was included in the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 (P.L. By eliminating the function "responsibly to direct" employees from the definition of supervisor, the RESPECT Act may increase the number of employees protected by the NLRA.

The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) establishes certain protections for private sector employees who want to form or join a labor union. These protections do not extend to supervisors. Historically, Congress has debated where to draw the line between employees who have different levels of management responsibility. It is generally agreed that employees who have significant supervisory duties, such as hiring and firing, are supervisors. However, disagreement occurs with respect to employees who have minor supervisory duties. In 2001, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the test administered by the National Labor Relations Board ("NLRB" or the "Board") to determine whether an employee is a supervisor was inconsistent with the NLRA. In response to NLRB v. Kentucky River Community Care, Inc., the Board issued a September 2006 decision in Oakwood Healthcare, Inc. in which it established new definitions for three key terms that are used to identify supervisors for purposes of the NLRA: to "assign" and "responsibly to direct" employees and to exercise "independent judgment." Applying the new definitions, the NLRB concluded that 12 permanent charge nurses employed by Oakwood Healthcare were supervisors. The Board found that the nurses exercised independent judgment in assigning employees to patients and assigning overall tasks to other employees. However, the Board found that none of the charge nurses at Oakwood Healthcare responsibly directed other employees. In the 112th Congress, Senator Richard Blumenthal introduced the Re-Empowerment of Skilled and Professional Employees and Construction Tradesworkers (RESPECT) Act (S. 2168). A similar version of the RESPECT Act was introduced in the 110th Congress by Representative Robert Andrews and Senator Chris Dodd (H.R. 1644/S. 969). The RESPECT Act would narrow the definition of the term "supervisor" in the NLRA. The legislation would eliminate "assign" and "responsibly to direct" from the current definition of supervisor in the NLRA. In addition, the act would add a limiting phrase to the definition of supervisor. Under the act, employees would be classified as supervisors if they are engaged in supervisory activities more than 50% of the time. Currently, an employee may be classified as a supervisor if the employee acts as a supervisor for at least 10%-15% of the employee's worktime. This change would reduce the number of employees who are classified as supervisors and, therefore, increase the number of employees protected by the NLRA The RESPECT Act, if it were enacted, may have a significant impact on foremen. In 1947, the Supreme Court upheld the position that the Board followed at the time that supervisors were included in the definition of employee. In response, Congress amended the NLRA to exclude supervisors from the definition of employee. The new definition was included in the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 (P.L. 80-101). Because the RESPECT Act would eliminate "responsibly to direct" as a supervisory function, foremen and employees with similar duties may no longer be classified as supervisors. They could, therefore, receive the same protections as other employees under the NLRA.

crs_R40496

crs_R40496_0

This report provides an overview of the major non-financial impact of the global financial and economic crisis—both actual and potential. Congress has a particular role to play in protecting the national interest; informing the public and managing public expectations; budgeting for economic assistance, diplomacy, and defense; determining trade policy; providing capital for the International Monetary Fund and Multilateral Development Banks and determining their role relative to the U.S. government; and ensuring that the U.S. grand strategy in dealing with the world succeeds. Political and Foreign Policy Effects of the Crisis Any event of the magnitude of the global financial crisis generates unanticipated effects and this particular set of events seems to be driving states to adopt policies unprecedented in recent times. On February 12, 2009, the U.S. Director of National Intelligence, Dennis Blair, told Congress that instability in countries around the world caused by the global economic crisis and its geopolitical implications, rather than terrorism, is the primary near-term security threat to the United States. Other countries also have recognized that potential political and security effects of the crisis. The political and foreign policy effects of the global financial crisis can be divided roughly into the following categories: effects on political leadership; regimes; perceived countries of influence; and stability, violence, and terrorism; effects on economic philosophy, state capitalism, and protectionism; effects on U.S. international leadership and attitudes toward the United States; effects on supranational financial and economic organizations; effects on poverty; and budgetary effects on resources for aid, diplomacy, and defense. Consolidating Government Power The second way that the crisis works on ruling regimes is through the actions of existing governments both to stay in power and to deal with the adverse effects of the crisis. Whether such assistance is extended or not may affect strategic and political relations with the nations in question. Of course, coping with the crisis can be viewed as a case of expediency overriding values rather than a shift in philosophy. Certain sectors also are excluded from trade agreements for national security or other reasons. Leadership and Attitudes Toward the United States Another issue raised by the global financial crisis has been the role of the United States on the world stage, the U.S. leadership position relative to other countries, and U.S. credibility. In addition, U.S. trade and foreign investments are key components of American soft power. Given the increasing role of China, India, and other new members of the G-20 in the financial crisis, should they also have a commensurately larger role in the governance of the international financial institutions? It has become apparent that remedial and recovery measures, both on macroeconomic and microeconomic levels, need to be coordinated.

The global financial and economic crisis affects all three of the essential national interests of the United States: national security, economic well being, and value projection. Only occasionally does an event of this magnitude occur that generates such daunting challenges yet also opportunities for U.S. policy. The effects of the crisis on foreign policy, trade, and security are so diverse and widespread that, out of necessity, policy responses must range from the highly specific to the broad and ethereal. This report provides an overview of the major non-financial effects of the global crisis. In some countries, incumbent governments have lost support or authoritarian governments are consolidating power. In certain countries, conditions for citizen discontent or even radicalism are being augmented and market capitalism is being questioned. On the world stage, U.S. leadership is being challenged; money to lend is becoming a critical component of soft power; budgets are tightening and threatening funds for economic assistance and national security; international financial institutions are assuming a higher profile relative to national governments; and shifts in trade flows are raising forces for protectionism. As seen in the G-20 London Summit, the financial crisis also has become a rallying point for anti-globalization groups and anti-government activists. The U.S. Director of National Intelligence, Dennis Blair, has told Congress that instability in countries around the world caused by the global economic crisis and its geopolitical implications, rather than terrorism, is the primary near-term security threat to the United States. The political and foreign policy effects of the global financial crisis can be divided roughly into the following categories: effects on political leadership, regimes, stability, and spheres of influence; effects on economic philosophies, state capitalism, and trade protectionism; effects on U.S. international leadership and attitudes toward the United States; effects on supranational financial and economic organizations; effects on poverty; and budgetary effects on resources for aid, diplomacy, and defense. Congress has been active in recognizing and moving toward dealing with the longer-term effects of the crisis, but most of the long-term effects are just developing, and it is yet not clear whether they are temporary jogs in a path or a permanent deviation from post-World War II trends. The response to the effects depends both on "more of the same" (working through existing institutions for diplomacy, aid, trade policy, and security) with incremental changes and at a higher level of intensity, and on new and innovative approaches to cope with problems laid bare by the crisis. As the dust from the onset of the crisis has begun to clear, it is apparent that the world has become more unstable, that much of the blame for the turmoil is being aimed at the United States, that attempted solutions are taking enormous amounts of budgetary resources, and that, if the crisis worsens, it may cause wrenching changes both within the countries most vulnerable and among the big power nations of the world.

crs_98-16

crs_98-16_0

Both Democratic and Republican Members of Congress have introduced legislation that would replace the current multigoal mandate of "maximum employment, stable prices, and moderate long-term interest rates" with a single goal to maintain "stable prices." Central bankers in all countries share a number of concerns. This notion of a political business cycle enjoys some support among economists. The Case Against a Single Goal for Federal Reserve Policy It is, perhaps, best to begin the case against a single goal for the Federal Reserve with the proposition that while the current monetary system does not have an explicit anchor such as would be provided by a fixed exchange rate or a legislated inflation target, it does have an implicit anchor. Thus, in practice, the adoption of an inflation target cannot be supported on the grounds that the Fed has neglected to pursue the goal of price stability. Nevertheless, the case for using an intermediate target and what is required to make it work is well stated by Bernanke and Mishkin: If credibility building is an important objective of the central bank, and if there exists an intermediate target variable—such as a monetary aggregate—that is well controlled by the central bank, observed and understood by the public and the financial markets, and strongly and reliably related to the ultimate goal variable, then targeting the intermediate variable may be the preferred strategy. Our central bank was to serve as a "lender of last resort" to the financial system in time of trouble to avert a serious destabilization or even collapse (such a role is currently being played by the Federal Reserve as it deals with the financial crisis that began in the summer of 2007). Most governments have fiscal policies, debt management policies, and even exchange rate policies. The Case Against a Single Goal Fed Policy—Summary Critics of proposals to make price stability the sole goal of monetary policy argue that there are other important goals that monetary policy can and should accomplish. These critics believe that the economy is too complex for monetary policy to be committed to one simple goal. It is impossible to foresee every contingency, so discretion is necessary to allow experts to use their best judgment. Technical Problems With Implementing a Price Stability Goal40 Beginning in the late 1980s, a number of countries imposed a goal of price stability on their central banks. Although the utility of this definition for policy formulation can be challenged, it does raise the question of whether price stability should be defined in general terms or in terms of a quantified numerical target. If too many events that cause prices to change are made exceptions to a price stability goal, confidence could be undermined and the directive to the central bank would be significantly diluted. Most countries have chosen not to make a list of formal exceptions. How Long Would the Central Bank Have to Achieve Its Goal? Thus, success in meeting a goal of price stability would likely depend on the time horizon over which the goal would need to be met. Conclusion The American model of central banking has distinctive attributes. While proponents are likely to agree that monetary policy has been a success in the last two and a half decades, they would attribute that success to the Fed's decision to focus single-mindedly on price stability. Alternatively, if the price stability goal is interpreted as a regime of "constrained discretion" which still allows for the stabilization of output, then critics would view the current multi-goal mandate as more appropriate. For that reason, the Fed could not reasonably be expected to keep inflation on a point target at all times, should a price stability goal be adopted. Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke, a longtime advocate of inflation targeting, has argued that the Fed could independently adopt one without any change to the current mandate.

Some economists have long criticized the American model of central banking for featuring multiple policy goals, discretion on the part of the central bankers as to which goal to emphasize, freedom in the choice of instruments to achieve the policy goals, and rather vague accountability for policy failures if, indeed, these can even be identified. Recently, the critics have urged that the multiple policy goals of the Federal Reserve (Fed) be replaced by a single goal of price stability. Critics believe that central bankers tend to use their discretionary powers to achieve political as well as economic objectives, notably to create "good times" through monetary expansion. Since these "good times" do not last long, such a policy imparts a costly inflationary bias to an economy and, hence, is not economically optimal over time. Among other virtues, it is argued that a single goal would provide an explicit anchor for the American monetary system. The current model has strong support as well. Since an economy faces many unforeseen contingencies, supporters argue that giving central bankers multiple goals and a high degree of discretion is optimal. They question whether a price stability goal would be flexible enough to allow the Fed to remain the lender of last resort to the U.S. financial system and to cope with short run stabilization problems that beset the country at times such as the financial turmoil that began in the summer of 2007. They note that the Fed has successfully delivered price stability for over two decades under the current multi-goal regime. Both proponents and opponents of a price stability goal are supported by an array of economic theories and empirical studies. To formally replace the current multi-goal mandate of "maximum employment, stable prices, and moderate long-term interest rates" with a single goal of price stability would require legislation. Members from both parties have introduced such legislation in past Congresses. But Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke, a long-time advocate of inflation targeting, has argued that the Fed could independently adopt an inflation target without changing the multi-goal mandate. A number of countries have made price stability the sole goal of their monetary policy. In practice, these countries have not focused their monetary policy solely on price stability, but have responded to changes in output and to the recent turmoil in financial markets. Thus far, these policy shifts seem not to have undermine their long-term price stability goals. This arrangement has been coined "constrained discretion." The price stability goal, while simple and straightforward, raises a number of technical questions about definition, in terms of a goal of inflation or constant prices, whether a point or band target should be used, and the appropriate price index to measure price stability. The goal may also place constraints on fiscal, debt management, and exchange rate policies—policies not delegated to the Fed. Accountability should be greater than under the current regime, but the degree of accountability depends on how the goal is defined. Since it is infeasible to expect the central bank to keep inflation right on target at all times, consideration should be given to the exceptions granted to the goal and the permissible time interval over which the targets must be met. But these exceptions in turn make accountability more difficult. This report will be updated as events warrant.

crs_RL34405

crs_RL34405_0

To assist in examining that question, this report provides an analysis of the role that home state Senators, historically and in the contemporary era, have played in the lower court selection process. In separate sections this report discusses the historical origins of the role of Senators recommending persons for nomination to lower court judgeships—particularly, the custom of "senatorial courtesy" and the Senate Judiciary Committee's long-standing "blue slip" procedure; the effect of Senators' political party affiliation on their role as recommenders of judicial candidates from their state; the lesser role that Senators play generally when recommending circuit court, as opposed to district court, candidates; the processes by which Senators evaluate and select judicial candidates; Senators' contacts with a President's Administration after they make their recommendations but before the President selects a nominee; the options available to home state Senators when the President selects a judicial nominee against their advice, or without consulting them; and issues that have arisen in recent years over the proper role, and degree of influence, of home state Senators in the selection of nominees for U.S. district and circuit court judgeships. For Senators who are not of the President's party, a consultative role, with the opportunity to convey to the President their views about candidates under consideration for judgeships in their states, also has been a long-standing practice. As a general rule, a Senator who belongs to the President's party has the primary role in recommending candidates for federal district court judgeships in the home state, and an influential, if not the primary, role in recommending candidates for federal circuit court judgeships associated with the home state. Whereas home state Senators of the President's party often, if not always, dictate whom the President nominates to district judgeships, their recommendations for circuit court nominees, by contrast, typically compete with names suggested to the Administration by other sources or generated by the Administration on its own. As discussed above, the extent to which the two Senators will share the judicial selection role depends, to a great extent, on their respective prerogatives and interests in this area. Procedures Used to Identify and Evaluate Candidates Senators have great discretion as to the procedures they will follow in identifying and evaluating candidates for appointment to federal judgeships. Clarifying the Senator's Role Initial contacts between an administration and a Senator's office regarding judicial appointments can be expected to clarify the nature of the Senator's recommending role. In either situation, the Senator will then face the question of whether to oppose the nomination, either first in the Senate Judiciary Committee or later on the Senate floor. Option of Opposing the Nomination in Committee or on the Senate Floor From the standpoint of a Senator, opposition to a lower court nomination in his or her state may serve a number of purposes, including one or more of the following: Preventing confirmation. Causing the Administration to take consultation more seriously. For instance, the policy sometimes has been applied to allow consideration of a judicial nomination when one or even (in very rare instances) both home state Senators have declined to return positive blue slips, or to allow a negative or unreturned blue slip to block committee consideration only if the Administration, in the view of the committee chair, did not consult in good faith with a home state Senator prior to selecting the nominee. Various considerations might influence the Senator to take this position. Specific issues concerning the Senators' recommending role have included the following: What Constitutes "Good Faith" or "Serious" Consultation? Should Home State Senators Always Have the Opportunity to Provide Their Opinion of a Judicial Candidate Before He or She Is Nominated? How Differently Should the Administration Treat the Input of Senators, Depending on Their Party Affiliation? What Prerogatives Should Home State Senators Have in the Selection of Circuit Court Nominees? As already discussed, home state Senators of the President's party by custom exert less influence over the selection of circuit court nominees than of district court nominees. Should the Judiciary Committee and the Senate, as a Matter of Courtesy to Colleagues, Approve Judicial Nominees Supported by Home State Senators? Should Home State Senators Use Commissions to Aid Them in Selecting Judicial Candidates to Recommend to the President?

This report examines the role that home state Senators, historically and in the contemporary era, have played in the selection of nominees to U.S. district court and circuit court of appeals judgeships. It also identifies issues that have arisen in recent years over the role of home state Senators in the selection process for federal judges. Report findings include the following: Supported by the custom of "senatorial courtesy," Senators of the President's party have long played, as a general rule, the primary role in selecting candidates for the President to nominate to district court judgeships in their states. They also have played an influential, if not primary, role in recommending candidates for circuit court judgeships associated with their states. For Senators who are not of the President's party, a consultative role, with the opportunity to convey to the President their views about candidates under consideration for judgeships in their states, also has been a long-standing practice—and one supported by the "blue slip" procedure of the Senate Judiciary Committee. In recent and many past Congresses, the Judiciary Committee's blue slip procedure has reinforced Senators' influence over judicial nominations in their state by permitting nominations to receive committee action only when both home state Senators have returned "positive" blue slips. Senators, in general, exert less influence over the selection of circuit court nominees than they do over district court nominee selection. Whereas home state Senators of the President's party often dictate whom the President nominates to district judgeships, their recommendations for circuit nominees, by contrast, typically compete with names suggested to the Administration by other sources or generated by the Administration on its own. Whether and how a state's two Senators share in the judicial selection role may depend, to a great extent, on their respective prerogatives, party affiliations, and interests. Senators have great discretion as to the procedures they will use to identify and evaluate judicial candidates, ranging from informally conducting candidate searches on their own to relying on nominating commissions to evaluate candidates. Contact between a Senator's office and the Administration can be expected to clarify the nature of the Senator's recommending role, including the degree to which the Administration, in its judicial candidate search, will rely on the Senator's recommendations. If a President selects a district or circuit court nominee against the advice of, or without consulting, a home state Senator, the latter must decide whether to oppose the nomination (either first in the Senate Judiciary Committee or later on the Senate floor). From the Senator's standpoint, opposition to the nomination might serve a number of purposes, including helping to prevent confirmation or influencing the Administration to take consultation more seriously in the future. On the other hand, various considerations might influence the Senator not to oppose the nomination, including the desirability of filling the vacant judgeship as promptly as possible, the qualifications of the nominee, and the possibility of better opportunities in the future to exert influence over judicial appointments. In recent years, the role of home state Senators in recommending judicial candidates has given rise to various issues, including the following: What constitutes "good faith" or "serious" consultation by the Administration? Should home state Senators always have the opportunity to provide their opinion of a judicial candidate before he or she is nominated? How differently should the Administration treat the input of Senators, depending on their party affiliation? What prerogatives should home state Senators have in the selection of circuit court nominees? Should the policy of the Judiciary Committee allow a home state Senator to block committee consideration of a judicial nominee? Conversely, should the Judiciary Committee and the Senate, as matter of courtesy, approve judicial nominees supported by home state Senators? Should home state Senators use commissions to aid them in selecting judicial candidates to recommend to the President?

crs_R40933

crs_R40933_0

Overview: U.S. Interests Toward ASEAN The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is Southeast Asia's primary multilateral organization, a 10-member grouping of nations with a combined population of 580 million and an annual gross domestic product (GDP) of around $1.5 trillion. Established in 1967 to foster regional dialogue during the turbulent post-colonial, Cold War period, it has grown into one of the world's largest regional fora, representing a strategically and economically important region that spans some of the world's most critical sea lanes and accounted for around 5% of the United States' total trade in 2008. The Obama Administration is pursuing a policy of expanding and upgrading U.S. relations with Southeast Asia, and with ASEAN itself. The United States has deep-seated interests in Southeast Asia, such as maritime security, the promotion of democracy and human rights, the encouragement of liberal trade and investment regimes, counterterrorism, the combating of illegal trafficking of narcotics and human trafficking, and many others. Engagement with ASEAN has presented the United States with an important foreign policy dilemma. Despite considerable U.S. security, economic, and foreign assistance initiatives in the region, particularly at the bilateral level, in recent years a perception has developed among Southeast Asian elites that the United States has placed relatively little priority on ASEAN itself and has, thereby, demonstrated a lack of commitment to Southeast Asia as a whole. However, many of the Bush Administration's initiatives—which included becoming the first country to appoint an ambassador to ASEAN, providing assistance to the ASEAN Secretariat to upgrade its capabilities, and launching the US-ASEAN Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA)—were undermined by a belief among Southeast Asian elites that the United States lacked a strong commitment to ASEAN and Southeast Asia. In February 2009, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton visited the ASEAN Secretariat in Jakarta, a first for a U.S. Secretary of State. In July 2009, during Clinton's second visit to Southeast Asia to participate in the ARF Foreign Ministerial in Thailand, the United States acceded to ASEAN's Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC), which promotes the settlement of regional differences or disputes by peaceful means and is one of the organization's core documents. Divergent U.S. and ASEAN approaches to Burma have also been an irritant to U.S.-ASEAN relations since Burma became a member of the organization in 1997. ASEAN has traditionally operated on principles of consensus and non-interference in the internal affairs of members, which has led to considerable difficulty in the group operating in formal concert. The new charter establishes a number of goals for ASEAN, including: Maintenance of peace, stability, and security in the region; Promotion of greater political, security, economic; and socio-cultural cooperation; Preservation of Southeast Asia as an area free of weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons; Creation of a just, democratic, and harmonious environment in the region; Formation of a single market and production base in which there is free flow of goods, services, and investment, as well as facilitated movement of business persons, professionals, talents and labor, and the freer flow of capital; Alleviation of poverty and the narrowing of the development gap in the region; and Promotion of sustainable development so as to ensure the protection of the region's environment. ASEAN's Regional Significance ASEAN is at the center of several other security- and trade-related groupings in the Asia-Pacific region. ASEAN as an organization will likely seek to balance external actors in the region while seeking to avoid antagonizing great powers. ASEAN has also held talks with the European Union (EU) about a possible free trade agreement, but progress has been slow and prospects are unclear. ASEAN reportedly is divided over whether to include the United States in such a grouping. In recent years, however, Congress has also sometimes played a leadership role in initiatives toward ASEAN. In October 2009, Senator Richard Lugar introduced S.Res. 311 , calling for the start of discussions on a free trade agreement with ASEAN. Shifts in U.S. policy toward Burma and the implications for relations with ASEAN have been a major focus in 2009 and will likely continue to be of congressional interest. Senator Jim Webb, chair of the Senate East Asia and Pacific Affairs Subcommittee, in August 2009 became the first Member of Congress in 10 years to visit Burma.

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is Southeast Asia's primary multilateral organization. Established in 1967, it has grown into one of the world's largest regional fora, representing a strategically important group of 10 nations that spans critical sea lanes and accounts for 5% of U.S. trade. This report discusses U.S. diplomatic, security, trade, and aid ties with ASEAN, analyzes major issues affecting Southeast Asian countries and U.S.-ASEAN relations, and examines ASEAN's relations with other regional powers. Much U.S. engagement with the region occurs at the bilateral level, but this report focuses on multilateral diplomacy. The United States has deep-seated ties in Southeast Asia, and it has viewed ASEAN as a useful organization since its inception during the Cold War. Today, U.S. policy toward ASEAN and Southeast Asia is cast against the backdrop of great power rivalry in East Asia, and particularly China's emergence as an active diplomatic actor in its geographic backyard. Some worry that the United States, preoccupied with other priorities, has been neglectful of ASEAN and of Asian multilateral diplomacy in recent years. The Obama Administration has expressed an intent to work more closely with multilateral organizations, particularly ASEAN. A number of steps in this direction include Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's visit to the ASEAN Secretariat in Jakarta in February 2009, the U.S. accession to ASEAN's Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) in July 2009, and President Obama's attendance at the ASEAN leaders meeting in November 2009. Congress has frequently played an important role in shaping U.S. diplomatic, security, and economic relations with Southeast Asia and ASEAN. Major U.S. and congressional interests in Southeast Asia include maritime security, the promotion of democracy and human rights, the encouragement of liberal trade and investment regimes, counterterrorism, combating narcotics trafficking, environmental preservation, and many others. In October 2009, Senator Richard Lugar introduced S.Res. 311, calling for the start of discussions on a free trade agreement with ASEAN. In August 2009, Senator Jim Webb visited five countries in mainland Southeast Asia and was the first Member of Congress in 10 years to visit Burma. The United States exerts a strong military and economic presence in Southeast Asia, and through diplomacy it seeks to remain a major power—perhaps the major power—in the region. ASEAN, however, has been active in recent years in exploring a variety of diplomatic architectures for East Asia and the Pacific. ASEAN is at the center of several broader security- and trade-related groupings in the Asia-Pacific region, through which it has aimed to maintain regional multi-polarity or a balance of powers among itself and other states including the United States, China, and Japan. ASEAN is also the nexus for discussion of regional economic integration. ASEAN has launched an internal free trade accord, the ASEAN Free Trade Agreement (AFTA), which will go into full effect in 2015. ASEAN has also concluded FTAs with many external trade partners, though not with the United States. ASEAN has also been exploring ways to advance the ultimate creation of a broader European Union-like East Asia Community. Some within the group—but not all—support the inclusion of the United States in such a community. Human rights conditions, particularly in some ASEAN members such as Burma, have long been a source of friction between the organization and the United States. ASEAN's new Charter, enacted in 2007, attempts to bring more pressure to bear upon recalcitrant member states. However, ASEAN still operates on principles of consensus and non-interference in the internal affairs of its members, so it remains unclear how active an actor it will be in this area.

crs_RL32253

crs_RL32253_0

When a party involved in a lawsuit makes a payment pursuant to a judgment or binding settlement agreement, the payment may be included in the recipient's income and may be deductible from the payor's income. A separate issue that also arises in litigation is whether either party may deduct the legal expenses incurred in the suit. The nature of the underlying claim is critical in determining the proper tax treatment of these payments and expenses. This report examines the tax consequences of these payments and expenses. It ends with a summary of the legislation proposed in the 109 th Congress that would affect these consequences. Portions of a payment may face different treatment depending on what each represents (e.g., replacement for lost wages, reimbursement of medical expenses, or punitive damages). H.R. H.R. 4707 (Simplified USA Tax Act of 2006) would return the law to how it was before SBJPA. The provision is included in S. 1565 (Tax Shelter and Tax Haven Reform Act of 2005) and the Senate-passed version of H.R. These are S. 1890 (Government Settlement Transparency Act of 2005) and the Senate-passed version of H.R. 4297 (Tax Relief Act of 2005). This provision has been introduced in S. 2020 (Tax Relief Act of 2005), the Senate-passed version of H.R. 3 (Safe, Accountable, Flexible, and Efficient Transportation Equity Act of 2005). H.R.

When a party involved in a lawsuit makes a payment pursuant to a judgment or settlement agreement, the payment may be included in the recipient's income and may be deductible from the payor's income. A separate issue that also arises in litigation is whether either party may deduct the legal expenses incurred in the suit. The nature of the underlying claim is critical in determining the proper tax treatment of these payment and expenses. Portions of a payment may face different treatment depending on what each represents (e.g., replacement for lost wages, reimbursement of medical expenses, punitive damages, fines or penalties, or attorneys' fees). This report addresses the tax consequences of these payments and expenses to the payment recipient and the payor. It ends with a summary of the bills that have been introduced in the 109th Congress that would affect these consequences: H.R. 3 (Safe, Accountable, Flexible, and Efficient Transportation Equity Act of 2005), H.R. 1985 (Federal Whistleblower Protection Tax Act of 2005), H.R. 2755 (Victims Tax Fairness Act of 2005), H.R. 3076 (Freedom from Unnecessary Litigation Act of 2005), H.R. 4297 (Tax Relief Act of 2005), H.R. 4707 (Simplified USA Tax Act of 2006), S. 1565 (Tax Shelter and Tax Haven Reform Act of 2005), S. 1890 (Government Settlement Transparency Act of 2005), and S. 2020 (Tax Relief Act of 2005).

crs_RL34055

crs_RL34055_0

These and all other BRAC recommendations must be completed within six years of their approval by the President. Main Post The Main Post is located at 7100 Georgia Ave. N.W. The major, though not the only, facility resident on the Main Post is the Walter Reed Army Medical Center (WRAMC). It is located on the WRAMC Main Post. Master planning for the creation of the WRNMMC and necessary NEPA (National Environmental Policy Act) actions began during Fiscal Year 2006. The staff is currently located at WRAMC. Construction of the METC is scheduled to be completed in September 2010. 13. The Department of State and the General Services Administration have requested that title to the property be transferred to them in roughly equal portions. Options for Congress Some legislation that could affect the implementation of BRAC Commission Recommendation #169 has already been proposed in the 110 th Congress. The bills that are most advanced include the proposed National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 ( H.R. 1585 ), which would establish a funding floor for WRAMC operations, and the Dignified Treatment of Wounded Warriors Act ( S. 1606 ), which would require the Secretary of Defense to assess the feasibility of accelerating the construction of new medical facilities. Both bills are on the Senate's Legislative Calendar. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: Realign Walter Reed Army Medical Center, Washington, DC, as follows: relocate all tertiary (sub-specialty and complex care) medical services to National Naval Medical Center, Bethesda, MD, establishing it as the Walter Reed National Military Medical Center Bethesda, MD; relocate Legal Medicine to the new Walter Reed National Military Medical Center Bethesda, MD; relocate sufficient personnel to the new Walter Reed National Military Medical Center Bethesda, MD, to establish a Program Management Office that will coordinate pathology results, contract administration, and quality assurance and control of DoD second opinion consults worldwide; relocate all non-tertiary (primary and specialty) patient care functions to a new community hospital at Ft Belvoir, VA; relocate the Office of the Secretary of Defense supporting unit to Ft. Belvoir, VA; disestablish all elements of the Armed Forces Institute of Pathology except the National Medical Museum and the Tissue Repository; relocate the Armed Forces Medical Examiner, DNA Registry, and Accident Investigation to Dover Air Force Base, DE; AFIP capabilities not specified in this recommendation will be absorbed into other DoD, Federal, or civilian facilities, as necessary; relocate enlisted histology technician training to Ft. Sam Houston, TX; relocate the Combat Casualty Care Research sub-function (with the exception of those organizational elements performing neuroprotection research) of the Walter Reed Army Institute of Research (Forest Glen Annex) and the Combat Casualty Care Research sub-function of the Naval Medical Research Center (Forest Glen Annex) to the Army Institute of Surgical Research, Ft. Sam Houston, TX; relocate Medical Biological Defense Research of the Walter Reed Army Institute of Research (Forest Glen Annex) and Naval Medical Research Center (Forest Glen Annex) to Ft. Detrick, MD, and consolidate it with U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases; relocate Medical Chemical Defense Research of the Walter Reed Army Institute of Research (Forest Glen Annex) to Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD, and consolidate it with the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Chemical Defense; and close the main post. As of the date of this report, the relevant bill sections and bill status are listed below: To prohibit the closure of Walter Reed Army Medical Center notwithstanding the 2005 recommendations of the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission. (Introduced in House) [ H.R. 712. U.S. Troop Readiness, Veterans' Care, Katrina Recovery, and Iraq Accountability Appropriations Act, 2007 (Enrolled as Agreed to or Passed by Both House and Senate) [ H.R. 110-28 on May 25, 2007. SEC. (a) Assessment of Acceleration of Construction of Facilities- The Secretary of Defense shall carry out an assessment of the feasibility (including the cost-effectiveness) of accelerating the construction and completion of any new facilities required to facilitate the closure of Walter Reed Army Medical Center, District of Columbia, as required as a result of the 2005 round of defense base closure and realignment under the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990 (part A of title XXIX of P.L.

The 2005 Defense Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) Commission recommended that the Department of Defense (DOD) establish a new Walter Reed National Military Medical Center (WRNMMC) on the site of the current National Naval Medical Center (NNMC) in Bethesda, Maryland. The President approved the recommendation in September 2005, and the Secretary of Defense is required by statute to implement it within six years of the date of that approval. Part of that recommendation is the realignment of the Walter Reed Army Medical Center (WRAMC), which entails the transfer of many functions from organizations currently located on its Georgia Avenue main post in the District of Columbia and Forest Glen annex in suburban Maryland to other defense installations. The main post is scheduled to be closed. The Department of State and General Services Administration have requested that title to portions of the main post property be transferred to them. This report details the BRAC Commission recommendation to create the WRNMMC, and the concomitant realignment of the WRAMC. It describes the concerns raised by the community before the BRAC Commission regarding the closure of the WRAMC main post and explains each of the 13 parts of the overall recommendation. The report details the principal organizations currently resident at WRAMC and indicates the fate of each. It describes the timing of the necessary construction and moves, as currently planned by DOD. It also includes a discussion of BRAC-related recommendations made by an Independent Review Group in their April 2007 report to the Secretary of Defense on patient care at WRAMC. Appendix C includes legislative language regarding the creation of the WRAMC that has been proposed during the 110th Congress. Significantly, the proposed National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (H.R. 1585) includes a provision (Sec. 712) that would establish a floor for funding for WRAMC operations at the FY2006 level until new facilities are "completed, equipped, and staffed." Also, the Dignified Treatment of Wounded Warriors Act (S. 1606) would require the Secretary of Defense to assess the feasibility of accelerating the construction of new facilities needed before closing WRAMC (the planned realignment actually closes only the main post, not the entire installation). If such acceleration is deemed feasible, he would then plan and execute that construction. Both bills are on the Senate's Legislative Calendar. Other proposed bills that could affect the operation of WRAMC include H.R. 1417 (to prohibit the closure of Walter Reed Army Medical Center notwithstanding the 2005 recommendations of the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission), H.R. 2206 (U.S. Troop Readiness, Veterans' Care, Katrina Recovery, and Iraq Accountability Appropriations Act, 2007, enacted as P.L. 110-28 on May 25, 2007), and S. 1044 (Effective Care for the Armed Forces and Veterans Act of 2007). This report will be updated as necessary.

crs_R42562

crs_R42562_0

Introduction The Moving to Work (MTW) demonstration program was created by Congress in 1996 to give the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) and local Public Housing Authorities (PHAs) the flexibility to test alternative policies for providing housing assistance through the nation's two largest housing assistance programs: the Section 8 Housing Choice Voucher program and the public housing program. The alternative policies are meant to increase the cost-effectiveness of assisted housing programs, promote the self-sufficiency of assisted families, and increase housing choices for low-income families. Critics of the demonstration have argued that MTW agencies have been given unprecedented flexibilities, yet there is little understanding of the impacts those flexibilities have had on the lives of the low-income families PHAs are responsible for serving, and some concern that those impacts have been negative. Supporters of the demonstration have argued that the flexibility of the MTW demonstration program has allowed participating PHAs to serve more families in unique, improved, and cost-effective ways. These competing perceptions of the MTW demonstration program have translated to conflicting calls to end the program, change the program, or expand the program. As Congress considers future reforms of federal housing assistance programs, policymakers may look to lessons from the MTW demonstration program for insight. The authorizing language directs the Secretary of HUD to conduct a demonstration program providing PHAs with the flexibility to design and test approaches for providing housing assistance to low-income families outside of the rules that govern HUD's primary assisted housing programs: the Section 8 Housing Choice Voucher program and the low-rent public housing program. Several policy debates influenced the consideration of public housing reform and the resulting development of the MTW demonstration program. Policies Implemented by MTW Agencies As stated previously, MTW agencies have adopted a wide range of program activities. For instance, some MTW agencies developed additional support services for tenants to increase self-sufficiency—these programs might have been possible under the traditional funding structure, but MTW agencies felt that they would not have undertaken them without funding flexibility. Conditions of Assistance MTW PHAs have also used their flexibility to implement new requirements for tenants receiving assistance. The specifications of the work requirements and time limits vary across MTW agencies. Observations about Outcomes As previously stated, there has been no systematic evaluation of the outcomes of the policies adopted by MTW agencies in achieving the goals of the program (reduce costs and increase cost-effectiveness in the provision of assisted housing, encourage the self-sufficiency of assisted families, and increase the housing choices for low-income families). A more systematic evaluation may be possible in the future, as HUD standardizes the program and increases the program's data collection. Critics of MTW have called for it to be phased out and, in some cases, replaced with targeted demonstrations that would allow for more meaningful evaluations to inform future policy changes. If the program continues as is, participating PHAs will continue to experiment with new policies that may influence the primary assisted housing programs.

The Moving to Work (MTW) demonstration program was created by Congress in 1996 to give the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) and local Public Housing Authorities (PHAs) the flexibility to test alternative policies for providing housing assistance through the nation's two largest housing assistance programs: the Section 8 Housing Choice Voucher program and the public housing program. The alternative policies are meant to increase the cost-effectiveness of assisted housing programs, promote the self-sufficiency of assisted families, and increase housing choices for low-income families. The more than 30 PHAs currently participating in the demonstration have adopted a wide range of new policies that would not have been possible under the traditional rules governing assisted housing programs. Participating PHAs have merged their various federal funding streams and used their merged, "block grant" funding to undertake new activities, including supportive services for residents, development of new affordable housing, and the restructuring of traditional public housing. MTW PHAs have also changed their rent policies in ways that may raise rents for some tenants, but may also improve incentives for families to increase earnings. Some PHAs have adopted policies that place new conditions on assistance, such as time limits and work requirements. And PHAs have undertaken changes to streamline administration of the program, such as modifying their quality inspection procedures. The way the demonstration program was designed—allowing for a wide variety of activities—and issues with data collection have meant that no systematic evaluation of the outcome of the policies adopted by MTW agencies has been undertaken. However, HUD has made efforts to increase and standardize data collection within the MTW demonstration program, which may make such an evaluation more feasible in the future. Both supporters and critics of the program have made observations about how the flexibility provided under MTW has been used, and those observations have influenced the policy debate about the future of the demonstration. Critics of the demonstration have argued that MTW agencies have been given unprecedented flexibilities, yet there is little understanding of the impacts those flexibilities have had on the lives of low-income families. Supporters of the demonstration have argued that the flexibility of MTW has allowed participating PHAs to serve more families in unique, improved, and cost-effective ways. These competing perceptions of MTW have translated to conflicting calls to end the program, change the program, or expand the program. To some extent, these conflicting visions of the future of the program reflect different ideas about the program's purpose. Should MTW be used as a testing ground for evaluating innovative policies for the delivery of assisted housing? Or, should something like MTW replace the major housing assistance programs? Regardless of whether Congress chooses to make changes to the MTW program, the policies adopted by participating PHAs appear to be influencing debates about assisted housing programs. Several of the policies adopted by MTW agencies are under consideration as permanent reforms for the public housing and Section 8 Housing Choice Voucher programs. As Congress considers the reform of federal housing assistance programs, policymakers may continue to look to lessons from the MTW demonstration program for insight.

crs_R43426

crs_R43426_0

Congressional Interest in Demographic and Other Background Characteristics of Judges The demographic characteristics and professional experiences of U.S. circuit and district court judges are of ongoing interest to Congress. Consequently, unless otherwise noted, the statistics reported below do not reflect all of the circuit or district court appointments made by a President during his tenure in office. Additionally, the statistics presented below do not include those individuals whose nominations to circuit or district court judgeships were unsuccessful or whose nominations are currently pending in the Senate. CRS noted previously that, during the Obama presidency, nontraditional judges for the first time in judicial history comprised over 50% of active federal appellate court judges (this occurred with the appointment of Pamela Harris of Maryland to the Fourth Circuit). As of June 1, 2017, this remains the case among active U.S. circuit court judges—specifically, 87, or 54.4%, of 160 active U.S. circuit court judges are white women, non-white women, or non-white men. Notably, as shown by Figure 6 , President Obama was the first President for whom nontraditional nominees (i.e., white women, non-white women, and non-white men) comprised a majority of all those he appointed as federal appellate court judges. As shown by Figure 8 , most active U.S. circuit court judges were either serving as U.S. district court judges or working as attorneys in private practice immediately prior to being appointed to the bench (each accounting for 26.9% of active judges). As of June 1, 2017, there were active female judges serving on 80, or 88%, of the nation's 91 U.S. district courts, with the greatest number of women serving as judges for the Southern District of New York (10, or 38%, of 26 active judges) and the Eastern District of New York (8, or 73%, of 11 active judges), and a single woman serving as an active judge on 37 U.S. district courts (representing 29% of the 129 active judges serving on the 37 district courts). Nontraditional Judges As discussed above, "nontraditional" judges are those belonging to certain demographic groups from which individuals, historically, were not often, if ever, selected for federal judgeships. As with circuit court appointees during the Obama presidency, nontraditional judges for the first time in judicial history comprised over 50% of active federal district court judges. As of June 1, 2017, this remains the case among active U.S. district court judges—specifically, 289, or 51%, of 570 active U.S. district court judges are white women, non-white women, or non-white men. Notably, as shown by the figure (and as with his circuit court appointees), President Obama was the first President for whom nontraditional nominees (i.e., white women, non-white women, and non-white men) comprised a majority of all those he appointed as U.S. district court judges. As shown by Figure 16 , a plurality of U.S. district court judges, immediately prior to appointment, were working as attorneys in private practice (35.4% of all active judges).

This report addresses ongoing congressional interest in the demographic characteristics and professional experiences of those individuals nominated and appointed to fill lower federal court judgeships. It focuses on demographic and other background characteristics of active U.S. circuit and district court judges who are currently serving on the federal bench. Unless otherwise noted, the statistics provided in the report do not reflect all of a particular President's circuit or district court appointments during his time in office—but only active judges appointed by that President. A judge in "active service" works full-time and is appointed to one of the circuit or district court judgeships authorized by Congress. He or she has not taken senior status, retired, or resigned from office. A judge who has assumed senior status continues, on a part-time basis, to perform the duties of his or her office (which can include hearing cases)—but the demographic and background characteristics of these judges are not included in the statistics presented in the main text of the report. As discussed below, "nontraditional" judges are those judges who belong to demographic groups from which, historically, individuals were not often selected, if at all, for federal judgeships. Specifically, for the purposes of this report, white women, non-white men, and non-white women are considered nontraditional judges. Some of the report's findings include the following: During the Obama presidency, nontraditional judges for the first time in judicial history comprised over 50% of active U.S. circuit court judges. As of June 1, 2017, this remains the case among active circuit court judges—specifically, 54.4% of active judges are white women, non-white women, or non-white men. President Obama was the first President for whom nontraditional nominees comprised a majority (69.0%) of all those he appointed as circuit court judges. A plurality of active U.S. circuit court judges (26.3%) are 70 years or older. Immediately prior to being appointed as U.S. circuit court judges, a plurality of circuit court judges were either serving as U.S. district court judges (26.9%) or as attorneys in private practice (also 26.9%). During the Obama presidency, nontraditional judges for the first time in judicial history comprised over 50% of active U.S. district court judges. As of June 1, 2017, this remains the case among active district court judges—specifically, 51.0% of active judges are white women, non-white women, or non-white men. President Obama was the first President for whom nontraditional nominees comprised a majority (62.0%) of all those he appointed as district court judges. A plurality of active U.S. district court judges (29.5%) are 60 to 64 years of age. Immediately prior to being appointed as U.S. district court judges, a plurality of district court judges were working as attorneys in private practice (35.4%) followed by those serving as state or local judges (30.5%).

crs_RL33201

crs_RL33201_0

Introduction In the event of a biological attack or the introduction of a highly contagious disease affecting the public, the U.S. health system may take measures to prevent those people infected with or exposed to a disease or a disease-causing biological agent from infecting others. In addition, the federal government may assist with or take over the management of an intrastate incident if requested by a state or if the federal government determines local efforts are inadequate. This report will examine federal and state authority to impose quarantine and isolation measures in order to prevent the spread of infectious disease. Federal Authority Quarantine and Isolation Federal quarantine and isolation authority derives from the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution, which states that Congress shall have the power "[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several states." The implementing regulations authorize the quarantine and isolation of individuals in order to prevent the spread of diseases identified in Executive Order 13295. The Director of the CDC is also authorized to take measures as may be necessary to prevent the spread of a communicable disease from one state or possession to any other state or possession if he determines that measures taken by local health authorities are inadequate to prevent the spread of the disease. State Police Powers and Quarantine Authority While the federal government has authority to authorize quarantine and isolation under certain circumstances, the primary authority for quarantine and isolation exists at the state level as an exercise of the state's police power. Federal authority over interstate and foreign travel is clearly delineated under constitutional and statutory provisions. In a public health emergency, federal, state, and local authorities may overlap. Thus, coordination between the various levels of government would be essential during a widespread public health emergency.

In the wake of increasing fears about the spread of highly contagious diseases, federal, state, and local governments have become increasingly aware of the need for a comprehensive public health response to such events. An effective response could include the quarantine of persons exposed to infectious biological agents that are naturally occurring or released during a terrorist attack, the isolation of infected persons, and the quarantine of certain cities or neighborhoods. The public health authority of the states derives from the police powers granted by their constitutions and reserved to them by the Tenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. The authority of the federal government to prescribe quarantine and other health measures is based on the Commerce Clause, which gives Congress exclusive authority to regulate interstate and foreign commerce. Thus, state and local governments have the primary authority to control the spread of dangerous diseases within their jurisdictions, and the federal government has authority to quarantine and impose other health measures to prevent the spread of diseases from foreign countries and between states. In addition, the federal government may assist state efforts to prevent the spread of communicable diseases if requested by a state or if state efforts are inadequate to halt the spread of disease. This report provides an overview of federal and state public health laws as they relate to the quarantine and isolation of individuals and a discussion of constitutional issues that may be raised should individual liberties be restricted in a quarantine or isolation situation.

crs_RL33733

crs_RL33733_0

At their best, NIEs provide a careful assessment of an international situation based on extensive collection and careful analysis that provides policymakers with insights into the opportunities and risks that the United States will face. On occasion, U.S. policies have not been coordinated throughout the executive branch or with Congress. There are other inherent limitations to the NIE process. Furthermore, it has been argued that NIEs are not necessarily the most important contribution of intelligence agencies, which produce thousands of assessments of varying complexity in a given year. Congress has from time to time informally requested NIEs (as was the case with the NIE on Iraqi WMDs produced in 2002, as discussed below), but the House intelligence authorization bill ( H.R. Congress included a requirement for an NIE on Iran in the FY2007 Defense Authorization Act ( P.L. 109-364 , §1213) to be submitted in classified form. The statute also stated that, "Consistent with the protection of intelligence sources and methods, an unclassified summary of the key judgments of the National Intelligence Estimate should be submitted." Most felt "sandbagged" by the Intelligence Community. Because, however, much of the public debate focused on Iraq's then-current WMD capabilities, the leadership of the Senate Intelligence Committee asked for an NIE "on the status of Iraq's programs to develop weapons of mass destruction and delivery system, the status of the Iraqi military forces, including their readiness and willingness to fight, the effects a U.S.-led attack on Iraq would have on its neighbors, and Saddam Hussein's likely response to a U.S. military campaign designed to effect regime change in Iraq." The NIE was requested on an immediate basis. An unclassified White Paper, containing many of the NIE's judgments, was issued shortly thereafter. P.L. NIE on Iranian Nuclear Intentions and Capabilities On December 3, 2007, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence released unclassified Key Judgments of an NIE prepared in November 2007, Iran: Nuclear Intentions and Capabilities . The Key Judgments of the 2007 NIE state that "We judge with high confidence that in fall 2003, Tehran halted its nuclear weapons program; we also assess with moderate-to-high confidence that Tehran at a minimum is keeping open the option to develop nuclear weapons." Conclusion: Useful Products if Limitations Appreciated Congress is and will continue to be an important consumer of national intelligence, but there are concerns that mandating NIEs may not support the legislative process to the extent that some have anticipated. Similarly, Section 1240 of the FY2012 Defense Authorization bill, passed by both chambers in December 2011, requires a report from the Secretary of Defense "in coordination with the Director of National Intelligence" on Russian nuclear forces by March 2012.

National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs) are often of considerable interest to many Members of Congress. They represent the most formal assessment of a given national security issue by the U.S. intelligence community. The intelligence process, however, is not an exact science and, on occasion, NIEs have proved unreliable because they were based on insufficient evidence or contained faulty analysis. This was demonstrated in the NIE produced in 2002 on Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction, parts of which were significantly inaccurate. At best NIEs provide an in-depth understanding of a complex international situation where U.S. policymakers may perceive a need to make difficult decisions. Although NIEs can provide insights into the likely effects of certain policy approaches, they are not usually prepared to take into account the details of planned U.S. diplomatic, economic, military, or legislative initiatives. Traditionally, Congress has not been a principal consumer of NIEs. Although Congress has on occasion requested NIEs and expressed interest in their conclusions, the experience with the NIE on Iraqi WMD and other assessments has led some Members to question their usefulness. The FY2007 Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 109-364, §1213) specifically requested a comprehensive NIE on Iran. The NIE was to be prepared in classified form and an unclassified summary of key judgments forwarded, "consistent with the protection of intelligence sources and methods." In early December 2007 the DNI released unclassified key judgments of a NIE, Iran: Nuclear Intentions and Capabilities. The NIE judged "with high confidence that in fall 2003, Tehran halted its nuclear weapons program." Even though the NIE did recognize "with moderate-to-high confidence that Tehran at a minimum is keeping open the option to develop nuclear weapons," the public release of the key judgments at a time of ongoing diplomatic initiatives was widely considered problematical. There seems to be an emerging consensus that publicly releasing NIEs, or even unclassified summaries, has limitations. Some of the nuances of classified intelligence judgments are lost and there are concerns that public release of an unclassified summary of a complicated situation does not effectively serve the legislative process. In passing the FY2010 Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 111-84), Congress chose not to require an NIE on the nuclear ambitions of certain states and non-state actors, but rather to request biennial reports (with unclassified summaries) from the DNI. Similarly, the FY2012 Defense Authorization bill, H.R. 1540, passed by both chambers in December 2011, requires a report on Russian nuclear forces to be prepared by the Secretary of Defense "in coordination with the Director of National Intelligence."

crs_R44583

crs_R44583_0

The 114 th Congress has expressed its interest in improving forecasts and warnings to protect life and property in the United States from severe weather events through its role in oversight, appropriations, and the authorization of language regarding NWS. NWS is one of several line offices within the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). To date, none of the bills has been enacted. Forecasts and Warnings: NWS's Core Mission NWS's core mission is to provide weather forecasts and warnings for protection of life and property. Apart from the budget for procuring weather satellites, NWS received the most funding of any agency or program within the FY2016 budget for NOAA. Prior to FY2015, NWS's Local Warnings and Forecasts (LW&F) program received approximately 70% of NWS funding each year (from FY2009 through FY2014, see Table 1 ), suggesting that short-term weather prediction and warning is a high priority for NWS and for NOAA, in accord with NOAA's statutory authority. Program Restructuring Starting in FY2015, NWS restructured its programs, spreading out the LW&F activities among five separate subprograms. The restructuring makes it difficult to compare funding for LW&F activities prior to FY2015 with funding for forecast and warning activities after FY2014. According to NOAA, the restructuring was "part of a broader effort to align the NWS budget to function and link to performance." In addition, several bills were introduced in the 114 th Congress that, if enacted, could affect NWS. Some of the bills focus on single topics, such as increasing the number of Doppler radar stations across the country. Other bills would address a broader array of programs within NOAA and NWS. Several bills may affect NWS only indirectly, such as those that would authorize strategies to improve resilience to extreme weather events. 1561 , S. 1331 ). 3538 , H.R. NOAA weather satellites are also critical components of the NWS's core mission, and Congress has been concerned about possible gaps in coverage and about the future of the weather satellite programs. Furthermore, Congress likely will continue to introduce legislation that would shape NWS operations, directly or indirectly, in an overall effort to improve NWS's ability to provide forecasts and warnings for protection of life and property in the United States.

The mission of the National Weather Service (NWS) is to provide weather forecasts and warnings for the protection of life and property. Apart from the budget for procuring weather satellites, NWS received the most funding (about $1.1 billion) of any office or program within the FY2016 budget for the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). The largest fraction of the NWS budget has been devoted to local forecasts and warnings, suggesting that short-term weather prediction and warning is a high priority for NWS and for NOAA, in accord with NOAA's statutory authority. Starting in FY2015, NWS restructured its programs, spreading out the local warning and forecast activities among five separate subprograms. The restructuring makes it difficult to compare funding for local warning and forecast activities prior to FY2015 with funding for forecast and warning activities after FY2014. According to NOAA, the restructuring was "part of a broader effort to align the NWS budget to function and link to performance." Several bills introduced in the 114th Congress would directly or indirectly affect NWS if enacted. Some of the bills focus on single topics, such as increasing the number of NWS-operated Doppler radar stations across the country (e.g., H.R. 3538, H.R. 5089, S. 2058). Other bills would address a broader array of programs within NOAA and NWS (e.g., H.R. 1561, S. 1331, S. 1573). Several bills may affect NWS only indirectly, such as those that would authorize strategies to improve resilience to extreme weather events (e.g., H.R., 2227, H.R. 2804, H.R. 3190). Other bills relate to NOAA weather satellites, which are critical components of NWS's mission to provide weather forecasts and warnings (e.g., S. 1331). Congress has been concerned about possible gaps in coverage and the future of the weather satellite programs. The 114th Congress has expressed its interest in improving forecasts and warnings to protect life and property in the United States from severe weather events through its role in oversight, appropriations, and the authorization of language regarding NWS. To date, none of the bills introduced in the 114th Congress has been enacted. However, Congress likely will continue to introduce legislation in the future that would shape NWS operations, directly or indirectly, in an effort to improve forecasts and warnings.

crs_R44372

crs_R44372_0

Introduction The German automotive manufacturer Volkswagen Automotive Group (VW) has admitted to installing a software algorithm in several of its diesel-fueled vehicle engines that acts as a "defeat device": the software detects wh en the vehicle is undergoing official compliance testing and activates certain pollution control devices to reduce tailpipe emissions. During normal driving situations, however, the control devices are turned off, resulting in higher emissions of nitrogen oxides (NO x ) and other air pollutants than claimed by the company. Federal and California regulators examined the use of this software—reportedly installed in 11 million vehicles worldwide from model years (MY) 2009 to 2016—and announced a $14.7 billion partial settlement in June 2016. The European Union (EU) is also examining the use of the software. On September 18, 2015, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) issued a notice of violation (NOV) to VW, contending that Volkswagen and Audi vehicles with 2.0 liter diesel engines (MY2009-MY2015) include software that circumvents EPA emissions standards for nitrogen oxide (NO x ) emissions. EPA stated that when the emissions equipment is disabled, NO x emissions are up to 40 times greater than the standard. The California Air Resources Board (CARB) also initiated an investigation into VW's use of this "defeat device." On November 2, 2015, EPA issued a second NOV alleging that VW installed defeat devices in light-duty diesel vehicles equipped with 3.0 liter engines for MY2014-MY2016, resulting in NO x emissions nine times the EPA standard. The U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) filed a civil complaint on behalf of EPA in federal court on January 4, 2016. DOJ alleged that nearly 600,000 diesel vehicles had illegal defeat devices installed, thereby impairing emissions controls and causing harmful air pollution in excess of EPA standards. EPA did not grant certificates of conformity for VW's MY2016 diesel vehicles, thus halting sales of these vehicles in the United States. The Clean Air Act and Vehicle Emissions What Federal Law or Regulation Has VW Allegedly Violated? Subsequently, VW reached a series of settlements that may resolve many of its liability issues related to the installation of defeat devices in 2.0L diesel vehicles. Potential issues include whether EPA has sufficient resources to monitor vehicle emissions, whether the current penalty structure is sufficient, why EPA failed to detect VW's defeat device when there have been similar cases in the past, and whether VW's response to the emissions problem and efforts to provide restitution to U.S. customers have been adequate.

The German automotive manufacturer Volkswagen Automotive Group (VW) has admitted to installing a software algorithm in several of its diesel-fueled vehicle engines that acts as a "defeat device": the software detects when the vehicle is undergoing compliance testing and activates certain pollution control devices to reduce tailpipe emissions. During normal driving situations, however, the control devices are turned off, resulting in higher emissions of nitrogen oxide (NOx) and other air pollutants than claimed by the company. Federal and California regulators and the European Union (EU) have examined the use of this software, which was reportedly installed in 11 million vehicles worldwide. A summary of federal and state actions includes the following: September 18, 2015: the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) issued a notice of violation (NOV) of the Clean Air Act (CAA) to VW, contending that 2.0 liter Volkswagen and Audi diesel cars (model years 2009-2015) include software that circumvents EPA standards for NOx, allowing emissions up to 40 times the standard. November 2, 2015: EPA issued a second NOV alleging that VW installed defeat devices in light-duty diesel vehicles equipped with 3.0 liter engines for model years 2014-2016, resulting in NOx emissions increases nine times the EPA standard. January 4, 2016: the U.S Department of Justice (DOJ) filed a civil complaint against VW on behalf of EPA in federal court alleging that nearly 600,000 diesel vehicles had illegal defeat devices installed, thereby impairing emissions controls and causing harmful air pollution in excess of EPA standards. EPA stated that it will not grant a certificate of conformity for VW's model year 2016 diesel vehicles, thus halting sales of these vehicles in the United States. The California Air Resources Board initiated an investigation into VW's use of this "defeat device," and, on January 12, 2016, issued a NOV to VW, alleging that "approximately 75,688 California vehicles do not conform to State law." June 28, 2016: EPA, the state of California and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) announced a settlement with VW with regard to its 2.0 liter vehicles, including a $10 billion buyback of affected cars from consumers, and $4.7 billion to mitigate pollution and support zero emission vehicle technology. This report is organized as a series of frequently asked questions. It focuses on a description of modern diesel technologies, their market and emissions profiles, and some potential reasons that could underlie the use of defeat devices. It summarizes the specific allegations filed against VW under the CAA, the current status of federal and state investigations, and the civil and potential criminal penalties that may result. Further, the report introduces several outstanding issues currently under debate, including whether EPA has sufficient resources to monitor vehicle emissions, whether the current penalty structure is sufficient, why EPA failed to detect VW's defeat device when there have been similar cases in the past, and whether VW's response to the emissions problem and efforts to provide restitution to U.S. customers have been adequate.

crs_R43957

crs_R43957_0

Prior to the secession of South Sudan, Sudan was Africa's largest nation by area, and the site of its longest running civil war. In 2011, after decades of fighting broadly described as a conflict between the "Arab" Muslim north and "African" Christian and animist south, the country split in two. Mistrust between Sudan and South Sudan lingers, and unresolved disputes still threaten the stability of the region. The north-south split did not resolve other simmering Sudanese conflicts, notably in Darfur, Blue Nile, and Southern Kordofan (see Figure 1 ). Khartoum's internal military operations against restive regions continue to draw international condemnation and have prevented Sudan from improving relations with many Western countries, including the United States. U.S. sanctions limit Sudan's access to U.S. dollars and, alongside debt arrears, impede Sudan's access to international financial markets and institutions. Instead of forging a common national identity, these policies have exacerbated Sudan's racial, cultural, and religious differences. As in Darfur, where the Sudanese government has been accused of war crimes and crimes against humanity, Khartoum has been accused of grave violations of human rights and international humanitarian law in the Two Areas. According to the U.N. Panel of Experts, which the U.N. Security Council created to monitor an arms embargo in Darfur and a related sanctions regime, the government's strategy "appears to consist of (a) collective punishment of villages and communities from which the armed opposition groups are believed to come or operate; (b) induced or forced displacement of those communities; and (c) direct engagement, including aerial bombardment, of the groups when their location can be identified." The credibility of the African Union-U.N. Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile In 2011, with the international community focused on ensuring the peaceful separation of Sudan and South Sudan and Khartoum still struggling to contain multiple armed insurgencies in Darfur, rebellions in Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile opened a new southern front among Sudan's array of internal conflicts. Relief agencies are also struggling to assist more than 140,000 South Sudanese refugees in Sudan who have fled conflict in their own country. Access by relief agencies to Sudan's conflict zones is at times constrained by government restrictions, fighting, and other forms of insecurity. The 2015 elections were controversial and were boycotted by the main opposition parties. More than a year prior, in January 2014, President Bashir had announced that, in preparation for the development of a new constitution, the government would commence a National Dialogue on conflict and political issues in the country. At the time, the move seemed to indicate official recognition of mounting public demands for reform, and the announcement was received with cautious optimism by some who have called for a more holistic approach to resolving the country's overlapping crises and political challenges. Many observers have expressed skepticism, however, that the NCP leadership will concede to significant political changes, and efforts to facilitate the participation of armed opposition groups in the process have been, to date, unsuccessful. U.S. Policy and Foreign Assistance U.S.-Sudan relations have long been turbulent. Sudan was seen as a Cold War ally starting in the late 1970s, but after the 1989 coup that brought Bashir and the National Islamic Front to power, the United States downgraded diplomatic relations and cut off aid. Efforts to normalize relations appeared to have some momentum in 2011, when Sudan was the first country to officially recognize South Sudan. The Obama Administration contends that mistrust and miscommunication hinder efforts to improve the bilateral dialogue. Congressional Engagement on U.S. Policy Toward Sudan Congressional action has often influenced U.S. policy toward Sudan. Facilitating peaceful relations between Sudan and South Sudan has also complicated U.S. engagement with regard to ongoing conflicts in the two countries.

Congress has played an active role in U.S. policy toward Sudan for more than three decades. Efforts to support an end to the country's myriad conflicts and human rights abuses have dominated the agenda, as have counterterrorism concerns. When unified (1956-2011), Sudan was Africa's largest nation by area, bordering nine countries and stretching from the northern borders of Kenya and Uganda to the southern borders of Egypt and Libya. Strategically located along the Nile River and the Red Sea, Sudan was historically described as a crossroads between the Arab world and Africa. Domestic and international efforts to unite the country's ethnically, racially, religiously, and culturally diverse population under a common national identity fell short, however, and in 2011, after decades of civil war and a six-year transitional period, Sudan split in two. Mistrust between the two Sudans—Sudan and South Sudan—lingers, and unresolved disputes and related security issues still threaten to pull the two countries back to war. The north-south split did not resolve other simmering Sudanese conflicts, notably in Darfur, Blue Nile, and Southern Kordofan. Roughly 3.7 million people are displaced, internally or as refugees, by violence in these areas. Like the rest of the Sahel, Sudan is susceptible to drought and food insecurity, despite significant agricultural potential in some areas. Civilians in conflict zones are particularly vulnerable. Instability and government restrictions limit relief agencies' access to conflict-affected populations. Logistical challenges, particularly during seasonal rains, also constrain access to those who have fled to remote refugee camps in South Sudan. The internal conflict that unfolded in South Sudan in late 2013 further threatens access to those refugees, and has led more than 146,000 South Sudanese to flee into Sudan. Harassment of aid workers is a problem in both countries, further hindering aid responses. The peaceful separation of Sudan and South Sudan was seen by some as an opportunity to repair relations between Sudan's Islamist government and the United States. Those ties have long been strained over Khartoum's human rights violations and history of relations with terrorist groups. Among the arguments in favor of normalizing relations has been the notion that the United States, given robust sanctions already in place, has few additional unilateral "sticks" to apply. Advocates have argued that certain "carrots," such as easing sanctions or elevating the level of diplomatic engagement, might advance U.S. policy goals. Efforts by the Obama Administration to improve relations, given Sudan's reported counterterrorism cooperation and acceptance of South Sudan's separation, have been impeded by reports of ongoing abuses, including allegations that Sudan continues to commit war crimes against civilians. Diplomatic relations are also complicated by the fact that several Sudanese officials, notably President Omar al Bashir, stand accused of war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide at the International Criminal Court. In 2014, under domestic and international pressure to address calls for reform and to resolve ongoing conflicts, President Bashir announced a National Dialogue, under which the government would engage opposition and civil society groups on the development of a new constitution. The African Union, the United Nations, the Obama Administration and other international actors expressed cautious support for the initiative, although the extent of the government's commitment to major political reforms remains unclear, and efforts to facilitate the participation of armed opposition groups in the process have been, to date, unsuccessful. Major opposition parties boycotted elections held in April 2015; President Bashir was reelected with 94% of the vote. This report provides an overview of political, economic, and humanitarian conditions, examines conflict dynamics in the country, and outlines U.S. policy and congressional engagement.

crs_R42093

crs_R42093_0

The Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008 ( P.L. Funding authority for most of these programs expired at the end of FY2012, and was extended until the end of FY2013 by the American Taxpayer Relief Act ( P.L. 112-240 ). As the title has grown in both size and interest, so too have questions and concerns about program funding, policy objectives, individual program effectiveness, comparative geographic emphasis, and the structure of federal assistance. Programs by Type Generally, farm bill conservation programs can be grouped into the following four categories based on similarities: working land programs, land retirement and easement programs, conservation compliance programs, and other programs and overarching provisions. Other programs such as the Wetlands Reserve Program (WRP) and the Grasslands Reserve Program (GRP) use a combination of long-term and permanent easements as well as restoration contracts to protect wetlands and grasslands from production. One of several concerns regarding conservation funding in the next farm bill centers on the possible reduction of mandatory program spending, without an increase in discretionary spending, thereby reducing the total level of conservation funding. Upon passage of the 2008 farm bill, the conservation title was one of the few titles to have received an increase in mandatory funding levels, which was seen as a victory by many in the conservation and environmental communities. Issues for the Next Farm Bill Current budgetary constraints continue to drive the debate related to the next farm bill. Many of the conservation issues discussed in the 112 th Congress continue to be discussed, including program consolidation, environmental regulation, and conservation compliance. The three largest sources of funding after nutrition are crop insurance, conservation, and commodity support (namely direct payments). Conservation Programs With No Baseline Thirty-seven provisions in the 2008 farm bill received mandatory budget authority but are not assumed to receive such funding in the budget baseline beyond the original expiration of the 2008 farm bill (FY2012). Many supporters of conservation programs viewed this as a victory during the farm bill debate. Others, including those interested in reducing agricultural expenditures or in spending the funds for other agricultural purposes, counter that even with these reductions, overall funding for conservation has not been reduced. Because these five conservation programs were extended to the end of FY2014, they were unaffected by the 2012 farm bill expiration and extension. Just as the savings from conservation reductions in appropriations bills are not always redirected toward other conservation activities, the reestablishment of the farm bill baseline through expiring conservation programs does not guarantee that future farm bills or appropriations will extend the same level of support for conservation. The current conservation portfolio includes more than 20 distinct programs with annual spending over $5 billion. Both the House-reported ( H.R. 6083 ) and Senate-passed ( S. 3240 ) farm bills in the 112 th Congress included several program consolidation measures. Under the original provisions enacted in 1985, a producer could lose the following farm program benefits if found to be out of compliance: price and income supports and related programs, farm storage facility loans, crop insurance, disaster payments, storage payments, and any farm loans that contribute to erosion on highly erodible lands. This leaves conservation program participation and direct payments as the remaining major benefits that could be affected by compliance. Environmental and conservation organizations are asking Congress to consider requiring conservation compliance for crop insurance benefits or any new revenue assurance programs.

Reauthorization of the Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008 (2008 farm bill) failed to pass in the 112th Congress, leaving it to the 113th Congress to continue the farm bill debate. The conservation title continues to receive attention and interest from farmers and ranchers as well as environmental and conservation organizations. Contentious issues raised in the 2012 farm bill debate might continue in the 113th Congress, specifically calls to reduce overall funding levels, including conservation, and the addition of crop insurance as a benefit lost under conservation compliance. Other issues from the 2012 farm bill reauthorization debate include consolidating duplicative programs, using public-private partnerships to extend federal funding, and amending existing programs by adding new options to protect and restore resources on agricultural lands. Budgetary concerns continue to drive the farm bill reauthorization discussion, with additional emphasis placed on reducing mandatory spending. In the past 25 years, conservation has received an increasing level of mandatory funding authorized through farm bills. Nutrition, direct payments, crop insurance, and conservation make up 99% of the 10-year estimated baseline funding for farm bill programs. As a result, conservation is one of the four major sources of mandatory program spending that continues to be closely examined during reauthorization. Several conservation programs, provisions, and funding authorized in the 2008 farm bill expired at the end of FY2012 and were extended to the end of FY2013 by the American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012 (P.L. 112-240). This extension did not include additional baseline funding for the 37 farm bill provisions that do not have baseline funding beyond FY2012, five of which are within the conservation title. The Senate-passed (S. 3240) and House-reported (H.R. 6083) farm bills in the 112th Congress included a number of program consolidations within the conservation title. The existing portfolio of conservation includes more than 20 programs, ranging in size and scope. The large number of programs has been cited as a source of confusion and redundancy, causing both the current and previous Administrations to request some form of consolidation. Other programmatic topics continue to be discussed and debated about conservation: (1) Should existing programs be amended, and if so, how? (2) How should funding be divided between programs for land retirement and for working lands? (3) Should conservation programs be subject to the same program limitations as other commodity support programs? (4) How will the debate be affected by new data that highlight the connection between conservation practices and positive environmental results? Various responses to these questions have been offered in extensive testimony at hearings, and are reflected in the policy options that Congress is considering. The federal response to environmental concerns related to agriculture is generally viewed as both supportive and restrictive. One of the primary means of support is provided through the voluntary conservation programs established in the farm bill. These conservation programs are increasingly called upon to support best management practices to meet federal environmental requirements; however, these programs are being considered for funding reductions. Other conservation efforts, such as conservation compliance on highly erodible lands and wetlands compliance, might be viewed as restrictive. Potential changes in commodity programs could reduce the effectiveness of compliance programs. This has caused some to advocate for reestablishing compliance requirements to other farm program benefits, such as crop insurance.

crs_R43355

crs_R43355_0

Background Marine Corps Roles and Missions According to the Marine Corps: The Marine Corps is a crisis response expeditionary force which is task organized and able to conduct operations across the entire spectrum of military operations. Fundamentally, the Corps is a "middleweight force" that fills the void in our Nation's defense structure between light Special Operations Forces (SOF) and heavier conventional units. The Marines' missions are codified in U.S. Code, Title 10, Section 5063, United States Marine Corps: Composition and Functions , dated January 3, 2012, which states: The Marine Corps shall be organized, trained, and equipped to provide fleet marine forces of combined arms, together with supporting air components, for service with the fleet in the seizure or defense of advanced naval bases and for the conduct of such land operations as may be essential to the prosecution of a naval campaign. They are organized for specific tasks and are comprised of four deployable elements: The Command Element (CE) which contains the MAGTF headquarters as well as operations, intelligence, logistics, communications, and administrative support. Types of MAGTFs There are four types of MAGTFs: the Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF); the Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB); the Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU); and the Special Purpose MAGTF. Special Purpose MAGTF (SPMAGTF) A SPMAGTF is organized to accomplish a specific mission, operation, or regionally-focused activity. During this briefing, a number of decisions related to the Marine Corps were announced, including The Marines would be a middleweight expeditionary force with reinvigorated amphibious capabilities; The Active Marine Corps would decrease from 202,000 Marines to 182,000 over five years (2017); There would be no decrease in the size of the Marine Corps Reserve; This new strategy envisioned a Navy and Marine Corps that was postured forward; and The Marines would sustain their level of presence in the Pacific and enhance their presence by partnering with Australia and others, such as the Philippines. While the Marines did not offer specifics about force structure reductions needed to reach the 174,000 active Marine endstrength by 2017, reports suggest that an additional five infantry battalions would be eliminated and, at this force level, the Marines would only be able to respond to one major contingency. Today the Marines number about 190,000, and they will draw down to 182,000. If sequestration-level cuts are re-imposed in 2016 and beyond, the Marines would have to shrink further to 175,000. Force Structure Initiatives As the Marines drawdown, a number of force structure-related initiatives are underway or under consideration. Expansion of Marine Security Guard Program As a result of September 11, 2012, Benghazi attack, Congress authorized 1,000 additional Marine security guards beginning FY2014. A sample of some proposals that might merit future discussion includes The Marines and Special Operations Forces (SOF) Responsible for Worldwide Ground Engagement38 This article in Joint Forces Quarterly, published by the National Defense University, proposes that U.S. SOF and Marine MAGTFs should be the lead instruments for land engagement operations with other countries. Should the Marines Be Given the Leading Role in the Pacific? Should the Marines' Focus Be Primarily Crisis Response? If the Marines are to focus primarily on crisis response, this could provide them with the opportunity to perhaps "slim down" the force by focusing instead on what types of force structure and equipment would be required for response to natural disasters, enhanced protection of U.S. diplomatic facilities and personnel, and limited raid-like combat operations. How Much Amphibious Assault Capability Does the Marine Corps Need? Should More of the Marines' Major Warfighting Capability Be Placed in the Reserves?

The Marine Corps characterizes itself as a crisis response expeditionary force which is task organized and able to conduct operations across the entire spectrum of military operations. The Corps is a "middleweight force" that is designed to fill the void in our Nation's defense structure between light Special Operations Forces (SOF) and heavier conventional units. The Marines' missions are codified in U.S. Code, Title 10, Section 5063, United States Marine Corps: Composition and Functions, and marines are the nation's primary amphibious force, capable of conducting amphibious assault operations in both permissive and non-permissive environments. Marine operational forces are organized for specific tasks and consist of four elements; a command element; a ground combat element; an aviation element; and a logistics combat element. There are four types of Marine Air Ground Task Forces (MAGTFs): the Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF); the Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB); the Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU); and the Special Purpose MAGTF. A number of decisions pertaining to national security strategy, force structure, and declining defense budgets have resulted in a drawdown of the active Marine Corps from 202,000 in 2011 to 174,000 by 2017. On February 24, 2014, Secretary of Defense Hagel announced that the Marines would draw down to a 182,000 Marine active force, but if sequestration-level cuts were reimposed in 2016 and beyond, the Marines would shrink to a 175,000 Marine active force. The Marines have instituted a number of force shaping programs to reach the 182,000 endstrength. They believe this force level can be achieved through natural attrition as well as voluntary separation programs where Marines who leave the service early can receive financial compensation. Officials caution that if the Marines are required to drawdown lower than 182,000, involuntary separation programs might need to be enacted. The Marines have instituted a number of force structure initiatives including creating Special Purpose MAGTFs - Crisis Response (SPMAGTF-CR) to respond to a variety of regional crises, including attacks on U.S. diplomatic facilities and personnel. In the wake of the September 11, 2012, Benghazi attack, Congress authorized 1,000 additional Marine security guards beginning FY2014. In response, the Marines are in the process of expanding their Marine Corps Embassy Security Group. The Marine Corps Special Operations Command (MARSOC) is also regionally-aligning its operational units and taking steps to begin deploying small MARSOC teams with MEUs. A sampling of academic discussions focusing on the Marine Corps of the future suggests the Marines and Special Operations Forces (SOF) could be given the lead responsibility for worldwide ground engagement. Another proposal suggests that Marines should operate in small, decentralized units and that the Marines' focus could shift to company and battalion-sized units, the so-called "sweet spot" for joint ground forces. Others contend that more Marine major war fighting units, such as armor, be moved into the Marine Corps Reserves and that Marine Aviation should be reorganized. A potential issue for Congress includes should the Marines be given the leading role in the Pacific and should their primary focus be crisis response? Other possible issues for examination include how much amphibious assault capability does the Marine Corps need; should MEUs be reorganized; and should more of the Marines' major warfighting capability be placed in the Reserves?

crs_RL33805

crs_RL33805_0

Federal Child Care and Early Education Programs and Tax Provisions Several federal programs support child care, education, or related services, primarily for low-income working families. Early childhood care and education programs still due to be reauthorized in the 110 th Congress include the Child Care and Development Block Grant and programs under the No Child Left Behind Act (NCLBA). The NCLBA programs include Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) Title I, Part A, Early Reading First, Even Start, and the Early Childhood Educator Professional Development program. Programs for young children contained in the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), such as the Preschool Grants program and the Infants and Toddlers program, are not up for reauthorization in the 110 th Congress. The CCDBG is administered by the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), and provides formula block grants to states, which use the grants to subsidize the child care expenses of families with children under age 13, if the parents are working or in school, and family income is less than 85% of the state median. Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) TANF, created in the 1996 welfare reform law ( P.L. The original legislation provided $16.5 billion annually through FY2002, and after a series of twelve temporary extensions, Congress included several welfare provisions (and mandatory child care funding) in its spending budget reconciliation bill ( S. 1932 ), which was signed into law ( P.L. 109-171 ) on February 8, 2006. Child care is one of many services for which states may use TANF funding. However, as part of the FY2006 appropriations, in addition to the regular SSBG funding, an additional $550 million was provided in the Defense Appropriations Act ( P.L. After unsuccessful attempts in the 109 th Congress to reauthorize the Head Start program (whose authorization had expired with FY2003), legislation reauthorizing the program through FY2012 was passed by the current Congress in November 2007, and that bill, H.R. 1429 / H.Rept. 110-134 ) by the President on December 12, 2007. Despite the long period of overdue reauthorization, funding continued to be provided through the appropriations process. After three continuing resolutions (CR) had extended temporary funding for Head Start at its FY2006 annual rate, a fourth CR ( H.J.Res. 110-5 ) on February 15, 2007, ultimately provided funding for the entirety of FY2007. As in the FY2007 budget request, the Administration requested no funding for the program for FY2008. FY2008 Appropriations Fiscal Year 2008 began without appropriations bills for the year having been completed. 110-424 ). All FY2008 appropriation amounts referenced in this report reflect the across-the-board cut. H.R. 2764 became the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2008 and was agreed to and signed into law by the President on December 26, 2007. 3043 (which was subsequently vetoed by the President), and ultimately, the funding levels approved by the President and signed into law ( P.L. 110-161 ). All final funding levels reflect the across-the-board reduction of 1.747%. As shown in Table 3 , the President's funding request for most of the early childhood care and education programs discussed in this report mirror the funding levels provided for FY2008. For FY2009, the Administration again proposes to eliminate the Even Start program, as well as funding for Early Childhood Educator Professional Development.

Federal support for child care and education comes in many forms, ranging from grant programs to tax provisions. Some programs serve as specifically dedicated funding sources for child care services (e.g., the Child Care and Development Block Grant, or CCDBG) or education programs (e.g., Elementary and Secondary Education Act, Title I, Part A; Early Reading First; Even Start; the 21st Century Community Learning Centers Program; the Early Childhood Educator Professional Development program; and the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act—Preschool Grants program and Infants and Toddlers program), while for others (e.g., Temporary Assistance for Needy Families, or TANF), child care is just one of many purposes for which funds may be used. In many cases, federal programs target low-income families in need of child care, but in the case of certain tax provisions, the benefits reach middle- and upper-income families as well. This report provides an overview of federal child care, early education, and related programs, and their funding status. Funding for many child care, early education, and related programs is provided each year as part of the annual appropriations process for the Departments of Health and Human Services (HHS), and Education (ED). Fiscal year (FY) 2007 appropriations bills for those departments did not receive floor action in the House or Senate during the 109th Congress, despite the 2007 fiscal year beginning on October 1, 2006. After three continuing resolutions (CRs) provided temporary funding for government operations, a fourth CR, providing funding through the end of FY2007, was ultimately signed into law (P.L. 110-5) on February 15, 2007, shortly after the President's budget request for FY2008 was released. For several but not all of the programs covered by this report, the FY2007 funding levels mirrored those included in the FY2006 appropriations (P.L. 109-149). Funding for Head Start was increased, as was that for Early Reading First. Even Start funding was cut, but not eliminated as had been proposed by the President. The FY2008 appropriations process, which included a series of continuing resolutions that provided temporary funding (at FY2007 levels) and a vetoed conference agreement (H.Rept. 110-424), ultimately culminated in the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2008 (H.R. 2764) being signed into law (P.L. 110-161) by the President on December 26, 2007. The legislation includes an across-the-board cut (1.747%) to the program funding level amounts contained in the act's language. (The levels included in this report reflect the across-the-board reduction.) On February 4, 2008, the President released his budget request for FY2009. The 110th Congress has not addressed all of the expired (or soon expiring) reauthorizations in the area of early childhood education and care. The CCDBG (expired with FY2002) remains funded without authorization. No Child Left Behind was granted an automatic one-year extension (through FY2008) under the General Education Provisions Act. Head Start reauthorization legislation (H.R. 1429) was approved by this Congress in November 2007, and signed into law (P.L. 110-134) by the President on December 12, 2007.

crs_R44075

crs_R44075_0

Frequently Asked Questions What Is the Independent Payment Advisory Board? Why Is the IPAB Controversial? (See " What Triggers IPAB Action? " for more information.) 849 and S. 260 would repeal the enabling provisions, Sections 3403 ("Independent Medicare Advisory Board") and 10320 ("Expansion of the Scope of, and Additional Improvements to, the Independent Medicare Advisory Board") of the ACA.

This report responds to frequently asked questions about the Independent Payment Advisory Board (IPAB), including the board's background, current status, controversial issues including legal challenges, and recent legislative efforts to repeal the IPAB. For additional information, see CRS Report R41511, The Independent Payment Advisory Board, by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed].

crs_RL33100

crs_RL33100_0

The Davis-Bacon Act The Davis-Bacon Act of 1931, as amended, requires, inter alia , that construction contractsentered into by the federal government specify minimum wages to be paid to the various classes oflaborers employed under those contracts. In addition to direct federal construction contracts, the Davis-Bacon prevailing wage"principle" has been written into a series of federal program statutes. The issues surrounding the act have changed little through the years. And, does the act mandate that union wages be paidon federal contract construction projects? It may -- butthat question is similarly open. For the more recent Administrations (those of Richard Nixonand George W. H. Bush), it is also difficult to define precisely their rationales -- though the BushAdministration acted in response to particular events. In this instance, there appears to have been a conflict between the provisions of theDavis-Bacon Act and the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA) -- the latter, a very broad generalstatute designed to restructure the economy and which was subsequently found to be unconstitutional(1937). (6) The impact of the suspension of 1934 seems not to have been immediately felt. (7) On June 30, 1934, as quietly as it had been suspended (just 25 days earlier), the act wasrestored to full force, the President simply remarking of the suspension proclamation that "it appearsthat a revocation of the said proclamation would be in the public interest." In a statement on February 23, 1971, President Nixon announced a decision. He noted that the act had been adopted in 1931 during a period marked byvery different circumstances. In 1971, the act meant something else entirely. What impact would(or could) the suspension of the act have in that environment -- in what, it turned out, was asuspension of just over 30 days. George H. W. Bush President Bush faced challenges leading up to the 1992 election. The President Acts on Davis-Bacon. (40) But then, on June 5, it was reported that the White House was"again giving 'serious consideration' to ordering a nationwide suspension" of the act and, accordingto "one White House source," the decision to suspend the act is now "more likely than not." (42) On October 9, 1992, Congress adjourned. During late August, Hurricane Andrew struck Florida and Louisiana. I do hereby suspend, until otherwise provided, theprovisions of any Executive order, proclamation, rule, regulation, or other directive providing forthe payment of wages, which provisions are dependent upon determinations by the Secretary ofLabor under the Davis-Bacon Act;.... (43) The Proclamation went on to discuss the relative merits of the suspension in terms of the generalreconstruction in the three areas to which it applied: Florida, Louisiana, and Hawaii. (57) Suspension Under George W. Bush On August 29, 2005, Florida and the Gulf Coast were hit by Hurricane Katrina. (62) On September 8, 2005, President Bush suspended the Davis-Bacon Act as it relates tospecific segments of the country (i.e., to portions of Florida, Alabama, Mississippi, andLouisiana). The Bush Administration, the Daily LaborReport stated, would reinstate on November 8th -- just two months after its suspension -- the"Davis-Bacon Act prevailing wage requirements for reconstruction projects in the hurricane-batteredGulf Coast region."

The Davis-Bacon Act is one of several statutes that deals with federal governmentprocurement. (See also the Walsh-Healey Act of 1936 and the McNamara-O'Hara Service ContractAct of 1965.) Enacted in 1931, Davis-Bacon requires, inter alia , that not less than the locallyprevailing wage be paid to workers engaged in federal contract construction. The act does not dealdirectly with non-federal construction. In addition to the act per se , the prevailing wage principlehas been incorporated within a series of federal program statutes through the years. And, manystates have enacted "little Davis-Bacon" acts of their own. The act of 1931, as amended, provides that the President "may suspend the provisions of thissubchapter during a national emergency." With slight variation, that provision has been a part of thestatute since it was enacted. The act has been suspended explicitly on four separate occasions: (a) In 1934, PresidentFranklin Roosevelt suspended the act in what appears to have been for administrative convenienceassociated with New Deal legislation. It was restored to full strength in less than 30 days with fewpeople, seemingly, aware of the suspension. (b) In 1971, President Richard Nixon suspended theact as part of a campaign intended to quell inflationary pressures that affected the constructionindustry. In just over four weeks, the act was reinstated, the President moving on to differentapproaches to the problem. (c) In 1992, in the wake of Hurricanes Andrew and Iniki, PresidentGeorge H. W. Bush suspended the act in order to render reconstruction and clean-up in Florida andthe Gulf Coast and in Hawaii more efficient. The impact of the suspension is unclear for the act wassuspended on October 14, 1992, just days prior to the 1992 election. President William Clintonrestored the act on March 6, 1993. And, (d) on September 8, 2005, President George W. Bushsuspended the act in order to render more efficient reconstruction and clean-up of Florida and theGulf Coast in the wake of Hurricane Katrina. The act was reinstated on November 8, 2005. In the suspensions of 1934 and 1971, the suspension applied to the entire country -- possiblywith the understanding that it would be restored once the immediate emergency was over. In 1992and in 2005, only portions of the country were involved. In 1992, it remains unclear how long thesuspension might have lasted -- if George H. W. Bush had been re-elected. Similarly, the suspensionunder George W. Bush was intended to be open-ended -- i.e., "until otherwise provided." But in fact,it lasted for about two months. The suspensions are also separated by the definition of "nationalemergency" used to invoke them: administrative convenience in 1934, inflationary pressures in theconstruction industry in 1971, and issues associated with hurricane damages in 1992 and in 2005. This report reviews the several cases during which the Davis-Bacon Act was suspended andwill likely be updated as developments make necessary.

crs_R42934

crs_R42934_0

Introduction On January 15, 2013, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) published a final rule in the Federal Register to strengthen the National Ambient Air Quality Standard (NAAQS) for particulate matter (PM) . The standards, set pursuant to the Clean Air Act (CAA), address potential health e ffects (including chronic respiratory disease and premature mortality) associated with short- and long-term exposure to particulate matter. In the final rule, the "secondary" standards that provide protection against "welfare" (nonhealth) effects, such as ecological effects and material deterioration, are identical to the primary standards, the same as in 2006. On January 15, 2015, EPA published its classification of 14 areas as "Moderate" nonattainment for the revised 2013 primary annual PM 2.5 standard. CAA section 188(c)(1) of Subpart 4 requires Moderate areas achieve attainment as expeditiously as practicable, but no later than the end of the sixth year after the effective date of final designation as nonattainment. Following this designation, approved by EPA, states then develop a SIP, which consists essentially of state regulations to be implemented by states that would affect the state emissions inventory, and therefore the expected or modeled concentrations of air pollutants. In the final rule published by EPA on January 15, 2013, the PM 2.5 and PM 10 standards and other implementation changes are as follows: Primary (Public Health) PM Standards PM 2.5 : EPA revised the annual standard, which currently is 15 micrograms per cubic meter (µg/m 3 ), by setting a new limit of 12 µg/m 3 (the proposal included an optional limit of 13 µg/m 3 and solicited comment for 11 µg/m 3 ); compliance with the "annual" standard is determined by whether the three-year average of its annual average PM 2.5 concentration (at each monitoring site in the area) is less than or equal to 12 µg/m 3 ; as proposed, EPA retained the daily (24-hour) standard at 35 µg/m 3 based on the current three-year average of the 98 th percentile of 24-hour PM 2.5 concentrations as established in 2006. EPA also revised its Regulatory Impact Analysis (RIA), in large part in response to comments received. EPA's final area designations as amended and published in the April 2015 Federal Register encompass 20 counties or portions of counties (nine areas) in four states—California, Idaho, Ohio, and Pennsylvania—as nonattainment only for the 2013 revised annual PM 2.5 standard. Rather it starts a process that could result in significant required investments by emitting sources in control measures. In part in response to comments received and considered following the June 2012 proposal, EPA revised its RIA for the final rule. As shown in Table 2 , EPA estimated that the monetized benefits associated with the January 2013 final revised PM 2.5 annual standard of 12 µg/m 3 would range $4.0 billion to $9.1 billion per year in 2020 (2010 $), compared to annual costs ranging from $53.0 million to $350.0 million. Critics of more stringent PM NAAQS stress that more stringent (and in some cases the existing) standards are not justified by the scientific evidence; the proposal does not take into account studies completed since the 2009 cutoff; requiring the same level of stringency for all fine particles without distinguishing sources is unfounded; costs and adverse impacts on regions and sectors of the economy are excessive; EPA has potentially overstated the expected benefits and underestimated expected costs; revising the standards could impede implementation of the existing (2006) PM NAAQS and the process of bringing areas into compliance, given the current status of this process; the benefits (and costs) associated with implementation of the 2006 PM NAAQS, as well as compliance with other relatively recent EPA air quality regulations that are being implemented, have not yet been realized; and revisions to PM NAAQS are unnecessary as shown by EPA's trends data that annual and 24-hour measured PM national concentrations have declined 24% and 28% respectively from 2001 to 2010. For details regarding EPA's initial final designations for the 2013 PM NAAQS revisions published January 15, 2015, and the subsequent April 7, 2015, modified designations, see CRS Report R43953, 2013 National Ambient Air Quality Standard (NAAQS) for Fine Particulate Matter (PM2.5): Designating Nonattainment Areas , by [author name scrubbed].

On January 15, 2013, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) published a final rule revising the National Ambient Air Quality Standard (NAAQS) for particulate matter (PM). The revised air quality standards were completed pursuant to the Clean Air Act (CAA) and, in part, in response to a court order and consent agreement. Based on its review of scientific studies available since the agency's previous review in 2006, EPA determined that evidence continued to show associations between particulates in ambient air and numerous significant health problems, including aggravated asthma, chronic bronchitis, nonfatal heart attacks, and premature death. Populations shown to be most at risk include children, older adults, and those with heart and lung disease, and those of lower socioeconomic status. EPA's review of and revisions to the PM NAAQS have generated considerable debate and oversight in Congress. The January 2013 revisions change the existing (2006) annual health-based ("primary") standard for "fine" particulate matter 2.5 micrometers or less in diameter (or PM2.5), lowering the allowable average concentration of PM2.5 in the air from the current level of 15 micrograms per cubic meter (µg/m3) to a limit of 12 µg/m3. The annual PM2.5 NAAQS is set so as to address human health effects from chronic exposures to the pollutants. The existing "24-hour primary standard" for PM2.5 that was reduced from 65 µg/m3 to 35 µg/m3 in 2006 was retained, as was the existing standard for larger, but still inhalable, "coarse" particles less than 10 micrometers in diameter, or PM10. As it did in 2006, EPA set "secondary" standards that provide protection against "welfare" (nonhealth) effects, such as ecological effects and material deterioration, identical to the primary standards. EPA revised the Regulatory Impact Analysis (RIA) accompanying its June 2012 proposed rule in part in response to comments received regarding the agency's cost and benefit estimates. In its December 2012 RIA, EPA estimated that the potential "quantifiable" health benefits (2010 $) associated with attaining the PM standard would range from $4.0 billion to $9.1 billion, and costs (2010 $) would range from $53.0 million to $353.0 million. Some stakeholders and some Members continue to express concerns that cost impacts would be more significant than those estimated by EPA for those areas out of compliance with the new standards. EPA's revisions to the PM NAAQS do not directly regulate emissions from specific sources, or compel installation of any pollution control equipment or measures, but indirectly could affect operations at industrial facilities and other sources throughout the United States. Revising PM NAAQS starts a process that includes a determination of areas in each state that exceed the standard and must, therefore, reduce pollutant concentrations to achieve it. Following determinations of these "nonattainment" areas based on multiple years of monitoring data and other factors, state and local governments must develop (or revise) State Implementation Plans (SIPs) outlining measures to attain the standard. These include promulgation of new regulations by states, and the issuance of revised air permits. The process typically takes several years. On January 15, 2015, EPA published its classification of 14 areas as "Moderate" nonattainment for the revised 2013 primary annual PM2.5 standard. EPA subsequently published amended designations on April 7, 2015. EPA's April 2015 modifications to the final area designations for the 2013 PM NAAQS resulted in nine areas consisting of 20 counties in four states designated as nonattainment. All but two of the 20 counties have been previously designated as nonattainment for the 2006 and/or the 1997 PM2.5 NAAQS. For a Moderate area, CAA Section 188(c)(1) of Subpart 4 establishes an attainment deadline of as expeditiously as practicable but no later than the end of the sixth calendar year after designation as nonattainment.

crs_RS22824

crs_RS22824_0

In most years, U.S. wheat export shipments decline seasonally during the winter, spring, and summer months. Historically Low U.S. and Global Wheat Stocks Global stocks are projected to drop to a 30-year low by July 2008, following seven out of eight years in which global consumption exceeded production ( Figure 2 ). In addition, in January USDA released an estimate for last fall's plantings of the winter wheat crop that, although up from last year, was significantly below market expectations. On February 25, 2008, the nearby futures contract for HRS wheat closed at a record $24 per bushel. Prices for soft white wheat (grown primarily in the Pacific Northwest) have also risen sharply in recent months. Wheat prices must rise high enough to compete for planted acres this spring (2008) with the other grains and oilseeds. As a result, assuming normal weather and average yields, U.S. wheat production is expected to rise by nearly 13%. Larger global wheat supplies are expected to significantly reduce international demand for U.S. wheat in the latter half of 2008. Markets are likely to exhibit substantial price variability until global stock levels can be rebuilt. Long-Term Outlook 10 As the global supply rebounds from the shortfalls of 2007, higher projected production is expected to facilitate the rebuilding of stocks and the return of prices to the $4 to $5 per bushel range over the next five- to ten-year period. USDA predicts that food price inflation for 2008 will be in the range of 3% to 4%, while bakery goods are expected to rise by 5.5% to 6.5%.

The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) projects the U.S. season-average farm price (SAFP) received for all wheat in the 2007/08 marketing year (June to May) to be in the $6.45 to $6.85 per bushel range. The range midpoint exceeds the previous U.S. record of $4.55 (in 1995/96) by 46%. During the past 30 years, the all-wheat SAFP has stayed within a range of $2.42 to $4.55, while averaging $3.33 per bushel. USDA projects a replenishment of U.S. and global supplies in 2008 (assuming normal weather conditions) to moderate market prices in the latter half of 2008. However, prices are likely to exhibit substantial variability until global stock levels can be rebuilt. The initial impetus for rising prices over the past year has been a 30-year low in global stocks following seven out of eight years in which global consumption exceeded production. However, in recent months several other factors—including reluctance of traditional exporters to make further supplies available to international markets, strong international demand, the rapid growth in the demand for grains and oilseeds as feedstock for biofuels production, and USDA's announcement that last fall's winter-wheat plantings were less than expected—have contributed to a sharp rise in cash and futures contract prices, particularly for higher-protein wheat varieties. This report will be updated as events warrant.

crs_R41222

crs_R41222_0

Introduction Terrorists, drug traffickers, mafia members, and corrupt corporate executives have one thing in common: most are conspirators subject to federal prosecution. The others outlaw conspiracy to commit some specific form of misconduct, ranging from civil rights violations to drug trafficking. The various conspiracy statutes, however, differ in several other respects. Elsewhere, conspirators often face more severe penalties. Moreover, statements by one conspirator are admissible evidence against all. This is no longer the case. A corporation is criminally liable for the crimes, including conspiracy, committed at least in part for its benefit, by its officers, employees and agents. 371 for conspiracy to commit a substantive offense requires proof that one of the conspirators committed an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy. Section 286 does not. The general principles of federal conspiracy law apply to both. 371 are (1) an agreement of two or more persons; (2) to defraud the United States; and (3) an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy committed by one of the conspirators. When Does It End? Sanctions Section 371 felony conspiracies are punishable by imprisonment for not more than five years and a fine of not more than $250,000 (not more than $500,000 for organizations). On the other hand, conspirators may be prosecuted for conspiracy, for any completed offense which is the object of the conspiracy, as well as for any foreseeable offense committed in furtherance of the conspiracy. Like conspiracy, a conviction for attempt does not require the commission of the underlying offense. Moreover, unlike a conspirator, an accused may not be convicted of both attempt and the underlying substantive offense. In some circumstances, he may be guilty of attempted conspiracy. Congress has outlawed at least one example of an attempt to conspire in the statute which prohibits certain invitations to conspire, that is, solicitation to commit a federal crime of violence, 18 U.S.C. Procedural Attributes Statute of Limitations The statute of limitations for most federal crimes is five years. For venue purposes, it does not. Double Jeopardy and Ex Post Facto Because conspiracy is a continuing offense, it stands as an exception to the usual ex post facto principles. Because it is a separate crime, it also stands as an exception to the usual double jeopardy principles. Since conspiracy and its attendant substantive offense are ordinarily separate crimes—one alone requiring agreement and the other alone requiring completion of the substantive offense—the double jeopardy clause poses no impediment to successive prosecution or to successive punishment of the two. Multiple conspiracies may be prosecuted sequentially and punished with multiple sanctions; single conspiracies must be tried and punished once. Asked to determine whether they are faced with one or more than one conspiracy, the courts have said they inquire whether: [1] the locus criminis [place] of the two alleged conspiracies is the same; [2] there is a significant degree of temporal overlap between the two conspiracies charged; [3] there is an overlap of personnel between the two conspiracies (including unindicted as well as indicted co-conspirators); [4] the overt acts charged [are related]; [5] the role played by the defendant [relates to both]; [6] there was a common goal among the conspirators; [7] whether the agreement contemplated bringing to pass a continuous result that will not continue without the continuous cooperation of the conspirators; and [8] the extent to which the participants overlap[ped] in [their] various dealings.

Zacarias Moussaoui, members of the Colombian drug cartels, members of organized crime, and some of the former Enron executives have at least one thing in common: they all have federal conspiracy convictions. The essence of conspiracy is an agreement of two or more persons to engage in some form of prohibited conduct. The crime is complete upon agreement, although some statutes require prosecutors to show that at least one of the conspirators has taken some concrete step or committed some overt act in furtherance of the scheme. There are dozens of federal conspiracy statutes. One, 18 U.S.C. 371, outlaws conspiracy to commit some other federal crime. The others outlaw conspiracy to engage in various specific forms of proscribed conduct. General Section 371 conspiracies are punishable by imprisonment for not more than five years; drug trafficking, terrorist, and racketeering conspiracies all carry the same penalties as their underlying substantive offenses, and thus are punished more severely than are Section 371 conspiracies. All are subject to fines of not more than $250,000 (not more than $500,000 for organizations); most may serve as the basis for a restitution order, and some for a forfeiture order. The law makes several exceptions for conspiracy because of its unusual nature. Because many united in crime pose a greater danger than the isolated offender, conspirators may be punished for the conspiracy, any completed substantive offense which is the object of the plot, and any foreseeable other offenses which one of the conspirators commits in furtherance of the scheme. Since conspiracy is an omnipresent crime, it may be prosecuted wherever an overt act is committed in its furtherance. Because conspiracy is a continuing crime, its statute of limitations does not begin to run until the last overt act committed for its benefit. Since conspiracy is a separate crime, it may be prosecuted following conviction for the underlying substantive offense, without offending constitutional double jeopardy principles; because conspiracy is a continuing offense, it may be punished when it straddles enactment of the prohibiting statute, without offending constitutional ex post facto principles. Accused conspirators are likely to be tried together, and the statements of one may often be admitted in evidence against all. In some respects, conspiracy is similar to attempt, to solicitation, and to aiding and abetting. Unlike aiding and abetting, however, it does not require commission of the underlying offense. Unlike attempt and solicitation, conspiracy does not merge with the substantive offense; a conspirator may be punished for both. This is an abridged version of a longer report, without the footnotes and citations to authority found there, CRS Report R41223, Federal Conspiracy Law: A Brief Overview, by [author name scrubbed].

crs_R44987

crs_R44987_0

O ver the last several years, there has been growing concern among the public and lawmakers in the United States about rising drug overdose deaths , many of which involved opioids. This report does not provide a comprehensive overview of opioid abuse as a public health or criminal justice issue. Instead, it answers common questions that have arisen due to rising drug overdose deaths in the nation and the ensuing federal response. Overview of Opioid Abuse This section answers questions on the nature of opioid abuse in the United States. Drug overdose deaths more than tripled from 1999 to 2014. In 2015, more than 52,000 people died from drug overdoses, and approximately 63% of those deaths involved an opioid. Where is the opioid supply threat greatest in the United States? Select Federal Agencies and Programs that Address Opioid Abuse This section discusses the efforts of federal agencies under the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), the Department of Justice (DOJ), and the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) to combat opioid abuse. The Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), part of DOJ, is the primary federal agency involved in drug enforcement, including diversion control efforts for prescription opioids. The Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA), part of HHS, is the primary federal agency supporting drug treatment and prevention. The federal government also has several programs (many of which are grant programs) that may be used, or are specifically designed, to address opioid abuse. These range from law enforcement assistance in combatting drug trafficking to assistance for states in developing a coordinated response to address opioid abuse. These programs span across several departments and agencies including, but not limited to, DOJ, HHS, and ONDCP. Two major laws were enacted in the 114 th Congress that address the opioid epidemic—the Comprehensive Addiction and Recovery Act (CARA, P.L. 114-198 ) and the 21 st Century Cures Act (Cures Act; P.L. 114-255 ). CARA focused primarily on opioids and also addressed broader drug abuse issues. Further, Congress appropriated funds to specifically address opioid abuse in FY2017 appropriations. Opioid Abuse and State Policies What have the states done to combat opioid abuse?

Over the last several years, there has been growing concern among the public and lawmakers in the United States about rising drug overdose deaths, which more than tripled from 1999 to 2014. In 2015, more than 52,000 people died from drug overdoses, and approximately 63% of those deaths involved an opioid. Many federal agencies are involved in efforts to combat opioid abuse. The primary federal agency involved in drug enforcement, including diversion control efforts for prescription opioids, is the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA). The primary agency supporting drug treatment and prevention is the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA). The federal government also has several programs that may be used, or are specifically designed, to address opioid abuse. These range from law enforcement assistance in combatting drug trafficking to assistance for states in developing a coordinated response to address opioid abuse. These programs span across several departments, including (but not limited to) the Department of Justice (DOJ), the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), and the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP). Federal and state lawmakers have addressed opioid abuse as a public health concern in enacting legislation that focuses heavily on prevention and treatment. During the 114th Congress, the Comprehensive Addiction and Recovery Act of 2016 (CARA; P.L. 114-198) was enacted in the summer of 2016 and aimed to address the problem of opioid addiction in the United States. Further, the government enacted the 21st Century Cures Act (Cures Act; P.L. 114-255)—a broader law that authorized new funding for medical research, amended the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) drug approval process, and authorized additional funding to combat opioid addiction, among other things. Of note, CARA also addressed broader drug abuse issues, and the Cures Act largely addressed cures and treatment research. Congress also provided funds to specifically address opioid abuse in FY2017 appropriations. This report answers common questions that have arisen as drug overdose deaths in the United States continue to increase. It does not provide a comprehensive overview of opioid abuse as a public health or criminal justice issue. The report is divided into the following sections: Overview of Opioid Abuse; Overview of Opioid Supply; Select Federal Agencies and Programs that Address Opioid Abuse; Recent Legislation; and Opioid Abuse and State Policies.

crs_RL34568

crs_RL34568_0

Introduction On November 26, 2007, President George W. Bush and Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki co-signed the Declaration of Principles for a Long-Term Relationship of Cooperation and Friendship Between the Republic of Iraq and the United States of America ("Declaration of Principles" or, "Declaration"). The Bush Administration later announced that it would negotiate two agreements, an agreement providing the legal basis between the two countries for the continued presence and operation of U.S. armed forces in Iraq, termed a status of forces agreement (SOFA), and a strategic framework agreement to cover the overall bilateral relationship. These were the "Strategic Framework Agreement for a Relationship of Friendship and Cooperation between the United States of America and the Republic of Iraq" ("Strategic Framework") and the "Agreement Between the United States of America and the Republic of Iraq On the Withdrawal of United States Forces from Iraq and the Organization of Their Activities during Their Temporary Presence in Iraq" ("Security Agreement," and together, with the Strategic Framework, the "Iraq Agreements" or the "Agreements"). Summary of Congressional Reactions, Oversight, and Proposed Legislation Several Members of Congress have proposed numerous pieces of legislation, both before and after the November 2008 finalization of the Agreements, designed to encourage or require the submission of the Iraq Agreements to Congress for formal approval. Congress has also conducted multiple hearings that have either focused on or at least touched on the Iraq Agreements. This testimony has equipped Congress with information pertinent to deciding what further action can be taken to involve Congress more in the implementation of the Iraq Agreements. This remainder of this report is divided into two main parts: the first describes in detail the actions taken by Congress concerning the planned Iraq Agreements, including legislative initiatives and congressional hearings; the second provides a range of options for further congressional action concerning Congress's role in negotiating, executing, and implementing the Iraq Agreements. The bill states several findings concerning the possible contents of a U.S.-Iraq security agreement and the constitutional role of Congress in approving international agreements. Legal scholars testified concerning possible legal requirements for congressional approval of the Iraq Agreements and opportunities for Congress to increase its role in the negotiation and execution of such Agreements. Ambassador David Satterfield, who leads the negotiations with Iraq, answered numerous questions from Members concerning the Iraq Agreements, making the following statements, among others: the Iraq Agreements will not include a binding commitment to defend Iraq or any other security commitment that would warrant Senate advice and consent; the Iraq Agreements will not create permanent U.S. bases in Iraq, and will not specify numbers of U.S. troops to be stationed there; any arrangement fulfilling the pledges of the Declaration of Principles between the Administration and Iraq will be made public and will not remain secret; the Administration does not contemplate the Strategic Framework as a legally binding agreement; the Administration has made clear to Prime Minister al Maliki and other Iraqi officials that the Agreements will not include an obligation to enter into combat if Iraq is attacked; the Iraq Agreements will not contain a commitment for U.S. forces to remain present in Iraq; and the Administration relies on the congressional authority in the 2002 authorization to invade Iraq as the basis for maintaining U.S. forces in Iraq past the end of the U.N. mandate.

On November 26, 2007, President Bush and Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki co-signed the Declaration of Principles for a Long-Term Relationship of Cooperation and Friendship Between the Republic of Iraq and the United States of America, which set out a number of issues concerning, among other things, a security agreement between the United States and Iraq. On November 17, 2008, the Bush Administration concluded a security agreement providing the legal basis for the continued presence, operation, and eventual withdrawal of U.S. armed forces in Iraq once the U.N. Security Council mandate expired on December 31, 2008, and a strategic framework agreement to cover the overall bilateral relationship between the two countries. After the Bush Administration announced its intention to enter into these agreements, several Members of Congress demanded that Congress be involved in creating the planned agreements, from negotiation to implementation, and took action to ensure such involvement. Members proposed numerous pieces of legislation that would increase Congress's role in creating these agreements, and, after the agreements were finalized, their implementation, from calling for executive-branch consultation and reporting to requiring formal congressional approval. Congress has also conducted multiple hearings that have concerned the agreements, receiving clarification on many important issues from Bush and Obama Administration officials, and subject-matter experts. This has equipped Congress with information pertinent to deciding what further action can be taken to involve Congress more in the implementation and continued oversight of the agreements. Several options remain available to Congress to pursue a significant role in the agreements. The purpose of this report is to provide detailed information and analysis on the specific oversight activities of Congress concerning the U.S.-Iraq agreements signed on November 17, 2008. This report is divided into three main parts: the first provides context both in the United States and Iraq concerning the negotiation, execution, and early implementation of the agreements; the second describes in detail the actions taken by Congress thus far in response to the announcement, negotiation, and execution of the Iraq Agreements, consisting of legislative initiatives and congressional hearings; and the third provides options for further congressional action concerning Congress's role in (1) the implementation of the Iraq Agreements, and (2) the possible negotiation and execution of amendments to the Iraq Agreement and new agreements directly related to the implementation of the Iraq Agreements. For analysis of the U.S.-Iraq agreements within the context of U.S. constitutional law of international agreements, and the law of congressional oversight over international agreements, see CRS Report RL34362, Congressional Oversight and Related Issues Concerning the Prospective Security Agreement Between the United States and Iraq, by [author name scrubbed], [author name scrubbed], and [author name scrubbed]. This report will be updated when events warrant.

crs_RL33365

crs_RL33365_0

On March 6, 2006, the President announced that he was sending to Congress proposed legislation that "would provide a fast-track procedure to require the Congress to vote up-or-down on rescissions proposed by the President." The President's proposal, denominated the "Legislative Line Item Veto Act of 2006," was introduced the next day in the Senate and House as S. 2381 and H.R. In comments accompanying the proposal it was asserted that "the President's proposal is fully consistent with the Constitution. In its 1998 ruling [in Clinton v. City of New York ] striking down the Line Item Veto Act of 1996, the Supreme Court concluded that the Act 'g[ave] the President unilateral power to change the text of duly enacted statutes.' The Legislative Line Item Veto Act does not raise those constitutional issues because the President's rescission proposals must be enacted by both Houses and signed into law." Standing alone, the proposed expedited rescission procedure would likely pass constitutional scrutiny. Congress would simply establish a process whereby the President may propose rescission of specific types of appropriation and tax provisions, including earmarks. The fact the Congress must act within a limited time period to either approve or reject the proposal, and that certain procedural and deliberative processes would be curtailed or eliminated, does not raise constitutional questions. The so-called fast-track process is an exercise of the constitutionally-based authority of each House to establish its own rules of internal procedure. The expedited rescission process of these bills, however, does not stand alone. Under the proposal, the President is given discretionary power to suspend covered spending and tax provisions for up to 180 days, and perhaps more, even if Congress rejects a proposed rescission within that period. This is unlike the current rescission process under the Impoundment Control Act, which requires the obligation of funds if Congress fails to approve the President's rescission proposal within 45 days of continuous session after submission of a rescission proposal, or the provision in the rejected Line Veto Act of 1996 which required expenditure of canceled authorities immediately upon the enactment of a joint resolution of disapproval. In addition, while Congress must act speedily when it receives the President's proposal, nothing in the bills specifies when the President must send up his proposal; nor do the bills appear to require that targeted spending and tax provisions in one law be sent up together; and nothing in the bills limits the suspension period of the stated 180 days or prohibits the additional utilization of the 45-day wait period for proposed rescissions under the current Impoundment Control Act, which is not to be repealed. An issue before a reviewing court, then, might be whether the bills' suspension power reaches far enough to be considered an effective grant of authority to cancel provisions of law that was proscribed by the Supreme Court in Clinton v. City of New York .

On March 6, 2006, the President announced that he was sending to Congress proposed legislation that "would provide a fast-track procedure to require the Congress to vote up-or-down on rescissions proposed by the President." The President's proposal, denominated the "Legislative Line Item Veto Act of 2006," was introduced the next day in the Senate and House as S. 2381 and H.R. 4890. In comments accompanying the proposal it is asserted that "the President's proposal is fully consistent with the Constitution. In its 1998 ruling [in Clinton v. City of New York] striking down the Line Item Veto Act of 1996, the Supreme Court concluded that the Act 'g[ave] the President unilateral power to change the text of duly enacted statutes.' The Legislative Line Item Veto Act does not raise those constitutional issues because the President's rescission proposals must be enacted by both Houses and signed into law." Standing alone, the proposed expedited rescission procedure would likely pass constitutional scrutiny. Congress would simply establish a process whereby the President may propose rescission of specific types of appropriation and tax provisions, including earmarks. The fact the Congress must act within a limited time period to either approve or reject the proposal, and that certain procedural and deliberative processes are curtailed or eliminated, does not raise constitutional questions. The so-called fast-track process is an exercise of the constitutionally-based authority of each House to establish its own rules of internal procedure. The expedited rescission process of these bills, however, does not stand alone. Under the proposal, the President would be given discretionary power to suspend covered spending and tax provisions for up to 180 days, and perhaps more, even if Congress rejected a proposed rescission within that period. This is unlike the current rescission process under the Impoundment Control Act, which requires the obligation of funds if Congress fails to approve the President's rescission proposal within 45 days of continuous session after submission of a rescission proposal, or the provision in the rejected Line Veto Act of 1996 which required expenditure of canceled authorities immediately upon the enactment of a joint resolution of disapproval. In addition, while Congress must act speedily when it receives the President's proposal, nothing in the bills specifies when the President must send up his proposal; nor do the bills appear to require that targeted spending and tax provisions in one law be sent up together; and nothing in the bills limits the suspension period to the stated 180-day suspension period or prohibits the additional utilization of the 45-day wait period for proposed rescissions under the current Impoundment Control Act, which is not to be repealed. An issue before a reviewing court, then, might be whether the bills' suspension power could be viewed as an effective grant of presidential authority to cancel provisions of law that was proscribed by the Supreme Court in Clinton v. City of New York. Subsequent modifications of the Administration proposal in the House and Senate may be seen to continue to raise significant constitutional concerns.

crs_RS21989

crs_RS21989_0

It grew out of a disputed November 28, 2010 presidential runoff election between former president Laurent Gbagbo ( baag-boh ) and his opponent, former Prime Minister Alassane Ouattara ( wah-tah-rah ), who both claimed electoral victory and formed opposing governments. Their rivalry erupted into a full-scale civil military conflict between their armed supporters in early March 2011, after three months of growing political volatility and violence. After the election, the United States, together with most governments around the world, endorsed Ouattara as the legally elected president and pressed for Gbagbo to cede the presidency to him, in accordance with United Nations (U.N.)-certified run-off results announced by the Ivoirian Independent Electoral Commission. As of late-April, $34.48 million worth of U.S. assistance was being provided to help address emergency humanitarian needs generated by the Ivoirian crisis. Background and Implications for the United States45 Côte d'Ivoire's late 2010 presidential election was conducted under the terms of the 2007 Ouagadougou Political Agreement (OPA), the most recent in a series of partially implemented peace agreements aimed at reunifying Côte d'Ivoire, which remained largely divided between a government-controlled southern region and a rebel-controlled zone in the north during a long political stalemate that followed the outbreak of a civil war in 2002. The post-electoral crisis and conflict directly threatened long-standing U.S. and international efforts to support a transition to peace, political stability, and democratic governance in Côte d'Ivoire, which are prerequisites for long-term socioeconomic development in Côte d'Ivoire, another key U.S. bilateral objective. Also indirectly at stake were broad, long-term U.S. efforts to ensure regional political stability, peace, democratic and accountable governance, state capacity-building, and economic growth in West Africa—along with several billion dollars worth of investments that the United States has made in the sub-region to achieve these goals. The United States has supported the peace process in Côte d'Ivoire since 2002, both politically and financially, with funding appropriated by Congress. It also contributed 22% of the cost of a 2003-2004 U.N. military monitoring and political mission, the U.N. Mission in Côte d'Ivoire (MINUCI), and continues to fund about 27% of the cost of the ongoing U.N. Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI), a multi-faceted peacekeeping mission that succeeded MINUCI. Most of the international community, including the United States, endorsed the IEC poll results as accurate and authoritative, and demanded that Gbagbo to accept them and cede the presidency to Ouattara. It ruled that he had received 51.5% of votes, against 48.6% for Ouattara. The council's decision was preceded by what appears to have been a coordinated effort by Gbagbo supporters to discredit selected runoff poll results before they were announced by the IEC—once it had become clear, based on partial preliminary poll results, that Gbagbo would likely not win the poll—and to disrupt or extend past the three-day deadline IEC validation of the results, creating a rationale for the council's review and rejection of the IEC's determination. The overall value of recent, current, or planned U.S. emergency humanitarian responses to the Ivoirian crisis totaled about $33.73 million as of mid-April. Presidential and Other High-Level Efforts to Pressure Gbagbo to Step Down The United States attempted to directly communicate with Gbagbo to urge him to abide by the results of the election and cede power to Ouattara, with little success. The resolution, H.Res. On April 7, 2011, Representative Timothy V. Johnson introduced H.Res. Key objectives include the imposition of Transitional Justice and accountability for Human Rights crimes during and prior to the electoral crisis; post-war economic recovery, notably focusing on the resumption of cocoa exports; and military and police and governance reform. The political division of the country also led to breakdowns in law and order, frequent impunity for security officials accused of human rights abuses and other crimes, and a rise in corruption.

Côte d'Ivoire is emerging from a severe political-military crisis that followed a disputed November 28, 2010, presidential runoff election between former president Laurent Gbagbo and his, former Prime Minister Alassane Ouattara. Both claimed electoral victory and formed opposing governments. Their rivalry spurred a full-scale civil military conflict in early March 2011, after months of growing political violence. Armed conflict largely ended days after Gbagbo's arrest by pro-Ouattara forces, aided by United Nations (U.N.) and French peacekeepers, but limited residual fighting was continuing to occur as of April 20. The election was designed to cap an often forestalled peace process defined by the 2007 Ouagadougou Political Agreement, the most recent in a series of partially implemented peace accords aimed at reunifying the country, which was divided between a government-controlled southern region and a rebel-controlled northern zone after a brief civil war in 2002. Ouattara based his victory claim on the U.N.-certified runoff results announced by the Ivoirian Independent Electoral Commission (IEC). These indicated that he had won the election with a 54.1% vote share, against 45.9% for Gbagbo. The international community, including the United States, endorsed the IEC-announced poll results as legitimate and demanded that Gbagbo cede the presidency to Ouattara. Gbagbo, rejecting the IEC decision, appealed it to the Ivoirian Constitutional Council, which reviewed and annulled it and proclaimed Gbagbo president, with 51.5% of votes against 48.6% for Ouattara. Gbagbo therefore claimed to have been duly elected and refused to hand power over to Ouattara. The electoral standoff caused a sharp rise in political tension and violence, deaths and human rights abuses, and spurred attacks on U.N. peacekeepers. The international community used diplomatic and financial efforts, sanctions, and a military intervention threat to pressure Gbagbo to step aside. The crisis directly threatened long-standing U.S. and international efforts to support a transition to peace, political stability, and democratic governance in Côte d'Ivoire, among other U.S. goals. Indirectly at stake were broad, long-term U.S. efforts and billions of dollars of foreign aid to ensure regional stability, peace, democratic and accountable governance, and economic growth in West Africa. The United States supported the Ivoirian peace process diplomatically and financially, with funding appropriated by Congress. It supports the ongoing U.N. Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI) and helped fund a UNOCI predecessor; and helped a regional military intervention force deploy in 2003. The 112th Congress may be asked to consider additional funding for UNOCI, post-conflict recovery efforts, or for additional emergency humanitarian aid, in addition to $33.73 million worth of such assistance provided as of mid-April. Côte d'Ivoire-related bills introduced in the 112th Congress include H.Res. 85 (Payne), expressing congressional support for such ends, and H.Res. 212 (Timothy V. Johnson), calling for the United States not to intervene militarily in Côte d'Ivoire in the absence of congressional approval. Top U.S officials also attempted to directly pressure Gbagbo to step down. An existing U.S. ban on bilateral non-humanitarian aid was augmented with visa restrictions and financial sanctions targeting the Gbagbo regime. As of early 2011, regional mediation had produced few results. A post-conflict transition process is now under way. Key emphases include security and public order; economic recovery; transitional justice and accountability for human rights abuses; and national political reconciliation and reunification. Continued political volatility is likely, both due to the divisions that widened during the post-electoral crisis, and pending resolution of the varied root causes of the crisis. The Overview and Recent Developments sections discuss Gbagbo's capture and ensuing events; prior developments are addressed in the balance of the report.

crs_R41653

crs_R41653_0

Military Construction Funding Trends, FY2010-FY2012 Appropriations Overview On Monday, February 14, 2011, President Barack Obama submitted to Congress his request for military construction appropriations to support federal government operations during FY2012, which will begin on October 1, 2011 (see Table 1 ). Since the beginning of FY2011, federal funding has been provided through a series of six temporary legislative instruments that have continued government spending at the same rate enacted for FY2010. Funding for the FY2010 act, the President's FY2011 appropriation request, H.R. Finally, the President is asking for virtually no OCO military construction funding. Of the funding requested by the President for FY2012, $9.3 billion is dedicated for expenditure within the United States, $1.8 billion for projects outside of the United States, and the remainder ($3.7 billion) for uses where either the location is unspecified or currently unknown (e.g., for future planning and design of various construction projects). Separate from the 2005 BRAC round, DOD announced plans to permanently move one of the Navy's aircraft carriers from its home port of Norfolk, VA, to a new duty station in Mayport, FL. Other issues potentially involving military construction funding include the recently announced disestablishment of Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) and the Navy's Second Fleet (2FLT) Headquarters. Pacific Command (PACOM) U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) is geographically the largest of the combatant commands, holding within its area of responsibility most of the Pacific and Arctic Oceans; the People's Republic of China; Mongolia; the Democratic People's Republic of Korea; the Republic of Korea; Japan and the Philippines; Indonesia; the countries of Southeast Asia; the southern Asian, Oceanic, and Australian landmasses to the western border of India; and the corresponding sea areas of the Indian Ocean. Guam Redeployment The two governments have also agreed to move approximately 8,000 Marines from their present garrisons in Okinawa to facilities in the U.S. Following agreements between the ROK and U.S. governments, the headquarters and U.S. Army and Air Force units are being concentrated into two large military communities centered on Osan Air Base and Camp Humphreys, south of the capital. Additionally, tours of duty for military personnel are being lengthened, and servicemembers will soon be permitted to bring their families with them, significantly increasing the size of those communities. For the past several years, military construction supporting this relocation has concentrated on these areas. A significant portion of the combat power remaining in the Army portion of EUCOM was scheduled to redeploy to new posts in the southwestern United States as part of the GDPR, but the Secretary of Defense agreed to reconsider the movement of two brigade combat teams when the most recent Quadrennial Defense Review reconsidered the U.S. interest in supporting NATO. Africa Command (AFRICOM) Until U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) was activated in 2008, military affairs on the continent were the responsibility of EUCOM. Funds for the construction of two headquarters buildings at Camp Lemonier, Djibouti, were requested in FY2011. Since its creation, AFRICOM headquarters has been located in Germany. While considerable construction in the CENTCOM area has been funded in previous years, the FY2012 request for appropriations includes only $80 million for a new entry control point and phases (slices) of funding for a barracks and drainage system at Bagram Air Base in Afghanistan. Nevertheless, since FY2004, Congress has annually renewed a temporary authority permitting the Secretary of Defense to use operations and maintenance (O&M) funding in the defense appropriation for military construction in support of overseas contingency operations. (a) No appropriation or funds made available or authority granted pursuant to section 101 for the Department of Defense shall be used for (1) the new production of items not funded for production in fiscal year 2010 or prior years; (2) the increase in production rates above those sustained with fiscal year 2010 funds; or (3) the initiation, resumption, or continuation of any project, activity, operation, or organization (defined as any project, subproject, activity, budget activity, program element, and subprogram within a program element, and for any investment items defined as a P-1 line item in a budget activity within an appropriation account and an R-1 line item that includes a program element and subprogram element within an appropriation account) for which appropriations, funds, or other authority were not available during fiscal year 2010. Military construction appropriations levels in that bill are also included in this report's tables. The President's FY2012 request is less than one-quarter of the amount needed during the last year of BRAC construction and movement. Even though the base budget request includes $80 million in construction for Afghanistan, this would mark a substantial reduction in construction activity in the area of the most intense U.S. military operations. Can DOD or the military departments efficiently obligate construction funds under a continuing appropriation?

President Barack Obama submitted his Fiscal Year (FY) 2012 request for appropriations to Congress on Monday, February 14, 2012. At the time, the federal government was operating under the fourth FY2011 continuing appropriation. Congress is currently considering H.R. 1473, the eighth continuing appropriation. This report explains those government activities funded under the military construction appropriation, examines trends in military construction funding over the past few years, and outlines military construction issues extant in each of the major regions of U.S. military activity. As shown in Table 1, the President's current request for military construction appropriations is reduced by approximately $9.9 billion below the amount enacted for FY2010 and $5.2 billion below what he requested for FY2011. The largest portion of those reductions comes from the military base closure accounts. Initiated in late 2005 with the approval of a list of recommendations for base realignment and closure (BRAC) actions, the 2005 BRAC round is expected to conclude in September 2011. The funding needed in FY2010 and FY2011 for construction and movement of organizations will not be necessary in FY2012 and subsequent years. In addition, the President is requesting less in regular military construction for FY2012 than he did for either FY2010 or FY2011. Finally, funding for construction supporting Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO, or active military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan), for which $1.4 billion was appropriated in FY2010 and $1.3 billion was requested for FY2011, has been virtually eliminated, with only $80 million in the regular FY2012 appropriation requested for construction at Bagram Air Base, Afghanistan. Construction issues within the United States center on the relocations associated with the BRAC movements, the proposed transfer of a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier from Norfolk, VA, to Mayport, FL, and the disestablishment of two major military commands, Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) and the Navy's Second Fleet (2FLT), both located in the Tidewater region of Virginia. In the Pacific region, the topics of major interest include planned relocations of U.S. Marine forces within the Japanese Prefecture of Okinawa and from Okinawa to the U.S. Territory of Guam, movement of U.S. garrisons in the Republic of Korea to new concentrations south of the capital of Seoul, and the normalization of duty for servicemembers stationed there, which will lengthen their tours and will bring many more military families to Korea. Troops are also moving within Europe and redeploying to the United States. Active duty military personnel stationed in Europe now number only one-quarter of the force present in 1980, and garrisons in Germany are being concentrated into two large military communities in the south. At least one major combat formation scheduled to move to the United States during the past few years has been retained at its garrison in Germany pending a military basing review. Military responsibility for Africa has been placed under a new Africa Command (AFRICOM). Though headquartered in Germany, AFRICOM does have one enduring military garrison site on the continent, at Camp Lemonier, Djibouti. Construction at that site continues to be of interest to Congress. Press accounts have indicated that a new permanent home for AFRICOM headquarters might be located in southeastern Virginia. Southwest Asia, the area of responsibility for U.S. Central Command, has seen ongoing military operations for almost a decade. Since FY2004, Congress has given DOD special authority to use some operations and maintenance funds for military construction outside of the normal appropriations process. That authority was extended into FY2011. Funds for military construction had been provided through special emergency supplemental appropriations, but beginning in FY2010, these funds were folded into the base budget—though still categorized separately from normal construction requests. Funding for military construction in support of operations in Central Command has fallen precipitously with the FY2012 request.

crs_R44936

crs_R44936_0

Political Conditions Paraguay is a landlocked country in South America bordered by Argentina, Bolivia, and Brazil, with a population of close to 7 million. In April 2013, Horacio Cartes of the Colorado Party was elected president with nearly 46% of the vote. Leftist parties have opposed his public-private partnership (PPP) legislation, which they have alleged is a covert effort to privatize government-run utilities and infrastructure. Some observers note that factionalism in Cartes's own Colorado Party—between traditionalists who wish to defend the party's long-standing patronage practices and those who have sided with the more technocratic approach adopted by President Cartes, called Cartistas —has served to undermine some of the president's initiatives. This act sparked severe rioting in Asunción and the burning of parts of the parliament building. The U.S. Embassy declared that the situation should be handled not in a secret vote but transparently. Eventually, President Cartes announced that he would not seek reelection. In late May 2017, Finance Minister Santiago Peña and the governor of the Itapúa department (the term for a state in Paraguay) announced their intention to run for the ticket of the Colorado Party when primaries are held in December 2017 ahead of the 2018 general elections. In addition, the country is experiencing division outside the realm of formal politics, as rural and urban disparities are revealing strains and occasionally sparking protest and a generation born after the years of the Stroessner dictatorship is beginning to become politically active. U.S.-Paraguayan Relations Paraguay traditionally has had friendly relations with the United States, and the United States has supported the consolidation of Paraguay's democracy and its continued modernization and economic reforms. The development program focused on democracy and governance aid to assist Paraguay in combating favoritism, corruption, impunity, and limited management capacity and fostered sustainable agricultural practices. In the Trump Administration's congressional budget request for FY2018, however, the development assistance component was zeroed out. The request for Paraguay declined to $400,000 to assist in the professionalization of the Paraguayan military, including in the area of human rights, and to help strengthen the military's ability to protect Paraguay's borders from transnational threats. In addition, Paraguay hosts a large Peace Corps program. In 2016, Paraguay became the 11 th partner of U.S. Southern Command's Human Rights Initiative. Paraguay grows and exports more marijuana than any other country in Latin America except Mexico, and it is a significant transshipment point for Andean cocaine. In late April 2017, in Paraguay's Ciudad del Este (the country's third-largest city), 60 armed men blasted their way into a Spanish security firm and stole $40 million dollars from a vault, which resulted in President Cartes calling on Paraguay's military to respond after federal police were clearly outgunned. Outlook Although the Cartes Administration has encountered fervent opposition at times—such as during recent, atypical political violence in response to the effort to push through presidential reelection—it generally has promoted policies to encourage foreign investment and promote greater economic stability while countering corruption and seeking to increase transparency. According to the International Monetary Fund, the Paraguayan economy is projected to grow by 4.3% in 2017; if so, it would be a standout in South America.

Paraguay is a South American country wedged between Bolivia, Argentina, and Brazil. It is about the size of California but has a population of less than 7 million. The country is known for its rather homogenous culture—a mix of Latin and Guarani influences, with 90% of the population speaking Guarani, a pre-Columbian language, in addition to Spanish. The Paraguayan economy is one of the most agriculturally dependent in the hemisphere and is largely shaped by the country's production of cattle, soybeans, and other crops. In 2016, Paraguay grew by 4.1%; it is projected to sustain about 4.3% growth in 2017. Since his election in 2013, President Horacio Cartes of the long-dominant Colorado Party (also known as the Asociación Nacional Republicana [ANC]), has moved the country toward a more open economy, deepening private investment and increasing public-private partnerships to promote growth. Despite steady growth, Paraguay has a high degree of inequality and, although poverty levels have declined, rural poverty is severe and widespread. Following Paraguay's 35-year military dictatorship in the 20th century (1954-1989), many citizens remain cautious about the nation's democracy and fearful of a return of patronage and corruption. In March 2016, a legislative initiative to allow a referendum to reelect President Cartes (reelection is forbidden by the 1992 constitution) sparked large protests. Paraguayans rioted, and the parliament building in the capital city of Asunción was partially burned. In response to the effort to change the Paraguayan Constitution to allow for presidential reelection, which included a secret vote in Paraguay's Senate, the U.S. Embassy in Asunción declared that constitutional revisions should be done transparently and called on all parties to work together to resolve issues sparking the disturbances. In April 2017, President Cartes announced that he would not run in the 2018 elections, and subsequently the initiative to enable reelection was withdrawn. U.S.-Paraguayan relations have been close for decades. The U.S. government has provided development assistance to Paraguay, and the two governments have collaborated on security, counternarcotics, and efforts to promote and strengthen democracy. In July 2017, Paraguay hosted the annual multination special operations competition held in the region, known as Fuerzas Comando. At the time, Admiral Tidd, commander of the U.S. Southern Command, held meetings with President Cartes and Paraguay's military leadership focused on U.S.- Paraguayan bilateral relations in security cooperation, humanitarian aid, fighting transnational crime, and counterterrorism. In addition, the Peace Corps has had a significant presence in Paraguay, with more than 200 volunteers in recent years. In FY2017, the program in Paraguay is estimated at nearly $5 million and is proposed to remain at the same level in FY2018. The Trump Administration's FY2018 foreign aid request for Paraguay would reduce U.S. assistance to $400,000, a 95% cut compared to FY2016, concentrating on military training and eliminating traditional development programs. Congress may wish to consider if the long-term U.S. focus on strengthening democracy and promoting development in Paraguay remains relevant.

crs_R42789

crs_R42789_0

S ince the 1980s, there have been five major disputes (so-called lumber wars) between the United States and Canada, interspersed by three different trade agreements. The latest dispute, Lumber V, started after the expiration of the 2006 Softwood Lumber Agreement (SLA) in October 2015. This report provides background information on the dispute, summarizes the key issues leading to the tensions between the United States and Canada over softwood lumber, and examines current developments in Lumber V. Background Softwood lumber, for purposes of this report, is lumber produced from conifer trees. Alleged Subsidies to Canadian Lumber Producers The main basis of the United States-Canada softwood lumber dispute is the allegation that Canadian lumber production is subsidized by the Canadian government. U.S. lumber producers allege that these subsidies give Canadian lumber producers an unfair advantage in the U.S. market, causing injury to U.S. producers. Different Land Ownership and Management Regimes The United States and Canada both have vast forest resources, but the ownership patterns, development pressures, and forest management policies in each country are very different. In Canada, about 94% of the timberlands are "crown lands" owned and administered by the federal and provincial governments. Different Fee Systems In large part due to the different land management regimes in the two countries, the United States and Canada each rely on different price allocation systems to determine the cost of lumber. There is generally a flat annual fee for maintaining the leases and a stumpage fee—a per-unit-of-volume fee charged for the right to harvest the trees—for the timber harvested. Comparing U.S. and Canadian Stumpage Fees Allegations that Canadian lumber production is subsidized by the Canadian government rest in part on the claims that Canadian stumpage prices—which are set administratively—are lower than the market-determined stumpage prices in the United States. Adjusting for these differences is difficult, under the best of circumstances. History of the Dispute The dispute between the United States and Canada regarding softwood lumber trade dates back to the 1930s, but the so-called lumber wars began in the 1980s when the United States first considered trade protection measures. The Canadian government and Canadian lumber producers generally have supported free trade but have been amenable to trade agreements that ensure access to the U.S. market. However, Commerce announced on November 2, 2017, that the two parties were unable to reach an agreement and announced the final determinations (see below). Litigation U.S. Trade Remedy Action The Committee Overseeing Action for Lumber International Trade Investigations or Negotiations (COALITION) petitioned the International Trade Administration (ITA) of the Department of Commerce and the U.S. International Trade Commission (ITC) to initiate antidumping (AD) and countervailing duty (CVD) proceedings against Canadian softwood lumber on November 25, 2016 (see Table 2 ). Dumping margins were assessed for four specific firms at 3.20% to 8.89%, with an all-other firm rate of 6.58%. The final subsidy determinations were assessed at 3.34%-18.19%, depending on the firm, with a 14.25% all-other rate. On December 7, 2017, ITC determined that practices found by ITA caused "material injury," to the U.S. lumber industry. Issues for Congress While the softwood lumber litigation plays out, Congress may seek to influence any settlement of the softwood lumber dispute through potential renegotiation of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). However, under Trade Promotion Authority (TPA), the President must give advanced notice to Congress for any renegotiation and must consult with Congress before and during the negotiations. U.S. lumber producers assert that they have been injured by Canadian subsidies that have given Canadian lumber producers an unfair advantage in selling lumber in the U.S. market. These contradictory results may be explained by the adjustments made to account for differences in timber measurement systems (one cubic meter of Canadian logs yields 125–275 board feet of U.S. lumber, depending on the logs' diameters); in tree species, sizes, and grades; and in requirements imposed on the timber purchaser (e.g., reforestation and road construction), among other factors. Other factors might also be important in the dispute over lumber imports from Canada.

Softwood lumber imports from Canada have been a persistent concern for Congress for decades. Canada is an important trading partner for the United States, but lumber production is a significant industry in many states. U.S. lumber producers claim they are at an unfair competitive disadvantage in the domestic market against Canadian lumber producers because of Canada's timber pricing policies. This has resulted in five major disputes (so-called lumber wars) between the United States and Canada since the 1980s. The current dispute (Lumber V) started when the 2006 Softwood Lumber Agreement (SLA) expired on October 12, 2015. Under that agreement, Canadian softwood lumber shipped to the United States was subject to export charges and quota limitations when the price of U.S. softwood products fell below a certain level. After a year-long grace period, a coalition of U.S. lumber producers filed trade remedy petitions on November 25, 2016, which claimed that Canadian firms dump lumber in the U.S. market and that Canadian provincial forestry policies subsidize Canadian lumber production. These petitions subsequently were accepted by the two agencies that administer the trade remedy process: the International Trade Commission (ITC) and the International Trade Administration (ITA). On December 7, 2017, the ITC determined that imports of softwood lumber, previously determined to be dumped and subsidized by ITA, caused material injury to U.S. producers. This means that ITA's final duties in the anti-dumping (AD) and countervailing duty (CVD) proceedings, announced on November 2, 2017, can be imposed on affected Canadian lumber. ITA found subsidization of the Canadian industry and determined a subsidy margin of 3.34%-18.19% on Canadian lumber, depending on the firm. ITA found dumping margins of 3.20% to 8.89%, also firm dependent. Canada is challenging these trade remedy decisions at World Trade Organization and North American Free Trade Agreement tribunals. Tension between the United States and Canada over the softwood lumber trade has been persistent and may be inevitable. Both countries have extensive forest resources, but they have quite different population levels and development pressures. Vast stretches of Canada are still largely undeveloped, whereas relatively fewer areas in the United States (outside Alaska) remain undeveloped. These differences have contributed to different forest management policies. For decades, U.S. lumber producers have argued that they have been injured by subsidies given to their Canadian competitors in the form of lost market share and lost revenue. In the United States, the majority of the timberlands are privately owned; private markets dominate the allocation and pricing of timber, although federally owned forests are regionally significant. In Canada, forests are largely owned by the provincial governments and leased to private firms. The provinces establish the price of timber through a stumpage fee, a per unit volume fee charged for the right to harvest trees. U.S. lumber producers argue that the stumpage fees charged by the Canadian provinces are subsidized, or priced at less than their market value, providing an unfair competitive advantage in supplying the U.S. lumber market. The Canadian provinces and lumber producers dispute the subsidy allegations. Directly comparing Canadian and U.S. lumber prices is difficult and often inconclusive, however, due to major differences in tree species, sizes, and grades; measurement systems; requirements for harvesters; environmental protection; and other factors. The softwood lumber trade between the United States and Canada is of interest to Congress due to the controversy between Canadian and U.S. lumber producers and the larger implications it might have on trade between the two countries. The potential renegotiation of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) may provide Congress an opportunity to weigh in on this issue, given its constitutional authority over trade policy, as well as authority granted under the 2015 Trade Promotion Authority (TPA). Congress may consider legislation or conduct oversight on these issues.

crs_RL34221

crs_RL34221_0

Proposed legislation in previous sessions of Congress demonstrates legislative interest in the recently recognized phenomenon of patented tax strategies. According to some experts, tax strategy patents may limit the ability of taxpayers to utilize provisions of the tax code, interfering with congressional intent and leading to distortions in tax obligations. Others assert that tax strategy patents potentially complicate legal compliance by tax professionals and taxpayers alike. Other commentators explain that patents on "business methods" have been obtained and enforced for many years. In addition, some commentators believe that tax strategy patents present a positive development, potentially improving the public disclosure of tax shelters for the attention of Congress and federal tax authorities. The Phenomenon of Tax Strategy Patents Patents on Methods of Doing Business The availability of patents on tax strategies has been linked to the grant of patents on the broader category of business methods. This long period of ambiguity over the patentability of business methods ended with the 1998 opinion of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group . Other tax patents have also been subject to litigation. On June 28, 2010, the Supreme Court issued its decision in Bilski v. Kappos concerning patentable subject matter. Innovation Policy Issues Although business method patents have been held to be patentable at least since the issuance of the State Street Bank opinion in 1998, the more recent phenomenon of tax strategy patents has resulted in a spirited discussion. Other observers go further, believing that to the extent that tax patents encourage further innovation in developing innovative tax avoidance strategies, such an incentive is not socially desirable. Tax professionals have also expressed concerns over the impact of tax strategy patents upon their own practices, as well as taxpayers in general. Some observers believe that the burdens of investigating whether a taxpayer's planned course of action is covered by a tax strategy patent, determining whether the patent was providently granted by the USPTO, and potentially negotiating with the patent proprietor in order to employ the strategy, will be costly and impractical for many taxpayers. Others make the affirmative case that tax strategy patents will produce positive social benefits. Observers also note that professionals in many spheres of endeavor have long had to account for the patent system during their decision-making process. In the view of these experts, if taxpayers mistakenly believe that the grant of a patent implies government approval of the patented strategy, then the proper response is to promote taxpayer awareness, not to limit or prohibit tax strategy patents altogether. In the 111 th Congress, three bills were introduced that would limit the enforcement of tax strategy patents. None were enacted. H.R. Other legislative responses are also possible. Congress could also encourage continued cooperation between the USPTO and the IRS with respect to tax strategy patents.

Several bills were introduced in previous sessions of Congress that would have addressed the recently recognized phenomenon of patented tax strategies. These legislative initiatives would have prevented the grant of exclusive intellectual property rights by the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) on methods that individuals and enterprises might use in order to minimize their tax obligations. This issue may arise before the 112th Congress. Many commentators trace the rise of tax strategy patents to the 1998 opinion of the Federal Circuit in State Street Bank v. Signature Financial Group, which rejected a per se rule that business methods could not be patented. In recent years, the USPTO has issued a number of patents that pertain to tax strategies. Several of these patents have been subject to enforcement litigation in federal court. The 2010 decision of the Supreme Court in Bilski v. Kappos continues to allow for the possibility of business method patents, and potentially tax strategy patents as well. The impact of tax strategy patents upon social welfare has been subject to a spirited debate. Some observers are opposed to tax strategy patents. These commentators believe that patent protection is unnecessary with respect to tax avoidance techniques due to a high level of current innovation. Others believe that patent-based incentives to develop tax avoidance strategies are not socially desirable. They assert that patents may limit the ability of individuals to utilize provisions of the tax code intended for all taxpayers, interfering with congressional intent and leading to distortions in tax obligations. Others have expressed concerns that tax strategy patents may potentially complicate legal compliance by tax professionals and individual taxpayers alike. Other experts believe that these concerns are overstated, and also make the affirmative case that tax strategy patents may provide positive social benefits. They explain that patents on "business methods" have been obtained and enforced for many years. They also observe that the grant of a patent does not imply government approval of the practice of the patented invention, and that professionals in many spheres of endeavor have long had to account for the patent system during their decision-making process. They also believe that the availability of tax strategy patents may promote innovation in a field of endeavor that is demonstrably valuable. Further, such patents might promote public disclosure of tax strategies to tax professionals, taxpayers, and responsible government officials alike. Three bills that were introduced, but not enacted, in the 111th Congress—H.R. 1265, H.R. 2584, and S. 506—would have prohibited the issuance of patents on tax strategies. Other legislative responses, including oversight of the USPTO, promotion of cooperation between the USPTO and the IRS, and the encouragement of private sector contributions to the patent examination process, are also possible.

crs_RS22324

crs_RS22324_0

The Dayton agreement outlined a common state of Bosnia and Herzegovina comprised of two entities, the Bosniak (Muslim)-Croat Federation and the Republika Srpska (RS), under the authority of an international representative and a NATO-led peacekeeping presence. Political differences among Bosnia's leaders and vested interests in the status quo continue to hinder efforts to strengthen Bosnia's central governing institutions and administrative capacity. Some Members of the 110 th Congress retain an interest in Bosnia's progress since Dayton, its path toward NATO membership and EU integration, as well as its record of cooperation on war crimes issues. Ethnic Croat parties are generally supportive of greater rights for the country's ethnic Croat community. Both the Office of the High Representative, which wielded extensive political authority for many years, and the international security presence have evolved considerably since the end of the war. EUFOR/NATO At the end of 2004, NATO concluded its SFOR mission in Bosnia and turned over peacekeeping duties to a European Union military force, EUFOR, to ensure continued compliance with Dayton and contribute to a secure environment in Bosnia.

Over 12 years since the Dayton accords ended the 1992-1995 Bosnian war, Bosnia's future is still somewhat in question. Despite the country's numerous postwar achievements, political and ethnic divisions remain strong, with many of Bosnia's political leaders maintaining sharply polarized views on institutional and constitutional reforms, especially those concerning the Dayton-mandated entities (the Bosniak-Croat Federation and the Republika Srpska) and the central Bosnian government. In general, the Bosniak (or Muslim) parties have emphasized a stronger central government, while the Bosnian Serb and Bosnian Croat communities favor more decentralization. (Bosnia's population includes 48% Bosniaks (Muslims), 37.1% Serbs, and 14.3% Croats (2000 estimate) [CIA, The World Factbook , 2008]). Nevertheless, Bosnia recently achieved new milestones in its path toward full integration with NATO and the European Union (EU). An international High Representative continues to provide hands-on diplomatic guidance, and an EU-led military force remains deployed to provide for a secure environment in Bosnia; both international missions derive from the Dayton agreement and neither has a set end-date. This report provides an overview of prominent current issues in Bosnia that may be of interest to Members of the 110 th Congress. It may be updated as events warrant.

crs_R42346

crs_R42346_0

These agencies are as follows: Bureau of Land Management (BLM), 248.3 million acres; Forest Service (FS), 192.9 million acres; Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS), 89.1 million acres; and National Park Service (NPS), 79.8 million acres. In addition, the Department of Defense (DOD) administers 11.4 million acres in the United States, about 2% of all federal land. Conflicting public values concerning federal lands raise many questions and issues, including the extent to which the federal government should own land; whether to focus resources on maintenance of existing infrastructure and lands or acquisition of new areas; how to balance use and protection; and how to ensure the security of international borders along the federal lands of multiple agencies. Emphasis shifted during the 20 th century from the disposal and conveyance of title to private citizens to the retention and management of the remaining federal lands. As noted, DOD is the fifth-largest land management agency, with lands consisting of military bases, training ranges, and more. Numerous other federal agencies—the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Bureau of Reclamation, Post Office, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, the Department of Energy, and many more—administer additional federal lands. In addition, the BLM administers about 700 million acres of federal subsurface mineral estate throughout the nation. These purposes were expanded in the Multiple Use-Sustained Yield Act of 1960. The FWS has a primary-use mission—to conserve plants and animals. The NPS has a dual mission—to preserve unique resources and to provide for their enjoyment by the public. Federal Land Ownership, 2015 The roughly 640 million acres of federal land in the United States represents about 28% of the total land base of 2.27 billion acres. Table 1 provides data on the total acreage of federal land administered by the four major federal land management agencies and the DOD in each state and the District of Columbia. These tables reflect federal acreage as of September 30, 2015, except that DOD figures are current as of September 30, 2014. The figures range from 0.3% of land (in Connecticut and Iowa) to 79.6% of land (in Nevada). Through the numerous individual acquisitions and disposals since 1990, the total federal land ownership has declined by 25.4 million acres, or 3.9% of the total of the five agencies, as shown in Table 3 . This increase was not uniform, with declines in some states and varying increases (in acreages and percentage) in others. Debates also encompass the extent to which federal lands should be developed, preserved, and open to recreation and whether federal lands should be managed primarily to produce national benefits or benefits primarily for the localities and states in which the lands are located. Advocates of retention of federal lands, and federal acquisition of additional lands, assert a variety of benefits to the public of federal land ownership. With regard to disposal, the NPS and FWS have no general authority to dispose of the lands they administer, and the FS disposal authorities are restricted. Western Land Concentration The concentration of federal lands in the West has contributed to a higher degree of controversy over federal land ownership in that part of the country. Of the land in the 11 contiguous western states, 46.4% is federally owned, which includes 73.4% of total FS lands and 70.3% of total BLM lands. In the rest of the country, the federal government owns 4.2% of the lands, with 60.9% of those managed by the FS. Nearly half of this land (12.3 million acres) was managed by BLM, and the other federal lands were managed by DOD (5.8 million acres), FS (3.8 million acres), NPS (2.4 million acres), FWS (2.2 million acres), and other federal agencies (0.2 million acres). Differences in missions and jurisdictional complexity among these agencies have been identified as potentially hindering border control.

The federal government owns roughly 640 million acres, about 28% of the 2.27 billion acres of land in the United States. Four major federal land management agencies administer 610.1 million acres of this land (as of September 30, 2015). They are the Bureau of Land Management (BLM), Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS), and National Park Service (NPS) in the Department of the Interior (DOI) and the Forest Service (FS) in the Department of Agriculture. In addition, the Department of Defense (excluding the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers) administers 11.4 million acres in the United States (as of September 30, 2014), consisting of military bases, training ranges, and more. Numerous other agencies administer the remaining federal acreage. The lands administered by the four major agencies are managed for many purposes, primarily related to preservation, recreation, and development of natural resources. Yet the agencies have distinct responsibilities. The BLM manages 248.3 million acres of public land and administers about 700 million acres of federal subsurface mineral estate throughout the nation. The BLM has a multiple-use, sustained-yield mandate that supports a variety of activities and programs, as does the FS, which currently manages 192.9 million acres. Most FS lands are designated national forests. Wildfire protection is increasingly important for both agencies. The FWS manages 89.1 million acres of the U.S. total, primarily to conserve and protect animals and plants. The National Wildlife Refuge System includes wildlife refuges, waterfowl production areas, and wildlife coordination units. In 2015, the NPS managed 79.8 million acres in 408 diverse units to conserve lands and resources and make them available for public use. Activities that harvest or remove resources from NPS lands generally are prohibited. The amount and percentage of federally owned land in each state varies widely, ranging from 0.3% of land (in Connecticut and Iowa) to 79.6% of land (in Nevada). However, federal land ownership generally is concentrated in the West. Specifically, 61.3% of Alaska is federally owned, as is 46.4% of the 11 coterminous western states. By contrast, the federal government owns 4.2% of lands in the other states. This western concentration has contributed to a higher degree of controversy over federal land ownership and use in that part of the country. Throughout America's history, federal land laws have reflected two visions: keeping some lands in federal ownership while disposing of others. From the earliest days, there has been conflict between these two visions. During the 19th century, many laws encouraged settlement of the West through federal land disposal. Mostly in the 20th century, emphasis shifted to retention of federal lands. Congress has provided varying land acquisition and disposal authorities to the agencies, ranging from restricted (NPS) to broad (BLM). As a result of acquisitions and disposals, from 1990 to 2015, total federal land ownership by the five agencies declined by 25.4 million acres (3.9%), from 646.9 million acres to 621.5 million acres. Much of the decline is attributable to BLM land disposals in Alaska and to reductions in DOD land. By contrast, land ownership by the NPS, FWS, and FS increased over the 25-year period. Further, although 15 states had decreases of federal land during this period, the other states had varying increases. Numerous issues affecting federal land management are before Congress. These issues include the extent of federal ownership and whether to decrease, maintain, or increase the amount of federal holdings; the condition of currently owned federal infrastructure and lands and the priority of their maintenance versus new acquisitions; and the optimal balance between land use and protection, and whether federal lands should be managed primarily to benefit the nation as a whole or to benefit the localities and states. Another issue is border control on federal lands along the southwestern border, which presents challenges due to the length of the border, remoteness and topography of the lands, and differences in missions of managing agencies.

crs_RL31135

crs_RL31135_0

Background Process for Approving a Nuclear Waste Repository Site The Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 (NWPA) (1) enacted a system for the federal government to establish a deep underground "geologic repository" forpermanent storage of radioactive waste from civilian nuclear power plants. (4) The State of Nevada exercised this disapproval authority onApril 8. The Act establishes an expedited procedure for congressional consideration of this joint resolution. The terms of the NWPA also specify that a state disapproval of a site designation can be overridden only by enactment of a resolution of repository sitingapproval, having the form prescribed by the Act and considered under the expedited procedure. Committee Action Requirement for Report or Discharge. 87 on April 25. In that situation, if a committee does not report an approval resolutionby the 60th day of continuous session in the newCongress, it will be discharged from all approval resolutions introduced in that house in the new Congress. 87 pursuant tothe statutory procedure on May 8. Once the resolution has been on the calendar for 5 legislative days, the Speaker may recognize a Member to call it up. The Act directs that at the end of the 2 hours' debate in the House,the previous question be automatically ordered, and the House proceed to vote on adopting the resolution. Finally, it explicitly prohibits amendment of an approvalresolution. (28) If the Senate disagrees to this motion, the Act provides that it may be repeated (and ifmore than one approval resolution reaches the calendar, the motion also might be offered with respect to each). It might be argued that if the resolution were amended, it would cease to meet the description required by42 U.S.C. For example, if the Senate adopted anamendment to an approval resolution, it might be possible for a Senator to raise a point of order that the amendedmeasure was no longer subject to the limits ondebate that the Act establishes as part of the expedited procedures for considering an approval resolution. This action maintains the resolution passed by the other house in aconvenient status for the receiving house to act on it. 34 , it will presumably vote on the House-passed H.J.Res. Each House Must First Consider Own Measure. The Act, however, establishes no further procedure by which either house could then clear forpresidential action an approval resolution received fromthe other. Like a permanent change in rules, a special rule takes the formof a resolution that the Committee on Ruleshas jurisdiction to report, and is considered under procedures that permit the House to vote to terminate debate, andpreclude amendment, after one hour. Additional Statutory Requirements for Site Approval The previous section addresses whether, if an approval resolution were to be amended into a form other thanthat prescribed by the NWPA, it would continue tobe eligible for consideration under the expedited procedure of the Act. It accordingly appears that, for example, the Senate might amend its approval resolution, then continue considering the measure without regard to the constraintsof the expedited procedure on debate and other procedural actions, and ultimately pass in lieu thereof an unamendedcompanion previously received from theHouse.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 (NWPA), as amended, establishes a process for the federal government to designate a site for a permanent repository forcivilian nuclear waste. In February 2002, this process culminated in a presidential recommendation for a repositoryat Yucca Mountain, Nevada. On April 8, theState of Nevada exercised its authority under NWPA to disapprove the site. As a result of this state disapproval,the site may be approved only if a joint resolutionof repository siting approval becomes law after being passed by Congress during the first period of 90 days ofcontinuous session after the disapproval. Thisperiod appears likely to terminate just after the August recess. The Act establishes an expedited procedure for congressional consideration of this approval resolution. Pursuant to this expedited procedure, approval resolutionswere introduced in both houses and referred to the respective committees of jurisdiction, which had until the60th day of continuous session after the statedisapproval to report or be discharged. The House committee reported on May 1, and the Senate committee on June10. In the House, once an approval resolution has been on the calendar for 5 legislative days, a supporter may call it up if the Speaker recognizes him or her for thepurpose. After 2 hours of debate, the House then votes on the resolution without amendment or other interveningmotion. The House passed its resolution onMay 8. In the Senate, once such a resolution is on the calendar, any Senator may make a nondebatable motion toproceed to consider it. Normally, such a motionwould be offered by the majority leader. If rejected, the motion may be repeated. If adopted, the Senate debatesthe resolution for 10 hours (which may bereduced by nondebatable motion), after which a final vote occurs. The statutory procedure forestalls filibustersagainst the resolution by prohibiting mostintervening motions or other actions, but does not on its face preclude amendment of the resolution. An attemptto consider the measure in the Senate wasexpected in early July. After one house passes an approval resolution, the other takes up and debates its own measure, but takes a final vote on the measure received from the first house. This procedure facilitates clearing the resolution for presidential action. The Act provides for this action to occuronly if the two measures are identical, as thepresent House and Senate measures are. If the Senate resolution were to be amended, however, the terms of the Actwould apparently make this clearanceprocedure unavailable. An amended measure also would cease to have the form prescribed by the NWPA for anapproval resolution, and accordingly might fail toqualify for further action under the expedited procedure. Either house might overcome such difficulties by using its constitutional power over its own rules to alter the procedure by which it considered an approvalresolution. If an approval resolution were enacted in a different form from that prescribed by the NWPA, however,it might arguably fail to meet the requirementsof the Act for permitting construction of the repository.

crs_RL31554

crs_RL31554_0

Title I: Public Company Accounting Oversight Board Section 101 establishes the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (Board), a new,independent regulatory body, to oversee the auditing of issuers (public companies which are subjectto the federal securities laws). The Board is subject to the oversight of the Securities and Exchange Commission, andsubject to this oversight the Board shall register public accounting firms which prepare audit reportsfor issuers subject to SEC registration, establish standards concerning the preparation of auditreports, conduct inspections of registered public accounting firms, conduct investigations anddisciplinary proceedings where justified upon registered public accounting firms, perform otherduties as determined by the SEC, enforce compliance with the Act, and set the budget and managethe operations of the Board and its staff. Section 302 directs the Commission to issue a rule requiring for each company filing periodicreports under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 that the principal executive officer and theprincipal financial officer certify in each annual or quarterly report that the signing officer hasreviewed the report and that, based on the officer's knowledge, the report does not contain untruestatements and does not omit statements resulting in a misleading report and that the financialstatements fairly represent the financial condition of the company. TheSEC may also accept gifts and bequests for this fund. § 1514A, which creates a civil action to protect employeesof publicly traded companies against discrimination in the terms and conditions of employment inretaliation for whistleblowing in securities fraud cases. §§ 78m(a) or 78o(d) and the compliance of those reportswith statutory requirements in 18 U.S.C. § 1350. Section 1105 amends 15 U.S.C. Under Section 1106 of the Act, the criminal penalties available under 15 U.S.C.

On July 30, 2002, President Bush signed into law the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, P.L.107-204 . This law has been described by some as the most important and far-reaching securitieslegislation since passage of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a et seq ., and the SecuritiesExchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a et seq ., both of which were passed in the wake of the stockmarket crash of 1929. The Act establishes a new Public Company Accounting Oversight Board which is to besupervised by the Securities and Exchange Commission. The Act restricts accounting firms fromperforming a number of other services for the companies which they audit. The Act also requiresnew disclosures for public companies and the officers and directors of those companies. Among theother issues affected by the new legislation are securities fraud, criminal and civil penalties forviolating the securities laws and other laws, blackouts for insider trades of pension fund shares, andprotections for corporate whistleblowers. This report will not be updated.

crs_R40780

crs_R40780_0

Introduction The existing authorization for federal surface transportation programs provided by the Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act: a Legacy for Users (SAFETEA-LU or SAFETEA) expires on September 30, 2009. Congress is now considering legislation that would either reauthorize these programs or extend the existing program into at least part of the next fiscal year. While it considers reauthorization or extension legislation, Congress must also address an ongoing financial shortfall in the highway account of the Highway Trust Fund. Just before leaving for its summer District Work period, Congress provided a short term fix for the funding problem by transferring $7 billion from the Treasury's General Fund Account to the highway account of the Highway Trust Fund ( P.L. These funds are expected to keep the trust fund solvent through the remainder of FY2009 and may also provide an additional cushion that could extend later into the fall. This action does not, however, address program extension and provides no long term solution to the trust fund's financial problems. There are many issues associated with surface transportation legislation. Some, but not all, are discussed in the examination of the legislation under consideration presented in this report. Those seeking to understand all of the major issues at play in this debate should refer to: CRS Report R40053, Surface Transportation Program Reauthorization Issues for the 111 th Congress , coordinated by [author name scrubbed]. On July 22, 2009, the Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works (EPW) reported the Surface Transportation Extension Act of 2009 ( S. 1498 ). This legislation would extend existing surface transportation programs at current funding levels for 18 months (beginning October 1, 2009 and ending March 31, 2011). As released, the legislation is incomplete, lacking funding data and the details of several major provisions. Subcommittee on Highways and Transit mark up of the proposed legislation occurred on June 24, 2009. The bill is as yet unnumbered as it has not been formally introduced. Information on the contents of the not yet completed bill is available at the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure's website: http://transportation.house.gov/ . But the length of the proposed legislation is also related to the aforementioned restructuring of the federal surface transportation programs and by significant changes in the overall policy goals advanced by the bill. This program is discussed in greater detail in the environmental section of this report. The source of funds would be the General Treasury, not the Highway Trust Fund.

The existing authorization for federal surface transportation programs provided by the Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act: a Legacy for Users (SAFETEA-LU or SAFETEA) expires on September 30, 2009. Congress is now considering legislation that would either reauthorize these programs or extend the existing program into at least part of the next fiscal year. While it considers reauthorization or extension legislation, Congress has also had to address an ongoing financial shortfall in the highway account of the Highway Trust Fund. Just before leaving for its summer District Work period, Congress provided a short term fix for the funding problem by transferring $7 billion from the Treasury's General Fund Account to the highway account of the Highway Trust Fund (P.L. 111-46). These funds are expected to keep the trust fund solvent through the remainder of FY2009 and may also provide an additional cushion that could extend later into the fall. This action does not, however, address program extension and provides no long term solution to the trust fund's financial problems. Extension legislation introduced so far is straightforward in its nature, containing no extraneous legislative provisions. The Senate is considering a bill, S. 1498, the Surface Transportation Extension Act of 2009, and related legislation that would extend the existing surface transportation program for 18 months and would provide an infusion of $27 billion to insure that the highway and transit accounts of the Highway Trust Fund remain financially viable throughout the extension period. Action to this point has occurred at the Committee level and floor consideration of the legislation could occur in the fall of 2009. At this point only one reauthorization bill has been introduced, the Surface Transportation Assistance Act of 2009. At present, however, the bill is incomplete, lacking funding data and other details on several of what might be the most significant features in the bill. The bill, although not yet formally introduced and hence unnumbered, has nonetheless been subject to mark up by the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, Subcommittee on Highways and Transit. There are many issues associated with surface transportation legislation. Some, but not all, are discussed in the examination of the legislation under consideration presented in this report. Those seeking to understand all of the major issues at play in this debate should refer to: CRS Report R40053, Surface Transportation Program Reauthorization Issues for the 111th Congress, coordinated by [author name scrubbed]. This report begins with a very brief discussion of the existing federal surface transportation program. Those already familiar with the program may choose to skip over this section of the report and move on to the sections that discuss the major provisions of significant legislation currently under consideration by the 111th Congress. As new legislation is introduced and more detailed information becomes available about already-introduced legislation, this report will be expanded and updated.

crs_RL31666

crs_RL31666_0

The FCRA establishes consumers' rights in relation to their credit reports and credit scores, as well as permissible uses of credit reports, disclosure requirements for credit reports and credit scores, and requirements for users of consumer credit reports and furnishers of information. The Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 2003 (FACT Act) amended the FCRA to include a number of provisions aimed at preventing identity theft and assisting victims. The Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure Act of 2009 (Credit CARD Act) strengthened protections for young consumers and advertising disclosures regarding free credit reports from consumer reporting agencies. More recently, the Consumer Financial Protection Act of 2010, part of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act), established the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB or the Bureau) and transferred administrative functions, including rulemaking and reporting, as well as certain enforcement functions, from other federal agencies such as the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the Federal Reserve Board, to the Bureau. Medical information may be included in consumer reports under certain circumstances and if CRAs and creditors follow statutory and regulatory procedures and conditions to protect the confidentiality of such information. Credit scores may be based partly on the information in a credit report and are used to evaluate creditworthiness. Permissible Uses of Consumer Credit Reports The FCRA outlines the purposes for which a consumer credit report may be furnished to a requester. Under the FCRA, consumers have the right to access all information in their credit reports, including the sources of the information, and the right to disclosure of their credit scores. In addition to their responsibilities related to the accuracy of information in consumers' files, credit reporting agencies must also ensure that consumer credit reports are released only for the purposes discussed above. The FCRA imposes specific requirements on persons who use consumer report information. Identity Theft Provisions The FCRA includes a number of provisions aimed at preventing identity theft and assisting victims of identity theft. These provisions mirror laws passed by state legislatures and create a national standard for addressing consumer concerns with regard to identity theft and other types of fraud.

The purpose of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) is "to require that consumer reporting agencies adopt reasonable procedures for meeting the needs of commerce for consumer credit, personnel, insurance, and other information in a manner which is fair and equitable to the consumer, with regard to the confidentiality, accuracy, relevancy, and proper utilization of such information." The FCRA establishes consumers' rights in relation to their credit reports, as well as permissible uses of credit reports. It also imposes certain responsibilities on those who collect, furnish, and use the information contained in consumers' credit reports. Additionally, it requires disclosure of credit scores in certain circumstances, including when adverse credit actions are based partly on a credit score. The FCRA has been amended several times over the last decade. The Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 2003 (FACT Act, P.L. 108-159) amended the FCRA to include a number of provisions aimed at preventing identity theft and assisting victims. The Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure Act of 2009 (Credit CARD Act, P.L. 111-24) strengthened protections for young consumers and advertising disclosures regarding free credit reports from consumer reporting agencies. More recently, the Consumer Financial Protection Act of 2010, part of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (P.L. 111-203), established the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (Bureau) and transferred administrative functions, including most rulemaking and reporting, as well as certain enforcement functions, from other federal agencies, such as the FTC and the Federal Reserve Board, to the Bureau. For more information on the functions of the new Bureau, see CRS Report R41338, The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act: Title X, The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, by [author name scrubbed]. This report discusses consumers' rights under the FCRA, as well as the type of information included in credit reports and credit scores, permissible uses of credit reports, disclosure requirements for credit reports and credit scores, and requirements for users of consumer credit reports and furnishers of information. It also addresses FCRA provisions aimed at preventing identity theft and assisting victims of identity theft. For further information on laws and issues related to identity theft, see CRS Report R40599, Identity Theft: Trends and Issues, by Kristin M. Finklea, and CRS Report RL31919, Federal Laws Related to Identity Theft, by [author name scrubbed]. For information on data security and the legislative efforts regarding such, see CRS Report RL34120, Federal Information Security and Data Breach Notification Laws, by [author name scrubbed], and CRS Report RL33273, Data Security: Federal Legislative Approaches, by [author name scrubbed].

crs_R45424

crs_R45424_0

Brief History of the 2015 Clean Water Rule The Clean Water Act (CWA) is the principal federal law governing pollution of the nation's surface waters. The CWA protects "navigable waters," defined in the statute as "waters of the United States, including the territorial seas." Thus, in implementing the CWA, the Army Corps of Engineers and U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) have defined the term in regulations. In 2001 and 2006, the Supreme Court issued rulings pivotal to the definition of WOTUS— Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and Rapanos v. United States , respectively. Both rulings interpreted the scope of the CWA more narrowly than the Corps and EPA had done previously in regulations and guidance, but they created uncertainty about the intended scope of waters that are protected by the CWA. On June 29, 2015, the Corps and EPA finalized the rule—known as the Clean Water Rule or WOTUS rule. It reflects over 1 million public comments on the 2014 proposed rule as well as input provided through public outreach efforts that included over 400 meetings with diverse stakeholders. It focused on clarifying the regulatory status of waters with ambiguous jurisdictional status following the Supreme Court's rulings, including isolated waters and streams that flow only part of the year and nearby wetlands. Environmental groups were supportive but also faulted parts of the final rule. Current Status of the 2015 Clean Water Rule Currently, the 2015 Clean Water Rule is in effect in 22 states and enjoined in 28 states (see Figure 2 ). In states where the 2015 Clean Water Rule is enjoined, regulations promulgated by the Corps and EPA in 1986 and 1988, respectively, are in effect. Since the 2015 Clean Water Rule was finalized, its implementation has been influenced both by the courts and administrative actions. Court Actions Following issuance of the 2015 Clean Water Rule, industry groups, more than half the states, and several environmental groups filed lawsuits challenging the rule in multiple federal district and appeals courts. Specifically, on August 27, 2015, the U.S. District Court for the District of North Dakota issued a preliminary injunction on the 2015 Clean Water Rule in the 13 states challenging the rule in that court. In October 2015, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit ordered a nationwide stay of the 2015 Clean Water Rule and later ruled (in February 2016) that it had jurisdiction to hear consolidated challenges to the rule. However, in January 2018, the Supreme Court unanimously held that federal district courts, rather than appellate courts, are the proper forum for filing challenges to the 2015 Clean Water Rule. Accordingly, on February 28, 2018, the appeals court vacated its nationwide stay. According to the preamble of the 2018 Applicability Date Rule, the agencies' intention in adding an applicability date to the 2015 Clean Water Rule was to maintain the legal status quo and provide clarity and certainty for regulated entities, states, tribes, agency staff, and the public regarding the definition of waters of the United States while the agencies work on revising the 2015 Clean Water Rule. Administrative Actions The Administration has also taken steps to rescind and revise the 2015 Clean Water Rule. On February 28, 2017, President Trump issued an executive order directing the Corps and EPA to review and rescind or revise the rule and to consider interpreting the term navigable waters as defined in the CWA in a manner consistent with Justice Scalia's opinion in Rapanos . On July 27, 2017, the agencies proposed a rule that would "initiate the first step in a comprehensive, two-step process intended to review and revise the definition of 'waters of the United States' consistent with the Executive Order." The first step proposes to rescind the 2015 Clean Water Rule and re-codify the regulatory definition of WOTUS as it existed prior to the rule. On July 12, 2018, the Corps and EPA published a supplemental notice of proposed rulemaking to clarify, supplement, and seek additional comment on the agencies' proposed repeal. The agencies have not yet issued a final step-one rule. On December 11, 2018, the Corps and EPA announced a proposed step-two rule that would revise the definition of WOTUS. Some Members have introduced the following free-standing legislation and provisions within appropriations bills that would repeal the 2015 Clean Water Rule, allow the Corps and EPA to withdraw the rule without regard to the Administrative Procedures Act, or amend the CWA to add a narrower definition of navigable waters . H.R. The conference report—as released on December 11, 2018, and agreed to in the Senate—did not contain a provision to repeal the 2015 Clean Water Rule. However, the Senate-passed version does not include that provision. The House-passed version of H.R. Two House-passed appropriations bills ( H.R.

The Clean Water Act (CWA) is the principal federal law governing pollution of the nation's surface waters. The statute protects "navigable waters," which it defines as "the waters of the United States, including the territorial seas." The scope of the term waters of the United States, or WOTUS, is not defined in the CWA. Thus, the Army Corps of Engineers and U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) have defined the term in regulations several times as part of their implementation of the act. Two Supreme Court rulings (Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and Rapanos v. United States), issued in 2001 and 2006 (respectively), interpreted the scope of the CWA more narrowly than EPA and the Corps had done previously in regulations and guidance. However, the rulings also created uncertainty about the intended scope of waters that are protected by the CWA. In 2014, the Corps and EPA proposed revisions to the existing 1980s regulations in light of these rulings. After reviewing over 1 million public comments and holding over 400 meetings with diverse stakeholders, the Corps and EPA issued a final rule in June 2015. The final rule—the Clean Water Rule—focused on clarifying the regulatory status of waters with ambiguous jurisdictional status following the Supreme Court rulings, including isolated waters and streams that flow only part of the year and nearby wetlands. Since the Clean Water Rule was finalized in 2015, its implementation has been influenced both by the courts and administrative actions. Following issuance of the 2015 Clean Water Rule, industry groups, more than half the states, and several environmental groups filed lawsuits challenging the rule in multiple federal district and appeals courts. A federal appeals court ordered a nationwide stay of the 2015 Clean Water Rule in October 2015 and later ruled that it had jurisdiction to hear consolidated challenges to the rule. In January 2018, the Supreme Court unanimously held that federal district courts, rather than appellate courts, are the proper forum for filing challenges to the 2015 Clean Water Rule. As a result, the appeals court vacated its nationwide stay. Three district courts have issued preliminary injunctions on the 2015 Clean Water Rule effective in the states challenging the rule in those courts. Accordingly, the 2015 Clean Water Rule is currently enjoined in 28 states and in effect in 22 states. In states where the 2015 Clean Water Rule is enjoined, regulations promulgated by the Corps and EPA in 1986 and 1988, respectively, are in effect. The Trump Administration has taken actions to delay implementation of the 2015 Clean Water Rule and rescind and replace it: In February 2018, the Corps and EPA published a rule that added an "applicability date" to the 2015 Clean Water Rule delaying implementation until February 2020. However, environmental groups and states filed lawsuits challenging the 2018 Applicability Date Rule, and in August 2018, a district court issued a nationwide injunction. The Trump Administration has also taken steps to rescind and replace the 2015 Clean Water Rule. In February 2017, President Trump issued Executive Order 13778 directing the Corps and EPA to review and rescind or revise the rule and to consider interpreting the term navigable waters in a manner consistent with Justice Scalia's opinion in Rapanos, which proposed a narrower test for determining WOTUS. In July 2017, the Corps and EPA published a proposed rule that would "initiate the first step in a comprehensive, two-step process intended to review and revise the definition of 'waters of the United States' consistent with the Executive Order." The proposed step-one rule would rescind the 2015 Clean Water Rule and re-codify the regulatory definition of WOTUS as it existed prior to the rule. In July 2018, the agencies published a supplemental notice of proposed rulemaking to solicit comment on additional considerations supporting the agencies' proposed repeal. A final step-one rule has not been issued. On December 11, 2018, the Corps and EPA announced a proposed step-two rule that would revise the definition of WOTUS. In the 115th Congress, some Members have introduced free-standing legislation and provisions within appropriations bills that would either repeal the 2015 Clean Water Rule, allow the Corps and EPA to withdraw the rule without regard to the Administrative Procedures Act, or amend the definition of navigable waters in the CWA. Two bills—H.R. 2 and H.R. 6147—have each passed the House and Senate in different forms. The House-passed versions of both bills would repeal the 2015 Clean Water Rule, while the Senate-passed versions of both bills do not include such provisions. The conference report for H.R. 2, released on December 11, 2018, did not include a provision to repeal the 2015 Clean Water Rule.

crs_RS21469

crs_RS21469_0

For FY2009 , the Bush Administration has proposed a continued reduction in the NTIA budget, primarily reflected in eliminating NTIA's program to construct and maintain public telecommunications facilities. In both FY2006 and FY2007, the Bush Administration requested ending funding for the public telecommunications facilities, planning and construction program. Salaries and Expenses This portion of the NTIA budget includes funding to maintain ongoing programs for domestic and international policy development, federal spectrum and related research. For FY2009, the Bush Administration has requested $19.2 million. The third NTIA program that the Bush Administration has requested funding for comes out of the 2005 Deficit Reduction Act. That law—and new NTIA program—called for the creation of a Digital Transition and Safety Public Fund, which offset receipts from the auction of licenses to use electromagnetic spectrum recovered from discontinued analog television signals. The receipts would fund the following programmatic functions at NTIA: a digital-analog converter box program to assist consumers in meeting the 2009 deadline for receiving television broadcasts in digital format; public safety interoperable communications grants, which will be made to ensure that public safety agencies have a standardized format for sharing voice and data signals on the radio spectrum; New York City 9/11 digital transition funding, until the planned Freedom Tower is built; assistance to low-power television stations, for conversion from analog to digital transition; a national alert and tsunami warning program; and funding to enhance a national alert system as stated in the ENHANCE 911 Act of 2004. Congress agreed with this request and eliminated funding for this program. Two important issues facing NTIA's administration of public telecommunications policy are domain name registration and use of spectrum. A second important issue is the role of NTIA in the auction and management of spectrum. That law ( P.L.

For FY2009, the Bush Administration has proposed a budget of $19.2 million for NTIA, with this money going towards administrative functions. There would be no funding under another NTIA program, which supports public telecommunications facilities planning and construction. Under the FY2008 enacted appropriation ( P.L. 110-161 ) NTIA is funded at $36.3 million, which was $3.3 million below the FY2007 enacted and $17.7 million above the President's request. There are two major components to the NTIA appropriated budget (a third program, which is a revolving fund based on spectrum auctions, is discussed below). The first is Salaries and Expenses. For FY2008, the Bush Administration recommended $18.6 million; Congress approved $17.5 million for FY2008. In the past, a large part of this program has been for the management of various information and telecommunications policies both domestically and internationally. For the second NTIA component, the Public Telecommunications and Facilities Program (PTFPC), the Bush Administration has requested that this program's funding be eliminated, arguing that most of the construction and refurbishing of public telecommunications facilities has already been done, and that any remaining support that is needed should come from local public broadcasting entities. However, for FY2008, Congress disagreed, citing the ongoing need for upgrading of public broadcasting facilities, particularly as the deadline of converting all analog broadcasts to digital in 2009 approaches. For FY2008, Congress funded this program at $18.8 million. Under at third program, NTIA operates a revolving fund which uses offset receipts from the auction of licenses recovered from discontinued analog signals. An important part of this program is to fund a digital-analog converter box program to assist consumers in meeting the February 2009 deadline for receiving television broadcasts in digital format.

crs_RL30628

crs_RL30628_0

Economic Conditions With the cutoff of assistance from the former Soviet Union, Cuba experienced severe economicdeterioration from 1989-1993, although there has been some improvement since 1994. Fidel Castro, who turned 73 on August 13, 1999, has ruled since the1959 Cuban Revolution, which ousted the corrupt government of Fulgencio Batista from power. (2) Since the early 1960s, U.S. policy toward Cuba has consisted largely of isolating the island nation through comprehensive economic sanctions. The Clinton Administration has essentiallycontinued this policy of isolating Cuba. The principal tool of U.S. policy remains comprehensivesanctions, which were made stronger with the Cuban Democracy Act (CDA) of 1992 and with theCuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996 ( P.L. 104-114 ), often referred to as theHelms/Burton legislation. Another component of U.S. policy consists of support measures for the Cuban people, a so-called second track of U.S. policy. In January 1999, President Clinton announced five additional measures to support the Cuban people: 1) a broadening cash remittances to Cuba, so that all U.S. residents (not just those with closerelatives in Cuba) are allowed to send $300 per quarter to any Cuban family and licensing largerremittances by U.S. citizens and non-governmental organizations to entities independent of theCuban government; 2) an expansion of direct passenger charter flights to Cuba from additional U.S.cities other than the current flights from Miami, and to cities other than Havana (direct flights laterin the year began from Los Angeles and New York); 3) the re-establishment of direct mail serviceto Cuba, which was suspended in 1962 (this measure has not yet been negotiated with the Cubangovernment); 4) authorization for the commercial sale of food to independent entities in Cuba suchas religious groups and private restaurants and the sale of agricultural inputs to independent entitiessuch as private farmers and farmer cooperatives producing food for sale in private markets and 5)an expansion of people-to-people contact through two-way exchanges among academics, athletes,and scientists. Over the years, although U.S. policymakers have agreed on the overall objective of U.S. policy toward Cuba -- to help bring democracy and respect for human rights to the island -- there havebeen several schools of thought about how to achieve that objective. Some advocate a policy ofkeeping maximum pressure on the Cuban government until reforms are enacted, while continuingcurrent U.S. efforts to support the Cuban people. Others argue for an approach, sometimes referredto as constructive engagement, that would lift some U.S. sanctions that they believe are hurting theCuban people, and move toward engaging Cuba with dialogue. Still others call for a swiftnormalization of U.S.-Cuban relations by lifting the U.S. embargo. Numerous measures have been introduced in the 106th Congress that reflect the range of views on U.S. policy toward Cuba. At the same time, there has been legislative action to increase sanctions: byconditioning aid to Russia on closing the Russian signals intelligence facility at Lourdes, Cuba; andby making it easier for enforcement of anti-terrorism judgments in U.S. courts, thereby allowing fora $187.6 million 1997 judgment against Cuba to be paid from Cuba's frozen assets in the UnitedStates to the families of three U.S. citizens killed when Cuba shot down two U.S. planes in 1996. Helms/Burton Legislation Major Provisions. As provided for in the bill, President Clinton waived such payments in the interest of nationalsecurity when he signed the bill into law on October 28, 2000. Allows travel between the United States and Cuba.

Cuba remains a hard-line Communist state, with a poor record on human rights. Fidel Castro has ruled since he led the Cuban Revolution, ousting the corrupt government of Fulgencio Batistafrom power in 1959. With the cutoff of assistance from the former Soviet Union, Cuba experiencedsevere economic deterioration from 1989-1993, although there has been some improvement since1994 as Cuba has implemented limited reforms. Since the early 1960s, U.S. policy has consisted largely of isolating the island nation through comprehensive economic sanctions. The Clinton Administration essentially continued this isolationpolicy. The principal tool of policy remains comprehensive sanctions, which were made strongerwith the Cuban Democracy Act (CDA) in 1992 and the Cuban Liberty and Democratic SolidarityAct in 1996, often referred to as the Helms/Burton legislation. Another component of U.S. policyconsists of support measures for the people of Cuba. This includes private humanitarian donationsand U.S.-sponsored radio and television broadcasting to the island. Under this rubric of support forthe Cuban people, President Clinton announced several policy actions in March 1998. Theseincluded the resumption of direct charter flights and cash remittances to Cuba and the streamliningof licensing procedures for the sale of medicines. In January 1999, the President announcedadditional measures, including a broadening of permissible cash remittances, increasing directcharter flights, expanding people-to-people contact, and authorizing the sale of food and agriculturalinputs to independent entities in Cuba. Although U.S. policymakers agree on the overall objective of U.S. policy toward Cuba -- to help bring democracy and respect for human rights to the island -- there have been several schoolsof thought about how to achieve that objective. Some advocate a policy of keeping maximumpressure on the Cuban government until reforms are enacted, while continuing current U.S. effortsto support the Cuban people. Others argue for an approach, sometimes referred to as constructiveengagement, that would lift some U.S. sanctions that they believe are hurting the Cuban people andmove toward engaging Cuba in dialogue. Still others call for a swift normalization of U.S.-Cubanrelations by lifting the U.S. embargo. Numerous measures were introduced in the 106th Congress that reflected the range of views on U.S. policy toward Cuba. Legislative initiatives proposed both easing and increasing sanctions. Inthe end, legislation passed reflected both approaches: it allowed the export of food and medicine butprohibited any U.S. financing, both public and private, of such exports. Travel to Cuba for tourismwas also prohibited. Another law facilitated enforcement of anti-terrorism judgments in U.S. courtsto allow for the payment of a $187.6 million 1997 judgment against Cuba to be paid from Cuba'sfrozen assets in the United States to the families of three U.S. citizens killed when Cuba shot downtwo U.S. planes in 1996. President Clinton waived the provision, however, upon signing the rest ofthe bill into law.

crs_R42956

crs_R42956_0

U.S. Policy toward Latin America and the Caribbean U.S. interests in the Western Hemisphere are diverse, and include economic, political, security, and humanitarian concerns. Geographic proximity has ensured strong economic linkages between the United States and the region, with the United States being the major trading partner and largest source of foreign investment for many countries. Four Priorities for the Region The Obama Administration has set forth a broad framework for U.S. policy toward Latin America and the Caribbean centered on four pillars or priorities: promoting economic and social opportunity; ensuring citizen security; strengthening effective institutions of democratic governance; and securing a clean energy future. Latin America's Economic and Political Environment U.S. policy toward the Latin American and Caribbean region is conducted in the context of significant economic and political changes in the hemisphere as well as the region's increasing independence from the United States. Latin American and Caribbean countries have diversified their economic and diplomatic ties with countries outside the region. Several Latin American regional integration organizations have been established in the past few years, a reflection of the region's increasing independence, growing internal cooperation, and ideological diversity. While to some extent CELAC's establishment reflects Latin American desire to lessen U.S. influence in the region, the United States still remains very much engaged in the region bilaterally and multilaterally through the OAS and its numerous affiliated organizations. A looming challenge for the United States was how to deal with the next Summit of the Americas, scheduled to be hosted by Panama April 10-11, 2015. Cuba had expressed interest in attending the sixth summit in 2012 in Colombia, but ultimately was not invited to attend. The United States and Canada had expressed opposition to Cuba's participation. Previous summits had been limited to the hemisphere's democratically elected leaders. Many Latin American countries vowed not to attend the 2015 summit unless Cuba was invited to attend, and as a result, Panama's Vice President and Foreign Minister Isabel de Saint Malo announced in August 2014 that it would invite Cuba to the summit, presenting a policy dilemma for the Obama Administration. In December 2014, as President Obama was announcing a new policy approach toward Cuba, the White House announced that the President Obama would participate in the summit, but emphasized that human rights and democracy would be key summit themes. Continuity and Change in U.S. Policy Under the fist six years of the Obama Administration, there was significant continuity in U.S. policy toward Latin America from the Bush Administration. Nevertheless, the Obama Administration also made several significant policy changes, including an overall emphasis on partnership and shared responsibility. Moreover, just after the end of the 113 th Congress in December 2014, President Obama unveiled a new policy approach toward Cuba that substantially broke with the long-standing U.S. sanctions-based policy and moved toward a policy of engagement. Congress and Policy toward Latin America and the Caribbean Congress plays an active role in policy toward Latin America and the Caribbean. Legislative and oversight attention to the region during the 113 th Congress focused on such issues as U.S. support to countries contending with drug trafficking and transnational crime, including Mexico under the Mérida Initiative, Central America under CARSI, and the Caribbean under the CBSI; continued counternarcotics and security support to Colombia as it moved toward a potential peace agreement; and continued support to Haiti as it continued to recover from the 2010 earthquake. Hearings on the region covered these issues as well as a variety of other topics, including overall U.S. interests and policy in the Western Hemisphere; energy issues; U.S. foreign aid to the region; challenges to democracy, including media freedom, the rule of law, and political unrest in Venezuela; concerns about Iranian activities in the region; U.S. relations with such countries as Brazil, Mexico, and the Dominican Republic; and the surge of unaccompanied minors from Central America (see Appendix B for links to hearings on the region during the 113 th Congress). Legislative action in the 113 th Congress included approval of: omnibus appropriations legislation for FY2013 ( P.L. 113-6 , Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2013, signed into law March 26, 2013), which included foreign aid appropriations with numerous provisions on Latin America; the Organization of American States Revitalization and Reform Act of 2013 ( P.L. 113-41 , signed into law October 2, 2013), which directs the Secretary of State to develop a strategy for the adoption of proposed reforms at the OAS; the U.S.-Mexico Transboundary Hydrocarbons Agreement in the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2013 ( P.L. 113-79 , signed into law February 7, 2014), with modifications to the U.S. cotton program related to a trade dispute with Brazil over U.S. subsidies and a reporting requirement on a U.S.-Mexico water dispute in the Rio Grande Basin; omnibus appropriations for FY2014 ( P.L. 113-162 ), which directs the Secretary of State to submit a report to Congress annually through 2017 on the status of post-earthquake recovery and development efforts in Haiti; omnibus appropriations for FY2015, ( P.L. Three resolutions were approved regarding the political and human rights situation in Venezuela: in October 2013, the Senate approved S.Res. 113-76 ). H.Res. 933 ( P.L. 3547 ( P.L. 113-235 ) did not include such a provision. 113-67 ). S.Res. 488 , approved by the House, and S.Res. In December 2014, Congress completed action on legislation, S. 2142 (signed by the President on December 18, but yet assigned a Public Law number) to impose targeted sanctions (visa restrictions and asset blocking) on those responsible for human rights abuses associated with the protests.

Geographic proximity has ensured strong linkages between the United States and the Latin American and Caribbean region, with diverse U.S. interests, including economic, political, and security concerns. U.S. policy toward the region under the Obama Administration has focused on four priorities: promoting economic and social opportunity; ensuring citizen security; strengthening effective democratic institutions; and securing a clean energy future. There was substantial continuity in U.S. policy toward the region during the first six years of the Obama Administration, which pursued some of the same basic policy approaches as the Bush Administration. Nevertheless, the Obama Administration made several significant policy changes, including an overall emphasis on partnership and shared responsibility. Moreover, just after the end of the 113th Congress in December 2014, President Obama unveiled a new policy approach toward Cuba that substantially broke with the long-standing U.S. sanctions-based policy and moved toward a policy of engagement. U.S. policy toward the region is conducted in the context of a Latin America that has become increasingly independent from the United States. The region has diversified its economic and diplomatic ties with countries outside the region. Over the past few years, several Latin American regional organizations have been established that do not include the United States, including the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) designed to boost regional integration and cooperation. While to some extent CELAC's establishment reflected declining U.S. influence in Latin America, the United States still remains very much engaged in the region bilaterally and multilaterally. A looming challenge for the United States was how to deal with the next Summit of the Americas, scheduled to be hosted by Panama in April 2015. Cuba had expressed interest in attending the sixth summit in 2012 in Colombia, but ultimately was not invited to attend. The United States and Canada had expressed opposition to Cuba's participation. Previous summits had been limited to the hemisphere's democratically elected leaders. Many Latin American countries vowed not to attend the 2015 summit unless Cuba was invited to attend, and as a result, Panama announced in August 2014 that it would invite Cuba to the summit. In December 2014, as President Obama was announcing a new policy approach toward Cuba, the White House announced that the President would participate in the summit, but emphasized that human rights and democracy would be key summit themes. Congress plays an active role in policy toward Latin America and the Caribbean. Legislative and oversight attention to the region during the 113th Congress focused on such issues as U.S. support to countries contending with drug trafficking and transnational crime, including Mexico and Central American and Caribbean countries; continued counternarcotics and security support to Colombia as it moved toward a potential peace agreement; and continued support to Haiti as it continued to recover from the 2010 earthquake. Hearings on the region covered these issues as well as a variety of other topics, including overall U.S. interests and policy in the Western Hemisphere; energy issues; U.S. foreign aid to the region; challenges to democracy, including media freedom, the rule of law, and political unrest in Venezuela; concerns about Iranian activities in the region; U.S. relations with such countries as Brazil, Mexico, and the Dominican Republic; and the surge of unaccompanied minors from Central America. Legislative action in the 113th Congress included the following: a measure directing the Secretary of State to develop a strategy for adoption of proposed reforms at the Organization of American States (P.L. 113-41); approval of the U.S.-Mexico Transboundary Hydrocarbons Agreement (a provision in P.L. 113-67); the 2014 farm bill (P.L. 113-79), with provisions modifying the U.S. cotton program related to a trade dispute with Brazil and requiring State Department reports on a U.S.-Mexico water dispute in the Rio Grande Basin; omnibus appropriations legislation for FY2013 (P.L. 113-6), FY2014 (P.L. 113-76), and FY2015 (P.L. 113-235), which included foreign aid appropriations with numerous provisions on Latin America; a measure requiring an annual report through 2017 on the status of post-earthquake recovery and development efforts in Haiti (P.L. 113-162); and a measure to impose sanctions (visa restrictions and assets blocking) on those persons responsible for certain human rights abuses in Venezuela (S. 2142, not yet assigned a Public Law number). Resolutions approved by either the House or the Senate included S.Res. 12, on Haiti's reconstruction and recovery; and three resolutions on the political and human rights situation in Venezuela—S.Res. 213, H.Res. 488, and S.Res. 365. This report provides an overview of U.S. policy toward Latin America and the Caribbean during the 113th Congress, including the Obama Administration's priorities; examines changes in the region's economic and political environment that affect U.S. relations with the region; and analyzes U.S. policy toward the region. The report then examines congressional interests in Latin America, looking at selected regional and country issues and congressional actions taken. Appendices provide U.S.-Latin America trade statistics and links to hearings focused on Latin America. For additional information and access to over 30 CRS reports on the region, see the CRS Issues in Focus webpage on "Latin America and the Caribbean."

crs_RL30485

crs_RL30485_0

An Overview of the AMT The AMT provides for an alternative tax calculation on a broader tax base than theregular tax. Exemptions are phased out. Theindividual compares AMT liability and regular tax liability and pays the higher one. Another 6 million returns would have been subject to limits on tax credits, such as the child credit and education credits enacted in 1997;this surge in the AMT coverage would have occurred in large part in 2002, but H.R. 1836 made the most important credit (the child credit) permanently availaleunder the AMT. As this table illustrates, the shift of exposure to the AMT from the very highest income classes to the middle and upper middle income classes is dramatic over time even withoutthe tax cuts in H.R. 1836 . And any tax cut thatreduces regular tax liabilities and does not also alter the AMT will interact with the AMT intwo ways: it will increase the number of taxpayers on the AMT and the number affected bythe credit limit, and it will cause some or all of the tax cut not to be received by certainfamilies. Married couples also tend to havehigher incomes and, while their AMT exemptions are also higher, may be more likely to beaffected by the AMT. H. R. 1836, which included the provisions in H.R. Because the estimates are calculated with asignificant rate reduction, the cost will be smaller, reaching about $3.1 billion for the standarddeduction and $4.7 billion for the increase in the 15% bracket. A large part of this effect is that more individuals will be pushed into the Alternative Minimum Tax because of the rate reductions and these individuals will not benefit from themarriage penalty relief. Moreover, for taxpayers subject tocredit limits, a change in the regular tax would have been offset by a loss in the credit, so thetaxpayer would not have benefitted from the tax revision. And, the tax cuts in the marriagepenalty legislation were likely to substantially increase the number of taxpayers on the AMT,a number that, as noted earlier, is already growing rapidly. 6 over the next ten years are taken back by the AMT,making the net budget effect $67 billion smaller. 3 , anacross-the-board tax cut proposal in the 106th Congress. The final proposal adopted by both houses, H.R. Indexing the exemptions is the step that would be necessary to begin to keep theAMT more or less fixed in relative importance in the tax system, assuming that no otherchanges in the regular tax structure occurred. The AMT as the Tax of the Future Some might see the AMT as a desirable, relatively-flat alternative tax with a wider base, and consider the expansion of the AMT desirable. (9) The exemption levelsin the AMT are not adjusted for family size or for head of household status; there are marriagepenalties within the AMT structure, and tax preferences are not uniformly included orexcluded. How the AMT should be altered as regular tax changes are made is also unclear. It wouldbe appropriate to simultaneously adjust the AMT deductions, brackets and rates to conformto the rate changes. Also, under this view of the AMT there appears no clear reason to allow credits under the AMT although there is a reason to adjust the AMT for the expansion of the standarddeduction in the marriage penalty legislation. Conclusion The growth in the AMT has been considered a potential problem for some time, and itsimportance increases with tax cuts, such as those passed in 1997 and 2001.

Tax cuts have been addressed recently. Rate reductions and across the board tax cuts were part of the H.R. 1836 , the tax cut signed by the President on June 7. Thisbill includes the changes in standard deductions and rate brackets relating to the marriagepenalty and also included in H.R. 6 , passed earlier by the House. The Alternative Minimum Tax (AMT) provides for an alternative tax calculation, on a broader base but with a large exemption and a two-tier rate that is below the top tax rates inthe regular tax structure. It is paid when the tax liability figured using the AMT base and ratesis higher than regular tax liability. The AMT is expected to grow rapidly and extend furtherinto the middle class because the exemptions in the AMT are not indexed for inflation. Inaddition, the tax credits (such as the child credit) enacted in 1997 would have caused manymiddle class taxpayers to be affected by the AMT. A temporary provision allowing thesecredits to be taken against the AMT was adopted last year, and was made permanent for thechild credit by H.R. 1836 . The marriage penalty legislation, and other proposals for cutting taxes will be limited in their effects for some individuals unless changes are also made in the alternative minimumtax (AMT). Individuals who pay the AMT are not affected by cuts in the regular tax andindividuals who switch to the AMT will not receive the full tax cut. This constraint will growover time. For example, about 28 % of the tax cuts over the next ten years, in a bill similarto H.R. 6 considered in the 106th Congress would not have been received bytaxpayers because of the AMT. This effect grows over time; by 2008, 44% of the tax cut willnot have been received. Cuts in regular tax, without also addressing the AMT, would cause more and more taxpayers to the subject to the complexities of the AMT, and also increase the revenue costsof future measures to restrain the growth of the AMT. H.R. 1836 partiallyaddressed this issue, by making the child credit apply against the AMT. The bill alsoincreased the exemptions by $2,000 for singles and $4,000 for joint returns, but theseprovisions sunset in 2004. There are a number of different policy options that might be considered in evaluating the AMT and its interaction with the regular tax. For some, a priority has been in making theexclusion for credits permanent, while for others indexing may be the most important priority. Both of these approaches will be costly in the future (about $26 billion for the credit ten yearsfrom now and about $14 billion for indexing). Others might wish to eventually phase out theAMT, which will raise about $37 billion by 2010. One can also make a case for expandingthe coverage of the AMT as an eventual flat tax, although in some ways the AMT does notconform to certain design principles (such as adjusting exemptions for family size). Anotherissue is how to adjust the AMT as changes in the regular tax system are made, to keep therelative position and original purpose of the AMT intact. In the latter case, the AMT mightbe adjusted when fundamental changes are made in the regular tax (rates, bracket widths,standard deductions) but not for proposals that provide special subsidies. This report will beupdated to reflect legislative developments.

crs_R42344

crs_R42344_0

Introduction1 The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) is a proposed regional free trade agreement (FTA) under negotiation between the United States and 11 other countries. Current participants include Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, the United States, and Vietnam. Congress may also establish U.S. trade negotiating objectives as part of its granting of Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) to the executive branch. These include achieving a comprehensive and high standard regional FTA that eliminates and reduces trade barriers and increases opportunities for U.S. trade and investment; allowing the United States to play a role in developing a broader platform for trade liberalization, particularly throughout the Asia-Pacific region; and providing the United States with an opportunity to establish new rules on emerging trade issues, such as regulatory coherence, supply chain management, state-owned enterprises, and increasing trade opportunities for small- and medium-sized businesses. This report focuses primarily on U.S. economic interests in the TPP agreement. It provides a comparative economic analysis of the countries currently negotiating the TPP and describes the U.S. trade flows with these countries at the bilateral level and in relation to the countries' economic linkages with the rest of the world. It is home to 40% of the world's population and nearly 60% of global GDP. Moreover, the region's economies are growing quickly. Non-U.S. TPP partners collectively represent a potential market with a population about 50% larger than the United States and several TPP economies have grown rapidly over the past decade (e.g. New and Potential TPP Participants One of the United States' expressed interests in the proposed TPP FTA is its potential expansion to include other Asia-Pacific economies. To date the expansion of the negotiations has included only APEC members. Japan's entry into the agreement is particularly significant. Japan is the third-largest economy in the world, the fourth-largest U.S. trading partner, and not party to an existing U.S. FTA, as opposed to Canada and Mexico, which are part of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Japan is now the second-largest country participating in TPP, both in terms of population (127 million) and GDP ($4.6 trillion). In addition, TPP countries have a number of bilateral and regional FTAs in effect, of varying degrees, some of which include other TPP negotiating partners. Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) ASEAN is another major regional economic partnership that includes TPP countries. U.S. trade with TPP partners was larger than the level of U.S. trade with South Korea, the largest of the recent U.S. FTA partners, by a factor of fourteen in goods trade in 2014 and a factor of nine in services trade in 2013. As the largest country in the TPP, both in terms of population and GDP, U.S. trade with TPP partners accounts for much of the trade among TPP countries. As mentioned above, the FTAs the United States already has in place with six of the TPP countries (Australia, Canada, Chile, Mexico, Peru, and Singapore) include investment provisions. The United States, the TPP country with the largest population and economy, and, hence, the largest domestic market, has a trade-to-GDP ratio of 30%, indicating that trade accounts for a smaller share of economic activity in the United States than in any other the TPP countries. Conclusion The proposed Trans-Pacific Partnership FTA would be a significant FTA for the United States and could eventually become the platform for a broader Asia-Pacific free trade area, an area that encompasses 40% of the world's people and over half of global production. TPP would be the largest U.S. FTA based on trade flows, and with the entry of Japan, a significant share of U.S.-TPP trade is not currently covered by an FTA. Due to the great diversity among the TPP participants, there may be challenges in achieving a comprehensive and high standard agreement.

The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) is a proposed regional free trade agreement (FTA) among 12 countries: Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, the United States, and Vietnam. The negotiating parties describe the TPP as a proposed "living agreement," which seeks to cover new trade topics and to include new members that are willing to adopt its high standards. The ongoing negotiations, which TPP country trade ministers have repeatedly announced are in the final stages, may progress more quickly with the recent congressional grant of Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) to the Obama Administration. The TPP negotiations are of ongoing interest to Congress. Congressional involvement includes consultations with U.S. negotiators on and oversight of the details of the negotiations, and eventual consideration of legislation to implement the final trade agreement. In assessing the TPP negotiations, Members may be interested in understanding the potential economic impact and significance of TPP and the economic characteristics of the other TPP countries as they evaluate the potential impact of the proposed TPP on the U.S. economy and the commercial opportunities for expansion into TPP markets. This report provides a comparative economic analysis of the TPP countries and their economic relations with the United States. TPP negotiating partners encompass great diversity in population, economic development, and trade and investment patterns with the United States. This economic diversity and inclusion of fast-growing emerging markets present both opportunities and challenges for the United States in achieving a comprehensive and high standard regional FTA among TPP countries. The proposed TPP and its potential expansion are important due to the economic significance of the Asia-Pacific region for both the United States and the world. The region is home to 40% of the world's population, produces nearly 60% of global GDP, and includes some of the fastest-growing economies in the world. Including Canada, Mexico, and Japan, TPP negotiating partners made up 37% of total U.S trade in 2013, and the Asia-Pacific economies as a whole made up 57%. The TPP would be the largest U.S. FTA to date by trade value. The United States is the largest TPP market in terms of both GDP and population. In 2014, non-U.S. TPP partners collectively had a GDP of $10.6 trillion, just over 60% of the U.S. level, and a population of 486 million, about 50% larger than the U.S. population. Japan's entry (pop. 127 million and GDP $4.6 trillion) increased the significance of the agreement on both these metrics. Unlike most previous U.S. FTA negotiations, the TPP involves countries with which the United States already has an FTA. The United States has FTAs in place with Australia, Canada, Chile, Mexico, Peru, and Singapore, which together account for over 82% of U.S. goods trade with TPP countries. Japan is by far the largest U.S. trade partner among TPP members without an existing U.S. FTA. Other TPP partners also have extensive existing FTA networks. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), of which Brunei, Malaysia, Singapore, and Vietnam are members, and its collective FTAs with other countries, accounts for the bulk of this interconnectedness. Moreover, ASEAN agreements with larger regional economies (e.g., China, India, Japan, and South Korea) present a second possible avenue for Asia-Pacific economic integration; albeit one that currently excludes the United States.

crs_R42069

crs_R42069_0

T he Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA; P.L. 111-148 , as amended) includes reforms of the health insurance market that impose requirements on private health insurance plans. It then describes the market reforms included in the ACA. The Appendix provides additional information about how the ACA market reforms apply to different market segments and types of health plans. Background Health Insurance Markets The private health insurance market is often characterized as having three segments—the large-group, small-group, and individual markets. ACA Market Reforms The ACA establishes federal requirements that apply to private health insurance. The reforms affect insurance offered to groups and individuals; impose requirements on sponsors of coverage; and, collectively, establish a federal floor with respect to access to coverage, premiums, benefits, cost sharing, and consumer protections. Although such market reforms may be new at the federal level, many of the ACA's reforms had already been enacted in some form in several states, with great variation in scope and specificity across the states. In general, all ACA market reforms are currently effective. The reforms do not apply uniformly to all types of plans. Often, reforms apply differently to health plans according to the market segment in which the plan is offered and whether the plan has grandfathered status. Furthermore, the reforms do not apply to certain types of plans (this is true of other federal health reforms as well). For example, retiree-only health plans are not required to comply with federal health insurance requirements, including the ACA's market reforms. Descriptions of the market reforms are grouped under the following categories: obtaining coverage, keeping coverage, cost of purchasing coverage, covered services, cost-sharing limits, consumer assistance and other health care protections, and plan requirements related to health care providers. In general, guaranteed issue in health insurance is the requirement that a plan accept every applicant for health coverage, as long as the applicant agrees to the terms and conditions of the insurance offer (e.g., the premium). With regard to plans offered in the group market, guaranteed issue generally means that a plan sponsor (e.g., an employer) must be able to purchase a group health plan any time during a year. Plans that otherwise would be required to offer coverage on a guaranteed-issue basis are allowed to deny coverage to individuals and employers in certain circumstances. As of the date of this report, regulations have not been issued. Covered Services Coverage of Essential Health Benefits Plans must cover the essential health benefits (EHB). In general, plans that are required to offer the EHB must model their benefits package after the state's selected benchmark plan. The limits apply only to in-network coverage of the EHB. The portal is required to provide, at minimum, information on the following coverage options: health plans offered in the private insurance market, Medicaid and the State Children's Health Insurance Program (CHIP), high-risk pools, and small-group health plans. Applicability of Market Reforms to Health Plans

The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA; P.L. 111-148, as amended) establishes federal requirements that apply to private health insurance. Its market reforms affect insurance offered to groups and individuals and impose requirements on sponsors of coverage (e.g., employers). In general, all of the ACA's market reforms are currently effective; some became effective shortly after the ACA was passed in 2010, and others became effective for plan years beginning in 2014. Although some of the market reforms had previously been enacted in some states, many of the reforms are new at the federal level. Collectively, the reforms create federal minimum requirements with respect to access to coverage, premiums, benefits, cost sharing, and consumer protections. For example, the requirement to offer health plans on a guaranteed-issue basis generally means that insurers must accept every applicant for health coverage, as long as the applicant agrees to the terms and conditions of the coverage (e.g., the premium). The ACA's requirement to offer the essential health benefits means that certain plans must cover a specified package of benefits. The market reforms do not apply uniformly to all types of plans. Some reforms apply to all three segments of the private insurance market—individual, small group, and large group—whereas others may apply only to plans offered in the individual and small-group markets. In the group market, the reforms do not always apply to both fully insured plans (plans offered by state-licensed carriers that are purchased by employers or other sponsors) and self-insured entities (groups that set aside funds to pay for health benefits directly). The reforms' applicability also depends on whether a plan has grandfathered status. Under the ACA, an existing health plan in which a person was enrolled on the date of ACA enactment was grandfathered; the plan can maintain its grandfathered status as long as it meets certain requirements. Grandfathered health plans are exempt from the majority of ACA market reforms. Although the market reforms' applicability is not necessarily uniform across plan types, it is uniform for plans offered inside and outside health insurance exchanges. Every state has an exchange, and individuals and small employers can use the exchanges to shop for and obtain health insurance coverage. The same market reforms apply to an individual plan offered through an exchange and to an individual plan offered in the market outside of an exchange. Some types of plans do not have to comply with any of the market reforms. For example, retiree-only health plans are not required to comply with federal health insurance requirements, including the ACA's market reforms. This report provides background information about the private health insurance market, including market segments and regulation. It then describes each ACA market reform. The reforms are grouped under the following categories: obtaining coverage, keeping coverage, cost of purchasing coverage, covered services, cost-sharing limits, consumer assistance and other health care protections, and plan requirements related to health care providers. The Appendix provides details about the types of plans that are required to comply with the different reforms.

crs_R42085

crs_R42085_0

Introduction In 1993, Russia formally applied for accession to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). Its application was taken up by the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995, when it was established to succeed the GATT. After a number of fits and starts during the 18-year process, the members of the WTO, on December 16, 2011, invited Russia to join the WTO. On July 10 and July 18, 2012, respectively, the lower house of the Russian parliament—the State Duma—and the upper house—the Federal Council—approved the protocol of accession. On July 21, President Putin signed the measure into law, allowing Russia to formally join the WTO on August 22. Russia is the largest economy that is not a member of the WTO, and therefore, its accession could have important influence on the future of the WTO and its members. On November 16, and on December 6, 2012, respectively, the House passed (365-43) and the Senate passed (92-4) H.R. 6156 . The President signed the bill into law ( P.L. WP members have been working to ensure that Russia's commitments to adhere to the SPS Agreement are reflected in the CU regulations. The United States and other WTO members had pressed Russia to allow foreign banks to open branches. 112-208 ) on December 14, 2012. On December 20, President Obama extended PNTR status to Russia by proclamation. In joining the WTO, Russia commits to bring its trade laws and practices into compliance with WTO rules. In doing so, it has taken a major step in integrating its trading system with the rest of the world. Those commitments include nondiscriminatory treatment of imports of goods and services; binding tariff levels; ensuring transparency when implementing trade measures; limiting agriculture subsidies; enforcing intellectual property rights for foreign holders of such rights; and forgoing the use of local content requirements and other trade-related investment measures. Russia will have also joined the WTO knowing that its fellow WTO members will hold it accountable, through WTO dispute settlement procedures, for fulfilling its WTO commitments. In return, Russia will have a major voice in shaping and implementing the international trade regime in the form of the WTO. It will also be able to hold other WTO partners accountable for adhering to WTO rules in conducting their trade relations with Russia, making those trade relations more predictable and stable. In addition, Russian economic reformers anticipate that WTO membership will make Russia a more attractive location for foreign producers and investors to do business by locking in trade-liberalizing reforms and will boost Russian trade and economic growth.

In 1993, Russia formally applied for accession to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). In 1995, its application was taken up by the World Trade Organization (WTO), the successor organization of the GATT. Russia is the largest economy not in the WTO; after a number of fits and starts during the 18-year process, the then-153 members of the WTO, on December 16, 2011, invited Russia to join the WTO during the Ministerial Conference in Geneva. On July 10 and July 18, 2012, respectively, the lower house of the Russian parliament—the State Duma—and the upper house—the Federal Council—approved the protocol of accession. President Putin signed the measure into law on July 21, allowing Russia to formally join the WTO on August 22. The immediate policy issue for Congress was whether to enact legislation authorizing the President to grant permanent normal trade relations (PNTR) status for Russia, a status that all WTO members are required to provide each other. Some Members of Congress viewed congressional consideration of PNTR legislation as the opportunity to ensure that the conditions on which Russia is invited to join the WTO reflected U.S. concerns and that Russia fulfill its commitments. On November 16, and on December 6, 2012, respectively, the House passed (365-43) and the Senate passed (92-4) H.R. 6156. The President signed the bill into law (P.L. 112-208) on December 14, 2012. The law removes the application of Title IV to trade with Russia and authorizes the President to grant PNTR to Russia by proclamation. It also contained other provisions requiring follow-up reports and discussion to ensure that Russia complies with its obligations to the United States and other WTO members. In joining the WTO, Russia has committed to bring its trade laws and practices into compliance with WTO rules and other market-opening measures. In doing so, it will take a major step in integrating its trading system with the rest of the world. Those commitments include extending nondiscriminatory treatment of imports of goods and services; reducing tariffs and binding tariff levels; ensuring transparency when implementing trade measures; limiting agriculture subsidies; enforcing intellectual property rights (IPR) of foreign holders of such rights; forgoing the use of local content requirements and other investment measures that limit imports; and opening government procurement contract opportunities to foreign firms. In joining the WTO, Russia commits to accepting WTO dispute settlement procedures. In return, Russia will have a voice in shaping and implementing the international trade regime. It will be able to hold its WTO partners accountable for adhering to WTO rules in conducting their trade relations with Russia, making those trade relations more predictable and stable. In addition, Russian economic reformers anticipate that WTO membership will make Russia a more attractive location for foreign producers and investors to do business by locking in trade-liberalizing reforms, which could increase Russia's economic growth.

crs_R41321

crs_R41321_0

Introduction Most federal employees (59.1%) are paid on the General Schedule (GS), a pay scale that consists of 15 pay grades in which an employee's pay increases are to be based on job performance and length of service. Some Members of Congress, citizens, and public administration scholars have argued that federal employee pay advancement should be more closely linked to job performance. With explicit congressional authorization, the Department of Defense (DOD) developed the National Security Personnel System (NSPS) as a unique personnel and pay system attempting to more closely link employee pay to job performance. NSPS was beset by criticisms since it went into effect in 2006. The system faced legal and political challenges from unions and employees who claimed it was inconsistently applied and caused undeserved pay inequities, among other concerns. On October 7, 2009, House and Senate conferees reported a version of the National Defense Authorization Bill for Fiscal Year 2010 that included language to terminate NSPS. On October 8, 2009, the House agreed to the conference report. The Senate agreed to the conference report on October 22, 2009. On October 28, 2009, the President signed the bill into law ( P.L. 111-84 ). DOD must now return employees currently enrolled in NSPS to the GS or to the pay system in which they were previously enrolled. The return to the GS or other pay system must be completed by January 1, 2012, pursuant to the law. NSPS was initially intended to cover all DOD employees, but had a final total enrollment of roughly 227,000 DOD employees or 31.7% of the department's 717,000-person workforce. In October 2010, DOD sent a report to Congress that said 76% (171,985) of employees formerly in the NSPS pay system had been converted to the GS. Of those employees who moved into the GS, 72% (124,200) received a pay raise when they were placed in the proper GS grade and step. As of January 2011, roughly 54,000 DOD employees remain in NSPS. 111-84 included language preventing any employee from suffering a loss or decrease in pay as a result of the elimination of NSPS. § 5363), 35,117 transitioning employees have been placed on "retained pay," which allows them to maintain their NSPS rate of pay, but requires that they receive half of the annual pay adjustment distributed to employees at the step 10 level of their position's assigned GS pay grade. Some NSPS employees, however, may argue that the cap on their annual pay increase amounts to a loss in pay. The 112 th Congress may choose to continue its congressional oversight of NSPS employees' transition to other pay systems. This report focuses on the transition of employees from NSPS to non-NSPS pay scales. It does not address the operation of NSPS or other pay schedules. The report discusses how the transition is scheduled to occur and analyzes congressional options for oversight or legislative action. If an employee was previously enrolled in a system that no longer exists, if his or her job and description did not exist prior to enrollment in NSPS, or if a new pay system is to be created for an employee to enter into, DOD is required by statute to determine the employee's pay system and transition him or her into that pay system by the January 1, 2012 deadline. Pursuant to P.L. Pursuant to P.L. The employee's manager would evaluate the employee's job duties and responsibilities based on the GS grade assigned to the position—without regard for the employee's pay rate. Other employees achieved pay rates that are not aligned with rates on their non-NSPS pay scale.

Most federal employees (59.1%) are paid on the General Schedule (GS), a pay scale that consists of 15 pay grades in which an employee's pay increases are to be based on performance and length of service. Some Members of Congress, citizens, and public administration scholars have argued that federal employee pay advancement should be more closely linked to job performance than it currently is on the GS. With these concerns in mind and with explicit congressional authorization, the Department of Defense (DOD) began developing the National Security Personnel System (NSPS) in 2003 as a unique pay scale attempting to more closely link employee pay to job performance. NSPS was beset by criticisms since it went into effect in 2006. The system faced legal and political challenges from unions and employees who claimed it was inconsistently applied and caused undeserved pay inequities, among other concerns. On October 7, 2009, House and Senate conferees reported a version of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 that included language to terminate NSPS. On October 8, 2009, the House agreed to the conference report. The Senate agreed to the conference report on October 22, 2009. On October 28, 2009, the President signed the bill into law (P.L. 111-84). DOD must now return employees currently enrolled in NSPS to the GS or to the pay system that previously applied to them or their position. If the employee's position did not exist prior to NSPS or if the previous pay scale was abolished during NSPS's lifetime, DOD must determine an appropriate pay scale for the employee. The return to the GS or other pay system must be completed by January 1, 2012, pursuant to the law. NSPS was initially intended to cover all DOD employees, but had a total final enrollment of roughly 227,000 DOD employees or 31.7% of the department's 717,000-person workforce. In October 2010, DOD sent a report to Congress that said 76% (171,985) of employees formerly in the NSPS pay system had been converted to the GS. Of those employees who moved into the GS, 72% (124,200) received a pay raise when they were placed in the proper GS grade and step. Employees who have not yet been transitioned out of NSPS are to be placed in pay scales other than the GS. As of January 2011, roughly 54,000 DOD employees remain in NSPS. P.L. 111-84 included language preventing any employee from suffering a loss or decrease in pay as a result of the elimination of NSPS. Pursuant to statute, 35,117 employees who transitioned to GS have been placed on "retained pay," which allows them to maintain their NSPS rate of pay instead of transitioning to the GS pay rate assigned to their job's grade. In such cases, the GS rate of pay assigned to the employee's position may not reach the pay level the employee achieved under NSPS. Retained pay, pursuant to statute, requires that an employee receive half of the annual pay adjustment given to employees who are at the maximum payable rate for their GS grade (step 10). Some NSPS employees may argue that the cap on their annual pay increase amounts to a loss in pay, and, therefore, violates P.L. 111-84. The 112th Congress may choose to continue congressional oversight of NSPS employees' transition to other pay systems. This report focuses on the transition of employees from NSPS to non-NSPS pay systems. It does not address the operation of NSPS or other pay schedules. The report discusses how the transition is scheduled to occur and analyzes congressional options for oversight or legislative action.