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gao_GAO-09-839T

gao_GAO-09-839T_0

OMB’s Guidance Is Not Consistently Addressed at All Agencies In December 2007, the OMB Office of Federal Procurement Policy issued guidance to chief acquisition officers and senior procurement executives to review and update their acquisition policies on the appropriate use of incentive fee contracts, which include award fee contracts. The following shows how OMB’s guidance is reflected in guidance provided by each agency: In response to GAO recommendations in 2005 and subsequent legislation, DOD issued guidance in 2006 and 2007 that states it is imperative that award fees are linked to desired outcomes, that the practice of rolling over unearned award fees should be limited to exceptional circumstances, that award fees must be commensurate with contractor performance, and that performance that is unsatisfactory is not entitled to any award fee. Of the five agencies we reviewed, only DOD collects data on award fee contracts. Concluding Observations and Prior Recommendations for Executive Action Award fee contracts can motivate contractor performance when certain principles are applied. Linking fees to acquisition outcomes ensures that the fee being paid is directly related to the quality, timeliness, and cost of what the government is receiving. Limiting the opportunity for contractors to have a second chance at earning a previously unearned fee maximizes the incentive during an award fee period. Additionally, the amount of the fee earned should be commensurate with contractor performance based on evaluation factors designed to motivate excellent performance. Further, no fee should be paid for performance that is judged to be unsatisfactory or does not meet contract requirements. While DOD has realized benefits from applying these principles to some contracts, these principles have not been established fully in guidance at DOE, DHS, and HHS. Having guidance is not enough, however, unless it is consistently implemented. Further, the lack of methods to evaluate effectiveness and promote information sharing among and within agencies has created an atmosphere in which agencies are unaware of whether these contracts are being used effectively and one in which poor practices can go unnoticed and positive practices can be isolated. In our report, we recommended that DOE, HHS, and DHS update or develop implementing guidance on using award fees.

Why GAO Did This Study From fiscal year 2004 through fiscal year 2008, agencies spent over $300 billion on contracts which include award fees. While many agencies use award fee contracts, over 95 percent of the government's spending using this contract type in fiscal year 2008 occurred at five: the departments of Defense (DOD), Energy (DOE), Health and Human Services (HHS), and Homeland Security (DHS) and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). In December 2007, the Office of Management and Budget's (OMB) Office of Federal Procurement Policy issued guidance to chief acquisition officers and procurement executives across the government that echoed several recommendations we made in 2005 on the use of award fees and emphasized positive practices to be implemented by all agencies. GAO's statement today is based on our May 29, 2009, report, Federal Contracting: Guidance on Award Fees Has Led to Better Practices But is Not Consistently Applied (GAO-09-630). Like the report, this statement addresses how agencies are implementing OMB's guidance. Specifically, we (1) identified the actions agencies have taken to revise or develop policies and guidance to reflect OMB guidance on using award fees, (2) determined the extent to which current practices for using award fee contracts are consistent with the new guidance, and (3) identified the extent to which agencies collect and analyze information on award fees to evaluate their use and share that information within their agencies. What GAO Found Award fee contracts can motivate contractor performance when certain principles are applied. Linking fees to acquisition outcomes ensures that the fee being paid is directly related to the quality, timeliness, and cost of what the government is receiving. Limiting the opportunity for contractors to have a second chance at earning a previously unearned fee maximizes the incentive during an award fee period. Additionally, the amount of the fee earned should be commensurate with contractor performance based on evaluation factors designed to motivate excellent performance. Further, no fee should be paid for performance that is judged to be unsatisfactory or does not meet contract requirements. While DOD has realized benefits from applying these principles to some contracts, these principles have not been established fully in guidance at DOE, DHS, and HHS. Having guidance is not enough, however, unless it is consistently implemented. Further, the lack of methods to evaluate effectiveness and promote information sharing among and within agencies has created an atmosphere in which agencies are unaware of whether these contracts are being used effectively and one in which poor practices can go unnoticed and positive practices can be isolated.

gao_GAO-04-470

gao_GAO-04-470_0

U.S. citizens only? To apportion Congress? Scope and Methodology As agreed with your offices, our objectives for this report were to (1) assess the soundness of the Bureau’s test design and its suitability for addressing the Bureau’s specific research questions, and (2) examine what past court decisions have held about Americans’ rights and obligations abroad that could help inform whether and how they should be included in the census. The test objectives and related research questions are appropriate as written, but, as shown in table 2, because of various methodological limitations, the data that will result from the test will not fully answer key questions concerning feasibility, data quality, and cost. Research Question #2: Information on Data Quality Will be Limited The Bureau plans on measuring the quality of the data collected in the overseas test by tabulating item nonresponse, which refers to whether a respondent completed a particular question. Cost Data Will Not Identify the Cost of Conducting Future Tests or an Overseas Enumeration in 2010 Although one of the Bureau’s objectives for the overseas enumeration test is to determine the cost of collecting data from overseas citizens, the Bureau’s test design lacked a specific research question aimed at obtaining this information. The Rights and Obligations of Americans Overseas Vary Americans residing abroad do not have the same rights and obligations under federal programs and activities as Americans living in the United States. For this study, we examined whether overseas Americans can vote in federal elections; are subject to federal income tax; and can receive Social Security, Supplemental Security Income, and Medicare benefits (see table 3). Legislation Would be Needed To Require the Census Bureau to Enumerate Americans Abroad The Bureau has the discretion to decide whether to count American citizens abroad. Indeed, there is nothing in the Constitution, the Census Act, or court decisions that would require the Bureau to count Americans living overseas, or to not count such individuals. The Bureau overstated the test’s ability to answer its key research objectives and, as a result, congressional decision making on this issue will be that much more difficult. Therefore, to give the Bureau as much planning time as possible, it will be important for Congress to soon decide whether the Bureau should be required to count this population group as part of the 2010 Census or as part of a separate data collection effort or whether there are so many obstacles to a successful overseas count regardless of the approach that the Bureau should shelve any plans for further research and testing. a. a. a. a.

Why GAO Did This Study In the 1990 and 2000 Censuses, U.S. military and federal civilian employees overseas were included in the numbers used for apportioning Congress. Currently, the U.S. Census Bureau (Bureau) is assessing the practicality of counting all Americans abroad by holding a test census in France, Kuwait, and Mexico. GAO was asked to (1) assess the soundness of the test design, and (2) examine what past court decisions have held about Americans' rights and obligations abroad. What GAO Found Although the overseas enumeration test was designed to help determine the practicality of counting all Americans abroad, because of various methodological limitations, the test results will only partially answer the Bureau's key questions concerning feasibility, data quality, and cost. For example, one research questions asks, "How good is the quality of the data?" However, the Bureau will only measure item nonresponse, which indicates whether a person completed a particular question. As a measure of quality, it is far from complete. Similarly, although a key research objective was to determine the cost of counting Americans overseas, the Bureau's data will not inform the cost of conducting future tests or an overseas enumeration in 2010. Overall, the Bureau overstated the test's ability to answer its key research objectives. Overseas Americans have various rights and obligations to federal programs and activities. For example, Americans abroad are generally taxed on their worldwide income and can vote in federal elections, but are generally not entitled to Medicare benefits. There is nothing in the Constitution, federal law, or court decisions that would either require the Bureau to count overseas Americans, or not count this population group. As a result, Congress would need to enact legislation if it wanted to require the Bureau to include overseas Americans in the 2010 Census. Counting Americans abroad as part of the census would add new risks to an enterprise that already faces an array of challenges. Therefore, it will be important for Congress to decide whether overseas Americans should be counted as part of the census or counted as part of a separate survey or whether there are so many obstacles to a successful count regardless of the approach that the Bureau should shelve any plans for further research and testing. To the extent a second test is required, the Bureau will need to take steps to develop a more rigorous design.

gao_GGD-95-126

gao_GGD-95-126_0

MLR Audit Guidelines Are Adequate for Assessing Causes of Bank Failures Our review of the IGs’ audit guidelines to do MLRs found that the guidelines represent a comprehensive approach for assessing the causes of bank failures. Further, certain costs associated with producing MLR reports should be considered; these costs include IG financial and personnel expenditures, some temporary disruptions to IG office operations, and duplication of effort among investigators. For example, Federal Reserve IG officials pointed out that PCRs, unlike MLR reports, do not assess the quality of bank supervision. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology In accordance with section 38(k) of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act as amended, our objectives were to (1) assess the adequacy of the preparations, procedures, and audit guidelines that the Inspectors General (IG) have established for performing material loss reviews (MLR) to ensure compliance with their responsibilities under the section; (2) verify the information contained in the MLR reports upon which the IGs based their conclusions; (3) recommend improvements, if necessary, in bank supervision based on a review of the MLR reports issued between July 1, 1993, and June 30, 1994; and (4) assess the economy and efficiency of the current MLR process.

Why GAO Did This Study Pursuant to a legislative requirement, GAO: (1) assessed the preparations, procedures, and audit guidelines that certain Inspectors General (IG) have established for material loss reviews (MLR); (2) verified the information contained in the MLR reports; (3) recommended improvements in bank supervision based on MLR reports issued between July 1, 1993, and June 30, 1994; and (4) assessed the economy and efficiency of the MLR process. What GAO Found GAO found that the IG reviewed have satisfied their MLR responsibilities by: (1) establishing a statement of understanding that coordinates their performance of MLR; (2) initiating and completing several pilot studies; (3) hiring staff with bank and audit experience; and (4) developing relevant training programs and comprehensive audit guidelines. In addition, GAO found that: (1) if MLR guidelines are implemented correctly, they will be adequate to determine the causes of bank failures and the quality of bank supervision; (2) the costs associated with producing MLR reports can be considerable and may cause temporary operational disruptions to IG offices; and (3) MLR requirements do not always give IG sufficient time to review reports prepared by other Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) officials who investigated causes of bank failures.

gao_AIMD-98-162

gao_AIMD-98-162_0

Objectives, Scope, and Methodology Our objectives were to assess (1) the overall status of State’s efforts to identify and correct its date-sensitive systems and (2) the appropriateness of State’s strategy and actions for remediating Year 2000 problems. Inadequate Progress in Remediating Systems State’s progress in remediating systems has been inadequate. Of the 40 systems State has identified as mission-critical and is either converting or replacing, only 17 (about 42.5 percent) have completed renovation, 11 have completed validation, and only two have completed implementation. If this is not done, the agency will not have a good basis for prioritizing systems for correction or developing contingency plans that focus on the continuity of operations. Until recently, State’s Year 2000 effort lacked a mission-based perspective. For example, at the time of our review, State had not determined its core business functions and linked these functions to its mission or to its support systems. In responding to a draft of this report, State noted that it is currently developing a framework for a mission-based perspective for its Year 2000 problem. It has recently determined its core business functions and linked these functions to its mission. However, it has not yet linked its core business functions to support systems necessary to conduct these operations. But under State’s Year 2000 approach, they rank equally. In responding to a draft of this report, the department stated that it had recently identified its core business functions and planned to link them to the 64 systems previously identified as mission critical, thereby providing a functional basis for prioritizing their efforts. State has not managed the identification and correction of its interfaces effectively. First, it is still in the process of identifying its interfaces, even though our Year 2000 Assessment Guide recommended that this be done during the assessment phase. While State has taken a number of actions to address this issue, its progress in several critical areas has been inadequate: only 17 of 40 systems that State has designated as mission-critical have completed renovation and it has not yet identified all of its interfaces. 2. 3. That is, agencies must first identify their core business processes and assess the Year 2000 risk and impact of these processes. 4.

Why GAO Did This Study Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Department of State's progress in solving its year 2000 computer systems problem, focusing on the: (1) overall status of State's efforts to identify and correct its date-sensitive systems; and (2) appropriateness of State's strategy and actions to correct its year 2000 problems. What GAO Found GAO noted that: (1) State has taken many positive actions to increase awareness, promote sharing of information, and encourage its bureaus to make year 2000 remediation efforts a high priority; (2) however, State's progress in responding to the problem has been slow; (3) for example, of the 40 systems that State identified as mission critical and needing either converting or replacing, only 17 (42.5 percent) have completed renovation; (4) more importantly, until recently, State's year 2000 effort lacked a mission-based perspective, that is, it had not determined its core business functions or linked these functions to its mission or to the support systems necessary to conduct these operations; (5) because the year 2000 problem is primarily a business problem, agencies need to take a business perspective in all aspects of it; that is, they should identify their core business areas and processes and assess the impact of system failures; (6) until it takes these steps, State will not have a good basis for prioritizing its systems for the purposes of correction or developing contingency plans that focus on the continuity of operations; (7) in responding to GAO's draft report, State noted that it has recently determined its core business functions and linked these functions to its mission; (8) it has not yet linked its core business functions to support systems necessary to conduct these operations; (9) State has not been managing the identification and correction of its interfaces effectively; (10) specifically, it is still identifying its interfaces, even though this task should have been completed in the assessment phase, and it has developed written agreements with data exchange partners for only a small portion of its systems; and (11) as a result, State has increased the risk that year 2000 errors will be propagated from one organization's systems to another's.

gao_GAO-03-548T

gao_GAO-03-548T_0

These waivers apply to a number of the provisions, including (1) the methods for designating joint specialty officers, (2) the posteducation assignments for joint specialty officers, (3) the assignment of joint specialty officers to critical joint duty positions, and (4) the promotions of officers to the general and flag officer pay grades. DOD uses a two-phased approach to educate officers in joint matters. Lack of a Strategic Approach Is Contributing to DOD’s Difficulties to Fully Respond to the Act’s Intent A significant impediment affecting DOD’s ability to fully realize the cultural change that was envisioned by the act is the fact that DOD has not taken a strategic approach that establishes clear goals for officer development in joint matters and links those goals to DOD’s overall mission and goals. DOD, for example, has not fully assessed how many joint specialty officers it actually needs. However, at the time of our review, the Secretary of Defense had not yet, within a total force concept, fully addressed how it will provide joint officer development to reserve officers who are serving in joint organizations – despite the fact that no significant operation can be conducted without reserve involvement. As of fiscal year 2001, DOD has been promoting more officers who had the requisite joint experience to the general and flag officer pay grades than it did in fiscal year 1995. In fiscal year 2001, however, DOD still relied on allowable waivers in lieu of joint experience to promote one in four officers to these senior pay grades. DOD has made progress, but is still not fully meeting provisions to promote mid-grade officers (majors, lieutenant colonels, and colonels in the Air Force, Army, and Marine Corps and lieutenant commanders, commanders, and captains in the Navy) who are serving or who have served in joint positions at rates not less than the promotion rates of their peers who have not served in joint positions. Between fiscal years 1995 and 2001, DOD met this promotion objective 74 percent of the time. Positive Actions Taken, but Gaps Remain in Education and Assignments One of the provisions in the Goldwater-Nichols Act requires DOD to develop officers, in part, through education in joint matters. The act, however, did not identify a specific numerical requirement and, similarly, DOD has not established numerical goals concerning the number of officers who should complete joint professional military education. According to DOD data, only one-third of the officers serving in joint positions in fiscal year 2001 had received both phases of the joint education program. This number reached an all-time high in fiscal year 2001, when DOD did not fill 311, or more than one-third, of its critical joint duty positions with joint specialty officers.

Why GAO Did This Study The Department of Defense (DOD) has increasingly engaged in multiservice and multinational operations. Congress enacted the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, in part, so that DOD's military leaders would be better prepared to plan, support, and conduct joint operations. GAO assessed DOD actions to implement provisions in the law that address the development of officers in joint matters and evaluated impediments affecting DOD's ability to fully respond to the provisions in the act. What GAO Found DOD has not taken a strategic approach to develop officers in joint matters. It has not identified how many joint specialty officers it needs, and it has not yet, within a total force concept, fully addressed how it will provide joint officer development to reserve officers who are serving in joint organizations--despite the fact that no significant operation can be conducted without reserve involvement. As of fiscal year 2001, DOD has promoted more officers with previous joint experience to the general and flag officer pay grades that it did in fiscal year 1995. However, in fiscal year 2001, DOD still relied on allowable waivers in lieu of joint experience to promote one in four officers to these senior pay grades. Furthermore, DOD is still not fully meeting provisions to promote mid-grade officers who are serving or who have served in joint positions at rates not less than the promotion rates of their peers who have not served in joint positions. Between fiscal years 1995 and 2001, DOD met more than 90 percent of its promotion goals for officers who served on the Joint Staff, almost 75 percent of its promotion goals for joint specialty officers, and just over 70 percent of its promotion goals for all other officers who served in joint positions. DOD has met provisions in the act that require it to develop officers in joint matters through education by establishing a two-phased joint professional military education program. The act, however, did not establish specific numerical requirements, and DOD has also not determined the number of officers who should complete the joint education. In fiscal year 2001, only one-third of the officers who were serving in joint organizations had completed both phases of the education. DOD has also increasingly relied on allowable waivers and has not filled all of its critical joint duty positions with officers who hold a joint specialty designation. This number reached an all-time high in fiscal year 2001 when DOD did not fill 311, or more than one-third, of its 808 critical joint duty positions with joint specialty officers.

gao_GAO-13-158

gao_GAO-13-158_0

Contractors’ labor costs include pension benefits, since such benefits are a normal part of compensation. Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA), which audits projected and actual costs associated with DOD contracts to ensure they are allowable, allocable, and reasonable in accordance with CAS and Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) rules. CAS and ERISA Rules Determine Pension Calculations but Have Diverged Over Recent Years CAS Rules Define How Much Pension Cost Can Be Allocated to Contracts While ERISA Rules Determine Required Pension Contributions DOD contractors make two sets of calculations for each of their defined benefit pension plans, following two sets of standards. This cost is allocated to contracts based on CAS rules. CAS rules are set by the CAS Board, part of the Office of Federal Procurement Policy within the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), which includes members from government and industry. Growing Divergence between CAS Costs and ERISA Contributions Has Generated Over $26 Billion in CAS Prepayment Credits The recent changes in the ERISA discount rate basis meant major differences in the methodology for CAS cost and ERISA contribution calculations, but CAS and ERISA rules were not fully aligned even before these changes. The most recent change to ERISA minimum contribution requirements can also affect CAS pension cost. The corporate-level contracting officer negotiates CAS pension costs and either comes to agreement with the contractor or recommends an amount of CAS pension cost that DCMA contracting officers at the division level can use in negotiations. Pension Oversight Processes Do Not Address Reasonableness of Value of Defined Benefit Pension Plans The FAR requires that total employee compensation, which includes many components such as salaries and bonuses, fringe benefits like retirement benefits and health insurance, and other nonwage compensation, must be reasonable in order to be claimed by the contractor as a contract cost. Multiple factors drive CAS pension costs. The Largest DOD Contractors Maintain Their Defined Benefit Plans in Similar Ways to Peer Companies Many of the Largest DOD Contractors Have Frozen Defined Benefit Plans, As Have Companies in Their Peer Group Nearly all of the largest DOD contractors—as well as the peer group of companies we examined—maintain some sort of tax-qualified, defined benefit pension plan for their employees. CAS Pension Costs for Large DOD Contractors Have Increased in Recent Years Due to the Market Downturn CAS Pension Costs Started Relatively Low and Rose Significantly over the Last Decade CAS pension costs for the largest DOD contractors grew considerably over the last decade. As these costs increased, contractors took several actions to control them. Harmonization Will Likely Increase the Magnitude and Volatility of Contractor Pension Costs Projected Pension Costs Are Sensitive to Economic Assumptions Both contractors and DOD officials expect CAS pension costs to increase as discount rates used for CAS calculations fall to match the rates used for ERISA funding calculations. Harmonization ties the CAS discount rate to ERISA rules, making it harder to project future CAS pension costs. The CAS Board Did Not Update Rules for Settlement of Plan Curtailments as Part of Harmonization The CAS Board did not harmonize the discount rates used for settling up if a contractor curtails a pension plan, meaning that liabilities could be calculated differently under ERISA and CAS rules if a contractor terminates a plan or freezes new benefit accruals for all participants. Recommendations for Executive Action We recommend that the Secretary of Defense take the following four actions: Assign responsibility for oversight of the reasonableness of pension plans offered by contractors, specifically the value of benefits earned by participants; Provide guidance on how to measure the value of pension benefits that participants earn in a given year to get a complete picture of total compensation for contractor employees; Provide guidance on the extent to which defined benefit plans should be included in assessments of the reasonableness of executive compensation packages; and Provide specific guidance to acquisition organizations, including DCMA and DCAA, on the discount rate or rates that would be acceptable for contractors to use in calculating pension costs for forward pricing purposes. In order to better align with the harmonized CAS 412, we recommend that the CAS Board set a schedule for revising the parts of CAS 413 dealing with settlement of pension plan curtailments. DOD agreed with all four recommendations made to the Secretary of Defense. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology Our objectives were to assess how (1) contractor pension costs are determined; (2) the Department of Defense (DOD) ensures the contractor pension costs it pays are appropriate; (3) DOD contractors’ defined benefit pension plans compare with plans sponsored by similar companies that are not among the largest DOD contractors; (4) pension costs have affected DOD contract costs and the factors that contributed to these pension costs; and (5) the December 2011 harmonization of Cost Accounting Standards (CAS) with the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) will affect the amounts DOD will pay in pension costs in coming years.

Why GAO Did This Study DOD contractors are among the largest sponsors of defined benefit pension plans in the United States and factor pension costs into the price of DOD contracts. Since the 2008 market downturn, these pension costs have grown--thereby increasing DOD contract costs--and recent changes in rules for calculating pension costs have raised the prospect of further cost increases. Given this possibility, GAO assessed how (1) contractor pension costs are determined; (2) DOD ensures the contractor pension costs it pays are appropriate; (3) DOD contractors' defined benefit pension plans compare with plans sponsored by similar companies; (4) pension costs have affected DOD contract costs and the factors that contributed to these pension costs; and (5) the harmonization of CAS with ERISA will affect the amounts DOD will pay in pension costs in coming years. To do this, GAO analyzed defined benefit pension plans for the largest contractors; interviewed contractor and DOD officials; and reviewed relevant laws and regulations, including changes made to harmonize CAS with ERISA. What GAO Found Labor costs are included in the prices contractors negotiate with the Department of Defense (DOD), and include pension costs as these are a normal element of employee compensation. Contractors make two sets of calculations for their defined benefit pension plans, following two sets of standards: (1) Cost Accounting Standards (CAS), which determine how pension costs are allocated to government contracts; and (2) Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), which establishes the minimum contribution required to fund plans. In 2008, revised ERISA rules altered the minimum funding requirements, causing CAS costs and ERISA contributions to diverge further apart. ERISA contributions have therefore greatly exceeded CAS pension costs reflected in contract prices. In December 2011, almost 4 years after ERISA changes took effect, the CAS Board, which is part of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), made changes to CAS that harmonized them to ERISA in order to gradually reduce the difference between the two calculation methods. DOD centralizes its technical expertise for management and oversight of defined benefit pension plans. DOD contracting officers at the corporate level negotiate pension costs with contractors and receive technical support from a team of DOD actuaries. DOD audits projected and actual costs for contracts, including pension costs, to ensure they are allowable, allocable, and reasonable. The Federal Acquisition Regulation requires that employee compensation, including pensions, be reasonable. However, the pension costs used for compensation reviews can be affected not only by the value of benefits earned by employees, but also by factors such as asset returns and interest rates. Also, oversight processes do not clearly assign responsibility for assessing the reasonableness of pension benefits, including those for executives. GAO analyzed the defined benefit plans of the 10 largest DOD contractors and found that nearly all of the contractors--as well as a peer group of companies--maintain some sort of tax-qualified, defined benefit plan for their employees. The largest contractors invest in similar types of pension plan assets as their peer group, and do so somewhat more conservatively. GAO also found that CAS pension costs reported by the contractors grew considerably over the last decade, from less than $500 million in 2002 to almost $5 billion in 2011, although not all of these costs were allocated to DOD contracts. Contractor CAS pension costs grew as the market downturn increased unfunded liabilities. Although pension cost projections are highly sensitive to economic assumptions, both contractors and DOD officials expect CAS pension costs to increase starting in 2014 due to harmonization. The CAS discount rates used to value liabilities will now be tied to the more volatile ERISA-based rates, making it harder to forecast future CAS pension costs and reducing the consistency of cost projections used in contract pricing. DOD issued limited guidance on projecting ERISA-based discount rates for CAS calculations, but lack of specificity in the guidance can lead to great variation among the rates contractors use. Moreover, when a contractor curtails a plan, DOD and the contractor must settle pension costs; however, the discount rates used for settlements were not updated as part of harmonization, meaning liabilities will be calculated differently under CAS and ERISA rules. A schedule has not been set for addressing this issue. What GAO Recommends GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense clarify responsibility for and guidance on assessing pension reasonableness and determining discount rates for pension cost projections. GAO recommends that the CAS Board set a schedule for revising the parts of CAS that address the settlement of plan curtailments. DOD agreed with the recommendations to the Secretary of Defense, and OMB said that when the CAS Board meets it will consider a schedule for revision.

gao_GAO-01-282

gao_GAO-01-282_0

The bureau subsequently stopped the ALMRS project. We recommended that BLM assess the usefulness of ALMRS IOC and other alternatives to meeting the bureau’s business needs, and strengthen its investment management processes and systems acquisition capabilities. While these actions represent improvements, BLM has not yet established criteria and processes to properly control and evaluate IT investments. The bureau has begun to improve the selection and management of its IT investments and develop more mature systems development and acquisition capabilities. BLM has also taken steps to acquire a component of a major information system before completing improvement actions to its investment control processes. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology As requested by the Subcommittee on Interior and Related Agencies, Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives, our objectives were to determine whether BLM (1) has adequately assessed the usability of the ALMRS IOC software and other alternatives to meet its business needs, (2) has adequately strengthened its investment management practices, (3) is using sound systems acquisition processes, (4) has integrated all of its investment management and systems acquisition improvement projects and developed an overall plan and schedule for completing this integrated work, and (5) is planning to undertake any sizable systems acquisition or development efforts prior to strengthening its information technology program. Land Management Systems: BLM Faces Risks in Completing the Automated Land and Mineral Record System (GAO/AIMD-97-42, March 19, 1997).

Why GAO Did This Study GAO reviewed steps taken by the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) to strengthen its information technology (IT) investment management and acquisition capabilities. The Bureau took these actions to address recommendations made in an earlier report on the failure of the Automated Land and Mineral Record System (ALMRS) to meet BLM's business needs. What GAO Found GAO found that since 1999, BLM has been working to implement GAO recommendations to determine the usefulness of ALMRS and to assess and strengthen its IT investment management and acquisition capabilities. Although the bureau has not yet finished these efforts, it has begun to apply improved management strategies for selecting IT investments, develop processes and practices for controlling and evaluating investments, and build a more mature systems acquisition capability. However, before completing and institutionalizing new investment control processes, the Bureau has begun moving forward with an IT acquisition. As a result, BLM's efforts may be subject to the same project management and management oversight risks that adversely affected the ALMRS/Modernization.

gao_GAO-14-434

gao_GAO-14-434_0

The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 required NNSA to submit a report to congressional defense committees (1) assessing the role of the nuclear security complex in supporting key activities and (2) identifying any opportunities for efficiencies and cost savings in the complex. More specifically, section 3123 of the act required the report to include the following: an assessment of the role of the nuclear security complex sites in supporting a safe, secure, and reliable nuclear deterrent; reductions in the nuclear stockpile; and the nuclear nonproliferation efforts of the nation; an identification of opportunities for efficiencies within the nuclear security complex and an assessment of how those efficiencies could contribute to cost savings and strengthening safety and security; an assessment of duplicative functions within the nuclear security complex and a description of which duplicative functions remain necessary and why; an analysis of the potential for shared use or development of high explosives research and development capacity, supercomputing platforms, and infrastructure maintained for the Work for Others program, if the Administrator determines it appropriate; and a description of the long-term strategic plan for the nuclear security complex. Report Describes Activities of the Nuclear Security Enterprise but Does Not Assess the Sites’ Role The act required that NNSA’s report to congressional defense committees include an assessment of the role of the nuclear security complex sites in supporting a safe, secure, and reliable nuclear deterrent; reductions in the nuclear stockpile; and the nuclear nonproliferation efforts of the nation. NNSA’s report, however, does not include such an assessment. NNSA officials also said that a 2008 report that assessed the role of the nuclear security enterprise sites is still valid. NNSA officials said that a new analysis of the role of the nuclear security enterprise sites may be warranted in the future if circumstances change sufficiently. Moreover, we note that NNSA’s report to Congress did not cite the 2008 report as support and, as discussed previously, NNSA did not provide an assessment of the role of the nuclear security complex sites in supporting key NNSA activities, as required by the act. NNSA’s Report Does Not Assess How Identified Efficiencies Could Contribute to Cost Savings or Strengthen Safety and Security, as Required As discussed above, NNSA’s report identifies seven efficiency opportunities. NNSA’s report does not provide an assessment of how the efficiencies identified could contribute to cost savings and strengthen safety and security, as required by the act. For example, NNSA’s report cites the establishment of two new offices—the Office of Acquisition and Project Management in 2011 and the Office of Infrastructure and Operations in 2013—as efficiency opportunities, but it does not provide an assessment of how these offices have contributed or will contribute to cost savings. In addition, three of the efficiency initiatives included in NNSA’s report involve projects or strategies that, in prior reviews, we have found face challenges, which, if not addressed, may impact NNSA’s ability both to achieve cost savings and strengthen safety and security. Constructing a new Uranium Processing Facility at the Y-12 National Security Complex: NNSA stated that the new facility would include engineered controls that will provide improved safety, security, and reliability of enriched uranium operations, among other things. Conclusions Like other federal agencies, NNSA is being asked to find ways to operate more efficiently and reduce costs. Recommendation for Executive Action To ensure Congress receives reliable information regarding budgetary savings, we recommend that the Administrator of NNSA, when reporting on efficiency and savings opportunities in the future, develop a methodology that includes details on how savings from each operational improvement will be achieved; the basis of any assumptions included in the savings estimates; an assessment of the reliability of data used to develop the estimate; verification or validation of the accuracy of savings calculations performed; and a process for tracking actual savings resulting from operational improvements. As we note in our report, however, NNSA did not cite this assessment in its report to congressional defense committees. Finally, NNSA did not concur with GAO’s recommendation that future reporting on efficiencies and cost savings should include a methodology for estimating the savings derived from potential efficiencies and track savings resulting from new efficiency efforts.

Why GAO Did This Study Nuclear weapons are an essential part of the nation's defense strategy, and NNSA is charged with performing key activities in support of this strategy. Like other agencies, however, NNSA is being asked to find ways to operate more efficiently and reduce costs. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 mandated that NNSA submit a report to congressional defense committees that, among other things, includes an assessment of the role of the nuclear security complex sites, as well as opportunities for efficiencies at these sites and how these efficiencies may contribute to cost savings and help strengthen safety and security. The act required that NNSA's report include certain topics and mandated that GAO assess the report submitted by NNSA. This report evaluates the extent to which the NNSA report (1) assessed the role of nuclear security complex sites in supporting key NNSA activities and (2) identified opportunities for efficiencies and cost savings within the nuclear security complex. GAO analyzed NNSA's statutory reporting requirements, the agency's report to congressional committees and supporting documentation, and interviewed NNSA officials. What GAO Found The National Nuclear Security Administration's (NNSA) report to congressional defense committees describes, but does not assess, the role of the nuclear security complex sites. The act required that NNSA's report include an assessment of the role of the nuclear security complex sites in supporting a safe, secure, and reliable nuclear deterrent; reductions in the nuclear stockpile; and the nuclear nonproliferation efforts of the nation—which GAO refers to in this report as key NNSA activities. NNSA's report does not include such an assessment. Instead, the report describes activities such as certifying annually that the nuclear weapons stockpile is safe, secure, and reliable. NNSA officials told GAO that a prior 2008 report that assessed the role of the nuclear security complex is still valid and said that they did not think the act required them to update it. GAO notes, however, that NNSA's report to Congress does not cite the 2008 report as support for its assessment and provides no other information that would constitute an assessment. NNSA officials said that a new analysis of the role of the nuclear security complex sites may be warranted in the future if circumstances change. Officials acknowledged that characteristics of some major projects—such as the Chemistry and Metallurgical Research Replacement Nuclear Facility in New Mexico—have changed recently due to technical and fiscal challenges, but that such changes do not alter the fundamental role each site plays. NNSA's report to congressional defense committees identified seven opportunities for efficiency, but it did not, as required by the act, provide an assessment of how these efficiencies could contribute to cost savings or strengthening safety and security. For example, NNSA's report cites the establishment of two new offices—the Office of Acquisition and Project Management in 2011 and the Office of Infrastructure and Operations in 2013—as efficiency opportunities but does not provide an assessment of how these offices have contributed or will contribute to cost savings or improved safety and security. In addition, some efficiency opportunities noted in NNSA's report—such as the capabilities provided by the new Uranium Processing Facility at the Y-12 National Security Complex—involve projects or strategies that GAO has previously reported face challenges, which, if not addressed, may impact NNSA's ability both to achieve cost savings and strengthen safety and security. Key principles for preparing savings estimates include a methodology that identifies the basis of any assumptions included in the savings estimates and a process for tracking actual savings. Such a methodology could help ensure that savings from proposed efficiencies can be achieved. Because NNSA did not assess how these efficiencies would lead to savings, however, it is not clear whether any cost savings will result. What GAO Recommends GAO recommends that, when reporting on efficiencies and cost savings in the future, NNSA establish a methodology for estimating the savings derived from potential efficiencies and track savings resulting from efforts. NNSA disagreed, stating that the act did not require, as GAO recommends, that efficiencies be linked to cost savings. GAO believes its recommendation remains valid.

gao_GGD-95-127

gao_GGD-95-127_0

These objectives are to “discourage unfair trade practices by making U.S. agricultural commodities competitive.” The nationality of an exporter’s ownership is not germane to the pursuit of these objectives, since both foreign- and domestic-owned EEP exporters act as intermediaries in the program’s sales of U.S. agricultural commodities in overseas markets. Eliminating foreign-owned exporters from the program would reduce the number of bidders for EEP bonuses. The economic studies we reviewed suggested that eliminating potential bidders from participating in EEP would reduce competition for EEP bonuses. Given the number of variables that affect whether an exporter participates in and receives bonuses under EEP, we could not determine if domestic-owned exporters could easily replace foreign-owned exporters in the program. Any unauthorized diversion of EEP shipments undermines the targeting aspect of the program. Agency Comments The Foreign Agricultural Service provided written comments on a draft of this report. Copies will be made available to others on request.

Why GAO Did This Study Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the participation of foreign-owned companies in the Foreign Agricultural Service's (FAS) Export Enhancement Program (EEP). What GAO Found GAO found that: (1) foreign exporters' participation in EEP is consistent with the program's basic objectives of discouraging other countries' unfair trade practices and increasing the competitiveness of U.S. agricultural commodities; (2) exporters help achieve these objectives by facilitating U.S. agricultural product sales in targeted countries; (3) restricting foreign exporters' EEP participation could reduce the effectiveness of the program; (4) eliminating foreign-owned exporters would reduce the number of bidders for EEP bonuses, which would reduce competition and result in higher program costs; (5) it is unclear whether domestic-owned exporters could easily replace foreign-owned exporters; and (6) FAS ability to detect unauthorized diversions of EEP shipments, consisting mainly of checking exporters' documents which may be unreliable or inaccurate, will be affected by limitations in the database.

gao_GAO-12-22

gao_GAO-12-22_0

CBP Does Not Have the Information Needed to Fully Support and Implement Its Plan CBP does not have the information needed to fully support and implement its Plan in accordance with DHS and OMB guidance. However, CBP has not  documented the analysis justifying the specific types, quantities, and deployment locations of border surveillance technologies proposed in the Plan;  defined the mission benefits or developed performance metrics to assess its implementation of the Plan; or  developed a plan to assess and address operational issues with the continuing use of SBInet systems along the highest risk section of the border that could affect the new Plan’s implementation across the remainder of Arizona. Without documentation of the analysis justifying the specific types, quantities, and deployment locations of border surveillance technologies proposed in the Plan, an independent party cannot verify the process followed, identify how the AOA was used, determine whether CBP’s use of the AOA considered the limitations identified by HSI, assess the validity of the decisions made, or justify the funding requested. Without defining the expected benefit or quantifying metrics, it will be difficult for CBP to assess the effectiveness of the Plan as it is implemented. We have previously reported that a solid business case providing an understanding of the potential return of large investments can be helpful to decision makers for determining whether continued investment is warranted. Effective use of existing SBInet systems is essential for a comprehensive and integrated approach for surveillance technology along the entire Arizona border. DHS guidance further states that the Post-Implementation Review should occur when a system has been in operation at least 6 months or immediately following investment termination, and the Operational Analysis should be performed annually for information technology investments in the steady-state or operations and maintenance phase like SBInet. However, the officials did not determine a level of confidence around their rough order of magnitude (ROM) estimate, inconsistent with best practices. CBP’s Cost Estimate Is Substantially Comprehensive and Accurate but Partially Documented and Minimally Credible Our analysis of CBP’s 10-year life-cycle cost estimate (LCCE) for the Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan (the Plan) found that CBP did not fully follow best practices for developing a reliable LCCE, which is at the core of successfully managing a project within cost and affordability guidelines. CBP’s estimate for the Plan is $1.5 billion. Our guide and OMB guidance emphasize that reliable cost estimates are important for program approval and continued receipt of annual funding. As a result, our analysis concluded that CBP’s cost estimate substantially, but not fully, reflected best practices for comprehensiveness. However, CBP used the ROM estimate to support its $242-million budget request for fiscal year 2012 because it lacked the time needed to develop a more robust estimate. It could also help CBP in making decisions for future technology deployments along the southwest border and provide a sound basis for assessing and deploying alternative technologies. Because CBP officials did not conduct a sensitivity analysis and a cost-risk and uncertainty analysis to determine a level of confidence in the $1.5-billion life-cycle cost estimate for the Plan, it will be difficult for decision makers to determine what levels of contingency funding may be needed to cover risks associated with implementing new technologies along the remaining Arizona border. Until CBP officials accurately quantify the impacts of the risks, the budget requests for fiscal year 2012 and beyond may not be realistic and sufficient to achieve program aims. Recommendations To increase the likelihood of successful implementation of the Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan and maximize the effectiveness of technology already deployed, we recommend that the Commissioner of CBP take the following three steps in planning the agency’s new technology approach:  ensure that the underlying analyses of the Plan are documented in accordance with DHS guidance and internal controls standards;  determine the mission benefits to be derived from implementation of the plan and develop and apply key attributes for metrics to assess program implementation; and conduct a post-implementation review and operational assessment of SBInet, including consideration of the ATEC test results, and assess the costs and benefits of addressing the issues identified to help ensure the security of the 53 miles already covered by SBInet and enhance security on the Arizona border. DHS did concur with the recommendation that CBP conduct a post-implementation review and operational assessment of SBInet. Key contributors to this report are listed in appendix V. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology Our objectives were to determine the extent to which (1) U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) has the information needed to fully support and implement its Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan in according with Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and Office of Management and Budget (OMB) guidance, and (2) CBP’s life-cycle cost estimate for the Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan reflects best practices. Secure Border Initiative Fence Construction Costs.

Why GAO Did This Study In recent years, nearly half of all annual apprehensions of illegal aliens along the entire Southwest border with Mexico have occurred along the Arizona border. Keeping illegal flows of people and drugs under control remains a top priority for the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP). In 2005, the Secure Border Initiative Network (SBInet) was conceived as a surveillance technology to create a "virtual fence" along the border. After spending nearly $1 billion, DHS deployed SBInet systems along 53 miles of Arizona's border that represent the highest risk for illegal entry. In January 2011, in response to concerns regarding SBInet's performance, cost, and schedule, DHS cancelled future procurements. CBP developed the Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan (Plan) for the remainder of the Arizona border. Funding for this Plan for fiscal year 2012 is $242 million. GAO was requested to assess the extent to which CBP (1) has the information needed to support and implement the Plan and (2) estimated life-cycle costs for future investments in accordance with best practices. GAO analyzed Plan documents and cost estimates, compared those estimates with best practices, and interviewed CBP officials. What GAO Found CBP does not have the information needed to fully support and implement its Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan in accordance with DHS and Office of Management and Budget (OMB) guidance. In developing the Plan, CBP conducted an analysis of alternatives and outreach to potential vendors. However, CBP has not documented the analysis justifying the specific types, quantities, and deployment locations of border surveillance technologies proposed in the Plan. Best practices for developing and managing costs indicate that a business case analysis should be rigorous enough that independent parties can review it and clearly understand why a particular alternative was chosen to support mission requirements. Without documentation of the analysis, there is no way to verify the process CBP followed, identify how the underlying analyses were used, assess the validity of the decisions made, or justify the funding requested for the Plan. CBP officials also have not yet defined the mission benefits expected from implementing the new Plan. GAO has previously reported that a solid business case providing an understanding of the potential return of large investments can be helpful to decision makers for determining whether continued investment is warranted after deployment. Defining the expected benefit could help improve CBP's ability to assess the effectiveness of the Plan as it is implemented. CBP does not intend to assess and address operational issues regarding the effectiveness and suitability of SBInet, steps that could provide CBP with information to help make decisions regarding alternatives for implementing the Plan. OMB guidance suggests that a post-implementation review occur when a system has been in operation for 6 months or immediately following investment termination. Such a review could help CBP make the most effective use of existing SBInet systems that, in connection with the Plan, could build a comprehensive and integrated approach for surveillance technology along the entire Arizona border. CBP's 10-year life-cycle cost estimate for the Plan of $1.5 billion is based on a rough order of magnitude analysis, and agency officials were unable to determine a level of confidence in their estimate as best practices suggest. Specifically, GAO's review of the estimate concluded that the estimate reflected substantial features of best practices, being both comprehensive and accurate, but it did not sufficiently meet other characteristics of a high-quality cost estimate, such as credibility, because it did not identify a level of confidence or quantify the impact of risks. GAO and OMB guidance emphasize that reliable cost estimates are important for program approval and continued receipt of annual funding. In addition, because CBP was unable to determine a level of confidence in its estimate, it will be difficult for CBP to determine what levels of contingency funding may be needed to cover risks associated with implementing new technologies along the remaining Arizona border. Thus, it will be difficult for CBP to provide reasonable assurance that its cost estimate is reliable and that its budget request for fiscal year 2012 and beyond is realistic and sufficient. A robust cost estimate--one that includes a level of confidence and quantifies the impact of risk--would help ensure that CBP's future technology deployments have sufficient funding levels related to the relative risks. What GAO Recommends GAO recommends that CBP document the analysis justifying the technologies proposed in the Plan, determine its mission benefits, conduct a post-implementation review of SBInet and determine a more robust life-cycle cost estimate for the Plan. DHS concurred with the recommendations.

gao_GAO-04-206

gao_GAO-04-206_0

Background DOD has for many years augmented its internally owned and operated satellite communications capability by leasing additional external telecommunications capacity on commercially owned and operated satellites. Demand has been increasing in recent years, as the military has come to rely more heavily on commercial satellite communications to plan and support operations and move toward a network-centric warfare environment. DOD leases commercial satellite bandwidth services primarily through DISA and its Defense Information Technology Contracting Organization (DITCO). DISA does not acquire commercial bandwidth directly from satellite service providers. Instead it procures bandwidth through several competitively selected vendors, which in turn compete work among individual bandwidth service providers. DOD’s Process Is Fair to Both Vendors and Service Providers DOD’s process through DISA for acquiring commercial fixed satellite service bandwidth is fair to both its vendors and their subcontractors, which are the ultimate commercial satellite bandwidth providers. Some Major Users Are Dissatisfied with DISA Process for Acquiring Commercial Satellite Bandwidth Services Some major users of commercial satellite bandwidth services are dissatisfied with the DISA process. In particular, they view the process as being too lengthy and costly. They also believe that the process results in contracts that are often too inflexible. For fiscal year 2002, we determined that, at a minimum, nearly 20 percent of DOD’s reported spending on services occurred outside the process, and one DOD official stated that the true percentage is probably much higher. Some Users Are Bypassing the DISA Process to Get Timely, More Flexible, and Less Costly Services Some users are bypassing the DISA acquisition process to acquire commercial bandwidth through alternative processes, either by formally requesting a waiver from the DISA process or by improperly procuring services without a waiver. Moreover, neither DOD nor DISA is making a concerted effort to collect forecasts of bandwidth needs from users, ensure those needs can be met by the commercial sector, and take steps needed to leverage its buying power with commercial providers. Moreover, by allowing users to bypass the DISA waiver process, DOD is hampering its ability to ensure that its communications networks are interoperable and to minimize redundancies. If DISA is to remain as DOD’s primary agent to acquire satellite bandwidth, then it must implement a more strategic management approach—not only one that continues to ensure that acquisitions are processed fairly, but also one that ensures services can be acquired in a timely and cost-effective way that meets users’ needs. Doing so will be a considerable challenge, however, given the current environment and potential resistance within DISA and from its users. Commitment is needed from senior leaders within DISA and DOD to overcome challenges associated with implementing a strategic approach. To ensure the successful implementation of this strategic management framework and to better leverage DOD’s buying power and increase user satisfaction, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks and Information Integration to develop performance metrics to assess user satisfaction with the timeliness, flexibility, quality, and cost in acquiring commercial satellite services; strengthen DOD’s capacity to provide accurate and complete analyses of commercial bandwidth requirements, spending, and the capabilities of commercial satellite providers by enhancing core internal technical expertise and information systems; and assess, and implement as needed, changes to the key elements of the existing acquisition process—including requirements generation, solution development and evaluation, and contract vehicles—to facilitate a more strategic approach to bandwidth acquisition.

Why GAO Did This Study In recent years, the Department of Defense (DOD) has come to rely more heavily on commercial satellite communications to plan and support operations and move toward a network-centric warfare environment. DOD acquires commercial satellite bandwidth services to support a variety of critical missions such as surveillance performed by unmanned aerial vehicles. GAO was asked to assess (1) whether DOD's process for acquiring these services is fair to vendors and providers, (2) whether the process meets users' needs, and (3) whether spending on these services is managed effectively and efficiently. What GAO Found DOD has for many years augmented its internally owned and operated satellite communications capability by leasing commercial fixed satellite bandwidth services primarily through the Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) and its Defense Information Technology Contracting Organization (DITCO). DISA does not acquire commercial bandwidth directly from satellite service providers. Instead, it procures bandwidth through several competitively selected vendors, which, in turn, compete work among individual service providers. GAO found that the process for acquiring commercial satellite bandwidth is fair to DOD's vendors and their subcontractors, which are the ultimate commercial satellite bandwidth service providers. However, some major DOD users of commercial satellite bandwidth services are dissatisfied with DISA's process. They view the process as being too lengthy, particularly for time-critical military operations, and they believe that the cost is too high. They also indicated that the contracts resulting from the process are often too inflexible. As a result, some users are bypassing the DISA process, either by formally obtaining a waiver or by procuring services without a waiver. In fiscal year 2002, nearly 20 percent of DOD's reported spending on satellite bandwidth services occurred outside the process, and one DOD official stated that the true percentage is probably much higher. By allowing users to bypass the DISA waiver process, DOD is hampering its ability to ensure that its communications networks are interoperable and to minimize redundancies. Further, DOD does not know exactly how much it is spending on commercial satellite bandwidth services, nor does it know much about its service providers or whether customer needs are really being satisfied. Without this knowledge, DOD cannot take steps to leverage its buying power, even though it is the largest customer for commercial satellite bandwidth. Moreover, neither DOD nor DISA is making a concerted effort to collect forecasts of bandwidth needs from users and ensure those needs can be met by the commercial sector. These are also important steps toward optimizing DOD's spending. If DISA is to remain as DOD's primary agent to acquire satellite bandwidth, then it must implement a more strategic management approach--one that ensures that services can be acquired in a fair, timely, and cost-effective way that meets users' needs. Doing so will be a considerable challenge, however, given the current environment and potential resistance within DISA and from its users. Commitment is needed from senior leaders within DISA and DOD to overcome challenges associated with implementing a strategic approach.

gao_GAO-07-1137T

gao_GAO-07-1137T_0

FSA Does Not Systematically Determine the Eligibility of Estates for Farm Program Payments and Cannot Be Assured That Payments Are Proper While many estates are kept open for legitimate reasons, we found that FSA field offices do not systematically determine the eligibility of all estates kept open for more than 2 years, as regulations require, and when they do conduct eligibility determinations, the quality of the determinations varies. Without performing annual determinations, an essential management control, FSA cannot identify estates being kept open primarily to receive these payments and be assured that the payments are proper. For most farm program payments, USDA regulations allow an estate to receive payments for the first 2 years after the death of the individual if the estate meets certain eligibility requirements for active engagement in farming. FSA did not conduct any program eligibility determinations for 73, or 40 percent, of the 181 estates that required a determination from 1999 through 2005. Because FSA did not conduct the required determinations, the extent to which these estates remained open for reasons other than for obtaining program payments is not known. Sixteen of these 73 estates received more than $200,000 in farm program payments and 4 received more than $500,000 during this period. Second, even when FSA conducted at least one eligibility determination, we found shortcomings. FSA also approved eligibility on the basis of insufficient explanations for keeping the estate open. Without Appropriate Management Controls, FSA Cannot Be Assured That It Is Not Making Payments to Deceased Individuals FSA cannot be assured that millions of dollars in farm program payments it made to thousands of deceased individuals from fiscal years 1999 through 2005 were proper because it does not have appropriate management controls, such as computer matching, to verify that it is not making payments to deceased individuals. In addition, complex farming operations, such as corporations or general partnerships with embedded entities, make it difficult for FSA to prevent improper payments to deceased individuals. FSA Made Millions of Dollars in Farm Program Payments to Deceased Individuals from Fiscal Years 1999 through 2005 FSA paid $1.1 billion in farm program payments in the names of 172,801 deceased individuals—either as individuals or as members of entities, from fiscal years 1999 through 2005, according to our matching of FSA’s payment databases with the Social Security Administration’s Death Master File. Of the $1.1 billion in farm payments, 40 percent went to individuals who had been dead for 3 or more years, and 19 percent went to individuals who had been dead for 7 or more years. Furthermore, of the 172,801 deceased individuals identified as receiving farm program payments, 5,081 received more than one payment because (1) they were a member of more than one entity, or (2) they received payments as an individual and were a member of one or more entities. First, it relies on the farming operation to self-certify that the information provided is accurate and that the operation will inform FSA of any operating plan changes, which would include the death of an operation’s member. Such notification would provide USDA with current information to determine the eligibility of the operation to receive the payments.

Why GAO Did This Study Farmers receive about $20 billion annually in federal farm program payments, which go to individuals and "entities," including corporations, partnerships, and estates. Under certain conditions, estates may receive payments for the first 2 years after an individual's death. For later years, the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) must determine that the estate is not being kept open primarily to receive farm program payments. This testimony is based on GAO's report, Federal Farm Programs: USDA Needs to Strengthen Controls to Prevent Improper Payments to Estates and Deceased Individuals ( GAO-07-818 , July 9, 2007). GAO discusses the extent to which USDA (1) follows its regulations that are intended to provide reasonable assurance that farm program payments go only to eligible estates and (2) makes improper payments to deceased individuals. What GAO Found USDA has made farm program payments to estates more than 2 years after recipients died, without determining, as its regulations require, whether the estates were kept open to receive these payments. As a result, USDA cannot be assured that farm payments are not going to estates kept open primarily to obtain these payments. From 1999 through 2005, USDA did not conduct any of the required eligibility determinations for 73, or 40 percent, of the 181 estates GAO reviewed. Sixteen of these 73 estates had each received more than $200,000 in farm payments, and 4 had each received more than $500,000. Only 39 of the 181 estates received all annual determinations as required. Even when FSA conducted determinations, we found shortcomings. For example, some USDA field offices approved groups of estates for payments without reviewing each estate individually or without a documented explanation for keeping the estate open. USDA also cannot be assured that it is not making improper payments to deceased individuals. For 1999 through 2005, USDA paid $1.1 billion in farm payments in the names of 172,801 deceased individuals (either as an individual recipient or as a member of an entity). Of this total, 40 percent went to those who had been dead for 3 or more years, and 19 percent to those dead for 7 or more years. Most of these payments were made to deceased individuals indirectly (i.e., as members of farming entities). For example, over one-half of the $1.1 billion in payments went through entities from 1999 through 2005. In one case, USDA paid a member of an entity--deceased since 1995--over $400,000 in payments for 1999 through 2005. USDA relies on a farming operation's self-certification that the information it provides USDA is accurate; operations are also required to notify USDA of any changes, such as the death of a member. Such notification would provide USDA with current information to determine the eligibility of the operation to receive payments. The complex nature of some farming operations--such as entities embedded within other entities--can make it difficult for USDA to avoid making payments to deceased individuals.

gao_GAO-13-505T

gao_GAO-13-505T_0

A number of federal law enforcement organizations participate in DOJ’s Assets Forfeiture Fund (AFF), including the U.S. Field-Based Information- Sharing Entities DOJ, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) operate or support, through grant funding or personnel, five types of field-based information-sharing entities that may collect, process, analyze, or disseminate information in support of law enforcement and counterterrorism-related efforts, as shown in table 1. DOJ Has Steps Under Way to Reduce the Risk of Unnecessary Duplication in Its Grant Programs In July 2012, we reported that DOJ’s more than 200 grant programs overlapped across 10 key justice areas, and that this overlap contributed to the risk of unnecessarily duplicative grant awards for the same or similar purposes. Five of the recommendations specifically relate to ways in which DOJ can improve program efficiency and resource management, and these are that DOJ conduct an assessment to better understand the extent to which the department’s grant programs overlap with one another and determine if grant programs may be consolidated; coordinate within and among granting agencies on a consistent basis to review potential or recent grant awards from grant programs that DOJ identifies as overlapping, before awarding grants; require its grant applicants to report all federal grant funding, including all DOJ funding, that they are currently receiving or have recently applied for in their grant applications; provide appropriate OJP, COPS Office, and OVW staff access to both grant management systems; and ensure its comprehensive study of DOJ grant management systems assesses the feasibility, costs, and benefits of moving to a single grants management system, including the steps needed to harmonize DOJ grant processes, so that any variation in how granting agencies manage their portfolios is not an encumbrance to potential system unification. DOJ has taken steps to partially address these recommendations. In February 2012, we reported that DOJ had designed several controls for the BVP program to ensure grantee compliance with program requirements, among other things, but could take additional action to further reduce management risk. To improve DOJ’s resource management, we recommended that DOJ deobligate undisbursed funds from grants in the BVP program whose terms have ended. For example, deobligating this funding could enable the department to apply the amounts to new awards or reduce requests for future budgets. The department concurred with this recommendation and has since deobligated $2 million. In early April 2013, DOJ officials stated that they expect to complete the deobligation process before the end of April 2013. DOJ officials stated that they plan to use the deobligated funds toward fiscal year 2014 BVP awards. DOJ and Treasury Have Not Yet Studied the Feasibility of Consolidating Asset Forfeiture Activities In September 2012, we found that DOJ and Treasury had made limited progress to consolidate their asset forfeiture property management activities. Thus, we recommended that DOJ and Treasury conduct a study to determine the feasibility of consolidating potentially duplicative asset management activities including, but not limited to, the use of asset-tracking systems and the sharing of vendor and contract resources. As of March 2013, DOJ officials reported that DOJ and Treasury representatives had met several times in the fall of 2012 and thereafter agreed upon an approach to conduct the study and assess potential costs. DOJ Has Not Documented the Process for Carrying Over Asset Forfeiture Funds from Year to Year In July 2012, we reported on the growth of revenues and expenses in DOJ’s AFF from fiscal years 2003 to 2011, and the need for transparency in DOJ’s process for carrying over funds from one fiscal year to the next. In contrast, at the end of fiscal year 2011, DOJ carried over $844 million to cover expenses into fiscal year 2012. We recommended that DOJ clearly document how it determined the amount of funds that it would need to be carried over for the next fiscal year, a recommendation with which DOJ concurred. DOJ officials stated that they plan to include information on the basis for its decisions concerning the amount of funds to be carried over in future Congressional Budget Justifications, but as of March 2013, the decision on how to present the information was still pending. DOJ and Other Agencies Could Improve Coordination to Help Reduce Unnecessary Overlap in Field-Based Information Sharing In April 2013, we identified overlap in some activities of five types of field- based information-sharing entities and concluded that DOJ, DHS, and ONDCP could improve coordination among the entities to help reduce unnecessary overlap in activities. DOJ generally concurred with both recommendations, but asserted that it was already actively promoting coordination and routinely seeking to identify efficiency gains.

Why GAO Did This Study In fiscal year 2012, DOJ's $27 billion budget funded a broad array of national security, law enforcement, and criminal justice system activities. GAO has examined a number of key programs where DOJ has sole responsibility or works with other departments and recommended actions to improve program efficiency and resource management. This statement summarizes findings and recommendations from recent GAO work in the following five areas: (1) overlap and potential duplication in DOJ grant programs; (2) DOJ's management of undisbursed funds from BVP grant awards whose terms have ended; (3) potential duplication in DOJ and Treasury asset forfeiture programs; (4) DOJ's management of asset forfeiture funds; and (5) overlap among DOJ and other federally funded field-based information sharing entities. This statement is based on prior products GAO issued from February 2012 through April 2013, along with selected updates obtained from April 2012 through April 2013. For the selected updates on DOJ's progress in implementing recommendations, GAO analyzed information provided by DOJ officials on taken and planned actions. What GAO Found In July 2012, GAO reported that the Department of Justice's (DOJ) more than 200 grant programs overlapped across 10 key justice areas, and that this overlap contributed to the risk of unnecessarily duplicative grant awards for the same or similar purposes. GAO has recommended, among other steps, that DOJ conduct an assessment to better understand the extent of grant program overlap and determine if consolidation is possible. DOJ has begun taking related actions, but it is too early to assess their impact. In February 2012, GAO reported that DOJ's Bulletproof Vest Partnership (BVP) Program--a source of funding for law enforcement ballistic- and stab-resistant body armor--had not taken steps to deobligate about $27 million in unused funds from grant awards whose terms had ended. GAO recommended that DOJ deobligate these funds and, for example, apply the amounts to new awards or reduce requests for future budgets. DOJ officials have since deobligated $2 million and plan to deobligate the rest by the end of April 2013. DOJ officials plan to apply the funds toward fiscal year 2014 BVP grants. In September 2012, GAO reported that DOJ and the Department of the Treasury (Treasury) conducted potentially duplicative asset management activities related to the seizure and forfeiture of assets associated with federal crimes. For example, GAO reported that each agency maintains separate tracking systems for seized and forfeited property. GAO recommended that DOJ and Treasury conduct a study to determine the feasibility of consolidating their asset management activities. In March 2013, DOJ officials reported that DOJ and Treasury had agreed upon an approach to conduct the study and assess potential costs, but that meetings between the departments were still ongoing and the study had not been finalized. In July 2012, GAO reported that annual revenues from DOJ's Assets Forfeiture Fund exceeded annual expenditures, allowing DOJ to carryover $844 million at the end of fiscal year 2011, in part to reserve funds for the next fiscal year. However, DOJ does not clearly document how it determines the amounts that need to be carried over. GAO recommended that DOJ more clearly document how it determines the carryover amounts. DOJ officials reported that they plan to provide this information, but as of March 2013, had not yet determined how to present the information. In April 2013, GAO reported on overlap in activities and services across field-based entities operated or supported by DOJ, the Department of Homeland Security, and the Office of National Drug Control Policy that may share terrorism-related information, among other things. GAO identified 91 instances of overlap in some analytical activities, such as disseminating information on similar issue areas, such as terrorism. GAO recommended, in part, that the federal agencies collaborate to hold the entities accountable for coordination and assess where practices that enhance coordination could be applied. DOJ generally agreed with the intent of the recommendations, but stated that DOJ has already taken steps to promote coordination. The steps, however, do not establish an accountability mechanism for monitoring coordination or assessing practices. What GAO Recommends GAO has made several recommendations to DOJ in prior reports to help improve program efficiency and resource management. DOJ generally concurred with these recommendations and is taking actions to address them.

gao_GAO-16-35

gao_GAO-16-35_0

Background The NDAA for fiscal year 2009 initially authorized CIPP as a pilot program through December 31, 2012, establishing basic eligibility criteria for participants, providing guidelines for implementing the program, and establishing congressional reporting requirements. For each month of sabbatical taken, servicemembers must complete two months of obligated service upon their return to active duty. CIPP Participation Has Been Lower Than Authorized Limits and the Military Services Have Identified Factors That Could Affect Participation, but DOD Has Not Established a Plan for Evaluating the Effect of CIPP on Retention Participation in CIPP has remained below statutorily authorized limits, and officials have identified factors that could be affecting CIPP participation, but DOD has not established a plan for evaluating whether CIPP is an effective means to retain servicemembers. The rate of DOD-wide participation in CIPP has been at less than half the authorized limit of 160 participants per calendar year, and officials from each of the services stated that factors including statutory requirements, service-specific limitations, military culture, and personal financial constraints could be affecting participation. As shown in figure 1, DOD is authorized to enroll up to 160 servicemembers per year in the program (up to 40 participants for each of the four services); but DOD-wide, the highest number of participants approved for CIPP was 76, in calendar year 2014. However, neither DOD nor the services have developed a plan for evaluating the extent to which the pilot program is an effective means to retain servicemembers. Additionally, DOD officials stated that CIPP should be made available permanently; however, without an evaluation of the program, the basis for DOD’s proposed changes to the program is unclear. Without a plan for evaluating the pilot that includes these key features, there will be limited assurance that the evaluations conducted will provide the information needed to make decisions about the future of CIPP. Moreover, the establishment of a plan including key features such as well-defined, clear, and measurable objectives and standards for determining pilot-program performance may aid in addressing some of the challenges posed by the pilot’s timeline. Navy Officials Stated That CIPP Has Provided an Option to Respond to Personal Needs of Servicemembers According to Navy officials, CIPP has provided an option for the Navy to respond to the personal needs of servicemembers, and they believe the program has helped to retain servicemembers who otherwise might have left the military. Also, a Navy CIPP document provided examples of participants who fared well with their career milestones following their return to active duty. All of the military services have implemented CIPP, and DOD officials have stated that the program should become permanent. Recommendation for Executive Action To assist DOD in determining whether CIPP is meeting its intended purpose of enhancing retention and providing greater flexibility in the career path of servicemembers, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, in collaboration with the service secretaries, develop and implement a plan to evaluate the pilot that includes key features such as well-defined, clear, and measurable objectives and standards for determining pilot-program performance. As of July 2015, 37 had completed sabbaticals.

Why GAO Did This Study Congress authorized CIPP in 2009 to provide greater flexibility in career paths for servicemembers and to enhance retention. CIPP allows servicemembers to take sabbaticals of up to 3 years in exchange for 2 months of obligated service for each month of sabbatical taken. The Navy is the only service to have participants who have completed sabbaticals. Senate Report 113-211 included a provision for GAO to examine CIPP, and particularly the Navy's experience with it. This report (1) evaluates the extent to which participation in CIPP has reached authorized participation limits and DOD has developed a plan for evaluating whether the program is an effective means to retain servicemembers; and (2) describes the Navy's reported experience with CIPP as a tool for aiding retention by providing career flexibility. GAO reviewed CIPP legislation and implementation guidance, interviewed DOD and service officials responsible for CIPP, and compared the information obtained against key features of pilot evaluation plans such as clear, measurable objectives and standards for determining pilot-program performance. GAO also reviewed Navy efforts to implement CIPP and, using a GAO-developed questionnaire, collected information from Navy CIPP participants who had completed their sabbaticals. What GAO Found Participation in the Department of Defense's (DOD) Career Intermission Pilot Program (CIPP)—a pilot program expiring in 2019 that allows servicemembers to take up to a 3-year break in service in exchange for a period of obligated service when they return—has remained below statutorily authorized limits, and officials have identified factors that could be affecting CIPP participation, but DOD has not developed a plan for evaluating whether CIPP is an effective means to retain servicemembers. DOD-wide participation in CIPP has been at less than half the authorized limit of 160 participants—up to 40 participants for each of the four services—per calendar year (see figure below). Service officials stated that factors affecting participation include statutory requirements, such as eligibility criteria, and military culture, among others. CIPP-authorizing legislation and DOD guidance require the services to report on the effectiveness of the pilot, including effect on retention and program costs; however, neither DOD nor the services have developed a plan for evaluating the pilot program. GAO has reported that a pilot program should have a well-developed and documented evaluation plan, including key features such as well-defined, clear, and measurable objectives and standards for determining pilot-program performance. Moreover DOD has proposed expansion of the pilot, and officials stated that CIPP should be made available permanently. However, the basis for these proposals is unclear, and without a well-developed plan for evaluating the pilot, there will be limited assurance that the evaluations conducted will provide the information needed to make decisions about the future of CIPP. Total Number of Participants Approved to Participate by All Military Services for Calendar Years 2009 through July 2015 According to Navy officials, CIPP has provided an option for the Navy to respond to the personal needs of servicemembers, and they believe it has helped to retain servicemembers who otherwise might have left the military. CIPP participants also provided GAO with examples of how the program allowed them to address work-life balance challenges, such as managing deployment schedules and caring for family, that could not be achieved using other options. What GAO Recommends GAO recommends that DOD develop and implement a plan to evaluate whether CIPP is enhancing retention. DOD concurred with GAO's recommendation.

gao_GAO-12-419T

gao_GAO-12-419T_0

With regards to focusing on urgent, common needs, almost all of the collaborations grew out of efforts to address urgent workforce needs of multiple employers in a specific sector, such as health care, manufacturing, or agriculture, rather than focusing on individual employers (see table 1). Another factor that facilitated collaboration was the use of leveraged resources. In all cases, boards and their partners provided employer-responsive services to actively involve employers and keep them engaged in the collaborative process. In other initiatives, boards and partners gained employers’ confidence in the collaboration by tailoring services such as jobseeker assessment and screening services to address specific employers’ needs. Finally, partners remained engaged in these collaborative efforts because they continued to produce a range of results for employers, jobseekers and workers, and the workforce system and other partners, such as education and training providers. Workforce Boards Overcame Some Challenges to Address Diverse Employer Needs and Developed Their Own Measures to Track Employer Engagement While these boards were successful in their efforts, they cited some challenges to collaboration that they needed to overcome. Some boards were challenged to develop comprehensive strategies to address diverse employer needs with WIA funds. WIA prioritizes funding for intensive services and training for low-income individuals when funding for adult employment and training activities is limited. The director of one board said that pursuing comprehensive strategies for an entire economic sector can be challenging, because WIA funds are typically used for lower-skilled workers, and employers in the region wanted to attract a mix of lower- and higher-skilled workers. Additionally, some boards’ staff said that while their initiatives sought to meet employer needs for skill upgrades among their existing workers, WIA funds can be used to train current workers only in limited circumstances, and the boards used other funding sources to do so. In addition, staff from most, but not all, boards also said that WIA performance measures do not directly reflect their efforts to engage employers. Many of these boards used their own measures to assess their services to employers, such as the number of new employers served each year, the hiring rate for jobseekers they refer to employers, the interview-to-hire ratio from initiative jobseeker referrals, the retention rate of initiative-referred hires, the number of businesses returning for services, and employer satisfaction. Labor Has Taken Steps to Support Local Collaborative Efforts and Address Some Challenges but Has Not Made Information on Leveraging Resources Readily Available In order to support local collaborations like these, Labor has conducted webinars and issued guidance on pertinent topics, and has also collaborated with other federal agencies in efforts that could help support local collaboration. While Labor has taken some steps to support local collaborations, it has not made information it has collected on effective practices for leveraging resources easily accessible, even though many of the boards we reviewed cited leveraging resources as a key to facilitating collaboration. this information has not been compiled and In conclusion, at a time when the nation continues to face high unemployment, it is particularly important to consider ways to better connect the workforce investment system with employers to meet local labor market needs. The 14 local initiatives that we reviewed illustrate how workforce boards collaborated with partners to help employers meet their needs and yielded results: critical skill needs were met, individuals obtained or upgraded their skills, and the local system of workforce programs was reinvigorated by increased employer participation.

Why GAO Did This Study This testimony discusses collaboration between workforce boards, employers, and others. As the United States continues to face high unemployment in the wake of the recent recession, federally funded workforce programs can play an important role in bridging gaps between the skills present in the workforce and the skills needed for available jobs. However, there is growing recognition that these programs need to better collaborate with employers to align services and training with employers’ needs. The Workforce Investment Act of 1998 (WIA) envisioned such collaboration by focusing on employers as well as jobseekers, establishing a “dual customer” approach. To create a single, comprehensive workforce investment system, WIA required that 16 programs administered by four federal agencies—the Departments of Labor (Labor), Education, Health and Human Services, and Housing and Urban Development—provide access to their services through local one-stop centers, where jobseekers, workers, and employers can find assistance at a single location. In addition, WIA sought to align federally funded workforce programs more closely with local labor market needs by establishing local workforce investment boards to develop policy and oversee service delivery for local areas within a state and required that local business representatives constitute the majority membership on these boards. Today, about 600 local workforce boards oversee the service delivery efforts of about 1,800 one-stop centers that provide access to all required programs. Despite the vision of collaboration between local employers and the workforce investment system, we and others have found that collaboration can be challenging. For example, in previous reports, we found that some employers have limited interaction with or knowledge of this system and that employers who do use the one-stop centers mainly do so to fill their needs for low-skilled workers. This testimony is based on our report, which was released yesterday, entitled Workforce Investment Act: Innovative Collaborations between Workforce Boards and Employers Helped Meet Local Needs. What GAO Found Workforce board officials and their partners in the 14 initiatives cited a range of factors that facilitated building innovative collaborations. Almost all of the collaborations grew out of efforts to address urgent workforce needs of multiple employers in a specific sector, rather than focusing on individual employers. The partners in these initiatives made extra effort to engage employers so they could tailor services such as jobseeker assessment, screening, and training to address specific employer needs. In all the initiatives, partners remained engaged in these collaborations because they continued to produce a wide range of reported results, such as an increased supply of skilled labor, job placements, reduced employer recruitment and turnover costs, and averted layoffs. While these boards were successful in their efforts, they cited some challenges to collaboration that they needed to overcome. Some boards were challenged to develop comprehensive strategies to address diverse employer needs with WIA funds. For example, some boards’ staff said that while their initiatives sought to meet employer needs for higher-skilled workers through skill upgrades, WIA funds can be used to train current workers only in limited circumstances, and the boards used other funding sources to do so. Staff from most, but not all, boards also said that WIA performance measures do not reflect their efforts to engage employers, and many boards used their own measures to assess their services to employers. Labor has taken various steps to support local collaborations, such as conducting webinars and issuing guidance on pertinent topics, and contributing to a new federal grant program to facilitate innovative regional collaborations. Yet, while many boards cited leveraging resources as a key to facilitating collaboration, Labor has not compiled pertinent information on effective practices for leveraging resources and made it easy to access.

gao_GAO-05-96

gao_GAO-05-96_0

A significant proportion—about 26 percent—of all workers in this industry are foreign- born noncitizens, compared with only about 10 percent of all manufacturing workers in the United States. Injury and Illness Rates Have Declined but Remain among the Highest of Any Industry Injury and illness rates in the meat and poultry industry fell steadily from 1992 to 2001, according to BLS data (see fig. The meat and poultry industry’s annual rate of incidence of illness and injury in 2001, at an estimated 14.7 cases per 100 workers, was about half its 1992 rate of 29.5 cases. Many Factors Affect Injury and Illness Rates Injury and illness rates may be affected by many factors, such as employer or employee emphasis on safety, the amount and quality of training, employee turnover rates, and the speed of the production line. Therefore, it is difficult to assess the effectiveness of OSHA’s efforts to improve safety and health. However, because these injuries were recorded as occurring in another industry, none of the injuries were reflected in the meat and poultry industry’s injury and illness rates. The data it collects on specific worksites—recorded in multiple databases—are not easily tracked because OSHA does not assign a unique identifier to each worksite. Conclusions The dangerous and repetitive nature of the work in the meat and poultry industry results in a variety of injuries and illnesses to workers. Recommendations for Executive Action In order to strengthen the agency’s efforts to improve safety and health of workers at meat and poultry plants, the Secretary of Labor should direct the Assistant Secretary for Occupational Safety and Health to consider adjusting OSHA’s criteria for selecting worksites for SST inspections and for record-keeping audits to consider worksites that have had large reductions in their injury and illness rates over time; requiring worksites that are surveyed by OSHA to obtain worksite-specific data on injuries and illnesses to include (1) multiple years of data, so that trends in their rates may be analyzed and (2) data on injuries and illnesses to workers employed by cleaning and sanitation companies that provide workers to the plant under contract so that these data can be included in the rates OSHA uses to select plants for inspection; requiring that a common identifier for each plant be used in all of its enforcement and cooperative program databases so that these different data sets can be more easily compared in an effort to measure the agency’s impact on worker safety and health; and expanding successful partnerships, such as the Omaha Area Office’s partnership with meatpacking plants in Nebraska to other area offices with high concentrations of meat and poultry plants. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology For this report, we attempted to (1) describe the characteristics of workers in meat and poultry slaughter and processing plants and the conditions in which they work; (2) identify the types of injuries and illnesses workers in meat and poultry slaughter and processing plants incur, how the injury and illness rates have changed over the past decade, and the factors that may have affected these rates; and (3) determine what is known about the effectiveness of the Occupational Safety and Health Administration’s (OSHA) efforts to improve safety and health at meat and poultry slaughter and processing plants. While the majority of time is spent cleaning the slaughter and process areas, at many plants the crews are responsible for also cleaning bathrooms and office space.

Why GAO Did This Study Because meatpacking is one of the most dangerous industries in the United States, we were asked to provide the Congress with information on the characteristics of workers in the meat and poultry industry and the conditions in which they work, the types of injuries and illnesses these workers incur, how injury and illness rates have changed over the past decade, and factors that may have affected these rates. We were also asked to determine what is known about the effectiveness of the Occupational Safety and Health Administration's (OSHA) efforts to improve safety and health in the meat and poultry industries. What GAO Found The largest proportions of workers in the meat and poultry industry, according to the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), are young, male, and/or Hispanic. Although the majority of workers are citizens, an estimated 26 percent of them are foreign-born noncitizens. They work in hazardous conditions involving loud noise, sharp tools, and dangerous machinery. Many workers must stand for long periods of time wielding knives and hooks to slaughter or process meat on a production line that moves very quickly. Workers responsible for cleaning the plant must use strong chemicals and hot pressurized water. While, according to BLS, injuries and illnesses have declined over the past decade, the meat and poultry industry still has one of the highest rates of injury and illness of any industry. The most common injuries are cuts, strains, cumulative trauma, and injuries sustained from falls, but more serious injuries, such as fractures and amputation, also occur. According to BLS, the injury and illness rate for the industry has declined from an estimated 29.5 injuries and illnesses per 100 full-time workers in 1992 to 14.7 in 2001. Injury and illness rates can be affected by many factors, such as the amount and quality of training, employee turnover rates, increased mechanization, and the speed of the production line. Some evidence suggests that OSHA's efforts have had a positive impact on the injury and illness rates of workers in meat and poultry plants. However, while the criteria OSHA uses to select plants for inspection--which focus on plants with relatively high injury and illness rates--are reasonable, OSHA could improve its selection process by also considering trends in plants' injury and illness rates over time. In addition, it is difficult to assess the effectiveness of OSHA's efforts because the agency does not assign a unique identifier to each plant, making it hard to compare the data it collects on specific plants' injury and illness rates with the information the agency collects on the results of its plant inspections and other programs.

gao_GAO-12-745T

gao_GAO-12-745T_0

Agency CIOs are also expected to have a key role in IT management. The actions were planned to be completed in three different time frames: (1) within 6 months (by June 2011), (2) between 6 and 12 months (by December 2011), and (3) between 12 and 18 months (by June 2012). Table 1 contains detailed information on selected action items in the IT Reform Plan. We discuss each of the topics in more detail in the report being publicly released today. OMB and Key Federal Agencies Have Made Progress on IT Reform Action Items, but Much Remains to Be Done As discussed in our report, OMB and key federal agencies have made progress on selected action items identified in the IT Reform Plan, but there are several areas where more remains to be done. Of the 10 key action items we reviewed, 3 were completed and the other 7 were partially completed by December 2011. The action items that are behind schedule share a common reason for the delays: the complexity of the initiatives. In all seven of the cases, OMB and the federal agencies are still working on the initiatives. However, OMB and federal agencies have established time frames for completing only two of these initiatives. In a December 2011 progress report on its IT Reform Plan, OMB reported that it made greater progress than we determined. The agency reported that of the 10 action items, 7 were completed and 3 were partially completed. OMB officials from the Office of E-government and Information Technology explained that the reason for the difference in assessments is that they believe that the IT Reform Plan has served its purpose in acting as a catalyst for a set of broader initiatives. They noted that work will continue on all of the initiatives even after OMB declares the related action items to be completed under the IT Reform Plan. We disagree with this approach. In prematurely declaring the action items to be completed, OMB risks losing momentum on the progress it has made to date. Until OMB and the agencies complete the action items called for in the IT Reform Plan, the benefits of the reform initiatives—including increased operational efficiencies and more effective management of large-scale IT programs—may be delayed. OMB Has Not Established Measures for Evaluating Results on Most IT Reform Initiatives The importance of performance measures for gauging the progress of programs and projects is well recognized. In the past, OMB has directed agencies to define and select meaningful outcome-based performance measures that track the intended results of carrying out a program or activity. Additionally, as we have previously reported, aligning performance measures with goals can help to measure progress toward those goals, emphasizing the quality of the services an agency provides or the resulting benefits to users. Furthermore, industry experts describe performance measures as necessary for managing, planning, and monitoring the performance of a project against plans and stakeholders’ needs. According to government and industry best practices, performance measures should be measurable, outcome-oriented, and actively tracked and managed. Recognizing the importance of performance measurement, OMB and GSA have established measures for 4 of the 10 action items we reviewed: data center consolidation, shifting to cloud computing, using contract vehicles to obtain Infrastructure-as-a-Service, and reforming investment review boards. Moreover, OMB reported on three of these measures in the analytical perspectives associated with the President’s fiscal year 2013 budget. Specifically, regarding data center consolidation, OMB reported that agencies were on track to close 525 centers by the end of 2012 and expected to save $3 billion by 2015. On the topic of cloud computing, OMB reported that agencies had migrated 40 services to cloud computing environments in 2011 and expect to migrate an additional 39 services in 2012. Regarding investment review boards, OMB reported that agency CIOs held 294 TechStat reviews and had achieved more than $900 million in cost savings, life cycle cost avoidance, or reallocation of funding. In addition, we are recommending that the Federal CIO ensure that the action items called for in the IT Reform Plan are completed by the responsible parties prior to the completion of the IT Reform Plan’s 18 month deadline of June 2012 and that the agency provide clear time frames for addressing the shortfalls associated with the IT Reform Plan action items.

Why GAO Did This Study This testimony discusses the progress the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and key federal agencies have made on selected action items associated with information technology (IT) reform. While investments in IT have the potential to improve lives and organizations, some federally funded IT projects can—and have—become risky, costly, unproductive mistakes. With at least $79 billion spent in fiscal year 2011 by the U.S. government on IT investments, it is important to ensure the most efficient and effective use of resources. In December 2010, the Federal Chief Information Officer (CIO) released a 25-point plan for reforming federal IT management. This document established an ambitious plan for achieving operational efficiencies and effectively managing large-scale IT programs. It also clearly identified actions to be completed in three different time frames: (1) within 6 months (by June 2011), (2) between 6 and 12 months (by December 2011), and (3) between 12 and 18 months (by June 2012). Congress asked us to testify on our report being released today that describes the progress OMB and key federal agencies have made on selected action items in the IT Reform Plan and the extent to which sound measures are in place to evaluate the success of the initiative. In this regard, the testimony specifically covers the progress made on 10 selected IT Reform Plan action items by OMB; the General Services Administration (GSA); and the Departments of Homeland Security, Justice, and Veterans Affairs. In preparing this testimony, we relied on our report being released at today’s hearing. In that report, we evaluated progress by selecting 10 action items from the IT Reform Plan, focusing on action items that (1) were expected to be completed by December 2011, (2) covered multiple different topic areas, and (3) were considered by internal and OMB subject matter experts to be the more important items. We also selected three federal agencies (the Departments of Homeland Security, Justice, and Veterans Affairs) based on several factors, including high levels of IT spending and large numbers of investments in fiscal year 2011. What GAO Found As discussed in our report, OMB and key federal agencies have made progress on selected action items identified in the IT Reform Plan, but there are several areas where more remains to be done. Of the 10 key action items we reviewed, 3 were completed and the other 7 were partially completed by December 2011. The action items that are behind schedule share a common reason for the delays: the complexity of the initiatives. In all seven of the cases, OMB and the federal agencies are still working on the initiatives. However, OMB and federal agencies have established time frames for completing only two of these initiatives. In a December 2011 progress report on its IT Reform Plan, OMB reported that it made greater progress than we determined. The agency reported that of the 10 action items, 7 were completed and 3 were partially completed. OMB officials from the Office of E-government and Information Technology explained that the reason for the difference in assessments is that they believe that the IT Reform Plan has served its purpose in acting as a catalyst for a set of broader initiatives. They noted that work will continue on all of the initiatives even after OMB declares the related action items to be completed under the IT Reform Plan. We disagree with this approach. In prematurely declaring the action items to be completed, OMB risks losing momentum on the progress it has made to date. The importance of performance measures for gauging the progress of programs and projects is well recognized. In the past, OMB has directed agencies to define and select meaningful outcome-based performance measures that track the intended results of carrying out a program or activity. Additionally, as we have previously reported, aligning performance measures with goals can help to measure progress toward those goals, emphasizing the quality of the services an agency provides or the resulting benefits to users. Furthermore, industry experts describe performance measures as necessary for managing, planning, and monitoring the performance of a project against plans and stakeholders’ needs. Recognizing the importance of performance measurement, OMB and GSA have established measures for 4 of the 10 action items we reviewed: data center consolidation, shifting to cloud computing, using contract vehicles to obtain Infrastructure-as-a-Service, and reforming investment review boards. Moreover, OMB reported on three of these measures in the analytical perspectives associated with the President’s fiscal year 2013 budget. Specifically, regarding data center consolidation, OMB reported that agencies were on track to close 525 centers by the end of 2012 and expected to save $3 billion by 2015. On the topic of cloud computing, OMB reported that agencies had migrated 40 services to cloud computing environments in 2011 and expect to migrate an additional 39 services in 2012. Regarding investment review boards, OMB reported that agency CIOs held 294 TechStat reviews and had achieved more than $900 million in cost savings, life cycle cost avoidance, or reallocation of funding. According to government and industry best practices, performance measures should be measurable, outcome-oriented, and actively tracked and managed.

gao_GAO-03-547

gao_GAO-03-547_0

Prior to 2001, retirees lost most of their military health coverage when they turned age 65, although they could still use MTFs when space was available, and they could obtain prescription drugs without charge from MTF pharmacies. In the Floyd D. Spence National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001 (NDAA 2001), Congress established two new benefits to supplement military retirees’ Medicare coverage: Pharmacy benefit. Each plan was required by OPM to offer the same package of benefits to demonstration enrollees that it offered in the civilian FEHBP, and plans operating in the demonstration sites were generally required to participate in the demonstration. Enrollment Rate Low on U.S. Mainland, Far Greater in Puerto Rico While some military retiree organizations as well as a large FEHBP plan predicted at the start of the demonstration that enrollment would reach 25 percent or more of eligible beneficiaries, demonstration-wide enrollment was 3.6 percent in 2000 and 5.5 percent in 2001. Nonenrollees Emphasized Better Benefits and Lower Costs of Existing Coverage Retirees who knew about the demonstration and did not enroll cited many reasons for their decision, notably that their existing coverage’s benefits— in particular its prescription drug benefit—and costs were more attractive than those of the demonstration. More than one-quarter of nonenrollees cited not being able to continue getting prescriptions filled without charge at MTF pharmacies if they enrolled. Lack of Medicare+Choice. Lack of employer-sponsored coverage. In 2000, national plans’ monthly premiums for individual coverage ranged from $65 for Blue Cross Blue Shield to $208 for the Alliance Health Plans. In 2002, the third year, when both the plans and OPM were able to examine a complete set of claims for the first year before setting premiums, the pattern was reversed: On average, the demonstration premiums for individual policies fell more than 2 percent while the civilian premiums rose by 13 percent. Agency Comments We provided DOD and OPM with the opportunity to comment on a draft of this report. However, DOD differed with our description of the demonstration’s impact on DOD’s budget as small. For example, as we report, DOD’s premium costs for the demonstration during 2001, when enrollment peaked, were about $17 million—less than 0.1 percent of DOD’s health care budget. OPM declined to comment. Appendix I: GAO-DOD-OPM Survey of Military Retirees and Others Eligible for the DOD-FEHBP Demonstration To determine why those eligible for the Federal Employees Health Benefits Program (FEHBP) demonstration enrolled or did not enroll in an FEHBP plan, we co-sponsored with the Department of Defense (DOD) and the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) a mail survey of eligible beneficiaries—military retirees and others eligible to participate in the demonstration. Appendix II: Data, Methods, and Models Used in Analyzing Factors Affecting DOD-FEHBP Demonstration Enrollment In this appendix, we describe the data, methods, and models used to (1) analyze the factors explaining how beneficiaries knew about the demonstration and why they enrolled in it, (2) assess the health of beneficiaries and civilian FEHBP enrollees, and (3) obtain the premiums of Medigap insurance in the demonstration areas. Medicare Subvention Demonstration: Pilot Satisfies Enrollees, Raises Cost and Management Issues for DOD Health Care.

Why GAO Did This Study Prior to 2001, military retirees who turned age 65 and became eligible for Medicare lost most of their Department of Defense (DOD) health benefits. The DOD-Federal Employees Health Benefits Program (FEHBP) demonstration was one of several demonstrations established to examine alternatives for addressing retirees' lack of Medicare supplemental coverage. The demonstration was mandated by the Strom Thurmond National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999 (NDAA 1999), which also required GAO to evaluate the demonstration. GAO assessed enrollment in the demonstration and the premiums set by demonstration plans. To do this, GAO, in collaboration with the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) and DOD, conducted a survey of enrollees and eligible nonenrollees. GAO also examined DOD enrollment data, Medicare and OPM claims data, and OPM premiums data. What GAO Found Enrollment in the DOD-FEHBP demonstration was low, peaking at 5.5 percent of eligible beneficiaries in 2001 (7,521 enrollees) and then falling to 3.2 percent in 2002, after the introduction of comprehensive health coverage for all Medicare-eligible military retirees. Enrollment was considerably greater in Puerto Rico, where it reached 30 percent in 2002. Most retirees who knew about the demonstration and did not enroll said they were satisfied with their current coverage, which had better benefits and lower costs than the coverage they could obtain from FEHBP. Some of these retirees cited, for example, not being able to continue getting prescriptions filled at military treatment facilities if they enrolled in the demonstration. For those who enrolled, the factors that encouraged them to do so included the view that FEHBP offered retirees better benefits, particularly prescription drugs, than were available from their current coverage, as well as the lack of any existing coverage. Monthly premiums charged to enrollees for individual policies in the demonstration varied widely--from $65 to $208 in 2000--with those plans that had lower premiums and were better known to eligible beneficiaries, capturing the most enrollees. In setting premiums initially, plans had little information about the health and probable cost of care for eligible beneficiaries. Demonstration enrollees proved to have lower average health care costs than either their counterparts in the civilian FEHBP or those eligible for the demonstration who did not enroll. Plans enrolled similar proportions of beneficiaries in poor health, regardless of whether they charged higher, lower, or the same premiums for the demonstration as for the civilian FEHBP. In commenting on a draft of the report, DOD concurred with the overall findings but disagreed with the description of the demonstration's impact on DOD's budget as small. As noted in the draft report, DOD's costs for the demonstration relative to its total health care budget were less than 0.1 percent of that budget. OPM declined to comment.

gao_GAO-17-540

gao_GAO-17-540_0

The royalty rate paid by the coal company after such allowable deductions have been factored in, along with any royalty rate reductions, is called the effective royalty rate. Table 1 shows federal royalty rates and rates for six states that represented more than 90 percent of federal oil, gas, and coal production in fiscal year 2015. According to state officials, as of March 2017, royalty rates for oil and gas production charged by these states vary but tend to be higher than federal royalty rates, while royalty rates for coal production charged by these states are generally the same as federal rates. Less is known about the royalty rates for production on private lands because of the proprietary nature of lease contracts, but a few published reports suggest that private royalty rates range from 12.5 percent to 25 percent for oil and gas production and from 3 percent to 10 percent for coal production. The federal government collected approximately $2.5 billion in gross revenue from the production of these resources on federal lands in fiscal year 2016. The majority of this revenue generally has come from royalties—about $2 billion, or 80 percent of total revenues in fiscal year 2016. Studies and Stakeholders Suggest Raising Federal Royalty Rates Could Decrease Production on Federal Lands Raising federal royalty rates for onshore oil, gas, and coal could decrease production on federal lands, according to studies we reviewed and stakeholders we interviewed. However, stakeholders disagreed about the extent to which production could decrease because they said other factors may influence energy companies’ development decisions. We identified two studies—one by the CBO and one by Enegis, LLC—that modeled the effects of different policy scenarios on oil and gas production on federal lands. The CBO study concluded that raising the royalty rate to 18.75 percent would lead to “reductions in production would be small or even negligible” over 10 years, particularly if the increased federal royalty rate remained equal to or below the royalty rates for production on state or private lands. The first study, by the CEA, examined how raising the federal royalty rate could affect coal production on federal lands after 2025 using a series of scenarios. The study found that the modeled increase in the effective royalty rate led to a decrease in federal coal production of less than 1 percent per year. Stakeholders we interviewed suggested that several factors could influence the extent to which oil, gas, and coal production might be affected if federal royalty rates were increased, including the following. Market conditions and prices. Cost advantages of different resources. Some stakeholders we spoke with stated that there is already a higher regulatory burden for oil and gas companies to develop resources on federal lands than on nonfederal lands, and one stakeholder noted that an increase in federal royalty rates would decrease the competitiveness of federal lands versus state or private lands. Studies and Stakeholders Suggest Raising Federal Royalty Rates Could Increase Federal Revenues Raising federal royalty rates for onshore oil, gas, and coal could increase overall federal revenues, according to studies we reviewed and stakeholders we interviewed. The studies we reviewed for oil and gas estimate that raising the federal royalty rate could increase net federal revenue between $5 million and $38 million per year (equivalent to around 0.7 percent to around 5.2 percent of net oil and gas royalties in fiscal year 2016). Similarly, according to the Enegis study, net federal revenues would increase under the scenarios that modeled raising the royalty rate to 16.67 percent, 18.75 percent, or 22.5 percent. For example, the modeling scenarios in the CEA study that raised the royalty rate to the equivalent of 17 percent or 29 percent predicted a range of increases in government revenues from $0 to $730 million annually after 2025, with approximately half of that revenue going to the federal government. The study by Haggerty, Lawson, and Pearcy suggested that total average royalty revenues could increase by $141 million per year if the effective royalty rate were raised. Stakeholders we interviewed also suggested that the effect on bonus bid revenue could influence the extent to which raising federal royalty rates would increase revenues from oil, gas, and coal production. For example, some stakeholders stated that companies would be more likely to offer lower bonus bids if they had to pay higher royalty payments, but a few stakeholders believed that the net impact on federal revenue would be minimal because royalties are a more significant portion of total revenues than bonus bids. The agency provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate.

Why GAO Did This Study In fiscal year 2016, the federal government collected about $2.5 billion in revenue associated with onshore oil, gas, and coal production on federal lands, including about $2 billion from royalties. Federal royalty rates sometimes differ from the rates states charge for production on state lands. For example, state oil and gas rates tend to be higher than federal royalty rates and state coal rates are generally the same as federal rates in the six states representing more than 90 percent of federal oil, gas, and coal production in fiscal year 2015. The explanatory statement accompanying the Consolidated Appropriations Act for fiscal year 2016 includes a provision for GAO to review issues related to royalty rates. This report describes what is known about how raising federal royalty rates would affect (1) oil, gas, and coal production on federal lands and (2) the federal revenue associated with such production. GAO reviewed an extensive list of studies and selected for more in-depth review four that modeled the effects of raising federal royalty rates—one study conducted by the Congressional Budget Office, one by the Council of Economic Advisers in the Executive Office of the President, one prepared for the Bureau of Land Management, and one by researchers. GAO also interviewed officials from federal and state agencies, industry groups, non-governmental organizations, academia, and other knowledgeable stakeholders. GAO is not making recommendations in this report. Interior reviewed a draft of this report and provided technical comments that GAO incorporated as appropriate. What GAO Found Raising federal royalty rates—a percentage of the value of production paid to the federal government—for onshore oil, gas, and coal resources could decrease oil, gas, and coal production on federal lands but increase overall federal revenue, according to studies GAO reviewed and stakeholders interviewed. However, the extent of these effects is uncertain and depends, according to stakeholders, on several other factors, such as market conditions and prices. Production . One study GAO reviewed found that oil and gas production could decrease by less than 2 percent per year if royalty rates increased from their current 12.5 percent to 22.5 percent, based on fiscal year 2016 production data. Another study stated the effect on production could be “negligible” over 10 years if royalty rates increased to 18.75 percent, particularly if the increased federal royalty rate remained equal to or below the royalty rates for production on state or private lands. Regarding coal, one study suggested that raising the federal royalty rate for coal to 17 percent would decrease production on federal lands by up to 3 percent after changes were fully implemented after 2025, while a second study said that increasing the effective rate—the rate actually paid by companies after processing and transportation allowances have been factored in, along with any royalty rate reductions—might decrease production on federal lands by less than 1 percent per year. Some stakeholders said that several other factors could influence the extent to which oil, gas, and coal production might decline. For example, some stakeholders said current market conditions, the cost advantages of different resources, and the regulatory burden associated with production on federal lands could influence the extent to which production might decline. Revenue . The oil and gas studies that GAO reviewed estimated that raising the federal royalty rate could increase net federal revenue between $5 million and $38 million per year. One of the studies stated that net federal revenue would increase under three scenarios that modeled raising the royalty rate from the current 12.5 percent to 16.67 percent, 18.75 percent, or 22.5 percent, while the other study noted that the effect on federal revenue would initially be small but would increase over time. Both coal studies suggested that a higher royalty rate could lead to an increase in federal revenues. One of the studies suggested that raising the royalty rate to 17 percent or 29 percent might increase federal revenue by up to $365 million per year after 2025. The other study suggested that increasing the effective rate could bring in an additional $141 million per year in royalty revenue. Stakeholders GAO interviewed cited other factors that could influence the extent to which raising federal royalty rates could increase revenues—in particular, how bonus bids, another revenue source, could be affected. Some of the stakeholders stated that companies would be more likely to offer lower bids to obtain a lease for the rights to extract resources if they had to pay higher royalties.

gao_GAO-04-652

gao_GAO-04-652_0

Although most contracts included bonds, some did not. We Observed Established Financial Procedures at the Projects We Visited During our project site visits, we observed evidence of established procedures in place for accounting for project funds, including procedures for receiving and tracking timber payments and tracking retained receipts and expenditures, as well as other steps taken to provide financial accountability. The Agencies Have Not Provided Substantial Guidance on Community Involvement, and Efforts to Involve Communities Varied among Projects Despite the stewardship contracting legislation’s emphasis on meeting community needs, the Forest Service initially provided little guidance on incorporating community involvement in stewardship contracting pilot projects; as a result, the type and extent of field staffs’ efforts to involve communities in projects varied considerably among the projects we reviewed. Because the Forest Service Initially Provided Little Guidance on Community Involvement, the Type and Extent of Community Involvement Varied Significantly among Projects Although the stewardship contracting legislation explicitly stated that stewardship projects are “to achieve land management goals for the national forests that meet local and rural community needs,” the Forest Service initially provided only minimal guidance on soliciting and incorporating community involvement in stewardship contracting projects, and most managers we spoke with articulated their frustration with the overall lack of guidance on community involvement. For example, the manager of the Upper Blue project in Colorado told us that public involvement in her project led to the development of more stringent criteria for protecting water quality during project activities. The Main Boulder project manager in Montana told us that public involvement in his fuels reduction project led to improved relations with the public, which in turn persuaded a neighboring landowner to offer the agency access across his land to an isolated parcel of public land needing fuel reduction. Neither Agency’s 2004 Guidance Clarifies How Community Involvement Should Be Incorporated Despite the many project managers who told us they wanted additional guidance on obtaining and incorporating community involvement, the Forest Service’s recent stewardship contracting handbook does not contain specific guidance in this area, and BLM’s guidance document is similarly lacking. Both Agencies Have Additional Projects Planned and Intend to Assess the Effectiveness of Stewardship Contracting Both the Forest Service and BLM plan to use stewardship contracting in the future. The project was subsequently altered to incorporate activities to reduce wildfire risk and was completed in 2004. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology Based on the congressional request letters of July 2002 and March 2003, and subsequent discussions with your staffs, we agreed to determine (1) the status of each stewardship project and the land management goals they address; (2) the extent to which the agencies have contracting and financial controls in place that ensure accountability in managing stewardship projects; (3) the steps the agencies have taken to involve communities in designing, implementing, and evaluating stewardship projects; (4) each agency’s plans for future use of stewardship contracting; and (5) the Forest Service’s response to concerns raised about 6 specific stewardship projects.

Why GAO Did This Study In their efforts to reduce hazardous fuels and the risk of wildfire on the nation's public lands, the Forest Service and the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) expect that stewardship contracting will play a major role. Stewardship contracting involves the use of contracting authorities--such as the exchange of goods for services--first authorized in 1998 and intended to help the agencies achieve land management goals that meet community needs. GAO was asked, among other things, to determine (1) the contracting and financial controls the agencies use to ensure accountability in managing stewardship contracting projects and (2) the steps the agencies have taken to involve communities in the projects. What GAO Found Although the Forest Service provided limited initial guidance on establishing contracting and financial controls, the eight stewardship projects GAO visited had incorporated such controls. (BLM was first granted stewardship authority in 2003 and had no projects under way at the time of GAO's review.) The projects generally used pre- and post-award controls, such as reviews of contractor bids using preestablished criteria, and performance and payment bonds to ensure completion of required activities. GAO's review of selected financial controls at the projects we visited showed that they appeared to have procedures in place to account for retained receipts, including tracking funds received and expended, and had incorporated procedures designed to ensure the completion of specific work tasks before contractors were paid. Both the Forest Service and BLM issued guidance in January 2004 containing such controls for future projects. The Forest Service initially provided minimal guidance on soliciting and incorporating public involvement in stewardship contracting projects and, as a result, the type and extent of efforts to involve communities varied considerably among the projects GAO reviewed. However, managers who did not incorporate public input may have missed valuable opportunities to strengthen their projects. For example, one project manager said that public involvement led to more stringent criteria for protecting water quality, and another reported that public involvement improved agency access to public lands needing fuel reduction. Although most managers GAO spoke with said they wanted additional guidance on public involvement, the Forest Service's recently issued stewardship contracting handbook does not contain specific guidance for obtaining community input--and BLM's recent guidance is similarly lacking. Without such guidance, each project manager must independently determine the type and extent of community involvement to solicit and then develop and implement community involvement procedures--an inefficient process that could lead to variation in community involvement across stewardship contracting projects in both agencies.

gao_GAO-03-298

gao_GAO-03-298_0

We found that the Air Force’s delinquency and charge-off problems are primarily associated with low and mid-level enlisted military employees. The Air Force’s Delinquencies and Charge- offs As of March 31, 2002, approximately 8,000 Air Force cardholders had over $5 million in delinquent debt. Over the last 2 years, Air Force delinquency rates fluctuated from 5 to 11 percent and on average were about 5 percentage points less than the Army’s and the Navy’s and 1 percentage point higher than non-DOD federal civilian agencies. Travel card program audits. Many of the problem cases that we reviewed were due to ineffective controls over the issuance of travel cards and the transfer or cancellation of accounts when individuals moved to other duty locations, separated, or retired. We also found that improvements are needed in the assignment and training of APCs. If effectively implemented, this requirement should improve delinquency rates and reduce potential fraud and abuse. This problem also was identified by the Air Force Audit Agency as a systemic problem. Table 6 includes details on 10 individuals who committed potentially fraudulent acts by writing three or more NSF checks to pay their travel card accounts. The individual’s credit report did not show any significant credit problems prior to issuance of the card. However, for the cases involving 58 cardholders whose accounts involved NSF checks, charge-offs, or salary offsets, we found documented evidence of disciplinary actions in only 19 cases. In addition to requiring the Secretary of Defense to establish guidance and procedures for disciplinary actions, section 8149(c) of the act states that such actions may include (1) review of the security clearance of the cardholders in cases of misuse of the government travel card, and (2) modification or revocation of the security clearance in light of such review. Section 8149(b) of the Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2003, requires creditworthiness evaluations of all potential cardholders and guidelines and procedures for disciplining individuals for fraudulent and abusive use of government travel cards. Our assessment covered the reported magnitude and impact of delinquent and charged off Air Force travel card accounts for fiscal year 2001 and the first 6 months of fiscal year 2002, along with an analysis of causes and related corrective actions; an analysis of the universe of Air Force travel card transactions during fiscal year 2001 and the first 6 months of fiscal year 2002 to identify potentially fraudulent and abusive activity related to the travel card; the Air Force overall management control environment and the design of selected Air Force travel program management controls, including controls over (1) travel card issuance, (2) agency program coordinators (APC) capacity to carry out assigned duties, (3) limiting card activation to meet travel needs, (4) transferred and “orphan” accounts, (5) procedures for terminating accounts when cardholders leave military service, and (6) access to Bank of America’s travel card database; and tests of statistical samples of transactions to assess the implementation of key management controls and processes for three Air Force units’ travel card activity including (1) travel order approval, (2) accuracy of travel voucher payments, (3) the timely submission of travel vouchers by travelers to the approving officials, and (4) the timely processing and reimbursement of travel vouchers by the Air Force and DOD.

Why GAO Did This Study Poor oversight and management of the Department of Defense (DOD) travel card program has led to high delinquency rates costing DOD millions in lost rebates and increased ATM fees. As a result, Congress asked GAO to report on (1) the magnitude, impact, and cause of delinquencies, (2) the types of fraudulent and abusive uses of travel cards, and (3) the effectiveness of internal controls over DOD's travel card program. GAO previously reported on travel card management at the Air Force. What GAO Found Air Force management has reduced travel card delinquencies through greater command attention and the use of travel card audits to identify problems and needed corrective actions. As of March 2002, the Air Force delinquency rate on average was about 5 percentage points lower than the rest of DOD and 1 percentage point higher than the federal civilian agencies. The Air Force's overall delinquency and charge-off problems were primarily associated with lower paid, low- to midlevel enlisted military personnel. Despite these improvements, a weak control environment contributed to significant abuse and potential fraud. For example, many of the problem cases identified were due to ineffective controls over the issuance and cancellation of travel cards and weaknesses in the assignment and training of agency program coordinators. During the period of our review, over 400 Air Force cardholders committed potential bank fraud by writing three or more nonsufficient fund (NSF) checks to Bank of America. Also, many cardholders used their cards for inappropriate purchases, such as cruises and event tickets. A significant relationship also existed between potential travel card fraud, abuse, and delinquencies and individuals with substantial credit history problems. Some cardholders had personal accounts placed in collection while others had filed bankruptcies prior to receiving government travel cards. Also, the issuance of the travel cards to virtually everyone who applied for them compounded these problems. GAO found documented evidence of disciplinary actions in less than half of the cases reviewed where cardholders wrote NSF checks, or their accounts were charged off or placed in salary offset. GAO also found that over half of the cases reviewed involved individuals who still had secret or top-secret security clearances. Other control weaknesses related to the Air Force's failure to provide the necessary agency program coordinator training, and infrequent or nonexistent monitoring of travel card activities. The recently enacted fiscal year 2003 Defense appropriations and authorization acts require the Secretary of Defense to establish guidelines and procedures for disciplinary actions and to deny issuance of travel cards to individuals who are not creditworthy.

gao_GAO-10-940T

gao_GAO-10-940T_0

The Coast Guard Has Made Progress in Improving Its Risk Management In December 2005, we reported that risk management, a strategy for helping policymakers make decisions about assessing risks, allocating resources, and taking actions under conditions of uncertainty, had been endorsed by Congress and the President as a way to strengthen the nation against possible terrorist attacks against ports and other infrastructure. In 2005 we reported that of the three components GAO reviewed—the Coast Guard, the Office for Domestic Preparedness (this office’s function is now within the Federal Emergency Management Agency), and the Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Directorate (now the National Protection and Programs Directorate)—the Coast Guard had made the most progress in establishing a foundation for using a risk management approach. However, we reported that those assessments were limited because they could not compare and prioritize relative risks of various infrastructures across ports. Regarding risk assessments, the Coast Guard transitioned its risk assessment model from the Port Security Risk Assessment Tool (PS- RAT) to the Maritime Security Risk Assessment Model (MSRAM). The Coast Guard uses the model to help implement its strategy and concentrate maritime security activities when and where relative risk is believed to be the greatest. According to the Coast Guard, the model’s underlying methodology is designed to capture the security risk facing different types of targets, allowing comparison between different targets and geographic areas at the local, regional, and national levels. DHS and the Coast Guard Have Taken Several Actions to Address the Small- Vessel Threat but Challenges Remain in Mitigating the Risk In recent years, we reported that concerns had arisen about the security risks posed by small vessels. DHS and the Coast Guard have developed a strategy and programs to reduce the risks associated with small vessels; however, they face ongoing challenges related to some of these efforts. Consistent with the Small Vessel Security Strategy’s goal to develop and leverage strong partnerships with the small- vessel community, the Coast Guard, as well as other agencies—such as the New Jersey State Police, have several outreach efforts to encourage the boating community to share threat information; however, the Coast Guard program faces resource limitations. Vessel Tracking. DHS has developed and tested equipment for detecting nuclear material on small vessels; however, efforts to use this equipment in a port area have been limited to pilot programs. Security Activities. The Coast Guard Has a Program in Place to Assess the Security of Foreign Ports, but Challenges Remain in Implementing the Program The security of domestic ports also depends upon security at foreign ports where cargoes bound for the United States originate. As we reported in October 2007, Coast Guard officials told us that challenges exist in implementing the International Port Security Program. Reluctance by some countries to allow the Coast Guard to visit their ports due to concerns over sovereignty was a challenge cited by program officials in completing their first round of port visits. To overcome this, program officials have worked with other agencies (e.g., the Departments of Defense and State) and international organizations (e.g., the Organization of American States) to secure funding for training and assistance to countries where port security conferences have been held (e.g., the Dominican Republic and the Bahamas). CBP has developed a layered security strategy to mitigate the risk of an attack using cargo containers. One of the programs in this layered security strategy is the Secure Freight Initiative (SFI). In October 2009, we reported that CBP has made some progress in working with the SFI ports to scan U.S.-bound cargo containers; but because of challenges to expanding scanning operations, the feasibility of scanning 100 percent of U.S.-bound cargo containers at over 600 foreign seaports remains largely unproven. Both we and CBP had previously identified many of these challenges, and CBP officials are concerned that they and the participating ports cannot overcome them. In October 2009, we recommended that DHS conduct a feasibility analysis of implementing the 100 percent scanning requirement in light of the challenges faced. DHS concurred with our recommendation. DHS concurred with our recommendation. Supply Chain Security: Feasibility and Cost-Benefit Analysis Would Assist DHS and Congress in Assessing and Implementing the Requirement to Scan 100 Percent of U.S.-Bound Containers.

Why GAO Did This Study Ports, waterways, and vessels handle more than $700 billion in merchandise annually, and an attack on this system could have a widespread impact on global trade and the economy. Within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), component agencies have responsibility for securing the maritime environment. The U.S. Coast Guard is responsible for protecting, among other things, U.S. economic and security interests in any maritime region. U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) is responsible for keeping terrorists and their weapons out of the United States, securing and facilitating trade, and cargo container security. This testimony discusses DHS and its component agencies' progress, and challenges remaining, regarding (1) strengthening risk management (a strategy to help policymakers make decisions about assessing risks, allocating resources, and acting under conditions of uncertainty), (2) reducing the risk of small-vessel (watercraft less than 300 gross tons used for recreational or commercial purposes) threats, (3) implementing foreign port assessments, and (4) enhancing supply chain security. This statement is based on GAO products issued from December 2005 through June 2010, including selected updates conducted in July 2010. What GAO Found DHS and its component agencies have strengthened risk management through the development of a risk assessment model to help prioritize limited port security resources. In December 2005, GAO reported that while the Coast Guard had made progress in strengthening risk management by conducting risk assessments, those assessments were limited because they could not compare and prioritize relative risks of various infrastructures across ports. Since that time, the Coast Guard developed a risk assessment model designed to capture the security risk facing different types of targets, and allowing comparisons among targets and at the local, regional, and national levels. The Coast Guard uses the model to help plan and implement its programs and focus security activities where it believes the risks are greatest. DHS and the Coast Guard have developed a strategy and programs to reduce the risks associated with small vessels but they face ongoing challenges. GAO reported from 2007 through 2010 that DHS and the Coast Guard have (1) developed a strategy to mitigate vulnerabilities associated with waterside attacks by small vessels; (2) conducted community outreach to encourage boaters to share threat information; (3) initiated actions to track small vessels; (4) tested equipment for detecting nuclear material on small vessels; and (5) conducted security activities, such as vessel escorts. However, the Coast Guard faces challenges with some of these efforts. For example, vessel tracking systems generally cannot track small vessels and resource constraints limit the Coast Guard's ability to meet security activity goals. DHS and the Coast Guard developed the International Port Security Program in April 2004 to assess the security of foreign ports, but challenges remain in implementing the program. GAO reported in October 2007 that Coast Guard officials stated that there is reluctance by certain countries to allow the Coast Guard to visit their ports due to concerns over sovereignty. Also, the Coast Guard lacks the resources to assist poorer countries. Thus the Coast Guard is limited in its ability to help countries enhance their established security requirements. To overcome this, officials have worked with other federal agencies and international organizations to secure funding for training and assistance to countries that need to strengthen port security efforts. DHS and CBP established the Secure Freight Initiative (SFI) to test the feasibility of scanning 100 percent of U.S.-bound cargo containers, but face challenges expanding the program. In October 2009, GAO reported that CBP has made progress in working with the SFI ports to scan U.S.-bound cargo containers; but because of challenges implementing scanning operations, such as equipment breakdowns, the feasibility of scanning 100 percent of U.S.-bound cargo containers remains largely unproven. At the time, CBP officials expressed concern that they and the participating ports could not overcome the challenges. GAO recommended that DHS conduct a feasibility analysis. DHS concurred with our recommendation, but has not yet implemented it. What GAO Recommends GAO has made recommendations to DHS in prior reports to strengthen port security. DHS generally concurred.

gao_GAO-07-826T

gao_GAO-07-826T_0

Each state administers its Medicaid program in accordance with a state plan, which must be approved by CMS. State Medicaid programs are required to cover EPSDT services for Medicaid beneficiaries under 21. These include (1) paying managed care plans with which they have contracts to cover or arrange for the provision of dental services; (2) “carving out” or not requiring the provision of dental services from the group of services provided by managed care plans and paying dentists on a fee-for-service basis; or (3) carving out the dental services and paying specialized dental managed care plans to provide Medicaid dental benefits, giving the managed care dental plan flexibility in managing the program in exchange for a capitated payment to cover dental services. CMS Requires States to Report Annually on Provision of EPSDT Dental Services through the CMS 416 CMS requires states to report annually on the provision of EPSDT dental services through the CMS 416, the agency’s primary tool for overseeing the provision of dental services to children in state Medicaid programs. According to CMS, the CMS 416 is used to assess the effectiveness of state EPSDT programs in terms of the number of children who are provided child health screening services, referrals for corrective treatment, and dental services. Problems we found in 2001 with the CMS 416 reporting included states not submitting CMS 416s on time or at all and states submitting reports that were not complete because of challenges they faced collecting accurate data. In our 2001 report, we recommended that CMS work with states to improve EPSDT reporting and the provision of EPSDT services. According to agency officials, CMS has taken steps to improve the CMS 416 data. However, state and national health association officials continue to cite concerns about the data’s completeness and sufficiency for purposes of overseeing the provision of dental and other required EPSDT services. Our July 2001 report found that states faced challenges collecting data on EPSDT services from both fee- for-service providers and managed care plans. Since 2002, according to CMS in April 2007, the agency had conducted focused reviews in 11 states. But despite these improvements, officials from states and from national health associations remain concerned that the CMS 416s are unreliable for developing national estimates of the provision of dental and other required EPSDT services and therefore insufficient for oversight purposes. One official told us that interrupted Medicaid eligibility, accompanied by the implementation of the State Children’s Health Insurance Program, has also caused problems in the data on the number of children eligible for services. CMS 416s Have Limitations for Oversight Purposes The type of data collected on the CMS 416 has limited usefulness for purposes of oversight, as officials from states and national health associations have noted. Second, the information captured by the CMS 416 is limited to summary statistics, such as age group, eligibility, state requirements, and services delivered, and does not provide information that would illuminate whether children have received the recommended number of visits for dental and other required EPSDT services. Third, CMS 416s do not contain information that would illuminate any of a number of factors that may contribute to low use of dental and other required EPSDT services among children enrolled in Medicaid.

Why GAO Did This Study The 31 million children enrolled in Medicaid are particularly vulnerable to tooth decay, which, if untreated, may lead to more serious health conditions and, on rare occasion, result in death. Congress established a comprehensive health benefit for children enrolled in Medicaid to cover Early and Periodic Screening, Diagnostic, and Treatment (EPSDT) services, which include dental services. The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) is responsible for oversight of these services. States are responsible for administering their state Medicaid programs in accordance with federal requirements, including requirements to report certain data on the provision of EPSDT services. GAO was asked to address the data that CMS requires states to submit on the provision of EPSDT dental services and the extent to which these data are sufficient for CMS oversight of the provision of these services. This testimony is based on reports GAO issued from 2000 through 2003. GAO updated relevant portions of its earlier work through interviews conducted in April 2007 with officials from CMS; state Medicaid programs in California, Illinois, Minnesota, New York, and Washington (states contacted for GAO's 2001 study or referred to GAO by another official); and national health associations. GAO also reviewed relevant literature provided by officials from CMS and other organizations. What GAO Found CMS requires states to report annually on the provision of certain EPSDT dental services through form CMS 416. The CMS 416 is designed to provide information on state EPSDT programs in terms of the number of children who receive child health screening services, referrals for corrective treatment, and dental services from fee-for-service providers and under managed care plans. Data captured on dental services include the number of children receiving any services, any preventive services, and any treatment services. The CMS 416s, however, are not sufficient for overseeing the provision of dental and other required EPSDT services in state Medicaid programs. We reported in 2001 that not all states submitted the required CMS 416s on time or at all. CMS 416s that states did submit were often based on incomplete and unreliable data. States faced challenges getting complete and accurate data, however, particularly for children in managed care. According to agency officials, CMS has taken steps since our 2001 report to improve the data. For example, CMS has conducted reviews of some states' EPSDT programs that included assessments of states' CMS 416 data. CMS officials said that 11 states' EPSDT programs had been reviewed since 2002. CMS has also required since 2002 that states collect data on utilization of dental and other required EPSDT services from managed care plans. State and national health association officials told us that these data have improved over time. But concerns about the CMS 416 remain. Concerns cited by state and national health association officials we contacted included inconsistencies in how states report data, data inaccuracies, and problems with the data captured that preclude calculating accurate rates of the provision of dental and other required EPSDT services. Further, the usefulness of the CMS 416 for federal oversight purposes is limited by the type of data currently requested. First, rates of dental services delivered to children in managed care cannot be identified from the data. Second, the data captured do not address whether children have received the recommended number of dental visits. And third, the data do not illuminate factors, such as the inability of beneficiaries to find dentists to treat them, which contribute to low use of dental services among Medicaid children.

gao_GAO-08-86T

gao_GAO-08-86T_0

Prior Actions Have Improved Port Security, but Issues Remain Port security overall has improved because of the development of organizations and programs such as AMSCs, Area Maritime Security Plans (area plans), maritime security exercises, and the International Port Security Program, but challenges to successful implementation of these efforts remain. Area Maritime Security Committees Share Information and Coast Guard Expands Interagency Operational Centers Two main types of forums have developed for agencies to coordinate and share information about port security: area committees and Coast Guard sector command centers. While some of the existing centers achieved results with existing interagency relationships, other high-priority ports might face challenges establishing new working relationships among port stakeholders and implementing their own interagency operational centers. The order sets specific activities for each port; however, the amount of each activity is established based on the port’s specific security concerns. DHS concurred with this recommendation. The SAFE Port Act included several new requirements related to security exercises, such as establishing a Port Security Exercise Program to test and evaluate the capabilities of governments and port stakeholders to prevent, prepare for, mitigate against, respond to, and recover from acts of terrorism, natural disasters, and other emergencies at facilities that MTSA regulates. The Coast Guard Is Evaluating the Security of Foreign Ports, but Faces Resource Challenges The security of domestic ports also depends upon security at foreign ports where cargoes bound for the United States originate. The report, expected to be issued in early 2008, will cover issues related to the program, such as the extent to which the program is using a risk-based approach in carrying out its work, what challenges the program faces as it moves forward, and the extent to which the observations collected during the country visits are used by other programs such as the Coast Guard’s port state control inspections and high interest vessel boarding programs. For example, the SAFE Port Act required that GAO report on various aspects of port security in the Caribbean Basin. To overcome this, program officials have worked with other agencies (e.g., the Departments of Defense and State) and international organizations (e.g., the Organization of American States) to secure funding for training and assistance to countries where port security conferences have been held (e.g., the Dominican Republic and the Bahamas). Port Facility Security Efforts Continue, but Additional Evaluation is Needed To improve the security at individual facilities at ports, many long-standing programs are underway. The Coast Guard is required to conduct assessments of security plans and facility compliance inspections, but faces challenges in staffing and training to meet the SAFE Port Act’s additional requirements such as the sufficiency of trained personnel and guidance to conduct facility inspections. Our work is preliminary. In this memo, DHS indicated that (1) programs requiring the collection and use of fingerprints to vet individuals will use the Automated Biometric Identification System (IDENT); (2) these programs are to reuse existing or currently planned and funded infrastructure for the intake of identity information to the greatest extent possible; (3) its CIO is to establish a procurement plan to ensure that the department can handle a large volume of automated vetting from programs currently in the planning phase; and (4) to support the sharing of databases and potential consolidation of duplicative applications, the Enterprise Data Management Office is currently developing an inventory of biographic data assets that DHS maintains to support identity management and screening processes. As of July 2007, CBP had certified more than 7,000 companies that import goods via cargo containers through U.S. seaports—which accounted for approximately 45 percent of all U.S. imports—and validated the security practices of 78 percent of these certified participants. DOE Continues to Expand Its Megaports Program The Megaports Initiative, initiated by DOE’s National Nuclear Security Administration in 2003, represents another component in the efforts to prevent terrorists from smuggling WMD in cargo containers from overseas locations. Department of Homeland Security: Ongoing Challenges in Creating an Effective Acquisition Organization. Customs Revenue: Customs and Border Protection Needs to Improve Workforce Planning and Accountability. Transportation Security: DHS Should Address Key Challenges before Implementing the Transportation Worker Identification Credential Program.

Why GAO Did This Study Because the safety and economic security of the United States depend in substantial part on the security of its 361 seaports, the United States has a vital national interest in maritime security. The Security and Accountability for Every Port Act (SAFE Port Act), modified existing legislation and created and codified new programs related to maritime security. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and its U.S Coast Guard, Transportation Security Agency, and U.S. Customs and Border Protection have key maritime security responsibilities. This testimony synthesizes the results of GAO's completed work and preliminary observations from GAO's ongoing work pertaining to overall port security, security at individual facilities, and cargo container security. To perform this work GAO visited domestic and overseas ports; reviewed agency program documents, port security plans, and post-exercise reports; and interviewed officials from the federal, state, local, private, and international sectors. What GAO Found Federal agencies have improved overall port security efforts by establishing committees to share information with local port stakeholders, and taking steps to establish interagency operations centers to monitor port activities, conducting operations such as harbor patrols and vessel escorts, writing port-level plans to prevent and respond to terrorist attacks, testing such plans through exercises, and assessing the security at foreign ports. However, these agencies face resource constraints and other challenges trying to meet the SAFE Port Act's requirements to expand these activities. For example, the Coast Guard faces budget constraints in trying to expand its current command centers and include other agencies at the centers. Similarly, private facilities and federal agencies have taken action to improve the security at approximately 3,000 individual facilities by writing facility-specific security plans, and inspecting facilities to make sure they are complying with their plans, and developing special identification cards for workers to prevent terrorist from getting access to secure areas. Again, federal agencies face challenges trying to meet the act's requirements to expand the scope or speed the implementation of such activities. For example, the Transportation Security Agency missed the act's July 2007 deadline to implement the identification card program at 10 selected ports because of delays in testing equipment and procedures. Federal programs related to the security of cargo containers have also improved as agencies are enhancing systems to identify high-risk cargo, expanding partnerships with other countries to screen containers before they depart for the United States, and working with international organizations to develop a global framework for container security. Federal agencies face challenges implementing container security aspects of the SAFE Port Act and other legislation. For example, Customs and Border Protection must test and implement a new program to screen 100 percent of all incoming containers overseas--a departure from its existing risk-based programs.

gao_HEHS-98-133

gao_HEHS-98-133_0

Because fewer employers offer retiree health coverage as a benefit and individually purchased insurance, when available, may be prohibitively expensive, the proportion of this age group that is uninsured may rise. Individual Market. Public Insurance Programs. Finally, some beneficiaries have access to employer-based retiree health benefits, which supplement their Medicare coverage. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology The Chairman, Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources, asked us to assess the ability of Americans aged 55 to 64 to obtain health benefits through the employer-sponsored or individual insurance markets. He specifically asked for information on the near elderly’s (1) health, employment, income, and health insurance status; (2) ability to obtain employer-based coverage if they retire before becoming eligible for Medicare; and (3) use of and costs associated with purchasing coverage through the individual market or COBRA continuation insurance. To determine trends in employer-based health insurance coverage for those who retire before reaching Medicare eligibility, we conducted a literature review on employer-based health benefits for early retirees. Demographic and Insurance Characteristics of the Near Elderly Because near-elderly Americans between the ages of 55 and 64 are different from younger age groups in terms of health, work, and income status, their access to and sources of health insurance also differ. Those near elderly with children see them growing up and leaving home. 2.6). 2.9). Second, the insurance status of 55- to 64-year-olds varied by the nature of their employment, that is, whom they worked for. Since employers typically cover retiree health costs as they are incurred, this liability is largely unfunded. Among the possible reasons for the mismatch between availability and coverage trends are that (1) the decision to retire is often predicated on the availability of health benefits; (2) coverage may be available through other sources, such as a working or retired spouse; (3) employers’ decisions not to offer retiree health benefits are frequently directed at future rather than current retirees; and (4) individuals may have postponed their retirement plans to avoid becoming uninsured or because of the high costs of purchasing individual insurance or COBRA continuation coverage. As noted earlier, the larger the firm, the more likely it is to offer health benefits to both active and retired workers. Only 11 percent of all beneficiaries remained enrolled for the full 18 to 36 months allowed. Observations Forecasting the insurance status of future generations of near elderly is inherently risky. With the number of 55- to 64-year-olds estimated to grow from 8 percent of the population today to 13 percent by 2020, the impact, in the absence of affordable and accessible alternatives, could lead to an increase in the number of uninsured near-elderly Americans. Overall sample increased every 5 years. It is not difficult to imagine an individual in poor health continuing to work to maintain access to employer-based benefits that are not available to retirees. Affordability of Health Insurance for the Near Elderly Using data from the March 1997 CPS and 1995 and 1996 information on insurance premiums, we estimated the percentage of median income that a 55- to 64-year-old would have to commit to health insurance under a number of possible scenarios, including purchasing coverage through the individual market in a community-rated state (Vermont) as well as one that had no restrictions on the premiums that could be charged (Colorado) using 1996 rates for a commonly purchased health insurance product and cost sharing under employer-based coverage using 1995 Peat Marwick estimates of the lowest, highest, and average retiree contribution.

Why GAO Did This Study Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the ability of Americans aged 55 to 64 to obtain health benefits through the private market--either employer-based or individually purchased, focusing on the near elderly's: (1) health, employment, income, and health insurance status; (2) ability to obtain employer-based health insurance if they retire before they are eligible for Medicare; and (3) use of costs associated with purchasing coverage through the individual market or employer-based continuation insurance. What GAO Found GAO noted that: (1) though the near elderly access health insurance differently than other segments of the under-65 population, their overall insurance picture is no worse and is better than that of some younger age groups; (2) since fewer employers are offering health coverage as a benefit to future retirees, the proportion of near elderly with access to affordable health insurance could decline; (3) the resulting increase in uninsured near elderly would be exacerbated by demographic trends, since 55- to 64-year-olds represent one of the fastest growing segments of the U.S population; (4) the current insurance status of the near elderly is largely due to: (a) the fact that many current retirees still have access to employer-based health benefits; (b) the willingness of near-elderly Americans to devote a significant portion of their income to health insurance purchased through the individual market; and (c) the availability of public programs to disabled 55- to 64-year-olds; (5) the individual market and Medicare and Medicaid for the disabled often mitigate declining access to employer-based coverage for near-elderly Americans and may prevent a larger portion of this age group from becoming uninsured; (6) the steady decline in the proportion of large employers who offer health benefits to early retirees, however, clouds the outlook for future retirees; (7) in the absence of countervailing trends, it is even less likely that future 55- to 64-year-olds will be offered health insurance as a retirement benefit, and those who are will bear an increased share of the cost; (8) although trends in employers' required retiree cost sharing are more difficult to decipher than the decisions of firms not to offer retiree health benefits, the effects may be just as troublesome for future retirees; (9) moreover, access and affordability problems may prevent future early retirees who lose employer-based health benefits from obtaining comprehensive private insurance; (10) furthermore, significant variation exists among the states that limit premiums: a few require insurers to community-rate the coverage they sell--that is, all those covered pay the same premium--while other states allow insurers to vary premiums up to 300 percent; and (11) the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act is only available to retirees whose employers offer health benefits to active workers, and coverage is only temporary, ranging from 18 to 36 months.

gao_GAO-10-644

gao_GAO-10-644_0

Examples of research-related resources include the Regional Educational Laboratories (REL) and the Doing What Works (DWW) Web site (http://dww.ed.gov): Regional Educational Laboratories. One of the goals of the Clearinghouse was to promote informed education decision making through a Web-based dissemination system that featured rigorous reviews of studies on the effectiveness of educational interventions. WWC Reviews Research in Accordance with Accepted Standards and Has Responded to Recommendations and Criticisms WWC Follows Accepted Review Standards and Is Improving Its Review Process in Response to a Congressionally Mandated Expert Panel Report We found that the WWC review process follows generally accepted practices for reviewing research. For example, in response to the panel’s recommendation that the WWC include a table of study dispositions (e.g., whether studies meet WWC evidence standards) at the front of intervention reports, the WWC is modifying the report template to include a summary table along with the existing listing of dispositions in the reference section. Further, in response to the panel’s concern that the WWC’s screening process may exclude some eligible studies, the WWC is undertaking an evaluation of the reliability of its screening process. The WWC created new standards to include additional study designs. WWC’s Output and Costs Increased; However, IES Has Not Developed Adequate Performance Measures Related to Cost or Product Usefulness WWC Increased Output and Introduced New Products WWC’s report output increased under the current contract, and its scope expanded to include new products and processes to support production. For example, the current contract calls for the WWC to increase the number of topic areas and intervention reports. Education Has Three Primary Ways to Disseminate Information about WWC Products, but Awareness and Use Vary among Target Audiences Education Has Various Ways to Disseminate Information about WWC Products, but Awareness of the Clearinghouse Is Generally Limited Education uses the WWC contractor, RELs, and DWW to disseminate information about the Clearinghouse to its target audience, which includes state and school district officials, as well as teachers and principals. RELs also disseminate research from WWC when responding to educator questions or concerns. We found that 33 of the 38 states that responded to our survey reported that they had heard of the WWC. States and School Districts Generally Used the Clearinghouse to a Small or Moderate Extent to Inform Decisions and Used Specific WWC Products to Varying Extents Based on our survey, most states and school districts that reported accessing the WWC Web site used it to inform decisions on effective education practices—a stated purpose of the WWC—to a small or moderate extent. An estimated 50 percent of school districts would likely increase their use of the Clearinghouse if it had reviews that were more timely (see fig. Improved dissemination of WWC products could increase awareness and use of the WWC. To better track the costs and usefulness of the WWC, we recommend that the Secretary of Education direct IES to incorporate findings from its cost studies to develop performance measures related to costs, such as identifying a range of acceptable costs per product and using that information to monitor contractor spending; and develop performance measures related to product usefulness and periodically assess whether WWC products are meeting the needs of target audiences by gathering information on product usefulness in the proposed survey or through other means. Agency Comments and Our Evaluation We provided a draft of this report to the U.S. Department of Education for review and comment. Education generally agreed with our recommendations. To determine how performance and costs changed over time, we analyzed the costs and productivity of the two WWC contractors. To obtain information about the usefulness of WWC products, we conducted a Web-based survey of all state education agencies and a nationally representative sample of school districts. Assessment of WWC Research Review Process GAO previously assessed the procedures and criteria used by the WWC by reviewing documents and interviewing IES officials and WWC contractors. Specifically, the survey asked officials about (1) their general sources of information on effective educational practices, (2) the extent to which they use WWC products to inform curriculum decisions (including questions on specific intervention reports and practice guides), (3) how useful the officials find the information in the WWC, (4) the likelihood they would increase their usage if certain changes were made to the WWC Web site, and (5) the extent to which the officials use the Doing What Works and Best Evidence Encyclopedia Web sites to inform curriculum decisions and how useful the officials find these other information sources to be.

Why GAO Did This Study In connection with the Omnibus Appropriations Act, 2009, GAO was required to study the What Works Clearinghouse (WWC), a federal source of evidence about effective education practices. Operating through a 5-year contract awarded by the U.S. Department of Education's Institute of Education Sciences (IES), the WWC reviews education research and disseminates its findings. GAO examined: (1) the extent to which the WWC review process meets accepted standards for research evaluation and how the WWC has responded to recommendations and criticism, (2) how WWC output and costs have changed over time and how its performance is measured, and (3) how WWC products are disseminated and how useful educators find them to be. To conduct its work, GAO reviewed WWC-related documents, analyzed cost and performance data, surveyed all states and a nationally representative sample of school districts, and interviewed IES officials, WWC contractors, researchers, and others. What GAO Found GAO as well as a congressionallymandated panel of experts, found that the WWC's review process, which includes screening studies to determine if they meet WWC criteria, follows accepted standards for evaluating research on the effectiveness of education interventions. WWC is responding to recommendations made by the expert panel to further improve its review and reporting processes. For example, the panel recommended improvements in the way the WWC presents information to readers on the reasons why studies do not qualify for review. The WWC is revising a report template to include a table summarizing which studies met or did not meet WWC criteria for evaluating research. The WWC has also responded to researchers who have criticized the WWC for presenting limited information because its screening criteria exclude some rigorous research designs that may be appropriate for evaluating certain education programs, such as special education. The WWC responded to this criticism by creating new standards that include two additional study designs and by creating a new product, called a practice guide, which includes a wider range of research. WWC's report output and scope increased under the current contract. For example, the WWC increased its production of various reports, introduced new products, and developed new processes for evaluating research. However, IES had a substantial backlog in its product review process from January 2009 to May 2010. The backlog generally decreased the timeliness of WWC reports, with 20 reports being delayed by up to 6 months. To support the increases in output and scope, WWC's costs doubled from the previous contract to the current one. Both contracts designated about 60 percent of costs to production, while the other 40 percent of costs support other tasks, such as communications, dissemination, and process development. IES' performance goals for the WWC primarily relate to the number of reports produced. However, IES has not developed performance measures related to the cost or usefulness of WWC products. Education uses WWC contractors, Regional Educational Laboratories (RELS) and the Doing What Works (DWW) Web site to disseminate information about WWC products; however, awareness and use of the WWC varies among states, districts, teachers, and principals. WWC contractors disseminate product information in various ways including email alerts and presentations. The RELs host events featuring WWC products for state, district, and school officials and DWW provides resources to educators based on WWC products. Based on our survey, officials from 33 of 38 state education agencies that responded to our survey and an estimated 42 percent of school districts have heard of the WWC. Those states and school districts generally used the WWC to a small or moderate extent to inform decisions on effective practices. Based on our survey, states and school districts reported that they would likely increase their use of the WWC if it included a broader array of information or more timely information. What GAO Recommends GAO recommends that IES: develop and implement strategies to avoid backlogs in WWC product reviews; establish performance measures related to costs and usefulness; and improve dissemination efforts to promote awareness and use of the WWC. Education generally agreed with GAO's recommendations.

gao_GAO-13-257

gao_GAO-13-257_0

Figure 1 depicts the program’s entry into DOD’s acquisition process as currently anticipated. Program Makes Progress Toward Establishing a Sound Business Case The Navy has made progress in the past year toward establishing a sound business case for development that reflects a rational balance between requirements, costs and schedule. The Navy completed the AOA, which was deemed sufficient by CAPE to inform future acquisition decisions, and OSD has approved the program to proceed to a Milestone B decision. Navy Completes AOA The Navy, building on its initial 2010 study, completed its AOA on April 4, 2012, and concluded that the currently proposed acquisition approach of using mature technologies from outside the program on an in-production commercial or military helicopter was acceptable. Specifically, the 2012 study estimates suggest that using the proposed approach of having the program enter the acquisition process in the engineering and manufacturing development phase rather than the technology development phase, as was anticipated in the 2010 study, would reduce investment cost by approximately $1.5 billion (19.7 percent) and shorten the development schedule by about 18 percent. The 2012 VXX AOA study team made a number of recommendations including: To mitigate aircraft certification risk, the airworthiness certifying authority actively participate in all government development activities for the cockpit, communications, and mission systems and be involved in the source selection process for the aircraft; To reduce the risk of having to resort to a Min Mod approach, an active and aggressive life cycle weight management effort should be put in place if the selected platform does not provide a large enough margin to accommodate future weight growth; and The release of a request for proposals be contingent upon achieving acceptable technical maturity of critical government developments, such as communications and mission systems. The Under Secretary decided that: Milestone B, scheduled for 3rd quarter of fiscal year 2014, will be the first formal acquisition system milestone for VXX; however, a Pre- EMD Review will occur prior to release of the Request for Proposals for development, integration, and production; Prior to the pre-EMD review, the Navy and the JROC are to approve the CDD and the Director, Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation is to develop an Independent Cost Estimate based on the approved CDD; and The Under Secretary will establish affordability targets for the VXX program concurrent with CDD approval by the JROC. Based on our review of the AOA report, supporting material, and interviews of program and other defense officials, we found the AOA to be sufficient for this stage of the acquisition. It included elements that GAO has reported should be part of a robust AOA. Cost estimating and analysis are significant components of an AOA. The initial 2010 analysis was based on performance requirements that were lower in a number of areas than for the VH-71 program. The 2012 AOA study reflected additional trade-offs made with regard to cost, schedule, risk and performance. This is to occur in the second quarter of fiscal year 2013. Efforts Intended to Leverage Technologies into VXX Aircraft Progress The Navy’s currently proposed acquisition approach relies on the government’s providing, as government furnished equipment, mature technologies for integration into aircraft. Those technologies either already exist or are in development, some as legacy fleet aircraft upgrades. Their provision will be an important factor in the Navy’s achieving the reduced cost and schedule it seeks through its proposed acquisition approach. While the program reports the key technologies to be provided by the government for integration are on track, there are risks that they will not work out as planned. To mitigate integration risk, though, the VXX program is making use of a systems integration laboratory and also plans to install the communications and mission systems into a test aircraft and do demonstration testing before integration efforts begin on the VXX platform. Ensuring the technologies being developed for integration into the selected VXX platform develop as needed and integration mitigation efforts are adequately planned, resourced, and executed. In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD stated that it would ensure that mitigations are in place to address potential risk areas. It believes its efforts are aligned with GAO’s best practices and the recommendations in GAO’s 2011 report on the program and plans to continue to monitor program progress in view of these standards. We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional committees; the Secretary of Defense; the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics; and the Secretary of the Navy.

Why GAO Did This Study The VXX is a Navy program to develop a replacement for the current fleet of presidential helicopters. The Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011 directed GAO to review and report annually to the congressional defense committees on the program. GAO has reported on the program twice previously. The first report identified major lessons learned from a prior terminated program that should be applied in the follow-on program. The second covered the program's progress, upgrades to the existing helicopters, and plans for moving the program forward. This is the last of the required reports. It discusses (1) the program's progress over the past year, particularly regarding evaluation of alternatives, and (2) DOD's efforts to develop key technologies for the VXX aircraft. GAO examined program documents; interviewed officials; and compared the AOA with elements GAO previously reported are needed for a robust AOA, and cost estimating and analysis standards. GAO also assessed the Navy's approach to developing key technologies and progress made. What GAO Found The Navy made progress in the past year in establishing a sound VXX business case that reflects a rational balance between requirements, costs and schedule. In 2012, the Navy completed an updated Analysis of Alternatives (AOA) based on refined requirements and an acquisition approach that would leverage mature technologies from outside the program onto an in-production commercial or military airframe--allowing the program to begin in the engineering and manufacturing development phase of the Department of Defense's (DOD) acquisition process. The 2012 AOA reflected additional trade-offs made among cost, schedule, risk, and performance. Some key performance requirements changed from the terminated VH-71 program to the VXX. Per the AOA, using this approach would reduce investment cost by approximately $1.5 billion (19.7 percent) and shorten the schedule by about 18 percent from the approach anticipated in 2010, which included more time and cost to develop technology within the program. DOD's Director of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation deemed the AOA sufficient to inform future acquisition decisions and the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics approved the program to move forward toward a decision to begin engineering and manufacturing development. GAO's review of the AOA found it to be sufficient for this phase of the acquisition. DOD's efforts to ensure key technologies are ready for integration into VXX aircraft are also making progress. The Navy's acquisition approach relies on the government providing mature technologies for integration into an in-production aircraft selected for the VXX program. These technologies either exist or are in development. Their use will be an important factor in achieving the reduced cost and schedule the Navy seeks. While the program reports that these efforts are on track and assesses the risks of integration as low, it is possible that key technologies may not be realized as planned or be as easy to integrate as anticipated. To mitigate integration risk, the Navy is making use of an integration laboratory and plans to demonstrate key technologies in a test aircraft. Building on these decisions, the program will have to manage challenges in a number of areas, including holding the line on VXX requirements, controlling helicopter weight growth, and ensuring that efforts to mitigate integration risks are adequately planned, resourced, and executed. What GAO Recommends GAO is not making recommendations in this report. DOD stated that it would ensure that mitigations are in place to address potential risk areas. It believes its efforts are aligned with GAO's best practices and the recommendations in GAO's 2011 report on the program and plans to continue to monitor program progress in view of these standards.

gao_GAO-09-349T

gao_GAO-09-349T_0

Today’s Financial Regulatory System Was Built over the Course of More Than a Century, Largely in Response to Crises or Market Developments As a result of 150 years of changes in financial regulation in the United States, the regulatory system has become complex and fragmented. Today, responsibilities for overseeing the financial services industry are shared among almost a dozen federal banking, securities, futures, and other regulatory agencies, numerous self-regulatory organizations, and hundreds of state financial regulatory agencies. Changes in Financial Institutions and Their Products Have Significantly Challenged the U.S. Financial Regulatory System Several key developments in financial markets and products in the past few decades have significantly challenged the existing financial regulatory structure. Regulators have struggled, and often failed, to mitigate the systemic risks posed by these conglomerates, and to ensure they adequately manage their risks. A second dramatic development in U.S. financial markets in recent decades has been the increasingly critical roles played by less-regulated entities. In particular, the increasing prevalence of new and more complex investment products has challenged regulators and investors, and consumers have faced difficulty understanding new and increasingly complex retail mortgage and credit products. Fourth, standard setters for accounting and financial regulators have faced growing challenges in ensuring that accounting and audit standards appropriately respond to financial market developments, and in addressing challenges arising from the global convergence of accounting and auditing standards. Finally, with the increasingly global aspects of financial markets, the current fragmented U.S. regulatory structure has complicated some efforts to coordinate internationally with other regulators. A Framework for Crafting and Assessing Alternatives for Reforming the U.S. Financial Regulatory System As a result of significant market developments in recent decades that have outpaced a fragmented and outdated regulatory structure, significant reforms to the U.S. regulatory system are critically and urgently needed. The current system has important weaknesses that, if not addressed, will continue to expose the nation’s financial system to serious risks. As early as 1994, we identified the need to examine the federal financial regulatory structure, including the need to address the risks from new unregulated products. 1. Some reform proposals suggest “principles-based regulation” in which regulators apply broad-based regulatory principles on a case-by-case basis. 2. As we noted in our report, gaps in the current level of federal oversight of mortgage lenders, credit rating agencies, and certain complex financial products such as CDOs and credit default swaps likely have contributed to the current crisis. 3. A regulatory system should focus on risks to the financial system, not just institutions. Efficient and effective. Key issues to be addressed: Consider the appropriate role of the states in a financial regulatory system and how federal and state roles can be better harmonized. Appendix I: Agencies and Other Organizations That Reviewed the Draft Report Related GAO Products High-Risk Series: An Update. Financial Regulation: A Framework for Crafting and Assessing Proposals to Modernize the Outdated U.S. Financial Regulatory System. Washington, D.C.: January 8, 2009.

Why GAO Did This Study This testimony discusses our January 8, 2009, report that provides a framework for modernizing the outdated U.S. financial regulatory system. We prepared this work under the authority of the Comptroller General to help policymakers weigh various regulatory reform proposals and consider ways in which the current regulatory system could be made more effective and efficient. This testimony is based on our report, which (1) describes how regulation has evolved in banking, securities, thrifts, credit unions, futures, insurance, secondary mortgage markets and other important areas; (2) describes several key changes in financial markets and products in recent decades that have highlighted significant limitations and gaps in the existing regulatory system; and (3) presents an evaluation framework that can be used by Congress and others to shape potential regulatory reform efforts. On January 22, we released an update to our biennial High-Risk Series, which described high-risk areas in federal programs, including by focusing on the need for broad-based transformations to address major economy, efficiency, or effectiveness challenges. Based on recent economic events and our past work on financial regulatory reform, we added the need to modernize the outdated U.S. financial regulatory system as a new high-risk area this year. What GAO Found The current U.S. financial regulatory system has relied on a fragmented and complex arrangement of federal and state regulators--put into place over the past 150 years--that has not kept pace with major developments in financial markets and products in recent decades. Today, almost a dozen federal regulatory agencies, numerous self-regulatory organizations, and hundreds of state financial regulatory agencies share responsibility for overseeing the financial services industry. As the nation finds itself in the midst of one of the worst financial crises ever, it has become apparent that the regulatory system is ill-suited to meet the nation's needs in the 21st century. Summary Several key changes in financial markets and products in recent decades have highlighted significant limitations and gaps in the existing regulatory system. First, regulators have struggled, and often failed, to mitigate the systemic risks posed by large and interconnected financial conglomerates and to ensure they adequately manage their risks. Second, regulators have had to address problems in financial markets resulting from the activities of large and sometimes less-regulated market participants--such as nonbank mortgage lenders, hedge funds, and credit rating agencies--some of which play significant roles in today's financial markets. Third, the increasing prevalence of new and more complex investment products has challenged regulators and investors, and consumers have faced difficulty understanding new and increasingly complex retail mortgage and credit products. Fourth, standard setters for accounting and financial regulators have faced growing challenges in ensuring that accounting and audit standards appropriately respond to financial market developments, and in addressing challenges arising from the global convergence of accounting and auditing standards. Finally, as financial markets have become increasingly global, the current fragmented U.S. regulatory structure has complicated some efforts to coordinate internationally with other regulators. These significant developments have outpaced a fragmented and outdated regulatory structure, and, as a result, significant reforms to the U.S. regulatory system are critically and urgently needed. The current system has significant weaknesses that, if not addressed, will continue to expose the nation's financial system to serious risks.

gao_GAO-03-643

gao_GAO-03-643_0

The LPP, as originally approved, was described as a cooperative U.S.-South Korean effort to consolidate U.S. installations and training areas, improve combat readiness, enhance public safety, and strengthen the U.S.-South Korean alliance. Specifically, the LPP covered about 37 percent of the construction costs planned at U.S. military installations in South Korea over the next 10 years, encompassing about $2 billion of the $5.6 billion that the U.S. military and South Korea planned to spend to improve the U.S. military infrastructure in South Korea from 2002 through 2011. It was intended to resolve 55 percent, or 49, of the 89 separate land disputes that were pending in South Korea in January 2003, which was considered a significant step forward. Forces Korea officials announced that they were reviewing all projects and that over $1 billion in ongoing and planned construction had been put on hold. First, the LPP is dependent on substantial amounts of funding that South Korea expects to realize through land sales from property returned by the United States, host-nation-funded construction, and U.S. military construction funds. Second, U.S. The extent to which these sources of funding would be required and available for broader infrastructure changes is not yet clear, particularly for the relocation of Yongsan Army Garrison. Recently, U.S. For example, U.S. Forces Korea, to (1) reassess planned construction projects in South Korea as the results of ongoing studies associated with overseas presence and basing are finalized and (2) prepare a detailed South Korea-wide infrastructure master plan for the changing infrastructure for U.S. military facilities in South Korea, updating it periodically as needed, and identifying funding requirements and division of funding responsibilities between the United States and South Korea. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology To determine the scope and cost of the plan in relation to total infrastructure issues in South Korea, we analyzed provisions of the Land Partnership Plan (LPP), identified the scope and cost of construction projects outside of the LPP, compared the scope and cost of LPP construction projects to the scope and cost of all construction projects in South Korea, and analyzed some of the key unresolved infrastructure issues not included in the plan, such as the relocation of U.S. troops from Yongsan Army Garrison. We used this information to identify the costs of ongoing and planned construction associated with improving military infrastructure in areas where there is uncertainty about future U.S. presence—such as Yongsan Army Garrison and U.S. installations located north of Seoul. We discussed challenges that must be addressed during implementation of the LPP and implementation issues associated with the plan that could affect future construction projects throughout South Korea.

Why GAO Did This Study The U.S.-South Korean Land Partnership Plan (LPP), signed in March 2002, was designed to consolidate U.S. installations, improve combat readiness, enhance public safety, and strengthen the U.S.-South Korean alliance by addressing some of the causes of periodic tension associated with the U.S. presence in South Korea. The Senate report on military construction appropriations for fiscal year 2003 directed GAO to review the LPP. GAO adjusted its review to also address the effect of ongoing reassessments of U.S. overseas presence upon the LPP and other infrastructure needs. In this report, GAO assessed (1) the scope of the LPP, (2) the implications on the LPP and other construction projects of proposals to change basing in South Korea, and (3) implementation challenges associated with the LPP that could affect future U.S. military construction projects in South Korea. What GAO Found Although broad in scope, the LPP was not designed to resolve all U.S. military infrastructure issues. Specifically, the plan was intended to resolve 49 of the 89 separate land disputes that were pending in South Korea. Of the land disputes the plan did not address, the most politically significant, complex, and expensive dispute involves the potential relocation of U.S. forces from Yongsan Army Garrison, located in the Seoul metropolitan area. As a result, the LPP, as approved, covered about 37 percent of the $5.6 billion in construction costs planned at U.S. military installations in South Korea over the next 10 years. Ongoing reassessments of U.S. overseas presence and basing requirements could diminish the need for and alter the locations of many construction projects in South Korea, both those associated with the LPP and those unrelated to it. For example, over $1 billion of ongoing and planned construction associated with improving military infrastructure at Yongsan Army Garrison and U.S. installations located north of Seoul--areas where there is uncertainty about future U.S. presence--has recently been put on hold, canceled, or redirected to an installation located south of Seoul. GAO identified some key challenges that could adversely affect the implementation of the LPP and future U.S. military construction projects throughout South Korea. First, the plan relies on various funding sources, including funding realized through land sales from property returned by the United States. The extent to which these sources of funding would be required and available for broader infrastructure changes is not yet clear. Second, a master plan would be needed to guide future military construction to reposition U.S. forces and basing in South Korea.

gao_GAO-16-548

gao_GAO-16-548_0

It also provides ethics training to agency officials. As of that date, about 3 percent of those SGEs (1,138 of 40,424) were not serving on federal boards and employed as experts or consultants. Over a 10-year period (from 2005 to 2014), we found that agencies generally reported more limited use in 2014 than in 2005, and used an annual average of approximately 2,000 SGEs not serving on federal boards, with a peak of about 3,100 in 2009 and a low of about 500 in 2013. Four of Five Selected Agencies Had Reliable Data on SGEs Not Serving on Federal Boards While HHS Had Challenges Reporting Reliable Data OGE Data Reflected Agency Reporting Agencies are responsible for identifying SGEs and reporting these data to OGE (through its annual questionnaire) and OPM (through information on personnel actions in EHRI). Moreover, accurate and complete data are important to allow OGE and Congress to provide informed oversight of agencies using SGEs not serving on federal boards. Section 3109 permits agencies to appoint experts or consultants without regard to the competitive service hiring rules. Officials from four of the selected agencies told us that supervisors are generally responsible for tracking whether the SGE stays within the 130- day service estimate. DOJ officials permit their SGEs to track their own days of service. Our analysis of 23 OGE reviews conducted at the CFO Act and Consumer Financial Protection Bureau for fiscal years 2005 to 2014 showed no issues specific to SGEs not serving on federal boards. Agencies are responsible for reporting on SGEs not serving on federal boards to OGE and OPM requires agencies to identify SGEs on an individual’s personnel action. Recommendations for Executive Action To help ensure HHS has reliable data on SGEs not serving on federal boards, we recommend that the Secretary of HHS take steps to improve the reliability of data on SGEs not serving on boards. In OGE’s written comments, it partially concurred with our recommendation to determine whether other executive branch agencies are experiencing data challenges similar to HHS, State, and NRC. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology The objectives of this engagement were to review agencies’ use and oversight of the special government employee (SGE) designation in the federal workforce for SGEs not serving on federal boards at the 24 agencies covered under the Chief Financial Officers (CFO) Act of 1990, as amended, and the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB). This report (1) describes what is known about the total number of SGEs not serving on federal boards in the executive branch as well as at CFO Act agencies and CFPB; (2) assesses the extent to which the Office of Government Ethics (OGE), Office of Personnel Management (OPM), and selected agencies identify and report data on SGEs not serving on federal boards; (3) assesses how selected agencies appoint, utilize, and oversee SGEs not serving on federal boards, and describes the relevant hiring authorities and ethics requirements; and (4) examines how, if at all, OGE oversees and ensures compliance with ethics requirements for SGEs, including the proper identification of individuals as SGEs, consistent with 18 U.S.C. We selected five agencies—the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), Department of Justice (Justice), Department of State (State), National Science Foundation (NSF), and Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) —to provide case illustrations of agencies’ use of SGEs not serving on federal boards. To assess the extent to which OGE, OPM, and selected agencies identify, collect, and report data on SGEs not serving on federal boards, we analyzed OGE’s, OPM’s, and selected agencies’ data related to the number of SGEs not serving on federal boards at CFO Act agencies and CFPB for fiscal years 2005 through 2014. For two agencies, we found several instances of misidentified SGEs not serving on federal boards, and after discussion with the agencies, they provided corrected data. § 3109, or a similar agency-specific authority).

Why GAO Did This Study The SGE category was created by Congress in 1962 to make certain ethics rules less restrictive than for other federal employees to overcome obstacles in hiring outside experts and other temporary employees for occasional service. SGEs are employees appointed to serve for not more than 130 days during any one year period. GAO was asked to examine agencies' use of SGEs not serving on federal boards. This report: (1) describes what is known about the total number of SGEs not serving on federal boards; (2) assesses the extent to which OGE, OPM, and selected agencies identify, collect, and report data; (3) assesses how selected agencies appoint, use, and track SGEs; and (4) examines how OGE oversees and ensures compliance with ethics requirements. GAO analyzed OGE, OPM, and agency data; reviewed agency documentation; and interviewed agency officials. GAO selected five agencies—the Departments of Health and Human Services, Justice, State, Nuclear Regulatory Commission and National Science Foundation—based in part, on the number of SGEs and ratio of SGEs not serving on federal boards to total employees. What GAO Found Federal agencies made limited use of special government employees (SGE) not serving on federal boards. As of December 2014, approximately 3 percent of SGEs (1,138 of 40,424) were working as experts or consultants and not serving on federal boards, according to the Office of Government Ethics (OGE). Over a 10-year period (2005 to 2014), GAO found that agencies used an annual average of approximately 2,000 SGEs, with a peak of about 3,100 in 2009 and a low of about 500 in 2013. Agencies are responsible for reporting on SGEs not serving on federal boards to OGE. The Office of Personnel Management (OPM) requires agencies to identify SGEs on an individual's personnel action. OGE's data reflected what agencies reported on SGEs not serving on federal boards. Three of the five agencies GAO reviewed had challenges reporting reliable data on SGEs not serving on federal boards. The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) had difficulty distinguishing between SGEs not serving on federal boards and those who were, and HHS did not explain data discrepancies. GAO found instances of misidentified SGEs not serving on federal boards at the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and the Department of State (State), but the agencies provided corrected data. Weak internal coordination and misunderstanding about the SGE designation contributed to the identification challenges. Stronger data would better position agencies to report on SGEs and provide the required ethics training. Moreover, accurate and complete data are important to allow OGE and Congress to provide informed oversight of agencies. Three of the five selected agencies primarily used expert and consultant hiring authorities to appoint SGEs not serving on federal boards. The other two agencies generally used their agency-specific authorities. The agencies used these employees in specialized areas (see figure). Four of five agencies said supervisors are generally responsible for tracking SGEs' days of service. One agency permits SGEs to track their own days. OGE has not found any issues specific to SGEs not serving on federal boards. GAO's analysis of 23 OGE reviews at Chief Financial Officers Act agencies and the Consumer Financial Protection Board for fiscal years 1998 to 2014 showed no issues specific to SGEs not serving on federal boards. Further, OGE had no outstanding recommendations related to SGEs at the selected agencies. What GAO Recommends GAO recommends HHS take steps to improve the reliability of data on SGEs not serving on federal boards and OGE should determine whether other agencies are experiencing data challenges similar to HHS, State, and NRC and take appropriate action. HHS concurred. OGE partially concurred. GAO maintains that OGE should undertake the actions as discussed further in the report.

gao_RCED-99-91

gao_RCED-99-91_0

Its 58 field offices assess financial penalties against storeowners who violate program regulations. FNS’ seven regional offices are responsible for collecting the financial penalties and related interest charges, which are recorded as debts in FNS’ accounting records. Furthermore, FNS and the courts collected $11.5 million from storeowners, and FNS waived, adjusted, or wrote off $49 million. During the 6-year period, the total penalties were $88.7 million, but they collected only $11.5 million, or about 13 percent. The dollar amount of penalty debt outstanding more than doubled from the end of year fiscal year 1993 to the end of fiscal year 1998 (from $12.3 million to $28.2 million), while the amount of collections increased slightly, from $1.8 million to $2.0 million. However, we found that FNS could have identified additional storeowners who violated program regulations if it more effectively used data on electronic benefits transfers. FNS Almost Always Assessed Financial Penalties When Warranted FNS followed its procedures for assessing financial penalties in nearly all of the 259 cases we reviewed in which stores were found to have violated program regulations. FNS Has Had Problems Collecting Penalty Debts Large amounts of debt owed by storeowners for Food Stamp Program violations go uncollected. According to agency officials, this small percentage reflects the difficulties involved in collecting this type of debt, such as problems in locating debtors as well as their refusal to pay. However, weaknesses in the agency’s debt collection procedures and practices also contributed to low collections. FNS expects to soon refer delinquent debt to the Department of the Treasury after it fully implements provisions of the Debt Collection Improvement Act of 1996. This law makes the Department of the Treasury primarily responsible for collecting debts delinquent for over 180 days and could help FNS better manage its collection activities. These practices include collecting debts aggressively; assessing interest on delinquent debts; collecting installment debt payments within 3 years; removing old uncollectible debts from accounts receivable; establishing procedures to identify the causes of delinquencies and developing the corrective actions needed; and referring delinquent debts to the Treasury Department, which can deduct the debt amounts from any federal payment due a storeowner and reporting to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) debts written off, which are treated as taxable income to the storeowner. FNS has not consistently charged interest on debt that is not fully paid when due. However, it has made progress and will soon be in a position to implement this requirement. Recommendations To improve the integrity of the Food Stamp Program, we recommend that the Secretary of Agriculture direct the Administrator, FNS, to develop guidance that specifies its field staff’s responsibilities, duties, and guidelines in reviewing data on electronic benefits transfers to identify and assess penalties against storeowners who violate the Food Stamp Program’s regulations; develop the corrective actions necessary, as required by the Federal Claims Collection Standards, to help prevent delinquencies and defaults, and determine the priority and resources it needs to assign to make debt collection more effective; and complete the actions needed to refer delinquent debts with storeowner taxpayer identification numbers to Treasury electronically in a timely manner. Scope and Methodology To identify the dollar amount of financial penalties, collections, and debt reductions (waivers, adjustments, or write-offs) for storeowners in the Food Stamp Program during fiscal year 1993 through fiscal year 1998, we interviewed and obtained financial reports and debt management information from officials in the Food and Nutrition Service’s (FNS) Accounting Division.

Why GAO Did This Study Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on the Food and Nutrition Service's (FNS) efforts to maintain the integrity of the Food Stamp Program, focusing on the: (1) dollar amount of the financial penalties, collections, and debt reductions (waivers, adjustments, or write-offs) affecting storeowners violating program regulations during fiscal year (FY) 1993 through FY 1998; (2) effectiveness of the FNS' procedures and practices for assessing financial penalties against storeowners for program violations; and (3) effectiveness of FNS' procedures and practices for collecting financial penalties levied against storeowners. What GAO Found GAO noted that: (1) over the past 6 years, FNS and the courts have assessed or levied about $78 million in financial penalties and interest against storeowners for violating Food Stamp Program Regulations; (2) the penalties and interest are recorded as debts in FNS' accounting records; (3) during this period, FNS and the courts collected $11.5 million, or about 13 percent of the total penalties, and FNS reduced the amount owed by storeowners by about $49 million, or about 55 percent, through waivers, adjustments, or write-offs; (4) the dollar amount of penalty debt outstanding at the end of the year more than doubled, from $12.3 million in 1993 to $28.2 million in 1998; (5) in 7 FNS field offices, GAO reviewed 259 Department of Agriculture undercover investigations that identified program violations, and GAO found that FNS almost always assessed financial penalties against storeowners when warranted; (6) however, other storeowners who may have violated program regulations and could have been penalized were not identified; (7) FNS is not effectively using data on the electronic redemption of food stamp benefits to identify these storeowners; (8) FNS officials noted that the small percentage of debt collected reflected, in part, the difficulties involved in collecting this type of debt, including problems in locating debtors and their refusal to pay; (9) however, weaknesses in FNS' debt collection procedures and practices also have contributed to low collections; (10) FNS has not aggressively collected debt, consistently assessed interest on unpaid debt, and written off uncollectible debt in a timely manner; (11) FNS has not yet referred any delinquent debt to the Department of the Treasury, which could deduct the debt from any future federal payments due the storeowners; (12) FNS expects to soon be in a position to make such referrals as it completes the implementation of the provisions of the Debt Collection Improvement Act of 1996; and (13) this law makes the Treasury primarily responsible for collecting debts delinquent for over 180 days.

gao_HEHS-98-65

gao_HEHS-98-65_0

Head Start Serves Both Children and Families Head Start programs were funded to serve about 701,000 children at any one time in program year 1996-97; however, the number of different children enrolled in the program throughout the 1996-97 program year was about 782,000, which averaged about 454 children per program, ranging from a low of 17 to a high of 6,045. 1). Most of the children—79 percent—spoke English as their main language. 2). 3). Children and Families Received Access to an Array of Services Through Head Start, children received access to a large array of services. Services for Children Provided in Primarily Part-Day, Part-Year Programs Most children attended centers that operated part day and part year. 4). About 44 percent of the families needing full-day, full-year child care services left their children at a relative’s or unrelated adult’s home when the children were not in Head Start, according to Head Start’s survey. 7). Most programs— about 90 percent—had multiple sources. 8). Across most states and territories, the non-Head Start funding increased the amount available per child (see table II.5 in app. Across all programs, the median amount of Head Start grant funds per child was $4,450 for the responding programs but ranged from a low of $792 to a high of $16,206. Median total funds per child of $4,932 across all programs ranged from $1,081 to $17,029 per child. The director told us that the program provided service for children in centers that operated year round and for 10 hours or more per day. In addition, programs spent their funds on a range of services. Other Programs Serving Head Start-Eligible Children Operated in Same Communities as Head Start Programs Many Head Start programs reported that state-funded preschools (70 percent), other preschools, child development and child care centers (90 percent), and family day care homes (71 percent) operated in their communities serving Head Start-eligible children. The extent to which these programs resemble Head Start is not known. However, programs that serve disadvantaged children may—like Head Start—help children and families obtain additional services such as medical and social services. These programs provided many of the same services as Head Start programs, but not all services were provided to all children. Major contributors to this report are listed in appendix V. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology Objectives In preparation for Head Start’s reauthorization, the Chairman and Ranking Minority Member, House Committee on Education and the Workforce; the Chairman and Ranking Minority Member, Subcommittee on Early Childhood, Youth and Families, House Committee on Education and the Workforce; Chairman and Ranking Minority Member, Subcommittee on Children and Families, Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources; and Representatives Cunningham and Kildee asked us to describe the (1) number and characteristics of Head Start participants, (2) services provided and the way they are provided, (3) federal and nonfederal program dollars received and spent by programs delivering Head Start services, and (4) other programs providing similar—in part or in whole—early childhood services.

Why GAO Did This Study Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on the Head Start Program in preparation for its reauthorization, focusing on: (1) the number and characteristics of those served; (2) the services provided and the way they are provided; (3) federal and nonfederal program dollars received and spent by programs delivering Head Start services; and (4) other programs providing similar early childhood services. What GAO Found GAO noted that: (1) Head Start served about 782,000 disadvantaged children and 711,000 families in program year 1996-97, according to GAO's review; (2) the demographics of these children and families were similar in many respects; (3) most children were 4 years old and spoke English as their main language; (4) families typically had more than one child and were very poor; (5) through Head Start, children received access to a large array of services, as did their families in some cases; (6) most child and family services, however, were neither paid for nor provided directly by Head Start programs; (7) instead, Head Start programs often functioned as a coordinator or facilitator, referring and linking children and families to needed services; (8) although many families required full-day, full-year child care, Head Start services were typically provided in centers that operated part day on schedules that paralleled the school year; (9) only a small percentage of children attended programs in centers that operated year round; (10) virtually no programs operated on weekends, and only a few operated before 7 a.m. or after 5 p.m.; (11) almost half of the families identified as needing full-day services left their children at a relative's or unrelated adult's home when the children were not in Head Start; (12) most programs responding to GAO's survey secured funding for their operations from multiple sources; (13) among all programs in the states and territories, the average amount of Head Start grant funds per child was $4,637, ranging from a low of $792 to high of $16,206; (14) the additional income programs received from other sources increased the amount of funds available per child to an average of $5,186, 12 percent more income per child; (15) total funds per child varied widely by program, ranging from $1,081 to $17,029 per child; (16) programs spent their income on a variety of services and activities; however, the largest promotion of programs' overall income was spent on education services; (17) most Head Start programs reported that state-funded preschools, other preschools, child development centers and child care centers, and family day care homes operated in the same communities as Head Start programs; and (18) although GAO's review did not determine the extent to which these programs resemble Head Start, some that serve disadvantaged children sometimes help children and families obtain additional services, such as medical services, as Head Start does.

gao_GAO-02-969T

gao_GAO-02-969T_0

Factors Contributing to Reduced Pharmacy Costs Drug Formularies Help to Reduce Drug Costs VA and DOD have been able to reduce spending on drugs by establishing formularies. Departments Use Several Purchasing Arrangements to Obtain Lower Drug Prices VA and DOD have been successful in using a number of purchasing arrangements to obtain substantial discounts on prescription drugs (see table 1). For the bulk of their pharmaceutical purchases, VA and DOD obtain favorable prices through the Federal Supply Schedule (FSS). Consolidated Mail Outpatient Pharmacies Reduce Drug Refill Costs VA has used consolidated mail outpatient pharmacy (CMOP) centers to reduce dispensing costs. In addition to reducing dispensing costs, additional benefits could result because VA’s CMOPs have reduced the pharmacy workload of VA hospital and clinic pharmacies. Generic drug contracts do not require drug class reviews—since competing products are already known to be chemically and therapeutically alike— and, therefore, take less effort and time—about 120 days. One of the most important challenges is the joint procurement of brand name drugs. As discussed earlier, garnering clinical support and provider acceptance on certain brand name drugs is more difficult because of the scientific reviews needed to gain clinical agreement on therapeutic equivalence of competing drugs. As a result, most VA and DOD joint procurements have been for low-cost generic drugs. The joint purchase of brand name drugs is further complicated due to the significant differences between the VA and DOD health care systems. One of these challenges is to increase joint purchasing of brand name drugs, which account for most pharmacy costs. To do this, the two departments need to address how differences in their respective patient populations, national formularies, and practice patterns among prescribers, some of whom are private physicians, can be managed to facilitate joint purchasing.

What GAO Found The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) and the Department of Defense (DOD) pharmacy expenditures have risen significantly, reflecting national trends. The increase in pharmacy costs would have been even greater if not for the efforts taken by VA and DOD. GAO identified four important factors that have contributed to reduced pharmacy spending by VA and DOD. First, the two departments have used formularies to encourage the substitution of a lower-cost drug that is determined to be just as effective as a higher-cost drug. Second, VA and DOD have been able to effectively employ different arrangements to pay for or purchase prescription drugs at substantial discounts. Third, VA has significantly reduced the cost of dispensing prescription refills by using highly automated and less expensive consolidated mail outpatient pharmacy (CMOP) centers to handle a majority of the pharmacy workload instead of VA hospital and clinic pharmacies. Fourth, VA and DOD have reduced costs by leveraging their combined purchasing power by jointly buying prescription drugs. Nevertheless, one of the most important challenges is the joint procurement of brand name drugs. Although brand name drugs account for the bulk of prescription drug expenditures, most of VA/DOD joint contracts have been for generic drugs. Generic drugs are easier to contract for because these products are already known to be chemically and therapeutically alike. Contracting for brand name drugs is more difficult because of the scientific reviews needed to gain clinical agreement on therapeutic equivalence of competing drugs. Joint purchasing of brand name drugs is also more difficult due to the significant differences between the VA and DOD health care systems in patient populations; national formularies; and prescribing patterns of providers, some of whom are private physicians.

gao_T-GGD-98-78

gao_T-GGD-98-78_0

The New Personnel Flexibilities Could Be Evaluated Before Being Made Permanent We have examined two bills that would give IRS new flexibilities in managing its workforce: H.R. The bills are similar in that both would give IRS additional flexibilities relating to performance management, staffing, and the development of demonstration projects. The legislative proposals in H.R. Until the Commissioner develops that plan, acting in accordance with both the new legislation and those provisions of Title 5 to which IRS would remain subject, and has some experience in implementing the new flexibilities, there is no way to predict just how helpful the new flexibilities may be in improving IRS’ actual performance. H.R. 2676 appropriately gives IRS the opportunity to factor in other measures, such as customer service results and employee behavior. Both H.R. Flexibility and Accountability The proposals for new personnel flexibility at IRS are part of a broader set of proposals to restructure the agency and improve its performance. In our previous work, we have recognized that to manage effectively for results, agencies need the flexibility to manage according to their needs and missions. We have also found that, over the years, Title 5 has evolved to give federal agencies more flexibility than they once had—and often, more than they realize—to tailor their personnel approaches to their missions and needs. The merit principles and certain other national goals, such as veterans’ preference, remain generally applicable to employees of all agencies. 2676 and S. 1174, while giving new personnel flexibilities to IRS beyond those already available to it under Title 5, would specifically require that the agency continue to conform to the merit principles and other national goals. However, the proposals for IRS do not make OPM’s role in this regard entirely clear. 2676 and S. 1174 have been developed to provide IRS exceptions from various Title 5 personnel requirements that IRS believes impede its ability to accomplish its mission. In addition, the bills’ provisions encouraging IRS to align its employees’ performance with IRS’ mission and goals are consistent with other public- and private-sector organizational trends that have been given congressional endorsement through the passage of the Results Act.

Why GAO Did This Study GAO discussed the possible implications of proposed legislation that would give new personnel flexibility to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). What GAO Found GAO noted that: (1) it examined two bills that would give IRS new flexibilities in managing its workforce: H.R. 2676 and S. 1174; (2) the bills are similar in that both would give IRS additional flexibilities relating to performance management, staffing, and the development of demonstration projects; (3) until the Commissioner of IRS develops an implementation plan, acting in accordance with both the new legislation and those provisions of Title 5 to which IRS would remain subject, and has some experience in implementing the new flexibilities, there is no way to predict just how helpful the new flexibilities may be in improving IRS' actual performance; (4) GAO believes that H.R. 2676 appropriately gives IRS the opportunity to factor in other measures, such as customer service results and employee behavior; (5) the proposals for new personnel flexibility at IRS are a part of a broader set of proposals to restructure the agency and improve its performance; (6) GAO has recognized that to manage effectively for results, agencies need the flexibility to manage according to their needs and mission; (7) GAO also found that, over the years, Title 5 has evolved to give federal agencies more flexibility than they once had--and often more then they realize-- to tailor their personnel approaches to their missions and needs; (8) the merit principles and certain other national goals such as veterans' preference remain generally applicable to employees of all agencies; (9) both H.R. 2676 and S. 1174, while giving new personnel flexibilities to IRS beyond those already available to it under Title 5, would specifically require that the agency continue to conform to the merit principles and other national goals; (10) the proposals in H.R. 2676 and S. 1174 have been developed to provide IRS exceptions from various Title 5 personnel requirements that IRS believes impede its ability to accomplish its mission; (11) the bills' provisions encouraging IRS to align its employees' performance with IRS mission and goals are consistent with other public- and private-sector organizational trends that have been given congressional endorsement through the passage of the Government Performance and Results Act; and (12) these proposals do not make clear the Office of Personnel Management's role of ensuring IRS' continued compliance with the merit principles.

gao_T-HR-97-22

gao_T-HR-97-22_0

Progress in Resolving High-Risk Program Areas Overall, agencies are taking high-risk problems seriously, trying to correct them, and making progress in many areas. The Congress has also acted to address several problems affecting these high-risk areas through oversight hearings and specific legislative initiatives. Full and effective implementation of legislative mandates, our suggestions, and corrective measures by agencies, however, has not yet been achieved because the high-risk areas involve long-standing problems that are difficult to correct. Effective implementation of this legislation and other agency actions is key to mitigating many of Medicare’s vulnerabilities to fraud and abuse. Additional agency attention to improve lending management and actions by the Congress are necessary as well. As countless studies we have performed have long noted and our high-risk series of reports demonstrates, federal agencies often fail to appropriately manage their finances, identify clearly what they intend to accomplish, or do the job effectively with a minimum of waste. Left unresolved, persistent and long-standing high-risk areas will result in the government continuing to needlessly lose billions of dollars and missing huge opportunities to achieve its objectives at less cost and with better service delivery. GPRA requires agencies to set goals, measure performance, and report on their accomplishments. GPRA will be more difficult for some agencies to apply than for others. But GPRA has the potential for adding greatly to government performance—a particularly vital goal at a time when resources are limited and public demand is high. Managing the Cost of Government Programs More Effectively Reliable financial information is key to better managing government programs, providing accountability, and addressing high-risk problems. As a result of situations such as these, financial information has not been reliable enough to use in federal decision-making or to provide the requisite public accountability. The landmark Chief Financial Officers (CFO) Act spelled out a long overdue and ambitious agenda to help resolve these types of financial management deficiencies. Important and steady progress is being made under the act to bring about sweeping reforms and rectify the devastating legacy from inattention to financial management.

Why GAO Did This Study GAO discussed major government programs and operations it has identified as high risk because of vulnerability to waste, fraud, abuse, and mismanagement and legislative and agency actions that have resulted in progress towards resolving these problems. What GAO Found GAO noted that: (1) without additional attention to resolve problems in the 25 areas that are the current focus of GAO's high-risk initiative, the government will continue to miss huge opportunities to save billions of dollars, make better investments to reap the benefits of information technology, improve performance and provide better service, and more effectively manage the cost of government programs; (2) effective and sustained follow-through by agency managers is essential to make further headway and achieve greater benefits; (3) continued oversight by Congress will add essential impetus to ensuring progress as well; (4) landmark legislation passed by Congress in the 1990s has established broad management reforms, which, with successful implementation, will help resolve high-risk problems and provide greater accountability in many government programs and operations; (5) overall, agencies are taking high-risk problems seriously, trying to correct them, and making progress in many areas; (6) Congress has also acted to address several problems affecting these high-risk areas through oversight hearings and specific legislative initiatives; (7) full and effective implementation of legislative mandates, GAO suggestions, and corrective measures by agencies, however, have not yet been achieved because the high-risk areas involve long-standing problems that are difficult to correct; (8) federal agencies often fail to appropriately manage their finances, identify clearly what they intend to accomplish, or do the job effectively with a minimum of waste; (9) the Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA) requires agencies to set goals, measure performance, and report on their accomplishments; (10) GPRA will be more difficult for some agencies to apply than for others, but GPRA has the potential for adding greatly to government performance, a particularly vital goal at a time when resources are limited and public demand is high; (11) reliable financial information is key to better managing government programs, providing accountability, and addressing high-risk problems, but financial information has not been reliable enough to use in federal decisionmaking or to provide the requisite public accountability; (12) the landmark Chief Financial Officers Act spelled out a long overdue and ambitious agenda to help resolve financial management deficiencies; and (13) important and steady progress is being made under the act to bring about sweeping reforms and rectify the devastating legacy from inattention to financial management.

gao_GAO-06-1007

gao_GAO-06-1007_0

Objectives, Scope, and Methodology To understand the steps that Treasury and the Federal Reserve took during the week of the September 11 attacks and during the following weeks to assure required debt obligations and payments were made on time and ensure liquidity in the financial market, we conducted interviews with knowledgeable Treasury and Federal Reserve officials and staff. To understand major actions Treasury, the Federal Reserve, and primary dealers have taken since the September 11 attacks to increase the resiliency of Treasury’s auction process and participation, we interviewed Treasury and Federal Reserve officials and staff involved in conducting primary dealer visits, the auction process, and systems. Compensating Balances Are No Longer Used Treasury replaced compensating balances with direct payments to banks for certain services in 2004. This effectively eliminated the alternative source of funds Treasury had drawn on during the September 11 attacks. Some Federal Reserve Actions and Financial Market Behavior Are Informative When Considering Alternative Funding Sources for Treasury Immediately after the September 11 attacks, many financial institutions, including some foreign central banks, looked to the Federal Reserve to provide liquidity through various methods. Despite Actions Intended to Increase Auction Resilience, Exploring Funding Alternatives Outside of the Auction Process Is Appropriate Regardless of the progress of resiliency efforts, the nature, duration, and effects of any potential future wide-scale disruption are unknown. In addition, since compensating balances are no longer used, Treasury has at least one less source of funds to rely upon. Finally, Treasury’s cash management policy of maintaining minimal cash balances to lower borrowing costs further limits Treasury’s access to cash during a wide- scale disruption. The relevant parties with whom we spoke, including primary dealers, agreed. Relevant Parties Validated Design Features and a Potential Tiered Approach to Treasury Funding Options Has Emerged from Discussions These parties also generally agreed that the main design features to be considered when weighing alternatives for backup funding options are the situations for use, source of funds, type of collateral, transaction type, approvals, determination of cost, amount limit, time limit, inclusion under debt ceiling, disclosure, and length of authority (if required). Discussions with Treasury and Federal Reserve officials and other relevant parties have led us to conclude that a two-tiered approach could enhance Treasury’s ability to obtain funds during a wide-scale disruption. The first tier consists of two funding options involving a range of appropriate financial institutions, namely (1) a credit line and (2) a private placement of a CM bill. The second tier involves a direct draw from the Federal Reserve that would provide Treasury a last resort source of funds when other options are not viable. Obtain a Line of Credit with Financial Institutions A credit line would provide Treasury a prior transparent commitment or understanding with several financial institutions to provide funds to Treasury during a wide-scale disruption. Private Placement of a Cash Management Bill A private placement of a CM bill would involve a prior arrangement to issue a CM bill after communicating with certain senior executives at financial institutions who would have the ability and authority to purchase a CM bill that meets Treasury’s immediate funding needs. Explicitly Authorize a Treasury Draw Authority with the Federal Reserve In the event that the first tier options involving financial institutions proved insufficient, turning to the Federal Reserve as a last resort funding source would require a change in law to allow the Federal Reserve to directly lend to Treasury. Appropriate limitations, adequate flexibility, and accountability would have to be included in the design. All these factors make it prudent to explore other funding options for Treasury to use during a wide-scale disruption.

Why GAO Did This Study The September 11, 2001, attacks significantly affected the financial markets that the U.S. Treasury (Treasury) relies on. To understand how Treasury could obtain funds during a future potential wide-scale financial market disruption GAO examined (1) steps Treasury and others took during the September 11 attacks and after to assure required debt obligations and payments were made on time and ensure liquidity in the markets, (2) major actions Treasury and others have taken since the attacks to increase the resiliency of the auction process, and (3) the opinions of relevant parties on the main design features of any backup funding options. We conducted interviews with Treasury officials and others and reviewed appropriate documents. What GAO Found In response to the effects of the September 11 attacks on the financial markets, Treasury canceled a scheduled 4-week bill auction after communicating with the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (FRBNY). Treasury then used compensating balances from banks across the country to help meet its obligations on time. Compensating balances were replaced by direct payments in 2004. Also, in response to the attacks' financial effects, the Federal Reserve lent billions of dollars to both domestic and foreign financial institutions through a combination of methods to help markets recover. Federal Reserve actions and market behavior in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks are informative when considering potential alternative funding sources for Treasury during a future wide-scale financial market disruption. Treasury, the Federal Reserve, and primary dealers have added contingency sites and systems intended to increase the resilience of the auction process. Regardless of resiliency efforts, the nature and impact of a potential future wide-scale disruption are unknown. In addition, Treasury has at least one less source of cash since the compensating balances Treasury relied upon during the September 11 attacks are no longer used. Finally, Treasury's cash management policy of minimal cash balances to lower borrowing costs further limits Treasury's access to cash during a wide-scale disruption. All these factors make it prudent for Treasury to explore other funding alternatives to use during a wide-scale disruption. Relevant parties with whom we spoke, including primary dealers, agreed. They also generally agreed on a list of main design features including source of funds, situations for use, approvals, and costs, among others, that should be considered when weighing alternative funding options. Discussions with Treasury, the Federal Reserve, and other relevant parties have led GAO to conclude that a two-tiered approach is promising. The first tier consists of two funding options involving a range of appropriate financial institutions, namely a credit line and a private placement of a flexible security known as a cash management (CM) bill. The second tier involves a direct draw from the Federal Reserve that would provide Treasury a last resort source of funds when other options are not viable. A credit line with several financial institutions would involve a prior transparent commitment or understanding by certain financial institutions to provide funds to Treasury. A private placement of a CM bill would involve a prior arrangement to issue a CM bill after communicating with certain senior executives at financial institutions who would have the ability and authority to meet Treasury's immediate funding needs. Finally, a direct draw from the Federal Reserve would require a change in the law to allow the Federal Reserve to directly lend to Treasury. Appropriate limitations, adequate flexibility, and accountability would have to be included in the design.

gao_GAO-14-140

gao_GAO-14-140_0

1). In 2012 about 126 million tons of coal was exported––about 12 percent of the total coal produced in the United States. In total, revenues from federal coal leases have generated about $1 billion annually in recent years. Of the 107 Tracts Leased Since 1990, About 90 Percent Had a Single Bidder, and Most Were Leased the First Time Offered In 1990, BLM began using the lease-by-application process as the primary method to lease out coal, and since then BLM has leased 107 coal tracts, 31 of which were in Wyoming. Royalties. Bonus bids. BLM’s Implementation of the Fair Market Value Process Lacks Sufficient Rigor and Oversight BLM’s guidance offers flexibility in how to estimate fair market value, and BLM state offices vary in the approaches they use to develop an estimate of fair market value. Some state offices use both the comparable sales and income approaches in their appraisals while others rely solely on the comparable sales approach and may not be fully considering future market conditions as a result. In addition, we found that BLM did not consistently document the rationale for accepting bids that were initially below the fair market value presale estimate, and some state offices were not following guidance for review of appraisal reports. Furthermore, no independent review of appraisals is taking place, as is recommended by commonly used appraisal standards, despite Interior having expertise that could be leveraged to do so. Under the comparable sales approach, bonus bids received for past sales are used to value the tract being appraised. BLM State Offices Differ in Their Appraisal Approaches, and Some Offices May Not Be Fully Considering Future Market Conditions as a Result During our interviews with BLM officials, we found that BLM state offices use different approaches to develop an estimate of fair market value of coal leases, and we confirmed this during our case file review. In addition, BLM is not currently taking advantage of a potential independent third-party reviewer with appraisal expertise within Interior, specifically, the Office of Valuation Services. BLM Considers Coal Exports to Limited Extent When Estimating Fair Market Value and Does Not Consider Domestic Reserve Estimates Because of Their Variable Nature BLM considers coal exports to a limited extent when developing an estimate of fair market value and generally does not explicitly consider estimates of the total amount of coal in the United States that can be mined economically, known as domestic reserve estimates. As a result, BLM may not be factoring specific export information into appraisals or keeping up- to-date with emerging trends. Domestic reserve estimates are not considered due to the variable nature of these estimates according to BLM officials. BLM Provides Limited Information on Federal Coal Lease Sales to the Public BLM generally provides limited information on federal coal lease sales to the public. In contrast, the New Mexico state office had no coal leasing information on its website. The Wyoming BLM officials’ point of view stands in conflict with BLM’s guidance that additional information in the form of public versions of the appraisal report should be prepared and the Office of the Solicitor’s determination that FOIA does not allow BLM to withhold entire documents relating to the estimate of fair market value in response to FOIA requests when portions of these documents contain information that is not protected from disclosure and should be released. Adequate oversight of the fair market value process is critical to ensuring that its results are sound and properly reviewed. Finally, BLM provides little summary information on its websites on past lease sales or links to sale-related documents. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope and Methodology Our objectives were to examine (1) federal coal leasing, including the number of tracts leased, along with the trends in associated coal production and revenues generated since 1990; (2) Bureau of Land Management’s (BLM) implementation of the process to develop an estimate of fair market value for coal leases; (3) the extent to which BLM considers coal exports and domestic coal reserve estimates when developing an estimate of fair market value; and (4) the extent to which BLM communicates information on federal coal lease sales to the public. We also analyzed data on coal production and revenues generated from federal coal leases from fiscal years 1990 to 2012 from the Department of the Interior’s Office of Natural Resources and Revenue (ONRR), which is responsible for collecting and distributing revenues associated with federal mineral leases including federal coal leases. Reports that are relevant to the determination of fair market value include the following: geologic reports, which contain an estimate of the amount of coal that can be recovered on the lease tract along with the characteristics of the coal, including its heating content; engineering reports, which generally contain estimates of the costs to extract the coal based on the number of employees and capital equipment necessary to carry out mining activities; economic reports, which establish price and demand levels for the lease tract’s coal; and appraisal reports, which document the fair market value for the lease tract, along with an explanation of the methods used to develop this number.

Why GAO Did This Study In fiscal year 2012, about 42 percent of the 1.05 billion tons of coal produced in the United States came from coal tracts leased under the federal coal leasing program. Interior's BLM is responsible for managing this program, including estimating the fair market value of the coal to be leased. GAO was asked to examine this program. (Representative Markey originally made this request as Ranking Member of the House Committee on Natural Resources. He is now a member of the United States Senate.) This report examines (1) the number of tracts leased, along with the trends in associated coal production and revenues generated since 1990; (2) BLM's implementation of the process to estimate fair market value for coal leases; (3) the extent to which BLM considers coal exports and domestic coal reserve estimates when estimating fair market value; and (4) the extent to which BLM communicates information on federal coal lease sales to the public. GAO analyzed data on coal leasing activity, examined regulations and case files for coal lease sales, and interviewed BLM and other officials. What GAO Found Since January 1990, the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) has leased 107 coal tracts, and associated coal production and revenues have grown. Most lease sales have had a single bidder and were leased the first time offered. The amount of coal produced from federal leases and associated revenues have increased since 1990, although production has leveled off since 2002. Revenues from federal coal leases have generated about $1 billion annually in recent years. Royalties paid when coal is sold and bonus bids paid for the right to mine a federal coal tract account for nearly all of these revenues. BLM's guidance offers flexibility in how to estimate fair market value, and BLM state offices vary in the approaches they used to develop an estimate of fair market value. In estimating fair market value, some BLM state offices used both the comparable sales approach--where bonus bids received for past sales are used to value the tract being appraised--and the income approach--which uses estimates of the future net revenue streams from the sale of coal from the appraised tract. However, some offices relied solely on the comparable sales approach and may not be fully considering future market conditions as a result. In addition, GAO found that BLM did not consistently document the rationale for accepting bids that were initially below the fair market value presale estimate. Furthermore, some state offices were not following guidance for review of appraisal reports, and no independent review of these reports was taking place. Adequate review of the fair market value process is critical to ensure that its results are sound and key decisions are fully documented. In addition, BLM is not currently taking advantage of a potential independent third-party reviewer with appraisal expertise within the Department of the Interior (Interior), specifically, the Office of Valuation Services. BLM considers exports to a limited extent when estimating fair market value and generally does not explicitly consider estimates of the amount of coal that can be mined economically, known as domestic reserve estimates. As a result, BLM may not be factoring specific export information into appraisals or may not be fully considering the export potential of a lease tract's coal as called for in agency guidance. The Wyoming and Montana BLM state offices considered exports, but they generally included only generic statements about exports in the reports they prepared. In the other seven states with leasing activity, exports were generally not considered during the appraisal process. According to BLM officials, domestic reserve estimates, which vary based on market conditions and the costs to extract the coal, are not considered due to their variable nature. BLM generally provides limited information on federal coal lease sales to the public because of the sensitive and proprietary nature of some of this information. The Wyoming BLM state office posts information on its website, including information on past lease sales, but most state office websites provide only general information. BLM's guidance states that redacted public versions of its appraisal reports should be prepared, but no BLM state office has prepared such reports. BLM supplied redacted versions of fair market value documents in response to a recent public information request only after being advised to do so by Interior's Solicitor's office. What GAO Recommends GAO recommends, among other things, that BLM require state offices to use more than one approach to estimate fair market value where practicable, develop a mechanism to ensure that reviews of appraisal reports take place, and take steps to release additional summary information on its websites, including past lease sales. Interior concurred with these recommendations.

gao_GAO-02-659T

gao_GAO-02-659T_0

We identified three critical elements that should be evaluated together as part of this framework: (1) physical security and real estate, (2) mission priorities and requirements, and (3) operational costs. We can also see ambassadors using this framework to ensure that embassy staffing is in line with security concerns, mission priorities and requirements, and costs to reduce the number of people at risk. The Paris Embassy, our case study, illustrates the importance of security and real estate issues in determining overseas staffing levels. The security situation in Paris is not good and suggests the need to consider reducing staff. One of the buildings is particularly vulnerable and staff face a variety of threats. Each agency in Washington has its own criteria for placing staff overseas. Our work in Paris highlights the complexity of rightsizing the U.S. overseas presence given the lack of clearly stated mission priorities and requirements and demonstrates the need for a more disciplined process. What Are an Embassy’s Operating Costs? We have documented the total cost for all agencies operating in France in fiscal year 2001 to be about $100 million. These options include: relocating functions to the United States; relocating functions to regional centers; relocating functions to other locations under chief of mission authority where relocation back to the United States or to regional centers is not practical; purchasing services from the private sector; and streamlining outmoded or inefficient business practices. For instance, the executive branch needs to prioritize foreign policy goals and objectives and insist on a link between those goals and staffing levels. Developing comprehensive cost data and linking budgets and staffing decisions are also imperative. What is the ratio of support staff to program staff at the embassy?

Why GAO Did This Study Rightsizing is the aligning of the number and location of staff assigned to U.S. embassies with foreign policy priorities, security, and other constraints. GAO is developing a framework to enable the executive branch to assess the number and mix of embassy staff. The framework will link staffing levels to the following three critical elements of overseas operations: (1) physical security and real estate, (2) mission priorities and requirements, and (3) operational costs. GAO reviewed policies and practices at the U.S. Embassy in Paris because of its large size and history of rightsizing decisions. What GAO Found GAO found that about 700 employees from 11 agencies work in main buildings at the Paris Embassy. Serious security concerns in at least one embassy building in Paris suggest the need to consider staff reductions unless building security can be improved. Staffing levels are hard to determine because agencies use different criteria and priorities to place staff. The lack of comprehensive cost data on all agencies' operations, which is estimated at more than $100 million annually in France, and the lack of an embassywide budget eliminate the possibility of cost-based decisionmaking on staffing. The number of staff could be reduced, particularly those in support positions, which constitute about one-third of the total. Options include relocating functions to the United States or to regional centers and outsourcing commercial activities.

gao_GAO-08-499T

gao_GAO-08-499T_0

Health IT offers promise for improving patient safety and reducing inefficiencies. Given the level of the federal government’s participation in providing health care, it has been urged to take a leadership role in driving change to improve the quality and effectiveness of medical care in the United States, including an expanded adoption of IT. In an effort to leverage the federal government’s role in health care, the President called for the Secretary of Health and Human Services to appoint a National Coordinator for Health Information Technology. The Secretary appointed the first National Coordinator in May 2004. For example, in late 2005 the National Coordinator’s Office awarded several contracts to address a range of activities important for expanding the implementation of health IT; these activities include ● defining criteria and a process for certifying the interoperability of electronic health records to help increase the number of health care providers adopting electronic health records, ● defining health information standards needed to ensure the interoperability of electronic health records and health IT systems, ● defining requirements for exchanging health information throughout a nationwide health information network, and ● defining privacy and security policies to ensure the protection of electronic personal health information. In May 2005, we recommended that HHS establish detailed plans and milestones for the development of a national health IT strategy and take steps to ensure that its plans are followed and milestones are met. HHS Is Pursuing Efforts to Advance the Nationwide Implementation of Health IT, but It Has Not Yet Completed a National Strategy HHS and the Office of the National Coordinator have been pursuing various efforts to implement health IT solutions. Among other activities, the department has been relying on recommendations of the American Health Information Community to assist the office’s health IT initiatives in several key areas aimed at the expansion of electronic health records, identification of health IT standards, advancement of nationwide health information exchange, protection of personal health information, and other related issues. Further, although HHS has initiated specific activities intended to meet the goals of its framework for strategic action, and it is continuing efforts to expand the nationwide implementation of health IT, it is undertaking these activities without a comprehensive national strategy that includes the detailed plans, milestones, and performance measures needed to ensure that the outcomes of its various initiatives are integrated and its goals are met. However, HHS has not yet defined detailed plans and milestones for integrating the various initiatives, nor has it developed performance measures for tracking progress toward the President’s goal for widespread adoption of interoperable electronic health records by 2014.

Why GAO Did This Study Health information technology (IT) offers promise for improving patient safety and reducing inefficiencies. Given its role in providing health care in the United States, the federal government has been urged to take a leadership role to improve the quality and effectiveness of health care, including the adoption of IT. In April 2004, President Bush called for widespread adoption of interoperable electronic health records within 10 years and issued an executive order that established the position of the National Coordinator for Health Information Technology within the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). The National Coordinator, appointed in May 2004, released a framework for strategic action two months later. In late 2005, HHS also awarded several contracts to address key areas of health IT. GAO has been reporting on the department's efforts toward nationwide implementation of health IT since 2005. In prior work, GAO recommended that HHS establish detailed plans and milestones for the development of a national health IT strategy and take steps to ensure that its plans are followed and milestones met. For this testimony, GAO was asked to describe HHS's efforts to advance the use of health IT. To do this, GAO reviewed prior reports and agency documents on the current status of relevant HHS activities. What GAO Found HHS and the Office of the National Coordinator have been pursuing various activities in key areas associated with the President's goal for nationwide implementation of health IT. In 2005, the department established the American Health Information Community, a federal advisory committee, to help define the future direction of a national strategy for health IT and to make recommendations to the Secretary of Health and Human Services for implementing interoperable health IT. The community has made recommendations directed toward key areas of health IT, including the expansion of electronic health records, the identification of standards, the advancement of nationwide health information exchange, the protection of personal health information, and other related issues. Even though HHS is undertaking these various activities, it has not yet developed a national strategy that defines plans, milestones, and performance measures for reaching the President's goal of interoperable electronic health records by 2014. In 2006, the National Coordinator for Health Information Technology agreed with GAO's recommendation that HHS define such a strategy; however, the department has not yet done so. Without an integrated national strategy, HHS will be challenged to ensure that the outcomes of its various health IT initiatives effectively support the President's goal for widespread adoption of interoperable electronic health records.

gao_AIMD-97-58

gao_AIMD-97-58_0

The Navy Has No Specific Career Path for Its Officers to Develop Core Competencies in Comptrollership The financial management core competencies needed by individuals in comptroller positions require both formal education in accounting and business, and experience in financial management. About half of the key comptroller positions are staffed by line officers and half by officers in the supply corps. By contrast, the Air Force and the Army offer a career path in comptrollership. After a 26-year career as a warfare officer, this captain was assigned as comptroller of a Navy fleet. Navy Officers in Comptroller Positions Often Lack Financial Management Experience and Accounting Education The Navy has staffed its military comptroller positions with individuals who, on average, lack the depth of financial management experience and the accounting education needed for the financial management environment of the 1990s. Profile of Navy Line Officers in Comptroller Positions Of the 100 key comptroller positions filled by Navy officers in October 1996, 53 were occupied by line officers whose primary career fields were in Navy operational commands, including surface weapons officers, aviators, and submariners. They averaged 17.8 years of commissioned service in the Navy, but only 3.4 years in financial management jobs, including their tenure in their current comptroller position. Thirty-two of the 53 officers (60 percent) obtained masters degrees in a business-related major, but 14 of the remaining 21 officers (26 percent) lacked either undergraduate or graduate education in any business-related field. While these officers have careers with more exposure to financial management activities than line officers, many supply officers still lack the depth of experience in fiscal administration and the accounting education needed for comptrollership in today’s complex financial management environment. They averaged 16.1 years of commissioned service in the Navy of which 3.4 years were in fiscal-related positions and 5.7 years were in logistics positions that involved some financial management experience. Although the Navy does not have a career path in financial management, a few supply corps officers have a career profile that was heavily focused on fiscal assignments. To meet these demands, Navy personnel practices for key comptroller positions need improvement to ensure the development of the core competencies and experience necessary to meet today’s considerable challenges.

Why GAO Did This Study Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed opportunities to improve the experience and training of key Navy comptrollers, focusing on: (1) personnel practices and the education and experience of Navy officers serving in comptroller positions; and (2) options for strengthening these practices. What GAO Found GAO noted that: (1) the Navy's personnel practices do not provide a career path for Navy officers to develop and maintain the core competencies needed by a comptroller; (2) by contrast, the Air Force and the Army offer a career path in comptrollership; (3) because of the Navy's approach, many officers in key comptroller positions lack the financial management experience and the accounting education needed to meet the demands of today's financial management environment; (4) slightly more than half of the Navy's key comptroller positions are filled by line officers whose primary occupation in the Navy is in surface warfare, submarines, aviation, or operational staff positions; (5) these officers averaged 17.8 years of commissioned service in the Navy, but only 3.4 of those years had been spent in any financial management position, including their current comptroller job; (6) about 60 percent of the line officers had obtained masters degrees in business-related majors, but due to Navy personnel practices, many did not utilize their financial management education until several years after graduation and generally served in a comptroller position for only one tour in their career; (7) about 26 percent of the line officers serving as comptrollers had no college degree in any business-related field; (8) supply corps officers, while more qualified from a formal education perspective than line officers for comptroller positions, generally lacked the depth of experience needed by a comptroller for the 1990s and beyond; (9) most of the supply officers held a college degree at the bachelors or masters level in accounting or business, but few had substantial experience in Navy fiscal administration assignments involving such roles as budget officer, accountant, or comptroller; (10) they averaged 16.1 years of commissioned service in the Navy of which 3.4 years were in fiscal administration and 5.7 years were in logistics positions that involved some financial management experience; and (11) in a few cases, senior supply corps officers had as much as 10 years experience in fiscal administration.

gao_GGD-98-110

gao_GGD-98-110_0

GSA’s Plan Does Not Provide a Clear Picture of Intended Performance Across the Agency We found that overall, GSA’s performance plan does not provide a clear picture of expected performance across the agency. First, most of the performance goals and related measures are not quantifiable or results oriented. Connecting Mission, Goals, and Activities Contrary to the Results Act and OMB guidance, GSA’s performance plan does not always show clear connections between the performance goals and the specific program activities and funding in its budget. The plan includes GSA’s mission statement and gives abbreviated versions of its strategic goals presented in its strategic plan, but they are not identified as such. For example, according to the plan, three of the performance goals under the goal to “promote responsible asset management” involve “collaboration among many federal agencies brought together by GSA” and “measurement of the results of policy initiatives will require collection of other agencies’ costs.” However, although the discussion of some of the efforts contain references to coordination with other federal agencies, the plan does not discuss how GSA will coordinate these efforts. Target percentages for fiscal years 1998 and 1999 are listed. GSA’s Plan Provides Partial Confidence That Performance Information Will Be Credible We found that GSA’s performance plan partially meets the Results Act criteria related to including information on verifying and validating performance data. Also, we found that the plan does not contain a discussion of actions GSA will take or has taken to address known data limitations. Conclusions GSA’s performance plan falls short of meeting the criteria set forth in the Results Act and related OMB guidance. Specifically, in developing the next plan, we recommend that the Administrator take steps to refine GSA’s performance goals to make them more quantifiable and results clarify how GSA’s performance goals link to specific program activities in GSA’s budget; explain how GSA has coordinated its crosscutting functions with the discuss GSA strategies to be used and resources needed to achieve its performance goals and their intended results, as well as external factors that could affect its overall performance; and discuss specific controls for verifying and validating data used to measure performance, recognize existing data limitations, and explain GSA efforts to overcome those limitations. 1115(a)(3). Additional copies are $2 each.

Why GAO Did This Study GAO reviewed the General Services Administration's (GSA) fiscal year (FY) 1999 annual performance plan, which was submitted to Congress as required by the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993. What GAO Found GAO noted that: (1) GSA's performance plan has several performance goals for each of its strategic goals; (2) some of its performance goals and measures are objective and quantified and provide a way to compare actual to planned performance; (3) in addition, the plan contains some goals and measures that involve comparisons of GSA and the private sector; (4) however, for the most part, the plan falls short of meeting the criteria set forth in the Results Act and related guidance; (5) it does not adequately provide a clear picture of expected performance across the agency because: (a) like the goals in its strategic plan, many performance goals, and related measures, are not quantifiable or results oriented; (b) performance plan goals are not always linked to the specific program activities and funding in its budget; and (c) also like the strategic plan, the performance plan does not discuss GSA's coordination efforts for many crosscutting activities; (6) GAO also found that the performance plan generally does not have an explicit discussion of the strategies and resources that will be needed to achieve goals or the external factors that will affect accomplishment of the goals; and (7) although the plan includes a discussion of how GSA plans to verify performance data that provides partial confidence that performance information will be credible, it does not discuss the actions GSA has taken or will take to address known data limitations.

gao_GAO-01-1162T

gao_GAO-01-1162T_0

Yet the task of providing security to the nation’s aviation system is unquestionably daunting, and we must reluctantly acknowledge that any form of travel can never be made totally secure. Safeguarding airplanes and passengers requires, at the least, ensuring that perpetrators are kept from breaching security checkpoints and gaining access to secure airport areas or to aircraft. Still, in recent years, we and others have often demonstrated that significant weaknesses continue to plague the nation’s aviation security. Potential for Unauthorized Access to Aviation Computer Systems Our work has identified numerous problems with aspects of aviation security in recent years. One such problems is FAA’s computer-based air traffic control system. FAA had not (1) completed background checks on thousands of contractor employees, (2) assessed and accredited as secure many of its ATC facilities, (3) performed appropriate risk assessments to determine the vulnerability of the majority of its ATC systems, (4) established a comprehensive security program, (5) developed service continuity controls to ensure that critical operations continue without undue interruption when unexpected events occur, and (6) fully implemented an intrusion detection capability to detect and respond to malicious intrusions. In May 2000, we reported that our special agents, in an undercover capacity, obtained access to secure areas of two airports by using counterfeit law enforcement credentials and badges. FAA monitors the performance of screeners by periodically testing their ability to detect potentially dangerous objects carried by FAA special agents posing as passengers. Differences in the Screening Practices of Five Other Countries and the United States We visited five countries—Belgium, Canada, France, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom—viewed by FAA and the civil aviation industry as having effective screening operations to identify screening practices that differ from those in the United States. We found that some significant differences exist in four areas: screening operations, screener qualifications, screener pay and benefits, and institutional responsibility for screening.

What GAO Found A safe and secure civil aviation system is a critical component of the nation's overall security, physical infrastructure, and economic foundation. Billions of dollars and myriad programs and policies have been devoted to achieving such a system. Although it is not fully known at this time what actually occurred or what all the weaknesses in the nation's aviation security apparatus are that contributed to the horrendous events on September 11, 2001, it is clear that serious weaknesses exist in our aviation security system and that their impact can be far more devastating than previously imagined. As reported last year, GAO's review of the Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) oversight of air traffic control (ATC) computer systems showed that FAA had not followed some critical aspects of its own security requirements. Specifically, FAA had not ensured that ATC buildings and facilities were secure, that the systems themselves were protected, and that the contractors who access these systems had undergone background checks. Controls for limiting access to secure areas, including aircraft, have not always worked as intended. GAO's special agents used fictitious law enforcement badges and credentials to gain access to secure areas, bypass security checkpoints at two airports, and walk unescorted to aircraft departure gates. Tests of screeners revealed significant weaknesses as measured in their ability to detect threat objects located on passengers or contained in their carry-on luggage. Screening operations in Belgium, Canada, France, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom--countries whose systems GAO has examined--differ from this country's in some significant ways. Their screening operations require more extensive qualifications and training for screeners, include higher pay and better benefits, and often include different screening techniques, such as "pat-downs" of some passengers.

gao_GAO-06-682

gao_GAO-06-682_0

Opinion on Financial Statements The financial statements and accompanying notes present fairly, in all material respects, in conformity with U.S. generally accepted accounting principles, the Foundation’s financial position as of September 30, 2005, and 2004, and the results of its activities and its cash flows for the fiscal years then ended. Compliance With Laws and Regulations Our tests for compliance with relevant provisions of laws and regulations for fiscal year 2005 disclosed no instances of noncompliance that would be reportable under U.S. generally accepted government auditing standards. Specifically, section 104(c)(1) of the Congressional Award Act, as amended (2 U.S.C. For 2004, because the Foundation did not have appropriate fiscal procedures and did not have an individual with expertise in accounting and financial management to routinely administer the procedures and account for the financial operations of the Foundation, we determined that the Director did not substantially comply with the requirements in section 104(c)(1) of the Congressional Award Act, as amended (2 U.S.C. § 804(c)(1)). In order to fulfill these responsibilities, we examined, on a test basis, evidence supporting the amounts and disclosures in the financial statements; assessed the accounting principles used and significant estimates made evaluated the overall presentation of the financial statements and notes; read unaudited financial information for the Foundation for the first 6 months of fiscal year 2006; obtained an understanding of the internal control related to financial reporting (including safeguarding assets) and compliance with laws and regulations; tested relevant internal control over financial reporting and compliance and evaluated the design and operating effectiveness of internal control; and tested compliance with selected provisions of the Congressional Award Act, as amended. We performed our work in accordance with U.S. generally accepted government auditing standards. Presented below are the Foundation's expenses by functional classification for the fiscal years ended September 30, 2005, and 2004. The Foundation’s ability to continue as a going concern is dependent on increasing revenues.

Why GAO Did This Study This report presents our opinion on the financial statements of the Congressional Award Foundation for the fiscal years ended September 30, 2005, and 2004. These financial statements are the responsibility of the Congressional Award Foundation. This report also presents (1) our opinion on the effectiveness of the Foundation's related internal control as of September 30, 2005, and (2) our conclusion on the Foundation's compliance in fiscal year 2005 with selected provisions of laws and regulations we tested. We conducted our audit pursuant to section 107 of the Congressional Award Act, as amended (2 U.S.C. 807), and in accordance with U.S. generally accepted government auditing standards. This report also includes our determination required under section 104(c)(2)(A) of the Act (2 U.S.C. 804(c)(2)(A)) relating to the Foundation's financial operations. What GAO Found We have audited the statements of financial position of the Congressional Award Foundation (the Foundation) as of September 30, 2005, and 2004, and the related statements of activities and statements of cash flows for the fiscal years then ended. We found (1) the financial statements are presented fairly, in all material respects, in conformity with U.S. generally accepted accounting principles, although substantial doubt exists about the Foundation's ability to continue as a going concern; (2) the Foundation did not have effective internal control over financial reporting (including safeguarding assets) but did have effective control over compliance with laws and regulations; and (3) no reportable noncompliance with the provisions of laws and regulations we tested during fiscal year 2005.

gao_GAO-02-89

gao_GAO-02-89_0

HHS has regulations on individual investigator financial interests in federally funded or regulated research. The universities generally acknowledged a need for better coordination, and several of the universities told us they were taking steps to develop these linkages. As part of our study, we asked the five universities to provide some basic data on investigators’ financial conflicts of interest in clinical research involving human research subjects. Although Not Required, Universities Had Policies and Procedures That Addressed Aspects of Institutional Financial Conflicts of Interest While there are no federal regulations or guidelines on institutional financial conflicts of interest or how to manage them, the universities we visited had policies and procedures that addressed aspects of these issues, such as the management of investment funds, technology transfer activities, use of licensing income, and the acceptance of equity in start-up companies. Current Regulations and Oversight Have Limitations for Promoting Research Integrity and Human Subjects Protection In our review, we identified limitations with the HHS regulations and oversight of financial conflicts of interest in biomedical research that have implications for promoting the integrity of research and protecting human research subjects. However, this guidance does not provide detailed advice on managing institutional financial conflicts of interest. HHS’ Draft Interim Guidance on Financial Conflicts of Interest Is Promising but Limited With Regard to Institutional Conflicts In December 2000 HHS developed draft guidance entitled “Financial Relationships in Clinical Research: Issues for Institutions, Clinical Investigators, and IRBs to Consider When Dealing With Issues of Financial Interests and Human Subject Protection: Draft Interim Guidance.” This guidance drew on information obtained at a conference HHS held in August 2000 on financial conflicts of interest in clinical research and comments it received.

Why GAO Did This Study Financial relationships between individual investigators or their research institutions and private industry have yielded significant results, including treatments for such diseases as AIDS and strokes. However, some collaborations have raised concerns that the focus on financial reward might compromise the integrity of the research and the safety of human research subjects. GAO reviewed five universities with broad policies and procedures on financial conflicts of interest. What GAO Found All five had difficulty providing basic data on individual investigators' financial conflicts of interest in clinical research involving human subjects. The universities acknowledged a need for better coordination of information on investigators' financial relationships, and several universities were developing ways to do so. Policies and procedures at the five universities addressed financial conflicts of interest affecting institutions, including technology transfer activities and financial relationships with small start-up companies that market products developed by the universities. The Department of Health and Human Services has had limited success in promoting the integrity of biomedical research and protecting human subjects. HHS has taken steps to improve its oversight and monitoring and has drafted guidance on financial conflicts of interest, but this guidance does not provide detailed advice on how to manage institutional conflicts of interest.

gao_GAO-05-559T

gao_GAO-05-559T_0

Preliminary Observations on Proposed Regulations for DOD’s National Security Personnel System DOD and OPM’s proposed NSPS regulations would establish a new human resources management system within DOD that governs basic pay, staffing, classification, performance management, labor relations, adverse actions, and employee appeals. We believe that many of the basic principles underlying the proposed DOD regulations are generally consistent with proven approaches to strategic human capital management. Today, I will provide our preliminary observations on selected elements of the proposed regulations in the areas of pay and performance management, staffing and employment, workforce shaping, adverse actions and appeals, and labor-management relations. However, the experiences of high-performing organizations suggest that DOD should require the use of core competencies as a central feature of its performance management effort. Providing Adequate Safeguards to Ensure Fairness and Guard Against Abuse Although DOD’s proposed regulations provide for some safeguards to ensure fairness and guard against abuse, additional safeguards should be developed. DOD acknowledges that a comprehensive outreach and communications strategy is essential for designing and implementing its new human resources management system, but the proposed regulations do not identify a process for the continuing involvement of employees in the planning, development, and implementation of NSPS. Because the NSPS design process and proposed regulations have received considerable attention, we believe one of the most relevant implementation steps is for DOD to enhance two-way communication between employees, employee representatives, and management. According to DOD, it has not completed an implementation plan for NSPS, including an information technology plan and a training plan; thus, the full extent of the resources needed to implement NSPS may not be well understood at this time. Involving Employees and Other Stakeholders in Implementing the System The proposed regulations do not identify a process for the continuing involvement of employees in the planning, development, and implementation of NSPS. However, DOD’s proposed regulations do provide for continuing collaboration with employee representatives. The 30-day public comment period on the proposed regulations ended March 16, 2005. DOD and OPM notified the Congress that they are preparing to begin the meet and confer process with employee representatives who provided comments on the proposed regulations. Last month, during testimony, we stated that DOD is at the beginning of a long road, and the meet and confer process has to be meaningful and is critically important because there are many details of the proposed regulations that have not been defined. Moving forward, GAO believes it would be preferable to employ a governmentwide approach to address human capital issues and the need for certain flexibilities that have broad-based application and serious potential implications for the civil service system, in general, and the Office of Personnel Management, in particular. This could also serve to severely set back the legitimate need to move to a more performance- and results-based system for the federal government as a whole. The Department of Defense’s (DOD) civilian employees play key roles in such areas as defense policy, intelligence, finance, acquisitions, and weapon systems maintenance.

Why GAO Did This Study The Department of Defense's (DOD) new human resources management system--the National Security Personnel System (NSPS)--will have far-reaching implications for civil service reform across the federal government. The 2004 National Defense Authorization Act gave DOD significant flexibilities for managing more than 700,000 defense civilian employees. Given DOD's massive size, NSPS represents a huge undertaking for DOD. DOD's initial process to design NSPS was problematic; however, DOD adjusted its approach to a more deliberative process that involved more stakeholders. NSPS could, if designed and implemented properly, serve as a model for governmentwide transformation in human capital management. However, if not properly designed and implemented, it could severely impede progress toward a more performance- and results-based system for the federal government as a whole. On February 14, 2005, DOD and the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) released for public comment the proposed NSPS regulations. This testimony provides GAO's preliminary observations on selected provisions of the proposed regulations. What GAO Found Many of the principles underlying the proposed NSPS regulations are generally consistent with proven approaches to strategic human capital management. For instance, the proposed regulations provide for (1) elements of a flexible and contemporary human resources management system--such as pay bands and pay for performance; (2) DOD to rightsize its workforce when implementing reduction-in-force orders by giving greater priority to employee performance in its retention decisions; and (3) continuing collaboration with employee representatives. The 30-day public comment period on the proposed regulations ended March 16, 2005. DOD and OPM have notified the Congress that they are preparing to begin the meet and confer process with employee representatives who provided comments on the proposed regulations. The meet and confer process is critically important because there are many details of the proposed regulations that have not been defined, especially in the areas of pay and performance management, adverse actions and appeals, and labor-management relations. (It should be noted that 10 federal labor unions have filed suit alleging that DOD failed to abide by the statutory requirements to include employee representatives in the development of DOD's new labor relations system authorized as part of NSPS.) GAO has several areas of concern: the proposed regulations do not (1) define the details of the implementation of the system, including such issues as adequate safeguards to help ensure fairness and guard against abuse; (2) require, as GAO believes they should, the use of core competencies to communicate to employees what is expected of them on the job; and (3) identify a process for the continuing involvement of employees in the planning, development, and implementation of NSPS. Also, GAO believes that DOD (1) would benefit if it develops a comprehensive communications strategy that provides for ongoing, meaningful two-way communication that creates shared expectations among employees, employee representatives, and stakeholders and (2) should complete a plan for implementing NSPS to include an information technology plan and a training plan. Until such a plan is completed, the full extent of the resources needed to implement NSPS may not be well understood.

gao_GGD-99-57

gao_GGD-99-57_0

We used the difference between the average payroll cost per employee for the 2.2 million employees at the beginning of fiscal year 1993 and for the 1.9 million employees at the end of fiscal year 1997 to approximate a $21.6 billion payroll increase for a constant workforce of 1.9 million employees. Impact of Downsizing on Federal Payroll and Human Capital Between the beginning of fiscal year 1993 and the end of fiscal year 1997, the total federal payroll cost grew by $8.7 billion to $102.4 billion, even though the number of employees decreased by about 300,000, because the payroll cost reductions attributable to the employees who left were less than the increased payroll costs for those employees who remained with the federal government. In terms of 1997 constant dollars, however, the payroll declined by $2.4 billion during the 5-year downsizing period. For comparison, in terms of 1997 constant dollars, the payroll increase was approximately $6,460 per employee and $12.0 billion for 1.9 million employees. The increased payroll costs for those employed by the federal government were attributable to several causes, but the predominant cause was the annual, statutorily-based pay adjustment meant to make federal pay competitive with that of nonfederal employers. Certain changes in the characteristics of the federal workforce also increased the overall federal payroll cost. The net increase of $8.7 billion in the payroll occurred because employees’ payroll costs increased in excess of the payroll cost reductions resulting from the separation of about 300,000 employees during the period. Factors that Increased the Federal Payroll During Downsizing Table 2.1 shows the factors and the extent to which each contributed to the changes in employees’ average pay and benefits and to total federal payroll costs. Also, the total change in the cost of benefits, compared with the 5- year period preceding downsizing, was $4.2 billion less governmentwide, due primarily to the reduction in the number of employees. OPM officials said that the increase in retirement and Social Security contributions during downsizing was due primarily to the increasing number of employees covered by the Federal Employees Retirement System (FERS). The resulting changes in the characteristics of the workforce caused the average grade level to increase from GS-9.1 to GS-9.5 during downsizing. Performance pay increases were a combination of GS quality step increases and merit pay increases.

Why GAO Did This Study Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on the factors causing the federal payroll to increase while the number of federal employees decreased during downsizing, focusing on the extent to which each major factor contributed to the increase in the federal payroll during fiscal years (FY) 1993 through 1997. What GAO Found GAO noted that: (1) between the beginning of FY 1993 and the end of FY 1997, the total federal payroll grew by $8.7 billion to $102.4 billion, while the size of the federal workforce decreased from 2.2 million employees to 1.9 million; (2) in real terms, however, overall federal payroll costs decreased because, in 1997 constant dollars, the payroll declined by $2.4 billion during the 5-year downsizing period; (3) because the decrease in the number of employees for the most part offset actual aggregate payroll cost increases for those employees remaining on the payroll, GAO calculated payroll costs for a constant workforce of 1.9 million employees over the 5-year period to isolate the payroll cost increases and their causes; (4) on this basis, GAO estimated that, between FY 1993 and FY 1997, payroll costs in nominal dollars increased about $11,600 per employee and approximately $21.6 billion in total; (5) for comparison, in terms of 1997 constant dollars, this payroll increase was approximately $6,460 per employee and $12.0 billion for 1.9 million employees; (6) the increased payroll costs were attributable to several causes, but the predominant cause was the annual pay comparability adjustment that is intended to keep federal pay competitive with that of nonfederal employers; (7) the cost of employee benefits and changes in the characteristics of the federal workforce also played a major role in increasing the overall federal payroll cost; (8) employee benefits increased due primarily to: (a) incentives paid to separating employees; (b) the increasing proportion of employees in the Federal Employees' Retirement System (FERS) and the increasing cost of the government's required match for FERS employees' Thrift Savings Plan contributions; and (c) increases in health insurance costs; (9) changes in the characteristics of the federal workforce that increased payroll costs included: (a) career step increases based on tenure and satisfactory performance; (b) promotions; and (c) pay increases due to high quality performance; and (10) the payroll cost increases that resulted from these factors, however, were partially offset by the limited hiring of staff, at grades below the governmentwide average, whose lower pay levels helped dampen the overall average payroll and grade increases.

gao_GAO-15-643

gao_GAO-15-643_0

According to VHA policy, NCPS is also responsible for disseminating important information learned from RCAs to VAMCs. RCA Process VAMCs use the RCA process to examine whether a systems or process issue caused an adverse event. Adverse event occurs. Overall, from fiscal years 2010 through 2014, the total number of RCAs completed at VAMCs decreased by 18 percent—from 1,862 in fiscal year 2010 to 1,523 in fiscal year 2014. 2.) VHA’s NCPS officials told us they are not certain why the number of completed RCAs has decreased over time, especially in light of an increase in reports of adverse events over the past 5 fiscal years. NCPS’s lack of analysis is not consistent with federal internal control standards, which state that control activities should include comparisons and assessments of different sets of data so that analyses of the relationships can be made and appropriate actions taken. However, VHA is unaware how many VAMCs use these alternative processes. Because NCPS has not conducted an analysis to understand the relationship between the decrease in RCAs and possible contributing factors, such as the increase in adverse event reports and use of alternative processes, it is unclear whether the decrease indicates a negative trend in patient safety at VAMCs or a positive one. Moreover, without complete information on the extent to which VAMCs are using alternative processes to address the root causes of adverse events and the results of those processes, NCPS lacks important data that may be helpful in better identifying trends and system-wide patient safety improvement opportunities. VHA Oversees the RCA Process by Monitoring VAMC Compliance, and Develops System- Wide Patient Safety Initiatives Informed by RCA Data NCPS and VISN patient safety officers oversee the RCA process by monitoring each VAMC’s compliance with RCA requirements, including by reviewing RCA information in WebSPOT and conducting site visits. In addition to monitoring compliance, NCPS uses RCA information to inform system-wide initiatives to improve patient safety. Patient Safety Alerts and Advisories are urgent notifications sent to VAMCs that contain a description of a safety issue, instructions for implementing actions to prevent recurrence of the problem, and due dates for completion of actions. The RCA team recommended a structural change to the vents to prevent recurrence, which VHA then required to be implemented at all VAMCs. Without analyzing the reasons for declining RCAs, and understanding the extent that VAMCs use alternative processes and their results, NCPS has limited awareness of what VAMCs are doing to address the root causes of adverse events. Recommendations for Executive Action To ensure that appropriate steps are being taken to address the root causes of adverse events within VHA, the Secretary of Veterans Affairs should direct the Under Secretary for Health to take the following two actions: Conduct an analysis of the declining number of completed RCAs within the VA health care system, including identifying contributing factors, and take appropriate actions to address them. Determine the extent to which VAMCs are using alternative processes to address the root causes of adverse events when an RCA is not required, and collect information from VAMCs on the number and results of those alternative processes.

Why GAO Did This Study Adverse events are incidents that pose a risk of injury to a patient as the result of a medical intervention or the lack of an appropriate intervention. VAMCs use the RCA process to identify and evaluate systems or processes that caused an adverse event, recommend changes to prevent the event's recurrence, and determine whether implemented changes were effective. GAO was asked to review VA's processes and procedures for responding to adverse events. In this report, GAO examined (1) the extent to which VAMCs used the RCA process to respond to adverse events and (2) how VHA oversees the RCA process and uses information from the process to make system-wide improvements. To conduct this work, GAO reviewed VHA policy and guidance documents, analyzed VHA data on RCAs completed from fiscal years 2010 through 2014, and interviewed officials from NCPS—the VHA office responsible for monitoring RCA data. GAO also analyzed local RCA data and interviewed officials from four VAMCs selected to provide variation in factors such as complexity and location. What GAO Found To address adverse events, Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) medical centers (VAMC) completed 18 percent fewer root cause analyses (RCA) in fiscal year 2014 compared to fiscal year 2010, and the Veterans Health Administration (VHA) has not analyzed the reasons for the decrease. VHA's National Center for Patient Safety (NCPS) officials told GAO they were aware of the decrease, but were not certain why the number of completed RCAs had decreased over time, especially in light of a 7 percent increase in reports of adverse events over the same time period. NCPS officials suggested several potential factors that could contribute to the decrease, including VAMCs' use of processes other than RCAs to address adverse events. However, NCPS is unaware of how many VAMCs use these other processes or their results. VHA's lack of analysis is inconsistent with federal internal control standards which state that agencies should compare data to analyze relationships and take appropriate actions. Because NCPS has not conducted an analysis of the relationship between the decrease in RCAs and possible contributing factors, it is unclear whether the decrease indicates a negative trend in patient safety at VAMCs or a positive one. In addition, without understanding the extent to which VAMCs use alternative processes and their results, NCPS has limited awareness of what VAMCs are doing to address the root causes of adverse events. NCPS oversees the RCA process by monitoring VAMC compliance, and develops system-wide patient safety initiatives informed by RCA data. NCPS monitors each VAMC's compliance with requirements by reviewing RCA database information and conducting site visits. NCPS uses RCA information to inform system-wide patient safety initiatives, such as Patient Safety Alerts and Advisories—urgent notifications sent to VAMCs that describe a safety issue and include instructions and due dates for implementing actions to prevent recurrence. What GAO Recommends GAO recommends that VA (1) analyze the declining number of completed RCAs, including identifying the contributing factors and taking appropriate actions, and (2) determine the extent to which VAMCs are using alternative processes to address adverse events, and collect information on their results. VA concurred with GAO's recommendations.

gao_GAO-10-10

gao_GAO-10-10_0

Background Under the OSH Act, OSHA is responsible for protecting the safety and health of the nation’s workers. more workers it defines as being in high hazard industries. DOL Verifies the Injury and Illness Data in the ODI, but OSHA Does Not Always Collect Information from Workers, and Excludes Certain Industries Although DOL is not required to, it verifies some of the workplace injury and illness data it collects from employers on the ODI survey via OSHA’s records audits. Some inspectors told us that because OSHA does not conduct records audits until about 2 calendar years after the injuries and illnesses are recorded, inspectors rarely learn about underrecorded injuries or illnesses from the interviews. Because of this lag, inspectors told us many workers are no longer employed at the worksite and those who remain may be unable to remember the injury or illness. BLS Does Not Verify Employer-reported Data in the SOII, but Has Undertaken Actions to Improve the Quality and Completeness of the Data BLS is not required to verify the accuracy of the data employers record on their OSHA forms; however, BLS has acknowledged limitations to the survey and has taken steps to improve it. Occupational Safety and Health Practitioners and Stakeholders Cited Worker and Employer Disincentives as Primary Factors That May Affect the Accuracy of Injury and Illness Data Disincentives that influence workers’ decisions to report and employers’ decisions to record work-related injuries and illnesses are primary factors that may affect the accuracy of the data, according to occupational safety and health practitioners and stakeholders. Various Disincentives May Discourage Workers from Reporting and Employers from Recording Injuries and Illnesses Occupational safety and health stakeholders we interviewed and occupational health practitioners we surveyed told us that primary factors affecting the accuracy of injury and illness data include disincentives that affect workers’ decisions to report work-related injuries and illnesses and employers’ decisions to record them. Stakeholders also told us employers may not record injuries and illnesses because having high injury and illness rates can affect their ability to compete for contracts for new work. From our survey, we found that more than one-third of health practitioners were asked by company officials or workers to provide treatment that resulted in an injury or illness not being recorded, but also was not sufficient to properly treat the injury or illness. Lack of Understanding of OSHA’s Recordkeeping Requirements and Other Factors May Also Affect the Accuracy of the Injury and Illness Data Several stakeholders and nearly all of the OSHA inspectors we interviewed said that the lack of understanding of OSHA’s recordkeeping requirements by the individuals charged with recording injuries and illnesses affects the accuracy of the injury and illness data. Recommendations for Executive Action To improve OSHA’s efforts to verify the accuracy of employer-provided injury and illness data, the Secretary of Labor should direct the Assistant Secretary for OSHA to take the following three actions: require inspectors to interview workers during the records audits to obtain information on injuries or illnesses and substitute other workers when those initially selected for interviews are not available; minimize the amount of time between the date injuries and illnesses are recorded by employers and the date they are audited by OSHA; and update the list of high hazard industries used to select worksites for records audits and target inspections, outreach, and technical assistance. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology Review of the Department of Labor’s Efforts to Verify the Accuracy of Employer-Reported Injury and Illness Data To examine whether the Department of Labor (DOL) verifies that employers are accurately recording workers’ injuries and illnesses, and, if so, the adequacy of such efforts, we focused on the efforts of DOL’s Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) to verify the data it collects from employers on workers’ injuries and illnesses through its annual OSHA Data Initiative (ODI) survey. In addition, we reviewed the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ (BLS) efforts to verify the data it collects for the Survey of Occupational Injuries and Illnesses (SOII). Analysis of OSHA’s Audits of Employer Injury and Illness Records We analyzed the results of the onsite audits of employers’ injury and illness records (records audits) OSHA conducted in 2005, 2006, and 2007 of employers’ injury and illness logs for 2003, 2004, and 2005—the most recent period for which data were available.

Why GAO Did This Study Under the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, the Department of Labor's (DOL) Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) is responsible for protecting the safety and health of the nation's workers. The act requires DOL to collect and compile work-related injury and illness data. GAO was asked to determine (1) whether DOL verifies that employers are accurately recording workers' injuries and illnesses and, if so, the adequacy of these efforts, and (2) what factors may affect the accuracy of employers' injury and illness records. GAO analyzed OSHA's audits of employers' injury and illness records, interviewed inspectors who conducted the audits, surveyed occupational safety and health practitioners, and obtained the views of various stakeholders regarding factors that may affect the accuracy of the data. What GAO Found DOL verifies some of the workplace injury and illness data it collects from employers through OSHA's audits of employers' records, but these efforts may not be adequate. OSHA overlooks information from workers about injuries and illnesses because it does not routinely interview them as part of its records audits. OSHA annually audits the records of a representative sample of about 250 of the approximately 130,000 worksites in the high hazard industries it surveys to verify the accuracy of the data on injuries and illnesses recorded by employers. However, OSHA does not always require inspectors to interview workers about injuries and illnesses--the only source of data not provided by employers--which could assist them in evaluating the accuracy of the records. In addition, some OSHA inspectors reported they rarely learn about injuries and illnesses from workers since the records audits are conducted about 2 years after incidents are recorded. Moreover, many workers are no longer employed at the worksite and therefore cannot be interviewed. OSHA also does not review the accuracy of injury and illness records for worksites in eight high hazard industries because it has not updated the industry codes used to identify these industries since 2002. OSHA officials told GAO they have not updated the industry codes because it would require a regulatory change that is not currently an agency priority. The Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) also collects data on work-related injuries and illnesses recorded by employers through its annual Survey of Occupational Injuries and Illnesses (SOII), but it does not verify the accuracy of the data. Although BLS is not required to verify the accuracy of the SOII data, it has recognized several limitations in the data, such as its limited scope, and has taken or is planning several actions to improve the quality and completeness of the SOII. According to stakeholders interviewed and the occupational health practitioners GAO surveyed, many factors affect the accuracy of employers' injury and illness data, including disincentives that may discourage workers from reporting work-related injuries and illnesses to their employers and disincentives that may discourage employers from recording them. For example, workers may not report a work-related injury or illness because they fear job loss or other disciplinary action, or fear jeopardizing rewards based on having low injury and illness rates. In addition, employers may not record injuries or illnesses because they are afraid of increasing their workers' compensation costs or jeopardizing their chances of winning contract bids for new work. Disincentives for reporting and recording injuries and illnesses can result in pressure on occupational health practitioners from employers or workers to provide insufficient medical treatment that avoids the need to record the injury or illness. From its survey of U.S. health practitioners, GAO found that over a third of them had been subjected to such pressure. In addition, stakeholders and the survey results indicated that other factors may affect the accuracy of employers' injury and illness data, including a lack of understanding of OSHA's recordkeeping requirements by individuals responsible for recording injuries and illnesses.

gao_GAO-03-894

gao_GAO-03-894_0

The National Energy Policy Report Was the Product of a Centralized, Top-Down Process The National Energy Policy report was the product of a short-term, labor- intensive process that involved the efforts of several hundred federal employees governmentwide. In the 3½ months between NEPDG’s inception and its presentation of the final report, the Principals and Support Group controlled most facets of the report’s development, including setting meeting schedules and agendas, controlling the workflow, distributing work assignments, rewriting chapters, approving recommendations, and securing the report’s contents from premature disclosure. Senior agency officials served on a select interagency Working Group, while the majority of staff working on the NEPDG effort played a tributary role, (1) helping their agency fulfill its NEPDG-related obligations, (2) providing NEPDG with analytical information, and (3) responding to the Support Group’s subsequent requests for information, review, or comment. In developing the National Energy Policy report, the NEPDG Principals, Support Group, and participating agency staff also met with, solicited input from, or received information and advice from nonfederal energy stakeholders, primarily petroleum, coal, nuclear, natural gas, electricity industry representatives and lobbyists. NEPDG met and conducted its work in two distinct phases: the first phase culminated in a March 19, 2001, briefing on challenges relating to energy supply and the resulting economic impact; the second phase ended with a May 16, 2001, presentation of the final report to the President. Cabinet-Level Officials and Support Group Staff Controlled the Report Development Process In a January 29, 2001, memorandum, the President established NEPDG— comprised of the Vice President, nine cabinet-level officials, and four other senior administration officials—to gather information, deliberate, and make recommendations to the President by the end of fiscal year 2001. NEPDG Principals The 14 NEPDG members—the Vice President, 9 Cabinet-level officials, and 4 other senior administration officials—were responsible for developing the National Energy Policy report. In a series of formal meetings convened by the Vice President, the group presented briefings, received assignments and the latest drafts, and discussed agenda items and recommendations. The following list shows the NEPDG members. The extent to which submissions from any of these stakeholders were solicited, influenced policy deliberations, or were incorporated into the final report is not something that we can determine based on the limited information at our disposal. Federal Agencies Did Not Track the Amount of Public Money Spent on NEPDG Activities None of the key federal entities involved in the NEPDG effort provided us with a complete accounting of the costs they incurred during the development of the National Energy Policy report. Several agencies provided us with rough estimates of their respective NEPDG-related costs; but these estimates, all calculated in different ways, were not comprehensive. The two federal entities responsible for funding the NEPDG effort—OVP and DOE—did not provide us with the comprehensive cost information we requested. OVP provided us with 77 pages of information, two-thirds of which contained no cost information, while the remaining one-third contained miscellaneous information of little to no usefulness. In response to our requests seeking clarification on the provided information, OVP stated that it would not provide any additional information. DOE was to “make funds appropriated to the Department of Energy available to pay the costs of personnel to support the activities of the Energy Policy Development Group.” The memorandum further stated that if DOE required additional funds, the Vice President was to submit a proposal to the President to use “the minimum necessary portion of any appropriation available to the President to meet the unanticipated need” or obtain assistance from the National Economic Council staff. Agency Comments We provided DOE, Interior, and EPA with an opportunity to review and comment on a draft of this report. Representatives from each of these three agencies reviewed the report and chose not to provide written comments.

Why GAO Did This Study On January 29, 2001, the President established the National Energy Policy Development Group (NEPDG)--a group of cabinet-level and other senior administration officials, chaired by the Vice President--to gather information, deliberate, and recommend a national energy policy. The group presented its final report to the President in May 2001. GAO was asked to (1) describe the process used by the NEPDG to develop the National Energy Policy report, including whom the group met with and what topics were discussed and (2) determine the costs associated with that process. Although appointed NEPDG Chair, the Vice President elected not to respond to GAO's request for certain factual NEPDG information. Accordingly, as authorized by GAO's access-torecords statute, and after exhausting efforts to achieve a resolution and following the processes specified in that statute, GAO filed suit in U.S. District Court to obtain the information. The district court later dismissed GAO's suit on jurisdictional grounds, without reaching the merits of GAO's right to audit and evaluate NEPDG activities or to obtain access to NEPDG records. For a variety of reasons, GAO decided not to appeal the district court decision. DOE, Interior, and EPA reviewed the draft report and chose not to comment. OVP declined an offer to review the draft and comment. What GAO Found According to the best information that GAO could obtain, the National Energy Policy report was the product of a centralized, top-down, short-term, and labor-intensive process that involved the efforts of several hundred federal employees governmentwide. In the 3 = months between the inception of NEPDG and its presentation of the final report, the Principals (the Vice President, selected cabinet-level and other senior administration officials) and their support staff (Support Group) controlled most facets of the report's development, including setting meeting schedules and agendas, controlling the workflow, distributing work assignments, rewriting chapters, and approving recommendations. Senior agency officials served on a select interagency Working Group, while the majority of agency staff working on the NEPDG effort played a tributary role, helping their agencies fulfill their NEPDG-related obligations and responding to the Support Group's subsequent requests for information, review, or comment. In developing the National Energy Policy report, the NEPDG Principals, Support Group, and participating agency officials and staff met with, solicited input from, or received information and advice from nonfederal energy stakeholders, principally petroleum, coal, nuclear, natural gas, and electricity industry representatives and lobbyists. The extent to which submissions from any of these stakeholders were solicited, influenced policy deliberations, or were incorporated into the final report cannot be determined based on the limited information made available to GAO. NEPDG met and conducted its work in two distinct phases: the first phase culminated in a March 19, 2001, briefing to the President on challenges relating to energy supply and the resulting economic impact; the second phase ended with the May 16, 2001, presentation of the final report to the President. The Office of the Vice President's (OVP) unwillingness to provide the NEPDG records or other related information precluded GAO from fully achieving its objectives and substantially limited GAO's ability to comprehensively analyze the NEPDG process. None of the key federal entities involved in the NEPDG effort provided GAO with a complete accounting of the costs that they incurred during the development of the National Energy Policy report. The two federal entities responsible for funding the NEPDG effort--OVP and the Department of Energy (DOE)--did not provide the comprehensive cost information that GAO requested. OVP provided GAO with 77 pages of information, two-thirds of which contained no cost information while the remaining one-third contained some miscellaneous information of little to no usefulness. OVP stated that it would not provide any additional information. DOE, the Department of the Interior, and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) provided GAO with estimates of certain costs and salaries associated with the NEPDG effort, but these estimates, all calculated in different ways, were not comprehensive.

gao_GAO-05-627T

gao_GAO-05-627T_0

Agencies were unable to assess the extent to which they were reducing wildland fire risks or to establish meaningful fuel reduction performance measures, as well as to determine the cost- effectiveness of these efforts, because they lacked both monitoring data and sufficient data on the location of lands at high risk of catastrophic fires to know the effects of their actions. Progress in National Strategy: Priorities Have Been Clarified and Funding Has Been Increased for Identified Needs Over the last 5 years, the federal government has been formulating a national strategy known as the National Fire Plan, composed of several strategic documents that set forth a priority to reduce wildland fire risks to communities. Agencies Face Several Challenges to Completing a Long- Needed Cohesive Strategy for Reducing Fuels and Responding to Wildland Fire Problems While the federal government has made important progress over the past 5 years in addressing wildland fire, a number of challenges still must be met to complete development of a cohesive strategy that explicitly identifies available long-term options and funding needed to reduce fuels on the nation’s forests and rangelands. While the agencies are now in a better position to do so, they must build on the progress made to date by completing data and modeling efforts underway, updating their fire management plans with the results of these data efforts and ongoing research, and following through on recent cost-effectiveness and affordability initiatives. Because there is an increasingly urgent need for a cohesive federal strategy that identifies long-term options and related funding needs for reducing fuels, we have recommended that the Secretaries of Agriculture and the Interior provide the Congress, in time for its consideration of the agencies’ fiscal year 2006 wildland fire management budgets, with a joint tactical plan outlining the critical steps the agencies will take, together with related time frames, to complete such a cohesive strategy. WILDLAND FIRE: Protecting Structures and Improving Communications Next, I would like to summarize the findings of our second report, being released today, that discusses ways to help protect homes and improve communications during wildland fires. As people continue to move to areas in or near fire-prone wildlands, the number of homes at risk from wildland fire is likely to grow. Once a wildland fire starts, many different agencies may assist in the efforts to manage or suppress it, including the Forest Service (within the Department of Agriculture); land management agencies in the Department of the Interior; state forestry agencies; local fire departments; private contract firefighting crews; and, in some cases, the military. My testimony today summarizes key findings from our report released today and addresses: (1) measures that can help protect structures from wildland fires, (2) factors affecting the use of these protective measures, and (3) the role that technology plays in improving firefighting agencies’ ability to communicate during wildland fires. Recognizing that during severe wildland fires, suppression efforts alone cannot protect all homes threatened by wildland fire, firefighting and community officials are increasing their emphasis on preventive approaches that help reduce the chance that wildland fires will ignite homes and other structures. Radio frequencies are grouped into bands. Defensible Space and Fire-Resistant Roofs and Vents Are Key to Protecting Structures; Other Technologies Can Also Help Managing vegetation and reducing or eliminating flammable objects— often called defensible space—within 30 to 100 feet of a structure is a key protective measure. Competing concerns. Lack of awareness of homeowners’ responsibility. Third, some state and local governments have adopted laws that require maintaining defensible space around structures or the use of fire-resistant building materials. Effective Adoption of Technologies to Achieve Communications Interoperability Requires Better Planning and Coordination Technologies are available or under development to help improve communications interoperability so that personnel from different public safety agencies responding to an emergency, such as a wildland fire, can communicate effectively with one another. These radios are beginning to be adopted by a variety of federal, state, and local agencies. In recent years, the federal government, as well as several states and local jurisdictions, have focused increased attention on improving planning and coordination to achieve communications interoperability.

Why GAO Did This Study Wildland fires are increasingly threatening communities and ecosystems. In recent years, they have become more intense due to excess vegetation that has accumulated, partly as a result of past suppression efforts. The cost to suppress these fires is increasing and, as more people move into fire-prone areas near wildlands, the number of homes at risk is growing. During these wildland fires, effective communications among the public safety agencies responding from various areas is critical, but can be hampered by incompatible radio equipment. This testimony discusses (1) progress made and future challenges to managing wildland fire, (2) measures to help protect structures, and (3) the role of technology in improving responder communications during fires. It is based on two GAO reports: Wildland Fire Management: Important Progress Has Been Made, but Challenges Remain to Completing a Cohesive Strategy ( GAO-05-147 , Jan. 14, 2005) and Technology Assessment: Protecting Structures and Improving Communications during Wildland Fires ( GAO-05-380 , Apr. 26, 2005). What GAO Found Over the last 5 years, the Forest Service in the Department of Agriculture and land management agencies in the Department of the Interior, working with the Congress, have made important progress in responding to wildland fires. Most notably, the agencies have adopted various national strategy documents addressing the need to reduce wildland fire risks, established a priority to protect communities in the wildland-urban interface, and increased efforts and amounts of funding committed to addressing wildland fire problems. However, despite producing numerous planning and strategy documents, the agencies have yet to develop a cohesive strategy that identifies the long-term options and related funding needed to reduce excess vegetation that fuels fires in national forests and rangelands. Reducing these fuels lowers risks to communities and ecosystems and helps contain suppression costs. As GAO noted in 1999, such a strategy would help the agencies and the Congress to determine the most effective and affordable long-term approach for addressing wildland fire problems. Completing this strategy will require finishing several efforts now under way to improve a key wildland fire data and modeling system, local fire management planning, and a new system designed to identify the most cost-effective means for allocating fire management budget resources, each of which has its own challenges. Without completing these tasks, the agencies will have difficulty determining the extent and location of wildland fire threats, targeting and coordinating their efforts and resources, and resolving wildland fire problems in the most timely and cost-effective manner over the long term. The two most effective measures for protecting structures from wildland fires are (1) creating and maintaining a buffer around a structure by eliminating or reducing trees, shrubs, and other flammable objects within an area from 30 to 100 feet around the structure and (2) using fire-resistant roofs and vents. Other technologies--such as fire-resistant building materials, chemical agents, and geographic information system mapping tools--can help in protecting structures and communities, but they play a secondary role. Many homeowners, however, are not using the protective measures because of the time or expense involved, competing values or concerns, misperceptions about wildland fires, or lack of awareness of their shared responsibility for home protection. Federal, state, and local governments and others are attempting to address this problem through a variety of educational, financial assistance, and regulatory efforts. Technologies exist and others are being developed to address communications problems among emergency responders using different radio frequencies or equipment. However, technology alone cannot solve this problem. Effective adoption of these technologies requires planning and coordination among federal, state, and local agencies involved. The Department of Homeland Security, as well as several states and local jurisdictions, are pursuing initiatives to improve communications.

gao_GAO-06-634

gao_GAO-06-634_0

Recently, the JWST program recognized significant cost growth and schedule slippage. In addition, the program’s schedule slipped nearly 2 years. JWST’s Revised Strategy Does Not Fully Incorporate a Knowledge-Based Approach That Could Reduce Risks and Better Inform Decision Making The JWST program recently revised its acquisition strategy to conform to NASA’s acquisition policies; however, the program still faces considerable challenges. GAO best practices work has found that using a knowledge- based approach is a key factor in program success. When we initiated our work and before the program’s recently revised acquisition strategy, program officials intended to have NASA commit to the program and start implementation with immature technologies, according to best practices, and without a preliminary design. During our review, we discussed these shortfalls with NASA officials, and they revised their acquisition strategy to align their decision milestones in accordance with NASA acquisition policy. In order to close the gaps between NASA’s current acquisition environment and best practices on knowledge-based acquisition, we recommended that NASA take steps to ensure that NASA projects follow a knowledge-based approach for product development. Furthermore, the strategy does not fully incorporate a knowledge-based approach that could address the program’s risks by ensuring—through the use of exit criteria—that resources match requirements in terms of knowledge, time, and money before program start. This requires greater fidelity in the testing, even as early as demonstrating the maturity of key technologies prior to program start. Given the severity of the fiscal challenges our nation faces and the wide range of competing federal programs, hard choices need to be considered across the government, and NASA is no exception. Recommendations for Executive Action To increase the JWST program’s chances of successful product development, we recommend that the NASA Administrator take the following actions: Direct the JWST program to fully apply a knowledge-based acquisition approach—to include incremental markers—that will not only ensure that adequate knowledge is attained at key decision points, but also hold the program accountable. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology To assess the extent to which the JWST acquisition strategy follows NASA policy and GAO best practices for ensuring readiness to proceed into implementation, we reviewed NASA policy on program management and compared the JWST project office’s management approach to NASA policy. In almost all cases, this is the end of the last “bug fixing” aspects of true system development.

Why GAO Did This Study The National Aeronautics and Space Administration's (NASA) James Webb Space Telescope (JWST) is being designed to explore the origins and nature of the universe. It should allow scientists to look deeper into space--and thus farther back in time--than ever before. The program, however, has experienced cost growth of more than $1 billion and its schedule has slipped nearly 2 years. NASA recently restructured the program and now anticipates a launch no sooner than June 2013. Because of the cost and schedule problems, under the Comptroller General's authority, we reviewed the JWST program to determine the extent to which this procurement follows NASA acquisition policy and GAO best practices for ensuring that adequate product knowledge is used to make informed investment decisions What GAO Found Although the JWST program recently revised its acquisition strategy to conform to NASA's acquisition policies, the program still faces considerable challenges because it has not fully implemented a knowledge-based approach, which our past work has shown is often a key factor in program success. In a recent report, we made recommendations that NASA take steps to ensure that projects follow a knowledge-based approach for product development. NASA concurred and revised its acquisition policy. When we initiated our work and before the JWST program's recently revised acquisition strategy, program officials intended to have NASA commit to program start, which is the end of the formulation phase and the beginning of the implementation phase, with immature technologies, according to best practices, and without a preliminary design. During our review, we discussed these shortfalls with NASA officials, and they revised their acquisition strategy to conform to NASA policy. However, the current strategy still does not fully incorporate a knowledge-based approach which ensures that resources match requirements in terms of knowledge, time, and money before program start. If program officials follow the current plan, the maturity of key technologies may not be adequately tested prior to program start. In addition, it appears the program will not have sufficient funding resources to ensure the program's success. In light of the fiscally constrained environment the federal government and NASA will face in the years ahead, adopting a knowledge-based approach will not only increase the JWST program's chances for success but also lay the foundation for comparison between competing programs.

gao_NSIAD-96-13

gao_NSIAD-96-13_0

CIESIN’s Mission According to CIESIN officials, CIESIN’s mission is to provide access to, and enhance the use of, information worldwide on human interactions in the environment and to serve the needs of scientists and public and private decisionmakers. CIESIN plans to continue to work on broadening the database capabilities and data sources supporting its mission. Appropriations for CIESIN through fiscal year 1995 totaled over $89 million, exclusive of over $42 million provided for building a CIESIN headquarters facility, which was subsequently withdrawn. Most of this funding has been fees from members of CIESIN. Officials at the federal agencies providing significant funding for CIESIN told us that, in the absence of actual or anticipated earmarks, funding of CIESIN would not have been requested because budgets were tight and that they all had higher priority, mission-related requirements. Of the federal agencies currently funding CIESIN, only NASA plans to do so after the remaining funds are used. NASA’s continued funding of CIESIN is for developing and operating a SEDAC. It neither does nor sponsors basic HDGC research. Thus, as HDGC researchers work under Foundation grants, CIESIN would provide electronic data and software support services. Noncompetitive SEDAC Contract Requires Rejustification NASA’s award to CIESIN for the SEDAC was not competed. Global Change Research Program’s Subcommittee on Global Change Research and other appropriate interested parties, to evaluate, and incorporate into Earth Observing System Data and Information System, any useful CIESIN products developed for the Departments of Agriculture and Defense and the Environmental Protection Agency; and procurement officials at the Goddard Space Flight Center to reexamine the Competition in Contracting Act exemptions to full and open competition and, prior to exercising the next 1-year option on the contract, determine whether an appropriate exemption justifies continuation of the noncompetitive award of the SEDAC contract to CIESIN. We discussed NASA’s role in overseeing work on the human dimensions of global change with NASA, National Science Foundation, and Office of Science and Technology Policy officials. Comments From the National Aeronautics and Space Administration Comments From the Consortium for International Earth Science Information Network The following are comments on the CIESIN letter dated September 11, 1995.

Why GAO Did This Study Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the activities of the Consortium for International Earth Science Information Network (CIESIN), focusing on: (1) its mission and funding; (2) the National Aeronautics and Space Administration's (NASA) oversight of CIESIN work on the human dimensions of global change (HDGC); (3) the similarities between CIESIN and the National Science Foundation's (NSF) Centers for HDGC; and (4) CIESIN building requirements. What GAO Found GAO found that: (1) CIESIN enhances scientists' and decisionmakers' use of information on human interactions in the environment through access to HDGC databases worldwide; (2) four federal agencies have provided most of the $82 million in CIESIN funding; (3) although they are satisfied with its performance, three of the agencies will cease CIESIN funding due to budgets constraints and higher priority needs; (4) NASA will continue funding CIESIN so that it can develop and operate a Socioeconomic Data and Applications Center (SEDAC) which will incorporate socioeconomic data into its Earth Observing System Data and Information System; (5) federal funding reductions will cause CIESIN to compete for grants and contracts from other sources; (6) NASA believes it can appropriately oversee CIESIN SEDAC activities; (7) there is no duplication of effort between NSF centers for HDGC and CIESIN because CIESIN does not conduct or sponsor basic research; (8) Congress appropriated about $42 million in fiscal year (FY) 1993 to build CIESIN headquarters, but has subsequently withdrawn all but about $3 million; (9) NASA can support only those CIESIN-leased facilities that support SEDAC activities; and (10) to maximize the usefulness of CIESIN work and to justify NASA noncompetitive contracting decisions, CIESIN work needs to be evaluated for its usefulness to federal programs and the noncompetitive SEDAC contract award needs to be justified.

gao_GAO-01-794

gao_GAO-01-794_0

Conclusions Operation Safe Home does not have the necessary information systems and management controls to ensure that HUD’s OIG managers can readily monitor the obligation and expenditure of funds and track the numbers of arrests and convictions. As a result, the OIG does not have a reliable mechanism for effectively allocating program resources or for accurately estimating its funding needs. Furthermore, in the absence of complete, consistent, or accurate information, the OIG has not had the means to accurately report the results of its investigations and thus to provide the Congress with reliable and supportable information on what Operation Safe Home has accomplished. The OIG has recognized the need for more effective management controls within Operation Safe Home and has begun to address the problems. These actions, once implemented, should improve the ability of the OIG to allocate resources more effectively, better estimate future funding needs, and more accurately measure and report the program’s accomplishments. The OIG cannot independently and impartially audit or investigate Operation Safe Home, and may not be perceived as impartial when auditing other similar HUD programs. For these reasons, as we stated in August 2000, Operation Safe Home raises questions about the OIG’s ability to independently audit and investigate HUD programs designed to reduce violent and drug-related crime in public and assisted housing. Although the HUD OIG did not dispute our conclusions regarding its independence to conduct audits and investigations of HUD’s programs to reduce violent and drug-related crime in public and assisted housing, the Acting Deputy Inspector General questioned our matter for congressional consideration that the Congress should assess whether the long-term involvement of the OIG in Operation Safe Home is worth the actual or perceived impairment of the OIG’s independence.

Why GAO Did This Study This report reviews the Department of Housing and Urban Development's (HUD) efforts to combat violent crime and drug trafficking in public housing through Operation Safe Home. What GAO Found GAO found that Operation Safe Home lacks the necessary information systems and management controls to ensure that HUD's Office of Inspector General (OIG) can readily monitor the obligation and expenditure of funds and track the numbers of arrests and convictions. As a result, the OIG cannot reliably allocate program resources or accurately estimate its funding needs. Furthermore, in the absence of complete, consistent, or accurate information, the OIG cannot Congress with reliable and supportable information on Operation Safe Home's accomplishments. The OIG recognizes the need for more effective management controls within Operation Safe Home and has begun to address the problem. These actions, once implemented, should help the OIG to allocate resources more effectively, better estimate future funding needs, and more accurately measure and report the program's accomplishments. However, GAO remains concerned about OIG's long-term involvement in Operation Safe Home. The OIG cannot independently and impartially audit or investigate Operation Safe Home, and may not be perceived as impartial when auditing other similar HUD programs. For these reasons, Operation Safe Home raises questions about the OIG's ability to independently audit and investigate HUD programs designed to reduce violent and drug-related crime in public and assisted housing.

gao_GAO-02-936T

gao_GAO-02-936T_0

In a 1977 report to the Congress, the American Indian Policy Review Commission criticized the department’s tribal recognition policy. In 1978, it established a regulatory process for recognizing tribes whose relationship with the United States had either lapsed or never been established— although tribes may seek recognition through other avenues, such as legislation or Department of the Interior administrative decisions unconnected to the regulatory process. In addition, not all tribes are eligible for the regulatory process. For example, tribes whose political relationship with the United States has been terminated by Congress, or tribes whose members are officially part of an already recognized tribe, are ineligible to be recognized through the regulatory process and must seek recognition through other avenues. The regulations lay out seven criteria that a group must meet before it can become a federally recognized tribe. Essentially, these criteria require the petitioner to show that it is descended from a historic tribe and is a distinct community that has continuously existed as a political entity since a time when the federal government broadly acknowledged a political relationship with all Indian tribes. The following are the seven criteria for recognition under the regulatory process: (a) The petitioner has been identified as an American Indian entity on a substantially continuous basis since 1900, (b) A predominant portion of the petitioning group comprises a distinct community and has existed as a community from historical times until the present, (c) The petitioner has maintained political influence or authority over its members as an autonomous entity from historical times until the present, (d) The group must provide a copy of its present governing documents and membership criteria, (e) The petitioner’s membership consists of individuals who descend from a historical Indian tribe or tribes, which combined and functioned as a single autonomous political entity, (f) The membership of the petitioning group is composed principally of persons who are not members of any acknowledged North American Indian tribe, and (g) Neither the petitioner nor its members are the subject of congressional legislation that has expressly terminated or forbidden recognition. Clearer Guidance Needed on Criteria and Evidence Used in Recognition Decisions While we found general agreement on the seven criteria that groups must meet to be granted recognition, there is great potential for disagreement when the question before BIA is whether the level of available evidence is high enough to demonstrate that a petitioner meets the criteria. The technical staff concluded that a 70-year evidentiary gap was too long to support a finding of continuous existence. Accordingly, in our November 2001 report, we recommended that the Secretary of the Interior direct BIA to provide a clearer understanding of the basis used in recognition decisions by developing and using transparent guidelines that help interpret key aspects of the criteria and supporting evidence used in federal recognition decisions. However, weaknesses in the process have created uncertainty about the basis for recognition decisions, calling into question the objectivity of the process.

What GAO Found Federal recognition of an Indian tribe can dramatically affect economic and social conditions for the tribe and the surrounding communities because these tribes are eligible to participate in federal assistance programs. There are currently 562 recognized tribes with a total membership of 1.7 million, and several hundred groups are currently seeking recognition. In fiscal year 2002, Congress appropriated $5 billion for programs and funding, almost exclusively for recognized tribes. Recognition also establishes a formal government-to-government relationship between the United States and a tribe. The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act of 1988, which regulated Indian gaming operations, permits a tribe to operate casinos on land in trust if the state in which it lies allows casino-like gaming and if the tribe has entered into a compact with the state regulating its gaming businesses. In 1999, federally recognized tribes reported $10 billion in gaming revenue, surpassing the amounts that the Nevada casinos collected that year. Owing to the rights and benefits that accrue with recognition and the controversy surrounding Indian gaming, the Bureau of Indian Affairs' (BIA) regulatory process has been subject to intense scrutiny by groups seeking recognition and other interested parties--including already recognized tribes and affected state and local governments. BIA's regulatory process for recognizing tribes was established in 1978 and requires that groups that are petitioning for recognition submit evidence that they meet certain criteria--basically that the petitioner has continuously existed as an Indian tribe since historic times. Critics of the process claim that it produces inconsistent decisions and takes too long. The basis for BIA's tribal recognition decisions is not always clear. Although there are set criteria that petitioning tribes must meet to be granted recognition, there is no guidance that clearly explains how to interpret key aspects of the criteria. The lack of guidance over what level of evidence is sufficient to demonstrate that a tribe has continued to exist over time creates controversy and uncertainty for all parties about the basis for decisions reached.

gao_GAO-16-671T

gao_GAO-16-671T_0

CBP Has Made Progress in Implementing the Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan, but Could Take Additional Actions to Strengthen Management of the Plan CBP Has Initiated or Completed Deployment of Technologies under the Plan and Has Taken Actions to Update Program Schedules and Cost Estimates In March 2014 and April 2015, we reported that CBP had made progress in deploying programs under the Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan, but that CBP could take additional action to strengthen its management of the Plan and the Plan’s programs. Additionally, as discussed further below, CBP has reported taking steps to update program schedules and life- cycle cost estimates for the three highest-cost programs under the Plan. For example, in May 2016, CBP provided us with complete schedules for two of the programs, and we will be reviewing them to determine the extent to which they address our recommendation. In addition, in March 2014, we reported that the life-cycle cost estimates for the Plan reflected some, but not all, best practices. We concluded that ensuring that scheduling best practices were applied to the programs’ schedules and verifying life-cycle cost estimates with independent estimates could help better ensure the reliability of the schedules and estimates, and we recommended that CBP verify the life-cycle cost estimates for the IFT and RVSS programs with independent cost estimates and reconcile any differences. CBP Has Made Progress toward Assessing Performance of Surveillance Technologies, but Has Not Fully Applied Performance Metrics or Assessed the Contributions of Its Technologies We reported in March 2014 that CBP had identified mission benefits of its surveillance technologies to be deployed under the Plan, such as improved situational awareness and agent safety. However the agency had not developed key attributes for performance metrics for all surveillance technologies to be deployed as part of the Plan, as we recommended in November 2011. Further, as of May 2015, CBP had identified a set of potential key attributes for performance metrics for all technologies to be deployed under the Plan. While CBP had expected to complete its development of baselines for each performance measure by the end of calendar year 2015, as of March 2016 the actual completion is being adjusted pending test and evaluation results for recently deployed technologies on the southwest border. CBP Utilizes Unmanned Predator B Aircraft and Tactical Aerostats for a Variety of Border Security Activities Preliminary Observations on CBP’s Utilization of Predator B Aircraft Our ongoing work shows that as of May 2016, CBP operates nine Predator B from four AMO National Air Security Operations Centers (NASOC) located in Sierra Vista, Arizona; Grand Forks, North Dakota; Corpus Christi, Texas; and Jacksonville, Florida. For example, CBP’s Predator B video and radar sensors support Border Patrol activities to identify and apprehend individuals entering the United States between POEs. CBP’s Predator B aircraft operate in the U.S. national airspace system in accordance with Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) requirements for authorizing all UAS operations in the National Airspace System. In accordance with FAA requirements, all Predator B flights must comply with a Certificate of Waiver or Authorization (COA). For our ongoing work, we analyzed CBP data on reported Predator B COA-designated flight hours from fiscal years 2011 to 2015 and found that 81 percent of flight hours were associated with COA-designated airspace along border and coastal areas. Based on our ongoing work, we found that airspace access and weather can impact CBP’s ability to utilize Predator B aircraft. Preliminary Observations on CBP’s Utilization of Tactical Aerostats in South Texas Our ongoing work shows that as of May 2016, CBP has deployed six tactical aerostats along the U.S.-Mexico border in south Texas to support Border Patrol. CBP utilizes three types of tactical aerostats equipped with cameras for capturing full-motion video: Persistent Threat Detection System (PTDS), Persistent Ground Surveillance System (PGSS), and Rapid Aerostat Initial Deployment (RAID). Each type of tactical aerostat varies in size and altitude of operation. As of May 2016, Border Patrol has taken actions to track the contribution of tactical aerostats to its mission activities. Based on our ongoing work, we found that airspace access, weather, and real estate can impact CBP’s ability to deploy and utilize tactical aerostats in south Texas. Border Security: Progress and Challenges in DHS’s Efforts to Implement and Assess Infrastructure and Technology. Unmanned Aerial Systems: Department of Homeland Security’s Review of U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s Use and Compliance with Privacy and Civil Liberty Laws and Standards GAO-14-849R. Borders. Border Security: Opportunities Exist to Ensure More Effective Use of DHS’s Air and Marine Assets. U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s Border Security Fencing, Infrastructure and Technology Fiscal Year 2011 Expenditure Plan.

Why GAO Did This Study CBP employs surveillance technologies, UAS, and other assets to help secure the border. For example, in January 2011, CBP developed the Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan, which includes seven acquisition programs related to fixed and mobile surveillance systems, among other assets. CBP has also deployed UAS, including Predator B aircraft, as well as tactical aerostats to help secure the border. In recent years, GAO has reported on a variety of CBP border security programs and operations. This statement addresses (1) GAO findings on DHS's efforts to implement the Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan and (2) preliminary observations related to GAO's ongoing work on CBP's use of UAS and tactical aerostats for border security. This statement is based on GAO products issued from November 2011 through April 2016, along with selected updates conducted in May 2016. For ongoing work related to UAS, GAO reviewed CBP documents and analyzed Predator B flight hour data from fiscal years 2011 through 2015, the time period when all Predator B centers became operational. GAO also conducted site visits in Texas and Arizona to view operation of Predator B aircraft and tactical aerostats and interviewed CBP officials responsible for these operations. What GAO Found GAO reported in March 2014 and April 2015 that U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), had made progress in deploying programs under the Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan (the Plan), but could take additional actions to strengthen its management of the Plan and its related programs. Specifically, in March 2014 GAO reported that CBP's schedules and life-cycle cost estimates for the Plan and its three highest-cost programs—which represented 97 percent of the Plan's total estimated cost—met some but not all best practices. GAO recommended that CBP ensure that its schedules and cost estimates more fully address best practices, such as validating cost estimates with independent estimates, and DHS concurred. As of May 2016, CBP has initiated or completed deployment of technology for each of the three highest-cost programs under the Plan, and reported updating some program schedules and cost estimates. For example, in May 2016, CBP provided GAO with complete schedules for two of the programs, and GAO will be reviewing them to determine the extent to which they address GAO's recommendation. GAO also reported in March 2014 that CBP had identified mission benefits of technologies under the Plan, such as improved situational awareness, but had not developed key attributes for performance metrics for all technologies, as GAO recommended in November 2011. As of May 2015, CBP had identified a set of potential key attributes for performance metrics for deployed technologies and expected to complete its development of baselines for measures by the end of 2015. In March 2016, GAO reported that CBP was adjusting the completion date to incorporate pending test and evaluation results for recently deployed technologies under the Plan. GAO's ongoing work on CBP's use of unmanned aerial systems (UAS) for border security shows that CBP operates nine Predator B aircraft in U.S. airspace in accordance with Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) requirements. Specifically, CBP's Air and Marine Operations operates the aircraft in accordance with FAA certificates of waiver or authorization for a variety of activities, such as training flights and patrol missions to support the U.S. Border Patrol's (Border Patrol) efforts to detect and apprehend individuals illegally crossing into the United States between ports of entry. Predator B aircraft are currently equipped with a combination of video and radar sensors that provide information on cross-border illegal activities to supported agencies. CBP data show that over 80 percent of Predator B flight hours were in airspace encompassing border and coastal areas from fiscal years 2011 through 2015. CBP officials stated that airspace access and hazardous weather can affect CBP's ability to utilize Predator B aircraft for border security activities. GAO's ongoing work shows that CBP has deployed six tactical aerostats—relocatable unmanned buoyant craft tethered to the ground and equipped with cameras for capturing full-motion video—along the U.S.-Mexico border in south Texas to support Border Patrol. CBP operates three types of tactical aerostats, which vary in size and altitude of operation. CBP officials reported that airspace access, hazardous weather, and real estate (e.g., access to private property) can affect CBP's ability to deploy and utilize tactical aerostats. Border Patrol has taken actions to track the contribution of tactical aerostats to its mission activities. What GAO Recommends GAO has previously made recommendations to DHS to improve its management of plans and programs for surveillance technologies and DHS generally agreed.

gao_GGD-95-40

gao_GGD-95-40_0

We also observed fingerprinting procedures at these district offices. Specifically, we evaluated INS’ actions and plans in response to the problems identified in the OIG report, including the timely mailing of fingerprint cards to the FBI, the timely filing of FBI criminal history reports, and the procedures used to follow up on fingerprint cards rejected by the FBI. Further, we discussed the future impact of automated fingerprinting identification systems with INS and FBI officials. INS Plans Certification Program to Increase Control Over Fingerprint Providers INS’ fingerprinting working group has recommended that INS implement a certification program that would increase control over fingerprint providers. INS plans to use the fees from organizations applying for certification to pay for the monitoring program. The working group rejected the option of having the district offices do the fingerprinting because of resource shortages and the potential for overcrowding in the district offices. Other options included using contractors, police departments, and voluntary groups. According to INS, it is actively pursuing the use of its own automated fingerprint identification systems to reduce fingerprint fraud and processing time. At the time of the alien’s hearing, if INS examiners do not find a criminal history report in an alien’s file and it is 60 days after the application date, the examiners assume that a fingerprint check has been completed and that the alien does not have a criminal history record. The program should help ensure that the fingerprints aliens submit with applications are their own. INS had told the district offices to correct the problems but had not monitored the districts’ efforts to follow those instructions. Recommendations We recommend that the Attorney General direct the Commissioner of INS to monitor progress to ensure that districts comply with INS’ headquarters directives to submit fingerprint cards to the FBI on a timely basis, file FBI arrest reports in aliens’ files immediately, and submit new fingerprint cards to replace those that are rejected by the FBI and obtain the results from the FBI of all its record and fingerprint checks, including those aliens who do not have criminal history records and make the results available to the examiners before the aliens’ hearings.

Why GAO Did This Study Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Immigration and Naturalization Service's (INS) fingerprinting procedures for aliens applying for immigration and naturalization benefits, focusing on: (1) INS efforts to ensure that the fingerprints aliens submit are their own; (2) options INS considered to improve the fingerprinting process; (3) the future impact of automated fingerprinting identification systems; (4) INS efforts to ensure timely mailing of fingerprint cards to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and timely filing of FBI criminal history reports; and (5) INS actions to follow up on fingerprint cards rejected because of illegibility or incomplete information. What GAO Found GAO found that: (1) INS plans to implement a certification and training program in 1995 for fingerprint providers and establish fingerprinting procedures to improve control over the fingerprinting process; (2) INS plans to monitor fingerprint providers at least every 3 years to ensure that they follow established procedures; (3) INS has decided not to have district offices do the fingerprinting due to a lack of resources and potential overcrowding at the offices; (4) INS has also rejected the option of having contractors, police departments, and volunteer groups do the fingerprinting; (5) INS plans to use a FBI-developed automated fingerprint identification system to electronically transmit information and reduce processing time; (6) INS has instructed district directors to correct problems with the mailing of fingerprint cards to FBI, filing FBI criminal history reports, and resubmission of rejected fingerprint cards, but it has not monitored the districts' progress in correcting these problems; (7) INS examiners sometimes approve an alien's application without a criminal history check because they assume one has been done even if it is not in the alien's file; and (8) INS examiners sometimes cannot determine if FBI fingerprint checks have been completed because FBI only returns reports when criminal histories are found.

gao_GAO-16-53

gao_GAO-16-53_0

Medicaid Funding Medicaid is funded jointly by the federal government and states. Medicaid Funding for Different Eligibility Groups . subsequently deemed eligible under PPACA if the state opted to expand Medicaid under PPACA. 2. Consequently, a state that chooses to expand its Medicaid program could potentially receive three different FMAPs for its different types of Medicaid enrollees. Medicaid Enrollment States are primarily responsible for verifying eligibility and enrolling Medicaid beneficiaries. PPACA- and State- Expansion Enrollees Comprised about 14 Percent of 2014 Medicaid Enrollees and about 10 Percent of Expenditures PPACA- and state-expansion enrollees comprised about 14 percent of Medicaid enrollees at the end of the last quarter in calendar year 2014. Most of these individuals—about 60.1 million—were traditionally eligible enrollees—comprising about 86 percent of total enrollees. About 9.7 million of the 2014 enrollees—approximately 14 percent—were PPACA-expansion or state-expansion enrollees, with 7.5 million (11 percent of all Medicaid enrollees) as PPACA-expansion enrollees and 2.3 million (3 percent of all Medicaid enrollees) as state-expansion enrollees. Expenditures for PPACA- and State-Expansion Enrollees Comprised about 10 Percent of Spending for 2014 Medicaid Enrollees As of June 2, 2015, states had reported $481.77 billion in Medicaid expenditures for services in calendar year 2014. Of this total, expenditures for traditionally eligible enrollees were $435.91 billion (comprising about 90 percent of total expenditures), about $35.28 billion (7 percent of total expenditures) was for PPACA-expansion enrollees and $10.58 billion (2 percent of total expenditures) was for state-expansion enrollees. Limitations in Eligibility and Expenditure Reviews Hamper CMS’s Ability to Ensure the Appropriateness of Federal Matching Funds CMS has implemented reviews that (1) assess the accuracy of eligibility determinations, and (2) examine states’ expenditures to ensure they are attributed to the correct eligibility group. However, both reviews contain gaps that limit CMS’s ability to ensure that expenditures for the different eligibility groups are appropriately matched with federal funds. However, the pilot eligibility reviews do not include a review of the accuracy of federal eligibility determinations in certain states that delegated authority to the federal government to make Medicaid eligibility determinations through the FFE. CMS’s Expenditure Reviews Cannot Identify Eligibility-Related Errors, Limiting Assurance that Expenditures Are Appropriately Matched with Federal Funds CMS modified its standard quarterly review of CMS-64 expenditures to examine expenditures for both categories of the expansion population. According to CMS officials, the expenditure review is primarily intended to ensure that states are correctly grouping expenditures for the different eligibility groups as initially determined, not whether the determination is correct. By excluding Medicaid eligibility determinations made by the FFEs from its pilot eligibility reviews, CMS has created a gap in efforts to ensure that only eligible individuals are enrolled into the Medicaid program. Furthermore, although CMS has a process for assessing the accuracy of eligibility determinations in the states, CMS does not use the results of these eligibility reviews, which have the potential to provide valuable information on state eligibility determinations, to better target its review of Medicaid expenditures for different eligibility groups. To increase assurances that states receive an appropriate amount of federal matching funds, we recommend that the Administrator of CMS use the information obtained from state and federal eligibility reviews to inform the agency’s review of expenditures for different eligibility groups in order to ensure that expenditures are reported correctly and matched appropriately. GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix V. Appendix I: Comments from the Department of Health and Human Services Appendix II: Scope and Methodology To determine the enrollment and spending for individuals who enrolled in Medicaid in 2014, and the extent to which these individuals were identified as eligible under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA), we examined data submitted to the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) by states as part of their enrollment and expenditure reporting. We obtained enrollment and expenditure data for calendar year 2014— the first full year that states had the option of expanding Medicaid under PPACA.

Why GAO Did This Study Historically, Medicaid eligibility has been limited to certain categories of low-income individuals, but PPACA, enacted on March 23, 2010, gave states the option to expand coverage to nearly all adults with incomes at or below 133 percent of the federal poverty level, beginning January 1, 2014. States that do so are eligible for increased federal matching rates for enrollees receiving coverage through the state option to expand Medicaid under PPACA, and where applicable, enrollees in states that expanded coverage prior to PPACA's enactment. GAO was asked to examine Medicaid enrollment and expenditures, and CMS oversight of the appropriateness of federal matching funds. This report examines (1) Medicaid enrollment and spending in 2014 by different eligibility groups; and (2) how CMS ensures states are accurately determining eligibility, and that expenditures are appropriately matched. GAO analyzed enrollment and expenditure data for enrollee eligibility groups submitted by states to CMS, examined relevant federal laws and regulations, internal control standards, CMS guidance and oversight tools, and interviewed CMS officials. What GAO Found PPACA-expansion and state-expansion enrollees—individuals who were not eligible under historic Medicaid eligibility rules but are eligible under (1) a state option to expand Medicaid under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA), or (2) a state's qualifying expansion of coverage prior to PPACA's enactment—comprised about 14 percent of Medicaid enrollees and about 10 percent of Medicaid expenditures at the end of 2014. According to GAO's analysis of state reported data, of the approximately 69.8 million individuals recorded as enrolled in Medicaid, about 60.1 million were traditionally eligible enrollees, comprising about 86 percent of the total; about 7.5 million (11 percent of all Medicaid enrollees) were PPACA-expansion enrollees, and 2.3 million (3 percent of all Medicaid enrollees) were state-expansion enrollees. With regard to expenditures, states had reported $481.77 billion in Medicaid expenditures for services in calendar year 2014. Of this total, expenditures for traditionally eligible enrollees were $435.91 billion (about 90 percent of total expenditures), expenditures for PPACA-expansion enrollees were about $35.28 billion (7 percent of total expenditures), and expenditures for state-expansion enrollees were $10.58 billion (2 percent of total expenditures). Proportion of Medicaid Enrollees by Eligibility Group, Last Quarter of Calendar Year 2014 The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS), which oversees Medicaid, has implemented interim measures to review the accuracy of state eligibility determinations and examine states' expenditures for different eligibility groups, for which states may receive up to three different federal matching rates. However, CMS has excluded from review federal Medicaid eligibility determinations in the states that have delegated authority to the federal government to make Medicaid eligibility determinations through the federally facilitated exchange. This creates a gap in efforts to ensure that only eligible individuals are enrolled into Medicaid and that state expenditures are correctly matched by the federal government. In addition, CMS reviews of states' expenditures do not use information obtained from the reviews of state eligibility determination errors to better target its review of Medicaid expenditures for the different eligibility groups. An accurate determination of these different eligibility groups is critical to ensuring that only eligible individuals are enrolled, that they are enrolled in the correct eligibility group, and that states' expenditures are appropriately matched with federal funds for Medicaid enrollees, consistent with federal internal control standards. Consequently, CMS cannot identify erroneous expenditures due to incorrect eligibility determinations, which also limits its ability to ensure that state expenditures are appropriately matched with federal funds. What GAO Recommends GAO recommends that CMS (1) review federal determinations of Medicaid eligibility for accuracy, and (2) use the information obtained from the eligibility reviews to inform the expenditure review, and increase assurances that expenditures for the different eligibility groups are correctly reported and appropriately matched. In its response, the agency generally concurred with these recommendations.

gao_GAO-02-442

gao_GAO-02-442_0

The Army plans to transform its forces over a 30-year period. IBCTS Are Expected to Fill a Perceived Gap in Military Capability The Army expects the IBCT to provide a force capability that it does not currently have: a rapidly deployable early-entry combat force that is lethal, survivable, and capable of operating in all types of military operations, from small-scale contingencies like the Balkans’ missions to a major theater war. They generally agree that the current Army force structure does not meet their requirements for a rapidly deployable, lethal, and survivable force. Rather, they saw the IBCT as providing them with a broader choice of capabilities to meet their operational needs. However, the Army has encountered challenges in forming the IBCT at Fort Lewis. One challenge to overcome is a combat capability shortfall in the first IBCT when it is certified. Further, the interim armored vehicle delivery schedule has compressed the time available for soldiers to train on the vehicles; personnel turnover resulted in more time spent on digital training than planned; and the 96-hour deployment capability, while a goal rather than a requirement, will not be attained by the first IBCT. Other requirements for this future force are to be able to deploy a division in 120 hours and five divisions in 30 days. Without having the lessons learned available, the Army may repeat mistakes in fielding subsequent brigades and may lose opportunities that could help it field subsequent brigades more efficiently. To assist subsequent installations where IBCTs will be formed in their planning, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the Army to expedite development of a program to sustain personnel skills on digitized equipment so that it will be available for subsequent IBCTs, collect and analyze data on why soldiers leave the IBCTs and take appropriate action to reduce personnel turnover, estimate the extent and cost of facility improvements that will be needed at installations scheduled to accommodate the subsequent IBCTs to assist them in their planning, establish a BCC-type organization at subsequent IBCT locations to deal with day-to-day challenges, and provide a central collection point for IBCT lessons learned so as to make the information available to personnel throughout the Army.

What GAO Found In 1999, the Army announced its plans to transform its forces during the next 30 years to enable them to deploy more rapidly and operate more effectively during all types of military conflicts, from small-scale contingencies to major wars. The Army's goal is to be able to deploy a brigade anywhere in the world within 96 hours, a division within 120 hours, and five divisions within 30 days. The first step is to form and equip six interim brigade combat teams by 2008. Created to fill a gap in military capability, the teams are intended to be a lethal and survivable deterrent force that can be rapidly deployed around the world. The commanders in chief envision different uses for the teams according to the unique requirements of their respective regions. However, they generally agree that the teams should provide them with a broader choice of capabilities to meet their operational needs. The Army faces many challenges in assembling its first team. For example, some planned combat capabilities will not be present when the team is certified for deployment next year. In addition, the interim armored vehicle delivery schedule has compressed the time available for training. Army officials believe that the organization at Fort Lewis that was created to help assemble the brigades has been effective in dealing with day-to-day challenges. The Army is chronicling lessons learned in forming the teams, but this information is not readily available in a central source. As a result, the Army may be unaware of some best practices or may repeat mistakes in forming later teams.

gao_T-NSIAD-98-211

gao_T-NSIAD-98-211_0

Key Elements of Export Control System State and Commerce’s export control systems are based on fundamentally different premises. This difference in who makes licensing decisions underscores the weight the two systems assign to economic and commercial interests relative to national security concerns. Under State’s system, Commerce is not involved, underscoring the primacy of national security and foreign policy concern. Commerce’s system is more transparent to the license applicant than State’s system. Evolution of Export Controls for Commercial Satellites Export control of commercial communications satellites has been a matter of contention over the years among U.S. satellite manufacturers and the agencies involved in their export licensing jurisdiction—the Departments of Commerce, Defense, State, and the intelligence community. Commercial communications satellites were contained on the industrial list. In April 1995, the Chairman of the President’s Export Council met with the Secretary of State to discuss issues related to the jurisdiction of commercial communications satellites and the impact of sanctions that affected the export and launch of satellites to China. The process of planning a satellite launch takes several months, and there is concern that technical discussions between U.S. and foreign representatives may lead to the transfer of information on militarily sensitive components.

Why GAO Did This Study GAO discussed the evolution of export controls on commercial communications satellites, focusing on: (1) key elements in the export control systems of the Department of Commerce and the Department of State; (2) how export controls for commercial satellites have evolved over the years; (3) the concerns and issues debated over the transfer of commercial communications satellites to the export licensing jurisdiction of Commerce; and (4) the safeguards that may be applied to commercial satellite exports. What GAO Found GAO noted that: (1) the U.S. export control system--comprised of both the Commerce and State systems--is about managing risk; (2) exports to some countries involve less risk than to other countries and exports of some items involve less risk than others; (3) the planning of a satellite launch with technical discussions and exchanges of information taking place over several months, involves risk no matter which agency is the licensing authority; (4) recently, events have focused on the appropriateness of Commerce jurisdiction over communication satellites; (5) by design, Commerce's system gives greater weight to economic and commercial concerns, implicitly accepting greater security risks; and (6) State's system gives primacy to national security and foreign policy concerns, lessening--but not eliminating--the risk of damage to U.S. national security interests.

gao_GAO-15-497

gao_GAO-15-497_0

Federal agencies can either distribute transit benefits directly to employees, enter into an interagency agreement with another agency, such as DOT, or contract with a private company for distribution. DOT’s transit benefit program is administered by TRANServe, located within the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Administration. The phrase “internal control” does not refer to a single event, but rather a series of actions and activities that occur throughout an entity’s operations on an ongoing basis and that serve as the first line of defense in safeguarding assets and preventing and detecting errors and fraud.Moreover, internal controls should be designed to provide reasonable assurance that unauthorized acquisition, use, or disposition of an entity’s assets will be promptly detected. DOT Has Established Multiple Internal Control Activities Designed to Prevent Non-Transit-Related Purchases DOT’s TRANServe debit-card program includes activities that correspond to the five internal control standards—(1) control environment, (2) risk assessment, (3) control activities, (4) monitoring, and (5) information and communication. In combination, these activities would be expected to provide reasonable assurance that non-transit-related purchases can be identified and denied. Based on our review of the design of TRANServe’s internal controls for the TRANServe debit-card program, we found that those internal controls align with GAO’s Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government. TRANServe has established a control environment framework for the debit-card program through the following: A primary goal for the debit-card program: TRANServe has set a primary goal for the debit-card program of offering enhanced internal controls to preserve transit benefits by deterring waste, fraud, and abuse. Internal controls officer: According to the program’s policy and guidance, the internal controls officer is responsible for examining current internal control activities and, identifying potential program vulnerabilities, through testing of controls related to the debit card. These SOPs include: Conducting debit card transaction data mining:provides the guidelines for weekly data mining, which includes reviews of debit card transactions to identify potential misuse or irregular activity, such as the purchase of non-transit items. Potential misuse, among other things, may involve retail merchants, or irregular transaction amounts. Inherent features of the debit card: According to TRANServe officials, ensuring that transit beneficiaries do not make non-transit-related purchases is an inherent feature in the design of the debit card TRANServe has implemented through Treasury and J.P. Morgan. The debit card is designed so that it can only be used to purchase transit fare media through transit providers that are identified through a limited list of MCCs approved by DOT. Sending anomaly letters: As previously described, TRANServe has established a process for sending debit-card anomaly letters to client agencies when consumer purchases are detected through the data mining process. TRANServe Collaborated with IRS to Demonstrate That Its Debit Card Met Requirements for Qualifying as a Fringe Benefit TRANServe worked with IRS to demonstrate that its debit-card program was in compliance with relevant statutes, Treasury regulations, and IRS administrative rules—specifically that the debit card qualified as a “transit pass” as defined in section 132(f)—for the purposes of qualifying as a transportation fringe benefit and being excludable from gross income. According to IRS, TRANServe demonstrated that the debit card was a “transit pass” because the card restrictions effectively permit recipients of the cards to use them only to purchase fare media on mass transit In May 2011, TRANServe first tested the use of a debit card systems. From 2011 to 2013, TRANServe implemented its field test, which included: researching the transit usage in the region, identifying target areas where the transit authorities are located, selecting point-of-sale locations where transit media are sold and as well as non-transit-related sales locations, distributing debit cards that already contained the MCC restrictions to testers, sending testers to the predetermined sales locations to purchase either transit fare media or non-transit-related items, assigning some testers to make debit-card purchases on-line or via telephone depending on the number of ways transit media were sold, and contacting J. P. Morgan to obtain transaction records during the field testing phase. Once IRS was satisfied with the final results in a service area, IRS sent TRANServe an email correspondence to confirm its understanding of the test results and that based on such test results, the debit card constitutes a transit pass and qualifies as a transportation fringe benefit. TRANServe substantially completed the roll out of the debit-card program by the end of fiscal year 2014. Agency Comments We provided a draft of this report to the Department of Transportation and Internal Revenue Service for review and comment. DOT and IRS provided technical comments, which we incorporated, as appropriate.

Why GAO Did This Study In 1992, Congress created a transportation fringe benefit that allowed public and private employers to offer employees transit benefits, excludable from gross income, to cover out-of-pocket public transportation commuting costs. Federal agencies may distribute these transit benefits directly or enter into an agreement with another agency, such as DOT, to distribute the benefits on a fee-for-service basis. In 2011, DOT's TRANServe began using debit cards to distribute transit benefits. IRS has established rules to help employers ensure their debit card programs qualify as allowable fringe benefits. Members of Congress have questioned whether the debit card restrictions prevent non-transit-related purchases and whether DOT's program complied with IRS rules. This report describes the extent to which DOT has (1) designed internal controls to provide reasonable assurance that employees do not use the debit card to make non-transit-related purchases and (2) worked with IRS to ensure its debit card program complies with IRS's rules. GAO reviewed the design of TRANServe's internal control system for preventing non-transit purchases, but testing the system was not within the scope of the work; compared federal standards and TRANServe's practices; reviewed IRS rules on fringe benefits; and obtained TRANServe documentation of the steps taken to demonstrate that its debit card complied with the rules. GAO is not making recommendations in this report. DOT and IRS provided technical comments that were incorporated as appropriate. What GAO Found The Department of Transportation's (DOT) Office of Transportation Services (TRANServe) has included multiple internal control activities in the design of the TRANServe debit card program. These controls are intended to prevent federal employees from using their debit card for non-transit-related purchases, and as designed, would be expected to provide reasonable assurance that non-transit-related purchases can be identified and denied. The phrase “internal control” does not refer to a single event, but rather a series of actions that occur throughout an entity's operations on an ongoing basis for safeguarding assets and preventing and detecting errors and fraud. DOT provided evidence that the design of its TRANServe debit card program aligns with each of the five internal control standards as identified in GAO's Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government and as described below. Control environment : DOT has established a control environment framework for the TRANServe debit card program by, among other things, setting the program's primary goal as enhancing internal controls to deter waste, fraud, and abuse of transit benefits. Risk assessment : DOT established the position of internal controls officer, in 2007, to examine control activities and identify potential program vulnerabilities through the testing of debit card controls. Control activities : TRANServe has established mechanisms for controlling the use of the debit card. For example, the debit card is restricted so it can only be used to purchase transit fare from transit providers that are identified by merchant category codes that have been approved by DOT. The codes are used to classify a business by type of goods or services it provides. Monitoring : TRANServe conducts weekly data mining, which includes reviewing debit card transactions to identify potential misuse and irregularities. Information and communication . TRANServe sends “anomaly letters” (letters detailing potential misuse of the debit card) to agencies when non-transit purchases are detected. TRANServe worked with the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) to demonstrate that the debit card program is in compliance with IRS's rules for qualified transportation fringe benefits and that in particular, it was a transit pass and effectively prevented non-transit-related purchases. From 2011 to 2013, TRANServe staff tested the debit card with transit agencies in eight areas across the country, making dozens of purchases of both transit-related and consumer-related products. In most cases the purchase restriction succeeded in preventing the debit card from purchasing non-transit-related products. In the few cases where the restriction failed, TRANServe took steps to have additional restrictions placed on the debit cards. Once it completed the tests in each region, TRANServe sent the test results to IRS, and once IRS was satisfied with the final results, IRS officials sent DOT an e-mail confirming that the debit card qualified as a transportation fringe benefit in that area. TRANServe then completed the roll out of the debit card program by the end of fiscal year 2014.

gao_GGD-96-32

gao_GGD-96-32_0

Background The retention allowance authority was established by section 208 of the Federal Employees Pay Comparability Act of 1990 (FEPCA). The act and OPM’s implementing regulations require agencies to document that (1) each allowance paid is based on a determination that unusually high or unique qualifications of the employee or a special need of the agency for the employee’s services makes it essential to retain the employee and (2) in the absence of such an allowance, the employee would be likely to leave federal employment. Scope and Methodology To identify which agencies gave the largest number of retention allowances and the highest amounts awarded, as well as to determine the total value of retention allowances and the number of SES employees awarded allowances, we reviewed OPM retention allowance reports for fiscal years 1991 through 1994, which were derived from OPM’s Central Personnel Data File (CPDF). Retention Allowances Were Generally Awarded to a Limited Number of Employees As of September 30, 1994, 354 employees (excluding HHS employees), or about 0.01 percent of the approximately 2.9 million federal civilian employees, were receiving retention allowances. The average allowance at the five agencies during fiscal years 1991 through 1994 was $7,789 per employee. Ex-Im Bank awarded allowances to 21.7 percent of its 462 employees during fiscal year 1994, while none of the other agencies awarded allowances to more than 0.3 percent of their employees. OPM has used this information to produce quarterly reports showing active retention allowance data governmentwide. Also, OPM’s regulations did not address whether agencies should review and/or recertify allowances when employees receive significant pay increases during the year. The retention allowance plans for DOD, Ex-Im Bank, and SEC did not include criteria for determining the amounts of allowances.

Why GAO Did This Study Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed federal agencies' use of retention allowances as salary supplements to retain essential employees, focusing on: (1) the total and average value of the allowances from 1991 to 1994; (2) the extent to which Senior Executive Service employees received retention allowances; (3) whether there were any compliance issues involved in retention allowance awards; (4) the agencies' adherence to Office of Personnel Management (OPM) retention regulations; and (5) the extent to which OPM oversees the use of retention allowances. What GAO Found GAO found that: (1) 354 civilian employees received retention allowances as of September 30, 1994; (2) although the Department of Health and Human Services did not report its allowance data, 20 of its employees received allowances during fiscal year (FY) 1994; (3) retention allowances totalled $2.8 million annually and averaged $7,789 annually per employee; (4) the Export-Import Bank (Eximbank) awarded allowances to 21.7 percent of its employees in FY 1994, while the other agencies awarded allowances to 0.3 percent or fewer of its employees; (5) Eximbank did not determine whether prospective recipients would have left their positions if they did not receive retention allowances; (6) the criteria the Department of Defense, Eximbank, and Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) used to determine the amount of employee allowances could not be determined; (7) OPM regulations do not require agencies to review or recertify retention allowances affected by pay increases; and (8) OPM has developed regulations and conducted longitudinal studies of Federal Employees Pay Comparability Act (FEPCA) actions at selected agencies.

gao_GAO-08-352T

gao_GAO-08-352T_0

Background Although our high-risk designation covers only DOD’s program, our reports have also documented clearance-related problems affecting other agencies. For example, our October 2007 report on state and local information fusion centers cited two clearance-related challenges: (1) the length of time needed for state and local officials to receive clearances from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and (2) the reluctance of some federal agencies—particularly DHS and FBI—to accept clearances issued by other agencies (i.e., clearance reciprocity). Four Key Factors Should Be Considered in Efforts to Reform Security Clearance Processes I will address the need for consideration of four key factors in my testimony: (1) a strong requirements-determination process, (2) quality emphasis in all clearance processes, (3) additional metrics to provide a fuller picture of clearance processes, and (4) long-term funding requirements of security clearance reform. We are not suggesting that the numbers and levels of clearances are or are not appropriate—only that any unnecessary requirements in this initial phase use government resources that can be utilized for other purposes such as building additional quality into other clearance processes or decreasing delays in clearance processing. Since (1) the average investigative report for a top secret clearance takes about 10 times as many investigative staff hours as the average investigative report for a secret clearance and (2) the top secret clearance must be renewed twice as often as the secret, the investigative workload increases about 20-fold. When OMB issued its February 2007 Report of the Security Clearance Oversight Group Consistent with Title III of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, it documented quality with a single metric. GAO has long reported that it is problematic to equate the quality of investigations with the percentage of investigations that are returned by requesting agencies due to incomplete case files. Incomplete investigations and adjudications undermine the government’s efforts to move toward greater clearance reciprocity. Without full documentation of investigative actions, information obtained, and adjudicative decisions, agencies could continue to require duplicative investigations and adjudications. Government Clearance Metrics Emphasize Timeliness Measurement, but Additional Metrics Could Provide a Fuller Picture of Clearance Processes Much of the recent quantitative information provided on clearances has dealt with how much time it takes for the end-to-end processing of clearances (and related measures such as the numbers of various types of investigative and adjudicative reports generated); however, there is less quantitative information on other aspects of the clearance process. Among other things, IRTPA established specific timeliness guidelines to be phased in over 5 years. Including these and other types of metrics in regular monitoring of clearance processes could add value in current and future reform efforts as well as supply better information for greater congressional oversight. Long-Term Funding Requirements Information Could Enable More Informed Congressional Oversight of Security Clearance Reform The joint Security Clearance Process Reform team may also want to consider providing Congress with the long-term funding requirements to implement changes to security clearance processes enabling more informed congressional oversight. Specifically, DOD’s August 2007 congressionally mandated report on clearances for industry personnel provided less than 2 years of data on funding requirements. However, the report did not include information on (1) the funding requirements for fiscal year 2009 and beyond even though the survey used to develop the funding requirements asked contractors about their clearance needs through 2010 and (2) the tens of millions of dollars that the Defense Security Service Director testified before Congress in May 2007 were necessary to maintain the infrastructure supporting the industry personnel security clearance program. As noted in our February 2008 report, the inclusion of less than 2 future years of budgeting information in the DOD report limits Congress’s ability to carry out its oversight and appropriations functions pertaining to industry personnel security clearances. GAO’s experience in evaluating DOD’s and governmentwide clearance plans and programs as well as its experience monitoring large- scale, complex acquisition programs could help Congress in its oversight, insight, and foresight regarding security clearance reform efforts. Questions for the Record Related to DOD’s Personnel Security Clearance Program and the Government Plan for Improving the Clearance Process.

Why GAO Did This Study In 2004, Congress passed the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act to reform security clearance processes. Much of GAO's experience in evaluating personnel security clearance processes over the decades has consisted of examining the Department of Defense's (DOD) program, which maintains about 2.5 million clearances on servicemembers, DOD civilian employees, legislative branch employees, and industry personnel working for DOD and 23 other federal agencies. Long-standing delays in processing applications--and other problems in DOD's clearance program--led GAO to designate it a high-risk area in 2005. GAO also has documented clearance-related problems in other agencies. For this hearing, GAO was asked to identify key factors that could be applied in personnel security clearance reform efforts. To identify key factors, GAO drew upon its past reports and institutional knowledge. For those reports, GAO reviewed laws, executive orders, policies, reports, and other documentation related to the security clearance process; examined samples of cases of personnel granted top secret eligibility; compared documentation in those sampled cases against federal standards; and interviewed a range of cognizant government officials. What GAO Found Current and future efforts to reform personnel security clearance processes should consider, among other things, the following four key factors: determining whether clearances are required for positions, incorporating quality control steps throughout the clearance processes, establishing metrics for assessing all aspects of clearance processes, and providing Congress with the long-term funding requirements of security clearance reform. Requesting a clearance for a position in which it will not be needed, or in which a lower- level clearance would be sufficient, will increase both costs and investigative workload unnecessarily. For example, changing the clearance needed for a position from a secret to top secret increases the investigative workload for that position about 20-fold and uses 10 times as many investigative staff hours. Emphasis on quality in clearance processes could promote positive outcomes, including more reciprocity among agencies in accepting each others' clearances. Building quality throughout clearance processes is important, but government agencies have paid little attention to quality, despite GAO's repeated suggestions to place more emphasis on quality. Even though GAO identified the government's primary metric for assessing quality--the percentage of investigative reports returned for insufficiency during the adjudicative phase--as inadequate by itself in 1999, the Office of Management and Budget and the Office of Personnel Management continue to use that metric. Concerns about the quality of investigative and adjudicative work underlie the continued reluctance of agencies to accept clearances issued by other agencies; as a result, government resources are used to conduct duplicative investigations and adjudications. Many efforts to monitor clearance processes emphasize measuring timeliness, but additional metrics could provide a fuller picture of clearance processes. The emphasis on timeliness is due in part to recent legislation that provides specific guidelines regarding the speed with which clearances should be completed and requires annual reporting of that information to Congress. GAO has highlighted a variety of metrics in its reports (e.g., completeness of investigative and adjudicative reports, staff's and customers' perceptions of the processes, and the adequacy of internal controls), all of which could add value in monitoring clearance processes and provide better information to allow improved oversight by Congress and the Executive Branch. Another factor to consider in reform efforts is providing Congress with the long-term funding requirements to implement changes to security clearance processes. DOD's August 2007 congressionally mandated report on industry clearances identified its immediate funding needs but did not include information on the funding requirements for fiscal year 2009 and beyond. The inclusion of less than 2 future years of budgeting data in the DOD report limits Congress's ability to carry out its long-term oversight and appropriations functions pertaining to industry personnel security clearances.

gao_HEHS-98-68

gao_HEHS-98-68_0

Background The Federal Employees Health Benefits Program FEHBP is available to federal employees, retirees, annuitants, and their dependents. See appendix III for a historical comparison of DOD and FEHBP beneficiary numbers and program costs. The issues include (1) who would be eligible and, among those, how many might be attracted to FEHBP and might choose to enroll; (2) how premiums would be set and what the cost-sharing arrangement would be; (3) whether FEHBP enrollees would be prohibited from also using military health care; and (4) whether the FEHBP option should be tested before deciding on nationwide implementation. Many of the bills would provide eligibility only for Medicare-eligible beneficiaries aged 65 and older—approximately 1.3 million retirees, dependents, and survivors.The Military Coalition, an alliance of beneficiary associations including The Retired Officers’ Association and the National Military Family Association, favors this approach as responding to the immediate needs of persons with declining direct care system access and as a way to reduce the option’s price tag. FEHBP would likely be more attractive and beneficial to Medicare-eligible beneficiaries, who also may have alternative health care choices but find them less comprehensive and more costly than FEHBP. Despite past studies showing higher health care use by military beneficiaries than the civilian population, OPM believes that the initial military premiums would not be markedly different from the federal pool and that future use by military FEHBP enrollees, because of the premium and copayment effects on usage patterns, would approximate that of the federal pool. Potential Concurrent Use of FEHBP and Military Health Care Another key issue is whether military FEHBP participants would also be allowed to continue using military facilities on a space-available basis or enroll in TRICARE or both. Allowing concurrent FEHBP and DOD care use also has DOD sizing and readiness implications. Should many current DOD care users switch to FEHBP, prohibiting concurrent use would allow DOD to downsize or close additional military facilities to help fund FEHBP costs. As it is, DOD’s $15.6 billion annual MHS appropriation is not sufficient to fund care for all DOD-eligible beneficiaries; it will fund only those now using the system. Health care use and choices tend to be relatively local and, thus, a test with too few localities and types of health care options could have results that would not be replicated across the country. The Bills in the 105th Congress We reviewed nine bills introduced in the 105th Congress that would authorize enrollment in FEHBP plans for selected military beneficiary groups. In this appendix, we provide our detailed analysis of each bill, including eligibility and premium-sharing provisions, whether concurrent use of DOD health care is allowed, and the implications for MHS operations and beneficiary costs. Finally, the bill requires an extensive evaluation to measure participation, out-of-pocket costs, and overall government costs, as well as an analysis of the program’s effects on the military health care system’s cost and access and use rates. Thus, all other areas in the continental United States would be possible test sites. III.2). 7, 1996).

Why GAO Did This Study Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed nine bills introduced in the 105th Congress to authorize the Federal Employees Health Benefits Program (FEHBP) for military beneficiaries, focusing on: (1) issues that cut across the various bills, such as potential effects on beneficiary costs, eligibility, and the military health system (MHS) generally; and (2) the bills' key features, highlighting their similarities and differences. What GAO Found GAO noted that: (1) GAO's analysis of the nine bills show that their different features could affect the numbers of beneficiaries who would be attracted to participate in the FEHBP, total government and beneficiary costs, and MHS operations; (2) FEHBP coverage would likely vary in attractiveness, depending on beneficiaries' current health care costs and military care eligibility and access and their other health care coverage; (3) the various bills' premium-setting and cost-sharing features would affect not only whether beneficiaries' chose to participate but also the Department of Defense's (DOD) potential added costs; (4) most proposals would set military enrollees' premiums separately from the federal FEHBP group's to shield the federal group's premiums should the military group have higher care usage and costs and thus a higher total premium; (5) whether military FEHBP enrollees should be allowed concurrent use of the MHS is both a cost issue and a military readiness issue; (6) allowing concurrent use of FEHBP and DOD care would create a system of overlapping coverage for younger beneficiaries who already have priority access to DOD-funded care through military facilities and civilian providers; (7) but those aged 65 and older, who have lower priority access to military health care, FEHBP would be far less duplicative; (8) prohibiting concurrent DOD and FEHBP care use might enable DOD to more appropriately size its system, facilitate downsizing of unneeded capacity, and thus have savings for use in helping to fund FEHBP enrollment; (9) the size and patient mix of the DOD medical system, however, are also affected by readiness needs; (10) DOD officials have stated that retaining sufficient numbers and an appropriate mix of patients in the DOD system is critical to recruiting, retaining, and training military physicians and support staff for wartime readiness; (11) yet some experts believe that military facilities' current patient mix is not sufficient to ensure physicians' wartime readiness; (12) to better assess a FEHBP option's attractiveness and potential effects on government costs and the MHS's operation, some bills would authorize a test of the program in a few areas of the country; and (13) such sites would include areas with military medical facilities and those far from such facilities and areas where a variety of FEHBP plans and such other health care options as Medicare health maintenance organization's are alternatively available.

gao_GAO-03-414

gao_GAO-03-414_0

Attacks Severely Affected Financial Markets but Heroic Efforts Were Made to Restore Operations Although the facilities of the stock and options exchanges and clearing organizations in lower Manhattan were largely undamaged by the attacks, many market participants were affected by the loss of telecommunications and lack of access to lower Manhattan. In addition, connectivity between market participants and exchanges had not been tested. Disruptions in Government Securities and Money Markets Severely Affected Clearance and Settlement, Liquidity, and Trade Volumes The attacks also severely disrupted the markets for government securities and money market instruments primarily because of the impact on the broker-dealers that trade in the market and on one of the key banks that perform clearing functions for these products. For example, some firms had difficulties in locating key staff in the confusion after the attacks. Financial Market Participants Have Taken Actions to Reduce Risks of Disruption, but Some Limitations Remain Since the attacks, exchanges, clearing organizations, ECNs, and payment system processors implemented various physical and information security measures and business continuity capabilities to reduce the risk that their operations would be disrupted by attacks, but some organizations continued to have limitations in their preparedness that increases their risk of disruption. However, at the time we conducted our review, 9 of the 15 organizations, including 2 we considered critical to the functioning of the financial markets, had not taken steps to ensure that they would have the staff necessary to conduct their critical operations if the staff at their primary site were incapacitated—including 8 organizations that also had physical vulnerabilities at their primary sites. If a wide- scale disaster caused damage or made a region greater than these distances inaccessible, these 4 organizations would be at greater risk for not being able to resume operations promptly. The remaining 6 organizations faced increased risk of being disrupted by a wide-scale disaster because 4 lacked backup facilities, while 2 organizations had backup facilities that were located 4 to 10 miles from their primary operations facilities. 3 of this report). SEC and SROs Generally Did Not Review Physical and Information System Security and Business Continuity at Broker- Dealers SEC and the securities market SROs generally have not examined broker- dealers’ physical and information system security and business continuity efforts, but planned to increase their focus on these issues in the future. However, the bank regulators’ guidance did not specifically address measures to protect facilities from terrorist or other physical attacks. Conclusions Financial market regulators have begun to develop goals and a strategy for resuming operations along with sound business continuity practices for a limited number of organizations that conduct clearing functions. Given the increased threats demonstrated by the September 11 attacks and the need to ensure that key financial market organizations are following sound practices, securities and banking regulators’ oversight programs are important mechanisms for ensuring that U.S financial markets are resilient.

Why GAO Did This Study September 11 exposed the vulnerability of U.S. financial markets to wide-scale disasters. Because the markets are vital to the nation's economy, GAO assessed (1) the effects of the attacks on market participants' facilities and telecommunications and how prepared participants were for attacks at that time, (2) physical and information security and business continuity plans market participants had in place after the attacks, and (3) regulatory efforts to improve preparedness and oversight of market participants' risk reduction efforts. What GAO Found The September 11 attacks severely disrupted U.S. financial markets, resulting in the longest closure of the stock markets since the 1930s and severe settlement difficulties in the government securities market. While exchange and clearing organization facilities were largely undamaged, critical broker-dealers and bank participants had facilities and telecommunications connections damaged or destroyed. These firms and infrastructure providers made heroic and sometimes ad hoc and innovative efforts to restore operations. However, the attacks revealed that many of these organizations' business continuity plans (BCP) had not been designed to address wide-scale events. GAO reviewed 15 organizations that perform trading or clearing and found that since the attacks, these organizations had improved their physical and information security measures and BCPs to reduce the risk of disruption from future attacks. However, many of the organizations still had limitations in their preparedness that increased their risk of being disrupted. For example, 9 organizations had not developed BCP procedures to ensure that staff capable of conducting their critical operations would be available if an attack incapacitated personnel at their primary sites. Ten were also at greater risk for being disrupted by wide-scale events because 4 organizations had no backup facilities and 6 had facilities located between 2 to 10 miles from their primary sites. The financial regulators have begun to jointly develop recovery goals and business continuity practices for organizations important for clearing; however, regulators have not developed strategies and practices for exchanges, key broker-dealers, and banks to ensure that trading can resume promptly in future disasters. Individually, SEC has reviewed exchange and clearing organization risk reduction efforts, but had not generally reviewed broker-dealers' efforts. The bank regulators that oversee the major banks had guidance on information security and business continuity and reported examining banks' risk reduction measures annually.

gao_GAO-01-889

gao_GAO-01-889_0

This model will help DOD determine the number of government-owned housing units that need to be constructed or maintained as well as determine the size of the Department’s housing privatization projects.” DOD and the services have worked to develop the framework for a single, consistent process for determining housing requirements. Issues such as what constitutes affordable civilian housing and reasonable commuting distances have slowed the adoption of the process. This rationale is not consistent with DOD’s stated policy of relying on the private sector first. Although the change in the housing allowance program is likely to decrease the demand for military housing relative to civilian housing, there are indications that the services are reluctant to reduce on-base family housing. While costs for the increased housing allowance appear substantial in the short term, evidence shows that it is cheaper for the government to provide an allowance for private sector housing than to provide a military house on base. Considerable evidence suggests that providing a housing allowance is less expensive and more flexible than providing a military house. Conclusions As the housing allowance increase is phased in—eliminating the financial disincentive to living in civilian housing—demand for military housing is likely to decrease. Scope and Methodology To determine whether DOD has implemented a standard process for determining the need for military housing based on available private sector housing, we held discussions with, and reviewed documents from, DOD housing officials about the Department’s efforts to develop such a process. The Congress, GAO, and the Department of Defense (DOD) Inspector General have identified problems with the military services’ methodologies for developing housing requirements.

Why GAO Did This Study This report reviews the Department of Defense's (DOD) family housing program. What GAO Found GAO discusses (1) whether DOD has implemented a standard process for determining the required military housing based on housing available in the private sector and (2) how an increase in the housing allowance is likely to affect the need for housing on military installations over the long term. Despite calls from Congress, GAO, and DOD's Inspector General, DOD has not introduced a standard process for determining military housing requirements. DOD and the services have worked to develop the framework for the process, but technical concerns, such as standards for affordable housing and commuting distance, have stalled its adoption. Increasing the housing allowance underscores the urgent need for a consistent process to determine military housing requirements because it is expected to increase demand for civilian housing and lessen the demand for military housing. From a policy standpoint, increasing the allowance better positions DOD to rely on the private sector first for housing because it removes the financial disincentive to living in civilian housing. From a management standpoint, considerable evidence suggests that it is less expensive to provide allowances for military personnel to live on the civilian market than to provide military housing. Although overall program costs are increasing significantly in the short term to cover increased allowances, DOD could save money in the longer term by encouraging more personnel to move into civilian housing.

gao_GAO-09-412T

gao_GAO-09-412T_0

Moving the Forest Service into Interior Would Align Federal Land Management Missions and Could Improve Effectiveness of Federal Programs yet May Yield Few Efficiencies in the Short Term A move of the Forest Service into Interior could improve federal land management by aligning the federal land management mission under one department and increasing program effectiveness. It may also yield long- term, but few short-term, efficiencies. Although a Move Would Align Federal Land Management Missions, It Could Diminish the Forest Service’s State- and Private-Lands Mission One result of moving the Forest Service into Interior would be an alignment of the federal land management mission in one department by bringing the Forest Service together with the other three federal agencies having major land management missions. 2), including almost 430 million acres of private forested lands across the nation. Many agency officials and experts we interviewed suggested that if the objective of a move is to improve federal land management or increase the efficiency and effectiveness of the agencies’ diverse programs, other organizational options may achieve better results than moving the Forest Service into Interior. These officials and experts raised a range of other options, such as increasing collaboration and coordination, moving BLM to USDA, and creating a new department of natural resources. Move Would Entail Consideration of Numerous Factors and Could Lead to Transition Costs, but Key Merger and Transformation Practices Could Help Facilitate Move and Manage Disruptions Moving the Forest Service into Interior would raise a number of cultural, organizational, and legal factors and related transition costs for Interior and USDA to consider. Nevertheless, Interior and USDA could implement some key merger and transformation practices to help manage any resulting disruptions and other transition costs. In 1996, the agency was merged into USGS. According to some agency officials and experts, if the Forest Service were moved, Interior would need to consider how the Forest Service would be placed in the department, unless this organization were legislated. Furthermore, integrating the Forest Service’s reporting, budgeting, acquisition, and other processes and systems into Interior’s would be difficult, time-consuming, and costly, according to many experts and officials. For example, such legislation could transfer the proper authorities from the Secretary of Agriculture to the Secretary of the Interior, as well as give the Secretary of the Interior broad reorganization authority to bring the agencies’ programs into alignment and to manage and modify processes, some officials said. In considering a move of the Forest Service into Interior, policymakers will need to carefully weigh long-term mission and management gains against potential short-term disruption and operational costs.

Why GAO Did This Study The Department of Agriculture's (USDA) Forest Service, which manages almost a quarter of the nation's lands, is the only major land management agency outside the Department of the Interior (Interior). Four federal land management agencies--the Forest Service and the Bureau of Land Management (BLM), Fish and Wildlife Service, and National Park Service in Interior--manage most of the 680 million acres of federal land across the country. Growing ecological challenges, ranging from wildland fires to climate change, have revived interest in moving the Forest Service into Interior. GAO was asked to report on the potential effects of moving the Forest Service into Interior and creating a new bureau equal to Interior's other bureaus, such as BLM. GAO was also asked to identify factors that should be considered if such a move were legislated, as well as management practices that could facilitate a move. What GAO Found Moving the Forest Service into Interior could potentially improve federal land management by consolidating into one department key agencies with land management missions and increasing the effectiveness of their programs. At the same time, a move would provide few efficiencies in the short term and could diminish the role the Forest Service plays in state and private land management. According to many agency officials and experts, where the Forest Service mission is aligned with Interior's--in particular, the multiple-use mission comparable to BLM's--a move could increase the overall effectiveness of some of the agencies' programs and policies. Conversely, most agency officials and experts GAO interviewed believed that few short-term efficiencies would be realized from a move, although a number said opportunities would be created for potential long-term efficiencies. Many officials and experts suggested that if the objective of a move is to improve land management and increase the effectiveness and efficiency of the agencies' diverse programs, other options might achieve better results. If the Forest Service were moved into Interior, USDA and Interior would need to consider a number of cultural, organizational, and legal factors and related transition costs, some of which could be managed by certain practices successfully used in the past to merge and transform organizations. For example, integrating the Forest Service's reporting, budgeting, and human capital processes and systems into Interior's could be time-consuming, costly, and disruptive. Nevertheless, Interior and USDA could implement some key merger and transformation practices to help manage any resulting disruptions and other transition costs. In considering a move of the Forest Service into Interior, policymakers will need to carefully weigh mission and management gains against potential short-term disruption and operational costs.

gao_GAO-04-112

gao_GAO-04-112_0

Maintenance problems due to personnel include (1) lack of trained and experienced technicians and (2) increases in maintenance man-hours required to repair some of these aging equipment items. However, some gaps exist because the services either have not validated their plans for the sustainment, modernization, or replacement of the equipment items, or the services’ program strategies for sustaining the equipment are hampered by problems or delays in the fielding of replacement equipment or in the vulnerability of the programs to budget cuts. The two equipment items for which we assessed the program strategy as red are the KC-135 Stratotanker and the Tomahawk Cruise Missile because, although the services may have developed long-range program strategies for these equipment items, they have not validated or updated their plans for sustaining, modernizing, or replacing these items. For example, as shown in table 2, we identified fiscal year 2003 unfunded requirements totaling $372.9 million for four major aircraft equipment items we reviewed. In general, the services will always ensure equipment is ready to go to war, often through surges in maintenance and overcoming obstacles such as obsolete parts, parts availability, and cannibalization of other pieces of equipment. Only one equipment item, the Marine Corps CH-46E helicopter, could not accomplish its intended wartime mission due to lift limitations. In this report, we identify a number of examples of equipment condition deficiencies and inconsistencies between the program strategies and the funding requests to address those deficiencies that were not fully addressed in the department’s budget documents. Scope and Methodology To determine the level of attention required by the Department of Defense, the military services, and/or the Congress for each of the 25 equipment items we reviewed, we performed an independent evaluation of the (1) equipments’ current condition; (2) services’ program strategies for the sustainment, modernization, or replacement of the equipment items; (3) current and projected funding levels for the equipment items in relation to the services’ program strategies; and (4) equipments’ wartime capabilities. indicates a problem or issue that is severe enough to warrant action by DOD, the military services, and/or the Congress within the next 3-5 years. We also reviewed the wartime capability of the selected equipment items, focusing on the extent to which each equipment item is capable of fulfilling its wartime mission. Because of ongoing operations in Iraq and our limited access to the deployed units and related equipment performance data, we were unable to obtain sufficient data to definitively assess the wartime capability for each of the 25 equipment items we reviewed, as we did for each of the other three assessment areas.

Why GAO Did This Study GAO was asked to assess the condition of key equipment items and to determine if the services have adequate plans for sustaining, modernizing, or replacing them. To address these questions, we selected 25 major equipment items, and determined (1) their current condition, (2) whether the services have mapped out a program strategy for these items, (3) whether current and projected funding is consistent with these strategies, and (4) whether these equipment items are capable of fulfilling their wartime missions. What GAO Found Many of our assessments of 25 judgmentally selected critical equipment items indicated that the problems or issues we identified were not severe enough to warrant action by the Department of Defense, military services, and/or the Congress within the next 5 years. The condition of the items we reviewed varies widely from very poor for some of the older equipment items like the Marine Corps CH-46E Sea Knight Helicopter to very good for some of the newer equipment items like the Army Stryker vehicle. The problems we identified were largely due to (1) maintenance problems caused by equipment age and a lack of trained and experienced technicians, and (2) spare parts shortages. Although the services have mapped out program strategies for sustaining, modernizing, or replacing most of the equipment items we reviewed, some gaps exist. In some cases, such as the KC-135 Stratotanker and the Tomahawk missile, the services have not fully developed or validated their plans for the sustainment, modernization, or replacement of the items. In other cases, the services' program strategies for sustaining the equipment are hampered by problems or delays in the fielding of replacement equipment or in the vulnerability of the programs to budget cuts. For 15 of the 25 equipment items we reviewed, there appears to be a disconnect between the funding requested by the Department of Defense or projected in the Future Years Defense Program and the services' program strategies to sustain or replace the equipment items. For example, we identified fiscal year 2003 unfunded requirements, as reported by the services, totaling $372.9 million for four major aircraft--the CH-47D helicopter, F-16 fighter aircraft, C-5 transport aircraft, and CH-46E transport helicopter. The 25 equipment items we reviewed appear to be capable of fulfilling their wartime missions. While we were unable to obtain sufficient data to definitively assess wartime capability because of ongoing operations in Iraq, the services, in general, will always ensure equipment is ready to go to war, often through surging their maintenance operations and overcoming other obstacles. Some of the equipment items we reviewed, however, have capability deficiencies that could degrade their wartime performance in the near term.

gao_GAO-11-193

gao_GAO-11-193_0

The Bureau Completed NRFU $660 Million under Budget The Bureau budgeted that NRFU would cost around $2.25 billion. However, by the end of the operation, the Bureau reported using approximately $1.59 billion, which was 29 percent lower than budgeted. However, a majority of LCOs generally finished their NRFU workloads ahead of this 10-week time frame. Significantly, our analysis of Bureau data found that the fast pace of NRFU was associated with the collection of less-complete household data. Indeed, after controlling for such variables as response rate and local enumeration challenges, we found that LCOs with higher percentages of proxy interviews and closeout interviews were more likely to have finished NRFU in 53 days or less (the average amount of time LCOs took to complete their NRFU workloads) compared to LCOs with lower percentages of proxy and closeout interviews. Although the IT systems ultimately functioned well enough for the Bureau to carry out the census, workarounds developed to address performance problems with PBOCS— a workflow-management system crucial for the Bureau’s field operations—adversely affected the Bureau’s ability to implement key quality-assurance procedures as planned. More generally, as the Bureau prepares for 2020, among other actions it will be important for it to continue to improve its ability to manage its IT investments. Key Follow-up Operations Were Generally Completed as Planned Vacant/Delete Check Operation Finished ahead of Schedule but over Budget To help ensure that people are counted only once and in the right place, as well as to collect complete and correct information about them, after NRFU the Bureau conducts a number of operations designed to improve the accuracy of the data. One of these operations is the VDC operation, where enumerators verified the Census Day status of vacant and deleted (nonexistent) housing units. Fundamental Reforms Will Be Needed for a More Cost-Effective Census in 2020 While it will be important to assess and revamp existing census-taking activities, the results of prior enumerations underscore the fact that simply refining current methods—many of which have been in place for decades—will not bring about the reforms needed to control costs while maintaining accuracy given ongoing and newly emerging societal trends. Over time, because of demographic and attitudinal trends, securing an acceptable response rate has become an increasing challenge, and the Bureau has spent more money with each census in order to secure a complete count. Indeed, the cost of conducting the census has, on average, doubled each decade since 1970, in constant 2010 dollars. What was the intended goal? The Bureau, recognizing that it cannot afford to continue operating the way it does unless it fundamentally changes its method of doing business, has already taken some important first steps in addressing these questions as well as other areas. On the basis of our work on planning for the 2010 Census, a road map for 2020 could include, but not be limited to, the following elements that could be updated on a regular basis: specific, measurable performance goals, how the Bureau’s efforts, procedures, and projects would contribute to those goals, and what performance measures would be used; descriptions of how the Bureau’s approaches to human-capital management, organizational structure, IT acquisitions, and other internal functions are aligned with the performance goals; an assessment of the risks associated with each significant decennial operation, including the interrelationships between the operations and a description of relevant mitigation plans; detailed milestone estimates for each significant decennial operation, including estimated testing dates, and justification for any changes to milestone estimates; detailed life-cycle cost estimates of the decennial census that are credible, comprehensive, accurate, and well-documented as stipulated by Office of Management and Budget and GAO guidance; and a detailed description of all significant contracts the Bureau plans to enter into and a justification for the contracts. Recommendations for Executive Action As the Bureau plans for the next decennial census in 2020, in order to support efforts to reexamine the fundamental design of the decennial census, and help refine existing operations should they be used again in the 2020 Census, we recommend that the Secretary of Commerce direct the Under Secretary of the Economics and Statistics Administration, as well as the Census Director, to take the following six actions: To help enhance the Bureau’s performance and accountability, improve the transparency of the planning process, gauge whether the Bureau is on- track toward a more cost-effective 2020 Census, and foster greater public dialog about the census, the Bureau should develop an operational plan or road map for 2020 that integrates performance, budget, methodological, schedule, and other information that would be updated as needed and posted on the Bureau’s Web site and other social media outlets, and develop a mechanism that allows for and harnesses input from census stakeholders and individuals. The Department of Commerce generally agreed with the overall findings and recommendations of the report. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology The objectives of this report were to assess the implementation of (1) nonresponse follow-up (NRFU), the largest and most costly census field operation, where the U.S. Census Bureau (Bureau) sends enumerators to collect data from households that did not mail back their census forms, and (2) other key follow-up field operations that were critical for ensuring a complete count; and (3) identify key questions and focus areas that will be important for the Bureau, Congress, and census stakeholders to consider going forward now that planning for the next enumeration is underway. The survey was designed to examine (1) factors that affect the cost and performance of local data collection efforts, and (2) LCO managers’ satisfaction with information technology (IT) systems and other management support functions.

Why GAO Did This Study Although the U.S. Census Bureau (Bureau) generally completed the field data collection phase of the 2010 Census consistent with its operational plans, at $13 billion, 2010 was the costliest census in the nation's history. Moving forward, it will be important to both refine existing operations as well as to reexamine the fundamental approach to the census to better address long-standing issues such as securing participation and escalating costs. As requested, this report reviews (1) the conduct of nonresponse follow-up (NRFU), where enumerators collect data from households that did not return their census forms, (2) the implementation of other field operations critical to a complete count, and (3) potential reexamination areas that could help produce a more cost-effective 2020 Census. The report is based on GAO's analysis of Bureau data and documents, surveys of local census office managers, and field observations. What GAO Found Nationally, the Bureau was well positioned to implement NRFU and subsequent field operations. The Bureau achieved a mail response rate of 63 percent, which was within its expectations, and recruited nearly 3.8 million total applicants for census jobs, which was 104 percent of its staffing goal. Moreover, the Bureau completed NRFU under budget, reportedly spending $1.59 billion on the operation, about $660 million (29 percent) less than the Bureau initially estimated. Most of the Bureau's local census offices (LCO) also completed NRFU ahead of the 10-week allotted time frame. Despite these operational successes, the Bureau encountered some notable challenges. For example, the pace of NRFU may have fostered a culture that tended to emphasize speed over quality, as those LCOs with higher percentages of less-complete questionnaires were more likely to have completed NRFU in 53 days or less (the average time LCOs took to complete NRFU). The Bureau also had to overcome issues with critical information technology (IT) systems. For example, performance problems with the IT system used to manage NRFU led to processing backlogs. Although the Bureau developed workarounds for the issue, it hindered the Bureau's ability to fully implement quality-assurance procedures as planned. The Bureau generally completed other follow-up operations designed to improve the accuracy of the data consistent with its plans. One of these activities was the vacant/delete check (VDC), where enumerators verified housing units thought to be vacant or nonexistent. The Bureau completed VDC two days ahead of schedule, but encountered duplicate addresses on the address list used for the operation, which could indicate a more systemic problem with the quality of the Bureau's address list. While it will be important to refine existing census-taking activities--many of which have been in place since 1970--results of prior censuses point to the fact that simply improving current methods will not bring about the reforms needed to control costs and maintain accuracy. The cost of conducting the census has, on average, doubled each decade since 1970. At the same time, because of demographic and attitudinal trends, securing a complete count has become an increasing challenge. As a result, a fundamental reexamination of the nation's approach to the census will be needed for a more cost-effective enumeration in 2020. Potential focus areas include new data collection methods; the tenure of the Census Director; and ensuring the Bureau's approaches to human-capital management, knowledge sharing, and other internal functions are aligned toward delivering more cost-effective outcomes. The Bureau recognizes that fundamental changes are needed and has already taken some important first steps, including developing a strategic plan. To help ensure the Bureau's efforts stay on track and to avoid problems it had in planning for prior censuses, it will be important for the Bureau to issue a comprehensive operational plan that includes performance goals, milestones, cost estimates, and other critical information that could be updated regularly. What GAO Recommends GAO recommends that the Census Director refine NRFU and other field follow-up efforts by, among other things, emphasizing quality as much as speed during NRFU and by incorporating best practices in its IT acquisition-management policy. To help ensure reform efforts stay on track, the Bureau should develop an operational plan that integrates performance, budget, and other information. The Department of Commerce generally agreed with GAO's findings and recommendations.

gao_GAO-09-303

gao_GAO-09-303_0

Background The JSF is a joint, multinational acquisition program for the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps and eight international partners. More Money and Time Will Be Needed to Complete JSF Development, While DOD Plans to Accelerate Procurement Two recent estimates indicate that JSF development will cost more and take longer to complete than reported to the Congress in April 2008, primarily because of contract cost overruns and extended time to complete flight testing. New Estimates Project Rising Costs and Further Delays to Complete JSF Development Development costs are projected to increase between $2.4 billion and $7.4 billion and the schedule for completing system development extended from 1 to 3 years, according to recent estimates—one by the JSF Program Office and one by a joint team of Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), Air Force, and Navy officials. Much Higher Annual Procurement Funding Required to Accelerate JSF Procurement The program office and joint estimating team also projected procurement funding requirements for the 6-year period fiscal years 2010-2015 based on DOD plans to accelerate procurement of operational aircraft. Procurement of Operational Aircraft under Cost Reimbursement Contracts to Continue; Increases the Government’s Exposure to Risks The JSF program is procuring a substantial number of aircraft on cost reimbursement contracts. Under the accelerated procurement plan, DOD could procure as many as 360 aircraft costing about $57 billion through fiscal year 2013 on cost reimbursement contracts, as illustrated in figure 1. Procuring up to 360 production aircraft on cost reimbursement contracts—-nearly 15 percent of the total DOD program—seems to be a tacit acknowledgment by DOD and the contractor that knowledge on JSF design, production processes, and costs for labor and material is not yet sufficiently mature and that pricing information is not exact enough for the contractor to assume the risk under a fixed-price contract. It has taken steps to improve manufacturing, the supplier base, and schedule management. Time and Money Needed for Manufacturing Development Test Aircraft Continue to Increase The prime contractor has restructured the JSF manufacturing schedule three times, each time lengthening the time to deliver aircraft to the test program. Given these supplier issues, manufacturing inefficiencies, and accumulating backlog in production, we believe that the program’s plans to accelerate production in the near term adds considerable risk and will be difficult to achieve in a cost-effective manner. DOD decisions to reduce development test aircraft and flight tests add to the risks, while any additional delays in manufacturing test aircraft will further compress the schedule. The department has stated that the contractor’s state-of-the-art ground test labs and a flying test bed will mitigate risks in the flight regimen and their use will effectively substitute for flight testing. Significant Investments Made before Development Flight Tests Are Completed DOD is investing heavily in procuring JSF aircraft before flight testing proves that they will perform as expected. Figure 5 shows the expected ramp up in flight testing with most effort occurring in fiscal years 2010 through 2012. Program’s Test Plan Extends Development and Relies Heavily on Ground Testing and Simulations to Verify Aircraft Performance The JSF Program Office developed a new and improved test plan in the spring of 2008 that extended the development period by 1 year, better aligned test resources and availability dates, and lessened the overlap between development and operational testing. Accelerating plans also does not equate to an ability to deliver to those plans. 2. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology To determine the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) program’s progress in meeting cost, schedule, and performance goals, we received briefings by program and contractor officials and reviewed financial management reports, budget documents, annual selected acquisition reports, monthly status reports, performance indicators, and other data. This review was the fifth and final effort under the mandate of the Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005.

Why GAO Did This Study The Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) is the Department of Defense's (DOD) most complex and ambitious aircraft acquisition, seeking to simultaneously produce and field three different versions of the aircraft for the Air Force, Navy, Marine Corps, and eight international partners. The total investment required now exceeds $1 trillion--more than $300 billion to acquire 2,456 aircraft and $760 billion in life cycle operating and support costs, according to program estimates. The Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005 requires GAO to review the JSF program annually for 5 years. This is the fifth and final report under the mandate in which GAO (1) determines the program's progress in meeting cost, schedule, and performance goals; (2) assesses manufacturing results and schedule risks; and (3) evaluates development test plans, progress, and risks. GAO's work included analyses of a wide range of program documents, cost data and interviews with defense and contractor officials. What GAO Found JSF development will cost more and take longer than reported to the Congress last year, and DOD wants to accelerate procurement. Two recent estimates project additional costs ranging from $2.4 billion to $7.4 billion and 1 to 3 more years to complete development. Despite cost and schedule troubles, DOD wants to accelerate JSF procurement by 169 aircraft from fiscal years 2010 through 2015; this could require up to $33.4 billion in additional procurement funding for those 6 years. DOD plans to procure hundreds of aircraft on cost-reimbursement contracts, magnifying the financial risk to the government. Ongoing manufacturing inefficiencies and parts problems have significantly delayed the delivery of test assets. The prime contractor has extended manufacturing schedules three times and delivered 2 of 13 test aircraft. The program is still recovering from earlier problems that resulted in design changes, late parts deliveries, and inefficient manufacturing. The contractor is taking positive steps to improve operations, the supplier base, and schedule management. Schedule risk analyses could further enhance management insight into problem areas and inform corrective actions. Officials expect to deliver all test aircraft and fix many problems by 2010. By then, DOD plans to have purchased 62 operational aircraft and will be ramping up procurement. Procuring large numbers of production jets while still working to deliver test jets and mature manufacturing processes does not seem prudent, and looming plans to accelerate procurement will be difficult to achieve cost effectively. DOD's revised test plan adds a year to the schedule, better aligns resources and availability dates, and lessens the overlap between development and operational testing, but it still allows little time for error discovery and rework. DOD's decision late in 2007 to reduce test aircraft and flight tests adds to risks while any additional delays in delivering test aircraft will further compress the schedule. The revised plan relies on state-of-the-art simulation labs, a flying test bed, and desk studies to verify nearly 83 percent of JSF capabilities. Only 17 percent is to be verified through flight testing. Despite advances, the ability to so extensively substitute for flight testing has not yet been demonstrated. Significant overlap of development, test, and procurement results in DOD making substantial investments before flight testing proves that the JSF will perform as expected. Under the accelerated procurement plan, DOD may procure 360 aircraft costing an estimated $57 billion before completing development flight testing.

gao_GAO-08-926T

gao_GAO-08-926T_0

The material weaknesses that contributed to our disclaimer of opinion were the federal government’s inability to satisfactorily determine that property, plant, and equipment and inventories and related property, primarily held by the Department of Defense (DOD), were properly reported in the consolidated financial statements; implement effective credit reform estimation and related financial reporting processes at certain federal credit agencies; reasonably estimate or adequately support amounts reported for certain liabilities, such as environmental and disposal liabilities, or determine whether commitments and contingencies were complete and properly reported; support significant portions of the total net cost of operations, most notably related to DOD, and adequately reconcile disbursement activity at certain agencies; adequately account for and reconcile intragovernmental activity and balances between federal agencies; ensure that the federal government’s consolidated financial statements were (1) consistent with the underlying audited agency financial statements, (2) properly balanced, and (3) in conformity with Generally Accepted Accounting Principles; and, identify and either resolve or explain material differences that exist between certain components of the budget deficit reported in Treasury’s records, used to prepare the Reconciliation of Net Operating Cost and Unified Budget Deficit and Statement of Changes in Cash Balance from Unified Budget and Other Activities, and related amounts reported in federal agencies’ financial statements and underlying financial information and records. Addressing Major Impediments to an Opinion on the Accrual Basis Consolidated Financial Statements Three major impediments to our ability to render an opinion on the U.S. government’s accrual basis consolidated financial statements continued to be: (1) serious financial management problems at DOD, (2) the federal government’s inability to adequately account for and reconcile intragovernmental activity and balances between federal agencies, and (3) the federal government’s ineffective process for preparing the consolidated financial statements. A substantial number of the agencies did not adequately perform the required reconciliations for fiscal years 2007 and 2006. The Nation’s Long- Term Fiscal Challenge The nation’s long-term fiscal challenge is a matter of utmost concern. The federal government faces large and growing structural deficits due primarily to rising health care costs and known demographic trends. Information included in the Financial Report, such as the Statement of Social Insurance along with long-term fiscal simulations and fiscal sustainability reporting can help increase understanding of the federal government’s long-term fiscal outlook. We were able to render an unqualified opinion on the 2007 Statement of Social Insurance—a significant accomplishment for the federal government. Conversely, the longer that action to deal with the nation’s long- term fiscal outlook is delayed, the greater the risk that the eventual changes will be disruptive and destabilizing and future generations will have to bear a greater burden of the cost. Simply put, the federal government is on an imprudent and unsustainable long-term fiscal path that is getting worse with the passage of time. However, after 11 years of reporting at the governmentwide level, it is appropriate to consider the need for further revisions to the current federal financial reporting model, which could affect both consolidated and agency reporting. While the current reporting model recognizes some of the unique needs of the federal government, a broad reconsideration of the federal financial reporting model could address the following types of questions: What kind of information is most relevant and useful for a sovereign nation? Closing Comments In closing, it is important that the progress that has been made in improving federal financial management activities and practices be sustained by the current administration as well as the new administration that will be taking office next year. However, the federal government still has a long way to go before realizing strong federal financial management. Federal agencies need to improve the government’s financial management systems. Given the federal government’s current financial condition and the nation’s long-term fiscal challenge, the need for the Congress and federal policymakers and management to have reliable, useful, and timely financial and performance information is greater than ever. Sound decisions on the current and future direction of vital federal government programs and policies are more difficult without such information. Until the problems discussed in this testimony are effectively addressed, they will continue to have adverse implications for the federal government and the taxpayers.

Why GAO Did This Study The Congress and the President need to have reliable, useful and timely financial and performance information to make sound decisions on the current and future direction of vital federal government programs and policies. Unfortunately, except for the 2007 Statement of Social Insurance, GAO was again unable to provide assurance on the reliability of the consolidated financial statements of the U.S. government (CFS) due primarily to certain material weaknesses in the federal government's internal control. GAO has reported that unless these weaknesses are adequately addressed, they will, among other things, (1) hamper the federal government's ability to reliably report a significant portion of its assets, liabilities, costs, and other related information; and (2) affect the federal government's ability to reliably measure the full cost as well as the financial and nonfinancial performance of certain programs and activities. This testimony presents the results of GAO's audit of the CFS for fiscal year 2007 and discusses the federal government's long-term fiscal outlook. What GAO Found For the 11th consecutive year, three major impediments prevented GAO from rendering an opinion on the federal government's accrual basis consolidated financial statements: (1) serious financial management problems at the Department of Defense, (2) the federal government's inability to adequately account for and reconcile intragovernmental activity and balances between federal agencies, and (3) the federal government's ineffective process for preparing the consolidated financial statements. In addition, financial management system problems continue to hinder federal agency accountability. Although the federal government still has a long way to go, significant progress has been made in improving federal financial management. For example, audit results for many federal agencies have improved and federal financial system requirements have been developed. In addition, GAO was able to render an unqualified opinion on the 2007 Statement of Social Insurance. Further, for the first time, the federal government issued a summary financial report which is intended to make the information in the Financial Report of the U.S. Government (Financial Report) more accessible and understandable to a broader audience. It is important that this progress be sustained by the current administration as well as the new administration that will be taking office next year and that the Congress continues its oversight to bring about needed improvements to federal financial management. Given the federal government's current financial condition and the nation's long-term fiscal challenge, the need for the Congress and federal policymakers and management to have reliable, useful, and timely financial and performance information is greater than ever. Information included in the Financial Report, such as the Statement of Social Insurance along with long-term fiscal simulations and fiscal sustainability reporting, can help increase understanding of the nation's long-term fiscal outlook. The nation's long-term fiscal challenge is a matter of utmost concern. The federal government faces large and growing structural deficits due primarily to rising health care costs and known demographic trends. Simply put, the federal government is on an imprudent and unsustainable long-term fiscal path. Addressing this challenge will require a multipronged approach. Moreover, the longer that action is delayed, the greater the risk that the eventual changes will be disruptive and destabilizing. Finally, the federal government should consider the need for further revisions to the current federal financial reporting model to recognize the unique needs of the federal government. A broad reconsideration of issues, such as the kind of information that may be relevant and useful for a sovereign nation, could lead to reporting enhancements that might help provide the Congress and the President with more useful financial information to deliberate strategies to address the nation's long-term fiscal challenge.

gao_GAO-13-562T

gao_GAO-13-562T_0

USPS’s Financial Condition USPS faces a dire financial situation and does not have sufficient revenues to cover its expenses, putting its mission of providing prompt, reliable, and efficient universal services to the public at risk. USPS continues to incur operating deficits that are unsustainable, has not made required payments of $11.1 billion to prefund retiree health benefit liabilities,USPS lacks liquidity to maintain its financial solvency or finance needed and has reached its $15 billion borrowing limit. Moreover, capital investment. As presented in table 1, since fiscal year 2006, USPS has achieved about $15 billion in savings and reduced its workforce by about 168,000, while also experiencing a 25 percent decline in total mail volume and net losses totaling $40 billion. USPS continues to face significant decreases in mail volume and revenues as online communication and e-commerce expand. First-Class Mail—which is highly profitable and generates the majority of the revenues used to cover overhead costs—declined 33 percent since it peaked in fiscal year 2001, and USPS projects a continued decline through fiscal year 2020. One of these liabilities, USPS’s debt to the U.S. Treasury, increased over this period from $4 billion to its statutory limit of $15 billion. USPS continues to incur unsustainable operating deficits. In this regard, the USPS Board of Governors recently directed postal management to accelerate restructuring efforts to achieve greater savings. At the end of fiscal year 2012, USPS had $48 billion in unfunded retiree health benefit liabilities. USPS has also reported that in the short term, should circumstances leave it with insufficient liquidity, it may need to prioritize payments to its employees and suppliers ahead of those to the federal government. USPS Initiatives to Reduce Costs and Increase Revenues USPS has several initiatives to reduce costs and increase its revenues to curtail future net losses. In February 2012, USPS announced a 5-year business plan with the goal of achieving $22.5 billion in annual cost savings by the end of fiscal year 2016. This plan included savings from a change in the delivery schedule; however, USPS has now put all changes in delivery service on hold, which will reduce its ability to achieve the full 5-year business plan savings. To increase revenue, USPS is working to increase use of shipping and package services. We recently reported that USPS is pursuing 55 initiatives to generate revenue. We found that USPS’s mail processing network exceeds what is needed for declining mail volume. Concluding Observations In summary, to improve its financial situation, USPS needs to reduce its expenses to close its gap between revenue and expenses, repay its outstanding debt, continue funding its retirement obligations, and increase capital for investment, such as replacing its aging vehicle fleet. In addition, as noted in prior reports, congressional action is needed to (1) modify USPS’s retiree health benefit payments in a fiscally responsible manner; (2) facilitate USPS’s ability to align costs with revenues based on changing workload and mail use; and (3) require that any binding arbitration resulting from collective bargaining takes USPS’s financial condition into account. As we have continued to underscore, Congress and USPS need to reach agreement on a comprehensive package of actions to improve USPS’s financial viability. In previous reports, we have provided strategies and options, to both reduce costs and enhance revenues, that Congress could consider to better align USPS costs with revenues and address constraints and legal restrictions that limit USPS’s ability to reduce costs and improve efficiency; we have also reported on implications for addressing USPS’s benefit liabilities. If Congress does not act soon, USPS could be forced to take more drastic actions that could have disruptive, negative effects on its employees, customers, and the availability of reliable and affordable postal services.

Why GAO Did This Study USPS is in a serious financial crisis as its declining mail volume has not generated sufficient revenue to cover its expenses and financial obligations. First-Class Mail--which is highly profitable and generates the majority of the revenues used to cover overhead costs--declined 33 percent since it peaked in fiscal year 2001, and USPS projects a continued decline through fiscal year 2020. Mail volume decline is putting USPS's mission of providing prompt, reliable, and efficient universal services to the public at risk. This testimony discusses (1) USPS's financial condition, (2) initiatives to reduce costs and increase revenues, and (3) actions needed to improve USPS's financial situation. The testimony is based primarily on GAO's past and ongoing work, its analysis of USPS's recent financial results, and recent information on USPS's proposal for a change in delivery service. In previous reports, GAO has provided strategies and options that USPS and Congress could consider to better align USPS costs with revenues and address constraints and legal restrictions that limit USPS's ability to reduce costs and improve efficiency. GAO has also stated that Congress and USPS need to reach agreement on a comprehensive package of actions to improve USPS's financial viability. What GAO Found The U.S. Postal Service (USPS) continues to incur unsustainable operating deficits, has not made required payments of $11.1 billion to prefund retiree health benefits, and has reached its $15 billion borrowing limit. Thus far, USPS has been able to operate within these constraints, but now faces a critical shortage of liquidity that threatens its financial solvency and ability to finance needed capital investment. USPS had an almost 25 percent decline in total mail volume and net losses totaling $40 billion since fiscal year 2006. While USPS achieved about $15 billion in savings and reduced its workforce by about 168,000 over this period, its debt and unfunded benefit liabilities grew to $96 billion by the end of fiscal year 2012. USPS expects mail volume and revenue to continue decreasing as online bill communication and e-commerce expand. USPS has several initiatives to reduce costs and increase its revenues. To reduce costs, USPS announced a 5-year business plan in February 2012 with the goal of achieving $22.5 billion in annual cost savings by the end of fiscal year 2016, which included a proposed change in the delivery schedule. USPS has now put all changes in delivery service on hold, which will reduce its ability to achieve the full 5-year business plan savings. USPS has begun implementing other parts of the plan, which includes needed changes to its network. To achieve greater savings, USPS's Board of Governors recently directed postal management to accelerate these efforts. To increase revenue, USPS is pursuing 55 initiatives. While USPS expects shipping and package services to continue to grow, such growth is not expected to fully offset declining mail volume. USPS needs to reduce its expenses to avoid even greater financial losses, repay its outstanding debt, continue funding its retirement obligations, and increase capital for investment, including replacing its aging vehicle fleet. Also, Congress needs to act to (1) modify USPS's retiree health benefit payments in a fiscally responsible manner; (2) facilitate USPS's ability to align costs with revenues based on changing workload and mail use; and (3) require that any binding arbitration resulting from collective bargaining takes USPS's financial condition into account. No one action in itself will address USPS's financial condition; GAO has previously recommended a comprehensive package of actions. If Congress does not act soon, USPS could be forced to take more drastic actions that could have disruptive, negative effects on its employees, customers, and the availability of postal services. USPS also reported that it may need to prioritize payments to employees and suppliers ahead of those to the federal government.

gao_GAO-08-784

gao_GAO-08-784_0

They typically use go-fast boats and fishing vessels to smuggle cocaine from Colombia to Central America and Mexico en route to the United States. Overall, U.S. Assistance Has Enhanced International Cooperation in Disrupting Illegal Drug Markets Since 2003, through U.S.-supported international counternarcotics programs, the United States and the eight major drug transit countries we reviewed, except Venezuela, have enhanced their cooperation in combating drug trafficking, primarily through improvements in investigations and intelligence gathering, maritime and land-based operations, and prosecutions of drug traffickers. Measuring the results of a wide variety of assistance programs across many countries over time is difficult as U.S. agencies have compiled limited and inconsistent performance data. With this support, several countries have participated in short- and long-term maritime interdiction operations with the United States and other countries since 2003. State/INL and USAID have supported judicial reforms within some partner nations intended to make judicial systems more fair, impartial, and efficient, and have strengthened the capacity of prosecutors to work effectively within those systems on drug- related cases. Several Factors Impede the Effectiveness of the Counternarcotics Efforts Several factors relating to U.S. assistance programs have impeded international counternarcotics efforts in the transit zone. Partner nations have limited resources to devote to counternarcotics efforts, and many U.S.-supported counternarcotics initiatives are not self-sustaining but, rather, are dependent on continued U.S. funding. Limited political support of U.S.-funded initiatives, as well as corruption, have also kept these nations from becoming full partners in the international counternarcotics effort—a goal of U.S. assistance, according to State. In addition, the effect of U.S. cargo container security assistance for the counternarcotics effort has been limited. However, most of State/INL’s initiatives have not been effective, and DHS has not routinely used its program of targeting and scanning cargo containers overseas to detect illicit drugs. DHS, through CBP, has implemented the Container Security Initiative (CSI) overseas, which may have potential for greater use in counternarcotics operations. Recommendations for Executive Action To link U.S.-funded initiatives in transit zone countries to the priority of disrupting illicit drug markets and the goal of assisting nations to become full and self-sustaining partners in the international counternarcotics effort, we recommend that the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Director of ONDCP, the Secretaries of Defense and Homeland Security, the Attorney General, and the Administrator of USAID, report the results of U.S.-funded counternarcotics initiatives more comprehensively and consistently for each country in the annual International Narcotics Control Strategy Report. We supplemented this data with information about trends in drug trafficking, interdiction, and cooperation with transit zone countries obtained from officials at JIATF-South. 2. 6. GAO Comments 1.

Why GAO Did This Study Each year, criminal organizations transport hundreds of tons of illegal drugs from South America to the United States through a 6 million square mile "transit zone" including Central America, the Caribbean, the Gulf of Mexico, and the eastern Pacific Ocean. Since fiscal year 2003, the United States has provided over $950 million to support counternarcotics efforts in transit zone countries, which historically lacked the capacity to interdict drugs. GAO was asked to examine (1) how the United States has assisted transit zone countries in disrupting drug trafficking and (2) what factors have impeded these efforts. GAO analyzed relevant data, met with U.S. and foreign officials, and visited selected countries. What GAO Found U.S. government assistance has improved international counternarcotics cooperation with the eight major drug transit countries GAO reviewed, except Venezuela. First, assistance programs have helped partner nations gather, process, and share information and intelligence leading to arrests and drug seizures. Second, they have enabled these nations to participate in counternarcotics operations--both at sea and on land--by providing assets (such as interceptor boats and vehicles), logistical support, and training for police units. Third, U.S. assistance has helped strengthen the capacity of prosecutors to work more effectively on drug-related cases. Assessing the impact of such a wide variety of programs is difficult because some are indirectly related to drug interdiction, and because results reporting has been limited and inconsistent. Despite gains in international cooperation, several factors, including resource limitations and lack of political will, have impeded U.S. progress in helping governments become full and self-sustaining partners in the counternarcotics effort--a goal of U.S. assistance. These countries have limited resources to devote to this effort, and many initiatives are dependent on U.S. support. Programs to build maritime interdiction capacity have been particularly affected, as partner nations lack fuel and other resources needed to operate and maintain U.S.-provided boats. Limited political support, particularly in Venezuela, and corruption have also hindered U.S. counternarcotics efforts. In addition, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has implemented a Container Security Initiative (CSI) that targets and scans containers for weapons of mass destruction and terrorist contraband. But CSI has not routinely been used for illicit drug detection, despite its applicability for this purpose.

gao_GAO-08-694

gao_GAO-08-694_0

2). LANL Conducts Over 175 Program Activities That Fall into Three Major and Two Support Program Categories LANL has three major program categories—Nuclear Weapons Science, Threat Reduction Science and Support, and Fundamental Science and Energy. Nuclear Weapons Science programs ensure the safety, performance, and reliability of the U.S. nuclear deterrent. Threat Reduction Science and Support programs support nonproliferation and counterproliferation efforts. LANL has two support program categories—Environmental Programs and Safeguards and Security. Of these 633 facilities, 607 are used by LANL’s major programs. LANL Is Implementing Over Two Dozen Initiatives Officials Believe Will Reduce Security Risk and Improve Protection of Classified Resources LANL has initiatives under way that are principally aimed at reducing, consolidating, and better protecting classified resources, as well as reducing the physical footprint of the laboratory by closing unneeded facilities. Classified removable electronic media. Classified documents. Inconsistent efforts to reduce classified holdings. Specifically, LANL’s storage of classified parts in unapproved storage containers and its process for ensuring that actions taken to correct security deficiencies are completed have been cited repeatedly in past external evaluations, but LANL has not implemented complete security solutions in these areas. In acknowledging the problem of sustaining security improvements, LANL officials described three management approaches they intend to use to ensure that security improvements currently being implemented are sustained over the long-term: (1) DOE’s July 2007 Compliance Order, (2) LANL’s Contractor Assurance System, and (3) NNSA’s annual performance evaluation plans. Specifically, the actions required by the Compliance Order must be completed by December 2008. This plan outlined the 27 actions LANL intends to take to address seven critical security issues identified as having contributed to the October 2006 security incident and to meet the requirements of the Compliance Order. LANL is designing the Contractor Assurance System to measure and track performance from the top down. Recommendations for Executive Action To improve security at Los Alamos National Laboratory, we recommend that the Secretary of Energy and the Administrator of NNSA require LANL to develop a comprehensive strategic plan for laboratory security that (1) addresses all previously identified security weaknesses, (2) contains specific and objective measures for developing and implementing solutions that address previously identified security weaknesses and against which performance can be evaluated, (3) takes an integrated view of physical and cyber security, (4) focuses on improving security program effectiveness, and (5) provides for periodic review and assessment of the strategic plan to ensure LANL identifies any additional security risks and addresses them. To identify the initiatives LANL is taking to consolidate its classified resources and reduce the scope of its physical footprint, we collected and reviewed data on LANL’s plans for consolidating classified resources and interviewed key LANL, National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), and DOE officials. As part of this review, we determined the extent to which each of these management approaches could sustain security improvement initiatives over the long-term and the extent to which these management approaches focused on either compliance with DOE security requirements or improved effectiveness of LANL’s security program. Supports the operation and maintenance of facilities and infrastructure that support the accomplishment of Nuclear Weapons Science programmatic missions Re-establishes an immediate capability to manufacture pits in support of the nuclear weapons stockpile, plans for long-term pit manufacturing capability, and manufactures specific quantities of W88 pits Supports the construction of new facilities and significant upgrades to existing facilities Provides the advanced computing infrastructure—hardware, software, and code—to simulate nuclear weapon performance Conducts research, development, and production work that is applicable to multiple nuclear weapon systems, as opposed to a specific weapons system (for example, basic research on critical factors of nuclear weapon operations) Appendix III: LANL’s NNSA Supported Threat Reduction Science and Support Programs LANL conducted work on 12 Threat Reduction Science and Support programs in fiscal year 2007 that were supported by NNSA.

Why GAO Did This Study In 2006, a Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) contract employee unlawfully removed classified information from the laboratory. This was the latest in a series of high-profile security incidents at LANL spanning almost a decade. LANL conducts research on nuclear weapons and other national security areas for the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA). GAO was asked to (1) identify LANL's major programs and activities and how much they rely on classified resources; (2) identify initiatives LANL is taking to reduce and consolidate its classified resources and physical footprint and the extent to which these initiatives address earlier security concerns; and (3) determine whether its new management approaches will sustain security improvements over the long-term. To carry out its work, GAO analyzed LANL data; reviewed policies, plans, and budgets; and interviewed officials. What GAO Found With fiscal year 2007 budget authority of about $2.7 billion, LANL conducts work on over 175 programs that can be grouped into three major program categories--Nuclear Weapons Science, Threat Reduction Science and Support, and Fundamental Science and Energy--and two support program categories--Environmental Programs and Safeguards and Security. Respectively, LANL's major programs serve to ensure the safety, performance, and reliability of the U.S. nuclear deterrent; support nonproliferation and counterproliferation efforts; and address energy security and other emerging national security challenges. LANL's Nuclear Weapons Science programs are the primary users of the facilities housing classified resources. For example, the Nuclear Weapons Science programs are the primary users of 14 facilities that store special nuclear material while LANL's other major programs are the primary users of only 7 such facilities. LANL has over two dozen initiatives under way that are principally aimed at reducing, consolidating, and better protecting classified resources, as well as reducing the physical footprint of the laboratory by closing unneeded facilities. While many of these initiatives address security concerns identified through past external evaluations--such as efforts to consolidate storage of classified documents and media into fewer secure facilities and to destroy unneeded classified nuclear weapon parts--significant security problems at LANL have received insufficient attention. Specifically, LANL has not implemented complete security solutions to address either classified parts storage in unapproved storage containers or weaknesses in its process for ensuring that actions taken to correct security deficiencies are completed. LANL intends to use three management approaches to sustain the security improvements it has been able to achieve to this point over the long-term: (1) undertake management actions required of LANL under the Compliance Order issued by the Secretary of Energy as a result of the 2006 security incident, (2) develop a Contractor Assurance System to measure and improve LANL's performance and management, and (3) implement annual performance evaluation plans NNSA uses to measure LANL's performance and determine a contract award fee. These approaches contain weaknesses that raise doubts about their ability to sustain security improvements over the long-term. Specifically, the actions LANL has proposed to take to meet the terms of the Compliance Order are only short-term--with completion planned for December 2008. Further, according to LANL officials, the Contractor Assurance System is not fully deployed and the measures it includes may not be fully effective. Finally, the annual performance evaluation plans do not sufficiently reward improving long-term security program effectiveness.

gao_T-RCED-96-259

gao_T-RCED-96-259_0

Percentage of Competitively Awarded 8(a) Contract Dollars Was About the Same To help develop firms and better prepare them to compete in the commercial marketplace after they leave the program, the act requires that 8(a) program contracts be awarded competitively to 8(a) firms when the total contract price, including the estimated value of contract options, exceeds $5 million for manufacturing contracts or $3 million for all other contracts. SBA’s June 1995 revisions to the 8(a) program regulations closed a major loophole involving the competitive award of indefinite delivery, indefinite quantity (IDIQ) contracts. Contract Dollars Continued to Be Concentrated in a Small Percentage of Firms The concentration of 8(a) contract dollars among relatively few firms is a long-standing condition that continued in fiscal year 1995. In 1995, SBA made several efforts to increase the award of 8(a) contracts to firms that had never received contracts. Few Firms Graduate From Program SBA’s regulations provide that any firm that (1) substantially achieves its business development goals and objectives before completing its program term and (2) has demonstrated the ability to compete in the marketplace without 8(a) program assistance may be graduated from the 8(a) program. The data also show that during fiscal year 1995, SBA terminated another 160 firms from the program for various reasons, including failure to comply with program requirements, and 250 more firms left the program because their program terms had expired during the fiscal year. Authorized by section 7(j) of the Small Business Act, as amended, the 7(j) program provides seminars and individual assistance to 8(a) firms. 8(a) Contracts and Dollars Awarded Competitively for Fiscal Years 1991 Through 1995 Range of Total 8(a) Contract Dollars Awarded to Top 50 8(a) Firms for Fiscal Years 1992 Through 1995 Analysis of 8(a) Firms’ Compliance With Their Non-8 (A) Business Requirements for Fiscal Year 1995 The first copy of each GAO report and testimony is free.

Why GAO Did This Study GAO discussed the Small Business Administration's (SBA) 8(a) Minority Business Development Program, focusing on SBA progress in: (1) requiring the competitive award of high-value 8(a) contracts; (2) distributing 8(a) contracts to a larger number of firms; (3) ensuring that firms rely less on 8(a) contracts as they move through the 8(a) program; and (4) graduating from the program firms that have demonstrated that they can survive without 8(a) contracts. What GAO Found GAO noted that: (1) while the dollar amount of 8(a) contracts awarded competitively during fiscal year (FY) 1995 increased over FY 1994, the percentage of contract dollars awarded competitively remained at about 19 percent; (2) SBA revisions closed a major loophole that allowed the use of indefinite delivery, indefinite quantity contracts to avoid competition; (3) although SBA made several efforts to more widely distribute 8(a) contracts, the concentration of 8(a) program dollars to relatively few firms continued in FY 1995; (4) during FY 1995, a larger percentage of 8(a) firms in their final year of the program achieved the required level of non-8(a) business than was reported for previous years; (5) during FY 1995, SBA graduated 3 firms from the 8(a) program, the first graduations in the program's history, and terminated another 160 firms for various reasons, and 250 firms left the program; (6) during FY 1995, SBA approved 885 8(a) applications; and (7) SBA provided management and technical assistance to 8(a) firms through its 7(j) program.

gao_GAO-08-750

gao_GAO-08-750_0

DOE Issued Regulations That Contained Required Elements, but One Key Aspect Is Not Clear On October 23, 2007, DOE’s final regulations for the LGP were published in the Federal Register. The final regulations contain requirements for preapplication and application submissions; programmatic, technical and financial evaluation factors for applications; and lender eligibility and servicing requirements. DOE changed some key aspects of the initial program guidelines in its final regulations to help make the program more attractive to lenders and potentially reduce financing costs for projects. The regulations define equity as “cash contributed by the borrowers and other principals.” Based on this definition, it appears that non-cash contributions, such as land, would not be considered equity. DOE Has Not Fully Implemented Activities Necessary for Effective and Accountable Program Management DOE may not be well positioned to manage the LGP effectively and maintain accountability because it has not completed a number of management and internal control activities key to carrying out the program. As a result, DOE may not be able to process applications efficiently and effectively, even though DOE has begun to review its first application, and officials told us they will begin reviewing other applications as soon as they are submitted. For example, we found the following: Project eligibility. Estimating Subsidy Costs As required by the LGP’s fiscal years 2007 and 2008 appropriation, DOE plans to charge borrowers fees to cover subsidy costs, as permitted by Title XVII. Inherent Risks Will Make Estimating Subsidy Costs Difficult and May Introduce Self- Selection Biases in the Projects That Ultimately Receive Loan Guarantees The nature and characteristics of the LGP will make estimating the program’s subsidy costs difficult even if DOE develops a sound and comprehensive methodology. Evaluating the risks of individual projects applying for loan guarantees will be difficult because the LGP targets innovative energy technologies and because projects will likely have unique characteristics—varying in size, technology, and experience of the project sponsor. The likelihood of misestimates and the practice of charging fees to cover all the estimated costs may lead to biases in the projects that ultimately receive loan guarantees and tilt the portfolio of loan guarantees toward those that will not pay for themselves. The CBO reported that such a bias in applicants’ acceptance of loan guarantees increases the likelihood that DOE’s loan guarantee portfolio will have more projects for which DOE underestimated the fee. As a result, if this financial viability is not distributed evenly across technologies targeted by Title XVII, the projects that ultimately receive loan guarantees may not represent the full range of technologies targeted by Title XVII. The difficulties DOE will face in estimating subsidy costs could increase LGP’s financial risk to the taxpayer. Recommendations for Executive Action To improve the implementation of the LGP and to help mitigate risk to the federal government and American taxpayers, we recommend that the Secretary of Energy direct the Chief Financial Officer to take the following steps before substantially reviewing LGP applications: complete detailed internal loan selection policies and procedures that lay out roles and responsibilities and criteria and requirements for conducting and documenting analyses and decision making; clearly define needs for contractor expertise to facilitate timely amend application guidance to include more specificity on the content of independent engineering reports and on the development of project cost estimates to provide the level of detail needed to better assess overall project feasibility; improve the LGP’s full tracking of the program’s administrative costs by developing an approach to track and estimate costs associated with offices that directly and indirectly support the program and including those costs as appropriate in the fees charged to applicants; further develop and define performance measures and metrics to monitor and evaluate program efficiency, effectiveness, and outcomes; and clarify the program’s equity requirements to the 16 companies invited to apply for loan guarantees and in future solicitations. To assess DOE’s progress in taking actions to help ensure that the program is managed effectively and to maintain accountability, we reviewed documentation related to DOE’s implementation of the LGP. GAO Comments 1. 2. 5. Instead, we specifically discuss reestimates to explain that even though DOE is proceeding with LGP under the provision that borrowers pay for the subsidy cost of the program, taxpayers will bear the cost of any shortfall, depending on the extent to which DOE underestimates the risks (subsidy cost) and therefore does not collect sufficient fees from borrowers. In addition, even in instances where DOE’s estimates of subsidy costs are reasonably accurate, the “borrower pays” option may cause some potential borrowers to not pursue loan guarantees because the fee is too high relative to the benefits to the borrower of the loan guarantee.

Why GAO Did This Study Title XVII of the Energy Policy Act of 2005 established DOE's loan guarantee program (LGP) for innovative energy projects that should decrease air pollutants or greenhouse gases and that have a reasonable prospect of repayment. For fiscal years 2008 and 2009, Congress authorized the use of borrower fees to pay the costs of loan guarantees through Title XVII's "borrower pays" option, under which DOE will limit loan guarantees to $38.5 billion. Congress mandated that GAO review DOE's progress in implementing the LGP. GAO assessed DOE's progress in (1) issuing final regulations and (2) taking actions to help ensure that the program is managed effectively and to maintain accountability. GAO also assessed how inherent risks due to the nature of the LGP may affect DOE's ability to achieve intended program outcomes. GAO analyzed DOE's regulations, guidance, and program documents and files; reviewed Title XVII; and interviewed DOE officials. What GAO Found In October 2007, DOE issued regulations that govern the LGP and include requirements for application submissions, project evaluation factors, and lender eligibility and servicing requirements. The regulations also generally address requirements set forth in applicable guidance. Some key aspects of the initial LGP guidelines were revised in the regulations to help make the program more attractive to lenders and potentially reduce financing costs for projects. For example, the maximum loan guarantee percentage increased from 80 to 100 percent of the loan. In addition, the regulations define equity as "cash contributed by the borrowers," but DOE officials told us they also plan to consider certain non-cash contributions, such as land, as equity. As a result, applicants may not fully understand the program's equity requirements. DOE is not well positioned to manage the LGP effectively and maintain accountability because it has not completed a number of key management and internal control activities. As a result, DOE may not be able to process applications efficiently and effectively, although it has begun to do so. DOE has not sufficiently determined the resources it will need or completed detailed policies, criteria, and procedures for evaluating applications, identifying eligible lenders, monitoring loans and lenders, estimating program costs, or accounting for the program--key steps that GAO recommended DOE take over a year ago. DOE also has not established key measures to use in evaluating program progress. Risks inherent to the LGP will make it difficult for DOE to estimate subsidy costs, which could lead to financial losses and may introduce biases in the projects that receive guarantees. The nature and characteristics of the LGP and uncertain future economic conditions increase the difficulty in estimating the LGP's subsidy costs. Because the LGP targets innovative technologies and the projects will have unique characteristics--varying in size, technology, and experience of the project sponsor--evaluating the risks of individual projects will be complicated and could result in misestimates. The likelihood that DOE will misestimate costs, along with the practice of charging fees to cover the estimated costs, may lead to biases in the projects that receive guarantees. Borrowers who believe DOE has underestimated costs and has consequently set fees that are less than the risks of the projects are the most likely to accept guarantees. To the extent that DOE underestimates the costs and does not collect sufficient fees from borrowers to cover the full costs, taxpayers will ultimately bear the costs of shortfalls. Even if DOE's estimates of subsidy costs are reasonably accurate, some borrowers may not pursue a guarantee because they perceive the fee to be too high relative to the benefits of the guarantee, affecting the project's financial viability. To the extent that this financial viability is not distributed evenly across the technologies targeted by Title XVII, projects in DOE's portfolio may not represent the range of technologies targeted by the program.

gao_GAO-02-588

gao_GAO-02-588_0

The District’s performance report is to include a statement of the actual level of performance achieved compared to each of the goals stated in the performance accountability plan for the year, the title of the District of Columbia management employee most directly responsible for the achievement of each goal and the title of the employee’s immediate supervisor or superior, and a statement of the status of any court orders applicable to the government of the District of Columbia during the year and the steps taken by the government to comply with such orders. The comments stated that the District planned, for example, to consolidate its goals and expand the coverage of its fiscal year 2001 report to more fully comply with its mandated reporting requirements. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology We examined the progress the District has made in developing its performance accountability report and identified areas where improvements are needed. The District’s 2001 Plan and Report Addressed a Consistent Set of Performance Goals The goals in the fiscal year 2001 performance accountability report were consistent with the goals in the District’s 2001 performance plan. Second, as part of the District’s emphasis on expanding its performance-based budgeting approach, the District needs to validate and verify the performance data it relies on to measure performance and assess progress, present this information in its performance accountability reports, and describe its strategies to address any known data limitations. However, the District has continued to report on the same 12 court orders for fiscal years 1999, 2000, and 2001. Table 3 lists these agencies and their fiscal year 2001 actual expenditures.

Why GAO Did This Study This report examines the progress the District of Columbia has made with its fiscal year 2001 performance accountability report and highlights continuing challenges facing our nation's capital. The District must submit a performance accountability plan with goals for the coming fiscal year and, at the end of the fiscal year, a performance accountability report on the extent to which it achieved these goals. What GAO Found GAO found that the District's Performance Accountability Report for Fiscal Year 2001 provided a more complete picture of its performance and made progress in complying with statutory reporting requirements by using a consistent set of goals. This allowed the District to measure and report progress toward the goals in its 2001 performance plan. Specifically, it reported information on the level of performance achieved, the titles of managers and their supervisors responsible for each goal, and described the status of certain court orders. The District has made progress over the last three years in its performance accountability reports and established positive direction for enhancements in court orders, its fiscal year 2003 performance based budgeting pilots, and performance goals and measures.

gao_GAO-16-325

gao_GAO-16-325_0

Cloud computing helps do this by giving agencies the ability to purchase a broad range of IT services in a utility-based model that allows an agency to pay for only the IT services it uses. Key Practices for Cloud Computing Service Level Agreements Can Help Agencies Manage Services More Effectively Based on our analysis of practices recommended by the ten organizations with expertise in the area of SLAs and OMB, we compiled the following list of ten practices that are key for federal agencies to incorporate into a contract to help ensure services are performed effectively, efficiently, and securely for cloud computing services. Without clearly defined roles, responsibilities, and terms, the agency may not be able to appropriately measure the cloud provider’s performance. OMB Guidance Addresses Seven of the Ten Key Practices Guidance issued in February 2012, at the direction of OMB highlighted SLAs as being a key factor for ensuring the success of cloud-based services and advised that federal agencies should include an SLA or a reference within the contract when creating a cloud computing contract. Without complete guidance from OMB, there is limited assurance that agencies will apply all the key SLA practices into their cloud computing contracts, and therefore may be unable to hold contractors accountable when performance falls short of their goals. Specifically, seven of the cloud service contracts reviewed met all 10 of the key practices. Of the remaining 14 cloud service contracts, 13 incorporated five or more of the key practices, and 1 did not meet any of the key practices. Agency officials responsible for the cloud services that did not meet or only partially met key practices provided the following additional reasons for not including all ten practices: Officials from DOD’s Office of the Chief Information Officer told us that the reason key practices were not always fully addressed is that, when the contracts and associated SLAs were developed, they did not have the aforementioned DOD guidance on cloud service acquisition and use—namely, the agency’s memorandum on acquiring cloud services that was released in December 2014, and the current Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement, which was finalized in August 2015. Until these agencies develop SLA guidance and incorporate all key practices into their cloud computing contracts, they may be limited in their ability to measure the performance of the services, and, therefore, may not receive the services they require. To help ensure continued progress in the implementation of effective cloud computing SLAs, we recommend that the Secretaries of Health and Human Services, Homeland Security, Treasury, and Veterans Affairs direct appropriate officials to develop SLA guidance and ensure key practices are fully incorporated as the contract and associated SLAs expire. Agency Comments and Our Evaluation In commenting on a draft of this report, four of the agencies—DOD, DHS, HHS, and VA—agreed with our recommendations; and OMB and one agency (Treasury) had no comments. For example, the department will develop service level agreement guidance to include the 10 key practices. We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional committees; the Secretaries of Defense, Health and Human Services, Homeland Security, the Treasury, and Veterans Affairs; and the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, and other interested parties. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology Our objectives were to (1) identify key practices used in cloud computing service level agreements (SLA) to ensure service is performed at specified levels and (2) determine the extent to which federal agencies have incorporated such practices into their cloud computing service level agreements. To identify key practices used in cloud computing service level agreements, we analyzed SLA research, studies, and guidance developed and used by federal agencies and private entities. First, they have the largest planned IT budgets for fiscal year 2015.

Why GAO Did This Study Cloud computing is a means for delivering computing services via IT networks. When executed effectively, cloud-based services can allow agencies to pay for only the IT services used, thus paying less for more services. An important element of acquiring cloud services is a service level agreement that specifies, among other things, what services a cloud provider is to perform and at what level. GAO was asked to examine federal agencies' use of SLAs. GAO's objectives were to (1) identify key practices in cloud computing SLAs and (2) determine the extent to which federal agencies have incorporated such practices into their SLAs. GAO analyzed research, studies, and guidance developed by federal and private entities to develop a list of key practices to be included in SLAs. GAO validated its list with the entities, including OMB, and analyzed 21 cloud service contracts and related documentation of five agencies (with the largest fiscal year 2015 IT budgets) against the key practices to identify any variances, their causes, and impacts. What GAO Found Federal and private sector guidance highlights the importance of federal agencies using a service level agreement (SLA) in a contract when acquiring information technology (IT) services through a cloud computing services provider. An SLA defines the level of service and performance expected from a provider, how that performance will be measured, and what enforcement mechanisms will be used to ensure the specified performance levels are achieved. GAO identified ten key practices to be included in an SLA, such as identifying the roles and responsibilities of major stakeholders, defining performance objectives, and specifying security metrics. The key practices, if properly implemented, can help agencies ensure services are performed effectively, efficiently, and securely. Under the direction of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), guidance issued to agencies in February 2012 included seven of the ten key practices described in this report that could help agencies ensure the effectiveness of their cloud services contracts. GAO determined that the five agencies and the 21 cloud service contracts it reviewed had included a majority of the ten key practices. Specifically, of the 21 cloud service contracts reviewed from the Departments of Defense, Health and Human Services, Homeland Security, Treasury, and Veterans Affairs, 7 had fulfilled all 10 of the key practices, as illustrated in the figure. The remaining 13 contracts had incorporated 5 or more of the 10 key practices and 1 had not included any practices. Agency officials gave several reasons for why they did not include all elements of the key practices into their cloud service contracts, including that guidance directing the use of such practices had not been created when the cloud services were acquired. Unless agencies fully implement SLA key practices into their SLAs, they may not be able to adequately measure the performance of the services, and, therefore, may not be able to effectively hold the contractors accountable when performance falls short. What GAO Recommends GAO recommends that OMB include all ten key practices in future guidance to agencies and that Defense, Health and Human Services, Homeland Security, Treasury, and Veterans Affairs implement SLA guidance and incorporate applicable key practices into their SLAs. In commenting on a draft of this report, OMB and one agency had no comment, the remaining four agencies concurred with GAO's recommendations.

gao_GAO-07-413

gao_GAO-07-413_0

Under SAFETEA-LU, FHWA provides funding that states may use to implement highway maintenance or construction projects that can enhance older driver safety. Some States Have Implemented FHWA’s Recommended Practices and Considered Older Drivers in Highway Safety Plans and Programs, but Other Safety Issues Generally Receive Greater Priority State DOTs have, to varying degrees, incorporated FHWA’s older driver safety practices into their design standards; implemented the practices in construction, operations, and maintenance activities; trained technical staff in applying the practices; and coordinated with local agencies to promote the use of the practices. Nearly half of the states have incorporated about half or more of FHWA’s practices into their design standards, as follows: 24 state DOTs reported including about half, most, almost all, or all of the recommendations. However, state STIPs may contain projects that will benefit older drivers. More than Half of States Have Implemented Some Assessment Practices for Older Drivers, and NHTSA Is Sponsoring Research to Develop More Comprehensive Assessments More than half of state licensing agencies have implemented assessment practices to support licensing requirements for older drivers that are more stringent than requirements for younger drivers. These requirements generally include more frequent license renewal, mandatory vision screening, in-person renewals, and mandatory road tests. For example, our review of state assessment practices indicates that all states screen for vision, but we did not find a state with screening tools to evaluate physical and cognitive functions. While research indicates that in-person license renewal is associated with lower crash rates—particularly for those aged 85 and older—other assessment practices, such as vision screening, road tests, and more frequent license renewal cycles, are not always associated with lower older driver fatality rates. In addition to coordinating groups, the six states have ongoing efforts to improve older driver safety in the areas of strategic planning, education and awareness, licensing and driver fitness assessment, engineering, and data analysis. However, state resources are limited, so information on other states’ initiatives or federal efforts to develop standards for the driving environment and on driver fitness assessment practices could assist states in implementing improvements for older driver safety. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology This report addresses (1) what the federal government has done to promote practices to make roads safer for older drivers and the extent to which states have implemented those practices, (2) the extent to which states assess the fitness of older drivers and what support the federal government has provided, and (3) what initiatives selected states have implemented to improve the safety of older drivers.

Why GAO Did This Study As people age, their physical, visual, and cognitive abilities may decline, making it more difficult for them to drive safely. Older drivers are also more likely to suffer injuries or die in crashes than drivers in other age groups. These safety issues will increase in significance because older adults represent the fastest-growing U.S. population segment. GAO examined (1) what the federal government has done to promote practices to make roads safer for older drivers and the extent to which states have implemented those practices, (2) the extent to which states assess the fitness of older drivers and what support the federal government has provided, and (3) what initiatives selected states have implemented to improve the safety of older drivers. To conduct this study, GAO surveyed 51 state departments of transportation (DOT), visited six states, and interviewed federal transportation officials. What GAO Found The Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) has recommended practices--such as using larger letters on signs--targeted to making roadways easier for older drivers to navigate. FHWA also provides funding that states may use for projects that address older driver safety. States have, to varying degrees, adopted FHWA's recommended practices. For example, 24 states reported including about half or more of FHWA's practices in state design guides, while the majority of states reported implementing certain FHWA practices in roadway construction, operations, and maintenance activities. States generally do not place high priority on projects that specifically address older driver safety but try to include practices that benefit older drivers in all projects. More than half of the states have implemented licensing requirements for older drivers that are more stringent than requirements for younger drivers, but states' assessment practices are not comprehensive. For example, these practices primarily involve more frequent or in-person renewals and mandatory vision screening but do not generally include assessments of physical and cognitive functions. While requirements for in-person license renewals generally appear to correspond with lower crash rates for drivers over age 85, the validity of other assessment tools is less clear. The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) is sponsoring research and other initiatives to develop and assist states in implementing more comprehensive driver fitness assessment practices. Five of the six states GAO visited have implemented coordination groups to assemble a broad range of stakeholders to develop strategies and foster efforts to improve older driver safety in areas of strategic planning, education and awareness, licensing and driver fitness assessment, roadway engineering, and data analysis. However, knowledge sharing among states on older driver safety initiatives is limited, and officials said states could benefit from knowledge of other states' initiatives.

gao_GAO-09-836

gao_GAO-09-836_0

Most HECM Lenders View the Overall Effect of the HERA Provisions as Neutral or Positive for Their Reverse Mortgage Business In combination, HERA’s changes to the HECM loan limit and origination fee calculation have had a positive to neutral influence on most lenders’ plans to start or continue offering HECMs. Current economic conditions have had a moderate upward influence on lenders’ plans; however, secondary market conditions have had a downward influence on about one-third of lenders’ plans to start or continue offering HECMs. For 42 percent of lenders, the combination of HERA’s changes to the origination fee and loan limits for the HECM program have had little to no influence on their plans to offer HECMs, while for 8 percent of lenders, HERA’s changes have had a downward influence. Proprietary reverse mortgages offered loan limits that were greater than the HECM loan limit. 7) that could influence lenders’ plans to offer a non-HECM reverse mortgage product in 2009. HERA Provisions Will Affect Borrower Costs and Loan Amounts Differently Depending on Home Value and Other Factors HERA’s provisions will affect borrowers in varying ways depending primarily on home value and whether HERA’s increase in loan limit will change the maximum claim amount of the loan. Our analysis of data on borrowers who took out HECMs in 2007 shows that had the HERA provisions been in place, most borrowers would have paid less or the same amount in up-front costs, and most would have had more or the same amount of loan funds available. The amount and direction of the changes to up-front costs and loan funds available primarily depended on house value and whether a borrower would have benefited from an increase in loan limit (about 28 percent of 2007 HECM borrowers’ homes were valued at more than the prior loan limit and would have seen their maximum claim amounts increase because of HERA’s increase in the loan limit). 28 percent of borrowers would have had more loan funds available, primarily due to the increase in loan limit; about 28 percent of borrowers would have had more loan funds available due solely to a decrease in their up-front fees; 17 percent of borrowers would have had a smaller amount of loan funds available due solely to an increase in their up-front fees; and 27 percent of borrowers would have experienced no change in the amount of loan funds available because their up-front fees and loan limits remained the same. HUD Has Enhanced Its Analysis of HECM Program Costs but Changes in House Price Trends and Higher Loan Limits Have Increased HUD’s Risk of Losses HUD has taken or planned steps to enhance its analysis of the HECM program’s financial performance. HUD in recent years has enhanced its cash flow model for the HECM program. HUD plans to subject the HECM program to an annual actuarial review, which should provide additional insight into the program’s financial condition. All other things being equal, lower house price appreciation can increase HUD’s insurance losses because it makes it less likely that the value of the home will cover the loan balance. For loans in which the property value is more than the HECM loan limit, this approach results in a conservative assumption about the amount of home equity available at the end of the loan to cover the loan balance. In these cases, the actual home value at the end of the loan is likely to be more than what HUD assumes and therefore more likely to exceed the loan balance at the end of the loan. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology Our objectives were to examine (1) how the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 (HERA) changes to the Home Equity Conversion Mortgage (HECM) program and other factors have affected HECM lenders’ planned participation in the reverse mortgage market, (2) the extent to which HERA’s changes to HECM origination fees and loan limits will affect costs to borrowers and the loan amounts available to them, and (3) Department of Housing and Urban Development’s (HUD) actions to evaluate the financial performance of the HECM program, including the potential impact of loan limit and house price changes.

Why GAO Did This Study Reverse mortgages--a type of loan against home equity available to seniors--are growing in popularity. A large majority of reverse mortgages are insured by the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) under its Home Equity Conversion Mortgage (HECM) program. The Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 (HERA) made several modifications to the HECM program, including changes in how origination fees are calculated and an increase in the loan limit. The Act directed GAO to examine (1) how these changes have affected lenders' plans to offer reverse mortgages, (2) how the changes will affect borrowers, and (3) actions HUD has taken to evaluate the financial performance of the HECM program. To address these objectives, GAO surveyed a representative sample of HECM lenders, analyzed loan-level HECM data, and reviewed HUD estimates and analysis of HECM program costs. What GAO Found On the basis of a survey of HECM lenders, GAO estimates thattaken together, HERA's changes to the HECM loan limit and origination fee calculation have had a positive to neutral influence on most lenders' plans to offer HECMs. Other factors, such as economic and secondary market conditions, have had a mixed influence. Although economic conditions have had a positive influence on about half of lenders' plans to offer HECMS, secondary market conditions have negatively influenced about one-third of lenders. GAO also estimates that the HERA changes have had little to no influence on most lenders' plans to offer non-HECM reverse mortgages. HERA's provisions will affect borrowers in varying ways depending on home value and other factors. The changes to HECM origination fees and loan limits are likely to change the up-front costs and the loan funds available for most new borrowers. GAO's analysis of data on HECM borrowers from 2007 shows that if the HERA changes had been in place at the time, most would have paid less or the same amount in up-front costs, and most would have had more or the same amount of loan funds available. For example, about 46 percent of borrowers would have seen a decrease in up-front costs and an increase in available loan funds. However, 17 percent of borrowers would have seen an increase in up-front costs and a decrease in available loan funds. HUD has enhanced its analysis of HECM program costs, but less favorable house price trends and loan limit increases have increased HUD's risk of losses. HUD has updated its cash flow model for the program and plans to conduct annual actuarial reviews. Although the program historically has not required a subsidy, HUD has estimated that HECMs made in 2010 will require a subsidy of $798 million, largely due to more pessimistic assumptions about long-run home prices. In addition, the higher loan limit enacted by HERA may increase the potential for losses. To calculate the amount of funds available to a borrower, lenders start with a limiting factor of either the home value or, if the home value is greater than the HECM loan limit, with the loan limit. For loans that are limited by the home value, the loan amount and the home value are closer together at the point of origination, which makes it more likely that the loan balance could exceed the home value at the end of the loan. In contrast, for loans that are limited by the HECM loan limit, there is initially a greater difference between the home value and the loan amount, making it less likely that the loan balance will exceed the home value at the end of the loan. The increase in the HECM loan limit may increase HUD's risk of losses by reducing the proportion of loans that are limited by the HECM loan limit.

gao_GAO-09-381T

gao_GAO-09-381T_0

ICE Lacks Key Internal Controls for Implementation of the 287(g) Program ICE has designed some management controls to govern 287(g) program implementation, such as MOAs with participating agencies that identify the roles and responsibilities of each party, background checks of officers applying to participate in the program, and a 4-week training course with mandatory course examinations for participating officers. However, the program lacks several other key controls. For example Program Objectives: While ICE officials have stated that the main objective of the 287(g) program is to enhance the safety and security of communities by addressing serious criminal activity committed by removable aliens, they have not documented this objective in program- related materials consistent with internal control standards. As a result, some participating agencies are using their 287(g) authority to process for removal aliens who have committed minor offenses, such as speeding, carrying an open container of alcohol, and urinating in public. Defining and consistently communicating how this authority is to be used would help ICE ensure that immigration enforcement activities undertaken by participating agencies are in accordance with ICE policies and program objectives. Supervision of Participating Agencies: Although the law requires that state and local officials use 287(g) authority under the supervision of ICE officials, ICE has not described in internal or external guidance the nature and extent of supervision it is to exercise over participating agencies’ implementation of the program. Officials from another four law enforcement agencies characterized ICE’s supervision as fair, adequate, or provided on an as-needed basis. Tracking and Reporting Data: MOAs that were signed before 2007 did not contain a requirement to track and report data on program implementation. Performance Measures: ICE has not developed performance measures for the 287(g) program to track and evaluate the progress toward attaining the program’s objectives. Program Resources Are Used for Training, Supervision, and Equipment; Benefits and Concerns Are Reported by ICE and Participating Agencies ICE and participating agencies used program resources mainly for personnel, training, and equipment, and participating agencies reported activities, benefits, and concerns stemming from the program. For example, as of February 2009, ICE reported enrolling 67 agencies and training 951 state and local law enforcement officers. Based on the data provided, individual agency participant results ranged from about 13,000 arrests in one location, to no arrests in two locations. Participating agencies cited benefits of the program including a reduction in crime and the removal of repeat offenders. However, more than half of the 29 state and local law enforcement agencies we reviewed reported concerns community members expressed about the 287(g) program, including concerns that law enforcement officers in the 287(g) program would be deporting removable aliens pursuant to minor traffic violations (e.g., speeding) and concerns about racial profiling. We made several recommendations to strengthen internal controls for the 287(g) program to help ensure the program operates as intended. Specifically, we recommended that ICE (1) document the objective of the 287(g) program for participants, (2) clarify when the 287(g) authority is authorized for use by state and local law enforcement officers, (3) document the nature and extent of supervisory activities ICE officers are expected to carry out as part of their responsibilities in overseeing the implementation of the 287(g) program, (4) specify the program information or data that each agency is expected to collect regarding their implementation of the 287(g) program and how this information is to be reported, and (5) establish a plan, including a time frame, for the development of performance measures for the 287(g) program. DHS concurred with each of our recommendations and reported plans and steps taken to address them. Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, this concludes my statement. This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States.

Why GAO Did This Study This testimony discusses the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement's (ICE) management of the 287(g) program. Recent reports indicate that the total population of unauthorized aliens residing in the United States is about 12 million. Some of these aliens have committed one or more crimes, although the exact number of aliens that have committed crimes is unknown. Some crimes are serious and pose a threat to the security and safety of communities. ICE does not have the agents or the detention space that would be required to address all criminal activity committed by unauthorized aliens. Thus, state and local law enforcement officers play a critical role in protecting our homeland because, during the course of their daily duties, they may encounter foreign-national criminals and immigration violators who pose a threat to national security or public safety. On September 30, 1996, the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act was enacted and added section 287(g) to the Immigration and Nationality Act. This section authorizes the federal government to enter into agreements with state and local law enforcement agencies, and to train selected state and local officers to perform certain functions of an immigration officer--under the supervision of ICE officers--including searching selected federal databases and conducting interviews to assist in the identification of those individuals in the country illegally. The first such agreement under the statute was signed in 2002, and as of February 2009, 67 state and local agencies were participating in this program. The testimony today is based on our January 30, 2009, report regarding the program including selected updates made in February 2009. Like the report, this statement addresses (1) the extent to which Immigration and Customs Enforcement has designed controls to govern 287(g) program implementation and (2) how program resources are being used and the activities, benefits, and concerns reported by participating agencies. To do this work, we interviewed officials from both ICE and participating agencies regarding program implementation, resources, and results. We also reviewed memorandums of agreement (MOA) between ICE and the 29 law enforcement agencies participating in the program as of September 1, 2007, that are intended to outline the activities, resources, authorities, and reports expected of each agency. We also compared the controls ICE designed to govern implementation of the 287(g) program with criteria in GAO's Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, the Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA), and the Project Management Institute's Standard for Program Management. More detailed information on our scope and methodology appears in the January 30, 2009 report. In February 2009, we also obtained updated information from ICE regarding the number of law enforcement agencies participating in the 287(g) program as well as the number of additional law enforcement agencies being considered for participation in the program. We conducted our work in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. What GAO Found In summary, ICE has designed some management controls, such as MOAs with participating agencies and background checks of officers applying to participate in the program, to govern 287(g) program implementation. However, the program lacks other key internal controls. Specifically, program objectives have not been documented in any program-related materials, guidance on how and when to use program authority is inconsistent, guidance on how ICE officials are to supervise officers from participating agencies has not been developed, data that participating agencies are to track and report to ICE has not been defined, and performance measures to track and evaluate progress toward meeting program objectives have not been developed. Taken together, the lack of internal controls makes it difficult for ICE to ensure that the program is operating as intended. ICE and participating agencies used program resources mainly for personnel, training, and equipment, and participating agencies reported activities and benefits, such as a reduction in crime and the removal of repeat offenders. However, officials from more than half of the 29 state and local law enforcement agencies we reviewed reported concerns members of their communities expressed about the use of 287(g) authority for minor violations and/or about racial profiling. We made several recommendations to strengthen internal controls for the 287(g) program to help ensure that the program operates as intended. DHS concurred with our recommendations and reported plans and steps taken to address them.

gao_GAO-17-524

gao_GAO-17-524_0

Also, we determined the status of corrective actions Treasury and OMB have taken to address open recommendations relating to their processes to prepare the CFS, detailed in our previous reports, that remained open at the beginning of our fiscal year 2016 audit. We have communicated each of the control deficiencies discussed in this report to your staff. We performed our audit in accordance with U.S. generally accepted government auditing standards. Control Deficiencies Identified during Our Fiscal Year 2016 Audit During our audit of the fiscal year 2016 CFS, we identified three new internal control deficiencies in Treasury’s processes used to prepare the CFS. Specifically, we found that (1) Treasury did not have sufficient procedures and metrics for monitoring the federal government’s year-to- year progress in resolving intragovernmental differences at the federal entity level, (2) Treasury did not have a sufficient process for working with federal entities to reduce or resolve the need for significant adjustments to federal entity data submitted for the CFS, and (3) three of Treasury and OMB’s corrective action plans did not include sufficient information to effectively address related control deficiencies involving processes used to prepare the CFS. Monitoring Intragovernmental Differences During our fiscal year 2016 CFS audit, we found that the federal government continued to be unable to adequately account for and reconcile intragovernmental activity and balances between federal entities. Treasury, in coordination with OMB, compiled a collection of corrective action plans in a remediation plan focused on resolving material weaknesses related to the processes used to prepare the CFS. The corrective action plans contained in the remediation plan—which are intended to address control deficiencies related to (1) treaties and international agreements, (2) additional audit procedures for intragovernmental activity and balances, and (3) the Reconciliations of Net Operating Cost and Unified Budget Deficit and Statements of Changes in Cash Balance from Unified Budget and Other Activities (Reconciliation Statements)—did not include sufficient information to demonstrate that the plans, if properly implemented, will effectively resolve such deficiencies. Status of Recommendations from Prior Reports At the beginning of our fiscal year 2016 audit, 24 recommendations from our prior reports regarding control deficiencies in the processes used to prepare the CFS were open. Treasury implemented corrective actions during fiscal year 2016 that resolved certain of the control deficiencies addressed by our recommendations. For 7 recommendations, the corrective actions resolved the related control deficiencies, and we closed the recommendations. We also closed 1 additional recommendation, related to corrective action plans, by making a new recommendation that is better aligned with the remaining internal control deficiency in this area. While progress was made, 16 recommendations from our prior reports remained open as of January 4, 2017, the date of our report on the audit of the fiscal year 2016 CFS. We will continue to monitor Treasury’s and OMB’s progress in addressing our recommendations as part of our fiscal year 2017 CFS audit. Although in its comments Treasury neither agreed nor disagreed with our recommendations, Treasury provided information on actions that it plans to take to address two of the recommendations and stated with regard to the third recommendation that its current corrective action plans were effective. However, we continue to believe that the corrective action plans in these three areas do not include sufficient information to effectively address related control deficiencies involving processes used to prepare the CFS. Treasury also described various actions taken and planned to address long-standing material weaknesses, including improvements in accounting for and reporting on the General Fund of the U.S. Government activity and balances, strengthening internal controls in the preparation of the CFS, and validating material completeness of budgetary information included in the Financial Report of the United States Government. OMB Comments OMB staff in the Office of Federal Financial Management stated in an e-mail that OMB generally agreed with the findings in the report and with Treasury’s written response to the draft. Appendix I: Status of Treasury’s and OMB’s Progress in Addressing GAO’s Prior Year Recommendations for Preparing the CFS Table 1 shows the status of GAO’s prior year recommendations for preparing the CFS. Appendix II: Comments from the Department of the Treasury

Why GAO Did This Study Treasury, in coordination with OMB, prepares the Financial Report of the United States Government , which contains the CFS. Since GAO's first audit of the fiscal year 1997 CFS, certain material weaknesses and other limitations on the scope of its work have prevented GAO from expressing an opinion on the accrual-based consolidated financial statements. As part of the fiscal year 2016 CFS audit, GAO identified material weaknesses and other control deficiencies in the processes used to prepare the CFS. The purpose of this report is to provide (1) details on new control deficiencies GAO identified related to the processes used to prepare the CFS, along with related recommendations, and (2) the status of corrective actions Treasury and OMB have taken to address GAO's prior recommendations relating to the processes used to prepare the CFS that remained open at the beginning of the fiscal year 2016 audit. What GAO Found During its audit of the fiscal year 2016 consolidated financial statements of the U.S. government (CFS), GAO identified control deficiencies in the Department of the Treasury's (Treasury) and the Office of Management and Budget's (OMB) processes used to prepare the CFS. These control deficiencies contributed to material weaknesses in internal control that involve the federal government's inability to adequately account for and reconcile intragovernmental activity and balances between federal entities; reasonably assure that the consolidated financial statements are (1) consistent with the underlying audited entities' financial statements, (2) properly balanced, and (3) in accordance with U.S. generally accepted accounting principles; and reasonably assure that the information in the (1) Reconciliations of Net Operating Cost and Unified Budget Deficit and (2) Statements of Changes in Cash Balance from Unified Budget and Other Activities is complete and consistent with the underlying information in the audited entities' financial statements and other financial data. During its audit of the fiscal year 2016 CFS, GAO identified three new internal control deficiencies. Treasury did not have sufficient procedures and metrics for monitoring the federal government's year-to-year progress in resolving intragovernmental differences at the federal entity level. Treasury did not have a sufficient process for working with federal entities to reduce or resolve the need for significant adjustments to federal entity data submitted for the CFS. Three of Treasury and OMB's corrective action plans did not include sufficient information to effectively address related control deficiencies involving processes used to prepare the CFS. In addition, GAO found that various other control deficiencies identified in previous years' audits with respect to the processes used to prepare the CFS were resolved or continued to exist. For 7 of the 24 recommendations from GAO's prior reports regarding control deficiencies in the processes used to prepare the CFS, Treasury implemented corrective actions during fiscal year 2016 that resolved the related control deficiencies, and as a result, these recommendations were closed. GAO closed 1 additional recommendation that related to corrective action plans, by making a new recommendation that is better aligned with the remaining internal control deficiency in this area. While progress was made, 16 of the 24 recommendations remained open as of January 4, 2017, the date of GAO's report on its audit of the fiscal year 2016 CFS. GAO will continue to monitor the status of corrective actions taken to address the 3 new recommendations made in this report as well as the 16 open recommendations from prior years as part of its fiscal year 2017 CFS audit. What GAO Recommends GAO is making three new recommendations—two to Treasury and one to both Treasury and OMB—to address the control deficiencies identified during the fiscal year 2016 CFS audit. In commenting on GAO's draft report, although Treasury neither agreed nor disagreed with GAO's recommendations, Treasury provided information on actions that it plans to take to address two recommendations, but stated that its current corrective action plans were effective for the third recommendation. GAO continues to believe that actions for this recommendation are needed as discussed in the report. OMB generally agreed with the findings in the report.

gao_GAO-08-869T

gao_GAO-08-869T_0

Some Instances of Noncompliance with Medical Care Standards Occurred At the time of our visits, we observed instances of noncompliance with ICE’s medical care standards at 3 of the 23 facilities we visited. However, these instances did not show a pervasive or persistent pattern of noncompliance across the facilities like we those identified with the telephone system. At the San Diego Correctional Facility in California, an adult detention facility, ICE reviewers that we accompanied cited PHS staff for failing to administer the mandatory 14-day physical exam to approximately 260 detainees. At the Casa de San Juan Family Shelter in California, we found that the facility staff did not administer medical screenings immediately upon admission, as required in ICE medical care standards. Officials at some facilities told us that meeting the specialized medical and mental health needs of detainees can be challenging. Some also cited difficulties they had experienced in obtaining ICE approval for outside nonroutine medical and mental health care as also presenting problems in caring for detainees. On the other hand, we observed instances where detainees were receiving specialized medical care at the facilities we visited. ICE Compliance Inspections Also Show Some Instances of Noncompliance With Medical Standards We reviewed the most recently available ICE annual inspection reports for 20 of the 23 detention facilities that we visited. The 20 inspection reports showed that ICE reviewers had identified a total of 59 instances of noncompliance, 4 of which involved medical care. Subsequent to each annual inspection, a compliance rating report is to be prepared and sent to the Director of the Office of Detention and Removal or his representative within 14 days. The Wakulla County Sheriffs Office in Florida had sick call request forms that were available only in English whereas the population was largely Spanish speaking. The Cowlitz County Juvenile Detention Facility in Washington state did not maintain the alien juvenile medical records on-site. The San Diego Correctional facility staff, in addition to the deficiencies noted earlier in this statement, failed to obtain informed consent from the detainee when prescribing psychiatric medication. Finally, the Broward Transitional Center in Florida did not have medical staff on-site to screen detainees arriving after 5 p.m. and did not have a properly locked medical cabinet. We did not determine whether these deficiencies were subsequently addressed as required. Alien Detainee Complaints Included Concerns About Medical Care Our review of available grievance data obtained from facilities and discussions with facility management showed that the types of grievances at the facilities we visited typically included the lack of timely response to requests for medical treatment, missing property, high commissary prices, poor quality or insufficient quantity of food, high telephone costs, problems with telephones, and questions concerning detention case management issues. ICE’s detainee grievance standard states that facilities shall establish and implement procedures for informal and formal resolution of detainee grievances. Four of the 23 facilities we visited did not comply with all aspects of ICE’s detainee grievance standards. The primary mechanism for detainees to file external complaints is directly with the OIG, either in writing or by phone using the DHS OIG complaint hotline. We did not independently assess the merits of detainee complaints. Of the approximately 1,700 detainee complaints in the OIG database that were filed in fiscal years 2003 through 2006, OIG investigated 173 and referred the others to other DHS components. We could not determine the number of cases referred to DRO or their disposition. On the basis of a limited review of DRO’s complaints database and discussions with ICE officials knowledgeable about the database, we concluded that DRO’s complaint database was not sufficiently reliable for audit purposes.

Why GAO Did This Study In fiscal year 2007, Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) detained over 311,000 aliens, with an average daily population of over 30,000 and an average length of stay of about 37 days in one of approximately 300 facilities. The care and treatment of aliens while in detention is a significant challenge to ICE, as concerns continue to be raised by members of Congress and advocacy groups about the treatment of the growing number of aliens while in ICE's custody. This testimony focuses on (1) the extent to which 23 facilities complied with medical care standards, (2) deficiencies found during ICE's annual compliance inspection reviews, and (3) the types of complaints filed by alien detainees about detention conditions. This testimony is based on GAO's July 2007 report evaluating, among other things, the extent to which 23 facilities complied with aspects of eight of ICE's 38 National Detention Standards. This report did not address quality of care issues. What GAO Found At the time of its visits, GAO observed instances of noncompliance with ICE's medical care standards at 3 of the 23 facilities visited. These instances related to staff not administering a mandatory 14-day physical exam to approximately 260 detainees, not administering medical screenings immediately upon admission, and first aid kits not being available as required. However, these instances did not show a pervasive or persistent pattern of noncompliance across all 23 facilities. Officials at some facilities told GAO that meeting the specialized medical and mental health needs of detainees had been challenging, citing difficulties they had experienced in obtaining ICE approval for outside nonroutine medical and mental health care. On the other hand, GAO observed instances where detainees were receiving specialized care at the facilities visited. At the time of its study, GAO reviewed the most recently available ICE annual inspection reports for 20 of the 23 detention facilities that it visited; these reports showed that ICE reviewers had identified a total of 59 instances of noncompliance with National Detention Standards, 4 of which involved medical care. One facility had sick call request forms that were available only in English whereas the population was largely Spanish speaking. Another did not maintain alien medical records on-site. One facility's staff failed to obtain informed consent from the detainee when prescribing psychiatric medication. Finally, another facility did not have medical staff on-site to screen detainees arriving after 5 p.m. and did not have a properly locked medical cabinet. GAO did not determine whether these instances of noncompliance were subsequently corrected as required. The types of grievances at the facilities GAO visited typically included the lack of timely response to requests for medical treatment, missing property, high commissary prices, poor food quality and insufficient food quantity, high telephone costs, problems with telephones, and questions concerning detention case management issues. ICE's detainee grievance standard states that facilities shall establish and implement procedures for informal and formal resolution of detainee grievances. Four of the 23 facilities GAO visited did not comply with all aspects of ICE's detainee grievance standards. For example, one facility did not properly log all grievances that GAO found in their facility files. Detainee complaints may also be filed with several governmental and nongovernmental organizations. The primary way for detainees to file complaints is to contact the DHS Office of Inspector General (OIG). About 11 percent of detainee complaints to the OIG between 2005 and 2006 involved medical treatment issues. However, we found that the OIG complaint hotline 1-800 number was blocked or otherwise restricted at 12 of the facilities we tested. OIG investigates the most serious complaints and refers the remainder to other DHS components. GAO could not determine the number of cases referred to ICE's Detention Removal Office and concluded that ICE's detainee complaint database was not sufficiently reliable.

gao_GAO-10-717

gao_GAO-10-717_0

Background O&S Costs Constitute a Significant Portion of a System’s Life-Cycle Costs A system’s life-cycle costs include the costs for research and development, procurement, sustainment, and disposal. Better Information and Guidance Could Help DOD to More Effectively Manage and Reduce O&S Costs of Major Weapons Systems Life-Cycle O&S Cost Estimates for the Production Milestone Were Not Available for Five of the Seven Systems Reviewed The services did not have the life-cycle O&S cost estimates that were prepared at the production milestone for most of the aviation weapon systems in our sample. In addition, at a time when the nation faces fiscal challenges and defense budgets may become tighter, the lack of this key information hinders sound weapon-system program management and decision making in an area of high costs to the federal government. Without complete data on actual O&S costs, DOD officials do not have important information necessary for analyzing the rate of O&S cost growth, identifying cost drivers, and developing plans for managing and controlling these costs. Navy’s VAMOSC System For the F/A-18E/F, the Navy’s VAMOSC system collected data on many of DOD’s recommended cost elements but did not collect actual O&S costs for interim contractor support costs, civilian personnel, and indirect infrastructure costs by weapon system. The Services Generally Do Not Use Updated Life-Cycle Estimates to Assess O&S Cost Growth for Fielded Weapon Systems Life-Cycle O&S Cost Estimates Were Not Periodically Updated after Fielding for Six of the Seven Systems Reviewed For six of the seven systems selected for our review, the services did not periodically update life-cycle O&S cost estimates after the systems were fielded, even though most of the systems have been in DOD’s inventory for over a decade. The guidance also notes that retrospective studies can be valuable in determining if any corrections need to be made to existing programs and to improve future estimates of other federal programs. When the F-22A program office updated the 2005 cost estimate in 2009, it found a 47-percent increase in life-cycle O&S costs. However, program changes complicate direct comparisons between estimated and actual costs, as they do for the F-22A. (These costs were instead included in the estimate as costs for repair parts.) Actual O&S Costs Increased for Five Systems, but Extent of Planned Cost Growth Is Uncertain Although we did not have production milestone estimates of life-cycle O&S costs for the Air Force’s F-15E and B-1B or for the Army’s AH-64D, CH-47D, and UH-60L, we reviewed changes in actual O&S costs for each system and found that costs increased over time for a variety of reasons. 3). Updated Estimates of Life- Cycle O&S Costs and Documentation of Program Changes Are Generally Not Required after Weapon System Production Decisions Even though periodic updates to life-cycle O&S cost estimates could quantify any cost growth in major weapon systems and help identify cost drivers, DOD acquisition and cost-estimating guidance do not require that O&S cost estimates be updated after a program has completed production. Service guidance that we reviewed does not consistently and clearly require the updating of O&S cost estimates after a program has completed production. DOD Has Departmentwide and Service-Specific Initiatives to Address Weapon System O&S Costs Several Departmentwide Initiatives Address Weapon System O&S Costs DOD has several departmentwide initiatives to address weapon system O&S costs. DOD concurred with our four recommendations to revise guidance to require the services to retain life-cycle O&S cost estimates and support documentation used to develop the cost estimates; develop guidance for documenting and retaining historical information on weapon system program changes to aid in effective analysis of O&S costs; require that the Director of the Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation retain any independent life-cycle O&S cost estimates prepared by that office, along with support documentation used to develop these cost estimates for major weapon systems; and revise DOD guidance to require the services to periodically update life-cycle O&S cost estimates for major weapon systems throughout their life cycle and assess program changes and cost growth. However, these systems are still being developed. To determine the extent to which (1) life-cycle O&S cost estimates developed during acquisition and data on actual O&S costs are available for program management and decision making and (2) DOD uses life-cycle O&S cost estimates for major weapon systems after they are fielded to quantify cost growth and identify its causes, we identified available cost estimates, compared the estimates with actual cost data, and obtained additional information on how O&S costs are tracked, assessed, managed, and controlled.

Why GAO Did This Study The Department of Defense (DOD) spends billions of dollars each year to sustain its weapon systems. These operating and support (O&S) costs can account for a significant portion of a system's total life-cycle costs and include costs for repair parts, maintenance, and personnel. The Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009 directs GAO to review the growth in O&S costs of major systems. GAO's report addresses (1) the extent to which life-cycle O&S cost estimates developed during acquisition and actual O&S costs are available for program management and decision making; (2) the extent to which DOD uses life-cycle O&S cost estimates after systems are fielded to quantify cost growth and identify its causes; and (3) the efforts taken by DOD to reduce O&S costs for major systems. GAO selected seven aviation systems that reflected varied characteristics and have been fielded at least several years. These systems were the F/A-18E/F, F-22A, B-1B, F-15E, AH-64D, CH-47D, and UH-60L. What GAO Found DOD lacks key information needed to effectively manage and reduce O&S costs for most of the weapon systems GAO reviewed--including life-cycle O&S cost estimates and complete historical data on actual O&S costs. The services did not have life-cycle O&S cost estimates developed at the production milestone for five of the seven aviation systems GAO reviewed, and current DOD acquisition and cost-estimating guidance does not specifically address retaining these estimates. Also, the services' information systems designated for collecting data on actual O&S costs were incomplete, with the Army's system having the greatest limitations on available cost data. without historic cost estimates and complete data on actual O&S costs, DOD officials do not have important information necessary for analyzing the rate of O&S cost growth for major systems, identifying cost drivers, and developing plans for managing and controlling these costs. At a time when the nation faces fiscal challenges, and defense budgets may become tighter, the lack of this key information hinders sound weapon system program management and decision making in an area of high costs to the federal government. DOD generally does not use updated life-cycle O&S cost estimates to quantify cost growth and identify cost drivers for the systems GAO reviewed. The services did not periodically update life-cycle O&S cost estimates after production was completed for six of the seven systems. The F-22A program office had developed an updated life-cycle O&S cost estimate in 2009 and found a 47-percent ($19 billion) increase in life-cycle O&S costs from what had been previously estimated in 2005. GAO's comparisons of estimated to actual O&S costs for two of the seven systems found some areas of cost growth. However, notable changes such as decreases in the numbers of aircraft and flying hours occurred in both programs after the production milestone estimates were developed, complicating direct comparisons of estimated to actual costs. According to federal guidance, agencies should have a plan to periodically evaluate program results as these may be used to determine whether corrections need to be made and to improve future cost estimates. However, DOD acquisition and cost estimation guidance does not require that O&S cost estimates be updated throughout a system's life cycle or that information on program changes affecting the system's life-cycle O&S costs be retained. The services' acquisition and cost-estimation guidance that GAO reviewed does not consistently and clearly require the updating of O&S cost estimates after a program has ended production. DOD has several departmentwide and service-specific initiatives to address O&S costs of major systems. One DOD program funds projects aimed at improving reliability and reducing O&S costs for existing systems. Other initiatives are aimed at focusing attention on O&S cost requirements and reliability during the acquisition process. In a recent assessment, DOD identified weaknesses in O&S cost management, found deficiencies in sustainment governance, and recommended a number of corrective actions. Many of DOD's initiatives are recent or are not yet implemented. What GAO Recommends GAO recommends that DOD take steps to retain life-cycle O&S cost estimates for major systems, collect additional O&S cost elements in its visibility systems, update life-cycle O&S cost estimates periodically after systems are fielded, and retain documentation of program changes affecting O&S costs for use in cost analysis. DOD concurred with GAO's recommendations.

gao_RCED-98-11

gao_RCED-98-11_0

Housing Assistance for the Elderly Reflects the Programs’ Intent The Section 202 program, far more often than the HOME program, is the source of funds for increasing the supply of multifamily rental housing for low-income elderly people. From fiscal year 1992 through fiscal year 1996, over 1,400 Section 202 and HOME program multifamily rental housing projects for the elderly opened nationwide. Most of the elderly households that obtained assistance from the HOME program—over 70 percent—used that assistance to rehabilitate the homes they already owned and in which they still lived. The remaining HOME assistance benefiting the elderly did so by providing tenant-based rental assistance; helping new homebuyers make down payments and pay the closing costs associated with purchasing homes; and acquiring, constructing, or rehabilitating single-family and multifamily rental housing. As a result, HOME projects typically attract significant levels of additional public and private funding from sources such as other federal programs, state or local housing initiatives, low-income housing tax credit proceeds, and donations or equity contributions from nonprofit groups. Availability of Supportive Services at Section 202 and HOME Projects HUD does not pay for supportive services through the HOME program but does, under limited circumstances, do so through the Section 202 program. For most of the Section 202 and HOME projects we visited, some supportive services, such as group social activities or subsidized meals programs, were available to the residents on-site, but usually only to the extent that the projects could generate operating income to pay for them. In addition to keeping up to date with the needs of their residents, the sponsors or management companies of the Section 202 projects we visited expected their service coordinators or resident managers to refer residents to community-based services as needed or to bring community-based services to their facilities on a regular or occasional basis. HUD also questioned whether our data included all HOME projects that might be comparable to Section 202 projects by taking into account the (1) projects developed through the substantial rehabilitation of existing buildings (as opposed to new construction), (2) projects in which vacant units might later be occupied by the elderly in sufficient numbers to achieve comparability with Section 202 projects, (3) projects in which 50 percent or more of the residents were elderly, and (4) projects that were under way but had not been completed at the close of fiscal year 1996. We acknowledge that the HOME program provides housing assistance to the elderly in several ways other than through the production of new multifamily rental housing that is set aside almost exclusively for the elderly. However, because this report describes comparable Section 202 and HOME-funded housing assistance and because the Section 202 program provides only one kind of housing assistance, we focused on the multifamily rental projects funded by the HOME program that are comparable to those funded by the Section 202 program. Our analysis of the HOME data also provided information on the amount and sources of funding for multifamily projects developed under the HOME program.

Why GAO Did This Study Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the similarities and differences between the Department of Housing and Urban Development's (HUD) Section 202 Supportive Housing for the Elderly Program and HOME Investment Partnership Program, focusing on: (1) the amount and types of new multifamily rental housing that each program has provided for the elderly; (2) the sources of each program's funding for multifamily rental projects; and (3) the availability of supportive services for elderly residents. What GAO Found GAO noted that: (1) during fiscal year (FY) 1992 through FY 1996, the Section 202 program substantially exceeded the HOME program in providing multifamily rental housing that was set aside for elderly households; (2) over 1,400 Section 202 projects opened during this time, providing homes for nearly 48,000 elderly residents; (3) at the same time, the HOME program provided housing assistance to 21,457 elderly households, including 675 elderly residents in 30 multifamily rental projects comparable to those developed under the Section 202 program; (4) the Section 202 program produced new multifamily rental housing for low-income elderly households through new construction, rehabilitation of existing buildings, and acquisition of existing properties that the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation obtained through foreclosure; (5) the HOME program provided housing assistance to address the most pressing housing needs that local communities and states identified among low-income people of all ages; (6) for the elderly, HOME assistance helped rehabilitate the homes they already owned and in which they still lived, provided tenant-based rental assistance, helped new homebuyers make down payments and pay closing costs, and made funds available to acquire, construct, or rehabilitate single-family and multifamily rental housing; (8) in the Section 202 program, the capital advance, which HUD provides to a project's sponsor, is the only significant source of funds for developing the project; (9) in general, a HOME project typically attracts significant levels of additional public and private funding; (10) HOME multifamily housing that is similar to Section 202 projects is usually financed with a combination of HOME funds and other federal and nonfederal funds; (11) HUD does not pay for supportive services, such as transportation or subsidized meals programs, through the HOME program but does do so under limited circumstances through the Section 202 program; (12) the extent to which the Section 202 and HOME projects provided these services on-site for their residents usually depended on each project's ability to generate the operating income needed to pay for the services; (13) these projects often depended on and referred their residents to community-based supportive services; (14) five of the eight Section 202 projects that GAO visited employed a staff person or expected their on-site resident manager to coordinate services; and (15) both projects in many cases had common areas or activity rooms that service providers or residents could use for community-based services, group social or educational activities, and dining.

gao_GAO-01-211

gao_GAO-01-211_0

In fiscal year 1999, about $785 million in Title III nutrition and support services funds was distributed to 56 states. States may then need to budget their spending on the basis of funding projections. The remaining two states did not specify how they limited the amount of area-agency and/or local-service-provider carryover. Conclusion At the present time, the buildup and use of Title III-C carryover funds to support elderly nutrition services does not appear to be a widespread problem. However, AoA does not monitor the states’ buildup of carryover funds. As a result, the agency has little assurance that it could identify meal service problems that could emerge in the future. Recommendation for Executive Action Although the use of carryover funds to support nutrition services for the elderly does not currently appear to be creating a serious meal service problem nationwide, we recommend that the Secretary, Department of Health and Human Services, direct the Assistant Secretary for Aging, Administration on Aging, to monitor the levels of unspent Title III-C funds that states carry over to the succeeding fiscal year and work with the states that build up substantial amounts of carryover funds to develop a strategy to spend down such funds in a manner that minimizes the potential disruption of meal services for the elderly.

Why GAO Did This Study Under Title III of the Older Americans Act, the Administration on Aging (AoA) distributes grants to states on the basis of their proportional share of the total elderly population in the United States. These grants are then disbursed to more than 600 area agencies nationwide, and are used to fund group and in-home meals, as well as support services, including transportation and housekeeping. The grants are further subdivided by these agencies to more than 4,000 local service providers. AoA requires that states obligate these funds by September 30 of the fiscal year in which they are awarded. Also, states must spend this money within two years after the fiscal year in which it is awarded. During this time AoA does not limit or monitor the amount of unspent funds that states may carry over to the succeeding fiscal year. GAO examined whether states were using Title III carryover funds to expand their meal service programs for the elderly beyond a level sustainable by their annual allotments alone. What GAO Found GAO found that the buildup and use of Title III carryover funds to support elderly nutrition services does not appear to be a widespread problem. However, AoA does not monitor the states' buildup of carryover funds. As a result, the agency has little assurance that it could identify meal service problems that could emerge in the future.

gao_GAO-13-805

gao_GAO-13-805_0

Background Laws Governing the Opportunity Scholarship Program Congress passed the D.C. School Choice Incentive Act of 2003 in January 2004, which directed the Secretary of Education to award a grant on a competitive basis for up to 5 years to an entity or entities to use to make scholarship payments to parents of eligible students to be used for This Act private school tuition, fees, and transportation expenses.created the program known as the District of Columbia Opportunity Scholarship Program (OSP), the first private kindergarten-through-grade- 12 school choice program supported by federal funds. The Act sets forth requirements for participating private schools.provides that none of the funds may be used by an eligible student to enroll in a participating private school unless the participating school 1. has and maintains a valid certificate of occupancy issued by the 2. makes readily available to all prospective students information on its 3. if operating for 5 years or less, submits to the eligible entity administering the program proof of adequate financial resources and the ability to maintain operations throughout the school year; 4. agrees to submit to site visits as determined to be necessary; 5. has financial systems, controls, policies, and procedures to ensure that funds are used according to the statute; and 6. ensures that each teacher of core subject matter in the school has a baccalaureate degree or its equivalent, regardless of whether the degree was awarded in or outside of the United States. Specifically, it provides up to $8,000 for grades K-8 and $12,000 for grades 9-12 starting in school year 2011-2012. The Trust Provides Untimely Information and Scholarship Awards The Trust Provides Information to Families through Many Channels, but Its Participating School Directory Provides Incomplete and Untimely Information The Trust provides program information to prospective and current OSP families through a variety of outreach activities. To reach prospective OSP families, the Trust advertises through print, radio, and bus ads, as well as in newspapers and flyers posted in neighborhood libraries, recreation centers, and local government service centers. The Trust also holds a participating school fair in which OSP families can obtain additional information about participating schools. Most families we spoke with were generally happy with their children’s participation in the program, citing increased safety and security at their children’s OSP schools and improved quality of education. In addition to having incomplete information, the Directory has also been published too late to truly assist families in selecting a school. However, the Trust published the Directory for the 2012-2013 school year in May 2013, about 9 months after the start of that school year. By that time, many of the schools in OSP had already completed their admissions and enrollment processes. The Trust Has Not Developed Effective Internal Controls to Safeguard Program Funds The Trust Has Not Developed Effective Policies and Procedures for Implementing and Overseeing the Program The Trust’s policies and procedures lack detail in several areas related to school compliance and financial accounting, which may result in little overall accountability for program funds. Internal control is broadly defined as a process designed to provide reasonable assurance that an organization can achieve its objectives with effective, efficient operations, reliable financial reporting, and compliance with laws and regulations. However, these amendments do not address all weaknesses identified in this report, and they have not yet been fully implemented. Without a mechanism or procedures for verifying the accuracy of the information provided by participating schools, the Trust cannot ensure that schools are eligible to participate in OSP and, therefore, risks providing federal dollars to students to attend schools that do not meet the educational and health and safety standards required by the District. Based on documents provided by the Trust, several schools we visited that participated in OSP during the 2010-2011 and 2011-2012 school years did not provide detailed financial statements necessary to assess their financial stability, and during this time, the Trust did not have a The financial practice of documenting its financial review of schools.information submitted by 6 of the 10 schools we visited did not include detailed financial information required by the Trust’s policies and procedures. In other words, it does not appear possible to use the Trust’s database to derive this priority category and puts in question the Trust’s ability to provide accurate priority categories for the OSP lottery. Lastly, data entry of application information is also problematic. According to the MOU, Education is responsible for working with the Trust to improve certain aspects of the administration of OSP. Education Has Provided Limited Assistance to the Trust Education has provided limited assistance to the Trust as agreed upon in the MOU and cooperative agreement governing OSP. Trust officials acknowledged that they have not proactively sought Education’s assistance in these areas. Further, as a result of the Trust’s tardiness in submitting mandatory financial reports, the Trust was unable to account for federal dollars spent on OSP for about 2 years after the end of fiscal year 2010. Although the MOU is a written agreement between Education and the District, it includes a responsibility for the Trust. Specifically, the MOU states that the Trust—as the grantee—is responsible for notifying District agencies to conduct these required inspections of participating private schools. However, because the Trust is not a signatory to the MOU, Trust officials were not acutely aware that they were responsible for notifying the District agencies. In its comments, Education did not indicate agreement or disagreement with our recommendations. The Trust generally agreed with our recommendations, but disagreed with some of the findings. In addition, the Trust’s revised policies and procedures do not address all of the weaknesses for which GAO recommended action, such as developing a process for addressing schools that are noncompliant with program requirements. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology We reviewed relevant federal and District laws and regulations and analyzed key documents from the DC Children and Youth Investment Trust Corporation (Trust), the federal Department of Education (Education), and participating schools, as well as generally accepted guiding documents for internal controls including those published by GAO and the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission (COSO). To determine the roles and responsibilities of the Trust, Education, and the District, we examined the grant transfer agreement between the Trust, the Washington Scholarship Fund, and Education; the memorandum of understanding between Education and the District of Columbia Government; and the cooperative agreement between Education and the Trust.

Why GAO Did This Study School vouchers, a school choice program designed to provide students with public funds to attend private schools, feature prominently in policy discussions about education reform. The OSP was reauthorized by Congress in 2011 by the Scholarships for Opportunity and Results Act, and has garnered national attention as the first federally-funded voucher program. Since the program's inception in 2004, Congress has provided almost $152 million for the program benefitting almost 5,000 students, currently providing scholarships of about $8,000 for grades K-8 and about $12,000 for grades 9-12. As requested, GAO examined (1) the extent to which the Trust provides information that enables families to make informed school choices, (2) whether the Trust's internal controls ensure accountability for OSP, and (3) how Education and District agencies responsible for overseeing OSP have performed their stated roles and responsibilities. To conduct this work, GAO visited 10 participating schools; interviewed school officials; conducted discussion groups with 14 parents of scholarship students; analyzed key program documents; reviewed generally accepted guiding documents for internal controls; and interviewed officials at Education, relevant District agencies, and the Trust. What GAO Found The DC Children and Youth Investment Trust Corporation (the Trust) provides information to prospective and current families of children participating in the District of Columbia (the District) Opportunity Scholarship Program (OSP) through a variety of outreach activities. To reach prospective OSP families, the Trust advertises through print, radio, and bus ads, as well as in newspapers and flyers posted in neighborhood libraries, recreation centers, and local government service centers. However, the Trust provides incomplete and untimely information about participating schools to OSP families. The participating school directory, which is published by the Trust, lacks key information about tuition, fees, and accreditation. The Trust published the directory 9 months after the start of the 2012-13 school year, too late to assist families in selecting a school for that year. Without such information, parents cannot make fully informed school choices. Additionally, the Trust awarded scholarships to students several months after many schools completed their admissions and enrollment processes, limiting the amount of time and choice in selecting schools. Most families GAO spoke with were generally happy with OSP but some were concerned about the availability of program information. The Trust's internal controls do not ensure effective implementation and oversight of OSP. Adequate policies and procedures can provide reasonable assurance of effective, efficient operations, reliable financial reporting, and compliance with applicable laws. However, the Trust's policies and procedures do not include a process for verifying eligibility information that schools selfreport. As a result, the Trust cannot ensure that schools are eligible to participate in the program and, therefore, risks providing federal dollars to students to attend schools that do not meet standards required by law. Furthermore, the Trust's database is not well structured and hampers the effectiveness of program implementation. For example, the Trust lacks written documentation for the database, and staff must rely on institutional memory to ensure processes such as data entry are conducted properly, which could contribute to errors in the database. As required by law, the Trust groups eligible applicants into three priority categories by which scholarships are then awarded by lottery; however, weaknesses in the database's structure puts into question the Trust's ability to provide accurate priority categories. Additionally, the Trust has not submitted its mandatory financial reports on time, despite a legal requirement that these reports be filed within 9 months of the end of the entity's fiscal year. The Trust's fiscal year 2010 financial report was almost 2 years late, and the Trust's fiscal year 2011 and 2012 reports had not yet been submitted as of August 2013. In August 2013, the Trust also made amendments to its policies and procedures in three areas GAO identified. However, these amendments do not address all weaknesses identified in this report, and have not yet been fully implemented. The Department of Education (Education) has provided limited assistance to the Trust in certain areas outlined in the memorandum of understanding (MOU) with the District and in the cooperative agreement with the Trust. Specifically, Education is responsible for helping the Trust make improvements to its financial system, enhance its site visit policies and procedures, and improve the accuracy of information provided to parents. Trust officials acknowledged that Education has provided general assistance regarding administrative and operational functions, but it has not assisted with specific improvements in these areas. Although the MOU is a written agreement between Education and the District, it holds the Trust, as the grantee, responsible for notifying District agencies to conduct required building, zoning, health, and safety inspections of participating schools—a requirement that is not detailed in the cooperative agreement signed by Education and the Trust—but would assist the Trust in providing continued oversight of schools participating in OSP. As a result, Trust officials were not acutely aware of this responsibility, and required inspections were not being conducted in the manner described in the MOU between Education and the District. What GAO Recommends GAO is making 10 recommendations to Education to improve OSP, such as ensuring that the Trust publishes a more complete school directory and updates key aspects of its policies and procedures. Education did not indicate agreement or disagreement with our recommendations. The Trust disagreed with some findings and both provided additional information.

gao_GAO-13-716

gao_GAO-13-716_0

Scope and Methodology To determine what is known about the supply and domestic demand for lithium-7, we analyzed data provided by industry representatives, reviewed agency and industry documents, and interviewed agency officials and industry representatives. In addition, we compared actions DOE is taking to manage and communicate lithium-7 supply risks with federal standards for internal control. Little Is Known about Lithium-7 Production, Creating Uncertainty about the Reliability of the Future Supply There is no domestic production of lithium-7, and little is known about the lithium-7 production capabilities of China and Russia and whether they will be able to provide future supplies. According to industry representatives, lithium-7 brokers, and NNSA documents, China and Russia have produced enough lithium-7 to meet the current U.S. demand, which is not expected to increase a significant amount in the near future, based on DOE’s information that shows five new pressurized water reactors scheduled to begin operating by 2018. China’s continued supply of lithium-7 may be reduced by its own growing demand created by the construction of new reactors and the development of new reactor designs. Additionally, China is planning to build a new type of nuclear power reactor—a molten salt reactor—that will require dramatically larger amounts of lithium-7 to operate. China is pursuing the development of two different types of molten salt reactors, according to the expert, each of which will result in a reactor that requires 1,000s of kilograms of lithium-7 to operate, rather than the approximate 300 kilograms (about 660 pounds) annually needed for all 65 U.S. pressurized water reactors combined, according to lithium- 7 brokers. The risk of relying on so few producers of lithium-7 leaves the 65 pressurized water reactors in the United States vulnerable to supply disruptions. According to NRC officials, operating a pressurized water reactor without lithium-7 could be done, but it would significantly increase the corrosion of pipes and other infrastructure. No Entity Has Taken Stewardship Responsibility for Assessing and Managing Risks to the Lithium-7 Supply, but DOE Is Taking Some Actions No federal entity has taken stewardship responsibility for assessing risks to the lithium-7 supply for the commercial nuclear power industry. Federal stakeholders—DOE, NRC, and NNSA—told us they view lithium-7 as a commercial commodity for which industry is responsible. The nuclear power industry may not be concerned about lithium-7 supply disruptions because it may not be aware of all the risks. As previously discussed, two of the lithium-7 brokers told us they are having difficulty obtaining lithium-7 from China and Russia. DOE Studied Lithium-7 Supply and Demand and Concluded That No Further Action Is Needed, but Its Study Has Shortcomings DOE studied the supply and demand of lithium-7 and concluded that no further action is needed to mitigate a potential lithium-7 shortage, but our review found shortcomings in its assessment of domestic demand and the mitigation measures it identifies for industry to consider implementing. In its discussions with industry representatives, representatives identified the following four actions that the nuclear power industry could take should a shortage of lithium-7 occur: recycling lithium-7 from the demineralizers; increasing the burnable poisons in the reactor fuel;reducing the acidity of the cooling water to reduce the amount of lithium-7 needed by using boric acid that is enriched with boron-10, which would reduce the amount of boric acid added to the cooling water, thus reducing the acidity; and developing alternative sources of lithium-7, including building a domestic lithium-7 production capability. The third option—reducing pressurized water reactors’ reliance on lithium-7–is also a longer-term option that would generally require changes in how reactors are operated and may produce only modest reductions in the use of lithium-7. Conclusions DOE studied the lithium-7 supply and demand situation, including identifying some supply risks, and is undertaking some actions to help mitigate a potential shortage, such as setting aside 200 kilograms of lithium-7 as a reserve. Recommendation for Executive Action To ensure a stable future supply of lithium-7, we recommend that the Secretary of Energy direct the Isotope Program, consistent with the program’s mission to manage isotopes in short supply, to take on the stewardship role by fully assessing supply risks; communicating risks, as needed, to stakeholders; ensuring risks are appropriately managed; and fully and accurately determining domestic demand.

Why GAO Did This Study About 13 percent of our nation’s electricity is produced by pressurized water reactors that rely on lithium-7, an isotope of lithium produced and exported solely by China and Russia, for their safe operation. Lithium-7 is added to the water that cools the reactor core to prevent the cooling water from becoming acidic. Without the lithium-7, the cooling water’s acidity would increase the rate of corrosion of pipes and other infrastructure—possibly causing them to fail. Utilities that operate the pressurized water reactors have experienced little difficulty obtaining lithium-7, but they may not be aware of all the risks of relying on two producers. GAO was asked to review the supply and domestic demand for lithium-7 and how risks are being managed. This report examines (1) what is known about the supply and demand of lithium-7, (2) what federal agencies are responsible for managing supply risks, and (3) alternative options to mitigate a potential shortage. GAO reviewed documents and interviewed officials from DOE, NNSA, and NRC, in addition to industry representatives. This report is an unclassified version of a classified report also issued in September 2013. What GAO Found Little is known about lithium-7 production in China and Russia and whether their supplies can meet future domestic demand. According to industry representatives, China and Russia produce enough lithium-7 to meet demand from U.S. pressurized water reactors, a type of commercial nuclear power reactor that requires lithium-7 for safe operation. However, China's continued supply may be reduced by its own growing demand, according to an expert that is familiar with China's plans. Specifically, China is building several pressurized water reactors and developing a new type of reactor that will require 1,000s of kilograms of lithium-7 to operate, rather than the 300 kilograms needed annually for all 65 U.S. pressurized water reactors. Relying on two producers of lithium-7 leaves U.S. pressurized water reactors vulnerable to lithium-7 supply disruptions. No federal entity has taken stewardship responsibility for assessing and managing risks to the lithium-7 supply, but DOE is taking some steps. Risk assessment is the identification and analysis of relevant risks, communication of risks to stakeholders, and then taking steps to manage the risks, according to federal standards for internal control. Officials at DOE, the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) told GAO they view lithium-7 as a commercial commodity for which industry is responsible. Industry representatives told GAO that they had no concerns about the lithium-7 supply, as they have experienced no problems in obtaining it. But GAO learned that industry representatives may not be familiar with all the supply risks. Notwithstanding, DOE plans to set aside 200 kilograms of lithium-7 and is funding research on lithium-7 production methods. DOE also studied lithium-7 supply and demand and concluded that no further action is needed. However, GAO found several shortcomings in its study, including that DOE underestimated the amount of lithium-7 used domestically. Industry estimates show that about 300 kilograms of lithium-7 are used annually in the United States, whereas DOE estimated that 200 kilograms are used annually. This and other shortcomings make it unclear if DOE's conclusion is correct that no additional action is needed. Based on information from agency officials and industry representatives, GAO identified three options to mitigate a potential lithium-7 shortage: (1) building a domestic reserve is a low-cost option that could help in the short-term; (2) building a domestic production capability is a longer-term solution that could eliminate lithium-7 imports, but take about 5 years and cost $10-12 million, according to NNSA; and (3) reducing pressurized water reactors' reliance on lithium-7 is another longer-term solution, but may require years of research and changes in how reactors are operated. What GAO Recommends GAO recommends that the Secretary of Energy ensure a stable future supply of lithium-7 by directing the Isotope Program to take on a stewardship role for lithium-7 by taking steps, including fully assessing risks and accurately determining domestic demand. DOE concurred with the recommendation.

gao_GAO-06-715T

gao_GAO-06-715T_0

First, about 40 percent of seniors read at or below the fifth-grade level, but the reading levels of the documents ranged from seventh grade to postcollege. Second, on average, the six documents we reviewed did not comply with about half of the 60 commonly recognized guidelines for good communications. For example, although the documents included concise and descriptive headings, they used too much technical jargon and often did not define difficult terms such as formulary. The 11 beneficiaries and 5 advisers we tested reported frustration with the documents’ lack of clarity as they encountered difficulties in understanding and attempting to complete 18 specified tasks. Help Line Responses Frequently Complete and Accurate, but Varied By Question Of the 500 calls we placed to CMS’s 1-800-MEDICARE help line regarding the Part D benefit, CSRs answered about 67 percent of the calls accurately and completely. Of the remainder, 18 percent of the calls received inaccurate responses, 8 percent of the responses were inappropriate given the question asked, and about 3 percent received incomplete responses. In addition, about 5 percent of our calls were not answered, primarily because of disconnections. The accuracy and completeness of CSR responses varied significantly across our five questions. 1.) For example, while CSRs provided accurate and complete responses to calls about beneficiaries’ eligibility for financial assistance 90 percent of the time, the accuracy rate for calls concerning the drug plan that would cost the least for a beneficiary with specified prescription drug needs was 41 percent. CSRs inappropriately responded 35 percent of the time that this question could not be answered without personal identifying information—such as the beneficiary’s Medicare number or date of birth—even though the CSRs could have answered our question using CMS’s Web-based prescription drug plan finder tool. The time GAO callers waited to speak with CSRs also varied, ranging from no wait time to over 55 minutes. For 75 percent of the calls—374 of the 500—the wait was less than 5 minutes. Part D Benefit Portion of Medicare Web Site Can Be Challenging to Use We found that the Part D benefit portion of the Medicare Web site can be difficult to use. In our evaluation of overall usability—the ease of finding needed information and performing various tasks—we found usability scores of 47 percent for seniors and 53 percent for younger adults, out of a possible 100 percent. While there is no widely accepted benchmark for usability, these scores indicate difficulties in using the site. For example, key functions of the prescription drug plan finder tool, such as the “continue” and “choose a drug plan” buttons, were often not visible on the page without scrolling down. CMS faced a tremendous challenge in responding to this need and, within short time frames, developed a range of outreach and educational materials to inform beneficiaries and their advisers about the Part D benefit. Although the initial enrollment period for the Part D benefit will end on May 15, 2006, CMS will continue to play a pivotal role in providing beneficiaries with information about the drug benefit in the future.

Why GAO Did This Study Today's hearing focuses on Medicare Part D, the program's new outpatient prescription drug benefit. On January 1, 2006, Medicare began providing this benefit, and beneficiaries have until May 15, 2006, to enroll without the risk of penalties. The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS), which administers the Part D benefit, has undertaken outreach and education efforts to inform beneficiaries and their advisers. GAO was asked to discuss how CMS can better ensure that Medicare beneficiaries are informed about the Part D benefit. This testimony is based on Medicare: CMS Communications to Beneficiaries on the Prescription Drug Benefit Could Be Improved, GAO-06-654 (May 3, 2006). What GAO Found Information given in the six sample documents that GAO reviewed describing the Part D benefit was largely complete and accurate, although this information lacked clarity. First, about 40 percent of seniors read at or below the fifth-grade level, but the reading levels of these documents ranged from seventh grade to postcollege. Second, on average, the six documents we reviewed did not comply with about half of 60 common guidelines for good communication. For example, the documents used too much technical jargon and often did not define difficult terms. Moreover, 16 beneficiaries and advisers that GAO tested reported frustration with the documents' lack of clarity and had difficulty completing the tasks assigned to them. Customer service representatives (CSRs) answered about two-thirds of the 500 calls GAO placed to CMS's 1-800-MEDICARE help line accurately and completely. Of the remainder, 18 percent of the calls received inaccurate responses, 8 percent of the responses were inappropriate given the question asked, and about 3 percent received incomplete responses. In addition, about 5 percent of GAO's calls were not answered, primarily because of disconnections. The accuracy and completeness of CSRs' responses varied significantly across the five questions. For example, while CSRs provided accurate and complete responses to calls about beneficiaries' eligibility for financial assistance 90 percent of the time, the accuracy rate for calls concerning the drug plan that would cost the least for a beneficiary with specified prescription drug needs was 41 percent. For this question, the CSRs responded inappropriately for 35 percent of the calls by explaining that they could not identify the least costly plan without the beneficiary's personal information--even though CSRs had the information needed to answer the question. The time GAO callers waited to speak with CSRs also varied, ranging from no wait time to over 55 minutes. For 75 percent of the calls--374 of the 500--the wait was less than 5 minutes. The Part D benefit portion of the Medicare Web site can be difficult to use. GAO's test of the site's overall usability--the ease of finding needed information and performing various tasks--resulted in scores of 47 percent for seniors and 53 percent for younger adults, out of a possible 100 percent. While there is no widely accepted benchmark for usability, these scores indicate that using the site can be difficult. For example, the prescription drug plan finder was complicated to use and some of its key functions, such as "continue" and "choose a drug plan," were often not visible on the page without scrolling down.

gao_GAO-11-280

gao_GAO-11-280_0

Reporting of Results. CMS 2009 Data Show that States Received Over 50,000 Nursing Home Complaints and Substantiated the Complaint and Cited Federal Deficiencies in 19 Percent of Investigations CMS’s national complaints data show that state survey agencies received over 50,000 complaints about nursing homes in calendar year 2009. The number and types of complaints varied among states. State survey agencies investigated all but 102 of the complaints that required an investigation. Additionally, 11 states received 15 or fewer complaints per 1,000 nursing home residents, while 14 states received more than 45. Roughly 10 percent of complaints were prioritized as immediate jeopardy and about 4 percent were prioritized as actual harm-low. According to CMS’s complaints database, roughly 26 percent of the immediate jeopardy complaints that were investigated were substantiated with at least one deficiency cited. In particular, 19 state survey agencies had difficulty investigating complaints and incidents prioritized as actual harm-high within the required time frame. Although the standards do not assess state survey agencies’ communication with complainants, CMS does expect agencies to convey investigation findings to complainants in accordance with CMS’s State Operations Manual. CMS’s assessment of state survey agencies’ performance found that some had difficulty meeting the timeliness of investigations standard, which evaluates: (1) whether an investigation was initiated within 10 working days of prioritization for actual harm-high complaints and incidents for nursing homes, and (2) whether an investigation was initiated within 2 working days of receipt for immediate jeopardy complaints and incidents for nursing homes and other facilities. Prioritization of Complaints Standard. Training and Guidance. 3). CMS’s Oversight of State Survey Agencies’ Complaint Investigation Processes Is Hampered by Data Reliability Issues, Due in Part to Inconsistent Interpretation of Performance Standards Among CMS Reviewers CMS’s oversight of state survey agencies’ complaint investigation processes, through its performance standards system and complaints database, is hampered by data reliability issues. While the four performance standards CMS uses to assess state survey agencies’ processes for investigating nursing home complaints are consistent with certain key criteria for performance measures identified by GAO and other audit agencies, the standards have weaknesses in areas related to other key criteria, particularly data reliability, due in part to inadequate sample sizes and inconsistent interpretation of some standards by CMS reviewers. In addition, CMS has not made full use of the information it collects about state survey agencies’ complaint investigation processes. Although CMS requires state survey agencies that fail performance standards to develop corrective action plans, these plans do not necessarily address the underlying causes of performance issues, such as staffing shortages. For example, CMS does not routinely use data from its complaints database to calculate certain measures that could enhance its understanding of state survey agencies’ performance investigating complaints and has not publicly reported state survey agencies’ scores on the performance standards. CMS’s performance reviews highlight state workload issues. Additionally, CMS data for 2009 showed that, among investigated complaints prioritized as either immediate jeopardy or actual harm-high, the percentage substantiated with at least one federal deficiency cited was higher if the investigation was initiated within required time frames than if it was not. To strengthen CMS’s assessment of state survey agencies’ performance in the management of nursing home complaints, we recommend that the Administrator of CMS take the following three actions: Conduct additional monitoring of state performance using information from CMS’s complaints database, such as additional timeliness measures. Assure greater consistency in assessments by identifying differences in interpretation of the performance standards and clarifying guidance to state survey agencies and CMS regional offices. HHS generally concurred with all of our recommendations. Appendix I: CMS’s State-Level Data on Complaints Received, Investigated, and Substantiated by State Survey Agencies, 2009 This appendix provides additional information on the number of complaints received, investigated, and substantiated by all 50 state survey agencies and the survey agency for the District of Columbia for 2009 based on complaints in Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services’ (CMS) national complaints database.

Why GAO Did This Study CMS, the agency within HHS that manages Medicare and Medicaid, contracts with state survey agencies to investigate complaints about nursing homes from residents, family members, and others. CMS helps assure the adequacy of state complaint processes by issuing guidance, monitoring data that state survey agencies enter into CMS's database, and annually assessing performance against specific standards. Concerns have been raised about the timeliness and adequacy of complaint investigations and CMS's oversight. GAO examined (1) complaints received, investigated, and substantiated by state survey agencies; (2) whether those agencies were meeting CMS performance standards and other requirements; and (3) the effectiveness of CMS's oversight. In addition to analyzing CMS data on complaints and performance reviews, GAO examined CMS guidance and conducted interviews with officials from three high- and three low-performing state survey agencies and their CMS regional offices. GAO addressed data reliability concerns by reporting only data we determined to be reliable. What GAO Found CMS's complaints data showed that state survey agencies received 53,313 complaints about nursing homes in 2009. The number and types of complaints varied among states. For example, 11 states received 15 or fewer complaints per 1,000 nursing home residents while 14 states received more than 45. State survey agencies assess the severity of a complaint and assign a priority level, which dictates if and when an investigation must be initiated. About 10 percent of complaints were prioritized as immediate jeopardy, requiring investigation within 2 working days of receipt, while 45 percent were prioritized as actual harm-high, requiring investigation within 10 working days of prioritization. State survey agencies investigated all but 102 complaints that required an investigation. Among investigated complaints, 19 percent were substantiated and resulted in the citation of at least one federal deficiency. The percentage of immediate jeopardy and actual harm-high complaints that were substantiated with at least one federal deficiency cited was higher if the investigation was initiated on time. In CMS's performance assessment for fiscal year 2009, many state survey agencies had difficulty meeting some of CMS's nursing home complaint standards, most of which also assess performance with regard to incidents--specific care issues that nursing homes are required to report. In particular, 19 state survey agencies had difficulty investigating actual harm-high complaints and incidents within the required time frame. However, most states were able to meet other CMS standards--timely investigation of immediate jeopardy complaints and incidents and appropriate prioritization of complaints and incidents. Although CMS's performance assessment does not review state survey agencies' communication with complainants, CMS does expect the agencies to convey investigation findings according to CMS guidelines. GAO found state survey agencies had varied interpretations of those guidelines, and some provided limited information to complainants. CMS's oversight of state survey agencies' complaint investigation processes, through its performance standards system and complaints database, is hampered by data reliability issues. While CMS's performance standards are consistent with certain key criteria for performance measures identified by GAO and other audit agencies, performance scores are not always reliable, due in part to inadequate sample sizes and inconsistent interpretation of some standards by CMS reviewers. In addition, CMS has not made full use of the information it collects. For example, in part because of data reliability concerns, CMS does not routinely use data from the complaints database to calculate certain measures that could enhance its understanding of agencies' performance. Although CMS requires state survey agencies that fail performance standards to develop corrective action plans, states' plans do not necessarily address the underlying causes of performance issues, such as staffing shortages. What GAO Recommends GAO recommends that the CMS Administrator take several steps to strengthen oversight of complaint investigations, such as improving the reliability of its complaints database and clarifying guidance for its state performance standards to assure more consistent interpretation. HHS generally agreed with our recommendations.

gao_GAO-07-1124T

gao_GAO-07-1124T_0

SBA also provides low-interest, long-term loans to individuals and businesses to assist them with disaster recovery through its Disaster Loan Program—the only form of SBA assistance not limited to small businesses. DCMS’s Limited Capacity and Difficulties in Other Logistical Areas Impeded SBA’s Response to the Gulf Coast Hurricanes Our July 2006 report identified several significant limitations in DCMS’s capacity and other system and procurement deficiencies that likely contributed to the challenges that SBA faced in providing timely assistance to Gulf Coast hurricane victims as follows: First, due to limited capacity, the number of SBA staff who could access DCMS at any one time to process disaster loans was restricted. Second, SBA experienced instability with DCMS during the initial months following Hurricane Katrina, as users encountered multiple outages and slow response times in completing loan processing tasks. Moreover, SBA faced challenges in obtaining suitable office space to house its expanded workforce. By late May 2006, SBA took about 74 days on average to process disaster loan applications, compared with the agency’s goal of within 21 days. Unprecedented Loan Application Volume and SBA’s Limited Disaster Planning Contributed to Challenges in Providing Timely Assistance to Hurricane Victims As we stated in our July 2006 report, the sheer volume of disaster loan applications that SBA received was clearly a major factor contributing to the agency’s challenges in providing timely assistance to Gulf Coast hurricane. As of late May 2006, SBA had issued 2.1 million loan applications to hurricane victims, which was four times the number of applications issued to victims of the 1994 Northridge, California, earthquake, the previous single largest disaster that the agency had faced. However, our two reports on SBA’s response to the Gulf Coast hurricanes also found that the absence of a comprehensive and sophisticated planning process contributed to the challenges that the agency faced. For example, in designing DCMS, SBA used the volume of applications received during the Northridge, California, earthquake and other historical data as the basis for planning the maximum number of concurrent agency users that the system could accommodate. SBA did not consider the likelihood of more severe disaster scenarios and, in contrast to insurance companies and some government agencies, use the information available from catastrophe models or disaster simulations to enhance its planning process. Additionally, SBA did not adequately monitor the performance of a DCMS contractor or stress test the system prior to its implementation. In the report we issued in February, we found that SBA did not engage in comprehensive disaster planning for other logistical areas—such as workforce or space acquisition planning—prior to the Gulf Coast hurricanes at either the headquarters or field office levels. SBA Has Taken Steps to Better Prepare for Disasters, but Continued Commitment and Actions Are Necessary In our July 2006 report, we recommended that SBA take several steps to enhance DCMS, such as reassessing the system’s capacity in light of the Gulf Coast hurricane experience and reviewing information from disaster simulations and catastrophe models. SBA officials said that DCMS can now support a minimum of 8,000 concurrent agency users as compared with only 1,500 concurrent users for the Gulf Coast hurricanes. While SBA has taken a variety of steps to enhance its capacity to respond to disasters, I note that these efforts are ongoing and continued commitment and actions by agency managers are necessary. In June 2007, SBA released a plan for responding to disasters. While we have not evaluated the process SBA followed in developing its plan, according to the SBA plan, the agency is incorporating catastrophe models into its disaster planning processes as we recommended in both reports. Further, based on information provided by SBA, the agency is also exploring the use of models developed by private companies to assist in its disaster planning efforts. These efforts to incorporate catastrophe models into the disaster planning process appear to be at an early stage. We encourage SBA to actively pursue initiatives that may further enhance its capacity to better respond to future disasters, and we will monitor SBA’s efforts to implement our recommendations.

Why GAO Did This Study The Small Business Administration (SBA) helps individuals and businesses recover from disasters such as hurricanes through its Disaster Loan Program. SBA faced an unprecedented demand for disaster loan assistance following the 2005 Gulf Coast hurricanes (Katrina, Rita, and Wilma), which resulted in extensive property damage and loss of life. In the aftermath of these disasters, concerns were expressed regarding the timeliness of SBA's disaster assistance. GAO initiated work and completed two reports under the Comptroller General's authority to conduct evaluations and determine how well SBA provided victims of the Gulf Coast hurricanes with timely assistance. This testimony, which is based on these two reports, discusses (1) challenges SBA experienced in providing victims of the Gulf Coast hurricanes with timely assistance, (2) factors that contributed to these challenges, and (3) steps SBA has taken since the Gulf Coast hurricanes to enhance its disaster preparedness. GAO visited the Gulf Coast region, reviewed SBA planning documents, and interviewed SBA officials. What GAO Found GAO identified several significant system and logistical challenges that SBA experienced in responding to the Gulf Coast hurricanes that undermined the agency's ability to provide timely disaster assistance to victims. For example, the limited capacity of SBA's automated loan processing system--the Disaster Credit Management System (DCMS)--restricted the number of staff who could access the system at any one time to process disaster loan applications. In addition, SBA staff who could access DCMS initially encountered multiple system outages and slow response times in completing loan processing tasks. SBA also faced challenges training and supervising the thousands of mostly temporary employees the agency hired to process loan applications and obtaining suitable office space for its expanded workforce. As of late May 2006, SBA processed disaster loan applications, on average, in about 74 days compared with its goal of within 21 days. While the large volume of disaster loan applications that SBA received clearly affected its capacity to provide timely disaster assistance to Gulf Coast hurricane victims, GAO's two reports found that the absence of a comprehensive and sophisticated planning process beforehand likely limited the efficiency of the agency's initial response. For example, in designing the capacity of DCMS, SBA primarily relied on historical data such as the number of loan applications that the agency received after the 1994 Northridge, California, earthquake--the most severe disaster that the agency had previously encountered. SBA did not consider disaster scenarios that were more severe or use the information available from disaster simulations (developed by federal agencies) or catastrophe models (used by insurance companies to estimate disaster losses). SBA also did not adequately monitor the performance of a DCMS contractor or completely stress test the system prior to its implementation. Moreover, SBA did not engage in comprehensive disaster planning prior to the Gulf Coast hurricanes for other logistical areas, such as workforce planning or space acquisition, at either the headquarters or field office levels. While SBA has taken steps to enhance its capacity to respond to potential disasters, the process is ongoing and continued commitment and actions by agency managers are necessary. As of July 2006, SBA officials said that the agency had completed an expansion of DCMS's user capacity to support a minimum of 8,000 concurrent users as compared with 1,500 concurrent users supported for the Gulf Coast hurricanes. Further, in June 2007, SBA released a disaster plan. While GAO has not evaluated the process SBA followed in developing its plan, consistent with recommendations in GAO reports, the plan states that SBA is incorporating catastrophe models into its planning process, an effort which appears to be at an early stage. GAO encourages SBA to actively pursue the use of catastrophe models and other initiatives that may further enhance its capacity to better respond to future disasters.

gao_GAO-14-459

gao_GAO-14-459_0

Background The United States has approximately 360 commercial sea and river ports that handle more than $1.3 trillion in cargo annually. Federal Stakeholders Have Taken Limited Actions to Address Cybersecurity in the Maritime Port Environment DHS and the other stakeholders have taken limited steps with respect to maritime cybersecurity. The Coast Guard Did Not Address Cyber-Related Risks in a National-Level Risk Assessment for the Maritime Mode While the Coast Guard has assessed risks associated with physical threats to port environments, these assessments have not considered risks related to cyber threats. Until the Coast Guard completes a thorough assessment of cyber risks in the maritime environment, maritime stakeholders will be less able to appropriately plan and allocate resources to protect the maritime transportation mode. However, the MTSA-required plans did not identify or address any other potential cyber-related threats directed at or vulnerabilities in the information and communications systems or include cybersecurity measures that port area stakeholders should take to prevent, manage, and respond to cyber-related threats and vulnerabilities. This occurred in part because, as Coast Guard officials stated, the guidance for developing area maritime security plans did not require the inclusion of a cyber component. Information-Sharing Mechanisms Were Active and Shared Cybersecurity Information to Varying Degrees Although the Coast Guard helped to establish mechanisms for sharing security-related information, the degree to which these mechanisms were active and shared cybersecurity-related information varied. However, the council disbanded in March 2011 and is no longer active. As a result, the Coast Guard would not be aware of and thus not be able to mitigate cyber-based threats. Port Security Grant Program Provides Some Guidance for Cybersecurity Grants but Has Not Taken Additional Steps to Help Ensure Risks are Addressed Under the Port Security Grant Program, FEMA has taken steps to address cybersecurity in port areas by identifying enhancing cybersecurity capabilities as a funding priority in fiscal years 2013 and 2014 and by providing general guidance regarding the types of cybersecurity-related proposals eligible for funding. In addition, because the Coast Guard has not conducted a comprehensive risk assessment for the maritime environment that includes cyber-related threats, grant applicants and DHS officials have not been able to use the results of such an assessment to inform their grant proposals, project scoring, and risk-based funding decisions. However, until it develops procedures to instruct grant reviewers to consult cybersecurity-related subject matter experts and uses the results of a risk assessment that identifies any cyber-related threats and vulnerabilities to inform its funding guidance, FEMA will be limited in its ability to ensure that the program is effectively addressing cyber-related risks in the maritime environment. Recommendations for Executive Action To enhance the cybersecurity of critical infrastructure in the maritime sector, we recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security direct the Commandant of the Coast Guard to take the following actions: work with federal and nonfederal partners to ensure that the maritime risk assessment includes cyber-related threats, vulnerabilities, and potential consequences; use the results of the risk assessment to inform how guidance for area maritime security plans, facility security plans, and other security- related planning should address cyber-related risk for the maritime sector; and work with federal and nonfederal stakeholders to determine if the Maritime Modal Sector Coordinating Council should be reestablished to better facilitate stakeholder coordination and information sharing across the maritime environment at the national level. To help ensure the effective use of Port Security Grant Program funds to support the program’s stated mission of addressing vulnerabilities in the maritime port environment, we recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security direct the FEMA Administrator to take the following actions: in coordination with the Coast Guard, develop procedures for officials at the field review level (i.e., captains of the port) and national review level (i.e., the National Review Panel and FEMA) to consult cybersecurity subject matter experts from the Coast Guard and other relevant DHS components, if applicable, during the review of cybersecurity grant proposals for funding and in coordination with the Coast Guard, use any information on cyber- related threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences identified in the maritime risk assessment to inform future versions of funding guidance for grant applicants and reviews at the field and national levels. In its comments, DHS concurred with our recommendations. Officials from DHS and the Department of Commerce also provided technical comments via e-mail. Based on our analysis, we determined that the U.S. Coast Guard (Coast Guard) and Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), within DHS, were relevant to our objective. It is developing this voluntary framework in accordance with its mission to promote U.S. innovation and industrial competitiveness. According to Volpe officials, this study was conducted mostly at international port facilities and vessels (though U.S. ports were visited under a different program). High Risk Series: An Update.

Why GAO Did This Study U.S. maritime ports handle more than $1.3 trillion in cargo annually. The operations of these ports are supported by information and communication systems, which are susceptible to cyber-related threats. Failures in these systems could degrade or interrupt operations at ports, including the flow of commerce. Federal agencies—in particular DHS—and industry stakeholders have specific roles in protecting maritime facilities and ports from physical and cyber threats. GAO's objective was to identify the extent to which DHS and other stakeholders have taken steps to address cybersecurity in the maritime port environment. GAO examined relevant laws and regulations; analyzed federal cybersecurity-related policies and plans; observed operations at three U.S. ports selected based on being a high-risk port and a leader in calls by vessel type, e.g. container; and interviewed federal and nonfederal officials. What GAO Found Actions taken by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and two of its component agencies, the U.S. Coast Guard and Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), as well as other federal agencies, to address cybersecurity in the maritime port environment have been limited. While the Coast Guard initiated a number of activities and coordinating strategies to improve physical security in specific ports, it has not conducted a risk assessment that fully addresses cyber-related threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences. Coast Guard officials stated that they intend to conduct such an assessment in the future, but did not provide details to show how it would address cybersecurity. Until the Coast Guard completes a thorough assessment of cyber risks in the maritime environment, the ability of stakeholders to appropriately plan and allocate resources to protect ports and other maritime facilities will be limited. Maritime security plans required by law and regulation generally did not identify or address potential cyber-related threats or vulnerabilities. This was because the guidance issued by Coast Guard for developing these plans did not require cyber elements to be addressed. Officials stated that guidance for the next set of updated plans, due for update in 2014, will include cybersecurity requirements. However, in the absence of a comprehensive risk assessment, the revised guidance may not adequately address cyber-related risks to the maritime environment. The degree to which information-sharing mechanisms (e.g., councils) were active and shared cybersecurity-related information varied. Specifically, the Coast Guard established a government coordinating council to share information among government entities, but it is unclear to what extent this body has shared information related to cybersecurity. In addition, a sector coordinating council for sharing information among nonfederal stakeholders is no longer active, and the Coast Guard has not convinced stakeholders to reestablish it. Until the Coast Guard improves these mechanisms, maritime stakeholders in different locations are at greater risk of not being aware of, and thus not mitigating, cyber-based threats. Under a program to provide security-related grants to ports, FEMA identified enhancing cybersecurity capabilities as a funding priority for the first time in fiscal year 2013 and has provided guidance for cybersecurity-related proposals. However, the agency has not consulted cybersecurity-related subject matter experts to inform the multi-level review of cyber-related proposals—partly because FEMA has downsized the expert panel that reviews grants. Also, because the Coast Guard has not assessed cyber-related risks in the maritime risk assessment, grant applicants and FEMA have not been able to use this information to inform funding proposals and decisions. As a result, FEMA is limited in its ability to ensure that the program is effectively addressing cyber-related risks in the maritime environment. What GAO Recommends GAO recommends that DHS direct the Coast Guard to (1) assess cyber-related risks, (2) use this assessment to inform maritime security guidance, and (3) determine whether the sector coordinating council should be reestablished. DHS should also direct FEMA to (1) develop procedures to consult DHS cybersecurity experts for assistance in reviewing grant proposals and (2) use the results of the cyber-risk assessment to inform its grant guidance. DHS concurred with GAO's recommendations.

gao_GGD-99-115

gao_GGD-99-115_0

Objectives, Scope, and Methodology The Chairman of the House Committee on Ways and Means asked us to determine how individual accounts could affect (1) private capital and annuities markets as well as national savings, (2) potential returns and risks to individuals, and (3) the disclosure and educational information needed for public understanding and use of an individual account investment program. As a result, the primary capital market effect is a purely financial one: borrowing in the Treasury debt market (or retiring less debt) to provide funding for investment in private debt and equity markets. Although substantial inflows into the private debt market could, in certain circumstances, result in some increased volatility, both the private equity and debt markets should be able to absorb the inflows without significant long-term disruption. There could eventually be a significant increase in the amount of new funds flowing into the annuities market. However, the magnitude of annuity purchases is likely to build gradually over time as more retirees build larger balances, allowing the market sufficient time to adjust. Redirection of Funds Could Affect Composition of Portfolios Most proposals use either the Social Security cash flow or federal general revenues as a source of funds for individual accounts. This redirection of funds— selling Treasury debt for the cash to invest in private debt and equity—is a purely financial effect. The extent to which individual accounts affect national saving depends on how they are financed (existing payroll tax, general revenues)—the effect on government saving; how private savings—the savings of households and businesses—respond to an individual account system; the structure of the individual account system (mandatory or voluntary); and the limitation or prohibition of the pre-retirement distribution or loans to make sure retirement income is preserved. If they do not adjust, national saving is on balance unaffected. Return and Risks Are Likely to be Higher With Individual Accounts There is a risk/return trade-off for individuals under an individual account program; instituting such a program would likely raise both the risks and the returns available to participants compared to the current system. The return that individuals receive would depend on both their investment choices and the performance of the market. Most advocates of individual accounts state that the expected return on investments under an individual account program would be much higher for individuals than the return under the current Social Security program. Under the current Social Security program, risks are borne collectively by the government. They state that history may not be a good predictor of the future. To provide participants with a clear understanding of the purpose and structure of an individual account program, an enhanced educational program would be necessary.

Why GAO Did This Study Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on the issues associated with individual social security accounts, focusing on how such accounts could affect: (1) private capital and annuities markets as well as national savings; (2) potential returns and risks to individuals; and (3) the disclosure and educational efforts needed to inform the public about such a program. What GAO Found GAO noted that: (1) individual investment accounts could affect the capital markets in several ways; (2) as a source of funds for the accounts, most proposals use either the cash collected from social security taxes or federal general revenues; (3) as a result, the primary capital market effect is a purely financial one: borrowing in the Treasury debt market to provide funding for investment in private debt and equity markets; (4) although the annual flows are likely to be sizeable, both the private debt and equity markets should be able to absorb the inflow without significant long-term disruption; (5) there could eventually be a significant increase in the amount of new funds flowing into the annuities market; (6) however, the magnitude of annuity purchases is likely to build gradually over time as more retirees build larger balances, allowing the market sufficient time to adjust; (7) individual account proposals could also affect the level of financial resources available for private investment by increasing or decreasing national savings; (8) the extent to which individual accounts affect national savings will depend on how they are financed, the structure of the program, and any behavioral responses of businesses and individuals; (9) national savings is more likely to increase if: (a) the government funds would have been spent but instead are not; (b) the program is mandatory and prohibits pre-retirement distributions; and (c) households do not fully adjust their retirement saving; (10) to the extent that households use the opportunities offered by an individual account program to invest in private equities and debt rather than Treasury securities, they could increase both the returns they receive and the risks they face compared to the Social Security program; (11) although asset diversification offers mitigation against certain risks, the returns that individuals receive would depend on and vary with their investment choices and the performance of the private debt and equity markets; (12) most advocates of individual accounts state that the expected future returns on private investments would be much higher for individuals than the implicit return available under the Social Security program; (13) some argue that historical returns may not be a good predictor of future returns; and (14) to provide participants with a clear understanding of the purpose and structure of an individual account program, an enhanced educational program would be necessary.

gao_RCED-97-216

gao_RCED-97-216_0

The Decline in the Timber Harvests, Timber Receipts, and Returns to the Treasury For fiscal years 1990 through 1996, the key indicators of the timber program—harvested volumes, timber receipts, and amounts available for return to the Treasury—decreased dramatically. Actions Taken by the Forest Service to Maintain a Positive NFF Balance in Fiscal Year 1996 In fiscal year 1996, the Forest Service was faced with having insufficient funds available in the NFF to make its payments to the states—including the spotted owl guarantee—and to meet its other required obligations. However, even with this additional money, a shortfall of $17.8 million still remained in the NFF. The Forest Service’s next action was to request the appropriation of about $135 million for the 1996 payments for the spotted owl guarantee authorized by the Omnibus Budget and Reconciliation Act of 1993 (P.L. Forest Service Transferred $56.1 Million to the NFF The Forest Service’s first analysis—performed in May 1996—of the estimated receipts for fiscal year 1996 showed that the NFF’s anticipated receipts were dangerously low. Instead, on August 27, 1996, the Forest Service instructed its regions to transfer the funds to the NFF that had been originally intended for deposit in the Salvage Sale Fund and Knutson-Vandenberg Fund for the remainder of the fiscal year to make up for the shortfall. Five weeks later, on November 7, 1996, the Forest Service resubmitted its request to the Treasury for a new General Fund expenditure account entitled “Payments to the States, Northern Spotted Owl Guarantee, Forest Service.” According to a Forest Service official, this delay in resubmitting the request to Treasury resulted from higher-priority tasks of year-end closings. Forest Service officials told us that they will return this amount to the Treasury; however, as of August 12, 1997, the Forest Service still retained the money in the NFF. Unauthorized Use of the NFF to Make Spotted Owl Guarantee Payments in Fiscal Years 1994 and 1995 The Forest Service used the NFF in fiscal years 1994 and 1995 for the required spotted owl guarantee payments to certain counties in California, Oregon, and Washington. This was an unauthorized use of the fund. In the short term, the regions were asked to implement a series of distribution priorities for timber sale receipts to ensure that funds are available to make the payments to the states and to meet other obligations, as well as to support critical elements of the reforestation and salvage sale programs. The guidance also required that each region initiate a sale review process within the region to ensure that the trust funds and timber sale accounts are being managed in accordance with these priorities. The task force was charged with developing a national policy on the management of receipts and trust funds so that sufficient receipts would be available in the NFF to make the payments to the states along with meeting the Forest Service’s other mandatory obligations. The National Forest Fund and Its Distributions, Fiscal Years 1990 Through 1996 The National Forest Fund (NFF)—an indefinite appropriation—was established pursuant to the Act of March 4, 1907 (P.L. The Forest Service’s appropriations acts for fiscal years 1991 through 1993 provided for payments to California, Oregon, and Washington, for counties that had lost portions of the 25-percent payments to the states because of the listing of the northern spotted owl as a threatened species.

Why GAO Did This Study Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Forest Service's use of its National Forest Fund, focusing on: (1) the timber harvest volumes, the timber receipts for fiscal years (FY) 1990 through 1996, and the timber sale funds returned to the Treasury from the National Forest Fund; (2) the actions taken by the Forest Service toward the end of FY 1996 to cover the shortfall in the National Forest Fund; (3) whether the Forest Service has been using the proper funding source for the spotted owl guarantee payment; and (4) the Forest Service's plans for FY 1997 to ensure that the National Forest Fund has sufficient funds to make the payments to the states. What GAO Found GAO noted that: (1) GAO's analysis of timber sales activities in FY 1990 through 1996 showed that the key indicators of the timber program--harvested volumes, timber receipts, and amounts available for return to the U.S. Treasury--have dramatically decreased; (2) in FY 1996, the forest service was faced with having insufficient funds available in the National Forest Fund to make the required payments to the states--including the legislatively required payment to compensate certain counties in California, Oregon, and Washington for the listing of the northern spotted owl as a threatened species (spotted owl guarantee)--and to meet its other required obligations; (3) in August and September 1996, the Forest Service transferred to the National Forest Fund a total of $56.1 million in timber sale receipts originally intended for deposit in other specific Forest Service funds; (4) however, even with this adjustment, a shortfall of $17.8 million remained; (5) in mid-September, the Forest Service requested that the Treasury make available $135 million appropriated under the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, for the 1996 payment of the spotted owl guarantee; (6) the Forest Service received approval for the appropriation on November 26, 1996; (7) as of August 12, 1997, the National Forest Fund had a balance of about $116 million for FY 1996 activities; (8) the Forest Service plans to return this amount to the Treasury's General Fund; (9) the Forest Service used the National Forest Fund in FY 1994 and 1995 to make the spotted owl guarantee payments to certain counties in California, Oregon, and Washington; (10) this was an unauthorized use of the fund; (11) instead, the Forest Service was required to use the spotted owl guarantee appropriation specifically enacted for this purpose; (12) on January 29, 1997, the Forest Service: (a) provided initial guidance to its regions on the priority for the distributions of receipts to ensure that funds are available to make payments to the states and to meet other obligations; and (b) required the regions to initiate a review process to ensure that the receipts were managed in accordance with these priorities; (13) in May 1997, the Forest Service established a National Task Force for Trust Funds and Payments to the States; and (14) the task force was charged with developing a national policy for the management of receipts and trust funds so that there would be sufficient receipts available in the National Forest Fund to make the payments to the states and to meet other mandatory obligations.

gao_GAO-02-654

gao_GAO-02-654_0

To help overcome these difficulties and promote homeownership among Native American, Native Hawaiian, and Pacific Islander veterans, the Congress established the Native American Veterans Direct Home Loan Program in 1992. Several Factors May Explain Disparity in Number of Loans Made to Different Groups Native Hawaiian and Pacific Islander veterans have received more loans than Native American veterans during the lifetime of the program, and several factors may explain this difference. Other factors that VA can address are program-related, such as loan limits and assistance with the mortgage process. The remoteness of some tribal lands has been an ongoing problem for housing development on Native American trust lands. VA Has Conducted Various Outreach Activities but Has Taken Limited Steps to Meet Assessment and Reporting Requirements VA has conducted outreach but has taken limited steps to meet assessment and reporting requirements as specified in the program’s authorizing legislation. Outreach requirements specified in the program’s authorizing legislation state that VA, among other things, is to attend housing conferences, and provide information to veterans, tribal governments and organizations. Appendix I: Other Federal Homeownership Programs for Native Americans on Trust Lands In addition to VA’s Native American Veterans Direct Home Loan program, four other federal programs provide homeownership assistance to Native American individuals or tribes on trust lands on the mainland. Native American Housing: Homeownership Opportunities on Trust Lands Are Limited.

What GAO Found Several federal programs have been developed to provide homeownership opportunities for Native Americans because private institutions have rarely supplied conventional home loans to Native Americans on trust lands. In 1992, Congress directed the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) to create the Native American Veterans Direct Home Loan Program to assist veterans in purchasing, constructing and improving homes. The Native American Veterans Direct Home Loan Program has been characterized by differences in the numbers served, with native Hawaiians and Pacific Islanders together receiving almost five times as many as loans as Native Americans. Several factors that apply to Native Americans, but not to native Hawaiians and Pacific Islanders, may explain this difference. Long-standing barriers to lending on Native American trust lands include insufficient income and credit history, a lack of meaningful interest in land among many Native Americans, and insufficient infrastructure on trust lands. Other factors that VA can address include program limits that may be lower than housing costs for some trust lands and potential applicants' inexperience with the mortgage lending process. VA has conducted outreach but has taken limited steps to meet the assessment and reporting requirements specified in the program's authorizing legislation. VA attends housing conferences, distributes promotional materials, and responds to inquiries about the program to meet outreach requirements specified in its authorizing legislation.

gao_NSIAD-96-41

gao_NSIAD-96-41_0

Specifically, we determined whether MSC has adequate management controls (1) to oversee contractors and prevent abuses and (2) to ensure contractual requirements are being met. Specifically, MSC lacks basic internal controls in its supervision of overhaul work, in its verification of crew-performed repairs, and in its review of invoices for subcontracts. During our review, however, we found that MSC does not have the organizational structure or the standardized procedures necessary to effectively manage its contractor-operated ship programs. Finally, MSC has no formal system to coordinate ideas to improve the contractors’ performance or reduce the programs’ costs. MSC Does Not Ensure That Contractors Comply With Requirements for Crew Trustworthiness and Security Clearances No office in MSC is responsible for tracking trustworthiness evaluations and security clearances for MSC’s contractor-operated ship programs to ensure that contractors are complying with contract requirements. However, MSC still will not have a system in place to systematically establish personnel requirements and to identify and implement best practices.

Why GAO Did This Study Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Military Sealift Command's (MSC) management of its contractor-operated ships, focusing on whether MSC has: (1) adequate management controls to oversee contractors and prevent abuses; and (2) sufficient oversight to ensure that contractual requirements are being met. What GAO Found GAO found that MSC: (1) does not require contractors to adequately document minor repairs, crew time, or subcontracted work; (2) does not adequately verify crew-performed repairs, review subcontractor invoices, or supervise overhaul work; (3) lacks sufficient internal controls to adequately manage its ship operation contracts; (4) has no guidelines for systematically establishing personnel requirements; (5) does not ensure that contractors comply with requirements for trustworthiness evaluations and security clearances; (6) has no formal system to identify and implement best practices that could improve contractor performance and reduce costs; and (7) has acknowledged its organizational problems and plans to designate program managers and establish formal lines of accountability.

gao_GAO-08-100

gao_GAO-08-100_0

Trustee Program. About 7 Percent of Those Who Filed for Bankruptcy Have Orders to Pay Child Support and Most Are Part of the CSE Program Our data match using the national bankruptcy and OCSE data found that among the 628,537 individuals who filed for bankruptcy between October 17, 2005, and October 17, 2006, the first year of implementation of the Bankruptcy Reform Act, about 7.2 percent were noncustodial parents with orders to pay child support. This population represents just one-half of 1 percent of the 9.9 million noncustodial parents who have orders to pay child support. While these proportions are small, they nevertheless represent 45,346 adults with orders to pay child support and at least as many children. The results of such a match would also reduce the research workload for state agencies by providing positive identification of bankruptcy filers with orders under the states’ purview by comparing the full SSNs of individuals in both databases. Currently, some case trustees do not include the full SSN of the filer in their notifications to the state agencies, which imposes additional work on the state agency staff to make a positive identification. A National Match of Federal Bankruptcy with Child Support Enforcement Data Might Identify Some Filers Who Do Not Report a Child Support Obligation Conducting a national bankruptcy and child support enforcement data match on a recurring basis might identify some additional filers who have orders to pay child support but who do not report this obligation, as required, when they file for bankruptcy. In a test review of bankruptcy filings involving orders to pay child support in Texas, we found that an estimated 2 percent of filers who completed all of their bankruptcy paperwork may not have reported their child support obligations. (The results could be higher or lower in other states.) In developing guidance for trustee noticing under the U.S. While EOUST officials acknowledged the importance of full SSNs in notices, they told us that they do not have authority to require case trustees to provide them. For case trustees who are overseen by judicial branch bankruptcy administrators in the six bankruptcy districts in Alabama and North Carolina, neither the Judicial Conference nor the Administrative Office has established an explicit policy about case trustees providing the filer’s full 9-digit SSN in the notices sent to custodial parents and the state child support enforcement agencies. In addition to these costs, bankruptcy officials cited some statutory and policy considerations to releasing their own data or to performing a data match. A Data Match with Transmission of Results to State Agencies Is Technically Feasible, Though It Would Not Replace Notifications to Custodial Parents Officials from the Administrative Office, EOUST, and CSE agencies said that it is technically feasible to provide information in their databases to the other system and then match records between the two systems on a routine basis. OCSE and some state agency officials we spoke with said that OCSE’s Federal Case Registry could disseminate this information to the 54 state agencies after modifications to this system and state systems. Trustee Program. They said, for example, they would need to build an exchange method that would allow for the secure exchange of data. Conclusion While matching federal bankruptcy data with child support records might facilitate the identification of some additional bankruptcy filers with child support obligations and improve the current system for notifying state agencies, these potential improvements seem modest in comparison to the costs, efforts, and statutory and policy considerations involved in implementing and maintaining a data matching system. As a result, it appears that instituting a routine data matching system may not be warranted. Moreover, a data matching system with results transmitting electronically to state agencies would not offer a comprehensive alternative to the trustee notification system insofar as it would not transmit information to custodial parents and would partially duplicate the trustee notification process. Scope and Methodology To conduct our work we reviewed relevant laws, rules and regulations, and guidance that affect the bankruptcy process and child support enforcement (CSE) program, including the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Title IV-D of the Social Security Act, the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, and the Privacy Act.

Why GAO Did This Study Recognizing the importance of child support, the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 requires that if a parent with child support obligations files for bankruptcy, a bankruptcy trustee must notify the relevant custodial parent and state child support enforcement agency so that they may participate in the case. The act also required GAO to study the feasibility of matching bankruptcy records with child support records to assure that filers with child support obligations are identified. GAO therefore (1) identified the percent of bankruptcy filers with obligations nationwide, (2) examined the potential for routine data matching to facilitate the identification of filers with child support obligations, and (3) studied the feasibility and cost of doing so. GAO interviewed child support enforcement and bankruptcy officials at the federal level and in six states. GAO also conducted a nationwide test data match and reviewed national bankruptcy filings for people with support obligations in Texas for an indication of whether filers are failing to provide this information. What GAO Found Nationwide, about 7 percent of individuals who filed for bankruptcy between October 17, 2005, and October 17, 2006--the first year of the bankruptcy act implementation--were noncustodial parents with child support orders. They, in turn, represented about one-half of 1 percent of the 9.9 million noncustodial parents with orders to pay child support. While these proportions are small, they represented 45,346 adults and at least as many children. Routine data matching might identify individuals who have not reported their child support obligations. However, GAO estimated from a random sample file review that 98 percent of noncustodial parents nationwide with orders in Texas had volunteered this information when they filed. (The results could be higher or lower in other states.) Another potential benefit would be to reduce the workload for state child support agencies by providing positive identification of bankruptcy filers with orders under the states' purview by comparing the full social security numbers (SSNs) of individuals in both bankruptcy and child support databases. This would help address the current situation state agency officials described, in which significant numbers of the notices they receive from bankruptcy trustees included only partial SSNs of the named person, imposing additional work on staff to make a positive identification in their databases. For bankruptcy case trustees participating in the U.S. Trustee Program, we found this to be the case, even though program guidance--covering 84 of the 90 bankruptcy districts--calls for case trustees to provide full SSNs in notices sent to state agencies. These notices are not part of any public record and trustee program officials said this use of the full SSNs is consistent with executive branch policies designed to guard privacy. For the remaining six districts, administered under a separate program, no guidance has been developed. A data matching system is technically feasible, but it would be a complex and costly undertaking, and would involve addressing some statutory and policy considerations. Regarding notifying state agencies of the match results, federal child support enforcement officials said that their national automated system could disseminate this data after modifications to federal and state systems. However, a data matching system would not offer a comprehensive alternative to the trustee notification system, because it would not transmit information to custodial parents. Regarding cost, bankruptcy and child support enforcement officials said that the development and implementation of an automated interface between two separate databases is a complex and costly undertaking, requiring modifications to each, with many steps required to assure that the matching system is developed and deployed without critical flaws and allowing for the secure exchange of data. Also, bankruptcy officials cited some statutory and policy considerations to releasing their own data or to performing a data match. It would also duplicate a portion of the current trustee notification process. In view of these findings, instituting a data matching system may not be warranted, especially if the case trustees can provide full SSNs of bankruptcy filers when notifying state agencies.

gao_GAO-03-1037T

gao_GAO-03-1037T_0

DOD Highlights Initiatives, But Also Reports Weaknesses DOD has undertaken several initiatives to improve its information security, including the development of an overall IA strategy and the issuance of information security policy and guidance. However, information that DOD’s CIO and IG submitted for fiscal year 2002 GISRA reporting showed that a number of challenges remain for the department in implementing both its policies and procedures and the statutory information security requirements. These challenges are indicated by the material weaknesses DOD reported related to its IA capabilities and its performance data, which showed that further efforts are needed to implement key requirements. DOD Efforts to Improve Information Security Overall, the DOD CIO reported in its fiscal year 2002 GISRA report that the department has an aggressive IA posture and highlighted several initiatives to improve its IA program. The actions DOD identified to address the eight deficiencies are: completing the implementation of the Information Assurance Vulnerability Alert process to all services and agencies; ensuring that effective computer security policies and procedures are distributed in a timely manner; improving DOD business processes to ensure that all systems are protected; decreasing the time necessary for correction of reported weaknesses; ensuring that computer security policies are enforced and security capabilities are tested regularly; ensuring that training is conducted for all network personnel (this includes awareness training for all personnel to specific network defense training for system and network administrators); increasing access security through the use of electronic tokens; and increasing security through certificates (for authentication and nonrepudiation). Currently, DOD reports that it has made progress in addressing many of these challenges. In January 1998, DOD announced its plans for DIAP—a program intended to promote integrated, comprehensive, and consistent IA practices across the department. Despite such steps, OMB reported in its fiscal year 2002 report to the Congress that the overall results of the Defense audit community’s assessment of the DOD fiscal year 2001 GISRA reporting reinforced the position that DOD does not have mechanisms in place for comprehensively measuring compliance with federal and Defense information security policies and ensuring that those policies are consistently practiced throughout the department. However, as its fiscal year 2002 GISRA reporting showed, further effort is needed to fully implement statutory information security requirements departmentwide and to expand future FISMA reporting to all systems.

Why GAO Did This Study The Department of Defense (DOD) faces many risks in its use of globally networked computer systems to perform operational missions--such as identifying and tracking enemy targets--and daily management functions--such as paying soldiers and managing supplies. Weaknesses in these systems, if present, could give hackers and other unauthorized users the opportunity to modify, steal, inappropriately disclose, and destroy sensitive military data. GAO was asked, among other things, to discuss DOD's efforts to protect its information systems and networks from cyber attack, focusing on its reported progress in implementing statutory information security requirements. What GAO Found In its fiscal year 2002 report on efforts to implement information security requirements under Government Information Security Reform law, DOD reported that it has an aggressive information assurance program and highlighted several initiatives to improve it. These initiatives included developing an overall strategy and issuing numerous departmentwide information security policy documents. DOD's reporting highlighted other accomplishments, but acknowledged that a number of challenges remain for the department in implementing both its policies and procedures and statutory information security requirements. DOD reported several material control weaknesses, which included needing to decrease the time necessary for correcting reported weaknesses and ensuring that computer security policies are enforced and security capabilities are tested regularly. Further, performance data DOD reported for a sample of its systems showed that further efforts are needed to fully implement key information security requirements, such as testing systems' security controls, throughout the department. Although DOD has undertaken its Defense-wide Information Assurance Program to promote integrated, comprehensive, and consistent practices across the department and has recently issued both policy guidance and implementation instructions, it does not have mechanisms in place for comprehensively measuring compliance with federal and Defense information security policies and ensuring that those policies are consistently practiced throughout DOD.

gao_GAO-17-361

gao_GAO-17-361_0

Marketplace Lending Marketplace lending connects consumers and small businesses seeking online and timelier access to credit with individuals and institutions seeking investment opportunities. Marketplace lenders use traditional and may use less traditional types of data and credit algorithms to assess creditworthiness and underwrite consumer loans, small business loans, lines of credit, and other loan products. Regulation and Oversight The regulation of marketplace lenders is largely determined by the lenders’ business model and the borrower or loan type. For example, marketplace lenders that provide services through an arrangement with a federally regulated depository institution may be subject to examination as a third-party service provider by the federal prudential regulator. The Securities Act of 1933 generally requires issuers that make a public offering of securities to register the offer and sale of their securities with SEC and provide investors with disclosures that include information about the company issuing securities such as risk factors and financial information.According to staff from SEC, certain transactions by marketplace lenders may be exempt from the registration requirements of the Securities Act of 1933 depending on the particular facts of their securities offerings. Marketplace lenders are subject to state-level laws in each state in which they are licensed to conduct business. Some agencies have taken a number of steps to understand and monitor the fintech industry, including the marketplace lending subsector. Mobile Payments Mobile payments allow consumers to use their smartphones or other mobile devices to make purchases and transfer money. Consumers and businesses use these devices to make and receive payments instead of relying on the physical use of cash, checks, or credit and debit cards. What It Is and How It Works According to publications we reviewed, there are different ways to make mobile payments, including the use of a mobile wallet. Underbanked: FDIC and the Federal Reserve have found that underbanked consumers use mobile financial services. Digital Wealth Management Digital wealth management platforms, including robo-advisors, use algorithms based on consumers’ data and risk preferences to provide digital services, including investment and financial advice, directly to consumers. Digital wealth management platforms provide services including portfolio selection, asset allocation, banking and account aggregation, and online risk assessments. Distributed Ledger Technology Distributed ledger technology (DLT) was introduced in 2009 as a technology intended to facilitate the recording and transferring of bitcoin, a virtual currency, specifically using blockchain. DLT has the potential to be a secured way of conducting transfers of digital assets in a near real-time basis potentially without the need for an intermediary. In 2015, CFTC formed a working group on blockchain, distributed ledger technology, and virtual currencies to study their application to the derivatives market and promote understanding and communication across the agency. We are sending copies of this report to the congressional requesters, agencies, and other interested parties. Appendix I: Agencies with Oversight Responsibilities Related to Financial Technology Firms Regulation of financial technology (fintech) firms depends on the extent to which the firms provide a regulated service and the format in which the services are provided. Consumers and Mobile Financial Services 2016. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. Federal Trade Commission Staff Report. Distributed Ledger Technology: Implications of Blockchain for the Securities Industry. GAO. GAO. GAO. GAO. IOSCO Research Report on Financial Technologies (Fintech). Office of the Comptroller of the Currency. The State of State Money Services Businesses and Regulation and Supervision.

Why GAO Did This Study Advances in technology and the widespread use of the Internet and mobile communication devices have helped fuel the growth in fintech products and services, such as small business financing, student loan refinancing, mobile wallets, virtual currencies, and platforms to connect investors and start-ups. Some fintech products and services offer the potential to expand access to financial services to individuals previously underserved by traditional financial institutions. GAO was asked to review a number of issues related to the fintech industry, including how fintech products and services are regulated. This report, the first in a series of planned reports on fintech, describes four commonly referenced subsectors of fintech and their regulatory oversight. GAO conducted background research and a literature search of publications from agencies and other knowledgeable parties. GAO also reviewed guidance, final rulemakings, initiatives, and enforcement actions from agencies. GAO interviewed representatives of federal agencies, including the federal prudential regulators, state supervision agencies, trade associations, and other knowledgeable parties. GAO is making no recommendations in this report. What GAO Found The financial technology (fintech) industry is generally described in terms of subsectors that have or are likely to have the greatest impact on financial services, such as credit and payments. Commonly referenced subsectors associated with fintech include marketplace lending, mobile payments, digital wealth management, and distributed ledger technology. Marketplace lenders connect consumers and small businesses seeking online and timelier access to credit with individuals and institutions seeking profitable lending opportunities. Marketplace lenders use traditional and may use less traditional data and credit algorithms to underwrite consumer loans, small business loans, lines of credit, and other loan products. Mobile payments allow consumers to use their smartphones or other mobile devices to make purchases and transfer money instead of relying on the physical use of cash, checks, or credit and debit cards. There are different ways to make mobile payments, including the use of a mobile wallet. use algorithms based on consumers' data and risk preferences to provide digital services, including investment and financial advice, directly to consumers. Digital wealth management platforms provide services including portfolio selection, asset allocation, account aggregation, and online risk assessments. Distributed ledger technology was introduced to facilitate the recording and transferring of virtual currencies, specifically using a type of distributed ledger technology, known as blockchain. Distributed ledger technology has the potential to be a secure way of conducting transfers of digital assets in a near real-time basis potentially without the need for an intermediary. Regulation of these subsectors depends on the extent to which the firms provide a regulated service and the format in which the services are provided. For example, a marketplace lender may be subject to: federal regulation and examination by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency in connection with certain services provided to depository institutions by the lender; state licensing and regulation in the states in which the lender conducts business; securities offering registration requirements administered by the Securities and Exchange Commission if the lender publicly offers securities; and/or enforcement actions by the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection and the Federal Trade Commission for violations of certain consumer protection laws. To learn about the fintech industry, some agencies hosted forums, formed working groups, and published whitepapers and regulatory guidance.

gao_GAO-16-133

gao_GAO-16-133_0

Funding Was Generally Steady for Past Decade but Decreased in Fiscal Year 2015 The National Guard counterdrug program budget data provided by DOD show that for fiscal years 2004 through 2014 the program’s total directed funding ranged between $219.3 million and $242.1 million–with a peak of $247 million in fiscal year 2013–but in fiscal year 2015 was reduced substantially. Based on DOD data, in every year since fiscal year 2004, Congress has directed funding above DOD’s requested amount, keeping program amounts generally steady through 2014. Specifically, in fiscal year 2013, DOD requested $117 million for the National Guard counterdrug program, about a 40 percent decrease from the prior year’s request. DOD’s data show that DOD’s budget request for the counterdrug program continued to decline from $112.1 million in fiscal year 2014 to $89.5 million in fiscal year 2015.In fiscal year 2015 Congress directed $86 million more than DOD requested for the program, ultimately leaving the program with a lower total funding of $175.5 million. NGB Has Performance Measures, but Does Not Use the Information Collected to Inform State-Level Programs or Oversee the Counterdrug Schools The NGB has developed performance measures to report on its counterdrug program; however, we found that the information collected is not used to evaluate and inform funding for state-level programs or oversee the counterdrug schools’ training. According to NGB officials, their current performance measures were developed in response to DOD guidance to report on the program’s aggregate performance to support DOD’s annual performance summary report to ONDCP. NGB officials stated that the guidance did not specifically require them to assess the performance of state-level programs; therefore, they did not fully consider the types of measures or information that would be useful to evaluate the effectiveness of individual state-level programs and oversee the counterdrug schools. Without performance information to evaluate state-level programs and oversee the counterdrug schools, DOD and Congress cannot ensure that the counterdrug program achieves its desired results and uses its resources most efficiently. Recommendation for Executive Action To ensure that resources are being efficiently applied to meet the National Guard counterdrug program’s objectives, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the National Guard Bureau in consultation with the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Counternarcotics and Global Threats to take the following two actions: Identify additional information needed to evaluate the performance of the state programs and oversee counterdrug schools’ training; and Subsequently collect and use performance information to help inform funding distribution decisions to state programs and to conduct oversight of the training offered by the counterdrug schools. To assess the extent to which the performance information is used to evaluate the counterdrug program’s activities, we reviewed documentation and interviewed counterdrug officials about program activities, types of performance information collected, and funding levels for individual state counterdrug programs.

Why GAO Did This Study Since 1989 the National Guard has received hundreds of millions of dollars to help enhance the effectiveness of state-level counterdrug efforts by providing military support to assist interagency partners with their counterdrug activities. The program funds the drug interdiction priorities of each state Governor; counterdrug-related training to interagency partners at five counterdrug schools; and state-level counterthreat finance investigations, all of which are part of DOD's broader counterdrug efforts. Senate Report 113-176 included a provision for GAO to conduct an assessment of the state operations of the National Guard's counterdrug program. This report: (1) identifies the changes in funding for the program since fiscal year 2004, and (2) assesses the extent to which performance information is used to evaluate the program's activities. GAO analyzed the program's budgets and obligations data, performance measures, and program guidance, and interviewed knowledgeable officials. What GAO Found The National Guard Bureau (NGB) counterdrug program's budget data show that funding has ranged from about $219.3 million to $242.1 million in fiscal years 2004 through 2014–with a peak of $247 million in fiscal year 2013–but in fiscal year 2015 funding was reduced substantially. Based on Department of Defense (DOD) data, every year since 2004 Congress has directed funding above the requested amount, thus keeping program amounts steady through 2014. In fiscal year 2013, DOD reported requesting $117 million for the program, about a 40 percent decrease from the prior year's request. While DOD reduced its request, however, Congress in fiscal years 2013 and 2014 directed funding at generally comparable amounts from prior years. In fiscal year 2015 Congress directed less of an increase above DOD's request, leaving the program with lower total funding of $175.5 million. The NGB has developed performance measures to report on its counterdrug program; however, the information collected is not used to evaluate and inform funding for state-level programs or oversee the counterdrug schools' training. GAO has previously reported that setting useful measures is important for oversight; without them, managers cannot monitor and evaluate the performance of programs' activities. NGB officials stated that they developed the current measures in response to DOD guidance to report on the program's aggregate performance and did not fully consider the types of measures or information that would be useful to evaluate individual state-level programs and oversee the counterdrug schools. Without collecting and using useful performance information to evaluate state-level programs and oversee the counterdrug schools, DOD and Congress cannot ensure that the counterdrug program is achieving its desired results and is distributing its funding most efficiently. What GAO Recommends GAO recommends that DOD (1) identify additional information needed to evaluate the performance of state programs and oversee counterdrug schools' training; and (2) subsequently collect and use performance information to help inform funding distribution decisions to state programs and to conduct oversight of the training offered by the counterdrug schools. DOD concurred with GAO's recommendations.

gao_GAO-06-753

gao_GAO-06-753_0

U.S. Security Support Informed by an Understanding of Italian Security Capabilities, but without a Formal Assessment of Italy’s Olympic Security Plans Following the Athens Games in the summer of 2004, the United States began planning for (1) the security support it would provide to the Italian government and (2) the protection of U.S. citizens who would be participating in or attending the 2006 Winter Games. While this interagency working group has been a useful forum for coordinating the domestic side of U.S. efforts in providing security support to overseas athletic events, it operates without written operational guidance and without the authority for tasking participating agencies in planning for future Olympic Games, according to State and DOJ officials. Agencies Contributed to Security Support for 2006 Winter Games; United States Spent Millions on Security Support Activities, but Lacks Formal Mechanism for Coordinating Financial Requirements Several U.S. agencies contributed to the U.S. security support effort in Turin, identifying more than $16 million in costs—over fiscal years 2005 and 2006—to arrange and provide for this support. State coordinated the U.S. interagency efforts in both Italy and Washington, D.C., and also provided security advice and other assistance to U.S. athletes, spectators, and commercial investors. For Turin, some agencies provided funds to State in advance of the Games, particularly for lodging deposits, while additional reimbursements were made after the Games. Such a framework would also be useful for anticipating resource needs, coordinating budgetary requests, and addressing potential funding issues associated with providing U.S. security support to future overseas Games. Security Planning Lessons Learned Were Applied in Turin and Additional Lessons Were Identified for the Beijing and Other Future Games Key lessons learned from the 2004 Summer Games were applied in the planning efforts for Turin, including (1) planning early for U.S. security support, (2) designating key U.S. officials to lead and deliver unified messages, and (3) centralizing U.S. resources and interagency operations. According to U.S. officials involved in the Turin Games, these lessons include the importance of (1) establishing a fully equipped, temporary operations center at the location of the Olympics when a U.S. presence is not nearby; (2) establishing clear roles and responsibilities for U.S. agencies in event planning and crisis response efforts; and (3) planning for Olympic-related expenditures over several fiscal years. This lesson has been communicated by Washington-, Athens-, and Italy- based personnel to their counterparts in China and has been incorporated into planning efforts for the Beijing Games. Agencies Identified Additional Lessons Learned in Turin U.S. agencies have begun to collect lessons learned from the Turin Games and disseminate them to their Beijing Games counterparts. For example, the U.S. Consulate in Milan used its staff to provide logistical support to the U.S. coordinators in Turin, such as the establishment of work space and other administrative support services. Planning Efforts Are Under Way to Identify U.S. Security Support for 2008 Beijing Games; Efforts Face Unique Challenges The United States is currently taking steps to coordinate a U.S. security presence and identify the types of security support that the United States may provide for the 2008 Beijing Games. To ensure the safety of U.S. athletes, spectators, and commercial investors, State has taken steps to identify and secure logistical support. The Departments of Energy and Homeland Security did not provide written or technical comments. To identify efforts under way for providing support to the 2008 Summer Games in Beijing, we gathered information from the various agencies previously mentioned; reviewed China’s Mission Performance Plan; attended meetings of the State-chaired interagency working group in Washington, D.C.; and interviewed the Deputy Olympic Security Coordinator and Olympic Coordinator at the U.S. Mission in Beijing.

Why GAO Did This Study The 2006 Winter Games in Turin, Italy, were the second Olympic Games to take place overseas since September 11, 2001. The United States worked with Italy to ensure the security of U.S. citizens, and it expects to continue such support for future Games, including the 2008 Games in Beijing, China. GAO was asked to (1) discuss the U.S. approach for providing security support for the 2006 Winter Games and how such efforts were coordinated, (2) identify the roles of U.S. agencies in providing security support for the Games and how they financed their activities, (3) review lessons learned in providing security support and the application of prior lessons learned, and (4) identify U.S. efforts under way for providing security support to the 2008 Beijing Games. What GAO Found In 2004, the United States began planning to provide a U.S. security presence in Italy and security support to the Italian government, and based much of its security strategy on its understanding of Italy's advanced security capabilities. The United States provided Italy with some security assistance, mostly in the form of crisis management and response support. To coordinate U.S. efforts, the U.S. Mission in Italy established an office in Turin as a central point for security information and logistics, and to provide consular services to U.S. citizens during the Games. The U.S. Ambassador to Italy, through the U.S. Consulate in Milan, coordinated and led U.S. efforts in-country, while the Department of State-chaired interagency working group in Washington, D.C., coordinated domestic efforts. While the interagency working group has been a useful forum for coordinating U.S. security support to overseas athletic events, State and Department of Justice (DOJ) officials have indicated that formal guidance that articulates a charter; a mission; and agencies' authorities, roles, and responsibilities would help in planning for security support to future Games. Nearly 20 entities and offices within several U.S. agencies provided more than $16 million for security support activities for the Turin Games. The roles of these agencies--which included the Departments of State, Justice, Homeland Security, Defense, and Energy--included providing crisis management and response support through personnel, equipment, and training and providing security advice and other assistance to U.S. athletes, spectators, and commercial investors. The U.S. Embassy in Rome initially paid for lodging and other administrative support needs, which were reimbursed by the participating agencies, although it struggled to do so. State and DOJ officials indicated that an interagency mechanism for identifying costs and addressing potential funding issues would be useful in providing U.S. security support to future Games. For the Turin Games, agencies applied key lessons learned from the 2004 Athens Games and identified additional lessons for future Games. Key lessons identified from the Turin Games included, the importance of establishing an operations center at the location of the Games, establishing clear roles and responsibilities for agencies in event planning and crisis response efforts, and planning early for several years of Olympic-related expenditures. These lessons learned were communicated by Washington, D.C.- and Italy-based personnel to their counterparts who are preparing for the 2008 Summer Olympics in Beijing. The United States is currently taking steps to identify the types of security support that agencies may provide to support China's security efforts for the 2008 Summer Games and to ensure the safety of U.S. athletes, spectators, and commercial investors.