{"article": "On March 8th, 2014, several citizens of Montgomery, Alabama, who had been imprisoned for failing to pay traffic fines, filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Alabama, under 42 U.S.C. \u00a71983, against the City of Montgomery, Alabama. The plaintiffs, represented by Equal Justice Under Law and private counsel, asked the court for a declaratory judgment that the plaintiffs' rights were violated, compensation for the damages caused by the city's conduct, and attorneys' fees. The plaintiffs alleged they did not have the ability to pay for the traffic tickets and that the City should not have imprisoned them for failing to pay the traffic tickets when they did not attempt to determine whether the plaintiffs had an ability to pay. On May 1, 2014, the district court (Judge Mark E. Fuller) granted a motion for a preliminary injunction. The injunction enjoined the city from attempting to collect monies owed to the city associated with traffic tickets by the plaintiffs. The city was also required to submit a comprehensive plan on how they will determine an individual's ability to pay for traffic fines. On August 20, 2014, the case was reassigned to Judge Myron H. Thompson, and on August 21, 2014, Judge Thompson extended the injunction until the court ordered a change. On October 31, 2014, the parties jointly moved to dismiss the case because they entered into a settlement agreement about the claims for declaratory and injunctive relief. The court granted this dismissal on November 17, 2014, and the court agreed to the plaintiffs\u2019 request to maintain jurisdiction over the settlement in case of any breaches by the defendant. Within the settlement, the Municipal Court of the City of Montgomery agreed to numerous changes in its operations, including using a microphone in its courtroom proceedings, notifying this plaintiff's counsel within 12 hours of a defendant being jailed for nonpayment of a fine, and training public defenders and prosecutors on compliance with Bearden v. Georgia and Turner v. Rodgers. The terms of the settlement agreement lasted up to three years. On December 12, 2014, Judge Thompson formally closed the case, though the court retained jurisdiction over the settlement and allowed the parties to resolve the issue of attorneys' fees, which was subsequently resolved on January 16, 2015. On April 2, 2015, the plaintiffs filed a notice with the court that the defendants willfully violated the settlement agreement. The matter seemed to be resolved quickly because on April 7, 2015, Judge Thompson ordered that no further action would be taken on the notice because defendants had taken corrective action. The case is now closed.", "summary": "The plaintiffs filed a lawsuit on March 8, 2014, alleging that the City of Montgomery, Alabama, improperly imprisoned them for failing to pay traffic fines. They alleged that they did not have an ability to pay the fines due to their financial circumstances and that the city did not consider their ability to pay. On May 1, 2014, the District Court granted the plaintiffs motion for a preliminary injunction, preventing the city from collecting more money from traffic tickets of plaintiffs'. On October 31, 2014 the parties filed to dismiss the case pursuant to a settlement agreement, which included numerous changes to Municipal Court proceedings. The case is now closed."} {"article": "On August 28, 2013, an indigent detainee in the Montgomery Municipal Jail filed this lawsuit in the Circuit Court of Montgomery County, Alabama. The plaintiff sued the City of Montgomery and the Honorable Milton J. Westry under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983. The petitioner, represented by the Southern Poverty Law Center, requested the court quash the Municipal Court order requiring the petitioner to serve an imprisonment term of 54 days. Petitioner claimed that the Municipal Court order violated Sixth Amendment, due process, and equal protection clause. The plaintiff was an indigent woman who accumulated $2,714.00 in fines and fees on traffic tickets that she received in 2008 and 2009. On August 20, 2013, the plaintiff was arrested and brought to the Montgomery Municipal Jail. The next day, the plaintiff appeared before Defendant Judge Westry, who told the plaintiff that she must pay $1,554.00 immediately or serve 31 days in jail. When the plaintiff informed Judge Westry that she would not be able to pay after only recently securing a part-time job, Judge Westry ordered the that her outstanding fines be converted into a term of imprisonment in the Montgomery Municipal Jail. Petitioner was not appointed a lawyer during the previously described court proceeding. After filing an emergency petition for writ of certiorari, the case was removed from state court to the United States District Court for the Middle District of Alabama on October 4, 2013. On the same day, the petitioner filed an amended complaint, seeking declaratory relief. Another indigent detainee filed a similar suit after he was taken into custody to serve a 54 day sentence for his inability to pay his traffic fees. Cleveland v. City of Montgomery, 2014 WL 6461900, at *1 (M.D. Ala. Nov 17, 2014). On October 28, 2013, the petitioner filed a motion to consolidate both cases. On November 12, 2013, petitioners amended their complaint and additionally sought injunctive relief. Judge Mark E. Fuller granted the motion to consolidate both cases on November 14, 2013. Discovery began on December 23, 2013. During discovery, a similar case raising comparable claims, Mitchell v. City of Montgomery, was filed. 2014 WL 6461900, at *1 (M.D. Ala. Nov 17, 2014). The court in Mitchell v. City of Montgomery entered a preliminary injunction that ordered the City of Montgomery to submit a comprehensive set of judicial procedures to implement for the collection of future fines. On May 14, 2014, petitioners motioned to have limited participation in the Mitchell v. City of Montgomery hearing regarding the proposed judicial procedures. 2014 WL 6461900, at *2 (M.D. Ala. Nov 17, 2014). On May 27, 2014, Judge Fuller granted the petitioners\u2019 motion in part and denied it in part. Judge Fuller determined that the petitioners were only permitted to participate in the Mitchell hearings orally and through ancillary briefings to provide perspective on the legal sufficiency of the City\u2019s proposed plan. Cleveland v. City of Montgomery, 300 F.R.D. 578, 581 (M.D. Ala. May 27, 2014). Following the petitioners' participation, all parties decided to engage in private mediation to create judicial procedures that would satisfy federal and state-law requirements. 2014 WL 6461900, at *2 (M.D. Ala. Nov 17, 2014). On August 28, 2014, both parties submitted a joint motion to approve the proposed settlement agreement. In the initial agreement, both parties submitted an agreement to pay the plaintiffs\u2019 attorneys fees and provide a list of basic premises and procedures that the Montgomery Municipal Court would abide by with regards to indigent defendants unable to pay any court-ordered monies, including fines, court costs, or restitution. The parties filed an amended joint motion for entry of agreed settlement order on September 12, 2014. The amended motion included a joint brief in support and requested that the court issue three declarations:
(1) Under the current status of the law, the constitutional principles set out in Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 103 S.Ct. 2064, 76 L.Ed.2d 221 (1983), regarding incarceration for non-payment, and Turner v. Rogers, 131 S.Ct. 2507, 180 L.Ed.2d 452 (2011), regarding notice, apply in municipal-court proceedings, and that, to the extent applicable in a particular case, the judges of the Montgomery Municipal Court are legally required to follow them. (2) that the proposed judicial procedures facially comply with the constitutional principles set out in Bearden, regarding incarceration for non-payment, and Turner, regarding notice. In Bearden, the Supreme Court held that, under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause and Equal Protection Clause, a trial court cannot \u201cautomatically revok[e] probation because [a] petitioner could not pay his fine, without determining that petitioner had not made sufficient bona fide efforts to pay or that adequate alternative forms of punishment did not exist.\u201d 461 U.S. at 662. (3) the proposed judicial procedures facially comply with the requirements of the Fourteenth and Sixth Amendments to the United States Constitution, \u00a7\u00a7 13, 64, and 225 of the Alabama Constitution, and Rule 26.11 of the Alabama Rules of Criminal Procedure.2014 WL 6461900, at *3-5 (M.D. Ala. Nov 17, 2014). Judge Myron H. Thompson submitted an opinion granting the parties\u2019 joint motion for entry of agreed settlement order and subsequent final judgment on the docket on November 17, 2014. The case is closed.", "summary": "In 2013, indigent detainee filed a complaint against the City of Montgomery and a Municipal Court Judge for unconstitutionally ordering the petitioner to serve time for her inability to pay court-order fines and fees for their traffic violations. The complaint was originally filed in the Circuit Court of Montgomery County, Alabama and then transferred to the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Alabama, where it was consolidated with a similar case. In the amended complaint, petitioners alleged that the imprisonment orders violated their Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment Rights. Petitioners sought remedy through injunctive and declaratory relief. In 2014, the parties reached a settlement that provided new judicial procedures for the Municipal Court to follow regarding indigent defendants and nonpayment. It also included three declarations, most importantly, it declared that the constitutional principles set out in Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660 (1983), and Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507 (2011) applied to municipal court proceedings, and awarded plaintiff's attorney fees. The case closed in November 2014."} {"article": "On May 1, 2006, an inmate awaiting execution at the Supermax Unit of the Arkansas Department of Correction filed this action under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas. Represented by the Federal Public Defender, the inmate claimed that the procedures used to carry out lethal injections in Arkansas\u2014specifically the use of potassium chloride in the lethal cocktail of drugs\u2014risked unnecessary conscious suffering in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The plaintiff sought injunctive and declaratory relief against the execution practices employed by the Arkansas Department of Corrections (ADC). He did not challenge his sentence or challenge the use of lethal injection. On May 4, 2006, a second death row inmate in Arkansas moved to intervene. A few days later, his execution was scheduled for July 5 of that year. On May 26, the district court (Judge Susan Webber Wright) allowed him to intervene as a plaintiff. On June 16, following his addition to the case, the second plaintiff filed a motion for a preliminary injunction to prevent the defendants from carrying out executions in accordance with the lethal injection protocol. At the hearing on the motion, a medical expert testified that the state's lethal injection procedure created medically unacceptable risks of inflicting pain and suffering. Judge Wright granted the motion on June 26, noting that the plaintiff had not delayed in filing to intervene because he had had to wait to exhaust all of his appeals. The order granting the preliminary injunction stayed the State of Arkansas from implementing the order for execution of the second plaintiff. And four days later, the defendants appealed. In the midst of ruling on the preliminary injunction appeal, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss the original complaint, arguing that the plaintiff could not state a claim. First, they argued that the plaintiff had not exhausted all of the remedies available to him under the Department of Correction\u2019s grievance policy. Second, the claim fell outside the statute of limitations for \u00a7 1983 actions. Judge Wright disagreed and denied the motion to dismiss on June 19, 2006. On November 22, 2006, a third death row inmate sought to intervene. On December 1, 2006, Judge Wright granted the motion. On July 7, 2007 the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed the preliminary injunction granted by the district court and vacated the stay of execution issued to the second plaintiff. The Court of Appeals found that the district court abused its discretion in granting the stay of execution and the preliminary injunction. Because the inmate could have brought his \u00a7 1983 claim before it was necessary to grant a stay, the district court exceeded the scope of its power to grant the preliminary injunction. 491 F.3d 804. On July 17, 2007 the defendants filed for summary judgment. They argued that Arkansas's lethal injection protocol was substantially identical to the protocol used by the state of Missouri, which was upheld against constitutional challenge by the Eighth Circuit in Taylor v. Crawford, 487 F.3d 1072 (8th Cir. 2007). In their reply to the defendants' motion for summary judgment, the plaintiffs argued that they had not been provided with the opportunity to engage in discovery, and that a significant number of genuine issues of material fact remained even without discovery. On August 5, 2008 the district court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment and dissolved the stay of execution. The district court relied on the Eighth Circuit's approval of Missouri's lethal injection protocol, which the court found was sufficiently similar to Arkansas' protocol. The district court found that the plaintiffs had failed to come forward with evidence that Arkansas' protocol for execution by lethal injection \"subject[ed] them to constitutionally significant risk of pain.\" On August 29, 2008, the plaintiffs filed an appeal. On February 8, 2010 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's summary judgment for the defendants. The Court found that Arkansas' protocol was substantially similar to Missouri's protocol upheld by the Court of Appeals and to Kentucky's protocol upheld by the Supreme Court. On November 10, 2010, the United States Supreme Court denied the plaintiffs' petition for a writ of certiorari. At the time of this writing, the original plaintiff had not been executed. The second plaintiff was granted a stay in 2017. The third plaintiff was executed on April 24, 2017. The case is now closed.", "summary": "A prisoner facing the death penalty in Arkansas sued over the form of lethal injection used by the state. The case was dismissed because of a lack of evidence that Arkansas's use of lethal injections subjected prisoners to a significant risk of pain. The case is closed, and one of the three plaintiffs was executed in 2017."} {"article": "On August 23, 2018, three Maricopa County, Arizona residents who were referred to Maricopa County's Marijuana Diversion program filed this class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona. The plaintiffs sued Maricopa County and Treatment Assessment Screening Center, Incorporated, a private company, under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983. The plaintiffs, represented by the Civil Rights Corps and private counsel, sought injunctive and monetary relief, claiming violations of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. The plaintiffs alleged that the Maricopa County Attorney's Office and Treatment Assessment Screening Center jointly operated a marijuana possession diversion program that discriminated against the poor in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, and led to unreasonable searches and seizures in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. Specifically, the defendants were, under threat of felony prosecution, subject to longer terms of imprisonment, repeated drug tests and increased fee payments due to their inability to pay fees associated with the program. One class member individually sought injunctive relief to prevent Maricopa County from keeping her in the diversion program if she could not pay the fees associated with completing the program. The case was assigned to Judge James A. Teilborg but immediately reassigned to Judge Steven P. Logan. On October 12, 2018, the case was reassigned to Judge James A. Soto. That same day, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint on October 12, 2018, adding a third representative to the class. In January 2019, the parties agreed to Magistrate Judge Jurisdiction and the case was assigned to Magistrate Judge Eric J. Markovich. After the submission of the amended complaint, several defendants filed motions to dismiss the case with regards to the allegations leveled against them specifically. Magistrate Judge Eric J. Markovich denied all these motions in a June 18, 2019 order (2019 WL 2515950). He stated that the plaintiffs sufficiently pleaded the elements of a 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 claim and that, because the violations of rights were ongoing, there is no statute of limitations concerns. As for the Treatment Assessment Screening Center, he stated that the group was not subject to qualified immunity because it was being sued as an organization, not in individual capacity. He also wrote that the County Attorney was eligible for suit because he oversaw what the plaintiffs allege is a discriminatory practice. He added that as a municipality, the County Attorney was not subject to sovereign immunity. On September 23, 2019, the plaintiffs submitted a second amended complaint adding another representative to the class. Discovery is ongoing in the case.", "summary": "On August 23, 2018, three Maricopa County, Arizona residents who have been referred to Maricopa County's Marijuana Diversion program filed this class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona, Phoenix Division. The plaintiffs sought injunctive and monetary relief, claiming that the Maricopa County Attorney's Office and Treatment Assessment Screening Center jointly operated a marijuana possession diversion program that discriminated against the poor in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, and led to unreasonable search and seizure in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. The plaintiffs amended their complaint twice to include new named plaintiffs for the class. The District Court denied the defendant's motions to dismiss the complaint, and discovery is ongoing both for class certification and the underlying claims."} {"article": "On March 8, 2006, the Pacific News Service filed a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 against the California Department of Corrections in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California. The plaintiffs asked the court for declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging that the defendants had violated the constitutional rights of the press and the public to attend, meaningfully observe, and gather and report on important information at executions being carried out by the defendants at the California State Prison at San Quentin. Specifically, the plaintiffs argued that the defendants' use of pancuronium bromide, a paralytic agent, acted as a chemical curtain over the lethal injection process. The plaintiffs alleged that this chemical made it impossible for witnesses to determine whether the executed inmates were being subjected to substantial and unnecessary pain before dying. As a result, the plaintiffs claimed that the witnesses were denied the information necessary for the public to decide whether and how executions should be conducted. On the same day the plaintiffs filed the lawsuit, they asked the court to consolidate their case with Morales v. Woodford (CJ-CA-0004 in this Clearinghouse). On March 28, 2006, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California (Judge Jeremy Fogel) denied without prejudice the request to consolidate the cases. On October 10, 2010, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim in response to the plaintiffs' second amended complaint. The defendants argued that the plaintiffs did not have a First Amendment right to dictate the method that the state uses to perform a lethal injection execution. Furthermore, the defendants argued that there were legitimate and constitutional reasons for using pancuronium bromide. On November 3, 2011, the court entered a scheduling order that included a discovery cut-off date, but the plaintiffs moved to vacate the order and to direct the parties to submit a new proposed schedule \"when viable lethal injection regulations are in place.\" On April 5, 2012 court denied the motion to vacate the scheduling order, reasoning that the ongoing state case, Sims v. California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR), could affect this case when concluded and therefore the motion was premature. In Sims v. CDCR, the Marin County Superior Court had issued a judgment on February 21, 2012 and held that CDCR failed to comply with the Administrative Procedure Act. The state court had issued an injunction prohibiting CDCR from executing anyone until new lethal injection regulations complied with the APA. In July 2012, the parties stipulated that the court should vacate the current scheduling order. On August 10, 2012, the Court vacated the order and stipulated that the parties should submit a new proposed schedule once (1) viable lethal injection regulations were in place; or (2) the Marin County Superior Court's decision invalidating the regulations was overturned on appellate review, whichever occurred first. On May 30, 2013, the appellate court affirmed the trial court\u2019s judgment in the Sims case and held that CDCR\u2019s lethal injection regulations were invalid for failure to comply with the APA. The court permanently enjoined CDCR from carrying out the execution of any condemned inmate by lethal injection until their new regulations complied with the APA. The plaintiff dismissed the case voluntarily on December 7, 2017 because Pacific News Service was going out of business. The case is now closed.", "summary": "On March 8, 2006, the Pacific News Service filed a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 against the California Department of Corrections in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California. The plaintiffs asked the court for declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging that the defendants had violated the constitutional rights of the press and the public to attend, meaningfully observe, and gather and report on important information at executions being carried out by the defendants at the California State Prison at San Quentin. On May 30, 2013, the issue in this case became moot due to a state court decision. In Sims v. California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR), the California Court of Appeals held that CDCR\u2019s lethal injection regulations were invalid for failure to comply with the APA. The court permanently enjoined CDCR from carrying out the execution of any condemned inmate by lethal injection until their new regulations complied with the Administrative Procedure Act. This case closed after a voluntary dismissal filed by the plaintiff organization."} {"article": "On April 20, 2012, a state prisoner filed this class-action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of California. The plaintiff sued the California Department of Corrections under \u00a71983 and California state administrative law. Represented by UnCommon Law, he asked the Court for declaratory and injunctive relief. Specifically, the plaintiff claimed that officials of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, and its Board of Parole Hearings, acted unfairly by refusing to authentically consider the appropriateness of parole for prisoners sentenced to life imprisonment. On October 18, 2012, Magistrate Judge Gregory G. Hollows granted the defendant's motion to dismiss, but allowed the plaintiff to file an amended complaint within 28 days. 2012 WL 5187779. On November 15, 2012, the plaintiff filed an amended complaint, alleging with more detail that officials of the State of California--including the Governor, the Secretary of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR), and various officials of the Board of Parole Hearings (BPH)--implemented a system to fabricate evidence to support their decisions to deny parole, particularly for inmates serving a life sentence (\"Lifers\"), and that this discriminatory scheme was used to protect their decisions from judicial scrutiny so that they could maintain the low rate of granting parole to Lifers. On March 31, 2014, U.S. District Judge Kimberly J. Mueller granted the plaintiff's motion for class certification of a class consisting \"of California state prisoners who are serving life sentences and are eligible.\" Judge Mueller also granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment as to the plaintiffs' equal protection and state law claims, but denied the defendants' summary judgment motion as to the plaintiffs' due process claims. 2014 WL 1309289. The defendants appealed this decision but their petition for permission to appeal was denied on June 12, 2014. On September 26, 2014, the defendants filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings, which Magistrate Judge Claire recommended be denied in part and granted in part. Though the defendants objected to the magistrate's findings and recommendations, they were adopted by the District Court in a May 14, 2015 order. 2015 WL 2358583. As a result, the defendants got judgment on counts four (alleging \"that their Due Process rights ha[d] been violated by the denial of 'notice of the evidence being used to consider their suitability for parole.'\"), five (alleging \"that the refusal to provide access to the data underlying the FAD reports also deprive[d] them of their Due Process right to be heard at their parole hearings\"), nine (alleging \"that they ha[d] a 'limited' Due Process right to 'confront and cross examine [the] putative experts' whose FAD reports [were] used to deny plaintiffs parole\"), and twelve (alleging \"that they ha[d] a Due Process right to call witnesses, including adverse witnesses, at their parole hearings\") of the plaintiff's complaint. The Court allowed the plaintiffs to, within 30 days, file an amended complaint as to the remaining counts. The plaintiff decided against amending a complaint. In a joint status report filed on July 17, 2015, the parties indicated that they had entered into negotiations and were working toward a settlement. On October 2, 2015, the parties entered into a finalized stipulation and settlement agreement, which required reforms in the psychological risk assessment process used by the parole board, including an opportunity for Lifers to challenge factual errors in risk assessments through counsel. The defendants also agreed to consult experts on the use of risk assessments in the correctional setting and make information presented by the Board of Parole Hearing's Psychologist available to the plaintiffs and be posted online. Furthermore, the Court was to retain jurisdiction over this case until January 1, 2017. If within 30 days after January 1, 2017, the plaintiffs believed that the defendants had not abided by the terms of the settlement, the plaintiffs could seek an extension of the Court's jurisdiction over this matter for no more than 12 months. Pursuant to the Settlement Agreement, once the Agreement was approved, the plaintiff voluntarily dismissed all but one of the defendants--the Executive Officer of the Board of Parole Hearings. The plaintiffs' motion to do so was granted in an order by Magistrate Judge Claire on June 24, 2016. The issue of attorneys fees was raised in a separate motion on October 16, 2015, which was referred to Magistrate Judge Claire. On November 10, 2015, she granted the plaintiff's motion for attorneys fees, and the defendants had 30 days to pay $119,796.05 to the plaintiff. The defendants challenged this order, filing a motion for Reconsideration of Timing of Fee and Cost Payment. On December 1, 2015, Magistrate Judge Claire granted the defendant's request for reconsideration and edited the last sentence of the court's order to read: \"Defendants shall remit payment to Plaintiffs' counsel in the amount of $119,796.05, within thirty (30) days after the Court grants final approval of the parties Amended Stipulated Settlement, subject to interest thereafter as provided in 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 1961.\" On October 6, 2017, the court extended its jurisdiction for another year, finding that the defendants had not complied fully with the Settlement. Specifically, the court limited the extension of its jurisdiction to the following issues: (1) revision of timelines for CRAs, objections, and responses; (2) revision of provision allowing CRA reports that contain factual errors to remain in an inmate's file; (3) defendant compliance with provision that \"[a]ll future CRAs will clarify that the Overall Risk Rating is relative to other life prisoners; and (4) defendant compliance with provision that \"CRAs will inform the reader of the report that, generally speaking, the current recidivism rates for long term offenders are lower than those of other prisoners released from shorter sentences.\" On February 4, 2019, District Judge Kimberly J. Mueller issued an order stating that, because one year had passed since the October 6, 2017, the case was to be closed.", "summary": "This civil rights class action was filed in 2012 in the Eastern District of California; it alleged due process violations when the state arbitrarily denied parole to nearly all lifers who had served their minimum sentence. On October 2, 2015, the parties entered into an agreement by which the defendants agreed to make changes to the psychological risk assessment processes used by the parole board. The Court approved the settlement in May 2016, and retained jurisdiction over the case until January 1, 2017, with the plaintiffs' able to get an extension of the Court's jurisdiction if the defendants fail to abide by the agreed upon terms. In February of 2019, the court issued an order stating that the defendants had complied with the order. The case is now closed."} {"article": "On June 9, 2018, the plaintiff in this case was arrested in Denver, Colorado; he was then unable to make his $10 bond, because the government imposed numerous additional fees. He brought this law suit against the City and County of Denver on October 10, 2018 in the United States District Court for the District of Colorado. He proceeded under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 for allegedly violating his 14th Amendment right to due process and equal protection. Specifically, he complained about a Colorado requirement that individuals arrested pay at minimum a $50 before release. The plaintiff claimed Denver had detained him solely because of his inability to make monetary payment, wrongfully depriving him of his liberty. He was represented by the ACLU and sought compensation and policy reform. The case was initially assigned to Magistrate Judge N. Reid Neureiter, and later reassigned to Judge Wiley Y. Daniel and again reassigned to Christine M. Arguello on December 6, 2018. The plaintiff entered jail with $64.24, sufficient to pay for his $10 cash bond and even an additional $50 bond fee. However, Denver took an additional $30 for booking fees, which the plaintiff could not afford to pay. The charges against the plaintiff were later dismissed. Shortly after the lawsuit was filed, Denver stopped collecting the $30 booking fee, the $50 bond fee, and the pretrial electronic monitoring fees. On December 13, Denver submitted an Offer of Judgment in favor of the plaintiff and agreed to pay $30,000 to cover attorney\u2019s fees and costs. On December 21, the plaintiff accepted the offer, and then on January 30, 2019, voluntarily dismissed the case. The case is now closed.", "summary": "In October 2018, a plaintiff sued Denver over its bond fee requirement. Within a few months, the defendants changed their policy and submitted an Offer of Judgment. The case is now closed."} {"article": "On May 1, 2012, a D.C. resident whose car was seized by Metropolitan Police Department officers filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. The plaintiff sued the District of Columbia under Bivens, claiming that their actions were a violation of the Fifth Amendment due process clause. The plaintiff, represented by the D.C. Public Defender Service, asked the court for declaratory and injunctive relief. The plaintiff claimed that the D.C. policy of seizing and retaining private vehicles pending civil forfeiture proceedings without providing vehicle owners with a post-deprivation hearing before a neutral arbiter was unconstitutional. The plaintiff was charged with several crimes relating to alleged possession of a firearm and was acquitted of all charges by jury trial. When seeking the return of his car, the police officers required him to pay a bond of over $1200 in order to challenge their possession of the vehicle. After reducing the bond to $800, the plaintiff began civil forfeiture proceedings but was not allowed to use the car in the interim. On July 6, 2012, Judge Emmet G. Sullivan granted the plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction. The court found that the District's failure to provide a post-seizure hearing to plaintiff violated his due process rights and ordered District to release the vehicle pending the forfeiture hearing, ordered the plaintiff to keep his vehicle and maintain insurance during the hearing, and gave the plaintiff a security deposit pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(c) for $1000. On October 19, 2012, the parties agreed to a private settlement that is not publicly available.", "summary": "In 2012, U.S. District Court of D.C. found that the policy of seizing and retaining private vehicles pending civil forfeiture proceedings without providing a post-deprivation hearing was unconstitutional."} {"article": "The city of Doraville relied on its municipal court as a source of revenue. The city received millions of dollars of its budget from court fines and forfeitures. As Doraville\u2019s City Council heavily relied on these revenues to balance the city\u2019s budget, its municipal court personnel, who serve at the pleasure of the City Council, had a financial incentive to convict defendants. In addition, the city\u2019s law enforcement personnel, who also ultimately serve at the pleasure of its City Council, had an incentive to ticket and prosecute to raise revenue. On May 23, 2018, four individuals who had been ticketed or threatened to be ticketed by the City of Doraville filed this lawsuit in U.S. District Court Northern District of Georgia. The case was assigned to Judge Richard W. Story. Represented by Strickland Brockington Lewis, LLP, and the Institute for Justice, the plaintiffs sued the City of Doraville under 42 U.S.C. \u00a71983 and the Declaratory Judgments Act. The plaintiffs alleged that the City\u2019s policy and practice of using its law enforcement and municipal court system for revenue generation violated the plaintiffs' due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. Specifically, the complaint claimed that the \u201cfinancial incentive to ticket and prosecute injects an unconstitutional financial bias or an appearance of such bias into law enforcement and prosecutorial discretion.\u201d The plaintiffs sought declarative and injunctive relief from Doraville\u2019s policy and practice of budgeting to receive revenues from fines and fees. The defendant sought to dismiss the complaint on July 2, 2018, claiming that the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction and the complaint failed to state a claim as a matter of law. On April 1, 2019, the court (Judge Richard Story) denied in part the motion to dismiss. The court found that the plaintiffs successfully alleged standing, as the complaint is replete with allegations showing that plaintiffs were personally harmed, and are likely to be harmed in the future, from the city\u2019s allegedly unlawful actions. Regarding the complaint\u2019s failure to state a claim as a matter of law, the court found itself \u201cunable to adequately assess whether Plaintiffs\u2019 claims are legally cognizable...as a result of the paucity of relevant case law.\u201d As such, the court ordered a hearing to address the proper standard of review and its application in this case. 2019 WL 3557893. This hearing was held on June 4, 2019. After reconsidering the motion to dismiss, the court denied the motion on July 9, 2019. Stating that \u201cto state a plausible due process claim for institutional bias, Plaintiffs must allege sufficient facts to establish two things: (1) that there is a conflict of interest and (2) that the conflict of interest is substantial\u201d, the court found that the plaintiffs established both. 391 F.Supp.3d 1207. As of June 2020, this case is ongoing.", "summary": "On May 23, 2018, four individuals who had been ticketed or threatened to be ticketed by the City of Doraville filed this lawsuit in U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia. The case was assigned to Judge Richard W. Story. Represented by Strickland Brockington Lewis, LLP, and the Institute for Justice, the plaintiffs sued the City of Doraville under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 and the Declaratory Judgments Act. The plaintiffs alleged that the city\u2019s policy and practice of using its law enforcement and municipal court system for revenue generation violated the plaintiffs' due process rights. The plaintiffs sought declarative and injunctive relief from Doraville\u2019s policy and practice of budgeting to receive revenues from fines and fees. The defendant sought to dismiss the case on July 2, 2018; the court denied the motion to dismiss on July 9, 2019. This case is ongoing."} {"article": "On May 22, 2012, several national and local news agencies filed a \u00a7 1983 lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Idaho, Southern Division, against the state of Idaho. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, asked the court for declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging a violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that the policy of the Idaho Department of Correction to prohibit public viewing of the preparatory phase of the execution process, during which the inmate is restrained and the IV is inserted, violates the First Amendment right to free speech and the Fourteenth Amendment right to due process. Along with their complaint, plaintiffs filed an expedited motion for a preliminary injunction, seeking to have the procedures in question enjoined before the execution of Richard Leavitt on June 12. The District Court (Judge Edward J. Lodge) granted the motion to expedite on May 24, but on June 5 the court denied plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction. Judge Lodge found that while the plaintiffs have a strong case on the merits and the public has an interest in viewing an execution in its entirety, the motion was not filed in a timely manner, and to allow it would disrupt a scheduled execution that the public has an even greater interest in seeing carried out. Plaintiffs immediately filed an interlocutory appeal to the Ninth Circuit. On June 8, 2012, the Ninth Circuit reversed the District Court. A three-judge panel (Chief Judge Alex Kozinski, Judge Stephen R. Reinhardt, and Judge Marsha S. Berzon) stated in an opinion by Judge Reinhardt that its ruling in California First Amendment Coalition v. Woodford, 299 F.3d 868 (9th Cir. 2002), had clearly indicated that Idaho's policy was unconstitutional for the reasons noted by the plaintiffs, that Idaho had had a decade to correct this policy, and thus that any problems of timing were the fault of the state and not of the plaintiffs. It further found that the District Court had abused its discretion in balancing the four elements the plaintiff must prove for a preliminary injunction. Accordingly, the appeals panel reversed the District Court and remanded for entry of an injunction prior to the execution of Richard Leavitt. The District Court (Judge Lodge) entered an injunction on June 11 and directed the parties to submit a joint litigation plan by June 22. On July 10, 2012, Judge Lodge entered a permanent injunction ordering the Idaho Department of Corrections, and responsible parties associated therewith, to modify their procedures to allow the witnesses to the execution of a condemned inmate to observe the entire execution from the moment the inmate enters the execution chamber through, to and including, the time the inmate is declared dead. The case is now closed.", "summary": "On May 22, 2012, several national and local news agencies filed a \u00a7 1983 lawsuit against the state of Idaho, alleging that the policy of the Idaho Department of Correction to prohibit public viewing of the preparatory phase of the execution process, during which the inmate is restrained and the IV is inserted, violates the First Amendment right to free speech and the Fourteenth Amendment right to due process. The District Court denied plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction on June 5, 2012, but the Ninth Circuit reversed the denial, on June 8, in time for the injunction to apply to the scheduled execution of Richard Leavitt. On July 10, the District Court entered a permanent injunction ordering the Idaho Department of Corrections to modify their execution procedures to allow witnesses to the execution throughout the entire execution process."} {"article": "On December 12, 2016, seven prisoners in the custody of the Illinois Department of Corrections (IDOC) filed this class-action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. The plaintiffs sued the State of Illinois and its attorney general under 42 U.S.C. \u00a71983. Represented by private counsel, they sought declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging that Illinois, by its policies regarding individuals convicted of sex-related offenses, had violated their rights under the Eight and Fourteenth Amendments. The case was assigned to Judge Virginia M. Kendall. Individuals convicted of certain sex-related offenses under Illinois law are subject to overlapping statutory and regulatory schemes that make it difficult for prisoners to satisfy conditions required for their release from prison. The Illinois Unified Code of Corrections provides that for all felony convictions, the sentencing court must provide within the sentencing order a term of parole or mandatory supervised release (MSR). Individuals convicted after July 1, 2005 of predatory criminal sexual assault of a child, aggravated sexual criminal assault, or criminal sexual assault, and individuals convicted after January 1, 2009 of aggravated child pornography or manufacturing or dissemination of child pornography were subject to a mandatory indeterminate term of MSR. The indeterminate duration of MSR could range from three years to life: an individual could only apply for termination of his indeterminate MSR sentence after completing three years of MSR outside of prison. A prisoner could not receive credit for MSR time served while in custody. The Prison Review Board (PRB) required that before inmates could be released from IDOC custody, they had to have an approved \u201chost site\u201d to reside at while serving their MSR term. IDOC only approved host sites that met all housing restrictions imposed by statute, by IDOC, and by the Prison Review Board. Illinois did not provide housing resources for inmates, and halfway homes and homeless shelters automatically rejected individuals with sex-related convictions. Each plaintiff had either submitted multiple host sites and been denied by the IDOC, or was indigent and had no housing options to select for their host site. The plaintiffs alleged that the multiple restrictions created an unmeetable condition that forced them to spend the duration of their MSR term incarcerated. For the plaintiffs that were given an indeterminate MSR sentence, the unmeetable conditions resulted in life imprisonment. On February 17, 2017, IDOC moved to dismiss the complaint on three grounds:
Children under the age of 18 who are in the custody of the New York City Administration for Children's Services (\"ACS\") and who are currently admitted or will be brought to and admitted to acute psychiatric hospitals and who, once admitted and deemed ready for discharge, are not moved by ACS and/or one of its contract agencies to the least restrictive setting appropriate to their needs.In November 2010, the parties submitted a settlement agreement to the court for preliminary approval. District Judge Brian M. Cogan held a fairness hearing on March 11, 2011, and gave final approval to the terms of the Stipulation and Order of Settlement filed on February 28, 2010. In the settlement, ACS agreed to promulgate new policies and procedures with respect to the placement of children in foster care in institutions. ACS will improve tracking, monitoring, and individualized planning so that children are not ignored and left to languish in institutions. They also agreed to develop new training programs for ACS staff and contractors. The agreement also provides for ongoing monitoring. A separate agreement, entered on June 29, 2011, provided specific relief (including damages and attorneys' fees) to the three named plaintiffs. On July 7, 2011, Judge Cogan entered a settlement order, in which the parties agreed to dismiss all claims and release defendants from liability in exchange for payment. The case was then dismissed with prejudice. On January 22, 2016, the parties filed a joint motion to alter the judgment. Judge Cogan signed the Stipulation and Order of Settlement the same day. The amended agreement extended the jurisdiction of the Court over the matter for an additional four months, until June 30, 2016, with the potential for extension of such jurisdiction for six months from the time the Court's jurisdiction was scheduled to terminate. The docket does not reflect any extension of the Court's jurisdiction, so it presumably expired on June 30, 2016.", "summary": "This was a class action challenge to New York's unnecessary institutionalization of children in foster care in psychiatric facilities. The initial settlement agreement, entered on February 28, 2011, provided for increased community-based placement opportunities for children in foster care with mental illness as well as individualized planning, staff training, and monitoring. In addition to the initial settlement agreement, on July 7, 2011, the plaintiffs agreed to release defendants from all liability in exchange for payment from defendants. On January 22, 2016, the parties agreed to extend the Court's jurisdiction until June 30, 2016, at which time its jurisdiction presumably expired."} {"article": "On May 30, 2013, an eleven-year-old child in the custody of the South Carolina Department of Social Services (SCDSS), filed a lawsuit in the Court of Common Pleas, Abbeville County, South Carolina under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 and state law against SCDSS, the Boys Home of the South (BHOTS), and individuals employed by both organizations. Plaintiff, represented by Children's Rights, Inc. and private counsel, asked the court for damages, punitive damages, and attorneys' fees. Plaintiff claimed that Defendants' policies and customs failed to comply with federal and state law, which violated Plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment rights, and that their gross negligence caused him permanent mental harm and injury. Specifically, Plaintiff claimed that while he was placed at BHOTS--a \"low management\" group home licensed by SCDSS that did not require awake staff at all times--he was repeatedly attacked and sexually assaulted by older boys at the home. He claimed that Defendants violated his rights to a safe and secure placement in state custody, his right to adequate supervision, and his right to prompt mental health treatment under both federal and state law. On June 28, 2013, Defendants removed the case to the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina. Over the next few months, the parties engaged in fact and expert discovery. As discovery proceeded, Plaintiff agreed to stipulate to the dismissal of several of the individual Defendants. The remainder of the Defendants, including SCDSS and BHOTS, moved for summary judgment. On February 4, 2014, while the motions for summary judgment were pending, Plaintiff and the BHOTS Defendants reached a settlement for an undisclosed sum of money, including $188,285.27 in costs. The settlement document did disclose, however, that as a result of the litigation, BHOTS was ceasing operations and would be filing for articles of dissolution with the South Carolina Attorney General. The Court (Judge Anderson) later approved the settlement on March 10, 2014. On February 14, 2014, the Court (Judge Anderson), in a brief, two-page order, denied the SCDSS Defendants' motion for summary judgment. The Court simply stated that, \"[b]ased on the filings of both sides, and their arguments during the hearing, this Court finds that genuine issues of material fact exist.\" On March 28, 2014, following mediation and shortly before jury selection was to begin, Plaintiff and the SCDSS Defendants (the remaining Defendants) reached a settlement for an undisclosed sum of money, including $17,186.58 in costs. With the SCDSS settlement, all parties had either settled or been dismissed, and the case concluded.", "summary": "On May 30, 2013, an eleven-year-old child in the custody of the South Carolina Department of Social Services (SCDSS), filed a lawsuit in the Court of Common Pleas, Abbeville County, South Carolina, against SCDSS and the Boys Home of the South (BHOTS), alleging that, as a result of Defendants' failures, Plaintiff was sexually assaulted on multiple occasions, causing him severe and permanent mental injury. Following removal to Federal Court, in early 2014, Plaintiff settled with both SCDSS and BHOTS for an undisclosed sum of money. BHOTS also permanently closed as a result of the lawsuit."} {"article": "On January 12, 2015, eleven named minor children in the legal custody of the South Carolina Department of Social Services (\"SCDSS\") filed this putative class action lawsuit (by their Next Friends) against the Governor of South Carolina and SCDSS in the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina. The named plaintiffs were represented by two advocacy organizations, Children's Rights and Appleseed, and by private counsel. Plaintiffs intended to seek certification of a class of all children who are or will be involuntarily placed in foster care in the legal custody of SCDSS as a result of emergency protective custody and/or a referral, report, suspicion, allegation and/or adjudication of abuse or neglect. Plaintiffs asserted claims under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983, alleging systemic deficiencies in the operation of SCDSS subjected children in the state's care to harm or an unreasonable risk of harm. The alleged problems included: whether SCDSS maintains an adequate number and kind of foster homes, resulting in over-institutionalization of foster children, repeated movement of children between placements, and deprivation of meaningful familial contacts; whether SCDSS has excessive caseworker caseloads, resulting in a workforce that cannot monitor children's safety, maltreatment in SCDSS care, and failure to investigate maltreatment; and whether SCDSS fails to provide initial and periodic medical, dental, and mental health assessments, treatments, and screens, leading to emotional and psychological deterioration of children in SCDSS custody. On March 16, 2015, Defendants moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim. On March 30, 2015, with Defendants' motion pending, the District Court (Judge Richard M. Gergel) entered a text order asking the parties to engage in early mediation. The Court indicated that Senior District Judge Michael Duffy had agreed to mediate, should the parties consent. Later that week, the parties indicated that they were willing to engage in early mediation. On September 28, 2015, the parties entered into an interim settlement agreement. As part of the \"Consent Immediate Interim Relief Order,\" the plaintiff class was certified and \"limited co-monitors\" were appointed. SCDSS also agreed to undertake several remedial steps, including phasing out use of SCDSS offices, hotels and motels as placements and no longer recommending that children remain in juvenile detention because of a lack of foster homes. SCDSS also agreed to undertake a workload study, adopt workload limits, conduct a placement needs assessment, and create a plan to end the placement of children ages six and under in non-family group placements. Judge Gergel approved the parties' final class action settlement agreement on October 4, 2016. The agreement defined the class as \"all children who are involuntarily placed in DSS foster care in the physical or legal custody of DSS either now or in the future.\" Pursuant to the agreement, the court appointed two co-monitors to issue periodic public reports on the parties' compliance with the settlement agreement. SCDSS agreed to (1) complete a foster care workload study and adopt workload limits; (2) ensure that worker-child visitation happens with appropriate frequency; (3) adopt enhanced investigation procedures; (4) adopt procedures to ensure appropriate child placement; (5) provide for family visitation; and (6) develop a health care improvement plan. The settlement agreement was to remain in effect until the Court issued an order dismissing the case. Regarding attorneys' fees, the parties agreed to submit the amount and terms of fees and expenses to final and binding arbitration by the mediator (District Judge P. Michael Duffy). In the September 2018 report, the co-monitors outlined several areas of accomplishment: leadership changes and internal restructuring; development of a five-year budget; building infrastructure to meet children's healthcare needs; conducting a data audit; and development of a training plan and case practice model. The co-monitors also identified several areas in need of focus and improvement. One of these areas was investigative practice within SCDSS\u2019s Out-of-Home Abuse and Neglect (OHAN) unit. The co-monitors noted that a lack of resources meant that staff had excessive case loads and did not have the time, direction, or tools to complete their work. Another area in need of improvement was SCDSS's placement array and processes. While SCDSS made some progress in reducing the number of children placed in congregate care and staying overnight at SCDSS offices, there had been little improvement in the period leading up to the September 2018 report. Finally, the co-monitors noted a need for improvement in the area of workforce recruitment and retention. In response to the September report, the plaintiffs filed a motion to hold the defendants in contempt for non-compliance with the settlement agreement on November 26, 2018. On December 5, 2018, the Court issued an order stating that, starting in January 2019, the Court will hold monthly status conferences to assess SCDSS's implementation of the reforms mandated by the settlement agreement. Prior to the first status conference, SCDSS must submit plans about the three main areas in need of reform: workloads, placement, and healthcare. The order also required that SCDSS appoint staff responsible for those three areas. Finally, the order required that the parties conduct a mediation session prior to the January status conference. The parties participated in mediation, and the monitoring arrangement continued with monthly status conferences. On August 15, 2019, the court issued an order stating that the settlement agreement required the defendants to have reached a set of benchmarks by July 1, 2020, that they had yet to achieve. The order further stated that the expectation remained that they would meet these benchmarks. As of May 22, 2020, the most recent biannual monitors' report was filed on March 2, 2020. The report detailed only moderate success, noting that budget restrictions created significant obstacles to compliance. Monitoring of the settlement is ongoing.", "summary": "On January 12, 2015, a class action lawsuit was filed against the South Carolina Department of Social Services (SCDSS) in the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, alleging numerous deficiencies in the operation of the state's child welfare system. On September 28, 2015, the parties reached an interim settlement agreement, providing for an end to certain SCDSS practices, as well as for studies of additional SCDSS practices. Monitoring revealed incremental improvements in conditions, and the settlement remains in effect."} {"article": "On Aug. 22, 2005, a paraplegic individual who uses a wheelchair sued Chipotle, alleging that two of the defendant's restaurants did not provide full and equal access to customers in wheelchairs. In his complaint, the plaintiff alleged that when he had visited two Chipotle restaurants, one in Encinitas and one in San Diego, 44-inch high walls in front of the food preparation area obstructed his view, and thus he was denied full and equal access as non-disabled people have the opportunity to view foods available for selection and the construction of their food. He also alleged that there were structural barriers at the entrance to the restaurants, dining tables, parking lots, and restrooms, making them inaccessible to those in wheelchairs, in violation of (1) the Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. \u00a712102; (2) the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, \u00a7 504 (as amended 29 U.S.C. \u00a7 794); (3) the California Unruh Civil Rights Act, codified as California Civil Code \u00a7\u00a7 51, 52, and 54.1, 54.3, and 55; and (4) other statutory measures which refer to the protection of the rights of \"physically disabled persons.\" The plaintiff sought an injunction ordering the defendants to provide full and equal access (by removing architectural barriers), statutory damages, compensatory damages, and attorneys' fees and costs. The defendant filed cross-complaints against the owners and operators of the properties on which the restaurants are located. The defendant also completed modifications to the restaurants to address the alleged lack of compliance with the ADA by Oct. 5, 2006. On Jan. 12, 2007, the defendant moved to dismiss the case or in the alternative, to consolidate it with Antoninetti v. Chipotle Mexican Grill, Case No. 3:06-cv-02671, a lawsuit filed on Dec. 6, 2006 by the same plaintiff, involving the same defendant and questions of law, this time as a putative class action. On Mar. 20, 2007, Judge Napoleon A. Jones, Jr. for the U.S. District Court for the District of Southern California, denied the defendants' motion to dismiss the case and granted their motion to consolidate for purposes of discovery only and leaving open the question of consolidation for trial. Meanwhile, on Feb. 23, 2007, the defendant had implemented a written nationwide \"Customers with Disabilities\" policy (\"the Policy\"), and formally began training its employees on the policy between March and May 2007. Among other things, the Policy required managers to greet disabled customers and ask them whether they required accommodations, and instructed managers and crew that efficiency was secondary to ensuring a positive experience for disabled customers. On Apr. 16, 2007, the defendant filed a motion for summary judgment, contending that the plaintiff's claims for injunctive relief under the ADA were moot because the defendant had modified the restaurants to comply with the Americans With Disabilities Act Accessibility Guidelines (\"ADAAG\"), including adoption and implementation of the effective nationwide Policy. On June 14, 2007, the court found that there were genuine issues of material fact as to whether the defendant's food-preparation counters complied with state and federal accessibility laws and thus denied the defendant's motion for summary judgment. The defendant had argued that its Policy that required its staff to offer suitable accommodations for customers with disabilities (including, for example: (1) showing samples of the food to the customers in souffl\u00e9 cups, (2) offering customers an opportunity to see and even sample food at a table in the dining area, (3) describing foods and food preparation processes to customers if they wished, or (4) any combination of above accommodations that was requested or appropriate) provided \"equivalent facilitation\" under Section 7.2(2)(iii) of the ADA. As for parking, the court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment as to the plaintiff's ADA claims, since the defendant cured the defects in both parking lots and only injunctive relief was available under the ADA. On the state law claims, the court denied the defendant's motion for summary judgment and granted the plaintiff's because it was undisputed that parking at both restaurants previously violated the ADAAG and therefore, the Unruh Act and the California Disabled Persons Act (DPA). The court denied the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on his claim that the tables at both restaurants violated the ADA because these claims were not part of the Complaint or any timely amendment to the Complaint. The court also granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment as to the plaintiff's claims relating to the entrances at the San Diego restaurant and the bathrooms at both restaurants. The court denied motions to reconsider by both parties. 2007 WL 2456223 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 23, 2007). On Sept. 6, 2007, the defendant moved to consolidate cases for trial. At this time, the individual case was already ready for trial, and the class action was still in the formative stages. On Sept. 7, 2007, the Court found that consolidation for purposes of trial was not merited because the potential for delay and prejudice outweighed any savings of time or effort. 2007 WL 2669531 (Sept. 7, 2007). The cases remained consolidated for discovery purposes. A four-day bench trial was held in late November 2007 and early December to determine the following issues: (1) whether the defendant\u2019s prior practice of accommodating customers with disabilities constituted equivalent facilitation; (2) whether the Policy constituted equivalent facilitation; (3) whether the plaintiff is entitled to an injunction requiring the defendant to lower the wall in front of the restaurants\u2019 food preparation counters; and (4) the amount of damages, if any, that the plaintiff is entitled to under the California Disabled Persons Act (CDPA) based on his visits to the restaurants. On Jan. 10, 2008, Judge Jones concluded that the defendant's prior practice of informally accommodating customers had been insufficient to comply with the ADA, but that the Policy was sufficient. The court also found that the plaintiff was not entitled to an injunction requiring the defendant to lower the wall, but that the plaintiff was entitled to $5,000 in damages for the occasions on which he encountered barriers to his entrance into the restaurants. 2008 WL 111052 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 10, 2008). On Apr. 21, 2008, the court denied the plaintiff's motion to amend findings of facts and for additional findings of fact. Later that month or in May 2008, the plaintiff appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, and the defendant cross-appealed. On Feb. 6, 2009, Judge Jones awarded attorneys' fees to the plaintiff in the amount of $136,537.83, less than a quarter of the $550,651.33 in fees and costs the plaintiff had sought, and ordered the parties to pay their own costs. The plaintiff appealed, and on May 15, 2009, Judge Jones ordered a stay regarding attorneys' fees pending the decision of the Court of Appeals. 2009 WL 1390811 (S.D. Cal. May 15, 2009). During this period, Judge Barry Ted Moskowitz replaced Judge Jones as the district judge assigned to the case. After a hearing on Nov. 16, 2010, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's decision that the Policy was compliant with the ADA, finding that the Policy was not equivalent because the \u201csubstitute experience\u201d for disabled customers lacked the customers\u2019 personal participation in the selection and preparation of the food that the full \u201cChipotle Experience\u201d furnished and, therefore, violated the ADA. The Ninth Circuit remanded to the district court to determine the scope of injunctive relief necessary to remedy the plaintiff's inability to view the food preparation counters. On Nov. 18, 2010, the Ninth Circuit awarded attorneys\u2019 fees on appeal to the plaintiff, and referred the determination of the appropriate amount of fees to the court\u2019s special master, Appellate Commissioner Peter L. Shaw. On Nov. 29, 2010, Judge Moskowitz entered judgment against the defendant for violation of the ADA. The district court declined to enter injunctive relief, as the defendant represented that its food-preparation counters at all of the defendant's restaurants in California, including the two restaurants at issue in this case, had been lowered to a suitable height that made them visible to wheelchair-bound customers. Because the defendant had not yet furnished evidence of these modifications or that the modifications would be permanent, the court ordered that limited discovery and briefing take place. Judge Moskowitz referred the question of additional damages to the magistrate judge for a settlement conference. Finally, the court found that the plaintiff was entitled to more than the $136,357.83 in attorneys' fees awarded in the original district court action, but would wait to determine the amount until the other issues were resolved. The plaintiff moved for summary judgment, on Apr. 22, 2011, and for attorneys' fees, on Apr. 29, 2011. The plaintiff died on May 9, 2011, and on May 20, 2011, his widow and successor in interest to the claim filed a motion to substitute the plaintiff, and the motion was granted. On Mar. 21, 2012, Judge Moskowitz granted in part and denied in part the plaintiff\u2019s motion for summary judgment and denied the plaintiff\u2019s motion for attorneys\u2019 fees and expenses. The plaintiff's death rendered moot any claim for injunctive relief under Title III of the ADA, thus the court denied the requested injunction requiring the defendant to maintain the current heights of the walls at the food preparation areas. Regarding damages, California Civil Code \u00a7 54.3 entitled a CDPA plaintiff to statutory minimum damages award of $1,000 for \"each offense\" established by the plaintiff. Upon determining that the defendant's unwritten policy constituted a violation of the ADA (and thus the CDPA as well) and that the original plaintiff had made five \"bona fide\" visits to the defendant's restaurants while that policy was in effect, the district court granted the plaintiff's request for $5,000 in statutory damages for each of his \"bona fide\" visits to the restaurant. Previously, on appeal, the Ninth Circuit had vacated the damages award and remanded for further proceedings. On remand, the plaintiff sought an additional $3,000 in damages because the original plaintiff had made three additional visits for the purposes of gathering evidence for this litigation. Here, the district court denied the plaintiff's request for $3,000 in additional damages, finding that these litigation-related visits should not be considered for the purposes of assessing damages, as he admitted in his deposition that his goal during the visits was to have bad experiences, and \"allowing \u00a7 54.3 statutory damages for visits made with the express intention of advancing a CDPA plaintiff's position in litigation would enable CDPA plaintiffs essentially to write their own damages check.\" 2012 WL 12845619 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 21, 2012). Last, the court denied the plaintiff\u2019s motion for attorneys\u2019 fees without prejudice, finding that it was premature. On May 2, 2012, the plaintiff entered another motion for attorneys\u2019 fees. On July 17, 2012, Judge Moskowitz granted in part and denied in part the plaintiff\u2019s motion. The court granted the plaintiff an award of $545,079.05 in attorneys' fees and costs (in addition to the $5,000 in statutory damages). The plaintiff filed a motion in the Ninth Circuit for attorneys' fees and costs and was awarded an additional $353,469.95 in attorneys\u2019 fees and expenses related to the appeals work that took place in 2008-2010. As of January 22, 2014, the case appears to be closed.", "summary": "A paraplegic individual who uses a wheelchair sued Chipotle for violations of the Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA) and California state law in two of its California restaurants. The defendant implemented a new \"Customers with Disabilities\" which the district court found to be in compliance with the ADA, but the Ninth Circuit found otherwise, that viewing the ingredients behind the counter was part of the \"Chipotle Experience.\" Ultimately, the defendant lowered the heights of the walls in front of the food-preparation areas in all of its California locations so that customers in wheelchairs could see the ingredients, and the plaintiff was awarded $898,549 in attorneys' fees and costs and $5,000 in statutory damages."} {"article": "In March 2012, the California Department of Fair Employment and Housing (DFEH) filed a complaint in the Alameda County Superior Court (San Francisco, CA) alleging that the Law School Admissions Council (LSAC) discriminated against and routinely failed to grant appropriate accommodations for test takers with disabilities on the Law School Admissions Test (LSAT). DFEH claimed that LSAC violated the federal Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), and the California Unruh Civil Rights Act, which incorporated by reference all ADA violations. DFEH brought this claim on behalf of 17 California-based LSAT test takers. In April 2012, because the case involved alleged violations of a federal statute, LSAC removed the case to the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California. DFEH claimed that LSAC violated the ADA in several ways. First, DFEH alleged that LSAC counted \"mitigation measures\" (steps taken to reduce the effects of a disability) as undermining a claim by test takers that they had a disability, even though that approach was explicitly prohibited by the ADA under the ADA Amendments Act of 2008. Second, DFEH alleged that LSAC's disability policy failed to \"best ensure\" that the test measure what it intended to rather than the test taker's disability in violation of the testing provision of Title III of the ADA (42 U.S.C. 12189) and its accompanying regulation (28 C.F.R. 36.309). Third, DFEH alleged that LSAC's policy of \"flagging\" (annotating the score reports to indicate when a test taker has received an accommodation) violated the ADA, including its prohibition against intimidation or threats against the exercise of ADA rights. Finally, DFEH alleged that LSAC had a pattern of denying reasonable accommodations to test takers, again in violation of the ADA. On May 17, 2012, LSAC filed a motion to dismiss. It argued that 1) DFEH did not have subject matter jurisdiction; and 2) that even if DFEH was within its power under California law, it failed to state a federal claim upon which relief could be granted. On June 27, 2012, the United States Department of Justice filed a statement of interest supporting DFEH's interpretation of the ADA. DOJ then moved to intervene as a plaintiff in the case on September 5, 2012. In its motion, DOJ cited eight more complainants who were denied accommodations on the LSAT. The Legal Aid Society - Employment Law Center also filed a motion to intervene as plaintiffs on July 27, 2012. On September 18, 2012, Judge Edward M. Chen issued an order granting in part and denying in part LSAC's motion to dismiss. Judge Chen denied LSAC's motion with respect to each of the substantive claims in the complaint. The Judge granted LSAC's motion to dismiss the case with respect to the defendants whose names were unknown to DFEH at the time of filing. 896 F.Supp.2d 849 (N.D. Cal. 2012). On October 12, 2012, Judge Chen granted the United States' motion to intervene. The court also allowed the Legal Aid Society - Employment Law Center to intervene, but only to the extent that it represented its three individual complainants. 2012 WL 5077126 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 18, 2012). On November 9, 2012, LSAC filed a motion to partially dismiss on the basis of improper venue with respect to non-California residents added in the amended complaint. The defendant alleged that that unreasonable expansion of litigation beyond the scope of California residents would impose undue costs and burden. On January 29, 2013, the motion was denied. DFEH filed a First Amended Group and Class Action Complaint on February 7, 2013 seeking damages and injunctive relief. DFEH moved to proceed for class or group relief on February 21. On March 27, it filed a Second Amended Group and Class Action Complaint. The motion to proceed as a group or class was granted on April 22, 2013. On September 27, 2013, Judge Chen granted DFEH's motion to file a third amended complaint. The complaint added allegations that LSAC violated California Education Code 99161.5 by: [1] requiring excessive and unnecessary documentation before it would give accommodations; [2] providing an arbitrary and unreliable system of appeals from its accommodations decisions; and [3] by flagging tests that received accommodations in clear violation of the text of the statute. These charges were added after a California Court of Appeals Decision reversed a trial court injunction prohibiting California from enforcing 99161.5 of the Education Code as it violated LSAC's rights under the California Constitution. See LSAC v. California DR-CA-0047. Meanwhile, the case was referred to Judge Joseph C. Spero for settlement conferences in March 2013. Conferences throughout 2013 and 2014 resulted in a settlement: on May 20, 2014, the parties entered into a proposed consent decree, which included injunctive relief. Set to last for 4 years, it required the LSAC to comply with the ADA, its implementing regulations and relevant California Law and cease from score flagging. The agreement requires:
The hardship and inequity falls decidedly on the Plaintiffs. Staying this discovery, suspends not only resolution of the case but puts the Plaintiff at an evidentiary disadvantage. It creates a chronic state of evidentiary suspension, with any end in sight being totally dependent on the Government\u2019s ability to correct a problem which it has been unable or unwilling to correct for over a year.On Dec. 22, 2017, the Ninth Circuit (Judges Tallman, Callahan, and Ezra) affirmed the District Court's Nov. 18 preliminary injunction order. 878 F.3d 710. (The order had required defendants to provide detainees after 12 hours with mats and blankets, but not beds, showers, or medical care provided by medical professionals.) The opinion, written by Judge Callahan, found that the District Court had not abused its discretion in the limited preliminary injunction. According to the opinion, the District Court had broad discretion to craft this remedy to balance the detainees' constitutional rights with the government's interests. On Feb. 5, 2018, the plaintiffs petitioned the Ninth Circuit for a rehearing en banc. Plaintiffs argued that the Ninth Circuit's Dec. 22 decision conflicted with prior decisions of that court and the Supreme Court on (1) whether civil detainees' right to adequate medical care encompasses a right to screening conducted by properly trained individuals supervised by medical professionals, and (2) whether, having found the existence of constitutional violations, a district court may decline to fully remedy them based on government expense. However, on Mar. 13, the Ninth Circuit denied the rehearing petition. The Ninth Circuit mandate issued, putting into effect the judgment of its Dec. 22 decision. On May 4, 2018, the plaintiffs filed a sealed proposed motion for partial summary judgment. The clerk was to file the motion if the plaintiffs' motion to seal is granted. Throughout the rest of 2018, the parties litigated what evidence would be permitted in the motion for summary judgment and whether exhibits would be sealed. When this was resolved (by an order granting in part and denying in part the defendants' motion to seal) the clerk filed the plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment. The plaintiffs sought summary judgment on the issue of the defendants' obligation to provide beds. The plaintiffs asserted that civil pretrial detainees must be provided beds or mattresses raised off of the floor if held for any period requiring sleep and that \"anything less, including floor mats, is a violation of their Fifth Amendment Due Process rights.\u201d Further, the plaintiffs argued that the use of floor mats led to overcrowding and unsanitary conditions that are \u201creprehensible and dehumanizing.\u201d The plaintiffs contended that there are no disputed facts precluding partial summary for their claim that civil detainees are constitutionally entitled to beds. On March 15, 2019, Judge Bury issued an order denying the plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment. 2017 WL 7520603. Judge Bury held that Ninth Circuit case law does not support plaintiffs' request for judgment as a matter of law that providing floor mats rather than raised beds is an unconstitutional practice. Judge Bury concluded the court was to consider the severity and duration of the conditions, along with the operational needs of the detention facility, to determine whether these conditions constituted objective deprivation of the constitutional right to humane shelter. Judge Bury determined that this was a fact-intensive inquiry and could not be properly made on the summary judgment record. Judge Bury ordered a 13-day bench trial set for January 13, 2020. For the remainder of 2019, the parties litigated various issues in preparation for trial. Beginning on January 13, 2020, the parties participated in a seven-day bench trial. On February 19, 2020, Judge Bury issued the court's finding of fact and conclusions of law, finding in favor of plaintiffs and against the defendants. 2020 WL 813774. Judge Bury concluded that the defendants' holding facilities were designed for short-term holds, \"lasting hours not days.\" Judge Bury found that the conditions of extended confinement in defendants' holding facilities were \"substantially worse than detainees face upon commitment to either a civil immigration detention facility or even a criminal detention facility, like a jail or prison.\" Accordingly, Judge Bury concluded that extended confinement in these facilities did not advance the government's legitimate interest in immigration enforcement and resulted in conditions, including detainees' inability to sleep for several nights, that were \"presumptively punitive\" and violated the Constitution. Based on these conclusions and finding of fact, Judge Bury issued an order enjoining defendants from holding detainees considered to be \"processing complete\" for longer than 48 hours unless defendants provide \"conditions of confinement that meet basic human needs for sleeping in a bed with a blanket, a shower, food that meets acceptable dietary standards, potable water, and medical assessments performed by a medical professional.\" Judge Bury adopted a \"no longer than 48 hour\" rule to accommodate logistic difficulties of transporting detainees after they are processed. Judge Bury maintained that anything beyond 48 hours forced CBP to perform the role of other civil immigration detention agencies and thus required it to provide the conditions of confinement standard at the facilities of other agencies. On April 17, 2020, the court entered an order for a permanent injunction, setting minimum standards with respect to detention length, available care, and compliance. The permanent injunction adopted many of the same standards as both the preliminary injunction and proposed permanent injunction. The court required defendants to collect and maintain data about each individual's time in the detention center, provide that data to the plaintiffs on a quarterly basis for a two-year period, and allow plaintiffs to request class access visits on a quarterly basis for two years. Further, the defendants were also ordered to conduct internal compliance evaluations and provide them to plaintiffs. The Court gave the defendants 90 days to attain compliance with the order. It also retained jurisdiction to reopen the case and enforce the permanent injunction and action. On September 11, 2020, two months following the defendants' third and final monthly status report, the plaintiffs filed a report alleging noncompliance. However, the court declined to act on the plaintiffs' report and instead noted on November 18, 2020, that the court's jurisdiction over the permanent injunction was to be narrow and only could be invoked if clear and convincing evidence of noncompliance were shown. Defendants filed appeals as to both the court's finding and the permanent injunction, and plaintiffs filed cross-appeals to each. On November 10, 2020, defendants voluntarily dismissed their appeal, after which plaintiffs also dismissed their cross-appeals on November 18, 2020. The case remained on the district court docket for overseeing compliance with the injunction. As of March 5, 2021, however, there was no additional activity on the docket.", "summary": "On June 8, 2015, civil detainees confined in the Tucson Sector of the U.S. Border Patrol filed a class action lawsuit, alleging violations of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the APA due to inhumane and punitive conditions while they were detained in holding cells. The district court granted a PI mandating that defendants must maintain conditions of confinement adequate for the detainees' physical needs and provide detainees with mats and blankets after 12 hours. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the PI order. In 2018 the plaintiffs filed a motion for partial summary judgment on the issue of defendants' obligation to provide raised beds for detainees held for any period requiring sleep; the district court denied this motion. After a 7-day trial in January 2020, the district court held that these extended confinement conditions violated the Constitution and issued an order enjoining the defendants from holding detainees for longer than 48 unless they provided conditions of confinement that meet basic human needs. This permanent injunction was ordered and has been in effect since April 2020."} {"article": "This case challenged the hotel chain Motel 6 reporting guests to federal immigration officials. Eight individuals who stayed separately at Arizona Motel 6 locations filed a class action lawsuit in U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona on January 23, 2018. Suing under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983, plaintiffs sued Motel 6 Operating L.P., its parent company G6 Hospitality LLC, and 10 unnamed Motel 6 employees in Arizona. The plaintiffs, represented by the Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund (MALDEF), requested class certification, and sought declaratory, monetary, and injunctive relief, as well as a civil penalty and attorneys' fees and costs. Judge David G. Campbell was assigned. Plaintiffs claimed Motel 6's policy of disclosing guests' information to the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) without requiring a warrant or reasonable suspicion of criminal activity violated the Fourth Amendment, as well as federal and state laws. Defendants allegedly violated 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1981 by discriminating against plaintiff\u2019s race or national origin by denying Latino guests the full and equal enjoyment of the contractual relationship with Motel 6. Additionally, by assisting DHS and ICE agents, the plaintiffs alleged that Motel 6 violated 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1985(3) by engaging in a conspiracy to violate the plaintiff's rights. Thirdly, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants violated their Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures by disclosing the plaintiffs' personal information to federal immigration officials without a warrant or reasonable suspicion of a crime. The plaintiffs also alleged a variety of state law violations, including various tort and breach of contract claims. The parties filed a joint notice of settlement on July 6, 2018. A joint request for conditional class certification and preliminary approval of settlement terms was filed on July 6, 2018. Plaintiffs sought one primary class and two subclasses. The primary class consisted of all persons who stayed at a Motel 6 between February 1, 2017, and November 2, 2018, and had their information shared with federal immigration authorities. The first subclass was all persons who were questioned or interrogated by federal immigration authorities at a Motel 6 as a result of guest information being shared. The second subclass was for all persons who had been placed in immigration removal proceedings due to disclosed guest information and the resulting encounters with federal immigration authorities at a Motel 6. The proposed settlement included a two-year enforcement period under a consent decree that would enjoin Motel 6 from providing guest information to DHS and ICE absent a warrant, subpoena, or the immediate risk of harm to a guest, employee, or another individual. Additionally, parties sought three categories of monetary damages totaling $7.6 million. First, $50 in damages per guest whose information was shared with federal immigration authorities, up to a class-wide total of $1,000,000. Second, $1,000 in damages to each class member questioned by federal immigration authorities during their stay. Finally, an amount of at least $7,500 to each Class Member who was placed in immigration removal proceedings in connection with their encounter with federal immigration authorities during their stay. On May 30, 2019, the court mooted the parties' joint motion. The parties had advised the court that they would be filing a new motion for preliminary approval of a class settlement. Plaintiffs filed an amended class-action complaint on June 5, 2019. The amended complaint contains largely the same allegations and claims as in the original complaint. Plaintiffs now sought a primary class and one subclass. The primary class was all persons who stayed at a Motel 6 and had their information disclosed to federal immigration authorities between February 1, 2015, and the date of judgment in the present case. The subclass included guests at a Motel 6 that had been interrogated, arrested, or placed in removal proceedings by federal immigration authorities due to guest information being disclosed. The parties again filed a joint motion for approval of the class action settlement and to certify class on July 5, 2019. The court granted preliminary approval of the class action settlement on August 2, 2019. On January 17, 2020, the parties filed a joint motion requesting five actions. First, final approval of the settlement. Second, certification of the proposed classes. Third, a consent decree for injunctive relief. Fourth, authorization to distribute the settlement monetary damages in accordance with the agreement. Finally, payment of attorneys\u2019 fees and costs. The court granted final approval of the third amended class action settlement on February 18, 2020. The court found that the amount of funds going to class members was sufficient and that the amount of funds held for four immigration rights organizations was \"consistent with the underlying objectives of the claims in this case, serves the interests of the silent class members, and is not too remote from the class.\" Judge Campbell signed a consent decree on February 18, 2020, making effective injunctive and recordkeeping provisions for three years. The injunctive provisions mandated Motel 6 do the following:
\"Any U.S. citizen and his or her noncitizen spouse who (1) has a final order of removal and has not departed the U.S. under that order; (2) is the beneficiary of a pending or approved I-130, Petition for Alien Relative, filed by the U.S. citizen spouse; (3) is not 'ineligible' for a provisional waiver under 8 C.F.R. \u00a7 212.7(e)(4)(i) or (vi); and (4) is within the jurisdiction of the Boston ICE-ERO field office.\"For the purposes of the plaintiffs' Due Process claim, the court certified the following class:
\"Any U.S. citizen and his or her noncitizen spouse who (1) has a final order of removal and has not departed the U.S. under that order; (2) is the beneficiary of an approved I-130, Petition for Alien Relative, and conditionally approved I-212, Application for Permission to Reapply for Admission into the U.S. After Deportation or Removal; (3) is not 'ineligible' for a provisional waiver under 8 C.F.R. \u00a7 212.7(e)(4)(i) or (vi); and (4) is within the jurisdiction of the Boston ICE-ERO field office.\"Judge Wolf again instructed the parties to confer regarding a potential settlement. On June 17, 2019, the plaintiffs filed an emergency motion for a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and a stay of removal of a class member. Specifically, the plaintiffs wanted the court to compel the defendants to provide an explanation as to why ICE was detaining and intending to remove the class member. The class member later expressed that he did not want to delay his removal and the plaintiffs withdrew their motion. Judge Wolf held an evidentiary hearing on June 27. He instructed the parties to file a joint statement memorializing his oral rulings at the hearing regarding notice to class members and the information regarding class members that the defendants must provide to class counsel. Judge Wolf then issued an order on August 7, 2019, in accordance with those rulings. In the order, he instructed the defendants to report information regarding class members to class counsel at the beginning of each month and provide prompt notice to class counsel when a class member is detained or when ICE intends to effectuate the removal of a class member. On July 25, 2019, the plaintiffs filed a motion for order to show cause. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants had continued to violate the post-order custody regulations described above, and requested that the defendants be ordered to show cause why the court should not order the release of a group of detainees appearing on the defendants' July detention report. After months of back-and-forth, the parties reported to the court on January 8, 2020, that they had resolved the issues related to the motion for order to show cause. On January 27, 2020, the plaintiffs filed an emergency motion to enjoin the removal of two class members. The plaintiffs later partially withdrew the motion, leaving the motion pending with respect to one class member. Then, on March 24, 2020, the plaintiffs filed a motion for immediate release of that class member. The plaintiffs alleged that the class member was currently detained in a facility in which an employee had tested positive for COVID-19. The plaintiffs stated that the defendants had not contended that the class member posed a threat to public safety, but rather had led to his prolonged detention by impeding the resolution of the plaintiffs' January 27 motion. Given the escalating threat to the class member's health, the plaintiffs requested that the court order his release during the pendency of the January 27 motion. In the alternative, they requested that the court hold a prompt telephonic hearing regarding the basis for the class member's removal. On March 25, Judge Wolf granted the plaintiffs' request and ordered the class member released no later than the following day, with the following conditions: he must reside with his wife and not leave their residence except for medical reasons, and he shall be subject to electronic monitoring by the defendants. In the transcript of the court's March 25 hearing where Judge Wolf orally ordered the class member's release, he explained that he concluded that district courts do have the power to order the release of immigration detainees on bail. He emphasized that the class member here was a civil detainee (someone who had never been charged or convicted of a crime), and concluded that a substantial claim had been raised by the class member's habeas petition. Finally, Judge Wolf noted that extraordinary circumstances (the COVID-19 pandemic) made the grant of bail necessary to make the habeas remedy effective. He noted that detention enhances the risk of infection and that given the mortality risk associated with COVID-19, the class member's release was required pending the resolution of the plaintiffs' January 27 motion. On April 7, 2020, Judge Wolf ordered the parties to confer and determine whether a noncitizen who had filed an emergency petition for a writ of habeas corpus and stay of deportation on April 6 is a member of the class certified in this case; and, if so, whether ICE violated any of the orders in this case with regard to him. The parties reported to the court that they agreed that this individual was not a class member and so Judge Wolf did not need to take any further action. On April 16, the parties filed a joint status report. The parties explained that they had reached an agreement whereby the plaintiffs would withdraw their January 27 motion to enjoin removal of the class member that Judge Wolf ordered released on March 25. They further requested that the court lift its stay of removal as to the class member, and lift its order requiring that he not leave his residence except for medical reasons. ICE would then impose conditions of supervision pursuant to the parties' agreement. Judge Wolf subsequently entered an order memorializing those terms. On November 18, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss both the habeas and equal protection claims. Defendants argued that the remedy plaintiffs requested, suspension of removal, is not available under habeas corpus and that intervening equal protection decisions have rejected claims that were based on an inference of animus from President Trump's campaign statements. The case is ongoing.", "summary": "In February 2018, an undocumented immigrant who was married to a U.S. citizen filed this suit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts. The plaintiff alleged that her unexpected arrest and detainment without notice or a hearing violated her due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment, the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), and the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). In April 2018, nine more plaintiffs were added, and they sought class certification, which was approved on May 17, 2019. On June 27, the district court instructed the defendants to begin providing monthly reports to class counsel regarding class members. On March 24, 2020 the plaintiffs filed a motion for immediate release of that class member because he was detained in a facility where an employee tested positive for COVID-19. On April 16, the parties filed a joint status report that altered the terms of release for the class member and the court lifted the stay on the class member's removal by ICE. ICE imposed conditions of supervision pursuant to the parties' agreement. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss on November 18, 2020. The case is ongoing."} {"article": "This is a case about President Trump\u2019s July 21, 2020 memorandum titled \u201cExcluding Illegal Aliens from the Apportionment Base Following the 2020 Census\u201d to the Secretary of Commerce. This memo instructed the 2020 Census to exclude undocumented immigrants from the population data created for the purposes of congressional apportionment. Many felt this action was taken to deter participation by immigrant communities and communities of color in the 2020 Census, which would in turn deprive these communities of the political representation and federal financial resources to which they are entitled, and filed suit as a result. In response to the memo, Haitian-Americans United, Inc., Brazilian Worker Center, Chelsea Collaborative, Inc. and Centro Presente\u2014all non-profits serving immigrants of color across Massachusetts\u2014filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District Of Massachusetts on July 27, 2020. The plaintiffs sued President Trump, the U.S. Department of Commerce, the U.S. Bureau of the Census, Director of the U.S. Census Bureau Steven Dillingham, and Secretary of the Department of Commerce Wilbur Ross under the Administrative Procedure Act and 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1985. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that the memo violated Article I, Section 2 of Constitution which specifies that congressional apportionment must be based on a total count of all persons because excluding undocumented residents will not result in the required of an \"actual enumermation\" of all persons and will chill immigrant participation in the 2020 census. The plaintiffs also alleged that the memo violated the right to equal protection as guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment becuase the memo \"is motivated by racial animus towards immigrants of color, non-US citizens, foreign-born individuals, and undocumented individuals. The plaintiffs further argued that the President and the Secretary of Commerce have conspired to violate immigrants' and non-citizens' right to equal protection. Represented by Lawyers for Civil Rights, the plaintiffs sought declaratory relief that the memo was unconstitutional and that any compliance with the memo's instructions to the Census Bureau to produce tabulations of population data excluding undocumented residents for congressional apportionment violated the Administrative Procedure Act, and injunctive relief preventing the defendants from providing information to the President that would permit him to exclude undocumented immigrants from the congressional apportionment base. In addition, the plaintiffs sought costs and reasonable attorneys\u2019 fees. The case was assigned to Judge Douglas P. Woodlock. On September 4, 2020, the plaintiffs filed an application for a three-judge court because Section 2284(a) requires the appointment of a three-judge court in actions challenging \u201cthe constitutionality of the apportionment of congressional districts.\u201d On September 11, 2020 Judge Woodlock granted the plaintiffs\u2019 application. Judge Bruce M. Selya and Judge Patti B. Saris were appointed to the three judge panel alongside Judge Woodlock. As of September 26, 2020, this case is ongoing and the defendants have yet to file an answer.", "summary": "On July 27, 2020, Haitian-Americans United, Inc., Brazilian Worker Center, Chelsea Collaborative, Inc. and Centro Presente filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District Of Massachusetts. The plaintiffs alleged that the Presidential Memorandum titled \u201cExcluding Illegal Aliens from the Apportionment Base Following the 2020 Census\u201d is unconstitutional and that any compliance violates \u00a7\u00a7 706(2) of the APA because it is contrary to constitutional power, right, privilege, or immunity and in excess of statutory jurisdiction and authority, and without observance of procedure required by law. The case has been approved for a three-judge court and is awaiting the defendants' answer."} {"article": "On Jan. 24, 2018, the NAACP filed this lawsuit against the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland. Represented by its own counsel, the NAACP challenged DHS's Nov. 2017 revocation of Temporary Protected Status (TPS) for Haitians living in the United States. The plaintiff alleged that DHS violated the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fifth Amendment by relying on stereotypes based on race and national origin to deprive Haitians of their rights. The plaintiff sought mandamus (for DHS to carry out the Immigration and Nationality Act's procedures for reviewing TPS) and a declaratory judgment. The case was assigned to Judge Marvin J. Garbis. Under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), the Secretary of DHS may find that a country's conditions temporarily prevent its nationals from safely returning, or that the country is unable to adequately handle the return of nationals. In such a situation, the Secretary may grant TPS to these nationals for 6 to 18 months, with a possible extension following a review of country conditions. TPS allows recipients to remain and work legally in the United States. DHS had initiated TPS for Haitians following the Jan. 2010 earthquake in Haiti. After each 18-month period since then, DHS had reviewed the program, determined that Haitian nationals could not yet return safely (due to severe safety, health, housing, and infrastructure problems, exacerbated by subsequent hurricanes), and extended the program. This policy, however, ended with DHS' termination of TPS for Haitians in Nov. 2017. The NAACP argued that DHS' decision to end the program was not based on a change in conditions in Haiti, but rather on racially discriminatory stereotypes of Haitians. These stereotypes allegedly appeared in President Trump's remarks that the plaintiffs claimed disparaged Haitians, and DHS' alleged search for evidence of Haitians' criminality and welfare dependence. On Apr. 17, the NAACP filed an amended complaint, adding two other organizational plaintiffs that advocate for Haitians living in the U.S. On May 7, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim and lack of jurisdiction. The defendants argued that Congress had statutorily precluded judicial review of challenges to the Secretary's discretionary decisions regarding TPS designations. As to the plaintiffs' equal protection claims, the defendants argued that the rational basis standard of review applied and that the plaintiffs had failed to demonstrate that the Secretary's decision was not rationally related to a legitimate government interest. The case was reassigned to Judge Deborah K. Chasanow on July 24, 2018. On March 12, 2019, Judge Chasanow filed an opinion and order granting in part and denying in part the defendants' motion to dismiss. First, Judge Chasanow found that the court did have jurisdiction to hear the plaintiffs' constitutional claims. Next, she held that the plaintiffs had alleged a plausible claim for relief. Instead of rational basis review, Judge Chasanow found that the proper question was whether the government's decision to terminate TPS was motivated by impermissible race or national origin discrimination; if so, the action would be presumptively invalid and only upheld if it were narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling government purpose. Consequently, Judge Chasanow held that it was appropriate to view any circumstantial evidence to find proof of discriminatory motive, and that the plaintiffs had provided such evidence, which was to be viewed in their favor at this stage. Judge Chasanow then dismissed the plaintiffs' claims for mandamus and declaratory relief, as their constitutional claim would provide them with full relief. 364 F.Supp.3d 568. On April 8, 2019, the defendants filed a motion to stay or, in the alternative, to confine discovery to the administrative record. The defendants requested that the court stay this case pending final appellate review of the preliminary injunction issued in a parallel case, Ramos v. Nielsen (located here in this Clearinghouse). In an April 26 order, Judge Chasanow informed the parties that if they could reach an agreement, discovery could be limited to what had already been produced by the government in other, parallel litigation. On March 23, 2020, Judge Chasanow granted the defendants' motion to stay. Due to the interconnected nature of the parallel litigation, particularly related to the scope of permissible discovery, and the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic, Judge Chasanow concluded it was best to stay proceedings in this case while the other cases were litigated. This case is ongoing.", "summary": "On Jan. 24, 2018, the NAACP sued the DHS over its Nov. 2017 revocation of Temporary Protected Status (first implemented after the Jan. 2010 Haitian earthquake) for Haitians living in the United States. The NAACP alleged that DHS violated the 5th Amendment by relying on racially discriminatory stereotypes to deprive Haitians of rights and sought mandamus and declaratory relief. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss, which was granted in part and denied in part by the court on March 12, 2019. The court allowed the plaintiffs' 5th Amendment claims to move forward. Due to ongoing parallel litigation over the revocation of TPS for Haitians, the defendants requested a stay in this case. The court granted the stay in March 2020. The case is ongoing."} {"article": "COVID-19 Summary: This is a habeas action filed by immigration detainees in ICE facilities in Maryland, seeking release from detention. The detainees claimed their underlying medical conditions made them particularly vulnerable to serious illness or death from COVID-19. The court granted preliminary injunctions on April 30 and May 7, ordering the release of several detainees. Additionally, on September 18, the court granted the petitioner's motion for class certification. The court denied a motion for expedited bail hearings on January 26, 2021.
\"All individuals who, from December 19, 2012, to the present, were held in confinement by the Sheriff after legal authority for those detentions ceased due to the Sheriff\u2019s policies or practices of: (1) re-arresting and imprisoning individuals who are released on their own recognizance, found not guilty or acquitted, or who have had their criminal charges vacated or dismissed; and (2) keeping inmates imprisoned who the courts have released to Community Corrections for electronic monitoring.\"The court denied the motion as to the 72-hour subclass, the cash subclass, and the computer system subclass. Dissatisfied with this order, the plaintiffs appealed the district court's denial as to the 72-hour and computer system subclasses. 2016 WL 5946839. Subsequently, on November 2, 2016, the plaintiffs filed a motion to stay case proceedings pending resolution of this appeal. On December 5, 2016, Judge Dinsmore filed a report and recommendation regarding the plaintiffs' motion to stay, recommending that the court grant the motion. Agreeing with Judge Dinsmore, Judge Young adopted the report and granted the motion. On June 15, 2017, the Seventh Circuit issued an opinion vacating the district court's decision and remanding the case. In this opinion, the appeals court found the district court's reasoning for denying the computer system subclass to be without base. Moreover, the Seventh Circuit noted that the district court erred in relying on a 48-hour presumption of reasonableness with regard to detention as a basis for denying certification of the 72-hour subclass. 859 F.3d 489. Given this opinion, the plaintiffs moved to amend the class certification order on July 10, 2017, asking the district court to certify the computer system subclass and modify its 48-hour presumption to a 6-hour presumption. In response, on September 19, 2017, arguing that the Seventh Circuit's opinion did not order the district court to certify the two subclasses, the defendants filed a motion to set a class certification hearing to resolve factual disputes. Agreeing with the defendants, the district court granted the defendants' motion for hearing and denied the plaintiffs' motion on December 14, 2017. The hearing was originally set for February 16, 2018, but was later rescheduled and held on October 8, 2018. The court certified the class of plaintiffs on November 5, 2019 with respect to the following classes: 1) the Sheriff's practice of operating under a standard allowing up to 72 hours to release prisoners who are ordered released; and 2) the Sheriff's practice of employing a computer system inadequate for the purposes intended with respect to the timely release of prisoners. On June 28, 2019, Indianapolis and Marion County moved for summary judgment. That same day, several of the named defendants also filed for partial summary judgment. As of April 9, 2020, they are still awaiting a ruling on these motions. This case is ongoing as of April 9, 2020.", "summary": "In 2014, individuals who were incarcerated in the Marion County correctional system filed this class-action lawsuit in the US District Court for the Southern District of Indiana. The plaintiffs sued the Marion County sheriff under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983. The plaintiffs sought monetary relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 against the Marion County Sheriffs Office. The plaintiffs claimed that they were incarcerated for longer than legally authorized as a result of unreasonable processing and release procedures. The case is ongoing."} {"article": "Built in 1991, the Campbell County Detention Center was designed to hold 135 prisoners. It quickly became overcrowded. In the weeks before this lawsuit was filed in the district court for the Eastern District of Kentucky, on April 29, 2005, the jail's population reached a high of 276 prisoners, many of whom were forced to sleep on the floor. Many of the inmates were awaiting transfer to the Kentucky Department of Corrections (KDOC), which was also named as a defendant in this lawsuit. The KDOC addressed overcrowding at the jail by simply reducing the required floor space for each prisoner from 50 to 40 square feet. This lawsuit, filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 by attorney Robert B. Newman of the Cincinnati, Ohio, law firm Newman & Meeks, alleged the overcrowding violated the prisoners' Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The plaintiffs, the class of inmates at the detention center, sought injunctive relief and nominal damages. The parties reached a settlement agreement on November 23, 2005, and notice was provided to the class and a fairness hearing held on January 25, 2006. The Court (Judge William O. Bertelsman) approved the settlement, after allowing one class member to opt-out, signing the consent decree on February 7, 2006. To settle the suit, County officials and the KDOC agreed to a number of measures aimed at reducing overcrowding. These included the building of a new Restricted Custody Center to house felons headed for the KDOC, expansion and remodeling of the old jail, and the implementation of new policies to prevent overcrowding. At the detention center, County officials agreed to add 256 beds, as well as a new kitchen and laundry facility, and to convert the old kitchen and laundry space into an upgraded infirmary. A full time nurse position was also created and filled. The jail also agreed to install more bunk beds and renovate dormitory showers; replace a boiler and all air conditioning units; upgrade the security system; and replace a leaky roof. In addition, the County agreed to decline regular requests to house federal prisoners, and the KDOC agreed to remove prisoners from the detention center within 45 days or sooner after the imposition of a prison sentence. The county reached an agreement with Boone County to house up to 30 prisoners at Boone County's new jail if necessary. County officials agreed to appoint a \"Population/Pretrial Officer\" responsible for managing the number of prisoners at the detention center; implement a \"Pretrial Conditional Release Program\" to reduce the number of prisoners housed at the detention center; and initiate an objective jail classification system. Finally, a Criminal Justice Advisory Council (CJAC) was to be be created and maintained to foster communication between judges, defense attorneys, and probation and parole officers in order to address issues that might reduce jail population. As an element of the CJAC, Campbell County police chiefs agreed to instruct their officers to simply ticket and release misdemeanor offenders (except those charged with domestic violence or driving under the influence) who are not a threat to public safety or a flight risk. On April 14, the Court required that status reports be filed every six months. The first report was filed on October 16, 2006. Subsequent reports were filed on April 16, 2007, and November 2, 2007. Agreeing that the defendants had implemented the terms of the settlement agreement, the parties moved to dismiss the case. On June 30, 2008, the Court granted the joint motion to dismiss the case.", "summary": "Built in 1991, the Campbell County Detention Center was designed to hold 135 prisoners. It quickly became overcrowded. In the weeks before this lawsuit was filed in the district court for the Eastern District of Kentucky, on April 29, 2005, the jail's population reached a high of 276 prisoners, many of whom were forced to sleep on the floor. Many of the inmates were awaiting transfer to the Kentucky Department of Corrections (KDOC), which was also named as a defendant in the lawsuit. The KDOC addressed overcrowding at the jail by simply reducing the required floor space for each prisoner from 50 to 40 square feet. This lawsuit, filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 by attorney Robert B. Newman of the Cincinnati, Ohio, law firm Newman & Meeks, alleged the overcrowding violated the prisoners' Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The plaintiffs, the class of inmates at the detention center, sought injunctive relief and nominal damages."} {"article": "COVID-19 Summary: This class action challenged COVID-related conditions at the Prince Georges County jail and sought mitigation and release for pretrial and post-conviction detainees. On May 21, the court granted in part the plaintiff's motion for temporary restraining order. Defendants appealed and were denied a stay pending their appeal. On July 7, the plaintiffs submitted an amended complaint, pointing to the lack of mental health services during an indefinite lockdown. On August 27, the parties filed a joint motion to stay proceedings pending settlement talks. The case is ongoing.
- limits to the inmate population, both for the individual dormitories comprising the three Occuquan Facilities and for the institution, cumulatively. - that defendants must provide the Court with written reports. The reports were to address (1) planned compliance with the population caps; and (2) every thirty days, the steps being taken to address the institution's many deficiencies.In evaluating the evidence before her, Judge Green frequently referred to standards established by professional correctional, health, and safety associations. Her opinion concluded by encouraging the defendants to adopt a goal of compliance with these professional standards. The defendants appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. On April 12, 1988, that appellate court, in a 2-1 decision (with its opinion written by Judge Kenneth Starr), vacated the District Court's ruling and remanded the case back to the trial court for further proceedings. Inmates of Occuquan v. Barry, 844 F.2d 828 (D.C. Cir. 1988). Judge Starr wrote that the lower court's repeated reliance on professional agencies' standards erroneously failed to focus on whether prison deficiencies equated to deprivations of \"minimal civilized measure of life's necessities.\" Additionally, the appellate majority ruled that the district court exceeded its equitable powers by imposing population caps without first seeking to specifically correct deficiencies that the court had identified as constitutional violations. District Judge Harold H. Greene, sitting by designation on the appellate panel, filed a dissent. The plaintiffs sought a rehearing of the panel's ruling by the entire District Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals, but this en banc review request was denied on July 8, 1988. Inmates of Occuquan v. Barry, 850 F.2d 796 (D.C. Cir. 1988). Circuit Judge Starr filed an opinion concurring in the denial, and separate dissenting opinions were filed by Circuit Judges Pamela Wald and Ruth Bader Ginsburg. Upon remand, the District Court (Judge Green) conducted a trial. Afterward, on June 30, 1989, she ruled that Eighth Amendment violations had been proven as to matters of sanitation, bathroom facilities, fire safety, health care, and staffing. Constitutional violations had not been proven regarding food services, inmate jobs, educational and drug programming, library facilities, and general idleness. Inmates of Occuquan v. Barry, 717 F. Supp. 854, 865-868 (D.D.C. 1989). The judge required the defendants to file a written report of how they anticipated correcting the constitutional violations. Additionally, Judge Green ordered the defendants not to cause the institution's population to exceed the level as of the date of her decision, in that then-planned renovations of certain dorms otherwise could cause population stress as inmates were shifted among available facilities. Over the next decade, in most years, the case generated occasional proposals, motions, and agreed-upon and supplemental plans, as well as consent orders and other orders addressing institutional conditions. These documents can be found in this Clearinghouse record, in documents 2 through 21. The 119-page court docket reflects that Special Officers of the Court were appointed during the litigation, including Grace M. Lopes and Karen M. Schneider, to act as Masters aiding the court. Included among the post-trial documents is a December 18, 1989, agreed plan by the parties to address deficiencies in hygiene, sanitation, ventilation, asbestos presence, fire safety, health care, mental health services, and physical safety. The plan was approved by Judge Green on December 21, 1989, as partial remediation. A supplemental agreed plan filed by the parties on January 26, 1990, addressed environmental health issues (lighting and airborne disease risks), fire safety and health care staffing. It, too, was approved by Judge Green as partial remediation, but her February 7, 1990, order added that monetary penalties would be imposed upon the defendants if they excessively delayed their compliance. During 1993 and 1994, the parties' counsel met with Special Master Grace Lopes and agreed, in filings of August 1, 1993, and April 8 and December 14, 1994, that monthly reports would be filed with the Special Master describing the mental health care provided at the Occoquan Facilities. The defendants' progress in complying with remedial directives lagged, which led to plaintiffs' filing in 1995 a contempt motion and a resultant supplemental plan agreed upon by the parties and made effective via a December 15, 1995 consent order. In the order, Judge Green imposed required correctional officer staffing levels, dormitory population limits, required a security audit, made provision for improving protected inmate separation from disciplined inmates, and addressed mental health issues. She directed development of an institutional mental health care plan, set a minimum level of psychologist staffing, ordered improved tracking and recall of inmates receiving psychological services, and called for medical record consolidation and mental health screenings of all inmates. Bimonthly compliance reports were required by the order, which also set a contempt fine schedule for instances of non-compliance and provided for defendants' payment of plaintiffs' attorney fees, as well as expert and monitoring expenses, resulting from prosecuting contempt or related proceedings due to defendants' non-compliance. On July 23, 1996, a consent order similarly provided that defendants pay such fees and expenses relating to non-compliance; however, this order largely dealt with environmental health and fire safety issues. It directed plumbing repairs, water temperature improvements, a preventive maintenance plan, ventilation repairs, carbon dioxide monitoring, window/screen and kitchen equipment repairs, housekeeping and vermin control plans, mattress sanitization and fireproofing, availability of cleaning supplies, correctional officer training, kitchen wall cleaning, and food temperature improvements, and set required distances between inmates' beds to limit air borne disease transmission. Judge Green also allowed for plaintiffs' compliance inspection of facilities, with 24-hour prior notice. Her fire safety directives included smoke detector, alarm, dryer vent and lighting repairs, certain structural improvements, an operational fire alarm system, and fire drills and evacuation plans. Bi-monthly reporting of compliance progress was also required. Two notable orders were entered with the parties' consent in 1997. Judge Green, on February 5, 1997, directed defendants to hire a system-wide medical coordinator with powers to enable compliance with the court's health-related orders. The judge's November 20, 1997 order authorized the Special Master to form and retain an expert team at defendants' expense. The team would review and make recommendations on matters of security, workforce utilization, classification and safety, and maintenance and sanitation. This latter order set a date for opening a new adjustment unit to house prisoners on administrative and disciplinary segregation. The following year, on January 20, 1998, a three judge panel of the District Court, including Judge Green, convened and granted a consent order adopting a population ceiling and related procedures for the institution. (The three-judge panel was a requirement for entry of such a ceiling, under the Prison Litigation Reform Act). Judge Green then, on February 5, 1998, amended her prior orders, upon the joint motion of the parties, to allow for a substituted correctional officer deployment plan and modification of ceiling numbers earlier set for beds per certain dorms. Continued use of a Special Master and the team of experts, at defendants' expense, was approved in order to provide management assistance, staffing and prisoner population limits, classification and maintenance aid, and to develop initiatives to limit prisoner idleness. Proceedings in the case continued well into 2003, with responsibility for rulings by then having been accepted by District Judge William B. Bryant. On April 26, 2003, Judge Bryant order that the District of Columbia pay Covington & Burling $275,000 in settlement of all of plaintiffs' remaining claims for fees and costs associated with monitoring compliance with the Orders entered previously. Throughout, occasional disbursements were made for Special Masters' and expert consultants' expenses and fees. These payments came from funds the defendants were periodically ordered to deposit into the court registry. In addition to these expenses, on one occasion a $40,000 payment from these defense-provided funds was directed by Judge Bryant to the Georgetown University Law Center for the operating expenses of the D.C. Family Literacy and Street Law programs. During this period, consent orders modifying prior orders relating to staffing, population, and institutional conditions were irregularly issued. The final docket entry presently in this database reflects receipt by the court of another deposit of funds by the defendants to the court's account for the funds to be paid to the Special Master. Since this deposit to the court's account in 2005, there has been no activity on this case, which indicates that the case is closed. Additionally, the court's docket reflect a relationship between this case and two other prison condition cases challenging conditions at other components of the Lorton Correctional Complex. Also filed in the D.C. District Court (docket numbers 79-1726 and 80-2136), these cases, John Doe v. District of Columbia and Twelve John Does v. District of Columbia, are designated PC-DC-0007 and PC-DC-0008, respectively, in the Clearinghouse. These cases are closed.", "summary": "In 1986, the prisoners at the Occoquan Facilites of the District of Columbia's Lorton Correctional Complex filed this class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court of the District of Columbia. The plaintiffs alleged that the District of Columbia government officials' overcrowding of the facility violated their Eighth Amendment rights. The court held that the defendants had violated the constitution, and required that the prison minimize its population. The case closed in 2003."} {"article": "On September 13, 2005, Prison Legal News (PLN), a non-profit legal journal devoted to reporting news and litigation concerning detention facilities, filed this action against the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. PLN sought declaratory and injunctive relief for the defendant's refusal to produce documents requested by PLN under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) or grant a fee waiver for the document requests. The case was assigned to Judge Reggie B. Walton. PLN had submitted a FOIA request to the BOP on August 6, 2003, seeking documents related to litigation expenses incurred by the BOP between January 1, 1996 and July 31, 2003. In conjunction with the information request, PLN also asked the BOP to waive all associated search and duplication fees, citing the FOIA provision that required a waiver where \"disclosure of the information is in the public interest. . . and not primarily in the commercial interest of the requestor.\" The BOP refused to grant the fee waiver, claiming that PLN had failed to explain how the information request would be of public interest, and that the request was overbroad. PLN appealed the BOP's decision to the U.S. Department of Justice's Office of Information and Privacy, which concluded that PLN's request for a fee waiver had properly been denied. Specifically, PLN did not demonstrate that the information would be communicated to the public and the release of the requested information would not enhance the public's understanding\u2014especially considering that some of the requested documents were already publicly available. After the plaintiff began this action, the defendant filed for summary judgment on November 30, 2005. PLN filed a cross-motion for summary judgment on December 30, 2005. On June 26, 2006, the court concluded that the plaintiff had sufficiently established that disclosure of the requested information was in the public interest because it was likely to contribute significantly to public understanding of the operations or activities of the government. The court also found that the plaintiff had demonstrated its intent and ability to disseminate the information to the relevant public. The defendant stipulated to pay $48,709.72 in attorney's fees and costs. On February 15, 2007, the court first ordered the defendant to process the plaintiff's FOIA request by March 20, 2007. But the defendant continued to request extensions of time to comply. PLN did not oppose the extensions until September 2007, when it noted to the court that compliance was already long overdue. The defendant eventually produced approximately 11,000 pages in response to the plaintiff\u2019s FOIA request, but 2,993 of these pages contained redactions. The defendant stated that these redactions were allowed under specific FOIA exemptions, but the plaintiff claimed that the defendant\u2019s justification was insufficient. PLN filed for judgment on March 28, 2008 and a court order for the defendant to properly comply with the request. The defendants filed a cross-motion for summary judgment. On March 26, 2009, the court ordered the defendant to either search for the records sought by the plaintiff or submit an affidavit indicating that the documents could be properly withheld under FOIA exemptions. On February 25, 2011, the court granted in part and denied in part both parties' motions for summary judgment. It agreed that the defendant had adequately searched for the requested documents, but agreed with the plaintiff that the defendant had not sufficiently justified its use of FOIA exemptions to redact or withhold information. The court requested that the defendant provide additional explanations about the relative weight of competing public and private interests at stake in a sufficiently detailed manner to enable the court to assess whether the exemptions were properly asserted. The court issued a schedule for the defendant to bring itself into compliance with the requirements of Vaughn v. Rosen. A Vaughn index is an itemized, detailed justification of a party\u2019s claims that documents or portions thereof are exempt from FOIA. 484 F.2d 820. In May 2011, the defendant produced a new Vaughn index, which the plaintiff claimed did not sufficiently justify the redactions. In response, the defendant provided the plaintiff with newly redacted documents, and a second supplemental Vaughn index. The plaintiff was still unsatisfied, because the documents contained redactions of individual names, job titles, department descriptions, work addresses, dates of employment, dates of events and entire sentences of text. In a memorandum opinion issued on July 23, 2013, the court ruled in favor of the defendant: it held that the defendant had properly relied on an exemption that allows information to be redacted or withheld if there is a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy that is not outweighed by the public interest. At this time, the case was closed. The plaintiff appealed to the DC Circuit Court on August 22, 2013 (USCA Case Number 12-5269). PLN argued that the district court erred in balancing the individual's privacy interest against the public interest in disclosure. On August 5, 2015, the Court of Appeals held that the defendant had not sufficiently justified its redactions; the court reversed and remanded the district court\u2019s decision. The court concluded that the defendant had combined the privacy interests of all individuals whose information was redacted into categories based on the type of document within which the individual's information appeared. The court found several problems with this categorical methodology: because the categories were centered on specific types of filed documents, they included a wide range of claims covering various degrees of privacy interests. But these privacy interests could be different depending on the claim. The categorical approach failed to distinguish between redacting the identity of the alleged victim and the identity of the alleged perpetrator, and the defendant made no effort to distinguish between the privacy interests of employees who were victims and those who were perpetrators. The court also found that the defendant redacted inconsistently; the names of some alleged perpetrators were redacted while others were not. For all these reasons, the Court of Appeals remanded the case, requiring the defendant to fashion a coherent catalogue of the documents still in dispute and instructing the district court to balance privacy and public interests in light of the defendant\u2019s new submissions. 787 F.3d 1142. On April 3, 2017, the district court approved a settlement. The parties stipulated that the defendant had acceptably produced the documents originally requested by the plaintiff and the defendant agreed to pay $420,000 in the plaintiff's attorneys\u2019 fees and costs. The plaintiff agreed to forever discharge, release, and withdraw any claims of access to records or portions of records previously made in the lawsuit. The case was dismissed and is now closed.", "summary": "On August 6, 2006, Prison Legal News (PLN) submitted a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request to the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) seeking documents related to litigation expenses. They asked the BOP to waive all search and duplication fees under the FOIA. BOP refused to grant the fee waiver and PLN appealed the decision to the Department of Justice.
It is clear that many changes have been made at the subject prison that pertain to the claims alleged in this lawsuit. The changes include, but are not limited to, new administrators, new prison personnel, and new service providers. The Court concludes that the alleged constitutional violations that may have existed at the time this lawsuit was filed no longer exist and, therefore, that the injunctive relief sought by Plaintiffs has not been shown necessary. Accordingly, judgment will be entered in favor of Defendants on all claims.Plaintiffs appealed the judgment to the Fifth Circuit on 1/30/2020. Meanwhile, the District Court taxed costs of $104,380 against the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs moved for a review of the taxation, arguing that the indigent plaintiffs brought a close case, and therefore should not be assessed the plaintiffs costs. The plaintiffs also objected to the defendants\u2019 billing of expenditures that included hotel stays, travel, and dining. Defendants opposed the motion, arguing that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(1) provides that costs \u201cshould be allowed to the prevailing party,\u201d and therefore entitles them to compensation for costs. The case is ongoing.", "summary": "In 2013, prisoners in the East Mississippi Correctional Facility (EMCF) filed a class-action lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 against the Mississippi Department of Corrections, claiming that EMCF violated the Eighth Amendment's Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause. Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that the inhumane living conditions at EMCF, a prison for the mentally ill, harmed inmates. In 2015, the court granted class certification. After engaging in discovery and a bench trial, the parties attempted to settle. After the parties submitted their supplemental expert reports, the parties attempted to settle. However, on January 24, 2019, the parties notified the court that the parties were unable to settle and that future settlement conferences would not be productive. As of March 25, 2019, the case is ongoing."} {"article": "This case is about the refusal of North Carolina's Department of Public Safety (DPS) to recognize Humanism as a faith group within the state prison system. On February 2, 2015, an inmate in a North Carolina prison and the American Humanist Association filed this lawsuit in the Eastern District of North Carolina against officers of the North Carolina Department of Public Safety that are involved in policy decisions related to recognition of faith groups in state prison under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983. Represented by the American Humanist Association's own legal team as well as private counsel, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants' disparate treatment of Humanists violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The plaintiffs sought declaratory relief, a permanent injunction, and attorneys' fees. On July 28, 2017, both the plaintiffs and defendants filed for summary judgment. On March 29, 2018, Judge Terrence W. Boyle granted the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment and denied the defendants' motion for summary judgment. 303 F.Supp.3d 421. The court rejected the defendants' argument that the American Humanist Association did not have standing in this case. Judge Boyle found that the American Humanist Association had associational standing because of its representation of other Humanist inmates incarcerated by the North Carolina Department of Public Safety. Regarding the plaintiffs' First Amendment claim, the court found that the defendants violated the Establishment Clause because the defendants did not have a secular purpose for denying Humanism recognition as a religious group or for their decision to prohibit Humanist inmates from organized group meetings. In addition, the defendants failed to put forth any evidence to support space, resource, or security concerns applicable to Humanist inmates that did not apply equally to other religious groups. Regarding the plaintiffs' Equal Protection claim, the court found that a violation because the defendants' authorized other non-theistic religions but not Humanism and there was not a rational connection between the defendants' cited interests in space, resources, and security and their refusal to recognize Humanism. Judge Boyle granted the plaintiffs' request for a permanent injunction, ordering DPS to recognize Humanism as a faith group and to permit a Humanist study group to meet within North Carolina state prisons on the same terms as other faiths are allowed. He also granted the plaintiffs' request for a declaratory judgment, stating that the defendants violated the Establishment Clause and the Equal Protection Clause by refusing to recognize Humanism as a faith group and to allow it to be designated on an inmate's prison records. Because the plaintiffs suffered constitutional violations at the hands of defendants, the court awarded nominal damages ($1.00) to the plaintiffs. Judge Boyle also awarded the plaintiffs attorneys' fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1988. The court retained jurisdiction to make any further orders necessary to carry out the terms of the relief. On July 9, 2018, the court ordered defendants to pay $5,905.25 to the plaintiffs for various court costs. On July 10, 2018, the plaintiffs withdrew their motion for attorneys' fees and litigation expenses, because the parties privately settled the matter of attorneys fees and expenses. Since the entering of the permanent injunction and motions regarding attorneys fees and costs, there has been no activity in this case. The permanent injunction remains in effect.", "summary": "This case is about the refusal of North Carolina's Department of Public Safety (DPS) to recognize Humanism as a faith group within the North Carolina state prison system. On February 2, 2015, an inmate in a North Carolina prison and the American Humanist Association filed this lawsuit in the Eastern District of North Carolina against officers of the North Carolina Department of Public Safety that are involved in policy decisions related to recognition of faith groups in state prison under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983. They alleged violations of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment, and on March 29, 2018, Judge Terrence W. Boyle granted the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment and denied the defendants' motion. He entered a permanent injunction ordering DPS to recognize Humanism as a faith group and to permit a Humanist study group to meet within North Carolina state prisons on the same terms as other faiths are allowed and entered declaratory judgment. The court also awarded nominal damages and attorneys' fees and costs. Since the entering of the permanent injunction, there has been no activity in this case. The permanent injunction remains in effect."} {"article": "On October 16, 2002, in the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey, private counsel representing a group of New Jersey state prisoners filed a lawsuit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 against contract medical care providers, their executives, and New Jersey corrections officials. In that complaint and a later, amended version, the prisoners alleged that they and their class had been exposed in the state's prisons to the Hepatitis C virus (HCV), or had been admitted to the prisons but not treated for the virus, or had contracted the virus in the prisons. They attributed these conditions to the deliberate indifference of the defendants, which allegedly violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments' protections against cruel and unusual punishment. The plaintiffs also alleged that the defendants' conduct constituted negligence, medical malpractice, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and negligent infliction of emotional distress under state common law, and that the conduct also violated the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 12131 et seq. The plaintiffs sought monetary and injunctive relief. The class plaintiffs sought to represent included all past or present New Jersey state prisoners from between January 1990, and the date of filing the amended complaint, whether or not they had contracted HCV. By the time the court adjudicated the class action issue, in May 2008, the New Jersey Department of Corrections had adopted major changes in how people with HCV were treated. According to papers filed with the court, its new program lined up with the federal Bureau of Prisons approach. In particular, the court (Judge Noel Hillman) found: a. The health care provider for the department, CMS, subcontracted with the Cooper Health System and its Infectious Disease Department to provide infectious disease consultations to inmates. Cooper Hospital is also in the process of reviewing every HCV inmate's medical care to assure compliance with the FBOP's HCV Guidelines. b. All inmates who meet the treatment criteria in the FBOP's HCV Guidelines are offered HCV pharmacologic treatment which they can accept or reject. Inmates who accept HCV medications are given a combination of pegylated interferon in combination with ribavirin. This pharmacologic treatment is FDA approved and recommended for use in the FBOP's HCV guidelines. c. Inmates in New Jersey, including in excess of 7,000 admitted prior to February 1, 2003, have been given a Blood Borne Pathogen Risk Assessment. Inmates identified with a positive risk factor for HCV have been encouraged to consent to a HCV test. d. Any inmate who requests an HCV test is given the test. e. All inmates are given extensive counseling and education materials, a NJDOC video on HCV and direct communications with their healthcare providers. f. The inmates' Electronic Medical Records have been updated with comprehensive HCV forms to assure more consistent and thorough HCV documentation. g. The care and treatment of all HCV inmates is closely tracked. h. CMS compiles and analyzes statistical data regarding New Jersey's HCV program to measure and analyze the effectiveness of the program. The data is shared with the NJDOC. i. The NJDOC monitors the HCV care and treatment given to inmates and CMS is subject to contractual penalties if it does not comply with its contract. Given that the injunctive relief requested by the plaintiffs was this same set of reforms, Judge Hillman denied the request for injunctive relief as moot. In addition, the court found that only prisoners who already had HCV were appropriate plaintiffs in the case--and that there was no evidence that this subset of the putative plaintiffs class was sufficiently numerous to justify class action status. It therefore denied class certification. As to two individual class members who had HCV, the court held there was sufficient evidence in the record to go to trial on their constitutional claims (though not on their Americans with Disabilities Act claims), and denied the state's motion for summary judgment. In October 2009, the case settled for money damages. It seems from some papers filed by one of the plaintiffs that he may never actually have received his money, but when he sought the assistance of the court in enforcing the settlement against his lawyer, Judge Hillman ruled that the court lacked jurisdiction, and directed him to file a collection action in state court.", "summary": "This was a prison medical care case filed in 2002 in the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey, seeking damages and an injunction against contract medical care providers and New Jersey corrections officials. The plaintiffs that the New Jersey prison system was failing to treat them for Hepatitis C. By the time the court adjudicated the class action issue, in May 2008, the New Jersey Department of Corrections had adopted major changes in how prisoners with HCV were treated; it updated its procedures to match those of the federal Bureau of Prisons, and \"backscreened\" all the prisoners willing to be screened for the virus. Given that the injunctive relief requested by the plaintiffs was this same set of reforms, Judge Hillman denied the request for injunctive relief as moot. As to two individual class members who had HCV, the court held there was sufficient evidence in the record to go to trial on their constitutional claims (though not on their Americans with Disabilities Act claims), and denied the state's motion for summary judgment. In October 2009, the case settled for money damages. (However, it seems from some papers filed by one of the plaintiffs that he may never actually have received his money. But when he sought the assistance of the court in enforcing the settlement against his lawyer, Judge Hillman ruled that the court lacked jurisdiction, and directed him to file a collection action in state court. )"} {"article": "On December 3, 2008, plaintiff, a prisoner who is an ordained Pentecostal minister, filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court of the District of New Jersey under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 2000cc, et seq. (\"RLUIPA\") against the Commissioner of the New Jersey Department of Corrections and the Administrator at the New Jersey State Prison (NJSP). The plaintiff, represented by the ACLU, asked the court for nominal damages and to enjoin defendants from prohibiting plaintiff from preaching and ministering to other inmates, from leading religious services, and from teaching religious classes. Specifically, plaintiff claimed that defendants violated plaintiff's First Amendment right by implementing a policy banning all prisoners from preaching in the prison. Plaintiff had preached at weekly worship services at NJSP for more than a decade when prison officials issued a blanket ban on all preaching by inmates, even when done under the direct supervision of prison staff. On February 23, 2009, the U.S. District Court (Judge Anne E. Thompson) issued an order denying plaintiff's request for preliminary injunction. The court noted that prisoners may preach to small groups of no larger than six people, but may not lead large groups for security reasons. On November 25, 2009, the parties filed a Stipulation of Dismissal, as the claims in the action had been resolved by the parties.", "summary": "On December 3, 2008, plaintiff, a prisoner who is an ordained Pentecostal minister, filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court of the District of New Jersey under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 2000cc, et seq. (\"RLUIPA\") against the Commissioner of the New Jersey Department of Corrections and the Administrator at the New Jersey State Prison (NJSP). Specifically, plaintiff claimed that defendants violated plaintiff's First Amendment right by implementing a policy banning all prisoners from preaching in the prison. During the litigation, the state changed its policy to allow the plaintiff to preach to groups of six or fewer prisoners, and on November 25, 2009, the parties filed a Stipulation of Dismissal, as the claims in the action had been resolved by the parties."} {"article": "On July 31, 2015, an inmate at the Northern Nevada Correctional Center (NNCC) living with hepatitis C filed this lawsuit in the District Court of Nevada. Representing himself, the plaintiff sued numerous medical and administrative personnel at the prison under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 for violation of his Eighth Amendment right against cruel and unusual punishment. He claimed that the defendants demonstrated deliberate indifference to serious medical needs resulting from his hepatitis C. The plaintiff sought declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief, including nominal, punitive, and compensatory damages. Plaintiff's bloodwork had revealed he was suffering from irreparable liver damage and was at risk of death from liver failure. Plaintiff had repeatedly informed defendants of his condition since his incarceration in 2012, but received no treatment. Specifically, his requests for Harvoni, a treatment that would cure his hepatitis C, were denied for being \"too expensive.\" According to the complaint, one defendant, a doctor who sits on the hepatitis committee at the prison, told plaintiff that \"the courts look to us [NNCC doctors] for medical opinions. So whether you need treatment or not, if we say you don't, the Court will side with us.\" In January 2016, the court stayed the case to allow opportunity for the parties to settle. An Inmate Early Mediation Conference was scheduled for May 17, 2016. Plaintiff filed a motion for an Inmate Advocate, whose role is to help the inmate to understand mediation proceedings, but was denied. On May 6, 2016, the parties asked for a time extension, as they were confident they would soon settle the case through informal settlement negotiations and wanted to avoid waste of judicial resources as well as the plaintiff's $350 filing fee. Plaintiff had previously filed to proceed in forma pauperis, but would still be responsible for the $350 regardless of the court's ruling on his motion, which would only occur if mediation failed to resolve the case. Ten days later the parties filed to dismiss the case with prejudice, with each party bearing their own costs. The terms of the private settlement agreement are unknown. The case is now closed.", "summary": "In July 2015, an inmate at the Northern Nevada Correctional Center living with hepatitis C filed this lawsuit in the District Court of Nevada in Reno. Representing himself, he claimed that the defendants, medical and administration personnel at the prison, violated his Eighth Amendment rights through deliberate indifference to serious medical needs resulting from his hepatitis C. In May 2016, the parties reached a private settlement agreement, the terms of which are unknown."} {"article": "On May 5, 1980, inmates of the Special Housing Unit in the Attica Correctional Facility in New York filed a class action lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 against the New York Department of Corrections in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of New York. The plaintiffs, represented by the Legal Aid Society and Prisoners' Legal Services of New York, asked the Court for declaratory and injunctive relief and alleged the following constitutional violations: the use of excessive force by prison guards, inhibition of religious exercise, inadequate ventilation, inadequate exercise, inadequate health care, denial of food, lack of sanitation, deprivation of clothing, improper classification, and denial of access to courts. On January 28, 1988, the U.S. District Court for the Western District of New York (Judge Michael A. Telesca) granted preliminary injunctive relief to the plaintiffs. The defendants appealed. On June 13, 1988, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit (Judge Wilfred Feinberg) affirmed the District Court's decision to grant the preliminary injunction. Eng v. Smith, 849 F.2d 80 (2nd Cir. 1988). Previously, on October 9, 1985, the prison correctional officers' union (Council 82) asked the District Court to allow them to intervene as defendants in the case. On April 1, 1988, the District Court (Judge Telesca) denied the request for intervention. The would-be interveners appealed. On January 12, 1989, the Second Circuit (Judge Joseph Edward Lumbard) dismissed the appeal. Eng v. Coughlin, 865 F.2d 521 (2nd Cir. 1989). On November 2, 1992, the parties entered into a partial settlement agreement, which the District Court (Judge William Skretny) entered as a Consent Decree in the case. On February 10, 1995, the court approved a stipulated dismissal of the plaintiffs' claims regarding food, exercise, sanitation, and religion. On March 9, 1998, the District Court approved the voluntarily dismissal of plaintiffs' claims relating to the mental health issue. Discovery and negotiations continued on the remaining issues for several years. On April 29, 2002, the District Court approved the plaintiffs' voluntary stipulation of dismissal and dismissed without prejudice the remaining claims of inadequate access to the law library and to legal research materials for monolingual Spanish speaking inmates. No further substantive action is reflected on the PACER docket.", "summary": "This case was brought, pro se, by a prisoner housed in the Special Housing Unit of New York's Attica prison, and then litigated by NY Prisoners Legal Services. It concerned conditions of confinement in that unit, including excessive force, religion, sanitation and nutrition, access to courts, and medical and mental health care. The parties settled, piecemeal, between 1992 and 2002."} {"article": "On September 29, 1997, prisoners at various facilities within the New York State Department of Corrections filed a class action lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 against Department officials. The plaintiffs, represented by Prisoners Legal Services of New York, brought the suit in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of New York, challenging the systemic deprivation of religious rights of Native American prisoners, in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. They asked the court for injunctive relief on behalf of all Native American prisoners in New York's correctional facilities who, because of the defendants' policies, were denied the opportunity to possess symbolic items necessary for religious practice; to engage in spiritual practices, including seasonal ceremonies and meetings for prayer or study; and to chant and dance, both in congregations and individually. For approximately the following year and a half, the parties engaged in discovery. On March 24, 1999, and then July 9, 1999, the court (Judge Charles J. Siragusa) held settlement conferences. On that date, the parties entered into a Settlement Agreement, approved by the court the same day. The parties agreed to create a Native American chaplain position, to allow inmates to practice their religion through group meetings, to possess certain religious items, and to celebrate religious holidays with family members. The Agreement also provided for staff notification and training as to the Native Americans' rights, and for a two-year observation period to follow entry of the Agreement in order to ensure compliance. On February 16, 2000, the parties filed a Joint Supplemental Response to the Plaintiffs' Report of Comments, dated December 14, 1999, reflecting their agreed-to interpretation of certain provisions of the Settlement Agreement. These provisions included the role of the chaplain, the burning of Indian tobacco after corrections facilities become smoke-free, and the guests able to be invited to religious ceremonies. Subsequently, on September 8, 2000, the court (Judge Siragusa) entered a decision and order approving the dismissal of the action pursuant to the terms of the Settlement Agreement. The case was closed the same day.", "summary": "In 1997, prisoners at various facilities within the New York State Department of Corrections filed a class action lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 against Department officials. The plaintiffs, represented by Prisoners Legal Services of New York, brought the suit in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of New York, challenging the systemic deprivation of religious rights of Native American prisoners, in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. In 2000, the parties reached a settlement and the court dismissed the case."} {"article": "On September 29, 2003, a group of paraplegic prisoners, proceeding pro se, filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York against prison officials. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants failed to provide adequate medical care in violation their rights under the Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments. Specifically, they alleged that prison officials failed to provide adequate bladder care and treatment, such as proper use of disposable catheters, properly sterilized catheters, and access to urologists. The plaintiffs also alleged that the defendants unlawfully discriminated against them by failing to construct wheelchair-amenable cells and failing to provide recreational activities, in violation of the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. The plaintiffs sought money damages and injunctive relief. By the time the amended complaint had been filed, all plaintiffs had been transferred to facilities in the Western District of New York. Judge Deborah A. Batts considered and denied the defendants' motion to dismiss the case for improper venue. In her unpublished order of August 26, 2005, however, Judge Batts granted the defendants' motion to transfer venue to the Western District of New York. Under the new case number 05-cv-6504, the case was reassigned to Judge Charles J. Siragusa. On December 14, 2005, Judge Siragusa granted a temporary restraining order directing the defendants to supply plaintiffs with six new single-use catheters per day. This was lifted on September 15, 2006, and Judge Siragusa ordered the defendants to instead supply the plaintiffs with soap and water sufficient for cleaning catheters after reuse. On May 29, 2007, the plaintiffs filed the third and final amended complaint. On May 30, 2009, the plaintiffs filed a motion for class certification. However, the court held the plaintiffs' motion in abeyance from 2010 through 2011 while the parties engaged in settlement discussions. On May 31, 2013, Judge Siragusa approved a joint stipulation that an expert visit the correctional facilities to review the conditions raised by plaintiffs. The expert was supposed to report back by August 16, 2013. However, as of April 23, 2014, there had been no activity in the docket. Although the judge ordered that counsel provide a joint status report to the court by December 11, 2015, the parties failed to do so. On October 10, 2017, the judge ordered the parties to show cause why the case should not be dismissed for failure to prosecute. In the plaintiffs' response, they said their lack of reporting to the court was based on a misunderstanding and that the parties had resumed settlement negotiations in September 2017. The plaintiffs noted that they had submitted a settlement proposal to the defendants and that the parties were in the process of negotiating. After several months of mediation, the parties were unable to reach a settlement agreement. On October 4, 2019, the court certified the plaintiffs' class, and pre-trial preparations began. The order identified the class as \"Plaintiffs and all prisoners in the custody of the New York State Department of Correctional and Community Supervision who suffer from a mobility disability limiting one or more of the prisoners major life activities and that requires the use of a wheelchair.\" On November 15, 2019, the court ordered plaintiffs' counsel to file a status letter within 30 days, and for the parties to confer and indicate to the court whether or not the matter this action was ready for trial. After nearly ten months passed with no status letter, the court issued an order to show cause on August 6, 2020. The plaintiffs responded and the court directed them to contact Magistrate Judge Mark W. Pedersen for a scheduling conference. In early 2021, the court set a discovery schedule. This case is ongoing.", "summary": "On September 29, 2003, a group of paraplegic prisoners, proceeding pro se, filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York against prison officials. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants failed to provide adequate medical care in violation their rights under the Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments. After extensive settlement negotiations and mediation, the parties were unable to reach and agreement. This case is proceeding to trial."} {"article": "On January 21, 2003, Plaintiff. a prisoner in an Oklahoma correctional center, filed a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. \u00a71983 in the United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma, alleging that his Constitutional rights under the Free Exercise Clause were being violated by the Oklahoma Department of Corrections' refusal to provide him with a Kosher diet. In June 2003, the court (Judge Wayne Alley) consolidated Plaintiff's case with two other similar complaints. All three prisoners filed their complaints pro se and were appointed counsel. The prisoners won both preliminary and permanent injunctive relief requiring the Oklahoma Department of Corrections to provide them a Kosher diet at no personal cost. On the merits, the district court (Judge Lee West) noted that in the Tenth Circuit, 'prisoners have a constitutional right to a diet conforming to their sincerely held religious beliefs, unless a state's decision to deny inmates access to such a diet 'is reasonably related to a legitimate penological interest,'' citing Beerheide v. Suthers, 286 F.3d 1179, 1184 (10th Cir. 2002). The court then conducted a four-part test per Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987), and concluded that the balance of the factors weighed in favor of the prisoners. At the worst, the state's budgetary concerns paled in comparison to the irreparable harm of the loss of a First Amendment freedom for the plaintiffs. The court granted the prisoners' motions for summary judgment, giving plaintiffs seven days to submit a proposed judgment and permanent injunction. That permanent injunction, issued February 8, 2006, ordered the Director of the Oklahoma Department of Corrections 'to immediately provide to the plaintiffs Kosher diets at no cost, [while complying with nutritional requirements currently applicable to all other ODOC prisoners].' The court held that 'the injunction is necessary to remedy a violation of these plaintiffs' rights to freely exercise their Orthodox Jewish religion as guaranteed by the First Amendment to the United States Constitution.' See Fulbright v. Jones, 2006 WL 222807 (U.S.D.C. W.D. Okla.). The court also awarded attorneys' fees. On September 26, 2012, the Court found that the judgment entered in this case only applies to the claims pursued by the three named plaintiffs, and the permanent injunction relief does not apply to all Oklahoma Department of Corrections inmates.", "summary": "On January 21, 2003, an Oklahoma Department of Corrections prisoner filed a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. \u00a71983 in the United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma, alleging that his Constitutional rights under the Free Exercise Clause were being violated by the Oklahoma Department of Corrections' refusal to provide him with a Kosher diet. The case was consolidated to include the complaints of two other prisoners. The prisoners won both preliminary and permanent injunctive relief requiring the Oklahoma Department of Corrections to provide them a Kosher diet at no personal cost. The permanent injunction, issued February 8, 2006, ordered the Director of the Oklahoma Department of Corrections 'to immediately provide to the plaintiffs Kosher diets at no cost, [while complying with nutritional requirements currently applicable to all other ODOC prisoners].' On September 26, 2012 the Court found that the judgment entered in this case only applies to the claims pursued by the three named plaintiffs, and the permanent injunction relief does not apply to all Oklahoma Department of Corrections inmates."} {"article": "The plaintiff was a transgender woman who filed this pro se suit in the District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma on November 7, 2013. At the time of filing, she was housed in a men's prison. The prison had denied her access to transition-related care and accommodations, which she claimed amounted to a violation of her rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment. The complaint named as defendants the Director of the Oklahoma Department of Corrections, the Chief Medical Officer of the DOC, the Warden of the prison, the Correctional Health Services Provider, and the psychologist and doctor who provided the plaintiff care while incarcerated. Each were named in both their individual and official capacity. The case was assigned to Judge Timothy D. DeGiusti in District Court and Judges Gorsuch, O'Brien, and Holmes in the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals. The plaintiff had requested injunctive relief, including medical staff trained to prescribe transition-related care consistent with the WPATH standards, an adequate and reliable dosage of Hormone Replacement Therapy, clothing and undergarments consistent with her gender identity, and transfer to a women's facility. At the time of filing her complaint she also filed motions for a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction. Both were denied by the District Court on May 9, 2014 (2014 WL 1875102). The Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of the preliminary injunction without comment on the TRO for lack of jurisdiction on Feb 3, 2015 (601 Fed.Appx. 632). On January 21, 2015, the Magistrate Judge issued a Report and Recommendation that recommended the court grant the defendant's motion to dismiss/motion for summary judgment. On Mar 18, 2015, Judge DeGiusti adopted this recommendation in its entirety. On the same day, he dismissed the claims against all defendants in their individual capacities without prejudice, and all the claims against them in their official capacity with prejudice. The plaintiff objected to the Report and Recommendation. On March 30, 2015, she filed a Motion for Independent Action for Relief from Judgment. Two weeks later, on April 13, 2015, the court denied the motion. The court affirmed that the rulings in the March 17, 2015 order were correct, finding that the plaintiff failed to state sufficient facts challenging the findings. The case is now closed.", "summary": "On November 7, 2013, a trans woman housed in a mens prison in Oklahoma filed a pro se case against prison staff and administration in the District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma. She claims that she has been denied appropriate transition related care and accommodations, amounting to a violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Her request for a TRO and preliminary injunction were denied at the district court level, and the circuit court affirmed the denial of the preliminary injunction without comment on the TRO for lack of jurisdiction. On April 3, 2015, the district court granted defendants' motion to dismiss, dismissing the claims against all defendants in their individual capacities without prejudice, and all the claims against them in their official capacity with prejudice. Though the plaintiff objected to the dismissal, the Court denied her motion and affirmed the dismissal."} {"article": "On December 7, 2011, plaintiff, a male prisoner, filed a complaint in the U.S. District Court of the Middle District of Pennsylvania under Bivens against the Federal Bureau of Prisons. The plaintiff, represented by public interest lawyers, asked the court for compensatory and punitive damages on behalf of himself and an injunction preventing defendants from continuing their unconstitutional housing, recreation, and restraint patterns, practices and policies on behalf of all current and future United States Penitentiary (USP) Lewisburg prisoners. On July 27, 2012, the plaintiff filed an amended complaint against all defendants. Specifically, the plaintiff claimed that the defendants violated plaintiff's right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution by forcing him to share a cell with a hostile prisoner, which caused a threat of violence, and by placing him in painful restraints that caused injury for prolonged periods on multiple occasions for refusing dangerous cell assignments with hostile prisoners; and that defendants violated his right to due process under the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution by depriving him of any meaningful process prior to and during their use of punitive measures against him. Plaintiff claimed that defendants engaged in a pattern, practice, or policy of placing hostile inmates together and putting those who refuse placement in brutal restraints for long periods of time. In 2008, the Bureau of Prisons created the Special Management Unit (SMU) at USP Lewisburg to serve prisoners who present unique security and management concerns including prisoners who participated in or led group/gang-related activity. Prisoners participate in intake interviews, in part to allow officials to gather information about the prisoners so as to make safe and appropriate placement decisions. On April 9, 2013, the U.S. District Court (Judge William B. Nealon) granted in part and denied in part defendant's motion to dismiss and declined to certify the class. 2013 WL 1452962. The plaintiff subsequently filed a petition to for leave to appeal the denial of class certification on April 23, 2013 to the Third Circuit, and the docket number 13-8046 was assigned. On October 3, 2014, the U.S. District Court granted an enlargement of time for discovery until after the Third Circuit Court of Appeals issues a decision on Richardson's appeal of his class certification claims, and the Third Circuit Court of Appeals has decided that Richardson's appeal will be held pending their decision in Shelton v. Bledsoe. On October 8, 2014, the U.S. District Court issued an order staying the case, pending further order of the court, and ordering the action administratively closed until after the Third Circuit Court of appeals issues a decision on Richardson's appeal of his class certification claims. On July 15, 2016, the Third Circuit reversed and remanded, determining that the class-wide claims for injunctive relief were not moot even though the individual plaintiff no longer had a personal stake in the class action. 829 F.3d 273. The Court of Appeals additionally ordered costs from appellees. The district court lifted the stay on November 1, 2016 following the remand. The parties filed a joint case management plan on January 20, 2017. Plaintiff moved to certify the class on January 27, 2017. On June 26, 2017, Magistrate Judge Martin C. Carlson recommended that the court provisionally certify the class. The court denied the motion to certify the class without prejudice on October 17, 2017 because the plaintiff had not introduced any evidence to support the motion for class certification and therefore, the plaintiff had not affirmatively shown compliance with Rule 23's requirements of sufficiently numerous parties and common questions of law or fact. The plaintiff was granted leave to refile the motion for class certification within a reasonable time after discovery was complete. The case was referred to Magistrate Judge Susan Schwab on June 6, 2018 for discovery disputes. On April 12, 2019, in the midst of ongoing discovery, the court ordered the resolution of the final discovery dispute. The court ordered the plaintiff to disclose the names of prisoners who may have information relevant to the claims in this case listed on his privilege log. On July 10, 2019, the court ordered the plaintiff's motion and its supporting brief for class certification was due by September 30, 2019. The defendant's opposition to the class certification was due by November 18, 2019, and the plaintiff's reply was due by December 9, 2019. As of October 31, 2019, the case was ongoing.", "summary": "On July 27, 2012, plaintiff, a male prisoner, filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court of the Middle District of Pennsylvania under Bivens against the Federal Bureau of Prisons. Specifically, the plaintiff claimed that the defendants violated plaintiff's right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution by forcing him to share a cell with a hostile prisoner, which caused a threat of violence, and by placing him in painful restraints that caused injury for prolonged periods on multiple occasions for refusing dangerous cell assignments with hostile prisoners; and that defendants violated his right to due process under the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution by depriving him of any meaningful process prior to and during their use of punitive measures against him. On April 9, 2013, the U.S. District Court (Judge William B. Nealon) granted in part and denied in part defendant's motion to dismiss, declining to certify the class. The Third Circuit reversed and remanded the district court's denial of class action certification on June 15, 2016, but the district court again denied certification. Litigation is ongoing."} {"article": "On May 18, 2015, a prisoner at the Mahanoy State Correctional Institute filed this complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania. The complaint arose out of the plaintiff\u2019s hospitalization for Hepatitis C. The plaintiff sued the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections (DOC) and the Bureau of Health Care Services of the DOC. The initial complaint claimed violations of First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The plaintiff claimed that, while hospitalized, the plaintiff\u2019s attorneys were barred from visiting him and all communication between plaintiff and his attorney was prohibited. Represented by a local public interest firm called the Abolitionist Law Center, the plaintiff requested monetary damages and motioned for an immediate preliminary injunction ordering the defendants to allow the attorneys access to the plaintiff. District Judge Robert D. Mariani was assigned to the case. The plaintiff is a high-profile Black Panther activist from Philadelphia. In 1982, he was convicted of murdering a Philadelphia police officer in a high-profile case. However, the plaintiff did not allege specific discrimination here. On May 26, 2015, the plaintiff withdrew his motion for preliminary injunction, notifying the court that the defendants allowed the attorneys access to the plaintiff. On November 24, plaintiff filed a supplemental and amended complaint that added the medical facility as defendants and alleged new claims. That complaint was filed under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 and alleged that defendants violated the plaintiff\u2019s Eighth Amendment rights. The complaint also alleged that the DOC was negligently liable for medical malpractice. Specifically, the complaint alleged that plaintiff was denied treatment after he was diagnosed with Hepatitis C and a severe skin condition. The plaintiff alleged that during his hospitalization, he was denied available antiviral drugs. On August 24, 2015, plaintiff filed another motion for a preliminary injunction. He requested that the court order the defendants to immediately administer the antiviral drugs and grant the plaintiff a right to in-person consultation with a doctor of his choice. The motion also requested that the court grant a permanent injunction permitting the plaintiff attorney-client and family visits once he received inpatient medical treatment. On September 18, 2015 Magistrate Judge Karoline Mehalchick recommended that plaintiff\u2019s motion for preliminary injunction be denied for failure to exhaust administrative remedies and because the plaintiff had failed to show irreparable injury. 2015 WL 12116641. Essentially, the judge found that although Hepatitis C is a serious medical need, given the number of inmates who file and want the court to intervene in their treatment, the plaintiff's condition had not progressed to the point where any court intervention was warranted. On December 7, 2015, the DOC medical staff (medical defendants) filed a motion to dismiss the amended complaint for failure to state a claim, and on January 4, 2016, the DOC also filed a motion to dismiss the amended complaint. Both parties began briefing both the motions to dismiss and the preliminary injunction. After several requests for extensions, Judge Mariani ordered both parties to submit briefs on the motions by March 11, 2016. On April 4, 2016, defendants filed a motion to strike a portion of the complaint on the grounds that it was immaterial. Judge Mariani denied that motion on June 3, 2016, finding that nothing was irrelevant or immaterial in the cited paragraphs of the amended complaint. On June 21, 2016, DOC defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. At the same time, the court denied the medical defendants\u2019 motion to dismiss. Defendants had argued that the plaintiff failed to exhaust all his administrative remedies through the prison before filing the suit, specifically claiming that he had not filed a grievance specific to his Hepatitis C treatment. Judge Mariani disagreed, finding that the plaintiff had filed the appropriate grievances through the prison. On August 5, 2016, the court granted in part and denied in part the DOC defendants\u2019 motion to dismiss. Judge Mariani dismissed plaintiff\u2019s request for monetary damage from the prison superintendent on the grounds that plaintiff could not recover against him in his official capacity. The state negligence claims were also dismissed -- defendant was entitled to sovereign immunity because he was not a health care employee under Pennsylvania State Law. That same day, he granted the medical facility\u2019s motion to dismiss. The plaintiff was granted time to file an amended complaint, which he filed on August 16, 2016. The following week, Judge Mariani denied the plaintiff\u2019s motion for a preliminary injunction. In his opinion he concluded the plaintiff had been denied proper medical treatment, but that the named defendants were not the appropriate defendants. The named defendants were not members of the Hepatitis C Treatment Review Committee and therefore the court could not properly issue an injunction against them. Though reaching the same result, Judge Mariani refused to adopt Magistrate Judge Karoline Mehalchick's report and recommendations from 2015 because Judge Mariani found that the court had significant new evidence from the evidentiary hearing that raised new issues. On January 10, 2017, Judge Mariani dismissed the defendants\u2019 summary judgment motion as moot, and on January 17, 2017 the plaintiff filed a third amended complaint. On May 4, 2017, Judge Mariani granted a motion to consolidate this case with another, Abu-Jamal v. Wetzel because of the common questions concerning Pennsylvania medical care. On June 26, 2017, Judge Mariani referred the case to the Court\u2019s Prison Litigation Settlement Committee to facilitate discussions. On August 23, 2017, the plaintiff filed his fourth amended complaint, which the defendants moved to dismiss. The court-appointed mediator reported on October 27, 2017 that a settlement had not yet been reached. On May 10, 2018, Judge Mariani denied the medical defendants\u2019 motion to dismiss, finding that the plaintiff had sufficiently alleged that the medical defendants were personally involved in the failure to treat his Hepatitis C and that he received only superficial treatment by the medical defendants. Judge Mariani next reviewed the DOC defendants\u2019 motion to dismiss: he granted the DOC defendants\u2019 motion to dismiss the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections as a defendant because the plaintiff did not oppose that dismissal, but denied the DOC defendants\u2019 motion in all other respects. On June 11, 2018, the DOC defendants appealed the decision to the US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. The Court of Appeals affirmed in part and dismissed appeal in part on July 19, 2019 (779 Fed.Appx. 893). On January 30, 2020, both the DOC defendants and the medical defendants filed for summary judgment and are awaiting the court's response as of September 15, 2020.", "summary": "In 2015, a prisoner at the Mahanoy State Correctional Institute filed this complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania. The plaintiff alleged that the defendants denied him necessary medical treatment, in violation of his Eighth Amendment rights. In May 2018, the district judge denied the defendants' motions to dismiss, which the defendants appealed to the Third Circuit. As of March 23, 2020, the case is still ongoing."} {"article": "On June 9, 2017, three mentally ill prisoners of the U.S. Penitentiary at Lewisburg (USP Lewisburg) filed this class-action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania. The case was assigned to Judge Yvette Kane. The plaintiffs sued the Federal Bureau of Prisons, alleging that the defendants\u2019 failure to provide adequate treatment for prisoners with mental illness constituted cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The plaintiffs alleged that they were deprived of medication, received puzzles and coloring pages in lieu of treatment, and had five-minute conversations in the public showers with mental health professionals instead of formal therapy sessions. Represented by the Pennsylvania Institutional Law Project, Washington Lawyers\u2019 Committee, and private counsel, the plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief. On August 11, 2017, the plaintiffs moved for class certification. The class would consist of all persons who were, as of the filing date of the complaint in this case, or are now, or will be in the future, confined to the custody of the United States Bureau of Prisons in the United States Penitentiary Lewisburg and suffer from a Serious Mental Illness or a Mental Illness, requiring treatment under one or more of the BOP\u2019s CARE levels. On October 2, 2017, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim or, in the alternative, a motion for summary judgement. In the two weeks after filing the motion, the defendants filed a motion to stay the plaintiff\u2019s motion for class certification pending their motion to dismiss and a statement of material facts containing records of the plaintiff\u2019s interactions with mental health services. The defendant argued that the plaintiffs\u2019 complaint did not sufficiently demonstrate that the defendants failed to provide treatment; rather, it merely demonstrated that the plaintiffs disagreed with the treatments that the medical professionals prescribed for them. On December 7, 2017, the court granted the defendants\u2019 motion to stay class certification until after the defendants\u2019 motion to dismiss was decided. On June 20, 2018, Magistrate Judge Schwab issued a report recommending that the defendants\u2019 motion to dismiss be denied. She found that the plaintiffs had not actually raised separate Eighth Amendment conditions-of-confinement claim in their complaint, but invited the plaintiffs to do so in an amended complaint if so desired. With regard to the Eighth Amendment medical care claims, the Magistrate Judge found that the plaintiffs had sufficiently alleged facts to state a claim of deliberate indifference, and so denied the motion to dismiss on that basis as well. The defendants also argued that the plaintiffs' complaint violated the favorable termination rule (by challenging the duration of their confinement), but the Magistrate Judge recommended that the court temporarily deny the motion to dismiss on that objection. The plaintiffs objected to the recommendation saying that they did not challenge the duration of their confinement, nor did they raise Eighth Amendment conditions claims. On October 26, 2018 Judge Yvette Kane adopted the Magistrate Judge's recommendation insofar as it denied the defendants motion to dismiss, motion for summary judgment, and motion to stay discovery. The case was then reassigned to Magistrate Judge Schwab. Over the following months, Magistrate Judge Schwab issued several orders. The first, on November 27, 2018, granted the plaintiffs motion for a protective order. The second, on February 22, 2019, denied class certification without prejudice. Discovery continued in the wake of these orders. On November 20, 2019, Chief Judge Christopher C. Conner issued a verbal order reassigning the case from Judge Yvette Kane to Judge Jennifer P. Wilson, and the plaintiffs again moved for class certification. On January 29, 2020, Magistrate Judge Schwab issued an order requiring that plaintiffs show cause why their claims should not be denied as moot and also issued a recommendation that the plaintiff's motion for class certification be denied due to lack of numerosity, among other grounds. On February 24, 2021, Judge Wilson declined to adopt Magistrate Judge Schwab's recommendation to deny the class certification due to lack of numerosity and recommitted the matter to Magistrate Judge Schwab with instructions to make further findings on whether the plaintiff's claims had been rendered moot by the closure of the Special Management Unit at USP Lewisburg. On March 23, 2021, the plaintiffs filed a stipulation of dismissal after conferring with Defendant's counsel. Both parties agreed that the subject of the plaintiff's legal action had been mooted by the closure of SMU at USP Lewisburg and the transfer of the named plaintiffs to other prisons within the BOP. The case was terminated on March 24, 2021.", "summary": "In June 2017, three mentally ill prisoners of the U.S. Penitentiary at Lewisburg (USP Lewisburg) filed this class-action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania. The plaintiffs sued USP Lewisburg and the Federal Bureau of Prisons, alleging that the defendants\u2019 failure to provide adequate treatment for prisoners with mental illness constituted cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The plaintiffs eventually dismissed their claims."} {"article": "On October 8, 2008, 47 prisoners filed a complaint under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 1346, against the federal government, in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Texas. Plaintiffs alleged that as a result of Hurricane Rita they were subject to inhumane and unsanitary conditions of confinement. Plaintiffs also alleged that the conditions under which they were employed at a UNICOR factory manufacturing Kevlar helmets for a Department of Defense contract were similarly inhumane. Plaintiffs alleged that as a result of a delay in production caused by Hurricane Rita they were forced to work grueling days in unsanitary conditions, while also being subject to confinement at the Beaumont Federal Correctional Institution which was heavily damaged by Hurricane Rita and not fit to house prisoners. In February 2009, the U.S. moved to dismiss the case, and in the alternative for summary judgment. Briefing was voluminous, but appears to have ended in October 2009. As of March 2012, the judge had not decided the motion -- and issued a notice stating his intention to decide it soon. This did not happen, however. While the motion was pending, in October 2012, the plaintiffs' lawyer died. No other lawyer appeared to take his place. A year later, in December 2013, Magistrate Judge Giblin recommended that the case be dismissed for failure to prosecute. District Court Judge Marcia Crone adopted that recommendation, and dismissed the case without prejudice should one or more of the plaintiffs decide to refile. It does not appear that any plaintiff objected.", "summary": "47 inmates at the Beaumont Federal Correctional Institution in Midland, Texas filed a complaint against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act. Plaintiffs alleged that the conditions at Beaumont were unsanitary and inhumane, and that as a result of damage to the building caused by Hurricane Rita, they were subjected to confinement in a building unfit for inhabitants. Plaintiffs also alleged they were entitled to damages for working conditions endured while working in a UNICOR factory manufacturing Kevlar helmets. Defendant moved for dismissal or summary judgment in the alternate. Several years later, but before the district court ruled, plaintiffs' counsel died, and the case was dismissed without prejudice for failure to prosecute."} {"article": "On May 21, 2012, a Native American prisoner incarcerated at the McConnell Unit of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice (TDCJ) filed this lawsuit, pro se, in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas. The plaintiff sued five TDCJ employees under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983: the Director of TDCJ, the Director of Chaplaincy Department, two chaplains, and the Deputy Director of Prison and Jail Operations. He claimed that TDCJ policies violated his rights under RLUIPA and the First Amendment. Specifically, he alleged that the TDCJ policies burdened the exercise of his religious beliefs by preventing him from: 1) smoking a prayer pipe during Native American pipe ceremonies; 2) wearing a religiously significant medicine bag other than within his cell and to and from religious ceremonies; 3) growing long hair, or alternatively, a kouplock, which is \u201ca one inch square section of hair at the base of the skull.\u201d Furthermore, he claimed the grooming policy violated his right to equal protection, because female prisoners were permitted to wear their hair long, but males were not. The plaintiff sought declaratory and injunctive relief requiring TDCJ to: 1) hire more Native American chaplains; 2) have security personnel available to supervise ceremonies until more chaplains could be hired; 3) allow the plaintiff to grow his hair, or alternatively, a kouplock; 4) smoke a prayer pipe at pipe ceremonies; and 5) wear medicine bags at all times. In addition, the plaintiff sought damages and attorney\u2019s fees and costs. Immediately after filing the complaint, the plaintiff moved to join another Native American prisoner claiming to experience the same deprivations, to whom the Court granted leave to join in June 2012. On June 12, 2012, Judge Nelva Gonzales Ramos ordered the consolidation of Davis v. Thaler, docket number 2:12-cv-169 in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas, with this case because the two were duplicates of each other. At an evidentiary hearing held in front of Magistrate Judge B. Janice Ellington on June 21, 2012, the plaintiff orally moved for and was granted permission to add three employees as defendants: the Program Analyst for Designated Units, the Director of Rehabilitative Programs, and the McConnell Unit Chaplain. The plaintiffs again moved to add an additional defendant on July 12, 2012, and Judge Ellington permitted the Regional Chaplain to be added the following September. On August 16, 2012, the initial plaintiff moved for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunctive relief. He alleged that he was not being allowed adequate time with his co-plaintiff in the law library to work on their lawsuit. Judge Ellington recommended denying this motion because the plaintiff had not explained what he could accomplish with more law library time and thus, did not suffer an irreparable injury. 2012 WL 4955289. Judge Ramos adopted these recommendations and denied the motion on October 16, 2012. 2012 WL 4959409. On August 30, 2012, the McConnell Unit Chaplain filed a motion to dismiss, to which the plaintiffs agreed. The claims against McConnell Unit Chaplain were dismissed with prejudice. On October 10, 2012, the Program Analyst moved to dismiss the claims against him. Judge Ellington recommended dismissing the plaintiffs\u2019 claims for monetary damages against the Program Analyst in his official capacity, dismissing plaintiffs\u2019 claims for injunctive relief against the Program Analyst in his individual capacity, and retaining the plaintiffs\u2019 First Amendment claim for monetary damages against the Program Analyst in his individual capacity. On January 7, 2013, Judge Ramos adopted this recommendation. The plaintiffs then filed an amended complaint on February 11, 2013 and consented to having a Magistrate Judge conduct all further proceedings. Shortly after, on February 22, 2013, they voluntarily dismissed all of their claims except their three RLUIPA challenges against the TDCJ Director in his official capacity and their First Amendment claim seeking damages against the Program Analyst in his individual capacity. The defendants also consented to proceed before a Magistrate Judge and Judge Ramos reassigned the case to Magistrate Judge Ellington for all further proceedings on April 29, 2013. The defendants filed a motion for summary judgment on July 8, 2013. The plaintiffs responded with a cross-motion for summary judgment on July 19, 2013. Judge Ellington granted the defendants\u2019 motion and entered a final judgment in the defendants\u2019 favor for all claims on February 27, 2014. 2012 WL 4959409. On the RLUIPA claims, Judge Ellington found that the policies were a substantial burden on the plaintiffs\u2019 exercise of their sincerely held beliefs, but that the defendants had demonstrated that they were employing the least restrictive means of furthering compelling governmental interests in security, controlling costs, and prison administration. On the First Amendment claim, Magistrate Judge Ellington found the Program Analyst defendant was entitled to qualified immunity because the plaintiffs had not established their First Amendment rights to exercise their religion had been violated. The plaintiffs appealed to the Fifth Circuit on April 2, 2014 and the docket number 14-40339 was assigned. On July 6, 2016 the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court\u2019s judgment in part and vacated in part. (Circuit Judges Leslie H. Southwick and Gregg J. Costa, District Judge Halil Suleyman Ozerden). The Fifth Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the defendants on the First Amendment claim and the medicine bag RLUIPA claim because the plaintiffs failed to offer explanation as to how the district court erred in granting summary judgment in their appeal. In addition, the Fifth Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the defendants on the pipe ceremony RLUIPA claim, agreeing with the district court that the logistical, health, and security concerns of permitting the plaintiffs to purchase their own pipes and store them in the chaplain\u2019s office outweighed the need for a religious accommodation. However, the Fifth Circuit vacated and remanded the grooming policy claim under RLUIPA because it was unclear if the district court considered all of the plaintiffs\u2019 summary judgment evidence. Furthermore, the legitimacy of TDJC\u2019s cost and security concerns over the wearing of a kouplock remained disputed, and the district court didn\u2019t consider the plaintiffs\u2019 claim in light of their individual circumstances as low security risk prisoners. 826 F.3d 258. On remand, the district court ordered additional briefing. The defendants filed a motion for clarification of appeal, and on August 8, 2016, the Fifth Circuit clarified there was not a need for a trial at this time. Only additional briefing and a reexamination of the motion for summary judgment on the RLUIPA grooming policy claim was necessary. The parties then filed numerous replies and responses. On March 7, 2017, Judge Ellington denied the defendant\u2019s motion for summary judgment on plaintiffs\u2019 RLUIPA grooming policy claim because there remained a material dispute as to whether the grooming policy was the least restrictive means of maintaining institutional security. 2017 WL 896299. Judge Ellington recommended that the Fifth Circuit remand the case for trial. In November 2015, the initial prisoner plaintiff was released. In response, on December 21, 2017, the defendant moved to dismiss his claims. The defendant argued that the grooming policy no longer affected this plaintiff\u2019s right to practice his Native American faith and the plaintiff lacked an injury that was likely to be redressed by a favorable decision. Judge Ellington agreed and granted the motion on January 25, 2018. On March 2, 2018, the Court on its own motion ordered the consolidation of cases Casey v. Davis (2:14-cv-13) and Cobb v. Morris (2:14-cv-22) with this case. The plaintiffs in these cases challenged the same policies of TDJC, alleging that these policies conflicted with their right to practice their Native American faith in violation of RLUIPA and the First Amendment. Similar to Goodman v. Davis, only the plaintiffs\u2019 RLUIPA grooming policy claim survived summary judgment and was set for trial. The cases were accordingly consolidated for trial in front of Judge Ramos. On March 5, 2018, the Court appointed pro-bono counsel from a private firm to represent each of the plaintiffs in the consolidated action. The plaintiffs had previously attempted to get counsel appointed four times, but each time were denied. In July 2018, trial was set for August 29, 2018. Additionally, during this time, the plaintiffs filed a consolidated amended complaint, setting forth their RLUIPA grooming policy claim against the TDCJ Director together. A bench trial was held before Judge Ramos from August 29, 2018 to August 31, 2018. Judge Ramos issued the Court\u2019s findings of fact and conclusion of law on January 24, 2019. He granted the plaintiffs\u2019 request for injunctive relief permitting them to grow their hair long, consistent with their Native American religious beliefs. The Court noted that the differences between male and female grooming policies was unrelated to any differences in violence, contraband, or hygiene. The Court highlighted how most jails, most state Department of Corrections, and the federal prison system allow male prisoners to have long hair. Furthermore, TDCJ\u2019s employees testified they had never found contraband in long, loose hair and only nuisance contraband in braided hair, casting doubt on their alleged security interests. Finally, the defendant was unable to show that searches would take longer or that the plaintiffs, whom all had little or no history of disciplinary violations, posed any particular danger or threat to prison security. Judge Ramos entered a final judgment in the plaintiffs\u2019 favor on February 26, 2019 and enjoined the defendant from enforcing its male grooming policy against the plaintiffs with respect to the rules preventing the plaintiffs from growing their hair without restriction and wearing it loose. The plaintiffs were also awarded reasonable attorney\u2019s fees and costs. Costs were later determined to be $9,803.19, and attorney's fees were $131,298.45. On March 27, 2019, the defendant appealed Judge Ramos\u2019 findings and final judgment to the Fifth Circuit, and the docket number 19-40279 was assigned. Shortly after, the defendant moved to dismiss its own appeal, and the Fifth Circuit granted the motion to dismiss the appeal on July 9, 2019. This case is now closed.", "summary": "On May 21, 2012, a Native American prisoner incarcerated at the McConnell Unit of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice (TDCJ) filed this pro se federal civil rights lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas. He sued multiple TDCJ employees under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983. He alleged that TDJC policies that prevented his smoking a prayer pipe during Native American pipe ceremonies, limited his ability to wear a religiously significant medicine bag, and prevented him from growing long hair violated his rights under RLUIPA and the First Amendment. He sought declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief as well as attorney's fees and costs. An additional Native American prisoner plaintiff joined the suit shortly after filing. In February 2013, the plaintiffs amended their complaint, consented to proceedings before a Magistrate Judge, and voluntarily dismissed all of their claims except their three RLUIPA challenges against the TDCJ Director in his official capacity and their First Amendment claim seeking damages against the Program Analyst in his individual capacity. The parties filed cross motions for summary judgment. On February 27, 2014, the defendant\u2019s motion for summary judgment was granted and a final judgment entered in their favor. The plaintiffs appealed to the Fifth Circuit and were successful in getting judgement on the RLUIPA grooming policy claim vacated and remanded. On remand, the defendant\u2019s motion for summary judgment on the RLUIPA grooming claim was denied. As the RLUIPA grooming policy claim moved towards trial, the initial prisoner plaintiff in the case was released and his claims were dismissed. The Court ordered the consolidation of cases Casey v. Davis (2:14-cv-13) and Cobb v. Morris (2:14-cv-22) with this case, as the two cases also were brought by Native American prisoner incarcerated at the McConnell Unit and involved RLUIPA grooming policy claims moving towards trial. After a bench trial, Judge Ramos granted plaintiffs\u2019 request for injunctive relief permitting them to grow their hair long, consistent with their Native American religious beliefs and entered a final judgment on February 26, 2019. The defendant appealed, but moved to dismiss the appeal shortly after. The Fifth Circuit granted the motion to dismiss the appeal on July 9, 2019. This case is closed."} {"article": "On October 17, 2005, a Sunni Muslim incarcerated at Keen Mountain Correctional Center in Virginia filed this lawsuit, pro se, in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Virginia. The plaintiff sued officers at the Virginia Department of Corrections (VDOC) and the Keen Mountain Correctional Center under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). The plaintiff alleged violations of his rights under the First Amendment. Specifically, he alleged that during his Ramadan fast the defendants deprived him of adequate nutrition and calories in 2002 \u2013 2004, when instead of providing a full 2,200 calories including two hot meals, the defendants only provided 1,000 calories of cold-bag meals. As a result, the plaintiff said he lost 13 pounds and had a diminished religious experience because he was constantly hungry. Additionally, the plaintiff alleged the defendants refused to permit him and other Muslims to conduct the Eid prayer service and Eid-al-Fitr feast to celebrate the completion of Ramadan. Lastly, the plaintiff alleged the loss of nutrition and calories violated his right to Equal Protection and Due Process in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. The plaintiff sought punitive damages of $545, declaratory relief, and injunctive relief requiring the defendants to revise the Ramadan menu to ensure all Ramadan fast participants received adequate nutrition and calories, the option for two hot meals, and the opportunity to participate in the Eid-al-Fitr Observance. The parties consented to proceedings before a Magistrate Judge and the case was assigned to Judge Pamela Meade Sargent. On January 12, 2006, the defendants filed a motion for summary judgment arguing the plaintiff\u2019s claims should be dismissed because the plaintiff voluntarily fasted and was permitted to partake in the Eid-al-Fitr prayer service and feast at a different time than alleged in the complaint. On February 9, 2006, the plaintiff filed a motion to supplement his pleadings with similar allegations against the defendants for Ramadan 2005, which occurred in October and November 2005. Judge Sargant granted the motion on February 22, 2006. As the 2006 Ramadan fast approached, the defendants indicated there would be no changes to their Ramadan procedures. In response, on August 30, 2006, the plaintiff filed a motion for a preliminary injunction ordering the defendants to provide an amount of food equivalent to that provided to non-fasting prisoners. On the same day, the plaintiff filed a motion to appoint counsel, but Judge Sargent denied the request for counsel on September 8, 2006. On September 22, 2006, the court issued two orders on the outstanding motions for summary judgement and for preliminary injunctive relief. In ruling on the motion for summary judgment, the court granted it in part and denied it in part. 479 F.Supp.2d 569. In a 53 page opinion, the court found that the 2002 claims were barred by the statute of limitations and that the plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies under the Prison Litigation Reform Act for some of the 2003, 2004, and 2005 claims. The court denied summary judgment to the defendants on the following claims, and ordered they be set for trial: -First Amendment and RLUIPA claims that he was denied adequate nutrition and calories during Ramadan 2004 and the associated Due Process claim regarding this allegation; -First Amendment and RLUIPA claims that he was denied the Eid-al-Fitr meal following Ramadan 2003 and 2005; and - First Amendment and RLUIPA claims that he was deprived of the Eid-al-Fitr prayer service following Ramadan 2004. In ruling on the motion for a preliminary injunction, the court granted the plaintiff's request and ordered the defendants to provide daily food containing approximately 2,200 calories, between sunset and dawn during the 2006 Ramadan period, beginning the next day. The court granted the preliminary injunction because the defendants did not present evidence to contradict the plaintiff\u2019s claim that he suffered weight loss due to the reduced caloric intake during Ramadan and the same weight loss would likely happen during the 2006 Ramadan period. The court held that such weight loss was irreparable harm and the requested relief would not disrupt Keen Mountain food service. On February 16, 2007, the parties participated in a settlement conference. On March 19, 2007, the parties reached an undisclosed settlement and moved for voluntary dismissal of the claims. Judge Sargent dismissed the case and the court retained jurisdiction to enforce the settlement agreement between the parties. The settlement agreement provided plaintiff a $2,250 cash payment and a change in policies surrounding the provision to allow prisoners to celebrate Muslim feasts and their yearly fasts. Prison officials agreed to determine dates for Ramadan in advance by mutual agreement with plaintiff and assistant of an expert from the Islamic Center of Virginia. Further, defendants agreed to not schedule a quarterly lockdown during the Ramadan period, unless emergency necessitated one. The settlement did not proceed smoothly. On January 30, 2009, the plaintiff accused the defendants of acting in bad faith and not providing adequate food. However, the record does not indicate what, if any, actions the court or defendants took to address the new allegations. Since there has been no activity on the docket for over ten years, the case is presumably now closed.", "summary": "A Sunni Muslim incarcerated in Virginia Department of Corrections facility (VDOC) brought suit against the officers of the VDOC for failing to provide adequate food to him during his Ramadan fasts and interfering with his participation in post-Ramadan religious events. The court issued a preliminary injunction. In 2007, the parties agreed to settle and the case was dismissed."} {"article": "On December 19, 2014, three Virginia prisoners placed in administrative segregation at Red Onion State Prison, filed this pro-se lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia. The plaintiffs sued the Virginia Department of Corrections (VDOC), various VDOC prison officials, and the External Review Team, Dual Treatment Team, and Unit Management Team of the Virginia Department of Corrections. The plaintiffs sued under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983, the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Eighth Amendment. They sought declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as monetary damages. The plaintiffs claimed that the VDOC Operating Procedure 830.A, a self-described Segregation Reduction Step-Down Program designed to help prisoners progress in stages toward a return to the general prison population, violated plaintiffs\u2019 rights. Specifically, they alleged that they had been assigned to the most restrictive status (\u201cIM\u201d) without adequate due process. Due to their classification, they had also been denied the opportunity to participate in the step down process. They claimed that the IM classified prisoners were treated in a discriminatory manner as compared to other prisoners in administrative segregation, and that these conditions of confinement constituted cruel and unusual punishment. They sought to abolish the procedure, be reassigned to a lower classification, and to be granted monetary damages. On January 14, 2015, the plaintiffs moved to certify a class and to appoint counsel. On March 6, 2015, District Judge James P. Jones denied both these motions, finding that the circumstances were not \u201cexceptional\u201d so as to justify appointing counsel. Therefore, because the plaintiffs were still bringing the case pro-se, Judge Jones found it inappropriate to grant class certification. On April 8, 2015, Magistrate Judge Robert S. Ballou severed this action into three separate civil suits, one for each plaintiff; the immediate case is for the named plaintiff\u2019s action. Judge Ballou held that the Prisoner Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) required prisoners to file separate filing fees. The purpose of the act was to force \u201cprisoners to think twice\u201d before filing civil litigation. The court subsequently filed the original complaint under separate dockets for the two other plaintiffs. Both cases were referred to Magistrate Judge Ballou. He dismissed one case (Velazquez v. Virginia Department of Corrections, 7:15-cv-00157-JPJ-RSB) on September 27, 2016. The plaintiff in the other case (Rivera v. Virginia Department of Corrections, 7:15-cv-00235-JPJ-RSB) moved to voluntarily withdraw his action on May 28, 2015. On May 18, 2016, the plaintiff filed an amended complaint. In it, he alleged that OP 830.A discriminated against IM inmates, who suffered a much more restrictive environment than inmates in other forms of administrative segregation; that IM status permanently prevented an inmate from working his way out of segregated confinement; that officials arbitrarily assigned him to IM status without allowing him to be present or offer argument, contradictory testimony, witnesses, or evidence; that review between the various privilege level status steps was not meaningful; that spiteful officers could falsely report poor behavior or fail to accurately record participation in programming, thus preventing progress to the next step; and that officers routinely approved their own recommendations during the step-down program reviews, in violation of VDOC policy. The plaintiff also complained that OP 830.A affected inmates\u2019 opportunities for parole and earning good conduct time. On July 28, 2016 the defendants filed a motion for summary judgement. On September 28, 2016, Judge Jones granted the defendants\u2019 motion. He held that the plaintiff had failed to show that his conditions of confinement were atypical or significantly harsh as compared to conditions expected within a prison environment. Nor, according to Judge Jones, had the plaintiff shown that the procedure violated his due process rights. Moreover, Judge Jones rejected the plaintiff\u2019s equal protection claim because he held that the plaintiff was not similarly situated to the other prisoners in less restrictive confinement. Judge Jones dismissed all claims against the Virginia Department of Corrections as legally frivolous, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 1915A(b)(1). He held that neither the Commonwealth of Virginia nor any governmental entity acting as an arm of the state, such as the VDOC, was a \u201cperson\u201d subject to suit under \u00a7 1983. 2016 WL 5415903. On October 6, 2016, the plaintiff appealed the district court\u2019s September 28th ruling to the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. On March 30, 2017, the Circuit Court assigned counsel for the plaintiff. On October 26, 2017, oral arguments were held before Judges Paul V. Niemeyer, Robert B. King, and Henry F. Floyd. On November 22, 2017, the Circuit Court panel, in an unpublished per curiam opinion, affirmed the judgment on the reasoning of the district court. The case is now closed.", "summary": "On December 19, 2014, three Virginia prisoners placed in administrative segregation at Red Onion State Prison, filed this pro-se lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia. They brought claims under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983, the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Eighth Amendment. They sought declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as money damages. The plaintiffs claimed that the VDOC Operating Procedure 830.A, (a self-described Segregation Reduction Step-Down Program designed to help prisoners progress in stages toward a return to the general prison population), violated plaintiffs\u2019 rights. On September 28, 2016, Judge James P. Jones granted the defendants\u2019 motion for summary judgement. On October 6, 2016, the plaintiff appealed the district court\u2019s September 28th ruling to the Fourth Circuit. On November 22, 2017, a panel of the Fourth Circuit, in an unpublished per curiam opinion, affirmed the judgment on the reasoning of the district court. The case is now closed."} {"article": "On May 6, 2019, twelve prisoners at the Red Onion and Wallens Ridge supermax prisons, who had each been in solitary confinement for between two and twenty-three years, filed this putative class-action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. The plaintiffs sued the Virginia Department of Corrections (VDOC) and the wardens of both Red Onion and Wallens Ridge under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983, the Americans with Disabilities Act and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. The plaintiffs - represented by private counsel and the ACLU of Virginia - sought declaratory and injunctive relief in addition to damages. The plaintiffs claimed breach of an earlier settlement agreement and violations of the Fourteenth Amendment\u2019s Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses, the Eighth Amendment, the Americans with Disabilities Act, and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. The plaintiff alleged that VDOC implemented a renamed version of the \u201cPhase Program,\u201d which was supposedly shut down in an earlier settlement, that \u201cwarehoused\u201d prisoners in solitary confinement without any opportunity to re-enter general population conditions. The earlier settlement had ended the \"Phase Program\" at the Mecklenburg Correctional Center. A class action lawsuit, Brown v. Hutto, was filed in 1981, alleging inhumane conditions and constitutional violations by VDOC. A VDOC investigation revealed that Mecklenburg could not fill its solitary confinement beds with its own prisoners. Instead, the prison had solicited other prisons to refer their prisoners for solitary confinement at Mecklenburg. Unlike the Special Management Unit, which housed prisoners unlikely to be reintroduced to the general population, the \"Phase Program\" track was designed to allow solitary confinement prisoners to reenter the general population by earning \"privileges\" for good behavior. But in practice, prisoners were very rarely phased down and prison staff could revoke privileges without oversight or appeals. The parties settled the case in 1985, with VDOC agreeing to end the Phase Program and to not start a similar program in the future. In this case, the Red Onion and Wallens Ridge prisoners alleged that the Step-Down Program was used to keep prisoners in solitary confinement in order to utilize solitary confinement space and justify the high cost of keeping both supermax prisons open. This program was alleged to be a new version of the Phase Program used at the since-demolished Mecklenburg facility. The prisoners alleged that staff at each facility were not trained or knowledgeable about the specific requirements of the Step-Down Program, leading them to keep prisoners in solitary confinement despite evidence that they should be stepped down to the general population. These decisions were not subject to meaningful review, and the review process was not appealable. The prisoners alleged this program caused significant mental and physiological harm to each of them and was implemented without any scientific basis. On May 31, 2019, VDOC filed a motion to dismiss the complaint. On June 14, 2019, the remaining defendants also filed a motion to dismiss. Both motions alleged that the plaintiffs failed to state a claim and that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the case. As of October 2, 2019, District Judge Robert E. Payne has not issued a decision on either of these motions. The case is ongoing. A documentary about the solitary confinement conditions of Red Onion can be found here.", "summary": "On May 6, 2019, twelve prisoners who had been held in solitary confinement in two Virginia supermax prisons for at least two years filed this putative class action lawsuit in the District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. The plaintiffs alleged that each prison had violated their Fourteenth and Eighth Amendment rights by continuing to implement a program that intentionally held prisoners in solitary confinement without the possibility of re-entering the general population. They alleged that this program also violated an earlier settlement agreement, the Rehabilitation Act, and the Americans with Disabilities Act. The defendants, the Virginia Department of Corrections, its employees, and the wardens of each prison, filed two motions to dismiss. District Judge Robert E. Payne has not yet issued a decision on either motion."} {"article": "On February 19, 2016, the plaintiff, a Muslim inmate at the Red Onion State Prison, filed this pro se lawsuit alleging a violation of right to free expression in the District Court for the Western District of Virginia. He sued the Virginia Department of Corrections (VDOC) under 28 U.S.C. 2201, 48 U.S.C. 1983, and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). He sought declaratory judgment, preliminary and permanent injunctions, costs, damages, and a jury trial. In the complaint, the plaintiff contested three specific prison policies that he alleged hindered his ability to practice his Sufi Islamic faith. First, he alleged that the prison's policy for Jum'ah, the weekly Islamic gathering, for inmates in solitary confinement like he is, violated his rights. In the general population, Jum'ah is broadcast in common spaces, but for inmates in solitary confinement, a taped version of Jum'ah is given to inmates with televisions. The plaintiff had neither a television nor a means to get a job that would allow him to purchase a television, since he alleged that he was being kept in solitary confinement as a result of his beard length. His second allegation stemmed from the prison's beard policies, saying that he was unable to grow his beard out to the four inches mandated by his faith due to the prison's quarter-inch beard policy. Finally, he focused on prison food policies, saying that his halal dinners no longer became halal once they entered the contaminated food slot all solitary confinement inmates use, and he was not given facilities to make his food halal again. Judge James P. Jones denied the plaintiff's request for a preliminary injunction on all issues on March 23, 2016, saying that the claims presented in the complaint did not meet the bar of imminent harm. 2016 WL 1179225. The plaintiff appealed this decision on April 14, 2016. In a December 22, 2016 opinion, the Fourth Circuit upheld the District Court's decision regarding the halal food issue and beard issue, but remanded the Jum'ah decision, saying that the court did not provide specific facts to support its decision. 672 Fed.Appx. 259. The case returned to the District Court, and on May 10, 2017, Judge Jones denied the plaintiff's request for preliminary injunctive relief on the issue of Jum'ah. 2017 WL 1929669, W.D. Va. This supported Magistrate Judge Pamela Meade Sargeant's recommendation to not grant injunctive relief on March 20, 2017 (2017 WL 9517164 W.D. Va.). This time, the Judge detailed that, since the prison gave him an option to improve his behavior to allow him to get a job that would pay for a television and the plaintiff did not take it, his religious exercise rights were not being infringed. The plaintiff appealed this decision on June 1, and the Fourth Circuit issued a short memorandum opinion declining to take the case on October 31, saying that it had enough information to uphold the District Court's decision. 699 Fed.Appx. 280. On December 15, 2017, Judge Jones issued an opinion on the defendant's motion for summary judgment, which was filed back before the preliminary injunction appeals on July 13, 2016. He denied the motion for the plaintiff's claims under the RLUIPA, saying that the defendants did not counter the plaintiff's allegations that his continued stay in solitary confinement is related to his refusal to trim his beard as his religion instructs, and that this stay is blocking him from accessing televised Jum'ah. However, he granted summary judgment on the First Amendment free exercise claims on the beard, halal food, and Jum'ah policies, saying that these policies were not an undue burden under existing precedent. The plaintiffs filed an amended motion for summary judgment addressing the RLUIPA issues on January 12, 2018, stating that the plaintiff remains in solitary confinement for disciplinary infractions unrelated to his beard length. Judge Jones granted this motion for summary judgment on September 19, 2018, saying that the defendants presented enough evidence to support this motion this time. 2018 WL 4512074, W.D. Va. The plaintiff appealed this summary judgment decision on October 23, 2018. The Fourth Circuit vacated the summary judgment motion and remanded the case on December 6, 2019, saying that the VDOC's use of access to television for religious services as an incentive program unduly burdens the plaintiff's rights to practice a bona fide religious belief. The panel stated that religious practice should be a right, not a privilege that can be taken away through an incentive program. 944 F.3d 243. The case returned to District Court, where the defendants could file another motion for summary judgment consistent with the Fourth Circuit's ruling. The case is ongoing as of May 25, 2020.", "summary": "In 2016, the plaintiff filed a pro se complaint in the District Court for the Western District of Virginia against the Virginia Department of Corrections alleging that their policies for beards, halal food, and television access for religious services for inmates in solitary confinement violated the Free Exercise Clause and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act. Judge John P. Jones denied the plaintiff's request for injunctive relief in 2017 and initially granted summary judgment in favor of VDOC in 2018, but the Fourth Circuit overturned him on appeal in late 2019, saying that VDOC's use of access to television for religious services as an incentive program unduly burdens the plaintiff's rights to practice a bona fide religious belief. The panel stated that religious practice should be a right, not a privilege that can be taken away through an incentive program. The case is ongoing."} {"article": "After a two-year investigation initiated in December 2016 under CRIPA and Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), the Department of Justice (DOJ) issued a Notice on December 19, 2018 concluding that the Hampton Roads Regional Jail Authority (\u201cHRRJ\u201d) failed to provide constitutionally adequate medical and mental health care to prisoners and placed prisoners with serious mental illness in restrictive housing for prolonged periods of time. The DOJ also concluded that HRRJ\u2019s housing practices discriminate against prisoners with mental health disabilities in violation of the ADA. In the Notice, the DOJ set forth factual findings about the conditions at HRRJ that violated prisoners\u2019 constitutional rights. Principally, the DOJ found that medical and mental health care at HRRJ was constitutionally inadequate. In all stages of medical and mental health care (including patient intake, chronic care and emergency care, treatment and therapy, continuity of care, and security and care for suicidal prisoners), the quality of care and access to care was found to be severely deficient, subjecting prisoners to a serious risk of harm due to delays and lack of care. The DOJ also found a lack of oversight and accountability and a deliberate indifference by HRRJ officials in identifying and mitigating risks. Furthermore, HRRJ utilized prolonged restrictive housing which disparately affects prisoners with mental illnesses, thereby denying them access to activities and programming that they would otherwise be eligible for, and putting them at risk for serious harm. Officials at HRRJ knew of these substantial shortcomings and the associated risks and failed to take appropriate action. On August 5, 2020, the DOJ filed this lawsuit against HRRJ in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia based on the findings in the December 2018 report and HRRJ\u2019s subsequent failure to take sufficient remedial steps. The DOJ alleges that HRRJ\u2019s policies and practices violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights of prisoners. As a result, the DOJ asked Judge Rebecca Beach Smith to declare that HRRJ\u2019s practices violated the constitutional rights of prisoners and violated the ADA, and to enjoin HRRJ to take immediate action to amend its policies and practices to ensure that lawful conditions of confinement are afforded to prisoners. By the time that the complaint was filed, the parties had already negotiated a settlement. On the same day as the complaint was filed, the parties filed a joint settlement motion. In the settlement agreement, HRRJ agreed to implement a comprehensive list of reforms including appropriate screening and assessment for medical and mental health needs by qualified professionals, adequate treatment planning for medical and mental health concerns, suicide prevention practices, specialized mental health housing units, oversight of restrictive housing placement, increased medical and mental health staff, increased training for staff, increased collaboration between mental health staff and jail leadership, and a Quality Assurance program to identify and correct deficiencies with the medical and mental health care system to be overseen by a Quality Assurance Committee which will provide monthly reports to the monitor and the DOJ. The settlement agreement noted that HRRJ would designate an Agreement Coordinator to coordinate compliance with the agreement. HRRJ agreed to create annual Implementation Plans to describe how it will fulfill its obligations under the agreement, including deadlines within the first year by which HRRJ must draft or revise policies and procedures, complete a staffing plan, develop and deliver training to HRRJ staff, develop and implement a Quality Improvement Committee, and develop and implement monthly quality assurance mechanisms to report on data relevant to prevent to prevent or minimize harm to prisoners. A key provision of the settlement agreement was the mandatory appointment of an independent third-party monitor, to oversee HRRJ\u2019s compliance with the agreement. The monitor was agreed to be retained for a period of three years and provide biannual status reports to the DOJ, HRRJ and the court. The monitor would also undertake compliance reviews, on-site inspections and issue monitor reports every six months to assess compliance and HRRJ\u2019s progress on the various reform efforts. The reports will also be filed with the court. In the event of noncompliance with the agreement, the District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia retains jurisdiction to enforce the agreement at the request of the DOJ. On August 31, 2020, the court approved the settlement agreement and subsequently, on September 10, 2020, the court approved the appointment of James Conrad Welch to be the third-party monitor. The settlement agreement is effective as of August 31, 2020. By the terms of the agreement, HRRJ will implement all provisions of the agreement within four years and the agreement will terminate in five years, so long as HRRJ has attained substantial compliance with the agreement and maintained that compliance for at least one year. HRRJ will have the burden to prove that it has achieved and maintained substantial compliance with the agreement and has been operating in accordance with the requirements of the ADA and the U.S. Constitution continuously for one year. The agreement will terminate by order of the court. As such, this case remains ongoing.", "summary": "On August 31, 2020, Judge Rebecca Beach Smith in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia approved a settlement between the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) Civil Rights Division and Hampton Roads Regional Jail Authority. The agreement resolved the DOJ\u2019s claims alleging unlawful conditions at the Hampton Roads Regional Jail (HRRJ) in violation of CRIPA and the ADA. Under the agreement, HRRJ will develop and implement policies, procedures, and training regarding adequate medical and mental health care and appropriate housing for prisoners with serious mental illness. These measures include specialized mental health housing units, increased training for medical, mental health, and security personnel, proper screening and assessment for medical and mental health concerns, adequate treatment planning and suicide prevention measures, and a quality assurance program. Per the agreement, the parties jointly appointed a monitor to assess and assist with compliance with the agreement. HRRJ must come into substantial compliance with the agreement within five years. The agreement can be terminated by court order."} {"article": "On June 25, 2009 the plaintiff, a former female prisoner, filed suit against the State of Washington, the Washington State Department of Corrections, the Washington Corrections Center for Women, and several correctional officers in the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington. She alleged violations of 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983, the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, and the Washington State Constitution. The suit arose from the treatment of her when she gave birth while incarcerated. She alleged that in violation of prison policy she had been shackled throughout labor and after she had given birth. She was only unshackled for an emergency cesarean section and was immediately shackled again after surgery. She sought declaratory relief, damages, and attorney's fees and costs for her great emotional and physical pain. As the suit proceeded, all individually named defendants were dismissed with the exception of two correctional officers. The plaintiff indicated she would no longer seek declaratory relief against the State of Washington and acknowledged that the Eleventh Amendment precluded her from recovering damages against the state of any state agencies. On May 3, 2010 the court (Judge Robert Jensen Bryan) issued an order concerning cross-motions for summary judgment. The plaintiff's motion for summary judgment was denied, the officers' claim of qualified immunity was denied, and the defendants' motion for summary judgment was granted in part and denied in part. The case came to a close on May 7, 2010 when the court (Judge Bryan) entered a stipulated order dismissing all remaining claims against all defendants after the parties reached a settlement. The details of the settlement are not known.", "summary": "On June 25, 2009 the plaintiff, a former female prisoner, filed suit against the State of Washington, the Washington State Department of Corrections, the Washington Corrections Center for Women, and several correctional officers in the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington. She alleged violations of 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983, the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, and the Washington State Constitution based on the treatment of her while she was giving birth. On May 3, 2010 the court denied the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and granted in part and denied in part the defendants' motion for summary judgment. The case came to a close on May 7, 2010 after the parties reached a settlement on the remaining claims. The details of the settlement are not known."} {"article": "On November 17, 2015, four prisoners in Washington state brought a class action lawsuit against the state's Chief Medical Officer of the Department of Corrections (DOC) and the Secretary of the DOC under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 for allegedly arbitrarily withholding necessary medical care from patients with serious and painful medical conditions. The prisoners, who went untreated or under-treated for serious ailments, including kidney failure, kidney stones, hernia, and chronic and substantial pain, alleged that the denial of care while incarcerated constituted cruel and unusual punishment forbidden by the Eighth Amendment. The Washington DOC only administered direct medical care for \"medically necessary\" conditions. All others required approval by a Department of Corrections Care Review Committee (CRC) consisting of doctors and other medical professionals across the state. Of all petitions for care, about 60% were being denied by the CRC. And complaints of chronic and substantial pain were ignored. The plaintiffs sought (1) a declaration that the Washington DOC's policies and practices governing the approval of medical care requests by DOC providers and outside specialists violate the Eighth Amendment; (2) a preliminary and permanent injunction restraining the DOC from denying, without reasonable medical justification, necessary care for class members' serious medical needs; and (3) reasonable attorney's fees. The plaintiffs also sought to certify the following class: \"All current and future prisoners, incarcerated under the jurisdiction of the Washington Department of Corrections, whose access to necessary medical care has been denied, or will be subject to denial, under the Department\u2019s policies and practices governing access to health care requiring prior approval.\" Judge Richard A. Jones denied class certification on September 18, 2017, holding that the proposed class lacked the necessary commonality for class certification. The court found that the plaintiffs had \"not adequately identified common policies and practices to show that Defendants were deliberately indifferent to inmates\u2019 needs.\" The plaintiffs sought to appeal the decision, but the Ninth Circuit denied their petition to appeal on December 21, 2017. The plaintiffs filed to amend the complaint in March 2018 to reflect a new Secretary of the DOC. Later in June 2018, the plaintiffs filed a motion to stay the proceedings of the case for six months while the parties tried to resolve the case. The motion stated that the DOC revised the Offender Health Plan. Days later, the court granted an order to dismiss one of the named plaintiffs and refused to stay the case, opting instead to vacate the trial date for six months. In December 2018, the court pushed the trial date even further, settling on September 2019. On January 14, 2019, the court granted requests from two plaintiffs for dismissal, leaving only one remaining plaintiff. Three months later, in March 2019, the final plaintiff moved to terminate the case. The court granted the dismissal of the party and in turn closed the case on March 27, 2019 as no plaintiffs remained. It is unknown why the plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed and the case is now closed.", "summary": "Washington state prisoners with serious medical problems sued the Washington Department of Corrections for failing to provide adequate medical care. The plaintiffs believed that the DOC applied the term \"medically necessary\" too narrowly and denied immediate care and that decisions to provide outside treatment are decided arbitrarily, without medical justification. The plaintiffs sought class action certification but Judge Richard A. Jones denied the certification on September 18, 2017 on the grounds that the proposed class lacked commonality. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals denied an appeal by the plaintiffs later that year. Between June 2018 and March 2019, each remaining plaintiff filed to dismiss himself as a party. As a result, the court closed the case on March 27, 2019 when no plaintiffs remained."} {"article": "On October 20, 2017, four minor plaintiffs, represented by their parents or guardians, filed a class action lawsuit against King County and the Kent School District in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 and state law. The plaintiffs, represented by Columbia Legal Services, alleged that King County has violated the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) (20 U.S.C. \u00a7 1400), by holding children in solitary confinement at King County\u2019s Maleng Regional Justice Center. They sought injunctive and declaratory relief to end King County\u2019s solitary confinement policy. The plaintiffs alleged that King County denied these children, who had not yet been convicted of any crimes, meaningful social interaction and education by holding them in isolation cells for weeks or months on end. These children were given only a few minutes of face-to-face educational instruction and denied access to reading or writing materials. The plaintiffs alleged that these deprivations could cause trauma, depression, anxiety, as well as permanent interference with a child\u2019s psychological and social development. The vast majority of children affected by King County\u2019s actions were children of color and many suffered from mental illness. The plaintiffs amended the complaint on October 23, 2017 to add additional named plaintiffs and an additional claim of discrimination. The plaintiffs sought to certify a class of all children currently incarcerated at the RJC and all such children who would be held there in the future. Besides declaratory judgment, they also sought to preliminarily and permanently enjoin the defendant from carrying out the allegedly unlawful policies and practices. In addition, the plaintiffs asked the court to issue declaratory and injunctive relief on behalf of a subclass of such children who have disabilities, as defined by the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, and were in need of special education and related services. The parties quickly began settlement negotiations. On August 20, 2018, the court granted plaintiffs\u2019 motion to approve a settlement agreement. Under the terms of the proposed settlement, the plaintiffs would receive $240,000 from King County and $25,000 from the Kent School District. King County agreed that the solitary confinement of juveniles was banned in all King County detention facilities, except when necessary to prevent physical harm to others, and that any use of solitary confinement would be discussed at a daily meeting. The parties also agreed to appoint a monitor to review alternatives to solitary confinement, and issue quarterly monitor's reports. The settlement was set to expire on January 31, 2022 if defendant complied with all terms.", "summary": "On October 20, 2017, four minor plaintiffs filed a class action lawsuit against King County and sought injunctive and declaratory relief for King County\u2019s policy and practice of holding children in solitary confinement at King County's Maleng Regional Justice Center. The Court approved the parties' settlement agreement and the plaintiffs will receive $240,000 from King County and $25,000 from the Kent School District. The settlement is set to expire on January 31, 2022 if defendant complies with all terms."} {"article": "On April 3, 2008, two Muslim prisoners incarcerated in the Wyoming State Penitentary (WSP) sued officials of the Wyoming Department of Corrections in the United State District court of Wyoming. Plaintiffs claimed violations of the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 2000cc et seq. (RLUIPA). Specifically, plaintiffs claimed that a prison policy requiring prisoners to consume their meals within twenty (20) minutes substantially burdens their ability to practice their religion, as they must choose between eating their meals and praying. The complaint specified that Jewish inmates experienced similar difficulties. After brief litigation, the parties entered a Consent Decree which was approved by the court (Judge Clarence A. Brimmer) on November 19, 2008. The Consent Decree permits prisoners who receive their meals in their cells or pods to take up to thirty (30) minutes to eat, and prisoners receiving religious meals may keep those meals in their cells until the next meal is served. Prisoners who eat in the dining hall are permitted to go to the front of the line and receive a 10-and 5-minute announcements before being escorted from the hall. Additional provisions in the Consent Decree substantially change the defendants' policies and practices concerning the observance by Muslims of fasting, special meals, and prayer time, and also guaranteed that a second microwave would be installed, from which pork products would be banned. The consent decree did not establish an expiration date. As of March 2018, there had been no further litigation.", "summary": "On April 3, 2008, Muslim prisoners sued the Wyoming Department of Corrections for violations of First Amendment Rights and the RLUIPA for failure to accommodate their religious practices. The case was resolved by Consent Decree on November 19, 2008."} {"article": "On December 2, 2010, two non-profit organizations, the Colorado Criminal Defense Bar and the Colorado Criminal Justice Reform Coalition brought this lawsuit under 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 2201(a) against the Governor of Colorado, in the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado. The plaintiffs, represented by pro bono private counsel, sought a declaratory judgment that Colorado violated the Sixth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendments by deferring the appointment of counsel to indigent defendants. This Colorado practice was due to a 1992 statute which provided that misdemeanor indigent defendants' applications for appointment of counsel \"shall be deferred until after the prosecuting attorney has spoken with the defendant.\" Colo. Rev. Stat. \u00a7 16-7-301(4). The plaintiffs argued that the practice of deferring counsel was a violation of the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Rothgery v. Gillespie County where the Court held that the accused is entitled to the presence of appointed counsel during any \"critical stage\" of criminal trial proceedings. 554 U.S. 191, 212 (2008). Judge John L. Kan was assigned to the case. On January 31, 2011, the defendant moved to dismiss, arguing that the matter was best resolved in the legislature, not courts. On February 25, 2011, the plaintiffs filed the first amendment complaint, adding as defendants all of the Colorado district attorneys, and the defendants again moved to dismiss. Litigation continued and Judge Kan set a date to hear oral arguments on the motion to dismiss. The plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint on January 20, 2012, which the defendants again moved to dismiss. The plaintiffs continued to litigate until a team of legislators took on the issue. In the 2013 regular legislative session, the House and Senate Judiciary Committees considered House Bill 13-1210 to repeal the statute. The bill was approved by both Committees, and the Appropriations Committee set aside approximately $8 million to hire additional public defenders to represent indigent clients in these matters. On January 10, 2013 the plaintiffs filed a notice to the court that legislation was being considered that would moot the issues presented in the case. In May 2013, Governor Hickenlooper signed the bill removing the requirement that misdemeanor defendants confer with a prosecutor before legal counsel is appointed. The law resolved all the claims in the lawsuit and on May 30, 2013, Judge Kan dismissed the case.", "summary": "Two non-profit organizations, the Colorado Criminal Defense Bar and the Colorado Criminal Justice Reform Coalition brought this lawsuit under 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 2201(a) against Colorado on December 2, 2010 in the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado. The plaintiffs, represented by pro bono private counsel, sought a declaratory judgment that a Colorado statute was unconstitutional, violating the Sixth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendments by deferring the appointment of counsel to indigent defendants until after the prosecuting attorney has spoken with the defendant. This case was voluntarily dismissed after the Colorado legislature passed a new statute that removed the requirement and subsequently allocated significant new funding to provide attorneys at initial appearances."} {"article": "On January 14, 2016, arrestees in New Orleans who were declared eligible to receive appointed counsel from the Orleans Parish Public Defender\u2019s Office (OPD) but were placed on a waiting list, sued in a class action OPD and the Louisiana State Public Defender office under 42 U.S.C. \u00a71983 for violating their Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. OPD\u2019s refusal to represent plaintiffs meant that they remained in jail without counsel. Plaintiff class seeks attorney\u2019s fees and a declaration that OPD\u2019s placement of class members on a waiting list for an indefinite amount of time violates their constitutional rights to counsel, due process, and equal protection. OPD refused to accept plaintiffs as clients due to budgetary shortages and excessive caseloads. After hearings in which OPD discussed its budgetary crisis in late 2015, the Chief District Defender announced it would start declining certain felony cases in mid-January of 2016. The withdrawals would occur at a defendant\u2019s first appearance before the magistrate. Plaintiffs credit OPD\u2019s situation to the State of Louisiana\u2019s underfunding of its public defender system. On June 15, 2016 the parties filed a joint motion for judgment granting final declaratory and partial injunctive relief. On October 27, 2016 the court sua sponte raised the issue of subject matter jurisdiction, giving both parties a chance to submit briefs addressing the issue. On January 31, 2017 the court (Judge James Brady) dismissed the case, citing grounds of federalism and comity. 231 F.Supp.3d 128. On September 25, 2017 plaintiffs appealed to the Fifth Circuit. On October 4, 2018 the Fifth Circuit dismissed the case as moot because it found that since the appeal was filed, Louisiana lawmakers had reallocated funding for appointed counsel sufficient to render the waitlists for non-capital defendants nonexistent. 905 F.3d 905. This case is now closed.", "summary": "Individuals who were eligible to be assigned a public defender in New Orleans, but were placed on a waiting list due to budgetary shortages, sued the city (OPD) and Louisiana state public defender's offices for violating their Constitutional rights to counsel, due process, and equal protection. They seek attorney's fees and a declaratory judgment that their rights were violated. On June 15, 2016 the parties filed a joint motion for judgment granting final declaratory and partial injunctive relief. On October 27, 2016 the court sua sponte raised the issue of subject matter jurisdiction, giving both parties a chance to submit briefs addressing the issue. On January 31, 2017 the court (Judge James Brady) dismissed the case, citing grounds of federalism and comity. On September 25, 2017 plaintiffs appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. On October 4, 2018 the Fifth Circuit dismissed the case as moot because it found that since the appeal was filed, Louisiana lawmakers had reallocated funding for appointed counsel sufficient to render the waitlists for non-capital defendants nonexistent. This case is now closed."} {"article": "On September 12, 2013, a juvenile sex offender and his parents filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Alabama under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 against Etowah County. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel and both the national and local American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), asked the court for both declaratory and injunctive relief. They alleged that the Sheriff's office and particular police officers violated their rights under the Fourth Amendment's guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures and the Fourteenth Amendment's protections for substantive due process and against deprivations of liberty without due process. Specifically, the plaintiffs objected to the Sheriff's Office's program of unannounced, random, and suspicion-less compliance investigations of every individual in the county who is subject to requirements of the Alabama Sex Offender Registration and Community Notification Act (\"the Act\"), Ala. Code \u00a7 15-20A-4(12). The primary plaintiff, James Doe, was required to register as a juvenile under the Act. As part of the Sheriff's Office's program, uniformed officers, including defendants and other unidentified officers, conducted warrantless searches of the plaintiffs' home without consent at least nine times between April 2012 and August 2013. On February 13, 2014 the Court dismissed the case after being informed that the parties reached a written agreement regarding merits of the action and litigation costs. The private settlement agreement stated that police would have to conduct all home visits outside of the home, and would not enter without the registrant's written consent. In addition, police would perform these visits in civilian clothes and unmarked vehicles for the registrant's privacy. The case is now closed.", "summary": "A juvenile sex offender and his parents filed a lawsuit in 2013 in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Alabama objecting to the Sheriff's Office's program of unannounced, random, and suspicion-less compliance investigations of every individual in the county who is subject to requirements of the Alabama Sex Offender Registration and Community Notification Act, Ala. Code \u00a7 15-20A-4(12). On February 13, 2014 the Court dismissed the case because they were informed that the parties reached a written agreement on the merits of the action and litigation costs"} {"article": "On the morning of April 7, 2003, protesters gathered at the Port of Oakland for a peaceful demonstration against the Iraq war and against specific companies that profited from the war and did business at the Port. Demonstrators formed a picket line and encouraged workers and truck drivers to refuse to enter the facilities, but did not to obstruct their access. That morning, the officers of Local 10 of the International Longshore and Warehouse Union (ILWU) met to decide whether its members should report to work given the demonstration and the police presence. Several members of the Union were posted at the gates to the terminals of two of the companies against which the demonstration was held, with the purpose of letting Union members know that a decision was pending and that they should not enter until it was reached. Most or all of the Union members present waited outside of the gates in a group separate from the demonstrators. Also present were several legal observers from the National Lawyers Guild. At about 7:15 AM, the Oakland Police issued a dispersal order, alleged to be inaudible to most of the demonstrators and unclear in its directive. The demonstrators cleared away from the gates and allowed traffic to pass through more easily. The police formed lines blocking access to the route to the BART station by which most of the demonstrators arrived, and also to the parking lots where others had parked. At about 7:30, allegedly without any further warning or provocation, the Oakland police officers began barraging the demonstrators with a variety of \"less-lethal weapons\" including \"sting ball\" grenades filled with rubber pellets and tear gas, and wooden dowels and lead shot-filled bean bags fired from shotguns. The officers did not distinguish between the demonstrators, legal observers, and members of the Union, subjecting them all to this barrage. The demonstrators and others attempted to retreat along the only open routes, and the Police pursued, continuing to fire \"less-lethal\" weapons into the crowd and to strike at them with battons. Some demonstrators were intentionally struck by officers' motorcycles, in accordance with the Oakland Police Department's (OPD) standard practice for crowd dispersal at the time. The officers fired these weapons at demonstrators who arrived after any notice to disperse was given, and on bystanders. The police allegedly also purposely singled out and fired their weapons at legal observers, videographers and journalists, and individuals who appeared to be leaders because they carried bullhorns. On June 26, 2003, two separate suits were filed against the City of Oakland, the OPD, and related defendants, in response to the OPD's actions on April 7. Both suits were filed in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California. Because the cases involved substantially similar questions of fact and law and arose out of the same events, on August 11, 2003, the Court ordered that the cases be officially related and heard before the same judge. The cases were not consolidated under the same docket, but most or all of the substantive orders and opinions issued by the Court thereafter bore the docket numbers and captions of both cases and applied to both cases. The cases were also officially related to a third case, Allen v. City of Oakland, a landmark case filed in 2000 that had settled in March 2003 with the City agreeing to implement comprehensive reforms to its policing practices and to submit to monitoring by court-appointed experts (Allen has a separate entry in the Clearinghouse, see related cases below.) One of the two cases addressed here, Local 10 ILWU v. City of Oakland, was filed as a class-action on behalf of all persons who attended the April 7 demonstration or who might attend future demonstrations in Oakland, and who were or would be subjected to the Defendants' alleged policy and practice of using excessive and arbitrary force to disperse or control demonstrations. In addition to the class plaintiffs, the suit also named as plaintiffs Local 10 ILWU and nine of its members, who were \"standing by\" in the vicinity of the demonstration but not active participants in it. All of the Union member plaintiffs had been hit by projectiles fired by the police. The other suit, Coles v. City of Oakland, sought relief for several individual demonstrators who were allegedly injured by the OPD. These individuals were all demonstrators who allegedly had been shot by the police with less-lethal munitions, struck with motorcycles, and/or wrongfully arrested. One plaintiff was struck in the torso by a police baton, hit by a motorcycle, and shot in the face and neck with a lead-filled bean bag. In both cases, Plaintiffs alleged that the Defendants' actions were prohibited the Constitutions of both the U.S and California. They alleged violations of their guaranteed rights to freedom of speech and association, their right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures, their rights to equal protection and due process, their right to be free from the use of excessive and arbitrary force, and their right to privacy. The case was brought under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983, which allows private actions to be brought against States for violations under color of state law of rights guaranteed by federal constitutional and statutory law. The Union also alleged that the Defendants had violated California privacy law by conducting investigations into its political affiliations and activities prior to the scheduled demonstration. In both cases, Plaintiffs sought compensatory, exemplary, and punitive damages, as well as to recover legal costs. They also sought declaratory judgments holding the Defendants' actions to have been unlawful violations of the Plaintiffs' rights under the Constitutions of the U.S. and of California and of statutory law. They sought injunctions that among other things would prohibit the Defendants from unlawfully interfering with the constitutional and statutory rights of participants in public demonstrations and protests; from intentionally striking demonstrators with motorcycles; and from using \"less-lethal\" weapons as a method of crowd control against non-violent crowds or demonstrations. They sought an order compelling compliance with the already mandatory terms of the Settlement and Consent Decree reached in Allen v. City of Oakland. On December 24, 2004, the parties entered a court-approved partial settlement addressing the Plaintiffs' claims for injunctive and declaratory relief to the extent that those claims related to the Defendants' crowd control policies. At the same time, class-action elements of the Local 10 ILWU case were voluntarily dismissed without prejudice. In the settlement, the Defendants denied any wrongdoing. The claims for damages and costs, and for other injunctive relief, remained to be litigated. The Court retained jurisdiction over the issues resolved by the settlement for purposes of enforcement. The City of Oakland and its Police Department adopted a new official Crowd Control/Crowd Management Policy in light of the settlement. The Crowd Control Policy restricted the City's power to declare an assembly unlawful only to those circumstances where demonstrators had already acted illegally or where they posed a clear and present danger of imminent violence. It forbade the OPD from dispersing demonstrations that had not been declared unlawful. It also required the OPD to provide an opportunity for demonstrators at assemblies declared unlawful to safely disperse prior to arrest, and required that repeated and sufficiently amplified announcements of the dispersal order, specifying available routes, be made. It also forbade the indiscriminate use of less-lethal munitions directly against crowds, even when specific individuals in the group were already violent. It prohibited the use of intentional motorcycle strikes and certain less-lethal weapons, such as wooden dowels and tasers, against crowds, and required that bean-bag munitions only be used against specifically targeted violent individuals or individuals who otherwise present an imminent risk to themselves or others. In 2011-12, the City of Oakland allegedly violated this policy repeatedly when it used less-lethal munitions against non-violent demonstrators at Occupy Oakland demonstrations and other protests. See related cases below (Campbell and Spalding). On April 27, 2005, the Court (Judge Thelton E. Henderson) denied the Defendants' motions to dismiss the Plaintiffs' Fourth Amendment claims in both cases for the use of excessive force in instances where plaintiffs were not arrested. The Defendants did not seek to have dismissed the Fourth Amendment excessive force claims of those plaintiffs who had been arrested. The Judge held that whether the police actions intended to physically move the plaintiffs constituted seizures (and therefore would qualify for protection under the Amendment) was a question that would need to be resolved at trial. The order also denied the Defendants motion to dismiss the Union's First Amendment claims, because the Union alleged that the police had investigated the Union prior to the protest and knew that many of its leaders supported the demonstrators and their cause. On September 27, 2005, the Court granted in part and denied in part Plaintiffs' motion for attorneys' fees and legal costs, determining that the Plaintiffs were entitled to fees but declining to order the Defendants to pay the amount requested, totaling about $1,100,000, although not declaring this amount to be unreasonable. The order required the parties to negotiate further, and to return to the Court for a judicial determination of the amount to be paid only if the negotiations failed. Coles v. City of Oakland, 2005 WL 2373724 (N.D. Cal. 2005). On December 6, 2005, Judge Henderson issued an order that granted in part and denied in part the parties' various motions for partial summary judgment or adjudication, resolving all outstanding questions of law and fact except the Fourth Amendment issue described above, which he held would need to be argued orally. He granted the Local 10 Plaintiffs' unopposed motion for summary judgment on their privacy claim, and the Defendants' unopposed motions to dismiss certain claims against some of the individual police officer defendants. After this order, the Plaintiffs in the Local 10 ILWU case entered settlement negotiations with the Defendants, and on July 31, 2006 the action was voluntarily dismissed with prejudice in light of settlements reached between the parties. These settlement agreements have not been obtained by the Clearinghouse and their terms are unknown, but they did include attorneys' fees and costs. The Court retained jurisdiction over the case in order to enforce the earlier settlement that established the Crowd Control Policy. The Plaintiffs in Coles also reached settlements with the Defendants. One plaintiff received $210,000 inclusive of attorneys' fees and costs. Another received $8,000, inclusive of costs. Other plaintiffs settled for $30,000, $10,000, $31,250, and $48,000, exclusive of attorneys' fees and costs. The amount received by the remaining plaintiff is unknown. On January 4, 2007, Judge Henderson granted in part and denied in part the Plaintiffs' motion for attorneys' fees in the Cole case. The Court ordered the Defendants to pay the Plaintiffs' attorneys $621,512.12. This included attorneys' fees and costs for the Coles portion of the earlier settlement for injunctive relief that lead to the Crowd Control Policy. As of the time of this writing, July 2013, there has been no activity on either docket since this last order. The settlement establishing the Crowd Control Policy does not appear to have a termination date, and so it is possible that the case could be reopened.", "summary": "On June 26, 2003, two separate suits were filed against the City of Oakland and the Oakland Police Department (OPD), and related defendants, in federal court. The suits were filed in response to the OPD's actions on April 7 at a peaceful antiwar demonstration at the Port of Oakland. The Police, without giving sufficient notice to disperse and without provocation, barraged demonstrators with a variety of \"less-lethal\" munitions, while blocking the main exit routes. Police pursued demonstrators and others present when they attempted to disperse, while continuing to fire at them and intentionally strike them with motorcycles. On August 11, 2003, the Court ordered that the cases be officially related and heard before the same judge. One of the two cases, Local 10 ILWU v. City of Oakland, was filed as a class-action on behalf of all persons who attended the April 7 demonstration. The suit also named as plaintiffs Local 10 of the International Longshore and Warehouse Union, plus nine of its members who were \"standing by\" in the vicinity of the demonstration but not active participants in it. The other suit, Coles v. City of Oakland, sought relieve for several individual demonstrators who were allegedly injured by the OPD. In both cases, Plaintiffs sought compensatory, exemplary, and punitive damages, as well as to recover legal costs. They also sought declaratory judgments holding the Defendants' actions to be unlawful violations of the Plaintiffs' rights under the Constitutions of the U.S. and of California and of statutory law. They sought injunctions that among other things would prohibit the Defendants from unlawfully interference with the constitutional and statutory rights of participants in public demonstrations and protests. On December 24, 2004, the parties entered a court-approved partial settlement addressing the Plaintiffs' claims for injunctive relief to the extent that those claims related to the Defendants' crowd control policies. Oakland adopted a new official Crowd Control Policy that forbade the police from dispersing crowds that had not behaved illegally or that did not pose a clear and present danger of imminent violence. It also forbade the indiscriminate use of less-lethal weapons directly against crowds, even when specific individuals in the group were violent. The remaining issues eventually settled, with awards of damages and attorneys' fees well in excess of $1,000,000."} {"article": "The plaintiff, a demonstrator involved in the Occupy Oakland protest movement, alleged that in the early morning hours of November 3, 2011, he was wrongfully beaten and imprisoned by two Oakland police officers, in the presence and with the approval of their supervising Sergeant. He alleged that the day prior he had participated, with several thousand other individuals, in a protest against recent police brutality and for economic justice. After the protest he went for dinner, and when walking home after midnight he encountered a police line obstructing his path. The plaintiff, an Army veteran of the war in Afghanistan, alleged that he questioned and criticized the officers' actions, and that in retaliation to his criticism two of the officers brutally beat him with clubs, sprayed painful chemicals in his face, and then arrested him. The beating caused lacerations to his spleen and internal bleeding, but rather than taking the plaintiff to a hospital, the police detained him in handcuffs at various locations near Oakland City Hall and then later transferred him to the Alameda County Jail. He was not taken to a hospital until approximately 18 hours after his arrest, after a friend paid his bail. He alleges that while detained his pleas for help were mocked or ignored by jail personal, including the jail medical staff. When he was taken to the hospital, his internal bleeding was discovered. The medical staff had to permanently cut off blood flow to his spleen, leaving him with a non-functioning organ. He was kept in intensive care for five days. The plaintiff filed the lawsuit on November 29, 2012 in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California. The suit was filed against the officers individually and in their official capacities, against other unknown individuals involved in his detention, and against the City of Oakland. The suit was filed under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 and alleged that the police's actions violated his First Amendment right to free speech, his Fourteenth Amendment rights to equal protection and due process, and the Fourth Amendment ban on unreasonable searches and seizures, as well as his rights to be free from excessive and arbitrary force, to personal liberty, and to freedom of movement. He also alleged analogous violations of California constitutional and statutory law, and a California statute requiring that certain misdemeanor plaintiffs be cited and released rather than jailed. Other allegations included assault and battery, false imprisonment, and negligence. The plaintiff sought compensatory, statutory, and punitive and exemplary damages, attorneys' fees and legal costs, and further relief as deemed appropriate by the court. On January 7, 2013, the plaintiff amended his complaint. The amended complaint appears to be substantially the same as his first complaint, expect with a paragraph describing the injury to his spleen in more specific terms. The parties entered into settlement negotiations. After two settlement conferences, the parties reached a settlement agreement which was ordered by the court on January 30, 2014. The Defendants paid $645,000 to the plaintiff to compensate his claims including attorney's fees. The case is closed.", "summary": "The plaintiff filed the lawsuit on November 29, 2012 in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California. The plaintiff, a demonstrator involved in the Occupy Oakland protest movement, alleged that when he was returning home from a protest, two Oakland police officers brutally beat him with clubs, sprayed painful chemicals in his face, and arrested him. The suit was filed under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983, and alleged that the polices' actions violated his First Amendment right to free speech, his Fourteenth Amendment rights to equal protection and due process, and the Fourth Amendment ban on unreasonable searches and seizures. After two settlement conferences, the parties reached a settlement agreement which was ordered by the court on January 30, 2014. The Defendants paid $645,000 to the plaintiff to compensate his claims including attorney's fees. The case is closed."} {"article": "This is a case about protestors being detained and arrested in downtown Los Angeles between November 24-26, 2014. On January 12, 2016, four protestors represented by private counsel and the National Lawyers Guild (NLG) filed this \u00a7 1983 class action suit against the City of Los Angeles in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California. The plaintiffs sought preliminary and permanent injunctions against the City and the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD), declaratory judgments that their rights had been violated, nullification of the arrests, and various damages and attorney\u2019s fees. They claimed that the LAPD had violated their First Amendment rights through unlawful detention during a protest; that they were unreasonably detained, searched, and arrested in violation of their Fourth Amendment rights; that not being permitted release on recognizance while held in custody based on a perceived affiliation with nation-wide protests and purported engagement in \u201ccivil disobedience\u201d violated their Fourteenth Amendment rights to equal protection and due process; and that their right to privacy under California state law was violated by compulsory disclosure and subsequent upload to a nationwide protestor database of personal information. The protestors were marching in response to a grand jury\u2019s refusal to indict a police officer for the shooting death of Michael Brown in Ferguson, Missouri. At some point during the demonstration, protestors were kettled in by LAPD officers and prevented from leaving. The protest was deemed unlawful because it was blocking motorists, but plaintiffs contended in their complaint that the only traffic interference originated from the LAPD. The captain of the police then issued a \u201cdispersal order,\u201d informing them they would only be let go after individual questioning. Few of the protestors heard this order (the complaint states that the LAPD captain later admitted it was \u201cinadequate\u201d). The subsequent questioning involved being restrained in zip ties, patted down and searched, recorded on video, and forced to provide private identifying information. This was not the first time the City and LAPD had been sued for similar practices. In 2005, the City agreed to a settlement in a lawsuit (National Lawyers Guild v. City of Los Angeles) brought by NLG that provided the LAPD would no longer prevent sidewalk protests, would not kettle protestors using their motorcycles, and would attempt to arrest individuals responsible for any unlawful conduct prior to declaring an unlawful assembly. The City had to settle again in 2009, stipulating that it would facilitate protests that may temporarily block traffic and set specific requirements for declaring an unlawful assembly. For more information, see MIWON v. City of Los Angeles. The complaint in this case alleged that the City had repeatedly failed to train its officers to adhere to any of these provisions, all of which were violated during the protests. The plaintiffs moved for class certification on July 14, 2016. The court granted their motion in part on May 25, 2017. It certified a class entitled to seek damages defined as the \"approximately 130 persons who were detained and arrested at 6th and Hope Streets on November 26, 2014, denied release on their own recognizance but never prosecuted.\" But the court declined to certify a class of protestors at a different intersection because the putative class representative was an NLG observer rather than a protester. It also declined to certify a class for injunctive relief consisting of all past and future protestors because \"no objective criteria\" existed to determine membership. 2017 WL 10776036. On February 27, 2017, the parties began court-ordered mediation. However, after over a year of failure to agree on a settlement, the parties were ordered into private mediation on July 8, 2018. The parties agreed to a provisional settlement on January 10, 2019, which after some modification Judge John A. Kronstadt approved on May 11, 2020. The plaintiffs were awarded a total of $750,000. $215,878.51 was put in a settlement fund for distribution to class members; $20,000 was awarded to the class representatives; and $476,801.93 was granted as attorney\u2019s fees (the rest went to various court fees). Injunctive relief was not part of the settlement. The case is now closed.", "summary": "Protestors in downtown LA alleged they were unlawfully detained, searched, interrogated, and some arrested during demonstrations in November, 2014. They brought a class action lawsuit against the City alleging violations of their 1st, 4th, and 14th amendment rights, as well as California state rights. A settlement was reached on May 11, 2020, granting plaintiffs $750,000 of attorney's fees, court fees, and class damages."} {"article": "This is a case about harm caused by the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) misclassifying residents as gang members or gang associates. On August 2, 2020, five residents of Los Angeles filed this putative class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California. They sued the City of Los Angeles under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983. Represented by attorneys from the Justice X Law Group, the plaintiffs sought damages for harms that arose from being falsely linked to gang activity, including imprisonment, excessive charging, job loss, inability to acquire housing, and loss of access to financial aid for college. Plaintiffs asserted that they were subjected to unnecessary and outrageous searches and seizures that violated the Fourth Amendment; that they were unlawfully confined in violation of the First Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment\u2019s Due Process Clause; and that the City of Los Angeles was responsible for and complicit in these LAPD policies. Much of the alleged misconduct in this case arose from section 186.22 of the California Penal Code (CPC). That law enhances sentences for crimes committed in association with a gang. Plaintiffs alleged that, since its inception, officers have abused it by knowingly or recklessly misclassifying people as gang members or gang associates while charging them with minor crimes to support convictions. Plaintiffs alleged they were misclassified for visiting family in a neighborhood with gang-related activity or having a cousin who was an alleged gang member. The magnitude of this abuse became clear in 2016 when, according to plaintiffs' complaint, a state audit found that California\u2019s statewide gang association database (CalGangs) contained abundant \u201cquestionable entries and errors such as the inclusion of year-old children.\u201d The issues of false classifications led to the California Department of Justice suspending CalGangs in June of 2020 and revoking LAPD\u2019s access to it in July of 2020. The L.A. County District Attorney\u2019s Office filed a criminal complaint against three LAPD officers on July 9, 2020 for conspiring to falsify police reports and fabricate court documents. An LAPD memorandum confirmed that as of July 10, 2020 twenty-four LAPD officers are under investigation for similar charges. The case is ongoing as of September 13, 2020.", "summary": "In 2020, residents of Los Angeles filed a putative class action complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California. The plaintiffs alleged that false claims of gang association and gang identity led to unreasonable searches, seizures, and imprisonment that violated their First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendment Rights. The case is ongoing as of September 2020."} {"article": "This class-action lawsuit was filed on July 1, 2020 in the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado. The suit came in response to police tactics used to quell protests in Denver that followed the police killing of George Floyd in May of 2020. Plaintiffs, seven private individuals, were represented by the civil rights law firm Loevy & Loevy and brought this suit against the city and county of Denver, as well as 10 anonymous officers of Denver Police Department (called Does 1-10). The class-action suit established two separate, putative classes: the Arrest Class, made up of those who were arrested in the protests, and the Direct Force Class, composed of protesters who suffered injuries from police using weapons. The suit alleged that on May 28, 2020 the Denver Police used weapons like tear gas, flashbang grenades, pepper spray, pepper balls, and rubber bullets on peaceful protesters. According to the complaint, these actions violated the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments. The First Amendment count claimed that the defendants' actions violated the U.S. Constitution's guarantee of Free Speech and Freedom to Petition. They also argued that the city's curfew itself was unlawfully executed because it only applied to protesters and not to non-protesters. The Fourth Amendment count argued that the defendants' actions in arresting and firing weapons at protesters constituted unreasonable search and seizure and excessive force. Finally, the Fourteenth Amendment count claimed that defendants violated the Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause. Specifically, the Direct Force Class was denied Due Process when the police fired weapons at them \"indiscriminately\" and the Arrest Class was denied Due Process and Equal Protection when the police arrested them for violation of curfew, according to the complaint. Plaintiffs sought class certification, declaratory relief, injunctive relief prohibiting defendants from further violations, and general and punitive damages. They also sought attorney's fees and costs. The case was assigned to Magistrate Judge Michael E. Hegarty. A week later, plaintiffs submitted a notice of related cases, citing two cases with common facts and claims and with at least one party in common: Abay v. Denver and Black Lives Matter 5280 v. Denver. The plaintiffs amended the complaint on July 23, 2020. The case was reassigned to Judge Lewis T. Babcock, since not all parties consented to jurisdiction of the magistrate judge. Then on July 28, the case was reassigned to Judge R. Brooke Jackson, consistent with the reassignment in Black Lives Matter 5280 v. City and County of Denver. On August 4, the two cases were consolidated together with BLM 5280 designated as the lead case. Additional information on this litigation can be found under the BLM 5280 entry. The case is ongoing as of January 2, 2021.", "summary": "This class action lawsuit was filed in response to police actions amidst the nationwide protests that ensued following the police killing of George Floyd. The complaint, filed by seven private individuals, argues that the police use of weapons like pepper balls, pepper spray, and rubber bullets constituted violations of the protesters' First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The suit established two classes of plaintiffs, the Arrest Class and the Direct Force Class. The case is ongoing as of January 2, 2021."} {"article": "On August 4, 2014, a 71-year old grandmother living in Washington, DC filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 against the District of Columbia. The plaintiff, represented by the non-profit organization Equal Justice Under Law, sought compensatory damages, punitive damages, costs, and reasonable attorneys' fees, claiming that her constitutional rights were violated. Specifically, the plaintiff claimed that the police verbally and physically abused her during a search of her home that was conducted despite the fact that she was under no suspicion of any wrongdoing. The incident happened on October 27, 2012 when two officers were on patrol and passed the plaintiff's home and saw three men near her property \"outside the fence line.\" One of the men was the plaintiff's grandson. After conversing with the men, the three were arrested for possession of an open container of alcohol and possession of synthetic marijuana. A handgun was also found. One of the other men admitted that all of the illicit items belonged to him and no charges were pressed against the plaintiff's grandson. Even though no charges were pressed against the plaintiff's grandson, the police sought to search the plaintiff's home on the basis that there might have been evidence related to illegal firearms in the home. According to the plaintiff's complaint, the search warrant application was vague and did not specify any specific reason for searching the home. Furthermore, the complaint alleges that the basis given for the warrant was inadequate. Both before and after obtaining the warrant, the plaintiff alleged that she was kept from entering her home and treated abusively by the police. After the search did not turn up anything illegal, the plaintiff claims that she reentered her home to find that it had been torn apart by the police. On September 16, 2014, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss. They argued that the officers' conduct was lawful, that the officers conduct was protected by qualified immunity, and that plaintiff failed to allege a Monell claim against the Metropolitan Police Department. The plaintiff filed an amended complaint on September 25, 2015, which added several officer defendants to the action. On September 30, 2016, Judge Randolph D. Moss ruled on the defendants' motion to dismiss, granting in part and denying in part. 211 F. Supp. 3d 150 (D.D.C. 2016). Specifically, the Court found that the officers had failed to establish the following: (1) that the firearm found gave them probable cause to conduct a warrantless arrest; (2) that the protective sweep of the home was lawful; and (3) that the application for the warrant for the subsequent search was supported by probable cause. The Court did find, however, that all defendants who executed the search except for one acted lawfully. Finally, the Court found that the plaintiff's complaint adequately alleged that the purportedly unconstitutional search of the home was the result of the District's \"pattern policy, and practice\" of an affiant officer falsely claiming that his training and experience led him to believe that evidence of a crime would be present. On May 1, 2017, the parties stipulated to a dismissal of the case pursuant to a private settlement agreement. The case is now closed.", "summary": "Plaintiff brings this lawsuit under the Fourth Amendment, claiming that her rights were violated by a search of her home that was conducted without probable cause. She claims that she was prevented from entering her home while the police conducted an illegal search based on misinformation and poorly conceived police procedures. She claims that the officers during the arrest were abusive mentally and physically. On September 30, 2016, the Court granted in part and denied in part the defendants' motion to dismiss. In May 2017, the parties reached a private settlement agreement and stipulated to a dismissal of the case, which is now closed."} {"article": "Black Lives Matter - D.C. and several individual protestors brought this lawsuit on June 4, 2020 in the U.S. District Court for the District of D.C. in response to President Trump's use of military police to disperse peaceful protesters in Lafayette Square Park on June 1st, 2020. Protesters had gathered as part of the nationwide outcry following the police killing of George Floyd. Around 6:30 in the evening, following an order to clear the square from Attorney General Barr, military and federal police forces used tear gas, pepper spray capsules, rubber bullets, and flash bombs to disperse the protesters in order to clear the path for President Trump to walk to nearby St. John's Church for a photo-op. Plaintiffs were represented by attorneys from Washington Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights and Urban Affairs, ACLU D.C., Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights Under the Law, and private counsel. Named defendants included President Donald Trump, Attorney General William Barr, and Secretary of Defense Mark Esper, as well as the heads of several military and law enforcement agencies. The plaintiffs also sued unnamed officers, members, and agents of the U.S. Park Police, the U.S. Secret Service, the U.S. Armed Forces, the Arlington County Police Department, and other federal and non-federal law enforcement agencies. The complaint alleged violations of the First Amendment, Fourth Amendment, 42 U.S.C. 1985(3) (conspiracy to deprive rights), and 42 U.S.C. 1986 (failure to prevent conspiracy to deprive rights). Plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief; compensatory and punitive damages, including damages for pain and suffering; and attorney's fees. The case was assigned to Judge Dabney L. Friedrich. On June 9, 2020, plaintiffs filed an amended complaint that sought class certification, added an individual plaintiff, and added Michael Carvajal (Director of the Federal Bureau of Prisons) as a defendant. The plaintiffs brought the action on behalf of themselves and two classes of an individuals: 1) an injunctive relief class and 2) a personal injury class. A second amended complaint was filed two months later. This amended complaint added two individual plaintiffs. It also removed General James McConville, Chief of Staff of the United States Army, as a defendant and added the Chief of the Metropolitan Police Department of the District of Columbia and unnamed Metropolitan Police Department officers. It also added First and Fourth Amendments claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983. On August 19th, 2020, Judge Friedrich ordered the parties in this case and Buchanan v. Trump to propose a consolidated briefing schedule or to explain why briefing should not be consolidated given the similar factual and legal questions in each case. The following day, the plaintiffs filed a motion for class certification. The plaintiffs filed a third amended complaint on September 3rd, identifying a number of individual law enforcement officers as defendants. In the following months, the defendants filed a number of motions to dismiss. As of April 21, 2021, the court has yet to issue decisions on any of the motions to dismiss and the lawsuit remains pending.", "summary": "On June 1st, 2020, President Trump and Attorney General Barr ordered military and federal police to attack peaceful protesters using chemical weapons. Protesters were gathered in response to the May 25th killing of George Floyd. The complaint, which eventually sought class certification, claimed that the government's actions represented violations of the First Amendment, Fourth Amendment, and constituted conspiracy to deprive rights and failure to prevent conspiracy to deprive rights. Plaintiffs sought declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief. As of April 21, 2021, the lawsuit is ongoing."} {"article": "On November 24, 2009, patrons of Atlanta Eagle, a gay bar in Atlanta, Georgia, filed this lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 against the City of Atlanta, the chief of police, and officers of the Atlanta Police Department in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia, Atlanta Division. The plaintiffs, represented by private lawyer Dan Grossman, and public interest lawyers from Lambda Legal Defense and the Southern Center for Human Rights, asked the Court for damages and declaratory and injunctive relief to redress defendants' violations of plaintiffs' rights under the U.S. Constitution and Georgia Constitution to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. Specifically, plaintiffs claimed that the police action was taken without any particularized reasonable suspicion or probable cause to believe that any individual was involved in any criminal activity. The plaintiffs also sought redress for the numerous state law torts committed by individual defendants, including false imprisonment, assault, battery, and trespass. According to the complaint, on September 10 and 11, 2009, a paramilitary, SWAT-type force of Atlanta police officers entered the Atlanta Eagle without a warrant, claiming to be searching for public sex, drugs, and illegal weapons. The police forced dozens of bar patrons to lie face-down on the floor, which was covered with spilled beer, dirt, and broken glass. Officers allegedly made threats of violence and anti-gay slurs. Plaintiffs claim that although they were not suspected of any criminal activity, police officers emptied their pockets, confiscated their IDs, and entered every patron's name into a police computer. After the raid, not a single patron was charged with any crime, and no weapons, drugs, or evidence of sex was found. In December 2010, the parties reached a settlement that required the Atlanta Police Department to rewrite their policies regarding arrest, search, and seizure, and to make other changes to protect the public from police misconduct. The settlement required, among other provisions:
Some institutions have implemented a timely and effective audiology process, managed interpretive services effectively, and even worked on improving communication with hard-of-hearing inmates by providing new amplification devices. That said, the most recent self-reporting cycle reveals the widespread continuation of two different kinds of problems. Procedurally, some institutions continue to struggle with keeping and sharing the records needed to comply with the agreement and to check on that compliance, including when I make requests for follow-up. And substantively, self-reporting and follow-ups reveal crucial areas of compliance weakness\u2014areas that I have seen and described consistently in several prior reports, as many as three years ago. These include: \u2022 Identification, tracking, and reporting of inmates who are deaf/hard-of-hearing \u2022 Ensuring prompt and accurate provision of audiology services \u2022 Providing interpretation, both in-person and remote \u2022 Providing videophone services.The seventh semi-annual report, filed December 2019, made numerous recommendations to KDOC about continuing issues, and included the department's responses as an exhibit. The eighth semi-annual report, filed May 2020, tracked (and included) responses to those recommendations. The settlement term was set to expire in July 2020, but the parties agreed in a joint filing dated August 3, 2020, to extend it for six months. Monitoring therefore continues through the end of 2020. On December 16, 2020, the monitor filed the 9th semi-annual report, which found significant improvement. It included training presentations that had been provided by the monitor in October 2020, and stated:
In this current filing, although the COVID pandemic has created real obstacles, I am pleased to report yet more progress. I cannot say that each KDOC prison is complying with each and every settlement agreement provision. However, compliance with many of the ADA/Settlement Agreement requirements has been accomplished. And I believe there is now a system in place that can\u2014if the prison authorities so choose\u2014succeed in maintaining that compliance and in solving remaining problems. In order to assist in that process, I continue to offer recommendations for the period after the settlement term closes.", "summary": "On January 1, 2014, deaf and hard of hearing inmates in the Kentucky prison system filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky against the Commonwealth of Kentucky and the Kentucky Department of Corrections, alleging violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Rehabilitation Act, and the First Amendment. Plaintiffs claimed that they were denied access to telecommunications and denied interpretative services for religious services, job training, disciplinary hearings, public announcements, educational and vocational training effectively excluding them from many governmental services. The parties reached settlement which was entered by the court in a consent decree in June, 2015. A monitor was appointed, who will submit a semi-annual report during the five-year term of the settlement. The settlement includes provision of services and accommodations through a qualified interpreter and communication technologies, staffing, and training."} {"article": "On January 2, 2015, a prisoner in Pennsylvania sued the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections (\"PDOC\"), several of its employees and administrators in their official and individual capacities, as well as Wexford Health Sources (the provider of medical care in state prisons), in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania. The lawsuit was brought under the Rehabilitation Act, the Americans with Disabilities Act, and 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983, for the alleged deprivation of the plaintiff's Eighth Amendment rights. The plaintiff alleged that the PDOC systematically denied medical care to persons with severe eye conditions, including severe cataracts. The plaintiff was represented by both private counsel and attorneys from the Pennsylvania Institutional Law Project and sought declaratory and injunctive relief; compensatory and punitive damages; and attorneys' fees and costs. Along with his complaint, he filed a motion for class certification. Since 1999, the plaintiff had suffered from various eye and vision conditions and had received cataract surgery on his right eye in 2001. Prior to 2008, an optometrist determined that the plaintiff's left eye required cataract surgery, to which the plaintiff consented. However, the defendants denied the recommended surgery, and the plaintiff appealed the denial to no avail. The DOC allegedly had an administrative policy colloquially known as the \"One Good Eye\" policy, which denies cataract surgery to those who retain a threshold modicum of visual acuity in one eye, notwithstanding physician recommendations to the contrary. In 2012, the plaintiff was diagnosed with a cataract in his left eye, and his treating ophthalmologist requested surgery, which was scheduled for September 2012, but then postponed the procedure. The plaintiff filed an administrative grievance seeking surgery, but in January 2013, the defendant upheld the decision to postpone. In May 2013, the plaintiff received an additional eye examination, his left eye was diagnosed with a \"very dense cataract,\" and he was referred for surgery. One of the defendant's staff instead scheduled the plaintiff for a follow-up consultation three months later and explained that the plaintiff was ineligible for cataract surgery on his left eye because the visual acuity in his right eye measured 20/60. Over the next two years, the plaintiff repeatedly requested further information regarding his ineligibility and filed another administrative grievance, while the cataract in his left eye caused virtual blindness in that eye and allegedly caused the vision in his right eye to deteriorate. He ultimately received cataract surgery on his left eye in Febuary 2015. Wexford filed a motion to dismiss on March 24, 2015. The other defendants filed their own motions to dismiss on April 16, 2015 and June 3, 2015, and the PDOC filed a motion for judgment and to stay discovery on July 17, 2015. Chief Judge Christopher C. Conner granted the motion to stay discovery. After a teleconference with the plaintiffs and defendants on August 24, 2015, however, the Court ordered that the defendants had failed to show good cause for keeping their cataract surgery policy confidential, although such policy has not appeared in the Court record yet. On July 17, 2015, the PDOC and its administrators filed a motion to stay discovery pending disposition of the plaintiff's motion for class certification, the defendants' motion to dismiss, and the defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings. On July 21, 2015, the Court granted the motion. On September 18, 2015, the Court denied the plaintiff's motion for class certification without prejudice. The Court stated that it would allow limited discovery related to the eligibility of this case for class action certification. On January 20, 2016, the Court granted in part and denied in part the defendants' motions to dismiss. The motions were denied as to the allegations that the defendants discriminated against the plaintiff on the basis of disability in violation of the ADA or \u00a7 504, and that some of the staff member defendants violated his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment in their individual capacities. The motions were granted as to the allegations that Wexford and some of the staff member defendants, acting in their official capacities, violated his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment, and that the same staff member defendants, acting in their official capacities, violated Pennsylvania's constitutional protections against cruel and unusual punishment. The Court noted that the plaintiff had sought only injunctive relief against some of the defendants and, because he had received the cataract surgery, those claims were moot. 159 F. Supp. 3d 502. On February 4, 2016, the parties jointly moved to stay pretrial deadlines pending the conclusion of settlement negotiations. On February 8, the Court granted the parties' motion and ordered that counsel submit status reports every 60 days. On April 8, 2016, the plaintiff wrote a letter notifying the Court that settlement negotiations with the PDOC and two of its administrators were proceeding but that negotiations with Wexford and its physicians had stalled. On April 19, 2016, the plaintiff moved to partially lift the stay with respect to the Wexford defendants, which the Court denied on April 20, 2016. Negotiations continued throughout the remainder of the year. On January 17, 2017, Chief Judge Conner signed an order referring the case for purposes of settlement only to Magistrate Judge Martin C. Carlson. A mediation took place on February 7, 2017. On February 8, 2017, Chief Judge Conner ordered the case dismissed without costs and without prejudice under the terms of a settlement agreement to which the parties had agreed. Thirty days after February 8, 2017, PDOC agreed to adopt a new cataract policy to replace the old \"One Good Eye\" policy. An individual would be eligible for cataract surgery even if the individual has one eye that does not need to be operated on. Additionally, individuals who were denied surgery under the old policy would be evaluated on a rolling basis according to the new cataract policy. The PDOC would also let individuals know about the policy change, and provide surgical evaluations for individuals with cataracts and post-operative care after the cataract surgery. For 3 years after February 8, 2017, the PDOC would provide plaintiff's counsel with an accounting of individuals who have cataracts and how they were evaluated under the new cataract policy. They must also provide plaintiff's counsel with a copy of proposed changes or revisions to the new cataract policy, if any. The PDOC also agreed to pay the plaintiff $16,500 but did not agree to pay attorneys' fees. The parties agreed that the Court would retain jurisdiction over the implementation and enforcement of this agreement for 3 years, after which the case would be dismissed with prejudice. On March 21, 2017, the parties signed a formal settlement agreement. Litigation continued over attorneys' fees and costs. On February 23, 2018, Magistrate Judge Carlson conducted a settlement conference for the parties. The parties reached an agreement, and on February 26, 2018, Chief Judge Connor ordered that a motion by the plaintiff for attorneys' fees be dismissed as moot because of this resolution. On March 30, 2018, an individual sent a handwritten letter to the Court explaining that he had not received surgery for his cataracts and that his vision was deteriorating. Judge Carlson forwarded this letter to counsel for both parties. The settlement agreement expired without any further docket activity, so the case is now closed.", "summary": "In January 2015, the plaintiff, a prisoner, filed this putative class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania, alleging that the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections systematically denied medical care to individuals with severe eye conditions, including severe cataracts, in violation of the ADA, \u00a7 504, and his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. The parties settled, and the Department of Corrections changed their cataract policy, no longer denying surgery to individuals who had \"One Good Eye.\""} {"article": "On May 21, 2011, multiple students of the Mobile County Public School System (MCPSS) filed this lawsuit in the United States District Court of the Southern District of Alabama, under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983, against the Mobile County School District. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel and the Southern Poverty Law Center, sought a court order mandating due process hearings before the school district issues long-term suspensions or expulsions. Specifically, plaintiffs claimed that the school district violated the Fourteenth Amendment right to due process by denying students a hearing before issuing long-term suspensions or expulsions. The plaintiffs also alleged that the school district also failed to notify parents before a suspension or expulsion was issued and denied students the right to defend themselves against accusations and to have an advocate or legal counsel present at a hearing. The plaintiffs alleged the Mobile County Public School System frequently used long-term suspensions and expulsions as disciplinary measures for minor infractions. These disciplinary measures have severe detrimental impacts on students, and plaintiffs claimed that to employ these measures without a hearing is a violation of due process. School administrators often used these measures not only without a hearing, but also without informing students' parents before the suspension was issued, a violation of the School Code of Conduct Handbook. To the extent that administrators acted against the disciplinary code, the plaintiffs claimed the Board of Commissioners turned a blind eye to these actions and failed in their duties to train and supervisor administrators. On March 1, 2013, the parties entered mediation and on June 10, 2013, the District Court (Judge William H. Steele) dismissed the case with prejudice contingent on the parties agreeing to terms of the settlement agreement. On June 28, 2013, a settlement was reached. The settlement agreement stated terms for amending the Mobile County Public School System's Conduct Code. These changes included: requiring notification of parents when the principal recommended a long-term suspension; requiring a due process hearing for any long-term suspension recommendation; changing the definition of long-term suspension from eleven or more school days to five or more school days; reducing the number of infractions that suspension may be applied to; providing information sessions for parents and students to explain discipline policies; developing alternative punishments to suspension; and training administrators and establishing goals in order to reduce suspensions, among other measures. The settlement also included individual remedies for the individually named plaintiffs. This settlement remained in effect until August 2016. There has been no action on the docket since June 28, 2013.", "summary": "Students in Mobile County schools sued the county for violations of the Fourteenth Amendment Right to Due Process by denying the students a hearing before issuing long-term suspensions and expulsions. The case entered mediation and was settled on the terms of the agreement that amended the school district's disciplinary procedures and practices."} {"article": "In 1870, Congress passed Mississippi\u2019s Readmission Act returning Mississippi to full statehood following the Civil War on certain conditions including that \u201cthe constitution of Mississippi shall never be so amended or changed as to deprive any citizen or class of citizens of the United States of the school rights and privileges secured by the constitution of said State.\u201d 16 Stat. 67 (1870). On May 23, 2017, four low-income African American women filed this lawsuit on behalf of their children, students of Mississippi schools, in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi against various officials in Mississippi's government, including the Governor, Speaker of the House, Lieutenant Governor and presider over the Senate, Secretary of State, and the entire Board of Education. Represented by the Southern Poverty Law Center and co-counsel, the plaintiffs sued under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 and Ex parte Young claiming that Mississippi failed to meet its obligations related to \"school rights and privileges\" under the Mississippi Readmission Act. The plaintiffs sought declaratory judgment that the educational requirements under the 1869 Mississippi Constitution and the Readmission Act remain in effect and that the current Mississippi Constitution conflicts with the Readmission Act. In addition, they sought attorneys' fees and costs. The case was assigned to Judge William H. Barbour. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that Mississippi was not upholding the Readmission Act because there was a significant disparity in the conditions and education at plaintiffs' schools where students were primarily African American and schools where students were predominantly white and wealthy. The state\u2019s top five highest-performing school districts were predominantly white whereas thirteen of the state\u2019s nineteen school districts with an \u201cF\u201d rating were more than 95 percent African American. The plaintiffs\u2019 children attended elementary schools in the Jackson Public School District and the Yazoo City Municipal School District, both with an \u201cF\u201d letter grade from the Mississippi Department of Education. The plaintiffs claimed the schools lacked textbooks, supplies, and experienced teachers and were in poor condition. For example, the complaint noted that at some schools paint was peeling off the walls and the ceilings had visible water spots. On March 28, 2018, Judge Barbour dismissed the case with prejudice, finding that it was barred under Eleventh Amendment Immunity. The Court found that while the plaintiffs were only suing state officials, not the state, they were suing state officials in their official capacities, and therefore, the state was the real substantial party in interest and enjoyed sovereign immunity. Further, the Court held that the Ex parte Young doctrine that creates an exception to state sovereign immunity, was not applicable in this case because the plaintiffs were not seeking injunctive relief. The plaintiffs then moved to have the judgment altered and for leave to file an amended complaint. On January 4, 2019, Judge Barbour found the Court did not err in finding the claims barred by Eleventh Amendment immunity, but altered the judgment so that the case was dismissed without prejudice. 2019 WL 3757948. He denied the plaintiffs' motion to amend the complaint and entered a final judgment dismissing the case without prejudice. The plaintiffs promptly appealed the judgment to the Fifth Circuit on January 25, 2019. The appeal was docketed as 19-60069. The Fifth Circuit (Circuit Judges Stephen A. Higginson, E. Grady Jolly, and James E. Graves Jr.) affirmed in part and vacated in part. 954 F.3d 729. It found the plaintiffs' claim seeking a declaration that the current version of Mississippi's Constitution violated the Readmissions Act could be pursued under the Ex parte Young exception to state sovereign immunity because the defendants were state officers sued in their official capacities and the plaintiffs alleged a continuing violation of federal law--the Readmission Act. However, the Fifth Circuit affirmed that the claim seeking a declaration that the 1868 Mississippi Constitution remained in effect was barred by state sovereign immunity and Ex parte Young did not apply because this would require a federal court to tell state officials how to conform to state law. The Fifth Circuit denied the defendants' request for rehearing en banc (9-8). 981 F.3d 437 Circuit Judge Edith H. Jones, joined by the seven other Circuit Judges voting for rehearing, dissented, arguing that the request for a declaration the current Mississippi Constitution violated the federal Readmission Act would necessarily require the impermissible adjudication of a question of state law. On January 13, 2021, the defendants filed a petition for review with the Supreme Court (Case No. 20A126). They also filled an application with the Supreme Court to stay the mandate of the Fifth Circuit pending the Supreme Court's decision on whether to grant review. Back in the district court, the case was reassigned to District Judge Kristi H. Jonhson and then District Judge Henry T. Wingate in January 2021. As of February 5, 2021, the petition for review remained pending, and the case is ongoing.", "summary": "In 2017, four low-income African American mothers filed suit against the numerous officials of the State of Mississippi claiming the state failed to live up to the educational requirements set by the Mississippi Readmission Act of 1870. They sought declaratory relief that the requirements are still intact. The case was dismissed in 2018 due to the state sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment. The plaintiffs appealed to the Fifth Circuit which affirmed in part and reversed in part. The defendants requested rehearing en banc, but the Fifth Circuit denied the request. The defendants then filed a petition for review with the Supreme Court and a request to stay the Fifth Circuit's mandate in January 2021. The case is ongoing."} {"article": "On April 8, 2009, the plaintiffs, a student discriminated against and harassed based on his sex and sexual orientation and his sister who tried to form a gay-straight student alliance at their high school, brought a suit against Indian River Central School District, the District Board of Education, and a number of individual administrative officials, in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of New York (Judge Glenn T. Suddaby). The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel and Lambda Legal, sought a declaratory judgment, permanent injunctive relief, a jury trial, and nominal, compensatory, and punitive damages due to the defendants' viewpoint and content-based discrimination under the Equal Access Act, 20 U.S.C. \u00a7 4071, et seq. and freedom of speech and association under the First Amendment, denial of equal protection due to sex and sexual orientation under the Fourteenth Amendment, sex discrimination under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, U.S.C. \u00a7 1681, et seq., and violation of New York law. Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that from September 1993 until January 2004, the defendants were deliberately indifferent and contributed to one of the plaintiff's severe, pervasive harassment based on his sex and sexual orientation, depriving him of equal access to educational programs and causing him to drop out of high school due to the emotional and physical harms he suffered. The plaintiffs also claimed that the defendant repeatedly denied students, including the plaintiffs themselves, permission to form a gay-straight student alliance in violation of their rights under the Equal Access Act and the First Amendment. On August 13, 2010, the United States moved to participate as amicus curiae, as the suit involved Title IX and Equal Protection claims based on sex. The motion was approved on December 6, 2010. On March 29, 2011, the Court granted in part and denied in part the defendants' motion for summary judgment and motion to dismiss. See Pratt v. Indian River Cent. Sch. Dist., 803 F. Supp. 2d 135, 154 (N.D. N.Y. 2011). The Court dismissed two of the plaintiffs' New York law claims and the plaintiffs' claim for punitive damages against the School District, but left the rest of the claims standing against the defendants. See id. The parties reached a private settlement agreement, which the Court recognized on June 21, 2013, and dismissed the action with prejudice on August 8, 2013. The settlement agreement required the District to: retain a consultant to advise them on how to better handle student harassment, share information about student bullying across the schools in the District, and follow certain guidelines set out in the agreement. See Lambda Legal, Lambda Legal Clients and Indian River Central School District Settle Antigay Harassment Lawsuit, Lambda Legal (August 8, 2013), http://www.lambdalegal.org/blog/pratt-v-indian-river-central-school-district-settlement.", "summary": "This federal lawsuit was filed in 2000 in the Eastern District of California; in it, a former high school student and the Gay-Straight Alliance Network sued his school district for failure to take effective measures to remedy continuing harassment that he faced based on his sexual orientation. The case settled for a consent decree entered August 15, 2002, which required the defendants to implement a mandatory staff training program, revise its policies, select compliance coordinators, develop systems for reporting harassment and discrimination, allow students to form a gay-straight alliance, and create a community advisory group. The decree implementation period was 6 months."} {"article": "On February 18, 2007, an African-American individual filed a class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Alabama. Represented by private counsel, the plaintiff sued the defendant Cook's Pest Control under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1981. The plaintiff alleged that defendant maintained a pattern and practice of discrimination in employment on the basis of race. Specifically, the plaintiff alleged that defendant discouraged African-Americans from applying for jobs with defendant by, among other things, telling them there was no job and requiring that they file applications personally at every office at which they sought employment. The plaintiff sought declaratory judgment, injunctive relief and damages. On August 8, 2007, the defendant filed motions to dismiss the plaintiffs' complaint for lack of service and the Title VII claims. On January 28, 2008, the district court (Judge L. Scott Coogler) denied the motions. On June 5, 2008, the defendant filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that the named plaintiff failed to failed to make a prima facie case for disparate impact or disparate treatment and failed to show any injury to himself. On December 9, 2008, Judge Coogler denied defendant's motion for summary judgment without prejudice pending further discovery. Over the next several years, extensive discovery was conducted. In December of 2010, the court stayed the case temporarily as the parties sought mediation. In October of 2011 the parties reached a settlement. Under the terms of the proposed settlement agreement, the defendant agreed to set up a settlement fund of $2,500,000 and to bear the costs of administering the payment of the class members' claims. It also agreed to establish and implement a race-neutral, anti-discrimination hiring policy with the help of a monitor, to train employees in the policy, and to keep records of the race of applicants and hires and the reason hiring decisions were made. The settlement was to last three years, with a possible extension of up to one additional year if necessary to resolve challenges still pending with the monitor. On January 27, 2012, Judge Coogler preliminarily approved the settlement and certified the class for the purposes of the settlement. The class is defined as: All African-Americans who applied for employment at any Cook\u2019s location from March 1, 2005, through the date of preliminary approval of the settlement, and who were denied employment, excluding all judicial officers or employees of the Federal courts within the second degree of affinity; employees of Plaintiffs\u2019 counsel; and any other person whose presence in the class would cause mandatory recusal of any judge assigned to the case. On July 17, 2012, the Court approved the parties' settlement agreement and dismissed the case with prejudice, while retaining jurisdiction to enforce the settlement agreement. 2012 WL 2923542. The named plaintiff was allotted to receive $48,000 for the service to the class. The court ordered the defendant to pay attorney's fees, costs and expenses in the amount of $928,831.55, which is $875,000.00 in attorney's fees and $53,831.55 of expenses. This case is now closed.", "summary": "This case was brought by an African-American job applicant against Cook's Pest Control, Inc., alleging that Cooks had maintained a pattern and practice of discrimination in employment on the basis of race. The parties reached a settlement in October of 2011 and the court has granted preliminary approval and certified a settlement class. The court approved the parties' settlement and dismissed the case with prejudice in July 2012."} {"article": "This class action involving store managers at Samsonite Company Stores, Inc. was filed on March 24, 2009, in the U.S. District Court, California Northern District. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, sought class certification (collective class and state classes for New York and California plaintiffs) as well as compensatory, declaratory, and injunctive relief, claiming that defendants consistently failed to pay appropriate overtime compensation as required by federal and state law. The complaint alleged that defendants misclassified plaintiffs as \"exempt\" from state and federal overtime laws; that defendants failed to pay all wages due and appropriate overtime compensation; that defendants failed to provide or authorize meal and rest periods; that defendants failed to maintain accurate time records; that defendants breached their contracts by promising plaintiffs vacation time based on hours worked, but did not pay for their vacation time based on their overtime hours; and that after filing this suit, certain plaintiffs were retaliated against and received pay cuts. The requested relief included damages in the amount of their respective unpaid overtime compensation, liquidated damages from 3 years immediately preceding the filing of this action, attorneys fees and costs, restitution of vacation time and other unpaid wages and premiums, and injunctive relief requiring defendants to provide timely, accurate, itemized wage statements as well as payment of meal and rest periods. Plaintiffs that alleged retaliation requested relief for backpay, compensatory damages, and punitive damages. Pursuant to court order, the parties participated in mediation. During the second mediation session, the mediator made a proposal that both sides accepted on November 5, 2009. A few weeks later, the parties agreed upon a Joint Stipulation of Settlement and Release. The settlement notes that defendants have reclassified all of its store managers nationwide to be non-exempt employees. Defendants, which filed for bankruptcy in September 2009, proposed to pay a lump sum of $850,000 to all 89 of the class members to resolve all outstanding wage and hour claims under the Fair Labor Standards Act and state laws. This is in addition to the amount of $116,251.08 that defendants already voluntarily paid to 30 of the 89 class members since the lawsuit was filed. Specifically, the settlement provides that all class members be paid 10% simple interest on their back overtime wage; that each class member be paid liquidated damages for the full 3 years of his/her FLSA claim; that California class members are paid additional amounts for the state claims raised in the suit, which defendants disputed, and which plaintiffs are waiving in the settlement; that California and New York class members will recover alleged vacation time underpayments; and that plaintiffs will recover for each claim they have for every week in which they were eligible for any recovery, for an average of nearly $6,300 per class member. In December 2009, the court certified plaintiff's class for settlement purposes and granted preliminary approval of the Joint Stipulation of Settlement and Release. In April 2010, the court granted final approval of the Joint Stipulation of Settlement and Release. The court also granted attorneys' fees of $241,562.77 and costs of $35,000, which comply with the 9th Circuit's benchmark for attorneys' fees in a class action (attorneys' fees equal 25% of the common fund). Also, based on the standards of Van Vranken v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 901 F.Supp. 294, 299 (N.D.Cal.1995), the court granted enhancements of $5,000 each sought by the representative plaintiffs.", "summary": "Plaintiffs, all current or former store managers of Samsonite Company Stores, Inc., sought compensatory, declaratory, and injunctive relief, claiming that defendants consistently failed to pay appropriate overtime compensation as required by federal and state law. In November 2009, the parties attended courted ordered mediation and reached a settlement agreement shortly thereafter. The court granted final approval of the settlement agreement in April 2010, which awarded plaintiffs a lump sum of $850,000."} {"article": "This is a case about the Women\u2019s National Soccer Team (WNT) suing the United States Soccer Federation (USSF) for gender discrimination. On March 8, 2019, members of the WNT filed this class-action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California. The plaintiffs sued the USSF under the Equal Pay Act (EPA), 29 U.S.C. \u00a7 206(d) et seq., and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 2000e et seq. Represented by Winston & Strawn LLP, the plaintiffs sought damages & fees (including back pay), an injunction against the USSF engaging in its gender discrimination practices, a declaratory judgment that such practices were unlawful, and an adjustment to their wages and benefits. They claimed that the USSF had been paying them less than similarly situated male employees despite better performance in violation of the EPA. Their complaint also stated that the USSF has been treating them less favorably than their male colleagues in violation of Title VII, specifically with respect to \u201cpay; playing, training and travel conditions; promotion of games; and support and development for games.\u201d The WNT has had world-wide success. It has been ranked first in the world according to FIFA\u2019s Women\u2019s World Rankings for ten of the past eleven years; it has won three World Cup titles and four Olympic Gold Medals; and has won numerous other awards and accolades. Plaintiffs alleged that because of this success, they spend more time training, competing, and participating in media sessions than their male counterparts. They furthermore contended that they earned more profit and/or revenue for the USSF than the Men\u2019s National Soccer Team (MNT) during the period relevant to this case. Despite this, the plaintiffs claimed that USSF has continued to treat its female employees worse than its similarly situated male employees. For non-tournament games called \u201cfriendlies\u201d, the complaint calculated that if all games were won, the WNT would earn on average 38% that of the MNT. For the 2014 World Cup, the MNT earned $5,375,000 in \u201cperformance bonuses\u201d after being knocked out in Round 16. In contrast, in 2015, the WNT earned only $1,725,000 after winning the entire World Cup. But the plaintiffs said that the disparate treatment extended to policies and practices as well. The WNT was much more often forced to play on inferior surfaces such as artificial turf, which affect the game and are more likely to lead to injury; the MNT has consistently received charter flights while the WNT has had to fly commercial; the USSF has allocated fewer resources for promoting WNT games than for promoting MNT games, and waited longer before announcing their games leading to reduced attendance; and the USSF charged less for tickets to WNT games than to MNT games, reducing the potential revenue from their games. The WNT began collective bargaining for equal pay through their union in 2012, but the USSF has continually rejected their demands. In fact, in response to their 2012 demands, the USSF countered that they would only compensate the WNT for winning games against FIFA top-ranked teams (the MNT, by comparison, were always paid no matter the outcome of the game or the rank of the opposing team). According to the complaint, in 2016, a representative of the USSF claimed that \u201cmarket realities are such that the women do not deserve to be paid equally to the men,\u201d after openly admitting that the WNT outperformed the MNT in both revenue and profit the prior year. In 2017, the WNT proposed a revenue-sharing model to test these \u201cmarket realities\u201d wherein their pay would increase or decrease based on whether the USSF derived more or less revenue from WNT\u2019s activities. The USSF rejected this proposal. Upon filing the suit on March 8, 2019, plaintiffs filed a motion to transfer the case to Multidistrict Litigation, but this was denied on June 10, 2019. Defendant filed to transfer to the Northern District of California on May 23, 2019, but this was denied on July 1, 2019. On August 20, 2019 the case was referred to mediation. On September 11, 2019, plaintiffs filed a motion for class certification, which was granted on November 8, 2019. The order granted: (1) Certification of a Rule 23(b)(2) class, defined as: \"All WNT players on the team at the date of final judgment, or the date of the resolution of any appeals therefrom, whichever is later;\" (2) Certification of a Rule 23(b)(3) class, defined as: \"All WNT players who were members of the WNT at any time from February 4, 2015 through the date of class certification;\" and (3) Conditional certification of a collective action pursuant to 29 U.S.C. \u00a7 216(b), defined as: \"All WNT players who were members of the WNT at any time from March 8, 2016 through the present.\" On February 20, 2020, both parties motioned for summary judgment. On May 1, 2020, Judge R. Gary Klausner denied the plaintiff\u2019s motion and granted the defendant\u2019s motion in part. The EPA claim was denied because (1) the WNT was paid more both on a cumulative and average per-game basis than the MNT, and (2) the WNT failed to offer sufficient evidence that despite this, they were being undercompensated compared to the MNT. The Title VII claim, however, survived \u201cinsofar as it is based on (1) travel conditions (specifically, charter flights and hotel accommodations), and (2) personnel and support services (specifically, medical and training support).\u201d On May 8, 2020, the plaintiffs appealed the court's summary judgment decision. The court denied their motion on June 23, 2020, reasoning that if the plaintiff loses at trial, an appeal of all claims is likely anyway, so it would not make administrative sense to do so before the trial. On July 29, 2020, the court scheduled a jury trial for January 26, 2021. As of October 3, 2020, the case is ongoing.", "summary": "The Women's National Soccer Team alleged that the United States Soccer Federation discriminated against them in terms of pay and working conditions in violation of the Equal Pay Act and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. The court denied the Equal Pay Act claim because the team failed to provide sufficient evidence for gender-based unequal pay. The Title VII claim is moving forward however on the premise of unequal working conditions and is scheduled for a jury trial on January 26, 2021. The case is ongoing."} {"article": "On April 22, 1999, a black employee of an automotive plant sued the owner and its manager in the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado, Judge Edward W. Nottingham, for failing to prevent racial discrimination by other workers, in violation of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1981, and state law. Specifically, Plaintiff claimed he was the only black employee among 65 employees at the factory. Other employees shunned him, referred to him with the n-word and intimidated him in various ways. When the plaintiff found a black doll with a noose around it in his locker, he quit his position out of fear. He claimed that supervisors, were aware of discrimination and in fact witnessed it yet did not discipline the other employees. He claimed discrimination, ethnic intimidation, and constructive discharge in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 2000e, et seq. (against the company only); 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1981; Colorado Revised Statutes \u00a7\u00a7 18-2-121(2) and 13-21-106.5; and Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress against 10 \"Doe\" defendants. The plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment, back pay, front pay, benefits, compensatory damages, punitive damages, and attorneys' fees and costs. On December 1, 1999, the court granted a stipulated motion to dismiss with prejudice the supervisor defendant from the case. On June 29, 2000, the court dispensed with both parties' motions for summary judgment. Goodman v. Timpte, 2000 WL 34507333, No. 99-795 (D. Colo. Jun. 29, 2000). The Court granted the defendants' motion in part as to the plaintiff's third claim for ethnic intimidation. It denied the motion in all other respects. The court also denied the plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment and dismissed his claims against the unidentified plaintiffs and the fourth claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. On October 30, 2000, the court dismissed the case with prejudice, after a stipulated motion. It appears the parties reached a settlement, although an agreement is not publicly available. This is the last entry on the docket.", "summary": "A black employee of an automotive plant sued the owner and its manager for failing to prevent racial discrimination by other workers, under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1981, and state law. It appears the parties settled, although an agreement is not publicly available."} {"article": "On March 16, 2001, an African-American employee of the District of Columbia Water and Sewer Authority (\"WASA\") filed this class action lawsuit against WASA on behalf of himself as well as current and former black employees under Title VII and 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1981 in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. The plaintiff, represented by private counsel, asked the court for declaratory and injunctive relief and compensatory damages, claiming that the defendant engaged in race discrimination through its hiring and promotion practices. Specifically, the plaintiff alleged that in 1996 the defendant adopted an at-will employment system that allowed managers to hire or promote their chosen candidates or to inflate those candidates' scores. With this new system in place, the plaintiff claimed that African-American employees encountered a \"glass ceiling\" that prevented them from obtaining the same positions as similarly situated white employees and from advancing as rapidly as those employees. The plaintiff alleged in particular that black employees were hired at the lowest levels of the agency, were forced to wait longer than white employees for promotions, and were often skipped over for promotions in favor of equally experienced white employees. The plaintiff sought to certify a class consisting of all African-American employees who applied for and were denied positions or promotions at WASA from October 1996 through December 2000. The defendant moved to dismiss the case on May 21, 2001, claiming that because the plaintiffs requested compensatory damages and a jury trial in addition to injunctive relief, they could not, as a matter of law, satisfy the requirements for class certification under FRCP 23(b). The District Court (Judge Henry H. Kennedy) denied the motion, explaining that the D.C. Circuit had adopted an \"ad-hoc approach\" to the issue and that the case law did not regard compensatory damages claims or a request for a jury trial as per se incompatible with class certification under 23(b). Taylor v. Dist. of Columbia Water & Sewer Auth., 205 F.R.D. 43, 2002 WL 5513 (D.D.C. 2002). The parties then engaged in a lengthy discovery battle. On March 13, 2007, the District Court (Judge Kennedy) certified the class as to liability under FRCP 23(b) for injunctive and declaratory relief, but it postponed any certification as to damages. Taylor v. Dist. of Columbia Water & Sewer Auth., 241 F.R.D. 33, 2007 WL 766229 (D.D.C. 2007). The defendant appealed this ruling, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit (Judge Karen L. Henderson) denied the petition as untimely on April 3, 2009. In re D.C. Water & Sewer Auth., 561 F.3d 494 (D.C. Cir. 2009). The plaintiffs moved to enlarge the class period on November 14, 2007, and the District Court (Judge Kennedy) denied this motion in an unpublished order on February 7, 2008. The parties then continued disputing the class composition and notice procedures until August 25, 2009, when the District Court (Judge Kennedy) acceded to the parties' request and issued a stipulation and order approving the class notice and directing issuance of the notice to class members. On November 30, 2010, at the parties' request, the District Court (Judge Kennedy) issued an order referring the case for alternative dispute resolution. The parties eventually reached an agreement and submitted a proposed settlement for approval on March 23, 2013. The District Court (Judge Barbara J. Rothstein) issued an order, on March 28, 2013, approving the class settlement. The Court announced that, in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011), it was vacating the class certification under FRCP 23(b)(2) and recertifying the class under 23(b)(3). The approved class had 1,037 members, consisting of all African-American employees who worked for the defendant between October 1, 1996, and December 31, 2000. Under the terms of the agreement, WASA transmitted $2,885,000 to a claims administrator, with $1.9 million set aside for the payment of claims and the remaining funds to be used for attorneys' fees, litigation costs, and a service award to the lead plaintiff. The settlement also included substantial non-monetary relief. Under the agreement, WASA was forbidden from retaliating against any class members for their involvement in the litigation, and was required to provide employees with a written statement of its commitment to equal employment opportunity and post a copy of this policy in common areas of the workplace. WASA also agreed to conduct a mandatory diversity and equal employment opportunity training for all employees and take measures to ensure that employees understand their obligations to identify and report violations of the policies. WASA further agreed to develop and implement complaint procedures and a complaint tracking system, as well as a voluntary affirmative action program. A settlement compliance monitor was assigned to oversee and report on WASA's implementation of the agreement, and WASA agreed to submit reports for the monitor's review. Finally, WASA agreed to create an internal implementation team as well as institute an annual review of pay and data practices to ensure that any racial disparities in pay are due to legitimate and non-discriminatory factors. On March 16, 2015, the District Court (Judge Rothstein), after receiving a letter from class members who claimed that they had not yet been paid their monetary award, issued an order requiring the parties to provide a status report. Plaintiffs' counsel responded on March 18 and explained that there had been a delay because WASA inadvertently omitted several people from the list of eligible class members it prepared for the claims administrator. Further compounding this delay, plaintiffs' counsel stated that his co-counsel has been preparing a motion to advise the court on how the administrator calculated the payouts to individual class members. The money would not be disbursed until this motion was filed. The matter resolved in June 2015 when the court ordered counsel to furnish the five individuals with proper documents to file for disbursement. The balance of $14,025.38 in settlement funds were distributed to the District of Columbia Legal Aid Society upon a motion by the parties on October 4, 2017. The case is closed.", "summary": "On March 16, 2001, an African-American employee of the District of Columbia Water and Sewer Authority (\"WASA\") filed this class action lawsuit against WASA on behalf of himself as well as current and former black employees under Title VII and 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1981 in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. The plaintiff claimed that the defendant engaged in race discrimination through its hiring and promotion practices. On March 28, 2013, the District Court approved a settlement agreement under which WASA paid $2.8 million and agreed to undertake extensive measures to address the discriminatory workplace practices."} {"article": "A senior who applied to work at a Cracker Barrel store alleged he was not hired because of corporation-wide age discrimination in hiring. It appears the parties settled, though no agreement is publicly available. The plaintiff, a man over sixty years of age, sued under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 621 et seq. The plaintiff contended that Cracker Barrel had a nationwide pattern or practice of asking for and illegally considering the age of all applicants for employment He demanded compensation for lost wages liquidated damages, and attorneys' fees and costs, as well as a permanent injunction against age discrimination in hiring. The complaint sought class certification for similarly situated individuals. On January 24, 2008, the United States District Court, Middle District of Florida, Tampa Division (Judge Mary Scriven) dismissed the case with prejudice. It appears the parties reached a settlement, although the details are not publicly available at this time.", "summary": "A senior who applied to work at a Cracker Barrel store alleged he was not hired because of corporation-wide age discrimination in hiring. It appears the parties settled, though no agreement is publicly available."} {"article": "On May 13, 2004, a deaf woman filed this lawsuit in the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District of the State of Idaho. She sued Hollywood Entertainment Corporation (doing business as Hollywood Video) under the Idaho Human Rights Act, claiming the company discriminated against her on the basis of her disability. The plaintiff, represented by private counsel, requested monetary relief, attorney fees and costs, and a jury trial. The complaint alleged that the defendant employer assigned fewer work hours, assigned her only menial jobs, withheld promotion, and ignored the harassment other employees inflicted upon her. On December 9, 2004, after the initial complaint and a special interrogatory to determine specific damage amounts sought by the plaintiff, the defendant filed a notice to remove the case to federal court. The case was removed to the U.S. District Court for the District of Idaho on December 9, 2004 and ultimately assigned to Judge B. Lynn Winmill. The defendant moved to consolidate this case with a similar action brought under the American with Disabilities Act (ADA). The case was consolidated on May 26, 2005 with EEOC v. Hollywood Ent Corp, which can be found at EE-ID-0012. On July 26, 2006, the plaintiff filed a stipulation to dismiss after the consolidated EEOC case ended in a settlement. The court ordered the case dismissed with prejudice on the same day. In March 2006, EEOC v. Hollywood Ent Corp settled by entry of a consent decree valid for two years that required Hollywood Video to provide injunctive relief within their business environment and monetary relief to the plaintiff. The case closed in 2008 after the two-year order expired.", "summary": "A deaf woman filed this lawsuit in the state court of Idaho, alleging that her former employer Hollywood Video discriminated against her on the basis of her disability. The case was removed to federal court and ultimately consolidated with an EEOC case in federal court."} {"article": "AT&T changed its pension plan in November 1997, which allegedly resulted in younger employees receiving more benefits than older employees previously had, while the pension benefits for older employees were reduced. On August 5, 1998, the plaintiff filed this class-action lawsuit in the District Court of New Jersey bringing 17 claims for relief alleging violations of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), ERISA, and state law. The complaint sought declaratory and injunctive relief requiring the previous pension plan to be used. The plaintiffs also sought money damages, punitive damages, and attorneys' fees. The putative class-action suit proposed a class of \"management employees of AT&T who were participants in the AT&T Management Pension Plan as of 12/31/1996.\" The case was assigned to Judge Nicholas Politan, and the plaintiffs were represented by private counsel. The defendants moved to dismiss some of the claims. In an opinion issued on April 23, 1999, Judge Politan dismissed some of the plaintiffs claims. The ERISA claims were dismissed because the plaintiffs had failed to exhaust their administrative remedies as required by the statute. Other state-law claims were dismissed because they were preempted by ERISA's framework. The plaintiffs filed an amended complaint on June 7, 1999, alleging nine claims involving the ADEA, ERISA, and other fiduciary duty claims. The defendants again moved for partial dismissal of claims on October 1. On June 19, 2000, Judge Politan granted the motion for the ADEA claims, but denied it for the other claims. After the plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint, Judge Politan certified the class for the ERISA claims only on June 7, 2001. The plaintiffs filed a third amended complaint on November 29, 2001. After the case was reassigned to Judge William G. Bassler, the defendants filed another motion to dismiss. In an order issued on October 17, 2002, Judge Bassler dismissed multiple ERISA claims included in the third amended complaint. 2002 WL 32159586. Based on the statutory text of ERISA, Judge Bassler determined that AT&T's revised pension plan complied with the law. After this order, the plaintiffs had five remaining claims: three based on ERISA violations, a breach of fiduciary duty claim, and a claim alleging a misleading description of the pension plan. The case was then reassigned to Judge Jose Linares. After both the plaintiffs and the defendants moved for summary judgment in October 2004, the plaintiffs filed a fourth amended complaint on November 23, 2004. The defendants subsequently moved to dismiss the fourth amended complaint, which the court granted on March 31, 2006 with regards to two more ERISA claims. 428 F. Supp. 2d 213. The plaintiffs moved for reconsideration of this opinion, but Judge Linares denied the motion. 2006 WL 3359722. The parties engaged in numerous discovery battles while the plaintiffs fought to keep their claims alive. In July 2006, the case was reassigned to Judge Stanley Chesler. Judge Chesler granted the plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration, reinstating two ADEA claims. 2006 WL 3626945. Subsequently, Judge Chesler's denied the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, and also denied the defendants motion for judgment on the pleadings. 2007 WL 14585. With their ADEA claims back in play, the plaintiffs moved to certify an ADEA class. The plaintiffs proposed a class of former or current AT&T management employees who were age 40 or over on November 19, 2001 when their employment with AT&T ended and participated in the Management Pension Plan after the change occurred. The court stayed the class certification question while it decided the defendants motion to dismiss the two reinstated ADEA claims. On March 29, 2007, Judge Chesler denied the defendants' motion. 2007 WL 958472. Two months later, the plaintiffs' proposed class was approved. 2007 WL 1557163. The plaintiffs supplemented their fourth amended complaint by seeking to reinstate two ERISA claims that had been dismissed earlier in the litigation. Subsequently, the defendants moved for summary judgment on all remaining claims. On June 7, 2010, Judge Chesler granted the motion. 2010 WL 2326211. This order resulted in a final judgment on all remaining claims. The plaintiffs appealed the judgment to the Third Circuit. On June 22, 2011, the Third Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. 2011 WL 2507089. This opinion ended the case after more than ten years of litigation. The case is now closed.", "summary": "AT&T management employees filed a class-action lawsuit alleging that changes to the company's pension plan violated the ADEA and ERISA. After more than ten years of litigation, the defendants were granted summary judgment on all claims."} {"article": "On May 21, 2007, the U.S. Department of Justice (\"DOJ\") filed a lawsuit on behalf of United States of America against the City of New York under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York, Brooklyn Division. On July 17, 2007, the Vulcan Society--an organization of Black firefighters, and three individuals, filed an Intervenor's Complaint. Plaintiffs sued to enforce the right of Black and Hispanic candidates to be treated fairly in the application process for positions in the New York City Fire Department (\"FDNY\"). Specifically, Plaintiffs challenged the City's reliance on two written examinations that were used to appoint entry-level firefighters to classes at the New York City Fire Academy (\"Academy\"). These examinations--Written Examination 7029 and Written Examination 2043--were administered from 1999 to 2007, and the City had appointed more than 5,300 entry-level firefighters based on the test's results. Although Plaintiffs identified approximately 3,100 of the examination candidates as Black and approximately 4,200 of the examination candidates as Hispanic, the City had appointed just 184 Black firefighters and 461 Hispanic firefighters from the challenged examinations. Plaintiffs asserted that the City's reliance on Exams 7029 and 2043 in selecting entry-level firefighters had had a disparate impact on Black and Hispanic candidates in violation of Title VII. The Intervenors also claimed, under a disparate treatment theory, that the City, two city agencies, the Mayor and the Fire Commissioner had long been aware of the discriminatory impact on Blacks of their examination process, and that their continued reliance on and perpetuation of these racially discriminatory hiring processes constituted intentional race discrimination. To remedy these claimed violations, Plaintiffs sought various forms of injunctive and monetary relief. The United States sought to enjoin the City from engaging in discriminatory practices against Black individuals on the basis of race and against Hispanics on the basis of national origin, and sought a specific injunction against the practices challenged in this case. It also asked the court to order the City to take appropriate action to correct the present effects of its discriminatory policies and practices and to enjoin it from failing to \"make whole\" those harmed by the City's policies and practices. The Intervening Plaintiffs sought similar, but broader relief, including an injunction requiring the City to appoint entry-level firefighters from among qualified Black applicants in sufficient numbers to offset the historic pattern and practice of discrimination against Blacks in testing and appointment to that position. The Intervenors sought to require the City to recruit Black candidates and implement and improve long-range recruitment programs and to provide future test scores, appointment criteria, eligibility lists, appointment data, and all other information necessary to conduct an adverse impact and job-relatedness analysis of the examination and selection process. The Intervenors also sought damages and other fees. On September 5, 2007, the Court (Judge Nicholas G. Garaufis) issued an order to bifurcate the liability and relief phases, and permitted intervention by the Intervenors. On July 25, 2008, the Court denied the Intervenors' motion to amend their Complaint, but on January 28, 2009, declined to dismiss the Intervenors' Complaint on timeliness grounds. On May 11, 2009, in a published opinion, the Court certified a class consisting of Black applicants for the position of entry-level firefighter. United States v. City of New York, 258 F.R.D. 47. On July 22, 2009, the Court concluded that Plaintiffs had established a prima facie case that the City's use of the two written examinations had resulted in a disparate impact upon Black and Hispanic applicants for the position of entry-level firefighter. The Court also concluded that the City had failed to present sufficient evidence that business needs justified its employment practices. Therefore, the Court granted Plaintiffs' Motions for Summary Judgment in their entirety. This ruling established that the City was liable for disparate-impact discrimination under Title VII. 637 F.Supp.2d 77. On January 13, 2010, in a published order, the Court held that the City's use of these two examinations constituted a pattern and practice of intentional discrimination against Blacks, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and State and City Human Rights Laws. 683 F. Supp. 2d 225. On January 21, 2010, in another published order, the Court expressly did not order any particular form of relief. Instead, the Court \"outlined the broad contours of relief and resolves several basic disputes regarding the implementation of a remedy.\" In essence, the Court concluded that two broad forms of relief were needed to remedy the City's discrimination: (1) compensation for the identified victims of the City's discriminatory testing practices, and (2) compliance measures to ensure that the City implements and administers a fair and job-related test for entry-level firefighters. The Court noted that these forms of relief were simple in concept, but would be complex in execution. Achieving these basic aims would require ongoing oversight, attention to myriad details, and resolution of disputes among the parties. 681 F. Supp. 2d 274. Following these decisions, the Court issued a preliminary relief order directing the parties to take certain actions to begin remedying the City's violations. Among other things, the Court directed the parties to prepare for a hearing (the \"6019 Hearing\") regarding the validity of Exam 6019, which in turn would determine whether and how the City could hire from the Exam 6019 eligibility list on an interim basis while a new, valid selection procedure was being developed. On August 4, 2010, in a published opinion, the Court held that the City failed to carry its burden to demonstrate that its use of Exam 6019 as a pass/fail and rank-ordering device was job-related and justified by business necessity. Therefore, the Court concluded that the City's use of Exam 6019 did not comply with Title VII. Accordingly, the Court restrained and enjoined the City from taking any further steps to initiate or finalize a fire academy class using the Exam 6019 eligibility list until October 1, 2010. 731 F. Supp. 2d 291. On October 19, 2010, the Court permanently enjoined the City from hiring firefighters based on the results of Exam 6019, except under one of the interim approaches already endorsed by the Court. 2010 WL 4137536. On June 6, 2011, the Court granted in part and denied in part Plaintiff-Intervenors' motion for continued remedial-phase certification of the class of Black victims of the City's discrimination that the Court had conditionally certified at the beginning of the remedial phase of the litigation. In that Order, the Court certified noneconomic loss and injunctive relief subclasses, each comprised of Black non-hire and delayed-hire victims of the City's discrimination. The Court appointed the three individual Intervenors as representatives of the noneconomic loss subclass, and the Vulcan Society as representative of the injunctive relief subclass. 2011 WL 2259640. With respect to issues of \"make-whole\" relief, including backpay and benefits, priority hiring, and retroactive seniority, the court denied Plaintiff-Intervenors' motion for certification of a single class represented by the Vulcan Society, but permitted Plaintiff-Intervenors to move for certification of non-hire victim and delayed-hire victim subclasses as to issues of make-whole relief as long as they were represented by individual subclass members. Before the Supreme Court's decision in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (U.S. 2011) (\"the Wal-Mart decision\"), Plaintiff-Intervenors contended that the two subclasses should be certified as mandatory subclasses under Rule 23(b)(2). In the alternative, they argued that they also qualified for certification under Rule 23(b)(3). After Plaintiff-Intervenors filed their motion for certification of the two subclasses, the Wal-Mart decision was issued on June 20, 2011. The Court ordered the parties to submit additional briefing addressing the effect of the Wal-Mart decision on the pending motions for certification of the two subclasses. The parties filed letters stating their views on the Wal-Mart decision on June 21, 2011. On July 8, 2011, in a published order, the Court addressed the effect of the Wal-Mart decision. Applying Wal-Mart, the Court denied the City's motion to decertify the liability-phase class; denied Plaintiff-Intervenors' motion for summary judgment as to compensatory damages for noneconomic losses; and under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3), certified the non-hire and delayed-hire victim subclasses as to common remedial-phase issues. 276 F.R.D. 22. On July 11, 2011, the court granted Plaintiff-Intervenors' Motion to compel the City to reduce the application fee for Exam No. 2000 from $54.00 to $30.00. On July 13, 2011, the court issued an order approving changes made to the next entry-level examinations, including inclusion of questions on race and gender. 2011 WL 2745940. On September 30, 2011, following a bench trial on injunctive relief, the Court issued a memorandum on findings of fact. 2011 WL 7661518. On October 5, 2011, the court issued an order containing a draft remedial order and informing parties of its intention to enter a permanent injunction, after reasoning that the court's involvement in remedying discrimination is required due to the City's historic lack of response to it. It aimed at compelling the City to undertake a court-guided institutional reform with several general injunctions and only few specific instructions. The draft remedial order also contemplated retention of jurisdiction by the Court for at least ten years and appointment of a Court Monitor to assess implementation of orders. 2011 WL 4639832. The court issued an order granting partial judgment and a permanent injunction on December 8, 2011. The order contained several permanent injunctions: 1) the City was enjoined from using policies previously found unlawful by the Court, or any other policies that have a disparate impact on Black or Hispanic applicants; 2) prohibition of discrimination on the basis of race or national origin in the City's recruitment and selection processes; 3) prohibition on retaliation. The order also contained more specific remedies, including, among others: 1) development of an optional survey to assess effectiveness of its selection procedures with an independent recruitment consultant; 2) mitigating effects of voluntary attrition plans on Hispanics and Blacks; 3) more comprehensive screening procedure; 4) assessment of its compliance with employment laws. The Court retained jurisdiction over the matter until the City's examinations, recruitment, selection and other procedures no longer had a disparate impact on Blacks and Hispanics, and, in any event, the court's jurisdiction to modify or enforce the order would not lapse until the later of January 1, 2022, or expiration of the City's next two civil hiring lists for entry-level firefighters. 2011 WL 6131136. On December 9, 2011, the defendants filed a notice of appeal of the order to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals. On February 1, 2012, the District Court denied a motion to intervene by a firefighters' union without prejudice regarding priority hiring eligibility, granted the motion with respect to the City's motion for a change in examination objection policy. 2012 WL 3134353. It also denied an individual's motion to intervene, and granted the plaintiff-intervenor's motion for partial final judgment on the issue of individual liability of the Mayor and other officials. On February 2, 2012, the plaintiff-intervenors appealed the Court's partial final judgment. On March 8, 2012, the Court issued an order denying summary judgment for the plaintiffs as to backpay liability because certain issues had to be resolved on an individual basis, but found there was no question that backpay was due. The pre-mitigation backpay was estimated to be $126,696,803.00 by statistical analysis. The court also permitted the City to amend its response to claim of failure to mitigate damages by the plaintiffs. The court also decided the issue of eligibility for backpay, settling on the definition of non-hire claimant and delayed-hire claimant. The former included any Black or Hispanic applicant who failed written exams 7029 or 2043 and did not gain position of entry-level firefighter, or passed exam 2043 and failed to gain the same position. The latter included any Black or Hispanic applicant who failed or passed written exams 7029 or 2043, but did not gain position of entry-level firefighter after a certain date. The definitions also included other qualifications, such as speaking English, not having a criminal record of a felony, and being of a certain age. The Court also denied the City's motion to delay individual relief determinations pending its appeal of the earlier summary judgment. 847 F. Supp. 2d 395. The proceedings continued with the matters concerning the fairness hearing on the relief granted to two classes of complainants. On September 28, 2012, the Court granted the City's motion to use Exam 2000 to create a list of eligible applicants. 2012 WL 4503253. Following a fairness hearing, the Court determined that none of the objections merited a change in the proposed relief order, and issued a final relief order on October 26, 2012. The final relief incorporate the proposed relief order and all the orders made by the Court in the interim (such as calculating backpay). 905 F. Supp. 2d 438. On May 14, 2013, the Second Circuit issued its decision on the City's appeal of the injunction against hiring entry-level firefighters, summary judgment against it on disparate treatment of January 13, 2010, and the plaintiff-intervenors' cross-appeal on individual liability of the Mayor and other officials. The Second Circuit vacated summary judgment against the City on disparate treatment, reasoning that the City met its burden of production to rebut the prima facie case of discrimination. It also found that there was sufficient evidence for an individual claim against the Commissioner based on federal law. In light of vacating the summary judgment, the Second Circuit ruled that certain provisions of the injunction had to be modified, wherever it referenced disparate treatment by the defendants. In all other respects, the injunction was affirmed. The disparate treatment issue was remanded for a trial with an order that a different judge preside over the proceedings. 717 F.3d 72. On August 30, 2013, the District Court granted the plaintiff-intervenors attorney's fees in the amount of $3,707,313.29. The expert's fees were denied without prejudice. 2013 WL 5542459. On June 3, 2013, the District Court issued an order allowing the plaintiffs to seek noneconomic compensatory damages under New York State Human Rights Law and New York City Human Rights Law, based on the disparate impact claims. Afterwards, the Court continued to review the Special Masters' reports and approving lists of priority hires, and denying some claimants (for example, see Docket Entry No. 1182). 2013 WL 12318105. On January 30, 2014, the District Court granted in part the plaintiff-intervenors' expert fees in the amounts of $198,751.11, $5,856.00 and $33,642.00. 2014 WL 347605. On March 18, 2014, the District Court received a letter that the plaintiffs and the City settled as to the disparate treatment dispute. On April 22, 2014, both parties filed a joint motion for provisional approval of the settlement, which was granted on April 28, 2014. The stipulation contained promises by the City to better recruit minority firefighters and creation of a position at FDNY for that purpose. According to the New York Times, the new Mayor of New York, Bill de Blasio, decided to settle the case and agreed to pay nearly $100 million in backpay to minorities. About six months later, the United States proposed a schedule of individual monetary awards for victims of discrimination. On March 11, 2015, Judge Garaufis accepted a modified form of the United States' proposal to resolve outstanding claims for backpay and fringe benefits. The order awarded a total of $99,098,358.29 to plaintiffs and included detailed procedures for allocating the award across plaintiffs based on the plaintiffs' individual circumstances. In addition, the City reimbursed $150,000 in costs to the United States but was not required to pay attorneys' fees. The Intervenors and the agreed to negotiate in good faith to arrive at reasonable attorneys' fees. The court decided that the total settlement was fair, placing particular stress on the fact that some plaintiffs had been injured 15 years ago. It also noted that individual plaintiffs were generally favorable towards the settlement. Turning to the allocation scheme, the court recognized a paucity of precedent but decided that the formula was \"lawful, consistent with the public interest, fair, reasonable, and adequate.\" In addition, Judge Garaufis rejected objections by individual plaintiffs that had surfaced during the preceding year. Judge Garaufis also noted that the City made a series of offers of judgment starting in April 2014 to Black claimants who suffered non-economic harm. 2015 WL 1063403. On April 16, 2015, Judge Garaufis ordered the City to pay back interest on claimant's employee pension contributions. Balancing the City's interests with those of the plaintiffs, Judge Garaufis found that Title VII's \"make whole\" imperative outweighs the City's potential savings. 2015 WL 1800245. In a June 5, 2015 order, Judge Garaufis adopted the parties' joint stipulation on the Intervenors' intentional discrimination claims. The City agreed to:
If an Airman wishes to be excepted from this Order and be separated or discharged, the Air Force shall provide them a written notice that their consent to separation is not required and that a federal lawsuit may result in his or her retention. After receiving such a notice, the Airman may make a written request to proceed with his or her separation or discharge, and then the Air Force may proceed with the separation or discharge.The plaintiffs did not oppose this motion, and three days later, Judge Brinkema granted the motion and amended the February 15 Order as proposed. The defendants filed a notice of appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit on April 16, 2019. They appealed the February 15, 2019 decision denying the defendants motion to dismiss that granted in part and denied in part the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction. (Appellate Docket No. 19-01410). Amicus briefs were filed by the HIV Medicine Association (with the American Academy of HIV Medicine, GLMA: Health Professionals Advancing LGBTQ Equality, and Infectious Diseases Society of America), former military officials, and the American Public Health Association (with Duke Law Health Justice Clinic, Southern AIDS Coalition, The National Alliance of State and Territorial AIDS Directors, and NMAC). All three amicus briefs were in support of the appellees. Oral argument was held on September 18, 2019 before a panel of Fourth Circuit Judges comprised of Judges James A. Wynn Jr, Albert Diaz, and Henry F. Floyd. Back in the district court, on May 3, 2019, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction in part. The defendants argued that the plaintiffs lacked standing to sue since Outserve was not injured by the military's policies nor was it the type of institutional plaintiff that can sue based on injury to its members. The plaintiffs rejected both of these contentions. On May 31, 2019 oral argument was held before Judge Brinkema, and on the same day, Judge Brinkema ordered that the motion to dismiss be held in abeyance so that the parties could engage in additional discovery. On June 18, 2019, following a decision in the companion case Harrison v. Shanahan, regarding the production of documents where the defendants similarly opposed the motion on the basis of deliberative process privilege, Magistrate Judge Davis issued an order granting in part and denying in part the plaintiffs' motion to compel documents and information. Judge Davis denied the motion to compel with regard to one document because it was not relevant to plaintiffs' claims because it was an appeal of a physical evaluation board hearing for someone who was not a party to this case. Based on the decision in Harrison v. Shanahan, Judge Davis ordered the defendants to produce the other requested documents because they were relevant to the plaintiffs' case, there is no other source of information, and the possible negative effect on the government is outweighed by the plaintiffs need for the information. In July 2019, the plaintiffs filed another motion to compel documents and information withheld on the basis of deliberative process privilege. After the June 2019 order by Magistrate Judge Davis, the defendants produced many documents, however, the defendants refused to produce complete versions of eight emails to and from senior officials regarding the Air Force\u2019s decision to refer asymptomatic HIV-positive Airmen into the Disability Evaluation System and to separate them from service. The plaintiffs filed a motion for partial summary judgment on July 23, 2019 with respect to their claim that the determinations of Roe and Voe's deployability and separability violated the APA, and their claim that the determinations of Roe and Voe's deployability and separability are arbitrary and capricious or an abuse of discretion. On July 19, 2019, the defendants filed a motion to stay the summary judgment briefings and the bench trial set to begin on September 9, 2019 because of the Fourth Circuit appeal in this case. Oral argument before a panel of Fourth Circuit judges was set for September 18, 2019. On August 1, 2019, Judge Brinkema cancelled the district court trial scheduled for September 9 and stayed all proceedings until further order of the court. On appeal, on January 10, 2020 the Fourth Circuit published an opinion affirming the decision of the district court. Four days later the Fourth Circuit published an amended superseding opinion written by Judge Wynn and joined by Judges Diaz and Floyd, once again affirming the decision of the district court. The district court previously concluded that Roe and Voe were likely to succeed on their claims that their discharges were arbitrary and capricious, in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act, and irrational, in violation of Roe and Voe\u2019s Equal Protection rights. On the motion to dismiss, the Fourth Circuit concluded that the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on at least one claim (either that discharging Roe and Voe violated the APA or that the deployment policies violate the APA), and that absent judicial review the plaintiffs were likely to suffer irreparable harm. 947 F.3d 207. On the preliminary injunction, the Fourth Circuit said the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits of their claim that their deployment policies at issue violate the APA because the government has not and cannot reconcile the policies with current medical evidence. Judge Wynn wrote that the district court rightly found that Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on their claim that the Air Force\u2019s discharge decisions were arbitrary and capricious, in violation of the APA. Department of Defense regulations require individualized determinations based on objective evidence to determine a service member\u2019s fitness for duty or separation under the Disability Evaluation System. The Fourth Circuit said that the government's explanation for why is has effectively imposed a ban on deploying HIV-positive service members to the Central Command area of responsibility is \"at odds with modern science.\" Because the Air Force ignored developments in knowledge and treatment that allow HIV-positive service members to carry out their duties without posing any substantial risk of transmission, the Air Force denied these service members an individualized determination of their fitness for military service. 947 F.3d 207 OutServe-SLDN and the American Military Partner Association merged in August 2019 and formed the Modern Military Association of America (MMAA). Due to this merger, On March 10, 2020, plaintiffs Voe and Roe filed a consent motion to substitute parties. The plaintiffs requested that the court substitute the Modern Military Association of America for OutServe-SLDN in this case, which the court did the next day. On March 27, 2020, Judge Brinkema denied the defendants' renewed motion to dismiss and in a separate order also denied the plaintiffs' motion to compel documents and information. Judge Brinkema found that MMAA (formerly Outserve) had direct standing as the organization personally suffered an injury due to the increased staffing required by the greater number of HIV-related calls. 2020 WL 1493557. On May 4, 2020 plaintiff Roe filed a motion for summary judgment. One month later, the defendants also filed a motion for summary judgment. A hearing before Judge Brinkema is scheduled for August 4, 2020. The case remains open.", "summary": "On December 19, 2018 two US Airmen under pseudonym and OutServe-SLDN, a network of LGBTQ military service-people, filed suit against the U.S. Department of Defense, James Mattis, and Heather Wilson in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. The Plaintiffs argued that the U.S had violated equal protection under the fifth amendment and the Administrative Procedure Act. The plaintiffs represented by Winston and Strawn LLP, LAMBDA Legal Defense and Education Fund, and Outserve-SLDN (now known as the Modern Military Association of America) sought declaratory and injunctive relief allowing HIV positive service members to continue to serve and damages. The Plaintiffs allege that they were discharged from their duties in the Air Force due to their HIV status. The case was assigned to Judge Leonie M. Brinkema. On January 11, 2019, the plaintiffs filed a motion for a preliminary injunction to prevent the defendants from restricting Roe and Voe and others similarly situated from being promoted, changing duty station, or re-training on the same terms as other service members living with HIV who are not being separated. A hearing was held before Judge Brinkema on February 15, 2019. The same day, Judge Brinkema issued an opinion granting in part and denying in part the plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction. The order enjoined the defendants from separating or dicharging from military service Richard Roe, Victor Voe, and any other similarly situated active-duty member of the Air Force because they are classified as ineligible for worldwide deployment or deployment to the United States Central Command area due to their HIV-positive status. The defendants appealed to the decision on the preliminary injunction to the Fourth Circuit. Oral argument was held on September 18, 2019 before a panel of Fourth Circuit Judges comprised of Judges James A. Wynn Jr, Albert Diaz, and Henry F. Floyd. In January 2020, the Fourth Circuit issued an opinion affirming the district court's decision. In the district court, both parties have filed motions for summary judgment, and oral argument is set for August 4, 2020. The case is ongoing."} {"article": "On September 28, 2006, the San Francisco district office of the EEOC brought this lawsuit against United Airlines in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington. The EEOC alleged that United Airlines had violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Civil Rights Act. Specifically, the complaint alleged that the defendant had refused reasonable accommodation to individuals with disabilities by disallowing them to work fewer than thirty hours per week. The EEOC claimed that these actions adversely affected their status as employees due to their disabilities and sought injunctive and monetary relief as well as attorney\u2019s fees. On February 14, 2008, the defendant filed a motion for summary judgment, which was denied on March 21 by Judge Thomas S. Zilly. The court held that there are material issues of fact as to the fundamental job duties of the employment position at issue and what constitutes a reasonable accommodation. In addition, the court held that the defendant\u2019s offer of a three-year unpaid leave is not a \u201creasonable accommodation\u201d for a disabled claimant who did not have a temporary medical condition. On May 29, three other employees of United Airlines filed a motion to intervene as putative class representatives, but the court denied their intervention as class representatives and granted them leave to intervene as individual plaintiffs-intervenors on July 16. Both the EEOC and proposed intervenors\u2019 motions for reconsideration of this decision was denied on August 7, 2008. On August 18, the proposed intervenors appealed the decision to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. The appellate court dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction on November 6, 2008 and remanded to the district court. Back in the district court, on June 5, 2009, the intervenors filed a complaint and motion to certify class. On July 6, 2009, the motion for class certification was stricken with prejudice as inappropriately. On February 4, 2010, more employees of United Airlines filed a second motion to intervene. On March 6, the first three intervenor plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed the case and the second motion to intervene was withdrawn. On August 26, 2010, the defendant filed a sealed motion for summary judgment. On December 17, 2010, the parties filed notice of a settlement agreement with an attached consent decree. That same day, the court approved the consent decree. The decree stipulated the following injunctive relief: 1) non-discrimination policies: United Airlines will permit reduced-hours schedules as reasonable accommodations for qualified individuals with disabilities in good faith and on a case-by-case basis. The parties also agreed that working fewer than 16 hours per week (the minimum schedule for United Airline's part-time workers) would be an unreasonable accommodation and would not be allowed. 2) training: United Airlines will train all supervisors involved in administering the reasonable accommodation process with respect to the interactive accommodation process, the requirements of the consent decree, among others. The trainer would be a qualified outside consultant, approved by the EEOC and knowledgeable in the ADA. 3) record keeping and reports: United Airline will mail to counsel a report of training provided and requests for reduced hours accommodations. In addition, United Airlines will pay $600,000 as damages to the plaintiff and each party will bear its own costs and attorneys\u2019 fees. The consent decree was set to terminate three years from date of entry unless the EEOC asked for a continuation. The case is closed, as there are no further activity on this case's docket as of March 2019.", "summary": "The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission brought an anti-discrimination lawsuit against United Airlines. The claim was that United Airlines discriminated against its employees when it denied employees with disabilities a reduced hours schedule as an accommodation. On December 17, 2010, the court approved a consent decree which required United Airlines to consider a reduced-hours schedule as a reasonable accommodation for employees with disabilities and awarded the plaintiff $600,000 in damages. The consent decree was set to terminate three years from date of entry unless the EEOC asked for a continuation. The case is closed, as there are no further activity on this case's docket as of March 2019."} {"article": "On August 14, 2013, private citizens filed a lawsuit in the Eastern District of Missouri against the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, the Administrative Procedure Act, and the First Amendment. The plaintiff, represented by the public interest firm Thomas More Society, asked the court for an exception to the Affordable Care Act (ACA) mandate requiring employers to provide health insurance coverage of contraception. Due to the ACA mandate, the plaintiffs' employer, the State of Missouri, only offered a health insurance plan that includes contraception coverage. The plaintiffs claimed paying for this health insurance plan violated their Catholic religious beliefs and their right to family integrity. On September 10, 2013, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that the plaintiffs do not have claim upon which relief can be granted. The defendants' motion argued that the ACA contraception mandate applies only to employers, not private individuals. Furthermore, defendants argued that if the government began allowing individual exceptions to certain aspects of insurance policies the group insurance model would fall apart. On October 16, 2013, the court (Judge Jean C. Hamilton) granted defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of standing. The court found that because plaintiffs' alleged injuries were linked with the independent discretionary actions of the State and his health insurance provider, neither of which were parties to the action, plaintiffs alleged only indirect causation between the contraception mandate and their alleged injuries. Moreover, plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that an injunction of the government's' policy would alter the behavior of these third parties. These third parties would retain discretion not to offer plaintiff a health plan that excludes contraception and abortion. 978 F. Supp. 2d 1008. Plaintiffs appealed the decision to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, and the case was heard before a panel of three judges: Judge Roger Wollman, Judge James Loken, and Judge Diana Murphy. On July 20, 2015, the Court of Appeals reversed. In an opinion by Judge Wollman, the court pointed out that, prior to the enactment of the contraception mandate, the insurance provider and the state had been willing to offer the plaintiffs a contraceptive-free healthcare plan. It concluded that this was persuasive evidence that the insurance provider might well alter its policy if the plaintiffs succeeded on the merits of their claim, and therefore that the injury was not too speculative for adjudication. The case was remanded to the district court for decision on the merits. 793 F. 3d 949. The defendants filed another motion to dismiss. On January 8, 2016, the court granted the motion in part and denied it in part: the plaintiffs\u2019 constitutional and APA claims were dismissed with prejudice, but the RFRA claim remained at issue because the plaintiffs alleged that the mandate imposed a substantial burden on their exercise of religion. 2016 WL 98170. On May 24, 2016, the defendants moved for summary judgment. Three weeks later, the plaintiffs did so as well. On July 21, 2016, the court granted the plaintiff\u2019s motion for summary judgment and denied the defendants\u2019. Judge Hamilton entered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs, enjoining the defendants from requiring the plaintiffs\u2019 health insurance issuer to provide them with health insurance that includes contraceptive coverage. The order applied only to health plans provided to the plaintiffs.196 F. Supp. 3d 1010. On August 18, 2016, the plaintiffs moved to recover attorneys\u2019 fees, but agreed to stay briefing on this motion on September 1 after the government indicated that it would likely appeal the district court's decision. The government duly filed its notice of appeal with the Eighth Circuit on September 16. On November 2, 2016, however, the government moved to hold the appeal in abeyance pending the Eighth Circuit's decision in a closely related case, Sharpe Holdings, Inc. v. U.S. Dep't of Health and Human Servs.. Sharpe was one of several RFRA-based challenges to the contraceptive-coverage mandate consolidated and remanded by the U.S. Supreme Court in order to allow the parties to reach an acceptable compromise. Zubik v. Burwell, 136 S.Ct. 1557 (2016). In the wake of that decision, on July 21, 2016, HHS sent out a Request for Information (RFI) to determine \"whether modifications to the existing accommodation procedure could resolve the objections asserted by the plaintiffs in the pending RFRA cases while still ensuring that the affected women seamlessly receive full and equal health coverage, including contraceptive coverage.\" Since the Eighth Circuit had already decided to withhold further action in Sharpe until after the government filed a status report on the RFI on November 30, it likewise agreed on November 23 to abey proceedings in this case. On February 13, 2017, the date when the abeyance was set to expire, the government wrote to the Eighth Circuit indicating that both parties agreed to extend the abeyance by an additional sixty days. The government explained that the change in presidential administrations that year would likely bear significantly on the issues of this case, with the possibility of the dispute being mooted entirely. Following President Trump's May 4 executive order directing a change in regulations to allow for conscience-based exceptions to the ACA's contraceptive-care mandate, the parties agreed to have the case dismissed on November 13, 2017. The Eighth Circuit obliged three days later, and on December 13, the plaintiffs withdrew their district court motion for attorney's fees. The case is now closed.", "summary": "Private citizens sought an exception to the Affordable Care Act mandate requiring employers to provide contraception coverage on that basis that paying for this insurance plan violated their Catholic religious beliefs. On October 16, 2013, the Eastern District of Missouri (Judge Jean C. Hamilton) dismissed the claim for want of standing, but on July 20, 2015, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and remanded for merits decision. Judge Hamilton dismissed all but one of the plaintiff's claims but granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff on that claim, enjoining the defendants from requiring the plaintiffs to pay for contraception through their insurance. The government appealed this determination, but following President Trump's May 4, 2017 executive order directing a change in regulations to allow for conscience-based exceptions to the contraceptive-care mandate, the parties agreed to have the case dismissed. The case is now closed."} {"article": "On May 17, 2018, a Catholic foster care and social services agency and {} filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, against the City of Philadelphia. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel and by conservative public interest organization the Becket Fund for Religious Liberty, alleged that city of Philadelphia revoked new referrals of foster children to their organization because of their faith-based opposition to same-sex marriage. The complaint sought monetary and injunctive relief for violations of under 42 U.S.C. \u00a71983, breach of contract, the First Amendment, Pennsylvania Constitution, and the due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. The case was assigned to Judge Petrese B. Tucker. Plaintiffs asserted that Philadelphia's decision to revoke new foster care referrals breached their contract with the city and targeted them on religious grounds. According to the plaintiffs, the city had previously excepted them from providing foster care services to same-sex couples, and therefore the city's contract was ambiguous on whether they were required to provide these services to same-sex couples. They also alleged that the public statements made by the Mayor of Philadelphia and other public officials criticizing their refusal to serve same-sex couples indicated the city's decision to suspend the contract constituted religious discrimination. On June 7, 2018, the plaintiffs filed a motion for a temporary restraining order (TRO) and preliminary injunction requesting that the Court reinstate referrals of foster children to the plaintiff. The defendants' opposition argued that the plaintiffs violated the City's Fair Practice Ordinance, which forbids discrimination against individuals in public accommodations, and was clearly included in the contract. Since the defendants were acting on behalf of the city, and the city was previously unaware of the plaintiffs' refusal to serve otherwise qualified same-sex couples, the defendants argued that they were within their right to suspend the contract. On July 13, 2018, Judge Petrese B. Tucker denied the plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction and TRO. Judge Tucker held that the parties' intent was clear: the Fair Practices ordinance applied to the contract and that plaintiffs' services fell within \"public accommodations\"; therefore, the plaintiffs were required to serve anyone who sought their services. 320 F.Supp.3d 661. The Court rejected the defendants' claims that this violated the Free Exercise clause; it held that the city's policy was neutral and also found that there was insufficient discriminatory intent to trigger strict scrutiny review. The plaintiffs appealed on the same day of this decision. On April 22, 2019, the United State Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision, in an opinion by Judge Thomas L. Ambro. The Court of Appeals held that the City's nondiscrimination policy was neutral and the religious views of the plaintiff did not entitle it to an exception from the policy. Additionally, the Third Circuit found that the City had not targeted the plaintiffs \"for its religious beliefs\" nor was its decision \"motivated by ill will against [the plaintiff's] religion, rather than sincere opposition to discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.\" 922 F.3d 140. The plaintiffs petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari on July 22, 2019. The Supreme Court granted certiorari on February 24, 2020. 140 S.Ct. 1104. Numerous parties filed amici curiae briefs for both the plaintiff and the defendant. A group of United States Senators advocated for granting the injunction on religious liberty grounds, while others argued for preserving the lower court's decision and reasoning. The case is ongoing with oral arguments scheduled for the upcoming 2020 Supreme Court term.", "summary": "On May 17, 2018, the plaintiff, a catholic foster care and social services agency, filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania against the City of Philadelphia. The plaintiffs alleged that the City's decision to stop referring foster care discriminated against them for their religious beliefs and violated their contract, constitutional rights, and state law. On June 13, 2018, Judge Petrese B. Tucker denied the plaintiffs motion for a preliminary injunction holding that the City of Philadelphia was entitled to suspend the contract for violations of the City Fair Ordinance which prohibited discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. The plaintiffs appealed on the same day, and the Third Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision on April 22, 2020. The case is ongoing, and the Supreme Court granted the plaintiff's petition for writ of certiorari on February 24, 2020."} {"article": "On January 5, 2017, two residents of the City of McCrory that were living in a trailer worth approximately $1500, filed a putative class action complaint in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas. Plaintiffs, represented by Equal Justice Under Law and private counsel, sued the City of McCrory and its Police Chief under 42 U.S.C \u00a71983. The plaintiffs alleged that the City\u2019s Trailer-Banishment Ordinance\u2014which forbid anyone from residing in a home or trailer worth less than $7500\u2014violated both the Eight and Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The plaintiffs sought both monetary and injunctive relief. That same day, the plaintiffs also moved for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction to stop the City from enforcing the ordinance. The next day, the Court (Judge D. P. Marshall Jr.) scheduled a hearing on the temporary restraining order, but in an answer filed that same week, the City promised not to enforce the ordinance against anyone and to immediately submit a replacement ordinance to the City Council. In response, the Court found the claim for preliminary injunctive relief moot, and it stayed the case to allow the City to alter the ordinance at issue. On January 10th, the City Council passed a new ordinance, removing the challenged provision and establishing a new one that contained no reference to the value of one\u2019s home or trailer. The defendants then moved to dismiss the case, but on May 23, the Court found that the plaintiffs still had a viable claim for compensatory damages based on any harm suffered during the months the ordinance was in effect. The defendants again moved to dismiss the claim but the Court found the plaintiffs had sufficiently stated a claim based on lost wages and transportation expenses totaling $800. The plaintiffs filed an amended complaint on June 16, 2017, seeking monetary relief and permanent injunctive relief to stop the City from passing a similar ordinance in the future. The defendants filed a counterclaim alleging that the plaintiffs' trailer was a public nuisance. The parties reached a private settlement, and the Court granted a voluntary motion to dismiss both parties claims on November 30, 2017. According to Stephanie Storey, spokeswoman for Equal Justice, the settlement totaled just over $20,000. We have no further information on the litigation, and the case is now closed.", "summary": "Plaintiffs challenged a city ordinance prohibiting residents from living in trailers or homes worth less than $7500. Less than a week after plaintiffs filed their complaint suit, the City changed the ordinance and eliminated the provision at issue. Ultimately the parties settled outside of court for roughly $20,000."} {"article": "The background to this case concerns a policy known as the Small Area Fair Market Rent (\u201cFMR\u201d) rule that was set to go into effect on January 1, 2018, after years of advocacy, research, and public debate. The rule required the public housing agencies (PHAs) that administered the Housing Choice Voucher program (formerly Section 8) to set voucher values in 24 metropolitan areas based on the prevailing private market rents for each distinct zip code within those regions. The revised methodology recognized the existence of very different local rental markets within each metropolitan area and calibrated the vouchers more closely to the amount needed to live in various neighborhoods. It thus enabled voucher holders to access a wider range of housing, outside of voucher-concentrated, racially-segregated areas. However, in August 2017, the Department of Housing and Urban Development (\u201cHUD\u201d) abruptly announced it would be delaying the rule\u2019s implementation for two years, claiming that further study was needed. HUD stated the agency was waiting for a final review of the Small Area FMR report and a further review of public comments. Additionally, HUD determined that the Public Housing Authorities had not been given enough guidance and technical assistance to implement the use of Small Area FMRs. On October 23, 2017, Open Communities Alliance and two individual plaintiffs, filed a complaint in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia against HUD and its Secretary. The complaint challenged HUD\u2019s decision to suspend a rule that would have assisted low-income families in securing affordable housing. The Plaintiffs claimed that the delay would only further racial and economic segregation, and argued that HUD\u2019s failure to implement the Small Area FMR rule violated the Administrative Procedure Act (\u201cAPA\u201d), the statute that governs how federal agencies propose and implement regulations. The Plaintiffs, represented by the NAACP Legal Defense & Educational Fund, the Public Citizen Litigation Group, the Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, and private counsel, sought to temporarily and permanently enjoin the suspension of the rule. On December 23, 2017, Chief Judge Beryl A. Howell granted the Plaintiff\u2019s Motion for Preliminary Injunction, requiring HUD to reinstate the Small Area Fair Market Rent regulation, criticizing HUD's decision to suspend final rules for two years without notice or comment or evidentiary findings. 2017 WL 6558502. The Defendants requested an extension to contemplate how to proceed with the litigation. The extension was granted, and the Defendants' response was due February 15, 2018. On February 15, 2018, the parties stipulated that the HUD would no longer delay implementing the FMR rules and allowed the court to enter judgment for the Plaintiffs. HUD acknowledged that it was in the process of implementing the FMR rules. The Plaintiffs then moved for attorney's fees. On February 15, 2018, the Court entered final judgment for the Plaintiffs. Attorney's fees of $154,272.11 were awarded on June 15, 2018. 2018 WL 8622230. HUD paid the fees, and the court closed the case on August 15, 2018.", "summary": "In August 2017, the Department of Housing and Urban Development (\u201cHUD\u201d) abruptly announced it would delay, by two years, a rule designed to allow low-income families greater choice in their housing options. The Plaintiffs argued that HUD\u2019s failure to implement the rule violated the Administrative Procedure Act, and they sought a preliminary injunction, which was granted. HUD then agreed to implement the rule and paid the Plaintiffs' attorney's fees."} {"article": "On January 18, 2001, the United States filed a complaint under the Fair Housing Act and the American with Disabilities Act against the Edward Rose Construction, in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana. The plaintiff sought injunctive, declaratory, and monetary relief. On September 3, 2002, the United States initiated a related lawsuit against the same defendants in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan. The defendants were developers, builders, and operators of rental apartment complexes in the Northern District of Indiana and numerous additional locations. These complexes contained multi-family dwellings, built after the effective date of 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 3604(f)(3)(C). Plaintiff claimed that defendants' pattern and practice of failing to design these dwellings so that that were readily accessible to and usable by persons with disabilities violated rights granted by the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 3601-3619; Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a712181-12189; and qualified as discrimination against a person or group of persons under Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a712181-12189. On September 3, 2002, the parties agreed to resolve both the Indiana and Michigan cases without an evidentiary hearing or findings of fact. On September 30, 2005, the plaintiffs presented a consent order to the court, which Judge Allen Sharp signed on October 3rd. Under the Consent Order, the defendants agreed to retrofit 49 apartment complexes in Michigan, Indiana, Illinois, Ohio, Wisconsin, Virginia, and Nebraska to enhance their accessibility to individuals with physical disabilities. The agreement affected more than 5,400 ground floor apartments. The consent decree also required the defendants to pay $1,060,000 to a fund for those who may have been harmed by the lack of accessibility features at the complexes. The consent order terminated in 2010, and the case is now closed. Contemporaneous with the submission of the Consent Order, the parties stipulated to the transfer of the Untied States' claim against the defendants in the Indiana Action to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan. The Michigan Consent Order is separate and resolves the claims raised by both the Michigan and Indiana actions against all Defendants.", "summary": "This case was brought in Indiana federal court and in Michigan federal court by the United States against the developers, builders, and operators of rental apartment complexes in Indiana, Michigan, Illinois, Ohio, Wisconsin, and Virginia. The plantiff claimed the defendants had designed and built apartments that are not accessible to persons with disabilities. The consent decree that resulted calls for millions of dollars in retrofits to apartments in six different states, and compensatory damages in the amount of $1,060,000."} {"article": "On September 28, 2020, the Massachusetts Fair Housing Center (\u201cMFHC\u201d) and Housing Works, Inc. (\u201cHousing Works\u201d) filed a complaint against the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (\u201cHUD\u201d) and the Secretary of HUD (\u201cSecretary\u201d) in the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts. The plaintiffs sued the defendants under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 702-703, alleging that a new HUD rule (\u201cthe 2020 Rule\u201d) limiting disparate impact claims under the Fair Housing Act (\u201cFHA\u201d) was contrary to law and arbitrary and capricious. The plaintiffs argued that the 2020 Rule contravened the language and intent of the FHA, as well as longstanding practice, by introducing new pleading and proof requirements and new defenses that would make it harder for victims to bring disparate impact claims and easier for violators to evade liability. The plaintiffs sought to enjoin the defendants from implementing the 2020 Rule until after this case was resolved. The case was assigned to Judge Mark G. Mastroianni. The plaintiffs filed a motion for a preliminary injunction on October 6, 2020. The court granted the plaintiffs\u2019 motion on October 25, 2020, finding that the defendant's purported justifications for the new rule appeared \"inadequately justified.\" 2020 WL 6390143. Accordingly, the court enjoined the defendants from implementing the 2020 Rule until this case was resolved. As of December 21, the case remains ongoing.", "summary": "On September 28, 2020, the Massachusetts Fair Housing Center and Housing Works, Inc. filed a complaint against the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development and the Secretary of HUD in the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts. The plaintiffs sued the defendants under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 702-703, alleging that a new HUD rule (\u201cthe 2020 Rule\u201d) limiting disparate impact claims under the Fair Housing Act was contrary to law and arbitrary and capricious. The plaintiffs sought to enjoin the defendants from implementing the 2020 Rule until after this case was resolved and filed a motion for a preliminary injunction on October 6, 2020. The court granted the plaintiffs\u2019 motion on October 25, 2020, finding that the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits of their claim that the 2020 Rule was arbitrary and capricious. This case is ongoing."} {"article": "On November 7, 2002, the U.S. Department of Justice's Civil Rights Division (\"DOJ\") sent its \"findings letter\" to Kentucky's governor, advising him of the results of the November 2001, DOJ investigation of conditions and practices at the Oakwood Developmental Center (\"Oakwood\"), a state-operated center in Somerset, Kentucky, for developmentally and mentally disabled persons. (Although legally a \"commonwealth,\" Kentucky will be referred to in this summary as a state, as it is more commonly known.) The investigations occurred under the authority of the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act (\"CRIPA\"), 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1997. DOJ and expert consultants visited the facility, reviewed a wide array of documents there, and conducted interviews with personnel and residents. The letter commended Oakwood and state government staff for providing a high level of cooperation during the investigation. The investigation found multiple deficiencies in resident care at Oakwood, in that numerous conditions and services there substantially departed from generally accepted standards of care. Constitutional and federal statutory rights of residents at the facility were violated in several respects, according to the DOJ. DOJ concluded that deficiencies existed in conditions of resident care and treatment due to Oakwood's failure to provide adequate: (1) protection of its residents from harm due to abuse, mistreatment, neglect, improper use of restraints, pica behavior (ingestion of non-food items), and an overall lack of environmental safety; (2) behavioral and psychology services, including adequate treatment team meetings, individual and behavioral support plans, and training programs; (3) psychiatric services; (4) medical care, including neurological care; (5) nursing care; (6) staffing and staff training; (7) nutritional management; (8) physical therapy, and (9) quality assurance mechanisms designed to self-correct institutional problems. The letter provided details of deficiencies for all of these categories. This summary provides examples of these details, using the numeric indicator from the prior paragraph, as follows: (1) numerous and recurring incidents of abuse and neglect by staff; continued employment of documented abusers; inadequate investigations of incidents; unacceptably high volume of abuse and neglect incidents; inadequate supervision and communication regarding residents known for pica or self-injurious behaviors; (2) inadequate interdisciplinary care team meetings and individual/behavior support plans; overuse of chemical and physical restraints; inadequate resident training programs; insufficient psychological staff resources; (3) incorrect psychiatric diagnoses and use of psychotropic medications without psychiatric diagnoses; no peer review of psychiatric care nor any functional system for treatment of movement disorders; untrained staff; (4) poor preventative care, medical monitoring, communication among medical professionals, record keeping, and mortality review; inadequate evaluation, diagnosis, and treatment for seizure disorders leading to improper medication usage; (5) fragmented, incomplete, and inconsistent nursing assessments and documentations; high level of medication errors; vague medical emergency protocols and inadequate documentation of emergencies by poorly trained staff; outdated and ineffective infection control practices; haphazard staffing; (6 and 7) inadequate individual meal management plans; unmonitored, unaided meals for residents with swallowing difficulties; under-staffing at mealtimes resulting in cold food; (7 and 8) absence of a positioning program; overuse of wheelchairs; inadequately trained direct care staff; understaffed physical therapy department; and (9) no quality improvement program capable of addressing systemic crises in clinical services; absence of formal feedback system; nursing performance goals not objective and measurable, precluding reliable assessment and monitoring; and a total lack of a management information system. In addition to the remarkable list of deficiencies at Oakwood, the letter also noted that the state regularly deprived Oakwood residents who desired to live in the community and who reasonably can be accommodated an adequate opportunity to do so, in violation of the state's obligations under the Americans with Disabilities Act (\"ADA\"), 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 12132 et seq., and ADA-related regulations. Ten pages of minimally-acceptable remedial measures for each of these categories were outlined in the letter, which concluded by inviting continued further collaboration in implementing the remediation. The letter provided notice that, absent a resolution of the federal concerns, the DOJ would file a CRIPA lawsuit to compel correction of the identified deficiencies at Oakwood. Subsequently, on September 21, 2004, the state and DOJ entered into a memorandum of understanding, setting out a \"Strategic Action Plan\" that aimed to resolve the many deficiencies in care and conditions at Oakwood (which, by this time, had been re-named and re-organized as the Communities at Oakwood). It included the appointment of a jointly-selected monitor, Dr. Nirbhay N. Singh, Ph. D., to oversee, at state expense, Kentucky's implementation of the memorandum and its plan. The plan, an attachment to the memorandum, set specific goals and target dates for achieving them. On August 31, 2006, in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky, DOJ simultaneously filed a CRIPA complaint against the state and a settlement agreement between the parties, the latter referencing and attaching the strategic action plan obligating the state to implement remedial measures. The settlement named the same monitor, who would also now report compliance progress to the court. The lawsuit, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, described practices at Oakwood that violated the residents' Fourteenth Amendment due process rights and their rights under the Americans with Disabilities Act (\"ADA\"), 42 U.S.C \u00a7\u00a7 12101 et seq., and the ADA's implementing regulations, 28 C.F.R. Part 35. The settlement obligated the state to ensure, and to periodically document its progress in ensuring, improvements that would bring the facility up to generally accepted professional standards of care. The state also obliged itself to educate Oakwood employees about the requirements imposed by the settlement agreement. The settlement provided for the United States to conduct regular compliance reviews, with facility inspections and interviews of staff and residents, and to fully access and review relevant documents. District Judge Karen K. Caldwell approved the settlement on September 13, 2006, retaining jurisdiction to enforce the strategic action plan. Following several years of the parties providing periodic updates to the court, the parties filed a Joint Notice of Dismissal and the court signed an order closing the case on September 29, 2011.", "summary": "On August 31, 2006, in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky, DOJ simultaneously filed a CRIPA complaint against the state and a settlement agreement between the parties, the latter referencing and attaching the strategic action plan obligating the state to implement remedial measures at the Oakwood Developmental Center. The court monitored implementation of the agreement until 2011, when the case was closed."} {"article": "On June 7, 2007, attorneys with the Southern Poverty Law Center filed a class action lawsuit in the U. S. District Court for the Western District of Arkansas on behalf of about 2,700 Mexican migrant workers who entered the United States with H-2A visas and harvested and packed tomatoes and performed other agricultural work in Bradley County, Ark., from 2002 to 2007. Plaintiffs alleged that the employers violated the Fair Labor Standards Act (\"FLSA\"), 29 U.S.C. \u00a7 201 et seq. by failing to pay the prevailing wage and overtime wages, and not reimbursing workers for travel, visa and hiring fees. Plaintiffs sought money damages, injunctive relief and class certification. Defendants included former employers Candy Brand, LLC, and Arkansas Tomato Shippers, LLC, and several individual supervisors. Defendants initially responded by filing a motion for more definite statement. The trial court denied that motion. Perez-Bemotes v. Candy Brand, LLC, 2007 WL 4189499 (W.D.Ark. Nov 21, 2007). On December 9, 2007, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint to include a statement about the grounds of jurisdiction over a class action claim. On October 13, 2008, the Court (Judge Harry F. Barnes) granted plaintiffs' conditional motion to certify a class and motion requesting information of potential class members from defendants. 2008 WL 4809105. After discovery, on March 23, 2010, the Court granted class certification for the plaintiffs, designating two classes. The first class included \"all nonsupervisory workers employed by Defendants any time between 2003 and the date of judgment in this matter who were employed pursuant to H-2A temporary work visas;\" and the second included \"all nonsupervisory workers employed in the Defendants' packing shed operations at any time between 2003 and the date of the judgment in this matter--irrespective of visa status--who did not receive overtime pay during workweeks when they worked more than forty (40) hours.\" 267 F.R.D. 242. The defendants tried to appeal this decision, though permission for interlocutory appeal was denied by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. Following class certification, the Court approved a stipulated dismissal as to defendant Dale McGinnis, though none of the other business defendants were dismissed. On August 30, 2010, the Court dismissed individual and joint motions for summary judgment by the defendants, allowing plaintiffs more time for discovery. The Court found that defendants were legally deemed employers for the H-2A guestworkers, and did not qualify for an exemption from paying overtime. The Court also held that defendants, in accordance with the FLSA, were required to reimburse plaintiffs for travel expenses if they brought plaintiffs' income below minimum wage, during the first work week. According to the employment contract, defendants were also required to reimburse plaintiffs for daily travel expenses and to pay plaintiffs overtime. Accordingly, on May 20, 2011, the Court denied defendants' numerous motions for summary judgment, and granted plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment related to violations of the FLSA and H-2A employment contracts, as well as their motion for summary judgment on the issue of employer status and liability of defendants. 2011 WL 1978414. The Court denied defendants' motion for reconsideration of the matter the next month. Following the grant of summary judgment for the plaintiffs, the Court instructed the parties to submit briefs regarding whether defendants mitigated damages by providing housing, whether defendants were liable for other expenses not presented in the motions for summary judgment, and whether plaintiffs were entitled to attorney fees pursuant to the FLSA. A jury trial was set for January 23, 2012. Before this date, however, the parties reached a settlement agreement and the Court granted a motion for preliminary approval of a proposed class action settlement. The settlement agreement required the defendants to pay plaintiffs $1,212,500 in damages and attorney fees; it also provided terms for how to handle breach of payment and administration of the settlement agreement. Later that year, defendants breached the settlement agreement, and on September 4, 2013, the Court entered judgment against the defendants, requiring payment in the amount of $790,625 with an interest rate of 5%, with interest building from January 1, 2012 until paid. Additional attorney fees were to be calculated at the time of collection.", "summary": "On June 7, 2007, attorneys with the Southern Poverty Law Center filed a class action lawsuit in the U. S. District Court for the Western District of Arkansas on behalf of about 2,700 Mexican migrant workers who entered the United States with H-2A visas and harvested and packed tomatoes and performed other agricultural work in Bradley County, Ark., from 2002 to 2007. Plaintiffs alleged that the employers violated the Fair Labor Standards Act (\"FLSA\"), 29 U.S.C. \u00a7 201 et seq. by failing to pay the prevailing wage and overtime wages, and not reimbursing workers for travel, visa and hiring fees. On May 20, 2011, the Court (Judge Harry F. Barnes) granted summary judgment for the plaintiffs. Later, the parties reached a settlement agreement, and a final version of the agreement was approved by the Court on April 9, 2012, requiring the defendants to pay $1,212,500 in damages and attorney fees to plaintiffs. Defendants breached this agreement and the Court entered judgment against them on September 4, 2013."} {"article": "On August 31, 2010, hourly employees filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California against their employer and its owner/president for violating various federal and state employment and non-discrimination statutes including the Fair Labor Standards Act (\"FLSA\"). Specifically, plaintiffs claimed that defendants failed to pay required minimum and overtime wages, to pay in a timely manner, and to provide accurate wage statements. Plaintiffs also alleged that their employer discriminated against them on the basis of their race and/or alienage by paying them less, failing to pay them overtime, and depriving them of other employment benefits. In addition, plaintiffs accused defendant of committing unfair business practices and fraud. An amended complaint was filed on March 30, 2011, and only maintained the claims under the FLSA and the California Labor Code. The amended complaint did not mention discrimination or plaintiffs' immigration status. Plaintiffs, represented by attorneys at the ACLU of Southern California and private counsel, sought class certification, damages, and injunctive and declaratory relief. According to plaintiffs, defendants required them to work as many as fourteen hours a day without compensating them with mandatory overtime pay. Plaintiffs allege that the defendants created two fraudulent schemes to evade paying plaintiffs the required overtime. On January 28, 2011, the District Court (Judge Percy Anderson) ordered the parties to a settlement conference, but no settlement was reached. On April 18, 2011, the court dismissed the FLSA claims without prejudice per the plaintiffs' submitted stipulation. The parties dismissed the claims to enable plaintiffs to participate in a civil action filed by the U.S. Secretary of the Department of Labor against defendants for FLSA violations. On April 22, 2011, the court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiffs' state law claims because all claims over which the court had original jurisdiction had been dismissed.", "summary": "On August 31, 2010, hourly employees sued their employer under federal and state employment and non-discrimination statutes for requiring plaintiffs to work as many as fourteen hours a day without compensating them with mandatory overtime pay. The plaintiffs dismissed their federal claims in order to participate in a civil action filed by the U.S. Department of Labor against defendants and the court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiffs' state law claims."} {"article": "On December 19, 2013, four immigration detainees of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) filed this class-action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California under 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 2201 against ICE and the Department of Homeland Security. The plaintiffs, represented by the ACLU and private counsel, asked the court for declaratory and injunctive relief, claiming that ICE violated the plaintiffs\u2019 rights under the First and Fifth Amendments and the Immigration and Nationality Act. Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that ICE restricted their access to telephones, contrary to the agency\u2019s National Detention Standards, thereby denying or severely limiting the plaintiffs\u2019 statutory and constitutional rights to retain counsel, to communicate with retained counsel, to gather and present evidence, to obtain a fair hearing, to apply for immigration benefits, and to petition for documents that might help them avoid deportation. The plaintiffs were in ICE custody pending deportation proceedings. Most detainees were geographically isolated from family, courts, and attorneys. As a result, telephone access was critical. Many detainees would qualify for one or more of the several forms of \u201crelief from removal,\u201d but because of ICE policies restricting telephone access many plaintiffs were unnecessarily detained for months. Many were forced to seek multiple continuances while they attempted to gather information and documents to contest their deportation. Others would accept deportation much earlier if they were able to obtain legal consultation over the telephone. The following are examples of the practices restricting telephone access, some of which violated ICE\u2019s own detention standards: Detainees are confined for up to 22 hours a day and are permitted to make calls only during inconsistently scheduled \u201cfree time,\u201d which is often early in the morning or at night. Detainees have no privacy when using telephones. Phone calls from the facilities are prohibitively expensive, especially for indigent detainees. Detainees are completely unable to receive incoming calls. Telephone systems in the facilities disconnect after 15 minutes, or if a recorded greeting begins to play (including voicemail or automated systems requiring the selection of options to reach a live person). Although ICE policy requires that detainees have access to a free-call platform for contacting nonprofit legal services, that platform is often unavailable and usually ineffectual. On April 16, 2014, the district court (Judge Edward M. Chen) granted the plaintiffs\u2019 motion for class certification. 300 F.R.D. 628. Then, on April 28, 2014, the court referred the case to Magistrate Judge Donna M. Ryu for settlement negotiations. Settlement discussions went on for over two years. During that time, the court approved an expansion of the plaintiff class on July 27, 2015. 308 F.R.D. 203. That expansion included detainees at newly-constructed detention facilities in California. The plaintiffs filed a supplemental complaint on August 27, 2015, which included allegations against telephone policies in the new facilities. On March 18, 2016, the court ruled that the detainees had no Sixth Amendment right to counsel, and that the telephone policies did not violate the plaintiffs\u2019 statutory rights to counsel. 171 F. Supp. 3d 961. However, the court allowed the due process and First Amendment claims to proceed. On July 1, 2016, the court granted preliminary approval of the parties\u2019 settlement agreement; on November 18, 2016, the court approved the settlement agreement and awarded attorneys\u2019 fees in the amount of $405,000. With this class-action settlement, restrictions on the detainees\u2019 use of telephones were lifted such that they could make outgoing calls and ultimately obtain legal assistance. The terms of the preliminary settlement agreement included the following:
All Individuals who returned to Mexico pursuant to a Qualifying Voluntary Return between June 1, 2009 and August 28, 2014, and who are described in both paragraphs (a) and (b) of this section: (a) Based on the facts as they existed at the time of his or her Qualifying Voluntary Return, the Individual: (i) Last entered the United States with inspection prior to his or her Qualifying Voluntary Return and satisfied the non-discretionary criteria for submitting an approvable application to adjust status under 8 U.S.C. \u00a7 1255(a), based on a bona fide immediate relative relationship defined in 8 U.S.C. \u00a7 1151(b)(2)(A)(i); (ii) Was the beneficiary of a properly filed Form I-130 Petition for Alien Relative based on a bona fide family relationship, which was pending or approved at the time of the Qualifying Voluntary Return; (iii) Satisfied the non-discretionary criteria to apply for cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. \u00a7 1229b; or (iv) His or her Qualifying Voluntary Return occurred on or after June 15, 2012, and he or she satisfied the non-discretionary criteria for Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (\"DACA\") listed on page one of the June 15, 2012 memorandum from former Secretary of Homeland Security Janet Napolitano; and (b) At the time of application for class membership, the Individual: (i) Is physically present within Mexico; and (ii) Is inadmissible under 8 U.S.C. \u00a7 1182(a)(9)(B), due to his or her Qualifying Voluntary Return**, except that this requirement does not apply to an Individual seeking recognition as Class Member under Paragraph (a)(i) above.**\"Qualifying Voluntary Return\" was defined as \"any Voluntary Return that occurred within the Relevant Area during the period starting June 1, 2009, and ending on the date of the District Court's Preliminary Approval of the Classwide Settlement.\" In exchange for the release of all claims for injunctive and declaratory relief against defendants, the defendants agreed that for a period of 180 days, they would accept applications from class members who wanted to return to the United States. If the application was granted, the class member could physically return to the United States and would be placed in the same position with regard to immigration law and regulation as they were prior to their Qualifying Voluntary Return. The defendants were responsible for class member notification costs up to the lower of 50% of total costs or $150,000, with the class counsel responsible for the remaining amount. Class counsel was awarded $700,000 in attorneys' fees and costs. There has been no action on the docket since April 22, 2016 and the case is likely closed.", "summary": "On June 4, 2013, plaintiffs, natives of Mexico who had agreed to voluntary departure from the United States, filed this class-action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court of the Central District of California under the Immigration and Nationality Act (\"INA\"), 8 U.S.C. \u00a71101, and state law against the acting director of Homeland Security, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (\"CBP\") and Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (\"ICE\"). The plaintiffs alleged that the defendant's agencies in southern California violated INA by coercing plaintiffs into accepting voluntary departure through misstatements, omissions, threats, and/or pressure in violation of defendants' own regulations. The parties settled on March 11, 2015, where defendants agreed to allow applications from the class members that would enable their return to the United States and their legal position prior to acceptance of voluntary departure."} {"article": "In December 2017, the ACLU of Northern California submitted a request to the Department of Homeland Security and Immigration and Customs Enforcement seeking documents related to the agency's use of a private contractor known as G4S Secure Solutions to restrain, process, and transport immigration detainees. G4S had reportedly been involved in instances of assault and neglect against detainees in their custody, including a 2014 incident during which a detainee died. The ACLU specifically sought records regarding the policies and procedures used by G4S and the manner in which the company was awarded its contracts with the government, totaling in excess of $200 million. The agency did not provide the records to the ACLU. On July 10, 2018, the ACLU filed this suit against Immigrations and Customs Enforcement under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) in U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California. The ACLU, represented by private counsel and in-house attorneys, sought declaratory and injunctive relief. Specifically, they sought an order directing the defendant to release the requested records; a declaration that the defendant's refusal to provide the records was illegal; and attorneys' fees. The case was assigned to Magistrate Judge Laura Beeler. The parties began filing case management updates shortly after filing the suit. Magistrate Judge Beeler put a minute entry into the record on March 8, 2019 asking the plaintiffs to provide a narrowed version of their FOIA request within a week. Subsequent case management statements showed that the plaintiffs submitted a narrower request within the deadline, though a June 13, 2019 case management statement from the ACLU indicated that the plaintiffs were concerned that the defendants would not process the revised requests in a timely manner. On June 26, 2019, the court received notice of a possibly related case from G4S, Liborio Ramos v. G4S Secure Solutions, 19-cv-02757 in N.D. Cal. This new case was filed by a private citizen represented by the ACLU alleging assault, battery, negligence, and negligent infliction of emotional distress in ICE custody via G4S. The defendants resisted relating the two cases, but Magistrate Judge Beeler filed an order relating the two cases on July 8, 2019. Document production continued after the cases were combined. In a September 26, 2019 case management conference, Magistrate Judge Beeler ordered the defendant to increase production of documents from 500 a month to 750 a month. COVID-19 moved document production and further case management conferences online in late March. A May 7, 2020 case management report shows difficulty in getting monthly document productions over to the plaintiffs in March and April, but the defendants promised to work with the plaintiffs to figure out the cause of the issue. Production is ongoing.", "summary": "On July 10, 2018, the ACLU of Northern California filed this FOIA suit against U.S. Immigrations and Customs Enforcement. The plaintiff sought records pursuant to a FOIA request about the defendant's use of a contractor to process and transport immigration detainees, some of whom had allegedly suffered injury and death due to the contractor's malfeasance. The plaintiff sought an order from the court that the defendant provide the records. This case was combined with a suit from a private plaintiff alleging mistreatment in ICE and G4S custody in July 2019. Document production appears to be continuing smoothly at a rate of 750 pages per month, but shifting production online due to COVID-19 has yielded some issues in getting documents over to the plaintiff. Document production is ongoing."} {"article": "COVID-19 Summary: This is a lawsuit brought by the State of California regarding the July 2020 release of ICE regulations which, in effect, meant that students on F-1 visas would risk deportation if their school shifted to online learning. In a different lawsuit filed against the administration over the same July directive, plaintiffs met with counsel for the government and worked to get the regulations rescinded. In order to effectuate the rescission, ICE removed the guidance from its website and replaced it with the previous guidance and as a result, plaintiffs withdrew their motion for a preliminary injunction. California continued to monitor the alterations ICE made to its website between July and September and filed a notice of voluntary dismissal on October 19, 2020.